Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor Leste (International Peacekeeping)

Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor Leste

Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor Leste

By

Louise Olsson

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Olsson, Louise, 1973Gender equality and United Nations peace operations in Timor Leste / by Louise Olsson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-04-17549-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. United Nations—Peacekeeping forces—East Timor. 2. Women and peace. 3. Peace-building—East Timor. 4. East Timor—Politics and government. I. Title. JZ6374.O446 2009 341.5’84—dc22 2009016015

ISSN 1380-748X ISBN 978 90 04 17549 5 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

To my family

CONTENTS Foreword ..................................................................................... Acknowledgments ....................................................................... Abbreviations ..............................................................................

xi xv xvii

PART I

SETTING THE STAGE 1. Introduction ............................................................................ 1.1 What we need to know ................................................ 1.2 Why Timor-Leste? ........................................................ 1.3 Overview of study ........................................................ 2. Creating a Framework ........................................................... 2.1 Positioning the basic ideas ........................................... 2.2 Understanding gender power-relations ........................ Gender power-relations ................................................ Dimensions of gender power-relations ........................ 2.3 What causes change in gender power-relations? ........ The context of armed conflict ...................................... A peace operation intervenes ....................................... 2.4 Conclusions ...................................................................

3 5 9 11 13 15 18 18 22 27 28 32 46

PART II

INTO THE FIELD IN TIMOR-LESTE 3. Prologue ................................................................................. 3.1 Focus of description ..................................................... Sources and information .............................................. 3.2 Overview of time-period and operations .................... 4. Context of conflict: Timor-Leste 1975–1999 ...................... 4.1 Timorese parties and gender power-relations ............. 4.2 Conflict and gender power-relations ............................ 4.3 The Timor-Leste conflict and the UN ........................

51 51 52 54 59 59 65 69

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CONTENTS

5. Peace operations intervene 1999–2006 ................................ 5.1 The mandate and structure of UN operations ............ Security versus politics? UNTAET peacekeeping and peacebuilding ................................................................ 5.2 UN operation policy and Timorese security ............... Establishing security through military means ............. Handling the old and new military of Timor-Leste .... Creating internal security ............................................ Creating insecurity?—The behavior of UN peace-operation personnel ........................................... 5.3 UN operation policy and Timorese politics ................ Administrating a state .................................................. Organizing democratic elections .................................. Building government .....................................................

73 73 83 85 86 91 98 107 112 113 120 133

PART III

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 6. The framework at work ........................................................ 6.1 Advancing gender power-relations .............................. Political Equality .......................................................... Security Equality ........................................................... Conclusions ................................................................... 6.2 How peace operations affect gender power-relations . Awareness in implementation ....................................... Handling local military ................................................ Local cooperation ......................................................... Personnel behavior ....................................................... Gender-balanced composition ...................................... Operation leadership .................................................... Conclusions ................................................................... 6.3 Are these effects unique for Timor-Leste? ................. 7. The contributions ................................................................... 7.1 What we have learned? ................................................ 7.2 Where do we go from here? .......................................

143 143 144 147 153 154 154 159 160 162 163 165 167 170 177 177 181

List of interviews ....................................................................... Bibliography ...............................................................................

187 189

CONTENTS

ix

FIGURE Figure 1: UN Operations in Timor-Leste June 1999 to March 2006 ............................................................................

57

TABLES Table Table Table Table Table

1: 2: 3: 4: 5:

Level of political equality Oct. 1999–Mar. 2006 ..... Est. level of violence 1975–Sept. 1999 .................... Est. level of protection 1975–Sept. 1999 .................. Est. level of violence Oct. 1999–Mar. 2006 ............ Est. level of protection Oct. 1999–Mar. 2006 ..........

146 148 149 150 151

FOREWORD I first came into contact with the issue of women, men and peace operations in early February 1999 when I was asked to write a background paper for a workshop to be held in Uppsala later that spring. The background for the workshop was rather typical of gender issues at that time. The UN-led project “Mainstreaming a gender perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations” had got stuck in the UN system due to internal disputes. The project was consequently moved to Uppsala by the head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s Lessons Learned Unit (today the Best Practice Unit), Mr. Leonardo Kapungu. In a meeting held at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in Uppsala in March 1999, he stated that he would never have guessed that the topic of “women and peace operations” was such a minefield. Going into the project, he had rather expected a calm and slowly progressing process. Now, instead, Kapungu found himself stuck but under great pressure by the financing Governments (primarily Sweden and Norway) to move the project forward. As a solution, he therefore asked if the Department could arrange the first workshop. Thus, together with the Dag Hammarskjold Chair of Peace and Conflict Research, Peter Wallensteen, and Ylva Blondel (who was to handle the preparation of workshop itself), I became part of this process. Being fresh out of university in 1999, I was fascinated to observe how policy was created in a process going from a vision to more focused and concrete arguments. That is, a vision that had caveats. The inclusion of an “a” before gender perspective, it turned out, was meant to underline the fact that the project could only deal with women, no other gender related issues, for example, sensitive issues relating to homosexuality. Moreover, starting the writing process of the background report, it soon became apparent that the research and policy field was much underdeveloped. I could only find one article (by Judith Hicks Stiehm) comparing the operations in Cambodia and Namibia, one policy paper by the UN on the issue and scattered arguments in a multitude of documents. Thus, I had to start identifying which issues which were central in the ongoing debate in order to write the workshop background paper. The main themes

xii

FOREWORD

were similar then as now. The first concerned women’s representation and participation within the UN operations – on all levels and with all forms of assignments. Then as today, the number remains low, particularly in decision-making or in the military components. The second theme concerned including local women in the work for peace and recognizing women’s contribution to peace processes. The third theme concerned ensuring that the work of an operation was gender mainstreamed in order for it to include women’s situation and needs along with those of men. The policy of gender mainstreaming had been adopted by the Social and Economic Council in 1997 and the process to consider this in peace operations was just beginning with the appointment of the first gender advisers. The main issues were women’s security as well as to cater for women’s needs in humanitarian or peacebuilding work. The fourth, and final, theme had to do with negative behavior of peacekeepers and peace operation personnel in terms of decreasing violence, abuse and use of local women. The Uppsala workshop – with participants such as J. Ann Tickner and Angela King – held in June 1999 discussed these issues and kicked off the process within the UN. The next step in the process was a UN seminar, held in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2000. Namibia was selected as a suitable place to meet as it celebrated 10 years of independence that year, having become independent under UN auspices. Judith Hicks Stiehm had been appointed as responsible researcher and I and two others wrote case-studies, drawing lessons from previous operations. My focus was on the Namibian and Cambodian operations and the other two reports were on Bosnia-Herzegovina and South Africa. The workshop was organized by the Lessons Learned Unit. During the seminar – with participants like Nina Lahoud, Dorota Gierycz, Sherrill Whittington, Dame Margaret Joan Anstee and several Namibian Government representatives – some of the most knowledgeable and influential women in the UN decided that they did not want to see another seminar ending with just another report. So, they sat down one evening and wrote a document that collected all the current knowledge in the area. They then presented this to the seminar which strongly supported the document. This document was then called “The Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action”. As a document written by UN employees and externals would not be recognized by the UN, they thereafter asked the Namibian Government if they would be willing to present this to the General Assembly which they agreed to do.

FOREWORD

xiii

They also asked the Namibian Government, which was to chair the Security Council later that year, to bring up the issue in the Council, which it did. This process contributed to what was to become UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”, taken in October 2000. After being part of the policy development up to mid-2000, I then turned to examining the topic from a scientific point of view. Working in parallel with the political process, however, it has been fascinating to see what has happened with the issue area in the years that has passed. The topics of women’s participation and inclusion of women’s situations and needs are still being introduced into more and more arenas – recently the EU and NATO – and the work still faces many of the same problems as it did in 1999. Unfortunately, we also still continue to see cases of negative behavior by peace operation personnel even if we now know that civilian personnel constitute a substantial part of the problem. All is not negative, however, as we finally saw a follow up resolution in 2008 – Security Council Resolution 1820(2008) – that sharpens the formulations of Resolution 1325 in many areas, foremost that on sexual violence against women. In addition, we have by now a much more developed knowledge of women and men’s roles and situations during armed conflict and the gender constructions and ideas that underlie inequality. However, while research on gender and peacekeeping has developed, peace operation research considering how men and women’s separate situations can play into the ability to conduct peace operations have not progressed to the same degree. This is the starting point of this book. As such, it also touches on the issues of the feminist debate and the issues underlying resolution 1325 but chooses to study the questions from the view of the operation. That is, what does a peace operation mean for men and women of the host populations given their unequal starting points? More specifically, under what conditions do operations create a more equal peace, or, at least, how can they avoid contributing to more inequality? Being inspired by these questions that underlie the policy debate, this book builds on existing research and policy discussions to create a systematic and structured study of how peace operations affect the power-relations between men and women of the host state. Uppsala, December 2008 Louise Olsson

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When writing this book, I have received both practical assistance and many constructive inputs from a number of people. This has been crucial. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to all those who have helped me in this process, and mention a few in particular. Every project has a beginning and in a sense one could say that this came when I as an undergraduate student became fascinated by research methodology. For getting me interested in research, and for invaluable guidance on designing projects in combination with selfless and instructive inputs on the writing process, I will always be very grateful to Mats Hammarström. I would never have been able to practice this interest in research without Peter Wallensteen whom I wish to thank for continuously supporting the project, giving me of his time and knowledge and for promoting the book. A very large thank-you also goes to Thomas Ohlson and to Mary-Jane Fox for many constructive suggestions; to Kjell-Åke Nordquist who was a source of information and assistance for the field-work in Timor-Leste; and to Desirée Nilsson and Kristine Höglund for their insightful comments on the manuscript. I am also grateful to Roxanna, Isak, Anders, Anna, Mimmi, Marga, Karen, and Erika for reading and commenting on drafts of the texts, and to all those at the Department’s research seminar who have been sources of comments and suggestions throughout the project. I also want to express a very warm thank-you to Gudrun Ersson, Anders Gustafsson and Johan Liljeros without whom this book never would have been written. I consider myself very lucky to have been a part of the constructive environment in Uppsala. I want to express my gratitude to Hylke Faber and Nienke BrienenMoolenaar at Brill Publishers, the Swedish Research Council for financing parts of this research project, and to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, both in Stockholm and New York, for providing much needed assistance, particularly Gerd Johnsson-Latham, Jessica Olausson and Prudence Woodford-Berger. I also want to say a warm thank-you to the administration at the Department who has helped me with all the practical aspects of the project, and to everyone who has assisted me at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

xvi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During my travels to collect information and get input, many people outside the Department have provided crucial insights as well as practical help. Visiting Timor-Leste and the United Nations in New York, I was deeply impressed with the work conducted by Timorese and international staff in the peace operations. I wish to thank the interviewees and all others who took of their valuable time to provide me with much useful help and information—particularly to Vicenta Guterres, Sofia Ospina, Nina Lahoud, Comfort Lamptey, Jennifer Laakso, Anne Brown, and Michael Stone. I want to express a thank-you to Edward Rees for providing me with much information, helping me with my field-work, and for commenting on sections of my text. I would further like to thank everyone who has given comments on the project at seminars, conferences, and other research visits, particularly Karen Karamé, Inger Skjelsbaek, Torunn Tryggestad, Peter Burgess, Mary Caprioli, Cynthia Enloe, Richard Caplan and all at the University of Queensland who were so hospitable and helpful during my research visit to Brisbane. Finally, on a personal note, I would like to say that the research process has been an intriguing though not always easy journey, both on a personal and professional level. The largest thank you therefore goes to my family—my mother, father and brother—without whom I could never have written this book and to my friends who has given me positive encouragement and support throughout this inspiring but lengthy writing process. From it, I have also learned an important lesson, useful for most situations. This can pointedly be summed up in a typical quote by Terry Pratchett for when one of his characters is faced with a specific problem: “The important thing, Vimes told himself, is not to shout at this point. Do not . . . what do they call it . . . go spare? Treat this as a learning exercise. Find out why the world is not as you thought it was. Assemble the facts, digest the information, consider the implications. Then go spare. But with precision” (Pratchett 2005, 70). July 2008, Louise Olsson

ABBREVIATIONS CAVR CEDAW

Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CIVPOL International Civilian Police CNRT National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration F-FDTL East Timor Defense Forces ETTA East Timor Transitional Administration FALINTIL Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor FRAP Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IMF International Monetary Fund INTERFET International Force in East Timor IOM International Organization for Migration KFOR Kosovo Force NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NC National Council (the reformed NCC) NCC National Consultative Council PNLT East Timor Police Force RESPECT Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-Combatants and Communities in East Timor SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General UDT Timorese Democratic Union UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

PART I

SETTING THE STAGE

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION During the same time that United Nations peace missions were becoming more numerous and more complex, the UN also began devoting more serious attention to women and to gender issues. The UN had long been committed to the principle of “gender equality” and throughout the 1990s, the language of United Nations pronouncements began to include a commitment to promoting “gender balance” in all professional posts and the adoption of a strategy called “gender mainstreaming,” which envisioned an assessment of the distinct implications for women and men of all planned UN actions, legislation, policies, and programs. These commitments to gender equality, balance, and mainstreaming were intended to include the areas of armed conflict, security, and peace operations (Whitworth 2004, 119).

United Nations peace operations—neutral third-party interventions which can include peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments—are mainly focused on establishing security and assisting in the creation of institutions to handle conflict.1 On the surface, this does not appear to affect internal power-relations. The opinion that operations should not meddle in the affairs of the host state is also deep-seated. In spite of appearances and opinions, however, it has been observed that operations, particularly those with substantial mandates, in reality have directly affected internal power dynamics. This observation has resulted in a growing number of scholarly works aiming to increase our understanding of how a peace operation actually affects the powerrelations in the host state. Research in this area is important, as it

1 This is a concept under debate (see, for example, Challenges Project 2002; Fetherston 1994, 153; Paris 2004, 18; United Nations 2000b). Stephen Ryan points out that with the development of a second generation of operations (compared to the first which only contained military peacekeeping assignments), it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Particularly as UN missions carry out peacebuilding assignments under the title of peacekeeping (Ryan 2000, 39). With this development, ‘peacekeeping’ had become used both as a collective term (for operations including both peacekeeping and peacebulding assignments), and to signify a particular assignment theme in an operation. In this project, the term ‘peace operation’ is used, as it is a more comprehensive term than ‘peacekeeping’ operation.

4

CHAPTER ONE

can contribute to an avoidance of “unintended negative consequences” (Hampson 2001, 400). A particularly under-researched, but very pertinent, power-relation which is frequently and unintentionally affected by peace operations is that between men and women in the host state, that is, gender power-relations. As a lucid illustration, Igballe Rogova, Program Director of the Motrat Qiriazi (Kosova Women’s Network) states that the United Nations Mission in Kosovo brought a different form of patriarchy to the area by excluding women from politics, and by enforcing ‘ancient’ laws that had previously not been practiced. According to Rogova, prior to the UN mission, many women had been active in the politics of the parallel society organized by the Kosovar as a response to Serbia’s excluding policies. This was not recognized by the UN operation (Rogova 2003). The result was that the UN—unintentionally—might have affected political equality in Kosovo by decreasing women’s participation in politics compared to that of men. A more generally recognized form of effect can be observed in the United Nations operation in Cambodia, 1992–93. This operation has become notorious for how peace-operation personnel behaved in relation to local women. In particular, negative behavior, such as sexual violence and harassment by operation personnel, was reported to have decreased Cambodian women’s security compared to that of men (Arnvig 1994; Whitworth 2004). With the preamble of the United Nations Charter stressing equality and respect of human rights, cases such as these places the UN in a difficult position, affecting its own credibility and legitimacy. This book argues that expanding our inquiry of peace operations to incorporate their effects on gender power-relations produces a more detailed understanding of peace operations and their contribution to peace. A twofold gap in previous research is identified. Firstly, there is a need to enhance our ability to trace changes in the access to power between men and women by developing the concept of ‘gender power-relations’. Secondly, but equally important, there is a need to systematically explore effects of peace operations for gender powerrelations. The purpose of this book is therefore to contribute to theory building on both the use of the gender power-relations concept, and on how peace operations affect these power-relations between men and women. To accomplish this, the study systematizes ideas and suggestions from previous research in an analytical framework and uses this in the analysis of the case of Timor-Leste.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

5

WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW

In order to fill the identified research gaps regarding both gender power-relations and how a peace operation affects these powerrelations, this book begins by formulating an analytical framework. The point of departure is the growing research on effects of peace operations on the local power context. Research on power-relations between men and women has hitherto been dominated by feminist research (Agathangelou and Ling 2003; Cockburn and Zarkov 2002; Higate and Henry 2004; Hudson 2005b; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005; Otto 1999; Whitworth 1998; Whitworth 2004). Although ‘feminism’ is usually viewed as a separate tradition, some of its ideas and suggestions will be used in this project which, in contrast, has a mainstream-based approach to research.2 The first gap in our current knowledge is addressed by refining the conceptualization of the power-relations between men and women by formulating the concept of ‘gender power-relations’. This concept analytically captures the relative access to power between men and women. The usefulness of this lies in the ability to trace fine-grained variation in the power balance. Additionally, it is imperative to formulate additional analytical tools in this area as many current concepts and terms are laden with strong normative and political connotations, if not being outright misunderstood. ‘Gender’, for example, is often mistakenly understood as equaling ‘women’.3 This particular study is instead interested in gender power-relations as one example of a power-relation within a state. To enable an exploration of variation, the power component of gender power-relations is understood as a

2 The main difference between ‘mainstream research’ and ‘feminist research’ is the latter’s expressed focus on women, and that the epistemological standpoint of feminist research differs from that of mainstream research. Ann J. Tickner, in her 2006 ISA presidential address, states that: “Feminists in all disciplines have been acutely aware of the relationship between knowledge and power and the ways that traditional knowledge has been constructed in the interest of the powerful. Feminist scholarship has emerged from a deep skepticism about knowledge that, even though it claims to be universal and objective, is not. In reality, such knowledge is usually partial, created by men, and based on men’s lives.” (Tickner 2006). See the section, Positioning the basic ideas, for further discussions of how previous research is utilized in this particular project. 3 This is considered a common mistake, dependent on the origin of the concepts as a method to bring also women’s situation into research (Kuper and Kuper 1996, 327–329).

6

CHAPTER ONE

divisible resource. When access to power in gender power-relations is considered as a question of degrees, it enables a more detailed tracing of effects as smaller variation in access to power becomes visible. Consequently, the normatively sensitive term ‘equality’ should here be understood simply as a practical tool to capture the balance of power in the relations. If the power-relation were symmetrical, there would be ‘equality’. In this respect, gender power-relations is a development of the understanding of equality in Mary Caprioli et al. (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Melander 2005a; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003),4 differing from the general feminist understanding of power as a patriarchal structure. The design of this project thereby allows for a more open question of how operations affect gender power-relations (instead of being limited to examining how they uphold ‘patriarchy’). This book focuses on two dimensions of gender power-relations— political equality and security equality—where we primarily expect effects of peace operations. Political equality relates to the level of participation of men and women in politics, and is an established understanding of access to power in this dimension. Security equality, on the other hand, is a new concept developed in this study. This term is inspired by discussions in previous research showing that apart from men and women being targets (in degrees) of different forms of violence, protection from violence also varies. To capture this dynamic, security equality is understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. The second gap that this book addresses is the need to systematically explore effects of peace operations on gender power-relations. This is an even more underdeveloped research area than that on gender power-relations. To begin tackling this gap, ideas and suggestions from previous research for how an operation can affect gender power-relations is structured and developed. Six factors are identified as particularly fruitful: awareness in implementation, handling local military, local cooperation, personnel behavior, gender-balanced composition, and operation leadership.

4 In these studies, however, the difference in access to power between men and women is the independent variable. That is, they examine the effect of equality on conflict.

INTRODUCTION

7

The first factor, awareness in implementation, identifies that failure to consider the difference in situation for men and women (i.e. the gender specificity) of the host population, results in deteriorating gender power-relations (i.e. the relation becomes more unequal). The second factor—handling local military—and the third—local cooperation—more specifically concern how an operation might affect the local power dynamic to men’s, or women’s, advantage. The role of the military is particularly identified as affecting political equality. The focus on local cooperation lies in operations may affect the internal power distribution when including, or excluding, local cooperation partners. If these three factors are more general, the last three are more concrete. The fourth factor, personnel behavior, is a frequently appearing feature in research, policy, and the media in terms of negative behavior toward local women. Cases of rape, sexual violence, harassment of local women and sexual exploitation have repeatedly made headlines, contributing to UN policy to combat the problem.5 Within this particular study, such negative behavior is expected to affect security equality by decreasing local women’s security compared to that of local men. The fifth factor, gender-balanced composition, is less debated outside the UN, where it is primarily understood in terms of discrimination of female UN staff. In this framework, however, the focus is on how the ratio of male/female UN staff can affect gender power-relations. The balance is stated to have both direct and indirect effects. The reason for the direct effect is that women are stated to be less prone to seek, or get, assistance if an operation is completely male-dominated. This is particularly relevant for lawand-order assignments, thereby affecting security equality. Indirectly, the gender balance is stated both to affect gender roles through the examples set by operation-staff behavior, and to display the importance attributed to equality by the operation. These more symbolic features can support, or undermine, local work for increased equality. The sixth, and last, peace-operation factor is operation leadership, 5 Negative personnel behavior is an area particularly researched by feminist scholars, mainly considering it a problem caused by the military component. This research relates negative behavior primarily to the construction of masculinity within the military. Apart from direct violence, this research is wider and includes the contribution of peace operations to the increase in the sex industry in negative behavior (Agathangelou and Ling 2003; Fetherston 1995; Higate and Henry 2004; Otto 1999; Whitworth 1998; Whitworth 2004).

8

CHAPTER ONE

which is deemed central for implementation. The leadership can enforce gender specificity, that is, an adaptation to the situation for both men and women, thereby ensuring that implementation is not biased to men’s advantage. The leadership can even choose to support improved gender power-relations in line with the UN policy of gender mainstreaming. The leadership may, however, also contribute to negative effects if it considers gender specificity irrelevant, and fails to address negative personnel behavior. Despite fundamental differences between mainstream research on peace operations and feminist research, they have in common the assumption that when a peace operation intervenes, it does so in an already existing local power context. Three potentially relevant ‘contextual’ factors are therefore identified: participatory ratio in the conflict, focus groups for equality, and the ideology of male-dominated parties.6 When addressing these gaps in previous research, it is central to consider an established empirical fact: All current operations intervene in states with asymmetrical gender power-relations, that is, inequality. Empirically, men (as a total in a given state) have in all states the world over better access to power and other resources than women (as a total in the same given state).7 It is only in the degree of how imbalanced the access to power is, that differs between countries. This means that regardless of which country that an operation intervenes in, gender power-relations will have an initial ‘negative’ value. That is, every country has a certain degree of inequality to men’s advantage. The correct question to ask is, thus, whether gender power-relations

6 The second contextual factor, focus groups for equality, is often discussed in terms of women’s organizations in previous research. The argument here, however, is that a focus group should be understood as an organization working for a specific political question. The term ‘women’s organizations’ is therefore not suitable for the purpose of this research project because a) women’s organizations do not necessarily work for equality, and b) men’s organizations working for improved equality would fall outside the categorization. Focus groups for equality is therefore a more accurate term for this study. 7 This observation is built on the fact that there are no states where either the gender-development index, or the gender-empowerment index, is 1,00 (that is, complete equal access to power and resources for both men and women). See the UNDP Human Development Index from (1995) and forward. Naturally, that does not say anything of dual relationships between individual women and individual men in a given state. On that analytical level, other factors such as ethnicity and class are important.

INTRODUCTION

9

deteriorate (become more unequal) or improve (become more equal) as an effect of operations? 1.2

WHY TIMOR-LESTE?

When we have systematized our existing knowledge into an analytical framework, this book uses an in-depth study both to develop the gender power-relations concept and to systematically explore effects of peace operations on these power-relations. Since the purpose is to achieve improved systematized knowledge of how such effects are generated,8 an in-depth case study is especially useful. As Andrew Bennett notes, in-depth studies are particularly suitable if theory is incomplete and data being in short supply (Bennett 2001, 1513). As we have already discussed, theory is underdeveloped in this area. As for data, there is only limited, and not easily accessible, genderspecific information that can be collected. The latter fact drastically increases the time and cost of identifying and collecting existing material and further supports the selection of the qualitative methodological approach. Timor-Leste and the UN operations there during June 1999 to March 2006 have been determined to be the best starting point for developing the analytical framework and obtaining knowledge of the usefulness of the approach. As we do not know the value or form of either dimension of gender power-relations or how and by what they are affected when we begin this study, we have no knowledge of variation in effects which could guide a strategic selection of the

8 That is, to generate blocks for theory-building. To help us in our study, this project structures ideas and suggestions from previous research into an analytical framework. This framework is then used to guide the empirical section. In practical terms, this means that the description in the in-depth study can revolve around the ideas outlined in the analytical framework. That use of the framework for the in-depth study provides focus while still allowing for the description to identify additional factors as well as to refine existing ones. In effect, this limits the risk of excluding competing explanations, and helps to achieve a better understanding of events. This study would therefore come closest to the form of in-depth study used to develop and evaluate the fruitfulness of a certain approach. In that sense, the study will exist between the open intensive study, and the variable focused extensive study. See Harry Eckstein (1975, 81) for a discussion on the use of in-depth studies for this purpose. To select this form of in-depth method decreases costs and enables a more fruitful use of collected material than, for example, an unstructured and open in-depth study would bring at this stage.

10

CHAPTER ONE

most suitable material. In the debate on the use of in-depth studies for theory building (see, for example, George and Bennett 2005; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), such a strategic selection appears to be preferred. Academic advancement of a topic where both the dependent (gender power-relations) and the independent variables (peace-operation factors) are under-researched in combination with information being very scarce and costly is not covered to the same extent. On the contrary, access to extensive information and knowledge of variation among cases seem to be taken as a given. The choice of Timor-Leste operations 1999–2006 is instead based on what is generally known about UN peace operations to optimize the theorybuilding objective of this new research area. From 1948 to 2004, the UN deployed 58 peace operations, 17 of these in intrastate conflicts (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005). The majority of operations were only mandated for peacekeeping assignments, as peacebuilding has been primarily included in the post-Cold War era. This means that the size of the operation mandates varies among the operations. In addition, there is a difference in degrees of decisionmaking power of the operations vis-à-vis the local parties between interventions. Depending on these variations in mandate scope and decision-making power, it is fruitful to think about operations as existing on a scale from low impact to high impact. The operations where we would expect to find the most substantial and varied effects would therefore be operations with transitional authority: large-scale operations for a short time practicing independent power. This form of operation has, for example, been set up in Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why, then, would Timor-Leste and the UN operations there be particularly fruitful for developing knowledge of gender power-relations and consequences of peace operations? UN operations in Timor-Leste are, in fact, a series of operations. The first had a limited electoral mandate and was launched in June 1999. This operation was followed by a large-scale peacekeeping operation, the peacekeeping mandate of which was taken over by the most substantial operation, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (from October 1999 to May 2002). In addition to peacekeeping, this operation had a substantial number of peacebuilding assignments in its mandate. After this operation, the influence and mandate of the two following operations were gradually reduced until March 2006, when the description and focus of this study ends. Concisely, the UN operations in

INTRODUCTION

11

Timor-Leste 1999–2006 include operations of varying mandates, from inclusive to limited, and with both peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments. Operations also display a large and varied composition of personnel, and a varying degree of influence (from low in 1999, very high 1999–2002, and declining from 2002 to 2006). This chain of operations therefore offers interesting variation of operation factors while keeping many other factors constant. 1.3

OVERVIEW OF STUDY

The research project is divided into three parts. The first part, Setting the Stage, formulates the analytical framework which will then enable us to increase our knowledge by structuring our ideas and then guiding our exploration of Timor-Leste. The first section, Positioning the basic ideas, handles the difference between the two utilized research fields—mainstream and feminist research—to clarify how the framework should be understood The second section, Understanding gender power-relations, organizes and develops the concept of gender powerrelations to enhance our ability to trace changes in the power balance between men and women. The section clarifies the distinction between gender power-relations and the concepts used in feminist research. Two dimensions of gender power-relations, political equality and security equality, where we primarily expect effects of peace operations, are then outlined. Finally, the study asks, What causes change in gender power-relations? This section systematizes suggestions on potentially relevant peace-operation factors, and considers competing explanations under contextual factors. Previous research is even more under-developed in this area but to enhance our knowledge, it utilizes research on peace operations to structure the framework. More gender-specific insights are generated from feminist research. The second part, Into the Field in Timor-Leste, observes the intention to decrease the twofold gap in previous research on gender powerrelations and peace-operation factors, and that the description needs to serve this dual purpose. After a general introduction to provide the reader with an overview, the part begins with the chapter ‘Context of conflict’. This chapter presents developments in relation to the TimorLeste conflict 1975–1999. The description in this chapter is relevant for two reasons: Firstly, it provides us with more detailed material to understand and develop the concept of gender power-relations;

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CHAPTER ONE

secondly, it establishes how these power-relations had developed under conflict, which increases the possibility of separating operation effects from those of contextual factors. The chapter also describes the international context relevant for how the future operations came to be organized. The following chapter, ‘Peace operations intervene’, continues to describe developments relevant for understanding gender power-relations while identifying and tracing effects on these powerrelations from UN peace operations in Timor-Leste from June 1999 until March 2006.9 After ironing out the general structure of the operations, focus in this chapter is directed at the creation of security from violence and building political structures, areas where we would expect to find more detailed suggestions for theory building. The sections UN operation policy and Timorese security, and UN operation policy and Timorese politics, therefore go into more detail in these central areas. The third, and final, part of the research project, Putting the Pieces Together, draws out what we have learned of the developments in Timor-Leste based on the analytical framework. The first part of the chapter, The framework at work, is called Advancing gender powerrelations. This assesses and develops the concept of gender powerrelations, primarily on how to understand and measure variation in the two dimensions of political and security equality. The section particularly considers the development of the new security-equality dimension. The second section, How peace operations affect gender power-relations, centers on the identified peace-operation factors while in relation to these considering relevant contextual factors. Just as under the section on the gender power-relations concept, the study develops the suggested factors and determines the respective use of them for understanding variation in gender power-relations. The last section finally asks, Are these effects unique for Timor-Leste? This section broadens the scope from the particular setting in Timor-Leste to a more general one by observing effects from other operations. The research project is thereafter brought to a close in the ‘the contributions’ which summarizes what we have learned as well as considers where we go from here in both research and policy.

9

That is, events taking place within the Timor-Leste territory.

CHAPTER TWO

CREATING A FRAMEWORK The purpose of this book is to contribute to expanding our systematic knowledge of effects of peace operations and gender power-relations, that is, to build theory.1 To realize the theory-building purpose, this project has to fill the gaps pertaining to both our understanding of gender power-relations and the effects of peace operations. That is, both the concepts and their potential relationships must be clarified. As a first step to build theory, suggestions and ideas from previous research are organized into an analytical framework.2 The study will then assess and develop this framework in the analysis of TimorLeste. This chapter structures previous research into the analytical framework. The first section, ‘Positioning the basic ideas’, outlines the differences between the two utilized research fields—mainstream and feminist research—to clarify how the framework should be understood. To address the gaps identified in mainstream research on peace operations, this project draws on gender-specific suggestions from feminist research. Because of the differences between mainstream and feminist research, however, utilizing feminist suggestions in a mainstream-based framework requires a clarification. The second section, ‘Understanding gender power-relations’, organizes and develops the concept of gender power-relations to enhance our ability to trace changes in the power balance between men and women. The section clarifies the distinction between gender powerrelations and the concepts used in feminist research. In addition, it advances our current use of equality within the mainstream literature on armed conflict and its resolution. Two dimensions of gender power-relations are then identified to be of the greatest importance for this project: political equality and security equality. It is in these dimensions we primarily expect peace operations to have effects.

In the view of this project, a theory consists of identified relationships between clearly defined concepts. This can be used to deduce reliable, valid, and falsifiable, propositions corresponding to empirical facts (Eckstein 1975, 86–90). 2 See Harry Eckstein (1975, 86). 1

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The third section focuses on the question ‘What causes change in gender power-relations?’ This section systematizes suggestions on potentially relevant peace-operation factors, and considers competing explanations. Previous research is even more under-developed in this area than for gender power-relations. Mainstream research has continuously progressed, providing an increasingly detailed understanding of the different components of peace operations, their use, and their effects on conflict resolution.3 However, as mainstream research does not differentiate between the situation for men and women, this limits its applicability. More gender-specific insights are instead generated from feminist research. Previous feminist research has developed around two themes. The first focuses primarily on equality within operations, and consequences of operation characteristics for local women. This approach is more empirical, and, in Sandra Whitworth’s perspective, uses gender as a tool to better understand and improve operations. The second research theme focuses on norms, ideologies/cultures, and gender constructions. Masculinity and militarism are central elements. Despite fundamental differences between mainstream research on peace operations and feminist research, they have in common the assumption that when a peace operation intervenes, it does so in an already existing local power context. This observation is not least important when using an in-depth approach, where the analysis of the material will have to rely, to some extent, on contra-factual considerations. That is, what would have happened if peace had been established without a peace operation? To reduce the risk that context-induced consequences are mistaken for effects of operation factors, and to identify relevant contextual factors, the section on what causes gender power-relations to vary begins with a discussion on potential contextual factors in previous research. 3 This literature is wide and encompassing (see Challenges Project 2002; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001; Diehl 1997a; Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fetherston 1994; Fetherston 2000; Otunnu and Doyle 1998; Paris 1997; Paris 2001a; Paris 2001b; Paris 2004; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002; Thakur and Schnabel 2001; Woodhouse, Bruce, and Dando 1998). Research has contributed to the continuous debate on peace operations in the UN (Eide et al. 2005; United Nations 2000b). In addition, critical research on peace operations has grown. Researchers have, for example, critiqued what they perceive as operations not being adapted to the local context, the interference of contributing states’ self-interests, and the lack of a developed plan for what the UN should accomplish with its peacebuilding and state-building assignments; see, for example, David Chandler (2001; 2006).

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

2.1

15

POSITIONING THE BASIC IDEAS

In order to successfully incorporate ideas and suggestions from feminism into a mainstream-based framework, the differences between the two research fields need to be carefully considered. In particular, it is necessary to take into account that the two fields differ in regard to the basic aims of research, methods, and, not least, epistemological standpoints. With regard to the basic aims of research, the purpose of much mainstream research on peace operations is to understand, evaluate, and improve the ability of operations to create peace. In contrast, feminist research aims primarily to problematize and question the basis of operations through a critical discussion. Attention is directed at the reasons behind negative and harmful effects of operations, understood as upholding inequality (between men and women, and between states within the global system). Therefore, many feminist studies stretch more broadly and generally over a spectrum of interrelated causes and effects (though not formulated in that manner), where the causal direction is often not specified. What nevertheless makes feminist research useful for this particular project is the intention in feminism to contribute to emancipation. With this intention in feminist research, it naturally focuses on effects on the local population (though primarily the female half ). For that reason, feminist research provides a different range of insights than those provided by mainstream peace-operation research. The difference in basic aims is reflected in the methods used by mainstream and feminist research. For this project, it is a complication that a) the two fields do not share a view on the level of analysis, b) there are no commonly agreed definitions of concepts, and c) there is no mutual understanding of how to measure effects and causal direction. Although there are weaknesses in (often policy-influenced) mainstream peace-operation research, it is primarily feminist research that, for the purposes of this project, is too vague to be easily applicable. Particularly the lack of definitions is problematic, as this increases the risk of conceptual stretch.4

4 Most centrally, it is often unclear whether previous feminist research, in the terms used here, considers ‘women’, ‘gender relations’, or ‘gender power-relations’. For example, even though the term ‘women’ is used, quite a few research projects still implicitly consider it in relational terms (although no direct comparison to ‘men’ is

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CHAPTER TWO

The discussed differences in aims and method make drawing relevant lessons for an analytical framework a challenge, but do not exclude that both fields are utilized. More of an obstacle, however, is that these differences often originate in different epistemological understandings of knowledge. In research, there is an ongoing debate as to how feminist approaches to questions in the international relations discipline differ from the epistemological underpinnings of ‘mainstream’ research, as to what constitutes ‘feminist research’, and as to how, and when, gender can be used as a variable (see, for example, Bilgin 2004; Caprioli 2004b; Caprioli 2004c; Carpenter 2002; Carver et al. 2003; Keohane 1998; Sjoberg 2006; Tickner 1997; Tickner 1998; Tickner 2005). Many feminists are critical of the studying of what they consider to be gender-specific questions without utilizing a feminist standpoint, while researchers from the mainstream field consider feminist suggestions to be of relevance also for conducting non-feminist research. This difference in perspective is mainly based on the diverging understandings of knowledge, which made Ann J. Tickner cry out “You just don’t understand” (Tickner 1997). While constituting an independent research approach, feminist research is closely related to critical, or post-modern, approaches. Tickner (2005, 4), claims that there is no common feminist methodology in the traditional sense. There are, however, four guidelines, which set feminist research apart from “mainstream, or more positivist forms of research” . . . . . . a deep concern with which questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research that is useful to women (and also to men) and is both less biased and more universal than conventional research; the centrality of questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and a commitment to knowledge as emancipation. I realize that not all these guidelines are unique to feminism. . . . What is unique to feminism, however, is a commitment to asking feminist questions and building knowledge from women’s lives—a commitment that, feminists believe, has wider implications that have the potential to transform existing knowledge frameworks (Tickner 2005, 4).5

made). If such a relational perspective is implied, there is often no differentiation made between the broader ‘gender relations’, and the more specific ‘gender powerrelations’. See pages 24–28. 5 See also Heidi Hudson (2005a, 158–160).

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

17

It is in the understanding of how to perceive knowledge produced by research that the difference becomes the more pronounced: Feminists in all disciplines have been acutely aware of the relationship between knowledge and power and the ways that traditional knowledge has been constructed in the interest of the powerful. Feminist scholarship has emerged from a deep skepticism about knowledge that, even though it claims to be universal and objective, is not. In reality, such knowledge is usually partial, created by men, and based on men’s lives (Tickner 2006).

Much feminist research focusing on peace operations has, therefore, made use of critical or narrative approaches with the aim of reshaping our knowledge. As observed by Johan Galtung, one major difference between the underlying epistemological approach of these methods, and those used by theory-driven mainstream research, is the former’s lack of interests, or outspoken reluctance, against generalization. Much feminist research agrees with this reluctance.6 This is indeed a complication for incorporating ideas from feminism into the framework. Galtung, however, claims that knowledge and data gathered in research negative to generalization, can still be systematized by researchers interested in developing frameworks which are less time-and-space dependent (Galtung 1967, 24).7 As observed by Galtung (1967), and noted by Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George (1997; 2005), what is relevant for mainstream research, is that previous research stipulates variables and relationships that can be used for theory-driven research. Bennett and George claim that although information will inevitably be lost, “[d]espite the uniqueness of historical events, one

6 Donna M. Hughes, for example, in one of the most dogmatic arguments states that “[t]he scientific method is a tool for the construction and justification of dominance and exploitation in the world. . . . Although sexist, racist, heterosexist, and classist biases in language, interpretation, and representation have been uncovered by scholars . . . the scientific method remains the citadel of scientific authority” (Hughes 1995, 395). According to her argument, statistical studies aimed at generalizing, though also contributing to knowledge, serve those in power to maintain dominance and construct the “other” (that is, those that fall outside the generalized commonality). Defining, naming, and empirically examining a question thereby serves to uphold inequality. Using mainstream methodology to decrease inequality is not possible, according to Hughes, as the master’s tools cannot bring down the master’s house (Hughes 1995). 7 For example, this was done by early studies in Peace and Conflict research where ideas and suggestions from primarily descriptive and historical studies were collected and systematized (see, for example, Richardson 1960; Sorokin 1957; Wright 1942).

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CHAPTER TWO

can deal with unique cases by treating them as members of a “class” or type of phenomenon” (Bennett and George 1997, 13). This entails a possibility to incorporate suggestions from feminist research into a mainstream-based framework despite the epistemological difference. This is how feminist research will be used in this project. Thus, feminist research is primarily used as inspiration by providing potentially fruitful ideas and suggestions about potential relationships between explanatory factors and effects for gender power-relations in the mainstream-based analytical framework.8 Using the term gender power-relations should therefore not be misunderstood to include a feminist methodological approach or standpoint. 2.2

UNDERSTANDING GENDER POWER-RELATIONS

When we now have established how previous research is used in the formulation of the analytical framework, we proceed to present its structure and main ideas. This first section discusses how to organize and develop the concept of gender power-relations to enhance our ability to trace changes in the power balance between men and women. The section clarifies how the concept of gender power-relations in this study differs from how ‘gender’ and ‘power’ is understood in feminist research; it also clarifies and develops the current conceptualization in mainstream research on armed conflict and its resolution. The section then proceeds to identify two dimensions of gender powerrelations—political equality and security equality—where the study primarily expects effects of peace operations to take place. Gender power-relations Though the abstract term ‘gender’ is not much used in everyday speech, traditional perceptions of women and men, and of the relation between them, are everywhere inevitably ‘gendered’ perceptions. Though with varied inflections from one culture to another, a difference between men and women is normally emphasized (Cockburn 1999, 2).

The concept of ‘gender power-relations’ consists of several parts, the two central being gender and power. ‘Gender’ entails the social 8 See Michael Nicholson (1996) for a discussion on the different schools in social science. He also provides insight into the different views on generalization in these schools.

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

19

distinctions between men and women, which vary between countries and over time (unlike the biological differences). A very influential researcher in gender research, R. W. Connell, describes gender as “. . . the structure of social relations that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproductive distinctions between bodies into social processes” (Connell 2002, 10). This has nothing to do with biology, according to Connell, but concerns how we interpret and give meaning to biological differences. Thus, for him, gender is “a social structure” (Connell 2002, 9). Gender is by itself a relational concept, “. . . a matter of the social relations within which individuals and groups act” (Connell 2002, 9). However, the use, limitation, and actual content of Connell’s definition of the concept are less clear. To him, it is not a question of cultural patterns: “Sometimes cultural patterns do express bodily difference. But often they do more than that, or less than that, or something else completely” (Connell 2002, 9). The general necessity for Connell is that gender involves reproductive distinctions but as these, in Connell’s study, do not have to be stated as gendered, it is difficult to determine what is not included in the concept. Connell makes a tautological assumption that “. . . social structure conditions practice. This does not imply that structures cause, or exist separate from, practices.” Gender, according to Connell, “. . . is something actually done; and done in social life, not something that exists prior to social life” (Connell 2002, 55). Even though the gender concept in Connell’s work is vague, what should be underlined is that ‘gender’ is not synonymous with ‘women’. This is fundamental also in feminist work. For example, Heidi Hudson states that women’s interests and gender interests, the latter entailing the challenge of one gender’s (presently, women’s) subordination, are not one and the same although they can coincide (Hudson 2000, 88). Instead of a patriarchal state,9 it is theoretically 9 Patriarchy is a difficult concept to find a detailed definition of in previous research, mostly because much feminist research is negative to strict definitions and categorization. Most uses of the concept appear to focus on male domination of power structures, and the higher value given to masculinity compared to femininity. Although not primarily writing in the feminist research tradition, Galtung describes patriarchy as involving violence in all areas: direct, structural and cultural. In defining the concept he states: “Patriarchy is then seen as an institutionalization of male dominance in vertical structures, with very high correlations between positions and

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CHAPTER TWO

possible to postulate a matriarchal state, where women’s interests and gender interests could be on opposing sides of the scale (Hudson 2000, 89–90).10 Thus, gender in this study should not be understood as meaning only one of the sexes, women, but in the sense that male and female roles, and behavior, are not a given but vary. This, in turn, brings with it different access to power and resources. Though based on the idea that gender varies over time and space, the concept of gender power-relations in this study is more concrete and limited in scope. It should therefore not be confused with ‘gender relations’, which is a concept used in a number of research fields. In its broadest form, gender relations has been widely used in anthropologically inspired studies and there encompasses a wide range of interactions, everything from power to emotional and symbolic relations between primarily men and women (but also between men-men, and women-women). These relations can take more formalized shapes as well as be more fluent in their character (see Connell 2002, 50–70; and Kuper and Kuper 1996 for further description).11 More importantly, however, is not to mistake gender power-relations for a concept in feminism that Cynthia Cockburn labels ‘gendered-power relations’ (Cockburn 2001, 28), where ‘gender power’ is central: Gender power is seen to shape the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena. It has expression in physique—how women’s and men’s bodies are nourished, trained and deployed, how vulnerable they are to attack, what mobility they have. It has expression in economics—how money, property and other resources are distributed between the sexes. It structures the

gender, legitimized by the culture (e.g., in religion and language), and often emerging as direct violence with males as subjects and females as objects. Patriarchy, like any other deeply violent social formation (such as criminal subcultures and military structures), combines direct, structural, and cultural violence in a vicious triangle. They reinforce each other in cycles starting from any corner. Direct violence, such as rape, intimidates and represses; structural violence institutionalizes; and cultural violence internalizes that relation, especially for the victims, the women, making the structure very durable” (Galtung 1996, 40). 10 As much feminist research considers inequality as structural violence, the positive peace concept is more relevant for feminists than, as Hudson argues, is often the case in general peace research (for a description of that concept, see Galtung 1969). 11 Feminism and gender research have often been considered as one and the same but have different roots. Gender originated in anthropological studies in order to be able to include women’s situations in addition to those of men. Feminism, on the other hand, is focused on understanding the subordination of women (Sarup 1993).

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

21

social sphere—who has initiative in the community and authority in the family, who is dependent. And of course gender shapes political power, furnishing the sex of political elites, representative assemblies, executives and command centers (Cockburn 1999, 3–4).

In Cockburn’s study, gendered-power relations appear to be an allinclusive concept, involving numerous interactions in various dimensions at different levels of analysis, where power affects distribution of resources between men and women. In this line of thinking, however, ‘gendered power’ can be understood as a patriarchal structure, predetermining the outcome between men and women.12 It is in this conceptualization of power that ‘gendered-power’ relations differ from the gender ‘power-relations’ used in this study. To put this more clearly, ‘power’ is a contested concept in the social sciences, where projects differ in their views on base, form, and use (see Kuper and Kuper 1996, 657).13 A common view is to consider power either as a relationship—in its simplest form if A can make B comply—or as a resource that enables a person to obtain what she or he wants (Kuper and Kuper 1996, 657; Østerud, Goldmann, and Pedersen 1997, 149). As an example of the latter, Mary Caprioli conceptualizes power as “a divisible, infinite resource and/or as the ability to reach goals” (Caprioli 2000, 55). Thus, if women are not allowed to participate in the public sphere equally to men, then that entails a lower access to power (Caprioli 2000, 58). In this project, this is considered in terms of more unequal gender power-relations. Unlike Cockburn’s ‘gendered-power’ concept, where it is a question of a relational structure granting A (men) power over B (women), i.e. patriarchy, a continuation of Caprioli’s argument is that power should instead be understood as a balance. This means that it is possible to have access to different degrees of power for men and women over time and between states. The outcome in the power balance is thereby no longer a given. That is, power-relations between men and women can be more or less balanced. If the relations were symmetrical, there would be gender equality. If they were asymmetrical, there would be varying degrees of gender inequality

12 A common view of power in feminist research. For example, Tina Sideris writes that gender inequality “. . . suggests a set of social practices, beliefs, ideas, values and speech that promote male domination . . .” (Sideris 2001, 143). 13 See Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (1996, 657–661) for an overview of the debates.

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depending on how uneven the balance is. This approach even allows for the possibility that women (as a total) can have more power than men (as a total) in a state. Thus, while many feminist projects focus on the production and reproduction of women’s subordination, this project is related to studies by Caprioli et al. which are based on the idea that the balance in gender power-relations, as one form of a power-relationship within a state, varies and is comparable between countries. Such research is conducted primarily in political science and international relations research, as well as being an idea used in the Human Development reports. These studies have divided the human group into two genders: women and men. They then measure the macro level balance with regard to access to power, in these studies the degree of equality, between these two groups (see Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Melander 2005a; Melander 2005b), what this study would call the varying balance of gender power-relations.14 Dimensions of gender power-relations The fact that women and men are equally—albeit differently—affected by organized violence must be highlighted, and the complex, multifaceted and ambivalent roles played by women and men during times of war and peace must be engaged with to avoid the perpetuation of incomplete understandings (Hudson 2005a, 162).

When it comes to dimensions of gender power-relations, previous research discusses a large number of empirical examples and suggestions. As Caprioli writes, the different dimensions capture different aspects of the relation (Caprioli 2000, 58). Of potential dimensions, the classic dimension of the power balance in politics clearly stands out. Political equality, in this study, relates to the level of participation of men and women in politics, and is a traditional and established dimension of equality. In addition to political equality, a new dimension can be identified in previous research. This dimension, in this study labeled ‘security equality’, entailing the distribution 14 Caprioli has been central for developing this model of observing gender powerrelations. However, unlike the present study, these studies focus on what effect more balanced gender power-relations, in these studies, ‘equality’, can have for onset of conflict, both interstate and intrastate. Thus, it is used as an independent variable in these studies.

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

23

of protection, is implied but even less formalized. This interesting dimension appears fruitful although requiring much development and consideration. Security equality, together with political equality, will therefore be focused on in this project.15 Political equality. Political equality is here understood in terms of men and women’s participation in politics. This is in line with how previous research on conflict and its resolution has used the concept. For example, armed conflict is predicted to affect how women participate in public roles, from health organizations to political institutions (Kumar 2001, 5–25). Caprioli identifies political equality as a central dimension of the degree of power in the relationship between men and women. She measures this through observing representation in politics, as access to formal power is central (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003). The present study ties in with this manner of capturing political equality, although the qualitative approach allows for a broader discussion of participation in political structures. This classic dimension of gender power-relations is therefore the first selected in order to determine its use in a peace operation setting. It is relevant to note that in previous feminist research, lack of political equality has been considered in terms of structural violence (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 115).16 The second dimension of gender power-relations included in this project does instead capture the question of protection from direct physical violence. This is the new dimension of security equality. 15 Two of the other, and the most compelling, dimensions are legal and economic equality. Though identified in previous work, they are not included in this study as the impact of peace operations is assumed to be lesser in these dimensions than in the selected security and political dimensions. Security equality is also most in need of development. That does not, however, entail that the legal and economic dimensions are not potentially relevant as dimensions of gender power-relations. Formal legal protection and recognition of equal rights are central aspects in liberal feminism (see Steans 1998, 16–18). Legal equality is observed through distribution of legal protection between men and women (Crawley 2000; Karamé 1999). In the debate on structural violence in previous research, legal inequality has, for example, been labeled as institutional violence (see Moser and Clark 2001 for further discussion). Economic equality, such as the distribution of economic resources between men and women, is not included since it is more complex than the others and to a greater extent dependent on a larger number of external actors. This complexity makes it too difficult to determine in this form of study what is a consequence of the operation (see Bhatia 2005 for a discussion of issues and actors). 16 Peterson and Runyan consider there to be a risk that this divide obscures the fact that war is not a male affair but depends on and affects both men and women (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 130).

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Security equality. Security equality should in this study be understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. The basis for security equality can be found in scholarly discussions on differences in how men and women are targeted with violence during armed conflict, what form the violence takes, what measures that are undertaken to enhance protection that are developed, and, more importantly, how these measures of protection are distributed between men and women (Brownmiller 1975; Carpenter 2003; Carpenter 2005; Cockburn 2002, 74; El-Bushra 2000; Enloe 2002, 27; Jacobson 2000; Mazurana 2005, 33; Mazurana et al. 2005, 4; Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Watts and Zimmerman 2002; Vickers 1993; Williams 2002, 99–100). For the formulation of the security-equality concept, two things are central in previous research: a) both men and women are the target of violence, but of different forms; b) in spite of this, the measures undertaken to enhance protection is not equally distributed to address all forms of violence. Exactly what protection entails in these studies is not clear, but the indication is that it is the measures taken by the judicial system, primarily the police, and the military, which are those primarily considered. Though under-researched, the empirical trend visible in the demographic balances after conflict is that the majority of those subjected to direct lethal violence by the warring parties will be men. This is also true if the civilian group targeted with lethal violence is included. Charli R. Carpenter claims that gender-stereotypical assumptions about women as the ‘civilian’ and the ‘innocent peacemaker’, compared to men as ‘culprits’ and ‘war-makers’, have taken focus away from the fact that men and boys of the civilian population are the ones with the highest risk of lethal violence. In her view, including a gender perspective—and by that she means ‘gender’ and not ‘women’—international agencies involved in the protection of human rights and humanitarian work would be able to protect all civilians—women and men—and not base their work on gender-essentialist stereotypes.17 In addition, these assumptions limit the reporting of, and protection from, many non-lethal forms of violence against men—such as rape—reporting

17 Essentialism means that gender is considered as a biological, rather than a social, trait which determines the behavior of men and women. Essentialism thereby often include a more conservative perspective on male and female roles in society.

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25

that would shake the established assumptions about masculinity and war (Carpenter 2005). While it is predicted that men will constitute the majority of victims of lethal violence, both men and women are stated to be the target of non-lethal violence used by the warring parties in conflict. The abuse differs between them in the sense that, in addition to the form of serious abuse that both men and women are the victim of, women are additionally the main targets of sexual violence and rape. Even though women are targeted to a higher degree with nonlethal violence, rather than lethal, sexual violence can often have long-term lethal consequences. This is because abused women risk being stigmatized, thereby losing networks for social protection and economic security, which increases the risk of further violence. In addition, abused women might, in many cases, later die from STDs, most prominently HIV/AIDS, or risk being killed by male family members, or men from their community. The latter is a consequence of, for example, rape being considered as a loss of honor, at times, as much for the male relatives as for the abused woman (Kelly 2000, 12; Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001).18 That is, these forms of violence have a stigma attached to them—labeling the victim as being just as guilty as the perpetrator. Thus, in the context of armed conflict, women and men are the target of different forms of violence. While recognizing that how to perceive, systematize, and measure, violence in armed conflict is part of a larger debate (Gurr 1980; Kuper and Kuper 1996, 896–897), for the analytical purpose of this book, violence is divided into conflict violence and non-conflict violence. Conflict violence should be understood as physical violence conducted by the warring parties of the armed conflict. This embraces both lethal and non-lethal forms of violence. The relevance of this classification for the development of the security-equality concept becomes the more obvious when we

18 In addition, most often, these deaths will not be recorded in ‘traditional’ estimations of those killed in armed conflict. To complicate matters, the classification of sexual violence as ‘shameful’ in many societies renders it difficult to collect data and, thereby, affects the ability to research under which conditions it takes place. The issue of rape, for example, is so sensitive that many countries do not allow reporting on the extent of the problem (Bop 2001, 26; Hynes et al. 2004; Watts and Zimmerman 2002). As violence directed at women has been rendered ‘invisible’ by such practices, that has also resulted in a lack of development of international law to handle such violence (Crawley 2000; Jacobson 2000).

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consider the non-conflict violence that affects the security of men and women. The main reason for a division is that in addition to conflict violence, previous research makes the argument that there is limited attention given to, and protection from, violence that primarily affects women. That is, violence in the private sphere (Watts and Zimmerman 2002; Venis and Horton 2002). This form of physical violence is reported to become more severe during armed conflict, but simultaneously even less prioritized by relevant authorities (Kelly 2000, 59–60). What should be considered relevant violence to ensure protection from, and how to analyze it, are therefore integral parts of much feminist research. Susie Jacobs et al. argue that the, in many respects illusionary, analytical division between public and private (domestic) spheres, complicates and ‘hides’ a majority of the violence endured by women during armed conflict. The reason is that this division only allows violence in the public sphere, where men due to the ‘patriarchal structures’ of society are the main actors, to be recorded and given significance. This produces a bias in our understanding of effects of armed conflict. For understanding women’s security, what goes on in the private sphere, which is by no means a safe haven during armed conflict, is central. It is here that many women will spend the conflict, and it is here that they also will become victims of violence caused by the conflict. To come to terms with the bias, Jacobs et al. argue that a connection should be made “between ‘the front-line’ and ‘the home-front’ ” (Jacobs, Jacobson, and Marchbank 2000, 17). For our understanding of security equality, this entails that measures taken to enhance protection should not be too limited in scope to exclude violence of which women are the main targets. Practically, the divide between public and private affects the protection of women’s human rights. The reason is that many crimes, such as domestic violence and rape, have been classified as a private affair (Crawley 2000, 96–100).19 Protection is thereby limited to a few forms of violence of which women might not be mainly threatened.

19 As the norm of considering women’s rights as human rights has developed, the problem has become more and more discussed. For example, from 1997 and forward, the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s Human Rights Commission has produced annual reports on violence against women (Commission on Human Rights 1998, 3).

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Caprioli finds a similar result in her statistical study, which displays that traditional measures to increase security capture very few aspects of women’s security. In short, when security in the traditional sense for men increases, a similar increase in women’s security does not automatically follow (Caprioli 2004a). This persists, although, as the World Bank notes, gender-based violence causes ill-health to as many women the world over each year as all cases of malaria and traffic accidents put together (Venis and Horton 2002). Moreover, feminist research claims that women are often the targets of even more violence in the post-war period than during conflict. Therefore, it is wrong to call this period an ‘aftermath’ of conflict (see Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001; and more specifically Pillay 2001 in the same book). Measures taken to end conflict violence would thereby not benefit women to the same extent as they do men. These above ideas in previous research constitute the basis upon which security equality as a dimension of gender power-relations can be developed. In this study, security equality is, therefore, understood as the distribution of protection between men and women in terms of measures undertaken to enhance protection from physical violence. For the analytical purpose of this project, we divide violence into two categories. The first is ‘conflict violence’, which is physical violence conducted by the warring parties of the armed conflict. This concerns both lethal and non-lethal forms of violence. The second category is ‘non-conflict violence’, which includes the violence conducted by others than the warring parties of the armed conflict. This ensures that violence in the private sphere is not excluded and provides more detailed insights into men and women’s respective situation. The continued development of the security-equality dimension will be carried out with the help of the empirical material from TimorLeste. Before we move to the case description, however, we must ask: What affects gender power-relations? 2.3

WHAT CAUSES CHANGE IN GENDER POWER-RELATIONS?

In the preceding section, previous research assisted us in developing the concept of gender power-relations and its dimensions. The question is now: what can cause change in gender power-relations? In particular, how can an intervening peace operation have an effect? And when it does have an effect, will the examined dimensions of

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gender power-relations deteriorate (become more unequal) or improve (become more equal)? In order to answer these questions, this project proceeds to systematize suggestions on potentially relevant peaceoperation factors in previous research. To limit the risk that effects are incorrectly attributed to operation factors, and to identify other potentially relevant explanations, however, the section begins with a discussion on potential contextual factors in previous research. The context of armed conflict Not all effects of intrastate conflicts on women and gender relations have been negative. In fact, in all case-study countries conflict undermined the traditional sexual division of labor, creating new economic and political opportunities for women. In most countries women were able to enter occupations that had been closed to them previously. Women’s political participation in community and local affairs increased. In many cases they assumed the leadership of grass-root civic and political institutions . . . (Kumar 2001, 215–216).

From previous research we can discern that it is vital to consider the local context, in order to understand effects of an intervening operation. This is the case also for gender power-relations as these are predicted to be in a state of change under the effect of ‘contextual’ factors.20 Previous research is broad and vague, but three particularly interesting contextual factors potentially affecting gender power-relations can be discerned: ratio in participation in military organizations, focus groups for equality, and ideology of male-dominated parties. Participatory ratio in the conflict. In general, men, to a higher degree than women, enlist or risk being forcefully recruited to military organizations. Women, to a higher degree, remain ‘civilian’, although that is a blurry concept concerning women’s roles during conflict, and take over many roles previously held by men (Vickers 1993). It is vital to note, however, that this division of labor is a question of degrees, not absolutes. In fact, an effect on political equality resulting from the participation ratio—the degree of male and female members—in military organizations of a conflict can be identified in previous research, if we compare studies on interstate and intrastate conflicts. 20 ‘Contextual factors’ should not be understood as equaling ‘case-specific’ factors. The focus in this section of the project is on factors which are believed to exist also outside of the Timor-Leste case.

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In interstate conflicts, there is often a clear distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’. This is because the military have a formal organization, separating it from the civilian group. Empirically, these regular military forces are male dominated, and women’s roles are often limited, if not outright restricted. Combat roles, for example, are often only for men. If recruited, women are instead most often found in support functions of lower status. The political implication is obvious when military participation also grants considerable political legitimacy. For example, in Israel, combat experience is considered a sign of political competence and strength, which female politicians are unable to gain as they have been excluded from combat roles (Enloe 2004, 221–222; Karamé 1999, 5–10).21 When military participation is related to political legitimacy and authority, this can therefore be understood as presenting a systematic obstacle to obtaining political equality. The relationship between participation in the conflict and political equality becomes even more pronounced if we compare interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts where the participation ratio can be more balanced. Intrastate conflicts often involve more informal, and often less hierarchical, military organizations, such as guerilla units. In these organizations, the male/female ratio is often more balanced, and women participate in roles primarily held by men in formal military organizations.22 This has resulted in challenges to traditional gender roles (Bop 2001, 20–21). The participation also appears to have political implications. For example, Elizabeth Thompson shows how female participation in military operations in the Lebanese and Syrian struggle for independence was used to forward women’s right to vote (Thompson 1999, 272). Increased participation ratios thereby appear to enable improved gender power-relations in the dimension of political equality. However, even though there appears to be a relationship between participation ratio and the gender power-balance, research is insufficiently developed to fully understand the causal chain. Two ideas

21 None of the referred researchers propagate increased female military participation. Rather, the separation of the military from politics is preferred. 22 For example, 25 percent of soldiers in the Farabundi Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador and 30 percent of the soldiers in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front were women. In 1979, the male/female ratio among combatants in the Eritrean movement was 87/13 percent (Karamé 1999, 18–19).

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can be identified. First, participation decreases the systematic obstacle to female participation in a conflict-focused society, as there would be both women and men who can base their legitimacy on military participation. Secondly, as conflict participation is predicted to grant political legitimacy, it is a persuasive argument for the right to have equality included in the peace agreement (Luciak and Olmos 2005, 216–217).23 ‘Women’ can, thus, have gained political advantages from female participation. The first argument on structural obstacles is directly related to men and women’s ability to participate in politics. The second argument on participation and broader effects, on the other hand, indicates that it is rather the use of participation on behalf of ‘women’ as a group that is important. The latter could, thus, entail that part of the improved political equality is not a direct effect of ratio in participation but an indirect effect of agency by organizations. To complicate matters, in military organizations where the ratio was more balanced, equality issues have often been used instrumentally by the male-dominated parties of the conflict to increase female participation (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 188–191).24 It can, thus, be so that it is instead the incorporation of equality by the dominating parties to increase female participation in the struggle that results in changed gender powerrelations (which would make the relationship between participation ratio and equality spurious). Empirically, however, there is no such direct link between inclusion of equality and actual effects in gender power-relations. Even if equality is incorporated in the rhetoric, it appears to require organization by the involved women to ensure implementation. Cockburn states that when recruited, women often have to fight on two fronts. They fight the enemy, but also their own organization; the latter in order to actually obtain the promised equality, or, at least, to ensure that they themselves and gender issues are not discriminated (Cockburn 1998, 42). This indicates the relevance of two other contextual factors: focus groups for equality (often women’s organizations), which often are formed during conflict, and the ideology of (male-dominated) dominating parties. See also Krishna Kumar (2001, 6–7) for a similar argument. This is, however, not always a necessary condition for recruitment as women often respond to the same goal of, for example, national liberation as men (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 188). 23 24

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Focus groups for equality. Based on these suggestions, we can understand focus groups for equality as working to improve the power balance in gender power-relations. That is, a focus group should in this study be understood as an organization working for a specific political question. This can be related to political equality, but also to security, economic, or legal issues. The formation and strengthening of focus groups often take place during, and after, conflict, and is often attributed to the changing division of labor that takes place during these periods. Focus groups for equality often constitute women’s organizations. However, what complicates equating all women’s organizations with focus groups for equality is that just as there are no commonly agreed universal male political interests, there are no such female interests. This does not entail that ‘women’ cannot evolve as a political group around equality issues caused by a general unequal situation. It does mean, however, that these are related to different ideological standpoints. For example, Sheila Meintjes et al. identify three categories of interests women’s organizations can form around. The first concerns women who after conflict are more interested in social transformation than in reconstruction, as the latter often entails the recreation of ‘patriarchal’ power. A second category relates to women who fight to hold on to changes in their gender roles created by their participation in the conflict. The third, and last, category concerns women who seek a return to what they perceive as the stability of the traditional gender roles of the pre-conflict situation. (Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001, 4–6). These opinions could be seen as existing on a scale, ranging from wanting to continue altering gender power-relations, to consolidating already existing changes, or wanting to revert to more unequal ‘traditional’ power-relations. In this project, the two first categories are considered to be focus groups for equality, while the last is not. Another problem with limiting the study to women’s organizations would be that focus groups for equality involving primarily male members would fall outside the definition. For example, the formation of men’s groups to decrease violence against women has been an increasing phenomenon, and clearly are focus groups for equality as understood in this study. In this study, focus groups are expected to be instrumental in changing the balance in gender power-relations. However, these groups

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often constitute only a limited force in a male-dominated state.25 This makes the dominating parties in a state central. Ideology of male-dominated parties. The power of focus groups is very limited vis-à-vis the dominating parties which they attempt to persuade. In a sense, focus groups for equality can be considered as lobby organizations targeting the dominating parties, which are almost exclusively male-dominated. South African developments can be considered as a lucid example of the role of these parties. Gisela Geisler argues that the ANC in 1980 considered women’s emancipation and feminism as ‘divisive’. After lobbying by women’s groups, ANC’s view changed in 1990. At this point, ANC recognized that gender equality would not automatically spring from national liberation, but required addressing in its own right. This decision, Geisler argues, opened up the political space for change. ANC thereafter more actively considered equality and gender specificity in its policies. One result was the internal quota system within the ANC, which contributed to 111 women (a male/female ratio of 73/27 in percent) being voted into parliament in the 1994 elections (Geisler 2000, 605–606). Although policies on equality are important, what should be considered is that because of the difference in situation for men and women in a state, all policies, not just those specifically on gender equality, can affect equality developments. This relationship is indicated in the majority of feminist research—often included in the understanding of ‘patriarchy’. In line with this argument, it is therefore imperative to consider the views on gender equality in the dominant political organizations. A peace operation intervenes There are, thus, contextual factors that can be relevant for gender power-relations. These contextual factors should also be considered in the light of the post-conflict setting in which they operate: An “ideal type” of postwar society might look like this: economically the infrastructure has been destroyed; the currency has been undermined;

25 There are indications of a relationship with peace operations. Ilja A. Luciak and Cecilia Olmos also indicate that a strong women’s organization in combination with a substantial participation in the struggle also makes it more likely that local women will be able to make use of international pressure for increased gender equality (Luciak and Olmos 2005, 216).

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commerce is at a standstill; agriculture has been devastated; unemployment is high, which means there are no jobs for soldiers; foreign investment has been frightened off; and there is no basis for exports. The country’s society has been undercut by the mutual dislike between warring groups, which is not any weaker than before the war; the wide distribution of weapons within the population; the people’s habit of nonobedience to government and authority generally; the undermining of traditional sources of authority; the need to demobilize and disarm at least two armies quickly; and the prevalence of young soldiers with no skills other than killing. The old political process has been discredited [. . .], there is no single legitimate government, there is a low tolerance for legitimate opposition, there is often little democratic tradition, and the police and judicial system are seen (usually correctly) as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution because they have no legitimacy for much of the population (Licklider 2001, 697–698).

The question is now what happens to gender power-relations when a peace operation intervenes into this “ideal type” of ongoing power competition and destruction after armed conflict. Although previous research is (naturally) vague on information valuable for the purpose of this project of what affects gender power-relations, discussions revolve around six themes, in this initial framework considered as operation factors. These can be identified as awareness in implementation, local cooperation, handling local military and local cooperation, personnel behavior, gender-balanced composition, and operation leadership. For this study, such commonalities indicate the fruitfulness of commencing a systematization based on these factors. Therefore, ideas are clustered, organized, and developed, around these factors to be of relevance for this study.26 Awareness in implementation. Those advocating gender mainstreaming often bring forth that gender specificity, that is, knowledge of men and women’s difference in situation in a state, should be integrated as early as possible in a peace process. Only such integration will ensure an unbiased implementation. If gender-specific considerations are withheld until the process is consolidated in its final stages, then women will most likely lose the opportunity to get access to the (re-) distribution of resources. “Later . . .”, in Cynthia Enloe’s words, “. . . is a patriarchal time zone” (Enloe 2004, 215). In extension, Enloe’s

26 Thus, the purpose is to generate ideas, not to review all previous research in this area.

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suggestion would propose that if implementation does not consider gender specificity, effects on gender power-relations will be negative. Another general observation that we can discern from previous research is that awareness would have to be present in the entire implementation, that is in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments. Potential effects of awareness should therefore be more thoroughly outlined for peacekeeping and peacebuilding respectively. Peacekeeping assignments in a peace operation concern foremost security. Originally, this focused on the security of the warring parties (to enable a peace settlement), but have increasingly come to involve that of the civilian population (Chandler 2001). These assignments are mainly conducted by international military components, which usually are the first international components to be deployed. Military components often contain the bulk of operation staff, the majority of which remain in national contingents under a UN mandate.27 The main focus of military components is directed at handling the behavior of local military organizations, i.e. to halt the use of ‘conflict violence’ (violence conducted by the warring parties of the armed conflict). This decrease of conflict violence can, in extension, contribute to increased protection for men and women of the population. As we have discussed under security equality and contextual factors, men are likely to be the main targets of lethal conflict violence, and a substantial part of the non-lethal violence. Although the removal of conflict violence will improve women’s security when they move in the public sphere, it is nevertheless likely that the implementation of peacekeeping assignments will contribute most substantially to men’s security. This is due to their difference in situation during conflict as men are the main participants and victims of violence in the armed conflict. As the brunt of women’s security concerns, in the feminist view, thereby by definition will be excluded by peacekeeping assignments, measures taken to enhance protection will primarily be directed at violence of which men are the target.

27 The study of the use of the military components in peace operations is very common in previous research (Diehl 1994; Diehl 1997a; Diehl 1997b; Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Durch 1994; Fetherston 1994; Fetherston 2000; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2004b; Gordon and Toase 2001; Goulding 1993; Hampson 2001; Heldt and Wallensteen 2005; Otunnu and Doyle 1998; Ratner 1996; Sorenson and Wood 2005; Thakur and Schnabel 2001; Wallensteen 1997; Woodhouse, Bruce, and Dando 1998).

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To the operation’s military-focused security assignments, civilian security through the establishment and enforcement of law and order (handling other forms of physical violence than conflict violence) has been added. Generally, this is connected to the development of law, and of a functioning penal system. As such, it is considered under peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. Establishing law and order is often handled by the international civilian police, CIVPOL, rather than international military, and CIVPOL’s role has grown since the beginning of the 1990s. In a few operations, the creation of a new national police force has also been included in this assignment (see Call and Stanley 2002, 314–315; Dwan 2002). The idea that peace requires broader forms of protection than that conducted by military peacekeeping components is forwarded by Charles T. Call and William Stanley. They point to the development of individual-based protection carried out by the international police as central for peace. The claim is that if individual security is not considered by an intervention, there is a high risk of increased insecurity for the population as a whole, perhaps even higher than that endured during the war (Call and Stanley 2002, 303). Call and Stanley’s observation is particularly interesting as there is a related argument forwarded by feminist researchers that ‘peace’ has little meaning to many women. This is because the degree of violence directed at women in ‘peace’ is often higher than during ‘war’ (Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001; Rosca 1993). This indicates a general insecurity in a post-armed conflict period which takes different forms for men and women. But even if protection has been broadened to include other forms of violence than conflict violence, violence against women has not been considered to an equal degree. According to Enloe, international actors often consider one of the most common forms of violence in a society, domestic violence, as a question of “non-priority”—to be solved later or as being outside of the mandate (Enloe 2002, 26–27).28 For all assignments on security, thus, implementation without awareness to explicitly consider gender specificity appears to limit

28 This assumption can remain even in circumstances where it is the policy of the operation itself that risks contributing to increased domestic violence. This could be the case, for example, if a demobilization policy does not consider female combatants, or ignores the family context of male combatants (as there is a substantial risk of increased domestic violence).

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the operation focus to forms of violence where women are not the main targets. Measures taken to enhance protection will thereby be distributed unevenly to men’s advantage. Lack of gender-specific considerations in the implementation of peacekeeping is, therefore, predicted to have negative effects on security equality. Apart from effects of implementation which can be expected to primarily affect security equality, operations are often mandated peacebuilding assignments. These often consist of arranging elections and contributing to the building of political institutions to handle conflict. Mainstream research has placed substantial importance on these assignments as political systems more directly affect the power balance between local parties. For example, Roy Licklider identifies access to, and distribution of, political power to be one of the most difficult issues to handle after conflict (Licklider 2001, 709). Although these considerations are limited to political parties, implementation of a new political system will have effects also on other power-relations in a state, such as the balance in gender power-relations. What effects we can expect for political equality are, however, even more under-researched. In general, Georgina Waylen indicates that one should not assume that because democracy is implemented, political equality among those constituting ‘demos’ inevitably follows: The premise is, first, that institutional democratization does not necessarily entail a democratization of power-relations in society at large, particularly between men and women and, second, that there is no necessary connection between playing an important part in any stage of the process of democratization and having any particular role during the period of consolidation (Waylen 1994, 329).

As the example in the introduction suggests, a change in the political system in Kosovo resulted in a negative change in political equality. The discussion under contextual factors claimed that in a conflict setting, focus groups for equality would very likely be working to persuade male-dominated parties to improve equality. The relevance of the operation factors would be if lack of awareness makes an operation overlook such developments. Under such circumstances, it is likely that an operation can contribute to a negative effect on political equality. To these general considerations we can add Richard Caplan’s suggestion that the manner in which political assignments are implemented plays a significant role. “Electoral rules and procedures can have a significant impact on political outcomes, and the choice of

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arrangements, therefore, may be anything but neutral” (Caplan 2005, 126). Caplan notes that some procedures might benefit one party over another, while others might result in representations leading to prolonged insecurity (Caplan 2005, 126). If we consider this argument in the context of gender power-relations, this can entail that all parts—down to the most detailed level—of the implementation can have an effect. For example, in a peace-operation setting, education of civilians in democratic procedures is often conducted with the assistance of the operation prior to elections. It is pointed out that this education must be gender sensitive, i.e. be adopted to gender-specific situations, to avoid negative effects. If the education is mainly directed at men (which often is the case when the training is assumed to be gender neutral), there is a risk of deteriorating gender power-relations (Olsson 2001; Olsson 2005). Thus, implementation would have to consider gender specificity if it is not going to primarily reach the men of the host population. Another practical aspect of awareness in implementing political assignments that might differ between men and women, concerns the secrecy of the vote. From the perspective of political equality, secrecy is relevant not only for upholding the right of individual freedom of opinion in relation to those in opposition parties, but also to those in the family—the last a particularly sensitive political issue. For example, in Namibia, some women feared reprisal from their husband as much as from those of the opposing parties, should women’s votes have been disclosed (Olsson 2001, 100). The secret vote is, thus, relevant not only for the relations of both men and women toward existing local parties, but also concerning men’s and women’s relations to each other. In conclusion, whether or not the implementation considers gender specificity, i.e. has an awareness of differences in situation for men and women, appears to be highly relevant for all aspects of operation implementation. It is mainly implementation without gender-specificity that is assumed to have negative effects. The suggestion of a relationship between lack of awareness of gender-specific situations in the implementation and negative effects for gender power-relations is strong for security equality, and a little more ambivalent for political equality. Handling local military. As discussed above, a central area for peace operations is the handling of the military of the host state. When operation policy affects the role and strength of existing military organizations, it operates in an area central in feminist work: ideas

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of militarism and militarization of societies. To Enloe, a persistent militarization29 of the postwar moment will “. . . entrench the privileging of masculinity” where “masculinity continues to be the currency for domination and exclusion” (Enloe 2002, 22; Enloe 2004, 217). To her, a sign of this is that persons—primarily men—who participated in the military part of the conflict, are given benefits that other parts of the populations are not. The role of military values and conflict participation results in a few men and most women being excluded from public debate if military background is considered to be of great importance (Enloe 2002, 25–26). This argument can be considered in the context of the discussion under the contextual factor on participation ratio in military organizations. In line with Enloe’s argument, it can be expected that a continued political role of the military and the conflict in a state would most likely result in a deterioration of political equality. Thereby, it is possible that if an operation can decrease the importance given to the military in the post-conflict society, then this ought to have a positive effect on political equality by decreasing an obstacle to female participation. This can be considered both in practical terms, where formal political participation of the military is limited, and in normative terms, where ideas of militarism are affected. Another aspect of handling the local military organizations, often brought up in previous research, concerns disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which is expected to affect security equality. In addition to short-term handling of conflict violence to enable settlement, peace operations are often involved in DDR to assist in the permanent reduction in the risk of conflict violence. Call and Stanley state that demobilization and disarmament can affect future levels of violence and crime in society carried out by former soldiers (Call and Stanley 2002, 306). To Licklider, the demobilization process should provide former soldiers with education and skills

29 Militarization, in Enloe’s view “. . . is a sociopolitical process.” (Enloe 2004, 220). This process entails adjustment and organization of a society to the ideals of militarism. According to Enloe, militarism entails ideas of: “. . . (a) that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions; (b) that human nature is prone to conflict; (c) that having enemies is a natural condition; (d) that hierarchical relations produce effective action; (e) that a state without a military is naïve, scarcely modern, and barely legitimate; (f ) that in times of crisis those who are feminine need armed protection; and (g) that in times of crisis any man who refuses to engage in armed conflict action is jeopardizing his own status as a manly man” (Enloe 2004, 219).

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that will give them a chance to successfully return to a civilian life, thus avoiding that this group contribute to insecurity (Licklider 2001, 704–705). According to Joanna Spear, it is particularly relevant when demobilized soldiers are to reintegrate into the civilian society, and thereby change their status (Spear 2002, 146). The DDR process is, thus, related to insecurity in a state. In work focused on women, Kumar states that in addition to being central for (primarily male) soldiers’ chances to return to civilian life, the way demobilization of former soldiers is handled affects women’s opportunity to move outside the private sphere. In that sense, DDR therefore appears to be more closely related to awareness of gender specificity in the implementation of the DDR process, rather than be directly related to the handling of military organizations. In part, gender specificity can be understood as relevant because of the threat demobilized soldiers can constitute to civilians, of which women are the majority. A particularly serious threat to women is sexual violence (including the risk of HIV/AIDS), which adds a double injury through the strong social stigma of having been attacked. In order to avoid placing themselves in danger, women might be unable to participate outside the private sphere (Kumar 2001, 5–25). If a DDR process is not conducted properly to ensure that protection is evenly distributed against threats that these demobilized soldiers can constitute, this might have effects for security equality. Should it limit women’s ability to participate in the public sphere to a higher degree than men’s, then it potentially also has effects for political equality. In conclusion, DDR appears to be relevant for developments in security equality. If operation policy does not consider gender specificity, than it is likely that security equality might be negatively affected. Thus, DDR falls under the factor of awareness in implementation, rather than being related to the handling of military organizations. The main relevance for this study is, thus, whether an operation affects the role of the military in society in general. Assisting in the reduction of the political role of the military would be assumed to contribute to an improved balance in political representation by decreasing an obstacle to women’s participation. Local cooperation. In order to carry out their mandate assignments, particularly those of peacebuilding, operations cooperate with local parties. For some peace operations, the matter of which local parties to cooperate with is stated in the mandate (as they have negotiated

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the agreement which the operation is to assist in implementing).30 Other mandates leave the question of cooperation partners more open. The latter involves a selection of local organizations. This is sensitive for the operation as impartiality has to be weighed against ensuring local ownership (or, at least, local inclusion) (Ball 2001, 723). As cooperation grants power to the local parties selected, Caplan observes that selection of cooperation partners is a political question (Caplan 2005, 95–96). What we can conclude from this is that, for the selected organization, this will involve the possibility to affect how the mandate is implemented, i.e. it brings power to forward interests. The absolute majority of leading groups in every society will be male dominated (of various ideologies). As this inevitably will result in that the majority of those selected, and thereby granted the most substantial influence, will be male-dominated, we can expect that the main impact on gender power-relations will stem from these groups.31 This can be observed in Thompson’s discussion on Lebanon and Syria which suggests that during the conflict and the resolution phase, a new gender regime was being established by the male-dominated parties. The work of these parties (which does not have to be explicitly on equality) affected gender power-relations for a substantial time period (Thompson 1999). Thus, this can be related to the discussion on ideology of male-dominated parties, identified under contextual factors. What can also be observed in related research is that selection does not only involve formal political parties. Caplan suggests that peace operations have come to perceive bottom-up initiatives as being as relevant as the top-down, elite-driven ones. This has resulted in an encouragement of civil society organizations, such as independent local NGOs (Caplan 2005, 132–133). With this change, cooperation can take place also with parties outside of the formal peace process. For this study, this entails that we can expect that selection can involve focus groups for equality. In its decision of inclusion or exclusion of groups, the peace operation will be likely to affect the ongoing 30 Although the operations answer to the Security Council and not to the local parties. 31 The alliances between different (male dominated) parties can have an impact on how gender power-relations are prioritized. For examples, liberal parties seeking alliance with more conservative parties might choose to give up the goal of gender equality. For an empirical example of such trade-offs, see Thompson’s discussion on Lebanon and Syria (Thompson 1999).

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political situation in a host state, as that described under contextual factors. There, focus groups for equality will most likely be operating and if these are ignored, as Ruth Jacobson claims happened in Mozambique and Angola (Jacobson 2005), then we could expect a negative effect for gender power-relations. To sum up, the process of selecting local parties is important in terms of who will be able to affect the implementation of the mandate. In an extreme scenario, if only male-dominated . . . parties with an ideology that is opposed to improving the power balance between men and women are selected, than we can expect negative consequences for gender power-relations. This will particularly be the case if focus groups for equality are simultaneously excluded. Effects are not limited to one dimension of gender power-relations, but are expected in several. In this study, that would entail both political equality and security equality. Personnel behavior. While the factors of awareness in implementation, handling local military, and local cooperation, are undeveloped, the impact of personnel behavior has been more clearly postulated in previous research. There is, however, a difference between mainstream and feminist research. While personnel behavior has been noted in mainstream research to have consequences for mission success (Diehl 1997a; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 1998, 58–61), these observations are primarily related to neutrality, a central characteristic of peace operations. For example: The Italian contingent was regarded as neutral by all sides, owing to its behavior during the operation (which included numerous humanitarian acts) and the political stance of its government. As a result, they generally were not the subject of protest or attack (Diehl 1997a, 165–166).

Personnel’s behavior toward local women, something that has resulted in much turmoil in later operations, is not noted in mainstream research. This despite the fact that crises caused by such behavior, for example in Eritrea, have affected the perception of the operation’s professionalism and neutrality.32 Feminist research, on the other hand, more clearly relates behavior to effects on women in the host population. Thereby, research is directed at the persons that are affected rather than directly to peace. 32 See, for example, the case-studies in Louise Olsson, Inger Skjelsbæk, Elise Barth, and Karen Hostens (2004), particularly Barth (2004) on Eritrea.

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For example, Cynthia Cockburn and Meliha Hubic argue that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, women’s security decreased as they were the targets of sexual violence from peace-operation personnel. In addition, there were increased levels of prostitution and human trafficking, fueled by the arrival of peacekeepers, organized by mafia (Cockburn and Hubic 2002). In a sense, the personnel behavior, which took place mainly off duty, was counterproductive to the security purpose of the operation. Negative behavior of personnel is, thus, primarily related to decreasing security equality. Enloe discusses the question of the behavior of peace-operation personnel as related to ideas of masculinity. In a peace-operation situation, where peacekeepers are to uphold peace rather than fight a war, she perceives the possibility of other forms of masculinity and masculine norms (Enloe 1993, 33–35, 260). These would not necessarily entail a negative behavior toward local women. Sandra Whitworth is, however, more radical in her analysis.33 For example, in the case of the Cambodian operation (1992–1993), Whitworth claims that the high degree of sexual harassment of local women, and the leadership’s lenient attitude shows that “ ‘[b]ringing peace to Cambodia’ . . . was accomplished in part through the deployment of soldiers who assumed that their prerogatives as militarized men included access to prostitutes, as well as a freedom to pursue, harass, and assault local women” (Whitworth 2004, 13).34 As there appears to be variation in behavior between operations and between military units within an operation, as well as it being equally common that other groups beside the military display negative behavior, this particular project consider the cause very

33 Making use of discourse analysis and critical theory, Whitworth’s study has two objectives. First she seeks to problematize our understanding of peace operations from a gender perspective, using the operation in Cambodia as a case study. Second, she wishes to broaden our understanding on norms, practices, meanings and constructions that influence peacekeepers themselves, particularly ideas of hyper-masculinity in the training of soldiers, where she focuses on the behavior of Canadian troops in Somalia. These norms and attitudes she considers relevant for explaining the consequences of violence, access to prostitutes, and sexual violence conducted by peacekeepers (see in particular Whitworth 2004 151–182). 34 Whitworth considers it plausible that peacekeeping is part of a more imperialistic agenda and that including gender as an instrument for making operations more effective, limits the possibility of using it as a tool to critique and question the very foundations of the operations. She also feels that these limitations shift our attention from the people affected by the operations to those conducting it (Whitworth 2004, 120–121). Anna M. Agathangelou and L. M. H. Ling (2003), studying the issue of sex trafficking for peacekeeping operations, have a similar view.

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

43

likely to be more complex than merely depend on the construction of military masculinity. Whatever the cause, however, empirically, the effect of negative behavior on security equality remains; women in Cambodia reportedly felt their movement to be restricted due to the negative behavior of peace-operation staff (and then not only from staff from military components) (Arnvig 1994, 180–182).35 In conclusion, based on these suggestions we can propose that personnel behavior is related to how staff interacts with the local population. A negative behavior, which is what we primarily expect according to previous research, results in decreased security equality. Gender-balanced composition. Gender-balanced composition (i.e. the male/female ratio of personnel) is not studied in mainstream research. There, composition concerns mainly the civilian-military balance. Instead, it is feminism and women-focused research which brings forth the gender-balance issue with regard to the composition of operation personnel. Empirically, however, the two are interconnected. The change in the military-civilian balance has brought with it a more balanced male/female ratio compared to when traditional military peacekeeping assignments dominated.36 In the literature, the gender-balance factor is discussed as having three different potential effects, one direct and two indirect. The direct effect is discussed in terms of both women and men having equal protection from the operation implementation. The two indirect effects would stem from both what examples male and female personnel set for the local population, and the importance granted to equality by the international operation.

35 After the increased media, policy, and research discussion of negative behavior of violence, such as rape, sexual violence and harassment, UN policy documents have been developed. Specific guidelines have become more formalized since 1996 (Beilstein 1998, 144). However, these remain to be implemented by all concerned contributing countries. 36 This is because the ratio of representation differs in different components of a mission. The number of women is very low in the military and police units but higher in civilian units (see, for example, Stiehm 2001, 40–41). As peacekeeping assignments are conducted by regular military components, where the male/female ratio is very unbalanced, women only constituted a minimal number of mission staff (Beilstein 1998). Judith Hicks Stiehm notes that the percentage of women in troops sent on peace operations tends to be lower than the number of women serving in national troops in the country of origin. The same is true for the international police components (Stiehm 1997, 33–34). The varying levels have been observed in several research projects (Mazurana 2002, 43; Olsson 1999; Stiehm 1997).

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The first argument is based on the idea that the balance will directly affect whether local women and men can have equal use of the operation’s presence. Judith Hicks Stiehm notes that an effect of the substantial increase in mandate components is that operations to a high degree will affect civilians, of which women are likely to constitute the majority (Stiehm 1997, 33). The relevance of the balance lies in that local women are expected to be more inclined to seek assistance from female staff (Beilstein 1998; Gierycz 2001, 28; Mazurana et al. 2005, 14; Olsson et al. 2004). Elise Barth claims that this is because male/female mixed military units make peacekeepers more approachable for locals (Barth 2004, 18).37 If operations are more approachable for local populations, then gender-mixed units might be beneficial for both local women and men. However, the most interesting aspect for the present study is whether women are least likely to turn to mission staff if it is not mixed. A continuation of this argument would be that an imbalanced operation therefore would have negative effects on the use of an operation for women compared to men. As assistance is mostly sought for security reasons, then security equality will be primarily affected. In addition to potential direct effects on security equality, an indirect effect on gender power-relations is suggested to be the display of more equal gender roles. Women and men working together in equal cooperation, or women performing tasks which present new roles for women in the host society, have been observed as relevant (Olsson 2001). Indirectly, these aspects would contribute to changed roles in the host society as well as supporting the work of focus groups for equality. The latter aspect is particularly related to the third argument. This states that the gender balance represents the general international attitude to gender equality and non-discrimination in the eyes of the local population (Mazurana et al. 2005, 14–15). For example, the low level of female representation in the Cambodian operation, particularly at the decision-making level, was reported to be considered as an expression of the international operation’s disregard of equality as perceived by the local population (Arnvig 1994, 180–182; Whitworth 2004, 71). Indirectly, in this line of thinking, a very imbalanced mission could undermine the work of focus groups for equality, thereby indirectly contributing to deteriorations in gender power-relations. 37

This is an efficiency argument (see DeGroot 2001; and Karamé 2001).

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

45

Concisely, a very imbalanced operation is predicted to have negative effects for security equality as it decreases the value of measures undertaken to enhance protection from operation components for women to a higher degree than it does for men. Indirectly, genderbalanced missions are predicted to affect gender power-relations by displaying alternative roles for women and men. A balance in the operation is also predicted to display the importance of, or disregard for, equality by the operation. An imbalanced mission is predicted to undermine local attempts to improve gender power-relations. The effects on gender power-relations might appear more limited, but particularly in combination with other operation factors, such as personnel behavior and selection of local parties for cooperation, results can be considerable. Operation leadership. A central factor for how an operation will conduct its work is the operation leadership. This is the last, but by no means least, of the operation factors discussed in previous research. This is particularly relevant as the leadership has such a high degree of decision-making power in an operation. Caplan considers in particular the behavior of the head of the operation as having considerable influence (Caplan 2005, 180). In more feminist research, the importance of the leadership is identified as important also for how gender is handled. The leadership have been reported to influence both whether gender specificity in implementation is considered, and to affect the behavior of staff (Arnvig 1994; Olsson 1999; Olsson 2000c; Olsson 2001; Stiehm 1997). This factor is considered as being able to affect gender power-relations, mainly depending on the behavior of the leadership. This is, therefore, most likely connected to knowledge of gender-specificity by personnel in the highest decision-making positions of operations. Awareness might, thus, be a central factor for the behavior of the leadership. If the operation leadership does not consider gender specificity then we can expect that effects on gender power-relations will be negative. In some studies, the gender of the leadership is identified as relevant. Janet Beilstein argues that the male/female ratio in the leadership will have an effect on leadership style, priorities and organizational culture (Beilstein 1998, 145).38 For example, Madeleine Rees argues that the reason for why a gender perspective was not included by,

38 An argument most often forwarded by ‘difference feminism’ (see Goldstein 2001, 34–52; Steans 1998).

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CHAPTER TWO

and gender issues not placed on the agenda of, international organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was an effect of them being male dominated, particularly on the decision-making level (Rees 2002, 58).39 It is, thus, possible, though it does not inevitably follow, that a female leadership might consider gender to a higher degree than a male leadership. What we can understand from previous research is that it is more likely that a female leadership will have a higher degree of awareness. However, if awareness is central, than it would be a question of probabilities, rather than the gender of the leadership being a determining factor. In conclusion, the operation leadership is central for implementation. Awareness of gender specificity appears to be relevant for behavior. If the leadership does not consider gender specificity, then we would expect an operation to contribute to negative effects on gender powerrelations in the dimensions of both security and political equality. While the gender of the leadership can affect the probability that s/he will include gender specificity, from an unaware leadership we would still expect a negative contribution, whether it is male or female. 2.4

CONCLUSIONS

Although insights on peace-operation effects are in certain ways complementary, the differences in aim, method and epistemology between mainstream and feminist research entails that knowledge is not easily transferable between fields. From this follows that positioning the contribution within the positivist-influenced mainstream strand, rather than the feminist approach, affects the construction of the framework. For the dependent variable, it involves portraying the power balance between men and women as varying. Thereby, the present research represents a development of the use of the concept of equality by Caprioli et al. In this study, gender power-relations entails the division of power between men (as a total) and women (as a total) on

39 A forum to coordinate the gender experts of the different international organizations, the “Gender Co-ordinating Group”, was formed in 1999. The coordinating group served to lobby gender issues both within local society and in international organizations, making use of local women’s NGOs. For example, they were successful in getting gender included in the Stability Pact but were excluded from the debate on domestic violence resulting in “minor acts” of domestic violence not being included in the legal system (Rees 2002, 60).

CREATING A FRAMEWORK

47

the macro level in a state. The definition signifies that the balance in gender power-relations should be considered as a relative measurement, or as degrees on a scale, rather than as a dichotomous variable (i.e. equal/non-patriarchal vs. unequal/patriarchal). This understanding of the balance in gender power-relations brings with it the benefit of not only making it possible to trace variation within a country, but also permits comparison between countries and over time. To capture how gender power-relations can vary, this study begins with suggestions in previous research concerning relevant dimensions. The already well-established dimensions of political equality (the level of participation of men and women in politics), and the, in this study identified, new dimension of security equality (the distribution of protection between men and women) were selected as particularly relevant in this first exploration. Political equality is primarily observed in terms of representation of men and women in state politics. The more even the ratio, the more equal the access to power. Security equality is in this study understood as the distribution of protection between men and women and observed in terms of measures undertaken to enhance protection from physical violence. To develop this concept of security equality, this study divides violence into conflict violence, i.e. physical violence conducted by the warring parties of the armed conflict—observing both lethal and non-lethal forms—and all forms of non-conflict (physical) violence. The mainstream epistemological standpoint results in an ability to systematically explore how different factors affect the variation in gender power-relations in search of more general trends. When structuring ideas and suggestions from previous research, six operation factors could be identified and developed: awareness in implementation, handling local military, local cooperation, personnel behavior, gender-balanced composition, and operation leadership. Of these, the factors of awareness in implementation, handling local military, and local cooperation are only implicitly indicated in previous research. These will therefore require more consideration in the analysis. Additionally, three contextual factors were particularly interesting to consider. These are participation ratio in the conflict, focus groups for equality, and ideology of male-dominated parties. It is important to recognize that we can expect interaction between factors. We have now deducted sufficient inspiration, ideas, and suggestions, from previous research to develop concepts and factors into an analytical framework, outlining both gender power-relations and

48

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a number of factors suspected to affect it. The intention is now to evaluate and develop these theoretical building blocks through the use of an empirical material. Before we can conduct such an analysis, however, we move to the description of Timor-Leste.

PART II

INTO THE FIELD IN TIMOR-LESTE

CHAPTER THREE

PROLOGUE Peace is about the implementation of social justice for the whole population . . . Xanana Gusmão1

3.1

FOCUS OF DESCRIPTION

The collected and systematized suggestions and ideas from previous research formulated into the analytical framework provide us with many insights. To continue building theory, the study needs additional knowledge that can only be obtained from studying what gender power-relations and their relationship to peace operation factors look like empirically. To receive that, the study now proceeds to the description of developments in Timor-Leste. Guided by the ideas from the analytical framework, the focus of the description is on areas where we expect to find fruitful suggestions for theory building concerning both gender power-relations, and on how an operation affects these relations. That use of the framework provides focus while still allowing for the description to identify additional factors that previous research has overlooked as well as to refine existing ones.2 This prologue now continues with a short description of the material and the time period to provide you with a birds-eye view. After the prologue, the chapter ‘Context of conflict’ begins with a presentation of developments in relation to the Timor-Leste conflict 1975–1999.

Quoted in Ben Kiernan (2001). It is therefore important to note that this empirical description should not be considered a complete in-depth case-study of the Timorese conflict, UN operations, events leading up to Timorese independence, or the complete developments of the new Timor-Leste state (see instead, Carey and Bentley 1995; Chopra 2002; Department of Public Information 2000; Department of Public Information 2002; Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Hill 2002; Lloyd 2000; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Meden 2002; Ospina and Hohe 2001; Pedersen and Arneberg 1999; Smith and Dee 2003; Soares 2000b; Taylor 1999; United Nations 1999a; United Nations 1999c). For a detailed chronology of events until UNTAET, see Department of Public Information (2000). 1 2

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The description in this chapter is relevant for two reasons: firstly, it provides us with more detailed material to understand and develop the concept of gender power-relations; secondly, it establishes how these power-relations had developed during conflict, which increases the possibility of separating operation effects from those of contextual factors. The chapter also describes the international context relevant for how the future operations came to be organized. The following chapter, ‘A peace operation intervenes’, continues to describe developments relevant for understanding gender power-relations while identifying and tracing effects on these power-relations from UN peace operations in Timor-Leste from June 1999 until March 2006.3 After ironing out the general structure of the operations, focus in this chapter is directed at the creation of security from violence and building political structures, areas where we would expect to find more detailed suggestions for theory building. As the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor operation (October 1999 to May 2002) had the highest degree of influence, the largest number of mandated assignments, and a large and varied composition of personnel, the description inevitably centers on this operation. However, as many assignments continue over several missions, the description follows developments until the policy is terminated. All events related to the period from April 2006 and forward, including the new peacekeeping and UN missions, are excluded as these events are perceived as addressing a new—now internal—conflict. To create a structure of the description of policy and Timorese developments that is easy to follow, headings in this chapter mainly follow those of the main policy areas. Also for the sake of readability, the country will consistently be called Timor-Leste, even when describing the time period preceding May 20, 2002 when the country was more generally known as East Timor.4 Sources and information This study has gathered and compared a broad spectrum of written material to ensure, as much as possible, an unbiased informative

That is, events taking place within the Timor-Leste territory. Or as ‘Timor Timur’, or as ‘Portuguese Timor’. A note of further information on the name: Timor means ‘east’ in Tetum and Leste means ‘east’ in Portuguese. In 2002, many Timorese rather wanted to call the country Timor Lorosae, which means ‘Timor of the rising sun’. 3 4

PROLOGUE

53

picture of events. UN documents, policy articles, and prior research on Timor-Leste are the sources primarily utilized. However, the availability of detailed gender-specific material on Timor-Leste is still relatively limited, particularly that containing statistics or material portraying men’s situation compared to that of women. In spite of the 1997 policy on gender mainstreaming (which included directions for the collection of information and UN documentation to enable analysis), even general UN documentation does not include much on gender-specific differences. Therefore, interviews were conducted during research visits to the UN in New York and to Timor-Leste to complement the written material.5 A central observation is that there exists a divide between ‘womenfocused’ material and ‘general’ material. These sources differ to some extent in their descriptions which leaves two possibilities. The first is that the general material foremost describes men’s situation. However, the description in the general literature and documents is often on a different analytical, or detail, level than that describing women’s situation. The second possibility is therefore that the situation for men on the same social level as most women portrayed is not fully captured. In addition, women-focused material is, at times, primarily focused on adding women-specific information. In so doing, it does not describe how women were affected by the total situation. A hypothetic example: both women and men are targets of lethal violence in a conflict, but only women are additionally the targets of sexual violence. Under such a situation, the women-focused material will primarily describe the use of sexual violence and not how much of the total violence, in all its forms, that was directed at women and how much was against men. In contrast, the general material very rarely specifies at all if it is about women or men. A similar problem along the same line arose when setting up and carrying out interviews to complement the written material. When the word ‘gender’ was specifically included in the questions, it was primarily women’s situation that was described. In such a situation, for example, when asking the interviewee to compare the level of

5 Due to considerations of the privacy of the interviewee, the information is most often referred to as ‘private communication’. Concerning the interviews, the new conflict that broke out less than a month after the last interviews had been conducted in Timor-Leste complicated potential follow-up with interviewees. To ensure that information was correct, other persons with competence on the respective areas read drafts of the description.

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violence against men and women, many were surprised to be asked about men’s situation (given that the level of violence that men are subject to turned out to be quite substantial, this was the more interesting). The interview was more fruitful, and more likely to portray a reasonably more ‘equal’ description, if questions of men’s situation were asked first and then the interview ‘broadened’ to include women. Other potential, very relevant, interviewees refused interviews because they claimed not to know anything about ‘gender’ and referred me to others who had worked on ‘women’s issues’. When attempting to persuade them by referring to questions on men’s situation in, for example, the military or police, the response was often a surprised ‘Why are you asking about this? I thought you were looking at gender issues’. A conclusion is that in spite of the work to widen the understanding of gender and gender power-relations in recent years, gender still does not naturally include a comparative or relational perspective between men and women. There also appears to be a common misconception that examining general policy is irrelevant as it does not affect women along with men, and that certain policy is ‘non-gendered’ by definition. Thus, there still remains an unabridged divide between those who work on ‘gender’ (entailing only women) and those who work on more ‘general’ questions (i.e. men on a more abstract level) although both, ironically, conduct work with clear gender specific effects. Obtaining a well-balanced material that could capture and compare men’s and women’s situation equally, was therefore a challenge. This empirical part of the study should be read with that in mind. 3.2

OVERVIEW OF TIME-PERIOD AND OPERATIONS

Timor-Leste, until May 2002 more generally known as East Timor, is located on the eastern half of the small island of Timor, just north of Darwin on the Australian mainland and within a string of Indonesian islands.6 In 1999, it had a population of about 900,0007 6 The other half of the island, West Timor, was a Dutch colony and became a part of Indonesia when the country established independence from Holland in 1945–1949. 7 No census has been conducted since 1990, and even then, the credibility of demographic data is hampered by the Timor-Leste population resisting co-operation with Indonesian authorities. In addition, this census does not consider migration

PROLOGUE

55

with a GNP per Capita of $331, making it one of the poorest countries in the world.8 Forty percent of the population lives in poverty, spending less than $0.55 per day. Timor-Leste is to a large extent a rural country, and poverty is more widespread in the rural areas than in the urban centers. The country has one of the highest fertility rates (7.77 in 2004) in the world (Lundahl and Sjöholm 2005). By 2005, over 67 percent of the population were under the age of 25, and 20 percent were under 5 years old (United Nations Development Programme 2006, 8). The majority of the population lives on smallscale farming, and the main country GDP revenues come from oil and coffee exports. The country was colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century. The country remained a Portuguese colony until 1974–1975, intersected only by Japanese occupation during World War Two. In December 1975, following a four-week-long Timorese civil war and a week of self-proclaimed independence, Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia. The subsequent occupation was continuously under attack from armed Timorese groups and from international critique. With the political developments taking place in Indonesia in 1998 and 1999, the new Indonesian regime begun to indicate, particularly through discussions in the good office of the UN, that it could consider holding elections to determine Timor-Leste’s status within Indonesia. The terms were settled in 1999 in the 5th of May Agreements, signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, and recognized by the Security Council in resolution 1236(1999). This agreement concludes that if autonomy was rejected by the people of Timor-Leste, Indonesia would recognize the territory’s independence. The UN, through ‘United Nations Mission in East Timor’ (UNAMET)—created by Security Council resolution 1246(1999) and modified and prolonged in resolutions 1257(1999) and 1262(1999) in the following months—organized the elections on (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999, 51). What has been noted is that Timor-Leste has had two periods of population decline. The first was during Japanese occupation (1941–1945), and the second was during the Indonesian occupation (1975–1999). Estimates differ, but it is argued that some 60,000 people were killed during the Japanese occupation and in the fighting that took place on the island. Between 9,000 and 200,000 are estimated to have died or fled as a result of the Indonesian intervention and following occupation. Sexual violence was common in both conflicts (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999, 74; Webb 2004, 42). 8 For an overview of the economic development from 1996 and forward, see Mats Lundahl and Fredrik Sjöholm (2005) and United Nations Development Programme (2006), particularly the appendixes.

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August 30, 1999. Of the Timorese electorate, 78.5 percent voted in favor of independence. From September 1, and further intensified by the UN declaration of election results on the 4th, there was a serious escalation of organized violence by local militia, and segments of the Indonesian National Army. On September 20, the ‘International Force in East Timor’ (INTERFET)—sanctioned on September 15 by Security Council resolution 1264(1999) and consisting of 22 countries under Australian command—was sent in to halt the violence, the organized looting, and the systematic destruction of buildings and infrastructure. ‘United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor’ (UNTAET) received a mandate in resolution 1272(1999) on October 25, prolonged and developed in resolutions 1338(2001)9 and 1392(2002), to assist Timor-Leste in establishing independence. This operation had both peacekeeping and peacebuilding components in its mandate. On May 20, 2002, after being under UNTAET administration for two and a half years, the independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was declared. UNTAET was concluded on the same day and was succeeded by the ‘United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor’ (UNMISET). Based on Security Council resolution 1410(2002)—prolonged and specified in resolutions 1473(2003), 1480(2003), 1543(2004), 1573(2004)—UNMISET had an executive policing mandate (which ended May 10, 2004). In addition, the operation provided support (primarily through advisors) to the Timorese government. UNMISET’s peacekeeping force and police component were both systematically withdrawn over the following years as security had improved. During its last year, UNMISET was a supportive mission with no executive power. UNMISET was finally concluded in May 2005 but a few of its assignments, judged in need of further international support, were taken over by the, even smaller, ‘United Nations Office in Timor-Leste’ (UNOTIL) (mandated by Security Council resolution 1599(2005). UNOTIL had a one-year follow-up mandate with some advisory positions to the government and support to the Timorese police. The

9 The Security Council also adopted resolution 1319 in September 2000, but this resolution was foremost related to events on the border to Indonesia, for example, condemning the murder of international staff in Timor-Leste, the responsibility of Indonesia to handle the militia in West Timor, and the need to investigate the humanrights abuses conducted by the militia and Indonesian army during the 1999 crisis.

57

PROLOGUE

operation had a purely peacebuilding mandate and no peacekeeping assignments.10 With the violence that began in Dili in April 2006 (set off by events related to the desertion/strike and resulting dismissal of a section of the new Timorese military in February–March), UNOTIL’s mandate was prolonged until August in resolution 1690(2006).11 This empirical study focuses on events taking place from June 1999 to March 2006 (handling the establishment and formation of independence). An overview of the operations in the June 1999 to March 2006 time period can be outlined as follows: June 99

Sept

Oct

Feb 2000

May 2002

May 2004 May 2005

March 2006

UNAMET

INTERFET

UNTAET

UNMISET UNOTIL

Figure 1: UN Operations in Timor-Leste June 1999 to March 200612 10 Which proved to be of particular relevance for how gender was perceived in UNOTIL compared to UNMISET. 11 Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia sent a new peacekeeping force of about 3,200 troops and police to handle this new internal conflict, fueled by internal regional antagonism between ethnic groups from east and west; internal power struggles between political factions in Dili, the military and police, and the major political parties, and severe poverty and widespread unemployment, particularly among youths. On August 25, the Security Council concluded UNOTIL and established ‘United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste’ (UNMIT), to assist the Timor-Leste government create security and political stability. 12 Apart from UNMISET, which decreased drastically in personnel size and mandate responsibility after May 20, 2004, operations are symbolized in terms of approximate size of personnel.

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UNAMET—United Nations Mission in East Timor, June 11, 1999 to October 25, 1999. Electoral mission. INTERFET—International Force in East Timor, September 15, 1999, to February 23, 1999. UN sanctioned peace enforcement and peacekeeping force led by Australia. UNTAET—United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, October 25, 1999 to May 20, 2002. Peacekeeping, as well as police and civil administration, i.e. peacebuilding, operation. UNMISET—United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, May 20, 2002 to May 20, 2005. Peacebuilding support mission with police and peacekeeping components (had an executive policing and defense mandate until May 20, 2004). UNOTIL—UN Office in Timor-Leste, May 20, 2005 (to August 25, 2006). Peacebuilding support mission.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEXT OF CONFLICT: TIMOR-LESTE 1975–1999 As we discussed in the analytical framework, there are contextual factors which are relevant for gender power-relations. Therefore, this chapter provides us both with more detailed material to understand and develop the concept of gender power-relations and establishes how these power-relations had developed during conflict. This description would thereby increase the possibility to separate operation effects from those of contextual factors. There are two areas of particular importance for understanding the development of gender powerrelations in Timor-Leste when the UN operations intervened. The first concerns the Timorese parties, both their gender balance and the work distribution during the conflict. These parties would have been the ones to determine the development for women and men had the UN operations not intervened. The second concerns the conflict and the effects this had on women and men. At the same time that these internal dynamics were ongoing, developments on the international level were in motion that would shape the future international involvement in Timor-Leste. The last section of the chapter therefore describes these events. 4.1

TIMORESE PARTIES AND GENDER POWER-RELATIONS

MEN’S AND WOM EN’S ROLES CHANGED SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE YEARS CONflICT AND SOCIAL DISRUP TION SINCE 1974. A SIGNI fiCANT NUM BER

OF OF

WOM EN ASSUM ED ACTIVE ROLES IN THE CLANDESTINE LIBERATION FRONT AND THE ARM ED RESISTANCE.

THEY

WERE SOLDIERS, THEY SM UGGLED M EDICATION,

FOOD, ARM AM ENTS, AND INFORM ATION TO THE RESISTANCE M OVEM ENT HIDING IN THE M OUNTAINS. . . .

IN

THE ABSENCE OF M ALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD, WOM EN

ASSUM ED NEW RESP ONSIBILITIES IN TRADITIONAL M ALE INCOM E GENERATION

(GODINHO-ADAM S 2001).1

The 1975–1999 conflict in Timor-Leste had several phases. The most violent parts of the conflict were the initial occupation 1975–1979 and 1

Reprinted in Torben Retbøll (2002).

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CHAPTER FOUR

the last crisis in 1999, which were interplayed by the low intensity conflict under Indonesian occupation. All of these phases display gender-specific effects. Prior to the conflict, there are some indications that gender roles had begun to alter in the 1970s, making them less strict.2 Labor roles would continue to alter by necessity during the war. The state institutions and the traditional system, were, however, all male with regard to public decision-making. All the major actors in the 1975–1999 conflict were to be male dominated, both in leadership and number, but with a large number of women as members of the organizations (see CAVR 2006f for further description). Apart from the commonality of male-dominated leadership and participation, there was a wide range of ideologies among the forming Timor-Leste parties. Religion appears to have played some role although that was to increase in importance during the Indonesian occupation.3 At the time of Portuguese decolonization, begun in 1974, independent national Timor-Leste parties were at their formative stages. Fretilin was to become the dominant party, originating as the ‘Timorese Social Democratic Association’. However, the party contained a large number of ideological views, resulting in internal debates between traditionalists, conservative military, Christians, and, among the left of the party, divergent opinions on what sort of socialist ideology to follow. At times these differences led to purges and division (Kiernan 2003, 214–215). A debate on the role of the military, and the power balance between military and civilian parts of the organization, what could be considered as diverging degrees of militarism, also took place.4 An election on the local level, organized by Portugal in mid-1975, resulted in 50–55 percent of the votes being in favor of Fretilin. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) became the second largest party. Both parties were almost totally male-dominated during this time period. Fretilin and UDT favored independence, although UDT sought

2 However, gender power-relations in Timor are hardly discussed in research outside of Timor-Leste until recently, making it difficult to accurately estimate the balance. 3 See, for example, Sofi Ospina and Tanja Hohe (2001). 4 Some elements favored equality between political and military tasks where all was determined by possible political gains. Others saw the military battle as superseding the needs and power of the political structure and political tasks. This power balance between the military and political components of the resistance varied over the entire conflict (CAVR 2006f; Kiernan 2003, 214–215).

CONTEXT OF CONFLICT: TIMOR-LESTE 1975–1999

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a gradual process while Fretilin wanted immediate independence. A third party, with limited support in the population, APODETI, sought integration into Indonesia (GendercideWatch 2000; Kiernan 2003, 204). Fretilin and UDT made an alliance of joint rule, but in August 1975, UDT carried out a coup. When in power, UDT arrested and killed Fretilin members, targeting those identified as communists. The following short civil war was won by Fretilin, which then proceeded to declare Timor-Leste independent on November 28, 1975 (CAVR 2006f, 2; Kiernan 2003, 206). On the side of the Indonesians, who were by now mobilizing for invasion, were a few local chiefs and the KOTA and Trabalhista parties, which were parties founded on monarchist ideology by ‘liurai’ (district rulers) (Kiernan 2003, 206).5 In spite of the commonality of male domination in number and leadership of all Timorese parties, their views on gender power-relations were more limited in range. Communist and socialist parties often have a more radical attitude to changing gender relations, also regarding access to power for men and women. The nationalistic, religious and traditional parties, on the other hand, usually have a more conservative view of gender relations, resulting in maintained inequalities in access to power. Fretilin might therefore be the party with the most radical views on changes in women’s participation in the public sphere. In this party, the question of equality had come up in 1975 when the first woman, Rosa Bonaparte6 took her place in the central committee of Fretilin and questioned its male domination. She was central for launching Fretilin’s women’s organization, called Organização Populwe da Mulhwe Timorense, to support women and organize their participation in the movement. As a result of this work, Fretilin upgraded the question of equality between women and men as an important goal. Women were also recognized as a ’discriminated group’ in the Fretilin-controlled zones (1975–1979) prior to the Indonesian take-over (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; CAVR 2006f; Jannisa 2001; Retbøll 2002).7

5 In December 1975, after a few months of ‘unofficial’ interventions along the West Timorese border, Indonesia launched a large-scale military intervention. 6 Rosa Bonaparte was killed in the initial stages of the Indonesian invasion. 7 During the Indonesian occupation, many Timorese women were organized by the Indonesians (often in organizations for the wives without whose participation, the husband could not advance). Independent women’s organizations were, however, more dangerous to be involved in and therefore had limited public participation.

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After the entire country had come under Indonesian control in the beginning of the 1980s, Fretilin, and its military wing FALINTIL, continued to lead the struggle supported by a large informal network.8 However, the military situation was never in FALINTIL’s favor. The superiority in manpower and resources of the Indonesian army removed any possibility of a military victory. Therefore, Timor-Leste resources were pooled and strategies broadened to include the use of non-military means to maintain resistance. A large effort was focused on national unity (CAVR 2006f ). But even though the strategy was broadened, keeping up the armed conflict, albeit on a very low scale, remained central for upholding the legitimacy for demands of independence (CAVR 2006f ).9 Therefore, military participation, or direct support of the military struggle, remained central for personal political legitimacy. In the interest of unity, the ideological divisions of the dominating pro-independence parties did not prevent them from coming together in different constellations from the 1980s. In April 1998, at a time when the Indonesian government begun to indicate that it could consider Timor-Leste’s status, pro-independence parties formed the ‘Timorese Council of National Resistance’ (CNRT). FALINTIL, originally the armed wing of Fretilin, had already in the late 1980s been transformed by Gusmão into an independent resistance movement for all parties in Timor-Leste (CAVR 2006f, 35ff ). In addition, with the changed political situation in Indonesia during the late 1990s, a number of other organizations critical to Indonesian occupation were forming in Timor-Leste (Soares 2000b, 62–63) but it was still dangerous to belong to these. Women’s organizations, but also student and youth organizations, were among those forming. FOKUPERS, founded in 1997, was one of the most prominent for women. It worked for women’s human rights in the Timor-Leste society and to support women who had been victims of the conflict (WomenWarPeace.org 2005).10 With regard to gender division of labor among the Timor-Leste opposition parties during the conflict, leadership and (official) comThe Indonesians also encouraged women to work outside the home (Interview with Vicenta Guterres). 8 FALINTIL stand for the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor. 9 See the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) report for a more detailed description. 10 See Retbøll (2002, 19) for further description.

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batants in the guerilla forces were all primarily male. Women, and some men, were organized as political cadres (CAVR 2006f) which moved together with FALINTIL and at times participated in combat.11 Female participation was, however, more common in the main infrastructural support of the movements; such as preparation of food, laundry, transport and smuggling of arms, munitions and information, hiding and caring for wounded guerilla soldiers, and assisting in the financing of the struggle. In addition, women kept up the ‘civilian’ support roles of the society in more traditional roles of housekeeping and childcare, but also more traditional male roles in economic production, while husbands, fathers, or brothers were involved in the military organizations. How this was organized in detail varied over the course of the conflict as the structure of the resistance changed (see Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; CAVR 2006f; ETAN ca 1999; GendercideWatch 2000; Rede Feto Timor Lorosae 2000; Roynestad 2003). Fretilin’s women’s organization, Organização Populwe da Mulhwe Timorense, promoted “the emancipation of women in all aspects of life” (WomenWarPeace.org 2005). Apart from mobilizing women, the organization also worked to improve the health of women in the resistance, and to ensure women’s needs in society in general (WomenWarPeace.org 2005).12 There were, however, diverging views on what roles women were allowed to play in the clandestine movement as the opinions of some were that “some things were too dangerous for women to do,” although women were already performing those roles in other parts of the independence movements.13 When the conflict moved into a phase where non-violent methods became more prominent, women constituted a large part of the participants in demonstrations and other manifestations against Indonesian occupation (Mazon 2005). On the Pro-Indonesian side—completely male dominated—militia groups begun to form already in the 1970s. The first, Halilintar, was formed around 1977.14 The main groups in the 1999 events—such Personal, communication, Dili, and with Edward Rees. The women’s organization also organized the first women’s conference in Timor-Leste in November 1998 where violence against women during the occupation was brought forward and the role of women in the resistance underlined. Later in November the same year, women’s organizations held demonstrations in Dili on the “International Day Against Violence of Women” (WomenWarPeace.org 2005). 13 Personal communication, Dili. 14 Dissolved in the 1980s and re-formed in 1995. 11

12

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as Saka, Mahidi, Besi Merah Putih and Aitarak—were formed at the end of the 1990s and increased in number after the Indonesian government begun to change its position on Timor-Leste. By 1999, all 13 districts had a militia group. A newspaper reports over 7,000 members.15 All militias were male-led, and the manner in which the groups were set up indicates a focus on only male participation. For example, one was started as a youth group, teaching mechanics and carpentry (GendercideWatch 2000; General Assembly 2000; Human Rights Watch April 1999; Kiernan 2003, 221). Saleh Abdulla and Henri Myrttinen state that the majority were male but there were a few women in administrative functions, similar to the situation in the regular Indonesian military forces on Timor (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004). A high degree of men were also ‘recruited’ against their will into the militia during the post-ballot crisis (GendercideWatch 2000; United Nations 1999a; United Nations 1999c) and there is only one report of a woman being forcefully recruited (General Assembly 2000).16 The militia were sponsored, and partly organized, by the Indonesian Army (General Assembly 1999; Kiernan 2003, 224). Apart from the militia, Indonesia had about 32,000 troops involved in the Timorese conflict in the 1970s, and had about 10,000 reserves in West Timor. At the beginning of the 1990s the Indonesian troop numbers had decreased to about 20,000, but these contained a growing number of locally recruited Timor-Leste troops.17 These troops were all male. The process of recruiting internal troops had begun already in the 1970s and by 1978, Indonesia had organized two Timor-Leste battalions.18

15 By 1998, the UN estimates the number of militia groups to 22 (General Assembly 1999). 16 Women were instead abducted during the 1999 crisis, either to be ‘wives’ of militia members, or to be raped. 17 For Timorese men, recruitment was not always voluntary. Even when recruits signed up, economic and security reasons quite often played a substantial role. The same was true for the enrolment into the militia. The reasons for why a man signed up in combination with how he had behaved while in the formal military (or militia), affected whether or not he could be reintegrated into the village from which he originated when the conflict was over or if they rejected him (Interview with Anthony Geddes). 18 To compare troop strength, Fretilin had about 2,500 regular troops, 7,000 militia-men, and about 10,000 reservists in the mid-1970s. During the occupation, FALINTIL was much weakened. Perhaps as a result of the decreasing number, Fretilin changed its tactics and came to make more active use of non-violent urban protest (Kiernan 2003, 208; 222–223).

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Thus, with regard to work distribution, Timor-Leste follows the pattern of a society with strict divisions between male and female roles. This can be seen in the male-dominated organizations and women’s roles changing in the sense that they become more active outside the home sphere, for example, in support functions of the resistance but also as armed combatants. These gender roles, in turn, had effects on how a person was targeted by, or protected from, violence. 4.2

CONFLICT AND GENDER POWER-RELATIONS

Although direct lethal violence in the 1975–1999 conflict was used against both men and women, men were the main targets. Violence was used both in regular fighting between the military units, as well as in keeping control of the Timor-Leste civilian population. In addition, in the early years of the conflict (1975–1979), many civilians of both sexes got killed when they became trapped together with the guerillas as the Indonesian troops used bombing, fire, and heavy shelling in attempts to end the conflict (CAVR 2006f; GendercideWatch 2000; Kiernan 2003, 210–212; 220–221).19 In the years of low-intensity conflict that followed when Indonesia had gained control of the entire island (from the beginning of the 1980s until 1999), there was still a relatively high degree of violence used, both lethal and non-lethal. Men were the main targets as they conducted most of the fighting and held higher positions within the political organizations. Torture upon capture by Indonesian troops or while in prison was frequent. Of the Timorese women, those involved in the infrastructure of the guerilla movement were the main targets. Women could also be targeted to indirectly hurt male family members involved in politics or warfare (CAVR 2006b, 253). For women, lethal violence was often preceded by sexual violence. Cases of sexual violence against men were reported but was even more taboo to discuss than sexual violence against women (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; Carey 2001; CAVR 2006c; Klute 2001, 218–219). For women, as with other forms of violence, sexual violence was most often directed against women who worked as political activists or who were related to male

19 See particularly the CAVR report for detailed information and eyewitness accounts.

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political activists (ETAN ca 1999; GendercideWatch 2000; General Assembly 1999). In non-fighting, civilian, situations, men were still the main targets of violence, imprisonment, and torture (CAVR 2006g). Rede Feto, a women’s network, reports of villages where all men had been killed (Rede Feto Timor Lorosae 2000). As regards civilian women, or women not involved in any aspect of the conflict (either supportive or direct), they could still be targeted with violence used to control the population. This violence entailed everything from lethal physical violence, torture, rape and sexual violence, to forced marriages to Indonesian soldiers stationed in Timor-Leste. Sexual slavery was also present. During the Indonesian occupation, the sacrifice of one woman, or a group of women, by a village to work as sex slaves to Indonesian soldiers (as a price to ensure security for the community) took place on a number of occasions (CAVR 2006c). The vulnerable situation of not only men but also women contributed to a change in the perception of violence against women. With the high degree of violence against women from the Indonesian army, women’s rights to protection from violence became a debated issue within Timor. This then spread to include domestic violence, and was the focus of forming women’s organizations, such as FOKUPERS. The conflict also affected the Timorese population in other respects, such as starvation and lack of health care. Forced sterilization, forced abortion, or forced use of contraceptives, mainly in the form of Depro Provera (which can be given as an injection with an effect that lasts 3 months), were reported to have been used at Indonesian-run prenatal clinics (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; ETAN ca 1999; Godinho-Adams 2001). The Timorese/international commission examining human-rights abuses and violence during the occupation, did not, however, find any support of forced sterilization being used as a method of genocide.20

20 UNTAET launched the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR for short) in July 2001 at the suggestion of CNRT. The purpose of the commission was to examine all cases of human-rights abuses from October 1974 until October 1999, and facilitate reconciliation between victim and culprit in minor cases. By the end of 2003, over 1,100 offenders had entered into a reconciliation agreement, for example, prescribing to offer an apology, or rebuild property that they had destroyed. Caplan claims that in Timor-Leste, reconciliation is important and that the other judicial models introduced, which were based on Western models of justice, did not include that concept (Caplan 2005, 66–67). CAVR concluded its final report in January 2006.

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However, the commonality of the rumor indicates a strong distrust of the family planning programs enforced by the Indonesians, which also involved the Indonesian army (CAVR 2006d). Many Timorese women, therefore, instead chose church- or NGO-run medical centers, which had even less access to resources than the Indonesian-run clinics (ETAN ca 1999; Retbøll 2002). There are reports of a difference in long-term effects of violence for men and women due to the perception of sexual violence in the Timor-Leste society. A member of a women’s organization states that: “Why is it that men who are tortured by the military forces are seen as heroes, whereas women who are tortured (including rape) are seen as traitors?” (Oxfam Community Abroad 1999).21 Women who have been raped were often ostracized and considered an ‘embarrassment’ to their families. Children born of these rapes were treated in the same manner (Carey 2001; CAVR 2006c; Harris 2002, 23; Retbøll 2002). During the occupation, these women often did not have any alternative but to turn to prostitution, primarily ‘serving’ Indonesian soldiers, in order to support themselves and their children (ETAN ca 1999). During the 1999 crisis, it was the militia and parts of the Indonesian army which conducted the violence. Fretilin, and its armed troops FALINTIL, refrained from violence as this might be used as an excuse for continued Indonesian presence. Therefore, FALINTIL forces chose voluntary cantonment. Instead, men of the militia were the main perpetrators of violence, but also soldiers (all male) of the Indonesian army—mainly those which had been recruited from Timor-Leste—participated. Violence followed a similar format as under occupation but was increased in intensity (GendercideWatch 2000; Jones 1999). Approximately 2,000 people, the absolute majority (primarily young) men, were killed. As males were also the main targets of violence, many were forced to flee, leaving women, children, and old people behind. Sexual violence against remaining women was frequent. An investigation by the UNHCHR describes the situation for women as such: Because the men fled to the mountains, the women were targeted for sexual assault in a cruel and systematic way . . . While in general, the militia refrained from killing women, they were subjected to humiliation

21

Reprinted in Susan Gail Harris (2002, 23).

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and different forms of harassment that included, stripping and sexual slavery. Women and children were also victims of forced displacement into exile (General Assembly 2000).

Apart from the physical violence, the main cities of Timor-Leste were burned, destroying some 60–80 percent of the infrastructure, such as health, education and electricity. Somewhere between 250,000 and 550,000 people, some even claim up to 90 percent of the population,22 were displaced, either within the country or to West Timor.23 Indonesian immigrants to Timor-Leste fled back to Indonesia, many of which constituted the educated elite, such as teachers or doctors, and those working in the civil administration of Timor-Leste (see Chopra 2002; da Costa and Soesastro 2002; Department of Public Information 2002; Dobbins et al. 2005; GendercideWatch 2000; General Assembly 1999; General Assembly 2000; Kiernan 2003; La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 2002, 3; Taylor 1999; United Nations 1999c).24 In conclusion, at the time the UNTAET operation was introduced, the country had seen some changes in gender power-relations. This was a result both of women’s and men’s participation and vulnerability during the conflict, and the forming of women’s organizations. The country, however, remained very gender unequal if measured in access to decision-making and resources. As ‘gender’ (equaling ‘women’) was considered as a separate topic, instead of as a part of the structure of conflict and its reconstruction in all areas, women’s needs would come, in some sense, to compete with ‘non-gendered’ (i.e. male-focused) reconstruction. Moreover, the destruction of large parts of the country’s infrastructure and buildings, the uprooting of the majority of the population, and the serious, wide-spread, physical and psychological trauma would place enormous pressure on the international and national parties.

See James Dobbins et al. (2005, 155). Of those who had voted for autonomy, some left voluntarily for West Timor, fearing civil war or revenge from those who had voted for independence. Many others were forced to travel to West Timor by the militia (Crouch 2000, 172). 24 The government of Indonesia promised to investigate human-rights abuses in Timor-Leste while the International Commission of Inquiry has remained hesitant in its attitude to such a solution (General Assembly 2000). 22 23

CONTEXT OF CONFLICT: TIMOR-LESTE 1975–1999

4.3

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THE TIMOR-LESTE CONFLICT AND THE UN

In some respects, Timor-Leste’s history is as much a history of international involvement as it is dependent on internal events. From the mid-1500s until 2002, the country was almost continuously under external control. In the UN, Timor-Leste had been on the agenda since the General Assembly included the territory on its list of self-governing territories in 1960. And, in fact, internationally, the solution to the ‘East Timor question’ was to, in part, develop independently of Timorese demands and needs. But in order to understand the international context which formed the operations, it is relevant to take a step back and consider the ‘international’ history of Timor-Leste. Aside from the period of Japanese occupation, Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony from the mid-1500s up until 1975.25 But even though international involvement has been continuously present, the effect on the country has varied. The areas around the capital Dili and the city of Baucau were the most affected, while the rural regions, where the majority of the population lives, remained primarily under internal control by a traditional, regionally based, system.26 This is because colonization was foremost directed at the capital Dili and the harbor of Baucau, ensuring access to Sandalwood trees for exports (Suter 1997). During World War Two, the country was drawn into this conflict (though Portugal was neutral) as Australia sought to head off Japanese expansion by landing troops on the island. Under Japanese occupation, a Japanese-Australian conflict was fought on Timorese soil. The Timorese assisted the Australian soldiers, and thereby became the target of violence from the Japanese soldiers. The institutionalized sexual slavery of local women used by the Japanese military in occupied areas, such as in Korea, was also practiced in Timor-Leste (CAVR 2006e; The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 2006). After World War Two, Timor-Leste was returned to Portugal. The other half of the island, West Timor, which was a Dutch colony, was integrated into Indonesia when it gained independence in 1949.

25 A colonization which formally lasted until Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002. 26 The colonizer did, however, attempt to play out Timorese parties against each other to ensure that no unified resistance to colonization existed (CAVR 2006e; Ospina and Hohe 2001).

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Timor-Leste was placed on the list of self-governing territories of the UN General Assembly in 1960.27 This first General Assembly resolution (1514) on Timor-Leste considers equality between men and women as central in the transformation of colonies to independent states. However, this was not brought up in later resolutions, nor was it visible when the actual decolonization was commenced. Decolonization begun after the change in the Portuguese government in 1974. After a short period of internal conflict in Timor-Leste, ending in independence and rule by Fretilin, the country was affected by the Cold-War dynamics. The self-declared independence was terminated by Indonesian invasion in December 1975. However, as the Timorese people’s right to independence had been recognized by the UN in 1960, Portugal was blamed for not ensuring the successful transfer of Timor-Leste to independence. The Indonesian invasion, and following occupation, was additionally “deplored” internationally.28 In 1976, the area was annexed into the Indonesian republic. Indonesia claimed it had Timorese support for this decision, but the integration was still not recognized by the United Nations.29 Australia was the only country that recognized de jure annexation (which it advocated from 1979 into the 1990s), but about 30 countries, among them the US and Sweden, explicitly or implicitly recognized the integration (CAVR 2006a, 20–21; CAVR 2006e). As internal resistance to Indonesian occupation continued, the ‘East Timor Question’ remained on UN’s agenda. For example, the Santa Cruz massacre of November 12, 1991, led to severe international critique.30

27 For the view of the UN on self-governance of ‘East Timor’, or ‘Portuguese Timor’, see General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), of December 14, 1960 and resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960. For a detailed discussion on the role of international actors for the occupation of Timor-Leste and independence struggle, see CAVR (2006a; 2006e). 28 See Security Council resolution 384 (1975). 29 See Security Council resolutions 384 (1975), and 389 (1976). See also, General Assembly resolutions 3485 (XXX), 12th December 1975, 31/53 of December 1st 1976, 32/34 of November 28th 1977, 33/39 of December 13th 1978, 34/40 of November 21st 1979, 35/27 of November 1980, A/RES/36/59 from the 24th of November 1981, and A/RES/37/30 of November 23rd 1982. In the later resolutions from the General Assembly, the role previously given to equality between men and women in the resolutions from 1960 is not included. In the UN, Portugal remained the legitimate administering Power until Timor-Leste independence in 2002. 30 In this incident, the Indonesian Army opened fire on a demonstration, killing over 270 people at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. This demonstration followed

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Already before 1991, however, resolution 37/30 (November 1982) had requested that consultations should be set up by the UN Secretary General with the parties to the conflict. These consultations begun in July 1983 but were not to be fruitful until the late 1990s, when the Indonesian political situation changed with Suharto’s resignation. The new Indonesian political leadership (under economic pressure due to severe recession) was more open to reviewing the question.31 On May 5, 1999, the government of Portugal (internationally continuously considered legally responsible for the territory of its ‘former’ colony), the government of Indonesia, and the UN, signed an agreement prescribing a popular vote on autonomy in Timor-Leste. No Timorese parties were signatories to the agreement. The popular consultation included two options: autonomy within Indonesia or independence. If the suggestion for autonomy was rejected, Timor-Leste would gain independence (Taylor 1999; United Nations 1999b).

from a mass for a youth killed by the military a few days earlier (Suter 1997, 15–16; Taylor 1999, xii–xv). 31 Megawati Sukarnoputri in the opposition, as well as the Indonesian Armed Forces, were against the holding of a referendum (Taylor 1999, xviii–xix). Therefore, there was fear internationally that if elections were postponed for some reason, they would be permanently cancelled.

CHAPTER FIVE

PEACE OPERATIONS INTERVENE 1999–2006 In the middle of internal conflict developments, and as a result of negotiations at the international level, the first UN operation, UNAMET, was created in June 1999. From that time, UN operations were to remain involved in Timor-Leste’s creation, and consolidation, of independence. This chapter continues to describe developments relevant for understanding gender power-relations while identifying and tracing effects on these power-relations from UN peace operations in Timor-Leste from June 1999 up until March 2006.1 After delineating the general structure of the operations, focus in this chapter is directed at the creation of security from violence and building political structures. These are areas where we would expect to find particularly fruitful suggestions for theory building. 5.1

THE MANDATE AND STRUCTURE OF UN OPERATIONS

The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was mandated by Security Council resolution 1246(1999) to organize the “popular consultation” on the status of Timor-Leste. At its peak, the operation included 1,148 international staff—of which 50 were military liaison officers, and 275 international police—and 4,000 local employees (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 159–160). Registration of voters was affected by serious security problems, where pro-integration militia harassed and terrorized UN staff, and, more severely, the Timorese population. Indonesia had refused international peacekeeping troops, and only allowed a few international police and military observers. As these were mainly there to handle the ballot boxes after the referendum, they had no mandate concerning security. Nevertheless, in spite of violence and harassment, 446,666 people registered (see Chopra 2002; Department of Public Information 2000; Department

1

That is, events taking place within the Timor-Leste territory.

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of Public Information 2002; GendercideWatch 2000; Kiernan 2003; United Nations 1999c). Due to the security situation, there was a three-week delay before elections could be held on August 30.2 The turnout for elections was 98.6 percent, despite the insecure and hostile situation, and 78.5 percent voted for independence (see Chopra 2002; Department of Public Information 2000; Department of Public Information 2002; GendercideWatch 2000; Kiernan 2003; United Nations 1999c). Although the 5th of May agreement contained a promise by Indonesia to uphold security, it could not, or would not, halt the military campaign conducted primarily by local militia, but also by elements of the Indonesian army, against pro-independence supporters (General Assembly 2000).3 After considerable international pressure,4 and after Indonesian reluctance or inability to stabilize the situation,5 Indonesia ‘invited’ a peacekeeping force to handle the crisis. Security Council resolution 1264(1999) gave the operation a Chapter VII mandate. One motivation for the mission, quoted in 1264(1999), is the appalling humanitarian situation, particularly for “women, children and other vulnerable groups” (Security Council 1999d). This Australian-led military intervention, ‘International Forces in East Timor’ (INTERFET), was launched on September 20, after further consultations with Indonesia and internal parties. INTERFET was mandated 11,000 troops at maximum strength, and consisted of 22 contributing countries (Australia with its 5,000

See Security Council resolution 1257(1999). For a description of the connection between the militia and the Indonesian army, see (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 163–170; 193; 197–200; 201ff ). The Indonesian army had, reportedly, run Timor-Leste as its own, and it is unclear how much direct power the central government in Jakarta had over the troops in Timor-Leste (Security Council 1999b). 4 For example, a Security Council delegation visited Jakarta and Dili in September, IMF suspended ongoing discussions with Indonesia on the review of a large loan, the World Bank linked a loan to the halting of the crisis, and the US suspended military sales (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 232ff; Samuel 2003, 216–217; Taylor 1999, xxxii–xxxv). For a description of the insights of the Security Council delegation, and the opinions of the UNAMET staff in Dili at the time, see Security Council (1999c). 5 A UN mission to Indonesia and Dili indicates that Indonesia might not have had control over their troops in Timor-Leste (Security Council 1999c). 2 3

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troops being the largest contributor), and was under Australian command (see Smith and Dee 2003; United Nations 1999c).6 As INTERFET gained control of the country, Indonesian troops were withdrawn from the island (the last troops leaving on October 31). The humanitarian situation was catastrophic. Buildings had been burned, infrastructure destroyed, and the population had fled to the mountains where they had no access to water or food. A factor contributing to the seriousness of the crisis was that many Indonesian immigrants that fled back to Indonesia had worked in the civil administration. Therefore, in combination with almost total destruction of the judicial and executive systems and infrastructure, Timor-Leste stood without official administrational authority and with a destroyed infrastructure at a time of massive human suffering. Due to these circumstances, in addition to controlling the violence, INTERFET assisted humanitarian organizations in delivering humanitarian assistance. Moreover, it became involved in the redeployment of UNAMET, the majority of which staff had been evacuated to Australia along with 1,400 Timorese refugees (United Nations 1999c). The possibility of creating a new UN mission to tackle the situation after the referendum had been raised in the discussions for the 5th of May agreement. This was further developed in discussions surrounding Security Council Resolution 1262(1999).7 When Indonesia had recognized the results of the referendum, the option of a new operation was utilized. ‘United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor’ (UNTAET) was created on October 25, 1999. Due to the complexity of the operation mandate and the catastrophic situation in Timor-Leste, it was to take a substantial period of time

6 For a detailed description of INTERFET’s work, see Smith & Dee (2003). That Australia led the INTERFET mission, and contributed a substantial part of its troops, was against the wishes of Indonesia. This resulted in substantial strain being placed on Australian-Indonesian relations. For example, Indonesia abrogated a security pact between the countries from 1995 (Ambassador Imron Cotan 1 March 2005; Maley 2000). Australian-Indonesian relations were further strained by clashes along the West Timor border in October 1999, a border not clearly agreed on (BBC 09 October 1999; BBC 11 October 1999; Security Council 2000a). As the US supported the Australian landing in Timor-Leste in September 1999, it also affected US-Indonesian relations (see Dickens 1999 for a discussion). 7 This resolution also reflects the deteriorating security situation as it increases the level of both police observers and military observers as well as prescribes new roles for international police and military to be involved. See Security Council (1999a) for a more detailed review of developments.

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before UNTAET became operational. In the mean time, UNAMET upheld a few of the assignments together with INTERFET, but this international staff could not achieve political control. The Indonesian political leadership had left and CNRT and FALINTIL members “moved into the vacuum of local authority” (Security Council 2000a, paragraph 3). Xanana Gusmão took on a leadership role when he returned to Timor-Leste in late October 1999, after having been released by Indonesia.8 This took place about a month prior to the arrival of the head of the UNTAET, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Sergio Vieira de Mello. When the operation leadership finally could arrive, the SRSG “invited” leading Timorese to develop a “proper framework for involving the East Timorese in the administration of the Territory” (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 134; Security Council 2000a, paragraph 4). The delay was partly caused by the planning of UNTAET at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations beginning late, almost two months into the 1999 crisis. The reason was that the UN administration could not prepare for a mission that had not yet been sanctioned by the Security Council. Thereby, the period of planning for such a substantial peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation became very short. Moreover, planning was conducted without substantial input from the Timorese parties, such as the local pro-independence alliance of CNRT. A CNRT representative in NY was informed by the UN on a regular basis, but the UN did not consider it appropriate with any further involvement of the group (Caplan 2005, 168; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 133). The reason was that the UN regarded CNRT as a pro-independence party in conflict with Indonesia. The exclusion caused considerable problems, for example, with food

8 After having led the political and military campaign in the country, Gusmão had been captured in 1992 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in Indonesia. He was released by Indonesia in 1999. Due to having spent a large part of the struggle in Timor-Leste and in Indonesian prison, Gusmão has a very high legitimacy in the eyes of the Timorese population. Many of the others in the political elite had instead spent the struggle as refugees in Australia or other countries which affected their legitimacy. This ties into the veteran issue. Many of those who had fought during the war (and were left with nothing—no work skills, no money, or other resources—at the end of the conflict) felt that they were entitled to compensation and respect when the war was over. A relative deprivation problem therefore arose when the well-educated, relatively rich, Timorese refugees returned at the time of the UN operation and received well-paid positions in the Timorese society while most of the veterans did not.

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distribution during the initial large-scale humanitarian crisis.9 In contrast, the World Bank’s planning of reconstruction programs and community-based development projects included Timorese parties from the beginning (Caplan 2005, 168). Similar to INTERFET’s mandate, UNTAET’s mandate, formulated in Security Council Resolution 1272 on October 25, 1999, was taken under Chapter VII. The resolution established the operation as “. . . an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence” (Department of Public Information 2002). The operation, and particularly the head of the operation, the SRSG, was to exercise all executive and judicial authority. In short: Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development (Department of Public Information 2002).

To accomplish this enormous undertaking, UNTAET was mandated civilian, police, and military, components. The civilian component was in charge of governance and public administration. The staff number of this component was not specified in the mandate, in contrast to the number of uniformed personnel, but was to consist of around 800 international civilian staff and an additional large number of local staff. The CIVPOL component was mandated a maximum of 1,640 police officers, which was to establish and uphold law and order. The military component (replacing that of INTERFET) was mandated 8,950 troops and 200 military observers (Department of Public Information 2000; Department of Public Information 2002).10 Concerning gender-balanced composition, the majority of the leadership in UNTAET was male, and the operation was largely male dominated. How imbalanced the operation was, varied between components, along similar lines as has been observed in other UN The Timorese parties had informal distribution systems developed during the independence struggle. The UN sidelined this structure and attempted to build up a new one which took additional time. (Interview with Kjell-Åke Nordquist). 10 See also Security Council resolution 1272(2000). 9

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missions. There were quite a few female personnel working in the UNTAET operation’s civilian sector, even though this, too, was male dominated. The military was almost exclusively male, with only a few countries, such as Australia, sending a limited number of female personnel. The ratio among the CIVPOL officers was more even, with an estimated 70 percent men and 30 percent women (UNTAET 2001a, 19). Of the staff, a few in the top leadership in UNTAET did have a positive attitude to ‘gender’ in general. One of the military commanders and the head of the CIVPOL at one point worked actively with gender issues within the UN components under their responsibility. For example, a code of conduct attempting to address cultural sensitivities was supported by them (UNTAET 2001a, 19).11 However, there are more examples of the opposite where others in the leadership had negative attitudes to gender, affecting the outcome in other directions.12 Outside of the leadership, however, awareness of genderspecific situations of men and women was very limited in the UNTAET (and the following UNMISET) staff. This is concluded in an evaluation by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which states that “[o]verall, however, it might be considered that the lack of gender awareness among the majority of UN staff restricted the attempts to establish more gender-sensitive policies and programs” (Ospina 2006, 26). With regard to the role given to gender by the UN in the planning and implementation of UNTAET, the Security Council mandate (in resolution 1272) “underlines the importance” of including personnel with “gender-related provisions”. In the first planning of the UNTAET operation, a Gender Unit13 was set up within the UNTAET leadership structure. After considerable turbulence and delays, such a Unit was eventually set up in UNTAET, but on a lower level than first planned. Before the Security Council took its resolution on Women, Peace and Security 1325(2000) in October 2000,14 the Gender Unit’s work was 11 Such as having female peacekeeping personnel conduct body searches of Timorese women, or at least establish metal detectors to decrease the stress for women crossing the border (United Nations 2001). 1 2 F o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , s e e t h e s e c tion on political changes in gender power-relations. 13 Formally called the Gender Affairs Unit. 14 The issue of women’s rights has a long history within the UN organization. The preamble to the UN Charter identifies discrimination based on gender as a universal

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based on the 1995 Beijing Women’s World Conference’s Platform for Action, the Economic and Social Council’s decision on gender mainstreaming in 1997, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Therefore, even before 1325 (2000), UNTAET was bound to include equality as UNTAET regulation (1999/1) lists the Convention among the human-rights standards that all UNTAET public officials were to uphold (UNTAET 2001a, 8). The centrality of the UN leadership for the inclusion of gender specificity in the operation is displayed with regard to the establishment of the Gender Unit. The first effect was negative. In the first drafts of the structure of the UNTAET operation (at that time by the Department of Political Affairs), a Gender Unit was placed in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, that is, in direct relation to the top leadership of the operation. However, the head of the UNTAET operation, SRSG Vieira de Mello, doubted the use of Gender Unit:

problem. The reason for why this was included was due to intense argumentation of the few women within the negotiating teams handling the formation of the Charter. Especially Eleanor Roosevelt can be identified as a leading figure in ensuring that gender was spelt out (Olsson and Tryggestad 2001; United Nations 1996, 1). During the Cold War, the issue of women’s rights and equality became politicized. Arguments and goals were used strategically to forward or to disable policies, in this field as in all others. In fact, that peace and security came to be considered also in the context of equality was partly caused by the Cold War policies. As the West block tried to bring up the issue of democracy and representation, the East block raised peace and security as a counter measure. During the UN decade for Women, 1976–1985, the issue of peace was one of the main themes. At the final conference in 1985, held in Nairobi, the UN came to place the issue of equality in the context of peace and security in its document outlining future strategies, the ‘Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies’. The importance of gender in peacekeeping operations was expressed more clearly in 1995 at the UN’s ‘Fourth World Conference on Women’ in Beijing and was further supported by the Economic and Social Council’s decision in 1997 on gender mainstreaming (Gierycz 2001). Furthermore, in 1999–2000 the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a study of gender and peacekeeping (summarized in United Nations 2000a). This reflects a new objective which calls for gender analysis and placing gender in the mainstream of peacekeeping policy. Although much debated, the goal of gender equality has been furthered as an international norm, to be implemented in the work of the UN’s operations (Challenges Project 2002, 132). When the gender equality norm is reinforced, it affects both the mandate and the organization of a UN mission. Thus, even though equality in the context of peace and security had a rough start, it still resulted in the development of what today is one of the most dynamic fields of equality within the UN.

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I was against the creation of a Gender Affairs Unit for the UN’s Transitional Authority in East Timor. I did not think a Gender Unit would help rebuild institutions from the ashes of what the militia left. I was wrong (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, /63).

When ordered to reduce the costs of the operation by the approval committee of the General Assembly, the Gender Unit was therefore removed from the UNTAET budget and organogram in January 2000. Instead, the idea was to gender mainstream by decentralizing it to the responsibility of the staff of all UNTAET components, supported by two gender advisors further down in the hierarchy of the operation: one in the Human Rights office and one in the Office of Deputy SRSG for Governance and Public Administration. This change met with considerable resistance at the international level. For example, Angela King, the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Women’s Advancement at the UN headquarters in New York, objected to the Unit being removed. After the support by the Special Adviser, support of the Unit by the Timorese women’s movement, and actions taken by Sherrill Whittington (who had been asked (by New York) to head the gender work), a Gender Unit could finally be created. This was now placed in the Office of the Deputy SRSG. Through the cooperation between the Gender Unit and the Timorese women’s groups the view on the importance of gender specific implementation changed in the top leadership. This took place at a meeting between the focus groups and the SRSG facilitated by Whittington. After this meeting, the head of the operation was very supportive of, and actively worked to include, the demands and work of the women’s organizations and the Gender Unit. Initially, however, funds for the Gender Unit mainly had to be found outside of the operation as the Unit did not get a regular UNTAETfinanced budget until November 2000. The reason is that the Unit had not been included in the General Assembly approved structure of UNTAET (Ospina 2006, 17; Roynestad 2003; United Nations 2001, 4; Whittington 2000).15 The delay in creating and funding the Gender Unit resulted in gender mainstreaming not being included in the planning of the UNTAET operation. Instead, some womenspecific considerations were added on afterwards by the work of the Gender Unit. The delay also resulted in the recruitment of national

15

E-mail exchange with Sherrill Whittington.

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staff being postponed, thereby halting capacity building in this area (UNTAET 2001a, 10). The work of the Gender Unit was twofold. First, it was to inform all peacekeeping components of the gender aspects of the mission, and on gender sensitivity. The unit focused on “raising awareness on promoting gender equality in policies, programs and legislation of UNTAET” (UNTAET 2002) and offered gender-awareness sessions to other peace operation personnel and the Timor-Leste police (UNTAET 2001a; UNTAET 2002; Whittington 2000). The Gender Unit also had Gender Focal points, that is, staff with other assignments in the operation that forwarded gender mainstreaming and awareness as an additional task, on the district level (UNTAET 2001a, 16). Secondly, the Gender Unit was to ensure gender mainstreaming of the entire work of the operation in accordance with CEDAW and other internationally established conventions. This was considered as an impossible assignment and work was instead focus on ensuring a degree of gender specificity in key areas of the implementation (UNTAET 2002). The reason for the focus was this. At its peak, the UNTAET Gender Unit consisted of only 6 UN staff (in an operation of about 11,000 international personnel). Informing all new UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel (in an operation with a high turn-over rate) as well as ensuring gender mainstreaming of a mission with a mandate to build a new state, was too overwhelming. Instead the work was focused on getting a support mechanism for equality in place within the new Timorese government, and on ensuring political participation of women.16 This work was conducted in cooperation between the Gender Unit and Timorese women’s NGOs.17 The work with gender mainstreaming and informing arriving personnel was continued by the Gender Unit of the following UNMISET operation. Modules for gender mainstreaming were then developed to be implemented throughout the operations, and the build-up of a Timorese institution for equality of the Timorese governance structures was continued (Ospina 2006, 20). UNTAET was terminated on May 20, 2002, when Timor-Leste became an independent state. UNTAET was then replaced by the

16 17

E-mail exchange with Sherrill Whittington. Interview with Sebastiana Perreira.

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‘United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor’ (UNMISET). UNMISET’s mandate primarily focused on security, such as external defense and law and order. Due to the security situation, UNMISET maintained an executive mandate for the police and defense forces until May 20, 2004, when it was taken over by the Timorese police (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 139–140). UNMISET had a maximum of 4,776 troops, gradually reduced to about 635 in April 2005. Equally important, UNMISET had a component of international police of, at its maximum, about 1,250 personnel. This was also sharply decreased after May 20, 2004. Less emphasis in UNMISET was given to the continuation of building up the public sector. During this time period, UNMISET provided support to the newly independent TimorLeste government, mainly through an advisory system of about 200 advisors (Department of Public Information 2002). While planning for UNTAET had begun late, planning for UNMISET instead began early. This planning met with considerable resistance from contributing countries concerning funding for the civilian peacebuilding component. Only 100 posts were granted by the Security Council mandate (in Security Council resolution 1410 (2002), while bilateral support funded an additional 100. This was still only half of what had been estimated as required by Timorese and international planners (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 139–140). Gender was also given less importance in UNMISET than in UNTAET in spite of the Gender Unit being specified in the mandate. Instead, many UN advisors to the government were not gender aware, and some even questioned the earlier ‘gender specific’ work of UNTAET. In addition, there was no substantial support given to the women’s movements to sustain changes made during the UNTAET operation.18 This was to become even more pronounced in the following mission. When UNMISET was concluded in May 2005, the “United Nations Office in Timor-Leste’ (UNOTIL) was set up. UNOTIL had a mandate along the same lines as UNMISET’s though even more limited. UNOTIL was to conclude UN’s presence in TimorLeste while continuing to provide some peacebuilding support to the government in order for the established political institutions to be consolidated. For this purpose, 45 civilian advisors were mandated along with an additional 10 human-rights experts. The support of

18

Personal communication, Dili, and interview with Tina Redshaw.

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the security structures—both police and military—had been primarily taken over by bilateral arrangements, but 40 police advisors and 35 military advisors to the police units patrolling the border to West Timor were mandated (United Nations 2005). Thereby, as the security situation was judged to have improved substantially, UNOTIL had no peacekeeping assignments in its mandate. When the operations in Timor-Leste were decreased in scope to contain only peacebuilding, the Gender Unit was closed. The reason was that Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) only demands a Gender Unit for peacekeeping missions.19 With United Nations Development Fund for Women, UNIFEM, moving into Afghanistan there was also a drastic decrease in resources, while simultaneously many of the leading women from the women’s organizations moved from NGOs and other central roles into parliament. These three factors resulted in the women’s movement in Timor-Leste almost collapsing.20 Security versus politics? UNTAET peacekeeping and peacebuilding As we have discussed, the planning period of the UNTAET political assignments was brief. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had about a month to plan this complex operation. In addition, unlike the peacekeeping assignments, there were less standard procedures and lessons to draw on for formulating the peacebuilding assignments. The recently (1999) established Kosovo mission was instead taken as a model. To complicate matters, the two simultaneous objectives of leading a state while creating a state came to compete against each other for funds and staff (Suhrke 2001). In addition, it can be noted that apart from the two components of peacebuilding—running the territory and simultaneously creating a viable political system and administration for Timor-Leste by the Timorese—competing against each other, peacebuilding also received much less focus and financial support, both materially and regarding staff, than the peacekeeping part of the operation (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Suhrke 2001). For example, the number of international civilian personnel was less than 1/9, compared to the international military. The mission which was to build the new state, UNTAET, was also based on peacekeeping

19 Personal communication, Dili, and interview with Isabella Watershoot and Tina Redshaw. 20 Personal communication, Dili.

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principles (principles of security and military operations) to which governance was added, rather than peacekeeping being constructed to support the transitional authority given to the operation (Joshi 2005; Suhrke 2001).21 This became even more evident in the following support mission of UNMISET. Despite identified needs in evaluation reports—both by those working in the mission and by Timorese actors—funds were even more limited for peacebuilding in the follow-up missions after UNTAET. The UN, but also bi-lateral contributors, were hesitant to give funds from the peacekeeping budget to peacebuilding activities (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005). Simultaneously, there was a competition for political power developing between the Timorese parties (both old and newly established), as well as between the Timorese parties and the UN operation. The conflict between the Timorese parties and the UNTAET operation had its basis in the unclear formulations in the Security Council mandate and the first assumption by the UN operation that Timor-Leste had neither internal resources nor capacity (Ammitzboell 2006). The slow build-up and limited resources of the governance and administration component of the UN operation soon also came to collide with the expectations of the local population of fast improvements of their life-situation (Hohe 2002; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Suhrke 2001). These differences in implementation climate and access to resources should be kept in mind when we now move to describe UN implementation and its effects in the security and political areas more in detail.

21 There was competition at UN headquarters between the Department of Political Affairs, which historically had handled Timor-Leste, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department of Political Affairs argued that the question was traditionally their area of expertise, as was governance and capacitybuilding. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations argued that with the launching of INTERFET, the mission was now a peacekeeping operation and should therefore be handled by them. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations came out as the winner, and the principles of peacekeeping became the guiding ones (Joshi 2005; Suhrke 2001, 6). Moreover, the UNTAET mandate was formulated along the lines of Chapter XI (on non-self-governing territories) of the UN Charter, and the Security Council discussed giving the UNTAET operation a trusteeship. However, this was abandoned due to the association with colonialism. Given the limited time available for planning, the UNTAET mission was rather an adaptation of the UN mission structure for Kosovo (Suhrke 2001, 7).

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UN

OPERATION POLICY AND

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Security is a central area of peace operations which consists of a number of tasks and involves a large number of actors. For the UN operations in Timor-Leste, mandate formulations on security from the Security Council were broad in order to not unnecessarily limit the work of the operations. Which areas of security that were focused on thereby became dependent on operation planning and implementation, demands driven by local actors, and events that took place while the operations were in theater. Security through military means was primarily at the focus of the operations in Timor-Leste from September 1999 to 2004—that is, during INTERFET, UNTAET and into the UNMISET operation. Security through law and order remained an issue from UNTAET into the UNOTIL operation, but assignments had the largest importance from October 1999 to May 2004. This period had the largest presence of international personnel. Because of theses reasons, we can expect the most fruitful suggestions for theory building during this period. This section describes four security-assignment areas in more detail.22 The first area is security created by the international military peacekeeping forces. Although this remains on the agenda into May 2004, the first year of the INTERFET and UNTAET missions are the most relevant for this study. Thereafter, the international police took over most of the assignments that concerned every-day security within Timor-Leste. Secondly, UNTAET became involved in the handling of military organizations in Timor-Leste. This concerned both the creation of a new defense framework for the independent Timor-Leste (organized in cooperation with bi-lateral arrangements), and the overseeing of the DDR process (conducted mainly by other international organizations). The two tasks became integrated as the creation of the new defense force was to some extent caused by the DDR process. International concerns with questions of establishing a new military organization took place mainly in 2000–2004, although the ‘veteran issue’ and the role of the military were debated throughout the entire time-period 1999–2006.23 International parties involved

22 Partly outlined in previous research on UNTAET as well (see Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005). 23 Given the events of March-July 2006, it will no doubt remain on the agenda.

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were military personnel (both UN and bi-lateral), the UN leadership, the World Bank and bi-lateral aid donors. Thirdly, handled primarily by the international police, UNTAET was to uphold security in Timor-Leste through establishing law and order. This assignment included the construction of a Timorese police force. Internal security, primarily from non-conflict violence, was focused on from late 1999 until 2004, with follow up into 2006. International involvement and influence was most substantial during UNTAET and into the UNMISET mission (until May 2004). The fourth, and last, area of security concerns negative behavior of UN peace-operation personnel (from all operation components) as a potential security threat for Timorese men and women. This was an issue for the entire time period but with the highest expected impact when the number of international personnel was the largest, from 1999 to 2004. After that, the continuous reduction of international personnel is likely to limit potential effects. Establishing security through military means During the 1999 UNAMET electoral mission, security was supposed to have been upheld by the Indonesian army and police. Therefore, UNAMET’s mandate did not include any peacekeeping assignments. In contrast, INTERFET, and the following UNTAET mission, both had mandates under the United Nations Charter’s Chapter VII to establish a secure environment in Timor—in effect, to deal with the behavior of the militia. UNMISET then took over the responsibility for military security from UNTAET. With the end of UNMISET in April 2005, the UN peacekeeping assignments were concluded. This section discusses security events during this time period and how men and women were targeted with, and protected from, violence. Indonesia, observed by a limited number of UN military and UN police officers, had the responsibility to uphold internal security during the UNAMET mission in Timor-Leste, from June to September 1999. In spite of this, there was a substantial degree of violence and harassment. Large groups of militia attacked pro-independence supporters, but also moderate pro-autonomy supporters, terrorized the city areas, and set up check-points on roads to control movement. This took place despite internal efforts to establish a Peace and Security Commission to enable communication between the two sides. In addition, there was international lobbying toward Indonesia to persuade

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it to uphold the agreement on security (Security Council 1999a, 5; Security Council 1999b). In spite of the failure of these measures, the limited presence of UNAMET international personnel—particularly the 50 military liaison officers and the 275 CIVPOL officers—appears to have had a limited positive effect on security by restraining some of the most blatant violence in the Dili area. In the countryside, however, the international presence did not have a calming effect and violence continued unabated (CAVR 2006g; Greenlees and Garran 2002, 160). Whether the international presence resulted in a difference in men’s and women’s security situation in Dili, is not reported. After the election result was announced on September 4, the limited positive effect UNAMET had had on the security situation in Dili was removed. The militia sought to frighten off all international staff and, therefore, threatened, and at times directly targeted, international personnel and destroyed buildings occupied by international staff. In response to the seriously deteriorating security situation, UNAMET evacuated almost all of its personnel. In this post-election violence, pro-independence supporters and their families were mainly targeted. About 2,000 people were killed, the vast majority men, and sexual violence against women was widespread. (CAVR 2006e; CAVR 2006g; Greenlees and Garran 2002, 222ff ). On September 20, after about three weeks of violence and destruction, INTERFET was deployed in Timor-Leste. The military peacekeeping component had the purpose of removing violence conducted by the warring parties. In the areas secured by INTERFET, the level of this violence dropped radically. Due to the force size and weaponry of INTERFET, in combination with negotiations with the Indonesians, the international component managed to gain control of the territory within a few weeks. Oecusse, due to its vulnerable position inside West Timor, was the last area secured. According to the UN, six suspected militiamen were killed in this first phase. These events were examined by the INTERFET’s military police (Caplan 2005, 50; General Assembly 1999).24 After INTERFET had gained military 24 In addition, INTERFET interpreted the mandate of creating peace and security to include arrests of individuals suspected of serious crimes, as well as crowd control, and weapons searches, which increased security further. Awaiting the build up of the international police, the aim of INTERFET was to contribute to internal security (Caplan 2005, 50). INTERFET also established detention procedures to handle arrests pending the creation of a functioning internal judicial system (Caplan 2005, 62).The detainees arrested by INTERFET, consisting mostly of males, had access

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control over the entire Timor-Leste territory, security incidents involving militia, and occasionally the Indonesian army, only continued on a low scale. This took place primarily in the border area toward West Timor and in Oecusse (Security Council 2000a, 6). In the mandating and planning of UNTAET, which was to take over the peacekeeping assignments from INTERFET, militarily-established security continued to be a top priority to ensure a secure environment in which the police and civilian UNTAET components could be set up. At that point in time, prioritizing military security was also reported to coincide with the wishes of the population.25 The Security Council mandate granted UNTAET the largest personnel component for this purpose (for example, the military/police balance was more than four to one).26 In the numerical sense, the UNTAET mission can therefore be considered a military-dominated operation. Politically, however, the international military was subordinate to the civilian and police components. The main purpose of peacekeeping was to ensure a secure enough situation for the civilian components to operate (i.e. a limitation of violence conducted by the warring parties). The official transfer from INTERFET to UNTAET’s peacekeeping troops took place in February 2000 and concerned mainly leadership and formal responsibility. All battalions save one were transferred from INTERFET to UNTAET (Security Council 2000a, 6). The first, and most substantial, attempt by the militia to regain power in Timor-Leste came in May 2000 when the militia sought to exploit the small changes in structure that had resulted from the transfer from INTERFET to UNTAET. This resulted in new deaths, primarily of militiamen but also peacekeepers. All those killed were male. The UNTAET peacekeeping forces and the UNTAET leadership responded with increased presence of peacekeepers in the concerned areas, and

to the ICRC to express complaints about treatment (General Assembly 1999). After the international police, CIVPOL, became operational in the latter half of 2000, the international military and CIVPOL continued to cooperate in situations where there were expectations of increased militia activity. For example, in May 2001, pending the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The purpose of the cooperation was to enable efficient military assistance to the police should the situation deteriorate (Security Council 2002a). There was, thus, a limited continued military involvement in internal security issues even though the work was led by the international police. 25 Personal communication, Dili. As an interviewee put it: “The people was positive to INTERFET and the UN. We had been waiting for them to come for 25 years.” 26 For a discussion and overview of the different pillars of UNTAET and their assignments, see Smith and Dee (2003).

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managed to decrease the level of militia presence and action to a minimum. Problems of militia activity in Timor-Leste continued, however, on a low scale also into 2001, again particularly at the start of the dry season. Though serious, the level of violence as seen in number of dead and wounded is not high even during these periods (Security Council 2000a, paragraph 18–22; Security Council 2000b; Security Council 2001a).27 As the militia, though weakened, remained on the border to West Timor, external security continued to be central to UNTAET’s military components throughout the operation and into the follow-up mission of UNMISET. To solve this problem constructively, external security concerns included improving Timorese relations with Indonesia. This was mediated through intense diplomatic efforts by both the UNTAET and CNRT leadership (Security Council 2002a).28 UNMISET took over from UNTAET in May 2002. It was granted almost 5,000 peacekeeping personnel but as the threat from the militia continuously decreased, the troops were systematically withdrawn. By the end of 2003, the number of troops was reduced to just under 2,000. With the UNOTIL mission taking over in May 2005, peacekeeping was removed from the mandate. However, bi-lateral arrangements, particularly with Australia and Portugal, entailed a continued presence of a handful of international military advisors in Timor-Leste (Smith 2004b). The reduction and eventual removal of peacekeeping assignments was in part due to the reduction in militia capability but also related to the establishment of the new Timor-Leste police force. The new police, assisted by a few international police advisors, took over the patrolling of the West Timorese border from the peacekeeping troops. As the above-related events, as well as the previous description of the conflict context, display, lethal violence of the conflict mainly consisted of man-to-man violence. Non-lethal conflict violence was also high, and this was directed toward both men and women. In general, differences in impact of direct violence are hard to estimate and compare, due to the lack of detail in reporting. However, existing material indicates that the risk of conflict violence for men decreased

27 Men were the main targets, but also women were killed. For example, in April 2001, a woman was shot and killed at the border (Security Council 2001b). 28 See Smith (2004b) for further description.

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drastically as the conflict was ended by the peacekeeping operation. For women, the effect on direct violence of the peace operation is displayed in a study on gender-based violence.29 This reports that violence toward women from a perpetrator outside of the family decreased substantially after the peace operation had come in. 24.2 percent reported violence shortly before or during the crisis, compared to 5.8 percent in 2000. That is, a 75.9 percent decrease in physical violence. Sexual violence also declined sharply, from 22.7 percent to 9.7 percent. The perpetrators during the crisis were, not surprisingly, mainly the militia, the Indonesian military, or the police. After the crisis, 66.7 percent of violence in the public sphere was carried out by a neighbor or someone from the community that the woman knew from before (Hynes et al. 2004, 305–306). Only 6.9 percent reported the abuse to the local authorities or police before the crisis, compared to 13.3 percent in the post-crisis situation. Of those who reported, between 40 and 50 percent did not receive any response to their reports (Hynes et al. 2004, 306). With regard to sexual violence, the women in the refugee group in West Timor were 2.7 times (one in every five women reported sexual violence) as likely to experience this compared to women who fled to the mountains (Hynes et al. 2004, 307). As to the form and seriousness of violence against women, Abdulla and Myrttinen make the observation that the number of killings with fire-arms

29 In this study, ‘gender’ entails ‘women’. The 2002 study was carried out in Timor-Leste to estimate the level of gender-based violence during the year of referendum and crisis and the year preceding the study. The purpose was to get an overview of trends in gender-based violence during and after conflict gathered in a comparable and reliable manner, using a method ensuring comparability to other studies from other conflicts. The violence in the study ranged from verbal abuse to life-threatening violence (Hynes et al. 2004). The results are interesting for the present study as the peace operation is the main factor for the transition from a violent crisis to post-conflict. The sample also displays interesting characteristics of the Timor society on the gender divisions of labor. 54 percent of the interviewed women stated that their husband or another family member provided the main income, while 36.5 percent of the women were the main providers. 7 percent of the women were head of a household. Only 8 percent of the women in the group had not been displaced during the 1999 violence. The majority had sought protection in the mountains in Timor-Leste while 23 percent had ended up in refugee camps in West Timor (Hynes et al. 2004, 301–303). The questionnaire also sought to get a view on how the women perceived the access to public institutions. 68 percent of the women interviewed considered it difficult to get access to police assistance and reproductive health-care (Hynes et al. 2004, 305).

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decreased drastically as the international troops of INTERFET entered. However, they estimate that light weapons such as machetes, are still used in domestic and sexual violence, and in femicide (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004). It can be concluded that the military intervention sharply decreased the level of violence in Timor-Leste. This concerns both men’s and women’s situation in the public sphere. The lethal violence during the crisis, and the clashes between the peacekeeping forces and the militia, were mainly in the form of man-to-man violence. That is, men were both the main perpetrators and casualties of the lethal violence. In addition, sexual violence against women from members of the militia was frequent. Both these forms of violence were decreased by the peacekeeping intervention of INTERFET, and upheld by the peacekeeping forces of UNTAET and UNAMET. Handling the old and new military of Timor-Leste When the Timorese militia either withdrew or was dispersed by INTERFET in 1999, this left the pro-independence guerilla of FALINTIL as the sole military organization of Timor-Leste. This group had substantial local legitimacy, due to its role in the independence struggle, and had voluntarily gone into cantonment prior to elections. UNTAET was not specifically mandated to handle the cantoned FALINTIL combatants, as all military organizations were expected to have been dissolved during the INTERFET intervention. The FALINTIL question was eventually solved through establishing a new military force of Timor-Leste, completed by the end of 2003, and through a DDR process for former combatants. This section follows both the formal and informal role of the military in the new Timorese state, as well as the effects of the DDR process. When INTERFET intervened, the militia withdrew into West Timor, was dispersed, or arrested by INTERFET. That is, the handling of the militia was conducted through military means. Indonesian troops, on the other hand, were handled mainly through negotiations with Indonesia, and were voluntarily withdrawn. This left only one active military organization within Timor-Leste—the FALINTIL guerilla. After being almost non-existent in 1990, the number of active and organized FALINTIL soldiers had risen after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. Mobilization had been further increased by the militia activity at the end of the 1990s. By August 1999, the number of active

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FALINTIL fighters had grown to about 1,500 (CAVR 2006f ).30 In spite of accusations from many civilian Timorese that FALINTIL failed to protect them, the majority of the guerilla had adhered to the self-imposed cantonment during the 1999 crisis on orders by Gusmão and the leader in the field, Matan Ruak (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 172; 230).31 FALINTIL remained in cantonment throughout the INTERFET mission. However, as living conditions for the FALINTIL soldiers and their dependants continued to deteriorate, feelings of marginalization and being demeaned grew. This was to some extent based on frustration with the almost non-existent security role given to FALINTIL by the international operations. This exclusion clashed with the FALINTIL view of itself as central in establishing independence and therefore a rightful participant in the continued work to create security. For example, already in November 1999, there were indications that FALINTIL wanted to be integrated into a formal security force (Security Council 2000b; The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 12–13). The wide-spread discontent in FALINTIL, both with its role and their living conditions, resulted in soldiers beginning to leave cantonment. Some returned home or found jobs outside the military. Still others became a security threat, harassing local communities, or joining criminal gangs. (Smith and Dee 2003, 80–81; The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 7).32 Given the problems of defection and increased demands from FALINTIL, UNTAET formed a ‘FALINTIL Study Group’, and financed provisions for the cantoned soldiers through the regular UNTAET budget. In addition, King’s College in London conducted an independent study of the security situation and future defense needs of Timor. This concluded that there was a need for an ‘East Timor Defense Force’ (F-FDTL) (UNTAET 2001a, 20). The staff 30 The number concerns those that were active and cantoned in 1999. This can be compared to the register of former FALINTIL combatants composed in 2006 which contained 30,000 names. 31 The internal conflict of 1975 had been used as an excuse for Indonesian intervention. FALINTIL also had less access to weapons and resources than the militia groups. 32 This is what feminist research considers a threat particularly to women’s security in the post-war era. This must, however, be considered as a threat also to males as it is very likely that a DDR process can result in both increased man-to-man violence and domestic violence. The material does, however, not give any clear indication of the extent of either problem.

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of the King’s College study also met with women’s organizations which expressed the need to include women in the future security forces. These organizations reported that the extremely limited participation of women in the peacekeeping military component, and in FALINTIL, had reduced the confidence women had in these forces (UNTAET 2001a, 20). The CNRT and the Timorese leadership had originally been against the formation of a permanent military defense for Timor-Leste (Walsh 1999). They had instead argued in favor of a gendarmerie (Sukma 2002, 87–91).33 However, in view of the 1999 post-ballot crisis, and faced with the need to handle FALINTIL, the opinion of CNRT changed (Security Council 2000b; The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 12–13). At the end of 2000, the East Timorese leadership agreed to the establishment of a defense force in accordance with the option in the King’s College Study which suggested a limited military organization with the sole purpose of being a deterrent for external occupation. The option which suggested a special military force for handling internal disturbances was rejected (Security Council 2000b; The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 12–13).34 The new military, F-FDTL, was formally established by UNTAET (Regulation 2001/1) in January 2001, and training was conducted by Australia and Portugal. The new military consisted of two battalions. The first recruited only former FALINTIL combatants who were selected by the political leadership. This battalion was all male, and it completed basic training by December 2001. The second, to which all Timorese between the age of 18 and 22 could apply, came to be composed of both men and women to a male/female ratio of 94/6.35

33 In practice, the Timorese police, and not the military, handle security in TimorLeste. The unclear role of the military resulted in competition and clashes between the two institutions. 34 See The Centre for Defence Studies (2000) for a description of the different options suggested in the King’s College study. 35 Personal communication, Dili, and interview with Edward Rees. Parts of the former troops were also integrated into the new police force. Both local police and local military have male and female staff. The former has 20 percent and the latter 6 percent. Originally, the introduction of female military and police personnel, national and international, was a shock to the Timorese society as many, particularly those in the urban areas, had not come into contact with female military or police before (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; Department of Public Information 2002). There are no clear gender policies within the military (Interview with Edward Rees).

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As the establishment of a defense force fell outside of the UNTAET political structure, it was in 2000 still handled by the UNTAET peacekeeping forces. There was no budget allocation to the defense force from the 2000/2001 UNTAET budget (The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 18).36 Later an ‘Office of Defence Force Development’ was formed, and in 2002, a ‘Secretary of State for Defence’ (which had no staff employed until 2006) was established by UNTAET. Until independence, the UN operation has primary control where the new Timorese military reported all policy and operation matters to the head of the UNTAET operation (Security Council 2002a, 4). Although training and structuring continued, the formal construction of the new military organization was completed by the end of 2003. The creation of the new Timorese military organization did not only concern the formal construction, but also what role the new organization was to have in the independent state of Timor-Leste. In Indonesia—and practiced in Timor-Leste during the occupation—the military had had a dual function which, apart from being responsible for security, prescribed a social and political role (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 164). In contrast, UNTAET defined the role of the new military as purely defensive in character (Smith and Dee 2003, 82; Sukma 2002, 92–93), not giving any role to the military in the politics of Timor-Leste. This was also practiced in the UNTAET operation where peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments were clearly separated. The King’s College study had reinforced this ideal of separating the military from politics (Smith and Dee 2003, 81).37 In the option accepted by the CNRT, the role of the new military was also focused purely on external protection, save assistance to the civil community at times of natural disasters and similar emergencies. The only time the military could be used to handle internal security threats, such as riots, was after a parliamentary decision (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 164). To underline the limited role of the military in future politics in Timor-Leste, an UNTAET amendment was made prohibiting F-FDTL soldiers from joining political parties, organiza-

36 In addition, the UN was hesitant to get to involved in the creation of the new defense force as it could increase the risk of the UN being targeted should the conflict escalate. 37 This was adhered to by CRNT through Gusmão resigning as commander of FALINTIL and the group being dissolved. F-FDTL was then proclaimed as the only legitimate military force of Timor-Leste (Smith and Dee 2003, 81).

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tions, or associations, as well as participating in any political action of such agents. F-FDTL members were also prohibited by UNTAET regulation to make any opinion of a political nature known (Sukma 2002, 94–95). After the UN process had been established and the role of the military had been defined, UNTAET and the Timorese leadership officially considered the question of former soldiers as resolved. Informally, however, former participation or support of the FALINTIL or the struggle continues to grant status and political legitimacy. This was particularly relevant for those in the political elite, while many former soldiers from further down in the FALINTIL hierarchy have been left without support or income after leaving (or being forced out of ) the military.38 Military participation per se does, thus, not automatically provide formal political or economic benefits, although it granted a substantial informal status. In addition, a few of those who had functions in the clandestine network, which supported FALINTIL, received compensation in the form of jobs and political positions (see The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 10–11). Politically, however, veterans outside of the new force were continuously played on by different political groups. As such, veterans remained a central group to recruit to achieve legitimacy for a question, and to forward a political agenda.39 To settle the question of compensation to veterans, President Xanana Gusmão established a series of ‘veteran commissions’ to identify and register veterans of the armed and civilian struggle, both living and deceased. The commission process was started in 2002 and will be completed with final cleaning of data in 2007. No women or civilian men were on the list of combatants, as women had not been formally recognized as such in FALINTIL. This in spite of women having participated in combat in addition to their supportive and political roles in the guerilla movement.40

38 This lies at the base of the tension between those who saw the conflict through, remaining in Timor-Leste and thereby keeping the struggle alive but also not receiving the education etc. that the refugees could, and those who return from abroad after more than 20 years. 39 Interview with Edward Rees. 40 Personal communication, Dili, and interview with Edward Rees. These lists are part of organizing the compensation to former participants for their contribution to independence. This is otherwise difficult to determine in a guerilla war where participation is less formalized than in a regular military organization (Smith 2004b, 288).

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While recognizing the informal importance of the independence struggle, the formal decrease in the role of the military compared to Indonesian occupation can still be argued to constitute a lessening of militarism compared to the period of occupation and armed conflict. That said, having participated militarily or supported the resistance, either directly or politically from abroad, still grants status without which it is difficult to have a successful political career. In that sense, the military ideal still serves an important purpose. This could make political careers for women more difficult as they were not formally part of the FALINTIL as combatants (but instead classified under political cadres although armed and participating in combat). However, as additional kinds of participation and support of the liberation struggle granted a certain status, it does not eliminate women’s participation in politics even through they were not formally classified as combatants. Interestingly, however, interviews note that women’s participation in the struggle for independence is not used as an argument by women’s organizations in Timor in favor of increasing women’s rights.41 A particular aspect of establishing a new military organization to handle former FALINTIL soldiers concerns those that were not integrated in the new military. In the analytical framework it was noted that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) can be a particularly interesting aspect to consider in relation to security equality. This is because a failed DDR process can result in former soldiers becoming a threat. In Timor-Leste, there were incidents of violence involving former FALINTIL members directed at both the population and the UN operations (Candio and Bleiker 2001, 70; Smith 2004b). For example, in Baucau in March 2001, the District Administrator and other UN staff were attacked, and in relation to this incident a mosque was burned (Security Council 2001b, 4). By 2002, “security groups”, involving former FALINTIL fighters that had not been incorporated into the new armed forces and that felt a “lack of public acknowledgement”, continued to exist in some parts of Timor-Leste. These were not considered to pose a “significant threat” by the UN (Security Council 2002a). However, it is unclear exactly to what they were not a threat: to the successful conclusion of the independence process, or to the population.

41

Personal communication, Dili.

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To handle the security threats from, and reintegrate, former FALINTIL members, in addition to effectively reducing the number of weapons in society, a ‘FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program’ was set up in 2001.42 The program focused on creating possibilities to find a livelihood for former soldiers in the male labor roles of crop farming and livestock, fishing, or the starting of a small business. Thus, the program aimed at addressing the needs of male combatants but was also expected to benefit the men’s families (International Organization for Migration ca. 2000). As women contributors had been classified as political cadres, this therefore also had economic effects for women who had participated in the conflict. When the program was concluded in 2003, the United Nations Development Program started a reintegration program for ex-combatants—‘Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for ExCombatants and Communities in East Timor’ (RESPECT for short). As a result of the international debate about reintegration programs, not least concerning gender, the target group was increased from the original focus only on combatants to include “. . . actual fighters, supporting personnel, widows, orphans, but also groups such as the elderly and disabled . . .” (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; Security Council 2001a, 4). The RESPECT program did not include a gender perspective (thereby not considering the potential risk of domestic violence in the post-conflict setting), but the participation of women’s groups was encouraged (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004). La’o Hamutuk has raised several critical points about the program. Of these the lack of communication with the Timorese community and the Timor-Leste government, as well as the almost total exclusion of women in the program, are central (La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 2004).43 UNIFEM has also been critical to the demobilization and reintegration process as male soldiers were given education or funds while women in support functions were not (UNIFEM ca. 2006). While it is indicated that there are security concerns from DDR that can be of relevance for security equality if it affects men and women differently (increased risk of domestic violence for women, or This was organized by International Organization for Migration, United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank. 43 La’o Hamutuk is a Timorese NGO analyzing the work of international organizations in Timor. 42

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increased risk of man-to-man violence for men) and measures taken to combat the problem is not directed to enhance an equal access to protection, the data is too poor to make an analysis. Creating internal security During the UNAMET operation, CIVPOL did not have a mandate to uphold internal security. The 275 CIVPOL officers that were deployed were only advisers and were, in addition, supervising the handling of ballot boxes. UNTAET, on the other hand, was mandated to maintain law and order in Timor-Leste. In addition, UNTAET was to build a new Timorese police force to take over law enforcement. Both of these assignments were hampered by the destruction of the judicial system and infrastructure during the 1999 crisis. To accomplish this, there was also bi-lateral support from Australia and Portugal which contributed to the training. Due to the continuous problems of internal security and slow build-up of the police, the follow-up mission of UNMISET had a component of international police and an executive mandate in the area until May 20, 2004. When UNOTIL was formed in May 2005, the international police were decreased to a limited number of advisers. From 1975 to 1999, the formal justice system, which includes the police, was organized by Indonesia. In parallel, the legal system under traditional Timorese leaders—almost exclusively male—was preferred by the Timorese population. The reason was existing corruption in the legal system, and the use of the system by the Indonesian authorities to control the Timorese population. Moreover, a trial held in the state’s legal system was often more costly than most Timorese could afford. The traditional legal system had, thus, grown quite strong (Soares 2000a, 287–288). During the 1999 crisis, the judicial system was dissolved, and all judicial infrastructure—police stations, arrest facilities, courts, and prisons—destroyed. Many who had worked in the system fled. Due to the destruction, INTERFET handled security both internally and externally. However, as no official rule of law existed, it was unclear what law INTERFET was to uphold, particularly as Indonesian law had little legitimacy in the eyes of the Timorese population (Hohe 2004, 337). In addition, the international military was not equipped or trained to completely fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of the Indonesia-organized police system. As a result, there was a forma-

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tion of gangs including small factions of former FALINTIL soldiers, and increased crime rates (Babo-Soares 2002, 60–62; Caplan 2005, 51–55). The emphasis on law and order in the UNTAET mandate was motivated by a wish to avoid these groups permanently filling the space created when the Indonesian authorities had withdrawn (Caplan 2005, 51–55). Thus, the literally ‘lawless’ situation in October 1999 resulted in law and order being given a high priority by the Security Council mandate for UNTAET. However, this written prioritization was somewhat contradicted by the Security Council limiting the number of CIVPOL officers to 1,640 (compared to the 8,900 military personnel mandated). In effect, CIVPOL would become reliant on INTERFET and the UN peacekeeping troops well into the second half of 2000 to uphold internal security. This need of cooperation was somewhat complicated by the operation leadership placing the international police and international military in different UNTAET departments to underscore the separation between military security and law and order. The separation was supposed to underline the break with the previous military-dominated security culture during the Indonesian occupation (Smith and Dee 2003, 75). Regarding the creation and upholding of law and order, there were several initial obstacles for the UN to overcome. First, the deployment of the international police, CIVPOL, met with difficulties in recruitment.44 By January 2000, only 400 of the 1,640 mandated police positions had been filled. After that, deployments increased, and by November 2000 civilian police, though still limited in number, had been deployed throughout most parts of the country. By the end of January 2001, 1,436 officers of the allowed 1,640, had been deployed (Security Council 2001a). Secondly, there was the question of which law to uphold. As the Timorese with legal education had been trained in Indonesia, UNTAET decided to use a combination of Indonesian law and international conventions. These were to remain law until they were changed by a future Timor-Leste parliament. Thirdly, the looting and violence of the post-ballot period had an effect on internal security also after the threat from the militia had been controlled by

44 CIVPOL officers are often more difficult to recruit than, for example, military units which more ‘easily’ can be recruited and dispatched as a group. CIVPOL officers are most often recruited individually.

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INTERFET. The conflict had created a very large number of people, mainly men, who had committed serious criminal acts or allied with the militia. Many of these men were not welcome back to their original communities. Therefore, at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000 there are UN reports of high degrees of violence and crime, primarily due to unresolved questions from the crisis. There were also a large number of crimes committed due to desperation during the grave humanitarian situation. By the end of 2000, CIVPOL had begun to work with local Timorese community authorities to achieve control of the territory. The level of crime decreased but the situation remained volatile. UN notes in 2001 that “the pervasive poverty and unemployment create social conditions that make it relatively easy to incite people to violence, notably disaffected youths” (Security Council 2001b, 4). In reports, the gender of participants was often not specified, but all those mentioned are male—both as perpetrators and victims. The INTERFET and UNTAET missions had created a more secure situation for men with regard to violence by the warring parties. As the public crime was decreased in 2000, this also decreased the risk of other forms of violence against men (which most often was in the form of crime-related man-to-man violence). However, after the decrease in 2000, violent crimes that primarily affect men were on the rise in the urban areas throughout the rest of the peace operations. Those mentioned in reports mainly involve young males, both as perpetrators and victims (Security Council 2000a; Steele 2002, 83). One of the most common threats to security for men was assault crimes. These were present from 1999 and into 2005, and were mainly the result of poverty, unresolved issues from the conflict and the 1999 elections and from the martial-art culture particularly popular among youths.45 Specific data has been difficult to find but in May 2003, crime rates were reported to be low generally, although 80 percent of all crimes were reported in Dili (which makes about 5.35 reports per day in a city of about 180,000 inhabitants). However, of all reported crimes, violence and assault crimes (domestic violence being a separate category) were reported to be 39 percent, intimidation and threat 8 percent, and attempted murder 1 percent. It was not possible to obtain specific data that could capture if this is lower

45

Personal communication, Dili.

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or higher than before the 1999 crisis. Sources only state that this was part of a social legacy (Gusmao 2003), which could indicate a similar pattern prior to 1999. Regarding gang fights, reported cases in Dili and Baucau increased substantially in early 2001 (Wurfel 2004, 216). In addition, there have been reports that some of the numerous martial-arts groups that exist have been involved in organized crime and inter-group fighting (Smith 2004b, 287). Apart from these forms of security threats for men, tension has arisen between the new Timorese police and the Timorese military after their creation. This stems partly from the unclear division of labor. At times, this tension has resulted in violence between the two male-dominated groups (U.S. Department of State 2005).46 For women, the level of violence in the public sphere clearly decreased as the INTERFET operation gained control of the country (Hynes et al. 2004; UNTAET 2002). In 2003, rape and sexual assault consisted of 2 percent of reported cases of violent crimes (Gusmao 2003).47 However, domestic violence did not decrease and it was also not in focus in the intervention of the civilian police component. The approaches to enhance protection from violence that affects men and women therefore appear to differ. In the gender-based violence study,48 52.7 percent of women in relationships reported domestic abuse—from verbal to physical violence and sexual abuse—both before the 1999 crisis and one year after. 41.5 percent of the abused received physical injuries (Hynes et al. 2004, 307–308).49 Only one woman in the sample had reported the incident to the police, while nearly 50 percent told other female family members or friends (Hynes et al. 2004, 309). Talking about domestic violence outside the immediate family brings shame on the woman and her family which limits reporting.50 For example, CIVPOL judged that only about 15 percent of all cases of domestic violence were reported in 2001 (UNTAET 2002). Other forms of crime, primarily affecting men, were not tainted with the same shame. In December of 2001, the Gender Unit reported that a Personal communication, Dili. This would escalate during the 2006 crisis. As these are sensitive crimes to report in addition to that there might have existed a number of dependency situations, would entail that there can be a high degree of non-reported cases. 48 See page 87, footnote 120. 49 The study reports connections between social factors, (such as, age, education, alcohol) and domestic violence (Hynes et al. 2004, 310–314). 50 Personal communication, Dili. 46

47

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‘record’, of sorts, had been set in more gender-balanced reporting of abuses. That month, 40 percent of all reported crimes were against women and 60 percent against men. Exactly what this entails is difficult to determine but it was the highest percentage of crimes reported against women (UNTAET 2002). By comparison, domestic violence against men is estimated to be very low, between 3 and 5 percent.51 In the study, 9 percent of the women reported that they had abused their partner at a time when he was not abusing them (Hynes et al. 2004). Male victims of domestic violence were, however, even less likely than women to report the abuse due to perceptions of masculinity in Timor-Leste.52 Unlike the other forms of violence—primarily affecting men—that had been on the UNTAET law-and-order agenda from the beginning, domestic violence became an issue for the UNTAET operation mainly through the work of local women’s groups, forwarded through the Gender Unit.53 In a sense, these local women’s groups took the opportunity that the operation provided to forward their excluded security need. Another reason which helped put domestic violence on to the UNTAET security agenda was that many CIVPOL officers, of which about 30 percent were female, encountered a considerable number of very severe domestic abuse cases.54 Addressing crime and abuse when taking place in the private sphere was, thus, not a preplanned part of the UNTAET mission and had to be demanded by local parties and international staff. After the slow initial response, UNTAET begun to actively develop measures to enhance protection from domestic violence. During the mission, the head of the operation made several public statements that resulted in the issue being debated. The support for the local women’s organizations working on this issue also continued. For example, the Gender Unit assisted in the creation of a network of Timorese women’s organizations working against domestic violence.55 Due to the change in situation, and the increase in access to CIVPOL officers, the women’s NGO FOKUPERS noted an increase in the reporting of domestic violence to CIVPOL in 2000. In FOKUPERS’

51 52 53 54 55

Personal communication, Dili. Personal communication, Dili. Interview wit Sebastiana Perreira. Personal communication, Dili. Interview with Sebastiana Perreira.

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estimate, 95 percent of this violence was conducted by a man targeting a woman, which was fairly in line with the gender-based violence study. However, the reporting rates still remain very low, only 70 cases of domestic violence were reported that year (Retbøll 2002). During 2001, this had increased somewhat. CIVPOL received reports on 382 cases of domestic violence that year (UNTAET 2002). On January 22, 2002, the SRSG and the Timorese Chief Minister led a media campaign to get domestic violence recognized as a public problem and a crime (UNTAET 2002). The information campaign by the SRSG and the minister has been continued by schools, NGOs etc. and resulted in increased awareness. It was also suggested that CIVPOL officers, by addressing domestic violence as a crime and taking reports seriously in their everyday work, influenced the perceptions of local police on this issue.56 There were, however, practical problems that limited women’s use of the international police. For women who reported violence, the lack of a common language was an obstacle. Most CIVPOL officers only spoke English, and there was limited translator assistance available. This resulted in the victim having to repeat her story several times, which caused additional trauma. It was made easier if the police officer was female (what was mentioned as ‘woman-to-woman understanding’) but language still made reporting sexual and domestic violence difficult.57 Another problem was that UNTAET’s work, including the campaign on raising awareness and making domestic violence a crime, preceded the build-up of institutions and structures to handle increased reporting by women. Women who turned to the police felt that they did not get the support they needed. The result was a temporary decrease in the number of reports.58 The work by UNTAET and local women’s organizations to get domestic violence recognized as a crime was not uncontested. The UN support for local women’s organizations’ initiative met with serious local opposition as the implementation of the UN campaign collided with traditional power structures. At times, this work was judged to threaten the cultural values of Timor as it was perceived as being enforced by an outsider.59 As the public justice system continued 56 57 58 59

Personal Personal Personal Personal

communication, communication, communication, communication,

Dili. Dili. Dili. Dili.

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to be costly for most Timorese and they felt less in control of this system, this might explain why many crimes of domestic violence were reported to the traditional justice system and not the formal one (United Nations Development Programme 2006, 17).60 The opposition to formalizing domestic violence into a crime did not only come from men. It was observed that women often did, and do, not want to bring formal charges but saw CIVPOL as an alternative form of the traditional structures which previously had intervened in serious abuse cases.61 Similar to how that system was practiced, instead of charges, a woman might want the international police, as persons of authority, to forbid her husband from beating her (which often only worked for a very limited period of time).62 Another aspect was the limited reach of the campaign and the police. In the countryside, the traditional system has remained strong and even if a woman should be aware of her legal rights in accordance with UNTAET regulation (and later Timorese law), there are few if any roads and a constant lack of transportation to enable her to get to a police station to report violence.63 Despite these problems, the result of the work of local women’s organization together with UNTAET and the Gender Unit was a change in the perception of domestic violence. As an interviewee working on women’s rights in Dili put it: “The UN created big change in terms of Human Rights and women’s rights. Now women know their rights when victims of domestic abuse.”64 This took place foremost in the Dili area while the impact was much smaller in the countryside, due to the limited influence of UNTAET (and later the government) there.65 The construction of a new Timorese police was an assignment integrated into CIVPOL’s work and had been considered from the

The government of Timor-Leste was at the beginning of 2006 interested in handling the traditional justice system by studying the interchange between them (United Nations Development Programme 2006, 17). 61 Personal communication, Dili; and interview with Anthony Geddes. In the traditional system, the woman would have turned to her male head of family who would then address the male head of the husband’s family. If his family considered the degree of domestic violence problematic, then they would ask the husband not to beat his wife, or at least not past the point where she got serious physical injuries. 62 Personal communication, Dili. 63 Personal communication, Dili. 64 Personal communication, Dili. 65 Personal communication, Dili. See also S/2002/432. 60

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beginning of UNTAET. The actual build-up, however, would take longer than first expected (Security Council 2000b; The Centre for Defence Studies 2000, 8). As with the launching of CIVPOL, there were issues to consider before a new police force could be formally organized. Therefore, in June 2000, a public prosecution service was set up by UNTAET.66 The model for this judicial system was taken from the Indonesian era, as all Timorese with legal expertise had been trained in that system (Amnesty International 2001). However, in this process, the relationship between the traditional systems and the national legal system was not clarified.67 These judicial problems affected the formal creation of the police by UNTAET. Formally, the new East Timor Police Force was created in March 2000 and launched by UNTAET regulation 2001/22 in August 2001.68 From August 2001 and until May 2004, policing was conducted in cooperation between CIVPOL and the Timorese police (JSMP 2005, 7). During this time period, the Timorese police was first under the control of UNTAET’s, and then UNMISET’s, Police Commissioner (Security Council 2002a, 4). Only after May 2004 was policing left entirely to the Timorese police service (JSMP 2005, 7). In the composition of the police force, UNTAET aimed for a gender balance of about 70/30, which was almost achieved. At the time of 66 A panel, consisting of two international judges and one Timorese, to handle serious crimes, such as genocide and war crimes, was also set up. 67 For example, Amnesty was worried that domestic violence and sexual violence were often brought to the traditional forum instead of the formal legal system (Amnesty International 2001). A Timorese women’s rights activist interviewed by Amnesty found the handling of these issues through traditional systems as contributing to the undermining of law and order. Instead, systems of dowry, and women being forced to marry a men who has raped them to save the family’s honor, were still practiced. In its study, Amnesty therefore concludes that the traditional system of handling violence against women is not adequate to protect women (Amnesty International 2001). In addition, Amnesty was concerned that the Indonesian Criminal Code, as well as the Timorese legal framework to protect women’s rights, do not reflect the latest developments of human rights. They give the example of domestic violence not being considered a specific crime and the definition of rape being too limited in scope (Amnesty International 2001). The Timorese women’s organizations FOKUPERS notes the same phenomenon; the legal code of Indonesia inherited’ by Timor-Leste makes no specific reference to domestic violence. There is an article in the code that refers to torture (article 351) which is used in these cases but, according to FOKUPERS, that is insufficient. They also claim that in the past, the police had not paid any attention to these issues but that this was slowly changing. In addition, many cases of domestic violence do not reach the courts, especially if the accused man has political power (Retbøll 2002). 68 Formally called the Policia Nasional Timor Leste (PNTL).

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the UNMISET’s mission, 29 percent of the local police consisted of women police officers, though few were in senior positions (Ospina 2006, 26). Training of the new Timorese police, was conducted by Australia and Portugal. Formal training was about 3 months, complemented by an additional 3 months learning in the field. The formal training included, particularly for the police officers of the former Indonesian police who had signed up, information on “democratic policing, ethics, human rights and community policing” (Security Council 2001a, 5). This training was judged to be good, but not always adapted to the everyday situation of a police officer in a developing country who will have very meager resources available to him/her when working in the field.69 The training of the police also contained lectures and material on ‘gender’, reportedly of high-quality. This part of the training included information on women’s rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and on domestic violence.70 However, in spite of gender-sensitivity training, and training in human rights, for the new police force, there have been cases of sexual violence and sexual harassment against women from the Timorese police (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; JSMP 2005).71 In addition, the fact that the traditional system has continued to exist in parallel was something that also affected the everyday work of the police, particularly in the rural areas. As Amnesty pointed out, many crimes, such as domestic violence, were often referred to this system (Hohe 2004, 336). Through to 2005 there was also a lack of interest in cases of domestic violence (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004; JSMP 2005).72 By 2005, the human-rights record in Timor was described as decent, but the problems with the national police continued. Those noted most were problems with the under-funded legal system and short training of police in formal police procedures. This resulted in insecurity primarily for males, for example, with regard to rights when arrested.

Personal communication, Dili. Personal communication, Dili. By March 2006, there was a beginning resistance in the police as voices were raised that there was too much focus on women’s rights and not their responsibilities. 71 Personal communication, Dili. 72 Personal communication, Dili. 69 70

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This is also relevant for women, but reports indicate foremost males as victims as they were the main suspects of crime (U.S. Department of State 2005). Training and increased resources are perceived as handling the problem of general crime and abuse. To strengthen police capability to address domestic violence, a ‘Vulnerable Persons Unit’, a direct effect of UNTAET, had been formed in March 2001. This unit works specifically with domestic violence and other crimes against vulnerable groups, such as women and children.73 The Unit is under-funded, like much of the police, but this unit, in addition, lacks authority and status within the police force. Other problems facing the police: the weak distinction between executive and political roles where politicians can use the police for their own means; the lack of accountability; the lack of data and evidence collection. This seriously impairs the work of the Unit. As a result, the Vulnerable Persons Unit remains highly dependent on assistance from NGOs, both national and international, for its work.74 Creating insecurity?—The behavior of UN peace-operation personnel Throughout INTERFET, UNTAET and to the end of the UNMISET operation, there was a large presence of international personnel. In addition, a large number of personnel from other international organizations ( for example, UNHCR, UNHCHR, World Bank, ICRC) and international NGOs, together with journalists etc., were also present in Timor-Leste.75 While the general behavior of the personnel of the UN operations in Timor-Leste was professional, there were cases of

73 Along the same line of argument as that put forward by Carpenter, some men have objected to the fact that ‘men’ have not been classified as a ‘vulnerable group’. The reasons were that the level of man-to-man violence was very high and that they were the targets of the majority of lethal violence during the conflict (personal communication, Dili). The forms of violence that Vulnerable Persons Unit was responsible for dealing with were: “rape, attempted rape, domestic violence (emotional, verbal, physical), child abuse, child neglect, missing persons, paternity, and sexual harassment” (JSMP 2005, 7). 74 Personal communication, Dili. Sebastiana Perreira considers the dependency of Vulnerable Persons Unit on international staff and the UN as a serious problem. When the UN finally withdraws, she thinks that the unit will also cease to exist (Interview with Sebastiana Perreira). 75 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCHR), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

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abuse of the Timorese population. As the number of personnel was the greatest from 1999 to 2004, we expect to find the most relevant observations during this period. Moreover, particularly Dili is likely to have been affected as personnel went there when off duty. UNTAET promised that all international staff holding public duties, or public office, was to be held responsible to human-rights standards (see Mégret and Hoffman 2003 for a discussion). The operations’ military personnel, sent by contributing states, could, however, only be held responsible to the laws in their state of origin. If crimes were committed, the UN operation could investigate, and then dismiss and return the responsible personnel back to their country of origin. However, once returned, whether or not the former personnel member was taken to court for the accused crime was the responsibility of the contributing country. With regard to violence against local men or local women from peace-operation personnel, the international military was perceived with a degree of fear when INTERFET arrived and became established. Though generally welcomed, in some respects the international military reminded the Timorese of the Indonesians; heavily armed, well-protected compounds, and with security controls posted everywhere. However, the behavior of (most) peace-operation personnel after a short while decreased that fear. In combination with the other operation components, the international military was even reported to have contributed to the norm that violence is not the manner to solve conflict.76 This positive view of the international military, however, decreased in strength over time as a result of the behavior of some in the UN personnel, in combination with unmet Timorese expectations of the UN operation. However, there are no reports of women feeling particularly threatened by the arrival of the peace operations, either by INTERFET or by UNTAET, or by personnel behavior in general in Timor-Leste. As the operations proceeded, there were cases of assault of Timorese committed by peace operation personnel, both military and civilian. There appears to have been a difference in behavior when off and on duty. When working, the behavior is reported to have been professional.77 When off duty, however, there are reports of

76 77

Personal communication, Dili. Personal communication, Dili.

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peacekeeping personnel who were on leave in Dili behaving badly, involving alcohol, fighting and drugs.78 In total, there was one case of reported rape of a Timorese woman by two officers from CIVPOL (Amnesty International 2001, footnote 20; Joshi 2005). Members of the Pakistani and Jordanian contingents have been accused of rape (for example, of a young boy) and abuse, a few Australian soldiers of sexual harassment, and some Portuguese soldiers of suspected rape/forced sex (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004). Due to dependency situations, there is also a substantial risk of many unreported cases.79 There have been a few cases of rape and sexual harassment by other international personnel present, such as civilian UN staff, a journalist, NGO-workers, businessmen etc. These groups, together with sections of the peacekeeping personnel, have also been reported to have contributed to increased prostitution and child prostitution in Timor-Leste.80 Enforcement of codes of conduct appears to have played a part in whether negative behavior could be halted.81 However, seminars for UN personnel addressing the question of sexual abuse and exploitation were not conducted until after October 2003, that is, well into the UNMISET mission (Ospina 2006, 20). Personal communication, Dili. Personal communication, Dili. It is not, however, possible in this book to determine the level of threat. 80 In a report by the Alola Foundation, prostitution is indicated to have somewhat increased during the peace operation as it had during periods of occupation, that is, the Portuguese colonial period, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian presence. Trafficking for prostitution by organized mafia network also appeared in Timor-Leste during the operations. Detailed information is, however, limited. By 2004, Timor-Leste had about 250 female and 100 male sex workers from different countries. For a description of trafficking, the sex industry and its conditions in Timor, see (Caron 2004). However, prostitution appears not to have become part of the peace operation culture in Timor to the same extent as it had been in other missions. For example, the client number of each prostitute was much more limited than in other similar peace operation situations (Pisani et al. 2005). There is also a very low degree of HIV/AIDS in Timor-Leste which does not appear to have risen during the occupation or the peace operation (Caron 2004). However, among the trafficked prostitutes, which mainly ‘served’ international staff, there was a presence of HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, even in this group, the number of infected was very low (Pisani et al. 2005). The fact that a large part of the peacekeeping troops, the Australian, were not allowed to stay in Timor-Leste when off duty might have served to keep prostitution down in Timor-Leste. There are, however, indications of a high number of relationships between peacekeepers and Timorese women, resulting in an estimated high degree of ‘UN babies’ (personal communication, Dili). 81 Group punishment, where one of the personnel misbehaves and the entire group gets punished, appears to have led to cover-ups of crimes committed. Individual punishment gave better results (personal communication, Dili). 78

79

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Attempts were made by the leadership to curb unwanted behavior. For example, in October 2000, the Force Commander sent a memo to all coordinating cells of the different national contingents of zero tolerance of sexual harassment, “particularly of Timorese women” (Ospina 2006). When under pressure from Timorese women’s organizations, international NGOs, and the UNTAET Human Rights Unit, the UNTAET leadership also requested an investigation into the most publicly known cases of abuse (Joshi 2005, 7).82 These are all serious cases, and, as they show, negative behavior did arise, primarily against women. However, given the size of the operation (over 11,000 international staff in INTERFET and UNTAET), these cases must still be considered very limited in number. Thus, on the macro level, behavior of personnel in general does appear to have had minor negative consequences for women’s security. Effects on Timorese men’s security stemming from peace-operation personnel’s off-duty behavior are more difficult to determine but appear even more limited. Even though the effects on the macro level were limited, there are indications of some regional differences. This resulted in some areas of Timor-Leste having a higher degree of security problems caused by peace-operation personnel. The most noted example is the Oecusse area. There, members of the Jordanian component were responsible for several incidents of harassment of the Timorese population, both men and women, and were accused of pedophilia and rape. In addition, part of this negative behavior took place during the regular exercise of operation assignments, and not only when the staff was off duty.83 A report states that when the local population in Oecusse area protested against the Jordanian behavior and wanted the group removed, the population was told that due to the precarious geographical situation of the area, they were not in a position to ask for replacements as no other country wanted to send troops there.84 However, the Oecusse incidents were one of the instances when the UN operation conducted a formal investigation into events. What

82 The only report which mentions this is from 2005, when the international presence was very weak. This report states that by then, international males were more at risk from abuse from the national police rather than the opposite (U.S. Department of State 2005). 83 Interview with Sebastiana Perreira; and interview with Katarina Ammitzboell. 84 Interview with Sebastiana Perreira.

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complicated the investigation was that the crimes the personnel were accused of were a capital offence in Jordan. This left the UN in a difficult human-rights situation. For the UN, it was also problematic to accuse staff from a member state of wrongful behavior.85 As an effect of the negative behavior, the Timorese population’s respect for peace operations personnel decreased and became more ‘country specific’. This concerned both the military and the police.86 In addition, the fact that most of the cases of abuse and misbehavior were not prosecuted in Timor-Leste—due to impunity of peaceoperation personnel—caused anger. The population felt that the UN, as the acting state, had double standards: UN personnel themselves were not held responsible by the laws formulated and implemented by UNTAET for the Timorese population.87 Also on other occasions, when laws were not practiced in line with the UN’s general message of gender-equal legal protection, this increased women’s distrust of the judicial system.88 In addition, there were other forms of behavior that caused friction and affected primarily women’s view of the operation. For example, there were cases of pornographic material being placed in public buildings and offices, such as police stations, by international personnel. This affected the faith Timorese women had in turning to the UN, as it made women feel very uncomfortable.89 These issues, in combination with the language problem of the international staff (primarily speaking only English and not learning the local languages), poor translation assistance, and the sensitivity of reporting crimes, such as sexual violence, can have decreased the assistance women could have had from the international presence. Besides behavior which could be predicted to cause offence, the international staff in Timor-Leste had a life style that was very different from that of most Timorese (Wurfel 2004, 215). These differences created unintentional tensions and effects. For example, one effect, quite unintended, was that the large number of international personnel affected the culture, particularly in the Dili area, on how to live,

Interview with Katarina Ammitzboell. Personal communication, Dili. 87 Personal communication, Dili. See also Gusmão (2001). 88 Personal communication, Dili. 89 Personal communication, Dili. In the Timor-Leste culture, nudity is considered as very offensive. See also Abdulla & Myrttinen (2004). 85 86

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behave, dress, etc.90 For example, dress codes changed and became less strict. Apart from these changes, there was also a difference in perception between the Timorese and the international personnel that was unintentionally offensive. For example, an interviewee describes the feeling of offence taken by the Timorese population in 1999–2000 when international staff off duty went to the beach, drinking beer, and having barbecues while the Timorese people were mourning the loss of those killed and the destruction of their lives and properties.91 5.3

UN

OPERATION POLICY AND

TIMORESE POLITICS

Political peacebuilding assignments were part of all UN operations from June 1999 to 2006, but it is only UNTAET which more independently implemented assignments. When the Democratic Republic of TimorLeste was declared in May 2002, the role of the following missions, UNMISET and UNOTIL, became primarily consultative. Concerning politics, it is important to note that the interaction and cooperation with the Timorese parties was even more central than in the case of security assignments. During UNTAET, this was complicated by the unclear mandate formulations about the role of Timorese parties in the UNTAET operation, and the increased competition between the Timorese parties pending independence. These two elements combined resulted in a turbulent process to independence and beyond. Three assignment areas are described in more detail. These are the interconnected political assignments of creating a state administration, arranging democratic elections, and building government. The UN operation mandates on political assignments were even more complex than the mandates on security, and few established operation procedures existed for such substantial peacebuilding (compared to that of peacekeeping). These assignments should also be considered in the light of the vibrant Timorese political developments that the UN operation enters into, attempts to steer in a certain direction, and at times to directly control. The first policy assignment area discusses the creation of a new state, primarily by attempting to organize a nation-

Personal communication, Dili. In the anthropological sense, it is therefore possible that the international presence in Dili can have altered the ideas of femininity there. 91 Personal communication, Dili. 90

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wide state administration. This was also a part of creating the ability to administer Timor-Leste by the operation itself in the 1999–2002 period. The second assignment area discusses the arrangements of elections as a tool for handling political competition, and for creating political legitimacy. Elections took place during the time period from UNAMET in 1999 to the presidential election under UNTAET in 2002. The third area focuses on building legitimate government to control the new state. This concerns the successive transfer of decision-making power from the UN to the Timorese parties, and the formal construction of governmental structures. All three examined assignment areas primarily take place 1999–2002, with follow-up by the subsequent operations. Administrating a state Timor-Leste had been administered first by Portugal and then by Indonesia prior to UN interventions. When the vote was in favor of independence in August 1999, UNTAET received the “overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor” as well as for building up local capacity for independence.92 The situation into which the operation was launched was extreme, due to the systematic destruction by the militia. By May 2002, UNTAET handed over power over the administration to the Timorese parties. A new operation, UNMISET, took over to provide support to the new government in the continued building of a state. This was followed up by UNOTIL which continued to support the development of state administration. While other parallel structures existed through the church and the traditional power (both male dominated),93 at the time of Portugal’s

92 Security Council resolution 1272(1999) also mandates UNTAET to “assist in the development of civil and social services”. This involved UNTAET in building institutions for education (mainly conducted with the help of UNICEF and other large NGOs), health (with the assistance of UNICEF, WHO), rebuilding of infrastructure (with the help of the humanitarian agencies, World Bank, and bi-lateral agreements), and agriculture (with Timorese and international experts). See the UN documents S/2000/53, S/2001/42, and S/2002/432 for further descriptions of the work and developments in these areas. 93 The traditional structure is built on historic royal authority along blood-lines and family, with clear definitions of decision-making and judicial authority. These “traditional social-political structures” of the Timorese society were regionally based, but were developed into a clandestine network used to support the struggle for independence 1975–1999 (Caplan 2005, 110, 119; Retbøll 2002). The Catholic Church, which came with the Portuguese colonization, worked to change the traditional

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withdrawal in 1975, no nation-wide state administration had been developed by the colonizer.94 Until the last years of the colonization period, a large part of the country instead administered itself through a traditional system (Suter 1997, 10). This began to change in the last years of Portugal’s rule, when attempts were made to create a state administration, involving Timorese parties. The two largest political parties at the time, Fretilin and UDT, were both integrated into the Portuguese administration in 1974, and work commenced on setting up an administrative structure for a future Timorese independent state (Wurfel 2004, 211). In 1975, UDT staged a coup. This was followed by a short civil war between Fretilin and UDT, which Fretilin won. This political development entailed that Fretilin took over the process alone, and Portugal started to withdraw. When Indonesia invaded at the end of 1975, Fretilin had begun to organize a nation-wide state administration (Hill 2002). As it was to take the Indonesians a long time to gain full control over the entire Timor-Leste territory, Fretilin’s work on administering the country continued in the ‘zones of independence’ before these were taken over by the Indonesian military. In these zones, Fretilin’s administration was often organized along Marxistinspired lines. This was in opposition to the traditional structures which Fretilin considered as oppressing the population (see, for example, CAVR 2006f ). When Indonesia had achieved control over the entire territory in the late 1970s, the state administration was organized as part of the Indonesian republic, including social, education, and health services.95 Creating a functioning administration (which included improvements

power structures as these were built on a competing religion. However, during the colonization period the Church had only a limited impact. To some extent, its work even managed to increase the importance of Timorese religions. It was not until the Indonesian occupation granted special opportunity for the Catholic Church to act politically that Catholicism became the dominating religion (CAVR 2006e; Hohe 2002; Ospina and Hohe 2001; Retbøll 2002; Suter 1997). Both of these structures are male dominated. 94 Portugal received critique from the UN as a functioning structure and local capacity had not been substantially developed prior to decolonization. See General Assembly resolution 3485(XXX) from 12 of December 1975 and Security Council resolution 384(1975) of 22 December 1975. In some respects, it could be considered that UNTAET in 1999 was to fulfill Portugal’s responsibilities in accordance with UN Charter chapter XI. 95 Areas largely overlooked by Portugal (Suter 1997, 11).

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of infrastructure) was, in part, an attempt to convince the Timorese population to accept Indonesian occupation. The funds for Timor-Leste even exceeded those granted to similar territories within Indonesia, although the Indonesian military in Timor-Leste often were on the receiving end (Bhatia 2005, 213–216; Candio and Bleiker 2001, 66; Jannisa 2001). Timorese were hired for this new administration, though often in lower positions than immigrants from other Indonesian islands.96 The majority of those working in the administration were men, but female participation in the work force was encouraged by the Indonesian authorities. In addition, while independent Timorese organizations were more or less abolished, Timorese women and men were channeled into organizations controlled by Indonesian authorities. For example, it might be impossible for the husband to advance, if his wife was not active in the women’s organization.97 When UNAMET arranged the elections on autonomy in 1999, this took place in the context of the existing Indonesian system. The 5th of May Agreement only outlined how the territory was to be administered if the vote was in favor of autonomy within Indonesia. In addition, after the election results were announced in favor of independence, the administration and infrastructure, along with the property of the Timorese population, were largely destroyed. Many of the immigrated administrative staff left for Indonesia. When UNTAET entered to set up a new administration, the general destruction remained a major obstacle for implementing peacebuilding assignments.98 It was not until the initial catastrophic situation—no electricity or clean water; destroyed communication infrastructure; complete lack of health care; no functioning financial system; the majority of buildings destroyed or burned—had begun to be overcome, that preparations could be made to set up a civil administration (Caplan 2005, 86). The UNTAET mission was based on an idea of sequential transfer of power from the international staff to the Timorese staff. The first UNTAET administrative unit was called ‘Governance and Public Administration’ which was an all-international unit, although it included expatriate Timorese. This was set up in 2000 to handle the first establishment of a state infrastructure, such as financial institutions Immigration was encouraged by the Indonesian authorities. Interview with Vicenta Guterres. 98 The enormous humanitarian catastrophe was addressed by humanitarian agencies both within and outside the UNTAET mandate. 96 97

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to administer aid. The building of the state administration then continued in several steps. In July 2000, a ‘transitional administration’ was set up to replace the first administrative UNTAET unit. This consisted of five Timorese staff and four international (Caplan 2005, 99–100; Smith and Dee 2003, 63–66).99 Since many of the personnel previously employed in the Indonesian administration left for Indonesia, UNTAET had made the assumption that very limited Timorese capacity remained. Caplan states that although the operation was aware of the need for local capacitybuilding, the initial administration set up consisted primarily of international staff (Caplan 2005, 87).100 Moreover, Timorese capacity-building remained low on the list of operation priorities. In part, this was due to the peacekeeping-peacebuilding competition for resources, and as a result of the very limited number of international staff hired to build and run a state under extremely harsh conditions (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005). In consequence, the resources available might have been too limited to conduct capacity-building simultaneously with conducting regular work. Internal and international critique of the lack of Timorese involvement increased substantially over time. As a result, the sequential transfer policy was increased in pace, although international staff continued to hold most of the senior positions. In September 2001, after Constituent Assembly elections had been held, a ‘public administration’ was set up to replace the transitional administration. Although the influence of Timorese parties increased as the process developed, it remained limited and, until independence, always under the authority of the operation leadership of Special Representative of the Secretary General Vieira de Mello (Caplan 2005, 99–100; Smith and Dee 2003, 63–66). The recruitment of Timorese for the new institutions became a central element in UNTAET’s creation of an administration at this later stage. A Civil and Public Employment Service was created to handle the recruitment. By May 2001, 86 percent of the administrative personnel had been recruited. These included 51 percent of the former civil servants of the former Indonesian administration This administration was called the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA). 100 Only the division for Health Services was headed by a Timorese (Caplan 2005, 87). 99

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(Fox 2002, 50–51). The recruitment of Timorese staff for managerial positions was, however, lagging behind. A few months prior to independence, only 50 percent of the Timorese staff for that level had been recruited (Security Council 2002a). The language barrier, where the international staff primarily spoke only English—not one of the three main languages spoken in Timor-Leste—was stated to have caused problems for foreigners to determine Timorese competence (Suter 1997, 10).101 The recruitment process for the new administration concerns the degree of participation by Timorese men and women. The UN operation itself did not set a positive example. UNTAET’s civil administration was very male-dominated—with only two women working in visible leading positions (Ospina 2006, 24). In the early stages of the UNTAET operation, the Timorese locally-recruited staff consisted of only 11.5 percent women, compared to 88.5 percent men (Ospina 2006, 24). In the Timorese Women’s Congress in June 2000, women united around the demand for 30 percent female participation in the new state administration. The CNRT was persuaded to accept this demand and, together with the Gender Unit, to pressure the UNTAET to adopt this gender-balance ratio. When presented with the demands, the head of the UNTAET operation “readily adopted” a balance of at least a 70/30 male/female ratio (Pires 2004, 4),102 with the ultimate goal of 50/50 representation in decision-making and administration (UNTAET 2001a, 3). By August 2000, the male/female ratio had reached a male/female ratio of 80/20. The Timorese women’s network, Rede Feto, raised the issue in a statement in October that same year that this was

101 These languages are Tetum, Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesia. However, depending on how it is measured, there are around 30 languages spoken in Timor, of which many are variations of Tetum. During the period of Indonesian occupation, Tetum and Portuguese were banned from schools (Suter 1997, 10). 102 Regarding work opportunities for women in general, Sahle Abdulla and Henri Myrttinen claim that Timorese women had been particularly marginalized during occupation. Under the UNTAET period, women had increased job opportunities, for example, in the new administrational institutions set up by the UN, in the UN administration itself, and the NGO community. The number of positions in the service sector, as cleaners and cooks, also increased. However, there were cases of tension within marriages due to reversed gender roles with regard to income generation (Abdulla and Myrttinen 2004). That UN staff could observe several cases of domestic abuse as effects of changed gender roles in income generation, is also supported by Katarina Ammitzboell (personal communication).

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still below the agreed 30 percent women (Rede Feto Timor Lorosae 2000).103 When the UNTAET leadership gave directions for the formal recruitment process for the state administration, which began in May 2001, the aim was therefore for a male/female ratio with no more than 70 percent men. To achieve this gender balance, and to avoid a gender-biased recruitment process, the UNTAET Gender Unit cooperated with the ‘employment service’ to set up the general recruitment strategy. This work, according to Sofi Ospina, consisted of “the use of women friendly channels to spread information on available posts. [sic!] women on interviewing panels, gender-sensitive interview questions, and counseling on the application process”(Ospina 2006, 23; UNTAET 2001a). Gender focal points assisted in identifying competent women and to increase their self-confidence to ensure that they applied (Ospina 2006, 23; UNTAET 2001a). Exactly how many that were hired during the UNTAET mission is unclear, but the civil administration had hired 31 percent women and 69 percent men up until 2005, the majority recruited under UNTAET (Ospina 2006, 25). From these descriptions, it would appear as if the UN operation served as a catalyst; the demands for increased participation came from Timorese women organizations trying to persuade both Timorese parties—mainly the CNRT—and the UN operation. The latter was conducted with the support of the Gender Unit (Ospina 2006, 25). However, when the more aware UN leadership had been withdrawn, and the Gender Unit had been reduced in strength, the gender awareness in recruitment decreased. It therefore appears not to have been institutionalized by the independent administration, the following operations, or the Timorese parties. For example, the model of gender-aware recruitment, practiced in 2001, was not followed by the National Institute of Public Administration in May 2004 when only one woman but 65 men were recruited for the administration. Ospina makes the comment that if the UN advisers to the government had been gender aware, the gender policy for recruitment that the UNTAET SRSG had supported could have been followed up (Ospina 2006, 24).

103 Issued on the occasion of the Security Council’s Special Session on Women in Peace and Security which resulted in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325(2000).

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Apart from the question of Timorese participation, which caused conflict, one of the main critiques against UN operations concerned UNTAET’s Dili-centered approach. Dionisio Babo-Soares describes how this left an “administrative vacuum”, where the majority of the Timorese mainly had to administer themselves (Babo-Soares 2000, 24). The Dili-focus dominated particularly when UNTAET arrived, leaving the traditional power structures in the countryside intact. To some degree this indirectly empowered village chiefs with UNTAET considering them working partners on the local level to whom information was foremost distributed (Ospina and Hohe 2001). As these traditional systems were, and remain, almost entirely male dominated, women have very little direct access to decision-making in a large part of the country. There was an attempt by UNTAET to set up district administrators, but these remained weak. In addition, the first head of the district administration resigned as a protest against, what he considered, UNTAET making decisions without consulting with the districts. In mid-2000, there were also Timorese complaints of many district administrators being incompetent. José Ramos Horta demanded that they should be replaced by Timorese staff to build internal capacity (Caplan 2005, 98).104

104 By comparison, the World Bank included Timorese parties in the planning. To reach the whole country, the Bank organized the “Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project” from the beginning of 2000. This focused on creating “democratically-elected village councils”. These elections held at the sub-regional and village level resulted in 450 councils which decided how to spend project funds given by the World Bank. Suggestions came from the villagers. As it was noticed by the Bank that the independence struggle had created a demographic imbalance with regard to gender, and to ensure that the needs of the female-headed households and widows were met, a 50/50 male-female gender balance was introduced for the councils. This increased female participation (The World Bank 2005, 48). The number of projects funded was substantial. By the end of 2002, it had funded more than 1,000 projects. However, as a result of this program, the World Bank ended up on a collision course with UNTAET, who initially resisted this development of what the operation deemed risked becoming a parallel political structure. When it finally approved, UNTAET specified that these councils could not have any power of government or go against the development of political and legal institutions being set up by UNTAET. Further, UNTAET objected to the gender balance, which the organization considered as clashing with local culture. On the last point, UNTAET was forced to concede after lobbying from Timorese women’s groups (Caplan 2005, 124 & 170–171). The program on the councils did, however, after the UNTAET acceptance, involve cooperation between UNTAET, the World Bank, and the CNRT. UNTAET regulation 2000/13 provided its legal framework (Hohe 2004). It is also important to note that outside of Dili, a competition between these councils and the

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At the time of the Timorese takeover in May 2002, it was determined that the administration was going to remain in need of support also after independence. A 10-year program was worked out by the Timorese National Planning Commission and UNDP for the development of the public and governance sector (Security Council 2002a). Initially, UNMISET’s operation staff continued to hold some functions that had not been filled by Timorese staff under UNTAET. The downscaling of the international direct involvement continued, however, and the international staff gradually took on only advisory positions as the Timorese administration developed (Security Council 2002b). Organizing democratic elections UNAMET’s mandate, in accordance with the 5th of May Agreement of 1999, was to organize a referendum to establish Timor-Leste’s status.105 The voting was successfully carried out on August 30, 1999. The second election during the 1999–2006 period was organized by UNTAET, which had received the mandate to establish a democratic political system. The election for a Constituent Assembly was held on August 30, 2001. After the Constitution had been passed, the Assembly transformed itself into the first parliament of Timor-Leste. The third and final national election in the 1999–2006 period was for President in April 2002, a month prior to independence. When UNAMET was established on June 11, 1999, there were political debates in Timor-Leste (among the Timorese) along ideological lines, ethnic lines, and, cutting through both of these, gender lines.106 The only dividing line recognized in the central UN resolu-

traditional leaders developed. This kept many councils from functioning effectively (United Nations 2001, 6). 105 Thus, the first is a referendum and the two latter regular elections. However, for the purpose of this study, which is to observe participation in the political process, that difference is not determinant. 106 In July 1999, before the UN had arranged the first elections, Joao Mariano Saldanha and Fransisco Guterres identify divisions along language and ethnical lines as the most relevant to deal with for the future political system of Timor-Leste. They identify two main ethnic groups (consisting of a number of sub-groups)—one eastern (Firacos) and one western (Caladis)—as the main possible division line in future politics. Saldanha and Guterres argue that the question of autonomy or independence, though having caused severe division during the independence struggle, will not remain the main question after independence. To come to terms with this, they suggest a consociational democracy along Lijpart’s model to avoid future conflict

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tion 1236(1999) by the Security Council,107 was the need to carry out elections on the status of Timor-Leste (independence or autonomy), in a “fair and peaceful” manner, “taking place in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side”. The responsibility to ensure this happened fell on Indonesia. There is no explicit mention of ensuring full participation of both men and women, or the risk of intimidation also in the private sphere. To carry out the mandate, UNAMET was composed of a civil affairs component, an electoral component, and an information component. To administer the elections, 200 registration centers were set up all over Timor-Leste. Much of the electoral work was conducted by UN Volunteers and local employees (Security Council 1999a; United Nations 1999a). In the election campaign for independence, the local male-dominated, pro-independence alliance, CNRT, kept a low profile so as not to risk an escalation of violence by the militia and the Indonesian military. Instead, the CNRT campaign used mainly informal measures, such as going door to door, where many different groups were involved in mobilization and information. Youth groups, mainly students, and women’s groups were the most active. Of the latter, Fretilin’s women’s movement ‘Organização Populwe da Mulhwe Timorense’ and FOKUPERS were central. Fernando de Araujo writes that women constituted the majority of campaign activists at certain times. However, in the media used by the CNRT to spread information about the elections, women were almost nonexistent (Araujo 2000, 118).108 In the registration, 451,792 people registered, which is more than the UN estimates of 400,000. Only 913 registrations were rejected (Smith and Dee 2003, 43). Everyone above the age of 17, who was born Timorese, or had lived in Timor-Leste more than five years, was allowed to register to vote. Anybody whose spouse—husband or wife—fulfilled these requirements, was also allowed to register to vote (United Nations 1999a). As the electoral rules took note of between these groups. They suggest that the conflict-resolution models developed between the different groups to handle cooperation and interaction can be integrated into the new political system (Saldanha and Guterres 1999). With the ethnic divisions re-developing in 2006, this observation is the more interesting. 107 Both Security Council resolution 1236(1999) and the Security Council resolution 1246(1999). 108 Pat Walsh reports that the relationship between Fretilin and its women’s organization had often been strained (Walsh 2001, 12).

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gender, it can be assumed that UN policy would not be an obstruction for anyone to practice their right to vote. There is very limited gender-specific information about women and men in the registration. For example, Catharina Williams cannot see any difference between men and women in registration. She observes that anyone who could get to the registration office registered, both men and women. Of those hired by the UN to assist with the elections, however, in William’s area, almost all were male (Williams 2000, 132–133). In spite of displacement and threats, over 98 percent of those registered, voted on August 30 (the actual day of voting was relatively calm). There are no reports of dissimilarity between women and men in practicing their right to vote. In 1999, there was, thus, a high degree of political mobilization by both men and women in Timor-Leste even though the major parties were male-dominated, particularly in their leadership. The second election was organized by UNTAET in August 2001.109 Security Council resolution 1272, mandating UNTAET, prescribed that governance in Timor-Leste should be upheld through democratic institutions. The introduction of this new political system in itself constituted a large shift from how Timor-Leste had previously been run. In addition, the population’s previous experiences of elections as a political tool were understandably not positive. Portugal had arranged a semi-official election in 1974, by many seen as contributing to the civil war between Fretilin and UDT; Indonesia had arranged a number of manipulated elections to legitimize its occupation; and the outcome of the 1999 referendum on the status of Timor-Leste had resulted in country-wide destruction. The exiled political elite had, however, had other experiences of democracy in many of the countries where they had sought refuge, such as Australia, Portugal and Mozambique. The election was for the 88 seats in the unicameral Assembly, which was to pass the Timor-Leste Constitution (within 90 days of the first sitting). The electoral rules for this Constituent Assembly election were formulated in UNTAET regulation 2001/2 “On the Election of a Constituent Assembly to prepare a Constitution for an

109 In conjunction with the Electoral Affairs Division from the Department of Political Affairs at the NY headquarters. E-mail exchange with Sherrill Whittington.

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Independent and Democratic East Timor”. This states the encouragement of “the equal participation of women and men at all stages of the electoral and constitutional process, and undertaking to promote the full enjoyment by women of their civil and political rights”. The right to register was quite similar to that for the earlier referendum, enabling all over 17, male or female, to vote. There is a difference, however, in that the voter for this election had to have been born in Timor-Leste, or to have at least one parent born in Timor-Leste, or be married to someone who fell under either category (UNTAET 2001b). The nationalistic tone is, thus, higher in the elections for the Constituent Assembly compared to that on the status of Timor-Leste when everyone who had lived in Timor-Leste for at least five years was eligible to vote. The election campaign, the first democratic party election campaign for government ever held in Timor-Leste, was, as could be expected under such circumstances, not uncomplicated. CNRT, which had been formed to unite all pro-independence parties in the 1990s, was dissolved during a national congress in June 2001. The reason for the dissolution was to allow for free competition between the different parties of the umbrella organization. During the June congress, discussion was heated as to the reason for the dissolution as many members feared a return to the internal conflict that had preceded the Indonesian occupation. The party formation that followed took place mainly in Dili, while the question of CNRT unity continued to dominate the discussion in the countryside. Fretilin was the only party which successfully created a nation-wide party network, from the village level up to the national level. It did so by playing on the sentiments of the independence struggle, and through building on the established clandestine networks from the struggle (Hohe 2002, 71–72). In addition, party formation was a relatively late phenomenon, resulting from elections being proclaimed by UNTAET only a few months prior to them taking place. Therefore, many parties were formed in the month preceding the final date for registration. There was also a shortage of funds for many parties, in addition to some political parties being unable to establish themselves in some districts due to discouragement, or at times outright rejection, by village leaders (King 2003, 749–750). The four largest parties that ran for the Assembly display an interesting variation of constituencies in the population. Although Fretilin, the absolutely largest party, had a nationwide network, it was

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stronger in the eastern part of Timor-Leste than in the western part. The other parties had a weaker party structure, but many eventually managed to establish district offices. The party which considered itself the ‘old Fretilin’, Social Democratic association of Timor (ASDT), had its primary support from the ethnic groups in the region from which the party leader originated. Support for ASDT also came from an anti-UN intervention movement ‘Committee for the Popular Defence of the Republic of Timor-Leste’. Two of the other parties, which were to receive a large number of votes, were the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party. These parties had quite similar political agendas but were supported by different age groups. The Social Democratic Party was led by a former Timorese governor from the Indonesian period. The party consisted of moderates—often those who had formerly worked in the Indonesian bureaucracy—and represented the older generation (similar in this respect to the ASDT). The Democratic Party, on the other hand, was established by a former student leader. The party was in opposition to the returned, previously exiled, Fretilin leadership, which the Democratic Party considered to be authoritarian. The antagonism was based on the feeling within the Democratic Party that Fretilin did not give enough recognition to the role students and urban groups had played in achieving independence.110 In addition to these four parties, the traditional groups and former pro-autonomy groups, such as APODETI and KOTA, also ran but were to receive almost no votes in the elections (Hohe 2002; King 2003, 754–755). In the run up to elections, there was limited participation in political meetings, and confusion about the purpose of elections. A nation-wide survey to ascertain the political knowledge of the population, conducted six months prior to elections, indicated a lack of knowledge about the election process. Of the survey participants, 61 percent stated that they thought the vote was for the presidency (that is, José Xanana Gusmão), not the Constituent Assembly. A total of 37 percent could not describe what democracy meant to them, and to 36 percent of participants, democracy meant freedom of speech. None of the participants mentioned elections as an integral part of

110 There is a generation division in general in Timorese politics between the first independence parties of 1975 and the younger generation of student and urban independence activists of the 1990s (Vikør 2003, 9).

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democracy and 32 percent did not think that all parties should be allowed to hold meetings in their area, while 41 percent considered party competition as something negative (19 percent of these stated that this was because it could cause civil war, similar to that which broke out in 1975 between Fretilin and UDT). There was a difference between Dili and the countryside, in that the population in the latter was less politically aware than in Dili. Many regional party offices were not aware of political programs, and support was more related to other factors, such as origin of party leadership (Hohe 2002, 72, 76–78). Former military participation and military symbols played a substantial role in the campaigning of all political parties. This could entail using experiences of previous participation in the struggle in campaign speeches to underline one’s own contribution to independence; inviting veteran FALINTIL fighters (using their nom de guerre) to join party leaders on stage at political meetings; referring to the political parties’ contribution to independence (particularly used by Fretilin which also was accused of systematically belittling the contribution of all other parties);111 or claiming that the population should vote to honor those killed in the struggle (i.e. in favor of the party that they had fought for) (Hohe 2002, 72, 76–78).112 There were examples of autocratic tendencies in the campaign. Fretilin, for example, had a ‘sweeping clean’ campaign (playing on the rhetoric of the 1999 elections). This ‘encouraged’ the population to clean up the country after the ballot, for example, tear down flags of other parties. Parties also played on the need for unity to encourage voters to vote for them (all voters uniting in their party). This was because there was a general wide-spread fear of a return to violence as parties competed for power, and the idea of unity is central to traditional ideas of power in Timor-Leste (Hohe 2002, 72, 76–78; Smith 2004a). Gender was also played on. For example, Fretilin called the youths in the Democratic Party “still breast-sucking”, playing both on a negative association with femininity and power, and on lack of 111 The urban focus of non-violence and demonstrations had managed to get international awareness to return to the Timor question in the beginning of the 1990s when the military struggle had failed to reach further results and was severely weakened (Hohe 2002; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Mazon 2005). 112 Traditional symbols and rhetoric were also used by the parties. The KOTA party, for example, argued for the importance of traditional kings and hierarchical power distribution to be reinstated.

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seniority (where male seniority is associated with power and decisionmaking traditionally) (Hohe 2002, 77). Even though military symbols were used, knowledge of democracy limited, and the stakes high as those in control of the Assembly would set the political rules for the future, there were few examples of direct intimidation or threat during the campaign. The organization which openly resisted the election and the UN intervention, ‘Committee for the Popular Defence of the Republic of Timor-Leste’, argued that Timor-Leste had been established in 1975. In the view of this organization, a liberated Timor-Leste should return to the Constitution of 1975. Therefore, this group opposed the internationally-led transitional process as it considered Timor to already be independent (Smith 2004b, 286).113 This movement was in conflict with Fretilin and Gusmão, and had aligned itself with the party claiming to be the original Fretilin—the ASDT. In the districts dominated by ASDT, there were cases of harassment, such as the “forced collection” of all registration cards in a village (King 2003, 752–753). UNTAET worked systematically to limit any threat to the openness of the election process and limit undue pressure on voters. For example, systematic polling of voters was prohibited, both in advance of election and afterwards. After the elections, all ballots were collected on the district level before they were counted. This was done in order to avoid any identification of an area with a specific election result (King 2003, 751–752). The international police and the international military also made efforts to coordinate their work to increase the voters’ feeling of security during the election campaign and while voting (Hohe 2002, 80). As there appears to have been a degree of strategic voting taking place in the elections (King 2003; Smith 2004a), it is possible that the secrecy of the vote, and the measures taken to ensure this, had an effect. Even though this debate identifies men as the main political actors to a much higher degree than women, men’s participation and access to power is still not unproblematic. When it comes to men’s access to power, running for the Assembly and voting, this could often be

113 The military rhetoric was strong within the group. Reportedly, it was dominated by veteran FALINTIL soldiers—those not incorporated into the new military—and was drawn from the more radical left elements of the former independence movement. It continuously claims that the FALINTIL resistance is the rightful government of Timor (Smith 2004b, 286).

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formulated in terms of social status (class related), as the TimorLeste society is hierarchical. The survey displayed limited knowledge of democratic rights among the population and political access also appears to be related to the question of whether a person, male or female, lived in an urban or rural area (King 2003, 751–752). In addition, Tanja Hohe claims that the political elite, mainly Dilibased who had returned from diaspora well-educated, attempted to use the traditional beliefs and fear of violence of the population to their advantage in the election campaign. Therefore, she claims, it is questionable as to how much the election results can be considered as showing the political power of local men and women by the electorate (Hohe 2002, 83). To contribute to increased knowledge of democratic procedure, UNTAET was involved in spreading information and providing training. However, by 2001 the ongoing conflict between the UN operation and the Timorese over access to power in the implementation process had made cooperation very difficult.114 The civic education campaign, therefore, failed to involve the Timorese parties and met with such resistance that it was delayed until only five months prior to elections (Caplan 2005, 123–124). In addition, the education that took place focused on the technical aspects of voting, not on explaining democracy as a political system.115 It did, however encourage everyone to vote, and Milena Pires reports that women and men registered to the same degree for the elections. The education and material did also make reference to gender issues and displayed gender-sensitive images. Moreover, UNTAET had made serious efforts to include both women and men in the electoral commission that oversaw the electoral process (Pires 2004, 9). In spite of the UN operation being in conflict with the local, maledominated, political parties over influence, the cooperation between local organizations and the UN was somewhat better in the area of ensuring women’s political participation. The Gender Unit, together with UNIFEM, and in cooperation with Timorese women’s organizations,

Interview with Katarina Ammitzboell. Hohe claims that the education needs to consider the political context into which it steps in and that local concepts of politics and decision-making are addressed in explanation of democracy. This was not done in Timor-Leste, she claims, and therefore the electorate was more vulnerable to undemocratic campaigning by certain parties and the election outcome less democratic (Hohe 2002, 84). 114

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conducted training workshops for potential women candidates in preparation for the elections.116 Female participants came from all the political parties and several local NGOs (Roynestad 2003; UNTAET 2002).117 In addition, this work to raise the number of women in politics had the support, both verbally and practically, of the SRSG.118 The reason for why cooperation differed between the male- and the female-dominated political organizations can be found in the question of a quota to ensure gender-balanced representation. The seats in the election for the Constituent Assembly were divided up into 75 national and 13 district seats. The electorate cast two votes, one for the national and one for the district seat. There was, thus, a quota to ensure that all regions were represented (King 2003, 746).119 The political setting of not only including this regional quota, but also one that ensured the representation of at least 30 percent women, was developed in parallel. The Timorese women’s organizations had increased much in strength from 2000 and reached their peak, according to Pires, during the election campaign to the Constituent Assembly. This was based on the ‘Platform for Action for the Women of Timor Loro Sae’ (henceforth ‘the Platform’) adopted at the Women’s Congress in June 2000.120 At the same conference, Rede Feto, an umbrella organization of all women’s organizations in Timor-Leste, was formed. This network organization worked to forward the Platform. The aim was to strengthen women’s situation, and to make women less unequal to men, particularly in decision-making. This was done by lobbying established, male-dominated, parties and the UN operation on the agreed wishes

116 Funds for this were made available from UNTAET as a result of the quota debate (see below). 117 The struggle for local women’s NGOs was to create the structural support, child-care and political training, that was required for women to be able to still work politically (ETAN ca. 1999). Thus, women’s political participation was connected to general labor divisions between men and women with regard to family. 118 E-mail exchange with Sherrill Whittington. 119 Nevertheless, in spite of this recognition, the main focus in 2001 was on national competition where also the regionally elected representatives came from the national political parties (King 2003, 746). 120 The women’s congress consisted of over 400 participants elected in district congresses (Pires 2004, 3 footnote 6). ‘The Platform’ had a broad focus, dealing with many aspects of equality apart from that in decision-making. Those areas concerned for example, the legal system, education, literacy, security, and economic growth focused on the grass-root level. This Platform also considered the involvement of UN agencies in this work (WomenWarPeace.org 2005).

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of the Timorese women formulated in ‘the Platform’ (Pires 2004, 3). The general demands in the Platform by the women’s organizations for increased participation and representation were forwarded by the UNTAET Gender Unit to the head of the UN operation. This changed the UNTAET SRSG Vieira de Mello’s view on the gender equality question (Pires 2004, 3; Roynestad 2003, 5; Whittington 2000). The SRSG distributed ‘the Platform’ to all UNTAET departments asking them to take it into consideration in planning and implementation and report back to him on its progress (UNTAET 2001a). While the top UNTAET leadership was positive to improving the balance in representation, when it came to a formal ‘gender’ quota, there was a very harsh debate.121 Pires even claims that “. . . warning was given that the UN would be forced to pull out if quotas were included . . .” (Pires 2004, 6).122 Interestingly, the two heads of the electoral issues (one man and one woman) both within the UNTAET and in New York objected to the quota. The head of the UNTAET was in favor of a quota and the Gender Unit assisted the women’s organizations to formulate a strong argument for why their demand for a quota (as established at the Women’s Congress) should be accepted.123 For the women’s organizations, the quota was considered central, as Timorese political parties and the political system were very male dominated (including that of the international operation). To get the formal quota, Timorese women’s organizations lobbied the CNRT congress and the UNTAET-appointed National Council (which was to pass the electoral law before it was approved by the opera-

121 Quotas are a complicated mechanism. Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall describe the different perceptions of quotas, benefits with informal and formal quotas, as well as the reason why demands of formal legal quotas have grown from women’s organizations the world over. One of the risks they perceive with formal quotas is that elected women might not have a power-base to build on and therefore more easily become tokens. Formal quotas therefore require capacity-building to enhance women’s chances to practice the power they have been given (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2003). For an overview of how quotas are used, see Dahelrup and Freienvall’s project on www.quotaproject.org. International IDEA and the InternParliamentary Union both provide numbers of women and men in parliament. See www.idea.int and www.ipu.org. 122 Indonesia had had between 11 and 12 percent in its parliament since the end of the 1980s (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1995, 142; International IDEA 2006). Interestingly, in 2001–2003, there was a debate in Indonesia, driven by women’s groups, to introduce a quota. This resulted in legislation requiring parties to consider selecting 30 percent women on their party lists (International IDEA 2006). 123 E-mail exchange with Sherrill Whittington.

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tion leadership). Both of them initially accepted. While the majority of the international actors were positive to a quota, a few expressed hesitation along the lines of equity being a luxury too expensive for Timor-Leste in the current situation, and the fear that the quota was driven only by Timorese women of the diaspora. There was, however, more pronounced resistance to quotas from some members of the Security Council, which was given as a reason by the UN Political Affairs Division in New York, to UNTAET’s Political Affairs Division to reject the quota demand. The UNTAET head of Political Affairs therefore opposed quotas on the grounds that they would compromise the freedom and fairness of the elections (Joshi 2005, 8; Pires 2002; Pires 2004, 6–7). Interestingly, Timorese inequality was used to argue against the demanded quotas. The argument was that the party system was too male dominated, and that completely male political parties would not have enough women members to include 30 percent women on their party lists. A quota would thereby make it impossible for these parties to run in the Assembly elections.124 After the debate, the National Council, including the female participants who had been included partly because of the lobbying of women’s organizations to increase female representation in the Council, voted against a gender quota (Jones, Wood, and Wachtmeister 2001; Pires 2004, 8; UNTAET 2001a). The women’s organizations organized protests against this decision, forcing UNTAET to make two concessions. Instead of a formal quota, the question was handled informally; political parties that included at least 30 percent women on their lists in winnable positions, received double air-time. In addition, funds were made available by UNTAET for training female candidates (undertaken by UNIFEM and the Gender Unit in cooperation with the women’s organizations) (Jones, Wood, and Wachtmeister 2001; Joshi 2005, 8; Pires 2004, 8; Roynestad 2003; UNTAET 2001a). In addition, the head of UNTAET met with leaders of political parties all around the country to discuss the democratic principles and to persuade them to have women in positions on their lists where they could get elected. In these discussions, he also underlined that women’s concerns should be included in the party programs (UNTAET 2001a, 6).

124

Personal communication, Dili.

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As the general political situation continued to be male-dominated, Pires notes that women’s issues were not included to any high degree although the parties did take advantage of the possibility of including women candidates to get more air time (Pires 2004). However, some parties enforced informal quotas on their lists when the National Council voted against formal quotas (Pires 2004, 8). As a result, there is great variation in the gender balance in the political parties. The Timorese Nationalist Party had the highest number of women candidates, with a gender balance of 52 percent men and 48 percent women. Christian Democratic Union of Timor had a ratio of 61/39 percent, and Fretilin 65/35. These parties also had a relatively high percentage of women in winnable positions (Gender Affairs Unit 2001). Cooperation on women’s election education was, thus, a Timorese demand driven by Timorese organizations in accordance with their goal of improving equality. This can be compared to education in general where cooperation with the Timorese male-dominated parties was very strained. In the elections on August 30, 2001—which took place without incidents of violence—91 percent of the electorate voted. A total of 991 national candidates ran for a seat in the Constituent Assembly. All but five ran for one of the 16 registered parties while the remainder ran as independent candidates (of which three were women nominated by the women’s organization Rede Feto). Of the 991 candidates, the ratio in representation between men and women was 73/27 percent (that is, 723 men and 268 women). Of those that ran for the 13 district seats, 11 were independent candidates and the rest were the party candidates. Of these, three were women. Of the 16 parties that ran, 12 gained seats in the Assembly.125 The four largest parties gained over 82 percent of the votes. Fretilin, the party that received the absolutely largest number of votes, won 56 of the 88 seats (43 of the national and all 13 district seats), and thereby gained a majority in the Assembly. However, this was still less than Fretilin had expected and below the required 60 seats to be able to alone pass the new Constitution. Fretilin therefore formed an alliance with the ASDT and was thereby able to achieve an absolute majority (King 2003, 756; Smith 2004a). The ratio in gender representation in

125 For more detailed information on percentages and seats won by the different parties, see Babo-Soares (2000, 31).

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the Constituent Assembly was 73/27 percent, that is, the same as the percentage that ran.126 When the Constituent Assembly had agreed on, and approved of, the Constitution, it transformed itself into a regular parliament (Caplan 2005, 118). UNTAET remained in power until independence on May 20, 2002, but began to more actively share power with the Timorese elite (Babo-Soares 2000, 30). To improve the political equality, there have been attempts to create a joint forum for women in parliament to support each other in the male-dominated political culture. This has not functioned well. The main reason is that it has been very difficult to work across party lines on any issue; if a parliamentarian does not toe the party line, he or she can be forced to leave. The parliament is, in addition, under-resourced and under-trained with limited logistical support. The training carried out by the UNTAET’s Gender Unit has not been followed up, and this has resulted in women parliamentarians often having less experience and confidence than their male colleagues. This limitation in female participation has resulted in decreasing support for gender equality in politics (Roynestad 2003, 8). The third, and last, election during the 1999–2006 period was the presidential elections, held in April 2002. In this election, only men ran for the position as president. José Xanana Gusmão was the main (close to self-evident) candidate. ASDT’s leader (and head of Fretilin at the time of the 1975 proclamation of independence), Francisco Xavier do Amaral, ran against him. Gusmão had the support of 11 of the political parties, but Fretilin decided to support neither candidate. In the elections, a total of 86 percent of the electorate voted. Gusmão received 83 percent of the votes (King 2003, 741, 751). Given the importance of the independence struggle in politics, the role of individual politicians has remained an important issue used to undermine or forward politicians. Gusmão’s popularity was, for example, to a large extent based on the legitimacy and authority he received as leader of CNRT and FALINTIL (Smith 2004b, 282–283). Gusmão has also used his legitimacy as former commander of the

126 Regarding the gender quota, by 2005–2006, when the first Timorese electoral law for the elections of 2007 was to be discussed, the quota question was again brought up by local women’s groups and UNIFEM. The support from the leading party Fretilin was ambiguous in March 2006. The UNOTIL SRSG did not want to affect Timorese politics by supporting the quota campaign.

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FALINTIL to counteract the demands of the movement which refused to recognize the UN-led transition process (Smith 2004b, 286).127 Building government Prior to 1999, Timor-Leste had been governed through two successive, but distinctively different, government structures on the national level: the Portuguese and the Indonesian. Neither had been democratic, and neither had included Timorese parties. In October 1999, UNTAET received the mandate to administer the country (in effect, to be its government), and to “support capacity for self-government”. The mandate specified that the political system established should be democratic. Implementation should be conducted by consulting and cooperating with Timorese parties. UNMISET and UNOTIL, the followup missions to UNTAET, focused on continued capacity-building, primarily by providing advisors to the Timor-Leste government after independence in May 2002. When Portugal decided to decolonize Timor-Leste, the process toward establishing independence was rapid. Due to the internal situation in Portugal, no government structures had been developed in Timor-Leste for independent rule prior to 1974. As the discussion under the development of state administration shows, however, a few Timorese parties had begun to form in the 1970s. Therefore, a Timorese political elite had been formed at the time of the Indonesian occupation in 1975. This would provide the nucleus for both the resistance movement against Indonesian occupation.128 Under the Indonesian occupation 1975–1999, Timor-Leste was gradually incorporated into the political system of Indonesia itself. This meant Suharto’s centrally-ruled authoritarian state, where the military’s role was not limited to security, but extended into politics and the economy (Törnquist 2000). With the help of the military, the authoritarian system of the center was harshly practiced in the territories all over the country that resisted Indonesian rule. In addition, Indonesian authorities attempted to use existing divisions in 127 A rift between Fretilin and Gusmão had started to become evident already in 1987 (King 2003, 748). This would be continued throughout the entire 1999–2006 period, and would be evident in the handling of the 2006 crisis. 128 There exists many interesting descriptions of this time period (see, for example, Jannisa 2001; Wurfel 2004).

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the Timor-Leste society in a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy (Candio and Bleiker 2001, 66). In spite of this, the traditional system remained a base for the independence struggle. In addition, a substantial part of the political work for independence was carried out by refugees outside of Timor-Leste. With the end of Suharto’s regime in 1998, the political system in Indonesia began to allow independent organizations to form. Student groups were in the forefront of driving this change (Törnquist 2000), and students from Timor-Leste studying in Indonesia brought these ideas back to Timor-Leste. These student groups, along with youth, church, and women’s groups, would come to be the driving force for voter’s education and lobbying groups for independence in the run-up to the referendum on Timor-Leste’s status in August 1999 (Araujo 2000; Montiel 2006).129 When the militia and segments of the Indonesian military destroyed the country in September 1999, the administration and infrastructure were targeted. Moreover, many of the Indonesians working in the former government administration left for Indonesia. On October 25, 1999, UNTAET was granted almost total power in Timor-Leste by the Security Council. Resolution 1272 (1999) gave the operation the entire jurisdiction, decision-making, and executive power, until the operation leadership decided that Timor-Leste was ready for independence. That is, until that date, UNTAET became the government of Timor-Leste. The role of Timorese parties during this transition process to independence was recognized but not defined. This would result in a continuous struggle between the UN operation and the Timorese parties. Due to the complexity of creating and organizing such a large operation as UNTAET, particularly in light of the almost total destruction of Timorese infrastructure, UNTAET was not fully operational until well into 2000. Simultaneously in Timor-Leste, the vibrant political developments increased in speed. The Timorese pro-independence coalition of CNRT, and its armed forces FALINTIL, began to reorganize and stepped into the “vacuum of local authority” created by the withdrawal of the Indonesian authorities and pending UNTAET establishment. Cristina Montiel claims that this increased organizational capacity and administrative experience. In addition, the political movement was strengthened by the political process leading up to elections, which helped create increased democratic space (Montiel 2006, 175). 129

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Gusmão, president of CNRT and commander of FALINTIL, returned to Timor-Leste—dressed in military uniform—from imprisonment in Indonesia on October 22, 1999. This was three days prior to the Security Council decision on the establishment of UNTAET, and over three weeks before the head of the UN operation, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Vieria de Mello arrived in Timor-Leste (Security Council 2000a, 2).130 Initially, the UN considered the CNRT as a fraction in the conflict with Indonesia which is why it was considered problematic to involve CNRT in the planning of UNTAET.131 As regards, CNRT, it was clearly in favor of the operation but had assumed that it would play a larger part than that which it was granted. Apart from CNRT, Peter Carey identifies three other ongoing political forces in Timor-Leste in 1999. The first was liberal, driven by many refugees returning from the diaspora. The second was driven by traditional elites, working to preserve Timor-Leste traditions. The last political force was religious, led by representatives of the Catholic Church (Carey 2001, 207–208). These forces were all male dominated, but their different ideological stand-points can have different implications for the developments of gender power-relations. For example, equality had become an issue in the Fretilin-dominated movement of the 1970s, and remained a question in the movement throughout the struggle, although not a high priority (see, for example, Crockford 2000, 226; Pires and Scott 1998). The difference between the liberal, forwarding changes in the power balance between men and women, and the traditional forces was, perhaps, reflected in reports of formerly exiled Timorese women. These women had participated in the exiled opposition, but when returning to Timor-Leste, many were discouraged from pursuing a political-leadership or decision-making role in Timor-Leste. Instead they were told to behave more in line with traditional gender roles (ETAN ca. 1999). The organizational capacity of Timorese women activists was, however, substantial. Many women had networked

130 INTERFET and UNAMET, the latter which was mandated to remain until a UNTAET mission could be launched, also made efforts to collect parties from both the pro-autonomy and pro-independence side to begin a reconciliation process. 131 On the international level, the question of reactions in Indonesia remained even more sensitive. The reason was the political changes taking place in the country resulting in international fears of an Indonesian civil war.

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internationally with women from other conflict areas to increase capacity for change, and to forward the demands of the Timorese parties. From 1998 and onwards, this movement had grown stronger (Roynestad 2003, 2–3). To handle the request in the Security Council mandate to involve the Timorese parties in the internationally-led process, UNTAET formed a National Consultative Council in December 1999 after discussions with Timorese political parties (Caplan 2005, 97). The Council had 15 members: seven from CNRT, one from the Catholic Church, three from pro-autonomy groups, and four UNTAET staff. The head of the UN operation, the SRSG, was chairman. This first Council was heavily male dominated; only two of the eleven Timorese members were women (Pires 2002; Security Council 2000a). The cooperation between the Council and the UN operation did not proceed smoothly. The role of the National Consultative Council was very limited. The most dominant complaints were that UNTAET did not take seriously the work and opinions provided by the Council, and that it did not have enough resources to carry out its work (Caplan 2005, 116). As a response to the growing critique from both Timorese and international parties, UNTAET formed the National Council in July 2000 to replace the National Consultative Council. The number of participants was increased from 11 to 36: 13 from the districts, seven from civil organizations, 13 from political parties, and three from religious groups (Security Council 2001a, 2). Similar to the first Council, the new National Council was not elected but appointed by the UN operation. Thereby, the Council was not easily accountable, which gave it limited legitimacy in the eyes of the Timorese population (King 2003, 746). A marked difference between the first and the second Council was the gender balance. After pressure from Timorese women’s groups assisted by the Gender Unit, the UNTAET leadership “issued a directive requiring” that when each of the districts and civil society groups nominated their four representatives for selection to the National Council, there would be at least two women among these. Of those accepted by UNTAET into the National Council, 13 were women, and 23 were men (Pires 2002).132 Xanana Gusmão was elected Speaker and Milena Pires was appointed Deputy Speaker.

132 That is, an increase from 18 percent female participation in the first council to 36 percent in the new National Council.

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At the same time, a Cabinet of Transitional Government, consisting of four international and four Timorese members, was formed to have authority over the developing government departments as well as “initiate, modify, and recommend draft regulations” to the National Council (Caplan 2005, 115–116). The reorganization did, however, not solve the conflict over influence as the entire transitional process remained under the UNTAET (male-dominated) leadership. The continued strife was to remain throughout the UNTAET operation (King 2003, 746). For example, the Timorese members of Cabinet threatened to resign in December 2000. This conflict increased the speed of the process to establish independence (Caplan 2005, 116). The work with creating a government continued after the Constituent Assembly elections. At this point, an all-Timorese Council of Ministers was formed. Fretilin, which had received the majority of votes in the elections, got six of the ten minister posts. However, the entire country remained under the control of the UNTAET leadership until independence. This meant that the signature of the UNTAET SRSG was still required on the decisions taken by the Timorese government (Caplan 2005, 116–117; Smith 2004a). In this first all-Timorese government, the gender ratio in representation was 8/2, where the two women held the posts of finance and justice (Ospina 2006). After May 20, 2002, the Timor-Leste government took power, and Timor-Leste became independent with Gusmão as newly-elected President. In this setting of Timorese frustration with the UN operation, it is interesting that the cooperation between Timorese focus groups for equality and international parties appears to have been more successful also with regard to the formation of the government (as it had been for elections and administration). Apart from improving the ratio in representation, the Gender Unit worked with Timorese women’s organizations to pressure the UNTAET, and the Timorese leadership, to institutionalize the question of equality within the new government. This was successful in September 2001, when the Office of the Promotion of Equality was created. This office was located in the Timorese Prime Minister’s Office after the model of the UNTAET’s Gender Unit, and has become more important after independence. The Office advises the Prime Minister on equality issues, mainstreaming of government work, promoting a culture of equality, and supporting the empowerment of women. It has received continued international support through other UN agencies, primarily those of development. However, Emily Roynestad claims that this work for equality was

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somewhat undermined by the UN policy of primarily hiring men for the top positions in the operation. She claims that this sent an unfortunate message to the Timorese leadership of the value of gender balance in decision-making (PRADET Timor Lorosa’e 2005, 30–31; Roynestad 2003, 9). Since taking over power from the UN operation at independence in May 2002, Fretilin has sought to consolidate its power (Smith 2004b, 280). While there has been little room for the opposition to forward their opinions without harsh reprimands and accusations from the dominant party, the primary rights and freedoms of the Timorese population have been upheld. This in spite of more autocratic attempts, such as plans to limit the freedom of speech—first for foreigners and then for Timorese actors—something which has alarmed human rights groups and journalists (Smith 2004b).133 The Fretilin party, similar to the majority of all parties in TimorLeste, has continued to be male-dominated, but with a (limited) degree of female participation in the top leadership. For example, a woman was appointed Deputy Prime Minister when the government was reshuffled in 2003. Also in the opposition, there has been development with one of the opposition parties appointing a woman in a leading position (Smith 2004b, 281–282). When UNMISET took over from UNTAET, the operation’s political role became only consultative: assignments were directed at providing advisors to the Timorese state for continued capacity building. The purpose was to assist in the consolidation of the new government structures. Although the Gender Unit was by now recognized in the operation mandate, its influence became more limited as staff was decreased in number. With the change in operation leadership and the general lack of gender awareness of the UNMISET advisers to the government, the new operation at times even came to work against the more gender-aware policies introduced by UNTAET.134 The changes in gender power-relations contributed to by UNTAET were thereby not supported by the following missions. Additional international support (mainly by other UN agencies) has focused on the Equality Office in the Timorese government. This

133 These have been blocked by the President. Apart from the attempt to limit freedom of speech, the above can be typical traits of democratization (Vikør 2003). 134 Personal communication, Dili.

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office has drawn strength from being included in regular Timorese politics.135 An interviewee also stated that “to enable increased participation of women in politics practical measures such as child-care, training and mentoring programs to build the capacity of women to address real political issues that affect not only women but their families and communities” are required.136 An acceptance of women in non-traditional roles of decision-making enables a change in this area, even though the interest in gender in Timor-Leste has continuously decreased after 2002.137 To summarize: there was a continuous struggle for power between the Timorese, male-dominated, parties and the UNTAET operation. After a low degree of participation by Timorese women in the initial stages of the UN operation, the level increases during the latter half of the operation. With the transfer to UNMISET, UN influence is radically reduced. Concerning the Gender Unit, the change from an aware leadership and the low degree of awareness of UNMISET advisors, contributed to a decrease in the influence of the Unit. After the UNTAET operation, the Timorese parties have been the ones primarily affecting this aspect of political equality.

135 136 137

Personal communication, Dili. Interview with Fernanda Borges. Personal communication, Dili.

PART III

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

CHAPTER SIX

THE FRAMEWORK AT WORK Our study of Timor-Leste shows that Timorese men and women had different situations and different needs throughout the conflict and during the peace operations. As we could see, the UN’s recognition and adaptation to this fact was neither mainstreamed nor consistent. What, then, can we learn from Timor-Leste? To determine that, it is now time to ask . . .” Is the developed analytical framework fruitful for explaining developments in Timor-Leste? What does it tell us about the gender power-relations concept? And how do peace operations affect these power-relations in a state? This chapter answers these questions. It analyzes the usefulness of the mainstream-based framework and how it can be further advanced. The first section of the analysis, ‘Advancing gender power-relations’ focuses on continuing to assess and develop the conceptual contribution, primarily on how to understand and measure variation in the two dimensions of political and security equality, concentrating on the latter. We then move on to the section on ‘How peace operations affect gender power-relations.’ This section centers on the identified peace-operation factors and, in relation to these, considers potentially relevant contextual factors. Just as under the section on the gender power-relations concept, there is a need to develop the suggested factors and determine the respective use of them for understanding effects on gender power-relations. The last section, ‘Are these effects unique for Timor-Leste?’, broadens the scope from the particularly setting in Timor-Leste to a more general one by observing effects from other operations in other countries. These examples are then discussed in relation to what we have learned from Timor-Leste. 6.1

ADVANCING GENDER POWER-RELATIONS

What, then, does our study of Timor-Leste tell us about assessing and developing the concept of gender power-relations? Our primary focus is on understanding and measuring variation in the two dimensions of political and security equality. The starting point was that

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the gender power-relations concept should be understood as the division of power between men (as a total) and women (as a total) on the macro level in a state. As such, it is necessary to consider that for this particular power-relation, all operations currently take place in a state which has an asymmetrical power-relation to women’s disadvantage. The question is therefore whether the power-relation will deteriorate—become more unequal—or improve—become more equal—as an effect of operations. The manner in which we defined gender power-relations signifies that the balance in gender power-relations should be considered as a relative measurement, or as degrees on a scale, rather than as a dichotomous variable (i.e. equal/non-patriarchal vs. unequal/patriarchal). This understanding of the balance in gender power-relations brings with it the benefit of not only being able to trace smaller variation, but that the degree is comparable between countries and over time. Two dimensions of gender power-relations were selected as being of particular interest for this study: The first was political equality, related to the level of participation of men and women in politics. The second, security equality, a dimension implied but not developed in previous research, was in this project understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. These are the dimensions where we begin to look for variation in gender powerrelations in Timor-Leste. Political Equality In the analytical framework, political equality relates to the level of participation of men and women in politics. Access to direct decisionmaking power was central for the balance in gender power-relations. This was most clearly manifested in the representation in political structures. As such, it was a classic and established measurement of equality in politics, both for gender power-relations and other forms of power-relations (such as ethnic, or class)—and, thus, required little development to be useful in this project. When applied to the TimorLeste operation, the dimension displays an interesting variation (even while the dominant trait remained male domination). As the description of Timor-Leste showed, both males and females were involved in politics from 1975 to 2006. Detailed statistics of political equality prior to 1999 have not been available, but all obtained information indicated that the Indonesian administration, the

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pro-independence groups, and traditional political structures in TimorLeste were largely male dominated between 1975 and 1999. There were some attempts made by the Indonesian authorities to encourage female participation in organizations and employment but it is in the Timorese pro-independence parties were we could detect the most variance in the male/female ratio. These were also the groups which would constitute the political elite after independence. While all parties were male dominated in number and leadership, there were a substantial number of female members on several levels in the organizations. In addition, during this period, there were attempts by Timor-Leste women, supported by a number of men, to increase women’s political influence. This was done both within existing structures—through women’s wings of existing male-led organizations—and by creating independent women’s organizations. The latter takes place primarily after 1997. Both forms of organizations worked to bring the issue of equality on to the agenda as well as to ensure that women’s needs were not ignored. During the UNTAET operation, representation in the new state became a debated issue, as the implementation did not initially include the Timorese. Women’s organizations were part of the general mobilization for increased participation, and insisted that a gender balance should be considered in this increased participation. After an initial, very imbalanced, ratio to women’s disadvantage, this begun to alter further into the UNTAET operation. Assisted by the UNTAET Gender Unit, the Timorese women’s organizations were quite successful in ensuring a gender-balance goal when the UN operation leadership increased Timorese involvement. The recruitment for the state administration aimed for 30 percent women, landing at a ratio of 69 percent men and 31 percent women. Of the representatives elected in the Constituent Assembly elections (later transformed into the first parliament), the ratio was 73 percent men and 27 percent women. When the first all-Timorese government was formed under UNTAET, two women and eight men became ministers in a maleheaded government. No women ran for president. Thus, the political parties and structures were all male dominated in number and all the highest positions were held by men, during both the occupation and the international operation. Data prior to 1999 is vague, but if only comparison over time is made with the formal (Indonesian-controlled) political decision-making (excluding the pro-independence parties), the period after the entry of the

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Table 1: Level of political equality October 1999–March 20061

State administration Parliament Government

Men

Women

69 73 80

31 27 20

UNTAET operation was likely to have been more balanced as regards representation.2 However, given the high degree of female participation in the pro-independence structures during the struggle, if this is included (which is reasonable, as it is this which will constitute the future political organizations), the ratio was more balanced during the conflict, decreased in the initial part of the UNTAET operation, and then increased toward the latter half of the operation. From the latter half of UNMISET and forward, there is an indication that a decrease in the ratio in representation is likely even though it is not yet visible in numbers (as there has not been another election in the examined period). Thus, the male/female ratio in participation varied in the examined time period. Furthermore, it is notable that the closer we move toward direct decision-making power (government), the higher the number of men and the lower the number of women. It is also important to note that the material gave no indication that the introduction of democracy was automatically followed by an increased number of women in politics, even though it gave them new political rights and enabled free organization. Instead, active political organization was required to improve the balance in the political dimension in gender power-relations and to uphold the political participation of women as established during the armed conflict. As men and women’s access to political power was measured on the macro level, the level of analysis deserves some discussion in the case of political equality. The reason is that the empirical material strongly indicated that the political situation in Timor-Leste was hierarchical. For example, the debate around elections and formation of government structures indicated clearly that ‘social status’ was a determinant factor for men’s participation and access to power at the 1 2

Representation in percent. Indonesia, by comparison had 10–12% women during the 1999–2006 period.

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individual level. This entails that access to political decision-making structures was limited for most people—men and women—although a higher degree of men than women had a position in society which enabled political participation. Security Equality Security equality should in this study be understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. The development of this new dimension was based on two observations in previous research. First, both men and women are the target of violence, but of different forms. For the analytical purpose of this project, therefore, violence was divided into conflict violence and non-conflict violence. Conflict violence should be understood as physical violence conducted by the warring parties of the armed conflict. This covers both lethal and non-lethal forms of violence as there was predicted to be a difference. Feminist research pointed out that mainstream research does not consider violence of which women are the main targets, such as sexual violence and domestic violence. Carpenter, on the other hand, identified the fact that much feminist research, in combination with the majority of policy and mainstream research, does not seriously consider the situation for the majority of men—the civilians—and thereby ignores their security needs (Carpenter 2005). Secondly, in spite of these differences, measures undertaken to ensure protection were not equally distributed to address all forms of violence. This was supported by Caprioli, who found that when security for men increases, this is not followed by a similar increase for women (Caprioli 2004a). Exactly what was meant by ‘protection’ was not clear in previous research, but the indication was that it primarily concerned the measures taken by state institutions—primarily the approach by the police, and the work of the military. These are the angles examined here. Thus, the analysis of security equality has its foundations in the observed difference in violence and protection between men and women, to develop how we can understand equality in security terms. As exact statistics of violence and protection for men and women are non-existent, the development required an estimation of the degree in the empirical material. This is illustrated on a scale from low to high. If we, on this scale, estimate and compare the risk of different forms of violence portrayed in the empirical material to the degree of

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Table 2: Estimated level of violence 1975–September 1999

Lethal conflict violence Non-lethal conflict violence Non-conflict violence

Men

Women

High High Medium

Medium High High

protection developed for men and women, this displays an interesting variation in Timor-Leste. In Timor-Leste, the level of lethal conflict violence against men was generally quite high, but peaked in the initial, and concluding, parts of the conflict. Conflict violence was also high in the non-lethal form, such as torture and abuse. Non-conflict violence was difficult to find, but the material indicated that the current level of assault crimes was a legacy of the occupation; it is likely that they took place to a reasonably high degree during this period as well. Women were more seldom the direct targets of lethal conflict violence in 1975–1999, even though a substantial number were killed.3 They were instead primarily the target of non-lethal conflict violence in the form of sexual violence, sexual slavery, rape, torture, and abuse. An exact comparison is difficult to make, but the level of violence was high enough to cause a public discussion of violence against women, a previously taboo topic. Non-conflict violence against women, in the form of sexual violence and domestic violence was very high. If we instead look at protection in 1975 to 1999, the level of conflict violence (both lethal and non-lethal) was high against men, but there were some structures developed to protect those who were politically active. The supportive network of the struggle was, in part, used to increase the protection to at least enable collective action and protection. However, civilian men, not working to enforce a political agenda or participating militarily in the conflict, were also targeted. There is indication of a higher degree in the level of violence directed at them because they were male, as civilian women were

3 Had we not focused on physical violence, it is possible that women and their dependants would be shown as having been the victims of death through starvation and lack of health-care to an even higher degree than men.

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Table 3: Estimated level of protection 1975–September 1999

Lethal conflict violence Non-lethal conflict violence Non-conflict violence

Men

Women

Medium-Low Low Medium

Low Low Low

not the targets to the same degree.4 For this civilian group of men, there was no protection developed and human-rights abuses were a common trait of the occupation. What is interesting to note about the conflict violence against men, is that it was not blamed on the victim of the abuse as we can observe for some forms of violence of which women were the targets. Women were less the target of lethal conflict violence than men, but the women who participated in the conflict received less protection from the developed structures. To come to terms with this, attempts were made by women’s movements to increase the protection of women in the pro-independence movement: this could be what Cockburn (1998, 42) identifies as fighting not only the enemy but also one’s own colleagues to achieve equal protection and respect. For example, Fretilin’s women’s movement worked to improve the situation for female participants in the guerilla. In addition to lethal conflict violence, women were also targeted with non-lethal conflict violence, where sexual violence was a common feature. No formal protection was developed from non-lethal violence. Both for targeted civilian, and politically active, women, sexual violence was also blamed on the victim and not only on the perpetrator. Although the extent of the violence against women from Indonesian troops resulted in the issue of blame being brought up for discussion in a manner in which it had not been before, the result was still often increased insecurity for abused women also after the incident of violence. For example, as a result of the blame, women could be ostracized leaving some abused women no choice but to turn to prostitution in order to find an income. With regard to the last form of violence, non-conflict violence, women were the targets of especially domestic violence to Men were also subject to involuntary mobilization to the Indonesian-created military forces and later the militia. From this, there was no protection. There was no similar risk for women. They were instead involuntary used as “forced wives” of Indonesian soldiers during their stay in Timor. 4

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Table 4: Estimated level of violence October 1999–March 2006

Lethal conflict violence Non-lethal conflict violence Non-conflict violence

Men

Women

Medium-Low Low Medium

Low Medium-Low High

a very high degree. There was very little protection developed to handle this form of violence. For both men and women, existing state institutions were not addressed with complaints as a means to handle non-conflict violence or receive protection. The police was part of the apparatus to keep control of the territory and was therefore distrusted by the Timorese population. As an alternative, the traditional system grew substantially in importance and took the place of the state justice system for most Timorese. The traditional system was male-based and it gave more protection from types of non-conflict violence of which men were the main victims. Compared to men’s situation, the violence that women were mainly the target of, domestic violence, was not addressed with the same weight. It could even be regarded as something that was to be solved within the family, and thus not seen as a crime. The level of protection from violence for women was, thus, even lower than that for men. This situation was to alter in some respects after the peace operations entered. INTERFET was deployed in late-September 1999 and had gained full control over the territory by the end of October. In the areas secured by the peacekeeping operation, the level of conflict violence against men, both lethal and non-lethal, decreased drastically. These forms of violence have since then remained reasonably low even though they have peaked during short periods of time when the militia made attempts to operate inside Timor-Leste, attempts which resulted in incidents of violence, foremost directed at men but also with a few women as victims. For men, non-conflict violence has remained mainly at a medium level, as there was a continuous presence of man-to-man violence. This took the form of riots, gang fights and other types of crime-related violence. For women, the risk of both forms of conflict violence was seriously decreased by the work of first INTERFET, and then UNTAET, peacekeeping forces. By comparison, non-conflict violence against women, primarily in the form of domestic violence,

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Table 5: Estimated level of protection October 1999–March 2006

Lethal conflict violence Non-lethal conflict violence Non-conflict violence

Men

Women

High High High-Medium

High High-Medium Low-Medium

remained very high. That is, there is limited in-group variation over time for the last form of violence. In addition, negative behavior of peace-operation personnel would add a degree of non-lethal conflict violence, primarily directed against women.5 If we move on to consider the development of protection from violence, the introduction of the peacekeeping forces of INTERFET and UNTAET, undertook measures for increased protection.6 A substantial part of the operation was directed to ensure the removal of conflict violence (the measures taken, in effect increased the protection of the population). With regard to non-lethal conflict violence, protection was initially high for both men and women. However, with the cases of rape and abuse of primarily Timorese women by international staff (which the operation failed to sufficiently take measures against until very late into the operation), the level of protection that the operation provided was somewhat reduced for women. With the arrival of the international police, followed by the construction of the national Timorese police force, the work to increase protection from non-conflict violence commenced. Handling violence directed against men, almost exclusively from other men, was placed on the agenda from the beginning of the operation and remained central. As regards the efficiency of the police component, the slow build-up of CIVPOL, the problems of creating a new Timorese police force based on new human rights standards, the competition between

5 The classification of violence conducted by the peace-operation personnel, as ‘conflict violence’ is based on the fact that this actor, like the warring parties, was an actor outside of a society’s normal composition directly related to the armed conflict (which the operation is there to assist in solving). That should not be misunderstood to mean that there are other similarities between the peace operation and the warring parties. 6 If the situation for the men in the militia or the Indonesian army is included, the protection decreases somewhat but the very limited use of lethal violence and the investigation of the killings of militia members limits the negative effect. As there are no women in these groups, this does not affect women’s level of protection.

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the new Timorese military and the new Timorese police, and the two competing judicial systems, limit the effectiveness of measures taken to increase this protection. As the traditional system was often part of a patron-client relationship, this also affects the protection of the competing system for men. Non-conflict violence against women taking place in the public sphere was addressed by the official structures. However, protection against the non-conflict violence that mostly affects women—domestic violence—was not automatically included in the mandate for UNTAET unlike the forms of violence which affected men. When the question of increasing protection from domestic violence was addressed, the focus was on getting domestic violence recognized as a crime. Thereby, this form of violence would be handled by the police and not the traditional system or family. The violence, however, continued to be accorded low priority and status within the police. Thus, even though the attitude to the violence has begun to change, actual protection developed remained low, particularly if compared to other forms of violence. Thus, the development of protection from conflict violence primarily had a higher impact on men than on women but this was mainly because men were the targets of such violence to a higher degree than women. Concerning non-conflict violence, public violence has been primarily addressed while protection from domestic violence remains lower. That is, much of the focus in increasing protection from nonconflict violence was directed at halting man-to-man violence. As a result, in ‘relative’ terms (which is at the basis of the security-equality concept) men’s security situation improved even more than that for women. In that respect, the peace operation benefited men to a higher degree than women, who received less protection through the measures taken by the operation (as women’s situation had required other measure to be taken to make their protection equal to that of men). Interestingly, and similarly to that predicted by Caprioli (2004a), the security situation for women did thus not automatically improve equally to that of men.7 However, it can also be argued that women became somewhat less unequal to men from the moment that the

7 Nevertheless, if the ‘absolute’ security situation for women is observed, women’s situation became more secure during, and after, the operation than it was during the Indonesian occupation.

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operation started taking measures to also handle domestic violence. As a result, domestic violence is now a crime that can be addressed by the police even though it still has lower priority than other forms of non-conflict violence. An additional difference between men and women that is particularly worth noting, was the normative aspects of blame for the violence. Violence against men was usually not blamed on both perpetrator and victims, as was the case with much of the violence directed at women. For example, women victims of sexual violence or domestic violence can be labeled as partly responsible for being abused. Conclusions In this section, we have advanced our conceptual contribution. The focus was on how to understand and measure variation in the two dimensions of political and security equality. As security equality is a new dimension identified in the framework, the section particularly considered the development of this dimension. Results of using the framework for analyzing Timor-Leste were rewarding. In both dimensions of gender power-relations, political equality and security equality, the power balance varies over time. For political equality (including the Timorese pro-independence parties), the ratio was more equal during the conflict, deteriorated to women’s disadvantage in the initial part of the UNTAET operation. Toward the latter half of the operation there was a shift where political equality instead began to improve. For security equality, the security situation was very serious for both men and women during the conflict, improved to a higher degree for men than for women in the first half of the INTERFET/UNTAET operations, and then became more equal as measures were taken to also handle violence of which women were the main targets (from the middle of the UNTAET operation and onward). This variation displays the fruitfulness of considering access to power as varying in degrees. If we particularly consider the development of the new dimension of gender power-relations—security equality—even the crude division of violence into conflict violence (lethal and non-lethal) and non-conflict violence on a scale from high to low displays interesting within-case variation.

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6.2

HOW PEACE OPERATIONS AFFECT GENDER POWER-RELATIONS

We now can pose an important question. Is the observed variation in gender power-relations in Timor-Leste caused by the peace operations, or primarily an effect of contextual factors? In addition, are there alternative factors which were overlooked in the formulation of the analytical framework? To explain the variation in gender power-relations in Timor-Leste that we have observed it is important to systematically search for factors that can have affected this change. Thus, the starting point of this section of the analysis is the above-established variation in gender power-relations. It was found that for political equality (including the Timorese pro-independence parties), the ratio in participation was more equal during the conflict, deteriorated to men’s advantage in the initial part of the UNTAET operation, and then improved toward the latter half of the operation. For security equality, the security situation was very serious for both men and women during the conflict, improved to a higher degree for men than for women in the first half of the INTERFET/UNTAET operations, and then became more equal as protection was directed to also handling violence where women were the main targets (from the middle of the UNTAET operation and onward). With these variations in mind, the analysis continues with assessing the value of the identified factors for the framework. The primary focus is on what caused the change from deteriorating to improving gender powerrelations that took place under the UNTAET operation. This section will go through each of the identified peace-operation factors of the analytical framework: awareness in implementation, handling local military, local cooperation, personnel behavior, gender-balanced composition, and operation leadership. In relation to these operation factors, potentially relevant contextual factors will be considered. Primary focus is on the identified contextual factors of participatory ratio in the conflict, focus groups for equality, and the ideology of male-dominated parties. As in the discussion on the gender power-relations concept, it is essential to determine the fruitfulness of the identified factors for understanding variation in both dimensions of gender power-relations as well as to develop the framework. Awareness in implementation As could be observed from the framework, awareness in mandate implementation is a vague and underdeveloped factor in previous

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research. In this study, the factor is interpreted as relating to gender specificity, that is, knowledge of the difference in the respective situation for men and women of the host state. According to the analytical framework, awareness had to be present in all assignment areas—that is, in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments—in order to avoid negative effects. Operation implementation is to a high degree dependent on the formulations in the mandate from the Security Council. The mandate is vital for what is considered as relevant, and what is to be considered as out of bounds. Therefore, in a first step to develop the factor of awareness in implementation, it is important to study whether there was recognition of gender-specificity in the mandate formulations. There is very little variation in the mandate formulations for the Timor-Leste operations on gender specificity. For UNAMET, the mandate did not include any recognition of gender specificity although we could see that this operation still had a degree of gender-aware writings in the electoral rules.8 INTERFET was partly motivated by the situation for women and children, but this was not followed by any explicit consideration in the mandate on the implementation of assignments. For UNTAET, there was only a minor improvement. The mandate did not generally consider differences in the situation for men and women, but stated the necessity of involving some staff with gender-specific knowledge (but what that entailed for general implementation was unclear). The mandate of the following mission, UNMISET, on the other hand, contained one line on the general importance of ‘gender’ in peacekeeping (but with no reference to how it was specifically relevant for the implementation of the Timor-Leste operation). In addition, the Security Council resolution for UNMISET mandated an institutional support function for gender mainstreaming, in the form of a Gender Unit. None of the preceding operations had been formally mandated such a Unit, even though one had been developed in UNTAET after much initial resistance. The mandate for the last operation, UNOTIL, made no reference to gender nor to a Gender Unit. The main reason for this decision was that peacekeeping assignments were removed from the mandate (compared to the earlier operations), and Security Council resolution 1325(2000), which outlined the questions of women, peace and security, only recognized the relevance 8 The operation also appears not to have had a negative effect on the ratio in participation between men and women and thereby follow the expected pattern.

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of gender for peacekeeping, not peacebuilding. In conclusion, apart from UNMISET, and to a certain degree UNAMET, there was little formal recognition of gender-specific situations for men and women in any original mandate for implementing assignments. According to the framework, for the operations where there was a general lack of awareness in implementation, negative effects for gender power-relations were expected to result. Until the second half of the UNTAET operation, the operations follow this expected pattern. A lack of awareness contributed to the initial deteriorating levels of equality in gender power-relations. For security equality, the military component focused on creating security in the public sphere by halting conflict violence. As a result of how the implementation of assignments was carried out, protection from all forms of conflict violence increased. Although highly important for women too, it can be argued that the focus on violence in the public sphere had the greatest positive effect on men as it was men who had been the main targets of lethal as well as non-lethal conflict violence.9 The main reason for why the change in protection was greatest for men was, however, that the violence of which women were the main targets was not addressed. Expressed in the terms of this study, there were few measures taken to improve protection from the form of violence mainly targeting women. Although the international civilian police, CIVPOL, thereafter did serve to increase the protec-

The analytical framework also noted disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as it was expected to affect security equality. With the militia dispersed, the remaining Timorese military organization, though small in terms of the number of active combatants, mainly involved FALINTIL. Male combatants were the only ones included in the process (this was in line with internal definitions of combatants in Timor-Leste where no women were officially recognized as formal combatants despite having participated in combat). After criticism, the process was increased to include the dependants of combatants. The focus of the process was on providing a livelihood, expected to benefit the entire family. There is no reference to whether the reintegration program actually addressed issues that could limit the risk of domestic violence caused by conflict trauma and separation. The only report that brings this up concerns general effects of disarmament, which resulted in fire-arms being more rarely used in domestic violence. As regards the combatants which were not successfully ‘reintegrated’, there were events of violence involving them, but the degree or targets are most often not specified. The little reporting that exists mainly concerns violence in the public sphere, most often man-to-man violence. In conclusion, demobilization appears to involve risks for both men and women from different forms of violence; men from man-to-man violence and women from increased risks of domestic violence. Information is too vague to make a definite conclusion but it is possible that failed DDR increased the level of violence for both. 9

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tion for men and for women in the public sphere from non-conflict violence, domestic violence remained equally widespread and severe after the armed conflict and was not equally addressed. Hence, the initial deterioration in security equality. With regard to political equality, we know that the ratio was more balanced during the armed conflict as many women participated in the pro-independence parties. This was not, however, considered in the initial UNTAET implementation. Therefore, this study argues that the lack of awareness in the operation contributed to the deteriorating balance in political equality in this time period. In practical terms, this meant that a very low number of women were included in the cooperation between the UN operation and the Timorese parties. Effects were, however, not limited only to representation during the operation but had potential long-term consequences as UNTAET conducted a major reform of the political sector. Also, this reform did not consider the ongoing internal political debate on equality, or the difference in power between men and women. Thus, similarly to security equality, the lack of awareness in implementation of political assignments had a negative impact on political equality. It is important to note that the mere introduction of democracy and a new state structures as initially planned by the operation did not result in a more even ratio in representation. The observed deterioration in both security and political equality was then halted, and a shift to improved relations took place in a later phase of the UNTAET operation. Most interestingly, that was a result of an increase in awareness but in a slightly different manner than first expected by the framework. The determining event was the increase in awareness on the operation-leadership level. That is, the shift was not the result of a change in the mandate, or in the awareness of gender specificity in the general staff.10 Regarding the latter, there was a theoretical possibility that awareness had developed among the staff while the operation was ongoing (based on what the staff observed in their work). Such acquired awareness could have resulted in a difference in how the operation implemented its assignments in later stages. However, we could see from the description The only exception was in the international police, where many of the staff contributed to raising awareness of the extent of the problem to get it onto the operation’s agenda when they encountered a number of very severe cases of domestic violence. 10

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that staff awareness of gender specificity was very low throughout UNTAET. What makes the change under UNTAET even more interesting is therefore that the positive effect on the leadership level comes about in an operation environment generally lacking in gender specificity on all other levels. An additional observation from the above discussions is that there exists a potential new peace-operation factor which was imperative for the increase in awareness in the leadership and for the subsequent change in gender power-relations. This factor is here labeled institutional support (in the Timor-Leste operations it took the form of a Gender Unit). This form of operation component was created to increase awareness in UN operations but has rarely functioned optimally (due to the conditions of the Units). For UNTAET, a Gender Unit had been instigated by the Department of Political Affairs in the initial planning but was removed by the UNTAET leadership when the operation planning was taken over by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN organizations (on the international level) which were forwarding women’s rights and gender mainstreaming were, however, rather strong in 1999. With the assistance of the international actors, a Gender Unit could therefore be created a few months into the UNTAET operation. When the Unit begun to cooperate with the Timorese focus groups for equality, this generated a change in the awareness of the operation leadership. It is here that the shift from deteriorating to improving gender power-relations begins, as it entailed that the leadership’s behavior became supportive not only of demands made by maledominated parties but also to demands made by Timorese women through the focus groups. Had this interaction not been successful, it is unlikely that the institutional support could have independently affected the change to improved gender power-relations. For example, the Gender Unit was not granted a budget until a year into the operation and the staff was very limited in number. Instead, it is in the interaction with other factors that this component was imperative by successfully affecting the implementation.11

11 A similar format was adopted for the UNMISET Gender Unit, although continuously cut in staff size compared to that existing during UNTAET.

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Handling local military The second factor of the analytical framework was the handling of the local military. As with the factor of awareness, the handling of the local military was a vague factor in previous research. What could be concluded, however, was that a continued role for the military in politics was seen to be related to a deterioration of political equality, or, at least, might constitute a systematic obstacle to improved participation ratios in politics. Thus, if an operation limits the formal role of the military in the post-conflict state, then that was assumed to have a positive effect on political equality. The reason is that a formal limitation of the military’s role could decrease the informal use of military ideals and former conflict participation in politics. To a certain degree INTERFET, but more clearly UNTAET and the first half of UNMISET, became responsible for politically handling Timor-Leste’s military organizations. As the empirical material shows, INTERFET, and then UNTAET, gave a very limited role in the operation to the existing Timorese military forces of FALINTIL, and no role to the militia. In addition, the UNTAET operation separated the international military from the peacebuilding assignments in its own organization. The purpose was to signify a break with the previous Indonesian system of including the military in politics. This policy was continued in UNMISET, where international staff, for example, spoke out against attempts by some Timorese parties to use the military in police, or political, matters. The formal construction of the new Timorese military was conducted in cooperation between UNTAET (and then UNMISET), bilateral arrangements, and Timorese parties. The new military was kept small in numbers in order not to constitute too high a cost for a developing country and the role of the new military was limited to external defense in case of an invasion.12 By UNTAET regulation, all Timorese military personnel were prohibited both from making their political opinions known, and from participating in political parties. In that sense, UNTAET and the following operations drastically reduced the formal role of the military, particularly in comparison to Indonesian rule (or in the parties of the pro-independence struggle). This formal

12 That is, only as a deterrent. In the everyday work, it is the new Timorese police force that handles security issues.

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reduction was, however, not followed by a similar decrease in the informal use of the military struggle in politics.13 Local cooperation In order to carry out mandate assignments, particularly those of peacebuilding, peace operations can cooperate with local parties (from warring parties and political parties to NGOs). As we discussed in the framework, operations have varying degrees of independence to implement mandates and choose local partners. The process of selecting local cooperation partners was considered important in the framework as it was related to which internal actors can affect the implementation of the operation mandate. The framework also determined that male-dominated parties were likely to be those primarily selected, as they would be the dominant ones in a state. The policies of these parties were, thereby, identified as central. In addition, it was important whether or not existing focus groups for equality were included by the operation. Such an inclusion would entail recognition of the existing political situation in the host state. By comparison, if only male-dominated parties with an ideology that was opposed to improving the power balance between men and women were selected, then we could expect negative consequences for gender power-relations. This would particularly be the case if focus groups for equality were simultaneously excluded. These effects were expected both for political equality and security equality. What was also important to note was that this selection is conditioned by the limitations in the mandate. For example, UNTAET had a very high degree of independence to choose cooperation partners. This turned out to be central. If we study the general situation of selection in Timor-Leste operations, the input of all Timorese groups was very limited, particularly for UNAMET and INTERFET. In the planning of UNTAET, the male-dominated CNRT did receive information, but involvement was restricted. The operation was instead planned at an extreme pace with the UN operation in Kosovo as a model. After UNTAET had been

13 As long-time combatants, with substantial political legitimacy, were restricted from political participation by their inclusion in the new military, the selected policy might even have assisted the political use of the struggle and decreased the potential political competition.

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established, the male-dominated parties were invited to discuss a suitable participatory format, but Timorese parties continued to have, in general, limited influence. This resulted in a mobilization of Timorese actors. In this, women’s organizations joined the other parties and NGOs. The result of the mobilization was a more inclusive operation strategy, even though the influence was to remain relatively limited. For UNMISET and UNOTIL, the cooperation with the Timorese parties was of a different form as Timor-Leste then constituted a sovereign state (apart from UNMISETs executive mandate on security which lasted until May 2004). As expected in the analytical framework, the Timorese parties selected were all initially male dominated (similar to the international operation). Interestingly, the largest of the selected parties, Fretilin, appears to be one of the most open to changes in the balance of gender power-relations. Focus groups for equality, in this period all were women’s organizations, were not among those selected by UNTAET in the initial period. After the Timorese Women’s Congress had been organized, the legitimacy of women’s demands was recognized by the UNTAET leadership (forwarded by the Gender Unit). The following inclusion of women’s organizations through the Gender Unit somewhat shifted UNTAET’s focus to include some of the women’s demands. Although the general work of the UN remained unaware of genderspecific circumstances, the acceptance of women’s organizations by the leadership (through the active work of the Gender Unit) was a key chain of events which can explain why the UNTAET operation did not continue to have a negative impact on gender power-relations. In addition, the effect of the above interaction was the key to improving security equality. The women’s organizations, working with the Gender Unit and forwarded by the leadership, were instrumental in getting violence against women recognized as a crime. This was a continuation of a process initiated by women’s organizations under the Indonesian occupation, which was now assisted by the UN operation. If Timorese women had been unable to forward these demands to the Gender Unit, or if the UNTAET leadership had ignored them, then it is likely that no measures would have been taken to enhance protection from this violence. Instead of a continued deterioration, the inclusion of the focus groups meant that these received assistance from the head of the UNTAET operation. For example, he led a campaign together with the top Timorese leadership to have domestic

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violence recognized as a crime. In addition to the campaign, the peace operation informed, and trained, the new Timorese national police to deal with crimes against vulnerable groups, defined as women and children. While the slow build-up of protection infrastructure—sufficient police, shelter, counseling and economic assistance—to assist abused women temporarily decreased the faith in the justice system, the work brought a change in the perception of domestic violence foremost in the Dili area. In the countryside, where the influence of UNTAET (and later the Timor-Leste government) was more limited, the impact was smaller. In conclusion, the fact that protection from all forms of violence began to be developed, and that the ratio in representation was addressed, both stem from focus groups for equality being selected. This selection was, to an extent, made possible because Fretilin, the dominant party, had a positive view on changing gender power-relations. As the male-dominated parties were likely to be considered as more central for the peace operation, we can consider a scenario where the dominant parties would have strongly opposed a change in gender power-relations. Under such circumstances, it is quite plausible that focus groups for equality would not have been selected and the operation would have been more careful in its approach to addressing equality issues. We will get back to these discussions when we address the factor of operation leadership. First, however, we will continue with the factors of personnel behavior and gender-balanced composition. Personnel behavior In the analytical framework, personnel behavior was understood as staff interaction with the host population. Primarily, personnel behavior was connected to whether it decreased or increased the number of threats to local women. The expectation was that negative behavior by operation personnel could decrease the protection women could receive from the operation (if sufficient measures were not taken to control negative behavior). That is, this was predicted to contribute to an increased imbalance in security equality to women’s disadvantage. In general, the level of abuse in Timor-Leste by peace-operation personnel appears to have been limited. Of the reported abuse of Timorese by international personnel, women were the main victims,

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although one of the most notorious cases concerns the rape of a boy. Violence was thereby not exclusively directed at women even though such cases constitute the majority. As we have concluded under the discussion on security equality, women’s situation became more secure through the regular implementation of operation assignments. However, with the cases of rape and abuse of Timorese women by peace-operation personnel, there was an, albeit limited, increase in violence toward women from this new actor. Measures to enhance protection were not taken by all operation components until rather late in the operations. Even though it was limited, the negative behavior would, thereby, have contributed to a decrease in security equality, as predicted in the analytical framework. Beyond the focus of this study, but deserving a comment, was the effect the cases had on decreasing the Timorese population’s respect for, and trust in, the operations. Respect and trust were further affected by other (in the eyes of the Timorese population) cases of negative behavior concerning clothing, drinking, display of pornographic pictures in public buildings, etc. In turn, such loss of trust can affect the use the population had of the operation in combination with potentially decreasing the ability to successfully implement an operation (as cooperation is made more difficult).14 Constructive behavior, on the other hand, which included interaction on equal terms and mutual respect between peace operation personnel and Timorese, made the population more positive to the operation. These efforts of cooperation and respect served to decrease fear and instead increase understanding. Gender-balanced composition Another factor related to personnel was that of the gender-balanced composition (i.e. the male/female ratio of personnel). In the framework, this was predicted to have three effects, one direct and two indirect. The direct effect, and potentially most central, was whether a very imbalanced operation had a negative effect for security equality by decreasing women’s opportunity to seek assistance from operation components to a higher degree than it did for men.

14 It was surprising how often the cases of negative behavior, though few, came up in discussions in Timor-Leste. They almost appear to have made as much, if not more, of an imprint as the implementation of assignments.

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Indirectly, more gender-balanced missions were predicted to affect gender power-relations by showing alternative roles for women and men. The other indirect effect was linked to how the balance in the operation displayed the importance of, or disregard for, equality to the host population. The effect would lie in that an imbalanced mission potentially undermined local attempts to improve the balance in gender power-relations. These effects for gender power-relations might appear more limited, but should they appear in combination with other operation factors, such as negative personnel behavior and exclusion of focus groups in the selection of local cooperation partners, effects could be considerable. For security equality, gender-balanced composition concerned foremost the usefulness of the peace operation to the host population. In the case of Timor-Leste, the operations were all male-dominated, although all had a substantial number of women employed. This composition varied between components, with the ratio being most imbalanced in the military components and most balanced in the peacebuilding components (thereby following the general trend of peace operations). Information on the impact of the low number of women in the peacekeeping troops is divided. Some report that it did have a negative impact with regard to security while others reported that it did not. For example, in the King’s College study on the new TimorLeste military, the low number of women in the international military appears to have negatively affected the view Timorese women had of the forces. It can, thus, not be ruled out that it possibly affected the protection women had from the operation’s presence in this respect. The operation’s conscious (occasional) organization of male and female soldiers for different purposes can also be seen as recognition of the potential impact of the gender balance. For example, in some situations, such as body searches, female soldiers handled Timorese women. The more even ratio in the international police was reported to have contributed to domestic violence being addressed. However, as this issue was also forwarded by a number of male police officers and not restricted to female police, it is possible that the addressing of domestic violence was more related to the laws in the police officer’s land of origin. What the presence of female police officers was more clearly related to, was the facilitation of reporting of (shame-labeled) violence against women, such as sexual or domestic violence. In that

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sense, a more equal ratio in this component’s operation personnel can have contributed positively to security equality. Whether operation personnel affected perceptions of gender roles in Timor-Leste, and perhaps, in the longer term, gender power-relations, was an angle more difficult to measure. Of what was reported, female operation personnel, particularly those in the military forces, were considered to have influenced both Timorese men’s and women’s perceptions of what jobs women could hold. The latter was even more apparent with the CIVPOL women, present in larger numbers, who inspired many Timorese women to apply to the new Timorese police force. Male CIVPOL officers who took domestic violence seriously were also reported to set a new standard in their training of Timorese male police cadets. The extent and the long-term impact on gender roles was, however, not possible to determine. The question of gender-balanced composition was reported to have an effect on how equality was perceived. For political equality, the unbalanced ratio of UN staff, with a low number of women in the UN operation, was reported to negatively affect the perception of the importance of equality among the Timor-Leste parties. In that respect, the operations can be seen as having set a negative political example. It is possible that these factors had an indirect limited effect on the work for gender power-relations by other factors, but it was difficult to determine to what extent. Operation leadership When we now address the last identified factor in the analytical framework, operation leadership, we return to the discussion of factors which had the most substantial effect on gender power-relations (as last discussed under local cooperation). In the framework, it was expected that if the leadership did not consider and forward policy that was sensitive to gender-specific situations, then an operation would contribute to negative effects for gender power-relations in both security equality and political equality. While the gender of the leadership was discussed as potentially related to whether s/he would include gender specificity, we would still expect a negative contribution from an unaware leadership, regardless of whether it was male or female. In practical terms, we therefore focus on pronounced support and behavior to estimate awareness in this study.

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The leadership of the UN operations in Timor-Leste consisted mainly of males, but there is no apparent difference between male and female behavior with regard to whether they considered gender specificity. Some males and some females in leadership positions regarded ‘gender’ as irrelevant, while some of the most important efforts were made by males in leadership positions. There was also one case where the female leadership of the UNMISET CIVPOL and the male leadership of the international military component cooperated to improve behavior of staff. For the Timor-Leste operations, there was, thus, no indication that the gender of the leadership was directly important for explaining the change in the gender power-relations which took place under the UNTAET operation. What could be noted, however, was that particularly the gender-imbalanced operation leadership symbolically demeaned the importance of equality in the eyes of the Timorese parties, as the operation itself did not uphold the norm it was to enforce in Timor-Leste. What we can observe was that the leadership’s awareness of genderspecific situations for men and women appeared more relevant than the gender of the leadership. The Timor-Leste case was particularly interesting as the change in awareness of the highest leadership, the head of the UNTAET operation, caused a change in policy implementation from lacking gender specificity to including it. This took place in the meeting with the focus groups and the Gender Unit. While this change in awareness in the top leadership (the SRSG) did not involve operation assignments becoming generally gender mainstreamed (even though it was encouraged), a few of the Timorese women’s needs were added. Thus, the change in awareness in the leadership changed the behavior to supportive of gender specificity. This support of the demands from, and work of, the focus groups/Gender Unit was the key to the most substantial change in gender power-relations. Had the leadership not been supportive, it is very likely that gender specificity would have been almost impossible to enforce. For example, the attempt by women’s organizations to formally break in from the side-track into the mainstream of Timorese politics through a legally established quota, was reportedly countered partly by the work of some in the operation leadership. The head of the operation was then persuaded (by the focus groups) to informally contribute to increasing female representation in politics. The actions by the leadership also strengthened the work of the Gender Unit, in cooperation with the focus groups, to support female politicians.

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In conclusion, the leadership was central for changing the impact of operations. Forwarded by the Gender Unit and the focus groups, the incorporation of an awareness of gender specificity in the implementation by the operation leadership was a key event for altering the negative trend in gender power-relations. This was the case in both political and security equality. For security, the leadership contributed to expanding the types of violence which could be handled by the operation (by, together with the Timorese leadership, contributing to it being considered as a crime). For political equality, the leadership served to increase representation, directly in the UN consultative organs and indirectly in the parliament. Conclusions In this section, we discussed each of the identified peace-operation factors of the analytical framework, and observed the importance of a new factor: institutional support. In relation to the operation factors, we also considered potentially relevant contextual factors. What we could detect was that a lack of awareness had resulted in deteriorating gender power-relations under the first part of UNTAET. After this, there was a shift to improved gender power-relations toward the latter part of the operation. The empirical material informed us that this shift was the result of an interaction of operation factors and contextual factors and that the chain of events which set this in motion began by affecting the factor of awareness on the level of the leadership. Thus, it was the initial lack of awareness that created deteriorating relations, and it was the shift to an increased awareness in the leadership of the operation that brought about improved gender power-relations in Timor-Leste. This clearly indicates that awareness is a central variable for operation effects and of more overarching weight than first discussed in the framework. Thus, of the factors which generated increased awareness, and hence im-proved gender power-relations, four have previously been recognized in the analytical framework—focus groups for equality, local cooperation, operation leadership, and the ideology of male-dominated parties. In the analysis of the case of Timor-Leste, a fifth factor, institutional support, was additionally identified. Further analysis revealed an interesting interplay of the involved factors. The first of the factors was a contextual one, focus groups for equality (in this phase, consisting of women’s organizations). These groups had begun to operate already

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in 1975, but accelerated in membership number and work during the late 1990s. These groups were in part a result of increased political awareness and mobilization of large parts of the population during the armed conflict. In this process, women had been mobilized, and equality had been incorporated in the political agenda of the dominating (and male-dominated) independence groups. In 2000, women’s organizations, with international assistance, formulated their demands at a countrywide congress. These demands were then forwarded and assisted by the UNTAET Gender Unit, the second central factor of institutional support. In so doing, the Gender Unit contributed to the focus groups’ demands being recognized by the operation leadership, the third central factor. It was from this interaction that the imperative change in the awareness of the operation leadership took place. Without this increase in awareness of the leadership, it would most likely have been impossible to successfully alter the ongoing negative effects on the gender power-relations. What is also important to note is that this interaction is made possible for two reasons: a) the mandate allowed for a more open selection of local cooperation partners, the fourth factor, (and thus, the UNTAET operation was not limited to a few specified local actors), and b) in the local context, the fifth factor, ideology of the male-dominated parties, was generally beneficial. Had not the main male-dominated parties, first CNRT and then Fretilin in the Timorese context, been positive to, and supported, increased equality, it is likely that the process could have taken another direction. These groups would, in many respects, have been more central for UNTAET to involve in the implementation. Therefore, had the dominating local parties openly resisted gender specificity or measures to improve equality, it is uncertain how the UN operation would have addressed that conundrum. It is, however, notable that the process of ensuring gender specificity is not an effect of general gender mainstreaming of all operation policy (it is fascinating to consider what the effect could have been, if that had been carried out). The selection and inclusion of focus groups took place mainly through the institutional support forwarding demands to a few in the top operation leadership which had changed from unaware to aware. The general work of the majority of operation staff, however, remained unaware of, if not opposed to, gender specific considerations. The fact that women’s organizations were included did not, however, mean that all their demands were met. UNTAET leadership and international pressure assisted in halting

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the attempts by the focus groups for equality to make a permanent mark in male-dominated politics through legally established quotas for women in parliament. Here, the level of awareness on the international level appears to have played a part, just as it had in the formulation of the mandates. The above factors are likely to have had the most substantial effect on the variation in gender power-relations. Two additional factors identified in the framework had important but more limited effects on gender power-relations in the case of Timor-Leste: personnel behavior, and gender-balanced composition. The factor of personnel behavior was identified as particularly relevant in the framework as negative behavior could have detrimental effects on security equality. In TimorLeste, negative behavior was limited in terms of number of violent acts, but as there was very limited protection developed to handle this violence, the trend supports the expected effects. Compared to personnel behavior, gender-balanced composition was instead indicated to improve security equality. This concerned mainly the presence of female international police which improved the use Timorese women could have of the operation, for example, in reporting sensitive forms of abuse. Indirectly, there are, however, also reports that the imbalanced mission (as a total) presented a negative image about the importance of equality in the eyes of the local, male-dominated, parties. For one factor, which was stressed in the framework, handling local military, there was no effect of the peace operations on gender powerrelations in the case of Timor-Leste. The framework had suggested that when an operation is involved in the process of determining the future role of the military, this may affect the level of political equality. According to the framework, the main reason is that a substantive role of the military in politics could be connected to the informal use of the conflict in politics. In Timor-Leste, UNTAET, and the following operation, worked systematically to reduce the military’s formal role in politics, both in comparison to the Indonesian era, and that practiced by the independence parties during the previous conflict with Indonesia. In addition, the operations demonstratively separated the international military from political roles in the operation’s own structure, and publicly criticized attempts by Timorese parties to use the military either politically, or in law enforcement. Formally, thus, the role of the new military in politics became very restricted as a result of operation policy. In spite of this formal exclusion, however, the operation could not affect that the military conflict, and former

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conflict participation, informally was granted a substantive importance in the political campaigns. These are the central effects of developments in Timor-Leste. We now turn to consider whether these effects are unique for these operations or whether they can be part of a more general trend? From this we can learn some valuable lessons which can assist us in identifying future research areas. 6.3

ARE THESE EFFECTS UNIQUE FOR TIMOR-LESTE?

Examples from other cases give us an indication of the usefulness of identified factors outside of the Timor-Leste setting. This is important as Eckstein observes, drawing conclusions using only one case “. . . is unlikely to constitute more than a clue to a valid general model . . .” (Eckstein 1975, 104). Therefore, to complement the analysis, results from Timor-Leste will now be discussed in relation to various examples from other cases to limit the risk of generalizing from a unique event and to consider the usefulness of the approach for future research. If we begin with political equality, one of the main observations from Timor-Leste was that operation implementation disregarding awareness of gender-specific situations for men and women resulted in deteriorating gender power-relations. This is displayed also in the introductory example from Kosovo, where decreased political equality followed from not recognizing the ongoing internal political developments (Rogova 2003). A similar development can be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the first implementation of elections did not recognize gender specificity. The result was a male/female ratio of 98/2. The second election, on the other hand, involved international support also to women. This resulted in a male/female ratio of 74/26 (UN’s Lessons Learned Unit 2000).15 This trend is observed in a UNIFEM report about the need to consider the mainstreaming of gender-specific needs and situations through the entire implementation: Gender mainstreaming needs to start from the very beginning of a mission to ensure that structures and programmes are designed to address

15

This work falls mainly under OSCE.

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the different needs of women and men for protection, assistance, justice and reconstruction (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 67).

However, even though gender specificity is not included from the beginning or mainstreamed throughout the operation, operations can still improve a negative trend. In Timor-Leste, we could discern that negative developments for gender power-relations were intersected by intervention of focus groups for equality, institutional support, and the operation leadership. The UN operation in Namibia 1989–1990, shows a similar pattern. Although this operation did not include a formal Gender Unit, it had an informal equivalent stemming from the recruitment of women from a UN equality group. The operation also had a leadership under SRSG Martti Ahtisaari that publicly expressed his support of equality—both racial and gender—and ensured that this was reflected in the composition of personnel. These two factors supported Namibian women’s demands for increased political equality. Similar to Timor-Leste, the independence struggle in Namibia had created a large group of politically-aware Namibian women, as well as strong women’s organizations strategically working to improve the ratio in representation. During the struggle, the male-dominated groups fighting for independence had to recruit more personnel in order to be successful. This had contributed to the opening of the political arena for women. The result was equality being recognized as a goal of the movement. Though the impact is lower as the direct decision-making power was more limited for the Namibian operation, the internal demands of equality were channeled through UN personnel aware of gender specificity to the head of the UN operation who supported the demands (Olsson 2000b). The centrality of leadership for how such processes turn out is supported by UN’s own examinations of impacts of operations: Missions that have made progress in promoting gender equality and women’s rights have had the support of the highest levels of authority within the mission. The head of mission has the responsibility to promote and facilitate attention to gender perspective in all areas of work and demand accountability from managers and staff on all levels. A clear commitment to the promotion of gender equality in the entire mission is required from the inception of its mandate to its end. This commitment must be translated into concrete actions in all areas of the mission and should be the responsibility of all staff in the mission, particularly senior managers (United Nations 2002, 76–77).

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While Timor-Leste and Namibia both required active organization by a combination of international and contextual factors, there exists a case of unintentional positive political effects during a UN operation: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992–93). During this operation, the set-up of the new democratic system resulted in women being recognized as political actors. It is difficult to determine what caused this change but it appears very likely that the demographic imbalance, where women constituted about 65 percent of the adult population, contributed to the change. Due to the imbalance, for the male-dominated parties to address also female voters was central for winning elections (Olsson 2000a). It is thus likely that this effect in Cambodia can mainly be explained by contextual factors. In Cambodia, however, the mere introduction of democracy through the operation (as agreed in the peace settlement between the Cambodian warring parties), in the previously autocratic country, allowed for freedom of organization. The result was the formation of focus groups which advocated equality issues. That is, the previous conflict and the situation during the conflict resolution had created a large group interested in altering the balance of power between men and women which had been prohibited from organizing. With the enforcement and upholding of democratic freedoms of speech and organization by the operation, this altered. This, in turn, can have contributed to increased political mobilization and participation of women (Olsson 2000a). Jacobson notes a similar effect from the operation in Mozambique. Despite the lack of gender awareness in the UN operation, the conditions for democratic governance that the operation set in place in the long run also benefited the work for equality. Her example is the elections leading to a large number of female parliamentarians (Jacobson 2005, 142). The more ambiguous effect of unaware implementation for political equality predicted in the framework therefore appears to remain if more cases than TimorLeste are considered. The main explanation seems to center on the role of focus groups for equality. If we turn to an alternative manner of affecting the debate on political equality in a host country, that is, the factor of gender-balanced composition, there is another interesting case to compare Timor-Leste to, Namibia. The Namibian operation had set a positive example by the more equal ratio in civilian staff giving equality a high credibility. This was further enhanced by the operation leadership clearly displaying equal trust in, and responsibility of, both female and male

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employees, thereby elevating equality in practical terms throughout the mission. Thus, when the UN legal adviser in the formulation of the new Namibian constitution stated that he found equality important, this then had a credible (and positive) effect on including equality in the Constitution. This was a demand originating from the Namibian women’s groups working for equality (Olsson 2000b). A similar development can be found in the South Africa operation in 1992–1994. Although a more limited operation, the interaction between the strongly developed women’s organizations’ work for general recognition of equality by dominant (male-led) parties, was assisted by the general recognition of equality as demonstratively relevant in the peace operation (Stiehm 1997). The conclusion we can draw from the above cases is that factors such as selecting focus groups among those with which an operation cooperates, awareness of gender specificity in the implementation of the operation mandate, and substantial role of the operation leadership are relevant in more cases than the operations in Timor-Leste with regard to changes in gender power-relations in the political dimension. It can also be observed that arguing in favor of general equality, as postulated in the United Nations Charter, only appears credible if practiced by the UN itself. For security equality, lack of gender specificity in the mandate or the general implementation, was predicted to have an effect also in other cases than Timor-Leste. For Timor-Leste, the security situation changed dramatically for the better with the work of the UN operations. This change was larger for men than for women for two reasons, men’s security situation under the armed conflict was worse (thereby the improvement was more substantial), and the non-conflict violence mainly affecting women was initially not addressed. In addition, security equality was somewhat decreased for women from the behavior of the new party in the conflict, the peace operation staff. A similar pattern is indicated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where lack of awareness in implementation by the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to establish sufficient protection for women from domestic violence, or from women-specific violence. This was addressed much later in the operation after international, and local, pressure (UN’s Lessons Learned Unit 2000). The importance of interaction between local and international actors for improving security equality can be seen in Kosovo. The OSCE in Kosovo, responsible in the peace operation for human rights and

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institution building, reports that violence against women increased after the armed conflict. To improve protection, OSCE supported the building of shelters for abused women. This had been initiated by locals who then sought support of the international operation. The support was also practical. One of the security measures taken for the shelters was to have direct phone lines to the international forces of KFOR. These were used if the shelter was attacked by men seeking particular women, or who in frustration from not finding them, attacked the personnel (Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2005). However, the general protection established by the international police in Kosovo, similar to TimorLeste in many respects, has decreased because of institutional problems of insufficient recruitment; of coexistence of local and official laws; of cooperation problems between local police and international; and crime and corruption among police staff, both local and international (where the international were accused, for example, of human trafficking) (Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006). The institutions created, thus, had the potential to positively improve the security for both men and women but this might have been counteracted by negative behavior of staff and insufficient funding. Domestic violence also appears to have been recognized only after local demands while other forms of violence were included from the beginning. A more general observation in Timor-Leste was that the main work of the peace operation implementation in the public sphere to reduce conflict violence, had a positive effect for both men and women. This was then, unfortunately, at times partially countered by negative behavior of peace operation personnel (which operations failed to sufficiently handle). In Timor-Leste, there appear to have been only limited cases of misconduct, but there are many operations which display cases of such negative behavior, primarily directed at women. For example, such cases were observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see, Cockburn 2002), Mozambique, Liberia, Eritrea, etc. The Cambodian operation might, however, be one of the most notorious. This operation’s high degree of negative behavior, further increased by the growth of the sex industry through the international ‘contribution’, served to deteriorate the security equality balance by the operation personnel themselves constituting a threat to Cambodian women (Arnvig 1994; Whitworth 2004). The lenient attitude of the operation leadership was in addition reported to have contributed to

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upholding this increased insecurity as no measures were taken to handle violence (Stiehm 1997; Whitworth 2004).16 For the gender balance of the operation, the operation in BosniaHerzegovina reports that female representation in the international police component increased the protection and use local women felt from the police as it facilitated reporting crimes of which they had been the victims. This was considered by the operation leadership, which worked to improve the gender balance. The effect women in the international police could have on the increase in local female participation in the police was also recognized. In this particular operation there was a difference between female and male leaderships’ approach to gender (UN’s Lessons Learned Unit 2000), and a similar example has been given from the small South African missions in 1992–1994 (Lowe Morna 2000). In conclusion, these cases indicate that effects in other operations circle around the same factors considered in this study. This suggests that it is fruitful to continue developing the study of effects using

16 What is interesting is that the negative behavior in Cambodia might be partly related to the escalating conflict taking place during of the UN operation. In addition, one of the international components that caused many of the problems were CIVPOL units, whose role was not well defined in this mission as, at this time, the use of CIVPOL in peace operations was quite new (Olsson 2000b). It would be interesting to study whether the successful handling of the local military and welldefined assignments affect the behavior of international components. In Timor-Leste, the two largest components, the military and the police, had more defined roles and there was not a long period of general insecurity or general escalation in the armed conflict. In that respect, it is particularly interesting to note that the Timorese area which had the most notorious incidences with negative behavior, Oecusse, was also the area where the international troops and police were isolated and, initially, at higher risk. Another interesting aspect is that the handling of negative behavior is associated with gender-balanced composition in Cambodia. There it was reported that the grave imbalance in the male/female ratio of the operation could have affected the difficulty of coming to terms with the negative behavior. This was not noted in Timor-Leste but necessitates further examination. More similar to Timor-Leste, however, was the report that the gender imbalance in staff negatively affected the possibility to work for equality as it demonstratively had been given little importance by the UN operation itself (Whitworth 2004). The role of the leadership and gender-aware personnel for handling negative behavior was displayed in Namibia. There one of the staff with a clear gender focus in her work would keep an eye on how the regional peacekeeping contingent behaved when personnel was off duty. If the behavior was negative, then she depended on the contingent leadership to handle the personnel. This cooperation was described as very positive for handling negative behavior (Olsson 2001).

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this mainstream approach. Thus, the next step for the future would be a more strict comparison as we now have begun to formulate concepts and potential inter-relations. This can be conducted with a higher likelihood that what we have found is not unique but is part of a more general phenomenon.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CONTRIBUTIONS As the previous missions to Timor-Leste, Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mozambique display, the need for expanding our knowledge about how peace operations affect the power-relations between men and women in the host state was dire. We need to make good use of this knowledge in new and ongoing UN missions in complex conflicts such as those in Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and Afghanistan. We have learned that neglecting gender specificity risks involuntarily contributing to deteriorating power-relations and to less efficient peace operations. The motivation for expanding research to incorporate effects on gender power-relations was that we thereby improve our understanding of how peace operations promote peace and how unintentional negative side effects can be avoided. To that purpose, this project set out to develop this new topic within the mainstream research tradition by contributing to theory building on both the use of the gender power-relations concept, and on how peace operations affect these power-relations between men and women. This study therefore systematized ideas in previous research into an analytical framework and applied this framework to the case of Timor-Leste. The results displayed the fruitfulness of the selected approach. What remains is to consider the contributions of the project as well as what the implications of this new knowledge are for how we proceed from here. 7.1

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED

This book tackled gaps in our knowledge regarding both what is to be explained and what can explain. In so doing, the project took on an unusual challenge. The results were successful in that we could both a) enhance our ability to trace changes in the power balance between men and women by developing the concept of gender powerrelations, and b) systematically explore effects of peace operations for gender power-relations in the host state.

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Thus, the first contribution is primarily conceptual. The book clarified and refined an ongoing research debate (see Caprioli 2000; Caprioli 2003; Caprioli 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Melander 2005a; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003) by delineating the concept of gender power-relations and by adding a new dimension, security equality. When applied in the analysis of Timor-Leste, the results displayed the fruitfulness of the selected approach; both examined dimensions of gender power-relations—political equality and security equality—revealed interesting variation over time. Political equality was understood as the level of participation of men and women in politics, and was primarily observed in terms of representation in political structures. While detailed data was difficult to access (as expected), the analysis indicates that there was an improved male/female ratio during the armed conflict 1975–1999. During the first stages of the UNTAET, however, there was a reduction in the influence of women compared to that of men. That is, the political equality dimension of gender power-relations deteriorated (became more unequal). This was then followed by an improvement of political equality toward the latter half of UNTAET. Although the ratio in representation was upheld in government and parliament after the operation was concluded at independence in 2002, in the following years there appears to have been a tendency toward a more imbalanced ratio. The new dimension of gender power relations, security equality, was understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. This was empirically observed as measures taken to enhance protection from physical violence. The formulation of this dimension enabled a more structured discussion for understanding security in terms of equality. For the analytical purpose of this project, violence was divided into conflict violence and non-conflict violence, where conflict violence was understood as physical violence carried out by the warring parties of the armed conflict. Data was sketchy, but it was possible to detect interesting variation even when utilizing a crude estimation on a scale from low to high. For Timor-Leste, this meant that with the measures taken by the operations to reduce conflict violence from the time of INTERFET deployment in 1999 and onward, the security improved. In ‘absolute’ terms, both women and men were more secure than during the armed conflict. That said, in ‘relative’ terms, which is at the basis of the security-equality concept, the measures taken to enhance protection for men was not followed

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by an equal enhancement in protection for women. Initially, therefore, women’s security situation became more unequal compared to that of men. Security equality thereafter improved toward the second half of the UNTAET operation as measures were taken to address also domestic violence (which was a serious threat to women). The positive effect on security equality was, however, not as substantial as it could have been. The reason was that, at this point in the operation, the negative behavior of the peace-operation personnel led to a deteriorated security situation primarily for women. In conclusion, it was fruitful to consider gender power-relations as varying in degrees. If gender power-relations had instead been considered as a dichotomous variable (patriarchal vs. non-patriarchal), the above variation would not have been visible. Equipped with the more fine-grained analysis of variation, it became possible to say more about the importance of certain operation factors. The second contribution is therefore the systematic study of how peace operations affect gender power-relations. In applying the analytical framework to the material from TimorLeste, the most central observation was that, as expected, a lack of awareness contributed to deteriorating gender power-relations. However, after this expected deterioration, there was an unexpected shift into improved gender power-relations taking place during the UNTAET operation. The analysis of the empirical material informed us that this shift was the result of an interaction of operation factors and contextual factors where the improvement was set off by the changes in the factor ‘awareness in implementation’ on the level of the leadership. When the awareness changed in the top leadership, the behavior of the leadership began to promote gender specificity in implementation. This clearly indicates that awareness is a central factor for operation effects which is more encompassing than first discussed in the framework. Of the factors which generated change first in awareness and subsequently in gender power-relations, four had been recognized in the analytical framework: the focus groups for equality (organizations working to forward this particular political question), the local cooperation (local parties selected for cooperation by the operation), the operation leadership (the behavior of the leadership in the implementation), and the ideology of male-dominated parties (the major parties’ ideology which supports or opposes increased equality). A fifth factor, that of institutional support (in the form of a Gender

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Unit), was additionally identified in the analysis of developments in Timor-Leste. The analysis revealed an intriguing pattern of interaction between these factors. The focus groups for equality had worked to get the dominating (and male-dominated) Timorese parties to include equality on their political agendas (which had been rather successful by the time the UN operations arrived). When it was apparent that a more equal ratio in representation was not considered by the UNTAET operation in the first selection of local cooperation partners, a cooperation between focus groups and the Gender Unit instead channeled the Timorese women’s demands on the implementation process to the operation’s leadership. The change in the awareness of the leadership that this cooperation generated resulted in a change in the behavior of the leadership. In effect, it meant that the operation leadership recognized and forwarded the demands by the focus groups.1 In addition, the support of the leadership allowed for a higher degree of gender-specific considerations in the implementation as organized by the Gender Unit. The fact that the largest male-dominated parties, CNRT and later Fretilin, had earlier incorporated equality issues and had an ideology which was not opposed to changes in gender powerrelations were conditions that facilitated the positive effects on gender power-relations. In combination with the operation mandate allowing for a more open selection of local cooperation partners, the general conditions were therefore conducive to achieving change.2 The above factors had the most substantial effect on gender powerrelations. Two additional factors of the analytical framework, those of personnel behavior and gender-balanced composition, indicate some 1 Examples from Timor-Leste and the Namibian operation show that effects can be reached either as direct support to focus groups (including their demands or providing them with resources), or by increasing incentives for male-dominated parties to improve equality. 2 Regarding the selection of cooperation partners, this is regulated by mandate and operation procedures. In this respect, the UNTAET had an unusually high degree of independent decision-making power. Many other operations will be more governed by which parties that were included in preceding peace agreements. This is the reason why focus groups for equality have lobbied to be included at peace negotiations. The only other organ with sufficient power to independently include the demand for gender specificity is the Security Council, which is why international focus groups and other UN organs have lobbied to get gender specificity generally recognized by this central organ. The main argument on which this work has been conducted is that peace can become more stable if the entire population—that is men and women—is considered in the peace process.

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minor but relevant effects. As to personnel behavior, some parts of the operation took measures to ensure protection from violence conducted by operation personnel. This consisted of, for example, not allowing personnel to stay in Timor-Leste when on leave and by investigating cases of violence which were part of the implementation of assignments. Most operation components, however, did not take measures to ensure protection from violence by operation personnel. This lack of action resulted in personnel behavior having a negative effect on security equality to women’s disadvantage. In contrast, the factor of gender-balanced composition was found to improve security equality. The presence of female international police officers increased the use Timorese women could have of the operation measures; for example, by facilitating the reporting of sensitive forms of abuse. Indirectly, however, the generally poor balance in the ratio of international personnel was reported to present a negative image about the importance of equality in the eyes of the Timorese population. One last factor was identified in the analytical framework as potentially important for political equality: handling local military. In the case of Timor-Leste, we could see no effects on political equality. This is intriguing when we consider that UNTAET, and the following UNMISET operation, drastically reduced the military’s formal role in politics. 7.2

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Where, then, do we go from here? To answer that, we need to consider both how to continuously improve both our understanding of gender power-relations and of how peace operations affect these relations. How can we continue to improve the work of peace operation staff currently on mission by making them aware that their everyday business can have different effects for men than for women? Turning first to the future advancement of the gender power-relations concept, the notion of political equality was useful as it added a gender aspect to the study of the local power dynamic to those already examined in peace-operation research. Future research should concentrate on applying political equality in comparative studies. This will provide us with more knowledge of how this dimension of equality generally develops in a conflict-resolution process. Moreover, we could observe that women in conflict and its resolution were

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political actors, often constituting a strong and well-organized factor. Women’s factual roles both in working for peace and as actors of conflict are still seriously under-researched topics. To ensure an optimal and mutually productive interaction between an operation and women’s organizations as well as to avoid supporting actors working against peace, these roles should be more closely examined. At present, many stereotypical assumptions of women in armed conflict remain dominant to the detriment of both local women and the peace operation efficiency. As to security equality, future research needs to continue to theoretically improve this new dimension as well as to use it in more strict comparisons. Inspiration for the security-equality concept came from the claim in feminist research that many mainstream notions utilized to capture conflict and its resolution are biased in that they systematically exclude all forms of violence primarily targeting women. The result of this bias is that measures taken to increase security do not sufficiently incorporate women’s needs along with those of men. This is an important starting point but future research also need to further consider the general debate on violence and protection in the mainstream field on armed conflict and its resolution (Gurr 1980; Kuper and Kuper 1996, 896–897) which can provide deeper insights into men’s situation. This is not least important as Carpenter (2005) has observed that civilian men are at a very high risk of violence during armed conflict, higher than for most women and perhaps even more so than for men in the military. Moreover, men tend to run a higher risk of being, forcefully or voluntarily, involved in the armed conflict more directly. For example, men involuntarily recruited into a military organization risk physical and psychological harm during their service in addition to the risk of being ostracized by their communities. These observations underline the need to ensure that there is a fair comparison made between men and women with regard to protection from violence. In continuing to develop the concept of security equality in future research, further consideration should therefore be given to the fact that the gender power-relations concept includes all men and women, that is, regardless of whether they are in the military or remain civilian. This inclusiveness will require further consideration of how violence and protection are perceived, classified, and measured—a development which should continue to draw both on the feminist and the mainstream scholarly debates. In this

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development, we also need to solve the data problem which could observed in the description and the analysis. The reward for successful development is that the use of this dimension is not limited to the study of peace operations but is generally applicable to tracing and understanding security in equality terms. In addition, it is a dimension relevant for both research and policy.3 If we are serious about mainstreaming gender as outlined in UN resolution 1325 (2000) then we need to collect data on both men and women’s situations and to continuously and relentlessly incorporate this knowledge in our everyday work. Only then can we be sure to not involuntarily contribute to insecurity. These are a few, but particularly important, directions for future research in the study of gender power-relations. Apart from the lessons from the case of Timor-Leste we can additionally take the examples from the other operations into account when developing suggestions for future research on peace-operation effects. What was striking in the analysis of how a peace operation affects gender power-relations was the high degree of interaction between the factors and their different explanatory status. Most important, the analysis of Timor-Leste identified that the awareness factor was more encompassing than any of the others. This is also supported by the examples from the other cases. For example, in the operations in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of awareness of gender specificity resulted in deteriorating gender power-relations. What we could additionally observe in Timor-Leste was that although the awareness in the leadership changed and produced a positive effect, the development did not take place in a situation of general staff awareness. Thus, the positive impact was still limited. Taken together, these observations from the analysis suggest a reformulation of the awareness factor. ‘Awareness in implementation’ should rather be understood as 3 In addition to continuing to develop the use and format of security equality and political equality, future research can increase the span of observed dimensions. For example, based on previous research, economic equality and legal equality can be considered as additionally relevant for receiving an even more elaborate understanding of the wider effects of peace operations (see footnote 23, page 24). While these have not been specifically studied in this project, the empirical material noted that aid resources and employment (thereby, salaries) are not equally distributed between men and women by the operation, and that legal protection between men and women can differ. It would therefore be valuable to further our knowledge in this area by including and developing economic and legal equality in future studies. This development would also need to consider potential interrelation between dimensions.

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awareness of gender specificity. This factor is considered to be relevant a) on the international level where operation mandating and planning takes place (that is, at UN headquarters), b) in the operation leadership which makes decisions about the implementation when the operation has been deployed, and c) among the operation personnel implementing the operation mandate.4 For these reasons, awareness stands out as particularly relevant for future research. That is, regardless of if you work at the UN head quarters or if you are on patrol in the field, there is a gender dimension to most of what we do in a peace operation. We need to improve our competence on gender to be able to accurately address existing needs. Future research must take note of the fact that the explanatory status of the factors appeared to differ. In the case of Timor-Leste, three factors—operation leadership, focus groups for equality, and institutional support—were instrumental for driving the change in gender power-relations. Since the interaction between these three was central, future research should use comparative studies to refine the knowledge generated from Timor-Leste. The new factor of institutional support should be particularly examined and for this purpose the case of Timor-Leste may serve as a fruitful starting point. Two factors appear to provide the conditions for the interaction. These were ideology of male-dominated parties (relevant in the host-state context), and the selection of local cooperation partners (related to the limitations in the mandate and the international standard rules for implementing an operation). Research should therefore particularly

4 Awareness can also be relevant for how the personnel behave in their interaction with the host population. For researching the particular aspect of negative behavior, future research needs to consider under which conditions this takes place as there apparently is substantial variation between operations. For example, in Cambodia, there had reportedly been much higher degrees of violence and even less protection developed. As we could see from the discussion under examples from other operations, there are potential interrelations between operation factors, for example, operation leadership and gender-balanced composition and negative behavior. It is also very possible that awareness of gender specificity is relevant in this respect. What is additionally interesting is that the conflict development during the operation appears to be relevant. In Cambodia, the effect of negative behavior is indicated to have particularly deteriorated security equality when the conflict escalated and the operation staff was targeted with violence. In the case of Timor-Leste, Oecusse, the Timorese area with one of the highest degrees of insecurity for the UN personnel, also had the highest degree of negative behavior. This should be further researched as it has such serious implications both for the persons affected by violence and for the effectiveness of the operation’s efforts to create peace.

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consider under what conditions changes in gender power-relations take place. The last, but very important, issue that future research needs to address is that of collecting and accessing better and more systematic data. Improvement in this regard is essential for continuing to develop the concept of gender power-relations and to analyze effects of peace operations on these relations. Importantly, information needs to contain systematic and comparative data on both women and men. To accomplish this, it is necessary to cooperate with the UN and other organizations involved in peace operations and development. Without such data, we can never fully expand knowledge in this field. With the apparent significance of increased knowledge and awareness, we have returned to the main observations and debates which originally motivated this book. As seen not only in Timor-Leste, but also in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia, both peacekeeping and peacebuilding assignments had direct implications for the power-relations between men and women of the host state. These effects emerged regardless of whether the UN peace operation had a conscious approach to gender power-relations or not. From this we can draw two final conclusions. Firstly, it is only through an increase in knowledge and awareness of gender specificity that we can avoid contributing to inequality, which is in line with the peacekeeping devises of ‘non-meddling’ and ‘do no harm’. Secondly, it is only through an increase in awareness that we obtain the ability to support equality corresponding to the UN policy of gender mainstreaming and as prescribed in the preamble of the United Nations Charter. It is only when the prevalent lack of awareness is maintained that a peace operation risks meddling in the private affairs of a state.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS Ubalda Alves, Rede Feto, Dili, 20th of February 2006. Katarina Ammitzboell, DPKO and UNDP (under UNTAET), phone interview, 18th of July 2006. Fernanda Borges, Dili, 16th of February 2006. Edith Bowles, World Bank, Dili, 10th of March 2006. Michelle Brandt, GAU/UNTAET, New York, 8th of December 2005. Kendelle Clark, Australian Federal Police, Police Adviser, Dili, 15th of March, 2006. Mauricio Claudio, UNTAET political unit, Dili, 15th of March 2006. Julia Davey, Women’s Justice Unit, JSMP, Dili, 21st of February, 2006. Jill Engen, UNCDF, UNDP, Dili, 17th of March, 2006. Paella Galhos, Lao Hamutuk journal, Dili, 15th of February 2006. Anthony Geddes, CIVPOL/UNTAET, Uppsala 30th of March, 2006. Vicenta Guterres, Dili, 24th of February, 2006. Isabel Guterrez, CAVR, Dili, 13th of March, 2006. Aina Iiyambo, UNIFEM, New York, 9th of December, 2005. Nina Lahoud, UNIFEM, United Nations, New York, 1st of December, 2005. Yasinta Lujina, Lao Hamutuk journal, Dili, 15th of February, 2006. Marito, Luta Hamutuk Institute & East Timorese Men Association Against Violence, Dili, 20th of February, 2006. Rachel Mayanja, United Nations Division on the Advancement of Women, New York, 9th of December, 2005. Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Uppsala, 28th of September 2005 Otelio Ote, CARE, Dili, 18th of February 2006. Karen O’Sullivan, UNFPA Project Manager, Dili, 13th of March 2006. Sebastiana Perreira, GAU/UNTAET Oecusse, Dili, 22nd of February, 2006. Milena Pires, UNIFEM, United Nations, Dili, 23rd of February, 2006. Tina Redshaw, Ambassador of UK, Dili, 15th of March, 2006. Edward Reese, DPKO, UN, NewYork, 8th of December, 2005. Anacleto da Costa Ribeiro, Timorese International Development Studies, Dili, 16th of March, 2006.

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James Rock, Family Health International, Dili, 10th of March, 2006. Emily Roynestad, UNFPA/Praedet, Dili, 13th of March 2006. Aderito Soares, Lawyer, Sahe Institute, Dili, 24th of February, 2006. Michael Stone, Australian Defense Forces, Dili, 15th of February and 14th of March, 2006. Isabella Watershoot, UNMISET and UNOTIL’s Gender Unit, Dili, 15th of March, 2006. Sherril Whittington, UNTAET Gender Unit, e-mail exchange, February 2007. Aguia Belo Ximenes, Fundasaun Timor Harii, Dili, 17th of February, 2006. Sebastião Dias Ximenes, Providor Human Rights Office, Dili, 17th of March, 2006. Fr. Yulio Yasunto, Catholic Bishop’s Administration, Dili, 14th of March, 2006.

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INDEX Abdulla, Saleh, 64, 90 Afghanistan, 83, 177 Ahtisaari, Martti, 171 ANC, 32 Angola, 41 APODETI party, 61, 124 Australia, 54, 56, 58, 69, 70, 74–75, 78, 89, 93, 98, 106, 109, 122 Awareness in implementation; understanding of, 33–37 Babo-Soares, Dionisio, 119 Barth, Elise, 44 Beijing Women’s World Conference’s Platform for Action, 79 Beilstein, Janet, 45 Bennett, Andrew, 9, 17 Bonaparte, Rosa, 61 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10, 42, 46, 170, 173, 175, 177, 183, 185 Cabinet of Transitional Government, 137 Call, Charles T., 35, 38 Cambodia, 4, 42–44, 172, 174, 177, 185 Caplan, Richard, 6, 21–23, 27, 46, 147, 152 Caprioli, Mary, 36–37, 40, 45, 116 Carey, Peter, 135 Carpenter, Charlie R., 24, 147, 182 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 79, 81 Christian Democratic Union of Timor, 131 International Civilian Police (CIVPOL), 35, 77–78, 98–105, 109, 151, 156, 165–166 Cockburn, Cynthia, 20–21, 30, 42, 149 Code of conduct, 78 Committee for the Popular Defence of the Republic of Timor-Leste, 124, 126 Conflict violence, understanding and use of, 25–27

Connell, R. W., 19 Constituent Assembly elections, 116, 120, 122–124, 128, 131–132, 137, 145 de Arujo, Fernando, 121 Democratic Party, 124 Democratic Republic of Congo, 177 Dili-centered approach, 119 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): 38–39, 85, 91, 96–97 District administrators, 119 do Amaral, Francisco Xavier, 132 Domestic violence, 26, 35, 46, 66, 97, 100–104, 106–107, 147–150, 152–153, 157, 162, 164–165, 173–174, 179 Dress codes, 112 East Timor Defense Force (F-FDTL), 92–95 East Timor Police Force, 105 Enloe, Cynthia, 33, 35, 38, 42 Equality; understanding of, 6, 8 Eritrea, 41, 174 FALINTIL, 62–63, 67, 76, 91–93, 95–98, 125, 132–135, 159 FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program, 97 FALINTIL Study Group, 92 Feminist research; the use of, 15–18 Focus groups for equality; understanding of, 31–32 FOKUPERS, 62, 66, 102, 121, 149 Fretilin, 60–62, 67, 70, 114, 122–126, 131–132, 135, 137–138, 161–162, 168, 180 Galtung, Johan, 17 Gang fights, 101, 150 Geiser, Gisela, 32 Gender advisors, 80 Gender focal points, 81, 118 Gender power-relations; understanding of, 5, 21–22

206

INDEX

Gender roles, 7, 29, 31, 44, 60, 65, 117, 135, 165 Gender specificity; understanding of, 7 Gender Unit, 78–83, 101–102, 104, 117–118, 127, 129–130, 132, 136–138, 145, 155, 158, 161, 166–168, 180 Gender; understanding of, 18–20 Gender-balanced composition; understanding of, 7, 43–45 Gender-based violence, 27, 90, 101, 103 George, Alexander L., 17 Gusmão, José Xanana, 51, 62, 76, 92, 95, 126, 132, 135–136 Handling local military; understanding of, 37 HIV/AIDS, 25, 39 Hohe, Tanja, 127 Hubic, Meliha, 42 Hudson, Heidi, 19 Ideology of male dominated elites; understanding of, 32 Indonesia, 55, 62, 64, 73–76, 86–89, 94–95, 98, 113–116, 121–122, 133–134, 145 Institutional support; the understanding of, 158 International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET), 56, 58, 74–77, 85–88, 90–92, 98–100, 108, 150–151, 153–154, 159, 160, 178 Indonesian invasion, 61, 70 Iraq, 177 Israel, 29 Jacobs, Susan, 26 Jacobson, Ruth, 41, 172 Jordan, 109–110 King, Angela, 80 Kosova Women’s Network, 4 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 83, 174 Kosovo, 4, 10, 36, 160, 170, 173–174, 177, 183, 185 KOTA party, 61, 124 Lao Hamutuk, 97 Lebanon, 29, 40 Liberia, 174 Licklider, Roy, 36, 38

Local cooperation; understanding of, 39–41 Meintjes, Sheila, 31 Militia, 56, 63–64, 67, 73–74, 80, 86–91, 99–100, 113, 134, 150, 159 Mozambique, 41, 122, 172, 174, 177, 185 Myrttinen, Henri, 64, 90 Namibia, 37, 171–173, 177, 185 National Council, 129–131, 136 National Institute of Public Administration, 118 NGOs, 40, 128, 160, 161 Non-Conflict violence; understanding and use of, 25–27 Office of Defence Force Development, 94 Office of Deputy SRSG for Governance and Public Administration, 80 Office of the Promotion of Equality, 137, 138 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, 79 Operation leadership; understanding of, 45–46 Organizacão Populwe da Muhlwe Timorense, 61, 63 OSCE, 173–174 Ospina, Sofi, 118 Pakistan, 109 Participatory ratio in the conflict; understanding of, 28–30 Personnel behavior; understanding of, 41–43 Pires, Milena, 127–130, 136 Platform for Action for the Women of Timor Loro Sae, 128–129 Political equality; understanding of, 6, 22–23 Portugal, 55, 71, 89, 93, 98, 105, 109, 113–114, 122, 133 Power; understanding of, 5–6, 21 Presidential elections, 132 Quotas, 129–131, 169 Ramos Horta, José 119 Rape, 7, 24–26, 66–67, 101, 109–110, 148, 151, 163

INDEX

Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for ex-Combatants and Communities in East Timor, 97 Rede Feto, 66, 117, 128, 131 Rees, Madelein, 45, 148 Rogova, Igballe, 4 Roynestad, Emily, 137 Ruak, Matan, 92 Santa Cruz massacre, 70, 91 Secretary of State of Defence, 94 Security equality; understanding of, 6, 24–27 Serbia, 4 Sexual violence, 4, 7, 25, 39, 42, 53, 65–67, 87, 90–91, 103, 106, 111, 147–149, 153 Social Democratic Association of Timor (ASDT), 124, 126, 131–132 Social Democratic Party, 124 South Africa, 32, 173, 175 Spear, Joanna, 39 Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Women’s Advancement, 80 SRSG; the role of, 76–77, 79–80, 103, 116, 118, 128–130, 136–137, 165–167, 171 Stanley, William, 35, 38 Stiehm, Judith Hicks, 44 Suharto, 71, 133, 134 Sweden, 70 Syria, 29, 40 The 5th of May agreement, 55, 74, 75, 115, 120 The Timorese National Party, 131 Thompson, Elizabeth, 29, 40 Tickner, Ann J., 16 Timorese Council of National Resistance (CNRT), 62, 76, 89, 93–94, 117–118, 121, 123, 129, 132, 134–136, 160, 168, 180 Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), 60–61, 114, 122, 125 Timorese National Planning Commission, 120 Timorese Social Democratic Association, 60 Timorese Women’s Congress, 117, 161 Trabalhista party, 61

207

United Nations Charter, 4, 86, 173, 185 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 76, 83, 158 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 130, 158 United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 83, 97, 127, 130, 170 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 120 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 79 United Nations General Assembly, 69, 70, 80 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 67 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), 55, 58, 73, 75–76, 86–87, 98, 113, 115, 120, 155–156, 160 United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 4 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), 56, 58, 78, 81–82, 84–86, 89, 98, 105, 107, 109, 112–113, 120, 133, 138–139, 155–156, 159, 161, 166, 181 United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 173 United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), 56–58, 82–83, 85, 89, 97, 112–113, 133, 155, 161 United Nations peace operations; mandate, 10, 11; power of, 10, 11; understanding of, 3 United Nations Security Council resolution 1325(2000), 78–79, 83, 155, 183 United Nations Security Council, 55–56, 76, 78, 82, 84, 99, 121, 130, 135–136, 155 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 10, 52, 56, 58, 68, 75–89, 91–95, 97, 99, 100–105, 107–110, 112–113, 115–120, 122, 126, 129, 133–139, 145–146, 150–162, 166–169, 178–181 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 4, 172 US, 70

208 Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 76, 79, 116, 129 Voter registration, 73, 121–123, 126 Vulnerable Persons Unit, 107 Waylen, Georgina, 36 Whittington, Sherrill, 80

INDEX

Whitworth, Sandra, 14, 42 Williams, Catharina, 122 Women’s Congress, 128–129 World Bank, 27, 77, 86, 107 World War Two, 55, 69