DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN AN INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM
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DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN AN INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM
In this book, Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny combine the social scientific approach with a broad, interdisciplinary scope to address some of the most intriguing and important political, economic, and environmental issues of our times. Their book employs formal and statistical methods to study the interactions of economic globalization, democratic governance, income inequality, economic development, military violence, and environmental degradation. In doing so, Li and Reuveny cross multiple disciplinary boundaries, engage various academic debates, bring the insights from compartmentalized bodies of literature into direct dialogue, and uncover policy trade-offs in a growingly interconnected system of polity, economy, and environment. They show that growing interconnectedness in the global system increases the demands on national leaders and their advisors; academicians and policymakers will need to cross disciplinary boundaries if they seek to better understand and address the policy trade-offs of even more complex processes than the ones investigated here. Quan Li is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program on International Conflict and Cooperation (PICC) at Texas A&M University, which he joined in 2008. Previously, he was a faculty member in political science at the Pennsylvania State University, where he codirected the Multidisciplinary Seminar Series on Globalization in the College of Liberal Arts and served on the inaugural Faculty Governing Council of the School of International Affairs. Professor Li served on the editorial board of the Journal of Politics and is serving on the editorial boards of International Studies Quarterly and International Interactions. Professor Li holds a Ph.D. in political science and international relations. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of economic globalization (international trade, foreign direct investment, financial openness, and capital account liberalization), democratic governance, political violence (interstate military conflict, civil conflict, transnational terrorism), and macroeconomic policymaking and cooperation. His research has appeared in numerous journals, including the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Peace Research, the Journal of Politics, and Political Research Quarterly. Professor Li is the corecipient of the 2003 Best Article on Democratization Award from the American Political Science Association. Rafael Reuveny is Professor of International Political Economy at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington. His research focuses on the causes and effects of economic globalization, democracy, international military conflict, and sustainable development. He is the author and coauthor of numerous articles and book chapters. Professor Reuveny’s work has appeared in journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ecological Economics, and Environmental and Resource Economics. He is the coauthor or coeditor of five books, the most recent of which is North and South in the World Political Economy (2008). He was also a guest coeditor of a special issue of International Studies Review (2007). Professor Reuveny was program chair of the 2006 meeting of the International Studies Association and the North America program chair of the 2008 meetings of the Global International Studies Conference. Reuveny has won two teaching awards at Indiana University and is the 2007 corecipient of the Award of Excellence in World Society Research, First Place, given by the World Society Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland. Professor Reuveny is also the corecipient of the 2003 Best Article on Democratization Award from the American Political Science Association. He holds a double-major Ph.D. in business economics and political science.
x
Acknowledgments
Chapter 3 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Reuveny, Rafael, and Quan Li. 2003. “Economic Openness, Democracy and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis,” Comparative Political c 2003 Sage Publishing. Studies 36(5):575–601. Copyright Chapter 5 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Reuveny, Rafael, and Quan Li. 2003. “The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model,” International Studies c 2003 Blackwell Publishing. Quarterly 47(3):325–347. Copyright Chapter 7 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2006. “Democracy and Environmental c Degradation,” International Studies Quarterly 50(4):935–956. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing. Chapter 8 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2007. “The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial Environment,” Conflict Management and Peace Science c 2007 Taylor & Francis. 24(3):219–238. Copyright This book has grown out of our decade-long joint research and collaboration, friendship, and many debates since we first met in 1999. The quality of our joint scholarship has benefited from both our agreements and our disagreements, all of which we were ultimately able to resolve with a smile. Without our mutual willingness to listen and compromise, and our continuous mutual support and trust, this book would not have come into being. Finally, our families have been important to the completion of this book. We owe many thanks to our respective parents in China and Israel, Li Maoji and Kuang Juying, and Mordechai and Ora Reuveny, for their unending support. Our spouses and children, Liu, Ellen, and Andrew, and Ronit, Adi, and Noam, have given so much support, encouragement, and meaning to our work that we feel we must dedicate this book to them.
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Complex Transformations QUAN LI Texas A&M University
RAFAEL REUVENY Indiana University
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521491433 © Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13
978-0-511-65157-1
eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-49143-3
Hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-72890-4
Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
page vii
Acknowledgments 1
ix
Introduction
1
PART I: THE DEMOCRACY–ECONOMY NEXUS
2
Democracy and Economic Openness
23
3
Democracy, Economic Openness, and Income Inequality
62
4
Democracy and Development
89
PART II: BRINGING IN CONFLICT
5
Democracy and Conflict
125
6
Economic Openness and Conflict
158
PART III: BRINGING IN THE ENVIRONMENT
7
Democracy and the Environment
205
8
Economic Openness and the Environment
239
9
Conflict and the Environment
266
Conclusion
292
10
References
309
Author Index
337
Subject Index
344
v
List of Figures and Tables
FIGURES 1.1. Graphical layout of the book 6.1. Disaggregated bilateral trade equilibrium 10.1. Graphical layout of key findings
page 5 167 294
TABLES 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.A1. 2.A2. 2.A3. 3.1. 3.A1. 3.A2. 3.A3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.A1. 4.A2.
Globalization promotes democracy Globalization obstructs democracy Globalization does not necessarily affect democracy Effects of economic globalization on democracy Pooled time-series cross-sectional models of democracy by decade OLS estimates with additional control variables or Freedom House data Parameter estimates from alternative estimators Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness Interactive effect of democracy and FDI on income inequality Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness (all countries) Effects of democracy and economic openness in DCs and LDCs Variables and expected effects in the simultaneous equations Democracy and development, 2SLS Democracy and development, 3SLS Democracy and development, 2SLS-Kiviet
vii
28 31 34 39 54 55 57 74 84 86 88 100 103 120 121
viii
List of Figures and Tables
5.1. Expectation of direction of effects in the simultaneous equations 5.2. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict 5.3. Probabilities and relative risks of MID involvement 5.A1. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict, controlling for affinity 6.1. Trade categories and conflict expectations 6.2. Effects of bilateral import and export in five sectors on MID initiation 6.A1. Equality tests on significant positive and negative effects of sectoral trade flows 6.A2. In-sample prediction of MID initiation 6.A3. Effects of bilateral sectoral flows on display of force and use of force 7.1. Effect of level of democracy on environmental degradation 7.2. Effect of democracy on environmental degradation 7.3. Effect of autocracy on environmental degradation 7.4. Effect of political regime type on environmental composites 8.1A–C. Summary of causal mechanisms 8.2. Effects of democracy and trade openness on deforestation and land degradation 8.A1. Effects of democracy and trade openness on deforestation 8.A2. Effects of democracy and trade openness on land degradation 9.1. War and CO2 emissions per capita 9.2. War and deforestation 9.A1. War, cubic GDP per capita, CO2 emissions per capita, and deforestation 9.A2. War and CO2 emissions per capita, omitting the lagged dependent variable
139 142 143 156 171 176 200 200 201 217 220 221 223 249 254 262 264 275 277 289 290
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the support of many friends, colleagues, and students at the Pennsylvania State University, Indiana University, and Texas A&M University. Our many friends and colleagues in political science and economics also offered numerous useful comments, criticisms, and suggestions regarding the various parts of our project, which were presented in earlier forms at many professional conferences, workshops, and seminars. We thank them all even though it is not possible to enumerate all those who played a role in some stage of our research project. We give special thanks to Jim Eisenstein, Frank Baumgartner, Evan Ringquist, and the reviewers for Cambridge University Press for their comments and suggestions directed at various parts of our book manuscript. Daehee Bak, Andreea Mihalache, Sam Sniderman, Ashley Allen Peterson, Leslie McDonald, Melanie Arnold, and Matt Warhol provided valuable research and editorial assistance, for which we are grateful. We also warmly thank Scott Parris at Cambridge University Press, who is the best editor an author could hope for. We deeply value his guidance throughout the different phases of this project. Scott’s assistant, Adam Levine, provided excellent editorial assistance. Himanshu Abrol effectively oversaw the production of our book, and Heather Phillips did a thorough job copyediting the manuscript. Five chapters of our book draw upon our previously published journal articles. We want to thank Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge University Press, Sage Publishing, and Taylor & Francis for their permission to use materials from those journal articles for this project. Chapter 2 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science c 2003 Cambridge University Press. 33(1):29–54. Copyright ix
ONE
Introduction
Two important and complex transformations have characterized the global political–economic system since the end of World War II in 1945. One transformation is the rise and spread of democracy over time and across countries. By the term democracy, we mean a national system of political governance based on free elections and broad political representation. We conceptualize this concept as a continuum of political regime types, ranging from full autocracy at one end to full democracy at the other end. The second transformation is the expansion and deepening of globalization. In recent decades, globalization has been a popular term but is more complex to define than democracy. Scholars typically employ this term to describe recent global transformations toward growing cross-national interconnectedness. Although many scholars tend to focus on the interconnectedness features of particular interest to their own disciplines, some take a broader perspective. For example, Held et al. (2009) cast a wide net, covering essentially all the transformations that have increased international interconnectedness, including political-legal (e.g., growth of international treaties and institutions), military (e.g., disputes, growth of armies, and weapon proliferation), communication and informational (e.g., Internet, telephone, and media), economic flows (e.g., trade and investments), knowledge flows (technology transfers and education), taste convergence (e.g., consumption preferences), social contacts (e.g., migration and tourism), and environmental developments (e.g., pollution and changes in the biosphere), as well as the national and international income inequalities resulting from these processes. Whereas the scope and meaning of globalization are controversial, most scholars agree that, at a minimum, economic globalization implies that countries are becoming more integrated into the world economy, with increasing information flows among them. Greater economic integration, in turn, implies more trade, investment, and financial 1
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
flows, or rising economic openness. We also adopt this conceptualization in our book. Questions that pertain to democracy and globalization have attracted the attention of scholars, policymakers, and the public at large. These questions stand at the center of our book. We believe it is best to describe our analytical focus by situating it within a big picture of world affairs. THE BIG PICTURE AND OUR ANALYTICAL FOCUS
Let us assume we are charged by an intergovernmental organization, comprising all the countries in the world, with the mission to address two questions. First, assuming other things do not change (e.g., public policies, state of technology, and human preferences), what will be the national trajectories of key forces such as income inequality, economic development, democratic governance, military conflict, and environmental degradation in the next decade? Second, assuming other things do not change, how will these economic, political, and environmental trajectories change if we alter certain policies to promote democracy and encourage economic openness? Fundamentally these questions point to the implications of democracy and economic openness for the world in which we live. Answering these questions helps to predict the evolution of the global system. Although no one can absolutely predict the future, we might be able to say something informative about it if we can explain current and past developments. Indeed, almost all the predictions in the social sciences use the present and recent past as a baseline. The logic driving this approach is straightforward. Because we try to say something about the near future, not the very distant future, we and our immediate offspring will probably still be around. It follows logically that the behavior of the socioeconomic– political–environmental system in the near future is connected to the state of affairs in the present and recent past. This book is not about forecasting the future but rather provides a sound analytical basis for such an exercise. The ultimate goal is to say something new and informative about the direction and magnitude of global transformations, defined in the spirit of Held et al. (2009), that are expected for the near future. To that effect, we must understand theoretically and empirically the interconnections among the relevant forces in a big picture of the world, which is what this book is about. Going deeper into our purpose in this book, we note that both economic openness and democracy have expanded dramatically over the past six decades. The number of democracies has increased considerably, spreading
Introduction
3
from Western Europe and North America to almost all the regions in the world. Meanwhile, the world economy has witnessed an unprecedented expansion in the volume and patterns of international commerce, crossborder investments, and international production.1 It is reasonable to assume, which is the basic argument we make and evaluate in this book, that democracy and economic openness, as two important and rapidly changing forces, must have left their marks on many other forces in the international system. We are particularly interested in the consequences of democracy and economic openness for three important aspects of life on Earth: the economy, the polity, and the environment. One can study the economic, political, and environmental aspects of life on Earth at different levels of analysis, including individual, subnational, national, regional, continental, and planetary. We focus on two levels of analysis: the monadic state and the dyadic interstate. Our choice is not arbitrary, for we submit that the nation-state remains the most important and influential actor in the international system despite the rising challenges from various nonstate actors. What should we study in terms of the economy, the polity, and the environment? The national economy covers many dimensions, such as the level of development, income distribution, money, investment, saving, taxation, innovation, and so on, whereas the national polity may concern forces, such as the government, the party system, civil society, social cleavages, the law and property rights institutions, and so forth. We could also examine the international aspects of the national polity that involve how states interact with each other. In the environmental domain, there are many aspects that concern nation-states, beginning with how they reach agreements over the environment, the way they treat their own environments, their abilities to provide resources, their levels of food sufficiency (as all types of food ultimately come from environmental sources), and so on. We recognize that, naturally, we cannot study everything at once. Such a study is not only overly complex but also largely intractable. We also face considerable difficulty communicating our findings to the scholarly and policymaking communities, toward which we aim our book. Therefore, we concentrate on the consequences of democracy and economic openness for some key aspects of the national economy, polity, and environment. 1
Information and communication technology (ICT) and immigration are also relevant. But in this book we emphasize on economic globalization (i.e., flows of goods and capital). One should note that the current globalization wave, which stands at the center of our book, involves much smaller immigration flows than globalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereas ICT is highly correlated with GDP per capita, which is part of our analysis.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
For the national economy, we focus on the national level of economic development and the national distribution of income. These two forces are important for any country. They inform us about the average standard of living in a country and the distribution of this standard across the population. The importance of economic development for human welfare goes without saying, and the effects exceed economics. The lack of economic development tends to beget grievances, increasing the likelihood of political instability. Spillovers into the environment also occur as poor countries, preoccupied with the immediate needs of subsistence, spend less on environmental regulation and cleanups. A skewed income distribution will most likely make things even worse. As the poor compare their situation to that of the rich, their grievances grow stronger, causing the political regime to break down in some cases. In sum, we are interested in furthering our understanding of how democracy and economic openness influence income distribution and economic development. For the polity, we are interested in the determinants of national democratic governance and interstate military conflict. It is no exaggeration to claim that these two phenomena are among the most salient issues in international relations and in political science in general. From a normative perspective, democracy and world peace are desirable, for they appeal to the longings of most human beings. In reality, however, democracy and world peace are often difficult to achieve and sustain. The scarcity of resources and the human desire to dominate others have also been with us for millennia, leading to conflicts of interest among individuals and between nation-states. Democratic governance is an important human-engineered institutional solution for resolving conflicts among people and groups living within national territorial boundaries. In the current international system, which operates on principles of anarchy and state sovereignty, interstate military conflict is often employed as an instrument for resolving disagreements among nation states. We seek to find out how the forces of globalization affect the prospect of democratic governance and how democracy and economic openness influence interstate military conflict. For many years, the environment was on the margin of scientific inquiry and policy analysis. As long as the economy was small in size relative to the environment in which it resided, and as long as the activities of the polity did not exert a large effect on the environment, one could arguably accept this neglect both intellectually and in public policy. Yet conditions have changed in recent decades. Human activities have increasingly caused environmental degradations of various types, impacting human conditions around the world and the global climate system. Environmental concerns
Introduction
5
Figure 1.1. Graphical layout of the book.
are no longer marginal issues. In light of these changing conditions, we believe it is important to expand research on the links between our forces of interest and the environment and to address such critical questions as whether spreading democracy, rising trade, and political violence are good or bad for the environment. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, ANALYTICAL APPROACH, AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The previous section described the primary elements of the big picture we study in this book. This section presents our analytical approach, lays out the conceptual framework within which we operate, and highlights the new things we bring to the table. Figure 1.1 displays a graphical blueprint of our inquiry. Although the interactions we study are in fact more complex and intricate than the figure illustrates, we believe this blueprint is a useful way to guide and visualize the overall structure of our inquiry. The forces of democracy and economic openness stand at the center of the figure, indicating the analytical foci of our conceptual framework. One set of arrows flows from the center to the national economy in the upper part of Figure 1.1, corresponding to the focus on the economy. The national
6
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
economy is represented by the national level of economic development and the national level of income inequality. The two-sided arrow flowing between democracy and the national economy represents their effects on each other. We will study the reciprocal effects between democracy and the level of economic development as well as the effects between democracy and income inequality. The arrow from economic openness to the national economy indicates that we will investigate how openness influences income inequality and development. The arrow from economic openness to democracy and the set of arrows from the center to military conflict in the bottom right of Figure 1.1 indicate the part of our analysis focusing on the polity. With respect to the polity, we conduct two analyses. First, we examine how economic openness affects democracy. Second, we study the effects of economic openness and democracy on military conflict. The set of arrows that flows from the center to the environment in the bottom left of Figure 1.1 represents our focus on the environment. The arrows leading from economic openness and democracy to the environment indicate that we study how democracy and economic openness affect the environment. Finally, we consider the effect of military conflict on the environment. We seek to shed new light on the causal interactions indicated in Figure 1.1, but the channels depicted in Figure 1.1 do not exhaust all possibilities. The arrows shown in the figure represent the channels we study in this book. They involve some of the most important and intriguing questions in the fields of international political economy, international relations, comparative politics, environmental economics, and global environmental politics. Thus, the reader should construe the conceptual layout in Figure 1.1 as a road map for the structure of our book, not as a model per se. Each of the primary causes and effects in Figure 1.1 is addressed in a separate chapter in the book. We adopt a quantitative and sometimes formal approach to study the complex interconnections in Figure 1.1 for several reasons. The various interconnections are modeled separately in the respective chapters, assuming other things do not change, but the findings are integrated in the concluding chapter. In the context of Figure 1.1, each primary cause and effect translates into a statistical model in the respective chapter. The effect (i.e., the phenomenon we seek to explain) is called the dependent variable or the left-hand-side variable in a statistical model. The causal determinants of the effect are referred to as independent or right-hand-side variables in the statistical model. We typically refer to the primary causal factor in a
Introduction
7
chapter as the key independent variable, and we call the other relevant, but secondary, independent variables in the model control variables. Of course, a key independent variable in one chapter often becomes a control variable in another chapter, and vice versa. In the quantitative approach, we conduct statistical tests of the hypotheses to ascertain whether the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable is statistically different from zero (where zero means no effect), and we compute the size of the effect for each relationship that is significantly different from zero. We employ large samples of real-world data and, where appropriate, we also evaluate the robustness of our findings in subsamples and with different measurements and statistical techniques. We seek robust, valid statistical inferences that answer the important questions we and others raise. The advantages of the quantitative approach are fully exploited. First, systematic quantitative analysis allows us to study some forces in detail while controlling for many other relevant factors to prevent spurious findings. Second, the quantitative analysis identifies the average cause-and-effect statistical association and allows the analyst to evaluate whether a theoretically hypothesized relationship is statistically different from zero in the empirical data. This approach is important if we seek to build theories that are empirically valid and generalizable and if we intend to adopt policies that may actually work. Third, the use of large samples of real-world data often prevents subjective case-selection bias and uncovers general patterns, which is critical if we want to understand how the world generally works. Fourth, systematic statistical analysis also enables us to evaluate the robustness of our findings when we vary measurements, samples, and statistical techniques. Finally, the quantitative approach offers a valuable opportunity for us to gauge the substantive size of an effect that is statistically different from zero, which provides useful information for policymakers who have to contemplate the effectiveness of public policies and the various trade-offs associated with competing policy objectives. Therefore, we believe that the statistical approach contributes with rigor and clarity new insights to our analysis of significant issues. Of course, the statistical modeling approach is not without limitations common to all studies of this type. First, we are aware that our approach may be more technical and numerical than that in many, though not all, of the books on these topics, possibly posing challenges to some readers. To make the findings more accessible to the general readership, we write out explicitly the estimated statistical models accompanied by detailed explanations, present one main set of statistical results, and describe the formal
8
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
and statistical models and their results in a way that does not require prior training in statistics or mathematics for comprehension. We relegate all the technical details to the chapter appendices. Readers who are interested in the substance of our findings only need to read the main text; those who are interested in the technical details can obtain the relevant information from the appendices. We believe that such organization of the presentation makes the book highly readable for a wide audience. Second, statistical findings imply probabilistic statements regarding relationships of interest, and they are not intended to depict or forecast each particular case. Where appropriate, we highlight some real-world cases for illustration. But in essence, our analysis is statistical and reflects average patterns in the real world. Finally, statistical models typically include a limited number of variables, relegating other possible influences to the error term. In other words, we should and do make further assumptions concerning which variables to include in each model. At the same time, these assumptions are not arbitrary; rather they are based on theoretical considerations and, to a large extent, previous studies. Our book brings at least three new things to the table, which other studies of our topics have typically not attempted to achieve thus far. First, we model a relatively large number of forces and topics pertaining to globalization and democracy. Previous scholarly works on these topics tend to be compartmentalized, focusing on one or two aspects of the global system. We acknowledge and model explicitly the economic, political, and environmental dimensions of the global system and their interconnections. Taken together, the findings from the different chapters form a relatively more holistic and integrative view of the inner workings of our world than previous research. Second, because we study seemingly diverse topics in a conceptually coherent framework and treat these topics as different components of a big picture, we are able to uncover interconnections that have thus far received little attention. Finally, because all the analyses employ statistical modeling, we have one coherent methodological approach throughout the book, which controls for various confounding forces, rigorously tests the relationships of interest, estimates the magnitude of each key relationship, and enables us to uncover general patterns. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
Our book consists of three parts, and democracy and economic openness run through all of them. The first part examines the relationships among
Introduction
9
democracy, openness, and the national economy. The second part investigates the relationships between democracy and openness, on the one hand, and interstate military conflict, on the other hand. The third part of the book studies the relationships among openness, democracy, and conflict, on the one hand, and various indicators of environmental degradation, on the other. Given the complexity of our topics, each chapter typically employs, as an anchor, one of the two core concepts – democracy or openness – relegating the other to the secondary role. As a preview, we discuss the gist of each chapter, focusing on the organization and flow of the argument and summarizing the key findings. The book includes eight main analyses or chapters, each pertaining to a part of the big picture. The organizational structure of each substantive chapter (2–9) is similar. We begin each chapter by stating the research question(s) and the theoretical argument(s) concerning the relationship(s) studied. On the basis of the theoretical argument(s), we turn to the empirical research that specifies the statistical model, clarifies important research design issues, and describes the primary findings in light of the arguments posited at the beginning of the chapter. The technical details pertaining to each chapter are in the chapter appendix, which follows the general flow of the discussion in the body of the chapter. The first and last chapters of the book integrate the eight analyses into a larger picture, but do so with different levels of detail. The current chapter introduces the book, focusing on the conceptual framework, analytical focus and approach, and structure. The concluding chapter of the book summarizes the key findings by incorporating them into a revised and much more elaborate version of Figure 1.1, suggests avenues for future research, emphasizes key policy implications, and evaluates the trade-offs and tensions that result from different policy objectives such as economic development versus environmental quality, economic development versus equitable distribution of income, democracy versus environmental quality, economic liberalization versus political liberalization, and democracy versus national security.
Part I: The Democracy–Economy Nexus Part I of the book focuses on the democracy–economy nexus. We begin our analyses by looking at the two key variables in our book, democracy and economic openness. In Chapter 2, we study the effects of economic openness on democracy, controlling for the important influences of economic development and income distribution. We ask whether more integration
10
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
into the world economy and the wider spread of democratic ideas and norms across countries lead to a rise or decline of democratic governance. This question has captured the attention of policymakers and academic scholars alike, who have provided various answers and policy recommendations. Anecdotal evidence is typically invoked in debates, but systematic evidence is scarce. To answer our question, we examine the effects of trade flows, foreign direct investment flows, financial investment flows, and the spread of democratic ideas on the level of democracy in a country. Our statistical analysis suggests that trade openness and portfolio investment inflows reduce democracy. The effect of trade openness is constant over time, whereas the negative effect of financial investment grows stronger. Foreign direct investment inflows promote democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas is persistently conducive to democracy over time. In Chapter 3, we examine the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality within countries. Although the issue of income inequality was central in classical economics – the body of thought that emanated from the writings of the liberal philosophers of the nineteenth century – it has received relatively little attention in neoclassical economics, the body of thought and knowledge in modern mainstream economics. We believe that the issue of income inequality deserves more attention, because commercial liberalism, or free market–oriented capitalism, and republican liberalism, or democracy as a form of political governance, are not easy companions. Whereas democracy is based on the principles of “one person, one vote” and representative government, capitalism is based on the principles of laissez-faire and private enterprise. Furthermore, democracy is often associated with redistributive policies (e.g., progressive taxation), but capitalism typically rewards heterogeneous individuals with different levels of income. Hence, democracy may suppress income inequality, but capitalism promotes income inequality. A skewed income distribution under capitalism could lead to an asymmetric distribution of political power, which could undermine democracy and, therefore, its effect on income inequality within a country. Turning to the empirical analysis of Chapter 3, we argue that the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality should be analyzed together rather than in separate models that include one force and exclude the other. Economic openness is measured based on national trade flows, foreign direct investment inflows, and financial capital inflows; income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of each country in the sample. We find that democracy and trade openness reduce income
Introduction
11
inequality, foreign direct investments increase income inequality, and financial capital inflows do not affect income inequality. We also find, however, that democratic governance mitigates the inequality-increasing effect of foreign direct investments in the advanced industrial democracies. In Chapter 4, we bring development into the story, focusing on the relationship between democracy and economic development. We open the democracy–development box, this time relegating economic openness to a control variable, and study the interactions between democracy and economic development. The democracy–development relationship not only is central to much academic research but also has significant policy implications. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs argues that “democracies consistently outperform autocracies” in economic development (Siegle et al., 2004: 57). U.S. President George W. Bush, the authors write, supports having democratic governance “as qualifying criteria for countries to receive assistance . . . The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), still the major development actor in the U.S. government, should also offer preferential treatment to democracies and target its assistance to help countries undertaking democratic reforms” (2004: 67). Normatively speaking, democratic governance, which favors equal participation, equal political rights, and equal civil liberties, is of course worthy of promotion. The argument in the Foreign Affairs essay, however, justifies the promotion of democracy as a means to increase economic development. Does democracy really encourage economic development? The Foreign Affairs essay presents anecdotal evidence to support its argument, but it does not take into account the possibility that the causality between democracy and development could flow from development to democracy. We argue that sorting out the causal direction between democracy and development is very important. If the goal is to promote democracy but the causation goes from development to democracy, we should not condition the distribution of aid to poor countries on instituting democratic reforms. In this case, we should condition aid on forces such as the quality of projects, market reforms, or investment in education. The issue of causation between democracy and development stands at the center of Chapter 4. We specify and estimate a statistical simultaneousequations model, which allows for reciprocal effects between the level of development and the level of democracy. This modeling approach rigorously evaluates the nature of the relationship, that is, whether democracy affects development only, development affects democracy only, they affect each other, or they are not related statistically. The empirical results indicate that a rise in the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development,
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
whereas a rise in the level of economic development promotes democracy. It is not difficult to imagine the important policy implications of these findings.
Part II: Bringing in Conflict In Part II, we introduce into our book a new force – interstate military conflict. Interstate political relations behave like a continuum of types of interstate interactions, spanning from full cooperation to full-scale war. In measuring the concept of conflict, some scholars consider it a continuum, whereas others focus on the discrete events that involve violence only. In this book, we employ the latter approach, focusing on militarized interstate disputes, for these types of interstate interactions have the most damaging consequences to human society. In Chapter 5, we focus on how democracy affects conflict, controlling for economic openness. This concerns the famous democratic peace proposition in the field of international relations. Democracies are highly unlikely to go to war with each other, which suggests that the spread of democracy in the international system implies the spread of peace. This idea has been around for many years and can be traced to the writings of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The modern, empirical-statistical incarnation of this argument takes the form of a simple and powerful claim: democracies rarely, if at all, go to war with one another. This is not to say democracies may not exhibit conflict with one another at times, or that they may never fight with one another. It only means that they are less likely to fight each other than to fight autocracies, and they are less likely to do so than two autocracies. The empirical literature concerning the democratic peace proposition has been arguably the largest in the field of international relations over the past two decades. The bulk of this literature shares a similar design, employing the dyadic level of analysis and estimating single-equation models. The dependent variable is typically dichotomous, measuring the presence or absence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). The models typically include a measure of joint (dyadic) democracy as the key independent variable and control for various confounding forces. The vast majority of studies report that the probability of a MID between two countries declines as joint democracy increases. A few studies, however, reject this argument and do not find supporting evidence. At the same time, another separate, growing body of literature in international relations argues that conflict affects democracy. Although scholars debate the direction of the effect of conflict on democracy, they seem to
Introduction
13
agree that some type of effect exists. Conceptually, these studies form a subset of the large monadic country-level literature within comparative politics that studies the determinants of national democracy. The argument that conflict affects democracy is intriguing because it implies the possibility that results of the effect of democracy on conflict may in fact have merely captured the effect of conflict on democracy. At any rate, the democratic peace literature and studies that address the effect of conflict on democracy have basically ignored the insights offered by one another. In particular, the effect of joint democracy on conflict has been treated as unidirectional by international relations scholars even though it has been demonstrated elsewhere that conflict affects democracy. By taking the two bodies of literature into account, one can reasonably argue that conflict and democracy affect each other simultaneously. Chapter 5 evaluates this possibility empirically. We develop an innovative simultaneous-equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict for a large number of countries over many years. We find that dyadic military dispute reduces the level of joint democracy of two countries, and that the level of joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. Our findings vindicate the main arguments in two separate bodies of literature. But we offer important caveats concerning the size of the effect of democracy on conflict, which is somewhat smaller than in previous research. In Chapter 6, we study how trade, as an important aspect of economic openness, affects conflict. This involves another salient controversy – the effect of trade on peace – among academics and practitioners, which has important theoretical and policy implications. We contribute to this debate with new theoretical and empirical insights. The intellectual history of competing positions on the relationship between trade and conflict is long. The idea that international trade promotes peace traces back to the great works of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, French social commentator and political thinker Baron de Montesquieu, English philosopher and economist Adam Smith, and early-nineteenth-century English journalist and member of the Parliament Norman Angell. The antithesis that trade begets political disagreement and even military conflict also has a long history, appearing in the writings of such important policymakers as Vladimir Ilich Lenin, political scientist Kenneth Waltz, and political economist Albert Hirschman. Among contemporary social scientific studies, the pacifying effect of trade has two explanations: the liberal argument and the bargaining argument, whereas the conflict-generating effect of trade is often explained from a neo-Marxist view or a neomercantilist derivative of realism. Scholars have
14
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
proved formally the logical consistency of the liberal and bargaining arguments. However, both formal models consider aggregated or total trade, ignoring variations of trade across economic sectors and flow directions (export and import). Almost all recent empirical studies have focused on the dyad as the unit of analysis and have employed data on total bilateral trade flows, computed as the sum of export and import flows in a dyad. Only a few studies examine the effect of bilateral trade in various sectors on international political conflict, but they fail to provide a microfoundation formally, they do not focus on military conflict, they have small samples, and they fail to distinguish between imports and exports. In this chapter, we challenge the prevalent approach and offer a theoretical formal model to explain how export and import flows in specific economic sectors influence the decision to initiate military conflict, a question almost all previous theories have ignored. Our model indicates that one country’s sectoral imports and exports influence the conflict it initiates toward another country through the expected effects the conflict will have on the prices of these trade flows. These effects reflect the sensitivities of sectoral import demand and sectoral export supply to military violence and, fundamentally, whether a country expects to benefit from initiating conflict in terms of less cost on imports or more revenue from exports. We employ these principles to generate hypotheses regarding the effects of export and import in specific goods on the likelihood of military conflict. We test the hypotheses using a data set covering many countries for almost three decades. The findings support our expectations on the effects of specific imports and exports broken down along sectors or goods. In particular, we are able to identify traded goods whose export and import flows increase the likelihood of conflict, goods whose trade flows reduce the likelihood of conflict, and goods that have no effect on conflict. Our research in this chapter leads to new insights on a long-standing debate in international relations, compelling scholars to rethink the logic of how trade affects conflict. The theory encompasses the liberal argument as a special case and offers an alternative explanation to the bargaining, neo-Marxist, neomercantilist realist, and classical realist arguments. It also has various important policy implications.
Part III: Bringing in the Environment Part III focuses on how the polity and the economy influence the physical and biological environments of countries or their biospheres. Specifically, we study the effects of democracy, economic openness, and military conflict on
Introduction
15
human activities that degrade the environment. The impact of these forces on the state of the environment has not received wide attention from political scientists, economists, or policymakers. We believe that this relative neglect will likely change as the global environment continues to degrade and environmental concerns and issues acquire salience in the public discourse. Chapter 7 focuses on the effect of democratic governance in a country on various aspects of its environment such as land, air, water, and vegetation. In recent years, the democracy–environment relationship has received some attention from theorists and is controversial. We begin the chapter by discussing various theoretical arguments on the effects of democracy on the environment. Some theorists claim that democracy reduces environmental degradation, whereas others argue that democracy has no effect on environmental degradation at best and may harm the environment at worst. Despite the growing importance of the issue, existing empirical evidence is relatively scant and mixed. Extant results also do not pertain to the same type of environmental variables. Some scholars examine government commitment to environmental quality in terms of signing international agreements to protect the environment, others investigate resource scarcity and access to environmental amenities such as safe water or sanitation, and a third group explores human activities harmful to the environment. Although the focal points of these analyses are undoubtedly important, we believe it is essential to study human actions that directly damage the environment because the best way to protect the environment is to minimize the damage in the first place. The empirical analysis examines five salient, specific types of humaninduced degradation: carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, land degradation, rate of deforestation, and organic pollution in water. We also look at an aggregate indicator of environmental degradation that may be interpreted as a measure of sustainable development. The results demonstrate that a rise in democracy reduces CO2 emissions, NOx emissions, land degradation, water pollution, and the aggregate measure of environmental degradation, but it raises the rate of deforestation. The size of the effect varies from small to substantial, depending on the particular environmental attribute at issue. The findings suggest that one should not treat democracy as a magic solution to environmental problems. Chapter 8 examines how international trade and its interaction with democratic governance influence the terrestrial environment. As international trade flows have become more and more important in the global economy, their effects on the environment have attracted more and more
16
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
attention. In principle, international trade may directly increase or decrease environmental degradation by changing the patterns of consumption, production, and investment; affecting the production technology; and influencing government regulatory policies. However, scholars disagree on the nature of the overall effect of trade on the environment. In one view, trade reduces environmental degradation and promotes environmental quality. In another view, trade can harm the environment, increasing environmental degradation. Most of these studies do not consider the effects of both trade and democracy, and certainly not their interactive effect on the environment. The empirical analysis in Chapter 8 studies the effects of trade on land degradation and the rate of deforestation within countries. These attributes are important because land quality is crucial for food production and deforestation is important to the water cycle, land erosion, and climate change. We include both democracy and trade in the model, examine the effect of trade conditional on democracy by including their interactive term, account for possible differences across continents, and distinguish between developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). We find that a rise in trade openness reduces deforestation in autocracy but raises it in democracy. These effects are similar for LDCs and DCs. A rise in trade openness reduces land degradation, but the effect is not robust and does not depend on regime type. A rise in democracy increases deforestation and reduces land degradation, but these effects are weaker in LDCs than in DCs. The effect of democracy on deforestation is stronger when trade openness increases, and the effect of democracy on land degradation does not depend on trade openness. Chapter 9 studies the effect of warfare on the environment. Many scholars in international relations have examined the effect of environmental factors on warfare. The expectation is that as climate change progresses and environmental degradation intensifies in the world, countries vie for depleted or degraded resources or quarrel about who should carry the costs of environmental damages, resulting in more warfare. This possibility has received attention, but the effect of warfare on the environment has largely been ignored. In empirical studies, the effect of war on the environment has virtually not been studied statistically. To understand how wars affect the environment, we separate them into those fought at home and those fought abroad, because they are likely to have different effects on the environment. We find that the effect of war depends on the location of the conflict and the environmental indicator examined. Wars fought at home or abroad reduce carbon dioxide emissions at home; wars fought at home speed up the deforestation in a country, but
Introduction
17
wars fought abroad slow it down. War could be a boon for the environment sometimes, though we obviously do not think that it is a good idea to use this knowledge to promote war. Chapter 10 concludes our book by performing three tasks. First, we summarize the analyses performed in this book and take stock of our key findings. We flesh out the conceptual framework of Figure 1.1 with our findings, explicitly identifying the sign of each cause–effect arrow we have analyzed and found to be statistically significant. Second, we offer some caveats regarding our analyses and propose some general directions in which one could usefully extend our research. As we noted earlier, one book-length manuscript cannot address all issues. Despite the richness of our models, we believe room always exists for additional research on the complex topics we study in this book. Finally, we highlight the key policy implications and trade-offs that have been revealed by our analyses. They pertain to economic, political, and environmental policies at both national and international levels. We believe that the issues we study and the results we obtain in this book should be of great interest to both academics and practitioners. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this chapter, we have presented our book in a nutshell by highlighting the key questions, issues, motivations, arguments, and findings. What we offer is a fresh look – either theoretically or empirically, or theoretically and empirically – at some of the most intriguing and important questions in contemporary social sciences. Our analysis in this book is relatively complex. We seek theoretical and empirical insights by reaching into a considerable number of issue areas, crossing multiple social science disciplines, linking different bodies of literature, engaging various academic debates, and applying formal and statistical social scientific methods. Our coherent conceptual, methodological, and organizational approach enables us to demonstrate the interconnectedness of different issues, debates, and disciplines among domestic and international forces in the economy, polity, and environment. We believe that our book is unique in that it combines the social scientific approach with a broad, interdisciplinary scope. In terms of the range of topics covered, the one book that comes closest to ours is Global Transformations by David Held and his coauthors (1999). This popular text, however, is more of a survey of the state of knowledge, whereas our book is a statement of an ongoing research program that aims at expanding the extant
18
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
body of knowledge.2 In terms of the methodological approach, many books use the same approach as ours, but their respective substantive coverages are much narrower, focusing on only one or some of the interconnected processes we investigate here. For example, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance by Yi Feng (2003) studies the interrelationship between democracy, regime type, inflation, and economic growth at the nation-state level, ignoring much of the globalization, environmental, and interstate conflict processes. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) investigates the interrelationships among military conflict, democracy, trade, and international organizations at the dyadic level, ignoring income inequality, development, environment, and aspects of economic globalization other than trade. Growth, Trade, and Systemic Leadership by Rafael Reuveny and William Thompson (2004) explores the long-term dynamics among growth, trade, and a few great powers at the system level, ignoring aspects of globalization other than trade, issues of democracy, income inequality, and the environment. These books are important in their own right, but they fail to address the interconnectedness of several key processes in the global system. We believe that to understand the impact of broad transformations like the spread of democracy and rising economic openness, one has to cross and transcend disciplinary boundaries. To that effect, our book confronts debates in various fields and subfields in the social sciences such as international relations, comparative politics, political economy, environmental politics, environmental economics, and globalization studies. It brings the insights from compartmentalized bodies of literature into direct dialogues and exchanges to produce a better understanding of the inner workings of the international system. Our book is academic, scholarly, and policy-oriented in nature. We orient this book toward a rather broad readership that encompasses scholars, graduate students, undergraduate students in upper-division honors programs, practitioners, and policymakers in the areas of international political economy, international relations, comparative politics, international economics, sociology, political geography, human geography, environmental economics, ecological economics, and environmental studies, as well as those who have broad interdisciplinary interests in the topics we analyze here. Our book ought to help graduate students, scholars, and policymakers get familiar with different debates, literatures, and new ideas in different 2
For another example by Held and his coauthors, see Held and McGrew (2007).
Introduction
19
fields that are interconnected in one framework. It also provides a springboard from which one can continue to investigate both the linkages we study and those linkages we do not study. Because we relegate all the technical materials to the chapter appendices, the general readership interested in the topics and relevant debates can be fully informed of the issues, arguments, and findings simply by reading the main text. Most important, we expect our readers to benefit from the opportunity to confront the various new connections, solutions, and policy trade-offs one could only identify within a larger picture of the world we live in. In an age of complex transformations, it is important to realize that policies and processes often interact in unexpected manners and produce unintended consequences. We must note that we do not cover all the possible cause–effect links, nor is it desirable to do so in one book. Yet it is important to discuss the missing links at the outset so that the analytical boundaries of the book are transparent. The reader may recall the big picture with which we started and gradually narrowed down to Figure 1.1 that represents the essence of our book. Naturally, the causal arrows shown in Figure 1.1 do not exhaust all possibilities. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the causal arrows we study in this book, not all the possible cause–effect links among those forces. One may group the causal arrows “missing” from Figure 1.1 into two types. One type concerns some channels that we include but treat as secondary in the book. For example, the channels from economic development to income distribution (the so-called Kuznets curve) and from development to the environment (the so-called environmental Kuznets curve) are discussed theoretically and analyzed statistically, albeit not in the spotlight of our analysis. A second type of missing arrows involves possible linkages between forces in Figure 1.1, but they are neither shown in the figure nor studied here. Most notably, income distribution, democracy, and interstate military conflict may influence economic openness. In fact, we intentionally treat economic openness as exogenous in this book for two reasons. We do so to focus on the consequences of globalization, for our interest lies in the effects of economic openness on democracy, inequality, development, the environment, and conflict, and the interactions among these forces facing globalization. In addition, this keeps our analysis tractable because the sources of economic openness and globalization are controversial and involve multiple bodies of literature on trade, foreign direct investment, and financial liberalization. Although we do not study these and perhaps other potentially missing channels in this book, we discuss them again in the last chapter as possibilities for future research.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
In closing, this book has grown out of our joint research program in recent years. The fact that several of our chapters have been published in different forms in high-quality journals and scrutinized by peer scholars multiple times speaks to one important strength of our project. But our book does not simply replicate our previous work word-for-word. Rather, we build on, extend, and rewrite our various projects from recent years to integrate them together into one coherent picture and to cater to the broad readership we have in mind. As such, this book amounts to a product whose total size is bigger than the sum of its individual parts. As we explained, the global system has experienced rising interdisciplinary interconnectedness among its different processes and mechanisms. Our previous works, like those of our peers, have emphasized single parts of the ensuing global transformations. We believe that only by putting together separate analyses and identifying their interrelationships can one understand the complex interconnections of these global transformations. With the introduction of the book behind us, we proceed to the next chapter. Chapter 2 begins by observing the growth of globalization forces in recent decades. The question we seek to answer is whether and how these processes affect democracy within national boundaries. To that effect, we conceptualize globalization as the interconnectivity of a country to the world system in the realms of economic and information flows. As we shall see, this interconnectivity may have significant and controversial ramifications for national democratic governance.
PART I
THE DEMOCRACY–ECONOMY NEXUS
TWO
Democracy and Economic Openness
INTRODUCTION
We begin our analytical journey with an analysis of the causal flow from economic openness to democracy, which stands at the center of the conceptual layout of the book in Figure 1.1. The issue we seek to investigate in this chapter is in fact much broader than the components of openness itself; it falls under the umbrella of economic globalization. A popular interpretation of this phenomenon is the gradual turning of separate national economies, each operating in its own domain, into a set of national economies heavily entangled with one another, affecting and being affected by the economic forces operating in other countries in the world much in the same way that the economy of the state of Texas is affected by and affects, for example, the economies of the states of California or Florida in the United States. As noted, the causal relationship of interest falls under the umbrella of the globalization discourse; therefore, we use the terms “economic globalization” and “economic openness” interchangeably. Two questions stand at the core of our investigation in this chapter. Does economic globalization affect the level of democracy? Is deepening integration into the world economy associated with a decline or rise of democratic governance? These questions have captured the imagination of policymakers and academic scholars alike. Various answers have been provided, and policy recommendations have been made. Anecdotal evidence is typically invoked in debates, but systematic evidence is scarce. This chapter seeks to fill this empirical lacuna. The notions of globalization and democracy are widely discussed in the literature. Most scholars agree that, at the minimum, globalization implies that countries are becoming more integrated into the world economy, with increasing information flows among them (e.g., Held et al., 1999, 2009). 23
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
Greater economic integration, in turn, implies more trade and financial openness. A rise in information flow implies, arguably, the spread of ideas and cultural convergence across countries. As we discussed in the previous chapter, most scholars also agree that democracy implies a national political regime based on free elections and broad political representation, and this is the conceptualization of democracy that we continue to use in this chapter and, for that matter, throughout the book. Before we delve further into this chapter, some clarifications are in order. Although the historical developments of both globalization and democracy have been long and cyclical, we will not take a long-term historical slant in this chapter, primarily due to the lack of economic performance and openness data over a long period of time.1 We also note that throughout this book, democracy is conceptualized as a level variable, a continuum of regime types, from fully autocratic at one end to fully democratic at the other. Hence, we use the terms “democracy” and “level of democracy” interchangeably. Returning to our questions for this chapter, the theoretical literature presents conflicting positions on the effect of globalization on the level of democracy: one position claims a positive effect, a second position asserts a negative effect, and a third position argues that globalization does not necessarily affect democracy. The position that globalization promotes democracy is entrenched in the views of recent American presidents, and it has been used as a rationale for promoting international economic liberalization. For example, U.S. President William Clinton (1996) argues that “commerce helps make the world safe for democracy” and U.S. President George W. Bush (2001) claims that “societies that open to commerce across their borders will open to democracy within their borders.” This view garners some support in stylized observations. Lin and Nugent (1995) argue that Korea, Taiwan, and Chile exemplify the positive influence exerted by economic openness on the democratic transitions of their authoritarian regimes. As another example, the opening up of Indonesia to the world economy, despite causing some financial difficulties in the late 1990s, seems to have facilitated the evolution of a more competitive political system in that country. In contrast, history also provides some opposing cases in which economic openness had little or even a negative effect on democracy. For instance, as noted by Flandreau (2007), the liberalization of trade between France 1
On the historical development of globalization, see, e.g., Wallerstein (1974), Cameron (1997), Held et al. (1999), and Held and McGrew (2007). On the historical development of democracy, see, e.g., Huntington (1991), Potter et al. (1997), and Diamond (1999).
Democracy and Economic Openness
25
and Britain in the 1860s was not associated with a change in democracy in France, which was then led by an autocratic regime. The contraction of trade liberalization in the late nineteenth century did not affect the levels of British or French democracy. The opening up of Russia to the world economy in the late nineteenth century, which involved deepening economic relations with democracies, was associated with an increase in its level of autocracy. Democratic governance in the United States evolved largely as an internal matter, not affected much by its increasing contacts with the world in the nineteenth century. Finally, recent increases in the economic openness of Russia and China seem to have led to a decline in the level of democracy in Russia since the late 1990s and have had little impact on the level of democracy in China. Of course, the anecdotal evidence does not demonstrate generalizable patterns across countries. Moreover, historical cases may not be applicable to the contemporary era. After all, one may argue that the globalization of our times is much more all-embracing than the one that intensified during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This argument in and of itself can make a difference in terms of the direction, not only the size, of the effect of increasing connectivity to the world economy on the level of democracy within a country. Progress in explaining the effect of globalization on democracy requires an empirical evaluation of the three competing theoretical positions. We seek to detect generalizable empirical patterns in the effect of globalization on democracy. As noted, democracy is conceptualized as a continuum. Four national aspects of globalization are examined: trade openness, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, portfolio (financial) investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. Our analysis in this chapter covers 127 countries from 1970 to 1996 in a pooled time-series cross-sectional statistical model. Our primary findings can be summarized as follows. Trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy. The effect of trade openness is constant over time, whereas the negative effect of portfolio investment inflows strengthens democracy. FDI inflows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time. The chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the studies on the determinants of democracy. The section that follows discusses the effects of globalization on democracy, which, as noted and as we shall further demonstrate, are highly controversial. This discussion is followed by a section that describes both research design and findings from the statistical
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
analysis. Understanding this section does not require statistical expertise, for the materials of more technical nature are delegated to the chapter appendix. The last section of this chapter summarizes our main findings and discusses their implications. THE LITERATURE ON DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY
This section reviews the literature on the determinants of democracy. Our review is not meant to be exhaustive but rather seeks to illustrate how our analysis fits into the larger picture. We categorize this voluminous literature into three groups. One group consists of detailed case studies. A second group includes statistical analyses. These two groups, by and large, focus on domestic political and economic variables and pay relatively little attention to international factors. A third group (discussed in the next section) includes largely theoretical studies of the effects of globalization on democracy. In their synthesis of a number of case studies, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) conclude that the effect of international factors on democracy is indirect and marginal. Challenging this conclusion, Pridham (1994) labels international factors as the “forgotten dimensions in the study of domestic transition,” and Schmitter (1996: 27) argues “perhaps, it is time to reconsider the impact of international context upon regime change.” Attempting to bridge this gap among case studies, Whitehead (1996) and Drake (1998) argue that international factors such as the diffusion of democratic ideas and global markets are important determinants of democracy. Among the statistical studies, the dependent variable is democracy, but the independent variables vary. As discussed in the previous chapter, one group of studies argues that economic development positively affects democracy.2 A second group debates the effects of economic crisis, such as recessions and high inflation (Helliwell, 1994; O’Donnell, 1973; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Gasiorowski, 1995). A third group expects positive influences by Christianity and negative effects of social cleavages (Huntington, 1984; Muller, 1988; Gasiorowski, 1995). A fourth group examines the effects of institutions such as constitutional arrangements, nonfragmented party systems, and parliamentary versus presidential systems (e.g., Lijphart, 1977; Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994). Finally, some statistical studies 2
See, e.g., Lipset (1959), Dahl (1989), Huntington (1991), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Muller (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Feng and Zak (1999).
Democracy and Economic Openness
27
consider external factors but not globalization-related variables, such as core-periphery status and diffusion.3 The strengths and weaknesses of case studies and statistical analyses of democracy are debated (e.g., see Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Briefly, statistical studies focus on the macro conditions that facilitate or hinder democracy. Although they can test general theoretical claims and control for competing forces, they are less able to explain the micro processes that affect democracy. Case studies identify detailed microlevel influences, but they are less able to test general theories or to assess the relative strength of causal factors. Our study in this chapter takes a macro approach. However, we believe that the macro and micro approaches to our question provide complementary insights into the determinants of democracy, much as macroeconomic and microeconomic analyses provide complementary insights into the operation of the economy. Our inquiry adopts the spirit of the important qualitative comparative study by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). Like their study, we also study many countries and emphasize the importance of transnational power relations, particularly economic and information flows. In the next section, we discuss how these external forces affect democracy. THE GLOBALIZATION–DEMOCRACY CONTROVERSY
The literature on the effects of globalization on democracy is quite large and mostly theoretical. It posits three competing theoretical positions: globalization promotes democracy, globalization obstructs democracy, and globalization has no systematic effect on democracy. To streamline the presentation of these positions, Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 summarize the arguments from studies supporting each of the three theoretical positions, respectively.
Globalization Promotes Democracy The first proposition listed in Table 2.1 is that globalization promotes democracy by encouraging economic development. The notion that free markets facilitate democracy can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. 3
For example, see Bollen (1983) and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), who study position in the world system. Starr (1991) and Przeworksi et al. (1996) study diffusion of democratic ideas. Gasiorowski (1995) focuses on the effect of economic crisis on democratization but also includes trade openness as a control variable.
28
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 2.1. Globalization promotes democracy
Number
Argument
Discussed in
1
Globalization promotes economic development.
2
Globalization increases the demand of international business for democracy. Globalization reduces the incentives of the authoritarian leaders to cling to power. Globalization reduces information costs, increasing contact with other democracies and making the prodemocracy international nongovernmental organizations more effective. Globalization pushes the authoritarian states to decentralize power. Globalization promotes domestic institutions that support democracy.
Schumpeter (1950), Held (1992), Platner (1993), Weitzman (1993), Bhagwati (1994), Lipset (1994), Muller (1995), Im (1996) Kant (1795), Bhagwati (1994), Schmitter (1996), Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a) Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), Diamond (1995), Drake (1998)
3
4
5
6
7
Globalization intensifies the diffusion of democratic ideas.
Van Hanen (1990), Brunn and Leinback (1991), Diamond (1992a), Schmitter (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kummell (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), Risse and Sikkink (1999) Self (1993), Sheth (1995), Roberts (1996) Roberts (1996), Fruhling (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Stark (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), Risse and Sikkink (1999) Kant (1795), Whitehead (1986, 1996), Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), Przeworski et al. (1996)
In this view, globalization promotes economic growth, increases the size of the middle class, promotes education, and reduces income inequality, all of which foster democracy. Trade, FDI, and financial capital flows are said to allocate resources to their most efficient use; democracy is said to allocate political power to its most efficient use. The outcome in both cases represents the free will of individuals.4 According to a second view, globalization increases the demand of international business for democracy. Business prosperity requires peace and political stability. Because democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other, commercial interests pursue democracy to secure peace and stability. As the 4
See Schumpeter (1942), Held (1992), Platner (1993), Weitzman (1993), Bhagwati (1994), Lipset (1994), Muller (1995), and Im (1996).
Democracy and Economic Openness
29
economic links between states develop, commercial interests strengthen, and the demand for democracy rises. Authoritarian countries that open their economies face greater pressures from international business for political liberalization. Furthermore, in economies open to the transnational flows of commodities and capital, the government and the central bank have to be more transparent in their procedures and policymaking to attract and maintain international business. The increased transparency, in turn, implies less power for the autocratic regime, which can facilitate democratization.5 A third argument is that globalization reduces the incentives of the authoritarian leaders to cling to power. Because the state can extract rents from society, losing office implies the forfeit of these rents. Hence, autocratic rulers cling to power, resisting democracy. However, globalization reduces the capacity of the state to extract rents from society by increasing competition and weakening the effectiveness of economic policies. It follows that leaders of autocracies whose economies are more open are less likely to resist democratization. To the extent that the autocrats believe that providing social welfare for the losers of globalization reduces the latter’s incentive to contest their grip on power, the autocratic leaders should be willing to give their citizens more political rights and civil liberties.6 A fourth view argues that globalization reduces information costs, increasing contacts with other democracies and making the prodemocracy international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) more effective. A prosperous democracy requires well-informed actors. With increasing globalization, citizens have access to more information, supplied not just by their own governments. Economic openness enables the established democracies, aided by their developed media, to export their values to autocracies. Authoritarian regimes now have less control over information. More exposure to the media also strengthens the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks and the INGOs, helping them protect prodemocracy forces in authoritarian regimes and promote democracy.7 According to a fifth view, globalization pushes the authoritarian state to decentralize power. As globalization deepens, states relinquish control over economic and social progress to the market, which is “inherently democratic” – as if millions of economic agents cast their “votes” voluntarily. 5 6 7
See Kant (1795), Bhagwati (1994), Schmitter (1996), Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a), and Dailami (2000). See Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), Diamond (1995), and Drake (1998). For the effect of social welfare spending and globalization, see Rudra (2005). See Van Hanen (1990), Brunn and Leinback (1991), Diamond (1992a), Schmitter (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kummell (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), and Risse and Sikkink (1999).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
The weakened state also implies the entrance of grassroots groups into the political arena (e.g., business and professional associations, labor unions). Citizens become more involved in the day-to-day governance of the country, facilitating democracy.8 A sixth view argues that globalization strengthens domestic institutions that support democracy. Because the efficient operation of the market requires an enforceable system of property rights and impartial courts, economic openness compels the popularization of norms respecting the rule of law and civil and human rights. The increased involvement of international business and INGOs in the domestic economy further promotes the transparency and accountability of domestic institutions and reduces state intervention, all of which are said to facilitate democracy.9 According to a seventh view, economic globalization intensifies the diffusion of democratic ideas across borders. Transnational movements of commodities, services, and factors of production facilitate and encourage the exchange of norms and ideas, increasing the diversity of political views in a country and indirectly promoting political competition. Scholars argue that the more democracies that surround a certain nondemocratic country, the more likely it is that this country will become democratic. Because greater economic openness is associated with more information flow and transnational contacts, the diffusion of democratic ideas across borders is expected to intensify with growing economic integration. The diffusion of democratic ideas and norms will affect the people in the nondemocratic countries, motivating them to demand democratic reforms.10
Globalization Obstructs Democracy The first argument in Table 2.2 is that globalization reduces state policy autonomy and brings about public policies that please foreign investors instead of the common people. Globalization increases financial capital mobility across countries and facilitates relocation of the means of production, which, in turn, reduces the ability of states to implement domestically oriented economic policies. Another consequence is that governments now try to compete for foreign capital and design their policies to please global
8 9 10
See Self (1993), Sheth (1995), and Roberts (1996). See Roberts (1996), Fruhling (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Stark (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), and Risse and Sikkink (1999). Kant (1795), Whitehead (1986, 1996), Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), Przeworski et al. (1996), and Dailami (2000).
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Table 2.2. Globalization obstructs democracy Number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Argument
Discussed in
Globalization reduces state policy autonomy and brings about public policies that please foreign investors instead of the common people. Globalization produces more domestic losers than winners, at least in the short run, and it also diminishes the ability of the state to compensate the losers financially. Globalization enables the fast movement of money between countries, resulting in frequent balance of payment crises and unstable domestic economic performance. Globalization deepens ethnic and class cleavages and diminishes the national-cultural basis of democracy. Globalization enables the state and multinational corporations to control and manipulate information supplied to the public. Globalization degrades the concept of citizenship, an important prerequisite for a functioning and stable democracy. Globalization widens the economic gap between the North and the South.
Lindblom (1977), Held (1991), Diamond (1995), Gill (1995), Jones (1995), Gray (1996), Schmitter (1996), Cox (1997), Cammack (1998) Drucker (1994), Muller (1995), Beck (1996), Bryan and Farrel (1996), Cox (1996), Moran (1996), Marquand (1997), Martin and Schumann (1997), Rodrik (1997), Longworth (1998) Im (1987), MacDonald (1991), Diamond (1992a, 1999), O’Donnell (1994), Trent (1994), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Cammack (1998)
Robertson (1992), Dahl (1994), Im (1996)
Gill (1995), Im (1996), Martin and Schumann (1997)
O’Donnell (1993), Whitehead (1993), Im (1996), Sassen (1996), Cox (1997), Boron (1998) Wallerstein (1974), Bollen (1983), Tarkowski (1989), Przeworski (1991), Gill (1995), Amin (1996), Cox (1996), Im (1996), Kummell (1998)
investors and firms, who may not act in the best interest of, or be held accountable to, the voters. It follows that the level of democracy declines.11 According to a second argument, globalization produces more domestic losers than winners, at least in the short run, and it also diminishes the 11
See Lindblom (1977); Held (1991), Diamond (1995), Gill (1995), Jones (1995), Gray (1996), Cox (1996), Schmitter (1996), and Cammack (1998).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
ability of the state to compensate the losers financially. Domestic producers that cannot compete internationally lose from more economic openness. Trade and financial liberalization also limit the ability of governments to deploy regulation and risk-sharing policies that can redistribute income from winners to losers. Governments that want to compensate the victims of economic openness confront the phenomenon of footloose capital, which in turn shrinks the tax base and penalizes deficit spending. Consequently, governments reduce the scope of welfare programs, and the poor increasingly feel this pinch. The result is rising income inequality and class polarization, which serve to weaken democracy.12 A third view argues that globalization enables the fast movement of money between countries, resulting in frequent balance-of-payment crises and unstable domestic economic performance. In such situations, the less developed countries (LDCs) are compelled to accept economic reforms imposed by the developed countries (DCs) and international organizations, and those reforms typically involve austerity measures. Economic crises hurt the poor more than the rich, raising domestic income inequality. Social unrest then rises, and support for radical opposition groups grows. In an attempt to reassert power, weak democracies resort to authoritarian measures. The electoral technicalities are seemingly retained, but civil rights and the inputs from the elected legislators are increasingly ignored.13 According to a fourth argument, globalization deepens ethnic and class cleavages and diminishes the national-cultural basis of democracy. The losers from economic openness tend to seek a united identity based on ethnicity or religion. The winners may promote discriminatory measures to maintain their edge over the losers. Globalization also induces labor migration across countries. The old comers typically attempt to restrict or eliminate the participation of the immigrants in the political system to reduce their competitiveness. All these actions intensify social cleavages and undermine the consolidation of democracy.14 A fifth argument is that globalization enables the state and the multinational corporations (MNCs) to control and manipulate information supplied to the public. With the help of new information technologies, the state and the MNCs feed to the public processed information that represents 12 13 14
See Drucker (1994), Muller (1995), Beck (1996), Cox (1996), Moran (1996), Marquand (1997), Martin and Schumann (1997), Rodrik (1997), Longworth (1998), and Dailami (2000). See Im (1987), Diamond (1992a, 1999), MacDonald (1991), O’Donnell (1994), Trent (1994), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), and Cammack (1998). See Robertson (1992), Dahl (1994), and Im (1996).
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only certain views. They are also better able to tightly monitor the people’s information sources. The result is a disconnection between the way government decisions are made and the way the public thinks they are made. The government becomes less transparent and less accountable to the people, and the level of democracy declines.15 According to a sixth argument, globalization degrades the concept of citizenship, which is an important prerequisite for a functioning and stable democracy. The global market transforms the individual into a common “Homo economicus” who cares more about profits than public and civic commitments. Individuals pursue their own economic interests, disregarding whether governments practice democratic decision making. Since the public has less interest in the conduct and content of public policy, democracy gradually weakens.16 A seventh argument is that globalization widens the economic gap between the North and the South. Globalization involves mostly DCs, draining capital, technology, and skilled labor from LDCs. With the gap in wealth rising, social unrest increases in LDCs, their elites cling to power, and their governments become less democratic. The dependency story evolves along similar lines. In a world composed of a rich core and a poor periphery, the core dominates the periphery. The elite in the periphery unite with the elite in the core to exploit the masses in the periphery. MNCs relocate to LDCs to enjoy both lower wages and more lax labor and environmental standards and then repatriate profits to the core. The penetration by MNCs distorts the economies in LDCs and sways domestic politics in their own favor, all of which obstruct democracy.17
Globalization Does Not Necessarily Affect Democracy Table 2.3 shows three arguments that question whether globalization has any general effect on democracy. The first argument holds that the extent of globalization is greatly exaggerated. The world economy is not as integrated as is commonly believed. Most international trade takes place within geographical regions, MNCs typically have a home-country bias, and most FDI concentrate in a few advanced countries. Because LDCs generally do not participate in the global economy, the effect of economic openness on 15 16 17
See Gill (1995), Im (1996), and Martin and Schumann (1997). O’Donnell (1993), Im (1996), Sassen (1996), Whitehead (1996), Cox (1997), and Boron (1998). See Wallerstein (1974), Tarkowski (1989), Przeworski (1991), Gill (1995), Amin (1996), Cox (1995), Im (1996), and Kummell (1998).
34
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 2.3. Globalization does not necessarily affect democracy
Number
Arguments
1
The extent of globalization is exaggerated.
2
Globalization does not render the welfare state powerless.
3
Effects of globalization on countries vary.
Discussed in Scharpf (1991), Jones (1995), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Wade (1996), Hirst (1997) Vernon (1971), Kurzer (1993), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Garrett (1999) Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Milner and Keohane (1996), Armijo (1998), Longworth (1998)
their democracy should not be large to begin with. Because DCs are already stable democracies, globalization does not affect their levels of democracy.18 A second argument asserts that globalization does not necessarily render the welfare state powerless. Increased national economic openness originates from the deliberate choices of states. Governments still exert considerable control over their own economies. Moreover, the modern welfare state is still effective because it provides important collective goods undersupplied by markets (e.g., social stability, property rights, infrastructure) and compensates the losers of economic openness. By implication, one can argue that the level of democracy does not necessarily have to decline with economic openness.19 According to a third view, the effects of globalization vary across countries and depend on government policies, a country’s location in the global pecking order, the domestic political institutions, the identity of the domestic winners and losers, whether economic sectors are privatized or not, and the current level of democracy. For example, though globalization-induced economic crises may force the authoritarian regime to exit and be replaced by democracy, these crises, if managed effectively, may instead increase the public support for the authoritarian leader. Hence, the effects of globalization on democracy may not be uniform.20 The arguments summarized in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 all appear to exhibit face validity in terms of logic consistency, and it is not possible to evaluate 18 19 20
See Scharpf (1991), Jones (1995), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Wade (1996), and Hirst (1997). See Frieden and Rogowski (1996) and Garrett (1999). See Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Milner and Keohane (1996), Armijo (1998), and Longworth (1998).
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them based on pure theoretical considerations. In other words, because these arguments reach conflicting conclusions, they need to be evaluated empirically, to which we turn next. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues. Next, the section presents the key results of the empirical analysis. The discussion in this section is self-contained and does not require any specific statistical expertise. Interested readers seeking further details should consult the chapter’s appendix, which discusses various technical issues related to the statistical design and implementation of the regression-based model presented here. The chapter appendix follows the same structure of presentation as in this section.
Empirical Model To assess the competing claims about the effects of globalization on democracy, we specify and estimate the following statistical model of democracy. We denote variables with uppercase letters and their coefficients with Greek notations. Each coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable – the phenomenon we seek to explain. The notation εt denotes the random error that is not explained by the statistical model. The variable subscripts t and t −1 indicate the time period of the variable, where t represents the current period and t −1 the previous time period (a lagged variable). To simplify the presentation, we refer to the variables without their time subscripts t or t −1. The model specification is based on the preceding theoretical discussions and the literature on democratization. It provides a structure for us to guide the statistically uninitiated readers through the empirical exercise. democracyt = 0 + 1 tradet−1 + 2 fdit−1 + 3 portfoliot−1 + 4 diffusiont−1 + 5 inflationt−1 + 6 growtht−1 + 7 developmentt−1 + 8 prior democracyt−1 + 9 year + 10 year∗ fdit−1 + 11 year∗ portfoliot−1 + 12 year∗ inflationt−1 +13 year∗ developmentt−1 +εt . (2.1) In the model, democracy denotes the left-hand-side variable or the dependent variable (the phenomenon we explain), whose determinants are
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
specified on the right-hand side of the equation and dubbed the independent variables. The democracy variable represents the level of democracy in a country in a given year. The level of democracy can be measured quantitatively over a continuum of national attributes ranging from complete autocracy or dictatorship at one end of the continuum to full democracy at the other end of the continuum. The measure construction, described in the appendix, includes both democratic and autocratic characteristics, an approach widely used in the literature. The independent variables divide into two types. One type involves the globalization-related variables, which stand at the center of our study. A second type of independent variable involves other determinants of democracy that have been identified in various other studies. We call the second type of factor control variables. Here we discuss briefly the measurement of these variables. We start with how to measure the notion of globalization. As a multidimensional concept, the integration of states into the world economy needs to be measured from multiple indicators. In our empirical model, globalization is measured by four indicators: trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and diffusion of democratic ideas across countries. The trade variable is a measure of trade openness – the extent to which a country depends on trade with other countries. The fdi variable is a measure of the openness of a country to foreign production capital flowing into a country, which refers to investments that enter a country for the purpose of building plants or acquiring management positions in plants. The portfolio variable is a measure of the openness of a country to financial capital flowing into a country, meaning portfolio investments that enter for the purpose of buying financial securities. The diffusion variable represents the diffusion of democratic ideas into a country, which is measured here by the extent to which a country is affected by democratic ideologies emanating from neighboring countries. Our study is one of the first attempts to assess the effects of globalization on democracy by using multiple indicators in one empirical statistical analysis. Because globalization produces competing effects on democracy through many mechanisms, these globalization indicators help estimate the short-run net effects. Obviously, democracy does not only depend on a country’s economic openness. Control variables must be included to avoid spurious statistical inferences. Although existing studies of the causes of democracy differ when identifying these additional determinants, many studies find that domestic economic factors such as economic development, economic growth,
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and inflation influence democracy.21 The inflation variable measures the yearly rise in price level in a country. The development variable measures the level of economic development in a country and is based on the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is the value of final goods and services produced in a country divided by the country’s population. The growth variable is the yearly growth rate of GDP, which captures the vitality and improvement of economic performance over time in a country. The prior democracy variable denotes the level of democracy in a country in the previous year. This variable controls for the fact that political regimes tend to have inertia and change slowing over time. Theoretically, domestic structural variables (e.g., Protestant population, institutional qualities of the regime, and party fragmentation) and the attributes of the international system may also affect democracy. These additional factors are relatively stable over time, implying that democracy exhibits inertia over time or that the past level of democracy affects the present. The year variable is a yearly counter that serves two functions. By itself, year tests whether the level of democracy has a linear trend, and it also interacts with other variables that have time-varying effects over democracy. It is possible that the effects of economic globalization on the level of democracy at home may change over time. For example, the scope and types of FDI, financial capital investments, and information flows took on a relatively more prominent role in the 1990s than in the 1970s. This change is not unique to the globalization variables. Gasiorowski, for example, finds that the effect of inflation on the likelihood of democratization changes over time. Ignoring this issue altogether may lead to model misspecification. In our exploratory by-decade analysis of which variables have time-varying effects on democracy (presented in Table 2.A1 of the appendix), we find that the effects of development, fdi, portfolio, and inflation on the level of democracy in a country change their signs over time. Hence, our statistical model includes interaction terms between year and these four variables, respectively.
Research Design Issues To implement our statistical model, several design issues must be raised that require some clarification. Although we address the technical details 21
For the three economic variables, see Bollen (1979), Muller (1988), Lipset et al. (1993), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Helliwell (1994), Muller and Seligson (1994),Gasiorowski (1995), Muller (1995), and Feng (1997).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
of these issues in the appendix, here we provide a brief overview for the general reader. First, the variable εt is the so-called error term in the statistical model, that is, the part of the variations in democracy the model does not explain. For statistical inferences to be valid, the error term needs to satisfy some assumptions. If the error term does not have several desirable properties, the accuracy of the results and our ability to make correct inferences is compromised. We address the related assumption violations using appropriate econometric techniques. Second, the relationship between democracy and other variables on the right-hand side may be reciprocal or simultaneous. For example, whereas economic integration variables may affect democracy, they themselves may be affected by democracy. A higher level of democracy may imply lower political risks and more secure property rights, attracting trade and investments (Olson, 1993). Ignoring this possibility can produce incorrect results. We deal with this risk by using the first lag of the right-hand-side variables, as denoted by the subscript t −1 in the model. The third issue concerns sample selection. We take the approach of largeN studies, employing a sample for many countries, where each country is represented by yearly data. More specifically, our sample includes 127 countries from 1970 to 1996. The unit of analysis is the country year. Such a sample design allows us to assess the effect of globalization on democracy over time and across countries and to generalize the inferred results across cases. A fourth issue concerns a complication in sample selection, which has to do with a possible distinction between DCs and LDCs. Most DCs have already achieved high levels of democracy at the beginning of the sample period. On the other hand, many LDCs experienced large variations in their levels of democracy from 1970 to 1996. Although the effects of globalization on the level of democracy may be independent of the development level of a country, it is equally possible that LDCs exhibit patterns in the effects of globalization on democracy distinct from those of DCs. In fact, several authors argue that the adverse effects of globalization on democracy may be stronger in DCs than in LDCs. We investigate this possibility by analyzing the effects of globalization for all countries and then for a sample that excludes DCs as measured by membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Empirical Findings We present the main results of our analysis in Table 2.4 for two samples. One sample includes all the countries for which we have data, whereas the
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Table 2.4. Effects of economic globalization on democracy
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant Observations Adjusted R2
All countries
Non-OECD countries
−0.0029∗∗∗ (0.0010) 5.1906∗ (3.3016) 4.7240∗∗∗ (1.8888) 0.2437∗∗∗ (0.1058) 0.0599∗∗ (0.0350) 0.0068 (0.0084) 34.2597∗∗∗ (11.5024) 0.9269∗∗∗ (0.0109) 0.1514∗∗∗ (0.0505) −0.0026∗ (0.0017) −0.0024∗∗∗ (0.0009) −0.00003∗∗ (0.000017) −0.0172∗∗∗ (0.0058) −301.8202∗∗∗ (100.2552) 2021 0.93
−0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0011) 5.8359∗ (3.7712) 5.3892∗∗ (2.4406) 0.2922∗∗∗ (0.1219) 0.0537∗ (0.0344) 0.0069 (0.0087) 36.7637∗∗∗ (16.8662) 0.9242∗∗∗ (0.0115) 0.1593∗∗∗ (0.0670) −0.0029∗ (0.0019) −0.0027∗∗ (0.0012) −0.000027∗ (0.000017) −0.0184∗∗ (0.0085) −317.8469∗∗∗ (132.8935) 1640 0.90
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
second sample includes only LDCs. The findings for the so-called control variables are consistent with those in previous studies in the democratization literature. This general pattern provides support for our statistical modeling. To sharpen our presentation, we delegate the discussion of control variables to the chapter appendix and focus on the findings of the globalization variables instead. Beginning with the all-countries sample, as shown in the second column of the table, the effect of a rise in trade (the level of trade openness of
40
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
a country) on democracy (the level of democracy in a country) is found to be negative. The finding for trade is consistent with the well-known tendency of trade to generate economic winners and losers in the short run. Although the overall gain from trade outweighs the cost of trade, the process by which the winners compensate the losers is political and slow, and the endogenous domestic economic adjustment process (e.g., movement of labor from losing to winning sectors) is also relatively slow. As such, trade can generate changes in the distribution of income in the short run, giving rise to the type of processes described in the section on the obstructing effects of globalization on democracy. The effect of a rise in fdi (the openness of a country to FDI inflow) on the level of democracy in that country is positive and statistically significant. However, this positive effect declines over time, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term year∗ fdi. More specifically, the total effect of a rise in fdi on the level of democracy, which is given by (5.1906 − 0.0026∗ year), is 0.055 for 1975, 0.029 for 1985, and 0.001 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of a rise in FDI on the level of democracy in a country is positive, but its size is declining over time. These results suggest that a rise in FDI exerts both positive and negative effects on the level of democracy in a country, as discussed earlier, but the negative effect grows over time. On the positive side, FDI can promote economic growth and technological progress. On the negative side, FDI can raise domestic income inequality. The tendency of FDI to quickly relocate to cheaper production places in other nations and the tendency of MNCs to interfere in host countries’ domestic politics (see “The Globalization– Democracy Controversy,” this chapter) may also account for the negative effect of FDI on democracy. The direct effect of a rise in portfolio (the openness of a country to financial flows) on the level of democracy of a country is also positive. However, once the dependence of this particular effect on time is incorporated, as indicated by the interaction term of year∗ portfolio, the total effect comes out negative. Specifically, the total effect of portfolio investment inflows in the all-countries sample, which is given by (4.7240 − 0.0024∗ year), is −0.016 for 1975, −0.04 for 1985, and −0.066 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of portfolio on democracy is negative and strengthens over time. The results for portfolio suggest that a rise in portfolio investments also has both positive and negative effects on democracy, as discussed earlier in the chapter, but the negative effect grows to become dominant in the all-countries sample. The positive main effect of portfolio investments on democracy may reflect the economic discipline financial markets impose on
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governments, which has contributed to greater transparency, better management practices, and stronger property rights institutions. The negative effect may capture the dramatic increase in the ability of portfolio investments to move quickly among countries, which at times leads to financial collapse and devastating sociopolitical outcomes. An increase in diffusion (the number of democracies in the region around a country) raises the level of democracy in that country. Interpreting this variable as a proxy for information flows induced by integration of a country into the world economy, one may argue that democratic ideas and values are more likely to transmit and diffuse to geographically proximate countries. Indirectly, then, this result does not support the claim discussed earlier in the chapter that the increased information flows into a country would reduce the level of democracy in that country. The spread of democratic ideas from one’s neighboring countries improves, rather than hinders, the country’s own level of democracy. The third column in Table 2.4 shows the estimation results obtained for a sample that includes only LDCs. These results match well with those we reported earlier for the sample of all countries. However, two primary differences in results exist between the two samples. One difference involves the sizes of the direct effects of trade, fdi, portfolio, and diffusion (our measures of globalization) on democracy. The coefficients of these variables appear to be larger in the LDC sample than those obtained in the full sample of all countries. We interpret this outcome as a demonstration that a rise in globalization has a larger effect on democracy in LDCs than in DCs. In a way, this result is intuitive since, in the period covered by our sample, the democracy levels of DCs are stable for the most part and hover at, or close to, the highest possible positive level of the democracy indicator. The democracy levels in LDCs, on the other hand, exhibit much larger variations and are more sensitive to the external influences of globalization. A second difference between the two samples concerns the total effect of portfolio on democracy. As in the all-countries sample, once one incorporates the dependence of the democracy effect of portfolio on time, indicated by the interaction term year∗ portfolio, the total effect (5.3892 − 0.0027∗ year) is 0.0567 for 1975, 0.0297 for 1985, and 0 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of a rise in portfolio on democracy for the LDC sample declines over time, as in the all-countries sample, but it has not yet turned negative in our sample period. We think this result is also intuitive. The direct effect of a rise in portfolio on an average country in the LDC sample is larger than the direct effect on an average country in the all-countries sample (5.8359 vs. 4.724,
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
respectively). A typical LDC gains more from a rise in portfolio investment than a typical country in the all-countries sample in terms of a rise in its level of democracy. Over time, the positive effect of a rise in portfolio is counteracted by a growing negative effect that reflects the overall rise in global capital mobility and increasing volatility of financial markets. The size of this negative component is larger in the LDC sample (−0.0027∗ year) than in the all-countries sample (−0.0024∗ year), but because the direct positive effect is larger in the LDC sample than in the all-countries sample, the overall effect in the LDC sample remains positive. This outcome is consistent with the observation that capital flows into a typical LDC are relatively smaller than those into a typical country in the all-countries sample. As such, the share of the growing negative effect of capital flows over time out of the total effect is smaller in the LDC sample than in the all-countries sample. While we have discussed the signs of the effects of globalization on the level of democracy, the statistical findings also can inform us about the substantive significance of these effects. In evaluating the substantive effect, we assume that trade, fdi, portfolio, or diffusion exhibit certain increases, and then we compute the changes in the level of democracy induced by these variables ceteris paribus. Studies often assume a one-standard-deviation increase for a certain variable, as identified by the estimation sample, and we also employ this approach. Using the coefficient of each variable for the all-countries sample in Table 2.4, we compute the percent change in democracy relative to its sample mean as the baseline. Turning to the size of effect, a one-standard-deviation rise in trade (46.83%) leads to a decline of about 8% in the average level of democracy in the sample (1.72). A one-standard-deviation rise in diffusion (0.79) raises the level of democracy by 6.5% relative to the baseline case. A onestandard-deviation rise in fdi (2.04%) in 1975 raises the level of democracy by 6.5% relative to our baseline, ceteris paribus, whereas a similar rise in fdi in 1996 raises the level of democracy only by 0.12%. A one-standarddeviation rise in portfolio (2.5%) in 1975 reduces the level of democracy by 2.3% relative to the baseline, whereas a similar change in 1996 reduces the level of democracy by about 10%. Therefore, the immediate responses of democracy to changes in globalization do not appear to be large in absolute size; this indicates that the globalization-induced changes in democracy tend to happen slowly over time. What about the long-run dynamic changes in democracy resulting from globalization forces? Indeed, the changes noted earlier in globalization also affect democracy in the next period through their effects on the lagged value of democracy. As detailed in the appendix, we can compute the effect of a
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change in, say, trade on democracy in the long run. On employing those one-standard-deviation changes, the long-term percentage changes in the average democracy level in the sample register a decline by 108% due to trade and a rise by 153% due to diffusion. The long-term effect of fdi change is a rise in the average level of democracy by 89% in 1975 and only 1.6% in 1996. With respect to portfolio, its long-term effect is a decline in the average level of democracy by 32% in 1975 and 131% in 1996. Hence, globalization forces could generate large changes in democratic governance over the long run.
Sensitivity Analyses The robustness of statistical findings is important for establishing empirical regularity, proving the validity of theoretical arguments, and facilitating public policy positions. Do the empirical results reported earlier hold when other possible confounding control variables enter the statistical model, or when other statistical estimation procedures are used? To answer this particular question, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to verify the robustness of the reported results. In one type of sensitivity analysis, we employ different statistical estimators, which are methods to obtain the quantitative effects of variables from historical data. In a second type of sensitivity analysis, we use various measures of democracy based on different types of data. In the third and final type of sensitivity analysis, we add various additional control variables to the model, including income inequality in a country, the level of education in a country, the number of INGOs to which a country belongs, and variables denoting whether a country belongs to periphery or semiperiphery of the world system (yet another indicator of its level of development). The details of these sensitivity analyses and their results are reported in the chapter appendix. We can summarize these additional statistical results by noting that the statistical findings we have reported, both in terms of the effects on democracy of the key globalization variables and the effects on democracy of the original control variables specified in this section, are found to hold under the large majority of the sensitivity analyses. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
In general, the effects of changes in globalization on the level of democracy in a country tend to be small in the short run but could accumulate to large magnitudes over the long run. The effects of FDI, however, tend to dwindle
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
over time. We believe that these results have important implications not only for future research on the determinants of democracy but also for the larger public policy debate about globalization. If maximizing economic efficiency is the only public policy objective, then the negative effects of globalization on democracy do not, and should not, matter. However, if the democratic form of governance is deemed a desirable public policy objective, our empirical findings presented in this chapter suggest a policy dilemma between economic efficiency gains and democratic decline. Our analysis implies that globalization erodes the prospects for democracy. The post-1945 model of embedded liberalism served to sustain democratic governance in DCs with open economies. However, this model cannot be easily implemented in LDCs in the current globalization. The emerging democracies among LDCs lack the financial and managerial resources needed to build social safety nets. As trade liberalization continues, the negative effect of trade on democracy may increase. Similarly, the growing capital mobility accompanying globalization produces a political dilemma for governments who want both economic competitiveness and democratic political accountability. Footloose capital is generally not accountable to the public. Capital mobility reduces the democratic government’s ability to respond to popular demands for social welfare and effective economic management. Our findings imply that under economic openness, the room for policy maneuvering is obviously reduced. Hence, the threats to democracy from financial inflows and FDI are substantial. If the current trend in the effect of globalization on democracy continues, our finding that the increasing number of democracies in a region is associated with greater democracy may reveal a “diabolic” flip side. That is, as trade, FDI, and financial flows become increasingly associated with democratic decline, the number of democracies in a region may also decline, which in turn may contribute to a decrease in the number of democracies. In light of our findings, it is only natural that one may ask the following question: If democracy falls due to trade openness, is openness a mistake, say, for Eastern Europe? Openness may generate economic gains. Countries open up because they seek the gains, or actors poised to gain are able to get their way, but some arguments suggest openness can also reduce democracy, which is what we find for trade. Thus, if both democracy and openness are desirable, countries face a trade-off. We further discuss this trade-off in the context of our larger conceptual picture in Chapter 10. In addition, one should note that our findings apply to the large-N sample, detecting average statistical patterns rather than explaining any particular country or region; Eastern Europe is just part of a larger sample.
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How can one alleviate the negative effects of globalization on democracy? We believe there are basically three possibilities. The first possibility is for there to be one world government, managing one economic system, without any barriers to the flows of goods, financial capital, and other factors of production. The trade-off between efficiency gains and democratic decline can then be effectively managed. But this option is currently impractical. A second possibility is to enhance the socioeconomic policy coordination among governments within the existing international system. For example, concerted tax policies could minimize excessive financial capital volatility in an integrated global financial market. With policy coordination, countries could continue to benefit from the globalizing economy while minimizing the harmful effects on democracy. However, one also notices the weakness of such an option. Historically, international socioeconomic policy coordination was generally unstable. Within the existing international political system, each national government is accountable to its own people. The policy coordination option is difficult to achieve and sustain over time. A third possibility is to slow down the rate of globalization. For example, governments could design tax and subsidy policies to compensate the losers from economic openness, slow down capital movements and reduce excessive volatility, and curtail by law excessive rent-seeking by MNCs. To be successful, this approach would require coordinated market regulation that involves the government, the private sector, and citizen advocacy groups, implying wide consultation with and under close monitoring by the private sector and citizen advocacy groups. The purpose of such coordination is to minimize the reliance on the government alone to design and implement regulation. Governments, particularly in LDCs, often suffer from inefficiency and inflexibility. Relying solely on governments may suffocate the market. Where democratic rules are not well established, as in many LDCs, the notion that only the government can correct market failures may cause excessive government intervention and lower social welfare, and it eventually precipitates a decline in democratic governance. Although this option may yield lower social welfare relative to the first two possibilities, it may be the only practical approach available at present for reducing the negative effects of globalization on democracy. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The theoretical literature presents conflicting expectations of the effect of globalization on democracy. These conflicting expectations are also reflected in the public debate on globalization. In this chapter, we make a systematic empirical effort to assess the controversial effects of globalization on
46
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
democracy. We find that trade openness and portfolio investment inflows exert negative effects on democracy. The negative effect of trade openness on the level of democracy is stable over time, whereas the negative effect of portfolio investment inflow into a country strengthens over time. FDI inflows into a country are conducive to its democratic governance, but the strength of this particular effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas flowing into a country from other countries in its vicinity contributes to increasing the level of democracy in that country persistently over time. These effects are all substantively important, particularly in light of their long-term implications for democracy. These empirical regularities are found to hold for both the all-country sample and LDCs alone. They are also robust across various model specifications, different measures of democracy, and alternative statistical estimators. In sum, the economic aspects of integration into the world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance, which ought to cause concern for both policymakers and academicians. In this chapter, we investigated the effect of aspects of economic openness, or economic globalization, on the level of democracy within countries. The reader may recall that, in our sensitivity analyses, the distribution of income within countries, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was one of the control variables. In the next chapter, we change the focus of our inquiry, making income inequality the main variable of interest. What is the effect of a rise in the level of democracy on the national distribution of income? What is the effect of our measures of economic openness (i.e., trade, FDI, and portfolio flows) on the national distribution of income? Do these forces make the rich richer and the poor poorer, further skewing the income distribution, or do they make the rich poorer and the poor richer, reducing the income gap? Historical observation suggests that these are important questions in that they can have political ramifications, particularly for the stability of the government and civic life. Extremely skewed distributions of income are known to have contributed to the violent revolutions in France in the eighteenth century, Russia in the early twentieth century, and China in the mid-twentieth century. Now it is time for us to step into Chapter 3.
APPENDIX EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This appendix accompanies the section “Empirical Model and Analysis” in the main text. We provide various details on the measurement of our
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variables, their data sources, issues pertaining to the technical design of the statistical model, and the expected effects of various control variables. We also report and discuss the results for the control variables as well as the various additional analyses.
Empirical Model The dependent variable democracy denotes the level of democracy for a country in any given year, based on the POLITY III data (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Gurr and Jaggers, 1999). The widely used POLITY III data register various attributes of regime type on an annual basis for many countries from about 1800 to 1998, using two indices. The 10-point democracy index (DEMOC) measures the democratic characteristics of the regime. The 10point autocracy index (AUTOC) measures the autocratic characteristics of the regime. As pointed out by Oneal and Russett, Londregan and Poole, Mansfield and Snyder, among others, because many governments have both democratic and autocratic characteristics, DEMOC and AUTOC do not provide redundant information about regime type, and both should be used to measure the level of democracy.22 We follow these studies and measure democracy as the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC, generating an index ranging between −10 (for the most autocratic regime) and 10 (for the most democratic regime). Globalization is measured by four indicators: trade openness, FDI inflows, portfolio investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. The three economic variables are collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. The trade variable denotes the yearly level of trade openness for a country. As conventional in the literature, trade is defined as the sum of the value of imports and the value of exports of goods and services of a country with the rest of the world, measured as a percentage of the country’s GDP.23 The fdi variable denotes the yearly value of net inflows of FDI as a percentage of a country’s GDP for each country. FDI involves either the acquisition of a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor or the creation of a new subsidiary of a firm in a foreign country. It is given here as the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long- and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. The portfolio variable denotes the yearly value of net 22 23
See, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a). We also estimated the models using the log of trade/GDP. All the results remain robust.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
inflows of portfolio investments as a percentage of GDP for each country. Portfolio investments (excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves) cover transactions in equity securities (the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors) and debt securities (publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt from privately placed bonds). The measure of the spread of democratic ideas is coded using POLITY III data; diffusion denotes the yearly number of democracies within a region around each country. The regions include Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and North and South America. We define a country as democratic if the difference between its DEMOC and AUTOC scores is greater than or equal to six (as in, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Russett, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Like Starr (1991) and Gasiorowski (1995), we assume that the type of political regime in a country is more likely to be affected by the type of political regime of its neighboring countries than by more distant countries. In general, the diffusion of democratic norms is said to work through contact-based mechanisms, which involve information flows, contact in the marketplace, communication networks, tourism, and so forth. Geographically proximate countries typically have more contact. Hence, in our context, diffusion may be thought of as a proxy for information and communication flows of democratic ideas among countries. It should be noted that we compute the correlation between a yearly measure of the number of main phone lines and television sets for each country and diffusion. The correlation (r = 0.45) is statistically significant at the 1% level. We do not include this measure as an independent variable because it is highly collinear (r = 0.8) with GDP per capita in the model. Hence, it is possible to argue that GDP per capita also serves as a proxy of the communication aspect of national integration into the world economy. Moving to the economic control variables, inflation denotes the yearly growth rate of the GDP deflator, which is the ratio of nominal GDP (measured in current prices) to real GDP (measured in constant prices). Several studies use inflation as a proxy of economic crisis, the effect of which on democracy is debated. Some studies argue the effect is positive, whereas others argue the effect is negative (Huntington, 1991; Gasiorowski, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Drake, 1998). The development variable denotes the logged yearly GDP per capita in purchasing power parity– adjusted real international prices. As discussed at length in this chapter, many statistical studies of the determinants of democracy use this variable as an indicator of the level of economic development, either as a central
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variable or as a control variable.24 The growth variable denotes the annual percentage growth rate of real GDP.
Research Design Issues Several empirical design issues influence our model specification and estimation in this chapter. First, in the main text, we note that, to control for the effect of inertia, we include the lagged dependent variable (the level of democracy) as an independent variable, a strategy also adopted in other studies.25 In addition to the theoretical reason, this lagged variable helps capture the effects of variables not present in the model. “With such a pervasive control in place, it is more difficult for spurious effects to be reported” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 905). It is worth noting that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable might soak up the variations in the dependent variable that could be explained by other independent variables, making it harder for us to find statistically significant results. Hence, our approach can be described as conservative. Second, to address the possibility that the effects of some of the determinants of democracy may change over time, we use the systematically varying parameter approach (Judge et al., 1988: 435; Griffiths et al., 1993: 421). To determine which variables have a time-varying effect, we first estimate a pooled time-series cross-sectional model for each decade (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). The decade selection has no particular theoretical justification, but the results provide a general sense about the temporal stability of the effects on democracy. Variables whose parameters exhibit reversals of signs across those pooled decades are suspected to have time-varying effects on democracy. Interaction terms between these variables and a calendar year variable are created and included in the model.26 Third, the error term in the model faces the risks of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The estimated coefficients are still consistent with heteroskedastic variance and serial correlation in the error term, but their standard errors are not efficient and are most likely biased. To deal with this problem, we estimate our statistical model using a variant of the White estimator of robust standard errors, which adjusts for clustering over country 24 25 26
In addition to sources cited in Chapter 2, see, e.g., Rueschemeyer (1991), Diamond (1992a), Gasiorowski (1995), and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). See, e.g., Bollen (1979), Muller (1988), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), and Muller and Seligson (1994). Gasiorowski (1995) employs such an interactive model to examine the time-varying effects of inflation on democratization.
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(White, 1980). This estimator yields consistent estimation of the covariance matrix under very general conditions of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). In addition, as Beck and Katz suggest, the lagged dependent variable models the temporal dynamics and also helps to address serial correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b). Fourth, consider the design issue for resolving the simultaneity bias. Ignoring the possible effect of democracy (the dependent variable in this chapter) on the right-hand-side variables in the model (globalizationrelated and others) implies the risk of simultaneity bias, which generates misleading estimated coefficients. The ideal solution to this problem is to estimate a fully specified simultaneous equations system, endogenizing democracy, trade, FDI, portfolio investment, and information flows. At the current stage of our knowledge of how these forces interact, it is not feasible to specify such a system of equations. In contrast, many studies deal with this problem by lagging the independent variables one period, which in our case amounts to one year (e.g., Muller and Seligson, 1994; Oneal and Russett, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Though this is not an optimal solution to the issue of simultaneity, we follow the same approach here. Fifth, we need to consider which statistical significance level to use when we interpret the results. In evaluating the effect of globalization on democracy, we have discussed three types of theories. One type expects that globalization will promote democracy, the other type expects the opposite, and the third type expects no effect at all. As we noted, the three types of theory appear logically consistent, given their own assumptions, regarding the effect of globalization forces on democracy. The empirical model can only identify the net effect of globalization on democracy. We therefore only test the sign of this net effect on democracy against the null hypothesis of no effect – or rather the two competing effects of globalization on democracy are equal in size – employing the one-tailed test in reporting the results. Many other studies have employed this approach (see, e.g., Morrow et al., 1998; Oneal and Russett, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Li and Reuveny, 2003; Reuveny and Li, 2003). Sixth, there is the issue of what thresholds to use for statistical significance. In interpreting the results, we employ 1, 5, and 10% significance levels. We take this approach for a couple of reasons. Some of our samples are relatively small because of limitations on data availability. In addition, the lagged dependent variable in the model soaks up the variations in the dependent variable to be explained by other explanatory variables, making it difficult to find significant effects. Seventh, we need to measure the size of globalization’s effect on democracy. In the text, we discuss not only the direct effect of the globalization
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variable but also the long-run effect through the lagged dependent variable. For the long-run effect, the impact of a globalization variable on the level of democracy from previous periods is absorbed into the effect of the lagged democracy variable, which is also on the right-hand side. The globalization variable affects the current level of democracy via the direct effect and continues to affect the level of democracy in the next period via the lagged democracy variable (Londregan and Poole, 1996). The long-run impact of a change in a globalization variable produces the following change in the level of democracy in a country: [coefficient of globalization variable/ (1–coefficient of lagged democracy)] ∗ (change in globalization variable). We compute the long-run effects for all our globalization variables. Finally, one may question in particular why we measure the impact of FDI by its flow rather than by stock. As noted, FDI flows may affect democracy, and FDI flows through many mechanisms and generates competing effects on democracy. The goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the immediate net effect of FDI flows on democracy. This measurement requires the use of FDI inflows (incurring during a year) because the stock variable, cumulated over time since the beginning of FDI, conflates the short- and long-run effects of FDI. As explained earlier, we estimate the long-run impact of FDI through the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model. In addition, the FDI stock data are statistically problematic. Whereas flows are reported by national governments to the IMF, stock data, which are only available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), are often estimated and involve large measurement errors. Stock data sum FDI flows and reinvestment earnings since the start of FDI. Reinvestment earning data are often missing, generating measurement errors that continue in the stock data in future years. In contrast, the effect of such measurement error in the flow data is limited to the year of the missing data. Moreover, the initial baseline stock of FDI in a country is often unknown for sure, and the year UNCTAD uses as the start of stock accumulation is the year in which a country began to report flows, not necessarily the year when FDI first entered a country. This generates another type of measurement error. Due to these errors, the stock data are not appropriate for cross-national comparisons.
Empirical Findings Table 2.4 presents the results for all countries from 1970 to 1996 in the first column and for the non-OECD countries in the second column. The adjusted R2 for both models are 0.93 and 0.90, respectively, indicating that the models explain most of the observed variations in democracy.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
All the interaction terms are statistically significant, as are all the main effects of the variables for which an interaction was included. Another general observation is that all the globalization-related variables are also statistically significant. In fact, except for economic growth, all the effects are statistically significant, which supports our model specification. Because we have discussed the results for the globalization variables in detail, here we focus on the control variables. In terms of the specific results of the control variables in column 1, prior democracy has a positive and statistically significant effect on current democracy. Other studies that include this variable report similar results, illustrating that democracy as a social phenomenon tends to have inertia. As Przeworski et al. (1996) argue, it almost seems tautological to argue that the current level of democracy rises when the past level of democracy rose. However, this result has an important substantive implication. One simply cannot expect to find a higher level of democracy by strengthening dictatorship or authoritarianism ceteris paribus. If the level of democracy fell in the past, one should expect to find a lower level of democracy in the future. Therefore, international interactions that strengthen an authoritarian regime are likely to hinder the movement toward democracy in that country in the near future. Similarly, reforms toward a higher level of democracy tend to accumulate over time, leading to democratic consolidation. The effect of inflation is statistically significant and positive, but its interaction term year∗ inflation is significant and negative. The total effect of inflation on the level of democracy is positive and was the largest in the 1980s; economic growth has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significant. As in many studies, economic development has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of democracy. The interaction term year∗ economic development is statistically significant but negative, suggesting that its effect weakens over time. The calendar year variable year is statistically significant and positive, indicating in this sample a partial tendency for democracy to grow over time. The results regarding the domestic economic effects on democracy replicate the spirit of previous studies, which supports our model. To further investigate the robustness of the results, we estimated the model for a sample of only non-OECD countries. Compared with the results for all countries in column 1, the adjusted R2 for the non-OECD countries in column 2 is a bit lower because of the smaller sample size and reduced variation in the independent variables. However, the signs and statistical significance levels for all the variables in column 2 match well with those in column 1,
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indicating that the results in column 1 are not an artifact of the inclusion of the OECD countries in the sample. We also estimate the models in Table 2.4 by excluding the lagged dependent variable. Although the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable usually makes other independent variables insignificant, its exclusion from our model actually renders the results statistically less significant in both samples. This suggests that we did not get null results in Table 2.A2 because of the lagged dependent variable. These results are available from the authors upon request. Now, as noted, to identify which variables have varying effects on democracy over time, we first estimate pooled time-series cross-sectional models for each decade for all countries and for LDCs. We report those results in Table 2.A1. The effect of trade on democracy is always negative and statistically significant, and the effect of diffusion is always positive and statistically significant in four out of six cases. The effect of prior democracy is always positive and statistically significant. The effect of economic growth is positive but statistically insignificant in all cases (except for the case of all countries from 1970 to 1979). Because the signs of these four variables are consistent across decades, we include them in the model as main effects only. The signs of economic development, fdi, portfolio, and inflation change over decades. Hence, they enter the model both individually and as interactive terms with year. For the overlapping variables (inflation, economic growth, economic development, trade openness), the results generally agree with those reported by Gasiorowski (1995), although his dependent variable measures the event of democratization (a 1, 0 variable), whereas our dependent variable measures the level of democracy. Overall, these results provide justification for why we specify the interactive model as such in the main text.
Additional Analyses Model specification, the measures of democracy, and the estimation techniques vary across statistical studies of democracy. To investigate the effects of these variations in our case, we conduct various sensitivity analyses. Specifically, we add new control variables, use Freedom House data to measure democracy, and apply different estimators. The results are presented in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3. Overall, the effects of globalization on democracy reported in Table 2.4 are replicated across the 25 experiments reported in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3. Therefore, we judge our results to be robust. Later we discuss Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 in detail. The results for the original control
54
−0.0042∗∗ (0.0022) 0.0141 (0.0178) 0.0031 (0.0183) 0.6034∗∗ (0.2662) −0.0031 (0.0028) −0.0019 (0.0153) 0.1098 (0.1143) 0.9253∗∗∗ (0.0237) −1.4142 (1.0956) 353 0.93
−0.0021∗ (0.0014) −0.0357 (0.0340) −0.0211 (0.0196) 0.1501 (0.1559) 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0067 (0.0122) 0.4081∗∗∗ (0.0999) 0.9253∗∗∗ (0.0161) −3.0927∗∗∗ (0.8233) 948 0.94
−0.0041∗∗ (0.0021) −0.0188 (0.0391) 0.0021 (0.0069) 0.2251∗ (0.1445) −0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0115 (0.0156) −0.0820 (0.0797) 0.9202∗∗∗ (0.0226) 1.0082 (0.7240) 720 0.90
−0.0049∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0110 (0.0192) −0.0118 (0.0216) 0.9548∗∗∗ (0.3172) −0.0045∗ (0.0029) 0.0012 (0.0165) 0.1523 (0.1509) 0.9141∗∗∗ (0.0244) −2.2999 (1.3985) 273 0.89
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Observations Adjusted R2
Constant
PRIOR DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPMENT
GROWTH
INFLATION
DIFFUSION
PORTFOLIO
FDI
TRADE
−0.0029∗∗ (0.0016) −0.0426 (0.0385) −0.0247 (0.0210) 0.1981 (0.1777) 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0071 (0.0125) 0.5352∗∗∗ (0.1199) 0.9290∗∗∗ (0.0170) −4.0277∗∗∗ (0.9187) 772 0.91
−0.0032∗ (0.0024) −0.0200 (0.0424) 0.0092 (0.0093) 0.2378∗ (0.1617) −0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0127 (0.0160) −0.1938∗∗ (0.1120) 0.9170∗∗∗ (0.0238) 1.7565∗ (0.9460) 595 0.88
ALL (1970–1979) ALL (1980–1989) ALL (1990–1996) LDC (1970–1979) LDC (1980–1989) LDC (1990–1996)
Table 2.A1. Pooled time-series cross-sectional models of democracy by decade
55 −0.0012 8.0087∗∗ 5.7176∗∗ 0.3073∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗ −0.0029∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
−0.0018∗∗ 6.2954∗∗ 4.5246∗∗∗ 0.2576∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
1568 0.90
Model 10 LDC
Model 9 ALL
1949 0.93
1640 0.90
2021 0.93
−0.0033∗∗∗ 6.3762∗∗ 4.9084∗∗ 0.2971∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0025∗∗ −0.9099∗
−0.0028∗∗∗ 5.4310∗ 4.1119∗∗ 0.2369∗∗ −0.0027∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.6336∗
0.0148 −0.7589∗∗ −0.5427∗∗ −0.1591 1879 0.93
−0.0016∗∗ 6.8347∗∗ 3.9381∗∗∗ 0.1345 −0.0035∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗
Model 11 ALL
0.1417 1662 0.93
−0.0025∗∗∗ 5.5593∗ 2.7475 0.3141∗∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0014
Model 3 ALL
Model 5 ALL
Model 13 ALL
1826 0.93
0.0170∗∗ −0.0046
1705 0.94
−0.0035 −0.0117
Freedom House Data −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0006 4.8632∗ 5.8462∗∗ 5.1121∗∗∗ 2.3640∗ 0.2902∗∗∗ 0.1151∗∗∗ −0.0025∗ −0.0030∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0012∗
Model 12 ALL
POLITY III data −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ 5.7162 5.6112∗ 3.6058 2.6123 0.3915∗∗∗ 0.3124∗∗∗ −0.0029 −0.0028∗ −0.0018 −0.0013 −0.1091 0.1137 0.1343 1281 1662 0.91 0.93
Model 4 LDC
1784 0.94
−0.0007∗ 4.3957∗ 2.4035∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0012∗∗
Model 14 ALL
−0.0027∗∗ 6.1508∗ 3.1767 0.3928∗∗∗ −0.0031∗ −0.0016 −0.3664 0.0879 1281 0.91
Model 6 LDC
1421 0.90
−0.0007∗ 5.3203∗ 1.6529 0.1209∗∗∗ −0.0027∗ −0.0008
Model 15 LDC
−0.0023∗∗∗ 8.4656∗∗ 5.6914 0.2844∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ −0.0029 0.0950 0.2889∗∗∗ 1783 0.93
Model 7 ALL −0.0025∗∗ 10.5950∗∗ 3.4633 0.3558∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗ −0.0017 −0.2263 0.2457∗∗ 1353 0.91
Model 8 LDC
Note: ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. Other independent variables not reported to save space. Models 5 and 6 include while Models 7 and 8 exclude economic development and its interaction term.
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO INGOS SEMIPERIPHERY∗ DEVELOPMENT PERIPHERY∗ DEVELOPMENT EUROPE MIDDLE EAST AFRICA ASIA N Adjusted R2
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO GINI EDUCATION N Adjusted R 2
Model 2 LDC
Model 1 ALL
Table 2.A2. OLS estimates with additional control variables or Freedom House data
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
variables from the models in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 are broadly consistent with Table 2.4. Therefore, we do not discuss these results again in this subsection. Table 2.A2 reports the results from 15 experiments, denoted Model 1 through Model 15, which investigated the effects of adding new control variables and/or using a different measure of democracy. In Models 1–12, democracy is measured based on POLITY III data as in Table 2.4 whereas in Models 13–15, democracy is based on Freedom House data. As for the new control variables, gini denotes the level of national income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. The variable education denotes the level of national education measured by the average number of years of education in the population. For gini and education, we use the same data and variable transformation as in Feng and Zak (1999). The variable gini comes from the high-quality data from Deininger and Squire (1996). We log and lag the raw data. The missing values of gini are filled with predictions from estimating gini as a function of GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, and regional dummies. The variable education comes from Barro and Lee (2000) and is also logged and lagged. The variable ingos denotes the number of INGOs to which individuals or organizations from each country belonged in a given year. The data on INGOs come from Boli and Thomas (1999). The two dummy variables semiperiphery and periphery denote whether a country belongs to the world-system semiperiphery or periphery, respectively. In the model, they interact with economic development as in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994). Similar to this study, we have also estimated the models using only semiperiphery and periphery dummies by themselves and found similar results; europe, middle east, africa, and asia are dummy variables that denote the geographical region of a country. Across Models 1–12 in Table 2.A2, the effect of trade is significant in 11 out of 12 cases and is always negative. The main effect of fdi is significant in 11 cases and is always positive. The interaction effect of fdi is significant in 11 cases and is always negative. The effect of diffusion is significant in 11 cases and is always positive. The main effect of portfolio is significant in 6 cases and is always positive. The interaction effect of this variable is significant in 6 cases and is always negative. These results strongly support those in Table 2.A2. Regarding the dependent variable, although we measure democracy based on the POLITY III data, some scholars employ the Freedom House data (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Diamond, 1999). It is worth noting that some scholars point out that the Freedom House data are not suitable for a pooled time-series analysis because the data are not fully comparable
57
∗
significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
−0.0030∗∗∗ 5.183∗ 4.652∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.024 0.004 41.139∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.003∗ −0.002∗ −0.021∗∗ −340.864∗∗ 1640 0.91
−0.000005 11.075∗∗ −1.311 0.185 0.006 0.003 24.572 0.792∗∗∗ 0.186∗ −0.000003 −0.006∗∗ 0.001 −0.013 −368.001∗ 1640 0.91
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant N Adjusted R2
Note:
−0.0027∗∗∗ 4.786∗ 3.545∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.039 0.005 36.566∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ −0.00002 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −312.65∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
0.0004 8.796∗∗ 0.515 0.197 0.006 0.004 45.851∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ −0.000003 −0.004∗∗ −0.0003 −0.023∗∗∗ −517.172∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
Fixed effects (year)
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant N Adjusted R2
Fixed effects (country) −0.0029∗∗∗ 5.191∗ 4.724 0.244∗∗∗ 0.060 0.007 34.260∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.017∗∗ −301.820∗∗ 2021 0.93 −0.0032∗∗∗ 5.836∗ 5.389 0.292∗∗∗ 0.054 0.007 36.764∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.159∗ −0.00003 −0.003∗ −0.003 −0.018∗ −317.847∗ 1640 0.90
LDCs −0.0032∗∗∗ 5.836 5.389 0.292∗∗∗ 0.054 0.007 36.764∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.018∗∗ −317.847∗∗ 1640 0.90
OLS and PCSE
All countries −0.0030∗∗∗ 5.196 4.724 0.244∗∗∗ 0.060 0.007 34.290∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.017∗∗∗ −302.064∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
Random effects
Table 2.A3. Parameter estimates from alternative estimators
−0.0029∗∗∗ 5.536∗ 5.882∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.007 35.577∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −306.119∗∗∗ 1640
−0.0027∗∗∗ 4.903∗ 4.704∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.007 32.634∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −288.835∗∗∗ 2021
GEE
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across years due to changes in methodology and scale (Gates, 2002).27 We use these data here because they offer a new take on qualities of democracies, despite their limitations. POLITY III data emphasize constraints on executive political recruitment, contestation, and functioning. Based on the Freedom House data, Diamond (1999) argues that in recent years some countries have become pseudodemocracies, where the rights of contestation are protected but civil rights are precarious. In addition to institutional aspects directly measured in POLITY III, Freedom House data capture aspects that are only indirectly implied in POLITY III, such as the de facto power of the opposition, freedom from foreign domination, minority rights, freedom of expression and belief, association rights, rule of law, human rights, and personal economic rights. Unlike POLITY III, Freedom House data are available only from 1973 onward. In their overlapping period, the cross-correlation between the two data sets is relatively high: 0.88 from a sample of all countries and 0.83 from a sample of LDCs. Indeed, the inferences from the Freedom House– based models in Table 2.A2 do not differ much from the inferences from the POLITY III–based models in Table 2.4. Like Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), we sum the two 7-point scales of “political rights” and “civil liberties” in Freedom House. This procedure gives an index ranging from 2 (lowest democracy) to 14 (highest democracy). We also recompute diffusion and prior democracy based on this score. Across Models 13–15, the effect of trade is always negative and statistically significant in two cases. The effect of diffusion is always positive and significant. The positive effect of fdi and the negative effect of its interaction term are always significant. The positive effect of portfolio and the negative effect of its interaction term are significant in two cases. Compared with Table 2.4, the results for Models 14 and 15, based on the Freedom House data, are weaker in terms of statistical significance for portfolio investments. We believe this is because Freedom House also measures civil rights and democratic norms that take a relatively long time to develop. The Freedom House index typically lags behind the POLITY III index and has a smaller variance.28 Because the Freedom House index varies less, the results are less significant. Furthermore, because portfolio 27 28
For additional issues on the measurement of democracy, see Bollen (1991). For example, for Bulgaria, the POLITY score rose from −7 in 1989 to +8 in 1991, a 75% increase (within a range of 20 from −10 to +10), whereas the Freedom House score rose from 2 in 1989 to 9 in 1991, a 53% increase (within a range of 13 from 2 to 14). For another example, for Russia over the same time frame, the POLITY score rose from −4 to +6, a 50% increase, while its Freedom House score rose from 5 to 7, a 15% increase.
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investments in LDCs are small and concentrated in the elite, their effect can be large in terms of constraints on the executive, which is the focus of POLITY III, but is likely to be smaller in terms of the civil rights, which is captured by the Freedom House. Table 2.A3 presents results for five estimators: country fixed effects, year fixed effects, random effects, OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), and general estimating equation (GEE) model. The country fixedeffects estimator assumes that the intercept term varies across panels, the year fixed-effects estimator assumes that the intercept term varies across years, and the random effects estimator assumes that the error term varies across panels. The PCSE method assumes that the variance of the error term is heteroskedastic across panels and homoskedastic within panels (Beck and Katz, 1995b). GEE is a population average–based estimator that is frequently used for panel data (Liang and Zeger, 1986). All models, including those in Table 2.4, have roughly the same goodness of fit. The estimates in Table 2.A3 are generally similar to those in Table 2.4, except for the country fixed-effects estimator. Scholars debate the merits of panel data estimation methods. Although this chapter is not about methods, we believe the estimator used in Table 2.4 (OLS with White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over countries) is the most appropriate for our case. Beginning with the fixed-effects estimators, King (2001) argues that using more elegant statistical techniques is preferable to using fixed effects estimation, which is the approach taken in Table 2.4. In simulations, fixed-effects estimators are known to soak up excessive between-country variations attributable to substantive variables and to reduce degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of many dummy variables. Unless the number of time periods approaches infinity, the estimated effects are biased for the country fixed-effects estimator (Green, 2007). Because we have 27 periods, our analysis may suffer from this problem, which could explain why the results from the country fixed-effect estimator differ noticeably from those based on the other estimators. The applicability of the random effects model for a certain data set can be tested using an appropriate Lagrange multiplier test. The null hypothesis is that the random effect model is not supported by the data (Green, 2007). From conducting this test we are not able to reject the null hypothesis, because we find no evidence in favor of the random effects model. The OLS with PCSE estimator assumes that the variance of the error term is heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels, and homoskedastic within panels (Beck and Katz, 1995b). The PCSE estimator may not be appropriate in our case because in Table 2.4 several variables have
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time-varying effects, suggesting the possibility of heteroskedastic errors over time. The estimator we used in Table 2.4 does not assume a certain structure of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, making it more appropriate for our purpose. One advantage of the PCSE method is its ability to correct for correlated errors across panels. However, as Beck and Katz (1995b) note, a better strategy is to model this correlation theoretically, which is achieved by our diffusion variable. The results from the GEE method in Table 2.A3 are identical to the results in Table 2.4 in terms of hypothesis testing. This outcome further supports the claim that our results are generally robust when different estimators are used (except for the country-fixed effects variant). Turning to the results for the new controls in Table 2.A2, Feng and Zak (1999) argue that a fall in income inequality and a rise in education raise the likelihood of democratic transitions. Whereas our analysis differs from Feng and Zak (we include economic openness, study the level of democracy, and our sample is larger), our results generally agree with theirs. In Models 1 and 2, the effect of gini is negative and significant (a rise in inequality reduces democracy). In Models 7 and 8, the effect of education is positive and significant when economic development is excluded. As in the study by Feng and Zak, when economic development is included (Models 3–6), the effect of education is positive but insignificant. As they explain, this is because education and economic development are correlated. When included with education (Models 5–8), the effect of gini is negative, as in Feng and Zak, but it is not significant, which we attribute to the aforementioned differences between our model and theirs. The effect of INGOs on democracy is positive and significant in Models 9 and 10. These results demonstrate that membership in INGOs increases the level of democracy in a member country, supporting the arguments of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse and Sikkink (1999). The coefficients of the regional dummies in Model 11 measure the effect on democracy of being in some region, relative to the American continent (i.e., we exclude one dummy to prevent falling into the dummy variable trap). The results indicate that relative to the American continent, the level of democracy in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia is lower but roughly the same as in Europe. As could be expected, when the regional dummies are included, the effect of diffusion (which correlates with regional effects), although still positive as in Table 2.4, is insignificant. The effects of the world position variables on democracy are examined in Models 12 and 13. In Model 12, the effect of semiperiphery is positive and
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significant, and the effect of periphery is negative and insignificant. However, in Model 13, which uses the Freedom House data as in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), both variables are negative and neither is significant. Our results differ from the results of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck because they find negative and significant effects for both periphery and semiperiphery interaction terms. We believe one reason for the difference has to do with the sample. Their data end in 1989 whereas ours end in 1996, capturing post–Cold War democratic transitions in many of the semiperiphery countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia). A second reason has to do with the difference between the POLITY III and Freedom House data. As noted, the measure based on POLITY III has a larger variance than that of Freedom House. POLITY III focuses on the changes in institutional constraints on the leaders of the executive branch, whereas Freedom House also covers the gradual changes in civil rights. These are also reflected in the world position variables, particularly semiperiphery.
THREE
Democracy, Economic Openness, and Income Inequality
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, we saw that the different aspects of national economic openness affect the level of democracy in a country. In that analysis, the level of national income inequality acted as a control variable in the statistical model of the sensitivity analysis. We found that a rise in the level of income inequality could reduce the level of democracy in a country. This chapter changes the causal arrow between income inequality and democracy, and we now focus on identifying the causes of national income inequality. We seek to study two interrelated important questions pertaining to this phenomenon: How does the level of economic openness of a country affect its distribution of income? How does the level of democracy influence a country’s distribution of income? These two questions are very important for social scientists because a country with a highly skewed income distribution tends to be politically unstable. Political instability often may lead to intrastate conflict and ultimately civil war. So far, these two questions of interest have been addressed in two separate bodies of literature. The effect of economic openness on the distribution of income has been debated in the literature on economic globalization (e.g., Rodrik, 1997; Held et al., 1999). The issue has also been debated in policy and popular circles (e.g., Soros, 1997; Wolf, 2000; World Bank Poverty Net, 2000). As discussed in the previous chapter, although the exact definition and scope of globalization are debated, scholars agree that current globalization implies growing economic openness of countries to trade, foreign direct investments (FDIs), financial capital flows, and – to a lesser extent – labor mobility (e.g., Held et al., 1999; Hughes, 2000). Existing studies offer conflicting theoretical expectations of the effects of economic
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openness on the distribution of income, but these studies do not provide rigorous empirical analyses of their claims. Meanwhile, the effect of democracy on income distribution is an important topic in the literature on democracy (Chan, 1997b). Scholars agree that democracy implies a national political regime based on free elections and broad political representation (e.g., Diamond, 1999). Existing studies argue that democracy reduces income inequality, but empirical evidence is inconclusive. Some studies find a negative effect of democracy on income inequality, other studies find a positive effect, and a third group finds no effect. These two bodies of literature have remained largely on separate courses. Taking a broader view, one may position economic openness and democracy at the center of liberalism. The literature on liberalism, which emphasizes the importance of free choice, comprises two main streams (Zacher and Matthew, 1995). Republican liberalism implies that democracy, the preferred political regime, reduces income inequality. Commercial liberalism (classical and neoclassical economics) argues that free market capitalism is the preferred economic regime, and income inequality is an inevitable by-product.1 Although the issue of income inequality was central for classical economists, it has received relatively little attention in neoclassical economics (Ferreira, 1999). We believe the relationship between income distribution, on the one hand, and democracy and open market, on the other, deserves more attention. We argue that the effects of these forces on income distribution need to be studied together. Capitalism and democracy are not easy companions. Whereas democracy is based on the principles of “one person, one vote” and representative government, capitalism is based on the principles of laissez-faire and private enterprise. Democracy is inherently associated with redistributive policies (e.g., progressive taxation), but capitalism typically rewards individuals with different levels of income and wealth. Hence, democracy may promote income equality, whereas capitalism may promote income inequality. Democracy and economic openness may cancel out or mediate each other in affecting the income distribution within a society. Since many studies2 also argue that economic openness affects democracy, empirical studies of income inequality that exclude either economic openness or democracy as a causal determinant can incorrectly attribute the effect of one force to the other. 1 2
For a review article focusing on the variants of liberalism, see Zacher and Matthew (1995). See, e.g., Im (1996), Whitehead (1996), Drake (1998), Held et al. (1999), and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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Our empirical work in this chapter differs from previous studies in several ways. We study the effects of both democracy and economic openness on income inequality. We examine how democracy, trade, FDI, and financial capital inflows influence income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, we pay particular attention to the possible interactive effect between democracy and openness. Using the World Bank data on national Gini coefficients, we employ a sample of 69 countries over the period 1960– 1996, which is larger than the samples in previous studies. Finally, we perform separate analyses for developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). Our primary findings can be summarized as follows: democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries; trade openness induces more equitable income distribution within countries; foreign financial capital inflows do not affect income inequality; and FDI leads to greater income inequality, but this effect is mediated and weakened in democracy. The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality. The section that follows describes the empirical research design and findings from the statistical analysis. The last section of the chapter summarizes our findings and discusses their implications.
EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS ON INCOME INEQUALITY
Effects of Democracy The claim that democracy promotes an egalitarian distribution of income can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. Many scholars argue that democracy increases the opportunities for political participation, which allows the poor to demand more equitable income distribution (e.g., Chan, 1997b; Boix, 1998).3 As suffrage expands, reelection-oriented leaders are held accountable to the voters and become increasingly attuned to their needs. Democratic governments are inclined to help the lower and middle classes by adopting redistributive policies such as welfare spending, progressive taxation, minimum wage laws, price subsidies, and public works. Authoritarian leaders, in contrast, are mainly accountable to a powerful and
3
See also Bollen and Jackman (1985), Sirowy and Inkeles (1991), Lappe et al. (1998), and Human Development Report (2000).
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rich minority. They tend to adopt public policies that benefit this minority – policies that tend to maintain or increase income inequality.4 Democracy affects the distribution of income through the process of competing pressures: the government is subject to pressure from interest groups. By promoting a more equal distribution of political power, democracy gives rise to labor unions and political parties that represent the lower and middle classes, as well as public policies that redistribute income to their constituents. The more organized and vital these groups are, the more successful they are at influencing policymaking. As described by Lenski (1966), democracy redistributes political power in favor of the majority and, therefore, leads to policies that reduce inequality.5 Previous empirical studies of the effect of democracy on income inequality exhibited several limitations. Some authors describe a few specific historical episodes, arguing, for example, that the expansion of suffrage in Western Europe in the early 1900s reduced income inequality (Lindert, 1994; Justman and Gradstein, 1999). When income inequality was measured directly in statistical studies, the data were limited. Muller (1988), for example, measured income inequality using the Gini coefficient (as we do), but only for 1970. Other scholars used larger samples but employed indirect measures of income inequality.6 The statistical evidence on the effect of democracy on income inequality is mixed. Muller (1988), Moon (1991), and Rodrik (1998) report that democracy reduces inequality. However, Bollen and Jackman (1985), Deininger and Squire (1996), and Gasiorowski (1997) report that the effect of democracy on income inequality is statistically insignificant. Chan (1997b) reports mixed findings, whereas Simpson (1990) argues that income inequality first rises with democracy and then declines after a certain threshold level of democracy.7 4
5
6
7
Some scholars argue that autocracies suppress wages to industrialize their economies (e.g., Schamis, 1991). Others note that industrialization in autocracies can also reduce inequality (e.g., Birdsall, 1998). For details, see, e.g., Lipset (1959), Muller (1988), Lindert (1989), Moon (1991), and Gasiorowski (1997). Alesina and Rodrik (1994) formalize these ideas by presenting an economic model in which the expansion of suffrage makes a poor individual the swing vote, leading to redistributive taxes that provide the poor with more income. For example, Chan (1997b) used government expenditures in areas expected to transfer income from the rich to the poor (e.g., health, housing, and education). Gasiorowski (1997) used the growth rates of industrial wages to gauge changes in income inequality. Rodrik (1998) used labor wages as a percentage of GDP. In their literature survey, Sirowy and Ingeles (1991) report that six studies find the effect of democracy on income inequality is negative and six studies find the effect is positive or statistically insignificant.
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Effects of Economic Openness In broad terms, economic openness creates winners and losers in a society. The effects of openness on income distribution depend on the identity of the winners and losers. We discuss these effects in four categories: international trade, FDI, foreign financial capital, and international labor mobility. Trade According to the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade, countries export goods that use their abundant factors of production intensively and import goods that use their scarce factors intensively. Building on this model, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) predict that trade would raise the incomes of the owners of abundant factors and reduce the incomes of the owners of scarce factors.8 Because DCs are relatively well endowed with skilled labor and capital, their imports are expected to hurt their unskilled labor while their exports should benefit the capital owners and skilled labor. In contrast, LDCs are relatively well endowed with unskilled labor. Therefore, their imports should hurt their capital owners and skilled labor while their exports should benefit the unskilled labor. Hence, trade should raise income inequality in DCs and reduce it in LDCs. Wood (1994) finds evidence in favor of the Stolper–Samuelson model. Robbins (1996), however, argues that wage inequality rose in many LDCs, contrary to the prediction of Stolper and Samuelson. It is also reported that, in many LDCs, trade shifts income to the resource-intensive sectors (Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).9 The Stolper–Samuelson theorem does not exhaust the channels through which trade can affect income inequality. Rodrik (1997) argues that trade makes it easier for firms in DCs to substitute the unskilled labor with cheap imports, reducing their bargaining power and wage rates. But to the extent that trade reduces the wages of the unskilled labor, it provides incentives for workers to acquire education and for firms to employ more unskilled labor, which may reduce inequality (Blanchard, 2000). Furthermore, according to Birdsall (1998), trade intensifies economic competition, which reduces the 8 9
The Stolper–Samuelson theorem deals only with the distribution of income. It is well established in the trade literature that economic gains from trade outweigh economic losses. Slaughter and Swagel (1997) attribute wage inequality in DCs to the technological-change bias toward skilled labor, whereas Minford et al. (1997) argue that trade and technological innovation contribute equally to wage inequality. However, Rodrik (1997) argues that the evidence in favor of a technological-change driver of wage inequality in DCs is weak.
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prices of basic consumption goods, benefiting the poor more than the rich because the poor spend relatively larger shares of their incomes on basic consumption goods. The competition also diminishes the monopoly position enjoyed by the upper class, which may reduce income inequality (Birdsall, 1998). Yet another argument is that trade increases labor productivity, which increases wages and reduces inequality (Held et al., 1999). Finally, the winners from trade could compensate the losers, reducing inequality, although such compensation typically is not offered voluntarily (Rodrik, 1997; Salvatore, 1998). Foreign Direct Investment FDI typically involves multinational corporations (MNCs), whose effects on income inequality are debated.10 Some analysts argue that FDI raises inequality. First, MNCs can pressure host governments to cut welfare expenditures and repress labor unions to reduce wages, both of which hurt the lower and middle classes. The threat of MNCs to leave the country also reduces workers’ wages by weakening their bargaining power (Nafziger, 1997; Salvatore, 1998). Second, MNCs are said to repatriate profits from LDCs, leaving LDCs underdeveloped and hurting their poor (Baran, 1973; Lall, 1974; Jenkins, 1996; Nafziger, 1997). Third, the capital-intensive techniques used by MNCs are said to create a dual economy with a small advanced sector and a large backward sector, which promotes unemployment among the unskilled laborers and distorts income distribution (Muller, 1979; Lall, 1985; Jenkins, 1996; Robbins, 1996; Nafziger, 1997). Fourth, MNCs are said to pay low wages in labor-intensive industries such as footwear and clothing, and to push domestic suppliers to follow suit in order to reduce the MNCs’ purchasing costs (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994; Held et al., 1999). Fifth, domestic tax systems are not well suited to tax MNCs. The smaller tax base reduces government revenue and, therefore, welfare expenditures, which hurts the poor more than the wealthy (Hatzius, 1997; Human Development Report, 1999). In contrast, several studies argue that MNCs provide LDCs with capital and technology, improve their corporate governance, and propagate better management practices. These forces, in turn, raise labor productivity and 10
FDI entails the acquisition of a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, or the creation of a subsidiary of a domestic firm in a foreign country. Portfolio investments cover private transactions in securities. For details, see World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).
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promote economic growth.11 It follows that FDI could eventually reduce income inequality via the Kuznets (1955) effect, which is discussed in detail in the next section. Dollar and Kraay (2000) also support this view; they argue that economic growth raises the income of the poor proportionally more than that of the rich, making FDI a useful tool in reducing poverty (Stiglitz, 1998). In this spirit, Borenszstein et al. (1994) find that MNCs promote economic growth in LDCs, and Blomstrom et al. (1992) find that FDI promotes technology transfer from DCs to LDCs. Other scholars argue that MNCs cannot easily relocate from one country to another to reduce their labor costs because lower wages also are associated with lower labor productivity. Hence, labor’s bargaining power is not necessarily diminished by FDI (Lawrence, 1994). Furthermore, the host governments can regulate the operation of MNCs, thus controlling their effects on host economies (Vernon, 1971; Kurzer, 1993). Relatively few studies investigate empirically the effects of FDI on wages in LDCs (Klein et al., 2001). They find that MNCs tend to pay higher wages for skilled labor, indirectly supporting the claim that FDI promotes income inequality by enhancing the premium on skilled labor.12 Several studies in the field of sociology argue that FDI promotes income inequality by reducing the power of labor unions to pull low-wage workers up the income ladder, thus distorting the occupational structure of LDCs and marginalizing workers displaced as a result of the capital-intensive nature of FDI.13 A couple of other studies (Bussman et al., 2005; Sylwester, 2005) find FDI and income inequality are uncorrelated, but these studies appear to suffer from important data problems. Bussman et al. (2005) use FDI stock over GDP, but as we explained at length in the appendix of Chapter 2, FDI stock data have serious measurement errors, making them inappropriate for cross-national comparisons. Also, using FDI stock, one conflates the shortand long-term effects of foreign investment. Sylwester (2005) uses net FDI inflows over GDP, but because he focuses on the change of income inequality between 1970 and 1990 and his sample is so small (29 observations), it is not surprising to find insignificant results. 11 12 13
See, e.g., Haddad and Harrison (1993), Coe et al. (1994), OECD (1994a), Blomstrom and Kokko (1996), Batra and Tan (1997), and Markusen and Venables (1999). See case studies by Aitken et al. (1996) for Mexico and Venezuela, Feenstra and Gordon (1995) and Graham and Wada (2000) for Mexico, and Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2002) for Africa. See, e.g., Sullivan (1983) and Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985). After empirical analysis, Tsai (1995) rejects this argument, whereas Dixon and Boswell (1996) and Alderson and Nielson (1999) support it.
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Foreign Financial Capital Several authors argue that to attract foreign financial capital, governments engage in liberal reforms (e.g., they reduce taxation and government expenditures, privatize state-owned enterprises, and deregulate markets). These reforms may hurt labor and increase income inequality (Strange, 1996; Germain, 1997; Held et al., 1999). A related issue is that financial openness tends to bring about volatile financial flows across countries, increasing the frequency and magnitude of financial crises. These crises typically hurt the poor more than the wealthy (Human Development Report, 1999). As the financial crisis ensues, the economy enters a recession and the rate of unemployment rises while the tax base erodes, public budgets are slashed, and welfare expenditures decline. Since the wealthy can better weather recessions than the poor, the poor suffer more and income inequality increases. Some statistical evidence (Quinn, 1997) indicates that financial openness raises income inequality. A competing view argues that financial openness does not necessarily imply the end of the welfare state. Financial markets allocate funds to places that need them the most, as they pay higher rates of return (Wooddall, 1995). Foreign capital also allows countries to consume more than they produce and to invest more than they save, promoting economic development and reducing income inequality (Nafziger, 1997). Financial openness forces governments to become more prudent, efficient, and accountable to the public, because financial markets penalize corrupt, deficit-oriented, inflationary, and inefficient governments with higher interest rates and currency crises (Wooddall, 1995). Better governmental policymaking can reduce income inequality by improving tax systems, property rights, and public welfare programs (Held et al., 1999). Foreign money also can be used to fund social security. Consequently, governments can spend more of their budgets on poverty reduction (Normand, 1996). International Labor Mobility Labor mobility across countries (migration) also affects the distribution of income within countries. We consider this empirically complex topic to be outside the scope of our chapter and defer it to future research. In the past several decades, international labor flows have generally been from LDCs to DCs. Accordingly, let us consider a two-country, North–South theoretical framework. The North is endowed with more skilled labor, and less unskilled labor, than the South. The wages for skilled labor are higher than they are for unskilled labor. It follows that unskilled labor migration from South to North reduces income inequality in the South and raises it
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in the North (O’Rourke, 2001). Contemporary migration to DCs typically involves unskilled labor from LDCs. Some immigrants from LDCs have joined the middle class in DCs. However, immigrants from LDCs typically take on the lower-paying jobs in the DCs. As a result, the unskilled workers in DCs can move to better-paying jobs (Held et al., 1999). It follows that the effect of labor migration on income inequality is theoretically ambiguous. Empirically, contemporary international labor migration generally has been restricted and small in size, and its effects on wages have been marginal and mixed.14
Hypotheses The literature argues that democracy reduces income inequality, as in Hypothesis H1, which follows. However, because some empirical studies report that the effect of democracy on inequality is not statistically significant, Hypothesis H1 may not be supported in our empirical test. In contrast to that of democracy, the overall (or net) effect of economic openness on income inequality is theoretically ambiguous. To focus our analysis, we posit directional Hypotheses H2–H4 on the effect of openness. Since the competing theories on the effects of openness all seem plausible, Hypotheses H2–H4 may be rejected in our empirical test. H1: H2: H3: H4:
Democracy reduces income inequality. Trade increases income inequality in DCs and reduces it in LDCs. FDIs reduce income inequality. Financial capital inflows reduce income inequality. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Similar to the previous chapter, this section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues. The section then presents key results from the empirical analysis. The discussion in this section is self-contained and does not require any specific statistical expertise. Interested readers seeking further technical details should consult the chapter’s appendix. 14
For a survey of empirical results, see Ichino (1993). For results from the United States, Canada, and Australia, see Borjas (1987, 1990, 1993). Labor migration flows were much higher in the late 1800s and early 1900s than today. Data from 1870 to 1913 show that inequality fell in the originating poor European countries and rose in the destination New World countries (Williamson, 1997).
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Empirical Model To test the effects of democracy and economic openness, we specify and estimate the following statistical model of income inequality. As noted, it provides a structure for us to guide the statistically uninitiated readers through the empirical exercise. income inequalityt = 0 + 1 tradet−l + 2 fdit−1 + 3 portfoliot−1 + 4 democracyt−1 + 5 gdppct−1 + 6 gdppc2t−1 + 7 past inequalityt−1 + εt .
(3.1)
The model specification is based on the theoretical discussion and the literature on income inequality. As in the previous chapter, we denote variables with small capital letters and their coefficients with Greek notation. Each coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, or the phenomenon we seek to explain. The notation ε t denotes the random error that is not explained by the statistical model. The variable subscripts t and t − 1 indicate the time period of the variable, where t represents the current period and t − 1 the previous time period (a lagged variable). To simplify the presentation, we refer to the variables without the time subscripts t or t − 1. In the model, income inequality within countries is the dependent variable (the phenomenon we explain). The right-hand side of the model includes independent variables that explain income inequality. The variable income inequality represents the level of income inequality in a country in a time period. An ideal measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of national income surveys. As noted, previous studies have used alternative measures of income inequality due to the lack of comprehensive Gini data. We take advantage of the income inequality data collected by Deininger and Squire (1996). However, even though their data set has the most comprehensive coverage, it contains many missing values because national income surveys are never conducted year after year. To address this problem, we follow the practice of Easterly (1999) and Higgins and Williamson (1999), and we use the decade averages of the Gini data for each country. Although the technical details of the Gini data are presented in the appendix, it is worth noting that the Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 denotes perfect income inequality and zero denotes perfect equality. To apply the appropriate statistical technique, we transform the Gini coefficient into an unbounded measure.
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To test the effects of both economic openness and democracy on income inequality in the same model, we include four key independent variables: trade, fdi, portfolio, and democracy. Corresponding to the income inequality measure, these variables take on average yearly values during each decade. As in the previous chapter, we measure economic openness by using flows of trade, fdi, and portfolio investments. The importance of these flows to a country depends on their magnitude relative to the size of the domestic economy. Accordingly, we divide each of these flows by GDP. The trade variable measures the share of trade within a country’s national economy. The variable fdi reflects the share of foreign production capital in the country’s national economy, and portfolio is the share of foreign financial capital in the country’s national economy. Also, as in the previous chapter, democracy measures the level of democracy in a country. It ranges from –10 (the most autocratic regime) to +10 (the most democratic regime) and combines information on both the democratic and the autocratic characteristics of the political regime. The model also controls for the effects of economic development and past inequality. Kuznets (1955) hypothesizes that below some level of GDP per capita, income inequality rises with GDP per capita; above this level, income inequality declines with GDP per capita. This pattern is known as the Kuznets curve. Previous empirical results on the Kuznets curve are mixed. Ahluwalia et al. (1979) and Higgins and Williamson (1999), for example, found evidence supporting the Kuznets hypothesis; Deininger and Squire (1998) found no supporting evidence. We use gdppc and gdppc2 to capture the Kuznets effect. gdppc represents GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity – adjusted international dollars – and gdppc2 is gdppc squared. If the Kuznets curve is correct, the coefficients of gdppc and gdppc2 should be positive and negative, respectively. The level of education and the share of agriculture in GDP, which can also affect income inequality, are indirectly included in the model. Both variables tend to be highly correlated with GDP per capita. The level of past inequality is measured by the one-decade lagged Gini coefficient. The inclusion of this variable is consistent with the observed tendency of inequality to persist over time. Several theoretical reasons account for this tendency. First, wealth concentration typically correlates positively with political influence, generating arrangements that favor wealth owners.15 Second, people tend to marry those from the same socioeconomic group. Consequently, the children of the rich (or poor) group remain in 15
For example, in 1950, 65% of all the agricultural land in Latin America was held by 1.5% of the farm owners. This inequality has increased since (Birdsall, 1998).
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the original group, perpetuating income differences across groups. Third, in cases where the poor and the rich belong to different ethnic groups, racial discrimination can institutionalize the current income distribution (Lewis, 1994). Fourth, education can promote upward social mobility, but acquiring education is costly. Poor people tend to have more children than rich people (Heerink, 1994). Thus, education spending per child tends to be smaller for the poor, ensuring a vicious circle. The poor remain less educated and earn less, and income inequality persists (Dasgupta, 1993).
Research Design Issues As in the previous chapter, to justify the validity of our analysis we highlight several key design issues that require some clarification. As before, the related technical details of these issues are relegated to the appendix. First, ε t in the model is the so-called error term, that is, the part of the variations in income inequality that are not explained by the model. For statistical inferences to be valid, the error term needs to satisfy some assumptions. We address the related assumption violations using appropriate econometric techniques. Second, the sample includes 69 countries over the period 1960–1996. Since economic openness and the level of democracy are generally higher in DCs than in LDCs, we examine the robustness of the results from the full sample in separate samples for DCs and LDCs. The DCs in our analysis are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whereas the LDCs are non-OECD countries. Third, we design our research to measure the net effects of economic openness and the level of democracy on income inequality. We do not intend to measure the strength of each of the competing forces discussed in the previous section. To assess the effect of each of the causal mechanisms would require a very large data-collection effort that would include variables such as wages, international technology transfers, government welfare expenditures, breakdown of fdi and trade by sectors, taxes, government transfer payments, and various attributes of political parties. The collection of these data is better deferred to future research. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3.1 presents the statistical results for the full sample, the DCs, and the LDCs.16 The models exhibit reasonably good explanatory power, and the 16
The number of countries in our full sample is smaller than the number of countries in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data, due to missing data points for the other variables in our model.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.1. Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness
DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO FDI GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations Adjusted R2
All countries
LDCs
DCs
−0.0125∗∗∗ (0.0033) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0074 (0.0166) 0.0632∗∗∗ (0.0229) −1.91e-06 (1.08e-05) 1.90e-10 (4.40e-10) 0.7181∗∗∗ (0.0590) −0.1307∗∗∗ (0.0402) 142 0.69
−0.0112∗∗∗ (0.0037) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0008) 0.0340 (0.0367) 0.0518∗∗ (0.0290) 3.92e-05∗∗ (2.20e-05) −2.98e-09∗∗ (1.28e-09) 0.7163∗∗∗ (0.0693) −0.1898∗∗∗ (0.0510) 99 0.62
−0.0125∗∗ (0.0056) −0.0026∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0059 (0.0157) 0.0590∗∗∗ (0.0218) 8.51e-07 (1.54e-05) 2.07e-10 (4.85e-10) 0.4901∗∗∗ (0.0755) −0.2718∗∗∗ (0.0682) 43 0.52
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
effects of the control variables are largely consistent with our expectations. The results provide us with confidence in the models. As before, we leave the discussion of the results of the control variables to the appendix. We begin with the result for democracy. As shown in the table, democracy reduces income inequality, and the effect is consistent in all three samples (all countries, DCs, and LDCs). When using better data of income inequality than previous studies of the effect of democracy on inequality – including economic openness in the model – and controlling for the Kuznets curve and past inequality, our analysis provides empirical support for the expected negative effect of democracy on income inequality. As Table 3.1 indicates, trade openness also reduces income inequality in all three samples. The results support Hypothesis H2, with regard to LDCs but not DCs. As discussed earlier in the chapter, trade generates both inequality-increasing and inequality-decreasing effects. Hence, our findings can be interpreted as representing the net effect of trade on income inequality within countries, which, in turn, reduces income inequality. In contrast to the effects of democracy and trade openness, fdi inflows raise income inequality in all three samples (all countries, DCs, and LDCs).
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These results reject Hypothesis H3. Again, fdi can generate both inequalityincreasing and inequality-decreasing effects. According to our results, the net effect of fdi is to raise income inequality. In all three samples, the effect of portfolio inflow on income inequality is positive. But the effect is never different from zero statistically, meaning that the effect is too weak to be different from what one would expect due to chance. These results are consistent with the observation that the rise in portfolio investment inflows is a relatively recent phenomenon. If financial market integration continues to deepen, portfolio investments may significantly affect income inequality in the future. In any case, our results do not support Hypothesis H4. How do the statistical findings in Table 3.1 inform us about the substantive significance of the effects of democracy, trade openness, and fdi inflows? Similar to what we did in the previous chapter, we first compute a baseline Gini coefficient by setting all variables in Model 1 of Table 3.1 at their respective means. We then raise democracy, trade, and fdi by one standard deviation at a time and compute Gini again. We illustrate the sizes of these effects in two ways. First, we compute the percentage change in Gini across the two scenarios, showing the absolute influence of these three variables on Gini. Second, we compute the ratio of each of the changes in Gini over the range between the average of the Gini maxima (42.93) and the average of the Gini minima (38.98) across the 69 countries in the sample (see Appendix 3.1 for the country statistics). This computation indicates the influence of changes in trade, democracy, or fdi on Gini relative to the variability of Gini in our sample. In absolute terms, a rise in democracy by one standard deviation above its mean reduces Gini by 1.5% (from 40.56 to 39.06). A rise in trade openness by one standard deviation reduces Gini by 1.39% (from 40.56 to 39.17). A rise in fdi by one standard deviation raises Gini by 2.17% (from 40.56 to 42.73). In relative terms, these changes are 38%, 35%, and 55% over the range of Gini values between the average of the Gini maxima and the average of the Gini minima in the sample for democracy, trade, and fdi, respectively. These estimated effects of democracy, trade, and fdi on income inequality are substantial.17 17
Alternatively, one could express the sizes of these effects in terms of their shares out of one standard deviation of Gini (9.77). This would give 15.46%, 14.22%, and 22.21% for democracy, trade, and FDI, respectively, which are also substantial. A third way is to examine the size of our effects as shares of the range between the Gini sample minimum (22.46) and sample maximum (65.38). This range understates the size of our effects, because the majority of the observations in the sample are far from the tails of the Gini distribution.
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Our results indicate that trade reduces income inequality, whereas fdi raises it. This result may reflect the fact that trade is often associated with welfare programs that compensate the losers from trade, whereas fdi typically is not associated with such programs. Additionally, the benefits of trade tend to diffuse throughout the domestic economy, benefiting all consumers. In contrast, the benefits of fdi tend to be concentrated in the industries or the individual firms (in the case of joint ventures) in which the investment takes place. Such concentration of benefits tends to increase income inequality. In summary, our results support Hypothesis H1 that democracy reduces income inequality. We find that trade openness reduces income inequality, supporting Hypothesis H2 with regard to LDCs, but not DCs. fdi increases income inequality, rejecting Hypothesis H3. Foreign financial capital inflows reduce income inequality, which does not support Hypothesis H4.
Additional Analyses We conduct several additional analyses to complement the main results reported earlier. As in the previous chapter, we report the details of these analyses in the chapter appendix. The first additional analysis is substantive and policy-relevant. In Table 3.1, we find that fdi increases income inequality and that democracy reduces it. As fdi flows into many democracies, an important policy question is whether democratic governance helps to mitigate the positive impact of fdi on inequality. If democratic institutions help reduce the negative impact of foreign capital on the host country, we uncover another benefit of spreading democracy, acquire more confidence in our ability to harness the powerful forces of economic globalization, and bring good news to the many democracies of the world. On the other hand, if democratic governance does not reduce the impact of foreign capital on income inequality, we should worry about how we could take advantage of the benefits of globalization and minimize its drawbacks. The interaction between fdi and democracy is thus an important empirical question. To evaluate this effect, we create an interaction term between fdi and democracy and reestimate the models in Table 3.1 with this additional interaction term. Table 3.A1 reports the results for these interaction models. The fdi∗ democracy interaction term does not have any significant effect in the all-countries sample or the LDC sample, but it has a significant negative coefficient in the OECD sample. Specifically, as democracy rises from −1.7 to +10 within the OECD sample, the significant total effect of fdi declines
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from about 0.30 to about 0.057. fdi increases income inequality across the range of all possible democracy values, but its effect shrinks dramatically as we move from Greece and Spain in the early years of the OECD into the mature democracies in the OECD world. This effect, however, does not exist in many other democracies in the developing world. Second, we evaluate the robustness of the main results in Table 3.1 by using alternative measures of income inequality, excluding the lagged income inequality from the model, and employing alternative estimators. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 3.A2. Overall, the effects of democracy and economic openness remain robust. democracy reduces income inequality. portfolio investment inflows do not produce any significant effect on inequality in any of the six models. fdi inflows always raise income inequality. trade openness is correlated with less inequality in all cases, and the effect is weak in all but the case of the country fixedeffects estimator. We believe that this insignificant result reflects the noted limitations of the fixed-effects estimator. Finally, one may wonder if the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality are different in size between the DC and LDC samples. We estimate a statistical model to compare the effects of the variables on the two samples; the results are in Table 3.A3. The effect of democracy remains the same between the two samples, as do the effects of trade, portfolio, and fdi. Interestingly, the effects of the Kuznets curve and past inequality differ between the two samples. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Our analysis demonstrates the need to study the effects on income inequality of economic openness and democracy together. Better theoretical explanations of inequality should consider economic openness, democracy, and their interaction. Our statistical findings indicate that trade openness tends to be associated with more equitable income distribution within countries, but FDI leads to greater income inequality, and foreign financial capital inflows do not have any significant effect on income inequality. A rise in democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries. In addition, democratic governance mediates and weakens the undesirable impact of FDI on income inequality in the OECD world but not in DCs. One may wonder why trade and FDI, often highly correlated with each other, exert different effects on inequality. It is important to note that trade and FDI do not coincide perfectly, because they are generally operated by different actors and are often driven by different costs and benefits.
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Had they perfectly correlated, we could not have estimated their individual effects statistically. Theoretically, as discussed earlier, trade and FDI often influence the distribution of income through different causal mechanisms. Also, government policies regulating and responding to trade and FDI tend to be different. Trade adjustment assistance has a much longer history and is much more common and widespread. What are the public policy implications of our findings? To the extent that their goal is to bring about a more equitable distribution of income, international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization may condition new memberships, continued memberships, or various assistance programs on improvements of democracy. Industrialized democracies that are interested in reducing income inequality in other countries may also make liberal political reforms a condition of foreign aid. In DCs, democracy enables people to appeal to all levels of their governments, which then regulate and make sure FDI is not damaging to income distribution. In LDCs, whereas democratic governance by itself reduces income inequality, it does not restrain the impact of FDI. People in LDCs are not as effectively organized and empowered politically. As their governments invite MNCs and give them preferential treatment, it comes at the expense of the poor, causing an even more skewed income distribution. Importantly, because most FDI flows among DCs and a much smaller part goes to LDCs, the democratic DCs are in a win-win situation: they are able to enjoy the benefits of FDI and neutralize one of its bad side effects (skewing income distribution). In contrast, LDCs are likely unable to grapple politically with this side effect of FDI because their democratic institutions may be too weak to make a difference. Both proponents and critics of economic openness should reassess their claims if their arguments hinge solely on income inequality. Economic openness may improve or worsen income equality, depending on its type. Policymakers seeking a more equitable income distribution could promote international trade while compensating the losers from trade openness. On average, it appears to be the case that governments tend to compensate those who lose from trade openness, preventing income inequality from getting worse. Policymakers may also take measures to reduce the negative effects of FDI. For example, governments may offer subsidies or tax breaks to sectors or regions without FDI and curtail the occurrence of FDI-induced dual economy. At the same time, governments need to be careful not to impose restrictions that entirely drive away FDI. Although the inequality-increasing effect of portfolio investments in our results is statistically insignificant, we
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believe that the consistently positive coefficient across samples may indicate a need for caution on the part of governments considering liberalization of this type. Finally, our results indicate that income inequality declines with economic development, but it also tends to persist over time. Governments interested in reducing income inequality need to design welfare programs that help the impoverished. Financial aid from DCs and international organizations to LDCs should be designed to reduce poverty. Regardless of the exact policies taken, we believe that reducing income inequality is important. If history is any guide, failure to reduce income inequality may well result in domestic and international political instability. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
Scholars have investigated the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality in two separate bodies of literature. In studies of democracy, scholars agree that democracy reduces income inequality, but the empirical evidence is mixed. In the literature on globalization, the effects of economic openness on income inequality are debated, but they have not been examined rigorously. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first systematic statistical study of the effects of both economic openness and democracy on income inequality. We argue that the two effects should be studied together. In other words, the exclusion of one variable or the other can lead to incorrect inferences of the determinants of income inequality. Our empirical analysis comprised 69 countries over the period 1960– 1996. We have focused on the effects of trade, FDI, foreign financial capital inflows, and democracy on income inequality. We find that a higher level of democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries. Trade openness is associated with more equitable income distribution within countries, FDI is associated with greater income inequality, and foreign financial capital inflows have no statistically significant effect on income inequality. All the empirical findings in this chapter are found to be robust across different measures of income inequality, alternative statistical estimators, and model specification. In this chapter, we investigated the relationship between economic openness and democracy, on the one hand, and income inequality, on the other. In this analysis, economic development acted as a control variable. In the following chapter, we shift our attention to the relationship between economic development and the level of democracy. Is economic development a prerequisite for democratization? Is democratization good for the
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economy? These two questions have generated large bodies of literature focusing on either economic development or democracy as the dependent variable. Our interest in the next chapter is to analyze the potentially reciprocal relationship between democracy and development that has been largely ignored in previous research.
APPENDIX EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
As before, this appendix accompanies the section “Empirical Model and Analysis” in the main text of the chapter. We provide various details on the measurement of our variables, their data sources, issues pertaining to the technical design of the statistical model, and the expected effects of various control variables. We also report and discuss all the results for the control variables as well as various additional analyses.
Empirical Model The dependent variable – income inequality within countries – is measured via the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of the Lorenz curve. In this curve, the cumulative percentage of income held by shares of society appears on the y-axis and the percentage of population that holds the particular income share appears on the x-axis. The line that is 45 degrees from the origin denotes perfect income equality (e.g., 10% of the people hold 10% of national income). However, perfect income equality is never observed empirically, and so the Lorenz curve is below this line. The Gini coefficient measures the area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve and is expressed as the percentage of the area between the x-axis and the line. Thus, a Gini coefficient of 100 denotes perfect income inequality, whereas a Gini coefficient of 0 denotes perfect equality.18 The Gini coefficient is an ideal measure of income inequality. As noted, previous studies have used alternative measures of income inequality due to the lack of comprehensive Gini data. We take advantage of the income inequality data collected by Deininger and Squire (1996). However, whereas their data set has the most comprehensive coverage, it contains missing values. To that effect, as in Easterly (1999) and Higgins and Williamson 18
For details, see, e.g., Nafziger (1997) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).
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(1999), all the variables in the model are computed as decade averages. Hence, the unit of analysis is country decade.19 Deininger and Squire (1996) note that although their Gini data generally are of good quality, differences in data sources and data analysis methods across countries may cause measurement errors in a pooled sample.20 Using these data, Easterly (1999) applies all the available information from Deininger and Squire (1996) in computing the Gini decade averages, under the assumption that the measurement errors are randomly distributed and are captured in the statistical model’s error term. We use the data computed by Easterly. To examine the robustness of our Gini-based results, we also employ the share of income held by the top 20% of the national population as an alternative measure of income inequality.21 Because the Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 100, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression could be problematic (OLS assumes that the dependent variable is unbounded). The usual practice is to transform the bounded variable into an unbounded indicator. We transform the Gini coefficient into an unbounded measure using the formula log[Gini/(100 − Gini)].22 We also assess the robustness of results using the untransformed Gini coefficient. As noted, we measure economic openness by using flows of trade, fdi, and portfolio investments. We divide each of these flows by GDP to capture their importance in a country’s domestic economy. The economic openness data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). As in the previous chapter, democracy is the level of democracy in a country and is computed on the basis of the POLITY III data set (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Gurr and Jaggers, 1999). This widely used data set provides two indices of political regime characteristics. The 10-point democracy index
19
20
21
22
The Deininger and Squire data include 111 countries, covering the period from 1890 to 1996, but the data coverage is very limited before 1960. The Gini decade averages we use were computed by Easterly (1999) and cover four decades (1960s to 1990s). These data are available at www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlife.htm. For example, the Gini coefficient may be computed from the level of income or the level of expenditure. In the case of income, individual welfare may be measured before or after payment of taxes. The aggregation of individual levels of welfare may vary across countries in the mixing of individual and household units. Appendix 3.1 provides the mean, minimum, and maximum values for the Gini data for each country in the sample. The country with the highest mean level of inequality is South Africa (Gini coefficient = 62.3), and the country with the lowest mean level of inequality is Hungary (Gini coefficient = 25.17). Log denotes natural logarithm. The transformed variable equals −∞ for Gini = 0 and +∞ for Gini = 100. See Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1991) for technical details.
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(DEMOC) measures the democratic characteristics of the regime. The 10point autocracy index (AUTOC) measures the autocratic characteristics of the regime. Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and others observed that many governments may have both democratic and autocratic characteristics. Consequently, these studies measure the level of democracy as the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC, a practice we also adopt here. The democracy measure ranges between −10 (the most autocratic regime) and 10 (the most democratic regime). In the model, gdppc is GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity–adjusted international dollars.
Research Design Issues Several design issues require further clarification. First, we employ a pooled time-series, cross-sectional research design. The sample includes 69 countries over the period 1960–1996. Statistical models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data may exhibit heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Although these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients, they could result in inefficient and biased standard errors for the coefficients. To deal with these potential problems, we estimate the model using OLS regression with Huber–White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust both to heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model helps to absorb temporal dependence in the data, as shown by Beck and Katz (1995a, 1995b). Second, in addition to the substantive reasons noted in the main text, the inclusion of past inequality in the model helps to control for the effect of potentially relevant but omitted structural variables, such as the ethnic and demographic structures of society. Many studies adopt this modeling strategy to prevent spurious findings (e.g., Bollen, 1979; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Muller, 1995). Third, as noted, we design our research to measure the net effects of economic openness and the level of democracy on income inequality. As is typically done, the statistical significance levels of the estimated coefficients are investigated with a one-tailed t-test since our hypotheses are signed. Fourth, we need to clarify how the size of the effect is computed for the statistically significant key variables. The coefficient sizes cannot be interpreted linearly from Table 3.1, because the dependent variable is a nonlinear transformation of Gini. As noted, we first compute a baseline Gini value by setting all variables in Model 1 of Table 3.1 at their respective means.
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We then raise democracy, trade, and fdi by one standard deviation at a time and compute Gini on the basis of the following equation: log[Gini/(100 − Gini)] = a + bx, where a is a constant, b is a vector of coefficients, and x is a vector of independent variables. We solve for Gini in terms of a, b, and x. Next we illustrate the sizes of these effects in two ways, as noted in the main text. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3.1 presents the estimated coefficients and their standard errors from the full sample, the DC sample, and the LDC sample.23 All the models in Table 3.1 have a relatively good fit to the data, with the adjusted R2 ranging from 0.52 (in the DC sample) to 0.69 (in the all-country sample). The joint significance level of the model’s independent variables from the F-test is statistically significant at a level better than 1% in all the samples, which supports our model specification.24 The effect of democracy on income inequality is statistically significant at the 5% level for the DC sample and at the 1% level for the LDC and all-country samples. The effect of trade openness on income inequality is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for all the samples, indicating that trade openness reduces income inequality. The effect of FDI inflows on income inequality is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the DC and LDC samples and at the 1% level for all countries. The effect of portfolio inflow on income inequality is positive in all samples, but it is never statistically significant. The effects of gdppc and gdppc2 on income inequality are statistically significant in the LDC sample at the levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. gdppc has a positive effect on income inequality, whereas gdppc2 has a negative effect. These results support the existence of a Kuznets curve for LDCs. In the DC and all-country samples, the Kuznets curve is not statistically significant. The insignificance of the Kuznets curve for DCs is to be expected. The Western European countries experienced a Kuznets curve transformation 23
24
The number of countries in our full sample is smaller than the number of countries in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data due to missing data points for the other variables in our model. We also check for high collinearity using the variance inflation factor. We find no high collinearity in the sample of LDCs, but high collinearity in the DC and all-country samples. Using the matrix of variance decomposition, we identify the sources of high collinearity to be gdppc and gdppc2 . These variables are correlated by construction, a quality shared by all models that include the Kuznets curve. Nevertheless, this result suggests caution in interpreting the Kuznets curve coefficients for the DC and all-country samples.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.A1. Interactive effect of democracy and FDI on income inequality
DEMOCRACY FDI FDI∗ DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations
All countries
LDCs
DCs
−0.0123∗∗∗ (0.0040) 0.0637∗∗∗ (0.0266) −0.0001 (0.0022) −0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0074 (0.0167) −1.92e-06 (0.00001) 1.91e-10 (4.42e-10) 0.7183∗∗∗ (0.0583) −0.1305∗∗∗ (0.0407) 142
−0.0097∗∗ (0.0053) 0.0545∗∗ (0.0299) −0.0011 (0.0027) −0.0013∗ (0.0008) 0.0352 (0.0378) 0.00004∗∗ (0.00002) −3.07e-09∗∗ (1.38e-09) 0.7181∗∗∗ (0.0684) −0.1889∗∗∗ (0.0516) 99
0.0041 (0.0130) 0.2680∗∗ (0.1063) −0.0211∗∗ (0.0105) −0.0026∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0063 (0.0159) 2.85e-06 (0.000015) 1.41e-10 (4.71e-10) 0.4870∗∗∗ (0.0718) −0.4523∗∗∗ (0.1176) 43
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kuznets, 1955). Since this period is not included in our sample, we do not detect a Kuznets curve effect for DCs. The effect of past inequality on current inequality is statistically significant at the level of 1% in all samples. The positive sign of this effect corroborates our expectation that income inequality exhibits inertia. The realization of equitable income distribution is a lengthy process; hence, one should take a long-run view of the dynamics of income inequality. The relatively large size of the inertia effect in our results suggests that models of income inequality that do not control for this effect may omit an important variable.
Additional Analyses The first additional analysis concerns the interactive effect of democracy and fdi on income inequality. Table 3.A1 presents the results. The total effect of fdi is (0.0637 − 0.0001∗ democracy) for all countries, (0.0545 − 0.0011∗ democracy) for LDCs, and (0.2680 − 0.0211∗ democracy) for
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DCs. We test the significance of the total effect of fdi across the different values of democracy for each sample. The total effect of fdi is significant only in the DC sample throughout the values of democracy. The second additional analysis focuses on the robustness of our results in Table 3.1. We use alternative measures of income inequality, exclude the lagged income inequality from the model, and employ alternative estimators. The results for the all-country sample are presented in Table 3.A2. The results for the LDC and DC samples are consistent with those in Table 3.A2 and are not reported here.25 Overall, the effects of democracy and economic openness in Table 3.1 are replicated and robust across the six experiments reported in Table 3.A2. The models presented in Table 3.1 employ a transformed Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. To assess the robustness of these results, we use alternative measures of inequality. In Column 1 of Table 3.A2, income inequality is measured as the share of national income held by the top 20% of the population. The data for this particular measure come from the studies of Deininger and Squire (1996) and Easterly (1999). In Column 2 of Table 3.A2, we use a nontransformed Gini coefficient, as in Easterly (1999) and Muller (1988).26 The inclusion of the lagged Gini coefficient in the models presented in Table 3.1 may reduce the variance to be explained by other variables. In column 3 of Table 3.A2, we exclude the lagged Gini coefficient for a robustness check. Recall, however, that the lagged Gini is part of our theoretical model specification. The results reported in Table 3.1 are generated from OLS regression with robust standard errors. Columns 4–6 of Table 3.A2 present the results from two other estimators: fixed effects with robust standard errors, and random effects. We employ two versions of the fixed-effects estimator, introducing country or decade dummies into the model. The fixed-effects estimator controls for the possibility that some countries or decades are marked by large income inequality. As noted in the literature, the fixed-effects estimator has serious limitations. First, the country and decade dummy variables are atheoretical and absorb many of the variations in the dependent variable that are attributable to the model’s independent variables.27 Second, the country dummy variables and other country-dependent variables (e.g., GDP per 25 26 27
Statistical results for the LDC and DC samples, as well as the by-country statistics for Gini and the sample descriptive statistics, are available from the authors on request. As noted, the transformation of the Gini coefficient is needed, since it is bounded. However, this transformation may introduce nonlinear effects and so is not used in some studies. As summarized by King (2001), most methodologists agree that using better models, better measures, and robust estimation is preferable to fixed-effects estimation.
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−0.3004∗∗∗ (0.0797) −0.0316∗∗ (0.0153) 0.2196 (0.3847) 1.4552∗∗∗ (0.5495) −1.50e-05 (0.0003) 3.37e-09 (1.05e-08) 0.7141∗∗∗ (0.0629) 11.0658∗∗∗ (3.2733) 142 0.68
−0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0010) −0.0002∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0041 (0.0035) 0.0103∗∗∗ (0.0029) 2.15e-06 (2.18e-06) −7.47e-11 (9.12e-11) 0.7352∗∗∗ (0.0521) 0.1166∗∗∗ (0.0252) 104 0.75 −0.2021∗∗ (0.0950) 142 0.25
−0.0125∗∗ (0.0073) −0.0014∗ (0.0010) −0.0014 (0.0233) 0.0884∗∗∗ (0.0318) −4.19e-05∗ (2.54e-05) 8.61e-10 (1.06e-09)
Without past inequality −0.0111∗ (0.0076) −0.0025 (0.0026) 0.0096 (0.0157) 0.0586∗∗ (0.0335) −3.96e-05∗ (2.62e-05) 1.27e-09∗ (8.11e-10) 0.0290 (0.1839) −0.1399 (0.1323) 142 0.92
Country fixed effects
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Observations Adjusted R2
Constant
PAST INEQUALITY
GDPPC2
GDPPC
FDI
PORTFOLIO
TRADE
DEMOCRACY
Untransformed Gini
Top 20% income −0.0130∗∗∗ (0.0036) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0040 (0.0151) 0.0566∗∗∗ (0.0223) 2.78e-06 (1.42e-05) −4.89e-11 (5.81e-10) 0.7266∗∗∗ (0.0588) −0.1337∗∗∗ (0.0505) 142 0.71
Decade fixed effects
Table 3.A2. Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness (all countries)
−0.0147∗∗∗ (0.0043) −0.0012∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0057 (0.0188) 0.0686∗∗∗ (0.0187) −5.02e-06 (1.56e-05) 3.17e-10 (6.28e-10) 0.6033∗∗∗ (0.0616) −0.1635∗∗∗ (0.0560) 142 0.70
Random effect
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capita) tend to be collinear. The random-effects estimator parameterizes the error term associated with different cross sections and is useful for cross-nationally dominated panels.28 Table 3.A2 suggests that the results from Table 3.1 are robust against the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable, alternative estimators, and alternative measures of income inequality. In all cases, the effect of democracy is statistically significant and negative, reducing income inequality. The effect of portfolio investment inflows is insignificant in all six models, as in Table 3.1. The effect of fdi inflows is always statistically significant and positive, again as in Table 3.1. The effect of trade openness is negative in all cases, reducing inequality, and is statistically significant in all but the case of the country fixed-effects estimator. We believe that this insignificant result reflects the noted limitations of the fixed-effects estimator. The control variables in Table 3.A2 replicate the spirit of Table 3.1. The effect of past inequality is positive in the five cases reported and is significant in all cases except for the country fixed-effects estimator. The effects of gdppc and gdppc2 are consistent with Table 3.1 in four of the six cases. Columns 3 (without past inequality) and 4 (country fixed effects) are the exceptions. The weaker results obtained without past inequality support our model specification. An argument against using the lagged dependent variable is that it causes insignificant results. Our results from the model including the lagged dependent variable, however, are more significant than those from a model without this variable. Since we also have theoretical reasons for including past inequality in the model, we believe Column 3 suffers from model misspecification bias. In Column 4, the effects of gdppc and gdppc2 are significant, but their signs are not consistent with the Kuznets curve. We believe this weaker result reflects the aforementioned limitations of the fixed-effects estimator.29 Finally, one may question whether the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality are statistically different between the DC and LDC samples. To answer this question, we constructed two variables for each independent variable in the original model. For example, instead of one democracy variable, we now have two separate variables: oecd democracy and ldc democracy. We estimated a full model of all variables thus created 28
29
An alternative estimator is the panel corrected standard error (PCSE; Beck and Katz, 1995b). Because our sample is cross-nationally dominated with only four decades, the PCSE estimator is not suitable for our application. We thank Neal Beck for this comment. We have also estimated the model in Table 3.1 with a dummy variable for communist regime status, because these countries tend to emphasize income equality. The results for the hypothesis testing are similar to those reported in Table 3.1.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.A3. Effects of democracy and economic openness in DCs and LDCs
DCs DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO FDI GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations Adjusted R2 Note:
∗
−0.0142∗∗∗ (0.0047) −0.0027∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0052 (0.0151) 0.0591∗∗∗ (0.0205) −8.36e-06 (0.00001) 5.20e-10 (4.71e-10) 0.4868∗∗∗ (0.0756) −0.1945∗∗∗ (0.0490) 142 0.69
LDCs −0.0113∗∗∗ (0.0038) −0.0012∗ (0.0008) 0.0346 (0.0370) 0.0516∗∗ (0.0293) 0.00004∗∗ (0.00002) −3.06e−09∗∗∗ (1.27e-09) 0.7155∗∗∗ (0.0703)
Coefficient equality test 0.26 1.02 0.54 0.04 5.10∗∗ 8.74∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗
significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
and report the results in Table 3.A3. We then tested whether the coefficient of, say, oecd democracy equals that of ldc democracy, and we did so for each variable. These equality test results are in the last column of Table 3.A3. The test results indicate that the sizes of the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality, although statistically significant in both DC and LDC samples, are not significantly different across the two samples.
FOUR
Democracy and Development
INTRODUCTION
The effect of democracy on economic development has captivated many thinkers. De Tocqueville (1835) and Schumpeter (1942), for example, believe democracy provides the social securities required for development. Hayek (1944) argues that democracies exhibit relatively less unrest and political instability, promoting development. Friedman (1962) asserts that democracy promotes development by keeping state power in check. North (1990) expects autocrats to prey on their subjects, and Olson (1993) argues that autocrats are corrupt and promote their cronies, which are bad for development. Going a step further, Fukuyama (1992) argues that capitalism and democracy work in unison to promote welfare, a view many observers share (e.g., The Economist, 1994; Cohen, 2007). In contrast, Marx (1867, 1871) and Lenin (1911) argued that democracy came out of capitalist development as a tool for the elite to deprive and appease the masses. John S. Mill (1860), a supporter of democracy, is skeptical about its ability to promote development. Huntington (1968) argues that democracies exhibit high state expenditures in response to their citizens’ demands, reducing the excess that is expendable for development. Olson (1982) argues that special interests in democracy shape public policy to promote their own interests, undermining the economy. Wade (1996) argues that strong autocrats can resist popular pressure for policies to save doomed industries, which is good for development. Barro (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) argue that autocrats can effectively pursue prodevelopment policies. Despite the controversy, the view that democracy promotes development has recently become prevalent in the policy circles of the developed world. For example, a number of senior practitioners recently argued that poor 89
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countries undertaking democratic reforms outperform poor autocracies in development. The United States should, therefore, target its aid to help countries that attempt democratic reforms. President Bush, the authors note, supports having democratic governance “as qualifying criteria for countries to receive assistance” (Siegle et al., 2004). Similarly, Bush’s Under Secretary of State Dobriansky argues that solid democratic institutions are the basis for economic development (U.S. Department of State, 2007), and Bush himself apparently believes that political and economic liberties, both of which promote social welfare, are the natural by-products of each other (Cohen, 2007). Democracy, as a regime favoring equal political rights and civil liberties, is definitely worthy of promotion. We have seen that many writers and policymakers justify the promotion of democracy as a means to encourage economic development, but does a rise in democracy really lead to a higher level of development? The argument that democracy promotes development considers neither the possibility that democracy could undermine development nor the possibility that the causality may flow from development to democracy. In fact, as we show in the next section, the effect of development on democracy has received ample scholarly attention. The issue of causation stands at the center of this chapter. We argue that sorting out the causal direction between democracy and economic development is important. For example, if the goal is to promote democracy but the causation goes from development to democracy, we should not condition the distribution of aid to poor countries on instituting democratic reforms; rather, we should condition aid on forces such as economic reforms that encourage development or on the quality of the projects themselves. The relationship between democracy and development raises two salient questions. Does development lead to democracy? Does democracy encourage or undermine development? Together, these questions imply that the two forces may affect each other in a reciprocal manner. But statistical studies typically employ single-equation models, which specify either democracy as the dependent variable and development as the key independent variable, or development as the dependent variable and democracy as the key independent variable. As several scholars noted recently, these single-equation models cannot address the possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development, and their inferences may be misleading (Chan, 2002; Midlarsky, 2002; Przeworski and Limongi, 2003).1 1
Chan (2002: 118) warns that even if some results indicate that democracy boosts development, “the relationship may well be the other way around [development boosts democracy].” Midlarsky (2002: 672) calls “for the greater use of structural equations modeling” in the
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The development–democracy reciprocity issue has so far received very limited attention. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) tested the causality between democracy and energy consumption per capita by using Granger’s method, but they did not specify a simultaneous equations model (SEM). Przeworski et al. (2000) used dynamic probit to study the effect of development on regime transition and a selection-corrected estimator to assess the effect of regime type on economic growth, but they did not specify a full SEM. Helliwell (1994) and Feng (2003) employed SEMs, but their analyses raise a number of concerns, to which we will return. Given the significance of and the inadequate attention to the issue, further analysis of the simultaneity between democracy and development is warranted. Some readers may view this issue as a methodological nuisance, not a theoretical problem. We consider it to have both theoretical and methodological implications. If democracy and development affect each other, unidirectional models are theoretically incomplete and, as Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) noted, will produce biased estimates. We construct a SEM of the levels of development and democracy. By employing this approach, we are able to decide which of the following four theoretically distinct possibilities holds: (1) development affects democracy, but not the other way around; (2) democracy affects development, but not the other way around; (3) the two forces affect each other; and (4) the two forces are unrelated. We also identify the signs and sizes of the statistically significant effects. We estimate this model using a large-N sample of countries across nearly four decades. The empirical results suggest that a rise in development in a country increases its democracy, whereas a rise in democracy reduces development. These findings have important policy implications. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between democracy and development, and the following section provides an overview of previous empirical efforts and raises several important but overlooked design issues. The fourth section discusses our statistical model and presents the main empirical findings. The last section summarizes the findings and explores their implications. As in previous chapters, technical details and additional results are delegated to the chapter appendix. development–democracy literature. Przeworski and Limongi (2003: 348) argue that “inferences based on standard [single-equation] regression models [of democracy and development] are invalid.”
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
This section provides the theoretical context for our analysis rather than an exhaustive review of two very large bodies of literature. We demonstrate that a large number of arguments exist for both claims: economic development influences democracy, and democracy affects development. Acknowledging these plausible arguments, one should entertain the theoretical possibility that development and democracy affect each other simultaneously.
Causality from Development to Democracy The hypothesis that economic development promotes democracy has received wide attention in the literature. Lipset traces this so-called modernization thesis back to the Greek philosopher Aristotle. “From Aristotle down to the present,” he writes, “men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (1959: 75). Development arguably promotes democracy through several channels. First, as economy develops, the need for an educated labor force rises and people can afford to spend more on education. Educated people, in turn, often demand greater government transparency, political freedom, and participation in policymaking (Diamond et al., 1987; Lipset et al., 1993), which are all elements of democracy. Educated people also tend to be more receptive to the idea of resolving political disagreement through nonviolent, majority-based decision making. They also demand freer flows of information, more mass media, and communication outlets, which assist the diffusion of democratic ideas (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1989; Diamond and Plattner, 1994). In a second channel, economic development promotes civic society and socioeconomic progress, which increase the power of the middle class at the expense of the ruling elite and constrain authoritarianism (de Tocqueville, 1835; Lipset, 1959; Huber et al., 1993; Putnam et al., 1993). Also, as the number of urban dwellers rises, the masses can more easily get organized to demand political rights (Lipset, 1959; Lipset et al., 1993). Third, underdevelopment and poverty cause discontent, accentuate grievances, and polarize societies. These tensions increase the attractiveness of violence as a means to secure survival and acquire social mobility, which can increase political instability and even lead to civil war. In
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trying to assert power, the state may become oppressive, reducing democracy. Economic development promotes democracy by alleviating these tensions (Im, 1987; Huntington, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). A fourth channel considers the appeal of autocracy to the elite. Political leaders constantly contemplate whether to accept the outcome of a democratic competition that mandates the distribution of the national pie or to fight to establish autocratic control so as to acquire a larger share of the pie. Assuming the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal return of capital decrease with affluence, the attractiveness of dictatorship is expected to wane when affluence rises. Also, as the economy and civil society develop, defeated politicians have more opportunities for respectable employment, enabling their acceptance of electoral defeats. Because economic development increases affluence and supplies more acceptable alternatives, dictatorship becomes less attractive as a political solution to distributional conflicts (Lipset, 1959, 1981; Przeworski et al., 2000). Finally, poverty and underdevelopment erode public confidence in the ability of nascent democracies to resolve problems, reducing the legitimacy of the regime and increasing the appeal of authoritarianism to the public. When developmental problems become salient and pressing, the democratic government may lose public support altogether, raising the likelihood of a forceful transition to autocracy. Development, in contrast, alleviates these pressures and enables democracy to take hold and consolidate (Linz, 1978; Seligson and Muller, 1987; Huntington, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). The positive effect of development on democracy, however, is not the only possible outcome. Development may delay democratization in two ways. First, economic development may strengthen an authoritarian government (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005); development provides more financial resources for the autocrat, not only the middle class, particularly when the government owns some means of production. Because a financially stronger government can sustain a larger security force and develop better monitoring and surveillance methods, it becomes more capable of suppressing the grassroots efforts toward democracy. Second, as long as the economy develops strongly, the public in an autocracy may not always be interested in changing the status quo. If the public values robust economic development more than democratic norms such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, or freedom of political participation, economic development may serve to maintain the autocratic regime. Some stylized observations support the argument that development may not bring about democratization. China, for example, has been vigorously
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developing its economy since the late 1970s, but it remains a one-party state. Since the late 1990s, Russia has achieved considerable economic development, but various reports suggest its level of democracy is on the decline. Strong developments in Japan from the late nineteenth century to 1945 and in Germany from 1933 to 1945 coincided with highly undemocratic yet popular regimes. Finally, despite Singapore’s stellar economic development record, the country is still autocratic.
Causality from Democracy to Development Theoretical considerations suggest the effect of democracy on development can be negative or positive. Starting with the negative impact, one channel argues democracies are bogged down by special interests and rentseeking, which hinders development. Special interests use the democratic political process to redistribute wealth from the public to themselves, and rent-seeking allocates resources to unproductive activities. A developmentoriented autocrat may restrain the overbearing rent-seeking interests (Olson, 1982; Lal, 1983; Jackman, 1993). In this vein, regimes based on alliances between the military and technocrats may be efficient in promoting development, because the technocrats devise required policies and the determined military regime implements them (O’Donnell, 1979; Cohen, 1985). In a second channel, free people may be reluctant to curtail their consumption in order to save. Low savings, in turn, leads to low investments, which slows down development. Democratic governments, depending on the electoral support to stay in office, are often afraid to impose unpopular measures to increase savings and investments. Depending relatively less on public support, autocrats can implement unpopular policies to boost savings and investments (Hewlett, 1979; Rao, 1985). Third, democratic governments tend to spend much on social welfare programs because the public values them. Massive government expenditures, in turn, crowd out resources for development projects. Democracies may also have to confront strong populist pressures to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor in various ways, reducing the willingness of the wealthy to save and invest. Authoritarian leaders may be better able to ward off these pressures, encouraging economic development (Haggard, 1990; Barro, 2000). In a fourth channel, democracies are less able to suppress social unrest than autocracies because they have to protect civil liberties. Social unrest, in turn, slows down production, undermines effective business planning, and
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scares away investors. Because it is more capable of enforcing social order, an autocratic regime can promote economic development better than a democratic government (Pye, 1966; Hewlett, 1980). Finally, less developed countries (LDCs) feature agrarian societies, high income inequality, youth-oriented demographics, low levels of technology, underdeveloped financial markets, and dependence on international capital and technology. In such situations, the state necessarily must play an active and interventionist role in promoting development, suggesting that authoritarian decision making may outperform the diffused democratic process (Chirot, 1977; Cohen, 1985). In contrast, several arguments indicate that democracy can facilitate development. First, political freedom leads to economic freedom. Free markets, in turn, allocate financial resources and factors of production to their most efficient use, bringing about development (Goodin, 1979; Goodell and Powelson, 1982). Second, democracy respects individual rights, including private property rights. Secure property rights, in turn, are critical for trade, savings, and investments, which promote development (Goodell and Powelson, 1982; North, 1990; Olson, 1993; Clauge et al., 1996; Li and Resnick, 2003). Autocrats may also secure property rights, but democratic leaders are more likely to do so since they are subject to checks and balances (North and Weingast, 1989). Autocrats may abruptly change the rules of the game, increasing uncertainty and, therefore, the willingness to invest. Autocrats may also be more predatory than democratic leaders, because they have fewer incentives to consider public welfare, as opposed to their own interests and those of their cronies (Goodell, 1985; Findlay, 1990; Olson, 1991). Third, because democratic regimes are more responsive to public concerns and more likely to solve problems through political compromise, they may experience less domestic unrest than autocracies. Because democratic governments represent the public, they may seek to achieve relatively more equitable income distributions than autocracies. All these forces work to defuse public grievances and reduce the likelihood of social strife and revolution. Political stability, in turn, leads to a longer time horizon for economic activities, increasing the allocation efficiency and investments required for development (Przeworski, 1985; Barro, 2000; Feng, 2003). Fourth, autocrats’ military spending needs to be relatively more excessive to sustain control over their population. Consequently, they need to extract more resources from society through tax or pillage, which hinders economic development. In addition, as autocrats allocate most of their energy to
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maintaining social order and guarding against possible coups that might be staged by their opponents or the public, they are less likely to be effective at modernizing their economies (Nordlinger, 1970; Bienen, 1971). Finally, the autocrat, who requires the support of the ruling elite, may be subject to rent seeking, corruption, and patron–client relationships, all of which undermine development. Whereas autocrats have more decisionmaking power, they still make bad decisions. For example, capital-intensive development strategies, which autocrats have often chosen, may produce dual economies in LDCs, which is detrimental for development. In contrast, rent-seeking in democracy need not be as severe as in autocracy, and democratic deliberation does not necessarily lead to bad public policy (Goodin, 1979; King, 1981; Nafziger, 2006). THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The previous section discussed various theoretical conjectures on the effects of democracy and development on each other. Taken together, these arguments suggest that democracy and development affect each other simultaneously. Moreover, because all the preceding arguments are theoretically plausible, the net effects of development and democracy on each other could be positive, negative, or insignificant. To the extent that theory cannot definitively calibrate the strengths of the causal forces, the exact nature and strength of the reciprocal relationship between democracy and development is an empirical issue. This section overviews empirical findings in the literature and discusses a number of critical design issues. In general, some stylized facts support Lipset’s (1959) modernization thesis. For example, today the developed countries (DCs) are all democratic, and those DCs with the most recent history of autocratic rule – Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey – are also the least developed among the DCs. In Taiwan, South Korea, and several other newly industrialized countries, a move toward greater democracy followed economic development, whereas some of the worst democratic records are found in LDCs. That said, stylized facts rejecting the modernization thesis also exist (e.g., China and Russia) and, more generally, stylized facts may not generalize across many countries. Statistical studies of democracy typically employ single-equation models. Development is typically measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (RGDPPC) and democracy is typically measured as a continuous variable. Most of these studies find that a rise in RGDPPC increases
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democracy.2 Other studies model democracy as a discrete event where democracy grows above some predefined threshold. The results of these studies are somewhat mixed.3 Turning to the reverse causality, analysts study the net effect of democracy on the growth rate of RGDPPC or GDP. The findings are mixed. In Borner et al.’s (1995) review, 10 studies find an insignificant or mixed effect of democracy on growth, 3 find a negative effect, and 3 find a positive effect. In Kurzman et al.’s (2002) survey, 19 studies report a positive effect, 6 report negative effects, 10 report insignificant effects, and 9 present mixed results. In Feng’s (2003) review, 4 studies find insignificant effects, 6 find positive effects, and 6 find negative effects. More recently, Krieckhaus (2004) also reports mixed results. Consider next the issue of simultaneity. If development and democracy indeed affect each other, the single-equation analysis is problematic and likely produces biased results. So far, only two studies have addressed this issue using a SEM, but their findings and designs differ. Helliwell (1994) found that a rise in real income per capita promotes democracy, whereas a rise in democracy does not affect economic growth. Feng (2003) found that a rise in economic growth does not affect democracy, whereas a rise in democracy promotes economic growth. The models of Helliwell and Feng raise three design issues. First, Helliwell uses the 1960 values as instruments for endogenous variables in 1985, but a SEM requires instruments based on all the exogenous variables in the model. Second, both models are cross-sectional, where variables are averages over more than two decades. However, as Feng notes, this design cannot study change over time, which is important in the relationship between democracy and development. Third, both studies focus on the economic growth rate, not the level of development, but the modernization thesis stresses the importance of the level of development in democracy, not growth. If one accepts the premise that democracy and development may affect each other, the democracy equation ought to include the level of development on the right-hand side, and the development equation should employ this variable as the dependent variable to maintain simultaneity 2
3
The findings of Lipset et al. (1993), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Gasiorowski (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Li and Reuveny (2003) support the modernization thesis. For contrary evidence, see Gonick and Rosh (1988) and Colaresi and Thompson (2003). For example, Przeworski et al. (2000) find that development does not affect democratic transition but promotes democratic consolidation post-transition. Boix and Stokes (2003) find that development promotes transition and consolidation.
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between the two equations.4 Also, we note that growth and development tell us different things. An economy can grow fast and be underdeveloped (e.g., China), whereas DCs can exhibit slow growth (e.g., Japan). Growth may change erratically, but development changes slowly. Furthermore, growth and change in development also differ. Using RGDPPCt for development in time t, the change in development is RGDPPCt − RGDPPCt−1 , where t − 1 is the previous period. Growth is (RGDPPCt − RGDPPCt−1 )/RGDPPCt−1 . Economies may display the same change in RGDPPC but grow at different rates due to different values of RGDPPCt−1 in the denominator of the growth expression. As we demonstrate clearly in the chapter appendix, inferences based on a growth–democracy SEM differ from those based on a development–democracy SEM. We believe that any SEM model of the development–democracy nexus needs to seriously address these design issues. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Although theoretical expectations indicate a possible simultaneous relationship between democracy and development, the empirical evidence obtained so far is mixed. The designs of previous studies that attempted to address the issue of simultaneity raise concerns, but we think their logic in recognizing the need for a SEM is sound. This section presents our statistical SEM, related research design issues, and main empirical findings. As in previous chapters, technical details of the model, measures, and data sources are presented in the chapter appendix.
Empirical Model We first need to consider the measurement of democracy as it affects our modeling strategy. The issue is not which features of democracy or autocracy should be recorded – which is important in its own right – but whether to model democracy as a discrete event indicating that democracy exists only above some threshold or as a continuous variable that ranges from full autocracy to full democracy. The discrete measure leads to models of the probability of democratic transition, whereas the continuous measure 4
If Y and Z are endogenous, the Y equation in a SEM needs to include Z on the right-hand side and the Z equation needs to include Y on the right-hand side. Specifying a democracy equation as a function of development and an economic growth equation as a function of democracy does not create a SEM.
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leads to models of the level of democracy. We seek to study the reciprocal relationship between the level of development and the level of democracy rather than the event of meeting a predefined threshold for democracy, because development may interact with the whole spectrum of democracy, not just with the discrete event of democratic transition.5 We specify and estimate a SEM to test the net effect of democracy on development and the net effect of development on democracy. The model distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous (or control) variables. An endogenous variable appears on the left-hand side of one equation and the right-hand side of the other. The exogenous variables appear only on the right-hand side of each equation. As in the previous chapters, small capital letters denote variables, and Greek letters denote coefficients to be estimated empirically. A coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The notations ␣c and ␣t denote vectors of coefficients. The Greek letters εt and ut represent the random errors in the two equations, respectively. The subscripts t and t − 1 denote the current and previous time periods (or years), respectively. We lag the exogenous variables for reasons discussed in the appendix. To simplify presentation, we refer to variables in the text without the time subscripts. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) present the development and democracy equations of the SEM, respectively, specified based on the democratization and development literature. RGDPPCt = ␣0 + ␣1 democracyt + ␣2 prior rgdppct−1 + ␣3 investmentt−1 + ␣4 population growtht−1 + ␣5 educationt−1 + ␣6 instabilityt−1 + ␣7 tradet−1 + ␣c country fixed effects + ␣t yearly fixed effects + ut ,
(4.1)
democracyt = 0 + 1 rgdppct + 2 prior democracyt−1 + 3 tradet−1 + 4 diffusiont−1 + 5 inflationt−1 + 6 economic growtht−1 + 7 year + εt .
(4.2)
The dependent variable in Equation (4.1), rgdppc, is the level of economic development, measured as the logarithm of real GDPPC in 5
For the alternative discrete event approach, see Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix and Stokes (2003).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 4.1. Variables and expected effects in the simultaneous equations
Democracy (DEMOCRACY) equation Variable Endogenous RGDPPC
Sign
Development (RGDPPC) equation Variable
Sign
Positive or negative
Endogenous DEMOCRACY
Positive or negative
Positive
Exogenous PRIOR RGDPPC
Positive
Exogenous PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR TRADE DIFFUSION
Positive Positive or negative Positive
GROWTH INFLATION
Positive or negative Positive or negative
INVESTMENT TRADE POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY FIXED EFFECTS
Positive Positive or negative Negative Positive Negative Positive or negative
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted terms. The dependent variable in Equation (4.2), democracy, is the level of democracy of a country, measured as in the previous two chapters. The specification of the development equation follows the economic development literature, and the specification of the democracy equation follows Chapter 2 (and the comparative politics literature). Table 4.1 summarizes the relationships among the endogenous variables and lists the expected effects of the exogenous variables. The variable prior rgdppc is gdppc from the previous period; investment is a measure of the amount of physical capital in the country; trade is a measure of economic openness, given by the share of a country’s total trade in the national economy; population is the population growth rate of a country; education is the level of human capital in a country; instability is a binary variable indicating the occurrence or absence of revolution or coup d’etat in a country; and country fixed effects is a group of country indicators that capture country-specific heterogeneity, whereas yearly fixed effects is a group of year indicators that capture year-specific heterogeneity. In the democracy equation, prior democracy is the first lag of the level of democracy; year is a year counter that captures the possible linear trend in democracy; trade is the same variable appearing in the development equation; diffusion is the average democracy score of countries within the region around each country; economic growth is the yearly percent growth rate of real GDP, PPP adjusted; and inflation is the yearly inflation rate in a country.
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Research Design Issues Several research design issues require clarification; we discuss their details in the chapter appendix. First, to assess and generalize the overall relationship between democracy and development, we employ a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) design. The unit of analysis is the country-year, and the empirical sample includes 127 countries from 1961 to 1996, including both DCs and LDCs. Second, stylized facts suggest that LDCs have generally experienced wide variations in their democracy levels during our time period, whereas DCs generally had consistently higher levels of democracy that were quite stable over time. To evaluate the effect of this difference on inference, we conduct analyses for two samples. One sample includes all the countries for which we have data, both DCs and LDCs. A second sample contains only LDCs, excluding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which we identify as DCs. Third, to assess whether any statistical basis exists for suspecting a simultaneous relationship between development and democracy, we employ a so-called exogeneity test. This test evaluates if democracy is not affected by development (thus, exogenous in the development equation) and if development is not affected by democracy (thus, exogenous in the democracy equation). The results of this test are not meant to replace a full SEM analysis but to provide some indication of the simultaneity and whether a SEM is necessary from a statistical perspective. Fourth, to estimate a SEM, we need to consider the mathematical issue of identification and the statistical issue of inference. We handle the issue of identification by using the familiar exclusion criterion. We handle the issue of inference in the presence of simultaneity between development and democracy by employing the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Fifth, we conduct an additional statistical analysis to evaluate the robustness of our results when we use a different statistical estimator – the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator, which is more efficient. Sixth, the economic development equation controls for cross-country heterogeneity for theoretical reasons. Empirically, one may model such heterogeneity as random or fixed effects. The choice between the two methods is based on the so-called Hausman test. Seventh, the economic development equation also includes the lagged dependent variable for theoretical reasons, which could lead to biased statistical results when used in conjunction with the country fixed effects. We check the robustness of our findings by using a variant of the 2SLS estimator, which we refer to as the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator that addresses this problem.
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Eighth, the error term of a statistical model needs to satisfy certain assumptions for the inferences to be valid. We address the related assumption violations by using appropriate econometric techniques. Finally, it is possible that other right-hand-side variables in the model will be affected by democracy or development. We handle the possible endogeneity of the other variables by lagging them one year, a widely employed practice in the literature.
Empirical Findings We first conduct the exogeneity test, seeking to establish a statistical basis for our SEM. The results indicate we should reject that democracy is exogenous in the development equation or that development is exogenous in the democracy equation. They demonstrate the need for a SEM setup if one intends to model correctly the relationship between democracy and development. Table 4.2 reports the 2SLS estimation results for two samples: one for all countries and the other for LDCs only. We begin with the results for the democracy equation. In column 1, for the sample of all countries, the coefficient of economic development, rgdppc, is positive and significantly different from zero. A rise in the level of economic development promotes the level of democracy, which supports Lipset’s modernization thesis. Does this hold in the LDCs? In column 3, for the sample of LDCs only, the effect of a rise in the level of economic development on the level of democracy remains positive and significantly different from zero. Thus, the positive impact of development on democracy is not an artifact of sample choice. How large is the effect of economic development on the level of democracy in a country? The coefficient of rgdppc (the logarithm of real GDP per capita) for the sample of all countries indicates that when the real GDP per capita rises from the estimation sample minimum of 416 PPP-adjusted real international dollars (a very-low-income country) to the estimation sample mean of 3,994 PPP-adjusted real international dollars (a low-to mid-income country), the level of democracy increases by 0.48 unit on the 20-point democracy scale (from −10 to +10). This change in the level of democracy seems small, but it only represents the immediate impact of a rise in economic development on democracy. In our SEM, a rise in economic development in the current period not only affects the level of democracy in the current period but also continues to affect the next period democracy via prior democracy in the model. The long-run effect of some change in development on democracy
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Table 4.2. Democracy and development, 2SLS Democracy Development DCs and LDCs DCs and LDCs RGDPPC PRIOR DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION INFLATION ECONOMIC GROWTH YEAR TRADE
0.2127∗∗∗ (0.0497) 0.9237∗∗∗ (0.0094) 0.2863∗∗∗ (0.0888) 0.00002 (0.00001) −0.0058 (0.0088) 0.0195∗∗∗ (0.0040) −0.0014∗∗ (0.0008)
PRIOR RGDPPC DEMOCRACY INVESTMENT POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY Constant Observations
−40.6822∗∗∗ (7.6661) 2914
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.00007) 0.9537∗∗∗ (0.0096) −0.0006∗∗ (0.0003) 0.0016∗∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0064∗∗∗ (0.0023) 0.0024 (0.0023) −0.0099∗∗∗ (0.0044) 0.3516∗∗∗ (0.0626) 2914
Democracy LDCs 0.1901∗∗∗ (0.0624) 0.9150∗∗∗ (0.0011) 0.3586∗∗∗ (0.107) 8.58E-6 (0.00002) −0.0060 (0.0097) 0.0286∗∗∗ (0.0054) −0.0009 (0.0010)
−58.5994∗∗∗ (10.1188) 2230
Development LDCs
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.00008) 0.9558∗∗∗ (0.0065) −0.00059∗ (0.0004) 0.0019∗∗∗ (0.0004) −0.0068∗∗∗ (0.0026) 0.0021 (0.0033) −0.0103∗∗∗ (0.0046) 0.0000 (0.0000) 2230
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
accumulates over time; we explain this computation in detail in the appendix. Suppose real GDP per capita rises from 416 to 3,994; the longrun change in democracy amounts to 6.30 units on the 20-point democracy. This increase in the level of democracy is much larger than the immediate impact of development, covering about one-third of the autocracy– democracy range of the democracy scale. Does a rise in the level of democracy in a country influence its level of development? In Table 4.2, the coefficient of democracy in the development
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equation is negative and significantly different from zero for both the allcountries sample and the LDC sample. Hence, a rise in the level of democracy in a country reduces its level of economic development, all other things being equal. The negative effect of democracy on development is not sensitive to the sample choice. How large is the effect of democracy on economic development? Consider the following scenario. Suppose an autocratic country, whose level of democracy is −10, experiences a rise in democracy to +6, a level that scholars often use to indicate a country’s transition into a democracy. How much does this democratization affect economic development? Since democracy is not logged and rgdppc is logged, the percent change in real GDP per capita due to a change of 16 units in democracy is given by 100 × (Change in democracy) × (democracy Coefficient), which is −0.96% (i.e., 100 × 16 × −0.0006 in percent). Hence, an autocracy whose level of democracy rises from −10 by 16 units can expect to see its real GDP per capita fall by almost 1% in real terms in that year, all other things being equal. This immediate change is substantively not small. How large is the change in the long run? The change in democracy in the development equation affects real GDP per capita immediately (computed earlier) and continues to affect it in the next period through its effect on prior rgdppc in the model. The long-run effect of some change in democracy accumulates over time. Based on the computation illustrated in the appendix, the long-run percent change in GDP per capita due to a change of 16 units of the democracy score is −20.73%. That is, a country whose democracy rises from −10 to 16 will see its real GDP per capita fall by almost 21% in the long run, all other things being equal. The results for the control variables in both the development equation and the democracy equation are largely consistent with the theoretical expectations stated in Table 4.1. These expectations, in turn, are based on previous studies. This increases our confidence in the results from our SEM. We discuss the results of the control variables in the appendix.
Additional Analysis As planned, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we employ the 3SLS estimator. Second, we employ the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator. Overall, the results from these analyses are consistent with those in Table 4.2, both in terms of the reciprocal effects between democracy and development and in terms of the control variable in the two equations. The additional analyses suggest that development promotes democracy, and yet democracy reduces the level
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of development. The robustness of our findings gives us more confidence in our analysis. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Scholarship on democracy and development has called for study of the reciprocal relationship between democracy and economic development. So far, almost all studies have employed single-equation models. The two important exceptions to this practice did not evaluate the possible reciprocal relationship within the context of a structural SEM that endogenizes the level of economic development and the level of democracy in a pooled TSCS large-N design. This chapter is the first to study the reciprocal relationship between the levels of economic development and democracy in a pooled TSCS research design using a SEM. The structure of the development equation follows directly from neoclassical economic growth theory, and the specification of the democracy equation resembles the one used in many studies of democratization. The large-N TSCS design captures both cross-sectional and time-series patterns. The results are robust across subsamples of countries and alternative SEM estimators. To summarize, in both the all-countries sample and the sample of LDCs only, we find that a rise in the level of economic development in a country leads to a rise in its level of democracy, whereas a rise in the level of democracy in a country reduces its level of economic development. The democracy–development causality goes two ways. Our use of the SEM methodology reveals a tension in the democracy– development relationship, which has important policy implications. Our results suggest that the wealth level of a country influences the creation and sustenance of democratic governance. In other words, the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions are likely to be more successful in richer countries. If democracy is a desirable political system, promoting economic development should be as important, if not more important, a task as promoting democracy directly. Efforts to promote democracy in poor countries without lifting them out of poverty are likely to fail. The idea that promoting democracy will lift poor countries out of poverty receives little empirical support. In fact, democratization presents a dilemma for policymakers. A rise in the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development, which in turn undermines democracy. Countries that set development as their priority may need to delay democratization, at least for a while. Authoritarianism may provide conditions that are conducive to economic development. Nondemocratic countries can more swiftly choose
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prodevelopment policies, avoiding the need to choose a middle-of-theroad approach that would placate and keep all constituencies on board. The drawback of this approach is that the public may have no say at all in the development process, leading to skewed economic development that favors the interests of a narrow group in society at the expense of the masses. The current policy approach in countries such as China, Singapore, Russia, and perhaps to a lesser degree Malaysia, and the policy approach of newly industrialized countries such as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s–1990s, suggest that when faced with a choice between democracy and development, many leaders and nations seem to choose development first. Our findings also suggest a significant implication about the outcome of democratic and economic reforms in LDCs. A strategy of development first, which postpones democratization until some level of development is reached, can eventually bring about a rise in democracy as development promotes democracy. In contrast, a strategy of democracy first may fail as a rise in democracy reduces economic development, which in turn is bad for democracy. Hence, the former strategy is more likely to improve both development and democracy. Ultimately, choosing between the two goals (i.e., which one should take the driver’s seat) is a normative decision of leaders and nations, but in doing so the leaders should be aware that they are walking a very fine line. Putting too much emphasis on the goal of economic development at the expense of democracy may backfire. As the country develops economically, pressures toward democratization in the country will likely rise. If these pressures are not released in an orderly manner, they may explode in the form of revolution or coup d’etat. Our results suggest that such political instability in turn reduces the level of economic development in a country, possibly wiping out the economic gains the society worked hard to achieve. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The relationship between democracy and economic development involves two causal questions. One question asks whether economic development promotes democracy; the other asks whether democracy influences development. Statistical analyses typically focus on one of the two questions, relying on single-equation models. Taken together, however, these two questions imply a possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development. The few statistical studies that attempted to address this possible simultaneous relationship suffer several methodological weaknesses.
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In this chapter, we revisit this important issue regarding the possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development. We specify and estimate a structural equations model of the simultaneity between the level of development and the level of democracy. This approach allows us to rigorously evaluate the nature of their relationship; that is, whether democracy affects development only, development affects democracy only, they affect each other, or they are not related statistically. The empirical results indicate that the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development, and development promotes democracy. This chapter concludes Part I of our book. In this part, we modeled the effects of economic openness on democracy, the effects of democracy and economic openness on income distribution, and the reciprocal relationship between economic development and democracy. As demonstrated in the different chapters, these are important issues. But these analyses ignored the possible influences of democracy and economic openness on interstate political relations. Yet we observe every day how interstate political events have influenced and been influenced by such significant transformations as democratization and economic liberalization. Part II of our book explicitly tackles the relevance of democracy (Chapter 5) and economic openness (Chapter 6) to interstate military conflict. In Chapter 5, we focus on the relationship between democracy and military conflict, which speaks to two separate bodies of literature: one on democratic peace and the other on the causes of democracy. We seek to highlight the previously overlooked reciprocal causal link between democracy and conflict.
APPENDIX MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH, AND DEMOCRACY
In this part of the appendix, we show in detail that a structural equations model of democracy and economic growth differs substantially from a structural equations model of democracy and economic development; hence, inferences based on the two models are not equivalent. Let us assume that theory expects the following SEM to be the “true” model: democracyt = b1 rgdppct + c1 Z1(t−1)
(4.A1)
rgdppct = b2 democracyt + b3 rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1), (4.A2)
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where, as in the main text, rgdppct is real GDP per capita at time t; rgdppct−1 is real GDP per capita at time t − 1; democracyt is the level of democracy at time t; Z1 and Z2 are vectors of relevant control variables; b1 , b2 , and b3 are coefficients; and c1 and c2 are vectors of coefficients. Is a model of the change in rgdppc equivalent to the model of the level of rgdppc shown in equation (4.A2)? The answer is yes. To see this point, subtract rgdppct−1 from both sides of equation (4.A2), generating equation (4.A3): rgdppct − rgdppct−1 = b2 democracyt + (b3 − 1)rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1) .
(4.A3)
Estimation of Equation (4.A3) captures coefficient b2 for democracy and coefficients vector c2 for Z2 , as in Equation (4.A2). And coefficient (b3−1 ) for rgdppct−1 is a simple transformation of b3 . But is a model of the growth rate in rgdppc equivalent to Equation (4.A2)? The answer is no. To see this, rework Equation (4.A3) to have the growth rate of gdppc as the dependent variable, denoted g_rgdppc, by dividing both sides of Equation (4.A3) with rgdppct−1 and producing Equation (4.A4): [rgdppct − rgdppct−1 ]/rgdppct−1 = b2 democracyt /rgdppct−1 + (b3−1 )rgdppct−1 /rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A4)
This equation can be rewritten as G rgdppct = b2 democracyt /rgdppct−1 + (b3−1 ) + c2 Z2(t−1) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A5)
For the rgdppc growth rate model (i.e., Equation (4.A5)) to be equivalent in parameters to the rgdppc level model (i.e., equation (4.A2)), the right-hand-side variables in the level model need to be transformed following Equation (4.A5). Previous scholars, in their typically estimated single-equation model of the rgdppc growth rate, do not transform their democracy and control variables as in Equation (4.A5). Therefore, the coefficients of democracy and the control variables in previous models of rgdppc growth rate are not the same as those in the rgdppc level model in Equation (4.A2). Similarly, for the democracy model in Equation (4.A1), the coefficient b1 for rgdppct is not the same as the coefficient of g_rgdppct . To see this, one
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divides both sides of Equation (4.A1) by rgdppct−1 : democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 rgdppct /rgdppct−1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A6)
Next, we rewrite Equation (4.A6) to get the growth rate of GDPPC on the right-hand side: democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 [rgdppct /rgdppct−1 − 1] + b1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A7)
The expression in the square brackets in Equation (4.A7) is the growth rate of GDPPC. Thus, democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 G rgdppct + b1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A8)
Hence, for the coefficient of rgdppc in Equation (4.A1) to be the same as the coefficient of g_rgdppc, one needs to estimate Equation (4.A8). In other words, the coefficient for g_rgdppc in a regression of democracy on g_rgdppct and Z1 is not the same as that for rgdppc in Equation (4.A1) of the true model. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Empirical Model We have two endogenous variables: rgdppc and democracy. rgdppc is the real GDPPC adjusted for PPP.6 Data are from the Penn World Table 6.1. democracy is measured from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000), as in other chapters. The widely used POLITY data register various democratic and autocratic attributes for many countries on an annual basis from 1800 to 1999. Our measure of democracy is the composite indicator POLITY from POLITY IV. It is constructed as the difference between the democracy and autocracy scores in the POLITY IV data set, ranging from −10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).7 The effect 6
7
Studies of democracy typically use real GDPPC to measure development (e.g., Diamond, 1992a, 1992b; Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Feng, 2003; Li and Reuveny, 2003). Among others, Londregan and Poole (1996) and Li and Reuveny (2003) also use this measure of democracy. As Marshall and Jaggers (2000) recommend, we code the “standardized authority codes” of −66, −77, and −88, which appear in the POLITY data set, into missing for −66, averages of the scores before and after the transition for −88, and zero for −77.
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of rgdppc on democracy could be positive or negative, whereas the effect of democracy on rgdppc can be positive, negative, or statistically insignificant, in light of the earlier arguments. The specification of the exogenous variables in the development equation follows Solow’s (1956) theory, which Mankiw et al. (1992) extended to include human capital in addition to physical capital. This theory predicts that the steady-state level of development rises with education and investment in physical capital, falls with population growth, and depends on country-specific determinants. The country-specific effects “reflect not just technology but [also] resource endowments, climate, geography, institutions, and so on; it may differ therefore across countries” (Mankiw et al., 1992: 6). In statistical estimation, the country effects can be modeled as either fixed effects or random effects, an issue to which we will return. Mankiw et al. (1992) assumed that countries are in steady state and therefore employ a cross-sectional design. As they note, however, at any given point in time in the Solow model, the economy is somewhere on the transition path leading to the steady state, not necessarily in the steady state. Hence, one needs to model development dynamics. Islam (1995) employs this insight in his dynamic extension of the Mankiw et al. setup, where development adjusts over time. Islam’s extension includes the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, as well as country- and periodspecific effects.8 The specification of our development equation builds on the setups of Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). The right-hand-side variables in our development equation include investment in physical capital, population growth rate, and average level of education, following the Solow model. We include, as called for by Mankiw et al. and Islam, country effects and, as called for by the Islam extension, the lagged level of development and yearly effects. We also control for political instability, as suggested by Feng (2003). The expected effects of the right-hand-side variables on rgdppc follow these studies. prior rgdppc is the lagged value of rgdppc. It models the tendency of economic processes to exhibit inertia due to frictions such as transportation delays, evolution of tastes, and the time it takes to negotiate agreements and produce goods. The effect of prior rgdppc on rgdppc is expected to be positive. investment is the logarithm of the percentage ratio of private and public investment in physical capital to real GDP, lagged one year. It is worth noting 8
The Solow/Islam model works in GDPPC level, not in GDPPC growth rate. Thus, it differs from the Barro (1998) type of economic growth model. As shown, moving the lagged dependent variable in the level model to the left-hand side does not lead to an economic growth model.
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that foreign direct investment is part of this variable. These data come from the Penn World Table 6.1. The effect of investment on rgdppc is expected to be positive. population growth is the rate of population growth of a country, lagged one year. Data come from the Penn World Table 6.1. The effect of a rise in population growth on rgdppc is expected to be negative. education denotes the level of national education, measured by the average number of years of education in the overall population. Data come from Barro and Lee (2000) and are lagged one year. The effect of this variable on rgdppc is expected to be positive. instability is set to 1 if a country experiences at least one revolution or coup d’etat in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The data come from CNTS (2008).9 An occurrence of instability is expected to reduce rgdppc (Feng, 2003). trade is the sum of the values of imports and exports of a country with the world, divided by the country’s GDP, lagged one year. The data come from the Penn World Table 6.1, where the division by GDP controls for the importance of trade to the country. The effect of a rise in trade on development is debated. Neoclassical economics expects a positive effect, whereas a neo-Marxist/dependency interpretation expects a negative effect, particularly for LDCs. country fixed effects and yearly fixed effects are country and yearly specific effects, which, as noted, are called for by economic theory (Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995). In general, the yearly effects capture economic dynamics. The country effects capture structural attributes of development such as climate and topography. Since these effects can be correlated with other independent variables, we might need to model them as fixed effects, an issue to which we will return. The specification of the democracy equation follows studies in comparative politics. The endogenous variable on the right-hand side is rgdppc. The exogenous variables include three types of variables: economic performance, slow-moving structural variables, and external influences. The economic performance variables include economic growth rate and inflation.10 Structural variables (e.g., ethnic and religious compositions, party fractionalization, and institutional qualities) are also sometimes included. These 9
10
CNTS (2008) defines revolution as an illegal or forced government change, an attempt to generate such a change, or an armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the government. A coup d’etat is an extraconstitutional or forced change of the government or its effective control. For the use of inflation and economic growth in democracy models, see Gasiorowski (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), Feng (2003), and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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theoretical factors tend to be stable over time, suggesting that democracy may exhibit path dependence or inertia. To model this inertia, we include the lagged level of democracy on the right-hand side, which, in addition to its theoretical role, assists in modeling the effects of variables that are not present in the model.11 As one study notes, “with such a pervasive control in place, it is more difficult for spurious effects to be reported” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 905).12 A third set of control variables involves international forces: trade, and diffusion of democratic ideas and norms.13 To these variables, we add a yearly trend, as democracy generally has risen in the period we study. prior democracy is the lagged value of democracy. As noted, democracy should exhibit inertia. A high level of democracy in the previous period is likely to promote democracy in the current period. The effect of prior democracy on democracy is expected to be positive. year controls for the possibility that democracy has a linear trend in our period. Casual observation suggests that democracy increased after 1945 in many countries, so we expected the effect of year on democracy to be positive. trade is the same variable defined for the development equation. As discussed in Gasiorowski (1995) and Li and Reuveny (2003), the effect of a rise in trade on democracy is under debate and could theoretically be positive, negative, or negligible. diffusion denotes the average democracy score of countries within a region around each country, lagged one year. The regions are Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and America. The diffusion of democratic norms is captured through channels such as economic relations, tourism, and communication networks (Starr, 1991; Gasiorowski, 1995; Li and Reuveny, 2003). The effect of diffusion on democracy is expected to be positive. growth is the yearly percent growth rate of real GDP, PPP adjusted and lagged one year, computed using data on real GDP from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). Several studies use negative economic growth as a proxy for economic crises; however, the effect of 11 12
13
See, e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Muller and Seligson (1994), Muller (1995), and Li and Reuveny (2003). The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable might absorb the variations in the dependent variable that could be explained by other independent variables, making it harder to find statistically significant results. Hence, our approach can be described as being conservative. For a study focusing on international forces, see Li and Reuveny (2003). See also Starr (1991) for the effect of diffusion, and Gasiorowksi (1995) for the effect of trade openness.
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economic crisis on democracy is debated. Some analysts claim the effect is positive; others argue the effect is negative (for discussions, see Gasiorowski, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; and Li and Reuveny, 2003). inflation is the yearly inflation rate in percent from the consumer price index, lagged one year. Data come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). As discussed by Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Li and Reuveny (2003), the effect of a rise in inflation on democracy is also debated. Although there are reasons for including country fixed effects in the development equation (as noted), no similar reasons exist for including them in the democracy equation. Moreover, because democracy often changes relatively slowly over time, fixed effects are likely to absorb most of the variations in democracy, leaving little to be explained by other substantive variables.
Research Design Issues Modeling Simultaneity For our SEM of democracy and development, we first need to consider the issue of identification. The model is clearly overidentified; the number of exogenous variables excluded from each of our two equations far exceeds the required number of one in our case, based on the number of endogenous variables in a particular equation minus one. As our model is identified, we can proceed to the estimation. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to each equation yields biased estimates because the endogenous variables are correlated with the error terms. To deal with the simultaneity, one needs to use SEM estimators, which are instrumental variable (IV) estimators, with one difference. Whereas the instrument in IV estimation can be any variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable and not correlated with the error term, in SEM estimation the instruments are based on all the exogenous variables, which is the best approach to deal with simultaneity; other methods (e.g., Heckman selection estimation) are second-best approaches. Two types of SEM estimators exist: 2SLS and 3SLS. In 2SLS, in stage one, each endogenous variable is regressed on all the exogenous variables in the model. In stage two, the endogenous independent variables are replaced by fitted values from stage one. In 3SLS, stage one is 2SLS; stage two uses the estimates to compute the system’s variance–covariance matrix. Stage three uses the matrix in estimating the system from generalized least squares.
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Both 2SLS and 3SLS estimators are consistent. The 3SLS estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS estimator, but it also is more sensitive to any specification error than the 2SLS estimator. Moreover, as summarized by Kennedy (2005: 165), “Monte Carlo studies have shown it [2SLS] to have small sample properties superior on most criteria to all other estimators. They have also shown it to be quite robust . . . to the presence of other estimating problems such as multicollinearity and specification errors.” Therefore, we employ 2SLS as the main estimator. While we model simultaneity between development and democracy, some of our control variables may be affected by democracy or development (e.g., traders may be affected by changes in democracy). Obviously we cannot model all the possible simultaneous effects in one study. Our model already is complex by considering the reciprocal effects between democracy and development. The literature typically deals with this issue by lagging the control variables.14 Although this is an imperfect solution, we also employ it here. Modeling Country Effects in the Development Equation As noted, for theoretical reasons, we include country effects in the development equation (but not in the democracy equation). This leads to two statistical issues. First, country effects can be modeled as random or fixed. Random effects are modeled as part of the error term and fixed effects are set as country dummies. The random-effects estimator is more efficient than the fixed-effects estimator, but it is consistent only if the country effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. Consistency of the fixed-effects estimator, or the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, is not subject to this requirement. Because our country effects capture attributes such as climate or input endowments, they are likely correlated with our independent variables (e.g., investment, population growth). The Hausman test compares the random-effects and fixed-effects estimators. The results corroborate our suspicion, suggesting the fixed-effects estimator should be used to model the country effects in the development equation. Second, the presence of the lagged dependent variable, together with the country fixed effects, makes the fixed-effects or LSDV estimator inconsistent when the asymptotics are considered in the N direction (where N is the number of countries). Amemiya (1967) and others have shown that the
14
For this approach, see, e.g., Muller and Seligson (1994) and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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LSDV estimator is consistent in the T direction. The size of the inconsistency in the N direction is about 1/T (Nickell, 1981).15 Beck and Katz (2004) compare the properties of the LSDV estimator in a dynamic panel setup such as ours (TSCS with a lagged dependent variable) to the properties of two alternative but consistent estimators of such a model: the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) (AH) estimator and the Kiviet (1995) estimator. The AH estimator removes the fixed effects by using first difference and uses the second lag of the dependent variable or the second lag of the first difference of the dependent variable as an instrument for the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. The Kiviet estimator employs LSDV estimates but corrects them with a formula that plugs in values from a consistent estimator such as the AH estimator. Since the finite sample properties of these estimators are unknown, Beck and Katz (2004) studied their bias and root mean square error in Monte Carlo simulations. On the basis of their findings, Beck and Katz recommend that “the AH estimator should not be used for TSCS [time series cross section] data. We see little reason, in general, not to prefer LSDV over the Kiviet estimator when T is twenty or more” (2004: 14). They add: “For typical comparative TSCS data, it does not appear that OLS with fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable (LSDV) is problematic” (2004: 29). In another Monte Carlo study, Judson and Owen (1999: 13) reach a similar conclusion: “When T > 30, LSDV performs just as well or better than the viable alternatives.” Based on these results and the number of years (35) in our sample period, we employ the LSDV estimator for the development equation.16 For robustness check, we also use the estimator of Bruno (2005), which extends the Kiviet (1995) estimator (that applied to balanced panels) to unbalanced panels. Because the Kiviet algorithm has not yet been extended to 2SLS, we apply the two-step estimation. We refer to this estimator as the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator. Performing 2SLS step by step produces biased standard errors in the second stage because the procedure uses the predicted values for the endogenous variable in computing the standard errors instead of the required actual values (Greene, 2003). But if the R2 in the first stage is high, say 0.8 and above as in our case, the size of the bias is expected to be quite small.17 The Kiviet estimator requires one to choose a consistent estimator to provide initial values, and the order of the bias to adjust for. 15 16 17
For detailed discussion, see Beck and Katz (2004). To be exact, the size of the asymptotic bias is only about 1/35, or 2.8%. We verified this point in personal communication with William H. Greene, the author of the popular Econometric Analysis (e-mails dated April 30 and May 2, 2005, and May 11–13, 2008).
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We use the estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for initial values, and 1/T for the bias (see also Bun and Kiviet, 2003). Heteroskedasticity, Serial Correlation, and Nonstationarity Since our sample involves panel data, we need to consider the possibilities of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms of both equations. We deal with these issues in two ways. First, the lagged dependent variable in each equation helps to address serial correlation and mitigate the risks associated with this potential problem (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b, 2004). Second, we estimate the standard errors of parameter estimates using a variant of the White (1980) estimator of robust standard errors that adjusts for clustering over countries, which is typically referred to as the Huber– White sandwich estimator. This estimator yields consistent estimates of the covariance matrix under very general conditions of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). One may also be concerned that, if the variables in the model are nonstationary, the estimates generated by the 2SLS (or 3SLS) may not be valid. As it turns out, this is not the case. As shown mathematically by the important study of Hsiao (1997) – see also Johnston and DiNardo (1997) – the 2SLS estimator is valid when the dependent variables are nonstationary or co-integrated. “In structural equation applications, what one needs to worry about are the classical issues of identification and estimation, not non-stationarity” (Hsiao, 1997: 385).
Empirical Findings In this part of the appendix, we first discuss the results of the exogeneity test and the Hausman test, then explain the computation of the long-run effects of development and democracy, next present the results for the control variables, and finally discuss briefly the results of the alternative estimators from robustness tests. Exogeneity Test Before we evaluate our SEM, we need to establish whether there is an empirical basis for such a model. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) employ the bivariate Granger causality test. They find that economic development Granger-causes democracy, whereas democracy does not Granger-cause development. The pioneering result of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck is important but does not suffice for our case, which involves a multivariate model.
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We therefore employ the Davidson–MacKinnon test of exogeneity for regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis is that an OLS fixed-effects estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. Rejection of the null indicates that the instrumental variables fixed-effects estimator should be employed (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). In other words, the null hypotheses are that democracy is exogenous in a single-equation model of development and that development is exogenous in a single-equation model of democracy, respectively, whereas the alternative hypotheses are that the two affect each other in some direction (according to the theories discussed earlier). Turning to the results, the test statistic has a p-value of 0.010 for democracy in the development equation and a p-value of 0.035 for development in the democracy equation. Hence, we reject the null hypotheses of exogeneity in both cases: treating development as exogenous in a model of democracy is not supported by the data. Similarly, treating democracy as exogenous in a model of development also is not supported by the data. Ignoring the simultaneity would lead to inconsistent estimates. Fixed-Effects–Random-Effects Test As noted in the main text, the development model calls for the use of country effects, which can be modeled as fixed or random. We conduct the Hausman test, which compares the random-effects and fixed-effects estimators for the development equation. The test statistic has a p-value of 0.007, rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients from the two estimators are indistinguishable. This result supports the use of the country fixed-effects estimator. Computing Long-Run Effects of Development and Democracy on Each Other In our SEM, a rise in economic development in the current period affects the level of democracy in the current period and continues to affect the next period of democracy via prior democracy in the model. The long-run effect of some change in development on democracy accumulates over time and is computed by the following formula: long-run change in democracy = Change in rgdppc × [rgdppc Coefficient/(1 − prior democracy Coefficient)].
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The expression in the square brackets of the formula is given by [0.2127/(1 − 0.9237)], which is 2.787. Thus, when real GDP per capita rises from 416 to 3,994, the long-run change in democracy