DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN AN INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM
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DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN AN INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM
In this book, Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny combine the social scientific approach with a broad, interdisciplinary scope to address some of the most intriguing and important political, economic, and environmental issues of our times. Their book employs formal and statistical methods to study the interactions of economic globalization, democratic governance, income inequality, economic development, military violence, and environmental degradation. In doing so, Li and Reuveny cross multiple disciplinary boundaries, engage various academic debates, bring the insights from compartmentalized bodies of literature into direct dialogue, and uncover policy trade-offs in a growingly interconnected system of polity, economy, and environment. They show that growing interconnectedness in the global system increases the demands on national leaders and their advisors; academicians and policymakers will need to cross disciplinary boundaries if they seek to better understand and address the policy trade-offs of even more complex processes than the ones investigated here. Quan Li is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program on International Conflict and Cooperation (PICC) at Texas A&M University, which he joined in 2008. Previously, he was a faculty member in political science at the Pennsylvania State University, where he codirected the Multidisciplinary Seminar Series on Globalization in the College of Liberal Arts and served on the inaugural Faculty Governing Council of the School of International Affairs. Professor Li served on the editorial board of the Journal of Politics and is serving on the editorial boards of International Studies Quarterly and International Interactions. Professor Li holds a Ph.D. in political science and international relations. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of economic globalization (international trade, foreign direct investment, financial openness, and capital account liberalization), democratic governance, political violence (interstate military conflict, civil conflict, transnational terrorism), and macroeconomic policymaking and cooperation. His research has appeared in numerous journals, including the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Peace Research, the Journal of Politics, and Political Research Quarterly. Professor Li is the corecipient of the 2003 Best Article on Democratization Award from the American Political Science Association. Rafael Reuveny is Professor of International Political Economy at the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington. His research focuses on the causes and effects of economic globalization, democracy, international military conflict, and sustainable development. He is the author and coauthor of numerous articles and book chapters. Professor Reuveny’s work has appeared in journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ecological Economics, and Environmental and Resource Economics. He is the coauthor or coeditor of five books, the most recent of which is North and South in the World Political Economy (2008). He was also a guest coeditor of a special issue of International Studies Review (2007). Professor Reuveny was program chair of the 2006 meeting of the International Studies Association and the North America program chair of the 2008 meetings of the Global International Studies Conference. Reuveny has won two teaching awards at Indiana University and is the 2007 corecipient of the Award of Excellence in World Society Research, First Place, given by the World Society Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland. Professor Reuveny is also the corecipient of the 2003 Best Article on Democratization Award from the American Political Science Association. He holds a double-major Ph.D. in business economics and political science.
x
Acknowledgments
Chapter 3 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Reuveny, Rafael, and Quan Li. 2003. “Economic Openness, Democracy and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis,” Comparative Political c 2003 Sage Publishing. Studies 36(5):575–601. Copyright Chapter 5 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Reuveny, Rafael, and Quan Li. 2003. “The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model,” International Studies c 2003 Blackwell Publishing. Quarterly 47(3):325–347. Copyright Chapter 7 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2006. “Democracy and Environmental c Degradation,” International Studies Quarterly 50(4):935–956. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing. Chapter 8 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2007. “The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial Environment,” Conflict Management and Peace Science c 2007 Taylor & Francis. 24(3):219–238. Copyright This book has grown out of our decade-long joint research and collaboration, friendship, and many debates since we first met in 1999. The quality of our joint scholarship has benefited from both our agreements and our disagreements, all of which we were ultimately able to resolve with a smile. Without our mutual willingness to listen and compromise, and our continuous mutual support and trust, this book would not have come into being. Finally, our families have been important to the completion of this book. We owe many thanks to our respective parents in China and Israel, Li Maoji and Kuang Juying, and Mordechai and Ora Reuveny, for their unending support. Our spouses and children, Liu, Ellen, and Andrew, and Ronit, Adi, and Noam, have given so much support, encouragement, and meaning to our work that we feel we must dedicate this book to them.
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Complex Transformations QUAN LI Texas A&M University
RAFAEL REUVENY Indiana University
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521491433 © Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13
978-0-511-65157-1
eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-49143-3
Hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-72890-4
Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
page vii
Acknowledgments 1
ix
Introduction
1
PART I: THE DEMOCRACY–ECONOMY NEXUS
2
Democracy and Economic Openness
23
3
Democracy, Economic Openness, and Income Inequality
62
4
Democracy and Development
89
PART II: BRINGING IN CONFLICT
5
Democracy and Conflict
125
6
Economic Openness and Conflict
158
PART III: BRINGING IN THE ENVIRONMENT
7
Democracy and the Environment
205
8
Economic Openness and the Environment
239
9
Conflict and the Environment
266
Conclusion
292
10
References
309
Author Index
337
Subject Index
344
v
List of Figures and Tables
FIGURES 1.1. Graphical layout of the book 6.1. Disaggregated bilateral trade equilibrium 10.1. Graphical layout of key findings
page 5 167 294
TABLES 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.A1. 2.A2. 2.A3. 3.1. 3.A1. 3.A2. 3.A3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.A1. 4.A2.
Globalization promotes democracy Globalization obstructs democracy Globalization does not necessarily affect democracy Effects of economic globalization on democracy Pooled time-series cross-sectional models of democracy by decade OLS estimates with additional control variables or Freedom House data Parameter estimates from alternative estimators Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness Interactive effect of democracy and FDI on income inequality Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness (all countries) Effects of democracy and economic openness in DCs and LDCs Variables and expected effects in the simultaneous equations Democracy and development, 2SLS Democracy and development, 3SLS Democracy and development, 2SLS-Kiviet
vii
28 31 34 39 54 55 57 74 84 86 88 100 103 120 121
viii
List of Figures and Tables
5.1. Expectation of direction of effects in the simultaneous equations 5.2. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict 5.3. Probabilities and relative risks of MID involvement 5.A1. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict, controlling for affinity 6.1. Trade categories and conflict expectations 6.2. Effects of bilateral import and export in five sectors on MID initiation 6.A1. Equality tests on significant positive and negative effects of sectoral trade flows 6.A2. In-sample prediction of MID initiation 6.A3. Effects of bilateral sectoral flows on display of force and use of force 7.1. Effect of level of democracy on environmental degradation 7.2. Effect of democracy on environmental degradation 7.3. Effect of autocracy on environmental degradation 7.4. Effect of political regime type on environmental composites 8.1A–C. Summary of causal mechanisms 8.2. Effects of democracy and trade openness on deforestation and land degradation 8.A1. Effects of democracy and trade openness on deforestation 8.A2. Effects of democracy and trade openness on land degradation 9.1. War and CO2 emissions per capita 9.2. War and deforestation 9.A1. War, cubic GDP per capita, CO2 emissions per capita, and deforestation 9.A2. War and CO2 emissions per capita, omitting the lagged dependent variable
139 142 143 156 171 176 200 200 201 217 220 221 223 249 254 262 264 275 277 289 290
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been possible without the support of many friends, colleagues, and students at the Pennsylvania State University, Indiana University, and Texas A&M University. Our many friends and colleagues in political science and economics also offered numerous useful comments, criticisms, and suggestions regarding the various parts of our project, which were presented in earlier forms at many professional conferences, workshops, and seminars. We thank them all even though it is not possible to enumerate all those who played a role in some stage of our research project. We give special thanks to Jim Eisenstein, Frank Baumgartner, Evan Ringquist, and the reviewers for Cambridge University Press for their comments and suggestions directed at various parts of our book manuscript. Daehee Bak, Andreea Mihalache, Sam Sniderman, Ashley Allen Peterson, Leslie McDonald, Melanie Arnold, and Matt Warhol provided valuable research and editorial assistance, for which we are grateful. We also warmly thank Scott Parris at Cambridge University Press, who is the best editor an author could hope for. We deeply value his guidance throughout the different phases of this project. Scott’s assistant, Adam Levine, provided excellent editorial assistance. Himanshu Abrol effectively oversaw the production of our book, and Heather Phillips did a thorough job copyediting the manuscript. Five chapters of our book draw upon our previously published journal articles. We want to thank Blackwell Publishing, Cambridge University Press, Sage Publishing, and Taylor & Francis for their permission to use materials from those journal articles for this project. Chapter 2 is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the following article: Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science c 2003 Cambridge University Press. 33(1):29–54. Copyright ix
ONE
Introduction
Two important and complex transformations have characterized the global political–economic system since the end of World War II in 1945. One transformation is the rise and spread of democracy over time and across countries. By the term democracy, we mean a national system of political governance based on free elections and broad political representation. We conceptualize this concept as a continuum of political regime types, ranging from full autocracy at one end to full democracy at the other end. The second transformation is the expansion and deepening of globalization. In recent decades, globalization has been a popular term but is more complex to define than democracy. Scholars typically employ this term to describe recent global transformations toward growing cross-national interconnectedness. Although many scholars tend to focus on the interconnectedness features of particular interest to their own disciplines, some take a broader perspective. For example, Held et al. (2009) cast a wide net, covering essentially all the transformations that have increased international interconnectedness, including political-legal (e.g., growth of international treaties and institutions), military (e.g., disputes, growth of armies, and weapon proliferation), communication and informational (e.g., Internet, telephone, and media), economic flows (e.g., trade and investments), knowledge flows (technology transfers and education), taste convergence (e.g., consumption preferences), social contacts (e.g., migration and tourism), and environmental developments (e.g., pollution and changes in the biosphere), as well as the national and international income inequalities resulting from these processes. Whereas the scope and meaning of globalization are controversial, most scholars agree that, at a minimum, economic globalization implies that countries are becoming more integrated into the world economy, with increasing information flows among them. Greater economic integration, in turn, implies more trade, investment, and financial 1
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
flows, or rising economic openness. We also adopt this conceptualization in our book. Questions that pertain to democracy and globalization have attracted the attention of scholars, policymakers, and the public at large. These questions stand at the center of our book. We believe it is best to describe our analytical focus by situating it within a big picture of world affairs. THE BIG PICTURE AND OUR ANALYTICAL FOCUS
Let us assume we are charged by an intergovernmental organization, comprising all the countries in the world, with the mission to address two questions. First, assuming other things do not change (e.g., public policies, state of technology, and human preferences), what will be the national trajectories of key forces such as income inequality, economic development, democratic governance, military conflict, and environmental degradation in the next decade? Second, assuming other things do not change, how will these economic, political, and environmental trajectories change if we alter certain policies to promote democracy and encourage economic openness? Fundamentally these questions point to the implications of democracy and economic openness for the world in which we live. Answering these questions helps to predict the evolution of the global system. Although no one can absolutely predict the future, we might be able to say something informative about it if we can explain current and past developments. Indeed, almost all the predictions in the social sciences use the present and recent past as a baseline. The logic driving this approach is straightforward. Because we try to say something about the near future, not the very distant future, we and our immediate offspring will probably still be around. It follows logically that the behavior of the socioeconomic– political–environmental system in the near future is connected to the state of affairs in the present and recent past. This book is not about forecasting the future but rather provides a sound analytical basis for such an exercise. The ultimate goal is to say something new and informative about the direction and magnitude of global transformations, defined in the spirit of Held et al. (2009), that are expected for the near future. To that effect, we must understand theoretically and empirically the interconnections among the relevant forces in a big picture of the world, which is what this book is about. Going deeper into our purpose in this book, we note that both economic openness and democracy have expanded dramatically over the past six decades. The number of democracies has increased considerably, spreading
Introduction
3
from Western Europe and North America to almost all the regions in the world. Meanwhile, the world economy has witnessed an unprecedented expansion in the volume and patterns of international commerce, crossborder investments, and international production.1 It is reasonable to assume, which is the basic argument we make and evaluate in this book, that democracy and economic openness, as two important and rapidly changing forces, must have left their marks on many other forces in the international system. We are particularly interested in the consequences of democracy and economic openness for three important aspects of life on Earth: the economy, the polity, and the environment. One can study the economic, political, and environmental aspects of life on Earth at different levels of analysis, including individual, subnational, national, regional, continental, and planetary. We focus on two levels of analysis: the monadic state and the dyadic interstate. Our choice is not arbitrary, for we submit that the nation-state remains the most important and influential actor in the international system despite the rising challenges from various nonstate actors. What should we study in terms of the economy, the polity, and the environment? The national economy covers many dimensions, such as the level of development, income distribution, money, investment, saving, taxation, innovation, and so on, whereas the national polity may concern forces, such as the government, the party system, civil society, social cleavages, the law and property rights institutions, and so forth. We could also examine the international aspects of the national polity that involve how states interact with each other. In the environmental domain, there are many aspects that concern nation-states, beginning with how they reach agreements over the environment, the way they treat their own environments, their abilities to provide resources, their levels of food sufficiency (as all types of food ultimately come from environmental sources), and so on. We recognize that, naturally, we cannot study everything at once. Such a study is not only overly complex but also largely intractable. We also face considerable difficulty communicating our findings to the scholarly and policymaking communities, toward which we aim our book. Therefore, we concentrate on the consequences of democracy and economic openness for some key aspects of the national economy, polity, and environment. 1
Information and communication technology (ICT) and immigration are also relevant. But in this book we emphasize on economic globalization (i.e., flows of goods and capital). One should note that the current globalization wave, which stands at the center of our book, involves much smaller immigration flows than globalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereas ICT is highly correlated with GDP per capita, which is part of our analysis.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
For the national economy, we focus on the national level of economic development and the national distribution of income. These two forces are important for any country. They inform us about the average standard of living in a country and the distribution of this standard across the population. The importance of economic development for human welfare goes without saying, and the effects exceed economics. The lack of economic development tends to beget grievances, increasing the likelihood of political instability. Spillovers into the environment also occur as poor countries, preoccupied with the immediate needs of subsistence, spend less on environmental regulation and cleanups. A skewed income distribution will most likely make things even worse. As the poor compare their situation to that of the rich, their grievances grow stronger, causing the political regime to break down in some cases. In sum, we are interested in furthering our understanding of how democracy and economic openness influence income distribution and economic development. For the polity, we are interested in the determinants of national democratic governance and interstate military conflict. It is no exaggeration to claim that these two phenomena are among the most salient issues in international relations and in political science in general. From a normative perspective, democracy and world peace are desirable, for they appeal to the longings of most human beings. In reality, however, democracy and world peace are often difficult to achieve and sustain. The scarcity of resources and the human desire to dominate others have also been with us for millennia, leading to conflicts of interest among individuals and between nation-states. Democratic governance is an important human-engineered institutional solution for resolving conflicts among people and groups living within national territorial boundaries. In the current international system, which operates on principles of anarchy and state sovereignty, interstate military conflict is often employed as an instrument for resolving disagreements among nation states. We seek to find out how the forces of globalization affect the prospect of democratic governance and how democracy and economic openness influence interstate military conflict. For many years, the environment was on the margin of scientific inquiry and policy analysis. As long as the economy was small in size relative to the environment in which it resided, and as long as the activities of the polity did not exert a large effect on the environment, one could arguably accept this neglect both intellectually and in public policy. Yet conditions have changed in recent decades. Human activities have increasingly caused environmental degradations of various types, impacting human conditions around the world and the global climate system. Environmental concerns
Introduction
5
Figure 1.1. Graphical layout of the book.
are no longer marginal issues. In light of these changing conditions, we believe it is important to expand research on the links between our forces of interest and the environment and to address such critical questions as whether spreading democracy, rising trade, and political violence are good or bad for the environment. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, ANALYTICAL APPROACH, AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The previous section described the primary elements of the big picture we study in this book. This section presents our analytical approach, lays out the conceptual framework within which we operate, and highlights the new things we bring to the table. Figure 1.1 displays a graphical blueprint of our inquiry. Although the interactions we study are in fact more complex and intricate than the figure illustrates, we believe this blueprint is a useful way to guide and visualize the overall structure of our inquiry. The forces of democracy and economic openness stand at the center of the figure, indicating the analytical foci of our conceptual framework. One set of arrows flows from the center to the national economy in the upper part of Figure 1.1, corresponding to the focus on the economy. The national
6
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
economy is represented by the national level of economic development and the national level of income inequality. The two-sided arrow flowing between democracy and the national economy represents their effects on each other. We will study the reciprocal effects between democracy and the level of economic development as well as the effects between democracy and income inequality. The arrow from economic openness to the national economy indicates that we will investigate how openness influences income inequality and development. The arrow from economic openness to democracy and the set of arrows from the center to military conflict in the bottom right of Figure 1.1 indicate the part of our analysis focusing on the polity. With respect to the polity, we conduct two analyses. First, we examine how economic openness affects democracy. Second, we study the effects of economic openness and democracy on military conflict. The set of arrows that flows from the center to the environment in the bottom left of Figure 1.1 represents our focus on the environment. The arrows leading from economic openness and democracy to the environment indicate that we study how democracy and economic openness affect the environment. Finally, we consider the effect of military conflict on the environment. We seek to shed new light on the causal interactions indicated in Figure 1.1, but the channels depicted in Figure 1.1 do not exhaust all possibilities. The arrows shown in the figure represent the channels we study in this book. They involve some of the most important and intriguing questions in the fields of international political economy, international relations, comparative politics, environmental economics, and global environmental politics. Thus, the reader should construe the conceptual layout in Figure 1.1 as a road map for the structure of our book, not as a model per se. Each of the primary causes and effects in Figure 1.1 is addressed in a separate chapter in the book. We adopt a quantitative and sometimes formal approach to study the complex interconnections in Figure 1.1 for several reasons. The various interconnections are modeled separately in the respective chapters, assuming other things do not change, but the findings are integrated in the concluding chapter. In the context of Figure 1.1, each primary cause and effect translates into a statistical model in the respective chapter. The effect (i.e., the phenomenon we seek to explain) is called the dependent variable or the left-hand-side variable in a statistical model. The causal determinants of the effect are referred to as independent or right-hand-side variables in the statistical model. We typically refer to the primary causal factor in a
Introduction
7
chapter as the key independent variable, and we call the other relevant, but secondary, independent variables in the model control variables. Of course, a key independent variable in one chapter often becomes a control variable in another chapter, and vice versa. In the quantitative approach, we conduct statistical tests of the hypotheses to ascertain whether the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable is statistically different from zero (where zero means no effect), and we compute the size of the effect for each relationship that is significantly different from zero. We employ large samples of real-world data and, where appropriate, we also evaluate the robustness of our findings in subsamples and with different measurements and statistical techniques. We seek robust, valid statistical inferences that answer the important questions we and others raise. The advantages of the quantitative approach are fully exploited. First, systematic quantitative analysis allows us to study some forces in detail while controlling for many other relevant factors to prevent spurious findings. Second, the quantitative analysis identifies the average cause-and-effect statistical association and allows the analyst to evaluate whether a theoretically hypothesized relationship is statistically different from zero in the empirical data. This approach is important if we seek to build theories that are empirically valid and generalizable and if we intend to adopt policies that may actually work. Third, the use of large samples of real-world data often prevents subjective case-selection bias and uncovers general patterns, which is critical if we want to understand how the world generally works. Fourth, systematic statistical analysis also enables us to evaluate the robustness of our findings when we vary measurements, samples, and statistical techniques. Finally, the quantitative approach offers a valuable opportunity for us to gauge the substantive size of an effect that is statistically different from zero, which provides useful information for policymakers who have to contemplate the effectiveness of public policies and the various trade-offs associated with competing policy objectives. Therefore, we believe that the statistical approach contributes with rigor and clarity new insights to our analysis of significant issues. Of course, the statistical modeling approach is not without limitations common to all studies of this type. First, we are aware that our approach may be more technical and numerical than that in many, though not all, of the books on these topics, possibly posing challenges to some readers. To make the findings more accessible to the general readership, we write out explicitly the estimated statistical models accompanied by detailed explanations, present one main set of statistical results, and describe the formal
8
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
and statistical models and their results in a way that does not require prior training in statistics or mathematics for comprehension. We relegate all the technical details to the chapter appendices. Readers who are interested in the substance of our findings only need to read the main text; those who are interested in the technical details can obtain the relevant information from the appendices. We believe that such organization of the presentation makes the book highly readable for a wide audience. Second, statistical findings imply probabilistic statements regarding relationships of interest, and they are not intended to depict or forecast each particular case. Where appropriate, we highlight some real-world cases for illustration. But in essence, our analysis is statistical and reflects average patterns in the real world. Finally, statistical models typically include a limited number of variables, relegating other possible influences to the error term. In other words, we should and do make further assumptions concerning which variables to include in each model. At the same time, these assumptions are not arbitrary; rather they are based on theoretical considerations and, to a large extent, previous studies. Our book brings at least three new things to the table, which other studies of our topics have typically not attempted to achieve thus far. First, we model a relatively large number of forces and topics pertaining to globalization and democracy. Previous scholarly works on these topics tend to be compartmentalized, focusing on one or two aspects of the global system. We acknowledge and model explicitly the economic, political, and environmental dimensions of the global system and their interconnections. Taken together, the findings from the different chapters form a relatively more holistic and integrative view of the inner workings of our world than previous research. Second, because we study seemingly diverse topics in a conceptually coherent framework and treat these topics as different components of a big picture, we are able to uncover interconnections that have thus far received little attention. Finally, because all the analyses employ statistical modeling, we have one coherent methodological approach throughout the book, which controls for various confounding forces, rigorously tests the relationships of interest, estimates the magnitude of each key relationship, and enables us to uncover general patterns. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
Our book consists of three parts, and democracy and economic openness run through all of them. The first part examines the relationships among
Introduction
9
democracy, openness, and the national economy. The second part investigates the relationships between democracy and openness, on the one hand, and interstate military conflict, on the other hand. The third part of the book studies the relationships among openness, democracy, and conflict, on the one hand, and various indicators of environmental degradation, on the other. Given the complexity of our topics, each chapter typically employs, as an anchor, one of the two core concepts – democracy or openness – relegating the other to the secondary role. As a preview, we discuss the gist of each chapter, focusing on the organization and flow of the argument and summarizing the key findings. The book includes eight main analyses or chapters, each pertaining to a part of the big picture. The organizational structure of each substantive chapter (2–9) is similar. We begin each chapter by stating the research question(s) and the theoretical argument(s) concerning the relationship(s) studied. On the basis of the theoretical argument(s), we turn to the empirical research that specifies the statistical model, clarifies important research design issues, and describes the primary findings in light of the arguments posited at the beginning of the chapter. The technical details pertaining to each chapter are in the chapter appendix, which follows the general flow of the discussion in the body of the chapter. The first and last chapters of the book integrate the eight analyses into a larger picture, but do so with different levels of detail. The current chapter introduces the book, focusing on the conceptual framework, analytical focus and approach, and structure. The concluding chapter of the book summarizes the key findings by incorporating them into a revised and much more elaborate version of Figure 1.1, suggests avenues for future research, emphasizes key policy implications, and evaluates the trade-offs and tensions that result from different policy objectives such as economic development versus environmental quality, economic development versus equitable distribution of income, democracy versus environmental quality, economic liberalization versus political liberalization, and democracy versus national security.
Part I: The Democracy–Economy Nexus Part I of the book focuses on the democracy–economy nexus. We begin our analyses by looking at the two key variables in our book, democracy and economic openness. In Chapter 2, we study the effects of economic openness on democracy, controlling for the important influences of economic development and income distribution. We ask whether more integration
10
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
into the world economy and the wider spread of democratic ideas and norms across countries lead to a rise or decline of democratic governance. This question has captured the attention of policymakers and academic scholars alike, who have provided various answers and policy recommendations. Anecdotal evidence is typically invoked in debates, but systematic evidence is scarce. To answer our question, we examine the effects of trade flows, foreign direct investment flows, financial investment flows, and the spread of democratic ideas on the level of democracy in a country. Our statistical analysis suggests that trade openness and portfolio investment inflows reduce democracy. The effect of trade openness is constant over time, whereas the negative effect of financial investment grows stronger. Foreign direct investment inflows promote democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas is persistently conducive to democracy over time. In Chapter 3, we examine the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality within countries. Although the issue of income inequality was central in classical economics – the body of thought that emanated from the writings of the liberal philosophers of the nineteenth century – it has received relatively little attention in neoclassical economics, the body of thought and knowledge in modern mainstream economics. We believe that the issue of income inequality deserves more attention, because commercial liberalism, or free market–oriented capitalism, and republican liberalism, or democracy as a form of political governance, are not easy companions. Whereas democracy is based on the principles of “one person, one vote” and representative government, capitalism is based on the principles of laissez-faire and private enterprise. Furthermore, democracy is often associated with redistributive policies (e.g., progressive taxation), but capitalism typically rewards heterogeneous individuals with different levels of income. Hence, democracy may suppress income inequality, but capitalism promotes income inequality. A skewed income distribution under capitalism could lead to an asymmetric distribution of political power, which could undermine democracy and, therefore, its effect on income inequality within a country. Turning to the empirical analysis of Chapter 3, we argue that the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality should be analyzed together rather than in separate models that include one force and exclude the other. Economic openness is measured based on national trade flows, foreign direct investment inflows, and financial capital inflows; income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of each country in the sample. We find that democracy and trade openness reduce income
Introduction
11
inequality, foreign direct investments increase income inequality, and financial capital inflows do not affect income inequality. We also find, however, that democratic governance mitigates the inequality-increasing effect of foreign direct investments in the advanced industrial democracies. In Chapter 4, we bring development into the story, focusing on the relationship between democracy and economic development. We open the democracy–development box, this time relegating economic openness to a control variable, and study the interactions between democracy and economic development. The democracy–development relationship not only is central to much academic research but also has significant policy implications. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs argues that “democracies consistently outperform autocracies” in economic development (Siegle et al., 2004: 57). U.S. President George W. Bush, the authors write, supports having democratic governance “as qualifying criteria for countries to receive assistance . . . The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), still the major development actor in the U.S. government, should also offer preferential treatment to democracies and target its assistance to help countries undertaking democratic reforms” (2004: 67). Normatively speaking, democratic governance, which favors equal participation, equal political rights, and equal civil liberties, is of course worthy of promotion. The argument in the Foreign Affairs essay, however, justifies the promotion of democracy as a means to increase economic development. Does democracy really encourage economic development? The Foreign Affairs essay presents anecdotal evidence to support its argument, but it does not take into account the possibility that the causality between democracy and development could flow from development to democracy. We argue that sorting out the causal direction between democracy and development is very important. If the goal is to promote democracy but the causation goes from development to democracy, we should not condition the distribution of aid to poor countries on instituting democratic reforms. In this case, we should condition aid on forces such as the quality of projects, market reforms, or investment in education. The issue of causation between democracy and development stands at the center of Chapter 4. We specify and estimate a statistical simultaneousequations model, which allows for reciprocal effects between the level of development and the level of democracy. This modeling approach rigorously evaluates the nature of the relationship, that is, whether democracy affects development only, development affects democracy only, they affect each other, or they are not related statistically. The empirical results indicate that a rise in the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development,
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
whereas a rise in the level of economic development promotes democracy. It is not difficult to imagine the important policy implications of these findings.
Part II: Bringing in Conflict In Part II, we introduce into our book a new force – interstate military conflict. Interstate political relations behave like a continuum of types of interstate interactions, spanning from full cooperation to full-scale war. In measuring the concept of conflict, some scholars consider it a continuum, whereas others focus on the discrete events that involve violence only. In this book, we employ the latter approach, focusing on militarized interstate disputes, for these types of interstate interactions have the most damaging consequences to human society. In Chapter 5, we focus on how democracy affects conflict, controlling for economic openness. This concerns the famous democratic peace proposition in the field of international relations. Democracies are highly unlikely to go to war with each other, which suggests that the spread of democracy in the international system implies the spread of peace. This idea has been around for many years and can be traced to the writings of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The modern, empirical-statistical incarnation of this argument takes the form of a simple and powerful claim: democracies rarely, if at all, go to war with one another. This is not to say democracies may not exhibit conflict with one another at times, or that they may never fight with one another. It only means that they are less likely to fight each other than to fight autocracies, and they are less likely to do so than two autocracies. The empirical literature concerning the democratic peace proposition has been arguably the largest in the field of international relations over the past two decades. The bulk of this literature shares a similar design, employing the dyadic level of analysis and estimating single-equation models. The dependent variable is typically dichotomous, measuring the presence or absence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). The models typically include a measure of joint (dyadic) democracy as the key independent variable and control for various confounding forces. The vast majority of studies report that the probability of a MID between two countries declines as joint democracy increases. A few studies, however, reject this argument and do not find supporting evidence. At the same time, another separate, growing body of literature in international relations argues that conflict affects democracy. Although scholars debate the direction of the effect of conflict on democracy, they seem to
Introduction
13
agree that some type of effect exists. Conceptually, these studies form a subset of the large monadic country-level literature within comparative politics that studies the determinants of national democracy. The argument that conflict affects democracy is intriguing because it implies the possibility that results of the effect of democracy on conflict may in fact have merely captured the effect of conflict on democracy. At any rate, the democratic peace literature and studies that address the effect of conflict on democracy have basically ignored the insights offered by one another. In particular, the effect of joint democracy on conflict has been treated as unidirectional by international relations scholars even though it has been demonstrated elsewhere that conflict affects democracy. By taking the two bodies of literature into account, one can reasonably argue that conflict and democracy affect each other simultaneously. Chapter 5 evaluates this possibility empirically. We develop an innovative simultaneous-equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict for a large number of countries over many years. We find that dyadic military dispute reduces the level of joint democracy of two countries, and that the level of joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. Our findings vindicate the main arguments in two separate bodies of literature. But we offer important caveats concerning the size of the effect of democracy on conflict, which is somewhat smaller than in previous research. In Chapter 6, we study how trade, as an important aspect of economic openness, affects conflict. This involves another salient controversy – the effect of trade on peace – among academics and practitioners, which has important theoretical and policy implications. We contribute to this debate with new theoretical and empirical insights. The intellectual history of competing positions on the relationship between trade and conflict is long. The idea that international trade promotes peace traces back to the great works of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, French social commentator and political thinker Baron de Montesquieu, English philosopher and economist Adam Smith, and early-nineteenth-century English journalist and member of the Parliament Norman Angell. The antithesis that trade begets political disagreement and even military conflict also has a long history, appearing in the writings of such important policymakers as Vladimir Ilich Lenin, political scientist Kenneth Waltz, and political economist Albert Hirschman. Among contemporary social scientific studies, the pacifying effect of trade has two explanations: the liberal argument and the bargaining argument, whereas the conflict-generating effect of trade is often explained from a neo-Marxist view or a neomercantilist derivative of realism. Scholars have
14
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
proved formally the logical consistency of the liberal and bargaining arguments. However, both formal models consider aggregated or total trade, ignoring variations of trade across economic sectors and flow directions (export and import). Almost all recent empirical studies have focused on the dyad as the unit of analysis and have employed data on total bilateral trade flows, computed as the sum of export and import flows in a dyad. Only a few studies examine the effect of bilateral trade in various sectors on international political conflict, but they fail to provide a microfoundation formally, they do not focus on military conflict, they have small samples, and they fail to distinguish between imports and exports. In this chapter, we challenge the prevalent approach and offer a theoretical formal model to explain how export and import flows in specific economic sectors influence the decision to initiate military conflict, a question almost all previous theories have ignored. Our model indicates that one country’s sectoral imports and exports influence the conflict it initiates toward another country through the expected effects the conflict will have on the prices of these trade flows. These effects reflect the sensitivities of sectoral import demand and sectoral export supply to military violence and, fundamentally, whether a country expects to benefit from initiating conflict in terms of less cost on imports or more revenue from exports. We employ these principles to generate hypotheses regarding the effects of export and import in specific goods on the likelihood of military conflict. We test the hypotheses using a data set covering many countries for almost three decades. The findings support our expectations on the effects of specific imports and exports broken down along sectors or goods. In particular, we are able to identify traded goods whose export and import flows increase the likelihood of conflict, goods whose trade flows reduce the likelihood of conflict, and goods that have no effect on conflict. Our research in this chapter leads to new insights on a long-standing debate in international relations, compelling scholars to rethink the logic of how trade affects conflict. The theory encompasses the liberal argument as a special case and offers an alternative explanation to the bargaining, neo-Marxist, neomercantilist realist, and classical realist arguments. It also has various important policy implications.
Part III: Bringing in the Environment Part III focuses on how the polity and the economy influence the physical and biological environments of countries or their biospheres. Specifically, we study the effects of democracy, economic openness, and military conflict on
Introduction
15
human activities that degrade the environment. The impact of these forces on the state of the environment has not received wide attention from political scientists, economists, or policymakers. We believe that this relative neglect will likely change as the global environment continues to degrade and environmental concerns and issues acquire salience in the public discourse. Chapter 7 focuses on the effect of democratic governance in a country on various aspects of its environment such as land, air, water, and vegetation. In recent years, the democracy–environment relationship has received some attention from theorists and is controversial. We begin the chapter by discussing various theoretical arguments on the effects of democracy on the environment. Some theorists claim that democracy reduces environmental degradation, whereas others argue that democracy has no effect on environmental degradation at best and may harm the environment at worst. Despite the growing importance of the issue, existing empirical evidence is relatively scant and mixed. Extant results also do not pertain to the same type of environmental variables. Some scholars examine government commitment to environmental quality in terms of signing international agreements to protect the environment, others investigate resource scarcity and access to environmental amenities such as safe water or sanitation, and a third group explores human activities harmful to the environment. Although the focal points of these analyses are undoubtedly important, we believe it is essential to study human actions that directly damage the environment because the best way to protect the environment is to minimize the damage in the first place. The empirical analysis examines five salient, specific types of humaninduced degradation: carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, land degradation, rate of deforestation, and organic pollution in water. We also look at an aggregate indicator of environmental degradation that may be interpreted as a measure of sustainable development. The results demonstrate that a rise in democracy reduces CO2 emissions, NOx emissions, land degradation, water pollution, and the aggregate measure of environmental degradation, but it raises the rate of deforestation. The size of the effect varies from small to substantial, depending on the particular environmental attribute at issue. The findings suggest that one should not treat democracy as a magic solution to environmental problems. Chapter 8 examines how international trade and its interaction with democratic governance influence the terrestrial environment. As international trade flows have become more and more important in the global economy, their effects on the environment have attracted more and more
16
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
attention. In principle, international trade may directly increase or decrease environmental degradation by changing the patterns of consumption, production, and investment; affecting the production technology; and influencing government regulatory policies. However, scholars disagree on the nature of the overall effect of trade on the environment. In one view, trade reduces environmental degradation and promotes environmental quality. In another view, trade can harm the environment, increasing environmental degradation. Most of these studies do not consider the effects of both trade and democracy, and certainly not their interactive effect on the environment. The empirical analysis in Chapter 8 studies the effects of trade on land degradation and the rate of deforestation within countries. These attributes are important because land quality is crucial for food production and deforestation is important to the water cycle, land erosion, and climate change. We include both democracy and trade in the model, examine the effect of trade conditional on democracy by including their interactive term, account for possible differences across continents, and distinguish between developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). We find that a rise in trade openness reduces deforestation in autocracy but raises it in democracy. These effects are similar for LDCs and DCs. A rise in trade openness reduces land degradation, but the effect is not robust and does not depend on regime type. A rise in democracy increases deforestation and reduces land degradation, but these effects are weaker in LDCs than in DCs. The effect of democracy on deforestation is stronger when trade openness increases, and the effect of democracy on land degradation does not depend on trade openness. Chapter 9 studies the effect of warfare on the environment. Many scholars in international relations have examined the effect of environmental factors on warfare. The expectation is that as climate change progresses and environmental degradation intensifies in the world, countries vie for depleted or degraded resources or quarrel about who should carry the costs of environmental damages, resulting in more warfare. This possibility has received attention, but the effect of warfare on the environment has largely been ignored. In empirical studies, the effect of war on the environment has virtually not been studied statistically. To understand how wars affect the environment, we separate them into those fought at home and those fought abroad, because they are likely to have different effects on the environment. We find that the effect of war depends on the location of the conflict and the environmental indicator examined. Wars fought at home or abroad reduce carbon dioxide emissions at home; wars fought at home speed up the deforestation in a country, but
Introduction
17
wars fought abroad slow it down. War could be a boon for the environment sometimes, though we obviously do not think that it is a good idea to use this knowledge to promote war. Chapter 10 concludes our book by performing three tasks. First, we summarize the analyses performed in this book and take stock of our key findings. We flesh out the conceptual framework of Figure 1.1 with our findings, explicitly identifying the sign of each cause–effect arrow we have analyzed and found to be statistically significant. Second, we offer some caveats regarding our analyses and propose some general directions in which one could usefully extend our research. As we noted earlier, one book-length manuscript cannot address all issues. Despite the richness of our models, we believe room always exists for additional research on the complex topics we study in this book. Finally, we highlight the key policy implications and trade-offs that have been revealed by our analyses. They pertain to economic, political, and environmental policies at both national and international levels. We believe that the issues we study and the results we obtain in this book should be of great interest to both academics and practitioners. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this chapter, we have presented our book in a nutshell by highlighting the key questions, issues, motivations, arguments, and findings. What we offer is a fresh look – either theoretically or empirically, or theoretically and empirically – at some of the most intriguing and important questions in contemporary social sciences. Our analysis in this book is relatively complex. We seek theoretical and empirical insights by reaching into a considerable number of issue areas, crossing multiple social science disciplines, linking different bodies of literature, engaging various academic debates, and applying formal and statistical social scientific methods. Our coherent conceptual, methodological, and organizational approach enables us to demonstrate the interconnectedness of different issues, debates, and disciplines among domestic and international forces in the economy, polity, and environment. We believe that our book is unique in that it combines the social scientific approach with a broad, interdisciplinary scope. In terms of the range of topics covered, the one book that comes closest to ours is Global Transformations by David Held and his coauthors (1999). This popular text, however, is more of a survey of the state of knowledge, whereas our book is a statement of an ongoing research program that aims at expanding the extant
18
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
body of knowledge.2 In terms of the methodological approach, many books use the same approach as ours, but their respective substantive coverages are much narrower, focusing on only one or some of the interconnected processes we investigate here. For example, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance by Yi Feng (2003) studies the interrelationship between democracy, regime type, inflation, and economic growth at the nation-state level, ignoring much of the globalization, environmental, and interstate conflict processes. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization by Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) investigates the interrelationships among military conflict, democracy, trade, and international organizations at the dyadic level, ignoring income inequality, development, environment, and aspects of economic globalization other than trade. Growth, Trade, and Systemic Leadership by Rafael Reuveny and William Thompson (2004) explores the long-term dynamics among growth, trade, and a few great powers at the system level, ignoring aspects of globalization other than trade, issues of democracy, income inequality, and the environment. These books are important in their own right, but they fail to address the interconnectedness of several key processes in the global system. We believe that to understand the impact of broad transformations like the spread of democracy and rising economic openness, one has to cross and transcend disciplinary boundaries. To that effect, our book confronts debates in various fields and subfields in the social sciences such as international relations, comparative politics, political economy, environmental politics, environmental economics, and globalization studies. It brings the insights from compartmentalized bodies of literature into direct dialogues and exchanges to produce a better understanding of the inner workings of the international system. Our book is academic, scholarly, and policy-oriented in nature. We orient this book toward a rather broad readership that encompasses scholars, graduate students, undergraduate students in upper-division honors programs, practitioners, and policymakers in the areas of international political economy, international relations, comparative politics, international economics, sociology, political geography, human geography, environmental economics, ecological economics, and environmental studies, as well as those who have broad interdisciplinary interests in the topics we analyze here. Our book ought to help graduate students, scholars, and policymakers get familiar with different debates, literatures, and new ideas in different 2
For another example by Held and his coauthors, see Held and McGrew (2007).
Introduction
19
fields that are interconnected in one framework. It also provides a springboard from which one can continue to investigate both the linkages we study and those linkages we do not study. Because we relegate all the technical materials to the chapter appendices, the general readership interested in the topics and relevant debates can be fully informed of the issues, arguments, and findings simply by reading the main text. Most important, we expect our readers to benefit from the opportunity to confront the various new connections, solutions, and policy trade-offs one could only identify within a larger picture of the world we live in. In an age of complex transformations, it is important to realize that policies and processes often interact in unexpected manners and produce unintended consequences. We must note that we do not cover all the possible cause–effect links, nor is it desirable to do so in one book. Yet it is important to discuss the missing links at the outset so that the analytical boundaries of the book are transparent. The reader may recall the big picture with which we started and gradually narrowed down to Figure 1.1 that represents the essence of our book. Naturally, the causal arrows shown in Figure 1.1 do not exhaust all possibilities. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the causal arrows we study in this book, not all the possible cause–effect links among those forces. One may group the causal arrows “missing” from Figure 1.1 into two types. One type concerns some channels that we include but treat as secondary in the book. For example, the channels from economic development to income distribution (the so-called Kuznets curve) and from development to the environment (the so-called environmental Kuznets curve) are discussed theoretically and analyzed statistically, albeit not in the spotlight of our analysis. A second type of missing arrows involves possible linkages between forces in Figure 1.1, but they are neither shown in the figure nor studied here. Most notably, income distribution, democracy, and interstate military conflict may influence economic openness. In fact, we intentionally treat economic openness as exogenous in this book for two reasons. We do so to focus on the consequences of globalization, for our interest lies in the effects of economic openness on democracy, inequality, development, the environment, and conflict, and the interactions among these forces facing globalization. In addition, this keeps our analysis tractable because the sources of economic openness and globalization are controversial and involve multiple bodies of literature on trade, foreign direct investment, and financial liberalization. Although we do not study these and perhaps other potentially missing channels in this book, we discuss them again in the last chapter as possibilities for future research.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
In closing, this book has grown out of our joint research program in recent years. The fact that several of our chapters have been published in different forms in high-quality journals and scrutinized by peer scholars multiple times speaks to one important strength of our project. But our book does not simply replicate our previous work word-for-word. Rather, we build on, extend, and rewrite our various projects from recent years to integrate them together into one coherent picture and to cater to the broad readership we have in mind. As such, this book amounts to a product whose total size is bigger than the sum of its individual parts. As we explained, the global system has experienced rising interdisciplinary interconnectedness among its different processes and mechanisms. Our previous works, like those of our peers, have emphasized single parts of the ensuing global transformations. We believe that only by putting together separate analyses and identifying their interrelationships can one understand the complex interconnections of these global transformations. With the introduction of the book behind us, we proceed to the next chapter. Chapter 2 begins by observing the growth of globalization forces in recent decades. The question we seek to answer is whether and how these processes affect democracy within national boundaries. To that effect, we conceptualize globalization as the interconnectivity of a country to the world system in the realms of economic and information flows. As we shall see, this interconnectivity may have significant and controversial ramifications for national democratic governance.
PART I
THE DEMOCRACY–ECONOMY NEXUS
TWO
Democracy and Economic Openness
INTRODUCTION
We begin our analytical journey with an analysis of the causal flow from economic openness to democracy, which stands at the center of the conceptual layout of the book in Figure 1.1. The issue we seek to investigate in this chapter is in fact much broader than the components of openness itself; it falls under the umbrella of economic globalization. A popular interpretation of this phenomenon is the gradual turning of separate national economies, each operating in its own domain, into a set of national economies heavily entangled with one another, affecting and being affected by the economic forces operating in other countries in the world much in the same way that the economy of the state of Texas is affected by and affects, for example, the economies of the states of California or Florida in the United States. As noted, the causal relationship of interest falls under the umbrella of the globalization discourse; therefore, we use the terms “economic globalization” and “economic openness” interchangeably. Two questions stand at the core of our investigation in this chapter. Does economic globalization affect the level of democracy? Is deepening integration into the world economy associated with a decline or rise of democratic governance? These questions have captured the imagination of policymakers and academic scholars alike. Various answers have been provided, and policy recommendations have been made. Anecdotal evidence is typically invoked in debates, but systematic evidence is scarce. This chapter seeks to fill this empirical lacuna. The notions of globalization and democracy are widely discussed in the literature. Most scholars agree that, at the minimum, globalization implies that countries are becoming more integrated into the world economy, with increasing information flows among them (e.g., Held et al., 1999, 2009). 23
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
Greater economic integration, in turn, implies more trade and financial openness. A rise in information flow implies, arguably, the spread of ideas and cultural convergence across countries. As we discussed in the previous chapter, most scholars also agree that democracy implies a national political regime based on free elections and broad political representation, and this is the conceptualization of democracy that we continue to use in this chapter and, for that matter, throughout the book. Before we delve further into this chapter, some clarifications are in order. Although the historical developments of both globalization and democracy have been long and cyclical, we will not take a long-term historical slant in this chapter, primarily due to the lack of economic performance and openness data over a long period of time.1 We also note that throughout this book, democracy is conceptualized as a level variable, a continuum of regime types, from fully autocratic at one end to fully democratic at the other. Hence, we use the terms “democracy” and “level of democracy” interchangeably. Returning to our questions for this chapter, the theoretical literature presents conflicting positions on the effect of globalization on the level of democracy: one position claims a positive effect, a second position asserts a negative effect, and a third position argues that globalization does not necessarily affect democracy. The position that globalization promotes democracy is entrenched in the views of recent American presidents, and it has been used as a rationale for promoting international economic liberalization. For example, U.S. President William Clinton (1996) argues that “commerce helps make the world safe for democracy” and U.S. President George W. Bush (2001) claims that “societies that open to commerce across their borders will open to democracy within their borders.” This view garners some support in stylized observations. Lin and Nugent (1995) argue that Korea, Taiwan, and Chile exemplify the positive influence exerted by economic openness on the democratic transitions of their authoritarian regimes. As another example, the opening up of Indonesia to the world economy, despite causing some financial difficulties in the late 1990s, seems to have facilitated the evolution of a more competitive political system in that country. In contrast, history also provides some opposing cases in which economic openness had little or even a negative effect on democracy. For instance, as noted by Flandreau (2007), the liberalization of trade between France 1
On the historical development of globalization, see, e.g., Wallerstein (1974), Cameron (1997), Held et al. (1999), and Held and McGrew (2007). On the historical development of democracy, see, e.g., Huntington (1991), Potter et al. (1997), and Diamond (1999).
Democracy and Economic Openness
25
and Britain in the 1860s was not associated with a change in democracy in France, which was then led by an autocratic regime. The contraction of trade liberalization in the late nineteenth century did not affect the levels of British or French democracy. The opening up of Russia to the world economy in the late nineteenth century, which involved deepening economic relations with democracies, was associated with an increase in its level of autocracy. Democratic governance in the United States evolved largely as an internal matter, not affected much by its increasing contacts with the world in the nineteenth century. Finally, recent increases in the economic openness of Russia and China seem to have led to a decline in the level of democracy in Russia since the late 1990s and have had little impact on the level of democracy in China. Of course, the anecdotal evidence does not demonstrate generalizable patterns across countries. Moreover, historical cases may not be applicable to the contemporary era. After all, one may argue that the globalization of our times is much more all-embracing than the one that intensified during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This argument in and of itself can make a difference in terms of the direction, not only the size, of the effect of increasing connectivity to the world economy on the level of democracy within a country. Progress in explaining the effect of globalization on democracy requires an empirical evaluation of the three competing theoretical positions. We seek to detect generalizable empirical patterns in the effect of globalization on democracy. As noted, democracy is conceptualized as a continuum. Four national aspects of globalization are examined: trade openness, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, portfolio (financial) investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. Our analysis in this chapter covers 127 countries from 1970 to 1996 in a pooled time-series cross-sectional statistical model. Our primary findings can be summarized as follows. Trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy. The effect of trade openness is constant over time, whereas the negative effect of portfolio investment inflows strengthens democracy. FDI inflows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time. The chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the studies on the determinants of democracy. The section that follows discusses the effects of globalization on democracy, which, as noted and as we shall further demonstrate, are highly controversial. This discussion is followed by a section that describes both research design and findings from the statistical
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
analysis. Understanding this section does not require statistical expertise, for the materials of more technical nature are delegated to the chapter appendix. The last section of this chapter summarizes our main findings and discusses their implications. THE LITERATURE ON DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY
This section reviews the literature on the determinants of democracy. Our review is not meant to be exhaustive but rather seeks to illustrate how our analysis fits into the larger picture. We categorize this voluminous literature into three groups. One group consists of detailed case studies. A second group includes statistical analyses. These two groups, by and large, focus on domestic political and economic variables and pay relatively little attention to international factors. A third group (discussed in the next section) includes largely theoretical studies of the effects of globalization on democracy. In their synthesis of a number of case studies, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) conclude that the effect of international factors on democracy is indirect and marginal. Challenging this conclusion, Pridham (1994) labels international factors as the “forgotten dimensions in the study of domestic transition,” and Schmitter (1996: 27) argues “perhaps, it is time to reconsider the impact of international context upon regime change.” Attempting to bridge this gap among case studies, Whitehead (1996) and Drake (1998) argue that international factors such as the diffusion of democratic ideas and global markets are important determinants of democracy. Among the statistical studies, the dependent variable is democracy, but the independent variables vary. As discussed in the previous chapter, one group of studies argues that economic development positively affects democracy.2 A second group debates the effects of economic crisis, such as recessions and high inflation (Helliwell, 1994; O’Donnell, 1973; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Gasiorowski, 1995). A third group expects positive influences by Christianity and negative effects of social cleavages (Huntington, 1984; Muller, 1988; Gasiorowski, 1995). A fourth group examines the effects of institutions such as constitutional arrangements, nonfragmented party systems, and parliamentary versus presidential systems (e.g., Lijphart, 1977; Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994). Finally, some statistical studies 2
See, e.g., Lipset (1959), Dahl (1989), Huntington (1991), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Muller (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Feng and Zak (1999).
Democracy and Economic Openness
27
consider external factors but not globalization-related variables, such as core-periphery status and diffusion.3 The strengths and weaknesses of case studies and statistical analyses of democracy are debated (e.g., see Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Briefly, statistical studies focus on the macro conditions that facilitate or hinder democracy. Although they can test general theoretical claims and control for competing forces, they are less able to explain the micro processes that affect democracy. Case studies identify detailed microlevel influences, but they are less able to test general theories or to assess the relative strength of causal factors. Our study in this chapter takes a macro approach. However, we believe that the macro and micro approaches to our question provide complementary insights into the determinants of democracy, much as macroeconomic and microeconomic analyses provide complementary insights into the operation of the economy. Our inquiry adopts the spirit of the important qualitative comparative study by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). Like their study, we also study many countries and emphasize the importance of transnational power relations, particularly economic and information flows. In the next section, we discuss how these external forces affect democracy. THE GLOBALIZATION–DEMOCRACY CONTROVERSY
The literature on the effects of globalization on democracy is quite large and mostly theoretical. It posits three competing theoretical positions: globalization promotes democracy, globalization obstructs democracy, and globalization has no systematic effect on democracy. To streamline the presentation of these positions, Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 summarize the arguments from studies supporting each of the three theoretical positions, respectively.
Globalization Promotes Democracy The first proposition listed in Table 2.1 is that globalization promotes democracy by encouraging economic development. The notion that free markets facilitate democracy can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. 3
For example, see Bollen (1983) and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), who study position in the world system. Starr (1991) and Przeworksi et al. (1996) study diffusion of democratic ideas. Gasiorowski (1995) focuses on the effect of economic crisis on democratization but also includes trade openness as a control variable.
28
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 2.1. Globalization promotes democracy
Number
Argument
Discussed in
1
Globalization promotes economic development.
2
Globalization increases the demand of international business for democracy. Globalization reduces the incentives of the authoritarian leaders to cling to power. Globalization reduces information costs, increasing contact with other democracies and making the prodemocracy international nongovernmental organizations more effective. Globalization pushes the authoritarian states to decentralize power. Globalization promotes domestic institutions that support democracy.
Schumpeter (1950), Held (1992), Platner (1993), Weitzman (1993), Bhagwati (1994), Lipset (1994), Muller (1995), Im (1996) Kant (1795), Bhagwati (1994), Schmitter (1996), Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a) Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), Diamond (1995), Drake (1998)
3
4
5
6
7
Globalization intensifies the diffusion of democratic ideas.
Van Hanen (1990), Brunn and Leinback (1991), Diamond (1992a), Schmitter (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kummell (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), Risse and Sikkink (1999) Self (1993), Sheth (1995), Roberts (1996) Roberts (1996), Fruhling (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Stark (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), Risse and Sikkink (1999) Kant (1795), Whitehead (1986, 1996), Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), Przeworski et al. (1996)
In this view, globalization promotes economic growth, increases the size of the middle class, promotes education, and reduces income inequality, all of which foster democracy. Trade, FDI, and financial capital flows are said to allocate resources to their most efficient use; democracy is said to allocate political power to its most efficient use. The outcome in both cases represents the free will of individuals.4 According to a second view, globalization increases the demand of international business for democracy. Business prosperity requires peace and political stability. Because democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other, commercial interests pursue democracy to secure peace and stability. As the 4
See Schumpeter (1942), Held (1992), Platner (1993), Weitzman (1993), Bhagwati (1994), Lipset (1994), Muller (1995), and Im (1996).
Democracy and Economic Openness
29
economic links between states develop, commercial interests strengthen, and the demand for democracy rises. Authoritarian countries that open their economies face greater pressures from international business for political liberalization. Furthermore, in economies open to the transnational flows of commodities and capital, the government and the central bank have to be more transparent in their procedures and policymaking to attract and maintain international business. The increased transparency, in turn, implies less power for the autocratic regime, which can facilitate democratization.5 A third argument is that globalization reduces the incentives of the authoritarian leaders to cling to power. Because the state can extract rents from society, losing office implies the forfeit of these rents. Hence, autocratic rulers cling to power, resisting democracy. However, globalization reduces the capacity of the state to extract rents from society by increasing competition and weakening the effectiveness of economic policies. It follows that leaders of autocracies whose economies are more open are less likely to resist democratization. To the extent that the autocrats believe that providing social welfare for the losers of globalization reduces the latter’s incentive to contest their grip on power, the autocratic leaders should be willing to give their citizens more political rights and civil liberties.6 A fourth view argues that globalization reduces information costs, increasing contacts with other democracies and making the prodemocracy international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) more effective. A prosperous democracy requires well-informed actors. With increasing globalization, citizens have access to more information, supplied not just by their own governments. Economic openness enables the established democracies, aided by their developed media, to export their values to autocracies. Authoritarian regimes now have less control over information. More exposure to the media also strengthens the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks and the INGOs, helping them protect prodemocracy forces in authoritarian regimes and promote democracy.7 According to a fifth view, globalization pushes the authoritarian state to decentralize power. As globalization deepens, states relinquish control over economic and social progress to the market, which is “inherently democratic” – as if millions of economic agents cast their “votes” voluntarily. 5 6 7
See Kant (1795), Bhagwati (1994), Schmitter (1996), Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a), and Dailami (2000). See Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), Diamond (1995), and Drake (1998). For the effect of social welfare spending and globalization, see Rudra (2005). See Van Hanen (1990), Brunn and Leinback (1991), Diamond (1992a), Schmitter (1996), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kummell (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), and Risse and Sikkink (1999).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
The weakened state also implies the entrance of grassroots groups into the political arena (e.g., business and professional associations, labor unions). Citizens become more involved in the day-to-day governance of the country, facilitating democracy.8 A sixth view argues that globalization strengthens domestic institutions that support democracy. Because the efficient operation of the market requires an enforceable system of property rights and impartial courts, economic openness compels the popularization of norms respecting the rule of law and civil and human rights. The increased involvement of international business and INGOs in the domestic economy further promotes the transparency and accountability of domestic institutions and reduces state intervention, all of which are said to facilitate democracy.9 According to a seventh view, economic globalization intensifies the diffusion of democratic ideas across borders. Transnational movements of commodities, services, and factors of production facilitate and encourage the exchange of norms and ideas, increasing the diversity of political views in a country and indirectly promoting political competition. Scholars argue that the more democracies that surround a certain nondemocratic country, the more likely it is that this country will become democratic. Because greater economic openness is associated with more information flow and transnational contacts, the diffusion of democratic ideas across borders is expected to intensify with growing economic integration. The diffusion of democratic ideas and norms will affect the people in the nondemocratic countries, motivating them to demand democratic reforms.10
Globalization Obstructs Democracy The first argument in Table 2.2 is that globalization reduces state policy autonomy and brings about public policies that please foreign investors instead of the common people. Globalization increases financial capital mobility across countries and facilitates relocation of the means of production, which, in turn, reduces the ability of states to implement domestically oriented economic policies. Another consequence is that governments now try to compete for foreign capital and design their policies to please global
8 9 10
See Self (1993), Sheth (1995), and Roberts (1996). See Roberts (1996), Fruhling (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Stark (1998), Boli and Thomas (1999), and Risse and Sikkink (1999). Kant (1795), Whitehead (1986, 1996), Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), Przeworski et al. (1996), and Dailami (2000).
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Table 2.2. Globalization obstructs democracy Number 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Argument
Discussed in
Globalization reduces state policy autonomy and brings about public policies that please foreign investors instead of the common people. Globalization produces more domestic losers than winners, at least in the short run, and it also diminishes the ability of the state to compensate the losers financially. Globalization enables the fast movement of money between countries, resulting in frequent balance of payment crises and unstable domestic economic performance. Globalization deepens ethnic and class cleavages and diminishes the national-cultural basis of democracy. Globalization enables the state and multinational corporations to control and manipulate information supplied to the public. Globalization degrades the concept of citizenship, an important prerequisite for a functioning and stable democracy. Globalization widens the economic gap between the North and the South.
Lindblom (1977), Held (1991), Diamond (1995), Gill (1995), Jones (1995), Gray (1996), Schmitter (1996), Cox (1997), Cammack (1998) Drucker (1994), Muller (1995), Beck (1996), Bryan and Farrel (1996), Cox (1996), Moran (1996), Marquand (1997), Martin and Schumann (1997), Rodrik (1997), Longworth (1998) Im (1987), MacDonald (1991), Diamond (1992a, 1999), O’Donnell (1994), Trent (1994), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Cammack (1998)
Robertson (1992), Dahl (1994), Im (1996)
Gill (1995), Im (1996), Martin and Schumann (1997)
O’Donnell (1993), Whitehead (1993), Im (1996), Sassen (1996), Cox (1997), Boron (1998) Wallerstein (1974), Bollen (1983), Tarkowski (1989), Przeworski (1991), Gill (1995), Amin (1996), Cox (1996), Im (1996), Kummell (1998)
investors and firms, who may not act in the best interest of, or be held accountable to, the voters. It follows that the level of democracy declines.11 According to a second argument, globalization produces more domestic losers than winners, at least in the short run, and it also diminishes the 11
See Lindblom (1977); Held (1991), Diamond (1995), Gill (1995), Jones (1995), Gray (1996), Cox (1996), Schmitter (1996), and Cammack (1998).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
ability of the state to compensate the losers financially. Domestic producers that cannot compete internationally lose from more economic openness. Trade and financial liberalization also limit the ability of governments to deploy regulation and risk-sharing policies that can redistribute income from winners to losers. Governments that want to compensate the victims of economic openness confront the phenomenon of footloose capital, which in turn shrinks the tax base and penalizes deficit spending. Consequently, governments reduce the scope of welfare programs, and the poor increasingly feel this pinch. The result is rising income inequality and class polarization, which serve to weaken democracy.12 A third view argues that globalization enables the fast movement of money between countries, resulting in frequent balance-of-payment crises and unstable domestic economic performance. In such situations, the less developed countries (LDCs) are compelled to accept economic reforms imposed by the developed countries (DCs) and international organizations, and those reforms typically involve austerity measures. Economic crises hurt the poor more than the rich, raising domestic income inequality. Social unrest then rises, and support for radical opposition groups grows. In an attempt to reassert power, weak democracies resort to authoritarian measures. The electoral technicalities are seemingly retained, but civil rights and the inputs from the elected legislators are increasingly ignored.13 According to a fourth argument, globalization deepens ethnic and class cleavages and diminishes the national-cultural basis of democracy. The losers from economic openness tend to seek a united identity based on ethnicity or religion. The winners may promote discriminatory measures to maintain their edge over the losers. Globalization also induces labor migration across countries. The old comers typically attempt to restrict or eliminate the participation of the immigrants in the political system to reduce their competitiveness. All these actions intensify social cleavages and undermine the consolidation of democracy.14 A fifth argument is that globalization enables the state and the multinational corporations (MNCs) to control and manipulate information supplied to the public. With the help of new information technologies, the state and the MNCs feed to the public processed information that represents 12 13 14
See Drucker (1994), Muller (1995), Beck (1996), Cox (1996), Moran (1996), Marquand (1997), Martin and Schumann (1997), Rodrik (1997), Longworth (1998), and Dailami (2000). See Im (1987), Diamond (1992a, 1999), MacDonald (1991), O’Donnell (1994), Trent (1994), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), and Cammack (1998). See Robertson (1992), Dahl (1994), and Im (1996).
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only certain views. They are also better able to tightly monitor the people’s information sources. The result is a disconnection between the way government decisions are made and the way the public thinks they are made. The government becomes less transparent and less accountable to the people, and the level of democracy declines.15 According to a sixth argument, globalization degrades the concept of citizenship, which is an important prerequisite for a functioning and stable democracy. The global market transforms the individual into a common “Homo economicus” who cares more about profits than public and civic commitments. Individuals pursue their own economic interests, disregarding whether governments practice democratic decision making. Since the public has less interest in the conduct and content of public policy, democracy gradually weakens.16 A seventh argument is that globalization widens the economic gap between the North and the South. Globalization involves mostly DCs, draining capital, technology, and skilled labor from LDCs. With the gap in wealth rising, social unrest increases in LDCs, their elites cling to power, and their governments become less democratic. The dependency story evolves along similar lines. In a world composed of a rich core and a poor periphery, the core dominates the periphery. The elite in the periphery unite with the elite in the core to exploit the masses in the periphery. MNCs relocate to LDCs to enjoy both lower wages and more lax labor and environmental standards and then repatriate profits to the core. The penetration by MNCs distorts the economies in LDCs and sways domestic politics in their own favor, all of which obstruct democracy.17
Globalization Does Not Necessarily Affect Democracy Table 2.3 shows three arguments that question whether globalization has any general effect on democracy. The first argument holds that the extent of globalization is greatly exaggerated. The world economy is not as integrated as is commonly believed. Most international trade takes place within geographical regions, MNCs typically have a home-country bias, and most FDI concentrate in a few advanced countries. Because LDCs generally do not participate in the global economy, the effect of economic openness on 15 16 17
See Gill (1995), Im (1996), and Martin and Schumann (1997). O’Donnell (1993), Im (1996), Sassen (1996), Whitehead (1996), Cox (1997), and Boron (1998). See Wallerstein (1974), Tarkowski (1989), Przeworski (1991), Gill (1995), Amin (1996), Cox (1995), Im (1996), and Kummell (1998).
34
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 2.3. Globalization does not necessarily affect democracy
Number
Arguments
1
The extent of globalization is exaggerated.
2
Globalization does not render the welfare state powerless.
3
Effects of globalization on countries vary.
Discussed in Scharpf (1991), Jones (1995), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Wade (1996), Hirst (1997) Vernon (1971), Kurzer (1993), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Garrett (1999) Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Milner and Keohane (1996), Armijo (1998), Longworth (1998)
their democracy should not be large to begin with. Because DCs are already stable democracies, globalization does not affect their levels of democracy.18 A second argument asserts that globalization does not necessarily render the welfare state powerless. Increased national economic openness originates from the deliberate choices of states. Governments still exert considerable control over their own economies. Moreover, the modern welfare state is still effective because it provides important collective goods undersupplied by markets (e.g., social stability, property rights, infrastructure) and compensates the losers of economic openness. By implication, one can argue that the level of democracy does not necessarily have to decline with economic openness.19 According to a third view, the effects of globalization vary across countries and depend on government policies, a country’s location in the global pecking order, the domestic political institutions, the identity of the domestic winners and losers, whether economic sectors are privatized or not, and the current level of democracy. For example, though globalization-induced economic crises may force the authoritarian regime to exit and be replaced by democracy, these crises, if managed effectively, may instead increase the public support for the authoritarian leader. Hence, the effects of globalization on democracy may not be uniform.20 The arguments summarized in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 all appear to exhibit face validity in terms of logic consistency, and it is not possible to evaluate 18 19 20
See Scharpf (1991), Jones (1995), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Wade (1996), and Hirst (1997). See Frieden and Rogowski (1996) and Garrett (1999). See Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Milner and Keohane (1996), Armijo (1998), and Longworth (1998).
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them based on pure theoretical considerations. In other words, because these arguments reach conflicting conclusions, they need to be evaluated empirically, to which we turn next. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues. Next, the section presents the key results of the empirical analysis. The discussion in this section is self-contained and does not require any specific statistical expertise. Interested readers seeking further details should consult the chapter’s appendix, which discusses various technical issues related to the statistical design and implementation of the regression-based model presented here. The chapter appendix follows the same structure of presentation as in this section.
Empirical Model To assess the competing claims about the effects of globalization on democracy, we specify and estimate the following statistical model of democracy. We denote variables with uppercase letters and their coefficients with Greek notations. Each coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable – the phenomenon we seek to explain. The notation εt denotes the random error that is not explained by the statistical model. The variable subscripts t and t −1 indicate the time period of the variable, where t represents the current period and t −1 the previous time period (a lagged variable). To simplify the presentation, we refer to the variables without their time subscripts t or t −1. The model specification is based on the preceding theoretical discussions and the literature on democratization. It provides a structure for us to guide the statistically uninitiated readers through the empirical exercise. democracyt = 0 + 1 tradet−1 + 2 fdit−1 + 3 portfoliot−1 + 4 diffusiont−1 + 5 inflationt−1 + 6 growtht−1 + 7 developmentt−1 + 8 prior democracyt−1 + 9 year + 10 year∗ fdit−1 + 11 year∗ portfoliot−1 + 12 year∗ inflationt−1 +13 year∗ developmentt−1 +εt . (2.1) In the model, democracy denotes the left-hand-side variable or the dependent variable (the phenomenon we explain), whose determinants are
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
specified on the right-hand side of the equation and dubbed the independent variables. The democracy variable represents the level of democracy in a country in a given year. The level of democracy can be measured quantitatively over a continuum of national attributes ranging from complete autocracy or dictatorship at one end of the continuum to full democracy at the other end of the continuum. The measure construction, described in the appendix, includes both democratic and autocratic characteristics, an approach widely used in the literature. The independent variables divide into two types. One type involves the globalization-related variables, which stand at the center of our study. A second type of independent variable involves other determinants of democracy that have been identified in various other studies. We call the second type of factor control variables. Here we discuss briefly the measurement of these variables. We start with how to measure the notion of globalization. As a multidimensional concept, the integration of states into the world economy needs to be measured from multiple indicators. In our empirical model, globalization is measured by four indicators: trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and diffusion of democratic ideas across countries. The trade variable is a measure of trade openness – the extent to which a country depends on trade with other countries. The fdi variable is a measure of the openness of a country to foreign production capital flowing into a country, which refers to investments that enter a country for the purpose of building plants or acquiring management positions in plants. The portfolio variable is a measure of the openness of a country to financial capital flowing into a country, meaning portfolio investments that enter for the purpose of buying financial securities. The diffusion variable represents the diffusion of democratic ideas into a country, which is measured here by the extent to which a country is affected by democratic ideologies emanating from neighboring countries. Our study is one of the first attempts to assess the effects of globalization on democracy by using multiple indicators in one empirical statistical analysis. Because globalization produces competing effects on democracy through many mechanisms, these globalization indicators help estimate the short-run net effects. Obviously, democracy does not only depend on a country’s economic openness. Control variables must be included to avoid spurious statistical inferences. Although existing studies of the causes of democracy differ when identifying these additional determinants, many studies find that domestic economic factors such as economic development, economic growth,
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and inflation influence democracy.21 The inflation variable measures the yearly rise in price level in a country. The development variable measures the level of economic development in a country and is based on the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is the value of final goods and services produced in a country divided by the country’s population. The growth variable is the yearly growth rate of GDP, which captures the vitality and improvement of economic performance over time in a country. The prior democracy variable denotes the level of democracy in a country in the previous year. This variable controls for the fact that political regimes tend to have inertia and change slowing over time. Theoretically, domestic structural variables (e.g., Protestant population, institutional qualities of the regime, and party fragmentation) and the attributes of the international system may also affect democracy. These additional factors are relatively stable over time, implying that democracy exhibits inertia over time or that the past level of democracy affects the present. The year variable is a yearly counter that serves two functions. By itself, year tests whether the level of democracy has a linear trend, and it also interacts with other variables that have time-varying effects over democracy. It is possible that the effects of economic globalization on the level of democracy at home may change over time. For example, the scope and types of FDI, financial capital investments, and information flows took on a relatively more prominent role in the 1990s than in the 1970s. This change is not unique to the globalization variables. Gasiorowski, for example, finds that the effect of inflation on the likelihood of democratization changes over time. Ignoring this issue altogether may lead to model misspecification. In our exploratory by-decade analysis of which variables have time-varying effects on democracy (presented in Table 2.A1 of the appendix), we find that the effects of development, fdi, portfolio, and inflation on the level of democracy in a country change their signs over time. Hence, our statistical model includes interaction terms between year and these four variables, respectively.
Research Design Issues To implement our statistical model, several design issues must be raised that require some clarification. Although we address the technical details 21
For the three economic variables, see Bollen (1979), Muller (1988), Lipset et al. (1993), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Helliwell (1994), Muller and Seligson (1994),Gasiorowski (1995), Muller (1995), and Feng (1997).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
of these issues in the appendix, here we provide a brief overview for the general reader. First, the variable εt is the so-called error term in the statistical model, that is, the part of the variations in democracy the model does not explain. For statistical inferences to be valid, the error term needs to satisfy some assumptions. If the error term does not have several desirable properties, the accuracy of the results and our ability to make correct inferences is compromised. We address the related assumption violations using appropriate econometric techniques. Second, the relationship between democracy and other variables on the right-hand side may be reciprocal or simultaneous. For example, whereas economic integration variables may affect democracy, they themselves may be affected by democracy. A higher level of democracy may imply lower political risks and more secure property rights, attracting trade and investments (Olson, 1993). Ignoring this possibility can produce incorrect results. We deal with this risk by using the first lag of the right-hand-side variables, as denoted by the subscript t −1 in the model. The third issue concerns sample selection. We take the approach of largeN studies, employing a sample for many countries, where each country is represented by yearly data. More specifically, our sample includes 127 countries from 1970 to 1996. The unit of analysis is the country year. Such a sample design allows us to assess the effect of globalization on democracy over time and across countries and to generalize the inferred results across cases. A fourth issue concerns a complication in sample selection, which has to do with a possible distinction between DCs and LDCs. Most DCs have already achieved high levels of democracy at the beginning of the sample period. On the other hand, many LDCs experienced large variations in their levels of democracy from 1970 to 1996. Although the effects of globalization on the level of democracy may be independent of the development level of a country, it is equally possible that LDCs exhibit patterns in the effects of globalization on democracy distinct from those of DCs. In fact, several authors argue that the adverse effects of globalization on democracy may be stronger in DCs than in LDCs. We investigate this possibility by analyzing the effects of globalization for all countries and then for a sample that excludes DCs as measured by membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Empirical Findings We present the main results of our analysis in Table 2.4 for two samples. One sample includes all the countries for which we have data, whereas the
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Table 2.4. Effects of economic globalization on democracy
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant Observations Adjusted R2
All countries
Non-OECD countries
−0.0029∗∗∗ (0.0010) 5.1906∗ (3.3016) 4.7240∗∗∗ (1.8888) 0.2437∗∗∗ (0.1058) 0.0599∗∗ (0.0350) 0.0068 (0.0084) 34.2597∗∗∗ (11.5024) 0.9269∗∗∗ (0.0109) 0.1514∗∗∗ (0.0505) −0.0026∗ (0.0017) −0.0024∗∗∗ (0.0009) −0.00003∗∗ (0.000017) −0.0172∗∗∗ (0.0058) −301.8202∗∗∗ (100.2552) 2021 0.93
−0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0011) 5.8359∗ (3.7712) 5.3892∗∗ (2.4406) 0.2922∗∗∗ (0.1219) 0.0537∗ (0.0344) 0.0069 (0.0087) 36.7637∗∗∗ (16.8662) 0.9242∗∗∗ (0.0115) 0.1593∗∗∗ (0.0670) −0.0029∗ (0.0019) −0.0027∗∗ (0.0012) −0.000027∗ (0.000017) −0.0184∗∗ (0.0085) −317.8469∗∗∗ (132.8935) 1640 0.90
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
second sample includes only LDCs. The findings for the so-called control variables are consistent with those in previous studies in the democratization literature. This general pattern provides support for our statistical modeling. To sharpen our presentation, we delegate the discussion of control variables to the chapter appendix and focus on the findings of the globalization variables instead. Beginning with the all-countries sample, as shown in the second column of the table, the effect of a rise in trade (the level of trade openness of
40
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
a country) on democracy (the level of democracy in a country) is found to be negative. The finding for trade is consistent with the well-known tendency of trade to generate economic winners and losers in the short run. Although the overall gain from trade outweighs the cost of trade, the process by which the winners compensate the losers is political and slow, and the endogenous domestic economic adjustment process (e.g., movement of labor from losing to winning sectors) is also relatively slow. As such, trade can generate changes in the distribution of income in the short run, giving rise to the type of processes described in the section on the obstructing effects of globalization on democracy. The effect of a rise in fdi (the openness of a country to FDI inflow) on the level of democracy in that country is positive and statistically significant. However, this positive effect declines over time, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term year∗ fdi. More specifically, the total effect of a rise in fdi on the level of democracy, which is given by (5.1906 − 0.0026∗ year), is 0.055 for 1975, 0.029 for 1985, and 0.001 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of a rise in FDI on the level of democracy in a country is positive, but its size is declining over time. These results suggest that a rise in FDI exerts both positive and negative effects on the level of democracy in a country, as discussed earlier, but the negative effect grows over time. On the positive side, FDI can promote economic growth and technological progress. On the negative side, FDI can raise domestic income inequality. The tendency of FDI to quickly relocate to cheaper production places in other nations and the tendency of MNCs to interfere in host countries’ domestic politics (see “The Globalization– Democracy Controversy,” this chapter) may also account for the negative effect of FDI on democracy. The direct effect of a rise in portfolio (the openness of a country to financial flows) on the level of democracy of a country is also positive. However, once the dependence of this particular effect on time is incorporated, as indicated by the interaction term of year∗ portfolio, the total effect comes out negative. Specifically, the total effect of portfolio investment inflows in the all-countries sample, which is given by (4.7240 − 0.0024∗ year), is −0.016 for 1975, −0.04 for 1985, and −0.066 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of portfolio on democracy is negative and strengthens over time. The results for portfolio suggest that a rise in portfolio investments also has both positive and negative effects on democracy, as discussed earlier in the chapter, but the negative effect grows to become dominant in the all-countries sample. The positive main effect of portfolio investments on democracy may reflect the economic discipline financial markets impose on
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governments, which has contributed to greater transparency, better management practices, and stronger property rights institutions. The negative effect may capture the dramatic increase in the ability of portfolio investments to move quickly among countries, which at times leads to financial collapse and devastating sociopolitical outcomes. An increase in diffusion (the number of democracies in the region around a country) raises the level of democracy in that country. Interpreting this variable as a proxy for information flows induced by integration of a country into the world economy, one may argue that democratic ideas and values are more likely to transmit and diffuse to geographically proximate countries. Indirectly, then, this result does not support the claim discussed earlier in the chapter that the increased information flows into a country would reduce the level of democracy in that country. The spread of democratic ideas from one’s neighboring countries improves, rather than hinders, the country’s own level of democracy. The third column in Table 2.4 shows the estimation results obtained for a sample that includes only LDCs. These results match well with those we reported earlier for the sample of all countries. However, two primary differences in results exist between the two samples. One difference involves the sizes of the direct effects of trade, fdi, portfolio, and diffusion (our measures of globalization) on democracy. The coefficients of these variables appear to be larger in the LDC sample than those obtained in the full sample of all countries. We interpret this outcome as a demonstration that a rise in globalization has a larger effect on democracy in LDCs than in DCs. In a way, this result is intuitive since, in the period covered by our sample, the democracy levels of DCs are stable for the most part and hover at, or close to, the highest possible positive level of the democracy indicator. The democracy levels in LDCs, on the other hand, exhibit much larger variations and are more sensitive to the external influences of globalization. A second difference between the two samples concerns the total effect of portfolio on democracy. As in the all-countries sample, once one incorporates the dependence of the democracy effect of portfolio on time, indicated by the interaction term year∗ portfolio, the total effect (5.3892 − 0.0027∗ year) is 0.0567 for 1975, 0.0297 for 1985, and 0 for 1996. Hence, the total effect of a rise in portfolio on democracy for the LDC sample declines over time, as in the all-countries sample, but it has not yet turned negative in our sample period. We think this result is also intuitive. The direct effect of a rise in portfolio on an average country in the LDC sample is larger than the direct effect on an average country in the all-countries sample (5.8359 vs. 4.724,
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
respectively). A typical LDC gains more from a rise in portfolio investment than a typical country in the all-countries sample in terms of a rise in its level of democracy. Over time, the positive effect of a rise in portfolio is counteracted by a growing negative effect that reflects the overall rise in global capital mobility and increasing volatility of financial markets. The size of this negative component is larger in the LDC sample (−0.0027∗ year) than in the all-countries sample (−0.0024∗ year), but because the direct positive effect is larger in the LDC sample than in the all-countries sample, the overall effect in the LDC sample remains positive. This outcome is consistent with the observation that capital flows into a typical LDC are relatively smaller than those into a typical country in the all-countries sample. As such, the share of the growing negative effect of capital flows over time out of the total effect is smaller in the LDC sample than in the all-countries sample. While we have discussed the signs of the effects of globalization on the level of democracy, the statistical findings also can inform us about the substantive significance of these effects. In evaluating the substantive effect, we assume that trade, fdi, portfolio, or diffusion exhibit certain increases, and then we compute the changes in the level of democracy induced by these variables ceteris paribus. Studies often assume a one-standard-deviation increase for a certain variable, as identified by the estimation sample, and we also employ this approach. Using the coefficient of each variable for the all-countries sample in Table 2.4, we compute the percent change in democracy relative to its sample mean as the baseline. Turning to the size of effect, a one-standard-deviation rise in trade (46.83%) leads to a decline of about 8% in the average level of democracy in the sample (1.72). A one-standard-deviation rise in diffusion (0.79) raises the level of democracy by 6.5% relative to the baseline case. A onestandard-deviation rise in fdi (2.04%) in 1975 raises the level of democracy by 6.5% relative to our baseline, ceteris paribus, whereas a similar rise in fdi in 1996 raises the level of democracy only by 0.12%. A one-standarddeviation rise in portfolio (2.5%) in 1975 reduces the level of democracy by 2.3% relative to the baseline, whereas a similar change in 1996 reduces the level of democracy by about 10%. Therefore, the immediate responses of democracy to changes in globalization do not appear to be large in absolute size; this indicates that the globalization-induced changes in democracy tend to happen slowly over time. What about the long-run dynamic changes in democracy resulting from globalization forces? Indeed, the changes noted earlier in globalization also affect democracy in the next period through their effects on the lagged value of democracy. As detailed in the appendix, we can compute the effect of a
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change in, say, trade on democracy in the long run. On employing those one-standard-deviation changes, the long-term percentage changes in the average democracy level in the sample register a decline by 108% due to trade and a rise by 153% due to diffusion. The long-term effect of fdi change is a rise in the average level of democracy by 89% in 1975 and only 1.6% in 1996. With respect to portfolio, its long-term effect is a decline in the average level of democracy by 32% in 1975 and 131% in 1996. Hence, globalization forces could generate large changes in democratic governance over the long run.
Sensitivity Analyses The robustness of statistical findings is important for establishing empirical regularity, proving the validity of theoretical arguments, and facilitating public policy positions. Do the empirical results reported earlier hold when other possible confounding control variables enter the statistical model, or when other statistical estimation procedures are used? To answer this particular question, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to verify the robustness of the reported results. In one type of sensitivity analysis, we employ different statistical estimators, which are methods to obtain the quantitative effects of variables from historical data. In a second type of sensitivity analysis, we use various measures of democracy based on different types of data. In the third and final type of sensitivity analysis, we add various additional control variables to the model, including income inequality in a country, the level of education in a country, the number of INGOs to which a country belongs, and variables denoting whether a country belongs to periphery or semiperiphery of the world system (yet another indicator of its level of development). The details of these sensitivity analyses and their results are reported in the chapter appendix. We can summarize these additional statistical results by noting that the statistical findings we have reported, both in terms of the effects on democracy of the key globalization variables and the effects on democracy of the original control variables specified in this section, are found to hold under the large majority of the sensitivity analyses. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
In general, the effects of changes in globalization on the level of democracy in a country tend to be small in the short run but could accumulate to large magnitudes over the long run. The effects of FDI, however, tend to dwindle
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
over time. We believe that these results have important implications not only for future research on the determinants of democracy but also for the larger public policy debate about globalization. If maximizing economic efficiency is the only public policy objective, then the negative effects of globalization on democracy do not, and should not, matter. However, if the democratic form of governance is deemed a desirable public policy objective, our empirical findings presented in this chapter suggest a policy dilemma between economic efficiency gains and democratic decline. Our analysis implies that globalization erodes the prospects for democracy. The post-1945 model of embedded liberalism served to sustain democratic governance in DCs with open economies. However, this model cannot be easily implemented in LDCs in the current globalization. The emerging democracies among LDCs lack the financial and managerial resources needed to build social safety nets. As trade liberalization continues, the negative effect of trade on democracy may increase. Similarly, the growing capital mobility accompanying globalization produces a political dilemma for governments who want both economic competitiveness and democratic political accountability. Footloose capital is generally not accountable to the public. Capital mobility reduces the democratic government’s ability to respond to popular demands for social welfare and effective economic management. Our findings imply that under economic openness, the room for policy maneuvering is obviously reduced. Hence, the threats to democracy from financial inflows and FDI are substantial. If the current trend in the effect of globalization on democracy continues, our finding that the increasing number of democracies in a region is associated with greater democracy may reveal a “diabolic” flip side. That is, as trade, FDI, and financial flows become increasingly associated with democratic decline, the number of democracies in a region may also decline, which in turn may contribute to a decrease in the number of democracies. In light of our findings, it is only natural that one may ask the following question: If democracy falls due to trade openness, is openness a mistake, say, for Eastern Europe? Openness may generate economic gains. Countries open up because they seek the gains, or actors poised to gain are able to get their way, but some arguments suggest openness can also reduce democracy, which is what we find for trade. Thus, if both democracy and openness are desirable, countries face a trade-off. We further discuss this trade-off in the context of our larger conceptual picture in Chapter 10. In addition, one should note that our findings apply to the large-N sample, detecting average statistical patterns rather than explaining any particular country or region; Eastern Europe is just part of a larger sample.
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How can one alleviate the negative effects of globalization on democracy? We believe there are basically three possibilities. The first possibility is for there to be one world government, managing one economic system, without any barriers to the flows of goods, financial capital, and other factors of production. The trade-off between efficiency gains and democratic decline can then be effectively managed. But this option is currently impractical. A second possibility is to enhance the socioeconomic policy coordination among governments within the existing international system. For example, concerted tax policies could minimize excessive financial capital volatility in an integrated global financial market. With policy coordination, countries could continue to benefit from the globalizing economy while minimizing the harmful effects on democracy. However, one also notices the weakness of such an option. Historically, international socioeconomic policy coordination was generally unstable. Within the existing international political system, each national government is accountable to its own people. The policy coordination option is difficult to achieve and sustain over time. A third possibility is to slow down the rate of globalization. For example, governments could design tax and subsidy policies to compensate the losers from economic openness, slow down capital movements and reduce excessive volatility, and curtail by law excessive rent-seeking by MNCs. To be successful, this approach would require coordinated market regulation that involves the government, the private sector, and citizen advocacy groups, implying wide consultation with and under close monitoring by the private sector and citizen advocacy groups. The purpose of such coordination is to minimize the reliance on the government alone to design and implement regulation. Governments, particularly in LDCs, often suffer from inefficiency and inflexibility. Relying solely on governments may suffocate the market. Where democratic rules are not well established, as in many LDCs, the notion that only the government can correct market failures may cause excessive government intervention and lower social welfare, and it eventually precipitates a decline in democratic governance. Although this option may yield lower social welfare relative to the first two possibilities, it may be the only practical approach available at present for reducing the negative effects of globalization on democracy. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The theoretical literature presents conflicting expectations of the effect of globalization on democracy. These conflicting expectations are also reflected in the public debate on globalization. In this chapter, we make a systematic empirical effort to assess the controversial effects of globalization on
46
Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
democracy. We find that trade openness and portfolio investment inflows exert negative effects on democracy. The negative effect of trade openness on the level of democracy is stable over time, whereas the negative effect of portfolio investment inflow into a country strengthens over time. FDI inflows into a country are conducive to its democratic governance, but the strength of this particular effect weakens over time. The spread of democratic ideas flowing into a country from other countries in its vicinity contributes to increasing the level of democracy in that country persistently over time. These effects are all substantively important, particularly in light of their long-term implications for democracy. These empirical regularities are found to hold for both the all-country sample and LDCs alone. They are also robust across various model specifications, different measures of democracy, and alternative statistical estimators. In sum, the economic aspects of integration into the world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance, which ought to cause concern for both policymakers and academicians. In this chapter, we investigated the effect of aspects of economic openness, or economic globalization, on the level of democracy within countries. The reader may recall that, in our sensitivity analyses, the distribution of income within countries, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was one of the control variables. In the next chapter, we change the focus of our inquiry, making income inequality the main variable of interest. What is the effect of a rise in the level of democracy on the national distribution of income? What is the effect of our measures of economic openness (i.e., trade, FDI, and portfolio flows) on the national distribution of income? Do these forces make the rich richer and the poor poorer, further skewing the income distribution, or do they make the rich poorer and the poor richer, reducing the income gap? Historical observation suggests that these are important questions in that they can have political ramifications, particularly for the stability of the government and civic life. Extremely skewed distributions of income are known to have contributed to the violent revolutions in France in the eighteenth century, Russia in the early twentieth century, and China in the mid-twentieth century. Now it is time for us to step into Chapter 3.
APPENDIX EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This appendix accompanies the section “Empirical Model and Analysis” in the main text. We provide various details on the measurement of our
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variables, their data sources, issues pertaining to the technical design of the statistical model, and the expected effects of various control variables. We also report and discuss the results for the control variables as well as the various additional analyses.
Empirical Model The dependent variable democracy denotes the level of democracy for a country in any given year, based on the POLITY III data (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Gurr and Jaggers, 1999). The widely used POLITY III data register various attributes of regime type on an annual basis for many countries from about 1800 to 1998, using two indices. The 10-point democracy index (DEMOC) measures the democratic characteristics of the regime. The 10point autocracy index (AUTOC) measures the autocratic characteristics of the regime. As pointed out by Oneal and Russett, Londregan and Poole, Mansfield and Snyder, among others, because many governments have both democratic and autocratic characteristics, DEMOC and AUTOC do not provide redundant information about regime type, and both should be used to measure the level of democracy.22 We follow these studies and measure democracy as the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC, generating an index ranging between −10 (for the most autocratic regime) and 10 (for the most democratic regime). Globalization is measured by four indicators: trade openness, FDI inflows, portfolio investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. The three economic variables are collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. The trade variable denotes the yearly level of trade openness for a country. As conventional in the literature, trade is defined as the sum of the value of imports and the value of exports of goods and services of a country with the rest of the world, measured as a percentage of the country’s GDP.23 The fdi variable denotes the yearly value of net inflows of FDI as a percentage of a country’s GDP for each country. FDI involves either the acquisition of a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor or the creation of a new subsidiary of a firm in a foreign country. It is given here as the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long- and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. The portfolio variable denotes the yearly value of net 22 23
See, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a). We also estimated the models using the log of trade/GDP. All the results remain robust.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
inflows of portfolio investments as a percentage of GDP for each country. Portfolio investments (excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves) cover transactions in equity securities (the sum of country funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors) and debt securities (publicly guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt from privately placed bonds). The measure of the spread of democratic ideas is coded using POLITY III data; diffusion denotes the yearly number of democracies within a region around each country. The regions include Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and North and South America. We define a country as democratic if the difference between its DEMOC and AUTOC scores is greater than or equal to six (as in, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Russett, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Like Starr (1991) and Gasiorowski (1995), we assume that the type of political regime in a country is more likely to be affected by the type of political regime of its neighboring countries than by more distant countries. In general, the diffusion of democratic norms is said to work through contact-based mechanisms, which involve information flows, contact in the marketplace, communication networks, tourism, and so forth. Geographically proximate countries typically have more contact. Hence, in our context, diffusion may be thought of as a proxy for information and communication flows of democratic ideas among countries. It should be noted that we compute the correlation between a yearly measure of the number of main phone lines and television sets for each country and diffusion. The correlation (r = 0.45) is statistically significant at the 1% level. We do not include this measure as an independent variable because it is highly collinear (r = 0.8) with GDP per capita in the model. Hence, it is possible to argue that GDP per capita also serves as a proxy of the communication aspect of national integration into the world economy. Moving to the economic control variables, inflation denotes the yearly growth rate of the GDP deflator, which is the ratio of nominal GDP (measured in current prices) to real GDP (measured in constant prices). Several studies use inflation as a proxy of economic crisis, the effect of which on democracy is debated. Some studies argue the effect is positive, whereas others argue the effect is negative (Huntington, 1991; Gasiorowski, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Drake, 1998). The development variable denotes the logged yearly GDP per capita in purchasing power parity– adjusted real international prices. As discussed at length in this chapter, many statistical studies of the determinants of democracy use this variable as an indicator of the level of economic development, either as a central
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variable or as a control variable.24 The growth variable denotes the annual percentage growth rate of real GDP.
Research Design Issues Several empirical design issues influence our model specification and estimation in this chapter. First, in the main text, we note that, to control for the effect of inertia, we include the lagged dependent variable (the level of democracy) as an independent variable, a strategy also adopted in other studies.25 In addition to the theoretical reason, this lagged variable helps capture the effects of variables not present in the model. “With such a pervasive control in place, it is more difficult for spurious effects to be reported” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 905). It is worth noting that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable might soak up the variations in the dependent variable that could be explained by other independent variables, making it harder for us to find statistically significant results. Hence, our approach can be described as conservative. Second, to address the possibility that the effects of some of the determinants of democracy may change over time, we use the systematically varying parameter approach (Judge et al., 1988: 435; Griffiths et al., 1993: 421). To determine which variables have a time-varying effect, we first estimate a pooled time-series cross-sectional model for each decade (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). The decade selection has no particular theoretical justification, but the results provide a general sense about the temporal stability of the effects on democracy. Variables whose parameters exhibit reversals of signs across those pooled decades are suspected to have time-varying effects on democracy. Interaction terms between these variables and a calendar year variable are created and included in the model.26 Third, the error term in the model faces the risks of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The estimated coefficients are still consistent with heteroskedastic variance and serial correlation in the error term, but their standard errors are not efficient and are most likely biased. To deal with this problem, we estimate our statistical model using a variant of the White estimator of robust standard errors, which adjusts for clustering over country 24 25 26
In addition to sources cited in Chapter 2, see, e.g., Rueschemeyer (1991), Diamond (1992a), Gasiorowski (1995), and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). See, e.g., Bollen (1979), Muller (1988), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), and Muller and Seligson (1994). Gasiorowski (1995) employs such an interactive model to examine the time-varying effects of inflation on democratization.
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(White, 1980). This estimator yields consistent estimation of the covariance matrix under very general conditions of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). In addition, as Beck and Katz suggest, the lagged dependent variable models the temporal dynamics and also helps to address serial correlation (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b). Fourth, consider the design issue for resolving the simultaneity bias. Ignoring the possible effect of democracy (the dependent variable in this chapter) on the right-hand-side variables in the model (globalizationrelated and others) implies the risk of simultaneity bias, which generates misleading estimated coefficients. The ideal solution to this problem is to estimate a fully specified simultaneous equations system, endogenizing democracy, trade, FDI, portfolio investment, and information flows. At the current stage of our knowledge of how these forces interact, it is not feasible to specify such a system of equations. In contrast, many studies deal with this problem by lagging the independent variables one period, which in our case amounts to one year (e.g., Muller and Seligson, 1994; Oneal and Russett, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Though this is not an optimal solution to the issue of simultaneity, we follow the same approach here. Fifth, we need to consider which statistical significance level to use when we interpret the results. In evaluating the effect of globalization on democracy, we have discussed three types of theories. One type expects that globalization will promote democracy, the other type expects the opposite, and the third type expects no effect at all. As we noted, the three types of theory appear logically consistent, given their own assumptions, regarding the effect of globalization forces on democracy. The empirical model can only identify the net effect of globalization on democracy. We therefore only test the sign of this net effect on democracy against the null hypothesis of no effect – or rather the two competing effects of globalization on democracy are equal in size – employing the one-tailed test in reporting the results. Many other studies have employed this approach (see, e.g., Morrow et al., 1998; Oneal and Russett, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Li and Reuveny, 2003; Reuveny and Li, 2003). Sixth, there is the issue of what thresholds to use for statistical significance. In interpreting the results, we employ 1, 5, and 10% significance levels. We take this approach for a couple of reasons. Some of our samples are relatively small because of limitations on data availability. In addition, the lagged dependent variable in the model soaks up the variations in the dependent variable to be explained by other explanatory variables, making it difficult to find significant effects. Seventh, we need to measure the size of globalization’s effect on democracy. In the text, we discuss not only the direct effect of the globalization
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variable but also the long-run effect through the lagged dependent variable. For the long-run effect, the impact of a globalization variable on the level of democracy from previous periods is absorbed into the effect of the lagged democracy variable, which is also on the right-hand side. The globalization variable affects the current level of democracy via the direct effect and continues to affect the level of democracy in the next period via the lagged democracy variable (Londregan and Poole, 1996). The long-run impact of a change in a globalization variable produces the following change in the level of democracy in a country: [coefficient of globalization variable/ (1–coefficient of lagged democracy)] ∗ (change in globalization variable). We compute the long-run effects for all our globalization variables. Finally, one may question in particular why we measure the impact of FDI by its flow rather than by stock. As noted, FDI flows may affect democracy, and FDI flows through many mechanisms and generates competing effects on democracy. The goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the immediate net effect of FDI flows on democracy. This measurement requires the use of FDI inflows (incurring during a year) because the stock variable, cumulated over time since the beginning of FDI, conflates the short- and long-run effects of FDI. As explained earlier, we estimate the long-run impact of FDI through the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model. In addition, the FDI stock data are statistically problematic. Whereas flows are reported by national governments to the IMF, stock data, which are only available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), are often estimated and involve large measurement errors. Stock data sum FDI flows and reinvestment earnings since the start of FDI. Reinvestment earning data are often missing, generating measurement errors that continue in the stock data in future years. In contrast, the effect of such measurement error in the flow data is limited to the year of the missing data. Moreover, the initial baseline stock of FDI in a country is often unknown for sure, and the year UNCTAD uses as the start of stock accumulation is the year in which a country began to report flows, not necessarily the year when FDI first entered a country. This generates another type of measurement error. Due to these errors, the stock data are not appropriate for cross-national comparisons.
Empirical Findings Table 2.4 presents the results for all countries from 1970 to 1996 in the first column and for the non-OECD countries in the second column. The adjusted R2 for both models are 0.93 and 0.90, respectively, indicating that the models explain most of the observed variations in democracy.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
All the interaction terms are statistically significant, as are all the main effects of the variables for which an interaction was included. Another general observation is that all the globalization-related variables are also statistically significant. In fact, except for economic growth, all the effects are statistically significant, which supports our model specification. Because we have discussed the results for the globalization variables in detail, here we focus on the control variables. In terms of the specific results of the control variables in column 1, prior democracy has a positive and statistically significant effect on current democracy. Other studies that include this variable report similar results, illustrating that democracy as a social phenomenon tends to have inertia. As Przeworski et al. (1996) argue, it almost seems tautological to argue that the current level of democracy rises when the past level of democracy rose. However, this result has an important substantive implication. One simply cannot expect to find a higher level of democracy by strengthening dictatorship or authoritarianism ceteris paribus. If the level of democracy fell in the past, one should expect to find a lower level of democracy in the future. Therefore, international interactions that strengthen an authoritarian regime are likely to hinder the movement toward democracy in that country in the near future. Similarly, reforms toward a higher level of democracy tend to accumulate over time, leading to democratic consolidation. The effect of inflation is statistically significant and positive, but its interaction term year∗ inflation is significant and negative. The total effect of inflation on the level of democracy is positive and was the largest in the 1980s; economic growth has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significant. As in many studies, economic development has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of democracy. The interaction term year∗ economic development is statistically significant but negative, suggesting that its effect weakens over time. The calendar year variable year is statistically significant and positive, indicating in this sample a partial tendency for democracy to grow over time. The results regarding the domestic economic effects on democracy replicate the spirit of previous studies, which supports our model. To further investigate the robustness of the results, we estimated the model for a sample of only non-OECD countries. Compared with the results for all countries in column 1, the adjusted R2 for the non-OECD countries in column 2 is a bit lower because of the smaller sample size and reduced variation in the independent variables. However, the signs and statistical significance levels for all the variables in column 2 match well with those in column 1,
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indicating that the results in column 1 are not an artifact of the inclusion of the OECD countries in the sample. We also estimate the models in Table 2.4 by excluding the lagged dependent variable. Although the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable usually makes other independent variables insignificant, its exclusion from our model actually renders the results statistically less significant in both samples. This suggests that we did not get null results in Table 2.A2 because of the lagged dependent variable. These results are available from the authors upon request. Now, as noted, to identify which variables have varying effects on democracy over time, we first estimate pooled time-series cross-sectional models for each decade for all countries and for LDCs. We report those results in Table 2.A1. The effect of trade on democracy is always negative and statistically significant, and the effect of diffusion is always positive and statistically significant in four out of six cases. The effect of prior democracy is always positive and statistically significant. The effect of economic growth is positive but statistically insignificant in all cases (except for the case of all countries from 1970 to 1979). Because the signs of these four variables are consistent across decades, we include them in the model as main effects only. The signs of economic development, fdi, portfolio, and inflation change over decades. Hence, they enter the model both individually and as interactive terms with year. For the overlapping variables (inflation, economic growth, economic development, trade openness), the results generally agree with those reported by Gasiorowski (1995), although his dependent variable measures the event of democratization (a 1, 0 variable), whereas our dependent variable measures the level of democracy. Overall, these results provide justification for why we specify the interactive model as such in the main text.
Additional Analyses Model specification, the measures of democracy, and the estimation techniques vary across statistical studies of democracy. To investigate the effects of these variations in our case, we conduct various sensitivity analyses. Specifically, we add new control variables, use Freedom House data to measure democracy, and apply different estimators. The results are presented in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3. Overall, the effects of globalization on democracy reported in Table 2.4 are replicated across the 25 experiments reported in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3. Therefore, we judge our results to be robust. Later we discuss Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 in detail. The results for the original control
54
−0.0042∗∗ (0.0022) 0.0141 (0.0178) 0.0031 (0.0183) 0.6034∗∗ (0.2662) −0.0031 (0.0028) −0.0019 (0.0153) 0.1098 (0.1143) 0.9253∗∗∗ (0.0237) −1.4142 (1.0956) 353 0.93
−0.0021∗ (0.0014) −0.0357 (0.0340) −0.0211 (0.0196) 0.1501 (0.1559) 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0067 (0.0122) 0.4081∗∗∗ (0.0999) 0.9253∗∗∗ (0.0161) −3.0927∗∗∗ (0.8233) 948 0.94
−0.0041∗∗ (0.0021) −0.0188 (0.0391) 0.0021 (0.0069) 0.2251∗ (0.1445) −0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0115 (0.0156) −0.0820 (0.0797) 0.9202∗∗∗ (0.0226) 1.0082 (0.7240) 720 0.90
−0.0049∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0110 (0.0192) −0.0118 (0.0216) 0.9548∗∗∗ (0.3172) −0.0045∗ (0.0029) 0.0012 (0.0165) 0.1523 (0.1509) 0.9141∗∗∗ (0.0244) −2.2999 (1.3985) 273 0.89
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Observations Adjusted R2
Constant
PRIOR DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPMENT
GROWTH
INFLATION
DIFFUSION
PORTFOLIO
FDI
TRADE
−0.0029∗∗ (0.0016) −0.0426 (0.0385) −0.0247 (0.0210) 0.1981 (0.1777) 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0071 (0.0125) 0.5352∗∗∗ (0.1199) 0.9290∗∗∗ (0.0170) −4.0277∗∗∗ (0.9187) 772 0.91
−0.0032∗ (0.0024) −0.0200 (0.0424) 0.0092 (0.0093) 0.2378∗ (0.1617) −0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0127 (0.0160) −0.1938∗∗ (0.1120) 0.9170∗∗∗ (0.0238) 1.7565∗ (0.9460) 595 0.88
ALL (1970–1979) ALL (1980–1989) ALL (1990–1996) LDC (1970–1979) LDC (1980–1989) LDC (1990–1996)
Table 2.A1. Pooled time-series cross-sectional models of democracy by decade
55 −0.0012 8.0087∗∗ 5.7176∗∗ 0.3073∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗ −0.0029∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
−0.0018∗∗ 6.2954∗∗ 4.5246∗∗∗ 0.2576∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
1568 0.90
Model 10 LDC
Model 9 ALL
1949 0.93
1640 0.90
2021 0.93
−0.0033∗∗∗ 6.3762∗∗ 4.9084∗∗ 0.2971∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0025∗∗ −0.9099∗
−0.0028∗∗∗ 5.4310∗ 4.1119∗∗ 0.2369∗∗ −0.0027∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.6336∗
0.0148 −0.7589∗∗ −0.5427∗∗ −0.1591 1879 0.93
−0.0016∗∗ 6.8347∗∗ 3.9381∗∗∗ 0.1345 −0.0035∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗
Model 11 ALL
0.1417 1662 0.93
−0.0025∗∗∗ 5.5593∗ 2.7475 0.3141∗∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0014
Model 3 ALL
Model 5 ALL
Model 13 ALL
1826 0.93
0.0170∗∗ −0.0046
1705 0.94
−0.0035 −0.0117
Freedom House Data −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0006 4.8632∗ 5.8462∗∗ 5.1121∗∗∗ 2.3640∗ 0.2902∗∗∗ 0.1151∗∗∗ −0.0025∗ −0.0030∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0012∗
Model 12 ALL
POLITY III data −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ 5.7162 5.6112∗ 3.6058 2.6123 0.3915∗∗∗ 0.3124∗∗∗ −0.0029 −0.0028∗ −0.0018 −0.0013 −0.1091 0.1137 0.1343 1281 1662 0.91 0.93
Model 4 LDC
1784 0.94
−0.0007∗ 4.3957∗ 2.4035∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0012∗∗
Model 14 ALL
−0.0027∗∗ 6.1508∗ 3.1767 0.3928∗∗∗ −0.0031∗ −0.0016 −0.3664 0.0879 1281 0.91
Model 6 LDC
1421 0.90
−0.0007∗ 5.3203∗ 1.6529 0.1209∗∗∗ −0.0027∗ −0.0008
Model 15 LDC
−0.0023∗∗∗ 8.4656∗∗ 5.6914 0.2844∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ −0.0029 0.0950 0.2889∗∗∗ 1783 0.93
Model 7 ALL −0.0025∗∗ 10.5950∗∗ 3.4633 0.3558∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗ −0.0017 −0.2263 0.2457∗∗ 1353 0.91
Model 8 LDC
Note: ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. Other independent variables not reported to save space. Models 5 and 6 include while Models 7 and 8 exclude economic development and its interaction term.
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO INGOS SEMIPERIPHERY∗ DEVELOPMENT PERIPHERY∗ DEVELOPMENT EUROPE MIDDLE EAST AFRICA ASIA N Adjusted R2
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO GINI EDUCATION N Adjusted R 2
Model 2 LDC
Model 1 ALL
Table 2.A2. OLS estimates with additional control variables or Freedom House data
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System
variables from the models in Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 are broadly consistent with Table 2.4. Therefore, we do not discuss these results again in this subsection. Table 2.A2 reports the results from 15 experiments, denoted Model 1 through Model 15, which investigated the effects of adding new control variables and/or using a different measure of democracy. In Models 1–12, democracy is measured based on POLITY III data as in Table 2.4 whereas in Models 13–15, democracy is based on Freedom House data. As for the new control variables, gini denotes the level of national income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. The variable education denotes the level of national education measured by the average number of years of education in the population. For gini and education, we use the same data and variable transformation as in Feng and Zak (1999). The variable gini comes from the high-quality data from Deininger and Squire (1996). We log and lag the raw data. The missing values of gini are filled with predictions from estimating gini as a function of GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, and regional dummies. The variable education comes from Barro and Lee (2000) and is also logged and lagged. The variable ingos denotes the number of INGOs to which individuals or organizations from each country belonged in a given year. The data on INGOs come from Boli and Thomas (1999). The two dummy variables semiperiphery and periphery denote whether a country belongs to the world-system semiperiphery or periphery, respectively. In the model, they interact with economic development as in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994). Similar to this study, we have also estimated the models using only semiperiphery and periphery dummies by themselves and found similar results; europe, middle east, africa, and asia are dummy variables that denote the geographical region of a country. Across Models 1–12 in Table 2.A2, the effect of trade is significant in 11 out of 12 cases and is always negative. The main effect of fdi is significant in 11 cases and is always positive. The interaction effect of fdi is significant in 11 cases and is always negative. The effect of diffusion is significant in 11 cases and is always positive. The main effect of portfolio is significant in 6 cases and is always positive. The interaction effect of this variable is significant in 6 cases and is always negative. These results strongly support those in Table 2.A2. Regarding the dependent variable, although we measure democracy based on the POLITY III data, some scholars employ the Freedom House data (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Diamond, 1999). It is worth noting that some scholars point out that the Freedom House data are not suitable for a pooled time-series analysis because the data are not fully comparable
57
∗
significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
−0.0030∗∗∗ 5.183∗ 4.652∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.024 0.004 41.139∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.003∗ −0.002∗ −0.021∗∗ −340.864∗∗ 1640 0.91
−0.000005 11.075∗∗ −1.311 0.185 0.006 0.003 24.572 0.792∗∗∗ 0.186∗ −0.000003 −0.006∗∗ 0.001 −0.013 −368.001∗ 1640 0.91
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant N Adjusted R2
Note:
−0.0027∗∗∗ 4.786∗ 3.545∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.039 0.005 36.566∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ −0.00002 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −312.65∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
0.0004 8.796∗∗ 0.515 0.197 0.006 0.004 45.851∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ −0.000003 −0.004∗∗ −0.0003 −0.023∗∗∗ −517.172∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
Fixed effects (year)
TRADE FDI PORTFOLIO DIFFUSION INFLATION GROWTH DEVELOPMENT PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR YEAR∗ INFLATION YEAR∗ FDI YEAR∗ PORTFOLIO YEAR∗ DEVELOPMENT Constant N Adjusted R2
Fixed effects (country) −0.0029∗∗∗ 5.191∗ 4.724 0.244∗∗∗ 0.060 0.007 34.260∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.017∗∗ −301.820∗∗ 2021 0.93 −0.0032∗∗∗ 5.836∗ 5.389 0.292∗∗∗ 0.054 0.007 36.764∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.159∗ −0.00003 −0.003∗ −0.003 −0.018∗ −317.847∗ 1640 0.90
LDCs −0.0032∗∗∗ 5.836 5.389 0.292∗∗∗ 0.054 0.007 36.764∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.018∗∗ −317.847∗∗ 1640 0.90
OLS and PCSE
All countries −0.0030∗∗∗ 5.196 4.724 0.244∗∗∗ 0.060 0.007 34.290∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ −0.00003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.017∗∗∗ −302.064∗∗∗ 2021 0.93
Random effects
Table 2.A3. Parameter estimates from alternative estimators
−0.0029∗∗∗ 5.536∗ 5.882∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.007 35.577∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −306.119∗∗∗ 1640
−0.0027∗∗∗ 4.903∗ 4.704∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.007 32.634∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −288.835∗∗∗ 2021
GEE
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across years due to changes in methodology and scale (Gates, 2002).27 We use these data here because they offer a new take on qualities of democracies, despite their limitations. POLITY III data emphasize constraints on executive political recruitment, contestation, and functioning. Based on the Freedom House data, Diamond (1999) argues that in recent years some countries have become pseudodemocracies, where the rights of contestation are protected but civil rights are precarious. In addition to institutional aspects directly measured in POLITY III, Freedom House data capture aspects that are only indirectly implied in POLITY III, such as the de facto power of the opposition, freedom from foreign domination, minority rights, freedom of expression and belief, association rights, rule of law, human rights, and personal economic rights. Unlike POLITY III, Freedom House data are available only from 1973 onward. In their overlapping period, the cross-correlation between the two data sets is relatively high: 0.88 from a sample of all countries and 0.83 from a sample of LDCs. Indeed, the inferences from the Freedom House– based models in Table 2.A2 do not differ much from the inferences from the POLITY III–based models in Table 2.4. Like Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), we sum the two 7-point scales of “political rights” and “civil liberties” in Freedom House. This procedure gives an index ranging from 2 (lowest democracy) to 14 (highest democracy). We also recompute diffusion and prior democracy based on this score. Across Models 13–15, the effect of trade is always negative and statistically significant in two cases. The effect of diffusion is always positive and significant. The positive effect of fdi and the negative effect of its interaction term are always significant. The positive effect of portfolio and the negative effect of its interaction term are significant in two cases. Compared with Table 2.4, the results for Models 14 and 15, based on the Freedom House data, are weaker in terms of statistical significance for portfolio investments. We believe this is because Freedom House also measures civil rights and democratic norms that take a relatively long time to develop. The Freedom House index typically lags behind the POLITY III index and has a smaller variance.28 Because the Freedom House index varies less, the results are less significant. Furthermore, because portfolio 27 28
For additional issues on the measurement of democracy, see Bollen (1991). For example, for Bulgaria, the POLITY score rose from −7 in 1989 to +8 in 1991, a 75% increase (within a range of 20 from −10 to +10), whereas the Freedom House score rose from 2 in 1989 to 9 in 1991, a 53% increase (within a range of 13 from 2 to 14). For another example, for Russia over the same time frame, the POLITY score rose from −4 to +6, a 50% increase, while its Freedom House score rose from 5 to 7, a 15% increase.
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investments in LDCs are small and concentrated in the elite, their effect can be large in terms of constraints on the executive, which is the focus of POLITY III, but is likely to be smaller in terms of the civil rights, which is captured by the Freedom House. Table 2.A3 presents results for five estimators: country fixed effects, year fixed effects, random effects, OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), and general estimating equation (GEE) model. The country fixedeffects estimator assumes that the intercept term varies across panels, the year fixed-effects estimator assumes that the intercept term varies across years, and the random effects estimator assumes that the error term varies across panels. The PCSE method assumes that the variance of the error term is heteroskedastic across panels and homoskedastic within panels (Beck and Katz, 1995b). GEE is a population average–based estimator that is frequently used for panel data (Liang and Zeger, 1986). All models, including those in Table 2.4, have roughly the same goodness of fit. The estimates in Table 2.A3 are generally similar to those in Table 2.4, except for the country fixed-effects estimator. Scholars debate the merits of panel data estimation methods. Although this chapter is not about methods, we believe the estimator used in Table 2.4 (OLS with White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over countries) is the most appropriate for our case. Beginning with the fixed-effects estimators, King (2001) argues that using more elegant statistical techniques is preferable to using fixed effects estimation, which is the approach taken in Table 2.4. In simulations, fixed-effects estimators are known to soak up excessive between-country variations attributable to substantive variables and to reduce degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of many dummy variables. Unless the number of time periods approaches infinity, the estimated effects are biased for the country fixed-effects estimator (Green, 2007). Because we have 27 periods, our analysis may suffer from this problem, which could explain why the results from the country fixed-effect estimator differ noticeably from those based on the other estimators. The applicability of the random effects model for a certain data set can be tested using an appropriate Lagrange multiplier test. The null hypothesis is that the random effect model is not supported by the data (Green, 2007). From conducting this test we are not able to reject the null hypothesis, because we find no evidence in favor of the random effects model. The OLS with PCSE estimator assumes that the variance of the error term is heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels, and homoskedastic within panels (Beck and Katz, 1995b). The PCSE estimator may not be appropriate in our case because in Table 2.4 several variables have
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time-varying effects, suggesting the possibility of heteroskedastic errors over time. The estimator we used in Table 2.4 does not assume a certain structure of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, making it more appropriate for our purpose. One advantage of the PCSE method is its ability to correct for correlated errors across panels. However, as Beck and Katz (1995b) note, a better strategy is to model this correlation theoretically, which is achieved by our diffusion variable. The results from the GEE method in Table 2.A3 are identical to the results in Table 2.4 in terms of hypothesis testing. This outcome further supports the claim that our results are generally robust when different estimators are used (except for the country-fixed effects variant). Turning to the results for the new controls in Table 2.A2, Feng and Zak (1999) argue that a fall in income inequality and a rise in education raise the likelihood of democratic transitions. Whereas our analysis differs from Feng and Zak (we include economic openness, study the level of democracy, and our sample is larger), our results generally agree with theirs. In Models 1 and 2, the effect of gini is negative and significant (a rise in inequality reduces democracy). In Models 7 and 8, the effect of education is positive and significant when economic development is excluded. As in the study by Feng and Zak, when economic development is included (Models 3–6), the effect of education is positive but insignificant. As they explain, this is because education and economic development are correlated. When included with education (Models 5–8), the effect of gini is negative, as in Feng and Zak, but it is not significant, which we attribute to the aforementioned differences between our model and theirs. The effect of INGOs on democracy is positive and significant in Models 9 and 10. These results demonstrate that membership in INGOs increases the level of democracy in a member country, supporting the arguments of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse and Sikkink (1999). The coefficients of the regional dummies in Model 11 measure the effect on democracy of being in some region, relative to the American continent (i.e., we exclude one dummy to prevent falling into the dummy variable trap). The results indicate that relative to the American continent, the level of democracy in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia is lower but roughly the same as in Europe. As could be expected, when the regional dummies are included, the effect of diffusion (which correlates with regional effects), although still positive as in Table 2.4, is insignificant. The effects of the world position variables on democracy are examined in Models 12 and 13. In Model 12, the effect of semiperiphery is positive and
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significant, and the effect of periphery is negative and insignificant. However, in Model 13, which uses the Freedom House data as in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), both variables are negative and neither is significant. Our results differ from the results of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck because they find negative and significant effects for both periphery and semiperiphery interaction terms. We believe one reason for the difference has to do with the sample. Their data end in 1989 whereas ours end in 1996, capturing post–Cold War democratic transitions in many of the semiperiphery countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia). A second reason has to do with the difference between the POLITY III and Freedom House data. As noted, the measure based on POLITY III has a larger variance than that of Freedom House. POLITY III focuses on the changes in institutional constraints on the leaders of the executive branch, whereas Freedom House also covers the gradual changes in civil rights. These are also reflected in the world position variables, particularly semiperiphery.
THREE
Democracy, Economic Openness, and Income Inequality
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, we saw that the different aspects of national economic openness affect the level of democracy in a country. In that analysis, the level of national income inequality acted as a control variable in the statistical model of the sensitivity analysis. We found that a rise in the level of income inequality could reduce the level of democracy in a country. This chapter changes the causal arrow between income inequality and democracy, and we now focus on identifying the causes of national income inequality. We seek to study two interrelated important questions pertaining to this phenomenon: How does the level of economic openness of a country affect its distribution of income? How does the level of democracy influence a country’s distribution of income? These two questions are very important for social scientists because a country with a highly skewed income distribution tends to be politically unstable. Political instability often may lead to intrastate conflict and ultimately civil war. So far, these two questions of interest have been addressed in two separate bodies of literature. The effect of economic openness on the distribution of income has been debated in the literature on economic globalization (e.g., Rodrik, 1997; Held et al., 1999). The issue has also been debated in policy and popular circles (e.g., Soros, 1997; Wolf, 2000; World Bank Poverty Net, 2000). As discussed in the previous chapter, although the exact definition and scope of globalization are debated, scholars agree that current globalization implies growing economic openness of countries to trade, foreign direct investments (FDIs), financial capital flows, and – to a lesser extent – labor mobility (e.g., Held et al., 1999; Hughes, 2000). Existing studies offer conflicting theoretical expectations of the effects of economic
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openness on the distribution of income, but these studies do not provide rigorous empirical analyses of their claims. Meanwhile, the effect of democracy on income distribution is an important topic in the literature on democracy (Chan, 1997b). Scholars agree that democracy implies a national political regime based on free elections and broad political representation (e.g., Diamond, 1999). Existing studies argue that democracy reduces income inequality, but empirical evidence is inconclusive. Some studies find a negative effect of democracy on income inequality, other studies find a positive effect, and a third group finds no effect. These two bodies of literature have remained largely on separate courses. Taking a broader view, one may position economic openness and democracy at the center of liberalism. The literature on liberalism, which emphasizes the importance of free choice, comprises two main streams (Zacher and Matthew, 1995). Republican liberalism implies that democracy, the preferred political regime, reduces income inequality. Commercial liberalism (classical and neoclassical economics) argues that free market capitalism is the preferred economic regime, and income inequality is an inevitable by-product.1 Although the issue of income inequality was central for classical economists, it has received relatively little attention in neoclassical economics (Ferreira, 1999). We believe the relationship between income distribution, on the one hand, and democracy and open market, on the other, deserves more attention. We argue that the effects of these forces on income distribution need to be studied together. Capitalism and democracy are not easy companions. Whereas democracy is based on the principles of “one person, one vote” and representative government, capitalism is based on the principles of laissez-faire and private enterprise. Democracy is inherently associated with redistributive policies (e.g., progressive taxation), but capitalism typically rewards individuals with different levels of income and wealth. Hence, democracy may promote income equality, whereas capitalism may promote income inequality. Democracy and economic openness may cancel out or mediate each other in affecting the income distribution within a society. Since many studies2 also argue that economic openness affects democracy, empirical studies of income inequality that exclude either economic openness or democracy as a causal determinant can incorrectly attribute the effect of one force to the other. 1 2
For a review article focusing on the variants of liberalism, see Zacher and Matthew (1995). See, e.g., Im (1996), Whitehead (1996), Drake (1998), Held et al. (1999), and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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Our empirical work in this chapter differs from previous studies in several ways. We study the effects of both democracy and economic openness on income inequality. We examine how democracy, trade, FDI, and financial capital inflows influence income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, we pay particular attention to the possible interactive effect between democracy and openness. Using the World Bank data on national Gini coefficients, we employ a sample of 69 countries over the period 1960– 1996, which is larger than the samples in previous studies. Finally, we perform separate analyses for developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). Our primary findings can be summarized as follows: democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries; trade openness induces more equitable income distribution within countries; foreign financial capital inflows do not affect income inequality; and FDI leads to greater income inequality, but this effect is mediated and weakened in democracy. The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality. The section that follows describes the empirical research design and findings from the statistical analysis. The last section of the chapter summarizes our findings and discusses their implications.
EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS ON INCOME INEQUALITY
Effects of Democracy The claim that democracy promotes an egalitarian distribution of income can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. Many scholars argue that democracy increases the opportunities for political participation, which allows the poor to demand more equitable income distribution (e.g., Chan, 1997b; Boix, 1998).3 As suffrage expands, reelection-oriented leaders are held accountable to the voters and become increasingly attuned to their needs. Democratic governments are inclined to help the lower and middle classes by adopting redistributive policies such as welfare spending, progressive taxation, minimum wage laws, price subsidies, and public works. Authoritarian leaders, in contrast, are mainly accountable to a powerful and
3
See also Bollen and Jackman (1985), Sirowy and Inkeles (1991), Lappe et al. (1998), and Human Development Report (2000).
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rich minority. They tend to adopt public policies that benefit this minority – policies that tend to maintain or increase income inequality.4 Democracy affects the distribution of income through the process of competing pressures: the government is subject to pressure from interest groups. By promoting a more equal distribution of political power, democracy gives rise to labor unions and political parties that represent the lower and middle classes, as well as public policies that redistribute income to their constituents. The more organized and vital these groups are, the more successful they are at influencing policymaking. As described by Lenski (1966), democracy redistributes political power in favor of the majority and, therefore, leads to policies that reduce inequality.5 Previous empirical studies of the effect of democracy on income inequality exhibited several limitations. Some authors describe a few specific historical episodes, arguing, for example, that the expansion of suffrage in Western Europe in the early 1900s reduced income inequality (Lindert, 1994; Justman and Gradstein, 1999). When income inequality was measured directly in statistical studies, the data were limited. Muller (1988), for example, measured income inequality using the Gini coefficient (as we do), but only for 1970. Other scholars used larger samples but employed indirect measures of income inequality.6 The statistical evidence on the effect of democracy on income inequality is mixed. Muller (1988), Moon (1991), and Rodrik (1998) report that democracy reduces inequality. However, Bollen and Jackman (1985), Deininger and Squire (1996), and Gasiorowski (1997) report that the effect of democracy on income inequality is statistically insignificant. Chan (1997b) reports mixed findings, whereas Simpson (1990) argues that income inequality first rises with democracy and then declines after a certain threshold level of democracy.7 4
5
6
7
Some scholars argue that autocracies suppress wages to industrialize their economies (e.g., Schamis, 1991). Others note that industrialization in autocracies can also reduce inequality (e.g., Birdsall, 1998). For details, see, e.g., Lipset (1959), Muller (1988), Lindert (1989), Moon (1991), and Gasiorowski (1997). Alesina and Rodrik (1994) formalize these ideas by presenting an economic model in which the expansion of suffrage makes a poor individual the swing vote, leading to redistributive taxes that provide the poor with more income. For example, Chan (1997b) used government expenditures in areas expected to transfer income from the rich to the poor (e.g., health, housing, and education). Gasiorowski (1997) used the growth rates of industrial wages to gauge changes in income inequality. Rodrik (1998) used labor wages as a percentage of GDP. In their literature survey, Sirowy and Ingeles (1991) report that six studies find the effect of democracy on income inequality is negative and six studies find the effect is positive or statistically insignificant.
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Effects of Economic Openness In broad terms, economic openness creates winners and losers in a society. The effects of openness on income distribution depend on the identity of the winners and losers. We discuss these effects in four categories: international trade, FDI, foreign financial capital, and international labor mobility. Trade According to the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade, countries export goods that use their abundant factors of production intensively and import goods that use their scarce factors intensively. Building on this model, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) predict that trade would raise the incomes of the owners of abundant factors and reduce the incomes of the owners of scarce factors.8 Because DCs are relatively well endowed with skilled labor and capital, their imports are expected to hurt their unskilled labor while their exports should benefit the capital owners and skilled labor. In contrast, LDCs are relatively well endowed with unskilled labor. Therefore, their imports should hurt their capital owners and skilled labor while their exports should benefit the unskilled labor. Hence, trade should raise income inequality in DCs and reduce it in LDCs. Wood (1994) finds evidence in favor of the Stolper–Samuelson model. Robbins (1996), however, argues that wage inequality rose in many LDCs, contrary to the prediction of Stolper and Samuelson. It is also reported that, in many LDCs, trade shifts income to the resource-intensive sectors (Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).9 The Stolper–Samuelson theorem does not exhaust the channels through which trade can affect income inequality. Rodrik (1997) argues that trade makes it easier for firms in DCs to substitute the unskilled labor with cheap imports, reducing their bargaining power and wage rates. But to the extent that trade reduces the wages of the unskilled labor, it provides incentives for workers to acquire education and for firms to employ more unskilled labor, which may reduce inequality (Blanchard, 2000). Furthermore, according to Birdsall (1998), trade intensifies economic competition, which reduces the 8 9
The Stolper–Samuelson theorem deals only with the distribution of income. It is well established in the trade literature that economic gains from trade outweigh economic losses. Slaughter and Swagel (1997) attribute wage inequality in DCs to the technological-change bias toward skilled labor, whereas Minford et al. (1997) argue that trade and technological innovation contribute equally to wage inequality. However, Rodrik (1997) argues that the evidence in favor of a technological-change driver of wage inequality in DCs is weak.
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prices of basic consumption goods, benefiting the poor more than the rich because the poor spend relatively larger shares of their incomes on basic consumption goods. The competition also diminishes the monopoly position enjoyed by the upper class, which may reduce income inequality (Birdsall, 1998). Yet another argument is that trade increases labor productivity, which increases wages and reduces inequality (Held et al., 1999). Finally, the winners from trade could compensate the losers, reducing inequality, although such compensation typically is not offered voluntarily (Rodrik, 1997; Salvatore, 1998). Foreign Direct Investment FDI typically involves multinational corporations (MNCs), whose effects on income inequality are debated.10 Some analysts argue that FDI raises inequality. First, MNCs can pressure host governments to cut welfare expenditures and repress labor unions to reduce wages, both of which hurt the lower and middle classes. The threat of MNCs to leave the country also reduces workers’ wages by weakening their bargaining power (Nafziger, 1997; Salvatore, 1998). Second, MNCs are said to repatriate profits from LDCs, leaving LDCs underdeveloped and hurting their poor (Baran, 1973; Lall, 1974; Jenkins, 1996; Nafziger, 1997). Third, the capital-intensive techniques used by MNCs are said to create a dual economy with a small advanced sector and a large backward sector, which promotes unemployment among the unskilled laborers and distorts income distribution (Muller, 1979; Lall, 1985; Jenkins, 1996; Robbins, 1996; Nafziger, 1997). Fourth, MNCs are said to pay low wages in labor-intensive industries such as footwear and clothing, and to push domestic suppliers to follow suit in order to reduce the MNCs’ purchasing costs (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994; Held et al., 1999). Fifth, domestic tax systems are not well suited to tax MNCs. The smaller tax base reduces government revenue and, therefore, welfare expenditures, which hurts the poor more than the wealthy (Hatzius, 1997; Human Development Report, 1999). In contrast, several studies argue that MNCs provide LDCs with capital and technology, improve their corporate governance, and propagate better management practices. These forces, in turn, raise labor productivity and 10
FDI entails the acquisition of a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, or the creation of a subsidiary of a domestic firm in a foreign country. Portfolio investments cover private transactions in securities. For details, see World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).
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promote economic growth.11 It follows that FDI could eventually reduce income inequality via the Kuznets (1955) effect, which is discussed in detail in the next section. Dollar and Kraay (2000) also support this view; they argue that economic growth raises the income of the poor proportionally more than that of the rich, making FDI a useful tool in reducing poverty (Stiglitz, 1998). In this spirit, Borenszstein et al. (1994) find that MNCs promote economic growth in LDCs, and Blomstrom et al. (1992) find that FDI promotes technology transfer from DCs to LDCs. Other scholars argue that MNCs cannot easily relocate from one country to another to reduce their labor costs because lower wages also are associated with lower labor productivity. Hence, labor’s bargaining power is not necessarily diminished by FDI (Lawrence, 1994). Furthermore, the host governments can regulate the operation of MNCs, thus controlling their effects on host economies (Vernon, 1971; Kurzer, 1993). Relatively few studies investigate empirically the effects of FDI on wages in LDCs (Klein et al., 2001). They find that MNCs tend to pay higher wages for skilled labor, indirectly supporting the claim that FDI promotes income inequality by enhancing the premium on skilled labor.12 Several studies in the field of sociology argue that FDI promotes income inequality by reducing the power of labor unions to pull low-wage workers up the income ladder, thus distorting the occupational structure of LDCs and marginalizing workers displaced as a result of the capital-intensive nature of FDI.13 A couple of other studies (Bussman et al., 2005; Sylwester, 2005) find FDI and income inequality are uncorrelated, but these studies appear to suffer from important data problems. Bussman et al. (2005) use FDI stock over GDP, but as we explained at length in the appendix of Chapter 2, FDI stock data have serious measurement errors, making them inappropriate for cross-national comparisons. Also, using FDI stock, one conflates the shortand long-term effects of foreign investment. Sylwester (2005) uses net FDI inflows over GDP, but because he focuses on the change of income inequality between 1970 and 1990 and his sample is so small (29 observations), it is not surprising to find insignificant results. 11 12 13
See, e.g., Haddad and Harrison (1993), Coe et al. (1994), OECD (1994a), Blomstrom and Kokko (1996), Batra and Tan (1997), and Markusen and Venables (1999). See case studies by Aitken et al. (1996) for Mexico and Venezuela, Feenstra and Gordon (1995) and Graham and Wada (2000) for Mexico, and Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2002) for Africa. See, e.g., Sullivan (1983) and Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985). After empirical analysis, Tsai (1995) rejects this argument, whereas Dixon and Boswell (1996) and Alderson and Nielson (1999) support it.
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Foreign Financial Capital Several authors argue that to attract foreign financial capital, governments engage in liberal reforms (e.g., they reduce taxation and government expenditures, privatize state-owned enterprises, and deregulate markets). These reforms may hurt labor and increase income inequality (Strange, 1996; Germain, 1997; Held et al., 1999). A related issue is that financial openness tends to bring about volatile financial flows across countries, increasing the frequency and magnitude of financial crises. These crises typically hurt the poor more than the wealthy (Human Development Report, 1999). As the financial crisis ensues, the economy enters a recession and the rate of unemployment rises while the tax base erodes, public budgets are slashed, and welfare expenditures decline. Since the wealthy can better weather recessions than the poor, the poor suffer more and income inequality increases. Some statistical evidence (Quinn, 1997) indicates that financial openness raises income inequality. A competing view argues that financial openness does not necessarily imply the end of the welfare state. Financial markets allocate funds to places that need them the most, as they pay higher rates of return (Wooddall, 1995). Foreign capital also allows countries to consume more than they produce and to invest more than they save, promoting economic development and reducing income inequality (Nafziger, 1997). Financial openness forces governments to become more prudent, efficient, and accountable to the public, because financial markets penalize corrupt, deficit-oriented, inflationary, and inefficient governments with higher interest rates and currency crises (Wooddall, 1995). Better governmental policymaking can reduce income inequality by improving tax systems, property rights, and public welfare programs (Held et al., 1999). Foreign money also can be used to fund social security. Consequently, governments can spend more of their budgets on poverty reduction (Normand, 1996). International Labor Mobility Labor mobility across countries (migration) also affects the distribution of income within countries. We consider this empirically complex topic to be outside the scope of our chapter and defer it to future research. In the past several decades, international labor flows have generally been from LDCs to DCs. Accordingly, let us consider a two-country, North–South theoretical framework. The North is endowed with more skilled labor, and less unskilled labor, than the South. The wages for skilled labor are higher than they are for unskilled labor. It follows that unskilled labor migration from South to North reduces income inequality in the South and raises it
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in the North (O’Rourke, 2001). Contemporary migration to DCs typically involves unskilled labor from LDCs. Some immigrants from LDCs have joined the middle class in DCs. However, immigrants from LDCs typically take on the lower-paying jobs in the DCs. As a result, the unskilled workers in DCs can move to better-paying jobs (Held et al., 1999). It follows that the effect of labor migration on income inequality is theoretically ambiguous. Empirically, contemporary international labor migration generally has been restricted and small in size, and its effects on wages have been marginal and mixed.14
Hypotheses The literature argues that democracy reduces income inequality, as in Hypothesis H1, which follows. However, because some empirical studies report that the effect of democracy on inequality is not statistically significant, Hypothesis H1 may not be supported in our empirical test. In contrast to that of democracy, the overall (or net) effect of economic openness on income inequality is theoretically ambiguous. To focus our analysis, we posit directional Hypotheses H2–H4 on the effect of openness. Since the competing theories on the effects of openness all seem plausible, Hypotheses H2–H4 may be rejected in our empirical test. H1: H2: H3: H4:
Democracy reduces income inequality. Trade increases income inequality in DCs and reduces it in LDCs. FDIs reduce income inequality. Financial capital inflows reduce income inequality. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Similar to the previous chapter, this section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues. The section then presents key results from the empirical analysis. The discussion in this section is self-contained and does not require any specific statistical expertise. Interested readers seeking further technical details should consult the chapter’s appendix. 14
For a survey of empirical results, see Ichino (1993). For results from the United States, Canada, and Australia, see Borjas (1987, 1990, 1993). Labor migration flows were much higher in the late 1800s and early 1900s than today. Data from 1870 to 1913 show that inequality fell in the originating poor European countries and rose in the destination New World countries (Williamson, 1997).
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Empirical Model To test the effects of democracy and economic openness, we specify and estimate the following statistical model of income inequality. As noted, it provides a structure for us to guide the statistically uninitiated readers through the empirical exercise. income inequalityt = 0 + 1 tradet−l + 2 fdit−1 + 3 portfoliot−1 + 4 democracyt−1 + 5 gdppct−1 + 6 gdppc2t−1 + 7 past inequalityt−1 + εt .
(3.1)
The model specification is based on the theoretical discussion and the literature on income inequality. As in the previous chapter, we denote variables with small capital letters and their coefficients with Greek notation. Each coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, or the phenomenon we seek to explain. The notation ε t denotes the random error that is not explained by the statistical model. The variable subscripts t and t − 1 indicate the time period of the variable, where t represents the current period and t − 1 the previous time period (a lagged variable). To simplify the presentation, we refer to the variables without the time subscripts t or t − 1. In the model, income inequality within countries is the dependent variable (the phenomenon we explain). The right-hand side of the model includes independent variables that explain income inequality. The variable income inequality represents the level of income inequality in a country in a time period. An ideal measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of national income surveys. As noted, previous studies have used alternative measures of income inequality due to the lack of comprehensive Gini data. We take advantage of the income inequality data collected by Deininger and Squire (1996). However, even though their data set has the most comprehensive coverage, it contains many missing values because national income surveys are never conducted year after year. To address this problem, we follow the practice of Easterly (1999) and Higgins and Williamson (1999), and we use the decade averages of the Gini data for each country. Although the technical details of the Gini data are presented in the appendix, it is worth noting that the Gini coefficient ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 denotes perfect income inequality and zero denotes perfect equality. To apply the appropriate statistical technique, we transform the Gini coefficient into an unbounded measure.
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To test the effects of both economic openness and democracy on income inequality in the same model, we include four key independent variables: trade, fdi, portfolio, and democracy. Corresponding to the income inequality measure, these variables take on average yearly values during each decade. As in the previous chapter, we measure economic openness by using flows of trade, fdi, and portfolio investments. The importance of these flows to a country depends on their magnitude relative to the size of the domestic economy. Accordingly, we divide each of these flows by GDP. The trade variable measures the share of trade within a country’s national economy. The variable fdi reflects the share of foreign production capital in the country’s national economy, and portfolio is the share of foreign financial capital in the country’s national economy. Also, as in the previous chapter, democracy measures the level of democracy in a country. It ranges from –10 (the most autocratic regime) to +10 (the most democratic regime) and combines information on both the democratic and the autocratic characteristics of the political regime. The model also controls for the effects of economic development and past inequality. Kuznets (1955) hypothesizes that below some level of GDP per capita, income inequality rises with GDP per capita; above this level, income inequality declines with GDP per capita. This pattern is known as the Kuznets curve. Previous empirical results on the Kuznets curve are mixed. Ahluwalia et al. (1979) and Higgins and Williamson (1999), for example, found evidence supporting the Kuznets hypothesis; Deininger and Squire (1998) found no supporting evidence. We use gdppc and gdppc2 to capture the Kuznets effect. gdppc represents GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity – adjusted international dollars – and gdppc2 is gdppc squared. If the Kuznets curve is correct, the coefficients of gdppc and gdppc2 should be positive and negative, respectively. The level of education and the share of agriculture in GDP, which can also affect income inequality, are indirectly included in the model. Both variables tend to be highly correlated with GDP per capita. The level of past inequality is measured by the one-decade lagged Gini coefficient. The inclusion of this variable is consistent with the observed tendency of inequality to persist over time. Several theoretical reasons account for this tendency. First, wealth concentration typically correlates positively with political influence, generating arrangements that favor wealth owners.15 Second, people tend to marry those from the same socioeconomic group. Consequently, the children of the rich (or poor) group remain in 15
For example, in 1950, 65% of all the agricultural land in Latin America was held by 1.5% of the farm owners. This inequality has increased since (Birdsall, 1998).
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the original group, perpetuating income differences across groups. Third, in cases where the poor and the rich belong to different ethnic groups, racial discrimination can institutionalize the current income distribution (Lewis, 1994). Fourth, education can promote upward social mobility, but acquiring education is costly. Poor people tend to have more children than rich people (Heerink, 1994). Thus, education spending per child tends to be smaller for the poor, ensuring a vicious circle. The poor remain less educated and earn less, and income inequality persists (Dasgupta, 1993).
Research Design Issues As in the previous chapter, to justify the validity of our analysis we highlight several key design issues that require some clarification. As before, the related technical details of these issues are relegated to the appendix. First, ε t in the model is the so-called error term, that is, the part of the variations in income inequality that are not explained by the model. For statistical inferences to be valid, the error term needs to satisfy some assumptions. We address the related assumption violations using appropriate econometric techniques. Second, the sample includes 69 countries over the period 1960–1996. Since economic openness and the level of democracy are generally higher in DCs than in LDCs, we examine the robustness of the results from the full sample in separate samples for DCs and LDCs. The DCs in our analysis are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whereas the LDCs are non-OECD countries. Third, we design our research to measure the net effects of economic openness and the level of democracy on income inequality. We do not intend to measure the strength of each of the competing forces discussed in the previous section. To assess the effect of each of the causal mechanisms would require a very large data-collection effort that would include variables such as wages, international technology transfers, government welfare expenditures, breakdown of fdi and trade by sectors, taxes, government transfer payments, and various attributes of political parties. The collection of these data is better deferred to future research. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3.1 presents the statistical results for the full sample, the DCs, and the LDCs.16 The models exhibit reasonably good explanatory power, and the 16
The number of countries in our full sample is smaller than the number of countries in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data, due to missing data points for the other variables in our model.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.1. Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness
DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO FDI GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations Adjusted R2
All countries
LDCs
DCs
−0.0125∗∗∗ (0.0033) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0074 (0.0166) 0.0632∗∗∗ (0.0229) −1.91e-06 (1.08e-05) 1.90e-10 (4.40e-10) 0.7181∗∗∗ (0.0590) −0.1307∗∗∗ (0.0402) 142 0.69
−0.0112∗∗∗ (0.0037) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0008) 0.0340 (0.0367) 0.0518∗∗ (0.0290) 3.92e-05∗∗ (2.20e-05) −2.98e-09∗∗ (1.28e-09) 0.7163∗∗∗ (0.0693) −0.1898∗∗∗ (0.0510) 99 0.62
−0.0125∗∗ (0.0056) −0.0026∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0059 (0.0157) 0.0590∗∗∗ (0.0218) 8.51e-07 (1.54e-05) 2.07e-10 (4.85e-10) 0.4901∗∗∗ (0.0755) −0.2718∗∗∗ (0.0682) 43 0.52
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
effects of the control variables are largely consistent with our expectations. The results provide us with confidence in the models. As before, we leave the discussion of the results of the control variables to the appendix. We begin with the result for democracy. As shown in the table, democracy reduces income inequality, and the effect is consistent in all three samples (all countries, DCs, and LDCs). When using better data of income inequality than previous studies of the effect of democracy on inequality – including economic openness in the model – and controlling for the Kuznets curve and past inequality, our analysis provides empirical support for the expected negative effect of democracy on income inequality. As Table 3.1 indicates, trade openness also reduces income inequality in all three samples. The results support Hypothesis H2, with regard to LDCs but not DCs. As discussed earlier in the chapter, trade generates both inequality-increasing and inequality-decreasing effects. Hence, our findings can be interpreted as representing the net effect of trade on income inequality within countries, which, in turn, reduces income inequality. In contrast to the effects of democracy and trade openness, fdi inflows raise income inequality in all three samples (all countries, DCs, and LDCs).
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These results reject Hypothesis H3. Again, fdi can generate both inequalityincreasing and inequality-decreasing effects. According to our results, the net effect of fdi is to raise income inequality. In all three samples, the effect of portfolio inflow on income inequality is positive. But the effect is never different from zero statistically, meaning that the effect is too weak to be different from what one would expect due to chance. These results are consistent with the observation that the rise in portfolio investment inflows is a relatively recent phenomenon. If financial market integration continues to deepen, portfolio investments may significantly affect income inequality in the future. In any case, our results do not support Hypothesis H4. How do the statistical findings in Table 3.1 inform us about the substantive significance of the effects of democracy, trade openness, and fdi inflows? Similar to what we did in the previous chapter, we first compute a baseline Gini coefficient by setting all variables in Model 1 of Table 3.1 at their respective means. We then raise democracy, trade, and fdi by one standard deviation at a time and compute Gini again. We illustrate the sizes of these effects in two ways. First, we compute the percentage change in Gini across the two scenarios, showing the absolute influence of these three variables on Gini. Second, we compute the ratio of each of the changes in Gini over the range between the average of the Gini maxima (42.93) and the average of the Gini minima (38.98) across the 69 countries in the sample (see Appendix 3.1 for the country statistics). This computation indicates the influence of changes in trade, democracy, or fdi on Gini relative to the variability of Gini in our sample. In absolute terms, a rise in democracy by one standard deviation above its mean reduces Gini by 1.5% (from 40.56 to 39.06). A rise in trade openness by one standard deviation reduces Gini by 1.39% (from 40.56 to 39.17). A rise in fdi by one standard deviation raises Gini by 2.17% (from 40.56 to 42.73). In relative terms, these changes are 38%, 35%, and 55% over the range of Gini values between the average of the Gini maxima and the average of the Gini minima in the sample for democracy, trade, and fdi, respectively. These estimated effects of democracy, trade, and fdi on income inequality are substantial.17 17
Alternatively, one could express the sizes of these effects in terms of their shares out of one standard deviation of Gini (9.77). This would give 15.46%, 14.22%, and 22.21% for democracy, trade, and FDI, respectively, which are also substantial. A third way is to examine the size of our effects as shares of the range between the Gini sample minimum (22.46) and sample maximum (65.38). This range understates the size of our effects, because the majority of the observations in the sample are far from the tails of the Gini distribution.
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Our results indicate that trade reduces income inequality, whereas fdi raises it. This result may reflect the fact that trade is often associated with welfare programs that compensate the losers from trade, whereas fdi typically is not associated with such programs. Additionally, the benefits of trade tend to diffuse throughout the domestic economy, benefiting all consumers. In contrast, the benefits of fdi tend to be concentrated in the industries or the individual firms (in the case of joint ventures) in which the investment takes place. Such concentration of benefits tends to increase income inequality. In summary, our results support Hypothesis H1 that democracy reduces income inequality. We find that trade openness reduces income inequality, supporting Hypothesis H2 with regard to LDCs, but not DCs. fdi increases income inequality, rejecting Hypothesis H3. Foreign financial capital inflows reduce income inequality, which does not support Hypothesis H4.
Additional Analyses We conduct several additional analyses to complement the main results reported earlier. As in the previous chapter, we report the details of these analyses in the chapter appendix. The first additional analysis is substantive and policy-relevant. In Table 3.1, we find that fdi increases income inequality and that democracy reduces it. As fdi flows into many democracies, an important policy question is whether democratic governance helps to mitigate the positive impact of fdi on inequality. If democratic institutions help reduce the negative impact of foreign capital on the host country, we uncover another benefit of spreading democracy, acquire more confidence in our ability to harness the powerful forces of economic globalization, and bring good news to the many democracies of the world. On the other hand, if democratic governance does not reduce the impact of foreign capital on income inequality, we should worry about how we could take advantage of the benefits of globalization and minimize its drawbacks. The interaction between fdi and democracy is thus an important empirical question. To evaluate this effect, we create an interaction term between fdi and democracy and reestimate the models in Table 3.1 with this additional interaction term. Table 3.A1 reports the results for these interaction models. The fdi∗ democracy interaction term does not have any significant effect in the all-countries sample or the LDC sample, but it has a significant negative coefficient in the OECD sample. Specifically, as democracy rises from −1.7 to +10 within the OECD sample, the significant total effect of fdi declines
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from about 0.30 to about 0.057. fdi increases income inequality across the range of all possible democracy values, but its effect shrinks dramatically as we move from Greece and Spain in the early years of the OECD into the mature democracies in the OECD world. This effect, however, does not exist in many other democracies in the developing world. Second, we evaluate the robustness of the main results in Table 3.1 by using alternative measures of income inequality, excluding the lagged income inequality from the model, and employing alternative estimators. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 3.A2. Overall, the effects of democracy and economic openness remain robust. democracy reduces income inequality. portfolio investment inflows do not produce any significant effect on inequality in any of the six models. fdi inflows always raise income inequality. trade openness is correlated with less inequality in all cases, and the effect is weak in all but the case of the country fixedeffects estimator. We believe that this insignificant result reflects the noted limitations of the fixed-effects estimator. Finally, one may wonder if the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality are different in size between the DC and LDC samples. We estimate a statistical model to compare the effects of the variables on the two samples; the results are in Table 3.A3. The effect of democracy remains the same between the two samples, as do the effects of trade, portfolio, and fdi. Interestingly, the effects of the Kuznets curve and past inequality differ between the two samples. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Our analysis demonstrates the need to study the effects on income inequality of economic openness and democracy together. Better theoretical explanations of inequality should consider economic openness, democracy, and their interaction. Our statistical findings indicate that trade openness tends to be associated with more equitable income distribution within countries, but FDI leads to greater income inequality, and foreign financial capital inflows do not have any significant effect on income inequality. A rise in democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries. In addition, democratic governance mediates and weakens the undesirable impact of FDI on income inequality in the OECD world but not in DCs. One may wonder why trade and FDI, often highly correlated with each other, exert different effects on inequality. It is important to note that trade and FDI do not coincide perfectly, because they are generally operated by different actors and are often driven by different costs and benefits.
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Had they perfectly correlated, we could not have estimated their individual effects statistically. Theoretically, as discussed earlier, trade and FDI often influence the distribution of income through different causal mechanisms. Also, government policies regulating and responding to trade and FDI tend to be different. Trade adjustment assistance has a much longer history and is much more common and widespread. What are the public policy implications of our findings? To the extent that their goal is to bring about a more equitable distribution of income, international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization may condition new memberships, continued memberships, or various assistance programs on improvements of democracy. Industrialized democracies that are interested in reducing income inequality in other countries may also make liberal political reforms a condition of foreign aid. In DCs, democracy enables people to appeal to all levels of their governments, which then regulate and make sure FDI is not damaging to income distribution. In LDCs, whereas democratic governance by itself reduces income inequality, it does not restrain the impact of FDI. People in LDCs are not as effectively organized and empowered politically. As their governments invite MNCs and give them preferential treatment, it comes at the expense of the poor, causing an even more skewed income distribution. Importantly, because most FDI flows among DCs and a much smaller part goes to LDCs, the democratic DCs are in a win-win situation: they are able to enjoy the benefits of FDI and neutralize one of its bad side effects (skewing income distribution). In contrast, LDCs are likely unable to grapple politically with this side effect of FDI because their democratic institutions may be too weak to make a difference. Both proponents and critics of economic openness should reassess their claims if their arguments hinge solely on income inequality. Economic openness may improve or worsen income equality, depending on its type. Policymakers seeking a more equitable income distribution could promote international trade while compensating the losers from trade openness. On average, it appears to be the case that governments tend to compensate those who lose from trade openness, preventing income inequality from getting worse. Policymakers may also take measures to reduce the negative effects of FDI. For example, governments may offer subsidies or tax breaks to sectors or regions without FDI and curtail the occurrence of FDI-induced dual economy. At the same time, governments need to be careful not to impose restrictions that entirely drive away FDI. Although the inequality-increasing effect of portfolio investments in our results is statistically insignificant, we
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believe that the consistently positive coefficient across samples may indicate a need for caution on the part of governments considering liberalization of this type. Finally, our results indicate that income inequality declines with economic development, but it also tends to persist over time. Governments interested in reducing income inequality need to design welfare programs that help the impoverished. Financial aid from DCs and international organizations to LDCs should be designed to reduce poverty. Regardless of the exact policies taken, we believe that reducing income inequality is important. If history is any guide, failure to reduce income inequality may well result in domestic and international political instability. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
Scholars have investigated the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality in two separate bodies of literature. In studies of democracy, scholars agree that democracy reduces income inequality, but the empirical evidence is mixed. In the literature on globalization, the effects of economic openness on income inequality are debated, but they have not been examined rigorously. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first systematic statistical study of the effects of both economic openness and democracy on income inequality. We argue that the two effects should be studied together. In other words, the exclusion of one variable or the other can lead to incorrect inferences of the determinants of income inequality. Our empirical analysis comprised 69 countries over the period 1960– 1996. We have focused on the effects of trade, FDI, foreign financial capital inflows, and democracy on income inequality. We find that a higher level of democracy reduces the level of income inequality within countries. Trade openness is associated with more equitable income distribution within countries, FDI is associated with greater income inequality, and foreign financial capital inflows have no statistically significant effect on income inequality. All the empirical findings in this chapter are found to be robust across different measures of income inequality, alternative statistical estimators, and model specification. In this chapter, we investigated the relationship between economic openness and democracy, on the one hand, and income inequality, on the other. In this analysis, economic development acted as a control variable. In the following chapter, we shift our attention to the relationship between economic development and the level of democracy. Is economic development a prerequisite for democratization? Is democratization good for the
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economy? These two questions have generated large bodies of literature focusing on either economic development or democracy as the dependent variable. Our interest in the next chapter is to analyze the potentially reciprocal relationship between democracy and development that has been largely ignored in previous research.
APPENDIX EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
As before, this appendix accompanies the section “Empirical Model and Analysis” in the main text of the chapter. We provide various details on the measurement of our variables, their data sources, issues pertaining to the technical design of the statistical model, and the expected effects of various control variables. We also report and discuss all the results for the control variables as well as various additional analyses.
Empirical Model The dependent variable – income inequality within countries – is measured via the Gini coefficient, which is computed on the basis of the Lorenz curve. In this curve, the cumulative percentage of income held by shares of society appears on the y-axis and the percentage of population that holds the particular income share appears on the x-axis. The line that is 45 degrees from the origin denotes perfect income equality (e.g., 10% of the people hold 10% of national income). However, perfect income equality is never observed empirically, and so the Lorenz curve is below this line. The Gini coefficient measures the area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve and is expressed as the percentage of the area between the x-axis and the line. Thus, a Gini coefficient of 100 denotes perfect income inequality, whereas a Gini coefficient of 0 denotes perfect equality.18 The Gini coefficient is an ideal measure of income inequality. As noted, previous studies have used alternative measures of income inequality due to the lack of comprehensive Gini data. We take advantage of the income inequality data collected by Deininger and Squire (1996). However, whereas their data set has the most comprehensive coverage, it contains missing values. To that effect, as in Easterly (1999) and Higgins and Williamson 18
For details, see, e.g., Nafziger (1997) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002).
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(1999), all the variables in the model are computed as decade averages. Hence, the unit of analysis is country decade.19 Deininger and Squire (1996) note that although their Gini data generally are of good quality, differences in data sources and data analysis methods across countries may cause measurement errors in a pooled sample.20 Using these data, Easterly (1999) applies all the available information from Deininger and Squire (1996) in computing the Gini decade averages, under the assumption that the measurement errors are randomly distributed and are captured in the statistical model’s error term. We use the data computed by Easterly. To examine the robustness of our Gini-based results, we also employ the share of income held by the top 20% of the national population as an alternative measure of income inequality.21 Because the Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 100, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression could be problematic (OLS assumes that the dependent variable is unbounded). The usual practice is to transform the bounded variable into an unbounded indicator. We transform the Gini coefficient into an unbounded measure using the formula log[Gini/(100 − Gini)].22 We also assess the robustness of results using the untransformed Gini coefficient. As noted, we measure economic openness by using flows of trade, fdi, and portfolio investments. We divide each of these flows by GDP to capture their importance in a country’s domestic economy. The economic openness data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). As in the previous chapter, democracy is the level of democracy in a country and is computed on the basis of the POLITY III data set (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Gurr and Jaggers, 1999). This widely used data set provides two indices of political regime characteristics. The 10-point democracy index
19
20
21
22
The Deininger and Squire data include 111 countries, covering the period from 1890 to 1996, but the data coverage is very limited before 1960. The Gini decade averages we use were computed by Easterly (1999) and cover four decades (1960s to 1990s). These data are available at www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddlife.htm. For example, the Gini coefficient may be computed from the level of income or the level of expenditure. In the case of income, individual welfare may be measured before or after payment of taxes. The aggregation of individual levels of welfare may vary across countries in the mixing of individual and household units. Appendix 3.1 provides the mean, minimum, and maximum values for the Gini data for each country in the sample. The country with the highest mean level of inequality is South Africa (Gini coefficient = 62.3), and the country with the lowest mean level of inequality is Hungary (Gini coefficient = 25.17). Log denotes natural logarithm. The transformed variable equals −∞ for Gini = 0 and +∞ for Gini = 100. See Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1991) for technical details.
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(DEMOC) measures the democratic characteristics of the regime. The 10point autocracy index (AUTOC) measures the autocratic characteristics of the regime. Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and others observed that many governments may have both democratic and autocratic characteristics. Consequently, these studies measure the level of democracy as the difference between DEMOC and AUTOC, a practice we also adopt here. The democracy measure ranges between −10 (the most autocratic regime) and 10 (the most democratic regime). In the model, gdppc is GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity–adjusted international dollars.
Research Design Issues Several design issues require further clarification. First, we employ a pooled time-series, cross-sectional research design. The sample includes 69 countries over the period 1960–1996. Statistical models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data may exhibit heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Although these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients, they could result in inefficient and biased standard errors for the coefficients. To deal with these potential problems, we estimate the model using OLS regression with Huber–White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust both to heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model helps to absorb temporal dependence in the data, as shown by Beck and Katz (1995a, 1995b). Second, in addition to the substantive reasons noted in the main text, the inclusion of past inequality in the model helps to control for the effect of potentially relevant but omitted structural variables, such as the ethnic and demographic structures of society. Many studies adopt this modeling strategy to prevent spurious findings (e.g., Bollen, 1979; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Muller, 1995). Third, as noted, we design our research to measure the net effects of economic openness and the level of democracy on income inequality. As is typically done, the statistical significance levels of the estimated coefficients are investigated with a one-tailed t-test since our hypotheses are signed. Fourth, we need to clarify how the size of the effect is computed for the statistically significant key variables. The coefficient sizes cannot be interpreted linearly from Table 3.1, because the dependent variable is a nonlinear transformation of Gini. As noted, we first compute a baseline Gini value by setting all variables in Model 1 of Table 3.1 at their respective means.
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We then raise democracy, trade, and fdi by one standard deviation at a time and compute Gini on the basis of the following equation: log[Gini/(100 − Gini)] = a + bx, where a is a constant, b is a vector of coefficients, and x is a vector of independent variables. We solve for Gini in terms of a, b, and x. Next we illustrate the sizes of these effects in two ways, as noted in the main text. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3.1 presents the estimated coefficients and their standard errors from the full sample, the DC sample, and the LDC sample.23 All the models in Table 3.1 have a relatively good fit to the data, with the adjusted R2 ranging from 0.52 (in the DC sample) to 0.69 (in the all-country sample). The joint significance level of the model’s independent variables from the F-test is statistically significant at a level better than 1% in all the samples, which supports our model specification.24 The effect of democracy on income inequality is statistically significant at the 5% level for the DC sample and at the 1% level for the LDC and all-country samples. The effect of trade openness on income inequality is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for all the samples, indicating that trade openness reduces income inequality. The effect of FDI inflows on income inequality is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the DC and LDC samples and at the 1% level for all countries. The effect of portfolio inflow on income inequality is positive in all samples, but it is never statistically significant. The effects of gdppc and gdppc2 on income inequality are statistically significant in the LDC sample at the levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. gdppc has a positive effect on income inequality, whereas gdppc2 has a negative effect. These results support the existence of a Kuznets curve for LDCs. In the DC and all-country samples, the Kuznets curve is not statistically significant. The insignificance of the Kuznets curve for DCs is to be expected. The Western European countries experienced a Kuznets curve transformation 23
24
The number of countries in our full sample is smaller than the number of countries in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data due to missing data points for the other variables in our model. We also check for high collinearity using the variance inflation factor. We find no high collinearity in the sample of LDCs, but high collinearity in the DC and all-country samples. Using the matrix of variance decomposition, we identify the sources of high collinearity to be gdppc and gdppc2 . These variables are correlated by construction, a quality shared by all models that include the Kuznets curve. Nevertheless, this result suggests caution in interpreting the Kuznets curve coefficients for the DC and all-country samples.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.A1. Interactive effect of democracy and FDI on income inequality
DEMOCRACY FDI FDI∗ DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations
All countries
LDCs
DCs
−0.0123∗∗∗ (0.0040) 0.0637∗∗∗ (0.0266) −0.0001 (0.0022) −0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0074 (0.0167) −1.92e-06 (0.00001) 1.91e-10 (4.42e-10) 0.7183∗∗∗ (0.0583) −0.1305∗∗∗ (0.0407) 142
−0.0097∗∗ (0.0053) 0.0545∗∗ (0.0299) −0.0011 (0.0027) −0.0013∗ (0.0008) 0.0352 (0.0378) 0.00004∗∗ (0.00002) −3.07e-09∗∗ (1.38e-09) 0.7181∗∗∗ (0.0684) −0.1889∗∗∗ (0.0516) 99
0.0041 (0.0130) 0.2680∗∗ (0.1063) −0.0211∗∗ (0.0105) −0.0026∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0063 (0.0159) 2.85e-06 (0.000015) 1.41e-10 (4.71e-10) 0.4870∗∗∗ (0.0718) −0.4523∗∗∗ (0.1176) 43
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kuznets, 1955). Since this period is not included in our sample, we do not detect a Kuznets curve effect for DCs. The effect of past inequality on current inequality is statistically significant at the level of 1% in all samples. The positive sign of this effect corroborates our expectation that income inequality exhibits inertia. The realization of equitable income distribution is a lengthy process; hence, one should take a long-run view of the dynamics of income inequality. The relatively large size of the inertia effect in our results suggests that models of income inequality that do not control for this effect may omit an important variable.
Additional Analyses The first additional analysis concerns the interactive effect of democracy and fdi on income inequality. Table 3.A1 presents the results. The total effect of fdi is (0.0637 − 0.0001∗ democracy) for all countries, (0.0545 − 0.0011∗ democracy) for LDCs, and (0.2680 − 0.0211∗ democracy) for
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DCs. We test the significance of the total effect of fdi across the different values of democracy for each sample. The total effect of fdi is significant only in the DC sample throughout the values of democracy. The second additional analysis focuses on the robustness of our results in Table 3.1. We use alternative measures of income inequality, exclude the lagged income inequality from the model, and employ alternative estimators. The results for the all-country sample are presented in Table 3.A2. The results for the LDC and DC samples are consistent with those in Table 3.A2 and are not reported here.25 Overall, the effects of democracy and economic openness in Table 3.1 are replicated and robust across the six experiments reported in Table 3.A2. The models presented in Table 3.1 employ a transformed Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. To assess the robustness of these results, we use alternative measures of inequality. In Column 1 of Table 3.A2, income inequality is measured as the share of national income held by the top 20% of the population. The data for this particular measure come from the studies of Deininger and Squire (1996) and Easterly (1999). In Column 2 of Table 3.A2, we use a nontransformed Gini coefficient, as in Easterly (1999) and Muller (1988).26 The inclusion of the lagged Gini coefficient in the models presented in Table 3.1 may reduce the variance to be explained by other variables. In column 3 of Table 3.A2, we exclude the lagged Gini coefficient for a robustness check. Recall, however, that the lagged Gini is part of our theoretical model specification. The results reported in Table 3.1 are generated from OLS regression with robust standard errors. Columns 4–6 of Table 3.A2 present the results from two other estimators: fixed effects with robust standard errors, and random effects. We employ two versions of the fixed-effects estimator, introducing country or decade dummies into the model. The fixed-effects estimator controls for the possibility that some countries or decades are marked by large income inequality. As noted in the literature, the fixed-effects estimator has serious limitations. First, the country and decade dummy variables are atheoretical and absorb many of the variations in the dependent variable that are attributable to the model’s independent variables.27 Second, the country dummy variables and other country-dependent variables (e.g., GDP per 25 26 27
Statistical results for the LDC and DC samples, as well as the by-country statistics for Gini and the sample descriptive statistics, are available from the authors on request. As noted, the transformation of the Gini coefficient is needed, since it is bounded. However, this transformation may introduce nonlinear effects and so is not used in some studies. As summarized by King (2001), most methodologists agree that using better models, better measures, and robust estimation is preferable to fixed-effects estimation.
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−0.3004∗∗∗ (0.0797) −0.0316∗∗ (0.0153) 0.2196 (0.3847) 1.4552∗∗∗ (0.5495) −1.50e-05 (0.0003) 3.37e-09 (1.05e-08) 0.7141∗∗∗ (0.0629) 11.0658∗∗∗ (3.2733) 142 0.68
−0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0010) −0.0002∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0041 (0.0035) 0.0103∗∗∗ (0.0029) 2.15e-06 (2.18e-06) −7.47e-11 (9.12e-11) 0.7352∗∗∗ (0.0521) 0.1166∗∗∗ (0.0252) 104 0.75 −0.2021∗∗ (0.0950) 142 0.25
−0.0125∗∗ (0.0073) −0.0014∗ (0.0010) −0.0014 (0.0233) 0.0884∗∗∗ (0.0318) −4.19e-05∗ (2.54e-05) 8.61e-10 (1.06e-09)
Without past inequality −0.0111∗ (0.0076) −0.0025 (0.0026) 0.0096 (0.0157) 0.0586∗∗ (0.0335) −3.96e-05∗ (2.62e-05) 1.27e-09∗ (8.11e-10) 0.0290 (0.1839) −0.1399 (0.1323) 142 0.92
Country fixed effects
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Observations Adjusted R2
Constant
PAST INEQUALITY
GDPPC2
GDPPC
FDI
PORTFOLIO
TRADE
DEMOCRACY
Untransformed Gini
Top 20% income −0.0130∗∗∗ (0.0036) −0.0013∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0040 (0.0151) 0.0566∗∗∗ (0.0223) 2.78e-06 (1.42e-05) −4.89e-11 (5.81e-10) 0.7266∗∗∗ (0.0588) −0.1337∗∗∗ (0.0505) 142 0.71
Decade fixed effects
Table 3.A2. Income inequality, democracy, and economic openness (all countries)
−0.0147∗∗∗ (0.0043) −0.0012∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0057 (0.0188) 0.0686∗∗∗ (0.0187) −5.02e-06 (1.56e-05) 3.17e-10 (6.28e-10) 0.6033∗∗∗ (0.0616) −0.1635∗∗∗ (0.0560) 142 0.70
Random effect
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capita) tend to be collinear. The random-effects estimator parameterizes the error term associated with different cross sections and is useful for cross-nationally dominated panels.28 Table 3.A2 suggests that the results from Table 3.1 are robust against the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable, alternative estimators, and alternative measures of income inequality. In all cases, the effect of democracy is statistically significant and negative, reducing income inequality. The effect of portfolio investment inflows is insignificant in all six models, as in Table 3.1. The effect of fdi inflows is always statistically significant and positive, again as in Table 3.1. The effect of trade openness is negative in all cases, reducing inequality, and is statistically significant in all but the case of the country fixed-effects estimator. We believe that this insignificant result reflects the noted limitations of the fixed-effects estimator. The control variables in Table 3.A2 replicate the spirit of Table 3.1. The effect of past inequality is positive in the five cases reported and is significant in all cases except for the country fixed-effects estimator. The effects of gdppc and gdppc2 are consistent with Table 3.1 in four of the six cases. Columns 3 (without past inequality) and 4 (country fixed effects) are the exceptions. The weaker results obtained without past inequality support our model specification. An argument against using the lagged dependent variable is that it causes insignificant results. Our results from the model including the lagged dependent variable, however, are more significant than those from a model without this variable. Since we also have theoretical reasons for including past inequality in the model, we believe Column 3 suffers from model misspecification bias. In Column 4, the effects of gdppc and gdppc2 are significant, but their signs are not consistent with the Kuznets curve. We believe this weaker result reflects the aforementioned limitations of the fixed-effects estimator.29 Finally, one may question whether the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality are statistically different between the DC and LDC samples. To answer this question, we constructed two variables for each independent variable in the original model. For example, instead of one democracy variable, we now have two separate variables: oecd democracy and ldc democracy. We estimated a full model of all variables thus created 28
29
An alternative estimator is the panel corrected standard error (PCSE; Beck and Katz, 1995b). Because our sample is cross-nationally dominated with only four decades, the PCSE estimator is not suitable for our application. We thank Neal Beck for this comment. We have also estimated the model in Table 3.1 with a dummy variable for communist regime status, because these countries tend to emphasize income equality. The results for the hypothesis testing are similar to those reported in Table 3.1.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 3.A3. Effects of democracy and economic openness in DCs and LDCs
DCs DEMOCRACY TRADE PORTFOLIO FDI GDPPC GDPPC2 PAST INEQUALITY Constant Observations Adjusted R2 Note:
∗
−0.0142∗∗∗ (0.0047) −0.0027∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0052 (0.0151) 0.0591∗∗∗ (0.0205) −8.36e-06 (0.00001) 5.20e-10 (4.71e-10) 0.4868∗∗∗ (0.0756) −0.1945∗∗∗ (0.0490) 142 0.69
LDCs −0.0113∗∗∗ (0.0038) −0.0012∗ (0.0008) 0.0346 (0.0370) 0.0516∗∗ (0.0293) 0.00004∗∗ (0.00002) −3.06e−09∗∗∗ (1.27e-09) 0.7155∗∗∗ (0.0703)
Coefficient equality test 0.26 1.02 0.54 0.04 5.10∗∗ 8.74∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗
significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
and report the results in Table 3.A3. We then tested whether the coefficient of, say, oecd democracy equals that of ldc democracy, and we did so for each variable. These equality test results are in the last column of Table 3.A3. The test results indicate that the sizes of the effects of economic openness and democracy on income inequality, although statistically significant in both DC and LDC samples, are not significantly different across the two samples.
FOUR
Democracy and Development
INTRODUCTION
The effect of democracy on economic development has captivated many thinkers. De Tocqueville (1835) and Schumpeter (1942), for example, believe democracy provides the social securities required for development. Hayek (1944) argues that democracies exhibit relatively less unrest and political instability, promoting development. Friedman (1962) asserts that democracy promotes development by keeping state power in check. North (1990) expects autocrats to prey on their subjects, and Olson (1993) argues that autocrats are corrupt and promote their cronies, which are bad for development. Going a step further, Fukuyama (1992) argues that capitalism and democracy work in unison to promote welfare, a view many observers share (e.g., The Economist, 1994; Cohen, 2007). In contrast, Marx (1867, 1871) and Lenin (1911) argued that democracy came out of capitalist development as a tool for the elite to deprive and appease the masses. John S. Mill (1860), a supporter of democracy, is skeptical about its ability to promote development. Huntington (1968) argues that democracies exhibit high state expenditures in response to their citizens’ demands, reducing the excess that is expendable for development. Olson (1982) argues that special interests in democracy shape public policy to promote their own interests, undermining the economy. Wade (1996) argues that strong autocrats can resist popular pressure for policies to save doomed industries, which is good for development. Barro (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) argue that autocrats can effectively pursue prodevelopment policies. Despite the controversy, the view that democracy promotes development has recently become prevalent in the policy circles of the developed world. For example, a number of senior practitioners recently argued that poor 89
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countries undertaking democratic reforms outperform poor autocracies in development. The United States should, therefore, target its aid to help countries that attempt democratic reforms. President Bush, the authors note, supports having democratic governance “as qualifying criteria for countries to receive assistance” (Siegle et al., 2004). Similarly, Bush’s Under Secretary of State Dobriansky argues that solid democratic institutions are the basis for economic development (U.S. Department of State, 2007), and Bush himself apparently believes that political and economic liberties, both of which promote social welfare, are the natural by-products of each other (Cohen, 2007). Democracy, as a regime favoring equal political rights and civil liberties, is definitely worthy of promotion. We have seen that many writers and policymakers justify the promotion of democracy as a means to encourage economic development, but does a rise in democracy really lead to a higher level of development? The argument that democracy promotes development considers neither the possibility that democracy could undermine development nor the possibility that the causality may flow from development to democracy. In fact, as we show in the next section, the effect of development on democracy has received ample scholarly attention. The issue of causation stands at the center of this chapter. We argue that sorting out the causal direction between democracy and economic development is important. For example, if the goal is to promote democracy but the causation goes from development to democracy, we should not condition the distribution of aid to poor countries on instituting democratic reforms; rather, we should condition aid on forces such as economic reforms that encourage development or on the quality of the projects themselves. The relationship between democracy and development raises two salient questions. Does development lead to democracy? Does democracy encourage or undermine development? Together, these questions imply that the two forces may affect each other in a reciprocal manner. But statistical studies typically employ single-equation models, which specify either democracy as the dependent variable and development as the key independent variable, or development as the dependent variable and democracy as the key independent variable. As several scholars noted recently, these single-equation models cannot address the possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development, and their inferences may be misleading (Chan, 2002; Midlarsky, 2002; Przeworski and Limongi, 2003).1 1
Chan (2002: 118) warns that even if some results indicate that democracy boosts development, “the relationship may well be the other way around [development boosts democracy].” Midlarsky (2002: 672) calls “for the greater use of structural equations modeling” in the
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The development–democracy reciprocity issue has so far received very limited attention. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) tested the causality between democracy and energy consumption per capita by using Granger’s method, but they did not specify a simultaneous equations model (SEM). Przeworski et al. (2000) used dynamic probit to study the effect of development on regime transition and a selection-corrected estimator to assess the effect of regime type on economic growth, but they did not specify a full SEM. Helliwell (1994) and Feng (2003) employed SEMs, but their analyses raise a number of concerns, to which we will return. Given the significance of and the inadequate attention to the issue, further analysis of the simultaneity between democracy and development is warranted. Some readers may view this issue as a methodological nuisance, not a theoretical problem. We consider it to have both theoretical and methodological implications. If democracy and development affect each other, unidirectional models are theoretically incomplete and, as Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) noted, will produce biased estimates. We construct a SEM of the levels of development and democracy. By employing this approach, we are able to decide which of the following four theoretically distinct possibilities holds: (1) development affects democracy, but not the other way around; (2) democracy affects development, but not the other way around; (3) the two forces affect each other; and (4) the two forces are unrelated. We also identify the signs and sizes of the statistically significant effects. We estimate this model using a large-N sample of countries across nearly four decades. The empirical results suggest that a rise in development in a country increases its democracy, whereas a rise in democracy reduces development. These findings have important policy implications. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between democracy and development, and the following section provides an overview of previous empirical efforts and raises several important but overlooked design issues. The fourth section discusses our statistical model and presents the main empirical findings. The last section summarizes the findings and explores their implications. As in previous chapters, technical details and additional results are delegated to the chapter appendix. development–democracy literature. Przeworski and Limongi (2003: 348) argue that “inferences based on standard [single-equation] regression models [of democracy and development] are invalid.”
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
This section provides the theoretical context for our analysis rather than an exhaustive review of two very large bodies of literature. We demonstrate that a large number of arguments exist for both claims: economic development influences democracy, and democracy affects development. Acknowledging these plausible arguments, one should entertain the theoretical possibility that development and democracy affect each other simultaneously.
Causality from Development to Democracy The hypothesis that economic development promotes democracy has received wide attention in the literature. Lipset traces this so-called modernization thesis back to the Greek philosopher Aristotle. “From Aristotle down to the present,” he writes, “men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (1959: 75). Development arguably promotes democracy through several channels. First, as economy develops, the need for an educated labor force rises and people can afford to spend more on education. Educated people, in turn, often demand greater government transparency, political freedom, and participation in policymaking (Diamond et al., 1987; Lipset et al., 1993), which are all elements of democracy. Educated people also tend to be more receptive to the idea of resolving political disagreement through nonviolent, majority-based decision making. They also demand freer flows of information, more mass media, and communication outlets, which assist the diffusion of democratic ideas (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1989; Diamond and Plattner, 1994). In a second channel, economic development promotes civic society and socioeconomic progress, which increase the power of the middle class at the expense of the ruling elite and constrain authoritarianism (de Tocqueville, 1835; Lipset, 1959; Huber et al., 1993; Putnam et al., 1993). Also, as the number of urban dwellers rises, the masses can more easily get organized to demand political rights (Lipset, 1959; Lipset et al., 1993). Third, underdevelopment and poverty cause discontent, accentuate grievances, and polarize societies. These tensions increase the attractiveness of violence as a means to secure survival and acquire social mobility, which can increase political instability and even lead to civil war. In
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trying to assert power, the state may become oppressive, reducing democracy. Economic development promotes democracy by alleviating these tensions (Im, 1987; Huntington, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). A fourth channel considers the appeal of autocracy to the elite. Political leaders constantly contemplate whether to accept the outcome of a democratic competition that mandates the distribution of the national pie or to fight to establish autocratic control so as to acquire a larger share of the pie. Assuming the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal return of capital decrease with affluence, the attractiveness of dictatorship is expected to wane when affluence rises. Also, as the economy and civil society develop, defeated politicians have more opportunities for respectable employment, enabling their acceptance of electoral defeats. Because economic development increases affluence and supplies more acceptable alternatives, dictatorship becomes less attractive as a political solution to distributional conflicts (Lipset, 1959, 1981; Przeworski et al., 2000). Finally, poverty and underdevelopment erode public confidence in the ability of nascent democracies to resolve problems, reducing the legitimacy of the regime and increasing the appeal of authoritarianism to the public. When developmental problems become salient and pressing, the democratic government may lose public support altogether, raising the likelihood of a forceful transition to autocracy. Development, in contrast, alleviates these pressures and enables democracy to take hold and consolidate (Linz, 1978; Seligson and Muller, 1987; Huntington, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). The positive effect of development on democracy, however, is not the only possible outcome. Development may delay democratization in two ways. First, economic development may strengthen an authoritarian government (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005); development provides more financial resources for the autocrat, not only the middle class, particularly when the government owns some means of production. Because a financially stronger government can sustain a larger security force and develop better monitoring and surveillance methods, it becomes more capable of suppressing the grassroots efforts toward democracy. Second, as long as the economy develops strongly, the public in an autocracy may not always be interested in changing the status quo. If the public values robust economic development more than democratic norms such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, or freedom of political participation, economic development may serve to maintain the autocratic regime. Some stylized observations support the argument that development may not bring about democratization. China, for example, has been vigorously
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developing its economy since the late 1970s, but it remains a one-party state. Since the late 1990s, Russia has achieved considerable economic development, but various reports suggest its level of democracy is on the decline. Strong developments in Japan from the late nineteenth century to 1945 and in Germany from 1933 to 1945 coincided with highly undemocratic yet popular regimes. Finally, despite Singapore’s stellar economic development record, the country is still autocratic.
Causality from Democracy to Development Theoretical considerations suggest the effect of democracy on development can be negative or positive. Starting with the negative impact, one channel argues democracies are bogged down by special interests and rentseeking, which hinders development. Special interests use the democratic political process to redistribute wealth from the public to themselves, and rent-seeking allocates resources to unproductive activities. A developmentoriented autocrat may restrain the overbearing rent-seeking interests (Olson, 1982; Lal, 1983; Jackman, 1993). In this vein, regimes based on alliances between the military and technocrats may be efficient in promoting development, because the technocrats devise required policies and the determined military regime implements them (O’Donnell, 1979; Cohen, 1985). In a second channel, free people may be reluctant to curtail their consumption in order to save. Low savings, in turn, leads to low investments, which slows down development. Democratic governments, depending on the electoral support to stay in office, are often afraid to impose unpopular measures to increase savings and investments. Depending relatively less on public support, autocrats can implement unpopular policies to boost savings and investments (Hewlett, 1979; Rao, 1985). Third, democratic governments tend to spend much on social welfare programs because the public values them. Massive government expenditures, in turn, crowd out resources for development projects. Democracies may also have to confront strong populist pressures to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor in various ways, reducing the willingness of the wealthy to save and invest. Authoritarian leaders may be better able to ward off these pressures, encouraging economic development (Haggard, 1990; Barro, 2000). In a fourth channel, democracies are less able to suppress social unrest than autocracies because they have to protect civil liberties. Social unrest, in turn, slows down production, undermines effective business planning, and
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scares away investors. Because it is more capable of enforcing social order, an autocratic regime can promote economic development better than a democratic government (Pye, 1966; Hewlett, 1980). Finally, less developed countries (LDCs) feature agrarian societies, high income inequality, youth-oriented demographics, low levels of technology, underdeveloped financial markets, and dependence on international capital and technology. In such situations, the state necessarily must play an active and interventionist role in promoting development, suggesting that authoritarian decision making may outperform the diffused democratic process (Chirot, 1977; Cohen, 1985). In contrast, several arguments indicate that democracy can facilitate development. First, political freedom leads to economic freedom. Free markets, in turn, allocate financial resources and factors of production to their most efficient use, bringing about development (Goodin, 1979; Goodell and Powelson, 1982). Second, democracy respects individual rights, including private property rights. Secure property rights, in turn, are critical for trade, savings, and investments, which promote development (Goodell and Powelson, 1982; North, 1990; Olson, 1993; Clauge et al., 1996; Li and Resnick, 2003). Autocrats may also secure property rights, but democratic leaders are more likely to do so since they are subject to checks and balances (North and Weingast, 1989). Autocrats may abruptly change the rules of the game, increasing uncertainty and, therefore, the willingness to invest. Autocrats may also be more predatory than democratic leaders, because they have fewer incentives to consider public welfare, as opposed to their own interests and those of their cronies (Goodell, 1985; Findlay, 1990; Olson, 1991). Third, because democratic regimes are more responsive to public concerns and more likely to solve problems through political compromise, they may experience less domestic unrest than autocracies. Because democratic governments represent the public, they may seek to achieve relatively more equitable income distributions than autocracies. All these forces work to defuse public grievances and reduce the likelihood of social strife and revolution. Political stability, in turn, leads to a longer time horizon for economic activities, increasing the allocation efficiency and investments required for development (Przeworski, 1985; Barro, 2000; Feng, 2003). Fourth, autocrats’ military spending needs to be relatively more excessive to sustain control over their population. Consequently, they need to extract more resources from society through tax or pillage, which hinders economic development. In addition, as autocrats allocate most of their energy to
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maintaining social order and guarding against possible coups that might be staged by their opponents or the public, they are less likely to be effective at modernizing their economies (Nordlinger, 1970; Bienen, 1971). Finally, the autocrat, who requires the support of the ruling elite, may be subject to rent seeking, corruption, and patron–client relationships, all of which undermine development. Whereas autocrats have more decisionmaking power, they still make bad decisions. For example, capital-intensive development strategies, which autocrats have often chosen, may produce dual economies in LDCs, which is detrimental for development. In contrast, rent-seeking in democracy need not be as severe as in autocracy, and democratic deliberation does not necessarily lead to bad public policy (Goodin, 1979; King, 1981; Nafziger, 2006). THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The previous section discussed various theoretical conjectures on the effects of democracy and development on each other. Taken together, these arguments suggest that democracy and development affect each other simultaneously. Moreover, because all the preceding arguments are theoretically plausible, the net effects of development and democracy on each other could be positive, negative, or insignificant. To the extent that theory cannot definitively calibrate the strengths of the causal forces, the exact nature and strength of the reciprocal relationship between democracy and development is an empirical issue. This section overviews empirical findings in the literature and discusses a number of critical design issues. In general, some stylized facts support Lipset’s (1959) modernization thesis. For example, today the developed countries (DCs) are all democratic, and those DCs with the most recent history of autocratic rule – Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey – are also the least developed among the DCs. In Taiwan, South Korea, and several other newly industrialized countries, a move toward greater democracy followed economic development, whereas some of the worst democratic records are found in LDCs. That said, stylized facts rejecting the modernization thesis also exist (e.g., China and Russia) and, more generally, stylized facts may not generalize across many countries. Statistical studies of democracy typically employ single-equation models. Development is typically measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (RGDPPC) and democracy is typically measured as a continuous variable. Most of these studies find that a rise in RGDPPC increases
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democracy.2 Other studies model democracy as a discrete event where democracy grows above some predefined threshold. The results of these studies are somewhat mixed.3 Turning to the reverse causality, analysts study the net effect of democracy on the growth rate of RGDPPC or GDP. The findings are mixed. In Borner et al.’s (1995) review, 10 studies find an insignificant or mixed effect of democracy on growth, 3 find a negative effect, and 3 find a positive effect. In Kurzman et al.’s (2002) survey, 19 studies report a positive effect, 6 report negative effects, 10 report insignificant effects, and 9 present mixed results. In Feng’s (2003) review, 4 studies find insignificant effects, 6 find positive effects, and 6 find negative effects. More recently, Krieckhaus (2004) also reports mixed results. Consider next the issue of simultaneity. If development and democracy indeed affect each other, the single-equation analysis is problematic and likely produces biased results. So far, only two studies have addressed this issue using a SEM, but their findings and designs differ. Helliwell (1994) found that a rise in real income per capita promotes democracy, whereas a rise in democracy does not affect economic growth. Feng (2003) found that a rise in economic growth does not affect democracy, whereas a rise in democracy promotes economic growth. The models of Helliwell and Feng raise three design issues. First, Helliwell uses the 1960 values as instruments for endogenous variables in 1985, but a SEM requires instruments based on all the exogenous variables in the model. Second, both models are cross-sectional, where variables are averages over more than two decades. However, as Feng notes, this design cannot study change over time, which is important in the relationship between democracy and development. Third, both studies focus on the economic growth rate, not the level of development, but the modernization thesis stresses the importance of the level of development in democracy, not growth. If one accepts the premise that democracy and development may affect each other, the democracy equation ought to include the level of development on the right-hand side, and the development equation should employ this variable as the dependent variable to maintain simultaneity 2
3
The findings of Lipset et al. (1993), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Gasiorowski (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), and Li and Reuveny (2003) support the modernization thesis. For contrary evidence, see Gonick and Rosh (1988) and Colaresi and Thompson (2003). For example, Przeworski et al. (2000) find that development does not affect democratic transition but promotes democratic consolidation post-transition. Boix and Stokes (2003) find that development promotes transition and consolidation.
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between the two equations.4 Also, we note that growth and development tell us different things. An economy can grow fast and be underdeveloped (e.g., China), whereas DCs can exhibit slow growth (e.g., Japan). Growth may change erratically, but development changes slowly. Furthermore, growth and change in development also differ. Using RGDPPCt for development in time t, the change in development is RGDPPCt − RGDPPCt−1 , where t − 1 is the previous period. Growth is (RGDPPCt − RGDPPCt−1 )/RGDPPCt−1 . Economies may display the same change in RGDPPC but grow at different rates due to different values of RGDPPCt−1 in the denominator of the growth expression. As we demonstrate clearly in the chapter appendix, inferences based on a growth–democracy SEM differ from those based on a development–democracy SEM. We believe that any SEM model of the development–democracy nexus needs to seriously address these design issues. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Although theoretical expectations indicate a possible simultaneous relationship between democracy and development, the empirical evidence obtained so far is mixed. The designs of previous studies that attempted to address the issue of simultaneity raise concerns, but we think their logic in recognizing the need for a SEM is sound. This section presents our statistical SEM, related research design issues, and main empirical findings. As in previous chapters, technical details of the model, measures, and data sources are presented in the chapter appendix.
Empirical Model We first need to consider the measurement of democracy as it affects our modeling strategy. The issue is not which features of democracy or autocracy should be recorded – which is important in its own right – but whether to model democracy as a discrete event indicating that democracy exists only above some threshold or as a continuous variable that ranges from full autocracy to full democracy. The discrete measure leads to models of the probability of democratic transition, whereas the continuous measure 4
If Y and Z are endogenous, the Y equation in a SEM needs to include Z on the right-hand side and the Z equation needs to include Y on the right-hand side. Specifying a democracy equation as a function of development and an economic growth equation as a function of democracy does not create a SEM.
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leads to models of the level of democracy. We seek to study the reciprocal relationship between the level of development and the level of democracy rather than the event of meeting a predefined threshold for democracy, because development may interact with the whole spectrum of democracy, not just with the discrete event of democratic transition.5 We specify and estimate a SEM to test the net effect of democracy on development and the net effect of development on democracy. The model distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous (or control) variables. An endogenous variable appears on the left-hand side of one equation and the right-hand side of the other. The exogenous variables appear only on the right-hand side of each equation. As in the previous chapters, small capital letters denote variables, and Greek letters denote coefficients to be estimated empirically. A coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The notations ␣c and ␣t denote vectors of coefficients. The Greek letters εt and ut represent the random errors in the two equations, respectively. The subscripts t and t − 1 denote the current and previous time periods (or years), respectively. We lag the exogenous variables for reasons discussed in the appendix. To simplify presentation, we refer to variables in the text without the time subscripts. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) present the development and democracy equations of the SEM, respectively, specified based on the democratization and development literature. RGDPPCt = ␣0 + ␣1 democracyt + ␣2 prior rgdppct−1 + ␣3 investmentt−1 + ␣4 population growtht−1 + ␣5 educationt−1 + ␣6 instabilityt−1 + ␣7 tradet−1 + ␣c country fixed effects + ␣t yearly fixed effects + ut ,
(4.1)
democracyt = 0 + 1 rgdppct + 2 prior democracyt−1 + 3 tradet−1 + 4 diffusiont−1 + 5 inflationt−1 + 6 economic growtht−1 + 7 year + εt .
(4.2)
The dependent variable in Equation (4.1), rgdppc, is the level of economic development, measured as the logarithm of real GDPPC in 5
For the alternative discrete event approach, see Przeworski et al. (2000) and Boix and Stokes (2003).
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 4.1. Variables and expected effects in the simultaneous equations
Democracy (DEMOCRACY) equation Variable Endogenous RGDPPC
Sign
Development (RGDPPC) equation Variable
Sign
Positive or negative
Endogenous DEMOCRACY
Positive or negative
Positive
Exogenous PRIOR RGDPPC
Positive
Exogenous PRIOR DEMOCRACY YEAR TRADE DIFFUSION
Positive Positive or negative Positive
GROWTH INFLATION
Positive or negative Positive or negative
INVESTMENT TRADE POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY FIXED EFFECTS
Positive Positive or negative Negative Positive Negative Positive or negative
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted terms. The dependent variable in Equation (4.2), democracy, is the level of democracy of a country, measured as in the previous two chapters. The specification of the development equation follows the economic development literature, and the specification of the democracy equation follows Chapter 2 (and the comparative politics literature). Table 4.1 summarizes the relationships among the endogenous variables and lists the expected effects of the exogenous variables. The variable prior rgdppc is gdppc from the previous period; investment is a measure of the amount of physical capital in the country; trade is a measure of economic openness, given by the share of a country’s total trade in the national economy; population is the population growth rate of a country; education is the level of human capital in a country; instability is a binary variable indicating the occurrence or absence of revolution or coup d’etat in a country; and country fixed effects is a group of country indicators that capture country-specific heterogeneity, whereas yearly fixed effects is a group of year indicators that capture year-specific heterogeneity. In the democracy equation, prior democracy is the first lag of the level of democracy; year is a year counter that captures the possible linear trend in democracy; trade is the same variable appearing in the development equation; diffusion is the average democracy score of countries within the region around each country; economic growth is the yearly percent growth rate of real GDP, PPP adjusted; and inflation is the yearly inflation rate in a country.
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Research Design Issues Several research design issues require clarification; we discuss their details in the chapter appendix. First, to assess and generalize the overall relationship between democracy and development, we employ a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) design. The unit of analysis is the country-year, and the empirical sample includes 127 countries from 1961 to 1996, including both DCs and LDCs. Second, stylized facts suggest that LDCs have generally experienced wide variations in their democracy levels during our time period, whereas DCs generally had consistently higher levels of democracy that were quite stable over time. To evaluate the effect of this difference on inference, we conduct analyses for two samples. One sample includes all the countries for which we have data, both DCs and LDCs. A second sample contains only LDCs, excluding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which we identify as DCs. Third, to assess whether any statistical basis exists for suspecting a simultaneous relationship between development and democracy, we employ a so-called exogeneity test. This test evaluates if democracy is not affected by development (thus, exogenous in the development equation) and if development is not affected by democracy (thus, exogenous in the democracy equation). The results of this test are not meant to replace a full SEM analysis but to provide some indication of the simultaneity and whether a SEM is necessary from a statistical perspective. Fourth, to estimate a SEM, we need to consider the mathematical issue of identification and the statistical issue of inference. We handle the issue of identification by using the familiar exclusion criterion. We handle the issue of inference in the presence of simultaneity between development and democracy by employing the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Fifth, we conduct an additional statistical analysis to evaluate the robustness of our results when we use a different statistical estimator – the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator, which is more efficient. Sixth, the economic development equation controls for cross-country heterogeneity for theoretical reasons. Empirically, one may model such heterogeneity as random or fixed effects. The choice between the two methods is based on the so-called Hausman test. Seventh, the economic development equation also includes the lagged dependent variable for theoretical reasons, which could lead to biased statistical results when used in conjunction with the country fixed effects. We check the robustness of our findings by using a variant of the 2SLS estimator, which we refer to as the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator that addresses this problem.
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Eighth, the error term of a statistical model needs to satisfy certain assumptions for the inferences to be valid. We address the related assumption violations by using appropriate econometric techniques. Finally, it is possible that other right-hand-side variables in the model will be affected by democracy or development. We handle the possible endogeneity of the other variables by lagging them one year, a widely employed practice in the literature.
Empirical Findings We first conduct the exogeneity test, seeking to establish a statistical basis for our SEM. The results indicate we should reject that democracy is exogenous in the development equation or that development is exogenous in the democracy equation. They demonstrate the need for a SEM setup if one intends to model correctly the relationship between democracy and development. Table 4.2 reports the 2SLS estimation results for two samples: one for all countries and the other for LDCs only. We begin with the results for the democracy equation. In column 1, for the sample of all countries, the coefficient of economic development, rgdppc, is positive and significantly different from zero. A rise in the level of economic development promotes the level of democracy, which supports Lipset’s modernization thesis. Does this hold in the LDCs? In column 3, for the sample of LDCs only, the effect of a rise in the level of economic development on the level of democracy remains positive and significantly different from zero. Thus, the positive impact of development on democracy is not an artifact of sample choice. How large is the effect of economic development on the level of democracy in a country? The coefficient of rgdppc (the logarithm of real GDP per capita) for the sample of all countries indicates that when the real GDP per capita rises from the estimation sample minimum of 416 PPP-adjusted real international dollars (a very-low-income country) to the estimation sample mean of 3,994 PPP-adjusted real international dollars (a low-to mid-income country), the level of democracy increases by 0.48 unit on the 20-point democracy scale (from −10 to +10). This change in the level of democracy seems small, but it only represents the immediate impact of a rise in economic development on democracy. In our SEM, a rise in economic development in the current period not only affects the level of democracy in the current period but also continues to affect the next period democracy via prior democracy in the model. The long-run effect of some change in development on democracy
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Table 4.2. Democracy and development, 2SLS Democracy Development DCs and LDCs DCs and LDCs RGDPPC PRIOR DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION INFLATION ECONOMIC GROWTH YEAR TRADE
0.2127∗∗∗ (0.0497) 0.9237∗∗∗ (0.0094) 0.2863∗∗∗ (0.0888) 0.00002 (0.00001) −0.0058 (0.0088) 0.0195∗∗∗ (0.0040) −0.0014∗∗ (0.0008)
PRIOR RGDPPC DEMOCRACY INVESTMENT POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY Constant Observations
−40.6822∗∗∗ (7.6661) 2914
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.00007) 0.9537∗∗∗ (0.0096) −0.0006∗∗ (0.0003) 0.0016∗∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0064∗∗∗ (0.0023) 0.0024 (0.0023) −0.0099∗∗∗ (0.0044) 0.3516∗∗∗ (0.0626) 2914
Democracy LDCs 0.1901∗∗∗ (0.0624) 0.9150∗∗∗ (0.0011) 0.3586∗∗∗ (0.107) 8.58E-6 (0.00002) −0.0060 (0.0097) 0.0286∗∗∗ (0.0054) −0.0009 (0.0010)
−58.5994∗∗∗ (10.1188) 2230
Development LDCs
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.00008) 0.9558∗∗∗ (0.0065) −0.00059∗ (0.0004) 0.0019∗∗∗ (0.0004) −0.0068∗∗∗ (0.0026) 0.0021 (0.0033) −0.0103∗∗∗ (0.0046) 0.0000 (0.0000) 2230
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
accumulates over time; we explain this computation in detail in the appendix. Suppose real GDP per capita rises from 416 to 3,994; the longrun change in democracy amounts to 6.30 units on the 20-point democracy. This increase in the level of democracy is much larger than the immediate impact of development, covering about one-third of the autocracy– democracy range of the democracy scale. Does a rise in the level of democracy in a country influence its level of development? In Table 4.2, the coefficient of democracy in the development
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equation is negative and significantly different from zero for both the allcountries sample and the LDC sample. Hence, a rise in the level of democracy in a country reduces its level of economic development, all other things being equal. The negative effect of democracy on development is not sensitive to the sample choice. How large is the effect of democracy on economic development? Consider the following scenario. Suppose an autocratic country, whose level of democracy is −10, experiences a rise in democracy to +6, a level that scholars often use to indicate a country’s transition into a democracy. How much does this democratization affect economic development? Since democracy is not logged and rgdppc is logged, the percent change in real GDP per capita due to a change of 16 units in democracy is given by 100 × (Change in democracy) × (democracy Coefficient), which is −0.96% (i.e., 100 × 16 × −0.0006 in percent). Hence, an autocracy whose level of democracy rises from −10 by 16 units can expect to see its real GDP per capita fall by almost 1% in real terms in that year, all other things being equal. This immediate change is substantively not small. How large is the change in the long run? The change in democracy in the development equation affects real GDP per capita immediately (computed earlier) and continues to affect it in the next period through its effect on prior rgdppc in the model. The long-run effect of some change in democracy accumulates over time. Based on the computation illustrated in the appendix, the long-run percent change in GDP per capita due to a change of 16 units of the democracy score is −20.73%. That is, a country whose democracy rises from −10 to 16 will see its real GDP per capita fall by almost 21% in the long run, all other things being equal. The results for the control variables in both the development equation and the democracy equation are largely consistent with the theoretical expectations stated in Table 4.1. These expectations, in turn, are based on previous studies. This increases our confidence in the results from our SEM. We discuss the results of the control variables in the appendix.
Additional Analysis As planned, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we employ the 3SLS estimator. Second, we employ the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator. Overall, the results from these analyses are consistent with those in Table 4.2, both in terms of the reciprocal effects between democracy and development and in terms of the control variable in the two equations. The additional analyses suggest that development promotes democracy, and yet democracy reduces the level
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of development. The robustness of our findings gives us more confidence in our analysis. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Scholarship on democracy and development has called for study of the reciprocal relationship between democracy and economic development. So far, almost all studies have employed single-equation models. The two important exceptions to this practice did not evaluate the possible reciprocal relationship within the context of a structural SEM that endogenizes the level of economic development and the level of democracy in a pooled TSCS large-N design. This chapter is the first to study the reciprocal relationship between the levels of economic development and democracy in a pooled TSCS research design using a SEM. The structure of the development equation follows directly from neoclassical economic growth theory, and the specification of the democracy equation resembles the one used in many studies of democratization. The large-N TSCS design captures both cross-sectional and time-series patterns. The results are robust across subsamples of countries and alternative SEM estimators. To summarize, in both the all-countries sample and the sample of LDCs only, we find that a rise in the level of economic development in a country leads to a rise in its level of democracy, whereas a rise in the level of democracy in a country reduces its level of economic development. The democracy–development causality goes two ways. Our use of the SEM methodology reveals a tension in the democracy– development relationship, which has important policy implications. Our results suggest that the wealth level of a country influences the creation and sustenance of democratic governance. In other words, the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions are likely to be more successful in richer countries. If democracy is a desirable political system, promoting economic development should be as important, if not more important, a task as promoting democracy directly. Efforts to promote democracy in poor countries without lifting them out of poverty are likely to fail. The idea that promoting democracy will lift poor countries out of poverty receives little empirical support. In fact, democratization presents a dilemma for policymakers. A rise in the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development, which in turn undermines democracy. Countries that set development as their priority may need to delay democratization, at least for a while. Authoritarianism may provide conditions that are conducive to economic development. Nondemocratic countries can more swiftly choose
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prodevelopment policies, avoiding the need to choose a middle-of-theroad approach that would placate and keep all constituencies on board. The drawback of this approach is that the public may have no say at all in the development process, leading to skewed economic development that favors the interests of a narrow group in society at the expense of the masses. The current policy approach in countries such as China, Singapore, Russia, and perhaps to a lesser degree Malaysia, and the policy approach of newly industrialized countries such as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s–1990s, suggest that when faced with a choice between democracy and development, many leaders and nations seem to choose development first. Our findings also suggest a significant implication about the outcome of democratic and economic reforms in LDCs. A strategy of development first, which postpones democratization until some level of development is reached, can eventually bring about a rise in democracy as development promotes democracy. In contrast, a strategy of democracy first may fail as a rise in democracy reduces economic development, which in turn is bad for democracy. Hence, the former strategy is more likely to improve both development and democracy. Ultimately, choosing between the two goals (i.e., which one should take the driver’s seat) is a normative decision of leaders and nations, but in doing so the leaders should be aware that they are walking a very fine line. Putting too much emphasis on the goal of economic development at the expense of democracy may backfire. As the country develops economically, pressures toward democratization in the country will likely rise. If these pressures are not released in an orderly manner, they may explode in the form of revolution or coup d’etat. Our results suggest that such political instability in turn reduces the level of economic development in a country, possibly wiping out the economic gains the society worked hard to achieve. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The relationship between democracy and economic development involves two causal questions. One question asks whether economic development promotes democracy; the other asks whether democracy influences development. Statistical analyses typically focus on one of the two questions, relying on single-equation models. Taken together, however, these two questions imply a possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development. The few statistical studies that attempted to address this possible simultaneous relationship suffer several methodological weaknesses.
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In this chapter, we revisit this important issue regarding the possible reciprocal relationship between democracy and development. We specify and estimate a structural equations model of the simultaneity between the level of development and the level of democracy. This approach allows us to rigorously evaluate the nature of their relationship; that is, whether democracy affects development only, development affects democracy only, they affect each other, or they are not related statistically. The empirical results indicate that the level of democracy reduces the level of economic development, and development promotes democracy. This chapter concludes Part I of our book. In this part, we modeled the effects of economic openness on democracy, the effects of democracy and economic openness on income distribution, and the reciprocal relationship between economic development and democracy. As demonstrated in the different chapters, these are important issues. But these analyses ignored the possible influences of democracy and economic openness on interstate political relations. Yet we observe every day how interstate political events have influenced and been influenced by such significant transformations as democratization and economic liberalization. Part II of our book explicitly tackles the relevance of democracy (Chapter 5) and economic openness (Chapter 6) to interstate military conflict. In Chapter 5, we focus on the relationship between democracy and military conflict, which speaks to two separate bodies of literature: one on democratic peace and the other on the causes of democracy. We seek to highlight the previously overlooked reciprocal causal link between democracy and conflict.
APPENDIX MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH, AND DEMOCRACY
In this part of the appendix, we show in detail that a structural equations model of democracy and economic growth differs substantially from a structural equations model of democracy and economic development; hence, inferences based on the two models are not equivalent. Let us assume that theory expects the following SEM to be the “true” model: democracyt = b1 rgdppct + c1 Z1(t−1)
(4.A1)
rgdppct = b2 democracyt + b3 rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1), (4.A2)
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where, as in the main text, rgdppct is real GDP per capita at time t; rgdppct−1 is real GDP per capita at time t − 1; democracyt is the level of democracy at time t; Z1 and Z2 are vectors of relevant control variables; b1 , b2 , and b3 are coefficients; and c1 and c2 are vectors of coefficients. Is a model of the change in rgdppc equivalent to the model of the level of rgdppc shown in equation (4.A2)? The answer is yes. To see this point, subtract rgdppct−1 from both sides of equation (4.A2), generating equation (4.A3): rgdppct − rgdppct−1 = b2 democracyt + (b3 − 1)rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1) .
(4.A3)
Estimation of Equation (4.A3) captures coefficient b2 for democracy and coefficients vector c2 for Z2 , as in Equation (4.A2). And coefficient (b3−1 ) for rgdppct−1 is a simple transformation of b3 . But is a model of the growth rate in rgdppc equivalent to Equation (4.A2)? The answer is no. To see this, rework Equation (4.A3) to have the growth rate of gdppc as the dependent variable, denoted g_rgdppc, by dividing both sides of Equation (4.A3) with rgdppct−1 and producing Equation (4.A4): [rgdppct − rgdppct−1 ]/rgdppct−1 = b2 democracyt /rgdppct−1 + (b3−1 )rgdppct−1 /rgdppct−1 + c2 Z2(t−1) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A4)
This equation can be rewritten as G rgdppct = b2 democracyt /rgdppct−1 + (b3−1 ) + c2 Z2(t−1) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A5)
For the rgdppc growth rate model (i.e., Equation (4.A5)) to be equivalent in parameters to the rgdppc level model (i.e., equation (4.A2)), the right-hand-side variables in the level model need to be transformed following Equation (4.A5). Previous scholars, in their typically estimated single-equation model of the rgdppc growth rate, do not transform their democracy and control variables as in Equation (4.A5). Therefore, the coefficients of democracy and the control variables in previous models of rgdppc growth rate are not the same as those in the rgdppc level model in Equation (4.A2). Similarly, for the democracy model in Equation (4.A1), the coefficient b1 for rgdppct is not the same as the coefficient of g_rgdppct . To see this, one
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divides both sides of Equation (4.A1) by rgdppct−1 : democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 rgdppct /rgdppct−1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A6)
Next, we rewrite Equation (4.A6) to get the growth rate of GDPPC on the right-hand side: democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 [rgdppct /rgdppct−1 − 1] + b1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A7)
The expression in the square brackets in Equation (4.A7) is the growth rate of GDPPC. Thus, democracyt /rgdppct−1 = b1 G rgdppct + b1 + c1 Z1(t) /rgdppct−1 .
(4.A8)
Hence, for the coefficient of rgdppc in Equation (4.A1) to be the same as the coefficient of g_rgdppc, one needs to estimate Equation (4.A8). In other words, the coefficient for g_rgdppc in a regression of democracy on g_rgdppct and Z1 is not the same as that for rgdppc in Equation (4.A1) of the true model. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Empirical Model We have two endogenous variables: rgdppc and democracy. rgdppc is the real GDPPC adjusted for PPP.6 Data are from the Penn World Table 6.1. democracy is measured from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000), as in other chapters. The widely used POLITY data register various democratic and autocratic attributes for many countries on an annual basis from 1800 to 1999. Our measure of democracy is the composite indicator POLITY from POLITY IV. It is constructed as the difference between the democracy and autocracy scores in the POLITY IV data set, ranging from −10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).7 The effect 6
7
Studies of democracy typically use real GDPPC to measure development (e.g., Diamond, 1992a, 1992b; Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Feng, 2003; Li and Reuveny, 2003). Among others, Londregan and Poole (1996) and Li and Reuveny (2003) also use this measure of democracy. As Marshall and Jaggers (2000) recommend, we code the “standardized authority codes” of −66, −77, and −88, which appear in the POLITY data set, into missing for −66, averages of the scores before and after the transition for −88, and zero for −77.
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of rgdppc on democracy could be positive or negative, whereas the effect of democracy on rgdppc can be positive, negative, or statistically insignificant, in light of the earlier arguments. The specification of the exogenous variables in the development equation follows Solow’s (1956) theory, which Mankiw et al. (1992) extended to include human capital in addition to physical capital. This theory predicts that the steady-state level of development rises with education and investment in physical capital, falls with population growth, and depends on country-specific determinants. The country-specific effects “reflect not just technology but [also] resource endowments, climate, geography, institutions, and so on; it may differ therefore across countries” (Mankiw et al., 1992: 6). In statistical estimation, the country effects can be modeled as either fixed effects or random effects, an issue to which we will return. Mankiw et al. (1992) assumed that countries are in steady state and therefore employ a cross-sectional design. As they note, however, at any given point in time in the Solow model, the economy is somewhere on the transition path leading to the steady state, not necessarily in the steady state. Hence, one needs to model development dynamics. Islam (1995) employs this insight in his dynamic extension of the Mankiw et al. setup, where development adjusts over time. Islam’s extension includes the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, as well as country- and periodspecific effects.8 The specification of our development equation builds on the setups of Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). The right-hand-side variables in our development equation include investment in physical capital, population growth rate, and average level of education, following the Solow model. We include, as called for by Mankiw et al. and Islam, country effects and, as called for by the Islam extension, the lagged level of development and yearly effects. We also control for political instability, as suggested by Feng (2003). The expected effects of the right-hand-side variables on rgdppc follow these studies. prior rgdppc is the lagged value of rgdppc. It models the tendency of economic processes to exhibit inertia due to frictions such as transportation delays, evolution of tastes, and the time it takes to negotiate agreements and produce goods. The effect of prior rgdppc on rgdppc is expected to be positive. investment is the logarithm of the percentage ratio of private and public investment in physical capital to real GDP, lagged one year. It is worth noting 8
The Solow/Islam model works in GDPPC level, not in GDPPC growth rate. Thus, it differs from the Barro (1998) type of economic growth model. As shown, moving the lagged dependent variable in the level model to the left-hand side does not lead to an economic growth model.
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that foreign direct investment is part of this variable. These data come from the Penn World Table 6.1. The effect of investment on rgdppc is expected to be positive. population growth is the rate of population growth of a country, lagged one year. Data come from the Penn World Table 6.1. The effect of a rise in population growth on rgdppc is expected to be negative. education denotes the level of national education, measured by the average number of years of education in the overall population. Data come from Barro and Lee (2000) and are lagged one year. The effect of this variable on rgdppc is expected to be positive. instability is set to 1 if a country experiences at least one revolution or coup d’etat in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The data come from CNTS (2008).9 An occurrence of instability is expected to reduce rgdppc (Feng, 2003). trade is the sum of the values of imports and exports of a country with the world, divided by the country’s GDP, lagged one year. The data come from the Penn World Table 6.1, where the division by GDP controls for the importance of trade to the country. The effect of a rise in trade on development is debated. Neoclassical economics expects a positive effect, whereas a neo-Marxist/dependency interpretation expects a negative effect, particularly for LDCs. country fixed effects and yearly fixed effects are country and yearly specific effects, which, as noted, are called for by economic theory (Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 1995). In general, the yearly effects capture economic dynamics. The country effects capture structural attributes of development such as climate and topography. Since these effects can be correlated with other independent variables, we might need to model them as fixed effects, an issue to which we will return. The specification of the democracy equation follows studies in comparative politics. The endogenous variable on the right-hand side is rgdppc. The exogenous variables include three types of variables: economic performance, slow-moving structural variables, and external influences. The economic performance variables include economic growth rate and inflation.10 Structural variables (e.g., ethnic and religious compositions, party fractionalization, and institutional qualities) are also sometimes included. These 9
10
CNTS (2008) defines revolution as an illegal or forced government change, an attempt to generate such a change, or an armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the government. A coup d’etat is an extraconstitutional or forced change of the government or its effective control. For the use of inflation and economic growth in democracy models, see Gasiorowski (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996), Feng (2003), and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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theoretical factors tend to be stable over time, suggesting that democracy may exhibit path dependence or inertia. To model this inertia, we include the lagged level of democracy on the right-hand side, which, in addition to its theoretical role, assists in modeling the effects of variables that are not present in the model.11 As one study notes, “with such a pervasive control in place, it is more difficult for spurious effects to be reported” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 905).12 A third set of control variables involves international forces: trade, and diffusion of democratic ideas and norms.13 To these variables, we add a yearly trend, as democracy generally has risen in the period we study. prior democracy is the lagged value of democracy. As noted, democracy should exhibit inertia. A high level of democracy in the previous period is likely to promote democracy in the current period. The effect of prior democracy on democracy is expected to be positive. year controls for the possibility that democracy has a linear trend in our period. Casual observation suggests that democracy increased after 1945 in many countries, so we expected the effect of year on democracy to be positive. trade is the same variable defined for the development equation. As discussed in Gasiorowski (1995) and Li and Reuveny (2003), the effect of a rise in trade on democracy is under debate and could theoretically be positive, negative, or negligible. diffusion denotes the average democracy score of countries within a region around each country, lagged one year. The regions are Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and America. The diffusion of democratic norms is captured through channels such as economic relations, tourism, and communication networks (Starr, 1991; Gasiorowski, 1995; Li and Reuveny, 2003). The effect of diffusion on democracy is expected to be positive. growth is the yearly percent growth rate of real GDP, PPP adjusted and lagged one year, computed using data on real GDP from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). Several studies use negative economic growth as a proxy for economic crises; however, the effect of 11 12
13
See, e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Muller and Seligson (1994), Muller (1995), and Li and Reuveny (2003). The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable might absorb the variations in the dependent variable that could be explained by other independent variables, making it harder to find statistically significant results. Hence, our approach can be described as being conservative. For a study focusing on international forces, see Li and Reuveny (2003). See also Starr (1991) for the effect of diffusion, and Gasiorowksi (1995) for the effect of trade openness.
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economic crisis on democracy is debated. Some analysts claim the effect is positive; others argue the effect is negative (for discussions, see Gasiorowski, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; and Li and Reuveny, 2003). inflation is the yearly inflation rate in percent from the consumer price index, lagged one year. Data come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2002). As discussed by Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Li and Reuveny (2003), the effect of a rise in inflation on democracy is also debated. Although there are reasons for including country fixed effects in the development equation (as noted), no similar reasons exist for including them in the democracy equation. Moreover, because democracy often changes relatively slowly over time, fixed effects are likely to absorb most of the variations in democracy, leaving little to be explained by other substantive variables.
Research Design Issues Modeling Simultaneity For our SEM of democracy and development, we first need to consider the issue of identification. The model is clearly overidentified; the number of exogenous variables excluded from each of our two equations far exceeds the required number of one in our case, based on the number of endogenous variables in a particular equation minus one. As our model is identified, we can proceed to the estimation. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to each equation yields biased estimates because the endogenous variables are correlated with the error terms. To deal with the simultaneity, one needs to use SEM estimators, which are instrumental variable (IV) estimators, with one difference. Whereas the instrument in IV estimation can be any variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable and not correlated with the error term, in SEM estimation the instruments are based on all the exogenous variables, which is the best approach to deal with simultaneity; other methods (e.g., Heckman selection estimation) are second-best approaches. Two types of SEM estimators exist: 2SLS and 3SLS. In 2SLS, in stage one, each endogenous variable is regressed on all the exogenous variables in the model. In stage two, the endogenous independent variables are replaced by fitted values from stage one. In 3SLS, stage one is 2SLS; stage two uses the estimates to compute the system’s variance–covariance matrix. Stage three uses the matrix in estimating the system from generalized least squares.
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Both 2SLS and 3SLS estimators are consistent. The 3SLS estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS estimator, but it also is more sensitive to any specification error than the 2SLS estimator. Moreover, as summarized by Kennedy (2005: 165), “Monte Carlo studies have shown it [2SLS] to have small sample properties superior on most criteria to all other estimators. They have also shown it to be quite robust . . . to the presence of other estimating problems such as multicollinearity and specification errors.” Therefore, we employ 2SLS as the main estimator. While we model simultaneity between development and democracy, some of our control variables may be affected by democracy or development (e.g., traders may be affected by changes in democracy). Obviously we cannot model all the possible simultaneous effects in one study. Our model already is complex by considering the reciprocal effects between democracy and development. The literature typically deals with this issue by lagging the control variables.14 Although this is an imperfect solution, we also employ it here. Modeling Country Effects in the Development Equation As noted, for theoretical reasons, we include country effects in the development equation (but not in the democracy equation). This leads to two statistical issues. First, country effects can be modeled as random or fixed. Random effects are modeled as part of the error term and fixed effects are set as country dummies. The random-effects estimator is more efficient than the fixed-effects estimator, but it is consistent only if the country effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. Consistency of the fixed-effects estimator, or the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, is not subject to this requirement. Because our country effects capture attributes such as climate or input endowments, they are likely correlated with our independent variables (e.g., investment, population growth). The Hausman test compares the random-effects and fixed-effects estimators. The results corroborate our suspicion, suggesting the fixed-effects estimator should be used to model the country effects in the development equation. Second, the presence of the lagged dependent variable, together with the country fixed effects, makes the fixed-effects or LSDV estimator inconsistent when the asymptotics are considered in the N direction (where N is the number of countries). Amemiya (1967) and others have shown that the
14
For this approach, see, e.g., Muller and Seligson (1994) and Li and Reuveny (2003).
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LSDV estimator is consistent in the T direction. The size of the inconsistency in the N direction is about 1/T (Nickell, 1981).15 Beck and Katz (2004) compare the properties of the LSDV estimator in a dynamic panel setup such as ours (TSCS with a lagged dependent variable) to the properties of two alternative but consistent estimators of such a model: the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) (AH) estimator and the Kiviet (1995) estimator. The AH estimator removes the fixed effects by using first difference and uses the second lag of the dependent variable or the second lag of the first difference of the dependent variable as an instrument for the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. The Kiviet estimator employs LSDV estimates but corrects them with a formula that plugs in values from a consistent estimator such as the AH estimator. Since the finite sample properties of these estimators are unknown, Beck and Katz (2004) studied their bias and root mean square error in Monte Carlo simulations. On the basis of their findings, Beck and Katz recommend that “the AH estimator should not be used for TSCS [time series cross section] data. We see little reason, in general, not to prefer LSDV over the Kiviet estimator when T is twenty or more” (2004: 14). They add: “For typical comparative TSCS data, it does not appear that OLS with fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable (LSDV) is problematic” (2004: 29). In another Monte Carlo study, Judson and Owen (1999: 13) reach a similar conclusion: “When T > 30, LSDV performs just as well or better than the viable alternatives.” Based on these results and the number of years (35) in our sample period, we employ the LSDV estimator for the development equation.16 For robustness check, we also use the estimator of Bruno (2005), which extends the Kiviet (1995) estimator (that applied to balanced panels) to unbalanced panels. Because the Kiviet algorithm has not yet been extended to 2SLS, we apply the two-step estimation. We refer to this estimator as the 2SLS-Kiviet estimator. Performing 2SLS step by step produces biased standard errors in the second stage because the procedure uses the predicted values for the endogenous variable in computing the standard errors instead of the required actual values (Greene, 2003). But if the R2 in the first stage is high, say 0.8 and above as in our case, the size of the bias is expected to be quite small.17 The Kiviet estimator requires one to choose a consistent estimator to provide initial values, and the order of the bias to adjust for. 15 16 17
For detailed discussion, see Beck and Katz (2004). To be exact, the size of the asymptotic bias is only about 1/35, or 2.8%. We verified this point in personal communication with William H. Greene, the author of the popular Econometric Analysis (e-mails dated April 30 and May 2, 2005, and May 11–13, 2008).
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We use the estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for initial values, and 1/T for the bias (see also Bun and Kiviet, 2003). Heteroskedasticity, Serial Correlation, and Nonstationarity Since our sample involves panel data, we need to consider the possibilities of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms of both equations. We deal with these issues in two ways. First, the lagged dependent variable in each equation helps to address serial correlation and mitigate the risks associated with this potential problem (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b, 2004). Second, we estimate the standard errors of parameter estimates using a variant of the White (1980) estimator of robust standard errors that adjusts for clustering over countries, which is typically referred to as the Huber– White sandwich estimator. This estimator yields consistent estimates of the covariance matrix under very general conditions of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). One may also be concerned that, if the variables in the model are nonstationary, the estimates generated by the 2SLS (or 3SLS) may not be valid. As it turns out, this is not the case. As shown mathematically by the important study of Hsiao (1997) – see also Johnston and DiNardo (1997) – the 2SLS estimator is valid when the dependent variables are nonstationary or co-integrated. “In structural equation applications, what one needs to worry about are the classical issues of identification and estimation, not non-stationarity” (Hsiao, 1997: 385).
Empirical Findings In this part of the appendix, we first discuss the results of the exogeneity test and the Hausman test, then explain the computation of the long-run effects of development and democracy, next present the results for the control variables, and finally discuss briefly the results of the alternative estimators from robustness tests. Exogeneity Test Before we evaluate our SEM, we need to establish whether there is an empirical basis for such a model. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) employ the bivariate Granger causality test. They find that economic development Granger-causes democracy, whereas democracy does not Granger-cause development. The pioneering result of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck is important but does not suffice for our case, which involves a multivariate model.
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We therefore employ the Davidson–MacKinnon test of exogeneity for regression estimated via instrumental variables. The null hypothesis is that an OLS fixed-effects estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. Rejection of the null indicates that the instrumental variables fixed-effects estimator should be employed (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). In other words, the null hypotheses are that democracy is exogenous in a single-equation model of development and that development is exogenous in a single-equation model of democracy, respectively, whereas the alternative hypotheses are that the two affect each other in some direction (according to the theories discussed earlier). Turning to the results, the test statistic has a p-value of 0.010 for democracy in the development equation and a p-value of 0.035 for development in the democracy equation. Hence, we reject the null hypotheses of exogeneity in both cases: treating development as exogenous in a model of democracy is not supported by the data. Similarly, treating democracy as exogenous in a model of development also is not supported by the data. Ignoring the simultaneity would lead to inconsistent estimates. Fixed-Effects–Random-Effects Test As noted in the main text, the development model calls for the use of country effects, which can be modeled as fixed or random. We conduct the Hausman test, which compares the random-effects and fixed-effects estimators for the development equation. The test statistic has a p-value of 0.007, rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients from the two estimators are indistinguishable. This result supports the use of the country fixed-effects estimator. Computing Long-Run Effects of Development and Democracy on Each Other In our SEM, a rise in economic development in the current period affects the level of democracy in the current period and continues to affect the next period of democracy via prior democracy in the model. The long-run effect of some change in development on democracy accumulates over time and is computed by the following formula: long-run change in democracy = Change in rgdppc × [rgdppc Coefficient/(1 − prior democracy Coefficient)].
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The expression in the square brackets of the formula is given by [0.2127/(1 − 0.9237)], which is 2.787. Thus, when real GDP per capita rises from 416 to 3,994, the long-run change in democracy is 6.30 units on the 20-point democracy scale, which is based on 2.787×[log(3,994) − log(416)]. How large is the long-run effect of democracy on development? The long-term effect of a rise in the level of democracy is given by the following formula: long-run percent change in gdp per capita = 100 × Change in democracy × [democracy coefficient/(1 − prior rgdppc coefficient)]. The expression in the square brackets of the formula is given by [−0.0006/(1 − 0.9537)], which is −0.013. Thus, the long-run percent change in gdp per capita due to a change of 16 units of democracy score is −20.73%, which is based on [100 × 16 × (−0.013)]. Results for Control Variables Next, we discuss the results for the control variables from the 2SLS estimator. Beginning with the development equation, the effect of a rise in prior rgdppc on development is statistically significant and positive for both samples. Economic development exhibits positive inertia, as expected. Also as theoretically expected according to the core Solow framework, the effect of a rise in investment on the level of economic development is positive and significant, and the effect of a rise in population on the level of economic development is negative and statistically significant. We obtain these results for both the all-countries sample and the LDC sample. The effect of a rise in trade on the level of economic development is statistically significant and positive. Trade openness promotes economic development, supporting the neoclassical position in this particular debate. The effect of a rise in the level of education on economic development is positive, as expected by the extended Solow framework, but is not statistically significant in our case. This result is sometimes reported in an economic development model, reflecting the correlation between this variable and the first lag of rgdppc. Note, however, that the lagged value of rgdppc is included in the model due to theoretical reasons called for by the Islam (1995) extension of the Solow model in a dynamic panel data setup. It should also be noted that the coefficient of education for the LDC sample is considerably smaller than this coefficient for the all-countries sample,
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reflecting the fact that the level of education in LDCs is relatively lower in general and, therefore, has a weaker effect on development. Finally, the effect of a rise of instability from 0 to 1, indicating the presence of coup or revolution or both, on the level of economic development is negative and statistically significant in both the all-countries and LDC samples. Consistent with Feng’s (2003) findings, political instability in the form of coup and revolution reduces the level of economic development. In the democracy equation, for the sample of all countries, the effect of a rise in prior democracy on democracy is significant and positive, demonstrating the importance of democratic inertia. The effect of a rise in year is significant and positive, reflecting the general positive trend of democracy in our sample. The effect of a rise in diffusion of democracy ideas on the level of democracy in a country is positive and significant. As the number of democratic countries in a country’s geographical region rises, so does the country’s own level of democracy. All these reported effects are robust in the sample of LDCs only. As we found in Chapter 2, a rise in trade is found to reduce the level of democracy in a country. One explanation of this result is that trade widens the social cleavages between winners and losers, leading to more social unrest and repressive regime. Further discussions are presented in Chapter 2. The effect of a rise in trade also is negative for the LDC sample but is not statistically significant at standard levels. The effects of a rise in the rates of inflation and economic growth on democracy are statistically insignificant for both samples, again as reported by Feng (2003), Li and Reuveny (2003), Gasiorowski (1995), and others. Results from Alternative Estimators Tables 4.A1 and 4.A2 present the results from the 3SLS and 2SLS-Kiviet estimators. The effect of a rise in the level of economic development on the level of democracy remains positive and significantly different from zero across the two alternative estimators and between the two samples. Likewise, the effect of a rise in the level of democracy on the level of economic development is negative and significantly different from zero across the two alternative estimators and between the two samples.
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RGDPPC PRIOR DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION INFLATION ECONOMIC GROWTH YEAR TRADE
0.2127∗∗∗ (0.0477) 0.9236∗∗∗ (0.0067) 0.2882∗∗∗ (0.0744) 0.00002 (0.0001) −0.0073 (0.0075) 0.0194∗∗∗ (0.0039) −0.0014∗∗ (0.0009)
PRIOR RGDPPC DEMOCRACY INVESTMENT POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY Constant Observations
−40.3984∗∗∗ (7.6554) 2914
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.9543∗∗∗ (0.0052) −0.00051∗∗ (0.0003) 0.0016∗∗∗ (0.0002) −0.0066∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.0024 (0.0022) −0.0102∗∗∗ (0.0029) 0.3507∗∗∗ (0.0598) 2914
Democracy LDCs 0.1904∗∗∗ (0.0654) 0.9148∗∗∗ (0.0081) 0.3612∗∗∗ (0.0943) 0.00001 (0.0001) −0.0076 (0.0088) 0.0284∗∗∗ (0.0051) −0.0009 (0.0010)
−58.3035∗∗∗ (10.1004) 2230
Development LDCs
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.9562∗∗∗ (0.0061) −0.00047∗ (0.0003) 0.0019∗∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0070∗∗∗ (0.0018) 0.0023 (0.0031) −0.0107∗∗∗ (0.0034) 0.0000 (0.0000) 2230
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 4.A2. Democracy and development, 2SLS-Kiviet Democracy Development DCs and LDCs DCs and LDCs RGDPPC PRIOR DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION INFLATION ECONOMIC GROWTH YEAR TRADE
0.2237∗∗∗ (0.0510) 0.9233∗∗∗ (0.0095) 0.2837∗∗∗ (0.0875) 0.00002 (0.00002) −0.0050 (0.0081) 0.0189∗∗∗ (0.0040) −0.0015∗∗ (0.0009)
PRIOR RGDPPC
DEMOCRACY INVESTMENT POPULATION GROWTH EDUCATION INSTABILITY Constant Observations
−39.7159∗∗∗ (8.1152) 2917
0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.9793∗∗∗ (0.0049)
Democracy LDCs 0.2010∗∗∗ (0.0641) 0.9148∗∗∗ (0.0113) 0.3549∗∗∗ (0.1068) 0.00001 (0.00002) −0.0053 (0.0088) 0.0277∗∗∗ (0.0055) −0.0010 (0.0010)
−0.00054∗∗ (0.00029) 0.00149∗∗∗ (0.00024) −0.0062∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.0011 (0.0028) −0.0102∗∗∗ (0.0029) 0.0000 −57.1632∗∗∗ (0.0000) (10.9474) 2858 2233
Development LDCs
0.0002∗∗∗ (0.00008) 0.9825∗∗∗ (0.0063) −0.00055∗ (0.0003) 0.0017∗∗∗ (0.00023) −0.0066∗∗∗ (0.0019) −0.00001 (0.0033) −0.0108∗∗∗ (0.0039) 0.0000 (0.0000) 2193
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
PART II
BRINGING IN CONFLICT
FIVE
Democracy and Conflict
INTRODUCTION
Interstate military conflict as an extreme form of political exchange is a central feature of the international system and has received the enormous attention it deserves from scholars and policymakers. Currently state sovereignty and anarchy make world peace seem elusive. Chapters 2–4 in Part I modeled the effects of economic openness on democracy, the effects of democracy and economic openness on income inequality, and the reciprocal effects of economic development and democracy, respectively. These analyses ignored the possible impact of democracy and economic openness on interstate political relations. In reality, democracy and economic openness develop in and around nation-states such that they inevitably influence political relations. In fact, scholars have argued and sought to demonstrate that both democracy and economic openness affect interstate military conflict, even though they debate the nature of their effects. Part II of our book explicitly tackles the relevance of democracy (Chapter 5) and economic openness (Chapter 6) to interstate military conflict. In Chapter 5, we are particularly interested in the relationship between democracy and military conflict. This chapter speaks to two separate bodies of literature: one on democratic peace and the other on the causes of democracy. Both topics have been the subjects of voluminous research, generating two large bodies of literature. Our contribution is not to overthrow but to build on and connect these two separate bodies of literature, highlighting and analyzing the previously overlooked reciprocal causal link between democracy and conflict. The claim that democracies do not fight one another has received wide attention. Most statistical studies investigating this claim share similar designs, employing a dyadic level of analysis and estimating single-equation 125
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models. In these studies, the dependent variable is typically dichotomous, measuring the presence or absence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). The independent variables include dyadic, joint (dyadic) democracy, and more or less the same collection of control variables. The vast majority of studies report that the probability of military dispute between two countries declines as their joint democracy level increases, although a number of studies reject this argument. We note that a much smaller group of studies argues that democracies are more peaceful in general, not only toward other democracies. This claim has received less empirical support. In this chapter, we focus on the dyadic version of the democratic peace argument. Side by side with the democratic-peace literature is a growing number of international relations scholars who argue that military conflict affects democracy. But they debate about the direction of the effect of conflict on democracy. Conceptually, these studies form a subset of the large monadic literature within comparative politics that studies the determinants of democratization. This chapter is motivated by the observation that the democratic-peace literature and the literature on the effect of conflict on democracy have basically ignored the insights offered by each other. In particular, most international relations scholars have treated the effect of joint democracy on conflict as unidirectional, even though conflict has been demonstrated to influence democracy. Once the two separate bodies of literature have been linked, one can reasonably argue that conflict and democracy affect each other simultaneously. Our goal in this chapter is to address the simultaneity between conflict and democracy within a unified statistical framework. We stress at the outset that our agenda is not to prove or disprove the existence of democratic peace. Rather, we believe that democracy and dyadic conflict affect one another. Thus, researchers need to model the reciprocal effects explicitly, which is not an easy task; it requires connecting monadic and dyadic levels of analysis. We develop a novel way to link the two levels of analysis while maintaining consistency with both the dyadic democratic-peace literature and the literature on the monadic determinants of democracy. In our simultaneous equations model, the endogenous variables include dyadic conflict measured by the presence or absence of a MID, the higher level of democracy in a dyad, and the lower level of democracy in a dyad. As in studies by Dixon (1994) and Oneal and Russett (1997), the higher level of democracy in a dyad measures political regime dissimilarity and the lower level of democracy reflects dyadic, joint democracy. Our model usefully integrates
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the dyadic determinants of dyadic conflict with the monadic determinants of democracy within one system of simultaneous equations. Some may view the simultaneity of dyadic conflict and democracy merely as a methodological nuisance. It is worth noting that, in contrast to this view, we consider the issue to be both theoretical and methodological. In fact, various scholars share this view. For example, Chan (1997a) argues in his comprehensive review that the democratic-peace literature needs to take more seriously the possibility of reverse causality from conflict to democracy. Gleditsch and Ward (2000) also note briefly that conflict often affects democratization. As discussed in detail later, in the first study that employs a partial simultaneous setup to examine the reciprocal relationship between conflict and democracy, James et al. (1999) argue that the effect of joint democracy on dyadic conflict is generally insignificant. Their study has led to a lively debate, but the conflict–democracy simultaneity issue remains unresolved.1 We believe that further investigation of the relationship between dyadic conflict and democracy within a simultaneous framework is warranted. As noted by Alvarez and Glasgow (2000: 163), “if there are theoretical reasons to suspect endogeneity in the model, it must be modeled. Ignoring endogeneity will lead to biased estimates.” Of course, the actual effect of simultaneity on the dyadic conflict–democracy nexus could be large or small; but unless one models the reciprocal interaction between democracy and conflict, one simply cannot evaluate the effect of ignoring the simultaneity, which is a common practice in the conflict community. Our work in this chapter assesses empirically the question of simultaneity between democracy and dyadic conflict across a sample of politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992.2 Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, dyadic conflict reduces both lower and higher levels of democracy in a dyad. Second, joint democracy reduces the probability of dyadic MID involvement. When compared with the single-equation estimate of Oneal and Russett (1997), the absolute magnitude of the effect in our study is smaller but in relative terms, the effect is similar in size. The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous countries. Third, the level of democracy in a country is affected by a number of economic and social 1 2
See Oneal and Russett (2000) and the response of James et al. (2000). For an earlier exposition of the position stated by James et al. (1999, 2000), see Wolfson et al. (1998). Politically relevant dyads are dyads involving at least one major power (United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR/Russia, and China) or geographically contiguous countries.
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variables that have commonly received attention in the democratization literature. Fourth, several control variables in the MID equation that prior studies have found to be significant in the single-equation framework are shown to lack statistical significance in our simultaneous equation model design. Notably, we find that preference similarity between two countries, based on the United Nations (UN) voting patterns, does not have a significant effect on dyadic MID involvement. We organize the chapter as follows. The next section reviews the democratic-peace literature as well as the literature on the effect of conflict on democracy, and the section that follows discusses the theoretical expectations. We then discuss the few empirical studies that have investigated some aspects of the simultaneity between democracy and conflict. The fifth section of this chapter presents our conceptual model. The sixth section discusses the statistical model, research design issues, and key findings and is followed by a conclusion section. TWO BODIES OF LITERATURE ON DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY CONFLICT
This section discusses the two bodies of literature that focus on the effect of democracy on military conflict and the effect of conflict on democracy, respectively.
Effect of Democracy on Conflict The democratic-peace literature has been reviewed extensively elsewhere.3 In this section, we briefly summarize this literature. Most scholars argue that democracies do not fight one another and that they are unlikely to engage in militarized disputes with one another.4 The monadic argument that democracies are less likely to be involved in MIDs with all countries also has been made but is relatively more controversial.5 As noted, we focus on the dyadic version of the argument. The democratic-peace literature is based on the empirical observation that democracies have almost never fought wars against each other. 3 4 5
For example, see Levy (1989), Russett (1993), Gleditsch (1995), Ray (1995), Chan (1997), and Russett and Oneal (2001). For example, see Bremer (1993), Maoz and Russett (1993), Dixon (1994), and Oneal and Russett (1997). Rummel argues that “the more a nation is democratic, the less severe its overall foreign violence” (1997: 5). However, he admits that this argument is controversial.
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Although a few cases are said to disprove this empirical regularity, a few studies explain why these cases are questionable.6 Given this empirical regularity, the thrust of the literature has focused on explaining why democracies do not fight each other, whether this regularity can be attributed to democracy or other forces, and whether it is simply due to random historical occurrence. The proponents of the democratic-peace proposition offer several explanations for their claims. The first, so-called institutional, explanation traces back to Kant (1795). The decision to wage war faces more checks and balances in democracies than in autocracies (Russett, 1993). Democratic governments confront more constraints by the rule of law. The slowing down of the decision-making process leaves more time for negotiation to take place and reduces the risk of errors and misunderstandings, both of which reduce the probability of war (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Yet another institutional explanation concerns the informational role of democratic institutions (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Because democratic leaders are held accountable and compete for reelection, military defeats may lead to electoral defeats by political opponents. When democracies fight, they mobilize their resources and tend to win; therefore, they prefer to mediate disputes and, in the event of war, choose their fights carefully to increase the likelihood of victory. Democracies do not fight each other because they are unattractive targets for other democracies. So the fact that a democracy mobilizes and escalates a crisis sends a clear signal regarding its resolve to the other party. Because all democracies behave in this manner and their leaders know it, democracies are less aggressive toward one another. According to a second so-called normative argument, democratic governments tend to tolerate their domestic opposition and resolve domestic conflicts peacefully. Analogously, they also behave in this way toward other countries (Weart, 1998). Although these effects are monadic, they are allegedly stronger when democracies interact with one another. Since the domestic politics of democracies is transparent, democracies can more readily trust each other (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993). It follows that conflicts among democracies are more likely to be mediated by third parties than they are to escalate (Dixon, 1994). 6
For a discussion of these cases see, e.g., Doyle (1997). Russett and Oneal (2001) emphasize that the effect of joint democracy on dyadic conflicts is probabilistic. Even if a few democratic dyads exhibit militarized disputes, these cases do not refute the claim that democratic dyads are generally less likely to exhibit militarized disputes than other dyads.
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A number of studies reject the democratic-peace proposition. Farber and Gowa (1995), for example, argue that the purported negative effect of joint democracy on conflict is an artifact of the common interests that were shared by democracies when facing the former USSR during the Cold War. Layne (1994) argues that the American Civil War is a strong disconfirming case of the democratic-peace argument. Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Robst (1998) argue that democracies do not fight each other because of their extensive trade relations, since conflict reduces trade.7 Lemke and Reed (1996) account for this apparent regularity by arguing that democracies tend to be content with the status quo, whereas autocracies tend to be dissatisfied with the status quo and, therefore, are more prone to conflict. This theory explains both the lack of wars between democracies and the higher incidence of wars between democracies and autocracies. From a different angle, Gartzke (1998) argues that democracies are less likely to disagree and, thus, have no need to fight each other. When one includes a measure of affinity based on the UN General Assembly voting patterns in the typical model, the effect of joint democracy on the probability of MIDs becomes weak and insignificant.8 Rosato (2003) does not challenge the empirical regularity of democratic peace but argues that extant evidence does not substantiate the different causal mechanisms offered by proponents to rationalize the existence of democratic peace.
Effect of Conflict on Democracy Whereas most scholars seem to agree that democracies do not fight each other, the effect of military conflict on democracy is a subject of controversy. According to one view, conflict reduces democracy. This view originated from the writings of de Tocqueville (1835: 650): “All those who seek to destroy the freedom of the democratic nations must know that war is the surest and the shortest means to accomplish this.” War may not immediately result in a military government, but it will eventually concentrate power in the hands of the government, leading to despotism and the decline of democracy. Elaborating on the negative effect of conflict on democracy, Lasswell (1977) argues that because some groups may not want to join the 7 8
For additional discussion of the link between democratic peace and economic relations, see Mousseau and Shi (1999). Another argument that weakens the democratic-peace proposition is offered by Mansfield and Snyder (1996), who argue that young democracies are more prone to engage in war with each other than are established democracies.
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war effort, the state may become increasingly autocratic to reassert power. Moreover, conflict may require resources that the state does not have. When people do not agree to give up wealth for the war effort, the state may have to become oppressive to pay for the war and subsequently force the people to do so.9 Layne (1994) and Thompson (1996) suggest a different mechanism. Building democracy requires peace. States facing external threats need to allocate resources to national defense and maintain a large governmental apparatus; both factors reduce the level of resources available for democratic consolidation. A competing view posits that conflict leads to democracy (Tilly, 1992). Historically, many leaders, when mobilizing their populations, granted political rights or land in exchange for their support of the war efforts. Such redistribution of wealth enlarges the number of people that are able to affect governance and, thus, facilitates democratization. Moreover, wars often provide the impetus for social reforms, including democratization (Higgs, 1988; Porter, 1994; Kasza, 1996). Skocpol et al. (2001) demonstrate this effect in a case study and argue that the U.S. Civil War and U.S. participation in World War I exerted a strong positive effect on the U.S. democratic civil society.10 A third group of studies, mostly in the field of international relations (e.g., Modelski and Perry, 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1999), offers a conditional argument for the expected effect of military conflict on the level of democracy. When an interstate war ends in a victory by a democratic country, the winner often imposes democratization on the loser, replicating its own political system design. In contrast, when the winner of a war is autocratic, the level of democracy tends to decline in the losing country.11 Despite competing expectations about the direction of the effect, all three views agree that military conflict does influence democracy. The overall or net effect of conflict on democracy thus appears to warrant empirical investigation. However, these studies do not take into account the converse possibility: democracy may affect conflict behaviors. Again, as noted, ignoring such reciprocal effects may lead to erroneous empirical findings. 9 10 11
For a similar argument, see Mintz (1985), Almond (1990), Martin (1994), Segal (1994), Midlarsky (1995), and Gates et al. (1996). For other case studies that demonstrate the positive effect of acute conflict on democracy forces, see, e.g., Marwick (1988), Porter (1994), and Reuveny and Prakash (1999). For example, compare the cases of Germany and Japan after World War II, where some European countries were under Nazi or Soviet control.
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IMPLICATIONS AND THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
We have reviewed two bodies of literature, one on the effects of democracy on conflict and the other on the effects of conflict on democracy. By synthesizing the two bodies of literature, we hypothesize that the relationship between dyadic conflict and democracy is reciprocal; in other words, the two forces simultaneously affect one another. Again, some may dismiss the simultaneity as a methodological nuisance; however, we believe this issue has important theoretical, methodological, and policy implications. The democratic-peace literature builds on results from single-equation models. However, such results rely on the regression of dyadic conflict on joint democracy – a technique that cannot distinguish whether joint democracy affects or is affected by MIDs. In contrast, our simultaneous-equations framework may yield one of three possible empirical outcomes. First, conflict influences joint democracy, but joint democracy does not affect conflict. Second, dyadic conflict does not affect joint democracy, but joint democracy influences conflict. Third, joint democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other. We cannot determine the empirical validity of these three distinct outcomes until we model the democracy–conflict simultaneity explicitly. That said, we believe the arguments that attribute peace to joint democracy are theoretically plausible. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that the democratic-peace argument has received wide empirical support in many single-equation studies. We therefore state the following hypothesis: H1: Joint democracy reduces the incidence of MIDs between two countries in a dyad. In terms of the effect of conflict on democracy, although the arguments in the literature are made in the context of a monadic level of analysis, they can be readily applied to the dyadic level, as dyads are merely pairs of countries. If conflict affects the level of democracy of any of the two countries in a dyad, it also could, in principle, affect the joint democracy of that dyad. Building on our discussion in the previous section, we categorize the effects of conflict on democracy into four types. The absence of conflict involvement by a country enables the provision of resources for the nurturing of democratic institutions. In contrast, the presence of conflict reduces the level of resources available to support democratization. The preparation for conflict may increase autocracy as the state coerces the people to participate in, and contribute resources to, an unpopular war. This channel, however, may also promote democracy: the state may grant political rights
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to groups in return for their support of the war. The occurrence of conflict generates a sense of crisis, which legitimizes power centralization. However, the state may also grant democratic rights during conflict to win support for the war. The postconflict effect comes in two variants. In one variant, conflict is a social shock, stimulating reforms that increase democracy. A second variant involves the winners of a war imposing their own political regime on the losers.12 In summary, the existing theories in the literature on the effect of conflict on democracy offer conflicting expectations, implying that the overall (net) effect of conflict on democracy is theoretically unclear and leading to the following expectation: H2: Conflict may raise or reduce the level of democracy. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CONFLICT–DEMOCRACY SIMULTANEITY
In general, the issue of conflict–democracy simultaneity has not received much attention in the empirical literature. Before we turn to our analysis, however, we believe it is beneficial to review the few studies that have dealt with some aspects of this simultaneity. Investigating the reverse causality, Mousseau and Shi (1999) focus on the proposition that democracy declines as countries prepare for war. However, their study does not find statistical support for this claim. Crescenzi and Enterline (1999), on the other hand, argue that the relationship between war and democracy is reciprocal, as reflected by the portion of democratic states in the system and the frequencies of democratization and war in the system. They found, using vector autoregression analysis, that these variables do indeed influence one another, but the strengths of their effects change across time and space. Rasler and Thompson (2000) argue both that states perceiving high external threats will be less democratic and that democracies are less likely to have MIDs with one another. Focusing on nine major powers from 1816 to 1992, they estimate two equations separately. In one equation, the monadic level of democracy is regressed on the change in democracy, the level of external threat, the change in the level of external threat, a dummy variable measuring war participation, and the lagged level of democracy. In a second equation, a dyadic MID dummy is regressed on a joint democracy dummy and the level of external threat. They conclude that a high level of external 12
Mousseau and Shi (1999) suggest a similar typology involving war’s anterior, concurrent, and posterior effects.
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threat reduces democracy and that democratic dyads are less likely to experience MIDs. None of these studies, however, has employed a simultaneous equations model. James et al. (1999) were the first to study the simultaneous relationship between joint democracy and dyadic conflict. They estimated the following structural equations model: hostility = F (regime, growth, proximity, ally),
(5.1)
regime = G (hostility, growth, stability).
(5.2)
where hostility is the highest level of dyadic hostility in a year, with five possible values (0 = no dispute, 1 = threat of force, 2 = display of force, 3 = use of force, and 4 = war); regime [(rH + rL )/(rH − rL +1)] is a measure of joint democracy from Maoz and Russett (1993), where rH and rL are the higher and lower regime scores in a dyad, respectively; r = c(d − a) is the regime index of a country, where autocracy, democracy, and concentration of power are represented by a, d, and c, respectively. growth is the average of the growth rates of the two countries, A and B, in the past three years. proximity captures if countries A and B are contiguous or if they can project force beyond their contiguous neighbors (i.e., United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union). ally reflects the alliance ties between two countries. stability measures joint regime stability within a dyad. In their estimation, James et al. (1999) ignored the simultaneity for Equation (5.1) and estimated it as a single-equation model. Equation (5.2) is estimated with a two-stage procedure, taking into account the simultaneity of regime and hostility. The authors find that the effect of joint democracy on the probability of MIDs is generally not significant; the hypothesis that peace induces democracy receives stronger support. Oneal and Russett (2000) criticize James et al.’s (1999) study on several grounds. First, they criticize the use of a dated measure of joint democracy. Second, they argue that the multinomial approach to hostility is destined not to find significant effects for democracy on conflict since MIDs are rare events – with the five categories of MIDs representing even rarer events. Third, Equation (5.1) omits the capability ratio of the two countries in the dyad. Oneal and Russett obtained different results for Equation (5.2) than did James et al. when this variable was included in Equation (5.1). Fourth, Equation (5.2) omits variables routinely used in the comparative politics literature on the determinants of democracy, such as GDP per capita, inflation, or economic growth (Gasiorowski, 1995). Fifth, Equation (5.2) assumes that dyadic conflict affects joint democracy. However, because it
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is a monadic quality, democracy ought to be affected by all the conflicts a country engages in, not only by dyadic conflict. James et al. (2000) replied that it is not clear why one empirical measure of joint democracy is superior to others and that the results of Oneal and Russett are sensitive to the measure used. Second, they argue that the aggregation of all MID types into one measure can introduce bias. Diplomatic protest, for example, is an action different from war. Third, they claim that capability ratio ought to be considered an endogenous variable, not an exogenous variable as Oneal and Russett assume. Moreover, including capability ratio in the equation of hostility still produces a weak effect for regime on hostility. Fourth, the sensitivity of the results from Equation (5.2) to the inclusion of a capability ratio in Equation (5.1) could reflect the sensitivity of the model to the practice of temporal aggregation. In the end, James et al. argued that whereas their simultaneous equations model is not meant to be the last word on the reciprocal relationship between military conflict and democracy, studies ignoring this issue do not offer reliable guidance for public policy. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
In putting together our statistical model in this chapter, we need to specify two types of equations: one for dyadic conflict and a second for democracy. The level of democracy of a country is a monadic attribute. Dyadic conflict is obviously a dyadic attribute. In the democratic-peace literature, dyadic conflict is assumed to decline with joint democracy. In our conceptual framework, joint democracy and dyadic conflict depend on each other. But democracy depends not only on dyadic conflict – it also depends on various monadic attributes, including the conflict a country has with other third-party countries. We include these factors in our model. Our measure of joint democracy follows the weak link assumption (Dixon, 1994). In this approach, joint democracy is given by the lower democracy score of the two countries in a dyad. This assumption formalizes the expectation that the likelihood of a dyadic militarized dispute depends on the regime score of the politically less constrained dyad member (i.e., the country that is less democratic). Authors of many statistical studies employ the weak-link assumption-based measure of joint democracy, including Dixon (1994), Oneal and Russett (1997), and Russett et al. (1998). Some studies also use the higher democracy score in a dyad as an independent variable in their single-equation model of MIDs. In fact, one would expect that the democracy scores of both countries in a dyad would interact with conflict; after all, it takes two states to engage in dyadic conflict.
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Therefore, if democracy affects conflict, each of the democracy scores in the dyad should affect its likelihood. Consequently, we also include the higher democracy score in the dyad in our analysis and treat it as a third endogenous variable. As suggested by Oneal and Russett (1997) and Russett et al. (1998), by holding the other regime score in a dyad constant, one may interpret the higher democracy score in a dyad as representing the regime dissimilarity between two countries. These authors and others expect conflict to decline with the lower democracy score in a dyad but to rise with the higher democracy score in a dyad. We formally develop the conceptual model in the appendix. Here we present our set of estimated equations, Equations (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5), where F indicates functional dependency: demL = F (ML , midABU , midLRU ),
(5.3)
demH = F (MH , midABU , midHRU ),
(5.4)
midABU = F (XAB , demL , demH ).
(5.5)
In these three equations, demL is the lower one of the two democracy scores (one for each country) in dyad AB, where A and B are the two dyadmember countries; demH is the higher democracy score in dyad AB; midABU is the unobserved propensity of dyad AB to engage in a militarized dispute; ML indicates the monadic attributes that explain the level of democracy for the demL country (the one with the lower democracy score in a dyad); and MH indicates the attributes that explain the level of democracy for the demH country (the one with the higher democracy score). For midLRU in Equation (5.3) and midHRU in Equation (5.4), we first need to define the concept of politically relevant international environment (PRIE). The PRIE of some country A includes all the countries that share a border with A, as well as those that are classified as major powers in a time period (Maoz, 2001a). midLRU is the propensity of the low democracy country in a dyad to engage in conflicts with third parties in its politically relevant international environment, a variable that is unobserved (the variable subscript LRU is from the italicized words). Similarly, midHRU is the unobserved propensity of the demH country to engage in military disputes with third parties in its PRIE. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Similar to the previous chapters, this section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues. Then the section presents the key results from the empirical analysis.
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As in the other chapters, the discussion in this section is self-contained and does not require any specific statistical expertise. The technical details of the statistical model, measure construction, and data sources are in the chapter appendix and follow the same order of presentation as in the main text.
Empirical Model The next three equations state our statistical model and follow the logic in Equations (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5). The statistical model provides a structure for us to guide statistically uninitiated readers through the empirical exercise. The model distinguishes endogenous and exogenous (or control) variables. The endogenous variables appear on the left-hand side of one of the equations and the right-hand sides of the other two equations, and exogenous variables appear only on the right-hand sides of the equations. Small capital letters denote variables, and the Greek letters , ␥ , and ␦ denote their coefficients, which we will estimate. The Greek letters εt , t , and t represent the error terms in the three equations, respectively. The subscripts L and H refer to the lower and higher democracy countries in a dyad, respectively. The subscripts t and t − 1 denote the time period of a variable, where t denotes the current period and t − 1 denotes the previous period (or a lagged variable). Equation (5.6) operationalizes Equation (5.3) in the conceptual model, which explains the causes of democracy in the lower-democracy country in a dyad: demLt = 0 + 1 midABUt + 2 prior demLt−1 + 3 yeart−1 + 4 inflationLt−1 + 5 inflationLt−1 ∗ yeart−1 + 6 gdppcLt−1 + 7 gdppcLt−1 ∗ yeart−1 + 8 growthLt−1 + 9 tradeLt−1 + 10 diffusionLt−1 + 11 third-party midt−1 + εt .
(5.6)
Equation (5.7) operationalizes Equation (5.4) in the conceptual model, which explains the causes of democracy in the higher democracy country in a dyad: demLt = ␥0 + ␥1 midabut + ␥2 prior demLt−1 + ␥3 yeart−1 + ␥4 inflationLt−1 + ␥5 inflationLt−1 ∗ yeart−1 + ␥6 gdppcLt−1 + ␥7 gdppcLt−1 ∗ yeart−1 + ␥8 growthLt−1 + ␥9 tradeLt−1 + ␥10 diffusionLt−1 + ␥11 third-party midt−1 + t .
(5.7)
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Finally, Equation (5.8) operationalizes Equation (5.5) in the conceptual model, which explains the causes of dyadic military conflict: midABUt = ␦0 + ␦1 demLt + ␦2 demHt + ␦3 contiguityt−1 + ␦4 alliancet−1 + ␦5 capability ratiot−1 + ␦6 trade dependencet−1 + ␦7 growtht−1 + ␦8 affinityt−1 + t .
(5.8)
The endogenous variables in this system are the unobserved propensity for conflict in dyad AB at time t (midABUt ), the lower level of democracy in dyad AB at time t (demLt ), and the higher level of democracy in dyad AB at time t (demHt ). Recall that the lower democracy score in a dyad represents the joint level of democracy shared by the countries in a dyad, and the higher democracy score in a dyad reflects the extent of regime dissimilarity between two countries. Also, we expect that demL reduces midABU , demH increases midABU , and the effects of midABU on demL and demH could be negative or positive. In empirical analysis, because we do not observe midABU , we replace it with an observed dichotomous indicator, midAB . It takes on a value of 1 when two countries are engaged in a dyadic militarized dispute (MID) and 0 otherwise. The involvement in a MID implies the threat of force, the display of force, the use of military force, or war. Table 5.1 summarizes not only the relationships among the three endogenous variables but also the expected effects of the exogenous variables. The exogenous variables ML and MH in the two democracy equations closely follow the model from the democratization literature, as in Chapter 2. To simplify the notation, we drop subscripts t and t − 1. In terms of the economic determinants of democracy, gdppcL and gdppcH indicate the levels of economic development for the low- and high-democracy countries in the dyad; growthL and growthH measure the yearly growth rates of the two countries; inflationL and inflationH indicate the annual inflation rates for the low- and high-democracy countries; tradeL and tradeH represent the countries’ levels of trade openness, where trade openness is the ratio of total trade over GDP; and year is a linear trend variable. The terms inflationL ∗ year and inflationH ∗ year are interaction terms between inflation and year in the low- and high-democracy countries, and the terms gdppcL ∗ year and gdppcH ∗ year are interaction terms between year and GDP per capita in the two countries. These interaction terms capture the time-varying effects of these factors.
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Table 5.1. Expectation of direction of effects in the simultaneous equations DEML equation endogenous
Sign
MIDAB
+, −
EXOGENOUS PRIOR DEMOCRACYL YEAR INFLATIONL
DEMH equation endogenous MIDAB
Sign +, −
+ +, −
EXOGENOUS PRIOR DEMOCRACYH YEAR INFLATIONH
+ +, −
INFLATIONL ∗ YEAR
+, −
INFLATIONH ∗ YEAR
+, −
GDPPCL GDPPCL ∗ YEAR GROWTHL TRADEL DIFFUSIONL THIRD-PARTY MIDL
+ +, − +, − +, − + +, −
GDPPCH GDPPCH ∗ YEAR GROWTHH TRADEH DIFFUSIONH THIRD-PARTY MIDH
+ +, − +, − +, − + +, −
+
+
MIDAB equation endogenous
Sign
DEML DEMH EXOGENOUS CONTIGUITY
− +
ALLIANCE CAPABILITY RATIO TRADE DEPENDENCE GROWTH AFFINITY
− −
+
− − −
In terms of the noneconomic determinants of democracy, prior demL and prior demH are the one-year lagged democracy scores of the lowand high-democracy countries; diffusionL and diffusionH indicate the average democracy scores of the countries in the PRIEs of the low- and high-democracy countries in a dyad; and third-party midL and thirdparty midH are dichotomous variables, which indicate whether the lowand high-democracy countries, respectively, are involved in a militarized dispute with at least one third-party country in their respective PRIEs. The exogenous (or control) variables in the MID equation are the usual suspects in the dyadic studies of democratic peace: contiguity indicates whether the two states in a dyad are geographically contiguous (or separated by up to 150 miles of water); alliance indicates whether the two states in a dyad are members in a military alliance; capability ratio reflects the differences between two countries in terms of material and military capabilities; trade dependence indicates the level of trade interdependence between two countries; growth captures the shared economic growth rate in a dyad; and affinity measures the level of preference similarity between two states, based on the congruence of their votes in the UN General Assembly.
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Research Design Issues To implement our statistical model requires us to address several special design issues. Although we discuss their technical details in the appendix, we offer a brief overview here for general readers. First, the simultaneous equations model includes equations for two observed continuous endogenous variables (demL and demH ) and one unobserved continuous endogenous variable (midABU ). As is typical in such cases, we replace the unobserved variable with an observed conflict indicator. Such models need to satisfy some econometric requirement so that their estimation is meaningful. In the chapter appendix, we show that this condition, which was developed by Heckman (1978), holds in our case. Second, in the empirical estimation of the model’s coefficients, we use a time-series cross-sectional data set (also known as panel data). The data are yearly, and the sample pools all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992. Scholars in the literature define politically relevant dyads as pairs of countries that are either geographically contiguous or that include at least one major power (United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR/Russia, and China). The politically relevant dyads are allegedly most likely to experience dyadic political conflict. Third, the estimation of any simultaneous equations model differs from the estimation of a single-equation model in that it needs to take into account the simultaneity relationships between variables or their reciprocal effects on one another. We estimate our model using a variant of the twostage least squares method suggested by Maddala (1983), which is designed for a system of simultaneous equations of the type developed in this chapter and includes both dichotomous and continuous endogenous variables. We use the word “variant” since, as we discuss in the appendix and in the next subsection, the Maddala method is designed for the case with one dichotomous and one continuous variable, but our model includes one dichotomous and two continuous variables. Finally, as noted in previous chapters, the error term in the statistical model needs to satisfy some assumptions for statistical inferences to be valid. We address the related assumption violations using appropriate econometric techniques. We also discuss other complications in our case of the simultaneous equations model in the appendix.
Empirical Findings This section presents our key empirical findings for the relationship between military interstate conflict and democracy. We first discuss our main results,
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followed by results from additional analysis. In the appendix of this chapter, we fully present the findings of the analysis and provide all the technical details for interested readers. Tables 5.2 presents the empirical results from the three equations of the simultaneous equations system. General observations on the performance of our simultaneous equations model suggest that the model performs well. The model’s goodness of fit between the predicted values and the data is high. The empirical results for the control variables, which we fully discuss in the appendix, are generally consistent with our expectations and previous findings from the literature. Starting with the results for the demL equation, the coefficient of midAB is negative and statistically different from zero. This means that dyadic conflict reduces the lower level of democracy in a dyad. In terms of the size of effect, a dyadic military dispute reduces the lower level of democracy in a dyad by about 0.16 – a decline of about 38% in the average lower democracy value in the sample (0.425). Now, because dyadic conflict also affects the lower level of democracy in the next period through its effect on the lagged lower level of democracy in the model, we can compute the effect of MID involvement on the lower level of democracy in the long run, based on the formula described in the appendix. By employing the coefficients of dyadic MID and the lagged lower level of democracy, we find that dyadic MID involvement reduces the lower level of democracy by 2.5 points over the long run – a 590% decline in the average value of the variable in the sample. Therefore, both the short- and long-run effects of dyadic military dispute on joint democracy are large in size. In terms of the results for the demH equation, the coefficient of midAB is negative and statistically different from zero. Thus, dyadic conflict also reduces the higher level of democracy in a dyad. With respect to the size of effect, a dyadic military dispute reduces the higher level of democracy in a dyad by about 0.13 – a decline of about 1.7% in the average higher democracy value in the sample (7.9). Similarly, because dyadic conflict also affects the higher level of democracy in the next period through its effect on the lagged higher democracy in the model, we compute the effect of MID involvement on the higher level of democracy in the long run. By employing the coefficients of dyadic MID dispute and the lagged higher democracy, we find that dyadic MID involvement reduces the higher level of democracy by about 1.6 points over the long run – a 20% decline in the average value of the variable in the sample. These short- and long-run effects of dyadic conflict on regime dissimilarity are not as large as their effects on joint democracy. Based on the results for the MID equation, the effect of demL on the likelihood of midAB is negative and statistically different from zero. Hence,
142
0.9364∗∗∗ (0.0053) 0.0619∗∗∗ (0.0125) −0.0385∗∗ (0.0150) 0.00002∗∗ (7.52e-06) 13.4305∗∗∗ (2.9239) −0.0066∗∗∗ (0.0015) −0.0071∗∗ (0.0032) −0.4276∗∗∗ (0.0844) 0.0091∗∗∗ (0.0011) 0.0845 (0.0535) −0.1597∗∗∗ (0.0418) −124.9733∗∗∗ (24.7767) 11644 0.95 N Adjusted R2
Constant
MIDAB
THIRD-PARTY MIDH
DIFFUSIONH
TRADEH
GROWTHH
GDPPCH ∗ YEAR
GDPPCH
INFLATIONH ∗ YEAR
INFLATIONH
YEAR
PRIOR DEMOCRACYH
Equation of DEMH 0.9163∗∗∗ (0.0088) 0.0547∗∗∗ (0.0193) −0.0872 (0.0647) 0.00004 (0.00003) 12.1750∗∗∗ (4.2280) −0.0061∗∗∗ (0.0021) −0.0053 (0.0046) −0.1059 (0.0685) 0.0047∗∗∗ (0.0010) 0.0701∗∗ (0.0348) −0.1327∗∗∗ (0.0310) −108.7286∗∗∗ (38.0668) 11644 0.94
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
N Adjusted R2
Constant
MIDAB
THIRD-PARTY MIDL
DIFFUSIONL
TRADEL
GROWTHL
GDPPCL ∗ YEAR
GDPPCL
INFLATIONL ∗ YEAR
INFLATIONL
YEAR
PRIOR DEMOCRACYL
Equation of DEML
N 2
Constant
AFFINITY
DEMH
DEML
GROWTH
TRADE DEPENDENCE
CAPABILITY RATIO
ALLIANCE
CONTIGUITY
Equation of MID
Table 5.2. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict
−2.1944∗∗∗ (0.1493) 11644 96.73∗∗∗
0.7829∗∗∗ (0.1375) −0.0907 (0.1388) −0.0285 (0.0409) −20.3836 (14.5072) −0.0287∗∗ (0.0116) −0.0207∗∗∗ (0.0067) 0.0027 (0.0106)
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Table 5.3. Probabilities and relative risks of MID involvement
Scenario 1: Contiguous, nonallied dyads Baseline: all continuous variables are set at mean values Increase in DEML by one standard deviation; other variables at baseline values Scenario 2: Noncontiguous, nonallied dyads Baseline: all continuous variables are set at their mean values Increase in DEML by one standard deviation; other variables at baseline values
Probability
Relative risk
0.0546 0.0402
73.6%
0.0086 0.0057
66.3%
Note: Based on coefficients in MID equation in Table 5.2.
democratic countries are less likely to engage in MIDs against each other. This result agrees with those reported by many single-equation studies in support of the democratic peace proposition. The effect of demH on midAB is not statistically different from zero. Russett et al. (1998) and Oneal and Russett (1997) argue that demH is an important part of the link between political regimes and conflict. For example, interpreting demH as political distance, Russett et al. (1998: 457) argue that “greater political distance makes a dyad more prone to conflict.” The result in Table 5.2 does not support this claim, however; the difference is attributable to the fact that we model demH –conflict simultaneity, whereas Oneal and Russett (1997) and Russett et al. (1998) do not. Table 5.3 illustrates the substantive effects in the MID equation by computing the probabilities of MID for contiguous and noncontiguous politically relevant dyads. Scenario 1 sets all the continuous variables at their mean values, contiguity at 1 (contiguous countries), and alliance at 0 (nonallied countries). Scenario 2 repeats the experiment but sets contiguity at 0 (noncontiguous countries). In Scenario 1, the baseline probability of dyadic MID involvement is 5.46%. When demL rises by one standard deviation (6.48 units), the probability of midAB drops to 4.02%, a decline of 1.44%. Because conflicts are rare events, it makes more sense to talk about the relative risk between the two scenarios (i.e., dividing the new probability by the baseline probability). The computed relative risk is 73.6%, which means that relative to the baseline contiguous dyad, the risk of MID involvement is 26.4% lower if the dyad’s joint democracy rises by one standard deviation. How do these effects compare with those found by Oneal and Russett (1997)? We observe
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a smaller absolute effect of joint democracy on the likelihood of dyadic MID (a decline of 1.44% in our results vs. a decline of 2.1% from 7.8% to 5.7% in their results). But the changes in the relative risk are similar between the two studies (26.4% vs. 26.9% from Oneal and Russett). In Scenario 2 (noncontiguous countries), the substantive effect of demL (joint democracy) on dyadic MID involvement is smaller by an order of magnitude. A rise of one standard deviation in demL reduces the probability of midAB (dyadic MID involvement) from 0.86% (in the baseline case) to 0.57%. The results of this experiment, which are not reported by Oneal and Russett (1997), lend support to the argument of James et al. (1999) that the effect of joint democracy on the probability of dyadic MID may be small. However, the relative risk is 66.3%. Relative to the baseline (0.86%), the reduction of 0.29% amounts to a decrease of 33.7% in the relative risk of MID involvement. That is, relative to the baseline noncontiguous dyad, the risk of MID involvement drops by 33.7% if the dyad’s joint democracy increases by one standard deviation. Overall, the empirical results support our theoretical expectation that the relationship between dyadic military conflict and democracy is reciprocal – they provide support for our argument that models that ignore the simultaneity of conflict and democracy miss something important about this structural relationship. Dyadic military conflict reduces both the lower and higher democracy levels in a dyad, although its short- and long-run effects on the lower democracy level are much stronger. At the same time, the lower democracy level in a dyad reduces the probability of dyadic military dispute, whereas the higher democracy level in a dyad does not.
Additional Analysis One additional analysis concerns the debate over the impact of affinity, which presumably measures preference similarity based on UN voting patterns. We present the additional results in Table 5.A1, based on a simultaneous equations model with affinity in the MID equation. The purpose is to check the sensitivity of our results in light of the debate between Erik Gartzke on one side and Bruce Russett and John Oneal on the other. This debate is not our main focus, but it provides an opportunity to evaluate the robustness of our results. For our purpose, we compare the results between Tables 5.2 and 5.A1 and find them quite similar across all three equations. The effects of demL and demH and midAB on each other are similar whether affinity values are included or not.
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As we further explain in the appendix, Maddala developed a method to estimate a simultaneous equations model with one endogenous continuous variable and one endogenous dichotomous variable. However, his method only works in this particular case and we therefore could not use it for our three-equations model. Thus, we conduct another analysis to assess the sensitivity of our results to the Maddala correction of standard errors. In this additional analysis, we estimate a model with two endogenous variables, midAB and demL . In other words, we drop the demH equation. We do this estimation in two ways. In one way, we use the Maddala method per se, including the special features it includes. In the second way, we do not use the full Maddala method but rather we use its two-stage features and compute robust standard errors with cluster, the approach we employed earlier for the three-equations models. The results from these two tests are very similar. We therefore expect that had a Maddala method been available and applied to our three-equation setup, it would not have changed the inferences reported here. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Our simultaneous equations model of dyadic conflict and democracy is markedly distinct from the typical single-equation research designs in the democratic-peace literature. In previous studies, midAB was assumed to be the dependent variable and the simultaneity of conflict and democracy was ignored. We demonstrate that conflict and democracy do in fact influence one another. Our major innovation is the combining of the dyadic analysis of military conflict with the monadic determinants that explain democracy levels in a dyad. Our approach exploits the insights from two bodies of literature that have remained on two separate courses: the monadic literature on the causes of democratization and the dyadic democratic-peace literature. The empirical findings support our choice of a simultaneous modeling approach. The simultaneous modeling approach in this chapter brings several new things to the study of democracy and dyadic conflict. First, it shows democratic peace is not an artifact of the effect of conflict on democracy, which has been a topic of debate in the literature. Second, the analysis shows that the pacifying effect of joint democracy is smaller in the absolute size than in the work of Oneal and Russett once one considers the democracy– conflict simultaneity. Third, it shows that dyadic conflict reduces both joint democracy and dyadic regime dissimilarity, rejecting the view that
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conflict promotes democracy. Finally, it shows that the congruence of interest between countries does not explain the lack of conflict between democracies in the context of a simultaneous equations framework, an issue debated among scholars who use single equations for the effect of democracy on conflict. Our findings suggest two policy implications that single-equation studies of MID fail to uncover. First, there is a negative relationship between dyadic conflict and joint democracy. Dyadic conflict reduces joint democracy, which makes future conflict more likely and moves the dyad away from peace. Hence, the preservation of peace requires early intervention in disputes before they cause the belligerents to become seriously less democratic. Second, there exists a positive relationship between dyadic peace and democracy. Peaceful dyads experience a rise in democracy for both nations. Thus, by brokering peace between adversaries, actors such as major powers or international organizations can help to facilitate the development of democracy, which in turn promotes peace. Although these effects may not be large, they are statistically significant and could well be important tools in conflict resolution. We need to stress that this chapter represents the beginning of a research program rather than a final analytic effort. We believe that the field of international relations could gain insight by repeating previous investigations of the relationship between conflict and democracy while using our simultaneous framework. In particular, we believe that the issue of the size of the effect of joint democracy on the likelihood of MIDs merits further investigation. For example, studies could use other control variables, other estimators, or other measures to gain additional insight. However, in our view, the simultaneity of conflict and democracy is too important to be ignored by future research. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
Many statistical studies in international relations investigate the claim that democracies do not fight one another. Virtually all these studies employ a single-equation design, where the dependent variable measures the presence or absence of a dyadic MID. A separate group of studies argues that conflict affects democracy and that its effects could be positive or negative. By and large, these two bodies of literature have not incorporated one another’s insights. We argue that democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other significantly and that statistical models that ignore the reciprocal nature of these effects may make incorrect inferences.
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In this chapter, we developed a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict. The model not only connects the monadic literature on the causes of democratization with the dyadic democratic-peace literature, but it also includes, in an innovative manner, the monadic causes of democracy and the dyadic causes of military conflict in one system of equations. In a sample of all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992, we find that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy, and joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. The effect of military conflict on joint democracy is large. And the absolute effect of joint democracy on conflict in our study is smaller compared with the single-equation estimates in the literature, whereas, in relative terms, the effect is similar in size. The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous ones. In this chapter, international trade played a role in the analysis as one of our control variables in both the democracy and the military conflict equations. The effect of trade on military conflict, however, is one of those issues that in itself has generated enormous controversy in the fields of international relations and international political economy. Studies have continuously debated the merits of trade as a tool to achieve international peace, and the issue is certainly far from reaching closure. Part of the reason for this controversy probably has to do with some previously noted technical differences in terms of samples, measures, estimators, and control variables. In the next chapter, we argue that another important substantive source of differences, which so far has not received much scholarly attention, has to do with the composition of trade in terms of both sectoral types and the directions of trade flows (import and export). Our work focuses on these very issues in the following order. We first offer a formal model of the effects of trade, broken down along sectoral type and trade flow directions, on the propensity of nations to initiate conflict against their trading partners. The model is then tested empirically using statistical methods. As we shall demonstrate, our work will bring new insight into this relatively old debate.
APPENDIX CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The conceptual model focuses on linking the monadic causes of democracy and the dyadic causes of military conflict. Recall that demL is the lower
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democracy score between demA and demB in dyad AB, where A and B are the dyad member countries; demH is the higher democracy score in dyad AB; midABU is the propensity of dyad AB to engage in a militarized dispute – a variable that is unobserved; MA is a vector of monadic attributes affecting the democracy of A (demA ); MB is a similarly defined vector for B (demB ); and F denotes a functional dependency. demA is a function of three components: MA , midABU , and midAJU . Similarly, demB is a function of MB , midABU , and midBJU . The elements of the vectors MA and MB are based on the literature of the determinants of democracy discussed in Chapter 2. The democracy score of country A is affected by any conflict that country A conducts with any country in its PRIE (see the text) and not only by conflict with country B. We divide the PRIE of country A into two parts: country B and other third-party countries (denoted J, where J = B). The propensity of conflict between A and B has already been denoted as midABU . The unobserved aggregated propensity for conflict that country A has with all third-party countries J in its PRIE is denoted by midAJU . Hence, in notation: demA = F(MA , midABU , midAJU ) demB = F(MB , midABU , midBJU ).
(5.A1)
Combining the definition of demL and Equation (5.A1), we get demL = F(MB , midABU , midBJU )
if demA > demB ;
demL = F(MA , midABU , midAJU )
if demA < demB .
(5.A2)
Similar to demL , the derivation of demH is given by demH = F(MA , midABU , midAJU ) if demA > demB ; demH = F(MB , midABU , midBJU )
if demA < demB .
(5.A3)
midABU depends on the democracy scores of both countries in the dyad. Hence, midABU = F(XAB , demL , demH ),
(5.A4)
where XAB is a vector of dyadic attributes that affect the likelihood of dyadic MID. The variables included in XAB are those used within the conflict literature. The democratic-peace literature expects that a rise in demL reduces midABU and that a rise in demH raises midABU .
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The full simultaneous equations model is now given by Equations (5.A5), (5.A6), and (5.A7), which were presented in the text: demL = F(ML , midABU , midLRU ),
(5.A5)
demH = F(MH , midABU , midHRU ),
(5.A6)
midABU = F(XAB , demL , demH ).
(5.A7)
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Empirical Model The elements of the vectors ML and MH in Equations (5.A3) and (5.A4) of the conceptual model include the following variables. We provide details on data sources, expected effects, and measure construction. The discussion of the democracy equations follows Chapter 2. gdppcL and gdppcH are the logged real GDP per capita values for the low- and high-democracy countries in the dyad, respectively. These data are taken from the Penn World Table 5.6. As noted in Chapter 2, many studies use GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development. We expect that gdppcL and gdppcH positively influence demL and demH , respectively, an expectation that is in line with the modernization theory – that economic development breeds democracy. growthL and growthH are the yearly growth rates of real GDP, computed using data from the Penn World Table 5.6, for the low- and highdemocracy countries in a dyad, respectively. As noted in Chapter 2, the democracy literature registers conflicting expectations regarding the effect of economic growth on democracy. Some studies argue the effect is negative, and other studies claim the effect is positive. inflationL and inflationH are the yearly inflation rates, based on the consumer price index, for the low- and high-democracy countries in a dyad, respectively. Several studies use inflation as a proxy for economic crisis, but scholars debate its effect on democracy (see Chapter 2). Data are from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (2000). tradeL and tradeH are the trade openness ratios for the low- and highdemocracy countries in a dyad, respectively. Trade openness is calculated as the sum of the values of imports and exports of a country divided by its GDP. Data are from the Penn World Table 5.6. As noted in Chapter 2, the debated effect of trade openness on democracy could be positive or negative.
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year tests whether democracy has a linear trend. In addition, the effects of inflation and economic development on democracy may change over time. As we performed and discussed in Chapter 2, to capture this possibility we include interaction terms between year and inflation, and year and GDP per capita, in the equations for demL and demH , respectively. prior democracyL and prior democracyH are the prior democracy values for the low- and high-democracy countries in a dyad, respectively. We expect these variables to influence demL and demH positively. The strategy of including the lagged dependent variable in the model was explained in Chapter 2. diffusionL and diffusionH are the averages of the democracy scores of the countries in the PRIEs of the low- and high-democracy countries in a dyad, respectively. As in Chapter 2, they capture the diffusion of democratic norms due to contact-based mechanisms such as economic relations, communication networks, and influence by major powers, but in this chapter they are computed for the PRIEs of the low- and high-democracy countries, not their geographical regions. We expect the effect of diffusion on demL and demH to be positive. third-party midL and third-party midH are dichotomous variables. The value of 1 denotes a situation in which the low- or high-democracy country in a dyad is involved in conflict with at least one third-party country in its respective PRIE. These variables capture the notion that the democracy level of country A, for example, may be affected by its conflict with any third-party country, not just by its conflict with country B. Drawing on the literature behind Hypothesis H2, we expect that the effect of thirdparty conflict on democracy could be positive or negative. The third-party dummy variable has been coded based on Zeev Maoz’s (2001b) data on third-party conflict in the PRIE of each country in a dyad. Moving to the MID equation, unless otherwise specified we use data from Oneal and Russett (1999a). As noted in the empirical test, the unobserved midABU variable is replaced by its realization midAB , which is the presence or absence of a MID in dyad AB. Another possibility is to replace midABU with a multinomial representation, classifying several types of MIDs, as in James et al. (1999). However, this method is not employed here because the estimation of simultaneous equations models involving continuous and multinomial variables is not well developed in the literature and because we wish to compare our results to the bulk of the democratic-peace literature, which employs the dichotomous operationalization of MIDs. contiguity takes the value of 1 when the two states in a dyad are geographically contiguous (or are separated by up to 150 miles of water) and
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zero otherwise. Contiguous states are expected to be more likely to experience conflict with one another. alliance equals 1 when both states within a dyad are members in a common military alliance, and zero otherwise. Alliance partners are expected to be less likely to experience conflict with one another. The capability ratio is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the more capable state’s composite national capabilities score to that of the less capable state in the dyad. For each country, this score rises as a state commands a larger resource base, comprising total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures. Dyads with an imbalance in capabilities are expected to be less likely to experience conflict with one another. trade dependence measures dyadic trade interdependence. Each state in a dyad has a bilateral-trade-over-GDP ratio, which represents the relative importance of trade with a dyadic partner. Following Oneal and Russett, we use the lower of the two trade dependence values in a dyad to measure the common level of dyadic trade dependence shared by the two states. Many scholars expect that dyadic trade dependence reduces conflict involvement, but the issue is debated. growth is the lower of the two economic growth rates in a dyad computed from the rate of change in the real GDP per capita for each state. The growth rates are obtained by using moving averages over a three-year period (substituted by one- or two-year-period averages when required values are missing). The literature offers conflicting expectations about the direction of this variable’s effect. This variable is computed using data from Penn World Table 5.6. affinity measures the level of preference similarity between two states in a dyad. This variable is based on the similarity of the states’ voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. Data are from Gartzke (1998). Several scholars debate whether it is affinity or joint democracy that causes peace in a dyad. Gartzke (1998) argues that preference similarity accounts for the hypothesized effect of democratic peace and reports that in the same model, affinity is statistically significant whereas joint democracy is not. In contrast, Oneal and Russett (1999b) argue that joint democracy indirectly contributes to preference similarity. Gartzke (2000) rejects this possibility.
Research Design Issues The relationship between some of our exogenous and endogenous variables may be simultaneous. Although this possibility applies to virtually all studies
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in the literature, we nevertheless believe we ought to discuss the issue. Of course, we cannot model all potential simultaneous effects between our variables, because our model is already quite complicated. To deal with this issue, we lag each of our exogenous variables by a single year, as we did in previous chapters. The next issue concerns the Heckman (1978) condition for our model. Heckman shows that a consistency requirement needs to be satisfied when one estimates a simultaneous equations model in which an unobserved endogenous variable is replaced by an observed dichotomous variable. If this condition is not fulfilled, the estimation is not meaningful because the structural equations are not consistent with one another (Amemiya, 1978). Heckman considers a model with two equations: one for the observed variable, and the other for the unobserved. The dichotomous realization of the unobserved variable is an independent variable in each equation. Suppose the coefficient of the endogenous variable in the equation of the unobserved variable is ␥ 2 , and the coefficients of the dichotomous variable (linked to the unobserved variable) are ␦1 and ␦2 in each equation, respectively. Heckman’s condition requires ␦2 = ␥ 2 ␦1 . In our case, Heckman’s condition holds because the coefficients of midAB in all equations are zero. That is, the demL, demH , and midABU equations do not include midAB as an independent variable. In addition, ␥ 2 = 0 in our case, because the coefficients of demL and demH in the midABU equation are not zero. Hence, we can say that in our case the Heckman condition holds. We estimate our model using a variant of the two-stage least squares method suggested by Maddala (1983) and pooling the politically relevant dyad from 1950 to 1992. As in other studies, we do not deal with the timeseries dynamics of democracy and conflict. Dealing with issues of dynamics would require time-series techniques, which are still not well understood in the context of MIDs. We defer this issue to future research. In the first stage of Maddala estimator, each endogenous variable is regressed on all the exogenous variables in the model. The midAB equation is estimated using probit. The equations of demL and demH are estimated using ordinary least squares. In the second stage, the endogenous variables on the right-hand side of each equation are replaced by their predicted values from the first stage, respectively. In the MID equation, the linear predictor is used – not the predicted probability. Maddala (1983) assumes that the error terms are white noise. He employs the coefficients from the second stage, as we do, but he applies a correction for their standard errors. Our model consists of one dichotomous and two continuous endogenous variables and we do not assume that the error terms are necessarily white noise. We do not use Maddala’s correction because,
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to the best of our knowledge, the literature has not extended it either to a model with more than two equations or to a case with possible nonspherical errors. Following the suggestions of Guilkey et al. (1992), Bollen et al. (1995), and Alvarez (1997), we use the standard errors computed in the second stage of the procedure to test our hypotheses. However, to assess the sensitivity of our results to Maddala’s method, we estimate a model with two endogenous variables (midAB and demL ) in two ways: one with the Maddala correction and the other with robust standard errors (that can control for potential nonspherical errors). We need to consider the potential existence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the model’s error terms. One may suggest that we examine the correlation structure of the error terms in the equations. So far the literature has not developed a diagnostic test that is appropriate for our case. Developing such a test is difficult for at least two reasons. First, one of the equations in our model has a dichotomous endogenous variable in a time-series cross-sectional design. Second, we have a structural equations model with one dichotomous and two continuous endogenous variables. Conventional tests such as Durbin–Watson are not designed to diagnose such models. Hence, future research is called for in this area. That said, in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, a model’s estimated coefficients are consistent, but its standard errors are inefficient and could be biased. To correct for these potential problems, we estimate our model using a variant of the White (1980) estimator of robust standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity and adjust for clustering over dyads to help account for possible temporal dependence of the error terms within each dyad. This estimator yields consistent estimation of the covariance matrix under very general conditions of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Wiggins, 1999). Finally, we demonstrate the importance of the results by examining the effect size of the key variable. We look at the direct effect of the key variables and their long-run effects through the lagged endogenous variables in the two democracy equations. The long-run impact of dyadic MID on democracy is based on the following formula: [coefficient of MID variable/(1 − coefficient of lagged endogenous democracy variable)].
Empirical Findings In this part of the appendix, we provide additional details on the sample and some diagnostics and discuss results for the control variables. The sample sizes for Models 1 and 2 in the tables shown in the text are 11,644
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and 11,022 observations, respectively. These samples are somewhat smaller than the samples used in some single-equation-based studies of MIDs, which is due to the fact that our model includes more variables than does the typical single-equation design and the data on some of these variables are missing for some years. While this places a potential limitation on our empirical analysis, we believe that our results are applicable to other samples, because our theoretical argument is not sample-dependent and our sample is nevertheless large. Table 5.2 in the main text presents the statistical results for all three equations. As noted in the text, the model’s goodness of fit is high. The adjusted R2 for the democracy equations is 0.94 or 0.95, and the 2 model fit test in the MID equation is statistically significant. We now discuss the results for the control variables in the demL equation. The effect of prior democracyL on demL is significant and positive, demonstrating the importance of democratic inertia. The effect of diffusionL is positive. As the level of democracy in the less democratic country’s PRIE rises, so does its own democracy level. The effect of year is significant and positive, reflecting the tendency of democracy to increase over time in our sample. The effect of inflationL on demL is significant and negative, and its interaction with year is significant and positive. Hence, a rise in inflation reduces a country’s level of democracy. This effect is not stable over time, however, as is also reported by Gasiorowski (1995) and in Chapter 2. The effect of GDP per capita on demL is significant and positive, whereas its interaction term with year is significant and negative. This replicates a known result in the literature; that is, democracy rises with economic development. We also find, however, that this effect declines over time. The literature offers contradicting expectations regarding the effect of economic growth on democracy. We find that this effect is significant and negative. As in Chapter 2 and Gasiorowski (1995), we also find that greater trade openness reduces the lower democracy score in a dyad. One interpretation is that trade widens the social cleavages between winners and losers, thus reducing democracy. This finding is consistent with the result in Chapter 2. Next we turn to the results for the demH equation. As one could expect, the results for the control variables are generally consistent with those from the demL equation, which adds justification for our modeling approach. The only exceptions are the effects of inflation, growth, and trade on demH , which are no longer significant in spite of having the same signs as in the DEML equation. This is not surprising because the high-democracy
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countries in a sample of politically relevant dyads tend to be developed countries, for which the levels of democracy tend to be high and stable. On the other hand, the low-democracy countries are typically less developed, exhibiting larger changes in democracy over time. In our sample, most of the MIDs are purely dyadic. Thus, we ought to expect that democracy levels would mostly be affected by the variable midAB . However, despite their relative rarity, third-party disputes also could affect democracy. We find that the effects of third-party mid on demH and (less so) on demL are positive and statistically significant. We can explain this empirical result by noting that the demH countries in a sample of politically relevant dyads tend to be countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and West Germany. Between 1950 and 1992, these countries were at times involved in multiple militarized disputes – a fact that has manifested itself in the positive correlation between demH and third-party mid (correlation = 0.136). The demL countries in the sample are typically less developed and tend to be involved in fewer MIDs with third parties, which is also demonstrated by a positive but weaker correlation between demL and third-party mid (correlation = 0.049). Finally, we discuss the results for the MID equation in Table 5.2. The effect of contiguity on the likelihood of MIDs is statistically significant and positive, as one would expect from the extant literature. The effect of growth on midAB is statistically significant and negative, which also is consistent with some prior results. The effects of alliance, capability ratio, and trade dependence, however, are not statistically significant in our results, though they have the same sign as in comparable singleequation studies. We attribute these differences to the fact that our model accounts for the simultaneity of conflict and democracy, whereas previous studies have not.
Additional Analyses Table 5.A1 reports the results for all three equations based on the additional analysis and concerns the debate over the impact of affinity. The threeequation model adds the affinity variable to the MID equation. As noted, these results shed light on a recent debate in the single-equation MID literature. Gartzke (1998, 2000) argues that democratic peace is driven by dyadic preference similarity. In his studies, when affinity is included, the effect of joint democracy on the likelihood of MID is not statistically significant. Oneal and Russett criticize Gartzke’s approach and reject his
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0.9346∗∗∗ (0.0056) 0.0615∗∗∗ (0.0131) −0.0388∗∗ (0.0150) 0.00002∗∗ (7.56e-06) 13.1769∗∗∗ (3.0734) −0.0065∗∗∗ (0.0016) −0.0066∗∗ (0.0033) −0.4638∗∗∗ (0.0886) 0.0096∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0968∗ (0.0557) −0.1742∗∗∗ (0.0434) −124.3320∗∗∗ (25.9593) 11022 0.95 N Adjusted R2
Constant
MIDAB
THIRD-PARTY MIDH
DIFFUSIONH
TRADEH
GROWTHH
GDPPCH ∗ YEAR
GDPPCH
INFLATIONH ∗ YEAR
INFLATIONH
YEAR
PRIOR DEMOCRACYH
Equation of DEMH 0.9143∗∗∗ (0.0090) 0.0602∗∗∗ (0.0204) −0.0841 (0.0649) 0.00004 (0.00003) 13.4123∗∗∗ (4.4671) −0.0067∗∗∗ (0.0023) −0.0060 (0.0048) −0.1384∗ (0.0722) 0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0011) 0.0635∗ (0.0360) −0.1295∗∗∗ (0.0316) −119.7263∗∗∗ (40.2063) 11022 0.94
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
N Adjusted R2
Constant
MIDAB
THIRD-PARTY MIDL
DIFFUSIONL
TRADEL
GROWTHL
GDPPCL ∗ YEAR
GDPPCL
INFLATIONL ∗ YEAR
INFLATIONL
YEAR
PRIOR DEMOCRACYL
Equation of DEML
N 2
Constant
AFFINITY
DEMH
DEML
GROWTH
TRADE DEPENDENCE
CAPABILITY RATIO
ALLIANCE
CONTIGUITY
Equation of MID 0.8041∗∗∗ (0.1346) −0.0543 (0.1577) −0.0498 (0.0445) −17.0885 (13.7160) −0.0261∗∗ (0.0123) −0.0188∗∗∗ (0.0065) −0.0018 (0.0110) −0.2145 (0.2127) −2.0699∗∗∗ (0.1777) 11022 82.75∗∗∗
Table 5.A1. Interactions among joint democracy, regime dissimilarity, and dyadic conflict, controlling for affinity
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findings. Our model facilitates a more accurate assessment of this debate by modeling the reciprocal relationship between demL and midAB . We find that the effect of affinity on the likelihood of dyadic MID involvement is negative but statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of joint democracy on the likelihood of MID involvement remains negative and significant. Our results thus support the position of Oneal and Russett in this debate. However, it is worth noting that affinity, based on UN voting patterns, may be a weak proxy for dyadic preference similarity. Hence, the question of whether preference similarity affects dyadic MID involvement would benefit from the development of better measures of this concept in future research. Finally, as noted, to assess the sensitivity of our results to the Maddala correction of standard errors, we estimate a model with two endogenous variables (midAB and demL ) in two ways: using the Maddala correction and using robust standard errors. Keshk (2002) provides details on the implementation of this estimator. The results from these tests are very similar, which is consistent with the findings from Monte Carlo simulations reported by Guilkey et al. (1992) and Alvarez (1997). They find that the Maddala correction has little effect on statistical inferences. We therefore expect that had a Maddala correction been available and applied to our three-equation setup, it would not have changed the inferences reported here.
SIX
Economic Openness and Conflict
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we shift our attention to the interaction between military conflict and the other focus of our book – economic openness – which played a crucial part in Chapters 2 and 3. Economic openness is measured in various ways, but in this chapter we emphasize the trade dimension of economic openness, which connects the analytical framework of our book to an important debate in the related fields of international relations and international political economy: the trade and conflict controversy. The idea that trade promotes peace dates from at least the late eighteenth century,1 and has two contemporary explanations: the liberal argument and the bargaining argument. The antithesis that trade generates conflict also has a long intellectual history,2 which is often explained from a neoMarxist view or a neomercantilist derivative of realism. So far, scholars have mathematically demonstrated the logical consistency of the liberal and bargaining arguments.3 These formal models consider aggregated or total trade, ignoring variations of trade across economic sectors and flow directions (export and import). With a few exceptions, statistical studies have also used total bilateral trade. Most of these studies find that a rise in trade reduces the likelihood of conflict. It is a fair statement that most theoretical and empirical works on the effect of trade on conflict ignore both the composition of trade across economic sectors and the trade flow directions in terms of export and import. We challenge the prevalent approach and provide new insights on the effect of trade on conflict. Indeed, it does not seem likely that international 1 2 3
See, e.g., de Montesquieu (1748), Smith (1776), Kant (1795), and Angell (1912). See, e.g., Hobson (1902), Lenin (1916), Hirschman (1945), and Waltz (1970). See, e.g., Polachek (1980) and Gartzke et al. (2001).
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exchanges of heterogeneous commodities and services (say, oil, bananas, corn, machinery, fish, and computers, to name just a few) should have identical effects on conflict. As one renowned scholar has repeatedly warned, “unduly extensive aggregation of trade data” is likely to produce “biased estimates of the ability of bilateral trade to diminish conflict” (Polachek, 1992: 113; 2000: 10).4 We suggest that the theoretical and empirical focus on total trade results in two aggregation biases: one from aggregation across economic sectors or goods and the other from aggregation across trade flow directions (import and export).5 To be sure, some studies do look at the effects of trade in different sectors on military conflict – but without formally providing a microfoundation – and almost all the existing statistical studies of this subject except that of Dorussen (2006) have used very limited samples. Meanwhile, to the best of our knowledge, the possibility that the effects of trade on military conflict may differ between that of export and import has not received attention in the literature. In this chapter, we offer a theoretical formal model to explain how export and import flows in specific economic sectors influence the decision to initiate military conflict, a question almost all previous theories have ignored. Like virtually any formal model, our model also relies on simplifying assumptions. As in neoclassical economics, we model trade as performed by economic agents in the marketplace. As in international relations, we model conflict as a choice made by leaders. We believe that these assumptions are generally reasonable and allow us to model and anticipate the individual effects on military dispute initiation of bilateral imports and exports in different sectors. Simply put, our theory suggests that leaders are less likely to initiate conflicts that cause trade losses. This idea is not new, but our first contribution here is to show that this consideration could vary across import, export, and traded sectors. And our theory goes beyond this argument: it predicts that leaders are more likely to initiate conflicts that increase profits to their trade. Formalizing these ideas, we show that the costs and the benefits of conflict can vary across trade sectors, exports and imports, and that they work through the expected effect of conflict on trade prices. Leaders initiate conflict if they conclude that it will be economically beneficial by 4
5
Polachek is not alone. Russett and Oneal (2001: 141) also note that “dyadic [total] trade, even when adjusted for the size of the overall economy, is an imperfect indicator of economic interdependence. For one thing, the composition of trade is not considered.” Surveys of the trade and conflict literature conclude that researchers should consider disaggregating total trade. See Sayrs (1990: 22), McMillan (1997: 53), and Reuveny (2000: 37). We use the terms “goods,” “economic sectors,” and “sectors” interchangeably.
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reducing the price of their import and increasing the price of their export, ceteris paribus. The decision depends on certain good-, export- and importspecific parameters. Using estimates of these parameters, our model predicts the effects of changes in exports and imports in the agriculture/fishery, energy, chemical/ mineral, manufactured products, and miscellaneous-consumption sectors on military interstate dispute (MID) initiation. We test these predictions using a large-N sample of all the directed-dyads from 1970 to 1997 for which data are available. We find that the effects of bilateral trade on MIDinitiation vary across sectors and between flow directions. Increases in agriculture/fishery imports and energy imports reduce the probability of MID initiation, and increases in energy exports, manufacturing imports, and manufacturing exports increase this probability. Yet changes in agriculture/ fishery export, chemical/mineral trade, and miscellaneous consumption products trade generally do not affect MID initiation. Our research, we believe, offers important insights for both academics and policymakers. As we explain in detail in the concluding section, our analysis sheds new light on a long-standing debate in international relations and offers an opportunity to rethink the logic of how trade affects conflict. Our theory encompasses the liberal argument as a special case and offers an alternative explanation to the bargaining, neo-Marxist, neomercantilist realist, and classical realist arguments. It also has various important policy implications. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the motivations of our analysis and discusses previous studies, which is followed by three sections that develop the theoretical model, a section that discusses the model’s implications and formulates hypotheses, and a section that presents the empirical model and discusses several research design issues. With these preliminaries out of the way, we turn to the statistical results of our analysis and the public policy implications of these findings. The last section summarizes the analysis and links the discussion to the next chapter. The appendix of this chapter presents technical details pertaining to the design of our analysis and the empirical results. DISAGGREGATED TRADE IN THE CONFLICT LITERATURE
The contemporary literature on the effect of trade on conflict is too large to fully review here.6 Generally speaking, scholars offer five main theoretical 6
For extensive reviews of the literature, see, e.g., Sayrs (1990), McMillan (1997), Reuveny (2000), Mansfield and Pollins (2003), and Schneider et al. (2003).
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explanations. The classical liberal view argues that trade promotes peace because military conflict reduces the trade that countries value (e.g., Rosecrance, 1986; Polachek, 1992, 2000; Russett and Oneal, 2001). The bargaining approach considers trade a tool that facilitates bargaining over some contested political issue, expecting that trade reduces the likelihood of military conflict over the issue (e.g., Morrow, 1999; Gartzke et al., 2001; Crescenzi, 2003). A neo-Marxist view (e.g., dos Santos, 1970; Choucri and North, 1975; Ashley, 1980) and a neomercantilist derivative of realism (e.g., Waltz, 1970, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Borrus and Zysman, 1992; Barbieri, 2002) envision trade as a tool of influence and exploitation, which can cause conflict if countries resent it or to peace if they comply. Classical realism expects that trade has no systematic effect on military conflict, the causes of which are political and strategic instead (e.g., Buzan, 1984; Gilpin, 1987; Ripsman and Blanchard, 1997; Keshk et al., 2004). Most existing empirical evidence supports the expectation of the first two explanations, that bilateral trade reduces interstate militarized disputes; but evidence to the contrary also exists, which the classical liberal view and the bargaining approach cannot explain. Attempts to apply some, but not all, of the five explanations to account for the effects of trade in different sectors on peace have produced conflicting conjectures. One argument expects that trade in sectors in which nations have a decisive comparative advantage facilitate peace, because such trade brings more economic benefits that would be lost to conflict. Another channel to peace is said to involve imported goods (e.g., oil, machinery, minerals) that a country considers important, the loss of which hinders economic growth. A third channel argues that because imported consumer goods benefit consumers, they support leaders that promote peace with the exporter.7 Other studies focus on strategic goods, including minerals, chemicals, steel, fuels, and high-tech goods. When strategic goods have no readily available substitutes, their trade may generate conflict,8 because countries may feel threatened by their vulnerability and resort to conflict to mitigate the scarcity. Countries also may be tempted to use trade as a political tool to exploit vulnerabilities of and exercise influence on others, causing resentment and conflict.9 Yet trade in strategic goods may also generate friendliness as one country supports another to protect its trade. A related expectation is that trade in goods with fewer substitutes may generate peace 7 8 9
Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982), Arad et al. (1983), Domke (1988), Polachek (1980, 1992). See Hirschman (1945), Baldwin (1985), Gasiorowski (1986), Sayrs (1989), and Førland (1991). Reuveny (1999a, 1999b) shows how Israel uses its trade with the Palestinians to affect their actions. For general discussions, see Gilpin (1984), Sen (1984), Borrus and Zysman (1992), and Vogel (1992).
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because countries tend to cooperate to secure the continuing flows of such goods.10 Some scholars debate the usefulness of the concept of strategic goods. Førland (1991: 197) quotes President Eisenhower, saying, “if our opponent needs something badly, then that something is strategic.” Schelling (1958: 500) notes that any good will be strategic to a country if it plans to consume it but does not produce it. Baldwin (1985: 214–215) explains that the strategic good can be “[any good] that is needed to pursue a given strategy and that is relatively inefficient to produce at home.” He warns that it is hard to identify a priori the “strategic quality of a good” since it depends on the extent that the good has substitutes and on whether the good is important for a certain case. Studies on international competitiveness argue that trade in high-tech goods creates positive externalities for economic growth and the production of weaponry. International competition over trade shares in these goods can lead to conflict. Moreover, states wishing to excel in economic growth, or states suspecting that others may translate growth into military power in the future, will maximize relative gains from trade in high-tech goods. The attempt of one country to gain more from trade than their trade partner can, in turn, lead to tension and ultimately conflict.11 Only a few empirical studies attempt to evaluate the effect of disaggregated trade on conflict, and none of them, with one exception, focuses on military conflict and their samples include only a few dyads. Bennett et al. (1992) studied the effect of U.S.–Japan trade on political relations from 1948 to 1978 and concluded that trade in steel, textiles, and electronics generates conflict. Park et al. (1976) found that, as oil exports rise, oil-exporting countries become hostile toward their trade partners. Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982) conclude that trade in agriculture and manufactured goods induces cooperation by the Warsaw Pact toward the United States. Polachek and McDonald (1992: 277) study the effect of disaggregated trade in raw materials and manufactured goods on conflict for 14 OECD countries in 1973. They report that trade reduces conflict but caution that these results are preliminary due to limited data coverage. Using a large-N sample, Dorussen (2006) finds that disaggregated trade reduces the likelihood of threats and use of force but not in all sectors; the effects of nonmanufactured goods, chemicals, metal products, building supplies, and electronics are not statistically significant. 10 11
On the possibility of trade in strategic goods leading to cooperation due to compliance, see Hirschman (1945), Baldwin (1985), Reuveny and Kang (1998), and Reuveny (2001b). This view often traces back to List (1856). See also Tyson (1992) and Mastanduno (1992).
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In sum, the literature presents conflicting theoretical conjectures and mixed findings. In the following sections, we attempt to add clarity to the trade and conflict literature through a model of the effects of trade, disaggregated across sectors and flow directions, on the initiation of military conflict. THEORETICAL MODEL
To study the effects on conflict initiation of bilateral trade broken down across goods and between flow directions, we need to model the attributes of traded goods such as sensitivities to conflict and price changes, and market forces such as import demand, export supply, and equilibrium. Stated broadly, our model considers two countries that trade in various goods with one another and maintain some political relations. We conceptualize conflict initiation (or the lack thereof) as a change in bilateral relations. A change in trade affects conflict initiation because conflict is expected to affect the price of a bilaterally traded good. When the price rises, the exporter’s profit and the importer’s cost rise. A country initiates conflict to increase export profit or reduce import cost, ceteris paribus. In our model, trade provides the incentive or disincentive for one state to initiate conflict toward another. Our logic, attributing the effect of trade on conflict to considerations of profit and cost, resembles the classical liberal argument, whose microfoundation is best demonstrated in the decision-theoretic model of Polachek (1980, 1992, 2000). We employ the approach of Polachek, but our model differs from his in two major ways. First, Polachek assumes that an exporter country that initiates conflict against a target will be paid less for its export to that country, and that an importer country that initiates conflict against a target will have to pay more for its import from that target. We do not make such assumptions; rather we explicitly allow import and export prices to be determined by demand and supply in the market. Second, Polachek’s model predicts that a rise in trade always brings peace, regardless of its composition or pattern. Our model predicts that the effect of a rise in bilateral trade on conflict initiation changes across traded sectors and between trade flow directions, generating ex ante sector- and flow-specific hypotheses. Our model includes two countries, A and B. We conceptualize political leaders of countries A and B as unitary rational actors whose utility functions rise with national consumption and military conflict they initiate toward each other. The conflict that country A sends toward country B is denoted by conflictAB . The unitary actor assumption is a simplification intended to keep the math of the model tractable. The assumption that leaders’ utility
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rises with conflict, ceteris paribus, may seem counterintuitive, but in fact it is implicit or explicit in all conflict models. Although conflict is costly, leaders may conclude that its benefits outweigh its costs. Assuming leaders are rational actors, when country A is observed to initiate conflict toward country B, it must be the case that country A’s leader believes this action will increase his or her expected utility.12 As usual, consumption equals national output plus import of A from B, importAB , minus the export of A to B, exportAB . When leaders choose conflict, they take consumption, import, export, and national output as given, as in Polachek’s model. Country A’s leader chooses the level of conflict against its trade partner, B, to maximize utility, constrained by the need to maintain some trade balance with country B. The mathematical details of the model are in the chapter appendix. Here we offer an accessible, verbal discussion of the key ideas. As the conflict that A initiates against B rises in our model, the prices of country A’s imports from country B and its exports to B change. These price changes are determined endogenously inside the model. This expectation differs from Polachek’s framework, which assumes that conflict always raises the price a country pays for its import and reduces the price it receives for its export. Although this is certainly a plausible possibility to consider, it is not the only possibility. The reason, as we shall demonstrate, is the fact that the prices of traded goods are determined in international markets rather than in a deterministic manner through model assumptions. Economic logic suggests that supply and demand determine the prices and quantities of traded goods between countries A and B, and this logic is fully embedded in our model. Each traded good involves a supply side and a demand side. The demand of an importer defines how much of a good to import at different prices, whereas the supply of an exporter defines how much to export at different prices. As the price of a good rises, the demand for this good falls and the supply of this good rises. The point at which supply equals demand determines the equilibrium price of each traded good in the dyad. More specifically, suppose in dyad A–B that A exports to B in some sector i (i.e., B imports from A), and A imports from B in another sector j (i.e., B exports to A). In equilibrium, country A’s demand for good j equals country B’s supply of good j to A. If B does not send enough of good j to A, country A’s demand for good j becomes larger than country B’s supply. In 12
Polachek (1980) employs the same leader’s utility function we employ here. For an exposition of the unitary actor model in international relations, and the expected utility approach to modeling the determinants of military conflict, see Bueno de Mesquita (1981).
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this case, the price of good j rises, prompting B to increase its supply to A. Sometimes, country B’s supply of good j is larger than country A’s demand. In this case, the price of good j declines due to the lack of demand in A, and B will reduce its supply. In equilibrium, the demand for bilateral import of good j equals the supply of bilateral export of that good. The same logic also applies to the export flow in sector i from A to B. How do trade prices change in response to conflict? This question stands at the center of our model. To answer it, we need to start with the supply and demand of each traded good. The formal import demand model presented in the appendix embeds the usual economic expectations that country A’s import demand for a product from B rises with country A’s income and falls with the good’s price. To this setup, we add a political–economic feature. We assume that conflict reduces country A’s import demand, for which we provide justifications shortly. The exporter side also follows the mainstream approach. As is usual in economics, the formal model in the appendix assumes that export supply rises with a good’s price and with the exporter’s income. The supply equation in the appendix includes a similar political–economic feature as in the import demand equation; that is, country B’s export supply to A falls with dyadic conflict. Several reasons explain our assumptions that both the import demand and the export supply fall with conflict. Importers and exporters may want to punish hostile partners by reducing trade. The importer may seek to reduce dependence on a hostile supplier, which may stop selling, whereas the exporter may seek to reduce dependence on a hostile importer, which may stop buying. Additionally, conflict often raises costs for both sides (e.g., higher risk insurance premium, delays in transportation, damages to goods), reducing trade. Furthermore, governments often restrict trade with foes, seeking to influence their opponents by weakening their economic and military capabilities. Various empirical examples and statistical studies support this assumption.13 In equilibrium, bilateral import demand for good j equals its bilateral export supply. We employ this condition to solve for the equilibrium price of good j. The solution indicates that the price of good j from B to A rises with country A’s income and falls with country B’s income, as is usually the case in bilateral trade models. More important, the direction of the effect of conflict on the price of the imported good depends on the difference 13
For additional discussion of these ideas see, e.g., Pollins (1989), Morrow et al. (1998), Reuveny (2001a, 2001b), and Li and Sacko (2002).
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between two parameters: ␣3 (the effect of conflict on country B’s export supply of good j to A) and 3 (the effect of conflict on country A’s import demand for good j from B). Specifically, if ␣3 < 3 , the import price, denoted as PM, falls with conflict. If ␣3 > 3 , the import price rises with conflict. If ␣3 = 3 , the import price does not change with conflict. Figure 6.1 illustrates how the equilibrium import price, PM, for good j is determined at the intersection of the bilateral import demand and export supply curves. In each panel, the system is initially at equilibrium E1 , where country A’s import demand (MD A1 ) and country B’s export supply (MSB1 ) intersect. The subscript 1 indicates the initial state of affairs, where conflict has not occurred. Now, as A initiates conflict against B, curve MD A1 (country A’s import demand) shifts inward to curve MD A2 , because country A demands less from country B. The curve MSB1 (country B’s export supply) shifts inward to curve MSB2 , because country B supplies less to country A. The subscript 2 indicates the new state of affairs due to conflict. The shifts in the supply and demand curves due to conflict in Figure 6.1 are determined by ␣3 and 3 , respectively, which, as noted, represent the strengths of the effects of conflict on supply and demand. The market adjusts and reaches the new equilibrium at E2 . A key point from Figure 6.1 is that the new equilibrium price at E2 can be higher than, lower than, or the same as the initial equilibrium price at E1 . In panel A, the export supply curve (MSB ) shifts inward less than the import demand curve (MD A ) (i.e., ␣3 <  3 ), so the price of good j (PM) falls. In panel B, MSB shifts inward more than MD A (that is, ␣3 >  3 ), so PM rises. In panel C, the two inward shifts are equal in size, so PM does not change. What determines the size of the shift of the demand or supply curve? If export supply is sensitive to conflict, the export’s effect on raising PM increases with ␣3 . This effect, however, declines if the export supply turns more elastic; that is, if the supply curve becomes flatter in Figure 6.1. Similarly, if import demand is sensitive to conflict, the import’s effect on reducing PM rises with 3 . And this effect decreases if import demand becomes more elastic or flatter. So far, we have discussed country A’s import of good j from B (i.e., country B’s export to A). We now turn to country A’s export of good i to B (i.e., country B’s import from A). Country B’s demand for country A’s export and country A’s supply of country B’s import are determined in manners similar to that discussed earlier for the opposing trade flow. The mathematical details in the chapter appendix demonstrate similar outcomes. In other words, the price changes of this trade flow depend on the sensitivity of the demand of good i to conflict (which we denote as ␦, which is comparable in meaning to  in the opposing trade flow discussed earlier)
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Figure 6.1. Disaggregated bilateral trade equilibrium.
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and the sensitivity of the supply of good i to conflict (which we denote as ␥ , which is comparable to ␣ in the opposing trade flow discussed earlier). The shifts of these demand and supply curves for good i also depend on their price elasticities (or slopes). Having identified how prices would respond to conflict, we analyze how these anticipated price changes influence the effects of trade on conflict initiation. In the chapter appendix, we present the details of the mathematical derivations. Following are the expectations derived from the model:14 i = 1, 2, . . . ; (6.1) (conflictAB ) = KE ␥3i − ␦3i · exportiAB j j j (conflictAB ) = KI ␣3 − 3 · importAB j = 1, 2, . . . . (6.2) According to Equations (6.1) and (6.2), where i and j indicate particular economic sectors, changes (denoted by the Greek letter ) in bilateral trade flows affect the changes in conflict that country A sends toward country B. Specifically, Equation (6.1) indicates that a change in country A’s export of good i to country B, (export iAB ), influences country A’s decision to change the conflict it initiates against country B, (conflictAB ). The term KE is a positively signed term determined by the math of the model, as shown in the appendix. Since KE is positive, the sign of the effect of country A’s export on conflict depends on the relative size between ␦3 and ␥ 3 . Therefore, for any given good exported by A to B, if ␥ 3 > ␦3 , a rise in exportAB (country A’s export to B) raises the conflict A initiates toward B, conflictAB . If ␥ 3 < ␦3 , a rise in exportAB reduces this conflict. If ␥ 3 = ␦3 , a rise in exportAB does not affect conflictAB . Equation (6.2) indicates that a change in country A’s import of good j j from B, (import AB ), affects country A’s decision to send conflict against B, (conflictAB ). The term KI is a positively signed term determined by the math of the model, as shown in the appendix. Since KI is positive, the sign of the effect of country A’s import on conflict depends on the relative size between 3 and ␣3 . Therefore, for any given good imported by A from B, if ␣3 < 3 , a rise in importAB (country A’s import from B) raises conflictAB . If ␣3 > 3 , a rise in importAB reduces this conflict. If ␣3 = 3 , a rise in importAB has no effect on conflictAB .
Implications of the Model and Hypotheses What are the theoretical implications of our model predictions? And how do we formulate testable hypotheses based on these model predictions? We address these questions in this section. The theoretical model generates two 14
In Equations 6.1 and 6.2, i and j are superscripts denoting good type, not mathematical exponents.
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new implications for the trade and conflict literature. First, the effects of country A’s export to B and country A’s import from B on the conflict A initiates against B can differ, because they depend on different coefficients (␣3 and 3 for import, and ␥ 3 and ␦3 for export). Second, the effects of different traded goods on the conflict that A initiates against B can vary across sectors because ␣3, 3 , ␥ 3 , and ␦3 vary across sectors. These implications differ from the thrust of the literature and provide new insights into the effect of trade on conflict. Focusing on total bilateral trade, previous studies ignore, implicitly or explicitly, the disparities in the effects of different trade flows in heterogeneous economic sectors. What is the logic behind the model? The effects of trade on conflict in our model are driven by the economic costs and benefits one anticipates from the expected conflict-induced price movements. For example, exporters expect to benefit from conflict if a rise in conflict causes the export price to rise. This export price increase occurs if the bilateral supply falls with conflict (raising price) more than the bilateral demand falls (lowering price), but when does the bilateral supply of a traded good fall more than its bilateral demand? This situation depends on the extent of substitution of the traded good by alternative suppliers or buyers. Expecting higher costs due to conflict, exporters may pursue alternative buyers, and importers may seek other suppliers. Both actions divert trade from foes, but imported and exported goods have varying degrees of substitution, ranging from full to none. If the exporter has alternative buyers for its good, it supplies less to its foe and more to others, which implies an inward shift of the supply curve, raising the price of the traded good. Expecting conflict, the importer may also buy from other suppliers, which implies an inward shift in the demand curve, reducing the price of the traded good. The trader that has relatively more alternatives is better positioned to benefit from conflict-induced market changes, and vice versa. Figure 6.1 illustrates this logic graphically. Suppose country A has more difficulty shifting its demand for some good j to other suppliers than country B has in shifting its supply of good j to alternative buyers. Country A depends more on country B as a supplier of good j than B depends on A as an outlet for this good. Panel B of Figure 6.1 represents this scenario. As conflict rises, the price of good j rises, making it more expensive for A to import each unit of good j from B. Hence, A has an incentive to initiate less conflict against B if its import of good j from B is large, ceteris paribus. This scenario is similar to Polachek’s prediction but it is not the only possible scenario in our model. Now, suppose country A’s import demand of good j from B is more sensitive to conflict than country B’s export supply of good j to A. Country A has less difficulty in locating other suppliers of good j than country B has
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in finding alternative buyers for good j. In this scenario, Panel A of Figure 6.1 shows that country A’s import demand shifts inward more than country B’s export supply. As conflict rises, the price of good j falls, making it less expensive for A to buy each unit of good j from B. If the amount of import is large, country A has an economic incentive to initiate more conflict against B, ceteris paribus. Polachek’s model as well as other previous research fail to consider this scenario. Another logical possibility implied by our model, which previous research also fails to anticipate, is that country A’s import demand and country B’s export supply of good j could be equally sensitive to conflict. In this case, when conflict rises, country B’s export supply and country A’s import demand shift equally in absolute terms. The import price remains unchanged. No additional economic incentive exists for A to initiate conflict against B even if country A’s import from B is large. Similar to the preceding three scenarios with respect to country A’s import of good j from B, country A’s export of good i can also generate three distinct effects on the conflict A sends toward B. Likewise, these effects depend on the sensitivities of country A’s export supply and country B’s import demand to the conflict. Finally, it is worth noting that the substitution of traded goods, which plays an important part in the theoretical model, can occur across countries, within sectors, or both. For example, the United States may substitute Russian wheat with Mexican wheat (across countries), or with American corn (within sector), or with Canadian corn (across countries and within sector). The ease of substitution within sectors may vary. For example, it may be easier to substitute some agricultural goods (e.g., wheat with rice) but harder to substitute some manufactured or energy goods (e.g., television with cars, oil with nuclear energy). So far, we have discussed the model’s implications for generic types of goods. To test these implications, we need to derive testable hypotheses for specific traded goods (e.g., agricultural or manufactured goods). Predicting the effects across specific exported and imported goods requires estimates of coefficients ␣3 , 3 , ␥ 3 , and ␦3 . The estimation of ␣3 , 3 , ␥ 3 , and ␦3 requires data on bilateral trade quantities and prices, which are not readily available for all goods. Reuveny (2001b) is the only study that has produced these coefficient estimates for five economic sectors: (1) agriculture/ fishery, (2) energy, (3) chemical/mineral, (4) manufactured products, and (5) miscellaneous consumption products. Table 6.1 presents the five sectors employed by Reuveny, the range of goods in each sector, the implied signs of (␣3 − 3 ) and (␥ 3 − ␦3 ) per sector, and the expected effects on
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Sector content
Increasing conflict
Reducing conflict
>0
<0
Reducing conflict
>0
Increasing conflict
Reducing conflict
>0
<0
Expected effect of import
␣3 − 3
<0
>0
>0
>0
<0
␥3 − ␦3
Reducing conflict
Increasing conflict
Increasing conflict
Increasing conflict
Reducing conflict
Expected effect of export
Note: ␣3 = conflict’s effect on country B’s export supply of good j to A; 3 = conflict’s effect on country A’s import demand for good j from B; ␦3 = conflict’s effect on country B’s import demand for good i from A; ␥ 3 = conflict’s effect on country A’s export supply of good i to B.
Agriculture products (fruits, vegetables, cereals, trees, sugars), fish, fishery products (2) Energy Coal, lignite, other briquettes, products of cooking, crude petroleum, natural gas, refined petroleum and products, electric power, gas, steam, radioactive materials, ores (3) Chemical/mineral Ferrous ores and metals, nonferrous ores and metals, nonradioactive ores and metals, nonmetallic minerals, chemicals (4) Manufactured products Metals and minerals products, agricultural and industrial machinery, office and data processing machines, precision instruments, optical instruments, electrical products, motor vehicles, other transport equipment (5) Miscellaneous consumption Meats, meat preserves, milk products, food, products beverages, tobacco products, textiles, clothing and accessories, leathers, leather and skin goods, footwear, wooden products, furniture, paper products, printing products, rubber goods, plastic products, goods not classified
(1) Agriculture/fishery
Sector
Table 6.1. Trade categories and conflict expectations
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conflict initiation. Here we employ his estimates for these five specific sectors and generate the following testable hypotheses. H1: An increase in country A’s imports from country B in the agriculture/ fishery, energy, or chemical/mineral sectors reduces the probability of A initiating military conflict against B. H2: An increase in country A’s imports from country B in the manufactured or miscellaneous consumption products sectors increases the probability of A initiating military conflict against B. H3: An increase in country A’s exports to country B in the agriculture/ fishery or miscellaneous consumption products sectors reduces the probability of A initiating military conflict against B. H4: An increase in country A’s exports to country B in the energy, chemical/mineral, or manufactured products sectors increases the probability of A initiating military conflict against B. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This section first presents our statistical model for the empirical analysis and then discusses several research design issues, followed by key results from the empirical analysis. As in the other chapters, the discussion is self-contained and does not require any statistical expertise. The technical details of the statistical model, data sources, and measure construction are in the chapter appendix, which follows the same structure of presentation as this section.
Empirical Model To test the hypotheses suggested by the theoretical model, we specify and estimate the following statistical model of dyadic conflict initiation: midt = 0 + 1 agriculture importt−1 + 2 agriculture exportt−1 + 3 chemical-mineral importt−1 + 4 chemical-mineral exportt−1 + 5 energy importt−1 + 6 energy exportt−1 + 7 manufactured importt−1 + 8 manufactured exportt−1 + 9 miscellaneous consumption importt−1 + 10 miscellaneous consumption exportt−1 + 11 gdp initiatort−1 + 12 gdp targett−1 + 13 contiguityt−1
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+ 14 distancet−1 + 15 target democracyt−1 + 16 initiator democracyt−1 + 17 regime dissimilarityt−1 + 18 power balancet−1 + 19 initiator capability ratiot−1 + 20 alliancet−1 + 21 minor powert−1 + εt .
(6.3)
The model specification follows our theoretical expectations to include dyadic conflict, indicators for import and export flows in five hypothesized economic sectors, as well as some control variables identified in the conflict literature. We denote variables with small capital letters and their coefficients with Greek notation. Each coefficient indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The notation εt denotes the unexplained random error in the model. The subscripts t and t − 1 indicate the time period of the variable, where t represents the current time period and t − 1 the previous time period (a lagged variable). The use of lagged variables is fully discussed in the appendix. To simplify the presentation, we refer to the variables without their time subscripts. The phenomenon we seek to explain in the theoretical model, conflictAB , is dyadic conflict. We measure it using the empirical indicator mid, which takes on the value of 1 if country A initiates a MID against country B, and zero otherwise. As usual, the event of a MID includes the threat of military force, the display of force, the use of force, or war. Our sample period of 1970–1997 includes 352 MIDs in our estimation sample. Our theory indicates that the empirical model ought to include measures of importAB and exportAB , that is, country A’s import from B in various economic sectors and country B’s export to A in these sectors. Based on the hypotheses, we include five import variables and five export variables, all measured in terms of the value of bilateral flow in real terms: agriculture import is the real dollar value of country A’s agricultural products imported from B; chemical-mineral import is the real dollar value of imported chemical and mineral products; energy import is the real dollar value of imported energy products; manufactured import is the real dollar value of imported manufactured products; and miscellaneous consumption import is the real dollar value of the import of all remaining consumption goods that are not included in the aforementioned groups. The variables agriculture export, chemical-mineral export, energy export, manufactured export, and miscellaneous consumption export are defined similarly for country A’s export to B. The decision whether to initiate military conflict, of course, does not depend only on trade variables. We need to control for possible confounding
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factors to avoid spurious inferences. In recent years, the conflict literature has generally used a similar set of control variables, which we also use: gdp initiator and gdp target are real GDPs of the conflict initiator and the target, respectively; contiguity indicates whether two states in a dyad are contiguous on land or through up to 150 miles of water; initiator democracy is the level of democracy of the MID initiator; target democracy is the level of democracy of the target; regime dissimilarity is the absolute value of the difference between the democracy levels of the initiator and the target; and power balance reflects the relative balance in materials capabilities between the two states in a dyad. The initiator capability ratio represents the relative importance of the initiator’s capabilities in the dyad, alliance indicates the presence or absence of dyadic military alliance, and, finally, minor power indicates whether both states in a dyad are only minor powers.
Research Design Issues Several issues guide the design of our research in this chapter. The first three design issues concern the measurement of our dependent variable, MID initiation. First, one may argue whether it is appropriate to aggregate the different types of MID to a single, 1–0 measure. This argument follows many studies from the literature and enables the comparison of our results with previous findings, and we address this issue in an additional analysis. Second, the theoretical concept of conflict in the model, conflictAB , is a continuous variable, which leaders can raise or lower, but the mid variable in the statistical model is dichotomous, which seems to make for a relatively crude measure. This issue, however, does not pose a key problem in our case, because our statistical technique and results inform us of the continuous likelihood of conflict, not the dichotomous event of conflict or no conflict. Third, the MID data may have measurement error from identifying which side of a dyad started a dispute. Since scholars code the MID data retrospectively based on historical accounts, it may not be easy to know who started the dispute. In spite of this limitation, the mid variable does indicate which side crosses the threshold into the realm of military force. Fourth, because our theoretical framework and implied hypotheses anticipate the likelihood of conflict initiated by country A against country B, we use a directed dyad framework. In this framework, the dyad US (A) => USSR (B) (the United States initiates conflict against USSR), for example, differs from the dyad USSR (A) =>US (B) (USSR initiates conflict against the United States). Our sample includes all those directed dyads for which trade and conflict data are available from 1970 to 1997. Fifth, conflict as
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the dependent variable may affect some right-hand-side variables; that is, the relationship between some of the right-hand-side variables and conflict may be reciprocal. For example, conflict may affect dyadic trade or the level of democracy in each side of a dyad. Ignoring the issue can produce wrong results, and we deal with this risk by applying the appropriate econometric technique. Sixth, for statistical inferences to be valid, the error term εt needs to satisfy some assumptions. If the error term does not have certain desired properties, our ability to make correct inferences is compromised. We address these issues with appropriate econometric techniques in the chapter appendix. Seventh, the right-hand-side variables should not be excessively correlated to one another. This issue warrants our attention because sectoral trade flows could be so highly correlated that they affect statistical inference. We discuss the diagnostic test results in appendix. Finally, we assess the effects of sectoral trade flows on conflict initiation in several ways. We test whether the results support the hypotheses and we compute the substantive effect of any key variable that has an effect statistically different from zero. We then test whether the effect of trade in one sector on military conflict initiation differs from that of trade in another sector, which allows us to evaluate whether a key assumption in previous studies is appropriate. Finally, we provide information on how well our model predicts the frequency of MIDs within our sample.
Empirical Findings We present the results of our main analysis in Table 6.2, where the dependent variable is coded as 1 whenever a country initiates a MID of any type in a year. Column 1 of Table 6.2 reports the results for hypothesis testing and column 2 presents the size of the effect of key variables. Starting with column 1, the coefficient of agriculture import is negative, as expected, and statistically different from zero. The coefficient of agriculture export is also negative, as expected, but the effect is statistically not different from zero. Hence, a rise in a country’s agriculture/fishery import reduces the likelihood of MID initiation toward the exporter, but the effect of a rise in a country’s agriculture/fishery export is very weak. When a country depends on the import of agriculture/fishery products from its partner more than its partner relies on the country as an export outlet, the former is less likely to initiate a conflict against the latter. But a country’s greater dependence on the other as an export outlet for agriculture/fishery products has little effect on its propensity to initiate military conflict.
Table 6.2. Effects of bilateral import and export in five sectors on MID initiation
All MIDs Agriculture-fishery import Agriculture-fishery export Energy import Energy export Chemical-mineral import Chemical-mineral export Manufactured import Manufactured export Miscellaneous consumption import Miscellaneous consumption export Initiator capability ratio Power balance Initiator democracy Target democracy Regime dissimilarity Alliance Log of distance Contiguity Minor power Initiator GDP Target GDP Observations Pseudo R 2
−0.00046 [4.27]∗∗∗ −0.00006 [0.71] −0.00004 [1.66]∗ 0.00004 [2.67]∗∗∗ −0.00004 [0.76] −0.00008 [1.19] 0.00003 [1.89]∗ 0.00003 [2.27]∗∗ −0.00005 [0.85] 0.00002 [0.56] 0.35938 [2.34]∗∗ −0.01451 [0.08] −0.00789 [2.26]∗∗ −0.00181 [0.50] 0.00941 [2.90]∗∗∗ −0.01330 [0.18] −0.08084 [4.93]∗∗∗ 0.80909 [6.15]∗∗∗ −0.32540 [1.89]∗ 0.06681 [2.83]∗∗∗ 0.09974 [4.40]∗∗∗ 213790 0.31
Relative risk 0.78
0.96 1.07
1.13 1.16
1.44
0.84
1.20
0.71
1.51 1.84
Note: Z statistics in brackets. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. Constant, peace-year, and spline variables not reported.
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The coefficient of energy import is negative, as expected, whereas the coefficient of energy export is positive, as expected. Both coefficients are statistically different from zero. A rise in a country’s energy import reduces the likelihood of MID initiation toward the exporter, but a rise in energy export increases the likelihood of MID initiation toward the importer. When a country depends on the energy import from its partner more than its partner relies on the country as an export outlet, the former is less likely to initiate a conflict against the latter. Energy dependence matters. In contrast, when a country’s dependence on its partner as a destination for its energy export is smaller than its partner’s dependence on its supply of energy export, the country is more likely to initiate a conflict. The coefficients of both manufactured import and manufactured export are positive, as expected, and significantly different from zero. A rise in a country’s import of manufactured products raises the likelihood of MID initiation toward the exporter, and a rise in a country’s export of manufactured products raises the likelihood of MID initiation toward the importer. When a country depends on the import of manufactured products from its partner less than its partner relies on it as an export outlet, the former is more likely to initiate a conflict against the latter. And when a country depends on its partner as an export outlet of its manufactured products less than its partner relies on its supply, the former is more likely to initiate a conflict against the latter. The coefficients of chemical-mineral import/export and miscellaneous consumption import/export are not statistically different from zero, which may be due to aggregations of very different products: chemicals and minerals in one case and various consumption goods in the other. The reader may recall that these particular aggregations are dictated by the availability of data, for which we provide further discussion in the appendix. At this point, one may ask whether those trade flows whose effects are statistically different from zero are large or small from the substantive point of view. Column 2 of Table 6.2 answers this question. As customary in the conflict literature, we address this question by computing the relative risk of MID. Relative risk is particularly useful when we examine the effect size of rare events like MID. It is the ratio of the predicted probability of MID when the trade variable of interest increases by one standard deviation above its mean over the predicted probability of MID at the baseline. We define the baseline scenario as one in which all continuous variables are at their sample means and the dichotomous variables are set to the contiguous, minor power, no-alliance dyad.
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When country A’s agriculture/fishery import from B rises by one standard deviation ($187 million) above the mean, country A is 22% less likely to initiate a MID against B, relative to the baseline level. When country A’s energy import from B rises by $439 million above the mean, it is 4% less likely to initiate a MID. When country A’s energy export to B rises by $439 million above the mean, country A is 7% more likely to initiate a MID. When country A’s import or export of manufactured products with B rises by $1.5 billion, country A is 13% or 16% more likely to initiate a MID, respectively. These effects vary across sectors and trade flows, as our theory suggests, but how do they compare in size with those of the nontrade variables? Column 2 also reports the results for the control variables. As in other chapters, we delegate the discussion of the control variables to the appendix. Here, we provide a summary of the comparison in terms of the size of effect. The substantive effects of increases in energy import and export are smaller than those for the nontrade variables; the effects of increases in agriculture/ fishery import, manufactured imports, and manufactured exports are of the same order of magnitude as that for the initiator’s democracy, target GDP, regime dissimilarity, and distance; and the effects of increases in the initiator’s GDP and capability ratio are larger than those for the trade variables. Overall, sectoral trade flows have important effects on conflict initiation but not the most important effect.
Additional Analysis We conduct three additional analyses to address several interesting questions. First, previous studies of trade and conflict implicitly assume that the coefficient for the total bilateral trade variable is the same for each of its component trade flows. One way to test this assumption directly is to test whether the statistically significant effects of the trade variables in Table 6.2 are equal in size across sectors. The results of this analysis in Table 6.A1 in the appendix show that the effects of increases of trade flows in the statistically significant sectors are not equal in size. Hence, aggregating exports and imports in different sectors masks their differential effects. Second, one may wonder if our model has good in-sample predictive power. For each dyad in each year in the sample, we compute the predicted probability of a dispute based on the model. If the probability is larger than a certain threshold (see the appendix), it suggests that the model expects a military dispute for that dyad in the year; otherwise, the model predicts peace. By comparing the predictions with actual dyadic events, we compute
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the predictive power of the model. As shown in Table 6.A2, the model predicts correctly the absence of MID initiation in 91% of the dyad-years and the presence of MID initiation in 81% of the cases. Thus, the model performs reasonably well in terms of in-sample prediction. Third, as noted, our dependent variable aggregates the different types of MIDs, ignoring their variations. We believe a focus on all MIDs also has merits. Leaders moving forces to the border or threatening to use force may be driven by the same considerations as leaders actually using force. It is also debatable whether the threats to use interballistic missiles or moving many divisions to the border are less hostile than border skirmishes or even clashes that cause killings. Nevertheless, to check robustness, we employ two additional dependent variables: one involves display of force, use of force, and war; the other includes use of force and war. The results obtained from using these two variables are in Table 6.A3 in the appendix. In the model for MIDs involving at least the display of force, the results for the trade variables are identical to those in Model 1. In the model for MIDs involving the use of force and war, the results for the trade variables are consistent with those in Model 1, except that the coefficient of chemical and mineral export is now negative and significant, rejecting the respective part of H4, and the coefficient of miscellaneous consumption export is negative and significant, supporting the respective part of H3.
Comparisons to the Literature and Stylized Examples Our empirical findings confirm several results reported in previous smallerscale empirical studies that did not employ the MID measure or our empirical model specification. The finding that a rise in energy exports promotes conflict is consistent with the result of Park et al. (1976) for a sample of oil-producing countries. Our result that a rise in agriculture/fishery imports reduces conflict initiation agrees with the finding of Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982) regarding the conflict behavior of the Warsaw Pact toward the United States. Our finding that a rise in manufactured products import or export promotes conflict confirms the Bennett et al. (1992) study of the U.S.–Japan dyad. In many ways, the study of Dorussen (2006) is the closest to ours, because it also employs a large-N sample and investigates the effect of disaggregated trade on the likelihood of MID. In addition, several of our findings are consistent with the spirit of Dorussen’s results. For example, chemical/mineral trade has a weak effect on conflict; some sectoral trade flows reduce the probability of MID.
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Our analysis, however, differs from Dorussen (2006) in other ways. Although his theory is generic like ours, it is not formalized. He argues that trade is more pacifying if traded goods have greater opportunity costs. If goods can be easily appropriated, the pacifying effect is weaker, or may be reversed. Our theory works through changes in trade prices and substitution. Dorussen notes the effect of trade may change between export and import, but he does not predict the effects of export and import in specific sectors. We predict the effects of import and export in different sectors on conflict and test these predictions. Empirically, Dorussen looks at both MID involvement and onset in a sample of nondirected dyads but excludes minor disputes below the use of force, whereas we study the MID initiations measured in three ways (all MIDs, at least display of force, and at least use of force) in a sample of directed dyads. Finally, whereas Dorussen finds trade either reduces or has no effect on conflict, depending on sector, we find that trade in some sectors can also increase the likelihood of conflict. Given the complexity of our model, our exposition could benefit from a few real-world examples, but we must first offer a caveat. Statistical studies such as ours typically do not discuss real-world examples, and for good reasons. Our model predicts a tendency toward conflict or peace due to a change in some trade variable, holding all the other variables in the model constant. In the real world, one observes the net effect of all the relevant variables held at the levels they happen to be, not the partial effects obtained from regression. We cannot, and do not, argue that the presence or absence of conflict in these examples is only driven by trade. Rather, we employ our model to illustrate the role of sectoral trade in conflict, ceteris paribus.15 Limitations notwithstanding, we may utilize the implications of our model to better understand some stylized examples. Consider first the Iran– U.S. dyad in the period since 1979, which included several U.S.–Iran MIDs. Based on our model, we speculate Iran may intensify conflict with the United States to raise the price of its oil exports. In other words, our model suggests that Iran, which is likely still selling oil to the United States directly or indirectly, benefits economically from hostility. A second example involves Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary in the 1930s. At that time, their trade flows became highly concentrated on Germany. They imported primarily manufactured goods and coal from Germany and exported agricultural and light manufactured goods to Germany.16 15 16
We also need to be careful when using nonlinear models such as probit since employing different control groups may affect the inferred sizes of effects. On Nazi Germany’s trade with these countries (and others) see, e.g., Hillmann (1940) and Leitz (2004).
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Since they were much less able than Germany to substitute these flows, they realized that not cooperating with Germany would damage their economies (Hirschman, 1945; Arad et al., 1983). Our model suggests that to pacify these countries, Germany could increase coal and agricultural exports and reduce manufactured exports and light manufactured imports. Finally, consider the U.S.–Japan dyad in the period leading up to December 1941. The United States reduced energy export to Japan, hoping to curb its territorial expansion in Asia, but the policy backfired. Historians such as Kennedy (1987) and Keylor (2001) argue that the fall in Japan’s energy import from the United States resulted in economic losses and a growing sense of vulnerability, which contributed to Japan’s hostility toward the United States – an explanation consistent with our model prediction. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Studies of the effect of trade on conflict typically invoke the notion of total bilateral trade, implicitly or explicitly assuming the effect does not vary across economic sectors and between trade flow directions. We challenge these premises. Our theory considers two countries that trade with one another and maintain some bilateral relations. The effects of changes in bilateral trade on the decision to initiate conflict vary across economic sectors and between trade flow directions. We employ our theory to identify ex ante the effects on conflict initiation of increases in export and import in the sectors of agriculture/fishery, energy, manufactured products, chemical/ mineral, and miscellaneous consumption products. In the empirical analysis, we find significant variations in the effects of trade on MID initiation across economic sectors and between trade flow directions. As predicted, rises in agriculture/fishery imports and energy imports reduce the probability of MID initiation, and rises in energy exports, manufacturing imports, and manufacturing exports increase this probability. Yet changes in agriculture/fishery export, chemical/mineral trade, and miscellaneous consumption products trade generally do not affect MID initiation. One logical explanation of these insignificant effects is that these sectors and flows are not important enough to the leader to influence her decision. But one may also attribute these insignificant results to two empirical problems: (1) the limited data for the measurement of the sensitivity parameters of sectoral import and export to conflict and (2) inappropriate aggregation of, say, chemicals and minerals into one category and very different consumption goods into one category. Improvements in solving
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these two problems should lead to more accurate empirical testing of our theory in future research. Like all regression results, these findings hold when other things do not change. However, the effects of most of our control variables are also found to be significant, suggesting that they also affect the likelihood of MID initiation. Moreover, although we have estimated the ceteris paribus effects of changes in all these variables on conflict initiation, only the net effect is observed in reality. Thus, a dyad could be in peace even if some of its sectoral trade flows promote MID, provided that the pacifying forces combined outweigh the antagonizing effects together. How does our model fit with the two primary formal models offered in the literature to explain the effect of trade on conflict, that is, Polachek’s liberal model and Gartzke et al.’s signaling argument? As discussed throughout the chapter, our model subsumes and extends the one of Polachek, predicting that a rise in trade may promote either peace or conflict and the effect may vary across goods and imports versus exports, depending on certain parameters. Consider next the signaling argument. In this theory, military conflict results from a bargaining failure over some contested issue. Acting under incomplete information, trading nations are less likely to fight each other only because they can credibly signal resolve during bargaining by resorting to trade sanctions or trade dissociation (Morrow, 1999; Gartzke et al., 2001). Within this logic, the classical liberal argument formalized by Polachek does not hold because the size of the benefit from bilateral trade is subsumed into the initiator’s demand and the target’s concession without reducing uncertainty–the main cause of bargaining failure and military conflict. One might argue that the same criticism against the classical liberal argument could be leveled against our model. That is, leaders factor expected economic costs into their reservation values when making demands of their opponents, and they make more concessions to avoid military conflict when the expected economic costs are high. We argue that, in fact, our research poses some important challenges for the signaling argument. In the signaling argument, the benefit of each actor from economic exchange is modeled by one opportunity cost parameter, which is common knowledge to both sides (e.g., Gartzke et al., 2001). The situation in our framework is more complicated because we allow n trade markets for there are n goods or sectors. As we have shown, each bilateral trade market does not necessarily suffer a loss due to conflict; some conflict may actually induce a rise in profit, a condition that is assumed away in the bargaining model. Now, the leader needs to aggregate the costs and benefits across the sectors
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in some way to figure out the welfare implications of a conflict decision. To do so, one needs to know who supplies what to whom, who demands what from whom, and who are the alternative suppliers and buyers and at what prices. The amount of information required is daunting, and much of the information is likely to be trade secrets. The leader may have difficulty getting access to all this information; even if she does, she may not be willing to share this financially valuable private information with the other side. Hence, our analysis of disaggregated bilateral trade creates four major problems for the signaling argument. First, the size of the opportunity cost is more difficult to pin down in multiple trading markets. Second, the costs and benefits in particular trading markets are not common knowledge such that the manipulation of a trading relationship may misinform as to the value of a particular trading relationship. Third, if one finds gains in trade from conflict that are unknown to the other side, this factor contributes to asymmetric information and uncertainty. Finally, the empirical finding that some sectoral exports and imports lead to conflict initiation challenges the theoretical prediction of the signaling argument that, if trade affects conflict at all, it should reduce the likelihood of military conflict. Taking a broader perspective, this research advances our theoretical understanding of the effect of trade on conflict initiation. To illustrate this point, let us further compare our theory with the five key theories in the literature in terms of their expected effect of trade on conflict, policy objective, policy tool, causal logic, and treatment of markets. Assuming states maximize material welfare, liberalism argues that leaders pursue peace with trade partners because conflict reduces valuable trade gains. The causal logic stresses economic incentives but oversimplifies market forces, assuming conflict is always costly or conflict lowers export price for an exporter and raises import price for an importer. The bargaining approach assumes leaders manipulate trade to facilitate negotiation over a disputed issue or influence its outcome. Cutting trade ties functions either as a credible signal to demonstrate resolve, enabling states to avoid bargaining failure and conflict, or as a tool to influence the bargaining outcome, resulting in less high-level conflict when actors face high exit costs. This approach also stresses economic ties, but reduces the economics of the marketplace to one or two parameters that denote the importance of trade to both sides. The neo-Marxist and neomercantilist realist arguments postulate that states use trade as a policy tool to affect the outcome of a contested issue or to expand their economic gains and political power. The outcome can be conflict or peace, depending on whether the other side rebels against, or
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complies with, the external demand. Economic incentives also play a role here, but market forces are not fully modeled – only loosely represented by the differential importance of trade to both sides. The classical realist argument assumes that states maximize power and security, using conflict as a policy tool. In this view, trade should have no systematic effect on conflict, because political relations trump economic relations. In our theory, states use conflict (or peace) as a policy instrument to maximize national welfare, which depends on wealth and security. Bilateral import demand and export supply in different sectors have different sensitivities to conflict, reflecting the underlying abilities of states to substitute these trade flows with others. Markets play an essential role in this logic, informing leaders about the costs and benefits of conflict via the expected changes in the bilateral trade prices. The costs and benefits, in turn, motivate or deter conflict initiation. In general, our theory subsumes the liberal logic as one special case and offers a distinct explanation alternative to the bargaining/signaling, neoMarxist, neomercantilist realist, and classical realist arguments. Our theory also specifies ex ante when and how export and import flows in specific economic sectors influence the likelihood of military conflict initiation, a question that has not been systematically addressed before. We believe the value of our analysis is not merely academic. Our results inform policymakers about how to manage bilateral trade flows to improve interstate relations. Previous studies have focused on the effect of total trade on conflict. To a certain extent, finding the net effect of total trade (i.e., aggregated across goods) has limited value for public policy and could be misleading, because countries have heterogeneous trade structures, and increasing trade in some goods could harm political relations. Public policy that seeks peace should promote bilateral trade in peace-promoting goods. Dispute resolution mechanisms should focus on tensions associated with conflict-promoting types of trade. Countries with a history of bilateral conflict that are interested in peace may expand trade in some goods, but not in others. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The effect of bilateral trade on interstate military conflict is the subject of a large and growing body of literature in international relations. Almost all theoretical and empirical studies focus on total bilateral trade, implicitly or explicitly assuming that the effect of trade on interstate conflict is constant
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across imports and exports in different economic sectors. We challenge the premise of most trade–conflict studies in international relations that the effect of trade on interstate conflict does not vary across imports and exports in different economic sectors. We analyze theoretically and empirically the effects of bilateral imports and exports in different economic sectors on conflict initiation. Our theory encompasses the liberal explanation as a special case and is a distinct alternative to the bargaining/signaling, neo-Marxist, neomercantilist realist, and classical realist arguments. It also specifies the different effects of export and import flows, an issue never systematically addressed before. Our theoretical model generates ex ante predictions of the effects of changes in imports and exports in the agriculture/fishery, energy, chemical/ mineral, manufactured products, and miscellaneous consumption products sectors on the likelihood of MID initiation. The empirical test employs a sample of directed dyads from 1970 to 1997. We find strong empirical evidence supporting our expectations for agriculture/fishery, energy, and manufactured products sectors, and little evidence supporting the expectations for chemical/mineral and miscellaneous consumption products. These findings lead to several conclusions. Rises in agriculture/fishery and energy imports discourage MID initiation. Rises in energy export and trade in manufactured products induce MID initiation. Changes in chemical/mineral trade, agriculture/fishery export, and miscellaneous consumption products trade generally do not affect MID initiation. These results hold for all MIDs and for MIDs involving at least display of force, and largely so for MIDs involving at least the use of force. The significant effects vary across sectors and trade flows, and their sizes are relatively substantial. The model predicts correctly the large majority of peace and MID events in the sample and sheds some light on several real-world cases. In this chapter, we have investigated the effect trade flows disaggregated across goods on the propensity of a state to initiate military conflict against a country with which it also trades. In our analysis of the results and their implications, we listed a number of examples referring to a specific conflict taking place, of course, on Earth. The previous chapters also refer, again of course, to interactions taking place on this very planet. We add the words “of course” naturally and almost in passing; but if so, the reader may argue, why have we not thus far introduced elements pertaining to the physical environment within which these interactions take place? We think this is a good question that needs to be addressed more often in the fields of international relations and international political economy.
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In the last part of our book, we take an initial step toward bringing the environment into our analysis of the complex transformation taking place in recent decades. In particular, we ask about the effect of the very forces studied in the first and second parts of the book – democracy, conflict, and economic openness – on the physical environment. We think these questions are important because changes in the physical environment can drastically alter the quality of life on Earth.
APPENDIX THEORETICAL MODEL
The quantity of trade in good i that country A exports to B is Xi and its price is PXi . The volume of trade in good j that country B exports to A is Mj and its price is PMj . The number of goods country A exports to B is NX . The number of goods country A imports from B is NM . The utility of country A’s leader is denoted by U (EC, C): EC is economic consumption of country A; C is the conflict country A initiates against B, defined as a positive number. The signs of the partial derivatives of utility are assumed to be as in Polachek: UEC > 0 (the marginal utility of economic consumption is positive, or utility rises with consumption), UEC EC < 0 (the marginal utility of consumption falls with more consumption), UC > 0 (the marginal utility of conflict is positive), and UCC < 0 (the marginal utility of conflict falls with more conflict). The partial derivative of the price of good i (A exports to B) with respect to conflict is PXCi (i = 1, 2, . . . , NX ). The partial derivative of the price j of good j (A imports from B) with respect to conflict is PMC (j = 1, j i 2, . . . , NM ). Their second-order derivatives are PXCC and PMCC . Polachek assumes certain directions for the effects of conflict on prices (PXCi < 0, j j i PXCC > 0, PMC > 0, and PMCC > 0), but in our model prices and their derivatives are set endogenously in the marketplace, which is one of our key innovations. Country A chooses the level of conflict (C) against B, taking consumption, import, and export as given, to maximize utility subject to the need to maintain a zero trade balance. It should be noted using a nonzero trade balance does not change any of the theoretical results we derive, because the math we present next is not sensitive to this particular modeling detail. Turning to the maximization itself, the problem that a decision maker is
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assumed to solve is formally stated as follows: max U (EC, C) by choosing C,
subject to 0 =
NX
X i · PXi (C)
i =1
−
NM
M j · PM j (C).
j =1
(6.1A) The solution of this problem involves maximizing the following Lagrangian with respect to conflict (C) and the Lagrange multiplier (). The first-order condition for C gives NX NM j UC (EC, C) + X i · PXiC (C) − M j · PMC (C) = 0. (6.2A) i =1
j =1
The effects of changes in country A’s export of good i and import of good j on the conflict that A sends toward B are given by computing the comparative statics of Equation (6.2A) with respect to X i and M j : − · PXiC ∂C = M i X ∂Xi UCC + · iN=1 X i · PXiCC − · Nj =1 M · PM iCC i = 1, 2, . . . , NX ;
(6.3A)
j · PMC ∂C = X i M j ∂M j UCC + · iN=1 X · PXiCC − · Nj =1 M j · PM CC
j = 1, 2, . . . , NM .
(6.4A)
Economic logic suggests that supply and demand determine the prices and quantities of traded goods i (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NX ) and j (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NM ) between A and B. Each good involves a supply side and a demand side. The demand of an importer defines how much of a good to import at different prices, whereas the supply of an exporter defines how much to export at different prices. As the price of a good rises, the demand for this good falls and the supply of this good rises. The equilibrium condition defines the price of each traded good in the dyad. More specifically, suppose in dyad A–B that country A exports to B in sector i (i.e., country B imports from A), and country A imports from B in sector j (i.e., country B exports to A). In equilibrium, country A’s demand
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for good j equals country B’s supply of good j to A. If B does not send enough of good j to A, country A’s demand for good j becomes larger than country B’s supply. In this case, the price of good j rises, prompting B to increase the supply to A. Sometimes, country B’s supply of good j is larger than country A’s demand. In this case, the price of good j declines due to the lack of demand in country A, and country B will reduce the supply of that good. In equilibrium, the demand for bilateral import of good j equals the supply of bilateral export of that good. The same logic also applies to the export flow in sector i from country A to country B. How do trade prices change in response to conflict? Demand and supply are often modeled as linear functions.17 We model country A’s import demand for good j from B (MAD ) by MAD = 0 − 1 P M + 2 Y A − 3 C,
(6.5A)
where the superscript j denoting the good is dropped hereafter to simplify notation. We define all the  parameters in Equation (6.5A) to be positive. YA is country A’s income, and PM is the price country A pays for imports from country B. Equation (6.5A) embeds the usual economic expectations that country A’s import demand for products from country B rise with A’s income and fall with the good’s price. The effect of conflict on import demand of country A in Equation (6.5A) is negative (C is defined as positive), a point to which we return shortly. Country B’s export supply of good j to country A is modeled as follows: MBS = ␣1 P M + ␣2 YB − ␣3 C,
(6.6A)
where all the ␣ parameters in Equation (6.6A) are positive, YB is the exporter B’s income, and PM and C are defined as in Equation (6.5A). As usual in economics, export supply rises with the good’s price and with the exporter’s income. Equation (6.6A) also indicates that the supply of goods by B to A falls with conflict (C). Several reasons exist why import and export fall with conflict in Equations (6.5A) and (6.6A). Importers and exporters may want to punish hostile partners by reducing trade. The importer may seek to reduce dependence on a hostile supplier, which may stop selling, whereas the exporter may seek to reduce dependence on a hostile importer, which may stop buying. Additionally, conflict often raises costs to both sides (e.g., higher risk insurance 17
See, e.g., Bond (1985), and Nicholson (2005) for similar formulations that do not include conflict.
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premium, delays in transportation, damages to goods), reducing trade. Furthermore, governments often restrict trade with foes, seeking to influence their opponents and weaken their economic and military capabilities. Various empirical examples and statistical studies support this assumption.18 In equilibrium, bilateral import demand for good j equals its bilateral export supply. The equation MAD = MBS is solved for PM, the equilibrium price of good j, as follows: PM =
2 ␣2 ␣3 − 3 0 + YA − YB + C. (6.7A) ␣1 + 1 ␣1 + 1 ␣1 + 1 ␣1 + 1
As usual in bilateral trade models, Equation (6.7A) indicates that the price of good j from country B to country A rises with country A’s income and falls with country B’s income. The denominator of the expression multiplying C in Equation (6.7A) is positive. Hence, the effect of C on PM depends on 3 (effect of conflict on country A’s import demand for good j from B) and ␣3 (effect of conflict on country B’s export supply of good j to A). If ␣3 < 3 , PM falls with conflict (the coefficient of C is negative). If ␣3 > 3 , PM rises with conflict. If ␣3 = 3 , PM does not change with conflict. Figure 6.1 illustrates the solution for PM in Equation (6.7A), as discussed in the main text. Equations (6.5A)–(6.7A) model the determinants of trade prices, leading to the question, what determines the effect of conflict on trade prices? Suppose A raises hostility toward B by one unit. The effect on PM is given by the expression in front of C in Equation (6.7A), (␣3 − 3 )/(␣1 + 1 ). The change in PM when C rises depends on the conflict sensitivities of demand (3 ) and supply (␣3 ) and on the price slopes of the demand and supply curves (1 and ␣1 , respectively). The shift in PM comes from two sources: country B’s export supply [␣3 /(␣1 + 1 )] and country A’s import demand [−3 /(␣1 + 1 )]. When conflict rises, the export’s effect on raising PM increases with ␣3 , indicating that export supply is sensitive to conflict. The effect declines with ␣1 , indicating that export supply is elastic (the supply curve becomes flatter in Figure 6.1). Similarly, when conflict rises, the effect of import on reducing PM rises with 3 , suggesting import demand is sensitive to conflict, and falls with 1 , suggesting import supply is elastic. So far, we have discussed country A’s import of good j from B (i.e., country B’s export to A). We now turn to country A’s export of good i to B (i.e., country B’s import from A). Country B’s demand for country A’s export and country A’s supply of country B’s import are determined 18
For additional discussion of these ideas, see, e.g., Pollins (1989), Morrow et al. (1998), Reuveny (2001a, 2001b), and Li and Sacko (2002).
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in manners similar to those defined by Equations (6.5A) and (6.6A). The volume of this flow is denoted as X. We use ␦ for the coefficients in country B’s import demand in Equation (6.8A) (instead of  for country A’s demand in Equation (6.5A)), and ␥ for the coefficients in country A’s export supply in Equation (6.9A) (instead of ␣ for country B’s supply in (6.6A)). Thus, country B’s import demand for good i from A is specified as X BD = ␦0 − ␦1 P M + ␦2 YB − ␦3 C
(6.8A)
and country A’s export supply of good i to B is specified as X SA = ␥1 P M + ␥2 Y A − ␥3 C.
(6.9A)
As before, all the ␦ and ␥ coefficients are defined to be positive. The condition X BD = X SA determines the equilibrium price PX for good i: PX =
␦2 ␥2 ␥3 − ␦3 ␦0 + YB − YA + C. ␥1 + ␦1 ␥1 + ␦1 ␥1 + ␦1 ␥1 + ␦1
(6.10A)
Next we turn to the effects of trade on conflict in Equations (6.3A) and (6.4A). These effects depend on the first and second derivatives of the trade prices with respect to conflict (C) in Equations (6.7A) and (6.10A): PXC =
␥3 − ␦3 ; ␥1 + ␦1
PXCC = 0;
PMC =
␣3 − 3 ; ␣1 + 1
PMCC = 0. (6.11A)
Substituting these derivatives from Equation (6.11A) into Equations (6.3A) and (6.4A), respectively, and reinstating the goods’ notation in the appropriate places, we get the following solutions: ␥ i −␦i
− · ␥3i +␦3i ∂C 1 1 = ∂ Xi UCC ∂C = ∂Mj
·
j
(6.12A)
j = 1, 2, . . . , NM .
(6.13A)
j
␣3 −3 j j ␣1 +1
UCC
i = 1, 2, . . . , NX ;
Expressions (6.12A) and (6.13A) specify, respectively, the effects of changes in country A’s export of good i (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NX ) and country A’s import of good j (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NM ) on its decision to initiate conflict against B. The signs of these effects depend on the relative sizes of the ␦3
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and ␥ 3 coefficients for country A’s export to B in Equation (6.12A) and on the relative sizes of the 3 and ␣3 coefficients for country A’s import from B in Equation (6.13A). Recall that Ucc < 0 in Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A). In Equation (6.12A), if ␥ 3 > ␦3 , a rise in country A’s export to B raises the conflict A initiates toward B. If ␥ 3 < ␦3 , a rise in country A’s export to B reduces this conflict. If ␥ 3 = ␦3 , a rise in country A’s export to B does not affect country A’s conflict against B. In Equation (6.13A), if ␣3 < 3 , a rise in country A’s import from B raises the conflict A initiates against B. If ␣3 > 3 , a rise in country A’s import from B reduces this conflict. If ␣3 = 3 , a rise in country A’s import from B has no effect on country A’s conflict against B. Finally, we simplify the presentation of Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A) to obtain Equations (6.1) and (6.2) in the main text. We define KE and KI , which we have also used in the main text of this chapter, as the following subexpressions in Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A): K Ei
=
− ·
␥3i −␦3i ␥1i +␦1i
UCC j j · ␣1 + 1 j Kl = UCC
i = 1, 2, . . . , NX ;
(6.14A)
j = 1, 2, . . . , NM .
(6.15A)
With these expression thus defined, we can rewrite ∂C/∂X and ∂C/∂M for the partial derivatives in Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A) as their mathematical approximation by replacing the partial differential ∂ with the change , giving the ratios C/X and C/M instead of the derivatives on the left-hand side of Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A), which together with Equations (6.14A) and (6.15A) can be rewritten to give Equations (6.1) and (6.2) in the chapter’s main text: (conflict AB ) = K E ␥3i − ␦3i · (exportiAB ) i = 1, 2, . . . ; (6.1) j j j (conflict AB ) = K I ␣3 − 3 · (import AB ) j = 1, 2, . . . . (6.2) IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
We have seen in the text that the important issue is whether countries engaged in conflict can substitute the traded goods. This event would depend on the sensitivity of the particular traded good to conflict. Formally, if country A’s import demand over good j from B is less sensitive to conflict
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than country B’s export supply of good j to A (3 < ␣3 ), Equation (6.13A) predicts that a rise in country A’s import from B in sector j lowers the conflict A initiates against B. In this case, as conflict rises, country A’s import demand shifts inward less than country B’s export supply, but only if A has more difficulty shifting its demand for good j to other suppliers than B has in shifting its supply of good j to alternative buyers. In other words, A depends more on B as a supplier of good j than B depends on A as an outlet for good j. As conflict rises, the equilibrium price of good j, PM, rises, as shown in panel B of Figure 6.1 and in Equation (6.7A), making it more expensive for A to buy each unit of good j from B. Hence, A has an incentive to initiate less conflict against B if its import of good j from B rises, ceteris paribus. This scenario is similar to the scenario in Polachek’s model (recall that he assumes import price rises with conflict). However, it is not the only possible scenario in our model. If country A’s import demand of good j from B is more sensitive to conflict than country B’s export supply of good j to A (3 > ␣3 ), Equation (6.13A) predicts that a rise in country A’s import from B in sector j raises the conflict A initiates against B. In this case, country A’s import demand shifts inward more than country B’s export supply, which occurs only if A has less difficulty in locating other suppliers of good j than B has in finding alternative buyers for good j. As conflict rises, the equilibrium price of good j, PM, falls, as in panel A of Figure 6.1 and in Equation (6.7A), making it less expensive for A to buy each unit of good j from B. Hence, A has an economic incentive to initiate more conflict against B, ceteris paribus. Yet another possibility implied by our model occurs when country A’s import demand and country B’s export supply of good j are equally sensitive to conflict (3 = ␣3 ). In this case, a rise in country A’s import from B in sector j does not affect the conflict initiated by A against B. When conflict rises and country B’s export supply and country A’s import demand shift equally in absolute terms, PM does not change. As a result, country A’s incentive to initiate conflict against B does not change when its import of good j from B rises. The reasoning behind the effect of country A’s export on the conflict A initiates toward B is similar. In Equation (6.12A), if country A’s export supply of good i to B is less sensitive to conflict than country B’s import demand for good i from A (␥ 3 < ␦3 ), a rise in country A’s export to B in sector i reduces the conflict A initiates against B. In this case, with conflict, country A’s supply of good i to B shifts inward less than country B’s demand for good i from A. Country A depends more on B as a buyer of good i than
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country B depends on A as a supplier. As a result, the price of good i, PX, falls, as shown in Equation (6.10A). When PX falls with conflict, A gets less for each unit of good i exported to B. Hence, A has an incentive to reduce conflict if its export of good i to B rises.19 If country A’s export supply of good i to B is more sensitive to conflict than country B’s import demand for good i from A (␥ 3 > ␦3 ), a rise in country A’s export to B in sector i raises the conflict that A sends against B. In this case, as conflict rises, country A’s supply of good i to B shifts inward more than country B’s demand for good i from A. Country A depends less on B as an outlet than B depends on A as a supplier. The price of good i, PX, rises, as shown in Equation (6.10A). Country A gets more for each unit of good i exported to B. Hence, A has an incentive to raise conflict if its export of good i to B rises, ceteris paribus. If country A’s export supply and country B’s import demand of good i are equally sensitive to conflict (␥ 3 = ␦3 ), a rise in country A’s export to B in good i does not affect the conflict A initiates against B. In this case, country A’s export supply and country B’s import demand shift inward equally in absolute terms in response to a rise in conflict, so the price of good i does not change with conflict. As a result, there is no incentive for A to increase or decrease the conflict it initiates toward B. Turning to our hypotheses, to generate specific hypotheses on the effects of different types of traded goods on conflict, one has to know the values of ␣3 , 3 , ␥ 3 , and ␦3 . The reader may recall that these four parameters are the coefficients of conflict in the bilateral import demand and export supply equations of each good. As with all demand and supply equations, these parameters are not readily observable and have to be estimated empirically. In principle, we could estimate the parameters ourselves, using data on bilateral trade prices and quantities for dyadic trade flows broken down along economic sectors, but these data are rarely available. Alternatively, we could use existing estimates of these parameters in the literature. We choose the latter approach, which offers an initial test of our theoretical model. Only a few trade studies estimate bilateral import demand and export supply using bilateral trade prices and quantities. They use data (Italianer, 1986) collected for the European Commission, but they do not include conflict. To our knowledge, only Reuveny (2001b) includes conflict in estimating sectoral bilateral import demand and export supply equations. He employs Italianer’s data for five sectors: (1) agriculture/fishery, (2) energy, 19
This scenario is implied by Polachek’s model, but again it is not the only possible scenario.
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(3) chemical/mineral, (4) manufactured products, and (5) miscellaneous consumption products. For each good traded in any dyad, he estimates a system of six equations with six endogenous variables: export of A to B, import of B from A, export of B to A, import of A from B, conflict from A to B, and conflict from B to A. The coefficients of conflict in the demand and supply equations provide our ␣3 , 3 , ␥ 3 , and ␦3 . We use the average estimates across dyads to compute (␣3 − 3 ) and (␥ 3 − ␦3 ) for each of Italianer’s five sectors, which Equations (6.12A) and (6.13A) employ to predict effects of the sectoral exports and imports, respectively, on conflict.20 Table 6.1 in the main text presents the five sectors, the signs of (␣3 − 3 ) and (␥ 3 − ␦3 ) per sector, and the expected effects of country A’s import from B and country A’s export to B in each sector on the conflict A initiates against B. We employ the signs of these expected effects to generate the four hypotheses listed in the main text. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Empirical Model Our theory indicates the empirical model ought to include bilateral sectoral imports and exports, and national incomes of both states in the dyad. We include import to A from B and export from A to B in the five Italianer (1986) sectors, denoted as agriculture import, agriculture export, chemical-mineral import, chemical-mineral export, energy import, energy export, manufactured import, manufactured export, miscellaneous consumption import, and miscellaneous consumption export. The raw data are purchased from the World Trade Flows database, sponsored by the University of California, Davis, and the National Bureau of Economic Research (Feenstra, 2000). They are provided in current U.S. dollars across 10 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) one-digit sectors and include all the countries that have data. We convert these data into millions of 1995 constant U.S. dollars and regroup them to conform to the Italianer (1986) sectors. The one-digit SITC sectors we use are denoted by numbers from 0 to 9 and their nature is as follows: (0) agriculture and fishery; (1) beverages and tobacco; (2) minerals and inedible crude materials; (3) energy, fuels, 20
Reuveny’s work has two limitations from our perspective. It employs events data to measure all types of conflict, not just MIDs, and its sample includes a few major powers in 1963–1994. Reuveny’s estimates are not perfect (as in all studies), but the implied issue is empirical, not theoretical.
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and lubricants; (4) animals, vegetable oils, fats, and waxes; (5) chemicals; (6) basic manufactured products; (7) manufactured machinery and transport products; (8) miscellaneous consumption products; and (9) goods not classified by kind. The five Italianer sectors and the way they match the SITC sectors listed in parentheses are agriculture-fishery (SITC 0), chemicalmineral (SITC 2, 5), energy (SITC 3), manufactured products (SITC 6, 7), and miscellaneous consumption products (SITC 1, 4, 9, 8). We do not use the SITC sectors directly because we do not have the required supply and demand coefficient estimates to form ex ante expectations for each sector. The trade data record only nonzero values. So for dyads covered by the trade database, trade values are set to zero for years showing no values, per exchange with Robert Feenstra. Moving to the control variables, gdp initiator and gdp target are real GDPs of the conflict initiator and the target, respectively, in millions of 1995 constant U.S. dollars. The data are from the World Bank (2002). We do not use the trade-to-GDP ratio measure because it may misrepresent the effect of trade. For example, if trade does not change and GDP falls, the ratio rises. Suppose we find in this case that a rise in the ratio reduces conflict. One often interprets this to imply a rise in trade reduces conflict, but in our case it is the fall in GDP that reduces conflict, not a rise in trade. This potential problem is discussed by Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) and Keshk et al. (2004). These studies include trade and GDP separately in the model, a practice we follow. By including the GDP, we also control the size of the economy, similar to what the trade-to-GDP ratio does. The remaining controls are standard in studies of directed dyads (e.g., Bennett and Stam, 2000a, 2004; Hegre, 2004). The variable contiguity is set to 1 when two states in a dyad are contiguous on land or are separated by up to 150 miles of water and zero otherwise. Contiguous states are more likely to fight one another. The distance is logged distance between the capitals of two states in a dyad. Some scholars (e.g., Russett and Oneal, 2001; Dorussen, 2006) argue that a rise in distance decreases the probability of MID initiation, whereas others (e.g., Ray, 2003) argue against including this variable. For completeness, we include both variables in our analysis. We construct three democracy-related variables to capture the effects of domestic political regimes. These variables are based on the POLITY2 variable from the POLITY IV data set, ranging from −10 to 10 (−10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy): initiator democracy is the level of democracy of the MID initiator, target democracy is the level of democracy of the target, and regime dissimilarity is the absolute value of the difference between their democracy levels. The initiator’s democracy
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variable tests whether democratic countries are more likely to initiate MIDs. the target’s democracy variable tests whether democracies are more likely to be MID targets, and the difference variable measures the effect of political dissimilarity on MID initiation. Following Bennett and Stam (2000b, 2004), we include two capability variables for each dyad, which are computed based on the COW composite index of national capabilities. power balance is the ratio of the larger state’s capabilities divided by the total of the initiator’s and target’s capabilities, ranging between 0.5 (equality) and 1 (dominance). The ratio tests if MID initiation is less likely for dyads of relatively more balanced capabilities. initiator capability ratio is the ratio of the initiator’s capabilities over total dyad capabilities and tests whether a rise in the initiator’s capabilities encourages MID initiation. alliance is a dummy variable indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of dyadic defense pacts, neutrality pacts, or ententes. minor power is coded 1 if both states in a dyad are minor powers and zero otherwise. In the EUGene computer program, which is used to generate these variables, the major powers are China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and USSR/Russia (Bennet and Stam, 2000b).
Research Design Issues Several issues guide the design of our research in this chapter. The first issue is that our dependent variable aggregates the different types of MIDs, ignoring their variations. We have addressed this issue in the additional analysis in the main text. A second issue is that conflict rises or falls in the theoretical model, but our dependent variable admits only values of 0 and 1. This issue applies to all studies using MID data and no one argues that conflict is really a 1–0 process. The logit/probit estimation, however, predicts the probability of a dispute, which is a continuous variable (like conflict in our theoretical model), preserving the model’s spirit. A third issue is that although many studies employ MID initiation (e.g., Bennett and Stam, 2000a, 2004; Reiter and Stam, 2003; Hegre, 2004; Lai and Slater, 2006), the MID data code initiators as the side that first takes military action. This practice ignores actions falling below the MID threshold, may not represent who started the quarrel, ignores that for actual conflict to occur the target is important, and overlooks the possibility that when one side moves, the other may essentially ignore it. That said, we believe that these limitations are not crucial here; because our theory focuses on the
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decision of one side to initiate military action, the MID initiation measure is appropriate for our purpose.21 Fourth, since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use the probit estimator. Our sample includes 213,790 observations but, as usual, only a very small number of directed dyad-years involve MIDs (352). Fifth, conflict as the dependent variable may affect some right-handside variables, including trade and democracy, causing simultaneity bias. This possibility applies to almost all statistical studies that model conflict as a function of various variables. Deviating from this norm, Keshk et al. (2004) model the simultaneous relationship between aggregate trade and MID. This method, however, is not feasible here. In our case, the system of equations would have to include 11 endogenous variables (5 imports, 5 exports, and 1 conflict variable), but the Maddala–Amemiya method used by Keshk et al. (2004) only works for a system of two endogenous variables (one continuous and one dichotomous). Therefore, we employ a suboptimal solution for addressing the simultaneity issue; we lag the right-hand-side variables, a strategy that is typically applied in the literature. Sixth, given the pooled nature of our data, the error term of our model may be subject to serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and temporal dependence within dyads. To control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate robust standard errors clustered over dyads. We also include the peace-year counter (peace_years) and three cubic spline variables (splines) to control for the duration dependence of peace within dyads, as suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). Seventh, sectoral trade flows may be correlated with one another, reflecting economic interrelationships, and may also affect other independent variables, which may lead to multicollinearity. We investigate this possibility by inspecting bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIF = 1/(1 − RI2 ), where RI2 is R2 from regressing the ith independent variable on all the other independent variables. If VIF > 10, multicollinearity is a problem. In this case, estimated coefficients and their variances remain unbiased, but the variances may be large. If the results are significant even now, they are robust since the test is demanding (Achen, 1982; Gujarati, 2002; Kennedy, 2005). Finally, we assess the effects of trade variables on conflict by testing hypotheses on the signs of effects, computing the sizes of statistically significant effects, testing hypotheses on the equality of significant effects, and 21
Whereas most quantitative conflict studies use the MID data, some studies use events data. Several studies discuss advantages and disadvantages of events data versus MID data (e.g., Reuveny, 2002).
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employing the model for in-sample prediction. Because our sample is large, we employ the relatively more conservative two-tailed tests for the statistical significance of the effects of our variables, even though our hypotheses are directional and one-tailed tests are appropriate. We employ significance tests because we analyze a sample, not the entire population. Even if our sample included all the countries in the 1970–1997 period, this would not have been the population since we would not have data for 2000, 1960, and so on, and we only have one collected data set. In evaluating the size of the effect, we compute the relative risk for each significant variable, which is the probability of an event in a treatment group divided by its probability in a control group (e.g., Gartzke et al., 2001; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Dorussen, 2006). Specifically, we compute the probability of MID initiation when a variable rises by one standard deviation above its sample mean, divided by the probability of MID initiation when this variable is set at its sample mean, ceteris paribus. Strictly speaking, the interpretation is as follows: Assume there are 100 MIDs and the relative risk rises 5% when variable X rises. If we had many samples for a model when X rises, the average number of predicted MIDs across these samples would be 105. The one-standard-deviation rise is widely used. We also test whether the statistically significant effects of our trade variables are equal in size (the insignificant effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero), which is an important test of the practice of using total trade data aggregated across sectors and flow directions and which is common in the literature. This practice is equivalent to assuming the same coefficient applies to imports and exports in different sectors or that all these trade flows have identical effects on conflict. We also evaluate the results with in-sample predictions. This evaluation computes the predicted probability of a MID for each directed dyad-year and compares it to a threshold, which is typically set to the proportion of MID initiation in the sample. The sample proportion of MID initiations is a reasonable cutoff because an uninformed observer can always use this value as a guide to provide an educated guess of the probability of MID initiation. If the predicted probability is larger than the threshold, the model is said to have predicted a MID, and vice versa. The proportion of correctly classified cases indicates the model’s predictive power.
Empirical Findings Table 6.2 in the main text presents the estimation results. The model has a pseudo R2 above 0.3, indicating good explanatory power. In terms of the control variables, the results largely resemble previous findings. The effect of
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a rise in initiator capability ratio on the likelihood of MID initiation is positive and significant at the 5% level. A state is more likely to initiate MIDs when its share of the dyad’s total capability increases. The effect of a rise in power balance is insignificant. Conflict is not less likely between states with relatively equal capabilities. The coefficient of alliance is insignificant, suggesting that the presence of a military alliance has little effect on MID initiation. The effect of a rise in initiator democracy is negative and significant at the 5% level, the effect of a rise in target democracy is insignificant, and the effect of a rise in regime dissimilarity is positive and significant at the 1% level. More democratic countries are less likely to initiate MIDs, but not more likely to be targeted. Countries are more likely to initiate conflict against those whose regimes differ more from their own. The effects of contiguity and distance are significant at the 1% level and are positive and negative, respectively. Contiguous states are relatively more likely to initiate MIDs against each other, whereas a rise in distance between countries reduces the likelihood of MID initiation. The effect of minor power is negative and significant at the 10% level. Minor power dyads are less likely to experience MIDs. The effects of initiator gdp and target gdp are positive and significant at the 1% level. Larger economies are more likely to be initiators and targets of MIDs. The results for the trade variables are discussed in the text. Here we list again the obtained sign of the effect and note its statistical significance level. The coefficient of agriculture import is negative as expected and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of agriculture export is negative as expected but not significant. The coefficient of energy import is negative as expected and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of energy export is positive as expected and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of manufactured import and manufactured export are both positive as expected and significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The coefficients of chemical-mineral import/export and miscellaneous consumption import/export are not significant. These effects vary across sectors and trade flows, as our theory suggests, but how do they compare with those of the nontrade variables? In Table 6.2, relative to the control group, the risk of MID initiation due to a one-standard-deviation rise above the sample mean is 44% higher for the initiator capability ratio, 16% lower for initiator democracy, 20% higher for regime dissimilarity, 29% lower for log distance, 51% higher for initiator GDP, and 29% higher for target GDP. Hence, the comparison in terms of substantive effects indicates that trade has an important effect on conflict initiation, but not the most important effect.
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Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System Table 6.A1. Equality tests on significant positive and negative effects of sectoral trade flows Agriculture/fishery import
Energy import
21.39∗∗ 22.34∗∗ 21.15∗∗
9.30∗∗ 4.68∗ 5.35∗
Energy export Manufactured import Manufactured export Note:
∗
significant at 5% level; ∗∗ significant at 1% level.
We examine the diagnostic tests for multicollinearity. Even though the largest correlation between any two independent variables is quite high (0.87 for manufactured goods export and chemical/mineral export), all the individual VIFs are smaller than the threshold value of 10. In all cases, the correlation between any two export flows is the same as that between the import flows of the same sectors, which is one check of the validity of the data. The VIF diagnostics indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious concern.
Additional Analysis Table 6.A1 presents results for the coefficient equality tests. The first row denotes the two flows (agricultural import and energy import) that reduce the probability of MID initiation. The first column denotes the three flows (energy export, manufactured import, and manufactured export) that encourage MID initiation. The results show that all the pairwise equality tests are statistically significant at conventional significance levels for two-tailed tests. Hence, the effects of these sectors are not equal in size, suggesting (again) that aggregating exports and imports in different sectors is inappropriate. Table 6.A2 presents results for the in-sample prediction of MID initiation for Model 1. The cutoff probability is 0.0016 (the sample average Table 6.A2. In-sample prediction of MID initiation Predicted MID Actual MID
0
1
Total
0 1
193,647 67
19,791 285
213,438 352
Total
193,714
20,076
213,790
Note: Model predicts MID Initiation = 0 correctly in 91% of the cases; model predicts MID Initiation = 1 correctly in 81% of the cases.
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Table 6.A3. Effects of bilateral sectoral flows on display of force and use of force (1) Display of force+ Agriculture-fishery import Agriculture-fishery export Energy import Energy export Chemical-mineral import Chemical-mineral export Manufactured import Manufactured export Miscellaneous consumption import Miscellaneous consumption export Initiator capability ratio Power balance Initiator democracy Target democracy Regime dissimilarity Alliance Log of distance Contiguity Minor power Initiator GDP Target GDP Observations
(2) Use of force+
−0.00046 [4.25]∗∗∗ −0.00007 [0.74] −0.00004 [1.76]∗ 0.00004 [2.61]∗∗∗ −0.00004 [0.69] −0.00008 [1.26] 0.00003 [1.94]∗ 0.00003 [2.32]∗∗ −0.00006 [0.88] 0.00002 [0.51] 0.36393 [2.35]∗∗ 0.04679 [0.26] −0.00708 [1.93]∗ −0.00019 [0.05] 0.01147 [3.40]∗∗∗ 0.00617 [0.08] −0.07961 [4.85]∗∗∗ 0.82614 [6.33]∗∗∗ −0.34438 [2.01]∗∗ 0.06672 [2.84]∗∗∗ 0.10066 [4.32]∗∗∗ 213790
Note: Z statistics in brackets. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; Constant, peace-year, and spline variables not reported.
−0.00035 [3.31]∗∗∗ −0.00007 [0.74] −0.00005 [1.83]∗ 0.00004 [2.26]∗∗ −0.00001 [0.28] −0.00012 [1.80]∗ 0.00003 [2.05]∗∗ 0.00005 [3.14]∗∗∗ −0.00003 [0.75] −0.00012 [1.82]∗ 0.49638 [2.87]∗∗∗ 0.08097 [0.40] −0.00618 [1.52] 0.00356 [0.83] 0.00898 [2.31]∗∗ 0.00714 [0.08] −0.07474 [4.13]∗∗∗ 0.81936 [5.63]∗∗∗ −0.39713 [1.91]∗ 0.03584 [1.41] 0.11342 [4.37]∗∗∗ 213790 ∗∗∗
significant at 1%.
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probability of MID initiations). Model 1 correctly predicts the absence of MID initiation in 91% of the dyad-years and the presence of MID initiation in 81% of the cases. Thus, the model performs reasonably well in terms of in-sample prediction. Table 6.A3 reports the model results based on alternative indicators of dyadic conflict. For both models, it is clear that the results closely resemble those obtained for the model based on all MIDs. In the model for MIDs involving at least the display of force, the statistical results for these control variables are essentially identical to those based on all MIDs. For the model for MIDs involving the use of force and war, the results for the control variables are similar to those based on all MIDs, except that the effects of initiator democracy and initiator gdp are not significant.
PART III
BRINGING IN THE ENVIRONMENT
SEVEN
Democracy and the Environment
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we begin the third and last part of this book. So far, the inquiries we have conducted could in principle have taken place anywhere, be it on planet Earth or somewhere else in space, as long as there exist people who interact with one another, markets that enable people to attach monetary values to goods and services, and governments that decide to use force against other countries. The global political economy and the interactions it entails, however, invariably occur within the confines of the physical environment, the biosphere of planet Earth. Consequently, the political and economic forces we focus on in this book – democracy, economic openness, and military conflict, and the complex transformations they entail – can influence this very physical environment within which we all live. The questions we seek to answer in the third part of the book concern whether and how these effects on the environment occur. Is a rise in the level of democracy good or bad for the environment? How does a rise in the level of international trade affect the environment? What are the implications of being involved in military conflict for a country’s physical environment? Chapters 7, 8, and 9 in the third part of the book address these important questions. Does a rise in the level of democracy of a country reduce or increase its environmental degradation? The democracy–environment link has captivated policy makers and the media with conflicting arguments and evidence, for which we are not taking sides. For example, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore has asserted that greater political and civil freedoms promote environmental quality (Gore, 1992). Geographer and media figure Jared Diamond (2005b) noted that the Scandinavian democracies have the best environmental record in the world. The experience of Central and 205
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Eastern Europe is also quite telling (Forest Watch Indonesia and Global Forest Watch, 2002). Under the Communist system, the environment seriously deteriorated; the arrival of democracy to the region resulted in much better environmental policies. On the other hand, Diamond argues that autocracy also can benefit the environment because not only can it legislate and implement laws by decree but it also may possess a long-run view due to its potentially long-lasting reign. In his recent bestseller Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, Diamond (2005a) cites a number of autocrats that protected forests, including seventeenth-century Japan’s Tokugawa Shogunate and the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo and Joaquin Balaguer. Diamond (2005b) also points to contemporary China, which phased out leaded gasoline over a period of only one year and ended logging at once by decree, demonstrating the beneficial impact of autocracy for the environment. Hence, Diamond claims that one cannot generalize the effect of democracy or autocracy on the environment. Scholars also debate the effect of democracy on environmental degradation, both theoretically and empirically. Some theorists claim that democracy reduces environmental degradation; others argue that democracy does not reduce environmental degradation and may even harm the environment. Despite the contentious nature of this issue, systematic empirical evidence is relatively scant and mixed, particularly in terms of large-N statistical analysis. The various theoretical mechanisms on the effect of democracy on environmental degradation, though often conflicting, are all plausible given their theoretical assumptions. In other words, it is not possible to adjudicate the competing claims based solely on the theoretical arguments. Because these causal mechanisms may operate at the same time, it is important to study their overall or net effect empirically, which is the focus of our analysis in this chapter. The dependent variable in our empirical/statistical model, environmental degradation, is measured with five salient types of human-induced degradation: carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions, nitrogen oxide (NOx ) emissions, land degradation, forest depletion in terms of the rate of deforestation and the share of forested area, and organic pollution in water. For each type of degradation, we estimate several regression-based statistical models employing various measures of democracy or autocracy. Our empirical analysis differs from previous studies in a number of ways. First, previous empirical analyses studied the effect of democracy on the signing of international environmental agreements, resource scarcity and access to environmental amenities, and human actions that directly harm the environment. We focus on human activities that directly affect
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environmental quality. Although it is important to study resource scarcity, access to environmental amenities, and commitment to environmental protection, we believe it is also important to study human actions that directly damage the environment. After all, the best way to protect the environment is to minimize the damage to the environment in the first place. Second, our sample size is generally larger than that of previous studies. Depending on data availability for the environmental indicators, the number of countries included in the empirical sample varies from 105 for the land degradation analysis to 143 for the CO2 emissions per capita analysis. A larger sample size allows us to have more variations in the data to facilitate statistical inference and gives us more confidence in the generalizability of our findings. Third, the empirical results for the effect of democracy on the environment are consistent across all the aforementioned types of human-induced degradation, except for deforestation: a rise in democracy reduces environmental degradation and improves environmental performance. The effects on forest depletion are mixed. Our cross-sectional analysis for forests finds that democracies tend to have relatively larger shares of forested area composing their total land area, but they also have higher rates of deforestation relative to nondemocracies. The substantive effect of democracy on the environment is considerable, but it varies in size across different aspects of environmental degradation. We also find that democracy has nonmonotonic effects that vary across the environmental indicators. The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical channels linking democracy to environmental degradation. The section that follows presents our empirical model in terms of the variables, data, measures, and expected effects. The fourth section of this chapter discusses several technical design issues pertaining to the empirical analysis, followed by a section presenting and discussing our empirical results. Finally, we summarize our key findings. EFFECT OF DEMOCRACY ON THE ENVIRONMENT
This section discusses the two opposing views regarding the effect of democracy on the environment and the associated empirical evidence. The debate in the literature turns on institutional attributes of political regimes affecting environmental problems: the role of public opinion in policymaking, interest groups’ aggregation and representation, state autonomy, social movement mobilization, and the flow of information. Scholars take positions in the debate by emphasizing some of these regime characteristics.
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Democracy Improves Environmental Quality A rise in the level of democracy in a country improves its environmental quality. Scholars holding this view have offered five different supporting arguments. According to the first argument, political rights and freedom of information promote the cause of environmental interest groups, which in turn raise public awareness and encourage environmental legislation (see, e.g., Schultz and Crockett, 1990; Payne, 1995). This effect works through environmental groups and public opinion at large. Information on environmental issues flows more freely, and political rights are more numerous and better protected in a democracy than in an autocracy. Environmental groups, therefore, are often more successful at informing people and organizing them to act on environmental problems in a democracy than in an autocracy. Whereas the elite in an autocracy may be more educated than the public (as education tends to rise with income), the autocratic regime censors information flows, and its decision making is more autonomous than that of a democratic government. Environmental degradation may not be reported by the media to the people. In contrast, because democracy allows for free media, environmental problems are more likely to be reported in the news. People in a democracy, therefore, are more likely to be informed about the environment than are members of the elite in an autocracy. Better informed actors, in turn, are more likely to act on environmental problems, raising environmental quality. A second argument is that democracies are more responsive to the environmental needs of the public than are autocracies (Kotov and Nikitina, 1995). This argument works through electoral accountability and the ability of groups to mobilize socially, achieve political representation, and influence public policymaking. Democracies hold regular and free elections, which can bring to power new parties, including those friendly to the environment (e.g., the Green Party in Germany). In an autocracy, the distribution of political power is concentrated, reducing the likelihood that environmentalists will come to power. Thus, environmentalists stand a greater chance of affecting policymaking in a democracy than they do in an autocracy. Of course, this logic implies that people can also freely elect extreme antienvironmental parties. Casual observation, however, suggests that in reality such situations do not occur frequently. A third argument focuses on institutional and ideational features of democracy. According to this argument, democracies are more likely to comply with environmental agreements because they respect the rule of
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law, which in turn raises environmental quality (Weiss and Jacobsen, 1999). Also, democracies respect economic freedom and, therefore, have market economies (Berge, 1994). The market, in turn, promotes environmental quality. Furthermore, because democracies respect human life more than autocracies, they are more responsive to life-threatening environmental degradation. And to the extent that democracies engage in fewer wars, they should have a higher level of environmental quality because wars destroy the environment (Gleditsch and Sverdlop, 2003). Finally, famines promote environmental degradation because they divert attention away from longrun environmental concerns. Famines tend not to occur in democracies because democratic governments are more responsive to the needs of the people (Sen, 1994). Hence, environmental degradation will be higher in autocracies than in democracies. A fourth argument expects that the elite in an autocracy will be less pro-environment than the masses or the public at large in a democracy (Congleton, 1992). The logic of this argument relies on environmental regulation that curtails pollution and waste. With prevailing technologies and materials, environmental regulation lowers production and consumption, which, in turn, imposes a higher cost on the elite in an autocracy than on the masses in a democracy, because the ruling elite in an autocracy hold a much larger share of national income than most people in a democracy and are therefore relatively less pro-environment than the masses in a democracy. A fifth argument begins with the observation that because environmental degradation typically develops slowly, the discount rate and time horizon of the government have important impacts on environmental regulation (Congleton, 1992). The masses in a democratic country should have less at stake over regime change than the elite in an autocracy. In an autocracy, the elite are tightly linked to the leader. If the leader loses power, the elite may suffer heavy losses or even lose their lives. Facing this possibility, the elite may wish to prevent regime change by force, and to this end more resources are allocated to oppression. The elite may also think that the change is inevitable, becoming hedonic. Both actions raise the discount rate and reduce the time horizon of the autocratic government. As a result, the ruling elite in an autocracy will ignore the environmental damage expected in the future. If they invest more today to suppress real or potential rebels, they allocate resources away from environmental issues. If they consume more today, they ignore environmental degradation that takes a long time to rectify or c