Review: Comments on Living High and Letting Die Author(s): Fred Feldman Reviewed work(s): Living High and Letting Die by Peter Unger Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Mar., 1999), pp. 195-201 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653469 Accessed: 28/04/2008 16:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999
Comments on Living High and Letting Die FRED FELDMAN
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Living High and Letting Die is advertisedas a "Liberationistvolume". Liber-
ationism is a collection of views, including views in substantive normative ethics, in metaethics, and in the methodology of moral philosophy. I focus here on the substantive normative ethics, which Unger views as Liberationism's most importantcomponent. Unger claims that the substantivenormativecomponentof Liberationism, together with certain empirical facts about people like us, entails that we ought to give quite a lot of our money to organizationssuch as Oxfam-America, UNICEF, and CARE, to be used to preventprematuredeaths among distant children.Thus, for example, he says '... for a well-to-do adult, like you or me, it's badly wrong not to provide vital aid even if it costs many thousands of dollars to lessen by just one the numberof distant children who'll die young ratherthanlive long.' (145) He says (151) that young philosophers should quit philosophy and take up some more remunerativeline of work, and then donate most of their earningsto lessen death among childrenin distant lands. Professors of law are instructedto resign their currentacademic positions and switch to higher paying jobs in corporate law. Then they should 'donatethe lion's shareof [their]much higher income towardhelping save distantyoungsters'lives.' ( 151) Unger insists that we cannot evade his moral directives by claiming that we have special obligations to our children, or our elderly infirmparents,or our spouses. In one typical passage, he says, 'For most of us well-to-do folks, no considerationsflowing from strong special obligations will change the moral picture much and, for most of our lives, we must give most of what comes our way to lessen distant serious suffering.' (150) Time after time, Unger specifies that the suffering to be alleviated is the life-threatening suffering of "toddlers"in 'the likes of Pakistanor Nigeria' (146), or "tykes" in sub-SaharanAfrica (146), or dying "ThirdWorldkids"(6). The normative claim is perplexing. Why does Unger think that people like us 'must give most of what comes our way to lessen distant serious suf-
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fering' among dying ThirdWorldtykes? Isn't it a bit fanaticalto focus in this way on the suffering of distant dying children?Why wouldn't it be OK for some of us to give most of what comes our way to lessen the suffering of nearby dying children?Furthermore,I wonderwhy it would be wrong to give most of what comes our way to preventprematuredeathsin teenagers. Surely death at age sixteen is a bad thing, too-perhaps almost as bad as death at age three. Yet Unger says that our duty is to give the lion's share of our income to organizations that prevent death among distant tykes and toddlers, not teenagers wherever they might be located. I also wonder why Unger thinks that we ought to be devoting our attentionto dying children;why can't some of us give our money to organizationsthat aid childrensufferingfrom painful but non-fataldiseases? Furtherquestions arise. Unger repeatedlyasserts that well-to-do folks like us have a duty to help decrease a certain kind of evil (death among Third World tykes), but he apparentlydoes not think that we have any duty to help decrease other sorts of evil (e.g., racial injustice, genital mutilation, ethnic cleansing, slavery, terroristbombings, destruction of the environment, drug addiction, homelessness, etc.). What justifies the exclusive focus on one sort of evil at the expense of all others? Going beyond this, one might wonder why Unger thinks that we have no duty to increase any sorts of good (e.g., intellectualsatisfactionsamong first world teenagers, aesthetic satisfactions among senior citizens, etc.). Why is this? Why do we have a strictduty to see to the decrease of one selected evil, but no duty at all to see to the increase of goods of any sort? In this sort of situation, the naturalapproachis to take a look at the normative theory, and attemptto determinewhether it has the alleged implications. If we do this, and we find that the theory does have these implications, then we can considerwhetherthe theoryis so attractiveas to make us want to endorse it and its strange implications. Let us then consider the normative component of Liberationism,and try to determine whether it really implies that well-to-do folks like us have a moral obligation to give most of our wealth to prevent deaths among distant children. In Mill's Utilitarianism there is a famous passage wherein Mill says 'the creed which accepts as the foundationof morality"utility"or the "greatesthappinessprinciple"holds...' and Mill goes on to state the essence of his utilitarianprinciple. In Kant's Groundworkthere are (notoriously)several passages in which Kant states the supreme principle of morality. Ross, and Moore, and many other moral philosophers in this way tell us what they believe. No such passage can be found in Living High and LettingDie. Though he frequentlyassertsthat Liberationismhas certain normativeimplications, and he teases the readerwith snippets of "Liberationistlore", Unger never forthrightlystates the doctrine. So right at the outset we confrontan interpretationalpuzzle. According to a remarkon the book flap, the normativecomponentof Liberationism 'corresponds quite closely to what philosophers now call act 196
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consequentialism'.Some commentatorshave suggested that some such view must underlieUnger's normativepronouncements.'However, the evidence of the book does not drive us to this view, and Unger (in privatecorrespondence) has explicitly rejectedit. I suspect that Unger's real view is more complex. He says: Often, it's good to treat morality as an infinity of moral principles, or precepts, each entailing infinitely many others, more and more specific. (57)
I suspect that Liberationismis to be construedin this way as "an infinity of moralprecepts". If this suspicion is right, then, in orderto understandLiberationismfully, we would have to grasp the infinite collection of precepts.This, of course, is unrealistic.A furtherproblemhere is thatthoughUnger states a few precepts, in several cases he subsequently rejects them. He apparentlydoes this for strategicreasons that are not mentioneduntil late in the book. (145) He never makes clear which principleshe really means to endorse. So it's with considerable uneasiness that I state something that I think is intended to be one of the componentsof Liberationism: Very briefly, here's a fallible formulationof a fair bit of Liberationism'ssubstantiveside: Insofar as they need her help to have a decent chance for decent lives, a person must do a great deal for those few people, like her highly dependent children, to whom she has the most serious sort of special moral obligation. Insofar as it's compatible with that, which is often very considerably indeed, and sometimes even when it's not so compatible, she must do a lot for other innocent folks in need, so that they may have a decent chance for decent lives. (12)
Let's call this fallible formulation'FF'. Unger implies thatsometimes a person "must"do a greatdeal for her children, but "must"also do a lot for others, even though these two obligations are not compatible. In light of the fact that these "musts"may in this way conflict, it seems reasonable to suppose that when Unger says that a person "must" do a certain thing, he means merely that there is some moral call upon her to do that thing, not that it is her "all things considered"absolute obligation. If this is right, then Unger's "must" statements express prima facie obligations. (He never says precisely this.) FF is a complex statementof two prima facie obligations, together with some remarksabout the relative stringency of the obligations. First, Unger mentions the case in which a person has "dutiesof special obligation"to her own childrenor others;they need her help in orderto have a decent chance for decent lives. In this case Unger seems to want to say that the person has a prima facie obligation to do "a great deal" to help these people. Secondly, Unger mentions other "innocentfolks"-ones to whom she has no duties of In his review of Unger's book in The New Republic (October 14, 1996), Colin McGinn suggests that Unger's normativepronouncementsmight rest upon utilitarianassumptions. BOOKSYMPOSIUM 197
special obligation. Unger apparentlywants to say that if she is in a position to help such folks have a decent chance for decent lives, then she also has a prima facie obligation to do "a lot" for those folks. Thirdly, Unger seems to want to say that sometimes the primafacie obligationto family overridesthe prima facie obligation to strangers.In other cases, apparently,the reverse is true. Nothing in the context indicates what factors would determine which primafacie obligationwould overridewhich. FF seems pretty plausible to me. However, it has no implications concerning anyone's absolute obligations to give substantialamounts of money to preventdeaths among distantchildren.Even if we grantthat I have a prima facie obligation to do "a lot" for innocent strangers,we cannot conclude that this obligationfocusses exclusively on the far-off dying childrenamong those strangers.Even if we had some way to reach this conclusion, it still would not follow that this particularprima facie obligation overrides all the other prima facie obligations I might have to other innocent strangers.Indeed, it is consistent with FF and the facts to suppose that my overridingobligation is to use my time and money to help immigrantCambodiansin Northampton learn to speak English. But the quoted passage comes early in the book. Perhaps it is one that Unger would reject as "obscenely lenient". (144) In the penultimatechapter, Unger states a numberof more demandingprinciples.Let's consider some of these. Unger states two principles of "EthicalIntegrity";one "Reasonable"and one "Weak".The "Reasonable"Principleis this: Otherthings being even nearly equal, if it's all right for you to impose losses on others with the result that there's a significantlessening in the serious losses suffered by others overall, then, if you're to avoid doing what's seriously wrong, you can'tfail to impose equal or smaller losses on yourself, nor can you fail to accept such losses, when the result's an equal or greater significantlessening of such serious losses overall. (139X40)2
The Reasonable Principle, as Unger acknowledges (140) "lack[s] ambition". It is not very demanding at all. More specifically, it does not imply that I now have an obligation to give anything to aid children in distant lands. For, in the first place, the Reasonable Principle implies only that I must be preparedto accept losses If it's morallypermissiblefor me to impose such losses on others. So if it would not be permissible for me to steal money from you to prevent serious losses by others, then (so far as this principle is concerned) I may have no obligation to give any of my money to prevent
2
198
The "weak" principle is weaker than the Reasonable Principle, demanding only that we be preparedto accept "much lesser losses" for ourselves if we are preparedto impose greaterlosses on others in the name of decreased serious losses overall.
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such losses. (Unger thinks it is morally permissible in some cases for me to steal for this purpose.) In the second place, the Reasonable Principle begins with the notorious weasel-words 'otherthings being even nearly equal'. Although I don't know precisely what these words are supposed to mean, I suspect that they might mean 'unless there is something else that is more important'.If that's right, then the principle implies merely that if it's OK to impose losses on others, and if there's nothing more importantfor me to do with my money, then it's obligatory for me to use my money to prevent equally serious losses. But since there very well might be plenty of otherthings that are more important, there is a second reason to doubt that this principle has the implications alleged. Thereis a thirdreasonto be dubiousaboutthe relevanceof the Reasonable Principle. Let's suppose that it is in fact OK for me to impose a loss of one thousand dollars on others to prevent very serious losses overall, and let's suppose that in fact there is nothing more importantfor me to do with my money. Then the ReasonablePrinciplecan be used to generatethe conclusion that I have an obligation to accept a one thousanddollar loss for the purpose of preventing serious losses overall. But from this nothing follows about childrenin distantlands. It is consistentwith the ReasonablePrincipleand all the imagined facts that it is my duty to use the thousand dollars to support research into the causes of leukemia among local teenagers, or even Alzheimer's Disease among elderly people in Connecticut.Clearly, teenage leukemia is a "serious loss", and my contribution of one thousand dollars might help to prevent it. The same is true of Alzheimer's Disease as well as a thousandothercauses of suffering. Thus, even when combined with a remarkablenumberof dubious empirical and moral assumptions, the Reasonable Principle does not imply anything about my moral obligation to give money to prevent prematuredeaths among distant children.3So far, then, we have seen nothing in Liberationism that has the implicationsUnger alleges. Perhapsthe most stringentpreceptstated in the book is this one: Other things being even nearly equal, if your behaving in a certain way will result in the number of people who very prematurelylose their lives being less than the numberwho will do so if you don't so behave and if even so you'll still be at least very modestly well off, then it's seriously wrong for you not to so behave. (144; Unger calls this "the Modest Principle".)
The Modest Principle might seem to have implications concerning my duties to preventearly deathsamong ThirdWorldchildren.Again, however, I am doubtful. As before, this principle begins with 'other things being even 3
The weak principle is similar to the Reasonable Principle in relevant respects; it has no implicationsconcerningduties to distantdying tykes. BOOKSYMPOSIUM 199
nearly equal'. Again, it seems to me that this must mean 'unless there is something else that is more important'.If so, The Modest Principle implies that I have a strict duty to help preventprematuredeath only if there is nothing else that's more important.Clearly, since there are other great evils, and my contributionmight help to alleviate some of these, I may have no obligation at all to help preventprematuredeaths. Unger clearly thinks that Liberationismcontains a principle that implies that we absolutely ought to behave in such a way as to minimize very premature deaths. And he seems to think that the best way to abide by that principle would be to give substantialamountsof money to UNICEF, CARE, and Oxfam-America.Perhaps(though he never puts it this way) the principle is something like this: If your behaving in a certain way will result in the numberof people who very prematurelylose their lives being less than the numberwho will do so if you don't so behave and if even so you'll still be at least very modestly well off, then it's all-things-consideredwrong for you not to so behave. (See 144; let's call this "theFanaticalPrinciple".) Note that the Fanatical Principle does not begin with the phrase 'Other things being even nearly equal'. This is not a principle about prima facie wrongs, but about all-things- considered wrongs. Note also that it tells you that it is wrong to fail to minimize very prematuredeaths. It is conceivable that the Fanatical Principle, together with the empirical facts, entails that it would be wrong for well-to-do folks such as us to fail to give a lot of money to UNICEF. For it is conceivable that nothing else we can do will so dramatically reducethe numberof people who very prematurelydie. However, the FanaticalPrinciple is clearly false. Consider the following case4: A Trolley, a Switch, and Five Preemies. A trolley is hurtling down the tracks toward a switch. You are standing next to the switch (because your 3 million dollarlime-greenBugattiran out of gas at that spot). You are wearing yellow Bermudashorts. If you flip the switch, the trolley will run into a siding at Boston Children's Hospital, and five hundredinnocent children will be very seriously (but not fatally) injured and three preemies in the neonatal intensive care unit will miraculously survive. Those preemies will go on to live thoroughly miserable lives-lives not worth living. If you do nothing, the trolley will run into a differentsiding at MassachusettsGeneralHospital, and two preemies will miraculously survive and five hundred innocent 4
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The example is supposed to follow the style and patternof a multitudeof cases discussed by Unger. FRED FELDMAN
teenagerswill be instantlycured of their painful but not fatal diseases. Those two preemies will go on to live very productive and satisfying lives. You flip the switch, three miserable preemies survive, and five hundredinnocentteenagersare seriouslyinjured. In this example, flipping the switch results in three people not losing their lives very prematurely(among otherthings). Doing nothing would have resulted in two people not losing their lives very prematurely(among other things). Thus, flipping the switch is the behavior that will minimize the numberof people who will lose their lives very prematurely.So the Fanatical Principle implies that it is your all-things-considered duty to flip the switch. Of course, in a case as bizarreas this one can never be confident of one's "intuitions".5But insofar as I have any intuitions on this case, those intuitions lead me to think that your obligation in the example would be to do nothing. Admittedly, if you do nothing, fewer preemies will survive (two ratherthan three).However, doing nothinghas otherconsequences.Five hundred teenagersinstantlyrecover from painful diseases; the preemies who survive will live happy and productive lives. Flipping the switch, on the other hand, would have broughtabout five hundredpainful injuries.The three surviving preemies would go on to live miserable lives. These consequences seem to me to matter;and they seem to point towardthe obligatorinessof doing nothing in this case. Sometimes it's better to let more people lose their lives very prematurely;it depends upon a lot of other factors (which are of necessity ignoredby the FanaticalPrinciple). My conclusions are as follows: (1) Although Unger never clearly states the normative component of Liberationism, he does state a smattering of principles that might be parts of it. (2) None of these principles, together with the facts, implies that anyone has an all-in obligation to give anything to prevent prematuredeaths in distantlands. (3) Although Unger never does so, it is possible to concoct principles that might have the desired implications. (4) Such principlesare wholly implausible. There are many sorts of evil in the world. Prematuredeath in distantlands is just one of these. A personcan lead a decent life by strugglinghardagainst evils of other sorts. A person can lead a decent life by struggling hard to promote goods. There is no justificationfor claiming (as Unger does) that all of us lead indecent lives merely because we choose to try to make the world betterin ways otherthanthe way Unger seems to prefer.
5
Richard Hare's discussion of the reliability of "moral intuition" in his Moral Thinking (Oxford University Press, 1981) is still one of the very most insightfulin the literature.His thoughtful (and scathing!) remarks about "playing trains" (139) are well worth careful consideration. BOOKSYMPOSIUM 201
