Comments on Shapere and Hesse

Comments on Shapere and Hesse Fred I. Dretske PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1976, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1976), pp. 299-303. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281976%291976%3C299%3ACOSAH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.

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Comments

Shapere and Hesse

Fred I. Dretske

U n i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin

P r o f e s s o r Shapere t r i e s t o show t h a t t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of knowledge i n t o s c i e n t i f i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and nomenclature and i t s u s e i n t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d s and domains i s n e i t h e r r a r e nor t o b e avoided. On t h e c o n t r a r y , h e s a y s , i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of mature s c i e n c e and t h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s why i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . D e f i n i t e advantages a r e gained t h e r e b y i n p u r s u i t of s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h ( [ 2 ] , p. 291). What a r e t h e s e advantages? A s f a r a s I can s e e Shapere does n o t des c r i b e any advantages t o i n c o r p o r a t i n g our t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge i n t o o u r c l a s s i f i c a t o r y vocabulary t h a t a r e n o t a l r e a d y advantages t o o u r h a v i n g t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge--whether o r n o t we a l t e r our c l a s s i f i c a t o r y system t o r e f l e c t i t . There i s , c l e a r l y , an advantage t o knowing a l l t h e t h i n g s t h a t Shapere d e s c r i b e s a s b e i n g embodied i n s t e l l a r d e s c r i p t i o n s . This i s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . What & c o n t r o v e r s i a l , o r a t l e a s t n o t obvious, i s what a d d i t i o n a l advantage i s gained by a b s o r b i n g t h i s knowledge i n t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t o r y a p p a r a t u s we use t o d e s c r i b e t h e items i n a domain. I f I know t h a t a l l t h e A 1 s w h i c h s t a n d i n r e l a t i o n R t o t h i n g s which a r e B have t h e p r o p e r t y C, I can use t h i s knowledge t o r e c l a s s i f y t h e A ' s . Perhaps i t would b e u s e f u l t o c a l l t h e A f s w h i c h s t a n d i n r e l a t i o n R t o t h i n g s which a r e B by a s p e c i a l name s o a s t o more economically e x p r e s s t h e law Shapere i s s u r e l y r i g h t t o p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t we do r e l a t i n g them t o C. t h i n g s l i k e t h i s , t h a t our knowledge a f f e c t s o u r systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . A f t e r a l l , t h e more we know t h e b e t t e r a b l e we a r e t o group t h i n g s i n ways t h a t s u b s e r v e t h e e x p r e s s i o n of more g e n e r a l law-like g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and t h e o r i e s . But t h i s advantage, i t seems t o me, i s a d e s c r i p t i v e advantage --not, a s Shapere seems t o s u g g e s t , an e p i s t e m i c advantage. By a l t e r i n g o u r c l a s s i f i c a t o r y systems under t h e guidance of our accumu l a t i n g knowledge we o b t a i n more e l e g a n t , more powerful, and more p e r s p i c uous d e s c r i p t i v e systems by means of which t o e x p r e s s what we know. But we do n o t e s s e n t i a l l y change o r enhance what we know. Shapere seems t o t h i n k t h a t we do. I guess I d o n ' t understand how t h i s i s supposed t o work. He t e l l s us t h a t problems, hypotheses, and l i n e s of r e s e a r c h a r e i n d i c a t e d , i n many c a s e s , through t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of well-grounded knowledge claims

PSA 1976, Volume 2, pp. 299-303 1977 by t h e Philosophy of S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n Copyright

a

i n t o s t e l l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Does h e mean t o s u g g e s t , t h e n , t h a t t h e s e problems, hypotheses, and l i n e s of r e s e a r c h a r e not i n d i c a t e d u n l e s s we embed t h e knowledge i n t o our system of s t e l l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n - - t h a t , somehow, t h e knowledge a l o n e ( a s i d e from t h e change i t b r i n g s about i n o u r c l a s s i f i c a t o r y a p p a r a t u s ) i s powerless t o have t h e s e b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s ? Why? What magic i s wrought by t h e a b s o r p t i o n of knowledge i n t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t o r y system? Shapere d o e s n ' t e x p l a i n i t . Unless I missed something, t h e most h e does i s t o show t h a t such a b s o r p t i o n t a k e s p l a c e and t h a t t h e knowledge s o absorbed h a s b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s . What remains t o b e shown is whether i t i s t h e knowledge o r i t s a b s o r p t i o n t h a t is responsible f o r these effects.

I d o n ' t t h i n k I understand what Hesse [ l ] i s up t o . There i s s o much t h a t I f i n d confusing about h e r p a p e r t h a t I conclude, i n accordance w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e of c h a r i t y , t h a t I am u s i n g t h e wrong t r a n s l a t i o n manual.

She s a y s , f o r example, t h a t T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y of t r u t h i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ( o r , a t b e s t , incomplete) because i t does n o t p r o v i d e an e x p l i c a t i m of such t h e o r e t i c a l s e n t e n c e s a s " E l e c t r o n s a r e round." We a r e t o l d t h a t T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y d o e s n ' t h e l p u s w i t h t h i s s e n t e n c e because i f we a r e w o r r i e d about t h e t r u t h and r e f e r e n c e of t h i s s e n t e n c e i n t h e o b j e c t language, we a r e e q u a l l y w o r r i e d about i t i n t h e metalanguage. The problem, s h e s a y s , i s t h a t we do n o t know how t o c o n s t r u e t h e p h y s i c a l i s t concomit a n t s of such s e n t e n c e s ( [ I ] P. 2 6 3 ) . I am n o t s u r e I know what t h e " p h y s i c a l i s t concomitants" of a s e n t e n c e a r e supposed t o b e , b u t i f we t a k e them t o b e , roughly, t h e s e t of observa b l e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s under which t h e s e n t e n c e i s t r u e , o r probably t r u e , t h e n M s . Hesse i s making t h e p o i n t t h a t T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y of t r u t h does n o t supply u s w i t h an o b s e r v a t i o n a l r e c i p e f o r determining which theor e t i c a l s e n t e n c e s a r e t r u e . It d o e s n ' t t e l l u s what t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s mean i n physics--what t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s . It seems t o me t h a t t h i s charge b e t r a y s a s e r i o u s misunderstanding of what a t h e o r y of t r u t h i s supposed t o be. A t h e o r y of t r u t h i s n o t a t h e o r y of meaning. It i s n o t a t h e o r y of c o n f i r m a t i o n . I f I am w o r r i e d about t h e t r u t h of t h e s e n t e n c e "Oscar s t o l e my w a l l e t , " T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y of t r u t h i s n ' t going t o h e l p me, b u t n e i t h e r i s any o t h e r t h e o r y of t r u t h . But t h i s i s n o t because t h e s e t h e o r i e s of t r u t h a r e i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s s e n t e n c e . Rather, i t i s because a t h e o r y of t r u t h is a t h e o r y , n o t about which s e n t e n c e s a r e t r u e and which s e n t e n c e s a r e f a l s e , n o t about t h e o b s e r v a b l e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t might f i g u r e i n o u r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a s e n t e n c e ' s t r u t h , b u t about t h e c o n d i t i o n , o r s e t of c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a s e n t e n c e ' s being t r u e .

What Ms. Hesse seems t o want from a t h e o r y of t r u t h i s a t h e o r y of confirmation--some kind of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e observa b l e c o n d i t i o n s under which a s e n t e n c e can reasonably b e h e l d t o b e t r u e . She makes c l e a r t h e f a c t t h a t what s h e i s a f t e r i s n o t a t h e o r y of t r u t h , b u t a t h e o r y of (what may b e c a l l e d ) o b s e r v a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e when s h e a s s e r t s t h a t i f t h e Carnapian e f f o r t s t o reduce t h e o r e t i c a l s e n t e n c e s t o o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e s had been s u c c e s s f u l , t h e n t h i s would have c o n s t i t u t e d a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x t e n s i o n of T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y of t r u t h t o t h e o r e t i c a l s e n t e n c e s ( [ I ] , p. 263). T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y of t r u t h is i n a d e q u a t e because i t d o e s n ' t s p e c i f y t h e o b s e r v a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s under which t h e o r e t i c a l s e n t e n c e s apply. But why should a t h e o r y of t r u t h b e o b l i g e d t o p r o v i d e t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n ? The only r e a s o n one might demand t h i s of a t h e o r y of t r u t h i s i f one thought t h a t t h e t r u t h of a s e n t e n c e was, somehow, bound up w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n . I h e s i t a t e t o a s c r i b e t h i s p o s i t i v i s t i c d o c t r i n e t o Ms. Hesse. It i s a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t what i s needed i n t h e way of a t h e o r y of t r u t h i s a c a u s a l s t o r y t h a t i n d i c a t e s how a language community comes t o b e t t e r t r u e and meaningful d e s c r i p t i v e s e n t e n c e s ( [ I ] , pp. 263-64). Perhaps we do need such a c a u s a l t h e o r y , b u t I s e e no r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t such a t h e o r y would b e a t h e o r y of t r u t h . Q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y , i t seems c l e a r t h a t such a c a u s a l t h e o r y could n o t b e a t h e o r y of t r u t h - - a t l e a s t n o t i n t h e s e n s e i n which T a r s k i ' s t h e o r y o r t h e Coherence t h e o r y a r e t h e o r i e s of t r u t h . For such a c a u s a l t h e o r y would n o t even make s e n s e u n l e s s we a l r e a d y had a t h e o r y of t r u t h . Members of a language community u t t e r f a l s e d e s c r i p t i v e s e n t e n c e s a s w e l l a s t r u e ones, and presumably t h e i r u t t e r a n c e of t h e s e f a l s e s e n t e n c e s i s a s much a c a u s a l m a t t e r a s t h e i r u t t e r a n c e of t h e t r u e ones. I f Ms. Hesse wants a c a u s a l account of t h e one c l a s s of e v e n t s r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r c l a s s of e v e n t s , i t can only b e because t h e i d e a of a s e n t e n c e ' s truth is a n i d e a t h a t i s independent of o u r b e i n g caused t o u t t e r i t . T h i s i s merely a n o t h e r way of s a y i n g t h a t we cannot hope t o g i v e a c a u s a l account of how people come t o u t t e r t r u e s e n t e n c e s u n l e s s we have some way of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between t r u e and f a l s e s e n t e n c e s t h a t i s independent of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e .

We a r e given something c a l l e d a Consensus Theory of T r u t h . We a r e t o l d t h a t almost everyone w i l l a g r e e t h a t f o r a given language community "true" o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e s and " c o r r e c t " a p p l i c a t i o n of o b s e r v a t i o n terms a r e ( a t l e a s t ) t h o s e t h a t a r e r e i n f o r c e d a s such by t h e consensus of t h e community. It i s q u i c k l y noted t h a t t r u t h i s not b e i n g reduced t o mere cons e n s u s : "It does n o t f o l l o w i n such a t h e o r y t h a t e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s agreed i s t r u e , n o r t h a t t r u t h i s r e l a t i v i s e d t o a language community." For a l though t r u t h i s b e i n g equated w i t h community agreement, t h e t y p e of agreement i n q u e s t i o n i s t h a t which i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t t o e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . The language community a g r e e s t h a t "Grass i s green" i s t r u e , b u t t h e cons e n s u s i s n o t c a p r i c i o u s o r a r b i t r a r y . For t h e r e i s something about g r a s s t h a t determines our agreement ( [ I ] , p. 265). What i s i t about g r a s s t h a t

is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e almost unanimous agreement among English speaking people t h a t t h e sentence "Grass i s green" i s t r u e ? Something, presumably, about i t s c o l o r . Perhaps t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s green. One i s hardpressed t o s e e what o t h e r r e l e v a n t e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t t h e r e might be on our consensus about t h e t r u t h of t h i s sentence. But i f t h i s is s o , then t h e Consensus Theory of Truth i s j u s t t h e correspondence theory of t r u t h dressed up i n c a u s a l terminology. It i s l i k e having a consensus theory of Volkswagens: a Volkswagen i s any automobile t h a t people agree t o c a l l a Volkswagen--as long a s t h e i r agreement t o c a l l i t a Volkswagen i s cond i t i o n e d o r constrained by t h e type of c a r i t i s and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , by i t s being a Volkswagen.

Aside from t h e Consensus Theory of Truth Ms. Hesse a r t i c u l a t e s a princ i p l e t h a t she wields w i t h d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t . According t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of no p r i v i l e g e , our s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s a r e a s much s u b j e c t t o r a d i c a l conceptual change a s p a s t t h e o r i e s a r e seen t o be ( [ I ] , p. 264). This p r i n c i p l e sounds l i k e an appeal f o r t o l e r a n c e and open-mindedness, a reminder t h a t man i s f a l l i b l e , t h a t h i s cherished t h e o r i e s have turned out wrong i n t h e p a s t and may w e l l t u r n out wrong i n t h e f u t u r e . Understood i n t h i s way t h e p r i n c i p l e appears t o be no more than t h e expression of a healthy scepticism. But t h i s i s n ' t how Ms. Hesse understands t h e princ i p l e . According t o h e r t h i s p r i n c i p l e implies t h a t e i t h e r a l l t h e o r i e s a r e t r u e o r a l l a r e f a l s e . This i s no-privilege with a vengeance. Since i t i s h e r p r i n c i p l e , she can claim f o r i t what she p l e a s e s , b u t I am a t a l o s s t o understand why anyone would want a p r i n c i p l e with t h e s e paradoxic a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . For, s u r e l y , any p r i n c i p l e t h a t has t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s i s simply a f a l s e p r i n c i p l e . My b e l i e f s a r e n ' t p r i v i l e g e d and I would be t h e f i r s t t o admit i t . I have been wrong i n t h e p a s t and I can be wrong again. But t o admit t h i s , and t o endorse a p r i n c i p l e t h a t e n j o i n s such modesty, i s not equivalent t o t h e view t h a t a l l my b e l i e f s a r e f a l s e o r t h a t i f my b e l i e f s contrad i c t yours, then e i t h e r we a r e both r i g h t o r both wrong. The only explana t i o n I can f i n d f o r why Ms. Hesse might think t h a t h e r p r i n c i p l e has such s t r a n g e consequences i s i f she b e l i e v e s t h a t i f something can be f a l s e , i t is f a l s e . The p r i n c i p l e of no p r i v i l e g e t e l l s us t h a t our contemporary t h e o r i e s a r e a s much s u b j e c t t o r a d i c a l change a s t h e t h e o r i e s they superceded. That i s , e i t h e r a l l t h e o r i e s can be f a l s e o r none of them can be f a l s e . And i f none of f a l s e . I f they can all be f a l s e , then they a l l = them can be f a l s e , then they a r e a l l t r u e . This i s t h e only way I can r e c o n s t r u c t t h e p a t t e r n of reasoning t h a t l e a d s Ms. Hesse t o say t h a t , "Therefore i n t h e s p i r i t of t h e p r i n c i p l e of no p r i v i l e g e , we must say e i t h e r t h a t a l l t h e s e ontologies a r e t r u e , i . e . , we must g i v e a r e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l of them, o r we must say they a r e a l l f a l s e . " ( [ I 1 P. 266).

References [ l ] H e s s e , Mary, " T r u t h a n d t h e Growth o f S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge." PSA 1976, Volume Two. E d i t e d b y F. Suppe and P.D. A s q u i t h . E a s t L a n s i n g : P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , 1977. P a g e s 261-280. [2]

In

S h a p e r e , Dudley. "The I n f l u e n c e o f Knowledge on t h e D e s c r i p t i o n of Facts." I n PSA 1976, Volume Two. E d i t e d by F. Suppe and P.D. A s q u i t h . E a s t L a n s i n g : P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , 1977. P a g e s 281-298.