CHINA'S RISE, TAIWAN'S DILEMMA'S AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Politics in Asia)

China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace

What is at stake in the triangular relation between China, Taiwan and the United States is nothing less than war and peace in the twenty-first century. If the stereotypes and misconceptions emanating from the media are to be believed, then a war between China and Taiwan is inevitable. This book examines the issue while bringing the Taiwanese views on identity politics to the forefront of the discussion. The book focuses on China’s authoritarian rise and explains how this has created painful dilemmas for a separate and democratic Taiwan while also suggesting different paths that could yet defeat the looming forces of war and contribute to maintaining the peace. Centering on the primary issues facing Taiwan, China and the United States, it analyzes Taiwan’s need to prevent China’s rule from suffocating their cherished democracy, whether China will pursue military force to achieve political and economic dominance over Taiwan, and how the United States proposes to maintain peace between these two countries to ensure both a continuation of democracy in Taiwan and good relations with China. In highlighting these issues, the contributors also seek to offer practical policy alternatives that could help to advance the cause of freedom and international peace. Featuring chapters from an international group of academics, China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace makes a valuable addition to the understanding of Taiwan–China relations within an international context. Edward Friedman is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, USA.

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China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace

Edited by Edward Friedman

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 Edward Friedman the editorial selection and matter; the contributors their individual chapters All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data China’s rise, Taiwan’s dilemmas, and international peace/edited by Edward Friedman. p. cm. – (Politics in Asia series) 1. Taiwan–Foreign relations–China. 2. China–Foreign relations–Taiwan. 3. Taiwan–Foreign relations–1945– 4. China–Foreign relations–1976– 5. Taiwan–Politics and government – 1988–2000. 6. Taiwan–Politics and government–2000– 7. Chinese reunification question, 1949– I. Friedman, Edward, 1937– II. Series. DS799.63.C6C447 2005 951.06–dc22 2005003848 ISBN 0–415–70185–6

For Susan, Ruth and Joanna

Contents

List of tables List of contributors Preface Acknowledgments

xiii xv xvii xxvii

PART I

Taiwan’s identity and China’s policy 1 Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others”

1 3

MASAHIRO WAKABAYASHI

2 The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options

22

WEIXING HU

PART II

Taiwan’s dilemmas 3 China isolates Taiwan

39 41

CHIEN-MIN CHAO AND CHIH-CHIA HSU

4 The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO

68

DENNIS V. HICKEY

5 One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan

85

J. BRUCE JACOBS

6 Civil society, grassroots aspirations and diplomatic isolation

110

CHEN JIE

7 Taiwan adapts to the network society DANIEL LYNCH

130

xii Contents PART III

China’s rise and international peace 8 Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

147 149

VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG

9 Taiwan’s bid for UN membership

174

T.Y. WANG

10 Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value

193

JIANN-FA YAN

11 China’s dilemma on using military force

205

EDWARD FRIEDMAN

12 Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security

227

JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN

Index

246

Tables

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.2

Measurements of diplomatic isolation Comparisons of isolation: Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa Typology of isolation The diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, 1990, 1999, and 2002 Changes in the diplomatic map of Taipei and Beijing, 1970–2002 Taiwan’s participation in NGOs Top twenty leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2003 Countries maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, December 2004 Views on Taiwan’s future, 1994–2003 Simplified views on Taiwan’s future, 1994–2003 Identity in Taiwan, 1992–2004 Patterns of growth in numbers of conventional international organizations, 1909–1999 International organizations by type Numbers of IGOs and NGOs to which Taiwan belongs (selected years) Taiwan’s participation in international organizations Taiwan’s membership of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (as of July 2002) Survey results on whether foreign or cross-Strait relations should be developed as a priority The functionalist approach to global governance: main functions of selected IGOs Examples of IGOs in which the functional importance of global governance is valued more highly than fair representation Taiwan’s bids for UN membership Justifications and objectives of Taipei’s UN campaign

42 44 46 53 57 60 76 77 103 104 104 152 153 154 154 156 158 161 162 176 179

Contributors

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Senior Researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research in Paris, has published widely and in multiple languages on both Chinese and Taiwanese politics, as well as on relations across the Taiwan Strait. Chien-min Chao is Professor of Politics at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He has written numerous books on China, Taiwan, and crossStrait relations, including Lee Teng-hui’s Legacy: Democratic Consolidation and Foreign Relations (edited, 2002); Rethinking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and Security (edited, 2001); Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan’s Foreign Policies (2000). Chen Jie is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, the University of Western Australia and has published extensively on the international relations of Taiwan and China. Edward Friedman is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison and has been doing research and writing on Taiwan and Sino-American relations for four decades. His most recent book is What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (edited, 2000). Dennis V. Hickey, Professor of Political Science and University Fellow in Research at Southwest Missouri State University, is the author of three books and numerous articles on China and Taiwan. Chih-chia Hsu is Assistant Professor at Ming Chuan University in Taiwan. His current research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Chinese politics, Sino-American relations, and cross-Strait relations. His publications include Chinese Foreign Policy and Sino-American Relations (in Chinese, 2004), Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-Making Patterns in the Era of Deng (in Chinese, 2000), and several journal articles. Weixing Hu is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong. His degrees are from Peking University, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), and the

xvi Contributors University of Maryland. He has held fellowships at Harvard University and the University of California, San Diego. His teaching and research focuses on international political economy, international politics, and China’s foreign relations, including cross-Strait relations. J. Bruce Jacobs is chaired Professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia and has been publishing about Taiwan and China for over thirty years. Daniel Lynch is a member of the School of International Relations faculty of the University of Southern California, and a student of East and Southeast Asian politics and society. His most recent book is The International Dimension of Asian Democratization: ‘Recentering’ Thailand, China, and Taiwan (forthcoming). Masahiro Wakabayashi is Professor of Asian Studies at the Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, and the doyen of Taiwan studies in Japan. He was one of the founding scholars of the Japan Association for Taiwan Studies and served as its first president from 1998 to 2002. T.Y. Wang is Professor of Political Science at Illinois State University and has edited volumes on both Taiwanese and Chinese politics, and specializes in comparative politics and international relations. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang is Professor of Political Science at the University of Richmond and has published numerous articles in leading scholarly journals and books on Taiwanese politics and foreign policy, US–China– Taiwan relations, and Asian international relations. Jiann-fa Yan is a member of the Business Faculty at Taiwan’s Ching Yun University, and directed the Policy Research and Coordinating Committee and the Department of Chinese Affairs for the Democratic Progressive Party from 1998 to 2002. In June 2004, he was appointed Vice Chair of the Planning and Research Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Taiwan.

Preface

What is at stake in the triangular relation between China, Taiwan and America is nothing less than war and peace in the twenty-first century. An analyst of power rivalries in China finds leading cliques afraid “to appear weak” yet not wanting to see “a mishap occur in an invasion of Taiwan” (Lam, 2004, p. 5). In short, strong forces in China press for military action against Taiwan. “Taiwan’s political future impinges on world peace” (Brown, 2004, p. 212). The scholarly analysts writing for this book all hope to make the peace prospect more likely. But to move away from the forces of war requires first understanding how those conflict-prone dynamics operate. The conventional wisdom among people who follow relations between China and Taiwan (formally known respectively as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)), a relationship referred to as cross-Strait relations, is that since Taiwan democratized, its two elected presidents, both the Nationalist Party (KMT) leader Lee Teng-hui and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian, have acted irresponsibly. In the standard view, the two presidents of Taiwan have unnecessarily provoked a peaceful China, which is ruled by an economically reformist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that prefers to be focused on economic issues but instead must contemplate using military means against a Taiwan that is roiling the waters of the Taiwan Strait. American analyst David Shambaugh found “They do not wish to use force . . .. That is not their preferred course of action. But they are prepared for worst case scenarios” (Lim, 2004). “Uppity Taiwan may push China to war” (Fishman, 2004, p. 27). In the People’s Republic, many are persuaded that China’s soft, conciliatory and generous approaches have failed and that therefore Taiwan may have to be brought into line by other means. In 2004 “retired generals urged military head Jiang Zemin to take swift action against Taiwan” (Marquand, 2004). Part III of this book details what is at stake in China’s new militarized approach to Taiwan. At best, this narrative about Taiwan as an irresponsible provocateur is a case for the prosecution, a Beijing attempt to put Taipei in the dock and to indict it. In fact, as the chapters in part II will show, China’s heavy-handed

xviii Preface approaches to Taiwan have alienated the people of Taiwan. China’s counter-productive Taiwan policy is infused by passionately nationalistic domestic Chinese political imperatives. In 2004, in political combat at the highest levels of the CCP, different networks and leaders all acted as if they feared being too soft toward Taiwan, feared to seem a traitor to the Chinese nation. China therefore intensifies pressure on Taiwan and prepares military means capable of overwhelming Taiwan. War or peace, therefore, “is really a ‘China problem’ to the degree that the Chinese regime and its people . . . want to see the unification of China and Taiwan – regardless of what the Taiwanese think” (Wang, 2004, p. 469). The authors of the chapters in part II of this book show how China’s words and deeds wound the feelings of the Taiwanese people. But China’s media do not inform the Chinese people about how their government in 1994 treated contemptuously the bereaved family members of a Taiwanese tour group whose participants were robbed and murdered on a lake in China by criminals attached to the Chinese military. The Chinese are totally out of touch with the realities of Taiwan and of cross-Strait relations as experienced on Taiwan. The chapters in this book introduce that reality. Right after the 2004 presidential election on Taiwan had not gone Beijing’s way, the CCP denounced a Taiwanese investor in China who had supported Taiwan’s re-elected President Chen. The denounced firm’s stock fell by a third almost overnight. There was no credibility left in Beijing’s “one country, two systems” offer to Taiwan, in which Taiwan would supposedly be allowed democratic self-rule even though it were part of an authoritarian China. Business people who supported the Taiwan-identified DPP feared that monetary support to the DPP would wound business opportunities in China. Democratic autonomy for Taiwan, as Hong Kong people have found with China’s promise of “self-rule” to the Hong Kongese, is a Leninist transitional slogan; that is, it is a ploy to ease the way toward eventual Chinese Communist Party domination. The CCP baldly asserts that it will only deal with “compatriots” on Taiwan; that is, those who will accept reducing an autonomous, vibrant and democratic Taiwan to the level of Hong Kong. Taiwanese who will not concede to unifying with China on the CCP’s terms are considered to be un-Chinese, to be traitors. Amazingly, China is perplexed that Taiwanese do not warmly respond to what the CCP claims are generous and conciliatory offers to the Taiwan people. Surely there has to be a better way to create incentives for negotiation, compromise, and conciliation. The contributors to this volume offer suggestions for how different CCP policies could lead to reconciliation with Taiwan. Taiwan is challenged by an ever stronger and more influential, economically rising China. Taiwan faces profoundly painful dilemmas. Almost a quarter of a million Taiwanese men have married mainland Chinese women. Twenty percent of Taiwanese college graduates see their future in China. Taiwanese tycoons and politicians court Chinese leaders. There are 60,000

Preface xix plus Taiwan factories in China. Can Taiwan’s democracy survive increasing dependence on and integration with authoritarian China? This worries Taiwanese leaders. Chapter 2 by Weixing Hu explains how much China counts on the economic factor leading to Chinese victory. Given the Taiwan–China power imbalance, which leads other nations to want to be on good terms with China and benefit from its rise, few in the international community pay close attention to the Taiwanese experience. Instead, most just accept the Chinese view in which China is reasonable and Taiwan is not. Yet the chapters in part II show that authoritarian China bullies and humiliates Taiwanese all over the world. The CCP claims that it has to act forcefully to keep a separate and autonomous democratic Taiwan from achieving de jure independence. Taiwan is, and long has been, de facto independent. As chapter 8 by Vincent Wang details, Taiwan enjoys all the attributes of a sovereign state except international recognition. Taiwan’s president may dream of de jure independence and China’s president may fear that Taiwan will achieve de jure independence by writing a new constitution or re-writing history books or renaming as “Taiwan” governmental entities once called “China.” But, in fact, as long as a strong China opposes international recognition for Taiwan, no major nation or international organization will oppose China’s preferences on other nations not officially recognizing Taiwan. The simple truth is that, no matter what Taiwan does, it can do nothing to achieve a de jure independence opposed by China, a great and rapidly rising power. Taiwan is too weak to control its international destiny. It lacks the power to change the status quo. In fact, if China gets really angry at Taiwan for futile gestures of re-naming, Taiwan may even find some of the few states still recognizing Taiwan as a nation-state actually de-recognizing it. There is consequently almost nothing Taiwan can do to reverse the trend of China eventually winning away from Taiwan virtually every one of its few remaining formal diplomatic partners. Contributors to this volume urge Taiwan’s leaders to abandon fantasies about impossible futures. In 1993, when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui began to seek a restored UN membership for the Republic of China on Taiwan, he promised success in three years. But as chapter 9 by T.Y. Wang shows, Taiwan has made no headway on the issue. Unless China sends its military abroad or collapses into chaos, Chinese power precludes realization of this Taiwanese dream of de jure independence. Why then are ruling groups in Beijing so worried about Taiwan achieving the international recognition that would institutionalize and legalize Taiwan’s de facto independence? In the notion of de jure Taiwan independence, China has invented a monster to scare itself. No major nation will turn its relationship with Taiwan from unofficial to official if that means risking the ire of great power China. However a diplomatically isolated Taiwan maneuvers, it can do nothing to win international recognition. Therefore, the internal Chinese debate on

xx Preface a supposed Taiwan move to establish Taiwan’s de jure independence is without purpose, except, perhaps, in jockeying for power in Beijing or legitimating an armed attack on an innocent and innocuous Taiwan for internal Chinese political purposes. That elements of a self-wounding public discourse about Taiwan prevail in Beijing is not reassuring for those seeking to perpetuate peace in cross-Strait relations. No doubt the CCP wishes that political leaders on Taiwan would not do things like re-write textbooks to reflect a separate Taiwan identity. But long before those school books could have an impact on voters, adults on Taiwan who thought of themselves as singularly Chinese had dropped to single digits, less than three percent for younger votes. The idea that Taiwan’s Taiwanese identity inflames Chinese nationalism makes it sound like Taiwan has a choice about whether to create a Taiwanese identity. The deep historical forces shaping Taiwan’s separate identity long pre-dated the rise to power of Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian, as chapter 1 by Wakabayashi Masahiro shows. Separate Taiwan identity has been deeply strengthened by Chinese behavior, which alienates Taiwanese, as detailed in most of the chapters in parts II and III of this book. In short, in excoriating Taiwan’s political leaders who win support by appealing to Taiwan’s separate identity, Chinese leaders focus on a consequence and not on the causes thereof. Chinese leaders and analysts, who find truth in PRC explanations of crossStrait tensions, would be better served by a more accurate understanding of Taiwanese history and of the impact of Chinese policies on the Taiwanese people. The chapters in this book try to contribute to that better understanding of cross-Strait relations, hoping to correct misunderstandings that, on their own, could lead Beijing to miscalculate, resulting in policy irrationality. Perpetuating the international peace requires the correction of dangerous misperceptions. Since Taiwan is only an island about the size of Massachusetts, it lacks the significance of China, which is a great and rising power. Few members of the American media are permanently stationed on Taiwan. Most academic analysts of cross-Strait relations learn their language in China and do their research in China. They are concerned about USA–China relations. They and their governments see a need to avoid unnecessary complications in Washington–Beijing relations, since cooperation between the two is important to so many vital issues, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation. China’s views, the opinions of a great power, therefore, are of course heard and heeded in the world community. The US president talks with the president of China. The president of Taiwan has no similar access to have his case heard. As chapter 3 by Chao and Hsu shows, Taiwan is the world’s most diplomatically isolated nation. The many points of view in a vibrant democratic Taiwan do not receive a respectful hearing from the world because Taiwan is small and weak. Its opinions just do not matter very much. This privileging of China’s point of view and the peripheralizing of Taiwan’s reflects how knowledge is

Preface xxi structured. There is no ill-willed international conspiracy against democratic Taiwan and its people. It is almost natural therefore that the conventional wisdom on cross-Strait relations in the international community tends to see things more from the perspective of the leaders of China. No matter how often Taiwan’s president insists he will not declare independence, whatever “independence” means, since Taiwan long has been de facto independent, the international media regularly iterates China’s depiction of Taiwan’s President Chen as “pro-independence.” Actually, no major party on democratic Taiwan will surrender the nation’s independence to an authoritarian and belligerent China. The chapters in this book reveal what the conventional wisdom misses: Beijing’s overtures to Taipei are not reasonable attempts to block Taiwan’s de jure independence and maintain the peace. Rather, Beijing is altering the status quo, suffocating Taiwan’s long-existing autonomy. China seems rigid, unreasonable and threatening. While Taiwan wishes to peacefully co-exist with China for mutual economic benefit, China is considering using any and all means to reduce Taiwan to the status of Hong Kong. The free people of Taiwan resent and resist such pressures. For peace to persist, some analysts are beginning to realize, the CCP should change its policy toward Taiwan. “China’s overall political strategy toward Taiwan, which is fundamentally coercive … portray[s] an increasingly credible military threat to Taiwan as a backstop to nonmilitary efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and pressure [Taiwan’s President] Chen to resume dialogue based on the ‘one China’ principle,” by which Taiwan surrenders its democratic autonomy to a CCP authoritarian government (US Department of Defense, Annual Report, 2004, p. 11). As a team of able analysts, one American and one Chinese, noted in 2004, for peace to be preserved, “Beijing will have to recognize that the Hong Kong– Macao model [of incorporation into one China, which the PRC insists on] will not work with Taiwan.” This is because “no Taiwan political leader will be able to compromise Taiwan’s identity and sovereignty” (Hamrin, 2004, pp. 346, 347). No leader, not just some supposedly weird and unhelpful elected president, a Lee or a Chen, as CCP propaganda would have people believe, can accept subjugation to an authoritarian China. How then does Chinese policy impact prospects for peace in the region? This book tries to bring Taiwanese views to the center in order to correct stereotypes and misperceptions that emanate from China and the Chinaidentified international media. The goal is to help educated, independent citizens clarify the realities of Taiwan–China relations. Peace in the region will not be served by accepting the discourse emanating from China, which comprehends Taiwan as a trouble-maker so as to legitimate Chinese military action against Taiwan (Freeman, 2004). The authors of the chapters in this book would subvert that war-prone discourse. But, most international analysts have only a passing acquaintance with Taiwanese history, society, and politics. Consequently, the elite media as

xxii Preface well as academic and governmental analyses, tend to overly reflect China’s war-prone and self-serving misunderstandings of Taiwan, undercutting forces in both China and Taiwan that are committed to maintaining the peace. There are groups and interests in China that could benefit from peaceful reconciliation with Taiwan. The contributors to this book offer policy suggestions for strengthening the forces of peace on both sides of the Strait. The essays herein counter war-prone misunderstandings of Taiwan. After Weixing Hu explores China’s perspective, other scholars explore the sources of Taiwan’s attitudes toward China. Why, if Taiwan, out of an enlightened self-interest, seeks to be helpful to China, do the CCP rulers insist that the only way to avoid a China-initiated war against Taiwan is for Taiwan to surrender to authoritarian China? Chapter 11 by Friedman explores how China came to experience a friendly Taiwan as a threat. To further freedom and international peace, the book’s contributors confront China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas, and International Peace. They explore the forces that lie behind the headlines that announce Chinese anxieties as rational responses to Taiwanese irrationality. The authors illuminate the deep historic sources of the powerful forces that infuse Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese policy preferences. One of those forces is China’s policy to Taiwan and the nasty domestic politics in Beijing that motivate that policy. Dennis Hickey, Chen Jie, and others provide a close examination of Beijing’s policy of turning other nations and international organizations against democratic Taiwan, no matter the harm thereby caused to Taiwan, China and the rest of the world. The Chinese authorities, anxious over disorder in their land, have promoted a fervent nationalism as a glue to hold China together. When Chinese students boycott a Taiwan singer, that is presented in China as popular patriotism. The Taiwanese are presented to the Chinese people as too proJapan. Chapter 1 by Wakabayashi explains the sources of Taiwan’s complex relationship with Japan. One of the most troubling patterns over the past dozen years has been the rise in China of a nasty nationalism directed in particular at Japan (Kristof, 2004, p. 89; Gries, 2005). In 2003 there were numerous anti-Japan incidents which won popular support. A campaign of hate for Japan was drummed up in China, highlighting chemical weapons left behind from the war (Cai, 2003). Japanese business was accused of dumping shoddy goods that might kill Chinese consumers. Bad Japanese were pummeled day after day for victimizing innocent Chinese. Japanese businessmen purchasing the services of prostitutes in Zhuhai were presented on popular Chinese websites in September 2003 as intentionally humiliating China. Soon thereafter Japanese academics in Xian had to flee home after an innocent skit was treated as offensive. When China’s premier visited the USA in late 2003, he reiterated how the cruel Japanese had burned down his family home during the war, that is, more than sixty years earlier when Japan was an authoritarian empire, long before Japan democratized, and before the

Preface xxiii CCP established its dictatorship in the People’s Republic. Even the courageous Chinese AIDS doctor, Gao Yaojie, who bucked the CCP coverup of how its corruption spread AIDS, legitimated herself by appealing to her experience of “indiscriminate bombing” by Japan, arguing, “If a country isn’t strong . . . it’s . . . easily bullied” (Yardley, 2003). China’s anti-Japan nationalism, which passionately demands the return to China of Taiwan, once a Japanese colony, provides the lenses and emotions through which Chinese see and feel about Taiwan. During the 2004 Asian Cup soccer matches in China, Chinese fans rained hatred on the Japanese athletes. In chapter 10 Jiann-fa Yan finds that the power goal of the CCP, in seeking to incorporate Taiwan, is to prevent Japanese hegemony in Asia and to promote Chinese predominance in Asia, bringing an end to the balance of power promoted by America, which facilitates the independence of Asian nations. China’s anti-Japan nationalism is actually a two-edged sword. The Chinese people blame today’s democratic Japan for atrocious behavior in China two generations ago during the imperial age of the Showa emperor and also use this as a way to criticize China’s own corrupt rulers for selling out to Japan and betraying the Chinese people, including a selfish greed among ruling groups that do not care for the fate of ordinary Chinese who lack pensions, health care, or job security. Chinese care most about China’s domestic destiny. China’s popular nationalistic discourse legitimates passions that pressure the regime in Beijing to prove itself by acting in an assertive way against Japan, Taiwan and the USA. Chinese of diverse persuasions, up to the highest levels of power, pick on Japan and Taiwan to legitimate their domestic agendas. This rage does not strengthen the forces for peace in cross-Strait relations. China’s anti-Japan nationalism experiences an autonomous Taiwan’s democratic representatives as continuing the subordination of Taiwan to Japan as in the 1895–1945 colonial era. It upsets many Chinese patriots that Japanese culture is very popular on Taiwan. It is actually very popular throughout Asia, even in China, but Taiwanese are uniquely portrayed in this nationalism as traitors to China. The US, in this Chinese nationalist narrative, is a naive power. It is too stupid to understand that in protecting democratic Taiwan it is actually restoring the Japanese empire. Despite China’s more or less peaceful multilateralism in Southeast Asia, its irredentism toward Taiwan prods Chinese leaders toward a war that would have a region-wide impact. Yet, in order to facilitate China’s economic rise, which would guarantee social stability in China, China’s rulers actually do not want bad relations with Taiwan, Japan or the US. The Chinese people are at war with themselves, with the Taiwan issue deployed in ways that do not favor the forces of peace and prosperity. No writer in this book wishes the Chinese people anything other than ever greater prosperity. But China’s better future is at risk, chapter 12 by Jean Pierre Cabestan shows, because of China’s war-prone nationalism.

xxiv Preface This surging Chinese nationalism is inflamed by a growing, separate Taiwanese identity. Chinese are taught to see Taiwan with its robust civil society as chaotic, to feel that democracy brings chaos, and that this democratic Taiwan somehow blocks China’s return to global greatness. The Chinese people do not see how Taiwan’s democracy can contribute to China and the world. Taiwan’s international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), promoting progressive reform on matters such as gender, indigenous people and the environment, as the contributions by V. Wang, Chen, Lynch, and Hickey (chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8) discuss, are kept by China from making contributions at international levels. The CCP even blocked Taiwanese participation at a symposium on checking international crime, meetings held in July 2004 at England’s Cambridge University. It does not allow Taiwanese members of the NGO Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict to put on the agenda how “to resolve crossStrait conflicts by peaceful measures” (Yiu, 2005). With the Taiwanese feeling that the government of China does not care an iota if they live or die, the Taiwanese identify themselves as Chinese ever less and as Taiwanese ever more (Pan, 2004). Among the younger people on Taiwan, almost no one thinks of themselves as purely Chinese. Yet, because of its distorting war-prone nationalistic lenses, this tough anti-Taiwan CCP worries that it has been too soft and generous to Taiwan. Instead, Beijing should be blaming itself for alienating the Taiwanese people and should be acting on the peace and reconciliation agenda suggested by contributors to this book. Having alienated the Taiwanese, China has asked the US to rein in Taiwan, warning that the alternative to the US pressuring Taiwan to do as Beijing desires would be a China compelled to act militarily to stop the Taiwanese from taking steps toward a formal declaration of independence, as if such a declaration could change international power realities which preclude Taiwan’s de jure independence. Actually, no Taiwanese leader will declare independence for a Republic of Taiwan, that is, unless China militarily attacks Taiwan. Yet China’s discourse about Taiwan has become the conventional wisdom among most international observers. People do not see what this book calls to our attention, that the power of a militarized nationalism in a Chinese regime, which feels it needs a strong patriotic legitimacy to survive in power and hold a fractious nation together, may be moving in ways that will present extraordinary challenges to maintaining the peace. The contributors to this book try to set the record right by clarifying Taiwanese reality and Chinese policy toward Taiwan. Hopefully, this peaceoriented analysis also provides a few modest suggestions for practical policy alternatives to the tendencies which, if unchanged and unchecked, could otherwise lead on to war. After all, in reality, little Taiwan, merely trying to survive, does not and cannot threaten a great and powerful China.

Preface xxv The contributors to this book place vital issues of war and peace in a context of ordinary political interests and identities in both China and Taiwan. The book grapples with important consequences of China’s rise, and clarifies how that rise creates painful dilemmas for a culturally separate, politically autonomous, and vibrantly democratic Taiwan. Hopefully, this effort will further thinking and action to defeat the looming forces of war. That is the story and the hope of this book, China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace.

References Annual Report (2004) Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, presented by the US Secretary of Defense to the U.S. Congress in 2004. Brown, Melissa (2004) Is Taiwan Chinese? Berkeley, University of California Press. Cai, Jane (2003) “Anti-Japanese Sentiment Swells Among Students,” South China Morning Post, November 10. Fishman, Ted (2004) “The Chinese Century,” New York Times Magazine, July 4. Freeman, Chas. (2004) “On Sino-US Relations and the Taiwan Issue,” speech of April 22, 2004, printed in People’s Daily (English), April 23. Gries, Peter (2005) “China’s ‘New Thinking on Japan’,” China Quarterly, 184 (forthcoming). Hamrin, Carol Lee and Zheng Wang (2004) “The Floating Island: Change of Paradigm on the Taiwan Question,” Journal of Contemporary China, 13 (38). Kristof, Nicholas (2004) “A Little Leap Forward,” New York Review, June 24. Lam, Willy (2004) “A House Divided,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, August 5. Lim, Benjamin Kang (2004) “China Gears Up for Showdown, Ball in Taiwan’s Court,” Reuters, July 5. Marquand, Robert (2004) “Would China Invade Taiwan?” Christian Science Monitor, July 22. Pan, Philip (2004) “New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan, Culture Shifting away from Mainland China,” Washington Post, January 2. Wang, Fu-chang (2004) “Some Reservations about Melissa J. Brown’s Is Taiwan Chinese?” Issues and Studies, 40(3/4). Yardley, Jim (2003) “Fighting Parallel Crises in China,” New York Times, December 20. Yiu, Cody (2005) “Taiwan NGOs Join Peace Group,” Taipei Times, January 12.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to express his gratitude to some of the many people whose help made this volume possible, especially to the gracious and good Professor Yone Sugita, who made the conference on this topic possible in Osaka, Japan, and to the highly competent Diane Morauske, who does such efficient work at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in the Department of Political Science, to political scientist Jennifer Ziemke, and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taiwan, whose external grant funded the Osaka conference. Needless to say, the diverse views expressed in this book are the responsibility of the authors alone.

Part I

Taiwan’s identity and China’s policy

1

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” Masahiro Wakabayashi *

Chiang Ching-kuo, the last strongman of Taiwanese politics, launched a series of historic measures leading to political liberalization. He accepted the formation of an opposition party and ended decades of martial law. At the same time, Chiang lifted a ban on traffic to and from mainland China, allowing a surge in the exchange of people, goods, and money across the Strait. Today, the two economies enjoy an increasingly connected relationship even as political rapprochement remains elusive. If anything, there is a greater distance felt between them as underlying military tensions persist, as Weixing Hu shows (see chapter 2). Two factors contribute to a political unease in the cross-Strait relationship, democratization and nationalism. Since the late 1980s Taiwan has achieved political democratization while China has lagged behind in its political reform. Moreover, in Taiwan, a Taiwanese nationalism has assumed considerable prominence, and a cultural nationalism trying to establish Taiwan’s cultural uniqueness has been gaining strength. At the same time, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while moving away from socialism, is attempting to transform itself into a party of developmentalism and nationalism in the midst of tensions brought on by marketization. Furthermore, while sticking firmly to a one-party dictatorship, the CCP set out on a systematic incubation of “patriotism” among its people as Communist ideology lost its attraction, a path whose foreign policy consequences are explored by Edward Friedman (see chapter 11). Taiwanese nationalism as we know it today can be defined as those thoughts and movements consolidating an “Independent Taiwan.” In other words, Taiwanese nationalism maintains that a sovereign political community, an autonomous nation, already exists on the island, and that this community’s sovereign position should be recognized within the global community of nations, something made virtually impossible by the opposition of great power China. Taiwanese nationalism was for a long time after World War II largely confined to overseas exiles. But after the failed suppression in December 1979 by the Kuomintang (KMT) authorities of the extra-party opposition

4 Masahiro Wakabayashi (dangwai), the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism appeared publicly in the island’s political debates and began to spread. The rise of the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism was furthered in the early 1980s by the dangwai adopting slogans such as “self-determination of Taiwan’s future by the people of Taiwan” and a historical interpretation challenging the ruling KMT’s official Chinese nationalism. As Taiwanese nationalism gained prominence, a unique brand of Taiwanese identity politics emerged regarding Taiwan’s status in the international community and the collective identity consciousness of Taiwanese citizens themselves. With the international status of Taiwan a major cause of dispute in cross-Strait relations, the rise of a separate Taiwan identity generated considerable tensions between the great powers1 and reverberated domestically in Taiwan’s ethnic relations.2 In this respect, a study of Taiwanese nationalism is indispensable for comprehending Taiwan politics and cross-Strait relations. Taiwanese nationalism has changed its characteristics as it has gained importance in Taiwanese politics3 and scholars have tried various approaches to capture its nature and the trajectory of its development.4 This chapter approaches Taiwanese nationalism from a historical and relational point of view, exploring how it was formed in relation to the “unforgettable others” of Taiwanese society in modern times, namely Japan and China. In this way, the chapter clarifies the historical significance of Taiwanese nationalism within modern East Asian development. The Japanese historian Hiroshi Mitani, citing examples from Japanese history starting from the Edo period, finds that “Nationalism is born when a certain group becomes conscious of ‘unforgettable others’. To put it more loosely, there is always the consciousness of ‘unforgettable others’ when nationalism exists.” “Unforgettable others” are “others” whom one is obliged to be aware of and refer to whenever one attempts to advocate one’s “self”, and are “impossible to deny no matter how much one wishes to, and become the subject of a ‘love–hate relationship’ in relation to one’s ‘self’.” 5 In Japanese history, the first example of this is the Chinese empire or the Middle Kingdom, as reflected in the Kokugaku thought that took shape in the late eighteenth century. According to Mitani, the eighteenth-century Kokugaku scholars of Japan were steeped in feelings of inferiority towards the Chinese empire, which had long been respected as the center of civilization. By establishing the academic study of Japanese classical literature, these Japanese scholars attempted to build a foundation for a Japanese culture that was seen as consistent from ancient times to the Edo period, along with the notion of the centrality of “Japan” in the world. The idea of consistency and the centrality of “Japan” that Kokugaku had achieved was passed on to the nineteenth-century samurai class and intellectuals. Later on in the century, America and European countries became the new “unforgettable others,” replacing the Chinese empire in the eyes of

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 5 Japanese shocked by the defeat of the Qing dynasty in the Opium War.6 At this juncture, modern Japanese nationalism came into being. By taking the Chinese empire as its “unforgettable other,” “Japan” achieved parity with the Chinese empire.7 This was also the case in taking Americans and Europeans as “unforgettable others.” In sum, a nationalism is born when a group becomes aware of its “unforgettable others” and strives to stand at parity with them, or at least feels strongly that it ought to do so. In the case of Taiwan, Japan as the colonial ruler from 1895 to 1945 and China after 1945 are the “unforgettable others” for Taiwanese nationalism. There are two Chinas in this respect, namely the Republic of China (ROC), which overthrew and inherited the Qing dynasty, and the People’s Republic of China, which established its capital in Beijing and forced the Republic of China to retreat to Taiwan when the CCP won the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Modern Taiwan has been positioned at the periphery of the centers of East Asia, China, and Japan, causing the Taiwanese to change their nationality twice since the late nineteenth century, and bringing forth a special tension. This is Taiwan’s historical and geopolitical “peripherity.” Taiwanese nationalism has come into being through experiences suffered by the Taiwanese people. It is an outcome of this “peripherity,” or the result of resentment harbored by the Taiwanese against that unequal status. The prototype of Taiwanese nationalism was born under Japanese colonial rule when metropolitan Japan became the indispensable “other” to the development of a Taiwanese sense of self, the “unforgettable other.” Subsequently, Taiwanese nationalism was formed in relation to the Republic of China, the first China that post-World-War-II Taiwan encountered, taking it as its “unforgettable other.” When the official nationalism of the Republic of China failed twice to annihilate or incorporate what the Taiwanese took as Chineseness, the Republic of China became the “unforgettable other” to Taiwanese nationalism. Entering the twenty-first century, Taiwanese nationalism is challenged by globalization and the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Taiwanese are made anxious by the “peripherity” imposed by China.

Taiwanese nationalism as an outcome of “peripherity” Taiwan’s entrance into Chinese history in the seventeenth century is late in comparison with the long history of dynasties across the Strait on the Asian continent. In 1662, the army of the Dutch East India Company occupying southern Taiwan was driven out by Ming loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung, who established a mini dynasty. Though lasting only for a short period, Cheng’s rule facilitated Sinicization on Taiwan. In 1683, during the reign of the Manchu Emperor Kangxi, Cheng’s force

6 Masahiro Wakabayashi was expelled by the Qing empire, and Taiwan was for the first time put under a dynasty governing from the continent, albeit a Manchu empire, not Han. The Qing court dispatched government officials to Taiwan. Until the end of the nineteenth century, agricultural development flourished, thanks to a growing number emigrating from the Mainland. Taiwan changed from an island consisting mainly of aborigines to one run by Han Chinese immigrants, although the Qing did not rule the large mountainous regions in the center of the island. The folk culture of peasants from Fujian became rooted firmly on Taiwan, while the influence of Chinese high culture was not strong. The literati stratum, bearers of the high culture, was not thick. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan became the new power in East Asia and challenged the rule of the Qing dynasty over Taiwan. After the first Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was positioned at the southern rim of Japan’s empire. This forced the Taiwanese people to experience a first nationality change. Facing calls for political reform from Taiwanese after World War I, Japan pushed assimilation, trying to make Japanese nationals out of colonial subjects. It was an “ambiguous nationalization.” The Japanese authorities were eager to force the Taiwanese to accept Japanese culture but reluctant to grant them the rights and duties afforded to Japanese, even after an intensive Japanization campaign during World War II.8 Half a century after the Japanese acquisition of the island, its colonial empire was dismantled following defeat in the Pacific War. Taiwan was incorporated as part of an empire turned nation-state, the Republic of China. The Taiwanese experienced a second change in nationality. Four years after the handover to Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT, the government of the Republic of China took refuge in Taiwan after losing a civil war against Mao Zedong’s CCP. When Mao aided North Korea in initiating the Korean War in 1950, the United States intervened, seeing Taiwan as part of an international struggle against expansionist communism, making Taiwan an outpost in the Cold War. Taiwan was put in a peripheral position to the United States, the new hegemon of East Asia.9 Taiwan has thus been positioned on the periphery of different powers. For Taiwanese, “peripherity” reveals itself in identity changes from the late nineteenth century to the twentieth century, from being subjects of the Manchu’s Qing dynasty to being second-class subjects of the Japanese empire and then becoming ROC citizens. However, because of its military defeat by Mao’s forces, the territory that the Republic of China controlled was reduced to Taiwan, with survival requiring subordination to American Cold War imperatives. Moreover, ROC rule over Taiwan was challenged by the new People’s Republic. For the Taiwanese, identity changed traumatically over a very short period. In the Europe of the modern era, a number of empires disintegrated into an array of nation-states or nations aspiring to that status, as in post-war Southeast Asia. Newly established nation-states are by no means successors of the states or dynasties that existed before the new imperial powers

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 7 established their colonial states. But in East Asia there is a relatively high territorial and population continuity between modern states and their premodern equivalents.10 This is the case with China. The revolutionaries who overthrew the Manchu Qing dynasty spoke in terms of an ethnic nationalism of Han Chinese opposing Manchu dominance. However, upon defeating the dynasty, the revolutionaries turned to a geographic nationalism, claiming the area and people formerly under Qing imperial rule as its territory. The new Republic of China invoked a “Chinese Nation” (Zhonghua Minzu) in which the Han would be leaders over minority ethnic groups. Chinese nationalism is an ideology attempting to construct a nation-state on the traditional domain of a prior dynasty, with an ethno-nationalism of Han Chinese at its core.11 According to Takeshi Hamashita, one of Japan’s leading historians of China, the ruling order of the empires that modern China followed consisted of several types of relationships between the center and the regions, defined by the nature and closeness of each entity with the center: difang (areas governed directly by the court), tusi or tuguan (ethnic minorities in the southwestern region), fanbu (fiefs of large ethnic groups like the Mongols), chaogong (tributary states like Korea and the Ryukyu islands), and hushi (trading countries like Japan without tributary relations with China).12 As with many nationalist discourses, the domain of the “Chinese nation” was not very clear.13 The extent of the “legitimate” territory of the “Chinese nation” has been established through conflicts, resulting in a territory that includes former imperial regions from difang to fanbu, with the exception of Outer Mongolia.14 Former hushi and chaogong countries were permitted to leave China. But the former difang and fanbu have become areas where the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity should, in the legitimating thinking of Chinese nationalism, be firmly applied. In the view of this Chinese nationalism, Taiwan should be an extension of the Qing dynasty’s rule into the modern era. Consequently, an “anomalous” state of affairs that has existed since the late nineteenth century needs to be brought to an end. In the Qing period of over 200 years of Manchu rule, a Sinified society was established on Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan was a difang region directly governed by mandarins dispatched from the center. Accordingly, discourses disagreeing with the project of the “Chinese nation,” such as those of Taiwanese nationalism, are apt to be treated by Han Chinese patriots as unworthy of serious response. They are imagined as reflections of external ambitions, or as an alien substance left by colonialism.15 Taiwanese see it very differently. They have been living in an “anomaly” since the late nineteenth century. This has meant passing on from parents to children, from children to grandchildren, the promises and menaces that changes in nationality have brought about. This is still true today in facing new challenges from globalization and the People’s Republic. Changes in nationality were forced experiences that imposed ceaseless re-questioning

8 Masahiro Wakabayashi of one’s own identity in relation to a new center. Such experiences in peripheries necessarily engender a self-consciousness distinct from the one that the center would hold and would expect the residents of the periphery to embrace.16 In this manner, Taiwanese identity can be understood as a consequence of real and deep historical experiences through multiple changes of nationality of a particular peripherality. Taiwanese nationalism is an outcome of its unsettled status on the periphery. It reflects the historical resentment of the Taiwanese people over this “peripherity,” as well as their strong aspiration to put an end to a history taunted by “peripherity.”

Taiwanese nationalism and Japan Nationalists usually make every effort to represent their national origins as being as ancient as possible. Taiwanese nationalists are no exceptions. However, from a historical point of view, “Taiwanese consciousness” (Taiwan Yishi) emerged at the earliest only under Japanese colonial rule. Imagining Taiwan as one’s homeland, imagining that there is an island-wide community, and attempting to pursue some sort of political self-rule and cultural uniqueness of that community, were new notions that are difficult to find before Japanese colonial rule. The Manchu empire was an empire, not a nation. “Taiwanese consciousness” was shaped by the discourses of political, social, and cultural movements of Taiwanese intellectuals starting in the 1920s and the 1930s.17 National identity emerged as a twentieth-century phenomenon in Taiwan, just a little after nationalism’s emergence in Japan and then China. These discourses reveal a strong yearning for modernity. The modernity Taiwanese intellectuals sought was not Japanese culture. However, what brought modernity to Taiwan was Japanese colonial rule. Japan expanded modern space in the colony to draw economic advantages from the island and to make Taiwan safe, healthy, and comfortable for Japanese colonizers. Furthermore, the best means to access European modern knowledge for Taiwanese intellectuals was by reading in Japanese (acquired under rather coercive conditions from their colonial education), either European works translated into Japanese or transmitted indirectly in the works of Japanese intellectuals. Although the colonized can be said to have benefited from extensions of modern institutions, these were also utilized by the colonizer as apparatuses of disciplinary power for more effective rule over the Taiwanese. There was colonial discrimination in access to these institutions. In short, it was a colonial modernity that the Japanese brought to the Taiwanese people.18 It was experienced as inequalities by the Taiwanese, regardless of former social cleavages among them, such as that between the Minnanese and the Hakka.19 Taiwanese intellectuals under colonial rule imagined that the people suffering from common discrimination were “Taiwanese,” and that

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 9 they had a deep yearning for a modernization of their own.20 Japan, as Taiwan’s colonial ruler monopolizing the agency of modernity and forcing the Taiwanese to accept discipline and discrimination, was the “subject of a love–hate relationship,” hence the “unforgettable other” to Taiwanese. Thus, “Taiwanese consciousness” was a new national identity imagined and invented by Taiwanese intellectuals mostly educated in the colonial school system, taking Japan as its “unforgettable other.”21 While Taiwanese consciousness in this sense is a phenomenon that does not greatly differ from other colonial nationalisms, it is different in that nationalist discourses were formed not under the dyadic relationship between a modern Western colonizer and a colonized non-Western society, but under a triadic relationship between the modern West, Japan, and Taiwan. This is also the case with Korea. But for Taiwan, in addition to this triadic relationship, there existed another triadic relationship, that between Japan, Taiwan, and China. Taiwan differs from Korea in this respect. Its peripherity is very specific, a point developed by Vincent Wang (see chapter 8). Because of the existence of this Japan–Taiwan–China triadic relationship, the colonial nationalist projects of “Taiwanese consciousness” were in many cases endeavors including a pursuit of “Chineseness.” There are two aspects to this phenomenon. The first concerns a Han Chinese consciousness of Taiwanese intellectuals. They frequently used such phrases as “we are the Han Chinese with our own cultural tradition” when opposing the assimilationist policies of Japanese colonial authorities. Mainland China was the native land of the ancestors of the Han immigrants to Taiwan. Moreover, a new state in which Han Chinese took the leading role, the Republic of China, was established in 1911 after Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Manchu dynasty in 1895. An often mentioned “fatherland complex” (zuguo guannian), a yearning for the native land of the ancestors and for the newly established Han state, infused this Han Chinese consciousness. But what made this consciousness come to the fore was the pressure of Japanese colonialism on Taiwanese intellectuals. Such a yearning for the “fatherland of the Han” was also “a kind of anti-Japanese spiritual armament” on the side of the colonized.22 The second aspect of Taiwan consciousness is found in the Taiwanese intellectuals’ efforts to pursue a sort of solidarity with contemporary China in a quest for modernity. Taiwanese intellectuals joined a range of literary and language reform movements in the 1920s, influenced by the Chinese literary and language reform movements that took place after the 1910s. Independent Taiwanese journalism and works produced under the banner of a “Taiwanese New Literary Movement” then helped build the foundation of modern Taiwanese literature.23 However, this “Taiwanese consciousness” did not harmonize with the “Chinese nation” after 1945. The Chineseness of Taiwanese intellectuals was isolated. During colonial rule, the comings and goings of people and

10 Masahiro Wakabayashi information between Taiwan and China was possible. Some Taiwanese joined in the revolutionary movements on the Mainland. But these physical crossings were quite limited for the Taiwanese because of restraints imposed by the Japanese authorities.24 Moreover, the economy of colonial Taiwan was constructed to complement that of Japan. Consequently, Taiwan’s economic relationship with China was limited. The nationalist project of Taiwanese intellectuals was a lonely imagining of Chineseness within an environment relatively closed off from the real China. Chineseness thus constructed was hardly acknowledged on the Mainland. This unique and isolated Chineseness was a peculiar Taiwanese-made Chineseness.25 Because it was self-made, it later could be incorporated into a narrative of Taiwanese nationalism as a unique “Taiwaneseness.”

Taiwanese nationalism and the Republic of China With Japan’s defeat in 1945, Taiwan was incorporated into the Republic of China as the Province of Taiwan. The Taiwanese initially welcomed this as a “return to the fatherland” and, unlike Japan in the late nineteenth century, the Republic of China in 1945 was not perceived by Taiwanese as an “other.” However, ideas and movements calling for an “Independent Taiwan” and a discourse of seeing China as an “other” were immediately engendered. This rupture can be largely traced to a particular 1947 event, a deadly encounter of the Republic of China with Taiwanese society, the February 28th Incident. The “2-28 Incident” was a popular uprising against the backdrop of socioeconomic confusion resulting from poor administration by the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, which had requisitioned Japanese government offices and assets. Another underlying factor was the friction between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, who came to rule Taiwan. On February 27, 1947, in the city of Taipei, the public clashed with the authorities when investigators from the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau quarreled with a woman over black-market cigarettes and a bystander was shot (he later died) by one of the investigators. The following day, protesters swarmed the Administrative Executive Office and were met with the bullets from the military police guards. Riots quickly spread throughout the island and the authorities lost control of areas without military bases. Meanwhile, influential Taiwanese formed a Committee to Settle the 2-28 Incident to end the chaos, at the same time pressuring Governor Chen Yi to reform the administration. Chen Yi, while buying time through offering a superficial compromise, secretly sent a request for military reinforcements to the chairman of the KMT government, Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing. Chiang then sent an army to Taiwan. It restored control in two weeks or so. In an ensuing “purge,” people involved in the Settlement Committee were hunted down. Weapons were confiscated across the island, leading to further arrests, incarcerations, and executions. In 1992 a government research group estimated the death toll at somewhere between 18,000 and 28,000.26

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 11 The 2-28 bloodshed was not only the origin of an ethnic fissure between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders but also the historical genesis of a broad Taiwanese nationalism as we see it today. Generally speaking, when there is bloodshed where national integration is not well established, that “incident” can trigger a new ethnic consciousness. As a Japanese political scientist put it: When there is bloodshed or civil strife, the awareness of cultural differences becomes fatalistic . . . after the “incident.” The differences between “them” and “us” would be told as if they were self-evident. A perception that those differences can be historically traced back would be born. After bloodshed and warfare strengthened ethnic consciousness, the apparent success of national integration becomes nothing but a fiction, and it is unthinkable to return to it.27 The 2-28 Incident produced a Taiwanese consciousness in which the unique Chineseness developed during the colonial period, which had hoped to be accepted by “the fatherland,” had ended in failure, rejection. This rejection is evident in the “Taiwanese Enslavement” theory (Tairen nuhua lun) promoted by the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office and Mainlander journalists on Taiwan. According to this theory, the Taiwanese have mental defects due to “enslavement education” under Japanese rule; they speak Japanese but are not fluent in their own (new) “national language”; they do not have an understanding of their “fatherland.” The Japanese language was banned in the mass media. And it seemed correct to limit the appointment of Taiwanese in government service. The Taiwanese people strongly opposed this theory of Taiwanese as defectives, especially former anti-Japanese activists. They initiated movements demanding the restructuring of governance, including an early enactment of self-government and the swift implementation of new election methods, including the election of prefectural governors and mayors by popular vote. The 2-28 Incident broke out as these campaigns were just getting under way.28 Colonial culture, especially urban culture, often goes through a hybridization, bringing forth a “third culture” that differs both from the prior culture of the native society and the modern culture of the metropolis. Several months before the 2-28 Incident, Song Feiru, a returned Taiwanese from the Mainland, then the president of Renmin Daobao (People’s Guidance News), pointed out that Taiwan’s culture, after fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, “is already different from that of Han cultural tradition, yet is not a pure Japanese culture.” 29 A new culture emerged under colonial rule as Taiwanese wanted and struggled to become their own agent of modernity. That a “third culture” was visible in Taiwan was the result of a subordinated Taiwanese people resisting Japanese assimilation policies and subjectively absorbing aspects of cultures that had originated in modern

12 Masahiro Wakabayashi Europe and been transmitted via Japan. Simply put, the Taiwanese thought of themselves as agents of their own culture. Immediately after the war, Taiwanese intellectuals thought that their own culture, which had resisted and experienced colonialism, had created a “third culture,” which should have been welcomed as an expression of Chineseness by their “fatherland.” But the ROC bureaucracy did not accept the Taiwanese people’s agency in the development of Taiwanese modernity. The KMT instead stigmatized the Taiwanese “third culture” as “enslavement,” demanding from the Taiwanese a categorical adoption of the KMT’s official nationalism. This controversy over “Taiwanese enslavement” from 1945 to 1947 was a struggle over decolonization, deciding what sort of Chineseness should be established as the basis of post-war Taiwan’s decolonization. The 2-28 Incident shows official KMT nationalism refusing to embrace the unique Taiwanese Chineseness embraced by the Taiwanese people. The Incident thereby became a turning point. A considerable number of Taiwanese came to see “China” as “outside.”30 “They,” the Mainlanders, became the “Chinese”; “we” the Taiwanese became a different community of people from these “Chinese.”31 The Taiwanese, facing a bloody rejection by official Chinese nationalism, responded in two ways. Some expected that a “new China” would emerge from the CCP-led revolution against the KMT. Others imagined that the “Taiwanese” constituted a sovereign community distinct from “China.” The emergence of the latter identity, the thoughts and movements of a Taiwanese nationalism, shows that, after a rejection of their unique Chineseness, a discourse of Taiwanese nationalism developed that designated the “fatherland” of the Han Chinese as the “unforgettable other.” This new Taiwanese nationalist discourse retained elements of Japanese culture, utilizing it as a tool of cultural and spiritual resistance against the perpetrators of the 2-28 Incident. China was constructed as the “outside.” However, because of KMT repression, these new identities could not make a public appearance. The KMT regime, having proclaimed martial law, used a fierce anti-Communist campaign to arrest many intellectuals and students, both Mainlander and Taiwanese, in a “White Terror.” Those lucky enough to escape arrest kept silent or fled, either to China or to asylum in democratic countries such as Japan and the United States. These exiles and students abroad in democracies continued the Taiwanese nationalist movement openly. The KMT authorities did not consider the clash of their official nationalism with Taiwanese society a failure. Rather, they saw a need for enhanced Chineseness. After 1949 a systematic Sinicization policy was implemented, mainly via the public education system. Under such circumstances, cultural resistance by the “trough generation”32 was confined to private spheres, such as a deliberate continued use of the Japanese language and an enthusiasm for such Japanese literary arts as tanka and haiku. The Japanese language and its literary arts became tools for members of this

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 13 “trough generation” to defend their identity against the mounting pressure of the Sinicization campaign, which treated Taiwanese as defectives.33 The main target of the KMT’s Sinicization project were those generations of Taiwanese after the “trough generation.” The KMT had considerable success promoting ROC Chineseness with the post-war generation, helped by the educational infrastructure left by the Japanese and the economic success known as “the Taiwan Miracle.” Nevertheless, the discourse and movement of Taiwanese nationalism made headway. The failure of the Taiwanese attempt at “subsuming” themselves as a unique Chineseness before the 2-28 Incident was repeated in the 1970s against a backdrop of diplomatic disasters for the Republic of China, in which Taiwan, as discussed by Bruce Jacobs (see chapter 5), was expelled from the United Nations. The Republic of China on Taiwan was not China. This led to a discourse among Taiwanese intellectuals advocating a “return to one’s native land (huigui xiangtu)” and to a mass arrest of opposition dangwai leaders, the “Meilidao Incident”, in 1979. Once again a loyal discourse was rejected by KMT rulers, forcing the Taiwanese into something else. According to a study by a Taiwanese sociologist, although there were various political inclinations among dangwai groups, the movement as a whole had been a loyal opposition seeking democratization and equal treatment of Taiwanese and Mainlanders within the established political framework of the Republic of China until the Meilidao arrests rejected the loyalists. The dangwai’s shift in political discourse towards a Taiwanese nationalism occurred only after loyal reformers were beaten, arrested, and tortured.34 Once again, there was a rupture imposed by a KMT policy of violently crushing Taiwanese reformers. By the 1970s, Taiwanese writers and critics of the post-war generations, stimulated by the discourse of seeking indigenous roots, began to present themselves as Taiwanese. They put forward the idea of a “native literature” (Xiangtu Wenxue), which would depict the reality of Taiwanese society and re-evaluate the “Taiwanese New Literature Movement” that had flourished during Japanese colonial rule. These appeals for the recognition of the significance of those cultural movements were manifestations of the Chineseness that the Taiwanese had inherited from the past, interpreted within the framework of the KMT regime’s official Chinese nationalism.35 This cultural phenomenon paralleled the dangwai’s political movement, demanding admission to the establishment as a “loyal opposition.” The KMT authorities did not at first respond to these discourses and movements in a harsh way. However, in the late 1970s, members of KMT literary circles began attacking the Xiangtu Wenxue as lao-nong-bing wenxue (literature for workers, peasants, and soldiers); that is, interpreting the Taiwanese as traitorous followers of a line the CCP promoted during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. The KMT then conducted the mass arrests of opposition leaders known as the Meilidao Incident.

14 Masahiro Wakabayashi However, Taiwan in the late 1970s was not the Taiwan of the 1950s. The KMT could no longer confine the activities of the dangwai and other antiKMT intellectuals. After the Meilidao Incident, on the political front, the dangwai began to put forward slogans expressing a Taiwanese nationalism such as “Self Determination of Taiwan’s Future by the People of Taiwan,” which synthesized the political discourse of the political and cultural opposition. This new politics of identity had considerable success in mobilizing mass support against the authoritarian regime. On the cultural front, a large number of Taiwanese humanist intellectuals turned to Taiwanese nationalism, putting forward the project of “Subjectifying Taiwan in History” (Taiwan zhutixing de lishixue) and “Taiwanese literature” as the national literature.36 In the new discourse, the pursuit of a particular Chineseness deployed by their predecessors against Japanese colonial rule was reinterpreted as actually that of a unique Taiwaneseness.37

Taiwanese nationalism, globalization, and the People’s Republic of China In sum, Taiwanese nationalism developed from the historical and geopolitical “peripherity” of Taiwan island. That nationalism was formed in relation to two “unforgettable others,” Japan and China. Two failures on the part of the official Chinese nationalism of the Republic of China in rejecting the unique Chineseness pursued by the Taiwanese contributed to the development of the Taiwanese nationalism that flourishes today. This Taiwanese nationalism faces great challenges. In survey research based on a method devised by Nai-teh Wu, a political scientist at the Academia Sinica, the percentage of “Taiwanese nationalists” in the Taiwanese electorate was only 24.0 as of August 2000. This survey sought responses to the following two claims: “If Taiwan could maintain peace upon attaining independence, then it should do so,” and “If there no longer will be any disparities of economic, social, and political conditions between China and Taiwan, then Taiwan should be integrated with China.” “Taiwanese nationalists” refers to those people who agree with the statement that “Taiwan should attain independence if able to maintain peace,” and at the same time disagree with the statement that “There shall be integration if disparities no longer exist.” Those who agreed with both arguments are “pragmatists.” They make up 34.4 percent of the people on Taiwan. Those who “agree to integration if disparities vanish” but “disagree to Taiwan independence even if peace can be maintained” are “Chinese nationalists.” They comprised 19.3 percent. In 1992, the percentage of “Taiwanese nationalists” was 9.3 percent, “Chinese nationalists” 38.0 percent, and “pragmatists” 25.0 percent.38 Then, with democratization, Taiwanese nationalism rose swiftly in the 1990s. This trend in the direction of Taiwan nationalism is the result of the deeply structured history sketched above.

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 15 Taiwanese nationalism as a thought and movement pursuing an “Independent Taiwan” rapidly gained influence after democratization at the end of the 1980s. It has negated the hegemony of official Chinese nationalism, which had buttressed the authoritarian regime of the KMT. But Taiwanese nationalism has not yet gained enough support for post-authoritarian national integration. Although Taiwanese nationalism is rising, the Taiwanese have been only hesitantly changing identity.39 Furthermore, Taiwanese nationalism is a “latecomer.” It has to face new and difficult challenges in intellectual and cultural fields that did not exist a century earlier. Anti-essentialist ways of looking at identity fill the mainstream intellectual discourse. Consequently, Taiwanese national identity, appearing in a post-modern era, faced the challenges of ethnic diversification within Taiwanese society, and, at the same time, was restrained by an intellectual tide, virtually hegemonic in the academic world, whose anti-essentialist persuasion curtails the essentialist convictions of Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals. Still, Taiwanese cultural nationalism offered an effective contestation to Chinese nationalism’s hegemony, the pillar of the KMT authoritarian rule. Different communities, however, embraced different identities. As a result, multicultural awareness spread.40 However, Taiwanese cultural nationalism’s discourse only began making headway at the same time as a globalized mass-consumer culture began spreading in East Asia. As residents in the coastal cities of China grow wealthier due to China’s economic rise, they have begun to impact Taiwan with a “Mandarinized” mass-consuming culture, one linking the China controlled directly by the CCP with Hong Kong and Taiwan. This “Mandarinized” mass-consumer culture, which incorporates Taiwan in a new globalization, also includes culture from Japan and the United States. Consequently, Taiwanese humanist intellectuals who helped develop the discourse of “a unique Taiwanese culture,” however enthusiastic they were about “nativization” (bentuhua), could do nothing to halt globalization and a tide of mass-consumer culture that weakened a nativized Taiwanese cultural identity. The biggest challenge confronting Taiwanese nationalism is the rise of China. The period when Taiwanese nationalism made headway was also a time when Taiwan entered a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China. This author still recalls the 1983 Legislative Yuan election when Ning-hsiang Kang, one of the major candidates of the dangwai force, appealed to the voters: “Taiwan is at its third crisis of fate.” What this meant was that Taiwan had already suffered two nationality changes, one in 1895 and one in 1945, times when the views of the Taiwanese people were ignored. Now Taiwan is facing a third crisis. Taipei (meaning the KMT’s one-party regime) should not be allowed to impose its will on the Taiwanese again. But a second China, the China that international society recognizes, then unexpectedly came to the fore. The Taiwanese people had to imagine their identity not only in relation to the first China, the Republic of China,

16 Masahiro Wakabayashi but also a second China, the People’s Republic. The continuous political and military pressures exerted on Taiwan by the People’s Republic increase Taiwanese anxieties and instigate another “crisis of fate,” accentuating the “otherness” of the People’s Republic to Taiwanese citizens, a change described by Jean-Pierre Cabestan (see chapter 12). A mutually beneficial increase in exchanges with China could contain the influence of Taiwanese nationalism. The economic change in relations with China is large, as detailed by Weixing Hu (see chapter 2). Since the major commercial routes of Taiwan shifted from the Qing dynasty to the United States and Japan when the ports of Anping and Tanshui opened at the end of the Qing era, Taiwan did not have extensive relations with the Mainland except for the period 1945–1949. Ever more Taiwanese citizens, starting in the 1990s, however, are seeing the People’s Republic as a place of significance for evolving strategies of family development. This may begin a new utilitarianism in which Taiwan’s national identity will be shaped by “pragmatists.” Despite the new Taiwanese nationalism, which rose in the late KMT era, the sociological conditions that affect Taiwanese citizens’ imagining of their national identity, post-modern globalization, and a rising China, have begun to change again. Taiwanese nationalists who reached a “historical compromise” with a democratized and Taiwanized Republic of China are confronting unexpected challenges that have to impact that identity of Taiwaneseness. The notion of “unforgettable other” clarifies the origins and present conditions of a Taiwanese nationalism that faces real and deep challenges. The rise of that Taiwanese nationalism means that the periphery, which had been marginalized by the dynamics of the center for so long, has come into its own and can respond to challenges emanating from the centers. Therefore, while an “Independent Taiwan” with a full statehood recognized by outside powers is difficult to envisage in the future, given Chinese power and its opposition to this scenario, it is also difficult to imagine that Taiwanese nationalism will cease to be an important factor in the island’s politics and in cross-Strait relations. How a rising China, the United States, and Japan (via the US–Japan Alliance) will respond to this recently conscious periphery will have considerable bearing on the future shape of the international order in East Asia. Great historical and political consequences flow from the historical dynamics making for the rise of Taiwanese nationalism.

Notes * This chapter is derived from my keynote speech delivered at the international conference, The Rise of China and Taiwan’s Dilemmas, Rihga Royal Hotel, Osaka, July 26, 2003. I thank the participants for their comments. I also thank Chih-huei Huang (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei), Tai-sheng Wang (National Taiwan University), Mao-kuei Chang (Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica), Rwei-ren Wu (Ph.D., University of Chicago), and Masayoshi Matsunaga for their thoughtful comments on the draft.

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 17 1 For example, the 1995–96 cross-Straits crisis sparked by Lee Teng-hui’s unofficial visit to the United States and the first popular election of a Taiwanese president. This crisis also added some precipitating impetus to the so-called “redefinition of the US–Japan Alliance.” 2 Political liberalization and democratization of the Mainlander-dominated authoritarian regime inevitably accompanied empowerment of the Taiwanese, which also made possible and precipitated the identity-reconstructing movements of minorities such as the Hakkas and the Taiwan Aborigines, and brought about ethnic political tensions and re-formation of ethnic relations within society. 3 Roughly, Taiwanese nationalism has passed through the following three stages of development: (1) the principle of an overseas opposition force (1950s–1970s, except for those who fled to Mainland China), (2) the principle of integrating opposition forces inside Taiwan (1980s), and (3) the leading but not hegemonic principle of the so-called Second Republic of China, the democratized Republic of China (1990s onwards). See Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Gendai Taiwan ni okeru Taiwan nashonarizumu no tenkai to sono gendaiteki kiketsu: Taiwan seiji kansatsu no aratana kadai (The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan Politics: the Outcomes and New Tasks of Taiwan-watching),” Nihon Taiwan Gkkaihou, No. 5, 2003, pp. 142–160, at pp. 146–148. The repeated victory by Chen Shui-bian of the DPP in the presidential election in March 2004 over the KMT’s Lian Chan, however, with a razor-thin margin, should be seen as a landmark, showing that Taiwanese nationalism has become hegemonic in Taiwan politics. It is yet to be seen whether this hegemony of Taiwanese nationalism will be enshrined as the principle of a “third Republic of China” through Chen’s bold initiative of new constitutional reform, as the DPP and its ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, failed to gain the majority in the Legislative Yuan election in December 2004. 4 A few major examples are listed here. Nai-teh Wu’s analyses of popular political consciousness based on opinion poll data: “Mianbao yu aiqing: chutan Taiwan minzhong minzu rentong de biandong (Bread and Love: a Preliminary Inquiry into the Changes of National Identity of Taiwanese People),” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Taiwan Association for Political Science, Chongcheng University, Jiayi, 2002. Fu-chang Wang’s study of mass mobilization process in the 1980s: “Taiwan Fandui Yundong de Gongshi Dongyuan: 1979– 1989 nian Liangbo Tiaozhan Gaofeng de Bijiao (Consensus Mobilization of the Political Opposition in Taiwan: Comparing Two Waves of Challenges, 1979– 1989),” Taiwan Zhengzhixuekan (Taiwan Political Science Review), No. 1, 1996, pp. 129–210. Mao-kuei Chang’s research on the impacts on multi-ethnic society of Taiwan: “Duoyuan zhuyi, duoyuan wenhua lunshu zai Taiwan de xingcheng yu nanti (Hard Problems of Pluralism and Discourse of Multi-culturism),” in Xue Tiandong, ed., Taiwan de Weilai (Taiwan’s Future), Taipei: Huatai Wenhua, 2002, pp. 223–273. A-chin Hsiau’s studies on cultural nationalism: Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, London and New York: Routledge, 2000; “Minzuzhuyi yu Taiwan 1970 niandai de ‘Xiangtu wenxue’: Yige wenhua (jiti) jiyi bianqian de tantao (Nationalism and ‘Xiangtu Literature’ of 1970s Taiwan: a Study of Change, Identity, and Collective Memory),” Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research), Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp. 77–138; “Kang-ri Jiti Jiyi de Minzuhua: Taiwan 1970 niandai de Zhanhou Shidai yu Rijushiqi Taian Xinwenxue (Nationalizing Collective Memory in the 1970s on Taiwan: The Postwar Generation and Its ‘Rediscovery’ of Taiwanese Colonial Literature and Anti-Japanese Resistance in the 1970s)”, Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research), Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, pp. 181–239; and “Rentong, Shushi, yu Xingdong: Taiwan 1970 niandai Dangwai de Lishi Jiangou (Identity,

18 Masahiro Wakabayashi

5 6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14

Narrative, and Action: Anti-KMT Dissident Construction of History in 1970s Taiwan),” Taiwan Shehuixue (Taiwanese Sociology), No. 5, 2003, pp. 915–250. Rwei-ren Wu’s studies from the perspective of intellectual history: “Zuguo de bianzheng: Liao Wenkui (1905–1952) Taiwan minzuzhuyi sixiang chutan (Dialectic of the Fatherland: a Preliminary Inquiry into Liao Wenhui’s Taiwanese Nationalism),” Si yu Yan, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1999, pp. 47–100; “The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese nationalism, 1895–1945,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 2003. Hiroshi Matani, Meiji ishin to Nashonarizumu (Meiji Restoration and Nationalism), Tokyo: Yamakawa, 1997, pp. 24–25. Ibid., pp. 21–22. This is also equivalent to imagining oneself as a “small Middle Kingdom” vis-àvis the Middle Kingdom. According to Takeshi Hamashita, the emergence of such imagining in East Asia by Japanese and Koreans was one of the important momentums that led to the collapse of the Chinese world order from within; see Takeshi Hamashita, Choko Shisutemu to Kindai Ajia (Tributary System and Modern Asia), Tokyo: Iwanami, 1997, p. 9. Historical description here is based on Masahiro Wakabayashi, Henyoushi Chuchosuru aidentiti (Taiwan: Hesitantly Changing Identity), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2001, chapters 1 and 2. There is much to be discussed about the significance of the United States to Taiwanese nationalism. Although we can probably assume that the US role is not that significant with regards to the origins of Taiwanese nationalism, it is still a significant factor. The United States had played the role of the chief supplier for Taiwan’s national security, had been one of the major overseas hosts for asylum-seekers in the opposition during the martial law period, and was a major international supporter of democratization. Drawing on a study by Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Sunny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 151–177, Mitani points out that in the Kanji (Chinese character) cultural sphere countries in East Asia, there is a strong tendency for nationalisms to be conceived as very old; see Hiroshi Mitani “‘Warera’ to ‘tasha’: suteitizumu, nashonarizumu keiseiso, nashonarizumu (‘We’ and ‘Other’: Statism, Forming Ingredients of Nationalism, and Nationalism),” in Chushaku Boku and Hiroshi Watanabe, eds., Kokka rinen to taigai ninshiki: 17–19 seiki (State Ideal and Conception of the Outside World), Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2001, pp. 217–254, at p. 218. This tendency strengthens the narrative of continuity. Yujiro Murata, “20 seiki shisutemu toshiteno Chugoku nashonarizumu (Chinese nationalism as a 20th-Century System),” in Shigeo Nishimura, ed., Nashonarizumu: Rekishi karano Sekkin (Gendai Chugoku no kouzouhenndou 3) (Nationalisms: An Approach from History (Structural Changes of Contemporary China, Vol. 3)), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000, pp. 35–68. Hamashita, Choko Shisutemu, pp. 9–11. Tatsumi Okabe, “Higashi Ajia niokeru seijiteki tougou to bunka: ‘ikkoku ryousei’ wo megutte (Political Integration and Differentiation in East Asia: Some Considerations on ‘One State Two Systems’),” in Hirano Ken’ichiro, ed., Ajia niokeru kokumin tougou: rekishi,bunka, kokusaikannkei (National Integration in Asia: History, Culture, and International Relations), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998, pp. 107–142. Hamashita, Choko Shisutemu, p. 28; Kazuko Mouri, Shuen karano Chuugoku: Minzoku Mondai to Kokka (Ethno-Nationalism in Contemporary China), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998, p. 10.

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 19 15 This finds reflection in such phrases frequently seen in the official Chinese media as: “It is due to foreign intervention that the solution of the Taiwan problem has been delayed” and “In the long history of China, although there were periods that the country was divided, the major trend has been unification.” 16 Chuan-Tiong Lim, a Hong-Kong-born scholar, calls the region consisting of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Okinawa “Peripheral East Asia,” and maintains that these areas, positioned in the periphery, experienced several cases of nationality changes and that these experiences lie at the root of the identity problems in this region today. See Senchu Rin (Chuan-Tiong Lim), ‘Henkyo Ajia’ no aidentitli poritikkusu (Identity Politics in ‘Peripheral East Asia), Askashi Shoten, Tokyo, 2005, chapters 1 and 2. This author owes some ideas to Lim’s argument. Chihhuei Huang demonstrates that from some of the tankas which the “trough generation” (see note 32, below) of the Taiwanese composed in the post-war years one can recognize a “sorrow of tossed nationality.” Some examples read: “Suffering the sorrow of being an orphan of the world, we the compatriots of eighteen million will survive.” “Is it the fate of Formosan people? Some changed their nationality three times in life!” See Chi’e Ko (Chih-huei Huang), “Posuto koroniaru toshi no Hijou: Taihoku no Nihongo bungei katsudou ni tsuite (Sorrow of a Post-colonial City: on Japanese Literary Art Activities in Taipei),” in Shinya Hashizume, ed., Possibility of the Cultural Study of Asian Cities, Osaka: Seibundo, 2003, pp.115–146, at p. 132. 17 A few studies in Japanese are listed here: Sekai Kyo (Koh Se-kai), Nihon touchi ka no Taiwan: Teikou to dan’atsu (Formosa under the Japanese Rule: Resistance and Suppression), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972; Shoudou Ko (Ng Yuzin Chiautong), “Taiwan no minzoku to Kokka (The People and the Nation of Taiwan)”, Kokusai seiji (International Relations), Vol. 84, 1987, pp. 62–79; and Masahiro Wakabayashi, Taiwan kounichi undoushi kenkyu (A Study of the History of Anti-Japanese Movements in Taiwan), Tokyo: Kenbun, 1983 (enlarged edition 2001). An important recent work is Wu, “Zuguo de bianzheng.” 18 On colonial modernity, see Takenori Matsumoto, “Chousen ni okeru ‘shokuminchi kindai’ ni kansuru kinnenn no kenkyu doukou (Recent Research Trend on ‘Colonial Modernity’ in Korea),” Ajia Keizai, Vol. 43, No. 9, 2002, pp. 31–45. Although Matsumoto is referring to colonial Korea, the basic picture was the same with Taiwan. Of course, the act of imagining a national identity under colonial rule was not the same due to the fact that the Koreans could envisage political continuity from the era of their pre-modern dynasties, something the Han Chinese on Taiwan could not do. 19 The Minnanese (the Hoklo) are descendants of immigrants from the southern part of Fujian Province. Their mother tongue, Minnanese, is often called “Taiwanese.” The Hakka of Taiwan came both from the northeastern part of Guangdong Province and the northwestern part of Fujian Province. 20 Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Taiwan wo meguru futatsu no nashonarizumu (Two Nationalisms Concerning Taiwan)”, in Kennichiro Hirano, ed., Koza Gendai Ajia (Contemporary Asia), Vol. 4, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994, pp. 35–39. Chin Baihou, who reviewed the history of national language (Japanese) education under colonial rule, stresses that the Taiwanese aspiration for “assimilation by (Western) civilization” was so strong that it can be regarded as resistance to the “assimilation by (Japanese) culture” promoted by the colonial authorities; see Baihou Chin (Peifeng Chen) “Douka” no Doushou imu: Nihon touchika Taiwan no Kokugo kyouiku saikou (Strange Bedfellows of “Assimilation”: Reconsidering the History of National Language Education under the Japanese Rule), Tokyo: Sangennsha, 2001. 21 This newly imagined Taiwanese identity did not yet include aboriginal minorities. In that sense, it was the imagining of a pan-Han identity of Taiwan-wide scale. In

20 Masahiro Wakabayashi

22

23

24 25

26

27

28

29 30

31

32

the 1980s, Taiwan’s aboriginal minorities began to call themselves “Taiwan Aborigines” and set out to assert themselves to Han society and to the rulers of Taiwan. In response to this movement of Taiwan Aborigines, together with the cultural movement of Hakka, “the Taiwanese” have begun to be imagined as a multi-ethnic nation in a discourse of Taiwanese nationalism consisting of the Minnanese, the Hakka, the Aborigines, and the Mainlanders; see Wakabayashi, Henyoushi Chuchosuru aidentiti, pp. 188–193. Go Missatsu (Micha Wu) “Taiwanjin no yume to ninihachijiken (Taiwanese’ dream and the February 28 Incident),” in Taichiro Mitani, ed., Ajia no reisen to datsu-shokuminchika (Asian Cold War and Decolonization (Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi Vol. 8) (Modern Japan and Colonies, Vol. 8), Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993, pp. 39–70, at p. 52. Masayoshi Matsunaga, “Taiwan no bungaku katsudou (Literary Activities in Taiwan)”, in Minato Kawamura, ed., Bunka no nakano shokuminchi (Colonies in Culture) (Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi Vol. 7) (Modern Japan and Colonies, Vol. 7), Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993, pp. 211–229, at pp. 213–220. Wakabayashi, Taiwan kounichi undoushi kenkyu, part II. In addition to the restraints imposed by Japanese colonialism, the cultural distance of the periphery from the center was also related to this isolation. The most salient example of this distance is the distance between the modern Chinese vernacular and the mother tongues of the Taiwanese. The language reform movements in which the Taiwanese intellectuals were involved under colonial rule exemplify the magnitude of the difficulties that this distance poses. See Ann Heylen, “Language Reform Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule (1914–1936),” Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, 2001. Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Overcoming the Difficult Past: Rectification of the 228 Incident and the Politics of Reconciliation in Taiwan”, in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Reconciliation in the Asia–Pacific, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 162–176. Kiichi Fujiwara, “Kokumin no Houkai, Minzoku no Kakusei: Minzoku-funsono Seijiteki Kigen (Collapse of a Nation, Awaking of Ethnicities: Political Origins of Ethnic Conflicts),” Japan Association for Comparative Politics, ed., Minzoku-kyozon no Jouken (Conditions for National Coexistence), Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 2001, pp. 3–24. For details see Tsui-lien Chen, “Qu-zhimin yu Zai-zhimin de Duikang: yi 1946 nian ‘Tairen nuhua’ Lunzhan wei jiaodian (Decolonization vs. Recolonization: The Debate over ‘Tai-jen nu-hua’ of 1946 in Taiwan),” Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research), Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, pp. 145–201; Gilin Ka (Yi-lin Ho), The February 28 Incident: The Formation of Taiwanese Ethnopolitics (Ni.nihachi Jiken: ‘Taiwanjin’ keisei no Ethnopolitics), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2003: chapters 2, 3, and 4. Cited in Chen, “Qu-zhimin yu Zai-zhimin de Duikang”, p. 179. Masayoshi Matsunaga, “Futatsu no ‘kyokasho mondai’ (Two ‘Textbook Problems’),” Paper presented at the International Conference on the Future of Civilization: Hybridizing or Purifiying?, Graduate School of Language and Society, Hitotsubashi University, 2002. This author recalls that in a meeting at Gaoxiong (Kaohsiung) City in the 1980s, a Taiwanese who happened to be the president of a local newspaper company used the word “Chinese” when denoting the Mainlanders in Taiwan, while calling themselves the “Taiwanese.” In the mother-tongue discourse of Taiwanese, especially of the Minnanese, such usage was rather common. Dai Guohui described the “trough generation” as those under the age of 15 in the year 1915 and over the age of 15 in the year 1945. This generation “was most affected in the course of colonial rule, by the technology and militaristic over-

Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others” 21

33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40

bearingness of the ‘Great Empire of Japan’”; see Tai Kokki (Dai Guohui), “Nihon tochi to Taiwan chishikiji: Bou jokyoju no shi to saishuppatu no kurushimi (The Japanese Rule and the Taiwanese Intellectuals: Agony of Restart and Death of an Associate Professor),” in Tai, Nihonjin tono Taiwa (Dialogues with the Japanese), Tokyo: Shakaishisosha, 1971, pp. 89–110, at pp. 90–91. Chih-huei Huang quotes a senryu (Japanese short poem style similar to haiku) by a “trough-generation” Taiwanese – “Truthfully we speak Japanese after the war” – and points out this senryu is so illustrative that it can show us that the Japanese language, now a foreign language to them, has become their tool of cultural resistance in the post-colonial situation in Taiwan; see Chi’e Ko (Chihhuei Huang), “Posuto koroniaru toshi no Hijou,” pp. 129–130. Wang, “Taiwan Fandui Yundong de Gongshi Dongyuan.” Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism; “Minzuzhuyi yu Taiwan 1970 niandai de ‘Xiangtu wenxue’; “Kang-ri Jiti Jiyi de Minzuhua.” Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, chapters 4–6. Hsiau, “Minzuzhuyi yu Taiwan 1970 niandai de ‘Xiangtu wenxue.’” Wu, “Mianbao yu aiqing.” Wakabayashi, Henyoushi Chuchosuru aidentit. Ibid., pp. 193–194; Chang, “Duoyuan zhuyi, duoyuan wenhua lunshu zai Taiwan de xingcheng yu nanti.”

2

The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options Weixing Hu

Since the mid-1990s, relations across the Taiwan Straits have been characterized by “political alienation cum economic integration.” While the Mainland and Taiwan are getting much closer economically, they are getting further apart politically on the “One China” concept. By the early twentyfirst century there were about 1 million Taiwanese living in the Mainland for part of the year, over 50,000 Taiwanese enterprises operating there, and over US$100 billion invested in the other side of the Strait. The Mainland and Taiwan are getting more interdependent economically: the Mainland has already become Taiwan’s largest export market and investment site and Taiwan’s foreign trade dependence on the Mainland is over 18 percent. Given this economic integration, theorists might predict a spillover effect on political relations. Yet growing economic and social interaction not only have yet to spill over onto political relations, but political alienation is getting deeper. This political–economic paradox is transforming the structure of cross-Strait relations. The paradox has redefined the strategic options facing policy-makers in Beijing and Taipei. This chapter examines Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan since the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from a “structural” perspective. The Sixteenth Congress claimed to have embarked on a new course in Taiwan policy. While maintaining the “One-China principle” as the bottom line for the future, Beijing moderated its posture toward Taiwan. When Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president in 2000, Beijing threatened harsh actions against proindependence activities. However, Beijing did not fire missiles during Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan election in 2001 and mayoral election in 2002, and did not react strongly to President Chen Shui-bian’s provocative remarks on the status of cross-Strait relations (Yi Bian Yi Guo). Beijing’s new approach, where both the Mainland and Taiwan are parts of China, allows more room for maneuver. The Mainland’s pragmatic policy on economic relations, that “Political differences should not affect or interfere with the economic cooperation between the two sides,” has sustained a steady growth of business ties across the Strait. On the political front, Beijing has become more open to contacting all political parties from the island,

The political–economic paradox 23 including welcoming visits by some DPP people in appropriate capacities. By putting Beijing’s new Taiwan policy after the CCP’s Sixtenth Congress in the context of the structural incongruity of political alienation cum economic integration, this chapter explores the question of whether the “new approach” actually represents fresh thinking in terms of strategic choices facing Beijing, and what the inherent dilemma is in its strategy toward Taiwan. Beijing’s “new thinking” began to take shape in mid-2001. The external reason for this policy shift was the US factor. The George W. Bush administration’s pro-Taiwan stand before September 11, to some extent compelled Beijing to readjust its militant posture toward Taiwan. After September 11, the Bush administration sought improved relations with Beijing. As seen by the CCP, Washington’s “rebalancing” between Beijing and Taipei helped to stabilize cross-Strait relations. Beijing, Taipei, and Washington had come to a minimum common understanding of the status quo: no independence, no use of force, and no change from a One-China policy. Domestically, Beijing’s “fresh thinking” reflected a profound review of China’s strategic options. Since 2001, President Jiang Zemin has asked advisers to come up with new approaches on how to speed reunification, or at least curb pro-independence proclivities of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian. The policy community and the leadership believe that as long as China can wield its economics cards effectively, it will be difficult for Taipei to travel further down a separatist road. As one of the Mainland’s leading Taiwan scholars Zhang Nianchi put it, Beijing’s approach to national reunification should target more on Taiwanese society, not its government; policy emphasis should be more on mutual interaction, not confrontation.1 Reflected in the CCP Sixteenth Congress report, Beijing’s policy focus moved from imposing the One-China principle on Taiwan’s government to constituting a mutually accepted web of beneficial cross-Strait relations that link up with the Taiwan public (Ji Xiwang Yu Taiwan Renmin).2 Beijing’s policy shift flows from the political–economy paradox. From the late 1980s the steady growth of trade, investment, and personnel exchanges formed powerful linkages across the Taiwan Strait. As the two sides are getting closer economically, they are moving further apart politically. Political changes on both sides appear to widen the Strait, though economic ties continue to bridge it. Beijing’s Taiwan policy is always a combination of Fang Du (prevention of Taiwan independence) and Cu Tong (promoting reunification). Preventing and even coercing Taipei from de jure independence is a constant and sometimes urgent task that could even lead to the use of force. However, promoting reunification among the Taiwanese public is a long-term and more difficult task. The political–economic incongruity has changed the nature of political–economic interaction, producing dynamic instability. What explains Beijing’s shift to a relatively peaceful approach toward the DPP government is not tactical. Rather it reflects a long-term recalculation of future cross-Strait relations built on the political–economic

24 Weixing Hu incongruence. Beijing’s long-term strategic calculation is meant to use its economic power to tilt the political–economic balance across the Strait in its favor in the long run.

The growing political–economic paradox From the late 1980s Beijing and Taipei began socio-economic exchanges and contacts that eventually led to semi-official dialogues in the early 1990s. Ever since its initiation of a “peaceful reunification” offensive policy toward Taiwan in the 1980s, Beijing has been keen to promote economic cooperation. For Beijing, trade and economic relations serve China’s modernization. Since the adoption of an open policy in 1978, Beijing has worked to promote foreign trade and to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Politically, trade and investment could lure Taipei into the arms of the Mainland, facilitating national unification.3 In November 1987, Taipei lifted its ban on visits to family members on mainland China. Some Taiwan businessmen began to make “disguised” trips to pursue investment opportunities. At the same time, mainland China was switching its strategy for industrial development to a “coastal development strategy” aimed at attracting the light and labor-intensive industries that were being priced out of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Fundamental political economic change in Taiwan joined with new opportunities in the Mainland to trigger a tremendous growth in economic interactions. Total exports from Taiwan to the Mainland increased steadily from US$2,242 million in 1988, to US$22,455 million in 1997, and US$49,360 million in 2003. Taiwan became the Mainland’s third-largest import market, just following Japan and the European Union. About onethird of Taiwan’s exports go to the Mainland (including Hong Kong). Meanwhile, Taiwan has enjoyed a large surplus in its trade with the Mainland and, in fact, in 2003 Taiwan was the largest trade deficit source of China, followed by South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia. The trade surplus makes an important contribution to Taiwan’s overall foreign trade picture. Taiwan’s total imports from the Mainland were only US$478 million in 1988 and rose to US$9,000 million in 2003.4 In 2003 it had a trade surplus of US$40,360 million with the Mainland. This trade surplus, if measured as a ratio of its global trade surplus, was over 100 percent in 1992 and was 266 percent in 1998.5 That means that without the trade surplus with the Mainland, Taiwan could have suffered severe trade deficits since the early 1990s. Cross-Strait trade was accompanied by massive investment. According to the statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce (formerly Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation), Taiwan’s total investment in the Mainland ranked it fourth after Hong Kong, the United States, and Japan. There were 4,853 Taiwanese investment items in the Mainland in 2002, worth US$3,970 million.6 Since the early 1990s, investment from

The political–economic paradox 25 Taiwan has kept a strong and growing momentum. Electronics and information-industry sectors became the newest investment hotspots from the late 1990s. In 1999, the Mainland additionally approved several crossStraits agricultural cooperation trial areas in the provinces of Shandong, Hainan and Heilongjiang. More than 50 percent of Taiwan’s foreign investment now goes to the Mainland. Some mainland scholars estimate that Taiwan’s foreign trade dependence on the Mainland is over 25 percent and is bound to increase rapidly.7 Economic interactions across the Strait have grown at an astounding speed. When Taiwan first opened indirect trade with China in 1987, Taiwan’s total trade with the Mainland was worth US$1.7 billion. It grew about thirty times and exceeded US$49.8 billion in 2003, while Taiwan’s total trade with other countries grew at a much smaller rate in the same period. The Mainland is now Taiwan’s number one trading partner and Taiwan is the Mainland’s seventh-largest trading partner after the United Sates, the European Union (EU), Japan, ASEAN, Hong Kong SAR, and South Korea. Compared with China’s other trading partners, Taiwan’s export to the Mainland have grown at about 12 percent annually. It has a 12 percent share of the Mainland’s imports, equivalent to the whole of the EU’s exports to China.8 However, trade and investment did not solve the sovereignty dispute. The Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96 portended a forceful “showdown” between Beijing and Taipei over what would be the future course of cross-Strait relations. The semi-official dialogue channel was shut down because of political gridlock over the “One China” principle. However, trade and investment across the Strait boomed. Underlying closer economic linkages are geopolitical changes in the Asian Pacific region and fundamental changes in Taiwan’s political scene. The international systemic change with shifting Sino-US strategic relations after September 11, the globalization trend as a driving force in regional economic integration, and political realignments in Taiwan’s domestic politics set the context in which the political economy of cross-Strait relations took shape. For Beijing, the new dynamics of the Taiwan question generated by DPP power and Sino-US strategic uncertainty put quite a strain on China’s policy of peaceful reunification. An “embedded” political– economic incongruence cast into doubt any short-term solutions to the Taiwan issue. Instead, the political–economic paradox in cross-Strait relations calls for a long-term strategy composed of economic integration, winning over the Taiwanese people, and creating a mutually beneficial relationship, with force a last resort. In the CCP’s Sixteenth National Congress in November 2002, a new policy posture of promoting a mutually beneficial relationship across the Strait and winning over the Taiwanese people (Ji Xiwang Yu Taiwan Renmin) was endorsed and spelled out in Jiang Zemin’s political report to the Congress.9 What underlies Beijing’s

26 Weixing Hu new thinking is a greater emphasis on the role of economic and social integration between the Mainland and Taiwan in the long run and de-emphasis on any quick solution, political or military, of the issue in the short term.

The emerging “transnational” dimension of cross-Strait relations The Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96 was a “showdown” between Beijing and Taipei over how the two sides would deal with each other.10 Political gridlock over the “One-China principle” prevented any meaningful communication. But, as already mentioned, trade, investment, and social exchanges were not disrupted. Rapid developments in socio-economic interactions are transforming the relationship. This paradoxical situation prompts analysts to ask whether political unification and economic integration are mutually exclusive or inclusive, and how socio-economic relations will affect the future political dialogue. Because the political space permitted by the “One-China principle” of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is very restricted, Beijing is moving beyond relations at the government-to-government level and focusing more at sub-state levels to work on “transnational” relations between the two societies. The transnational relations approach is a non-state-centric approach. It uses relations at the sub-state level to influence the structure of policy choices at the state level. Superficially, there is a “separation” between politics and economics and between official and civilian relations in cross-Strait relations, but the two types of relations in fact interact with one another. “Transnational” actors are those social groups that link the two societies, two economies, and even sub-units of governments. “Transnational” relations are not just irregular contacts or interactions. Instead, they are purposeful activities utilizing non-state actors to penetrate the policy-making process by forming “transnational” policy coalitions to achieve specific goals in certain areas, such as the “three links” (San Tong), cross-Strait exchanges, and dialogues. One important “transnational force” is Taiwanese entrepreneurs in the Mainland (Tai Shang). These 1 million Tai Shang living and working on the Mainland can be powerful agents of change. It is expected that their experiences have changed their political orientations on the cross-Strait issue and that these changed attitudes can affect policy-making by the Taiwanese authorities. Tai Shang should be viewed as “agents of change” in cross-Strait relations because they will forge new “winning coalitions” in Taiwan’s policy-making process. Policy-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious groups (such as Ma Tsu pilgrims) are also “agents of change.” Like Tai Shang, they can gain access and influence policy. There are also “transgovernmental” policy networks across the Straits. In the case of “three mini-links” (Xiao San Tong), “transgovernmental” webs linked local government officials in Taiwan-controlled

The political–economic paradox 27 Kinmen and Matzu and their counterparts in Mainland-controlled Fujian Province. They developed common interests and influenced policy-making in Beijing and Taipei. Theoretically, the subtle use of transnational power by one side, China, could increase its political bargaining power because of the asymmetric vulnerability of the other, Taiwan. Yet international relations theorists disagree on whether stronger transnational ties bring more cooperative relations. Many people believe cross-Strait economic integration can produce positive effects, such as agenda formation and policy coordination between Beijing and Taipei. But the process of how transnational networks and winning coalitions are formed needs to be carefully examined. By studying the role of these “transnational actors,” we find, surprisingly, that both governments have suffered a “loss of control” in cross-Strait “transnational” relations. We ask how such “transnational” relations affect the balance of power in solving the political dispute over the sovereignty issue and Taiwan’s political future. It is also useful to explore the impact of transnational relations on political attitudes and identity changes. Can commonalities develop within a divided nation? The complex and “border-crossing” nature of Taiwan–Mainland relations makes it difficult to conceptualize the role of “transnational” forces in crossStrait relations. The existing literature either focuses on domestic politics in Taiwan and the Mainland or on the international environment in which cross-Strait relations take place,11 leaving the patterns of cross-Strait interaction largely unexplored. At the domestic politics level, the “developmental state” model, based on Charmers Johnson’s analysis of the Japanese economic miracle, makes sense of Taiwan’s economic policy toward the Mainland in the post-authoritarian era. In studying the Mainland’s economic policy toward Taiwan, a similar analogy can be applied.12 The vote-maximizing model, developed by Wu Yu-shan, explains the interparty, competitive dynamics of Taiwan’s Mainland policy-making, by vote distribution patterns rather than by an ideological divides.13 Shih Chih-yu, on the other hand, uses a psycho-cultural approach to probe the roots of identity held by the people on both sides, and the influence of identity on mutual imaging across the Strait.14 At the international system level, theories and models, both liberal and realist, include the “strategic triangle,” asymmetrical balance of power, “democratic peace,” and “regional order.” These theories offer templates for sorting out different “external” structures through which the two sides make their policies toward each other.15 The divided-nation model and integration theory are useful conceptions, although they are more descriptive than explanatory. The divided-nation model, first introduced by Henderson, Lebow, and Stoessinger, argues that divided nations would gradually shift away from high hostility, nonrecognition, and military solution to co-existence, tacit recognition, reduced ideological confrontation, and even non-military solutions and active rapprochement. Intensive communications would lead to loose political

28 Weixing Hu amalgamation and symbolic unification in the long run.16 However, the model, largely drawn from the inter-German and inter-Korean experiences, does not offer much illumination for inter-Chinese relations. The dividednation model neglects the role played by economic interaction in the divided nations.17 In contrast, the integration research programs developed in the 1960s and 1970s for the West European experience offer useful insights into crossStrait political–economic connections. Integration theory pointed to the role of multiple non-state actors in social transactions and political communications. It argues that economic integration could gradually “spill over” to other functional areas and even to cooperation on “high politics” issues. The theory also identifies a number of economic and social background factors that could condition political processes in which interests and policies are defined.18 Disputing the functionalist school’s economic determinism, neofunctionalism argues that the will and motivation of governments, political parties, and interest groups are vital for the success of an integration process. If political agents do not find integration beneficial, the processes would not be fruitful.19 Applying integration theories to cross-Strait relations, one would expect a beneficial effect from economic interaction between Taiwan and the Mainland. It would create a win–win political solution as the cooperative relation in the economic sphere spills over into the political realm. 20 However, empirical studies indicate various obstacles to the spillover (such as the incompatibility of elite values and goals, the threat of force, and the difficult learning process). Consequently, political disputes over the sovereignty issue have not been lessened and have even got worse. Why? We need a framework from which we can synthesize interaction-level analysis with domestic-level analysis, and study how non-state actors affect government policies toward each other. In explaining the political–economic incongruence, we should put crossStrait relations in a transnational paradigm. The transnational politics paradigm, first proposed by Keohane and Nye, applies the pluralist conception of civil society to the study of state-to-state relations.21 Many nongovernmental actors are linked with their counterparts in other societies, with the transnational ties influencing national policy-making. Since transnational ties – contacts, networks, and interactions across political boundaries – are not necessarily controlled by governments, they can form a web of shared interests and norms for cooperation, despite the governments.22 The transnational approach distinguishes two levels of analysis – domestic level and interaction level – and brings in a new site for investigation – the interplay of the two levels. When cross-Strait economic integration increases economic interdependence and social contacts, how does it alter policy objectives and preferences of both governments? The last twenty years of developments in cross-Strait relations have shown that Taiwanese entrepreneurs, policy-oriented NGOs,

The political–economic paradox 29 religious and cultural groups across the Strait, through their intensified transactions, have formed “transnational” interest networks and policy alliances. These networks and alliances have strong agenda-setting effects on the governments of the two sides, pressuring them toward a policy dialogue and toward coordination mechanisms to deal with common substantive issues.23

Beijing’s “transnational” approach and its “trading state” strategy24 Is Beijing’s new approach, to “transnationalize” cross-Strait relations and exert pressure on Taipei through economic and societal forces, a fundamental shift in the PRC Taiwan strategy? If so, what accounts for it? This strategic shift can be best understood in terms of the theoretical framework suggested by Richard Rosecrance.25 He hypothesizes two different systems or worlds: the territorial (military–political) world and the trading world. In the territorial system, all states are ranked in order of their power and territory, and their objectives and functions are identical; they “compete for primacy.” As a result, “war and the threat of war are the omnipresent features of interstate relationships.” In contrast, the trading system is characterized by the different functions of states, with specialization and a division of labor. Because their respective functions are mutually complementary, the states are mutually dependent in mutually beneficial ways and incline to improve their positions in the system through peaceful competition rather than violent war.26 The post-war structure of international politics, according to Rosecrance, has dual characteristics. Politically, the emergence of the bipolar world consolidated the old system, while economically the establishment of the Bretton Woods system greatly facilitated the development of the new system. The former Soviet Union and the United States (to a lesser extent) are good examples of territorial states during the Cold War, whereas Japan and Germany behaved as trading states. Since the benefits from trade and cooperation greatly exceed those of military competition and territorial aggrandizement, ruling groups think of improving economic growth sustained by foreign trade to maintain and increase the standard of welfare enjoyed by the population.”27 Growing economic interdependence among nation-states makes the cost of an all-out war almost unthinkable. Rosecrance’s typology is useful in analyzing Beijing’s Taiwan strategy. The two systems offer two approaches to achieve national advancement and development. Which system would prevail in national strategy depends on the options available and the efficacy of the chosen strategy. There can be different combinations of the two strategies. The trading system demands that states treat military and political means as tactical endeavors and take trade as the strategic requirement. In contrast, the territorial system required just the opposite. That is, if China takes economic development as

30 Weixing Hu its most important strategic requirement, military coercion of Taiwan and forced unification with Taiwan in the short run are but tactical endeavors. Otherwise, Beijing would more incline to use force or other coercive means to realize its national reunification goal. For Rosecrance, “a peaceful trading strategy is enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before” because states can change their policy-orientation through the process of “social learning.”28 The most important prerequisite for such a transformation is to move beyond the national state as the limit of economic and political horizons. China’s phenomenal economic growth since 1978 is closely related to its becoming enmeshed in the regional and global trading system. In order to maintain its robust growth, leaders in Beijing have become more “liberalized” in their foreign policy thinking. Beijing has become more proactive in participating and promoting regional economic integration. Following its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China signed a “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation” with the Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) on November 14, 2002. Beijing is also actively involved in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, the ASEAN+3 dialogues, and negotiating bilateral free-trade area (FTA) agreements with countries in the Asia– Pacific region. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao even made an FTA proposal to the Central Asian leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) when they met in September 2003.29 The economic determinant in China’s foreign policy has become weightier. In 1978, China was the thirty-second-largest trading state; in 2003, it was fifth. Its trade volume in 2003 was 5 percent of the world’s total and 20 percent of Asia’s (including Japan) total trade. The value of China’s foreign trade volume was US$851.2 billion in 2003; this was 118 times the level it had been in 1978. China received more than US$52 billion FDI in 2002, the highest in the world, and accounting for more than 50 percent of all FDI flows into all developing countries. It received twenty times more FDI than India and in 2002 its foreign trade volume was four times larger than India’s.30 China’s economic boom is attributed to its growing economic integration in Asia, including closer economic ties across the Taiwan Strait.

Liberalism versus realism in China’s Taiwan strategy “Liberalism,” “realism,” “nationalism,” “hardliners,” and “moderates” are labels used to describe different “schools of thought” among Chinese intellectuals. These labels also fit the Taiwan issue.31 “Liberals” or “moderates” favor a long-term economics-over-politics strategy toward Taiwan, while most “realists,” “nationalists,” or “hardliners” are more concerned with the rise of a pro-independence tendency in Taiwan and the island’s drifting away from the motherland. Most Chinese analysts are

The political–economic paradox 31 eclectic in terms of theoretical orientations. Few neatly fall into the paradigmic categories of international relations theory. However, there is contention among the “schools of thought” on the best strategy to deal with Taiwan’s independence tendency. The dispute flows from different conceptions of China’s national interests, the nature of China–US strategic relations, and the relationship between economic development and national reunification. There is a consensus that the Taiwan question is a matter of long-term national strategy, not a regional or local strategic issue in East Asia. Therefore, Taiwan must be dealt with in terms of China’s overall and longterm national development strategy. Specifically, the political–economic incongruity of cross-Strait relations has prodded analysts to a “grand strategy” overview, which focuses on three fundamental and interrelated issues. The first dilemma is what is the best strategy to prevent Taiwan’s independence and achieve national reunification. Given perceived failures in inducing Taipei to come to the negotiating table since the late 1980s, the “realists” or “hardliners” doubt the utility of peaceful inducements and argue for coercive diplomacy and military force as more effective means to rein in Taiwan’s move toward independence. Up to 1995–96, most Chinese analysts were still confident of the peaceful approach, believing that the eventual direct “three links” would bring the two sides closer and that the Mainland would eventually “absorb” Taiwan. The “liberals” argued that military conflicts leading to Chinese killing other Chinese was “unthinkable.”32 However, after Lee Teng-hui’s US visit in June 1995, most analysts began to favor a more assertive approach to both Taiwan and the United States. Some “realists” explicitly argued for the early resolution of the Taiwan problem – armed reunification if necessary – because armed reunification sooner rather than later is less costly. Short-term agony is better than long-term pain.33 While most “liberal” or “moderate” analysts have expressed concern over Taiwan’s independence tendency, they believe that Jiang Zemin’s eightpoint statement in 1995 is still valid, and that economic integration plus appealing to the Taiwanese people would, over time, work. The resolution of the Taiwan issue through military means would be too costly. The key to national reunification would be China’s own economic development and modernization.34 Shi Yinhong, a leading foreign policy scholar, argued that the costs of the use of force would be historically too high and might result in a long Cold War between the United States and China.35 The second issue is how to balance the Taiwan issue against Sino-US relations. Which is more important? To be sure, the Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive part of Sino-US relations. But is it possible to avoid a new Cold War with the United States while settling the Taiwan issue in China’s favor? Should China trade delay on Taiwan for a better relationship with Washington? “Realist” analysts argue that China must prepare for the

32 Weixing Hu worst-case scenario in China–US relations because Washington will treat a rising China as America’s principal rival in the Asia Pacific and use Taiwan against the rise of China. Others argue that China should make it clear to the United States that China would be happy to be a status quo power, but only after its reunification goal is achieved.36 On the other hand, “liberal” intellectuals emphasize the importance of a stable and constructive Sino-US relationship. They believe that it will be in the best interest of China to have a good relationship with the United States, rather than a confrontation over Taiwan, in the near future. In their view, good Sino-US relations are essential for China’s economic modernization and integration into the world system. The first twenty years in the twenty-first century are a period of “strategic opportunity” for China’s peaceful rise in the world, and China cannot afford to fight a war with the United State over Taiwan. In that sense, the Taiwan issue is less important than a healthy Sino-US relationship. The last but not the least important issue is the relationship between China’s reunification and its modernization. The political–economic paradox suggests a trade-off between these two goals. What are the effects of stable and dynamic economic relations across the Strait for China’s drive for modernization? How does modernization affect reunification? The “liberal” scholars tend to embrace Deng Xiaoping’s logic of economic development and national reunification. One of the leading “liberal” scholars on the Taiwan issue, Zhang Nianchi, argues that national reunification is but a component of China’s great national rejuvenation in the twenty-first century. Reunification should not interrupt modernization but should be handled within the framework of modernization.37 Another strategist, Shi Yinhong, using the notion of national grand strategy, argues that reunification can only be a dependent variable of China’s economic prosperity and growing comprehensive national capabilities.38 The “realist” analysts, on the other hand, argue that China’s modernization cannot proceed smoothly unless the Taiwan problem is first resolved. Yan Xuetong contends that the Taiwan problem has been used by Washington and other major powers to block the rise of China in the world, and an early resolution of the problem is a prerequisite for achieving modernization.39 However, the debate between the “liberals” and “realists” is closely linked to the state of cross-Strait relations and, especially, domestic political changes in Taiwan. President Chen Shui-bian’s drive for a referendum and for rewriting the constitution (Gong Tou Zhi Xian) since the middle of 2003 is seriously challenging Beijing’s bottom line on the “One-China principle.” That helped the “realist” voice prevail in the debate. Chinese leaders, policy elites, and the general public have been very much irritated and alarmed by Chen Shui-bian’s independence agenda and dramatic changes in Taiwan’s political environment since the middle of 2003. After decades of gradual changes, the attachment to the “One China” framework for cross-Strait relations is disappearing , and Taipei, no matter which party is in power, will

The political–economic paradox 33 eventually turn its de facto independence into a de jure one. As one recent internal analysis observes, although the “overall situation” concerning Taiwan’s independence drive has not seen any major breakthrough, and the majority of states still stick to the “One China” policy, the struggle against Taidu (Taiwan independence) “has come close to the critical point in its historical course.”40

Will economic integration lead to reunification? The next question is: will economic integration with Taiwan lead to reunification? Will “transnational” relations across the Strait give Beijing an upper hand in annexing a politically drifting-away Taiwan? Beijing’s new pragmatic strategy within the prevailing political–economic incongruity can be examined from various integration conceptions. Hirschman’s concept of “vulnerability interdependence” is particularly useful.41 Economic interdependence is by nature a power relationship through which one actor uses the economic factor as an instrument of political control over other actors. Chinese leaders have a well-defined strategic calculation behind their new approach to Taiwan, tolerating asymmetrical bilateral economic ties across the Taiwan Strait, seemingly in Taiwan’s favor. Beijing’s new strategy suggests that increasing economic integration will go along with, or eventually lead to, a growing political bridge between the two sides and, eventually, political integration. If the Hirschmanian model corresponds to Beijing’s pragmatic strategy, the concept of “vulnerability interdependence” may help us to understand why the Taiwan authorities are worried about the growing dependence of Taiwan’s economy on the Mainland. Liberal international relations theorists argue that economic integration reduces misunderstanding, enhances communication across cultures, and builds institutional mechanisms capable of mediating conflicts of interest. Therefore, mutual gains through economic integration help to facilitate mutual understanding and peace.42 As trade and foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives to conduct territorial expansion and foreign conquest. Actually, according to Richard Rosecrance, it is a more efficient and rewarding means for a trading state to acquire markets and resources than through military conquest.43 Liberal theorists believe that economic intercourse facilitates interstate political communication as well as mutual understanding, which could foster cooperative relations and promote peace in the long run.44 As for international conflicts, liberals believe that states are deterred, if not prevented, from initiating conflict against their trading partners under the fear of losing potential trade benefits. Trade and economic integration increase welfare gains as well as mutual vulnerability between trading partners. The loss of trade by conflict is a potential welfare loss. These potential welfare losses deter conflict. Mutual vulnerability between trading partners leads to a greater sensitivity to the trading partners’ demands. Thus

34 Weixing Hu economic integration and interdependence between trading partners makes conflict more costly and less likely. However, in considering trade’s positive effect on international relations, we cannot completely ignore that trade links are heavily influenced by the state of political relations between trading partners. Trade is often used by states to achieve political utilities as they address economic concerns such as distribution of welfare, production patterns, prices, and transaction costs. Interstate politics and domestic politics impact trade. More economically dependent states may face negative political pressures if they become subject to the manipulation or coercion by the more powerful (less dependent) state.45 Extensive economic dependence therefore can threaten national autonomy and create political problems for domestic foreignpolicy-makers. This negative consequence of economic interdependence is more pronounced for the more dependent party in an asymmetrical relationship.46 Economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait since 1988 have included a heavy involvement of governments on both sides in regulating and manipulating cross-Strait trade and investment. To a large extent, the political intervention in cross-Strait trade and investment has resulted in the political–economic paradox in cross-Strait relations. This paradox inhibits the economic exchanges from bringing a political spillover that would alleviate hostility and tension. Beijing sees economic interdependence as a way of promoting peaceful reunification, while Taipei considers it to be a bargaining chip for extracting political concessions from Beijing on recognizing Taiwan’s international status, enlarging Taiwan’s international influence, and renouncing military force against Taiwan. The political objectives are in fundamental conflict. Beijing has encouraged cross-Strait exchange because it believes that increasing economic interdependence can keep Taiwan from declaring independence by increasing its cost, and thus help gradually to promote national reunification. Rejecting that agenda, Taipei tries to control the pace of cross-Strait economic exchange so as not to fall into the trap of Beijing’s reunification policy. Since the 1980s, Beijing has tried to promote Taiwan’s business and investment in the Mainland by pushing forward “three links,” while Taiwan’s leaders have tried to use the “three links” as bargaining chips. Although economic interaction and interdependence have been growing at an astonishing speed, the heavy interventions of both Beijing and Taipei on cross-Strait exchanges have resulted in contradictory trends, a paradoxical combination of closer economic convergence and greater political divergence. The intensified economic interactions did not lead the two governments toward an agreement on any terms of meaningful political negotiation, or even recognition of legitimacy. As Harry Harding notes, integrative economic forces worked alongside significant disintegrative, or centrifugal, political tendencies, the intensified Taiwan independent

The political–economic paradox 35 movement, and Beijing’s threat of using force to achieve reunification.47 The political conflict alienates the Taiwanese. This pattern of cross-Strait relationship is described by Taiwan’s Yun-han Chu as a “concurrent process of economic convergence and political divergence.”48

Conclusions Beijing’s “new approach” toward Taiwan after the CCP’s Sixteenth Congress reflected an economic-oriented and society-oriented long-term strategy. While the political–economic paradoxical relations are expanding, Beijing is relaxed about the future direction of cross-Strait interaction as long as Taipei does not push the envelope. Chinese leaders have a positive reading of the paradox of political alienation cum economic integration in cross-Strait relations. Beijing is confident that growing economic interdependence will translate in its favor in the long run. As seen from the “liberal” perspective, leaders in Beijing are becoming more confident of future positive outcomes from cross-Strait dealings. They believe that time is on the Mainland’s side. Beijing’s new strategy also reflects lessons learned in previous cross-Strait interactions. Beijing learned that coercive diplomacy and missiles may be counter-productive and play into the hands of the pro-independence forces in Taiwan. This suggests that Beijing will be more restrained and careful in reacting to the “election languages” of political parties in Taiwan in the future because Beijing believes that not Taiwan politics but economic dependence and transnational interactions will weigh heavier in resolving the paradox of cross-Strait relations. However, Beijing’s “liberal” approach toward Taiwan is increasingly challenged by rapid changes in Taiwan’s domestic politics. Taiwan’s Mainland policy and its domestic debate on the future political relationship with the Mainland significantly affect the Taiwanese people’s perception of the Mainland and their political identification. Economic integration may influence cross-Strait relations but cannot determine the Taiwanese people’s political identity. Recent political changes in Taiwan have shown that the immediate urgency for Beijing’s Taiwan policy is not to promote reunification (Cu Tong), but, rather, to prevent Taiwan’s de jure independence (Fang Du). Chen Shui-bian’s use of referendums and his attempt at rewriting the constitution are a serious challenge to Beijing and to Washington, and to the international community as well, because a unilateral change in the status quo of cross-Strait relations would endanger peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region, forcing China to feel it must resort to force. Washington could play an important role in managing crossStrait relations and restraining Taipei from moving further toward de jure independence. A stable and healthy cross-Strait relationship is in both Washington and Beijing’s interest. And it would help Beijing retain a more “liberal” approach toward Taiwan.

36 Weixing Hu

Notes 1 Zhang Nianchi, “Understanding the Mainland’s Taiwan Policy – on the Seventh Anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s Eight Points Speech,” Ta Kung Pao, January 24, 2002. 2 Jiang Zemin’s report to the CCP Sixteenth Congress, in Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiliuci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Wenjian Huibian (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, November 2002), p. 44. 3 For analyses of Beijing’s strategy in the political use of cross-Strait economic relations, see, for example, Wu Yu-shan, “Mainland China’s Economic Policy toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or Unification Scheme?” Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 9 (September 1994), pp. 29–49; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later,” China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 1996), pp. 1260–1283. 4 Trade figures are adapted from data published in the PRC Ministry of Commerce website at www.mofcom.gov.cn from 1988 to 2003. 5 See Mainland Affairs Council, Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly (liang’an jingji tongji yuebao), No. 96 (Taiwan, August 2000). 6 See http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200307/20030700112769_1.xml 7 For example, see Li Jiaquan, et al., “A Roundtable Forum: South China Free Trade Area and Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation,” China Review, No. 67 (July 2003), pp. 56–67. 8 Data adapted from the PRC Ministry of Commerce website, March 26, 2004 at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200403/20040300200937_1.xml 9 See Jiang Zemin’s report to the CCP Sixteenth Congress, the section on Taiwan policy, in Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiliuci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Wenjian Huibian (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, November 2002), pp. 44–45. 10 Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999). 11 Tzong-Ho Bau and Wu Yu-Shan, eds., Zhengbian zhong de lianan guanxi lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Straits Relations) (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999); Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S. G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 12 Tse-Kang Leng, The Taiwan–China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996). 13 Bau and Wu, Zhengbian zhong de lianan guanxi lilun. 14 Chih-yu Shih, “Zhima! Kaimen Xinli fenxi yinling liangan zhengce yanjiu jinru xinjingjie (Sesame! Open the door. Psychoanalysis leads study on cross-Strait policy to new frontier),” in Bau and Wu, Zhengbian zhong de lianan guanxi lilun. 15 Cheng et al., Inherited Rivalry; Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects of Reunification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).; Bau and Wu, Zhengbian zhong de lianan guanxi lilun. 16 Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay, 1974). 17 Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen, Multi-System Nations and International Law: the International Status of Germany, Korea and China, Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 8 (Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1981); Wu-yueh Chang, Fenlie guojia hudong moshi yu tongyi zhengce zhi biao yanjiu (A Comparative Study of the Interaction Mode and Unification Policy of Divided Nations) (Taipei: Ye ch’iang, 1992); Yung Wei, “From Multi-System Nations to Linkage Communities: a New Conceptual Scheme for Integration of Divided Nations,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 33, No. 10 (Oct. 1997), pp. 1–19.

The political–economic paradox 37 18 Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, CA Stanford University Press, 1958); David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1966). 19 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 50. 20 Wu, Bridging the Strait. 21 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977). 22 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 185–214; Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler, “The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–35. 23 Yung Wei, “State, Nation, and Autonomy: Conflict Resolution and the Linkage Communities,” paper delivered at 43rd Annual ISA Convention, New Orleans, USA, March 24–27, 2002; Ernst Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regime,” World Politics Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 1980), pp. 357–405. 24 I am indebted to Dr. Jianwei Wang for his inspiration on this point. He brought up this point at an international conference on Sino-US relations and the Taiwan Issue Under the George W. Bush Administration, June 19–20, 2002, Hong Kong. 25 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 26 Ibid., p. 8. 27 Ibid., p. 71. 28 Ibid., p. ix. 29 See the Communiqué of the SCO Premier Meeting, Beijing, September 23, 2003. 30 Based on the WTO trade databank; see http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ statis_e/its2003_e/section3_e/iii72.xls 31 See Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojion Zha, eds., China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), the introductory chapter. 32 For example, see Wang Jisi’s (a leading foreign policy analyst with “liberalist” views) interview with the New York Times before the 1995–96 Strait Crisis, in New York Times, March 13, 1996, p. 3. 33 See, for example, Niu Jun, “Bu Pa Meiguo de Ganshe (Do Not Fear US Intervention),” Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), September 24, 1999; and Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan yu Zhongguo Anquan (American Hegemony and Chinese Security) (Tianjin: Tianji Renmin Chubanshe, 2000). Both of them are leading intellectuals and policy analysts in the study of Chinese foreign policy and the Taiwan problem in think-tanks and universities. 34 See, for example, Zhang Nianchi, “Guanyu Guojia Tongyi de Benzhi Sikao (Essential Thinking on Our National Reunification),” Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), No. 32 (August 2000), pp.15–20. 35 Shi Yinhong, “Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Jixiang Bixu Zhengshi de Dazhanlue Wenti (Grand Strategic Questions of Taiwan that Must Be Given Heed to),” Zhanlu yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 2 (2000), p. 30. 36 See, for example, Xiu Chunpin, “Meiguo DuTai Zhengche Bianhua de Beihou (Behind the Readjustment of the US Policy toward Taiwan),” Zhongguo Pinglun (China Review), No. 55 (July 2000), pp. 57–59. Ms. Xiu is Director of Foreign Relations Section, Institute of Taiwan Studies in Beijing.

38 Weixing Hu 37 Zhang Nianchi, “The 16th Party Congress and Cross-Strait Relations,” China Review, No. 60 (December 2002), p. 7. 38 Shi Yinhong, “Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Jixiang Bixu Zhengshi de Dazhanlue Wenti.” 39 Yan Xuetong, Meiguo Baquan yu Zhongguo Anquan, pp. 188–190. 40 Zhong Wen, “Complicated Picture in Taiwan’s Political Situation,” in CCP Propaganda Department’s Current Affairs Report (see Xihuanet, January 25, 2004). 41 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980). 42 Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; Mitrany, A Working Peace System. 43 Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State 44 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997). 45 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. 46 Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968). 47 Harry Harding, “The Concept of ‘Greater China’: Themes, Variations and Reservations,” China Quarterly, No. 136 (December 1993), p. 684. 48 Yun-han Chu, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 15 (1997), p. 230.

Part II

Taiwan’s dilemmas

3

China isolates Taiwan Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu

The fight between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) over international space is a remnant of the Cold War. The ferocity is unabated even though the economic relations between these two former arch rivals and the overall environment in East Asia have been dramatically reshaped since the 1990s, as discussed in chapter 2. Huge transactions of commercial goods and capital have made the Strait of Taiwan one of the busiest waterways in the world. Despite economic interdependence, the two are still locked in deadly diplomatic wrangling. Since Chen Shui-bian’s election as president of the Republic of China in March 2000, China’s opposition has increased in intensity. Two days after Chen assumed the Chairmanship of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in July 2002, Beijing forced Nauru, one of the twenty-eight countries that still maintained formal relations with the Republic of China, to shift diplomatic recognition. A private visit to Indonesia by ROC Vice President Annette Lu in August 2002 was nearly derailed by the People’s Republic when the news was leaked after the plane had landed in the host country. To refuse Taiwan international space has been an essential part of China’s Taiwan policy, a source of confrontation decades after the shelling on the frontline islands stopped in 1979. China’s caustic policy is also responsible for the rise of anti-China sentiment and Taiwan-centered identity that has engulfed the island republic in recent years, as detailed in other chapters in this section of the book. Beijing’s drive to expunge Taiwan’s international personality won a major boost at the turn of the 1970s when the Republic of China lost its UN seat. Subsequently, a rentong yu huigui (identification and return) policy to win over overseas Chinese was implemented.1 A comprehensive drive to isolate Taiwan began. As major countries broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Republic of China on Taiwan was reduced to dire straits. When the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) was in power, the China– Taiwan diplomatic tussle was perceived as a continuation of the civil war fought between the Nationalists and the Communists in the 1940s. Both sides tried to use diplomatic advantage to establish the legitimacy of their rule. Since the DPP came to power, the fight has been intensified. Democratic

42 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu Taiwan is now increasingly reluctant to adhere to the old “one China” practice.2 Throughout, the People’s Republic has been the key factor determining the degree of Taiwan’s participation in international affairs.3 For China, Taiwan’s endeavors to resuscitate its status in the international arena constitute a crime of “splitting the motherland.” China will accept nothing less than a public acknowledgement that Taiwan is an integral part of China, the same as Hong Kong and Guangdong. As long as the Republic of China remains sovereign, it is not likely that China will relent in its opposition. Fearing international isolation, the people of Taiwan ponder what will happen to them if the Republic of China loses its international personality or even its status as a sovereign state. Taiwan’s dilemmas provide a case study for the understanding of the impact of diplomatic isolation. This chapter focuses on the causes of, and effects on, three isolated states and tries to build a theory on sovereignty-driven diplomatic isolation.

Typology of diplomatic isolation A state may be isolated out of its own choice to ward off foreign influences or isolation can be forced upon it. Forced isolation is like banishment or quarantine;4 nations tend to avoid isolation since it is invariably perceived as a sign of weakness.5 Indicators of isolation Isolation is a multi-dimensional phenomenon encompassing a wide spectrum of inter-state relations. Past history has yielded different types of isolation. Deon Geldenhuys develops four measurements – political and diplomatic, military, economic, and socio-cultural – to fathom isolation. The four areas can then be broken into sixteen indicators.6 They are further condensed into fourteen by the authors (see Table 3.1). Table 3.1 Measurements of diplomatic isolation Political and diplomatic indicators

Military indicators

Economic indicators

Diplomatic relations Military visits Foreign trade Membership of interand agreements Foreign governmental Arms sales investment, organizations (IGOs) Military aid loans, and International treaties and cooperation technology Official visits abroad transfer International support Foreign aid in IGOs

Socio-cultural indicators Membership of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) Travel and tourism Sport, art, and entertainment exchange

Source: Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17–18.

China isolates Taiwan 43 1

2

3

4

To have relations with other states and participate in international activities are essential ingredients for the existence of a country. They are important sources of legitimacy required for statehood (and the government it breeds).7 Ordinarily, it is the undeniable right of a state to develop normal relations with the outside world. Therefore, depriving a state of this right is a severe loss. Sometimes, it could bring devastating consequences. Arms embargoes and banning the transfer of military technology are important strategies of isolation, too. The aim of an arms embargo is to prevent the isolated state from getting materials that could be used for domestic suppression or defending itself in military conflicts. A longterm embargo could weaken the target nation’s military capability.8 The purpose of military isolation is to enervate a country’s capability to defend itself and survive. Since the UN Charter opposes violence as a means of resolving international conflicts, sanctions (especially embargos), like political and diplomatic pressures, have become a substitute technique to force a country into compliance.9 Economic sanctions can de-link a country from the international economic order and gradually stifle the economy. To restrain a country from developing socio-cultural exchanges with the international society is yet another form of isolation. Exclusion from participation in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil exchanges is a common strategy in this category.10 For the general public of the targeted country, the sense of loneliness and inconvenience resulting from this type of isolation is palpable.

Models of isolation The Republic of China, South Africa and Israel have been the most isolated states since World War II.11 South Africa was isolated because of its racially discriminatory apartheid policy; Israel was isolated because the Arab states wanted to negate its existence in the Middle East; and Taiwan has been isolated by the People’s Republic over the issue of sovereignty. South Africa’s plight came earliest. At a UN Assembly meeting in 1946, India accused South Africa of discriminating against Indians, prompting the world body to condemn South Africa for its apartheid policy.12 Between 1960 and 1980, the United Nations imposed diplomatic, military, and economic sanctions against South Africa to pressure the white government to abandon its unjust racial policy. Although South Africa was able to keep its UN membership because of support from the United States and Great Britain, it was extremely isolated.13 Ultimately, outside pressure helped force President F. W. de Klerk to release Nelson Mandela from imprisonment and legalize the African National Congress in 1990.14 Eventually the apartheid policy was dismantled. It was not until Mandela became president that South Africa was able to escape from the nightmare of isolation in entirety.

44 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu Ever since becoming established as a country in its own right, legitimated by a UN resolution in 1948, Israel has been fighting for its survival.15 Arab countries not only refused to recognize Israel, they also lobbied other states to join in a “sacred war” against Israel.16 Although Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt at Camp David in 1979, entered into an agreement with the Palestinians in 1993, and signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, improving its relations with part of the Arab World,17 the shadow of isolation still looms. Yet Table 3.2 shows, taking the 1980s as a base for comparison, that Taiwan was the most isolated of the three. The reason for this is largely because Taiwan’s “nation-state” status is not only not recognized by most states, it is not even recognized by the United States. Relative to the other two cases, Taiwan was the least recognized (only by twenty-two countries in 1988), and none of the industrialized democracies (including Japan) recognized it.18 Taiwan only participated in nine inter-governmental organizations (IGOs, most of them economic in nature) and was not a member of the United Nations. By comparison, apartheid South Africa was accepted by twenty-seven IGOs and was a legitimate member of the United Nations. As for official visits abroad, Taiwan’s premier visited two states, South Korea and Paraguay in 1988, while Israeli leaders visited four states – Hungary, the United States, Italy, and France. In the field of economic and socio-cultural isolation, Taiwan’s situation was a little better but was still restricted in the participation of its NGOs, as detailed by Chen Jie (see chapter 6). Consequently, Taiwan was involved far less in NGO affairs than were the other two countries. While South Africa and Israel also faced diplomatic and political isolation, they both retained official relations with the major industrialized powers. Table 3.2 Comparisons of isolation: Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa Indicator

ROC (Taiwan)

Israel

South Africa

Official diplomatic relations (1988) Membership in IGOs (1987) Top leaders’ overseas visits (1988) International treaties (1980) International trade (US$100 million) (1988)1 Membership in NGOs (1987) Foreign visitors (1987–8)

223 93 23 283 110,1563 6853 1,935,1343

813 363 43 73 24,7703 1,1323 1,423,0002

293 273 73 83 40,5943 8363 804,9853

Source: Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Notes 1 Data from World Trade Organization, “World merchandise trade by region and selected economy,” at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/webpub_e.xls. 2 1987. 3 1988.

China isolates Taiwan 45 In the military sphere, South Africa, like Taiwan, also suffered a shortage of arms supplies. But Taiwan’s situation was more dire because of the overwhelming military advantage of the People’s Republic over Taiwan and because the United States was gradually becoming the sole source for Taiwan’s arms procurement. Economically, Taiwan was in a better position. The struggle with China was focused on political sovereignty. This window of opportunity has enabled Taiwan to achieve an “economic miracle” based on close integration with the world market. In the socio-cultural arena, South Africa’s isolation was pervasive and Israel was boycotted by the Arab world. While Taiwan has to work hard to develop official socio-cultural relations with the outside world, it has, as Chen Jie shows (see chapter 6), scored moderate success among NGOs.19 South Africa’s isolation ended with the dismantling of apartheid. While Israel’s problem is not over yet, its isolation has been greatly reduced. Only democratic, multicultural Taiwan, with no territorial ambitions, remains trapped in isolation. Although almost thirty countries maintain official ties with the island republic, that number might shrink to a single digit because of the efforts of the People’s Republic. Without US support, Taiwan will not be able to acquire weaponry for its own defense. With the exception of the economy, Taiwan is facing comprehensive isolation (see Table 3.2). Building on the experiences of these three cases, two types of isolation can be distinguished, depending on whether sovereignty is involved. Taiwan is unique in that its isolation is “sovereignty-driven” because of the policies of China, first over the issue of representation and then on a separate sovereignty. As its sovereignty and legal status are challenged by a major regional power, one with veto power in the UN Security Council, Taiwan faces severe and comprehensive political-diplomatic and military isolation. The other veto-wielding Security Council members will not sacrifice their need for China’s support on key issues merely to recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty. However, Taiwan’s economic linkage with the outside world remains basically unhindered. Some contend that, in this age of globalization, it is the economy that is decisive. Whereas Taiwan is vibrantly multicultured, South Africa’s isolation was “human rights- and race-driven,” due to its racially unjust apartheid system. Although the legitimacy of the racist government was questioned, the sovereignty and the legal status of the country were not seriously challenged. Hence, measures of punishment were concentrated in the economic and socio-cultural areas. Israel, on the other hand, became isolated because neighboring countries long refused to recognize its legitimate existence. But as that rejectionism has eroded, Israel’s isolation can be labeled as “raceand religion-driven.” Although the legal status of Israel was once challenged, that was limited to hardline Muslim states, none of which was a Great Power. The isolation was more localized and its sovereign survival was not in danger. For the “sovereignty-driven” isolation of Taiwan, the focus of isolation

46 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu centers in political areas, while for the non-sovereignty-driven (including race-, human-rights- and religion-based) isolation, difficulties are more in the economic area. Table 3.2 substantiates the dichotomy. Taiwan is obviously the most isolated among the three in political-diplomatic terms, with official diplomatic relations, membership in IGOs, and top leaders’ overseas visits the fewest. But Taiwan was extremely active in international trade. It also attracted the most visitors (including tourists and businessmen). For “sovereignty-driven” isolation, the danger is more comprehensive, because the international system is primarily a political arrangement among states. Under such isolation, it is harder for the targeted nation to make a breakthrough. It is not impossible for the isolated country to completely lose its international personality. Table 3.3 shows that with the exception of economic relations, states isolated because of sovereignty suffer a more complete shut-off than those threatened by non-sovereignty-driven isolation. This is probably because diplomacy is conducted by sovereign states and the game of sovereignty tends to be zero-sum. For countries not directly related to the conflict, it is easier to go along with the isolation attempt than to resist a Great Power. But for non-sovereignty-driven isolation, the chances for a complete shutout are smaller since the targeted countries remain qualified sovereign states, whatever the objectionable nature of particular regime policies. With the end of the apartheid policy, South Africa has resumed a normal diplomatic status. Of the two remaining isolated states, despite the terror bombing, Israel is in a much better situation to survive than is Taiwan. While the Palestinians and the Israelis could grow weary of their conflict and move Table 3.3 Typology of isolation Indicator

Sovereigntydriven isolation

Representative state

ROC, Israel South Africa (before the 1990s?) Less Less

Official diplomatic ties Diplomatic relations with great powers None Membership in UN None Major source of isolation Non-economic Participation in major IGOs Official visits abroad Military exchanges Sources of arms sales Boycott on foreign trade Participation in NGOs

Some Few Little Little None Average

Human rights- Race-driven and race-driven isolation isolation Israel More

Many Yes Economic and other kinds

Many Yes Economic and other kinds

Many Many More Some Severe Average

Many Many More Ample Mild More

China isolates Taiwan 47 to find ways to co-exist peacefully, Taiwan is engaged in a zero-sum diplomatic game with China in the international arena. As the young democracy has become further consolidated with the transition of power from the old elite KMT to the long-time challenger DPP in 2000, Taiwan actually faces the risk of being further isolated. Seeing the DPP as working for Taiwan independence (meaning international recognition as the sovereign state it is), China has increased its pressure against Taiwan’s DPP administration, although, as outlined above, China’s power and policy absolutely preclude Taiwan from winning international recognition.

Beijing’s isolation strategy before the DPP came to power Taiwan’s uniquely threatening isolation originates from entanglement by the issue of sovereignty. Because of the uncompromising nature of the confrontation by China, the party that imposes isolation will try its best to abort all attempts by Taiwan to break out of the containment. The governments of the People’s Republic and the Republic of China started a diplomatic tussle right after the People’s Republic was founded in 1949. The major battlefield in the beginning was the United Nations. The Republic of China held on to its UN seat until expelled in October 1971, plunging Taiwan into an abyss of isolation.20 Defeated, Taiwan abandoned its old hanzei bu liangli (the Chinese and the bandits would not co-exist) policy in the late 1980s and substituted “pragmatic diplomacy,” meaning that substantive relations are more important than symbolism.21 The policy change signified the success of China’s attempt to isolate the island and the powerlessness of Taipei to stop Beijing from obstructing Taiwan from pursuing orthodox diplomacy. The so-called “pragmatic diplomacy” was an attempt to prevent Taiwan from being totally overwhelmed. When Lee Teng-hui became president in 1988, Taiwan further relaxed its foreign policy rigidity and adopted a policy of “substantive diplomacy.” When the Provisional Articles in the Period during the Suppressing of the Communist Rebellion were revoked in 1991, Taiwan started to recognize the People’s Republic as a de facto ruling entity. Taiwan yearned merely for co-existence.22 However, instead of ushering in a new era of peaceful coexistence, the new initiative was taken by the PRC government as aiming at the creation of “two Chinas.”23 In response, Beijing went yet further in isolating an already isolated Taiwan. China’s isolationist policy To block Taiwan from gaining de jure status has been central to Beijing’s “one country, two systems” policy. Since sovereignty is an integral component of the formation of a country,24 Beijing believes that if all nations and IGOs refuse to acknowledge the legal status of Taiwan and instead recognize the island as part of the People’s Republic, that would be

48 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu conducive to resolving the “Taiwan problem” as a domestic issue of China. Beijing believes that once Taiwan is deprived of any international status, it will have no choice but to turn to China and accept the offer China puts on the table. In order to achieve Taiwan’s extreme isolation Beijing has resorted to two basic methods: first, to make the “one-China principle” a universal norm; and second, to prevent Taiwan from doing anything that would contradict sub-sovereign status. The one-China principle The People’s Republic has been pushing for its “one-China principle” relentlessly. When other countries seek formal relations with China, it is the most important language demanded in the communiqués.25 For the Communist Party leadership of Beijing, “there is only one China; the PRC is the sole legal government representing China; and Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.” Visitors to China are often asked to parrot that mantra before business can be discussed. To make the “one-China principle” universally acceptable and codified is a core item on the PRC agenda. In other words, Taiwan commits the crime of being “unpatriotic and treacherous” if it intends to counter the isolation imposed on it by China. Actions by other nations that counter Taiwan’s isolation would bring accusations of trying to “internationalize” the Taiwan issue. Under these circumstances, almost all countries are forced to express acceptance of the “one-China principle” when establishing official relations with the People’s Republic, as shown by Bruce Jacobs (see chapter 5). China believes that the People’s Republic is the only representative of a China with its capital located in Beijing, and that Taiwan is only a province or regional government of the country. Therefore China will not tolerate Taiwan developing official relations with other states. Governments with formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic are not allowed to make official contacts with Taiwan. Nor does Taiwan have the right to send its top officials for overseas visits or to sign official agreements or documents, even with countries without formal diplomatic ties, and not with international organizations requiring statehood as a condition for admission.26 The stakes are so high that Beijing demands immediate termination of official relations once a country recognizes the Republic of China. The same is true for the IGOs. Beijing does everything possible to stop Taiwan from participating in them.27 According to Beijing, Taiwan is not a sovereign state and therefore the principle of universal UN membership makes Taiwan part of China.28 Beijing almost always brings up Resolution 2758 (passed by the UN General Assembly in 1971), which ended ROC membership in the world body, to deny Taiwan the right to join the United Nations and its affiliated organizations. If some non-political IGOs choose to ignore the “one-China principle,”

China isolates Taiwan 49 Beijing then insists that Taiwan be admitted with an unorthodox title. For example, Taiwan was finally admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a title of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” in January 2002 because of the weight it carries in the global trade regime. In its effort to gain an observer status from the World Health Organization, Taiwan has to no avail invented the term “Taiwan Health Entity.”29 Beijing’s isolationist policy constricting Taiwan’s breathing space is extended to include NGOs as well. The People’s Republic allows Taiwan to participate only when the title properly displays Taiwan as a local entity of China. If the NGOs show reluctance to abide by the “one-China principle,” Beijing would then press the organizations to make adjustments or China will withdraw its membership.30 When it comes to the extreme isolation of Taiwan, China means business. Strategies and methods of isolation China employs a host of methods and strategies to achieve the goal of isolating Taiwan. In the area of political and diplomatic isolation, there are three common strategies. First, enticing (or coercing) countries to end their official relations with Taiwan has been the most effective measure that China has used. For the PRC leaders, since there is only one China, therefore the international personality of the Republic of China should be expunged. Since Beijing will not consent to the principle of dual recognition, it will break off formal relations with those who resist China’s will. Given China’s growing clout in the world, this threat is quite a powerful deterrent. Second, preventing Taiwan from participating in official international activities is another strategy commonly used by Beijing. The policy is so strict that Taiwan is not even allowed to deliver humanitarian aid to countries with whom it has no formal ties. China blocked relief when Taiwan wanted to provide assistance to Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt during the first Persian Gulf Crisis in 1991. After assessing the situation, Egypt gently refused Taiwan’s aid offer. Although Jordan and Turkey still accepted Taiwan’s offer, it was not an easy decision.31 Taiwan has been trying to reenter the United Nations since 1993, as detailed by T.Y. Wang (see chapter 9). But that effort is going nowhere because of China’s obstruction. Regardless of their size, countries have been successfully pressed not to give support to Taiwan’s bid.32 For example, China threatened Guatemala, which recognizes Taiwan, not to support Taiwan’s UN bid; otherwise China would veto a UN resolution to send peace-keeping forces to supervise the ceasefire that had been reached between the government and the rebel army – an end to decades of inhumanity in Guatemala. In the end, the Central American nation was forced to abandon supporting Taiwan in exchange for China withdrawing its veto.33 Third, preventing Taiwan’s officials from making outside contacts is yet

50 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu another strategy that China has used to isolate Taiwan. China forbids countries with official relations with China from entertaining visits by Taiwan’s top officials (including the president, the vice president, the premier, the foreign minister, and the defense minister). Beijing conveyed its opposition to the Clinton administration before then President Lee Tenghui was granted a visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in June 1995. After America failed to stop the visit, Beijing called back its ambassador and officials who were visiting Washington, DC. The People’s Republic also postponed military consultation with the United States and summoned the American ambassador in Beijing for censure. Finally, in March 1996, on the eve of Taiwan’s first presidential election, Beijing lobbed missiles near the major ports of Taiwan.34 To stop arms transfer to Taiwan is another tool that Beijing has employed in its fight against Taiwan. Beijing believes that a militarily capable Taiwan is not helpful to China’s cause of unification, and therefore stopping arms sales to Taiwan has been a top priority. In awe of Beijing’s retaliation, most countries have chosen not to antagonize Beijing. When the Dutch government approved the sale of two diesel-powered submarines to Taiwan in 1982, Beijing immediately recalled its ambassador from The Hague and asked the Dutch ambassador to leave Beijing, downgrading the Dutch mission to chargé d’affaires level.35 The Dutch no longer sell arms to Taiwan. The United States is the only country that stands up to Beijing’s pressure. To cut American arms sales to Taiwan is a top priority in Beijing’s relations with the United States. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims that America’s arms sales to Taiwan make Taiwan more resistant to China’s unification demand. US arms sales are deemed interference in China’s domestic affairs.36 Under Beijing’s strong pressure, the United States has made concessions. In a joint communiqué on August 17, 1982, the Reagan administration promised to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, both in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms, contingent upon the improvement of relations between Taiwan and China. As a result, Taiwan was unable to upgrade its air force in the 1980s. Arms sales almost always come up when Chinese officials meet with their American counterparts. US arms sales to Taiwan prompt protests from Beijing. When President George W. Bush, for electoral reason, decided in 1992 to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 jet fighters, in disregard of the 1982 communiqué, Beijing immediately summoned the American ambassador and publicly condemned the United States for breaking its promise. To pressure Bush, Beijing refused to attend Middle East arms control meetings between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.37 In the end, China decided to drop out of the meeting because of US refusal to cancel the sale.38 To isolate Taiwan, China will sacrifice peace and stability elsewhere, from Central America to the Middle East. There is another dimension to Taiwan’s military isolation. The People’s Republic asked Saudi Arabia to break off relations with Taiwan in exchange

China isolates Taiwan 51 for China selling the Middle East country Chinese missiles.39 Destabilizing other regions to get what China wants from Taiwan is standard PRC policy. Beijing has also been playing economic instruments to isolate Taiwan. As China has been rising and gaining strength through reforming its economic system since 1978, Taiwan has found it harder to compete against China’s largess to woo poor countries to maintain relations with Taiwan. The two sides compete to buy support. China’s economic offers are extremely effective because almost all of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners are poor and small Pacific island, African, and Latin American countries. When visiting Latin America in 1985, the then Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang, told his hosts that relations could start with economic exchange and cooperation if there were still obstacles for normalizing political relations.40 China accepted imports from Latin America and ran a trade deficit. Arms sales to the governments were also encouraged.41 Beijing’s efforts were rewarded handsomely. When the Sandinista government in Nicaragua decided to establish diplomatic relations with China in December 1985, it received an interest-free loan of roughly US$10 million from Beijing. It received another loan, of approximately US$19 million, one year later when its leader Daniel Ortega visited Beijing.42 Receiving foreign aid is appealing to many Third World governments. Preferential loans, joint ventures, and donations have followed upon the rise of China’s economic power.43 Sending personnel with medical and agricultural expertise to help Third World countries also wins friendship. With its economy expanding rapidly, China has increased its foreign aid. Although still receiving economic aid from Japan, China spends over US$300 million per year in overseas assistance. Between thirty and forty countries have received aid.44 For South Pacific island countries, China has provided interest-free loans, built huge construction projects, and sent economic development and medical teams to Western Samoa, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. China also imported copper from Papua New Guinea and sugar from Fiji to promote bilateral trade relations.45 Lastly, China has also been trying to prevent Taiwan from participating in socio-cultural activities in international society. It is not uncommon for Chinese officials to press sponsors of international events not to give representation to Taiwan. If Taiwan is a participant, Beijing then asks the sponsors not to display the ROC national flag, nor to show Taiwan’s official designation. Not acceding to the PRC demands means risking a possible Chinese boycott. To deprive Taiwan of any opportunity to display its sovereign status at international forums, Beijing tries to prevent Taiwan from even participating in international activities.46 To portray Taiwan’s actual international presence as merely that of a regional Chinese government is yet another strategy for the Beijing leadership. As soon as Taiwan was accepted in 1991 into the International Foundation for Science, an NGO providing support to scientists in developing countries, the People’s Republic withdrew.47 In April 2003,

52 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu Taiwan was asked to change its name in order to remain a member of the International Lion’s Club. In sum, whether dealing with Europe or America, or the United Nations, or the smallest and poorest nation, or a private service club, a rising China has been using its new clout to isolate Taiwan.

China’s measures of isolation after the DPP came to power The presidential election held in 2000 witnessed the first peaceful transition of power in the Republic of China’s ninety-year history. The symbolic significance was momentous.48 The long-ruling Kuomintang was finally defeated by the DPP, whose leader, Chen Shui-bian, became the fifth president since the ROC government resettled in Taipei after military defeat by Mao’s Red Armies in 1949. Since the DPP embraced “localized” values and yearned for independence, the election was unsettling to the People’s Republic.49 Many pundits predicted that Beijing would tighten its noose around Taiwan.50 Before the election, Chinese officials publicly expressed opposition to the election of DPP candidate Chen. The Chinese ambassador to the United States declared that opposition while meeting with a group from Taiwan.51 Commenting on Taiwan’s upcoming election, the Chinese premier spoke loudly, angrily, and in a threatening manner, stating that “whoever engages in Taiwan independence is bound to have ill consequences.”52 He warned Taiwan not to play with fire. Subsequently, many found that the tough talk had backfired and alienated the Taiwanese. Following the KMT’s electoral defeat, the CCP Politburo met to map out a new strategy. The PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office expressed that policy initiative toward Chen as one of “listening to his words and observing his deeds.”53 China would do nothing that could redound to President Chen’s benefit. Mistrusting the DPP, China is not pleased with the praise Taiwan’s democratic consolidation has received from the international media and from academics. China remains suspicious of what the new ruling party might do in power, especially after Chen was re-elected for a second term in March 2004, something China had worked hard to prevent. Still, the strategies that China has resorted to in order to isolate the DPP’s Taiwan remain the same as those used against the KMT’s Taiwan, although the intensity has been heightened. Taiwan has faced greater pressure to isolate it from the international community since the DPP’s Chen came to power in May 2000. However, the democratic transition that started in the late 1980s has enhanced Taiwan’s leverage in the international community. Table 3.4 shows that the number of countries maintaining official relations with the Republic of China has held steady. There are even some positive signs, as Taiwan’s membership in NGOs, the amount of foreign direct investment, international trade, and foreign visitors have all increased. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s ability to acquire

China isolates Taiwan 53 Table 3.4 The diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, 1990, 1999, and 2002 Indicator Official ties Membership of IGOs Foreign countries visited by top leaders1 International treaties Arms imported (US$ million) Total United States Others International trade (US$ million) Foreign direct investment (US$ million) Membership of NGOs Foreign visitors

1990

1999

2002

283 103 23 443

29 16 8 52

27 18 7 101

7202 7203 03 121,9293 2,3013 7473 1,854,5063

1,664 1,658 6 232,272 4,231 962 2,411,248

203 203 0 243,129 3,271 1,064 2,726,411

Sources: website of the Office of the President, Republic of China at http://www.president. gov.tw/; website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China at http://www.mofa. gov.tw/newmofa/index.htm; website of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA at http:// www.trade.gov.tw/bofteng/index.asp; http://www.motc.gov.tw/service/year-c/ycmain.htm; Foreign Relations Yearbook, ROC, 1989, 1990, 1992 at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/ yearbook/yearbook.htm; SIPRI, “Arms transfers to China and Taiwan, 1993–2002,” at http:// projects.sipri.se/armstrade/atchi_taidata.html Notes 1 Top leaders include the president, the vice president and the premier. 2 1993 data. 3 1990 data.

weaponry has been further wounded. In 1998, three countries provided arms to the Republic of China. Two countries, the United States and France, provided the lion’s share at about US$2 billion each. A third country, Canada, sold to Taiwan US$15-million-worth of weaponry. But since 2001 the United States has stood as the sole supplier of arms to the island.54 Taiwan is ever more isolated in key things. Political-diplomatic and military isolations Since the DPP came to power, four countries have broken relations with the Republic of China and shifted diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic. In Europe, that left only the Vatican recognizing Taiwan. After Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration as president, he sent his foreign minister to Europe on a get-acquainted mission in June 2000. Bilateral relations with Macedonia seemed solid.55 But one year later, after a government restructuring in Macedonia, China pressed the new authorities to break with Taiwan. Macedonia and China established formal relations in June 2001. Beijing then humiliated Taiwan’s DPP president by asking Nauru, a small island country in the South Pacific with a population of 20,000, to cut relations with the Republic of China in exchange for US$130 million, a switch meant to coincide with Chen Shui-bian assuming the DPP’s chairmanship on

54 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu July 21, 2002.56 The setback was followed by two more severances: Liberia and the Commonwealth of Dominica. To gain a seat at the United Nations has been a goal for the DPP not only because of a survival need for international space for Taiwan, but also because it symbolizes to the DPP electorate that Taiwan is respected by the international community. To prevent the DPP government from making headway in its UN bid has been a matter of priority for the People’s Republic. The Chinese ambassador to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN Secretariat in August 2002, reiterating the stand that Taiwan is part of China, and that Taiwan is absolutely not qualified to be involved in any operations or activities of the world body, or its subordinate organizations, under any name or any circumstances.57 A decade after it first applied for membership of the World Trade Organization, and long after it had met WTO guidelines, Taiwan was finally accepted into the WTO, becoming its 144th member in January 2002 under the name of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” However, Beijing is still not happy with the arrangement. In May 2003, Beijing lodged a protest to the WTO Secretariat, asking that Taiwan merely be accorded the same treatment as Hong Kong and Macau,58 which, in contrast to Taiwan, do not have independent militaries and sovereign control of their foreign relations. With the assistance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, Taiwan was granted membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group in 1991. However, it is not allowed to send its top leaders to attend the summit meeting and has had a hard time obtaining the right to host the annual meeting. Nor is the ROC foreign minister qualified for participation. It has become customary that upon receiving an invitation for an APEC summit meeting Taiwan would appoint a special envoy (usually an economics official or a senior advisor to the president without government portfolio) who would serve on behalf of the Taiwan president. At APEC’s annual meeting held in Shanghai in October 2001, Taiwan was embarrassed when its intended head of delegation, retired former Vice President Lee Yuan-chu, was rejected by China. This policy of depriving the top ROC leaders of any international presence is felt by the people of Taiwan as proof that, instead of caring about the well-being of the people of Taiwan, what concerned Beijing the most was to create an international impression – what the Taiwanese would consider a false impression – that Taiwan was but a part of China. In the end, Taiwan boycotted the 2001 APEC summit meeting.59 During the APEC press conference held by the host Chinese foreign minister, Taiwan’s delegation was prevented from fielding questions. Such behavior alienates the Taiwanese from China. While Taiwan has been trying to obtain an observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO) since 1997, Beijing has done all it can to block it on the ground that the WHO is a subordinate organization of the United Nations, an organization of nation-states. The eruption of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and China’s obstruction of WHO aid to

China isolates Taiwan 55 Taiwan, detailed by Dennis Hickey (see chapter 4), earned Taiwan more sympathy. Taiwan then received more support at the World Health Assembly (WHA), the highest decision-making body of the WHO, at its annual meeting in May 2003. Many nations, including the United States and the European Union, spoke for Taiwan for the first time on humanitarian grounds. The attempt to win Taiwan observer status failed again, however, because of China’s opposition. The Chinese ambassador misleadingly claimed that China had “helped Taiwan to fight against the SARS.”60 Speaking at a WHA meeting held in Geneva, the Chinese deputy premier, who was concurrently minister of public health, questioned the legality of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. She asserted that Beijing had adopted an array of measures to strengthen cooperation with Taiwan to help fight the illness.61 In fact, there appeared to be no such exchange between the two sides. To keep Taiwan isolated, Chinese diplomats lobbied against a transit stop for President Chen Shui-bian in the United States en route to Latin America on a state visit in 2001. The People’s Republic sent letters to US Congressmen and to the Houston mayor asking the hosts not to meet with Chen. China also mobilized overseas Chinese and students to protest against Chen’s visit, organizing a demonstration in front of a hotel at which Chen stayed.62 Similarly, when Vice President Annette Lu wanted to make a connecting flight at Rome en route to the fifty-first Annual Conference of the Liberal International, a private event held in Budapest, Hungary, in March 2002, Chinese diplomats in Rome protested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. China also strongly protested to the Hungarian government and threatened a suspension of bilateral meetings.63 However, the Hungarian government refused to buckle and Vice President Lu was able to deliver a speech at the opening ceremony of the conference. To penalize Hungary, China refused to sign an economic, commercial, and technical cooperation agreement with the country. When Premier Yu Shyi-kun made a transit stop in the United States, China also lodged strong protests to the US government.64 Not even a former president – that is, a private citizen – is spared China’s heavy-handed suppression. After failing to stop the Japanese government from issuing a visa to former President Lee Teng-hui to seek cardiac treatment in Japan, Chinese diplomats organized protests against the visit and sent protest letters to the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister.65 Economic and socio-cultural isolation The combination of the rise of China’s economic strength and the coming to power of an indigenous Taiwan party in Taiwan has heightened Beijing’s resolve to harness more economic resources to the detriment of its nemesis. As Taiwan’s hopes are snuffed out by China in the area of health, so China tries to suffocate Taiwan in the international economy. In a global economy, free trade agreements are needed to expedite the flows of goods and

56 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu services. China agreed to enter such an agreement with countries of the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) in 2002. However, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Economics and Trade warned other countries at a press conference held during the Sixteenth CCP Congress not to enter into similar agreements with Taiwan or they would get into “severe political troubles.”66 The People’s Republic thus threatens Taiwan’s international economic ties, Taiwan’s lifeblood. If China succeeds, Taiwan’s isolation will get even worse. Speaking at the East Asia and Latin America Forum held in Chile in March 2001, the Chinese foreign minister warned that China would raise tariffs on states without diplomatic relations with China even after the nation became a member of the WTO. Therefore, the Chinese minister continued, it was urgent that countries like Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Belize, which all recognized the Republic of China at that moment, allow Beijing to establish a commercial office first. At about the same time, a Chinese state enterprise showered largess on the government of Panama, another nation with whom Taiwan has normal relations, pouring in US$200 million as a gesture of goodwill.67 China also provided US$2 million to a labor union in Paraguay to help construct a dormitory for laborers.68 China’s message is that it pays to have diplomatic ties with China; it costs to have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Although China consents to Taiwan’s involvement in non-political activities at the international arena in its “eight-point” initiative proposed by then President Jiang Zemin in January 1995, China’s policy betrays its words. China tends to ask NGOs to shun Taiwan. Facing China’s wrath, many NGOs just delay and then leave the Taiwan issue to Beijing and Taipei to find solutions,69 thereby further isolating Taiwan. The fight over Taiwan’s status at the Lions Club International provides an illustration. The Republic of China joined the international organization in 1915 and has actively participated in its affairs, including giving donations, since the headquarters of the local chapter was relocated to Taipei in 1953. However, two local units from China sought to join this NGO in 2002. They requested that the original ROC chapter designation be changed to that of “China Taiwan” and that Taiwan’s Lions Club not be allowed to use the ROC flag in the organization’s activities.70 Taiwan’s Lions Club protested, suggesting a change in name from Republic of China to “Taiwan.”71 Taiwan was then asked to strike out the word “Taiwan” from the club’s banner.72 In sum, although Beijing claims its struggle with Taiwan is merely “fierce in official and political domains but moderate over private and economic areas,”73 in fact, Chinese officials pursue their policy of isolating Taiwan fiercely in all realms, and the realms of isolation are worsening for Taiwan.

Impact and side-effects of China-imposed isolation The all-out war to suffocate Taiwan by constricting its international breathing space has not only decimated Taiwan’s presence in the international

China isolates Taiwan 57 community, it has also deepened the mistrust of China in Taiwan and aggravated the identity crisis among Taiwanese, leading ever more of them to feel that Chineseness is the enemy of Taiwanese.74 Political and diplomatic isolation China has imposed on Taiwan an unparalleled isolation. Table 3.5 contrasts the differences in diplomatic recognitions received by the Republic of China and the People’s Republic, starting with the year before US President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor first went to China. The Table 3.5 Changes in the diplomatic map of Taipei and Beijing, 1970–2002 Year

Taipei

Beijing

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

67 54 41 37 31 27 27 23 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 23 23 23 22 26 28 29 29 29 29 30 30 27 27 29 29 28 27

54 69 87 89 96 105 109 111 113 117 121 121 122 125 126 127 127 127 136 136 136 139 153 156 157 158 158 160 160 160 161 162 164

Sources: Chien-min Chao, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui: a Balance Sheet,” in Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao, eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 182; Foreign Relations Yearbook, ROC, 1999–2002; China Diplomacy, 1999–2002.

58 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations in 1971 was the beginning of a reconfigured diplomatic map between Taipei and Beijing. Countries recognizing the Republic of China declined steadily, stabilizing in the 22–29 range. The breaking of relations with Taiwan came in three waves. The first started soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic. Almost all of the countries in the Soviet Union’s camp and some nations in the Third World severed relations with the KMT government in Taipei. As for the major industrialized democracies, Britain did not break relations with the Republic of China or appoint an ambassador to Taipei. France, in 1964, was the first European democracy to have full official relations with Beijing. A second wave of diplomatic isolation came in the early 1970s. Taiwan lost all of the major democracies, including Japan, save the United States. In 1970 Taiwan still maintained formal relations with sixty-seven countries, but the number was cut to twenty-seven by 1975.75 This wave ended when the United States, Taiwan’s most important ally, with whom a defense treaty had been signed in 1954, ended official diplomatic relations in 1979. The third wave came in the 1990s, when Taiwan lost diplomatic ties with three middle-range powers – Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa. From then on Taiwan only had official relations with the weak and the small. When the DPP came to power in 2000, four more countries cut relations with Taiwan. It is not impossible, given the PRC rise and its use of its new wealth and power to isolate Taiwan, that the Republic of China might become legally non-existent. Currently, Taiwan is a member of twenty-one IGOs, with observer status in five organizations.76 Some of these organizations, like the WTO, the APEC, and the Asian Development Bank, are very active in global or regional trade, economic, and monetary regimes. Most of the IGOs in which Taiwan is allowed membership are economic in nature. None of these permit Taiwan to use its official title. Taiwan is neither a member of the United Nations nor a member of the WHO, or any other subordinate organizations of the United Nations. Taiwan also faces a daunting challenge in sending its top leaders overseas for goodwill calls. While former President Lee Teng-hui had the opportunity to visit two countries, the United States and Singapore, which did not have official ties with Taiwan, Lee’s successor, President Chen Shui-bian, was forced to limit official overseas calls to the small and the weak. Whether President Chen’s meeting with twenty-four Congressmen while transiting in the United States in May 2001 was a partial reversal of isolation remains to be seen.77 Military isolation Taiwan now imports almost all of its weaponry from the United States. According to Chinese statistics, between 1979 and 2001 America provided

China isolates Taiwan 59 forty-seven packages of arms to Taiwan, totaling US$40 billion. In the five years between 1994 and 1999, Taiwan spent US$13.3 billion on arms procurement, making it the world’s largest importer of military hardware. About 95 percent came from the United States.78 Taiwan’s overseas military procurement can be divided into three stages. Before the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan the island’s purchase was already highly dependent on the United States. Some 90 percent of Taiwan’s imported weaponry came from the United States.79 The end of diplomatic relations with America marked a second stage in Taiwan’s attempt to maintain a defensive deterrent. Restrictions were imposed on arms sales to Taiwan in the Joint Communiqué signed between the administrations of Deng Xiaoping and Ronald Reagan on August 17, 1982. Taiwan therefore sought to diversify its arms procurement. About one-third of Taiwan’s arms came from countries other than the United States by the mid-1980s.80 The situation improved for Taiwan after the June 4, 1989 Beijing massacre of peaceful proponents of democratization in China. The first Bush administration ignored the 1982 Communiqué and agreed to sell Taiwan 160 F-16 high-performance jet fighters in 1992. Other significant weapon packages followed. The United States, in the Clinton years, sold more advanced weaponry to Taiwan to counter China’s increasing military build-up across from the island.81 Following the US lead, France sold sixty Mirage-2000 jet fighters and six Lafayette-class frigates to Taiwan. Finally, George W. Bush, Jr., agreed to sell Taiwan eight diesel-powered submarines and four Kidd-class destroyers in April 2001,82 ending a policy of not transferring submarines to the island because, it was argued, the offensive nature of the weaponry was not compatible with the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan has long offered training exercises for the Singaporean national army.83 In the area of military exchange, Taiwan has encountered more difficulties than in its formal diplomacy. The United States was probably the only country among the big powers to proceed with such cooperation.84 But the exchange of top-level military brass between the two countries was stopped after the United States established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic. The visit to the United States by Taiwan’s Minister of Defense, in the name of attending a privately held conference in March 2002 was the first such visit since 1979.85 In response to China’s growing missile threat to Taiwan, some US–Taiwan military cooperation has begun. Economic isolation Since economic activities conducted in the international community are basically non-official, Taiwan has built itself into one of the most dynamic economies in the post-war world. China concluded in the 1990s that more integration between the two economies would be conducive to China’s cause, as shown by Weixing Hu (see chapter 2).

60 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu But Beijing has hurt Taiwan’s economic activities overseas. Because of China’s opposition, Taiwan has had a hard time signing official treaties of economic cooperation with other states. A decade’s wait, with the prerequisite of China’s prior accession, preceded Taiwan’s membership to the WTO. However, Taiwan has been largely unsuccessful in its bid to sign free trade agreements with countries like the United States, Japan, and Singapore. In the 1980s, half of Taiwan’s exported goods were sent to the US market; by the twenty-first century, Taiwan’s exports were more diversified. Four areas emerged as Taiwan’s major markets: the United States (23 percent), Mainland China (19 percent), the European Union (16 percent), and Japan (12 percent).86 In general, in the area of economic isolation, China’s attempted strangling of Taiwan is mainly limited to preventing the signing of official economic agreements and blocking Taiwan from joining economic-related IGOs. Otherwise, matters are not too bad for Taiwan’s access to the international market. Socio-cultural isolation Compared with gaining official recognition and joining IGOs, Taiwan has had less trouble in acquiring international membership for its NGOs (see Table 3.6). But it is regularly forced to accept undesirable titles. Taiwan’s achievement in international NGOs pales in comparison with China’s (in 2002 Taiwan had less than half China’s memberships, which numbered 2297). In this realm, too, China demands that Taiwan be portrayed as a local entity of China’s, similar to other local authorities (such as Hong Kong). Still, the socio-cultural isolation that Taiwan experiences is less severe than its political-diplomatic and military isolation. Table 3.6 Taiwan’s participation in NGOs Year

Number

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

,747 ,766 ,778 ,795 , 816 , 867 ,901 , 917 , 943 , 962 , 983 1,059 1,064

Sources: Foreign Relations Yearbook, ROC, 1990–2001; ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/org/nation3_other.htm

China isolates Taiwan 61

Conclusion As a major power on the international stage, a rising China has successfully isolated Taiwan from the international community. Only a few countries would take the risk of losing normal relations with, and potential access to, a hoped-for huge market in China merely to develop official ties with Taiwan.87 There is, therefore, no way for Taiwan to win the international recognition required for de jure independence. As China rises, the future does not bode well for the island republic of Taiwan. Apartheid South Africa was banished from international society for quite a while and ended up recognized by only a handful of countries. But at the worst times, even apartheid South Africa maintained official relations with the major industrialized democracies. For the countries that joined hands in applying sanctions against the racist regime, it was not the “country” of South Africa that they opposed, but rather the “regime.” International isolation had an impact. The apartheid policy was dismantled partly as a result of the de-legitimatizing efforts of the international society. International isolation can be effective. For quite a while Israel was recognized by none of the countries in its region because of Arab opposition. But the boycott was not global. The survival of a South Africa or an Israel as legitimate countries was never in question for the industrialized democracies. In other words, it was particular policies that brought international isolation. The sovereignty of the isolated countries was rarely doubted. In this sense, Taiwan stands out. It is a special case. Taiwan’s very survival is threatened. Consequently, Taiwan is increasingly relying on unorthodox methods, as sketched by Daniel Lynch (see chapter 7), in conducting its external behavior. Its sovereignty is being buttressed not by the size of its diplomatic corps but by its economic achievement; its diplomacy is less dependent on official channels than on commercial and private connections. Taiwan’s international personality is not defined in codified form but merely by tacit recognition and politically changeable understandings. Legally the Republic of China might be annihilated. Yet Taiwan is an entity separated from PRC rule. That has long been a reality. Taiwan does not pursue objectionable policies deserving the penalty of isolation. It is not so difficult to differentiate a democracy such as Taiwan from an authoritarian regime such as the People’s Republic, which massacred its democracy movements’ members and fights against the effort to advance internationally recognized human rights.88 All that Taiwan has going for it officially is that when acknowledging that Taiwan is part of China at the time of establishing formal relations with China, most countries have avoided the term “recognize,” and hence continued to treat Taiwan as a de facto country. Secondly, the purpose of China’s attempts to isolate Taiwan has been to pre-empt a split Chinese sovereignty, “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Beijing claims that its “one-China principle” and its “one country,

62 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu two systems” formulae accommodate the needs of the Taiwanese.89 But the actual result of China’s isolation of Taiwan has been to strengthen a Taiwancentered identity and a process of “de-Sinicization.” Consequently, words like “China,” “Chinese,” “one country, two systems” have become alienating and repulsive to Taiwanese. Instead of extinguishing a separate Taiwanese identity, China has helped strengthen it. The outburst of the contagious disease SARS illustrates Taiwan’s dilemma. Despite being one of the major victims, Taiwan’s request for assistance from the WHO, as Dennis Hickey details (see chapter 4), was ignored at first. Taiwan’s attempt to obtain an observer status at the international health organization was denied at the peak of the crisis. Even an invitation letter to a WHO meeting was passed on via Beijing. China showed disdain for the lives of the people of Taiwan and the powerlessness of the Taipei authority to protect its own people. Beijing’s principle of the indivisibility of Chinese sovereignty cannot lure the people of Taiwan into accepting unification with an authority that is hostile to Taiwanese. Taiwan has been humiliated and wounded. For Taiwanese, Beijing’s attitudes and policies do not promote the trust that would guarantee peace and mutual benefit prior to a final solution of the cross-Strait issue. Diplomatic isolation may weaken the Republic of China’s international standing. But can it achieve China’s purpose of “suppressing forces of Taiwan independence?” In reality the effects are the opposite. Diplomatic isolation seems to be impelling momentum for Taiwan’s independence and creating great resentment on Taiwan against the “great China” complex. Thirdly, Beijing’s heavy-handed policy of isolating Taiwan has deepened the fissure that has characterized the island republic’s society since the February 28 Incident in 1947, described by Wakabayashi (see chapter 1).90 As a result, there have been increasing calls for a new identity. The Taiwanese have been plunged into an “identity crisis.” Are Taiwanese the Republic of China, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Taiwan, or some other political entity? Who are the people living in the island? Are they Chinese or Taiwanese? Is the People’s Republic a motherland or an entirely different country that has nothing to do with Taiwan? As passions and fissures intensify on Taiwan, China’s policy of isolation, however successful for China and threatening to Taiwan in the international community, is not helping China’s cause with the people of Taiwan. The situation is dire. The island has to find ways to increase its visibility at the global stage. It needs to be more flexible and accommodating towards China and to engage, instead of confront, its giant neighbor not only in economic terms but also in political terms. Less ideology should be attached in the making of its foreign policies as well as its China policies. Campaigns to “rectify the name” of the country and to write a new constitution that are based more on passions rather than rationality should be dropped. Taiwan needs to understand that it is utterly not in its best interests to confront a giant who is still growing at an amazing rate.

China isolates Taiwan 63 Taiwan should also try to present itself as a responsible democracy. Being one of the most outstanding market economies since World War II, and a functioning democracy, there is much that Taiwan can reciprocate to East Asia and the rest of the world. However, as long as it is entangled in a zerosum game of sovereignty with China, it is unlikely that this will happen. Taiwan needs to show that it is capable of handling the delicate situation in a mature manner. China also needs to see that its policy of suffocating Taiwan is not succeeding. Beijing could be a bit more proactive in helping Taiwan to participate in events that have less to do with politics. An improvement of relations across the Taiwan Strait is the shortest path towards some form of unification. Diplomatic warfare benefits no one.

Notes 1 Chien-min Chao, “China’s Policy toward Taiwan,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1990), p. 127. 2 T. Y. Wang, “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 731–732. 3 Chien-min Chao, Liangan hudong yu waijiao jingzhu (Cross-Strait Interactions and Diplomatic Competition) (Taipei: Yongye chubanshe, 1994), p. 190. 4 Richard E. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organization (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 33. 5 C. Howard, Splendid Isolation (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 1. 6 With the assistance of 16 indicators and detailed statistical data, Geldenhuys discussed and compared diplomatic isolations in South Africa, Israel, Taiwan, and Chile. While he did a great deal of work analyzing the consequences of isolation in the four countries, he barely touched the reasons contributing to their isolation. See Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17–18. 7 I. L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization, Vol. 20 (1966), pp. 367–379. 8 Neta C. Crawford, “How Arms Embargoes Work,” in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 46. 9 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 13–14. 10 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p. 536. 11 Historically, many states have faced different kinds of sanctions and some have become isolated. Bolshevik Russia, Weimar Germany, and Fascist Italy all suffered isolation one time or another before or during World War II. Cuba, Iraq, Portugal, Rhodesia, Northern Korea, Chile, and some socialist states also faced isolation after the war. Cuba’s situation was quite severe but the pain was gradually relieved after 1975. Rhodesia also faced severe isolation in the first fifteen years after gaining independence from the United Kingdom. In this chapter, Taiwan, South Africa, and Israel were chosen because the isolation suffered by the three states is unparalleled. 12 Ved P. Nanda, “Multilateral Sanctions against South Africa: a Legal Framework for Comprehensive Implementation,” in George W. Shepherd, Jr., ed., Effective Sanctions on South Africa: The Cutting Edge of Economic Intervention (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 3.

64 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu 13 Audi Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 49. 14 Chris Alden, Apartheid’s Last Land: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 280. 15 Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs at the end of the Century (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), pp. 3–4; Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 8th edn., 1992), pp. 367–368. 16 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p. 97. 17 Aharon S. Klieman, Israel and the World after 40 Years (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1990), p. 46. 18 After South Korea and South Africa broke relations with the Republic of China, the country was not even recognized by medium-sized countries. All its diplomatic allies are small, Third World countries. 19 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, pp. 664–667. 20 Chih-Chia Hsu, “America’s One-China Policy,” in Guoli bianyi guan (National Bureau on Editing and Translation), ed., Taiwan zhuquan lunshu (Narratives on Taiwan’s Sovereignty) (Taipei: National Bureau on Editing and Translation, 2001), p. 860. 21 Cal Clark, “Taiwan’s Pragmatic Diplomacy and Campaign for UN Membership,” American Asian Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 45–46. 22 Chien-min Chao, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui: a Balance Sheet,” in Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao, eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). 23 Taiwan Works Office, the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan Affairs Office, the State Council, Zhongguo taiwan wenti (China’s Taiwan Problems) (Beijing: Jiouzhou tushu chubanshe, 1998), pp. 186–188. 24 Lay Songsheng, Principles of International Law (Taipei: Chengchong Books Company, 1981), pp. 37–38. 25 Taiwan Works Office et al., Zhongguo taiwan wenti, p. 199. 26 Ibid, p. 200. 27 Yang Shankun, “CCP’s Notice about Further Strengthening Works toward Taiwan: Speaking in the National Taiwan Works Meeting,” Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), 14 April, 1991, p. 7. 28 Taiwan Works Office et al., Zhongguo taiwan wenti, pp. 204–205. 29 Taiwan has been trying to gain a seat at the WHO for the past seven years. Building on the failure experiences of the past, the government has lowered its goal recently to seek “observer status.” The term “health entity” is also a new creation. 30 Taiwan Works Office et al., Zhongguo taiwan wenti, pp. 208–209. 31 Chien Fu, “New Orientations of ROC’s Foreign Policy in 1990s,” Wenti yu yanjiu (Issues and Studies) (Taipei), Vol. 30, No. 10 (October 1991), pp. 5–6. 32 See Chiu Kunshuan, “Re-enter UN and Cross-Strait Relations,” International Relations Reviews, No. 12 (October 1997), p. 98. 33 Washington Post, January 21, 1997. 34 Fu Yaozu and Zhou Qipeng, Jujiao Zhongguo Weijiao (Focus on China Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 451–452. 35 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, pp. 483–484. 36 Hao Yufan, “Taiwan Wenti: Qianzai de Dingshi Zhadan (Taiwan Issue: A Potential Time Bomb),” in Hao Yufan and Zhang Yiandong, eds., Xianzhixing jiechu: Bushi zhengfu duehua zhengche zouxian (Limited Contact: The Orientation of the Bush Administration’s China Policy) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2001), p. 187. 37 Renmin ribao (Beijing), September 4, 1992, p. 1.

China isolates Taiwan 65 38 Liu Liendi and Wang Dawei, eds., Zhongmei guanxi de gueji: jienjiao yilai daishi tzonglan (The Track of Sino-American Relations: Events after Establishing Diplomatic Relations) (Beijing: Sheshi chubanshe, 1995), p. 346. 39 Chien Fu, “New Orientations of ROC’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s,” p. 5. 40 “Zhao in Bogota: Old Friend Comes Home,” Beijing Review, Vol. 28, No. 5 (November 11, 1985), p. 6. 41 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “Peking’s Growing Political, Economic, and Military Ties with Latin America,” in David S. Chou, ed., Peking’s Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1989), pp. 399–404. 42 Robert Delfs, “Count on Contadora,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2, 1986, p. 48. 43 Zhang Zhixin, “Yuanwai gongzuo zi gaige zhong fazhan (General Trend of Reforming the Work of Foreign Aid),” China Foreign Economic and Trade Annual Books 1996–97 (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1996), pp. 72–73. 44 Chih-Chia Hsu, Zhongguo waijiao jieze moshi: deng xiaoping shidai fengxi (China’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Patterns: Analysis in the Era of Deng) (Taipei: Shueniou chubanshe, 2000), p. 81. 45 Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 8 (August 1989), pp. 805–806. 46 Some of China’s isolation actions could be seen in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities in 2001,” January 17, 2002 at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/910117.htm 47 Zhiyou shibao (Liberty Times) (Taipei), April 20, 1991, p. 10. 48 Lin Min and Maria Galikowski, “Taiwan’s Presidential Election: a New Era for Taiwan and for Cross-Strait Relations,” New Zealand International Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (May–June, 2000), pp. 2–3. 49 Willem van Kemenade, “Taiwan, Voting for Trouble?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 135–151. 50 Wang, “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan,” pp. 731–732. 51 “China’s U.S. Envoy Says All Presidential Candidates Acceptable Except DPP’s Chen,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 18, 1999, at http:/ /web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ 52 Xinhua News, March 16, 2000, at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/zgrdxw/ lianghui/news/0316/031602.html 53 Renmin ribao (overseas edition), March 19, 2000, p. 2. 54 SIPRI, “Arms transfers to China and Taiwan, 1993–2002,” at http:// projects.sipri.se/armstrade/atchi_taidata.html 55 Zhongguo shibao, July 30, 2000, p. 4. 56 http://www.ey.gov.tw/web/docu/p_talk0803.htm 57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities from July to September 2002,” 6 November, 2002, at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/911106.htm. 58 Lianhe bao (United Daily) (Taipei), May 29, 2003, p. A2. 59 Zhongguo shibao, October 19, 2001, p. 1. 60 Zhongyang ribao (Central News) (Taipei), May 13, 2003, at http:// news.yam.com/cna/international/news/200305/200305130016.html 61 Renmin ribao, May 20, 2003, p. 3; China News, May 20, 2003, at http:// jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-05-20/127345.html 62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities in 2001,” January 17, 2002. 63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities from January to March 2002,” May 2, 2002 at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/910502.htm 64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy

66 Chien-min Chao and Chih-chia Hsu

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

87 88 89

and NGO Activities from July to September 2002,” November 6, 2002 at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/911106.htm Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities in 2001,” January 17, 2002. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities from October to December 2002,” January 17, 2003, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/920117.htm Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities in 2001,” January 17, 2002. Ibid. Gerald Chan, China and International Organizations: Participation in Non Governmental Organizations Since 1971 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 26–32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Examples of PRC’s Pressure on Our Diplomacy and NGO Activities from April to June 2002,” July 16, 2002, at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/fight/910716.htm Zhiyou shibao (Liberty Times) (Taipei), April 21, 2003, at http://www. libertytimes.com.tw/2003/new/apr/21/today-p1.htm Ibid. Yang Shankun, “CCP’s Notice about Further Strengthening Works toward Taiwan.” See Chien-min Chao, “Taiwan’s Identity Crisis and Cross-strait Exchanges,” Issues and Studies (Taipei) (April 1994), pp 1–13; “Can Economic Integration Lead to a More Congenial Political Culture?” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 280–304. See Chao, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Relations Under President Lee Teng-hui,” p. 182; Han Nienlong, ed., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (Modern China Diplomacy) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987), pp. 476– 483. Chao, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Relations Under President Lee Tenghui,” p. 188. Zhongguo shibao, May 23, 2001, p. 1. Li Wuyi, et al., Daguo guanxi yu weilai zhongguo (Great Powers Relations and Future China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), p. 104. Martin L. Lasater, The Security of Taiwan: Unraveling the Dilemma (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1982), p. 65. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 1986. Beijing Youth (Beijing), April 28, 2001 at http://gptaiwan.org.tw/~cylin/China/ 2001/2001_4_28_2.htm Taipei Times (Taipei), April 25, 2001, p. 1. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, pp. 484–485. Ibid, p. 449. Taipei Times, March 11, 2002. Eugene Chien, “Impact on Contemporary Washington–Beijing–Taipei Triangular Relations after PRC Attended WTO,” April 1, 2002 at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/MajorSpeeches/chien910401.htm. Mainland China surpassed the United States as the largest export market for Taiwan in 2002. Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 69–70. Edward Friedman, “China,” in Edward Kolodzies, ed., A Force Profonde (State College, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), pp. 128–143. The PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office and State Council Information Office, “One China Principle and Taiwan Issue,” in Yang Jiemian, et al., Shijie

China isolates Taiwan 67 geju zhong de taiwan wenti: Bianhua yu tiaozhan (Taiwan Issue in World System: Change and Challenges) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2002), p. 354. 90 A revolt against the mainlander rulers erupted that day. The new government formed after the surrender of the Japanese colonial government suppressed it with force. Consequently, thousands of Taiwanese as well as mainlanders were killed. The reasons for the disturbance were many. Among them, the incompetence of the new government was a major cause. See Lai Tse-han, ed., Beijuxing de kaiduan: taiwan 228 shibian (The Beginning of a Tragedy: Taiwan 228 Accident) (Taipei: China Times chubanshe, 1992).

4

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO Dennis V. Hickey*

This chapter examines Taiwan’s drive to gain a voice in the most important global institution related to public health – the World Health Organization (WHO). It provides a general outline of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, discusses the recent campaign to join the WHO, and analyzes the costs incurred by denying Taiwan admission to the world body. The conclusion is that it is in every nation’s interest to support Taiwan’s application for observer status in the WHO and help find ways for the island’s voice to be heard in it. To do otherwise undermines the principle of international cooperation and constitutes a threat to the health of the entire global community. A rising China should use its enhanced power for mutual benefit.

Background and evolution of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations In 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to the island of Taiwan. Since that time, Taiwan’s association with international organizations has gone through a complete cycle that started with Taiwanese active support and participation, moved to relative indifference and isolation, and, most recently, returned to support and a passionate Taiwanese desire to participate.1 Phase one During the first period – which extended from the early 1950s to the early 1970s – the Republic of China’s strong international support and the failure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to gain recognition from most of the global community enabled the Kuomintang (KMT) government on Taiwan to occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the WHO, and most other significant international organizations. In January 1950, only a few months after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government in Beijing, PRC authorities cabled UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, demanding Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations. For

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 69 roughly two decades, however, the United States and its allies blocked Beijing’s efforts to take Taipei’s UN seat. From 1951 to 1960, the Republic of China’s friends and allies argued that the People’s Republic, which had fought against a UN force in Korea, did not meet the UN Charter’s prerequisites that members must be “peaceloving states.” In the 1960s, as Beijing developed nuclear weapons and support for its admission began to mount, the United States and other states switched tactics and barred PRC membership by claiming that the Chinese representation issue was an “important question” under Article 18 of the UN Charter and therefore required a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly.2 As Beijing’s international clout grew, Taiwan’s support eroded. Phase two In the late 1960s, a shift in global alignments led the United States to reassess its stance. In an effort to patch up relations with Beijing, Washington acquiesced to the position that the two-thirds rule was irrelevant to the Chinese representation in the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek ordered his delegation to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971, a move some contend was a diplomatic blunder (a matter discussed by Bruce Jacobs – see chapter 5), but an outcome that was probably inevitable once Henry Kissinger agreed to accept the PRC one-China policy.3 Following the ROC withdrawal from the United Nations, Taipei lost representation in numerous other institutions. Although the Republic of China had participated in the WHO since it was founded in 1948, it was forced to withdraw from the organization shortly after the UN debacle. In 1980, it lost its World Bank and IMF seats. By the early 1980s, Taiwan had been expelled from most important international organizations.4 Phase three The third phase in Taiwan’s participation in international organizations began when Lee Teng-hui, then the island’s president, began to promote a flexible approach to international relations in 1988. “Pragmatic diplomacy,” as it came to be known, calls for: (1) maintaining and improving relations with governments that recognize the Republic of China; (2) upgrading informal or “substantive” relations with governments that do not maintain formal diplomatic ties with the Republic of China; and (3) actively participating in international organizations.5 To accomplish these objectives, Taiwan stopped approaching all diplomatic contests with the People’s Republic as “zero-sum” games. When attempting to join or rejoin an international body, Taiwan no longer insists on PRC expulsion from the institution. Moreover, Taiwan is willing to accept membership in organizations under names other than its

70 Dennis V. Hickey official designation – the Republic of China. Finally, Taiwan has agreed to participate in international conferences or activities conducted in China. With respect to membership in the WHO, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry has long emphasized that it will adopt a “flexible stance” toward the island’s name.6 The local media have speculated hopefully that the People’s Republic might eventually agree to accept Taiwan’s participation under the name “Chinese Taipei.”7 Since 2002, Taiwan has sought to gain admission as a “health entity” with observer status. Officials reason that this approach might ultimately prove acceptable to Beijing. After all, Taiwan participates in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an “economic entity” and in various international fishing institutions as a “fishing entity.” Moreover, as the ROC Health Minister explained, Taiwan is willing to “humble” itself and accept participation as a health entity “to minimize difficulties regarding the issue of statehood.”8 Indeed, Taiwanese officials emphasize that “our request is quite modest and it’s quite clear that our initiative with respect to the WHO has no intention to challenge the PRC’s status in that organization.”9 At the international level, Taiwan is not playing politics with the WHO membership drive. Too much is at stake for that.

Understanding Taiwan’s campaign to participate in the World Health Organization International organizations are often divided into two broad categories – intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). When seeking to join IGOs, Taiwan has enjoyed its greatest successes with those having an economic focus, as described by Chao and Hsu (see chapter 3). In 1988, Taipei resumed participation in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under the name “Taipei, China.” In 1991, it accepted membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the title “Chinese, Taipei.” In 1992, Taiwan entered the South Pacific Forum using the name “Taiwan/Republic of China.” Taiwan also participates, albeit “unofficially,” in the Pacific Basin Economic Community (PBEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC).10 More recently, Taipei has sought to become a full economic dialogue partner of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and it now participates as an “economy” in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).11 It also participates as an economy (“the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Jimmen and Matsu”) in the WTO. Taiwan’s efforts to join (or rejoin) the world’s most important IGOs have met with little success. The highly visible campaign to return to the United Nations, described by T.Y. Wang (see chapter 9), has been stalled ever since it was launched in 1991. In September 1999, developments appeared to take a dramatic turn for the worse when the United States signaled for the first time that it actually opposed Taipei’s admission to the world body.

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 71 Previously, Washington had kept silent whenever Taiwan’s diplomatic partners had tried to convince the United Nations to consider the island’s case.12 Following the election of George W. Bush, however, the United States reverted to the original position. The American delegation to the United Nations now remains silent whenever the Taiwan representation issue is raised. A conjunction of factors prompted Taipei to seek to return to the United Nations. But some speculate that the campaign is driven primarily by domestic political considerations. After all, as T.Y. Wang shows (see chapter 9), the KMT had opposed the idea until the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), then the KMT’s chief challenger party, organized massive rallies supporting it in the early 1990s. High-ranking Taiwan authorities have acknowledged that important domestic political interests have been served by the drive to rejoin the United Nations.13 In March 2000, the ROC Foreign Minister explained: “The majority of the people on this island support this effort [the UN drive]. No government can ignore the aspirations of its people. Otherwise, they have to face the electorate and be ousted.”14 Similarly, a Director-General of the Department of International Organizations in Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that domestic political considerations were a contributing factor in the UN campaign: “Our people … have strong aspirations to be engaged internationally. As a democratic government, we have to take into account those aspirations and translate those aspirations into policy.”15 But domestic political considerations do not explain Taiwan’s bid for WHO membership. The WHO was established in 1948. According to its charter, all countries may join: All countries which are members of the United Nations may become members of WHO by accepting its Constitution. Other countries may be admitted as members when their application has been approved by a simple majority vote of the World Health Assembly.16 This position squares nicely with the body’s stated goal of “the attainment by all peoples of highest possible levels of health.”17 In order to realize its stated objective, the WHO assists governments in strengthening health services, provides aid in emergencies, and stimulates and advances work to prevent and control disease. The organization also promotes and coordinates biomedical and health services research, establishes international standards for biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products, and acts as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work. In 1997, Taiwan began to seek admission to the WHO merely as an observer. Since that time, proposals calling for Taiwan’s participation as an observer have been submitted to the steering committee of the World Health Assembly (WHA) on an annual basis. Each year, a group of nations

72 Dennis V. Hickey with diplomatic ties to Taiwan, primarily governments in Africa and the Caribbean, will raise the issue. Several others will then speak in favor of Taiwan’s membership. In the May 19, 2003 meeting of the WHA General Committee, Palau, Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Gambia all spoke in favor of granting observer status to Taiwan.18 Washington and Tokyo have also recently begun to voice support for Taipei’s cause. In 2003, at a closed-door meeting of the WHA during the SARS crisis, delegations from both nations spoke for Taipei’s admission.19 As the American Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services explained, “We know this is a controversial issue, but we do not shrink from taking a public stance on it. The people of Taiwan deserve the same level of public health as citizens of every nation on earth, and we support them in their efforts to achieve it.”20 The election of Chen Shui-bian – the first non-KMT candidate to win the presidency in the history of the Republic of China – did not weaken the government’s determination to enter the WHO. President Chen has argued that, at a time of globalization, of close exchanges between the peoples of different nations, “disease knows no borders” and it is a “serious threat” to justice to exclude Taiwan from the WHO.21 Despite Beijing’s opposition, President Chen has vowed to continue Taiwan’s efforts to join the world health body. In 2003, he suggested a nationwide referendum on the island’s participation in the WHO, a move that made both Beijing and Washington uncomfortable. Both worried it could foreshadow an eventual referendum on the island’s relationship with China, something Chen denies.22 The President reasons that an island-wide vote would “demonstrate to the world its people’s unanimous wish to join the WHO.”23 Unlike the UN campaign, the WHO drive has not been politicized by Taiwan’s political parties. Popular demonstrations did not galvanize public opinion on this issue or prompt the government to pursue participation in the organization. Although admission to the WHO undoubtedly would serve important domestic political interests (Beijing, which treats Chen Shui-bian as an enemy, claims that it would provide him with a major political boost), the realization that the island’s admission makes sense as a matter of public health policy appears to be the driving force behind this crusade. In fact, it was the 1999 Taiwan earthquake that initially energized the WHO campaign. More than 2,400 people perished in the disaster and roughly 10,000 people were injured. The earthquake also left roughly 100,000 of the island’s inhabitants homeless. Yet the People’s Republic blocked international help from reaching Taiwan. The spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) from China to Taiwan in March 2003 provided a major boost to the WHO drive. Authorities in Beijing, who had allowed the virus to fester and covered up the extent of the infection, initially blocked all efforts by Taiwan to secure assistance from the WHO. As had happened after the 1999 earthquake, the People’s Republic insisted that all aid must be filtered through the Chinese

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 73 government and suggested that Taipei turn to “the central government” for assistance. Not until early May 2003 did Beijing finally relent and grudgingly permit the WHO to send a team to Taiwan to investigate the island’s deteriorating SARS situation. In sum, Taiwan seeks only to join the WHO as an “observer.” The Holy See, Palestine, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies all enjoy observer status. Taipei is willing to bracket the thorny statehood issue, so as not to rock international affairs, by applying as a “health entity.” As Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister explained, “we are flexible as to the definition of an entity – it’s up to the international community to define what it is.”24 Finally, as a Foreign Affairs spokesman explained, the campaign is not a publicity stunt or part of a grand conspiracy to promote the island’s de jure independence from China. This is a health issue. There are strong humanitarian reasons for Taiwan to be included in the global health network. For example, if we take into account the possible damage of bio-terrorists, I think there is a sense of urgency that Taiwan should be included in the global network of disease and epidemic control. The other reason is that this is a “trans-boundary” issue. Let’s set aside politics. Let’s talk about the importance of including Taiwan in the network so that we don’t have any missing links in the collective efforts in containing the spread of diseases.25 In short, a consensus has emerged within the various political parties and factions that constitute the Taiwanese polity that the island’s participation in the WHO is a pressing matter of public health.

Paying the price: the cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO A strong case may be made that Taiwan deserves to participate in the WHO. Taiwan’s exclusion is a violation of the WHO’s stated goal of “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.” But there is much more at stake. There are high costs incurred when the international community caves in to China’s threats and excludes Taiwan. As described below, the entire global community – including the People’s Republic – loses by blocking Taipei’s membership to the WHO. The cost to Taiwan The propensity for the international community to acquiesce to Beijing’s demands that Taiwan be barred from participation in the WHO constitutes a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the 23 million Taiwanese people. Taiwanese medical authorities are unable to gain access to vital medical information to help fight the spread of infectious diseases. Indeed, health

74 Dennis V. Hickey officials and medical professionals experience great difficulties when attempting to take part in WHO meetings or workshops concerning issues related to public health. A noted Taiwanese physician explains: For not being a member of the WHO, Taiwan’s exchange of disease information internationally cannot be timely channeled through regular routes. Taiwan has to rely on the published information of the WHO, and is therefore often one-step behind in taking appropriate disease control measures.26 Making matters worse, should the island suffer an outbreak of disease, Taiwan is ineligible for assistance because it is excluded from the WHO. The cost of what the Taiwanese now describe derisively as an international policy of “health apartheid” has proved to be very high. When epidemics break out in other countries, the WHO does not share information about the disease with Taiwan because the island is excluded from the organization’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. In 1998, this exclusion contributed to the deaths of more than 80 Taiwanese children when an outbreak of a virulent strain of enterovirus type-71 spread from Malaysia to Taiwan. After this struck the island, international assistance was slow in coming. As Taiwan’s Director General of Health explained, “We were virtually left alone to fight it and felt isolated.”27 When help finally did arrive from the United States, it was “not timely” for the children who had died.28 On September 21, 1999, central Taiwan was rocked by a massive earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale. Thousands perished in the disaster. Valuable time was lost as the WHO attempted to figure out “unofficial” and “indirect” ways to offer assistance to Taiwan. Not upsetting Beijing took precedence over providing a quick response to a humanitarian crisis. As the WHO dithered, the death count rose. In March 2003, the SARS epidemic that had been festering in China since November 2002 finally reached Taiwan. Taiwan health officials immediately reported the outbreak to the WHO. Initially, no one from the WHO responded and no assistance was offered.29 Several days later, however, Taiwanese authorities received word that the organization could not provide any direct assistance to the island because it was a “province” of China. After a delay of almost two months the WHO finally sent officials to Taiwan to investigate the island’s deteriorating situation. As was the case with the 1999 earthquake, Beijing had blocked all efforts by Taipei to secure help from the WHO. To be sure, the lack of assistance from the WHO was not the only factor that contributed to the 2003 medical emergency in Taiwan. However, most Taiwanese medical authorities concur that it made “a bad situation worse.”30 As one high-ranking health official lamented, “this help did not come immediately enough.”31

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 75 Looking to the future, Taiwanese officials fear that the island’s people will continue to pay a heavy price for exclusion from the WHO. Health authorities are especially nervous about the spread of AIDS/HIV and other infectious diseases. Commenting on the AIDS epidemic, one health official confessed, “I am worried about how we can prevent this from picking up momentum . . . unless we ask, nobody thinks of us – it’s as if we are nonexistent.”32 The cost to the international community and global health When KMT forces reached Taiwan in 1945, the island’s economy was in a shambles. Within three decades, Taiwan had evolved into an economic powerhouse. As one of the largest international traders, it now commands the respect of the world’s financial leaders (see Table 4.1). As one of the world’s major trading nations, Taiwan is visited by roughly four million foreigners each year. But as a hub for trade, the island may also serve as a hub for epidemics and disease. According to a recent study: Taiwan is a major transportation hub linking Northeast and Southeast Asia. In the year 2002, Taiwan registered 7.85 million outbound travelers and 2.19 million inbound visitors. At the end of 2002, 303,684 migrant workers from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam were living and working in Taiwan. This combination of factors places Taiwan at the crossroads of any infectious disease outbreak in the region.33 Taiwan’s transformation into an international trading center – an economic superpower that also happens to be a diplomatic orphan – can threaten both the health of the Taiwanese people and of the entire global community. Taiwan’s deep commercial ties with the People’s Republic – a nation widely recognized as the origin of numerous strains of influenza and other infectious diseases – exacerbates the danger. In January 2001, the executive board of the WHO proclaimed that “the globalization of infectious diseases is such that an outbreak in one country is potentially a threat to the whole world.”34 Indeed, a virus originating in southern China may spread to Taiwan and onward to Japan or America in less than 24 hours. Old infections – including tuberculosis – are reappearing while new diseases, including HIV/AIDS, SARS, and the Ebola virus, are appearing. As President Chen Shui-bian observed, excluding Taiwan from the WHO “has caused a loophole in the global efforts at epidemic prevention.”35 Until this loophole is closed, the price that the international community may ultimately have to pay in order to continue to exclude Taiwan from the WHO could prove staggering.

76 Dennis V. Hickey Table 4.1 Top twenty leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2003 Rank

Exporter

Rank

Importer

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Germany United States Japan China France United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Belgium Hong Kong China South Korea Mexico Spain Taiwan Singapore Russia Federation Sweden Switzerland Malaysia

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

United States Germany China United Kingdom France Japan Italy Netherlands Canada Belgium Hong Kong China Spain South Korea Mexico Singapore Taiwan Austria Switzerland Australia Sweden

Source: “World Trade in 2003: Overview,” World Trade Organization website at http://www. wto.org/

The costs to the developing world The Japanese helped lay the foundation for modern health care in Taiwan during their occupation of the island between 1895 and 1945. What now sets Taiwan apart from developing nations is that the Republic of China has eradicated infectious diseases such as smallpox, rabies, plague, polio, and malaria. Indeed, Taiwan was the first Asian country to rid itself of polio and also the first in the world to provide children with free hepatitis-B vaccinations. Its efforts to promote public health have yielded dividends that are recognized globally. Moreover, Taiwan possesses the resources to assist other countries. As Taiwan’s Health Minister observed, “with a US$14,000 per capita income and the third largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, Taiwan has the capacity to contribute to the less fortunate peoples of the world.”36 Taiwan has long sought to “give something back and boost world health.”37 Between 1995 and 2002, contributions in medical aid, supplies, and humanitarian assistance to the developing world totaled over US$120 million.38 Due to restrictions imposed by a rising China, however, much of Taipei’s assistance must be confined to the handful of small nations that continue to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (see Table 4.2).

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 77 Table 4.2 Countries maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, December 2004 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Belize Burkina Faso Chad Costa Rica Dominican Republic El Salvador Gambia Grenada Guatemala Haiti Honduras Kiribati Malawi

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Marshall Islands Nicaragua Palau Panama Paraguay St Kitts and Nevis St Vincent and the Grenadines São Tomé and Principe Senegal Solomon Islands Swaziland Tuvalu Vatican City (Holy See)

Source: ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mofa.gov.tw

In 2003, Taiwan had medical missions stationed in four African countries that recognized the Taipei government – Chad, São Tomé and Principe, Burkina Faso, and Malawi. Taipei also works closely with numerous disease prevention programs. It provides support to Care France’s AIDS prevention program in Chad, donates vaccines to Senegal, and provides condoms and medicine to Burkina Faso and Swaziland to help prevent the spread of AIDS. Moreover, thousands of wheelchairs have been donated to hospitals and charity organizations in Africa and Latin America. Taiwan recently donated US$1 million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS.39 Taiwan’s success in eradicating malaria during the 1960s – a program launched with assistance and guidance from the WHO – was followed by heavy Taiwanese involvement in malaria eradication programs in Africa. Taiwan’s medical assistance is not provided solely to states that formally recognize the government in Taipei. The island provided aid to India’s Gujarat province after it was rocked by a massive earthquake in January 2001.40 Moreover, during the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, Taipei gave over US$17 million in aid to the troubled Central Asian nation. In fact, since 1995 Taiwan has provided medical aid and support to almost eighty different countries, the vast majority of which do not have formal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Taiwan has done much to help the developing world. But it could do more if allowed to participate in the WHO. The US Population Crisis Committee has praised Taiwan’s family planning program as the best of all such initiatives among the developing world. But the island is shut out of the WHO’s World Fertility Survey, the Demographic Health Survey, and other related medical data-gathering and analysis efforts. Moreover, Taiwan’s medical teams have a lot of valuable experience in handling the devastation wrought by earthquakes. However, the island’s medical professionals were not allowed to assist WHO rescue efforts in Turkey when that country was

78 Dennis V. Hickey struck by a major earthquake on August 17, 1999. Although Taiwan possesses an impressive universal health insurance system and an advanced pharmaceutical industry,41 it is locked out of all UN and WHO-related programs that would enable the island to share its expertise in these areas. In sum, Taiwan’s efforts are largely stymied by the WHO lockout. As Milanga Mwanatambwe, Associate Professor of Pathology at Mbuji Mayi University in Congo, observed, when provided the opportunity, “Taiwan can make its influence felt and contribute to international health projects. Taiwan can help and can make a big impact in the WHO, by sharing its knowledge of new advances and the results of medical research.”42 Taiwanese officials concur that the island could provide “a window of opportunity to a lot of developing countries to benefit from our ability to contribute to their medical and health efforts.”43 The burden that the developing world must bear to comply with Beijing’s demand that Taiwan should not participate in the WHO and its related health activities is very heavy. The costs to cross-Strait relations For over two decades Beijing has pushed to make Taiwan a special administrative region of China. Believing that this formula would jeopardize the freedom, security, and welfare of the 23 million people on Taiwan, Taipei rejects these terms, a policy stance that enjoys widespread support in Taiwan. In fact, many Taiwanese now support a permanent separation from China.44 To be sure, an explosion in trade and investment is moving the Taiwanese and Chinese economies closer together, as described by Weixing Hu (see chapter 2).45 Despite these economic trends, however, an increasing number of Taiwanese – particularly the younger generation and/or those who have spent considerable time in China – find the mainland unfriendly and threatening. Beijing’s efforts to isolate Taipei internationally by blocking its admission to the WHO and other IGOs reinforce negative perceptions of the People’s Republic among the Taiwanese. It is only the People’s Republic that stands in the way of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. As one ROC official observed, everyone knows that “they are putting politics before health and that is very unfortunate.”46 Speaking off the record, even high-ranking WHO officials concede that Beijing behaves like “a real bully” when it comes to Taipei’s application to join the WHO.47 Beijing’s obstruction of Taiwan’s bid to join the WHO represents a lost opportunity for cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As a DPP Deputy Secretary General observed, “both sides of the Taiwan Strait could seek more cooperation and mutually beneficial opportunities on such issues as trade and health.”48 In fact, there are many ways in which Taiwan could assist the People’s Republic in the field of public health. Medical teams could be dispatched to remote provinces and/or the mainland’s medical professionals could receive training in Taiwan. These

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 79 activities might help pave the way for cooperation in other areas and ultimately reduce cross-Strait tensions. Rather than respond positively to the health crisis in Taiwan, however, Beijing continues to block the island’s participation in the WHO and refuses to apologize to Taipei for spreading SARS. PRC officials argue that Taiwan cannot join the WHO because it is “not a state” and that only states may participate in UN-affiliated organizations. By any definition of the term, however, the Republic of China is a state. It exercises predominant authority within its borders, possesses a relatively stable population that owes its allegiance to the ROC government, and maintains formal diplomatic ties with over two dozen small nations and strong “unofficial” links with many others. But Taiwan is not even seeking to join the WHO as a state. It seeks only to participate as a “health entity” in the WHO, which permits non-state entities to participate. Consequently, Beijing’s opposition on these grounds is not persuasive. Some PRC authorities argue that Taiwan cannot participate in the WHO because it should seek medical assistance from “the central government” in Beijing.49 When the SARS epidemic swept China, however, many Taiwanese people became familiar with the level of medical care provided in the People’s Republic. China, for political reasons, has concealed information about the epidemic, has left their people ignorant in the middle of an epidemic without telling them what it was, and has even denied medical care for those who cannot afford it. If this is the way they look after the health of people, Taiwan can do without.50 Indeed, according to most accounts, medical care in China has been deteriorating.51 Finally, Chinese authorities suggest that there is no need for Taiwan to participate in the WHO because it already enjoys a high standard of public health and has enough access to health information.52 But this argument ignores the island’s pressing need for medical assistance during national emergencies like the 1999 earthquake or 2003 SARS epidemic. It also ignores all the other reasons why a globalized world is safeguarded by Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Beijing’s persistent opposition to Taiwan’s participation in the WHO has hurt the feelings of the Taiwanese people. China’s behavior during the 2003 SARS epidemic underscored Beijing’s hostility toward the Taiwanese people. PRC officials sought initially to downplay and cover up the extent of the SARS epidemic. These tactics – perhaps adopted in an effort to maintain social stability and prevent foreign investors from fleeing – succeeded only in allowing the disease to fester and grow. Due to its close contacts with China, the epidemic ultimately spread to Taiwan. Despite the fact that it was largely responsible for the health calamity, Beijing blocked all efforts by

80 Dennis V. Hickey Taipei to obtain WHO assistance to combat the disease. The People’s Republic only relented and allowed a WHO team to visit Taiwan in May 2003. By that time, the epidemic had spread throughout the island. In May 2003, a ROC government spokesman observed that China’s behavior during the SARS crisis was “not at all conducive to ameliorating already thorny cross-Strait relations.”53 Public opinion polls reveal that approximately 65 percent of the population now believe that the People’s Republic is unfriendly toward the Taipei government, while roughly 44 percent think that Beijing is unfriendly toward the Taiwanese people.54 A DPP law-maker reflected the opinion of many Taiwanese when he proclaimed that “it’s time the government adjusts its policy in dealing with Beijing following China’s suppression [of Taiwan].”55 The Chen administration responded to the intransigent and harmful PRC policy position by calling for an island-wide referendum on the WHO question, a move that Beijing could interpret to legitimate armed action across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s continued opposition to Taipei’s participation in the WHO is making it far more difficult for China to win the trust and respect of the Taiwanese people.56

Conclusion Obviously, the People’s Republic is the chief obstacle to Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Beijing fails to distinguish between, on the one hand, Taipei’s drive to participate in the WHO and, on the other, its attempt to return to the United Nations, the campaign to upgrade “unofficial relations” with foreign countries, or any of the other efforts to “increase Taiwan’s living space.” But China’s opposition to Taiwan’s WHO application is only part of the problem. In addition, the international community accedes to Beijing’s threats and excludes Taiwan from the WHO and other international organizations. While only a small number of states openly champion the PRC stance on the Taiwan question, most states remain quiet and hope to avoid the issue. Yet the cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO could become incalculable. If the Taiwanese people suffer, the health of the international community is jeopardized, the developing world loses priceless medical assistance and expertise, and cross-Strait relations are undermined. The exclusion of Taiwan from the WHO also undermines the efficacy of the United Nations, the WHO, its related organizations, and all IGOs. As Taiwan’s Vice President observed, “The WHO, acting against truth and justice and against the human right of life, has proven that many international organizations are fake.”57 Indeed, members of the US Congress have characterized the WHO’s behavior as “unconscionable.”58 For the WHO and its affiliated bodies to stand up for the international ideals expressed in the WHO charter, Taiwan should be admitted to the WHO as an observer. After all, at the present time, several “non-state”

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 81 actors participate in the organization as observers. Others – including Puerto Rico and Tokelau – participate as “associate members.” Certainly there must be room for Taiwan in the WHO. Otherwise, China’s policy of isolating Taiwan could prove a threat to the health of the entire global community and jeopardize the efficacy of IGOs in general. In the final analysis, it may take more than international pressure to convince China to revise its stance on Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. Beijing’s leadership must recognize that it serves China’s national interest to accommode Taiwan’s participation as a “health entity” in the WHO. Some policy advisors in China, cognizant of how Beijing’s policies alienate the Taiwanese people, are calling for the use of “soft tactics” as part of a strategy to curb the island’s drift away from China. One of these tactics is permitting Taiwanese participation in some IGOs. Indeed, on May 17, 2004, Beijing issued a statement that included an appeal to “resolve appropriately the issue of Taiwan’s international living space through negotiations.”59 This is a hopeful sign. It shows that some in China may finally have concluded that adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Taiwan is in the interest of peace and accommodation and a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait political estrangement.

Notes * This project was supported with a University Research Grant from Southwest Missouri State University. The author would also like to thank the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Illinois, for arranging interviews in Taipei and for providing materials to the author. 1 This overview borrows points raised in Dennis V. Hickey, “Taiwan and the World Health Organization: Good Health for All or Some?” Issues and Studies, Volume 36, Number 5, September–October 2000, pp. 41–61. 2 For more information, see Kuo-Chang Wang, United Nations Voting on Chinese Representation: An Analysis of General Assembly Roll-Calls, 1950–1971 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1984), pp. 11–27. 3 See Julian Baum, “In Search of Recognition,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 18, 1991, p. 26. 4 As one analyst observed, by 1980, Taiwan had been replaced in the United Nations and “in all UN specialized agencies” by the People’s Republic. See Kay Moller, “Does Flexible Diplomacy Improve Taiwan’s International Status?” in Jean-Marie Henckaerts (editor), The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 53–54. 5 For more information, see Government Information Office, Pragmatic Diplomacy of the Republic of China (Taipei: Government Information Office, June 5, 1991). For a detailed analysis of Taiwan’s unconventional approach to international relations, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “US Policy and Taiwan’s Reintegration into the Global Community,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Volume XI, Number 1, Spring 1992, pp. 18–32. 6 See “Taiwan Says WHO Name Issue Flexible,” Central News Agency (Taipei), December 10, 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 13, 1999, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 7 Ibid.

82 Dennis V. Hickey 8 See “Taiwan Able to Help World’s Less Fortunate People’s: Health Minister,” Central News Agency, May 23, 2002, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 9 Author’s interview with Shen Ssu-tsun, Director General, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, November 7, 2002. 10 The PBEC is a forum for exchanging information among business leaders in East Asia while the PECC promotes regional economic cooperation by linking scholars, business people, and government officials. 11 See “Taiwan Asks to be Economic Dialogue Partner of ASEAN,” Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire, November 16, 1998, available through the Lexis/Nexis website; Department of State, Report on Taiwan Participation in International Organizations, Report Required by Section 704 of the FY 2000– 2001 Foreign Relations Authorization Act as enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000 (P.L. 106–113). This report was provided to the author courtesy of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Washington, DC. 12 See Lee Siew Hua, “Strong US Signal on One-China Policy,” Straits Times (Singapore), September 18, 1999, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 13 See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “Taiwan’s Return to International Organizations: Policies, Problems and Prospects,” in Henckaerts (editor), The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order, pp. 65–78. 14 Author’s interview with Chen Chien-jen, ROC Foreign Minister, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, March 31, 2000. 15 Author’s interview with Shen Ssu-tsun, Director-General, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, November 7, 2002. 16 See “About WHO: WHO Member States” at http://www.who.int/aboutwho/en/ mission.htm 17 See “About WHO: Mission Statement” at http:://www.who.int/aboutwho/en/ mission.htm (emphasis added). 18 See Lin Fang-Yan, “World Health Assembly Again Snubs Taiwan,” Taiwan Journal, May 23, 2003, p. 1. 19 See “Taiwan Frustrated by Beijing’s WHA Blocks,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), May 26, 2003, p. 1 20 Lin Fang-yan, “We Want WHO Membership, Not SARS,” Taiwan Journal, April 4, 2003, p. 1. 21 Lilian Wu, “Excluding Taiwan from WHO a Serious Threat to Justice: President,” Central News Agency, May 4, 2002, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 22 Benjamin Yeh, “WHO Snub Hurt Taiwan: Analysts,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), May 26, 2003, p. 2. 23 “President Pitches for Plebiscite on WHO Bid,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), May 21, 2003, p. 1 24 See Lin Fang-yan, “ROC Official Sees Place for Nation in WHO,” Taiwan Journal, April 18, 2003, p. 2. 25 Author’s interview with Shen Ssu-tsun. 26 Wu Yung Tung, “Taiwan Fights SARS Alone,” unpublished paper provided courtesy of Ms. Carol Li, Information Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Chicago, IL. 27 Nora Boustany, “Taiwan’s Lonely Quest for Help on Health,” Washington Post, August 1, 2001, p. A13, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 28 Ibid. 29 See William Foreman, “Taiwanese Accuse UN Health Agency of Ignoring Them: Say it Could Aggravate Spread of Mystery Illness,” Associated Press, March 30, 2003, available through the Lexis/Nexis website.

The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO 83 30 Mike Chinoy, “Taiwan a SARS ‘Loophole,’” CNN.Com, May 20, 2003, in Taiwan Security Research at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/ 31 “Taiwan Accuses WHO of ‘Health Apartheid,’” China Post (International Airmail Edition), May 23, 2003, p. 4. 32 See Boustany, “Taiwan’s Lonely Quest for Help on Health.” 33 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan in the WHO: Promoting Health for All (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). 34 Quoted from Chien-Jen Chen, “Taiwan Deserves its Own Voice in World Health Organization,” Insight on the News, June 10, 2002, p. 45, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 35 Lin Fang-yan, “Taipei Hosts Seminar on Asia-Pacific Security,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), April 11, 2003, p. 1. 36 “Taiwan WHO Membership Internationally Beneficial, Health Minister Says,” Central News Agency, May 23, 2002, in British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring International Reports, May 23, 2002, available through the Lexis/ Nexis website. 37 See Cecilia Fanchiang, “Medical Professional Group Targets WHO Entry,” Taiwan Journal, March 21, 2003, p. 2. 38 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan in the WHO. 39 Ibid. 40 For more information see Jagdish Singh, “SARS Raises Stakes on Taiwan’s WHO Bid,” Taiwan Journal, May 23, 2003, p. 7 41 Over 97 percent of Taiwan’s population is covered by the national health insurance system. According to one study, “the NHI program in Taiwan has performed well in providing the public with full and easy access to medical care”; see Teh-Wei Hu and Chee-Ruey Hsieh, “An Economic Analysis of Health Care Reform in Taiwan,” December 2001, p. 7 at www.bm.ust.hk/~econ/healthconf/ paper2/nhi.pdf Another study has concluded that “like any new social program . . . Taiwan’s NHI has had its share of problems, but they do not negate the country’s considerable accomplishments in health policy. Americans . . . should be impressed”; see Tsung-Mei Chung, “Taiwan’s New National Health Insurance Program: Genesis and Experience So Far,” Health Affairs, Volume 22, Number 3, May/June 2003, p. 72–73. 42 “International Officials Praise Taiwan’s Medical Achievements,” Taiwan News, October 10, 2002, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. 43 Author’s interview with Shen Ssu-tsun. 44 See public opinion polls on unification proposals conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China at http://www.mac.gov.tw/ 45 Many of the Taiwanese residing in China are not permanent residents. See Michelle Hsu, “Investments on Mainland at US$66.8 bil., CBC Says,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), January 17, 2003, p. 3. 46 Author’s interview with Shen Ssu-tsun. 47 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “SARS Furor Heightens Taiwan–China Rift,” New York Times, May 19, 2003; also on Taiwan Security Research website at http:// www.taiwansecurity.org/ 48 “MAC Asks Beijing to Drop Harsh Stance,” China Post, July 6, 2003; also on Taiwan Security Research website at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/ 49 For example, during the midst of the SARS epidemic, Zhang Mingqing, spokesman for the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, “indicated that if Taiwan needs help from China’s experts or needs medical assistance, the mainland is well prepared and will provide assistance at any time”; see “China Willing to Help Taiwan Stop Spread of Atypical Pneumonia – Official,” Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency, March 26, 2003, in British Broadcasting

84 Dennis V. Hickey

50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Corporation Monitoring International Reports, March 27, 2003, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. Wu Yung Tung, “Taiwan Fights SARS Alone.” For a general overview of the “calamity” that has struck China’s healthcare system, see David M. Lampton, “China’s Health Care Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2003; also on Taiwan Security Research webiste at http:// www.taiwansecurity.org/ See Dennis V. Hickey and Mariesa Ho, “Taiwan Deserves a Seat in the WHO,” Taipei Times, May 25, 2002, p. 8; also at http://www.taipeitimes.com Shu Shih Luh and John Pomfret, “Taiwan Cites SARS in Bid to Join WHO,” Washington Post, May 10, 2003, p. A18; also on Taiwan Security Research website at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/ See public opinion polls of Taiwanese residents conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC at http://www.mac.gov.tw/ See Yeh, “WHO Snub Hurt Taipei,” p. 2 Ibid. Kathrin Helle, “WHO ‘Failed to Protect Taiwan from SARS’ FT Interview: Vice President Annette Lu,” Financial Times, April 5, 2003, p. 13, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. “Taiwan Applies WHO Pressure Over SARS,” China Post, March 30, 2003, available through the Lexis/Nexis website. For more information, see “China Gives President an Ultimatum,” Taiwan News, May 18, 2004, and “Taiwan Vice President Sees ‘Goodwill’ in Beijing 17 May Statement,” Central News Agency, May 18, 2004 in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 18, 2004, both available through the Lexis/Nexis website.

5

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan J. Bruce Jacobs*

How did Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation arise? The easy answer is, it is the success of “China’s ‘One-China policy’.” But the One-China policy of Taiwan’s former authoritarian government is also responsible for Taiwan’s current plight. Until Lee Teng-hui became president in 1988, Taiwan maintained a rigid “One-China policy” in which the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was the only China. By the time of the flexibility of 1988, more than fifteen years had passed since China had “re-entered” the world with the Kissinger and Nixon visits, the entry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with most countries. Thus, Lee Teng-hui’s pragmatism came much too late to be internationally effective for the newly emerging nation of Taiwan. Today’s democratic Taiwan continues to suffer from the consequences of the stubborn obduracy of the prior rigidly dogmatic authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) regime.

The early years (1949–1963) That the Nationalist-led Republic of China on Taiwan could gain recognition from a majority of the world’s nations in the 1950s and 1960s was a diplomatic coup. Between the establishment of the People’s Republic on 1 October 1949 and the commencement of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, only fourteen countries recognized the People’s Republic.1 These included nine Communist dictatorships (the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Poland, Mongolia, Albania, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam), three newly independent Asian countries (India, Indonesia, and Burma) and two Scandinavian democracies (Sweden and Denmark). From September 14, 1950 until May 21, 1951, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Finland, and Pakistan also recognized the People’s Republic. “Based in the world-wide antagonisms of the Cold War, Taipei’s success [in establishing its international status] was furthered by a fine foreign aid program to many of the world’s new nations, and prolonged by China’s Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s,”2 in which Mao’s China isolated itself from the world community.

86 J. Bruce Jacobs The People’s Republic records the establishment of relations with the United Kingdom as occurring on March 13, 1972. The British, in contrast, say that they recognized the People’s Republic of China on January 6, 1950. There were several factors in this British decision, including Hong Kong, the heavy investment of British business in China, and a desire by Britain’s Labour government to stand with the newly independent former British colonies that were recognizing the People’s Republic. The British decision, however, “immediately ran up against difficulties.”3 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai asked that a representative be sent to “negotiate” diplomatic relations. The Chinese are said to have raised three issues: British support for the seating of the People’s Republic in the United Nations, Chinese property in Hong Kong claimed by the Chinese government, and the British consulate in Taiwan, which was attached to the KMT-controlled Taiwan provincial government. Britain did support the People’s Republic to enter the UN in September 1950, but Chinese intervention in the Korean War in October put matters on hold.4 Only on July 8, 1954 did the British chargé d’affaires present his credentials to Premier Zhou, and only on October 27, 1954 did the Chinese chargé d’affaires arrive in London in accord with an agreement reached in Geneva on June 17, 1954.5 With their “Legation” in Beijing headed by a chargé d’affaires and their consulate in Tamshui attached to the KMT’s provincial government on Taiwan, the British had implemented a type of “Two Chinas” policy. In the mid- and late 1950s, there were international efforts to place Taiwan under a UN protectorate and to give the island an opportunity for self-determination. In the 1955 British election, both major parties made policy statements concerning Taiwan. The Labour Party called for the neutralization of Taiwan under the United Nations: Labour has constantly urged that this crisis can only be overcome by the evacuation of the offshore islands, now held by Chiang Kai-shek’s forces; by the long overdue admission of Communist China to the United Nations; and by the neutralisation of Formosa [Taiwan] under the United Nations to enable its inhabitants to make their own choice.6 While the Conservative Party was less opposed to the Nationalist dictatorship in Taiwan, it too saw Taiwan’s international status as an open question. It proposed “the reconsideration at an appropriate moment both of Chinese representation in the United Nations and the future status of Formosa.”7 Such reconsideration of the Taiwan question became more difficult with the Korean War armistice and China’s challenges to Taiwan-held islands just off China’s shores. Given the Mutual Defense Treaty agreed between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1954, and further Chinese attempts against the offshore islands in 1958 under Mao’s new radicalism, US support for the government on Taiwan was further entrenched.

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France recognizes the People’s Republic (1964) France’s President Charles de Gaulle asserted his country’s independence of American Cold War choices by recognizing the People’s Republic of China on January 27, 1964, just after China emerged from the “three difficult years” of famine caused by Mao’s radical Great Leap Forward (1958–1960). Knowing French recognition of the People’s Republic of China was about to occur, the Republic of China on Taiwan protested vehemently two days earlier.8 Following France’s formal announcement recognizing the People’s Republic on January 27, 1964, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Taiwan announced that we “oppose any idea of Two Chinas . . . This basic position absolutely will not change under any circumstance.”9 Did President de Gaulle recognize China without intending to break relations with Taiwan? The communiqué issued by Paris and Beijing on 27 January 1964 simply read: The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the French Republic have decided in mutual agreement to establish diplomatic relations. For this purpose, the two Governments have agreed to appoint their ambassadors within three months.10 No mention was made of Taiwan. The former French Premier, Edgar Fauré, who had negotiated for President de Gaulle in China, stated that no conditions were involved in the agreement and a Quai d’Orsay spokesman repeated that “the agreement to recognize Peking had been made without conditions and that France saw no reason to break with Formosa.”11 Yet, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China insisted on January 28: According to international practice, recognition of the new government of a country naturally implies ceasing to recognize the old ruling group overthrown by the people of that country. . . . It was with this understanding that the Government of the People’s Republic of China reached agreement with the Government of the French Republic on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors between China and France. The Chinese Government considers that it must again proclaim that Taiwan is Chinese territory. The Chinese Government and the Chinese people absolutely cannot agree with any attempt to separate Taiwan from China’s territory or other fabrication of plans for “Two Chinas.” 12 On January 29, a People’s Daily editorial likewise opposed a “Two Chinas” solution: Both before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France, the US press has raised a hullabaloo asserting that

88 J. Bruce Jacobs China has “mitigated” its opposition to “two Chinas” and that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France will “unlock the door” for “two Chinas.” This is nothing but a distortion with an ulterior motive and is a day-dream.13 Again, on February 3, 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai reminded the French of their obligations14 and on February 6, Zhou told an AFP reporter, “The world has only One China. It does not have Two Chinas.”15 At the same time, archives in Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan also opposed “Two Chinas.” Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a document to the cabinet dated January 31, 1964, and the Premier of the government on Taiwan, in a secret document dated February 1, 1964, made this opposition very clear.16 In short, both the government of the People’s Republic and the government on Taiwan insisted on “One China.” However, the French had not explicitly conceded this point. It seems the United States advised Chiang’s government to do nothing,17 though an examination of the archives in Taipei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs failed to find any evidence of American advice at this time. Whether or not the French counted on the KMT in Taiwan to break relations remains unclear. On February 10, 1964, the Republic of China on Taiwan did announce that it had severed diplomatic relations with France. It declared that “it firmly opposed any advocacy of Two Chinas and this national policy would absolutely not change under any circumstances.”18 Thus, at least partially because of a policy choice by the rulers of Taiwan, the “Two Chinas” question did not arise. According to the Chinese list, five newly independent African countries recognized Beijing from February 1964 through July 1965. Then the selfisolation of Mao’s Cultural Revolution’s virtually ended China’s diplomatic development for five years.

Canada, Italy and Chile recognize China (1970–1971) Canada recognized China more than six years after France, on October 13, 1970. The Canadians bargained over Taiwan. The joint communiqué with the People’s Republic announcing diplomatic relations stated, “the Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.”19 In his statement of October 13, 1970, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said, “the Canadian Government does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese Government’s position on the status of Taiwan.”20 On November 6, 1970 Italy recognized Beijing with a formula similar to that of Canada,21 as did Chile on December 15, 1970. The joint Chinese– Chilean communiqué was not published in the People’s Daily until January

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22

6, 1971, which was one day after Taiwan broke relations with Chile. As with the opportunity offered in France’s recognition of China, which was silent on Taiwan, once again the KMT threw away any opportunity to establish an international diplomatic personality for Taiwan. China also established diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea and with Ethiopia in the last quarter of 1970, and with five more nations in the first half of 1971.23 An episode with Greece confirms that the KMT maintained a firm “One China” policy. According to Han Lih-wu (Hang Liwu), Taiwan’s ambassador to Greece from 1968 to 1972, the Greek Prime Minister told him in 1970, “After the Greek government recognizes the Chinese Communist regime, if your honorable country is willing to indicate that your honorable country’s sovereignty is limited to the Taiwan region, perhaps Greece will consider continuing to recognize the Republic of China.” The Americans came to know of this and Taiwan’s government reacted negatively. It telephoned Ambassador Han and demanded that he tell the Greek Prime Minister that Taiwan “could not recognize that there are Two Chinas.” Two days later, Ambassador Han saw the Greek Prime Minister who first told him, “I gave this matter to the Foreign Ministry to study. I’m sorry but our country can only recognize one China.” Thus, Ambassador Han did not have a chance to deliver his message. Greece recognized China in 1972.24

Kissinger visits China twice and Taiwan leaves the United Nations (1971) In 1971, two events ended Taiwan’s “diplomatic coup” of representing “China” to most of the world. First, Henry Kissinger visited China. Second, the United Nations admitted the People’s Republic to the China seat and expelled the Republic of China. Taiwan was a key issue during the Kissinger visits to Beijing as well as in the discussions surrounding the visits.25 On Kissinger’s first visit during July 9–11, 1971, Premier Zhou summarized China’s position on Taiwan as having five key points: 1 2 3

4 5

the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people Taiwan belongs to China the US does not support a two Chinas or a one China, one Taiwan policy and does not support the so-called Taiwan Independence movement the spokesman of the Department of State no longer reiterates . . . that the status of Taiwan is undetermined [The US] would gradually withdraw all armed forces from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits gradually within a fixed period.26

Kissinger replied that two-thirds of US troops in Taiwan actually supported the war in Indochina and that the State Department would no longer

90 J. Bruce Jacobs talk about Taiwan’s status being indeterminate. Zhou showed considerable concern that Japan would place troops in Taiwan following the removal of US troops.27 He also expressed concern that the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would support Taiwan’s Independence.28 In the course of a longer second Kissinger stay in China, during October 20–26, 1971, concern focused on the joint communiqué to be issued during President Nixon’s visit in February 1972. Taiwan remained the only topic on which Zhou and Kissinger could not reach agreement in October 1971.29 When the two sides finally approved the February 28, 1972 Shanghai communiqué, each side made clear its own position: The Chinese side reaffirmed its position . . . the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere . . . The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.30 At the same time as the Kissinger visits, events in the United Nations also moved dramatically. Documents in Taipei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm that Taipei’s “One China” policy precluded any policy flexibility that might have saved a Taiwan seat in the United Nations. Certainly, the Taiwan government had sufficient warning that its seat was in danger. Some “Extremely Top Secret (ji jimi)” Ministry of Foreign Affairs materials, dated February 24, 1971, discussed the various options and included Chinese translations as well as original texts of several motions that had been proposed.31 In mid-1971 the United States and other countries began pushing for a “dual representation” solution. Australia said: What we would see as a desirable finish is that the People’s Republic take over the Security Council seat, and that Taiwan remains on as a member, an ordinary member, of the UN. . . . If the UN recognises the PRC instead of the ROC as occupying the Chinese seat, and nothing else is done, of course, Taiwan would be out in the cold. We wouldn’t favour that resolution.32 Between June and August 1971, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai met regularly with the American and Japanese ambassadors to Taipei.33 In a conversation with the Japanese ambassador about dual representation, the Foreign Minister said, “Although I have no way to approve of it and under

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the circumstances must express my opposition, we could tolerate its existence”. The English phrase, “We can live with it,” is added to the Chinese text.34 With the General Assembly due to convene on September 21, 1971, Taiwan government planning was well under way in early August. Taipei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced an “Absolutely Secret (juedui jimi)” document on August 3, 1971, which laid out the options and Taiwan’s preferences. The first preference was that the “Important Question” motion be passed. The second preference was “dual recognition.” But even at this late moment, after more than twenty years of rejecting any alternative to “One China,” the Nationalist authorities would not openly embrace dual recognition. This posed difficult problems for Taiwan as the motion “is in opposition to [the] basic stance of opposition to any ‘Two Chinas’ arrangement,” especially one in which Taiwan surrendered its seat on the Security Council to the People’s Republic. Thus, “we must always express opposition.” But, since our “purpose is to defeat the Albanian resolution, this is a tactical measure, so our ambassadors must explain to the governments, where they are posted, the reasons why we cannot support the dual recognition motion.”35 This, of course, was a very difficult message to convey. On September 8, 1971, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers sent a four-page personal message to Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai which was labeled “Secret” on the top and bottom of each page. Rogers wrote that since the public announcement of US policy on representation in the United Nations on August 2, 1971, the government “has made exceptionally intensive efforts around the world to explain and seek support for this new policy” of dual representation.36 Rogers noted that this effort had met with little success and he believed that the failure to mention the Security Council seat had caused this difficulty: Despite our best efforts, we have been totally unable to assemble even a minimally acceptable list of co-sponsors for the [Dual] Representation Resolution. This is due primarily to the absence from that resolution of any reference to the Security Council seat. Well over forty friendly countries have pointed to this omission in their discussions with us, and almost all have expressed the view that the [Dual] Representation Resolution will have no chance for success unless it recommends that the Security Council seat be held by the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, some countries have come to regard our willingness to include such a recommendation as a test of our seriousness in pressing ahead with all available means to make our approach prevail in the General Assembly. Many more have reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to associate themselves with a resolution which in their view has no chance of success.37 Rogers continued:

92 J. Bruce Jacobs I must inform you that we have been forced to the conclusion that our choice now lies between tabling a [Dual] Representation Resolution which recommends that the People’s Republic of China hold the Security Council seat or anticipating the overwhelming passage of the Albanian Resolution. Our latest estimates show that unless we take this step now, the Important Question Resolution is likely to lose by a substantial margin. The Albanian Resolution will be adopted by an even larger margin, and the [Dual] Representation Resolution itself will never even come to a vote.38 As a consequence, Rogers argued: Given this situation, given our commitment to attempt by all means at our disposal to protect your Government’s representation in the United Nations – a commitment which I publicly reiterated on September 3 – and because any further delay would be fatal to what we and the Republic of China would hope to accomplish, I am sending urgent personal messages to all potential co-sponsors of influence in the General Assembly informing them of our consultations that a majority of UN members wish to see the People’s Republic of China seated in the Security Council and that, accordingly, we are soliciting their cosponsorship for the [Dual] Representation Resolution amended so that the first operative paragraph will end “. . . and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.”39 Rogers continued: I am aware, of course, that this action will present many problems to your Government, just as it does to our own. I trust you will understand that we are forced to take this step by the situation we now face and the prospect of defeat if we fail to act decisively and in timely fashion.40 In his letter, Rogers wrote of “certain intangibles” which are important, including “the need to prevent any public acrimony between ourselves and the Republic of China.” He said he needed “at least the tacit acquiescence of the Republic of China.”41 Rogers concluded: I must emphasize, however, that to accomplish this result we shall have to mount the most intensive campaign yet seen in the General Assembly. I trust that in this we may count upon the unstinting cooperation of the Republic of China, so that we may be victorious in defeating the Albanian Resolution.42 By making explicit that the People’s Republic would gain the Security

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Council seat, the dual recognition resolution gained several more sponsors, including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. However, two factors undercut the dual recognition proposal. First, the People’s Republic of China was no longer an isolated pariah as it was during the Korean War and the early years of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. In contrast to the relative flexibility towards Taiwan in the earlier British, French, and Canadian recognitions of China, Beijing now declared that it would not come to the United Nations if Taiwan were to retain a seat: The Chinese Government solemnly declares: the Chinese people and Government firmly oppose “two Chinas”, “one China, one Taiwan” or any similar absurdities, firmly oppose the fallacy that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”, and firmly oppose the scheme of creating “an independent Taiwan”. Should a situation of “two Chinas”, “one China, one Taiwan” or “the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined” or any other similar situation occur in the United Nations, the Government of the People’s Republic of China will have absolutely nothing to do with the United Nations.43 In his discussions with Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai also downplayed China’s interest in the United Nations: “Your Excellency [Kissinger] must know that we do not consider the matter of reclaiming our seat in the UN as such an urgent matter.”44 Second, Kissinger’s October visit to Beijing coincided with the UN vote. This undercut American efforts to gather support for dual representation. Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers discussed the issue several times. Apparently, the UN vote occurred earlier in 1971 than in previous years and the Americans were caught in a bind.45 On October 25, 1971, the United Nations voted. The first vote, on whether the China representation issue was an “Important Question,” failed by a vote of 55 in favor, 59 opposed, with 15 abstentions and 2 absent. The Albanian Resolution, rather than the Dual Representation Resolution, then came to the floor. Henry Tanner wrote, “Moments before the vote, Liu Chieh, the Chinese Nationalist representative, announced from the rostrum that his Government would take no further part in the proceedings of the Assembly. He received friendly applause from most delegations, and then led his delegation out of the hall.”46 The Albanian Resolution to seat the People’s Republic and expel Taiwan then won by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, 17 abstentions, and 3 absent. The Dual Representation Resolution never made it to the floor. Dual representation, despite strong American support, had difficulty because all of the co-sponsors other than Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were small. Many countries wanted to be on the winning side and so were reluctant to join with the United States.47 The Nationalist authorities on Taiwan had overestimated their support in

94 J. Bruce Jacobs the United Nations. Just before the vote, Taiwan believed the Important Question would pass 55 to 49 (but conceded it did not know about 13 additional countries), the Dual Representation Resolution would fail by 47 to 52, and the Albanian Resolution would fail by 52 to 54. Interestingly, while counting themselves as in support of the Important Question issue, the documents did not list Nationalist “China” on Taiwan in favor of dual representation. Rather, the documents stated, “we are still not included (wo wei baokuo zai nei).”48 Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT hesitated right to the very end. Taiwan thus lost its UN seat owing both to its own “One China” policy and that of China. Although documents in the archives highlight the role of Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, in fact President Chiang Kai-shek led the decision-making. His presence in the written records of the archives is limited,49 but it was President Chiang’s statement to “Compatriots of the Whole Nation (quanguo tongbao)” that led the three-page coverage of Taiwan’s withdrawal in the official Central Daily News.50 The Foreign Minister implemented Chiang’s policy.

Britain upgrades its ties and Japan, West Germany, Australia, and New Zealand recognize the People’s Republic (1972) The Chinese, believing the British too closely linked to the United States, staved off British attempts to upgrade ties. Britain, though supporting the entry of the People’s Republic to the United Nations, had still supported the US motion declaring the issue important, thus requiring a two-thirds vote for China’s admission. Following Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, Britain reversed this position. In addition, Britain had shown to anti-Soviet China that Britain was anti-Soviet by expelling 105 Soviet diplomats as spies in 1971, and had also joined the European Common Market. The diplomatic agreement between Britain and China stated that diplomatic relations would be raised to ambassadorial level on March 13, 1972, and at the same time Britain’s consulate in Taiwan would be withdrawn.51 Britain appeared to concede much more than Canada on the Taiwan issue: Britain, “acknowledging the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China, have [sic] decided to remove their official representation in Taiwan on 13 March 1972.” Britain recognized the Chinese government as “the sole legal government in China.”52 On September 29, 1972, Japan and the People’s Republic established formal relations. Japan conceded less than had the British. The paragraph on Taiwan stated: The Government of the People’s Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.53

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This limited Japanese sovereignty to the four main islands and such minor islands as agreed to by Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek.54 The Federal Republic of Germany established relations with China on October 11, 1972. The brief formal communiqué “said nothing about Taiwan nor about the People’s Republic being the ‘only legal government.’ This reticence presumably obviated the need for China to state a position on the embarrassing question of the two Germanies.”55 To this day, China refuses to consider the two Germanys or the two Koreas to be a parallel case for China, since the Germanys and Koreas were separated by formal international agreements while China was said to be divided by a civil war. When the new Australian Labor Government recognized the People’s Republic on December 21, 1972, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam agreed that “The Australian government . . . acknowledges (chengren) the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China.”56 This conceded much beyond the Canadian formula of “takes note” and, according to one recent memoir, “Whitlam . . . wanted a quick result . . . and this weakened Australia’s hand in the negotiation. . .”57 The new New Zealand Labour government soon followed and the joint communiqué read: “The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an [in]alienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The New Zealand Government acknowledges (chengren) this position of the Chinese Government.”58 Australia and New Zealand had closely followed the British model. By this time, Taiwan no longer had alternatives to a OneChina policy in the international arena.

The United States recognizes Beijing (1978) In 1975 Chiang Kai-shek died, followed by Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in mid-December 1978, China moved decisively towards “Reform and Opening to the Outside (gaige kaifang).” The Third Plenum also endorsed the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, which had been announced two days before the Plenum convened. Taiwan clearly loomed large in the Chinese decision to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The People’s Daily prominently printed both the text of Chairman Hua Guofeng’s press conference, in which four of six questions concerned Taiwan, as well as a story highlighting Hua’s responses on Taiwan.59 The Communiqué of the Third Plenum, while devoting only two sentences to reunification, explicitly tied the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States to reunification with Taiwan: “The Plenum believes that with the normalization of SinoAmerican relations, the return of our sacred territory Taiwan to the bosom of the Motherland and the prospect of achieving the great undertaking of reunification has already come one step closer.”60

96 J. Bruce Jacobs Some people have argued that America “sold out” Taiwan. But Congress clearly had other ideas. In April 1979 it passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which President Carter signed. This Act had three key points. First, it made “clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” (emphasis added). Second, it decided “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.” Third, the Taiwan Relations Act declared Taiwan would be treated as equivalent to a nation-state: The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the Unites States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan, prior to January 1, 1979. . . . Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.61 Furthermore, except for the Mutual Defence Treaty, which ceased operation one year after the United States began diplomatic relations with Beijing, all treaties and agreements with Taiwan continued in force: For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multi-lateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force unless and until terminated in accordance with law. Thus, for example, Taiwan maintained most-favored-nation status. The Taiwan Relations Act established the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto American embassy in Taipei. Originally headed by a retired ambassador, AIT was staffed by government employees, formally separated from government service, who were entitled to re-enter government service “with the attendant rights, privileges and benefits which the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated [to work in the American Institute].”62 The Taiwan government also established a Coordination Council for North American Affairs to provide representation in Washington and the various cities in which Taiwan had had consulates. These arrangements followed the formula pioneered by the Japanese in 1972.

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Domestic and foreign developments in Taiwan following the break in relations with Washington (1979–1988) Domestically, following the break in diplomatic relations with the United States, Taiwan postponed legislative elections scheduled for December 3, 1978. Taiwan’s non-partisan opposition had had high hopes for this election, following its success in the November 19, 1977 election for Provincial Assembly and County Executive.63 The opposition continued a series of demonstrations and activities to remain in the public’s eye. In addition, several journals were published. The Eighties (Bashi niandai), founded by Kang Ning-hsiang in June 1979, published seven issues until December 1979. Formosa (Meilidao) published four issues from August to November 1979. Formosa differed from the other opposition journals in that it openly operated as an opposition political organization, a “political party in all but name.” Its leaders established “Service Offices (fuwuchu)” in most of Taiwan’s counties and municipalities, which sponsored various meetings and forums on a wide variety of issues.64 With a reputed circulation by November 1979 of 100,000,65 about 1 percent of the adult population, Formosa, as an organization, felt threatening to the regime. In retrospect, the “Kaohsiung Incident” of December 10, 1979 has become a key event in Taiwan’s history of democratization. At the time, the Kaohsiung Incident, a march celebrating Human Rights Day, was only a prelude to a much larger planned rally in Taipei scheduled for December 16, 1979, the anniversary of the announcement of normalization between Washington and Beijing. Careful interviewing a month after the Kaohsiung Incident convinced me that mistakes by both the authorities and the demonstrators led to a “Tragedy of Errors.” On the morning of December 12, 1979, non-partisan leaders held a news conference expressing regret about the violence that had occurred during the march. But in the early hours of December 13, 1979, massive arrests took place. KMT leaders had held two full days of debates at Yangmingshan on how to handle the opposition. Conservatives forces won and widespread arrests were implemented. The context for this decision was the US announcement in December 1978, in accord with the Treaty’s provisions, that the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan would be terminated after one year on January 1, 1980. This led to considerable unease in Taiwan, which declared 1980 as “self-strengthening year (ziqiang nian).” This period was the most xenophobic this analyst had ever seen in Taiwan. Yet, by the year’s end, Taiwan’s voters gave strong support to the spouses of political prisoners. Despite important controls by the authoritarian KMT, the early 1980s were a hive of opposition journal activity, which played a crucial role in developing the sense of a Taiwan very separate from any concept of “China,” a Taiwan that had to forge its own destiny, an activity described by Wakabayashi (see chapter 1).66

98 J. Bruce Jacobs In these difficult circumstances, Taiwan tried to enhance its trade and “unofficial” foreign relations beyond the United States and Japan. Australia established a small trade office in Taipei in 1980 and during the early 1980s Taiwan began trading with Communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, formerly “forbidden” territory.67 Yet the KMT did not abandon its “One China” policy. In 1984, Surinam, which had recognized Beijing in 1976, approached Taipei to establish relations. The Republic of China on Taiwan still insisted, despite the harsh lessons of the previous thirty-five years, that Surinam first break relations with Beijing.68 Thus, under President Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT still failed to seek an alternative to “One China.” In the final eighteen months of his life, President Chiang Ching-kuo permitted three key reforms. First, on September 28, 1986, the opposition founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). On the basis of precedent, the party founders should have been arrested. In fact, the DPP prepared ten groups of ten leaders, each to replace the other as each was arrested. No such arrests occurred, however, and the DPP campaigned under its own name in the December 1986 legislative elections, despite being an officially illegal party. Second, on 15 October 1986, less than three weeks after the founding of the DPP, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the abolition of martial law, effective in July 1987. Finally, in October 1987, the Taiwan government permitted Taiwan residents to visit the Mainland. This policy established the first substantial people-to-people links between Taiwan and the Mainland in almost forty years. China welcomed these visits, but Taiwan residents reported back on how dictatorial, bureaucratic, and poor China was. These visits greatly diminished the likelihood of the Taiwanese welcoming China’s policy of “one nation, two systems (yi guo, liang zhi)” and contributed to a sense that Taiwan’s destiny was separate from that of China. The people of Taiwan were turning away from “One China.”

The Taiwanization of Taiwan under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian (1988–2003) After Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13, 1988, Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, a native-born Taiwanese, succeeded to the presidency. Some people expected Lee to be a “figurehead” president, much like Yen Chiakan who succeeded Chiang Kai-shek in 1975. Chiang Ching-kuo, who had already become premier in 1972, became KMT Party Chairman in 1975 and was clearly the leader. Many in the Mainlander elite of the ruling KMT felt that Lee should be a president similar to Yen Chia-kan, while real power was exercised from elsewhere. Lee, however, won support and became KMT Party Chairman. The Mainlander elite remained powerful. Therefore, President Lee faced an uphill struggle to exercise genuine influence. He did, however, have

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan

99

strong support from the increased numbers of Taiwanese among the party leadership, people whom Chiang Ching-kuo had promoted. Lee used the tensions among the Mainlander elite to gain greater power. Thus Premier Yu Kuo-hua, who remained premier following Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, was replaced as premier in June 1989 by Lee Huan, a senior Mainlander liberal. Lee Huan, too, worked against President Lee Teng-hui. Following Lee Teng-hui’s election as president on March 21, 1990, he was able to remove the disloyal Lee Huan and appointed Minister of Defense Hau Peitsun as premier in May 1990. Hau proved a popular appointment and cleaned up Taiwan’s deteriorating public order situation. But, as the leader of the KMT’s Anti-Mainstream faction, Hau too provided Lee with competition. Following the Mainstream’s victory in the December 19, 1992 legislative elections, Premier Hau realized he lacked sufficient legislative votes for another term and resigned.69 In addition to implementing a series of political reforms, which led to and strengthened Taiwan’s democracy, President Lee promulgated changes that meant Taiwan no longer contested sovereignty over China with the People’s Republic. These reforms were embodied through three key 1991 documents. First, and most importantly, Article 10 of the Constitutional Amendments of 1991 “limits the area covered by the Constitution to that of the Taiwan area, and recognizes the legitimacy of the rule of the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland.”70 Second, the Guidelines for National Unification, adopted by the National Unification Council on February 23, 1991 and by the Cabinet on March 14, 1991, declared: The two sides of the Straits should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve all disputes through peaceful means, and furthermore respect – not reject – each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.71 The third important document was the termination of the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,” effective on May 1, 1991.72 According to an official source, “Thus, the ROC government recognized the fact that two equal political entities exist in two independent areas of one country.”73 To deal with Mainland issues, President Lee Teng-hui established a threetier administrative structure. In the presidential office, Lee presided over the National Unification Council. Secondly, a Mainland Affairs Council, part of Taiwan’s Cabinet, originally coordinated policy among Taiwan’s ministries and commissions, though subsequently it exercised leadership on Mainland policy. Finally, President Lee established a Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), an officially unofficial body designed to meet with its Mainland counterpart, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).

100 J. Bruce Jacobs These arrangements led to the Wang–Koo talks between China and Taiwan, headed by Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu, in Singapore between April 27 and 29, 1993. Later several KMT leaders stated that the basis for these talks had been a “1992 consensus (jiu er gongshi)” of “One China, Each Side Interpreting in Its Own Way (ge yi Zhongguo, ge zi biaoshu),” but in the campaign for the December 1, 2001 legislative elections, the then leaders of the Mainland Affairs Council stated there was no documentary evidence that any such consensus had ever been reached. The Chinese, who originally had denied the existence of any “1992 consensus,” now proclaimed that it had existed! President Lee ended Taiwan’s “One China” policy in which Taiwan was the one and only China.74 When Saudi Arabia recognized the People’s Republic in 1990, Taiwan refused to break relations, forcing Saudi Arabia to do so under pressure from Beijing.75 Under President Lee, Taiwan also moved to establish links with the Communist and post-Communist world in Central and Eastern Europe, starting in 1988 and accelerating in the 1990s. Offices were established in Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Belarus, and Latvia, while several countries also established offices in Taipei. Senior people, including the Premier, made visits to several countries. Taiwan and Macedonia established diplomatic relations from January 1992 until June 2001, when a change of government in Macedonia and the Balkan difficulties required Chinese support for UN peace-keeping forces in the Balkans, and forced Macedonia to recognize the People’s Republic. (This was important because Macedonia was the only European country to recognize Taipei other than the Vatican.) Intriguingly, Latvia also maintained consular relations with Taiwan from January 1992 until July 1994, despite having established relations with China on September 12, 1991. In addition, the Czech Republic spoke in favor of Taiwan’s entry to the United Nations in October 1994, while Latvia spoke in favor of Taiwan in October 1995.76 Small democracies that had recently been liberated from Communist Party dictatorships seemed to appreciate Taiwan’s dilemmas. Foreign relations under President Lee also used “dollar diplomacy.” Taiwan had rich foreign reserves and used aid to gain recognition and support in Africa, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Pacific, and Southeast Asia. “Dollar diplomacy” often aligned Taiwan with one section of a country’s politics. Therefore, a change of government often meant a collapse in support for Taiwan. Macedonia was at least partially one such case, as were Nauru and Liberia. In most cases, the extent of money used in Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy” is unclear, but the funds, which brought about one week of recognition from Papua New Guinea (PNG) in July 1999, included: ●

Private placement of US$250 million in PNG bonds with the Central Bank of Taiwan at a lower interest rate than that prevailing in the market.

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan 101 ●

●

●

Provision of a US$100-million line of credit by the Central Bank of Taiwan to the Bank of PNG. Provision of US$1.5 billion in grant assistance, of which US$500 million was to be released when full diplomatic relations were established between Papua New Guinea and Taiwan. The remaining $1 billion was to be disbursed in five equal annual payments. Extension of US$500 million in concessional loans at an interest rate of 4 percent to 5 percent a year over twenty years to finance development within two months of signing the treaty establishing diplomatic relations.77

The small cross-Strait advances of the Wang–Koo talks came unstuck owing to China’s internal politics. In 1993, China’s President Jiang Zemin personally took charge of Taiwan policy, attempting to implement a moderate policy. Unfortunately, when his revised policy document was completed in 1994, the Qiandao Lake Incident occurred, in which several Taiwanese tourists to China were murdered and Chinese authorities were disdainful of bereaved Taiwanese family members. This led to considerable cross-Strait tension. The new policy China had proposed, which became known as Jiang’s Eight Points (Jiang ba dian), was released on Chinese New Year, 1995.78 On first reading, the text offered little new to Taiwan, yet Chinese sources insist that Jiang’s Eight Points did make concessions to Taiwan. Even though Taiwan did not see much new in Jiang’s Eight Points, it agreed to new Wang–Koo talks, as well as other discussions.79 By 1995, the “moderates” had lost control of China’s Taiwan policy to the “hardliners.” Although Taiwan’s President Lee had visited President Ramos of the Philippines, President Suharto of Indonesia, and King Bhumibol of Thailand, as well as several other Southeast Asian leaders in 1994, the Chinese were agitated over President Lee’s visit to the United States in 1995, where he was to give a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. The visit caught the Chinese off-guard, since the US State Department had assured them that President Lee would not receive a visa for such a visit. However, Congress – with a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives and only two dissenting votes in the Senate – called for him to be given a visa. President Clinton surrendered to the bipartisan pressure to treat the leader of a new democracy with respect and dignity. The Chinese “went ballistic” in more than just the literal sense of the term. The “hardliners” argued that the “moderate” policy had failed.80 In response, the Chinese implemented two new policies. First, they personally attacked President Lee with numerous, offensive articles in the Chinese press.81 The Chinese government also threatened Taiwan militarily during Taiwan’s legislative elections of December 2, 1995 and Taiwan’s presidential election of March 23, 1996. Taiwan’s voters reacted to these threats by voting strongly for President Lee, increasing his vote by some 20 percent according to reliable polls.82

102 J. Bruce Jacobs China’s hardline policies proved counter-productive in terms of China’s own self-declared goal of courting the Taiwan people.83 In addition, finding that his moderate “unificationist” policies had met with such negativity from China, President Lee Teng-hui moved toward further emphasizing Taiwan’s separate status, which now had an increasingly broad popularity among Taiwan’s electorate. Originally, he was not an advocate of Taiwan Independence. The development of “de facto Taiwan Independence” as a widespread and well-accepted phenomenon in Taiwan, while building on popular sentiments unleashed in the February 28th (1947) and Kaohsiung incidents, only congealed amidst the hardline Chinese policies towards Taiwan in the second half of the 1990s.84 President Lee’s frustration with China became evident when he told Deutsche Welle radio on July 9, 1999, “The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-Strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government.”85 (The term for state here is guo, sometimes translated as “nation.”) The Chinese reacted strongly to Lee’s description of cross-Strait relations as “special state-to-state” relations and cancelled Wang Daohan’s planned October 1999 visit to Taiwan. China refused to speak with President Lee and then refused to speak with Lee’s elected successor, President Chen Shui-bian, despite Chen’s “five noes” raised in both his campaign rhetoric and his inauguration speech of May 20, 2000: 1 2 3 4 5

no declaration of independence; no changing the national name; no inclusion of “state-to-state relations” in the Constitution; no referendum on independence or unification if China did not attack; no abolition of the “Guidelines for National Unification” or the National Unification Council.86

This continued Chinese intransigence following President Chen’s election, the transmission of SARS from China in early to mid-2003 described by Hickey (see chapter 4), and the difficulties of Hong Kong with “one nation, two systems,” also in early to mid-2003, further contributed to the idea of a “de facto independent Taiwan” gaining widespread currency in Taiwan. China’s actions, including military threats and an unwillingness to talk with Taiwan’s popularly elected leaders, have done much to strengthen the Taiwan Independence sentiment that China claims it opposes. While the rigidity of the Chiang family dictatorship on Taiwan helped China to legitimize “One China,” it is Chinese obduracy that has legitimated a Taiwanese identity on Taiwan, which is separate from China. These trends can be seen from Table 5.1. These figures become clearer when we add the first and second, the third and fourth, and the fifth and sixth

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan 103 Table 5.1 Views on Taiwan’s future, 1994–2003 View on Taiwan’s status

Dec. 1994

June 2003

Independence as soon as possible Maintain status quo, move toward independence Maintain status quo indefinitely Maintain status quo, decide at later date Maintain status quo, move toward unification Unification as soon as possible Non-response Total

3.1 8.0 9.8 38.5 15.6 4.4 20.5 99.9

5.1 13.7 16.6 37.2 14.0 2.1 11.3 100.0

Source: “Changes in the Unification–Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (National Chengchi University) (1994–2003), 13 August 2003”; original chart provided by Election Study Center

categories. This calculation gives us those who ultimately prefer independence, the status quo, and unification respectively (Table 5.2). Those advocating immediate or future independence have increased significantly, while those advocating immediate or future unification have declined. Those preferring the status quo (Taiwan’s separate status) or the status quo of de facto independence with a decision at a later date, have risen. This cautious “middle” is by far the largest group. The “non-response” group has declined substantially as the Taiwanese have become more aware of the issues and less afraid to express their opinions. The preferences for diplomatic caution and continued separation are those of an informed and responsible democratic electorate. Another survey manifests these results more starkly. This survey questions identity among Taiwan residents. The proportion identifying themselves as both “Taiwanese and Chinese” has fallen slightly (though over the years there have been some increases and decreases), but the proportion who identify themselves as “Taiwanese” has risen sharply and those who identify themselves as “Chinese” has fallen considerably (see Table 5.3). The “non-response” rate has also fallen sharply. These data suggest, perhaps even more strongly, that the concept of a Taiwanese entity, separate from that of China, is increasingly popular throughout the island. While Chinese rulers continue to insist that Taiwan belongs to the CCP’s China and refuse to negotiate except under their “One China” principle, reducing Taiwan to a local government of their China, the concept of a Taiwan “nation” has grown very rapidly in Taiwan. The “honor” of belonging to a “great” Chinese nation has little attraction for Taiwan’s people, who imagine themselves as having fought long and hard for their separate democracy where searing experiences that have no meaning to the Chinese, such as the Kaohsiung Incident, have shaped a separate identity. Given its rigidity, the People’s Republic has done virtually nothing to respond to openings from President Chen Shui-bian. The Taiwanese backlash to Chinese contempt for Taiwan’s elected president has strengthened

104 J. Bruce Jacobs Table 5.2 Simplified views on Taiwan’s future, 1994–2003 View on Taiwan’s status

Dec. 1994

June 2003

Prefer independence Prefer status quo Prefer unification No-response Total

11.1 48.3 20.0 20.5 99.9

18.8 53.8 16.1 11.3 100.0

Table 5.3 Identity in Taiwan, 1992–2004 Identity

June 1992

Dec. 2004

Low score High score

Both Taiwanese and Chinese Taiwanese Chinese Non-response Total

45.4 17.3 26.2 11.0 99.9

44.4 43.7 6.1 5.7 99.9

39.1 17.3 6.1 11.0 –

50.9 43.7 26.2 4.6 –

Source: Election Study Center, NCCU (National Chengchi University).

President Chen domestically as it further alienates the Taiwanese from China. Whether China’s leaders can implement major changes in their policies to court Taiwan remains problematical, given China’s difficult domestic struggles and priorities, which lead to a heightened Chinese nationalism, described by Friedman (chapter 11). Thus, China’s Taiwan policies will most likely continue to foster and deepen Taiwan’s nationalism. A rigid Chinese “One China” policy, together with a democratic Taiwan that is developing a separate national identity, will offer no swift peaceful solutions to cross-Strait dilemmas.

Notes * The author expresses his gratitude to the Australian Research Council (ARC) for a three-year Discovery Research Grant which enabled the research that underpins this chapter. 1 “Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Sweden”, http:// www.chinaembassy.se/eng/premade/11321/2.htm (accessed July 21, 2003). 2 J. Bruce Jacobs, Taiwan (Sydney: The Asia–Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, 1993), p. 32. 3 Richard Harris, “Britain and China: Coexistence at Low Pressure”, in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Towards China: Views from Six Continents (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 18. 4 Ibid., pp. 18–19. 5 J.P. Jain, China in World Politics: A Study of Sino-British Relations 1949–1975 (London: Martin Robertson, 1975), p. 24. 6 Quoted from PhD thesis of Mark Harrison, “Legitimising Taiwan: The Formation of a Taiwanese Identity”, Monash University, chapter 2, submitted in 2004. The original source is Keele University Political Science Resources, “British

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan 105

7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29

Labour Party election manifesto, 1955,” at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/ man/lab55.htm (accessed October 29, 2002). Quoted from Harrison, Legitimising Taiwan, chapter 2. The original source is Keele University Political Science Resources, “British Conservative Party election manifesto, 1955,” at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con55.htm (accessed October 29, 2002). Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), January 25, 1964, p. 1. Ibid., January 28, 1964, p. 1. Stephen Erasmus, “General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking,” The China Quarterly, No. 18, April–June 1964, p. 195. The Chinese text appears in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), January 28, 1964, p. 1. Erasmus, “General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking,” p. 196. Ibid., pp. 196–197. The Chinese text appears in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), January 29, 1964, p. 1. The last two sentences appear only in the Chinese text. Erasmus, “General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking,” p. 197. The Chinese text appears in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), January 29, 1964, p. 1. Erasmus, “General de Gaulle’s Recognition of Peking,” p. 197. Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), February 7, 1964, p. 1. Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, Ouzhou si, category 305, file 22, Fafei jianjiao wo dui Fa kangyi an (Documents on France and the Bandits Establishing Diplomatic Relations and Our Protest to France), January 23–February 10, 1964, pp. 204103–204105 and 204110-204111. François Fejtö, “France and China: The Intersection of Two Grand Designs,” in Halpern (ed.), Policies Towards China, p. 62; Harold C. Hinton, China’s Turbulent Quest (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 276. Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), February 11, 1964, p. 1. “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 45, January/March 1971, p. 209. Ibid., p. 209. Ibid., p. 211. Ibid., p. 209. “Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Sweden.” Hang Liwu xiansheng fangwen jilu (Records of Visits with Mr Han Lih-wu) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiuso (Modern History Institute, Academia Sinica)), 1990), pp. 61–62. In preparing this discussion of Kissinger’s visits to China, I have relied on The Beijing–Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China (September 1970–July 1971), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, edited by William Burr, February 27, 2002, a collection of fortyone documents (cited hereafter as Briefing Book 66) and Negotiating U.S.– Chinese Rapprochement: New American and Chinese Documentation Leading Up to Nixon’s 1972 Trip, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 70, edited by William Burr, May 22, 2002, a collection of twenty-seven documents (cited hereafter as Briefing Book 70). These two electronic briefing books are available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ and http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/ These five points are quoted from Briefing Book 66, Document 35, p. 4. Note that the fifth point actually appears in the previous paragraph and the numbering is added. Briefing Book 66, Document 35, p. 7. See also Briefing Book 66, Document 38, pp. 10–11, as well as Briefing Book 70, Document 11, pp. 31–32 and Briefing Book 70, Document 13, p. 6. Briefing Book 66, Document 34, pp. 15–16. For these discussions, see Briefing Book 70, Document 10, pp. 7, 15; Briefing

106 J. Bruce Jacobs

30

31

32

33

34 35

36

37 38 39

Book 70, Document 11, pp. 13–35; Briefing Book 70, Document 12, pp. 2–9; Briefing Book 70, Document 13, pp. 6–8, 10; Briefing Book 70, Document 15, pp. 22–25; Briefing Book 70, Document 16, pp. 5–11; Briefing Book 70, Document 17, p. 2; Briefing Book 70, Document 18, pp. 3–4, 7, 10–15 and Briefing Book 70, Document 19, pp. 1–2; 7–16, 21. For a Chinese perspective, see Briefing Book 70, Document 21, especially pp. 6 and 9, and for Kissinger’s briefing of President Nixon, see Briefing Book 70, Document 20, especially pp. 2–4, 7–8, 14–16. “The Shanghai Communiqué,” reprinted as Appendix 3 in Victor H. Li (ed.), The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), pp. 128–132, quote from p. 131; text also available in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 50, April/June 1972, pp. 399–402, quote from p. 402. “Guanyu Lianheguo dahui chuli suowei ‘Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti’ zhi gezhong shi’an (Several Draft Resolutions Concerning the General Assembly of the United Nations Dealing with the So-called ‘China Representation Issue’)”, Waijiaobu guoji zuzhi si bian (edited by the International Organization Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), located in Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90022, Nianliujie Lianda yinying wo daibiaoquan ge zhong shi’an an (Various Draft Resolutions for the 26th General Assembly Concerning Our Representation), January 12–May 15, 1971, pp. 127464–127492. Letter from H.A. Dunn, Australian Ambassador to Taipei, to Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, dated June 4, 1971, quoting Australian policy; available in Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90023, Zhou buzhang jiu Lianda Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti yu Mei, Ri zhengyao bianjie tanhua jilu an (Documents on Records of Conversations between Foreign Minister Chow and Ranking American and Japanese Officials about the China Representation Issue in the United Nations), March 4–July 30, 1971, p. 501189. See Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90054, Zhou buzhang jiu Lianda Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti yu Mei, Ri zhengyao bianjie tanhua jilu an (Documents on Records of Conversations between Foreign Minister Chow and Ranking American and Japanese Officials about the China Representation Issue in the United Nations), June 25–September 8, 1971. Ibid., pp. 300012–300013. Waijiao bu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), “Lianda di ershiliu jie changhui zhong wo daibiaoquan an zhi yinying fang’an (Resolutions on Our Representation at the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations),” August 3, 1971, p. 2 in Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 633, File 90053, Lianda di ershiliu jie changhui (The 26th General Assembly of the United Nations), September 1–October 12, 1971. Note that this document did not have archive pagination. Letter from Rogers to Chow, September 8, 1971, p. 1 in Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640 and 635, File 90003, Di nianliu jie Lianda daibiaoquan an Meiguo lichang an (Documents on the American Position for our Representation at the 26th Session of the United Nations), August 5–October 16, 1971, p. 300506. Note that this document has four pages, but p. 2 of the document is not numbered in the archive. Thus, the archival page range for the whole document is pp. 300506–300508. Ibid., pp. 1–2. Ibid., p. 3 (p. 300507 in archive pagination). Ibid., p. 3.

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan 107 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48

49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57

58 59 60

Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4 (p. 300508 in archive pagination). “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 20 August 1971.” This document is included as pp. 2–4 of a UN document, which is available in Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90042, Di nianliu jie Lianda wo daibiaoquan an biaojue jieguo ji wo xuanbu tuichu jingguo jieyao an (Documents on the Results of the Vote on Our Representation at the 26th Session of the United Nations and Circumstances of Our Announcing Our Withdrawal), October 27–November 15, 1971, pp. 501086–501089, quote from p. 4 (p. 501089). Briefing Book 66, Document 35, p. 17. For these taped White House discussions, see Briefing Book 70, Documents 6–8 for discussions on September 30, 1971 and Document 9 for a discussion on October 17, 1971. Henry Tanner, “Session is Tense,” New York Times, October 26, 1971, p. 1. Kathleen Teltsch, “Tactics Left US on the Defensive”, New York Times, October 26, 1971, p. 10. See Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90036, Di nianliu jie Lianda wo daibiaoquan ge an gupiao an (Documents Estimating Votes on the Various Resolutions on Our Representation at the 26th Session of the United Nations), September 25–October 26, 1971, especially pp. 500835–500852. For example, Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Waijiao bu, guo zu si, Category 640, File 90054, Zhou buzhang jiu Lianda Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti yu Mei, Ri zhengyao bianjie tanhua jilu an (Documents on Records of Conversations between Foreign Minister Chow and Ranking American and Japanese Officials about the China Representation Issue in the United Nations), June 25–September 8, 1971, p. 300013. Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), October 27, 1971, pp. 1–3. Jain, China in World Politics, pp. 46–47. “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 50, April/ June 1972, pp. 382–383. The full text of the joint statement is in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 52, October/December 1972, pp. 782–783, quote from p. 782. The text of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 is available at http:// www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/potsdam.htm “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 53, January/March 1973, p. 201. Gary Klintworth, Australia’s Taiwan Policy 1942–1992 (Canberra: Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1993), pp. 55–56; see also “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 53, January/March 1973, p. 200. John Burgess, “Recognising China”, Quadrant, Vol. 42, No. 3, March 1998, pp. 46–50. On Australia’s relationship with Taiwan, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Australia’s Relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan”, in Nicholas Thomas (ed.), Re-orienting China–Australia Relations: 1972 to the Present (Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 35–50. “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 53, January/March 1973, p. 202. Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), December 17, 1978, p. 1. Ibid., December 24, 1978, p. 1.

108 J. Bruce Jacobs 61 The quotations from the Taiwan Relations Act are copied from Jacobs, Taiwan, pp. 33–34. A copy of the full Taiwan Relations Act is available as Appendix 9 in Li (ed.), The Future of Taiwan, pp. 150–160. 62 Ibid. 63 See J. Bruce Jacobs, “Political Opposition and Taiwan’s Political Future”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 6, July 1981, pp. 21–44 for details. 64 This was the same “external” nomenclature used by the Kuomintang, but interviews with several opposition leaders following their release from prison suggests they were not aware of this. 65 Katherine Lee, “Taiwan’s dissidents,” Index on Censorship, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1980, p. 54. 66 This point is made in A-chin Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 96–102. The present writer’s recent research reinforces this point; see J. Bruce Jacobs, “‘Taiwanization’ in Taiwan’s Politics”, in John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau (eds.), Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan (New York: Palgrave, 2005). 67 Jacobs, Taiwan, p. 34. 68 Gabriel Fok, “Flexibility to Adapt Describes ROC Policy”, Free China Journal, January 22, 1990; available at http://publish.gio.gov.tw/PSUser/psfrmqry. htm?NS_adv_search=1&NS_zone_search=0 (accessed July 21, 2003). 69 More details are available in J. Bruce Jacobs, “Democratisation in Taiwan”, Asian Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, July 1993, especially pp. 121–123. 70 The quote is from “President Lee Teng-hui interviewed by Deutsche Welle, July 9, 1999,” in Taipei Speaks Up: Special State-to-State Relationship, Republic of China’s Policy Documents (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, 1999), pp. 1–8, quote from p. 1. Lee also cites Additional Articles 1 and 4 as indicating the separation. For the English text of the 1991 additional articles, see Republic of China Yearbook 1991–92 (Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 580–581. The English text does not clearly confirm President Lee’s analyses. 71 “Guojia tongyi gangling (Guidelines for National Unification)”, published in numerous places. Translation from Republic of China Yearbook 1991–92 (Taipei: Kwang Hua Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 583–584. 72 See statement of President Lee Teng-hui, April 30, 1991, in Republic of China Yearbook 1991–92, pp. 584–585. 73 Republic of China Yearbook 1991–92, p. 141. 74 Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), p. 28. 75 Suisheng Zhao, “Reunification Strategy: Beijing versus Lee Teng-hui”, in Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (eds.), Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 225. 76 This information comes from an excellent paper by Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy Towards the Post-Communist States, 1988– 2003: Success for Failure?”, presented to the Chinese Studies Association of Australia Conference, July 9–12, 2003, Sydney. I thank Dr Tubilewicz for providing me with this information. 77 Geoffrey Barker, “PNG’s Skate Quits in Bid to Rescue Government,” Australian Financial Review, July 8, 1999, p. 1. This information came from PNG’s Post-Courier newspaper. Details of this whole episode between Taiwan and Papua New Guinea appear in Jacobs, “Australia’s Relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan”, pp. 43–44. 78 For the text of Jiang’s Eight Points, see Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), January 31, 1995, pp. 1–2.

One China, diplomatic isolation and a separate Taiwan 109 79 Details are available in J. Bruce Jacobs, “China’s Policies Towards Taiwan”, in C.L. Chiou and Leong H. Liew (eds.), Uncertain Future: Taiwan–Hong Kong– China Relations after Hong Kong’s Return to Chinese Sovereignty (Aldershot, UK, Brookfield, USA, Singapore, and Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), especially pp. 96–98. 80 Ibid., p. 98 81 Examples appear in Ibid., pp. 98–99. 82 Ibid., pp. 100–101. 83 Ibid., pp. 101–106. 84 J. Bruce Jacobs and I-hao Ben Liu, “Lee Teng-hui: A Preliminary Assessment,” (manuscript currently being refereed). 85 “President Lee Tenghui Interviewed by Deutsche Welle, July 9, 1999”, pp. 1–8, quote from pp. 1–2. 86 The “five noes” can be found in numerous places including Republic of China Yearbook: Taiwan 2001 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2001), p. 117.

6

Civil society, grassroots aspirations and diplomatic isolation Chen Jie

Introduction Democratization has led a rapidly expanding number of Taiwanese nonprofit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to take part in transnational activities.1 This phenomenon is studied in Taiwan from the perspective of how NGOs can facilitate the state’s foreign policy of resisting international isolation by China. NGO studies have been commissioned by the government to serve its minjian waijiao (people-to-people diplomacy), a policy of reducing isolation initiated by the Kuomintang (KMT) government and strengthened by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This chapter avoids that subject, which is discussed by Dan Lynch (see chapter 7).2 Instead, it explores Taiwanese NGOs’ own participation in transnational activities. After first introducing an analytical framework for exploring the transnational activities of Taiwanese groups, the chapter reviews these activities, outlines the dilemmas of Taiwanese NGOs confronted by their state’s isolation and China’s dramatic rise, examines China’s NGO communities, and concludes with an assessment of the partial pariah status imposed on Taiwanese NGOs.

Transnational civil society and global governance: implications for Taiwan When it succeeded in dropping its “one China” curtain on the world in the early 1970s, Beijing conceded that Taiwan could maintain and develop non-governmental relations with other peoples. For Beijing, “nongovernmental” or “people-to-people” relations meant study, tourism and business, matters that were private and personal. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not anticipate the proliferation of organized participation (or a strong urge for such participation) in world politics by civil society groups in a new age of globalization. Globalization blurs a stark distinction between the governmental and non-governmental, and is characterized by an increasing interconnectedness of transnational civil society, multinational business, state and inter-state organizations in an emerging and loosely structured framework of global governance.

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 111 The end of the Cold War witnessed an explosion of NGOs. There was a “global associational revolution”, a striking upsurge in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, non-profit or non-governmental organizations. Associations, foundations and similar institutions were formed to deliver human services, promote grass-roots economic development, prevent environmental degradation, protect civil rights and pursue “a thousand other objectives”.3 One type of organization is assertive socialmovement NGOs, grass-roots advocacy or cause-oriented groups working to “change some elements of the social structure”, particularly on environmental, human rights, gender and development issues.4 The dynamic cross-border activities or transnational networking of “nonstate entities of a social, ecological, technical and scientific, ideological, religious or other nature” can be seen as a defining stage in global politics.5 Post-Cold-War international relations witnessed a rapid upsurge of interactions among NGOs. These are usually defined as “transnational politics” and not as nation-state “international politics” or inter-state interactions. One result has been a proliferation of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), including many with members from diverse countries. Members are typically national associations.6 It is estimated that there were 12,260 INGOs and 5,807 internationally oriented national NGOs in 2003.7 INGOs and numerous less formal transnational networks forged by INGOs, NGOs, foundations and activist research centers constitute a global civil society. The growing number of networks and collaborative arrangements among non-profit and non-governmental organizations share common economic, social, cultural, environmental, political and security concerns. Globalization presents challenges requiring transnational responses at a time when governments are limited in their ability to deal with those problems. The dismantling of Cold War ideological barriers, along with technological advances in communication and transportation, have improved the conditions that make transnational actions possible. NGO networks and their key members play an increasingly prominent role in world politics. Global governance refers to collective efforts by state, inter-state organizations and non-state actors at a global level to tackle issues and challenges of common concern. Despite their fragmentary and fluid nature, such collective efforts have become increasingly institutionalized and operate with increasing use of international law. Civil-society activists take an active part in key inter-state international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and in many international treaty bodies focused on more specific issues. It has become a norm that the major international conferences organized by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or state treaty bodies also hold parallel NGO forums, and numerous IGOs provide other mechanisms for non-state actors to take part in international policy discussions. Through participation in policy debates, standard-setting and norm-making, non-state actors impact the policies of states and IGOs. Those arrangements, materializing

112 Chen Jie partly under the pressure of transnational actors themselves, have provided a catalyst for the formation of many INGOs. A special institutionalized mechanism within the United Nations is the so-called “consultative status” designed to give citizen groups access to influencing policy-making at the global level. The UN Charter says that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should take measures to consult non-state actors. By 1992, more that 700 INGOs and internationally oriented NGOs had attained consultative status. The number reached 2,300 in 2003.8 In sum, INGOs exert influence in world politics as shapers of opinion, as autonomous actors, and as competitors with states.9 These developments have major implications for Taiwan. First, Taiwan must take part in those global efforts to tackle concerns it shares with other countries (from child prostitution and climate change to human trafficking and humanitarian relief). Just as they needed the expertise of the global health mechanism centred upon the World Health Organization (WHO) to combat SARS, the Taiwanese who attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development (held in Johannesburg in August 2002) believed that “many cases of successful environmental protection will be publicized during the Johannesburg summit, . . . they can be used as models for improving the quality of life in Taiwan”.10 Second, following Taiwan’s 1971 expulsion from the UN family, Taiwan’s government cannot take part in the state end of global governance because of UN dominance in most of the global forums of standards-making and norms-setting. Consequently, Taiwanese NGOs have a special responsibility for the island’s future. However, there is a serious limit to Taiwan NGO participation, because transnational civil society is becoming connected to the inter-state system through which China isolates Taiwan. Third, NGOs’ comparative diplomatic freedom and transnational civil society connections with the state end of world politics have made the Taiwanese government more hopeful of finding a way to creep into the world of officialdom through an NGO back door, the essence of minjian waijiao.

Transnational participation by Taiwan’s civil society Taiwan’s democratic transition was unique in not featuring an organized solidarity with transnational NGO coalitions. Dense interactions between fully mobilized domestic activist groups and their INGO allies facilitated democratic transitions and improvements in human rights in Latin America, Africa, East Asia and Eastern Europe.11 Transnational institutionalized coalitions and solidarity by Taiwan’s social movement NGOs were negligible during the democratizing 1980s, except for burgeoning women’s and environmental movements.12 Transnational linkages grew after democratization, particularly since the mid-1990s. Though the non-social-movement NGOs or traditional groups (definition below) started to develop their transnational connections much earlier, these were mostly non-political.

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 113 The lack of NGO transnational participation before the 1990s reflected Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. Also, KMT-style authoritarianism stunted the growth of bona fide and autonomous NGOs.13 The dominant groups in the authoritarian era were the party-state’s corporatist associations of women, children, youth, farmers, workers, professionals, intellectuals, business, and religious believers.14 Minjian organizations of the martial law era were controlled by or cooperated with the party-state or its corporatist organizations. Minjian organizations that were allowed international access were Taiwan chapters of politically “safe” INGOs, including the Rotary Club, the Lions Club, Jaycees, Kiwanis, Junior Chamber International, World Vision, Soroptimist International, Zonta International and the Young Women’s Christian Association. Organizations set up by the KMT for foreign policy purposes, including the Chinese Association for Human Rights and the Taiwan chapter of the World Anti-Communist League (the league itself was the KMT’s own brainchild) were also active. Social-movement NGOs started to emerge in the 1980s. Prosperity provided resources and increased awareness of problems. The budding social-movement NGOs, self-defined or self-constituted social change activist groups independent of the KMT and the state, pressed for change.15 However, only after the end of martial law did civil society flourish. The country witnessed a rapid growth of social-movement NGOs. They worked on empowerment and consciousness-raising, focusing on consumer interests, the environment, conservation, and the human rights of women, children, labor, indigenous peoples and the disabled.16 Social movements first facilitated liberalization and democratization, and then democratization further legitimated the NGO sector and helped it grow.17 The emergence of an autonomous civil society also increased the independence and liveliness of numerous traditional groups. By 2001, Taiwan was home to an estimated 15,000 NGOs and 3,000 foundations (mostly private and corporate). More than 60 percent of those NGOs and 75 percent of the foundations were established in the 1980s and 1990s.18 Given increasing transnational activism, a 1999 survey of NGOs in the Taipei metropolitan area found that 30 percent or so networked with INGOs.19 Taiwanese membership in INGOs increased from 514 in 1986 to 1,695 in 2002.20 The transnationally most active include humanitarian and community-development NGOs or aid NGOs, social-movement NGOs, and some well-established and large traditional groups, particularly the Taiwan chapters of the above-mentioned service INGOs.21 The global involvement of grassroots organizations has been concentrated in five advocacy areas: human rights, women’s issues, environmental protection, indigenous peoples and migrant workers (Southeast Asian maids and construction workers in Taiwan).22 Taiwan groups join with likeminded NGOs and INGOs at forums and conferences. Many Taiwanese groups have joined existing INGOs and become active participants in transnational campaign networks. Apart from seeking cross-border

114 Chen Jie solidarity and exchanging information, transnational activism permits a transfer of best practices, especially from activists in the industrialized democracies. This serves domestic reform.23 NGO activism also combats Taiwan’s international isolation, which activists in Taiwan find has kept Taiwan uninformed. As Huang Wen-hsiung (former President of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, a leading human rights NGO in Taiwan) noted, as late as 1998: Taiwan lacks information and books on human rights . . . no library has a collection of UN laws on human rights . . . there is a glaring lack of human rights-related courses in universities. The seven biggest libraries only have 162 books on . . . human rights. This has a lot to do with Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. Of course, the Kuomintang was within the UN before the early 1970s and signed three treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but this was for “Free China” propaganda. The Kuomintang regime simply did not want to have anything to do with the human rights stuff . . . Then from the 1970s, the monitoring and reporting system of the UN human rights mechanism became more mature and functioned more effectively. If Taiwan had stayed in the UN, then no matter how reluctant the government was, it would have been dragged into this human rights system: as a result, it would have to face international monitoring; and bureaucracy and relevant academic personnel would have been better informed.24 Since the late 1990s, Taiwanese activists’ global learning has been fast. Transparency Taiwan (TT), established in August 2002 as the Taiwan chapter of Transparency International (TI), has learned the monitoring tools of the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to measure and combat corruption by business and politicians.25 Of the 133 countries selected by Transparency International in 2003 for a CPI ranking of government corruption, Taiwan was number 30 with 5.7 points, where a total of 10 points indicated corruption-free governance (China, at 3.4, was ranked number 66). The 2002 BPI statistics, however, ranked Taiwanese business as the third most corrupt for international investors in terms of bribing foreign public servants for lucrative projects (only business from Russia and mainland China behaved worse).26 Taiwanese grassroots ties to INGOs like Transparency International help anticorruption activists raise public awareness, study relevant lessons and craft effective campaigns. Environmental NGOs on Taiwan have been using Agenda 21, the global plan of action for sustainable development adopted at the UN 1992 Rio Earth Summit, as a basis to review the government’s handling of chemical toxicant control, water resources management, ecological preservation, the relation between women and the environment, energy policies, and the establishment of a new partnership with aboriginal people.27 The Chinese

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 115 Association for Human Rights uses international standards to monitor Taiwan’s rights conditions.28 Aboriginal activists led by the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines adopted global discourses to advance their causes. Their campaign shifted from a fight for equal treatment to a demand for collective rights and selfdetermination, borrowing concepts and slogans from indigenous groups in many nations and in UN documents.29 The Taiwanese avidly apply what is happening in such UN-orchestrated events as the Decade of the Indigenous Peoples (1994–2004), the Decade of Human Rights Education (1995–2004), and so on. To use international laws as leverage has become common when lobbying the government and as a foundation for community education. Taiwanese groups compile and publish international laws, especially conventions and treaties on human rights and gender equality. They monitor the specialized UN agencies, treaty bodies and programmes, and attend forums where norms are debated and policies are made. Eric Liou, Secretary General of the Environmental Quality Protection Foundation, said, “We aim to keep Taiwan well-informed about the latest environmental treaties, especially the Kyoto Protocol”. Taiwan NGOs use information from the international community to promote a sustainable future for Taiwan.30 Women’s groups and activists working on child prostitution and migrant workers utilized three UN conventions, namely the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the International Convention on Children’s Rights, and the Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.31 A further Taiwan NGO goal is to incorporate international laws into domestic laws, a common campaign practice of social movements in new democracies. Eden Social Welfare Foundation, an NGO campaigning to clear landmines in Quemoy and Matsu and to improve the conditions of the disabled, pushed the legislature to ban the production and the sales/ purchase of anti-personnel landmines by following the 1998 Mine Ban Treaty. The NGO learned such tactics from the Australian and Belgian members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Eden became a member of ICBL in 1997).32 The Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) carefully studied other nations’ experiences with the National Human Rights Commission and then campaigned to incorporate international human rights standards into Taiwan law, with the assistance of rights INGOs such as Amnesty International.33 This effort bore fruit on 12 December 2002, when the legislature ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). (The Republic of China had signed both the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1967 but failed to ratify them by 1971, when Taiwanese UN membership ended.) Transparency Taiwan successfully pushed for the January 2003 amendment

116 Chen Jie of anti-corruption laws to prevent Taiwanese businessmen bribing foreign public servants.34 Most significantly, a Gender Equality Labour Law was passed by the legislature in December 2001, coming in to force on 8 March 2002, International Women’s Day. It was the first legislation drafted by woman NGOs incorporating international standards on women’s rights in the workplace, equal opportunity and sexual harassment.35 For the Women Awakening Foundation, one of the most important women’s NGOs in Taiwan since the 1980s and the key promoter of the legislation, it was the fruit of years of campaigning dating back to the 1985 UN “Decade of Women” conference held in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference required UN member states to pass “women’s provisions” guaranteeing women the right to education and employment. The Taiwan Foundation sent delegates to the conference, was inspired, and then engaged in an energetic campaign.36

Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic isolation: impact on civil society Taiwanese NGOs are challenged by the international community’s continuing non-recognition of the Taiwanese state. An “East Asian Women’s Plan of Action” adopted at the First East Asian Women’s Forum (a biannual event organized by Asian women NGOs) in Tokyo in 1994 stated: We urge governments to ratify and enforce all international conventions and declarations related to violence against women and to distribute information on these conventions and declarations as well as to provide necessary support to the [UN] Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in carrying out their work.37 Such declarations ring hollow to Taiwanese. Their government does not have the legal persona required to sign and ratify international treaties. Although Taipei can unilaterally sign and ratify the documents and turn them into domestic law, that would still deprive affected groups of the advantages won by NGOs in internationally recognized signature states, such as appealing to the treaty bodies responsible for monitoring the treaties upon receiving a report on implementation. Reports from Taiwan would not be accepted or monitored. Neither would the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) provide Taiwan with advisory services and technical assistance. Treaties provide an extra-territorial channel for remedies. The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women contains a complaints mechanism whereby, once they have exhausted national remedies, women bring complaints to the Committee against governments that have violated their rights under the Convention. It also provides an inquiry procedure whereby the Committee can act on its own initiative to investigate grave or systematic violations. The Taiwanese enjoy no such access. While advocacy groups elsewhere can

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 117 embarrass their government at UN forums by pointing out the discrepancy between the government’s behaviour and treaties it has signed, Taiwanese NGOs have no such power. Their government is never seen in UN forums. This absence can frustrate transnational campaign coalitions. At the Ninth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, administered by the UN Environment Programme) in 1994, European NGOs attacked Taiwan’s insufficient efforts to crack down on the consumption of rhino horn and tiger bones as violating CITES, only to find that Taiwan was neither allowed to attend the meeting nor to sign the treaty. Their allied Taiwanese NGO, Life Conservationist Association (LCA), could only attend the conference by using the name of a foreign conservation group.38 Like many other UN forums symbolizing global governance, the CITES mechanism is supposed to encourage the world’s NGOs to participate as observers, but Taiwan is denied that minimal participation. What would happen to Taiwan in the arena of international treaties and their reporting mechanisms should it concede China’s “one country, two systems”, as has Hong Kong? The statement by a Chinese official at the UNHCR in 2001 is revealing: the Chinese government sent its delegation to participate in the consideration of its periodic report on the implementation of the Convention against Torture by the UN Committee against Torture in May 2000. Representatives from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region participated in the consideration as members of the Chinese delegation and replied to questions concerning the Hong Kong SAR. In October 2000, the Chinese government submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination its integrated eighth and ninth periodic report on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The report has incorporated in it two separate parts from Hong Kong and Macao.39 China systematically obstructs Taiwanese NGOs. Taiwanese groups are barred from participating in the affairs of the UN system or other IGOs as observers, irrespective of whether the Taiwanese are willing to compromise on nomenclature with respect to Beijing’s “one-China principle”. No Taiwanese NGO has been allowed UN consultative status, though many have applied. While overseas branches of large groups such as the Tzu Chi Buddhist Charity Foundation, legally foreign NGO, might hope for observer status,40 China’s rejectionism is more political than legal. Participation by stealth, using other INGOs’ identities to attend official UN forums, has negative consequences, since the Taiwanese groups must keep Taiwan’s profile low. During 2002–3, Taiwanese activists in human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights participated in major UN forums by using the name of the People’s Movement for Human Rights Education

118 Chen Jie and International Research Foundation for Development (both INGOs enjoy UN consultative status).41 Other sympathetic INGOs also helped Taiwanese groups attend forums organized by ECOSOC, WHO and UNHCR.42 Only a handful of Taiwanese NGOs have been accepted by a UN forum as observers without having to use some INGO’s name. This has happened under exceptional circumstances with extraordinary conditions. For example, the Environmental Quality Protection Foundation from Taiwan was accepted by the secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as an observer in October 2002, upon identifying themselves as from China.43 The label “Chinese Taipei” was not sufficient. Even this suppressed participation took years of negotiation.44 Second, Taiwan groups participating in NGO forums that are fully from civil society but organized by the UN system or other IGOs depend on the attitude of the officials in charge: officials of the host governments, officials of the international organizations concerned, and officials of the Chinese government posted to such organizations. In some cases Taiwanese groups are banned. In other instances Taiwanese NGOs participate as “Chinese Taipei” or “Taiwan region” but with their rights downgraded. This provides niche opportunities for some Taiwanese groups, though grassroots advocacy NGOs tend not to compromise on their status. While many socialmovement groups prefer to be called “Taiwan” and tend not to compromise, pro-KMT traditional groups prefer “Republic of China” and are more likely to compromise with China-imposed nomenclature. Non-compromising NGOs either reject participation in international forums or participate by stealth, by borrowing identities from INGOs.45 If China is the host, the challenge can be overwhelming. Fifteen Taiwanese feminist groups tried to participate in the UN-hosted NGO forum in parallel to the Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing in 1995. They submitted the necessary applications and credentials, but were all rejected. They were told to participate as part of the Chinese delegation by applying to the All China Women’s Federation in Beijing. That was unacceptable.46 Whichever guise a Taiwanese group uses to attend an international forum, it complicates its ability to discuss issues that matter to their homeland, Taiwan.47 The third situation is where both Taiwan and PRC groups are members of the same INGO and the nomenclature and rights of the Taiwanese are usually downgraded, particularly for those INGOs that accept members only on a national basis. In April 2002, Lions’ Club International (LCI) unilaterally changed the name of its Taiwan chapter from “Taiwan, ROC Lions Club” to “China Taiwan Lions Club” to meet Beijing’s condition for joining and for letting LCI set up branches in Guangzhou and Shenzhen.48 Under strong protest from the Taiwanese, LCI accepted a designation “MD300, Taiwan” (“MD300” is the Taiwan chapter’s district number) in November of that year, without consulting Beijing. But China soon forced LCI to change Taiwan’s designation back to “China Taiwan Lions Club”. In

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 119 the Lions Clubs Convention in Denver, Colorado, in early July 2003, the Taiwanese delegation was shocked to find that the China chapter had prepared a membership flag for Taiwanese representatives to use during the convention’s opening ceremony.49 In recent years, the People’s Republic has intensified challenges posed by Beijing or its government-sponsored groups to Taiwanese membership in INGOs. During the 1970s, Beijing demanded that INGOs expel their Taiwanese member organizations. Practical difficulties and a more liberal international outlook then led Beijing to agree to Taipei’s membership in INGOs under certain conditions: membership status of Taiwan groups should be lower than that of those from China, with the Taiwanese accepting designations like “Chinese Taipei”. This would permit only the PRC groups to enjoy the status of a national member.50 Thus co-membership would not necessarily mean equal membership. A 1993 survey of 170 NGOs that were members of INGOs found that about two-thirds had the right to speak at INGO conferences, about half had the right to vote, while more than 10 percent could only attend meetings as observers or informally. About one-third could use the national flag. Half could use the official state name. A key factor causing such wide variations was whether these INGOs also involved PRC groups and how the two worked out the “Taiwan problem”. Taiwan did best in INGOs that did not have PRC groups.51 But China’s global integration and exclusionary pressures have intensified. Fourthly, in loosely structured transnational forums organized by country NGOs, Taiwanese are in a stronger position because such gatherings occur in a third country, and because both hosts and participants are exclusively NGOs. Nevertheless, bitter wrangling about nomenclature, rights and even the contents of Taiwanese presentations is the norm, causing enormous headaches to local grassroots hosts, who have no clue about arguments made by the Chinese. The Secretary General of the Korea Council of Citizens’ Movements, an NGO coalition in South Korea, found that bitter arguments about the “correct name” of Taiwan distracted from the substantive issues under discussion.52 The “name fight” (“country report” versus “region report”, “Taiwan” versus “Taiwan region”) between China’s “official NGOs” (mainly the All China Women’s Federation) and Taiwan’s feminist organizations at the East Asian Women’s Forum is legendary. Sometimes, the hosts are innovative. At the 1992 International Symposium on Women and Children’s Rights in Manila, the host University of the Philippines talked both the Chinese and Taiwanese delegates into using name badges that did not identify the home country. The Taiwanese made their official “country report”, but did so in the China session.53 In sum, Taiwanese do participate and do best at the NGO end of the spectrum. The boundary of the transnational NGO world is porous. The authoritarian PRC political system renders it unable or unwilling to penetrate into all corners of the world’s NGO community. There is still space for

120 Chen Jie Taiwanese NGOs to join INGOs and transnational NGO networks. But, unfortunately for Taiwan, however diplomatically the Taiwanese act, IGOs are far more important to social-movement NGOs needing first-hand experiences with the deliberation on, and making of, international norms and standards for their own domestic campaigns. In that crucial realm, China isolates Taiwan.

Transnationalization of the PRC state-dominated NGO community Pressure by the People’s Republic on Taiwanese NGOs is most effective when PRC organizations participate in transnational NGO affairs. Such participation has increased dramatically. Since the 1980s, there have been mounting issues and challenges leading citizens in China to organize. Growing numbers of Chinese activists have established organizations that keep expanding and networking. However, the PRC government fears grassroots social forces it cannot control. Its fierce response to the Falun Gong movement is indicative. The Beijing government has imposed severe restrictions on NGO activities and bans the formation of any autonomous organization in politically sensitive issue areas. Citizen groups are predominantly concentrated in service provision, women, (inter-provincial) migrant workers, children, the disabled, and the environment. Given budgetary limits, the Chinese government welcomes the services provided by some NGOs. Also, due to a growing recognition that associations of entrepreneurs, industrial and trade associations, and professional associations have an important role in ensuring economic vitality, Beijing tends to be lenient with those sorts of organizations.54 The Chinese government has created an official NGO sector. Government and Party departments set up foundations and other organizations to advance charitable, research, information and policy objectives. Some “GONGOs” (Government Organised NGOs) emerged from traditional “mass organizations” (renmin tuanti). There are eight, including the All China Youth League, the All China Women’s Federation and the All China Federation of Trade Unions. The government is restructuring these mass organizations away from their original role as Communist Party overseers of particular constituencies towards a more service facilitation role. The GONGO sector has two major purposes. One is to receive expertise and funding the government finds hard to access. Some government departments establish organizations to make it possible to conduct exchanges with international organizations and to participate in overseas study tour programmes in an unofficial capacity. Distance from mainstream government agencies makes it easier for government-initiated organizations to explore new areas of work, such as advice for unmarried people or HIV/ AIDS prevention programmes for sex workers and drug addicts.55 By the early twenty-first century, officially registered NGOs in China

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 121 56

reached 230,000. The number of bottom-up NGOs is unknown. But in 2000, around 26,000 registered social organizations could be classified as “NGOs in a western sense”.57 The number of nationally well-known bottomup advocacy NGOs was about 300 by 2001.58 Foreign NGOs’ maverick activism at the UN-hosted NGO forum on women in Beijing in 1995 was a catalyst for grassroots activist NGOs in China. Many large ones are financially sustained by international sources such as the Ford Foundation.59 Both GONGOs and Chinese NGOs have benefited from international sources (foundations, INGOs, UN agencies and governments) in capacity-building, programme planning, management and accountability.60 Significant assistance has been given by many INGOs, which operate projects inside China with local partners, mainly in the areas of women, environment, public health, poverty and education.61 China’s membership in INGOs, predominantly by GONGOs, has greatly increased: 71 in 1977, 484 in 1986, and 2,297 in 2002.62 Though not all bottom-up NGOs are democratically operated, an expanding autonomous social sector facilitates political pluralism, even though permissible activities cannot touch sensitive issues. Also, an interest in volunteer efforts helps create a more liberal culture. Much of this volunteering is essentially charitable, described in terms of “loving hearts” and “warm heartedness”. This may not seem a particularly exciting manifestation of “civil society” to those who associate the term with the citizens’ movements that shook Eastern Europe in the 1980s, but it may be a significant indicator of expanding social capital, civic consciousness and reciprocity. In a country where volunteering and charity have been co-opted by Leninist mass mobilizations, for such activities to move into the realm of societal goodwill is no small change.63 There is even a latent potential for GONGOs to evolve a semiindependent relationship with the government. Many are acquiring a more independent identity, developing a sense of themselves as belonging to a distinctive, non-government community.64 Transnational connections, by assisting the growth of Chinese NGOs and making them more accountable, amplify the pluralizing impact of this sector, despite a concentration in functional areas or “low politics”. INGOs like Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children International and the World Wide Fund for Nature may not be political in China, yet they can have a liberalizing effect. The recent experience of Lions Club International (LCI) is a good example. Despite its expressly non-political nature, even LCI can help transform official and popular attitudes toward NGOs. First, there is the Lions’ own democratic structure, with the members from Shenzhen and Guangzhou branches deeply inspired by annual presidential elections, participatory mechanisms, equality among leaders and members, dedication and transparency. Second, such a culture is also influencing the operations of the two branches themselves.65 Case studies show that the GONGOs’ recent independence tendency has been mainly caused by increased access to the

122 Chen Jie international NGO communities.66 Interactions with INGOs have also helped some mass organizations in China develop some sense of autonomy.67 Even though there is little conflict between Taiwanese activists and bottom-up civic groups from China, Beijing’s policy encroached upon the space of Taiwanese groups. Fruitful and issue-oriented exchanges between Taiwanese and Chinese NGOs have occurred in international forums.68 But for the government of China, institutionalized transnational participation outside the country must be dominated by its major GONGOs and mass organizations. To Beijing, such participation is still politically sensitive enough for government departments to monitor and control, particularly membership in INGOs (most of which are managed by people from democracies). GONGOs and party-state mass organizations have more financial, human and foreign-language resources than grassroots groups. This CCP domination is reminiscent of the transnational participation of the KMT’s Republic of China before Taiwan’s democratization. Due to their political parentage, GONGOs assert the one-China principle over Taiwanese groups. However, China’s GONGOs/mass organizations are mainly active in the non-political or depoliticized layer of the transnational NGO community. The overwhelming majority are in the social/health, scientific/technical, sport/recreational, academic/professional, economic and welfare areas. Whereas INGOs specializing more in advocacy than technical assistance still provide Taiwan groups with full participation and Taiwanese NGOs enjoy robust interaction with human rights INGOs such as Amnesty International. Also, INGOs in functional areas are too numerous for the People’s Republic to join them all, at least not yet. Indicatively, there is no shortage of medical and relief INGOs that express support for their Taiwanese members’ campaign for observer status in the WHO. Out of an estimated 12,260 INGOs in 2003, China joined merely 2,297, ranking it with Thailand (1,915), the Philippines (2,036), South Korea (2,241) and Israel (2,966).69 A country’s profile in transnational civil society is predominantly determined by the degree of its own democratization (with Taiwan being the partial exception to this rule). In the absence of grassroots Chinese NGOs, some INGOs and foreign NGOs in activist areas have started to deal with China’s GONGOs/mass organizations. Amnesty International has had some dialogue with the China Society for Human Rights Studies. Invitations by some grassroots activists in Asia to the All China Women’s Federation to attend the East Asian Women’s Forum exemplifies the tendency. Advocacy organizations do not want to be permanently locked out of an ever more important China or tied only to dissident groups in exile. Few bottom-up groups on women’s rights have either the resources or the freedom in China for satisfactory participation in events outside the country. Yet the All China Women’s Federation, the China Society for Human Rights Studies and the China

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 123 Disabled Persons’ Federation enjoy UN consultative status. These GONGOs can interact even at the NGO end of global governance. Asian organizations increasingly also give in to China’s pressure to limit their relations with Taiwanese counterparts. Few NGOs in the region exclude China because of its authoritarian behaviour, since a rising China is powerful. People – not just state leaders, but also the NGO elite – seek to avoid trouble with China. Therefore, very few regional groups based in Hong Kong, which hosts a sizeable number of regional INGOs, work on China on political issues such as human rights. Regional activists consequently are little engaged with the Tibet question (except that there is significant sympathy and assistance for them among Indian NGOs), whereas they did solidarity work on East Timor.70 While these dealings with China by the more political end of the transnational civil society have not yet caused major problems for Taiwanese NGOs, despite a few cases of “name fights”, the trend line for Taiwan may be from bad to worse.

Conclusion There is a cost from the suppression of Taiwanese NGOs in transnational affairs which is born by all parties. Taiwanese groups are frustrated in their efforts to benefit fully from the emerging realm of global governance and to learn from international counterparts. This restricts the full release of the potential of civil society in making contributions to Taiwan, and also restricts the further development of civil society itself. Frustrations in transnational affairs lead an increasing number of Taiwanese NGOs to perceive a common interest with their government, reinforcing a notion that when the state does not enjoy a legitimate politico-diplomatic status, NGOs cannot fully participate in world politics either. This tends to make some NGOs more willing to answer the call of the government’s “NGO diplomacy”, which, as Lynch shows (see chapter 7), may have a dubious influence on their autonomy, even as it intensifies a Taiwan identity and negates Chinese identity, the opposite of what the government of China claims to seek. In addition, transnational civil society is also unable to benefit fully from what Taiwanese NGOs have to offer. If Taiwanese NGOs could freely attend UN-organized forums, activists from many developing countries would have had more opportunities to learn from the island’s successful social-movement campaigns in a range of issue areas, as Hickey details for improving health care (see chapter 4). Largely thanks to persistent campaigns by feminist NGOs, the status of Taiwanese women has become one of the most respected in the entire developing world, something that can certainly inspire grassroots campaigners in South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. For the economically less developed countries, their communities can also learn from Taiwanese

124 Chen Jie activists about the negative social and environmental consequences of “growth at all cost” development policies, and about civil society approaches to tackle those problems. There is also a cost for China. Its obstructionism intensifies popular separatist sentiment on Taiwan by forcing NGO activists to experience international frustrations which they used to perceive as problems only for Taiwan’s senior officials. Chinese obstructionism also prevents Taiwanese NGOs from cooperating with counterpart Chinese groups. Taiwan’s NGOs have skills and experiences that are very relevant in tackling China’s mounting social and environmental issues. Taiwanese NGOs are experienced in handling such challenges because Taiwan, which has gone through similar stages of market-oriented development, is still facing many similar problems, and the Taiwanese NGO sector is far more mature and sophisticated. Also, as a country annually hit by major floods, China might take an interest in how various relief NGOs in Taiwan organized themselves so effectively in executing relief missions in the aftermath of natural disasters, such as the 1999 earthquake. Referring to Chinese NGOs’ helplessness in combating SARS in 2003, an activist of the Beijing-based Green Environment Volunteers noted, “In the crisis of Taiwan’s September 21 [1999] earthquake, NGOs continuously worked in the front-line in rescue and reconstruction during and after the disaster. . . . Others can do it – why can’t we?”71 Taiwan’s NGO sector also has significant potential to assist the growth of an autonomous civil society in China. After all, China’s NGO sector today, dominated by the GONGOs/ mass organizations, with peripheral roles for bottom-up groups, is precisely what Taiwan’s NGO sector experienced in the era prior to democratization. Taiwan’s civil society bears the marks of co-optation by a single-party dictatorship, an experience shared by the CCP. Taiwanese civil-society activists can also function as useful bridges between the Chinese NGO sector and the mainstream democratic nation-dominated transnational civil society, just as Taiwanese investors and traders often occupy a useful middle ground between Chinese and international business sectors in a win–win–win division of labor. Despite expanding people-to-people exchanges across the Strait, direct participation by grassroots NGOs from Taiwan is not impressive, particularly advocacy NGOs, regardless of whether the issues are highly political, such as human rights, or less so, such as women’s issues, aboriginal rights and the environment. These are the most robust elements in Taiwan’s civil society. A Beijing-based long-time analyst of the Chinese NGO scene finds few exchanges involving grassroots NGOs from Taiwan. “I do know of a few Taiwanese individuals, foundations and community based groups that do nonetheless work in the People’s Republic – perhaps the best known being the Himalaya Foundation and the Tzu Chi Foundation, but that is really all”.72 This lack may be because of a paucity of well-known autonomous groups

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 125 in China, and/or the exclusionary policies of the Chinese government. Clearly, China’s obstruction of transnational participation by Taiwanese NGOs does not create an atmosphere conducive to exchanges. For the fifteen leading Taiwanese women’s NGOs whose attendance at the 1995 UN forum was blocked by Beijing in a humiliating fashion, as for similar groups in Taiwan, it may take a while for them to develop a serious interest in China. Yet their skills and experiences would be invaluable to China’s NGO sector. The exclusionary pressures on Taiwanese NGOs reflect CCP policy preferences. That policy hampers Taiwan’s emerging transnational civil society. Any solution on the NGO front would require a fundamental revamping of Beijing’s cross-Strait diplomacy. However, improvement can still be made before such fundamental changes. Considering its nature, transnational civil society has become the greyest of all grey areas in China– Taiwan interactions. The ways Taiwanese NGOs are treated reflect specific circumstances and various interpretations of “One China” by the Chinese side and by international parties. Thus, advancement furthering a win-forall scenario remains possible. While Taiwanese groups should concentrate on the substance of transnational participation and avoid unnecessary bickering on national identity, it is more important for the People’s Republic to reassess its approaches. The People’s Republic should construct a framework which, while not necessarily abandoning One China, should comprehensively satisfy the urges of transnational participation by the very Taiwanese people it has always claimed it seeks to win over. Such a new policy would positively influence governments, IGOs, and INGOs and third-country NGOs. The latter two institutions, however, should be more issue-oriented and innovative in dealing with the China/Taiwan problem so as to live up to their own claims as a positive force in the world politics of the new millennium. A Taiwanese civil society interacting with China in transnational civil society would help reduce the cross-Strait tension, while also benefiting the people of both China and Taiwan in specific issue areas under civil society’s purview.

Notes 1 I use this term “NGO” because in English literature published in Taiwan itself, “NGO” has been the term used in referring to minjian tuanti, the sort of organizations under discussion in this paper. Minjian means “non-governmental”, and tuanti means organizations, groups, associations, and so on. Broadly, what Taipei calls minjian tuanti are NGOs as commonly – and loosely – used in the general discourse of international relations. 2 It is analysed extensively in “Total Diplomacy: Parliamentarians, Parties, and NGOs”, in Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (London: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 223–277. 3 Lester M. Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, pp. 109–118. 4 Louis Kriesberg, “Social Movements and Global Transformation”, in Jackie

126 Chen Jie

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

13

14 15 16

17 18

Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds), Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 12. Paul Ghils, “International Civil Society: International Non-governmental Organizations in the International System”, International Social Science Journal (UNESCO: Paris), Vol. XLIV, No. 133, August 1992, p. 418. Louis Kriesberg, “Social Movements and Global Transformation”, p. 12. Yearbook of International Organizations 2002–2003 (Munich: K. G. Saur, for the Union of International Associations, 2002), Vol. 2, p. 1607 (hereafter Yearbook). Information from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) website (http:// www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/). Ghils, “International Civil Society”, pp. 421–7. Editorial in Taipei Times, August 23, 2002. See, for example, Patricia Chilton, “Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe”, in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Chetan Kumar, “Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy”, and Thomas Risse, “The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society and Human Rights”, both in Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo and Washington, DC: The Japan Center for International Exchange and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 115–142, 177–209; and Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). This is based on information from “Taiwan Report” tabled by the Women’s Ministry Committee of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan at the Ecumenical Decade Festival, Harare, Zimbabwe, 27–30 November 1998, p. 24; Wang Shijung, The Third Sector: America’s Asia Foundation and Taiwan (in Chinese) (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Asia Pacific Research Academy, January 1997), pp. 61–62, 65; Laura Li, “Women on the Move”, Sinorama (Taipei), September 1995, p. 46; and Chou Bi-e and Chiang Lan-hong, “Experiences of the Current Women Movement in Taiwan”, in Hsu Zheng-guan and Soong Wen-lee, eds, Before and After the Martial Law: Newly Emerging Social Movement in Taiwan (in Chinese) (Taipei: Juliu Books Company, March 1996), p. 87. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, “NGOs, the State, and Democracy under Globalization: The Case of Taiwan”, paper presented at the International Conference on NGOs and the Nation in a Globalizing World: Asia–Pacific Views, APARP, Academia Sinica, and Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, Boston University, 21–22 June 2002, p. 1. Shelley Rigger, “Mobilisational Authoritarianism and Political Opposition in Taiwan”, in Garry Rodan, ed., Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 301–302. Gao Chenshu, “Structural Formation of the Newly Emerging Social Movement in Taiwan”, in Hsu and Soong, eds., Before and After the Martial Law, pp. 9–19. Hsiao Hsin-Huang, “Analysis and Deconstruction of Taiwan’s New Social Movement”, in Hsu and Soong, eds, Before and After the Martial Law, pp. 24–5. See also Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 24, July 1990, pp. 165–167. Hsiao, “NGOs, the State, and Democracy under Globalization.” Ibid. According to Hisao, with few exceptions, most of Taiwan’s foundations are operating foundations rather than grant-making foundations. Because of this

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 127

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35

unique character, Taiwan’s foundations are not so easily distinguished from what are normally defined as NGOs. Ibid. Statistics from Yearbook 1986/87, Vol. 2, cited in Gerald Chan, China and International Organizations: Participation in Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1971 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 16 and Yearbook 2002–2003, Vol. 2, p. 1612. This impression is based on my own survey and research during 1999–2001, but seems to agree with the statistical survey presented in a recent authoritative report: Chen Lung-chu, Taiwan fei zhengfu zuzhi guoji canyu celue zhi yanjiu (Study of the Strategies of Transnational Participation by Taiwan NGOs). The report, completed in late 2002, was commissioned by the Administrative Yuan’s Research, Development and Evaluation Commission. Accessible on the Taiwan New Century Foundation website at http://www.taiwanncf.org.tw/index-c.htm Chen Jie, “Love with Frontier: Trans-nationalism of Taiwan’s Social Movement NGOs and the Nation State”, paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the North American Taiwan Studies Association, Harvard University, 16–19 June 2000, pp. 5–6. For an analysis of the more recent Asian interests of Taiwanese NGOs, see Chen Jie, “Exploring the Human Dimensions of Taiwan–Southeast Asia Economic Interdependence: Migrant Labourers, Ethnic Chinese and Alien Wives”, in Samuel C. Y. Ku, ed., Southeast Asia in the New Century: An Asian Perspective (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: National Sun Yat-Sen University Press, September 2002), pp. 83–124; Chen Jie, “Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan’s Social Movement NGOs”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29, November 2001, pp. 613–644. Huang Wen-hsiung’s article in Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times, Taipei), 25 April 1998. For TAHR’s efforts in promoting study and training in human rights through cooperation with major rights INGOs such as Amnesty International, International Service for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, see MidYear Report of Taiwan Association For Human Rights, 1998, pp. 3–4, 6. Transparency Taiwan (http://ti-taiwan.org/ch.files/index-1.htm). For an analysis of Transparency International, see Fredrik Galtung, “A Global Network to Curb Corruption: the Experience of Transparency International”, in Florini, ed., The Third Force, 17–48. Transparency Taiwan website. Taipei Times Online, July 17, 2002 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/). Taipei Journal Online, January 3, 2003 (http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/fcj.html). Ku Kun-hui, “Aboriginal Movements and National Identity in Taiwan”, paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the North American Taiwan Studies Association, Harvard University, Boston, 16–19 June, 2000, p. 4. Taipei Times Online, October 26, 2002 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/). Lin Mei-Jung, “Renshi renquan (Understanding human rights)” and “Funu de quanli (Women’s rights)”, in Lin Mei-Jung, ed., Funu renquan shouce (Women’s Human Rights Handbook) (Taipei: Amnesty International Magazine, May 1999), p. viii, I–v. Lin is Coordinator, Taiwan Grassroots Women Workers’ Center, Taipei. Interview with Encore Pai, Deputy Director, Eden Social Welfare Foundation, Taipei, 7 January 2000. Interview with Chen Min-Jen, Secretary General, Taiwan Association for Human Rights, 1 December 1998. Transparency Taiwan website. Article by Yu Mei-nu, former Chairwoman of Women Awakening Foundation, in Zhongguo Shibao (China Times, Taipei), 22 December 2001.

128 Chen Jie 36 Fax from Yu Mei-nu, 23 March 2000. Laura Li, “Women on the Move”, Sinorama, September 1995, p. 45. 37 Documents of 1st to 3rd East Asian Women’s Forum (Taipei: Year 2000 EAW’S Forum Taiwan Women’s NGO Committee, April 1999), p. 34. 38 Interview with Wu Hung, Secretary General of Life Conservationist Association, Taipei, 16 December 1999. 39 Statement by Mr. Ren Yisheng, Advisor of the Chinese Delegation, on Item 18: “Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms at the 57th Session of the Commission on Human Rights (April 19, 2001, Geneva)”, accessible on the website of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland (http://www.china-un.ch/eng/). China has acceded to 18 international human rights instruments. 40 In a 2003 report posted by Cai Ming-dian (Secretary General of Amnesty International Taiwan) to the NGOs Association for International Affairs (NAFIA, Kaohsiung) website (http://www.nafia.idv.tw/). 41 Ibid. 42 Chen Liyin, “Lianheguo fei zhengsu zuchi tixi zhi yunzuo ji woguo qieru guandao shixi (An Analysis of How the UN-operated NGO Mechanisms Work and How Our Country can Penetrate into These Mechanisms)”, a report written on 4 April 2002, available on the Taiwan New Century Foundation website (http://www.tainwanncf.org.tw/index). 43 Taipei Times Online, 26 October 2002 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/). 44 Ibid. 45 Chen Liyin, “Lianheguo fei zhengsu zuchi tixi zhi yunzuo ji woguo qieru guandao shixi”. 46 For accounts of this incident, see Female Workers in Taiwan (Taiwan Grassroots Women Workers’ Center, in Chinese), Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1995, p. 6. 47 China can go to great length in suppressing Taiwan’s profile in a UN-organized forum. China’s representatives forcefully interrupted the speech of a Taiwan delegate on hearing Taiwan described as “a nation” at the Asian Civil Society Forum for NGOs held in Bangkok in December 2002 by the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (Taipei Times, 8 January 2003). One month later, protests by China over the presence of NGOs from Taiwan stalled for hours the procedure of the UN-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society Asian Regional Conference in Tokyo. Chinese delegates at the conference, which was attended by NGOs as well as government delegates from the region, said Taiwanese participation was an affront to its “one-China policy”. The problem was solved after the Taiwanese groups were listed under a Japanese NGO in a reprinted list of participants (Taipei Times, 15 January 2003). 48 Taipei Journal Online, 28 June 2002 (http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/fcj.html); Susan V. Lawrence, “The Lions in the Communist Den”, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 22 August 2002, p. 7. 49 Taipei Times, 8 July 2003 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/). 50 Chan, China and International Organizations, pp. 26–28, 32, 34. 51 Hu Chih-Chiang, ed., Woguo yu guoji fei zhengfu zhuzhi fazhan guanxi zhi yanjiu (A Study of the Development of the ROC’s Relations with International Non-Governmental Organizations) (Taipei: Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Administrative Yuan, May 1993), p. 252. 52 Interview with Soh Kyung Suk, General Secretary, Korea Council of Citizen’s Movements, during his visit to Taipei, 17 January 2000. 53 Interview with Lin Mei-Jung, Co-ordinator of Taiwan Grassroots Women Workers’ Centre, Taipei, 21 January 2000.

Transnational civil society and diplomatic isolation 129 54 Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”, in 250 Chinese NGOs: Civil Society in the Making (Beijing: China Development Brief, 2002), pp. 9–19; see also Matt Forney, “Voice of the People” and Pamela Yatsko, “Helping Hands: Private Charities Survive Against the Odds”, both in Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1998, pp. 10–14. 55 Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society”. For a comprehensive study of mass organisations, see Wang Ming, Liu Guohan and He Jianyu, Zhongguo Shetuan gaige: cong zhengfu xuanze dao shehui xuanze (Reform of China’s Social Organisations: From Governmental Preference to Social Preference) (Beijing: Social Science Works Publishing Agency, December 2001), pp. 167–183. The following titles all discuss the development of Chinese NGOs since 1949, their typology, and the key facilitating role played by transnational dimensions: Wang Ming, “Zhongguo NGO de fazhan fenxi (An Analysis of Chinese NGOs’ development)”, paper presented at the Cross-Strait Symposium on NGOs – Transformation and Development of NGOs, hosted by Himalaya Foundation, Taipei, 31 July 2002; Deng Guosheng, “1995 nian yilai dalu NGO de bianhua yu fazhan qushi (Changes and Development in Mainland China’s NGOs Since 1995)”, paper presented at the Cross-Strait Symposium on NGOs; Wang Ming et al., Zhongguo Shetuan gaige; and Chan Kin-man, “Development of NGOs under a Post-Totalitarian Regime: The Case of China”, presented at the International Conference on NGOs and the Nation in a Globalizing World, Boston, 2002. 56 Wang Ming, “Zhongguo NGO de fazhan fenxi”, p.16. 57 Chan Kin-man, “Development of NGOs under a Post-Totalitarian Regime”, p. 9. 58 Deng Guosheng, “1995 nian yilai dalu NGO de bianhua yu fazhan qushi”, p. 30. 59 Ibid., pp. 29–31. 60 Ibid. p. 37. 61 Young, “Searching for Civil Society.” 62 Yearbook 2002–2003, Vol. 2, p. 1611, and statistics from Yearbook 1983/84 and Yearbook 1986/87, Vol. 2, cited in Chan, China and International Organizations, p16. 63 Young, “Searching for Civil Society.” 64 Ibid. 65 Susan V. Lawrence, “The Lions in the Communist Den”, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 22 August 2002, pp. 24–27. 66 Fengshi Wu, “New Partners or Old Brothers? GONGOs in Transnational Environmental Advocacy in China”, China Environment Series, No. 5, 2002, pp. 45–58; Wang Ming et al., Zhongguo Shetuan gaige, p. 172. 67 Deng Guosheng, “1995 nian yilai dalu NGO de bianhua yu fazhan qushi”, p. 33. 68 Personal correspondence with Hsu Kuang-Jung, Vice President of Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, 22 March 2000. The Union formed an Atmospheric Action Network–East Asia in 1998 with groups from seven countries, including China and the Russian Far East. 69 Yearbook 2002–2003, Vol. 2, pp. 1607, 1611–1612. 70 Email from Sophia Woodman, a Hong-Kong-based activist for Human Rights in China, 23 September 1998. 71 Wang Yongchen, “NGO under SARS”, a paper posted to the C-Pol, an internet China discussion forum managed from the University of California, 14 August 2003, p. 47. 72 Personal correspondence with Nick Young, Editor of China Development Brief, 16 June 2003.

7

Taiwan adapts to the network society Daniel Lynch

In the early 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek abandoned efforts to recapture Mainland China and directed government energies to transforming Taiwan into a “model province.” Chiang hoped to create a microcosm of a glorious future China: orderly, prosperous, and patriotic. The Chinese people would then recognize the virtues of the Chiang family and of Kuomintang (KMT) party rule and overthrow the Communists. Chiang (or his son Ching-kuo) could then return to govern the Mainland, triumphing without firing a shot. This pipedream for turning Taiwan into a model Chinese province ignored the views of the Taiwanese people. By the early 1980s a dangwai1 opposition movement was gaining strength, seeking democracy and cultivating a distinctive Taiwanese proto-national identity, as described by Wakabayashi (see chapter 1). Soon, the son, Chiang Ching-kuo, accepted the dangwai leaders’ basic demand and began to democratize. KMT conservatives hoped that political liberalization and continued growth would neutralize the Taiwanese identity movement. However, by the time of Chiang Ching-kuo’s passing and Lee Teng-hui’s ascent to the presidency in January 1988, new cultural and political forces had been unleashed. These furthered a powerful and broad-based identity movement committed to establishing Taiwan not as another country’s model province but instead as an autonomous “Subject in History”: a separate nation-state, governed democratically, and through whose agency the Taiwanese people would decide their own affairs, domestically and in global society.2 With its prosperous economy, democratic politics, educated populace, and vibrant civil society, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was a de facto model country by the mid-1990s. Exclusion from international society, described by Chao and Hsu (see chapter 3), did not prevent Taiwan from being a good global citizen. Each year, it gave about 0.15 percent of its GDP to less-advantaged countries.3 Taiwan also contributed to the world’s stock of scientific knowledge; during the 1990s it jumped from twenty-eighth to eighteenth place in the Sciences Citations Index worldwide national rankings,4 an amazing accomplishment for a country of only 23 million. Yet despite acting as a model country, Taiwan was in grave danger of disappearing as an autonomous entity. China placed enormous military and

Taiwan adapts to the network society 131 diplomatic pressure on the island to accept an ignominious absorption into the PRC hierarchical system as a “special administrative region” akin to Hong Kong. Cross-Strait economic integration intensified the pressure, as detailed by Weixing Hu (see chapter 2). One possible solution to this vexing problem is to establish a new model of security rooted in the network logic of the emerging global society. With the advent of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) governance in May 2000 and President Chen’s call in his first inaugural address for a new “people’s diplomacy,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) under Tien Hungmao and his successors intensified earlier scattered efforts to mobilize nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-traditional global actors (as described by Chen Jie in chapter 6), to enhance Taiwan’s status and security. The new strategy, albeit desperate and forced, is also creative and dynamic. If it works, Taiwan would secure agency on the world stage, directing its own affairs and participating in the “structuration” of an international society possibly more supportive of democratic politics in the future.

The network society Sociologist Manuel Castells is the primary exponent of a network model of global society.5 His point of departure is three ideal-typical ways of organizing and governing the human race: (1) in distinct sovereign-autonomous units, (2) in a single hierarchy, or (3) in a global network. The Realist conception of world politics assumes sovereign-autonomous units. But large-scale transnational relations and full-scale globalization suggest that the international ecology has changed since the heyday of Realism. To deal with these changes, Neorealists and Neoliberals propose state-based transnational arrangements (“international regimes”) to manage increasing cross-border flows. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains the world’s leading promoter of the Realist model even as it has become extraordinarily receptive to foreign capital and thoroughly committed to foreign trade.6 It is a world view linked organically to the CCP’s determination to annex Taiwan as an additional imperial appendage.7 Beijing is accumulating the military and economic power to coerce, intimidate, and perhaps even attack the island society. Yet, if the world is in fact reorganizing into a globe-wide network, then Chinese foreign policy is bound to be frustrated and a nimble, creative, and innovative Taiwan has room for maneuver. Castells’s second ideal-typical way of ordering the world – hierarchically – was promoted by Confucian idealists in pre-modern China and expressed through the Tributary System. Some observers suggest that China hopes to establish a new Tributary System and that incorporating Taiwan is a part of this larger design. But whatever the actual history of the Tributary System, today, as a state in a world of states, China would have to try to establish some other kind of hierarchical order. Any such venture in Asia would run

132 Daniel Lynch into resistance from the United States, Japan, India, and the nations of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). Because neither the sovereign-autonomous unit model nor the hierarchical model of international relations satisfactorily conceives global reality, Castells developed the network model. Under globalization, he finds power increasingly dispersed into disaggregated but interconnected nodes, which come together at key points in switches. Nodes are not coterminous with whole countries or multinational corporations. Nodes are more fragmented, disjointed, ephemeral, and difficult to discern: They are stock exchange markets and their ancillary advanced service centers, in the network of global financial flows. They are national councils of ministers . . . They are street gangs and money-laundering financial institutions in the network of drug traffic . . . They are television systems, entertainment studios, computer graphics milieus, news teams, and mobile devices generating, transmitting, and receiving signals in the global network of the new media at the roots of cultural expression and public opinion.8 Nodes coalesce into switches when different kinds of power networks – economic, military, and ideological – intersect in relatively stable patterns, for example, when “financial flows take control of media empires that influence politics.” Rupert Murdoch’s network exemplifies the concept. To Castells, studying the application of power through a switch like this will become much more illuminating than static or institutionalist conceptions of power could conceive. Actual power is being distributed over an undefined number of ephemeral and difficult-to-map nodes and switches which cannot be ranked hierarchically. Nor can nodes and switches be walled off from one another by sovereign-autonomous units. Nodes and switches are linked in a worldwide network, in ways that no single actor can dominate or control. Multinational corporations, legislatures, terrorists, journalists, bureaucracies, celebrities, and so on are bound together; yet none enjoys determinative power. Power is, in a sense, everywhere and yet nowhere within the Net, making it impossible for a putative hegemon to institutionalize domination: A network-based social structure is a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance. Networks are appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, globalization, and decentralized concentration; for work, workers, and firms based on flexibility, and adaptability; for a culture of endless deconstruction and reconstruction; for a polity geared towards the instant processing of new values and public moods; and for a social organization aiming at the suppression of space and the annihilation of time.9

Taiwan adapts to the network society 133 Castells’ primary task in The Information Age is to explain how the Net has expanded since the advent of computerized telecommunications and micro-articulated economic globalization, and how alienation between individuals and the Net has given rise to a dizzying array of new social movements, including movements that oppose globalization. He does not find evidence for such end-of-history projects as “global civil society” and “the democratic peace,” although he finds that problem-solving authoritarian “solutions” are bound to fail, given network logic. That is, even as it exacts a fearsome human toll, the CCP’s efforts to expand and maintain an authoritarian, multinational empire are doomed to failure if Castells’s logic reflects reality. Even if Castells is premature or overstating his case, and states and multinational corporations still remain centers of global power, his arguments and projections are cogent and buttressed with compelling evidence. The continued smooth “rise of China” is called into doubt by the developing AIDS crisis, sky-rocketing world oil prices, and other “chaotic” events that inevitably arise in network structures. Therefore, PRC power, as a closed and sovereign entity, may be, in key respects, fragile, unreliable, and even transitory.10 Even the military power China directs against Taiwan is arguably unusable because the costs to China of launching a war would be enormous and the outcome uncontrollable and unpredictable. Taiwan cannot afford to be reckless, of course, but it might act on the assumption that the network model is accurate and therefore pursue a diplomacy that takes advantage of network logic.

“People’s diplomacy” In fact, the ROC government began pursuing a variant of network diplomacy in the months immediately following President Chen’s inauguration in May 2000. While the KMT under Lee Teng-hui had already tried to expand Taiwan’s “international space,” Lee-era efforts often reflected the ethos of a still-quasi-authoritarian party-state with a lot of money to throw around. President Chen and his idealistic young foreign policy advisors wanted to move away from what they considered to be the KMT’s overly cynical approach and develop a new “people’s diplomacy” rooted in increasing international influence for NGOs.11 As Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao explained in June 2000: The ROC’s civilian sector has enormous vitality and unlimited human and material resources. If the government can fully cooperate with it and make the best use of all available resources to carry out its foreign affairs tasks, we would gain immense momentum for a multi-level, multi-faceted and diversified diplomacy.12 In September 2000, the MOFA’s Research and Planning Board published an influential strategy document, “The Role and Importance of NGOs in

134 Daniel Lynch Taiwan’s Diplomacy.”13 Noting the increasing global influence of NGOs in matters ranging from environmental policy to international peace, the document argued that NGOs could be a vehicle for communicating directly with citizens of other countries and appealing to their moral sensibilities. NGO activists could speak on behalf of Taiwan to foreign governments and international organizations and contribute to the on-going creation of a global climate of opinion that would refuse to countenance any forced PRC annexation. NGOs should take up Taiwan’s cause because they and Taiwan alike are committed to pursuing the contemporary post-Enlightenment agenda of peace, sustainable development, public health, and social justice, in contrast to the national strength, growth at any cost, elitism of the People’s Republic. In contrast to China, the agendas of Taiwan’s NGOs support these new networks. Therefore, should Taiwan’s NGOs link up with their counterparts in global civil society, new networks would be created to support Taiwan. Taiwan is unusually well placed to integrate into the world of international NGO activism because the Taiwanese are well educated, wealthy, and “wired.”14 Coupled with an affinity of interests and ideology, Taiwan and the NGOs seem natural allies in struggling against Metternichianism and Sinocentrism, causes of gratuitous past suffering in places ranging from Xinjiang to Vietnam. But international NGOs have not taken much notice of Taiwan and its predicament. One reason is, as demonstrated by Chen Jie (see chapter 6), that many NGOs are affiliated with UN agencies, where the People’s Republic exerts enormous pressure to isolate Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan is “off the radar screen” for most international and Asian regional NGOs.15 The MOFA document cited above finds that MOFA can help facilitate international and domestic NGO linkages: 1

2

3

It can coordinate and lend strategic focus to Taiwan’s numerous and scattered subsidy programs for domestic NGOs to participate in international conferences – and for international NGOs to hold conferences in Taiwan. It can assist Taiwan’s domestic NGOs with capacity-building for international activities; for example, it can hold seminars on how to work within international organizations and on how the United Nations system functions. It can help consolidate Taiwan’s domestic NGOs into larger and more effective coalitions and then mobilize diplomats overseas to gather information about comparable coalitions abroad – since coordinated, cross-national action by large coalitions has become a key trend in NGO activism.

To implement these recommendations, in October 2000 MOFA established an NGO Affairs Committee as a standing body.16 By the end of November 2001 it had approved 387 grant applications for Taiwanese

Taiwan adapts to the network society 135 NGOs to host international meetings and conferences or to travel to participate in such events overseas. The Committee also assumed responsibility for coordinating Taiwanese NGO participation in humanitarian efforts abroad, such as the relief effort that followed earthquakes in El Salvador and India.17 The Committee sponsored training camps and internships for Taiwanese NGO workers and overseas volunteers, reinforcing the UN’s International Year of Volunteers. The Committee reported that Taiwanese NGO activists had joined more than 1,000 international NGOs by the end of 2001 and were “involved with” another 1,000. By July 2002, the Committee had sponsored Taiwanese participation in 2,782 international seminars and 605 other global NGO events. The potential was greater still because Taiwan by 2003 had some 30,000 registered domestic NGOs, most “mature enough to go international.”18 “People’s diplomacy,” however, involves more than NGO activism and development assistance to poor countries, which Taiwan has long supported. It also involves the mobilization of influential personalities on Taiwan’s behalf. This can be subtle, reflective of the non-traditional definitions of power embedded in Castells’s model of the network society. For example, President Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, visited Europe in November 2001 and the United States in September 2002. Crippled in a mysterious car “accident” while campaigning for Chen in 1985, Wu implied in her public appearances that Taiwan is similarly victimized by the brutal logic of Realist international relations: Wu’s visit to the US affirms the emergence of a new model of diplomacy for Taiwan, which began to take shape when she traveled to France [in November 2001] to accept the Prize of Freedom on behalf of Chen and visited the Czech Republic at the invitation of the Czech first lady . . . Unrestrained by any official government post, [Wu] enjoys much more freedom and latitude in terms of places she can travel and topics she can address . . . Under the circumstances, all the people of Taiwan should view Wu’s [US] visit with excitement and pride.19 Wu was very well received during her 2001 trip to Europe and her 2002 trip to Washington, where she was making the first visit to the US capital for an ethnically Taiwanese ROC First Lady. Wu used her US trip to draw attention to Taiwan’s new NGO diplomacy, visiting the American Red Cross and inviting its president to Taipei to discuss cooperation. She reminded her interlocutors that Taiwan had provided humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban. She told an audience at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) that Taiwan would establish a similar foundation the following year and that “we’ll be more than willing to cooperate with the NED in boosting the democratic movement around the world in the future.”20 She contended that it was wrong to exclude Taiwan from the United Nations and other state-based

136 Daniel Lynch international organizations because Taiwan is a democratic country and respects human rights.21 Clearly, Wu was attempting to make use of her effective personality and tragic personal history – along with ideological power (the symbol of Taiwan as a model country) – to work nodes of power inside and outside the states system on behalf of Taiwan’s national dignity and security. Measuring the effectiveness of any single endeavor would be difficult, even though, by all accounts, Wu’s trips were successful. But, the new network-oriented diplomacy suffers generally from at least three significant shortcomings. First, Taiwan initiated a gigantic number of NGO-related schemes without any clear coordination and frequently failed to follow through. For example, the Taipei-based Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace (GADP), which established its twelfth and thirteenth branches in June 2002, “one in Argentina and one in Belize, to promote peace around the world as well as across the Taiwan Strait,” was founded by the DPP in January 2002. It is more a “front organization” for the ruling party than a genuine NGO.22 In August 2002, the government-funded World League for Freedom and Democracy joined with the Asia-Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy and two Taiwan universities to hold a conference in Taipei on forming a new “Asian Democratic Alliance” for “consolidating the third wave” of democratization in Asia. President Chen endorsed the Alliance. His Vice President, Annette Lu, announced in December 2002 that the city of Kaohsiung would host a Democratic Pacific Assembly in March 2003 to facilitate “the democratization of non-democratic states in the region.”23 President Chen also fully endorsed the Assembly during a keynote speech to the International Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Asia-Pacific Security at the Grand Hotel in January 2003, where he additionally announced that a Taiwan Democracy Foundation (TDF) would be established in June.24 But with the Taiwan government taking the lead in so many scattered endeavors, the inevitable impression is that Taiwanese NGOs are front organizations. After all, the first chairman of the Taiwan Democracy Foundation was the Legislative Yuan president; the first vice chairman was the minister of foreign affairs; and the chief executive officer was a vice foreign minister. Much funding was provided by the government, which promised, implausibly, that the Foundation “would definitely operate independently of MOFA.”25 The problem is paradoxical. An insecure and unrecognized state is trying to use non-state actors to increase its own legitimacy and security within the international society of states. But can government appendages take advantage of the network logic that Castells believes is undermining state power globally?26 It sometimes seems as if Taiwan’s democracy is merely yong (a usable technology) while Taiwan’s state survival is ti (the premise). President Chen often asserts that “democracy is the chief fundamental value that we all share” and that “democracy embodies the highest respect for human life,

Taiwan adapts to the network society 137 27

property, and human rights.” But other statements by Chen and other leaders suggest a more cynical mindset. The DPP candidate for Taipei mayor in December 2002 noted that “to consolidate democracy, safeguard freedom, and promote human rights is . . . the important foundation on which we can win over the support and sympathy of the international community.”28 Used over and over again, such discourse can sound cynical. As in many fledgling democracies, popular commitment to democracy may also be shallow in Taiwan. By 2003, economic malaise and out-ofcontrol SARS had spawned “impatience” and “anomalous feelings of helplessness,” which “devalued the image of democracy and left people wondering if democracy is really all it’s cracked up to be.”29 Unpublished public opinion data collected by Luo Chih-cheng and Larry Diamond suggest that support for democratic values might be thin,30 perhaps limited by anxieties over Taiwan’s eventual absorption into the authoritarian Chinese system. The spring 2004 demonstrations to reverse President Chen’s re-election victory suggest that a substantial proportion of the population is more committed to victory for its preferred candidates than to democratic rules of the game. At the other end of Taiwan’s political spectrum, the ideology and praxis of former president Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) suggest that Lee is not above viewing democracy as mere yong for securing the Taiwanese state. Since establishing the TSU in 2001, Lee’s party has pursued a legislative agenda that evinces hostility to cardinal democratic principles in its attitudes toward people who identify with Chinese culture. Fearful of economic integration bringing “Hongkongization” and the island’s submission to Chinese rule, the TSU promotes “de-Sinicization:” On May 11, 2002, about 10,000 Taiwanese took to the Taipei streets to advocate changing the Republic of China’s official name to the “Republic of Taiwan.” The march was organized by the Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan, an umbrella group of more than 70 domestic NGOs aligned with Lee’s TSU. An Alliance convener said their purpose was to “encourage the people of Taiwan to take pride in being Taiwanese and to identify Taiwan as their sole motherland.”31 Another convener, a Presbyterian minister, said the authorities should encourage use of the word “Taiwan” in government agencies and embassies abroad and eventually in the private sector.32 The TSU chairman, who read a supportive missive from Lee Teng-hui, explained that the name change was necessary to promote a sense of Taiwan’s national distinctiveness from China.33 The goal was to have 100,000 people march in a May 2003 rally, which had to be postponed because of SARS. Lee thereupon blamed the SARS outbreak on pro-China unificationists in Taiwan.34 He depicted his opponents as alien and murderous. The TSU has also pressured the DPP government to further revise school textbooks to emphasize Taiwan’s history and geography to subvert the notion that Taiwan is a part of China.35 Former education minister Ovid

138 Daniel Lynch Tseng antagonized Lee Teng-hui’s allies by refusing to press de-Sinicization in the classroom. Tseng also promoted the Hanyu Pinyin Mandarin transliteration system (useful for international business, tourism, and other exchanges) instead of Taiwan’s own Tongyong Pinyin system. Because Hanyu Pinyin is used in China, Lee and his supporters contended that its adoption at home would imply Taiwan’s subjugation to Beijing. They clamored to have Tseng ousted. The People’s Republic condemned the tendency: Pro-independence organizations are anxious to . . . thoroughly instill the Taiwan independence concept into school textbooks. They entertain the wishful thinking of breaking the umbilical cord relationship between Taiwan and the motherland and creating public opinion in preparation for the founding of “Taiwan’s statehood.”. . .The Chen Shui-bian administration is propagating the tricks of “de-Sinicization,” engaging in maneuvers promoting Taiwan’s cultural independence, and inculcating the younger generation with the Taiwan independence concept. Its intentions are sinister indeed!36 President Chen removed Tseng in a January 2002 cabinet reshuffle, replacing him with a former psychology professor and social activist who announced in July 2002 that Taiwan would adopt the native Tongyong Pinyin system. Meanwhile, on April 30, 2002, the TSU introduced a bill to establish a framework for Taiwan citizens to decide the nation’s name, flag, and anthem in a direct popular vote. The Chen administration at first opposed the measure so as not to irritate China, which insists that a referendum on independence is a cause for war.37 Asserting that “we cannot always put China’s reaction at the top of our list of concerns,” the TSU rallied support for its proposal, arguing that “Taiwan would prove itself to be a more democratic country if the law [allowing referenda on items of independence] is passed.”38 Others worried that emotionality would undermine Taiwan’s security. Yet, President Chen called on August 3, 2002 for the legislature to pass a law that would allow holding a referendum, should one become useful in a military crisis. Subsequently, in October 2003, he launched his reelection campaign by calling for a referendum on adopting a new constitution. After new legislation was passed in December 2003, two referendums were held in conjunction with the March 2004 presidential election, but, because of American government concern about China’s reaction, neither question in the final referendum wording addressed independence. Taiwan’s security, its life and death, had become a political football. The same forces proposed that only Taiwan-born citizens be eligible for election as president. This initiative would have disqualified a significant proportion of the population and removed from presidential contention powerful opposition figures such as James Soong and Ma Ying-jeou. The

Taiwan adapts to the network society 139 target population felt themselves treated as outcastes and traitors. The measure would also have violated the constitution. The Chen administration distanced itself from the proposal on that ground.39 But the outcome of the struggle for Taiwanese survival was mistrust and fear among Taiwanese communities. Democratic reconciliation was not advancing. Taiwanese society felt less tolerant and less multicultural. While the TSU held only 13 of 225 seats in the Legislative Yuan and fared poorly in the December 2002 local elections, its appeals were resonating with the Taiwanese fearful of absorption by an authoritarian and threatening China. Apparently unconscious of how CCP policies and rhetoric contribute to deepening Taiwan’s separate identity, China’s official Xinhua News Agency launched broadsides against the TSU for trying to forestall Taiwan’s ineluctable Hongkongization: The TSU has stepped up its campaign aimed at gradual Taiwan independence, with unreserved efforts in this regard, coming up with a new move on almost a daily basis with an eye to sowing discord among different groups of people and on sustaining and escalating political wranglings and conflicts in Taiwan. On the other hand, with a blind eye to the Taiwan people’s demand for revitalizing the economy and improving their livelihood, the TSU has also been seeking to block economic and trade exchanges between the two shores. Indeed, the TSU’s frenzied clamors for Taiwan independence – coupled with its relentless pursuit of turbulence and intranquility in Taiwan society in the name of “love for Taiwan” – are smothering Taiwan’s future, including the Taiwan people’s wishes. In fact, what they are doing is aimed at murdering Taiwan.40 Pressures from a rising China thus impose dilemmas on Taiwan which are wounding its democracy. Ultimate anxieties reinforce a tendency to view democracy as merely yong. The dilemma Taiwanese face is that their democracy could not survive incorporation into the Chinese empire along Hong Kong lines. So it seems worthwhile to risk democratic principles to consolidate national strength and rouse the Taiwanese people’s national pride. Taiwan must preserve its separation to be democratic. But rhetoric and tactics that appear nativistic and divisive split Taiwan, risk losing the support of the United States, and alienate NGOs inside the liberal democracies, which are Taiwan’s natural allies in the global network society. To save Taiwan by wounding its democracy could end up making it yet more difficult for Taiwan to resist authoritarian Chinese pressures.

The Chinese vision of “multipolar modernity” Castells believes that eventually China will be transformed, but not necessarily in a democratic direction. Chinese leaders see network logic as a

140 Daniel Lynch loathsome, US-dominated global cosmopolitanism where NGOs support a hegemonic American quest by acting as agents of democratization, an evil to be struggled against relentlessly. China’s leaders and establishment intellectuals insist that the CCP is the only organization capable of directing China toward wealth and strength. The CCP embraces modernity to make a CCP-led China rich and strong and to enhance the country’s prestige within international society. Both the Party and establishment intellectuals assert an alternative modernity for China rooted in a distinct culture and history and a unique identity, which the authoritarian state must protect. S.N. Eisenstadt and others have described “multiple modernities” as the outcome of several centuries of world development and change.41 In contrast, Chinese elites articulate a world structured around “poles” of comprehensive power that cannot be dissolved in the development of global society. China links its domestic political development to the Realists’ international power structure and sets as a goal the future development of what it vaguely calls “political civilization” rooted in “socialist democracy” – Orwellian words which mean not democracy but a kind of nationalistic social authoritarianism demanding Taiwan’s annexation. Following repeated rounds of repression, Chinese democrats seem thoroughly without influence and unlikely to gain influence in the years ahead. Their prospects seem especially poor if rapid economic development continues, because increasing wealth and power strengthen and embolden the ever more self-confident authoritarian party-state to persist, while maintaining relentless military and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan. Chinese leaders and establishment intellectuals assert that China is or will soon become truly democratic, meaning actually a perfected party dictatorship. They reject constitutional democracy and embrace their own political system of one-party despotism, which they dub socialist democracy. Chinese elites engage in what Alastair Iain Johnston has called “adaptation” as opposed to “learning,” paying lip service to humane values to stave off criticism while, in fact, refusing to change.42 Treating democracy – practised in Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India (that is, most of the rest of Asia) – as a system reflecting submission to US hegemony, China’s rulers uphold authoritarianism. They “strongly resist the political pressure of Westernization, [and instead] safeguard the rights and interests of our nation, and protect our cultural heritage.”43 The CCP is determined to prevent corruption of an imagined Chinese essence (ti) by not allowing globalization to reconstitute China at the level of identity. The CCP arrogates to itself the right to preserve its notion of a Chinese essence by monopolizing determination of the “cultural traditions” that will be venerated. To the CCP, abandoning authoritarianism would allow alien forces to re-form China’s collective identity so that it would become a decentered appendage of a globally hegemonic American identity. “What is

Taiwan adapts to the network society 141 abnormal,” an article in the Party Center’s organ declared, “is that the United States treats its particular kind of parliamentary [sic] democracy as the only popular kind, and makes wild boasts about it, . . . falsely accusing our socialist democratic system of being a ‘totalitarian system.’”44 Given patriotic pride in their authoritarian system, Chinese leaders and propagandists find it galling that many Taiwanese argue that Taiwan could serve as a political model for China. Taiwan Premier Yu Shyi-kun proclaimed in August 2002 that Taiwan had indeed already become “a lighthouse for Chinese democratic politics.”45 Yu added in January 2003 that Taiwan was willing to help promote democracy in China and that only through democratization could China achieve sustainable economic development.46 Former president Lee ridiculed foreign observers who took seriously the CCP’s rhetoric about socialist democratization. Lee said, “I was doing the same thing more than 12 years ago in the KMT. . . . Nobody was permitted to speak his mind. All were required to clap their hands.” The Chinese leaders should follow Taiwan’s example, Lee opined, and “if they really have guts,” they will democratize.47 Taiwanese assertions that their island polity could serve as a model for the great Chinese nation/empire infuriate PRC commentators: Disregarding facts, [Taiwan’s President] Chen Shui-bian has indulged in wild fantasy and is apparently overrating his own abilities. Talking big, he is claiming and posing himself as the “democracy teacher” and “human rights coach” for the Mainland. To others’ surprise, he has pledged to establish a “system to monitor and assess” democratic and human rights conditions on the Chinese Mainland, to prepare “human rights reports,” to “help the Mainland train personnel in promoting democracy,” and to formulate all kinds of measures to counter the Mainland. In making such pledges, he has indeed made a wrong calculation!48 Taiwan is defined by China’s rulers as a local government whose political experiments – poisoned by alien Japanese and American influences – cannot possibly serve as models for culturally authentic Chinese localities. China is its own center. It intends to be its region’s center. It has little interest in Castells’s global network society.

Conclusion Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and their successors could not turn Taiwan into a model suitable for emulation by China. But, if Castells is right, China’s principles are unsustainable in the emerging network-based international social ecology. Those principles create an iron wall of hostility towards any hint of Taiwan attaining security and dignity as an autonomous democratic unit.

142 Daniel Lynch Taiwanese leaders and intellectual elites recognize that the new networkbased global ecology provides opportunities to defend their country against PRC pressures and to enhance Taiwan’s visibility and prestige. But Taiwan’s state-directed notion of networking also contradicts the logic of the new network-based ecology, whose centerpiece, NGOs, will not allow themselves to be manipulated by any state. Once they are so manipulated, they cease to be NGOs. What is required is something that, as Chen Jie’s chapter shows, China’s international isolation of Taiwan renders virtually impossible: Taiwan’s NGOs integrated into the new network society. NGOs all around the world should take up the Taiwanese cause. For the sake of a peaceful pluralism on the side of democracy, human rights, sustainable development, and social justice, the emerging global community should welcome, network with, and support a model polity like Taiwan.

Notes 1 Dangwai means “outside the [KMT] party.” 2 See Chang Yen-hsien, “Taiwan shi yanjiu yu taiwan zhutixing (Taiwan Historical Research and Taiwanese Subjectivity),” in Chang Yen-hsien, Chen Mei-jung, and Lee Chung-kuang, eds., Taiwan jinbainian shi lunwenji (Taiwan’s Recent 100 Years of History) (Taipei: Wu Sanlian Jijinhui, 1996), pp. 431–451. 3 See http://www.gio.gov.tw This figure is actually less than the average for the significantly wealthier member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which in 2002 was 0.4 percent, a fact causing concern in some quarters of Taiwan. It is a better effort than that of the United States, however, which gave only 0.12 percent of its GNP as foreign aid in 2002, but a lesser effort than that of Japan, which gave 0.23 percent (see http:/ /www.oecd.org). Comparable data are unavailable for China, since China is not an OECD member. While the People’s Republic gave aid, World Bank figures indicate that in 2002, China remained a net importer of foreign aid, receiving about $1.4 billion net (see http://china.org.cn and http://www.worldbank.org/ data/). 4 Data from Academia Sinica, July 1999. 5 See, especially, Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, Volume II: The Power of Identity (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 6 It is certainly true that China’s leaders have been willing to work in multilateral organizations in recent years, evidence of a cooperative orientation on certain key issues. But willingness to work in multilateral organizations is completely consistent with having a Realist strategic culture. This is of course a foundational concept for students of international regimes. 7 I use the term “imperial” advisedly to communicate the constructed nature of “China” and to suggest the utility of viewing the People’s Republic not merely from the perspective of the ethnically Han urban elites who populate western and Japanese universities and receive foreigners when they visit Beijing. To understand “China” fully, it is essential also to view it from the perspective of Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, and of course Taiwanese, as well as others who may not share the definition of the “Chinese nation” agreed upon by urban Han elites in the May Fourth era and accepted uncritically by most western Sinologists down to the present. For two excellent alternative perspectives, see Nimrod Baranovitch, “Between Alterity and Identity: New Voices of Minority

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19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26

People in China,” Modern China 27(3), July 2001, pp. 359–401; Gardner Bovingdon, “The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang”, Modern China 28(1), January 2002, pp. 39–78. Castells, The Information Age, pp. 470–471. Ibid. For a thorough and eminently readable discussion of this logic, see Samir Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-Linear Realities (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002). Interviews in Taipei, July–August 2002. Tien Hung-mao, “The Current State of ROC Diplomacy,” June 5, 2000 at http:// www.mofa.gov.tw The document written by Maysing Yang and Bo Teddards is available at http:// www.dsis.org.tw See also Tien Hung-mao, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the New Age,” speech at Harvard University, September 6, 2001 (available at http://www.mofa.gov.tw); Liu Kuan-te, “It’s Time to Shift the Focus of Taiwan’s Diplomacy,” Taipei Times, August 5, 2002. Articles published in the Taipei Times may be accessed at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ This statement is based on four interviews conducted in September 2003 at two leading regional NGOs based in Bangkok, Thailand: Forum-Asia and Focus on the Global South. MOFA had assisted NGOs in an ad hoc way before; for example, it worked closely with the Taipei Overseas Peace Service (TOPS), supporting in particular TOPS activities in Cambodia before the pro-China Hun Sen government took power in a 1997 coup. See “Taiwan’s NGOs Playing Diplomatic Role,” Taipei Times, April 25, 2000. Taiwanese NGOs acquired internationally valued experience in helping earthquake victims following Taiwan’s own horrific earthquake in September 1999. Data taken from Cecelia Fanchiang, “Diplomatic Tactic Boosts ROC Image with NGOs,” 21 February 2003 at http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/past/03022121. html and ROC Annual Yearbook, 2003 at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwanwebsite/5-gp/yearbook/chpt09-1.htm “Wu Best Spokesperson for Taiwan,” Taipei Times, September 22, 2002. James Kuo, Fan Cheng-hsiang, and Sofia Wu, “Taiwan’s First Lady Receives Democracy Award during Reception on US Capitol Hill,” Taiwan Central News Agency, September 26, 2002. Articles on the Taiwan Central News Agency website maybe accessed at http://www.cna.com.tw Cited in Jay Chen and Deborah Kuo, “Taiwan First Lady Says Taiwan Should Not Be Excluded from United Nations,” Taiwan Central News Agency, September 25, 2002. Oscar Chung and Deborah Kuo, “Taiwan Global Alliance for Democracy Opens Two More Overseas Branches,” Taiwan Central News Agency, June 17, 2002. Maubo Chang, “Taiwan to Stage Democratic Pacific Union Meeting in March,” Taiwan Central News Agency, December 5, 2002. Cited in Deborah Kuo, “Taiwan Must Help More Countries Enjoy Fruits of Democracy,” Taiwan Central News Agency, January 17, 2003. Huang Kwang-chun, “Taiwan Democracy Foundation Established,” Taiwan Central News Agency, June 17, 2003; Tsai Ting-i, “Foundation Set Up to Enhance Taiwan’s Democracy,” Taiwan News, June 18, 2003. It is unlikely that Taiwanese NGOs generally could become dominated by the state, but it is possible that the state could come to exert an inordinately strong influence over those seeking to go international.

144 Daniel Lynch 27 Quoted in Kuo, “Taiwan Must Help More Countries Enjoy Fruits of Democracy.” 28 Lee Ying-yuan, “Universal Values as a Guide for DPP Policy,” Taipei Times, September 15, 2002. 29 Huang Wen-hsiung, “Famine, Disease, and Democracy,” Taipei Times, April 17, 2003; Huang is a presidential advisor and consultant to the Taiwan Association for Human Rights. 30 Private communication. 31 Sofia Wu, “Pro-Taiwan Activists to Promote use of ‘Taiwan’ in Group Names,” Taiwan Central News Agency, April 23, 2002. 32 Lin Mei-chun, “‘Taiwan’ Takes to the Taipei Streets,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2002. 33 Wu, “Pro-Taiwan Activists to Promote use of ‘Taiwan’.” The ROC government added the name “Taiwan” to passports in January 2002. 34 See Tsai Ting-i, “Lee Says Pro-Unification Forces to Blame for SARS Outbreak,” Taiwan News, May 19, 2003. The rally was re-scheduled for September 2003 and attracted about 50,000 marchers. 35 Lilian Wu, “TSU Promoting Taiwan as National Title,” Taiwan Central News Agency, April 23, 2002. 36 Wu Yuan, “At the Foot of Mount Yangming: Lee Teng-hui Calls for Removal of ‘Minister of Education,’” Ta Kung Pao, January 10, 2002 (translated in FBIS Daily China Report, January 15, 2002). FBIS is accessible through at http:// wnc.dialog.com/ 37 Crystal Hsu, “TSU Promotes Referendum Bill,” Taipei Times, May 1, 2002. 38 Lin Mei-chun, “TSU Seeks Support for Patriotism Law,” Taipei Times, May 17, 2002; interviews by author, Taipei, July–August 2002. 39 Edward Chen, “TSU Tries to Restrict Citizens Not Born in Taiwan from Running for President,” Taiwan Central News Agency, February 6, 2002; David Hsu, “MOI Opposes ‘Born-in-Taiwan’ Requirement for Presidential Candidates,” Taiwan Central News Agency, March 8, 2002. 40 Chen Jianxing, “Suicidal Act Harmful to Taiwan,” Xinhua, 22 April 2002 (translated in FBIS Daily China Report, 23 April 2002). 41 See the Winter 2000 issue of Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 42 See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Changes in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” The China Journal 35 (January 1996), pp. 27–61; Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 4th ed., 1998), pp. 55–87. 43 Wang Jisi, “Does Globalization Mean Westernization?” Banyuetan 10 (2000) (translated in FBIS Daily China Report, May 23, 2000). Edward Friedman (private communication) argues that, on the popular level, Chinese fearful of democracy associate “Westernization” with “a subversion of family values by amoral individualists who won’t take care of their parents, who will divorce, who will be selfish individuals.” Party-state elites then manipulate the anxiety such images produce by associating “Westernization” with the embrace of American culture described in negative ways. 44 Zheng Hangsheng, “Drawing a Line of Demarcation between Socialist Democracy and Congressional Democracy of the West,” Renmin Ribao, 11 July 1996 (translated in FBIS Daily China Report, July 22, 1996). 45 Yu Shyi-kun quoted in Wan Shu-chang and P.C. Tang, “‘One Country, Two Systems’ Would Hinder Taiwan’s Democracy,” Taiwan Central News Agency, August 16, 2002.

Taiwan adapts to the network society 145 46 Victor Lai, “Taiwan Willing to Help Promote Democratization in PRC,” Taiwan Central News Agency, January 16, 2003. 47 Monique Chu, “Lee Says Taiwan Has Set Example,” Taipei Times, November 17, 2002. 48 Liu Hong, “Taiwan Strait Observation: Truth Brooks No Slander – On Chen Shui-bian’s Recent Irresponsible Remarks,” Renmin Ribao, September 17, 2002 (translated in FBIS Daily China Report).

Part III

China’s rise and international peace

8

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations Vincent Wei-cheng Wang*

Discussions on Taiwan’s international participation should begin by choosing from the contrasting perspectives on Taiwan’s contested international status.1 According to the official yearbook of Taiwan:2 The Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state with a population of 23 million and a defined territory consisting of the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and several islets. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been governed separately, with neither subject to the other’s rule. The Republic of China maintains its own national defense and conducts its own independent foreign policy, including full diplomatic relations with nearly 30 countries and substantive ties with more than 140 others. Its democratically elected government represents the 23 million people living in Taiwan, and no other government in the world can legitimately claim to represent them or speak on their behalf.3 According to the official “White Paper” of China: 4 There is only one China in the world, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part. The Government of the People’s Republic of China has been recognized by the United Nations and throughout the world as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people. . . . The sovereignty of each State is an integral whole which is indivisible and unsharable. The Government of the People’s Republic of China, as the sole legal government of China, has the right and obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represent the whole of China in international organizations. The Taiwan authorities’ lobbying for a formula of “one country, two seats” in international organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states is a maneuver to create “two Chinas.” The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to such an attempt.5 Taiwan meets the four criteria for statehood authoritatively defined by the Montevideo Convention: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined

150 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.6 However, its international relations have been severely restricted by China’s obstructionism and by the international community’s acquiescence to China. Consequently, Taiwan is the most prominent of a handful of “de facto states”: “entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularlysupported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area.”7 De facto states are in some ways mirror images of “quasi-states” – those so-called states that enjoy juridical equality as a result of international support but cannot otherwise stand on their own. As Pegg puts it, “The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no matter how effective it is.”8 A de facto state like Taiwan is a functional reality that is denied legitimacy. Taiwan’s quandary is a result of the “sovereignty game.” Political scientist Stephen Krasner thinks that “A state like Taiwan can have Westphalian sovereignty, but not international legal sovereignty.”9 “International legal sovereignty” refers to the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence, while “Westphalian sovereignty” is political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory.10 Although Taiwan is recognized by only twenty-seven mostly small and poor states, it maintains “substantive relationships” with over 140 others, including the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU).11 Some of these relationships are unofficial only in name. One respected international law text observes: “The American Institute of (sic) Taiwan functions like an embassy and actually all US relations with Taiwan are much like those with any state or government.” It asks, “In view of the unofficial relations maintained with Taiwan by so many states, should it be considered to be a state, although perhaps a state a bit different from the usual?”12 Major states have been unwilling to recognize Taiwan in deference to the People’s Republic and the government of Taiwan has hitherto not sought recognition as a new Taiwanese state.13 In other words, an implicit fifth Montevideo element – an entity can only be recognized as a state if it calls itself a state – could be used to reject Taiwan’s statehood. Until 2000, Taipei’s position had been that Taiwan is (1) part of a historical China, (2) open to unifying with a future democratic China, and (3) presently synonymous with the Republic of China, a sovereign state that exercises effective jurisdiction over Taiwan and some smaller islands. For the former ruling party, the Kuomintang (the KMT – the Nationalists), the issue is one of recognizing an existing government. However, the ruling party since 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), seems to envision a new state. The DPP’s platform states: “Taiwan’s sovereignty is separate

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 151 from and does not belong to the People’s Republic of China. Nor does Taiwan’s sovereignty extend to the Chinese mainland.” The platform calls for “establishing an independent country in accordance with the reality of Taiwan’s sovereignty, enacting a new constitution . . . and returning to international society based on principles of international law.”14 President Chen Shui-bian in fall 2003 called for a new constitution for Taiwan by 2006.15 Chen’s predecessor, former president of Taiwan and current leader of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), Lee Teng-hui, argues that “the Republic of China no longer exists,” and that for Taiwan to become a “normal country” it must have a name “rectification” [zheng ming] and “discard the ‘Republic of China’ moniker.”16 In sum, Taiwan’s unique international legal status is a result of a lack of recognition by others. Recognition is a matter of debate. A declaratory school argues that statehood is objective. An entity is a state or it is not. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention declares: “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition of other states.” Article 6 further clarifies the nature of recognition: “The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law” and “recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.”17 In contrast, the constitutive school argues that recognition should be added to the four Montevideo elements of statehood.18 Taiwan is not accorded recognition because of China’s opposition. China’s rising international stature means that states are unlikely to challenge its position. Hence, the differences between the KMT and the DPP on recognition, for all practical purposes, are rendered moot. China opposes Taiwan’s participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Most IGOs, eager to include a major power like China, accept this condition. The result is that Taiwan has been excluded from all but a few IGOs. In terms of IGO membership, it is the world’s most isolated state,19 as Chao and Hsu explicate (see chapter 3). “State-directed isolation means that the very existence of the ostracized state is at issue. . . . That particular population’s claim to nationhood and independence are rejected.”20

Synopsis of Taiwan’s IGO membership According to the authoritative Yearbook of International Organizations, as of 1999 there were 251 IGOs and 5,825 non-governmental organizations (NGOs).21 Table 8.1 shows the growth of these organizations, while Table 8.2 provides a different answer to the question “How many international organizations are there?” By including other types of organizations, Table 8.2 shows that there are in fact a lot more IGOs and NGOs than is commonly appreciated. They form the backbone of an interdependent world. Taiwan’s isolation in terms of IGO membership can be seen in Table 8.3.

152 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Table 8.1 Patterns of growth in numbers of conventional international organizations, 1909–1999 Year

IGOs

NGOs

1909 1951 1956 1964 1972 1978 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1998 1999

37 123 132 179 280 289 378 311 300 297 272 266 258 254 251

176 832 973 1,470 2,173 2,420 4,676 4,235 4,621 4,620 4,830 5,121 5,585 5,766 5,825

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, 1999–2000 (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 2000), also available at http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php

In 1981 Taiwan belonged to only nine IGOs, all outside the UN ambit. Since China crushed the 1989 Tiananmen movement for democracy, a modest but steady improvement in Taiwan’s IGO participation has ensued. In 2002 Taiwan doubled its 1981 IGO memberships. With its entry into the InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in July 2003, Taiwan now has membership in nineteen IGOs. Table 8.4 lists the IGOs to which Taiwan belongs or holds observer status. There were two periods in which Taiwan was most successful in participating in IGOs: the 1950–1960s and the 1990s–present. Taiwan joined eleven out of the nineteen IGOs in Table 8.4 after 1991. There was a two-decade hiatus between 1971, when the Republic of China was expelled from the United Nations, and 1991. The second point to note is that with the exception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), most of these IGOs are regional or technical. None is within the UN family. Table 8.4 reveals the changing importance to Taiwan of the various issues represented by IGOs over time. In the early days, Taiwan was active in IGOs devoted to agrarian and rural development; in recent years, the emphasis shifted to trade, tuna fishing, money laundering, and so on. Such changes parallel Taiwan’s transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial and service-oriented one. Taiwan’s stature in IGOs falls short of its population size and economic strength. Its population is larger than all but 40 UN members; its economy is the seventeenth largest in the world. However, Table 8.5 presents a quite different profile for Taiwan’s stature in global governance. It has membership in 1,064 NGOs (as of July 2002) – a fairly high percentage of

Table 8.2 International organizations by type Type

Conventional international bodies A. Federations of international organizations B. Universal membership organizations C. Intercontinental membership organizations D. Regionally oriented membership organizations Total conventional

Intergovernmental (IGO)

Non-governmental (NGO)

Total

No.

No.

No.

% type

% IGO

% type

% NGO

% total

1 35 35 180 251

2.63 6.74 3.20 4.06 4.13

0.39 13.94 13.94 71.73 100.0

37 484 1,057 4,247 5,825

97.36 93.25 96.79 95.93 95.87

0.63 8.30 18.14 72.93 100.00

38 519 1,092 427 6,076

0.62 8.54 17.97 72.87 100.00

Other international bodies E. Organizations emanating from places or persons or other bodies F. Organizations of special form G. Internationally oriented national organizations Total other

775 724 89 1,588

25.60 16.95 1.57 12.36

48.81 45.59 5.60 100.00

2,138 3,547 5,567 11,252

73.39 83.04 98.42 87.64

19.00 31.52 49.48 100.00

2,913 4,271 5,656 12,840

22.68 33.26 44.06 100.00

Total: Types A to G

1,839

17,077

18,916

Special types H. Dissolved or apparently inactive organizations J. Recently reported bodies – not yet confirmed K. Subsidiary and internal bodies N. National organizations R. Religious orders and secular institutes S. Autonomous conference series T. Multilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements U. Currently inactive non-conventional bodies Total special

460 170 560 0 0 113

11.43 15.93 29.27 0 0 17.25

10.05 3.71 12.23 0 0 2.46

3,563 897 1,353 3,370 893 542

88.56 84.06 70.72 100 100 82.74

13.25 3.33 5.03 12.53 3.32 2.01

4,023 1,067 1,913 3,370 893 655

12.78 3.39 6.08 10.71 2.83 2.08

2,028 1,245 4,576

100 7.11 14.54

44.35 27.20 100.00

0 16,263 26,881

0 92.88 85.46

0 60.53 100.00

2,028 17,508 31,457

6.44 55.69 100.00

Total all types

6,415

43,958

50,373

Source: Yearbook of International Organizations, 1999–2000 (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 2000), also available at http://www.uia.org/ uiastats/ytb199.htm

154 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Table 8.3 Numbers of IGOs and NGOs to which Taiwan belongs (selected years) Year

IGOs

NGOs

1981 1988 1992 1996 1998 2001 2003

9 10 12 13 16 18 19

– – 781 909 943 1,059 –

Source: Zhonghua minguo jiushiyi nian waijiao tongji nianbao (Republic of China Foreign Affairs Statistical Yearbook, 2002), online at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/sdo/kc-91/ p68.pdf; Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 173

Table 8.4 Taiwan’s participation in international organizationsa IGO A. IGOS in which Taiwan is a member Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Interim Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the Northern Pacific Ocean World Trade Organization

Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units of the World Association of Asian Election Authorities Asian/Pacific Group on Money Laundering Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and Research Association for Science Cooperation in Asia Central American Bank for Economic Integration Conference of Governors of South-east Asian Central Banks Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization Asian Development Bank International Cotton Advisory Committee International Seed Testing Association

Asian Productivity Organization International Office of Epizootics

Acronym

Name/capacity

Date joined

IATTC

Chinese Taipei (fishing entity)

July 23, 2003b

ISC WTO

Jan. 30, 2002 Separate Customs Jan. 1, 2002 Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu July 1998

AAEA APG SGATAR ASCA CABEI (BCIE) SEACEN APEC AVRDC

Feb. 1998 Feb. 1997 Feb. 1996 China

1994 Nov. 10, 1992 Jan. 24, 1992

Chinese Taipei

1991 May 22, 1971

FFTC/SPAC

1970

AARDO

1968

ADB ICAC ISTA

APO OIE

Taipei, China

Aug. 22, 1966 1963 Separate Customs 1962 Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu May 11, 1961 Taipei, China Oct. 1, 1954

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 155 Table 8.4 Continued IGO B. IGOs in which Taiwan is an observer Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Sistema de la integracion Centroamerica Foro de Presidentes Legislativos de Centroamerica Central American Parliament Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Inter-American Development Bank European Bank of Reconstruction and Development International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas

Acronym

Name/capacity

Date joined

OECD

Dec. 20, 2001

SICA FORPEL

Feb. 1, 2000 Dec. 15, 1999

PARLACEN CCSBT

1999 1994

IDB EBRD

1991 1991

ICCAT

1972

Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/org/nation 3_other.htm (names compiled from the website’s links to various IGOs); CIA, The World Factbook 2002, online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html#Govt; CIA, Handbook of the Nations, 21st edition (Thomson Learning, 2001); Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), online at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua%20Convention %20 ENG%20SPN%20FRA%20adopted%20text%2023%20JUL%2003.pdf and http://www.iattc. org/PDFFiles2/C-03-09%20Participation%20of%20fishing%20entity.pdf; “Taiwan will Join Tuna Commission,” China Times, 11 July 2003 Notes a According to the CIA World Factbook, Taiwan participates in the following international organizations: APEC, ADB, BCIE, ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), IFRCS (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), IOC (International Olympic Committee), WCL (World Confederation of Labor) and the WTO b Taiwan had been an observer at the IATTC since 1973. The Antigua Convention, passed at the organization’s 70th meeting (24–27 June 2003), established the concept of “fishing entity” (article XXVIII). Resolution C-03-09 decided to admit Taiwan into this previously 13-member body under the name “Chinese Taipei.”

participation in the 5,825 total NGOs (only dozens are well-known and important). These NGOs serve nearly every conceivable function. Individuals, associations, schools, institutions, and other entities variously represent Taiwan in these NGOs. The traditional state-centric model of IGOs does not capture Taiwan’s reality in the era of globalization. This chapter proposes a functional competence approach and makes a case for a sui generis model for Taiwan membership in IGOs based on its status in globalization.

From WTO to WHO? After twelve years of negotiations, Taiwan became the 144th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 2002.22 For a diplomatically isolated trade powerhouse like Taiwan, WTO membership resembled admittance into the “economic UN.” Pent-up aspirations gave Taiwan’s

156 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Table 8.5 Taiwan’s membership of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (as of July 2002) Nature of organization Medicine and hygiene Science and technology Sports Trade unions R&D and management Business, finance, and economics Religion and philosophy Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and animal husbandry Charity and social welfare Culture and arts Education Industrial technology Leisure and recreation Wildlife conservation and environmental protection Transportation and tourism Mining and energy Law and police administration Engineering Electronics and mechanical engineering Women, family, and youth Journalism Total

No. 232 101 100 82 76 68 61 48

Example World Medical Association International Association of Science Parks International Baseball Association World Federation of Teachers’ Unions International Political Science Association Pacific Economic Cooperation Council World Muslim Congress International Seed Testing Association

49 Rotary International 37 World Congress of Poets 32 International Association of Universities 31 World Semiconductor Council 27 World Leisure and Recreation Association 26 Sustainable and Peaceful Energy Network Asia 21 International Association of Ports and Harbors 18 World Nuclear Fuel Market 17 Amnesty International 16 World Federation of Engineering Organizations 11 International Federation of Robotics 8 Zonta International 3 International Press Institute 1,064

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/org/ nation3_other.htm and Government Information Office, The Republic of China Yearbook Taiwan 2001 (Taipei: GIO, 2001), p. 137. Examples are the author’s choices from the website’s links

persistent quest for “international space” a new impetus. Some hoped “the WTO model” might spearhead Taiwan’s entry (or the Republic of China’s return) to many IGOs, particularly those affiliated with the UN system, and hence, as T.Y. Wang shows (see chapter 9), the United Nations is most important from Taipei’s standpoint. Utilizing Article 33 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which defined members (“contracting parties”) as “governments which are applying the provisions of the Agreement,”23 Taiwan applied for membership in 1990 as a “Separate Customs Territory,” partly to sidestep the thorny issue of sovereignty. Gaining full membership without the litmus test of statehood in this specialized agency within the UN system has inspired Taiwan to try replicating the “WTO model” in other UN-affiliated specialized agencies. The World Health Organization (WHO) became the next focal point.

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 157 Since 1997 Taiwan has sought observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA), the “supreme decision-making body for the WHO.”24 As described by Hickey (see chapter 4), in May 2002 for the first time Taiwan sought to make its case for WHO membership as a “public health entity.”25 Citing precedents for observers set by the WHO – The Holy See, the Order of Malta,26 and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) – Taiwan proposed an apolitical nomenclature, “public health entity.” Taiwan invoked functional “precedents,” its entry into the WTO as a “customs territory,” as a “fishing entity” (under the name “Chinese Taipei”) in the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (MHLC),27 and as an “economy” (under the name “Chinese Taipei”) in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.28 But despite this non-confrontational approach, the WHA Steering Committee refused to include Taiwan’s application on the agenda.29 China’s opposition blocked Taiwan.30 In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) added drama to Taiwan’s WHO bid.31 Taiwan, with the world’s third-highest SARS toll, received an unprecedented expert team from the WHO in early May. However, neither this development nor increased US support could change the outcome. Taiwan’s quest for observer status was rejected.32 Notwithstanding China’s mishandling of SARS, which contributed to the worldwide outbreak, and Taiwan’s acute needs, China did not soften its opposition to Taiwan’s bid. Optimism was dashed. WTO membership proved no short cut for Taiwan into the WHO, despite similarities in their acronyms. Since there was no WTO model to facilitate Taiwan’s return to international society, it remains sui generis.

Foreign policy versus mainland policy Taiwan’s quandary with IGOs results from an international legal theoretical void and a domestic policy dilemma. The theoretical lacuna points to the inadequacies of the conventional state-centric approach toward international law and organization – one based on the juridical standing of a “sovereign state hypocritically constructed,” to use Stephen Krasner’s phrase33 – on the issue of Taiwan membership in IGOs. This may be compared to a newer approach based on functional competence dictated by globalization. The domestic policy dilemma stems from the paradoxical symbiosis of Taiwan’s foreign and mainland policies. Opinion polls consistently show that developing foreign relations enjoys a high degree of public support, providing an impetus for a campaign to join the United Nations (since 1993), described by T.Y. Wang (see chapter 9), and the WHO (since 1997), which became a key electoral factor. President Chen’s floating the idea of a referendum on WHO entry can be understood in this context.

158 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Taiwan’s public is more likely to support participation in international bodies and be less concerned about Taiwan’s status in such bodies. A 2002 poll shows that when asked whether they consider participation in international organizations in any capacity or participation only under a proper name (one that presumably reflects Taiwan’s sovereign status) as more important, participation wins by more than two to one.34 But developing foreign relations may be at odds with developing better relations with China. Table 8.6 compares the results from several polls on whether developing foreign or cross-Strait relations is more important. Taiwanese people are pragmatic but ambivalent on the trade-off between foreign policy and mainland policy. Their preference for foreign policy reflects their aspirations for dignity and international status, and for resisting China’s isolation. But they also understand that promoting foreign relations cannot be pursued without paying heed to China’s reaction. Hence, sometimes more respondents think that developing cross-Strait relations should be the priority. It is Taiwan’s dilemma. An increasing number find it untenable to avoid a choice. In August 1999, 46 percent (the largest group) replied that both foreign and mainland policies were important. In May 2003, only 16 percent chose this answer. Respondents support efforts to develop foreign relations despite China’s opposition. Polls from May 1998 to May 2003 show that 54.5–79.4 percent of the respondents say “yes” to the question “If developing foreign ties led to rising tension on cross-Strait relations, would you agree with such an effort.” Only 11.9–20.0 percent said “no.”35 Although Taipei, as Chen Jie shows (see chapter 6), has evinced pragmatism by exploring the variegated modalities of “participation,” it seeks, through participation in IGOs, to define an international personality distinct from one subordinated under Chinese Communist Party rule. But Beijing has not softened its objection to any formula for Taiwan’s participation that

Table 8.6 Survey results on whether foreign or cross-Strait relations should be developed as a priority (percent) Survey date

Effective Developing sample size foreign relations is more important

Developing cross-Strait relations is more important

Both are equally important

Don’t know

May 2003 July 2002 April 2000 August 1999

1,082 1,091 1,085 1,067

29.9 35.0 26.7 20.1

15.8 16.2 27.7 46.6

17.5 22.8 16.8 2.4

36.8 26.0 33.8 31.3

Source: Compiled from Mainland Affairs Council, “Whether to Develop Foreign or CrossStrait Relations as Priority,” online at http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9205/ 9205e_5.gif

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 159 does not imply the IGO’s acceptance of (or acquiescence to) China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, or at least the latter’s “Chineseness.”36 Consequently, Taiwan suffers prolonged diplomatic isolation. But Taiwanese are also resolute in resisting Chinese pressure. Thus China’s policy alienates the Taiwanese people, whom China claims to wish to win over, and IGOs lose a valuable partner and have to spend time and resources on debates over Taiwanese membership. The cross-Strait dispute is internationalized. Taiwanese are of different opinions on what to do. The KMT has viewed the cross-Strait relationship as akin to that between North and South Korea or between East and West Germany – a “divided state”, “two Chinas” now and “one China” in the future.37 A respected international law scholar describes divided states as follows: A peculiar phenomenon in the post-1945 world, reflecting a bipolar orientation of world politics, was the emergence of several states divided into two entities, each equipped with an operative government: Germany (Federal Republic and Democratic Republic), Korea (North and South), China (Republic of China and People’s Republic), Vietnam (North and South), and Cyprus.38 Viewing the cross-Strait relationship as one of divided states leads to a push for “parallel representation,” a Republic of China and a People’s Republic, following the examples of the two Germanys and two Koreas in the United Nations. By contrast, the DPP views the cross-Strait relationship as between two states – China and Taiwan. It calls for “establishing an independent country in accordance with the reality of Taiwan’s sovereignty, enacting a new constitution . . . and returning to the international society based on principles of international law.”39 DPP adherents prefer that Taiwan enter IGOs as “Taiwan.” Beijing attempts to impose the mainland–Hong Kong relationship upon the cross-Strait relationship, a central government and a local government, a “one country, two systems” model. Therefore, the People’s Republic might sponsor Taiwan as an “associate member” in those IGOs with such provisions (i.e. a Hong-Kong-like status) as a reward for progress in crossStrait relations. But Taipei would not accept Hong-Kong-like status, since acceptance would signify approval of Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan. The impasse is more disadvantageous for Taiwan. People debate whether a diplomatic breakthrough hinges on reaching a modus vivendi with Beijing or altering international law or practices. As Lynch argues (see chapter 7), Taiwan should rethink its strategy on IGO participation in light of globalization and present to the international community a compelling case on why it merits a sui generis treatment with respect to international participation.

160 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang

From sovereign state-centricity to functional competence The centrality of the state as the primary actor in international relations is challenged by the “simultaneous trends toward globalism, on the one hand, and subnational particularisms, on the other.”40 The need for “global governance,” a broader concept encompassing not only regimes and rules concerning inter-state activity, but also situations in which the creators and operators of rules are non-state actors of various kinds, working within or across state boundaries,41 is illustrated by the tremendous growth of international organizations (see Table 8.1). Table 8.4 showed the range of IGOs in which Taiwan is a member or participates in the activities.42 The proliferation of international organizations reinvigorates Wilsonian idealism, raising hopes of global governance through representation based on popular participation. Although global politics continues to rest on sovereign states protective of territorial integrity, ethnic particularlism and globalism combine to weaken the force of nationalism based on territoriality. Nowhere is this more evident than in the global economy and environment, where the pervasive transnational nature of international finance, drug trafficking or money laundering, and global warming erode the sovereignty of the state. Consequently, a fruitful approach to studying international organization (as a historical process) is the structuralfunctional analysis of institutions created by particular IGOs. Functions refer to “what must be done,” and structures refer to “what must be done is to be done.”43 Although public interests often focuses on high-profile comprehensive IGOs that glamorize diplomacy (e.g. the United Nations), the specialized agencies are the actors that get things done. Their approach is functional. For every important function, there is an international organization to facilitate interstate cooperation and enhance global human welfare. Table 8.7 summarizes the main functions or purposes of some of the most wellknown and important specialized UN agencies. Table 8.4 showed that the IGOs that Taiwan participates in are mostly Asian in scope, rather than global, and mostly technical or with a narrow mandate, rather than political or with a broad mandate. Taiwan’s international participation will show the most promise if it focuses on those IGOs that are more likely to recognize Taiwan’s functional competence on the issues entrusted to these IGOs, rather than those IGOs that are weighed down by realpolitik and the gamesmanship of sovereignty.

A functionally competent Taiwan in global governance Most IGOs seek democratic representation and effective governance. Both contribute to the IGO’s legitimacy. Representation stresses equality; effectiveness stresses governance. The two goals are embodied in two

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 161 Table 8.7 The functionalist approach to global governance: main functions of selected IGOs IGO

Main functions/purposes

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

To raise levels of nutrition To promote efficient production and distribution of food and agricultural products To seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world To ensure . . . that assistance provided by it . . . is not used . . . to further any military purpose To ensure the safe, orderly, and efficient growth of international civil aviation, with the concomitant development of airports, air navigation facilities, and so on To enhance working conditions, living standards and equitable treatment of workers To promote cooperation among governments regarding the technical aspects of shipping To facilitate high standards of maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and control of pollution from ships To promote international monetary cooperation and the expansion of trade To promote change stability To establish a multilateral system of payments among members To eliminate foreign exchange restrictions that would hinder world trade Its substantive programs promote the advancement and exchange of knowledge Its operational programs are. . . to combat illiteracy and to raise the overall level of education Provides world-wide information services on . . . major diseases Gives assistance to countries for disease prevention and control Encourages medical research

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) International Labor Organization (ILO) International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Health Organization (WHO)

Source: Compiled from Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting: Selected Documents (St. Paul, MN: West, 1993), 3-8.

institutional arrangements, “one person, one vote” in the plenary body, and an executive system (e.g. council) that adds weight to the more important members on a given issue. Table 8.8 summarizes IGO provisions for members “of chief importance/ interest.” Aside from the “veto power” exercised by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, one well-known example of the “chief importance/interest” clause is the International Monetary Fund’s weighted voting system (as opposed to “one person, one vote” of the UN General

162 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Table 8.8 Examples of IGOs in which the functional importance of global governance is valued more highly than fair representation IGO

Special role for “Members of Chief Importance” in the executive body

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

The Council’s membership (39) represents three groups: states of chief importance in air transport; states making the largest contribution to facilities for international civil air navigation; and states selected on the basis of geographic representation The Governing Body is composed of 56 members: 28 representing governments, 14 representing employers and 14 representing workers. Currently 10 of the government representatives are appointed by the member states of chief industrial importance The Council consists of 32 members elected by the Assembly. Eight of the Council members must be states with the largest interest in providing international shipping; 8 others have the largest interest in seaborne trade; and the other 16 represent the major geographic areas of the world and have special interests in maritime transport or navigation Each member is assigned a quota . . . the size of the quota reflects the member’s relative size in the world economy. The quota determines not only the subscription (investment) a member must make, but also affects the extent to which it may draw on the Fund’s financial resources, determines the extent of its voting power under the Fund’s system of weighted voting, and defines the quantity of SDRs to which it may be entitled The Executive Board consists of 51 members, elected as representatives of their governments . . . with regard to their competence in the arts, humanities, sciences, education, and the dissemination of ideas The Executive Board is composed of 31 state representatives, technically qualified in the health field

International Labor Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

Source: Compiled from Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting: Selected Documents (St. Paul, MN: West, 1993), pp. 3–8.

Assembly), under which a member’s vote is determined by its quota, which is assigned by the Fund in terms of this member’s relative size in the world economy.44 The functional competence approach has two premises: (1) international organizations need to accommodate globalization; and (2) better governance

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 163 demands the inclusion of functionally competent actors. By accepting these premises, discussions on globalization, IGOs, and Taiwan’s international participation link together and imply the following conclusions: (1) in the era of globalization, IGOs must include all the most “globalized” nations; and (2) these most-globalized nations are the members of chief importance in globalization-era IGOs. So, how does Taiwan stack up on globalization? If countries could be traded like company stocks, Thomas Friedman would “buy Taiwan, hold Italy, and sell France”45 because in the “globalization system” what matters is no longer where or who you are but what you are – how an entity scores on speed of change, capacity to harvest knowledge, ability to add value, openness to the outside world, internal transparency and tolerance that encourage innovation, good leadership, creative destruction, ability to partner with others, and ability to market itself as a superior “brand.”46 From this globalization perspective, Taiwan is a key player. Consequently, China’s isolation of Taiwan hurts almost everyone in this age, since in the era of globalization, IGOs should include this highly globalized nation so that it could contribute its functional competence to global governance. Taiwan is, for example, a crucial player in the global supply chain of information technology (IT). Taiwanese firms are the world’s largest supplier of cases, screens, microprocessors, hubs, modems, LAN cards, keyboards, monitors, scanners, motherboards, power suppliers, CD-ROMs, and graphics cards.47 World IT markets felt the aftershocks of Taiwan’s earthquake of September 21, 1999, which cut power supply to the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park – Taiwan’s “Silicon Valley” – and disrupted production and worldwide sales.48 Although globalization has long been conceptually associated with the intensification of socio-economic and cultural links across borders, finding a satisfactory measure to operationalize this concept is not easy. A globalization index including 62 countries, who make up more than 80 percent of world trade, is composed of 13 indicators that measure four major aspects of globalization: 1 2 3 4

economic integration: trade, foreign direct investment and portfolio capital flows, and income payments and receipts; personal contact: international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic, and cross-border transfers; technology: number of internet users, internet hosts, and secure servers; political engagement: number of memberships in international organizations, UN Security Council missions in which each country participates, and foreign embassies that each country hosts.49

The ten most globalized countries on the 2003 Globalization Index were Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, Singapore, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Finland.50 The next ten were the

164 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang United States, France, Norway, Portugal, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Germany, Malaysia, Israel, and Spain. In 2003, Taiwan ranked thirty-fourth, right after Poland and Botswana, but ahead of Japan. By contrast, on the 2002 Globalization Index, Taiwan ranked thirty-second, behind South Korea and Slovenia, but ahead of Chile and Japan. Taiwan’s low ranking results from an incongruity. It ranks seventeenth on the technology dimension (with the world’s eighth-largest number of internet hosts and the fifteenth-largest number of internet users); it ranks twenty-ninth on economic integration (with the world’s sixteenthlargest trade volume and fourteenth-highest amount of portfolio capital flows), thirtieth on personal contact (with the world’s eighteenth-busiest international telephone traffic). But Taiwan ranks dead last on political linkages – last in number of memberships in international organizations and second-last on foreign embassies hosted.51 Taiwan’s economic integration and technological prowess contrast sharply with its political isolation. A Taiwan newspaper noted that China’s relentless diplomatic isolation and economic absorption of Taiwan threaten to undermine Taiwan’s globalization.52 Taiwan’s forging of close economic and interpersonal interactions with the rest of the world, in spite of its political isolation, must be counted as a remarkable accomplishment. Certain conventional elements that constitute Taiwan as an economic powerhouse – the world’s seventeenth-largest economy, twenty-fifthhighest GNP per capita, third- largest foreign exchange reserves – reflect the importance of its inclusion in such keystone international economic organizations as the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, Taiwan is a major producer of semiconductors and other IT products and one of the largest foreign direct investors. Viewed from a functional competence perspective, international organizations in the globalization era – both new-age bodies operating on the basis of functional competence and reinvented conventional bodies that are now more receptive to a reconstructed and renegotiated concept of “sovereignty” – should find ways to include Taiwan, not only to fulfill the principle of universalism but also to enhance the effectiveness of global governance. Given Taiwan’s weight, it should play a key role in certain IGOs by virtue of the “special interests/chief importance” principle. Accordingly, Taiwan should reprioritize its IGO strategy to mesh with the imperatives of globalization. While membership in universal political IGOs (e.g. the United Nations) may have the appeal of bestowing collective recognition of the nation’s political aspirations, functional global imperatives suggest that Taiwan’s attention should be turned to those IGOs listed in Table 8.8 and those functional IGOs in which Taiwan’s importance cannot be easily dismissed. In these cases, the costs of isolating Taiwan are demonstrable. Inclusion might be achieved while instituting a moratorium over Taiwan’s sovereignty and by setting aside cross-Strait differences.

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 165

A sui generis model of IGO participation Given the diametrically opposed viewpoints of Taipei and Beijing over Taiwan’s status, deadlock continues. Due to its clout, the People’s Republic has been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with over 160 states (and getting them to use words like “take note of,” “understand,” “acknowledge,” “respect,” or “recognize” to express their varying degrees of concurrence with China’s view of Taiwan’s status – from passively refraining to active endorsement) and in ensuring most IGOs adhere to Beijing’s “one China” principle. However, the Republic of China, judging from its ability to maintain “substantive relations” with over 140 countries, is a de facto state. Beijing’s view that Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic and should be represented by Beijing is not universally shared. Each state and IGO weighs its own interests when deciding on the level and modality of interacting with Taiwan. Taiwan is thus a sui generis case in international law. A large majority of states do not accept that it is a normal state enjoying privileges of statehood such as diplomatic recognition and IGO membership. But these same states do not consider Taiwan a territory or dependency under PRC control. Although they refrain from challenging China’s claim of sovereignty, they have developed pragmatic ways for doing business with Taiwan by virtue of the government’s actual control of Taiwan and its importance in the world economy. This unique status has been gradually acknowledged. The CIA’s authoritative World Factbook recognizes 268 “separate geographic entities,” of which 192 are “independent states” and 63 are “dependencies and areas of special sovereignty.” Taiwan is the only entity in a category called “other.”53 This publication considers Taiwan neither an independent state nor a territory or dependency; it sees Taiwan as a sui generis entity, which conventional international legal concepts fail to capture. This is a realistic reading of the actual situation and holds potential for constructing a feasible model for Taiwan’s participation in IGOs. All parties bear the high cost of Taiwan’s international isolation – Taiwan because of its prolonged exclusion and humiliation, China because of the energy and expense it spends on blocking Taiwan (which also causes the Taiwan people’s backlash against China’s unification overture), and the international community because of its inability to devise a way to accept Taiwan and benefit from its contribution. The main cause of this inferior outcome is Beijing’s notion of sovereignty, which is at odds with the norms and the needs of the era of globalization. China treats humanitarian intervention as at odds with its stance of noninterference in internal affairs. On Taiwan’s participation in IGOs, China again places its concern (real or imagined) for sovereignty and territorial

166 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang integrity above the needs of Taiwan’s people and the benefits that the international community can derive from such a player. However, by differentiating the various parties’ “first principles” and ranking their preferences, this game (Taiwan’s IGO participation) could be transformed into a win–win game. For the Republic of China, participation is preferable to exclusion. Furthermore, participation in a capacity with the full trappings of statehood (e.g. joining under the name “Republic of China” or another formula that indicates that Taiwan is not subordinated under China) is preferable to participation in a capacity that falls short of statehood and/or implies subordination to the People’s Republic (e.g. joining with names like “Chinese Taipei,” “Taipei, China,” etc.). For the People’s Republic, exclusion (of Taiwan) is better than (allowing its) participation. If (allowing) participation is inevitable, then imposing a name like “Chinese Taipei” or “Taipei, China” is better than allowing Taiwan to join as the “Republic of China” or “Taiwan.” For the international community, admitting Taiwan by a formula that is acceptable to both sides is better than excluding Taiwan, because the former option rewards the IGOs with both Taiwan’s contribution and China’s blessing, whereas the latter option gains only China’s satisfaction but not Taiwan’s participation. Allowing Taiwan to join in a sovereign capacity is the least preferred option since the cost of China’s fury exceeds the benefit of Taiwan’s contribution. The following is the rank order of each player’s preferences, where S = Taiwan joins as a sovereign state; O = Taiwan joins as an “other” (i.e. a sui generis capacity); E = Taiwan is excluded: For the ROC: S > O > E For the PRC: E > O > S For IGOs: O > E > S54 In other words, O is the second-best choice for both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic and the best choice for the IGOs. Neither the Republic of China nor the People’s Republic can get their best choice, since their respective first choices are zero-sum. Compromise and ingenuity are thus needed. It behooves all the major actors to find a way to include Taiwan while accommodating everybody’s core interests: security for Taiwan, sovereignty for China, and universality for the IGOs. Exactly what this “other” capacity is remains to be worked out and requires a mindset completely different from the kind that has brought hostile confrontations. The following elements can form the contours of a sui generis model for Taiwan’s membership in IGOs.

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 167 1 Decoupling the issues of Taiwan’s IGO membership and diplomatic recognition Under this principle, member states are not obligated to recognize Taiwan as a result of Taiwan’s entry into any IGO (although they are not prevented from doing so, either). They only judge whether Taiwan’s intrinsic value serves the organization’s interests. This condition can alleviate China’s fear that IGO membership for Taiwan may imply collective international recognition of Taiwan, and hence constitute a challenge to China’s sovereignty claim. Another advantage of this condition is to reduce the politics – hence, obstacles – involved in Taiwan’s IGO memberships. 2 Amending charters or constitutions of those IGOs that allegedly only admit sovereign states so that they can also admit a functionally competent entity (for a particular issue area) This institutional innovation is needed in light of the needs of globalization (both cooperation to attain joint benefits and coordination to avoid joint disasters) and the reality that a player like Taiwan, which is important in various areas and exercises effective control over 23 million inhabitants of an island that stands at the crossroads of international commerce and navigation, has no formal representation in most IGOs. By creating a new sui generis category, IGOs are finding ways to include Taiwan in their work. The key is that the People’s Republic does not block the mutually beneficial innovation. The WTO model is illustrative. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao are all full members, because these “customs territories” exercise effective control over trade going in and out of their jurisdictions. Although Taiwan’s international status is contested, it is recognized by twenty-seven states. By contrast, no country recognizes either Hong Kong or Macao as an independent state; in fact, the CIA World Factbook groups both under the category of “dependencies and areas of special sovereignty,” rather than “independent states”. Taiwan’s status is more state-like than Hong Kong’s or Macao’s. Following this logic, Taiwan should be admitted into those IGOs in which Hong Kong or/and Macao enjoy full memberships but Taiwan does not, or those for which Taiwan can make a good case because of its importance – the World Customs Organization (WCO),55 World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Hydrographic Organization (IHO); or those in which Hong Kong and Macao have associate memberships, such as the World Tourism Organization (WTO), International Maritime Organization (IMO),56 and Interpol (sub-bureau). Even Puerto Rico and Tokelau, neither independent states, have associate memberships in the WHO, and the Vatican has membership in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and observerships

168 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang in the WHO, the United Nations, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).57 It is therefore reasonable to include Taiwan in these bodies; membership is “commensurate” with Taiwan’s status. That so many IGOs have found ways to include non-sovereign entities in global governance strengthens the case for Taiwan to participate in a sui generis capacity. This can take the form of adding a new clause in each IGO’s membership criteria to include “entities that possess functional competence in _________.” Hence, Taiwan can be admitted as a “fishing entity,” “public health authority,” “tourism operator,” “criminal-investigation authorities,” “currency board,” “development fund subscriber,” etc. 3 Stating on Taiwan’s accession documents that admission into a given IGO does not have any impact on that body’s position on China representation or imply sovereignty for Taiwan This formula can assuage China’s concerns and preserves the IGOs’ oneChina posture. It may be hard for Taiwan to swallow, but China’s rejectionism has been the biggest obstacle for Taiwan’s IGO participation. Given the improbability of a fundamental change in the mindset of China’s leaders, Taiwan’s IGO membership proposal should include this homage to China’s formula. Case studies on those IGOs in which both China and Taiwan are members, such as the WTO, ADB (Asian Development Bank), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), offer lessons (or necessary conditions) for Taiwan’s success in preserving/gaining memberships: 1

2

3

Taiwan joined the body before China did and this body had no clause for expelling a member in good standing (ADB) or China was not yet a member in the body and hence could not oust Taiwan (WTO). Taiwan was an important player and other major players were determined to bring it in (e.g. US attitudes for Taiwan’s APEC and WTO memberships). Some limitations were placed upon Taiwan’s participation, such as name (all three) or which officials could participate (APEC), in exchange for China’s acquiescence (all three).

The WTO model could further interest China, for it offered the allure of “one country, four seats.” 4 Stipulating that Taiwan will automatically lose membership if it declares independence after its entry into the IGOs This is a “safeguard” for China that Taiwan’s entry into IGOs is not a prelude to gaining formal legal independence. Because Taipei has championed its IGO participation on the principles of universality and globalization,

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 169 and China has opposed Taiwan’s IGO participation on the ground of sovereignty, this condition has the potential to satisfy both sides. It could produce incentives for Taipei and Beijing to start a dialogue regarding their relationship and the issue of Taiwan’s international participation. It also could create an environment for Taipei and Beijing to continue interacting with each other and thus to realize the benefits of cooperation, rather than confrontation. The benefits of a sui generis model Everyone benefits if China accepts this sui generis way to include Taiwan in IGOs. Development trends of IGOs and practices of the People’s Republic show that international actors are capable of learning58 and that the kind of international order they will live in is what they make of it. Past practices by Beijing and Taipei have resulted in a debilitating deadlock. Most other major powers and international society in general look the other way and pretend the problem does not exist. But Taiwan is not going to fade away and the problem is unlikely to resolve itself. Other players can help. First, they should involve China more in the work of IGOs and encourage it to play a constructive role in global governance. Through this process, China may feel more secure about its place in the international community and learn to negotiate its world view with changing trends in international norms and customs. Second, they should politely but firmly tell Beijing that an all-out isolation of Taiwan does not serve its own stated objective of peaceful unification with Taiwan by winning over the hearts of the Taiwan people. On the contrary, it stokes Taiwan nationalism. They should also make clear to Beijing that the international community stands to gain from Taiwan’s participation, as long as the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can reach an agreement on how this may come about. Third, they should tell Taiwan that while they may be sympathetic to its arguments for universality and the need to have international space, they are not prepared to endorse any ulterior diplomatic motives behind Taipei’s campaign to join IGOs. They should also advise Taipei against a confrontational approach or exercise in futility. Fourth, the international community should encourage cross-Strait dialogue and discourage unilateral provocative acts by either party. This is too important to let either Beijing or Taipei alone decide the course of action. The two should be urged to consider the interests of the international community. Conflicts in the Taiwan Strait will hurt the international community, whereas cross-Strait reconciliation will benefit it. These policy recommendations derive from the functional-competence model elaborated earlier. The shift of discourse from traditional sovereign state-centricity to globalization-era functional competence opens a new possibility for tackling a tough international problem.

170 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang

Notes * An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the International Conference, “China’s Rise and Taiwan’s Dilemmas,” Osaka, Japan, July 26–28, 2003. The author thanks the participants at that conference, John Outland of the University of Richmond, and Dennis Hickey of the Southwest Missouri State University for their helpful comments. 1 See, inter alia, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996); Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott, “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94 (July 2000), pp. 453–477; Christopher J. Carolan, “The ‘Republic of Taiwan’: A Legal-Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (May 2001), pp. 429–467. 2 Throughout this paper, the term “Taiwan” is used interchangeably with “the Republic of China (ROC),” which controls Taiwan, Penhu, Kinmen, and Matsu, with its capital in Taipei. 3 Government Information Office, The Republic of China Yearbook Taiwan 2002 (Taipei: GIO, 2002), p. 126. 4 Throughout this paper, the term “China” is used interchangeably with “the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which controls the Chinese mainland with its capital in Beijing (Peking). 5 Taiwan Affairs and Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993), reprinted in Henckaerts, The International Status of Taiwan, pp. 275, 276. 6 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), December 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, Article 1. For two accounts testing Taiwan’s statehood against the Montevideo Convention, see Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations: History, Issues, and Approaches,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 10 (October 1994), pp. 118–121; and Carolan, “The ‘Republic of Taiwan,’” pp. 450– 458. 7 Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, MS: Ashgate, 1998), p. 4. 8 Pegg, International Society, p. 5. 9 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 4. 10 Krasner mentions two additional ways that the term “sovereignty” has been used. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity. Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. Krasner warns “Various kinds of sovereignty do not necessarily covary,” Sovereignty, pp. 3–4. 11 Gary D. Rawnsley’s Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (New York: St. Martin’s 2000) is an excellent study on how a diplomatically isolated state endeavors to promote itself in the international community. 12 Both quotes are from Christopher L. Blakesley, Edwin B. Firmage, Richard F. Scott, and Sharon A. Williams, The International Legal System (New York: Foundation Press, 5th ed., 2001), p. 105. 13 The 1991 Guidelines for National Unification (GNU) calls for a three-stage approach to unification, declaring that “both the mainland and Taiwan are

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 171

14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21

22

23 24

25 26

27 28 29

Chinese territories,” and that to achieve the short-term goals of promoting exchanges and mutual benefits, neither side should “deny that the other side is a political entity.” It is reasonable to deduce that the GNU envisages a “one state, two political entities” or “one state, two governments” formula. The issue is thus one of recognition of government (i.e., two governments within the same Chinese state), rather than recognition of a state (i.e., a Taiwanese state that administers Taiwan and a Chinese state that administers the mainland). For the text of GNU, see http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolocy/gnu.htm Democratic Progressive Party Basic Program (in Chinese), available at http:// newcongress.yam.org.tw/dpp/programme.html “Taiwan’s President Sparks Debate on New Constitution,” Financial Times, September 30, 2003, p. 3; “Taiwan President Seeks to Clarify Plan for Constitution,” Financial Times, October 1, 2003, p. 3; Kathrin Hille, “Taipei to Push for New Constitution,” Financial Times, November 12, 2003, p. 10. Lee Teng-hui, “‘Rectifying’ Taiwan’s Name,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 16, 2003, p. 29. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention). For more discussions, see David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), pp. 54–55. Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 187. Ibid., pp. 93, 22. Yearbook of International Organizations, 1999/2000 ed. (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 2000), at http://www.uia.org/statistics/ organizations/ytb299.php. For a description (year of founding, aim, members) of some of the most important IGOs, see US Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of the Nations, 21st edition: A Brief Guide to the Economy, Government, Land, Demographics, Communications, Transportation Systems, and National Defense Establishment of Each of 267 Entities of the World (Detroit: Gale Group Thomson Learning, 2001), pp. 575–609. As of April 4, 2003, the WTO has 146 members, 30 observer governments, and 7 international organizations observers to General Council. Armenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joined after Taiwan. See WTO, “Members and Observers,” at http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, p. 183; WTO website, “Members and Observers.” See Chapter V (Article 10-23) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, in Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting: Selected Documents (St. Paul, MN: West, 1993), pp. 175–177; and “Governance” on the WHO website at http://www.who.int/m/topicgroups/ governance/en/index.html See “Allowing Taiwan to Participate in the World Health Organization as a ‘Public Health Entity’” (n.d.), courtesy of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States. The full name is the Sovereign Military Order of the Knights of Malta. For a brief account of the Order’s origin and evolution, see Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (New York: Macmillan, 5th ed., 1986), pp. 66–67. See Multilateral High Level Conferences on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific website at http://www.ffa.int/multilat.html. “Allowing Taiwan,” pp. 3–4. Monique Chu, “No Place for Taiwan on WHO Agenda,” Taipei Times Online,

172 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang May 14, 2002, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/05/14/story/0000135933 30 Beijing’s principled stance against Taiwan membership in UN-affiliated special agencies is exemplified by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue’s response: WHO membership is open only to sovereign states; as a province of China, Taiwan is thus ineligible whatsoever to join that organization (genben meiyou zige canjia gai zuzhi). See “Chinese Communists Protest to the U.S.,” China Times Online, April 9, 2002, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/ newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110502+11200240900 31 Donald G. McNeil, “SARS Furor Heightens Taiwan–China Rift,” New York Times, 19 May 2003, p. 8; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Here’s How a Tiny Virus Can Help Improve Cross-Strait Ties,” Straits Times, May 17, 2003. 32 Melody Chen, Wang Ping-yu, and Brian Hsu, “WHO Shoots Down Assembly Entry Bid,” Taipei Times, May 20, 2003, p. 1; Editorial, “Shutting Out Taiwan,” Washington Post, May 20, 2003, p. A18. 33 Krasner, Sovereignty. 34 49.4 percent of the respondents say that participation is more important, and 20.3 percent think ensuring proper designation is more important. The survey was conducted over April 15–18, 2002, based on a sample of 1090. At 95 percent confidence level, the margins of error were ± 2.97 percent. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The First Opinion Poll, 2002,” Powerpoint presentation slide 13, 9 May 2002. To access this, go to the Chinese website (http://www.mofa. gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?ct Node=132&CtUnit=113&BaseDSD=7), click on “2002 Public Opinion Polls” and launch Powerpoint. 35 Mainland Affairs Council, “If Developing Foreign Ties Led to Rising Tension on Cross-Strait Relations, Would You Agree with Such an Effort?” available online at http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9205/9205e_4gif 36 The Republic of China was a founding member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966. In accepting China’s entry (and its conditions for entry) in 1986, the ADB changed Taiwan’s designation to “Taipei, China” – a format similar to “Hong Kong, China” now that the former British colony has become a special administrative region of the Peoples’ Republic. Taiwan protested ADB’s unilateral change every year, but stayed in the organization. See the ADB website at http://www.adb.org/About/members.asp 37 See the Guidelines for National Unification (GNU); John J. Metzler, Divided Dynamism: The Diplomacy Of Separated Nations: Germany, Korea, China (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, rev. ed., 2001); Yung Wei, “Recognition of Divided States: Implication and Application of Concepts of ‘Multi-System Nations,’ ‘Political Entities,’ and ‘Intra-National Commonwealth,’” The International Lawyer (Fall 2000), pp. 997–1011. 38 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (New York: Macmillan, 6th rev. ed., 1992), p. 60. 39 Democratic Progressive Party Basic Program (in Chinese), available at http:// newcongress.yam.org.tw/dpp/programme.htm 40 Robert S. Jordan, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach to the Management of Cooperation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 4th ed., 2001), p. 1. 41 Ibid., p. 9. 42 There are different counts on Taiwan’s IGO participation. For example, the CIA World Factbook entry on Taiwan inlcudes nine, as listed in the notes to Table 8.4. But some of these are INGOs; see http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html. Another source, A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, which credits the CIA World Factbook as the source, lists six, but does not enumerate them; see the “International Organization Data” (in pdf format) at http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?site=1&a=5&b=4&c=1&d =43

Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 173 43 Jordan, International Organizations, p. 6. 44 Currently the quotas of the G-7 countries are as follows: the United States (17.49 percent), Japan (6.27 percent), Germany (5.12 percent), France (5.06 percent), the United Kingdom (5.06 percent), Italy (3.32 percent), and Canada (3.00 percent), for a total of 46.32 percent. For a current breakdown of IMF members’ quotas and voting power, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/ members.htm 45 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, newly updated and expanded ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), pp. 212–247. 46 Ibid.; these categories are modified from Friedman’s nine rhetorical section headings. 47 Friedman, Lexus, p. 260; Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “Developing the Information Industry in Taiwan: Entrepreneurial State, Guerrilla Capitalists, and Accommodative Technologists,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Winter 1995/ 96), p. 560. 48 Craig Addison, “A ‘Silicon Shield’ Protects Taiwan from China,” International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2000, p. 6. 49 “Globalization’s Last Hurrah?” Foreign Policy (January/February 2002), pp. 38–51; “Measuring Globalization: Who’s Up, Who’s Down?” Foreign Policy (January/February 2003), pp. 60–72. For data used to calculate the index, visit A.T. Kearney’s website (http://www.atkearney.com/), locate “Latest Thoughts … Our Ideas and Insights,” and click and download each of the 13 indicators on that page (in pdf format). 50 See the 2001, 2002, 2003 Globalization Index at http://www.atkearney.com/ shared_res/pdf/Rankings_2003_S.pdf 51 “Measuring Globalization,” p. 65. 52 “Beijing Hampers Our Globalization,” by the Liberty Times editorial, Taipei Times, January 19, 2003, p. 8. 53 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2001, available at http:// www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 54 No attempts have been made to theorize on the intensity or distance between these ordinal numbers; that is, I am mainly interested in showing that the best outcome is better than the second best, rather than how much better. 55 Kaohsiung, Taiwan, is the world’s fifth largest container port. 56 Taiwan’s Evergreen is the world’s largest commercial liner. 57 All membership information is from the CIA World Factbook. 58 For a representative treatise of the constructionist theory of international relations, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

9

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership T.Y. Wang*

The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan suffered another diplomatic setback in 2003 when its bid for UN membership was rejected by the world body for the eleventh time.1 Launched in 1993, Taipei’s campaign to return to the United Nations has been ignored except by a few diplomatic allies. Despite the expected setbacks, largely due to Beijing’s isolation of Taiwan internationally, Taipei officials have vowed to continue trying to expand the island country’s “international space.”2 This chapter explores the causes and consequences of Taipei’s persistence in its bid for UN membership.

Changing realities and the “one China” principle When Chiang Kai-shek and, later, his son Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled an authoritarian Taiwan, the principle of “one China” was taken for granted. The issue at stake was not whether there was only one China, but whether the Chiangs could claim to be the sole legitimate rulers of the country. As a result, they adamantly rejected any possibility of coexistence of both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. As one of the founding members of the United Nations, the Republic of China, with support from America and other countries, successfully blocked Beijing’s attempts to take Taipei’s seat in the world body for over two decades. Support for Beijing’s admission to the United Nations mounted in the late 1960s. By 1971, the UN Twenty-Sixth General Assembly had rejected Washington’s motion that the issue of Chinese representation was “an important question” which would have required a two-thirds supermajority vote of the member states.3 Nonetheless, the Chiang regime, as described by Bruce Jacobs (see chapter 5), steadfastly opposed the “dual representation” proposal sponsored by the United States, in which the People’s Republic would hold China’s seat on the Security Council and Taiwan would be an ordinary member of the United Nations.4 Rather than suffering the consequence of its opposition to dual representation, the humiliation of expulsion, Taipei withdrew from the United Nations. With a simple majority, the General Assembly then approved Resolution 2758, which

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 175 recognized the Beijing government as “the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” The Resolution also expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations affiliated to it.”5 The loss of UN membership for the Republic of China on Taiwan symbolized the People’s Republic’s decisive victory in cross-Strait competition for international legitimacy. Insisting that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, Beijing leaders maintain that the island of Taiwan has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries or to participate in any international organizations requiring statehood as a condition of membership. Over the years, the growing importance of the People’s Republic in international affairs has led many countries to break relations with the Republic of China as a necessary condition for establishing formal ties with the People’s Republic. By 1988, the year Lee Tenghui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as ROC president, only twenty-two countries officially recognized Taipei.6 With the exception of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and South Korea, most were insignificant international players.7 At the same time, Taipei’s official membership in international organizations dwindled to only eight. The “one China principle,” Beijing’s claim that Taipei was a local government of China, threatened the island’s continuing existence as an independent and sovereign state, as Chao and Hsu have described (see chapter 3). A change in Taiwan’s foreign policy strategy was called for. Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation coincided with a period of rapid economic and political change. Between 1970 and 1990, Taiwan’s economy underwent significant structural change. Its gross domestic product grew at about 9 percent per year and the island became the fifteenth largest trading nation. As one of the largest economies in the world, Taiwan has ranked among the top holders of foreign exchange reserves. Its economic success has propelled it firmly into the ranks of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).8 The island country’s lack of international standing did not match its status as a world-class economy. Frustrated by Beijing’s imposed isolation, Taiwan’s citizens demanded that their democratic government seek ways to re-join the international community.9 Meanwhile, the political reforms set into motion by President Chiang Ching-kuo in the mid-1980s had made ideas previously banned and suppressed during the years of authoritarian rule into constitutional rights protected by law. After Lee Teng-hui became the first native-born president in 1988, many exiled advocates of Taiwanese independence were allowed to return safely. Foreign policy was no longer a domain dictated by the few in the ruling Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The strongest competitor to the KMT was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which tapped into the island residents’ frustration over Taiwan’s lack of international status. Leaders of the DPP called for pursuing UN membership10 and openly pushed for Taiwan independence, including the dropping of all

176 T.Y. Wang claims to territory across the Taiwan Strait and declaring the island an independent country. Consequently, a DPP government would apply for UN membership in the name of “Taiwan,” as a new state. The DPP’s call for UN membership received increasing support from island residents. As the country transformed itself into a democracy, the ruling KMT under President Lee’s leadership had to respond to the demands of its citizens in order to take the UN issue away from the DPP or run the risk of becoming irrelevant in the political debate over Taiwan’s identity and future. Employing a “pragmatic diplomacy” (wu-shi wai-jiao), the Taipei government in the early 1990s challenged the one-China policy as it had previously been understood. In an attempt to alter the “one-China principle,” that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of that China run by the Communists in Beijing, the essence of “pragmatic diplomacy” was to seek a new framework in which the island could be treated as distinct and separate from the People’s Republic. In addition to enhancing formal and/or substantive ties with other countries, active participation in international organizations and activities, including the United Nations, became important parts of this foreign policy.11 After Chen Shui-bian’s swearing in as ROC president in 2000, joining the United Nations became an essential component of the DPP’s strategy of advancing its claim that Taiwan is an independent and separate country in the world community.

Taipei’s strategies Table 9.1 lists the key aspects of Taipei’s applications for membership in the world body since 1993. From 1993 to 1999, when the ROC government was under KMT rule, the country’s UN campaign was characterized by a “parallel representation” model. After political power was transferred to the DPP in 2000, Taipei’s drive for UN membership sought to join the world body as a new state. The divergent approaches reflect differences between the KMT and the DPP. Table 9.1 Taiwan’s bids for UN membership Year Session Title

Name of application

Model of application

1993 48

Consideration of the exceptional situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality and in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of divided countries at the UN

Republic of China in Taiwan

Parallel representation

1994 49

Consideration of the exceptional situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality and in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of divided countries at the UN

Republic of China in Taiwan

Parallel representation

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 177 Table 9.1 Continued Year Session Title

Name of application

Model of application

1995 50

Consideration of the exceptional situation of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality and in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of divided countries at the UN

Republic of China on Taiwan

Parallel representation

1996 51

Consideration of the exceptional situation of Republic of the inability, resulting from General Assembly China on resolution 2758 (XXVI), of the 21.3 million Taiwan people on Taiwan, Republic of China, to participate in the activities of the UN

Parallel representation

1997 52

Need to review General Assembly resolution Republic of 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 owing to the China on fundamental change in the international Taiwan situation and to the coexistence of two Governments across the Taiwan Strait

Parallel representation

1998 53

Need to review General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 owing to the fundamental change in the international situation and to the coexistence of two Governments across the Taiwan Strait

Republic of China on Taiwan

Parallel representation

1999 54

Need to examine the exceptional international Republic of situation pertaining to the Republic of China China on on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental Taiwan right of its twenty-two million people to participate in the work and activities of the UN is fully respected

Parallel representation

2000 55

Need to examine the exceptional international Republic of situation pertaining to the Republic of China China on on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental Taiwan right of its twenty-three million people to participate in the work and activities of the UN is fully respected

New state

2001 56

Need to examine the exceptional international Republic of situation pertaining to the Republic of China China on on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental Taiwan right of its twenty-three million people to participate in the work and activities of the UN is fully respected

New State

2002 57

Question of the Representation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the UN

Republic of China (Taiwan)

New state

2003 58

Question of the Representation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the UN

Republic of China (Taiwan)

New state

Source: Documents supplied by the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Illinois

178 T.Y. Wang Taipei’s UN bid under the KMT government A difficult task for the KMT government during President Lee’s leadership was to balance the party’s long-held position in favor of one China and the popular call for rejoining an international community where the People’s Republic was China. When Taipei decided to seek UN membership, several approaches were proposed. The question was whether Taipei should seek exclusive representation as China in the United Nations or join the United Nations as a new state.12 For many in the ruling KMT, the long-held notion of one China was sacred and inviolable, holding that the Taiwanese are Chinese and the island of Taiwan is an integral part of China. An eventual unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, as promulgated in the National Unification Guidelines (NUG),13 is regarded as both natural and inevitable. Joining the United Nations as a new state directly contradicts this line of reasoning. Many in the then-ruling KMT thus considered returning to the world body through reversing Resolution 2758 as the only acceptable approach. It would be based on the notion of one China and exclude any implication of Taiwan independence. Although Mao’s death led to a shift in China’s strategy towards Taiwan at the end of the 1970s, away from a reliance on “military liberation” and toward “peaceful initiatives,” Beijing leaders have refused to renounce the use of force against the island country. Beijing repeatedly warned that it would use military force should Taiwan declare itself independent. Because even the mere attempt at UN membership could be interpreted by Beijing as a backdoor bid for independence, Taipei needed to be cautious so that its UN campaign would not trigger a violent response by Beijing. The military exercises and missile tests by the PRC government soon after then President Lee’s “private visit” to the United States in June 1995 were meant to demonstrate that Chinese leaders are willing to use military force to prevent Taipei’s permanent separation from China. In response to these internal and external pressures, the Lee administration characterized China as a “divided country” and proposed that there should be two states within the framework of one China, a situation of parallel representation. As the Chinese mainland under Beijing’s rule was known as the People’s Republic of China, the island country should be recognized as the Republic of China on Taiwan. While this “one country, two equal political entities” or the “one divided China” framework promised an eventual unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, it sought international standing for the Republic of China on Taiwan.14 Lee therefore urged Beijing as well as the international community to “accept the reality that, within overall Chinese boundaries, there exist two political entities which exercise jurisdiction over two separate parts of China.”15 Table 9.2 lists the major justifications and immediate objectives of Taipei’s UN campaign from 1993 to 1999. Several major arguments were proffered. First, in order to escape from the limitations imposed by the “one-China principle”, Taipei redefined Taiwan’s identity in the world

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 179 Table 9.2 Justifications and objectives of Taipei’s UN campaign Year Session Justifications

Objective

1993 48

1 The ROC in Taiwan continued to exist as an independent political entity and was not annexed by the PRC 2 Resolution 2758 was over-simplistic and had adverse consequences for the ROC in Taiwan 3 The ROC in Taiwan is a dynamic and progressive member of the international community and a peace-loving country. 4 The recognition by the UN of the rights of the ROC in Taiwan would be consistent with the principles of universality and the equality of States before the law 5 [ROC’s UN membership] would promote the final reunification of the Chinese nation into a single legal and political entity

An ad hoc committee to be established by the UN to analyze comprehensively all aspects of the exceptional situation and make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly

1994 49

1 Resolution 2758 deprives 21 million people under the jurisdiction of the ROC in Taiwan of representation in the UN 2 The ROC in Taiwan is an independent political and legal entity with a democratic system of government and its own institutions, laws and security and defense arrangements; all these elements make it totally distinct from the PRC 3 There are precedents for parallel representation of divided countries [and they do] not impede the eventual unification of the parties involved 4 The recognition by the UN of the rights of the ROC in Taiwan would be consistent with the principles of universality and the equality of States before the law

An ad hoc committee to be established by the UN to analyze comprehensively all aspects of the exceptional situation and make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly

1995 50

1 Resolution 2758 deprives 21 million people under the jurisdiction of the ROC on Taiwan of representation in the UN 2 The ROC in Taiwan is an independent political and legal entity with a democratic system of government and its own institutions, laws and security and defense arrangements; all these elements make it totally distinct from the PRC 3 There are precedents for parallel representation of divided countries and they do not impede the eventual unification of the parties involved 4 The recognition by the UN of the rights of the ROC in Taiwan would be consistent with the principles of universality and the equality of States before the law

An ad hoc committee to be established by the UN to analyze comprehensively all aspects of the exceptional situation and make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly

1996 51

1 Resolution 2758 excluded the ROC on Taiwan from the UN 2 The infringement of the fundamental rights of the 21.3 million people under the jurisdiction of the ROC on Taiwan violates the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

An ad hoc committee to be established by the UN to analyze comprehensively all aspects of the exceptional situation and make appropriate

180 T.Y. Wang Table 9.2 Continued Year Session Justifications

Objective

3 The ROC on Taiwan has an elected recommendations to the government, a defined territory, and General Assembly population. All these elements distinguish the ROC on Taiwan from the PRC on the Chinese mainland 4 There are precedents for parallel representation of divided countries 5 Parallel representation will be beneficial to the peaceful resolution of the issue of the reunification of China 6 There are precedents for the General Assembly to review its own resolutions 1997 52

1 Two Governments have been coexisting within China for nearly half a century, which is unique in the international community 2 Resolution 2758 (XXVI), whereby the ROC on Taiwan was excluded from the UN, violates the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3 The ROC on Taiwan fully meets the requirements for UN membership, yet is excluded from the UN. This disadvantage, a highly unusual situation, should be redressed by the UN 4 Parallel participation in the UN by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would be conducive to regional security and world peace 5 Full participation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN is a vital issue affecting the integrity of the UN and its viability in the twenty-first century 6 The General Assembly’s review of its own resolutions is not without precedent 7 The General Assembly should re-examine the deficiencies of resolution 2758 (XXVI) in order to restore promptly to the 21.5 million people of the ROC on Taiwan the lawful right to participate in all activities within the UN system

To revoke the part of the decisions contained in its resolution 2758 (XXVI) excluding the ROC on Taiwan from the UN, and to restore to the people and the Government of the ROC on Taiwan all their lawful rights at the UN and in all the organizations related to it

1998 53

1 Since the division of China almost half a century ago, two Governments have ruled over the two parts of China 2 Resolution 2758 (XXVI) adopted by the General Assembly in 1971 violates the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3 The ROC meets all requirements for membership in the UN 4 The international situation has changed fundamentally in the past quarter century, as has the political orientation of the ROC 5 Parallel representation in the UN by the two sides of a divided nation poses no barrier to unification; indeed, it can be conducive not only to unification but also to regional security and world peace

To revoke the part of the decisions contained in its resolution 2758 (XXVI) excluding the ROC on Taiwan from the UN, and to restore to the people and the Government of the ROC on Taiwan all their lawful rights at the UN and in all the organizations related to it

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 181 Table 9.2 Continued Year Session Justifications

Objective

6 The General Assembly should address the unjust situation created by the adoption of resolution 2758 (XXVI) and restore to the people of the ROC their lawful right to participate in the UN and all of its activities 1999 54

1 Each side of the Taiwan Strait has been ruled by a distinct and separate Government since 1949 2 The General Assembly of the UN adopted Resolution 2758 (XXVI) in 1971 to confer UN membership upon the PRC. The Resolution, however, did not address the issue of representation in the UN for the people of the ROC on Taiwan 3 The ROC, a country with significant achievements, is a constructive and responsible member of the international community. 4 The ROC is a free and democratic country. The UN should consider with an open mind the appeal of its twenty-two million people for their own representation in the Organization 5 The participation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN poses no barrier to the future peaceful and democratic unification of a divided China; indeed, it can be conducive to regional peace and security 6 The UN General Assembly should act to ensure that the voice of the twenty-two million people on Taiwan is heard in the UN and its related organizations

A working group to be established by the UN with the mandate of examining thoroughly the exceptional international situation pertaining to the ROC on Taiwan and make appropriate recommendations for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the participation of the ROC in the UN

2000 55

1 The ROC is a democratic country and its democratically elected Government is the sole legitimate one that can actually represent the interests and wishes of the people of Taiwan in the UN 2 The exclusion of the Republic of China from the United Nations and its related agencies has created a major and serious obstacle for both the Government and the people of the Republic of China in their pursuit of normal participation in international organizations and activities 3 The ROC, a country with significant achievements, is a constructive and responsible member of the international community 4 The UN should take note of the recent conciliatory gestures of the ROC towards the PRC and play a facilitating role by providing a forum for their reconciliation and rapprochement 5 The participation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN poses no barrier to the future peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; indeed, it can be conducive to regional peace and security

A working group to be established by the UN with the mandate of examining thoroughly the exceptional international situation pertaining to the ROC on Taiwan and make appropriate recommendations for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the participation of the ROC in the UN

182 T.Y. Wang Table 9.2 Continued Year Session Justifications

Objective

6 The General Assembly should act to ensure that the voice of the 23 million people on Taiwan is heard in the UN and its related organizations 2001 56

1 The ROC is a democratic country and its democratically elected government is the sole legitimate one that can actually represent the interests and wishes of the people of Taiwan in the UN 2 The exclusion of the ROC from the UN and its related agencies has created a major and serious obstacle for both the Government and the people of the ROC in their pursuit of their fundamental right to participation in international organizations and activities 3 The ROC, a country with significant achievements, is a constructive and responsible member of the international community 4 The UN should take note of the recent conciliatory gestures of the ROC towards the PRC and play a facilitating role by providing a forum for their reconciliation and rapprochement 5 In the world of increasing globalization, the General Assembly should act to ensure that the voice of the 23 million people on Taiwan is heard in the UN and its related organizations

A working group to be established by the UN with the mandate of examining thoroughly the exceptional international situation pertaining to the ROC on Taiwan and make appropriate recommendations for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the participation of the ROC in the UN

2002 57

1 The ROC (Taiwan) is a free and peace-loving state, and its democratically elected Government is the sole legitimate one that can represent the interests and wishes of the people of Taiwan in the United Nations 2 Universality is a fundamental principle of the UN 3 General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) has not resolved the issues of the representation of Taiwan 4 The ROC (Taiwan) is a sovereign state and a constructive member of the international community 5 Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN constitutes discrimination against its people, depriving them of their fundamental human rights to benefit from and contribute to the work of the UN 6 The ROC on Taiwan is able and willing to carry out all UN Charter obligations 7 Taiwan’s participation in the UN will help maintain peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific 8 The representation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN will contribute to the common interests of all humankind

To recognize the right of the 23 million people of the ROC on Taiwan to representation in the UN system and to take appropriate measures to implement this resolution

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 183 Table 9.2 Continued Year Session Justifications

Objective

2003 58

To recognize the right of the 23 million people of the ROC on Taiwan to representation in the UN system and to take appropriate measures to implement this resolution

1 The ROC (Taiwan) is a free and peace-loving state, and its democratically elected Government is the sole legitimate one that can represent the interests and wishes of the people of Taiwan in the United Nations 2 Universality is one of the fundamental principles of the UN 3 General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) has not resolved the issues of the representation of Taiwan 4 The ROC (Taiwan) is a sovereign state and a constructive member of the international community 5 Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN constitutes discrimination against its people, depriving them of their fundamental human rights to benefit from and contribute to the work of the UN 6 Taiwan has carried out all UN Charter obligations, and will continue to do so 7 Taiwan’s participation in the UN will help maintain peace, prosperity and stability in Asia and the Pacific 8 The representation of the ROC on Taiwan in the UN will contribute to the common interests of all humankind

Source: Documents supplied by the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Illinois.

community as an independent political entity separate from China. The major point of Beijing’s “one-China principle” is that the Republic of China has no longer existed since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Since Taiwan is a part of China, the island has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries or to participate in any international organizations. In contrast, Taipei insisted: The Republic of China (ROC), the first Republic established in 1912 in Asia, is an independent sovereign state. As a result of the Chinese civil war, however, the People’s Republic was founded on the Chinese mainland on Oct. 1, 1949, while the ROC continues to exist on its own territory – Taiwan and its adjacent islets. For almost half a century, the ROC and the People’s Republic have not been subject to each other’s rule. The People’s Republic’s claim that it represents all of China is obviously fictitious.16 Thus, Taipei sought ROC representation in the United Nations. Taipei also stressed that the Republic of China on Taiwan was a democratic country. The Lee administration made a moral appeal to the

184 T.Y. Wang international community, contrasting a democratic Taiwan to a communist China under authoritarian rule. To rebut Beijing’s claim that it is the sole legitimate government representing China, including Taiwan, Taipei has insisted that only the democratically elected government in Taiwan could actually represent the interests and wishes of the Taiwanese people in the United Nations. Taipei has also characterized its UN campaign as a human rights issue, arguing that Resolution 2758 was a product of ideological confrontation during the Cold War era, which negated the fundamental right of the people living on Taiwan to participate in international organizations and their activities. An abrogation of Taiwanese rights violates the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations in 1948. The UDHR declares that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration. . . . Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.”17 Citing the experiences of the former East and West Germany and North and South Korea, Taipei argued that these were international precedents for parallel representation. Most importantly, since Germany had reunified, these precedents were “sufficient proof that membership in the United Nations does not impede the unification of a nation, nor does it imply international endorsement for its permanent division.”18 Prior to 1997 the Lee administration had asked the United Nations to establish an ad hoc committee “to analyze comprehensively all aspects of the exceptional situation” and to “make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly.” Since 1997 Taipei has requested that Resolution 2758, which expelled the Taipei government, be amended to restore the “lawful rights” of the Republic of China on Taiwan and its people at the United Nations and other international organizations. This more forceful proposal, coming right after Beijing launched a series of provocative missile tests and live-fire military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait, demonstrated that China’s threats strengthened the determination of Taiwan to assert its separate identity. The Lee administration saw itself as pragmatic in its approaches to UN membership. Considering China’s weight in the world community, Taipei made it clear that it had no intention to engage in a zero-sum game with Beijing over legitimacy. Its campaign for UN membership was for a parallel representation for Taiwan’s “participation” in the world body and did not aim to challenge Beijing’s sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. Instead of asking the United Nations to reverse Resolution 2758, Taipei sought only to have the Resolution perfected to address representation for the Taiwanese people. In sum, Taipei’s bid for UN membership during the period of 1993–1999 was primarily based on the parallel representation model within the framework of “one divided China.” Instead of joining the world body as a new state, this approach aimed to pursue “dual recognition” in the international community.

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 185 Taipei’s UN bid under the DPP government After Chen Shui-bian was elected president in March 2000, his DPP government continued Taipei’s attempt at UN membership. But it rejected the KMT government’s “one divided China” formula, which promised an eventual unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland.19 The DPP government took a different direction.20 The DPP has long upheld a “one China, one Taiwan” principle.21 It finds that “Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state. It does not belong to the People’s Republic of China and it has no sovereign power over the Chinese mainland.”22 Considering Beijing’s powerful influence in the United Nations, reversing Resolution 2758 in any way is considered impossible. But the DPP believed that the KMT’s “parallel representation” model erred in not conceptually separating Taiwan from China, trapping Taiwan into a straitjacket of one China, which would reinforce Beijing’s claim that the island is a part of China.23 Thus, the DPP preferred to join the United Nations as a new state.24 Yet, as Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show, the wording of the key justifications presented by the DPP government in 2000 and 2001 was similar to the KMT’s. This may be because the Chen administration had not yet developed a coherent strategy in its UN campaign or because it wished to ease domestic and foreign concerns that Chen might provoke China by supporting Taiwan independence.25 In its first two years, the Chen administration asked the United Nations to establish a working group to examine the exceptional international situation of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Notably missing were appeals for parallel representation and the idea of Taiwan’s eventual unification with the Chinese mainland. The Chen administration’s goal of joining the United Nations as a new state was clearly laid out in its 2002 and 2003 UN campaigns.26 Consistent with the language of the UN Charter that “membership in the United Nations is open to all . . . peace-loving states,”27 Taipei declared that “The Republic of China (Taiwan) is a free and peace-loving state.” For the first time, Taipei designated itself “the Republic of China (Taiwan),” treating “Taiwan” as a synonym for “the ROC.”28 Taipei explained that “Taiwan is not, and has never been, a local government or province of the People’s Republic of China,” the notion behind Chen’s characterization of crossStrait relations as “one country on each side” (yi-bian yi-guo) of the Taiwan Strait.29 Instead of seeking Taiwan’s “participation” in the world body, the DPP sought “representation” in the United Nations. Rather than requesting an ad hoc committee to study the island country’s application, Taipei in 2002 and 2003 asked the General Assembly to take appropriate measures to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s “representation in the United Nations system.”

Beijing’s response Meeting the criteria of statehood as defined by the Montevideo Convention, Taipei would have acquired UN membership many years ago without

186 T.Y. Wang Beijing’s determined opposition.30 As a universal organization the United Nations is intended to be open to all states. This universalism is stipulated in Section 1 of Article 4 of the UN Charter that “membership in the United Nations is open to all . . . peace-loving states” willing to accept and carry out obligations listed in the Charter. Section C of Article 55 calls on the United Nations to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” based on “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” The observance of these principles rests on power politics. Article 4 of the UN Charter stipulates that “The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” This means that Taipei’s campaign for UN membership as a new state is doomed to defeat since new membership requires the recommendation of the Security Council in the manner of an “important question.” Beijing, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, will certainly exercise its veto power over Taipei’s application.31 Also, even if Taipei’s application were placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for consideration, it would require the support of two-thirds of the UN voting member states.32 Considering that Taipei has diplomatic ties with fewer than thirty countries, Taipei’s bid for UN membership as a new state is not likely to be approved. The KMT’s tactic of calling for a reversal of portions of Resolution 2758 encountered the same difficulty. Requests were submitted to the Steering Committee on Taiwan’s behalf by governments with diplomatic ties with Taipei. Only with the Committee’s approval can such an application be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. Given how few governments are willing to upset Beijing, Taipei’s call for reversing portions of Resolution 2758 cannot succeed. Even if Taiwan’s request had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, Taipei would have needed at least half of the voting member states’ support to reverse the portion of Resolution 2758. If Taipei’s requests had been deemed “important questions” by the General Assembly upon a majority vote, Taipei would then have needed the support of two-thirds of the voting member states. Taipei’s tactic of asking the United Nations to create an ad hoc committee has similar practical difficulties. Ad hoc committees are formed either by the President of the General Assembly or by the UN Secretary General. Under “courtesy to the permanent members,” Beijing would be given an opportunity to appoint a representative on the committee. Because ad hoc committees normally work on the basis of consensus, Taipei’s failure is inevitable, considering China’s powerful influence.33 The obstacles to Taipei’s bid for UN membership appear to be two practically related but conceptually separable factors: Beijing’s objection and the lack of support from other UN members. Given Beijing’s long-standing “one-China” policy, the new Chinese leaders are not going to change China’s position on the status of Taiwan. However, if Taipei can win enough support to amend

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 187 Resolution 2758, its campaign for membership of the world body would have a chance to succeed despite Beijing’s objection. The key to the ROC’s UN drive, thus, will be to garner international support, which is no easy matter.

A long-term strategy Observers have suggested that joining UN specialized agencies would be a time-consuming yet feasible long-term strategy.34 This “backdoor” strategy is based on the reality that the General Assembly is like a legislature and operates very much like any legislature, through log-rolling and alliances. In order to find a winning coalition that is large enough to amend Resolution 2758, Taipei needs to find a way to accustom UN members by working with them and to demonstrate Taiwan’s contributions to the world community. The UN specialized agencies might provide such opportunities. Non-membership in the General Assembly is not necessarily an insuperable obstacle to Taipei’s participation in UN specialized agencies. Although the United Nations stands at the core of a network of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), each IGO controls the conditions of its own membership. The World Health Organization (WHO) requires that members be “states,” that is, affiliated with the United Nations,35 but it allows new applications to be approved by a simple majority vote of the Health Assembly if the applying countries are not UN members.36 Both the IMF37 and the World Bank38 offer membership to “countries” and do not require that they be member states of the United Nations. Switzerland was affiliated with both long before it became a UN member in 2002. The Republic of China maintained its membership in both the IMF and the World Bank for nine years after withdrawing from the United Nations in 1971. Taipei’s campaign for IGO membership therefore does not need to face an automatic Chinese veto. Its successful campaign for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO, formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) is an example. Through UN specialized agencies, Taiwan’s increasing interactions with other member states can accustom them to see the island country as a separate and independent political entity making positive contributions to the world community. World opinion would then hopefully change and Taipei could acquire a coalition large enough to amend Resolution 2758. There are also inherent benefits from joining specialized agencies. Valuable information and contacts are exchanged in the specialized IGOs. The recent episode of combating severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan is a good example. Because the Republic of China is not a member of the WHO, the Taipei government was not able to acquire valuable information and assistance from the world’s leading health organization in a timely manner, a matter described by Dennis Hickey (see chapter 4). This lack of WHO aid facilitated the rapid spread of the disease on the island and Taiwan was listed on WHO’s travel advisory list for more than a month.39 Also, if the Republic of China successfully acquires membership in many

188 T.Y. Wang IGOs, its separate international personality will be further demonstrated. Therefore, the Taipei government, both the former KMT and the incumbent DPP, has been pursuing a long-term strategy of working through specialized IGOs to establish the Republic of China’s presence in the international community, as described by Chen Jie (see chapter 6).

Implications for cross-Strait relations Taiwan-centered national identity is increasingly dominant on the island. A majority of the population sees Taiwan as an independent and separate political entity.40 Taipei’s drive for membership in the United Nations and other IGOs reflects its citizens’ desire for dignified international standing. As the Republic of China has become a full-fledged democracy, any political leader on the island must pursue policies that will heed the popular will. While Taiwan’s UN campaign has easily been stymied by China, Taipei officials, finding that it took more than two decades for the People’s Republic to unseat the Republic of China in the United Nations, argue that Taipei must similarly be patient in its campaign to rejoin. Taipei’s annual bid for UN membership triggers international debate on the status of the island. As one Taipei official noted, “Since the ROC’s withdrawal from the United Nations, there has been little debate over the status of Taiwan within the international community . . . and the attempt to re-enter the United Nations is meant to stress that here we are striving for recognition.”41 Emphasizing the positive contributions that Taiwan has made through such international organizations as the WTO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Taipei intends to communicate to other nations that Taiwan’s exclusion from the international community is unfair to Taiwan and harmful to the international community.42 The annual discussion in the Steering Committee of the General Assembly about Taiwan’s representation has provided a public forum for Taipei to publicize its claims that the Republic of China is a separate political entity and deserves to participate in the world community. Because the discussion has been so extensive,43 the PRC representative in 2002 pressured the committee chair to impose a two-minute limit on each member state.44 Nonetheless, it still took the Committee nearly three hours for the discussion by eighty-six nations.45 Taipei thereby engages Beijing in a public debate about Taiwan’s representation. Beijing’s success in isolating Taiwan internationally, as described by Chao and Hsu (see chapter 3), has become a source of irritation for the 23 million island citizens. Popular outrage was visibly demonstrated in reactions to Taipei’s seventh failed bid for WHO observer status and to Beijing’s attempt to downgrade the island’s WTO representation.46 The ruling DPP discussed an island-wide referendum for participating in the WHO, a matter that has received widespread domestic support.47 Beijing’s continuing hostility provided President Chen with political capital to mobilize support for his successful 2004 presidential re-election.

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 189 Chinese leaders declare that they want to win “the hearts of the Taiwanese people.”48 One Chinese leader reformulated “one China” to mean that: “there is only one China in the world and both Taiwan and the mainland are a part of China,”49 implying that Beijing and Taipei are equal. But Chinese leaders’ continuing efforts at isolating Taiwan internationally do not match the more flexible words from Beijing. Few people on Taiwan support Beijing’s “one country, two systems” unification proposal of reducing Taiwan to the status of Hong Kong, finding the proposal an attempt to absorb Taiwan. When Taipei launched its UN campaign a decade ago, it merely aimed to “participate” in the world body under the framework of “one divided China” with no intention to challenge the legitimacy of the PRC. Given Taipei’s flexibility in form and legality for its participation in the United Nations, Beijing may have missed an opportunity to further its goal of unification. Had Chinese leaders offered Taiwan an arrangement giving it a subordinate role in the United Nations within a framework of one China, they might have put Taipei in a very awkward position. If Taipei accepted, it would become part of a China in which Beijing held superior status. If Taiwan had refused the offer, its UN campaign would have been jeopardized because Beijing would appear accommodating while Taipei would have seemed rejectionist and rigid.50 Since the United States and the international community wish to see peaceful cross-Strait interactions continue, the one seen as rigid can be portrayed as the “trouble-maker.” Instead, Beijing’s rigidity hurt the feelings of the Taiwanese people. Policy changes are needed if Beijing leaders want to win “the hearts of the Taiwanese people” and achieve a peaceful unification with Taiwan. As a new generation of leaders has emerged in the mainland, some creative thinking of this sort deserves serious consideration if the new leadership is in fact committed to peace and unification.

Notes * This paper was delivered at the international conference, China’s Rise and Taiwan’s Dilemmas, Rihga Royal Hotel, Osaka, Japan, July 26–28, 2003. The author would like to thank Edward Friedman and Denis Thornton for their helpful comments. Acknowledgment is extended to Ms. Carol Su-chun Li of the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Illinois, for providing materials. 1 “UN bid fails again, more speak against,” Taipei Times, September 19, 2003, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 2 “UN entry for Taiwan far not ‘mission impossible’: Chen,” Taipei Times, July 8, 2002, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 3 Section 2 of Article 18 of the UN Charter stipulates that “Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting”; see UN Charter, at http:// www.un.org/aboutun/charter 4 See “Statement of His Excellency Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on His Government’s Withdrawal from the United

190 T.Y. Wang

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

21 22

Nations,” in China Yearbook: 1971–72 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., n.d.), pp. 801–804. “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” Resolution 2758, October 25, 1971, at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm At the end of 1960, forty-one countries had diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic, while the Republic of China had fifty-six allies around the world. Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South Africa switched their diplomatic recognitions from Taipei to Beijing in 1990, 1992, and 1997, respectively. T.Y. Wang, “State Policy and Industrial Promotion in Taiwan: an Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 1956–1994,” International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 23, No.10 (2000), pp. 1749–1776. Julian Baum, “Virtual Reality: Moves to Rejoin UN, Recognize Mongolia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 3, 1993, p. 15. DPP, Yi Taiwan Min-yi Jia-ru Lian-he-guo (Join the UN in the Name of Taiwan) (Taipei: the Central Headquarter of the DPP, 1994). For an analysis of Taiwan’s “pragmatic diplomacy,” see T.Y. Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-Hui Rule: 1988–2000,” American Asian Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 71–106. Li-fa-yuan Zi-liao-shi (Library and Information Service of Legislative Yuan), Chung-fan Lian-he-guo (Re-entrance to the United Nations), Chinese Legislative News Review Series, Vol. 46 (May 1994). See also Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? History, Issues, and Approaches,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No.10 (October 1994), pp. 108–131. For the content of NUG, see Cheng-pang Chang. “The Republic of China’s ‘Guideline for National Unification’,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1991), pp. 1–3 and Republic of China Yearbook, 1991–92, p. 140. Government Information Office (GIO), Looking Beneath the Surface of the “One China” Question (Taipei: The Executive Yuan, Taiwan, 1997). “ROC Terminates Hostilities towards Peking,” Free China Journal, May 2, 1991, p. 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, “The Participation of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the U.N.,” April 1994, at http://www.taipei.org/ press/gioun94.htm “Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the Provisional Agenda of the FiftySecond Session: Need to Review General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 Owing to the Fundamental Change in the International Situation and to the Coexistence of Two Governments across the Taiwan Strait,” 16 July 1997, at http://www.taipei.org/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, “Position Paper on the Participation of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the U.N.,” April 1993, at http://www.taipei.org/press/gioun93.htm GIO, Looking Beneath the Surface of the “One China” Question. Democratic Progressive Party, Min-zhu Jin-bu Dang Dang-zhang, Dang-gang (The Party Plank of the Democratic Progressive Party) (Taipei: the Democratic Progressive Party, 1995), p. 14. See also Democratic Progressive Party, “Taiwan Qian-tu Jue-yi-Wen (Resolution on Taiwan’s Future Status),” May 1999, supplied by the DPP. For a comparison of DPP and KMT China policies, see T.Y. Wang. “‘One China, One Taiwan’: An Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party’s China Policy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2000), pp. 159–182. Democratic Progressive Party, Min-zhu Jin-bu Dang Dang-zhang, Dang-gang (The Party Plank of the Democratic Progressive Party) (Taipei: Democratic Progressive Party, 1995), p. 14. See also Democratic Progressive Party, “Taiwan

Taiwan’s bid for UN membership 191

23 24

25

26

27 28 29

30 31 32

33 34

Qian-tu Jue-yi-Wen (Resolution on Taiwan’s Future Status)”, May 1999, supplied by the DPP. The Committee of the China Affairs, Taiwan Zu-chyuan shiun-da su (The Declaration of Taiwan’s Sovereignty) (Taipei: the National Headquarters of the Democratic Progressive Party, 1995). In 1999, the DPP National Congress passed “the Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” which recognizes “the Republic of China” as the official name of Taiwan. In October 2001, the DPP National Congress further determined that the 1999 Resolution is equal in status to the “Taiwan independence” clause in the party’s charter, downplaying any call for establishing “the Republic of Taiwan.” Immediately after the election, the Clinton administration expressed concerns about what Chen might say or do that could invoke a radical response on the part of Beijing. Raymond F. Burghardt, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and chief US representative in Taipei, visited Chen twice in four days after the election to impress on him the necessity of moderation. To further strengthen the message, Washington sent former congressman Lee H. Hamilton to Taiwan to remind the president-elect that the United States would not support him if he moved towards independence. See John Pomfret, “Taiwan Makes Goodwill Bows Toward China,” Washington Post, March 22, 2000, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ and Justin Brown, “America Sends Envoys to Calm China–Taiwan Rhetoric,” Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2000, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ “Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the FiftySeventh Session Question of the Representation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations,” August 8, 2002, at http://www.taipei.org/press/ gioun93.htm and “Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Fifty-Seventh Session Question of the Representation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations,” August 5, 2003, supplied by the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chicago, Illinois. Section 1 of Article 4 of the UN Charter. See comment by Parris Chang, who is a DPP law-maker specializing in DPP foreign policy: “Taiwan to Make Tenth Bid for UN Entry,” Taiwan News, August 14, 2002, at http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw Sandy Huang, “‘Pan Blue’ Camp Pans Chen’s Talk,” Taipei Times, August 5, 2002, at http://www.taipeitimes.com; “Chen’s Pro-independence Remarks, Dangerous Provocation,” People’s Daily Online, August 6, 2002, at http:// www.peopledaily.com.cn/; Craig S. Smith and Keith Bradsher, “China Issues New Warning to Taiwan, Just in English,” New York Times, August 8, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com See, for example, John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) and Wang, “How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations?” Section 3 of Article 27 stipulates that “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” Section 2 of Article 18 stipulates that “Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include:…the admission of new Members to the United Nations.” Harvey Feldman, Taiwan and the United Nations: Conflict between Domestic Policies and International Objectives (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1995). The following discussion is based on Feldman, Taiwan and the United Nations.

192 T.Y. Wang 35 Articles 3 and 4, respectively, of the WHO Constitution stipulates that “Membership in the Organization shall be open to all States” and that “Members of the United Nations may become Members of the Organization by signing or otherwise accepting this Constitution in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIX and in accordance with their constitutional processes.” See the Constitution of the World Health Organization, at http://policy.who.int/ 36 Article 6 of the WHO Constitution stipulates that “Subject to the conditions of any agreement between the United Nations and the Organization, approved pursuant to Chapter XVI, States which do not become Members in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 may apply to become Members and shall be admitted as Members when their application has been approved by a simple majority vote of the Health Assembly.” See the Constitution of the World Health Organization. 37 Section 2 of Article 2 of the Articles of Agreement stipulates that “Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors. These terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles consistent with those applied to other countries that are already members.” See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, at http://www.imf.org/ 38 Under the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), to become a member of the Bank a country must first join the IMF. See, IBRD Articles of Agreement, at http://web. worldbank.org/ 39 A travel advice was issued on Taiwan on May 8, which was lifted on June 17, 2003. See “Update 50 – WHO extends its SARS-related travel advice to Tianjin, Inner Mongolia and Taipei in China,” and “Update 82 – Change in travel recommendations for Taiwan,” on the WHO website at http://www.who.int 40 T.Y. Wang and I-chou Liu, “Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), pp. 568–590. 41 “Taiwan Makes its Point again with UN Bid,” Liberty Times, August 29, 2001, at http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/ 42 Interview with Ambassador Andrew L. Y. Hsia, August 29, 2003. Ambassador Hsia is Taipei’s point-man responsible for Taiwan’s UN campaign. 43 For instance, the Steering Committee spent 3 hours 16 minutes and 3 hours 20 minutes in 1999 and 2000, respectively, discussing the question of Taipei’s UN membership. See “ROC’s Latest UN Bid Rejected,” Taiwan Headlines and News Reports, September 8, 2000, at http://publish.gio.gov.tw and “ROC Membership of UN Rejected,” China Times, September 17, 1999, at http:// www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw 44 Shijie Ribao (The World Journal), September 13, 2002, p. A2. 45 Lin Fang-yan, “UN Bid Fails Despite Support from Allies,” September 20, 2002, at http://publish.gio.gov.tw/ 46 See, for example, Tung Chen-yuan, “China’s New Thinking Dies Early,” Taipei Times, May 28, 2003, and Lin Chieh-yu and Monique Chu, “Chen Vows Tough Fight on WTO Name,” Taipei Times, May 28, 2003; both are at http:// www.taipeitimes.com/ 47 “Bian: Tai-ru Shi-wei Jiu-bu Gong-tou (Bian: There Will be No Referendum if Taiwan Acquires WHO Membership),” The World Journal, August 19, 2003, at http://www.chineseworld.com 48 “Beidaihe Meeting: Placing Hope on ‘Taiwanese People’,” The World Journal, July 25, 2000, p. A2. 49 “Now, a Beijing Peace Offensive,” Asiaweek, July 28, 2000, at http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/ and The World Journal, August 26, 2000, p. A1. 50 Ross Munro, “Giving Taipei a Place at the Table,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 (Nov./Dec. 1994), pp. 109–122.

10 Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value Jiann-fa Yan

The rapid rise of China China as a global factory and market China has been evaluated as the market with the highest investment potential in the world. In addition to its cheap labor and improved technology, the liberalization of its trade and investment leading to a flood of exports of inexpensive high-quality products, China is becoming a center for manufacturing industries and a key regional base for global distribution. China has emerged as the “world’s factory” for both low-tech and high-tech foreign firms. American companies continue to move into China, seeing its people as a huge future market, a “goldmine.” China is one of the few sources of robust growth in the early twenty-first century. It has come close to monopolizing direct overseas investment among developing countries.1 For Honda Motor Company, a Japanese automaker with a Chinese partner, Chinese manufacturers make about 90 percent of Honda parts, which are then assembled for export from Japan. Central to the global supply chain, China has a large weight in the global economy. The sheer magnitude of its potential consumer market gives China, a country of over 1.3 billion people, an advantage that impacts many economic sectors.2 Some analysts predict China will become the world’s largest economy by 2050. Its momentum was demonstrated in the minimal economic impact of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). From the end of 2002 to June 2003, anxious pundits worried that SARS might be more damaging to Asian economies than the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Yet SARS hardly slowed China’s roaring economy.3 Given China’s rise, its Asian neighbors fear a hollowing-out of their manufacturing industries as more and more plants move to China, an efficient and relatively low-cost producer with a potentially huge consumer market.

194 Jiann-fa Yan China as an active participant in regional integration Chinese leaders have re-oriented their policies in matters other than economics. In fall 1999, during the first three-nation summit held during the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) summit, China rejected a trilateral relationship among China, Japan, and South Korea. Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that “the conditions for establishing a trilateral relationship are not ripe.”4 But China changed its mind the very next year, during a Singapore summit, proposing that 2002 be a year for exchanges between China, Japan, and South Korea. China is increasingly confident that it wins from globalization, multilateralism, and economic integration. During the ASEAN summit in the fall of 1999 in Manila, attended by leaders of Japan, China, and South Korea, the Japanese Prime Minister agreed that economic cooperation, on the basis of a 1999 trilateral study agreed to at the annual ASEAN Plus Three summit to combat terrorism and international crime, should be enhanced. Cultural and tourism exchanges would be cultivated in subsequent ministerial meetings.5 China is shifting from anxious unilateral realism to multilateralism. It has been assimilated into the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) web of multilateral networks. It has committed itself to a free trade agreement with ASEAN.6 At a Malaysia–China Partnership Summit on September 19, 2003, both sides noted that both ASEAN countries and China have a “strong political will” to push forward the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) process. Beyond courting neighbors and gaining economically, China hopes to defeat the American unilateralism pushed by the George W. Bush administration. China has cooperated multilaterally in dealing with poverty, smuggling, illegal drugs, terrorism, and epidemics. These are important matters to nations in the region. China’s new multilateralism has greatly enhanced its regional influence.

Taiwan’s nightmare as a threat for the Asia-Pacific region China is dissatisfied with a world order defined by American hegemony; China desires to be a “great power.” Its Taiwan policy likewise reflects this overall priority. Incorporating Taiwan into China is not merely a sentimental matter of nationalistic emotions; it is integral to China’s opposition to American hegemony. China’s rulers see Taiwan through geostrategic lenses. Taiwan is understood as a key spot in the “first island chain” serving American predominance in Asia.7A 1999 report concludes that Taiwan is the crucial point in the first chain of islands, located where Northeast and Southeast Asia meet.8 Consequently, China sees its incorporation of Taiwan, so-called “reunification,” as essential to China’s return to great power status in Asia.

Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value 195 While China’s military capabilities remain decades behind America’s, Beijing has been playing its “economic cards” to weaken America’s weight in the region. Japan and South Korea look to China for further economic cooperation. China rewards and flatters friends, while isolating and attacking what it deems to be unfriendly behavior, such as a visit by a Singapore leader to Taiwan. In short, China’s policy toward Taiwan is actually about power relations in the entire region. If Taiwan were unified with China by military force, a domino effect might ensue. Southeast Asian countries in which overseas Chinese dominate the economy would be hard-pressed to resist the preferences of the new regional hegemon. The South China Sea in Southeast Asia would become a Chinese lake.9 In such a situation, Japan and South Korea would lose much of their room for maneuver and would have to concede to the interests and policies of Chinese regional paramountcy. In sum, Taiwan’s autonomy helps preserve a pluralist balance of power in the entire region. Taiwan is therefore pivotal to Sino-American rivalry. Over the past two decades, China has been significantly modernizing and upgrading its military. New weapons have provided Beijing with the potential for a massive surprise attack.10 The physical and psychological vulnerability of Taiwan to China’s growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles presents a real threat to Taiwan’s fledgling democracy. It is increasingly difficult for Taiwan to defend its autonomy, the basis of its democracy.11 After 9-11, the attack on New York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, which redefined America’s strategic priorities, China cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea. In contrast, little Taiwan did not have much to offer America. The Taiwan authorities therefore feel a strong sense of crisis in face of the combined weight of China’s new multilateralism joined with partnership in George W. Bush’s war on terror. This crisis, threatening Taiwan’s very survival, has led some members of the ruling Green Camp to suggest radical new approaches in Taiwan’s policies. They argue that Taiwan has to make the world aware of the will of the Taiwanese people. A Taiwan government should negate the existence of a Republic of China on Taiwan, urged former President Lee Teng-hui on September 6, 2003.12 President Chen Shui-bian seeks a referendum for a new constitution to express the will of Taiwan’s democratic people.13 The goal is to make international society understand the will of 23 million Taiwanese people. But would not the Asian nations instead see such moves as provocations, irresponsible Taiwanese actions legitimating a Chinese use of force against Taiwan? Would these nations so accept a Chinese definition of cross-Strait relations that they would not see that an autonomous Taiwan allows Americans to help provide a balance of power serving the independence of all friendly nations in the Asia-Pacific region?

196 Jiann-fa Yan

A key knot for cross-Strait relationships: one China as a principle or an issue Chinese mainstream strategists view Bush’s “war on terror” as creating a strategic “breathing space” for China through cooperation with the United States. These strategists see China as encircled by American troops in Central Asia, Japan, and Korea. They regard American intervention in Afghanistan as a strategy to strengthen America’s presence in Central Asia, undermining China’s weight in the region. Looking both to its west and its east, China feels urgent security concerns with regard to America.14 Given an expansive notion of its rightful power position in Asia, Chinese leaders conclude that a use of Chinese force may be needed to protect China from foreign domination, containment, or national humiliation, and to establish China’s rightful place in the world. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), therefore, incorporating Taiwan is an issue of historical significance. It defines who and what China is. Yet, on Taiwan, strong forces embracing a separate Taiwanese identity are ever more popular. This trend angers and worries Beijing. Hence, the status quo which benefits all of China’s neighbors is not guaranteed. China demands that Taiwan accepts Beijing’s “one-China principle,” the claim that Taiwan is but a regional government of one, mighty China, a policy outcome that would strengthen China’s role as Asia’s leading power. A broken “one-China principle” The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué between America and China has undergirded a peaceful cross-Strait relationship. It declared that the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the sole legal government of China, opposed the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” an “independent Taiwan” or that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.” Before Taiwan’s democratization in 1988, the authoritarian mainlander Kuomintang (KMT) did not challenge the notion of one China, although it had its own version of one China. Only after Lee Teng-hui became president, as shown by Bruce Jacobs (see chapter 5), was China’s version of this doctrine fundamentally challenged. In 1991, subsequent to an initial revision of the ROC constitution, President Lee officially accepted the Republic of China’s lack of authority over the China mainland. What existed was two political entities, Taipei and Beijing, hopefully two peaceful entities committed to enhancing economic mutual benefit. In a vibrant Taiwanese democracy, the PRC “one-China principle”, in which Taiwan was but a local government of China, appeared as a ridiculous myth and an alienating threat. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rejected Beijing’s one-China principle in its party constitution. The first DPP president of

Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value 197 Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, rejected Beijing’s precondition for talks – Taiwan’s acceptance of the PRC one-China principle.15 Instead, President Chen maintains that “a future one China” can be an issue for discussion by the parties on both sides of Taiwan Strait. This allows for negotiations over mutually beneficial common markets, confederation, and other institutions of peaceful cooperation. Taiwan ardently seeks that peaceful cooperation. The Taiwanese people who have lived on the island for centuries have developed a cultural identity distinct from their mainland counterparts, an identity transformation detailed by Wakabayshi (see chapter 1). There were fifty years of separation during Japanese colonialism and a yet longer period of separation after the KMT government lost a civil war on the mainland in 1949. Taiwan and China have had very different modern experiences. The island’s mainstream culture is becoming more “Taiwanese.” Chinese women marrying into Taiwanese families have a lot of learning and changing to do to fit into Taiwanese society. A paradigmatic shift in the ROC–PRC relationship Advocates of Taiwanese independence tend to find that according to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, Taiwan, as the Republic of China (ROC), was surrendered to America by the Japanese government, but that Taiwan was never transferred to the authoritarian People’s Republic of China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Neither Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China nor Mao’s People’s Republic was invited to that Treaty meeting. Hence, legally, neither the Chiang Kai-shek regime nor the People’s Republic had a legitimate claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. However, through stability, growth, and progress in democratic reform, the Republic of China became accepted by most Taiwanese as the legitimate government of their island. The 1996 Taiwan presidential election marked a new era; the Taiwanese decided their own political fate. In May of 1999, a DPP “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Destiny” passed in its Party Congress, taking a pragmatic attitude toward co-existence with the People’s Republic. The DPP had abandoned its rigid 1991 party platform. On July 9, 1999, then President Lee Teng-hui noted that Taiwan’s relations with mainland China should be viewed as “country-to-country, or at least as special state-tostate” relations. That phrase merely reflected reality. The Republic of China as a country on Taiwan has been fully Taiwanized and accepted by most of the people in Taiwan. In this sense, today’s Republic of China has a far more legitimate claim to Taiwan than the government of the People’s Republic of China, which has no standing for most of the Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese reject subordination to an authoritarian, CCP-run China. A moderate President Chen, also the head of the DPP, has tried to steer the party into a New Middle course. In his 2000 presidential inauguration speech he announced that, during his term, there would be no declaration of

198 Jiann-fa Yan independence, no change in the name of the nation, no incorporation of a “state-to-state” theory into the constitution, no referendum to change the status quo, and he would not abolish the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council, that is, as long as China had no intention of using military force against Taiwan.16 This is Chen’s “Five Noes Policy.” Peace requires similar steps toward accommodation on Beijing’s part. Instead, China has not tried to meet Taiwan half way. It will not even talk with President Chen. Instead, China’s military might and its verbal threats escalate. Chen hoped that Taiwan and China would work together to deal with “a future one China issue.” That is to say, “one China” is an issue that the two sides can discuss and negotiate, but it cannot be a precondition for talks. Furthermore, on January 1, 2001, President Chen put forward an “integration” concept. He appealed for Taiwan and China to begin with economic integration, and then move on to cultural integration, and eventually, one day, to establish a framework for permanent, peaceful political interaction.17 This was a serious offer, but China dismissed it. President Chen still seeks a normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China.18 A forward-looking concept of “integration” is a creative and open-ended scheme to fulfill Chen’s New Middle course. Instead of responding in the direction of peaceful accommodation, the CCP has grown more obdurate and slanderous. When Taiwan emphasizes its sovereignty and right to exist, it does not imply that Taiwan has to be detached from or opposed to China. The “integration” proposal offered by President Chen seeks democratic equality and co-existence. In that context, a future one-China issue is negotiable. However, in order to consolidate Taiwan’s internal consensus of today’s “Taiwan as an independent sovereign state” before entering a second stage of “integration,” President Chen set forth the idea of “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” on August 3, 2002.19 This simple declaration of a peaceful reality was treated as scandalous not only in Beijing but also in a Washington seeking China’s cooperation in Bush’s global war on terrorism. Continuing political stalemate across the Taiwan Strait Because of China’s rejection of Taiwan’s overtures and China’s threats to Taiwan, the development of economic and commercial ties, as Weixing Hu has shown (see chapter 2), does not enhance political, cultural, and emotional fusion between Taiwan and China.20 For the CCP, economic integration is a ploy; for the DPP, it is a worry. Beijing’s belligerent insistence on its version of one China hinders communication and cooperation between Taipei and Beijing. Whereas Mao and Deng Xiaoping were willing to wait a hundred years for Taiwan’s integration, today’s People’s Republic evinces a growing impatience. It has threatened to use force should Taiwan depart from

Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value 199 China’s notion of the status quo. A 2000 white paper suggested that it would use force should Taiwan delay unification on Beijing’s terms. Beijing interprets President Chen’s generous overtures, which seek a peaceful modus vivendi, as, instead, paving the way for Taiwan’s de jure independence, as if Taiwan had the power to get major nations to recognize Taipei instead of Beijing. The People’s Republic fiercely condemned Chen’s call for a referendum law to allow democratic Taiwan to hold a popular referendum on anything as “a serious incident intended to split China,” even though formal sovereign separation was excluded from the referendum process and will be excluded from constitutional re-engineering. Beijing’s attempt to suffocate a vibrant and free civil society on Taiwan ignores the desire of the Taiwanese people to perfect their democracy. Yet foreign analysts, accepting the CCP’s portrayal of cross-Strait relations, tend to ignore Taiwan’s peace-prone overtures and domestic imperatives and treat China’s rigidity and threatening posture as if they were rational moderation. Beijing is trying to intimidate Taiwan with its ever-growing deployment of missiles across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing also squeezes Taiwan’s international space, as detailed by Chao and Hsu (see chapter 3). While insisting it is courting Taiwanese to return to the motherland, Beijing actually alienates the Taiwanese people. You cannot win love by threatening rape. China’s blockade of Taiwan’s participation in the WHO during the SARS epidemic, discussed by Hickey (see chapter 4), ignited great public anger in Taiwan. High-level political dialogue and military communication between Taiwan and China are lacking. Except for the United States, no nation will get involved in cross-Strait matters if it angers the People’s Republic. The United States has tried to encourage both sides to negotiate, but Beijing acts so as to erode confidence and security in Taiwan, not to enhance it.21 Unless China changes to a policy of accommodation, it is unlikely that the ever more militarized stalemate will be peacefully broken soon.

The status quo temporarily maintained in the Asia-Pacific region The rise of China has had a strong impact on the economic and political order in the Asia-Pacific region. America’s goal in Asia has long been to prevent any single power from dominating Asia. It sees China as a rising power that needs to be positively integrated into regional networks but precluded from paramountcy. China’s strong ambition to be dominant in Asia contradicts basic American interests. Since Taiwan is an island with strategic value for both China and the United States, Taiwan is involved in sensitive and complicated relations with both. The Taiwanese worry about the imbalance of military capacities between Taiwan and China.22 Since the Taiwan issue is linked with Southeast Asian, American, and Japanese interests, therefore peace for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations is an international issue of major proportions.

200 Jiann-fa Yan The government of China faces many economic challenges, including the reform of state-owned enterprises and the banking system, growing unemployment and underemployment, a need to construct an effective social safety net, and large regional economic disparities. Hong Kong’s popular rejection of an anti-subversion bill imposed by China that threatened Hong Kong’s civil liberties shocked Beijing.23 For Beijing, stability – that is, continuing the CCP dictatorship – is the supreme guiding principle. Given anxieties over the danger of collapse, as occurred with the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, the CCP leadership does not hurry to upset the status quo with Taiwan, concerned not to unintentionally unleash forces that might destabilize China. The most urgent task for the fourth-generation of PRC leaders is to maintain stability so as to preserve the rule of the CCP. But China’s growth is dependent on open access to the US market. China’s rapid modernization is difficult without US acquiescence.24 Beijing upgraded its military capacity rapidly through technology transfers from Russia and, to a lesser degree, Israel, which is politically dependent on the United States. Therefore, China cannot help but accept a certain amount of unpleasantness in dealing with America. Beijing has become more moderate in the region because of its incremental confidence in its economic achievement. Due to a series of successes, from getting through the Asian financial turmoil, winning the bid for the Olympic games of 2008, and entering the WTO, Mao’s and Deng’s political successors tend to be confident and cautious. Out of long-term strategic concerns, Chinese leaders avoid direct confrontation with the United States. But PRC leaders compete with America all over the globe, looking for other economic partners for exports and foreign direct investment. A temporary status quo is desirable for Beijing’s leaders. But it is temporary. The temporary status quo is welcomed by the United States, too. America and China have common interests in fighting against global terror and deepening mutual economic relations. But there exist sharp differences between them when it comes to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, democracy, religious freedom, the rights of Hong Kong citizens, the Tibet issue, the Taiwan issue, and so on. Given China’s rise and America’s need for help in the war on terror, the United States seems to have shifted away from acting as a balancing power in East Asia and toward a closer relationship with China.25 Meanwhile, the changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait engendered by China’s arms build-up has endangered Taiwan’s survival. This has grave implications for the region and for America itself. Despite Beijing’s help to the United States in dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear program, America did not overly use Taiwan as a quid pro quo in dealing with China, which is what the People’s Republic wanted. Despite its one-China policy, the United States is still committed to defending Taiwan should China, without provocation, attack. The Government of Taiwan will not undermine the commitment.

Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value 201 To be sure, the PRC regime’s eventual democratization, should that occur, would serve international interests. But until then, the increasing power of China threatens the peace, that is, if China uses force against Taiwan. The United States can maintain Taiwan’s separate status at a low cost. For the time being, maintaining the status quo has become a common goal for all parties concerned with peace and prosperity. However, China has no intention of maintaining the status quo. Its aim is to incorporate Taiwan. It was reported in July 2002 that China had made the invasion of Taiwan its paramount strategic focus in the region.26 If that is true, then China’s “status quo” policy merely means waiting for a favorable opportunity to forcefully incorporate Taiwan.27 Yet a dynamic status quo for Taiwan is also in the interests of America and of virtually all the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of Taiwanese identity issues can be taken as responsive echoes to the threatening Chinese chauvinism. The outcome of the 2004 legislative elections kept the ruling DPP a minority government. The DPP needs centrist votes to prevail in the 2008 presidential election. Therefore, it cannot afford to alienate centrists with the rhetoric of “renaming the state” and “promulgating a new constitution.” Instead, the DPP will have to concentrate on middle-of-the-road, votewinning issues. Moderateness in order to maintain the dynamic status quo will still be urgent for the ruling DPP.

Concluding remarks For the People’s Republic, there is only one China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. Resolving the Taiwan question and achieving unification is, for the CCP, an inevitable trend of history. China will not promise to abandon the use of force.28 China’s elimination of an autonomous Taiwan, which does not bode well for the rest of Asia, remains a top PRC priority. In contrast to Beijing’s perspectives, a peaceful solution still seems to be the American paramount objective. It sells Taiwan advanced military hardware. President Bush insists that America’s one-China policy means that the issue ought to be resolved peacefully.29 Most nations in the region are opposed to any resolution of the cross-Strait crisis by any means other than peaceful dialogue. The alternative could be a larger war that benefits no one in the region. A free and democratic Taiwan serves American interests and promotes freedom, democracy, and human rights. If Taiwan remains free and democratic, the United States has little to fear from China. If Taiwan is absorbed by an authoritarian China, then the twenty-first century could see the eclipse of American influence in Asia, a defeat in the region for a balance of power that preserves room for maneuver for the nations of the region, and a defeat for the forces of freedom, democracy and human rights.30 Acting multilaterally and joining America in its war on terrorism has

202 Jiann-fa Yan greatly enhanced Chinese power.31 The America–China relationship is growing stronger. Many Asian countries worry about American unilateralism and economic decline, and about American over-reaction in other regions. They are deepening their relations with China in pursuit of wealth. Asian governments rely on economic development for legitimacy.32 They are increasingly joining China’s bandwagon. This upgrading of China’s role in the Asia-Pacific area has dampened Taiwanese morale. Taiwan’s defeat would alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific world and challenge the pluralism through which the region has thrived.33 China’s use of force would destabilize the region. Peaceful resolution of outstanding issues is a norm for international society. Yet China challenges the peace because it will not renounce the possibility of using force against Taiwan. For Taiwan, intensifying political pressure by China and the military threat from China have made the notion of “peaceful resolution” of Taiwan–China issues a concept increasingly devoid of substance. The stronger powers in the Asia-Pacific region therefore have a practical interest in persuading China to give up its military threat and in moving the People’s Republic to respect the will of the Taiwanese people to determine their own political fate without external domination. Taiwan’s President Chen, as described by Daniel Lynch (see chapter 7), has urged Taiwan to join like-minded democracies in the region to form what he has called an “Asian Democratic Alliance” to help transform China into a democracy.34 The more that Asian nations make Asian cooperation on behalf of regional human rights and democracy a reality, the more likely it is that China will have to find a way to peacefully accommodate democratic Taiwan, avoiding the horrors of a regional war. Taiwan seeks a positive role on behalf of peace and human rights. Taiwan is also a valuable part in the division of labor in the world market. It continues to play a role as a motor for the economic development of the AsiaPacific region. Taiwanese businesses not only pervade the global trade system, but also the domestic Chinese market. They are valuable partners for foreign companies seeking to invest in China. Similarly in politics, Taiwan’s experiences in political modernization are uniquely suitable to Chinese elites. Taiwan can have great strategic and humanitarian value for the region, if politics in Beijing would only permit Taiwan to play this positive role. Therefore, Taiwan and peace require normal communications with China. Economic cooperation and political dialogue are needed for both sides. Any facilitating move from friends and neighbors to resume such talks will bring more winners for this region. The United States has been acting as a stabilizing balancer. The European Union, as another great power, can also play a larger role in facilitating a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait. If it is going to end its arms embargo on China, perhaps it can obtain in return Chinese agreement to a code of conduct to prevent China from using force against a democratic Taiwan, and promote a peaceful dialogue between Taiwan and China without any precondition.

Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific geostrategic value 203

Notes 1 Editorial, “The Realities Have Changed, so Must Japan’s ODA to China,” Asahi Shimbun, at http://www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/K2001102900320.html 2 “China’s entry into WTO: a mixed blessing,” Asahi Shimbun, at http:// www.asahi.com/english/business/K2001111400418.html 3 “China after SARS,” The Economist, June 28–July 4, 2003, p. 27. 4 See http://www.asahi.com/english/asianet/report/eng_2001_06.html 5 Takehiko Yabe, “Japan, China, S. Korea Inch Closer,” Asahi Shimbun, at http:// www.asahi.com/english/politics/K2001110600965.html 6 Atsushi Yamada, “Asian Initiative Empty without Free Trade,” Asahi Shimbun, at asahisearch.cab.infoweb.ne.jp./cgi-bin/common.cgi 7 See http://www.newamericancentury.org/china_019.htm 8 Robert H. Scales, Jr. andLarry M. Wortzel, “The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of American Commitment,” April 6, 1999, at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12113/carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ ssipubs/pubs99/usmilasa/usmilasa.pdf 9 Ark Mori Building, “United States–Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines,” Transcript of the Public Seminar, CGP International Conference Hall, Tokyo, Japan, January 15, 2001, at http://www.ceip.org/ people/kagstan15.htm 10 See http://www.tpwmi.com/asia.html 11 See http://www.newamericancentury.org/china_019.htm 12 See http://taipeitimes.com/News/Taiwan/archives2003/10/02/2003070076 13 Ibid. 14 David M. Lampton, “On Their Minds and on the Agenda: The Bush–Jiang Crawford Summit,” at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1 Issue3/vol1isse3Lampton.html 15 Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010701/faessay 4991/kurt-m-campbell-derek-j-mitchell/crisis-in-the-taiwan-strait.html 16 President Chen Shui-bian, “Inaugural Speech,” 20 May 2000, at http:// www.oop.gov.tw/english2000/2000520/speech.htm 17 President Chen Shui-bian, “Cross-century Remarks,” 31 December, 2000, at http://www.president.gov.tw/1_news/index_e.html 18 Normalization here means that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic are two independent countries; see “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” passed by the National Party Congress of the Democratic Progressive Party, 8th term, 2nd meeting, May 8, 1999, available at http://203.73.100.105/english/pub/ LIT_1.asp?ctyp=LITERATURE&pcatid=1975&catid=2142&ctxid=2143&single=Y 19 Lin Miao-Jung, “China hits back hard at ‘splittist’ Chen,” Taipei Times, 6 August 2002, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ news/2002/08/06/story/000159145 20 Campbell and Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” 21 Ibid. 22 Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly, “Arms and Taiwan: Our Interests Lie With Theirs,” Washington Post, April 23, 2000, at http://www.newamerican century.org/china_019.htm 23 Taipei Times, July 13, 2003, p. 5. 24 Chris Wu, Kam Yiu-yu, and Yu Haochen, “China, US Should Develop Together,” Taipei Times, September 30, 2001, p. 8. 25 Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, pp. 119–120. 26 See http://www.tpwmi.com/asia.html

204 Jiann-fa Yan 27 Ark Mori Building, “United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines.” 28 “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,” remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Press Conference, Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas, at http://www.etaiwannews.com/ Editorial/2003/03/22/1048298187.htm 29 “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea.” 30 “Beijing Waiting for US–Iraq war?” at http://english.pravda.Ru/columnists/ 2002/11/26/39994.html 31 Joseph Nye, Jr., “US Power and Strategy after Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, July/ August 2003, p. 61. 32 Sorpong Peou, “Withering Realism: a Review of Recent Securities Studies on the Asia-Pacific Region,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, Winter 2002–2003, p. 582. 33 Abramowitz and Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” p. 131. 34 Monique Chu, “Chen Urges Asian Democracy,” Taipei Times, 27 August 2002, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/08/27/story/0000165733

11 China’s dilemma on using military force Edward Friedman

Overview Global strategists such as Michael Mandelbaum worry that “the most dangerous place on the planet is the Taiwan Strait . . . a tinderbox for war between the United States and China.”1 This chapter explores the insecurity unleashed by China’s proclaimed willingness to use military force. With China a major power of 1.3 billion people and the small island of Taiwan, which is north of the Philippine island chain and south of the Ryukyu island chain of Japan, home to but 23 million, with the Philippines (part of the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN]) and Japan (tied to Australia) both military allies of America, which do not wish to see Taiwan taken by force, a China-initiated war could portend a large catastrophe. War or peace is a Chinese dilemma. After all, “just about everybody agrees on one thing, it [Taiwan] will not fire the first shot.”2 The post-Mao reframing of Taiwan as part of a new nationalist discourse has made war more likely. Rulers in Beijing re-mapped the priorities and goals for which Chinese people could be politically mobilized by making Taiwan’s incorporation a high political priority. But with economic growth the highest priority, reform leader Deng Xiaoping engendered contradictory mappings of Taiwan, one tending to war (to reincorporate stolen territory) and one towards peace (to earn the wealth needed for China’s rise to great power). Given the imperative of rapidly expanding wealth for creating jobs, for maintaining social stability to enhance Party legitimacy, and for upgrading the military, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rulers cannot afford war. A conflagration would harm China’s rise by disrupting trade, tourism, and investment, and alienating China’s most vital economic partners. Consequently, putting economics first, China will not launch an attack against Taiwan. Reform leader Deng’s removal of political obstacles to deep economic interactions with Taiwan contribute to peace. An unworried Taiwan disappointed arms merchants from 2002 to 2005 by not purchasing all the expensive weaponry that the Bush administration made available. Whatever the rhetoric, given China’s interests, its military did not seem a threat. But patriots in Beijing believe that it is only China’s military threat that has

206 Edward Friedman stymied separatist forces on Taiwan. If Taiwan, however, actually ignores China’s military warnings, is it heating up political passions in Beijing that make a Chinese-initiated war inevitable? The big question is whether the CCP’s basic interests in economic growth premised on peaceful interdependence will always trump the passions – CCP legitimation through a nationalism requiring China’s annexation of Taiwan. The passions reflect the post-Mao nationalism experienced by CCP ruling groups as a glue to hold together an increasingly fractious Chinese society, an imperative of continued CCP dictatorial governance, the basis of political stability.3 This new nationalism incorporates the victim consciousness of the Mao period where patriotism meant ending an era of imperialist indignities. To be sure, CCP leaders will follow their interests, but what one’s interests are, as David Hume long ago pointed out, is a matter of opinion. The imperative of political survival in this nationalist environment could produce CCP leaders who envision their self-interest as using force against Taiwan. After the Chinese Premier’s threatening warning to the Taiwan electorate (that if it chose the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian for president the Taiwanese would then not have another opportunity to vote) backfired in 2000, Beijing changed tack and began to court the Taiwanese, as Weixing Hu has detailed (see chapter 2). Yet, as the previous chapters illustrate, the nationalist policies of the People’s Republic actually alienate the Taiwanese. The passions defeat the interests.4 But if China’s policies alienate the Taiwanese, while its threats are not credible, how can China achieve “reunification”? This is China’s Taiwan dilemma, being wedded to a threat of war that could alienate neighbors and wound China itself. These nationalistic passions are a recent construction. They are instrumental to a ruling CCP that can no longer legitimate itself by a socialist project. Nationalism is an ideology obscuring certain ruling group interests. Is the CCP pragmatic when self-interested restraint on behalf of the strength and prosperity of the Chinese people can be rejected as treason? CCP leaders blame Taiwan. Beijing sees its reform-era Taiwan policy as a switch from confrontation to peace. Mao-era policy is imagined as warprone, with post-Mao reformers seeking a peaceful environment to further economic growth. Actually, Mao was a dove on Taiwan. His idée fixe was to prod people toward socialism. After 1958, Mao kept alive the notion of an unfinished CCP civil war with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party on Taiwan, the Kuomintang ( KMT), by not seizing the offshore islands of Jinmen (Chinmen, Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) occupied by Chiang’s supporters, but instead staging ritualized every-other-day shellings of the islands. An atmosphere of war, not war itself, helped to legitimate Mao’s war-communism project of building true socialism.5 In the post-Mao era, his economically irrational, self-wounding socialist project was discredited. Faced with a crisis of belief, in search of nationalistic bona fides, Deng Xiaoping moved the Taiwan issue near the top of the

China’s dilemma on using military force 207 political agenda. Because of the “renewed stress placed on reunification by Deng,”6 incorporating Taiwan was made a high priority. This double switch, promoting modernization and anti-Taiwan nationalism, is a time bomb. While Asian neighbors adjust to China’s great and growing influence flowing from its economic rise, a threat of war leads them to seek a balancer in the United States, a role which infuriates Chinese patriots, thereby increasing their passion to incorporate Taiwan. Do the passions serve Chinese interests?

Deng, Lee and Clinton create a crisis When Deng became China’s paramount leader, in 1979 he created a Central Committee Taiwan Affairs Office and in 1980 a Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group to put unification front and center. American guarantees for Taiwan were reinterpreted as perpetuating an imperialist humiliation, the Japanese theft of Chinese territory in 1895. Except for the 1989–1993 era of superficial warmth triggered by the CCP’s conciliationist response to isolating international sanctions following the June 4 massacre of Chinese promoters of democracy, Beijing has rejected Taipei’s efforts for peace, understood in Beijing as challenging the CCP’s patriotic bona fides. A PRC “one-China principle,” the claim that Taiwan is but a regional entity of a China run by the CCP in Beijing, is said to be the premise of talks. In Taiwan this is experienced as a demand for surrender. Chinese ruling groups believe that the Taiwanese, as all Chinese, identified with Han China’s return to glory. If it were not for some evil individuals who misled the “Chinese” people on Taiwan, the Taiwanese would welcome reunification with PRC compatriots. Taiwan leaders were portrayed in China in a way that stirred up popular outrage, a feeling that Taiwan’s continued separation was an insufferable racist indignity. The CCP ignored how, once Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon went to China in 1971 and 1972 to begin normalizing US–PRC relations, the ruling KMT in Taiwan’s single-party dictatorship headed by Chiang Kai-shek faced a legitimation crisis. Taiwan, as detailed by Bruce Jacobs (see chapter 5), lost its seat at the United Nations. Many Taiwanese suddenly saw the post-World-War-II arrivals who ran the KMT dictatorship as a useless mainlander minority making Taiwanese people vulnerable to an awful and unknown future. Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Ching-kuo, responded to Taiwan’s legitimation crisis by Taiwanizing the KMT, which included choosing a Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as a successor and approving peaceful exchanges with China. That is, democratization, Taiwanization and peaceful dealings with China were self-interested Chiang family policies to prolong KMT power. They were not, as the CCP contends, the plot of a nefarious Lee Teng-hui. CCP imperatives hide Taiwan realities. Following democratization in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, in 1989 a great democratic movement swept China, leading to Deng’s order to crush it. When, in November

208 Edward Friedman 1989, the Berlin wall fell, and soon thereafter, East European Communist Party dictatorships imploded, and when in August 1991 the Communist Party in the USSR lost power, leaders in China’s Communist Party were panicked. They imagined democratization as an American plot to subvert communist rule everywhere, to weaken challengers to a hegemonic United States, preventing China’s return to glory. Taiwan’s democratization and peace overtures to China were imagined as a part of this plot. China opted to make its use of force against Taiwan credible. The CCP decided to move missiles across from Taiwan. China’s on-going dilemma of whether to use force against Taiwan is a reflection of panicky passions from a particular historical conjuncture. Actually, Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui was not trying to undermine the CCP regime. Taiwan weighed in during China’s hour of need [after the June 4, 1989 massacre]. They [sic] did not get involved in the criticism [instead denying Chinese democrats their request to broadcast to China from Taiwan or from a ship from Taiwan]. They kept investment flowing [into China].7 Clearly, Taiwanese behavior is not the source of Chinese beliefs about Taiwan. Beijing’s new war-prone policy instead reflects the CCP’s legitimation crisis, which fostered a nationalistic narrative in which Taiwan was imagined as part of an American plot to democratize and weaken China. Much evidence went the other way. Given CCP demonization of Taiwan, by 1992–93 the Chinese military was tasked to find a way to defeat an alleged Lee Teng-hui plot. With a purging of CCP reformers after June 4, 1989, conservative and reactionary forces rose. It was a Brezhnev-like moment. The military (e.g. Yang Shangkun), security officials, and a dogmatic Li Peng had a large input to Taiwan policy. A military approach had more weight. Consequently, in 1992–93 the CCP opted for “greater pressure (including military coercion).”8 A 1993 white paper on Taiwan issued “under Yang Shangkun’s aegis” was even “less flexible.”9 The consensus by 1992 was that only intimidation would keep Taiwan from de jure independence.10 In popular cultural symbols, Chinese patriarchs imagined Taiwan as a wayward son to be smashed into filial obedience by a stern father in Beijing “to reunite the larger Chinese family.”11 The “people of Taiwan resemble a little brother who wants to ‘break up the family and live apart’. . . . The people on the mainland are analogous to an older brother. ‘We will never let him break up the family. If he does so, we will beat him to death.’” 12 While most people in Taiwan oppose the patriarchal and hierarchical notions infusing the CCP’s Taiwan policy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was told to purchase the military capabilities required to smash wayward Taiwan into the subordination required by China’s stern patriarchal construction. Given this passionate re-framing of Taiwan, policy-making was infused by

China’s dilemma on using military force 209 hardliners. Yet, the economic interests kept the PRC from worst-case choices. A secret June 1993 military study concluded that: The final goal of the mainland is to unite the people and material resources of the Chinese people, to vigorously develop the economy of China and to make the Chinese race stronger. Based on this principle, the recovery of Taiwan must not damage the economic structure of Taiwan. Therefore, no matter what the circumstances, a destructive recovery of Taiwan cannot be undertaken.13 While naval battles or wars in the Western Pacific seas might be needed, “the return of Taiwan is better resolved by peaceful means than by armed force.”14 Meanwhile, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was thrilled by Taiwan’s peaceful democratization. His supporters imagined him as similar to Havel or Mandela. A China suffering both from international sanctions following its 1989 massacre of democrats and also economic stagnation as conservatives rolled back reforms, seemed no threat. Lee imagined Taiwan as West Germany, with China as a decaying East Germany. The days of communist regimes seemed numbered. Taiwanese visiting China reported that it was poor, corrupt, and backward. President Lee imagined a democratic Taiwan, as post-apartheid democratic South Africa, ending its isolation and embraced by the world’s democracies. China’s paramount leader Deng had responded to China’s post-massacre isolation by not seeking conflicts even on supposedly principled issues in dealings with Hong Kong and ASEAN, as well as Taiwan. In 1991, China accepted Taiwan as a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). President Lee, allowed to carry on “vacation diplomacy” with ASEAN nations, persuaded himself that the CCP no longer had the capacity to impose its one-China principle on Taiwan. Lee did not note the importance of Deng’s January 1992 re-igniting of reform and China’s subsequent rapid rise. China’s President Jiang Zemin, replacing Deng and focusing on economic imperatives, made what he imagined as a conciliatory overture to Lee – an “eight-point proposal” – in January 1995. Jiang’s carrot was accompanied by a military stick, beginning in 1994, deploying missiles opposite Taiwan (as decided by 1992), threatening force if Taiwan did not surrender to Jiang’s “one country, two systems” version of the one-China principle in which Taiwan ends up like Hong Kong.15 A confident Lee dismissed Jiang’s overtures. Committed to countering China’s policy of denying Taiwan international dignity, Lee went all out to reverse America’s distancing of itself from Taiwan since Nixon’s 1971–72 breakthrough to China, a policy of not welcoming Taiwan political leaders to the United States because, for America, diplomatically speaking, there was only one China. In Washington, that diplomacy was seen as preserving the peace.

210 Edward Friedman In 1994 Lee tried to “push the envelope” by transiting through the United States on his way to Central America to visit countries with official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.16 The Clinton administration, which had been upgrading relations with Taiwan, including accepting having the Taiwanese people able to decide their own future, saw Lee undermining a policy required for regional peace. But Lee portrayed America’s policy continuity as an insult. He instructed lobbyists to get the Congress to pressure Clinton. Lee Teng-hui [is] going to Costa Rica, the only permanent democratic state in Central America. He’s going to Nicaragua, where Chamorro has been put in by democratic forces and we got rid of the Sandinistas. He’s going to South Africa for the event of the 20th century, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela. He’s going to Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. He’s going to see the chiefs of state in each one of those countries, all of which recognized China. And the United States, the greatest power on earth, screws around about this transit thing. It looked perfectly terrible. And the Congressmen were enraged by our two-bit action.17 Although the US Department of State “sent our AIT Director, Nat Bellochi, to Hawaii to extend courtesies [to President Lee]” and “invited Lee into the VIP lounge, . . . he stayed on the plane and then put out the word that he was forced”18 “to come in the dark of night” and “not be greeted by anybody.”19 Lee’s political theater helped persuade the Congress to press Clinton to allow Taiwan’s President to visit America and speak at Lee’s graduate-school alma mater, Cornell. China’s leader, Jiang Zemin, was blind-sided. His policies to Taiwan and America were discredited in the CCP. When, in May 1995, Clinton approved Lee’s trip to the United States, China’s military, attacking “Jiang’s weak stand on Taiwan,” insisted on an end to political and military relations with Washington.20 China withdrew its ambassador and its military ended exchanges with the Pentagon. “What the hell happened [to US–China relations]? . . . Lee Teng-hui happened.”21 Yet the Clinton administration, trying to keep the peace, got President Lee to agree to an apolitical speech at Cornell. The US Government then assured Jiang that Lee would only have “a ‘private’ and ‘unofficial’ visit.” 22 In addition, according to highly placed but uncorroborated sources, presidents Lee and Jiang were still in touch through a trusted intermediary. Jiang was provided with a text of Lee’s Cornell speech, allowing Jiang to assure senior colleagues that he had the relationship under control. But Lee rewrote the speech, adding claims about Taiwan’s sovereignty. Lee precipitated a crisis. Jiang had to concede to hardline colleagues who insisted on military action against Taiwan. China’s ruling elite was left with no trust in Lee and with no willingness to accept mere verbal assurances

China’s dilemma on using military force 211 from Taiwan. China’s new nationalism, Lee’s over-reaching, America’s caving in to Lee’s demands, and continuing political struggles in Beijing between forces representing both the passions and the interests all combined to threaten the peace. Jiang had to criticize his errors and allow China’s military an opportunity in 1995–96 to force Taiwan to change its behavior. The passions were defeating the interests. Seeking to avoid war After Clinton dispatched aircraft carriers in response to China’s 1996 missile exercises against Taiwan, Presidents Jiang and Clinton sought to avoid future troubles. In 1997–98, they put relations back on an even keel. For the US government, cooperative relations with a rising China were very important. President Lee was stunned. He was seen in both Beijing and Washington as irresponsible. He feared that they were ganging up against Taipei. The euphoria in Taiwan at Clinton’s sending aircraft carriers to protect Taiwan turned to deep anxiety. In this crisis context, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, associated with Henry Kissinger, invited Chinese and Taiwanese specialists on cross-Strait relations to a “Roundtable on US–China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations,” hoping to increase mutual understanding, avoid worst-case outcomes, and explore peaceful solutions.23 While these meetings were not official, given the quality of the participants, they reflected important views in Taiwan, China, and America. At the first meeting in June 1997, the Chinese were tone deaf to Taiwanese fears and to how the CCP’s one-China principle alienated the Taiwanese. The Chinese side predicted that their 1997 Fifteenth Party Congress would come up with “new ideas” (it did not). The Taiwanese side pointed out the error of the conveners in not including “representatives of the DPP,” Taiwan’s major opposition party. In general, the minutes of the meetings show the Americans as over-optimistic, the Chinese making peace-oriented promises that were not delivered on, and the Taiwanese striving to get the others to heed Taiwanese concerns. At the second meeting in January 1998, the Americans somehow found both that “the PRC is reaching out to the DPP” and also that the People’s Republic was showing “flexibility in interpreting the key issue of ‘one China.’” The hopeful US side found “reason for optimism.” The Taiwan side argued that a peaceful resolution required that the CCP abandon “its definition of ‘one China’ as a precondition for the resumption of talks,” since the DPP could accept a confederation or a “Chinese Commonwealth.” The Americans were tone deaf to Taiwanese anxieties about losing their autonomy and democracy when Americans asserted that “the United States has an enormous amount to gain from a peaceful reunification,” or when an American insisted, after a Chinese participant threatened Taiwan, “that it was important not to drift with the status quo because the status quo holds

212 Edward Friedman danger.” Taipei found Beijing and Washington ganging up against Taiwan. Taiwan’s anxieties were palpable at the third roundtable in July 1998. The Taiwanese saw the Clinton administration’s agreeing with Jiang Zemin “that Taiwan is not to enter into intergovernmental organizations” and that Taiwan could not use the threat of independence as a bargaining chip against a China claiming a right to use force had gravely weakened Taiwan’s diplomatic possibilities. “A PRC participant noted that Taiwan’s international position was deteriorating.” As proof they would not be provocative, DPP representatives noted that their Chairman had declared back in 1995 that “the DPP need not and will not declare Taiwan independence if the DPP takes power.” The split between DPP realists (“as China grows stronger, it will enter into a collision course with the United States”) and DPP liberals (who “want to lift the ban on direct economic links”) with China was manifest. Roundtable members heard American anger at how Taiwan “had played the Congress card in obtaining a visa for President Lee Teng-hui and had not observed the guidelines” agreed to for Lee’s speech. Lee was not “mindful of American interests” and acted in ways that could cause events to “spin out of control.” Lee–Clinton tensions were obvious, as was the more diplomatically responsible position of the liberal wing of the DPP. But Lee’s people were not impressed that President Clinton, in his China visit, did not give in to the most extensive set of Chinese demands. There was no fourth communiqué, no joint statement, no agreement on a timetable for reducing arms sales to Taiwan, and no commitment as to whether the United States will eventually provide theater missile defense [TMD] to Taiwan. Also the President cited the TRA [Taiwan Relations Act] directly while in China, the first time that had been done. That is, while Clinton’s policy was to strengthen ties both with Taiwan and China, Lee saw Clinton as one-sidedly pro-China. At the fourth roundtable in January 1999, the Americans tried to get the Chinese to see how their “campaign to eliminate Taiwan’s bilateral diplomatic relations and keep it out of intergovernmental organizations” “antagonizes the people of Taiwan and makes it more difficult for the Taipei authorities to make the concessions in cross-Strait relations desired by the PRC.” The Americans worried about China’s continuing “missile buildup” across from Taiwan, which made it more likely that America would provide Taiwan with a missile defense. In addition, “a separate Taiwanese identity” of “new Taiwanese” was rising. The DPP was upset with the KMT negotiator’s embrace of Chinese cultural symbolism while in the People’s Republic. DPP leader Chen Shuibian’s assertion that “Taiwan and China . . . are independent ethnic states” was not palatable in Beijing because “Beijing remained incapable of facing

China’s dilemma on using military force 213 up to the reality of divided rule. . . .” Mistrust was “deepening.” The People’s Republic tried to “compel Taiwan to negotiate” on China’s terms, hoping to stymie trends toward a separate, Taiwanese identity, which, as Wakabayashi shows (see chapter 1), is the fruit of deep historical roots. To the Taiwanese, the CCP’s one-China principle, reducing Taiwan to but a local government of a communist China, was offensive. Representatives of a rising China saw Washington’s policy of “no independence, no reunification” as a plot “to check the growth of China.” In the CCP’s new nationalism, China should be the predominant power in Asia. That required incorporating Taiwan, much as Hong Kong had been incorporated. Still, Chinese participants insisted that the People’s Republic was willing to build on the notion of “‘one China’ but ‘two equal political entities,’”24 a one- China policy that could be palatable to Taiwanese. But again, the Chinese side never followed through. The American side saw “misunderstanding,” “miscalculation,” and “passion.” China’s lack of political reform and its drumming up of nationalism were no basis for resolving Taipei–Beijing issues peacefully. Supposedly, China’s “Qian Qichen had said to [Taiwan cross-Strait relations negotiator] Koo Chen-fu very clearly in October 1998, ‘There are three ways we can resume talks. . . . Number one, there’s only one China. Number two, we are that one China. And number three, you belong to us’.”25 Worried about losing Taiwan’s de facto independence, Taiwan President Lee intentionally26 scuttled the talks with China in July 1999 by telling a German reporter that relations between Taiwan and China were “special state-tostate” relations.

The 1999 crisis At the fifth roundtable in August 1999, peace in the Taiwan Strait looked frail. President Lee’s July 9 declaration of “special state-to-state” relations between Taiwan and China was seen by some Americans as a “virtual declaration of independence,” a quest for de jure independence which impeded progress on cross-Strait relations until after Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential elections. Americans debated whether the United States should abandon strategic ambiguity for military support for Taiwan’s existing de facto independence. While Taiwan saw Washington as having “tilted towards the PRC” at Taiwan’s expense, trying to force Taipei into dangerous “interim agreements,” the CCP saw that Clinton continued to defend Taiwan strongly and worried that, if America kept obstructing China’s incorporation of Taiwan, China would have to drag America into the Taiwan conflict. China had learned from American intervention in Kosovo “not to give the United States time to react with its superior military power, but to preempt, i.e., to strike first.” Ever since the 1991 Gulf War, in China “Offense is now understood as capturing the nature of warfare.”27 Chinese voices favoring

214 Edward Friedman the use of military force against Taiwan even at the risk of war with America grew. In 1999, a “very significant national security debate . . . took place” in China. Many in the military were “unsatisfied with PRC policy toward the US.” “Washington’s specific interventions toward China” were worrisome. Jiang had been arguing that “two more decades of peaceful development . . . will decisively alter the balance of power between the mainland and Taiwan in the mainland’s favor.”28 Twenty years previously, “Deng [had] told his military leaders . . . to place economic construction above all else, and to wait [on Taiwan] for at least 20 years.” But given the Japanese military alliance with America, which now seemed to the Chinese to cover Taiwan, along with President Lee’s unwillingness to surrender as had Hong Kong, and a continuing anti-China atmosphere in America since the June 4, 1989 massacre of Chinese promoters of democracy, China’s defense establishment “saw a need for enhanced military capacities.” Its military declared, “we have been patient for 20 years. How long must we wait?”29 Jiang agreed that American hegemonism, and a willingness to use the American military, had risen. His policy responses “stayed ahead of Chinese nationalism and popular indignation” at alleged Chinese weakness toward America. The military budget was greatly increased, starting with a quick 1999 infusion.30 Many missile “programs have been placed on an accelerated R&D schedule since May 1999.” 31 Jiang’s actions left him firmly in control of foreign policy organs.32 But the hand of the hardliners was strengthened. The 1999 “debate concluded with a renewed commitment to Deng’s policy of placing primacy on China’s economic development . . . [but] modified by an accelerated effort to modernize China’s “military.” 33 Jiang had to heed the passions in order to serve China’s economic interests. But how long could this high-wire balancing act continue? This was China’s Taiwan dilemma. The American side was again optimistic during the August 1999 roundtable. The Clinton administration would maintain a balance of power in the region. The next Taiwan president could accept three links to enhance economic ties with China. Both Taipei and Beijing would soon be in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cross-Strait cooperation on information technology would grow. “Integration and interdependence” were unstoppable globalization trends. Consequently, Taipei and Beijing would eventually end military tensions, perhaps by a deal in which China would “cap its missiles unilaterally” and the United States “could limit the transfer of TMD technology to Taiwan.” While “in the short term” there were no political solutions and military tensions had to be addressed, peace-prone economic forces still had a powerful life of their own. But at the sixth roundtable in January 2000 “the political impasse” had “hardened.” Beijing’s missile threat was growing while its patience ebbed. America’s hope was in a new Taiwan president with whom China could make a deal. The Taiwanese side explained why it felt threatened and why

China’s dilemma on using military force 215 no Taiwanese leader could abandon the position that the Republic of China on Taiwan is, and long had been, an independent state. However, Taiwan was open to direct air links and a common market, and the WTO would speed economic ties. China was asked to think about Taiwan–China relations as modeled on Finland and the USSR or on Ireland and the United Kingdom, where agreements guaranteed security for the major power and autonomy for the smaller entity. But that required political will on the part of the major power to respect the other side’s nationalism. Chinese passions precluded respect for Taiwanese identity. The Chinese at the January 2000 roundtable dismissed Taiwan elections as local, worried about Chen Shui-bian (the DPP presidential candidate), and would not budge from a one-China principle treating Taiwan as but a local government of a CCP polity. Still, according to the Chinese, there was hope if the next Taiwan president were to abandon Lee’s “special state-tostate relations” declaration, which the Chinese characterized as a “twostates theory.” The Americans sympathized with Taiwanese fears and hoped the Chinese would offer “some assurances that will safeguard Taiwanese security.” The American side embraced the Finland model, not noticing that its presupposition, respect for a Finnish nation, was unacceptable to Chinese patriots. Americans hoped Taiwan and China would return to a 1992 consensus “whereby they would agree on ‘one China’ but each side would be free to define that ‘one China’ in its own way.” However, the People’s Republic insisted that there was no such consensus, that President Lee had agreed in 1992 to China’s one-China principle, accepting Taiwan’s political subordination to the CCP. No Taiwan mainstream party, however, could expose itself to that possibility, unless Beijing first agreed that the Taiwan side could define a one-China principle in whatever way it wanted, which is what the KMT believed the CCP had done in 1992. Beijing denied it. With its offensive might growing, China’s military planners considered “war plans.” Consequently, some “important groups” in America were beginning to discuss abandoning “the one-China policy” of acknowledging that people in Taiwan and the People’s Republic agreed they were part of one China and instead moving “closer to a military alliance with Taiwan.” By early 2000 President Jiang expressed a leadership consensus that “the Taiwan issue cannot drag on.”34 China’s war policy led America to deepen its military ties with Taiwan, as Cabestan has detailed (see chapter 12). On November 4, 1999, an informed American observer, worried that an arms race had begun, had stated: “We are moving on theater missile defense in a way that will make it impossible, politically, for us not to extend to Taiwan and that’s going to drive China ballistic. . . . So I really see a train wreck potentially coming down the road.” 35 DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian, elected as Taiwan’s president in March 2000, on taking office in May did precisely as the Chinese had suggested, quashing Lee’s claim of “special state-to-state relations.” But Jiang did not

216 Edward Friedman respond to Chen’s overtures. China’s promises of peaceful formulae again came to nothing. At the seventh round table in June 2000, the Americans saw “a vicious circle” that could result in “a war.” Beijing’s threats, passions, and weaponry were increasing. Consequently, the “opportunity” offered by Chen’s election was lost. The CCP would not compromise its passions to serve its interests. It would not talk with President Chen. It cursed him.

War passions From an American perspective, the Chinese leadership seemed “highly emotional.” Beijing sought ties with President Chen’s opponents and his “conciliatory” gestures went unanswered. In “the context of 150 years of Chinese humiliation by imperialist powers . . . Jiang Zemin cannot appear as too soft on the Taiwan issue or be perceived as the leader who ‘lost’ Taiwan to the ‘separatists.’” American optimists hoped that, despite Chinese passions, talks would be possible when the CCP saw “that Chen Shui-bian is not another Lee Teng-hui.” “Chen is a pragmatist” who “can make a deal” because he “wants to concentrate on his domestic agenda” while “working closely with the US administration.” The American priority was stopping the “drift toward militarization” through cooperation (trade, immigrants, smuggling, etc.), dialogue, building on consensus, and military restraint. Should this fail, “US options regarding Taiwan’s defense remain open.” PRC military policies led Clinton to deepen security cooperation with Taiwan. The source of the problem was the post-Mao policy priority of territorial aggrandizement to establish the nationalistic credentials required for regime legitimacy in a post-socialist China in which charismatic authority disappeared when the original revolution’s leaders and purposes were buried. China’s Taiwan policy reflected the legitimation crisis of post-Mao China. Claiming that Taiwan has always been part of China, and imagining that Taiwan’s autonomy encourages separatism in Uighur Muslim areas, CCP leaders saw Taiwan’s rejection of China’s one-China principle as subversive and treasonous. That could not be endlessly tolerated. The CCP imagined the US/NATO intervention in Kosovo in Europe as an omen for China in relation to Taiwan and Uighur separatists. China then needed to intensify pressures so Taiwan leaders would accept Beijing’s demands.36 Chinese passions precluded mapping Taiwan so that Beijing–Taipei relations could be imagined as similar to Pyongyang and Seoul or East Germany and West Germany. In the Korean and German cases, CCP leaders had adopted a peace-oriented policy of recognizing both governments and welcoming both parts of the divided nation into the international arena, hoping that, over time, a thickening of relations would congeal into a solid basis for a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of the mistrustful division. Peace and prosperity in the Western Pacific would also

China’s dilemma on using military force 217 be served by China treating Taiwan as it had treated West Germany and South Korea. Instead, Taiwan has been treated by China as an illegal government. In China’s new nationalism, Taiwan became an issue left over from the age of imperialism. A Taiwan seized by Japan in 1895 after the Treaty of Shimonoseki would have to join the People’s Republic in order to remove the final humiliation left behind by a century of imperialist aggression and Chinese weakness. A rising China would encompass Taiwan. This nationalistic identity differed from Mao-era nationalism when Taiwan was an issue left over from a civil war pitting Mao’s Communists against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. Now, the continued existence of an autonomous Taiwan was a disgrace that Chinese patriots should extinguish as soon as possible. Taiwan was imagined as similar to terroristic and splittist Uighur Muslims. The war danger arose less from Taiwanese actions than from Chinese passions. China’s imagined Taiwan has little to do with the lived experience of the Taiwanese. Taiwan, in contrast to China’s friends in Pakistan, did not train and support Islamic terrorists. Ideological misunderstanding was palpable in 1995, the hundredth anniversary of the Manchu empire’s surrender of Taiwan to the Meiji empire via the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The treaty was commemorated in China much as was Opium War imperialism, which led to the loss of Hong Kong, a shameful blot on the national escutcheon crying out for elimination. In Taiwan, in contrast, Shimonoseki reflected the Manchu empire’s lack of concern for the fate of Taiwan’s long-suffering people. Alien indifference to the Taiwanese people led to mistreatment of the Taiwanese by, first, the empires of Spain, Holland and remnants of the late Ming, and then later by Showa-era imperial Japan and also the corrupt and brutal Chinese mainlander KMT, which perpetrated the massacre of February 28, 1947. Only through recent democratization and Taiwanization were the Taiwanese, at long last, in control of their own destiny and no longer the plaything of outsiders. Shimonoseki was one of many events reminding Taiwanese that only a free Taiwan could defend the interests of the Taiwanese people. Proud Han Chinese abhorred this Taiwanese consciousness. It reduced the heirs of the post-World-War-II Chiang Kai-shek military takeover of Taiwan to a mere minority ethnicity, the mainlanders, marked by a peculiar dialect and an inability to speak Taiwanese mother tongues. Patriots in China felt Taiwanese nationalism was an absurd racism. It split the great Chinese people (what, after all, was a mainlander ethnic group?37) and could block the rise of the Great Han race to glory. Within Chinese passions, Taiwan presidents Lee and Chen were racist genocidaires, truly insane. At the eighth roundtable convened by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in August 2000, the Americans saw the Chinese as unwilling to budge on the one-China principle. But for Taiwan’s President Chen to make any farther concessions required “clear incentives from the mainland in the form of security guarantees and international space for

218 Edward Friedman Taiwan.” These were not forthcoming. The Chinese side imagined its stance as flexible. It had allowed that one China need not be the People’s Republic or the Republic of China (though, contradictorily, Taiwan must first accept the “one-China principle”). A grand bargain, in which China gave up the use of force, would have to include “the United States giving up the sale of weapons to Taiwan,” a non-starter until China accepted Taiwan’s separate identity. The CCP feared that Chen, if re-elected in 2004, would “make more drastic moves away from the one-China idea.” China therefore urged America to end arms sales to Taiwan, which would then be moved by Chinese “reason.” Taiwan would have to surrender. For the CCP leadership, “reunification with Taiwan is a matter of leadership legitimacy, regime legitimacy, and national unity.” Such passions made inaudible DPP explanations that Taiwanese had nothing to do with the Chinese civil war pitting Mao’s Communists against Chiang’s Nationalists, that Taiwanese have their own identity, and that “one China” has no meaning for them. No mainstream party on Taiwan could surrender to the CCP as Hong Kong had done. The usually optimistic Americans worried “that time is running out.” America was being pushed toward a stance of deterrence, toward supplying Taiwan with weapons of total mass destruction. “Taiwan is a democracy and . . . China needs to offer Taiwan more incentives and fewer threats.” Given the Taiwanization of the politics of the island and the militarization of China’s policy toward Taiwan, the situation seemed “structurally unstable and potentially explosive.”

A peaceful modus vivendi When the ninth roundtable convened in February 2001, “calm” prevailed in cross-Strait relations. While China continued its military build-up, it would wait for “a political realignment on the island” after the December 2001 legislative elections or the 2004 presidential election. Chinese “leaders now believe that time is on their side.” Jiang reined in hawk forces. War-prone chauvinism in Beijing was contested by new passions which confidently privileged long-term growth, as imagined in a rising Shanghai. A Shanghai analyst opposed to war with Taiwan offered a different family analogy than that of hardline patriarchs who would whack wayward son Taiwan into proper filial behavior. While Macao and Hong Kong were “our children” who were once kidnapped and have now returned to the family, Taiwan was “our brother who . . . ran away from home. . . .We are against a fight among brothers in the same family.”38 If the economy is the top priority, then the international status quo is good, providing Chinese with trade, tourists, and investment, and creating jobs, wealth, and stability. China has been the world’s top beneficiary from globalization. A Beijing nationalism with a short-term “timetable for national reunification with Taiwan” was “jeopardizing other important

China’s dilemma on using military force 219 national goals,” especially peace, prosperity, and stability. For both China and America vis-à-vis Taiwan, “It is in their fundamental interests not to let the issue divert their attention, let alone make them confront each other.”39 The short-term timetable for reintegrating Taiwan agreed to by the CCP leadership in 2000 was in abeyance. Optimists about China’s future trajectory saw a successful globalized modernization, now part of a peaceoriented nationalism, trumping war-prone chauvinism. Many political leaders in Taiwan shared this optimism. Why the change? Perhaps the military was persuaded that it was premature and self-defeating to confront a stronger America. Perhaps the Jiang regime and its successor embody a new southern consciousness or southern political clout with long-term faith in the economic imperative, whereas a military tied to the suffering central regions and fixated on the rise of a separate Taiwan identity does not. Perhaps the military was bought off or co-opted. Perhaps Jiang’s consolidation of his power and the removal of Li Peng from Taiwan policy-making allowed Jiang the political space to impose peace-oriented priorities. If it is the latter, then small changes in China’s balance of power can have large implications for the fate of Taiwan. China damns Taiwan’s President Chen and rejects his offers toward a mutually beneficial modus vivendi (e.g. federation or confederation). The Chinese military builds the might to deter America from stopping a Chinese attack to coerce Taiwan into submission. Missiles increase in number across from Taiwan. Yet economic ties deepen. A self-confident Shanghai nationalism envisions Taiwan becoming dependent on China’s economy with Taiwan’s tycoons, as Hong Kong’s did in the 1990s, forcing Taiwan’s political class to accept China’s terms. In Shanghai it is almost impossible to imagine Taiwan as a threat. The hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese living in the Shanghai region seem crude bumpkins, no match for the Shanghaiese. After the CCP warned Taiwan’s Stanley Shih, the Chief Executive Officer of Acer, that supporting Chen Shui-bian for Taiwan president could get in the way of Shih’s ability to do business in China, Shih made a generous philanthropic donation to Shanghai, hoping to make amends. In Shanghai it seems obvious that China’s continuous rise cannot help but render Taiwan acquiescent. War with Taiwan would therefore be a waste. China’s rise is quite enough to guarantee that a needful little Taiwan will one day settle with a mighty China on China’s terms. In the meantime, Taiwanese business interests will prevent the island from embracing separatism. In addition, a rising China needed good relations with Washington, which would be lost if China attacked Taiwan. Also, as proved by Asian responses to China’s 1996 military exercises, an attack by China would, defensively, move Asian neighbors to closer military ties with America, thereby frustrating China’s drive for predominance in Asia, a drive moving Asians toward accepting a China-centered region. It suddenly seemed that “Beijing is unlikely to resort to force against Taiwan in the near future.” China’s

220 Edward Friedman interests still precluded war. But now the interests were reinforced by new nationalistic passions in the coastal south concerning the best path for China’s return to greatness. Patriotism could be reconstructed.

China’s dilemma By the roundtable in January 2002, there seemed “no strong risk of high tension or conflict.” Economic integration was proceeding. But it was not obvious to the Americans why that should “lead to political integration.” While China would not soon upset the status quo, for how long would this situation prevail, if economic integration and military bullying did not lead to political integration? “If they discover that Chen survives politically – they might become dangerously frustrated about cross-Strait trends.”40 In 2004 Chen was re-elected as President of Taiwan. While China would not respond to Chen’s overtures, it also would not abandon united front tactics and economic integration. China would not heed hawks who insisted on “urgency.” The American participants in the roundtable were reassured about Chinese politics. Although President Chen had offered to discuss political integration and one China, and reassured Beijing that Taiwan would not declare independence, the CCP stuck to its hardline one-China principle and worried that America’s embrace of Taiwan as a democracy meant that American support for one China was hollow. The Chinese confronted a dilemma. The Chinese persuaded themselves that Taiwanese young people “favor integration with the mainland” because they want to pursue “their careers on the mainland.” The Shanghaiese felt their home was attractive, soft power. “China . . . wants to concentrate on its economic modernization and does not want war; therefore, it is emphasizing peaceful reunification.” In Shanghai nationalism, China’s rise, over time, would decide the Taiwan issue, without resort to war. But for China’s hardliners the political status quo could not “continue indefinitely.” The Taiwanese with a separate identity were growing in number and the American side “accepted Taiwan as a de facto political entity” and “did not believe that politics would inevitably follow economics.” For China’s hawks, “China needs to reassess its Taiwan policy.” Meanwhile in the post-9-11 atmosphere, for America, “The United States and China are potential partners” in the anti-terrorism campaign. The Bush administration reversed itself on its electoral campaign attacks on President Clinton’s strategic partnership with China. The Taiwanese grew anxious. Beijing gained leverage over Bush with regard to Taiwan. Another roundtable meeting took place in March 2002. This time, the Taiwanese were excluded. The “one China, two systems” demand of the CCP was treated as merely ritualistic. China’s threat to use force was losing credibility. The Chinese side worried about a Bush administration tilt toward Taiwan, while the Americans worried about Chinese nationalism

China’s dilemma on using military force 221 and militarization. The Chinese side insisted that its policy of peaceful reunification (allowing Taiwan to surrender as did Hong Kong) was a concession, warning that continuing the “upgrade in US–Taiwan relations” “will undermine US–China relations.” The Chinese also worried about Taiwanese identity strengthening. “The United States might miscalculate the extent of China’s tolerance and overestimate the limit of China’s concessions. And China might underestimate the US determination to defend Taiwan.” What was decisive for war or peace was not only politics in China, as reflected in the struggle between two kinds of nationalism, two conflicting passions – one facilitating war, one peace – but also the accuracy of southern optimism about Taiwan eventually surrendering peacefully to China’s new strength.41 A final roundtable, also with no Taiwanese participants, took place in December 2002, hosted on the Chinese side by “an associate of . . . Hu Jintao,” President Jiang’s successor. The Chinese described China as “a status quo power” that would “be ‘wiser’ than Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany or the Soviet Union.” That is, China would not militarily challenge America. China hoped for cooperation against terrorism (“inasmuch as the United States has now recognized an Islamic group operating in East Turkestan as a terrorist organization, China is no longer concerned about double standards in the American definition of terrorism”) and for growth. Yet, despite “a more deft and conciliatory policy on Taiwan,” China’s “sense of national humiliation” still mapped friends and enemies and infused political mobilization at home. As from the beginning of the roundtables, the Chinese, ignoring the impact of their threats to and humiliations of the Taiwanese, were persuaded they had offered generous terms, which should be welcome on Taiwan. The Chinese listed four recent changes in their Taiwan policy. First, China had defined “one China” to include both the mainland and Taiwan. Second, it had dropped its insistence that the “three links” must be considered a domestic matter. Third, China had agreed to deal with the DPP members in “an appropriate capacity.” Finally, “new thinking” had developed on the issue of deploying missiles. China was willing to seek an alternative to a dangerous arms race which legitimated US weapons of total mass destruction for Taiwan. Since China actually spurned Taiwan’s overtures, Peking University international relations specialist Jia Qingguo worried that China could yet “act irrationally,” that is, not in its interests, because passionate nationalists experience Washington’s ties to Taipei as pushing Beijing “too hard.” “The next generation of leaders may not be able to resist” what they will experience as having to push back against insufferable US interference, a policy switch away from the Jiang administration’s cooperation with America, a policy which was dismissed by a new generation of northern nationalists as too pro-American.42 Peace cannot be taken for granted. The American participants suggested that China make a unilateral move

222 Edward Friedman on missile deployments. Beijing was asked to deal directly with the government on Taiwan, even to enter into negotiations with Taipei without preconditions and to stop trying to delegitimize the Taiwan government. But China’s politics did not permit such peace-oriented initiatives.

A new nationalism? Many in Beijing see Taiwan changing its passport and history textbooks as part of a plot for de jure independence backed by the Bush administration, which increasingly treats the US representative office in Taipei as a real embassy. Consequently, by 2002, some CCP and PLA leaders again argued that maintaining China’s dignity required a definite date for peacefully resolving the Taiwan issue – perhaps 2011, the centennial of the 1911 republican revolution, perhaps 2006, before the 2008 Beijing Olympics.43 Given China’s militarization of its Taiwan policy in the 1990s, it cannot make Taiwan policy in contravention of the emotional nationalism of hawks who will not compromise (except on timing), even if it means war with the United States.44 Jiang and Hu Jintao both courted this military support in power struggles. Events could yet conspire to empower China’s war hawks. Taiwan’s President Chen seems somewhat worried. “We cannot ignore the fact that we are feeling greater pressure from China because of its growing missile force, state-of-the-art weapons and overall arms build-up. They are still likely to miscalculate the situation and launch a war in the Strait.”45 But he is only somewhat worried. He is full of “overconfidence” about US military support such that Taipei has reached a “judgment that China’s PLA is bluffing.”46 He does not see a Chinese dilemma on whether to use force against Taiwan. The best hope for a secure peace seems to be a changed nationalist consciousness in China, one that goes even beyond Shanghai nationalism, one in which an autonomous Taiwan is not seen as a threat to Chinese unity. Instead, it is seen as a major factor in China’s rise, a place which, after the June 4, 1989 Beijing massacre, paid no attention to international sanctions against China and instead came in to China with badly needed foreign direct investment leading to a surge in exports, facilitating Deng’s January 1992 reigniting of China’s reform economy and the resumption of China’s extraordinary rise. Taiwan is not a threat to Chinese unity or glory. Such a reconstruction of the nationalist mythos would discredit fourthand fifth-generation revanchistes. In Beijing nationalism, political forces of independence on Taiwan see time as on Taiwan’s side, allowing for the embedding of a separate identity. In Shanghai nationalism, economic forces of integration with Taiwan and China’s military build-up put time on China’s side. “Shanghai experts” tend to have an “optimistic assessment” about what can be achieved peacefully, while “analysts situated in Beijing insist that reunification will only be possible if force is first used to coerce Taiwan.”47 In 2001, Beijing was “in favor of attacking, but the provinces south of the Yangzi are afraid to attack.” The director of the Shanghai East

China’s dilemma on using military force 223 Asia Research Institute urged the Chinese not to be led astray by their nationalism or to put the issue of Taiwan ahead of the core issue of building up China. For the first twenty years of the twenty-first century, therefore, China should concentrate on the living conditions of its people (a repeat of Mao’s 1958 policy and Deng’s commitment to peaceful construction for twenty years made twenty years later). China’s grand cause of reunification should be subordinated to this overall need.48 Peace requires that the dangerous nationalism that attended Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power and his privileging of the issue of Taiwan’s unification lose their persuasive power. This is not impossible. The war-prone passions of post-Mao northern nationalism have only recently been engendered and are already contested. Deng-era nationalism, contradictorily privileging both the incorporation of Taiwan and also the modernization of China, was an ambiguous historical construction serving mutable political purposes. Would acquaintance with Taiwanese history help engender a Chinese nationalism accommodative of Taiwan’s autonomy? Before 1943, Mao’s CCP saw Taiwanese, like Koreans, as an independent people engaged in a national liberation struggle against Hirohito’s imperial Japan. In 1942–43, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt began to imagine the post-war Western Pacific.49 When America opened a dialogue with Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan was not a passion inside China’s anti-Japan nationalism. Roosevelt found Chiang envisioning a post-war China incorporating Vietnam (conquered in the Chinese Ming), Mongolia (incorporated by the invading Manchus), and Taiwan (seized and lost by the Manchus). Roosevelt saw Taiwan as a place for American bases to check a resurgence of Japanese militarism. In 1943 America proposed that, when Hirohito’s Japan was defeated, Chiang’s Republic of China would control a Taiwan with American military bases. For Roosevelt, who ignored Chiang’s other aggrandizing claims, returning Taiwan to Chiang’s Republic of China was but a strategic ploy against a revanchist Japan. But then Mao’s Communists began to defeat Chiang’s Nationalists. The Americans searched for an alternative disposition for Taiwan but found none that met America’s strategic concerns in the Western Pacific. After the February 28, 1947 massacre of Taiwanese by Chiang’s Nationalists, Americans, like the Taiwanese, for the first time began to imagine the Taiwanese people as having a legitimate interest that conflicted with Chiang’s occupying mainlander army. When Mao was complicitous with Kim Il Song’s invaders of South Korea in 1950, the US government experienced a security threat to the island chain of the Pacific, including Taiwan, and intervened to safeguard American security concerns in the Western Pacific. Mao’s war policy altered Taiwan’s destiny. Not until the 1970s, after Chiang’s regime was thrown out of the United Nations, did a Taiwanese national identity congeal. In this new nationalism, which barely preceded Deng’s reconstruction of Chinese nationalism, Taiwan was first made a political entity in the seventeenth century by the

224 Edward Friedman Dutch empire. The name “Taiwan” did not even exist prior to the Dutch arrival. Previously, the indigenous peoples had diverse relations with neighbors. The founding emperor of the Ming considered them eastern barbarians, and so mapped and named their home island. Not wishing to live under Chiang’s tyranny or Mao’s yet worse tyranny, Taiwanese in the 1970s came to see themselves as a long-suffering people enduring almost 400 years of diverse conquerors (Spanish, Dutch, the half-Japanese Koxinga, the Manchus, Imperial Japan and the KMT mainlanders), a people whose only salvation was ruling themselves democratically. As Chinese nationalism has surrendered imperial claims to Vietnam and Mongolia, the imperative of peace in the region is a China that can accommodate the Taiwanese nationalism that infuses Taiwan’s democracy. A Chinese international relations analyst suggests that just as Mao treated Taiwan as a small issue that could be put off for centuries while China concentrated on the international enemies of true communism while raising up the Chinese people spiritually, so reform-era leaders can do the same visà-vis Taiwan in the interest of raising up the Chinese people materially.50 On March 18, 2003, China’s President Hu Jintao proposed that “in the first twenty years of the twenty-first century,” China should “focus on construction and development.” 51 However many twenty years the CCP puts off the military option, the peace would be secure if Chinese nationalism welcomed Taiwan into the international community, thereby ending China’s Taiwan dilemma by abandoning China’s military threat. Chinese could be proud patriots and not need a military threat against a friendly people living in dignity on the island of Taiwan. A rising China could have the self-confidence not to impose painful dilemmas on the Taiwanese by threats of war that endanger the peace and prosperity of the West Pacific. This requires a national consciousness that would re-map the world in ways that would preclude mobilization by the hawks, hardliners, conservatives, and chauvinists who legitimate China using military force against Taiwan. Temporarily guaranteeing the peace are economic interests and a southern nationalism whose weight derives from momentary regional realities. Taiwan has not yet been constructed in the national mythos of the Chinese people to support peace-prone forces. The prevailing peace therefore totters on fragile legs. China’s passionate, militarized nationalism creates dilemmas for Taiwan and the United States. But, most importantly, Taiwan is China’s dilemma.

Notes 1 Patrick Tyler, “The World Cries Uncle,” New York Times, Sunday Book Review, September 22, 2002, p. 22. Others offer similar warnings: see Bill Emmott, Vision, New York: Farver Straus and Giroux, 2002. The “Taiwan problem [is] a ticking time bomb” according to Pan Zhongqi, “US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 35 (2003), p. 403.

China’s dilemma on using military force 225 2 He Guanghu, “Mainland China Should Heed the Teaching of Ancient Sages and Not Go to War at a Time when Peaceful Solutions are the Consensus of the World,” Feng Huang Wang online text, November 18, 2004. 3 Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 4 Robert Marquand, “China Throwing Diplomatic Elbows to Isolate Taiwan,” Christian Science Monitor, December 19, 2003. 5 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 6 Michael Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 298 7 James Lilley in Oral History Roundtable on “China Policy and the National Security Council,” Washington, DC, November 4, 1999. 8 Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” p. 316. 9 Ibid., p. 317. 10 Bi Jianhai, “The Role of the Military in PRC Taiwan Policymaking,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 32 (2002), p. 568. 11 Beijing sees Washington as a distant neighbor telling father Beijing that it cannot whack its wayward son, Taipei. An American response “was that it is unhelpful to think of the PRC as a parent and Taiwan as a child. And the PRC needs to stop demanding, like a parent, that Taiwan accept its terms” “because I have the PLA to back me up”; see Alan Romberg, “Some Thoughts on CrossStrait Relations,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 24 (2002), pp. 251, 254. I would suggest that a political-culture approach to the new nationalism suggests that with urbanization, mobility, and modern transportation, elders feel that filial piety is threatened. Children immorally forget their duties to the parents who nurtured them. Consequently, the father who has to discipline the son to make him filial has great resonance with more conservative sectors of the Chinese people. 12 He, “Mainland China Should Heed the Teaching of Ancient Sages.” 13 Xiao Bing and Qing Bo, Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War? Chongqing (June 1993), translated in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-CAR-94024-L, May 5, 1994, p. 20. 14 Ibid., p. 25. 15 Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan.” 16 Winston Lord in Oral History Roundtable. 17 James Lilley in Oral History Roundtable. 18 Winston Lord in Oral History Roundtable. 19 James Kelley in Oral History Roundtable. 20 Bi, “The Role of the Military in PRC Taiwan Policymaking,” p. 569. 21 John Holdridge in Oral History Roundtable. 22 Qian Qichen, “Progress Made in Ties, but More must be Done,” Beijing Review, October 23–29, 1995, p. 13. 23 I am grateful to the Committee for making the minutes available to me on the condition of my not revealing anyone’s identity. 24 Again China did not deliver on its peace-oriented words. One China with two equal governments (yi zhong, liang fu) might be acceptable on Taiwan, but China did not offer that formula for a peaceful resolution. 25 James Lilley in Oral History Roundtable. 26 Private communication, December 14, 2004. 27 You Ji, “The Supreme Leader and the Military,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., The Nature of Chinese Politics, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 284. 28 Ibid., p. 292.

226 Edward Friedman 29 David Finkelstein, “The View from Beijing,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing Military Power, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 22, 25, 28, 39. In 1958 Mao asked the Chinese military to agree not to go to “war over Taiwan within 20 years”; see Yang Kuisong, “Reorientation of China’s Foreign Policy and its Causes,” Social Sciences in China, Summer 2003, p. 140. Deng had done the same some twenty years later. 30 Finkelstein, “The View from Beijing,” pp. 34, 44, 40, 61. 31 Mark Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense,” in Scobell and Wortzel, eds., China’s Growing Military Power, p. 111. 32 Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries and Party Departments,” in Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, p. 42. 33 H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s ‘Third Generation’ Elite,” in Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, p. 141. 34 Alex Chopan, “A Table for Two: Jiang Zemin and the PLA,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 31 (2002), p. 289. 35 Stapleton Roy in Oral History Roundtable. 36 Thomas Christensen, “Tracking China’s Security Relations,” Chinese Leadership Monitor, No. 1, September 1, 2001. 37 Ethnicities are constructed anew all the time, everywhere: “Ossies” are a new construction in Germany; in America, Catholics and Jews were not “white” until after the Civil War. 38 Zhang Nianchi, “China’s Rise more Important than Reunification,” Zhong guo Pingliu, (Hong Kong), December 1, 2002, pp. 6–8. 39 Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China. 40 Christensen, “Tracking China’s Security Relations,” p. 11. 41 PRC leaders, in resorting to force, have many times underestimated the strength of the response to their provocation. They did not foresee Truman’s response to their 1950 backing of North Korea’s invasion of the South. They miscalculated Eisenhower’s 1958 response to their shelling of Taiwan Strait islands. They were shocked by how Third World nations rallied to India’s side when they devastated the Indian army in 1962. They were unprepared for Vietnam’s successful resistance to Chinese invaders in 1979. They were shocked at Clinton’s strong response to China’s terrorization of Taiwan in 1996. 42 Susan Lawrence and Murray Hiebert, “Bending in the U.S. Storm,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 2002, pp. 32–36. 43 Kuan Chieh, “President Jiang Reveals Deadline for Solving Taiwan Issue,” Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), March 1, 2002, pp. 17–18, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 44 Ellis Joffe, Taiwan and the Chinese Military, Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, CAPS Paper No. 29, July 2000. 45 Taipei Times, February 13, 2001. 46 Gary Klintworth, “China and Taiwan – From Flashpoint to Redefining One China,” Taipei Review, March 2001, p. 53. 47 Bonnie Glaser, “Beijing Fears About Chen Shui-bian Subside as Taiwan’s Political and Economic Troubles Mount,” PacNet 5, February 2, 2001. 48 Zhang, “China’s Rise More Important Than Reunification.” 49 This and the next paragraph condense material in Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 50 Wu Zichen, “China’s Twisted Road to Coexistence,” Heartlands, Vol. 2 (2001), p. 35. 51 Joseph Kahn, “China’s New Leaders Vow to Pursue Market-Style Economics,” New York Times, March 18, 2003.

12 Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security Jean-Pierre Cabestan

At first glance, the assertion encapsulated in the title of this chapter appears at least a paradox, if not a folly. How can marginalizing Taiwan in the international community and making threats against this island weaken the security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Indeed, the diplomatic isolation of the Republic of China (ROC), since its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, has been perceived in Beijing as the best guarantee of preserving China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and thus its external security. This policy is considered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership as the most successful way of keeping pro-independence Taiwanese in check and of preventing Taiwan from remaining definitively separate from China. The policy includes a strategy to assemble a credible military threat against Taiwan to undermine both its capacity to defend itself and its willingness to remain master of its own destiny. The deployment by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2003 of about 500 short-range missiles (a figure that has risen to 700 by 2005) targeted on the island is a symbol of an intention to develop a military capacity able both to create an imbalance of forces in the Strait and, perhaps, subjugate Taiwan, whether by precision air strikes, a maritime blockade, or even an invasion.1 How can this (from Taiwan’s viewpoint) deteriorating military balance across the Strait not enhance the security of the People’s Republic? The Chinese policy also encompasses a strategy of economic integration between the island and the mainland with a view both to increasing the dependence of Taiwan upon China and also gradually diminishing – hollowing or sucking out – Taiwan’s economic might. In other words, in Beijing’s eyes, marginalizing, threatening, and integrating Taiwan guarantee future unification, turning Taiwan into a ripe fruit ready to fall into the mainland’s basket. There is an obvious contradiction in this unification policy, however. While economic integration with the mainland is a trend that most Taiwanese are unable and increasingly unwilling to resist, the marginalization of and threats against the island not only tend to nullify the benefits of integration and delay any settlement between Beijing and Taipei, but also actually contribute to weakening the mainland’s security.

228 Jean-Pierre Cabestan First, the attempts to marginalize and threaten Taiwan have alienated the vast majority of Taiwanese. While the Taiwanese remain divided in their views on their identity and their future, they are largely united in their opposition to China’s “one country, two systems” formula and in their support for and identification with the Republic of China as a sovereign state. Second, Beijing’s attitude has made any government-to-government contacts across the Taiwan Strait very difficult, if not virtually impossible. Beijing still poses as a precondition to any talks Taipei’s prior approval of Beijing’s “oneChina principle” (Taiwan as but a local government of Beijing’s China) and its recognition that a “consensus” was reached in 1992 on this issue (while it was rather a compromise in which Taiwan agreed to disagree on the definition of the one-China principle). Third, marginalizing Taiwan has made it very difficult to manage and defuse the tension between the two states in any conventional manner, increasing the risk of uncontrolled incidents. Finally, China’s growing military pressure has forced the United States, Taiwan’s sole military guarantor, to shed its traditional reserve (as in the March 1996 missile crisis) and replace strategic ambiguity with a growing clarity in support of Taiwan’s external security and separate (but not formally independent) existence. China’s military pressure has created a zone of tension, triggering concerns not only among China’s neighbors, such as Japan, but also among large segments of the international community. In so doing, the People’s Republic has managed to antagonize America, worry Japan, and increase the wariness of many countries concerning China’s growing regional power and military modernization. In sum, China’s policy of marginalizing and threatening Taiwan has weakened the mainland’s security.

Weakening China’s security This section focuses on two major issues. The first is the lack of direct contacts between the PRC and ROC authorities, which has made it more difficult for the two governments to manage and defuse tensions in the Strait and has thus aggravated the risk of crises. The second aspect is that the marginalization and threats carried out by China, which have forced America to assume an increasingly crucial role in Taiwan’s security, have intensified the mainland’s insecurity. The difficulties of managing and defusing tensions in the Taiwan Strait In view of the military tension in the Taiwan Strait, a lack of direct communication and talks between Beijing and Taipei is dangerous. The PRC refusal to establish direct governmental relations with the Republic of China and to discuss security matters with the island’s authorities have made the management and defusing of tension very difficult, preventing the

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 229 establishment of confidence-building measures and aggravating the risk of crises in the Strait. At the same time, this refusal has contributed to an acceleration in Taiwan’s quest to modernize its own weaponry. Increased risk of crises due to lack of direct channels of communication Since the People’s Republic does not recognize Taiwan as a state, it cannot establish any sort of direct government-to-government relations with it. Even after the two sides set up an unofficial channel of communication in the early 1990s – between Taipei’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) – discussions were limited to functional issues, such as fishing disputes and the return of criminals and illegal immigrants. From the very beginning, political talks and discussions on security were excluded. It can be argued that, until June 1995, when they were suspended by China after the visit to America by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, the SEF– ARATS talks made some contribution to lessening tension. At the same time, however, they proved no help at all in preventing not only the tensions caused by China’s missile-building, but also the post-1991 PLA reevaluation of its strategy towards Taiwan, a re-evaluation that took place when cross-Strait relations were good,2 as described by Friedman (see chapter 11). In October 1998, following a brief resumption of the SEF–ARATS contacts, Taiwan reluctantly agreed to include political issues in future discussions. Meetings between SEF and ARATS representatives have been suspended since July 1999, when Taiwan President Lee made public his belief in “special state-for-state relations.” But even if talks had not been so quickly interrupted, it is still important to ask whether they would have helped the two sides to manage the tension in the Strait better and to address the most sensitive issues, such as the PLA’s expansive missile deployment across from Taiwan. It is also possible to wonder whether such contacts would have been useful had a military accident actually occurred in the Strait during China’s 1996 missile exercises. In early August 1999, PLA air force fighters repeatedly crossed the symbolic middle line that runs through the Strait as a way of expressing PRC dissatisfaction with Lee’s initiative on state-to-state relations. Taiwanese fighters flew to the middle line to intercept and deter such incursions. Had two planes collided then, Beijing would have had great difficulty in managing the incident directly with Taipei and preventing it from deteriorating into a crisis. The two sides would have had no other choice but to rely on America. Of course, since the 1980s, PRC and ROC authorities have established secret channels of communication which can, in principle, be activated each time tensions arise. These channels remained open during the 1996 missile crisis and the mini-crisis in the summer of 1999.3 However, these discreet

230 Jean-Pierre Cabestan contacts are far from reliable, as Beijing, for tactical reasons, is often tempted to suspend them at the peak of a crisis. And they are no substitute for institutionalized mechanisms of crisis management and confidencebuilding between the two governments and their military forces. From Beijing’s point of view, a quasi-reliance on America may not be a totally negative approach. It avoids any de facto or de jure recognition of the ROC government and military; and it allows the People’s Republic to exert some indirect pressure on Taiwan. This could be seen in the 1999 crisis when the Clinton administration was induced to point the finger of blame at Lee Teng-hui as the “trouble-maker,” and in August 2002 when the Bush administration swiftly asked Chen Shui-bian to abandon his “one side, one country” (yibian yiguo) catchphrase. Nevertheless, the lack of direct contacts between Beijing and Taipei increases the risk of a crisis exploding and ironically strengthens Washington’s position in this triangular game, thus weakening PRC security. Taiwan’s military modernization and coordination with the United States The other major consequence of China’s growing military pressure on Taiwan has been both to accelerate Taiwan’s military modernization and intensify its coordination with the American armed forces.4 Back in the 1980s, the military balance favored Taiwan. China possessed an antiquated navy and air force, while its army was trained to conduct “people’s wars” on continental battlefields (as in Vietnam in 1979). It did not have the means to project power beyond its shores and its missile forces, in particular as far as its short-range missiles were concerned, were limited. Taiwan’s military was then mainly reliant on weapons systems from the 1960s and the 1970s, but its edge over the PLA was clear, and the Strait continued to protect the island against any air, sea, or landing operation. Moreover, in the 1980s the PLA also moved a substantial number of troops and weapons out of Fujian as a goodwill gesture aimed at reinforcing its peaceful reunification policy.5 However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, removing China’s main external threat, altered Beijing’s security objectives. Since then, as a result of its dominant role in the security not only of Taiwan but also of the entire Asia-Pacific region, America has gradually become the main challenge to the People’s Republic and, in particular, to the PLA. At the same time, the Republic of China embarked on a dramatic transition to democracy, which strengthened Taiwan’s national identity and quest for recognized statehood, objectives treated by Beijing as threats to its own national security. Of course, the modernization of Taiwan’s armed forces has not always been directly related to the growing threat posed by the PLA. Several weapons systems, such as the Perry class and the French La Fayette frigates, were acquired in the early 1990s to replace ships built at the end of World

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 231 War II. The same could be said of Taiwan’s replacing its F-5Es with fourthgeneration fighters such as the F-16 or the French Mirage-2000. But in this latest case, it was China’s purchase of a first batch of Su-27s in 1991 (and to some extent France’s intention to sell sixty Mirage-2000s) that rationalized the October 1992 decision by US President George Bush to authorize the sale to Taiwan of 150 F-16s. This series of decisions triggered a new dynamic – an arms race – across the Strait in which every acquisition of new weapons by the PLA is regarded by Taiwan and America as an additional threat against the island and vice versa. It can of course be argued that, as a result of the rapid economic rise of the People’s Republic, its increased financial capacity to buy sophisticated weapons abroad, or its technical ability to manufacture them on its own soil, the PLA would have modernized anyway, even without China–Taiwan tensions. Such a development would in any event pose a new challenge to America and the other military powers in Asia. Nevertheless, capabilities cannot be disconnected from intentions. And China’s priority in the post-Cold-War era is less to replace America as the main security guarantor in East Asia than to gradually weaken and neutralize Taiwan in order to force it to accept a unification formula that would assert the mainland’s dominance over the island and fulfill a Chinese nationalistic agenda. This is the reason for the deployment in Fujian and Jiangxi of a growing number of short-range ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan,6 and the concentration of new ships, including Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines, and aircraft (Su-27s and Su-30s) at bases located in the vicinity of the island and under the command of the Nanjing military region. In the same period, China has striven to proscribe any major arms sales to Taiwan. True, Beijing’s objective has always been to reverse the military balance in the Strait by preventing Taipei from acquiring sophisticated weapons from abroad. This strategy is illustrated by the sanctions it imposed after The Netherlands sold two Zwaardvis submarines to Taipei in 1981 and by the third China–US communiqué (in 1982) on the gradual reduction of American arms sales to Taiwan, as permitted by peaceful conditions in the region. But the Chinese authorities became more aggressive in tackling this matter in the early 1990s: for instance, imposing many sanctions on France (including limiting its access to the China market) and then, in January 1994, forcing a commitment from France to stop “participating in the armament of Taiwan.” However, while the People’s Republic was successful in frightening off most arms exporters from supplying Taiwan, it suffered a stark defeat with America. China’s military escalation forced the United States, as early as 1996 (if we consider the 1992 US sale of F-16s, the result of electoral politics, as an exception – which the State Department officially did), to freeze de facto the enforcement of the third communiqué and to provide Taiwan with a greater quantity of weapons. While George W. Bush’s announcement in

232 Jean-Pierre Cabestan April 2001 of an unprecedented arms package to Taipei was perceived by some as a turning point, it was actually the result of a trend initiated during the Clinton presidency after the 1996 missile crisis and based on numerous updated assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs. The PLA’s build-up has been the trigger for a number of well-known arms deals: three Patriot Pac-2 anti-missile systems, four AEWS Hawkeyes, eleven S-70 anti-submarine warfare helicopters, as well as many new types of missiles, including the sophisticated AMRAAM and, more recently, twelve P-3C Orion anti-submarine airplanes and four Kidd destroyers. Authorizations of arms sales by America have become so weighty that Taiwan has problems finding the means both to finance and integrate all these newly offered weapon systems (the Kidds, acquired in 2004, and the Pac-3s, as well as eight diesel submarines when and if they are built). In response to China’s continuing military build-up, since the end of the 1990s, Taiwan has acquired or contracted to acquire not only defensive but also dual-use weapons, which will increase the vulnerability of the mainland in the event of war. These changes illustrate another evolution, this time in Taiwan’s military strategy. Defensive in essence, the strategy has gradually developed since 1996 to include concepts of tactical offense aimed at deterring (hezu) the PLA from crossing the middle line in the Strait and at taking the decisive battleground outside of Taiwanese territorial waters (jingwai juezhan), and if need be to the mainland.7 The development of new conventional missiles (such as Tianma or cruise missiles) and precision weapons able to reach Shanghai or Guangzhou or neutralize the PLA’s offensive capability (missile bases) forms part of this new approach.8 The question then arises of whether conventional weapons can prevent war from reaching Taiwan’s shores. The deteriorating military balance with regard to the People’s Republic may, if the latter starts to act too aggressively, again revive the nuclear debate on the island or push Taiwan to contemplate arming its offensive missiles with chemical warheads. This option was shelved after America intervened in 1987 to terminate Taiwan’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, if ROC survival is at stake and American support is not reliable, such an option is likely to be contemplated again by the Taiwanese authorities. All these developments underscore the fact that in developing its coercive policy towards Taiwan, the People’s Republic, far from reinforcing its security, has in fact contributed to undermining it. The major factor affecting the mainland’s security, however, is not Taiwan but America. The risks of antagonizing the United States and the international community The inability of Beijing and Taipei to better manage and defuse tensions in the Taiwan Strait has intensified the pressure on America to intervene and

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 233 assume a larger role in this dispute. It has also forced a number of other countries to reassess their China policies and to introduce a new security dimension. The growing US involvement in Taiwan’s security The build-up being conducted by the PLA and China’s more bellicose discourse on Taiwan in the second half of the 1990s led America to boost its arms sales to Taiwan and also to clarify its commitment to Taiwan’s security and to intensify the coordination between the American and Taiwanese armed forces. Although China moderated its anti-American stance following the events of September 11, 2001, that has not weakened the support America lends to the island’s military forces. The first consequence is well known: strategic clarity has replaced strategic ambiguity.9 The statement made by George W. Bush on April 25, 2001 not only underlined the strength of the security commitment enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), it also contained a direct threat to the People’s Republic in the event of an unprovoked war initiated by China in the Strait.10 The reservation added later the same day, and repeated several times since, on US commitment to the one-China policy and its rejection of Taiwanese independence, did not alter the main message: if Beijing once again embarked on an aggressive policy towards Taiwan, strategic competition with Washington would overwhelm bilateral cooperation. A number of Chinese analysts rightly characterize the new America–Taiwan relationship as a de facto or “quasi” alliance.11 Although no American administration would be in a position publicly to confirm this reality, such an evolution could only have been caused by the military posture the People’s Republic has adopted with regard to the island. The second development has proved less discernible, following its introduction during the Clinton administration, primarily as America and Taiwan have wanted to avoid any unnecessary tension with Beijing. It has become more obvious since 2001, partly because Bush decided to publicize it, but also because of a series of leaks emanating from the Taiwan side. In any case, this second development has had a significantly more far-reaching consequence: restoring to some extent the defunct 1954 alliance. The American and Taiwan militaries have gradually established closer communication and coordination. Interoperability seems to remain a much too ambitious objective and, in a war scenario, could well prove counter-productive. In fact, military cooperation and communication were never fully suspended after 1979. America maintained a signal intelligence facility on Yangmingshan, on the outskirts of Taipei, providing Taiwan’s National Security Bureau with vital information on China’s military.12 But during the 1996 missile crisis, the American military became aware not only of the weaknesses of the Taiwanese armed forces but also of the lack of proper direct communication

234 Jean-Pierre Cabestan between the US Pacific Command and the Taiwanese general staff. The situation had to be rectified. The surging cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries aims to provide them with an ability to better prepare and organize a coordinated reaction in the event of a military crisis or war in the Strait. It includes exchanges of intelligence, partial sharing of communication codes (datalinks), discussions on strategies and war scenarios, American assistance to and participation in Taiwanese military exercises (as in Hanguang 19 in 2003) and more training of Taiwanese military personnel in the United States.13 Visits of the Taiwanese defense minister and vice ministers to America in 2002 and 2003 (which included a trip to the Pentagon for Vice Ministers Kang Ning-hsiang and Lin Chong-pin) symbolize this growing coordination. The new American objective has also strongly increased the pressure on the Taiwanese armed forces to fulfill the requirements of their role more professionally, something that has created tensions between the two militaries in terms of weapon choices and strategic culture. America is willing to provide Taiwan with the capability to resist attack from China for one month (compared with supposedly two weeks today).14 At the same time, the Bush administration has intensified its demands for the Taiwanese government to buy in due course the numerous armaments offered in American arms packages. Facing mounting financial difficulties, Taipei is trying to slow down these purchases as well as select the equipment that is most needed (C4ISR or command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). This has generated friction with America and its powerful military industrial complex (which has been insisting, for instance, on the purchase of the Pac-3 system and the submarines). The message from America is clear: we will get more involved in Taiwan’s security but you have to do your homework, share the burden with us more equitably, and demonstrate to us your resolve in the defense of your own land. This hands-on attitude adopted by America has implications for regional missile defense systems. While it can be assumed that Taiwan will not formally take part in the system that America is planning to set up in East Asia (with Japan), Taiwanese territory cannot be artificially excluded. Washington is trying to persuade Taipei to acquire the Pac-3 in order to boost the island’s own low-altitude anti-missile capability. Both governments are aware that the Pac-2 and Pac-3 systems will never alone form an efficient umbrella against the missiles held by the PLA; primarily they provide some additional psychological security for Taiwan’s inhabitants – hence the criticism of some opposition legislators to this acquisition. While America has not excluded delivering its Aegis (navy-wide) systems to Taiwan at some point, the financial difficulties that the island is facing, and the on-going military debate, will probably delay such a sale to a distant future. In the meantime, Taipei has decided to reinforce or put underground a growing number of its military facilities and command-and-control

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 235 headquarters, and place its reliance on America’s theater-high-altitudearea-defense (THAAD) system when it is ready. Despite Beijing’s more moderate attitude towards America since September 11, the PLA is continuing its build-up against Taiwan. The most recent developments have triggered a growing American commitment to the defense of the island and the result, once again, is that the security of the mainland is weakened. Other countries and Taiwan’s security Other countries are obviously much less concerned about Taiwan’s security because they are not directly involved in it. The one exception is Japan. But the increasing military pressure exerted by China on Taiwan, in spite of a more generally accommodating foreign policy implemented by Beijing, as described by Jiann-fa Yan (see chapter 10), has contributed to creating a China threat syndrome that continues to influence policy not only in America but also in Asia and to some extent in Europe.15 Japan’s interest in the Taiwan Strait is another factor of insecurity for the People’s Republic. A close linkage exists between the growing threat against Taiwan posed by the PLA and the military policy pursued in Japan. The rise of China and the modernization of its armed forces have modified the sentiments of Japanese politicians and society towards its neighbor and helped strengthen the strategic alliance between Japan and America.16 While the 1996 Guidelines for America–Japan Defense Cooperation were drafted before the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait, their intention was to address the strategic changes in the region, in particular the North Korean issue and the implications of China’s military modernization. Although these guidelines did not, contrary to Beijing’s assertions at the time, extend the perimeter of intervention of the alliance, they have more clearly identified Taiwan as one of the “areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”17 Since the guidelines were published, Japan has decided to speed up its own military build-up. Between 2001 and 2005, it budgeted US$223 billion for military equipment (including two destroyers with the Aegis system, in addition to the two already in service, plus two small aircraft carriers). After September 11, it conducted the first overseas deployment of its navy, ordering three ships to the Indian Ocean in a show of support for the war against the Al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan. Japan also sent some 1,000 non-combatant troops to Iraq. Of course, Japan would try to limit its involvement in any armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait (probably to logistical assistance to the United States).18 Nevertheless, the mindset of Japanese politicians and military chiefs about their country’s role in the defense and security of Asia is rapidly changing under the impact of both the North Korean nuclear crisis and the PLA military build-up. A debate on the development of nuclear weapons underlines this evolution.

236 Jean-Pierre Cabestan These changes are not all directly linked to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. China’s rapid economic growth and rising power are the main forces that have provoked Japan’s military effort, which on the whole remains defensive (intended for the protection of sea lanes). Nevertheless, the growing risk of a military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait has also played a part in Japan increasing its defense expenditure and in aggravating an antiChina sentiment in Japan. If there were an armed conflict in the Strait, it is doubtful whether the new generation of Japanese leaders would be as shy as their predecessors about providing logistical support and perhaps taking part in the defense of Taiwan. In response to China’s military threat to Taiwan, Japan therefore already constitutes for the People’s Republic an additional factor that weakens China’s security. The perception in China that other American allies in the region, such as Australia, might potentially side with America and participate in an American military action against China in the Taiwan Strait may also be correct. Canberra’s readiness to cooperate with Washington’s missile defense project and to participate in the Iraq War underscores its profound ambivalence towards Beijing. As with Australia, any rise of tension in the Strait tends to close ranks around the world’s sole superpower. Europe, for its part, does not consider China a threat in the military sense, but rather in terms of human rights and the environment. As an illustration, the arms embargo decided on by the European Union following the crushing of China’s democracy movement headquartered in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 was based on humanitarian rather than security considerations. Since 2003, in order to resume what they hope will be profitable arms sales to China amid a current dearth of clients, some European governments, including the French, are trying to persuade other member states to repeal this sanction in the light of somewhat dubious improvements in the human rights situation. This point is worth mentioning because, since the mid1990s, the main reason for NATO’s ban on arms sales to China is no longer human rights but Taiwan, in spite of the official arguments still put forward by Brussels to resist Beijing’s pressure on this matter.19 Thus, while the embargo as such, perceived as a relic of post-Tiananmen China, will probably be lifted in the not too distant future, with the probable result that more European dual technologies (such as observation satellites) will end up in China, there is actually little chance, to the chagrin of Jacques Chirac’s pro-multipolarity France, that large European arms deals will be concluded with the People’s Republic. In June 1998, the European Union set up a “Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers” that “can prevent the export of weapons to repressive and non-democratic governments and halt sales to countries involved in regional tension.”20 And this Code of Conduct will be very probably strengthened before the embargo is lifted. In other words, the threatening posture adopted by the PLA against Taiwan also plays its part in undermining PRC security, as it is forced to purchase most of its weapons (90 percent from Russia, a country whose weapons industry has long encountered a great many difficulties).

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 237

China’s efforts to limit the negative impact of its threat to Taiwan The CCP leadership has developed several tactics to limit the negative impact of its military pressure on Taiwan. Indeed, some of these strategies have been firmly in place since the late 1970s. Despite several demonstrations of force, China avoided armed incidents and took a pragmatic approach to solving accidents. However, other strategies have emerged since George W. Bush’s election, but especially after the Chinese leadership realized that its aggressive posture and rhetoric towards Taiwan were counter-productive. By provoking the Taiwanese to elect Chen Shui-bian, and America to move from Clinton’s “constructive strategic partnership” to Bush’s “strategic competition,” the rhetoric was not having the desired effect – the very opposite in fact, as it was, again, serving only to undermine the mainland’s security. It was then that President Jiang Zemin and his colleagues decided to implement a number of changes, as detailed by Weixing Hu (see chapter 2). First, Beijing toned down its rhetoric on or towards Taiwan. Second, it accepted some sort of second-track dialogue with Taiwanese defense experts in multilateral settings. Third, since 2002 it has sought, if not a rapprochement, at least an understanding with America, especially on the question of its missile deployment targeted on Taiwan. And fourth, it has opened dialogues with third countries on Taiwan and on possible resolutions of the issue. However, given China’s continuing military build-up across from Taiwan, there is no certainty that these strategies have dramatically improved the level of external security enjoyed by the mainland. Before 2001: a manageable level of tension in the Strait In spite of the growing military pressure exerted by China on Taiwan and the multiple exercises that the PLA has conducted in the vicinity of the island, the Strait has enjoyed absolute peace since 1979. No exchanges of fire and no armed incidents have occurred. The People’s Republic has on the whole respected de facto the middle line in the Strait and between the offshore islands of Kinmen (Jinmen, Quemoy) and Matsu and the mainland. Although the term is unacceptable to Beijing, it has respected Taiwan’s jurisdiction (guanxia) over its “territorial waters.” Even during the (mini) crises that took place in the 1990s, the Chinese leadership was keen to prevent an outbreak of incidents. Every time there was an encounter between the ships of the two navies or the aircraft of the two air forces, the PLA avoided pushing its provocations too far. This kind of behavior also applies to the PRC’s “research ships” (or spy ships) that cruise around Taiwan and, increasingly frequently, along the eastern shore of the island. Every time such boats are identified and escorted out of the sensitive area where they are found by the Taiwanese navy, they leave without resistance.21 No less interesting is the way both sides, in the absence of any agreement, manage and try to solve disputes between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese

238 Jean-Pierre Cabestan fishermen. In the early 1990s, numerous incursions by PRC fishing boats into Taiwanese waters had to be intercepted by the ROC coastguard (around 300,000 between 1993 and 1995). Although such incidents have decreased, disputes continue to take place, forcing communication and some sort of cooperation between the PRC and ROC coastguards or maritime customs authorities. This cooperation has intensified in response to a surge in smuggling in the Strait, with the police forces of each side inspecting the boats under their respective jurisdictions.22 Finally, since the Kinmen Accord which, since 1991, has regulated the repatriation of PRC illegal immigrants from Taiwan, the two sides have constantly cooperated in sending back to the mainland any illegal immigrants caught trying to sneak into Taiwan. The SEF–ARATS talks played a part in this relaxation of tension; but, on the whole, these contacts have been the result rather than the cause of a “semi-détente” between the two sides. The growing economic and human contacts across the Strait have had a much bigger impact on the atmosphere of the PRC–ROC relationship. All in all, while intensifying its military threat against Taiwan, China has avoided tension in the Strait from getting out of control. Since 2001: decreasing the tension in the Strait and improving China’s image Nevertheless, just keeping the tension under control has not proved fully satisfactory. The more the PLA has accumulated modern, offensive weapons targeted against Taiwan, the more Beijing has needed to balance such a deployment of forces with diplomatic and para-diplomatic gestures. More moderate rhetoric and policy One of the most striking changes that has occurred since 2001 has been the toning down by China of its rhetoric on or towards Taiwan, with Beijing moderating its discourse first toward Washington and then toward Taipei. Of course, Bush’s characterization of the America–China relationship as “constructive, cooperative and candid” as early as October 2001 (at the APEC summit in Shanghai) made it easier for the PRC authorities to make such a move. However, in response to the more resolute posture towards Taiwan’s security adopted by Washington, a decision was made in Beijing not to answer in strong or emotional ways. The difference in attitude has been astonishing, not only in light of the American arms package to Taiwan in April 2001 or the visit by Chen Shuibian to New York later that year, but also in view of the growing coordination between the American and Taiwanese militaries. The new attitude also explains China’s rather subdued denunciation of the “one side, one country” initiative put forward by Chen Shui-bian in August 2002. Here again, the discreet but clear message of dissatisfaction sent by the Bush

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 239 administration to Taipei must have played a part in the PRC adoption of this restraint. At the same time, however, the cooperation that Clinton sought with China against Lee Teng-hui in 1999 did nothing at all to calm down the rhetoric voiced by Beijing and its show of force in the Strait. But 1999 was in many aspects a very special year in Sino-American relations, with Premier Zhu Rongji’s difficult visit to Washington in April and a NATO plane’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In fact, this evolution in approach illustrates the adoption of a somewhat more moderate Taiwan policy in the summer of 2000. At that time, Qian Qichen put forward a more flexible definition of the one-China principle, declaring that both the mainland and Taiwan are part of one China, aimed at initiating a rapprochement with the opposition parties in Taiwan and better relations with the United States.23 This policy has led Beijing to give a nod of agreement to the “mini-three direct links” that Chen Shui-bian decided to establish in January 2001 between the small offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the mainland, sea lanes which had been suspended since 1949, links that were supposed to prepare and facilitate the opening of direct sea and air links between Taiwan and China, as well as to depoliticize future talks on direct air and sea links between the island and the People’s Republic. Following the December 2001 legislative elections in Taiwan, China has also allowed some kind of communication to be established between Beijing and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. One of the probable effects of this less belligerent policy has also been the removal from the Taiwan Strait of some of the large-scale military exercises that the PLA organizes every year. For instance, in the winter of 2002–3, maneuvers were conducted in northeast China, where the PLA trained for a war in a cold and snowy environment, not one that it would encounter across the Strait, underlining the fact that Taiwan represents only one potential war zone among several. Similarly, in summer 2004, most of the PLA maneuvers loudly announced by Beijing were quietly called off. More openness to second-track dialogue Because Taiwan is a “non-state,” China has constantly opposed its participation in security and defense forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, in the last few years, Taiwanese experts have more frequently been able to participate in “second-track” meetings on regional security. This is the case at the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CISCAP) where, although they cannot take a role on the steering committee, Taiwanese delegates take part in several working groups, among them the one on regional security. More fruitful, perhaps at least initially, has been the initiative launched by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London to organize every year multilateral conferences attended by Asia-Pacific defense ministers and military specialists at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore.

240 Jean-Pierre Cabestan These encounters, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, were the occasion for military experts, if not defense ministers, from both the PRC and ROC governments to meet. That China agreed to send to the first conference that took place in May 2002 Zhan Maohai, a spokesman for the defense ministry, was unprecedented and can possibly be attributed to the fresh flexibility in PRC Taiwan policy. Attending from Taipei was Antonio Chiang Chun-nan, Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Council, a state institution that reports directly to the president. However, because of SARS, the second meeting in May 2003 did not attract any PRC top defense officials. And in 2004, probably because of Chen Shui-bian’s recent reelection, China decided not to send any prominent defense official either. Finally, it has become easier since 2001 for military and security experts of both sides to come together at academic discussions or in non-official settings. Some of these meetings take place in Hong Kong, others in the mainland or abroad. For instance, in October 2002, a KMT delegation headed by a former vice president of the Legislative Yuan visited China, where it met with military experts drawn from the National Defense University.24 But these new forms of dialogue are infrequent and unreliable and have not been able to replace the only strategic dialogue that really matters for the People’s Republic – one with the United States. Since Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in March 2004 and Taiwan’s legislative election in December 2004, China has remained reluctant to resume any talks across the Strait. Having dismissed Chen’s overtures, Beijing has continued to criticize an alleged “lack of sincerity.” True, in May 2004, China issued a statement that refrained from mentioning Deng Xiaoping’s “one China, two systems” formula. However, Jiang Zemin’s retirement from the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission and his replacement by Hu Jintao in September 2004 have not facilitated any change of policy. Hu’s need to get the support of PLA leaders may, on the contrary, convince him to show that he is even less ready to compromise on Taiwan. In any case, China seems more inclined to first reach some kind of understanding with the United States before contemplating the resumption of talks with Taiwan. President Chen’s 2004 failure to win a majority in the Taiwan Legislature may convince Beijing to wait until 2008 and the next national elections before reactivating any channel of formal communication with Taipei. Reaching out to the United States on missiles From the very beginning, the more moderate policy adopted by China towards Taiwan has been aimed primarily at the US. China’s missile deployment has become a growing issue for Washington. Beijing has also experienced increasing international pressure surrounding this problem. In October 2002, therefore, on his visit to President Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, Chinese President Jiang Zemin proposed negotiations to decrease

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 241 the number of missiles targeted against Taiwan in exchange for a suspension of US arms sales to the island. During the same visit, Jiang also acknowledged, as a concession to the US, an international dimension to the Taiwan issue. The US government took note of these remarks but did not react. A few months later, in February 2003, Taiwan’s pro-unification newspaper, The United Daily News (Lianhebao), reported that an undisclosed number of PLA missiles had just been moved away from Taiwan to China’s distant northwest,25 although this report was not confirmed by any reliable source, and it was suspected that its publication was designed to help the newly formed Lien Chan–Soong Chu-yu Taiwanese opposition coalition promote a better image of the People’s Republic on the island. Its timing, however, can be no coincidence. This offer should not be totally discounted. Of course, the US cannot accept the establishment of a direct linkage between a withdrawal of missiles and a decrease in its weapons sales to Taiwan. Its reluctance here is not simply based on the “Six Assurances” given by President Reagan to Taiwan in July 1982 (just before the signing of the Third Sino-American communiqué on the diminution of US arms sales to the island), including a guarantee that the US would not negotiate with Beijing on the nature or the amount of weapons offered to Taipei,26 but is also based on a concern that such a linkage may lead to the gradual disarmament and “Finlandization,” or neutralization, of Taiwan. Such options await larger changes in the politics of Chinese nationalism discussed by Edward Friedman (see chapter 11). The new offer put forward by Jiang to Bush could eventually favor the establishment of indirect confidence-building mechanisms across the Strait, as the US will continue to base its decisions on arms sales to Taiwan on the level of military threat posed by the PLA. The Bush administration has not closed its door to such an initiative, which indirectly acknowledges America’s interests in the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. Boosting dialogue with other countries on Taiwan The last initiative taken by the People’s Republic since 2001 has been to develop a variety of strategic dialogues not only with the US but also with other countries vis-à-vis Taiwan. This initiative has been aimed in particular at Japan and the European Union. For instance, in 2001–2, China’s Taiwan Affairs Bureau, with the help of the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs, organized a series of “second track” meetings with China experts from the US, Japan, and Europe, during which the Chinese side tried to gain a better understanding of the main concerns of the various countries regarding cross-Strait relations and the security situation created by the dispute between Beijing and Taipei. These meetings have not yielded a great many results so far. Nevertheless, they have made the Chinese authorities more aware of the security preoccupations of other governments

242 Jean-Pierre Cabestan and, hopefully, of China’s “rogue state” image generated by its threatening of Taiwan with missiles. If threatening Taiwan makes China seem a rogue state, China’s neighbors will warmly welcome the US military into the region, thereby weakening mainland security.

Conclusion Have the efforts invested by China to moderate its Taiwan policy (in particular since 2001) and alleviate some of the security concerns of the countries most involved in this part of the world, especially the US and Japan, been fruitful? In particular, have they improved the external security of the mainland? The increasing moderation of China’s Taiwan policy has had a positive impact on Sino-American, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-European relations, as well as, to some extent, cross-Strait relations. This moderation has probably helped convince the Bush administration to focus its pressures on Taiwan, in particular after its President Chen Shui-bian decided in late November 2003 to organize on March 20, 2004 (the same day as the presidential election) a “defensive referendum” on the PLA’s missile deployment towards Taiwan.27 At the same time, however, Taiwan and other countries have rapidly come to experience the limitations of China’s moderation. Rifts surrounding ROC representation at the World Health Organization (WHO) or even the World Trade Organization (WTO) are reminders that the People’s Republic is not ready to compromise on the existence of the Taiwanese (or Republic of China) state. More importantly, the PLA’s military build-up opposite Taiwan has continued at a steady pace. True, the gradual integration of the economies of the two countries, and to some extent their societies, and a steady increase of contacts, whatever their nature, between the political elites on both sides have been conducive to a relaxation of tension in the Strait. In the absence of government-togovernment relations and in view of the slow progress of Sino-American talks on PLA missiles, these factors are today probably the best confidencebuilding measures that it will be possible to establish between Beijiing and Taipei in the foreseeable future. Can confidence-building measures resolve the situation in the Strait? They have usually played their (modest) role of tension managers or moderators most successfully between two countries or groups of countries of comparative military strength (e.g. between NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact). But the PRC and ROC militaries are of unequal size and the gap will only widen, with the PLA acquiring a clear edge over the Taiwanese armed forces in the foreseeable future. In such circumstances, would it be in the interest of Taipei to embark on such talks? The answer can only be affirmative if the PLA agrees not simply to remove its weapons, in particular its missiles, but also to dismantle them, a very unlikely decision for the time being. Even if such an initiative were

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 243 taken, in exchange, say, for a provisional political settlement across the Strait, how much would it affect the global bilateral military balance? In other words, which other offensive weapons (from both sides) would have to be included in the negotiation basket? And finally, how can Taiwan be brought into such talks if the People’s Republic continues to refuse direct security contacts with the ROC government? This series of questions brings us to the root of the current military tension in the Taiwan Strait. This tension is not caused by the desire among the Taiwanese to declare independence. Only a minority of the island’s citizens, including a minority of the DPP, would approve of such an unnecessary move, as the Republic of China is already an independent state. The tension results both from the PRC refusal to acknowledge that the Republic of China did not die for good in 1949, and also from the military threat that China has put together in order to support this “myth” that the Republic of China is dead and buried. The Republic of China is a state which, though reduced and altered since the foundation of the People’s Republic, has survived on a part of the old Manchu empire, the island of Taiwan. In other words, Beijing cannot have it both ways. If China refuses to recognize the Republic of China’s reality, it then pushes the Taiwanese into a gradual divorce from any kind of political, if not cultural, Chineseness. To prevent such an eventuality, China then has to continue to threaten Taiwan militarily. In so doing, however, China will not only perpetuate the strategic dilemma with the US that it has created but it will never win the hearts of the Taiwanese. Alternatively, China accepts at least the de facto existence of the Republic of China on Taiwan, as a Chinese Republic, and offers it a space in the Chinese nation that is both attractive and safe. As long as it does not take up the latter option, the People’s Republic will see its external security weakened, not only because no nation has ever been persuaded to enter into a marriage with another nation under the threat of a growing number of missiles, but also because China’s current course affects its regional environment and has the potential to destabilize the entire AsiaPacific region. In such circumstances, how can external actors contribute to keeping peace across the Taiwan Strait? First, not only the United States and Japan but also more distant actors such as the European Union should increase their pressure on China to convince it to freeze and possibly dismantle the weapon systems amassed near the Taiwan Strait. Second, these actors should also intensify their pressure to persuade Beijing to resume unconditional talks with Taipei, since “one China” is rather an objective (and a diplomatic fiction) than a reality on the ground. Third, they should also make clear to the Taiwanese authorities that any departure from ROC institutions and symbols, any rewriting of Taiwan’s history as a non-Chinese entity, would only contribute to increasing the tension in the Strait and decreasing any prospect for peace. Finally, external actors should help the

244 Jean-Pierre Cabestan Taiwanese pan-green parties’ leaders and militants to get a better knowledge of the PRC reality, embrace economic integration, and open direct sea and air links with it instead of stimulating Taiwanese nationalism and concentrating their efforts on an illusory reintegration of Taiwan as an independent state in the international community. This does not mean that Taiwan’s international status cannot eventually be improved. But such an improvement can only be made through a negotiation with Beijing, possibly with the participation of other external actors in a multilateral setting, and an acceptance that the Republic of China is part, if not of the People’s Republic, at least of a Chinese nation.

Notes 1 496 missiles was the figure revealed by Chen Shui-bian in early December 2003 in order to win support for his “defensive referendum” initiative. Before that, the figure usually provided was 450 missiles; see Taipei Times, December 2, 2003. In February 2005, Chen Shui-bian announced that 706 missiles were pointed at Taiwan, Central News Agency, March 1, 2005. 2 Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Military Agenda Towards Taiwan, CAPS Papers, No. 24, Taipei, November 1998, pp. 177–191. 3 Mingbao, 20 July 2000, p. B15 and 22 July 2000, p. A15. See also Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait,” Daxiyangguo, Revista Portuguesa de Estudos Asiaticos, 2003, No. 3, pp. 67–80. 4 This section is inspired by the first part of Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Chine –Taiwan: la guerre est-elle concevable?, Paris, Economica, 2003. 5 Zhan Jun, Ending the Chinese Civil War, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 6 On December 1, 2003, Chen said China had deployed 496 missiles, including 96 missiles each in Leping and Ganxian in Jiangxi Province, Meizhou in Guangdong Province, as well as 144 in Yongan and 64 in Xianyou in Fujian Province, but he did not specify the type of missile deployed; see Taipei Times, December 2, 2003. 7 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, Taipei, Ministry of National Defense, 2002, p. 68 ; see also Su Tzu-yun, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Defense Strategy and Defense Concept of Taiwan New Administration,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, No. 1, October 2000, p. 130. 8 South China Morning Post, July 8, 2003, p. A6. 9 On this subject, see Robert Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Towards Beijing and Taipei,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36, August 2003, pp. 477–492. 10 This last point was confirmed by the US Nuclear Posture Review, made public in March 2002; see Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002. 11 Jiefangjunbao, April 30, 2001; Wenhuibao, May 3, 2001, p. A8. 12 Taipei Times, January 18, 2003, p. 4; Asia Times Online, 6 March 2003. 13 In January 2003, a leak revealed that some US militaries would take an active part in these exercises. Presented by the United States as an “evacuation taskforce” to calm down Peking, this latter information has stirred up resentment both in Taiwan and in the United States; see Zhongguo Shibao (China Times), January 2, 2003 (electronic version). 14 Wenhuibao (Hong Kong), December 3, 2002, p. A8. 15 Herbert Yee and Ian Storey eds., The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

Marginalizing Taiwan weakens mainland security 245 16 Wenran Jiang, “The Japanese Assessment of the ‘China Threat’,” in Yee & Storey, eds., The China Threat, pp. 150–161. 17 On this issue, see Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin eds., The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, New York, The Council of Foreign Relations, 1999. 18 Thomas Christensen, “China, the US–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, p. 69, note 59 and p. 74. 19 International Herald Tribune, October 14, 2003, p. 3. 20 See http://www.basicinc.org/WT/armsexp/codes/htm 21 Mingbao, May 28, 2000, p. A10 and April 16, 2002, p. B14; South China Morning Post, October 13, 2002, p. 6. The Xiangyanghong No. 14 is a familiar visitor to these waters. 22 For instance, in May 2001, the ROC navy intervened to assist a Taiwanese fishing boat arrested by a PRC custom ship which suspected it to be smuggling gas oil to mainland fishermen. After a nine-hour confrontation/negotiation, an agreement was reached “on the sea,” each party accepting inspection and the possibility of taking legal action against the boats under its jurisdiction. See Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2001, p. 4. 23 Mingbao, July 14, 2000, p. B17. 24 Wenhuibao, October 15, 2002, p. A20. 25 Lianhebao, February 20, 2003, p. 1. 26 Harvey Feldman, “Taiwan, Arms Sales, and the Reagan Assurances,” The American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 75–101. 27 On 9 December, sitting by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the White House, Bush indicated his hostility to any “unilateral change of the status quo” by the leader of Taiwan; see Taiwan News, December 11, 2003, p. 1.

Index

Note: “n.” after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page. Aborigines, Taiwanese 17 n. 2, 20 n. 21, 115 Afghanistan 77 African National Congress 43 Agenda 21: 114 aid: isolation of Taiwan 49, 51, 54–5, 85, 130; network society 130, 135; Taiwan’s WHO membership campaign 72–3, 74, 76–8 AIDS/HIV xxiii, 75, 77 All China Women’s Federation 118, 119, 122 Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines 115 Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan 137 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) 96 Amnesty International 115, 122 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 58, 70, 168, 172 n. 36 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): China’s active involvement 30; Taiwan’s isolation 54, 58, 70; Taiwan’s participation 157, 168, 209 Asia-Pacific geostrategic value of Taiwan 201–2: China’s rapid rise 193–4; one China as principle or issue 196–9; Taiwan’s nightmare as threat for AsiaPacific region 194–5; temporary maintenance of status quo 199–201 Asia-Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy 136 Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) 99, 229, 238 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 70: ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 194; ASEAN Plus Three dialogues 3, 194; ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 239; China’s active participation in regional integration 194; China’s “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation” 30; Taiwan’s isolation 56; Taiwan’s participation 209 Australia 90, 93, 95, 98, 236

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 167 Belize 56, 72 Bellochi, Nat 210 Bhumibol, King of Thailand 101 Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 114 Brown, Melissa xvii Burghardt, Raymond F. 191 n. 25 Burkina Faso 77 Bush, George H. W. (Sr) 59 Bush, George W. (Jr): American unilateralism 194; China’s military threat 205, 220, 222; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 230, 231–4, 237, 238–9, 241, 242; one China policy 201; political–economic paradox 23; Taiwan’s isolation 50, 59, 71; war on terror 195, 196, 198 Canada 88, 94, 95 Care France 77 Carter, Jimmy 96 Castells, Manuel 131–3, 135, 136, 139 Chad 77 charity 121; see also aid Cheng Ch’eng-kung 5–6 Chen Shui-bian: CCP propaganda xxi; China’s military threat 206, 212–13, 215–20, 222; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 230, 237, 238–9, 240; constitution, call for a new 151; international media’s depiction of xxi; irresponsibility xvii; nationalism 17 n. 3; network society 131, 133, 135, 136–7, 138–9, 141; “one China” principle xxi; political–economic paradox 22, 23, 32, 35; supporter denounced by CCP xviii; Taiwanization of Taiwan 102–4; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 195, 197–8, 199, 202; Taiwan’s isolation 41, 52, 53–4, 55, 58; UN membership issue 176, 185, 186–7; WHO membership campaign 72, 75, 80, 157, 189

Index 247 Chen Yi 10 Chiang Ching-kuo 3, 98, 130, 174, 207 Chiang Chun-nan, Antonio 240 Chiang Kai-shek: America’s dialogue with 223; China’s military threat 207; death 95; February 28th Incident 10; network society 110; “one China” principle 174, 175; San Francisco Treaty (1951) 197; Taiwanese nationalism 6; Taiwan’s association with international organizations 68; Taiwan’s isolation 86, 88, 94, 95; UN 69, 175 Chile 88–9 China Disabled Persons’ Federation 123 China Society for Human Rights Studies 122 Chinese Association for Human Rights 113, 115 Chinese Communist Party (CCP): alienation of Taiwan xxiv; Chen supporter denounced xviii; Chinese Civil War (1949) 5; civil society 110, 120, 122, 124, 125; corruption, and spread of AIDS xxiii; democratic autonomy for Taiwan xviii, xix; fear of being too soft toward Taiwan xviii; nationalism xxiii, 3; network society 133, 139, 140–1; “one China” principle 174; policy change toward Taiwan, need for xxi; political– economic paradox 22, 23; Realist model 131; security of mainland 227, 237; Sixteenth Congress 22, 23, 25; Taiwanese nationalism 6, 12, 13; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 198, 199, 200; Taiwan’s identity xx; Taiwan’s isolation 48, 50, 52, 95; Taiwan’s provocation xvii; war, threat of 205–8, 211–13, 215–16, 218–20, 222, 224 Chirac, Jacques 236 Chow Shu-kai 90–1, 94 Churchill, Winston 95 civil society 110, 123–5: and global governance 110–12; impact of Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic isolation 116–20; transnationalization of China’s NGO community 120–3; transnational participation by Taiwan 112–16 Civil War, Chinese (1949) 5 Clinton administration: China’s military threat 210–12, 213, 214, 216; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 230, 232, 233, 237, 239; Taiwan’s isolation 50, 59, 101; Taiwan’s UN membership campaign 191 n. 25 Cold War 6 consumer culture 15 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 117 Coordination Council for North American Affairs 96 corruption 114, 116

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 114; see also Transparency International Costa Rica 56 Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CISCAP) 239 Czech Republic 100 dangwai 4, 13–14, 15, 130 de facto states 150 de Gaulle, Charles 87 de Klerk, F.W. 43 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): Chen’s chairmanship 41; China’s military threat 211, 212, 215, 221, 239; founding 98; Legislative Yuan election (2004) 17 n. 3; nationalism 17 n. 1; network society 131, 136, 137; political–economic paradox 22, 23, 25; presidential election (2004) 17 n. 3; supporters xviii; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 196–7, 198, 201; Taiwan’s isolation 41–2, 47, 52–6, 58; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 150–1, 159; UN membership issue 71, 175–6, 185; WHO membership campaign 188 Deng Xiaoping: economic development and national reunification 32; nationalism 223; Taiwan’s integration 198; Taiwan’s isolation 59; war, threat of 205, 206–7, 209, 214 developmental state model 27 divided-nation model 27–8, 159 dollar diplomacy, Taiwan 100–1 Dominca, Commonwealth of 54 Dominican Republic 72 Dutch East India Company 5 earthquakes: India (2001) 77, 135; Taiwan (1999) 72, 74, 79, 124, 143 n. 17, 163; Turkey (1999) 77–8 East Asian Women’s Forum 119, 122 East Timor 123 Ebola virus 75 economic integration 33–5: see also political–economic paradox economic sanctions 43 Eden Social Welfare Foundation 115 Egypt 49 Eighties, The (Bashi niandai) 97 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 226 n. 41 Eisenstadt, S.N. 140 El Salvador 72 enterovirus type-71: 74 entrepreneurs, Taiwanese 26 environmental issues 114 Environmental Quality Protection Foundation 115, 118 Equatorial Guinea 89 Ethiopia 89 ethnic relations, Taiwan 4

248 Index European Union 55, 202, 236, 241, 243 exports, from Taiwan to China 24, 25 Falun Gong movement 120 family planning program, Taiwan 77 fatherland complex, Han Chinese consciousness 9 Fauré, Edgar 87 February 28th Incident 10–13, 62, 102, 217, 223 Federal Republic of Germany 95 Fiji 51 fishing disputes 238 Fishman, Ted xvii Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 161 Ford Foundation 121 foreign direct investment (FDI) in China 30 Formosa (Meilidao) 97 foundations 113 France 58, 59, 87–8, 89, 231, 236 free-trade agreements/areas (FTAs) 30, 55–6, 60 Friedman, Thomas L. 163 Fujian 6, 230 functionalism 28 Gambia 72 Gao Yaojie xxiii Geldenhuys, Deon 42 geostrategic value of Taiwan see AsiaPacific geostrategic value of Taiwan Global Alliance for Democracy and Peace (GADP) 136 Global Fund to Fight AIDS 77 global governance: civil society 110–12; functionalist approach to 160, 161; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 152, 160–4 globalization: China the chief beneficiary of 218; civil society 110; index 163–4; of infectious diseases 75; network society 132, 133; Taiwanese nationalism 7, 15; Taiwan’s isolation 45; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 155, 157, 163, 164 Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict xxiv government organized NGOs (GONGOs) 120–3 Great Britain 58, 86, 94, 95 Greece 89 Guatemala 49, 56 Guidelines for National Unification (GNU) 170–1 n. 13, 178 Gulf War (1991) 49, 213 Hakka 8, 17 n. 2, 20 n. 21 Hamashita, Takeshi 7 Hamilton, Lee H. 191 n. 25

Hamrin, Carol Lee xxi Han dynasty 6, 7, 9, 12, 217 Han Lih-wu (Hang Liwu) 89 Hanyu Pinyin Mandarin transliteration system 138 Harding, Harry 34–5 Hau, Pei-tsun 99 health insurance system, Taiwan 78 health issues 72–81; see also World Health Organization Himalaya Foundation 124 Hirschman, Albert O. 33 HIV/AIDS xxiii, 75, 77 Hoklo 8 Honda Motor Company 193 Honduras 72 Hong Kong: China’s loss of 217; civil society 117, 123; “one nation, two systems” 102, 159; rejection of anti-subversion bill 200; “self-rule” promise xviii; UK–China relations 86; WTO membership 167 Hua Guofeng 95 Huang Wen-hsiung 114 Hu Jintao 221, 222, 224, 240 human rights issues 114–15, 122, 184 Hume, David 206 Hungary 55 identity, Taiwanese xx, xxiv, 4, 6, 9, 15–16, 57, 62, 102–4, 188, 221 imports to China from Taiwan 24, 25 India 77 information technology sector, Taiwan 163, 164 integration theory 27, 28 intellectuals, and Taiwanese consciousness 9, 14 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) 152 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 161 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 115 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 161, 162 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 115 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 115 International Foundation for Science 51 international governmental organizations (IGOs): global governance 111; Taiwan’s participation in 149–69, 187–8; Taiwan’s politico-diplomatic isolation 117–128, 120; see also specific IGOs International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) 167 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 239–40

Index 249 International Labor Organization (ILO) 161, 162 international law 115–16 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 161, 162, 167 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 69, 161–2, 187 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs): global governance 111, 112; Taiwan’s participation in 156; Taiwan’s politicodiplomatic isolation 117–20; transnationalization of China’s statedominated community 121–3; transnational participation 112–16; see also specific INGOs International Research Foundation for Development 118 Interpol 167 investment in China from Taiwan 24–5 isolation of Taiwan xix, xx, 41–2, 61–3, 68–70, 85: after DPP came to power 52–6; before DPP came to power 47–52; Britain’s upgrading of its ties 94; Canada, Italy and Chile’s recognition of PRC 88–9; China’s security weakened by 227–44; civil society 112, 114, 116–20; early years (1949–1963) 85–6; France’s recognition of PRC 87–8; impacts and side-effects 56–60; indicators 42–3; Japan, West Germany, Australia and New Zealand’s recognition of PRC 94–5; Kissinger’s visits to China 89–94; models 43–7; Taiwanization of Taiwan (1988–2003) 98–104; typology 42–7; UN membership issue xix, 13, 41, 44–5, 47–9, 54, 58, 68–71, 89–94; US break in relations (1979–1988) 97–8; US’s recognition of PRC 95–6; WHO 70–81 Israel 43, 44–7, 61, 200 Italy 88 Japan: aid to China 51; China as global factory and market 193; China’s military threat 205, 214; and Chinese nationalism xxii–xxiii; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 228, 235–6, 241–2, 243; economic cooperation with China 195; post-WWII Western Pacific 223; recognition of China 94–5; and Taiwanese nationalism 5, 6, 8–10, 11–13, 14; Taiwan’s health care 76; Taiwan’s isolation 44, 55, 58, 90, 93; Taiwan’s WHO membership campaign 72; “unforgettable others” 4–5; US–Japan Alliance 17 n. 1; US troops’ withdrawal from Taiwan 90 Jiang Zemin: China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 237, 241; Eight Points policy 101; political–economic paradox

23, 25, 31; retirement 240; Taiwan’s isolation 56, 101; urged to take militarized approach xvii; war, threat of 209–12, 214–16, 218–19, 221, 222 Jia Qingguo 221 Johnston, Alastair Iain 140 Jordan 49 Kang Ning-hsiang 97, 234 Kangxi, Emperor 5–6 Kaohsiung Incident 97, 102, 103; see also Meilidao Incident Kim Il Song 223 Kinmen Accord 238 Kissinger, Henry 69, 89–90, 93, 94, 207, 211 Kokugaku thought 4 Koo Chen-fu 100, 101, 213 Korea 9 Korea Council of Citizens’ Movements 119 Korean War 6, 86 Kosovo 213, 216 Krasner, Stephen D. 150, 157 Kuomintang (KMT): China’s military threat 207, 212, 215; civil society 113, 114, 118, 122; February 28th Incident 10, 217, 223; Kaohsiung Incident 97; Mao’s atmospherics of war 206; nationalism 3–4, 6, 12, 13–14, 15; network society 130, 133, 141; presidential election (2000) 52; presidential election (2004) 17 n. 3; Taiwanization of Taiwan 98–100; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 196; Taiwan’s isolation 41, 58, 85, 88, 89, 94, 97–8; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 68, 150, 151, 159; UN membership issue 71, 175, 176, 178–84, 185, 186; visit of delegation to China (2002) 240 Kyoto Protocol 115 Lam, Willy xvii language reform 9, 20 n. 25 Latin America 51 Latvia 100 Lee Huan 99 Lee Teng-hui: cardiac treatment in Japan 55; CCP propaganda xxi; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 229, 230; irresponsibility xvii; network society 130, 133, 137–8, 141; pragmatic diplomacy policy 47, 69, 85; recognition of Taiwan 175; Taiwanization of Taiwan 98–102; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 195, 196, 197; Taiwan’s isolation 58; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 151; UN membership issue xix, 176, 178, 184; visit to US 17 n. 1, 31, 50, 101, 210, 239; war, threat of 207–8, 209–15, 217

250 Index Lee Yuan-chu 54 Lian Chan 17 n. 3 liberalism versus realism in China’s Taiwan strategy 30–3 Liberia 54, 100 Lie, Trygve 68 Lien Chan 241 Life Conservationist Association (LCA) 117 Lim, Benjamin Kang xvii Lin Chong-pin 234 Lions Club International (LCI) 52, 56, 118–19, 121 Li Peng 208, 219 literature 9, 12–13 Liu Chieh 93 Lou, Eric 115 Lu, Annette 41, 55, 136 Macao 117, 167 Macedonia 53, 100 Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan 99, 100 malaria eradication programs 77 Malawi 77 Manchu empire 5, 6, 7, 9, 217 Mandela, Nelson 43 Mandelbaum, Michael 205 Mao Zedong: death 95, 178; Great Leap Forward 87; isolation of China 88; policy on Taiwan 206, 223, 224; radicalism 86; San Francisco Treaty (1951) 197; Taiwanese nationalism 6, 13; Taiwan’s integration 198 Marquand, Robert xvii Ma Ying-jeou 138 media, international xxi Meilidao Incident 13–14; see also Kaohsiung Incident military force, China’s dilemma on using 205–7, 220–2: crisis (1999) 213–16; Deng, Lee and Clinton create a crisis 207-13; mainland security 227–44; nationalism 222–4; peaceful modus vivendi 218–20; war passions 216–18 military isolation of Taiwan 43, 45, 50–1, 53–5, 58–9 Ming dynasty 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 131, 133–5, 136 minjian organizations 113 Minnanese 8 Mitani, Hiroshi 4 modernity, multipolar 139–41 modernization, political–economic paradox 32 Montevideo Convention, statehood criteria 149–50, 151, 186 Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the

Western and Central Pacific (MHLC) 157 multipolar modernity 139–41 Murdoch, Rupert 132 Mutual Defense Treaty (1954) 86 Mwanatambwe, Milanga 78 Nai-teh Wu 14 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 135 national health insurance system, Taiwan 78 nationalism: Chinese xxii–xxiv, 3, 5, 7, 15, 104, 206, 216–19, 222–4; Japanese 4–5, 8; Korean 9; Taiwanese 3–16, 104 Nationalist Party see Kuomintang National Unification Council, Taiwan 99 National Unification Guidelines (NUG) 170–1 n. 13, 178 NATO 236, 239 Nauru 41, 53–4, 100 neofunctionalism 28 Netherlands 50, 231 network society 130–3, 141–2: Chinese vision of “multipolar modernity” 139–41; “people’s diplomacy” 133–9 New Zealand 93, 95 Nicaragua 51, 72 Ning-hsiang Kang 15 Nixon, Richard 90, 207, 209 non-governmental organizations (NGOs): isolation of Taiwan xxiv, 43, 44, 45, 49, 56, 60; network society 133–7, 140; political–economic paradox 26; Taiwan’s participation 151–5; transnational activities 110–25 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 236, 239 North Korea 6, 235 Opium War 5 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 70 Ortega, Daniel 51 Oxfam 121 Pacific Basin Economic Community (PBEC) 70 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) 70 Pacific War 6 Pakistan 217 Palau 72 Panama 56 Papua New Guinea 51, 100–1 Paraguay 56 Pegg, Scott 150 “people’s diplomacy” 133–9 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 208, 222, 227, 229–43

Index 251 People’s Movement for Human Rights Education 117–18 “peripherity” of Taiwan 5–8, 9, 14, 16 Persian Gulf Crisis (1991) 49, 213 pharmaceutical industry, Taiwan 78 Philippines 205 political–economic paradox 16, 22–6, 35, 164, 175: Beijing’s “transnational” approach and “trading state” strategy 29–30; economic integration and reunification 33–5; liberalism versus realism 30–3; “transnational” dimension of cross-Strait relationship 26–9 Potsdam Declaration 94–5 psycho-cultural perspective, political– economic paradox 27 public health issues 72–81; see also World Health Organization Puerto Rico 167 Qiandao Lake Incident xvii, 101 Qian Qichen 194, 213, 239 Qing dynasty 5, 6, 7 quasi-states 150 Ramos, President 101 Reagan administration 50, 59, 241 realism 30–3, 131 religious groups as agents of change 26 Rogers, William P. 91–2, 93 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 223 Rosecrance, Richard 29–30, 33 Russia 200, 236; see also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sanctions, economic 43 Sandinista government 51 San Francisco Treaty (1951) 197 São Tomé and Principe 7 SARS see Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Saudi Arabia 50–1, 58, 100 Save the Children International 121 Sciences Citations Index 130 Senegal 77 September 11 terrorist attacks 23, 25, 195 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): economic impact 193; network society 137; Taiwan’s isolation 54–5, 62, 102, 187; Taiwan’s WHO membership campaign 72–5, 79–80, 157 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 30 Shangri-La Dialogue 240 Shih, Stanley 219 Shimonoseki, Treaty of 217 Shi Yinhong 31, 32 Showa emperor xxiii Singapore 59, 195 Sino-Japanese War, first 6

Song Feiru 11 Soong, James 138 Soong Chu-yu 241 South Africa 43, 44–6, 58, 61 South Korea 58, 195 South Pacific Forum 70 Soviet Union 98, 230 Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) 99, 229, 238 Suharto, President 101 sui generis model of IGO participation 165–9 Surinam 98 Swaziland 77 Switzerland 187 Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) 114, 115 Taiwan Democracy Foundation (TDF) 136 Taiwanese Enslavement theory 11–12 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 17 n. 3, 137–8, 139 Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–96) 25, 26 Tanner, Henry 93 Tibet 123 Tien Hung-mao 131, 133 Tokelau 167 Tongyong Pinyin system 138 trade balance 24 “trading state” strategy 29–30 transliteration systems 138 transnational civil society 110, 123–5: China’s state-dominated NGO community 120–3; and global governance 110–12; Taiwan’s participation 112–16; Taiwan’s politicodiplomatic isolation 116–20 transnational dimension of cross-Strait relations 26–30 transnational politics paradigm 28–9 Transparency International (TI) 114; see also corruption Transparency Taiwan (TT) 114, 115–16 Tributary System 131–2 Truman, Harry S. 95, 226 n. 41 Tseng, Ovid 137–8 tuberculosis 75 Turkey 49, 77–8 Tzu Chi Buddhist Charity Foundation 117, 124 Uighur Muslims 216, 217 UNESCO 161, 162 “unforgettable others” 4–5, 9, 12, 14, 16 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 98, 230; see also Russia United Kingdom 58, 86, 94, 95 United Nations: China’s entry 86, 94; civil society 115, 116–18, 121, 123;

252 Index Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) 116, 117; Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 116; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 117; economic sanctions 43; functional competence 160, 161; global governance 111, 112; isolation of South Africa 43, 44; Taiwan’s membership issue xix, 13, 41, 44–5, 47–9, 54, 58, 68–71, 89–94, 174–89; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 152, 156, 160, 161, 164 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 161, 162 United States of America: Asian balance of power xxiii; China as global factory and market 193; China’s anti-Taiwan nationalism xxiii; China’s discourse on Taiwan xxiv; China’s military threat 205, 207–22; China’s security and Taiwan’s marginalization 228–43; France’s recognition of China 87–8; Korean War 6; Lee Teng-hui’s visit 17, 31, 50, 101, 210, 239; Mutual Defense Treaty (1954) 86, 96, 97; network society 138, 139, 140–1; political–economic paradox 23, 25, 31–2, 35; recognition of Beijing 95–6; Taiwan Relations Act 96, 233; Taiwan’s geostrategic value 194–6, 198–202; Taiwan’s isolation xx, 44–5, 50, 53, 55, 58–9, 70–1, 86, 89–93, 97–8; Taiwan’s participation in international organizations 150; UN, and Taiwan’s membership issue 69, 70–1, 174, 189, 191 n. 25; unilateralism 194, 202; US–Japan Alliance 17 n. 1; WHO, and Taiwan’s membership campaign 72, 74, 80; Wu Shu-chen’s visit 135 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 184 Vatican 53, 100, 167–8 volunteering 121 vote-maximizing model 27 vulnerability interdependence concept 33–4 Wang, Fu-chang xviii Wang Daohan 100, 101, 102

war, threat of 205–7, 220–2: crisis (1999) 213–16; Deng, Lee and Clinton create a crisis 207–13; nationalism 222–4; peaceful modus vivendi 218–20; war passions 216–18 Wen Jiabao 30 Western Sahara 51 West Germany 95 “White Terror” 12 Whitlam, Gough 95 Women Awakening Foundation 116 women’s rights 116, 122 World Anti-Communist League 113 World Bank 68–9, 187 World Customs Organization (WCO) 167 World Health Organization (WHO): global governance 161, 162; membership conditions 187; SARS outbreak 54–5, 62; Taiwan’s isolation 49, 54–5, 58, 68, 69, 70–81, 156–7, 187, 188–9 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 167 World League for Freedom and Democracy 136 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 167 World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002) 112 World Tourism Organization (WTO) 167 World Trade Organization (WTO): China’s accession and assimilation 30, 194; Taiwan’s isolation 49, 54, 56, 58, 60; Taiwan’s participation 70, 152, 155–7, 167–8, 187–8 World Vision 121 World War II 6 World Wide Fund for Nature 121 Wu Shu-chen 135–6 Yang Shangkun 208 Yan Xuetong 32 Yen Chia-kan 98 Yu Kuo-hua 99 Yun-han Chu 35 Yu Shyi-kun 55, 141 Zhang Mingqing 83 n. 49 Zhang Nianchi 23, 32 Zhang Qiyue 171 n. 30 Zhan Maohai 240 Zhao Ziyang 51 Zhou Enlai 86, 88, 89–90, 93, 95 Zhu Ronji 239