Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

BUILDING TERRORISM RESISTANT COMMUNITIES

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 55

ISSN 1874-6276

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities Together Against Terrorism

Edited by

Sıddık Ekici University of North Texas Police Major, Turkish National Police

Ahmet Ekici Chief Superintendent, Turkish National Police

David A. McEntire University of North Texas

Richard H. Ward University of New Haven

and

Sudha S. Arlikatti University of North Texas

Amsterdam • Berlin • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities Washington D.C., USA 26–27 September 2008

© 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-60750-006-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2009924873 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface This book includes the proceedings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2008 Advanced Research Workshop (ARW), titled “Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities.” The workshop was held in Washington D.C. on September 26–27, 2008, and was planned and organized by Sıddık Ekici from Turkey and Lindita Caci from Albania, with excellent sponsorship from NATO. This event was also co-sponsored by the University of North Texas (UNT); the College of Public Affairs and Community Service (PACS) at UNT; and the Department of Public Administration (PADM) at UNT. Distinguished participants representing twelve different countries (from the academia and law enforcement communities) were in attendance. The goal of the meeting was to explore methods to involve the community in the fight against terrorism in an effort to enhance its protection from terrorist attacks and to establish a network between the participants for future collaborations. Not only was there a comprehensive series of highly relevant presentations on strengthening the community against terrorism, but the meeting also provided an opportunity to share mutual concerns and meet academicians and practitioners in the field. The workshop was organized around two main topics: 1. 2.

Defining the problem of terrorism and collective community protection Counter-terrorism practices and their relation to the community

On the first topic, attendees presented their studies related, in particular, to why terrorism exists and why people join and/or support extremist groups. Although the studies were problem-oriented, at the conclusion of each presentation, suggestions were offered on how to diminish the threat. The second topic represented studies that primarily focused on developing non-orthodox methods to combat terrorism. In other words, the researchers presented their arguments as to why communities should be included in the fight against terrorism. In addition, suggestions were made concerning how this integration could be achieved and what kind of limitations could exist in the cooperation between law enforcement and the community. Following the classification of studies received, the articles contained in this book were categorized into three parts: 1. 2. 3.

Terrorism and its Causes Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism Civil Society and Counter Terrorism Operations

It is hoped that this book will be a guide for policy makers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of how counter terrorism, as well as many other applications, require community support and involvement to the fullest extent possible. Because the existing threat of terrorism is proof of the failed classical militaristic approaches, the time has come to integrate our communities into the practice of fighting the threat

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together. Certainly, the integration of communities in counter terrorism policies bears some limitations. Therefore, attempts to counter terrorism together with our communities should be in accordance with the suggestions and recommendations offered in such and/or possible future studies. Sıddık Ekici March 2009

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About the Editors Sıddık Ekici, ABD, is a Police Major in the Turkish National Police. He received his M.S. degree from the Criminal Justice Department at the University of North Texas. His Ph.D. studies are focused on human needs that cause individuals to join terror groups in general and specific groups in particular. He is the author of Family Dynamics and the Runaway Problem: An Assessment on the Impact of Family Dynamics on the Runaway Problem among Teenagers, and the Co-Editor of Understanding and Responding to Terrorism. His research interest includes: security, policy development and emergency management studies. [email protected] Dr. Ahmet Ekici is a Chief Superintendent in the Turkish National Police. He has been in the agency for 15 years. He obtained his M.A at Kent State University, Ohio and Ph.D. at Sam Houston State University, TX. His studies are focused on policing issues, ethics, and management. Dr. David A. McEntire is an Associate Dean in the College of Public Affairs and Community Service. He teaches emergency management in the Department of Public Administration. He is the author of Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective (Wiley). His research interests include emergency management theory, disaster response, homeland security, and international disasters. [email protected]. Dr. Richard Ward is currently the Dean of the Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences. A former New York City Detective, besides numerous other books and articles on international crime and terrorism he is the co-author of: Criminal Investigation: A Method for Reconstructing the Past (5th edition); and Homeland Security: An Introduction. [email protected] Dr. Sudha S. Arlikatti is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration at the University of North Texas. Her research interests include environmental hazards mitigation and management, spatial analysis, and sustainable development. She has published in premier environmental and disaster management journals including Environmental Management, Environment and Behavior, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Risk Analysis and Disasters. [email protected]

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Principal Contributors Sudha ARLIKATTI University of North Texas Alain-Michel AYACHE Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) Fatih BALCI University of Utah Erik CASE University of North Texas Fatih DEMIROZ University of Central Florida Ahmet EKICI Turkish National Police Sıddık EKICI University of North Texas I. Sevki ELDIVAN Rutgers University Orhan ERDEM Turkish National Police Malatya Junior Police College Vladimir FEDORENKO George Mason University Silvia CIOTTI GALLETTI EuroCrime Research Institute – Italy St. John International University Nadir GERGIN Virginia Commonwealth University Ira GROSSMAN Winbourne and Costas Inc., USA

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J.B. HILL Institute for the Study of Violent Groups Sam Houston State University Sarah M. HUGGINS Virginia Commonwealth University Naim KAPUCU University of Central Florida (UCF) Lina KOLESNIKOVA Rossnova Solutions, Risk, Crisis and Disaster Consultancy, Belgium Daniel J. MABREY University of New Haven David A. McENTIRE University of North Texas Ekrem MUS Virginia Commonwealth University Igor OSYKA The Kharkiv National University, Ukraine Mahmoud SADRI Texas Woman’s University Bahadir SAHIN University of Central Florida (UCF) Emile SAHLIYEH University of North Texas Velizar SHALAMANOV Center of Operational Analysis, Institute of Parallel Processing – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Angus SMITH Royal Canadian Mounted Police Nickolaj F. STARODUB A.V. Palladin Institute of Biochemistry of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Kiev National University Benjamin STIPE Sam Houston State University

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Ali UNLU University of Central Florida (UCF) Igor VOLKOV University of Central Florida Richard H. WARD University of New Haven Richard WARNES RAND Europe &University of Surrey Jeffrey WINBOURNE Winbourne & Costas, Inc., USA Ismail YILMAZ Virginia Commonwealth University Farhod YULDASHEV University of Central Florida

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Contents Preface Sıddık Ekici

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About the Editors

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Principal Contributors

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Introductory Chapter. Perspectives on Community Involvement in Counter Terrorism Sıddık Ekici and Emile Sahliyeh

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Part 1. Terrorism and Its Causes Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression Erik Case and Emile Sahliyeh

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Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism Angus Smith

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Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate Ismail Yilmaz

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The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved Silvia Ciotti Galletti and Sarah M. Huggins

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Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment and Ways for Its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists Nickolaj F. Starodub The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism Ahmet Ekici and Orhan Erdem

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Part 2. Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism Reconsidering Homeland Security Policy: Recognizing the Role of Emergency Management in Promoting Terrorism Resistance and Resilience David A. McEntire Terrorism: Notes on a Communitarian Approach Mahmoud Sadri Collaborative Crisis Management: Comparative Perspectives on Crisis Management in the European Countries, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu and Bahadir Sahin

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“Terrorism Watch” or “Natural Hazard Mitigation” Why the Difference? : Community Policing in the Indian Context Sudha Arlikatti

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Matching Incident Management Technologies and Human Factors for More Resilient Communities Velizar Shalamanov, Ira Grossman and Jeffrey Winbourne

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Part 3. The Society and Counter Terrorism Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (BTRC): The Problem and the Way Out Sıddık Ekici and Ekrem Mus

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Importance of the Participation of Civil Society into Effective Counter-Terrorism Policies Vladimir Fedorenko

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Cooperation of Law Enforcement and the Public in Combating Terrorism in Ukraine Igor Osyka

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Pushing the Private-Public Partnership: Exploring Extant Tools J.B. Hill and Benjamin Stipe

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Terrorist De-Radicalization: Comparative Approaches for Reintegrating Terrorists into the Community Daniel J. Mabrey and Richard H. Ward

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Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against The PKK: The “Fish” or the “Water”? Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci and I. Sevki Eldivan

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Fighting Against Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan: Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement Approach 284 Farhod Yuldashev, Fatih Demiroz and Igor Volkov ‘Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism’: The Importance of Counter-Ideology as Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism Richard Warnes

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Achieving Resilience in Communities: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks Lina Kolesnikova

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The Role of ‘Cultural Communities’ in Preventing Terrorism in the West Alain-Michel Ayache

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Concluding Chapter. Suggestion: Counter the Threat Together! Ahmet Ekici and Sıddık Ekici

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Subject Index

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Author Index

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-1

Introductory Chapter Perspectives on Community Involvement in Counter Terrorism Sıddık EKICI1 and Emile SAHLIYEH2 University of North Texas

Abstract. This chapter provides a summary of the competing perspectives presented at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advanced Research Workshop (“Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities”) that convened in Washington D.C. on September 26-27, 2008. Keywords. civil, community, counter terrorism, terrorism, non-orthodox approaches, policy

Despite its long history, terrorism is likely to continue posing a threat to our communities and occupy policy makers and scholars alike for the foreseeable future. In this chapter, we summarize the competing perspectives presented at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advanced Research Workshop that convened in Washington D.C. on September 26-27, 2008. Participants attending the workshop, “Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities,” explored the causes of terrorism and various organizational and structural approaches to terrorism and proposed new methods to counter terrorism, including local communities in the fight against terrorism. They ascertained that traditional military approaches alone are not appropriate for all types of terrorist attacks and military means do not provide long term solutions. They further contended that local communities should actively participate in innovative counter terrorism techniques that would heighten efficiency and effectiveness. Accordingly, the contributions made by the authors are organized into three parts: (1) Terrorism and its causes, (2) organizational and structural approaches to terrorism and, (3) civil society and counter terrorism operations.

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Ph.D. candidate, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas. Police Major, Turkish National Police 2 Professor of Middle East Politics, Director of International Studies, University of North Texas

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1. Part One The first part of the book consists of six chapters that examine terrorism and its causes. In chapter one, Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression, Erik Case and Emile Sahliyeh provide a background on structural approaches to analyzing the roots of terrorism. Their research findings highlight the fact that state level variables (repression and state capacity) contribute to terrorism. In addition, structural features evidenced in the limitations on non-violent political expression increase the possibility of using violent political tactics (i.e. terrorism). In chapter two, “Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism,” Angus Smith from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, provides a new perspective on approaching terrorism. He argues that our language can impact the creation of new Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism. Smith notes that scholars, policy-makers and the media should be more careful in using their language to define and describe certain types of terrorist activities. He further maintains that incorrect use of such language can compound the problem. Smith’s study also examines the Al-Qaeda’s terror organization and how it managed to inspire people and contribute to unstable politics and culture in a wide range of geographical locations stretching from the shores of the Mediterranean to the South China Sea, Europe, Australia and throughout America. Smith concludes by suggesting that the “resolution requires a global response and meaningful international cooperation since influential campaigns are rooted in the notion of a collaborated world,” and that there is a need for a “common language to describe terrorism adequately, along with a comprehensive understanding of the process of radicalization and the manner in which we may intervene.” In chapter three, “Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate,” Ismail Yilmaz, doctoral candidate and member of the Turkish National Police, looks into terrorist profiling. His study examines the general characteristics of Turkish domestic terrorists and points out that, in general, previous studies provide descriptive analyses and/or reported backgrounds and demographics. Despite the valuable contribution of these studies, he believes that more should be done. Statistical analysis in a multivariate setting is applied to determine the socio-demographic forces that drive terrorists to repeat their offenses. Yilmaz further argues that early intervention methods must be complemented with policies that include a counter-terrorism strategy and should consider those who are already committed to terrorism. Yilmaz’s study aims to discover whether domestic terrorists in Turkey hold different demographic characteristics from the rest of the Turkish population and how extensive these terrorists are involved in terrorism. In chapter four, The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved, Silvia Ciotti Galletti and Sarah Huggins explore the impact of the environmental factors upon extremism. Their research provides an overview of the issues and forces that contribute to the religious extremism in Morocco. They attempt to lay out the origins of terrorism and examine the sociological, demographical, and political environments in relation to terrorism. Current and past terrorist activities in Morocco are used to determine whether their findings support theories suggesting that socio-economical despair and political instability in the midst of densely populated areas are causes of terrorism, more especially extremist terrorism. In light of their findings, Galletti and Huggins emphasize that counter terrorism requires community cooperation; that counter terrorism policies must focus on the needs and desires of the community, break the isolation within communities and reintroduce these isolated

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communities into normal city “life”; and that they need to use networks to inform law enforcement and other community members about extremists. In chapter five, Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in Environment and Ways for its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists, Nikolaj F. Starodub from Ukraine examines bioterrorism. Starodub’s study introduces biosensors that control the total toxicity of environmental objects and reveal group toxic elements and individual toxins. He describes various toxins including mycotoxins, fumasine, atrazine and T2, for example, and notes that T2 is considered as a potential specimen that can be used in bioterrorism. Starodub also discusses ways to decontaminate polluted areas using two primary approaches and maintains that they provide all practices required for the prevention of disastrous consequences resulting from bioterrorism activities. In chapter six “The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism,” Ahmet Ekici and Orhan Erdem identify proper law enforcement conduct and practices that could possibly contribute in reducing the number of people sympathizing or joining terrorist organizations. The authors discuss in detail the battle between government and terrorist organizations in winning over the public. Data utilized were collected from actual terrorists confined in Turkish prisons. The study further explores the behavior of Turkish practitioners and law enforcement practices. In addition, focusing on militaristic and traditional policing methods used to respond to terrorism, the study endeavors to discover the impact that these methods might have on an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. The study reveals that although law enforcement attempt to fight terrorism, employing the wrong methods and tactics, however, may lead to an undesired effect, namely, encouraging people to sympathize or join terrorist groups. The concluding chapter offers suggestions to practitioners and policy makers as to where law enforcement should focus their attention while fighting terrorism. 2. Part Two The second part of the book consists of five chapters and discusses the organizational and structural approaches to terrorism. In chapter seven, “Reconsidering Homeland Security Policy: Recognizing the Role of Emergency Management Terrorism Resistance and Resilience,” David A. McEntire contends that emergency management (EM) should be recognized as an important contributor in homeland security policies. Highlighting the point that (EM) should be considered as an important partner in homeland security’s fight against terrorism, he notes that despite the common language used by emergency managers and homeland security officials in regard to vulnerability, resistance and resilience and despite the efforts of emergency managers in dealing with terrorism, EM has still not been recognized as a viable profession. The chapter underscores the benefits of linking emergency management with homeland security. McEntire, however, makes it clear that his intention is not to diminish the role of prevention agencies, namely intelligence, military and law enforcement personnel in terrorism incidents. In chapter eight, Terrorism: Notes on a Communitarian Approach, Mahmoud Sadri, outlines the general cultural approach to terrorism and contrasts it to instrumental and organizational approaches. Sadri contends that Americans and Europeans approach the problem of terrorism differently, with Americans considering

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terrorism a political problem while Europeans view it as a communal problem. Sadri argues that theories of terrorism developed in the United States overlook the cultural dimension of the phenomenon. He further underlines the need to evaluate terrorism as the “result of a radicalization of cultural norms and values prevalent in extremist ‘subcultures,’ making terrorists ‘enthusiastic champions of cultural aspirations.’ Sadri concludes the chapter by suggesting that greater attention should be devoted to the cultural dimension of terrorism in an attempt to understand and solve the problem; otherwise, efforts are less likely to be successful. Chapter nine, “Collaborative Crisis Management: Comparative Perspectives on Crisis Management in Four European Countries: Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey” provides another EM perspective concerning the organizational and structural approaches to terrorism The authors, Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu and Bahadir Sahin compare crisis management systems in Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey and conclude that all of these countries apply different Crisis Management (CM) systems. They also investigate the training functions of central crisis management organizations and the role of local authorities in the emergency management system. The authors conclude that the four countries have their own national response and split regional emergency response systems. Additional findings suggest that local authorities are empowered for non-cross boundary emergencies and in the case of larger incidents; the central government plays additional roles. Another important finding is that empowered local authorities appear to be better than a centralized emergency management structure in dealing with emergencies. In chapter 10, “Terrorism Watch” or “Natural Hazard Mitigation:” Why the Difference?: Community Policing in the Indian Context,” Sudha Arlikatti discusses Indian community policing that provided for the state’s adoption to new challenges. She analyzes the change in the government’s approach concerning its emergency management style from command and control to more problem solving. The new emergency management style features continuity, coordination and cooperation in hopes of saving more lives and securing the Indian community, especially vulnerable groups including children, women, the elderly, and minorities. Arlikatti argues that this change aims to increase trust in the Indian government. She concludes her chapter by offering ideas on how to expand and sustain the community’s involvement in emergency management situations in an attempt to reduce the public’s vulnerability to all types of disasters and to achieve disaster resilient communities in India. Chapter 11, “Matching Incident Management Technologies and Human Factors for More Resilient Communities,” explores the communication aspect of collaboration between various services. Velizar Shalamanov, Ira Grossman and Jeffrey Winborn argue that communication is certainly a vital part of cooperation and system integration. In their analysis, the authors concur that integration between different services that handle civil security requires new communication systems. Their work is aimed at “matching the new technologies with the human factor (both in security organizations and from the community) to provide safety and security in a terrorism threatened environment.” They further ascertain that during the last ten years security concepts have changed and brought about new challenges in greater scope, namely involvement of a civil society. Thus, suggestions are provided on the horizontal and vertical integration of all possible information and communications systems.

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3. Part Three The third part of the book consists of ten chapters which investigate the possible role of a civil society in counter terrorism. In chapter 12, “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (BTRC): The Problem and the Way Out,” Sıddık Ekici and Ekrem Muş offer recommendations by analyzing a number of existing community based security programs in an attempt to become familiar with the characteristics required for building terrorism resistant communities. Furthermore, they identify obstacles that could possibly undermine international cooperation to fight terrorism. Ekici and Muş contend that even in the absence of international cooperation, local communities can strengthen themselves against terrorism threats. By using the comparative content analysis method, they determine the characteristics of various existing community based security programs in the United States, United Kingdom and Turkey. Based upon their analysis of the case studies, they outline the required minimum qualities of a program seeking to build terrorism resistant communities. Recommendations include the need for communities to practice non-orthodox approaches for a safer environment, become actively involved in public security programs and participate in awareness training to aid law enforcement agencies in their fight against terrorism. In chapter 13, “Importance of the Participation of the Civil Society into Effective Counter Terrorism Policies, Vladimir Fedorenko examines the importance of involving society in long term counter terrorism policies. He argues that non-governmental organizations (NGSs) are the exact opposite of terror organizations. The study suggests looking at and using NGOs to understand and fight terrorism. His study underscores the importance of civil engagement and defines society’s role in counter terrorism. Structural analyses are provided for three key actors: state, civil society and terrorist groups. Various ways are suggested that to mobilize the community toward counter terrorism. In chapter 14, “Cooperation of Law Enforcement and the Public in Combating Terrorism in Ukraine,” Igor Osyka asserts that building terrorism resistant communities requires comprehensive multidisciplinary efforts in which the community’s role is no less important than that of the police. He suggests that a cooperative partnership between law enforcement and the public with support of the national government would serve to better counter terrorism, and draws the attention to the legal aspects of such policies. In addition, he stresses the significance of the media’s role in combating terrorism by noting that it should serve as the primary means of promoting education and awareness as well as developing added public trust in law enforcement agencies. In chapter 15, “Pushing the Private-Public Partnership: Exploring Extant Tools,” J. B. Hill and Benjamin Stipe highlight the problems encountered during public-private collaborations by examining a number of existing tools for to understand the state of these partnerships. Gaps in the private-public partnership applications practiced by the U.S. government are identified, and guidelines on filling these gaps are provided. Hill and Stipe suggest that some sectors that became popular in private-public partnerships largely ignored inter-sector coordination, which lead the government to fulfill this role, necessitating that the government defines its role in such matters. They argue that “…without a clearly defined government role, significant increases in the bidirectionality of information sharing, and a reduction of the costs to private entities joining in private-public partnerships, it is unlikely that the paradigm will be able to have the impact that it could were those issues resolved.”

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In chapter 16, “Terrorist De-Radicalization: Comparative Approaches for Reintegrating Terrorists into the Community,” Daniel J. Mabrey and Richard H. Ward investigate the de-radicalization programs of some countries. They assess the overall methodological approach and effectiveness of known de-radicalization programs in some countries, and offer a comparison on similarities and differences in these programs. The authors note that Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have successful deradicalization programs. However, they assert that although there is reported success in some countries’ de-radicalization programs, others are still poorly understood because the success reports came merely from government sources. In chapter 17, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies against the PKK: The ‘Fish’ or the ‘Water’”?, Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci and I. Sevki Eldivan evaluate Turkish counter terrorism policies. Based on their findings they suggest policies they feel fit the needs of Turkey. In their research, they examine the past and current counter terrorism strategies applied in Turkey, specifically against The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) Terrorist Organization. The study covers counter terrorism policies between 1985 and 2008. The authors note that Turkey’s post-2000 period counter terrorism policies are significantly different from those before 2000. While counter terrorism policies before 2000 were based merely on coercive policies, in the post-2000 period, the government became more lenient in its policies that aim to win the hearts and minds of locals through economic investments, financing education, health, and other non-military policies. Gergin, Balci and Eldivan found that the new policies have almost dissolved the terror organization, and the government became more popular in the region subject to terror acts than before 2000. As a result, the authors conclude that militaristic policies should be subordinate to non-military solutions and that cohesive policies appear to be the best solution against the PKK terror organization. Chapter 18, “Fighting against Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan: Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement Approach,” conveys ideas about new counter terrorism approaches that focus on community involvement and partnerships with citizens in Kyrgyzstan. In their study, Farhod Yuldashev, Fatih Demiroz and Igor Volkov contend that terrorism was exhibited in both small and large scale incidents. They note that the state in Kyrgyzstan is the primary player in counter terrorism and, as such, the government increased its capacity for better results with international support. However, they argue, the involvement of community groups and citizens has largely been overlooked. They explored tools that will involve the community in terrorism fighting policies. Such community involvement is also likely to help government initiatives to curb corruption and increase state agencies’ legitimacy and efficiency in fighting terrorism, religious extremism, drug smuggling, and poverty. In chapter 19, “Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism: The Importance of CounterIdeology as Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism,” Richard Warnes from the United Kingdom argues that the radicalization dimension of terrorism has increased in importance. Ward contends that the ideological motivation of terrorism has increasingly moved in the direction of religious extremism. As a result of this change, the threat terrorism poses to the community has increased due to networks of independent cells that may carry out suicide attacks. He argues that counter terrorism policies need to incorporate and utilize counter-ideology. Such policies should take into account that individual radicalization takes place within the community. Based on his finding, the author calls for the need to re-imagine counter terrorism. And, Warnes notes, re-imagining counter terrorism necessitates wider community assistance through the inclusion of key individuals within it.

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In chapter 20, “Achieving Resilience in Communities: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks,” Lina Kolesnikova puts forward models to help manage the short and long term after-event phases. Kolesnikova maintains that these phases should be given the same importance accorded to prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks. She argues that management of the terrorist attack response is crucial in view of maintaining public assurance and viability of the state. The study provides a framework to approach these management challenges and conceptualizes the response to management and formalizes the processes. Kolesnikova further contends that, based on inputs and outputs, the community can see the global picture, determine their role, and prepare for a resilient community. She concludes by stating that the resilience idea assumes communities are able to sustain and rebound from the effects of hazardous events. She also calls for enabling, inviting, planning for, and supporting active community participation in an attempt to achieve disaster resilient communities. Finally in chapter 21, Alain-Michel Ayaache points out why law enforcement should get closer to minorities and explains how such a diverse community can actually prevent terrorism in their societies. Mainly focusing on Canada, Ayaache first identifies different minorities (cultural communities) possibly living in Western societies and problems associated with communication and trust between these communities and law enforcement agencies. He notes the challenges in becoming closer with the ‘cultural communities’ but also provides practical suggestions in an attempt to obtain their support in counter terrorism. 4. Conclusion The book, like many previous studies, once again reveals the complexity of terrorism and possible solutions to it. However, efforts like these bring us closer to developing more effective counter terrorism policies. In here, the terrorism threat has been studied from several aspects and the authors (from various countries) have provided ideas that could be deemed as non-conventional. The book concludes with a consensus from the participants that counter terrorism policies need improvement, and that they need to include the community as an important counterpart of such policies.

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Part 1 Terrorism and Its Causes

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-11

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Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression Erik CASE and Emile SAHLIYEH University of North Texas

Abstract. Structural approaches to analyzing the roots of terrorism have identified state level variables (for example, repression and state capacity) as possible causes of terrorism. We argue that these structural features represent limitations on nonviolent political expression, thus increasing the utility of using violent political tactics, namely terrorism. Our study expands upon existing empirical research to include both domestic and transnational terrorism, as well as conceptualizing economic freedom as a form of political expression. We present summary statistics that add support to our argument. Keywords. causes, expression, politics, repression, roots, state, terrorism, terrorist

Introduction There is much disagreement over both the meaning of terrorism and which groups and actions can be considered ”terrorist” in nature. For some, terrorists are national liberation heroes and “freedom fighters.” Despite divergent views, policymakers, scholars and practitioners agree that terrorism is a political act distinct from violent crimes, and that the motivation of the terrorist act hopes to affect political change by using unconventional violence designed to shock, gain publicity and instill fear. Viewing terrorism as politically motivated and as a form of political expression raises the question: Does the level of available political freedom affect the likelihood of terrorism? In this study, we will attempt to explain the recurrence of terrorism. We contend that differing conditions of political freedoms can contribute to the frequency and utility of terrorism. The findings will include implications for future terrorism and policymaking research. With noted exceptions, there has been little empirical research to support the arguments that political conditions play a role in terrorism. A review of the current literature pertaining to terrorism is presented followed by our findings regarding the occurrence of terrorism as it relates to political expression. We will conclude by offering suggestions for future research and policymaking.

1. Review of the Literature Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it has become a more serious concern in the last few decades. The openness of modern society and the availability of new means of communications and transportation allow terrorists to operate not only within the

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confines of the nation state but also transnationally. The increased frequency and intensity of terrorism over the last three decades has generated a considerable body of research. Before reviewing the contribution and limitations of this research, we will briefly discuss the definition of terrorism, its utility, and its causes. 1.1. Definitional Issues There is strong disagreement among scholars concerning the characteristics that make terrorism a distinct form of political violence. Most definitions focus on the nature of the attacker, the purpose of the attack, and the nature of the victim or victims. For the purpose of our study, a specific set of terrorism requirements are identified. First, the perpetrators of terrorism must be non-state actors seeking to change the established order in some fashion. This requirement excludes incidences that are commonly referred to as ‘state terror,’ wherein a government or officially recognized government representatives perpetrate illegitimate violence against civilians through clandestine agencies or by funneling arms and other forms of support to terrorist groups. Second, the violence perpetrated by non-state actors must be directed towards non-security civilians. This is perhaps the constitutive element of terrorism that is most habitually ignored by nation states, with many countries tending to view any attacks on their security personnel as terrorism. Third, there must be some kind of overarching political objective behind terrorist violence. This adds an element of precaution to the act of terrorism, excluding random attacks by individuals seized with passionate frenzy. For example, in July 2008, a Palestinian construction worker intentionally plowed his vehicle into afternoon traffic, killing three Israeli civilians and wounding many more. Terrorism was initially suspected, but an investigation revealed that the man had no known connection to political organizations that use terrorism. Thus, he was a non-state actor, targeting non-combatants, but the seemingly random nature of his act was more accurately termed as a possible ‘hate crime’. For the purpose of this study, terrorism is defined as the use of violence by non-state actors, directed at civilians, with the intent of achieving an ultimate political objective. 1.2. The Utility of Terrorism Terrorism involves the deliberate use of unconventional violence upon civilians to create panic and fear in order to publicize their cause. The fact that civilian populations are less fortified than the military make them attractive targets for terrorist groups who face a disadvantage on the traditional battlefield. Groups that employ the tactic of terrorism use the lack of a conventional military force to their advantage, blending in with the general population until the operational phase of attack. In an effort to explain the political utility of terrorism, scholars employed a variety of approaches including game theoretic and rational choice modeling to clarify the utility of terrorism. After reviewing classic gaming scenarios including the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Coordination’, Arche and Sandler applied them to the study of terrorism, specifically, to the reactive responses by the United Nations regarding the phenomenon of terrorism. Such reactive tools “include deterrence, embassy fortification, and United Nations (UN) conventions” [1 p. 325]. The deterrent effect of hardening targets can lead to a sort of ‘fortification race’ because, assumedly, countries that spent the least resources are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Game theoretic simulations, however, found little effectiveness for UN conventions against terrorism.

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The authors argued that for so-called ‘spectacular’ events, the cost of deterrence is lower than the cost of preemption, while the opposite is true for ‘normal’ terrorist attacks. In addition, game theory literature has not reached a consensus on the effect of negotiating with terrorists. Some writers have argued that negotiating with terrorists actually increases violence because the process naturally appeals to the more moderate elements of a terrorist group while the radical elements of the terrorist group would increase their attacks. Arche and Sandler did not fully explore a possible counterargument to this position. The authors concluded that more research was needed in studying the resource allocation of terrorist campaigns over time and the application of differential and cooperative forms of game theory to the topic of terrorism [1]. In their effort to explain the utility of terrorism, another group of researchers examined suicide terrorism -one of the most extreme forms of terrorism- and uncovered an underlying logic applicable to terrorism in general. In his study of suicide terrorism, Spriznak observed that the tactic is low cost. Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide attacks do not require sophisticated weaponry, making such tactics attractive to non-state actors that do not have the ability to conscript a conventional standing army or purchase heavy weapons systems. Moreover, suicide terrorism reduces operational complexities by making escape plans unnecessary [2]. Likewise, Pape argued that the usefulness of suicide terrorism comes from its effective coercive power. Militarily inferior groups use suicide terrorism to punish civilians and armies since they can not confront them directly. Pape also observed that suicide terrorism is useful because it works and leads to tangible outcomes. In this context, he noted that former President Ronald Reagan cited the Hezbollah suicide bombing of U.S. Marines as a reason for withdrawing from Lebanon, exactly what Hezbollah desired [3]. As the case of 9/11 indicated, terrorism accomplishes a lot with relatively little expenditure. One of the goals of the terrorists who were engaged in 9/11 was to damage the American economy. Kunreuther cited estimates that the attacks created an $80 billion loss for the U.S. economy [4], while the 9/11 Commission reported the operational expense for the group was only $400,000-$500,000 [5]. Terrorist attacks also serve the purpose of sending multiple signals to the different parties involved. Hoffman and McCormick viewed the use of suicide terrorism as a form of communication that signals a group’s capability and willingness to employ violence for political aims. “Through the targets, tactics, and the timing of their attacks” [6 p. 247], terrorist groups can communicate to various target audiences a threat level that is higher than their actual abilities. The scholars further contended that the use of suicide terrorism has an advantage over other forms of terrorism because “the choreographed brutality of the act commands attention” [6 p. 249]. Target audiences can be captivated by the level of violence witnessed in such strikes. The authors also argued this cheap form of attention grabbing is an exercise in maximizing returns and minimizing costs. Recruitment and public support are vital to terrorist organizations. In this connection, the signals sent by terrorist attacks are intended to elicit a response [6]. Another group of scholars maintain that attacks are often conducted in the hopes of producing an over-response. In this connection, Buena de Mesquita and Dickson explored the logical process that drives terrorist groups to strike with expectations of provoking a government response that inflames the population the group claims to be fighting for and increases that public’s support for their tactics. Because terrorist groups operate discretely among a civilian population, government countermeasures run the

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high risk of netting innocent civilians. This leaves policymakers in a bind when choosing to implement counterterrorism measures. They must balance the risk of being perceived as weak with the risk of further increasing the support for terrorism among the group’s home audience. Using game theoretic simulations coupled with empirical statistical analysis, the authors argued that heavy handed government responses can serve to further alienate an aggrieved population by causing them physical and economic damage [7]. 1.3. The Causes of Terrorism: Towards Explanatory Perspectives Terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw argued that three (seemingly interrelated) questions define the study of terrorism: “why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are” [8 p 379]. Her focus was primarily on the first question, as she argued there was an absence of satisfactory literature regarding the subject. Crenshaw concluded that a terrorist campaign could be a “rational, political choice” [8 p. 385]. Ross identified the three key theories that dominated the terrorism literature during the early 1990s. He maintained that the causal models fall into three categories of psychological, structural and rational choices. Structural approaches generally maintain “the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies.” [9 p. 317]. In his opinion, the structural model had an advantage in terms of operationalization, metrics and predictive power. However, the structural model of analysis had several serious methodological problems including sloppy classification schemes or selective and incomplete case studies. Ross proposed a most different systems (MDS) approach to the causal modeling of terrorism with a minimum of three groups and including domestic, transnational and state sponsored terrorism [9]. In exploring the different levels of analysis that yield different insights into the causes of terrorism, researchers have focused on the psychological motivations of terrorists. Crenshaw noted that the advantage of psychological analysis of terrorism is that it links several levels of analysis from individual up to societal. She concluded that, while critical to the understanding of terrorism, causal explanations should be one part of terrorism literature and other avenues should be explored, including the analysis of terrorist groups moderating by ceasing their campaigns [10]. Krueger, et al. conducted a meta-analysis review of the literature that focused on the connection between poverty, education and terrorism. Policy prescriptions to combat these causes have proliferated since the September 11th attacks. However, the authors found little hard evidence to support this position. They argued that “any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak” [11 p. 119]. Other explanations of terrorism go beyond economic grievances of terrorists and view terrorism as a reaction to frustrations borne out of political realities. In this context, Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens argued that poor human rights conditions create a conducive atmosphere for terrorism. In their study, Toward a Theory of Terrorism, they “contend that the basis for terrorism is found in deprivation of political, subsistence, and security rights, and therefore any policy designed to decrease terrorism necessarily implies addressing these rights” [12 p. 680]. The authors focused on state capacity, repression levels and the manners of security response following terrorist

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attacks. They argued that those conditions represent the human rights conditions in a given country. Still, other scholars, Newman in 2007 and Piazza in 2008, explored the idea that weak or failed states served as incubators for terrorist groups [13, 14]. This claim is often made in reference to Afghanistan and Somalia. The basic argument of this perspective is that the power vacuums created by state failure, coupled with a lack of order, provide sanctuary for terrorist groups and offer opportunities for such groups to flourish. To test the possible causal relationship between weak or failed states and terrorism, Newman used the European Union and United States-designated terrorist group lists and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base to compile a set of the deadliest terrorist groups. The author used the United Nations Human Development Index and the Failed States Index as indicators to measure state capacity. His correlation analysis concluded that “contested” states, rather than failed states, are more attractive to terrorist groups, and that failed states that do produce terrorism tend to produce more deadly terrorism. Newman concluded that “in terms of international terrorism and threats to western interests, there is insufficient evidence to formulate a rigorous hypothesis regarding the relationship between terrorism and state capacity” [13 p. 484]. In another study of transnational terrorism, however, Piazza found empirical support for three propositions. He contends that “states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, have their nationals commit transnational attacks and are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists themselves” [14 p. 1]. Because of the nature of his data, Piazza restricted his analysis to transnational terrorism; that is, terrorist attacks perpetrated by non-domestic actors [14].

2. The Roots of Terrorism: Toward a Theory of Political Expression The existing literature makes significant contributions that serve as the foundation for our study. First, given the argument that terrorism is a rational act with specific utility, we can be more confident in predicting its occurrence than if it had been established as the purview of the criminally insane. Second, structural conditions within some states may make it more likely that those countries may experience terrorist attacks. Third, there is an economic component of political expression that has yet to be fully explored in the existing literature and may help explain why some authoritarian governments with high economic activity experience relative low levels of terrorism. Fourth, institutional approaches to terrorism focus on state capacity in the form of weak states or state failure, or state repressiveness. Incorporating these factors into a broader model will give a more complete picture of how limitations on political expression can create conditions that make terrorist attacks more likely. In addition to the main findings of the literature, the contribution of our study lies in explaining how limits on political expression, whether they be passively created by failed states, or actively propagated by repressive states, influence the occurrence of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. 2.1. Reduced State Capacity and Limits on Political Expression The research on state capacity and weak or failed states in relation to terrorism has thus far focused mainly on the argument that weak governments are unable to establish a

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monopoly on violence, enabling other violent groups to operate with a relatively free hand in their territory. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens stated that weak or failed states contribute to a “deprivation of political, subsistence” because they cannot protect those practicing non-violent oppositional political expression [12]. In a deteriorated security environment, those expressing political opinions, whether it be through protest, the organization of civil society groups, or lobbying public officials, are at risk of becoming victims of political violence. Needless to say, any sort of overt political organization must be difficult to operate in a lawless environment since it would not facilitate a peaceful way to express political grievance. Political grievance, once suppressed, does not simply disappear. Rather, when the avenue to nonviolently express political grievance is closed, political violence, and specifically terrorism, becomes a viable alternative for political expression. In addition to providing the space for terrorism to operate, we argue that the failure of a state to provide basic protections also reduces the opportunity to express political grievance in an effective, nonviolent manner. This increases the attractive power of radical ideologies and radical tactics like terrorism. We expect that reduced state capacity will increase a country’s chances being attacked by both transnational and domestic groups. Domestic political groups, with limited options for expressing political grievances, would be more likely to turn to the use of terrorism to achieve their objectives, while transnational groups would be drawn in by the security vacuum, and perhaps also to claim the mantle of protector for a subgroup within a country they may share a particular kinship with. The prevailing conditions in Iraq since 2003 provide a clear example for such outcomes. After the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, a provisional government was initially created, where U.S. civilian administrators made major policy decisions. By July 2003, control was handed to a handpicked Iraqi governing council that had little power or popular support from the Iraqi people. While The U.S. military had routed the Iraqi army in a short time, building a consolidated government, however, proved to be much more difficult. The initial looting and lawlessness sent a message to the Iraqi people that the state was weak and powerless to stop challenges to its authority. Authors have argued that a security vacuum like the one which existed in post-invasion Iraq would be particularly attractive for groups willing and able to compete violently for political control of the region. In addition, the fledgling Iraqi government’s failure to provide basic services increased the level of hostility and grievance among the domestic population. The violence that grew in the face of an impotent governing authority limited the choices available to the Iraqi civilians to express political frustrations. The situation became like a pressure cooker whereby increasing grievances caused by the chaotic violence and lack of services as well as limited outlets to express those grievances, together with other factors, led to the sharp increase in terrorist attacks across Iraq after 2003. The state’s inability to protect those who were attempting to participate in the non-violent political process made the choice to use political violence, particularly terrorism, more attractive in the absence of political freedom. Sunnis who had previously held positions of political power found themselves victims of reprisal and violence from a multitude of parties that had suffered under Saddam’s regime. Such violent attacks must have dissuaded some of the Sunni from participating in a government that was unable and reluctant to protect them and pushed them, instead, into joining the nationalist insurgency and Sunni jihadist groups that embraced the use of violence against civilians.

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By August of 2003, Iraq had experienced its first terrorist car bombing and was beset by riots protesting the lack of adequate governmental services. The first major terrorist attacks targeted the United Nations, the Jordanian embassy, and a Shi’ite mosque, dispelling any doubt that nonviolent political and religious organizations were considered fair game in the deteriorating security environment [15]. As Iraqi civilians began to choose a permanent government in 2005, many of the political parties participating in the process were attacked. A substantial number of Sunnis boycotted the democratic political process wholesale [16]. Certainly their refusal was multifaceted, but the risk entailed by participating in the political process, absent a government capable of protecting them, most likely reduced its appeal. It is little wonder, then, that given the Iraqi government’s inability to protect political participants, that groups in the country increasingly turned to terrorism as an effective alternative way of political expression [15, 16]. We thus argue that where a security vacuum exists, groups violently competing for power essentially take turns in playing the role of a repressive state, each seeking to silence the particular societal elements expressing contrary political positions. In Iraq, it was the Shi’a militias targeting Sunni clerics, or the regional al-Qaeda group deploying suicide bombers targeting Shi’a religious festivals. The violence perpetrated by such groups serves to increase the risks of nonviolent political action and, as such, lead these groups to choose violent alternatives. Given the nature of a weak or failing state where the line between civilian and security personnel is exceptionally blurred, it is reasonable to expect terrorist attacks to increase. In his 2008 study, Piazza found that the 2006 Foreign Policy Failed State Index [17] was a significant predictor of transnational terrorism. Using data released by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism [18] that included both domestic and transnational attacks, we count the number of attacks experienced in 2006, the year the data overlaps. In Figure 1, the first five countries listed on the left side of the graph are highest ranked, stable nations, and on the right side are the five lowest ranked countries in terms of state capacity.

State Capacity & Terrorism 6639

7000 6000

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1168 0

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Figure 1

Austra- Canada Austria lia

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The first five countries, displayed on the left hand side of the graph, experienced relatively few terrorist attacks. Norway and Austria were able to progress the entire year without a single terrorist attack. Australia and Canada, two democracies on opposite sides of the globe, experienced one and three attacks, respectively. On the right side of the figure we see the number of terrorist attacks in countries with failed or failing governments. Iraq, by far, has the dubious distinction of being a glaring example of the relationship between reduced state capacity and terrorist attacks, experiencing 6,639 recorded attacks during 2006. It is common knowledge that both foreign and domestic fighters utilized terrorism in the Iraqi war zone, adding credence to our belief that reduced state capacity attracts both domestic and transnational attacks. Although rated a failing state by the Failed State Index, Haiti stands out in that it only experienced one attack during 2006. Nepal, a weak state beset by internal conflict, also experienced over 1,000 attacks during the 2006. Pakistan, a nuclear armed nation that remains highly unstable, experienced 372 attacks. Sudan, a pariah state known for its ongoing genocidal campaign, is also ranked as a failing state and experienced 89 attacks. 2.2. Direct State Repression of Political Expression Not only weak or failed states create an environment where outlets for political expression are repressed, but the deprivation of economic subsistence in such states comes by way of a lack of state power, and powerful repressive states are able to monopolize the use of force and actively quell the political expression of their citizenry. Authoritarian states with a high level of control and consolidation are able to quash opposition through the use of a forceful security apparatus. The state exercise of political violence and its repression of the citizens are likely to encourage some civilians to answer with force. The violent options available to citizens in repressive states may include open rebellion against the state security apparatus or directing violence at civilians or civilian administrators perceived as supportive of the government. The fact that different ethnic groups, tribes and religious sects are spread across the globe also implies that transnational groups may be attracted to attack countries that are perceived as oppressing their kin. We therefore suggest that states which actively suppress political expression are more likely to experience internally and externally initiated terrorist attacks. The history of countries, namely Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, among others, provide examples for the violence directed against repressing and authoritarian states. In Figure 2, we look at 2006 and compare the number of terrorist attacks in the most and least repressive states as ranked by the Political Terror Scale [19]. Again, the first five countries listed are displayed on the left side of the chart and have the lowest levels of political repression.

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Repression and Terrorism 6630

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0 Australia Bhutan

Brunei Canada

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Vene- Vietnam zuela

Figure 2 We see that those five countries on the left, with the lowest levels of repression, experienced few, if any terrorist attacks during 2006. Three of the least repressive states, Australia, Brunei and Cape Verde, experienced no attacks whatsoever. The other two, Butan and Canada, experienced only one and three attacks, respectively. On the right side of the graph, beginning with Iraq, we see the number of attacks in the most repressive states. Sri Lanka, home to one of the most effective and brutal terrorist groups, the Tamil Tigers, experienced 228 attacks in 2006. Iraq received one of the worst scores on the Political Terror Scale, experiencing over 6,000 attacks during the raging internal strife. Interesting, Iraq appears as both a failing and a repressive state. This could be due to the different methodologies that Freedom House and Foreign Policy use when scoring for state capacity or state repression. However, that Iraq appears as both a failing state and a repressive one may also be supportive of an argument made in comparative politics  that state repression is actually a function of state weakness. 2.3. Economic Freedom as Political Expression Some states, despite the repressive nature of their governments, do not experience a large number of terrorist attacks. Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) and China, for example, are renowned for their heavy handed suppression of oppositional political activity. Although such states should be a prime target for groups that use terrorism, they are relatively rarely the victim of terrorist attacks or campaigns. While it is not always possible to disentangle economic freedom from political freedom, the OPEC and Chinese examples illustrate a situation where grievances built up by the lack of conditions for political expression are alleviated by providing for the basic human needs of the citizens and their economic freedoms. We contend that when citizens are not allowed to organize politically or participate in independent civil society, their opportunity for nonviolent political action is reduced. We also argue, however, that rewarding the citizens for their political silence with an opportunity to compete in the economic marketplace and satisfying their basic human needs are likely to mitigate the appeal of political violence. We believe that economic freedom and

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satisfaction can serve as an alternative form of political expression, discouraging domestic terrorist attacks. Likewise, we propose that transnational terrorism should be minimal and not target countries with higher levels of economic freedom. Thus, we expect the likelihood of both domestic and transnational terrorism to decrease with higher levels of economic freedom, higher standards of living and quality of life, even in nations that utilize a heavy handed security apparatus. Figures that measure the accuracy of our basic prepositions will now be presented. The non-profit Freedom House organization ranks the level of political freedom in all countries across the globe. One sub-category of its rankings deals with economic freedom. Freedom House assigns values to each country using the following criteria: “Have social and economic freedoms, including equal access to economic opportunities and the right to hold private property” [20]. Economic Freedom and Terrorism 100

90

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80 60 40

30

20 0

0

0

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0 Nether- Norway San Sweden Switzer- North Somalia TurkSudan Zimbabwe lands Marino land Korea menistan

Figure 3 Figure 3 compares the number of terrorist attacks in countries at the very highest and lowest ends of the economic freedom spectrum. There is a fairly noticeable difference between the countries with the highest levels of economic freedom on the left, and the lowest ranked countries on the right. The Netherlands, Norway and San Marino all ranked at the top in terms of economic freedom and experienced no terrorist attacks in 2006. Sweden and Switzerland, the only nations in the highest ranking economic freedom category to experience any attacks, did not experience more than two attacks. On the right side of the graph are countries ranked at the bottom in terms of economic freedom. Interestingly, North Korea and Turkmenistan did not experience any terrorist attacks in 2006, more closely resembling the attack tallies of their more economically free counterparts. However, Somalia and Sudan both experienced dozens of terrorist attacks while severely limiting economic freedom. Figure 4 depicts the number of terrorist attacks in some of the authoritarian nations that have high levels of economic activity. The scores assigned by Freedom House for economic freedom in these countries are relatively low, but they are much higher than the least economically free nations listed in Figure 3 [20]. We included China and several OPEC nations that are prosperous, but not necessarily tolerant of dissent.

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Terrorism and Economic Freedom 8

7

7

# Attacks

6 5 4

3

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0

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Qatar

UAE

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0 China

Venezuela

Figure 4 All of the countries shown in Figure 4 experienced relatively small amounts of terrorism in 2006. China, a nation with over one billion people and an actively encouraging economic enterprise within, experienced only three attacks the entire year. Venezuela experienced the highest number of incidences, seven, which, when compared to Iraq during the same year, is smaller by a factor of almost one thousand. The Gulf States of Qatar, The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait experienced no terrorism at all while maintaining relatively high levels of economic freedom for nondemocratic nations.

3. Concluding Remarks 3.1. Assessment and Implications for Future Research Our study suggests that limits on political freedom and restricting avenues of nonviolent political expression increase the likelihood that individuals and groups will use terrorism and increase the likelihood that a country will experience both national and transnational terrorist attacks. These limits can be placed passively by states unable to protect political expression, or actively, by authoritarian governments seeking to silence political opposition. In line with the existing literature, our study also included the argument that economic freedom is an outlet for political expression. Based upon data from 2006, findings shown in the various figures support our main propositions. Although the statistics we presented provide some support for our argument, more advanced analyses in the future can offer an even more convincing case for a causal link between limits on political expression. Such an analysis may include a model that takes into account time and a host of other independent control variables.

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3.2. Implications for Policymakers This study includes policy implications for nations, NGOs and IGOs seeking to prevent the occurrence of terrorism. A critical step in preventing both domestic and transnational terrorism involves the ability to identify hot spots that increase the utility of terrorism as a form of political expression while decreasing the utility of nonviolent political competition. States that have collapsed, or are on the verge of collapse, should be monitored closely, because they offer few protections for those willing to participate politically in a non-violent manner and offer incentives for groups looking to utilize terrorism within, as well as groups looking for a base to direct outward attacks on other nations. This means that in countries like Afghanistan, a substantial part of the rebuilding process must be focused on protecting political actors and organizations that have opted to negotiate with words rather than weapons. In addition, it is advisable that nations experiencing increasingly high levels of state repression be monitored as well. We expect that nations ratcheting up their repressive actions put themselves at a higher risk for terrorist attacks, as well as increasing the likelihood that they too will spawn groups that attack transnationally. If upward trending repression levels are detected by other nations and organizations early on, it may be possible for those other nations to increase security measures in their interactions with high risk repressive states. Finally, when attempting to determine which repressive nations represent the largest threat in terms of spawning terrorism, we expect that the more economically free regimes are the least likely to be problematic.

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

Arche M., Daniel G, and Sandler, Todd., Terrorism and Game Theory. Simulation Gaming. 34 (2003), 319-337. Sprinzak, Ehud, Rational Fanatics. Foreign Policy. 120 (2000), 66-73. Pape, Robert A, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. The American Political Science Review. 97/3 (2003), 343-361. Kunreuther, Howard C., Michel-Kerjan, Erwann and Porter, Beverly, Assessing, Managing, andFinancing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism. NBER. Working Paper No. W10179 (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=481451 The 9/11Commission.“TerroristFinancing.” http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf Hoffman, Bruce, and McCromic, Gordon, Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 27/4 (2004), 243-281. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Dickson, Eric S, The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. American Journal of Political Science. 51/2 (2007), 364-381. Crenshaw, Martha, The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics. 13/4 (1981), 379-399. Ross, Jeffery Ian, Structural Causes of Oppositional Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model. Journal of Peace Research. 30/3 (1993), 317-329. Crenshaw, Martha, “The Psychology of Terrorism.” Political Psychology. 21/ 2 (2000): 405-420. Krueger, Alan B. and Maleckova, Jitka, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 17/4 (2003), 119-144. Callaway, Rhonda, and Harrelson-Stephens, Julie, Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 29/7 (2006), 679-706. Newman, Edward, Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence. 19 (2007), 463-488 Piazaa, James, Failed States and Terror. International Studies Quarterly. Forthcoming (2008), http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/Piazza%20Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20States.pdf . Frontline, Timeline: Fighting on Two Fronts.”PBS. (2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/cron/ .

E. Case and E. Sahliyeh / Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression [16] Young,Jeffrey,IraqchoosesapermanentGovernment.”NewsVOA.(2005), http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-12/2005-12-13voa46.cfm?CFID=89294371&CFTOKEN=78845924 . [17] The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy. 154 (2006), 50-54. [18] MIPT, National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 2004-2006 (Reformatted and provided by the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base). (2006). [19] Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. (2008) http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. [20] FreedomHouse,FreedomintheWorld2006CountrySubscores.(2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=278

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Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism Angus SMITH Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of language - specifically, the language that we use to define and describe certain types of terrorist activity - and how incorrect use of such language can compound the problem. It also uses language - specifically interpretations of the concept of jihad - as a backdrop to a discussion of radicalization, its linkages to extremist action, and possible mitigating strategies. This paper is intended to stimulate discussion around the need for a common language to describe terrorism adequately, along with a comprehensive understanding of the process of radicalization and the manner in which we may intervene. Keywords. terrorism, language, radicalization

Introduction Describing Terrorism: Are You Talking to Me? Since 9/11, Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies have often been criticized for the language that they use to describe the terrorism that has an ideological basis in Islam. Muslims have observed that terms such as “Islamic terrorism,” “Islamist terrorism,” “Jihadism” and “Islamo-fascism” succeed only in conflating terrorism with mainstream Islam, thereby casting all Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists. Intelligence officers and analysts who, in Canada, are governed by criminal law that explicitly links terrorism and religiosity [1], may have (or believe they have) a precise understanding of what is meant by these terms. As they are filtered through the media and the public imagination, however, this precision is blunted, and even innocuous terms and completely legitimate expressions of belief become loaded with innuendo. This points to the difficulties inherent in finding language to describe forms of terrorism that are rooted in a particular interpretation of Islam, without implying that there is a “clash of civilizations” between Islam, in its broadest sense, and the West [2]. Like the other Abrahamic faiths - Judaism and Christianity - the fundamental tenets of Islam are rooted in compassion, kindness, forgiveness and, perhaps most importantly, social justice. One of the Pillars of Islam is zakat - the giving of alms to the poor - and during the Ramadan fast, Muslims are enjoined to remember the less fortunate for whom fasting is involuntary (2:177; 183-186) [3]. Incorrect statements

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about the nature of Islam are deeply offensive to the huge numbers of Muslims who try to live within those tenets. More importantly, distorted and inflammatory linkages between Islam and terrorism can serve to convince Muslims - both in the West and in the larger Islamic world - that the West is, in fact, their enemy. Law enforcement and intelligence communities are acutely aware of this problem. Official communications about terrorism are increasingly at pains to downplay the Islamic component of terrorist conspiracies and terrorist acts, focusing on the mechanics of the plots rather than the cultural or religious backgrounds of the plotters themselves. The media and the public are often highly critical of these attempts to shape discourse, arguing that they distort reality by effectively ignoring a critical component of the problem [ 4]. There is merit to this argument. A peculiarly violent and “ideologized” form of Islam is a component of the contemporary security environment. To ignore or downplay this is to ignore the “first principles” of a critical global threat. Even attempts to take a more strategic or nuanced view by differentiating between “Islam” and “Islamism” can result in distortion. Islamism as a political ideology does not necessarily translate into terrorist “praxis.” For example, the Muslim Brotherhood a quasi-secret society to which members of al-Qaeda (including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the planner and organizer of 9/11) [5] have been associated - is an Islamist group in that it explicitly links its political goals to an avowedly Islamic worldview. Its founders and chief ideologues (who include Sayyid Qutb, discussed below) were predominantly anti-Western and tended to characterize Islamic political aspirations as fundamentally counter to democracy. Increasingly, however, the Brotherhood has repudiated radicalism and adopted a gradualist perspective which, while not aligned to Western democratic principles (the Brotherhood is linked to Hamas, for example) is more positively oriented towards them [6]. Few members of the Muslim Brotherhood espouse terrorism and in many Muslim countries they have served as voices of moderation, channeling people away from violence and towards legitimate politics and charitable activities [7].

1. The Problem of Jihad Sometimes, the terminology that we reflexively employ when we discuss or describe “Islamist” terrorism is inaccurate. Moreover, the sense in which we use it can have the unintended consequence of authenticating or validating the very extremism we are trying to address. An example of this is the word jihad, which has become almost a catchall term for extremism of any kind. The nuances - to say nothing of the differing interpretations - of the term are much more subtle, however, and are worth examining. Translated literally, jihad means “striving” and is often expressed in the context of the expression jihad fi sabil illah, or “striving in the path of God” [8]. In this context, jihad describes the effort to live in the way that God intends for human beings [9] and to find the inner will and discipline to live according to the basic tenets of Islam [10]. Despite widespread popular belief to the contrary, jihad is not one of the Pillars of Sunni Islam (aside from fasting at Ramadan and the giving of alms, referred to above, these consist of the profession of faith, prayer and pilgrimage to Mecca - 1:1-7; 2:125129; 142-153; 196-202; 22:26-30, among others). Nevertheless, jihad as a constant act of piety remains a duty for all Muslims and often refers to some act aimed at social or personal improvement. A Muslim might speak of his or her jihad to stop smoking, to

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raise money for a community project or, simply, to become a better person. In 2005, Raheel Raza was the first Muslim woman to lead mixed gender Friday prayers in Canada. She characterized the courage and determination that allowed her to persevere over the objections of conservative and traditionalist elements as a form of “gender jihad” aimed ultimately at helping all women take their rightful and scripturally mandated place as full participants in the temporal and spiritual life of the community of Muslims [11]. So, in this way the concept of jihad is akin to the concept of ‘mission’, a term often used by Christians when referring to an individual or collective task, usually with a motive of community or self-improvement, which one has been called upon, by one’s beliefs, to carry out. Jihad also has a more combative interpretation. Like the basic texts of Judaism and Christianity, the Qur’an has numerous references to physical struggle and confrontation with unbelievers and others who represent a threat to the safety and the integrity of the community of the faithful. Tell the desert Arabs who stayed behind, ‘You will be called to face a people of great might in war and to fight them, unless they surrender: if you obey, God will reward you well, but if you turn away, as you have done before, He will punish you heavily.’ (48:16-18. See also 2:190-195; 8:12-20; 9:29, among others) Indeed, combat is one of the central metaphors of the history of early Islam, as the Prophet Mohammed and his followers did battle with and ultimately triumphed over idolaters and unbelievers [12]. Moreover, the canon of Islamic teachings stresses that it is the duty of all Muslims to defend dar al-islam (the land of Islam) from moral or spiritual corruption originating in dar al-harb (the land of war) where Islamic law does not prevail [13]. Despite this, Islamic law and tradition has always favored defensive over offensive war, the importance of mercy to enemies and the inviolability of women, children and non-combatants: Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits...If they cease hostilities, there can be no hostility...do good, for God loves those who do good. (2:190-196) Also, Islamic teachings often stress the importance of the “greater” (spiritual) jihad over the “lesser” (physical) jihad [14]. The concept of jihad as an all-out offensive war is largely a 20th century phenomenon, developed primarily in the writings of ideologues like Abdul Ala Mawdudi, founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-I Islami, and Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian thinker who is in many respects the ideological father of al-Qaeda and its offshoots. Mawdudi and Qutb found a refuge from both political repression at home and the perceived decadence of Western and secular societies in a particularly conservative interpretation of Islam. They reframed jihad as an obligation equivalent to one of the Pillars (and in the process transformed it from a spiritual concept to a political one). In this new understanding, jihad became a physical rather than a spiritual struggle, one that should be used against both the ignorance and barbarism of those who threaten the fundamental integrity of Islam (the Western world or the “far enemy”) and “secular” Muslim leaders (the “near enemy”) who turn their backs on the teachings of the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet [15]. Omar Bakri, the Syrian-born Islamic cleric recently

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barred from the United Kingdom, vividly illustrated both the thinking behind, and the consequences of, this form of jihad in a 2007 television interview: The duty of jihad...had been neglected by the Islamic nation for a long time, because of the arrogance and injustice of America and its allies against the Islamic nation, and because of their support for Israel...the 9/11 operations were a response to great acts of aggression by America - its attacks on Afghanistan, on Iraq, on Sudan, not to mention the historic Crusades from long ago...Killing innocent people is forbidden in Islam. But who is innocent that is another question [16]. This highly politicized interpretation of jihad has been a key driver in a series of critical events in the Muslim world, from the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 to the rise of the Taliban. And filtered through the anti-Western ideology of Osama bin Laden and his adherents, it lies at the heart of a whole range of terrorist plots and attacks beginning with the first World Trade Center bombing of 1993, through 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, to the Toronto 17 and Heathrow Bomb plots of 2006. If both interpretations of jihad can be termed “correct,” then both are highly problematic from the point of view of policing and intelligence. If we use jihad to describe either terrorist activity or the terrorist mindset, we risk alienating those Muslims for whom jihad describes either a highly personalized internal struggle or effecting positive change within or beyond the Muslim community. We effectively brand them, if not as terrorists, then as dangerous radicals, which in turn perpetuates popular mythology that equates Islam and its adherents with terrorism. On the other hand, the conflation of jihad and, if not terrorism, then at least violence in the name of faith (or a political creed masquerading as faith), is not incorrect. But by referring to extremists as jihadis - a positive component of the Muslim historical and cultural experience - we effectively recognize their actions as being in the path of God and, therefore, legitimate [17]. And in opposing jihad and its practitioners, we risk characterizing ourselves - again - as the enemies of Islam. Not only does this empower extremists, but it sends a strong message that we are engaged in a struggle, not with extremism, but to suppress Islam itself. Again, this is not a message that we can afford to send.

2. So What Do We Say? As the religious historian Karen Armstrong has observed, knowing who the enemy is not is just as critical as knowing who the enemy is [18]. In the process of naming enemies correctly, we learn more about them: how they think and how they are likely to act. Therefore, it is in the best interests of those at the forefront of addressing terrorism—the intelligence and law enforcement communities—to assume a leadership role in researching and determining appropriate terminology to describe extremism and its perpetrators. To date, work in this area has been dispersed and not well advanced [19]. A glossary of alternate terminology is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, more appropriate descriptions of the challenges that we face do exist. As previously mentioned, Osama bin Laden and many other extremists are heavily

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influenced by and have added to the writings of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who urged his followers not only to withdraw from the moral vacuum of modern society but also to destroy it [20]. Qutb validated extreme violence in the cause of faith, so “Islamic terrorism” could more accurately be called “Qutbian terrorism.” As always, however, we must remain mindful of words and their nuances. For example, many contemporary terrorist movements—including Afghanistan’s Taliban and al-Qaeda—have theological roots in Wahhabism, a sect that forms the “state orthodoxy” of contemporary Saudi Arabia [21]. Wahhabism is a particularly strict interpretation of Islam that adheres to the Salafist notion that “pure” Islam must be rooted in the teachings of the “early fathers”—the Prophet Mohammad and his companions [22]. Both “Wahhabist” and “Salafist” have been used extensively to define particular types of terrorism. But while elements of Wahabbism could give rise to a mindset that includes extremist action - as 9/11 itself demonstrates - the vast majority of Wahabbists and Salafists are not and never will be terrorists.

3. Jihad and People The debate over jihad, its meaning and its proper role plays itself out in Muslim communities around the world. In Canada, Muslim commentators like Raheel Raza emphasize the need for Muslims both to speak out and to take action to ensure that terrorism, extremism and anti-Western propaganda are eliminated from Muslim discourse. Muslims must “take back the mosques” to ensure that the voices of “reasonable Muslim men and women” are heard over calls for physical jihad [23]. Indeed, this imperative can itself be expressed as a form of jihad. The critical consideration is not so much what Ms. Raza says -reasoned, compassionate and very much a product of the Canadian “multiculturalist” environment - but rather the manner in which this diverges from other forms of Islamic discourse. There are real ideological and rhetorical differences among Muslim communities throughout the West and the larger Islamic world. These differences can be sufficiently profound to cause, not so much a “clash of civilizations,” but rather a series of clashes within a specific civilization - in this case Islam. In Europe, where the influence of extremist ideology tends to inhibit the integration of certain segments of Muslim populations into their host societies [24], the conception of the physical jihad exerts tremendous influence. Beyond this, ideological conflict within Islamic communities often manifests itself as conflict between two distinct cultural groupings. Tariq Ramadan characterizes the first of these as middle class, “integrated” Muslims whose Islam is sophisticated and attuned to broader social and intellectual currents [25]. The second group (and, necessarily, the group of greatest interest to the law enforcement and intelligence community) consists of young, unintegrated (often despite having been born in the West) and sometimes underclass individuals (but not always –members of the “Hamburg Cell,” discussed below, were enrolled in degree programs at German universities and the suspects in the botched 2007 attacks in London and Glasgow were physicians and other professionals) [26]. Characterized by a strong sense of specific or generalized grievance, they exhibit strong leanings towards a shared Islamic identity and a spirit of specifically Islamic activism and mobilization that is often in conflict with Western social and political norms. They reject Western culture (including westernized intellectuals and assimilated Muslims) as a reproach to

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“true” Islam and are drawn to historical and ideological discourse that “proves” the greatness of Islamic civilization. This combination of perceived oppression and the search for a dignified alternative, easily translates into openness to physical, or politicized, jihad [27]. Exemplars of this demographic include Mohammed Bouyeri, the Netherlands-born killer of Theo Van Gogh, the British-born London Bombers, and the “Hamburg Cell” that became the hard core of the 9/11 conspiracy. Exemplars of Ramadan’s first group, like Raza, tend to distance themselves from the second group, claiming that it has transformed the traditional concept of jihad as a form of spiritual struggle into an ideology of violence and revenge. But there is also distortion in portraying “true” Islam in an unremittingly positive light. Extremism in the name of a politicized Islam is a perversion of the faith. The problem is, to its adherents it is a legitimate form of discourse, fully justifying direct action that can range from proselytizing to overt acts of terror on the scale of New York, Bali, Madrid and London. The messaging - particularly the interpretation of jihad - that originates with “integrated” Muslim thinkers and commentators is comforting, particularly to nonMuslims who find themselves perplexed and disquieted by the violence inherent in alQaeda-type extremist ideology. But those thinkers and commentators may not speak for that portion of the Muslim world that is disconnected, isolated, or otherwise susceptible to such ideology. So it is difficult to state with any degree of accuracy how meaningful their message is in the overall context of Muslim discourse, or to what degree it can compete rhetorically with the siren call of extremism and physical jihad.

4. Making Worlds 4.1. The Extremist World An understanding of the nuances of concepts like jihad is critical. Any attempt to promote one understanding or interpretation over another is probably fruitless, however. As Douglas Streusand points out, “classical texts speak only to, not for, contemporary Muslims. . .”, and ultimately, individual Muslims will make up their own minds [28]. What is clear is that with the extremist mindset, we are addressing a cultural and an emotional phenomenon that is much greater than the sum of any of its parts, including “physical” entities like al-Qaeda. As one Saudi extremist exhorted, I do not need to meet the Sheikh and ask his permission to carry out some operation, the same as I do not need permission to pray or to think about killing the Jews and the Crusaders. There are a thousand Bin Ladens in this nation. We should not abandon our way, which the Sheikh has paved for you, regardless of the existence of the Sheikh or his absence [29]. Since 9/11 (and, in some cases, long before it), governments and law enforcement and intelligence communities have been engaged in a concerted strategy to confront extremism through a variety of means. In many respects, we have been successful. Conspiracies have been disrupted, terrorist operations have been pre-empted, meaningful alliances have been forged and knowledge and understanding of the threat posed by this particular form of extremism has become both sophisticated and widespread. The problem continues, however, and shows no sign of dissipating. Indeed,

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many indicators suggest that it is getting worse, particularly with regard to the link between radicalization of young Muslims in Western countries and extremist action against those countries. The phenomenon of radicalization is a critical subset of the terrorist threat and awareness of it as a challenge is growing rapidly among law enforcement and security agencies. Radicalization refers to the process by which individuals - usually young people - are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in and of itself, it becomes a threat when individuals espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism [30]. Historically, radicalization has spanned not only the entire “left-right” political spectrum, from environmental and animal rights activists to neo-Nazis, but a range of ethnic and religious interests as well. Radicalization can occur due to a multitude of factors and influences. There is no single group that seeks out vulnerable and impressionable young people. Nor is radicalization limited to any single ethnic or interest group [31]. In a contemporary context, however, domestic radicalization associated with violent Islamist extremist ideology is a particular concern for law enforcement and security agencies. Since 9/11, virtually all of the planned or actual terrorist attacks in Western Europe and North America have been carried out by young Muslims of various national and cultural origins who were either native-born citizens or long-term residents and who had undergone an identifiable process of radicalization. These include the Theo Van Gogh killing and the “Hofstad Plot” in the Netherlands; the Madrid bombings; the 7/7 bombings and their aftermath; the “Toronto 17” case; Operation OVERT (the “Heathrow Plot”), and the 2007 firebombing of Glasgow Airport and failed terrorist attacks in Central London. These cases embody many of the key features of contemporary radicalization that are of particular concern to law enforcement and security agencies. Foremost among these is the speed with which radicalization occurs and the fact that pre-radicalization indicators are often extraordinarily subtle, particularly to a cultural outsider like a police or intelligence officer. It is also clear that trying to anticipate (or address) radicalization through concepts like “alienation” is not useful. Terrorists do not necessarily exist at the margins of society. Subtle (and largely immeasurable) social, political and religious motivations may trump belonging and citizenship [32]. 4.2. Alternative Narratives Ultimately, the most effective long term strategy against al-Qaeda-type extremism, whether domestic or global, may be rooted in the construction of “alternative narratives” designed to subvert extremist messaging. We need to find ways of counterbalancing the culture of death and martyrdom with a culture that celebrates the value of life [33]. In order both to develop a long term strategy and to create meaningful alternative narratives, however, a number of things need to happen. Intelligence and law enforcement communities must learn not only how to penetrate the extremist world effectively but, just as importantly, how to understand the discourse that defines that world. This includes not just words, not just rhetoric, but extends to the meaning and symbolism underlying even sounds, colors and images [34] - in short, a much broader and deeper understanding of the cultural roots of extremism than we currently possess.

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We also need to determine the targets of our messaging. The US Cold War experience shows that messaging campaigns tend to work best when they are asymmetric; focused away from the opponent’s center of gravity and towards groups that are more likely to be receptive [35]. Domestically, hardened activists are probably a lost cause, whereas confused and idealistic adolescents may represent real opportunities to exert far-reaching influence. Internationally, it may be possible to engage groups which, like the Muslim Brotherhood, remain Islamist while being prepared to repudiate extremism. The Internet is arguably one of the most important tools available to the contemporary terrorist, particularly for al-Qaeda-inspired entities which are less groups than they are loose associations of far flung networks. With little “physical” capacity, they must rely on the Internet to recruit and train adherents, to raise funds, to propagandize, to document their history and mythology and to organize terrorist attacks [36]. An interesting feature of the presence of al-Qaeda-inspired groups on the Internet is that much of the associated technological innovation/software development has been done by extremists who have received engineering and computer training at Western colleges and universities. Indeed, the path to radicalization often seems to lead from Muslim homelands to the Muslim Diaspora via the study of applied science in Europe and North America. The “Hamburg Cell,” discussed above, is by no means atypical in this regard. To the extremist mind, there is undoubtedly poetic justice in using the technology of the West as a means of attacking and terrorizing the very societies that created it (the choice of civil aviation as a continuing focus of terrorist activity is no accident) [37]. On a more practical level, it is notable how few extremists have any grounding in either the history or culture of the societies that they are bent on destroying. By immersing themselves in the applied sciences, they acquire a superficial understanding of the technological manifestations of Western culture, but not of its intellectual underpinnings. For this reason, the creation of alternative narratives requires not just cultural understanding on our part, but also on the part of the target audience as well. To be effective, however, any large scale cross-cultural initiatives cannot be rooted in a missionary sensibility that characterizes one culture as inferior to another. At the same time, they cannot ignore the political and social factors that combine to make the culture of extremism a compelling one, or the successes of Western political culture in promoting tolerance, freedom and prosperity. Nor can they fail to include key audiences such as women and - as the predominant demographic throughout the Muslim world - young people. Ultimately, they must seek to find common ground and to demonstrate what is worth saving in both cultures [38]. The concept of the alternative narrative is also applicable to community engagement strategies aimed at the prevention of domestic radicalization. It is important to note, however, that individual ethno-cultural communities may be extremely suspicious of engagement strategies that are linked explicitly to a security agenda. At best, counter-radicalization programming can seem like political expediency. At worst, it can provide activists and extremists with an opportunity to characterize the programming itself as a covert means of infiltrating and manipulating communities. While the radicalization issue is certainly more critical in some communities than in others, ideological and social stimuli are constantly evolving. Therefore, lasting radicalization prevention strategies must be applicable to society as a

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whole and not to any single religious, ethnic or cultural constituency. Beyond this, national counter-radicalization strategies are not solely the task of the police, of the security services, or of government. They must also involve health authorities, school boards, social and community services, faith- and ethnic-based groups and nongovernmental organizations. All must contribute equally to the counter-radicalization narrative, because all have a stake in its outcome.

5. Conclusion Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism, and its many offshoots and analogs, is a truly global phenomenon. Not only has it helped to create a highly unstable political and cultural fault line that runs from the shores of the Mediterranean to the South China Sea, it exists (and flourishes) in Europe, in Australia and throughout the Americas. This is precisely its importance as a venue for extremism and precisely the challenge inherent in any attempt to counteract extremist messaging. Again, no single agency, no single sector, and no single government can undertake such a strategy on its own. A global phenomenon requires a global response and meaningful international cooperation will be required if influence campaigns that are rooted in the notion of an alternative world are to have any real impact.

References

[1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]

The Criminal Code of Canada (R.S.C. 1985, Chapter C-46, 2007), Part II.1, S 83.01 (1) (b) defines terrorism as “...an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause...” Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. All scriptural references are to the M.A.S. Abdel Haleem translation of The Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Blatchford, Christie. “Ignoring the Biggest Elephant in the Room.” Globe and Mail (5 June, 2006). National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). 145. International Crisis Group. “Understanding Islamism.” Middle East / North Africa Report (No. 37 - 2 March, 2005), 7. Leiken, Robert S. and Brooke, Steven. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” Foreign Affairs (March / April 2007), 112. Streusand, Douglas E.; Tunnell, Harry D. Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism (National Defense University, 2006), 3. Armstrong, Karen. Islam: A Short History (New York: Random House, 2002), 6. Raza, Raheel. Their Jihad...Not My Jihad. (Ingersoll, Ontario: Basileia Books, 2005), 18. Ibid., 118-122. Op. Cit., Armstrong, 18-22. “Jihad” in Martin, Richard C. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (New York: Macmillan, 2004). Ibid. Op. Cit., Armstrong, 168-170. Middle East Research Institute. Special Dispatch Series (No. 1529 - March 30, 2007). Op. Cit., Streusand & Tunnell, 2. Armstrong, Karen. “Violent Islamic Radicals Know They Are Heretical.” Guardian (July 8, 2006). Douglas Streusand and Harry Tunnell have written on this subject and are cited elsewhere in this report. The European Union has also prepared a handbook of non-offensive terminology to use in

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[20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31]

[32] [33] [34]

[35] [36] [37] [38]

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describing terrorism, but this remains classified (see Waterfield, Bruno, “Don’t confuse terrorism with Islam, says EU,” The Telegraph (March 31, 2007)). Op. Cit., Armstrong, 169-170; Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 28-31. Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilization: the Conquest of the Middle East (London: Fourth Estate, 2005), 1045. Allen, Charles. God’s Terrorists: the Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (London: Little, Brown, 2006), 210. Op. Cit., Raza, 61. Op. Cit., International Crisis Group, 13. Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 106-107. “British Identify Two ‘Principal’ Suspects.” New York Times (July 8, 2007). Op. Cit., Ramadan, 107-109. Op. Cit., Streusand & Tunnell, 3. Cited in Stern, Jessica. “The Protean Enemy.” Foreign Affairs (July - August 2003), 35. This conceptualization of radicalization is in common use in the RCMP national security program. Personal experiences of the process of radicalization can be observed in the lives of figures as diverse as Vladimir Lenin, Ernesto “Che” Guevara and the American outlaw Jesse James. See Anderson, Jon Lee. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997); Service, Robert. Lenin: A Biography (London: Pan, 2000); and Stiles, T.J. Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War (New York: Vintage, 2002). See, in particular, Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 107-135. This builds on ideas expressed by, among others, Gabriel Weimann of Haifa University, cited in Sinai, Joshua. “Defeating Internet Terrorists.” Washington Times (8 October, 2006). See, for example, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy. The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/imagery.asp). Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl; Schwartz, Lowell H. & Sickle, Peter. Building Moderate Muslim Networks. (Santa Monica: RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2007), 142. Gabriel Weimann. “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report (No. 116, March 2004), 3-4. Ibid., 5 Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: Meridian, 1946).

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Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate Ismail YILMAZ Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract. The purpose of this study is twofold: First, it seeks to determine whether domestic terrorists in Turkey hold different demographic traits from the rest of the Turkish population. Second, this study focuses on terrorists’ degree of involvement in terrorism (as measured by arrest history) in relation to their sociological characteristics and backgrounds (age, gender, education, social class). In other words, to understand at what level domestic terrorists are involved in terrorism, the researcher aims to model patterns of arrest for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members. Keywords. commitment to terrorism, DHKP/C, involvement in terrorism, terrorist, Turkish Hezbollah

Introduction For the past three decades, studies of terrorism have expended tremendous efforts to determine whether there are unique social background and personality traits common to all terrorists; researchers from diverse parts of the world have attempted to draw a general terrorist profile in an effort to understand different processes of terrorism, as for example becoming a terrorist or engaging in terrorist activities [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Findings suggest that a typical terrorist is predominantly male, well educated, in his mid-twenties, and from the middle class. However, current studies are not immune to methodological issues. In general, previous studies suffer from two shortcomings. First, they did not use control groups that would allow for making a comparison between the characteristics of terrorists and non-terrorists. Second, they focused primarily on “who becomes a terrorist and why,” whereas other processes, namely involvement or engaging in terrorist acts and leaving terrorism are usually ignored. Most existing studies assume a homogenous terrorist profile which tends to ignore the possibility that terrorists may have different characteristics that may ultimately determine not only one’s vulnerability to becoming a terrorist in the first place but also the degree of involvement and dedication to terrorism. As a result, questioning whether terrorists are different from an average person and whether all terrorists are equally involved in terrorism have not as yet been answered. 1. Purpose of the Study This study aims to complement a series of research conducted by Teymur [9] and Yayla [10] who sought to identify general characteristics of Turkish domestic terrorists.

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Their studies used descriptive and bivariate statistical analyses to report backgrounds and demographics. However, further analysis is required to determine whether domestic terrorism in Turkey is borne out of social and demographical forces common to all terrorists and their families. Such an analysis is necessary in developing “early intervention” methods to counter terrorism. In addition, a counter-terrorism strategy must consider those terrorists who are already committed to terrorism. For example, terrorists are not equally committed to and involved in violent acts. Depending on arrest histories, statistical findings suggest differences that call for further statistical analysis conducted in a multivariate setting that establishes specific socio-demographic forces that drive terrorists to repeat their offenses. As such, this researcher attempts to answer the following research questions: 1.

To what extent are Turkish terrorists similar to or different from the general Turkish population? (terrorist versus non-terrorist) 2. To what extent are terrorists similar or different in terms of their degree of involvement in terrorist activities? (highly-involved offenders versus lowly-involved offenders) 3. What factors are influential in the degree involvement in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah? (high/low involved DHKP/C members versus high/low Turkish Hezbollah members)

2. Review of the Literature 2.1. Current Gap in the Literature Understanding the nature of terrorism is the key to identifying the motivations of terrorists. However, the nature of terrorism has undergone significant changes recently. For example, modern terrorists of our era have extensive technical skills ranging from piloting an aircraft to making the most sophisticated bombs. Moreover, conducting deadly attacks went from being a highly technical issue to a matter of locating inexpensive explosives. Today, terrorist organizations have the ability to plot extremely violent attacks with little cost by using a human body as a bomb. Parallel to the changes in world politics, the nature of Turkey’s domestic terrorism has also changed. One of the significant changes occurred in the structure of leftist terrorist organizations. The collapse of the USSR and demise of communism as a promising prospect pushed leftist terrorists to a greater utilization of legal activities including, but not limited to, gathering around solidarity associations, student confederations and labor unions. Many potential recruits lost their belief in a communist revolution that has at least been the case for DHKP/C and other leftist terrorist organizations in Turkey for the last two decades. The legalization trend had an impact on recruitment methods of terrorist organizations as well. More precisely, to ensure survival DHKP/C and other leftist terrorist groups kept their recruitment criteria very lax by granting many sympathizers membership status. As a result, membership has become available to many more persons than in the past. The purpose of greater legalization is to create more propaganda and attract more potential recruits. Sympathizers now serve both overtly or publicly. Police witnessed a changing trend in the familiar terrorist characteristics, from professional and fully dedicated terrorists to non-professional and part-time workers.

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Interestingly and unexpectedly, new terrorists have regular occupations during the day whereas they may go out and plot a terrorist attack during the night. Terrorism literature, however, has a tendency to view terrorists as full-time workers. In this view, terrorists are not part-timers, but rather professionals who are thoroughly dedicated. The problem is that this view tends to ignore the differences amongst terrorists, which in turn creates a stereotypical terrorist profile in the minds of terrorism scholars. As a result, the degree to which a terrorist is involved in terrorist activities, the central focus of this study, does not draw enough attention from terrorism scholars. This study aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by examining the terrorist profile from a different angle. In other words, this study attempts to make a profile of terrorists according to their involvement levels. 2.2. Theoretical Framework Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; therefore, it cannot be “explained in a vacuum” [12]. What makes terrorism so attractive for dissident groups is its effectiveness among other alternative forms of dissidence. Terrorism is a choice made by terrorists and terrorist organizations. However, how, what, why, and when terrorists make these choices is subject to hot debate among scholars. Terrorism theories can be broken down into four categories depending on their point of interest: (a) strategic theories; (b) structural theories; (c) psychological theories and (d) sociological theories. Strategic theories envision terrorism as an instrument to achieve a set of goals identified by rational actors, while structural theories picture terrorism resulting from internal dynamics of political organizations. Psychological and sociological theories, on the other hand, emphasize the influence of individual personality, gender, age, education, and political affiliation factors. These set of theories have some applications for this research. However, in strategic and structural theories, the main focus is on the determinants of the decision to act. In other words, the dependent variable or the focus of interest is “terrorist act.” On the other hand, psychological and sociological theories center on individual characteristics and their likely relationship to terrorist decision making in different processes of terrorism. Both approaches attempt to draw a terrorist profile and try to discover common psychological and sociological attributes that lead terrorists to perpetrate violent terrorist acts. While these theories emphasize individual factors, there are significant differences between explanations that define factors leading an individual to resort to terrorism. Psychological theories of terrorism take a behavioral approach and assume an atypical personality. Sociological theories, however, emphasize the importance of demographic traits including age, gender, education, and social class, for example, on the behaviors of terrorists. Although the psychological approach is deemed more promising, it is subject to criticism in two respects. First, some scholars, namely Laquer [13] and Wilkinson [14], argued that there is no terrorist profile. In this opinion, the nature of terrorism varies over time, and geography results in a constant change in the profiles. According to Laquer, one can be certain about sociological characteristics such as the age of terrorists, by saying that they are mostly young, but their psychological characteristics may vary across different cultures. White [15] furthers a similar argument to that of Laquer when he states that individual personalities vary considerably, and it is impossible to draw a single behavioral profile. Second, studying psychological profiles have methodological restrictions such as limited accessibility to research subjects.

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According to Israel, even the most comprehensive studies regarding the personality of terrorists rely on historical analysis of biographical information. The issue of accessibility to research subject is also applicable for sociological profiling. However, juxtaposed to each other, sociological variables are far more accessible than psychological variables. Data regarding the demographical background of terroristsage, gender, education, and social classcan be obtained from government authorities or published biographies of terrorists. Hence, sociological profiling is considered a more reliable strategy than psychological profiling even though it is not completely infallible. Given the limitations of a psychological approach, this study utilizes a sociological approach, because psychological profiling appears to be less achievable in this situation since the researcher does not have direct contact with terrorists. However, the researcher has access to secondary resources that make it possible to gather data about terrorists’ sociological characteristics and backgrounds. The literature regarding sociological theories and variables examined by previous researchers will be reviewed next to gain a better perspective of a terrorist’s background and characteristics. Sociological terrorism explanations can be broken down into sociological profiling, social learning theory of aggression, frustration-aggression hypothesis, and relative deprivation theory. Sociological profiling does not offer a theoretical explanation to terrorism but rather focuses on the common sociological attributes of terrorists (age, gender, education, and social class). Although it assumes that terrorism is a function of socio-demographic characteristics common to all terrorists, it does not offer farreaching accounts as to why these demographic attributes are related to one’s choice or greater involvement in terrorism. In this sense, profiling is a simplistic way of understanding the relationship between terrorism and demographic attributes. For instance, simply reporting a proportional difference in gender is descriptive in nature but it provides little details about gender difference in participation. However, reporting demographics in relation to social processes of terrorism such as “joining in a terrorist organization” and “engaging (involvement) in a terrorist act” presents a more meaningful relationship. As an example, female’s lower levels of involvement in terrorist acts as compared to their male counterparts can be explained by the troublesome nature of committing a terrorist act that is typically incompatible with their feminine characteristics. Therefore, this study explains terrorists’ differential involvement in terrorist acts in relation to their socio-demographic characteristics. Learning theory of aggression, on the other hand, suggests that violence results from the observation and imitation of an aggressive role model. The frustration-aggression hypothesis of terrorism asserts that political violence is a result of desperation that occurs in the face of oppression. Finally, relative deprivation theory assumes that political violence results from the gap between expectation and actual achievement. Studies and evidence related to each sociological explanation are provided next to gain a better understanding about sociological characteristics of terrorists. 2.2.1. Sociological Profiling Profiling research regarding demographics of terrorists has some applications to this study. Demographic analysis is usually applied to discover who becomes a terrorist and for what reasons. This study, however, attempts to learn if there is a difference between the involvement levels of terrorists in relation to certain sociological characteristics. The hypothesis that terrorists have different involvement levels (which make some stay

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longer and others shorter) in respect to their educational levels, gender, social class and other characteristics has not been studied to date. The implications of this study would not only contribute to the current literature but also would help security personnel to identify terrorists who might repent and turn over information. Profiling studies attempted to define a common terrorist portrait in understanding why some individuals engage in terrorism while others do not under similar circumstances. This type of analysis has been used extensively in the past [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Previous terrorist profiling studies relating to sociological characteristics can be categorized under two different headings: early terrorist movements in Russia in the late 19th century and modern terrorist organizations worldwide. Profiling studies were first introduced in the 1970s when scores of people were inspired by a socialist revolution ideal. Since then, many profiling studies have been conducted with different orientations. Most recently, the orientation has changed to religiously motivated terrorists. Thus, modern profiling studies can be analyzed under three headings: (a) worldwide analysis, (b) regional and domestic analysis and (c) Middle Eastern suicide and non-suicide terrorists 2.2.1.1. Worldwide Analysis of Terrorist Profile The first worldwide analysis of terrorist profiling was conducted by Russell and Miller [1] in 1977, and their findings were widely cited in terrorism literature. Russell and Miller attempted to draw a sociological profile of the modern urban terrorist by compiling more than 350 terrorist cadres and leaders from German, Irish, Turkish, Spanish, Argentinean, Brazilian, Iranian, Palestinian, Japanese, and Uruguayan terrorist groups. Their study confirmed some of the widely reported sociological characteristics of terrorists in 1970s such as age, gender, educational, occupational and socioeconomic backgrounds, and marital status that were collected from published data. However, Russell and Miller’s [1] study suffered from methodological issues that consisted of comparing the characteristics of terrorists from various part of the world and then making generalizations about those characteristics, which ultimately harmed the validity of their study. On the other hand, they limited their analysis with urban terrorists by omitting those carrying out rural guerilla warfare. Still, findings of this study have been cited widely and used as references when making a generalization about terrorist characteristics. Long after Russell and Miller [1], Sageman [8] compiled information from a public domain on 172 persons who identified themselves as members of “Salafi Mujahidin,” an informal umbrella organization under which a number of religiouslymotivated and transnational terrorist groups convened such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda. When compiling the information for his analysis, Sageman used the documents and transcripts of legal proceedings, government documents, press and academic articles, and Internet articles. In his analysis, Sageman [8] included social background as measured by social origin, education, socio-economic status, occupation, family status; psychological background as measured by mental illness and terrorist personality (pathological narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personality); circumstances of joining the jihad as measured by age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, and relative deprivation; and social affiliation as measured by friendship, kinship, discipleship, and worship. Sageman also presented a social network analysis of global Salafi Mujahidin and the characteristics of this network. Sageman, however, did not include terrorists engaged in

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local terrorism; his sampling was biased towards groups engaged in transnational terrorism and towards those terrorists who had not investigated. 2.2.1.2. Regional and Domestic Studies of Terrorist Profile The lack of worldwide data sources about terrorists led many researchers to conduct regional studies on terrorist profiles. For instance, Clarke [2] focused on the profile of Basque separatists from what is known as ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) by using two different kinds of biographical information. The first consisted of 48 case studies of ETA members, and the second one included more limited information on 447 other ETA members. Clarke’s study examined the age, sex, socioeconomic background of members and families, and ethnic and linguistic characteristics of ETA terrorists. The study also discussed various processes in the lives of ETA members including radicalization of Basque youth, recruitment, relationships with families, friends, and loved ones, and leaving the organization. In another study, Weinberg and Eubank [3] examined the profiles of Italian terrorists. By obtaining information from two major newspapers in Italy and from court files, Weinberg and Eubank reported biographical characteristics of Italian terrorists consisting of sex, age, place of birth, place of residence, role in the organization, group affiliation, nature of relationship to other terrorists, occupation prior to becoming terrorist, and membership to political organization prior to becoming a terrorist. This was the first known study to examine the role of women in a terrorist organization; of the 2,512 terrorists whose biographical characteristics were reported, 451 were women. In the final study mentioned in this category, Handler [5] analyzed the socioeconomic profile of American terrorists. He placed the American experience with domestic terrorism as issue-oriented and reformist political groups, for example, antiabortionists, began to take stage in American politics toward the end of the 1970s. Biographical backgrounds of 280 known right-wing and left-wing terrorists who were active in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s were compiled. Different from previous studies, Handler [5] tabulated socio-economic variables with right-left wing affiliation, gender and position in the terrorist organizations. As for socio-economic variables, education, religion, race, occupation, income, and parent’s occupation and income were included. Handler’s study of right- and left-wing terrorists serves to understanding reasons why people choose to participate in specific groups. 2.2.1.3. Analysis of Middle Eastern Terrorist and Suicide Bombers Most recently, another category of profiling studies has emerged with a special interest in Middle Eastern terrorists. In fact, Russell and Miller’s [1] study included Middle Eastern terrorist organizations long before this category of profiling began. However, early terrorist organizations in the Middle East such as Al-Fatah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) acted with a Marxist-Leninist motive even though their ultimate purpose was the same as their contemporary religious counterparts. On the other hand, recently established terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah (i.e. Turkish Hezbollah) [11], Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas came into the picture by using religious motives. Since these organizations were involved in highly sensational suicide attacks during the last two decades, the characteristics and motives of their militants drew considerable scholarly attention.

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For instance, Hassan [6] conducted an on-site study and interviewed approximately 250 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza during three years between 1996 and 1999. Most of the terrorists Hassan interviewed were participants in attempted suicide attacks but failed to complete the attack as planned. Hassan was able to interview her subjects in meetings arranged by intermediaries. Hence, Hassan’s study has been extensively cited for her exceptional data collection method. Normally, the clandestine structure of terrorist organizations and terrorists’ lives, rarely allows an independent researcher to have a systematic access to the research subject. Most independent researchers who previously conducted profile studies had to rely on secondary resources. Hassan’s study [6], however, constitutes an exception. Unfortunately, she did not report any specific demographic and socio-economic variables of terrorists she interviewed as part of her agreement to keep the records strictly anonymous. Pedahzur [7] and his colleagues compared the characteristics of suicide terrorists and non-suicide terrorists in the Middle East. Pedahzur et al. did not limit their study with a specific terrorist organization. They collected data from an Israeli daily newspaper (Ha’aretz) by detecting all terrorist events (suicide or non-suicide) between 1993 and 2002. The population consisted of 819 subjects, 743 of whom were nonsuicide and 80 who were suicide terrorists. Among the variables included were previous experiences in terrorism acts, education, ideological affiliation, marital status, age, socio-economic background, and gender. Pedahzur et al.’s study offered a useful comparison of terrorists with different motives, suicidal and non-suicidal. However, this study was criticized on the basis of its data sources. More specifically, the study relied heavily on journalistic accounts which are problematic because researchers have limited ways of knowing the reliability of information given unless they triangulate or unless they confirm the same information from another data source [8]. Most recently, Berrebi [81] attempted to investigate the potential link between terrorism and economic desperation. Another focus of his study was to investigate the potential similarities and differences between terrorists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine. Berrebi collected data from the biographies of 335 killed terrorists from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) from their online sources. His dataset included the age, poverty status, education, marital status, labor force status, resident type (rural vs. urban), and district of residence. Berrebi’s [81] comparison between terrorists and the general population of Palestine indicated that terrorism studies can take advantage of quasi-experimental research designs by using control groups. In the field of terrorism, the root cause of approach is highly problematic from a methodological standpoint; therefore, terrorism scholars have not been so eager to apply it. However, this study can be considered as an exception. One of the significant limitations of Berrebi’s study was related to the accuracy of biographical information. Since data were collected from terrorist websites, the possibility of exaggerating facts was high. In addition, there was no clear indication of terrorists’ poverty status in their biographies. Therefore, the researcher had to infer the poverty status by looking at an individual’s occupation, foreign travel history, car ownership, and computer availability, if any of these was available. In other words, poverty status of terrorists was conveniently constructed. As seen in this brief review, most profiling studies suffered from a common methodological problem and the reliability of the information collected. This was because of the nature of terrorism studies that gives little room of opportunity for an

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independent observer to conduct on-site data collection. Despite this shortcoming, previous studies found similar patterns in the profiles of terrorists. Evidence from the aforementioned studies will be provided next to demonstrate that terrorists have common social backgrounds and that a similar analysis is possible to determine their involvement levels as well. 2.2.1.4. Findings of Sociological Profiling 2.2.1.4.1. Age Findings from previous studies suggest that as age increases participation in terrorism diminishes. This is a relationship that also exists between crime and age, and this pattern (in terrorism) remains remarkably the same across time, geography and type of crime. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no variance between participation age, peak age and dropout age. These terms refer to different time periods in a terrorist’s life. Participation age refers to the age of first engagement with a terrorist group. Peak age, on the other hand, represents the age when participation in terrorist activities peak. Finally, dropout age indicates the age when a terrorist quits. The participation age in terrorism shows great variance across region and organizations. The dropout age, however, is somewhat similar and begins towards the end of one’s twenties [1, 2, 3]. There is no evidence for peak age. Age trends change from one group to another. However, terrorists tend to be young. Russell and Miller [1] reported that the average age of a typical terrorist ranged from 22 to 25, except for German, Japanese, and Palestinian terrorists. The mean (participation) age for terrorists from these countries was even lower, ranging from 20 to 25. Sageman [8], however, found that the joining age was almost 26 for Salafi Mujahidin. Clarke found a similar result to that of Sageman when he stated that ETA members tended to be in their middle or late twenties when they joined the organization. [3] and Eubank found that a majority of terrorists were between 20 and 29 when they joined a terrorist organization. The same study also reported that the lowest age of participation was 15 for Italian women terrorists. A similar pattern was reported by Taylor concluding that the average age dropped in the 1980s for different terrorist groups such as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The participation in the PKK is also as low as 14, as reported by the organization itself on their own website (www.hpg-online.net). Even though the mean age for a typical terrorist ranged between 20 to 29 in most studies, and even lower in some cases, terrorist leaders tend to be older than ordinary terrorists. Carlos Marighella of Brazil was 58 and Huseyin Velioglu of Turkish Hezbollah was 49 when they were killed; Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK is 60 and Dursun Karatas of DHKP/C is 55 and they are still alive. Russell and Miller [1] found that of the 17 terrorist organizations they examined most leadership cadres were in their mid-30s or early 40s. A similar pattern was reported by Weinberg and Eubank [3] for Italian women terrorists; almost 25 percent of their sample was at least in their early 30s and higher. Although there is evidence for participation and dropout ages, there is no evidence for peak age. Normally, a terrorist can participate in any terrorist activity at any point in his career. However, younger terrorists are more likely to take risks than older terrorists, which, in turn, affects their willingness to participate in terrorist acts. On the other hand, one can equally assert that older terrorists are much more committed to the causes and therefore their willingness to participate would also be more than that of younger

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terrorists. As a result, the relationship between age and participation in terrorist activities is not certain. Because there is no evidence for participation, it can be hypothesized that: H1:

There is no association between the age of terrorists and their willingness to participate in terrorist activities.

2.2.1.4.2. Education Profiling studies, in general, concluded that terrorists are well-educated. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that two-thirds of the terrorists had some type of university degree. Educational level was even higher for German Baader-Meinof terrorists with almost 80 percent having university degrees. This pattern did not change for countries with a Muslim majority such as Turkey, Iran, and Palestine. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism scholars focused on the type of education as well as its level. Sageman’s [8] study of global Salafi Mujahidin measured education in two different ways: type of education and educational level achieved. According to Sageman, contrary to the common view that Pakistani and Saudi Arabia encourage a system of education that advocates hatred of the West, only 17 percent of the terrorists he analyzed had participated in religious schools. However, a majority had a secular education in elementary and secondary schools. Sageman also rejects the argument that links participation in terrorism to the low level of education, which, in turn, makes terrorists vulnerable to brainwashing by religious extremists. According to his findings, almost 71 percent of the terrorists from global Salafi Mujahidin had a college or graduate degree. Sageman’s [8] finding was consistent with that of Krueger and Maleckova [83] who measured the support for political violence among Palestinians. Accordingly, the support for political violence against Israeli civilians was more common among professionals than labor workers (43 vs. 35 percent), and the support was higher among people with secondary education than among people with no education (39 vs. 32 percent). However, the pattern that terrorists are highly educated is not the same across all terrorist organizations. Russell and Miller [1] reported that almost none of the terrorists from Provisional Wing of Irish Republican Army (IRA) had higher educational levels. Handler [5] found that the percentage of college degrees earned among American leftist terrorists was as high as 75 percent whereas this figure for rightist ones was only 22 percent. Nevertheless, the number of studies reporting that terrorists are highly educated is far more than the number studies reporting otherwise. Do education levels vary between highly involved and lowly involved terrorists? Previous studies did not report any findings whether there is a relationship between the levels of education and involvement. Yet, considering the evidence that most terrorists are well educated, one can still hypothesize that: H2: As educational level increases, one’s involvement in terrorist activities also increases.

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2.2.1.4.3. Gender Findings from previous research suggest that terrorism is a male profession. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that among the Latin American and European terrorist groups they profiled, male terrorists accounted for more than 80 percent whereas female terrorists accounted for only 16 percent. Clarke reported that males accounted for 91 percent of all ETA terrorists arrested between 1979 and 1980. In Weinberg and Eubank’s [3] biographical study of Italian terrorists who acted between 1970 and 1984, 82 percent were male. Russell and Miller’s [1] findings suggested that gender proportion is closely associated with the strategy followed. In their study, urban terrorists were predominantly male. On the contrary, females usually assumed secondary positions in urban-based terrorist groups. On the other hand, rural-based insurgent groups in Latin America such as FSLN and the Shining Path of Peru included a large number of female terrorists in their cadres. Handler’s [5] findings indicated that gender proportion may also be related to the political orientation of a terrorist group. In his study of American terrorists, Handler found significant differences in the number of female cadres between the left-wing and right-wing terrorist organizations. Accordingly, of the American right-wing terrorists he studied, 89 percent were male and 11 percent were female. However, the gender proportion in American left-wing terrorist groups was almost even, with 54 percent male and 46 percent female. Similar to Handler’s finding, Russell and Miller [1] reported that the number of women served in two leftist Latin American groups, Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and July Second Movement, reached up to 60 percent in 1976. Weinberg ad Eubank [3] reported a parallel pattern. Of the 451 Italian female terrorists they studied, only 10 percent were affiliated with neo-fascist terrorist groups, and the remaining 90 percent were connected with different leftist groups such as the Red Brigades. A couple of explanations were brought as to why females join a terrorist group at a low rate disproportionate to their society’s population. According to Galvin [16], women are involved in terrorism with a totally different motivation than men. In her opinion, most of the time women are attracted to terrorism with an expectation for glory and power. Weinberg and Eubank [3] found that companionship and family ties were cited as other reason for female involvement in terrorism. Of the Italian terrorists they profiled, 27 percent were related by family and companion ties to other terrorists. Previous research also questioned the level of involvement in terrorist activities by gender. Most studies reported that female terrorists typically carry out low profile jobs in a terrorist organization. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] found that most of the terrorist attacks occurring in Latin America and West Europe between 1966 and 1976 were planned and executed by male terrorists. Females were usually deployed in jobs that required little or no manpower such as intelligence collection or assisting terrorist cadres as a nurse or courier. A similar pattern was reported by Clark about ETA members in Spain. Clarke stated that ETA systematically denied women from being involved, particularly in active duties. In addition, there was a “pronounced antipathy” against women in the ETA. On the other hand, there have been women terrorists, especially from leftist groups, who assumed leadership positions. According to Handler [5], 35 percent of the American leftist women terrorists, were identified as a member of a leadership team, while of the men, 27 percent assumed leadership positions. In the past, there were

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charismatic female terrorist leaders who had great influence on many female terrorists such as Sofia Perovskaia of Narodnaia Volia, Susanne Albrecht, Gudrun Esslin, and Ulrike Meinhof of the Baader-Meinof, Leila Khaled of Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine (PFLP), and Dora Maria Tellez of Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Nevertheless, women involvement in terrorism, in general and terrorist attacks, in particular, still remains low, a fact that suggests the following hypothesis: H3: When compared to their male counterparts, females are less likely to be involved in terrorist activities. 2.2.1.4.4. Social Class (Socioeconomic Status) Is terrorism a response to poor market opportunities? Previous profiling studies have attempted to answer this question by examining the socio-economic class that terrorists come from. Russell and Miller [1] found that most of the terrorists they surveyed were either upper-middle class or upper class. Most of the European and Japanese terrorists were the children of affluent families in contrast to those terrorists from certain groups such as the PKK, the LTTE and Revolutionary Armed Force of Columbia (FARC). For instance, the German RAF and Italian Red Brigades were exclusively composed of middle-class terrorists who had dropped out of high schools or universities. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, socialist ideology attracted many affluent young people from West Europe, the United States and Japan into the radical groups with a sense of responsibility for sufferings of the poor of the world. However, not all terrorists in Russell and Miller’s [1] study were middle- and upper- class members. Terrorists from the PKK, LTTE and FARC, as well as terrorists from paramilitary groups of Ireland such as the Official Irish Republican Army (Official IRA) and the Provisional Republican Army (Provisional IRA) who came primarily from working class families. Related to their social class, terrorists from these paramilitary groups also did not have a higher educational background. For Palestinian terrorist groups, most of the rank and file cadres were lower class in their society while their leadership cadres were middle and upper class. Similar to that of gender proportion, the strategy of terrorist groups (urban versus rural) seems to be one of the factors that determines social class. Most rural-based insurgent terrorist groups such as the PKK, FARC and the Provisional IRA attract people from lower segments of the society. On the other hand, most urban-based leftist terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army, German Baader Meinhof, and Uruguayan Tupamaros recruit people from middle and upper classes. This fact was clearly stated by Uruguayan Chancellor Jorge Peirano Facio in 1970 when he said “for each family of the upper class there is a Tupamaro” [1]. A similar prototype was reported by Clarke about terrorists from the Basque region of Spain. Most of the ETA terrorists in his study were either working class or lower middle class. Considering the fact that ETA is a rural-based insurgent group that is aiming to separate a part of Spain and that most of its members were industrial small town workers, this result corresponds to that of Russell and Miller [1]. The same analysis was also true for American right-wing and left-wing terrorists. According to Handler [5], right-wing American terrorists were mostly middle and lower class, while left-wing American terrorist were mostly middle and upper class. As a result, one can conclude that terrorists may come from a wide variety of social class backgrounds. However, upper-middle class and upper-class members prefer left-wing and urban-

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based terrorist organizations while lower-middle class and working class members make their choice for right-wing and rural-based terrorist organizations. Studies of Middle Eastern terrorists found similar results to the previous research. For instance, Hassan’s [6] interview with 250 Palestinian suicide bombers indicated that none of them were “desperately poor.” Similarly, Berrebi’s [81] comparison of 48 killed suicide bombers from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine revealed that the terrorists were less likely to come from impoverished families when compared the general Palestinian population. Krueger and Maleckova’s [83] study found no support for the link between poverty and participation in (Lebanon) Hezbollah. Most recently, Sageman [8] points out that the traditional way of measuring socioeconomic status tends to ignore differences among the various clusters. His analysis of Global Salafi Mujahidin revealed that most of the leadership cadres and core Arab clusters (terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and Syria) were middle and upper classes. On the other hand, most of the Southeast Asian cluster (terrorists from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and the Maghrep Arab cluster (terrorists from Morocco, France and Algeria) were middle and lower classes. Overall, three-fourths of all terrorists he examined were middle and upper classes. According to Sageman, this refutes the argument that terrorism emerges from poverty. Similar to Sageman’s point on socio-economic status of terrorists, this study is a comparison of two different clusters of terrorists: highly involved versus lowly involved ones. Previous studies, however, did not present any evidence of whether social class has an impact on the degree of involvement. On the other hand, there is no conceptual argument whether differential involvement in terrorism is a function of socio-economic status. Hence, this study hypothesizes that: H4: There is no difference in the socioeconomic status of highly-involved and lowly-involved terrorists. 2.2.1.4.5. Place of Recruitment (Rural versus Urban) Terrorist groups recruit members in the areas where they concentrate their operations most, because local recruits have the advantage of knowing the area of operation and the ability to contact local aides. Therefore, urban-based terrorist organizations focus on urban areas whereas rural-based terrorist organizations target rural areas for recruitment. For potential recruits, a terrorist organization’s being conveniently available in a surrounding area becomes a significant factor in their decision to join. Previous research supports this argument. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that most of the terrorists in Latin American and European terrorist groups in the 1970s joined from urban areas. This pattern was almost the same across different groups such as Uruguayan Tupamaros, German Baader-Meinof and Italian Red Brigades. For Palestinian terrorists, especially those from PFLP, many were born or lived a significant portion of their lives in urban cities. Most of the terrorist organizations mentioned in Russell and Miller’s study were based on urban cities of their country of origin. Weinberg and Eubank [3] reported that 65 percent of the Italian terrorists they surveyed were recruited from small cities. On the other hand, 30 percent of the terrorists were born in small communities where the populations were under 100,000. When the place of birth is compared to the place of recruitment, it is clear that almost

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one-half of the terrorists recruited from large cities were mobile and emigrated from smaller communities. Weinberg and Eubank’s findings were similar to that of Russell and Miller [1] because they studied urban-based neo-fascist and leftist terrorists groups. Studies on rural-based terrorist organizations such as Clarke’s analysis of Spain’s ETA did not report the place of recruitment. Clarke, however, reported that a typical ETA member comes from a working class or lower-middle class. He concluded that those from a working class were not likely to be employed by large factories but rather by small factories in small towns. In other words, ETA which is a rural-based (Basque region) terrorist organization in Spain recruits its members from among the dwellers of industrial small towns in Basque, Spain. Despite ample evidence indicating a relationship between the place of recruitment and the type of organizations, there is no evidence for differential involvement in terrorism activities and the place of recruitment. In Turkey, both urban-based and ruralbased terrorist groups organize their activities in the slums of big cities where most of the residents are immigrants of rural towns of the inner country. The immigrant population is concentrated in certain neighborhoods, and integration of immigrant populations into the urban society takes a long time, which, in turn, makes them vulnerable to the exploitation of terrorist organizations. Even though most of the terrorists join from urban cities, many have a rural family background. However, to what extent this terrorist feature impacts the level of involvement is not clear. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: H5: The place of recruitment does not correlate with involvement level in any way. 2.2.1.4.6. Marital Status According to Russell and Miller [1], being an unmarried terrorist is a rule. The need for security, mobility and dedication to the cause prevents many terrorists from taking the responsibilities of a family and forces them to remain single. Russell and Miller’s findings indicated that 75-80 percent of Latin American, European, Middle Eastern and Asian terrorists were single. The only exception was Uruguayan Tupamaros with almost 30 percent of its cadres married. Contrary to the findings of Russell and Miller [1], Sageman [8] found that almost 75 percent of Salafi Mujahidin members were married. Sageman attributes the high marriage rate among the Salafi Mujahidin to their faith. Accordingly, Islam encourages its believers to marry and have children. Thus, the pattern of low marriage among the Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller’s study was not confirmed by Sageman’s study of Salafi Mujahidin. For one thing, Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller’s study were not members of religious oriented groups. Rather, they were from Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Black September Organization, both of which were secular and did not have a religious orientation. Sageman also confirmed that this high marital status pattern is unique to Salafi Mujahidin as studies on other types of terrorism found that a typical terrorist is an unmarried one. Sageman also denoted that most of the single terrorists were single because they were either too young, still students or financially unable to afford a marriage. In conclusion, previous studies found that most of the terrorists from leftist groups are unmarried whereas most of the terrorists from religiously motivated groups are married. However, previous studies did not report any finding on the association

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between the level of involvement in terrorist acts and martial status. One can still assume that there might be a difference in the level of involvement among the terrorists in relation to their marital status. Those who have family responsibilities are expected to have a lesser involvement in terrorist acts because there is the risk of being arrested for married terrorists in frequent involvement. In other words, married terrorists have a stake in conformity and they take part in low-profile terrorist activities. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: H6: The probability of involvement is higher for married terrorists than it is for unmarried terrorists. 2.2.2. Relative Deprivation (RD) Another line inquiry in terrorism research concentrated on what is known as relative deprivation (RD). This theory posits that people feel deprivation when they perceive that they are treated unjustly compared to some standards or reference groups. Relative deprivation is often related to economic conditions. Accordingly, people may turn to collective violence, namely revolutions, rebellions and riots when they are economically deprived. This study seeks to discover whether relative deprivation is related to the level of involvement in terrorism. The application of relative deprivation to terrorism is not new. Early studies of terrorist characteristics sought to understand whether low socioeconomic status was an indicator of a typical terrorist character [1, 2, 3]. None of these studies, however, indicated that terrorists were economically deprived. This pattern appears not to have changed for modern terrorists. The plight of Palestinian people pushed scholars to search whether terrorism in the Middle East is related to the poverty [6, 8]. Findings from these studies did not suggest a direct relationship between terrorism and poverty. However, reducing the relative deprivation concept simply to the poverty level may be considered as a flaw because not all people with low socio-economic status feel deprivation. Hence, researchers should fully understand theoretical underpinnings of relative deprivation before they initiate a test of the concept. 2.2.2.1. Assumptions and the Many Versions of RD The assumptions of relative deprivation theory correspond to the assumptions of frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard and his colleagues [17]. Both theories assert that individuals feel deprived of something they desire. The major differences between relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis is that the former asserts that believing others have something and feeling himself as entitled to have the same things are necessary preconditions for deprivation, whereas the latter asserts that a having a desire for something and believing it is feasible to obtain are sufficient for frustration. The term relative deprivation was first used by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues of the Research Division of the U.S. Army in their study, The American Soldier. They used relative deprivation as a provisional explanation for their findings that respondents they examined were better off in some situations whereas they were worse off in other situations with reference to comparison groups. Since then, relative deprivation has attracted wide attention from political scientists Nagel, Gurr [18], [24], sociologists

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Merton and Rossi [20], and psychologists Crosby [21] and Pettigrew [22]. For further clarification, four famous models of relative deprivation will be discussed. Davies was considered first to establish a formal theory of relative deprivation. According to Davies, an individual who lacks certain goods and opportunities will have a sense of injustice whenever he feels that similar others have those goods and opportunities. His formulation of relative deprivation encompasses three essential conditions for deprivation: the individual who lacks something desired should (a) perceive others have it; (b) have a desire for it; and (c) have a feeling of entitlement for it. In the absence of any one of these, deprivation does not occur. In Davies’ opinion, an individual can make two distinct comparisons, the first of which occurs between ingroup members and the second of which occurs between out-group members. Adding another condition to that of Davies, Runciman [23] claimed that an individual should also feel that obtaining the desired goods and opportunities is feasible. According to Runciman, this last condition helps an individual distinguish unrealistic and realistic hopes. If an individual knows that his desire is an unrealistic one, he does not feel deprivation. However, if that individual thinks otherwise, he feels deprivation. Runciman [23] made a differentiation between egoistic deprivation in which an individual compares himself to others and fraternal deprivation in which an individual compares his group to other groups. Contrary to Davies and Runciman, Gurr [24] defined relative deprivation by making no assumption about the sources of expectation. In his definition, relative deprivation is viewed as an individual’s perception of discrepancy between his expectations and capabilities. Accordingly, expected status or standards may not only be determined in reference to others, but rather the so-called or perceived deprivation may also reflect a desire for one’s own past condition, or an abstract ideal or standards put by leaders. In Gurr’s [24] opinion, if the source of deprivation is based on a loss of what a person once had or believed he could have, it is a decremental deprivation. In this situation, that person experiences a relative deprivation by reference to his own past condition. In other words, a person’s value capabilities begin to decline while his value expectation remains at the same level. Examples include the loss of political influence by oppositional groups or the decline in status of a middle-class population as the status or influence of working-class population increases. In aspirational deprivation, however, a person does not experience a significant loss. Rather, he is angered because he has no means to attain increasing or intensifying expectations. Contrary to decremental deprivation, in aspirational deprivation expectations begin to rise while capabilities remain the same. For instance, contemporary demands of the African-American population in the 1970s for social equality compared to those made earlier reflected an increase in their expectations for more status. According to Gurr [24], traditionally an individual’s mere exposure to education increased their expectations. Such an increase in expectations may cause a relative deprivation if the level of actual achievement (or capabilities) remains the same. As a special case of aspirational deprivation [24], Gurr defined a third category of deprivation, progressive deprivation, in which an upward improvement in both expectations and capabilities generates an expectation of continued improvement. If the capabilities somehow stabilize or decrease, then a progressive deprivation is likely. This kind of deprivation is seen in societies where there occurs an economic recession in a growing economy.

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Gurr’s [24] concept of progressive deprivation can be considered as a generalized version of Davies’s J-curve [25]. According to Davies, individuals feel angry when they lack certain standards and opportunities if (a) they have a desire for them and if (b) they possessed them in the past. The major difference between relative deprivation theory and Davies’s J-Curve (and also Gurr’s progressive deprivation) is that the former claims that individuals should make a comparison with others while the latter posits that individuals can also make comparisons with their past. In addition, Davies did not discuss feasibility of desires. Of all the relative deprivation theories mentioned, the most applicable one to the current study is that of Davies’s J-curve and Gurr’s [24] progressive deprivation. These two concepts claim that an upward improvement in expectations and capabilities generates an expectation of constant improvement. If capabilities stabilize or begin to decrease, a relative deprivation occurs as the result of a rising gap between expectations and capabilities. More specifically, a change in the status or standards of a (non-professional) terrorist may result with a deprivation, which, in turn, may affect his degree of involvement in terrorism. Making a comparison between his past and current situation, a (non-professional) terrorist who has experienced a layoff or dropout may feel deprivation that ultimately leads him to greater involvement in terrorist acts. This type of deprivation may also be known as egoistic deprivation, because the person feels the deprivation as a result of a change in his own situation. On the other hand, a (non-professional) terrorist without experiencing deprivation is expected to take lesser risks because he has a stake in conformity. This type of terrorist is involved in terrorism less than others because he should be in a state of relative satisfaction compared to others who experience a relative deprivation. Consequently, this study will use progressive and egoistic deprivation theories as models because it is assumed that involvement in terrorism is a function of resentment that occurs as a result of an increasing gap between personal expectations and achievements. In this sense, this study will answer how much of the variation in involvement in terrorism can be attributable to the perceived deprivation felt by terrorists as a result of negative life experiences, namely school dropout and layoffs from work. 2.2.2.2. Empirical Support for RD Runciman’s [23] categorization of egoistic deprivation (self versus others) and fraternal deprivation (my group versus other groups) and Gurr’s [24] introduction of decremental, aspirational and progressive deprivation enhanced the earliest applications of relative deprivation theory. Since then, the theory has received mixed support. Brush [26] examined the extent of empirical support for relative deprivation theory (as manifested by Gurr) by reviewing the studies listed in the Social Science Citation Index. According to his findings, relative deprivation theory received considerable support during the first half of the 1970s. However, support for the theory declined during the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, especially among political scientists and sociologists. This pattern, however, was not the same among psychologists. Crosby, who was a psychologist herself, reported that she found support for egoistic deprivation in 95 different studies. At this point, it is reasonable to ask why there is a disagreement on the empirical validity of relative deprivation theory between psychologists on the one side and sociologists and political scientists on the other side. According to Brush [26],

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psychologists more often direct their attention to the feelings of resentment, whereas sociologists and political scientists focus more on the occurrence of collective violence. More specifically, while psychologists often succeed in explaining individual deprivation, political scientists and sociologists fail to explain how individual deprivation is transformed into collective violence. Today, it is known that strains of aspiration can produce psychopathology; however, the relationship between strain and collective violence is suspect. According to Laqueur [13], no truly scientific theory of collective violence has emerged; perhaps because no quantitative measure is suffice to understand the qualitative nature of human frustration. On the contrary, Brush argued that refutation of a theory, in general, and relative deprivation theory, in particular, should not be taken as a failure. Rather, refutation, as well as validation, should be taken as progress because oftentimes social science theories are judged by harsh standards. In natural science, however, each experiment is considered as a progress towards the perfection of a theory regardless of failure or success. For example, theories about the assumed properties of an atom were accepted long before atoms could be observed. Hence, current charges against relative deprivation theory relating to its unobservable parts would not be taken as a critical flaw. Rather, each study in the literature has a contribution to the current status of relative deprivation theory. This researcher is interested in whether relative deprivation at the individual-level predicts participation in terrorist activities. Previous researchers rarely questioned the link between relative deprivation and participation in terrorist activities. Rather, they centered their focus on the link between relative deprivation and social violence. Nevertheless, there are a handful of studies that question the relationship between poverty and socio-economic class and participation in terrorist activities. For instance, Kruger and Maleckova tested the link between poverty at the individual level and the probability of participation in (Lebanon) Hezbollah among the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and found no support. Similarly, Berrebi’s analysis of 243 suicide terrorists found no evidence for economic deprivation although suicide terrorists were considered as the most economically deprived of all terrorists. Hassan, on the other hand, conducted a vis-à-vis interview with 250 Palestinian terrorists and reported that none of the terrorists she interviewed were desperately poor, but many were middle-class members [6]. These studies, however, have failed to construct relative deprivation. Primarily in these studies, relative deprivation is implied or reduced simply to poverty, unemployment, or low socio-economic status without knowing, in reality, whether or not these factors lead people to relative deprivation. Relative deprivation, however, is a psychological process that cannot be identified without people reporting it. Deprivation is relative when a person makes a comparison between self and others (fraternal) or between present and past (egoistic). Thus, constant poverty or unemployment may not lead to relative deprivation when individuals have no way to make a comparison between past and present unless they have experienced a layoff and a school dropout. On the other hand, even though terrorists have a persistent poverty background and have no way to compare between present and past, a comparison of self to others is still possible. Such a comparison is often used by terrorist groups as a method of propaganda to recruit new members from the lower-class. However, most of the terrorists in the studies of Kruger and Maleckova [83], Berrebi [81] and Hassan [6] were middle or upper class members and well-educated.

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Then the question becomes: How can these people feel a relative deprivation if they belong to the upper classes of society? Krueger and Maleckova’s answer is enlightening: “Would-be terrorists could be inspired by the poverty of their countrymen. This is what they call the “Robin Hood model of terrorism’.” In other words, relative deprivation is also possible for middle- and upper-class members when they act out of altruistic purposes. On the other hand, even middle- and upper-class members can experience an egoistic type of relative deprivation when “their potential opportunities are less attractive than their expectations.” In such a situation, relative deprivation becomes more significant than absolute deprivation because a downward trend in expectations as opposed to an upward trend in opportunities is more likely to be frustrating than a stable trend in both expectations and opportunities. Middle- and upper-class members, in this sense, are more likely to be subject to such frustrating trends than lower class members. Thus, the finding that most terrorists are middle- and-upper class members should not be surprising if relative deprivation is considered as a change in (economic) expectations rather than as absolute poverty or as the state of unemployment. Consequently, for relative deprivation to occur there must be a decline in expectations and an increase in opportunities. Since relative deprivation is not identical to absolute deprivation, it does not belong to a social class. Furthermore, middle- and upper-class members are more likely to encounter relative deprivation because the probability of sudden change in economic situations is higher compared to lower-class members who are more likely to encounter absolute deprivation. On the other hand, middle- and upper-class members may participate in terrorist activities for altruistic reasons. In such situations, they may experience what is known as fraternal deprivation in which a person suffers for the grievances of others. Finally, lower-class members have no way to experience relative deprivation of an egoistic type if they live in constant (or absolute) poverty. They can only feel this type of deprivation in the event of a change in their situations such as a layoff. Lower-class members may still be inspired by fraternal deprivation by making a comparison between the poor and the rich. As a result, any person from any social class may experience relative deprivation of any type. Relative deprivation is related to changes which would ultimately affect a person’s economic prosperity. Thus, the following hypotheses can be developed in light of the evidence presented: H7: Participation in terrorist activities is not associated with social class. H8: The probability of participation in terrorist activities is higher for those who have experienced a school dropout. H9: The probability of participation in terrorist activities is higher for those who have experienced a lay off. 2.2.3. Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis The violent nature of terrorism brings an important question to the minds concerning the psychology of terrorists: Does frustration have a role in terrorist decision-making? For the purpose of this study, this question becomes: To what extent can frustration explain the variation in the involvement level of terrorists? At first glance, a relationship between a frustrating event and a consequent involvement in terrorism

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seems likely. However, constructing such a relationship requires an extensive psychological analysis of terrorists that is very demanding and hard to apply in the study of terrorism due to difficulties in the accessibility of research subjects. On the other hand, the relationship between frustration and aggression had been largely examined in the psychology field long before it was first applied to the study of social violence in 1970s. The frustration-aggression hypothesis dominated the psychological study of aggression during the preceding three decades of its invention in 1939 by Dollard and his colleagues [17]. Although the concept was extensively criticized in the following years and the original version has been reviewed several times, the central proposition of a causal relationship between a preceding frustrating event and a following aggressive behavior still remains as the rule. The hypothesis has inspired other modern concepts regarding the nature and source of human aggression, namely the relative deprivation theory of social violence [19, 18] and scapegoat theory of prejudices. 2.2.3.1. Basic Assumptions The hypothesis initially proposed that “the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” [14]. In this context, frustration was defined as the interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence. Occasionally, however, the term frustration is used not only as the process of blocking a personal goal but also as the reaction to such blocking. In other words, in order for a person to be considered frustrated, that person should not only be thwarted from reaching his goal but also should show some type of reaction. If frustration always leads to aggression, how does this process occur? In developing the original formulation, Dollard et al. [17] stated that the certainty of aggression depends on (a) the reinforcement value of interfered goal responses, (b) the level of frustration and (c) the number of interferences. In the occurrence of aggression first, the reinforcement value of interfered goals is important, because frustration is related to goal attainment. Second, the level of frustration becomes a significant factor, because not all frustrations instigate aggression but rather frustration instigates aggression only if it is complete. Third, if frustrations can be leveled, then the number of interferences becomes important. That is, frustration is an additive process that develops cumulatively. Dollard et al. [17] recognized that sometimes aggression may be inhibited and may break out in a different form. Inhibition occurs when the anticipated severity of punishment exceeds the anticipated gratification of aggression. In such situations, frustration results in covert aggression. Dollard et al. denoted that inhibited overt aggression cannot be taken as nonaggression. Accordingly, inhibited overt aggression can be considered as covert aggression, or those who manifest the aggression covertly are sometimes known as “furious inside.” One of the significant components of the frustration-aggression hypothesis concerns the displacement of aggression. Dollard et al. [17] proposed that frustration directs aggression against the primary source of frustration. However, at times, frustration instigates aggression against an alternative target. The displacement of target occurs if there is an association between the primary and the alternative source of frustration. The strength of instigation is related to the similarities between the primary and the alternative targets.

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How long can instigation to aggression ensue? Instigation to aggression can only be reduced by aggressive or hostile activities either against the primary target or against the alternative target. Since frustration is an additive process, the instigation to aggression increases with every frustration until it eventually results in violence. Consequently, one may imply from the theory that frustration has long-term effects. 2.2.3.2. Different Versions of Frustration-Aggression As aforementioned, the frustration-aggression hypothesis assumes that (a) aggression is always based on frustration and (b) frustration always leads aggression. Proponents of the hypothesis soon acknowledged that these assumptions were too simplistic and general. Miller, one of the coauthors of the original version, then had to rephrase the latter part holding that frustration may lead to a number of responses, one of which is “instigation to aggression.” Thus, he clearly acknowledged that frustration may not only result in aggression but also may result in alternative actions. Miller’s revised version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis put forth that (a) any aggressive behavior occurs as a result of frustration and (b) frustration instigates behaviors that may or may not be aggressive. Accordingly, frustration is not viewed as a sufficient, but as a necessary condition for aggression. Thus, Miller’s reformulation was applied to the second part of Dollard et al.’s [17] original proposition. Other than Miller, there have been a number of attempts to revise the frustrationaggression hypothesis. For example, Barker, Dembo and Levin [27] proposed what they termed frustration-regression hypothesis. Maier [28], on the other hand, developed his frustration-fixation hypothesis. However, these two revisions made negligible contributions to the original version of the theory. Probably, the most sweeping contribution was made by a contemporary scholar, Berkowitz [29]. Like Dollard et al. [17], Berkowitz recognized that a frustrating event increases the probability of aggression, and this relationship exists “in many animal species, including man.” Berkowitz also agreed with Dollard et al. when he held that “frustration is an interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence” [29]. On the other hand, he asserted that the goal response should be active, and the individual should be prevented from reaching that goal if frustration is to result in aggression. In other words, for Berkowitz, frustration is neither a simple deprivation nor a state of mind, but rather an interference with the realization of a (specific) goal-driven activity at a specific time. Contrary to Dollard et al. [17], and Miller, Berkowitz [29] identified frustration as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for aggression. However, frustration stimulates an emotional reaction which then creates a “readiness” for aggressive behaviors. In Berkowitz’s opinion, even this readiness is not sufficient alone to create aggression unless there are “suitable cues.” Berkowitz defined suitable cues as stimuli that are associated with previous or present frustrating instigators. Accordingly, all stimuli that can be associated with a frustrating experience could be a potential aggressive cue someday. In this context, the probability of aggression depends on two factors: (1) the strength of association between the stimulus and the past or the present frustrating instigators and (2) the strength of readiness. When does frustration actually result in aggression? According to Berkowitz [29], the state of aggressiveness or aggressive drive ends whenever the frustrated individual encounters an aggression-triggering stimulus. In other words, aggression results whenever the frustrated individual finds an appropriate target in which to direct his

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aggression. However, the appropriateness of target or the existence of aggressiontriggering stimulus does not suggest that the target could be anyone or anything. For Berkowitz, aggressive means and agents may be substituted whereas a target may not. That is, aggression cannot be displaced in the sense of changing the primary target. Attacks on alternative targets can be explained by excess violence that is committed by extremely ready aggressors. 2.2.3.3. Empirical Evidence for Frustration The literature on terrorist profiles has often questioned the probable link between frustration and joining in terrorism groups. A majority of the existing studies found support for this relationship. For the purpose of this study, a summary of the literature is presented next to determine what factors have been considered to cause frustration that ultimately motivates potential terrorists to participate in terrorism. In a study of Palestinian women’s motivation to terrorism, Berko and Erez [30] found that five out of 14 women they interviewed reported that before they joined a terrorist organization, they sought revenge for the harms and losses they suffered which they attributed to Israeli’s military operations. Of the women who sought revenge, three mentioned offenses against their brothers and two indicated their brothers’ deaths as their motivations. Another study of Colombian terrorists by Morris [31] mentioned the police use of excessive force in demonstrations as a motivating factor for joining in a terrorist organization. Bruinessen [32] examined the biographies of 250 PKK terrorists and found that “almost all were receptive to the party’s romantic doctrine of revenge.” Bruinessen further argued that the concept of revenge seems to be the major doctrine for the PKK terrorists as well as most terrorist organizations. Bruinessen attributes PKK terrorists’ desires to revenge the counter terrorism measures taken by Turkish governments, namely, the Martial Law. On the other hand, there is an apparent dearth of literature that focuses specifically on frustration’s impact in engaging in terrorist activities. In fact, it is naïve to expect that frustration will end after the frustrated person joins a terrorist organization. As aforementioned, however, frustration is expected to persist until the frustrated person finds a suitable target to attack. This would only be possible if the frustrated person finds an opportunity to engage in (involve in) a terrorist activity in which he can release his frustration. In this sense, in identifying the characteristics of suicide bombers, researchers could better understand the role that frustration plays in the “involvement in” process, because a number of terrorism scholars point out that frustration has an undeniable role in participating in suicide attacks. Stern [33], for example, mentions that real or perceived humiliation of Palestinian people by Israeli policies has given a rise to desperation and unmanageable outrage among the Palestinians. Sprinzak [34], on the other hand, points out that Hamas’ resorting to suicide bombings did not result from their opposition to a peace process but rather a tactical choice which was meant to take revenge out on humiliating Israeli actions. According to Sprinzak, Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron in 1994 was a turning point for Hamas to resort to suicide bombings. According to Hudson [35], “Hamas thrives on the misery and frustrations of Palestinians” (1999, p.183). Similarly, in Mogadham’s [36] opinion, the fact that many suicide bombers in Palestine have a desire to take revenge is attributable to the high rate of casualties and injuries, especially during the Second Intifada. In addition, Moghadam continues, many Palestinians, as well as Israelis, have “remained untouched

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by the violence” thus far and almost everybody has a loved one who has either been injured or killed. Empirical evidence supports the points made by Stern, Sprinzak, Hudson, and Moghadam. In a study of Palestinian suicide bombers, Yom and Saleh [37] reported that many of the bombers had an experience of violent encounters with the Israeli Defense Force in which they were either imprisoned or injured or lost family members. Soibelman’s [38] analysis of “the factors underlying the development of Palestinian suicide bombers” presented similar findings. Having interviewed five bombers caught before they detonated the bombs, Soibelman reported that all had some types of negative experiences with Israeli military such as shooting and killing a friend, beatings and unnecessary use of force at checkpoints. In light of existing evidence, one can comfortably suggest that frustration does not only play a role in joining a terrorist organization but also in the involvement of highly risky terrorist attacks. In other words, one can equally suggest that the involvement level may vary by the frustration level. Thus, it can be hypothesized that: H10: The probability of participation in a terrorist organization is higher for those who have experienced the death of a loved one. H11: The probability of participation in a terrorist organization is higher for those who have experienced the arrest of a family member.

3. Conclusion and Limitations The study has not been completed yet. However claims in this study should be empirically tested. The preliminary findings in this study suggest that frustration is an important factor for terrorist offender’s involvement in terrorist activities. In other words, if a terrorist has experienced a frustrating event such as the arrest of a family member or the death of a family member, this may affect his commitment to a terrorist organization or involvement in terrorist activities. This does not necessarily mean that social learning and relative (economic) deprivation have no implications in a terrorist life. However, social learning and deprivation may well affect an individual’s joining in a terrorist organization. However, subsequent involvement in terrorist activities or commitment may have different determinants, as suggested by the preliminary findings of the study. On the other hand, the study has some limitations. In the first part, the study analyzes the differences and similarities between terrorists and the general population. Thus, the comparison is limited to the variables found in the first dataset (N=1,076). For the second and third part, the study is limited with variables found in autobiographies. Obviously, involvement in terrorism can also be related to other variables such as the impact of the criminal justice system or the impact of terrorist leaders. Thus, the findings regarding involvement in terrorism are limited to individual factors such as age, gender, marital status, political party affiliation, education level, and so on.

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[34] Sprinzak, E. (2000). ‘‘Rational Fanatics.’’ Foreign Policy, 120:66–73. [35] Hudson, R. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why? Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. [36] Mogadham, A. (2003). Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Conceptual Framework. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26.2, pp.65-92 [37] Yom, S. and Saleh, B. (2004) Palestinian suicide bombers: A statistical analysis. ECAAR News Network 16(3) 8–11. [38] Soibelman, M. (2004). Palestinian suicide bombers. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling , 1(3), pp. 175-190. [39] Silke, A., (2001). Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Terrorism. Research. Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (4), 1–14. [40] Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. [41] Victoroff, J. (2005). The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution , 49(1), 3-42. [42] Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime And Delinquency. Criminology, 30(1), 47-87. [43] Crelinsten, R. D. (1987). Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled. In P. Wilkinson (Ed.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism . Aberdeen, Scotland: MacMillan Publishing Company. [44] Crenshaw, M. (1985). An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. Orbis, 29(3), 19-21. [45] Crenshaw, M. (1988). The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism. In R. O. Slater & M. Stohl (Eds.), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (pp. 12 [46] New York: St. Martin’s: Palgrave Macmillan . [46] Crenshaw, M. (1990). The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. [47] Crenshaw, M. (1992). Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning. In D. della Porta (Ed.), Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations (pp. 29-44). Greenwich: JAI Press. [48] Davies, J. C. (1969). The J-Curve Theory of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (p. 690–730). New York: Praeger. [49] della Porta, D. (1992). Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations. Greenwich: JAI Press. [50] della Porta, D. (1995). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press. [51] Dunn, J. (1972). Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. [52] Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1995). Terrorism: Theory and Applications. In K. Hartley & T. Sandler (Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics (p. 129–148). Amsterdam: Elsevier. [53] Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2002). Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative TimeSeries Estimates. International Studies Quarterly, 46, 145-65. [54] Feierabend, I. K., & Feierabend, R. L. (1966). Aggressive Behaviors within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10(3), 249-271. [55] Gurr, T. R. (1990). Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism (pp. 86-102). Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. [56] Hacker, F. J. (1976). Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies; Terror and Terrorism in Our Time. New York: Norton. [57] Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. [58] Jenkins, B. M. (1982). Terrorism and Beyond: an International Conference on Terrorism and Low Level Conflict. Santa Monica: RAND. [59] Koseli, M. (2006). Poverty, Inequality & Terrorism Relationship in Turkey. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia. [60] LaFree, G., & Dugan, L. (2004). How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime? Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives, 15(53-75). [61] Lapan, H. E., & Sandler, T. (1993). Terrorism and Signalling. European Journal of Political Economy, 9(3), 383-397. [62] March, J. G. (1994). A Primer on Decision Making. New York: Free Press. [63] Margolin, J. (1977). Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism. In Y. Alexander & S. M. Finger (Eds.), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (p. 377). New York: John Jay Press.

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[64] McCormick, G. H. (1993). Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. [65] Morf, G. (1970). Terror in Quebec. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin. [66] Mythen, G., & Walklate, S. (2006). Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality? British Journal of Criminology, 46(3). [67] Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. [68] Oberschall, A. (1973). Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. [69] Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). The Mind of the Political Terrorist. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resour Books. [70] Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces. In W. Reich (Trans.), Origins of Terrorism (pp. 25-42). Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. [71] Rapoport, D. C. (1997). Politics of Atrocity. In Y. Alexander & S. Finger (Eds.), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (p. 46). New York: John Jay Press. [72] Ross, J. I. (1996). A Model of the Psychological Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2(2), 129-141. [73] Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W. W. Norton. [74] Schelling, T. C. (1984). Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [75] Simon, H. A. (1976). From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. In S. J. Latsis (Ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics (pp. 129-148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [76] Simsek, Y. (2006). Impact of Terrorism on Migration Patterns in Turkey. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia. [77] Sutherland, E. H., & Cressey, D. R. (1970). A Theory of Differential Association. In E. H. Sutherland & D.R. Cressey (Eds.), Criminology (8th ed., pp. 75-77). Lippincott. [78] Tullock, G. (1974). The Social Dilemma: the Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, VA: Univ. Publ. [79] Turkish Anti-Terror Law. (12.04.1991). Act No. 3713: Law to Fight Terrorism. Retrieved February 9, 2008 from http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/btwc/nat_imp/leg_reg/turkey/anti-terror.pdf [80] Waterman, H. (1981). Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective. World Politics, 33(4), 554-589. [81] Berrebi, C. (2004). The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism. Princeton University. [82] Davis, J. (1959). A formal interpretation of the theory of relative deprivation. Sociometry, 22(4), 280-296. [83] Krueger, A., & Maleckova, J. (2002). The economics and the education of suicide bombers. Does poverty cause terrorism. The New Republic, 24, 1-11.

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The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved Silvia CIOTTI GALLETTIa and Sarah M. Hugginsb a EuroCrime Research Institute – Italy St. John International University b Virginia Commonwealth University Abstract. In this work, we conduct an examination of the sociological, demographical and political environments in relation to the origin of terrorist groups and similar illegal activities. Principally considering the significance of critical issues in the genesis and support of terrorist attacks, we attempt to suggest how these weaknesses can be transformed into strong elements devoted not only to prevent the development of terrorist organizations but also in support of the victims involved in these attacks. We will explore current and past terrorist activities in Morocco that will support theories suggesting that socio-economical despair and political instability amongst densely populated areas create a breeding ground for terrorist infiltration and extremist development. Keywords: Morocco, shanty towns, terrorist attacks, victims of terrorism

Introduction The recent terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, and other countries have forced us to examine the similarities of their social environments, cultural traditions, and political make-up. In fact, if we consider the civilians living in these areas and the origin of the terrorists, we can observe that they are coming from the same villages and neighborhoods with substantially similar ways of life, social levels, education, and so forth. Therefore, we can state that, in many cases, the social environment is a relevant variable in analyzing a terrorist attack. In our analysis, we will examine how the social environment and the community intervene in the “birth” of extremist movements and in the decision to participate in one of the movements. Considering that in many cases, attacks are made against people living in similar areas and social environments, we will analyze how these communities might not only be the “fishing pool” for terrorist organizations but also a high-quality and solid web of support for the victims of the terrorist attempts or attacks. Our analysis will focus on the Kingdom of Morocco and consider the attempts made in Casablanca in 2003.a The situation of the country is analyzed beginning with the three main critical issues that have been aiding the development of violent religious movements, frequently including the situation in shanty towns where many of the terrorists now live or previously lived. The strong social web of the shanty towns was, and still is, used by extremists to involve new members in their activities and to spread a

The analysis is focused on these attempts because we now have sufficient data and information to flag down their origin, development and consequences, thus allowing us to fully analyze their links with the urban and social environment and with the community.

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their ideas; however, the same social web could be used to offer human and social support to the victims of eventual future attempts. In fact, even if the attempts in 2003 were directed towards a western target in Morocco (or, at least, places populated by western people, or in centers of western interests), it is probable that the future could face more dangerous and violent attacks against the local population in an attempt to spread terror and panic among the common people in order to destabilize the government and to increase their authority. Throughout this paper, one will observe that various elements play a role in the development of violent religious (or pseudo–religious) movements in Morocco, which are examined as an endeavor to provide an overview of the underestimated level of terrorist risks in this country. The complacency present will be revealed throughout this paper.

1. Critical Issue: The Spanish Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla Ceuta (in Arabic Sebta) and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves located in the Moroccan territory. An enclave is a territory whose boundaries lie within another territory’s boundaries. This is not only a real point of access to Spain, but also to the entire Schengen European area. We are not going to describe in detail the particular situation in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla; however, it is necessary to underline various aspects that are relevant from a criminological point of view. First, the relationship between Spain and the two cities are far from easy to assess. Spain has difficulty in justifying to the presence of two of their own colonies in another independent country. Moreover, the colonies are not only in front of other countries, but as revealed in an internal public opinion, it is not desirable for the maintenance of the links with the enclaves. These difficulties have increased over the past few years since Ceuta and Melilla have truly been “under attack” by thousands of illegal migrants coming from the Maghreb and the sub-Saharan countries. In trying to use the two cities and their contacts with the motherland as a passage to the European Union (E.U.), discontent increased in Spain, Ceuta and Melilla, not only against the migrants, but also against Spanish control that was rejected, for instance, by the terrorist group “21st August,” based in Ceuta. As a first consequence of these mutual difficulties, while Morocco can not control these areas, Spain somehow does not want strict control over Ceuta and Melilla either, as they are centres for various negative behaviours. The situation of the two enclaves is highly critical. For example, enormous and solid enclosures are realised throughout the cities in an attempt to maintain illegal migrants, and camps were created to host migrants who come to the enclaves in hopes for an opportunity to travel to their motherland, Spain. Calamocarro was the centre for migrants in Ceuta; however this camp, as the one realised near Melilla, was completely inadequate to accommodate the large numbers of people arriving daily to the cities. Thus, the internal situation that developed became highly explosive. On September 27, 2005, almost 500 African migrants assaulted the metallic barrier that divided the Moroccan territory from the Spanish territory of Melilla. At least 200 illegal migrants managed to cross the double metallic gate; however, they were immediately arrested by

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the border police. Although the migrants were arrested and rejected by police, the local population was still deeply upset and affected by this event. Currently, the seven and a half mile barrier in Melilla is defended by law enforcement officers who use rubber bullets to reject the migrants’ assaults. Additionally, in an attempt to stop the aggression, the Spanish government recently built the barrier almost 10 feet higher. In October of 1995, local authorities decided not to allow the illegal migrants to leave Spain. In retaliation, the migrants began to throw stones at the local officials’ cars; thus, the citizens reacted with violence and tried to lynch the migrants who had been arrested. Discontentment was great, and Ceuta and Melilla were the preferred passage ways to the E.U., not solely for the migrants but also for the criminal organizations involved in human smuggling, drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Trucks carrying fruits and vegetables conducted the drug trafficking, typically reaching Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, or France upon leaving Morocco from Ceuta or Melilla, and criminal groups used fast and powerful boats to transport illegal migrants, cocaine or weapons at coasts near the two cities in order to reach the Strait of Gibraltar, a part of Spanish territory. The lack of regulations inside the enclaves enabled shelter for many terrorists, who used Ceuta and Melilla as a base of operation or as an intermediate stop during their movements. Situations in Ceuta became worse in 1999, when the Spanish Secret Service (Cesid) began an investigation directed towards the Grupo Indipendiente Liberal (GIL), Jesus Gil’s party. Jesus Gil was the very controversial mayor of Marbella and owner of the Atletico Madrid football team. Beginning in May of 1999, the Cesid began informing the Spanish government about the risks of a possible victory of the GIL in the near administrative elections in Ceuta and Melilla. The primary risk was the diffusion in the two enclaves of the same building. Speculation was carried out in previous years by Jesus Gil in Marbella, and more importantly was the existence of strong bonds between Gil and organized crime groups who brought drugs, human trafficking and money laundering into Marbella. On August 23rd, 1999, the GIL won the elections in Ceuta, a victory that enabled the power of Ceuta’s organized crime associations to become stronger, resulting in chief control on trafficking and smuggling humans. This uncertain position in Ceuta and Melilla, as well as difficulties in obtaining a clear role and position in the national and international chequers provided a great opportunity for terrorist and criminal organizations to conceal their businesses and coordinate their activities abroad, while maintaining a safe base of operation [1].

2. Critical Issue: the Western Sahara and the Polisario Front The critical political situation regarding Western Sahara and the relationship between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front are, in actuality, too complex to be effectively examined in this work. Therefore, we must simply draw attention to the fact that there were prolonged and uncertain situations in this section of the Maghreb territory. The various influences on their political culture connected to changing international policies, and the support given by some countries, including the Polisario

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Front and Morocco, created a difficult situation, by offering shelter and resources to criminal and terrorist organizations. For years, Western Sahara has become a base operation for many terrorist groups; not only for the Polisario Front and the connected groups, but also as a better passage way for cocaine coming from Colombia and travelling to Europe under the control of international and Moroccan criminal organizations. Moreover, weapons were often seen entering either Morocco, Europe or other Maghreb countries from the Western Sahara territories. Even if the Western Sahara situation appears to be currently quite stable, the ambiguity of the circumstances in this area and the uncertainty about who holds the responsibility of controlling and managing Western Sahara’s security, contribute to create a “grey area” in which illegal activities are tolerated and can thrive, spreading to the nearby areas [2].

3. Critical Issue: the Moroccan Shanty towns In previous years, a large portion of the Moroccan population moved from poverty stricken areas to the larger and wealthier cities, usually Casablanca and Rabat, in hopes of finding work in new industries. Many higher class communities were under construction in the suburbs, often near the seats of the industries, areas that became ridden with illegal activities. In addition, the area’s living conditions were deplorable, having no pipelines, sewers, electricity, or water services. Undoubtedly, these areas were at great risk of becoming shanty townsnot an ideal or attractive place to live by any means [3]. Casablanca and Rabat could not accommodate the overwhelming population influx, as, for example, in the shanty town of Casablanca’s Sidi Moumen, 170,000 people lived in an area covering 6.2 square miles and housing 30,000 families. Furthermore, other problems including sexual promiscuity, lack of safety, unemployment, and inadequate school structures continued to appear at the forefront. Under these conditions, the presence of drugs, petty crimes, organized crime, and an increasing influence of the extremist Islamic movements contributed to a feeling of discontent, thus leading to rebellion. There were also an insufficient number of law enforcement forces that were unable to control these rebellious behaviours [4]. In this climate, the May of 2003 terrorist attempts in Casablanca were planned and organized in the shanty town of Sidi Moumen, where 12 of the suicide bombers originated from the area of Almassira, the poorest part of Sidi Moumen. In an attempt to destroy these uncontrollable suburbs and to transfer the inhabitants into new districts, the Moroccan government implemented a new policy. In 2005, the government spent almost 363 million Euros trying to eliminate the shanty towns remaining in Casablanca, or 30% of all Moroccan shanty towns and the home to 47,000 families. These projects involved most of the district of Sakouila. There was another 30 million Euros designated for the region of Rabat, Salè and Tamara and for destruction of the shanty town of Sidi Yahia Zaher where almost 4,000 families lived. Yet, these interventions were carried out without cooperation from the inhabitants. The majority simply did not want to leave their homes, a place where they knew everyone and where they had their rules and “protectors.” They considered that being

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ordered to leave their homes constituted an injustice and abuse of power, and often reacted with violence or engaged in conflict with the police. Furthermore, more times than not, the new houses were not completed, thus requiring the inhabitants to finish, often including building a roof or buying doors and windows. Without having the necessary funds to afford these construction projects, they remained in an unstable situation just like the previous shanty town they came from. Moreover, the new living areas were not too different from the shanty towns previously occupied. The houses were constructed with cement, they remained isolated, almost confined, and the social problems were not solved. The inhabitants tended to recreate their previous living conditions, and nothing was done to drive out the drugs, crime or corruption. Although the new districts were basically better looking than the shanty towns, they were not, however, made up only of buildings but also by people who resided in those districts. As will become apparent, the difficulties connected with the situation of life in the shanty towns not only created a good climate for extremist Islam but also for the drug market and organized crime. Unless the Moroccan government decides to implement a new recovery program and look to the population’s cooperation and approval, shanty towns will remain full of corruption, crime and terrorists.

4. Morocco and Islamic Extremism Up until a few years ago, Islamic extremism appeared to be extraneous to the Moroccan society. The strong religious and traditional role of the monarchy granted religious unity and moderation among the population, unifying the Moroccan citizens in the pride of being ruled by a direct descendant of the Prophet.b Beginning in the late 90s, extremist ideas and feelings began to spread through Morocco, stemming from the universities. Moreover, the difficult conditions faced by students exposed them to the influence of extremist preachers, who were the only ones to grant them economical help, food, books and accommodations, in the name of the Islamic solidarity [5]. This different climate was perceived by the Moroccan Hebrew community that made up 0.4 percent of the total population and has since decreased to 0.2 percent in the last 40 years, with a large portion of the decrease taking place over the past few years. Currently, there are approximately 5,000 Moroccan Hebrews residing in Morocco, all of whom live in the Casablanca metropolitan area. Their position is becoming more difficult daily, due largely to the political attacks they have suffered since 2002 and 2003. The Moroccan Hebrews actually live almost a restricted life, trying to dissimulate their religious beliefs and avoid every kind of contrast and confrontation within the Islamic population. But how could the violent Islamic extremists spread through the Moroccan society? First we must acknowledge the fact that these terrorist groups are well-organized and operate with well-rehearsed protocol to target and entice prospective members [6]. b

The King of Morocco is believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed without interruption in the dynastic line. Owing to his origin, the King is called “The Lord of the believers.”

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The more well-known groups are known as Assirat al Mustaqim (The Right Way) and Attakfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication and Exile). In the Sidi Moumen, there are at least five different extremist groups. Former members of these groups described the system’s ability to attract these individuals into such movements. Extremist leaders would invite young men who were involved in criminal activities and those who had no hope for themselvesc to come to their place of worship,d promising spiritual peace, deep beliefs, and a new life. When the new recruit was present in the mosque for the first time, the leaders would begin the lessons and pray to rid the recruit from desperation and hopelessness. At the beginning, the topics were all about religion and nothing was mentioned about violence or terrorism. If the recruit continued to attend the mosque, the “brothers” would begin to take care of him and his family: money for marriage, funerals, food, medicine, and so forth would be provided. More importantly to note, to begin the assimilation of the new extremist ideas, they would only offer help to those who attended daily lessons and demonstrated interest and participation. After one or two years, the third phase of the recruitment process would begin: projection of videos exalting “martyrs,” the Afghan, Chechen and Palestinian terrorists. Simply stated, this was their training of life and violent death. After making it to this point, leaving the group is practically impossible. Similar to the inner city gang systems found in America, disassociation with the group or faction is all but non-existent. Once the terrorist group’s true agenda has been revealed, a recruit’s only choice is to flee or face most certain death. Results from this type of recruitment began to appear in 2002, when the Moroccan authorities dismantled a terrorist organization directed by Mohammed al Tubaiti, a Saudi Arabian citizen living in Morocco who was preparing a series of attacks in Morocco. In 1999, Al Tubaiti was given the responsibility to organize a “mission of martyrdom” in Morocco that included actively visiting the Moroccan shanty towns and suburbs. Through this mission, he managed to locate a sufficient number of young recruits disposable to realize the suicidal attempts; however, he was but stopped by the authorities just in time. In 2002, the Moroccan police arrested five individuals suspected to be members of an Al Qaeda organization. This group was caught organizing suicide attempts against NATO vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar. In addition, the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla were breeding grounds for young North African terrorists wanting to defend Islam and “liberate” the enclaves from “colonial” Spain. Algeria’s Islamic insurgency that has been ongoing over the last decade provided young militants for the movements in 1996, when Spain was ordered to leave the territories of the two cities, thus menacing violent attacks. The Spanish Guardia Civil recently reported that Ceuta and Melilla were “being used by individuals linked with violent Islamism to carry out tasks of recruitment and/or indoctrination.” Their document highlighted the creation of a hostile anti– Spanish climate in the two autonomous cities that could favour the radical aspirations of Salafist groups in both Morocco and Algeria. The list reported various regions of c

The high unemployment rate, most of all in the shanty towns, create large groups of young men passing their days just hanging around and consuming drugs, most of all hashish; the lack of social structures, for example, public sporting clubs, forces these men to remain all day in the streets or in the little public “café” with nothing to do, exposed to the solicitations of the extremist preachers. d Since 2000, extremist preachers took control on some mosques and, in many cases, on private ones.

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Spain consisting of were large North African populations and the likely existence of terrorist groups that were not fighting at the moment, but planned to attack if they were given the order to do so. In March of 2005, a Spanish judge ordered the detention for the alleged terrorist of Moroccan, Redouane Ben Fraima, already serving a prison sentence in Ceuta. Fraima was charged with the involvement in terrorist acts, in that he had a detailed plan of a ferry that plied between Algeciras and Ceuta, and other important documents in Arabic, French and Spanish. Redouane Ben Fraima was suspected to be a member of Takfir Wa Hijra, a terrorist organization planning attacks all over the world.

5. The Attempts in Casablanca in 2003 During the evenings of May 16 and 17, 2003, a dramatic terrorist attempt upset the Kingdom of Morocco: 41 citizens died and at least 100 were injured in suicide attacks carried out by 14 suicide bombers in Casablanca. Eleven of the terrorists who were connected with the Al Qaeda organization died in the attack. The suicide bombers were organized in teams; one team “exploded” near the Casa de Espagna, a Casablanca Spanish cultural club consisting of very popular restaurants that were crowded at all times. Other bombs exploded in front of the Consulate of Belgium, at the Safir Hotel and the club of the Hebrew Alliance, all places frequented predominately by foreigners. All suicide terrorists were Moroccan citizens, of which 12 came from the shanty town of Sidi Moumen, in particular, the Almassira area. Moreover, this group was supported by the extremist Jamaat Sirat al Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia. These attacks changed the Moroccan attitude towards Islamic terrorism. For example, the hazards and dangers were near; the enemies were among the population, in the streets, markets, and in the schools where they lived, worked, and played on a daily basis. The Moroccan authorities had a strong reaction. There were over 700 individuals prosecuted and put on trial in July of 2003, due to their suspected involvement in the attempts. In August of 2003, a penal court in Casablanca sentenced three of the bombers to death as well as an Islamic extremist, all members of Salafia Jihadia. Another 83 suspects were sentenced ten years to life in prison. In September, a penal court in Kenitra sentenced 27 Islamic extremists, also all members of Salafia Jihadia, from six months to 15 years for their involvement in the Casablanca attempts. Pierre Robert, a French extremist known as Abu Abderrahman, and three other members of Salafia Jihadia were sentenced to a life sentence, while another 22 received sentences ranging from 10 to 30 years. As a result, although the reaction was strong and quick, yet, it was a repressive solution with massive imprisonments and powerful and publicized trials. Even if the suspects around Sidi Moumen and other shanty towns increased after these attempts, no measures were adopted to prevent the diffusion of Islamic violence in these areas. Moreover, very little was accomplished in trying to understand the links between the Moroccan suicide bombers and the international terrorist organizations. There was little attempt to realize the various systems used to finance this attempt, and more importantly, very little attention was dedicated to the Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) used to obtain the money necessary for the bombings [7].

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IVTS, and particularly Hawala, were regularly used for money transfers from one country to another as well as being the preferred instruments used by immigrants to send money to their home country. Based on trust and informal passages of money, these systems, however, have been subjected to abuses. For instance, they have been used by organized crime groups and organizations for money laundering activities and by terrorist organizations to transfer money to the cell that organizes attacks. In fact, in addition to money coming from criminal activities  kidnappings, armed robberies, human smuggling, and drugs  and various organizations, “state sponsorship” governments and political parties, the IVTS was absolutely fundamental for terrorist groups to obtain the necessary economic resources to carry out these heinous acts [8]. The IVTS can be utilized in any network that is used to transferring funds from one place to another, either without leaving a formal paper trail of the transaction or without going through regulated financial institutions. They are also used for many types of transnational criminal activities, namely, tax evasion, human smuggling, drugs, and stolen works of art trafficking. One must acknowledge, however, that funds may be perfectly clean at the beginning, for example, money from state agencies, charities, businesses, and so forth. In fact, we can have two different kinds of money sources: legal contributions and illegal contributions. Legal sources include funds from charities, the use of commercial entities, dues from local institutions, cultural events, fundraising, contributions from the wealthy, and contributions from state agencies. Illegal contributions include acts of drug trafficking, kidnapping, robberies, extortions, cigarette smuggling, credit card fraud, welfare frauds, and the sale of counterfeit or stolen goods such as works of art, to name only some. In Arabic, “hawala” means “transfer” and in Hindi, the term means “reference.” Hawala simply involves the transfer of money and values from place to place; there is often a type of “security code,” or “reference,” to ensure that the rightful recipients receive the transferred funds. This is important because this reiterates the fact that in its relevant development, this economic instrument of convenience was perfectly legal. The use of IVTS is an old method used for trade and remittances to the extended family in the global South, especially South Asia, and has traditionally been based on trust. Populations are served with no banking or other alternatives near to their place of residency. Money or valuables reach their beneficiaries within minutes or hours at a very good exchange rate without hassle or trouble, and even if Hawala is not by definition criminal, it is very vulnerable to abuse. There are two main aspects in Hawala: (1) sending or payment of funds (relationship between hawaladar and his or her client) and (2) the settlement process (relationship among intermediaries). Each hawaladar makes payments for other clients; in this way, funds do not have to move across borders because hawaladars send payment instructions via fax, e-mail or telephone. Because of the terrorists’ abuses of the IVTS, however, governments have put a stop to its use that places regular citizens in the hands of extremist and terrorist groups in order to use this system. Moreover, because of government regulations, hinders relatives’ financial assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and other crime victims are hindered. IVTS also obtain money from the black market and other currency exchange networks, courier services, or physical transfer methods, which include smuggling, correspondent bank accounts, gifts, money transfer overseas services via special vouchers and Internet web sites, Internet based payments or transfers, stored values

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such as pre–paid telephone cards, and debit and credit cards used by multiple individuals. It is not an easy task to control the IVTS, especially for a country such as Morocco that has been gaining a substantial amount of its national wellness from the money transfers made by immigrants. With that said, we know that the funds used to organize the attempts in Casablanca arrived to the terrorist cell through one, or more, of these systems. But, to date, we can not discuss in detail how the money actually arrived into the shanty town. In many Western countries, in an attempt to intercept money destined to terrorist movements, many controls and restrictions have been imposed to the “official” hawala system. However, this was not a solution, because the illegal money was still transferred using the “unofficial,” and almost impossible to control hawaladar, and these controls only increased the mistrust in Western financial systems by people legitimately using the hawala system. In fact, many strongly believed that the restrictions were imposed only to force them to use the Western banking system. The most effective way to obtain real control on the IVTS, primarily on the hawala system, is to use the same web of trust and cooperation that supports the systems themselves. If it is true that the terrorists, as well as other criminals, are exploiting the human and personal links and relationships to transfer their funds safely, it is also true that the majority of people involved  clients or operators  in these financial mechanisms are law abiding citizens, honest and, in many cases, willing to cooperate against the illegal involvements in the IVTS systems. It is possible to obtain their cooperation against the illegal use of these system simply by asking them for help (and not deletion!) in procuring information about “non clear” transfers and situations and offering them support and acceptance for their traditional financial systems. In fact, this is a fundamental issue: the IVTS are not only traditional, accepted and serious “banking” instruments for many people and many countries, but, in many cases, they are also the only systems that can be used to transfer money to isolated villages or poor areas. Completely stopping the use of this tool would end the only financial support system for many families and would dangerously intervene in the global economy of many countries where money sent home by migrants is one of the primary economical resources. This type of measure would destabilize countries and governments and increase the appeal of extremist movements that would present themselves as the defendants of local religion, history and tradition.

6. Activities Abroad and the Attempts on New York and Madrid Owing to the monarchy’s present strong and firm influence on the religious assets of the country and their moderate attitude towards Islam, many Moroccan extremist groups organized their activity abroad, actively cooperating with the organization and realizing that some of the worst attempts against Western targets have occurred in the last few years. Among these groups, probably the stronger and most dangerous was Takfir Wa Hijra, alias Martyrs for Morocco, believed to be an off–shoot of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). This group has maintained bases of operation in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Lebanon, Spain and the United Kingdom. Takfir Wa

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Hijra, whose name means “Rejection of Sins and Exodus” in English, is regarded as one of the most fundamental groups operating in Islamic culture today. Claims differ as to its origin; however, official Dutch government reports claim that Hijra is now under the guidance of a U.K.-based Palestinian, “Caliph” Abdallah al-Rifai. In fact, the groups have members who are not only Moroccan citizens, but also Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and other people coming from all over the Arab and Muslim world. To date, Takfir Wa Hijra is best analysed as a plan, an Islamic religious sect or cult, whose membership allegedly includes Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and Iraqi terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, rather than an organized terrorist group. Their members, who reportedly can never leave the group once joining, attempted to assassinate Osama bin Laden in 1995 in Sudan for his “liberal” views. Recently, Takfir Wa Hijra has been linked to the November 2004 murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh. Moreover, Moroccan sources have asserted that Takfir members in Morocco have formed an operational alliance with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in neighbouring Algeria. Samir Azzouz, a young Moroccan Muslim suspected of plotting attacks against several targets in the Netherlands, belonged to Takfir. Azzouz was put on trial in Rotterdam after being arrested in the Netherlands following the discovery in his house of plans, maps and other detailed information of concrete targets, including the nuclear reactor located at the southwestern town of Borssele, home to the Parliament House and the headquarters of the AIVD secret service at Leidschendam. The group also included Mohammed Achraf, an Algerian arrested in Switzerland in 2004, and the Moroccan citizen Abdelakim Akoudad, arrested in Spain for his involvement in the May 2003 attacks in Casablanca. Mohammed Achraf led a cell, part of Takfir Wa Hijra, that planned to detonate a truck loaded with 1,100 pounds of explosives near Spain’s Supreme Court, whose judges were leading a series of hearings regarding Islamic militants, including the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 that killed 191 people. The new attacks in Madrid, dismantled by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon, were planned for March 11, 2005. Among the potential targets were two train stations, the Picasso office tower, Real Madrid football stadium, the headquarters of the main opposition Partido Popular and, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court building. Achraf, who was extradited from Switzerland to Spain in April 2005, is believed to be by Moroccan authorities, Abderrahmane Tahiri, a dangerous extremist who was expelled from France in 1995. Beyond Achraf, 30 other men have been accused of belonging to the cell that was originally formed in jail. The most recent “emir” or spiritual leader is Mustapha Maimouni who was arrested in Morocco and linked to the May 2003 Casablanca attacks. Two of those men were ready to serve as suicide bombers. The cell dismantled by Judge Baltasar Garzon was firmly connected with Mohammed Atta, one of the suicide bombers in the New York 9/11 attacks. In fact, while his permanence was to Spain in 2001, Atta was hosted and helped by Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, alias Abu Dahdah, now formally charged with mass murder for the September 11 attacks, who recruited Mustapha Maimouni and placed him in the Spanish cell. We tried to briefly recreate the web of connections and cooperation that links some of the most dramatic terrorist attacks of the last few years all over the world to Takfir Wa Hijra and its members. As we can observe, not only the attempts in New York, Casablanca and Madrid are linked, but also many other dismantled cells and avoided

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attempts are connected to the same terrorist web and the same subjects who are actively organizing terrorist activities and attempts even while incarcerated. Morocco is, somehow, involved in this web of terror. Some Moroccan citizens are members of Takfir Wa Hijra, and many of their contacts and relatives pass through the Moroccan territory using chances offered by the particular situation of Ceuta and Melilla. More than the internal terrorist menace, Morocco tolerates a more dangerous international scheme in which key elements include offering shelter, criminal resources and recruits to the large terrorist web of which Al Qaeda is considered to a part.

7. The Future The monarchy in which the King is believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet is a good instrument to protect the Kingdom of Morocco from Islamic extremism. The deep religious beliefs of the population are directed in a collective, uniform and moderate direction that unify religious beliefs and social behaviours, consolidating both around the King, his family and entourage. For many years, however, Islamic extremism has made its appearance in Morocco, starting from the universities, the shanty towns and then spreading to the poorest parts of society. The extremists managed to get to the university population through their basic needs by providing food, medicine, jobs, housing, or offering the students all services that the universities were unable to provide; that is, free books for indigents, paper and pens, assistance in learning proper French, indispensable to study the scientific disciplines, and so forth. The influence and ideas of the more extremist part of Islam are now becoming stronger among the population and recruiting the youngest to become a part of the terrorist movements. Even if the Moroccan society as a whole resists the invitations to use terrorist violence, there are many other Moroccan citizens that were involved in terrorist attempts, especially in the worse ones over the last few years. In fact, it has been proven that there was an active involvement of Moroccan citizens in the New York 9/11 attacks, in the Madrid 3/11 attempts and in the last dramatic attempt in London on July 7, 2005. Moreover, the attempts in Casablanca in May of 2003 were all organized and known by Moroccan citizens to have come from the shanty towns of Sidi Mounem and Almassira. Investigations conducted by international police, the United States, British and Spanish authorities demonstrated that organized Moroccan terrorist groups were installed in many Western countries. Spain, Belgium and The Netherlands were at the forefront where groups were organizing and managing attempts all over the world. The fact that some Moroccan citizens migrated abroad has been spreading through Islamic extremism in Europe, and with the cooperation and participation in some of the main attacks toward the Western nations, created a climate of suspect around Morocco and its migrants. In fact, following 9/11 and particularly 3/11, in which Moroccan Islamists orchestrated the attacks, large portions of the Spanish society together with the government have become increasingly suspicious of North African immigrants. The concern and reaction of the Spanish authorities are certainly not disproportionate to the threat that faces their country. Salafi groups have operated in Algeria, Tunisia and

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Morocco for many years. These groups could potentially reach out to “compatriots” in Spain and execute attacks in that country and other European countries. These facts, connected to the great flow of illegal migrants passing through the Moroccan borders [9] continue to create difficulties for the Moroccan government. Even if the policies about migrations continued not to be as strictly defined in each country, the government still strives to obtain more trust of the Western government. This is an attempt to show active participation in the fight against trafficking and smuggling humans as the first step in recovering control over the Moroccan migrations. These actions are not as easy for the Moroccan government, and if they are capable of obtaining the approval and consent of Western government, serious conditions of social and economic instability in the country could be created at the same time. There are varying causes that contribute to Morocco becoming a good shelter for terrorist groups. The lack of cooperation on border issues between Morocco and Algeria has been useful for terrorists who use unpatrolled areas to obtain shelter. In this situation, Oujda, a Moroccan city near the border with Algeria, became a sort of “no man’s land,” where it is possible to traffic drugs, humans, weapons, and other illegal goods without difficulty which was used by many terrorists as a shelter among various final destinations. Additionally, the geographical position of Morocco located near to the European coasts and to Gibraltar is absolutely perfect to organize attempts, provide every kind of needed material, such as explosives, and then transport the goods to Spain, Italy, France, or Gibraltar and then return to Morocco after the attempt and “disappear” in a favourable shanty town [10]. Situations are not simple for the Moroccan government due to a direct policy against all the Islamic extremisms that could potentially create great discontent and delusion in the country, thus pushing the population towards extremist positions and creating opposition to the government and monarchy and a climate of instability. Morocco needs a defined policy against terrorism in cooperation with international institutions and with other countries, and most importantly, with European countries. The efforts made in recent years are encouraging, but still remain far from a definitive solution. However, the situation regarding terrorism in Morocco appears to be less serious for this country than other critical issues, namely drug trafficking and organized crime. In fact, the use of the Moroccan territory as a shelter, training camp  most of all in the Western Sahara territory and in the areas near Algeria’s border  and a “market” in which money can be exchanged increases income to pay the expenses connected to terrorist attempts. To date, the biggest problem regarding this topic derives from the Moroccan government’s international pressure more than from the terrorist organizations.

8. Summary and Conclusion This paper provided a brief overview of the various critical issues that aid in the development of violent religious movements in Morocco and provides an analysis of the origin of the people’s involvement in these groups who live in the shanty towns.

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The poverty, isolation, low level of education, high level of unemployment rate, and strong prejudices are some of the factors that keep these areas separated from other parts of Moroccan cities as well as from the “stronger” parts of Moroccan society. The solutions proposed were adopted and brought forth to assist the local population. However, the citizens did not consider these solutions as real support and help, but only as a way to control them and to move in other areas, thus not solving their real problems. In many cases, we can state that these solutions were also aimed to break the very strong social and human links between the people living in the shanty towns as is happening in many other parts of the world as well (for example, Brazil). These kinds of interventions made the links stronger through increasing the communities’ isolation and pushing them firmly into the arms of crime and extremisms that are the only resources remaining for the inhabitants living in shanty towns. But these solid links, through the strong presence of mutual support, find that the relationships are not only elements that contribute to the isolation of the communities, but could also be instruments in stopping the development of violent movements, creating “virtuous” social environments and a strong web to support the victims involved in terrorist attacks. Although many government reforms and interventions are required to begin and serve as an easy first step in an attempt to obtain these results, it is fundamental to:       

work in cooperation with the community itself, not imposing solutions but proposing them, debating with the people belonging to the community and paying attention to their needs and desires; break the isolation of many communities, primarily the poorest; reintroduce isolated communities and neighbourhoods into the normal “life” of the city, thus increasing the infrastructure and involving the inhabitants in the common public life; stimulate the creation of local offices and structures devoted to social support; connect these structures with hospitals, law enforcement agencies, and so forth to develop a stable web for support to the victims of terrorist crimes; train people to work in these structures in order to provide medical, psychological, juridical, and economical support for victims of terrorist attacks; and use the web of support to spread information as a kind of “social enforcement” against extremist and violent ideologies.

If we really listen to the needs of these types of communities and try to cooperate with them, reintroduce them to a civil life and break their isolation, we could not only help them to support and protect the victims of terrorist attacks, but at the same time (and using the same structures and webs) end the spreading of extremist ideology and the recruitment of new members to terrorist groups.

References [1] Smith M.J and Tilley N. (2005). Crime Science, Cullompton (U.K.): Willan Publishing. [2] Griset P. and Mahan S. (2003). Terrorism in perspective. London: Sage Publications Inc.

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Hope T. and Sparks R. (2000). Crime, risk and insecurity. London: Routledge. Karstedt S. and Bussmann K.D. (2000). Social dynamics of crime and control. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Ronczkowski M.R. (2004). Terrorism and organized hate crime, Boca Raton (Florida), CRC Press. Makarenko T. (2003). “The ties that bind”: uncovering the relationship between organised crime and terrorism, in Siegel D., Van de Bunt H. and Zaith D. (eds.), (2003), Global Organized Crime–Trends and developments. Dordrecht (The Netherlands): Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 159 – 173. [7] Martin G. (2003). Understanding terrorism, London: Sage Publications Inc. [8] Perlmutter D. (2004). Investigating religious terrorism and ritualistic crimes. Boca Raton (Florida), CRC Press. [9] Finckenauer J.O. (1998). Migration and organized crime: the Russian connection, in Migration and Crime, proceedings of the International Conference on Migration and Crime.Global and Regional Problems and Responses, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 5 – 8 October 1996, pp. 155 – 169, ISPAC. [10] Siegel D., Van de Bunt H. and Zaith D. (2003). Global Organized Crime–Trends and developments. Dordrecht (The Netherlands): Kluwer Academic Publishers. [3] [4] [5] [6]

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Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment and Ways for its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists Nickolaj F. STARODUB A.V. Palladin Institute of Biochemistry of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Kiev National University, Kiev, Ukraine

Abstract. Biosensors for the express control of the total toxicity of environmental objects, revealing of group toxic elements and individual toxins among them are presented. Among the individual toxins, primary attention is paid to mycotoxins, in particular, fumasine, atrazine and T2. T2 is considered as a potential specimen for bioterrorists’ activities. Ways to decontaminate polluted environmental objects from different types of low molecular weight toxins are presented. More especially, the possibility of using some calyx [4] resorcinol arenas for specific binding of the number of mycotoxins and pesticides is discussed. This possibility is analyzed from two points of view: the application of calix [4] resorcinol arenas for the removal of toxic substances and the creation of the artificial sensitive layer of sensors revealed by the instrumental analytical devices in the express and on line regime. Both approaches provide practices demanded for the prevention of non-desirable consequences from bioterrorists’ activities. Keywords. biosensors, control pollution, environmental objects low molecular weight toxins, express determination, T2 and other mycotoxins, ways of decontamination

Introduction Today we live in a world with the very real and frightening concern of protecting our environment from bioterrorists who use biological warfare agents (BWAs) that are not only practical for solving local conflicts but also with the purpose of psychological terror aimed to inflict panic among people and to create permanent terror. The information gleaned from researchers throughout countries who have worked at biological weapon programs has been presented earlier [1]. Their investigations were directed toward the induction of acute diseases among people and animals, destroying sex status, prevention of antibiotic effects and others. BWAs are divided into three main groups: toxins, viruses and bacteria. Toxins are biochemicals of various origin and chemical structure, and mycotoxins may serve as one example of BWA. These substances are characterized by having more than 300 individual toxins produced by various fungi strains [2]. T2, aflatoxins, searelenone, patulin, and others are widespread and characterized by the high level of toxicity. For example, T2 mycotoxin has 400 times more toxic effect than mustard gas and lewisite and may be very simply

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prepared. Both circumstances and simplicity in obtaining and high level of toxicity present an extremely serious problem, because these toxic elements may be used as a weapon by bioterrorists. Out of necessity, it is important to mention that generally the use of toxins from among other BWA groups is the most probable choice of bioterrorists since viruses and bacteria present a bigger danger that also sacrifices the executors of terrorist acts as well. Appropriate services offered by simple, very selective and sensitive methods that reveal the components of BWA in one’s environment is an important task, among others, directed toward preventing serious consequences. Unfo rtunately, to analyze the low molecular weight toxins, using instrumental approaches such as a highperformance liquid or gas chromatography with mass spectroscopy or liquid chromatography with mass spectroscopy are required. Due to the extreme complication and exorbitant cost of analysis involved in these methods, the development of innovative approaches, namely immune analysis and particular chemo- and biosensors, is very urgent [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In this review, primary attention will be given to groups of toxins known as endocrine disrupting factors; for example, mycotoxins, heavy metal ions (HMI), nonylphenol (NPh), surface active substances (SAS), and some pesticides. The analysis will be conducted by using modern approaches based on the principles of biosensorics. This aspect will be considered from two points of view: by analyzing the efficiency of our developed biosensors with the standard solution and comparing the obtained results with those received after the application of biosensors under real conditions. The type of biosensors, their peculiarities in design and details of the accomplished analysis will then be presented. Working in the field of developing biosensors involves basic research, creation of working prototypes and development of different elements of technology. A fundamental aspect includes the selection of types of transducers, or physical surface, and physical-chemical signals for registering the interaction of biological molecules as well as selecting sensitive biological material and developing effective methods for the oriented immobilization of this material. Working prototypes of biosensors are used in the area of human and veterinary medicine ecology and biotechnology. After examination of the biosensor work under real conditions, elements of biosensor technology production are worked out. Our investigations in field of development of biosensors and their application include the following steps: (1) control of the total toxicity of environmental objects by use of bioluminescent bacteria with an optical signal registration and determination of the intensity of Daphnia exometabolites through chemiluminescent; (2) revealing the groups of toxic elements by the electrochemical and thermo metrical biosensors with the sensitive elements presented by special micro organisms and enzymes; and (3) determination of the concrete toxic elements by the electrochemical and optical biosensors based on the enzyme and immune components as the selective structures from one side and the different types of transducers including surface plasmon resonance (SPR), porous silicon (PS), electrolyte-insulator structures (EIS) from the other side.

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1. Instrumental Analytical Approaches for the Determination of the Total Toxicity of Environmental Objects Usually different living organisms, Crustacea, fish, algae, fungi, some vegetables, and others are used to control total toxicity of environmental objects. International standards exist on the basis of determining indexes of Daphnia immobilization (ISO 6341:1996(E) [9]. This is a very routine procedure. Other approaches that obtain the practical applications are based on the control of oxygen consumption by microorganisms or determination of their luminescence [10]. 1.1. Method with the Use of Daphnia as a Sensitive Object We propose the principal new approach based on the determination of the chemiluminescence (ChL) level of a Daphnia living medium. The differences of measuring cell signals before and after introducing Daphnia in the solution to be analyzed are registered. In the experiments, Daphnia magna St. (Cladocera) was used that was kept in the medium according to the international standard rules [9]. In preliminary experiments, it was shown that only 1-5 of Daphnia’s are sufficient for the experiments [11]. The exited ChL of the medium was registered in the presence of luminol and H2O2, and the optimal concentrations of the above numerated chemicals were preliminary established in special experiments. Stationary, semi-portable and portable devices supplied by optrods, a high sensitive photomultiplier, or photo resistors were created for the determination of the intensity of ChL [12, 13, 14, 15]. Figure 1 presents the developed portable luminometer based on the photo resistors.

2 1

Figure 1. Portable chemiluminometer based on photoresistors. 1 – electronic part, 2 – reactor block.

Depending on the source of toxic substances, we obtained deviations of ChL values from the initial levels that were in compliance with the toxic effect’s intensity. In comparing the standard method with immobilization of Daphnia the results were accomplished. Potassium dichromate was used as the standard chemical solution and its toxicity was checked by the generally accepted method (according to the index of

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Daphnia immobilization), and was biosensor based on the determination of its level of ChL Daphnia living medium. Generally stated, the accepted method allows 0.1 mg/L of potassium dichromate as a minimal level. At the same time, the sensitivity of the proposed biosensor approach was almost two orders higher [16]. It is necessary to mention that the overall time of analysis was very different in both cases (about 24 hours and 30 minutes, respectively, for the generally accepted and biosensor methods). Sensitivity of Daphnia to mycotoxins of T2 and patulin was demonstrated [17, 18, 19]. Diapason of the measurements of T2 mycotoxin by the generally accepted method was in a frame of concentration of 0.01 – 0.1mg/L. At the same time, in the case of using the biosensor method, this frame was from 0.001 to 1mg/L. Moreover, the level of sensitivity did not depend on the time that Daphnia incubation was in the solution to be analyzed. As for patulin, there was the possibility for it to be in a quantitative determination by the biosensor method frame of 0.001–1 mg/L. 1.2. Method with the Use of Bioluminescent Bacteria as a Sensitive Object In this case Photobacterium phosphoreum K3 (IMB B-7071), Vibrio fischeri F1 (IMB B-7070) and Vibrio fischeri Sh1 purified from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov were used. The level of bioluminescence (BL) was measured by the devices mentioned above in section of 1.1. The samples contained 0.8 ml of the tested substance in 2.5% solution of NaCl, 0,1 ml of 0.5 M phosphate (pH 7.0) or phosphate citrate (pH 5.5) buffers and 0.2 ml of bioluminescent bacterial suspension including 5x105 cells/ml. In the other case, bioluminescent bacteria (105 cells) were immobilized in sepharose gel (about 0.1 ml) deposited at the end of fiber optics. In both cases, the BL intensity (I) was registered through 30-120 min. The level of toxicity was presented as the concentration which caused a 50% decrease of the intensity of BL (EC50). In the case of analysis of mycotoxin T2, the value of EC50 oscillated in the range of 7-19 mg/L depending on the time of bacteria incubation in the solution to be analyzed. It is necessary to underline that the sensitivity of V. fischeri F1 to micotoxin T1 is much higher in comparison with the sensitivity of Ph phosphoreum Sq3 [20]. As for increasing the patulin concentration from 0.63 to 40 mg/L by the influence on Ph.phosphoreum Sq3 during 12 to 60 minutes, it caused sufficient decreasing of the BL intensity. The value of EC50 for patulin was in the frame of 0.63-1.25 mg/L [20]. The dose-effect of patulin at a low concentration (low as 1 mg/L) may be confidently registered in the case of three repeated measurements. In this case, the toxic effect of patulin to bioluminescent bacteria may be revealed at a concentration less than 0.15 mg/L. Moreover with the prolongation of the influence time (up to 90 minutes) the toxic effect of patulin increased and the value of EC50 was in the frame of 0.15-0.63mg/L. By decreasing pH from the medium to the lower physiological limit (5-5.5), the sensitivity increased up to one order. The value of EC50 is analogous with semi lethal doses intended for animals, and it correlates with other indexes of toxicity (cytotoxicity, irritation of mucouses, e.a.) [21]. It is necessary to mention that the intestinal barrier in animals is destroyed at a patulin concentration of about 1 mg/L [22]. Taken into consideration of this fact, the above indicated data testify that the proposed biosensor analysis with the use of bioluminescent bacteria may be effective at the screening of water, juice, foods and other environmental samples. In studying the influence of different types of SAS on bioluminescence’s intensity of bacteria (Ph. phosphoreum K3 (IMB B-7071), V. fischeri F1 (IMB B-7070) and V.

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fischeri Sh1), it was revealed that the main part of the investigated substances act as inhibitors in this process. At first, the cationic and anionic SAS had similar kinetics of inhibition. Second, nonionic SAS has an additional stage in which the inhibition is absent or some activation of bioluminescence is observed. Therefore, for revealing toxicity of this group of SAS, it is necessary to incubate these substances with bacteria for a long time [23].

2. Biosensors for the Determination of Groups of the Toxic Elements To determine group specific toxic substances, for example, phosphororganics, chlororganics, cyanides and others, we have developed multi-biosensors based on EIS structures. The principles of design and work of biosensors were presented in [24, 25]. Since the number of enzymes that have serine residuum in the active centre (first of all, butyrylcholine esterase – BChE, acetylcholine esterase – AChE and total choline esterase – ChE) are very sensitive to phosphororganic pesticides (PhOrPe) and others (urease), when the thiol groups react with HMI, there is a possibility to simultaneous determine these classes of toxic elements [26]. The sensitivity of HMI and PhOrPe determination depends essentially on the incubation time of the enzyme membranes in the medium of samples. Two different approaches: (1) registration of the sensor output signal in the mixture of a substrate and an analysis, (2) separation of the inhibition reaction from the following measurement of the residual enzyme activity. In the last case, the threshold sensitivity of toxin analysis was about 10 times higher. The time of incubation, chosen experimentally, was 15 minutes. The concentration of HMI that could be determined by the urease channel of the sensor array lay within a range from 10-4 to 10-7 M, depending on the type of metal used. The range of linear detection covered 2 to 3 orders of the concentration change. The effects of both pesticides are very similar. The detection limit of pesticides indicated above was 10-7 M, and the range of the linear response was from 10-5 to 10-7 M. At the same time, the sensitivity of BChE to HMI was substantially lower than that of urease. The maximum sensitivity of BChE to HMI was for concentrations of more than 10-4 M. Activity of glucose oxidase (GOD) depends on the presence of HMI for concentrations above 10-4 M. GOD was used as a reference enzyme which has a minimal reaction in respect of both types of toxin groups. This type of device is able to work as the multi-immune biosensor. In these experiments, the simazine conjugates and antiserum to simazine and 2,4dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) were used. Specific antibodies to herbicides were immobilised through the Staphylococcal protein A. The analysis was accomplished by the sequential saturation way in which when antibodies are left unbound after their exposure to native herbicides in the investigated sample, then they have interacted with the labelled herbicide. The sensitivity of the sensor based on the EIS structures simazine the horse radish peroxidase (HRP) and when conjugates were used, they were approximately 5 µg/L. The linear plot of the sensor response lay in the range of concentrations from 5 to 150 µg/L. This sensitivity of the sensor based on the EIS structures towards both herbicides was lower than requested in practice. We tried to elucidate the main reasons for such a situation. One may be connected with difficulties to register sensor output due to the formation of air bulbs that appear as a result of high activity of the HRP. Use of high concentrations of ascorbic acid may be another reason for the lower sensitivity of this sensor. We changed the HRP label to the GOD one and

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obtained sensitivity of the analysis approximately 5 times higher. The linear plots for simazine and 2,4-D were in the range of 1.0-150 and 0.25-150 µg/L, respectively [27, 28]. An immune biosensor based on the EIS structures attracts attention because of a simple procedure of the analysis and existing possibility to accomplish multiparametrical control of the environment. For the repeated analysis, replaceable membranes are very suitable. The overall time of the analysis is about 40 minutes. Therefore, the immune sensor based on EIS structures may be used for wide screening of the environment for the presence of herbicides. This gives the possibility to perform an analysis of 8 to 10 samples simultaneously and is suitable for a wide screening of not only herbicides but also other types of toxicants. For verification, the results of analysis may be used by other types of biosensors; for example, based on the ionsensitive field effect transistors, sensitivity determined for the above mentioned herbicides is at the level of 0.1µg/L and less (up to 0.05 µg/L) that corresponds to practice demands [27, 28]. We believe that the sensitivity of the immune sensor based on EIS structures can still be increased. One of the prospective ways to do this can be the development of special suitable membranes. It is necessary to provide a very high density of the immobilized specific antibodies on the membrane surface. Moreover, it would be very effective if these antibodies were immobilized not only on the membrane surface but also in its large-scale pores, which would be accessible for large molecules of conjugates of herbicides with enzymes. In our opinion, synthetic biologically compatible polymers that can be prepared in a simple way with different levels of density and porosity may serve as a prospective material for such membranes [29, 30, 31, 32]. Of course, to increase the sensitivity of the analysis, it would also be very efficient to use monoclonal antibodies with a high level of affinity to analytes, choose enzyme labels with a high turnover of the activity and provide preservation of the enzyme activity during preparation of the conjugate. If the membranes are prepared in advance, the duration of the analysis may be shortened up to 10 minutes. Membranes are simple to prepare, are very inexpensive and they can be stored for a long time in the refrigerator.

3. Biosensors for the Determination of Individual Toxins For this purpose we apply SPR, TRIE and calorimetric based biosensors. 3.1. Analysis by SPR and TIRE Based Optical Immune Biosensors

The measuring part of the SPR device was made at the Institute of Semiconductor Physics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the principles of its construction and main algorithm of analysis are described in [33]. In special experiments, SPR was chosen as the optimal condition of the analysis accomplished. As a rule, we have analyzed in detail the number of main variants of approach: (a) specific antibodies from antiserum was immobilised on the gold surface of the SPR transducer through an intermediate layer from Staphylococcal protein A or some lectin and free analyte was in solution to be analyzed (direct way of analysis); (b) conjugate (NP, simazine, 2,4-D or T2 mycotoxine) with some protein – bovine serum

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albumine (BSA), or soybean tripsin inhibitor (STI), or ovalbumin (Ova) was directly immobilized on the gold surface of the SPR transducer and free analyte when an appropriate antiserum was in solution (competitive way with the immobilized conjugate); (c) the specific antibodies from antiserum were immobilised as in “a” and free analyte and its conjugate with some protein were in solution to be analysed (competitive way with the immobilized antibodies); and (d) immobilized and oriented as in “c” antibodies react with free analyte and then with an appropriate conjugate (approach with saturation of active binding sites on the surface). As stated, orientation antibodies on the surface are more effective with the help of protein A in comparison with the use of lectins. Maybe it is connected with the possibility of the presence of some carbohydrates not in the Fc-fragment of antibodies only but in Fab-fragments too. As can be seen, the sensitivity of 2,4-D analysis by direct way is about 5-10 µg/L, which is not high. Such a low level of sensitivity at the direct way of analysis is observed in the case of determining other low weight substances, for example: T2 mycotoxin, NPh. Much more sensitive was the analysis was accomplished by the ways appointed above as “b”-“d.” Biosensors based on the TIRE allows mycotoxin T2 up to 0.15 ng/ml [34, 35, 36]. Both optical immune biosensors can provide sensitivity of analysis that is needed for practice. Overall, the time of analysis is about 5 to 10 minutes if the transducer surface is preliminarily prepared. There is a necessity to mention that the immune biosensor based on the SPR is simpler then the TIRE biosensor. In addition, one must first be realized as a portable device. 3.2. Analysis by Calorimetric Immune Biosensor This biosensor was designed in two different forms: micro calorimeter and thermistor based devices. Efficiency of the immune biosensor in determining low molecular substances will be demonstrated by the results obtained in the experiments with NPh [37, 38]. The portable biosensor based on the microcolorimeter and thermistors are shown in Figures 2 and 3. For successful development of the calorimetrical biosensor, first it was necessary to set the optimal concentration of antiserum (for example, antiserum to NPh). For this purpose, 150 µl antiserums in different concentrations was brought in a measuring cell and incubated for 15 minutes to establish a baseline (this time the temperature was set in a barn at an optimum level). Then a 50 µl solution of NPh in concentrations of 1; 5 and 10 µg/ml were brought into the cell. Therefore, it was set so the optimum concentration of antiserum was about 5 mg of protein in 1 ml. To determine the NPh in solutions with the help of a thermal biosensor, it was necessary to build up a corresponding calibration curve. For this purpose, 150 µl of antiserum (concentrated in 5 µg of protein in 1 ml) was brought into a measuring cell and then 50 µl of NPh in a range of concentration from 0.5 up to 10 µg/ml was pumped into the measuring cell. Thus, an opportunity of “direct” detection of NPh by calorimetrical biosensor was demonstrated with a sensitivity of about 1 µg/ml. The overall time of analysis is about 20 to 30 minutes. Certainly, the sensitivity of NPh as determined by the thermal immune biosensor is much less than in the case of applying a SPR or TIRE biosensor, but it is necessary to mention the simplicity of accomplishing measurement. Maybe thermal biosensors could be used for the screening of toxic elements in environmental objects with the next verification of the analysis results by optical immune biosensors.

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1

3

2

Figure 2. Thermal biosensor system based on the principle of the measurement of the heat transferring and the solid phase electrolyte thermistors. 1- thermal sensitive unit; 2 – interface with the registration unit; 3 – laptop.

Figure 3. Biosensor is based on thermistors. Registering device (right) and separate thermistors (lings and below)

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4. Novel Multi-Parametrical Electronic Biosensors The measurement of one parameter at the complicated and multifactor characters of biochemical processes could not, in principal, be allowed to provide the creation of biosensors that would correspond to fully complex the practice demands, including selectivity, sensitivity and stability, in general, and to contaminated substances, repetition of results, needed functioning time, and others. To achieve this purpose, a microelectronic enzymatic biosensor was created that gives possibility to register a number of parameters, namely: the determination of glucose, sucrose and lactose in the case of controlling technological processes at the sucrose production or the estimation of glucose, insulin (I) and anti-insulin antibody (anti-I Ab) levels at controlling the diabetic and autoimmune state development. Such integral biosensor contains two separate channels simultaneously: amperometrical and thermometrical. These measurements were carried out in combination with those that were accomplished by the optical biosensor based on the SPR effect [39, 40]. The concentration glucose, sucrose and lactose were measured by the enzymatic amperometrical and thermometrical biosensors. At the same time, the level of I and anti-I Ab were determined by SPR and thermomethrical immune biosensors as well as by amperometrical immune enzymatic biosensors. The obtained results were compared in two aspects: providing of the analysis sensitivity and receiving objective information regarding the investigated biochemical parameters. Amperometrical channel includes a whole line of planar microelectrodes with the help of which the current one was registered. As a rule, the average value of three microelectrodes was preceded. Thermometrical channel is represented by a thin layer of sensors that work in differential regimes. Output integral biosensor signals are processed by a special electronic block. Thin layer temperature sensors were prepared in two ways: on the basis of platinum or oxide cerium. These sensors, together with the platinum working electrodes and reference electrode (AgCl) for the amperometrical measuring, were situated on the common solid phase. Three working electrodes were taken for increasing the accuracy of measurements. Thermometrical channel contents are also working and reference thermistors which have a weaving form. The concrete realization of microelectronic chips for multi-parametrical simultaneous determination in some biochemical quantities is shown in Figure 4. Thermometrical channel contents are also working and reference thermistors which have a weaving form. The manufacture technology of such chips includes: (a) chemical cleaning of the plate; (b) resistive forming of platinum film by evaporation pressure in a 5x10-6 mm box of mercury and the temperature of the evaporator and plate is 1800 and 200 0С, respectively during 4 minutes; (c) photolithography of resistors and electrodes with the use of mixture: ; (d) resistive evaporation of the 2 Pt + 4 HNO 3 + 12 HCl = 3 PtCl 4 + 4 NO + 8 H 2 O

silver layer at a temperature of 900 0С; (e) formation of contacts and reference electrode by photolithography with the application of mixture of 10% solutions of ferricyanic potassium and sodium phosphate (1:1) for silver; (f) preparation of the AgCl layer by electrolytic etching; (g) evaporation of protective Al 2O3 layer at the following conditions: pressure in box – 5x10-6 мм mercury, temperature of plate – 200 0 С, IE –120 mА, U –12кV, time ~ 3 min; (h) deposition of sensitive biochemical layer. The sensitive layer was formed in three steps: deposition of polyvinylchloride, mixture

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of one enzyme, or insulin, or anti-insulin specific antibodies with glutaraldehyde and, at last, nitrocellulose. It was demonstrated that thermometry allows control of concentrations in a frame of 0.002-25; 0.005-100; 0.1-10 mM and sensitivity about 2.35; 0.45 and 0.85 rel. units/mM for glucose, sucrose and lactate, correspondingly. From the other side, amperometry was characterized by values of controlled concentrations in a frame of 0.5-50; 0.1-80; 0.1-200 mM and sensitivity on the level of 4.3; 3.3; 3.3 nA/mM for above mentioned substances, correspondingly. In general, it is necessary to mention that these values correspond to the practice demand in respect to the sensitivity from one side, and from other one the obtained values have been conformed by special biochemical experiments. It is very important to underline that the total time of analysis is very short, and, in addition there is a possibility to obtain irrespective data about the level of a parameter by different approaches. The sensitivity of determining I and anti-I Ab in blood serum of patients with diabetics is highest at the application of immune enzymatic amperometric biosensors, among others. Unfortunately, we did not have the possibility of measuring the concentration of I with a needed sensitivity by thermometrical a biosensor. Maybe, there is a necessity to optimize the type and concentration of buffer systems. The SPR immune biosensor is the most simple among the other ones and can provide an analysis of anti-I Ab but not I in the blood.

Figure 4. Scheme of microelectronic chip (with the concrete materials and structure dimensions).

5. Way for the Decontamination of Polluted Environmental Objects As a rule, the decontamination of polluted environmental objects from low molecular substances is a very complicated procedure connected with the application of specific chemicals that may produce an additional non-desirable effect on living organisms. In our opinion, there are different existing ways to achieve such a procedure with the most

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effective one being the use of chemicals that are able to select binding toxins and their inactivation. In this respect, we have examined the efficiency of some calix[4]arens for the selective binding of simasine, atrazine and T2 mycotoxin [41, 42]. Calix[4]arens are as macro cyclic crater form compounds that can be prepared by acid catalyzed condensation of resorcinol with different aldehydes [43]. Calix[4]resorcinol arenas have the stabilized intermolecular interstice by four hydrogen bounds between the nearest hydroxyl groups of the neighbour’s rings (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Structural view of calix[4]resorcinol arenas and their transitions.

Thus, they are very important building blocks for the creation of hollow receptors [44]. It possible to select some calyx[4]arenas that have the most selectivity to concrete low weight chemical structures. So, it was demonstrated by a different selectivity in some calyx[4]arenas to 2,4-D, atrazine and T2 mycotoxin (Table 1). We consider that both discussed approaches, namely, express control of the presence of toxins and their simple and rapid removal from polluted objects are very effective ways to prevent nondesirable and dangerous consequences for living organisms. Table 1. Constants (Kа) of “host-guest” complexes at the interaction of 2,4-D, atrazine and T2-mycotoxin with calix[4]arenas. „Guest” 2,4 D Atrasine T2mycotoxin

CCalixarenas x 10-4 M 1 2 3 365 772 507 7 7 678 251 648 5 3 3 550 885 102 0 0

Moreover, it was stated that some calyx[4]resorcinol arenas as artificial receptors may be used for the direct creation of the nanostructure complexes on SPR’s sensitive surface for the binding of T2 mycotoxin according to the guest-host principle. In this case, it was shown that the use of the dodecanthiol as an intermediate layer increases the density of calyx[4]arenas receptors on the transducer surface and allows having a

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high sensitivity of sensor analysis of T2 mycotoxin up to 10 ng/mL. The structured selective sites on the basis calyx[4] arenas with the intermediate layer on transducer surface is demonstrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Structured calix[4]arenas on the gold transducer surface.

6. Conclusion The developed complex of the instrumental analytical devices based on the biosensorics principle can provide all practice demands with respect to the express, sensitive and simple monitoring of different environmental objects that reveal the presence of toxic substances. Among them, mycotoxins, in particular, mycotoxin in general, and T2 mycotoxin, especially, are substances that may be used as objects for bioterrorist activity. The strategy of any monitoring is based first on the determination of total toxicity and then, in case of positive results, the next steps will follow which are connected with the discovery of group toxic elements and their concrete specimens. Biosensors may cover all of these aspects of analysis. To effectively remove low molecular weight toxins from polluted environmental objects, there are prospective chemical substances, namely different forms of calyx[4]resorcinol arenas. Moreover, they may serve as selective structures that are capable for artificial modelling of binding sites the chemical way.

References [1] B. Roberts, M. Moodie, 2002: Toward a threat reduction strategy. Nat. Defense Univ., http://www.ndu.edti/iass/pms/ndttithfi.htmt.

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[2] C.J. Mirocha, R.A. Pawlosky, Chatterjee K. S. Watson, W. Hayes, Analysis for Fusarium toxins in various samples implicated in biological warfare in Southeast Asia. J Assoc Anal Chem, 66 (1983), 1485-1499. [3] J.H. Rittenburg (ed.), Development and Application of Immunoassay for Food Analysis, London/NY, Elsevier Applied Science; 1990. [4] S.S. Iqbal, M.W. Mayo, J.G. Bruno, B.V. Bronk, C.A. Batt and J.P. Chambers, A review of molecular recognition technologies for detection of biological threat agents. Biosensors & Bioelectronics,15 (2000), 549-578. [5] A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, A.K. Hassan, N.F. Starodub, Total internal reflection ellipsometry and SPR detection of low molecular weight environmental toxins. Appl Surface Sci, 246 (2005), 381-386. [6] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, O.A. Gojster, G.O. Khmel’nitsky, Control of T2 mycotoxin in solutions and foods by biosensors based on SPR and TIRE. In: Proc Intern Conf “Sensor+Test 2006”, Nuremberg, Germany, 2006, p. 87-92. [7] N.F. Starodub, V.I. Nazarenko, S.P. Ivashkevich, V.V. Goncharuk, N. A. Klimenko, Principles of express instrumental control of total toxicity of environmental objects and their realization in space conditions. In: Proc Soc Automotive Eng (SAE) Norfolk VA, USA, 2006. [8] N.F. Starodub, V.G. Mel’nik, O.M. Shmireva, Instrumental approaches and peculiarities of design of stationary and portable analytical devices for determination of bio- and chemi-luminescence. In: Proc Soc Automotive Eng (SAE) Norfolk VA, USA, 2006. [9] ISO 6341:1996(E), Water quality – Determination of the mobility of Daphnia magna Straus (Cladocera, Crustacea) – Acute toxicity test. [10] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, Biosensors and control of pesticides in water and foods. Chem. Technol. Water, 6 (2001), 612-638. [11] S.P. Ivashkevich, S.P. Levkovetz, V.I. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, Chemiluminescence of medium Daphnia cultivation and optimization of conditions of it determination. Ukr Biochem J, 74 (2002), 9397. [12] N. Starodub, Express instrumental control of environment by new generation of biosensors. In: Abstract Book of 7-th International Conference “Gas in Marine Sediments”, October 7-12, Geology Institute, Baku, 2002, p. 170-173. [13] V.G. Mel’nik, O.M. Shmyryva, N.F. Starodub, Luminescent biosensor complexes based on uniformed impedancemetry systems. Physical-technical characteristics. Sensor Electronics and Microsystem Technologies, (2007), 1, 50-61. [14] V.G. Mel’nik, V.I. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, N.V. Maksimchuk, O.M. Shmireva, Electronic bioluminescent device for the determination of toxic substances. In Proc.: Electronic and Connection. Thematic issue: “Problems of electronics”, part 2, Medical devices and systems. 2008, p. 110-114. [15] N.F. Starodub, V.G. Melnyk, O.D. Vasylenko, O.M. Shmyriyva, M.V. Bogoljubov, Development and investigation of luminescent impedancemetric biosensor system. Proceeding of 13th International Conference “Sensor 2007”, Nuremberg, Germany, 22-24 May 2007, 1, p. 334-338. [16] І.А. Levkovetz, S.P. Ivashkevich, V.І. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, Application of chemiluminescent method for the determination of sensitivity Daphnia magna to different toxic substances. Ukr. Biochem. J., 74 (2002), 120-124. [17] O.S. Gojster, N.F. Starodub, G.A. Chmel’nitskij, Determination of Т2 mycotoxin by chemiluminescent method with the use of Daphnia. Hydrobiol J, 5 (2003), 85-91. [18] L.N. Pilipenko, A.V. Egorova, I.V. Pilipenko, N.F.Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, S.P. Ivashkevich, Investigation of toxic effect of patulin with the help of biosensorics systems. Food Sciences and Technology, (2007), 1, 35-38. [19] N.F. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, S.P. Ivashkevich, L.N. Pilipenko, A.V. Egorova, I.V. Pilipenko Patulin toxicity and determination of this toxin in environmental objects by optical biosensor systems. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 237-348. [20] А.М. Katzev, O.S. Gojster, N.F. Starodub, Influence of T2 mycotoxin on the intensity of bacterial bioluminescence. Ukr Bioch J, 75 (2003), 99-103. [21] M.T. Elnabarawy, R.R. Robideau, S.A. Beach, Comparison of three rapid toxicity test procedures: Microtox, Polytox and activated sludge respiration inhibition. Toxicity Assess, 3 (1988), 361-370. [22] R. Manfoud, M. Maresca, N. Garmy, J. Fantini, The mycotoxin patulin alters the barrier function of the intestinal epithelium: mechanism of action of the toxin and protective effects of glutathione. Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol, 181 (2002), 209-218. [23] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, N.I. Kanjuk, A.L. Kukla, Yu.M. Shirshov, Biological sensor array for express determination of a number of biochemical quantities. In: Proc. of 2nd EUREL Workshop “European Advanced Robotic System Development. Medical Robotics”, 23-24 Sept. 1999, Piza, Italy, 1999, p. 57-64.

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[24] N.F. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, A.L. Kukla, Y.M. Shirshov, Multi-enzymatic electrochemical sensor: field measurements and their optimization. Anal. Chim. Acta, 385 (1999), 461-466. [25] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, Immune sensors: origins, achievements and perspectives. Ukr Biochem. J., 72 (2000), 147-163. [26] Y.M. Shirshov, N.F. Starodub, A.L. Kukla, N.I. Kanjuk, A.V. Prokopovich, R. Merker, Creation of the multi-enzymatic sensor for simultaneous determination of phosphororganic pesticides and heavy metal ions in solutions. In: Proc. of the 11th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers. Eurosensors XI. September 21-24, 1997, Warsaw, Poland; 1997, p.727-730. [27] V.M. Starodub, N.F. Starodub, Electrochemical immune sensor based on the ion-selective field effect transistor for the determination of the level of myoglobin. In: Proc. of the 13th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers, September 12-15, 1999, The Hague, the Netherlands, 1999, p.185-188. [28] N.F. Starodub, B.B. Dzantiev, V.M. Starodub, A.V. Zherdev, Immunosensor for the determination of the herbicide simazine based on an ion-selective field effect transistor. Anal. Chim. Acta, 424 (2000), 37-43. [29] А.V. Rebrijev, N.F. Starodub, A.F. Masljuk, Optimization of conditions of immobilization of enzymes in a photopolymeric membrane. Ukr. Biochem. J., 74 (2002), 82-87. [30] A.V. Rebrijev, N.F. Starodub, Photopolymers as immobilization matrix in biosensors. Ukr Biochem J., 73 (2001), 5-16. [31] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Rebriev Liquid photopolymerizable compositions as immobilized matrix of biosensors. Bioelectrochemistry, 71 (2007), 1, 29-32. [32] N.F. Starodub, W. Torbicz, D Pijanowska, V.M. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, M., Dawgul, Optimization methods of enzyme integration with transducers for analysis of irreversible inhibitors. In: Proc. of the XII European Conference on Solid-State Transducers and the IX UK Conference on Sensors and their Applications, Sept. 13-16, 1998, Southampton, UK. Edited by White, N.M. Bristol: Inst. of Physics., 1998, v.1, p. 837-840. [33] N.F. Starodub, T.L. Dibrova, Y.M. Shirshov, K.V. Kostioukevich, Development of sensor based on the surface plasmon resonance for control of biospecific interaction. In: Proc. of the 11th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers. Eurosensors XI. September 21-24, 1997, Warsaw, Poland, 1997, p. 1429-1432. [34] V.M. Starodub, N.F. Starodub, Optical immune sensors for the monitoring protein substances in the air. In: Eurosensor XII. The 13th European conference on solid-state transducers September 12-15 1999. The Hague. The Netherlands, 1999, p. 181-184. [35] A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, A. Holloway, N.F. Starodub, O. Gojster, Registration of T2mycotoxin with total internal reflection ellipsometry and QCM impedance methods. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 22 (2007), 885-890. [36] N. F. Starodub, A.V. Nabok, Immune biosensors for the express determination of some endocrine disrupting factors in environment. In Book of Abstracts: Europtrode IX, Ninth European Conference on Optical Chemical Sensors and Biosensors, Dublin, March 30-April2, 2008, p. 241. [37] A.V. Demchenko, V.G. Mel’nik, N.F. Starodub Thermal biosensor for detecting nonylphenol in the environment. Ukr. Biochem. J., 79 (2007), 5, 173-176. [38] A. V. Demchenko, N. F. Starodub Modification of immune SPR biosensor surface at nonylphenol analysis. Biopolymers and Cell, 23 (2007), 2, 143-147. [39] N.F. Starodub, O.M. Shmireva, L.M. Shuliak, V.G. Mel’nik Multi-parametrical microelectronic biosensors. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 10-11. [40] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Demchenko, N.V. Piven’, A.V. Goncharik Development of optical biosensor for express control of anti-insulin antibodies level in blood of diabetics. Proceeding of 13th International Conference “Sensor 2007”, Nuremberg, Germany, 22-24 May 2007, v. 1, p.439-444. [41] O.I. Kalchenko, A.V. Solovyov, S.A. Cherenok, N.F. Starodub, V.I. Kalchenko, Complexation of Calix[4]arenephosphonous acids with 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and atrazine in water. J. Inclusion Phenomena and Microcyclic Chemistry, 46 (2003), 19-25. [42] N.F. Starodub, O.S. Gojster, O.M. Shivanjuk, V.I. Kal’chenko, Modelling specific sites for the determination of endocrine disrupting factors by chemical sensors. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 82-83. [43] L. M. Tunstad, J. A. Tucker, E. Dalcanale, J. Weiser, J. A. Bryant, J. C. Sherman, R. C. Helgeson, C. B. Knobler, D. J. Cram, Host-guest complexation. 48. Octol building blocks for cavitands and carcerands. J. Org. Chem., 54 (1989), 6, 1305-1312. [44] O..M. Shivanjuk Functional calyx[4]arenas and calyx[4]resorcinol arenas in self organization and molecular recognition. Thesis of Dr. Sci., Institute of Organic Chemistry of NAS of Ukraine, 2005.

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The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism Ahmet EKICIa and Orhan ERDEMb a,b Turkish National Police b Malatya Junior Police College Abstract. Law enforcement response to terrorism is argued to be defining the factor in that will be successful -the terrorist organizations or law enforcement agencies. This study used a sample of confitents in Turkey, examined law enforcement practices, focusing on militaristic and traditional policing methods, in responding to terrorism in order assess the impact on the individual’s decisions to join a terrorist organization. The study also looked into participants’ perceptions about Community Oriented Policing (COP); and if it implemented in Turkey, how it would affect the individuals’ decisions to join terrorist organizations. More than 25% of the respondents reported the influence of law enforcement practices on their decision to join the organizations. A significant relationship was found to exist between brutality and law enforcement’s influence and reliance on militaristic tactics in an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. Keywords. law enforcement, counter-terrorism, Community Oriented Policing, PKK, law enforcement practices.

Introduction When terrorism hits a country, the first response comes from the law enforcement. When looking at the countries that have experienced terrorism, it can be observed that most countries apply identical or similar responses. The most common responses are the deployment of military in rural areas with the duty to search, find and eliminate or at least suppress the terrorist group. In urban areas, more traditional policing tactics are used, or more power is given to police for searches, seizures, arrests, eavesdropping and questioning. During this process the rights of innocent people are diminished by law, and in many instances are violated by law enforcement and other institutions. This is just what the terrorist organizations want and aim for. The more the public is dissatisfied with the government organizations, the more arguments the terrorist organizations have against the government and its representatives. A community that is dissatisfied with its law enforcement also gives the terrorist organizations a very large pool and a handy tool for recruitment. The question then becomes whether law enforcement organizations are actually fighting terrorism or supporting their cause? Fromkin [1] points out that the success of Algerian National Liberation Front was mainly because of the harsh response from the French government. Likewise Baynard [2] and Ron [3] argue that the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) gained public support because the Peruvian government responded with classic and harsh methods. Turkey’s response in the early

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stages to the actions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was no exception; Durna and Hancerli [4] indicate similar response tactics. On the other hand community policing has been proposed as a philosophy that can be applied in all community problems. The threat of terrorism is certainly a community problem, because in many cases the target is the community; sometimes for recruitment purposes and sometimes to cause chaos and fear in the community for the achievement of the terrorist organizations goal. In times when terrorism strikes, which policing tactics would be more effective for law enforcement: militaristic and classic policing tactics or community based policing methods? This study used responses from confitents (individuals who used to be a member of a terrorist organization and (a) had engaged in operations of the organization but have changed their mind and surrendered, (b) were captured and decided to provide information about the organization and its operations, and are serving their sentence in Turkish prisons) located in different prisons in Turkey assessed the impact of law enforcement practices on the decisions of individuals’ to join terrorist organizations. Since the main response tactics consisted of military responses and traditional policing tactics, those were assessed. Respondents were also asked to indicate whether their initial response would have been different if law enforcement had applied community policing methods in their fight against terrorism and in service delivery. The respondents were made up of 59 PKK members, 24 Turkish Hezbollah (TH) members, and 8 other group members.

1. Purpose of the Study Turkish law enforcement agencies, along with their counterparts all over the world, try to fight terrorism with all means they have and all methods they know. However, especially during the initial phases of terrorism, because of mistakes in methods and tactics, the populace from time to time has stopped supporting the law enforcement and even shown sympathy and to support to terrorist organizations. For a long time law enforcement agencies did not practice community based policing methods which focus largely on the identification of the root causes of problems within the community. Finding possible solutions, applying them with the involvement of the community, and preserving the democratic rights of the individual are central to the community policing model. Where applied to the problem of terrorism the community policing philosophy emphasizes winning the hearts and minds of the public. If this can be achieved the recruitment arguments by a terrorist organization can be minimized, and the counterterrorism can be maximized. As Gozubenli and Akbas [5] argue, “for police agencies to successfully implement effective antiterrorism strategies they must focus on long term strategies, rather than policing practices that only provide temporary or reactive responses” (p. 208). Past studies have focused on the many aspects of terrorism, but the role of law enforcement and their behavior, their actions or inactions, their relationships with the public, and their service policies, have been important considerations that are not well researched. The determination of which police practices may cause individuals to side with terrorist organizations and which practices may contribute to siding with law enforcement will be useful information for all countries and law enforcement decision makers that face the threat of terrorism. This study focuses on the effects of law enforcement practices and their impact on the decision making process of individuals

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to join terrorist organizations. In short, this study looks into past law enforcement practices to identify what, if any, law enforcement practices, strategies, methods and policies influence the decision making process of individuals who become terrorists.

2. Brief History of the Problem: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party-PKK) The PKK, known also as the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK) or Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL), or under any other alias is recognized by the European Union (E.U.) and the United States (U.S.) as a terrorist organization [6]. The history of the organization can be summarized in parallel with its imprisoned leader: Abdullah Ocalan. While attending Ankara University’s College of Political Science, he was arrested for handing out fliers and served seven months in prison. After his release from prison in 1973, he created the Kurdish Revolutionists with those who shared Marxist-Leninist theory/ideology. In 1976 the group expanded their recruitment efforts to the South East provinces of Turkey. It was only after their first congress in 1978 that the organization took the name Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK). Abdullah Ocalan took the responsibility of writing the Foundation Statement of the PKK [7] where he made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a Greater Kurdistan [8]. Just before the military coup, Ocalan fled to Syria in 1979 and got a camp in Bekaa Valley from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) [7]. For about six years the organization continued its recruitment and training in secrecy but also contacted other states for support which they received. After its second congress in Syria in 1982, the organization started its armed campaign and the first attack took place in 1984. The attacks continued in urban areas with bombings, suicide attacks, and mines on roads and in the countryside. The attacks also targeted international relations, interests and the global image of Turkey; the PKK kidnapped foreign tourists, attacked Turkish diplomats in Europe, and assaulted symbolic representatives such as teachers in the Southeast of Turkey [8]. Radu [9] states that the PKK had a Marxist-Leninist ideology while claiming to be fighting for the rights of the Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism. Toward this effort the sole leader without question, Abdullah Ocalan, surprisingly did not speak Kurdish but Turkish. In 1985, the organization created the Kurdish National Liberation Front, which was mainly responsible for propaganda and recruitment. Another effort to increase recruitment and propaganda was the creation of MEDTV, a TV station for broadcasting. In 1986, the Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu (ARGK [Kurdish National Liberation Army]) was created [10]. One other important decision was to send suicide bombers to every province in Turkey [11]. And, a cease fire declared by Ocalan in 1990 soon came to an end an attack killing 33 soldiers in 1993when the organization realized that they were losing power. The organization used all means and methods to achieve its goals: legal political parties were created followed by organizing so called peace meetings and celebrations. The peace meetings were so called because the organization never ceased its armed attacks. After the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the organization changed its arguments again and declared the goal as reaching

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“Democratic Republic and Peace”, arguing for democratic change within Turkey as a solution to the Kurdish problem. The changes in tactics continued with the decision to get rid of a “terrorist organization image” during the congress in 2002. Accordingly, the organization changed its name to Kongreya Azad zˇ Demokrasiya Kurdistan (KADEK). Until 2004 there were no major attacks; however, starting in 2004, attacks took place targeting law enforcement and governmental buildings in Turkey, especially along the Iraqi border. One main reason for an increase in the attacks was shown as the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the unwillingness to allow the Turkish military to strike against the PKK bases in Northern Iraq. In 2007, following an increase in terrorist attacks inside Turkey, including an ambush by PKK where 13 Turkish soldiers were killed, followed by another ambush which killed 12 more soldiers and captured another 8, the Turkish military attacked PKK camps in Northern Iraq on December 16, 2007. The PKK never stopped using violence against civilians, law enforcement, and other governmental representatives. Kule [12] states that: The PKK combined violence and terror with political organization. The village guards were the top priority target of the PKK for many years [13]. Many school teachers and civil servants were killed; schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the existence of the Turkish state in Southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once stated that ‘the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results.’ Alkan [14] writes that terrorist organizations have to maintain violence because it serves their goals to provide propaganda, to announce their existence, to provide morale to their members, to scare those who are not supporters, to shake the authority of the government, to force the government and its representatives to use coercion and oppression against the public, to train their members, and finally to create chaos. 2.1. PKK’s Recruitment Methods Aktan and Koknar [15] report that the ordinary Turkish terrorist is of average intelligence, not very perceptive of his/her environment, an introvert, and easily manipulated. Dire economic conditions, religious sensitivities, ethnic consciousness, and pressure from the feudal social structures push young Turkish people into the arms of terrorist organizations. Ocalan’s dictate was that “in order for the revolution to be accepted by the public, the idea of revolution had to be extended to especially educated part of society and larger groups had to be included in the action” (as quoted in Pirim and Ortulu, [7]). The educated groups were those in the universities. Some associations were formed by the organization for recruitment purposes. Existing associations formed for other reasons (e.g. cultural associations, aid and cooperation associations, and beautifying associations) were used for meeting and recruitment purposes of the organization [7] as well. In past practice, prisons in Turkey were organized in dormitory style rather than isolated cells; unfortunately, the captured terrorists were placed in this system, offering a recruitment venue in that even if the individual was not a hard core terrorist he/she would receive political and ideological training, as well as close combat

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training [15]. As there were many protests, hunger strikes, resistance and riots causing the deaths of 30 inmates and 2 Gendarmerie officers, in 2000 one and two person cells were introduced. One other method the PKK used was the so called military law of the PKK developed in 1986. Based on this law, the organization used children as young as 15 as soldiers; the majority of these children were taken by force and kidnapped from their families [15]. The children feared that their families would be hurt if they did not obey while the families feared for their children. Esentur [16], states that of those children that had joined the terrorist organization, 86% reported that they had joined the organization to support their family income but argued that the promise was not kept by the organization. The main reason for not leaving the organization was stated as fear of reprisal to them or their families. Once recruited, individuals were kept within the organization through repression and fear of reprisal. The terrorist organization used a double edge knife. The PKK also established a network of sympathizers who would supply funds, food, and when needed, sanctuary and also recruited foreigners from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, Lebanon, Greece, and Germany. Although tribalism still exists in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey, most of the tribal leaders were not supportive of the terrorist organization. The organization, in order to gain the support of tribal leaders, used threat, oppression, and attacks on villages and forced people to take sides. Turkish military uniforms were used in order to focus villager anger towards the Turkish military and law enforcement, thereby achieving one of the main goals of alienation and creation of distrust of the government. Of course the actions of the PKK also led to repressive measures by law enforcement as well. Singer [17] points out that losing a loved one for the cause may fill the rest of the family members with pride and may encourage them to join the organization as well. When pride is insufficient, suffering and the desire for revenge may lead to the same outcome. Pedahzur [18] reports that some Chechen women became suicide bombers after losing a loved one. Although not verified it is claimed that Ocalan gave an order that there had to be at least one martyr in every household, and if not caused by combat with law enforcement, the organization would do it and blame the Turkish military. “In an environment where there are economic difficulties, poverty, lack of education, employment, and a constant threat from a terrorist organization and lack of trust for government representatives, individuals may feel pushed to join with the terrorist organization because they argue for equality, better conditions, and employment and blame all sufferings on the existing government” [19]. Kule [12] argues that it is through peer, friend, relative, or school relations where individuals learn about the terrorist organizations and that it is a socialization process of learning terrorism. Alkan [14], who makes similar arguments, identifies the use of social and psychological methods in recruitment by terrorist organizations. He identifies social methods as friendship relations, family members and fellow countryman or citizenry. Organizing social and cultural events or arranging meetings to discuss religious views are also social methods to identify possible recruits. The last social method is identified as ethnic identity; thus, if you are a Kurd it is your obligation to join them. Motivation and group dynamism are identified as the two psychological methods [14].

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3. Problems with Law Enforcement Practices against Terrorism Throughout the world many countries have experienced the pain of terrorism, some more than others. Turkey has been of those who suffered more than others; in the last three decades, around 40 thousand people have lost their lives in the fight against terrorism while 100 billions of very hard needed dollars that could be spent on development of the country had to be spent on military operations against the terrorist organizations [20]. Although Turkey has been fighting terrorism since its existence in 1923, [21] it has been the last three decades that has had the highest impact. After the military coup of 1980, most terrorist organizations seized but the PKK continued its existence and became even more powerful and active. The TH was the second notorious terrorist organization that became active. Unfortunately these organizations became more powerful because there were nations that gave all sorts of support to these organizations [22]. When it comes to reacting, the response of the Turkish government and law enforcement has been similar to other countries. The military was assigned to find and capture the terrorists. The military, also including the gendarme, employed tactics that they were most familiar with. The government initiated martial law while the military conducted operations in many areas including outside the borders of Turkey. Inside the borders, decisions were taken to restrict movement in areas which the military officials considered possible areas for terrorist activities. The military had all authority to fight the terrorists and in many instances the civilian police, although legally not required, became subordinate to the military in small residential areas. Because of the constant threat the police also made use of similar tactics as of the military. The classic policing tactics were applied in the fight against terrorism while delivery of all other services was dropped, safety and security was emphasized more than everything; even the rights of the civilians. The law enforcement response, especially in the early stages of the threat, was more reactive rather than proactive. In some regions law enforcement treated all residents as possible terrorists because terrorist activities were high in these regions and the terrorist groups could easily recruit manpower. The laws gave extra power to the law enforcement agencies, which unfortunately was abused by some officials. The law enforcement response focused on fighting the terrorist organizations but little or no attention was given to the cause of the problem; research was lacking to look into why some individuals joined the terrorist organizations and most importantly whether the practices of law enforcement agencies were actually successful. Law enforcement agencies assumed that the fight had to rely on weapons, military tactics, and classic policing methods. Because of this, communication and relations with the populace was weak, which also caused a dearth of good intelligence. In many examples, the idea was that for the safety and security of the state and people, some democratic rights of the populace could be sacrificed. “Law enforcement tactics and methods, supported by laws and conditions, has led to intimidation of civilians, reduction in the quality of life, distrust of law enforcement, and sympathy towards terrorist organizations” [19]. The “criminal justice” model and the “war” model are two models identified by Crelinsten [23] for responding to terrorism. In the criminal justice model it is the civilian police force that is the main responding agency that makes use of minimum force while maintaining democratic methods and tactics. On the other hand, in war model, the main responding agency is the military, with the means and methods at

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hand, which may require war standards, use of maximum power and restrictions in some democratic rights for the sake of fighting terrorism. Turkey was not totally inexperienced in fighting terrorism prior to the emergence of the PKK. Since its establishment, the Turkish State has had to deal with some form of terrorist group; some are religiously motivated, others ideologically, nationalistically, or ethnically motivated. Still it can be argued that the responses to the PKK threat were not totally proper. The responses of Turkey to terrorism can be categorized under four main headings: 1-Law enforcement responses, 2- Economic policies, 3- Laws and regulations, and 4- International policies. 3.1. Law Enforcement Responses Law enforcement responses consist of military operations within national borders, outside national borders, the enactment of martial law and later on a state of emergency, the creation of temporary village guards and the creation of Special Forces in military and in civilian police. Radu (1998) states that in the first years of PKK operations, Turkey did not realize the real threat and the response was not adequate to stop the organization’s growth. Aktan and Koknar [15] note that Turkey did not take seriously the “people’s war rhetoric of Ocalan.” As in previous counter terrorism actions, Turkey did not comply and did not even consider the demands of terrorist organizations. After the initial attacks of PKK, the military conducted numerous small and large scale operations in the mountainous areas of East and South East Anatolia. Of course, these were not sufficient because in many cases the attacks were planned and coordinated from Iraq and thus the military initiated incursions in to Iraqi soil. Between 1983 and 1999 a total of 24 military operations were launched in to Iraq. Of course these operations were based on the self defense doctrine as well as on bilateral agreements. Because of the brutal terrorist campaigns during the late 1970’s, Turkey had limited some civil rights; after the military coup in 1984, martial law was declared in nine Eastern and Southeastern provinces. This martial law was replaced by a “state of emergency” in 1987 which lasted until 2002. Although the military used strategies to cover as much area as possible, most of the attacks were against villages in remote and mountainous areas. The scattered settlements made it impossible to provide military force in each and every village. As argued by Radu [9], one of the most effective measures taken by Turkey was a community-based response. With the proposal of the military and based on a law enacted in 1985, the Village Guard was created. Volunteer villagers were enlisted as village guards. This provided recognition and pride to the villagers as well as economic benefit because the government paid the village guards. On the other hand, the PKK denounced the villages with village guards as traitors and collaborators and ordered punitive strikes, followed by brutal attacks to villages where entire families or villages were wiped out. This earned Ocalan the nickname of “baby killer” [15]. Using one of the main methods of most terrorist groups, the PKK moved in small groups through the mountainous areas of Southeastern Turkey. From time to time, the small groups came together and conducted their attacks but never remained in large groups. In contrast, the military acted in larger numbers and were easily detected by the terrorist groups. The large numbers also made movement from one spot to another more difficult and took more time. The police as well as the military decided to create

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new Special Operation Forces and trained them in unconventional counterinsurgency tactics. Supplied with the most up to date technical and specially developed operational equipment and training, these units achieved great success, especially in rural areas [24]. The police had about 6,200 men in these Special Forces and conducted operations in urban areas as well as joining the military in rural areas. Meanwhile, the military created a professional corps that consisted of noncommissioned officers who had already served their military service [15]. 3.2. Economic Policies Research has shown that one of the main reasons for individuals to join terrorist organizations is poverty, usually as a result of a lack of employment and poor economic conditions in a region [25]. Koseli [22] maintains that poverty has had an effect on Turkey’s terrorism problem; if the government wants to solve the problem it should focus more on improving economic conditions. The government provided income to many families with the introduction of Village Guards, but this only covered a small proportion of the people who were unemployed. Because of terrorism, there was not much industry in the affected regions and farming did not provide sufficient income. However, one of the world’s biggest projects has been the Southeastern Anatolian Project (Ataturk Dam, GAP). The project estimation was $32 billion but current numbers show it has exceeded that. Radu [9] reports that between 1983 and 1992, the investment per capita in the region was twice that of other regions. When finished, it will provide sustainable development in the region. In order to attract investment in the region, the government offered incentives such as no taxes, energy at reduced prices, and deductions in health and social security payments for employees. 3.3. Laws and Regulations Although most laws enacted, restricted the democratic rights and free movement of the people, they all were aimed at providing more safety and security. In addition, specific laws were enacted that targeted the individuals that were already members of a terrorist organization. The Repentant law was one of the most influential laws -but enacted and applied differently several times- that led many members of the terrorist organization to surrender to Turkish authorities, provide information, and cooperate with law enforcement against the organization. The law was enacted in 1980, 1985, 1988, and 1999 [26]. The next bill with a similar goal was “The Returning Home Bill” (or “The Win Back to Society Bill”) and was enacted in 2003. Both of these laws offered a sort of pardon to terrorists that were forced to join the organization and wanted to leave but feared punishment by the government. The individuals could surrender or be captured; either way, they could petition to have the law applied to their case [27]. Other laws aimed to improve the democratic conditions in the country, especially towards the most affected regions. As of 2002, the government TV channels have been required to air at least some shows in Kurdish. Permission to teach courses in the Kurdish language was granted on October 3, 2001, however these programs are now closing due to a lack of demand [28].

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3.4. International Policies Although the E.U., the U.S., and most other countries identified the PKK as a terrorist organization, when it came to fighting them and supporting Turkey or at least not aiding the terrorist organization, there was much hesitation. Turkey saw the PKK as an internal problem and never accepted international pressure which aimed to have the PKK be recognized as a political party and apply the Geneva Convention regulations towards PKK members. Turkey successfully resisted this pressure and initiated international diplomatic efforts against PKK. The law enforcement and Turkish intelligence agencies cooperated with other international agencies. This cooperation led to the arrest and extradition of many PKK members from countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Germany and other European nations. The biggest example of this was the collaboration between the U.S., Israel, and Turkey during the capture of Ocalan in Kenya; U.S. support made it possible that no country opened its doors to Ocalan [9]. Another diplomatic effort resulted in the listing of the PKK as a terrorist organization under any alias. In order to get rid of its terrorist image and avoid being listed by countries a terrorist organization, the PKK changed its name several times, however, because of these diplomatic efforts and policies it was to no avail. Turkey made it clear with diplomatic messages and stances that it would not tolerate support of the PKK by its neighbors. As Radu [9] puts it, Ankara also pursued other policies that greatly enhanced its position vis-àvis Ocalan's rebels. As noted above, it’s increasingly assertive regional diplomacy, backed by credible threats of force, led Syria to expel Ocalan and close down PKK camps on its territory and in Lebanon. Syria and Iran have banned PKK activities, but in Iraq, because of the current post-U.S. invasion conditions, and an absence of a strong political power in the area, the PKK is able to continue its activities. Unfortunately, until recently the law enforcement made almost no use of community based policing methods in their service delivery as well as in their fight against terrorism. Afacan [29] asserts that terror is used as a means to “gain political, economic, psychological, and even military goals” (p. 253); terror becomes a tool and a method to achieve this objective. With terror, fear increases and the groups gain control over the populace. “According to the methods and tactics they choose, terrorists intensify the emotional state within the movement and among supporters outside the movement while disorientating and confusing civil authorities” (p. 253). In many instances the confusion leads law enforcement to become repressive of the public causing the “infraction of civil liberties and isolation of individuals from their society” (p.253). In order to prevent this, Afacan [29] argues for community policing methods in the fight against terrorism because terrorism is a community problem.

4. Data For this study, a self administered survey was used. Since the confitents are located in various prisons throughout Turkey, the General Directorate of Corrections was contacted for information and permission. Because it was felt that hard core terrorists

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would provide biased or no information at all, confitents were chosen for the study. The directorate confirmed that the majority of confitents were located in nine institutions found in eight cities throughout Turkey. A total of 132 confitents were identified; 95 of them filled out the survey but only 91 of the completed surveys were useable. Since the data was collected through a questionnaire, the general limitations of surveying apply to this study as well. In addition, although the majority of confitents has been reported in the nine institutions, the actual total number in Turkey is not known which might be an issue of sampling bias and generalizability. It may also be argued that the confitents might have felt compelled to respond in a manner that would favor law enforcement. 5. Results The data indicated that approximately 65% of the respondents were members of the PKK, 26% were of TH and 9% belonged to other terrorist organizations (Table 1). Table 1 Membership PKK Turkish Hezbollah Others

Frequency

Percent

59 24 8

64.8 26.4 8.8

The majority of the respondents were militia (68%); only 35 (3%) were in leadership positions (See Figure 1). Figure 1 Highest Position in Organization.

As seen in Table 2, around 70% of respondents were in the organization for less than 10 years.

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Table 2 Years in Organization Frequency

Percent

Less than 5 years

33

36.3

5 to 10 years

30

33.0

10 to 15 years

10

11.0

15 to 20 years

5

5.5

No answer

13

14.3

Again, it can be seen in Table 3 out of 91 respondents 44 % of respondents had attempted to finish elementary school, while another 29% had attempted to finish high school. Table 3 Highest Education Level Attempted Frequency Elementary 40

Percent 44.0

High School

26

28.6

College

17

18.7

Illiterate

8

8.8

The most striking result of the study can be seen in Table 4: 27.5% of respondents indicate that law enforcement had an impact in their decision to join the terrorist organization. Table 4 Impact of Law Enforcement in Joining Terrorist Organization Law Enforcement Not Impacted

Frequency 25 66

Percent 27.5 72.5

Another important finding indicates that almost 65% of respondents did not see law enforcement practices and methods as reasonable. (See Table 5) Table 5 Perceptions About Law Enforcement Practices and Methods Frequency Percent No 59 64.8 Maybe 17 18.7 Yes 15 16.5

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When respondents were asked to indicate what they viewed as unreasonable among law enforcement practices, Figure 2 shows that rudeness, discrimination, not respecting local norms and values, and relying on military tactics were identified as the most objectionable. Figure 2 Law Enforcement Practices and Methods seen as Unreasonable.

p

60

53

50 42 40 30 30

24 19

20

21

18

18

15

17

14

13

7

10 0 0

2

1

3

1

17

3

7 6

14

12 13 7

7 8

11

0 Rude

Discriminate Don't respect Military Don't respect Violate laws Crime No trust in Not gaining Reactive not norms/values tactics rights fighters/no public public proactive service support Highly Unreasonable

Moderately Unreasonable

Tolerable

As reported in the literature, when responding to terrorism, law enforcement agencies occasionally employ more force than necessary. Tables 6 and 7 show that being subjected to brutality or having a family member subjected to brutality significantly influences individuals’ decisions to join a terrorist organization. The Chi square test indicated that a significant relationship between the use of brutality by law enforcement and a respondent’s decision to join a terrorist organization: X2(1, N=91) = 13.825, p<.001. for the individual himself and X2(1, N=91) = 20.727, p<.001 for family members being subjected to brutality exists.

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Table 6 Law Enforcement Impact vs. Being Subjected to Brutality Subjected to brutality Not subjected to brutality Number % Number % LE had impact 20 80 5 20 No one had 24 36.4 42 63.6 impact

Pearson Square N of Cases

ChiValid

Value

df

Asymp. sided)

13.825

1

.000

Sig.

(2-

91

Table 7 Law Enforcement Impact vs. Family Member Being Subjected to Brutality Subjected to brutality Not subjected to brutality Number % Number % LE had impact 20 80 5 20 No one had 18 27.3 48 72.7 impact

Pearson Square N of Cases

ChiValid

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

20.727

1

.000

91

Respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions regarding certain militaristic approaches in fighting terrorism. Tables 8, 9, and 10 show that over 80% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the use of arms and forced migration will increase sympathy with and the possibility of joining terrorist organizations. Table 12 displays confitents’ response to the formation of the village guard; around 60% indicated that its formation influenced them to join a terrorist organization. This response was somewhat surprising—it was expected that this community oriented approach would not be seen in such a negative light because of providing income and community pride. It seems that the increase in village guards may have been perceived as forcing individuals to take sides and thus if someone did not join the village guards, they would have to join the terrorist organizations.

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Table 8 Use of Arms as Primary Response increases Sympathy for the Organization Percent Strongly agree 52.7 Agree 28.6 Neither agree nor 13.2 disagree Disagree 2.2 Strongly disagree 3.3 Table 9 Use of Forced Migration for Security Purposes increases Joining the Organization Percent Strongly agree 58.2 Agree 28.6 Neither agree nor 4.4 disagree Disagree 4.4 Strongly disagree 4.4 Table 10 Use of Arms as Primary Response increases Joining the Organization Percent Strongly agree 57.1 Agree 23.1 Neither agree nor 14.3 disagree Disagree 4.4 Strongly disagree 1.1 Table 11 Increase in Temporary Village Guards Joining the Organization Percent Strongly agree 41.8 Agree 18.7 Neither agree nor 26.4 disagree Disagree 6.6 Strongly disagree 6.6 The above four variables were then factored into one variable representing reliance on militaristic tactics; the independent t-test showed a significant difference between the perceptions of the respondents who reported a law enforcement effect on their decision to join the organization and the respondents who indicated no effect.

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Tables 12, 13, and-14 display the significant difference in the perceptions of the two groups, t(89)=-3.36, p<.01. Table 12 Factor Analyses - Component Matrix Component1 Var26

.783

Var27

.847

Var27 Var27

.582 .661

Table 13 Reliability Statistics Cronbach's Alpha .679

N of Items 4

Table 14 Independent T-test Levene's Test Eq. Var.

Eq assumed Eq. assumed

var. var.

F .386

t-test Means

Sig. .536

not

Eq.

t -3.363

Df 89

-3.673

56.296

Sig. (2tailed) .001 .001

Table 15 Group Statistics No one had an impact Law enforcement

N

Mean

SD

SE

65

16.06

3.025

.375

26

18.31

2.462

.483

On average, respondents who reported a law enforcement tactic influence on their involvement in a terrorist organization had a higher score (M=18.31, SD=2.46) than their counterparts (M=16.06, SD=3.03). Results showed that individuals indicating law enforcement impact would reconsider their involvement in terrorist organizations if military tactics were not used as the primary response to terrorism. Five variables measured community oriented policing (COP) practices and the impact of these practices on the individuals’ decisions. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would have reconsidered joining the terrorist organization if these community policing methods had been practiced. As Table 16 indicates, all five variables clustered on one component; a new variable representing COP was created. Table 17 shows that more than 90% of respondents confirm support or strong support

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for community oriented policing practices; they indicated that they would have reconsidered joining the terrorist organization if COP methods had been practiced. Table 16 Factor Analyses - Component Matrix Component1 Var30 Var31 Var32 Var33 Var34

.658 .771 .831 .819 .759

Table 17 COP Perception

No Support Some Support Strong Support

Percent 7.7 45.1 47.3

Figure 3 illustrates the finding that if law enforcement agencies had shared community values, had been more polite, and had shown more concern about community problems, individuals may not have had joined the organization. In contrast, COP practices such as sharing information and being more supportive of law abiding citizens were reported to be the least influential in deciding not to join the organization.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations The study shows that even though the Turkish law enforcement agencies tried to effectively fight terrorism, because of mistakes in the methods and tactics used, a reverse effect may have resulted. Indeed, traditional and militaristic law enforcement practices in responding to terrorism and in service delivery have an impact on individuals’ decision to join terrorist organizations. As the study indicates, in Turkey, law enforcement practices influenced approximately 25% of the confitents to join terrorist organizations. Byman suggests [30] that ethno-terrorism polarizes ethnic conflict, increases fear of race war, and reinforces ethno-nationalist issues. Especially in Turkey, that is one of the goals of the PKK, TH, and other terrorist groups. The organizations want to force, through their actions or through law enforcement reactions, the population to choose a side: either the government’s side or the organization’s side.

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Figure-3

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The study also indicates that a majority of confitents favor law enforcement agencies to employ methods representing community oriented policing philosophy. If law enforcement wants to have the public on their side, they have to change their methods and tactics; they should minimize the use of traditional and militaristic methods, and focus more on democratic, community oriented, proactive and service delivery oriented policing practices. Of course, fighting terrorism cannot and should not be done only by law enforcement agencies; it needs a multi dimensional approach. The government should focus on improving economic conditions and alter the social environment. In poor communities with high unemployment rates, the terrorist organizations will have much material for propaganda and recruitment. Clearly, most families would not want their sons or daughters to join terrorist organizations; the government, through different organizations and associations, should focus on families and communicate and coordinate with them to keep their vulnerable relatives uninvolved in terrorist organizations.

References [1] D. Fromkin, The Strategy of Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. 53/4 (1975), 683- 698. [2] S.A. Baynard, A Policy Brief Defining and Defeating Terrorism in a Democracy Istanbul Conference on Democracy & Global Security 2005 Proceedings. Ankara: Oncu Press; 2006. [3] J. Ron, Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation. Journal of Peace Research. 38 /5 (2001), 569- 592. [4] T. Durna, S. Hancerli, Implementing Democratic Policing in the PKK Terrorism Torn Areas of Turkey, In O. Nikbay, S. Hancerli (eds.) Understanding and Responding to Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi Dimensional Perspective. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, IOS Press: Netherlands; 2007. [5] M. Gozubenli, H. Akbas, Adaptation of community policing in Arab and Muslim communities in response to terrorism. In S. Ozeren, I.D. Gunes, & D.M. Al-Badayneh (Eds.), Understanding terrorism: Analysis of sociological and psychological aspects (pp. 207-220). Nato Security Through Science Series. Washington, DC: IOS Press; 2007. [6] A.K. Cronin , H. Aden, A. Frost, and B. Jones, Foreign terrorist organizations: CRS report for congress. 2004 Retrieved on December 18, 2007, from http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/29722.pdf [7] O. Pirim, S. Ortulu, PKK’nin 20 yillik oykusu [The 20 year history of PKK]. Istanbul, Turkey: Boyut Kitaplari; 1999. [8] M.P. Roth, M. Sever, The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as criminal syndicate: Funding terrorism through organized crime, a case study. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30/10(2007), 901 – 920. [9] M. Radu, The rise and fall of the PKK. Orbis, 4/1 (2001), 47. [10] Z. Haciibrahimoglu, Belgelerle Abdullah Ocalan davasi: Imralidan Strasbourg’a [Abdullah Ocalan’s trial documented: From Imrali to Strausbourg]. Istanbul, Turkey: Turk Yay Kitaplari; 2004. [11] K. Karademir, Intihar saldirilari [Suicide attacks]. Ankara, Turkey: Temuh Yayinlari. 2000 [12] A. Kule, Socialization process of the individuals who join terrorist organizations in Turkey (Doctoral dissertation, City University of New York, 2007). Retrieved March 19, 2008, from ProQuest (ProQuest document ID No: 3245098). [13] H.J. Barkey, G.E. Fuller, G. E. Turkey's Kurdish Question. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers; 1998. [14] N. Alkan, Genclik ve terorizm [Youth and terrorism]. Ankara, Turkey: EGM, Temuh Daire Baskanligi Yayinlari; 2002. [15] S.A. Aktan, A. M. Koknar, Turkey. In Y. Alexander (Ed.), Combating terrorism: Strategies of ten countries (pp. 261-298). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; 2002. [16] U. Esentur, Devlet aleyhine suç işleyen teröristlerin sosyo-ekonomik ozellikleri [The socio-economic status of terrorists]. Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University; 2007. [17] P.W. Singer, Children at war. New York: Pantheon Books; 2005. [18] A. Pedahzur, Suicide terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; 2005.

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[19] A. Ekici, The Role Of Law Enforcement Practices On Terrorist Recruitment: A Study Of The Impact Of Traditional And Community Policing Practices On The Recruitment Process Of Terrorist Organization Members; Unpublished dissertation, Sam Houston State University; Huntsville, TX; 2008. [20] T. Cam, Ayrilikçi terörü besleyen kaynaklar ve teröristlerin ozellikleri [Sources feeding the separatist terrorism and the characteristics of terrorists]. Unpublished master theses. University of Kirikkale, Department of Sociology: Kirikkale, Turkey; 2003. [21] A. Celik. 1931'de İnönü'ye sunulan terörle mücadele raporu [The Anti-terrorism report submitted to Inonu in 1931]. Retrieved on December 26, 2007 from http://www.stratejikboyut.com/ article_detail.php?id=165 [22] M. Koseli, Poverty, inequality & terrorism relationship in Turkey. Unpublished Dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA; 2006. [23] R. D. Crelinsten, R. D. The discourse and practice of counter-terrorism in liberal democracies. The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44 (2004), 389-410. [24] I. Cerrah, The stance of a democratic society against terrorism: Turkey’s approach(2006). Retrieved January 13, 2008, from http://www.turkishweekly.net /comments.php?id=2061 [25] R. Dumanli, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'deki boyutları [Poverty and its dimensions in Turkey (2006)]. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from: http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ uztez/dumanlir.html [26] M. Yetkin, Pismanlik Yasasi Pismanlik Kaldirmaz [Repentant law does not take repentance(2003)]. Radikal Newspaper, internet copy. May 17, 2003. Retrieved January 5, 2008, from www.radikal.com.tr/ haber.php?haberno=75394 [27] Belgenet, Topluma kazandirma yasasi [The win back to society bill (2003)]. Retrieved October 10, 2007, from http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k4959.html [28] Haberler.com, Talep yetersizliği Kürtçe dil kurslarına tabela indirtti [Not enough demand for Kurdish language courses caused for closure(2007)]. Cihan News Agency, November 22, 2007. Retrieved on January 8, 2007, from http://www.haberler.com/talep-yetersizligi-kurtce-dil-kurslarinatabela-haberi [29] M. Afacan, Local policing: Using community policing principles as a tactic in the time of terror. In H. Durmaz, B. Sevinc, A.S. Yayla, & S. Ekici (Eds.), Understanding and responding to terrorism (pp. 252-259). Nato Security Through Science Series. Washington DC: IOS Press;2007. [30] D. Byman, The logic of ethnic terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21 (1998), 149-69.

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Part 2 Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism

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Reconsidering Homeland Security Policy: Recognizing the Role of Emergency Management in Promoting Terrorism Resistance and Resilience David A. MCENTIRE1 University of North Texas

Abstract. The following chapter argues that emergency management must be seen as a valued participant in homeland security policy. It acknowledges that intelligence, military and law enforcement officials are vital for efforts to prevent terrorism. It then defines emergency management, and discusses terminology that is related to both terrorism and other types of disasters. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the benefits of involving emergency management in homeland security. Keywords. terrorism, homeland security, emergency management, vulnerability, resistance, resilience.

Introduction It is a common adage that 9/11 changed the world. Although the impact of this event has indeed affected everyone, the abrupt departure from previous priorities was seen no more visibly than in the United States. All attention seemed to focus on terrorism after Al Qaeda members hijacked four planes and began their rampage of death and destruction in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania. In conjunction with this emerging consensus, a new organization was created to deal with America’s visible enemies and potential terrorist attacks in the future. The introduction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) amounted to the most sweeping reform of government since the close of World War II, and national leaders and bureaucrats overseeing and working within the fledgling entity gave highest preference to terrorism prevention. Key politicians and the vast majority of officials in DHS also came from and supported intelligence, military and law enforcement agencies. While no one should dispute the need to thwart future attacks, the major problem with this singular goal was that emergency management suddenly became the red-headed step-child of government [1]. Ironically, this occurred at a time when the disaster profession was on the cusp of solidifying its importance for communities, states and the nation as a whole.

1

David A. McEntire: Associate Professor/Ph.D. Coordinator, Emergency Administration and Planning, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #310617, Denton, Texas, 76203-5017, [email protected].

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For instance, the DHS subsumed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under its organizational umbrella. This severed ties between the FEMA Director and the President of the United States, thereby complicating communications during the response to any major disaster or terrorist attack. In addition, FEMA’s already-meager budget was cut back significantly or diverted to fund the start-up costs of the DHS. This led to a reduction in pro-active disaster reduction programs while disaster losses were rising exponentially. What is more, several preparedness programs were extracted from FEMA and placed elsewhere in the bureaucracy of the DHS. This produced a harmful divorce among those planning for and others responding to disasters. Finally, the National Response Plan was developed to outline how America would deal with disasters and terrorist attacks, but it was far too complex and lacked any significant input or involvement from the emergency management community during its creation. In hindsight, it appears that the nation’s emergency management system was being dismantled at an alarming pace and without any serious consideration of negative consequences. Several years later, we have come to recognize the fallacy of such decisions [2]. Current legislation is now helping emergency management take its rightful place along side the homeland security function. Keeping the above introduction in mind, the following chapter asserts that vulnerability to disasters and terrorist attacks can only be reduced if emergency management is valued and included in homeland security policies. The chapter first acknowledges the need to accept intelligence, military and law enforcement perspectives in terrorism prevention. It then describes emergency management, and defines several concepts that are common to both homeland security and emergency management. The chapter subsequently identifies several reasons why emergency management should be viewed as an important partner in homeland security policies. The purpose of the chapter is not to question the need for prevention activities, but instead to illustrate the added benefit of considering emergency management in light of the threat of terrorism and other disasters.

1. The Importance of Prevention Agencies The agencies belonging to the DHS, as well as the other organizations that work closely with it, are vital to the national security interests of the United States [3]. Terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, the Al Qaeda network, and other extremist groups (whether domestic or foreign) have publicly denounced the United States and declared their intent to kill Americans and attack their interests at home or abroad. For this reason, the organizations involved in prevention activities are of paramount importance. This includes intelligence, military, law enforcement, border control and transportation security agencies. Intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency help to identify terrorists, expose possible plots, and relay crucial information to other pertinent agencies so that necessary preventive measures may be taken. This may include intelligence gathered from allies, electronic sources, geospatial imagery, or human intelligence officers, among others. After the data is collected, it may then be analyzed, put into briefings and reports, and then disseminated to decision makers and relevant homeland security agencies [4]. With intelligence knowledge, America can reduce the possibility of being taken by surprise and is better able to implement other measures to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks.

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The military is another vital participant in homeland security. Service men and women in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines undertake covert or counterterrorism operations to stop known terrorists abroad. If terrorist organizations can be identified and dealt with elsewhere, the likelihood of attacks on the United States can be diminished. Of course, such activities may require close collaboration with foreign governments and the military in other nations. Successful operations can, if carefully undertaken, save lives and reduce property or economic damage that could occur if attacks are not prevented. If an attack does occur, specialized military personnel can help the nation and communities deal with the effects of weapons of mass destruction. For instance, Civil Support Teams have well-equipped, trained teams to identify dangerous substances (e.g., radiological material), treat the injured, and clean up a degraded environment. Law enforcement agencies are also vital to the goals of homeland security. Law enforcement personnel may include federal bureaucrats, such as special agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or local representatives, such as municipal police officers. In either case, their role is to identify potential terrorists through under-cover operations and intelligence gathering. If attacks are being planned, law enforcement officials will conduct pre-emptive strikes to neutralize threats. If law enforcement is unable to prevent an attack, their goal shifts to gathering evidence in the aftermath. Special concern is given to the chain of custody and other steps to guarantee prosecution. There are many others involved in prevention activities and this includes border, transportation, and other security organizations. Border Patrol agents deter the infiltration of terrorists across national boundaries. Immigration and Customs Enforcement personnel ensure only legitimate travelers and goods arrive on U.S. soil. The Coast Guard monitors sea vessels to ensure there is no smuggling of terrorists or weapons into the United States. The Transportation Security Administration also works to protect road, rail, sea and air transportation systems from potential terrorist attacks. Besides these governmental organizations, there are many others that work to prevent terrorist attacks. Many private corporations also help to prevent or protect against potential terrorist attacks. There are many trading companies that participate in the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). This program helps to monitor ports and the shipments coming into the United States to make sure they are safe. Banks are important players in homeland security because they are required to notify the government of transactions that might be related to terrorist funding. Finally, many companies hire security guards to protect potential terrorist targets. Corporations also have gates, fences, cameras, and entry denying devices that may help deter terrorist activity. Taken as a whole, the agencies and organizations involved in homeland security play a crucial role in homeland security. Their activities have successfully thwarted at least 19 terrorist attacks since 9/11[5]. For instance, U.S. officials arrested Jose Padilla in Chicago in 2002 after he conspired with Islamic terrorist groups to use a “dirty bomb” against the United States. A terrorist cell under the direction of Dhiren Barot was prevented from launching an attack on the New York Stock exchange in 2004. The FBI charged Michael Reynolds for his intention of attacking a gas refinery in Wyoming in 2005. In 2006, Assem Hammoud was stopped from bombing a subway in New York City. Also in 2006, law enforcement officials were able to prevent the downing of 10 commercial aircraft with liquid explosives while terrorists planned to travel from the United Kingdom to the United States. Two final cases to be mentioned

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here occurred in 2007. Plots against a U.S. Army base and JFK Airport were also disrupted and those planning the attacks were brought to justice. Thus, it is easy to see the benefit of organizations involved in prevention activities.

2. The Nature of Emergency Management While most people are aware of the personnel and agencies involved in terrorism prevention, they often have less understanding of emergency management. This lack of comprehension is due in large part to the broad and ever changing role of emergency management (i.e., priorities being shifted from civil defense initiatives to natural and industrial disasters and now to terrorist attacks) [6]. In addition, emergency management is a relatively new profession and it lacks a strong lobby as compared to other disciplines and fields of practice. Regardless of these challenges, emergency management can be described as the function by which governments identify risks and take measures to deal with disasters [7]. The goal of emergency management is to reduce the impact of catastrophic events or be prepared to react to their consequences effectively should they be unavoidable. Such disasters may be triggered by natural phenomena, technological failures, or human mistakes and premeditated malice (e.g., earthquakes, dam failures, and school shootings, among others). Despite the implication owing to its name, emergency management is less involved in smaller events like accidents, crises and emergencies [8]. These situations can easily be handled by our well-trained police, fire, and emergency medical services personnel. Emergency managers are, however, more interested in disasters that may have broader community and national impact. As a result, emergency managers are more akin to public administrators rather than traditional first responders. Emergency managers play a leadership and coordinating role, rather than being solely devoted to operational concerns. The emergency management function accordingly includes numerous personnel and agencies in the public sector and at all levels of government. Participants range from FEMA to local and state emergency management agencies. Indeed, emergency managers partner with other government agencies such as the National Weather Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, Utilities, Parks and Recreation and many others. Emergency management also requires the involvement of organizations in the private and non-profit sectors (e.g., business continuity planners and the American Red Cross). For this reason, emergency management is both a vital profession and a far-reaching task in society. As can be seen, emergency management is related to homeland security because both are concerned about the possibility of future terrorist attacks. However, homeland security concentrates heavily on prevention activities but is less involved with the aftermath of attacks. Meanwhile, while emergency management has involvement before terrorism occurs, it plays a much greater role if prevention activities prove inadequate. Prevention agencies concentrate on terrorism while emergency management takes into consideration all types of events and disasters.

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3. Fundamental Concepts Although distinct differences exist between the homeland security and emergency management communities, there are at least three concepts that are commonly used among professionals in these two areas. These include vulnerability, resistance and resilience. Inherent in the concept of vulnerability is a propensity of being attacked or affected by a disaster. Vulnerability can also suggest limited abilities to prevent, prepare for, respond to, or recover from a terrorist threat or other type of hazard. Therefore, vulnerability is a measure of risk that includes the variables of probability and consequence [9]. Because both homeland security and emergency management attempt to reduce vulnerability, the concepts of resistance and resilience are also used in each field. In other words, reducing vulnerability can be accomplished by raising both resistance and resilience. The concept of resistance implies an ability to diminish the possibility of a disagreeable event or limit the impacts of such situations [10]. Examples of resistance in homeland security may include effective border control or target hardening. Illustrations of resistance in emergency management may include land-use planning, zoning regulations and improved construction. In this sense, resistance is closely associated with the terms prevention and protection in homeland security or mitigation in emergency management. Resistance is thus a pro-active concept for dealing with terrorist threats and other hazards. Resilience is another term that is applicable to homeland security and emergency management alike. In either case, resilience connotes an ability to react or bounce back effectively after terrorist attacks and other disasters [11]. For instance, being able to find and apprehend the perpetrators of attacks, and bring them to justice are examples of resilience. Resilience may also include providing emergency medical care and helping to rebuild damaged property. Therefore, resilience is more of a reactive approach to dealing with terrorism and disasters (although the resilience of a community is most likely to be ensured if preparedness measures have been taken in anticipation of threats and hazards).

4. The Need for Emergency Management If America’s vulnerability is to be reduced, and if resistance and resilience are to be promoted in our communities, it becomes clear that emergency management should be a major participant in such efforts. Emergency management can help to avert prior mistakes, perform vital functions in homeland security and guide future homeland security policy. Each of these points will be discussed in turn. 4.1. Aversion of Prior Mistakes One of the major contributions of emergency management is to help avoid some common errors that have been made periodically throughout our nation’s history [12]. These lapses in judgment are witnessed when national security priorities compete with and do not compliment emergency management preferences. Our ability to deal with all types of disasters suffers as a result. In many ways, emergency management is an outgrowth of national security priorities [13]. That is to say, emergency management emerged as a result of the civil

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defense initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s. While emergency management was regarded as a means of preparing communities for the impacts of a potential nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the relations between emergency management and the national security community have not always been harmonious. As an example, during the Reagan years, military concerns seemed to overshadow the need for emergency management. All efforts and budgets were directed toward civil defense issues, and the potential for other disasters was ignored. The capabilities of FEMA were consequently eroded during this period and the entire emergency management system performed poorly when Hurricane Andrew Florida hit in 1992. Law makers quickly called for the dissolution of FEMA after its post-disaster debacle. Ironically, the agency had very little control over its destiny during this period. In the mid 1990s, attention was given to rebuilding emergency management in the United States [14]. Such efforts would be short lived, however. A repetition of problems leading up to Hurricane Andrew occurred shortly after the turn of the new century. The federal government became consumed with the possibility of another terrorist attack when terrorists struck on 9/11. Even though emergency management played a vital and successful role after these terrorist hijackings, this profession was not seriously considered when the DHS was created a short time later. Intelligence, military and law enforcement priorities took center stage, and the lessons from prior disasters were soon forgotten. As was mentioned in the introduction, FEMA was neglected under the DHS and emergency management started to slide into disarray. When the much anticipated-Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, the federal government (along with its emergency management counterparts at the local and state levels) seemed unable to operate quickly and effectively [15]. Again, politicians blamed FEMA initially for the depressing results. Once congressional investigations into the matter were completed, the problems created by DHS became evident. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act was introduced to improve emergency management in the United States. Keeping this profession in mind is one way to ensure that similar mistakes are not repeated again in the future. 4.2. Facilitation of Important Functions Another major benefit of emergency management is that it will help homeland security officials fulfill important functions pertaining to the issue of terrorism. This includes risk assessment as well as mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery operations [16]. The word “threat” is used in homeland security to denote the potential for terrorist attacks against specific locations and people, whether they include critical infrastructure, key assets or soft targets. In contrast, emergency management officials rely more on the notion of “hazards” as a way to describe the natural, technological and human-induced agents that often result in disasters. These hazards include events like earthquakes, industrial explosions or intentional acts of violence. While threats and hazards are undoubtedly distinct concepts from specific academic fields, both describe the deadly, destructive and disruptive potential of terrorist attacks and other disasters. Because emergency managers have a long history of assessing the risk of such threats and hazards, it is logical that they should be consulted when such analysis is undertaken. Emergency managers are particularly adept at identifying what might happen as well as possible negative consequences.

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Emergency management will also help promote a number of important mitigation activities. Even if we exclude emergency managers’ efforts to reduce the impact of flooding and technological disasters, the principles of structural and non-structural mitigation are equally applicable to the threat of terrorism. Building design and the location of edifices can aggravate or minimize potential attacks. For instance, the shape and construction of structures as well as the set-up of systems may exacerbate or reduce the impact of incendiary, biological and chemical weapons. The placement of parking lots and drive ways also determines the appeal of buildings as possible bombing targets. If terrorist attacks are to be deterred or minimized, emergency management must play an important role in working toward this objective. Preparedness for terrorist attacks is another reason why homeland security must rely on emergency management. Emergency managers have a long history of planning for all types of disasters, including terrorist attacks. They understand how to write plans and are more capable than many others to make correct assumptions about human behavior in such incidents. Emergency managers know what training is available to first responders and other government officials, and they are adept at running exercises to test strengths and identify weaknesses. What is more, emergency managers have close ties to the community and they are best positioned to educate the public about what they should do when attacks occur. If homeland security officials are serious about preparing the nation for terrorist attacks, emergency managers should logically be their best partners. Emergency managers may also help homeland security officials respond effectively to terrorist attacks when they occur. Emergency managers have been involved for decades in overseeing many activities like search and rescue, evacuation, sheltering, donations management, and volunteer management. They know who to contact for assistance and how to coordinate complex multi-organizational responses. Emergency managers are also adept at running emergency operations centers, and they have recently acquired the needed skills to help public health officials with massfatality management, decontamination, quarantines, mass inoculations, etc. For these reasons, emergency management is of paramount importance when terrorist attacks do occur. Recovery from terrorism is another contribution of emergency management. Since emergency managers work with their communities to rebound after major disasters, they understand how to assess damages, declare disasters, and remove debris. FEMA is also the vehicle for providing relief assistance to affected individuals, families and government entities after disasters and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, emergency managers understand the importance of implementing mitigation measures during the recovery period in order to prevent similar events from happening in the future. Homeland security officials must therefore recognize how emergency management can strengthen efforts to deal with terrorism before, during and after it occurs. 4.3. Guidance for Policy Decisions A final, but notable role for emergency management in homeland security is in the realm of policy making. Since homeland security is a relatively new profession, it may not have the insight needed to successfully guide all types of policy decisions. In addition, the homeland security viewpoint may not always value the sharing of information. Two examples are provided below.

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First, practitioners in emergency management have a long history of studying the characteristics of effective warning systems. They are aware that warnings must be clear, concise, and consistent. Researchers involved in emergency management also know that warnings must be given from credible sources and that they must provide concrete and repeated recommendations for the recipients. Ironically, the literature on warnings and the findings of decades of research appear to have been ignored when the DHS developed the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) [17]. The HSAS is the color-coded warning method which has been the focus of many jokes in the news and on late night television. It is vague and does not provide solid advice for those being given information by the government. Had emergency managers been consulted when the HSAS was created, it would have been more useful for public officials and citizens alike. Second, emergency managers have a unique outlook on terrorism and disasters, which can benefit homeland security policy. While intelligence officers, military officials and law enforcement personnel have historically avoided sharing information with others, emergency managers see this as one of their most important priorities. Because terrorist attacks are complex and require the involvement of many different parties, an emergency management perspective is likely to increase the flow of knowledge and improve cooperation among the involved participants. As the withholding of information was regarded to be one of the major failings leading up to 9/11, an emergency management viewpoint could logically help to avert similar attacks in the future [18]. This is yet another reason why emergency management is important for the homeland security community.

5. Conclusion Since its inception as a profession, homeland security has not fully included emergency management in its efforts to deal with potential terrorist attacks. Ironically, emergency managers and homeland security officials share much of the same conceptual language in terms of vulnerability, resistance and resilience. In addition, emergency management may help avert prior mistakes, fulfill important functions regarding terrorism and correctly shape future homeland security policy. This is not meant in any way to deny or diminish the contributions of prevention agencies as intelligence, military and law enforcement personnel cannot be excluded when it comes to terrorism. However, the evidence in this paper serves as a simple reminder to seriously consider how emergency management may assist our nation’s efforts to better deal with terrorist attacks and other disasters. It is therefore hoped that homeland security officials will more fully recognize the essential role of emergency managers in reducing our vulnerability to terrorism.

References [1] Rood, Justin, FEMA’s Decline: An Agency’s Slow Slide From Grace, All Hands Community, 2005, http://all-hands.net/Article2268.html . [2] Tierney, Kathleen J., Recent Developments in U.S. Homeland Security Policies and their Implications for the Management of Extreme Events, Pp. 405-412 in Rodriguez, Havidan, Enrico L. Quarantelli, and Russell R. Dynes (eds.), Handbook of Disaster Research, Springer, New York, 2006.

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[3] McEntire, David A., Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective, Wiley, New Jersey, 2009. [4] Deucy, Patrick C., Intelligence and Information Sharing in Counter-terrorism, Pp. 391-412 in Kamien, David G. (ed.), The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2006. [5] Carafano, James Jay, U.S. Thwarts 19 Terrorist Attacks Against America Since 9/11, Backgrounder, No. 2085, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 2007. [6] Rubin, Claire B., Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2005, Public Entity Risk Institute, Fairfax, Virginia, 2007. [7] Waugh, William L., Living with Hazards, Dealing with Disasters: An Introduction to Emergency Management, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2000. [8] McEntire, David A., Disaster Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics for Resilience, Wiley, New Jersey, 2006. [9] McEntire, David A., Tenets of Vulnerability: An Assessment of a Fundamental Disaster Concept, Journal of Emergency Management, 2 (2004), 23-29. [10] Geis, Don. By Design: the Disaster Resistant and Quality-of-Life Community, Natural Hazards Review, 1 (2000), 151-160. [11] Britton, Neil R, and Gerard J. Clarke. From Response to Resilience: Emergency Management Reform in New Zealand, Natural Hazards Review, 1 (2000), 145-150. [12] Rubin, Claire B., Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2005, Public Entity Risk Institute, Fairfax, Virginia, 2007. [13] McEntire, David A., International Relations and Disasters: Illustrating the Relevance of the Discipline to the Study and Profession of Emergency Management, Pp. 170-177 in McEntire, David A. (ed.), Disciplines, Disasters and Emergency Management: The Convergence and Divergence of Concepts, Issues and Trends in the Research Literature, C.C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 2007. [14] McEntire, David A., The historical challenges facing emergency management and homeland security, Journal of Emergency Management, 5, (2007), 17-21. [15] Cooper, Christopher and Robert Block, Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security, Times Books, New York, 2006. [16] McEntire, David A., Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective, Wiley, New Jersey, 2009. [17] Aguirre, Benigno E., Homeland Security Warnings: Lessons Learned and Unlearned, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22, (2004), 103-115. [18] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, W.W. Norton, New York, 2004.

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Terrorism: Notes on a Communitarian Approach Mahmoud SADRI Texas Woman’s University

Abstract. Europeans tend to approach the problem of terrorism as a communal problem while the American administrations treat it as a political one. Thus instrumental and organizational theories of terrorism lauded in the United States neglect the cultural dimension of the phenomenon. Research shows, however, that terrorism must be understood as a result of a radicalization of cultural norms and values prevalent in extremist “subcultures” as well. This means that terrorists succeed not only by distancing themselves from the community as individuals and organizations, but by linking themselves to it as enthusiastic champions of cultural aspirations. This essay outlines the general contours of a cultural approach to the phenomenon of terrorism and contrasts it to instrumental and organizational approaches. Keywords. instrumentalist model, organizational model, cultural model, deviant subcultures, extremist subcultures.

Introduction In this essay, I will describe two schools of thought on the origins, nature, and goals of terrorism: the instrumental model and the organizational model. I will, then, suggest a third complementary approach: the cultural model. Then I will identify national policies that they inspire. The instrumental model imagines terrorism as an instrumentally rational response to external events; usually this is a confrontation characterized by an uneven array of forces. This model perceives “means-end rationality” in the behavior of terrorists who are supposed to be seeking the most cost-effective method of fighting a war with a stronger adversary. According to this model, then, increasing the cost of terrorism will make the terrorists take into account that added cost and, eventually, cease and desist. Thus, the instrumental approach casts terrorism as a bargaining process based on unconventional ways of mustering the power to hurt or the ability to coerce. As such, it responds to similar counter-measures. The most prominent proponent of this school of thought is Robert Pape of the University of Chicago [1]. This approach proposes two strategic measures for fighting terrorism: “defense,” which includes tactics such as preemption and prevention; and “deterrence,” which involves measures such as denial and retaliation. These responses are intended as ways of reducing the reward and raising the cost of terrorism. The organizational model, on the other hand, understands terrorism not in terms of its goals but in accordance with organizational imperatives such as “group survival” and “team competition.” Therefore, recruiting and retaining membership, for example, is of utmost significance for these exclusive and largely insular fraternities. They struggle against impending decline by restricting departure from, and quelling dissent

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within the organization. Sometimes, as a concession to the extremists within their ranks, these organizations embrace ever more radical options, thus preventing those elements from branching out into splinter groups to “fight harder.” In the same vein, they monitor ideologically similar organizations lest they lose their polemical or tactical edge. Thus, organizational survival takes precedence even over principle and ideology. The latter is often modified to serve organizational goals. According to this theory, tactics proposed by the instrumental model such as disproportionate retaliation may actually confirm, even boost the prestige of organizations who struggle, above all, to attract and maintain their radical membership and excel in fighting credentials over their rival radical organizations. The leading advocate of this perspective is Martha Grenshaw of Stanford University [2]. The organizational theory proposes a different set of measures for controlling and reducing terrorism; these include, for example, decreasing departure costs for disenchanted elements through the announcement of clemency, and support of parallel “non violent alternatives” alongside the terrorist groups so deserters can find a venue of expression and action within the general confines of their ideology without losing face and without the appearance of having “sold out”. Although I will argue that neither of the above theories is adequate to either understand or deter terrorism in all its ramifications, I concede that they have a place in an overall strategy for describing and, ultimately, defeating terrorism. It seems that terrorist causes that have short term objectives (actually, a minority of cases) are more apposite for an instrumentalist and rationalist analysis; whereas those with long term objectives are better suited for the organizational approach. Therefore, instrumental and organizational models can be seen as complementary theories with limited use in the attempt to understand and confront terrorism. In addition to the above two models that have been developed, for the most part, by political scientists, there is a body of literature developed mainly by sociologists, anthropologists, journalists, and novelists that adumbrates what I have dubbed the “cultural approach.” Theoretical observations [3, 4, 5] and field research in the religious realm [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] and in the secular arena [12, 13] have fleshed out certain cultural components of terrorism. Novelists and journalists [14, 15] too, have illuminated submerged passions of postcolonial populations and new generations of transmigrants. They all confirm the proposition that terrorism is rarely a “lone wolf” phenomenon but a part and parcel of cultural environments whose understanding is imperative for confronting the problem of terrorism. They also posit that the use of the instrumentalist rational choice theories in explanation of terrorism would have to be parsimonious in the extreme. From a purely sociological point of view, and as a contribution to the “cultural model”, I have elsewhere [16] articulated, refined and synthesized several stages through which terrorism evolves. I will present a synopsis of these findings here. The point of departure for my model is, of course, a culture that perceives itself distressed, attacked, or humiliated. Such cultures are prone to spawn disparate ideological enclaves known as “extremist subcultures” or “anti-movements”. The latter can be conceptualized, using the terminology of the classical sociology of deviance, as “deviant subcultures”. They are within the purview of the general world view of their cultural environment and, indeed, filter their surrounding cultural norms and values in a way that justify infractions from the culture at large [17]. These subcultures teach both “skills” and “attitudes” that enable the members not only to engage in deviant behavior but to justify their infractions as well. In my conceptualization, “extremist” deviance is not different from “criminal” deviance in that it provides not only the skills that facilitate violence but justifications that lower members’ normative resistance to

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violence. Life inside a deviant subculture, then, is a microcosm of life within the culture at large in that it provides the individuals with moral and material support, camaraderie, and competition toward valorized goals, purported to be congruent with general cultural goals. Extremist subcultures thus provide the environment in which local cultural, political, and religious norms and values undergo specific modifications. As was mentioned above, cultures whose identity and aspirations are deemed threatened or frustrated by real or perceived barriers to expression and realization are more vulnerable to the emergence of extremist subcultures in which cultural ideals and aspirations will acquire radicalized and rejectionist guises. Extremists believe that they are fiercely loyal to their cultures’ ultimate values as they adhere to what they consider the spirit and the essence of religious, ideological, traditional, or ritual practices of their people. However, they see themselves as insightful and privileged in that they realize that “business as usual” has not worked, that the culture is hopelessly besieged and brought to the threshold of extinction. They posit that a brave and fresh approach, a new strategy, and a bold initiative are required to extricate the people from their tragic historical predicament. If this would involve sacrifice by a selfless vanguard, so be it. It is in this way that the “necessary” bloodshed and unorthodox means toward political and religious ideals are justified. Ideological exceptions to cultural and religious rules concerning the innocent, the non-combatants are crafted to exonerate members who are groomed to break those rules. This is what I mean by the process of “attitude adjustment.” “Skill acquirement,” the second aspect of subcultural instruction (in this case, paramilitary training) is provided after the extremist subculture undergoes a “mutation” that transmogrifies a loose community of extremist members into a closed and disciplined order of terrorist brethren. It is fair to say, then, that extremist subcultures serve as launching pads for terrorist organizations. What distinguishes terrorists from their extremist counterparts is the systematic acquiring of paramilitary discipline and the practical skills for planning and execution of focused attacks on non-combatant civilians. 1 Some observers have aptly described these movements as “ethno-nationalist terrorism” [18], thus underlining the cultural dimension of the phenomenon.

1. Discussion The cultural and political scope of terrorism obviously extends beyond the explanatory capacity of the instrumental and organizational models, hence the need for a cultural frame of reference. It is well known that cultural support for terrorism, however implicit, complicates the attempts to predict and control it. The case of Eric Rudolph, the 1996 Atlanta 2 bomber is instructive: he eluded capture for five years despite the fact that the

1

The last five words of this sentence contain my specific definition of terrorism. Anything other than “focused attack on noncombatant civilians would constitute a phenomenon other than terrorism, such as paramilitary or guerilla warfare. Such a narrow, yet universal definition nullifies slogans such as: one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Anyone who targets noncombatant civilians is a terrorist, regardless of the justice of his or her ideals or grievances.

2

In addition to the bombing in Atlanta, Mr. Rudolph bombed two abortion clinics and a gay bar. He was on FBI’s “most wanted” list and there was a million dollars reward for his capture. The local community,

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authorities knew his general whereabouts (rural North Carolina) and that no less than seven federal and local agencies were mobilized to apprehend him [19]. Mr. Rudolph’s success as a fugitive was, in part, due to the widespread empathy of the local community for his conservative Christian ideology. Supportive bumper stickers and T shirts urging him to “run" and to “hide” adorned trucks and public spaces while numerous local encounters with Mr. Rudolph went unreported [20, 21, 22]. If such marginal cultural support for a lone domestic terrorist (and killer) can frustrate the allout attempts to bring him at home, one can only imagine how intractable culturally supported terrorism would be half way around the world. The cultural model envisions three concentric circles where the local culture (the outer circle) contains any number of extremist subcultures (the middle circle) that launch terrorist ideologies (the innermost circle). Terrorism, then, is the result of a two stage process of radicalization and mutation of local cultural values and aspirations. Levels of cultural support for terrorism can be scaled and measured.3 The more insular the concentric circles, the more starved and vulnerable the extremists and terrorists. The more porous the separating walls, the easier the flow of the moral and material support into extremist and terrorist groups. The real or perceived external threat fosters a sense of defeat, desperation and disenfranchisement that accelerates the formation of extremism and facilitates the mutation of extremism into terrorism. This would deprive terrorism of the vast cultural resources otherwise available to it. The effort, however, requires a long term approach and significant investment in global communication. In the long run, durable multilateral engagement of the community of nations to overcome the affluence gap between North and South and the cultural divide between East and West will have a salutary effect on culturally sanctioned terrorism. Conversely, distorted perceptions of the cultural ‘other’ based on fear, ignorance or even fascination lead to postures and policies that exacerbate tension and resentment between cultures and creeds.

2. Conclusion The contemporary global community has to face the reality that even without the above mentioned cultural component; a certain amount of terrorism will continue to be a part of the national and international landscape for the foreseeable future. In other words, there will always be eccentrics and radicals of various stripes, the “lone wolves”, who may engage in terrorist homicide or suicidal homicide. However, nations, in cooperation with each other, can mobilize their resources to handle such terrorist threats as a “normal risk”. On the other hand, the culturally embedded and sanctioned terrorism cannot be easily managed. It readily draws upon the vast moral and material reservoirs of the community. It operates and spreads at a scale beyond the capacity of any free modern society to predict or to control it. Even the combined international resources face enormous challenges in controlling this kind of terrorism. Only through understanding the nature of the bonds between the terrorist cells and their respective cultures, and

though, treated him as an outlaw hero. There were, according to reports, restaurants with signs that read: “Eric Rudolph Ate Here”. 3

Jurgensmeyer ranks these “cultures of support”, distinguishing three levels of support for terrorism: Palestine (high), Ireland (medium), and the United States (low).

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through denying them the blood vessels of ideological and logistical support can the international community hope to stem the tide of terrorism. The above observations favor the European approach to terrorism over the American posture. European countries seem more cognizant of the cultural dimension of terrorism and devote greater resources to community guidance and policing. This approach constitutes a more realistic and fruitful strategy for dealing with actual and potential threats of terrorism. The American administration, on the other hand, has treated terrorism primarily as a political problem and allocated its resources to fighting it as a “war”. Thus, instrumental and, to a lesser extent, organizational models have found a more receptive audience among the American policy makers than the cultural model. It is the contention of this essay that unless greater attention is devoted the cultural dimension of terrorism, the success of the attempts to check its growth will remain limited.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]

R. Pape, “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism”, in: American Political Science Review, pp. 343-461 (August 2003) M. Grenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches” in: Inside Terrorist Organizations, (ed. David Rapoport), London. Franck Cass, 2001. J. Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, New York, Verso, 1990. P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, Boston, Harvard University Press, 1991. J. Elster, “Motivation and Beliefs in Suicide Missions”, in: Making Sense of Suicide Missions, pp. 233-258, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. pp. 233-258. M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2000. M. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, New York, Pantheon Books, 2004. C. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil, New York, Harper Collins 2002. M. Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right, Chapel Hill, The University of North California press, 1997. J, Stern, Terror in the Name of God, New York, Harper Collins, 2003. D, Gambetta, Making Sense of Suicide Missions, pp. 233-258, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. M. Wievoiorka, The Making of Terrorism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. D. Rapoport, (ed) Inside Terrorist Organizations, Portland, Frank Cass, 2001. J. Updike, Terrorist, New York, Knopf, 2006. M. Hamid, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, New York, Harcourt, 2007. M. Sadri, “Terrorism as Suicidal Homicide: A Durkheimian Approach”, in: Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects, Fairfax, IOS Press, 2007, pp. 3341. E. Sutherland and D. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, 1960, J.B. Lippincott Company, New York. B, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. H. Schuster, “FBI: Olympic Bombing Suspect Arrested” CNN, May 31, 2003 (internet source). D. Noe “All about Eric Rudolph”, reported in: Court TV’s Crime Library, (internet source) J. Smith, “Rudolph, an Alabama Jailbird”, CBS News, June 3, 2003 (Internet source). Copeland, Larry, “Rudolph’s Capture is Talk of the Town”, USA Today, June 1, 2003. (internet source).

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Collaborative Crisis Management: Comparative Perspectives on Crisis Management in the European Countries, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey Naim KAPUCU, Ali UNLU and Bahadir SAHIN University of Central Florida (UCF)

Abstract. Crisis management (CM) systems today are gaining more importance than ever before because of the increasing number of natural and manmade crises. However, there is not a unique worldwide CM policy; the systems are different in every single country as exemplified by even developed European Union member countries that apply different systems. Defining the characteristics of four EU countries may give an idea in understanding the various public administration perspectives and their effects on CM systems. This paper explains the crisis management systems in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey and also provides relevant CM case analyses from those countries. Keywords: crises and extreme events, crisis management, disasters emergencies, European Union

Introduction Crisis management (CM) 1 has emerged as an important issue of concern due to the recent increase in the number of natural and manmade disasters resulting in countless casualties and devastating damages. Although the literature recommended many techniques to improve world CM efforts [56, 65, 54, 5, 6, 13, 14, 40, 31], there is, however, no consensus on developing a one-single emergency planning policy for all public administration units. In addition, societies increasingly expect higher CM performance from government agencies [44, 55, 60]. Thus, the authors examined crises experienced by emergency management systems in Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Turkey. In particular, the United Kingdom, Spain and Turkey also experienced recent terrorist attacks. This research investigates the similarities and differences among the four countries, and specific concerns and questions are addressed in the discussion and conclusion section. Data for CM systems were gathered from the literature and official state department web pages. The literature provided cases of terrorism for each country, and 1

Crisis management, emergency management and disaster management are used interchangeably. In this paper, crisis management applies to emergency management and disaster management.

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the web pages kept the authors updated regarding the structures of public, private and non-profit CM agencies. In addition, case analyses offered a general idea about how CM systems operate. For all four countries, interior ministries (Ministerio del Interior in Spain, Bundesministerium des Innern in Germany, Secretary of State for the Home Department in the UK, and Icisleri Bakanligi in Turkey) were generally responsible and authorized public-federal organizations for CM efforts. Official European Union websites were also utilized to process information about the topic of crisis management. The European Union (EU) consists of 27 independent sovereign member countries. Rather than examining all emergency planning policies in EU countries, however, this study will address the general emergency management features in selected countries that we believe to be economically and socially representative of all EU members. Germany, Spain, the UK, and the candidate member of Turkey demonstrate diverse characteristics in terms of political structures and crisis management issues. The study will provide brief descriptions of these case countries including general information about public administration structures, repeating crisis issues within the countries and the CM organizations and legislation status. Of the EU countries, Germany has the largest economy, ranking third in the world, as well as the largest population [29]. The country, formed by 16 quasi-federal states, is one of the founding members of EU. Houben [37, p. 183] argued that the federal German government is more dominant on its states than are the UK and Spain. Germany was divided into two separate countries after the Second World War, and remained that way until 1989. After demolition of the Berlin Wall that had divided the country for half a century, Germany became a united country once again. Emergency incidents are generally characterized as natural disasters in Germany. The 2002 Elbe flooding, to be thoroughly discussed later, was the worst and most costly flood disaster to ever happen in Central Europe and caused $9 billion damage [6, 13]. Spain joined the EU in 1986. The Spanish administrative system, a parliamentary monarchy, is similar to that of the UK [29, 30]. Spain has also suffered from ethnic terrorism for decades. ETA, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom terrorist organization, was responsible for taking the lives of approximately 800 people in Spain between 1960 and the 1990s [1]. One case that will be examined in this paper is the Spanish Madrid Train Bombings in 2004, in which the capital of Spain was targeted by Al-Qaida attacks. Additionally, recent natural disasters such as floods, drought and forest fires have also occurred in Spain bringing significant materialistic damage to the country [34]. The United Kingdom, another strong and powerful EU member country, is believed to have a developed understanding of democracy and is governed by a constitutional monarchy system [29]. The Nazi Germany led by Hitler heavily bombed the country with warplanes in World War II, resulting in countless deaths and material damage to the country. The UK also suffered from terrorist group attacks related to Northern Ireland’s separatist movements in the 1990’s. As recent as 2005, the London Metro Bombings brought attention to crisis planning policies in the UK [52, 30]. However, manmade disasters are not the only crisis threats in the UK; natural disasters also threaten more than 5 million people each year [22]. Although Turkey has been a candidate member of the EU for long time, the country’s entrance process has been a political dilemma for both EU countries as well as Turkey. As a republic country that has held free periodic elections since 1946, the Parliament and Cabinet govern the country without a monarchy unlike the UK and

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Spain [29, 59, 61]. However, the central government is very powerful and dominant over the local public administrations. Turkey’s strict centralized public administration structure affected the CM structure as well, which will be discussed henceforth. Due to mass-casualty earthquakes, crisis management policies changed up to the present. Nonetheless, the 2003 Istanbul bombings were proof that more should be accomplished in terms of Turkey’s crisis management policies and procedures [59].

1. Crises Management Systems in Four Countries: 1.1. Germany The Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) controls the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK-Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) in Germany. Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (hereafter BBK) was founded in May, 2004 as a governmental response to new natural and manmade threats, namely 9/11 and the 2002 Elbe flood. The possible event of other large-scale crises prompted the immediate and urgent need for a central organizational structure to be in charge of civil safety [11]. The BBK operates under the command of the federal government agency (BMI); on the other hand, it coordinates CM efforts in the federal states (Land) as well. The organization’s objectives are defined as:        

fulfilling the tasks of the federal government with regard to civil protection and coordination of international cooperation; preparing national and area risk analyses, hazard cadastres and emergency planning, and providing coordination of the civil-military-police cooperation; providing conceptual planning and interdisciplinary coordination of the protection of critical infrastructures; ensuring national information, communication and resource management in case of damage; providing coordination of technical-scientific research with regard to civil protection and protection against weapons of mass destruction; ensuring threat-adequate civil protection training of executives at the high and highest administrative levels; providing national coordination of the European integration process in the area of preventive civil safety; and providing disaster medicine [11, p. 1].

These services are run through different federal bureaus within BBK’s hierarchical body that are represented by an organizational chart explaining the job classifications. The chart clearly designates which departments are to handle particular CM phases such as mitigation, preparedness, rescue and recovery. As a mitigation process, BBK also offers a training facility, the Academy of Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ), comprised of 80 employees and 32 lecturers who serve to improve Germany’s national and international crisis management issues.

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In addition to the BBK, other public federal CM organizations, namely the German fire department and the Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal Agency for Technical Relief, THW) also provide immediate response and recovery during disasters. German disaster relief (Katastrophenschutz) and civil defense (Zivilschutz) programs are also controlled and coordinated by Germany’s BBK, the administrative federal CM organization. For example, BBK calls and controls efforts of related federal ministries and other groups such as telecommunications companies, financial organizations and transportation institutions for help in the event of a disaster. If civil authorities lack the resources for response and recovery actions, the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) can also be deployed through suggestions offered by the BBK crisis committee, to be discussed later. Other international organizations, namely the EU Disease Control and IFRC, in addition to the help of border countries are also coordinated by the BBK [11]. Besides governmental CM agencies, nongovernmental organizations (for example, the German Red Cross, the Workers’ Samaritan Federation of Germany, the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft [German Life Saving Federation], the Johanniter Emergency Service, and Malteser Germany) are integrated into the system as well as the municipality fire brigades and other rescue services [47]. The Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is the most important non-profit organization in Germany’s CM system [69]. Founded in 1950, it has approximately 80,000 employees around the world. Only one percent is made up of full-time paid workers while the organization’s remaining workload is voluntary-based. THW was established as a civil protection unit during the Cold War to decrease the casualties of a possible war with Russia. After that era, THW volunteers served disaster relief operations internationally and were one of many international aid organizations that played an important role in the rescue efforts of the worst 2004 tsunami disaster recorded as well as the 2005 Katrina Hurricane disaster in the U.S. [69]. Although volunteers should be between the ages 17 to 60, there are no other age, gender or race restriction. Volunteer-based employment brings quality to CM efforts because the employees do not work for benefits, and the effort put forward is at least satisfactory, if not perfect. Moreover, the German government supports the THW’s voluntary-based system. Usually, German citizens are required to serve six months in the military; however, this service is not necessary for citizens who subscribe as a volunteer for six years, an important volunteer source for THW [69]. THW is not the only organization that depends on voluntary-based CM positions. For instance, there are approximately 1.3 million volunteers who serve in local fire brigades and other relief organizations [32]. Case Study: Elbe Flood in August 2002. The Elbe River area located in Central Europe had experienced the same weather conditions that caused flooding in 1897, 1927, 1957 and 1997. However, the raindrops had never reached the magnitude [13] that would result in Germany being hit by the worst flood since the Czech Republic. Local fire brigades and police were the first responders of the disaster management team. As soon as the federal government recognized the extremely dangerous situation in the region, approximately 20,000 military troops were deployed in Saxony and Dresden to provide rescue mission efforts [23]. The Elbe Flood of August 2002 resulted in a total damage of 21.1 billion Euros and 37 fatalities [58]. More than 23,000 members of the local fire brigades and 11,000 personnel from non-profit CM organizations included, but was not limited to the Arbeiter-SamariterBund (ASB), Deutscher Lebensrettungs-gesellschaft (DLRG), Johanniter Unfallhilfe

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(JUH), the German Red Cross (DRK) and Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD) that participated in rescue and recovery operations in the disaster region [26, 24]. However, the DKKV [26] crisis management organization reported a lack of coordination that, according to the report, their unlikely success was attributed to the social informal relationships among the local and federal CM authorities. DKKV [26] advised that an “informal channel” should be strengthened among rescue groups in future disasters. Lack of mitigation studies in the region against floods resulted in a complete failure to use the region’s CM infrastructure. The emergency infrastructure that was supposed to be operating during a possible disaster malfunctioned due to its being hit first [45]. Therefore, CM’s entire performance in the disaster region was response and recovery [47]. An Absence of early warning systems and inexperienced CM employees contributed to the increased material damage [26]. According to the DKKV report [26], weather stations issued a warning for excessive rainstorms and possible flood danger in the disaster region only after the flood had hit Dresden. The early warning system consisted of conventional war sirens designed to alert communities for an aerial attack. Unfortunately, in retrospect, alert techniques designed to use SMS, public radio and television channels should have been used immediately to warn citizens of the flood dangers [45, 26]. In addition, preparedness was heavily ignored before the flood as well. For example, public and private infrastructures were located very close to the Elbe River as if there were no flood risk. However, the flood instantly covered an important part of the city of Dresden with mud and water including the emergency management facilities [45]. The federal government has since enacted a new law that prohibits construction of any kind of buildings in the flood zones. With that legislation, the German government also adopted a five-point flood prevention program for the risk zones [47]. Considering the weaknesses and strengths of the collective CM reaction in the Elbe Flood, the federal German government took the following significant measures in preparation for possible future extreme events: 1.

2.

3.

Advanced cooperation and coordination will be achieved among the local, federal, public and nonprofit disaster relief agencies. Meetings, collaborations and partnerships will be established to improve collaboration. Joint CM practices and exercises will help in future incidents. Technological developments will be utilized at the most extent by first responders and other CM organizations. Advanced communication tools will increase collaborative efforts. Moreover, geographical information processing systems will provide a spatial analysis which will increase the effectiveness of CM systems. Academy for Crisis Management for Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ) was founded under BBK for professional training and practice. The education facility serves to national and local organizations with the motto “Development, training and implementation of a common management ethos” [26].

1.2. Spain Spain remained as a dictatorship until Dictator Franco’s death in 1975. The democratization process changed the public administration system, including CM

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processes and legislations. Localism was the primary purpose of the new CM system. Although this highly decentralized public administration system allowed local and regional autonomous authorities to manage CM efforts, the central government did not involve them in many crises due to a lack of national interest. However, after the ETA attacks and other natural disasters, the government enacted a number of crisis management laws that share responsibility among the regional and national agencies. By law, the official assignment of first responders, namely the local and national police, fire brigades, task forces, and volunteers has only been possible after the Madrid 2004 bombings [50]. Spain’s CM structure is controlled by the General Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency (Direccion General de Proteccion Civil y Emergencias, DGPCE) under the Ministry of Interior (MDI). This central agency is still responsible for the region’s first response, coordination of rescue efforts, mitigation, and preparedness if the case is outside the borders of a national emergency [50]. DGPCE’s duties include: 1. 2.

3.

Preparation of national civil protection plans Simulation of those plans nationally or regionally, implementing risk analyses, building risk structures and planning, training of citizens and volunteers against disasters, building and suggesting necessary infrastructure for mitigation and preparedness efforts Coordinating, requesting help from international emergency management organizations and/or military units in Spain if necessary

The Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan classifies the collaborative actions of crisis management organizations into three category response levels. The first level is used only when local effort is adequate, or, in other words, the related municipality responds to the crisis. The second level involves regional activity among more than one municipality, and level three, the highest emergency level, indicates a national threat. DGPCE takes direct responsibility of crisis management efforts at this level [15]. DGPCE also trains local and national crisis responders and volunteers and other CM associates in an advanced training facility, the National School of Civil Protection (la Escuela Nacional de Protección Civil [ENPC]) in addition to preparing and evaluating national disaster plans. ENPC shares experiences and hosts international conferences with other CM education centers throughout Europe and various other countries [50]. Special Case: Madrid Train Bombings in March 2004: The bloodiest terrorist attack to ever hit Europe occurred on the 11th of March, 2004, when 14 backpack bombs were placed in different locations on Madrid’s transportation train lines. Terrorists detonated ten bombs simultaneously at 7:39 a.m. while the trains were traveling in different directions. Including the perpetrators, 191 people died instantly and more than 1,500 were injured. Terrorists selected to attack during the busiest time of the day with the purpose of killing as many people as possible [15]. Spain, and even Europe, had never before experienced an attack of this magnitude. First responders provided the rescue efforts that were collaborated by national and regional crisis management action. Central government authorities were involved in CM approximately one hour after the attack, and regional CM organizations took care of injured people by transporting them to the nearest hospitals and securing the crime scene areas for official investigation. Cornall [21] reported that temporary infirmaries decreased the workload of hospitals thus providing an important source of extra

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medical emergency services. Fast intervention reduced the death toll to 12 people after being taken to the hospitals. By all accounts, the Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan had worked well under this emergency [21]. The first responders were ready for these attacks due to the Basque Separatists terror they had experienced for decades, thereby preparing them for another possible terrorist attack. In an attempt to double rescue efforts, the CM workers’ night-day shifts did not take place, and the devotion displayed by police organizations and medical service employees significantly increased crisis management collaboration among the responders [15]. After only 90 minutes from the first blast, due to the Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan’s around the hour clockwork, there were no reported injuries in the area, and after eleven hours, the transportation system was once again in service [21]. Very soon after the attacks, emergency telephone lines received 20,000 calls in one day [21]. Correct information sources had been established by the central government plan, underscoring the fact that no other CM tool can prevent social disorder and chaos more than continuously providing accurate public information. Bolling [15] adds the coordination of CM responders as another vital tool. In an effort to provide collaboration among CM organizations, there should be emergency practices conducted with multiple organizations as much as possible [15]. The successful government intervention during the Madrid Train Bombings began as a Level One threat, but shortly after a Level Three alarm was announced, the government became involved. Effectiveness of preparedness and mitigation efforts directly affects emergency success rates. Although CM policies rely on high autonomous regions, the practice sessions and training of emergency managers eliminated the danger for CM organizations to fail in the Madrid Bombings. Gonzales [34] indicated that because natural and manmade disasters are on the rise in Spain, more developed coordination and practices among agencies are the most efficient methods to provide successful CM action [15]. Britz and Bremberg [16] argued that an unsafe crisis management policy would shift the civil defense policy to a civil protection policy as existed during the country’s communist era. Spain’s law now assigns the Spanish Army to provide civil protection in times of crisis [62]. Another law that recently passed specified that the Military Emergency Unit (Unidad Militar de Emergencias [UME]) will take command in an emergency [63]. According to the law, UME will remain in charge until civilian authorities are back in power. The Madrid Bombings caused a change from “the protection of civilians in times of war to a focus on peacetime crisis management” [16, p. 20].

1.3. United Kingdom Paul [53], and O’Brien and Read [52] argued that the UK’s CM system was basically formed on Second World War plans and strategies when aerial attacks were the main assault type used against British citizens; therefore, the civil defense system aimed to decrease loss of lives due to warplane bombings. Because the bombings took place locally, the local governments were held responsible for crisis management action during those attacks rather than the central government that did not coordinate the efforts at war time [57]. Even threats by separatist Irish terrorist groups did not result in a centralized crisis management plan.

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In July 200l, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office was established in response to the need for a central governmental agency as the result of fuel protests, floods and the hoof-and-mouth disease crises in 2000 [52, 57, 2]. These emergencies caused national economical crises requiring governmental intervention [49]. September 11 was the milestone for every CM policy planning in the world and the UK was no exception. In 2004, the CCS regulations were revised to make the system more compatible to newer terrorist threats. These regulations (Civil Contingencies Act [CCA]) aimed to increase collaboration among different levels of CM organizations [18]. The CCA Act revised local and governmental agency responsibilities, increased the collaborative action among those organizations and made CM policies more clear to the participating agencies [52]. The CCA was revised once again after the London Bombings in 2005, and resilience was a term adopted as a policy of crisis management. Wood-Heath and Annis [73] defined resilience as “the ability at every level to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disruptive challenges.” O’Brien and Read [52] argued that the transformation from civil protection to resilience was wise since manmade and natural disasters became so common that the UK’s CM system had decided to act like an organism that evolves through the threats and adopts significant environmental changes within an equilibrium state. The Civil Contingencies Act is responsible for resilience in the UK [18]. The Civil Contingencies Act classified emergencies into national terrorist crises and non-terrorist crises. As such, the CCA organized the related ministries to form a CCA committee to handle and coordinate non-terrorist contingencies that include earthquakes, floods, wildfires, drought, and other natural disasters. On the other hand, the terrorist contingencies are coordinated by Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) led by the Prime Minister. Other members can change depending on the situation. However, they usually consist of the fire service minister, junior ministers from the Ministry of Defense, officials from the Department of Transport and the Home Office, representatives from the UK security services, and civil servants from other relevant departments [18]. Volunteers who are also coordinated by CCS comprise the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), the largest volunteer population in the UK. Major nonprofit volunteer organizations, namely ActionAid, the British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care International, Christian Aid, Concern Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund, and World Vision are headed by DEC that relies on public donations as well as government funds. The organization does not only operate in the UK but is an international disaster relief organization [25]. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is equipped with a training facility for CM employees and volunteers. The Emergency Planning College (EMC) offers professional crisis management training for “representatives of local and Central Government, the emergency services, the private sector and volunteer groups to network and share good practice” [27]. EMC establishes partnerships with national universities to provide quality in service that greatly contributes to the UK resilience [27]. Special Case: London Bombings in July 2005: The 2001 World Trade Center Attacks, 2002 Bali Bombings, 2003 Istanbul Bombings, and 2004 Madrid Bombings were a warning to every government on earth regarding terrorist networks that are capable of targeting their country’s main transportation systems. The UK government,

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however, was preparing for possible terror incidents that could target British civilians [36] when the Civil Contingencies Act was legislated before the attacks. On 7th of July 2005, at 8:50 a.m., three terrorists detonated hand-made bombs on trains headed to different destinations around London. The explosions killed 42 people including the perpetrators and injured hundreds of civilians. One hour later, another terrorist detonated an additional handmade bomb on a bus killing 14 including himself and injuring 110 [38]. The UK government was well-prepared to handle these attacks. For example, the first COBR met at 9:30 a.m., 15 minutes before the second attack with central governmental agency members and the metropolitan police since the prime minister was out of town. The Home Secretary expressed that the explosions caused “extreme casualties,” and the metropolitan police commissioner stated at 11.00 a.m. that “the situation has been very confused but is now coming under control” [38, p. 10). Police investigators uncovered the other perpetrators in the following days [38]. Rockett [57] stated that the central governmental approach to such an incident is important because the public needs factual information during a crisis. Decentralized CM systems can handle the pressure; however, the lack of a one-correct-information source will create chaos. The government reported that the early official statements had reduced the tension. First responders were at the crime scenes in a short period of time, secured the scene and immediately transferred the injured to nearest hospitals. Wellprepared CCS coordination prevented public chaos, reduced panic and helped the CM organizations [38]. Although CCS is a centralized and hierarchical effort, local and regional governments were also adequately funded. In November 2005, however, the CCA legislation doubled these local funds [36]. Before this change, their policy was harshly criticized for ignoring local crisis management preparedness efforts [57, 53, 52] and thus creating disorganization [22]. After the government evaluated those criticisms, local funds were doubled, resulting in a great crisis management intervention on 7th of July 2006 [36]. On the other hand, the suggestion can be made that local funds should be audited as well; otherwise, it will not make any difference. The central government should regularly coordinate, fund and inspect local CM organizations in an effort to provide perfect resilience. Besides inspection, lack of coordination in the immediate response may be prevented through volunteer training [57], disaster planning [22] and stronger centralized government policies [52]. 1.4. Turkey Crisis management is perceived as an earthquake management response in Turkey because earthquakes constitute the primary destructive disasters. The location of Turkey is in the eastern Mediterranean sector of the Alpine-Himalayan earthquake belt. Seventy one percent of the population lives on the first and second-degree seismic hazard zone. Similarly, 76 percent of the industries and 69 percent of the dams are also located in high degree seismic zones [7, 10, 33, 39]. Between 1992 and 1999, 131 earthquakes were recorded representing 60 percent of all disasters [28], and more than 20,000 people died in the latest five earthquakes [10, 35, 42]. The protection of human lives and property are on both the government’s agenda as well as other public organizations.

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Although legislation is a formal way of responding to disasters, most of the disaster and crisis management laws were enacted soon after disasters. Crisis management consists of providing food, clothing, health services, and temporary housing during and after disasters [33, 43]. A major change, however, occurred in 1985 with Development Law 3194 that gave the principal authority to municipalities for determining the local lands unsuitable for development, a system for evaluating the existing building stocks and procedures of control over construction [7, 10, 19, 68, 71]. On the other hand, the main weakness of the new law was not to be connected to Disaster Law 7269. Even though there were potential links between the two laws, development and mitigation issues were kept separate in practice [19]. Turkey’s crisis management system has been evaluated during four periods. After tragic disasters, the government took important steps to strength the system. First, the post-1999 “Awakening Period” came after the 1999 earthquake when the government aimed to transform its approach from conventional post-disaster activity and pretensions of emergency preparations to pre-disaster mitigation regulations. As such, the government reversed its role from “State as Healer” to “State as Protector” [8]. As a result, legislation forced the province and district administrators to draft their own emergency plans as legal consequences of Disaster Law Number 7396 and Regulation Number 12777; however, these plans did not consider the complexity of the disaster management [20, 68]. Turkey’s crisis management system is highly centralized and strictly hierarchical. In particular, before the 1999 earthquake, the CM structure was “paternalistic, wherein the state was responsible for almost all phases of disasters” [33, p.282]. Because any major CM effort requires central government intervention, province and local administrators and ministries can recommend to the Council of Ministers that an event be declared as a crisis. The Decree on Basic Principles Related to a Disaster Affecting the Life of the General Public (Official Gazette No. 13007) gives central government the direction to decide whether or not to intervene [33]. The main government organizations responsible for CM are the Turkish Emergency Management Directorate (TEMGD) of the Prime Ministry, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the General Directorates of Civil Defense (GDCD) of the Ministry of Interior, and finally, the General Directorate State Hydraulic Works (SHW) under the Energy Ministry. Decree No. 600 grants more authority and responsibility to TEMGD in coordinating post-disaster activities and mitigation efforts. Moreover, other ministries, state agencies and institutions are also responsible as a part of the crisis management system designed in the “Regulation Concerning the Fundamentals of Emergency Aid Organizations and Planning Associated with Disasters.” In any large-scale emergency, the Central Coordinating Committee for Disasters manages and supports response efforts based on the “Disaster Law” legislated in 1959 [43]. After restructuring of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, it became a main figure for pre- and post-disaster management, development issues and building constructions [19]. The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement was also responsible for implementing Disaster Law 7269. The Ministry functions with two departments: the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) established to manage a nationwide disaster in 1965, and the Earthquake Research Department established in 1975 [51]. GDDA is responsible for providing emergency relief and coordination during disasters, taking short- and long-term measures, making preparations and having others do the same, identifying natural disaster-prone areas, taking relevant measures to prevent

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disasters, and identifying measures and principles to minimize casualties in disasterprone areas through cooperation with public organizations [43]. The General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD) was established in 1959 under law number 7126, and was given the authority to hire rescue personnel after the 1992 Erzincan Earthquake [19, 41]. The law requires the Civil Defense Directorate to make preparedness plans for rescue and first aid efforts, for example, securing lives as well as the belongings of civil people during wars and natural disasters, reducing damages to the lives and belongings of victims during disasters, renewing, repairing and protecting private and government institutions that are of vital importance, and building up morale among the civilians [43, 41, 42]. After the 1999 Marmara earthquake, the number of professional rescue personnel and emergency centers at the General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD) increased by the Cabinet decision numbering 586/1999. The number of search and rescue centers increased from three to eleven, modern equipment and vehicles were provided and 120 more rescue personnel were hired [19]. Restructuring the Kandilli observatory as Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute in 1984 was another parallel change that gave priority to research for disasters. This institute was also transformed from the National Education Ministry to Bogazici University and focused on seismic research with three new departments: Earthquake Engineering, Geodesy and Geophysics [19]. The Turkish Armed Forces transformed one of its regiments to a search and rescue battalion in an effort to strengthen its effectiveness in disasters. The Foundation of Natural Disasters Search and Rescue Troop by the Turkish Ground Forces was another improvement made in army crisis preparedness. Turkish Ground Forces provided the new organization with modern equipment, helicopters and central coordination centers that controlled five separate teams [19]. In 1966, difficulties in the coordination of organizations and resources in a bureaucratic structure driven by hierarchic management lead policy makers to shift the responsibility of post-disaster operations from the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement to the Prime Ministry [19]. With the Cabinet decisions numbered 583/1999 and 600/2000, the Turkish Emergency Management General Directorate (TEMGD) was founded to coordinate public organizations in emergencies. The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center is responsible for nationwide coordination of organizations and resources consisting of three administrative bodies: the Crisis Coordination Committee (CCC), Crisis Evaluation and Watch Committee (CEWC) and the Secretariat. With the prime minister being responsible for crisis decision making and leading the committee, the CCC works as a smaller scale of the Ministry Cabinet [67]. Although the leadership role shifts from Public Works and Settlement Ministry (PWSM) to the Prime Ministry, the linearity of the system keeps its characters in a command and control approach through more hierarchical power-solution [19]. By law, only central government representatives, the governor and locally elected district mayor are authorized to respond to a crisis at the province level. The Ministry of Interior regulates certain crisis management responsibilities of elected mayors and appointed governors [71, 72]. In particular, preparedness is held by local administrations as a legal obligation, and this public responsibility is given to all provincial administrations by so-called “Disasters Law” that explain methods and standards of “preparedness-planning” [9]. While provincial administrators are fully responsible and liable, they have no authority to intervene in the development process without an ongoing crisis management effort. This is due to inefficient implementation

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of laws and national plans at the local level and lack of sufficient local resources for better preparedness [43]. The current tendency of the Turkish government is to extend responsibilities and authority of local administrators for crisis preparation and mitigation duties. The mayor’s office is given all powers of monitoring, planning and construction activities but it is not successful in implementing technical requirements of disaster management [43]. Thus, earthquakes have a greater impact on cities than expected. As in all cities, mayors have authority over fire departments because they work under the mayor’s power. After Turkey’s 1999 earthquake, the new approach lead local governments to strengthen their fire departments and to support the foundation of volunteer search and rescue teams. The participation of local volunteers in local crisis management policy has been encouraged; in fact, in 2000, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs issued a regulation to register them to its local offices [19, 71]. Provincial and district crisis management centers are responsible for coordinating organizations and resources before and after crises. The rescue and aid committee in these centers is thought to be prepared for disasters because this is mandated by law [33]. Valis (governors) head the committee in the provinces and Kaymakams head the districts. The committee acts as a local crisis management center in the event that crisis management is declared. There are also regional crisis management centers that work under the Prime Ministry Management Center. As a requirement of Regulation 96/8716, these centers are responsible for the coordination of response and recovery operations in more than one disaster site [19]. Before the 1999 earthquake, the role of private firms and non-profit organizations was underestimated. However, the Turkish government has moved away from the traditional “paternalistic” approach and has reallocated responsibilities. Local governments had originally held construction inspection, but after the 1999 earthquake, central government was of the opinion that they had failed to inspect constructions [33]. This responsibility was therefore given to private Building Inspection Firms (BIFs) [48]. Another initiative after the 1999 earthquake was the establishment of an independent organization known as the National Earthquake Council consisting of scientists from diverse fields, for example, earth scientists, structural and earthquake engineers, environmental engineers, architects, urban planners, and psychologists. The goal of the council is to identify priority research areas for the country’s disaster mitigation. Although the council has no enforcement power, it has the authority to propose strategies for better mitigation. The first report published in 2002 was “National Earthquake Mitigation Strategy.” Nevertheless, the council is not as effective as expected [33]. Establishment of the National Disasters Insurance Administration under the Treasury was an additional important improvement in the crisis management system after the 1999 earthquake. The administration is headed by seven executive board members from public and private sectors, namely insurance and finance organizations. The organization collects the mandatory earthquake insurance from homeowners for the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool [33] and provides services by outsourcing activities. For example, policy distribution and marketing is held by 24 insurance companies and their agencies [33]. One of the weaknesses of the insurance pool, however, is that it is limited to earthquakes and therefore does not cover other flood, landslide or avalanche disasters [33]. The Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), established in 1868, is one of the primary and non-governmental organizations of crisis management structures. The

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Society is comprised of national, provincial and district level committees and actively operates in disaster areas. TRCS also provides blood transfusion services and AIDS and first aid training as well as disaster preparedness training efforts. The well-equipped Disaster Operation Center (AFOM) was also established in Ankara [46]. The role of nonprofit organizations in disaster preparedness and life saving efforts during the emergency response and rescue period lead the government to regulate their existence in CM systems [33]. For instance, after 2000, the Ministry of Interior regulated how non-governmental organizations were involved in the system. Another example is the Turkish Radio Amateur Club (TRAC) founded in 1962 to provide post-disaster communication services. TRAC facilitates communications during the crisis and makes agreements with national organizations responsible for crisis management, as well as some cities, mayors and fire departments, and health departments. TRAC has an office in each Turkish province and coordinates local relationships [70]. AKUT was also the first volunteer search and rescue organization after 1995 that became the leading model for various volunteer search and rescue organizations [19]. AKUT has nine regional offices and increasingly receives public support through volunteer participation and fund-raising activities [4]. 1999 Marmara Earthquake: The 1999 Marmara Earthquake was the deadliest natural disaster in Turkey since 1939, killing more than 15,000 people and leaving over 250,000 homeless, in addition to damaging 214,000 residential and 30,000 business units with a total economic loss of more than U.S. $16 billion [64]. Marmara was a regional earthquake heavily affecting the provinces of Avcilar, (Istanbul), Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, and Bolu. As a central government unit, officials of the General Directorate of the Civil Defense arrived at the area at 05:30, approximately two hours after the earthquake hit. However, without a sufficient communications infrastructure or truck radio dispatches, there was great uncertainty about the organization of rescue operations. The lack of factual information further obstructed government authorities from distributing the correct type of aid to the right locations [35]. When new rescue teams arrived, they had no idea where to go, how to start, or how to communicate with other rescue teams and government officials. Therefore, the first day of the earthquake was the least effective when compared to the entire rescue operations conducted specifically for this disaster [74]. The characteristics of the Turkish Government Crisis Management Policy focused on the post-disaster period (response and recovery stage) rather than risk analysis, risk mitigation or risk spreading approaches [43]. However, the 1999 Earthquake proved that if another similar one were to hit Istanbul, the scale of human and physical destruction would be even worse [43]. Moreover, current populist policies facilitate illegal settlements into metropolitan areas. To strength the mitigation plan in terms of urban planning, the Development Law and the Disaster Law should be considered as two sides of a single coin [17]. Another weakness of the national plan was the assumption that disasters will not occur in district centers, and province resources will be sufficient for response and recovery. Nevertheless, disaster experiences such as the 1992 Erzincan and 1999 Marmara Earthquakes showed that natural disasters do, in fact, hit the province centers. Contrary to the assumption, these centers require the help of other neighboring provinces and municipalities as well as centralized organizations [19]. After the 1999 Marmara earthquake, the Ministry of Interior divided provinces into 100 groups with respect to major disasters. Each provincial member was asked to collectively respond to

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disasters. However, residents of Corbacioglu and Kapucu [3, 19] argued that there was insufficient organizational and technical interprovincial capability among Turkey’s public administration organizations. The difficulties in coordinating crisis management organizations lead the government to take control. Because the prime minister can assume responsibility of emergencies by declaring a “crisis management” situation, a “crisis center’ is activated in the Office of Prime Ministry and the management of crisis is directed through these centers established in other organizational headquarters. The crisis is defined as a foreign threat; widespread harmful (terrorist) attack, natural disaster, refuge and big immigration movements, epidemics, large fires, chemical and technological disasters (radiation and air pollution), heavy economic crisis, and other similar situations. The management of crisis consists of different organizational levels; while the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center makes the decision at the central level, the first response comes from local governorships of provinces that establish a crisis center to coordinate local and central government efforts. Although the center has the responsibility, it does not have the essential authority to command or the technical capacity to coordinate state bureaucracy during a crisis [19, 39] and also suffers from insufficient human and financial resources to undertake its coordinative tasks [33]. Turkey’s current crisis management policy is based on a linear approach resulting in a formal government structure that ignores the role of non-profit organizations. While availability of research and rescue teams remains inefficient, a non-profit organization can contribute to one of the important duties during an emergency [43]. The hierarchical structure of a crisis management system tends to discourage local initiatives and undermines the role of local administrators [43]. As such, local administrators are ineffective in establishing strong crisis management systems at the local level. Because Turkey’s provincial governors and district heads are not elected officials, but rather appointed by the central government, they have a turnover rate and are, therefore, unfamiliar with local conditions [33, 66]. In addition, the Office of General Directorate of Disaster Affairs that works under the umbrella of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement sets up disaster preparedness plans at the local level. Thus, two-headed preparedness constitutes a problem in that the heads of provincial and districts are affiliated with the Ministry of Interior [33]. In sum, most of the crises have truthfully revealed that the Turkish government’s response is more reactionary than pre-planned. The government’s plans in handling disasters were typically enacted immediately after the crises. For example, the government’s first crisis policy was shaped in the 1930s after the Erzincan earthquake. Although this policy has been revised many times, revisions have been made only after natural disasters in an attempt to meet the changing expectations of people [44]. Similarly, the latest regulations are based on the 1999 Marmara Earthquake experience. The Turkish Crisis Management System is not flexible enough to be applicable to all possible crises. Terrorist attacks in Istanbul in 2003 revealed that the government still suffers from the lack of a well-structured crisis management system that can be applied to terrorist attacks as well. The current government response system relies upon mandating responsibilities to state agencies with legal regulations, and the government establishes special institutions for emergencies. However, those regulations are not as effective as desired [43, 66]. As shown in Table 1, among the four countries, Germany and Turkey prefer the centralized approach in organizing emergency management systems. While each country gives the responsibility of emergency preparedness and management to a

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specific organization, a higher level of authority is responsible for the management of emergencies during the crisis. All four countries have special institutions to train officers in emergency management system. One of the main differences among the four countries is that Turkey has many government institutions directly responsible for Table 1: Similarities and Differences between EM and PAD Organizations of Case Countries Germany

Spain

UK

Turkey

General PAD Style EU Acceptance Date Main CM Organization

Centralized

Decentralized

Decentralized

Centralized

Founding member

1986

1973

Candidate

BBK (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance)

DGPCE (Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias) (General Directorate of Civil Defense and Emergencies)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

the General Directorates of Civil Defense (GDCD) of the Ministry of Interior

Training Office for EM Studies

AKNZ (Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz) (Academy of Crisis Management)

ENPC (Escuela Nacional de Protección Civil) (National School of Civil Protection)

EPC (Emergency Planning College)

The General Directorates of Civil Defense (GDCD) of the Ministry of Interior

Higher Emergency Network During Extreme Events

KOST (Koordinierungsstelle fur groflchige Gefah- renlagen) (joint coordination centre during extreme danger situations)

SACOP (Sala de Coordinación Operativa) (Operative Coordination Centre)

COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms)

Turkish Emergency Management Directorate (TEMGD) of the Prime Ministry

Other EM Organizations

DKKV, THW, GTZ

ACF-E, Spanish Red Cross

DEC, ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD)

the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the General Directorate State Hydraulic Works (SHW) under Energy Ministry. The Turkish Armed Forces, The Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), The National Disasters Insurance Administration, Turkish Radio Amateur Club (TRAC)

emergency management. Thus, organizational proliferation in emergency management inhibits the government from organizing their institutions around a unique policy. Particularly during the emergency, governments pay more attention in organizing government institutions as opposed to private and non-profit organizations.

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2. Conclusion It was shown in this study that European countries have similarities in terms of emergency management policies. Each country mentioned Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey has a national response and separate regional emergency response systems due to the priority of crises. Local authorities are empowered for non-cross boundary emergencies, and the national emergency plans and organizations are applicable only in large-scope cases wherein a central authority is required to coordinate the resources in and out of the country, to take immediate precaution against possible newer disasters and to handle the preparedness and mitigation efforts for likely national disasters. Organizations in the four countries also have a central training mechanism that provides emergency planning for local and federal officials. These training facilities keep the emergency management system ready for newer, unusual disasters. Each of the training centers hold annual conferences, seminars and other educational discussions to keep the country’s emergency culture updated and also target ordinary citizens to increase their civil protection. Volunteers are coordinated through these training centers and central emergency management organizations. In this study, the regional emergency management is the first responder in each country. Localism is chosen to be the best tackling method for an emergency, and local authorities are responsible for all phases of emergency management: preparedness, mitigation, response, and evaluation. Empowered local authorities also tend to handle emergencies better than a centralized emergency management structure in cases that do not require a national response. In every article cited regarding the special cases, the authors can firmly state that the resources are sufficient enough to handle the cases despite the huge disasters.

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[37] Houben, M (2005) International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States, Routledge, London. [38] House of Commons (HC) (2006) Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, London: The Stationary Office. [39] Istanbul Technical University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management. (2005). Disaster Management Perspective of Terrorist Attacks in Istanbul on November 15 & 20, 2003. Istanbul: ITU Press. [40] Jaeger PT; Shneiderman B; Fleischmann KR; Preece J; Qua Y; Wu PF (2007) Community response grids: E-government, social networks, and effective emergency management, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 3:10-11, pp. 592-604. [41] Jalali, R. (2002). Civil Society and the State: Turkey After the Earthquake. Disasters, 26(2): 120-139. [42] Jeoloji Mühendisleri Odası, T. (2006, 16.08.2006). Türkiye'de Afetin Adi Yok. Basin Açiklamasi. http://www.jmo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=913 [accessed January 19, 2008]. [43] JICA.(2004).CountryStrategyPaperforNaturalDisastersinTurkey. http://www.spo.org.tr/resimler/ekler/5d8ce590ad8981c_ek.pdf?tipi=58&turu=X&sube=0[accessed 02/09/2008]. [44] Kapucu, N. and Van Wart M. (2006) The emerging role of the public sector in managing extreme events:Lessons learned, Administration and Society, Vol.38:3 pp. 279–308. [45] Keys C (2005) The great Labe-Elbe river flood of 2002, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 20:1. [46] Kizilay. (2008). TARHÇEMZ. http://www.kizilay.org.tr/yeni/kizilay3.php [accessed 02/09/2008]. [47] Kley-Fiquet, B. (2005) Outline for national reporting and information on disaster reduction: Background for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe-Hyogo, Japan, 18-22 January 2005. [48] Law on Building Inspection (No.4708) Effective by 13 July 2001. Resmi Gazete from http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr [accessed on June 10, 2008]. [49] McConnell, A. (2003) Overview: Crisis Management, Influences, Responses and Evaluation, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 56, Number 3, 1 July, pp. 363-409. [50] Ministry Del Interior Website (MDI) (2008) General Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency: Guidelinesretrievedon2.14.2008fromthewebsite http://www.proteccioncivil.es/es/DGPCE/funciones.html. [51] Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. (2008). Organization and Functions of the Ministry. http://www.bayindirlik.gov.tr/english/index.php [accessed on February 22, 2008]. [52] O'Brien, G; Read, P. (2005) Future UK emergency management: new wine, old skin? Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol.14: 3, pp. 353-361. [53] Paul S (1999) UK emergency planning – the integrated approach, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 13:4 [54] Perry, R.; Lindell, M (2003) Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guide- lines for the Emergency Planning Process, Disasters, Vol. 27:4, pp. 336–350. [55] Petak, W. J. (1985). Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 45(1): 3-7. [56] Quarantelli, E.L. (1987) What Should We Study? Questions and Suggestions for Researchers about the Concept of Disasters, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters Vol. 5, pp. 7-32. [57] Rockett J.P. (1994) A Constructive Critique of United Kingdom Emergency Planning, Disaster Prevention and Management Vol. 3:1, pp. 47 – 60. [58] Rück, M (2003) updated: Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft: topics Jahresrückblick Naturkatastrophen 2002. 10. Jahrgang, Munich, 48 pp. Updated by W. Kron on 24.10.2003: Damage report. [59] Sahin, Bahadir, Naim Kapucu, and Ali Unlu. (2008). Perspectives on Crisis Management in European Union Countries: United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany. European Journal of Economic and Political Science (EJEP) 1(1): 19-45. [60] Sandhu, R. J. (2002). Disaster Recovery Planning An Overview. Disaster Recovery Planning Ed. Mathew Varghese. Cinninati, Ohio: Premier Press [61] Sauvagnargues-Lesage S; Picard C; Vasconselos S; Xanthopoulos G (2006) Fire suppression management and planning: A state of the art: final version, EUFIRELAB: Deliverable D-09-07, retrieved on 03.15.2008 from http://eufirelab.org [62] Spanish Law (SL) (2005) Ley Orgánica 5/2005 de 17 de noviembre, de la Defensa Nacional (BOE núm. 276 de 18/11/2005). As cited in Britz & Bremberg (2007) [63] Spanish Law (SL) (2007) Real Decreto 399/2007, de 23 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el protocolo de intervención de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME) (BOE núm. 131 de 1/6/2007) as cited in Britz & Bremberg (2007)

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-142

“Terrorism Watch” or “Natural Hazard Mitigation” Why the Difference? : Community Policing in the Indian Context Sudha ARLIKATTI University of North Texas

Abstract. Since the new millennium, the Indian government has moved from the traditional command and control style of emergency management to a more problem solving style characterized by continuity, coordination and cooperation in an effort to reduce the losses to lives and property from natural and manmade disasters and to channel special attention towards women, children, the elderly, and minorities in an attempt to reduce their vulnerability to these disasters. This practice is also a bid to increase trust and confidence among the citizens in the Indian government. The author discusses community policing experiments that have been successfully adopted as well as the challenges of sustaining them in a culturally diverse developing country. The article concludes by suggesting how to possibly expand and sustain community involvement as a means to create disaster resilient and sustainable communities leading to a better future for the Indian populace. Keywords. community communities, terrorism

policing,

disaster

management

India,

resilient

Introduction Since the new millennium, changes have been effected to the traditional styles of emergency planning by governments and policy makers in developed and developing nations of the world. This article notes these changes from a dominant emergency planning model characterized by a command and control structure to a problem solving model characterized by continuity, coordination and cooperation adopted by the Indian government. This is in an effort to channel special attention during disaster situations towards vulnerable community groups, namely women, children, the elderly, and minorities, and to increase the citizen’s confidence in their government’s administration. With this new focus, there have been efforts to use Western inputs tailored to the needs of the Indian population in adopting an all hazards proactive approach to emergency management. These initiatives included creation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2005 [1] charged with increasing stakeholder participation through community education efforts, community policing, specialized training of government officials, and setting up marine policing stations to mitigate against natural and manmade disasters affecting the Indian peninsula. Bearing this context in mind, the following sections briefly discuss two emergency management models and India’s

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recent shift from one to the other. Following, India’s natural and manmade disaster hotspots are highlighted, and successful community policing experiments to combat them are detailed. The article concludes by noting the challenges faced in continuing these efforts over time and offers possible solutions at the local, state and national levels for expanding and sustaining community involvement to emergency responses, thus helping to make communities more resilient to future disasters.

1. Emergency Management Models 1.1. The Dominant Model Command and Control This dominant model of emergency management is often referred to as the military model wherein the disaster is perceived as an enemy and handled accordingly. The model utilizes a 3C’s approach where each C relates to a fundamental assumption regarding the enemy [2]. The first C assumes that a disaster or an emergency is characterized by CHAOS and the other two Cs assume that chaos requires that COMMAND and CONTROL be used in an effective manner. The idea emerged during the post-World War II era under the first comprehensive emergency management legislation of the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. Popular belief held that disasters or emergencies posing a serious threat could only be dealt with by military skills and resources possessed. This led to the adaptation of a military or para-military structure for civilian organizations responsible for dealing with emergencies. Dynes (1994) noted that the dominant model was based on three interrelated assumptions (pp. 144). Assumption 1: The notion of normalcy in the pre-emergency period is marked off by manifestations of social chaos in the emergency period that is signaled by irrational social behavior. Assumption 2: There is a total breakdown of the traditional social control mechanisms in effect before a disaster and extraordinary measures are required to set things right during and after a disaster strikes. Assumption 3: The problems stem from inherent weaknesses in individuals and social structures and hence emergency planning should focus its attention on establishing ‘command’ and ‘control’ to overcome the ‘chaos’ arising in the emergency period. The implication under the assumption that chaos justifies command and control suggests that ordinary citizens, organizations and institutions are incapable of dealing with an emergency situation because they are fragile and become ineffective. This led to the following planning conclusions: (1) ‘local institutions’, other than para-military organizations, need to be supplemented or replaced by ‘outside’ organizations, most preferably the military, (2) only para-military organizations such as the police and fire can function effectively, (3) those organizations that wish to function effectively in an emergency will have to change their structures to a command and control form, and (4) pre-emergency social structures existent in society as families and voluntary organizations are irrelevant to emergency responses. In turn, the dominant model was characterized by a set of rigid operational rules firmly placed in the myth that citizens will panic and chaos will result, and this will require stringent control mechanisms and significant resources to be allocated by military and para-military forces and new organizations randomly set up to control the situation.

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1.2. Community Disaster Impact Model Over the past twenty years, experiences gained by disaster researchers and emergency practitioners around the world have led to a more realistic set of assumptions constructed on quite a different view of ‘emergencies’ than assuming them to be the ‘enemy’ [2]. Existing disaster models that conceptualize the “phases” of an event, for example, warning, threat, impact, inventory, rescue, and recovery, provide a useful profile of the physical and psychological dynamics of a single-incident disaster. The internationally used Mitigation/Prevention, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery disaster response model is conceptually linked to the management of event phases, namely the tsunami, although not in strict sequences [3, 4]. More recently, researchers have suggested a holistic paradigm calling for a comprehensive vulnerability management model [5] that integrates disaster communities with sustainable hazards management, for example environmental protection interwoven with poverty reduction programs and delivery of aid as ways to reduce disasters [6, 7, 8]. Furthermore, there are those who advocate the community disaster impact model based on citizens who act as rationally in disaster situations as they do in every day life. In other words, they do not panic but rather make rational decisions on what to do and what protective actions to take given the available information and time [9], [10]. Generally speaking citizen response saves the day when disasters strike. Not only do citizens effectively bring themselves to safety but their altruistic selves also help save their fellow citizens. Most of the initial aid is also provided by fellow citizens as they converge to disaster locations in massive numbers to help out. This model, also known as the problem solving model, is characterized by CONTINUITY, COORDINATION and COOPERATION.

2. The Indian Context India is one of the oldest civilizations in the world with a culture marked by a high degree of syncretism and cultural pluralism. A federal republic consisting of 28 states and seven Union Territories, the Indian peninsula has an area of 3.28 million sq kms, and its coastline stretches about 5,700 kms on the mainland and about 7,500 kms including the two island territories of Andaman and Nicobar. With an estimated population of 1.13 billion, India is the world’s second most populous country having an extremely high population density of approximately 340 people per square kilometer compared to the U.S. with 30/sq km, and a quarter of the population live within 50 kilometers of the coast [11]. All 28 states and the two union territories of Puducherry and the National Capital Territory of Delhi have elected governments. The other five union territories have centrally appointed administrators and hence are under the direct rule of the president. Each state or union territory is divided into basic units of government and administration known as districts. There are nearly 600 districts in India that, in turn, are further divided into tehsils and eventually into villages. The constitution recognizes Hindi in Devanagiri script and English as the official language of the union. In addition, 22 other languages, in particular, are recognized that are either abundantly spoken or have classical status with the number of dialects spoken as high as 1,652. Approximately 70% of Indians reside in rural areas, although in recent decades

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migration to larger cities has led to a dramatic increase in the country’s urban population. India is a relatively poor country, with an estimated 2004 GDP per capita of $3,100 in the Purchasing Power Parity [12], and its Human Development Index of .602, ranked 127 out of 177 countries [13]. The Indian government has engaged in affirmative action programs known as reservations since its independence in 1946. Such efforts have targeted members of the two lowest castes in the traditional varna system and tribal people who lived outside the varna systemthe Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)as well as women, to help shape national discourse and policy on economic and fiscal matters. In general, under these programs, seats in elected governmental bodies, government jobs and institutions of higher education are reserved for members of the SCs and STs on the basis of their proportion in the population, and one-third of the seats are reserved for women. Historically, in spite of these safeguards built into the electoral system, marginalized groups, including women, dalits (untouchables or outcastes) and tribal people have not been fully integrated into the governing structures, and their interests continue to be underrepresented [14]. Arguably, a society’s systematic marginalization of significant segments reduces the usefulness of social capital [15, 16]. Cultural diversity and religious secularism were believed to be the backbone of Indian society since time immemorial as her people lived in peace and harmony respecting one another’s differences. Since her independence from the British Raj in 1947, India has developed into a buoyant power house of knowledge in the information technology and service sectors, a nuclear-weapons state and a food exporter. Unfortunately, however, this has increased other problems for the people. For example, as the country expands, one of the challenges is to meet the needs of an ever growing population consisting of socio-economic, religious and cultural diversity and a population speaking more than 21 different languages. The problems are further exacerbated by the nexus between politicians and crime cartels, corruption at various levels and extreme poverty and illiteracy, all of which have resulted in an increase in backward states running parallel governments with differing ideologies and support, and funding from neighboring countries increasing political unrest and terrorist activities around the country.

3. Hot Spots for India’s Disasters 3.1. Terrorism in India With one of the world’s highest rates of terrorism, today India is battling underground extremists on multiple fronts: Jihadist rebels in the northernmost state of Kashmir and elsewhere; Maoist/ Naxalite communist rebels operating in rural and Adivasi areas along a north-south corridor stretching from Bihar, Jharkhand, western Orissa, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh and the south-western coastal states of Kerala and Maharashtra, and separatists in the northeast region between Burma, Bangladesh and China-annexed Tibet. According to a report issued by the National Counter-terrorism Center in Washington D.C. (2007), India experienced more violent deaths due to terrorist incidents than Afghanistan. In fact, in this respect, the country is only behind Iraq. Because of lack of education and insufficient monetary resources, it is difficult to control these threats and have a unified mitigation strategy. In recent years, in an

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attempt to channel special attention towards softer community targets, namely women, children, the elderly, and minorities and to increase public confidence, the Indian government took various legislative measures to reinforce the police machinery and infrastructure at the state levels through community policing experiments. At the same time, however, India is plagued by natural disasters ranging from floods, earthquakes, cyclones, droughts, landslides, and tsunamis causing countless deaths and injuries and losses to property and livestock thus resulting in an extreme challenge to natural disaster management strategies. 3.2. Natural Disasters in India India has been traditionally vulnerable to natural disasters because of its unique geoclimatic conditions. Floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes, and landslides have been recurrent phenomena. Approximately 60% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of various intensities; over 40 million hectares are prone to floods; about 8% of the total area is prone to cyclones, and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought. In the decade 1990-2000, an average of 4,344 people lost their lives and another 30 million were affected by disasters. The loss in terms of private, community and public assets has been astronomical. Until quite recently, disaster management traditionally focused on response and recovery only. The idea of hazard mitigation, or passive protective measures–for example, land use planning, building codes and practices, education, and so forthand disaster preparedness phaseswarning systems, training, setting up memorandum of agreementswere never considered due to lack of resources or the perception of risk or extreme poverty among the populations. However, the super cyclone in Orissa in October 1999, the Bhuj earthquake in Gujarat in January 2001, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Kashmir earthquake, also known as the Great Pakistan earthquake, in early 2005, changed everything and underscored the need to adopt a multi dimensional endeavor involving diverse scientific, engineering, financial and social processes [17]. 3.3. Disaster Management in India India’s Disaster Management Act of 2005 mandated setting up an apex body for disaster management to create an enabling environment for institutions at the state and district levels that would facilitate empowering stakeholders and help reduce losses to lives and property. This led to the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) with the Prime Minister of India as its head. Its mission statement reads as follows: “It envisions the development of an ethos of Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness and will strive to promote a National resolve to mitigate the damage and destruction caused by natural and man-made disasters, through sustained and collective efforts of all Government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations and People’s participation, by adopting a technology-driven, pro-active, multihazard and multi-sectoral strategy for building a safer, disaster resilient and dynamic India.” The NDMA’s vision is to empower all stakeholders at the local, district, state, and national levels for improving the effectiveness of disaster management in India; contain

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the potential threat of natural and manmade disasters through capacity development of all stakeholders; express solidarity at all levels to supplement the efforts of the government; act as a catalyst in integrating the entire process at all levels of government; and bring disaster management to the forefront of the national agenda through institutional capacity development initiatives and strengthening public awareness and community resilience through training and funding programs. This has led to the adoption of a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectorial approach of incorporating vulnerability analysis and the development of plans and strategies for risk reduction. The states have been advised to restructure/regroup the officers/staff within the Department of Disaster Management with well-defined responsibilities in order to pursue the holistic approach to disaster management. The four functional groups assigned with specific tasks within the departments include:    

Functional Group 1: Hazard Mitigation Functional Group 2: Preparedness and Capacity Building Functional Group 3: Relief and Response Functional Group 4: Administration and Financ

The Indian government is also taking various legislative measures to reinforce the police machinery and infrastructure and to increase citizen involvement and participation through community policing experiments in various states. These consist of the Beat Officers System (BOS) to patrol communities, complaint boxes/kiosks, a help line for distressed women, slum adoption programs, trust building programs for youth, neighborhood or community watch groups, the installing of Wide Area Network (WAN) connecting all police stations, and specialized training for lower level police staff, or constables, in how to interact and engage with common citizens. But, these come with a host of challenges due to the diverse socio-political and cultural setting that India presents.

4. Community Policing Experiments in India Community policing, the first major reform in policing in a half-century, changes the way police think and act. This revolutionary movement broadens the police mandate beyond the narrow focus of fighting crime to include efforts that also address fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighborhood decay [18]. The core elements of community policing as elaborated by the U.S. Department of Justice [19] are: 

 

Organizational elements a wide philosophy adopted organization, decentralized decision-making and accountability, fixed geographic accountability and generalist responsibilities, utilization of volunteer resources and enhancers. Tactical elements enforcement of laws, proactive crime prevention and problem-solving oriented. External elements– public involvement in community partnerships, government and other agency partnerships.

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Community policing rests on the belief that contemporary community problems require a new decentralized and personalized police approach that draws citizens into the process of policing themselves. Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. At the heart of the scheme is better security for local communities to be achieved through citizen participation and closer cooperation between the police and the general public through trust building efforts. Community policing is an effort to foster and crystallize untapped sentiments of goodwill for the police that exist among the general public, transform the police image, open up channels of communication, and provide a reservoir of intelligence and manpower [20]. In India, police organizations throughout numerous cities have recently engaged in community policing efforts tailored to their needs and adapted to their organizational capabilities. A selected few are described in the following section. 4.1. Beat Officers’ System (BOS) The city is divided into a specific number of beat zones, and each beat is manned by police constables known as ‘Beat Officers’. Being personally responsible for an explicit geographic area instills pride and empowers them to make independent decisions and become more responsible and responsive to the public needs. The program envisages a beat officer leading night patrolling in an area with people’s participation and also interacting closely with households designated under each beat zone. The beat officer is also expected to coordinate with private security personnel who work at various multistoried residential units, businesses and private homes. These officers are also encouraged to attend to civic problems that will gain the goodwill and trust of the people. Identifying and keeping track of strangers visiting the locality, preventing drug peddling and atrocities on women and offering protection to the elderly are other roles outlined for the beat officer. Through these efforts, the police can gradually succeed in creating an atmosphere that is increasingly citizen friendly, conducive to sharing of information and increase citizen volunteers for crime and disaster watch. This was first successfully initiated by the Trichy police in Tamil Nadu state of India under the leadership of Police Commissioner J.K. Tripathy. The beat officers effectively met the challenges through contemporary as well as traditional policing practices by leveraging the existing organizational structure and resources. Further, the police commissioner was awarded for this effort by the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances [21]. This philosophy of community policing is being replicated in other states as well. In his keynote address, K.V. Thomas, a member of the Legislative Assembly in Kerala said, “The city had a big volume of migrant population coming in every day and it was not possible for the police to keep watch on the flow by themselves.” Launching community policing at three stations was a means of overcoming these limitations in Kochi [22]. 4.2. Complaint Box System Complaint boxes are placed throughout different locations of the city to receive anonymous information from people who prefer to remain unidentified and yet participate in their efforts to assist the police. To encourage informants, letters are

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collected daily, prioritized and acted upon as quickly and efficiently as possible. A team of police officers in the state of Uttar Pradesh have showed innovation and adaptation in meeting stakeholder complaints and requirements by setting up “Lokvani–an effort to empower the citizen.” The team initiative involved online monitoring of the status of citizens’ complaints and transparency in the functioning of the district administrative bodies. The Public Private Partnership that adopted running the interactive kiosks in Hindi, the national language of India, has facilitated large-scale participation of rural area poverty-stricken people who were traditionally left out of the loop. Complaint boxes are also an effective method of reducing the time taken to address public grievances and to make district officials more accountable to the public at large. Initially, the initiative began in the Sitapur District and was later introduced in 2005 to the entire State of Uttar Pradesh. To sustain the initiative, in 2006, a state-level apex society known as “Lokvani Uttar Pradesh” was created as the nodal agency responsible for coordinating and supervising the district level’s functioning of Lokvanis societies. By December 2007, the number of complaints received totaled 107,453 through the 700 Lokvani kiosks across the state, of which 102,648 were addressed [21]. Challenges, however, include obtaining funding to purchase complaint boxes or kiosks and preventing them from being vandalized. Choosing safe locations manned by security guards such as government buildings, federalized banks, public schools, college/university campuses, or ATM booths would be the key to making this an effective method. 4.3. Help Line for Distressed Women To reach society’s softer targets, namely destitute battered women, a help line has been launched by some communities to receive distress calls around the clock by a team of police, social activists and students. They may visit the victims or provide counseling, legal help, medical support, and so forth as the situation demands. The Trichy police in Tamil Nadu State have gone a step further in promoting awareness on gender issues and women’s rights and, with the help of NGOs, women organizations and the social welfare department they offer rehabilitation programs by providing victims, along with their children, accommodations, education, vocational training, and employment. 4.4. Slum Adoption Programs Due to poverty and other socio-economic factors, India’s slums have become the breeding ground for criminals and other anti-social elements. Slum adoption programs play a dual role of alleviating poverty and increasing police accessibility to slum neighborhoods. Attempts are being made to improve the living conditions through mass awareness programs on hygiene, evils of drug/alcoholism and AIDS. Women self-help groups have been formed to instruct vocational training and provide assistance in the manufacturing and marketing of products. The Kerala State government is involved in another poverty eradication mission, Kudumbashree ASRAYA, or shelter that is concerned with identifying and rehabilitating the destitute populations and monitoring their progress. One unique feature of the ASRAYA project is that the implementation is carried out through involvement of the local Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that use simple criteria for identifying the recipients. Neighborhood group membership is comprised of 20 to 40 women from poor families who are the key contact persons for

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recognizing and supporting the destitute in their areas. Physical requirements of the target groups as well as the source of funding for meeting their basic needs are integrated into the Village Plan by the CBOs in consultation with the respective recipients. As a result, Kudumbashree today covers 633 of 999 Village Panchayats benefiting a total of 49,080 families. The program has increased awareness of all stakeholders and has mobilized large scale voluntary resources. The redeeming outcome is mainstreaming of the destitute families and their social inclusiona remarkable achievement [21]. 4.5. Vishwas Yojna (Building Trust with Children) Schools are encouraged to routinely take children to visit police stations, thereby overcoming their fear of the police which is apparently ingrained by popular media and Bollywood films. This will go a long way in increasing transparency, awareness and a better understanding of the police force and encourage children to respect and possibly choose this profession. Educational documentaries, like ‘Aap aur Hum’: you and us (the police), help explain in lay terms the functioning of police stations and traffic posts, the rules for police officers at various levels, as well as highlight the challenges faced due to limited resources and the role of citizen participation in policing. 4.6. Neighborhood or Community Watch Groups The community policing initiative in the state of Assam was started in 1996 by launching “neighborhood watch schemes” to promote policing through community participation. This was aimed at changing the perspectives of the police constables about the public, and to make them people friendly, and at the same time improve living and working conditions of the communities involved. Thus the goal of ‘PRAHARI’ (guard), was twofold, one to tackle social problems and two, to bring the police and community closer during this process. It was first launched in a remote village where five innocent people were brutally murdered by the villagers. This was a follow up to the deaths of several children due to various diseases. When the villagers were questioned about the brutal deaths they strongly justified their actions by saying that those five had murdered their children as a sacrifice to the local gods. Very low levels of education and lack of medical facilities has led to beliefs in witchcraft in different backward parts of Assam. The police efforts through ‘Project Prahari’ has initiated the formation of Community Management Groups (CMG) or Community Liaison Groups that allow people to meet with the police and voice their concerns and complaints while working together on building community wells, canals and hand pumps or self help initiatives [23].

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5. Challenges of Sustaining Community Policing Successfully achieving the transformation from a traditional policing model to a community policing model in all the states, districts and cities of India can prove to be difficult due to a host of reasons including, overcoming the innate distrust of police that exists in the minds of traditionally marginalized communities and ethnicities; concern for personal safety and other consequences in befriending the police; maintaining continued organizational support and validation for community policing programs; challenges of bureaucracy, red-tape and corruption; and lack of a visible rewarding system for the police or the citizens at large. These problems are compounded by organizational resistance inherent in most para-military organizations similar to the police and fire departments that prefer to maintain the status-quo. Thus, we see a piece-meal community policing approach in various parts of India dependent upon pro-active leadership of certain government officials or para-military heads. Additionally, there is a challenge in maintaining the interest of grossly underpaid police constables who can see no direct rewards translating into promotions or salary bonuses and who are, hence, reluctant to spend more time and energy towards these efforts. There is also concern among police personnel and the public for personal safety, because of the persistent lack of trust between the two parties. With minimal accountability or oversight standards and organizational backing, these projects are certain to close down from underfunding in the future. There is much to be learned and emulated from community policing experiments that have succeeded as they not only make their communities more vigilant against terrorist threats but also create community stakeholders who are better trained, capable and stronger in the face of natural disasters. Building disaster resilient communities in India will require the combined efforts of the National Disaster Management Authority under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the various stakeholders, including citizens and para-military groups, private sector organizations and non-profit groups. They must be collectively involved in initiating, monitoring, reviewing, and revising programs at the local levels that incorporate: 1. Hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness practices that involve the community at all stages of planning and implementation (for example, education programs). 2. Bridge social and regional gaps by institutionalizing and validating these community policing involvements (for example, community policing, citizen watch). 3. Interact with youth at high schools and universities to educate and develop youth leaders and reduce fundamentalist ideologies from taking root in the youth. 4. Interact with pressure groups -faith-based groups and community-leaders within the Indian society to reduce tensions stemming from differing beliefs and preferences. 5. Educate and train citizens in different walks of life on the “do’s and don’ts” for multiple disasters. 6. Strengthen infrastructure support (for example, disaster warning systems) and drills and exercises to periodically test and be assured of public knowledge and participation. 7. Set up trained city vigilance groups comprised of the young and old and represented equitably by a cross section of the population.

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8. Fund, initiate, and encourage citizens to seek training through the citizen police and fire training academies to ensure a steady pool of trained volunteers. 9. Initiate Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between various agencies to be able to suitably expand local capacities at times of disasters. 10. Increase funding to train doctors and hospital staff and set up more government run counseling centers. 11. Encourage funding for international work groups and alliances to exchange ideas, training protocols and information sharing that will help meet the needs of India and as well as the global community. 6. Conclusion In the United States, federal involvement has changed the nature of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) [24] programs that educate people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area and train them in basic disaster response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical operations, to name a few. Simpson [25] found that the most important influence in increasing the popularity of these programs across the country was the role that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) played in terms of (1) institutionalization, (2) validation, (3) standardization, (4) facilitation, and (5) promotion of these programs. In India, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) can influence the popularity of community policing programs by institutionalizing them in all the states. The NDMA should facilitate setting up sub-agencies within the police department, fire department, trade schools, or local community centers in various cities. These can then offer train-the-trainer courses, built on the lines of core courses offered to officials in police academies and strengthened with topics that address “what to do” scenarios for an all-hazards approach. Additional modules can be tailored to meet the specific needs of a community (for example, religious unrest, theft, flooding, and so forth). These training materials can also be uploaded on city police websites that are freely available to citizen watch groups who wish to seek training. Giving these an “official” sanctioned look will help in validating these community policing programs and also reduce distrust in the minds of people. Listing of community policing programs across the country on a national portal with links to the achievements and best practices adopted in various communities, cities and states will further help in promoting these programs. Making video training materials available in community libraries, schools, colleges, universities and trade schools to train the younger generation of citizens will also be meaningful and will allow citizens and police of poorer communities to share their challenges and experiences and facilitate information and resource sharing from wealthier states and organizations. Also, standardizing manuals and training materials made available in different nationally recognized languages, especially those that are spoken in India’s major disaster spots (namely, Hindi, Assamese, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali, Kannada, Kashmiri and Tamil) will facilitate a greater number of citizens in becoming trained to deal with major disasters. These measures will facilitate a broader acceptance of the concept of citizen participation in disasters and emergency management by the Indian people.

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These community policing efforts adopted primarily to combat the growing threat of racial and religious conflicts, riots, murder, anti-social activities, and terrorism can also serve as an opportunity in disguise for natural hazards mitigation and management. Citizens trained in community policing academies can be synonymous with community emergency response teams and assist in mitigating, preparing and responding to natural hazards as well. Thus, an all hazards approach to disaster risk reduction that encourages community stakeholders to work together will be the road to sustainable development and serve in creating disaster resilient communities of the future in India.

References [1] National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Government of India. Retrieved on September 5th, 2008, http://ndma.gov.in/wps/portal/NDMAPortal. [2] R. Dynes, Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 12/2(1994):141-158. [3] M. K. Lindell, C. S. Prater and R. W. Perry, Introduction to Emergency Management. Hoboken NJ: John Wiley and Sons (2007). [4] J. Salter, Towards a better Disaster Management Methodology. Australian Journal of Emergenc Management, 10(4)(1995), 8-16. [5] D. McEntire, A. Fuller, C. Johnston, C. W. and Weber R, A Comparison of Disaster Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic Policy Guide. Public Administration Review, 62 (3)(2002.): 267-281. [6] P. Berke,. Natural-Hazard Reduction and Sustainable Development: A Global Assessment. Journal of Planning Literature. 9(4)(1995):370- 82. [7] P. Berke, R. Kartez, Jack and Wenger, Dennis. Recovery after Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation and Equity. Disasters 17(2)(1993): 93-109. [8] B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and Davis, Ian, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. 2nd ed. London: Routledge 2004. [9] Helsloot and A. Ruitenberg, Citizen Response to Disasters: a Survey of Literature and Some Practical Implications. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 12(3)(2004): 98-111. [10] Perry, W. Ronald and Lindell, Michael K. Understanding Citizen Response to Disasters with Implications for Terrorism. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 11(2)(2003): 49-60. [11] Census of India. Office of the Registrar General and Census commissioner of India. 2001. Statistics on Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics. Retrieved on September 8th, 2008 from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/glance.aspx [12] CIA.2005.TheWorldFactbook.RetrievedonSeptember15th,2008,from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. [13] United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2005. Human Development Reports. Retrieved September 15th, 2008 from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/. [14] C. Prater, W. Peacock, S. Arlikatti, and Grover, H, Social Capacity in Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu after the December 2004 Great Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami. Earthquake Spectra. 22(S3) (2006) pp 715S-729S. [15] R. Shaw, and K. Goda, From Disaster to Sustainable Community Planning and Development: The Kobe Experiences. Disaster Prevention and Management, 28(1)(2004), 16-40. [16] Y. Nakagawa, and R. Shaw, Social Capital: A Missing Link to Disaster Recovery. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22(1)(2004), 5-34. [17] Disaster Management in India a Status Report. Retrieved on September 5th, 2008, http://www.ndmindia.nic.in/EQProjects/Disaster%20Management%20in%20India%20%20A%20Status%20Report%20-%20August%202004.pdf [18] R. Trojanowicz, V.E. Kappeler, L.K. Gaines, B. Bucqueroux and Sluder R. Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective. Anderson Publishing, Cincinnati, OH(1998). [19] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, retrieved on 15th September, 2008 from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=36. [20] M. Morash, J.K. Ford, (eds.). The Move to Community Policing: Making Change Happen. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, London (2002). [21] Civil Service Awards, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances (DARPG), Government of India, retrieved on September 15th, 2008 from darpg.gov.in/arpgwebsite/civilserviceday/pmsaward06-07.pdf.

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[22] The Hindu, online edition of India’s National Paper http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/03/27/25hdline.htm [23] Human Rights Initiative Community Policing Experiments/ Outreach Programmes in India.Retrieved on September15th,2008, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/new/community_policing_experiments_in_india.pdf [24] Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Retrieved on November 4th, 2008 from http://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/. [25] D. M. Simpson, Community Emergency Response Training (CERTs): A recent History and Review. Natural Hazards Review, 2(2)(2001.): 54-63. [26] M. Lindell, and C. Prater, Assessing Community Impacts of Natural Disasters. Natural Hazards Review (2003). [27] D.L. Sheth, Caste and the secularization process in India. Pp.237-263 in Contemporary IndiaTransitions, ed. Peter Ronald de Souza. Fundação Oriente and Sage Publications, New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London (2000).

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Matching Incident Management Technologies and Human Factors for More Resilient Communities Velizar SHALAMANOV,a Ira GROSSMANb and Jeffrey WINBOURNEb a Center of Operational Analysis, Institute of Parallel Processing – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences b Winbourne & Costas, Inc., USA

Abstract. Deeper integration between various services dealing with civil security requires a new type of information and communications systems. At the same time, to a greater extent of importance is the community’s involvement in providing a better environment for security forces to protect citizens and the infrastructure. The authors focus on matching new technologies with human factors–both in security organizations as well as from the community–in providing safety and security in a terroristic threatened environment. Although integrated security operation centers supported by system development and training centers do not comprise the only answer based on technology, they do represent a new tool for community building programs. Keywords. civil security, emergency management, emergency communications, community building, resilience, computer based training

Introduction There exists a serious change in the security environment resulting from the various types of operations required to protect citizens [4, 7]. The key characteristics are related to the complexity, uncertainty, information intensity, and rapid speed of change. In the security sector, this presents a serious challenge for both technologies and human factors, as well as for communities that are now directly involved in a number of security operation aspects. The following discussion offers a possible solution to this challenge by introducing a test bed in an attempt to develop concepts and conduct experiments on the optimal use of new technologies and the related adaptation of human factors to the growing network of diverse security operation centers in a new environment. The role that operational analysis plays in concept development and training, more especially computer assisted exercises–CAX and computer-based training (CBT)–is analyzed through change management in the security sector. These developments are considered in the context of identifying factors that build more resilient communities. Using a test bed, we could develop better concepts for new types of security operations centers, integrated both vertically and horizontally. Examples of an integrated 112/911 emergency communications system (ECS), an integrated emergency management system (IEMS) and an integrated crisis management system

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(ICMS) are provided with special analysis of the required governance models, including private-public partnerships and democratic control aspects of the security system. This paper is based on research projects implemented by the Group of Operational Analysis and Training (GOAT) with the Joint Training Simulation and Analysis Center (JTSAC) on Civil Security (CS) in the Institute of Parallel Processing (IPP) located in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) and feasibility studies and management consulting projects of Winbourne & Costas Inc. (WCI). The main focus addresses Bulgaria’s interrelated projects funded by the Bulgarian Government, NATO, EU and USTDA.

1. New Types of Security Operations The key shift in security operations stem from a single organization operation to a well defined area of operations to complex integrated crisis management operations among the people, involving most, if not all, of the different security organizations and civil society as well [1]. These operations are very information-intensive and depend on reliable, accurate and timely information as well as society’s cooperation since the goal is to protect citizens and win the battle of society’s confidence [13].

Min. of Emergency Management

One Ministry’s Operation: •Diplomacy •Defense •Public order •Emergency management

Special Services

Min. of Interior

MoEM

Min. of Defense S e r v i c e s

MoI

Min. of Foreign Affairs MoD

i a l

Integrated Security Sector for Integrated Security, Information Intensive Operations

MoFA

S p e c

Integrated Security Sector Civil society Complex Crisis Management Operations of the Integrated Security Sector strongly dependent of information

Figure. 1. Contemporary security operations.

The security sector’s current structure of including different institutions with the authority to use force (information operations in support of the use of force) mirrors that of well-defined and separate operations in the use of force/information that support its use around stove pipe organizations (ministries, services). At the same time, the current security environment defines the need for complex crisis management operations where interagency, international, joint, and private-public cooperation is essential as presented in Figure 1. This requirement drives integration in the security

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sector where different institutions can maintain their identity together with an opportunity to form combined interagency joint forces for specific complex operations with a change in the mix of forces occurring during different operational stages or when moving from one to another operation in the same region. An integrated security sector is not a new stove pipe institution but rather a concept that allows a networked organization of institutions to work together, support one another, and reinforce each other when one institution has primary responsibility for an event according to the operation’s legal status.

The Кey Role of Decision Making Decision

Info attack

Info attack Decision Orientation

Planning

Understanding Knowledge Info assurance Information

Info assurance

Data

Observation

Action

Figure. 2. Integration of the decision making loop and cognitive pyramid in C2 process.

In the security sector, the key role is for decision making and effectiveness of Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems (C4IRS). Success is based on speed of the Observation, Orientation, Decision, Planning and Action (OODPA) cycle determined by a cognitive pyramid (transformation from data to information, knowledge, understanding, decision and down again) [11]. At the same time, we must recognize that there will be permanent information attacks attempting to ruin this process. Mitigating this attempt requires the capacity to assure that information in this environment has permanent command and control (C2) warfare/information operations (see Figure 2). Further, this concept defines C2 systems requirements as providing Civil Security through an Integrated Security Sector. Another challenge is because citizens are part of the operation itself, as a result, the C4ISR system with related C2 warfare/information operations involve the community. Every system that we design must contribute to winning C2 warfare over the opponent.

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2. Integrated Security Sector, Technologies and Community Resilience Factors It is extremely difficult to define a complete list of organizations belonging to the security sector. Although there are differences from county to country, for the purpose of this paper, we could consider that all the institutions presented in Figure 3 are part of the sector. Additionally, if we are looking at the change management process to bring these organizations into the overall integrated security sector architecture, there is ample space for research [2, 5]. The key issue concerning an integrated security sector architecture is to identify the capabilities provided by each organization, to assess its governance, management, and C2 structures and to plan the transition or transformation to where we have the best mix of capabilities and capacity to govern and manage the system optimally in order to provide for the best results in operations. With a focus on C2, such a study is closely related to the technologies used and the level of interoperability. Although there are many reasons for integration, two, in particular, are of critical importance: 1. There is one user–the citizen (for example, community, society, state, and alliance) that needs the service to be referred to as “security” because he/she does not want to deal with 30 institutions for this essential service

Organizations of the Integrated Security Sector Police Gendarme NATO

UN

EU

Fire Emergency Medical Civil Protection

Interpol Europol

Private Security Companies

Frontex Integrated Security Sector

Infrastructure companies

Army AF

Utility companies Volunteer EM groups

Navy Special Services

Schools Universities

NGO Red Cross / Red Crescent

Investigation

Reserve – National Guard

Figure. 3. Example of the diverse elements of the integrated security sector.

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2.

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There are new types of operations to provide security, but none of the organizations can achieve success without cooperating with the others

So, if we really want to serve the citizens and be successful, there is an urgent need for integration and better communication with the user. In regard to civil security, the key reform is in the area of policing [3]. The problem is that these organizations have totally different cultures as well as their own traditions and procedures. Therefore, the first step is to provide at least a certain level of interoperability of the core C2 systems through key technologies. Additionally, we must think about deeper integration using the change management tools. Furthermore, we will specifically focus on operational analysis (OA) and computer assisted exercises (CAX) as tools. Analysis of the operations and organizations brings us to the operational architecture including main planning scenarios (PS) and security/emergency support capabilities/functions (SSC/ESF) used to define the operational architecture of the integrated security sector.

Structure of the Technologies to Support C2 for Civil Security Surveillance, EW and Notification System 112 Call System

Dispatching Response teams comms, navigation and C2

Info Fusion and Decision Making Support Ops Centers Incident / Emergency / Crisis Management System

CPX / CAX

Backbone network Radio comms Field OC

Field eXercises

Operational Analysis of Civil Security System

Figure. 4. Example of the diverse technologies in support of the C2 process.

System and technical architectures are related to technologies. As it was difficult to list all organizations in the security sector, it is even more difficult to name the technologies that support C2 in security operations. In order to start somewhere, let us consider the technologies used in 112/911 Emergency Communications Systems (ECS), Integrated Emergency Management Systems (IEMS) and Integrated Crisis

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Management Systems (ICMS) presented in Figure 4. In military terms, this covers all C4ISR [6]. When matched with the operational architecture, analysis of the main systems and respective technologies will bring us to the system and technical architecture of the C2 system for the integrated security sector operations. There must be the same amount of maturity in operational, system and technical levels in order to have an effective C2 system. This is a challenge to be addressed later. Even a fully integrated security sector using the best new technologies is not capable of resolving the problems faced by current security. In a civil society, every citizen plays a role in contemporary security operations. One of the goals is to improve the community’s resilience that can occur only in close cooperation between the security sector and the communities themselves. Because this includes making communities a partner in the security environment, we need to study specific capabilities that include the “governance, management and C2” structure of every specific community and match them with the integrated security sector’s local operations. For local operations, the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) is the interface between the community and security sector. PSAPs are characterized by their dynamic inbound call environment that maintains both a reactive and responsive posture by receiving and triaging citizen calls for service and dispatching appropriate public safety resources. Data input by dispatchers into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system provide a wealth of information that can be utilized by all disciplines for a variety of management purposes, including police, fire, EMS, and emergency management staff. CAD data provide statistical information that can be utilized to support the priority setting, policy making and resource deployment. In the United States, private security officers, whether armed or not, rely on the 911 system to notify police, fire, and EMS of crimes that are in progress or have already occurred and to request assistance for medical and other emergencies. The PSAP is a “one-stop shopping” for public safety resources and a critical element to both local and national domestic preparedness. Although the PSAP primarily receives calls, its unique situational awareness of events also places it in a position to provide information to citizens. Some jurisdictions in the United States utilize an emergency alert system, or an electronic Emergency Alert Notification System, a communication tool that gives public safety agencies the ability to contact citizens when an emergency exists. Citizens’ phone numbers are stored in a computer system that pinpoints their location thus allowing emergency personnel to notify residents living in areas affected by the emergency. A recording is broadcast to the affected area giving instructions on proper steps to take. This is an especially important capability that can enhance domestic preparedness and emergency responses to an entire region regardless of whether it involves severe weather or a terrorist event. Operationally, the PSAP must maintain readiness to effectively handle incidents that generate an abnormally high volume of calls while supporting the ability to filter, analyze, respond, and share the amalgam of information. This is also critical to preparation and response activities of emergency operation centers that can benefit from the timely, accurate and reliable information that is generated at the PSAP. Accordingly, the co-location of emergency operation centers and PSAPs in the United States continues to increase with each new facility. This trend was primarily brought

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about by major events and activities occurring at the beginning of this century that illuminated the need for all public safety organizations to share information. Although designing and building a co-located PSAP and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with distinct operations is a relatively simple matter, it is another matter to establish a government structure that supports effective information-sharing and coordination of activities in a more collaborative fashion. The consolidation or “fusion” of information-sharing facilitates first responder effectiveness and enhanced public safety. A newer component of public safety in the United States is the growth of fusion centers that essentially manage the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and private industry.1 The fusion process turns information and intelligence into actionable knowledge. Modern information technology systems do not require that PSAPs and EOCs cohabitate in a single facility. Video-conferencing capabilities are now commonplace in many larger U.S. police departments that can bridge the communications gap formerly caused by the utilization of disparate facilities. However, PSAP and EOC operations each require different and specific domain expertise and leadership skills. Hence, it is natural that each operation should retain its distinct identities which does not distract from the ability to foster a fully cooperative information exchange in support of public safety. Further, when crises arise and command action is required, reliable, accurate and timely information-sharing, decision support leadership meetings and the unambiguous issuance of directives involve faceto-face interaction to be most effective. Thus, the trend is towards joint EOC/PSAP facilities. Additionally, it is more cost-effective to design, locate and build one central hardened facility than two. Within the context of this research, the challenge is to develop an all-inclusive information gathering and fusion process and governance model that can truly incorporate all levels of government and private industry in an effective manner. We need to develop the concept of security operation centers (SOC) as a network in order to provide the most effective cooperation between the community and security sector. All factors that influence the community’s resilience must be taken into account when building a SOC is considered. Figure 5 displays only a few examples of the possible factors to support community resilience.

1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Fusion, April 28, 2005.

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Factors for the Resilient Community Building Call Centers and CAD/RMS Active NGO

Alerting and Notification

Involvement of schools Contribution of universities

Professional Level of the Security Services Resilient Community

Governance and Financing of the Security Systems

Community involving in Exercises Computer based training for citizens

Civil and Democratic Control of the Security Services

Mutual Trust and Confidence

Effectiveness of the Security Services

Figure. 5. Example of the diverse factors to support community resilience

3. Role of the OA and CAX in Security Sector Change Management In order to match security operations, security sector organizations and community technologies and factor their resilience, there is a need for intensive operational analysis. Additionally, we must utilize innovative training/testing approaches based on modern computer technologies to internalize solutions both for the security sector and communities. Concerning governance, architecture, infrastructure, operations and even management aspects of security systems, 911/112 Emergency Communications Systems (EMS) and other higher level systems such as Integrated Emergency Management Systems (IEMS) and Integrated Crisis Management Systems (ICMS), there is a need for a Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) process with Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD) and training. Several times it has been mentioned that Operational Analysis (OA) can play a serious positive role in making better decisions or contributing to the good governance model development. In addition, our studies have proved that testing new alternative concepts for decisions or even developing alternatives through computer assisted exercises (experiments) could highly improve transparency, effectiveness and efficiency and provide an opportunity for measurement and accountability [8]. The last characteristics are of crucial importance for the effectiveness of democratic control. Using NATO SfP981149 and NATO SfP982063 projects in Bulgaria to build OA and CAX capacity in support of the security sector transformation, it was possible to positively influence the process of decision making, although, we have learned that the approach must be internalized in administration [8]. Additional findings have indicated that it is very helpful to partly outsource the analysis to the academic sector in order to

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provide a high quality analyses. At the same time, this approach could be used as an integration tool between security sector entities such as, for example, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Ministry of Defense and so forth, using the same academic base for operational analyses. In the future, it will be possible to base security sector decisions on true integrated joint analysis. As shown in Figure 6, putting humanities and social sciences in the loop of CDE is of great importance. Recently, when decisions in the security sector were significantly influenced by citizen perceptions and the results were more directly related to the security of every citizen than ever before, this provided “an open door” to study the human factor interaction with technology and organizational arrangements–not only the security sector human factor but community representatives as well. Relation between OA and CAX in Integrated Security Sector Studies Humanities and Social Sciences

Subject Matter Experts

Decision Makers System Analysts

OA

OR / Mathematicians

CAX

Software Developers

Humanities and Social Sciences Concept Development

Experimentation

Figure. 6. Interaction as the process of CDE using the OA and CAX The Joint Training Simulation and Analysis Center in Civil Security (JTSAC-CS) that was used to support the change management process in Bulgaria’s civil security area is based on the specially developed model for concept development and experimentation in the area of civil security through CAX. This model is a base for the change management process; transformation of the security sector into an integrated network enabled the organization to address challenges of civil security, a goal of the third generation of security sector reform (the previous two generations were structural and functional challenges or the identification and differentiation phase of change).

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Training as a Tool for Change Management Individual Training General Education / Training

Joint CAX Planning

Knowledge management

Lessons Learned Analysis

Specialized Tactical Training

Pre-exercise Training

CAX / experiment

Remote sites, citizens

Figure. 7. Process of education and training in support of change management

JTSAC is a research instrument including modeling and simulation (M&S) in crisis management to support CAX in this area. This observation is especially supported in the exercise context of EU TACOM SEE-2006 (EU terrorist attack was a consequence management in the SEE exercise), in particular its CAX part that the JTSAC supported [12]: • • • • • • •

Strategic review of the civil protection system in Bulgaria and its EU/NATO/regional context Development of the Civil Security Concept for Bulgaria Development of General Scenario, Operational Architecture and Message Flow for EU TACOM SEE-2006 Establishing a model environment based on JTSAC for implementation of the Operational Architecture and Message Flow for EU TACOM SEE-2006 Individual and pre-exercise participant training in the exercise CAX implementation itself Currently undergoing the process of analysis, assessment and lessons learned drafting from the exercise plans to update a white paper on civil protections and concepts for civil security

CAX has a key role in the CDE process because it provides integration of different organizations and technologies as well as involves people in the loop of experimentation. In a certain sense, CAX itself is a motivation and tool for joint work

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and well-documented experimentation, providing objective material for conceptual analysis and adaptation [12]. Experimentation of new concepts is the driving force of change of which training has a critical role to play. We see the training aspects in all the different elements in understanding the process for change in management: • • • • • • •

General education and training (E&T) Joint planning for CAX Individual training Pre-exercise group training CAX itself (or just experimentation for knowledge acquisition support) Lessons learned analysis and recommendations drafting and Specialized tactical training in parallel or separately from CAX

To play such a role in the Change Management Tool, training must be based on effective M&S of the future reality or virtual reality in order to learn from this “future.” It must be supported by an effective measurement system and adaptation. In this sense, CAX is only a platform to arrange different types of training with a main focus on experimental concepts and to drive the change.

4. Architecture of the Security Operation’s Command and Control Test Bed and Operations Center In order for OA and CAX to be used effectively, there is a need for an adequate infrastructure. An infrastructure can be in industry facilities, in administration research and training centers or on the premises of an academic public research institution (in Bulgaria, BAS or a university). Maybe even in this case, a mixed solution is the best if properly governed. Due to political turmoil during last 20 years in Bulgaria, it is very difficult to develop and sustain a solid research and education capacity inside the security sector, and because of the Soviet legacy at the BAS (a research institution consisting of 80 different institutes covering all aspects of human behavior), our approach is focused on developing a center for applied interdisciplinary studies in security governance, management and C2 within BAS in cooperation with the universities, administration and industry at the national, NATO and EU level. This is a test bed for commercial off the shelf (COTS) and state of the art (SOA) technologies “upgraded” by innovative architectures, models, databases, and organizations/procedures that include human factors in the loop for training and for the study of medico-biological and behavioral aspects of operating in such an environment (the research team in JTSAC-CS has an experience form similar to the experiment on MIR’s Space Station during the SovietBulgarian Flight and later during EU TACOM SEE-2006). Another aspect of using the test bed is connected with the economic issues of security operations and security research/training. The test bed is derived from the established framework to plan, manage and assess CDE processes using project management tools and balanced score card technology based on a clear strategy of using JTSAC-CS for change in management to the integrated security sector.

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In order to support the strategy, an open and flexible architecture needs to be developed. In the center of this architecture is the Operations Center (configured for every specific study/test that can be used room for brain storming, discussion and training). This center is surrounded by other elements of the architecture as shown in Figure 7. The concept is that in every specific case some of these elements could be the real ones or simulated by a Modeling and Simulation Cell. Currently, all the technologies and personnel deployed to operate the JTSAC-CS are based on people from the BAS and assets acquired through various projects sponsored by the government, NATO, EU, and U.S. The center is open for regional cooperation in the civil security area [9].

Architecture of the test bed for technologies and human factor role Continuity of Operations Planning / Information Assurance Communications center

Scenario Development

Analytical center / DMS Modeling and Simulation

Mobile C2 Center Monitoring & Early Warning Alerting and Notification

Operations Center

Planning and Assessment, Lessons Learnt

Media and Public Relations / Communities

Briefing / training center – Knowledge Management

Call taking and dispatching

Human Factor Analysis Center

Service Oriented Architecture / Capabilities Planning Figure. 8. Functional packages in the architecture of civil security C2 process

Using the experience of JTSAC-CS and working very close with WCI on feasibility studies, we achieved the model from the universal Security Operations Center’s (SOC) architecture presented in Figure 8 that can be adapted to every specific case on the basis of: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Analysis of planning scenarios Review of emergency support functions/security support capabilities Assessment of the current technologies used Assessment of the security sector’s organization for the specific case and procedures used Analysis of community related factors (including universities, schools, hospitals, etc.) as well as the role of local private business Review of the upper level (up to the international level) of security systems

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7. 8. 9.

Assessment of the governance and financing mechanisms Validation development of the conceptual design Development of a comprehensive solution with adequate management mechanism implementation

One of the key elements of this architecture, in addition to being generic and capable to provide a base for adaptation, is that most of the components are multi-role. For example, the emergency operations room could be used for planning conferences, training, coordinating meetings, etc. (in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, this room was even used for the local election commissions during elections). Similarly, the room could be used as a center for call back notifications and so forth.

Architecture of the Security Operations Center Video teleconferencing

Video Projection Screens

112 Center

Flat Panel Screens or Front Projection Screens

Early Warning System

Communications with mobile command units

ESF

ESF

ESF

Emergency Ops Room Glass

Notifications Systems Expandable/Optional Crisis Workstations

Incident Management System

IEWS

Comms

Ops Mgr

Glass

Watch Room Utilities Transport

GIS/Maps

IEMS

Confidential Room

CAD

Computer aided Dispatch

Figure. 9. Generic architecture for the operations center in civil security C2 system

Using the concept of formal theories in mathematics, there is a close relationship between different SOC and JTSAC-CS. We could claim that JTSAC-CS is a theory or ideal model, with many implementations in the specific SOC. Our focus on the SOC is to start with the basic element, building blocks of the integrated system to provide security for the citizens and infrastructure. Citizen security is provided on at least three levels by three vertical level integrated systems presented in Figure 9. 1.

The Incident Management System that receives calls from citizens or other sources and react with first responder capabilities police, fire teams, Civil Protection (CP) teams, and Medical Emergency (ME) teams

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Information Systems Support to the Operations of the Integrated Security Sector Citizen / caller Unified Emergency Call Taking Incident

Specialized Dispatching (CAD)

Police

Fire

Medical Emergency

Large Emergency Situation Emergency Support Functions

Early Warning System

Civil Protection Alert and Notification System

Rescue Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Mobile EOC

Defense Related Emergency Support Functions

Crisis Management Center (CMC) Defense Related Crisis Response Functions

Crisis Situation

Figure 10. Integration among incident, emergency and crisis management systems – vertical and horizontal

2.

3.

If there are too many calls or calls for a series of incidents as well as information from the Early Warning (EW) System (part of the Integrated Emergency Management System–IEMS) or from the Crisis Management System (CMS) for large emergencies, the IEMS is activated through the network of Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and deployment of the mobile EOC. In addition to police, fire, ME and CP, other capabilities are activated from emergency support function areas (transport, utilities, and others). In certain cases through CMS, the defense force elements (defense related to EM support functions from engineers, NBC, medical, transport, even Special Forces and CIMIC) are activated in support of civil authorities. In this case, the Incident Management System (IMS) is “subordinated” to a certain extent to the higher priority emergency management operation. If there is any kind of intentional external threat or any kind of threat to Bulgarian citizens outside the country, the crisis management system is activated and the emergency management and incident management systems are “subordinated” to the highest priority crisis management operation.

Critical for IEMS is Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) linked with Geographic Information System (GIS) and related Automated Vehicle Location (AVL) databases (including access to Automatic Number Identification–ANI and Automatic Location

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Identification–ALI) as well as sharing call taking, dispatch, and operations information between different centers. On the level of EOC, a new system for emergency management is required with an opportunity to manage resources and messages to be linked with the Early Warning System, Alert and Notification System, Decision Making Support System, and enhanced Office Management System. This IEMS is linked with CAD and GIS databases of the IMS. On the level of the Crisis Management Center (CMC) at the next level, a modern C2 system for intensive military involvement is required but linked with IEMS and IMS. The CMC should have access to the Alert and Notification System (for the population or specific decision makers) and the EOC. In certain cases, especially at the district and municipality level, the EOC and CMC could be one and the same facility with certain specifics but there is a need for redundancy so as to have a main and alternate center. When the city is a district/region center, one main center could be run by the governor’s administration or an alternative one by the mayor’s administration. However, it is required to have two available both for the governor and the mayor in order to save resources and to provide a level of redundancy. In analyzing Figure 10, there are key principles for governing the integrated C4ISR system that could be drafted: • • • • • • •

There are both horizontal and vertical integrations between elements of the security sector and citizens/community. Integration is supported mainly by integrated information and communications systems. For vertical integration, there is always a main subsystem controlling the operation and systems below and above providing support. For horizontal integration, there is always a main subsystem controlling the operation and systems from the same level providing support. Subsystems from the higher level follow information from the subsystems at the lower level and decide at which threshold level to take over. Subsystems of the same horizontal level exchange limited information required for providing support to the leading one. When the authority is transferred from one to another subsystem (in any situation–horizontally or vertically), the whole “operational picture” is transferred to provide continuity.

5. Governance, Partnership and Democratic Control of the Security Operations Command and Control Systems In order to illustrate the complexity of governance, management and C2 level, as well as the challenge of including the citizens/community, we will consider the model developed by WCI for 112 ECS in Europe (presented and highly appreciated during the first EU Safety and Security Conference in Brussels, June 2007). Key elements of this governance model presented in Figure 11 include [10]: •

Government level 112 ECS Council consisting of representatives from all stakeholders, including citizens/communities

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• • • • • •

Trust fund managed by the government but off the budget Surcharges collected by the telecom operators from the users of any kind of telephone sets (established by law for the trust fund) Assigned operator of the 112 ECS (from the government or in publicprivate partnerships (PPP) with a private operator) Integration of the 112 ECS with IEMS and ICMS Assigned System Developer/Operational Readiness (including training) Agent Existence of users representing an organization to provide assessment of the quality of service for 112 ECS in coordination with the 112 ECS Council

Management Consulting for the challenge of Governance, Financing, Integration and Operational readiness in IMS, EMS, CMS Integration (case of Bulgaria) MoF is managing Trust fund for 112 Implementation and Operation

Telecom operators “112” surcharge collection and accountability for expenditures

CRC - Regulations Incident Management System

MoD – Crisis management and Mobilization

Emergency and Crisis Management System

MoH - Dispatching MoEM - Dispatching

Т. 150

Т. 8626075

Agency for CI Protection

“112” Council

T. 080020112

MoI - Dispatching Т. 160, 166

ITC Agency– program office for the project, training, maintenance

EOC of MoEM 6 x Т. 112 Call Centers

Early warning and Notification System

Figure. 11.. Example of the governance structure for 112 ECS (MoF–ministry of finance, MoD–ministry of defense, MoI–ministry of interior, CI–classified information, ITC–Information technology and communications, MoEM–ministry of emergency situation, CRC–commission for regulations of communications)

There are many specifics on the organization and rules of operation of the council, trust fund, call/dispatch centers, issues related to protection of classified information and protection of personal data, and so forth that are included in the model but are not discussed in this paper. The transition to effective operations in a totally new security environment does not only include the issue of reforming the security sector, introducing new

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technologies and involving community and industry, but is also a real challenge for “inventing” an effective development and operational partnership model. Following the experience in Bulgaria, working in close cooperation between administration, industry, the academic sector, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions, we are keen to establish and further improve the model presented in Figure 11. Of course, it is up to industry to provide solutions for different systems such as 311 and 911 in the U.S. (113, 112 in EU), integrated early warning, integrated emergency management, crisis management, and C4ISR for the military sector. These systems are integrated according to the concepts developed using OA in the academic sector working with the administration; in this environment, training through CAX and ADL (other computer based training) is taking place with involvement from the communities as well. The general political environment and public policies are developed by NGOs and parties and are defended publicly in the society. By decree, such an ideal model could not be implemented in a day. It is a long process of change management, primarily change in the culture of all involved organizations, and again OA and CAX are one of the key tools to support the process of change.

Development Partnership Model Industry Solutions

NGO Policy and Politics

311 / 113

112/911 CMS

EOC

Analysis

C4ISR

IEMS IEWS

Local

National and regional Operational Analysis / CAX / ADL Science and technology Administration

Local security systems

National / regional security systems

Figure. 12. Model for partnership between NGO, industry, administration and academic (research) community in the process of development civil security C2 systems

One of the first steps in providing the foundation for change management in the security sector was the development of the general reference architecture (temple) of security/security sector presented in Figure 12. Security is related to the required operations that support it and respective operational concepts (for example, Effect

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Based Operations, Network Enabled Operations, and so forth). This security concept is supported by four main pillars: •

• • •

Documents (from the Constitution/Founding Agreement through laws and other normative acts to define rules, followed by concepts, strategies and doctrines to define goals, tools and at the end reporting/assessment documents as annual reports and white papers) Organizations (all types of institutional arrangements at the governmental, management and operational level) Systems, or better yet, capabilities (in all areas of interest for effectively performed operations, defined on the roof of the temple of security) Resources (to include financial, material, human, and information/ knowledge and even political and motivation resources as well)

Architecture Framework for Security Sector Institution Building

Security and Defense Operations D O C U M E N T S

ORGANIZATIONS

S Y S T E M S

RESOURCES

National/International cooperation / integration Democratic Control Change management

Figure. 13. Temple of the security sector These pillars are placed at three fundaments: •

•

National/international cooperation/integration (to provide horizontal and vertical integration between national security sector elements as well as regional and larger cooperation and integration in security alliances such as NATO) Democratic control (to provide legitimacy and strength of the security sector in the long term based on political and public support and to prevent the security sector to be used against society or in any private interest)

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•

173

Change management capacity (based on the concept of continuous improvement and readiness for radical change if such occurs in the environment)

This framework exists in the larger environment of relations between security and development, threats and opportunities as well as relations between the security sector and all institutions of the civil society, academic and business sector regarding security. Every element of this “temple of security” is important, but of critical importance are the foundations. We would particularly like to emphasize the role of democratic control, the element that must guarantee that all the efforts to build the institutions will serve to the public good, and to the citizens, but not to private or narrow institutional interests. Efforts in the area of community involvement in the process of change management, including training and development of support capabilities, contribute both to the improvement of the community’s resilience and strengthen the integrated security sector’s capability of by improving the base for democratic control.

6. Conclusion This paper covered a very diverse portfolio of research and practice over the last 10 years, focusing mainly on Bulgaria’s experience. Yet, we have presented these findings in the context of successful NATO and EU integrations as well as the strategic partnership with the U.S., especially in the area of security. More specifically, the paper is a product of close cooperation between JTSAC-CS and WCI during the NATO, EU and U.S. funded projects in Europe. The main idea projected is that understanding security has changed during the past 10 years. Operations that provide security for citizens, the infrastructure and the economy are extremely complex interagency efforts that involve civil society in a greater capacity. This challenge leads to the evolving concept of an integrated security sector, supported by horizontal and vertical integration of the information and communications systems. Effective development, implementation and operation of these systems require new types of test beds for concept development and experimentation that directly support the design of new types and networks of SOCs. Operational analysis and CAX in JTSAC-CS (test bed for civil security C2 systems) is only the first step in addressing the issue. The next level of challenges is related to the governance model, development of a partnership model and maintaining effective democratic control. In all these tasks, we need to recognize the community’s role and satisfy the factors by providing a higher level of resilience for these communities. Briefly, the authors presented their experiences from both sides of the Atlantic and from military and public safety backgrounds. More importantly is the opportunity for us to discuss our findings and ideas with professionals and to work together on how better to use JTSAC-CS in Sofia in cooperation with WCI, and, most of all to reinforce the power of TIDS as a network to support security and democracy.

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References [1] T. BarnettT. 2004. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century. New York: Berkley Books. [2] A. Bryden, and M. Caparini (eds.). 2006. Private Actors and Security Governance. Berlin: Lit Verlag. [3] M. Caparini, and O. Marenin (eds.). 2004 Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe: Process and Progress. Munster: Lit Verlag. [4] B. Jenkins, 2006. Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, Washington, DC: RAND. [5] J. Clarke (ed.), 2006. Armies in Homeland Security: American and European Perspectives. Published by George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. [6] G. Johnson, (ed.), IT, Emerging Commercial Capabilities, Terrorism – Information and Security International Journal, Volume 19, Sofia: ProCon; 2006. [7] G. Nicole and G. Giovanni Grevi, The New world Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025, ISS-EU, Paris. [8] K. Niemeyer. V. Shalamanov and team. 2008. Operations Research Support to Force Planning in the New Security Environment, Final report of NATO SfP981149 project (2004-2008), Sofia: ARTGRAF. [9] P. Volten, and B. Tashev (eds.), 2007. Establishing Security and Stability in the Wider Black Sea Area,” Bulgaria, 5-9 April, 2006, NATO Science for Peace Security, Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics, vol. 26. [10] V. Shalamanov. 2008. “Civil Security and Crisis Management: CDE Process in Bulgaria (the Role of US, NATO, EU in SEE).” In: Iztok Prezelj (ed.) NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 32 “Crisis Management and Counter-terrorism in the Westerns Balkans.” Amsterdam-Berlin-Oxford-Tokyo-Washington: IOS Press. [11] V. Shalamanov, and T. Tagarev. 1996. Information Aspects of Security. Sofia: ProCon Ltd. (in Bulgarian). [12] V. Shalamanov. Computer Assisted Exercise Environment for Terrorist Attack Consequence Management, In Transforming Training and Experimentation through Modeling and SimulationMeeting Proceedings RTO-MP-MSG-045, Rome, Italy, October 4-7, 22-1 - 22-18, 2006. [13] R. Smith. 2008. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. New York: Vintage Books– A Division of Random House, Inc.

Part 3 The Society and Counter Terrorism

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-177

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (BTRC): The Problem and the Way Out Sıddık EKICIa,1 and Ekrem MUSb,2 a University of North Texas b Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract. This study points out two important problems related to protecting our communities from terrorism and introduces a community based protection method to develop Terrorism Resistant Communities. A comparative content analysis method is used to determine the characteristics of existing community based security programs. For this purpose, programs relative to three countries (U.S., the U.K. and Turkey) are examined. The minimum qualifications for building terrorism resistant communities are identified and recommended in the findings. Keywords. community, counter terrorism, new initiative, program, resilience, terrorism, terrorism resistant

Introduction Although terrorism has affected our communities for decades, after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center, the reality became clear that no country is immune to terrorism [1]. There are two ways to approach the problem: proactive and reactive. Proactive approaches include counter measures taken in advance to avoid terrorism threats and attacks, while reactive approaches consist of merely offensive measures to respond to an attack and recovery operations to heal from an attack [2]. Based on existing terrorism problems faced in many countries, it is quite clear that reactive measures do not provide long term solutions. In addition, due to political concerns and definitional problems experienced in the field of terrorism, there is a need for communities to develop non-conventional protection methods oriented towards citizens and encourages their involvement. Terrorist attacks can be carried out through the use of any number of agents and delivery methods, including anthrax, smallpox, the water system, the agriculture industry; threats to bridges, tunnels, trains, airlines, and other transportation systems; suicide bombings in crowded cities, convention centers, and shopping malls; the possibilities are many, but there is also a limit to them. 1

Sıddık Ekici: Ph.D. candidate, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas. Police Major -Turkish National Police. 2 Ekrem Mu: Ph.D. candidate, Department of Public Administration and Public Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University. Police Major- Turkish National Police

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Thus, community preparation is vital in maintaining a safe environment through early detection of related threats and applying new methods, namely including the community. Until recently, less attention has been given to the community’s preparation in protecting against terrorist attacks. Basically, law enforcement and terrorist experts have played the most important role in the fight against terrorism. However, the threat of terrorism, in fact, provides the possibility of creating partnerships with citizens, other government organizations and other law enforcement agencies. As a whole, the community must eventually be incorporated and prepared to deal with threats and attacks. The intention of this study is to describe two important issues related to protecting our communities and to introduce a draft of a program designed to develop Terrorism Resistant Communities that will serve to create a better understanding of terrorism and provide the necessary steps to take in exercising more caution. Put simply, communities may become more aware of the threat and how they should react before a possible event or after an actual terrorism incident. These precaution measures can result in protecting an individual who realizes or encounters a threat as well as protecting others by issuing warnings in the near surroundings. Trained citizens can also assist the police and first responders. At no phase of the study do the authors opt for a paramilitary community, but rather, they hope to instill a plan that will result in a conscientious community that will, in turn, gain some understanding of terrorism issues and the recognition that our communities can become a less vulnerable target for terrorist threats. To a terrorist, a less desirable community means that they are not as likely to hide undetected, they have less area for movement within the community, and their actions are even likely to be recognized by regular citizens.

1. The Problem Terrorism has proven the devastating harm and destruction it has inflicted not only on the human losses and serious injuries or the economical disruption, but also the psychological damages sustained that could take years or perhaps never for recovery. In other words, the harm caused by terrorism can be a long or everlasting battle [3]. Turkey, for example, has spent more than one hundred billion U.S. dollars ($125 billion) in fighting terrorism [4], some even argue it is a couple of hundred billions, and has lost more than 35,000 people during its struggle, notwithstanding the thousands of soldiers, police officers, families of victims, and others who suffer from terrorism’s psychological effects [5]. To further elaborate on the evils of terrorism, Table 1 displays the impact it has had on only three well-known attacks occurring in New York, Madrid and London. Although these examples can certainly be expanded, only those listed as well as the Turkish experience indicate the need for a better and more effective proactive approach to terrorism.

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Table-1 Impacts of Terrorism Incident Year/Location 2001/World Trade Center 2004/Train bombing 2005/Public transportation system bombings

Country/City

Economical Impact

Human Life Losses

U.S./NY

$21.8 Billion [6]

Approximately 3,000 [7]

Spain/Madrid

Unknown, but bonds lost a great value [8]

191 [8]

London/UK

Public transportation system disrupted; stock market affected [8]

37 [8]

1.1. The Definitional Dilemma and International Politics The term “terrorism” first appeared during the 1789-1795 French revolution to define the harsh measures taken by the government against its own people who demanded more freedom [9]. Despite the long history of terrorism, the world has not been effectively involved in proactive measures [2] and, unfortunately, has failed to reach a common consensus regarding its actual meaning [10]. Hence, cooperation, more especially on the international arena, has been significantly altered [11]. Interestingly, although a majority of terrorism experts and governments agree on the term “terrorism,” apparently the difference lies especially when a group or an individual is defined as a “terrorist” [3]. To illustrate how much worse the definitional issue poses, a prime area to examine is a review of the literature that provides over one hundred definitions [12]. Moreover, even agencies in a country, namely the U.S., may have varying definitions of terrorism [7]. In light of these different approaches that attempt to identify “who is a terrorist” and the “political concerns” related to labeling someone as a terrorist, the reason countries are unable to cooperate with one another against terrorism is quite understandable. As White [3] argues, some countries avoid defining a group or an individual as a terrorist, because, by doing so would socially and politically degrade them and not serve in the best interest of the caller. Underlying factors or important problems in this conundrum include, first, as mentioned above, because some countries avoid defining a group or certain individuals as terrorists, by evading the issue can diminish international cooperation but strengthen those terrorist groups that are able to seek refuge in a particular country. The reason for a country’s avoidance in making the call may often be due to their economical, political, cultural or ethnical relations with the group or individuals in question. Thereby, terrorists are determined by who is calling. In other words, the criterion becomes who is it that harms innocent people to attain specific ideological, political or religious goals? Unfortunately, this misunderstanding causes conflict as well as endangerment to the combat against terrorism. 1.2. Short Term Solutions The second problem is, thus far, the use of military and/or police means commonly representative of counter activities do provide successful short term solutions [13], but

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although necessary, they fail in the long run [2]. For example, Turkey’s existing terror threat that has been around for approximately three decades proves that applying only conventional short term reactive measures are not the solution [14]. Until recently, Turkey has carried out 24 ground operations and many air strikes in Iraq’s northern region in an effort to cleanse the terrorist camps, but after some time, the same terrorist elements carried out attacks on Turkish soil [12]. Thus, having wider control, or watching for signs of threat and cooperating with law enforcement, and protection of our communities is necessary.

2. Purpose of the Study Before beginning, the definition of terrorism as used in this study is established from the findings of Schmid [15] and McEntire [7]. Schmid researched 109 definitions and found that the most common (see Table 2) terms define terrorism as an act that uses violence and force, creates fear, terrorizes and utilizes threat to reach political, ideological, religious, social or other goals that may result in psychological damage, creating victims and destroying targets, while sending a clear message. Similarly, McEntire [7] adds that the terroristic act is performed by individuals or groups against citizens or governments. Table 2 Frequencies of 109 Definitional Terms of Terrorism (adapted from Schmid [15]) Term Violence, force Political aim Fear, terror Threat Psychological effects Victim-target differentiation

Frequency 83.5% 65.0% 51.0% 47.0% 41.5% 37.5%

In this study, we define terrorism as: An act that uses violence and force, creates fear, terrorizes and utilizes threat to reach a political, ideological, religious, social, or other goals that may result in psychological damage, creates victims and demolishes targets, while also sending a message to a particular audience, and is performed by individuals or groups against citizens or governments. Although it is argued that there is no consensus among countries regarding the definition of terrorism, this does not mean that there have been no efforts to identify one. For instance, the United Nations (UN) made several attempts to define terrorism but it never reached full agreement among its members [16]. As such, it appears that our communities will face the threat of terrorism for another long period of time, or, as Martin [17] argues, “one’s terrorist will remain other’s freedom fighter” (as cited in [7], p. 26). The reason for the various definitions is due to the term itself being “emotionally charged and laden with value judgments” ([7], p. 26) and also because, over time, the meaning constantly changes [18].

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Then the issues present questions: Because we have a problem of not knowing what terrorism really is, or no internationally agreed-upon definition, and, because representatives of various countries or agencies and people define same groups or individuals in different ways (for example, terrorist, freedom fighter, rebel, insurgent, guerilla, and so forth); because for political, economical, ethnical, religious and cultural reasons some avoid labeling a particular group or people as terrorists; and because traditional counter terrorism approaches, namely the police and/or military, are more common, how can we then secure our communities? In fact, is that at all possible? Regardless, we argue that we can secure our communities despite the existing problems! This study addresses community protection on a small scale meaning that each community alone can contribute to its own protection. Further, a small scale of initiatives, we are not concerned about the lack of international terrorism definitions or the concern both national and international politics. If we manage to add several nonorthodox counter terrorism actions to the orthodox ones, our communities are likely to suffer less from terrorism. There is no need to establish innovative programs for this purpose. In fact, the solution to the terrorism threat is not far from our own communities; actually, the solution can be found within them. Almost every country has some type of community based security programs. To mention simply a few, for example, there are the Neighborhood Watch programs and the Community Emergency Management Teams (CERT) in the U.S.; the Community Intelligence Program and the Safe City program in the UK; and in Turkey, the new Family Policing Program has been applied as a part of other community policing projects. Apparently, the majority of law enforcement agencies and managers do realize that community support is vital to the success in fighting crime. So, then, the questions arise: Why do we not project the focus of our communities in our fight against terrorism? Why do we not have them involved, in a safe circumstance, in counter terrorism programs? Who else could be more willing to secure themselves than the community members themselves? The new community protection approaches require the involvement of all segments of society to protect their communities. Protection should no longer be considered solely as the role of the police and/or the military because crime and criminals have become more sophisticated. But, to do this, we must determine the program’s dimensions that will help enable us to develop a program just for this purpose; therefore, attention must be directed toward avoiding a constant fear in the community while trying to increase their awareness. Then, there is the need for an approach that does not concern itself with whether there is or is not an international consensus on identifying terrorism. In addition, community protection should be an approach that is more effective and provides long term solutions compared to orthodox methods. And finally, the new approach should be applicable anywhere in the world. Basically, the community should be in power, and by including it in such a program will make all our communities more resilient to terror threats. Eventually, a modified version of one of the programs mentioned in this study or an integrated version of all or some of the existing programs can reveal the steps we need to take in an endeavor to integrate the community in the combat against terrorism, or at least establish the kind of components the program must contain. For this reason, we will now discuss existing community policing initiatives related merely to security and how they will be used to develop a program to build terrorism resistant communities. By terrorism resistant, we are referring to the community that, due to an

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increased awareness, is able to keep out or respond effectively to terrorists and terrorism-related incidents.

3. Methodology To lay out the foundation for a terrorism resistant community program, we have selected community programs from three different countries: the U.S., the UK and Turkey. These countries were chosen because of the authors’ affiliation with or prior knowledge of the existence of programs in these countries. Other countries were not considered because the need was not felt due to the expectation that the selected ones will, most likely, provide the necessary knowledge about community policing programs related to security issues. As a known fact, the United States and the United Kingdom are among the counties that have made enormous progress in applying community policing, and Turkey is included because it has a brand new and interesting form of community policing program known as House Policing. Basically, the authors applied the comparative content analysis method to determine the types of solutions that have been in place for other crimes or problems that could be incorporated into the fight against terrorism, thus enabling community integration in combating terrorism. The programs in the predetermined countries were chosen based upon their turn of appearance in the Google Scholar search engine and/or the University of North Texas and Virginia Commonwealth University online library resources. Programs were included in the study during searches by using terms and phrases such as: “Community Policing Program,” “Crime Prevention Program,” “Community and Law-enforcement Cooperation,” “Community Awareness,” “Crime Prevention and Community,” and “Terrorism Resistant Community.” The located resources were screened, and according to their relevancy and indication that they might help in developing a program to build a terrorism resistant community program, they were further analyzed. The common characteristics and differences between these programs were used to shed light on how a community’s outreach program should be utilized in an effort to increase public awareness relating to a specific security related topic. Then, based on the findings from the existing programs, a draft program was established in order to offer suggestions as to how we could develop a program that would permit all aspects of law enforcement-community cooperation against terrorism.

4. An Alternative Approach for Fighting Terrorism: Community Policing Community policing is a major application of new ideas in policing. The concept was initiated as a result of the desire to increase public trust in the police and cooperation between the community and law enforcement agencies [18]. Basically, community policing refers to the practical version of law enforcement and public cooperation against crime or to solve other crime-related problems such as fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighborhood decay [20]. From another perspective, community policing is the understanding that law enforcement is to be of service to the community not in control of the community [21]. As such, community policing should be applicable to prevent terrorism as well because terrorism aims for chaos, fear, panic, and insecure environments in an attempt to achieve their political, religious or

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ideological goals [22], but community policing aims to gain trust between the community and law enforcement, cooperation and prevention of uncertainty and chaos. Through close cooperation between the citizens and police agencies, community policing can prevent the public’s feeling of fear and uncertainty. They will be kept upto-date on all possible situations and, hence, will feel as a part of the protection system and will provide continuous support to agencies fighting terrorism. Through community policing efforts, terror groups will fail to control the community in the direction that will serve to achieve their goals. In other words, close cooperation between the community and the police will result in the public being in control rather than terror groups controlling the community through fear, chaos and uncertainty. Moreover, thus far, community policing remains the best method to engage with the community’s immigrants and religious groups. As part of the community, their support is vital in the fight against terrorism by becoming beneficial in identifying threats rather than profiling techniques that risk harming innocent individuals based on their appearance, ethnic background, religious and/or country affiliation. Community policing has been used widely around the world to fight specific crimes. For example, Hickman and Reaves [23] argued that through understanding the concept of community policing, in recent years, a large number of law enforcement entities in the United States have adopted the idea. For instance, a 2001 U.S. Department of Justice report specified that law enforcement personnel designated as community police rose from 34% in 1997 to 64% in 1999, and the actual number of community policing officers increased from 21,000 to 113,000. Another interesting study concluded that community policing can further help prevent drug-related crimes. Hawkins and Catalano [24] analyzed the essence of drug abuse prevention programs and found that communities that collectively care are more likely to be successful in implementing drug abuse programs than those communities that display indifference. They used community mobilization, educational strategies, voluntarism, and achievement of mass media to reduce juvenile drug use in four phases: assessment and planning; obtaining the involvement of crucial community leaders; developing a board; and establishing, institutionalizing, and evaluating the prevention effort. Some of the developed programs across the world that are engaged in fighting terrorism and crime can be used as focal points in building Terrorism Resistant Communities.

5. A Sample of Community Protection Programs 5.1. The Neighborhood Watch Program, United States The Neighborhood Watch program (NWP) is an early organized community crime prevention program established during the early 1960s by the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) as an initiative to fight and prevent crime in residential areas. Although the program required collective efficacy from the community, it failed to show success in non-stable urban residential communities where crime is significantly higher in these inner city neighborhoods. Despite this limitation, NWP served well in regard to increasing community awareness and involving citizens in the program to secure their neighborhoods. Basically, the program’s intention was to instill community awareness of crime and to experience civic engagement in combating neighborhood

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crime through face-to-face meetings and small training programs related to emergency preparedness and response. In 2002, the NSA partnered with USA Freedom Corps, Citizen Corps and the U.S. Department of Justice and initiated the USAonWatch program that represents an expanded role of neighborhood watch programs throughout the United States [25]. Communities that participate in this program are identified with board road signs marking the respective neighborhoods. These boards serve to warn suspicious people hanging around the neighborhood that they will be reported directly to the police, thus indicating that a constant monitoring system is present in that particular neighborhood. 5.2. The Business Watch Program, United States Business Watch is a program that can be defined as a community service wherein the police department attempts to influence their cooperation with businesses in an effort to include the business community in measures developed for community protection and reduction in crime that targets businesses [26]. The program encourages business owners and employees to get to know one another and work together. Employees receive training in recognizing suspicious activities and reporting them to the police. In addition, they obtain training on handling emergencies, how to be good witnesses and applying crime prevention methods, namely building security principles, avoiding fraud and shoplifting and operation identification, among others [26]. To establish such a program, the business owner must assign a liaison officer, or watch coordinator, to the police, pay a $5 annual fee to cover simple costs and provide business plans that enable crime prevention officers to make appropriate crime counter measures. After all requirements are fulfilled and employees are trained, business owners receive stickers to display around specific entrance or other common area locations warning that their establishment is a member of the Business Watch program against crime. And, finally, the businesses are added to a Business Watch Notification system through which the owners and employees are updated on recent area crime events and other related matters [26]. 5.3. The D.A.R.E. Program, United States The Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program teaches children how to stay away from drugs, gangs and violence. Founded in 1983 in Los Angeles, D.A.R.E. became such a great success that the program was implemented in 75% of the school districts in the United States and in 43 countries throughout the world. As part of the educational series within the D.A.R.E. program, in cooperation with the school districts, police officers enter classrooms and distribute necessary information to the children that can help them avoid incidents involving drugs, gang and violence. Children subject to D.A.R.E. vary from kindergarten to the 12th grade [27]. Police officers who teach the students are required to undergo an approximate 80hour special training course including topics that address child development, classroom management and teaching and communications techniques. Through this training, the officers obtain necessary skills to answer the most challenging questions from students related to drugs, gangs and violence. If needed, some officers attend an additional 40hour training to assist high school youth. D.A.R.E. is considered to provide more than teaching the program develops personal skills for juveniles to resist pressures that

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may entice them to engage in crime. Briefly, D.A.R.E. is accepted internationally as one of the most successful community policing programs. Its benefits include: D.A.R.E. “humanizes” the police; that is, young people can begin to relate to officers as people. D.A.R.E. students see officers’ helping roles as opposed to only their enforcement activities. D.A.R.E. establishes lines of communication between law enforcement and children. D.A.R.E. officers provide other information about useful topics other than drugrelated topics, if needed. D.A.R.E. develops a dialogue channel between the school, police and parents or guardians to deal with other concerns [27]. 5.4. The Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) Program, United States Another well-known community protection project is the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) developed by the Los Angeles Fire Department in 1985. The goal of the program is to provide measures that will allow community citizens to engage in emergency management issues by teaching them how to respond to and deal with a potential disaster and how to meet their immediate needs after a disaster. After the recruitment process, civilians receive training as neighborhood, business, and government teams that are expected to react as first responders to a disaster in their own neighborhoods or businesses. CERTs provide rapid assistance to disaster victims at the local level, continue organizing and training spontaneous volunteers and collect pertinent disaster information that will assist professional responders. The intelligence gathered serves to understand priorities in the case of a disaster and how allocation of resources should be distributed in the disaster area. Currently, CERTs exist in 170 communities in the United States and have been made nationally accessible since 1993 by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) [28]. CERTs have proven to be an active and fundamental part of community preparedness and response abilities. Members are kept updated and trained during community activities that include, but are not limited to, social gatherings and practice meetings [28]. 5.5. Diversity Training and Diversity Policing Programs, United States Although the success of the police depends much on community support, often minorities do not recognize the badge as favorable that naturally reduces their support [29]. The 9/11 attacks created much hatred against minorities, more especially toward Muslims living in the United States. The increase was significant compared to past records. According to data taken from the Council on American-Islamic Relations report published in 2005, hate crimes caused by anti-Islamists increased from 42 cases in 2002, to 93 in 2003, and 141 cases in 2004. In addition, some non-Muslims, namely Sikhs, South Asians and Latinos who were mistaken as Muslims were unjustly victimized. For instance, throughout the entire United States, there were 71 hate crimes against Sikhs between 2001 and 2004, but after 9/11, in Chicago alone, 80 hate crimes against the same minority group was reported [30]. Thus, the Chicago police developed a project to train its officers about other cultures and provided videos regarding minorities and their cultures. The project was

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found to be successful and was therefore implemented in the largest 50 cities in the United States in an attempt to educate officers about cultural differences and how to cooperate with minorities and obtain their support and thus establish a more secure community [30]. Police efforts to understand other cultures emerged in other forms as well; for example, the New York police preferred to implement diversity policing, which is a quite common practice in many countries. As communities are becoming more diverse than ever before, police felt the need to adopt new policies to address these changes. A problem that law enforcement must consider is that failure to understand diverse cultures severely diminishes minority support of the police [29]. Because New York City leads the nation as having one of the most diverse communities in the entire United States, the New York police department adopted a new strategy to bring racial balance to its police force by hiring at least one representative from each minority group living in their jurisdiction to recognize and address minority concerns. According to a 2000 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the average minority percentage was higher in 2000 than 1990. The average percentage of sworn personnel who were members of a racial or ethnic minority was 32% for municipal police departments, 23% in county police departments, 22% for sheriffs’ departments, and 16% in state agencies [31]. 5.6. FBI Citizens’ Academy Program, United States Although there are various forms of citizens’ academy programs both at the local and national level in the United States, we will address the Federal Bureau of Intelligence’s (FBI) academy established in 1993 by Jim Ahearn, a Special Agent in Charge (SAC), representing FBI’s Phoenix Division. As an idea to strengthen his division’s relationship with the community, Ahearn modeled the FBI Citizens’ Academy Program after one he had observed operating in a local police agency [32]. Although there are some differences in their method and content, almost all citizens’ academy programs strive to obtain the same goal: more communication with the public to gain their support in exchange for law enforcement services. The FBI Citizens’ Academy Program recruits participants through a Bureau employee or by a former Academy attendee with each training program consisting of 20 to 30 trainees. Often among potential nominees are civic, religious and business leaders who must be at least 21 years of age and pass the security screening process before they are permitted to training [32]. The required training curriculum taught by active SACs includes investigative techniques used during national and criminal investigations, and the sessions involve eight meetings dispersed over a ten-week time period. As another requirement to be eligible for these trainings, the candidate must reside within his or her jurisdictional division [32]. Additional training includes evidence collection and preservation, FBI jurisdiction and congressional oversight, structure and operation of FBI field offices and remote agencies, fingerprinting, forensics, technology, and training, in addition to ethics, discipline, communications, drug enforcement, civil rights, and future criminal trends and firearms training [33].

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5.7. Counter Terrorism through Community Intelligence, the United Kingdom After the terrorist bombings in London in July 2005, the United Kingdom police adopted new proactive policies to fight terrorism. Community Intelligence (CI) is one of the new programs suggesting that terrorists blend into the communities out of concern for their own security, but still, they need accommodations, financial and transportation support to carry out their attacks. In this day and age, there is a trend in understanding that community support is an indispensable part of counter terrorism strategies. On the other hand, because terrorists are against the welfare of communities regardless of faith, race and color, once communities are made aware of these facts, they can be instrumental in counter terrorism activities. Innes [34] explored counter terrorism policing strategies and practices in the United Kingdom and the changes in these practices due to the recent terrorist attacks. He advised that the local and democratic style of neighborhood policing (NP) community intelligence can serve as a remedy and become one of the best policies of preventing and deterring future forms of terrorism violence. Innes interviewed 26 police officers and staff working on community intelligence at the local and central levels and found that working relationships are closer between local and central antiterrorism departments because they break the “firewalls” between these departments. During the interviews, officers noted that because terrorist attacks hold uncertainty, this presents a substantial drawback in their need to respond. On the other hand, they added that manageable community intelligence can decrease the uncertainty if a proper information chain can be established between minorities and the entire community [34]. Although communication is a necessity for all community policing programs mentioned, there is now a proper and real close communication method that has become extremely important because, especially after the London bombings, terrorism impacted the political process and amplified social and community cohesion based on ethnicity and faith. Following the London Bombings, there was a 600 percent increase in racial and faith hate crimes reported to the police [35]. Traditional intelligence methods have limited sources to integrate into the minor localities; therefore the police must achieve their goals by using “soft power” rather than “hard power,” defined as preferring persuasion and negotiation with minorities. Otherwise, if innocent minorities become victims of post-terror attack hate crimes and police abuse, terrorists can use that excuse to claim that their violent actions were appropriate. 5.8. Safe City Program, the United Kingdom The Safe City Program in the United Kingdom is specifically designed to protect the most vulnerable group in our communities, children more precisely street children! The Safe City Program provides all possible support to youths on the street through literally working in the streets. Every day that workers go out and traverse the city in groups, they visit predestinated locations at pre-determined, announced times. But, however, they also perform these visits outside scheduled times in hopes to coincide with youth in need and provide them a specific service they may need. Besides these services, the program also conveys messages between the parents and their children on the streets. The messenger role serves to establish a communication link between the parents, government officials and the child that might, possibly, result with them rejoining [36].

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The outreach/outpost workers distribute packages containing juice, food, toiletries, underwear, and socks. In addition, the street youths are provided information on where they can go to receive help. Unfortunately, street youth do not typically seek help and show very low interest in utilizing services such as mental health, education and treatment for alcohol or drug problems [36]. 5.9. Family Policing Program, Turkey Despite the delay in launching the Family Policing Program, community policing implementations are spreading very rapidly throughout Turkey. The interest in the new policing method has created new teams for the sole purpose of showing the friendly face of the Turkish National Police to the community. These new teams now have their own units, fancy uniforms and ride motorcycles through public areas being observed talking to citizens, business owners, and school children. The Turkish National Police attempt to establish wide open communication channels between the police and the public in an effort to increase public trust and work with them to prevent future crimes or resolve current ones. This rapidly growing idea brought new ideas in regard to Turkey’s community policing. For instance, as of 2008 January, the city of Erzincan launched an innovative community policing program that is likely to affect other Turkish cities [37]. In the Family Policing Program developed by the Erzincan police and implemented in their own city as a pilot project, the number of family households is divided by the number of police in the city, and each police officer (PO) is responsible for a specific number of homes, or in the case of Erzincan, 38 households per PO. The officers assigned to these households are known as “Family Police,” similar to the family doctor policy. According to the program, the police not only help the citizens with their security needs and other social necessities by including other government agencies, but also gather security-related intelligence and cooperate with the citizens to prevent crime [37]. Each PO visits family households in their jurisdiction, and during these visits, a close communication channel is established. If any information is received regarding a problem that can be handled by the police, the PO takes care of it; however, if the issue is related to other non-police matters, the problem is handed over to governmental agencies until it has been resolved. Although family policing is a recent project, the program has achieved much success in terms of police and citizens fighting crime together. As the Erzincan Chief of Police Dr. Ahmet Cimen noted, “the core function of the police is to be responsive to the expectations of the public it serves … but the police is not the only group who is responsible for securing the community in the modern era, the community itself is entitled to apprehend criminals and prevent crime as well.” Thus, law enforcement and the citizens must cooperate with each other to serve all segments of the community to include, for example, children, women, men, the elderly, and youth [37]. Despite the noted success, more advanced analysis and evaluation of this community crime prevention program is needed. Thus far, the public’s reaction has not been empirically measured. Although there is success on the side of the police in solving more crime, what do the families think? Do they trust someone walking into their homes simply because he or she is a police officer? And yet still, because the type of special training these POs have undergone is not clear, did they have any training at

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all? These issues must to be answered and explored before we can confidently comment on the program’s success or failure.

6. Findings According to the Neighborhood Watch Program (United States) findings, community based programs contain the risk of being ineffective in non-stable, or transition, communities because they are proven to be more successful if the community knows its members, and constant change does not permit this. The Neighborhood Watch Program strives to engage civic groups in an effort to increase awareness and collaboration against crime that is known to be successful in stable communities. Although the program contains some training and is established by the National Sheriff’s Association, it does not make any clear distinction regarding community involvement but, apparently, all segments can participate. Finally, warnings signs are used to frighten suspicious individuals roaming the neighborhoods with seemingly bad intentions. The Business Watch Program (United States) also strives to promote teamwork among businesses and their employees in an effort for them to become acquainted with each other, similar to the neighborhood watch program. The program that is run by the police provides training on security and other crime-related matters, and charges a small annual fee of $5. The D.A.R.E. Program (United States) targets a specific group in the community school children with the goal of teaching them through school visits how to avoid drugs, gangs and violence despite peer pressure. Operated by the police, D.A.R.E. tries to provide a secure community for the children and seeks cooperation from both them and their parents. However, not all children and their parents display interest in the program even though open channels of communication are available between the parents, law enforcement and the children. The program might possibly be expanded by inviting the public as a whole to cooperate with the police in locating community drug dealers, gangs and violent individuals. The CERTs (United States) are established and trained by fire department personnel. In this program too, the aim is to include the community for disaster issues rather than security. To make their jobs easier, fire department employees teach the community how to prepare, respond or recover from disasters. The program includes face-to-face training and social meetings. The Diversity Training and Diversity Policing Programs (United States) target minority recruitment and training of police officers in an effort to gain public trust and support. The expectation is certainly to achieve better police conduct and cooperation with all parts of the community in an attempt to provide more and better security. Operated by the police, the program advertises available posts for minorities within the department. Although there is no specific community training, officers are trained to understand and appreciate diverse cultures. The FBI Citizens’ Academy Program (United States) and similar programs are established for the sole purpose of citizens getting to know the FBI or the program running agency, and through this effort obtain their support in routine operations. Although nominees are often civic, religious and business leaders, the security screening omits some community members. Classroom and field trainings are included concerning FBI methods and other methods in the criminal justice field (for example,

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fingerprinting, forensics, technology, training, in addition to ethics, discipline, communications, drug enforcement, civil rights, future criminal trends and firearms training). Although this appears as if the citizens are taught material they don’t need, covering these topics are why recruits attend the academy, and while the FBI has their attention, they can establish a network for future collaboration against crime. Thus, the program indirectly serves the community through security. The Counter Terrorism through Community Intelligence (United Kingdom) program is run by the police and strives to develop close communication and contact ties in an effort to obtain intelligence and update the community about security matters. Because uncertainty will not exist in the community thereby giving citizens a feeling of security, terrorists can not enjoy this uncertainty. In this program, officers visit the community and there is no actual training involved. The Safe City Program (the United Kingdom) run by social services is designed to reach and protect street youths in an attempt to educate them and provide help in the hopes that that they may return home. Meanwhile, program workers try to establish a communication channel between the youth, their parents and governmental agencies. From one perspective, the program’s intentions are to make a safe city for the children by directly working with them; however, the program would most likely be more effective if social service workers also demanded support from the community that could sustain the program both economically and from an information-gathering standpoint. Finally, the Family Policing Program (Turkey), established and run by the police, focuses more intensively on cooperation from the community by working with each household in their respective jurisdictions. The program’s goals are to identify problems in the community, resolve issues and, with cooperation from the community, prevent future crimes and solve the existing ones. No training is involved, and the program depends on police visits to households. Findings identifying the characteristics of each program discussed are shown in Table 3 and can serve to understand basics that should be included in a program that will serve to make our communities more resistant to terrorism.

Table 3 Characteristics of the Community-based Programs

Program

Wants Full Community Involvement?

Includes Training/Education?

Wants to Increase Awareness about the Problem?

Run by?

Yes

Literature Deems as Successful?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Law enforcementPolice

Business Watch

Only businesses and their employees

Yes

Yes

Law enforcement police

Yes

D.A.R.E.

School children

Yes

Yes

Law enforcementPolice

Yes

Neighborhood Watch

Other Evidence Success? Is being applied in many states and countries More businesses becoming part of the program Number of schools showing interest is growing

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CERTs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Fire department

Yes

Diversity Training and Diversity Policing Programs

Not all, minorities

Trains only its officers

Education about other cultures for officers

Law enforcementPolice

Yes

FBI’s Citizens’ Academy

Yes but based on security screening

Yes

Yes, but about FBI duties/ tasks

Law Enforcement-FBI

Yes

Yes

No, just information obtaining during visits

Yes

Law enforcementPolice

Yes

Safe City

Street Youths

Some education

Yes

Social services

Yes

Family Policing

Yes

No, only information-sharing during visits

Yes

Law enforcementPolice

Yes

7 out of 9 Aims increasing community awareness about the problem. 1 aims to increase the awareness of the officers about the diverse community and 1 aims the increase awareness about the agency

7 are run by lawenforcement agencies, 1 by the fire departments and 1 by social services

Counter Terrorism through Community Intelligence

FINDINGS

4 out of 9 aim full community 5 out of 9 aim partial community involvement 100% have Community involvement on varying degrees

5 out of 9 involve training/education of community 3 out of nine train a part of the community 1 educates officers 72% Contain Community Training/ Education

63% Aims to increase public awareness about the problem on varying degrees

63% are run and established by law enforcemen t agencies

100% Are deemed successful in literature

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Number of CERTs increase Many other police agencies apply similar training programs More people apply for limited number of seats, and number of implementing agencies increases No other evidence available No other evidence available Other cities have launched similar programs The success of 7 programs out of 9 find support from similar program applications elsewhere 2 programs have no additional support from practice 63% have other supporting evidence for their success

In conclusion, as the findings suggest, in combating terrorism problem, it seems to be beneficial in referring to the community for assistance. Thus, a community based counter terrorism approach may serve well, because all the programs mentioned either partially or totally strives for community cooperation in solving a security problem, directly or indirectly. However, the findings suggest that with a 72% rate, the program

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should contain a public training and/or education component regarding the terrorism threat in an effort to increase awareness between law enforcement and the community. In addition, based on a 63% rate, it is alright to have the program established and operated by a law enforcement agency. Following the suggestions of this study may possibly create a successful community based security program that will encourage law enforcement-community partnerships against terrorism, and based on the experience from previous programs, such a program is likely to succeed.

7. Limitations, Strengths, and Recommendations There are limitations in this study that should be considered in future research and while drawing conclusions. First, the programs represented only three countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey, and the study did not include all of their community policing programs. Thus, the study could be improved by examining all existing programs from these countries that would result in more reliable data, yet still not be generalizable to programs from other countries. However, the study’s strength lies in the fact that the most probable known programs from these countries were examined and their identified characteristics may, therefore, provide a basis from which future projects may be developed and utilized in creating terrorism resistant communities. Because an empirical evaluation was not conducted about each one of the programs presents a second limitation. However, we can only rely on information gleaned from the literature that could possibly be biased because most was obtained from the respective program’s official websites. Thus, actual program evaluations would serve well.

8. Conclusion Community policing (CP) has served as an active method in creating a climate of safety and in addressing crime and fear of crime occurring during the last two decades. The success of community policing is the quality of the relationships built between law enforcement officers, agencies and community members. Despite critiques, these relationships have served as indispensable functions in closing down drug houses, cleaning up abandoned properties, and keeping children safe, among others, and these endeavors have given citizens an active voice in the safety of their communities. Therefore, the concept and philosophy of community policing are a focal points in preventing and responding to terrorism. Police departments should heed attention in using “soft power” and utilizing select techniques of BTRC. The logic of the community protection programs described can be applied specifically to the threat of terrorism. The government, together with volunteer organizations, should provide community training to all parts (including minorities) of the community that includes basic knowledge and recognition of terrorist threats, suspicious activities, networking, and cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Importantly, plans should be at an understandable level for citizens to maintain continuous support and involvement in the fight against terrorism. In other words, training must strive to diligently increase public awareness regarding the threat of terrorism and educate the public on how to assist official responders in the event they

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are asked to do so. To clearly elaborate on this issue, Figure 1 is provided as a useful tool in understanding how community involvement can serve to reduce terrorist activities in a community.

Figure 1 illustrates the expected results when citizens are integrated into counter terrorism activities through community based programs. The largest circle represents a community in which counter terrorist activities are non-existent. Although this circle represents only an imaginary community, such a community would provide terrorists a safe haven to plan their activities. The second smaller circle on the left displays how the environment of terrorists can be reduced by introducing regular police and military counter terrorist activities. On the other hand, the very smallest circle shows how the same environment for terrorist activities can be limited more effectively when the community becomes involved in counter terrorism activities. By including the community in the fight against terrorism, we certainly do not imply that a semi-military community be created but rather claim that communities should be able to recognize suspicious activities and cooperate more effectively with law enforcement through basic training. Eventually, community involvement in the fight against terrorism will provide a safer community and perhaps lead to a more efficient administration. In short, if communities possess a high awareness of terrorists and their activities, future attacks may be circumvented and additional recovery costs lessened. We suggest that training should provide information regarding how terrorists behave and survive in the community in addition to how they act while they are preparing to carry out attacks. In brief, citizens should be able to recognize abnormal behavior when they observe their community. In addition to existing programs that should be included in the new initiative, their content must be balanced in an order that

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will provide basic public knowledge in an attempt to obtain support during suspicious circumstances and avoid risks of creating chaos or constant fear in the community.

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[28] CitizenCorps.NeighborhoodWatchProgram.[Online]Available from: URL: http://www.citizencorps.gov/programs/watch.shtm [2007b] [29] M. L. Beeman, M. L. Increasing diversity in police departments: Strategies and tools for human rights commissionsandothers.[Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.hrccj.org/hrccj/pdfs/increasing_police_diversity.pdf [2006] [30] R.Kanani.Researchreport.[Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.pluralism.org/research/profiles/display.php?profile=74371 [2006] [31] B. A. Reaves, M. J. Hickman. Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) 2000: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers. NCJ 203350. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lem00in.pdf [2004] [32] FBICitizen’sAcademy.[Online]Available from: URL: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/citizens.htm [2008] [33] InyourcommunityFBI’sCitizens’Academy.[Online]Available from: URL: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/academy.htm [2008] [34] M. Innes. Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 605 (2006), 222. [35] C. Brown, N. Morris. Race-hate crimes surge after bombs. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/racehate-crimes-surge-after-bombs-501239.html [2008] [36] Browne, Fallshaw 1998. Street children and crime in the UK: a case of abuse and neglect. Child Abuse Review, 7(4), 241-253 [37] PolisHaber.(2007).Erzincan’daailepolisi.[Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.polis.web.tr/article_view.php?aid=15606 [2008]

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Importance of the Participation of Civil Society into Effective Counter-terrorism Policies Vladimir FEDORENKO George Mason University

Abstract. This paper examines the importance and role that civil society plays in its involvement in responding to terrorism. Strengthening its response against the threat of terrorism in a long-lasting and effective way is the key issue addressed in this paper. As such, a systematic understanding should be developed that points out potential limitations that a civil society may face in its efforts to provide an effective means through involvement in the fight against terrorism. The author performs structural analyses of three key actors: state, civil society and terrorist groups. In addition, the various ways and means in which civil societies can be mobilized to counter terrorism is demonstrated by outlining practical strategies that can be implemented across the globe. Keywords. counterterrorism, civil society

Introduction Typically, most academic resources that offer counterterrorism strategies focus on governmental units as the primary actors of counterterrorism activities, namely, law enforcement agencies and officials and legislative and executive bodies. Therefore, civil society’s role in responding to terrorism is often underestimated. The goal of this article is to demonstrate how civil society can become an extremely important strategic factor in countering terrorism, and should be considered as one of the main actors in the fight against terrorism. The thesis of this paper states that civil society is an essential and capable actor that should play a significant role in the response to the threat of terrorism. The dependent variable, importance of the civil society in counterterrorism policy, is examined through a combination of descriptive and comparative analyses. Independent variables include structures of the state, civil society and terrorist organizations. This research is conducted in two phases. The first phase consists of comparative analyses that aim to provide explanatory arguments based on conceptual structural differences and similarities between state, civil society and terrorist groups. After the comparison is made, similarities between civil society and terrorist groups are pointed out. Next, by using the same structural comparative approach, the importance of civil society as a tool for a multidimensional and comprehensive response to terrorism is demonstrated. The second phase deals primarily with the logical sequence of functional steps taken by civil society in an attempt to counter terrorism successfully and

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comprehensively. A civil society’s effectiveness in the fight against terrorism is examined by this sequence that begins with describing actions that aim to prevent terrorist attacks by taking proactive steps. Then, the sequence describes reactionary actions that can be implemented during an assault. Finally, involvement of civil society into post-conflict rehabilitation to cure social wounds is examined. Although states and anti-terrorist policy makers are the primary core targets of terrorism, civil society has a capacity to contribute immensely in a state’s counter terrorist policies and provide alternative tenable solutions. This article seeks to investigate civil society’s approach to the threat of terrorism not only as a domestic problem, but also as an international issue. In order to have a long-lasting and effective response to the threat of the terrorism, civil society must implement various functions that address terrorism from different levels and perspectives which will be broadly discussed in this article. Usually, governments with democratic political systems are more often targeted by terrorists than are authoritarian governments since democracies are more open for coercive punishment. “Terrorists view democracies as ‘soft’, usually on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy” [1]. Accordingly, if democracies have weak civil society institutions, they will possess feeble governance, because civil society, which is the natural structural link between society and government, will not function properly. However, in this article, the type of state political system is not included in the analytical framework. Despite the type of the government where civil society could be more or less powerful, it is still capable of making an immense contribution to counterterrorism policies. One of the many definitions describes terrorism as a “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence the audience” [2]. Terrorism is an illness that undermines the health and welfare of society. When terrorism threatens a state’s security, society may become frustrated towards state politics; however, as a non-state actor in representing human rights, civil society is an indispensable contributor in responding to the threat of terrorism [3]. Because civil society is a linking unit between government and the grassroots, it can easily interact with all layers of the state’s population in an effort to alleviate negative feelings. In order to understand the ways in which this can be done, it is essential to consider the concept of civil society more comprehensively.

1. Civil Society Historically, civil society is a term that is linked with the concept of “civility,” meaning the respect for human autonomy based on security and trust among people who may have never met, according to Rousseau, the first to link civil society with civility. Civility emphasized rules of conduct, respect for law and control of violence [4]. Opposition to violence is part of the concept of civil society per se. Civil society generally emphasizes the idea that people volunteer in order to protect the interests of society and achieve political or social changes [5]. Civil society is represented by various non-governmental institutions or organizations established in an effort to sustain the wellness of society. Strong and active civil society is characterized by a social infrastructure of dense networks of face-to-face relationships that eliminate existing social cleavages such as

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race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender that strengthen democratic governments [6]. In fact, a robust civil society has an essential power that can be influential in governmental decision-making. For example, successful experiences of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America have resulted in experts considering civil society as a crucial agent for decreasing authoritarian government, strengthening the people’s empowerment and fostering political accountability [7]. In today’s political vocabulary, the term “civil society” is generally used to emphasize the contrast between civil society and state. According to Bobbio Norberto, especially in periods of institutional crisis, civil society is a place where de facto powers aimed at obtaining their own legitimacy are formed even at the expense of legitimate power and where the processes of “delegitimating” and “relegitimating” take place. This definition serves to support the opinion that the solution to crisis threatening a state should be sought first and foremost inside the civil society [8].

2. Structural Comparative Analyses 2.1. Structures of States and Terrorist Organizations From the perspective of a state, terrorism is very complex and a strong opponent to fight with. Terrorist organizations have flexible structures that can easily be transformed or reshaped, and they also have demonstrated the adaptive capabilities to counterterrorism measures of governmental institutions. Some terrorist organizations are able to resurrect or recover after being defeated by the state. In Italy, for example, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rossi) terrorist group turned inactive due to governmental action and an unfavorable political situation. However, a short time after the supposed decease of the Red Brigades, a new group known as the Anti-Capitalist Nuclei emerged exhibiting the same ideology, styles of communication and even the same members from the original Red Brigade organization. This ability to re-emerge under favorable conditions demonstrates the durability of terrorist organizations as a serious threat to states [9]. In contrast to terrorist organizations, states have relatively rigid forms of organization, the transformation of which is difficult and complicated. Even if a state’s structure is subject to changes, it will take a lengthy period of time to incorporate these changes. For example, the USA Patriot Act, intended to expand the authority of law enforcement officials and intelligence agents to combat terrorism in response to 9/11, was passed by Congress and signed into law by President G. W. Bush on October 26, 2001. Despite this fact, many of the provisions of the Patriot Act are still debated by Congress and are subject to change by the court [10]. Yet even now, six years after 9/11, it is still unclear whether or not this act was fruitful in fighting terrorism. Furthermore, some regular activities of the state can be restricted by counterterrorism measures. For example, while the Turkish AKP government was making new harmonization laws to accelerate its access to the EU, the opportunities of these new laws were restricted due to an active fight against terrorism following the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 [11]. In essence of their foundation, states are obligated to act according to domestic and international rules of law, norms and morality that give them eligibility to exercise power, and at the same time to bring some constrictions. Countries which are in the process of approving the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the

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ICCPR) [12] are often asked the following critical question: “How have the recent counterterrorism measures affected the principles, norms and standards that have been set out in international human rights law?” [13] States have an obligation of strict compliance with international norms and standards no matter how serious the crime that has been committed. Governments that decide to implement countermeasures against terrorism must sacrifice some of these rules of law and basically the human rights of their citizens. In comparison, terrorist organizations are not bound by any laws or moral values; therefore, they are not restrained to consider the consequences of their actions. The fact that approximately 355 children died during the Beslan’s school seizure demonstrates that terrorists are ruthless and do not make distinctions among children, women, ill or elderly people [14]. States are political units located over a geographic area that possess domestic authority and certain roles in international relations. While states have definite boundaries, terrorists are not bound to any certain place they can be reached. For example, it is known that Al Qaeda has a highly decentralized dispersed structure. While most of Al Qaeda’s groups are known to operate in the West, its associate groups are numerous in the South and are developing throughout the world. Moreover, terrorist organizations are highly mobilized and act under a veil of secrecy. Therefore, it is very difficult to gather concrete statistical data about terrorist groups and their activities. In the normative sense, the state has a constructive structure whereas terrorism is infamous for being destructive. The idea of citizenship initially resulted from the need to provide defense, prosperity and sustainability for people living inside the walls of ancient city-states. Likewise, the concept of terrorism was initially considered to be “the justice and the emanation of virtue” [15]. Stemming from the word regime de la terreur, a regime that prevailed in France in 1793-1794, terrorism was designed to consolidate the power of the newly-established revolutionary government, protecting it from subversive elements. Despite such a positive justification, 40,000 people were executed by the guillotine in one year [16]. Despite being under heavy panoply of law, norms, and moral values, states are vulnerable to the destructive hit-and-run attacks of terrorists. Stemming from differences in structure and capabilities, a state-level approach cannot provide comprehensive solutions to the threat of terrorism. 2.2. Structures of Civil Society and Terrorist Organizations The first similarity between civil society and terrorist organizations is that civil societies and terrorist groups are typically founded by grassroots, and they gather their strength and resources from them. Terrorist organizations can only survive in the long run if they are supported by a sympathetic population. Without this support and recruitment, they will, over a period of time, become weak and insignificant. For example, the Irish IRA and the Basque ETA were both strongly supported by the grassroots at the highest point of their popularity. Only after the population’s support had decreased did peaceful negotiations become possible [17]. Likewise, civil organizations can survive in the long run only if they are run by and supported by similar-minded volunteers. Most of the civil and terrorist organizations are funded by voluntary contributions and donations. Although these contributions are not sufficient enough to cover all costs

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of terrorist activities, they produce a significant inflow of money. Both terrorist groups and civil organizations attempt to attract similar-minders to their activities, and they do so quite successfully because they are capable of directly representing their interests. For instance, according to the CIA, Al Qaeda has a potential of drawing the support of 6 to 7 million people, 120,000 of whom are ready to take up arms [18]. The second similarity is that civil societies are as organized and flexible as terrorist groups are; they can easily reshape and reconstruct their structures in order to match the external influences and adapt to outer pressures. The third resemblance is that both civil and terrorist organizations use global networks to exchange information, experience and resources. Further, they both consist of networks of self-organized groups linked by a common mission. Al Qaeda is known to consist of cellular networks, associate terrorist and guerilla groups and other affiliated organizations [19]. In fact, the cellular organization of terrorist groups makes it more difficult to penetrate them than in a hierarchical organization; however, because civil organizations have similar cellular structures, this feature has an advantage if the civil society is considered as an opponent to terrorism. Stemming from this comparison, it is possible to determine the role of civil society in its response to terrorism. Civil society’s role against terrorist organizations can be defined in three broad terms. First, civil society is a natural linking unit between state authorities and common people. Second, it is the closest partner of the state in managing an anti-terrorism strategy. Third, it is the key to multidimensionality and comprehensiveness of this strategy. So why is civil society so important in the fight against terrorism? In response, if its importance is neglected, the state would be too weak to fight terrorism on its own, because civil society, in comparison to a state, has a more flexible structure that is capable in providing quick and multidimensional adjustments to the terrorism threat. Since civil society plays an immense role as a medium between society and government, it multiplies the effects of state programs and attaches its own multi-dimensional perspective to the anti-terrorism issue. And since civil society is directly related to grassroots, it is capable of understanding the root causes of terrorism and communicating the needs of common people to authorities. Civil society alone is not an answer to the problem of terrorism; however, the combined efforts of civil society and the state make the response to terrorism effective and long-lasting. Thus civil society should become the state’s closest partner in an attempt to make this anti-terrorism response really comprehensive and multidimensional.

3. Importance of Civil Society’s Involvement in the Response to Terrorism “Not only political leaders, but civil society and religious leaders should clearly denounce terrorist tactics as criminal and inexcusable. Civil society has already conducted magnificent campaigns … I should like to see an equally strong global campaign against terrorism.”1 If the state is to be compared with civil society, the former can be defined as a superstructure, while the latter may be indentified as an infrastructure [20]. It is known that the root-causes of terrorism include poverty, human deprivation, hopelessness and 1

Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, Madrid Summit on Democracy, Terrorism & Security, March 2005.

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anger at government politics. Although it is the responsibility of the state to eliminate these causes; however, it is the responsibility of civil society to cure these causes within the grassroots. Civil society should become a cure for the deprived society by soothing its pain and embedding positivity to all layers of the population. That function is exactly why the government may be helpless because it does not have such a tight interaction with grassroots whereas civil society has a natural capability to interact directly with the common people. Involvement in the response to terrorism should be one of civil society’s main priorities. The central reason why civil society should be engaged in the response to terrorism is that people will not live in a peaceful environment unless they are willing to sacrifice some of their interests to sustain the safety of others. Without a sense of responsibility and desire to help and support each other in emergencies, people have a much less greater chance of survival. Civil participation is a flourishing spirit and force in the battle against terrorism, because civil society has the capability to address problems that the government is feeble at addressing [21]. Civil society can be labeled as the voice of the people. In other words, civil society has the potential of communicating public opinion into broader societal spheres and thus simplifying the conflict resolution process. Hence, the second reason why civil society should be involved in the response to terrorism is that it represents the interests of common people who are the main victims of terror. Additionally, civil society has the ability to encourage the population to openly and sincerely debate on most acute subject matters, namely the risks of terrorism. Finally, but not the last reason why strengthening of civil society represents an important prerequisite of the response to terrorism, is because strong civil society has strong influence over the way the government acts. Robust civil society is capable of influencing the government to change or cancel international or domestic policies that are not supported by the population. For example, civilian protest or approval can become a decisive factor in the question of whether or not to start or cease military action [22]. Even in the worst cases where the state is feeble or reluctant to implement domestic counterterrorism policies, civil society could still be an effective actor. In other words, when state-level cooperation is absent, the global civil society through its networks can still cooperate with the state’s domestic civil society organizations and gain political and social leverage affecting the state’s government.

4. Global Dimension Contemporary terrorism that is both the response to and the product of globalization has benefited from the advantages of this global process. In order to stay protected from terrorism, we must reconsider the nature and the functioning of global politics beginning with the locality. In responding to the threat of global terrorism, civil societies representing diverse nations should engage in multidimensional and comprehensive counterterrorism strategies that address countering terrorism on both local and global levels which would, in turn, integrate domestic security efforts with international cooperation. Besides using law enforcement and military approaches, this strategy should invest a great number of efforts in effective diplomacy and exploring cultural, ethnic and religious differences [23].

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Civil society has become global as well. Global civil society plays a significant role in fighting terrorism. For instance, campaigners against terrorist groups have plenty of opportunities to connect with other similar-minded civil groups in different parts of the world and address their demands not only to national institutions but also to global ones. Global civil society’s attempt to protect human rights and safety could prove to be more efficient than attempts implemented on local levels. Global cooperation of civil society means that international civil society groups are better linked with each other. In addition, globalization benefits such as connectedness and rapid interactions provide favorable conditions even in places where the problems are relatively local. Thus, global civil society can play an important role in supporting global institutions and in strengthening the public opinion pool that is essential for these institutions to be successful in counterterrorism measures [24]. Terrorist groups and civil organizations are the opposite of one another in a normative sense with the former representing violence and the latter representing nonviolence, friendly relationships and peace; however, when looking at their structural organization, we can see many similarities. In her article “Strengthening Civil Society,” Mary Kaldor demonstrated a distinctive parallel between NGOs and terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. She observed that the form of terrorist group organizations is similar to that of non-governmental organizations; for example, both consist of loose cross-border networks of self-organized groups linked by a common mission, both are funded by voluntary contributions and both use sources of electronic media to communicate their mission to society [25]. The methods of new members’ involvement are also similar; both NGOs and terrorist groups attempt to spread their networks in an attempt to attract more supporters. Finally, both NGOs and terrorist organizations have become globalized. This is not meant to imply that their activities have only extended across national boundaries; rather it is emphasized that these organizations have experienced functional integration of internationally dispersed activities. Therefore, the key issue of globalized organizations is the opportunity of transnational cooperation that makes them more diverse, more active and stronger [26].

5. Actions of Civil Society in Responding to the Threat of Terrorism An effective and long-lasting approach for resisting terrorism must combine different functions and techniques and involve as many actors and volunteers as possible. Most importantly, approaches to resisting terrorism must stay within the principles of morality and objectivity [27] and pay particular attention at protecting human rights of different ethnic and religious groups from prejudices and false criticism. In the struggle against terrorism, civil society can perform three major functions: preventing violent conflict, managing the terrorist attack scene, and managing postconflict rehabilitation. Since these functions attempt to solve problems related to different stages of a terrorist attackbefore, during and aftereach function should be comprehensively managed in an effort to address the various complicated tasks. Each function has its own sub-functions that are essential parts of the comprehensive response to the threat of terrorism. These functions are described and exemplified below.

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5.1. Preventing Terrorism Strong civil society is able to create trust, cooperation and open debate on a variety of subjects between representatives of various ethnic and religious groups. This ability is an important key to promoting peace and safety between diverse societal groups. Handling cooperation between various groups mitigates possible frictions on the base of which terrorism incidents might occur. Thus, civil society manages an important function of long-term prevention in the case of a terrorist attack. Preventing terrorism is a complex set of different tasks including a combination of various educational programs aimed at (1) protecting youth from the influence of terrorist ideologies, (2) increasing public awareness, (3) building public resilience to potential threats of terror, and (4) supporting negotiations. 5.1.1 Protecting the Youth Protecting the young generation against influences of terrorist ideologies should be one of the major priorities in a civil society. Often, the weakness of civil society partially gives rise to terrorist group membership. Although the decision to enter a terrorist group is private one, there are many external forces that lead people to violence. Young generations are especially vulnerable to these forces since they are vulnerable, susceptible and have standstill periods in their lives when they are emotionally weak [28]. During these periods, youngsters are especially open to the influence of extremist groups that appear to give a sense of protection and a mirage of a better life. Therefore, the predominant and most important problem that civil society must solve is protecting youngsters from the influence of terrorist groups by engaging them into educational programs and organizations. It is especially important to educate the illiterate population that does not have proper access to information sources. Atak College illustrates a good example of a school founded as the result of social engagement that proposed the establishment of educational programs for children from different ethnoreligious groups in Mardin, one of Turkey’s most undeveloped regions known for increased terrorist activity. Funded solely by civilian efforts, the school has played an essential role in preventing the spread of PKK activity in Turkey by becoming the cure for Mardin’s uneducated and illiterate population [29]. People of different ethnicities who earlier were hostile toward one another began to cooperate and coexist in a friendly atmosphere. 5.1.2. Increasing Public Awareness Increasing public awareness is an essential part of the multidimensional response to the threat of terrorism that can be achieved by increasing society’s public awareness. The objective of public awareness programs includes keeping people away from the influence of radical nationalism and ideological sects. For example, “Muslims Against Terror” (MAT) is a large NGO that struggles for global peace and justice and has been able to successfully run both of these functions. The mission of MAT is to create public awareness about the issues of terrorism and unite people in collective efforts to stop terrorism. The NGOs also work to establish links with non-Muslim communities in an effort to help them understand Islam as a religion of peace [30]. In general, the spread of religious networks plays an important role in increasing public awareness regarding the realities and horrors of terrorism.

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5.1.3. Building Resilience Unfortunately, it is a bitter reality that everyone can become a victim of a terrorist attack. Therefore, another important function of civil society is to prepare the population to face all kinds of emergencies that can occur during a terrorist incident. This strategy might be known briefly as building resilience in the society. Building resilience includes increasing public awareness in regard to possible dangers that might occur before and during an attack and proposing optimal schemes of behavior during the incidents in an attempt to minimize losses and to survive [31]. Importantly, in building resilience, the civil society should organize educational programs that teach the potential risks and basic methods to prevent attacks. For example, civil organizations should enlist citizens to pay attention to any suspicious activities. Through these programs and information desks, citizens should learn to become more aware when walking in public places or traveling abroad. Citizens should also pay special attention to unattended packages and suspicious individuals and know how to react if faced with these situations. Timely reporting of a suspicious activity could, perhaps, prevent enormous losses and damages sustained from a possible attack. Additionally, educational programs should provide essential and comprehensive information about the risks of terrorist attacks yet avoid creating a sense of constant and inevitable danger. For example, Citizens Corps, a special organization that encourages the American population to be prepared for all types of emergencies also offers useful tips on “basic disaster response skills,” including first aid and fire safety [32]. 5.1.4. Supporting Negotiations The role of civil society in supporting peace negotiations is primarily related to the ability of managing peace constituency and building peace in terror-torn environments for the sake of humanitarianism [33]. It is important to consider that the degree to which public opinion can influence political leaders is directly related to the sensitivity of these leaders to these views [34]. Hence, civil organizations can work towards influencing public opinion and communicating the sentiments and demands of the public to political leaders. Additionally, during peace settlements, civil organizations can work to maintain the peace [35]. For example, in Sri Lanka, well-known for its high terrorist activity, extreme politicization of the society turned ordinary people into passive receivers of the state’s policies. Volunteer civil organizations were formed in an effort to address the needs of society and call for political reformations. Members of the movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality traveled the country with the purpose of educating people about the reasons behind ethnic conflicts and the need for political changes [36]. Another important issue in the formation of peace constituencies is appealing to the grassroots because grievances held by ordinary people usually remain unrepresented.

6. Managing the Terrorism Attack Scene In an attempt to understand and resolve the complex task faced by civil society in fighting terrorism, it is important to describe what constitutes a terrorism incident scene. A terrorist attack scene is an extremely fervent zone that can include chemical,

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biological, radiological hazards, fire, explosions, kidnapped hostages, hijacked planes, destroyed buildings, and countless victims begging for assistance and panicking. The scene can be anywhere in the world and result in thousands of deaths and injuries. Taking into account these horror scenes, it is quite normal to consider that the public may assign blame on the government and political institutions for violation of public security. Although the government responds immediately to a terrorist attack, the response may appear to be much prolonged in the aftermath of such a terrifying event. Civil society’s reaction to the attack is much quicker than that of the government, and further, in emergency situations even civilians from all walks of life are ready to accept roles they are not trained to do for the sake of common civil virtue. It is a known fact that the initial response after a terrorist attack happens usually comes from nearby individuals who are ready to assist others despite their own injuries [37]. Since civil society is directly linked with the grassroots by social and friendly bounds that are not present in relationships between society and government, there are more opportunities available to assist victims. Organizations representing civil society should collaborate in exploring possible and effective strategies that would help to manage the terror zone and minimize the number of victims. These strategies should be targeted at mitigating the loss, damage, suffering or hardships caused by an attack and include measures to protect public safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to immediate victims of an attack. For example, such strategies could include law enforcement incident management, mass fatality management and other types of strategies directed at alleviating the damages and emergency situations involving casualties and injuries. There are excellent examples of civil organizations in the United States that have been quite successful in incorporating incident management, including EMS (Emergency Medical Services), CBIRF (the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force) and MMRS (Metropolitan Medical Response System). EMS is a first aid and transportation system with new levels of advanced equipment and training its human resources, thereby allowing quick reaction to any kind of emergency. The functions of EMS are immediate recognition of a patient’s problem, intervention of first responders and bystanders, and rapid transportation of victims to the nearest medical facilities. The EMS service is available throughout the entire nation and is generally provided by public agencies [38]. CBIRF is a civil-federal team that responds to incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). CBIRF also provides assistance in determining the type of weapon used during an attack and prepares the follow-up on federal assets. The MMRS is a medical care focused organization that provides immediate response to nuclear, biological and chemical attacks in metropolitan areas. Managing the consequences of attacks occurring in such areas is an extremely complicated task that demands special training. Many metropolitan areas include tall buildings and skyscrapers that can hold up to 10,000 people. These buildings represent increased attractiveness for the terrorists [39]. These examples of organized civil groups depict the progress that response management has had on terrorism in the United States which was obviously successful in learning bitter lessons from the September 11th terrorism incidents. During an attack, involvement of non-state actors in humanitarian assistance can lead to peaceful relations and trust between parties by struggling to provide security and safety to civilians as well as protecting human rights.

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7. Managing Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Civil society and associations play an important role in the initiation and promotion of policies that support victims of terrorism incidents [40]. Terrorists take advantage of victims by using them as a means for spreading fear throughout society. Involvement of civil society to assist victims of terrorism and reinforce solidarity among them is one of the key factors in the long-term response to terrorism. Since civil society is the closest layer to common people, civil organizations have the capability to understand and satisfy the needs of grassroots. The common term that might be useful in summarizing the abovementioned functions is rehabilitation. The civil dimensions of rehabilitation emphasize the interaction between aid-organizations and focus on soothing the vulnerable and sick population after a terrorist attack. Individuals who recover from a terrorist attack are reported to have a series of psychological disturbances including insomnia, memory lapses, apathy, sudden fear, and depression [41]. Therefore, civil societies should ensure good assistance to victims of terrorism including necessary medical, psychological, spiritual, and emotional assistance in an effort to provide them with adequate and timely compensation for their sufferings. Civil organizations can also provide practical support such as psychological therapies for victims, and, in addition, human rights organizations can offer support in political terms, namely advocating on the behalf of victims. A good example is “Golos Beslana,” or “the voice of Beslan,” a civil organization that struggled for social protection of victims’ rights as a result of the Beslan incident [42].

8. The Role of NGOs in Responding to Terrorism The role played by NGOs in responding to terrorism constitutes the most influential structural unit of the civil society. Their essential involvement in the fight against terrorism is enormous. There are, however, some prerequisites for this fight. The first is the existence of a robust “army” that consists of the contribution of existing members and continuous involvement of newcomers. The second prerequisite is an overall agreement by all members on the common mission. In an attempt to make the response to terrorism comprehensive, it is important to counteract terrorism both at the local and global levels. Some NGOs are established to directly resist terrorism and lessen the consequences of terrorist attacks, while others, specifically human rights, pursue different purposes; however, their activity is also crucial in the overall response to terrorism. Contributions of all NGOs engaged with the problems of human security and wellness is an essential factor in the fight against terrorism. In the last several decades, there has been an increased growth of nongovernmental organizations concerning human rights and peace that function at local, national and global levels. An example of the successful global cooperation of local NGOs is referred to as “Citizens Against Terror” (CAT), a global organization consisting of various groups involved in countering terrorism. These groups include the families of 9/11, human rights activists from Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Palestine, Russia, the British Campaign “We are not afraid,” among others. The mission of CAT is “to empower people across the globe to take non-violent action to bring an end to terror,” and their core objectives are:

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 To build a community of solidarity, to protect and support those challenging and those affected by terror, wherever they are  To counteract terror and enhance human security by promoting the framework of international law, including human rights and humanitarian law  To address the contexts which give rise to terrorism through research, dialogue and the advocacy of non-violent alternatives [43] Almost all global non-governmental organizations consist of units acting at the local and national levels. Fighting terrorism at the local level should be the foremost strategy of all NGOs. Eliminating germs of violence, protecting youth from the influence of radicalism and ideologies adopting terrorism, and supporting the rights of victims of terror are the main functions of local NGOs. Despite the fact that globalization has introduced the “death of distance” concept implying that the distance and proximity between people has greatly diminished in importance, proximity and locality still matter a great deal. Undoubtedly, NGOs throughout the world should cooperate together in order to exchange valuable information and experiences about handling terrorism issues. However, major global cooperation can only be effective after the problems are targeted locally as well. Another important dimension that deserves to be highlighted is not only do NGOs dealing exclusively with antiterrorism issues have an enormous impact on countering terrorism, but participation of non-governmental organizations that concentrate on human rights also contribute immensely to the fight against terrorism. These NGOs prevent terrorism and violence by helping to eliminate the root causes such as poverty, discrimination, human despair, and injustice. Elimination of these obstacles helps to alleviate human anger or dissatisfaction with the government which is possibly one of the reasons why people embrace violence and choose terrorism as a solution to their problems. Combined efforts to eliminate these root causes as well as universal human rights protection can enforce public security and decrease the level of terrorism [44].

9. Conclusion Organized terrorist groups are the major opponents of civil society. Due to similarities in the form of the organizations and the ability to benefit from the advantages of globalization, civil society and organized terrorist groups are almost equal opponents of each other. Since effective functionality of non-governmental organizations depends directly on the contributions and quantity of volunteers, civil society should involve as many supporters of anti-terrorist activities as possible. Moreover, we should consider the fact that while the majority of the population opposes terrorism, there does exists a part of society that supports and even contributes to terrorist activities. Therefore, the most important role of the NGOs in response to terrorism is to increase public awareness regarding the nature and consequences of terrorist activities among the population circles that are in favor of terrorism. Organized terrorist groups represent the major opponents of civil society. Civil society plays an immense role as a medium between society and government by multiplying the effects of state programs and attaching its own multidimensional perspective to the anti-terrorism issue. Thus, civil society is an important indicator of

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society’s attitude toward domestic governmental policies or other courses of the state’s action by, perhaps, clarifying the roots of certain terrorist actions. If terrorism is encouraged and supported by the state, civil society could be the most effective instrument undermining domestic support for terrorist groups by educating citizens about the devastating realities of terrorism. Civil society has an influence on government not only as a check and balance mechanism within a state but also as an important part of networks that are effective on both sides of the conflict. Military solutions cannot provide a comprehensive answer to terrorism. To address the problem in the long run, it is necessary to cut its roots, and the most convenient approach would be to use more subtle tools through strong involvement of civil society. Unfortunately, a terrorist bomb can explode in several seconds, but the rehabilitation and healing of the social wounds could take decades. Civil society can play a healing role in an effort to rebuild the social fabric. Terrorists want to know that a majority of people watch the horror they’ve caused rather than dying. Publicizing their attacks satisfies their exact desire and gives them an opportunity to recruit members from supporting communities. Civil society is, however, capable of decreasing the negative effect of publicizing by involving grassroots of the community into education programs regarding the purposes, objectives and dangers of terrorism. In conclusion, terrorism cannot be solved immediately, but it can be managed effectively. Therefore, it is important for political leaders to encourage civil society to become involved in the fight against terrorism in an effort to maintain a stable, safe and peaceful democratic environment. However, civil organizations should not wait for encouragement by political leaders; they, instead, should become initiators of counter terrorist campaigns. Importantly, open and frank discussions touching all acute aspects of contemporary terrorism should be a crucial method of increasing public awareness related to alarming terrorism issues. It is the responsibility of civil society to become involved in countering terrorism and all of its influences. In addition to instituting the most effective systems and coordinating with counterterrorism efforts of other nations, all nations should present themselves as good world neighbors and attempt to persuade anti-democratic forces by example and by education to appreciate the benefits of living in a free, fair and open society [45].

References [1]

Pape, R. Willing to Die: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. In Mingst, K. & Snyder, J. (eds.) Essential Readings in World Politics. 2nd ed., W.W. Norton; 2004; p. 391. [2] Henderson, H. Global Terrorism. MP Hermitage; 2002; p. 5. [3] Rupesinghe, K & Naraghi, A. Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. London: Pluto; 1998; p. 22. [4] Kaldor, M. Strengthening Civic Society. In L. Weinberg, Democratic Responses to Terrorism. Routledge; 2007; p. 30. [5] Orjuela, C. Building peace in Sri Lanka: A Role of Civil Society? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No: 2, (Mar., 2003); 2003; p. 196. [6] Edwards, B. Foley, M. & Diani, M. Beyond Tocqueville. UPNE; 2001; p. 17. [7] Caparini, M. Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 132; 2004; p. 1. [8] Bobbio, N. Kennealy P. (1989) Democracy and Dictatorship of Minnesota Press p. 26 [9] http://www.terrorism-research.com/future/ [10] The Civil Liberties Implications of Counterterrorism Policies: Full Chapter http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=384&key=118&parent=5&report=61

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[11] Arakon, M. , 2007-02-28 "Fighting Terrorism and Human Rights in Turkey, Candidate for the European Union, Analysis around the Particular Situation after the November 2003 Al Qaida Bombings" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA . 2008-10-09 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179828_index.html [12] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc A 16316(1966), 999 UNTS 171 entered into force 23 March 1976. [13] Skinnider, E. (2004) Counter-Terrorism Measures and the Impact on International Human Rights Standards in the Field of Criminal Justice. http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Counter%20terrorism%20measures.pdf [14] http://kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224736.htm [15] Quoted in Modern History Sourcebook: Maximilien Robespierre: Justification of the Use of Terror, online at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.htmli Downloaded 8 January 2003. [16] A brief history of terrorism (2003) http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1502 [17] Waldmann, P. Perspectives on Terrorism - The Radical Milieu: The Under-Investigated Relationship between Terrorists and Sympathetic Communities. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=59 [18] Gunaratna, R (2002) Inside Al Qaeda. Columbia University Press p. 95. [19] Gunaratna, R (2002) Inside Al Qaeda. Columbia University Press p. 95. [20] Bobbio, N. Kennealy P. (1989) Democracy and Dictatorship U of Minnesota Press p. 26. [21] O’Conell B., Gardner, J. Civil Society: The Underpinnings of American Democracy; 1997; UPNE pp. 10-11. [22] Orjuela, C. Building peace in Sri Lanka: A Role of Civil Society? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No: 2, (Mar., 2003); 2003; p. 197. [23] Henderson, H. Global Terrorism. MP Hermitage.; 2002; p. 39. [24] Kirton, J. & Hajnal, P. Sustainability, Civil Society, and International Governance: Local, North American, and Global Contributions. Ashgate Publishing; 2006; p. 20. [25] Kaldor, M. Strengthening Civic Society. In L. Weinberg, Democratic Responses to Terrorism. Routledge; 2007; p. 27. [26] Dicken, Peter. Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century. 4th ed. London: Sage; 2003; p.12. [27] Dershowitz,. A. Why Terrorism Works. Yale University Press; 2002; p. 166 [28] Bell, S. A Martyr’s Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist. John Wiley & Sons Canada; 2005; p. 45. [29] Kalyoncu, M. Civilian response to Ethno-religious Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.fethullahgulen.org/conference-papers/contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/302contributions-of-the-gulen-movement/2525-civilian-response-to-ethno-religious-terrorism.html; 2007. [30] Retrieved from http://www.m-a-t.org/ [31] Speckhard, A. Building resilience in Civil Society’s Psychological Response to Terrorism. P. 3 [32] Retrieved from http://www.citizencorps.gov/ [33] Orjuela, C.Building peace in Sri Lanka: A Role of Civil Society? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No: 2, (Mar., 2003); 2003; p. 197. [34] Mor, Ben D. Peace initiatives and Public Opinions: the Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution. Journal of Peace Research. 34(2); 1997; pp. 197-215. [35] Orjuela, C. Building peace in Sri Lanka: A Role of Civil Society? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No: 2, (Mar., 2003); 2003; p. 197. [36] Orjuela, C. Building peace in Sri Lanka: A Role of Civil Society? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No: 2, (Mar., 2003); 2003; p. 199. [37] Forest, J. J. F. CounteringTerrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated; 2007; p. 248. [38] Maniscalco, P. & ChristenH. Understanding Terrorism and Managing its Consequences. Prentice Hall; 2001; p. 6. [39] Maniscalco, P. & ChristenH. Understanding Terrorism and Managing its Consequences. Prentice Hall; 2001; p. 16. [40] OSCE; High Level Meeting on Victims of Terrorism; 2002; Hofburg, Viena. [41] Weinberg, L. Democratic responses to terrorism. Routledge; 2007; p. 90 [42] Retrieved from http://kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1224736.htm [43] Retrieved from http://citizensagainstterror.net/

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[44] Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, A. Anti Terrorism Measures and Human Rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; 2004; p. 116. [45] Perl, L. Open for Debate Terrorism. Benchmark Books; 2004; p. 126.

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Cooperation of Law Enforcement and the Public in Combating Terrorism in Ukraine Igor OSYKA The Kharkiv National University, Ukraine

Abstract. The author analyzes legislative frameworks and discusses problems of applying legislative provisions to countering terrorism in Ukraine. In particular, various forms and methods of cooperation between authorized law enforcement agencies and public/private businesses are considered, followed by recommendations. The analysis and discussions are based on a comparison of the Ukrainian, European and USA experiences and practices. Keywords. forms of cooperation, law enforcement methods, legislation, public, terrorism

Introduction After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States the country’s most severe and devastating act of violence ever experienced not only did the world change, but society’s way of thinking and attitudes toward terrorism also changed. This tragedy resulted in worldwide transformations regarding law enforcement’s institutional structures and legislative frameworks of their activities. New perceptions of terrorism also required innovative law enforcement approaches in methods to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism. As never before has the necessity for public and private business entities to unite in the struggle against terrorism as well as the application of complex and comprehensive approaches to solve the problem become clear. The first and immediate response to 9/11 took place in the United States by adopting the USA PATRIOT Act [1] that extended the powers of law enforcement agencies to include application of investigation methods which limited human rights and virtually eliminated financial secrecy in cases of terrorism and suspected terrorist activities. The second measure taken was establishing and beginning immediate operation of the Department of Homeland Security, a specialized governmental agency aimed at preventing future terrorist attacks on the USA. The necessity for setting up this agency was the failure of the CIA and FBI to communicate and coordinate effectively in an attempt to prevent the 9/11 attacks [2]. Thus, one of the lessons learned post-September 11th was the necessity to strengthen cooperation, information sharing and coordination of law enforcement and special services activities within the country at every federal, state and local level. Adoption of these measures lead to changes in approaches, forms and methods of prevention and investigation of terrorism. One approach used for the effective prevention of terrorist activities was efficient cooperation between the private economic sector and the public in an effort to detect early threats, suspicious activities

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and people, information sharing and resources, for example. Most typically, cooperation was initiated and maintained by the FBI’s InfraGard Program [3] developed by the Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) [4]. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security also encouraged other forms of cooperation with the private sector and developed corresponding recommendations, as well, for jurisdictions seeking to improve collaboration with their private sector agency counterparts [5]. The government of Ukraine, one of the largest countries in Europe with a unique geographic location all the way from Asia to Europe, also responded to new challenges including legislative amendments and changes in law enforcement’s institutional structure and approaches to their activities. The 9/11 attacks triggered ratification of international treaties, amendments to criminal law and setting up special divisions within law enforcement agencies on terrorism prevention and investigation. Ukraine’s current economic and political situation and the endless political crisis caused by the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 creates additional challenges and difficulties for Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in countering terrorism as well as other serious crimes in the country. The situation is further complicated by the lack of public trust in law enforcement officers as a result of their high level of corruption and the historical experience gained during the Soviet Era when law enforcement agencies served as a tool of political repression and punishment and struggled with those who disagreed or criticized the government and existing political order in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This paper analyzes the legislation and institutional developments in Ukraine concerning countering terrorism as well as existing ways, forms and methods of collaboration between law enforcement agencies and public or private business entities, governmental institutions and self-government and non-governmental organizations in combating terrorism. The analysis applies historical and comparative approaches to the data processing and in making final conclusions.

1. Terrorism in Ukraine: Problems and Approaches According to the Acting Head of the Security Service of Ukraine responsible for countering terrorism, Ukraine is not currently considered to be a target for attacks by international terrorists or religious extremist organizations. As of May 2008, there were no international terrorist organizations operating in Ukraine. However, at the same time, preconditions for potential threats exist that are caused by the presence of international terrorist supporters and religious extremist organizations, attempts to strengthen fundamentalist influence in Ukraine, radicalization by some people who support the religious ideology of extremist organizations, considerable increase of migrants from countries having an unstable political situation, presence of Ukraine diplomatic missions that participate in antiterrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the location of Ukraine’s territory that is attractive for terrorist infrastructure attacks using elements of nuclear and hydroelectric power stations, chemical plants, oil and natural gas transportation systems. The Security Service of Ukraine has developed identification methods resulting in a list of infrastructures that could become potential targets for terrorist attacks including the embassies and consular, offices of international organizations, more than 3,000 events involving large crowds of people, and more than 51 establishments in the Ukrainian territory.

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Some crimes of a terrorist nature were registered, detected and investigated but did not have systematic characteristics and did not relate to international terrorist organizations. For example, during 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, 172 crimes and administrative offences having terrorist characteristics were detected, and 40 persons were brought to criminal trial and another 21 to administrative liability. The most famous terrorist type attacks occurred in 2004 when an explosive was detonated at one of the courts in Kyiv, and in 2006 when within one day and an interval of a few hours; explosions in three supermarkets took place in Kharki. Although no one was killed, some people received serious injuries creating fear among the public in going to the supermarkets owned by one company in particular. The Security Service of Ukraine’s main emphasis is directed toward prevention, detection and bringing to the terrorist activities to an end as well as identifying and stopping members of international terrorist and extremist organizations from entering into the country. The Security Service cooperates closely with foreign law enforcement agencies and special services including participation in the activities of antiterrorist structures of the UN, NATO, OSCE and a number of regional initiatives. In particular, the Service signed more than 70 interdepartmental agreements and more than 80 protocols with partner special services and law enforcement agencies in foreign states that continuously cooperate and exchange information on terrorist and extremist organizations and groups and various forms and methods of their activities as well as terrorism financing information. As a result of cooperative partnerships, during 2003 to 2007, 1,692 persons suspected in terrorist-related activities were prevented from entering into Ukraine, and an additional 53 foreign citizens who cooperated with international terrorist organizations were sent out of Ukraine. The Security Service of Ukraine also takes action on building terrorism resistant communities by using the mass media to cover potential threats of terrorism and inform the public about prevention of terrorist attacks and stopping, detecting and investigating terrorist type crimes and punishment of terrorists [6]. For these purposes, the Service’s official web site is used extensively. Ukrainian law enforcement and other governmental agencies authorized that in combating terrorism, an individual does not require extensive experience in prevention, stopping or investigating large scale terrorist attacks and acts of terrorism. At the same time, a system of countering and preventing terrorism was set up and is now functioning. Modern Ukraine is an integrated part of the global world, and therefore takes all necessary measures to be a reliable partner in the transnational and global fight against terrorism. Special services and law enforcement agencies are constantly taking measures to trace persons suspected of terrorist activities and possible schemes and sources for financing terrorism as well as intelligence, analysis and information sharing. In many respects, the effectiveness of special services and law enforcement agencies functioning of any country depends on national legislation that provides tools and mechanisms for their activities. The tools and mechanisms for combating terrorism in Ukraine are discussed next.

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2. Ukraine’s Legislation of Incorporating Citizens in Fighting Terrorism and Financing of Terrorism In fighting terrorism, legislation includes the Constitution of Ukraine, Criminal Code of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine on Fighting Terrorism, Law of Ukraine on Prevention of and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds of Crime (hereinafter, Anti Money Laundering Law), other Ukrainian laws, international treaties’ consent to which obligatory status was given by the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), decrees of the president of Ukraine, enactments and resolutions by the Cabinet of Ministers, and other bylaws adopted in order to implement the laws of Ukraine. Besides legislation in place, Ukrainian legislators and decision makers at the stage of developing new laws and procedures pay considerable attention to honoring Ukraine’s obligations taken in connection with joining the Council of Europe. At the current stage of the country’s development, a clear direction towards the recommendations by European institutions for Ukraine has more precise and obligatory characteristics when compared to the countries that have already joined the European Union. Relevant recommendations of the Council of Europe institutions will be considered in this paper as directives for further development and improvement in countering terrorism and building terrorism resistant communities. 2.1. International Treaties According to Article 9 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 19 paragraph 1 of the Law Ukraine “On International Treaties of Ukraine,” international treaties in force consented to which obligatory status was given by the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and is considered to be a part of Ukraine’s national legislation [7]. Article 19 paragraph 2 of the Law Ukraine “On International Treaties of Ukraine” also states that in cases when the rules provided for by the national legislation contradict provisions of an international treaty, those rules provided the international treaty must apply. In other words provisions of the international treaties that are part of the Ukrainian legislation prevail over provisions of the national legislation [8]. Ukraine is a signatory state on the following international treaties concerning fighting terrorism and suppression of financing terrorism:      

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 27.01.1977 ratified by Ukraine 17.01.2002 and entered into force for Ukraine 14.06.2002 Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 15.05.2003 ratified by Ukraine 20.09.2006 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 8.11.1990 entered into force for Ukraine 01.05.1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 ratified by Ukraine 29.11.2001 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 ratified by Ukraine 12.09.2002 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 16.05.2005 ratified by Ukraine 31.07.2006, entered into force for Ukraine 01.06.2007

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International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 14.09.2005 ratified by Ukraine 15.03.2006.

The abovementioned international and European treaties contain provisions that are predominantly concerned with criminal liability for various acts and financing of terrorism as well as rules concerning extradition of criminals. Few, in one way or another, address investigative methods, procedures of prevention and investigation, and collaboration with public and private business. For example, Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism stipulates that “each Party shall take appropriate measures in the fields of education, culture, information, media and public awareness raising, with a view to preventing terrorist offences and their negative effects” as well as “take such measures as may be necessary to improve and develop the co-operation among national authorities with a view to preventing terrorist offences and their negative effects by, inter alia: (a) exchanging information; (b) improving the physical protection of persons and facilities; (c) enhancing training and coordination plans for civil emergencies.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same article mention direct cooperation with the public and community in preventing and controlling terrorism, in particular, stipulating that “each Party shall promote tolerance by encouraging inter-religious and cross-cultural dialogue involving, where appropriate, non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society with a view to preventing tensions that might contribute to the commission of terrorist offences” and “endeavor to promote public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by terrorists and consider encouraging the public to provide factual, specific help to its competent authorities that may contribute to preventing terrorist offences [8].” Provisions of Article 13 of the same Convention require Parties to adopt measures to protect and support the victims of terrorism that have been committed within their own territory. These measures that are subject to domestic legislation may include, for instance, financial assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism and their close family members [9]. Article 8, paragraph 4 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism also mentions obligations of the each State Party to consider establishing mechanisms whereby the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the terrorist and other offences mentioned in the Convention. Ukraine also joined a number of regional initiatives of cooperation that include collaboration in the field of fighting terrorism. The most significant and active regional initiative is the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter CIS) that includes republics of the former Soviet Union. In the CIS framework, the following actions were taken at the legislative and organizational level: a program of cooperation of the CIS member countries in fighting terrorism and other violence manifestations of extremism for 2008–2010 which envisions organization and conducts a roundtable discussion on “possible ways of cooperation of competent authorities and business in countering terrorism and other violence manifestations of extremism.” In the CIS framework, the concept of cooperation of the CIS member countries in fighting terrorism and other violence manifestations of extremism was also developed and approved. According to this concept, one of the main directives in fighting terrorism should be cooperation with civil society and the mass media with the aim of raising effectiveness of countering terrorism and extremism. CIS member countries also set up a

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Counterterrorist Center with which authorized Ukrainian agencies cooperate and coordinate its activities. The other regional initiative that Ukraine actively participates in is the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development–GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) set up in 1997. In the framework of this international union of the states, the Agreement, in cooperation between governments of the GUAM member states of fighting terrorism, organized and other dangerous kinds of crimes was signed. In May 2006, in Kyiv a Ukrainian segment of the GUAM Virtual Center was launched for operations. The main plan of the Virtual Center is the exchange of operative and intelligence information on terrorist groups, terrorist activities, and people suspected in terrorist activities or relevant to terrorist organizations in real time by protected communication lines. The Ukrainian segment of the GUAM Virtual Center is managed by an interdepartmental group set up by the President Decree with the goal of organizational, legislative, and logistic communication and other support of the Center’s activities. Ukraine also participates in the Black See Economic Cooperation Organization. The member states of this organization also signed an agreement on the fight against crime, in particular organized, and an additional protocol to this agreement concerns cooperation in fighting terrorism. All of the above mentioned regional initiatives pay much attention to the exchange of experience, best practices and research results in improving existing and developing new forms and methods of countering terrorism through various means including cooperation with citizens and private business. 2.2. National Legislation Ukraine has a special law on fighting terrorism that was adopted in 2003. The law determines legal and organizational grounds for fighting terrorism, defines the scope of the rights and obligations of public authorities, governmental and non-governmental organizations and citizens in this field, sets the order of coordination of activities, and provides for guarantees of legal and social protection to those who participate in the fight against terrorism. One of the main principles for fighting terrorism in Ukraine, according to this law, is the comprehensive use of legal, political and social and economic information, and propaganda possibilities with a priority on preventative measures. According to this law, the following governmental agencies are responsible for fighting terrorism in Ukraine: Security Service of Ukraine as the main responsible body; Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Border Guards Service, State Department for Execution of Punishments, and the Department of State Guards of Ukraine. Upon necessity, other governmental bodies could be involved in anti-terrorist operations including the Service of External Intelligence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finances, State Customs Service, State Tax Administration, and so forth. The governmental agencies responsible for combating terrorism are required to cooperate with one another and the public in the framework of their legal mandate and scope of responsibilities including information campaigns, education and other preventative measures. For instance, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, among others, is required for conducting educational and practical measures in an effort to teach citizens how to react and behave in the case of a terrorist attack.

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The Counter Terrorism Center at the Security Service of Ukraine secures the coordination of all antiterrorist activities in the country. The center develops concepts and programs of fighting terrorism as well as recommendations on discovering and eliminating grounds and reasons favoring terrorism and terrorism related crimes. The center also gathers and analyses information on terrorism in Ukraine and trends relating to its possible development, organizes trainings for law enforcement agencies and special services, coordinates anti-terrorist operations, drafts national legislation and international treaties of Ukraine, and cooperates with foreign law enforcement agencies, special services and international organizations. The Counter Terrorism Center includes the Interdepartmental Coordination Commission and headquarters and regional coordination groups. The Law “On Fighting Terrorism” sets different forms of cooperation for authorized governmental bodies with the public in preventing and combating terrorism. Article 9 of the Law puts the obligation on public organizations and citizens to cooperate with competent authorities in fighting terrorism by providing information necessary for prevention, detection, stopping, investigation or mitigation of a terrorist act or attack. The Law also allows involving citizens in anti-terrorist operations upon their consent and also sets conduct rules on communications to the mass media during an anti-terrorist operation. In this case, public information about acts of terrorism could be conducted only by the chief of headquarters or other person authorized by him to maintain contacts with the mass media. The Law explicitly prohibits dissemination through mass media or in any other way information on special technical means and tactics of antiterrorist operations conduct, information containing terrorist propaganda or justifying terrorism, citations of people who counteract or call for counteraction to the antiterrorist operation, data on the materials or substances that could be used for acts of technological terrorism, or personal data on the people who participate or assist in the operation [10]. Criminal liability for an act of terrorism is established by the Criminal Code of Ukraine in Article 258 that describes terrorism as a socially dangerous act committed with the use of weapons and by explosion or arson or other means that cause danger to a person’s life or health or considerable material damage or other serious consequences. To be interpreted as terrorism and not as another crime, this act should be committed with the following special aims and desired results, in particular: (a) threat of people; (b) provocation of military conflict; (c) complication of international relations with other countries; (d) influence on decision making by public or selfgovernance and state authorities, NGOs, public and business corporations and their officials; and (e) attraction of public attention to political, religious or other views of a terrorist. The Criminal Code of Ukraine also establishes criminal liability for supporting terrorist activities; in particular, the separate liability is set for: (1) involving a person in the commission of a terrorist act or coercing to the commission of a terrorist act using deceit, blackmail, distress, or through use or threat of violence; (2) public calls for the commission of a terrorist act, as well as distribution, production or storage for distribution of materials containing such calls; (3) setting up a terrorist group or terrorist organization, directing such terrorist group or terrorist organization, or participating therein, as well as materially, institutionally or otherwise facilitating the setting up or operation of terrorist group or terrorist organization; and (4) recruiting, financing, materially supporting, arming, or training a person for the purpose of committing a terrorist act, as well as using a person for such purpose.

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Ukraine also takes measures to prevent and stop financing of terrorism. The Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of and Counteraction to Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds of Crime” establishes the system of financial monitoring in the country and sets forth the order and rules of its functioning. One of the elements of the system of financial monitoring is taking measures on prevention and bringing to an end financing of terrorism. According to Article 12-1 of this Law, each financial institution must check their clients against the list of persons suspected in terrorist activities or in supporting of such activities that is provided by the State Committee for Financial Monitoring. Such transactions can be terminated for a period from two up to five banking days [11]. Since technically, terrorism is a crime, the methods used for combating this very serious type of crime are the same as methods used to prevent, stop, detect and investigate organized and/or transnational crime. There are also other means of combating terrorism, namely military intelligence, counterintelligence and so forth, but discussions involving public cooperation should be given first priority out of all police methods. In comparison to other agencies authorized to combat terrorism, the police are in the very front line concerning public communication. Since 2000, a special law regulating involvement of citizens in the fight against crime has been in force in Ukraine it is the Law of Ukraine on Participation of Citizens in Public Order Maintenance and the State Border Protection. According to Article 1 of this Law that refers to the Constitution of Ukraine, citizens of Ukraine have the right to establish non-governmental organizations with the aim to participate in maintenance of public order and protection of the state border; provide assistance to local self government, law enforcement agencies, the State Border Guard Service and bodies of executive power in prevention and stopping administrative offences and crimes, and protecting people, property and public interests from illegal encroachments as well as participation in rescue operations. Such non-governmental organizations regarding maintenance of public order and protecting the state border can be created as self-governed organizations (hereinafter public order and border protection NGOs–POBP NGOs) in the form of a united squad of the POBP NGOs, special squads (groups) of support to militia1 (police) and the State Border Guard Service (hereinafter SBGS), and associations of the POBP NGOs. In addition, they can be established in neighborhoods, educational institutions and in places of employment on a voluntary basis with a total of ten or more people. Any person who is 18 years of age or older, does not have a criminal record, has not violated a public order, and/or does not have a drug or alcohol abuse problem or mental disease is eligible to volunteer. The POBP NGOs have their own statute approved by local law enforcement or border protection agencies and local self government. Everyday operations of NGOs are directed and controlled by local law enforcement agencies, and they have some privileges in comparison to other NGOs, namely exemption of a registration fee and taxes due to their non-profit organization status. In addition, local self government, law enforcement or border protection agencies can provide the premises, technical operational equipment and funding to the POBP NGOs free of charge. The main tasks of the POBP NGO include the following: (1) provide assistance to the police in public order and security maintenance and prevention of administrative 1

The official name of the Ukrainian law enforcement agency responsible for performance of police functions is militia. For the reader’s convenience, “police” will be used for the term “militia.”

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offences and crimes as well as assistance to the SBGS in protection of the state border; (2) inform police on crimes under preparation and committed crimes or locations of criminal groups; (3) provide support to the police in detection and solving crimes, search for criminals and fugitives, detection and arrest of trespassers, protection of human rights and public interests, participation in traffic control and combating juvenile crime; (4) provide assistance to the SBGS in identification of preconditions for criminal activities at the state border and its prevention as well as participate in the prevention of border violations; (5) participate in surveillance for the elements of infrastructure at the pre-border area; and (6) in the event of natural or other disasters, provide assistance to victims and participate in rescue operations. The POBP NGO has the right to: (a) participate in public order maintenance operations and conduct such operations individually in rural areas by performing tasks of the heads of law enforcement agencies; (b) participate in stopping administrative offences and crimes; (c) collaborate with other NGOs in crime prevention campaigns, prevention of traffic violations, environmental and historical heritage protection; (d) represent interests of its members; and (e) make propositions on crime prevention policies. Various forms of POBP activities are: participation in patrols and special posts at the near-border areas, participation in searches and inspections of places of possible frontier violations, participation in public order maintenance operations during public events, and participation in other law enforcement and investigative operations. Members of POBP NGOs function under control of the police or SBGS officers, and can participate in law enforcement and border control operations under the condition that they attend special courses in law and special skills training with local law enforcement agencies; upon completion they receive an ID and armband. They also have the power to detain people who commit administrative offences, and they may escort them to police stations or other governmental body premises if the violation of order could not be stopped in another way, require inspection documents in case of suspicion of an offence or crime commission, file administrative offences, use violence and special means of self defense such as tire gas and so forth. The rules for the use of special means of self defense are the same as for the use of firearms by police officers. For the members of POBP NGOs, special rules of social protection and guarantees are applied [12]. Ukrainian legislation also mentions other forms of involving citizens into the struggle against terrorism that include support to special services and law enforcement agencies on a voluntary basis; confidential cooperation on a voluntary or paid basis; and traffic volunteers. These forms of cooperation are supported by the Law of Ukraine “on Militia,” “on operative and search activities,” “on intelligence agencies,” “on Security Service of Ukraine,” “on counterintelligence,” and other. Thus, Ukraine has substantial national legislation in force that allows a number of law enforcement methods to be applied in preventing and countering terrorism. Many provisions of the current laws are in place and were incorporated into legislation as a result of the ratification by international and European treaties aimed at countering terrorism. 2.3. Recommendations by the Council of Europe Institutions Another source of international obligations for the Ukraine includes Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. These recommendations do not contain an obligation for any government but serve as a

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guideline for developing national legislation, policies and procedures. Taking into account the current foreign policy of the Ukrainian government aimed at joining the European Union, Recommendations of the European Institutions are reflected into new legislation and procedures that are possible and appropriate. In particular, in the Ukrainian legislation and policy drafting practice, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe are taken into consideration. In combating terrorism and collaboration with public and private businesses in these activities, the following documents of the Council of Europe are considered:              

 

PACE Recommendation 684 (1972) on International Terrorism PACE Recommendation 1584 (2002) Need for intensified international co-operation to neutralize funds for terrorist purposes PACE Recommendation 1549 (2002) Air transport and terrorism: How to enhance security PACE Recommendation 1677 (2004) Challenge of terrorism in Council of Europe member states PACE Recommendation 1644 (2004) Terrorism: A threat to democracies PACE Recommendation 1687 (2004) Combating terrorism through culture PACE Resolution 1271 (2002) on combating terrorism and respect for human rights PACE Resolution 1400 (2004) Challenge of terrorism in Council of Europe member states Recommendation Rec(2003)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning partnership in crime prevention Recommendation Rec(2005)7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states concerning identity and travel documents and the fight against terrorism Recommendation Rec(2005)9 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of witnesses and collaborators of justice Recommendation Rec(2005)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on “special investigation techniques” in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism Recommendation Rec(2006)8 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on assistance to crime victims Recommendation Rec(2007)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member states regarding cooperation against terrorism between the Council of Europe and its member states and the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO–Interpol) Recommendation 1550 (2002) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Combating terrorism and respect for human rights The Council of Europe Guidelines on Human rights and the fight against terrorism

These documents contain general guidelines for the Council of Europe member countries including Ukraine’s government on building and developing policies, legislation and practices of combating terrorism in a way that would secure human rights and protect the interests of citizens.

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In particular, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1687 (2004), Combating terrorism through culture, stresses the need for an overall approach to combating terrorism and combining culture with political, economic, legal, and social methods. According to the Parliamentary Assembly’s opinion, a culture that includes the arts, heritage, religion, the media, science, education, youth, and sports can play an important role in preventing the development of a terrorist mentality and in cutting terrorists off from wider support. This could be accomplished by building intercultural and interreligious dialogue and developing conflict prevention policies and programs. Special attention in the recommendation is directed toward the mass media’s role in covering terrorism issues, creating a platform for public debate of the issues of terrorism and calling for developing relevant to professional ethics. Another important cultural component in the prevention of terrorism is education that is considered to be one of the most powerful tools. With the goal of preventing terrorism, education should become a means of transmitting not only knowledge but also values, developing a critical mind and resistance to violence as a means of conflict resolution in society. Education should also offer individuals the possibility of fully participating in the development of a democratic, just and equitable society in which terrorism has no place. The education should also be aimed at improving mutual understanding between diverse groups and cultures through creating a culture of tolerance, dialogue, understanding, respect and pluralism. In an effort to better understand and monitor the causes and development of terrorism, it is necessary to encourage reflection and research on terrorism and culture based on developing educational programs aimed at promoting knowledge of diverse cultures and religions. According to the PACE Recommendation, the educational component also includes: (a) history teaching and revising textbooks in an attempt to reduce prejudice and stereotypes and remove incitements to terrorism; (b) discussion on terrorism among the younger generation to include conflict prevention and the promotion of a culture of peace; (c) supporting international youth work as a way of giving concrete expression to intercultural dialogue; and (d) developing human rights education and education for citizenship. This, in turn, will ensure proper education that promotes tolerance and builds intercultural and interreligious dialogue. PACE also recommended the development of inter-communal cultural activities as a way of relieving tension between communities and promoting understanding and tolerance by encouraging the distribution of cultural and audiovisuals from other parts of the world and supporting mobility and exchanges of artists, performers, scholars and scientists. All of these measures would reduce the heroic aura surrounding terrorists and help eradicate public acceptance of terrorist acts [13]. Recommendation (2003) 21 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning partnership in crime prevention stresses the need for governments to: (a) recognize that responsibility for crime prevention should be widely shared in society; (b) partnerships in crime prevention should have a strong legislative background; (c) awareness on crime prevention and necessity for cooperation in this field should be raised; (d) recognize, in particular, the need to involve local authorities and local communities in crime prevention activities, as constitutionally appropriate, both as initiators and participants; (e) foster motivation, education and staff training, and the mobilization and empowerment of social responsibility in private and public institutions, volunteers and ordinary citizen participants; (f) provide research and develop recommendations on the forms and methods of partnerships and ensure their communication and exchange of experience with one another; and (g) provide political

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support and continuous support to partnerships at different levels. In an effort to implement these policies, techniques should be developed for partners to collaborate on crime impact assessment and crime risk assessment and on forecasting new crime problems and opportunities for their prevention, as well as relevant trends of a wider nature. It should be recognized that effective partnerships require the prior existence of trust between partners, or its development, which may take time and special effort [14]. Recommendation 1713 (2005) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states, encourages governments to set up effective mechanisms of democratic supervision over special services. According to PACE, one of the specific tools intended to ensure political accountability and transparency of the security sector is a good relationship between the various segments of the security sector and representatives of civil society (for example, NGOs, the media, political parties, and so forth) [15] PACE Recommendation 1584 (2002) Need for intensified international cooperation to neutralize funds for terrorist purposes, suggests governments to intensify cooperation between national administration, police forces, courts, financial institutions, regulatory, and other authorities in an effort to uncover suspicious international transactions and thereby reach the organizations and individuals behind them [16]. It is necessary for law enforcement to cooperate with the mass media for a number of reasons. First, of all the mass media forms, society’s image of the police and level of law enforcement trust in many ways depend on how its activities and separate actions are covered in the press. Second, the mass media could be used as an instrument for informing the public about possible terrorist threats, thereby raising public awareness of terrorism or a search for witnesses, for example. Third, the mass media could also be directly used by covering terrorism prevention campaigns, counter terrorism programs, or documentary films addressing issues of xenophobia, religious and nationality hate crimes that quite often serve as a motivation for terrorist attacks. The police should also build partnerships or other types of close effective cooperation with the mass media in an attempt to prevent its use for terrorist purposes, namely undermine the government’s reputation or society’s increased feeling of fear. For example, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers in its Declaration on freedom of expression and information in the media in the context of the fight against terrorism of 2 March 2005, among others, invites the media and journalists to consider the following suggestions: (a) bear in mind their particular responsibilities in the context of terrorism in order not to contribute to the aims of terrorists; they should, in particular, take care not to add to the feeling of fear that terrorist acts can create, and not to offer a platform for terrorists by giving them disproportionate attention; (b) bear in mind the significant role which they can play in preventing “hate speeches” and incitement to violence, as well as in promoting mutual understanding; (c) to be aware of the risk that the media and journalists can unintentionally serve as a vehicle for the expression of racist or xenophobic feelings or hatred; (d) refrain from jeopardizing the safety of persons and the conduct of antiterrorist operations or judicial investigations of terrorism through information they disseminate; (e) bear in mind the importance of distinguishing between suspected or convicted terrorists and the group (national, ethnic, religious or ideological) to which they belong or to which they claim to subscribe; (f) assess the way in which the media informs the public about questions concerning terrorism, in particular, by consulting the public, by analytical broadcasts, articles and colloquies, and informing the public of the assessment results [17].

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The Council of Europe Institutions developed a comprehensive set of political, legislative, organizational and institutional measures that should be taken by the government of Ukraine into consideration with the goal of strengthening countering terrorism in Ukraine in close cooperation with its citizens, public and private businesses. Existence of legislation in force does not solve the existing problems in a particular field. To have a law on paper is not enough for effective measures aimed to overcome or solve a particular problem. The status quo of implementing provisions to the abovementioned laws that regulate citizen involvement in the fight against crime, including terrorism, is a very bright example of how the law differs from practice.

3. Practical Aspects of Collaboration with Public and Private Businesses in Fighting Terrorism and Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine Terrorism itself is a complex phenomenon that has many sides and manifestations. Some view terrorism as an ideology for reaching a particular political, social or national goal used for fighting against existing states and governments while others consider terrorism as a social phenomenon that develops in national minority societies or religious organizations and strongly influences the minds of these members. Still yet, terrorism may be seen as a very serious and dangerous crime that endangers society, citizens and a country’s government. In addition, because terrorism has many manifestations, different approaches are required to deal with the problem. For example, terrorism can be considered as a crime against the state when the attack is aimed at undermining a legally existing government or a violent crime against public order when committed in public places through the use of firearms and explosives. Undoubtedly, terrorism is a type of organized and transnational crimes. Depending on the means used to carry out attacks, some terrorist activities can be interpreted as cyber crime; on the other hand, financing terrorism or providing assistance to suppliers of funds for supporting terrorist activities can be considered a white collar crime. Therefore, if terrorism is considered a crime, the same policing and investigating methods could apply to combat the act as in the case of any other serious crimes. Policing methods aimed at combating crime are divided into two types of categories: proactive policing and reactive policing. Proactive policing typically includes methods of prevention, detection and stopping crime. Proactive measures aimed at fighting terrorism usually consist of (a) military intelligence; (b) criminal intelligence; (c) financial intelligence; (d) counterintelligence; (e) intelligence through ordinary police operations (field stops, traffic stops, arrests and investigations); (f) intelligence in the communities; (g) identification, assessment and mitigation of potential threats; (h) exchange of information and cooperation; and (i) counter terrorist and police operations to prevent or stop terrorist acts or attacks. On the other hand, reactive policing involves conduct of rescue operations, investigation of crime and support and rehabilitation of victims. Reactive methods in combating terrorism include: (1) response to weapons of mass destruction; (2) response to mass casualty events; (3) ordinary and special investigative techniques and methods (arrests, interrogations, search and seize, line up, forensic examinations, wire tapping, undercover surveillance, and so forth); and (4) legal, medical, psychological, social, and financial support to victims. In the case of terrorism, police deal more with proactive methods, that is, gathering of intelligence information through ordinary police operations or by applying

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methods of community policing and other programs aimed at public cooperation. At the reactive stage of response to terrorism, the police play a more supportive role as opposed to an active role, for instance, maintaining public order during responses to mass casualty events. Effectively fighting terrorism is not possible without support from public and private business entities and corporations such as private security companies, entrepreneurs, mass media, non-governmental organizations, local communities and neighborhoods, and individual citizens. From the policing point of view, public representatives are an extremely valuable source of information; in other words, there is always someone who either heard or saw something suspicious that could be used by the police or other law enforcement authority in detection or investigation. Additionally, taking into account the specifics of terrorism as a crime with strong political, religious or nationality motivation, ordinary people could become instruments in the hands of terrorists and used for direct participation in attacks or provide terrorists with support at different stages of attack preparations. That is why it is very important to follow community developments and dispositions, detect possible terrorists or terrorist groups and stop propaganda that could lead to ideas and motives for terrorist actions. Public representatives are also potential victims of terrorists or terrorist acts and attacks. That is why it is necessary to conduct awareness campaigns that explain signs of a potential acts or attacks and convince the community to report to the police any suspicious people, objects, events and so forth. In the event that a terrorist attack happens, citizens should know how to behave in an effort to support the police actions, assist victims, liquidate consequences, preserve evidence and not create obstacles. All these methods require constant and close contact with law enforcement officers as well as the communities they serve. By the beginning of the 21st century, police science and practice had developed a number of methods to incorporate citizens into the fight against crime and public order maintenance. Methods including community policing, team policing and problem oriented policing are designed to build, support and develop partnerships between communities and police in a particular area or neighborhood. For example, in the United States, community policing methods began to appear by the end of the seventies and resulted in much success and a considerable increase in policing effectiveness [18]. However, the events of 9/11 and the new Homeland Security initiatives and policies caused changes in the approaches to traditional policing methods, including community policing and problem oriented policing. According to researchers, after September 11th, community policing approaches became substituted with Homeland Security methods that deal more with tactical methods, technology, gathering of intelligence, and detection of possible threats rather than delivery of community services. This rapid change in the approaches is explained by two basic foundations: fear and money. These factors have served to stretch police budgets and increase the police workload [19]. Other researchers have tied this change to the consequences of the attacks that had political, economic and social characteristics. Politically, 9/11 resulted in adoption of the USA PATRIOT Act. The economic effects lead to a situation where many governmental agency budgets were reduced including police-related grants while the budget for Homeland Security had risen [20]. In terms of social implications, public concern regarding terrorism moved from little to no concern during the pre 9-11 years to ranking as one of the three most important problems facing the USA every since 9/11 [21]. This brings the element of fear when citizens are ready to give up their rights, for example, privacy, in an effort to be better protected from terrorist attacks

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[20]. Thus, in the United States, approaches to policing and cooperation with the public in fighting terrorism were changed. Correlations between community policing and Homeland Security methods have also been researched. The most difficult question raised was the role of the police in the Homeland Security operations. According to researchers, the role of the police in fighting terrorism is centered more toward gathering of local intelligence that could contribute to the detection of terrorists and possible threats as well as serving as a front line of defense in the event of possible threats. Ideally, in these conditions law enforcement and community partnerships would provide police with greater intelligence about possible terrorists or suspicious neighborhood activity. The police and citizens through community policing initiatives could also be trained on how to be better prepared in responding to terrorist attacks and know what to do in case of such an attack [18]. On the other hand, such an approach can present a problem. According to Oliver, the police function within the Homeland Security operations as intelligence gathering “could actually serve to destroy the relationship between the police and community partners as the emphasis would shift to fighting an unseen enemy, rather than the prevalent and highly visible problems of street crime and disorder” [18]. The situation in Ukraine is quite the opposite. Fortunately, Ukraine has not experienced a major terrorist attack, and therefore, the perceptions of terrorism and attitudes toward the police are very different as are the methods of policing. Despite that 16 years have passed after gaining independence, the Ukrainian police still employ the Soviet methods of policing which, if compared to the policing changes in the USA, have always been the “homeland security” model rather than community policing. The biggest problem and challenge for Ukrainian police and other law enforcement agencies is building trust within the community. In Ukraine, the relations between people and police can not be defined as a partnership or cooperation. Since the USSR era, the main form of cooperation between the police and citizens has been to provide police assistance but not as an equal partnership [22]. The first step aimed at building partnership relations between the police and public was taken in 1999 by the Ministry of Interior when the program of the development of partnership between the militia and citizens for 2000–2005 was adopted. The Program emphasized that there were a number of violations and abuses by the militia officers, namely, lack of professionalism and ethics in performance of their duties. The Program also criticized police officers for not finding proper forms of cooperation with citizens and involving them into public order maintenance and prevention of crime. The goal of the program was to convince people of the necessity to cooperate with militia and build partnerships between citizens and the militia. One of the ways to reach this goal is to estimate and develop civil monitoring and control over police activities. But, this program was very general, and in many places, suggested that militia officers find problems and ways to solutions without setting up criteria for evaluation of the results. Overall, the program was not realized because the partnerships practically did not exist [22], the next step was adoption of the Law of Ukraine on participation of citizens in public order maintenance and the state border protection which has never been implemented. There were a number of attempts to implement this Law into practice such as the Adoption in 2005 Order of the Minister of Interior on the approval of the status of a volunteer (civilian assistant) or the present police officer, which ordered to set up such position in any rural area, and elect, appoint, train and equip, and organize and secure their functioning; adoption in 2006 Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers on the issues of functioning POBP NGOs which ordered to analyze application of the

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Law, to set up the position of an instructor on dealing with POBP NGOs; and adoption in 2007 Decree of the President on the measures aimed and support to Ukrainian Cossacks which called for involvement of the historical unions of modern Cossacks in the public order maintenance and other bylaws and enactments which were also not implemented. Some practical steps were also taken. For instance in 2000–2003, an experiment on implementing community policing in Kharkiv took place that involved two police stations where activities such as conduct using a sociological survey on the evaluation of police performance and expectations from the public was conducted, and experimental methods of cooperation with the public in local conditions in the forms of consultancy committees, Neighbourhood Watch, prevention of burglaries, anonymous telephone hotline “Stop a Criminal,” and cooperation with schools were incorporated [23]. Unfortunately, due to many circumstances, the results of this very successful experiment were not spread to other parts of Ukraine. Thus, all attempts to build partnership relations between the police and the public in Ukraine until today did not have much success. This means that in the event of a terrorist threat or attack, the police and other law enforcement agencies can not account on strong public support. In the case of terrorism prevention, the chance for gaining information and other assistance from the public is even less. A number of reasons which lead to this situation include: lack of quality in both state and local budgets directed to development of partnerships; lack of interest from the local authorities; lack of control and monitoring in the application of such initiatives; dominance of Soviet ideology in legislation and practice; political instability; lack of executive discipline; and lack of trust in the police. The latest require separate attention and analysis because they are the key obstacles. People do not trust the police because of the historical heritage of the Soviet era mentality and psychology of people when the police represented a tool for repressions, brutality and violence; lack of professionalism in general and in communications with people; lack of ethics; high level of corruption; turnover of personnel in the force; and the creation and maintenance of a negative image in mass media with personal political aims. As a result, 66% of people do not trust the police in Ukraine [24] and only 1.2% of forum visitors at the Ministry of Interior’s official web site had positive comments concerning the police officers and the Ministry [22]. Such a situation definitely does not favor development of partnerships between law enforcement agencies and the public.

4. Conclusion Building terrorism resistant communities is a very difficult task that requires a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach. The role of the police in these kinds of activities can not be underestimated as well as the role of community and citizens that the police exist to serve. When dealing with the issues of terrorism prevention, in the majority of cases, police apply the same methods as they apply to prevention of other serious crimes. Thus, traditional police methods such as community policing, problem oriented policing and others could be successfully applied in operations aimed at countering terrorism. The key aspect of police activities that guarantee positive results is existence and development of partnership relations with the public. Development and maintenance of such partnerships depends on many social, cultural, financial and political factors.

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Ukraine’s experience which has a number of very good written and thorough laws, bylaws and national programs, for example, showed that pure existence of laws and regulations that are not supported by political will for their implementation, proper financial support, understanding from both sides–law enforcement and the public does not guarantee the success and give proper results. In order to improve the situation, it is necessary to understand that the leading role in such cooperation should belong, first of all, by local authorities and law enforcement agencies. Also very important is to provide necessary government support at the national level. Society, or the public, should be ready and willing to cooperate with government and law enforcement in developing partnerships. The role of mass media in such cooperation should not be underestimated and should be used not only for educational and awareness campaigns but also for building a positive image of law enforcement agencies. The national and local programs aimed at building terrorism resistant communities and reform of law enforcement agencies should be incorporated simultaneously. For example, the Special Action Plan Ukraine–NATO for 2008 approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of April 1 2008 N 289/2008 promotes a comprehensive approach to reform of criminal law and procedure, reform of law enforcement agencies, development of partnership relations between law enforcement agencies and the public, including mass media, and improvement of measures aimed at combating terrorism and financing of terrorism [25]. Taking into account the research of International and European treaties, recommendations of European institutions, experience of the USA, and Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, the following recommendations are offered for building terrorist resistant communities by law enforcement agencies in the capacity of their legal mandate and responsibilities:  The national programs and legislation aimed at combating terrorism through development of police-public partnerships should be realistic and accompanied by a proper step-by-step action plan, financing and monitor/control mechanism of its implementation and application.  Governments and law enforcement should take into account cultural aspects of terrorism prevention.  In attempting to build partnerships with communities, law enforcement agencies should seek support from local authorities and non-governmental organizations.  Partnerships should be based on trust, mutual respect, common aims, and joint interests in reaching a particular result.  Law enforcement agencies should address each element of civil society separately, applying individual approaches to each group, community or individual.  Law enforcement agencies should be trained in communications with citizens and the mass media.  Law enforcement should care about its image and take measures to improve it.  Approaches to law enforcement management and evaluation of its effectiveness should be changed in an effort to receive more support from the public.  Law enforcement agencies should keep a balance with human rights, religious and national feelings.

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 Civil control over law enforcement agencies should be in place and function effectively.

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Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 115 Stat. 272 (2001) E. Bumiller, D.E. Sanger, Bush Seeks Cabinet Post on Security. New York Times, Friday, June 7, 2002 InfraGuard History: www.infragard.com [2006, July 26] National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Information Sharing: www.dhs.gov/nipp [2006, July 25] A. Morabito and S. Greenberg, Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement – Private Sector Partnerships. New Realities Law Enforcement in the Post-9/11 Era, Bureau of Justice Assistance Office of Justice Programs US Department of Justice. Paper NCJ 210678 (September 2005), vii        « *+ » 15-19  \ 2008 +^ http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=78707&cat_id=78362 [September 2008] ` ^\ *+ .       (), 1996, N 30, . 141 {+ *+  «| }~    *+ ».       (), 2004, € 50, . 540 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Warsaw, 16.V.2005: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/196.htm [September, 2008] {+ *+  “|  ^  }}”.       (), 2003, N 25, .180 {+ *+  | ‚

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} ˆ\‡}.       (), 2003, N 1, . 2 {+ *+  “| ^ }\  ‡  } + ‚\+^  ~  + ^”.       (), 2000, N 40, .338 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1687 (2004) Combating terrorism through culture http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta04/EREC168 7.htm [September, 2008] Recommendation Rec(2003)21 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning partnership in crime prevention https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=70083&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntran et=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 [September, 2008] Recommendation 1713 (2005) Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta05/erec1713.htm [September, 2008] PACE Recommendation 1584 (2002) Need for intensified international co-operation to neutralize funds for terrorist purposes http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FAdopted Text%2Fta02%2FEREC1584.htm [September, 2008] Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Declaration on freedom of expression and information in the media in the context of the fight against terrorism adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2005 at the 917th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/fight_against_terrorism/2_adopted_texts/Declaration%20freedom%20and%20media%2020 05%20E%20pdf.pdf [September, 2008] Willard V. Oliver, The Homeland Security Juggernaut: The End of the Community Policing Era? Crime and Justice International, March/April 2004, p.6-10 James F. Pastor, Terrorism and Public Safety Policing. Crime and Justice International, March-April 2005, p. 4 Willard M. Oliver. The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001 to … Crime and Justice International, March-April 2005, p.9-10 Maguire, K. and Pastore, A.L. (2005) Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics [Online] Available: http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ [January 17, 2005] cited in Willard M. Oliver. The Era of Homeland Security: September 11, 2001 to … Crime and Justice International, March-April 2005, p.9

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Pushing the Private-Public Partnership: Exploring Extant Tools a

J.B. HILL a and Benjamin STIPE b Institute for the Study of Violent Groups b Sam Houston State University

Abstract. This paper examines several current tools for private-public partnership. Specifically, it seeks to identify gaps in the private-public partnership efforts by the United States government and provides direction in filling these gaps. Additionally, current tools being utilized are examined as a group to assist in the understanding of the current state of private-public partnerships in the United States. Keywords. private-public partnership, homeland security, terrorism, information sharing, Information Sharing Analysis Centers, Homeland Security Information Network

Introduction One of the consistent refrains from both the private and public sectors, and particularly from the Bush administration and Congress, after September 11th 2001, is that there needs to be more consistent private-public partnership regarding national and homeland security, and specifically regarding counterterrorism [1]. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fundamentally challenged the way that the private sector and the public sector had previously worked together in regards to security [2]. The necessity of addressing this challenge has been made clear not only in the Report of the Commission on the 9/11 attacks [3], but frequently afterwards. With nearly 85 percent of the critical infrastructure of our country owned and operated by the private sector," [9/11] Commission Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton said, "it is clear that any measures the public sector takes on its own will not be enough to guarantee the safety of all Americans [2]. A 2004 U.S. General Accounting Office Report, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, again brought this to light: DHS has not yet developed a plan for how it will carry out its information sharing responsibilities….It is essential for DHS to develop this plan, along with internal policies and procedures, to establish effective informationsharing relationships both within DHS and with other federal agencies and infrastructure sectors [4].

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While this refers specifically to information sharing, which indeed is one of the most significant areas of private-public partnership regarding security; it by no means is the only area where the concept is applicable. Suggestions for private-public partnerships extend from providing mitigated risk to the private insurance sector to make terrorism insurance widely available, to allowing companies that follow specific protocols and procedures related to homeland security increase speed when making their way through customs [5]. Critical infrastructure has also become an extremely important aspect of private-public partnerships [6]. There has been a concerted effort within private industry, and specifically within the critical infrastructure sectors, to coordinate with the government, as exemplified in the Information and Analysis Sharing Centers (ISACs, examined below) [7]. These centers allow critical infrastructure sectors to not only share information within the private-public partnership paradigm, but also allow the organizations to coordinate with one another, incorporating best practices and other industry standards, often with the explicit input of the government. However, thus far, "the federal government has largely taken a hands-off approach to the private sector, believing that market mechanisms will provide levels of security sufficient to address the modern terrorist threat," [2]. Unfortunately, and despite calls to the contrary, as the hurricane Katrina disaster demonstrated, neither the private sector nor the public sector is completely ready for a large-scale homeland security disaster. While private-public partnerships have taken on a new urgency since the September 11th attacks, the idea that government and private industry must work together regarding homeland defense is not a new one. "In the 1940's, American business built an ‘arsenal of democracy’ to win the war. Today, they are building an ‘arsenal of security’-exciting, nimble, cutting-edge products, that can cut response time and save lives” [8]. This same sentiment was enshrined well before 9/11 in Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, signed in 1998 [9]. The directive looks specifically at how the private sector can assist the government in protecting critical infrastructure (CI). Indeed, it is estimated that over 90% of the United States’ CI is owned by the private sector, adding even more urgency to the integration of security between private and public [6]. Despite this perceived importance and the sometimes exceptional efforts to increase private-public partnerships, there remain significant problems within the framework, both within individual tools, as well as across the partnership paradigm. In January 2008, the Washington Post reported that one of the most significant informationsharing tools, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN, examined below), would be replaced by the government because it was too hastily implemented and exhibited significant security issues, in addition to its redundancy [10]. Given this emphasis on private-public partnerships, it becomes exceedingly important to not only identify those areas where the cooperation is taking place, and evaluate accordingly, but also to find gaps in the private-public partnership framework, and find solutions to fill those gaps. Unfortunately, despite its importance, the private-public partnership remains a relatively understudied phenomenon. The majority of the research thus far tends to focus broadly on the topic, and does not delve into individual tools [2]. Alternately, some authors focus only on a specific tool’s shortcomings and miss the opportunity to draw broad conclusions across the topic of private-public partnership [10]. This paper seeks to identify significant tools developed by or in conjunction with the United States Government being currently utilized in the quest for extended

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private-public partnership, and summarize those tools while identifying shortcomings and problems, as well as positive aspects. It then evaluates the private-public partnership system as it currently stands, with a specific emphasis on providing commentary on the gaps in the current system. Finally, solutions and policies are offered to correct some of the identified problems in the system.

1. Methodology The authors identified many of the primary private-public partnership platforms developed or assisted by the United States Government and attempted to identify major operational features of each program. Only programs that have a national government component were accepted, meaning that several noteworthy partnerships were not covered in the main part of the analysis.1 However, these tools, where possible, were also examined and their descriptions are appended to this paper. The information used in the descriptions of the tools covered in the analysis was developed from the literature provided by the organizations themselves, and any analyses the authors could locate. Because of the closed nature of many of the partnership entities, the information reported by them was taken at face value. The authors then identified major characteristics of the programs, and within each characteristic provided a summary of the areas covered and potential problems. The state of private-public partnership was then examined as a whole, with the authors identifying gaps in areas of coverage both within each sub-category as well as between them. 1.1 A Note About ISACs The authors include Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) within the framework of this paper. However, because of the recent proliferation of ISACs, it was thought best to only include the largest ISACs in the bulk of the analysis, and append the information regarding smaller ISACs. The information about these smaller ISACs will be used throughout the analysis and readers referred to the appropriate appendix.

2. Private-Public Partnerships In the context of this examination, private-public partnerships are U.S. Government created or assisted entities that explicitly seek to assist in cooperation regarding security between the private sector and the United States Government, including national offices as well as smaller government entities. These entities can be in any of several areas such as information sharing, private sector outreach, or critical infrastructure protection. By no means do the organizations and entities listed below represent all of the private-public partnership efforts executed by either the government or the private sector themselves. A full examination, while fruitful, is far beyond the scope of a single

1 Of particular note in this regard is NYPD Shield, an excellent information sharing organization run by the NYPD.

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paper. Here the authors only seek to represent a cross-section of the private-public partnerships available, to highlight issues within the context of the paradigm. 2.1. Law Enforcement Online (LEO) Law Enforcement online is a secure, internet-based communications platform for law enforcement and others with a security interest both in the United States, as well as internationally. Its primary function is distributing sensitive but unclassified material to interested parties via the web-portal provided by the service. All users are vetted by LEO, and there are currently more than 100,000 users on the system, despite its original user-base of 20 when it was established in 1995. Along with access to the information contained in the web-portal, LEO offers a national alert system and access to the Special Interest Group (SIG) sites of LEO members. These SIGs allow members with various expertises to communicate with one another in a secure environment, fostering collaboration among members. Each SIGs access level is set by the member organization in charge of the SIG. All LEO member groups are able to establish a SIG. Additionally, access to a multimedia library and a Virtual Command Center round out LEO’s functions, though additional services are available through the site, such as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and the database for the Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Access to LEO is difficult to obtain for those outside of the immediate law enforcement community. Contractors and analysts can gain entry, but frequently are turned down before they are accepted.2 Additionally, LEO SIGs are difficult to find unless users know specifically what they are looking for, and most require affiliations with the group maintaining the SIG. While these foster collaboration among individuals within a given SIG, it makes it difficult to work across the platform. Those SIGs that are open remain relatively few [11]. 2.2. United States Private and Public Partnership (USP3) The United States Private and Public Partnership is private-sector collaboration with various states, local and federal partners. It is primarily focused on information sharing, and the major attribute is a common repository for information regarding members. Private sector members include ASIS International, the Dallas Emergency Response Team (DERT), InfraGard (mentioned below) and the Global Incident Map. The public sector is represented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in addition to the Federal Executive Boards and the Emergency Preparedness Council. Membership again is self-directed, with little outreach. The concept for USP3 was developed before September 11th, 2001 and has since been known in several guises including DHS INFO and HSIN-CI. Membership seems relatively open, though each USP3 member vets its own membership utilizing criteria that they establish. Like HSIN (mentioned below) it serves to bring several other private-public partnership initiatives under the same umbrella, with the stated goal of providing a coordination conduit for private and public outreach programs. Interestingly, HSIN, RISS, and LEO are all considered partners of USP3 [12]. 2 The authors work frequently in a Law Enforcement support capacity and one was turned down twice before gaining admittance into the LEO system.

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2.3. InfraGard InfraGard is an FBI-affiliated private-public partnership organization dedicated to information sharing and analysis. It includes businesses, academic organizations and state and local law enforcement agencies. Because it is geographically based, the size of the chapters, as the basic units are called, is varied. Each chapter is geographically linked with an FBI field office, and each has an FBI Special Agent Coordinator assigned to it. Additionally, InfraGard also affiliates with several government programs including the GETS program, the RTP and CINTAS, though participation of these is at the discretion of individual InfraGard members [16]. The InfraGard Members Alliance is a collaboration effort among many of the InfraGard members. It has over 26,000 members organized into 86 chapters representing all 18 of the nations’ critical infrastructure. The main tool of the organization is a secure website, allowing communication and information sharing among members. It views its private members as Subject Matter Experts, who are asked to share their knowledge with the rest of the alliance. It is remarkably similar in many ways to LEO, though with a more singular effort towards Private Sector entities, versus Law Enforcement Agencies [17]. The individual chapters are responsible for most of the activity of the organization. The chapters may offer training, newsletters or a contingency plan for local critical infrastructure, but are not compelled to do so by the organization writ large. This means that potentially, some of the smaller chapters may not have the resources to offer these services, even if the chapter wishes [13]. 2.4. Private Sector Office The Private Sector Office (PSO) was created under the auspices of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and developed to fulfill several functions within the privatepublic partnership framework. Specifically it works to foster strategic communications with the private sector, advise the Secretary on the effects of Department policies, regulations and other actions on the private sector, create Private Sector Advisory Councils, develop innovative approaches to technology, promote private-public partnerships, promote best practices within the private sector, identify private sector resources that could supplement public activities regarding counterterrorism and disaster recovery, and consult with DHS components and the Commerce Department on matters of concern to the private sector. The office is divided broadly into two sections. The first, the Business Liaison Division, works with a variety of private sector entities to gather information from the private sector to advise senior leadership within the context of the policy process. Additionally, the Division maintains relationships with public sector entities as varied as the Small Business Administration and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in order to foster strategic communications across sectors. It has the additional responsibilities of promoting DHS policy in the private sector, as well as providing outreach through a variety of methods including assisting in rollouts and facilitating involvement of the private sector in public preparedness exercises. The second division, the Private Sector Economic Analysis Division, seeks to provide economic analyses of actions proposed by the DHS to offer policy makers insight into those actions, in addition to evaluating the consequences of various disaster possibilities such as Pandemic Flu and catastrophic cyber attacks. Further, the

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Economic Analysis Division reviews potential regulations, assessing their impact on the affected private sector entities. The Office does not seem itself to have a specific tool set to offer within the context of private-public partnership, only performing analysis and outreach in addition to its advisory role within the DHS [14]. 2.5. Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) The HSIN is different from most other information-sharing networks in that it serves as an umbrella for several other information-sharing networks, not all consisting of private-public partnerships. The major component of HSIN is a computer-based counterterrorism information system that connects all 50 states to a national operations center to allow quick dissemination of necessary information in case an attack should occur. Currently, the system is deployed in all 50 states, five territories, Washington D.C. as well as several major urban areas. It is designed to accommodate law enforcement and private sector personnel at all levels, including local, state and national. The HSIN has been plagued by significant problems. In particular, under-use, as well as significant security concerns have limited the scope of penetration in terms of private-public partnership, and state and local entities complain that HSIN is a duplication of effort. However, in June 2008 it was announced that HSIN would be updated to attempt to account for many of these concerns. While it remains to be seen how this update will affect overall use, it is significant that the plans include further integration of the private sector into this public effort [15, 10]. 2.6. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) ISACs, the entities that transcend industry lines, were the brainchild of the Clinton administration. Specifically, they were formed from the aforementioned PDD-63. While certain ISACs have flourished in their particular industry, the PDD-63 provided the groundwork for these entities. They were formed to guard against cyber and physical attacks that would prove devastating to the United States military and economy. The only position the federal government has within the ISACs is an advisory position that “encourages” key individuals of the industry to implement an ISAC. Beyond this encouragement from an assigned government agency, the actual structure, terms of communication, terms of membership and method of information dissemination is to be determined by the industry specific ISAC. A consortium of key industry personnel is the preferred method for ISAC formation. However, this is not always the case nor is it always possible. Certain ISACs are integrated into the industry as being operated by powerful industry organizations. Correspondingly, certain ISACs are integrated within local and regional governments which have appointed officials and committees that direct the activity of the ISAC. Thus, an ISAC represents the instrumental stakeholders in a given industry. These are the people, the decision-makers, and the organizations that thrive off of an industry and know its vulnerabilities best. Once assembled, members of the ISAC have a few decisions to make concerning their means of information dissemination. All ISACs have various levels of membership and most require an annual fee. With this membership and fee, the user receives information regarding analysis and

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trends in a certain industry. The higher the level of membership, the higher the annual cost and the greater the information received. Other ISACs deal largely with the public and the governments though these ISACs are not money-making opportunities; however, membership requirements are just as stringent. ISACs receive their information from their members in the entity itself and its affiliates. To generate timely reports, some ISACs use private companies to generate reports from the information they receive, while others generate the information in-house [7]. 2.6.1. Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) A distinguishing characteristic of the EMR-ISAC is its heavy integration with the DHS security via the United States Fire Administration (USFA). Via its exclusive webpage on the USFA’s website, it utilizes a series of reports and infograms to relay critical information to members regarding emergency management. The infograms are prepared by a private company, NATEK Incorporated for the USFA. Infograms contain information intended to be disseminated to the emergency management and response sector. This information is meant to inform first responders on issues facing their critical infrastructure. All previously released infograms are available via their website archive, which reaches as far back as 2001. For example, in reference to the concern of “cloned vehicles” (normal automobiles prepared as emergency vehicles), the EMRISAC offers additional suggestions on how to train emergency personnel to detect a fraudulent vehicle [16]. 2.6.2. Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) The FS-ISAC is one of the oldest ISACs known; it was created in 1999. In comparison to other industry ISACs, the FS-ISAC is well placed within its industry. It considers itself “uniquely positioned to quickly disseminate physical and cyber threat alerts and other critical information to your organization.” It gathers information from a multitude of sources: federal, state and local government agencies, law enforcement, commercial security companies, financial services providers and various other sources that are trusted within the community. This information includes analysis and recommended solutions from leading industry experts. Once the information is composed and analyzed, it is disseminated to the ISAC’s members in a timely fashion. In particular, the FS-ISAC implemented its own tool, the Critical Infrastructure Notification System (CINS), to disseminate security alerts rapidly, CINS also provides user authentication and delivery confirmation. The information sharing capability of the FS-ISAC is anonymous and available to all within the financial services industry. Both the U.S. Treasury department and DHS recommend it. To receive information from the FS-ISAC, users must apply and are subject to a fee which, depending upon the membership level, can range from free to $25,000 a year. The application is then reviewed, and a recommended level of information to be received is applied. A board of directors is responsible for determining member eligibility, enforcement of member eligibility verification, and oversight of FS-ISAC operations [17].

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2.6.3. Information Technology – Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) The IT-ISAC is similar to the FS-ISAC insofar as it is exclusively an industry-specific ISAC. It identifies itself as a “trusted community of security specialists from companies across the IT industry dedicated to protecting the IT infrastructure that propels today’s global economy by identifying threats and vulnerabilities to the infrastructure, and sharing best practices on how to quickly address them.” The organization’s responsibilities are as follows: 1.) The reporting and exchanging of information concerning electronic incidents, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, solutions and countermeasures, best security practices, and other protective measures. 2.) The establishment of a mechanism for systematic and protected exchange and coordination of such information. 3.) The provision of thought leadership to policymakers on cyber security and information sharing issues. The IT-ISAC considers itself a 24/7 “centralized information hub.” The organization offers in-house analysis that is related to the IT infrastructure. It disseminates information to its members in various manners, including its secure web site, secure e-mail, and regular conference calls. Additionally, it provides sanitized information to DHS when necessary. The IT-ISAC limits its membership to those employed within the IT sector. Membership is limited to the General Member, Tech Member, ISAC Council, IT-SCC member, and IT-CIP member. However, members receive access to IT-SAC’s operations center for members’ companies, and for consultation with other members on cyber and physical attacks [18]. 2.6.4. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) The MS-ISAC is similar to other ISACs with one exception--instead of corporations; it is comprised of all 50 states plus the District of Columbia, local governments, and U.S. territories. It identifies itself as “a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure from the states and providing two-way sharing of information between and among the states and with local government.” It aims to be a “common mechanism for raising the level of cyber security readiness and response in each state and with local governments.” The MS-ISAC interfaces with several governments and thus is well integrated with local and state governments. Its services are broader than other ISACs due to its client base. Its responsibilities include: 1.) Dissemination of early warnings of cyber system threats. 2.) Sharing security incident information. 3.) The provision of trending and other analysis for security planning. 4.) The distribution of current proven security practices and suggestions. 5.) The promotion of awareness of the interdependencies between cyber and physical critical infrastructure, as well as between and among the different sectors [19].

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2.6.5. Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-ISAC) SC-ISAC is one of the newest ISACs to be formed. It was in June of 2006 that this ISAC was launched, thanks in large part to the International Cargo Security Council (ICSC). Its responsibilities include the collection, analysis, and dissemination of security intelligence across the expansive supply chain industry. Additionally, it outlines a few objectives that are not noted explicitly by other ISACs. The SC-ISAC specifically aims to facilitate communication between its industry stakeholders. Similarly, it also seeks to create a partnership between the private and public sectors; a partnership which can exchange sensitive information. Setting it apart from other ISACs, the organization possesses a web-based application, SC Investigate, which accomplishes the aforementioned responsibilities for information regarding cargo theft, counterfeit products, illegal diversion and organizations behind smuggling operations. The SC-ISAC is funded partially by annual member subscriptions ($500 and an additional $50 for vetted members). The ISAC is spearheaded by its executive director, Jack Smith, a former U.S. Secret Service SAC of the Intelligence Division. Information analyses are unavailable to the public; they are available only to members, who may include law enforcement and other government agencies [20]. 2.6.6. Airports Council International – North America – (ACI- ISAC) The Aviation ISAC has a similar function to the other ISACs, but is formed differently than the other organizations. Its similarities lie in the fact that the organization “represents local, regional, and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada.” The ACI-NA’s vision is described as “the recognized and authoritative voice of airports.” The organization’s membership is comprised of 174 airport operators with 366 airports in the United States and 49 airport operators with 180 airports in Canada. In addition to the airports, the ACI also accepts membership from industry-related firms. There are currently 400 industry-related firms found in the ACI [21]. 2.6.6.1 Differences The differences between ACI-ISAC and other ISACs is observed first in the organization’s primary responsibility in “advocating policies and providing services that strengthen the ability of commercial airports to serve their passengers, customers, and communities.” Secondly, the ACI is not an organization exclusive to the United States, or North America. North America is one of five worldwide regions of the organization, though it is the largest. The organization has several missions including: advocacy, promotion, communication, research, networking, education, an annual conference and exhibition, and annual contests and recognition. Within this list of responsibilities, communication is found to be the most closely related to the general functions performed by other ISACs. In accord with this function, the ACI informs its members of important developments in the industry as well as associated trends. Information is disseminated by the ACI through several methods. These methods include ACI-ISAC’s Daily Clips service, the weekly enewsletter @irports Update, their quarterly magazine Centerlines, a monthly CEO

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newsletter CEO Brief and finally by regular e-mail communications from organization committees and staff members. 2.6.7. Food and Agriculture ISAC (FA-ISAC) The FA-ISAC was created on February 15, 2002 by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) as a partnership of the Food Industry Associations Coordinated. The organization lists its main function as timely dissemination of sensitive information from the nation’s intelligence community. FA-ISAC outlines its objectives as: 1.) Making the food industry a difficult and undesirable target for terrorist attacks. 2.) Bringing the industry’s talents together to deal with preventing terrorism and deliberately malicious attacks. 3.) Providing a rapid means of communicating and disseminating information relevant to these attacks. 4.) Providing, in the event of an attack, a means for a coordinated industry-wide response to limit effects and enable the food system to recover as rapidly as possible. The FA-ISAC also gathers information from the industry concerning threats and suspicious acts. This information is then forwarded to either the National Infrastructure Protection Center or the Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit located within the FBI. The organization carefully stipulates that the ISAC’s protocol does not supplant safety measures already in place, e.g., incident reporting for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration. Additionally, it is not to be taken as a replacement for incident reporting to existing law enforcement agencies beyond the FBI. Reports from the industry are composed voluntarily from individuals. Reports are made on the following activities: cyber attacks, physical attacks, suspicious surveillance, extortion attempts, kidnapping threats, contamination threats, and bomb threats. Reports that are generated from any one of these incidents bypass the ISAC administration completely to be passed onto DHS’s National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC). Report submission and any subsequent warnings are held strictly confidential. In regards to report generation, helpful information can be found on the FAISAC’s page within the FMI’s web site. It contains information regarding what should be reported to DHS and how an individual carries out a report. The ISAC features a sample report on the page. The FA-ISAC is a well-organized, well-planned, well-integrated entity that is not a stand-alone information clearinghouse as other ISACs describe themselves. The ISAC offers multiple links and a FAQ section. It also offers a daily newsletter via e-mail specifically for grocery retail executives. As with the Aviation ISAC, the Food and Agriculture ISAC is well placed within the industry that it serves. The FA-ISAC encompasses several “sub-ISACs” from the agriculture, manufacturing/processing and retail, foodservice, and distribution sectors. The board of directors for the FA-ISAC is comprised of directors of the respective subISACs. Per the FA-ISAC’s Formal Structure white-paper, the entity is to remain nimble by eliminating unnecessary links in the chain of command thus making the organization flat. The FA-ISAC possesses plans to expand its coverage to

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“international enterprise companies, overseas threat information, classified threat information and additional product areas.” The FA-ISAC considers all personnel of the 52 associations involved with the FA-ISAC to be members of the national organization [22]. 2.6.8. Real Estate ISAC (RE-ISAC) The RE-ISAC was formed with the recognition that hotels, shopping centers, apartment buildings, and “high-profile” office buildings are frequently targets of terrorist attacks. It describes itself as a “private-public partnership between the U.S. real estate industry and the federal government to counter terrorism and protect buildings and the people who occupy and use them. RE-ISAC identifies itself as a non-profit organization created by the Real Estate Roundtable, 13 members of the real estate sector. These members are mostly national associations found within the sector, with the exception of two international associations and another representing a major American metropolis. The organization has three major roles that include: 1.) Disseminating federal information to the real estate sector and then combining the analysis power of the real estate sector with that of government officials. 2.) Facilitating information transfer from the private sector to the government. 3.) Bringing together those from the public and private sectors for information sharing and discussion. Communication that is directed towards the industry is handled with alerts and informational bulletins. These items can only be found on the ISAC’s secure web site, and are made available only to members of the ISAC. Information that is directed towards the ISAC and the Federal government is done via reports in a similar manner as that of the FA-ISAC. Reports are generated on the same basic premises of suspicion, threat, or attack. The ISAC possesses a PDF document of its report; however, the threshold of information is higher than that of the FA-ISAC. The RE-ISAC gives a basic criterion which a report must meet before submission. Additionally, there is no mention of stringent confidentiality or bypassing of ISAC administration in an effort to expedite reports to the federal government, as found in the FA-ISAC [23]. 2.6.9. National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) The NSTAC is possibly the oldest conceptually known form of an ISAC. The committee has been bringing together key industry personnel for over 25 years. Industries involved include companies from the finance, information technology, and aerospace sectors, in addition to the major telecommunications companies and network service providers. The success experienced by the NSTAC caused other industries to create their own exclusive ISACs. Thus, the NSTAC identifies itself as “the prominent model for trusted public/private partnerships.” Its mission “is to provide the U.S. government the best possible industry advice in matters of national security and emergency preparedness. The priorities of this ISAC revolve around the Nation’s national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) issues. NSTAC identifies five major themes that guide their areas of focus:

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1.) Strengthening national security. 2.) Enhancing cyber security. 3.) Maintaining the global communications infrastructure. 4.) Assuring communications for disaster response. 5.) Addressing critical infrastructure interdependencies and dependencies. Information is gathered from the industry and subsequently analyzed for threats and trends. The analyses are processed as recommendations from the sector that are then given directly to the President. Membership of the NSTAC is comprised of CEOs, COOs, and Chairmen from the major telecommunication corporations found in the United States. Currently, there are 21 such individuals on the NSTAC. Several publications can be found on the NSTAC’s web site dating back to 1989. These publications are letters to the President, NSTAC Fact Sheets, and NSTAC Pocket Brochures. Additional methods of interaction with the NSTAC are its periodic Research and Development Exchange platforms. These platforms are held approximately every two years, and bring together key personnel from industry, government, and academia alike. It is during these exchanges that each respective NSTAC community can remain up-to-date on issues that could potentially confront the industry in the future [24].

3. Current Private-Public Partnership Areas Parsing the existing tools’ functionality into a succinct group of categories is a significant challenge because of the overlap involved. This in itself is an important, if not unexpected finding, and is perhaps somewhat ironic, indicating that while many of the tools are meant to share information, the proliferation of these tools may make the information currently available even more unwieldy. Grouping the functions of the above-described private-public partnerships, there are 3 primary areas, though, as mentioned previously, there is much overlap: 1) Information Sharing 2) Best Practices 3) Private Sector Outreach The information sharing components tend to have an inward focus, with “members” who have to join each partnership explicitly and information that is usually disseminated from a central data source. In some cases there is a significant fee involved. There are several attempts to allow interaction among the information sharers, most notably HSIN, which has had significant failures and is awaiting a revision, and more successfully, InfraGard [10]. However, there seems to be a good deal of duplication of effort across information-sharing platforms, with most including “threats” to their areas of operations, which may imply that similar threats exist across areas as well. The best example of this duplication of effort is the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), which in many ways fills a function that HSIN was designed to accommodate [10]. Additionally, many of the information-sharing platforms, notably the ISACs, have internal vetting procedures [7]. While this may increase the efficiency of membership

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processing, it may also allow companies to be involved who otherwise should not be, and vice versa. Finally, there seems to be a general paucity of “public” in several of the information sharing platforms, begging the question of how sincere the privatepublic partnership could be. Within the best-practices arena, there seems to be virtually no distinction from many of the information-sharing components, save the information provided. This is unfortunate, given the drastically different nature of the information involved, in addition to the necessity of training in best-practices, not just the description. Additionally, in the majority of partnerships, any training that is provided regarding best-practices seems to be left to the smallest units of the organization; for example, InfraGard utilizes its “chapters” as the unit of delivery [13]. In many cases, this could conceivably lead to a lack of resources to bring in the necessary participants, especially in smaller chapters. Private sector outreach is unfortunately the smallest segment of any of the platforms, with the notable exception of the outreach-oriented Private Sector Office in the DHS [26]. This is significant, and perhaps telling, when one considers the low level of government participation in many of these partnerships. It is also interesting to note that within many of the platforms, private industry outreach is performed by the private sector entities themselves instead of by the national government. While acknowledging that this may, in fact, be a positive aspect of the current private-public partnership paradigm insofar as private industry may be more effective at reaching entities active in their own areas, it begs the question of why there is not outreach by both involved sectors.

4. Gaps in the Current Private-Public Partnership Paradigm Within the context of private-public partnerships, there are several easily identified gaps. Most notable among these, and probably the least shocking, is the duplication of effort across information sharing platforms. This duplication is most clear among the ISACs, many of which either do not belong to the national organization of ISACs, or have not been added to the roster indicating that other members’ organizations may not know of the additional ISACs. Even if one were to argue that duplication is a misnomer because of the differences among industries, it is hard to believe that the lack of coordination among them is not a significant, related issue. It seems ironic that there is a “reverse stovepipe” that is created by thinking of private-public partnership in these narrow, industry-specific terms when the driving force behind their recent development is completely devoted to abolishing stovepipes altogether [3]. Lack of coordination across private sectors is, in many ways, as bad as lack of coordination among government entities. The fact that, 90% of critical infrastructure is supported by private industry in and of itself, suggests that coordination among critical infrastructure entities is necessary, as all of them, individually, are critical. An additional, significant issue is the perennial lack of bi-directionality when it comes to information sharing. Many of these efforts at private-public partnership seem to lack a concerted effort on the part of the public sector, and rely on either distributing information in some general, one-size formula such as a newsletter or email alert. This sets up an interesting relationship where private-public partnerships are originally pushed by the public sector, adopted with some trepidation by the private sector, which

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then provides information to government, with relatively little return on their investment. Even more suggestive is the fact that in many cases private sector entities are required to pay a fee to receive information that many times is not generated by the government at all, but by a third-party, private company paid by the partnership to provide reports. The Congressional Research Service noted in 2005 that The federal government and the private sector should share information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities. Most ISACs reported that they believed they were providing appropriate information to the government but, while noting improvements, they still had concerns with the information being provided to them by DHS and/or their sector-specific agencies. These concerns included the limited quantity of information and the need for more specific, timely, and actionable information. In its recent white papers, the ISAC Council also has identified a number of potential barriers to information sharing between the private sector and the government [4]. Additionally, there are continuing complaints that many of the partnerships are unclear on what the role of various government organizations are within the context of private-public partnerships regarding security [4]. All of these issues combine to create a situation where the government is initiating action it does not clearly understand, cannot define, or cannot follow through on regarding private-public partnerships. This may be a result of the government not having clearly defined its own role in private-public partnerships before calling for them to be developed. Further, there is a significant cost accrued to the private industry when they engage in private-public partnerships both in money as well as the potential cost of sharing proprietary information [4,6,7], which increases the problems of the issues mentioned above and makes private-public partnerships less attractive to private sector entities.

5. Suggestions and Conclusion This assessment has found that gaps and perception issues still exist within the privatepublic partnership. While there are numerous individual and sector specific issues that could cause this; these are too pervasive to be a result of industry groupthink. Rather, at least in the case of the ISACs, they are largely indicative of the stance taken by the PDD-63 which suggested “that participation in the national infrastructure protection system be voluntary” by the private sector. This same sentiment is pervasive throughout the realm of private-public partnerships [9]. It was thought that this private sector volunteerism would “fully engage” the industries’ needs. This idea has worked only to a limited extent. Some sectors that are critical to the function of the United States have flourished in their respective partnerships, but have largely ignored intersector coordination. However, other sectors that do not view their area as critical have failed to flourish. Despite the existence of successful models, some seem to flounder in function and relevance. From this assessment, the authors deduce that the government should implement best practices for private-public partnerships concerning their structure and information sharing. However, in order for the government to be able to further facilitate private-public partnerships, and the information-sharing components thereof, it must define its role

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within the paradigm. Currently the schizoid tendency of the government to proliferate multiple tools for a single job may be creating more confusion than assistance with information sharing. In addition, however the government’s role is finally defined; it is unlikely to change the fact that there is a cost associated with private-public partnerships, a cost that the government should more actively seek to offset. Overall, there has been a significant amount of progress towards creating effective private-public partnerships. However, without a clearly defined government role, significant increases in the bi-directionality of information sharing, and a reduction of the costs to private entities joining in private-public partnerships, it is unlikely that the paradigm will be able to have the impact that it could were those issues resolved.

References [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6]

[7] [8] [9] [10]

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

[16]

[17] [18] [19]

United States Department of State. Government-Private Partnerships Key to Defeating Terrorism. 20, April2006.[Online]Availablefrom:URL:http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2006/April/20060420172707idybeekcm0.6224176.html [2008, September 1]. S.E. Flynn and D.B. Prieto, Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security. CSR No. 13; Council on Foreign Relations; 2006. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. H.C. Relyea, J.W. Seifert, Information Sharing for Homeland Security: A Brief Overview. Library of Congres; Washinton D.C.; Congressional Research Service. T. Lehrman. Building Transformational Partnerships to Combat WMD Terrorism. Remarks at the U.S. Military Academy, Washinton, D.C., November 7, 2007. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/77155.htm [2008, August 25]. A. Kochems. Who’s on First? A Strategy for Protecting Critical Infrastructure. The Heriatage Foundation.[Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1851.cfm [2008, August 21]. ISAC Council. Reach of the Major ISACs – White Paper. January 31, 2004. [Online] Available from : URL; www.isaccouncil.org/pub/Reach_of_the_Major_ISACs_013104.pdf. [2008, August 25]. R.H. Ward, K.L. Kiernan, and D.Mabrey, Homeland Security: An Introduction. Assoicated Press; Anderson Publishing; 2006. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63. May 22, 1998. The White House. [Online] Available from: URL: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm [2008, August 24]. S.S. Hsu, R. O’Harrow, Jr. DHS to Replace ‘Duplicative’ Anti-Terrorism Data Network. Washington Post, January 18, 2008; A03. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703279.html [2008, June 3] Law Enforcement Online. Federal Bureau of Investigation. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/leo.htm [2008, August 20]. United States Private and Public Partnership. Local Knowledge =Regional Strength = National Security. [Online] Available from: URL: https://nwwarn.usp3.org/USP3/Default.aspx [2008, July 30]. InfraGard. Learn More about InfraGard. Available from: URL: http://www.infragard.net/ [2008, August 23]. About the Private Sector Office. United States Department of Homeland Security. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1166220191042.shtm [2008, August 25]. Homeland Security Information Network. United States Department of Homeland Security. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm [2008 August 21]. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Emergency Management and Response – Information Sharing and AnalysisCenter(EMR-ISAC).[Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/subjects/emr-isac/index.shtm [2008, August 25]. About The FS-ISAC. Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center. (FS-ISAC). [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.fsisac.com/about/ [2008, August 25]. About the IT-ISAC. Public Area. Information Technology Information and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC). [Online] Available from: URL: https://www.it-isac.org/ [2008, August 25]. About the MS-ISAC. Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). [Online]

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Available from: URL: http://www.msisac.org/about/ [2008, August 28]. [20] About SC ISAC. Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis (SC-ISAC). [Online] Available from: URL: https://secure.sc-investigate.net/SC%2DISAC/ [2008, August 25]. [21] About ACI-NA – Who We Are. Airports Council International – North America. [Online] Available from: URL: www.aci-na.org [2008, August 25]. [22] A Formal Structure for the Food and Agriculture ISAC. Food Marketing Institute (FMI). [Online] Available from: URL: www.fmi.org/docs/isac/isacorgstructure.pdf [2008, August 25]. [23] Sharing Information to Counter Terrorism…and Protect People and Property. Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.reisac.org/about.html [2008, August 27]. [24] The NSTAC Mission and Key Themes. National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.html [2008, August 27]. [25] D. Alexander. SecurityInfoWach.com. Defining the Private-public Partnership on Terror. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/article.jsp?siteSection=361&id=2579 [2008, August 25]. [26] A. Martinez-Fonts Jr., Private Sector Preparedness Part I – Defining the Problem and Proposing Solutions, Statement for the Record before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Subcommittee on State, Local and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, Unites States Senate, [ 2007].

Appendix A Guide to the ISACs This appendix provides a brief, informal description of each of the ISACs and a short review of their websites. It is provided to the reader in order to increase the awareness of the spread of the ISACs and some of the information problems that they entail. http://www.isaccouncil.org/sites/index.php 1.) Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NCC-ISAC) – (http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/main.html) (Government webpage) – Link from isaccouncil.org is broken. Phone: 703.607.4950 E-mail: [email protected]

2.) Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center – ES-ISAC is operated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation on behalf of the entire electricity sector. The website indicates that all entities within the electricity sector are participants in the ES-ISAC. The website describes itself as facilitator of communications between electricity sector participants, federal governments, and other critical infrastructures. Its responsibilities include the dissemination of threat indications, analyses, and warnings, together with interpretations. The information provided by the ES-ISAC is intended to allow sector participants to take protective actions. (http://www.esisac.com/) – (Commercial page) - The website is shallow, containing no in-depth information. The site does have its own library containing six documents: Security Guidelines, Assessment Methods, Critical Infrastructure Protection Reference Manuals, Presentations, Security Workshops, and Other. The website contains a short

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FAQ section which identifies itself, ISACS, and the PDD-63 that initiated the ISACs. There is a small message board at the bottom of the page that indicates recent or upcoming events. The home page features the threat levels of the DHS. The website does have a “contact us” link, however, when opened in a browser, no e-mail address is indicated. E-mail contact [email protected] 3.) Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) – It appears to be that the heart of the information and what the EMRISAC does is relay important information for precaution via their infograms and bulletins. The infograms are prepared by NATEK Incorporated for the USFA. All known infograms are available via their website archive as far back as 2001. Specifically in reference to the concern of “cloned vehicles” the EMR-ISAC offers additional suggestions to prepare emergency responders on how to find a fraudulent vehicle. (http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/subjects/emr-isac/index.shtm) – (government page) It is a well-developed webpage within the greater U.S. Fire Administration’s (U.S.F.A) website. The webpage provides weekly “infograms” that users in the Emergency Services Sector can read regarding critical infrastructures. These infograms can be viewed on the webpage or received by e-mail. The website provides links of interest and the ability of uses to order a free DVD concerning Critical Infrastructure Protection. Users can set-up their infograms as RSS feeds. Phone: 301.447. E-mail: [email protected]. 4.) Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) – The FSISAC bills itself as being “uniquely positioned to quickly disseminate physical and cyber threats alerts and other critical information to your organization.” The information includes analysis and recommended solutions from leading industry experts. The FS-ISAC has implemented its own tool to disseminate security alerts rapidly, the Critical Infrastructure Notification System (CINS). CINS also provides user authentication and delivery confirmation. The information-sharing capability of the FS-ISAC is anonymous and available to all within the financial services industry. The FS-ISAC advertises itself as “one of the best ways financial services firms can do their part to protect our industry and its vital role in the U.S. critical infrastructure.” It is recommended by both the U.S. Treasury department and DHS. To receive information from the FS-ISAC, users must apply and are subject to a fee dependent upon membership level (from free to $25k annually). The application is then reviewed, and a recommended level of information to be received is applied. A board of directors is responsible for determining member eligibility, enforcement of member eligibility verification, and oversight of FS-ISAC operation. (http://www.fsisac.com/) – (commercial website) This is a well-developed, stand-alone website displayed in an aesthetically pleasing manner. The website indicates that it is owned by its dues-paying members. VeriSign is listed as being the service provider for the website. Nothing is left to question on their website.

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FS-ISAC Operations Contact Information: Security Operations Center (SOC) Phone: (888) 732.2812 - Toll-free (703) 948.4044 - Direct Fax: (571) 434.6009 Email: [email protected] User Administration Phone: 703.948.4172 Email: [email protected] To Become a Member Phone: 703.948.4172 Email: [email protected] 5.) The Highway Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Highway-ISAC) – (http://www.highwayisac.org) – (Non-governmental organization website) – Website indicates time-out, unavailable. 6.) Information Technology – Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) – Membership is limited to the General Member, Tech Member, ISAC Council, IT-SCC member, and IT-CIP member. The IT-ISAC identifies itself as a “trusted community of security specialists from companies across the IT industry dedicated to protecting the IT infrastructure that propels today’s global economy by identifying threats and vulnerabilities to the infrastructure, and sharing best practices on how to quickly address them.” Responsibilities of the IT-ISAC include: 1.) Report and exchange information concerning electronic incidents, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, solutions and countermeasures, best security practices and other protective measures, 2.) Establish a mechanism fro systematic and protected exchange and coordination of such information, and 3.) Provide thought leadership to policymakers on cyber security and information sharing issues. The IT-ISAC considers itself a 24/7 “centralized information hub.” It disseminates information in various manners, to include conference calls among members and dissemination of sanitized information to DHS when necessary. (https://www.it-isac.org/) – (Non-governmental organization website) – This is a welldeveloped, stand-alone webpage displayed in an aesthetically pleasing manner. The website has a “public area” that is only navigable to non-members; all other tabs are frozen. One may contact the IT-SAC executive director, Scott Algeier, by email or phone, 703.385.4969. Contact Information: Phone: 404.236.2880 Fax: 703.753.1171 Email: [email protected]

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7.) Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) – The MS-ISAC is comprised of all 50 states plus the District of Columbia, local governments, and U.S. territories. It identifies itself as “a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats to critical infrastructure from the states and providing two-way sharing of information between and among the states and with local government.” It aims to be a “common mechanism for raising the level of cyber security readiness and response in each state and with local governments.” The MS-ISAC appears to be the wellintegrated as it serves several different types of users. Its services are wider ranging than most others. Its responsibilities are to 1.) Disseminate early warnings of cyber system threats, 2.) Share security incident information, 3.) Provide trending and other analysis for security planning, 4.) Distribute current proven security practices and suggestions, 5.) Promote awareness of the interdependencies between cyber and physical critical infrastructure, as well as between and among the different sectors. (http://www.msisac.org/) – (Non-governmental Organization) – This is a welldeveloped, stand alone webpage. E-mail: [email protected] Phone: 866.787.4722

8.) Public Transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC) – The PT-ISAC was established through the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) Executive committee’s Security Task Force. APTA was designated as sector leader by the USDOT. PT-ISAC identifies itself as “the primary contact to organize and bring the public transportation community together to work cooperatively on physical and cyber security issues.” The PT-ISAC considers itself to be an “ISAC within an ISAC” (STISAC operated by the Association of American Railroads AAR). PT-ISAC claims to have government analysts with top-secret security clearances and higher. Its responsibilities include the collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical cyber and physical security and threat information from government and private sources 24/7. Members must pay dues. Contact information is given for those who want to apply. (http://www.surfacetransportationisac.org/APTA.asp) – organization website) – This is a webpage of another ISAC.

(Non-governmental

Phone: 202-496-4857 9.) Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) – The ST-ISAC identifies itself as “a one-stop clearinghouse for information on cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities and solutions.” It appears that little to no information is available to non-members. Membership is available on two different information dissemination levels. The ST-ISAC indicates that “members can submit information anonymously and receive near time updates and take advantage of 24/7 Incident Response Consulting from leading industry experts.” (http://www.surfacetransportationisac.org/) – (Non-governmental organization) – The website is well-developed but not as in-depth as those of the financial and IT sectors.

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SAME CONTACT INFO as PT-ISAC 10.) Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-ISAC) – Its responsibilities include the collection, analysis, and dissemination of security intelligence across the Supply Chain Industry. The SC-ISAC possesses a web-based application, SC Investigate, that accomplishes the aforementioned responsibilities for information regarding cargo theft, counterfeit products, illegal diversion and organizations behind smuggling operations. The International Cargo Security Council (ICSC) was instrumental in launching this ISAC in June 2006. The SC-ISAC is funded partially by annual member subscriptions ($500 and an additional $50 for vetted members). Jack Smith is the Executive Director of the SC-ISAC. He is a former U.S. Secret Service SAC of the Intelligence Division. Actual information is unavailable to the public; it is only available to members, including law enforcement and other government agencies. (https://secure.sc-investigate.net/SC%2DISAC/) – (Network website) – This is a welldesigned, stand alone webpage. Phone: 972.722.4777 OR 800.616.8581 11.) Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Water-ISAC) – The Water-ISAC identifies itself as “the most comprehensive and up-to-the-minute online resource of security and disaster preparedness information for America’s drinking water and wastewater utilities. It provides a unique link between the water sector and federal environmental, homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence and public health agencies.” The Water-ISAC carries information on threats regarding American, Canadian, and Australian drinking water and wastewater systems. Access to WaterISAC is available in two different levels, Water-ISAC Basic (free) and Water-ISAC Pro (subscription). (http://www.waterisac.org/) – (Non-governmental organization website) – This is a well-designed, stand-alone website featuring interactive media. HELP DESK 1-866-H2O-ISAC (426-4722) [email protected] WaterISAC Analysts [email protected] Subscription Information 1-866-H2O-ISAC [email protected] Subscription Updates - Eugenia Cadena 202-331-0479 [email protected] Executive Director - Diane VanDe Hei 202-331-0479 [email protected] Deputy Executive Director - Michael Arceneaux 202-331-0479 [email protected]

(426-4722)

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12.) Airports Council International – North America – (Aviation ISAC) - Not necessarily a traditional ISAC as the others, but acts in a similar regard. Its similarities lie in the fact that the organization “represents local, regional, and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada.” The ACI-NA’s vision is billed as “the recognized and authoritative voice of airports.” The organization’s membership is comprised of 174 airport operators with 366 airports in the United States and 49 airport operators with 180 airports in Canada. In addition to the airports, the ACI also accepts membership from industry-related firms. There are currently 400 industry-related firms found in the ACI. E-mail: http://www.aci-na.org Website – (www.aci-na.org) – (Organizational Website) – This website is extremely well-developed with a considerable amount of depth. The website indicates that the organization is fully integrated with the industry, so much so, that its accumulation of knowledge, resources, and manpower, allow it to be an advocate for pertinent policies. Thus, with a fully integrated organization, its focus is not information sharing but advocacy. However, its well networked and well integrated status in the industry still allows the ACI-NA to be considered a “clearing house for information and ideas.” 13.) Chemical Sector ISAC The purpose of the Chemical Sector ISAC is to enable the NIPC to receive incident reports from Chemical Sector ISAC participants and to provide participants with timely, accurate, and actionable warning of physical, operational, and cyber threats or attacks on the national chemical infrastructure Phone: 800-424-9300 http://chemicalisac.chemtrec.com 14.) Food and Agriculture ISAC - the FA-ISAC was created on February 15, 2002 by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) as a partnership of the Food Industry Associations Coordinated The FA-ISAC outlines its objectives as 1) Making the food industry a difficult and undesirable target for terrorist attacks; 2) Bringing the industry’s talents together to deal with preventing terrorism and deliberately malicious attacks; 3) Providing a rapid means of communicating and disseminating information relevant to these attacks; 4) In the event of an attack, providing a means for a coordinated industry-wide response to limit effects and enable the food system to recover as rapidly as possible. The FA-ISAC is a well-organized, well-planned, well-integrated entity that is not a stand-alone information clearinghouse as other ISACs make themselves out to be. As with the Aviation ISAC, the Food and Agriculture ISAC is well placed within the industry that it serves. The FA-ISAC encompasses several “sub-ISACs” from the agriculture, manufacturing/processing and retail, foodservice, and distribution sectors. The board of directors for the FA-ISAC is comprised of directors of the respective subISACs. Per the FA-ISAC’s Formal Structure white-paper, the entity is to remain

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nimble by eliminating unnecessary links in the chain of command thus making the organization flat. The FA-ISAC possesses plans to expand its coverage to “international enterprise companies, overseas threat information, classified threat information and additional product areas.” The FA-ISAC considers you a member already if you are a member of one of the approximately 52 associations involved with the FA-ISAC. (http://www.fmi.org/isac/) – (organization website) – The FA-ISAC has a webpage within the Food Marketing Institute’s webpage. The page contains a considerable depth of information. 15.) Real Estate – ISAC – The RE-ISAC was formed from the recognition that hotels, shopping centers, apartment buildings, and “high-profile” office buildings are targets of terrorists. RE-ISAC identifies itself as a non-profit organization created by the Real Estate Roundtable. The RE-ISAC was founded by 13 members of the real estate sector. The organization has three major roles that include the 1.) disseminating federal information to the real estate sector and then combining the analysis power of the real estate sector with that of government officials; 2.) facilitating information transfer from the private sector to the government; 3.) bringing together those from the public and private sectors for information sharing and discussion. (online presentation of REISAC’s importance http://www.reisac.org/why.html). http://www.reisac.org - The website itself is a well-designed, well-thought exclusively ISAC information tool. Their website includes a page that provides instructions and guidelines to follow for making incident reports. Additionally, the page in question contains links to the FBI’s website for contacts. 16.) The Research and Education Networking ISAC - REN ISAC is an integral part of higher education's strategy to improve network security. Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis Center – RENISAC – The REN-ISAC is Higher-Education’s response to greater information sharing in the post 9/11 atmosphere. It was spearheaded by Indiana University through relationships with EDUCAUSE and Internet2. The relationship is to provide “information collection, analysis, and dissemination, early warning, and response” to the higher-education community and associated research networks. Additionally, REN-ISAC looked to protect the national cyber infrastructure by joining the U.S. ISAC structure. The REN-ISAC claims it has a “unique aggregate view of the current and near-future security situation in the higher-education community.” REN-ISAC has access to the resources of the Global Network Operations Center and Advanced Network Management Lab located at Indiana University. http://www.ren-isac.net/ Phone: 317-278-6630 [email protected] 17.) National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) - [Telecom ISAC (Different from the communication ISAC)] – NSTAC bills itself as “the prominent model for trusted public/private partnerships.” Its mission “is to provide the U.S. government the best possible industry advice in matters of national security and

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emergency preparedness. The priorities of this ISAC revolve around the Nation’s national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) issues. NSTAC identifies five major themes that guide their areas of focus: 1) Strengthening national security, 2) Enhancing cyber security, 3) Maintaining the global communications infrastructure, 4) Assuring communications for disaster response, and 5) Addressing critical infrastructure interdependencies and dependencies. http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.html 18.) Trucking ISAC Truck ISAC – The trucking ISAC is quite possibly the smallest ISAC as it has no official website and its sector is largely covered by the aforementioned ISACs that involve the transportation of goods. However, it is necessary that the trucking industry have a way to share information. Information sharing in the trucking ISAC relies on the “ISAC watch officer” who relays the information to the appropriate law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Trucking ISAC stresses that informants can remain anonymous. Additionally, the ISAC possesses some specifics that the industry needs to pay close attention to: 1.) Persons apparently following trucks on the highway for extended periods of time, especially those transporting volatile or highly hazardous cargo; 2.) Persons photographing trucks and facilities from cars or public access areas; 3.) Persons asking questions about routes, origins, destinations, cargo, vehicle capacities and the like. Phone: 703-563-3181 email: [email protected] http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/channeldetail.asp?cid=8&caid=1009 (Contains alerts, analysis and threat information needed by daily trucking operations.)

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-253

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Terrorist De-Radicalization: Comparative Approaches for Reintegrating Terrorists Into the Community Daniel J. MABREY and Richard H. WARD University of New Haven

Abstract. This paper seeks to list the various publicly acknowledged terrorist deradicalization programs and provides insights concerning their overall methodological approach and effectiveness. Similarities and differences are noted and the paper concludes with commentary about the state of the research on the topic. Keywords. de-radicalization, jihadist, radical, reintegrating terrorists, terrorist

Introduction “The real center of gravity of the [terrorist] enemy is their narrative. It is ideologically bankrupt.” – Quote by Frank Cilluffo, a former White House Homeland Security official who is researching de-radicalization at George Washington University [1]. “None are truly de-radicalized. Disengagement is more realistic.” – Quote by Dr. John Horgan, a psychologist at Pennsylvania State University [1]. The U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism led many countries, both traditional allies and otherwise, to confront segments of their populations that became jihadists and violent Islamist radicals. In many cases, this confrontation began when the U.S. began returning captured fighters from battle zones in Iraq and Afghanistan to their countries of origin, leaving these countries to imprison these individuals without any real strategy for engaging, adjudicating or reintegrating them back into society. In other cases, countries that supported the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism began to experience terrorist attacks by jihadists and violent Islamist radicals domestically. As new counterterrorism units were formed and suspects were arrested or detained, the prisons of these countries were transformed into breeding grounds of terrorist radicalization. In the isolated sanctuary of prisons where an inmate could receive protection simply by associating with Jihadist inmates, convicted and detained jihadists were able to spread their ideology by proselytizing to those with whom they were incarcerated. This situation escalated for many countries as jihadists and their converts directed terrorist activities from within the prison or recidivated upon their release from prison. In contrast to traditional criminal justice policies designed to deal with violent criminals and high-recidivates, such as imposing stricter sentences and harsher penalties, several countries began to engage jihadist inmates on their motivations and justifications for violence and challenged their espoused ideologies. With an end goal

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of changing the jihadist mindset and/or philosophical foundations of an individual, these programs became referred to as de-radicalization programs that have spread rapidly throughout the Islamic world.1 Some of these de-radicalization programs have declared to be astonishingly successful, with national governments claiming recidivism rates of less than 2% in some cases and nearly all pointing to decreases in the number of terrorist attacks within their countries as evidence that de-radicalization programs are effective in reducing terrorism. Research for this paper identified sixteen countries that have acknowledged de-radicalization programs.2 At a recent conference,3 terrorism expert and psychologist Dr. John Horgan stated that there were 14 countries with de-radicalization programs in place, but claimed that he knew of an additional six countries with de-radicalization programs that had not been made public. This paper seeks to catalog the various publicly acknowledged de-radicalization programs and provide insights as to their overall methodological approach and effectiveness. Similarities and differences will be noted, and the paper will conclude with commentary about the state of the research on this topic.

1. Country Survey of De-Radicalization Programs The public acknowledgement of national de-radicalization programs for jihadists and violent Islamic radicals was minimal until mid-late 2007 when details about the successes of programs in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia began to appear in mainstream media. Since that time, the de-radicalization programs of 16 countries have been mentioned by major English-language and Western media organizations. These include: Australia Algeria Bangladesh [2] Britain [1, 3] Egypt [1, 4, 5, 6] Indonesia [1, 4, 7, 6, 8, 9] Iraq [1] Jordan [6] Malaysia [6] Pakistan [10] 1

Roughly defined as the countries from Morocco to the Philippines where the predominant religion is Islam. 2 This paper is concerned solely with programs designed to de-radicalize jihadists and violent radical Islamists who have been arrested/detained. Many countries have adopted radicalization prevention programs aimed at inoculating at-risk communities from fundamentalist and jihadist Islamic ideologies, and while important, are outside the scope of this essay. 3 On 19-20 September 2008, at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the DHS National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Dr. Horgan gave a three-minute overview of his upcoming study to survey de-radicalization programs throughout the world.

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Saudi Arabia [1, 4] Singapore [1, 4, 6, 10, 8] Spain Tajikistan Thailand Yemen [4, 6, 10] Much of the reporting on these programs has been published in 2008, with the summer of 2008 seeing the highest reporting frequency on this topic since mid-2007. Recognizing the importance of understanding these programs, the Department of Homeland Security, through its National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, commissioned a study in the summer of 2008 to create case studies of six de-radicalization programs that will be the first unclassified study of its kind. This paper seeks to organize the emerging literature of these programs as a foundation for future research in this area. Research for this paper was unable to uncover published details, other than that a program exists, about de-radicalization programs for prisoners/detainees in Australia, Great Britain, Jordan, Pakistan, Spain, and Tajikistan. The other 11 programs are briefly reviewed below. 1.1. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization efforts are directed by the Ministry of Interior and advised by a special committee of moderate religious authorities that oversee all religious re-education in the program. The Care Rehabilitation Centre located on the outskirts of Riyadh is a three-phase program that culminates with the transfer of inmates from incarceration to a treatment facility that serves as a kind of halfway house for reintegrating inmates into Saudi society. This program is very progressive in its design, and the government has claimed remarkable success in rehabilitating militants who have been radicalized into joining Jihadist campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts throughout the world. The program is a mix of religious reindoctrination, psychological counseling and direct financial and social support [11]. Five special jails in Saudi Arabia, each capable of housing 1,200 prisoners, have been built specifically for incarcerating militants with the purpose of promoting ideological reform through dialogue and debate. Every inmate receives individual religious re-education in moderate interpretations of Islam, permitting (in fact encouraging) debate on religious issues and the asking of hard questions about their personal interpretation of Islam. Militants who successfully complete their sentence in these special jails are moved to the Care Rehabilitation Centre where militants focus on community reintegration and are given generous support to reenter the community. This support is by far the most progressive documented to date and includes: o o o o

Access to swimming pools, table tennis, Play Station gaming systems, football matches, and gourmet-style meals Attend lessons based around Islamic Law and the Jurisprudence of Jihad Sessions with psychologists to teach detainees about managing emotions when reacting to world events Use of art therapy as treatment

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o o o

Unescorted visits to family members during the final months of their stay at the Care Rehabilitation Centre with the understanding that they must return Visitation from family while at the rehabilitation centre Receive housing, transportation, employment, and usually a readjustment stipend upon release

One notable aspect of the Saudi program is the role that a militant’s family plays in the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Beyond the encouragement of family visitation and furloughs to visit family during the end of the process, the Saudi program requires a militant’s family to sign an agreement upon release that they will be responsible for his/her actions and behaviors [6]. In some cases, the government has gone so far as to find spouses for militants upon their release from the rehabilitation centre [6]. If official Saudi figures are to be believed, the results of the program are remarkable. The Saudi government claims that of 3,000 terrorism suspects and sympathizers whom have been arrested since 2003, two-thirds have agreed to deradicalization, or referred by the Saudis as re-education programming [12]. More than one-third of these militants have formally renounced their beliefs and have been reintegrated into Saudi society. Further, this program claims a recidivism rate of less than 2% for militants who have been reintegrated upon completing the program [6]. This official statistic, while impressive, could be attributed to selection bias, as it has been reported that no jihadists who have been convicted of violent terrorist acts have been released through the program thus far [6]. 1.2. Yemen The Yemeni government has acknowledged their de-radicalization program publicly and even claims rehabilitation figures comparable to those of Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, there are no public details beyond stating that the program occurs in Yemeni prisons and is based on re-educating militants regarding their religious beliefs through a moderate interpretation of Islam [10]. The Yemeni government claims to have rehabilitated hundreds of former radicals [12]. Claims a rehabilitation rate of 98% [13]. 1.3. Bangladesh Bangladesh has acknowledged that it has a formal de-radicalization program for incarcerated militants, but like many of the programs reviewed for this paper, there is scant public information about the program. Instead, the Bangladesh government stresses its counter-radicalization program (although the government also refers to this program as de-radicalization) that aims to improve the lives of radicals produced through the country’s madrassah system, the primary form of education in Bangladesh [2]. This is an interesting approach, and unique from other countries surveyed here, in that the Bangladesh government essentially stipulates to radicalization being a byproduct of the country’s predominately rural education system.

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The counter-radicalization program in Bangladesh is a two-pronged program where the government takes an active role in (1) influencing the imams teaching in the madrassahs by promoting moderate Islam while reforming and expanding the school curriculum and (2) creating economic opportunity for graduates of the madrassah system to diffuse social disaffection. This strategy is promising because whereas nearly twice as many of the madrassahs are operated outside of State control, nearly  of the jihadists who belong to the two largest terrorist groups in Bangladesh were educated at government-monitored madrassahs [2]. 1.4. Egypt Egypt is the only country with a de-radicalization program that pre-dates the onset of the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism. On its face, official Egyptian government statistics suggest that the de-radicalization program has been successful with less than 5,000 jihadist suspects incarcerated or known to Egyptian authorities; down from more than 20,000 in the late 1990s [5]. The Egyptian de-radicalization program differs from most programs surveyed here in that it now relies primarily on former radicals to make public recantations of extremist views and Jihadist ideology. The government actively conducted a campaign of religious intervention by using authoritative Islamic scholars to challenge the ideologues of al-Gama’a Islamiyya that was once the largest Jihadist organization in the world. These reformed al-Gama’a Islamiyya ideologues are the few individuals in Egyptian society that can speak credibly about Jihadist ideology and affect the Jihadist activist/sympathizer populations in Egypt. Most of these Jihadist ideologues have now been freed and together, they have produced more than 25 volumes of revisions to alGama’a Islamiyya’s ideology known as “Corrections of Concepts.” These reformed jihadists have been used by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior to meet with imprisoned Jihadists and hold religious dialogues with major scholars at alAzhar and other institutions of Islamic Jurisprudence [5]. Leading this effort is the Dr. Sayed al-Shareef, once referred to as al-Qaeda’s philosopher and the former ideological mentor to Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2007, he publicly broke with al-Qaeda and condemned the Jihadist ideology that he had helped create, and in 2008 he published a book, “Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World,” that is one of the most important and credible resources in Egypt’s de-radicalization efforts. 1.5. Singapore The de-radicalization program in Singapore officially began in 2003 with establishment of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), a government sponsored religious/community group that works proactively to combat Jemaah Islamiyya’s (JI) specific jihadist ideology [4]. De-radicalization efforts by the RRG include counseling militants in detention along with their families [4, 8] and uses religious authorities to re-educate militants in moderate interpretations of Islam that challenges radical notions of Jihad and religious justifications of violence [10]. The RRG also proactively engaged Muslim community leaders in Singapore to publicly challenge jihadist ideology in an attempt to inoculate susceptible populations against radicalization [4].

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1.6. Thailand Thailand is unique among the countries that have publicly acknowledged having a deradicalization program in that it is the only program that has not advocated using religious re-education in its prisons or in public information efforts. Dealing with radicalized militants in the southern provinces of Thailand is the responsibility of the Royal Thai Military, and their primary solution is to detain Muslims they suspect of being involved in the Insurgency. Many of those that are detained are sent to special camps for job training and labor skills to rehabilitate them [14]. 1.7. Iraq Iraq easily has the largest population of detained radicalized militants in the world because the U.S.-led coalition forces in the country have been the epicenter of the global Jihadist struggle. At the time of this writing, U.S. forces were in control of jihadist detainees in the country. In mid-2008, the U.S. government acknowledged that it was conducting a de-radicalization program at Camp Bucca, the largest U.S. detention facility in Iraq, where more than 2,000 hard-core al-Qaeda inspired/related jihadists are kept among a population of more than 19,000. The first hint that such a program was in development was a series of funding solicitations released in 2006 by the U.S. Department of Defense seeking proposals to implement a religious reeducation program in Iraq. Although the date the program began is not known, it is currently delivered at Camp Bucca by imams who teach a moderate interpretation of Islam approved by the U.S. Military. While clearly inspired by de-radicalization programs throughout the world, the U.S. program in Iraq appears to be more responsive to the militants detained after they are debriefed/interrogated by intelligence personnel. One example is that incarcerated militants at Camp Bucca are allowed visits from their family members during their detention. The decision to allow this was reportedly based on intelligence gleaned from detainee debriefings that showed most Iraqis participating in the Insurgency did so only after first receiving permission from their families as a means of making money. Official U.S. reporting about Camp Bucca’s program claims that whereas all detainees are subjected to this re-education program, 7,000 inmates have been released and only seven have recidivated and been returned to the facility. 1.8. Malaysia There are few details available regarding the de-radicalization program in Malaysia other than that it is focused on known/suspected militants in the prison population [10]. Malaysia has officially acknowledged the program, and the de-radicalization efforts appear to stress religious re-education of militants using authoritative moderate Islamic scholars. Similar to other de-radicalization programs reviewed here, the Malaysian program engages the families of militants who are incarcerated [8], although it is unclear whether the families are actively involved in the rehabilitation process. Similar to the Saudi rehabilitation program, Malaysian militants can become eligible for a prisoner-release program. The Malaysian program does prescribe harsh punishments if released prisoners recidivate and rejoin militant movements. It is not known what reintegration processes or benefits the prisoners receive prior to their release.

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1.9. Indonesia The final de-radicalization reviewed here is the program in Indonesia that is conducted in Indonesian prisons and directed by the elite Indonesian police anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88. This program is unique in that it does not attempt to re-indoctrinate detained militants to accept a different interpretation of Islam; rather, it strives to get them to renounce violence. A militant is first approached to participate in the program when he/she is initially placed in police custody. Often the militant is offered a reduction in charges in exchange for voluntary participation in the de-radicalization program. Once a militant agrees to participate, he/she is engaged individually [8], often by a former militant or radical who has renounced violence. The militant’s individualized program is conducted with the primary goals of (1) getting jihadists to reject the killing of innocent civilians and (2) seeking rejection of the anti-state ideology prolific among Indonesian jihadist groups (Schulz quoted in Waterman, 2008). The Indonesian program is unique in that it does not use authoritative religious moderates to re-educate militants and challenge the basic justification of violent Jihad. In fact, the program often acknowledges that jihadist violence perpetrated in previous conflicts in Ambon and Poso could be condoned. Indonesia’s program has received considerable media attention and is the only program to have been reviewed, albeit informally, by an external organization–the highly reputable International Crisis Group. One reason for the high public profile of the Indonesian program is the use of former radicals to reach out to imprisoned/detained jihadists. Two former terrorists in particular, Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron, were noted for their direct, individualized approaches to de-radicalizing members of Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia’s prisons [7, 9]. Nasir Abbas is perhaps the most celebrated case outside of Egypt to use former radicals to directly challenge detained militants. Abbas’ credibility comes from his background of being a member of Jemaah Islamiyya for 18 years where he served as a weapons instructor at various mujahideen training camps and as leader of Mantiqi Three–JI’s training unit [1]. Abbas claims that the Christmas Eve Church bombings in 2000 were in violation of the teachings of the Prophet which ban Muslims from destroying places of worship. He regularly visits his former JI comrades in prison to help them de-radicalize by exposing inconsistencies in the JI ideology with the Koran. Detachment 88 claims that more than two dozen JI members have disengaged from the group and renounced violence [1]. This official claim has been challenged in the media by some observers who suggest that many of the rehabilitated jihadists might not have been jihadists at all, but criminals networked with the jihadists for protection while in prison [9].

2. Insights on De-Radicalization It is clear that while many countries’ de-radicalization programs have been influenced by reported successes of countries like Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, there is significant variation in the scope and programmatic approaches to de-radicalization. Nearly all deradicalization programs place an emphasis on religious re-indoctrination as the primary means of moderating a jihadist’s ideology. For the majority of the programs surveyed, this religious re-indoctrination is conducted through institutional-wide educational

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programming where State-approved imams are encouraged to spread moderate interpretations of Islam that confront and contradict jihadist ideologies. Most de-radicalization programs culminated in the prisoner’s release for reintegration into society although this option was often not available to jihadist prisoners who had committed violent acts. For those prisoners eligible for release, many programs took steps to involve the prisoner’s family in the re-indoctrination and rehabilitation processes. There was no mention of involvement of a jihadist prisoner’s peers or associates in the rehabilitation process which is surprising given the considerable research literature in criminology, sociology and psychology on the impact of a person’s peer groups on his/her actions and tendency to engage in delinquent behavior. This also runs counter to Dr. Marc Sageman’s theory that a person is radicalized to engage in jihadist terrorism not because he/she is motivated by the ideology and is a “true believer,” but rather that his/her friends are involved in the same behaviors. The Indonesian program was unique among the 16 programs surveyed for this paper in that it adopted an individualized approach to de-radicalization. The fact that former jihadists played a key role in the de-radicalization process led observers to suggest that the program’s success was attributable to the credibility that former JI leaders carry when speaking about the incompatibility of jihadist ideology with the teachings of the Prophet. The fact that the Indonesian program’s progress was informally reviewed and confirmed by the well-respected International Crisis Group lends support to using an individualized approach with authority figures in deradicalization programs. This observation is bolstered by similar successes that were documented in Egypt in the late 1990s following the Egyptian government’s conversion of al-Gama’a Islamiyya ideologues to a more moderate interpretation of their ideology which, in turn, led them to repudiate their jihadist ideology. The Saudi Arabian program was by far the most advanced de-radicalization program surveyed and the only program to place such an intensive focus on the reintegration of the jihadist into society. The immense financial resources of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia make such a program possible, and it is unlikely that many countries could replicate such a program. Despite these reported successes, de-radicalization programs are still poorly understood, with much of the reporting being provided by the national governments without external evaluation or review. In many cases, the statistics on recidivism and observations revealing that de-radicalization programs lead to reduced numbers of terrorist attacks are anecdotal at best and cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence that de-radicalization programs are effective. In many cases, countries with deradicalization programs exclude those jihadists who have ever committed a violent act which raise many questions about whether the programs are actually de-radicalizing jihadists or merely sympathizers and activists.

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[30] Indonesian scholar promotes soft approach in eradicating terrorism. . (2008, July 28). BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://www.lexisnexis.com.unx1.shsu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh20.332739.2981 417131&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220837677740&returnTo Key=20_T4503477405&parent=docview. [31] INDONESIA'SYEAROFLIVINGNORMALLY.RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://web.ebscohost.com.unx1.shsu.edu:2048/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=104&sid=0386ae0b-ea6d-440ba66f-0a37f92f5ab4%40sessionmgr108. [32] InternationalCrisisGroup-142“De-radicalization”andIndonesianPrisons. . RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5170&CFID=51700679&CFTOKEN=62613953. [33] Karniol, R. (2008a, March 31). An educated reform programme. The Straits Times (Singapore).RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://www.lexisnexis.com.unx1.shsu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh20.832492.6273 83451&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220837793783&returnToK ey=20_T4503484656&parent=docview. [34] Kur, J. (2008, January 11). PROGRESS IN INDONESIA - WEANING RADICALS FROM TERRORISM. St. Paul Pioneer Press (MN), B8. [35] Kuruvila, M. C. (2007, June 5). Security agency enlisting Muslims to rebut radicals - Idea is to engage young minds in ideological battle. San Francisco Chronicle (CA), A4. [36] Lefkowitz, J. TerroristsBehindBars.pdf (application/pdf Object). . Retrieved September8,2008,from http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/TerroristsBehindBars.pdf. [37] Moir, J. (2008, June 4). Therapy for aspiring terrorists won't extinguish the hate. The Daily Telegraph (LONDON).RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://www.lexisnexis.com.unx1.shsu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh20.516686.6137 9727296&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220837478193&returnT oKey=20_T4503464216&parent=docview. [38] O'Brien,N.(2007,October22).Terroristswhosaynototerror.TheAustralian (Australia).RetrievedSeptember8,2008,from http://www.lexisnexis.com.unx1.shsu.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh20.834461.8824 869822&target=results_listview_resultsNav&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220836949388&returnTo Key=20_T4503430767&parent=docview. [39] Pincus, W. (2007, December 24). 'Deprogramming' Iraqi Detainees. Washington Post, The (DC), A13. [40] 'Reformed Terrorist' Comments on De-radicalization Work. . Retrieved September 26,2008,from https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_1019_43/http%3B/apps .opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/8948159?highlightQuery=eJzTSEktSkzJTE 7MyaxKLMnMz9MEAEDHBuk%3D&fileSize=6571. [41] 'Reformed Terrorist' Comments on De-radicalization Work. . Retrieved September 26,2008,from https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_1019_43/http%3B/apps .opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/8948159?highlightQuery=eJzTSEktSkzJTE 7MyaxKLMnMz9MEAEDHBuk%3D&fileSize=6571. [42] SaudisSeektoDeprogramCapturedMilitants.RetrievedSeptember8,2008, fromhttp://blogs.wsj.com/informedreader/2007/05/01/saudis-seek-to-deprogram-captured-militants/. [43] Schmidle, N. (2008, April 17). Inside Saudi Arabia. Slate (USA). Retrieved September8,2008,from http://docs.newsbank.com/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/NewsBank/1202BADD70398520/0FF53AECB94824ED [44] Schulze, K. Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization. . Retrieved September 8, 2008, from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss8.pdf. [45] U.S. tries rehab for religious extremists | csmonitor.com. . Retrieved September 8, 2008, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1009/p01s04-woap.html?page=1. [46] UKSourceExaminesGovernment'sNew'De-radicalization'PlanforMuslim Extremism.RetrievedSeptember26,2008,from https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_246_203_0_43/http%3B/apps.ope nsource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/9245030?highlightQuery=eJzTSEktSkzJTE7M ySxOLMnMz9MEAECWBuI%3D&fileSize=8891. [47] UK: Former Radical Muslim Describes De-radicalization Process. . Retrieved September26,2008,from https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_1019_43/http%3B/apps .opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/7558618?highlightQuery=eJzTSEktSkzJTE 7MyaxKLMnMz9MEAEDHBuk%3D&fileSize=32933.

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-264

Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against The PKK: The “Fish” or the “Water”? Nadir GERGIN,a Fatih BALCIb and I. Sevki ELDIVANc a Virginia Commonwealth University a University of Utah c Rutgers University

Abstract. Turkey has suffered from ethno-nationalist terrorism of the PKK since 1984. This paper contains a description of counter terrorism policies implemented by the Turkish government from 1985 to 2008, and further demonstrates that during the post-2000 period, Turkey’s counter terrorism procedures changed significantly from counterinsurgency-based coercive policies to cohesive policies that seek to win the hearts and minds of the Kurds through economic investments, financial education, health and other non-military policies. These cohesive policies helped the government regain the support of the Kurds; hence, the PKK lost a considerable amount of its popularity. The paper concludes that in the long term, non-military based cohesive policies represent the best policies against the PKK. Keywords. counterinsurgency, counter terrorism policy, fish, insurgency, PKK, political wing, Turkey, water, winning hearts and minds policies

Introduction Turkey has suffered from terrorism by the Kurdistan Workers Party (hereafter, the PKK) every since August 15, 1984, when the PKK conducted its first bloody attacks against two gendarmerie stations in the Semdinli and Eruh localities of the eastern region of Turkey, allegedly known by the PKK as the “Kurdistan” region. August 15, 1984, marks the beginning of PKK’s (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan- Kurdish Workers’ Party) frightening reign of terror for both the Kurdish and Turkish populations. As Anthony Oberschall stated “The bloody drama is played before an audience, and its reactions are important for the outcome” [1]. In an astonishingly short period of time −within the next year after the attack− the Turkish government launched a comprehensive counter terrorism campaign against the PKK derived from the British Counterinsurgency Doctrine that was practiced in the UK’s colonial countries, Kenya, Malaya and the Cyprus of Greece. These early counter terrorism policies of Turkey lasted until the early 2000s. Both the capture of the PKK leader and Turkey’s new government has influenced Turkey’s counter terrorism policies considerably. After the 2000s, Turkey abandoned its earlier counterinsurgency-based coercive policies and adopted “winning hearts and minds policies” aimed at gaining support from the Kurdish population through non-military policies, namely education, social welfare, economic, and other policies. The authors suggest that Turkey’s early counter terrorism

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policies between the mid-1980s and early 2000s did not work, alienated the Kurdish population from the government and worsened the situation, whereas the post-2000 period “winning hearts and minds policies” did work and eroded popular support for the PKK. Finally, the paper concludes that, in the long term, winning hearts and minds policies, non-military in nature, are the best policies to overcome terrorism. The first part of this paper briefly explains the counter terrorism concept, and the second part introduces PKK’s terrorism and evolution. The third part describes and analyzes Turkey’s early counter terrorism policies, followed by the fourth part that addresses Turkey’s non-military policies during the post-2000 period against the PKK. Finally, from the perspective of popular support, the last part evaluates the outcome of latter counter terrorism policies through an analysis of Turkey’s election results.

1. Issues in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 1. 1. Difficulties in Defining Terrorism and Identifying Turkey’s Terrorism Problem “Terrorism” is one of the most controversial terms that have little, if any, common consensus as to its true meaning. In this paper, the authors contend that the problem stems from “differences in language” and “political concerns of the Third Party Government.” In his book titled The Language of Public Administration, David Farmer, a leading American public administration scholar, suggests that terrorism is a word that evokes different meanings to different nations [2]. For example, when the French speak of bread, they picture a long, thin object unlike the rectangular shaped slice of American bread. By the same token, when speaking of terrorism or terrorist organizations, the Turkish and Westerners have conflicting perceptions. For instance, the PKK is described as a terrorist organization in Turkey whereas the West refers to the PKK as an “insurgent organization.” The Turkish words that come closest to a definition of insurgency are “isyan” or “ayaklanma,” meaning “rebellion,” “insurrection” or “mutiny” that are not, however, equivalent to the term “insurgency.” We argue that this lack of an equivalent word in the Turkish language creates difficulty in understanding another country’s point of view related to the terrorism issue. This misunderstanding sometimes leads the Turkish to blame the West for not recognizing Turkey’s terrorism problem or even supporting it. For example, in 2007, when the Time referred to PKK members as “Kurdish insurgents” after the murder of 15 Turkish soldiers in Diyarbakir, a city in Turkey [3], Prime Minister Erdogan expressed dissatisfaction about the term “insurgent” because he was under the impression that the Time labeled members of the PKK as “rebels.” In other words, Turkish authorities prefer the use of “terrorist” or “terrorism” terms when speaking of the PKK rather than “insurgent” or “insurgency” due to a lack of distinguishing terrorist organizations from insurgent organizations. In an attempt to grasp a better insight into the PKK and Turkey’s counter terrorism policies, insurgency and terrorism should be clearly defined or described. According to the U.S Counterinsurgency Doctrine of 2006, the term “insurgency” is defined as An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-

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military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. The doctrine distinguishes terrorism and insurgency concepts by implying that insurgent organizations are different from terrorist organizations. However, we argue that terrorism is a tactic that can be used in a war between nation-states, in a civil war or in an insurgency. In other words, individuals, organizations or even states can employ terror strategies. Throughout history, terrorist and guerrilla tactics have frequently been used by terrorist and insurgent organizations. To succeed against superior resources and technology, terrorist/insurgency organizations prefer a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory as opposed to a long, bloody protracted struggle. As such, because insurgent organizations often use terrorism to achieve their goals, what, then, is “terrorism”? These authors argue that when Western countries refer to the term terrorism, they ascribe to a different meaning than that used by the Turks. For instance, Boaz Ganor defines “terrorism” as the “intentional use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aim” [4]. This definition represents the point of view primarily used by the majority of Western countries and has, for a long time, apparently dominated Western counterterrorism policies against foreign terrorist organizations. Ganor’s, definition, however, does not reflect Turkey’s perception of terrorism. In other words, Ganor characterizes terrorism as (1) violence or threat to use violence; (2) civilian target; and (3) political aim. However, the Turkish perception is different and does not consider terrorism as a “terrorist act,” because first, there must be “organization.” Turkey’s Anti-terrorism Law (No. 3713) of 12 April 1991, established three main criteria for defining a terrorist act [5]: (1) “Modus operandi”: the law stipulates that terrorism involves the use of coercion, violence, terror, intimidation or threats; (2) the “purposes” for which the act is perpetrated; and (3) the “organization”: the act must have been committed by a person or persons belonging to an organization. These authors suggest that the elements of “organization” and “nature of the target” constitute the most obvious difference in the perception of terrorism between the West and the Turks. The joint elements include the “violence” and “political aim” or “purposes.” Bruce Hoffman’s portrayal of terrorism comes closer to the Turkish approach by characterizing the term as (1) a political concept; (2) pursuit of power to achieve political change; (3) violence or threat of violence in the service of a political aim; and (4) a systematic act. However, one deficiency of Ganor’s definition does not consider attacks as terrorism if they are against combatants rather than civilians as became crystal clear when Al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole while harbored in the Yemeni Port, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 more. These authors agree with Hoffman’s definition of terrorism and suggest that their target should not be limited to only civilians but rather should cover even animals, plants or other living subjects that could intimidate the innocent party. Because the target choice is a symbolic issue that terrorists use to communicate with their audience, they carefully choose them to signal out addressees who could include politicians, public and security forces or any other target. If, for example, terrorist attacks targeting only military or police officer combatants are excluded from the definition of terrorism and are thus not considered as terrorist acts, there is always the possibility that some “terrorists” can be viewed as “freedom fighters.” In turn, this could lead other countries to view other’s terrorists as “freedom fighters” and might avoid cooperating or even support them. Although the PKK has

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targeted civilians since the mid-1980s, unfortunately, it was somehow omitted from the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations until May 2002 and by the U.S. until late 2004 [6]. In sum, defining terrorism remains a very controversial and political issue and, unfortunately, there is still no consensus on an agreed-upon definition. These authors imply that if any insurgent organization employs a terrorism strategy, then it should be treated as a terrorist organization as opposed to merely an insurgent organization. To clarify Turkey’s definitional complexity of a terrorist versus an insurgent organization, in this paper the PKK is defined as a “terrorist insurgent organization.” As such, the PKK is an insurgent organization because it aims to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the Middle East and therefore aims to overthrow the constituted Turkish government to achieve this goal; on the other hand, the PKK is also a terrorist organization because it has adopted terrorism as the core strategy, adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and acts systematically as an organization. Hence, the PKK should be regarded as a terrorist organization and condemned for its bloody terrorism against both civilian and governmental targets. Overall, due to these reasons, the PKK as presented in this paper is a insurgent terrorist organization and will be identified as a terrorist organization throughout the paper. 1.2. Political Violence Although terrorist organizations use violent behavior for various reasons, political violence is the indispensable element of terrorism. In this paper, a symbiotic relationship between political violence and terrorist organizations is suggested. Political violence has very special meanings to terrorist organizations and their supporters. For example, without political violence, a terrorist organization can not survive and will thus lose its supporters. Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister’s found that advocates of Irish terrorist organizations do not support decommissioning of weapons [7], because political violence can generate public support, and terrorist organizations can benefit from its resources [8] as well as attract potential supporters to join their organizations. Hayes and McAllister further stated that IRA’s intense and sustained terrorism campaign during the 1970s inevitable drew many people into paramilitary terrorist organizations [7]. Each act of terrorist violence signifies to these audiences that the target is vulnerable and that the perpetrators exist and have the capacity to strike again [9]. Insurgents resort to guerrilla warfare and terrorism tactics for any number of reasons that may include disadvantages in manpower or organization, relatively limited resources compared to the government, and, in some cases, a cultural predisposition to an indirect approach to conflict. To strengthen and sustain their efforts, once manpower is mobilized, insurgents require money, supplies and weapons [10]; therefore, insurgents may use coercive force to provide security for people or intimidate them as well as legitimate security forces into active or passive support. Kidnapping or murdering local leaders or their families is a common insurgent tactic to discourage a person from working with the government. Militias sometimes use the promise of security, or the threat to remove security, in an attempt to maintain control of cities and towns. The government must recognize and remove the threat to sovereignty and legitimacy posed by terrorist organizations [10].

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1.3 Countering Terrorism If terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter terrorism measures may include strategies of a counterinsurgency doctrine; if this is the case, political, economic and other measures should focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror. Since the PKK is an insurgent type of terrorist organization that frequently uses terrorist tactics to overwhelm their terrorism, the Turkish government adopted a counterinsurgency doctrine and its core principles between 1985 and the early 2000s, a fact that raises several consecutive questions. What is a counterinsurgency? What are the core principles of a counterinsurgency? What does counterinsurgency suggest? The U.S. Department of Defense defines “Counterinsurgency” as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. According to the 2006 U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule [10]. Furthermore, counterinsurgency involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners must never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces alone cannot succeed in counterinsurgency. For example, America’s doctrine attached great importance to non-military, civilian efforts to overwhelm the insurgency problem by introducing two indicators of a successful policy: (1) people engaged in their own lives that do not care about insurgency and (2) consent to the government’s rule. These authors agree with this argument. As will be discussed in the following pages, the 2007 Parliamentary elections were proof of the Kurdish population’s consent to the political party (AKP) of the ruling government rather than PKK’s political wing represented by the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Although terrorist attacks still occur against both governmental and civilian targets, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey is now implementing poor counterterrorism policies; sometimes it might appear vice versa. In an effort to secure its citizens against terrorism and overwhelm the terrorism problem, governments must formulate and implement effective counter terrorism policies. To win the war on terrorism, counter terrorism policies must be well planned and also win over public support, the determinant and key factor in countering terrorism. Whichever gets the greater public support, either the government or the terrorist organization, will be the ultimate winner. As Parker (2007) points out, a successful counter terrorism strategy erodes popular support for terrorism, and unsuccessful ones contribute to support for terrorism [11]. Therefore, successful counter terrorism policies must be formulated and implemented properly if the government truly seeks to win over the public and obtain its support. What if those policies are poorly designed and implemented and are far away from meeting the needs of the public? Unfortunately, poor counter terrorism policies are counterproductive and even worsen the situation by the following ways: (1) alienate the public from the government; (2) generate public support for terrorist organizations; 3) decline governmental legitimacy; (4) strengthen the terrorist cause; [11] and (5) exacerbate the potential for violence [12]. Ted Gurr’s (1978) theory of political violence argues that “repressive measures to curb political violence—especially those randomly, inequitably, or inconsistently applied—introduced in the absence of meaningful reform are ultimately only likely to exacerbate the potential for further violence” [11]. In his writing on the history of PKK’s military wing, Duran Kalkan, the leader of the military

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wing (the president of People Defense Committee of the PKK), supports Gurr’s argument. Kalkan states that Turkey did not tolerate even propagandist expressions and responded harshly to and implemented suppressive policies in the late 1970s, especially after the military coupe and during military rule; hence, the PKK decided to respond with violence against the government, especially military targets [13]. Cemil Bayik, one of the top level leaders of the PKK, state that the first bloody attack against gendarmerie stations in 1984 was a response to the 1980 military coup and its suppressive policies against the Kurds [14]. It is argued that after the 1980 military coup, 650,000 individuals were arrested, 210,000 cases were opened, 98,404 individuals were charged with being members of a terrorist organization, and 50 individuals were executed [15]. Turkey’s suppressive policies during the military rule, unfortunately, generated a “cause” that the PKK could use to justify its existence and violent acts. The PKK’s violence was justified by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it viewed as a massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity and cultural rights carried out by governments in the allegedly Kurdistan region [16]. This relationship between suppressive policies and support for terrorist organizations was captured by many insurgent leaders. In the Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla, Carlos Marighela, a Brazilian communist, explicitly encouraged terrorist groups to conduct attacks designed to provoke state authorities into overreaction [17]. According to Parker, Marighela theorized that a repressive state response would alienate the government from its population and generate support for the terrorists and that declining governmental legitimacy would strengthen the terrorist cause [11]. Likewise, Gurr suggested that successful violence increases the likelihood of its recurrence [12]. However, by adopting punitive measures, the regime is also likely to be reinforcing an oppositional ideological narrative that aims to show the regime in a negative light, challenge its legitimacy, and enhance the credibility of the terrorist cause, thus contributing to a process identified by David Snow as ‘‘frame amplification” [12].

2. The PKK and Brief History of PKK Terrorism 2. 1. History of the PKK On 27 November 1978, the PKK was founded during a meeting, more commonly known as the First Congress of the PKK, of Abdullah Ocalan and his associates in the city of Diyarbakir, considered as the prospective capital of allegedly Kurdistan. [6]. In its Foundation Statement, the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered throughout Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a Greater Kurdistan in this region as its long-term objective [6]. Although 1978 was the official date of its foundation, the roots of PKK go back to the early 1970s when left wing and right wing political organizations used to actively operate and conflict with each other. In other words, the PKK appeared to be an additional terrorist organization during such very unstable political conditions that people were killed everyday because of terrorist attacks. PKK adopted an offensive military strategy against governmental targets in an effort to achieve its political goals or to create an independent “Greater Kurdistan” and to do that, sent its selected members into the Palestinian training camps to receive military training. First, in September 1979, terrorist groups had to arrive to those camps in Palestine and begin their training under the supervision of Palestinian instructors

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[18]. Sending its militants to be trained in Palestinian camps continued until the PKK established its own camps in Beka Valley in Syria. Turkey’s unstable situation resulted in a military coup on September 12th, 1980. After the military coup, Chief of General Staff of Military, Kenan Evren took over the Presidency, and the National Security Council ruled the country until the parliamentary elections held on November 6th, of 1983. Immediately following, the military coup under military command and security forces launched an offensive counter terrorism campaign against all types of terrorist organizations and the security forces arrested thousands of people. Under these strict military conditions, the PKK organized its Second Congress in Damascus, Syria from 20–25 August 1982. It was during this meeting that the group decided to initiate a violent armed campaign in an attempt to establish a Kurdish state [6]; and the following month, September of 1982, the PKK began sending its trained militants to Turkey [19]. Finally, the PKK took the terrorism stage on August 15th of 1984 with a simultaneously bloody terrorist attack against gendarmerie stations in the city of Semdinli and Eruh. Kalkan stated that those stations were intentionally selected because they were small enough to succeed and would represent the PKK’s war zone [19]. The impact of the terrorist attacks was enormous on the public, the government and at the international level. The PKK believes that these attacks had a determinant impact on awareness of the Kurdish problem at the international level [14]. At the beginning, the government had considered the attacks as a military problem and expected to suppress the PKK within a couple days, and therefore preferred to respond to these attacks with a three-day military operation in 1984 and followed by a comprehensive military operation in 1985 [19]. According to Duran Kalkan, it was after the Third Congress of the PKK in 1987 that the Turkish government realized it would take longer than expected to defeat PKK terrorism [19]. Thus, the government launched a series of counter terrorism policies derived from the British counterinsurgency experience in her colonial countries during the ‘50s and ‘60s. English General Sir Thompson had implemented five major successful policies in Malaya: (1) single leadership; (2) turned insurgents; (3) resettlement; (4) village guards; and (5) Winning Hearts and Mind Policies. Although Turkey has applied four of these policies with great effort, the most important one, however, has been ignored−winning hearts and minds policies during the pre-2000 period. In this paper, Turkey’s counter terrorism policies will be divided into two periods: the “coercive period” that covers the mid-1980s and early 2000s and the “cohesive period” that covers between the early 2000s to the present.

3. Turkey’s Early Counter Terrorism Policies (1984-2000): “Coercive Period” After the simultaneous terrorist attacks on gendarmerie stations in the Semdinli and Eruh localities on August 15th of 1984, less than one year later the Turkish government launched the following counter terrorism policies that originated from the insurgency doctrine against the PKK. 3.1 State of Emergency Policy and Single Leadership Approach (Regional Governors) Before the PKK terrorist attacks in 1984, Turkey had not launched a comprehensive counter terrorism policy, but instead, the government preferred to overcome the

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problem of terrorism through suppressive policies that resorts to military solutions and limiting civil liberties. The current Turkish Constitution was adopted in 1982, two years after the 1980 military coup. Due to terrorist activities and anarchic conditions that prevailed before the military coup in 1980, lawmakers added the “state of emergency” and “martial law” concept into the Constitution. The current Turkish Constitution (1982) authorizes the government to declare martial law and a state of emergency under certain conditions of which terrorism is among these conditions. Article 120 regulates the state of emergency and states that: In case of emergence of serious indications of widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order established by the Constitution or of fundamental rights and freedoms, or serious deterioration of public order because of acts of violence, the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of the president of the Turkish Republic, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare a state of emergency in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months. Article 122 regulates martial law, mobilization and the state of war stating that: the Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare martial law in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months, in the event of widespread acts of violence which are more dangerous than the cases necessitating a state of emergency and which are aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order or the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution; or in the event of war, the emergence of a situation necessitating war, an uprising, or the spread of violent and strong rebellious actions against the motherland and the Republic, or widespread acts of violence of either internal or external origin threatening the indivisibility of the country and the nation. This article suggests that both the “state of emergency” and “martial law” amendments consider terrorism as a reason to declare a “state of emergency” or even “martial law” if necessary. During the martial law or state of emergency, governmental bodies have power to restrict fundamental rights and extra investigative tools. Based on the Constitution amendments, a specific statute, “state of emergency law,” passed on October 25th of 1983. However, the statute was not been implemented in any province until 1987 [20].The terrorist attacks in 1984 and continuing intensive PKK terrorism led the government to implement that harsh and suppressive policy and, unfortunately, alienated most of the Kurdish population from the government and worsened the situation. The “state of emergency law” restated under what conditions a state of emergency can be declared and specifically defined the counter measures to be taken against widespread violence acts, namely terrorism. Like the single leadership model adopted by the U.K in Kenya and Malaya during insurgencies, the state of emergency law adopted “a single leadership approach” and introduced “regional governorships.” The law described the implementation of state of emergency and introduced its organs by suggesting that if state of emergency covers more than one province, a regional governorship shall be established and will be responsible for those provinces under its governorship.

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The main reason behind the law was to effectively coordinate various governmental agencies among the provinces and exercise extra authority in countering terrorism. Former minister of interior and director general of the Turkish National Police, Mehmet Agar stated that the “state of emergency law” facilitated countering terrorism through providing extra investigative tools and increased coordination among those provinces through the regional governorship model [21]. On the other hand, in his speech to the General Assembly in 1996, Omer Hatipoglu, a parliamentary member, pointed out some of the damages that the law caused [22]: (1) the state of emergency law did not work. Instead, it was abused by the PKK and led the local Kurdish population to support the PKK rather than the government; therefore, the law should be abrogated; (2) due to this law, thousands of people were arrested, investigated or tortured for supporting or aiding the PKK terrorists; (3) due to terrorism in this region, these provinces have been deprived of economic investments; therefore, it did not develop; (5) those certain provinces are Kurdish populated provinces; therefore, it is perceived as if Kurds are governed under a regime that is different from the Turkish population; (6) security force officials dominate bureaucracy and counter terrorism efforts in those provinces rather than civilian authorities; and (7) military, gendarmerie and the police act differently and have different practices; hence, it leads the local population to distrust the government and alienate from the government. In sum, the state of emergency law only introduced countermeasures to be taken including restricting fundamental rights and a regional governorship model; however, neither has established a single regional governorship nor declared a state of emergency in any province until 1987. Although the law authorized the state’s governor of the emergency province to evacuate certain areas and to transfer people to other areas in case of “natural disasters or dangerous epidemic diseases,” it did not grant that authority to the governor in case of violence (terrorism) until December 16 th of 1990, or referred to in this paper as the “resettlement policy” that originated from the British counterinsurgency approach. The state of emergency policy used to be extended every six months by the General Assembly; finally, due to severe criticism regarding the law and less frequency of terrorist attacks, the state of emergency law was not extended and ceased to exist in 2002. 3.2 Village Guard Policy When the government acknowledged that the state of emergency policy would not and could not stop PKK terrorism, it decided to implement comprehensive counter terrorism policies consisting of a series of policies derived from the British counterinsurgency doctrine. The village guard policy was the first counterterrorism policy implemented by the Turkish government. Only seven months after the first bloody attacks against two gendarmerie stations, on March 26th in 1985, the Turkish government passed the amendment of Village Law No. 442, Article 74 through Law No. 3175 [23]. Village guards are armed local paramilitary militias that struggle against the PKK. The logic behind the policy was to protect the armless and defenseless Kurdish population who live in remote areas, scattered villages and hamlets that are very difficult to provide security and protection from the atrocities of PKK terrorism. According to the amendment, village guards can be hired upon the governor’s proposal and approval by the minister of interior in certain provinces that are determined by the Cabinet in cases (1) where declaration of a state of emergency may be necessary, (2) where serious signs of violent acts have been observed in or around a village, or (3)

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where violations on the lives and properties of villagers have increased. The employment contract covers the salary, severance pay and clothing expenses and provides poor social security benefits to the village guards [23]. Village guards work under the supervision of local gendarmerie station commanders and receive two weeks training when they are initially hired [24]. The village guard policy was first launched in nine provinces in 1985, and expanded to 22 provinces in 1993 due to the rise of PKK violence against the civilian population. At the beginning, 15,000 individuals were recruited from the local population in 1987 [25]. Abdulkadir Aksu, of the Ministry of Interior, reported that a total of 57,757 village guards were employed in 22 provinces in 2005 [23]: 5,187 in Diyarbakir; 6,756 in Sirnak; 2,887 in Batman; 2,511 in Bingöl; 3,730 in Bitlis; 3,323 in Mardin; 1,860 in Mus; 4,661 in Siirt; 7,320 in Van; 7,614 in Hakkâri; 368 in Tunceli; 1,485 in Adiyaman; 1,838 in Agri; 91 in Ardahan; 2,083 in Elazig; 555 in Gaziantep; 362 in Igdir; 33 in Kilis; 2,236 in Kahramanmaras; 558 in Kars; 1,365 in Malatya; and 934 in Sanliurfa. In addition to the temporary village guards currently under full employment, there are 25,000 voluntary village guards, who are armed but not paid. As shown in Map 1, in 22 provinces, the village guard policy is still being implemented, and Map 2 represents the number of village guards employed in certain provinces.

Map 1: Provinces of Turkey where the guard policy is still implemented. As Map 2 depicts, most of the village guards are employed in the provinces of Hakkari, Sirnak and Van, the provinces that border Iraq and Iran. Iraq and Iran have been used as safe havens for years by the PKK. According to governmental sources, before Turkey’s incursion into Iraq, approximately 2,900 to 3,000 militant cadre were operating within Iraq’s soil whereas 680 to 730 were operating in Iran. Most armed conflict between security forces and the PKK take place within these three provinces; therefore, the majority of village guards are employed in these provinces. Because the village guards are recruited from the local population, they are at least as familiar with the region as are the PKK terrorists; therefore they participate in counter terrorism operations conducted by the security forces.

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Map 2: Number of village guards employed in certain provinces. Although the village guard policy’s purpose was to protect the defenseless population against PKK terrorism, it also caused problems: (1) Some military territorial commanders were claimed to have forced local villagers to serve as village guards or were otherwise threatened to evacuate their villages because of supporting the PKK [26, 27]. For instance, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) organization reports that gendarmerie forces required 160 families to leave from their villages in Bitlis province in 1994 due to refusing to be a village guard [27]; (2) The policy divided Kurdish clans into two parts−proponents of government and opponents of the government. Kurdish clans who served as village guards blamed others who were not opponents of the government or even blamed proponents of the PKK [23]; (3) Hundreds of village guards were involved in crimes including illegal drugs and rape and murder of their rivals claiming that they were terrorists. The Ministry of Interior reports that 936 of village guards committed crimes against property, and 428 were involved in smuggling crimes [28]; (4) The policy prevented people who were evacuated for security reasons to return their homes [27]; (5) Some village guards willingly or forcibly collaborated with the PKK. According to the Ministry of Interior, 2,402 village guards were involved in terrorism crimes [28]; and (6) The policy intensified PKK violence. As expected, this policy was not welcomed and was targeted by the PKK. Approximately 1,400 village guards lost their lives during either terrorist attacks or counter terrorism operations against the PKK [23]. The PKK frequently called on village guards to decommission their arms and stop serving as village guards by threatening them with violence against them as well as their families. In conclusion, although the policy resulted in other problems, it can be agued that only the village guard policy among the early counter terrorism policies worked given Turkey’s geographic conditions and the PKK’s characteristics of terrorism, because, more or less, it isolated the PKK from the Kurdish population and caused difficulty in gaining their active support [29]. Due to this policy, Turkish security forces did not loose “area control” and initiative over the region. In other words, on one hand, the PKK could not have expanded its authority and could not have established a “shadow government.” Turkey has been severely criticized by the European Union due to the village guard policy [27]. For example, in 2001, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations reported that village guards, to whom many murders were attributed, should be disarmed and the village guard policy should be abrogated [27]. On the other hand, some officials and authors argued that the village guard policy should not be considered as merely a security issue; rather, disbanding of village guards could cause

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other social and economic problems, thereby suggesting that they should be either employed under different job categories, namely governmental officials, forest rangers or others. 3.3. Turned Terrorists and Amnesties In an effort to dissolve the terrorist organization, beginning from June 5th of 1985 to 2003, the General Assembly passed eight laws to reduce sentences of terrorists who regretted joining a terrorist organization or surrendered to security forces and provided important information about terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, these laws, referred to by the public as “Shriver Laws,” did not grasp the expected attention of PKK terrorists. For example, 157 terrorists in 1985, 359 in 1988, 152 in 1990, 393 in 1992, 409 in 1995, 562 in 1999, 8 in 2000, and 2,912 in 2003 applied to benefit from these legal arrangement regulations. In February 2008, Mehmet Ali Sahin, the minister of justice, reported that 1,365 of the applicants surrendered to security forces to benefit from this law that was enacted in 2003 [30]. The rest of the applicants included those who were already in prison convicted of being terrorists. Together with security forces, most early turned terrorists who were used to counter terrorism operations revealed the locations of PPK terrorist shelters and havens, and it is argued that some actually did help security forces. The act of 2003 remains in force. 3.4. Resettlement Policy and Evacuation of the Villages The resettlement policy was implemented between the mid-1980s and early 2000s. Upon the continuity of PKK terrorism against the local population, and either willingly or unwillingly, support of the PKK, on December 15, 1990, the government expanded the authority of regional province governors where the state of emergency law was in force by issuing a decree and granting them authority to transfer the local population and evacuate residential areas if necessary. According to this decree: For reasons of general security and public order in the provinces where a state of emergency is in force, persons who have been requested to be moved for settlement elsewhere, or who engage in harmful activities either voluntarily or involuntarily, or who are known or likely to disturb public order, may be moved or expelled, as the case may be, from the region at the discretion of the State of Emergency Regional Governor for a period not exceeding the period for which the state of emergency is in force. Where appropriate, such persons may be provided financial support from the Development and Support Fund according to criteria specified by the Ministry of the Interior and on the condition that they live at a definite place. This decree equipped regional governors with the resettlement authority that could affect hundreds of thousands of people’s lives and trigger a number of unforeseen problems. There is neither a definite number of individuals nor villages. In his reply to a legislative inquiry submitted by parliamentary member, M.Riza Yalcinkaya, on July 14, 2008, Besir Atalay of the Ministry of Interior reported that the resettlement policy was implemented in 14 provinces, and he listed the number of evacuated villages as follows [31]: six in Adiyaman, eight in Agri, 137 in Bingol, 125 in Bitlis, three in

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Elazig, 45 in Hakkari, 31 in Mus, 100 in Tunceli, 33 in Van, 37 in Batman, 134 in Diyarbakir, 129 in Mardin, 96 in Siirt, and 61 in Sirnak. He also noted that out of a total of 62,448 households, 386,360 individuals left. However, non-governmental organizations claimed that the actual numbers are higher than official numbers. For instance, according to the Turkey Human Rights Foundation (TIHV) reports, at least 3,500 villages had been evacuated due to security reasons. The Human Rights Association (IHD) reported the number of evacuated villages as 3,246 whereas the Immigration Association (GOC-DER) reported 4,500. The most comprehensive and unbiased study was conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies published on December 6th of 2006. Findings of the study concluded that the number of individuals who immigrated from those 14 provinces was estimated to be between 953,680 and 1,201,200 [32] or three times higher, at best, than the official numbers reported by the government. The study also provided the estimated number of immigrants according to years: 300,000 to 380,000 (31.6%) during 1986-1990; 585,000 to 735,000 (61.3%) during 1991-1995; 47,000 to 60,000 (5%) during 1996-2000; and 20,000 to 25,000 (2.1%) individuals voluntarily or involuntarily left their homes due to security reasons during 2001-2005. Figure 1 indicates these numbers and percentages during those periods, and as the numbers suggest, 93% of the individuals left their homes between 1986-1995.

Individuals Left Their Homes Due to PKK Terrorism / Resettlement Program 1996--2000, 5% 47.000-60.000

2001--2005, 2.1% 20.000-25.000

1986--1990, 31.6% 300.000-380,000

1986--1990 1991--1995 1991--1995, 61.3% 585.000-735.000

1996--2000 2001--2005

Figure 1: Number and Percentages of Individuals Who Left Their Homes The Hacettepe University’s study reveals the untold facts of the resettlement policy. Although the resettlement authority was granted to the regional governors in 1990, the study found that a majority of the local population, 300,000 to 380,000 (31.6%) individuals left their homes due to security reasons during 1986-1990. These numbers clearly indicate that the resettlement policy was implemented before the decree, a fact that is supported by personal records of the former general Veli Kucuk, a Gendarmerie commander of the Van province in 1987. According to his notes written

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in his personal notebook, on October 2nd of 1987, Lieutenant General Hulusi Sayin, the commander of the Military Corps, ordered him to gather intelligence on the villages that supported the PKK in his jurisdiction and then evacuate them out of his jurisdiction [26]. Many individuals who had been evacuated from their villages applied to the European Human Rights Court. Unjust implementation of the resettlement policy by gendarmerie forces worsened the situation and alienated the local population from the government. For instance, statements of Halitpinar, Oztoprak and other cases of the European Human Rights Court depicted how harshly these military officials implemented the resettlement policy [33]. According to the statements, on October 4 th of 1994, soldiers surrounded the Halitpinar village in Tunceli province, brought all residents together in the village’s open space and ordered them to take necessary belongings with them and leave their village for an indefinite period of time. The village residents were then taken to prefabricated buildings located in Ovacik, another small city. Furthermore, it is claimed that soldiers set their houses and harvests on fire immediately following the evacuation. It is also argued that the resettlement policy was implemented in provinces where residents refused to be village guards because the government perceived refusing to join the village guard system as supporting, either actively or passively, the PKK. Regardless of whether this argument is true or not, it is a fact that implementation of the resettlement policy, no doubt, undermined the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and alienated the public from the government. Neither governments nor terrorist organizations can achieve their goals without public support. Furthermore, unfortunately, this policy did not work and caused other problems. These problems have been studied by individual researchers and non-governmental organizations. For example, a report published in 2004 by the Chamber of Architectures (TMMO) pointed out some of those problems as follows [34]: (1) The resettlement program caused high unemployment rates in a short period of time in the provinces where thousands of individuals immigrated; (2) The resettlement policy increased juvenile crime rates; (3) Fifty-three percent of children of those immigrants did not attend any school; (4) Thousands of people did not have any social security and lacked health services; (5) Infrastructures of those villages and agricultural lands had been destroyed by security forces and therefore could no longer be used; and (6) The resettlement policy changed the social, economic, political and demographic situation of the provinces. Although there might be additional problems that are not mentioned in this paper, the fact remains that the resettlement program had been rapidly implemented as a response without caution or prediction of possible problems. These resettlement programs not only worsened the problem but also spread terrorism to other provinces and metropolitan areas as well. Most of the immigrants moved to the cities where their relatives lived and established communities that could be considered as ghettos. In an attempt to find a job or a house, some have not been left alone but rather have been either contacted with or by members of the PKK. In other words, PKK terrorism found an invaluable opportunity to spread its terrorism to urban areas. In conclusion, similar to other early counter terrorism policies originated from the British insurgency doctrine, the resettlement policy did not work either but rather worsened the terrorism problem by spreading to other provinces, especially in urban and metropolitan areas and alienated the Kurdish population from the government.

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4. Turkey’s New Counter Terrorism Policies (Post-2000): “Cohesive Period” Two cornerstone events influenced Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies that led Turkey to formulate moderate policies against the PKK: (1) the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in 1999 and (2) a new government. 4.1. Capture of the PKK leader The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish Security Forces through a praiseworthy operation in Kenya on February 15th of 1999. Five and one-half months after his capture, on August 2nd of 1999, as a mark of good will, the PKK decided to send its armed terrorist groups out of Turkey, in particular to Qandil Mountain located at the border between Iraq and Iraq. Furthermore, a month after this decision, on September 1st of 1999, the PKK declared a one-sided “ceasefire,” known as the fourth ceasefire [35]. After this decision, the PKK mitigated its terrorism campaign for five years. During this ceasefire period, the PKK reorganized itself and focused on establishing training camps in the Qandil area that later became a stronghold and safe haven. However, on June 1st of 2004, the PKK declared the end of the ceasefire period and once again launched a blood terrorism campaign. 4.2. The New Government The AKP Party, or the Justice and Development Party, came to power with the 2002 parliamentary elections during the ceasefire phase, the taciturnity period of the PKK. In its party manifest, the new government actually signaled its counter terrorism strategy. In the manifesto, the new government clearly stated that the AKP viewed the Kurdish language as a cultural diversity and an asset that reinforced and supported the unity and integrity of Turkey rather than weaken it [36]. Furthermore, the AKP stated that the Party would adopt a rehabilitative, deterrent and protective approach rather than a reaction to terror, and would therefore implement an economic, health, welfare and other necessary policies to promote the life conditions in eastern and southeastern regions where the majority of Kurdish population live. The new government also aimed to make Turkey a member of the EU, thereby changing many policies to make them consisted with the EU laws. 4.3. Post-2000 Period: New Counter Terrorism Policies (Cohesive Period) The new government did not favor early coercive counter terrorism and hence implemented a series of counter terrorism policies. Although these new policies are not direct counter terrorism policies in their nature, they helped to generate a considerable amount of public support for the government. In the literature, these types of policies are known as “winning hearts and minds policies.” The most distinguished feature of Erdogan administration’s policies is that they target the local population rather than terrorists and seek non-military solutions such as health, social welfare, education and others while securing the local population from terrorism. The first effort of the new government is to repeal the state of emergency and regional governorship policy that was previously implemented in two cities. The 2002 parliamentary elections were held on November 3rd, and the new government repealed

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those policies the same month, on November 30th, 2002. This action removed the strict rules implemented in those cities and put pressure on the local population. The government also repealed the resettlement policy. After 2002, not a single village had been evacuated due to security reasons. In 2002 and 2008, the government took further steps to promote cultural diversity, made several legal adjustments and removed the barriers in front of broadcasting written in other languages [37]. Furthermore, in December of 2004, the legislatures passed a law permitting to teach local languages; after January 19th of 2004, many courses began to be taught in the Kurdish language; however, most were closed in a short period of time due to lack of demand. The new government’s comprehensive counter terrorism policies have been identified and described in the “Counter Terrorism Action Plan” by Terorle Mucadele Yuksel Kurulu, Counter Terrorism High Council on December 29th, 2005, and results of the plan were evaluated after two years, in December, 2007. Although the document is classified and is not published in its entirety, some parts have been leaked out. The plan consists of 61 clauses to be implemented in 23 cities located in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. According to the plan, the government adopted a long term, unarmed counter terrorism policy alongside the armed one; however the armed counter measures are subordinate to long term and unarmed policies. The action plan identifies the counter measures in education, health, sports, employment, immigration, religion and other fields [38], and the results are pleasing and give hope for the future. For example, according to report, the government spent one billion dollars for the KOY-DES project, or Supporting Villages Project, to establish a drinking water system in 8,000 villages, build 8,500 kilometers of stabilized roads and to asphalt 13,500 village roads in the regions. Regarding education, in 2007 alone, 24,500 new teachers were assigned, and 292 schools were built in the region. Furthermore, the quota of successful students was increased from 2% to 3% in private teaching institutions offering university preparation courses that enabled 5,500 students to attend these courses at no cost. In the medical field, the number of doctors and other health professionals were redoubled compared to the 2002-2007 periods. In 2007 alone, more than 1,200 medical doctors and 8,100 health professionals were assigned to those regions. Recep Akdag, the Ministry of Health, reported that in Sirnak, a poor city that borders Iraq and Syria, the number of specialist doctors increased by three times compared to 2002. The director of the health department of Sirnak reported that 79 specialist doctors and 135 generalist doctors serve in the province and further stated that the number of individuals per doctor in Sirnak is less than in Istanbul. Regarding economic measures, the government implemented a law to encourage economic investments such as tax reduction, appropriation of land with no cost, exemption from worker’s insurance premiums, among others. In 2007 alone, approximately $3 billion U.S. (3 Billion 217 million 105 thousand 696 YTL) and 11,103 new employment opportunities were projected in those regions through this law. Within the last four months of 2007, 950 cattle and 2,600 calves were donated to needy individuals. The government also implemented policies to compensate those individuals who suffered from terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror. In July 2004, the legislatures passed Law No. 5233 on the “Compensation of Damages that Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terrorism” [39]. According to Ministry of Interior records, between 2004 and July 30th of 2008, 341,429 individuals applied to the government to benefit from the law. Commissions revived the applications and agreed to pay 89,695 of the applicants [40]. Furthermore, a total of $280 million U.S. (390 million YTL) was paid as of 2007 and was decided to pay an extra $270 million U.S.

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(374 million YTL) [38]. In addition to these winning hearts and minds efforts, the government also made adjustments in the criminal justice and diplomacy fields. For example, the government abolished the state security courts that will place suspected terrorists under more restrict criminal procedures. The government also increased cooperation between the EU and U.S. The U.S. supports our troops through providing timely intelligence against the PKK targets. 4.4. Analysis of Elections and Collapse of the Popular Support for the PKK The authors of this paper suggest that this new counter terrorism approach works and generates a considerable amount of public support for the government. How can we evaluate whether those policies worked or not? In our opinion, although there are various suggested criteria to evaluate, support measurements from the local population appear to be the most reasonable. The 2006 U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine stated that “long long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule.” Likewise, Parker (2007) suggested that successful counter terrorism strategies erode popular support for terrorism. Actually, both basically suggest the same concept; the former looks at popular support for the government whereas the latter looks at support for terrorist organizations. Analysis of the elections data could provide essential information regarding the PKK’s popularity among the population. These authors suggest that because the PKK has had a political wing running in elections since 1995, government consent or popular support can be measured through the elections. HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was the first political wing of the PKK and ran for the parliamentary elections in 1995 and 1999. At the national level, HADEP obtained 4.2% in 1995, and 4.7% of all votes [41] (see Figure 2). The Supreme Court of Appeals opened a case against the HADEP on January 29th, 1999, and the Constitutional Court decided to shut down the

VOTE RATE%

VOTE RATES FOR THE POLITICAL WING OF THE PKK AT PARLIMENTARY ELECTIONS 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1990

Series1

1995

2000

2005

YEAR

Figure 2: Parliamentary Elections between 1995 and 2007.

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HADEP in March 2003 [42]. However, the PKK formed a new political party known as DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party) and ran for the 2002 parliamentary elections. The PKK benefited the attempt of the Supreme Court of Appeals and increased its vote rates to 6.2%. In April 2003, the Supreme Court of Appeals prepared a report and sent it to the Constitutional Court to close down the DEHAP. As a result, the DEHAP dissolved itself and transferred all of its resources to the DTP (Democratic Society Party) established in October 2005 by an order from Abdullah Ocalan [43]. It is argued that rather than avoiding to be closed by the Constitutional Court, Ocalan ordered to establish the DTP because DEHAP did not compete enough with the AKP and did not receive a sufficient number of votes from the Kurdish population in municipality elections in 2004 [43]. In Turkey’s parliamentary election system, there is a 10% barrage for political parties, and political parties must pass the 10% barrage in order to gain a seat in the General Assembly. To eliminate this barrier, the PKK used a different tactic in the 2007 parliamentary elections; the DTP candidates ran for the 2007 parliamentary elections as independent candidates. However, this did not change the fate of the DTP. Only 3.8% of the constituents voted for the DTP, which meant a clear defeat by AKP, the government’s party. Both the 2004 municipality elections and 2007 parliamentary elections signaled that the PKK had lost a considerable amount of popular support in 2004 and were still losing support. O’Neill suggested that terrorist organizations typically apply to coercion if other ways of gaining popularity does not work [44]. Consistent with O’Neill, after the elections, PKK launched a more offensive, bloodier and sensational terrorism campaign against governmental targets and some civilians that led Turkey’s incursion into Iraq.

5. Conclusion Gaining public support is the key factor in overwhelming the insurgency type terrorism problem and can be achieved through implementing winning hearts and minds policies. These policies typically include health, education, economic, and social policies and focus on non-military policies. Military and other security measures should be subordinate to non-military solutions. Civilian policy makers should formulate and direct the counter terrorism policies rather than military, intelligence or other bureaucrats. Military, police, intelligence and other relevant participants of the counter terrorism plan should be viewed as separate but concordant components of an orchestra whose maestro is an elected politician. However, the local population usually does not support the government unless they are secured and protected from terrorists. Therefore, without providing proper security to the local population, winning hearts and minds policies do not work and do not yield desirable results. In conclusion, the success in eroding public support for the PKK lies in repealing early coercive counter terrorism policies and implementing “winning hearts and minds policies” that offer non-military problem solutions for PKK terrorism and include social, education, health, and economic policies. Implementing these types of winning hearts and minds policies is, by far, the best long term strategy to defeat PKK terrorism and erode its popular support.

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[27] H.Cartner, Köy Korucu Sisteminin Kaldırılması, Köy Korucularının Katıldıkları Suistimallerin Soruşturulması Ve Sorumlu Tutulmalarının Garanti Altına Alınması. [Online] Available from: URL: http://hrw.org/turkish/docs/2006/06/08/turkey13579.htm [2006, June 8] [28] 21Yılda5BinKöy Korucusu Suça Karışmış. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.radikal.com.tr [2006, July 27] [29] U.Ozdag,Koy Koruculari. [Online]Availablefrom:URL: http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazar.asp?a=2500, 10,29 [2005, August 28] [30] M.A.Sahin, Report to the Turkish Parliament.[Online] Available from: URL: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr [2008, February 18] [31] B.Atalay,Reply to an Interpellation.[Online] Available from: URL: http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/73927c.pdf [2008, July 14] [32] TurkeyMigrationandInternallyDisplacedPopulationSurveyoftheHacettepeUniversity InstituteofPopulationStudies.[Online] Available from:URL: http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tgyona/basin.pdf [2006, December 6] [33] Ovacik-Halitpinar - Öztoprak ve Digerleri, Başvuru No. 33247/96. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.dersimsite.org/oztoprak.htm [2006, February 2] [34] Tmmob İnsan Hakları Komisyonu Zorunlu Göç Raporu. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.mimarlarodasi.org.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=Belge&Sub=detail&RecID=61 [2004, April 8] [35] 5.Ateskese Nasil Gelindi? [Online] Available from: URL: http://rojaciwan.com/modules.php ?name=Sections&op =viewarticle&artid=65 [2008, October 11] [36] Secim Beyannamesi. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname.asp [2008, September 11] [37] İşte İlk Kürtçe Yerel Televizyon. [Online] Available from: URL http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/04/11/pazar/yazdundar.html [2006, April 11] [38] Ekonomik ve sosyal paket Doğu'da yaraları sarıyor. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.turkishmedia.com/forum/lofiversion/index.php/t111372.html [2007, December 13] [39] National and Regional Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement: Turkey. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/Laws-and-Policies/turkey.aspx [40] 90 Bin Kişiye Terör Tazminatı. [Online] Available from: URL:http://www.maksimum.com /haberler/ h/90_bin_kisiye_teror_tazminati.php [2008, September 22] [41] Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçlari Veri Tabani. [Online] Available from: URL: http://tuikrapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/ rwservlet?secimdb2=&report=tablo1. RDF&p_il=0&p_s1= 1&p_s2=2&p_s3=3&p_s4=4&p_s5=5&p_s6=6&p_s7=7&p_s8=8&p_s9=9&p_s10=61&p_s11 =62&p_s12=63&p_kod=2&desformat=html&ENVID=secimEnv [2007, August] [42] E.Bal, HADEP Kapatildi DEHAP’a Dava. [Online] Available from: URL: http://www.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2003/03/14/politika/politika1.html [2003, March 14] [43] M.Gundem, Ümit Fırat: Öcalan İmralı'da telefonla konuşuyor. [Online] Available from: URL: http://yenisafak.com.tr/Roportaj/?t=05.05.2008&i=67622 [2008, May 5] [44] B.E.O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Dulles;VA: Brassey’s Inc; 2000.

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Fighting Against Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan: Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement Approach Farhod YULDASHEV, Fatih DEMIROZ and Igor VOLKOV University of Central Florida

Abstract. The evil of terrorism has manifested itself in both large and small scale events in Kyrgyzstan. In fighting against terrorism, Kyrgyzstan has developed policy reforms to increase the state capacity and technical base with the help of international assistance and cooperation. However, the involvement of community groups and citizens has largely been overlooked. This paper uses collaborative public management and new governance perspectives to argue that establishing mechanisms of collaborative partnerships and citizen participation in solving societal problems that breed terrorism will help the Kyrgyz government increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of government agencies in preventing terrorism by virtue of distinctive local capabilities and resources that communities and citizens provide. Keywords. collaborative public management, governance, citizen involvement, religious extremism, terrorism.

Introduction As the five Central Asian countries gained their independence from the Soviet rule and began consolidating their statehood, various groups both within and without the region emerged with the goal of ruling the region in different ways. Some of these groups chose to use violence and terror to reach their goals. In the Kyrgyz Republic, this kind of terrorism manifested itself in 1999 and 2000 when armed groups of the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist organization which aims to establish Islamic rule in Central Asia, entered twice into the territories of Kyrgyzstan, taking hostages—including both tourists and villagers [1]. These terrorist events created a state of war in Kyrgyzstan and produced profound fear into the lives of Kyrgyz citizens. In contrast to these major terrorist events, there have been various acts of terrorism on a smaller scale in the south of the country, where the root of the problem is believed to lie. During 2005 and 2006, some police officers and a local religious leader were killed, resulting in deep anxiety and fear in the country. Various analysts and scholars studying the region have identified terrorism as stemming from religious extremism in the Fergana valley, a part of which is located within Kyrgyz borders [2, 3, 4]. In that region, drug smuggling has also been an important source of finance for terrorism [5]. In the aftermath of these terrorist events, Kyrgyzstan has passed major legislations and enacted policy changes concerning anti-terrorist activities both at the domestic and international level operations. Reform policy in law enforcement and other critical

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areas has been implemented with the help of foreign governments and international organizations assisting in capacity building and technical support [6, 7, 8]. Numerous international treaties have been signed to jointly fight against the evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism – all of which feed one another [9]. However, although there has been legislation for public-private partnerships to increase the effectiveness of Kyrgyz anti-terrorism activities, community and citizen involvement and the benefits of cross-sector partnerships have not yet been fully utilized. It is therefore the aim of this paper to address the issue of collaborative partnerships and a citizen involvement approach in increasing the community capacity and resilience in preventing the acts of terrorism by focusing on the roots of the terrorism problem. By using the governance theory perspective from the public administration discipline, this paper analyzes the ways in which effective collaboration of public servants with community organizations and citizens in law enforcement, education, religion, and other sectors could help improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Kyrgyz government and make the society more peaceful and just.

1. Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement This study uses collaborative public management and governance theories in addressing the issue of community involvement in fighting against terrorism in Kyrgyzstan. The concept of collaborative public management is defined as a process of managing multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems which are difficult to be resolved by an individual organization [10]. A broader concept of governance emphasizes both the mechanisms of multi-organizational collaboration and governing agreements “where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” [11]. Taken together, collaborative public management and governance concepts contribute to our discussion of community and citizen involvement in governing contemporary societies. The challenges of coordination across various units and levels of government as well as difficulties in incorporating the input of communities and neighborhoods result in the adoption of network mechanisms and public-private partnership arrangements. While traditional public management works under the centralized hierarchies and distinct units and levels of government, the governance approach turns the attention from hierarchic agencies to organizational networks and emphasizes collaboration instead of tension amongst government agencies and private, nonprofit, and community/citizen groups. This way government agencies gain important partners and become more flexible by including valuable input from communities and citizens. In collaborative mechanisms, however, the issue of accountability must be carefully designed and addressed in order to avoid future problems [12]. According to the scholars of the field, the terrible, complex problems of today’s societies can no longer be solved by individual organizations, no matter in which political jurisdiction or functional sector they operate. Going beyond organizational, sectoral, and jurisdictional boundaries and engaging in effective collaboration and partnerships are imperative directions for solving those complex problems [13, 14]. In addition, the allocation of resources and the exchange of information among multiple

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actors from public, private, and nonprofit organizations as well as communities are necessary to solve profound societal problems [15]. Along with inter-organizational collaboration and networking, the involvement of citizens and communities is crucial in governing contemporary societies. Citizen participation results in the creation and implementation of better policies and programs aimed at solving complicated problems [16]. Communities and citizens possess local knowledge and grounded experience that can be effectively utilized in preventing terrorism and other illegal acts by actively sharing intelligence and information within a collaborative framework [17]. Community partnerships and public involvement also have significant impact upon the legitimacy and efficiency of government policies and institutions. The more inclusive the governance system is, the better the citizen perception of social justice becomes [18]. If, on the contrary, public policy and actions exclude citizens or certain groups of citizens, then government programs and institutions become isolated and estranged from the public; the citizens do not support their government and seek other ways of reaching social justice. And even if public policies and services are legitimate and just, their delivery may not be efficient. Community and citizen involvement contributes distinct capabilities and resources as well as innovative ways of solving problems, thereby increasing the effectiveness of public organizations and programs [18]. Community and citizen involvement is also important in that it informs and educates the public about important policy issues. Moreover, it provides the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problems, alternatives, and solutions. Public feedback on important policy decisions is useful as it adds local knowledge and experience to technical wisdom and expertise, resulting in policy and program innovation [16]. Citizen participation in policy formulation and decision making can reduce conflict. By including the perspectives of community members, who will be impacted by the policy outcome, in governance processes, policy consensus is reached around politically reasonable outcomes and forms the framework for successful implementation. An important factor in reducing conflict is increasing trust among the parties; without trust, it can be extremely difficult and costly to accomplish tasks [18]. Moreover, people need ‘spaces of appearance’ [21] in order to reflect their needs and feelings about the current situation. This approach gives them an opportunity to act as public persona and provide input for the resolution of societal problems [22]. Community and citizen involvement improves the quality of public life by restoring the trust and engagement of citizens. Citizen participation cultivates mutual understanding, builds bonds of trust among citizens, decision makers, and governing institutions, and can effect changes in political attitudes and behavior. This social capital rationale suggests that deliberation can re-engage citizens in the political life of the nation by giving them a real stake in outcomes and, as a result, reverse long-term declines in political and civic engagement [19]. Especially regarding occurrences of terrorism, the role of communities and citizens becomes more vital and visible as government agencies cannot individually overcome those crisis situations. In the form of voluntary participation, donations, and information exchange, communities and citizens are actively involved in response and recovery efforts in the aftermath of terrorist incidents. But what is more important is that terrorist events are better be prevented from occurring by means of active

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mitigation and preparedness at the community and individual levels as well as voluntary training, planning, and exercises [20].

2. Community and Citizen Input in Preventing Terrorism Kyrgyzstan has experienced both major and minor acts of terrorism throughout the last decade: as mentioned earlier, in 1999 and 2000, armed members of the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan attacked on Kyrgyz territory, holding hostage several villages and groups of tourists in the mountains bordering Tajikistan [1]. In 2005 and 2006, acts of terrorism cost the lives of police officers and a religious leader [4]. These events have left deep impact on the lives of Kyrgyz citizens. The roots of terrorism emanate from deeply ingrained social, political, and economic problems in the country, particularly in its southern area. The southern region of Kyrgyzstan is home to various religious ideologies. It is also a place where people live below the poverty line and without education. Many analysts and scholars in the region have reasonably argued that the lack of education and identity crisis have led to the recruitment of the local population by extremist religious and terrorist organizations [2, 4]. Moreover, the estrangement of the government agencies from the public and the state repression and subjugation of citizens have prompted people to identify themselves with extremist religious organizations and pursue alternative and oftentimes violent ways of seeking justice and establishing social order in the region [3]. With the new initiative of the Kyrgyz government, there have been major legislation and policy changes in the fight against terrorism. These changes included inter-agency collaboration and the coordination of various state agencies both at the organizational and operational levels. The Kyrgyz Parliament has granted the President the authority to coordinate the activities of the Ministries of Justice, Internal Affairs, and others in improving the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. Police reform has also been initiated and implemented, but with less success [6]. At the international level, the Kyrgyz Parliament has ratified various treaties with regional security organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization as well as partnership agreements with the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to conduct joint exercises and to cooperate in the fight against cross-border activities of extremism, separatism, terrorism, human trafficking, and drug smuggling [6, 7, 8, 9]. With the assistance of major countries such as the United States, Russia, China and member nations of the European Union, the Kyrgyz State capacity and technical/logistic bases have improved and became more capable to fight against the evils of terrorism. International governmental organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others have assisted Kyrgyzstan in reforming its state institutions and increasing its technical and organizational capacity [8, 9, 10]. However, in addition to these policies and reforms, intended to have immediate impact, the Kyrgyz government should also focus on the long term by solving the deeprooted problems lying behind the acts of terrorism. In addition to its global efforts, the Kyrgyz government needs to establish and coordinate local efforts to solve the fundamental problems of poverty, lack of education, exclusion of citizens from public policy making processes, estrangement from ethnic and religious diversity, and similar issues in order to prevent terrorism and establish peaceful, resilient communities. To do

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so, the government needs to establish flexible networks and negotiation structures beyond the state hierarchies and lead the creation of collaborative mechanisms in which community and citizens have a say and input in the designation and implementation of the policies and programs to prevent terrorism. Furthermore, since terrorism is highly dependent on people and their support, it is imperative to include public participation in the process. Many leaders emphasize the importance of the inclusion of stakeholders that share interest [23] in the outcomes. Citizens and communities can collaborate with law enforcement officials in protecting their own communities by providing important local knowledge and experience [18]. For example, citizens could give information about the suspicious groups of people organizing certain covert and illegal events and activities in their neighborhood. As drug and human trade are both important sources of finance for terrorism, citizens could help the police to identify suspicious people cultivating, refining, or selling drugs and trafficking in humans. Both an individual and community sense of responsibility is important in preventing terrorism. Parallel to this, a mobilized effort is needed to educate the public on the concept of being able to make a difference through responsibility. The fact that individual efforts could potentially lead to a collective effort to deal with such problems is a major point in collaboration. For example, the Cold War and the methods employed in the former USSR and the US, illustrates how state initiatives can be used to reach out to public to aid in fighting societal problems. The main idea of those propaganda techniques is that the public and especially individuals are the ones that can help their countries directly, even if it is as little as providing an inkling of suspicion to law enforcement agencies. For, it should be remembered that terrorist organizations heavily depend on the direct support of the public. In order to increase citizen input in fighting against those involved in illegal activities (which is usually extremely dangerous for individuals and their families who may undeservedly incur forms of retaliation), the public needs to have a sense of safety. Other efforts for local law enforcement to take responsibility for situations and provide additional protection are vital especially for those individuals who share sensitive information and request protective support. Many community law enforcement agencies in the United States, for example, make an effort to overcome the “us and them” attitude, in which the public perceives the police as not being able to understand that individuals take risks by talking to them about illegal activities. On the other hand, without citizen participation, state agencies lose their legitimacy and efficiency and fail to provide social justice [18]. Further, when the state represses ethnic and religious diversity and subjugates citizens, it isolates itself from the source of its power. Because diverse groups of people reside in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan who are oppressed and subjugated by the state and excluded from political participation, those groups have started to identify themselves with extremist groups who provide answers to their questions of identitiy crisis and persuade them to fight for a regime change in which social justice will be established by alternative systems, for example the Islamic rule of Sharia [3]. Outside powers that have interest in destabilizing the country take advantage of the chance to finance those groups who are excluded by their state. Therefore, the Kyrgyz government should establish collaborative mechanisms to include communities and citizens in public policy making processes, which would lead to better efficiency and legitimacy and less corruption as the public will hold the government agencies accountable for their actions and directly raise their concerns and shape the decisions.

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Citizen participation and collaborative partnerships among state agencies and schools, mosques, imams, local liquor stores, councils of the elderly, and other traditional neighborhood institutions will contribute to better policies and programs targeted at digging out the roots of terrorism in Kyrgyzstan. This approach will also help establish and increase the capacity of resilient and peaceful communities.

3. Conclusion In addition to enacting reforms to improve institutional capacity and the technical base of state agencies and new policies to cooperate with international organizations and foreign nations, the Kyrgyz government has to consider reforming coordination mechanisms at the local level and including community and citizen efforts in alleviating the problems breeding terrorism in Kyrgyzstan. Under the approach of collaborative public management and governance theories, collaborative partnerships and citizen involvement mechanisms can help government initiatives to curb corruption and increase the legitimacy and efficiency of state agencies in fighting against terrorism, religious extremism, drug smuggling, poverty and lack of proper education. The introduction of community partnerships and citizen involvement mechanisms into the overall picture of the counter-terrorism policy will help the Kyrgyz government to consider multiple sides of the problem and designate a viable “all-out approach” to fight against terrorism.

References [1] D. Passon, A. Temirkulov, Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan. Analysis Research Consulting. 2004. http://www.arc-berlin.com/pdf/Kyrgyzstan.pdf [2008, September 23] [2] F. Hill, Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. The Brookings Institution, 2003. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/testimonies/2003/0723asia_hill/20030723.pdf [2008, September 23] [3] M. Y. Omelicheva, Ethnic Dimension of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 28 February – 3 March, 2007. http://www.hsrgroup.org/images/stories/Documents/ISA2007/isa07_proceeding_178916.pdf [2008, September 23] [4] I. Rotar. The Islamist Underground in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Terrorism Monitor, 4/23 (2006). The Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370225 [2008, September 23] [5] S. E. Cornell, N. L. P. Swanstrom, The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security. Problems of Post-Communism,53/4(2006),10-28. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2006/0608Eurasiandrugtrade.pdf[2008, September 23] [6] International Crisis Group, Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform. ICG Asia Report No. 42. 2002. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1444 [2008, September 23] [7] United Nations Development Program, Countering Terrorism Financing and Illicit Money Laundering. 2002. http://www.undp.kg/index.php?option=com_resource&controller=article&article=437&Itemid=30&la ng=ru [2008, September 23] [8] United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2007. http://www.un.org.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Itemid=27 [2008, September 23]

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[9] ChinaDaily,ChinaHailsKyrgyzstan’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts. 2006. http://www.chinadaily.net/china/2006-08/03/content_656378.htm [2008, September 23] [10] R. Agranoff, M. McGuire, Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 2003. [11] C. Ansell, A. Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26/3 (2007), 300-314. [12] L. Salamon, Training Professional Citizens: Getting Beyond the Right Answer to the Wrong Question in Public Affairs Education. National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. Indianapolis: Center for Civil Society Studies. 2004. 1-21. [13] B. Hudson, B. Hardy, M. Henwood, G. Wistow, In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration in the Public Sector: What is the Contribution of Theory and Research? Public Management: International Journal of Research and Theory, 1/2 (1999), 235-260. [14] D. F. Kettl, Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration Imperative, Public Administration Review, 66 (2006), 10-19. [15] D. Henton, J. Melville, T. Amsler, M. Kopell, Collaborative Governance: A Guide for Grant makers. Menlo Park, CA: William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. 2008. [16] T. L. Cooper, The Emergence of Administrative Ethics as a Field of Study in the United States. In Handbook of Administrative Ethics, edited by Terry L. Cooper, New York: Marcel Dekker. 2001. 1-36. [17] R. L. Kemp, Homeland Security: Best Practices for Local Government. Washington DC: ICMA Press. 2003. [18] A. Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. Public Administration Review, 66 (2006), 66-75. [19] C. J. Lukensmeyer, L. H. Torres, Public Deliberation: A Manager’s Guide to Public Deliberation. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. 2006. [20] N. Kapucu, Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in Dynamic Contexts. Public Administration: An International Quarterly. Volume 84/1 (2006), 205-220. [21] H. Arendt, 1958, p.199 as cited in R. Maltese, Three Philosophical Pillars That Support Collaborative Learning. The English Journal 80/5 (1991), 20-23. [22] R. Maltese, Three Philosophical Pillars That Support Collaborative Learning. The English Journal 80/5 (1991), 20-23. [23] D. Himberger, D. Sulek, S. Krill Jr, When There Is No Cavalry. 2007. Retrieved March 13, 2008, from Strategy+Business: http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/sb48_07309.pdf

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‘Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism’: The Importance of Counter-Ideology as Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism Richard WARNES RAND Europe &University of Surrey1

Abstract. As the ideological motivation of terrorism has increasingly shifted towards religious extremism, particularly in its violent jihadist form, so the threat it poses to society has increased, with networks of independent cells willing to use indiscriminate ‘catastrophic’ multiple mass casualty suicide attacks. While traditional counter-terrorist measures have mitigated this threat, because of its mutation into a global ideological movement, such ‘new’ terrorism has regenerated through radicalization. Consequently it is increasingly necessary to incorporate and utilize counter-ideology as part of the wider counter-terrorist strategy. As the radicalization of individuals occurs at a community level, the use of counterideology by the authorities will rely on the support of the wider community and assistance of key individuals within it, to ‘re-imagine counter-terrorism’. Keywords. terrorism, ideology, radicalization, counter-terrorism, counter-ideology

Introduction At the beginning of this century, it could well be argued that ‘terrorism’ [1], particularly when it forms part of a wider insurgency, is one of the greatest threats currently facing modern societies [2]. Following the end of the ‘Cold War’ at the start of the 1990s, far from a period of greater stability, the world has been faced with a proliferation of new transnational ‘asymmetric threats’ to international security, including terrorism [3]. Though the use of terror tactics in warfare and as a form of state repression date back centuries [4], and while the advent of modern international terrorism occurred in the late 1960s [5], it is argued that currently the threat it poses has substantially increased, as evidenced by such attacks as 9/11 [6], the Istanbul bombings of November 2003 [7], the Madrid rail bombings of 3/11 [8] and the 7/7 London bombings [9]. These reflect a shift in terrorism from predominantly hierarchically structured politically and nationalistically motivated groups, often referred to as ‘Old’ terrorism, to now include independent global networks of religiously motivated cells [10] in so called ‘New’ terrorism [11, 12], often utilizing multiple mass casualty suicide attacks [13, 14] and potentially in extremis, threatening the use of CBRN weaponry in an ultimate act of ‘technological terrorism’ [15]. The key question for modern authorities, and equally importantly local communities, is ‘how best to counter such a significant potential threat’? Perhaps one of the solutions is to begin to ‘re1

Kindly supported by Fellowships from Bramshill National Police Staff College and the Airey Neave Trust.

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imagine counter-terrorism’ [16] by incorporating counter-ideology as part of a wider holistic counter-terrorist strategy.

1. Counter-Terrorist Responses Traditionally, responses and interventions utilized to counter-terrorism have fallen into two main groupings. The first are the more reactive and defensive ‘anti-terrorist measures’ such as physical, operational and personnel security, often referred to as ‘target hardening’ [17], the use of defensive technology [18] and legislation [19, 20], providing the authority for the introduction of preventative measures, the powers of investigation when a terrorist incident has occurred, and the means to prosecute and punish those responsible for such acts. Secondly, there are the more proactive and offensive ‘counter-terrorist measures’, such as the gathering, processing and dissemination of intelligence [21,22,23] and its critical use in ‘intelligence led’ policing [24,25] and military [26, 27] operational responses. Within liberal democracies, these various interventions have generally been seen as operating along two main theoretical models of response, which reflect the crimewarfare dichotomy of terrorism. Firstly, the ‘Criminal Justice Model’ which views terrorism as a politically motivated form of crime, responds to the threat through law enforcement, legislation and the criminal justice system, provides police primacy and prioritizes the protection of democratic principles and the maintenance of the rule of law. Secondly, the ‘War Model’, which views terrorism as a form of low intensity asymmetric warfare, places the onus of primacy on the military, responds more robustly through the use of intelligence and military methods, and prioritizes the control of terrorism and the rules of war over the maintenance of democratic rights [28]. In reality, while most liberal democracies have predicated their responses to terrorism on the ‘Criminal Justice’ approach, they have utilized military measures as and when they have become necessary, in ‘Military Aid to the Civil Power’ (MACP) roles [29]. It has therefore been advocated by various authors that as terrorism contains elements of both ‘crime’ and ‘warfare’ [30], and as the nature of the threat is continually changing, so all responses should be considered, as long as they are grounded in the rule of law [31]. Consequently, other models have emerged, which more closely resemble this situation of utilizing both criminal justice and military responses as necessary.

2. Changing Nature of the Terrorist Threat While all these responses, and the theoretical models underpinning them, are critical in minimizing, controlling and preventing terrorist threats, they originally emerged to counter more traditional forms of terrorism prior to the watershed events of 9/11 and the emergence of the al Qaeda network and its affiliate organizations. As has been stated, it is argued that the threat posed by terrorism at the start of 21st Century has increased significantly due to a growing shift in the ideological motivation behind a number of currently active terrorist groups away from the more coercive political or nationalist positions, towards potentially catastrophic terrorism driven by religious extremism [32,33]. As one author states, “in 1980 the US State Department roster of

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international terrorist groups listed scarcely a single religious organization. In 1998 US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, listed thirty of the world’s most dangerous groups; over half were religious” [34] . It is suggested that such religiously motivated terrorism poses a greater threat than its more secular political and nationalist equivalents for several reasons.

2.1. ‘Coercive’ vs. ‘Catastrophic’ Many political or nationalist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) [35,36] and Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA - Basque Fatherland and Freedom) [37], have some restraining concerns, often related to their community support base, and are conscious of negative publicity [38]. Consequently, they tend to have more of an emphasis on making statements and gaining publicity through their attacks, in order to achieve longer term political objectives, rather than necessarily seeking to inflict the maximum number of casualties. Generally, though with the notable exceptions of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK – Kurdistan Workers Party) [39] and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) [40], this can be seen in examples of political and nationalist groups deliberate targeting of selected individuals, bomb attacks against buildings at night or at weekends and telephone warnings prior to bomb attacks in public areas [41]. By comparison, religious extremist individuals or groups have tended to launch large scale, multiple, often suicide, attacks with no warning, in an attempt to inflict the maximum number of indiscriminate casualties [42]. In that sense, while the more traditional political and nationalist groups have generally tended to be more ‘coercive’, modern, religiously motivated terrorism has been ‘catastrophic’ in its nature. 2.2. Tangible Goals vs. Intangible Objectives Political or nationalist groups tend to have more tangible temporal goals, such as an independent Palestinian or Basque homeland, or a united Ireland, which allow some, albeit often limited, interface and dialogue with the authorities [43, 44]. Religious groups on the other hand, often have a set of intangible theological, spiritual or eschatological objectives, based on a different ‘worldview’, sometimes seeking to remove or destroy existing society, rather than obtain political or other concessions from it. Consequently, as well as limiting the possibility for dialogue or negotiation with the authorities, this provides little or no opportunity for common interaction within the wider community, leading many of these groups to become isolated, introverted and intolerant [45]. 2.3. Geographical Localization vs. Global Networking Although political and nationalist groups are typically geographically localized, by the very nature of their campaigns, such as the PIRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque region of Northern Spain and the PKK in the Kurdish areas of South East Anatolia and Northern Iraq, religious extremism tends to present a far more nebulous global phenomenon [46, 47], much harder to pin down and isolate. This in turn means that while many political and nationalist groups are domestic in nature, presenting an internal threat, some religious groups such as Hezbollah [48, 49] and the al Qaeda

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network [50, 51] have developed truly global networks presenting an increased joint internal and external level of threat. 2.4. Blurring of Traditional Conflict Boundaries Due to the globalization of such groups, there has been a blurring and breaking down of traditional boundaries: international versus domestic, external versus internal and overseas versus home-grown threats. Consequently the ‘battlefields’ of this conflict are now not only seen in the form of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya, but on the streets of major cities such as New York, Washington, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Madrid, Moscow and London. Likewise, the targets on this new ‘battlefield’ are not only the politicians and military, but ordinary members of the public going about their daily lives. Indeed some have argued that in such a type of conflict, as “targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture” [52], these groups will try to attack the very cohesion and morale of society itself, as demonstrated by the longer term impact of the Madrid bombings in 2004. 2.5. Undermining of Traditional Deterrent Defenses Finally, religiously motivated terrorism may effectively undermine many traditional defenses, both physical and legal, most of which are based around the deterrent threat of capture, imprisonment, injury or death. Whereas political or nationalist groups may be deterred, or will seek a softer target, such defenses may not deter a religious suicide bomber, who not only has no fear of injury or death, but actively seeks it in martyrdom [53, 54]. As one author states, “the problem of holy warriors – religious zealots in direct contact with the truth- is that rationality is no barrier to action for them” [55].

3. Radicalization A critical factor in the emergence and expansion of such religiously motivated terrorism over the last few years has been the radicalization of both individuals and groups [56], leading to increasing international concerns regarding both those violently radicalized individuals motivated to commit such attacks and those individuals within the wider society vulnerable to such indoctrination and radicalization. Whilst it is acknowledged that violent radicalization can, and has historically been manifest as a key factor in the motivation of various extremist political, nationalistic, ideological and racist acts of violence, such as those committed by the PIRA in the United Kingdom (UK), ETA in Spain and the PKK in Turkey, since the events of 11 September ,2001 and the many ‘Islamist’ terrorist attacks which have followed, much of the focus has been on the impact of the violent jihadist form of radicalization within Muslim communities. This is particularly the case amongst young Muslim males, in the European context often second and third generation youths from minority immigrant families, who might adopt such beliefs and attitudes in response to perceived challenges and discrimination against themselves or their community, and may seek to mobilize wider Muslim support for their version of a ‘true’ Islamic society [57]. Whilst there are numerous causal factors in the growth of violent radicalization which vary widely between individuals within different communities and countries, a

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number of key factors have been identified as either significant catalysts or facilitators in this process. As has been alluded to, perhaps one of the most significant of these is the impact on the individual of perceptions of discrimination and exclusion as part of a minority group, leading to feelings of alienation from the wider society. These emotions and feelings of exclusion can result in a concomitant desire to ‘belong’ to an exclusive group or movement, leaving the individual open to exploitation. As has been seen, such individuals are vulnerable to the powerful ideas and inflammatory rhetoric of charismatic leaders in positions of influence, particularly when away from the usual social support of family and friends. Hence the process of individual radicalization is often associated with social ‘hotspots’ where contact with such charismatic leaders and likeminded groups of individuals can occur. Examples have included societies at schools and universities, outward bound and adventure sports groups, mosques, religious centers and other places of worship, radical bookshops and community centers and prisons or young offender institutes. Such ‘radicalization’ has been defined as “the process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal, into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme” [58], while an official Dutch report describes radicalism as the active pursuit of, and or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to the continued existence of the democratic legal order, and which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order [59]. This ‘radicalization’ in its violent jihadist form has clearly been facilitated and encouraged by extremist organizations [60], the powerful ideas and inflammatory rhetoric of charismatic ‘religious’ leaders [61, 62], and the use of the internet, which has effectively expanded the capacity for such radicalization by creating a ‘virtual’ network of likeminded individuals, ‘radical preachers’ and web sites which mirror the perceived injustices and inequalities felt by the individual [63]. While the majority of those so radicalized may well not embark on actual acts of violence, the increasing growth of a large number of individuals who oppose the basic principles of dialogue, toleration and respect upon which most democratic societies are based provides a major security concern. This radicalization of a ‘pool’ of alienated and ‘excluded’ individuals may provide a ‘stepping stone’ to the recruitment of such individuals into a terrorist conspiracy and their use of extreme violence.

4. Counter-Ideology Although the utilization of the previously mentioned traditional legal, intelligence, policing and military responses by the authorities have reduced the effectiveness of the core group of al Qaeda and its violent jihadist affiliates since 2001, the organization’s evolution into a global ideological movement means that in the longer term the network will continue to regenerate through the process of radicalization. Thus, not only does the threat remain, but for the various reasons highlighted, it may well increase and proliferate [64]. Consequently, as the al Qaeda network has evolved into an ideological movement, so there will be an increasing need to counter it ideologically by incorporating counter-ideology into a wider holistic counter-terrorist strategy. While the traditional counter-terrorist responses have, by their very nature, been coordinated

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by the authorities, as radicalization tends to occur at a ‘grass roots’ level, effective counter-ideology will rely increasingly on the support of the wider community, particularly the religious, political and cultural leaders within it. This in turn will require a ‘re-imagination’ of the traditional structure and control of counter-terrorism. At the same time, the families of those arrested for terrorist offences and ‘reformed’ former terrorists must also be considered in terms of both their integration/reintegration into the wider community and their membership as part of that community. Failure on the part of the authorities to support such individuals may lead to their return to violent jihadism, or the radicalization of family members. Consequently, a number of examples exist internationally in various differing societies; geographically, culturally and religiously, where the authorities have interfaced or collaborated with the wider community and critical individuals within it, to counter the violent jihadist ideology inculcated through radicalization: 4.1. The United Kingdom Following the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, the UK Government conducted a review of its long term strategy for counter-terrorism, under the auspices of the Counter Terrorism Strategy Team of the Cabinet Office led by Denis Keefe. The findings of this study were approved by the Prime Minister in April 2003 [65], as part of the wider UK ‘National Security Strategy’ [66] and developed into a long-term plan for countering the threat posed by terrorism. This was in the form of the ‘National Counter Terrorism Strategy’, often referred to as ‘CONTEST’, a cross-government counter-terrorism strategy comprising both open and classified elements, based around four main work streams, each with a specific objective: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Of these four streams, the Prevent strand “is concerned with tackling the radicalization of individuals” through several means. Firstly, “tackling disadvantage and supporting reform by addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalization, such as inequalities and discrimination.” Secondly, “deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalizing others can operate.” Finally, “engaging in the battle of ideas by challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so” [67]. One practical example is the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder fund (PVE), a flagship program within the Prevent strand which will be given 45 Million Pounds Sterling over the next three years. However, concerns have been raised that some of those members of the Muslim community involved, though non-violent, espouse extremist beliefs, while at the same time there are worries the program might stigmatize members of the community [68]. Due to the crossgovernment nature of its strands and their associated initiatives the responsibility of implementing the CONTEST strategy falls across a number of organizations. These range from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) [69], the Home Office [70], the Intelligence Services [71], the various emergency services [72], local government and various other organizations in both the public and private sectors. At the policing level, while UK strategies focus on national security, one author argues that to assume that the ‘paramilitary response’ based model is best suited to achieve this is a miscalculation. Rather, he suggests that “using the principles of community policing is a much more sensible and effective way of dealing with terrorism….it has been accepted that police cannot fight crime alone and must rely on

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the community…the same principle applies to terrorism” [73]. Another author differentiates between two types of terrorist attack, symbolic crimes against iconic cultural or social symbols, and signal crimes which tend to cause mass casualties, signaling vulnerability in routine settings. He suggests that a means of policing such ‘uncertainty’ is to “better integrate a system of local neighborhood policing into the counter-terrorism apparatus” allowing the building of “inter-personal trust with members of Muslim and other minority communities upon which the communication of intelligence is often contingent” and points out that such ‘soft power’ models “may be more effective and ultimately less damaging to democratic traditions than extending covert policing methods and… reactionary legislative reform” [74]. In a more recent report, the same author states that neighborhood policing orientated to community reassurance can impact on radicalization in two significant ways, firstly: By using a citizen-focused problem solving approach to target key signal events, local policing teams can enhance the security and reassurance, experienced and perceived in Muslim communities. By visibly countering sources of insecurity at a local level they can perform a ‘Hearts and Minds’ role that over a series of iterations should improve levels of trust and confidence in the police. [Secondly,] in so doing, part of the aim is to improve the community intelligence assets available to the police. The so-called ‘eyes and ears’ strategy [75]. 4.2. The Netherlands Within the Netherlands, the threat posed to Dutch society by violent jihadist extremism was fully confirmed by the brutal murder of the Dutch film maker, Theo Van Gogh, in Amsterdam on November 2nd, 2004 [76]. Consequently amongst other measures [77], the Dutch authorities have introduced a wide ranging strategy aimed at countering both radicalization and polarization in Dutch society, which it defines as “the sharpening of differences between groups in society which can result in tensions between these groups and an increase in segregation along ethnic and religious lines” [78]. This strategy involves a number of initiatives in several areas, all reliant on close cooperation between the authorities and local communities, with primacy in the hands of the local administration. The three key initiatives as outlined by the Policy Advisor to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) are [79]: Firstly, promoting the integration of Muslims into the wider Dutch society by including such measures as “considering specific identity problems of Muslim youths in Western surroundings, introducing anti-discrimination measures and encouraging social and political participation.” Secondly, heightening resistance amongst the Muslim population to radicalization through actively supporting “Islamic initiatives against radicalism,” such as, disseminating “more diverse information about moderate versions of Islam via intermediary institutions.” Finally, “acknowledging, isolating and curtailing radicalization processes among groups or individuals.” To that end, the Dutch authorities have introduced a five year ‘Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan’, which through ‘Prevention, Pro-Action and Repression’ seeks the prevention of (further) processes of isolation, polarizations and radicalization by the (re-) exclusion of people who are at risk of slipping away or turning away from Dutch society and the democratic legal order…the early signaling of these processes by

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administrators and professionals and the development of an adequate approach… the exclusion of people who have crossed clear boundaries and seeing to it that their influence on others is limited as much as possible [80]. Interestingly, as well as seeking to counter violent jihadist radicalization, the Dutch plan is equally aimed at right-wing extremist radicalization amongst those bitter at a ‘multicultural’ society, which they view as the cause of unemployment or housing shortages. While prime responsibility for the Dutch ‘Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan’ falls on the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), its local implementation is in the hands of the various Dutch municipalities. However, like the UK’s CONTEST model, because of the breadth of initiatives, areas and interventions covered, a number of cabinet members are involved in the plan: the Minister of the Interior (BZK), Justice, Living Environment, Neighborhoods and Integration (WWI), Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), Public Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS), Youth and Family, Education, Culture and Science (OCW) and Foreign Affairs (BZ) [81]. 4.3. Singapore Following the arrest of members of a number of Jemaah Islamiyah cells or Fiahs in Singapore during two waves of arrests in December 2001 and September 2002 and the revelation of various planned attacks against US and other ‘Western’ targets on the island state [82], the Singaporean authorities sought to counter the violent jihadist ideology of their prisoners, establishing the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) [83]. The objective of the organization is to “study the Jemaah Islamiyah’s ideology, offer expert opinion in understanding Jemaah Islamiyah’s interpretation of Islam, produce necessary counter-ideological materials and to conduct public education for the Muslim community on religious extremism” [84]. This group understandably comprises Islamic scholars and experts from the wider Muslim community of Singapore, who can advise and develop appropriate counter-ideological responses, but it also includes a panel of counselors, responsible for interviewing and rehabilitating prisoners and their families [85]. The latter is particularly relevant, in that as well as seeking to counter the ideology of its Jemaah Islamiyah detainees; the RRG also seeks to support their families, both ideologically and materially. Such measures appeared “significant in helping to win over the hearts and minds of the detainees and their families…It was particularly important to minimize the risk of the children being radicalized in future by the detention of their fathers” [86]. Allegedly, as a result of the Singaporean RRG program, three of the former prisoners have now been released [87]. 4.4. Indonesia Indonesia has suffered from a number of high profile terrorist attacks perpetrated by violent jihadists associated with the Jemaah Islamiyah movement [88], which is closely affiliated with the al Qaeda network. These have notably included the suicide bomb attacks on Bali nightclubs in October 2002 (Bali 1), the August 2003 attack on the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, the September 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the October 2005 suicide bomb attacks on Bali restaurants (Bali 2) [89]. Given the resultant 170 or so individuals held for terrorist or other jihadist motivated offences, dispersed amongst a number of Indonesian prisons, there has been some attempt by the authorities, albeit somewhat haphazardly, to ‘deradicalize’ former

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members of both Jemaah Islamiyah and other violent Islamist groups. In total around 25–30 such individuals have agreed to cooperate with the police. However, due to the level of corruption, violence and lack of oversight within the Indonesian prison system, these ‘deradicalization’ approaches have been made outside the main prison system [90]. The first approach is based around a group of Islamic religious scholars, known as the Tim Penanggulangan Terror (TPT) or ‘Team to Address Terror’. This emerged after Vice President Yusuf Kalla invited a group of Islamic scholars to examine the suicide statements of the Bali 2 bombers, in late 2005 and critique them theologically. While in early 2006 they made visits to a number of Pesantren Islamic boarding schools with links to Jemaah Islamiyah, and wrote some publications regarding Islamic interpretation, they have not had any great impact, although they do still meet occasionally. This lack of impact appears to be “because some members were not persuaded that there was a serious need and others had no idea of the content of the teachings they were supposed to counter” [91]. The other main approach, which has been somewhat more successful, has come from the Indonesian Police, and focuses on both radicalized prisoners and their families. While initially introduced with the intention of obtaining more intelligence, it has since recruited Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, both Afghan Alumni and senior leaders within Jemaah Islamiyah, the former with military expertise, the latter with expertise in Islamic theological law and strong religious standing. They were given “access to other detainees to engage in informal debates and encourage discussion of what was right and what was wrong about their approach to Jihad” [92]. This was because the Indonesian Police realized that detainees were not going to listen to state officials or moderates from outside the movement, who would have no credibility. At the same time the police understood that such discussions and reflections could not take place within the Indonesian prison environment, for the reasons stated. Consequently, senior figures within Jemaah Islamiyah and other Islamist groups are held in Jakarta police facilities when they are arrested, to allow ‘deradicalization’ in the hope that if they accept the Police approach, other more junior members of the organization will follow them [93]. A second strand in the Police approach to ‘deradicalization’ is to undermine the prisoners perception of them as Thogut or anti-Islamic, by kindness and ‘Hearts and Minds’ approaches to family travel costs, family accommodation, extra food, long distance learning, medical treatment and negotiating more lenient sentences [94]. The one great concern with all these measures is that because of the strong social and religious ties within a group like Jemaah Islamiyah, many of those who renounce violent action may revert to their old ways once in the prison system, or upon their release. 4.5. Saudi Arabia While Saudi Arabia has been referred to as ‘the oldest fundamentalist state’ [95] and there have been many concerns raised over its position regarding the al Qaeda network [96], particularly as the majority of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals, the bomb attacks of May and November 2003 in Riyadh proved critical catalysts. Although the first attack was “a clumsy attempt at best at targeting westerners as outlined by bin Laden’s notorious ‘fatwa’ of February 23, 1998, the second attack, where the victims were almost exclusively Muslims, focused a more explicitly outraged public opinion on its propriety” [97]. Consequently, following these attacks, and under growing US and international pressure, “the Saudi authorities established a program aimed at countering

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the radicalizing ideology of extremist sympathizers…one aspect of this program is counseling, which seeks to engage extremists in theological debate and psychological counseling” [98]. The counselors, including Islamic scholars, academics and psychologists engage the prisoners in an “attempt to persuade them that their religious justification for their actions is wrong and based on a corrupted understanding of Islam” [99]. In a similar way to the Singaporean model, along with dialogue and debate, the authorities also provide good conditions for the prisoners, which one journalist who recently visited the Hayar rehabilitation prison on the outskirts of Riyadh described: They certainly benefit from accommodation which, if not quite luxurious, would certainly raise no complaint from, say a backpacking student. There’s a lawn, a ping-pong table and table football. One door opens unexpectedly onto a decent-sized indoor swimming pool. The bedrooms have neither locks nor bars. There is a comfortable television room, although the choice of programs is limited to sport, news and religion. [100]. In addition, as in the previous models, the Saudi authorities provide for the families and children of the prisoners during their detention, aware that otherwise extremist organizations will step into the vacuum to provide such support. For those who have completed the program and are deemed as suitable for release, the authorities assist with finding jobs, wedding costs, medical care and providing accommodation, thus assisting the ‘reformed’ violent extremist to re-enter the community. Such support may prove critical in ensuring that former extremist prisoners properly re-integrate back into the community; otherwise they remain vulnerable to re-radicalization and a return to their former ways. While difficult to accurately judge the program’s success, one author states that, since 2004 around 2000 prisoners have participated in the program, of which roughly 700 have been released [101]. 4.6. Yemen The country of Yemen, with its lack of central government control in many regions, has, emerged as one of the more fertile locations for al Qaeda activity. The primary affiliate in Yemen…the Islamic Army of Aden Abyan (IAA) was responsible for the kidnapping of Western tourists in 1998, the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and an attack on the French tanker Limburg in 2002 [102]. In 2002 the Yemeni authorities created a program titled the Religious Dialogue Council (RDC) which was given responsibility for ‘deradicalizing’ its violent jihadist prisoners [103]. The head of the new program Judge Hamoud al-Hitar allegedly stated to the prisoners that “if you can convince us that your ideas are justified by the Koran, then we will join you in your struggle. But if we succeed in convincing you of our ideas, then you must agree to renounce violence” [104]. Although initially hailed as a great success, after releasing around 364 violent jihadists back into the community, within a few years, doubts were being raised about its effectiveness for several main reasons. Firstly in an interview with the BBC, one inmate stated “we understood what the judge

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wanted and he understood what we wanted from him. The Yemeni Mujahideen in prison know Hitar is the way for them to get released, so they ingratiate themselves with him” [105]. Secondly, it was discovered that a number of those released after completing the program had been found fighting as insurgents in Iraq. Finally, there was a mass break out of inmates on the program, many of whom were believed to have rejoined their former colleagues.

5. Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism While the nature of al Qaeda network and the threat it poses has evolved, and while the previous examples provide salient lessons on countering its violent radicalization both in the wider community and amongst individuals, many nations have failed to adequately change their response to this threat by fully incorporating counter-ideology into their wider counter-terrorism responses. This failure to ‘re-imagine counterterrorism’ by effectively countering the rapidly diffusing ideology of al Qaeda is a major weakness with long term implications for the successful mitigation of the movement’s threat. As the global movement seeks to foment growing tension and conflict between modern societies and its version of Islam, it will become increasingly important to ideologically counter the movement; If no effort is made to counter or dilute the ideology of extremism, then support for the al Qaeda model of Islam among radicalized Muslims will only increase, which means that the military campaign against al Qaeda, even if pursued unrelentingly, may last for decades [106]. Critically, it will become necessary to stop viewing the diverse Muslim community as a monolithic bloc and to ensure the wider community is strengthened against radicalization, particularly those vulnerable individuals within that community. Much of this will need to be achieved through wide scale programs incorporating counterideology as a strand, such as the UK CONTEST strategy and the Netherlands ‘Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan’. While providing an interface between the authorities and local communities, these programs are dependent on building up strong relationships based on trust with progressive religious, political and cultural leaders within the community, who have the appropriate credibility and respect. As has been shown, such individuals can play a critical role in countering the ideology of violent radicalization and where possible they should be encouraged and their position strengthened. However, the concept of ‘re-imagining counter-terrorism’ through the incorporation and expansion of counter-ideology is not only valid at the tactical and operational levels, when employed to counter radicalization amongst individuals and domestic communities. Similar concepts and measures clearly need to be applied at the strategic level if an effective impact is to be made on the global ideological movement which the al Qaeda network has evolved into. The first step is to build both a strong dialogue and actively support moderate Muslim political and religious leaders, both in the West and other countries, in particular where Muslim regimes face continuing attacks by al Qaeda or its affiliates. It will also become increasingly important to provide an ideological religious counter-weight from respected Islamic scholars to the various fatwas and

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other religious pronouncements of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al- Zawahiri and the al Qaeda leadership [107, 108]. As Koranic scholars from the Islamic Research Council at al Azhar University, Cairo, pointed out following 9/11: Islam provides clear rules and ethical norms that forbid the killing of non-combatants, as well as woman, children, and the elderly, and also forbids the pursuit of the enemy in defeat, the execution of those who surrender, the infliction of harm on prisoners of war, and the destruction of property that is not being used in hostilities [109].

6. Conclusion While it is argued that in the short term the threat posed by the al Qaeda network and its affiliate organizations can be mitigated through the use of traditional counterterrorist responses such as security measures: the legal system and intelligence led policing and military operations, in the longer term the international community must counter the network’s transformation into a global ideological movement by incorporating and expanding counter-ideology as part of a wider holistic counterterrorist strategy. It is submitted that just as it was found that an effective way to counter guerrilla warfare and insurgencies was to use small groups of special forces, utilizing the same tactics and techniques as the insurgents, so too, to effectively counter an ideologically driven terrorist movement, the authorities must respond by gathering experts on ideology to counter the terrorists and their supporters beliefs and arguments. While such a response does not necessarily preclude the use of covert psychological operations (PSYOPS) “designed to influence attitudes and behavior of enemy forces, noncombatants, or others” [110], the most important effects are likely to be achieved through the overt measures already discussed, involving local communities and individuals in countering radicalization. Finally, as part of such a longer term strategic response ‘Western’ nations, their associates and the international community will need to identify the root causes of genuine and perceived injustices against the Muslim World, and where possible, attempt to address some of these key issues, whether political, legal or economic. As one author states, “there is indeed a battle between the West and men like bin Laden. But it is not a battle for global supremacy; it is a battle for hearts and minds” [111]. Ultimately therefore, to succeed in this longer term ‘battle’, we will have to begin to ‘re-imagine counter-terrorism’.

References [1]

[2] [3]

Despite numerous definitions, terrorism essentially combines elements of religious, political, racial or ideological motivation, psychological justification, military style tactics and criminal intent, hence the evolution of two main theoretical models, ‘Terrorism as Crime’ and ‘Terrorism as Warfare’. A definition might be, ‘The use or threat of indiscriminate violence, against civilians or non-combatants (including police officers and off duty military personnel), for political, religious, racial or ideological objectives, by a sub-state group, with the intention of putting in fear an audience far greater than its initial victims’. A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the threat, responding to the challenge. New Haven; London: Yale University Press; 2002. R. Gunaratna, Transnational threats in the post-Cold War era, Jane’s Intelligence Review Jan 2001, 4650.

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J. Pimlott. (ed). International Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London: Fitzroy Dearborn; 1997. B. Hoffman Inside Terrorism: Revised and Expanded Edition New York: Columbia University Press; 2006. 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton & Company; 2005. B. G. Williams, ‘Turkey’s al-Qaeda Blowback’. Terrorism Monitor, 2/8: Jamestown Foundation (2004). L. Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The new battleground of international jihad. New York: Prometheus Books; 2006. Intelligence & Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. London: HMSO. Cm 6785; 2006. M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; 2004. W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. London: Phoenix Press; 2001. B. Ganor (ed). Post Modern Terrorism. Herzliya: ICT; 2005. D. Gambetta, (ed). Making sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford: Oxford University; 2006. A. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2005. J. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 1999. Phrase and concept originally suggested by Steve Monblatt, former US diplomat and lecturer at the US National War College. C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Fourth Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 2006. B. Jackson et.al. Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding terrorist efforts to overcome defensive technologies. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation; 2007. V. Ramraj, M. Hor, and K. Roach, Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005. A. Vercher, Terrorism in Europe: An international comparative legal analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1992. P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2006. J. Baud, Le Renseignement et la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme: Strategies et perspectives internationales.Paris: Lavauzelle; 2005. P. Pillar, ‘Intelligence’ in A. Cronin and J. Ludes (eds.) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy.Washington DC: Georgetown University Press; 2004. L. Clutterbuck, ‘Law Enforcement’ in A. Cronin and J. Ludes (eds.) Ibid. P. Chalk and W. Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’: Security intelligence, the police, and counterterrorism in four democracies. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation; 2004. J. P. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences. London: Praeger; 2001. P. Harclerode, Secret Soldiers: Special forces in the war against terrorism. London: Cassell; 2000. P. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The liberal state response. Second Edition. London: Routledge; 2006. G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics and counter-measures. Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998. A. Cronin and J. Ludes (eds.) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press; 2004. L. Clutterbuck 2004. Op.Cit. J. Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why religious militants kill. New York: Harper Collins; 2003. M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley: University of California Press; 2001. Ibid. p.6. R. English, Armed Struggle: A history of the IRA. London: Macmillan; 2003. E. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA. London: Allen Lane; 2002. Y.Alexander et.al., ETA: Profile of a terrorist group. New York: Transnational Publishers; 2001. For example PIRA – Harrods, London 1983, ETA-Hipercor, Barcelona 1987, RIRA-Omagh, NI 1998. A. Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For forty years we fought alone. London: Routledge; 2005. S. Kaarthikeyan, ‘Root Causes of Terrorism? A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the LTTE’ in T. Bjorgo (ed). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: Routledge; 2005. Such as the PIRA bombings of the City of London in the 1990s and FLNC/Corsican separatist bombings of French Government buildings in Corsica. Such as the Tokyo Subway 1995, Oklahoma 1995, Tel Aviv & Jerusalem buses shops and restaurants 1990s, 9/11, Bali 2002, Istanbul 2003, Madrid 2004 and London 2005. A. Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land defeated America. London: Penguin; 2005.

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[44] B. Rowan, The Armed Peace: Life and Death After the Ceasefires. Edinburgh: Mainstream ; 2003. [45] O. McTernan, Violence in God’s Name: Religion in an age of conflict. London: Dartman, Longman & Todd; 2003. [46] J.Sirrs et. al. (eds). Unmasking Terror: A global review of terrorist activities. Washington DC: Jamestown Foundation; 2004. [47] Y. Schweitzer, & S. Shay, S. The Globalization of Terror: The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the response of the international community. Herzliya: ICT/Transaction; 2003 [48] J.P.Harik, Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism. London: I.B. Tauris; 2005. [49] A. Norton, Hezbollah: A short history. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2007. [50] R. Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global network of terror. Second Edition. London: Hurst & Company; 2003. [51] A. Rodier, Al-Qaida: Les connexions mondiales du terrorisme. Paris: Ellipses/CF2R; 2006. [52] W. Lind et.al. The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette October 1989.p.2. [53] P. Sookhdeo, Understanding Islamic Terrorism. Wiltshire: Isaac Publishing: 2004. [54] M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The allure of suicide terror. New York: Columbia University Press; 2005. [55] J. White, Terrorism: An introduction. Third Edition. Belmont CA: Wadsworth; 2002.p.242. [56] M. Silber and A. Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. New York: NYPD; 2007. [57] Q. Wiktorowicz,, (ed.) Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; 2004. [58] G. Hannah, L. Clutterbuck and J. Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation; 2008.p.2. [59] AIVD, From Dawa to Jihad: The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order. The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; 2004. p.13. [60] E. Hussein, The Islamist. London: Penguin Books; 2007. [61] L. Clutterbuck, ‘Radicalisation and Extremism in the UK: The Role of the Radical Clerics’in The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) (ed.) Radicalisation in Broader Perspective. The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; 2007. [62] S. O’Neill and D. McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park mosque. London: Harper Perennial; 2006. [63] G. Weimann, www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet. Special Report- United States Institute of Peace no.116, March 2004. [64] E. Denece, Al Qaeda: Les nouveaux reseaux de la terreur. Paris: Ellipses/CF2R; 2004. [65] A. Stewart ‘UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Background to Contest’ in W. Bowen and A. Stewart (eds.) (2005) Broadening the Government’s Counter-Terrorist Response– CONTEST, Airey Neave Papers Number 50 (2005) Shrivenham: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute. [66] Cabinet Office (2008) The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world. London: HMSO. Cm. 7291; March 2008. [67] HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy. London: Cm.6888; July 2006. [68] D. Godson ‘No Way to Combat Terrorism: The Government have some dangerous bedfellows in its attempt to prevent violent extremism’ Times 25th March 2008. [69] http: //www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism/ [70] http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism strategy/about-the-strategy/ [71] http://www.mi5.gov.uk and www.sis.gov.uk [72] D. Veness, ‘The Contribution of the Blue Light Services to CONTEST’ in W. Bowen and A. Stewart (eds.) 2005 Op.Cit. [73] J. Murray, ‘Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities?’ Police Practice and Research, 6/4 (2005), 347-361. p.359. [74] M. Innes, ‘Policing Uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605 (2006), 222-241. [75] M. Innes, Hearts and Minds and Eyes and Ears: Reducing Radicalisation Risks Through ReassuranceOrientated Policing, Cardiff: Universities Police Science Institute: University of Cardiff; 2007. pp.7-8. [76] I. Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The death of Theo Van Gogh and the limits of tolerance. London: Atlantic Books; 2006. [77] J. Sinai, ‘Terrorism and the Netherlands: The threat and the response’. Counter Terrorism: Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security. 14/2 (2008) 38-43. [78] Ministry of Interior, Polarisation and Radicalisation: Action Plan 2007-2011. The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; 2007. p.5.

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[79] M. Meines, ‘Radicalisation and its Prevention from the Dutch Perspective’ in NCTb (ed.) Radicalisation in Broader Perspective. The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; 2007. pp.34-39. [80] Ministry of Interior 2007. Op .Cit. p.7. [81] Ibid. p.16. [82] M. Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An eyewitness account of Al-Qaedas newest center of operations in Southeast Asia. New York: Free Press; 2003. [83] Much of this sub-section is based on: Section 4.5 G. Hannah, et. al. 2008 Op. Cit. [84] M. Hassan and K.G. Pereire, ‘An Ideological Response to Combating Terrorism – the Singapore Perspective, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17/4 (2006), 458-477. p.461. [85] Ibid. p. 462. [86] Ibid. p. 463. [87] G. Hannah et. al., 2008. Op. Cit.. p. 36. [88] T. Dahlby, Allah’s Torch: A report from behind the scenes in Asia’s war on terror. New York: Harper Collins; 2005. [89] A. Rodier 2006 Op. Cit. p.167-170. [90] Much of this sub-section is based on: International Crisis Group, ‘Deradicalisation’ and Indonesian Prisons. Asia Report 142, 19th November (2007). [91] Ibid. p. 11. [92] Ibid. p. 12. [93] Ibid. p. 12-13. [94] Ibid. p. 13. [95] D. Hiro, War Without End: The rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global response. London: Routledge; 2002. [96] L. Sykiyanen, ‘Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe?’ Terrorism Monitor 1/2 : Jamestown Foundation (2003). [97] S. Ulph, ‘The War Within’Terrorism Monitor 1/7: Jamestown Foundation (2003). [98] G. Hannah et. al. 2008 Op. Cit. p. 36. [99] C. Boueck, ‘Extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia’, Terrorism Monitor 5/16: Jamestown Foundation (2007).p.2. [100] A. Horowitz, ‘The Anti-Guantanamo: Saudi Arabia’s plan to tackle terrorism – nicely’ Seven, The Sunday Telegraph. 13th July 2008. p.9. [101] C. Boueck 2007. Op. Cit. p.3. [102] J. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East affiliate groups and the next generation of terror. New York: Specialist Press: Washington Institute; 2004. p. 67. [103] Much of this sub-section is based on: G. Hannah et. al. 2008 Op. Cit. p.37. [104] ‘Koranic Duels Ease Terror’, Christian Science Monitor February 2005. [105] BBC,‘Yemenianti-terrorschemeindoubt’,BBC News Website http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/4328894.stm 11th October 2005. [106] R. Gunaratna, 2003 Op. Cit. p. xxxiv. [107] R. Gunaratna, ‘An Examination of Al-Qaeda and its Methods’, INTERSEC 15/3 (2005) [108] Y. Alexander and M. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a terrorist network.. New York: Transnational Publishers; 2001. [109] Al-Hayat, Islamic Research Council of al-Azhar University. November 5th 2001. [110] T. Clancy, Special Forces: A guided tour of US Army Special Forces. London: Sidgwick & Jackson; 2001. [111] J. Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror. London: I. B. Tauris; 2003. p. 249.

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-306

Achieving Resilience in Communities: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks Lina KOLESNIKOVA Rossnova Solutions, Risk, Crisis and Disaster Consultancy Belgium

Abstract. Although counter-terrorist agencies are faced with the dubious task of preventing and deterring terrorist attacks, inevitably, it is only a matter of time before terrorists will successfully strike again. Thus, management of post-event short-term aftermaths and long-term outcomes are at the forefront in fighting terrorism. Terrorist attack response management is crucial in maintaining public assurance of protection and survival. This article offers a framework that will approach the fundamental challenge of management in a structured way through formalizing its processes, inputs and outputs in an effort to provide a global picture that identifies the role and preparation that communities play. From the lessons learned from previous terrorist attacks, establishment of a strategic community resilience framework that will positively support response management in the short- and long-term recovery and thus, return lives to normalcy once again is presented. Keywords. counter-terrorism, lessons learned, recovery, resiliency, response management, terrorist attacks

Introduction Although terrorism is by no means a new threat to society, its radical nature has increased dramatically as evidenced by the massive and indiscriminate killings of innocent victims. Terrorists are more likely to strike vulnerable civilian or military targets in non-traditional ways to avoid direct confrontation on the battlefields or force governments to take actions in the interest of terrorists. Beyond the destruction, injury, loss of life, and fear instilled, terrorism enormously affects the personal, organizational, and society at both the national and international levels that can result in profound psychological, economic and social consequences. Under these circumstances, national Special Forces and anti-terrorist agencies can not guarantee public security. Further, the meaning of “security,” or rather the concern of “insecurity,” has shifted from the seemingly remote level of interstate war to the very close level of personal vulnerability. Today, the very real threat of massive casualties and destruction of operations face virtually all societies, particularly those whose nations symbolize the world through government, tourism, business, sports or entertainment. Typically, counter-terrorist agencies are responsible for the prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks. Although they manage to prevent attacks, inevitably terrorists will execute other successful attacks that make it impossible to protect every single person and every single building in the country. Therefore, the management of

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after-event short-term aftermaths and long-term outcomes is at the forefront in fighting terrorism. The terrorist attack response management becomes crucial in its effort to maintain public assurance of security and stability. Differing from the intelligence community-driven attack prevention and deterrence activities, response management involves multiple organizations from various sectors of the society as well as communities. Because there is no assurance that all terrorist attacks can be prevented, response management’s during- and after-event activities, in particular, are the available methods that most influence the outcomes of a terrorist attack. If response management is well thought out and delivers well, any negative outcomes can be minimized, but if the response management fails, the outcomes might be extremely unpleasant. Terrorist attacks have not only tangible “physical” consequences but also social “intangible” influences that are interwoven into these events. How people prepare for, respond to, and cope with terrorism depends greatly on the community’s ability to “bounce back” to a normal life after a major disaster [1]. Every major impact on society −and a terrorist attack is clearly one− leads to changes that can be either positive or negative. The latter are, for example, the fear of taking responsibility or actively participating in community life or a perception of vulnerability and lack of protection, both impacting social behaviors and driving them to a passive acceptance of worsening the social atmosphere in the “new” after-attack reality. While full restoration of one’s “previous” life is typically not possible, the key consideration is to turn the changes experienced into a more positive direction, for example, improving awareness and preparedness at all levels of society. The majority of terrorism prevention and response models are now geared towards incorporating the idea of community resilience. In other words, the idea is to assist communities in having all necessary precautions in place in an effort to rebound to normal life as quickly as possible, cope with and recover from the negative impacts after a hazardous event and effectively identify, nurture and focus upon positive changes. This form of assistance can be translated into raising preparedness and equipping communities with information, frameworks and other supportive mechanisms. Community preparation for possible disasters involve a variety of activities, for example, training both the public and first responders with specific strategies and educating the public about possible attacks, behavioral reactions and eventual supportive activities in assisting victims as well as the community and society in general. Of most importance is effectively educating communities about organizing efficient response management and the processes involved and associated desired conditions. Simply put, this encompasses what responders would normally do, what they need and want communities to do and what they need communities NOT to do. Hence, stress management techniques and cooperative strategies are necessary to professional response management. Ultimately, encouraging people to prepare and, possibly, to train for reactions that would help both community and responders in their join effort. Gone are the days when law enforcement and emergency management activities were carried out by a select group of officers directing and prescribing response-based advice and activities towards a predominantly passive public. In some cases, although the public remained passive, immediately available response resources were not sufficient. In other cases, the public took an active but non-coordinated role, effectively complicating the situation and distracting otherwise sufficient response management

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resources. Modern threats require that both responders as well as the public be prepared, and everyone should possess at least a basic understanding of how to help one another. Consequently, the focus of this article is to put forward a framework that assists in approaching this fundamental challenge in a structured way. Conceptualizing response management, formalizing its processes and its inputs and outputs portrays a global picture in which communities should be able to recognize and prepare for their role. Outlining the lessons learned from other countries’ terrorist attacks and mapping them to the response management framework will offer possible approaches to strategic establishment of the community resilience in a way that positively supports the response management and both short- and long-term recovery and the community’s return to a normal life.

1. Response Framework to Terrorist Attacks [2] A crisis and disaster response management framework allows structured analysis and permits results to be drawn as well as describe processes involved in responding to a terrorist attack.

Diagram 1. Crisis and disaster management framework (Rossnova Solutions)

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To present a proper understanding of the framework, it is important to explain what the concept is behind the framework. The framework is built based on the principle of first identifying the necessary outcomes, then identifying processes that would lead to those outcomes and, finally, defining the inputs that would feed and support processes in delivering the proper desired outcomes. Building the framework is essentially a multi-iteration process of identifying and refining the definition of processes, inputs and outputs (outcomes), and taking into account considerations to a greater extent.

Diagram 2. Bi-directional use of the framework for various needs (Rossnova Solutions) When the framework is understood, it can be applied to various situations and in various ways. As shown in the diagram above, the framework can be understood as a way used to test the plans and capabilities. Effectively, one will be going from the top to the bottom, or the direction that events will follow during an actual crisis. One can use the framework in the same top-to-bottom way to research an actual crisis, as it assists in analyzing the events in a structured way.

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Diagram 3. Framework assists in structured analysis of actual cases (Rossnova Solutions) One can use the same framework in an opposite bottom-to-top direction; effectively building up the response measures in several iterations of the bottom-to-top planning and top-to-bottom testing. At this stage, it is important to stress that following a review of the existing research, the crisis management framework focuses on non-police activities, as those appear to be underdeveloped, and this is where the major positive impact on the response management can be achieved. Groups of processes making up the framework can be structured into phases or identifying what the whole response management consists of. “Immediate” group of processes translates into a Pre-phase (what happened before the attack) and Hot Phase (what happened at and during the attack). “Short-term” response processes follow (Cold Phase). “Long-term” processes are split into the “Inquiry phase,” covering investigation, inquiry and readjustment, and “long-term” victim assistance processes that should be built into one’s normal life, or business as usual or normal operations. The pre-phase occurs before the terrorist attack and extends to include all other activities occurring before the hot phase. This is the preparation of response activities by the assigned organizations–for example, Special Forces, rescue services and public

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health organizations. The pre-phase also includes all activities occurring after the terrorist act goes public, for example, activities such as negotiations, or mediation, with terrorists and gathering information on terrorists’ plans and objectives, choosing potential response measures, and so forth. The hot phase occurs when Special Forces intervene to take over the terrorists, to neutralize them and to prepare acceptable conditions for rescue services. For example, this might include locating and neutralizing bombs, explosives and/or other potential threats to the critical infrastructure, hostages and rescue personnel. The cold phase begins with rescue services entering the site and beginning evacuation of the victims. The cold phase can be considered to consist of a sequence of six major steps:      

On-the-spot treatment and evacuation. Assigning identification and local on-site pre-hospitalization treatment, typically carried out at a central location next to the incident scene. Victims sorting, dispatching and transporting. Hospitalization (medical treatment). Discharge from hospitals. Rehabilitation of victims and relatives (and wider rehabilitation of the society).

The last phase is the inquiry intended to insure that lessons are learned that include investigation of the event, audit of the actions of stakeholders and supporting policies’ readjustment. Subsequently, this readjustment is looped back to planning. Every part of the actual case is considered as a process that should match one of the processes defined within the framework. Each process may consist of a number of sub-processes, requiring specific inputs and generating appropriate outputs. There are few sub-processes that are present during all phases and steps. For example, gathering, analyzing, preparing, and dispatching the information are referred to together as communication processes. Overall, there are five vertical Operation’s Pillars–processes involving and ensuring the cooperative effort of various involved agencies and spanning across all, or a majority, of the phases. These processes include interagency coordination, interagency command, interagency and overall communication, interagency planning, and interagency personnel dispatching. These processes are enhanced to accommodate the operation’s surroundings, including communities, and have a direct relation to communities and their resilience features. Overall, response to a terrorist attack includes a variety of processes. In taking the time dimension into account, there are three groups of processes. In this article, time refers to the continuity of the terrorist attack and its aftermath, starting from the top and going downwards on the diagram. The role of the community grows with time and should play a passive supporting role during the initial phases of the crisis response. However, in the long-term, especially, as the professional emergency response fades out, the community should become more and more active in driving roles. “Immediate” is a group of processes occurring before and during an attack. If used for researching actual cases, this usually refers to a relatively short period of time concentrating primarily on the hot phase. The pre-phase, while taking a long time, is

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summarized into a few processes directly linked to those of the hot phase. Considering inputs that would feed successful outputs of the response operation, some require activities prior to the attack. In order to simplify the overall analysis, processes that should take place prior to the terrorist attack and which are required for a response operation to be a success, are also included in this “immediate” group. As such, this group consists of all involved processes up until the response-related activities. The pre-phase is the phase when resilience of the community should be nurtured and trained. The community plays no active role during this phase, apart from eventual help to the police forces in preventing the attack. The hot-phase occurs when the major role of the community is to support the response operation (typically, this is the phase driven mainly by the police forces), while ensuring that the community does not take actions that would disturb the operation. “Short-term” is a group of processes occurring directly after the attack, specifically, as soon as rescue services may enter the site and begin acting. Typically, this set of activities is completed after victims have been discharged from hospitals and have returned to their homes. The community’s role is larger, as responders may need assistance from the local population in various ways. Again, this phase typically is NOT driven by the community, but by responders, and the community should deliver their support in a non-disturbing way. “Long-term” is a group of processes typically occurring during a prolonged period and deals with consequences and negative effects of the attack. This group of processes is intended to insure that lessons are learned, policies and society, in general, are readjusted to the “new reality” and victims are rehabilitated and supported as appropriate. This is the phase when resilience of the community plays its major role, or, in other words, the community becomes the major driving force. As we talk about resilience, a crisis, namely a terrorist attack, impacts all of the society, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it is necessary to establish a clear view of the victims, because community resilience has much to do with recovering, in particular, with returning direct and indirect victims to the community and returning them to a normal life while adjusting to the “new” reality.

Diagram 4. The importance of NGOs and communities grow with time (Rossnova Solutions)

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In view of the categorization above, it is important to note that there are political and cultural aspects that affect assistance and support to victims. One of these is the short-term focus that states often pay to a terrorist attack–as events fall out of the media and the general public’s gaze, the state loses interest [3]. This suggests that long-term response success can only be achieved if backed by well-developed and competent non-governmental (NGO) sectors driven by a community’s strong will and capabilities. Following the analysis of the response using the crisis response management framework, it is important to define, analyze and categorize the victims, people and communities who will require post-crisis assistance in an effort to bounce back to normal life as much as possible. Such a categorization is based on the degree of presence at and the degree of the direct impact by the terrorist attack. There are primary (direct), secondary and tertiary (indirect) victims [4].

Diagram 5. Categorization of victims (Rossnova Solutions)

Primary (direct) victims are those physically present at, or in close proximity to, an event. They are there at the scene during the onset of the attack, including those who died and those who survived the attack, as well as immediate witnesses of the attack who happened to be at or next to the scene. The number of people in this category is typically limited, though, still might be very significant, as modern terrorism changes its attitudes towards this symbolic target–before, killing was an operation’s outcome, now killing is an operation itself [5].

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Diagram 6. Killing is now an operation, not the outcome (Rossnova Solutions) Secondary victims include family members and close associates of primary (direct) victims. Disasters involving violent criminal mass victimization result in intensified psychological reactions among not only direct victims and families, but relief workers as well –thus causing the relief effort to be more challenging and stressful. Emergency responders must learn to accept that they should not be too harsh on themselves because there is simply no coping with some situations [6]. Experience suggests, however, that exposure to critical incidents has serious mental health and behavioral implications, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD), anxiety, depression, anger, or aggression [7]. Therefore, the secondary victim category also includes first responders: Special Forces, police, firefighters, military, rescue personnel and other professionals who assist primary (and, possibly, other secondary) victims, namely, medical personnel, psychologists, clergy, NGOs, special community representatives, and so forth. Typically, the number of people in this category is higher than the number of primary direct victims, although mass hostage taking has the potential for making the number of primary victims comparable to the number of secondary victims. Tertiary (indirect) victims are those individuals in a community who are impacted by the secondary effects of disaster. Reached largely through the media, they are the audience for the terror and recognize little distinction between themselves and direct victims. Due to the quality and the repetitiveness of visualization, some tertiary victims may suffer similar to primary and secondary victims, and, therefore, should be subject to appropriate assistance. These indirect victims are the principal targets of terrorism. This large part of the population is subjected to fear, anger and other emotions that may influence the social transformations in a way desired by terrorists, the critical point in response management. The communities should bounce back to a normal life as soon as possible and accommodate to the new reality. The speed and degree of this bounce back are

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defined by the resilience of communities, or what defines whether the overall response management, not only a certain component of it, is successful or otherwise. By using the described framework, it is now possible to reveal how community resiliency might be achieved and improved.

2. “Immediate” Actions Before an attack occurs, communities must have feasible warning to prepare themselves and be on alert. However, there are rare cases where a particular warning can actually be given by intelligence services. The majority of alerts that intelligence services give are, fortunately, false alarms in the sense that attacks do not occur (they are prevented or deterred or, simply “false-positive”). Therefore, politicians are often hesitant to further alert the community, as they believe, and not completely unfounded, this would damage their popularity. In some cases, however, it would be better to inform the community of a threat rather than simply hope that police forces would take sufficient measures. Beslan can be used as a prime example when an alert was given via the intelligence services, but the community was neither aware nor prepared. While part of the blame in the Beslan case was with the police forces, it is clear that even a double- or triple-size presence of the police at the scene would not prevent or deter the attack. However, the alert, if had been properly given, could have lead to better preparation of the school event by responsible people and the community in general, and in particular, rapid escape and evacuation information, and behavioral and cooperative awareness amongst the population. Lack of the latter led to the severe complications during the latest stages of the Beslan tragedy. Therefore, the most critical part of a community’s pre-event preparedness is continuous civil defense communication and, as much as reasonably possible, training or most likely an awareness campaign, taking into account local specifics dynamically tailored to the most viable threats at any given moment in time. Clearly, only close cooperation between communities and local police may provide for such a cooperative awareness effort to be effective (see Table 1). The majority of terrorist attacks do not provide an opportunity for immediate response activities during the attack. However, in the case of the so-called continuous emergency (hostage taking, hijacking, and use of chemical or biological weapons), there are specific actions to be taken, such as preparation for necessary supplies of water, food, and medications for victims, relatives and responders. At the same time, witnesses and bystanders should be the first to be evacuated from the scene in order that those in need of medical and psychological assistance can be nurtured and given brief information about the events that have taken place. At this stage, the role of the community is important and becomes more supportive; for example, supply of necessary food and water may be organized through local businesses. The same applies to evacuation where vacant offices or warehouses can be used to shelter a large number of people (local schools and stadiums are typically assigned as primary locations). Essentially, community assistance is vital in identifying places and establishing proper communication with the owners and other “useful” community members as well as their subsequent support to responders, a good example of the Public-Private Partnership that is a hot topic nowadays. Clergy, teachers and other representatives of the local community might be assigned to counsel with victims and relatives, as well as help in communicating with and controlling crowds.

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Table 1 Pre- and on-attack actions Victims

Primary (Direct)

Tertiary (indirect)

Directly involved

Witnesses/ bystanders

Relatives/ friends/ associates

First responders

Professionals assisting direct victims

Lay public

Nondisclosure of sensitive private info (religion, citizenship, big bosses and their relatives, etc.)

Evacuation (move out of the scene)

Information dispatching (inform them that their relatives are impacted)

Information dispatching (what happened, what to expect about timing and conditions of their work, etc.)

Information dispatching (what happened, what to expect about timing and conditions of their work, etc.)

Information dispatching (what happened without terrifying details/pic tures)

Continuous emergencies supplies (water, food, etc.)

Medical support (if necessary)

Medical support (if necessary)

Medical support (if necessary)

Medical support (if necessary)

Psycholog ical support (hot lines– psycho assistance)

Information dispatching (explain them what happened)

Psychological support (splitting in small groups, assign psychologists to each group)

Psychological support (antistress, antishock, posttraumatic stress disorder)

Psychological support (antistress, antishock, posttraumatic stress disorder)

What and how community can do and DO NOT do (including support to “professional” responders in delivering on their tasks

Psychological support (antistress, antishock, posttraumatic stress disorder)

Hot lines (info gathering, dispatching, psycho assistance help lines)

Insurance coverage (in contracts)

Phases

On attack (pre- and hot phases)

Secondary

In the event of mass hostage taking and other continuous crises, it might, perhaps, be valuable to provide further assistance by gathering information on who is affected by the crisis. The community can significantly simplify this activity by taking over the

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main effort in contacting the local population, asking for pertinent information and providing the response command center with concentrated information as opposed to the command center taking all individual calls. It is equally important that the community is informed about what their members should NOT do. The case of Nord Ost is very illustrative in that few people got to the scene, entered the theatre, and were shot by terrorists. Beslan: The local population gathered around the scene and stayed very close to the school at all times. There are still speculations that the local armed militia was responsible for exchanging the first shots at terrorists. Ultimately, in addition to communication links, resilience in the community would be highly improved by establishing mechanisms required during the pre- and on-event situation to support the desire, willingness and ability of the community to volunteer and to support responders as needed. Proactive participation, even if limited, rather than desperately waiting for news, makes the community withstand the crisis easier and turn something positive out of an otherwise negative event. If not handled proactively, the local population may take their own spontaneous actions, potentially complicating or even unintentionally endangering the situation.

3. Short-term or Directly After an Attack Following a terrorist attack, when Special Forces neutralize the terrorists or explosives, the crisis response management team goes into its active phase by evacuating and treating victims. This phase consists of the majority of the processes described in the framework and the complexity of interrelations. Here, the role of the community increases significantly as shown in Table 2. In cases of mass victimization, there is an enormous short-term necessity of supplies such as generators, robust communication links, IT equipment, furniture, sleeping bags, camp beds, food, drink, water supplies, medical supplies, blankets, and clothes, for example. These are especially needed if the public is forced to leave their homes and require shelter. When the number of direct victims is significant, in the case of mass hostage takings, for example, the communities may assist with transportation or providing information regarding local routes. Typically, the command center will work with various local and federal agencies to ensure that a sufficient number of vehicles and drivers are on hand. However, it is essential that every driver is provided with an assistant from the local population who can help the driver to navigate on the local roads. The Nord Ost mass hostage taking is again a prime example. Although there was a sufficient number of vehicles present around the scene, many were drawn from organizations operating nearby, but still outside of Moscow. As a result, the drivers were not specifically aware how to reach the right hospitals and thus lost precious time in searching for the “right turn.” This task could have been dramatically simplified if local assistance had been available. In the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. voluntary sector developed processes and procedures to enable instant there-and-then “spontaneous volunteering” in emergencies. This made it possible for people to volunteer on-the-spot, without prior arrangements or contact. Regarding the issue of “convergence” or “spontaneous” volunteering, the U.S. NGO volunteer “Points of Light Foundation” stated that “if you

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Table 2. Short-term after-attack actions Victims

Primary (Direct)

Secondary

Tertiary (indirect)

Phases

Shortterm (Cold phase)

Relatives/ friends/ associates

First responders

Professionals assisting direct victims

Directly involved

Witnesses/ bystanders

On-the-spot treatment and evacuation

Information dispatching (general info)

Information dispatching (conditions of victims, who is where, etc.)

Information dispatching (general info)

Information dispatching (general info)

Information dispatching (general info)

Assigning identification and local on-site prehospitalisation treatment

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance)

Transport for relatives to get to the place (whatever place is appropriate)

Medical support (if necessary)

Medical support (if necessary)

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance)

Sorting, dispatching and transporting

Victim-witness protection (if necessary)

Accommodation on place (as appropriate)

Psychological support (antistress/antishock)

Psychological support (antistress/antishock)

Collaborative mechanisms to direct the energy and willingness to act of the community and its members towards the most needed assistance

Hospitalisation

Supplies (food, …) on place (as appropriate)

Discharge from hospitals

Psychological support

Immediate medicopsychological rehabilitation and support

Medical support (if necessary)

Logistics - those non-local victims to be sent to their homes

Legal - to those who lost relatives, assist with paperwork

Victim-witness protection (if necessary)

Logistics transportation of bodies. Potentially, transportation of survivors and relatives back to their residence Financial assistance - to those who lost relatives (e.g. for funeral) Legal and financial to unattended children or incapable people who lost their parents/mentors

Lay public

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plan they will come, if you don’t plan they will come” and say it is all about “people’s willingness to volunteer versus the system’s capacity to utilize them effectively and safely” [8]. Beslan represents another important example wherein a crowd had surrounded the scene at all times. People were willing to participate, and in evacuating the hostages, many were taken to various hospitals, homes and so forth−all without the command center knowing their destiny. The local population was so actively involved and close to the scene that organized responders could not reach the school. As a result, a number of hostages were thought to have been taken by escaped terrorists, but it appeared later that they were simply taken by the active local people to hospitals and homes without informing the command center. Because there is always the community’s longing to actively participate and support the response team, establishing mechanisms to turn this non-organized desire into action is, therefore, vital in delivering a positive impact. As exemplified, the role of communities in short-term actions is very important for both responders and the community as a whole. Again, the public-private partnership is an essential method of improving the resiliency of communities.

4. Long-term (Continuous Efforts to Adapt to the “New Reality”) The role of the community in long-term actions is enormous. As the state response activities fade, the communities and NGOs are the ones who take the major load. Victims of any terrorist attack are members of society and of certain communities who return back to their lives, families and jobs after a terrifying experience. Whether relatives of those who died or survived, or responders or witnesses, they all become part of the “new reality.” Their rehabilitation and road back-to-normal is the ultimate test in building a resilient community by establishing mechanisms to assist in working with and helping victims. When these mechanisms exist and are effective, the community may return to a normal life with minimal loss, both tangible and intangible, insuring that an adjustment to the “new” reality is as smooth as possible, negative impacts are minimized and positive experiences can be leveraged upon (see Table 3). For those direct victims, their status after the terrorist attack should be clearly defined in legal terms. Financial compensation for material and morale damages should be provided. While there are typically state-funded assistance programs, local community assistance is usually more targeted and effective. Awareness programs that inform victims about their rights and benefits should be introduced. The legislation providing for and the level of victim compensation in many countries, however, are often rather poor or non-existent. Again, the community can become the primary channel of information proliferation. Often, the legislation defines the perpetrator, or terrorist, responsible and, therefore, he is the one who should pay. Thus, it is vitally important that victims are free of making decisions related to the offender. In other words, the state is responsible for dealing with the offender, and this should not be the victim’s responsibility or concern. It might, perhaps, be much better if the local community’s representative takes part in the related activities rather than leaving victims and possibly their lawyers to handle issues on their own.

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Table 3. Long-term actions community resiliency Victims

Primary (Direct)

Phases

Directly involved

Witnesses/ bystanders

Relatives/ friends/ associates

First responders

Professionals assisting direct victims

Lay public

Medical assistance (regular medical surveillance; continuous healing of injuries/ consequences of the terrorist attack-PTSD)

Information dispatching (general info, lessons learned/ investigation report)

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance)

Information dispatching (general info, lessons learned/ investigation report)

Information dispatching (general info, lessons learned/ investigation report)

Informati on dispatchin g (general info, lessons learned/ investigati on report)

Legal assistance; it is necessary to define who is victim of terrorist attack

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance)

Legal assistance (where necessary)

Medical assistance (regular medical surveillance; continuous healing of injuries/ consequences of the terrorist attack - PTSD/ anti-fatigue/ anti-shock/antistress)

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance); professional and continuous antistress/ antishock/ PTSD/ anti-fatigue)

Psycholog ical support (hot linespsycho assistanc)

Social assistance: not bureaucratic treatment of people

Preparedness trainings/info/…

Social assistance (where necessary); they should not request/ require support, but it should be readily offered

Legal normally covered in contracts (some of them legally cannot be investigated)

Preparedness trainings/info/…

Prepared ness trainings/ info/…

Financial compensation of material and moral damages (various types of grants, etc.)

Victim-witness protection (if necessary)

Financial compensation of material and moral damages (various types of grants, etc.)

Financial normally covered in contracts and by insurance

Psychologica l assistance and longterm rehabilitation

Awareness program informing victims about their rights and benefits

Transport to the place

Psychological support (hot lines - psycho assistance); professional and continuous antistress/ antishock/ PTSD/ anti-fatigue

Victimwitness protection (if necessary)

Psychological support

Preparedness trainings/info/ …

Awareness program informing victims about their rights and benefits

Awareness program informing victims about their rights and benefits

Long-term rehabilitation. New reality

Secondary

Tertiary (indirect)

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Direct victims require medical assistance on a long-term basis with the same applying to psychological or psychiatric assistance and surveillance. One important form of working with victims is home patronage, because a majority may not leave the city where the attack occurred and do not ask for assistance. Information regarding stress, children phobias and similar disorders should be delivered not only to parents but also to those who deal with people suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Much attention should be paid to preventive measures of anxiety, speech aggression, xenophobia, and enemy search. Psychologists believe that even five to ten years after a terrorist attack, 20% of adults and 5% of children suffer from PTSD. These people may exhibit depression, lack of an interest to live and no desire to work. In particular, this can be damaging for children who were among direct victims in some countries. It is necessary to pay attention to all details: how each child-victim plays, his/her perception of colors, taste, and so forth. Therefore, parents must be taught to recognize factors that need attention. Psychologists who worked with children from Beslan, for example, observed children’s anxiety as well as their complaints of having nightmares. Some children even played making believe they were terrorists or hostages. Here the community’s role, in a broad sense, is crucial, as it is the community that may organize and facilitate information-gathering and dispatching while being close to those victims. Of course, it is impractical to impose psychological assistance; this should be a free-will decision on the part of the individual victim. On the other hand, a quite powerful and successful instrument of assistance and psychological rehabilitation is religion. Relatives who lost family members should have legal and financial assistance as well as access to psychological assistance. An awareness program that informs victims about their rights and benefits should also be introduced, and further, it is the role of the communities to ensure that information is delivered and understood by those concerned. Responders and those who assist them should be informed about lessons learned and general investigation information. Medical and psychological assistance should be provided, especially for those who continue to work with victims on a long-term basis. New training should also be available for after-event considerations. Here, a rather professional community may further facilitate and assist those victims in bouncing back after being involved in a devastating crisis. Society should be informed about investigation and victim assistance programs, including psychological assistance available through help lines. Again, communities are the main channels in supporting victims in their jurisdiction, and civil defense information should be delivered with after-event consideration, among other activities aimed at adjusting to the “new reality.” Civil society plays a crucial role in supporting victims and effectively steers communities and their members back to leading a normal life. For various reasons, the state alone cannot manage all long-term actions and often sufficient financial and human resources are not available to deliver assistance and support to victims. It is, therefore, important that the state establishes wide cooperation with NGOs and communities. In the case of a terrorist attack, informal care providers, namely teachers, supervisors and religious leaders, are instrumental in providing information and support to victims and their families as well as helping to manage any psychological consequences of the event. Unfortunately, this non-governmental sector is often insufficiently developed and is immature; therefore, adequate cooperative mechanisms and information channels are neither established in advance nor at and after the crisis.

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Donations are an indispensable means of providing financial support to victims. However, only in cases where making a charitable donation is trusted will people typically distribute money. This is important, wherein having such a channel is possible to achieve a reasonably balanced and equal distribution of necessary funds to all types of victims. Here, the communities play a major role by providing legitimate and appropriate control over the collection and distribution of funds. In those undeveloped civil societies, bureaucracy and corruption separate people and the state. Overall, an atmosphere of distrust between the population, authorities and public organizations exists. Thus, an important long-term role of civil society, in general, and of the various geographical, professional and other communities, in particular, is to establish trust and cooperative mechanisms between the parties. Only in such a trusted environment will long-term assistance and support be reasonably provided that involve multiple state and private donations and funds. It is vital to organize victim peer support groups where victims can talk openly about their feelings and grieve without shame or pressure. It is strongly advised that communities take the initiative to organize these groups, as they will be seen as the least intrusive parties. It is also important to engage the public in civil contingency and disaster planning. Resilience assumes cooperation and communication across multiple organizations, professionals and community groups. Response organizations should facilitate collaboration, cooperation and coordination between government, local authorities, businesses and communities, and voluntary and other organizations. As the state often falls short in persuading their response management team to such deep levels of society, communities must play the larger role.

5. Training to All Societies Accessible and adoptable training should be provided to all people, as we are all potential victims. Knowledge of civil defense has already saved many lives; therefore, it is necessary to • • • •

Reanimate courses of civil defense, making them absolutely accessible and add new information about possible threats Information should be delivered in simple and easy to remember forms (for example, comics and leaflets) For children, special classes should be organized by their schools Citizens should be taught – How to speak with terrorists (psychology) – How to maintain water balance – How to economize force and rehabilitate muscles in case of long immobility – Basic survival skills – Safe behavioral patterns, in particular in normal life, as well as during and following a rescue operation

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Special joint programs such as intelligence services/communities for a special category of victims who might be forced to be suicide-bombers should be included: a. b. c. d.

e.

provision of financial and humanitarian assistance to widowers, prostitutes or raped women in closed/marginalized communities explanatory work with fathers and heads of other religious groups should be organized through their leaders. pensions should be provided to widowed women and free access to professional retraining special telephone lines and witness protection programs should be established. Appropriate information should be distributed through reliable sources and made certain that the information reaches all people who might need it (a specific often-forgotten aspect is a multi-language operation). in Russia, for example, an adoption process of Chechen orphans by Chechen and/or Caucasian diasporas in regions outside of Chechnya should be organized

In all these cases, local, professional, religious and other communities should play the crucial role. As one may conclude, the number of actions that the communities can participate in is wide. Whether communities will make the step forward or not, only the future can predict. Only by taking this route through preparation, will communities improve their resilience, thereby making them solid and stable, and providing their members with proper assistance in bouncing back to a normal life. We all must further the concept of cooperative support and responsibility towards the state and other organizations as well as the local communities and general public. Only together can all stakeholders handle major crises and achieve resilience of the whole society.

6. Conclusion After September 11, terrorism tops the international security agenda and its risks have risen dramatically. Hostile nations, terrorist groups and other individuals may target civilians, institutions and/or infrastructures with weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive weapons. The goals of terrorism are to create panic and cause social systems to break as well as give the impression that powerful economic, military and political forces cannot protect ordinary people going through their daily routines. Terrorists want to show that the norms of civil society cannot protect the population from an intrusive force. The selected operational crisis management framework not only allows the analysis of individual cases, but also allows for a series of cases, thus looking for patterns.

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Use of the common framework permits one to draw conclusions out of different and generally non-comparable situations. The emotional consequences that terrorism poses challenges officials charged with planning prevention and responses to raise important questions regarding the public health system’s ability to understand and to prepare for such events. All analyses suggest that the role of communities in the response is to be broadened and that communities should be taken into the response management through cooperative support and communications mechanisms. This will help not only the responders but the communities as well, thus improving their resilience. Learning from lessons of other countries is important in minimizing the impact of a possible terrorist attack in one’s own country. Specific arrangements should be implemented to ensure that lessons are learned and that all activities, including support and assistance to victims, are readjusted to meet the requirements of the “new reality” after terrorist attacks. Learn from states that have experienced large-scale attacks, namely Israel, the USA, Russia, the UK, Spain, France, to mention only a few. Implementation of these measures is a significant effort in terms of cost, time, resources and political will, but in an attempt to protect the population and ensure society’s stability, as shown in this research, it is crucial to rethink the approach to response organizations. Here, the communities have an important role to play. When a disaster occurs, inadequate and uncoordinated efforts at providing assistance are often the norm around the world. Consequently, communities vulnerable to a hazard’s occurrence are at risk for a variety of reasons, including physical risk to persons and property as well as social and economic risks. Better means are needed to help communities prepare for and cope with terrorism. The main goal is to help local communities prepare for an event in such a way that response is effective, lives are saved, property damage is minimized, and the community can recover both physically as well as psychosocially. Until recently, most policy and research in the area of manmade and natural disaster readiness emphasized a “loss reduction” model. However, a shift to a more comprehensive model of community resilience includes ideas that are based on sustainability, systems, and community problem-solving approaches. In other words, rather than simply preventing loss, resilience assumes the concept of factors that promote healthy communities that can sustain and rebound from the effects of a perilous event. To achieve resilience, through enabling, inviting,

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planning for and supporting the active participation of communities will make the difference.

References [1] [2]

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Kevin R. Ronan and David M. Johnston, Promoting Community Resilience in Disasters Springer 2005 Lina Kolesnikova, Hostage taking and release. Nord-Ost theatre IDER 2004 Conference proceedings; Lina Kolesnikova, Long-term victim support, Crisis Response. Volume 3, Issue 2. Wotton: Gemini Press Limited; Lina Kolesnikova, Hostage situation, Intersec. Volume 17, Issue 4, April 2007. Lina Kolesnikova, Ibid. Lina Kolesnikova, Ibid. John White, Terrorism and homeland security, Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth 2006, p. 50. Erik De Soir, Psychosocial crisis intervention – Part II,. Crisis Response. Volume 3, issue 1. Wotton: Gemini Press Limited 2006. L. Alexander et al., How stressed are emergency workers?, Crisis Response. Volume 3, issue 1. Wotton: Gemini Press Limited 2006 Virginia Department of Emergency Management as an example http://www.vdem.state.va.us/ www.vdem.state.va.us/library/outreach/PSOConf/2005/Fernandez_SponVol.pdf -

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The Role of ‘Cultural Communities’ in Preventing Terrorism in the West Alain-Michel AYACHE Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM)

Abstract. The intention of this paper is to provide the few means by which Western governments may be able to stop terrorism or avoid its implantation in the West, specifically by becoming closer to “cultural communities.” This would mean by understanding their concept of “citizenship” and “allegiance” to their new country versus their motherland and also highlighting their reactions and analysis of social issues that are their main concerns. This might, perhaps, lead in many cases towards “dealing with the devil” rather than fighting it. Keywords. Arabs, authorities, cultural communities, immigrants, immigration countries, Islam, Security Forces, terrorism, Western countries

Introduction This article is based more on an empirical approach rather than a fully theoretical one. Although it will tackle modern theories directly related to terrorism issues, its perspective is limited to the perception of terrorism acts in the West, in general, and in North America, in particular, on how western societies view such acts and to whom they attribute them. But also, the author will attempt to explain how first and second generation immigrants tend to analyze “terrorism” as defined by the West and their role in either combating or adhering to the idea. In addition, this article provides solutions that might, perhaps, bring answers to current problems that Western countries encounter when dealing with social and political issues directly related to the recruitment of potential terrorists from within our countries!

1. Defining Terrorism The word “terrorism” as conceived in the West prior to 9-11 previously included all acts throughout the world that targeted mainly European governments and Israel since 1948. Hence, “terrorists” were designated as leftist groups∗ that supported to a certain extent the Marxist, Maoist and Leninist visions of the world or, in other words, those who supported the Soviet Union against “imperialist” America and its allies as well as *

Among those designated as terrorist groups operating mainly in Europe in the late 60s and early 70s include the West German “Baader-Meinhoh Group” later known as the “Red Army Faction (RAF),” Action Directe (France), The Red Brigades (Italy), The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Au Nidal Group (ANG) since its split from the PLO in 1974, among others. Among groups that won this label in the mid-70s, 80s and 90s are Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, and so forth.

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NATO. Although in many cases under the British Empire some social and ethnic movements started rebellions to seek independence, their fight was portrayed as terrorist acts. This was the case in Palestine under the British mandate when the Jewish Irgun group (1931-1948) attacked British positions and bombed the King David Hotel resulting in countless casualties. Later other populations across the world were also designated as “terrorists” when launching guerilla warfare against occupying foreign armies. Hence, and as we shall see throughout this article, what is considered by some as being a “terrorist act,” may, for others be “a fight for freedom.” The problem of agreeing upon a precise definition of “terrorism” and the difficulty of the international community to address the term is highlighted [1]. The result is translated into “Hundreds of definitions … offered in the literature. Some focus on the perpetrators, others on their purposes, and still others on their techniques” [2]. As Lawless states: these multiple definitions define terrorism in individual contexts and for the purpose of the specific treaty or convention and don’t provide a stipulative definition within which all terrorist acts could be assessed and determined [3]. The Supreme Court of Canada notes in the case of ‘Suresh vs. Canada’ [4] that: The absence of an authoritative definition means that, at least at the margins, ‘the term is open to politicized manipulation, conjecture, and polemical interpretation [5]. Since 9-11, this definition has taken a new approach where the term is now limited in general terms to portraying mainly Muslim countries and Al-Qaeda cells and their affiliates in the world. As for the methods used and considered as “terrorism acts” Lawless goes on to state that: Following 11 September 2001, the convention for the suppression of terrorist bombing saw ratifications increase from 28 States to 115. Similarly, the convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism saw ratifications increase from six States to 117 in the wake of the attacks [6]. Michael Dillon explains that in responding to contemporary terror, one should remember that: Terror has long distinguished the ways in which the west waged war and accounted for what it is to be modern. And neither is the peculiar terror of self-immolation in the cause of a higher cause confined to religious belief or peculiar to Islam [7]. He argues that “suicidal terrorism” is more a political phenomenon that expresses Islam and political modernity’s encounters in local and global struggles [8]. Although the designation of Muslim and Arab countries and groups being mainly the sole “terrorist” active cells or terrorist-harboring States is partly true, especially because of its wide visibility, it remains one aspect of the major global terrorism activities. Indeed, there are other groups as active as Al-Qaeda cells around the world that target other countries which are not necessarily western ones. For instance, the PKK attacks against Turkish institutions as well as other terrorist cells with specific agendas include the Corsican Liberation Front in France, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) the Basque group in Spain, Hezbollah beyond the Lebanese borders, Palestinians groups (such as Hamas, and other Syrian controlled Muslim and Arab groups), different Salafist groups operating in different Arab and North African countries, and the Timor Tigers in Sri-Lanka. Accepting the way in which these groups operate in the West begins by understanding their own populations, especially of those who chose to come and live in

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what is known as “immigration countries” such as North America, Australia and to some extent Europe. In fact, understanding the “Diaspora” of many cultures and countries will most certainly increase the chances of uncovering the degree of penetration of these communities in the West and the ways used by terrorist groups to infiltrate and take control of these communities when not recruiting the younger generation to commit acts of violence. Before transforming recruits into terrorist cells ready to act from within our societies, 9-11 can be considered as one of the main examples simply because those who perpetrated the acts were already living in the United States and acting “normally”! Hence, the main objective of this paper is to offer a guide to overcome the barrier of misunderstanding that separates our western societies from their newcomers. Knowing the communities and interacting with them is a bridge to fill the existing gaps between us especially in accepting newcomers as compatriots. In fact, recognizing the role of the cultural communities will help to strengthen ties between the security forces and these communities, thus undermining the possibility for terrorist groups to take control and recruit elements from among youngsters living in these communities. For this purpose, I have chosen to define the common denominator of “cultural communities” as Canadian communities that do not belong to the three main founding societies including the French, English and Aboriginese.

2. Identifying Them… 2.1 Cultural Communities: 1st and 2nd Generations In her paper entitled “Redefining ‘diaspora’, The challenge of connection and inclusion,” Rima Berns-McGown [9] states that: Current definitions of ‘diaspora’ contribute to the marginalization of immigrant, minority, and ethnic communities, in terms of both societal inclusion and inclusion in the foreign policy process. They therefore serve to undermine the stated goals of the Canadian multicultural project and to skew foreign-policymaking as policymakers seek to protect it from ‘special pleading’ of ethnic minorities. She adds that: A new definition of diaspora is needed–one that takes into account current political environments and that encompasses all peoples who find themselves in a diasporic situation [10]. In addition to examining the links that exist between understanding these “diasporic peoples” and preventing terrorism, defining “diaspora” remains an essential tool in drafting new sociocultural policies in Canada, in particular. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, immigrants from the first, second and in some cases third generations will be referred to as members of “cultural communities.” Although European migrants are also considered to be members, this definition is limited to those originally from Asian countries, the African continent, the Middle East as well as Latin America. The author will move from the assumption of what pushes a person toward qualifying as a member of a “cultural community” to the “visibility,” for example,

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color of one’s skin, traditional outfit worn or in some cases the spoken accent, especially among first generation immigrants. These communities are often located in urban areas. In Montreal, for instance, researchers have found that one out of four Montrealers were born outside of Canada, while this figure is much higher in Toronto and Vancouver, where the estimates vary from 40% to 65% [11]. In addition, this paper refers to a specific category of immigrants that includes, but is not limited to, the 13 to 35+ year-old generation. 2.2 Portrait The sample is composed primarily of men and women who are politically active (political activists), economic migrants and political “refugees” as well as “visibly active” extremists with specific agendas. Thus, understanding their behaviors will likely result in preventing certain troubling activities that might lead to terrorist acts on Western soil.

3. Identifying the Different Components 3.1. Political Activists Political activists are typically not involved in the host country’s politics but rather in their own homeland politics. They have a tendency to pursue these political affairs on both internal and external levels throughout the immigration countries to either search for or control their diaspora for fundraising activities in financing certain legal or illegal activities, and in some cases, to help in purchasing military technologies and equipment in the west and send it to their motherland. One example includes the Hezbollah activities in North America where the FBI has caught a great number of U.S. and Canadian citizens from Lebanese descent attempting to purchase night vision goggles, communications equipment and drone technology [12] to be sent to Beirut for Hezbollah use. Illicit drug activities also figure on such curricular with the same end result. 3.2. Economic Migrants Many of the known theories in existing literature focus on the determinants of asylum seeking or on migration in a more general way. They distinguish between factors leading persons out of their motherland and factors pulling people toward wealthier countries, particularly Western ones [13]. Economic migrants are officially in the host country to build a new life for their families. While generally true, some cases have shown that “economic migration” can be used by some groups to establish a “bridge head” in the West and implant a new population that could be entirely controlled by agenda oriented groups. Example of the Hezbollah cells in the U.S. and Canada are explicit [14].

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3.3. Political Refugees Political refugees are individuals who often abuse the humanitarian policies and facilities that certain western countries offer persecuted persons. After destroying their official papers, this is the best way to enter a country, for instance, Canada. Although post-9-11 made this process more difficult to accomplish, there are still many cases where so-called political “refugees” migrate to Canada and other countries seeking “asylum” from persecution in their own countries. The latter category is extremely important to examine for different reasons. First is the fact that these refugees often come from troubled countries where they are indeed persecuted for their political beliefs. However, others belong to opponent groups that could also be responsible for terror activities in their own countries. One example that still creates controversy is the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who, according to well-known observers of Syrian politics, is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, or enough grounds for Syrian authorities to place him on a black list. On the other hand, the Syrian regime is known to be one of the most oppressive regimes in the region. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria played a major role in encouraging “resistance” in Iraq [15] while in parallel, Syrian officials tried to send a message to the U.S. signaling their willingness to cooperate. This is how the list of undesirables including Arar’s name was sent to the U.S. and triggered the “humanitarian” crisis that followed [16]. Although there is no proof that Arar conducted criminal activities, the fact that he was considered a political activist in Syria and in Canada resulted in his becoming the center of a major dispute that affected the reputations of both Canada and the U.S.

4. Identifying Current Problems Now that the “diasporic” population has targeted in this paper, the reality that surrounds it is now presented.. 4.1. Who is Canadian? Legally answering this question is simple since it designates all persons born in Canada or those who were chosen to immigrate to this land and after fulfilling the prerequisites to obtain the citizenship asked for naturalization. However, in today’s reality, a legally Canadian person is often designated by her/him having membership in a community, or in other words, one may be Italian or Greek, Sikh, Indian, Arab, Jewish, Pakistani, and so forth. Rarely are those who identify themselves as “Canadian” when first asked despite the fact that they have in common the Canadian passport! Other less common aspects can be found in being fans and supporters of the same hockey, football or soccer teams. A look at the number of non-Canadian flags displaced on balconies and on cars is an indication of a person’s belonging to the nation he/she proudly displays. A comparison with the United States hints at the difference in mentalities that exists even between the U.S. “cultural communities” and the Canadian ones. Hence, while in the United States, belonging to the U.S. and the American Nation is seen explicitly through the Stars and Stripes proudly displayed on doors or practically all houses, but through the strong “American Nationalism” in Canada, this “behavior” is limited to those

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parents whose sons are fighting in Afghanistan. As for Quebec, the Fleurdelisé is more a sign of belonging to the “Quebec nation” rather than to Canada! Even more complicated in Canada is when it comes to linguistics. Indeed, a person living in Canada should belong to either one of the three main groups of languages: the Anglophones (English-speaking), the Francophones (French-speaking) and the “Allophones” (all other spoken languages). While the first two are the main European founded and only Canadian official languages, the rest is considered as being “communities’ languages.” Thus, the complication arises when second generation immigrants are raised in either one or both official languages but are still considered as linguistically belonging to a “cultural community.” Sumaira Shaikh explains that, despite the fact that she was born Canadian and raised in Canada in English, she still was designated as being “other” than Canadian. Her brown skin was the primary reason behind which the school decided to put her in an English-as-a-second-language (ESL) class: …While I spoke no language other than English until I was about nine, I was told by the school that I needed to take English-as-a-second-language (ESL) classes in Bradford. Of course, the only other people in my ESL class were a few black kids and a girl who spoke Portuguese. I didn’t last long in the class –they quickly realized I didn’t need it– but the fact that I was put there based on my color stays with me–and scarred me. With that negativity began the journey of creating me [17]. Recognition of belonging to the Canadian Nation then becomes problematic so long as no exact definition as to what is Canada and what is the Canadian nation becomes found, beyond the multiculturalism reality that proves each day the need to be redefined. Jack Jedwab highlights the problems of belonging through analyzing the concept of dual citizenship and the sentiment of being Canadian. He asserts that: Canadians take their citizenship for granted and thus do not possess a strong enough sense of belonging to Canada, on the one hand, and the degree to which Canadians positively evaluate their own degree of belonging to the country and the significant value they accord to their citizenship on the other [18]. He then refers to authors’ works that qualify Canada as a “Non-Nation” country before challenging “those who make the claim that Canadian identity is fragile and that dual citizenship erodes our collective sense of ‘Canadianess’” to provide “strong evidence (empirical or otherwise) in support of such claims”[19]: Author Yann Martel referred to Canada as the ‘greatest hotel on Earth’ upon accepting a Booker Prize in 2002, Michael Bliss has called Canada a ‘working non-nation’, Andrew Cohen a ‘virtual nation’, and Allan Gregg a ‘no-name supermarket’ [20]. Christopher Stuart Taylor presents a checklist of what he considers as being taken for granted as a “typical Canadian: He or she was born in Canada, speaks English and/or French, celebrates Christmas, is Christian, plays hockey, owns a snow shovel, drinks Canadian beer, has a barbeque on Canada Day, watches hockey every Saturday night, is friendly and polite, has liberal views, dislikes American hegemony but

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watches American TV shows, loves their neighbor, and generally cares about the wellbeing of others … you must be white [21]. Although he admits that his list is incomplete, the question he raises is full of meaning and directly addresses today’s problems: When you think of Canada or a Canadian, you don’t think of a Muslim woman in a hijab, or a Sikh man in a turban, let alone a black man [22]. Hence, adopting Canada as its own country became to members of the cultural communities a challenge by itself especially when they have to make the necessary effort to get the “Nation” to accept them as “full” members and the society as an integral part of it. Meimuna Ahmed Gilao, a fourth year university female student in Toronto born Somali and immigrated with her parents to Canada in 1991 at the age of five years, has explored what she called as her “psychological implications of being displaced” [23]. More than a decade after her arrival to Canada she realized that she finally belonged to the “Canadian” nation rather to Somalia where she doesn’t identify neither with the country nor with her inhabitants. But she still feels that she is rejected in Canada and subject to racism of a different kind, the one that forbids immigrants to work in their field once landed and many years after, since the standard is that they need to possess the “Canadian experience”: My mother and father worked hard; they had to earn a living. But what jobs were available to my parents, who came from so-called foreign educated background? Could they continue to work in their fields of learning? The answer of course was no, because according to Canadian standards they just weren’t qualified. And so this marked our first sense of rejection, essentially for my parents. They learned that immigrants and refugees, despite whatever educational backgrounds you came from, your identity and qualifications before Canada dissolved overnight. Whatever prestige or wealth you came from was dismissed instantly, and the opportunity to recover your identity and continue to work in your field of study was rejected [24]. This rejection is not only proper to the first generation of immigrants, but also affects their descendents, especially if the concerned are not Caucasians. In Meimuna’s case, it did affect her sense of belonging to the nation and her lack of integrating her own society back home where she did not feel comfortable as she did in Canada made out of her a citizen of nowhere: Canada has rejected me in so many ways–its people, its society. I have experienced racism, in both silent ways as well as clear open ones. Growing up I always found the school system to be lacking assistance to those kids who came from minority backgrounds. Little encouragement was given to us and there was little understanding of who we were and what we needed to succeed [25]. This ignorance of the background of these cultural communities is important to be addressed especially that often, the actions and reactions of their members are based on their acceptance, marginalization or rejection by Canada. The last two lead to finding an alternative way to acceptance by often opening doors to street gangs or terrorist activities, or by simply going into near complete isolation, that is, consolidating the formation of a ghetto where internal matters of all kinds are dealt with no place made to the Canadian judicial system and police intervention.

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Hence, the feeling of rejection that these communities encounter opens the doors to groups with specific agendas to recruit among them, highlighting the necessity to form a homogenous cell to officially counter the Canadian rejection. Accepting them and trying to help them in integrating the Canadian society, is by far the most important aspect to deal with because it is the one that leads to identifying problems that these communities encounter in their daily life in their new host country. This is a very important aspect that Meimuna Ahmaed Gilao explains: We were treated as equals to kids whose parents have been here for generations and there was no sensitivity to the trauma we had experienced and from which we were trying to recover, no understanding that we came from utter displacement. This marked my first sense of rejection growing up–within the school system, where I sensed I wasn’t equal to my peers and I noticed that they weren’t fighting to survive like I was [26]. Thus, if those “specificities” are adequately addressed by authorities, communities that are considered “visible minorities” can then fully belong to the system as such without being targeted or isolated pushing them towards establishing ghettos within our society where security has practically no access while potential terrorist groups can establish solid cells and start recruiting among their members… 4.2. Getting Communities out of Isolation and into the “Society” This is why all level of governments should place emphasis on erasing some fears that inhabit the minds of the members of these communities. Indeed, as stated earlier, many communities came from countries where security forces are perceived as the aggressor. Coming to Canada to build a new life does not necessarily mean these communities have put behind their past, knowing that in many cases former security officials or officers also got residency permits to come to Canada and that they might be targeted after all by them should they try to denounce them to Canada’s authorities. Added to this is the fear from everything that is related to security and the lack of Canadian authorities to understand this fear and its causes and how to address it. This is translated on the grounds by a separation between the authorities and the population of these specific urban areas where cultural communities are concentrated. 4.3. Security Forces Considered As the “Oppressor” If one looks to the major urban areas where immigration is strong, one notices that the police and security forces are often considered as the oppressor while the young generation is considered as the victim. Many studies [27] have shown that poverty is the main aspect that leads to such concentration of populations in urban areas. However, despite the fact that poverty also touches many “European-Canadian” communities, the majority of poor populations remain “visible” communities or minorities. On the other hand, and in spite of the fact that poverty leads in many cases to civil unrest in our modern societies, the absence of knowing the other remains the number one fact that leads to trouble.

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4.4. Communities Are Considered As “The Enemy from Within” The opposite is also true; when the mainstream population sees trouble as a source of internal instability and terrorism and points to immigration as the source to fight, these cultural communities (or at least those of specific backgrounds) are seen as “the enemy from within.” These perceptions often lead to negative outcomes such as the following. 4.4.1. Communities Tend to Close in on Themselves The immediate effect of the cultural communities is the feeling of being rejected by the system and by the society as such, which leads to developing their own world and society within the hosting society. Of course, such a situation would encourage a parallel economy where everything is controlled by the strongest gang in the street and where common persons are subject to intimidation in their own community and even to further grave actions aimed at them should they try to appeal to the country’s legal system or security forces. Such a scenario is likely to generate inter-gang relations that might lead to serving specific interests such as acts of terrorism. 4.4.2. Don’t Trust the Authorities The fact that these cultural communities mistrust their own police and security forces back home is more likely to consider the same approach towards our security forces. This is why building a bridge of trust becomes a priority to reach out to them and encourage them to become part of the forces … not for show or because it is politically correct or for equal opportunity policies, but especially to serve and protect their own against intimidation and wrongdoings. 4.4.3. Likely to Close Their Eyes on any Wrongdoing When mistrust exists, it is difficult to break the wall of isolation and call upon the police and other security forces to help. This is especially true for different cultural communities who immigrated to Canada mainly from third world countries where police, security forces and the army are the primary instruments of the regime’s repression. If one considers the cultural background of those communities, indeed, immigrants and/or refugees coming from countries ruled by dictators are most likely to avoid any contact with security forces. They tend to solve their own problems among themselves often portraying police forces as being biased against them, especially in poor neighborhoods. This is also true when it comes to areas where the population’s concentration is mainly immigrants. For instance, in the area of Montreal North where the majority of the population is from different ethnic backgrounds, police intervention tends to be perceived as against the youth of these communities. Many incidents between the police and the youth that resulted in death outcomes have given the media and the mainstream population an image of non-integrated communities and raised fears of civil unrest similar to the ones that occurred in the Parisian suburbs in 2005. Another problem that is equally important is the fear of retaliation from community gang leaders who tend to take over control of the streets when police deterrence is reduced to maintaining a limited scope of daily security. Add to this that in many cases, and due to their cultural backgrounds, some communities tend to solve internal issues more through mediation conducted by the elderly of their communities

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or even religious figures, thus keeping out any Canadian official or judicial intervention. This is especially true since authorities are perceived as far from knowing or even understanding these diverse cultures and needs. Other important aspects tend to push communities into not involving authorities in their preoccupation, namely the lack of trust in the judicial system. Although our democracies focus on the right of the individual to be considered innocent until proven guilty, in many cases, the judicial system and its bail system raise the fear among those communities of possible retaliation against any denunciation of wrongdoing of a gang member, especially if this person is released on bail prior to his trial. This is important to understand since those communities are accustomed to their own judicial system which often is oppressing, and accused persons are often imprisoned and even tortured with no possibility of bail. Hence, the paradox in such a situation is that communities tend to reject such a system when they are targeted but support it when it comes to “real” criminals!

5. Recommendations on How to Reach Out Getting closer to these communities is a must to better understand their fears and expectations, their problems and needs. Hence, building bridges become a necessity. For this to succeed, the following is suggested: 5.1. Regularly Visiting Community Leaders Indeed, establishing a continuous dialogue with the community’s leaders is one major way to communicate and gain the trust of those communities. These visits should consist of courtesy and exchange of ideas so authorities can get a better knowledge of problems and expected solutions. CSIS’ visits that often are seen as offending to some communities should be replaced by a different kind of “friendly” approach based on understanding rather than inquisitive. Gaining the trust of the leaders would certainly help in identifying a possible sleeping threat and ways to stop it. 5.2. Establishing Common Activities Aimed at the Younger Generation Commander Fady Dagher [28], a second generation Lebanese-Canadian of the Montreal Police force, explained that his “community-based approach” changed the way the police force works with poor neighborhoods and the advantages of focusing on prevention rather than on repression. The positive results he obtained through dealing with young people were reflected in a sustainable change in the streets compared to a high criminality score in the same area years ago [29]. Commander Dagher highlighted the importance of reaching out to youth in schools at a young age, organizing social and sports activities with them [30] and explaining the pros and cons of the SaintMichel neighborhood, comparable to the Parisian suburbs in term of the population’s profile. He stressed that ongoing youth activities and one-to-one meetings is important in getting closer to youth and helping them to avoid falling into street gang schemes. He also explained that his role is not only limited to security and dealing with troubled youth but also in educating and helping the families of these young people to cope with their children and with their new society. “I try, along with my police officers, to establish a link of trust with these populations. Knowing them and their habits and our

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concerns is avoiding upcoming troubles such as what happened in Paris in 2005.” He then pointed to the fact that his neighborhood’s policy has now become an example seriously studied by French authorities in an effort to implement an equivalent one in Parisian suburbs in a move to avoid a repetition of the civil unrest of 2005. 5.3. Encouraging Security Officers to Learn the Language of the Communities Although encouraging security officers to learn the language of the communities is not mandatory, engaging in better communications relations will help improve communitypolice relations by showing that diverse cultures are important to the authorities. Being able to understand one’s language also minimizes barriers and leans towards empathy between both sides. The message sent to communities is that authorities are willing to “adopt” a different culture’s language, especially because Canada is based on multiculturalism. At least, acknowledging allophone languages and mastering some words can certainly bring a smile on the faces of a community, thus breaking down the wall of silence and/or mistrust between minority citizens and police. Even more helpful would be to recruit security officials with the same or close backgrounds among the communities. For this reason, an official who speaks another’s language fluently would certainly be advantageous in opening the dialogue within a particular community [31]. Recruiting more members of minority communities is another important aspect in demonstrating that local security authorities do not represent only the main founding communities or the Caucasian society as such! For example, by engaging members of diverse communities among the police forces will point out that authorities are inclined to understanding the needs of these communities. Further, participation in activities geared toward youth will show parents that authorities seek a better future for these youngsters and aim to eliminate illicit activities that youth tend to adopt when no other alternative or hope seems possible or when their parents must hold down more than one job to sustain a family. 5.4. Build a Realistic and Interactive Approach toward Mutual Trust In an effort to ease potential community tensions, building a realistic and interactive approach toward mutual trust is necessary. As an example, acknowledging matters that are considered as either important or not important from community members and, by the same token, sharing with them the incidents considered police priorities or nonpriorities is important. One would likely be surprised about the numerous small but very important issues that are of major concern to communities that were never thought of before. Finally, the other side of the coin is often represented by the dark side that leads toward street gangs and terrorism. Therefore, on the following points related to cultural communities: 5.4.1. Political Activism Mobilization often occurs when an outspoken figure suddenly appears in a cultural community to denounce an official foreign affairs policy aimed at one’s motherland. This is true, for example, when an official stance is taken of the Canadian government regarding one country in particular or even to a specific international event. The most explicit example is the Lebanon War of 2006 that opposed Hezbollah fighters to the

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Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) where Canada’s Prime Minister, Conservative Stephen Harper officially stated that “Israel had the right to defend itself” and that its heavy bombardment of Lebanese infrastructures was “measured” [32]. While this declaration was seen as a logical conflict outcome, it was interpreted by the Muslim Shiite Lebanese community as an insult to the “heroic resistance” of its sons in Lebanon. The official Canadian speech was perceived as a biased stance towards Israel and an anti-Muslim message that included not only Lebanese Shiite Muslim groups but also many other Sunni Muslims groups from all Arab and Muslim countries [33]. Despite that Canada organized the largest evacuation in its history from a troubled zone where most of the evacuees were Lebanese Shiite Muslims residing in Lebanon but holding Canadian citizenship, its conservative government was still portrayed by the Muslim community as a whole as a pro-Israeli and anti-Muslim, anti-Arab government. This triggered many demonstrations across Canada with a particular one held in Montreal where Hezbollah supporters succeeded in winning the support of Quebec and Canadian MPs to march along their side with a Hezbollah flag battling the wind. This created a controversy that led to excuses from some opposition political parties whose members marched alongside Hezbollah demonstrators. This occurred because Canada had outlawed Hezbollah and put it on the terror list following the U.S. policy against North American groups accused of harboring and supporting terrorist activities throughout the world, in general, and North America, in particular [34]. Consequently, in such cases, authorities can locate the organizers and follow their activities through monitoring different aspects of their behavior including not only their financial one but also implication in their communities’ affairs and their direct entourage. Signs such as their external richness, frequent trips to troubled countries and electronic purchases are also important to monitor and closely examine. Voice over IP (VoIP) technology is one major means for groups to use in communications methods that are difficult to trace. Indeed, VoIP technology is often used by terrorist groups and various cells around the world to communicate with sleeping cells or contacts in the West. Importantly, in Third World countries communications are closely monitored by regimes and secret services making this nearly impossible for terrorist cells to use traditional communications outlets. International communications are all made through an operator switchboard that is often linked to the secret service monitoring facility. VoIP, on the other hand, has the advantage of using the Internet that is difficult to be monitored by those regimes as well as using direct links to the outside world. To illustrate, this would be a person living, for example, in Canada or the U.S. who purchases a VoIP line from companies in either country, pays through a credit card and receives the router box that decodes the Internet line into a VoIP line. This person then sends the router box to cells operating in Third World countries where they have access to Internet connections through different means. All they must do is connect the router box to the Internet and they have instant access to all of North America and Europe for less than $30 a month paid directly on a credit card with no authority hassle whatsoever, thus enabling them to keep in touch with each other far from the local authorities’ censorship or risk of uncovering their plot! Other sources to be closely monitored are community newspapers where Op-Ed pieces can usually give a good idea about a community’s mobilization with regard to a

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specific topic of major interest to terrorists but also to identify upcoming activities that might be used to undermine a government policy or to organize a demonstration. For that reason, authorities should be quick to understand the language of these communities. Often, the best way is to recruit a member from these communities so misinterpretation of the message’s content can be avoided, especially because spoken regional languages can differ drastically from region to region within the same country. This is primarily true when understanding a terrorist’s behavior in a given situation. Indeed, let us assume that the country where terrorists are currently living is organizing a major event involving activities with officials from their motherland to which they are opposed. The fact that the background problems are known by authorities and the anticipated reactions are known as well through an analysis of their community media, will certainly help tremendously in anticipating problems and pushing toward a better behavioral approach from both the authorities and representatives of the concerned population. Another aspect is understanding where they are coming from. For instance, and referring again to the Middle East countries, communities often transport their conflicts along with them. Hence, the Arab-Israeli conflict would then be transferred to Canadian soil and confrontations could occur in urban areas where concentration of different cultural communities is concentrated. Montreal’s example is one among many where Jewish institutions have been targeted by young Arab activists in retaliation to Israeli security policies in Gaza, the West Bank or even against Hezbollah in Lebanon [35]. This could also be applied to other communities with divergent viewpoints in their motherlands that could trigger confrontation in countries where they currently live [36]. In fact, the latter example is important because it can divide a cultural community into several entities opposed to each other and in many cases terrorizing their own and introducing a variable that is out of comprehensible reach by Canadian authorities. However, in other cases, CSIS and the RCMP have established links with both sides to better understand their reactions but with no solid effect other than playing the observer’s role while concerned parties clash in different ways away from the public and media coverage. For this reason, by getting to know a cultural community’s own political divisions, authorities can better understand the risks of transporting their problems to the West into their new homelands. Therefore, it is advisable that a pre-emptive approach be implemented based on mutual understanding between a cultural community and the security services. Security officials need to know that often, these populations come from countries where security officials are corrupted or express the oppressor regime’s social policies. Therefore, the trust is absent and these populations tend to look at the security forces as enemies rather than as protectors. This is why an educational approach is also necessary to reduce the mistrust and encourage these communities to openly speak to security forces of the Western democracies.

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5.4.2. Building Trust Building trust necessitates several steps to be put forward. Among them are: 5.4.2.1. Identifying the “Real” Community Leaders. Typically, officials tend to establish contacts with an outspoken person and also have tendencies to wrongly designate a person as a representative of his/her community. This should be changed and real leaders need to be identified as those who can influence and seek better conditions for their own people in immigration countries. 5.4.2.2. Establishing a Series of Regular Meetings with Main Community Leaders Once identified, establishing a series of regular meetings with main community leaders is a must that will lead to a better mutual understanding but will also encourage those leaders to speak out and, in some cases, denounce abuses made by some of their own. This would be true once trust is established and once the system proves effective. 5.4.2.3. Attending Official Ceremonies, Cultural and Religious Festivities Attending official ceremonies and cultural and religious festivities should be mandatory and not only reserved for politicians in time of elections, but especially to security officials. Communities will then feel that law enforcement is interested in their affairs in a positive way. Official presence will signal the importance it carries and make community members feel a part of the society they live in. However, when attending such events, security officials should act as guests and not as security agents. Their presence should be seen as participating in the event, not monitoring it, although “invisible” agents in some cases should be on hand to record behavioral attitudes regarding the different aspects of the ceremonies or festivities. 5.4.2.4. Encouraging Community Members to Join In The fact that security officials are present and taking part in the festivities could trigger interest within the younger generation who might consider joining in. Security officials should take the first step to encourage youth participation. By approaching the youth, authorities can begin building a bridge toward a better mutual understanding. This point is important to security forces, because by succeeding in recruiting persons from within cultural communities, they can then cover several aspects of police work that currently is delayed by the need of human resources capable of filling the tasks. Such activities can consist of but not be limited to translation of documents (for example, dialects, and so forth); explaining certain social aspects not obvious for Westerners; joining the forces and contributing to securing their own communities; participating in educating their own on how to integrate the “system” and “serve” it; representing or helping Western authorities as main negotiators (not only as translators) in key-negotiations with their motherland. However in doing so, some aspects should be avoided and taken into consideration namely, hiring a person(s) (for example, a translator) from the same monitored group because he/she might not accurately translate a document that is of major importance to the security forces. This is where the use of the services of other persons from different

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backgrounds but who master the language and are familiar with the traditions of those monitored becomes relevant. An example would be hiring skilled and knowledgeable Middle Eastern Christians from the first generation to help in understanding some particularities of their Arab Muslim compatriots that otherwise would be neglected by a regular translator or mistakenly identified leading to the opposite results that authorities are seeking. Overlooking unobvious connections among similar groups (for example, Shiites and Sunni radicals, PKK and Al-Qaeda) and potential sleeping cells and taking for granted that the two opposite groups will not establish limited cooperation that serves both goals. Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh argue that networks are easy to create and are often made from different nodes that connect if having common specific goals such as what opposes them to the West. Hence, disparate groups may find ways to benefit from the financing, arms shipments, logistical support, camaraderie, and other assets of kindred nefarious actors who can be accessed through such hubs [37] Daniel Byman provides a long list of loosely connected motivations for joining the (terror) network. These include disparate grievances about U.S. foreign policy in places such as Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia; hatred for Israel; concerns about civil versus religious governance; anger about perceived injustices against Muslim world; concerns about the intrusion of global markets and culture into traditional societies; and a variety of highly particular, local issues [38]. Trans-border community connections (for example, the USA & Canada) and the need to monitor people travelling from the U.S. to Canada (or other European countries) through new technological means such as a Carte a puce can be located on a drivers license or other regular ID cards that are used on a regular basis. The goal is to monitor from a distance the whereabouts of a specific population that is considered to be a risk to national security … of course within the limits of respecting privacy. But again, this by itself is a major debate because it relates to the main question of scarifying privacy in order to eradicate terrorism!

6. Conclusion It is rather difficult to conclude on such a topic, especially that needs further detailed and more in-depth field studies to fully understand the implications and inter-relations between immigrants, their motherland’s politics, our Canadian foreign policies–with regard to their homeland but also to other countries of major interest to them, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah–and, of course, terrorism. This is equally important to also understand their lobbying methods and recruiting strategies within federal and provincial ministries to fight or put down a law/bill that is contrary to their plans or agenda. A main example for Canada would be, for instance, the Hezbollah (Hizballah)** status of the “Terrorist Organization” and security bill or the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act, AKA Bill C36.

**

The Lebanon-Shiite-Based organization was named on Canada’s terror’s list on December 11th, 2002 by the Liberal Government. See the Public Safety Website for an exhaustive list of terror organizations in Canada, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp

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Hence, establishing solid links and building trust between authorities, on the one hand, and security forces, on the other, cultural communities would certainly help fill the gaps and lead toward a better society where racism is often the generator of misunderstandings and mistrust among communities. The recent election of the first black man to the White House might help bring better hope to cultural communities and encourage them to open more to authorities for a better collaboration and more integration within their own societies as full members equal to Caucasians.

References [1] M. Lawless, “Terrorism, an international crime,” International Journal. Vol. LXIII, no. 1, Winter 2007- 2008, pp. 139-159. [2] J. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorist, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, USA, 1999, p.11. [3] M. Lawless, Op. cit. p. 147. [4] Suresh vs. Canada, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2002, 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 at para. 94, noting the position of the Canadian Arab Federation, which was an intervener in the case. [5] Reported by M. Lawless, Op. cit. [6] M. Lawless, Ibid. p. 148. [7] M. Dillon, “Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence,” International Political Sociology, Vol. I, Issue 1, 2007, p. 7. [8] Ibid. [9] R. Berns-McGown, “Redefining ‘diaspora’, The challenge of connection and inclusion,” International Journal, Op. cit., pp. 3-20. [10] Ibid., p. 3. [11] For all data, see Statistics Canada, www.statcan.ca [12] G. Raz, « Hezbollah in the U.S.: Fundraising or Worse? », NPR, Online edition, July 25th, 2006, Washington, DC, USA, [13] J. Schoorl, Push and Pull factors of International Migration: A comparative Report. Luxembourg, Belgium: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000. [14] Ibid. [15] R. Mauro, “Syria’s Role in Destabilizing Iraq,” The Eurasian Politician, February 2004, Online Edition: http://users.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/2004/syria.htm [16] www.maherarar.ca [17] S. Shaikh, “Second-generation connection, Wanting to change my country – Canada », International Journal, Op.cit, p.123. [18] J. Jadwab, Dually divided? “The risks of linking debates over citizenship to attachment to Canada,” Ibid., p. 66. [19] Ibid.. [20] Ibid.. [21] C. Stuart Taylor, “Second-generation connections, Marginalizing Identity, The I and the other of a second-generation Canadian,” International Journal, Op. cit, p.127. [22] Ibid.. [23] M. Ahmaed Gilao, “Second-generation connections, Rejection and Possibility, Being ‘home’,” Ibid., p.116. [24] Ibid., p. 119. [25] Ibid., p. 120. [26] Ibid.. [27] M. Mourani, La face cache des gangs de rue, Montréal, Éditions de l’Homme, c2006, 211 pages. Also: R.-A. Brisebois, Parcours de parents immigrants dont le fils a fait l’expérience d’un gang de rue et d’une institutionnalisation : vécu familial bouleversé, Thèse de mémoire en Criminologie (M. Sc. Thesis), Facutlé des études supérieures, Université de Montréal, 2007, x, 151 feuillets. [28] Interview conducted especially for the purpose of this paper. [29] Also read Newspaper article: K. Gagnon, « La police tricotée serré », La Presse,September 23rd, 2008, Montreal, Québec, Online edition: http://www.cyberpresse.ca/actualites/regional/montreal/200809/23/01-22798-la-police-tricoteeserre.php [30] K. Gagnon, « Jouer au basket avec les jeunes, ça n’est pas le rôle de la police » Ibid. [31] Ibid.

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[32] M. Blanchfield, “Harper stands by his comment on Israel’s ‘measured’ response” The Gazette, Tuesday, July 18th, 2006 edition, Montreal, Qucbec, Online edition: http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=296184ac-63d1-4dca-a85c1552513c7490 [33] Canada.com, News report, “Harper blocks Lebanon resolution,” Friday, September 29th 2006, online edition: http://paulinebrock.newsvine.com/_news/2006/09/29/380040-harper-blocks-lebanon-resolution [34] CTV.ca, “Thousands in Montreal protest Lebanon war” Sunday, August, 6th, 2006, online edition: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060806/montreal_protest_ 060806/20060806?hub=CTVNewsAt11 [35] J. Ravensbergen, and A. Coates, “12 teens escape firebombing of Jewish school,” The Gazette, & Canada.com, Monday, September 4th 2006 online edition of Canada.com: http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=58451a5a-d2bb-4eb3-9a3b5eb8ce83aad5&k=87848 [36] See also, C. Ghorra-Gobin, “Political representation as response to urban rioting, A comparative perspective” in Eurozine, December 11th 2006, Online edition: http://eurozine.com/pdf/2006-12-11ghorragobin-en.pdf [37] R. Matthews and G. Shambaugh, “The Limits of Terrorism: A Network Perspective” in International Studies Review, Vol. 7, Issue 4, Blackwell Publishing, AZ, U.S.A., p.617 [38] Ibid.

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Concluding Chapter Suggestion: Counter the Threat Together! Ahmet EKICI 1 and Sıddık EKICI 2 Abstract. The issues presented and discussed in the book covered various topics about terrorism. However, three primary issues received close attention: (1) terrorism and its causes, (2) organizational and structural approaches to terrorism and (3) civil society and counter terrorism operations. Reaching out to these topics was no mistake because if we want to go “Together Against Terrorism,” we must take a holistic approach in covering all corners and all issues that may help us better understand the threat. Keywords. terrorism, causes, prevention, resilience, community, countering terrorism

Introduction The world has been experiencing terrorism for a significant period of time. Therefore our collective knowledge about terrorism is at a high level. However, the world is experiencing trouble in countering terrorism together because of various reasons (i.e. national interest, politics etc). That is why counter terrorism policies need change. This book is the result of one of many efforts that aim to bring together different people from different countries in order to develop more effective counter terrorism policies that can be applied in many countries. Consequently, this chapter provides the findings of the book which emphasize the complexity of terrorism and the application of unorthodox counter approaches that include the community to combat terrorism.

1. Terrorism and Its Causes Simply attempting to understand terrorism and its causes requires extensive research and analysis. As previous studies have revealed, finding a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism is not an easy task. However, when observing terrorists from the practical perspective of who they are and why and how they become terrorists, the defining issue becomes more clearly understood. For example, in the work presented by Emile Sahliyeh and Erik Case, a better insight was gained as to the role that government plays in creating terrorists. Angus Smith, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, brought up and uniquely examined the puzzling question of why some 1 2

Ph.D., Chief Superintendent, Turkish National Police

Ph.D. Candidate- Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas; Police Major, Turkish National Police

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individuals actually contribute to the cause of terrorists and become sympathizers of their organizations due to wrong naming. smail Yilmaz, followed by Silvia Ciotti Galletti and Sarah Huggins, gave an in-depth discussion including specific variables that could impact an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. Ahmet Ekici and Orhan Erdem argued how even law enforcement could contribute to terrorism through its use of non-democratic, harsh, military tactics that might lead to public dissatisfaction and, in time, encourage certain individuals to sympathize with terrorists and subsequently join them. Finally, Nickolaj F. Starodob revealed how the use of toxic substances can further the complex topic of terrorism. In brief, part one contained the “no size fits all” argument in attempting to explain terrorism and terrorists. The chapters revealed that, terrorism is a very distinct and complicated process wherein countless variables and factors must be considered in determining how, when, where and why a person becomes a terrorist in the first place.

2. Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism The second theme, organizational and structural approaches to terrorism, revealed another challenge. Although terrorism remains a worldwide major threat to society, and both government and private organizations throughout the world have joined together in ways to be prepared and respond to its devastating effects, it appears that different countries have distinct approaches and understanding in counter terrorism tactics. For example, Mahmoud Sadri noted that Europe views terrorism as a communal problem whereas the United States believes it is a political problem. However, all societies concur that, because when and where the terrorists are going to hit is unknown, emergency management structures, policies and procedures must be ready to respond and more importantly, equipped to defy. David A. McEntire discussed some issues between emergency management and homeland security, followed by Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu and Bahadir Sahin who compared the crises management systems in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Sudha Arlikatti observed that India’s changes in emergency management policies clearly demonstrated the need for a collaborative organizational structure against terrorism. Finally, Velizar Shalamanov and his colleagues noted the necessity for integrating the various communication systems to create better collaboration between agencies. Part two revealed that one of the main goals of terrorist organizations is to create chaos and fear because that is the kind of atmosphere needed for terrorism to live and breed. The chapters in this section indicated that, although there are varying organizational and structural approaches to terrorism, the goal of terrorists can only be baffled with properly organized, trained and equipped individuals as well as appropriate programs and policies and a strong partnership between respective agencies and other parts of the community.

3. Civil Society and Counter Terrorism Operations The third main theme built its discussions on the arguments in relation to the structural and organizational approaches. Community involvement in counter terrorism was a center topic of discussion, and suggestions were provided on procedures to accomplish its mission. Societies have created all kinds of institutions and organizations to respond

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to their needs and problems. For instance, whatever the crisis may be, society must face and endure the problem or suffer the consequences. Thus, the question then becomes, why leave the protection of our communities simply to select/appointed people, groups, or organizations only? In part three, Sıddık Ekici and Ekrem Mu demonstrate that if law enforcement wants to have public cooperation and support, they do not have to “reinvent the wheel” the existing programs can be applied in practically all societies and by all law enforcements. Igor Osyka, Vladimir Fedorenko, Farhod Yuldashev, Fatih Demiroz, Igor Volkov, J.B. Hill and Benjamin Stipe each emphasized the importance of participation of civil society in the fight against terrorism with examples presented by Ukraine and Kyrgzystan. Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci, and I. Sevki Eldivan stated that the lessons learned from a 30 year long fight against PKK shows that the former tactics of reliance on only military power was not the most effective and efficient choice. The mistake was noticed, and organizations have now turned to win the hearts and minds of the public and get their support. Two experts in the area of terrorism, Richard H. Ward and Daniel J. Mabrey, argue that, “Yes! They might be terrorists but they are still human, and if we don’t view them as criminals who need treatment and who sooner or later will be back in the society, then we will be losing.” This was a striking reminder of another possible problem. Richard Warnes from the U.K. argued for creating a counter ideology as a response to terrorism, Lina Kolesnikova looked back on the lessons learned from previous attacks, and finally Alain-Michel Ayaache made it clear that we need to consider and find ways to include diverse communities in counter terrorism efforts The third part of the book proposed a new approach to counter terrorism. Because reliance on militaristic approaches obviously does not bring long term solutions, scholars and practitioners recommended that communities be included in counter terrorism policies. Basically, contemporary counter terrorism policies must be based on the entire community in order to be successful and provide long term solutions.

4. Conclusion Definitional issues, organizational and structural approaches, and responses to terrorism clearly indicate it is not yet possible to combat terrorism with full international support. However, terrorism still threatens the whole community and we need to protect them. At the very least, policies that can secure our own communities are a must; we cannot postpone their application. Therefore, contemporary counter terrorism policies should include the community as much as possible. In other words, the responsibility of securing our citizens should not be left to law enforcement alone, but rather law enforcement agencies must be supported by their communities through various programs. In addition, globalization has created more diverse communities. New policies that aim to create terrorism resistant communities can not be successful if they fail to consider minorities and obtain their support. Considering them as the others will undoubtedly leave a gap in counter terrorism applications. However, means to establish successful cooperation between the various parts of society necessitates wellmaintained communication to understand one another (through understanding among agencies as well as between agencies and the public, and between the different parts of the civil community, including minorities). Although that is likely to be a challenging

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issue, it is necessary! Suggestions made so far indicate that, whatever differences we might have in our communities, “we must counter the threat together.” That is why it is hoped that in the future, these topics will be covered by practitioners and academicians more in depth. And that they will diligently search for means to overcome the communication barriers, differences within communities, and problems of trust among our societies as a whole in order to build terrorism resistant communities.

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Subject Index Arabs 326 authorities 326 biosensors 73 causes 11, 343 citizen involvement 284 civil 1 civil security 155 civil society 196 collaborative public management 284 commitment to terrorism 34 community 1, 177, 343 community building 155 Community Oriented Policing 87 community policing 142 computer based training 155 control pollution 73 counter terrorism policy 264 counter-ideology 291 countering terrorism 343 counterinsurgency 264 counter-terrorism 1, 87, 177, 196, 291, 306 crises and extreme events 123 crisis management 123 cultural communities 326 cultural model 118 de-radicalization 253 deviant subcultures 118 DHKP/C 34 disaster management India 142 disasters emergencies 123 emergency communications 155 emergency management 109, 155 environmental objects low molecular weight toxins 73 European Union 123 express determination 73 expression 11 extremist subcultures 118 fish 264 forms of cooperation 211 governance 284

Homeland Security Information Network 230 homeland security 109, 230 ideology 291 immigrants 326 immigration countries 326 information sharing 230 Information Sharing Analysis Centers 230 instrumentalist model 118 insurgency 264 involvement in terrorism 34 Islam 326 jihadist 253 language 24 law enforcement 87 law enforcement methods 211 law enforcement practices 87 legislation 211 lessons learned 306 Morocco 59 new initiative 177 non-orthodox approaches 1 organizational model 118 PKK 87, 264 policy 1 political wing 264 politics 11 prevention 343 private-public partnership 230 program 177 public 211 radical 253 radicalization 24, 291 recovery 306 reintegrating terrorists 253 religious extremism 284 repression 11 resilience 109, 155, 177, 343 resiliency 306 resilient communities 142 resistance 109

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response management 306 roots 11 Security Forces 326 shanty towns 59 state 11 T2 and other mycotoxins 73 terrorism 1, 11, 24, 109, 142, 177, 211, 230, 284, 291, 326, 343 terrorism resistant 177 terrorist 11, 34, 253

terrorist attacks 59, 306 Turkey 264 Turkish Hezbollah 34 victims of terrorism 59 vulnerability 109 water 264 ways of decontamination 73 Western countries 326 winning hearts and minds policies 264

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Author Index Arlikatti, S. Ayache, A.-M. Balci, F. Case, E. Ciotti Galletti, S. Demiroz, F. Ekici, A. Ekici, S. Eldivan, I.S. Erdem, O. Fedorenko, V. Gergin, N. Grossman, I. Hill, J.B. Huggins, S.M. Kapucu, N. Kolesnikova, L. Mabrey, D.J.

142 326 264 11 59 284 87, 343 v, 1, 177, 343 264 87 196 264 155 230 59 123 306 253

McEntire, D.A. Mus, E. Osyka, I. Sadri, M. Sahin, B. Sahliyeh, E. Shalamanov, V. Smith, A. Starodub, N.F. Stipe, B. Unlu, A. Volkov, I. Ward, R.H. Warnes, R. Winbourne, J. Yilmaz, I. Yuldashev, F.

109 177 211 118 123 1, 11 155 24 73 230 123 284 253 291 155 34 284

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