Suicide as a Weapon: Volume 30 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics

SUICIDE AS A WEAPON

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 30

ISSN 1874-6276

Suicide as a Weapon

Edited by

Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Motivation for Suicide Bombers Ankara, Turkey 24–25 May 2007

© 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-795-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007935971 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface The present volume originated in an Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) which took place at the Cultural Centre of the Central Officers’ Club, Ankara, 24–25 May 2007. This was a workshop hosted by the Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE–DAT), which was opened in Ankara in 2005 with the purpose of supporting NATO on defence issues related to terrorism. Turkey is the framework nation, and at present six other nations also contribute with staff and funds, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania, the Netherlands and Germany. Each year, COE–DAT organizes numerous workshops and courses, bringing academic rigour and institutional expertise in terrorism to interested parties in NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Non-triple Nations and others. The framework of the workshop is reflected in this book. The first session considered what is new about today’s terrorism and the phenomenon of suicide attacks, while the second session, “Defining the Threat,” analyzed specific aspects of this terrorism. The third session looked at terrorism’s impact on modern society. The fourth and fifth sessions addressed “Countering Suicide Terrorism” and “Organizing to Fight Suicide Terrorism,” respectively. The topic of suicide terrorism takes us right to the heart of the dilemmas of the 21st century. This type of attack has become the weapon of choice of ‘globalized terror’, a term explored by Laila Bokhari (see her chapter on “Jihad in a Globalized World”), who highlights the interplay between the local and global contexts of al-Qaeda’s associates, with an emphasis on extremism within Europe’s immigrant communities. The scene is set by a historical review of suicide attacks in the first paper (see Brig.-Gen. Stanciu’s “Factors Involved in Terrorist Attacks”). This wide-ranging analysis divides the phenomenon into three main headings: individual and psychological factors, the organization and its contribution, and the environments (political, social, cultural/religious, etc) in which the terror is nurtured. While beginning with the topic of what is new about modern terrorism, Capt (N) Altunbulak and Lt.-Col. Sarıca’s consideration of “Religious Motivations and Suicide Bombings” concentrates on the error of glibly associating al-Qaeda-type terror with Islam, and identifies this error in some of the security methods of the US and Britain. On a more positive note, Turkey’s history can provide material for an informed and constructive dialogue between western governments and their Muslim citizens. Ch.-Supt. Ahmet Eren is an expert on the wide spectrum of terrorism in Turkey. His paper concentrates on the mindset of members of the PKK terror organization, showing how they are dominated by an autocratic leadership style which values only obedience. In contrast, the Iraqi suicide volunteer Mervan Ebu Ubeyde comes from a privileged background, but has chosen to sacrifice himself, expressing his motives in the broadest of terms. Ahmet Eren notes the danger of creating a vicious circle if security forces react randomly to terror, and he writes against misconceptions about Islam. The methods used by terrorist organizations to recruit and train suicide bombers is the subject of a study by Supt. Süleyman Özeren. His paper also provides a useful

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survey of relevant literature, including references to discussions from a psychological viewpoint of what makes a terrorist. Another aspect of terrorism considered in this book takes its starting point from the fact that women suicide bombers have a high profile in some terror organizations. Laila Bokhari’s second paper suggests that women’s past role as victim or supporter may be changing, and considers the significance of this development. In the last five years, since Wafa Idris blew herself up in Jerusalem, radical Islamists have accepted female volunteers for suicide attacks. The web magazine “al-Khansaa” is aimed at women in pro-al-Qaeda families, and generally sees its readership in traditional supportive roles, although some sections provide information on training for combat. Brian Fishman brings a wealth of information about the area which is now the undisputed focus of suicide attacks, Iraq. Here we learn, for example, that in the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks in Iraq no responsibility is claimed. In another section we are introduced to the main arguments used by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to justify suicide attacks according to one view of Islamic Law. Fishman also looks at the impact of suicide attacks on US public opinion, and argues that they are not shaping public opinion to any great extent. William Gawthrop requires a certain stretch of the imagination if we are to accept one assumption in his paper, namely that people interrogated in investigations of alQaeda-style terror base their responses on a detailed grasp of Islamic Law and what it says on such subjects as informing, picking apart a brother’s words, and giving a misleading impression. The article takes as its one authority on Islamic Law the ‘Umdat as-Salik of Ahmad ibn Naqib. Anthony Richards analyzes the 7 July 2005 London Bombings and evaluates the “Emergency Response, Intelligence and Causes.” In his survey of the reports and reactions of the UK government, he points out that the attack was not unexpected, and already many important steps had been taken like the creation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. In terms of the British government’s response, Dr Richards notes that the “Countering International Terrorism” document (2006) emphasized the need to tackle inequalities in British society, a need which has been recognised and acted on for years. There is, however, ‘very little acknowledgement of the foreign policy sphere a being a major source of the problem.’ In “The Role of Intelligence in Combating Suicide Terrorism; Sharing Intelligence amongst States,” Ely Karmon demonstrates the international character of suicide attacks, and reviews the performance of existing international cooperation frameworks. Some of the criticisms made of the current structures are presented, not least Turkey’s dissatisfaction with European efforts against the PKK. Rolf Tophoven answers the question of how the police and/or private security personnel can provide on-site security against suicide terrorism, especially in situations where rings of defence can be established around a possible target area. “The Law and Rules of Engagement against Suicide Attacks” is a long article in which Jonathan Edwards reviews the laws relating to orders issued to military personnel on the use of force in situations where there is a threat of suicide attacks. Attacks on land, sea and from the air are considered. While the emphasis is on the difficulties faced by US troops in Iraq, the article compares the laws of other countries. Incidents in which the orders have been tested are presented, for example the London Metropolitan Police’s shooting of an innocent Brazilian man mistaken for a suicide bomber. There is a detailed account of the case concerning the shooting of the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena and two intelligence officers in Baghdad in 2005.

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Nick Ridley’s article looks at many aspects of terrorism before touching on some financial aspects of various suicide attacks. He points out that “the financial outlay to a terrorist organisation… is comparatively small compared to other forms of terrorist attack,” and “these financial advantages are enhanced by the mobility and adaptability of the suicide terrorist.” We are taken into the world of donors, charities and the ‘hawala’, the simple bank transfer widely used by extremist groups in financing terrorism, by Katharina von Knop’s article. Dr von Knop analyzes the Safa Group, in which businessmen and others including Sami al-Arian had a complex network of connections and a strong interest in funding various extremist organizations. Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu’s closing remarks reflect on some of the discussions which took place at the Ankara workshop. Lt.-Col. Halil Sarıca ARW Director

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Contents Preface Halil Sarıca Factors Involved in Suicide Attacks Ion Aurel Stanciu Religious Motivations and Suicide Bombings Nihat Altunbulak and Halil Sarica Jihad in a Globalized World, Local Arenas for Global Violent Extremism; Local and Global Contexts, Causes and Motivations Laila Bokhari

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1 15

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Psychology and the Mindset of Suicide Bombers Seyit Ahmet Eren

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Recruitment and Training Methods of Suicide Terrorism Süleyman Özeren

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Women and Terrorism – Passive or Active Actors? Motivations and Strategic Use Laila Bokhari

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The Political Impact of Suicide Attacks in Iraq Brian Fishman

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The Impacts of Suicide Bombers on American Society William Gawthrop

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Emergency Response, Intelligence and Causes: The Case of the London Suicide Bombings Anthony Richards

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The Role of Intelligence in Combating Suicide Terrorism: Sharing Intelligence Amongst States Ely Karmon

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How to Prevent a Suicide Attack, Security Measures in Countering Suicide Attacks Rolf Tophoven

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The Law and Rules of Engagement Against Suicide Attacks Jonathan P. Edwards

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Terrorism, Financing of Terrorism and Suicide Terrorism Nick Ridley

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Patterns of Terrorism Financing: The Art of Puzzling Katharina von Knop

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Closing Remarks Mustafa Kibaroğlu

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Author Index

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Factors Involved in Suicide Attacks Brig.-Gen. Ion Aurel STANCIU, Ph.D. Air Fleet General, Romanian General Staff

Abstract. Traditionally viewed as a problem affecting the Middle East and South Asia, the threat posed by suicide terrorism is spreading around the globe. The past three years have seen more attacks than the last quarter century. The 9/11 as well as the London attacks have emphasized how acts of suicide terrorism have the potential to cause considerable losses of human lives and damage to physical infrastructure, while influencing the course of the global environment. Thus, in order to develop policies vital to national and international security that will meet the challenges of suicide attacks, the need to understand the causes and the factors involved in this phenomenon appears evident. On the basis of my own experience, and according to the conclusions drawn by well known experts in this field, I have realized that this phenomenon has to be analysed taking three main factors into account: individual, organizational and environmental. Keywords. Suicide attacks, suicide terrorism, martyrdom, terrorism, terrorist organizations, suicide bombers, self-sacrifice, shahid, Al-Qaida, jihad, istishhad, globalization

1. Background Suicide attacks have become more prevalent globally, gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade onto the political, economic, and social routines of national life and the international environment. The phenomenon of suicide attacks cannot be fully understood without placing it within its broader historical context. Suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been employed as an act of warfare since ancient times. The Old Testament describes how Samson in a single act of vengeance caused the death of about 3,000 Philistines, knowing that he himself would die along with his victims. Samson used his extraordinary power to bring down the two pillars that supported the temple, crushing his enemies, in the name of God.1 In a tragically similar act, Al-Qaida used airplanes to bring down the two towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, crushing to death nearly 3,000 people, an atrocity in which the number of casualties and the manner of their death eerily recall Samson’s act of revenge 33 centuries earlier. Following Samson, in the Middle Ages the Jewish “Sicairis” sect was infamous for this type of attack.2 Another group, the Muslim “Assassins” (from “Hashishiyun”, also known as “Ismaili-Nazaris”) that operated in the eleventh through to the thirteenth 1 Salim, Emad, “Suicide Terrorism: A Case of folie à plusieurs?” British Journal of Psychiatry, 2003, p. 475. 2 Schweitzer, Y, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics,” available at http://www.ict.org.il.

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centuries, conducted suicide missions. Although they did not have Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that could be used to kill both their victims and themselves simultaneously, they conducted their operations in a way that ensured their death as part of the mission. They used daggers to kill their victims, usually prominent officials, in public places where there were many witnesses, thus simultaneously assuring the publicity of their acts. The group’s description of these assassins as “fedayeen”, which refers to the consecrated ones and their admiration for the martyrdom involved in these attacks, mirrors the actions of some of today’s Islamic terrorist organizations. Later on, Muslim communities in Asia from the eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries experienced suicide operations too. Muslim in regions of Southwestern India, Northern Sumatra, and in the Southern Philippines used suicide attacks to punish and instil fear in the European colonial powers. Prior to carrying out the attacks, the executants underwent religious rituals to consecrate their status of martyrs sacrificing their lives for their cause. In each case, suicide attacks against civilians followed unsuccessful classic warfare against an asymmetrical more powerful European military force. In the late nineteenth century, dynamite having been invented, terrorists began using bombs in their attacks. Groups, such as the “Narodnaya Volya” (“The People’s Will”) in Russia, due to the primitive nature of those early explosive devices, had to deploy suicide bombers to the target’s close vicinity in order to accomplish their mission. In a marginally similar fashion, in the 20th century, the Japanese launched kamikaze attacks during the Second World War, deliberately planning the attackers 3 death to strike asymmetric targets. Eventually, the “modern” features of this terrorist tactic emerged with the first suicide terrorists in Lebanon, around 30 years ago in April 1983, when “Hezbollah” attacked western premises in Lebanon. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka, however, is recognized as the most effective and brutal organization to utilize this form of terrorism. The LTTE has a dedicated suicide unit – “The Black Panthers” – consisting of both men and women and directed primarily against senior government and military personnel. The LTTE is the only organization that has succeeded in assassinating two heads of state. The former Primer Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi was killed in May 1991 by a female suicide bomber and the Sri Lanka President Prendesa was killed in 1993 by a male suicide bomber who had lived at the president’s premises 4 for about a year prior to conducting the suicide attack. In modern times, suicide attacks have been employed by a large variety of groups, including Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish, and secular organizations. They were especially located in the Middle East but also in many other regions of the world. A partial list of terrorist groups that actively use suicide attacks includes Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of the Fatah Movement, Al-Asar Mujahidin in Chechnya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Hezbollah, Lashkare-Taiba of Pakistan/Kashmir, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, Barbar Khalsa International (BKI) of India, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK/Kongra Gel) of Turkey, and Al-Qaida.

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Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Handbook No. 1.03, “Suicide Bombing in the COE,” I–3. Ibid, I–4.

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2. An Integrated Approach Many countries all over the world have been forced to contend with the phenomenon of suicide attacks: USA, Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Jordan, Morocco etc. There have been many debates amongst scholars regarding the reason and the key factors of the increasing number of suicide attacks in the past decade, and many answers have been found. On the one hand, there is one approach according to which suicide attacks are carried out by individual deranged fanatics, while, on the other hand, some others would claim that the answer lies in the broader realm of the grievances and motivations of the perpetrators. Research on suicide attacks indicates that most terrorist operatives are psychologically normal, in the sense that psychological pathology does not seem to be present, and the attacks are virtually always premeditated.5 Others argue that this phenomenon is an outcome of the radical religious nature of international terrorism. However, single-factor explanations overlook the fact that terrorist behaviour is an interaction between individual psychology and external environment. Therefore, in order to understand the causes and characteristics of suicide attacks and to develop a policy in this domain we need a multi-causal model. Accordingly, suicide attack analysis should be conducted on various levels through an integrated approach of the phenomenon’s key factors. In “The Causes of Terrorism”, Martha Crenshaw was among the first scholars to note the need to distinguish between three levels of analysis:6 x Situational variables (such as broad political, economic or social conditions); x The strategy of the terrorist organization; x The issue of individual participation. These factors render the likelihood of terrorism higher in some situations than in others.7 Perhaps the most comprehensive approach to understanding terrorism’s causes on a number of levels has been designed by Post, Ruby, and Shaw.8 They grouped thirtytwo variables into four categories: 1. Historical, cultural, and contextual factors; 2. Key actors affecting the group; 3. Characteristics of the group and organization; 4. The immediate situation.9 However, most researchers tend to agree on the four main categories of factors related to suicide attacks: 1. Individual/personal/psychological factors; 5

Sprinzak, Ehud, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2000, p. 66–67. Creshaw, Martha, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4, July 1981. 7 Moghadam, Assaf, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: a Multi-Causal Approach,” paper presented for the Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, University of Texas at Austin, May 12–13, 2005, p. 9. 8 Post, Jerrold; Ruby, Kevan; and Shaw, Eric, “The Radical Group in Context 1: An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” and “The Radical Group in Context 2: Identifying Critical Elements in the Analysis of Risk for Terrorism by Radical Group Type,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 2 (March – April 2002). 9 Ibid. 6

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2. Organizational/strategic factors; 3. Environmental/structural factors; 4. Causal variables. Only such a multi-level framework of analysis properly covers the complexity and multilateral variability of the phenomenon of suicide attacks. Accordingly, we will focus on the following key factors such as:

3. Individual/Personal/Psychological Factors There is a broad consensus among psychiatrists and psychologists interested in terrorism that terrorists are not mentally ill, and the psychopathologies are not proven to be disproportionately present among suicide terrorists. Most suicide terrorists are willing participants in their missions, although there is evidence that the PKK in Turkey may have forced individuals to take parts in attacks. However, the paths to martyrdom are diverse. They require different abilities, talents, and temperaments. Some charismatic leaders commonly succeed in promoting highly pro-social and non-destructive goals; others are able to push entire groups of followers into mass suicide without injuring anybody else outside the group; and still others lead highly cohesive parties to challenge political power using suicidal terror. In this respect, Adolf Tobena considers that research efforts directed at disentangling the critical social vectors of suicidal terrorism are extremely important. They can become even more valuable if individual factors are considered, rather than rejecting such a perspective out of hand just because of the above-mentioned absence of clear links between suicide terrorists and psychopathology. Moreover, he proposes additional personality traits as possible factors that may play important roles in the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism: aggressiveness, narcissism, obedience, altruistic punishment, “messianic-ism”, and religiosity. He claims that rejecting individual factors can lead to a fundamental miscalculation: certain traits are robustly related to 10 particular human propensities or temperamental styles. Scott Atran writes that institutional reinforcement of evolved psychological dispositions may play a role in the training of the suicide terrorist. Organizations that recruit and train suicide terrorists purposefully manipulate human dispositions to such a level of commitment that they eventually engender or reinforce the willingness to commit suicidal sacrifice. In Atran’s view, successful manipulation is plausible only if commitment to suicide is developed in the context of kin and the psychological dispositions related to kin-related altruism.11 He proposes the concept of “Fictive Kin” and a model to explore the relationship between kin recognition, altruistic behaviour, and evolved cues that are open to manipulation. Relevant literature suggests that cues most applicable to human behaviour are close physical association (particularly during development), phenotypic similarity, and the use of kin terms and other symbolic kin referents. Thus, organizations desiring to maintain and reinforce non-kin altruistic behaviour among their members should attempt to manipulate predispositions associated with these cues. It is predicted that they will tend to “cloister” recruits with each other and their trainers, provide them with false phenotypic matches such as 10 11

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Tobena, Alfred, “Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism,” Science, vol. 304, 2 April 2004, p. 47. Qirko, Hector, and Atran, Scott, “Fictive Kin” and Suicide Terrorism, Science, vol. 304, 2 April 2004, p.

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uniforms and distinctive hairstyles, and encourage use of linguistic and other symbolic kin referents. The same pattern can be seen among recruits of Al-Qaida, where kinship imagery is particularly pronounced: Osama bin Laden is known as the “elder brother”, and recruits are placed in “families” during training and development.12 Through indoctrination of recruits in relatively small and closeted cells – emotionally tight-knit brotherhoods – terror organizations create a family of cellmates who are just as willing to sacrifice for one another as a parent is for a child. On the other hand, suicidal terrorism is seen as an expression of the individual living in an oppressive regime, struggling to achieve personal gratification, against the world that is indifferent to these struggles and prone by its very nature to cycles of order and chaos. Some psychologists suggest that many terrorists are violent “true believers” – people who are ready to sacrifice their life for a holy cause. Violent true believers are characterized by stereotype thinking, belief in the superiority of their belief system, an indifferent attitude to people with other belief systems, arrogance and disdain, fanaticism, hostility, justification of their violent behaviour and lack of critical selfreflection and rigidity.13 The main factor that psychologically distinguishes terrorists from the general population is their belief system, which places them at the centre of a Manichean struggle between good and evil. In the Palestinian case, motivations of the suicide bombers have been shown to include any given combination of a number of possible motivations of both the individual and his/her next of kin. These include: seeking of revenge, struggle for national liberation, influence of a widespread culture of martyrdom, expectation of personal posthumous benefits, and material or immaterial rewards for family members.14 Leaders of HAMAS see their struggle with Israel in terms of a cosmic war between good and evil and believe that Israel ultimately wants to destroy Islamic nationalism. Suicide bombing is viewed as “purely” defensive warfare. In this view, the sacrifice of suicide bombers ennobles them, allowing them to achieve personal and social redemption. Religion and violence are seen as antidotes to humiliation.15 Some extremists associate martyrdom with hero status and the aim of a suicide attack is merely to impress an audience and to be remembered. This is especially evident to the populations that perceive life as having little significance otherwise. For example, the LTTE holds an annual “Hero’s Day” to honour all suicide terrorists who sacrificed their lives for their cause.16 Suicide terrorism will often be used to seek revenge for the alleged or confirmed atrocities conducted by a group/country/security force against relatives or close friends of the attacker. This was the case of several Chechen women – so called “Black Widows” or “Saliheen” – who have lost family members in the Chechen wars.17 12

Ibid. Martens, W.H.J., “Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder,” Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 4(1), 45, 46. 14 Moghadam Assaf, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: a Multi-Causal Approach,” p.20. 15 Smith, Allison, Ph.D., Summary of Research Conducted on Suicide Terrorism, American Association for Advancement of Science Fellow, Department of Homeland Security available at: http://www.nijpcs.org/terror/Smith%20 Table.pdf. 16 Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Handbook No.1.03, “Suicide Bombing in the COE,” III–3. 17 Zedalis D., Debra, “Female suicide bombers,” June 2004, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi 13

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In understanding suicide attacks it is essential to comprehend the tribal mentality that urges individuals to avenge defeat to the bitter end, even across generations. Arabs will continue to fight forever if needed once their dignity has been injured. People are expected and are obliged to join the struggle according to the Arab tribal code. They will only stop if the aggressor will publicly acknowledge his guilt and assumes responsibility for his aggression. Arabs will then enter the honourable “solha” or peace.18 Al-Qaida adopted suicide as the supreme embodiment of global jihad and raised Islamic martyrdom to the status of a principle of faith. According this worldview, one’s willingness to sacrifice his or her life for Allah and “in the path of Allah” (“fi sabil Allah”) is an expression of the Muslim fighter’s advantage over the opponent. For AlQaida, sacrificing your own life has the supreme value, its symbolic importance being equal to if not greater than its tactical importance. Al-Qaida leaders have cultivated the spirit of the organization, constructing its ethos around the commitment to self-sacrifice and implemented it through suicide attacks. Readiness for self-sacrifice has been one of the most important characteristics to imbue both veteran members and new recruits. Bin Laden himself clearly expressed the ethos instilled in his followers: “I do not fear death. Sacred death is my desire. My sacred death will result in the birth of thousands of Osamas.”19 There is no single profile of Islamic suicide terrorists but rather four general categories.20 Concerning the ideological category, the oppressed Shi’a and the Afghan Arabs blow themselves up for ideological reasons. The former were recruited from Lebanon and the Iraqi exile community and were motivated by a combination of Shi’ism and the desire to rid their country of foreign invaders. The latter came from various countries to fight in Afghanistan and are motivated by Sunni religious fanaticism reinforced by political grievances. In contrast to the ideological types, the frustrated, avenger, and uprooted categories of Islamic suicide bombers blow themselves up for personal reasons. The frustrated types are generally participants in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and are motivated by the grievances they feel in the local context. The avenger types come from traditional societies experiencing civil war and are motivated by the need to avenge the personal loss of a loved one. The uprooted types come from diverse backgrounds but have all experienced cultural dislocation and isolation from their families. They find a new identity in a violent form of Islam and are motivated by the desire to fight for this identity/ideology. This fifth category of terrorism unfortunately will be around for a long time due to its leader’s commitment and its large pool of potential recruits. In a suicide attack, the terrorist is completely aware that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process. This statement is worth an emphasis since only in this type of attack the terrorist finds himself in a very special psychological mood that can be defined as “tunnel vision”. In this mood, while entering one end of the tunnel determined to march to the other end and fulfil his mission, his death is 18

Moghadam, Assaf, Ibid, p.23. Schweitzer, Yoram and Ferber, Goldstein, Sari, “Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism,” Memorandum No. 78, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2005, pp.26, 27. 20 Smith, Allison, Ph.D., Ibid. 19

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essential. The terrorist knows he/she has no other option – either he/she presses the button and kills himself/herself and the target, or he/she refrains from doing so, his/her life is spared, and the target is missed. He/she cannot partially fulfil his/her mission and he/she cannot cling to the hope of staying alive after carrying it out.21 Nevertheless, the term “Suicide Attack” has a relative interpretation because in the eyes of the attacker and his community this phenomenon has nothing to do with committing suicide. The perpetrator of a suicide attack is not considered either by himself, or by other activists or his own community at large to have committed suicide. Indeed, committing suicide is forbidden in Islam. Instead, he is seen as a “shahid” – a martyr who fell in the process of fulfilling the religious commandment of “jihad” (holy war). Thus, his act is called in Arabic “istishhad”. Understanding suicide attacks requires also understanding of what drives humans to suicide. While commonly regarded as a way to exit adverse social conditions in which individuals feel themselves powerless, suicide can be seen as a means to achieve self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in the face of damnation, and honour in the face of humiliation. This may explain the prevalence of suicide attacks in the context of the Middle East, where many feel a sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and social humiliation. The study of terrorist psychology has advanced significantly in the past two decades, but much more needs to be done to develop a true psychology of the terrorist’s decision-making process. Both the diversity of terrorism – which makes any generalizations questionable, and the difficult access of academic researchers to empirical data make research into terrorism a tough challenge. Psychological studies of captured or repentant terrorists suffer from inherent defects, since it is doubtful whether the conditions of these studies represent the normal terrorist’s habitat and/or the examined individual subjects are a representative sample of the active, uncaptured terrorist population.

4. Organizational/Group Factors Today experts agree that the acts of suicide bombers are more attributable to organizational masterminds than to personal psychopathology. In this respect, one can consider that suicide terrorism is both an individual and organizational phenomenon. During the motivational phase of a suicide attack, both the individual and the organization consensually contribute to reach the decision for engagement and the required level of determination to carry it out. Individuals most likely to attack have more that one reason for deciding to engage in an operation. These may include the desire to be involved in jihad, gain a more elevated social status, ensure financial benefits for family, achieve revenge, and regain dignity. At the same time, the organization’s contribution ensures that the suicide attacks are concurrent with its official and operational goals. In addition, organizations may have motives and goals that are distinct from those of individuals. Organizational motives to resort to suicide terrorism revolve firstly around the need for organizational survival and perpetuation. A minimum degree of 21 Dr. Ganor, Boaz, “The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon,” available at http://ict.org.il/apage/11290.php.

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violent presence is necessary for terrorist organizations to remain effective. Failure to maintain such a degree of violence eventually leads to the irrelevance and gradual disappearance of the organization as a political actor. In other words, the organizational struggle to persist and remain relevant is closely related to the terrorist organization’s pursuit of political power – a main feature of any terrorist group.22 Usually recruits are approached by an organization that chooses them based on their different qualities. The group prepares the candidates for suicide missions through indoctrination and, to create a sense of peer pressure, divides them into small martyrdom cells of 3–5 recruits. Further, the organization has these “living martyrs” make out their wills and martyrdom videotapes before carrying out their missions. However, this is only an incomplete and gross generalisation. Therefore, it is important to study each specific group in order to understand their particular dynamics. During the institutional phase, which starts as soon as an individual is recruited, the organization trains, indoctrinates, and reinforces the suicide bomber’s willingness to die to ensure that he/she is able to carry out the mission. The organization also takes care of the logistics of the attack – e.g. procuring weapons, equipment, and transportation – and the target selection. Suicide attacks as a tactic are institutionalised to different degrees in different organizations. Some groups only use this tactic in exceptional circumstances; others adopt suicide attacks as a temporary strategy in a crisis – when they feel it is adequately supported by their religious/ideological leaders and their communities (e.g. the PKK); and others adopt them as a permanent strategy (e.g. the LTTE). Moreover, groups may tend to engage in suicide attacks when there is a cultural precedent for self-sacrifice, when a conflict is long-running and has already involved many casualties on both sides, and when the protagonists are desperate. Nevertheless, groups’ use of suicide terrorism is not constant. For the organization itself, the tactic of suicide terrorism is rational in that it is cheap, demonstrates the strength of organization, results in a high level of damage, is hard to deter, is successful in reaching targets, does not require escape plans, does not leave perpetrators open to interrogation, and attracts media attention. Moreover, suicide attacks often result in a more or less broad societal support for the group’s cause. Even though usually not mass based, it is important to look for its roots in the communal and social dynamics and understand how this popular support increases and decreases. The public is more likely to support suicide terrorism when other tactics have already failed and especially when the group’s targets are ethnically and/or religiously different. Suicide terrorism is also used to establish a radical group’s credibility when it competes with other groups for popularity. However, to increase the support for such a tactic, a group needs to minimize collateral damage. For instance, in Sri Lanka suicide attacks paved the way for the LTTE to distinguish itself from other militant Tamil groups that challenged the Tigers’ aspiration to stand at the helm of the resistance movement. Lebanon serves as an additional example where two Shiite groups, Hizballah and Amal, began to outbid each other in suicide attacks. Moreover, the tactic of suicide terrorism is most likely to occur in societies that are small, closed, and dominated by tradition, religion, and emotion. While the families of suicide terrorists may receive some financial rewards, the real reward is the honour bestowed on the bomber and his/her family. In this respect, it is important to 22

Moghadam, Assaf, ibid p.29.

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understand the social groups – family, peer, ethnic, and national – to which potential terrorists belong. Local social networks lead potential recruits to approach and participate in terrorist groups. The role of the actual terrorist groups in the indoctrination of suicide bombers may be overstated, as many volunteers do not undergo extensive training. The decision to participate in a suicide bombing is facilitated by bombers’ internalized social identity; their exposure to an asymmetric conflict and to appealing organizations; and their appurtenance to a larger community in which martyrdom has high symbolic significance. After reaching the decision to engage in an operation, suicide bombers become extremely focused on committing the act.23 The organization’s role in the attack is obviously demonstrated by the style and content of the videotapes that attackers usually make on the eve of their operation. Typically, the so-called “living martyr” is standing in front of the terrorist group’s flag, holding an assault rifle (and sometimes also a copy of the Quran), as he/she explains the motive behind the attack. The image of these “now deceased” becomes a powerful tool for winning further adherents. Nevertheless, these rituals, in which the prospective attacker typically engages, are also designated to make any backing out of executing the attack virtually impossible without completely losing individual and familial honour and place in the community. In addition, even more than ordinary terrorist attacks, suicide operations are likely to draw attention to a group’s cause, due to the media’s extraordinarily high interest in such events. Therefore, by employing a tactic that involves the death of members of the constituency that the organization purports to represent, the group may believe that it can strengthen support in the international arena. There is some evidence that outside audiences may sympathize with groups who are using martyrdom tactics, assuming that members of a community willing to sacrifice themselves must have been subjected to particularly gruesome treatment by their enemy, thus leaving them with no other option other than to seek death. For Al-Qaida, suicide attacks are both an operational mode and a propaganda tool. One of most important components adopted by Bin Laden as part of the organization’s pioneering culture, and as a guiding operative principle, is propaganda through deed. The central element of this type of propaganda is to introduce the terrorist operations as acts of personal example and as an ideal for others to emulate. Modern terrorism is a psychological warfare and suicide attacks intensify its psychological effect. The number of casualties, the perpetrator’s determination and the media coverage of the attacks emphasize the feeling of fear and anxiety within the targeted population. The random, indiscriminate nature of the attack and the inability to identify and stop the attacker instils a feeling of helplessness – the particularity that differentiates this special type of attack from other terrorists’ modus operandi. From this point of view, the media’s propensity to include the assailant’s death in the casualty toll of a bombing attack has a quite peculiar contribution. As a subtle effect of this type of reporting, that associates the death of the perpetrator with that of the others, it actually “victimizes” the attackers too in the eyes of an ordinary reader or observer. Al-Qaida has made a pivotal contribution to the escalation and internationalization of suicide terrorism, transforming the concept of self-sacrifice (istishhad) into its main unifying principle. The willingness for self-sacrifice lies in the centre of the recruitment process and constitutes a fundamental criterion for joining the Al-Qaida organization. 23

Smith, Allison, Ph.D., Ibid.

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Al-Qaida regards the idea of istishhad as above any need to demonstrate organizational supremacy, organizational control, or organizational responsibility. Bin Laden stressed this concept as the heart and soul of the idea of jihad, promoting it through the decentralized and empowering management style that he both employed in Al-Qaida and instilled in its affiliates. Thus, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism has transformed into an international issue, turning millions of citizens around the world from spectators into participants in, and victims of, acts of terrorism.24 Through suicide terrorism, Al-Qaida has grown into a real model of emulation for other terrorist organizations. Moreover, part of Al-Qaida’s achievement to date has been its success in instilling the supremacy of the concept of istishhad above even the leadership itself, including that of Bin Laden. The suicide attacks in London showed that the cross-border paradigm of suicide attacks that Bin Laden implemented attracts scattered individuals from the population of Muslim countries and the population of Muslim immigrants in non-Muslim countries. Today it is clear that Al-Qaida’s concept of self-sacrifice around the world has been adopted by the socially frustrated Muslim population in the West, resulting in the evolution of a more popular culture of suicide.

5. Environmental/Structural (Political-Geopolitical, Social, Historical, Cultural, Economic, Religious) Factors Although suicide terrorism is planned and executed by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations, there is an additional factor which significantly interferes with individual/personal/psychological and organizational/group factors – the environmental/structural one. Even though the political-geopolitical, social, historical, cultural, economic, and religious variables have no direct effects on terrorism, they definitely contribute to the genesis and rise of suicide terrorism through indirect ways. Some experts, for instance, contend that analysing terrorism separately from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous because both phenomena (globalization and terrorism) are intricately intertwined in the international security 25 framework of 21st century. Today terrorism has become a worldwide threat as the result of trans-nationalism and globalization. It is trans-national in its identity and recruitment, and global in its ideology, strategy, targets, network of organizations, and economic transactions. In fact, global terrorism, being a facet of the global culture produced by globalization, depends on its success. It is indeed ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, having been facilitated by globalization, eventually becoming its biggest challenge – thus, a veritable dialectical unity of opposing forces. This is one of the paradoxes of our days. Indeed, globalization provides global terrorism both advanced means – by its technological progress and permanently current sources/causes – primarily by creating great economic discrepancies among various countries of the world. The emergence of a terrorist network like Al-Qaida perfectly illustrates such a development. Al-Qaida is a network created around Bin Laden as the organization’s “symbolic figure” and “global insurgent”, but it functions in more than 60 countries. 24 25

Dr. Ganor, Boaz, Ibid. Baregu, Mwesiga, in African Security Review, vol. 15, no. 3, 2006, p.106.

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Even though it used to have an epicentre in Afghanistan, it is actually not related to any specific territory, conversely being both a de-territorialized actor and a global one that mirrors the dynamics of a globalised word. Al-Qaida members reportedly used encrypted e-mails to communicate, stenography to hide encoded messages in web images, underground banking networks called hawala to transfer untraceable funds, cell phones, on-line travel agencies and global TV networks like al-Jazeera and CNN to get word out. The suicide attacks of 9/11 were obviously a global event that dramatized an interconnected and conflicted networked society where there is a constant worldwide flow of people, products, technologies, ideas and the like. The 9/11 spectacle of terror was obviously constructed as a media event to circulate the terror and to demonstrate to the entire world that even the epicentre of global capitalism and American power is not immune. One of the unintended consequences of globalization is the impact on societal cultures throughout the world. Frequently, this impact leads to experiencing the “death of a way of life”, which further develops the perception of losing the cultural identity. Perhaps just because of being the most different from all non-Western societies, Muslim societies to respond to globalization by aggressively rejecting the Western values and way of life. The result is a dangerously conflicting interface between the two cultures with a global scale impact: groups and individuals from different places and affiliations have been and continue to be mobilized to commit large-scale terrorist acts such as 9/11, Bali, Madrid or London. Globalization impacts also upon the Western immigrant communities of Muslim people. Individuals and groups live together in Western societies in a veritable microcosm of the conflict between Western and Muslim cultures: in a clustered, rebuilt replica of their world of origin with almost no genuine integration into and understanding for the host culture and values. This results in incidents such as the publication of the cartoons in Denmark or the death of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. In Europe, the dramatic acceleration of self-radicalization process among certain members of Islamic communities is obvious today more than ever. Members of this kind of communities are surely able to commit terrorist acts, even suicidal ones. Moreover, the latest period has demonstrated that terrorists can appear any time after a very short training process. This fact determines a spectacular decrease of opportunities to identify them and subsequently address the potential threats. At the same time, we cannot speak anymore about a standard profile of the European Islamic fundamentalist terrorist because it has been proven that the threat can come either from those who seem to be perfectly integrated into the society, having jobs and families, or from those who are living in economic poverty and social promiscuity. The most important aspect of this new phenomenon is the spread in some Muslim communities of the cult of martyrs. This new cult of suicidal attacks has spread among the Islamic immigrants communities of the second or even third naturalized generation, which are apparently well integrated into the host societies. There is a broad agreement among scholars and analysts that Europe has been evolving into a nerve centre for the global jihad and it is here where the attacks against Western interests are most likely to be planned and executed. The 1990s saw the emergence of terrorist centres of activity in a large number of European countries, most prominently in Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark. In the early 1990s, based mainly on the previous shared experience of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, these centres of gravity were linked from the beginning into a

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dense network of personal relationships, where many of the key players had already met and cooperated. In the latter half of the decade, the first network of the veterans of the Afghan jihad was reinforced and invigorated by a continuous stream of recruits circulated through the Bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan. The recruitment of Islamic terrorists from European residents or with easy access (relatives, friends, business already established) to Europe began in 1999, fostered by the generally tolerant atmospheres in European countries. Recruiters generally focused on seeking out individuals who seemed estranged and drawing them together into tightknit ideological circles where they become radicalized. Only in Europe could such a large multinational network be made functional: Europe is small enough to allow uncomplicated face-to-face meetings among key members of the network and it possesses the communication and travel infrastructure that make these interactions feasible. Moreover, Europe consists of open and – at least regarding the European Union – tightly interdependent nation states within and among which the movement of people is largely unrestricted. Therefore, Europe presented the Salafi jihadists excellent conditions for establishing and sustaining complex, illicit networks, and was an ideal base from where to organize a terrorist campaign directed primarily against Western targets. An examination of 394 terrorists affiliated with the global Salafi jihad showed that they came together because they were cut off from their cultures, and they felt lonely and alienated. They went to mosques searching for companionship, like-minded people, and trying to form friendships. Social bonds preceded ideology. As their bonds were solidifying, they eventually became a “bunch of guys” resenting society and pushing each other into increasingly extreme forms of religious extremism. They often joined the jihad voluntarily, seeking the mentioned group bonding, and were not actively recruited. The members of these small groups became extremely loyal to each other and to their religious cause and began actively to hate those outside the group. Self-sacrifice combined with mass murder became the ultimate sign of loyalty to the 26 group and the cause. Therefore, the danger does not come from ruling elites, fully integrated into the local society, but more from those numerous social and economic groups that, for whatever reasons (cultural, historical, geographical etc.), are yet unable to take part to the global success. Conversely, they actually produce new political pathologies that are profoundly anti-global. Parts of these groups have proud cultural traditions that make them difficult to accept a de-favoured, second-class social status. Others have strong warring traditions that give them a distinctive edge in certain kinds of warfare. In addition, above all, religion gives them an expressive instrument such as suicide bombing.27 Globalization on the one side relentlessly divides the world into have and havenots, promotes conflicts and competition, and fuels long simmering hatreds and grievances, and on the other side connects people, bringing them together, creating new relations and interactions, and even new socio-economic hybrids. This is indeed the objective ambiguity of globalization: it both brings people together, creating social interactions and inclusion, but also incites them to conflict with each other, producing hostilities and exclusion. Thus, exactly those institutions of the open society meant to 26

Smith, Allison, Ph.D, Ibid. Coker, Christopher, “Globalisation and Terrorism,” available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/conferences/2002/tokyo/cocker.pdf. 27

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generate democracy, free trade, and cultural and social exchange, unlock the possibilities of destruction and violence.28 Furthermore, as different groups gain access to technologies of destruction or/and devise plans to use conventional technologies (like aircraft) as instruments of destruction, as the threat of an expected terror event, at any place and time proliferates, the media-catalysed frightening global security environment of the contemporary moment comes into being. Once again, the interconnection and interdependency of a networked world was dramatically demonstrated when terrorists from the Middle East invoked their local grievances to attack key symbols of American power and the very infrastructure of New York. Further, there are explanations to explore for the fact that it was exactly the milieu of the Islamic world from where terrorism, including suicide terrorism, acquired its global dimensions. In fact, the widely communicative character of globalization along with its other advances is systematically destroying the very fragile balance on which Muslim societies based their stability. The balance between private and public spheres, between the religious observance (in the domains of family life and everyday practices of praying, cleanliness, feeding, and sexuality) and the sphere of the “bazaar” economy is severely challenged by the ideas and images global capitalism brings into these 29 societies. On the other hand, globalization has been encouraging religious fundamentalism, too. Thirty years ago, there was not a single religious cult or religious related terrorist movement in the world. As recently as 1980, only two of the world’s 64 known terrorist groups were animated by religious belief. Since then fundamentalist groups have accounted for a quarter of all terrorism-related deaths. Moreover, globalization has been also producing new network-centred terrorist organizations. A product was Al-Qaida, which is largely a franchising agency functioning through religious internationalism and stateless networks rather than through the Cold War mechanism of sponsoring states.30 Radical Islam does not reject the means of globalization, only its message. Paradoxically, while denouncing globalization it relies on it to reconstruct a Muslim community beyond national boundaries – ummah – based on fundamentalist values and the duty of jihad.

6. Conclusions: A Multi-Level Counter-Strategy As mentioned above, the phenomenon of suicide attacks requires a holistic approach that takes into account the role played by many factors. Clearly, it is difficult to prevent or counter suicide attacks because terrorist stratagems are increasingly innovative and proactive. Therefore, our counterstrategy must be comprehensive and must include offensive and defensive measures. Hard power must be supplemented with soft power in an adaptive framework.

28

Kellner, Douglas, “Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and its Aftermath,” available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner. 29 Maskaliunaite, Asta, “Terrorism and Globalisation: Recent Debates,” available at http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubicon/forum/terrorism.htm. 30 Cocker, Christopher, ibid.

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Among the offensive measures are pre-emptive strikes against organizations that orchestrate suicide attacks (especially their leaders), vigorous intelligence collection, and efforts to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates. In order to undermine the ability of the organizations to operate, for example, military operations for destroying the target group’s physical infrastructure, efforts to cut off funding and/or pre-emptive strikes for capturing or killing the leaders may be effective. In this respect, the principle of proportionality in using of force, subject to full compliance, manifests itself as a critical necessity, in order to avoid the occurrence of new terrorist entities like the Chechen “Black Widows”. Nevertheless, today’s repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attacks. Like pounding mercury with a hammer, this sort of top-heavy counterstrategy only seems to generate more varied and insidious forms of suicide terrorism. Even with many top Al-Qaida leaders now dead or in custody, the trans-national jihadist fraternity is transforming into a hydra-headed network more difficult to fight than before. Therefore, effective counter terrorism measures require knowledge of the society and culture from which the terrorists arise. The best way to respond to terrorism may be to isolate terrorists from their community or try to integrate the terrorist group’s supporters into the broader community. If multiculturalism allows the existence of hostile enclaves within a larger society, it is not truly integrative and cannot serve the purpose of discouraging terrorism. As the decision to engage in suicide attacks is made at the organizational level, even though is not significantly costly, making higher the overall cost of conducting suicide operations may affect this decision-making process. Moreover, protecting potential targets through the full range of measures in the homeland defence and security fields (physical barriers, security screening, strict border controls etc.) helps making the terrorist’s job more difficult. Preparing the public in advance to respond calmly when facing an attack is another way to reduce the potential attractiveness of the attack. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that only common international efforts and a shift of the responsive actions from the “effects” to the “roots” of the terrorism form the basic conditions for a long-term successful countering campaign against international terrorism in general, as well as against suicide terrorism in particular.

Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Religious Motivations and Suicide Bombings Capt. (N) Nihat ALTUNBULAK and Lt.-Col. Halil SARICA Chief of Education Dept., COE–DAT; Instructor/Trainer, COE–DAT

Abstract. Suicide attacks are not new. There are strategic and psychological reasons for this method, which is also used by secular terror organizations. The last fifteen years have seen the unprecedented world-wide rise of a ‘brand’ of suicide terrorist who gives religion as his motivation. Religion can offer various rewards to an attacker, and in the history of Turkey opponents from the West and Middle East have used religion to motivate their combatants. A progression can be seen in al-Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam. These views do not represent Islam. Again, Turkey’s experience is important: The Ottoman State based itself on Sharia Law, but interpreted Koran and Hadiths in a very different way, and religious tolerance was the norm. Muslims object when Westerners associate Islam with terror. Government institutions like the CIA may fail to understand the distinctions and take actions which are rightly condemned as racist. So how are suicide attacks to be stopped? The intelligence community should be more aware of the religious issues. In order to gain more information, some civil liberties may have to be set aside, especially in the area of non-intrusive intelligence-gathering. In order to undermine religious motivations, governments should engage more positively in the inner-Islamic debate. Keywords. Terrorism, suicide attacks, Islam, the Ottoman Empire, intelligence, security

The Need to Consider the Motives When we discuss the issue of motivation in this paper, it is from a military point of view. Suicide as a weapon is very hard to stop. There will always be gatherings of people, and security will never be tight enough to recognise and stop the bomber in every instance. Suicide bombing will also remain attractive because it creates a sensation, both among the terror organization members and, via the media, in the general public. Dissuasion, if possible, would be an even more effective strategy than improved intelligence, although we will mention this later. Dissuasion is not a matter of appeasement, or of responding to the motivations alleged by the terrorists. Let us remember Prof Alan Dershowitz’s warning: ‘The reason terrorism works – and will persist unless there are significant changes in the responses to it – is precisely because its perpetrators believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed in

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attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances and their demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their root causes” … We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation.’1 Although we can see why Alan Dershowitz even rejects the effort to understand root causes, as people engaged in defence against terrorism, listening to what the terrorist is saying is one part of an analysis of the issue of motivation, and may be a step on the road to dissuasion, i.e. undermining that motivation. It is in our military interest to understand the new terror situation as fully as possible, using the results of sociological and psychological studies as well as intelligence data and strategic considerations, and to employ all methods which might impede the rise of terrorism. Where terror organizations claim that a religion provides the rationale for their actions, the place of their assertions within religious discourse will also be studied.

New Aspects of Suicide Terrorism ‘Religiously-inspired terrorism’ should be a contradiction in terms. It is a sign of the times that this ‘anomaly’ has arisen in the 21st century to become, from NATO’s point of view, a threat of the first order. In particular this paper discusses the willingness of religiously-inspired terrorist organizations to use the method of the suicide attack. In certain conflict areas, including Israel–Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, such terror organizations seem to have no difficulty in finding volunteers willing to kill themselves. Although history can always provide examples of suicide attacks, we should be aware that the situation we have today is extraordinary. We are talking about a set of ideas (religious/cultural, political, and social) compelling enough to take large numbers of people from different backgrounds through the stages of forming an intent, contacting others, planning, acquisition of explosives, obtaining or improvising the detonating device, through to execution. The sheer numbers involved are something new. One relatively new aspect which has given suicide bombing a strong appeal to terrorists of the modern world is the dominance of visual media. Photographs and TV footage are more powerful than the written word, as is clear when we remember the iconic power of footage of the Twin Towers and the 9/11 attacks. A suicide terrorist, while working in secret, always has in mind the aim of becoming as famous as possible. Another feature of the modern terrorism problem is that, while motivations for terrorism arise from within separate and contrasting societies, the language of religiously-inspired militants is of a clash of religions which goes beyond national borders. Thus the terrorists believe, and act out their belief, that the geographical limitations characteristic of earlier terrorism are irrelevant. Our response must be similarly international.

1

Why Terrorism Works, Alan Dershowitz (Yale University Press, 2002).

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Turkey’s Experience in Combating Suicide Terrorism The experience of Turkey is useful. Here we are well aware that suicide bombing is nothing new, and it is not necessarily associated with religion. The PKK was formed in 1978 with a Marxist-Leninist agenda, and the latest suicide attack in which the organization was in some way involved took place in Ankara on 22 May 2007. Turkey also has a clear position on refusing dialogue with PKK terrorists. Turks often wonder why some – even allied – countries seem willing to allow such groups publicity, freedom to fundraise, and other measures of support. Decades of fighting the PKK/Kongra Gel mean that Turks can see the many similarities between the background of the religiously-inspired suicide bombings and the preparations of secular organizations like the PKK for such attacks. All the groups have a ruthless hierarchical system. Doctrine certainly plays an important role, whether or not that doctrine is coherent. The suicide bomber seeks, and his/her leaders require, an unquestioning acceptance of the rationale given for their cause. Much of the training materials, videos and books, which are distributed to organization members are about violent attacks in the past, which are taken as models. The decline of the Marxist-Leninist world-view has hit the PKK hard. With other factors it has contributed to some fragmentation in the organization. Various factions have turned away from seeking funding from political allies, including from abroad, and have concentrated on drugs, smuggling and extortion. Other factions have moderated their rhetoric, while often not abandoning their support for terrorism as a method. What we see is that, however the doctrine changes, adapts, and contradicts itself, the terrorism remains. Nor is it right to claim that the religiously-inspired suicide terrorist is somehow more ruthless than the nationalist/separatist terrorist. Again we can think of the Ankara/Ulus bombing, where the left-wing extremists’ choice of target, a cheap shopping centre, seemed almost random. Whatever doctrines the suicide terrorist may believe, they have a common total lack of concern for the victims. Nonetheless, given that presenting their message in the media is important to terror organizations, the fact that religiously-inspired terrorism is seeking to appeal to a more diffuse public means they may feel less inhibited by the prospect of public outrage in the areas where attacks occur.

Al-Qaeda Terrorism Moving on from general considerations about suicide terrorism, this paper will now concentrate on aspects of the al-Qaeda phenomenon, before presenting what we hope are practical recommendations. Again, the importance of Turkey’s position and experience will be evident. We will look at: x The development of religiously-inspired suicide bombings in the Middle East, x How suicide terrorism came to be considered acceptable according to religious teachings, x What individuals and terror groups think they gain from suicide attacks, x Whether and why religious groups, in particular, value this type of operation. The first Middle Eastern group to employ suicide attacks was the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah in the early 1980s. Beginning with attacks on Israeli soldiers, the

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suicide method was then used in two devastating attacks on the barracks of French and American peace-keepers. 241 US Marines and 58 French Paratroopers were killed. The peacekeepers and the Israelis left, and extremists in the region learnt the effectiveness of the suicide attack. Hezbollah, at the time smaller than the other Shia group, Amal, grew in popularity directly as a result of having pioneered the suicide attack. It also gave the attacks a religious justification in Shia terms, with explicit references to the deaths of Hasan and Huseyin. We see from this time the word istishhad (giving oneself as a martyr), used by advocates of suicide attacks to avoid the word intihar (committing suicide). Islamic Law has particularly strong teachings against suicide. The path of al-Qaeda, a Sunni organization, to suicide bombings, was forged to a large extent by Usama Bin Laden, the son of a rich Saudi Arabian buildings contractor. Like a number of other Saudis he fought as a so-called mujahid in Afghanistan. He claims that the Palestinian mujahid Mustafa Azzam introduced him to the idea of transferring the armed struggle from specific Middle Eastern conflicts to a worldwide defence of Islam (in his terminology ‘fighting until the one God is recognised’). What Bin Laden sees as his own contribution, and it is a doctrine which al-Qaeda members associate with Bin Laden, is the ‘rediscovery’ (in his terms) of the doctrine that responsibility to defend Islam by taking up arms is a farz ayn (a law which each individual Muslim must decide when to apply), not a farz amm (a law which the Muslim community must decide when to apply). The presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia from 1991 has frequently been harped upon by Bin Laden, who began making bitter attacks on the Saudi royal family from that time. However, al-Qaeda is notorious for citing anything and everything as a justification for attacking non-Muslims, including many references to the Muslim loss of Spain in 1492! In the war against the Russian in Afghanistan we did not see the use of suicide attacks. The notion of istishhad was later accepted as appropriate for al-Qaeda’s worldwide struggle, and this method was used in Nairobi and a series of other bombings in the 1990s. In this period we see a number of imams, especially those linked to the Salafi doctrine espoused by Bin Laden, issuing legal judgements taking positions on whether suicide attacks are acceptable in Islamic law. (Salafism also split on the issue of whether to accept the Saudi government, with the Imam al-Madkhali leading the loyalist element.) Also repugnant to Islam, from this time some imams sympathetic to al-Qaeda have issued judgements condoning ‘the killing of women and children,’ clearly condemned in the scriptures, as well as judgements which have permitted funding obtained by criminal means from non-Muslims. The willingness to ally their cause with criminality is one of the characteristics which distinguish al-Qaeda from other groups. With these points in mind, we will return at the end of this paper to the question of whether speaking of ‘Islamic’ or even ‘Islamist terrorism’ can be in any way acceptable.

Religion as a Motivation It is clear that religious teaching, more easily than secular teaching, can promise rewards for a suicide attacker. Whereas a secular separatist movement can tell its militants that their death will lead to the ultimate triumph of the cause, a religious

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movement can promise eternal rewards. It would seem to be this which ensures that religious movements, perhaps more than others, can find volunteers for suicide attacks. The promise of rewards in the afterlife certainly seems to have played an important role in motivating the nineteen 9/11 attackers. As is well known, a four-page letter was found in Muhammad Atta’s suitcase, which was not taken onto the plane. Shreds apparently from a copy of the same letter were traced to the luggage of another attacker. The letter, possibly composed by Atta, lists Koran verses and prayers which the attackers recited to fix their resolve and to prepare for death. It also has a check-list of things not to forget, both in terms of what they should take on the flight, and the need to be composed and not show any nervousness. As the letter was written for use by the hijackers, rather than for the public to read, it gives a better insight into what they understood their motivations to be. There is also no doubt that the attackers believed that God would reward them for their attack. One passage in the letter reads: ‘You will begin your joyful, contented life in everlasting bliss among the prophets, the martyrs …’. It is these passages, in which the hijackers are assured of future heavenly rewards, that provide the most evident religious motivation for the attacks. However, the letter also makes clear that religion not only supplies the hoped-for reward. It also contains the disciplines necessary to maintain resolve, especially the practice of reciting familiar passages and prayers. In fact the verses which should be recited provide the main topic of the letter: ‘When you set foot in the plane and sit in your seat, recite the prayers we wrote, the well-known ones which we mentioned above. Keep your mind occupied with repeating the name of God, and repeat often what Almighty God said. “O you who believe, if you come upon a group then stand firm,” and repeat often the name of God, so that you may be successful.’ Not only among this group, but among many al-Qaeda affiliated groups, the practice of memorizing passages, and reciting verses in order to remain strong in times of crisis, is widespread. Not only did the attackers look forward to rewards, they also look back to the battles of sacred history. They compare themselves with their spiritual ancestors, and in particular there are references in the letter to the example of the earliest warriors of Islam. There is an effort to forget one’s individual concerns, and identify completely with the perceived destiny of one’s religion. Of course, the sub-text that one should read in this letter is that the role of suicide attacker was attractive to these men precisely because they were seeking to escape their individuality. They had risen to the challenge of creating an individuality which could reconcile their Middle-Eastern upbringing with what they knew of the West. We should see the bold claims of militant Islam, and the constant repetition of set verses, as a discourse whose purpose is to obliterate difficult and painful realities, and to place unheroic actions in a heroic light. Turkey’s Experience of Religiously-Inspired Conflict Turkey’s history shows that religion has always been used as a powerful motivating factor in conflicts. If we go back to the time of Sultan II Selim, the Pope and Charles V formed a ‘Holy League’ to fight the Battle of Lepanto (1571). Each soldier of the league was ordered to fast and pray the rosary for three days, and to wear a cross. Rewards in the afterlife were promised to increase the courage of the men. Similar

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appeals to religion can be seen in wars between Muslims. The Arabs who rose up against the Ottoman Turks used religious justifications when they killed Turks in Damascus and elsewhere. Allied to the British and French during the First World War, the Arabs declared a so-called jihad against their Turkish rulers. The point is that, inevitably, traditional and religiously-minded communities sought to justify their actions in religious terms, just as they do today. Iraq in particular still has a strongly feudal structure in many areas of the country. It is a mistake to identify the claims of terrorists to Islamic motivations with the religion itself. Turkey’s History of Opposition to Extremism In fact, if the study of Islamic civilizations shows us one thing it is that interpretations of Islamic Law varied greatly. The sources of Islamic Law, the Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet and his companions), are sufficiently opaque and wideranging that interpretation has always played a strong role. Even at the time of greatest codification of the law, the four main schools varied considerably on issues of legal theory and individual laws. Furthermore, in the new situations presented by history, religious authorities have always shown considerable willingness to apply the law according to their preferences. At the moment we face a situation where Saudi Arabia has for some decades invested heavily in spreading their interpretation of Islamic Law, which claims to be the only valid interpretation and refuses to accept that “there is mercy in the diversity of opinions” (hadith from Baihaqi, Madkhal). The Ottoman Empire was also based on the Sharia, which had a quite different character from that of the scholars from the Najd (in today’s Saudi Arabia) who rose up against the Ottomans. It is well worth looking at the literature of some religious scholars under the Ottomans who, on the basis of Koran and Hadith, opposed Wahhabism, one of the main sources of Salafism. The empire was generally characterized by religious tolerance, especially if we take into account the presence of large and vocal non-Muslim and Muslim minorities. This willingness to live together, to accept the other, is discussed in a recent book by the Head of the Directorate of the Topkapı Museums, Prof ølber Ortaylı: “The Mediterranean world was one in which different languages, religions, and ethnicities had been obliged to live together since the earliest times. The tensions which existed here could not take place in the direct confrontation of two groups. In such a mixed environment, all these groups had constantly to learn to get on with each other, and to agree together when creating their social environment …”.2

The Dangers of Generalizing It is not surprising that many people in Western countries adopt a hostile and critical attitude to Islam, on the basis of little knowledge. What is disappointing is when government agencies in the West take measures which show that they regard Islam in general as a threat. We take the example of inland security because in this area sufficient statistics exist, from reliable sources, about arrests and other measures taken by the authorities in 2

“Osmanlı’da Öteki”, in ølber Ortaylı, Son ømperatorluk Osmanlı (Timaú, Istanbul, 2006), p.83.

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the US, Britain and elsewhere. From these we can see the extent to which the rights of ordinary Muslims have been disregarded. There have been hundreds of arrests, the great majority not resulting in prosecution. In other words, there was no evidence. Many of those arrested were clearly peace-loving citizens. Sometimes patterns can be detected in the measures taken. For example, after 9/11 a series of arrests was made involving the larger conurbations of the US and Britain. These did not result in prosecutions. Instead, the intention seems to have been to ‘send out a message’ to the Muslim communities on a nation-wide basis, to communicate that the government was in charge in each urban area. Security authorities have a duty to respond to evidence from intelligence sources. When they act on the basis of policies adopted by security chiefs, or imposed by the government, inevitably they are led into a generalized approach which can be said to target Islam. The result is that the extremists’ assertion that there is a clash between Islam and non-believers appears to be confirmed. Voices of moderation are sidelined as the direct result of government policy.

Conclusion This realisation leads us to the main practical recommendations of this paper, which are firstly that intelligence and security work should take a more differentiated approach. By all means focus on groups associated with extremism. Going further and maintaining a ‘watching brief’ over less extreme organizations is fully justified. The intelligence community should become informed enough to be able to distinguish between a small, militant minority and the many and flourishing peace-loving movements within the Muslim community. Secondly, security operations should be led by intelligence, not by policies adopted from above. Broad-ranging policy decisions are inevitably blind to individual circumstances. It is from individual circumstances that motivations for terrorism arise, and when we recognise this we can begin to build a strategy for effective dissuasion. An extremist in Detroit, although he may recite the same litany of complaints that alQaeda uses everywhere, is in fact taking his motivations from very different circumstances to an extremist in Egypt or Afghanistan. What is needed is that intelligence organizations remain, and are known to be, strictly apolitical. What should be avoided is all kinds of ‘policy-driven intelligence’. To help us to avoid generalizing about Islam we should not speak of ‘Islamist terrorism’. The term ‘religiously-inspired terrorism’ is useful. Where more precise categories are needed, many terms are available, like ‘militant Salafi’, ‘militant Brotherhood’, ‘al-Qaeda associated terror’, etc. Finally, whether we like it or not, governments take sides in religious issues. Although Turkey is a secular state, the Directorate of Religious Affairs guides the religious debate. Rather than forgetting what can be learned from the long experience of countries like Turkey in these issues, and sidelining the voices of reason, the governments of the West can promote the clear case which can be put from within Islam against the modern terrorists.3 3 Although the US and British governments have shown an interest in the Yemeni government’s method of ‘dialogue’ with terrorists, the process in Yemen developed by Qadi al-Hitar comes too close, in our view, to appeasement.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Jihad in a Globalized World, Local Arenas for Global Violent Extremism; Local and Global Contexts, Causes and Motivations Ms Laila BOKHARI Research Fellow, The Transnational Radical Islamism Project, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

Abstract. The following brief paper will aim to address the following questions: What do we mean by a local or global Jihad? What is the terminology used? What are possible causes of extremism and terrorism, the role played by social, economic and political deprivation in a globalized world? What are local forms of violent extremism seen in Europe in particular relating to Islamic minorities – what links to global/foreign terrorist groups? What other local contexts/conflicts play a role on a global stage – what role can armed conflicts play in creating global movements? Characteristics of the “Global Jihad”. A possible dissuasion strategy – local and global, short and long-term. Keywords. Terrorism, global jihad, local jihad, Islamic minorities, dissuasion

Introduction There are at least three areas which may be of particular interest when we look at the interplay between local and global factors. We all agree that our world is more globalized – wherever we live we are somehow affected and concerned not only with the local contexts but also things that happen at a more global stage – importantly however, I will argue, motivated by local contexts. I will explain what I mean below. Firstly, motivations can be found at a local, regional and global stage. Likewise, the causes for radicalization or for going down a path of terrorism may be found at local, regional and global levels. Also, terrorism – or acts of political violence may play out on both local or global arenas. Attacks may take place in a very local setting (Iraq, Kashmir), or involve a more global setting (like the terrorist attack on the UN compound in Baghdad, 19 August 2003, the Bali bombings etc). Furthermore, attacks and the organization of attacks may take place “facilitated” by global factors, such as technology, international communication. Such “global technology” may make global networks more easily available and in turn also communication, organization etc. One component of my research has focused on radical Islamist networks on the European continent. The transnational characteristics of the European networks and its multinational member components have led to the conducting of continuous parallel

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research on the ‘local conflicts’ be they in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Pakistan. Why? Mainly because a number of examples, be they European cases or other have shown that the local ‘diaspora’ context provides youth with motivational factors as a result of perceived deprivation and alienation as part of their immigrant status, while, at the same time, the global context of symbolically important conflicts (Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq, Kashmir, etc) fuel the ideological-political motivations for a violent Jihad. Furthermore as I have argued here in Ankara before, certain conflicts, such as the Kashmir conflict have changed their outlook and raison d’etre from a local to a more global setting – this can, arguably, be seen in a number of other contexts – it has been argued, for example, that foreign militants are today making Afghanistan and Iraq more of international conflicts than local ones. Likewise, to take a recent example, when the Algerian GSCP, Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Prediction et le Combat – Salafist Group for Call and Combat – was said to have changed their name to The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, it was also seen as a change in outlook, ambitions and targets.

A Local and a Global Jihad The word Jihad has become a well-known word for many people these days. Most of us will know and understand that for most Muslims the word Jihad is something positive – a striving and struggle towards or for a better world, to be a better Muslim, to fight evil etc. Questions which are debated are whether this involves – or may involve – violence? To use some examples: Jihad in the Pakistan/Kashmiri context was seen as a liberation struggle, a national cause, for the Kashmiri population first. Arguably however, it is a struggle which has been “hijacked” by a more global motivation and agenda. Today, one may also argue, the struggles of global jihadists (terms used by Usama bin Laden and the like themselves), include Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine, Sudan – local conflicts brought out on the global agenda – connected by global rhetoric and labelling from both sides – the terrorists and the counter-terrorists. By those trying to recruit and radicalize people, local conflict and contexts are made to be seen equally a responsibility for any person around the world. Similarly, calls are made by leaders via statements broadcasted through new global media, able to reach anyone. Importantly, the technology of the internet is able to attract, motivate, radicalize, train and prepare a person wherever he – or she – may be. And in this way it can be seen as something living out on a more global platform. But importantly, also, we are producing the labelling and answering to these calls by answering with the same labelling. What do I mean? Understanding terminology and the real causes behind what is happening is essential to deconstruct what is going on. If not we will play into the hands of those who want this to be seen as a global struggle. By looking for example at a few local contexts, I will try to explain what I mean. The motivations and causes may be both very different and similar in different contexts, but the challenges must be tackled at a local level. The challenge of the above is however complicated by the fact that many of the organizational patterns, networks and planning, funding and recruitment patterns are truly global. Analysis of plots recently in Europe has shown incredible international links and connections.

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The Spread of Local Conflicts – War Veterans’ Influence Before going closer into some of the European international networks we have seen, I would however want to focus briefly on another phenomenon which in many ways formed the basis for much of what arguably were the roots of the global jihadist movements, the war veteran phenomenon – as a result of armed conflict. The most typical example is the mujahidin veterans from civil war zones in Afghanistan during the 1980s; Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Somalia, Kashmir and the Philippines during the 1990s; to Iraq in the post-millennium period. (Palestine is ideologically-speaking extremely important for the internationalist jihadist movement, but with a few exceptions, it has not been an arena for foreign jihadist fighters.) These conflicts invariably involved Muslims fighting non-Muslims, or Islamists fighting secular Muslim governments, and fuelled the global spread of militant Islamism. The genocidal sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya gave some credence to the militant message that Islam was under a global military attack, which had to be repelled at all costs. While the particular circumstances of the Afghan liberation war of the 1980s played a key role in the rise of al-Qaida, there can be little doubt that the various civil war zones also contributed significantly in consolidating a global network of volunteer Islamist fighters, many of whom were, or later came to constitute, the core of Usama bin Ladin’s organisation. The civil war zones were portrayed as ‘lands of jihad’ and attracted Muslim youth from around the world with a mixture of adventurism and ideological commitment, a parallel to the stream of European volunteers to the Spanish civil war in the 1930s. However, a minority of them became battle-hardened war veterans, joined al-Qaida’s network, and ended up as perpetrators of international terrorism. For example, most of the dozen or so Turkish Islamists suspected of plotting an attack on a NATO summit in June 2004 were reported to have ‘been trained or fought alongside Islamic militants’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are also other ways in which armed conflicts contribute to terrorism. As already alluded to, states have facilitated international terrorism by fighting proxy wars through open or tacit support for insurgents and terrorist organisations operating in or against a foreign state (or states). In addition, armed conflicts by themselves create propitious environments for international terrorist organisations, not only because such conflicts are rallying cries for the mobilisation to militant groups, but also in the numerous refugee camps created by the conflict, as well as among sympathetic diaspora communities. Areas ravaged by armed conflict and civil strife often emerge as no-man’s-land, controlled by non-state entities be they rebel groups, warlords, tribal chieftains, or drug cartels. Under certain circumstances, these lawless zones may provide international terrorist groups with safe havens, training camps, etc., and may also assist them in establishing long-lasting relationships with like-minded groups.

The European Context If we take the local setting of Europe, it is extremely interesting to look closer at both the forms of extremism and links between local and global sentiments. Let us firstly look at what forms of extremism are seen in Europe in particular relating to Islamic minorities – what links to global/foreign terrorist groups?

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Europe has a diverse immigrant community, in terms of geographical and socioeconomic background. The time the different groups have spent in Europe also varies (i.e. first, second, third generation immigrants, political refugees, etc). The ties to their ‘home country’ also vary. Europe has become an arena firstly, for support networks (sanctuary) and secondly, increasingly for recruitment and actual activity (attack arena). Europe has become a target in its own right, for small groups of highly motivated, and more or less trained terrorists, with varying ideological and organisational ties alQaida. Europe has long been a sanctuary for Islamist expatriates of various ideological shades, and is still an arena for moderate, semi-radical and radical Islamists who engage in support activity for jihadist insurgencies in North Africa, the Middle East and other parts of Asia. Jihadist terrorist plans and attacks in Western Europe over the past few years have involved multinational, transnationally operating, ‘ad-hoc’ jihadist terrorist groups that were either associated with, or inspired by, al-Qaida. When we consider the profiles of terrorists in Europe, the following points can be made: x The cells seen in Europe, composed of male Muslim immigrants (first and second generation), most often of North African ancestry. They comprised political refugees as well as legal and illegal immigrants. Also a few ethnic European converts to Islam. x Profiles included criminals, drug addicts or ‘socially misplaced people’ – but also many gifted, educated, employed and seemingly assimilated into Western European countries. Many were married with children. Many did not appear to have been religious or politically active prior to their affiliations with militants. Leaders of groups often described as ‘model immigrants’, leading western lifestyle, wearing western clothes, having western girlfriends. Very few fit the ‘typical’ terrorist profile x The terrorists usually resided in Europe prior to joining jihadist groups. They were thus recruited to Islamist militancy inside Western Europe, although there are examples of operatives who were recruited in North Africa, Pakistan, or other places. x The typical pattern is that the young alienated male North African and Middle Eastern immigrants to European countries have become ‘newborn Muslims’, and taken active steps to seek out the radical Islamist doctrine: visited radical mosques/contacted radical milieus – encountered ‘gatekeepers’. x Gatekeepers are often ‘jihad-veterans’ (fought/trained in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir etc). Gatekeepers provided knowledge about how to join militant groups, where to go in order to receive necessary training.

Characteristics of the Global Jihad When addressing what may be possible causes of extremism and terrorism, the interplay between local and global tendencies are factors to look at. For example, what role is played by social, economic and political deprivation? Is it deprivation in the local context – or/and also possibly perceived deprivation in a global context? The European context seen above may provide some clues to build on. These may be grouped as:

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x x x x x x x x x x

x x x

Complex causes /motivations Ideological (religious)-political Social grievances related to the local European context, the countries of origin, as well as on the global/structural level the doctrine and idea of ‘global defensive jihad against aggressors attacking Islam and Muslims’ – the single most important motivational factor at the group level occupation of Palestine, the French support for the Algerian regime, Russia’s military operations inside Chechnya, the Iraq war regional European issues: tightened security, more restrictive immigration legislation surveillance and persecution of radical Islamist milieus in European countries in the aftermath of 9/11 political and military developments in areas of symbolic value and political grievance for radical Islamists – the most important as motivational factors for the terrorist group as a whole at an individual level: ‘social relative deprivation’ – raised expectations of being fully accepted as a fully-fledged member of European societies – which are not fulfilled – played an important role in motivating young Muslim immigrants to join jihadist groups problems of fitting into Western societies the jihadist groups offer young alienated immigrant youth the social gains of companionship, identity and ‘direction in life’ many recruits joined during personal crisis and transitional phases (death of parents, divorce, depression). Not harmonious people. Several cases indicate that those who ended up as terrorists were alienated: exposed to racism, general deprivation = vulnerable and receptive to propaganda of jihadist groups – offered social gains, strong and clearly defined identity, spirituality, and a consistent ideology, clearly defining ‘evil wrongdoers’

Conclusion - Dissuasion In trying to understand the local and global interplay one may attempt to come up with factors that may dissuade people from joining a ‘global violent jihad’. What are possible solutions towards dissuading second generation minorities from treading the path of terrorism? In terms of countering recruitment, there are both short-term and long-term strategies. Short-term policy measures: x

Increased efforts to identify and render harmless potential jihad-entrepreneurs by either prosecuting them, or guiding them to find more constructive and peaceful ways to act out their activism.

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x x

x

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Another important target group are charismatic ‘gatekeepers’ such as radical clerics, ‘jihad veterans’, and leaders in militant milieus who play a vital recruitment role. A key factor in countering recruitment is to hamper the proliferation of jihadist propaganda through the internet. Dissemination of such propaganda on the internet has been, and will most likely become even more important as a means in recruitment processes. Prevent the establishment of new training facilities and sanctuaries in which militants openly can spread their ideology, indoctrinate new members and socialize them into the jihadist worldview.

Long-term countermeasures: x

Politically, integration and inclusion of Muslim immigrants in all segments of Western societies are important means in dealing with the social and political grievances that contribute significantly to the making of extremists and militants. x Efforts must be made to secure an open dialogue between Muslim immigrants and Western societies to facilitate cooperation on efforts to keep young Muslims away from jihadist ‘gatekeepers’. x As much as possible must be done (political and diplomatic measures and pressures), by all nations affected by Islamist militancy, to settle peacefully conflicts at the local and global levels that motivate young Muslims to resort to violence (i.e. those conflicts addressed by al-Qaida and associated groups, such as Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya), and in this way contribute to counter perceptions that Islam is under attack. In essence, the ‘global war on terrorism’ needs to be fought in ways that do not confirm the ideology of the militants. Accordingly it is important to avoid, to the extent possible, actions and practices that create symbols on ‘the suffering of Muslims’ and ‘injustices against Muslims’. In the text and discussion above, we have tried to look at factors that may have become instrumental in creating both local and global contexts in which radicalization is allowed to flourish and terrorism is allowed to develop. One thing is however sure, that as the world we live in is becoming more and more global, so also are its conflicts, messages and methods. Yet at the same time one should not forget that the interplay between the local and the global and those who exploit this may often be the very root of many problems.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Psychology and the Mindset of Suicide Bombers Ch. Supt. Seyit Ahmet EREN Turkish National Police/Anti-Terrorism Department, Currently Instructor and Course Director in COE-DAT

Abstract. The lecture aims to scrutinize the concepts of terrorists, who either voluntarily commit suicide attacks or are forced to do so, with various motivational factors. The presentation focuses on the mindset of terrorists mainly from Turkey, however, it touches on the psychology of other terrorists across the world. It is a known fact that terrorist organizations are capable of using some ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ methods as a means of propaganda to influence these individuals. The lecture explains the militants’ point of view in interpreting the events taking place around them as the effects of group psychology and dynamics. The lecture emphasizes how this ideology turns into a belief system in the world of the militants a certain period after joining a terrorist organization. It also highlights the importance of ideological publications, which are read continuously during organizational training. It finally reflects the effects of all these factors in becoming a suicide bomber.

Key words. Suicide attacks, mindset of terrorists, psychology of terrorists, motivation for suicide terrorism

Dealing with the mindset of suicide bombers is a huge issue, however, the most important aspects of the issue are handled in this paper. In addition, the topics presented here mostly reflect the police perspective, because suicide bombings are still a danger to security forces, especially to police organizations.

Terrorism in Turkey In order to be able to understand the situation in Turkey, it might be useful to mention from terrorist networks in Turkey. Turkey has been under threat from different types of terrorism based on MarxistLeninist, separatist and religious ideologies for the last thirty years. Within the last 30 years, thousands of people have died including innocent citizens, soldiers, police officers, state officials and terrorists as well. Their terrorist activities caused also huge economic losses and waste of time in terms of development.

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These organizations carried out their activities in the rural and metropolitan areas following their own ideologies. Turkey has been faced with left-wing, right-wing, and Armenian ASALA terror activities between 1970 and 1980. Beginning from 1980 up to now separatist PKK terrorism activities have been on the agenda. Moreover, since the 1990s religious/fundamentalist terror acts have been committed with the aim of targeting the secular regime. There have been many terrorist organizations large and small in Turkey. These organizations acting in Turkey can be categorized under four main titles. These are; 1. Left-Wing Terror Organizations, 2. Right-Wing Terror Organizations, 3. Separatist Terror Organizations, 4. Terrorist Groups Connected to Al-Qaeda. Major Left Wing Terror Organizations Another scourge that Turkey is forced to overcome is ‘urban terror’ that started in the early 1970s and certain factions of which continue to be a challenge. The major left-wing terror organizations in Turkey are: x DHKP/C x TKP/ML (Turkey Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist) with two factions; 1 – Conference, 2 – MKP (Maoist Communist Party) x MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party) Terror Organizations Exploiting the Religion Besides these, Turkey continues to fight against extreme religious terrorist groups that aim to convert the secular and democratic structure of Turkey into an Islamic Order. The important ones are; x Hezbollah, x Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/Front (IBDA/C), x Federal Islamic State of Anatolia (AFID/Caliphate State Organization). PKK/KONGRA-GEL There is no doubt that the most important terrorist organization is the PKK/KongraGel, which is responsible for the death at about 35,000 people in Turkey. It is useful to mention some facts about this organization that has caused more casualties and injuries in Turkish society than all the networks mentioned before. It is the terrorist organization also which has committed many suicide attacks in Turkey. The PKK (Kongra-Gel) terror organization was established in 1978 and started armed activities in 1984. Having a Marxist-Leninist ideology, it has been aiming to establish a Kurdish state on the territories of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq that they name Kurdistan. This organization gets its income from organized crime activities such as drug, human and arms trafficking. The leader of the organization, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999 and after trial he was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment.

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After the September 11 attacks, the PKK changed its name firstly to KADEK (Kurdish Liberty and Democracy Congress) in 2002, and later on to Kongra-Gel (Kurdish People’s Congress) in 2003, in order to avoid international condemnation and reaction. Currently, PKK/Kongra-Gel has at about 2,000 armed terrorists in Turkey and 3,500 abroad, the majority of whom are in Northern Iraq. The front network of PKK/Kongra-Gel that supports the armed organization politically, financially and logistically is active in about 30 countries, generally in Europe. Some European and neighbouring countries are responsible for providing support to PKK terrorists. Al-Qaeda-related international terrorists have unfortunately struck in Turkey as well. Of all the suicide attacks Turkey has ever seen, the most tragic ones were the Istanbul bombings, which took place in November 2003. On 15 November 2003, 2 attacks have been carried out at 2 synagogues. On 20 November 2003, the British Consulate and a bank of again a British interest (HSBC) were attacked in Istanbul. The attacks were carried out using bomb-loaded trucks, SVBIEDs. Overall, 61 people were killed as a result, including 3 police officers and the British Consul, and hundreds were wounded. It became soon apparent that perpetrators had received both military and political training in Afghanistan. 172 persons have been taken into custody and 43 have been arrested by judicial authorities.

Suicide Attacks In the last few years, many suicide and IED attacks have been carried out in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and some other countries. It has been observed that many innocent civilians have been killed along with the targeted military personnel. However, as of September 2006, 68% of the casualties in the suicide attacks carried out in Afghanistan have been civilians. When we take into account the IED attacks, we can say that 6 in every 7 casualties are civilians.1 As a reminder, let us have a look suicide attacks. Why do terrorist organizations resort to the suicide attack? Because it: x is sensational, x causes greater casualties, x immensely affects the population and the media, x is difficult to identify the attacker, x requires little training, low cost, low technology, low risk, x is conducted in the place and at the time that is determined by the terrorist, x involves no danger of being interrogated giving away important information, x requires no escape routes or complicated rescue operations, x is basically a punishment strategy.

1 “IED Threat in Afghanistan”, The Second Briefing Day for IEDs, 03 November 2006, Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara.

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Profile of Suicide Bombers in General Although there is no single suicide bomber profile, they are; x generally single, x between 16-60 years old, x usually from poor and multi-children families, x both educated and uneducated, x both male and female, x not necessarily motivated by religious fanaticism (left-wing organizations), x eager to avenge themselves on security officers/enemy, x mostly psychologically normal, x sometimes suffering from psychological/health problems, x not useful any more for the organization, unskilled especially in the field. A Case Study In a suicide attack study Turkish Police worked on, it was found out that a young girl acting in the PKK terrorist organization had been assigned by the mentioned organization to commit a suicide attack. But she refused to commit the attack and subsequently she was killed due to disobedience. The planned attack, carried out by a different girl, took place in 1996, killing 3 police officers and 1 citizen, and wounding 12 citizens. The details will not be given in this paper, however the intention is to show how the members of terrorist organizations some times are forced to act in the direction of instructions of the organization. The young girl, Turkan Adfıyaman, refused to commit a suicide attack, in other words, she disobeyed the order. A male terrorist took the young girl along with another young girl, Leyla Kaplan, outside the city, and killed the refusing girl with one bullet to her head. After killing her, he buried the corpse there. All these occurred in front of the second girl. Then, the male terrorist ordered to the second girl, 17-year-old Leyla Kaplan, to commit the attack. He said that; “Either you die as a hero for the organization, or I will kill you as a traitor and coward, as I did to her.” Leyla Kaplan knew that if she refused to carry out the attack, she was going to be killed like the previous girl. So, she decided to die as a hero! The PKK then recorded a videotape of suicide bomber Leyla Kaplan, just one day before the suicide attack, as if she were committing the attack voluntarily. The aim of the PKK in recording this film was to encourage the other militants and to make propaganda. The videotape was later on seized in the operation conducted by the police. The statements of the male terrorist who confessed in the homicide case illuminated the fact that, once the militants are ordered to commit a suicide attack, they have no option but to do so. Since the main focus point of this paper is the psychology and mindset of suicide bombers, the following will be handled a bit in detail. The psychology of joining a terrorist group or being a suicide attacker differs depending on the typology of the group. Motivational elements vary from country to country, from region to region and even from organization to organization. Terrorists have many different reasons or motives for their acts. Many politically motivated terrorists, whether they are of the left or right, want to bring down an existing government or regime. Many religious terrorists want to attack those they see

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as attacking their religion. Others want publicity for their cause. Suicide attackers have usually had at least one relative or close friend who has been killed, maimed, or abused by their enemies. They regard themselves as unknown warriors and self-sacrificing people of the community. According to them people in the community are unaware of their rights and unconscious. Therefore they cannot distinguish good from bad. This is why the public does not join the organizations. They also believe that as time goes on the people will become conscious and take part in activities. Until then, as the conscious group of the community, the struggle must be implemented on behalf of the public.2 Ideology is very important for the terrorist organizations. They regard their ideologies as a unique guide that produces solutions to every kind of problem in the universe, and it is therefore not necessary for a member in the organization to think for himself or herself. A member within the organization is expected to be obedient to whatever the leader or his commanders say. The leaders in the religious terrorist organizations have a great influence on the obedient cadre of the organizations. Because of strict hierarchy and high discipline in these groups, the leaders keep full control over the political and military issues. It is as if the leaders made themselves a God and regard their militants as their servants. They direct their staff towards the attacks by invoking religion and by finding a basis in the Scriptures. In order to achieve their aims, terrorist organizations using religious motives can kill anybody, even Muslim leaders or scholars who are believed to cause an obstacle to their making progress. Having been accepted into the organization, the individual is taken for training both ideological and practical. Ideological training comes first. Ideology is of vital importance in terms of changing the mentality. The organization makes the necessary changes in the attitude of the person by penetrating his perception of the world, and forms a new subconscious. Thus, the new member earns a militant identity and personality. Each member considers himself as a revolutionary and, in order to be able to change the whole world, a revolutionary has to change himself first in the direction of his organization’s ideology.3 How can it be achieved? Ideological thoughts turn into a belief system in the world of the militants thanks to ideological publications, which are read continuously during the organizational training. As a result of the training, the militants become extremists of their ideologies. Especially the ones who were starved for affection may have tendency to be fanatical. While they were nothing in their own minds and in the environment they lived in, until they join the organization, after joining the organization they regard themselves as heroes that can rebuild the world. These feelings give them energy, strength, and enthusiasm. This is why they are so ruthless and merciless while killing people, even babies. A while after joining the organization, the militants start to regard everything as ‘black’ or ‘white’. In other words, they divide the people into two parts; those who are from us, and those who are not from us. Most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people, or damage property. Many terrorists have a simplistic thinking in which “I am 2 Necati Alkan, Genclik ve Terorizm, (Youth and Terrorism), Publication of Anti-Terrorism Department, Turkish National Police, No:9, Catalog No: 323, Ankara, 2002, p.144–156. 3 Ibid., p. 144–156.

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good and right, you are bad and wrong.” This belief makes easier to kill people who are believed to have a connection with their enemies. They do not feel other people’s pain. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill. This is also not a lack of intelligence however. Many terrorists are of above average intelligence. Besides these, the leaders make up brilliant dreams and make their staff believe these dreams. As the time goes on, the leaders, too, start to believe the things they concocted. The terrorists feel that they carry out a magnificent and holy duty. It can be said that this feeling is one of the main pillars of legitimacy to kill or to die. Ideological publications and the subjects in these publications increase the incentives to imitate the former militants, especially the martyrs. Additionally, as is the case in the Middle East, suicide bombers expect to be admired and envied by those left behind. Teenage groups praise martyrs in their songs.4 Suicide attacks are the last stage of dedication, which entail not only killing but also dying. Terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, grows in an environment in which the conditions are abnormal. Some blame military occupations or heartbreaking economic and social conditions as causing the existence of abnormal conditions. Under the abnormal conditions, some people in the region think of suicide attacks as a necessity and the last remedy where the weapons are not equal. Research done in the USA showed that suicide terrorism is employed “to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the suicide bombers consider to be their homeland,” as political scientist Robert A. Pape, from the University of Chicago, mentions in his book “Dying to win; The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” that catalogues every suicide terrorist attack between 1980 and 2003, using an original database. Pape finds that 301 of the 315 recorded attacks were components of large, coherent struggles against foreign occupation. Suicide terrorism, he argues, is employed as a strategy of last resort designed to cause more damage than conventional forms of resistance. He also adds that the description of these catastrophes as products of Islamic fundamentalism and false presumptions threaten America and harm Muslims around the world.5 Because of their frequent use, suicide attacks become a goal in a society rather than a means. The culture using it degenerates after a while. Then that society does not need to spend much effort to find suicide attackers since the environment is convenient for raising up such persons. The people in that society feel themselves to be very strong when they take death lightly in the struggle against the enemy. As a result, suicide action gives them a feeling of unlimited power despite their weakness. So, if the conditions are restored, and people are confronted with the truth, then communities and people might relinquish these considerations. After mentioning the psychology of the suicide bombers, let us review some points: Suicide attackers harbour animosity against those who do not support their approach. Psychiatrists have studied the behaviors and actions of the 19 terrorists who were held responsible for involvement in the 9/11 attacks, and determined that they had shown similarities in terms of hardness and intolerance with unhealthy reactions and extreme anger against the people outside their community.6

4

Debra D. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers, Research, June 2004, p. 9. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 2005. 6 Erol Göka, Siyasi Vahúet Gruplarının ve øntihar Eylemcisinin Psikolojisi, (The Psychology of Politically Brutal Groups and Suicide Attackers), (Compiled by Erol Göka and Iúık Kuúçu, Ankara, the publication of Euro-Asia Strategic Studies Centre (ASAM), 2002, p. 297. 5

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Another study showed that the perpetrators of 9/11 had been reared in an environment in which the incurability and anger was dominant. The experts claimed that they directed their violent attitudes and anger towards the individuals causing their social wounds and those of their societal values, partially or entirely.7 There have been hundreds, maybe thousands of volunteer suicide attackers in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere, and each of them had a reason to commit a suicide attack. Since we will not be able to give a voice to all of them, I have decided to quote the story of one of them. What one of Zerkawi’s militants in Iraq, a-twenty-year old young man, nicknamed Mervan Ebu Ubeyde, says in an interview to “Time Magazine”8 shows us the mood of volunteer attackers in terrorist organizations exploiting the religion and their determination as to death. Mervan states in his interview that there have been hundreds of volunteers ready to die and explains his sole aim is to become a martyr and to guarantee the reward in paradise. He also says; “It is not important if people know what I am doing. God knows what I am doing and this is enough for me, because he is going to ask me how many unbelievers I killed.” Mervan submits as an excuse for his actions that after the toppling of Saddam’s regime, the U.S. did not leave the country and furthermore American troops killed 12 students in a military raid on a school in 2003, and they wounded some other students. He says that his aim is to exalt Islam, to become a martyr, and to protect his country. Mervan furthermore says that insurgents recruited many people from Felluja at that time. He says that he was one of privileged younger generation in Felluja and his father was a prosperous businessman. He adds that he waits impatiently for the order to commit a suicide attack. As of today, when we have taken into consideration the quantity of suicide attacks in Iraq, where approximately 40–50 people are killed in a day, it is not difficult to presume that this young man has died. Mervan’s confessions reveal also the times spent in the camps after being recruited. He says that apart from the military and religious training, volunteer suicide attackers are given some books which furnish them with religious philosophy, and give them power and enthusiasm. The books are mostly about the lives of martyrs. He adds that relations are cut with families after joining the organization. The suicide bombers are confined to private cells on their last days for prayer, worship, and in order to prevent negative thoughts from entering their minds. They know nothing about the suicide action, when and where it will take place, until the last minute. Mervan says he prays for the innocent in case they may die in the attacks, but if they die he believes God will forgive them. Mervan states that there is a very strong motivation behind this preparedness. Attackers promise to meet each other in paradise. He adds that he wishes to explode the bombs in a military compound. However, if he is ordered to go to the centre of the city and complete the mission, he says he would definitely obey the order, because the leader and his commanders have the unique authority to decide what to do and how to do it. Another example to the lack of empathy is the behavior of Nezar Hindawi, a freelance Jordanian terrorist. In April 1986, he sent his pregnant Irish girlfriend to 7

Abdülkadir Çevik and Birsen Ceyhun, Psikolojik yönden kimlik geliúimi ve Etnik Terörizm, (Identity Improvement in Terms of Psycho-Politic and Ethnic Terrorism), Ankara, Political Psychology Centre, 1995, p. 28. 8 “Bir Canlı Bomba Psikolojisini Anlatıyor”, (A Suicide Bomber Explains His Psychology), “Haftalık” magazine, vol. 118, 13–19 July 2005, p. 21.

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Israel by airplane, saying he would meet her there to be married. She apparently was not aware that Hindawi had hidden a bomb provided by the Abu Nidal organization in her luggage. His willingness to sacrifice his girlfriend and unborn child displays this incident as psychopathic.9 This plan failed thanks to the attention of the security personnel in the airport.

Vicious Circle Having mentioned all these, let us see how a vicious circle comes to exist. To attack innocent civilians increases the hostility between the parties. It only encourages others to take up the cause. It also causes the thought to spread that while the powerful side continues operations, the weak ones will attack with the sole thing they have; their bodies… Then, a new attack is inevitable. Thereby a vicious circle comes into existence. Therefore, suicide bombings should not be responded to randomly, by targeting everybody, among whom there might be perpetrators. Rather it is necessary that specific, credible information be gathered about the perpetrators.

Conclusion Before moving on to the strategies for how to respond to terrorist networks exploiting the religion, we must review two misconceptions about Islam, which are commonly seen in the West, including America; x The first is that Islam is irrational, anti-modern, and monolithic and has a tendency to violence, x The second is that extremist groups are merely an obvious perversion of Islam that can be easily dismissed. Some say these misconceptions are related to Jihadist-Salafism.10 Those who are asserting that they are on the way of God are killing the innocents, whose mistakes are merely to be present where the bombs exploded. The attackers expect to go directly to the paradise and to be rewarded by God. Whereas in fact they are stigmatizing and blackening the name of their religion by resorting to violence. They are supposed to know that, and actually it is one of the basic tenets of Islam11: “If someone kills somebody else unjustly, it is as if he killed all humanity.” According to the holy book of Islam, “Murderers are the permanent residents of the hell.” If they claim that they are killing justly, then they should explain the death of babies, women, or any other individuals who are not combatants. A war may break out between fighting sides, and killing may be justifiable. Even then, there are some certain rules in international law and in the scriptures, such as not to kill the non-combatants or civilians, or not to destroy the places of worship etc. As they act in a contrary way, we can conclude that they are considerably deceived.

9

Maxwell Taylor, Ryan, Helen, “Fanaticism, Political Suicide, and Terrorism”, no. 2, p. 91–111, 1998. Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Countering Terrorist Ideology,” Lecture note of the Seminar of the CCMR, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism, 19-30 Jun 2006, Peace Support Operations Department Training Center, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 11 See Holy Koran; 4/90, 5/32, 60/8. 10

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Therefore, religious scholars have great responsibilities in illuminating such deceived individuals. Religions should not be politicized. Divine messages in the holy books must not be misinterpreted. Another interesting point is that, during the Soviet occupation, mujahids in Afghanistan never resorted to suicide attacks. Recently, most of the suicide attacks have gained legitimacy in terror organizations misinterpreting the religion, while we believe this is the new fashion transferred into Islam by the perverted perception of AlQaeda, and therefore it should be called as ‘Bin Ladinism’. As for the leaders of terrorist organizations exploiting the religion, they should commit the suicide attack, if it is so sacred, instead of encouraging their militants to go to the paradise. They should also show the examples if the Prophet of Islam ever encouraged or ordered to his companions to commit a suicide attack.

What Else Can We Do? Policies and relations between the countries/groups must be reviewed and new approaches must be adopted based on mutual understanding. Peaceful resolutions must be implemented instead of mutual retaliation. More attention has to be paid to historical, economic, social, cultural, political, psychological and religious factors. For this, not only the security forces but also other institutions and civil society must get involved in coping with suicide terrorism. In order to prevent false teachings and the misuse of the religions, governments should provide education on religious subjects. As for the Western World Considering every Muslim as a potential terrorist should be avoided. This perception deeply hurts Muslims across the world and increases the polarization. Neither terrorism nor suicide attacks are approved in the religion. In addition, special efforts must be made by the media, researchers and politicians in distinguishing the real tenets of Islam and the approaches of members of a religious terrorist organization exploiting the religion. Would it not be much better if we could term the situation ‘terrorism with religious motives’ or ‘terror organizations exploiting the religions’ instead of ‘Islamic terrorism’?

References ALKAN Necati, (2002), Genclik ve Terorizm, (Youth and Terrorism), Publication of Anti-Terrorism Department, Turkish National Police, No:9, Catalog no: 323, Ankara. ÇEVøK Abdülkadir, and CEYHUN Birsen, (1995), “Psikolojik Yönden Kimlik Geliúimi ve Etnik Terörizm,” (Identity Improvement in terms of Psycho-Politic and Ethnic Terrorism, Ankara, Political Psychology Centre. GÖKA Erol, (2002), “Siyasi Vahúet Gruplarının ve øntihar Eylemcisinin Psikolojisi,” (The Psychology of Politically Brutal Groups and Suicide Attackers), Compiled by Erol GÖKA and Iúık KUùÇU, Ankara, the publication of Euro-Asia Strategic Studies Centre (ASAM). “Haftalık Magazine,” (2005), “Bir Canlı Bomba Psikolojisini Anlatıyor”, (A Suicide Bomber Explains His Psychology”, vol. 118. Holy Koran; 4/90, 5/32, 60/8.

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MOCKAITIS Thomas R, (2006), “Countering Terrorist Ideology”, Lecture note of the Seminar of the CCMR, Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism, Peace Support Operations Department Training Center, Bosnia-Herzegovina. PAPE Robert A. (2005), “Dying to win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” TAYLOR Maxwell, RYAN Helen, ( 1998), “Fanaticism, Political Suicide, and Terrorism,” no: 2. The Second Briefing Day for IEDs, (2006), “IED Threat in Afghanistan,” Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara. ZEDALIS Debra D, (2004), “Female Suicide Bombers”, Research.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Recruitment and Training Methods of Suicide Terrorism Supt. Süleyman ÖZEREN, Ph.D. Police Academy, Turkey

Abstract. Suicide attack is one of the most effective tactics of terrorism. While it is important to identify the tactics of suicide terrorism in terms of how it is carried out, it is also more important to know the recruitment and training process of suicide terrorism. Identifying the methods of recruitment and training of suicide terrorism will enable the law enforcement personnel to develop new tactics to counter suicide terrorism. Such an attempt will also enable policy-makers to develop new strategies and policies to undermine recruitment methods. Countering terrorism strategies are applicable to suicide terrorism because literature shows us that recruitment methods of suicide terrorism share similar features with terrorism in general. The purpose of this paper is to analyze both the recruitment and training methods of suicide terrorism. Keywords. Terrorism, suicide terrorism, motivation, recruitment and training methods.

Introduction Terrorism has become one of the most critical issues in the world. Terrorism is a complex problem due to its political nature; however, it also presents multifaceted issues, including the ideologies, tactics, recruitment methods, and financing resources. Understanding the phenomenon of terrorism requires the researchers and practitioners to comprehend the causes of terrorism. “Single-factor explanations overlook the fact that terrorist behavior is an interaction between individual psychology and external environment,” (Long, 1990). As with other forms of terrorism, it is also important to realize how complex suicide terrorism is. Kimhi and Even examined the Palestanian suicide attacks and concluded that “most researchers tend to agree … that suicide terror is a multi-factorial phenomenon. The various explanations for suicide terror include personal and group motives, environmental conditions, and their interactions” (as cited in Moghadam, 2005). Such a comprehensive approach requires three levels of analysis. Although it is not the purpose of this article to analyze these levels, to be able to set the scene for recruitment and training methods of suicide terrorism it is necessary briefly to explain them.

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It is vital to shed light on the issue of different levels of analysis. In order to acquire knowledge about the recruitment and training methods of suicide terrorism, it is important to understand the motivating factors. This will also help the security forces to respond to suicide attack. Moreover, at both the operational and strategic levels of responding to terrorism, such an understanding will be of great importance. The first level of analysis involves the individual level which looks at the personal motivation for committing a suicide attack. The second level of analysis looks at the organization which decides to carry out the suicide attack. The third level of analysis describes the environment and is “meant to uncover the various structural factors and conditions that provide the context for the individual and the organizational levels” (Moghadam, 2005). In other words, environmental factors play an important role in the organization’s decision to carry out a suicide bombing, as well as the individual’s motivation to sacrifice his or her own life. Terror tactics are communication strategies which serve terrorist organizations in achieving the ultimate purpose of their terrorism. Through attacks (extremely violent in nature) terrorists send a message to the government, the mainstream society, sympathizers, and the members. Each party will be affected by the attack depending on its position in the conflict. Suicide terrorism is also very effective method in the organization’s options list. Suicide terrorism is one of the most effective and efficient tactics of terrorism. The aim of this article is to analyze recruitment and training methods of suicide terrorism.

1. Definition of Suicide Terrorism In terms of defining suicide terrorism, it is important to note that “suicide terrorism should not be considered a sui generis phenomenon because ordinary terrorism and suicide terrorism share many characteristics in common” (Moghadam, 2005, p. 6)—the main exception being the “motive of individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom” (Crenshaw, 2004). This being stated, there are different types of definition of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism can be broadly defined as “the readiness to sacrifice one’s life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal. The aim of the psychologically and physically war-trained terrorist is to die while destroying the enemy target” (Gunaratna, 2000). Another definition is presented by Schweitzer, who defines suicide terrorism as “a politically-motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission”. Pape defines suicide terrorism as “the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of losing support among the terrorists’ own community” (2003, p. 3). Suicide terrorism shares similar elements with ordinary terrorism. As has been stated before, the concept of terrorism involves three major elements; ideology, organization, and violence. These three elements differentiate acts of terrorism from ordinary violence or organized crime. In sum, for an act to be defined as terrorism, there has to be an organization which uses violence in support of an ideology. Suicide terrorism, on the other hand, has another element which can be considered as a sub-

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element. That is the self-sacrificial nature of the act. “Self-sacrifice has always been a concept acceptable and even glorified, as part of war… the concept of self-sacrifice for a variety of causes; Country/Ethnic Identity/Tribe, King/Queen/Emperor/Great-Leader, God/Deity/Religious beliefs, Ideology, Flag/Banner has been and remains a highly regarded archetype within every society” (Gunawardena, 2004).

2. Why Suicide Terrorism? Suicide terrorism has many features that cause terrorist organizations to carry out such attacks. While there are varieties of reasons why terrorist organizations choose suicide as a tactic, the following are to summarize organizational and individual motivations. 2.1. Organizational Motivations The organization is the sole entity which orchestrates the suicide attacks, from the decision to execution of the attack (Cronin, 2003). Organizational motivations to carry out suicide attacks are as follows: “Suicide attacks may result in a large number of casualties” (Hoffman, 2003). Suicide attack itself involves human tragedy since there is a human sacrifice. For that reason such an attack will draw more attention in the public. “It is a strategic alternative based on cost-benefit calculations by those who are weak, with limited resources, and they are seeking to wage war against very powerful opponents … which may sound an irrational or highly controversial form of violence, yet in reality is an effectual technique of asymmetrical warfare” (Hafez, 2004). Suicide attack is a big investment for the organization in terms of cost-benefit analysis. While preparation and execution of a suicide attack requires little expense, the result or the benefit to the organization will be huge compared to the cost. As a result of the attack, the attacker may become a martyrdom ‘symbol’, a ‘legend’ which can also be capitalized on by the organization to recruit new members. The organization can control the timing and the placement of the attack. It can generate a great deal of fear and anxiety in the public. The situation may lead police and other security agencies to behave in a prejudiced way towards the specific community from which the attacker comes, as a result of which the security forces may alienate themselves from the mainstream society. Strategically, it demonstrates the strength of the organization, which will encourage retaliation by the government; however, the research indicates that retaliation policies are not as effective as they have been presented (Enders and Sander, 1993). Suicide attacks help the organization to maintain internal cohesion among the members. The attack will show the members of the terrorist organization that the group is still powerful enough to orchestrate the attack. Furthermore, such an attack is a sign of the determination of the organization to maintain its strength to the extent that it sacrifices its members when it is necessary. Such a tactic also will boost the morale of the members. On the other hand, the suicide attack also demonstrates desperation on the part of the terrorist organization.

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2.2. Individual Motivations There are also personal motivations which lead an individual to carry out suicide attacks. First of all, such an attack will draw attention to the cause. Secondly, a member can choose to sacrifice himself or herself for personal notoriety. Moreover, the motivation can be anger and revenge against the specific target. The world has witnessed several suicide attacks in Iraq especially after the incidents in Abu Ghurayb Prison (Özeren and Cinoglu, 2006). Fourth, a person may choose to become a suicide attacker for retribution against perceived injustice. As Davis cites from an interview with one military commander in Islamic Jihad, suicide attack is described as follows: “The martyr is not someone who commits suicide, as people always think he is. And people who commit acts of martyrdom by using their bodies are not stars in the organization. They are people seeking revenge for acts done against us” (Davis, 2003, p.137). Fifth, unemployment, frustration, and sense of humiliation can be sources of suicide terrorism. Refugee status can force a person to become a suicide attacker, since such a situation may not offer any foreseeable future in life. Seventh, humiliation and bitterness will lead to a suicide attack, which may put a person into a situation in which death can only be an escape for the individual. In terms of the relationship between the organization and a member, loyalty to the organization, strong group identity, and a desire to be a hero can be listed as motivation factors as well. “Terror groups frame suicide attacks as acts of unparalleled heroism, religious obligation, and opportunities for personal redemption. In doing so, they foster a culture of martyrdom that generates future volunteers for suicide attacks” (Hafez, 2004). The logic that drives voluntary acts of self-destruction is therefore as follows. “Each person who chooses the death of the self does so because at the given moment death will enhance her most valuable asset, the identity that she has selected and invested in through her life, but living on will damage it irreparably. The moment is such that by choosing life she must abandon this identity” (Harrison, 2003). Finally, punishment for refusal can be a negative reinforcement for such a decision. Hafez summarizes the reasons why an individual, organization, and society embrace the culture of suicide terrorism. He argues that not only members and the organization but also the society may consider suicide terrorism as an option to respond to the conditions. At the level of society, suicidal violence is embraced and venerated when three conditions are met: (1) prevailing cultural norms and mores encompass belief systems, symbolic narratives, and historical traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom; (2) legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3) groups or communities feel overwhelming threats and victimized by external enemies in the course of political conflict (Hafez, 2004, p. 1).

3. Recruitment and Training Methods of Suicide Terrorism There are social and psychological tactics that terrorist organizations use when they recruit new members. But there are also conditions which provide opportunities for

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organizations to find candidates. As Hoffer (1951) states “people who have not found their place in life, but still hope to find a better life, such as adolescent youth, unemployed college graduates, veterans, poor people, minorities, new immigrants, and other similar categories that are dissatisfied with their positions, are open targets for being converted or lured by extremist groups.” 3.1. Recruitment Methods of Suicide Terrorism “For the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often made by a friend or group, rather than an abstract ideology or to violence” (Crenshaw, 1983). For instance, a survey showed that 71 percent of PKK members joined the PKK in a way that was not their individual choice (Alkan, 2002). Parallel to the PKK findings, Della Porta points out that among Italian extremists, the decision to join a terrorist organization was rarely given individually. Outside attractions, such as social relationships and personal connections, have a crucial role in joining a terrorist group. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that an existing group is a crucial component of terrorist acts. This explanation, however, has also limits within itself because it disregards the point of how a terrorist organization first emerges in a society. The following section analyzes some of the social and psychological tactics terrorist organizations use. 3.1.1. Social Tactics It is important to note that recruitment tactics and techniques of suicide terrorism are not totally different to recruitment methods of terrorism in general. In other words, recruitment methods of terrorism are also applicable to suicide terrorism. Terrorist organizations use similar tactics and capitalize on similar social, economic, cultural, political, and psychological conditions. In terms of recruitment methods, terrorist organizations use social tactics, including peer groups, friends, relatives, social and cultural activities, and religion (Alkan, 2002). Most of the time it is the organization which attempts to recruit new members. In other words, individuals rarely decide to join to the terrorist organization through solely their own decision. Rather, organizations use a variety of tactics to get in touch with potential recruits. The following section will explain the aforementioned recruitment methods. Della Porta points out that among Italian extremists, the decision to join a terrorist organization was rarely given individually (2001). Social relationships and activities, and personal connections play a crucial role in making the decision to join a terrorist group (Borum, 2004). 3.1.1.1. Peer Groups/Friends Especially youngsters can be a potential target for terrorist organizations. In those ages, friends and peer groups are important for the young individuals. Terrorist organizations use friendship to get in touch with potential individuals. Young members in the terrorist organizations meet the potential recruit and try to gain his or her confidence, and then the process of propaganda and indoctrination will start. Since during the ages of adolescence, youngsters are not fully aware of their surroundings, they may not know whether their friends are really friends. Once they become fully involved in terrorist organizations it may be too late to go back.

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As a case of recruitment which did not reflect personal choice, Saliha Dagci was killed on 27th February 1998 by the military forces. She was a member of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party). Her diary was found, and in the diary she was talking about how she was deceived by her friends at the university. She wrote: “I regret that I left the university. The two years I spent at the university were the most beautiful years in my life. I cannot forget the days I spent in Istanbul. We had a joyful life in the university dormitory. Hatice, Aysun, Saadet, and I used to go out together ... I am so full of regrets …” (as cited in Alkan, 2002, p. 148). This piece alone enables us to understand how peer groups are critical for the recruitment process. 3.1.1.2. Relatives During the early stages of development, individuals may consider some of the people around them as role models. Most of the time, parents, an uncle, cousin, aunt, or sometimes a distant relative can be a role model for a person. When it comes to terrorism, this is also an important part of the recruitment process. One’s close relative can be an inspiration for a person to become a terrorist. Also the loss of a close relative who is a member in a terrorist organization may act as a triggering effect which will push the individual into the hands of the terrorist organization. An example of this is a Chechen woman who failed to carry out a suicide attack which could not be completed due to a failed detonation. Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, who is in a Russian prison, lost her husband who had also been fighting against Russia. She was all alone, fifteen years old, pregnant, and without money, all of which made her a suitable candidate for suicide. She was promised that her debts would be cleared and her family would receive money as well (Merari, 2004). Another example is also from Chechnya. Aisa Gazuyeva killed herself during a suicide attack by detonating herself in front of Geidar Gadzhiev, who was a military commander of Ursus Martan, southwest of Grozny. She committed such an act to take a revenge for her husband, who was murdered by Gadzhiev in front of Gazuyeva’s eyes four months previously (Moghadam, 2005). These two events have similar characteristics which made these two individuals easy targets for recruitment. Then the terrorist organization took advantage and capitalized on the conditions of these two women. 3.1.1.3. Social and Cultural Activities Terrorist organizations use social and cultural activities to identify new candidates for recruitment. Sports competitions, summer camps, tea parties, concerts, and other social gatherings may facilitate a kind of socialization among the candidates and the members of an organization. Moreover, the doctrinal wings of a terrorist organization may organize such events to look for possible candidates. Of course, it is not just these social and cultural activities which can be used to reach out to individuals for recruitment. Rather these events play a catalyzing role in meeting new people and becoming friends. Sultan Canik, a member of the Revolutionary People’s Party/Front (MarxistLeninist terrorist organization), was contacted by party members during a social gathering organized by the Women’s Association for Revolutionary Struggle (Devrimci Mücadele Kadınlar Derne÷i, DEMKAD). Normally Canik was a shy person who did not have many friends, but people in DEMKAD became her friends. She eventually went through an indoctrination process

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by the organization. She became an active member of the DHKP/C. Later in October 1992, during an operation, she was killed in a cell house by the police (Alkan, 2002, p. 154). It is necessary to note that these events are also part of the recruitment process. Social activities provide opportunities for the organizations to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the possible candidates. 3.1.1.4. Religion Laqueur (1996) contended that the faith would become the primary influence on terrorist behavior. Indeed, faith-motivated terrorism has increased over the past decade (Hoffman, 1995). Its consequences are cosmic as well as extremely tragic, because faith is manipulated to justify every action, including the destruction of the whole world (White, 2000). Berger (1980) has similar perspective to Marty and Appleby (1991). He argues that there is a collision between traditional and modern values. People in this arena have three choices: rejecting change, coping with change, or seeking new ideologies preserving tradition within change. The rejectionists may turn to militancy because change is not a social revolution but it is confrontation with evil in their perspective. So, the rejectionists use violence as a way of protecting the traditional values. In this sense, rejectionists develop their interpretation of religion. Christian Identity, the Patriot movement, Survivors, Odinism, Nordic Christianity, Hizballah in Turkey, and Al-Qaeda are some examples of these interpretations of religion. It is also known that ethnic hatred and ethnocentric religion gave rise to the massacres in Balkan Peninsula. Although faith is misinterpreted in such a way as to constitute one of the major sources of motivation for the use of violence, in its essence it does not justify violence. White (2000) believes that religious faith cannot produce violence and terrorist behavior, but it can be interpreted in such a way as to justify an attack on social structures. He argues that three circumstances must be present to motivate believers to move from thought to violence action: (1) believers must perceive a threat to their values, (2) a theology must be transformed into a dogma produced by a textual interpretation, (3) the true believers must embrace violence as a means to preserve the faith. Terrorism becomes part of theology when these three circumstances are present (White, 2000). Particularly, religiously motivated terrorist organizations misuse the religion as a motivation factor to recruit new members. The Istanbul attacks in 2003 were carried out by the Al-Qaeda connected terrorist groups in Turkey. Also Palestinian terrorist organizations use suicide attacks against Israeli targets. When it comes to suicide terrorism, Hizballah represents a unique position since suicide has proven very effective after the attacks in Lebanon in 1983 against the French and US military barracks. Mosques and bookstores have been used to recruit new members. For instance, based in southeastern Anatolia, Turkish Hizballah originally operated mainly in the cities of Diyarbakir, Van, Batman and Mardin. Members of the terrorist group habitually gathered in and around bookstores, where they discussed their ideologies and spread their propaganda (Özeren and Van De Voorde, 2006, p. 81). They are able to establish initial contacts when people go to these bookstores and mosques. According to official reports, the founding members of Turkish Hizballah initially gathered at one bookstore, Vahdet, but they were never able to form a homogenous group (Özeren and Van De Voorde, 2006, p. 81).

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It is necessary to state that when it comes to suicide terrorism, the literature mostly focuses on Middle East origin terrorism and religious extremism and generally ignores the fact that there are other terrorist organizations which use suicide as a major and decisive tactic (Pipes, 1986): “… although religious motives may matter, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic Fundamentalism” (Pape, 2003, p.1, Wyne, 2005). Religion can be a very strong factor as a source of motivation that terrorist organizations use. However, as Pape stated: “Religious fanaticism does not explain why the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a group that adheres to a Marxist/Leninist ideology, while existing psychological explanations have been contradicted by the widening range of socio-economic backgrounds of suicide terrorists” (2003, p. 1). 3.1.1.5. Ethnic Background The term ethnic is defined as “a sizable group of people sharing a common and distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage” (The Free Dictionary). Such a group acts as a sub-culture which provides a kind of safe heaven for the socially alienated individuals. On the other hand members of a specific ethnic minority may feel that his or her ethnicity is the major factor to blame for the lack of employment, lack of opportunities, and the like. Such a perception may be capitalized on by the terrorist organization to approach individuals. Other factors, including immigration, and economic and social instability may accelerate one’s decision to join in an organization which promises solutions to the destitution and misery the individual is experiencing. Ethnic background provides ample opportunities for terrorist organizations, such as the PKK and Tamil Tigers (LTTE). There prevails a supportive environment from the entire community carefully inculcated by the LTTE over a period of more than two decades. This can be termed as ‘social conditioning’. In the context of the Black Tigers this is one of the most important motivational imperatives, and it can bring forth volunteers for the Black Tigers more than religion, ‘cause’, mystic indoctrination or individual personality characteristics. The Kurdish PKK, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, which claims a Marxist ideology, has also carried out several suicide attacks, one of which was recently executed in Ankara. This terrorist organization has nothing to do with religion. As in many terrorist organizations, suicide attacks have been carried out based on nationalist motivations or in the name at least of nationalist motivations, or patriotic motivations as they see it (Merari, 2000). The PKK launched a suicide terrorism campaign most notably between 1995 and 1999. Many of the terrorist suicide attacks perpetrated by PKK-KONGRA GEL actually coincided with the arrest, imprisonment, sentencing or extradition of Ocalan, the leader of the terrorist organization, as well as upsurges in repressive measures adopted by the Turkish government (Özeren and Van de Voorde, 2006). The last suicide attack and other failed attempts (the Turkish security forces successfully tracked down the suicide attackers and captured them before they carried out the attack) were orchestrated as a response to allegations that Ocalan has been poisoned in the prison, which was a claim invalidated by the doctors.

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3.1.2. Psychological Tactics When a terrorist organization makes a decision to recruit a person to the organization, they start to collect information about the individual. This is a kind of background check or security check that the organizations implement. It is also a defensive measure to avoid police or other security agency personnel infiltrating the organization. The information which is being acquired or collected about the person includes his or her family structure, friends whom he or she has a relationship with, economic and social status, vulnerabilities (any weakness, psychological or social crisis, humiliation, etc.), religious, cultural, or ethnic background (Alkan, 2002). All of the information will provide insights about the person which will be used by the organization. After acquiring the information, the organization approaches the person through the psychological, social, economic, and cultural vulnerabilities of the person. Of course, it is necessary to note that individual psychology is also an important factor, while the effect of group dynamics still plays the dominant role. The next section will examine individual and group psychology in the recruitment process. 3.1.2.1. The Effects of Individual Psychology What kind of a person or personality can do repulsive and evil things including the massive use of deadly force? From Winter’s (2002) terrorism model, a terrorist is modeled as an actor in a process of violence, disillusion, dedication and vision of new order. According to Dr. Kernberg, a terrorist individual has a “... malignant combination of paranoid and narcissistic features in the syndrome of malignant narcissism characterized by narcissistic personality, paranoid features, ego syntonic aggression and antisocial behavior.” Similarly, psychiatrist Dr. Irwin Wolkoff contends that suicidal terrorists “would qualify for such diagnoses as narcissistic personality disorder, malignant type, with superego pathology or antisocial personality disorder” (May, 2001). On the other hand, Martha Crenshaw (1998) disagrees with Dr. Wolkoff. She points that it is the group psychology, not individual psychopathological forces, that lead the individual to engage in terrorist acts. She says that “they form a deeply cohesive community. Individual identities are merged. Their loyalty is to the group as much as to the cause” (May, 2001). 3.1.2.2. The Effects of Group Psychology According to Freud (1921), the “terrifying impressions of helplessness in childhood” give rise to the need for protection and to need and desire for an “omnipotent protector”. At this point the person desires to join a group where he feels himself powerful. Freud notes that, in a group situation, the individual tends to lose his own sense of distinctiveness and succumbs to a feeling of power and invincibility, as well as a loss of personal responsibility. In a sense he takes on a group mentality and becomes open to any influence. This process is somewhat similar to a mystical experience where the subject’s affection and desires are strengthened by the overpowering intensity of the emotions that they experience. In fact, Fredrick Nietzsche, referring to the ancient Greek cult of Dionysus, notes that the adherents participated in rites and worked themselves up into a frenzied state of existence. Indeed, such an experience is not peculiar to the Western world; they can be noted in Buddhism and the Sufi tradition of Islam as well.

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According to White (1998), the person must feel himself good when using violence involving deadly force. Condemned by the majority of the population, terrorists must seek outside social norms1 to justify their violent actions. Similarly, Cooper (1977) argues that terrorists, like other individuals, do not like to kill the innocent people. Rejected by the normative society, terrorists go into a process2 through which they justify their actions. In this process, terrorists gradually come to believe that the status quo does more damage than killing innocents. Furthermore, violence is necessary to save society from cosmic evil. According to Wilkinson (1974), a terrorist group prepares the environment for its members to justify terrorist behaviors. The group gives them a message conveying that violence is a revenge for social evils and that it is more benign than the evil actions that the government does. In this way, a group, in Wilkinson’s view, produces its own ethical norms for justification of the evil acts. Similarly, Jerrold Post (1987) argues that the group becomes the important source of social reward for its members. If the group has anti-social norms, the fanatic is motivated to attack the mainstream society. In Post’s view, the behavior must be accepted somewhere; therefore, the rejection of external authority gives rise to the acceptance of internal authority. Since the criminal act is rejected by society, the person committing crime may seek for a group accepting him with his criminal actions. Therefore, engaging in a criminal act may become the first step towards entering criminal organizations.

Figure 1. The process of becoming a suicide attacker. Source: Pedahzur, A. (2005). “The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombing.” Prepared for Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars February 17th, 2005.

1 Those social norms basically contain social acceptance and reinforcement for what a terrorist does. It is the terrorist organization providing those social norms. 2 This process described by Cooper is called as “the doctrine of necessity” (White, 2000).

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3.2. Training Methods of Suicide Terrorism Terrorist organizations use different training methods but in general the training process involves ideological or theoretical training and practical or operational training. 3.2.1. Ideological or Theoretical Training The individual will go through an intensive training on the ideology of the terrorist organization. During this process, the person will read several publications of the organization, including books, magazines, journals, and brochures. At this stage, the sympathizer’s level of ideological commitment will be elevated to be able to carry out suicide attack. Indoctrination is necessary for the new recruit to commit suicide attack. Indoctrination involves “an education process to convince of the importance of the cause and the means necessary [including suicide bombing] for its implementation” (Merari 1990). The group members psychologically control the new recruits. The individual will be persuaded and brainwashed by the group members to be ready to carry out a suicide attack. The new recruit will be persuaded to “believe that by carrying out a suicide bombing, they would find an honored place in the corridor of martyrs, and their lives would be meaningful; moreover, their families would be financially rewarded… From the time they were recruited, the group members never left their sides, leaving them no opportunity of backing down from their fatal choice” (Mansdorf 2003). Persuasion may also involve fear, intimidation, and threat by the group. The group may threaten the person being killed by the organization if he or she refuses to carry out the suicide attack. The PKK on several occasions has used force and threat to persuade the suicide attacker. After ideological training, the individual will receive operational or practical training. 3.2.2. Operational or Practical Training Operational training involves teaching the individual how to execute the attack. Depending on the tactic and ammunition that will be used, the attacker will be carefully instructed how to do it. If the person has a background and is trained in the use of such devices, then the training will focus on the actual attack. But if the person does not have any knowledge about such devices then the training will involve both basic training and training about the specific device or method that will be used. For instance, Tamil Tigers give military training to the new recruits. But they also give special training to the Black Tigers who will carry out suicide attack: “Military Wing Black Tigers are provided special forces type training, as well as operation of special equipment. This training is carried out separately from other LTTE combat units, but in small groups” (Gunawardena,2004). Furthermore, operational training involves reconnaissance and the identification of the building, installation, or individual who is the target. This stage is a kind of rehearsal.

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4. Conclusion Suicide terrorism is one of the most effective methods of terrorism. Recruitment and training methods of suicide terrorism are not totally different to original terrorism. However, understanding the recruitment process will help the security forces to develop new strategies and tactics to counter such a threat. Understanding the recruitment process will also shed light on the strategic level of responding to terrorism. As pointed out before, understanding terrorism requires a comprehensive, multifaceted approach. Accordingly, understanding and comprehending suicide terrorism will open new avenues for response strategies. There is no single profile of suicide terrorism in terms of tactics, attackers, motivations, or recruitment and training methods. Law enforcement and other security agencies should look at the issue from a broad perspective rather than taking a narrow approach.

References Alkan, N. (2002). Youth and Terrorism. Ankara: TEMUH. Atran, S. (2006). The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism. Washington Quarterly, 29:2, pp. 127–147. Berger, P. L. (1980). The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation. Garden City, NY: Anchor. Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. Crenshaw, M. (1983). Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. Crenshaw, M. (2001). “‘Suicide’ Terrorism in Comparative Perspective,” in ICT, 21, 25. Cronin, A. K. (2003). Terrorists and suicide attacks. CRS Report for Congress. Davis, J. M. (2003). Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East. New York: Palgrave. Enders, W. and Sander, T. 1993. The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vector-autoregressioninterventon analysis. American Political Science Review 87: 829-844. Gunaratna, R. (2000). “Suicide terrorism: A Global Threat. Jane’s Intelligence Review, Retrieved from http://www.janes.com/security/international _ security/ news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml Gunawardena, A. (2004). LTTE ‘Black Tigers’: The Sri Lankan Experience. Suicide Terrorism Conference. National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C. Hafez, M. M. (2004). Manufacturing human bombs: Strategy, culture, and conflict in the making of Palestinian suicide terrorism. National Institute of Justice. Washington D.C. Hoffman, B. (2003). The logic of suicide terrorism. Atlantic Monthly. Hoffman, B. (1995). Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 18: 271-84. Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct. Long, D. E. (1990). The anatomy of terrorism. New York: Free Press. Mansdorf, I. J. (2003). The psychological framework of suicide terrorism. The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Mark Harrison, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” Royal United Services Institute Security Monitor, vol. 2, no. 1 (2003), pp. 11–13. Marty, M. E., and Appleby, R. S. (1991). Fundamentalisms Observed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merari, A. (2004). Suicide Terrorism, in Robert I. Yufit and David Lester (eds.), Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Suicidal Behavior (pp. 431-454), New York: Wiley. Merari, A. (2000). Terrorism and Threats to U.S. Interests in the Middle East. House Committee on Armed Services. Merari, A. (1990). The readiness to kill and die. In W. Reich (eds). Origins of Terrorism (pp. 192-207), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Moghadam, A. (2005). The roots of suicide terrorism: A multi-causal approach. Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism University of Texas at Austin, May 12-13. Özeren, S. and Van de Voorde, C. (2006). Turkish Hizballah: A case study of radical terrorism, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol: 29 (2).

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Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, in American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 3. Pedahzur, A. (2005). The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombing, prepared for presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars February 17th, 2005. Pipes, D. (1986). The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism, retrieved from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175. Porta, D. 2001. Terror against the state, The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, K. Nash and A. Scott (eds), Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Schweitzer, Y. (2000). “Suicide terrorism: Development and characteristics”. International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzeliya, Israel, 21 Feb 2000. White, J. R. (1998). Terrorism: An Introduction, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. White, J. R. (2000). Theologies of Terror: Religion and Domestic Terrorism. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, New Orleans, LA. Winter. (2002). Internet: www.umich.edu/~psycours/490/schedule.htm. Wyne, A. (2005). Suicide Terrorism as Strategy: Case Studies of Hamas and the Kurdistan Workers Party Strategic Insights, volume IV, issue 7.

Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Women and Terrorism – Passive or Active Actors? Motivations and Strategic Use Ms Laila BOKHARI Research Fellow, The Transnational Radical Islamism Project, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

Abstract. This paper looks at women’s role and the perception of their role in one particular form of violence, namely terrorism. The questions raised in this paper are based on discussions and research in the context of sessions with the titles of the sub-sections below. The paper aims to look at the motivations of both the women who have become activists and the organisations that recruit them. We will also be looking at what areas and what roles women have played in a number of radical movements. Finally we will conclude with a few reflections on what consequences a possible increasing acceptance of female terrorism might have for the development of terrorism. Keywords. Terrorism, gender studies, women and terrorism, female suicide bombers

Introduction This paper is based on lectures held at the ANU/Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) Master Programme on Gender and Conflict in the period 2004–2006. The course has aimed to explore the gender dimensions of armed conflict, the different phases of conflict, their participants and the driving forces behind these conflicts, the conduct and the consequences of violence. This specific session looks at women’s role and the perception of their role in one particular form of violence, namely terrorism. The questions raised in this paper are based on discussions and research in the context of the above sessions. Even though it is difficult to make a general terrorist profile, our stereotype mediamade terrorist is very often a male individual, ageing between 18–35 years old. It seems that the majority of those who commit atrocities for a cause are, indeed, men. However, there is a sizeable number of women who also are members and active participants of these organisations. Women have been involved in a wide number of tasks in support of terrorist activity. The concept of the female terrorist is not a new one, and in some organisations, such as the Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers (the LTTE), women have constituted as many as 30 per cent of the actual fighters. Increasingly though it is seen that female involvement is widening, both in context and form.

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Recently we have seen a number of striking examples of this phenomenon. Importantly, terrorism suspects from atypical backgrounds are becoming increasingly common. In Western Europe, counter-terrorism officials tell us, new plots surface every month, police across Europe are arresting significant numbers of women, teenagers, white-skinned suspects and people baptized as Christians. The demographics of those arrested are so diverse that many European counterterrorism officials and analysts say they have given up trying to predict what sorts of people are most likely to become terrorists. In Belgium, Muriel Degauque, 38, a blond, white Catholic, converted to Islam and travelled to Iraq to blow herself up in November 2005. But also other examples explain what kind of involvement is there: a number of women, it has become known, have been persuaded, via the internet, to wire money on behalf of organisations, because they were less likely to attract suspicion. According to testimonies heard in March 2006 (London, eight male al-Qaida suspects) one female college student was asked to wire USD 5,000 so that defendants could go to Pakistan in 2003 to attend an al-Qaeda training camp. In the testimony it was said that: “…it had to be a woman because sisters do not get caught – brothers get caught if they send money.” What explains this development – but also what explains our fascination – or surprise – with this development? Traditionally, men are seen as having a certain familiarity with violence – whether as defenders or aggressors, they are expected to “know how to fight”.1 Women, by contrast, are associated with nurturing and caring. They are the protectors and givers of life, rather than the destroyers. If the male members of a movement committed to violence are seen as mad, bad and evil, how much more then are the females? In taking up arms, some people argue, they commit a double atrocity: using violence, and in the process destroying our safe, innocent and traditional view of women. This paper aims to look at the motivations of both the women who have become activists – and the organisations that recruit them. We will also be looking at what areas and what roles women have played in a number of radical movements. Finally we will conclude with a few reflections on what consequences a possible increasing acceptance of female terrorism might have for the development of terrorism. The cases that have been looked at (and some of them are included here as case studies) seem to indicate that there is no main difference in the act that a woman executes and that of a man. That is, once the subject is given the trust and responsibility to commit an act he or she does it with the same “perfection”. Nothing in this paper or in the research makes it possible to say whether a woman is less evil or less violent. This is not the purpose of this study and may be a question for a different academic field. To answer such a question one would probably need to involve psychologists or researchers on gender. The point that is made is however that women are, by society, portrayed as “less likely offenders”, and as such more innocent. This makes her, according to strategic terrorist planning, an interesting weapon in both reconnaissance and execution. Some writers have stressed the point made by some anti-terrorist squads that the less violent sex is regarded as more lethal. “Shoot the women first,” was their message, as the women would be seen as more committed to the act and as such more violent.2 In addition, focus must be put on the way the “audience”, the research community or the media, portrays and tries to analyse female terrorism. Several researchers have 1 2

M. Tiernay, “Young, gifted and ready to kill,” The Herald, Glasgow, UK, 3 August 2002, via FBIS. E. MacDonald, Kill the Women First, Fourth Estate, London, 1991:11.

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emphasised the point that once a woman is seen as the actor deeper questions are asked as to why the act was committed and what the personal story behind might be. Also, interestingly, a woman is portrayed more as part of a wider/broader society: In her, and in trying to explain the background for an act, lies the “reasoning” of her society and its injustices. As such researchers seem to be both more surprised when they meet a woman terrorist and also more curious.

Motivational Aspects Women’s involvement in politically violent organisations and radical movements highlights several general themes within the study of terrorism. This relates to both why an actor gets involved and also questions of recruitment. In understanding the motivational aspects of why an actor gets involved in terrorism, it might be useful to first have a look at a few “logics of terrorism”3: Terrorism represents the outcome of a learning process. Terrorism is likely to be a reasonably informed choice among available alternatives tried out through time. Also terrorists tend to learn from the experiences of others, usually, and increasingly so, communicated to them via the news media. This also relates to the idea of actor innovation. In an increasingly difficult operational environment, organisations have to innovate to reach out with their message. Terror organisations adapt to higher levels of external pressure by altering their techniques and targets. Increasingly, organisations have to innovate to gain strategic advantage. The “surprise” element is also of importance. Constant adaptation to the surrounding security challenges remains an aspect, and as a result terrorist organisations tend to be highly adaptive and pragmatic. Organisations innovate to exploit external conditions, and may therefore select targets considered taboo, “theatres” where violence is unexpected, or engage new actors who will surprise. As such, the inclusion of women as terrorist actors can be seen a strategic move. The question becomes whether she is used as a weapon for organisational purposes, and thus indirectly a victim, or whether she actively and consciously herself gives her life to the cause.

For the Woman – Equality in Death? Trying to explain why an individual woman engages in violent activity becomes necessary because there is according to many observers something not quite “natural” about a female terrorist.4 A woman is often seen traditionally as a victim of violence or of society, as widows or mothers, or as passive supporters – part of a support network. She symbolises the guardian of tradition, a symbol of motherhood and life. How can she then, seemingly contradictory to this, give her life to violence and death? There is an increasing fascination among many observers as to why women for a long time have joined and participated in radical violent movements such as the FARC, 3 See for instance M. Crenshaw, “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice,” in (Ed.) W. Reich, Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 7 – 24. 4 “Dressed to kill,” Shark Blog, April 2002, http://www.usefulwork.com/shark/Dressed_to_Kill.jpg.

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Shining Path and the LTTE. Politics and especially revolutionary politics have traditionally been regarded as male affairs and arenas – and as a result historians and researchers have never really had to explain why an individual man chose to enter political activity. If there is a notion of consequences of women joining political movements, it is more that they will change an organisation to more “female” values, arguably values and forms of engagement that are more non-violent, democratic and humane.5 General assumptions are that women join for personal reasons, because of a personal relationship with a man or a personal tragedy – such as the death of a family member or rape. A woman is thus a victim of her surroundings and forced into a contextual atmosphere that encourages her to devote her life to radical activities. In very many cases this is the case, the female activist is a product of her society and her personal story, and they will tend to use this as a motivational argument. Many Tamil women guerrillas, for example, say they joined the Tigers after brothers, husbands and fathers died in battle or disappeared while in the custody of Sri Lankan security forces – which many organisations have blamed for torture and summary executions.6 There is an ongoing debate both among women activists and researchers on whether the motivation to join a political violent movement lies on an individualistic or a collective level. To take an example: In the context of Sri Lanka, collectively, freedom and liberation capture the legitimating ideology of the LTTE vis-à-vis the Sinhalese and the Indian governments. Liberation also appears to be conceptualised individualistically as, according to one Tamil Tiger, “the use of women in war is part of a larger vision of the guerrilla leadership to liberate Tamil women from the bonds of tradition.”7 This however undermines the woman’s motivation and belief in the cause for which she, or her people, is fighting. Interviews done by several authors on the subject indicate that women do express the same motivations as men – the national cause, the fight for their people’s rights, and the willingness to fight for this in the same way as men. 8 Women show strong motivations for the political cause, and in most cases consciously decide to devote their life to this struggle. Research indicates that the women’s motivation for joining terrorist groups has increased in a number of conflict zones. Conflicts that are long-term have lower barriers and are less worried about breaking social and cultural taboos. Necessity drives society into a new phase. 9 Interviews with women who are themselves involved in terrorist organisations, or family members of female activists, point towards an expressed willingness, sympathy and legitimisation for female participation, not only as supporters but also as actors in the most violent acts. The young generation of Chechen women for instance show an increasing acceptance to female suicide bombings. This is contrary to their mothers’ generation.10 The same can be found in other Muslim societies.

5

S. Emmanuel, “The Female Militant Romanticized,” Women in Action, April 2002. “Tamil female liberation,” Los Angeles Times, 21 February 2000, via FBIS. 7 K. J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (3) (May–June 2003), p. 181. 8 See for example Cunningham, Delaney and Neumann, MacDonald. 9 E. MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, Fourth Estate, London, 1991: 10. 10 ““I suspected I had to commit a suicide-attack.” A surviving suicide bomber answers questions of Izvestia from a ‘Lefortovo’ cell,” Izvestia, No. 18 (26575), 3 February 2004, pp. 1–13. 6

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Developments within the radical Islamic movements have long been seen as the most traditional. The exception is the Palestinian case. In September 1970 Leila Khaled, together with a male accomplice, attempted to seize an El Al flight. Even though she failed she was seen by her generation as a heroine, she shattered a million taboos and revolutionised the thinking of hundreds of other angry young women around the world. Most importantly however: “Leila Khaled achieved in a few hours what the lives and deaths of hundreds of other Palestinian fighters have failed to do either before or since: she grabbed the attention of the world’s media and held it enthralled.”11 Since January 2002, however, a number of Palestinian suicide bombers have been female. Research shows that even if they had their very personal grievances, stories and motivations, behind their involvement, the bottom line was a belief in the cause they were fighting for and a willingness to die so that political attention would be put on their people’s suffering.12 Another motivational factor that seems to be apparent is the aim for fame and recognition. The image of heroism is important to both female Tamil Tiger fighters and women of the ETA according to the writer Eileen MacDonald.13 This was explained by some, as the only opportunity of becoming equal to men. The recognition that women receive more attention than men doing the same act seemed to be a strategy understood both by the organisation (which will be looked at below) and by the woman herself. “We know that the audience will be shocked by seeing that it is the same woman who gives life, who also takes life.”14 The motivations are mixed and many, they do however indicate that the women who have been active are very much aware of their role and position within the organisation. They believe themselves to be equal to men, capable of doing the same tasks, and just as committed to the political goal as men. Also they do not see themselves as forced into a role by the male section of the population. Rather by contextual circumstances.15

Strategic Recruitment What makes women attractive for organisations, and why do terrorist organisations recruit and operationalise women? Both the logic of terrorism and the strategic elements of terrorism involve a discussion of a logic development in the means and tactics used by terrorist organisations. As such the recruitment of women is seen as a logical next step in an increasingly tighter security environment. Women are seen as effective actors in that with their innocence they will avoid detection in nearly every context. Their nonthreatening nature, together with the taboos associated with the woman’s body, clothing and performance gives her a special advantage in that she can infiltrate the enemy in an innovative and deeper way. She can commit an act in, but also gather intelligence from, new and broader arenas. 11

E. MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, Fourth Estate, London, 1991: 97. Ibid. Ibid. 14 Y. Schweitzer, “Female suicide bombers for God,” Tel Aviv Notes, No. 88, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 9 October 2003. 15 A. B. Delaney and P. R. Neumann, “The spectacular rise of the female terrorist,” International Herald Tribune, 6 September 2004. 12 13

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Terror organisations are aware of the value a female member represents as a weapon in reaching out. By using women as actors one can play on established prejudices and presuppositions. Women are not seen as the typical terrorist, and have traditionally been seen as the grieving widow or mother. In times when one has to constantly innovate and to reach out, the limits to what is acceptable become lower. The taboos surrounding female involvement may become blurred, and one needs, in addition to using stronger means, also to send out a message that is stronger. An understanding of terrorism must involve the issue of communication. Terrorists want to, and need to, communicate their message to the outside world and an audience. Symbolically female participation in terrorism sends a powerful message, blurring the distinction between perpetrator and victim. It is as if when “women decide to violate all established norms about the sanctity of human life, they do so only as a last resort.”16 In this way using women as a last resort could be a symbol of the utter desperation of the cause, but also of the conflict. “If a woman was involved, the media focused on “what made her do it,” not on the carnage that she had created. (…) .. if the attacker was a woman , it was the bomber who became the victim, and whose grievances needed to be addressed.”17 As she does not fit our notion of what a terrorist should look like, she shocks us even more. As the writer Jessica Stern has noted, “the perception that women are less prone to violence, the Islamic dress code and the reluctance to carry out body searches on Muslim women made them the “perfect demographic.”18 Operational imperatives, where males face obstacles, women may be able to perform better. Operationally and strategically therefore a woman can be seen as useful and crucial actors to an organisation.

Types of Involvement Terrorism is a strategy that involves many stages and levels of involvement. A strategy may see a spectrum of roles from the ideologues/the intellectuals, the fundraisers, support-networks, the sympathisers, to the activists. Different people may play different, or many roles, simultaneously. Women in conflict are often portrayed as mere victims of oppression or as objects being used or manipulated into an evil act, rather than seen as an active participant of a movement. Women have, however, historically been involved in a number of different acts, as victims, supporters or actors in various roles. Societies under occupation or long-term serious conflict will have a lower barrier for letting go of their women. There is a broader societal acceptance as the cases of Chechnya and Palestine have shown. 19 Some observers view this as a development towards greater equality, while others see it differently. Traditional societies in conflict, such as the Sri Lanka, Chechen and the Colombian contexts, also raise the question of what will happen to these women who step “out of their traditional roles” once the 16 A. B. Delaney and P. R. Neumann, “The spectacular rise of the female terrorist,” International Herald Tribune, 6 September 2004, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=537338.html. 17 A. B. Delaney and P. R. Neumann, “The spectacular rise of the female terrorist,” International Herald Tribune, 6 September 2004, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=537338.html. 18 Jessica Stern, cited in A. B. Delaney and P. R. Neumann, “The spectacular rise of the female terrorist,” International Herald Tribune, 6 September 2004, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?file=537338.html. 19 See sections below.

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conflict is over. How will these women be seen by their societies, and what roles will they play once the conflict is ended? Let us look at what roles women have played in terrorist organisations. We divide these into supporting roles or networks and activists or fighters, acknowledging that there is a whole spectre of different roles, also at times overlapping roles, within these rather general divisions. Supporting Roles A support network may have both passive roles and more active ones. What constitutes a support network member and an activist may be a bit blurred, but one may also include in the support networks functions such as fund-raising, social capacities and recruitment responsibilities. A woman as a nurturer and educator has a tremendous role in these areas. The more active and physical role of a fighter or a perpetrator is addressed separately below. Women have for a long time historically participated in terrorist groups but their low numbers and seemingly passive roles have undermined their credibility as terrorist actors. Women have been considered as peripheral players, typically relegated to providing safe houses or gathering intelligence. Invisibility does not, however, equate with passivity or powerlessness. Women have functioned in support capacities as mothers, wives, daughters or sisters of male activists. They have been seen by for instance the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Tayyiba group as “the ones nurturing our next generation of young jihadists,” and the ones who will “encourage and look after the men before and after their duties.”20 Women have thus provided shelter, cooked and nurtured for their male companions, but also acted as messengers, educators and propagandists. The Al-Khansaa magazine, allegedly issued by the Al-Qaida’s Arabian Peninsula Women’s Information Bureau, discussed later in this paper, stresses that a woman’s main role is to support their husbands in the jihadist struggle and to help show their children the path of jihad: “We stand shoulder to shoulder with our men, supporting them, helping them, and backing them up. We educate their sons and we prepare ourselves.”21 Even though the importance of fighting the jihad is stressed, the supporting role is mainly encouraged: “… the Muslim woman is a female jihad warrior always and everywhere. She is a female jihad warrior who wages jihad by means of funding jihad; she wages jihad by means of waiting for her jihad warrior husband, and when she educates her children to which Allah loves.” 22 Activists/Fighters “Some people can kill – others cannot. It does not matter if you are a man or a woman.”23 The trend seems to be that even if the supporting role of women will remain 20

“Ya banat hamara,” DAWN Urdu, 25 November 2002, via FBIS. “Al-Qaida Women’s Magazine: Women must participate in Jihad,” The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 7 September 2004. 22 “Al-Qaida Women’s Magazine: Women must participate in Jihad,” The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 7 September 2004. 23 Susanna Roncini of the Italian Red Brigades, quoted in E. MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, Fourth Estate, London, 1991: 233. 21

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constant, there is also a widening female involvement in all aspects of terrorism activity. Arguably this can be seen as a logical and strategic progression in women’s operational roles within various organisations. 24 As seen above there may be two reasons for this: x Terrorist organisations operate under increasingly heavy government pressure and are forced to “innovate” to regain a strategic advantage. x Women’s motivation for joining terrorist groups has also increased in a number of worsening conflict zones. Increasing contextual pressures motivate both organisations to recruit women and women themselves are motivated to join.25 This widening trend is seen ideologically; that is in both ethnic-national and religious organisations, logistically; in all the activities that constitute a terrorist act, and geographically; the trend is not particular to a certain geographical context, although one should take into account the conflict context. For some organisations this is not a new trend. Women of the ethnic–national movement the Kurdish PKK have carried out about two-thirds of the organisation’s suicide bombings already since the end of the 1970s.26 The LTTE is another example looked at below where women have since the mid-1980s enjoyed participation even as Black Tiger fighters. The Chechen and Palestianian cases seem however to indicate that more active involvement is widening also geographically. The debates within religious Islamic circles as to whether women should be accepted as jihadists highlight many of the dilemmas here.27

Case Studies The Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (the LTTE) The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka are probably the most widely known to have a large pool of female fighters. Since 1983 women have been recruited to the most dangerous and crucial roles within the “Black-Tigers’ unit” of the ethnic-national movement the Tamil Tigers, and in 1989 they developed their own female leadership structure. Women have accounted for about a third of the 240 suicide bombings in Sri Lanka, and they make up a third of the fighting force, which is numbered at as many as 15,000 fighters.28 Women of the Liberation Tigers are seen as emerging as the movement’s most important weapon after thousands of men have died in battle. Another reason for the recruitment is the massive migration of men that the Tamil society has experienced.

24 K. J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (3) (May–June 2003). 25 Ibid. 26 Y. Schweitzer, “Female suicide bombers for God,” Tel Aviv Notes No. 88, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 9 October 2003. 27 “Hamas woman bomber kills Israelis,” BBC News, 14 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3395973.stm. 28 Y. Schweitzer, “Female suicide bombers for God,” Tel Aviv Notes No. 88, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 9 October 2003.

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The periods that have seen the highest recruitment of women have been the times when women were the worst sufferers of the war.29 They are seen as leaders of female squads, fully-fledged fighters, stripped of their old identities.30 They are said to often rely on their gender to for instance slip through checkpoints staffed by men.31 As such it is seen as a military strategy, women are used because they are less threatening and protected by cultural taboos, while the aim is to inflict the maximum damage to the enemy by playing on exactly these notions. The Tamil Tiger case is particularly interesting because it seems to be the example in which the female fighters have achieved the greatest equality in the sense that they perform exactly the same tasks as their male counterparts, even though they live separately from men in their camps and are strictly forbidden to meet their male companions. Absolute devotion to the cause is expected and as such they are completely separated from society at large. Some observers have described this LTTE projected equal possibility of death for men and women in its organisation as “the teacher of equality in life.”32 The female cadres are also seen as the ultimate symbol of women’s liberation. Others have seen it as a complete construction of an artificial society that will fall through once the conflict is over. Evidence of this is seen by looking at the traditional treatment of women outside of the LTTE.33 This arguably shows that the shift is not necessarily ideological and reflecting equality in society as a whole, but rather a practical necessity within an organisation. The induction of women and children is primarily a result of the need for a constant supply of cadres and personnel.34 Chechnya One of the most shocking aspects of the recent Chechnya suicide attacks has been that many of the perpetrators have been women. Chechen women have traditionally not featured prominently as fighters, but are rather seen as refugees or weeping mothers and wives. Little research has been done into their motivations. The research that has been done, however, shows a high degree of support for taking up arms.35 It also reveals the absolute desperation of many Chechen women’s lives. Specialists also say that nearly all Chechen women in the conflict are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders. Three-quarters have lost relatives, 60 per cent have had their homes destroyed and at least half are unemployed.36 The two wars in Chechnya have left more than 100,000 people dead, and although full-scale fighting has abated, low-level guerrilla combat is ongoing. Many Chechen women have lost their relatives in this low-intensity war. The BBC journalist Mark 29 S. Subramanium, “Sri Lanka: Women Lead Rebel Attacks, But Tiger Leaders are Men,” IPS News Report, 11 August 1997, http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/aug/srilanka.html. 30 “Female fighters push on for Tamil victory,” The Michigan Daily, 10 March 2000, http://www.pub.umich.edu/daily/2000/mar/03-10-2000/news/09.html. 31 Ibid. 32 V. Samarasinghe, “Soldiers, housewives and peace makers: Ethnic conflict and Gender in Sri Lanka,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XIV, No.2, July 1996. 33 Interview with Iselin Frydenlund, expert on Sri Lanka, Norwegian Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 9 October 2004. 34 V. Samarasinghe, “Soldiers, housewives and peace makers: Ethnic conflict and Gender in Sri Lanka,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XIV, No.2, July 1996. 35 S. Eke, “Chechnya’s female bombers,” BBC News, 7 July 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3052935.stm. 36 Ibid.

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Franchetti has interviewed many of the so-called “black widows”, and stresses the incredible rise in the numbers of female suicide bombers and the wide-spread acceptance for these acts among the younger generations. A general trend seems to be that they have lost a relative, are newly devoted religious, and do not see any way out of their own and their people’s desperation than to take their own lives. As one young Chechen woman put it: “I have only one dream now, only one mission – to blow myself up somewhere in Russia, ideally in Moscow. To take as many Russian lives as possible – this is the only way to stop the Russians from killing my people. Maybe this way they will get the message and leave us alone, once and for all.”37 Most of the women also do not seem to have any concerns about leaving their children behind: “I have a daughter who is 18 months old, but it’s not worth living for my child, not now that my husband is dead.”38 On the question of motivation, the same Chechen woman answers that the motive is revenge: “In my case – as with most cases with female suicide bombers – the motive is revenge. No-one is forcing us and I am not afraid.”39 Russian authorities have claimed that the “black widows” are brainwashed into carrying out their attacks, or otherwise “raped into submission”. The ones interviewed by Mark Franchetti however claimed it was their own free choice and will. It should be noted that the Chechen terrorist organisations act in the name of an ethnic-national ideology but some observers think they are co-operating with more global jihad organisations. This has led to a fear that it may turn out that the growth in the number of Chechen female suicide bombers signals the beginning of a change in the position of women in suicide attacks. Radical Islamist Organisations Until recently, the use of female suicide bombers was a clear indicator of secular terrorism as seen above. The distinction between “secular” and “religious” has, however, become increasingly blurred. Already in August 2001 the High Islamic Council in Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa urging women to join the fight against Israel as martyrs. Until then women were seen as having mainly supporting roles, laying the bomb, preparing the martyrs, nurturing the new generation suicide bombers etc. As the conflict in Israel and the Middle East deepened however, the scope of activism widened to include women in an increasing array of activities, up to and including suicide bombing – and women pushed for these roles.40 The first female Palestinian suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, blew herself up in Jerusalem 27 January 2002. She acted on behalf of the Fatah-aligned nationalist AlAqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and her operation was followed by a series of female suicide operations in Israel.41 Wafa Idris gained an immediate iconic status, and was widely discussed and portrayed in the media. She was worshipped as a heroine and the Arab media stressed that this opened up a whole new pool of activists. Idris’ motivation to commit a suicide operation was arguably prompted by a sense of hopelessness under 37

“Inside the mind of a “Black Widow,” BBC News, 4 September 2003, via FBIS. Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 K. J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (3) (May–June 2003). 41 P. Beaumont, “Woman Suicide Bomber Strikes,” The Guardian, 28 January 2001. 38

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occupation and rage. Even though there was in the aftermath confusion as to whether the bomb detonated by mistake or not, her friends and family later said she would have been conscious in doing this task. Wafa Idris created a turning point in the minds of many secular and Islamist Palestinian and Arab leaders, following a fierce debate much of which was conducted in the open media. Reactions to female participation in suicide acts were mixed and muted, but not entirely negative. The willingness of fundamentalist Islamic organisations to make use of women in their operations contradicts in many ways the traditionally interpreted principles of religion as well as traditional social norms that preclude the involvement of women in “masculine” activities that require close contact with men to whom they are not married. These contradictions have been fiercely debated by religious figures authorised to give legal approval of the suicide operations carried out by religious terrorist organisations. But in choosing between the competing claims of religious structures and practical needs, religious authorities who supported suicide attacks, such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of the Palestinian religious Hamas movement, have found an appropriate legal justification that permits the involvement of women for practical and strategic reasons. The result was willingness and a careful acceptance to use of both men and women in terrorist attacks, and at the same time an acknowledgement of the utility of using suicide bombers against civilian targets within Israel to undermine Israeli security. This symbolised a tactical shift. In January 2004 Hamas member Reem Raiyishi, a mother of two in her mid-20s, killed herself in a suicide attack at the Erez checkpoint, on the border between Israel and Gaza. Hamas said it sent a woman because of growing Israeli security “obstacles” facing its male bombers. Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin added that: “For the first time Hamas used a female fighter and not a male fighter and that was a new development in resistance against the enemy.”42 In August 2004 a new jihadist magazine for women was launched on the web. The magazine is said to be published by Al-Qaida’s Arabian Peninsula Women’s Information Bureau founded by the former leader of Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, Abd-alAziz al-Muqrin, who was killed by Saudi security forces in June 2004. The magazine is titled Al-Khansaa after a famous Arab poetess, Al-Khansaa bint Omar, of the early days of Islam who is herself considered the “Mother of the Shahids”.43 The magazine is aimed exclusively at women. The aim is to show women how to reconcile fighting jihad while maintaining a righteous family life. While the magazine portrays a traditional supportive role for women in teaching women married to radical Islamists how to support their husbands in their conflict with the authorities, and how to bring up their children in the path of jihad, there are also sections that teach how to provide first aid and information on what kind of physical training women need to prepare themselves for fighting. As quoted in the magazine: “The blood of our husbands and the body parts of our children are our sacrificial offering.”44

42 “Hamas woman bomber kills Israelis,” BBC News, 14 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3395973.stm. 43 “Al-Qaida’s Women’s magazine: Women must participate in Jihad,” The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 7 September 2004. 44 “Jihad magazine for women on web,” BBC News, 24 August 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3594982.stm.

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Conclusion: Consequences for the Development of Terrorism “It is a woman who teaches you today a lesson in heroism, who teaches you the meaning of jihad, and the way to die a martyr’s death … It is a woman who has shocked the enemy, with her thin, meagre, and weak body … It is a woman who blew herself up, and with her exploded all the myths about women’s weakness, submissiveness, and enslavement.” “It’s a Woman!” editorial, Al-Sha’ab, 1 February 2002. Women are not only passive victims of terrorism and violence. Some women, although a relatively small number, participate in or encourage terrorism. Women have committed acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings. In one of the few cases when a world leader was killed during an act of terrorism, a woman assassinated India’s Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. When not playing the role of terrorists directly, some women support men’s militancy in their traditional roles as mothers nurturing families committed to militarist or terrorist causes.45 In many societies women have been traditionally charged with passing on cultural norms and expectations of their communities to sons and daughters. When these norms include the use of violence for political ends, women encourage the radicalism and militaristic self-sacrifice that lead to terrorist acts. Women in this way also bring moral weight to militarist movements and encourage involvement in them. The interesting aspect is however that even though women continue in most contexts to fill their most traditional roles, their involvement is widening also as highprofile operatives. One example is in 2002, when Chechen terrorists took 700 hostages in a Moscow theatre, 18 of the kidnappers were women. In Israel, the first female suicide bombers appeared in the same year, and groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas have since “liberalised” their recruitment policies to allow females to join their ranks. Strategists both on the recruitment side and on the counter-terrorism side have seen that this opens a whole new demographic pool. The two arguments that have been looked at in this study are firstly, from an operational point of view: terrorist organisations operate under increasingly heavy government pressure and are forced to “innovate” to regain a strategic advantage. And secondly, from the activist’s point of view: women’s motivation for joining terrorist groups has also increased in a number of worsening conflict zones. Both the organisation (the recruiters) and the women express a conscious decision in recruitment and participation. This arguably shows that the shift is not necessarily ideological and reflecting equality in society as a whole, but rather a practical necessity within an organisation and for a society. Strategically female participation opens up a whole new demographic pool, but also many possibilities for innovation. Recent focus within research has been on the number of converts to Islam who have been involved in suicide bombings. These have also included a number of women and stand as interesting examples to be further explored. This study has not aimed to look at whether women are inherently less violent than men, as they are often portrayed. Studies done by others have however pointed out that once a woman is given a role she does it just as well. She is in fact more committed and more lethal, some British anti-terrorists squads told the writer Eileen MacDonald when

45 C. O. N. Moser and F.C. Clark (eds.), Victims, Perpetrators, or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict, and Political Violence, Zed Books, London, 2001.

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interviewing them about the IRA-women.46 The question of equality has been raised at times, but there is nothing indicating that women’s involvement in terrorist activity is a result of a societal equalling out between the sexes. Instead it seems that countries in deep and long-term conflict have lower barriers and as such also are more likely to violate social norms pertaining to restraints on violence, for example. An interesting aspect is to see what effect the female terrorists have on us as an audience. Arguably when a woman is involved the coverage is more on the woman as a person, her personal story and her reasoning for getting involved. She shocks us even more by breaking societal taboos and forces us to deal with our notions of a woman as innocent, non-violent and a protector of life. The result may be that both she and her cause get more attention. It is as if when society has given a woman to death then that must be the last sign of desperation, as the above quote by one Arab newspaper editor written after Wafa Idris, the first female suicide bomber, killed herself in 2002. Terrorism is about communicating a political message through a violent act. By using a woman as a perpetrator one includes an element of surprise and shock. It surprises us that women can go to the extent of getting involved in a terrorist act, and as such it reaches us deeper. A survey of the literature on the issue shows that researchers to a greater extent when looking at female participation in terrorism and political violent movements tend to ask the question of what lies behind an action. Our societal ideal of a woman as a more non-violent human being seems to trigger deeper questions. The personal story of the female terrorist becomes more interesting: Who is she, why and what makes her give up her life and family to violence and death? Does this say something about the level of conflict, the society and the cause and its desperation? If it is so that when a woman is involved in a terrorist act the audience tends to question the societal context to a greater degree, looking both for her story and the story of her cause, maybe society as a whole will aim to look for a deeper understanding of terrorism. As such terrorist organisations are strategically reaching out to their audience. In turn, maybe research on terrorism will be forced into looking at questions of counter-terrorism and security issues in a different way.

46

Eileen MacDonald, Kill the Women First, Fourth Estate, London, 1991.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Political Impact of Suicide Attacks in Iraq Mr Brian FISHMAN Senior Associate, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, USA

Abstract. This paper is divided into four major sections: an introduction to the academic study of suicide bombings by both Western scholars and jihadi-salafis, a discussion of the dynamics of suicide bombings in Iraq, and an analysis of the impact of suicide bombings on U.S. domestic opinion on the war. Finally, the paper will offer some conclusions and recommendations for policy makers who may face suicide campaigns in the future. Keywords. Terrorism, combating terrorism, suicide bombings, Iraq conflict

Introduction Terrorist organizations face extraordinary challenges. They must exert tactical and strategic pressure on opponents that are numerically, materially, and financially superior. Traditionally, terrorists have used media and propaganda operations to enhance the political impact of their military activities. Beginning in the 1980s, a variety of terrorist organizations recognized the tactical and strategic utility of suicide bombers. From Hizballah militants to Tamil guerillas, suicide terrorism revolutionized both the physical battlefield and the media battlespace. As Robert Pape has noted, initial explanations for suicide terrorism tended to focus on religious or psychological behavioral drivers. The problem with those explanations is that they overlook the strategic rationale of suicide campaigns.1 Pape argues that suicide attacks are most commonly used by organizations resisting occupation by democracies. The incentives are higher in such circumstances because of the immediate tactical efficacy of suicide attacks and the relative unwillingness of democracies to suffer casualties. He argues that suicide bombing campaigns are essentially coercive techniques to bend receptive societies—democracies—to the will of the terrorist organization.2 The insurgency in Iraq demonstrates some of the conditions Pape predicts will produce suicide attacks—namely a democratic country occupying foreign territory. Nonetheless, Iraq’s insurgencies display peculiarities that differentiate it from Pape’s 1 Pape, Robert. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 97 #3 July 14, 2003. 2 Ibid.

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archetype. Notably, foreign fighters played a critical role introducing suicide bombings to the Iraqi theatre. Also, suicide bombings in Iraq, unlike in other regions, are only one of numerous militarily effective tactics used by insurgents. The purpose of suicide bombings is to elicit a strategic response from the society being attacked. It is not at all clear that suicide bombings rather than the general violence in Iraq have deteriorated American resolve in Iraq. Although suicide attacks contribute to many Americans’ perception that the Iraqi civil war is intractable, suicide attacks themselves are not the critical element weakening American resolve. This paper is divided into four major sections: an introduction to the academic study of suicide bombings by both Western scholars and jihadi-salafis, a discussion of the dynamics of suicide bombings in Iraq, and an analysis of the impact of suicide bombings on U.S. domestic opinion on the war. Finally, the paper will offer some conclusions and recommendations for policy makers who may face suicide campaigns in the future.

Suicide Bombings Pape records Hizballah’s November 11, 1982 car bomb on the Israel Defense Force Headquarters in Tyre, Lebanon as the first modern suicide attack.3 Hizballah continued to use the tactic to great effect against a variety of targets during the Lebanese civil war, most notably for Americans against the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983.4 Hizballah’s success driving the United States out of Lebanon and dominating Lebanese politics demonstrated the tactic’s efficacy to other militant organizations. Most importantly, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began using suicide attacks against Sri Lankan government targets in 1990.5 LTTE was not content to simply reproduce Hizballah-style attacks. Although they used suicide belts and car bombs like Hizballah, LTTE was an innovating force. They delivered suicide bombers via boat, bicycle, and scuba diver.6 The Tamil movement’s extensive use of suicide attacks demonstrated that this brutal methodology was not limited to Islamic or even religious organizations. The LTTE experience demonstrates that a political movement does not need to incorporate religious ideology to convince followers to sacrifice themselves. Further, LTTE— rather than Hizballah—demonstrated the most innovative and deadly suicide campaigns, at least until the occupation of Iraq. Despite LTTE’s extensive use of suicide tactics, Tamils did not receive the notoriety of Palestinian factions, such as HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The world community—and the West in particular—was much more focused on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict than the Tamil separatist movement. Palestinian attacks also tended to fit an established Western conception of suicide bombings, as a phenomenon limited to the Mideast and committed by Muslim terrorists. The fact that many Palestinian suicide bombers were motivated by nationalism did not change the public perception. Al-Qa’ida is no stranger to suicide bombings. Before the suicide flights of 9/11, Al-Qa’ida used suicide tactics in Africa, the Mideast, and Afghanistan. Although the 3

Pape, Robert. Dying to Win (Random House: New York, NY), p. 253. Sprinzak, Ehud. “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2000 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 4 5

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embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya received the most global media attention, the most strategically important may have been the September 9, 2001 assassination of Ahmed Shah Massood, the Afghan hero who opposed Taliban rule. In spite of hysterical media coverage, academics generally conclude that suicide bombings are undertaken for very rational purposes. Whereas media discussion of suicide terrorism tends to focus on the distorted rationale of the bomber, academics tend to focus on the strategic logic of suicide attacks from a group perspective. Bruce Hoffman writes that: “Suicide tactics have been adopted by a growing number of terrorist organizations around the world because they are shocking, deadly, costeffective, secure, and very difficult to stop. There are only two basic operations requirements that an organization must be able to satisfy to get into the game: a willingness to kill and a willingness to die.”7 Robert Pape goes a step further. He argues that groups employ suicide attacks when they have few, if any, other tactical options, and are facing an occupation by a democratic government.8 Suicide bombings give organizations unique tactical options, but they also allow the terrorist group to demonstrate the dedication of their organization. The purpose is to demonstrate to the occupier the futility of continuing their fight to control the occupied territory. Increased casualties and the prospect of an open-ended conflict tend to be influential on democracies because popular opinion directly shapes government policy.9 Al-Qa’ida’s ideology is particularly important within this context, because it conceives of vast swaths of the earth as “Muslim” land that is occupied by either imperialist “infidels” or their “apostate” partners. Al-Qa’ida’s ideology stipulates that its suicide attacks against American targets from Iraq to Tanzania are all resistance against an illegitimate occupation. Hoffman points out that organizations that use suicide tactics are often engrossed in a very messy political environment with numerous insurgent groups operating.10 One motivation for adopting suicide tactics is to distinguish one organization from other terror groups operating in the same arena. HAMAS illustrates this point. HAMAS adopted military tactics in the first place because it feared losing public support after other Palestinian organizations, notably Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began using violence. HAMAS’ motivation to escalate to suicide tactics in the 1990s was likely motivated by a desire to distinguish HAMAS’ partially religious-based resistance from more secular organizations such as Fatah. Al-Qa’ida’s strategic logic notwithstanding, there are serious debates among Muslims over the theological acceptability of suicide, or “martyrdom” attacks. Even among jihadi-salafis, these tactics are controversial. Many in the West question how or why anyone would be willing to commit a suicide attack. Preliminary analyses indicate that young, unmarried, impoverished men commit most suicide attacks.11 But there is a lot of contradictory evidence. The LTTE includes women in its suicide brigade, the Black Tigers. Palestinian organizations have also employed female suicide bombers.12 The challenge of recruiting suicide bombers seems to have lessened over time. Mia Bloom argues that Palestinian society has grown increasingly receptive to suicide 7

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press: New York), p. 165. Hassan, Nasra. “An Arsenal of Believers,” The New Yorker, June 11, 2001. 9 Pape. Dying To Win. 10 Inside Terrorism. 11 Spriznak. 12 Ibid. 8

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bombings over time.13 Bombers are considered heroes in the community and acclaimed for their willingness to sacrifice for their families and communities. The explosion itself can be seen as a cathartic expression of frustration and revenge. Religious terrorist organizations often use theological arguments to justify selfsacrifice. Not only can they promise rewards in the afterlife for the bomber, some offer the bomber’s family supernatural rewards as well. It is not hard to understand why an individual with very few prospects for earthly comfort would be tempted by the promise of eternal reward. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi is one of the most influential jihadi-salafi scholars.14 This former mentor of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi long eschewed directly taking part in jihad, but has long supported the global jihadi movement by releasing fatwas and strategic doctrine. Maqdisi’s discussion of the theological legitimacy of “martyrdom” operations delineates the conditions necessary for “martyrdom” operations to be acceptable in Islam: “Martyrdom operations should not be carried out unless certain conditions are met: 1. One’s intention is sincere and pure – to raise the Word of Allah. 2. One is reasonably sure that the desired effect cannot be achieved by any other means which would guarantee preservation of his life. 3. One is reasonably sure that loss will be inflicted on the enemy, or they will be frightened, or the Muslims will be emboldened. 4. One should consult with war strategy experts … for otherwise he may upset a plan and alert the enemy to their presence. If the first condition is absent, the deed is worthless, but if it is satisfied while some others are lacking, then it is not the best thing, but this does not necessarily mean the mujahid is not shaheed.”15 Maqdisi’s justification for suicide attacks by jihadists illustrates the jihadi-salafi perspective on this tactic. A suicide attack is legitimate so long as the bomber adopts the tactic as a last resort and is primarily motivated by a desire to impose destruction on his enemy, rather than take his own life. Otherwise, such an attack might be considered unacceptable. Importantly for the Iraqi theatre, Maqdisi’s position on suicide bombings has not always been as clear as it is today. Maqdisi’s pupil, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, believed that Maqdisi opposed the use of suicide bombings when they worked together in Jordan in the mid-1990’s. Zarqawi credits a largely unknown jihadi thinker named Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir for convincing him that “martyrdom” attacks are acceptable, even preferable to traditional military tactics.16 It is not clear exactly what Muhajir’s theological argument was, but some jihadi thinkers claim that martyrdom requires a sincere decision to sacrifice on behalf of God rather than simply being killed in a just war on a just mission. Muhajir may have argued that the sincere decision to sacrifice oneself in a suicide attack suggests that all such bombers are true “martyrs” rather than just soldiers killed in battle. 13 Bloom, Mia. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119 #1 2004. 14 McCants, William and Jarret Brachman. The Militant Ideology Atlas, (Combating Terrorism Center: West Point, NY) 2006. 15 Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad. The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations. 16 Fishman, Brian. “Zarqawi’s Jihad: Inside the Mind of Iraq’s Most Notorious Man,” Combating Terrorism Center Working Paper. Muhajir’s name is almost certainly a nom de guerre. Muhajir simply means “immigrant” or “traveler.” It is possible that Zarqawi referred to a more well-known thinker using this name in order to conceal his identity.

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Suicide Attacks in Iraq Between the invasion of Iraq on March 22, 2003 and March 22, 2007 there were 629 suicide attacks in Iraq. 17 The vast plurality of these incidents targeted Iraqi police forces (see figure 1). Private citizens in public spaces and religious figures were also common targets. Importantly, most suicide attacks in Iraq occur in Baghdad. Mohammed Hafez has concluded the most comprehensive study of suicide bombing in Iraq; he has found that of 443 suicide bombings in Iraq between March 22, 2003 and February 20, 2006 52 percent of them occurred in Baghdad, with the remaining 48 percent distributed across the rest of Iraq. The focus of suicide attacks in Baghdad contrasts sharply with the distribution of U.S. casualties around Iraq (see figure 2).18 Likewise, there is strong evidence that foreign fighters associated with Al-Qa’ida are responsible for many—if not most—of the suicide attacks in Iraq. Hafez found that 30 percent of suicide attacks had been claimed by Al-Qa’ida and another six percent were claimed by Ansar al-Islam or Ansar al-Sunnah, two groups with historical and ideological ties to Al-Qa’ida’s operators in Iraq. 19 Hafez found that 58 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq go completely unclaimed; the Terrorism Knowledge Base database indicates that the number of unclaimed attacks is as high as 72 percent (see figure 3).20

Figure 1. Targets of Suicide Attacks in Iraq

17

21

Terrorism Knowledge Base. www.tkb.org. Hafez, Mohammed. “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29: 591–619. 19 Ibid. 20 Hafez. “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq,” and Terrorism Knowledge Base. 21 Terrorism Knowledge Base. 18

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Suicide tactics have also enabled some of the most dramatic and politically important attacks in Iraq. Measuring political impact is difficult, but a preliminary list would include the Jordanian Embassy bombing (August 7, 2003), the United Nations compound bombing (August 19, 2003), the assassination of Ayatollah Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Hakim (March 1, 2005), the sophisticated attack on the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad, temporary home of many foreign journalists (October 24, 2005), and the numerous mass casualty sectarian attacks against marketplaces in Baghdad.22

Figure 2. U.S. Fatalities in Iraq

23

The vast majority of suicide attacks in Iraq occur in Baghdad, the country’s strategic and cultural heart, but Anbar province is the deadliest for U.S. troops. The discrepancy is explained by the insurgent decision to focus suicide attacks primarily against Iraqi regime targets rather than U.S. troops. Hafez concludes that the groups 22 http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/07/sprj.irq.embassy.blast/ August 7, 2003; http://www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/unhqbombing.htm; “Car Bomb Kills More than 100 in Iraq” Associated Press http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/28/news/iraq.php; “Palestine Hotel in Baghdad Hit by Car Bomb” Associated Press October 24, 2005. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002580651_webiraq.html; http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IBO356540.htm, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/03/29/iraq.main/index.html, etc. 23 www.icasualties.org

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most inclined to use suicide tactics are also those that hope to destroy the current political process in Iraq, rather than manipulate it for their own gain. Thus, they focus attacks on the Iraqi regime targets rather than the U.S. occupier. Hafez’s logic is sound, but it differentiates the use of suicide attacks in Iraq from the historical trend of suicide attacks against democratic occupiers. Pape concludes that terrorist organizations turn to suicide attacks in response to occupation by a democracy. Al-Qa’ida’s focus on suicide attacks in consistent with this logic because AQ considers all territory in the Mideast occupied by illegitimate rulers backed by the United States. Al-Qa’ida’s strategic logic is quite simple; they want to punish collaborators with the foreign occupation. If the purpose is to push the United States out of Iraq, this strategy may be misguided. The specter of continued violence in Iraq certainly disheartens American leaders and the American public, but it is not clear that sectarian violence or the prospect of continued sectarian fighting, rather than an increased American death toll, is what weakens U.S. commitment to fighting in Iraq.

Figure 3. Claims of Responsibility for Suicide Attacks in Iraq

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Impact in the United States Suicide bombings tend to have a strategic impact that vastly exceeds the direct kinetic impact of the weapon. Thus, it is very important to assess the media strategy associated with the bombing. Many Iraqi insurgent groups have sophisticated media battalions that are capable of producing audio, video and print messages. The audience for these

24 Terrorism Knowledge Base. Hafez’s statistics reflect a similar trend, but he identifies the attacker in a higher percentage of attacks. His number of 30% of attacks being claimed by AQ linked groups is reasonable.

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products varies widely, from the domestic Iraqi audience, to Arabs and Muslims around the world, to the U.S. government and, in some cases, the U.S. population. Al-Qa’ida’s decisions about media strategy are particularly important because its global goals imply that it needs to magnify the importance of its attacks inside Iraq so that information consumers worldwide feel connected to the organization’s goals and activities. Al-Qa’ida is also responsible for a major percentage of suicide attacks in Iraq. Indeed, many of the unclaimed suicide attacks in Iraq are likely attributable to AlQa’ida. Several major suicide attacks, including the U.N. embassy bombing and the assassination of Ayatollah Hakim went unclaimed at the time of the attack, but were later claimed by Al-Qa’ida. There is no statistical evidence that the decline in U.S. support for the war in Iraq is attributable to increases or decreases in suicide bombings in Iraq. American support for the decision to begin the war in Iraq has hovered around 45 percent since just after the U.S. presidential election in 2004 (see figure 4). Support for the decision to invade Iraq did not drop substantially from that level even when suicide bombings peaked in the summer of 2005 (see figure 5).

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Figure 4. U.S. Support for the Decision to Invade Iraq

Polling data is not necessarily the best way to measure American attitudes toward the war in Iraq, or the impact that suicide bombings have had on U.S. public opinion. A review of editorials in major American newspapers provides more anecdotal evidence that may actually reflect U.S. public opinion more accurately. Between April 1, 2003 and April 1, 2007, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today collectively published 69 editorials that use the term “suicide

25

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey, accessed at www.pollingreport.com.

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bomb,” “suicide bombing,” “suicide bomber” along with the word “Iraq.”26 Not every reference was to suicide bombings in Iraq (see figure 6). Surprisingly, many of these editorials were explaining the regional context of events in Iraq and were actually referring to suicide bombings in Israel or the Palestinian territories. Editors may have come to associate the tactic of suicide bombings with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and are more likely to mention such attacks when discussing that topic than they are in Iraq. This methodology may overestimate the number of instances that suicide bombings inside Iraq are discussed, but it does provide useful insight into how Americans relate the tactic of suicide bombings with the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that suicide bombings received less and less attention as the war in Iraq has dragged on. This is consistent with the notion of “compassion fatigue,” a concept used to describe the inability of countries fighting limited wars to continually empathize with the suffering involved in the conflict.

Figure 5. Suicide Bombings in Iraq

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There does not seem to be a relationship between the quantity of suicide bombings and mentions of the tactic in U.S. editorials. The steady decline in references suggests that editors are unwilling to tell the same story over again as the war drags on. Newspaper editors must constantly find new events to write about; as the tactic of suicide bombings has become increasingly normal, the incentive for editors to refer to it has decreased. This is especially true because very few U.S. troops are killed by suicide attacks. Most American troops are killed by roadside bombs, rather than truck or car bombs. Most editorial references to suicide bombs in Iraq eschew descriptions of individual attacks, preferring to describe the phenomenon itself. Even dramatic bombings like the attack on the U.N. Mission in 2003 were only referenced as indicative of a larger trend. This excerpt from an August 20, 2003 USA Today editorial 26 27

Lexis Nexis Academic. Hafez. “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq.”

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is indicative of many U.S. commentaries that reference suicide bombings in Iraq. “The powerful truck bomb that ripped through the United Nations’ headquarters in Baghdad on Tuesday, killing the top U.N. official in Iraq and at least 19 others, was the most brazen act of terrorism in the country since the U.S. invasion in March. But it was hardly the first. The pattern of increasingly audacious attacks supports warnings by Iraq’s U.S. administrator, Paul Bremer, that disgruntled Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s former regime have teamed up with foreign militants in a coordinated campaign of terror. Last week, the spiritual leader of Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group operating in northern Iraq, characterized the violence as ‘part of the continuous Islamic struggle.’”28

Figure 6. Mention of “Suicide Bombings” and “Iraq” in U.S. Editorials

More important than their role as punctuation marks to the larger insurgency is how editors use the tactic of suicide bombings to relate the fight in Iraq with other conflicts, especially the war between Israelis and Palestinians. In other words, the tactic of suicide bombings has come to be a symbol of a certain kind of intractable conflict. This excerpt from the December 13, 2003 New York Times illustrates the trend: “Frustrated by suicide bombings and guerrilla violence, American military officers resort to the kind of harsh tactics that have caused endless ill will in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Unable to develop reliable intelligence of its own, the administration has authorized the creation of an internal Iraqi spy agency, which will recruit former Iraqi military and intelligence officials to find those responsible for the attacks. Creating an agency like this at a time when the administration cannot tell friend from foe, and before there is any kind of Iraqi government to control its actions, seems like a road map to more serious trouble.”29 Insurgents have compared images of American-supplied Israeli Apache helicopters circling the Gaza Strip with images of American Apaches circling Baghdad in order to draw emotional parallels between the two conflicts for an Arab and Muslim audience. 28 29

“Success in Broad Terror War Requires U.S. Resolve in Iraq,” USA Today, August 20, 2003. “The Story Gets Worse.” The New York Times December 13, 2003

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Suicide bombings evoke a similar reaction in many Americans. Conditioned to the idea of Palestinian suicide bombings, many Americans immediately relate suicide attacks in Iraq to those campaigns. Although this is probably a useful propaganda tool for groups in Iraq planning suicide attacks, it demonstrates that they cannot completely control the symbolic message conveyed by their violence. As Pape and Hoffman argue, organizations use suicide attacks to demonstrate their resolve in a very difficult fight. American editorials that use suicide tactics to relate Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggest that the terrorists’ message has been received. This is in spite of the fact that most suicide attacks in Iraq target Iraqis rather than Americans. The tactic itself is so emotionally powerful that its use anywhere in a conflict involving Americans generates a unique revulsion that both Pape and Hoffman suggest is part of the strategic rationale for using the tactic in the first place. Despite the fact that suicide attacks in Iraq serve an important symbolic role tying the Iraqi conflict to others, Americans seem increasingly less attuned to identify these kinds of attacks as particularly interesting or symbolic. Likely, the American public has just grown accustomed to daily reports of extraordinary violence in Iraq. The sheer prevalence of suicide attacks there limits the strategic importance or psychological impact of any particular attack or of the tactic itself. Whereas the tactic used to be newsworthy, it no longer is worthy of daily reporting. In theory, this numbness should reduce the incentive for Al-Qa’ida and other organizations to use suicide bombings in Iraq, but that does not seem to be the case. Although the number of attacks varies widely from month to month, there is no evidence that the tactic has been discarded. There are three critical reasons that Al-Qa’ida and others continue to use suicide tactics in Iraq. First, they facilitate a variety of tactical choices that would be otherwise impossible. Suicide car bombs are an especially effective means of implementing largescale sectarian attacks. Secondly, the mythology of martyrdom in Iraq serves to both inspire new recruits and legitimize the jihad.30 Third, Al-Qa’ida and others want to distinguish themselves from other insurgent groups in Iraq. They do this by publicizing their jihadi-salafi ideology, but the ability to link that to specific tactics increases its effectiveness, especially when those tactics demand extraordinary sacrifice.

Conclusions American perceptions of the suicide tactics used in Iraq are shaped by the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. For many Americans, discussion of suicide bombings immediately conjures images of Palestinian youth destroying Israeli cafes. The intellectual relationship between Iraqi suicide attacks and those in IsraelPalestine increases the political impact of suicide tactics in Iraq. Conversely, the political power of such attacks is mitigated—so far as Americans are concerned—by the fact that most suicide attacks in Iraq target Iraqis. For average Americans, the tactic used is less important than the increasing sense that Iraq is out of control. Terrorist organizations in Iraq employ suicide tactics for disturbingly traditional reasons: tactical advantages, the demonstration of determination, and as a means to separate a group from other resistance organizations. All of these motivations remain 30 Hafez, Mohammed. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Fame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 19: 95-115.

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for organizations already using suicide tactics in Iraq, but changing American perceptions of the war may compel Iraqi groups to change their targeting choices. The incentives for insurgents to target American forces with suicide tactics is increasing. New U.S. tactics require smaller units to be deployed forward, putting them at increased risk of all sorts of attacks, including suicide bombs. There are other incentives as well. Iraq’s insurgents target American resolve to remain in Iraq as much as they do Iraqi police and U.S. troops. Early in the war, suicide attacks against Iraqi forces were shocking enough to provoke horror in many Americans. Those days are over. As Americans increasingly see suicide bombings as just another indication of Iraq’s violence, Al-Qa’ida and its allies may feel the need to redirect attacks against American forces in order to continue to up the pressure on the American people. Conversely, some Al-Qa’ida strategic documents suggest that they do not want to force the United States out of Iraq in the near term. Al-Qa’ida, which is responsible for many of the suicide attacks in Iraq, will likely remain focused on consolidating control over the Sunni community in Iraq before they focus primarily on pushing the U.S. out of Iraq. Such a strategy would likely entail continued small-scale attacks against U.S. forces, but avoid large-scale attacks that might dramatically shift U.S. public opinion and force a precipitous withdrawal before AQ is able to completely control the Sunni community in Iraq. As with all forms of terrorism, the public needs to be educated about suicide attacks. The immediate American association of suicide tactics with the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is both misguided and unhelpful, especially when it is unintentional. A public that understands both the history and strategy of suicide terrorism is less likely to be unduly influenced by a suicide campaign. The United States faces a precarious situation in Iraq that requires very difficult strategic calculations. The U.S. must be able to have a coherent internal debate on the future of its Iraq strategy without the external pressure from terrorists in Iraq. Pape argues that suicide bombings are most useful when they are used as part of a major campaign. The Iraqi suicide campaign demonstrates some of the limits on this principle. The forces targeted by suicide bombs can grow overly acclimated to the tactic and reduce the incremental value of each attack. As the number of suicide bombings in Iraq climbs toward 1,000, this trend will continue unless insurgents dramatically change their choice of targets.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Impacts of Suicide Bombers on American Society Mr William GAWTHROP National Defense Intelligence College, USA

Abstract. This paper presents a broad view of various considerations confronting intelligence and law enforcement personnel involved with investigations in which some or all of the principal players (subject, victims, witnesses, investigators, translators or analysts) may be subject to the obligations of two competing legal disciplines; the sharia and the protocols of secular, state sponsored, legally sufficient criminal investigations. Little has been written or openly discussed about these issues. Reasons include unawareness of the provisions of Islamic Law and its attending religious and political sensitivities. The application of doctrinally sound investigative procedures and analytical art may no longer be sufficient when addressing issues involving the sharia. Keywords. Intelligence, criminal investigations, Islamic law

Background1 The impacts of Suicide Bombers on American Society can be measured in multiple ways. For example, the strikes of 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had both economic and military impacts. Economically, the loss of the Twin Towers and related buildings at Ground Zero were initially estimated at about $60,000,000,000 (sixty billion dollars) and the economic repercussions placed at another about $60,000,000,000 (sixty billion dollars). Yet, five years later, the American economy is strong, inflation is low, and unemployment is less than seven percent. Militarily, the Pentagon suffered a direct attack against a newly renovated section, and the damage, while substantial, was greatly attenuated. Lives were lost, and, as a response, the US Government pressed directly into Afghanistan destroying the Taliban Government hosting Al Qaeda. But there are other impacts that go beyond the economic and military dimensions and one of those impacts are doctrinal. Suicide Bombers act in accordance with their perceptions of their doctrines. In response, American Society, in the form of Law

1

Disclaimer: The views in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any agency of the United States Government. Editor’s note: This chapter has been revised by the author taking into consideration the views and criticisms expressed about the earlier version by participants at the “Motivation for Suicide Bombers” workshop, Ankara 24–25 May 2007 (see the “Closing Remarks” of Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaro÷lu).

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Enforcement, must respond in accordance with their doctrines. This sets the stage for a strategic test for both doctrines.

Law Enforcement Investigations As a consequence of the 11 September, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, law enforcement has found itself engaged in investigative and analytical processes having a hitherto unanticipated dimension: the influence of the Sharia2and secular law enforcement investigative doctrine. Criminal investigations are characterized by interviews of witnesses and victims and interviews and interrogations of subjects, or suspects. Prior to 9/11, individual and infrequent anomalies in individual investigations such as the unwillingness of victims to come forward or cooperate, instances of witnesses declining to assist in investigations and inexplicable problems in translator services, were written off as naturally occurring phenomena characterizing a normal percentile of investigations. Individually, investigators applied standard investigative procedures to counter these obstructions by conducting additional interviews, working a little harder, and in some cases, shelving an investigation. As time passed, through person to person contacts, conferences, and professional exchanges, there emerged an appreciation that a larger phenomenon was at work. Intangible to the senses, difficult to articulate, and sufficiently indistinct such that very few could appreciate that two legal doctrines may be in collision during the investigative phase.

The Evolution of the Sharia The evolution of Islamic Law, or the Sharia, is inextricably intertwined with the early history of Islam characterized by the Meccan and Medina periods which evolved into a doctrine governing interpersonal relations having implications for current law enforcement and intelligence doctrine. Meccan Period The early history of Islam before Muhammad fled to Medina is known at the Meccan Period. Believers were threatened, assaulted and occasionally murdered by their unbelieving families and neighbors necessitating the development of defensive social doctrines known as dissimulation. These included kitman (“Concealing; keeping a secret”)3, and takiyya (“…denotes dispensing with the ordnances of religion in cases of 2

For a detailed overview of the Sharia, see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1997) Vol IX p. 321-328. 3 Thomas Patrick Hughes, Dictionary of Islam: Being a Cyclopaedia of the Doctrines, Rites, Ceremonies, and Customs, together with the Technical and Theological Terms of the Muslim Religion, (originally printed in 1886, reprinted Chicago: KAZI Publications, 1994) p. 280 “Concealing; keeping a secret”. (Publishers Note: Kazi Publications, Inc, has reprinted this 19th Century Dictionary of Islam with the author’s preface for its readers because of the comprehensiveness and scope of the work. No similar work has been done over 100 years later. We do not agree with all of the entries or descriptions but felt that the knowledge should be available to all to read and then to decide from himself or herself which descriptions are accurate of Muslim life and beliefs.” p. vi).

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constraint and when there is a possibility of harm”) which are, in the modern era, more frequently characterized as Shia practices.4 As early coping mechanisms, these defensive doctrines gained scholarly acceptance and later became precedence codified in Islamic law. Muhammad prescribed moral and ethical mandates, discouraged confrontation and advocated polite disassociation to reduce adversarial encounters between the Muslim and Non-Muslim communities. Medina Period After the Hijra, or flight to Medina, and known as the Medina Period, Muhammad’s revelations gave practical guidance for the resolution of conflicts by encouraging Muslims to carefully gauge contact with non-Muslims to protect against hostile and subversive forces. Pertinent revelations include Suras 3:28, 4:139, 4:144, 5:57, 9:23, 9:29, 60:1, 60:2., 60:3, and 60:13.5 The central themes with secular law enforcement implications are: x do not take disbelievers as protectors, helpers or friends (Sura 3:28) (4:144) (5:57) (60-1) (60:3) (60:13).

4

Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 2000) Vol X, p. 134. Sura 3:28 (Medina Period) Let not the believers take disbelievers as Auliya (protectors or helpers or friends) instead of the believers, and whoever does that will never be helped by Allah in any way, except if you fear a danger from them. And Allah warns you against Himself (His punishment), and to Allah is the final return. Sura 4:139 (Medina Period) Those who take disbelievers for Auliya (protectors or helpers or friends) instead of believers, do they seek honour, power and glory with them? Verily, then to Allah belongs all honour, power and glory. Sura 4: 144 (Medina Period) O you who believe! Take not as Auliya (protectors or helpers or friends) disbelievers instead of believers. Do you wish to offer Allah a manifest proof against yourselves? Sura 5:57 (Medina Period) O you who believe! Take not as Auliya (protectors and helpers) those who take your religion as a mockery and fun from among those who received the Scripture (Jews and Christians) before you, and nor from among the disbelievers; and fear Allah if you indeed are true believers. Sura 9:23 (Medina Period) O you who believe! Take not as Auliya (supporters and helpers) your fathers and your brothers if the prefer disbelief to Belief. And whoever of yours does so, then he is one of the Zalimun (Wrongdoers). Sura 9:29 (Medina Period) Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad) (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (Islam) among the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians) until they pay the Jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. Sura 60:1 (Medina Period) O you who believe! Take not My enemies and your enemies (i.e. disbelievers and polytheists) as friends showing then affection towards them, while they have disbelieved in what has come to you of the truth (i.e. Islamic Monotheism, the Qu’ran, and Muhammad), and have driven out the Messenger (Muhammad) and yourselves (from your homeland) because you believe in Allah your Lord! If you have come forth to strive in My Cause and to seek My Good Pleasure, (then take not these disbelievers and polytheists, as your friends). You show friendship to then in secret, while I am All-Aware of what you conceal and what you reveal. And whosoever of you (Muslims) does that, then he has gone (far) astray from the Straight Path. Sura 60:2 (Medina Period) Should they gain the upper hand over you, they would behave to you as enemies, and stretch forth their hands and the tongues against you with evil, and they desire that you should disbelieve. Sura 60:3 (Medina Period) Neither your relatives nor your children will benefit you on the Day of Resurrection (against Allah). He will judge between you. And Allah is the All-Seer of what you do. Sura 60:13 (Medina Period) O you who believe! Take not as friends the people who incurred the Wrath of Allah. Surely, they have despaired of (receiving any good in) the Hereafter, just as the disbelievers have despaired of those (buried) in graves (that they will not be resurrected on the Day of Resurrection). 5

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x x x x

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those who do take disbelievers as protectors, helpers or friends are untrustworthy (4:139). avoid family members who take disbelievers as protectors, helpers or friends (9:23). fight disbelievers (9:29). If disbelievers gain the upper hand over you they will behave as enemies and stretch forth their hands and tongues against you with evil to induce disbelief (60:2).

Interpersonal Relations With regard to interpersonal relations within the Umma, Muhammad sought to foster forbearance and tolerance among the faithful and mandated the reduction or elimination of undue social inquisitiveness about private matters. Remembering the early years in Mecca in which the faithful were subjected to a number of intrigues, Muhammad gave clear guidance on issues of propriety, appropriate and inappropriate social inquiry, preservation of confidences and secrets, prohibitions on slander, and the exigencies of dissimulation which can be found in the Koran, traditional accounts of Muhammad’s life (the Sira 6 ), the example of Muhammad (the Sunna 7 ) and the traditions associated with his sayings (the Hadiths). The Koran, the Sunna, and the Hadiths are foundational to Islamic Law.

Islamic Law Islamic Law is the sharia and it comes in multiple interpretations, modified by local practices and individual interpretations. But at the strategic level, and within at least the Sunni Sects, there are four schools of Law: Hanafi,8 Hanbali,9 Maliki,10 and Shafi.11

6

There are two terms: Sira and Sunna. The Sira is “a genre of early Islamic literature,” Muhammad’s biography. “Sira means ‘way of going’; ‘way of acting’; ‘way of life (in these meanings it is almost synonymous with sunna…In hadith collections and books on Islamic Law, the plural siyar is also used for ‘rules of war and dealings with non-Muslims’ ” For a detailed discussion of “Sira” see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1997) Vol IX, p. 660-663. 7 There are two terms: Sira and Sunna. The Sunna describes the “generally approved standard or practice introduced by (Muhammad) as well as the pious Muslims of olden days. And at the instigation of al-Shafi, the sunna of (Muhammad) was awarded the position of the second root (asl) of Islamic Law, the Sharia, after the Koran. Not long after that, sunna came to stand for the all-encompassing concept orthodoxy, which is still in use today. Out of this there grew the dichotomy between Sunni (orthodox and Shi’i (heterodox) Islam.” For a detailed discussion of “Sunna” see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1997) Vol IX, p. 878-881. 8 For a detailed overview of Hanafiyya, the Hanafi madhhab school of religious law, see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1986) Vol III, p. 162-164. 9 For a detailed overview of Hanabila, the Hanbali madhhab school of religious law, see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1986) Vol III, p. 158-162. 10 For a detailed overview of Malikiyya, the Malikite madhhab school of religious law, see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1991) Vol VI, p. 278-283. 11 For a detailed overview of Shafiiyya, the Shafii madhhab school of religious law, see Leiden Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co, 1997) Vol IX, p. 181-189.

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These schools of law are codified in a number of fiqh manuals12 which, for law enforcement and intelligence analysts, provide insight to the obligatory (wajib), recommended (mandub), permissible (mubah), prohibited (haram) or the repugnant (makruh) categories of behavior.13 The more readily available manuals included Riyadus-Saliheen, 14 The Distinguished Jurists Primer, 15 The Book of Revenue, 16 AlMasqasid: Nawawi’s Manual of Islam 17 and Umdat as-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller).18

Some Impacts on US Intelligence and Law Enforcement In at least the American context, law enforcement and intelligence investigations are secular inquiries aimed at finding the truth of the matter. Investigative phases include the questioning of witnesses and subjects, interpretation of the interviews and evidence, drawing conclusions concerning culpability, and the referral of the investigation for subsequent state action. Specifically, the investigator asks about the actions of another, solicits incriminating evidence, tries to expose secrets, and carefully reviews testimony for accuracy. In some cases, the services of a translator may be required. An already difficult situation may be compounded if one or more members of the investigative team are obligatorily responsible to the conflicting demands of two

12

Hughes, p. 128. “Fiqh. The dogmatic theology of the Muslims. Works on Muhammadan law, whether civil or religious, The books most read by the Sunnis are the Hidayah, written by a learned man named Ali ibn Abi Bakr, (A.H. 593), part of which has been translated by the late Colonel Charles Hamilton; the Darru’l Mukhtar, by Alu ‘d-din, (A.H. 1088), the Sharhu’l-Wiqayah, by Ubaidu ‘Ilah ibn Masud, (A.H. 745), the Raddu ‘l Muhtar, by Saiyid Muhammad Amin ibn Abidi d-din, and the Fatawa Alamgiri. Amongst the Imamiyah School, or the Shiahs, the principle works are Kitabu sh-Sharai, by Abu l-Hasan Ali (A.H. 326), the Muqni fi ‘l-fiqh, by Abu Ja’far (A.H. 360); the Shara’l’u ‘l-Islam, by Shaikh Najmu d’din (A.H. 679) and the Jami’u ‘l-Abbasi, by Baha’u d-din (A.H. 1031).” 13 Hallaq, Wael B, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni usul al-fiqh, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: (1997). 40. 14 Al-Imam Abu Zakariya Yahya, Riyad-us-Saliheen, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: (1998). 15 al-Juywani, Al-Haramayn. A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2001). 16 Ibn Sallam, The Book of Revenue, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2003). 17 Keller, Nuh Ha Mim. Al-Masqasid: Nawawi’s Manual of Islam, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD: (1994). 18 al-Misri, Ahmad ibn Naqib. Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD: (1994). Sheikh Nuh (the Translator) in his own words about his book, March 31, 1999. “I began translating Reliance of the Traveller in Jordan, out of personal need for a shari'a manual, to know and practice Islam in my own life. Making it available to others was an afterthought that came to me after I had set out to produce a work in which I could look up the questions that I needed to know without having to memorize it all. … At the end of summer 1981 I moved to Huwwara, a village in the north of Jordan, … (and met) Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wakil al-Durubi, who … suggested … `Umdat al-salik (Reliance of the Traveller). … Working through the translation, the knowledge-based shari‘a approach captured my imagination, and I was to add several appendices on questions not treated in the text, including biographies of all the scholars mentioned, not only to help Muslims know their scholars, but also to clarify, by actual examples, the difference between the present level of Islamic scholarship and the past.” http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/customer-reviews/0915957728/sr=81/qid=ARRAY(0x5d0d69a0)/ref=cm_rev_next/104-3074606-9532715?ie=UTF8&customerreviews.sort%5Fby=-SubmissionDate&n=283155&s=books&customerreviews.start=21&qid=ARRAY%280x5b17516c%29&qid=1174489861&qid=1174489861&sr=8-1, accessed 20 March 2007.

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competing doctrines: sharia and the protocols of secular, state sponsored, legally sufficient criminal investigation. To identify some areas of possible, but not necessarily inevitable, conflict, analysts and investigators may find the Reliance of the Traveller a useful reference.

Reliance of the Traveller Reliance of the Traveller, written in 14th Century by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri (d. 769/1368), and translated and updated by Nuh Ha Mim Keller in the 1980s, is the codification of Sharia from the Shafi legal perspective. For investigators and analysts Traveller is not adequate for fully understanding the full scope of Islamic law, but it is useful as a basic starting point. It should be remembered, however, that: “… the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali, are identical in approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions, while the remaining questions, variances within a single family of explainers of the Holy Koran and prophetic sunna, are traceable to methodological differences in understanding or authentication of the primary textual evidence, differing viewpoints sometimes reflected in even a single school.”19

Figure 1. Reliance of the Traveller

Endorsements There are two endorsements that are particularly relevant for analysts and investigators using this reference. One from Al Azhar University, the other from the President of

19

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. vii.

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both the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Fiqh Council of North America. Al Azhar University Al Azhar University, founded in Cairo, Egypt, in 971 AD, is the world’s oldest university and Islam’s center of excellence. 20 On 11 February 1991, the General Director of Research, Writing and Translation of Al Azhar University, Fath Allah Ya Sin Jazar, certified “that the above mentioned (English) translation (of the book Umdat al-salik wa ‘uddat al nasik by Ahmad ibn Naqib) corresponds to the Arabic original and conforms to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni Community (Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a).”21 The International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Fiqh Council of North America On 18 December 1990, Dr Taha Jabir al-Alwani, President of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, (Herndon, Virginia) and President of the Fiqh Council of North America, made the following assessments of Reliance of the Traveller:  the translation is a valuable and important work, whether as a text book for teaching Islamic jurisprudence to English speakers, or as a legal reference for use by scholars, educated laymen and students in this language;  the translation presents the legal questions in a faithful and precise idiom that clearly delivers the complete meaning in a sound English style;  the book will be of great use in Southeast Asia in particular, and in America, Britain and Canada;  from a purely academic point of vie, this translation is superior to anything produced by orientalists in the way of translations of major Islamic works in that while faithfully maintaining the required scholarly level, its aim is to imbue the consciousness of the non Arabic speaking Muslim with a sound understanding of Sacred Law …22

Relevant Sections Having Possible Investigative Implications Traveller is comprised of 22 chapters addressing wide ranging topics governing daily life. The most relevant chapter from an intelligence and law enforcement perspective is Holding One’s Tongue which is comprised of 40 sections. Eleven (11) sections are relevant to law enforcement and intelligence analysts. They are Slander, Two People Conversing So that a Third Cannot Hear, Informing on Another, Lying, Giving a Positive Interpretation to Another’s Seeming Mistakes, Giving a Misleading Impression, Picking apart a Brother’s Words, Asking about Another’s Mistakes, Searching out a Person’s Faults, Rejecting a Brother’s Excuse, and Revealing a Secret. Each of these sections have direct, dramatic and disproportionate effects on both suicide bombing investigations and post 9/11 intelligence and law enforcement investigations.

20

http://www.alazhar.org/english/about/index.htm, accessed, 15 May 2007. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. xx. 22 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. xviii. 21

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Slander Slander, in the Western context, is the utterance of false charges or misrepresentations which defame and damage another’s reputation. Within the Sunni Islam tradition, slander means mentioning anything concerning a person that that person would dislike. The investigator, seeking the truth of the matter from a member of the umma about another member may (may) be inducing the moral and legal appearance of soliciting slander. From Reliance of the Traveller, “Slander means to mention anything concerning a person that he would dislike, whether about his body, religion, everyday life, self, disposition, property, son, father, wife, servant, turban, garment, gait, movements, smiling, dissolution, frowning, cheerfulness, or anything else connected with him.” 23 “Do you know what slander is?” They answered, “Allah and His Messenger know best.” He said, “It is to mention of your brother that which he would dislike.” Someone asked, “What if he is as I say?” And he replied, “If he is as you say, you have slandered him, and if not, you have calumniated him.”24 “The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. He does not betray him, lie to him, or hang back from coming to his aid. All of the Muslim is inviolable to his fellow Muslim: his reputation, his property, his blood. Godfearingness is here (the heart). It is sufficiently wicked for someone to belittle his fellow Muslim.”25 Two People Conversing So that a Third Cannot Hear The Prophet said, “When there are only three of you, two of you may not speak together apart from the third unless you join a group of others, lest your doing so sadden him.”26 This has been interpreted by Nahlawi27 as prohibiting “two individuals conversing privately when a third is present and likewise prohibits three or more people from doing so when there is a single person apart from them.” “The prohibition indicates its unlawfulness, it being impermissible for a group to converse apart from a single individual unless he gives his permission.”28 The Malikite school holds that “the prohibition is applicable at all times, whether one is at home or traveling” while Hanafi scholars hold “that such converse is forbidden only while traveling, not when home, for when traveling it may portend danger.”29 When there are four people, two may converse privately from the other two. Informing on Another The Prophet … said, “Let none of my Companions inform me of anything another of them has said, for I wish to come to you without disquiet in my heart.”30 23

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 730. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 732. 25 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 732. 26 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 743. 27 Khalil ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Shaybani al Nahlawi, a Hanafi Scholar in Damascus, who died in 1350/1931. 28 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 743. 29 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 743. 30 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 742. 24

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Lying “Primary texts from the Koran and sunna that it is unlawful to lie are both numerous and intersubstantiative, it being among the ugliest sins and most disgusting faults. Because of the scholarly consensus of the Community (Umma) that it is prohibited and the unanimity and amount of the primary textual evidence, there is little need to cite particular examples thereof, our only concern here being to explain the exceptions to what is considered lying, and appraise of the details.”31 Muhammad “said, ‘He who settles disagreements between people to bring about good or says something commendable is a not a liar.’”32 “This much is related by both Bukhari and Muslim, with Muslim’s version recorded that Umm Kulthum added, “I did not hear him permit untruth in anything people say, except for three things: war, settling disagreements, and a man talking with his wife or she with him (A: in smoothing over differences).”33 Abu Hamid Ghazali (1058-1111) who is credited with being an “outstanding theologian, jurist, original thinker, mystic and religious reformer,” 34 is quoted as saying, “If a praiseworthy aim is attainable by lying but not telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible. It is obligatory to lie if the goal is obligatory. When, for example, one is concealing a Muslim from an oppressor who asks where he is, it is obligatory to lie about him being hidden. Or when a person deposits an article with one for safekeeping and an oppressor wanting to appropriate it inquires about it, it is obligatory to lie about having concealed it, for if one informs him about the article and he then seizes it, one is financially liable (to the owner) to cover the article’s cost. Whether the purpose is war, settling a disagreement, or gaining sympathy of a victim legally entitled to retaliate against one so that he will forbear to do so; it is not unlawful to lie when any of these aims can be obtained through lying. But, it is religiously more precautionary in all cases to employ words that give a misleading impression, meaning to intend by one’s words something that is literally true, in respect to which one is not lying, while the outward purport of the words deceives the hearer, though even if one does not have such an intention and merely lies without intending anything else, it is not unlawful in the above circumstances.”35 “Lying is permissible when there is a legitimate desired end.”36 “The legitimate desired end may be a personal one.”37 “When an oppressor intending to appropriate one’s property inquires about it, one may deny it. Or, if a ruler asks one about a wicked act one has committed that is solely between one’s self and Allah (e.g. does not concern the rights of another) one can disclaim it … There are many well known hadiths in which those who admitted they deserved punishment were given prompting (by Muhammad) to retract their confessions … An example of a legitimating desired end of another is when one is asked about another’s secret and one disacknowledges it … One should compare the bad consequences entailed by lying to those by telling the truth, and if the consequences of telling the truth are more damaging, one is entitled to lie though if the 31

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 744. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 745. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 745. 34 E.J. Brill, The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Vol II, (Leiden, The Netherlands: 1983), p. 1038. 35 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 746. 36 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 746. 37 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 746. 32 33

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reverse is true or if one does not know which entails more damage, then lying is unlawful. Whenever lying is permissible, if the factor which permits it is a desired end of one’s own, it is recommended not to lie, but when the fact that permits it is the desired end of another, it is not lawful to infringe on his rights. Strictness opposed to the above dispensations is to forgo lying in every case where it is not legally obligatory.”38 Giving a Positive Interpretation to Other Seeming Mistakes Nawawi opined that with regard to the responses of students to their teachers, “it is obligatory for a student to give a positive interpretation to every utterance of his brothers that seems to be wrong until he has exhausted seventy excuses. No-one is incapable of this except a failure.” 39 Giving a Misleading Impression “Giving a misleading impression is among the most important topics, being frequently met with and often abused. It befits us to examine the matter closely, and whoever learns of it should reflect upon it and apply it.” 40 “Giving a misleading impression means to utter an expression that ostensibly means to utter an expression that ostensibly implies one meaning while intending a different meaning the expression may also have, one that contradicts the ostensive purport. It is a kind of deception.” 41 “It often takes the form of the speaker intending a specific referent while the hearer understands a more general one, as when a person asks a householder, “Is So and so here?” to which the householder, intending the space between himself and the questioner rather than the space inside the house, replies, “He is not here.”42 “Scholars say that there is no harm in giving a misleading impression if required by an interest countenanced by Sacred Law that is more important than not misleading the person being addressed, or if there is a pressing need which could not otherwise be fulfilled except through lying.” 43 Picking apart Another’s Words “Picking apart another’s words consists of attacking another’s speech by revealing the mistakes in it, whether its weak Arabic, meaning, or the intention of the speaker, as when one says, “this is true, but you do not intend the truth by it, when such an attack involves no other motive than contempt for the other and displaying ones cleverness, it is unlawful.”44 When one “hears something true, it befits him to accept it. If it is not true, but is unconnected with religious matters, he should remain silent, though if connected with

38

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 746. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 757. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 748. 41 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 748. 42 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 748. 43 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 759. 44 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 756. 39 40

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religious matters, he is obliged to show that it is false and to condemn it if there is a chance that anyone will believe him, because this is forbidding the wrong.”45 Asking about Another’s Mistakes “It is forbidden to ask about another’s errors and blunders in order to tell them they have made a mistake or to embarrass them, being unlawful because it entails injury to another and belittling him in front of people. But when one’s asking about mistakes is to learn or teach, or to test or sharpen student’s minds or make them reflect, then it is recommended and desirable, because it facilitates the comprehension of religious knowledge.”46 Searching out a Person’s Faults Asking about and searching out the faults of others is spying, which Allah Most High has forbidden by saying: “Do not spy” (Sura 49:12), meaning to look for the shameful points of Muslims. The Prophet … said: 1. “If you search for people’s shameful points, you corrupt them…” 2. “O you who have entered Islam with your tongues but whose hearts faith has not entered: do not slander people, and do not ferret out people’s shameful points. Whoever searches out the shameful points of his brother, Allah will search out his own shameful points, be sure that He will disgrace him even if he should remain in the middle of his house.”47 Rejecting a Brother’s Excuse “When someone offers an excuse to his fellow Muslim and the latter does not accept it, his sin is like the crime of imposing taxes.”48 By way of comparison, “He who imposes taxes resembles a highwayman, and is worse than a thief.”49 Revealing a Secret “Muhammad said: “When a man says something. Then glances left or right, his words are a confidence to be kept.” “Telling a secret means to inform others of a remark, action, or state which one learns of from someone who wants to remain hidden, whether it be good or bad. This is hurting him, and hurting others is unlawful. When two people meet, it is obligatory to keep secret any act that occurs, any word spoken, or any state attributable to someone, when these concern something one would normally wish to remain confidential, while not being unlawful. If it is against Allah Most High alone and does not involve legal measures such as prescribed legal penalties or disciplinary action, then it must be kept secret. If it involves legal measure, as do fornication and drinking, then one has a choice between revealing it or not, though it is superior to conceal it. If it involves another person’s rights, then if concealing it entails 45

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 756. al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 759. 47 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 759. 48 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 763. 49 al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 674. 46

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harm to anyone, or if it concerns prescribed legal measures such as retaliation for an injury or death, or covering the cost of an article destroyed through negligence, then if the person whose rights have been infringed is ignorant of it, one is obliged to make the matter known, and must testify to it if asked to. If it involves another’s rights, but concealing it does not entail harm to anyone and it does not concern prescribed legal measures, or it entails one of these two, but the person concerned already knows of it through another and one has not been asked to testify about it, then one is obliged to conceal the matter.” 50

Summary This paper presents a broad view of various considerations confronting intelligence and law enforcement personnel involved with investigations in which some or all of the principal players (subject, victims, witnesses, investigators, translators or analysts) may be subject to the obligations of two competing legal disciplines; the sharia and the protocols of secular, state sponsored, legally sufficient criminal investigations. Little has been written or openly discussed about these issues. Reasons include unawareness of the provisions of Islamic Law and its attending religious and political sensitivities. The application of doctrinally sound investigative procedures and analytical art may no longer be sufficient when addressing issues involving the sharia.

50

al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 771–772.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Emergency Response, Intelligence and Causes: The Case of the London Suicide Bombings Dr Anthony RICHARDS University of St Andrews, UK

Abstract. The 7th July attacks in London were not wholly unexpected. Much progress has been made in recent years in the UK’s emergency preparedness and its ability to pre-empt terrorist attacks through, for example, the Civil Contingencies legislation and the formation of JTAC respectively. There are, however, many hurdles to be overcome. But another key part of counter-terrorism strategy, and arguably the most important, is to demotivate, to reverse the motivation and recruitment potential, of those 1,600 or so individuals that MI5 sees as a threat and, equally importantly, to prevent the radicalisation of many more. The British government has been reluctant to acknowledge the impact that the international realm and some foreign policies have had on domestic radicalisation in the UK. This may be partly why it is looking within for solutions to the problem of radicalisation, through the emphasis on integration, societal cohesion and equality. As laudable as these aspirations appear to be, one should not deceive oneself into believing that these initiatives will solve the problem of home-grown terrorism. The problems of societal cohesion and lack of integration of minority communities into mainstream society have been with us for decades, a long time before any serious threat of terrorism emerged from within the UK’s Muslim community. If the government is to engage with the Muslim community in its response to terrorism then an acknowledgement of the impact of UK foreign policy on domestic radicalisation would at least better inform that engagement. Keywords. Terrorism, home-grown terrorism, UK, emergency response, intelligence, impact of foreign policy, London bombings

Introduction Just before 4am on July 7th 2005 three men, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain drove south from Leeds to Luton railway station where they met a fourth man, Jermaine Lindsay. The four left their two cars behind, wearing bulky rucksacks and caught the 7.40am Thameslink train to King’s Cross, London. At approximately 8.30 the men bade their farewells to each other at the King’s Cross platform and disappeared into the London underground. Twenty minutes later three bombs exploded simultaneously – one at Edgware Road that killed 7 people and injured 163, one at Liverpool Street that killed 8 and injured 171, and another in

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between King’s Cross and Russell Square that killed 27 and injured over 340.1 The fourth man, Hussain, having tried to make contact with his fellow bombers, boarded a London bus to Euston and then switched to another bus bound for Marble Arch. Just after 9.45am his bomb exploded, killing 14 and injuring 110. It was the worst terrorist attack that London had ever suffered, exceeding anything that the IRA had perpetrated in the 30 years of the ‘Troubles’. The following will argue that, while July 7th 2005 was the first multiple suicide terrorist attack on UK soil, it was in fact 9/11 that represented a watershed from the point of view of both the UK’s emergency services and intelligence organisations (although, even before this a wholesale review of emergency planning was under way). This article will assess some of the progress and outstanding problems in relation to UK emergency and intelligence responses, some of the implications of the bombings for society, and will address the highly contentious issue as to how and why these attacks took place – fundamental questions that need to be tackled in order to best inform the response that the UK needs to make in the face of today’s terrorist threat.

The Emergency Response Initially it was thought that the explosions may have been the result of a huge power surge. Whatever caused the blasts, the Metropolitan Police confirmed by 9.30am that they were dealing with a ‘major incident’ and the emergency services were galvanised into action. The emergency preparedness of London and the UK as a whole had in fact been reviewed and enhanced some time before the attacks of July 7th 2005. Even before the devastating attacks of 9/11 the British government (in July 2001) had created the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in order to provide a wholesale review of emergency planning arrangements in England and Wales.2 While it was initially set up in response to the fuel protests, the foot and mouth disease outbreak and flooding in 2000, it was given a whole new impetus after the terrorist attacks in the United States. The London Resilience Forum (later to become the London Regional Resilience Forum) was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 and has overseen the work of the London Resilience Team, which was established to provide greater coordination from London’s emergency services and other agencies. The UK has, of course, been no stranger to the threat of terrorism. Indeed, the problem of Irish terrorism over a period of thirty years has meant that the emergency services in the capital city have acquired extensive experience in responding to terrorist related emergencies. As far back as 1973 the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel was established to achieve greater coordination between the emergency services in the face of this threat. The current threat, however, is of an entirely different nature. Al Qaeda and those purporting to be acting on behalf of the Global Salafi Jihad aim to inflict mass casualties, often through the use of simultaneous bomb attacks (suicide or otherwise). 1

The Stationery Office, ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’, p. 5. Emergency planning is a devolved responsibility in Scotland but the Scottish Executive agreed that ‘the civil protection provisions in [the] Civil Contingencies Bill being introduced in Westminster should extend to Scotland’ through the Civil Contingencies Resilience Unit in the Justice Department. In Northern Ireland civil protection is the responsibility of the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister. 2

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This was why in one sense the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo sect also represented a watershed because the emergency services were having to take seriously the possibility of a similar ‘mass casualty’ attack taking place on the London Underground. Today the fear is that another radical ideology (in the form of Al Qaeda) will converge with a capability to use unconventional weapons, perhaps in the form of a ‘dirty bomb’. In the course of the British government’s review of emergency planning the British Economic and Social Research Council commissioned a project entitled ‘The Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks in the UK’ that ran from January 2003 to the end of 2005. The research was led by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews in partnership with the University of Southampton. The project aimed to assess the ability of the UK to both pre-empt a major terrorist attack and also to deal with the consequences of one. The subsequent ESRC report acknowledged that there had been much progress in enhancing the emergency preparedness of the UK. In addition to replacing the existing legislative framework for emergency planning through the Civil Contingencies Act the Fire Service’s New Dimensions project was being implemented. This entailed phase 1 (costing £56 million), which has provided mass decontamination equipment, and phase 2 (£132 million), which has provided urban search and rescue equipment, high volume water pumping and water safety equipment. 3 There have also been a number of emergency response exercises (such as the Bank underground exercise in September 2003, Exercise Magpie in Newcastle in April 2004 and Exercise Horizon in Birmingham in July 2004). In addition, the government has announced increases in resources in its Spending Review, though it is difficult to know whether or not those funds allocated to emergency planning will be sufficient as new responsibilities become apparent. However, while it was acknowledged that much progress was being made on the emergency response side, the following where identified as areas requiring improvement: 1. The general impression has been that while London has made significant progress in its emergency preparedness this has not necessarily been replicated outside the capital.4 Indeed, while the London Regional Resilience Forum is seen as a role model for other regions in the country, the regional tier advocated in the Civil Contingencies Bill is as yet underdeveloped outside London. It is natural enough to prioritise the capital city when enhancing its emergency response (and this was clearly demonstrated by the July 7th and 21st attacks) but the nature of the threat (including simultaneous bomb attacks and a willingness to hit ‘soft’ targets if other targets are ‘hardened’) informs us that any cities in the UK could be earmarked for attack. 2. The research found that the main issue of concern for the emergency services has been the slow progress in the provision of adequate chemical and particularly biological detection/identification equipment. Part of the reason for this is that much research in this area has traditionally focussed on detection/identification in 3 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ‘Government presses ahead with the modernisation of the Fire and Rescue Service’, website: http://www.odpm.gov.uk/pns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2004_0057. 4 Patrick Cunningham, chairman of the Emergency Planning Society’s local authorities issues group, observed in February 2003 that ‘the London resilience programme may have completed its work, with ministerial support, but it [resilience] appears to have stopped at the M25’, in Patrick Cunningham, ‘I call it my Insomnia List’, website: http://society.guardian.co.uk/publicvoices/emergencyplanning/.

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a military environment. The knock on effect of inadequate detection/identification capability is that where it is perceived that there has been a release of an agent the fire service has to default to its highest level of protective equipment (all-hazards gas suits) which then restricts the mobility and operational duration of its personnel. While it is acknowledged that a great deal of research has been carried out in this area the impression has been that effective detection/identification equipment has been taking too long to deliver to emergency services. 3. The ESRC report concurred with the Royal Society and the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee that further research is required into decontamination procedures. There has been little tangible evidence of progress that would take us to what has been termed ‘post-bucket’ decontamination procedures. 5 4. In May 2002 the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee stated in relation to communications that ‘the argument of different emergency services operating different systems is so bizarre that I hope something seriously will emerge.’ 6 Interoperability would enable the ambulance service to offer advice to the other emergency services on medical issues for workers and victims, and on safety and entry for ambulance staff.7 It could also provide worker to worker communications in the hot zone (if and when, for example, ambulance service personnel are able to enter it). Nigel Jones, Information Operations Capability Team, Qinetiq, noted that we need interoperable communications to improve situational awareness, to support decision-making, to facilitate the provision of direction and co-ordination of actions and to receive feedback ‘and by so doing, help mitigate the adverse consequences of a crisis’.8 There is, however, judging from our research, clearly a long way to go before interoperable communications between the emergency services can be achieved (maybe a decade at least). It is currently no more than an aspiration, partly because there does not appear to be any central direction or control over the issue. As there are three emergency services that are separately controlled by three different ministries there is uncertainty as to where the lead is going to come from. Further obstacles include the different cultures, operational requirements and lexicons of the three services. 5. The research also pointed out the need for greater attention to be given to survivors: ‘there is a desperate need at this time for someone to act as a buffer between those who are suffering and the machinery of disaster response.’9 This would aid long term recovery, which is another aspect that requires greater attention. Thus, when one looks at the impact of the July 7th bombings, from an emergency response point of view 9/11 had already provided a stark warning that the UK needed to be prepared for a major terrorist attack. Indeed, for some it came as no surprise that 5 Royal Society report, website: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=9461 , House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, ‘The Scientific Response to Terrorism’, November 6th 2003, p. 15, website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmsctech/415/415.pdf. 6 Bruce George, Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Minutes of Evidence, May 7th 2002, website: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/518/2050707.htm. 7 Ibid. Richard Diment, Chief Executive, Ambulance Service Association, ‘Communications Interoperability in a Crisis’, Royal United Services Institute conference, September 21st 2004. 8 Nigel Jones, Information Operations, QinetiQ, ‘Communications Interoperability in a Crisis’, Royal United Services Institute conference, September 21st 2004. 9 Rosie Murray, ‘We need a register of people who can help support the bereaved’, March 2nd 2003, http://society.guardian.co.uk/publicvoices/emergencyplanning/.

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an attack took place with the police repeatedly warning that it was a case of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’, especially after the Madrid bombings of March 2004. Nevertheless, the response to the July 7th attacks still revealed some serious problems. The issue of communications and its failings came to the fore in the London Assembly report into the bombings, which stated that ‘communications within and between the emergency services did not stand up on 7 July’. In relation to underground communication it noted that it was ‘unacceptable that the emergency services, with the exception of the BTP [British Transport Police], are still not able to communicate by radio when they are underground, 18 years after the official inquiry into the King’s Cross fire recommended action to address this problem’. As a result emergency service personnel could not communicate effectively, ‘in some cases with each other and in other cases with their control rooms’. The London Assembly report also found that ‘the most striking failing in the response to the 7 July attacks was the lack of planning to care for people who survived and were traumatised by the attacks’. It stated that ‘procedures tend to focus too much on incidents, rather than on individuals, and on processes rather than people’. As valuable as emergency response exercises are, this is perhaps one lesson that only becomes obviously apparent during a real major emergency. The report noted the lack of survivor reception areas despite the estimated 3,000 people who are said to have suffered from post-traumatic stress, along with a further 3,000 who were directly affected. In a government report into the attacks the British Home Secretary (John Reid) and Culture Secretary (Tessa Jowell) acknowledged that ‘…there is a clear message that more could have been done to support all those who were caught up in the attacks – in our preparation and response on the day and in the days and weeks that followed. And a crucial lesson we have drawn is that the quality of help received in the first few hours and days can determine for years to come people’s reaction to a terrible event of this sort’.10

Pre-emption – The Intelligence Response It is, of course, always preferable to try and make sure that suicide attacks or indeed any terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda or the Global Salafi Jihad do not happen in the first place. A vital part of this pre-emptive response is to ensure that the intelligence machinery is of a sufficiently high standard to prevent as many terrorist plots as possible. There are two major challenges that confront our intelligence agencies in their efforts to achieve this. The first is to generate as many channels and as wide a net as possible in order to improve the chances that intelligence of a terrorist attack does actually make it into ‘the system’. The Intelligence and Security Committee report into the July 7 attacks concluded that the main lesson learned was the need ‘to find ways of broadening coverage to pick up currently unknown terrorist activity or plots.’ 11 It should be remembered that prior to the July attacks the threat level had actually been 10

‘Addressing Lessons From The Emergency Response To The 7 July 2005 London Bombings’, September 22nd 2006, available at: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/lessons-learned?view=Binary. 11 Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, May 2006, available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf .

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reduced from ‘severe general’ to ‘substantial’ because MI5 and JTAC had little inkling that 7/7 was about to take place. The second challenge is to be able to recognise such intelligence when it is in the system and this can lead to a whole host of other questions: To what extent is ‘product’ shared between the different agencies? Do the different agencies complement each other or do the boundaries between them as separate organisations present an obstacle to sharing ‘product’? How quickly is intelligence converted into pre-emptive action? Does this depend on where the intelligence enters the system? The US Congressional Report into the role of intelligence prior to 9/11 stressed the failure to recognise the ‘collective significance’ of pieces of intelligence that were in the possession of the intelligence agencies. This second challenge, like the first, is not an easy task and goes to the heart as to why best practice for inter-agency cooperation is needed. The challenge of recognising intelligence when it is in the system may sound quite straight forward but the serious difficulty lies in the fact that there are so many different agencies that are involved in the collation and assessment of intelligence that it is quite conceivable that a piece of information that seems innocuous to a member of one agency might be significant to a member of another. In other words, as the US Congressional Report found, intelligence needs to be looked at collectively – the challenge is therefore to find some way of generating a collective appreciation of all the separate pieces of information that enter the system. In the case of the United Kingdom the culture of sharing intelligence was already in place before 9/11, primarily due to the decades long experience of dealing with the threat of Irish republican terrorism and loyalist terrorism (both in Northern Ireland and on the mainland). It is through this experience that the different agencies have been used to sharing information and that Special Branches have been able to work effectively with national coordination mechanisms. The nature of the threat from the Global Salafi Jihad is, however, qualitatively different. Its lack of structure and the international scale of the threat has presented a different kind of intelligence problem. In response to this threat the Police International Counter-Terrorism Unit (PICTU) was established to coordinate the activities of all the Special Branch units around the country so that the prospects for the early detection of any major attack are improved. Another significant development was the creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). This body was formed from secondees that came from a wide variety of agencies including MI5, MI6, GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters), the MoD (Ministry of Defence), PICTU, the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) and Transec (Transport Security). JTAC thus gave institutional form to cooperation and intelligence sharing between all of these agencies. Its remit is to provide: x long-term studies of international terrorism, for example, on the suicide bomber problem, x immediate assessments of current threats.12 The ISC stated that JTAC ‘has significantly improved the UK intelligence community’s ability to warn of terrorist attacks’. Another significant and positive development has been the decision to expand MI5 from its current staffing level of 2,000 to 3,000 by 2008 not least in order to deal with

12 Gregory, F., ‘An Assessment of the contribution of intelligence-led counter-terrorism to UK homeland security post 9-11 within the ‘contest’ strategy’.

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the demands that lowering the collation threshold places on it. The Secret Service is also developing regional offices to enhance cooperation with the police at local levels. Such is the international nature of the terrorist threat to the UK, either through perpetrators from abroad or those at home who see themselves as part of the Global Salafi Jihad, that it is absolutely vital to generate greater intelligence sharing at the international level. This is abundantly evident in the number of international links that operatives and radicals have (such as Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada). The UK intelligence agencies, for example, have a close working relationship with the US National Counter-terrorism Center (formerly Terrorist Threat Integration Center, or TTIC). European Union cooperation initiatives, such as the reinvigoration of Europol’s counter-terrorism task force after the Madrid bombings and the expansion of the Joint Situation Centre’s capacity to include a counter-terrorism unit, have also strived to break down the barriers that inhibit intelligence sharing and cooperation. Perhaps, to conclude, the following are areas of concern related to intelligence: 1. The question of resources – the cross party Intelligence and Security Committee noted that the MI5 team charged with investigating the lead bomber of the London attacks was diverted to another anti-terrorist operation and that the failure to investigate both was due to a lack of resources. It was this that prompted the expansion of MI5. Nevertheless, because surveillance is so resource intensive and because the collection threshold of intelligence has been lowered the issue of resources will require ongoing assessment. 2. There is a concern that, while MI5 will increase its personnel significantly, it will take time to vet and train up those that are being recruited. 3. The Intelligence and Security Committee noted, notwithstanding the history of Special Branch cooperation with national coordination mechanisms and the more recent formation of PICTU, that ‘more needs to be done to improve the way that the Security Service (MI5) and Special Branches come together in a combined and coherent way to tackle the ‘home-grown’ threat.’ It stated that: ‘the value of closer joint working between the Security Service and the police on a more local level is one of the key lessons to arise from the July attacks.’ 4. The problem of what used to be termed (when dealing with Irish republican terrorists) ‘clean skins’, i.e. those that do not have a ‘track record’ and therefore may elude any form of surveillance. 5. There continues to be a concern over the lack of language skills (specifically Arabic and Urdu) within the UK’s intelligence agencies in dealing with international terrorism. 6. The intelligence agencies must be (and must be seen to be) entirely apolitical and, after the controversy that followed the failure of the US and its allies to discover unconventional weapons in Iraq, it is highly damaging if there is any perception that the UK has policy driven intelligence rather than intelligence driven policy.

Public Information There has been something of a sea change in the way that MI5 is defining its relationship with the general public. It has sought to increase its engagement with the latter ‘to improve its public communications and contribute to the government’s policy of keeping the public informed about the national threat level.’ It has done this in a number of ways. JTAC (which reports to the Director General of MI5) has issued threat

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levels to the general public which can now be communicated via e-mail, recruitment drives have been carried out publicly and through the press, and the MI5 website includes a page that invites people to anonymously report suspicious activity. Public information in general (i.e. how and what is disseminated) is, of course, a key part of emergency preparedness. The ESRC research noted above argued that it is possible to better inform the general public in preparation for emergencies without causing unnecessary anxiety or panic. It recommended the following: x that the government place more emphasis on a national education programme to enhance the public’s knowledge of the types of threat that we face. We believe that the public can be better prepared psychologically for a major terrorist attack without causing panic. Indeed, in relation to the level of threat, the ISC report argued that after the July attacks there is ‘an even greater need for members of the public to be better informed.’13 x that the government endeavours to centralise the source and provision of information to limit the confusion that might arise from information being disseminated from multiple sources (i.e. Home Office, MI5, Health Protection Agency and so on). x that the government assesses the impact of public information dissemination at the time of an incident on: public order, the transport network and the emergency response.

Impact on Society Suicide terrorism perhaps has a greater psychological impact than other acts of terrorism for two reasons. Firstly, the suicide bomber is the perfect targeting machine where he or she is able to detonate his or her device at the exact time and place of choosing. Thus, as studies have shown,14 it is a more lethal method that is able to reap maximum casualties. Secondly, the fact that individuals are willing, and indeed even eager, to sacrifice themselves in such a way is even more shocking and seemingly inexplicable than those acts where terrorists are able to escape. It sends a very different message – that the perpetrators are so determined to ‘address’ their grievances and fight for their cause that they are actually willing to kill themselves in the process. The July 7th bombers managed to kill 52 London commuters and injured hundreds more. Their impact did not end there, however. As noted above, 3,000 were estimated to have suffered (or are suffering) post-traumatic stress disorder. The UK Health Protection Agency found from follow up questionnaires that were completed by 158 survivors that, apart from hearing difficulties, survivors were suffering from psychological effects and that 80% had experienced ‘emotional upset’.15 In relation to the wider public, reports suggest that, despite the subsequent drop in the numbers using the tube and buses and the drop in the number of tourists visiting the capital in the following weeks, normality was restored by September. 16 It was such

13

ISC report, p. 42. Pedahzur, pp. 8 and 236. 15 See HPA website: http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpa/news/articles/press_releases/2006/061130_londonbombing.htm. 16 Jonathan Freedland, ‘How London carried on’, Guardian Newsunlimited, July 7th 2006. 14

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‘Blitz spirit’ from the 2nd World War and indeed the IRA’s bombing campaigns that is said to have accounted for this stoicism and resilience. Relations between communities within the UK was always going to be a concern in the aftermath of the July attacks. Yet, the impact here appears to have been minimal. According to the ‘The Impact of the July 7 London Bomb Attacks on Muslim Communities in the EU’ (November 2005) report, commissioned by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the number of reported incidents against members of the Muslim community and their places of worship in the UK increased almost immediately after the attacks (from 15 in the week before the attacks to 68 and 92 in each of the weeks afterwards). However, the level of these incidents soon returned to normal (to 20 by October 10th).17 Moreover, the report found that there was no significant increase in incidents against the Muslim communities in most EU states during the reporting period.

The July 2005 Attacks – the Motivation? Suicide in the name of some political cause is not new. Silke takes us back to 44 years B.C. and the example of Cato’s suicide to deny Julius Caesar’s power to keep him alive, and the biblical story of Samson taking the lives of Philistines along with his own.18 More lately, the well documented kamikaze pilots were employed by the Japanese airforce in World War II to inflict maximum damage against enemy targets. The human body has also been used as a political weapon in the form of hunger strikes, perhaps most notably in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s when ten Irish republican prisoners died in protest against their criminal status. Suicide as a ‘terrorist’ tactic is also not a new phenomenon. Pedhazur in his book on the topic notes that such a tactic was used by the Assassins between the 11th and 13th centuries while later on in the late 19th century members of Muslim tribes in the Phillipines also sacrificed themselves in protest against Spanish rule and Christian expansion. 19 In the contemporary world perhaps the single event that heralded the introduction of ‘modern’ suicide terrorism was Hezbullah’s truck attack on a US marine base in Beirut that killed 241 American servicemen. The LTTE, Hamas, and the PKK have all since used suicide terrorism. Its most devastating manifestation, however, was in the attacks on 9/11 carried out by Al Qaeda. This was followed not just by the suicide attacks in Bali but also the multiple suicide assault on London in July 2005. What was it that led the four young British men to carry out such devastating acts and to take their own lives in the process? What is it that prompts individuals to become suicide terrorists in general? It is these questions that need to be tackled in order to best inform how one responds to such brutal attacks. To go back one step further, what is it that prompts one to follow the path of terrorism (as opposed to suicide terrorism)? There has been much debate on the issue as to ‘what makes a terrorist’. Perhaps it is easy to make the assumption that terrorists must be mentally deranged in some way in order to carry out the attacks that they do.

17

‘Response to London attack praised’, BBC. Silke, A., ‘The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2006, Volume 18, No. 1, pp. 36-40. 19 Pedahzur, A., Suicide Terrorism, Polity, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 9-10. 18

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In fact, many psychologists argue that terrorists in the main are not psychologically imbalanced but are actually as ‘normal’ as the rest of us. Nor does it appear to be the case that suicide terrorists are unhinged beings that are exploited and brainwashed by groups to further their political ends. 20 Silke argues against the idea that brainwashing takes place and states that ‘potential bombers have nearly always had at least one relative or close friend who has been killed, maimed or abused at the hands of enemies. These individuals join the various terrorist groups in an angry and vengeful frame of mind and already possess the intention of taking part in a suicide action. The groups do not coerce them into it.’ 21 Indeed, in societies where a ‘culture of martyrdom’ exists perhaps it is not seen as such an unusual thing. At an international summit of experts on terrorism held in Madrid in March 2005 it was argued that: “Suicide terrorism is a function of a culture of martyrdom, the organizational decision to employ this tactic, and a supply of recruits willing to give their lives in a ‘martyrdom operation’. Social psychological forces are particularly important, leading some scholars – with particular reference to Palestinian suicide terrorism – to speak of the ‘suicide terrorist production line’. The elements of this ‘production line’ include the establishment of a social contract, the identification of the ‘living martyr’ (which accrues great prestige within the community), and – in the culminating phase – the production of the final video. After one has passed through these phases, to back away from the final act of martyrdom would bring unbearable shame and humiliation. Similar but fuzzier phases may occur for other groups as well. Thus, as with terrorism psychology in general, suicide terrorism is very much a function of group and collective psychology, not individual psychopathology” (http://english.safe-democracy.org/causes/). Thus, while there are clearly those that choose to become suicide bombers, it is fair to suggest that there are also ‘collective psychological’ and organisational processes that take place as well. In addition to this, it is argued that there are some environments where different groups vie for the support and loyalty from the same constituency and so suicide bombing is undertaken to ‘outbid’ rivals in a group’s attempts to court this support (Bloom). Doubtless once the suicide bomber has passed the point of no return he or she, perhaps willingly, is subjected to the reaffirmation of the justness of the cause and the religious sanctity of what they are about to do. The extent to which the worldview of the group has been both implanted and sustained by the individual themselves (through his or her experience), or conversely reinforced by the organisation, varies. In general, trying to understand suicide attacks as the result of strategic considerations at the group level might indeed be useful, particularly when studying, for example, the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey and Hamas, Hezbullah and the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in the Middle East. But what of Al Qaeda and the Global Salafi Jihad where the notion of the existence of a ‘group’ as the perpetrator, and also therefore the idea that group influence is a significant factor, is harder to determine? What of those suicide bombers that appear to have acted relatively autonomously without the group dynamics of organisations like Hamas? Were there any organisational or group influences in the case of the London bombers? To reiterate, if we are to truly understand how to respond most effectively to 20 21

Pedahzur, pp. 121-2. Silke, A., (citing Kushner), ‘The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism’, p. 97.

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the threat of the suicide terrorism perpetrated on July 2005 (and therefore to the threat of Al Qaeda and the Global Salafi Jihad more broadly) then we must understand how and why it happened. This is not least because these attacks were certainly not ‘oneoffs’. A further simultaneous attack was attempted just two weeks later. Indeed, the Director General of MI5 (in November 2006) warned of a serious and growing threat that will last a generation, with currently 30 terrorist plots and 1,600 individuals under surveillance. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the July 7th bombers were influenced, indoctrinated or manipulated by others. The threat from those purporting to be fighting and dying in the name of the Global Salafi Jihad is decentralised and dispersed, ranging from established groups (such as Jemaah Islamiyya) to cells acting autonomously although they are part of the same movement and inspired by the same ideology. Unlike the examples (noted above) in the Middle East where a factor in recruitment appears to be the personal suffering and grievance of those willing to volunteer for a suicide mission, coupled with a ‘supportive’ societal environment, the London bombers did not appear to have suffered such personal loss, nor were they immersed in a society that encouraged and glorified suicide bombing. Neither were they foreigners who had suffered immeasurable personal loss in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq who had come to seek revenge on the UK. We might therefore speculate that these recruits might actually have undergone a greater level of indoctrination in order to make up for these apparent lack of ‘individual’ and personal motivations. Indeed, while much of the threat, if not most of it, from the Global Salafi Jihad cannot be characterised as coming from ‘groups’, it does appear likely that the July bombers had links with, and were heavily influenced by, others in a ‘network’. Arquilla and Ronfeldt cite three types of network: the chain with separated contacts and end to end communication, the hub where outside actors are tied to a central (but apparently not hierarchical) node and the all-channel type which is described as a full matrix network.22

Figure 1. Diagrams of different types of network (from Arquilla and Ronfeldt)

In a later work the two authors state that the way that Al Qaeda has adapted has borne out one of their hypotheses – ‘that it would evolve away from a mainly hub-andspokes design centred on Osama bin Laden into a more distributed design characterized

22 Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror of Terror, Crime and Militancy, RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 7. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/index.html.

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by dispersed small zones of all-channel connectivity linked loosely by chains.’23 This model would not be complete without also emphasising what in sum amounts to ‘netwar’ where these forms of organisation (and their strategies and technologies) are attuned to the information age.24 Aside from the virtual realm, friendships, personal ties and introductions in the ‘real’ world appear to be how these networks develop. Also, in an annex to the government report into the July 7 bombings it talks of mentors who may identify individuals susceptible to radicalisation who can then be ‘groomed’.25 Such networks are not restricted by national boundaries. The House of Commons report into the bombings confirmed that two of the bombers, Sidique Khan and Shezad Tanweer, had visited Pakistan from 19 November 2004 to 8 February 2005, and it stated that ‘it seems likely that they had some contact with Al Qaida figures’ and that ‘it is possible that Khan made his martyrdom video during this visit.’ The report goes on to confirm that suspicious contacts were made between the four men and one or more individuals in Pakistan from April up to the bombings. Al Qaeda, through al Zawahiri, claimed responsibility for the attacks though its involvement is difficult to verify and rumours abound as to who the bombers may have been in contact with both at home and abroad. The other factor to consider is the notion of the global umma and the importance that radicals place on defending their ‘brothers and sisters’ in the face of their ‘oppression’ from the West wherever they may be and this in itself may serve as a powerful motivating factor. Added to this is the emergence of the new satellite TV media and the enormous growth and accessibility of the internet where radicals, through generating online communities and conscience, can feel more deeply attached to, and part of, their umma. This enhanced intimacy with one’s global community in the virtual realm may be another underpinning factor that has prompted suicide attacks (and attempted attacks) in the UK as acts of revenge. Speaking of would-be members of terrorist groups Silke observed that: “Importantly, one does not need to experience unjust events first-hand in order to feel sufficiently motivated to become a terrorist. For example, many terrorists report that they first joined the organisation after witnessing events on television. They did not come from the area where the events occurred, nor did they know the people who lived there, but at some level they identified with the victims.”26 This refers to terrorists in general and not necessarily suicide terrorists – who, as noted above, are often willing suicide bombers because of the personal loss and grievance they have suffered. But in the case of the July 7th bombers a further factor appeared to come into play and this is often overlooked – that is the intense desire for martyrdom. In addition to what some have termed the ‘push’ factors it appears that a powerful ‘pull’ factor is the bombers’ apparently sincere belief that God wants them to carry out their attacks, that it is their religious duty and that, as a reward for their sacrifice, they will go to paradise. Hence they apparently appeared ‘happy, even euphoric’ at 8.30am when they were seen at Kings Cross station. The bombers didn’t just feel ‘pushed’ into doing this on behalf of their ‘community’. They wanted to do it,

23 Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D., ‘Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues’, in Bunker, R., Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, Routledge, 2005, p. 9. 24 Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D., ‘Netwar Revisited: The Fight for the Future Continues’, in Bunker, R., Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, Routledge, 2005, p. 8. 25 Government report into July 7 bombings, p. 31. 26 Silke, pp. 43-4.

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and here again one can only speculate as to the degree of indoctrination that may have been behind this. The debate over the extent that the London bombers were indoctrinated might provide some insight as to how and why the attacks took place. But a broader question needs to be addressed: regardless of the indoctrination versus self motivation discussion, what is it that has motivated these young men and many others to have become either angry enough to act relatively autonomously or to have become so susceptible to indoctrination? For it now seems clear that hundreds of British born individuals appear to be willing to commit serious harm to the UK and its citizens.

The Response to Radicalisation Within The British government, through its ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’ document (2006) stressed the importance of countering radicalism within the UK. It placed firm emphasis on tackling ‘disadvantage’ and ‘inequalities’, and improving Muslim educational performance, employment opportunities, and housing conditions. It also stressed the need for increasing community cohesion and strengthening community integration. There are two points for consideration here: first, there appears to be an optimistic assumption that tackling longstanding structural issues to do with equality, integration and societal cohesion, that have existed a long time before any such home-grown threat materialised, will help to resolve the terrorist problem. The second is that, while it is of course sensible to engage with the Muslim community to tackle extremism, the implicit assumption is that the solution to the terrorist threat now faced in the UK primarily lies within our shores and, more specifically, within the Muslim community. The polite inference is that the Muslim community (with the ‘help’ of the government) needs to get its house in order, while there is very little acknowledgement of the foreign policy sphere as being a major source of the problem. In other words, because any unpalatable admission that Iraq has stoked the fires of terrorism both at home and abroad may be too much for a government already dogged by the Iraq episode to make, there appears to have been a conscious effort to internalise the sources of radicalisation. Where does one find evidence of the impact of the international environment on the terrorist threat in the UK? One need look no further than the recruitment strategy of Al Qaeda itself. The messages that are being disseminated are not covert or secret. The enormous scope for the dissemination of Al Qaeda’s doctrine and propaganda that the internet and the mass media have provided has meant that its strategies for motivating others to join the jihad are transparent, public and accessible. In the propaganda videos and audios of Al Qaeda ideologues and suicide bombers the message is clear – it is precisely the foreign policies of the US and the UK that the organisation focuses on as the means to boost recruitment internationally. Al Qaeda has attempted to exploit the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and has framed them as Western assaults on the global Muslim community as a whole. The videotapes of suicide bombers, such as those of two of the London bombers of July 7th 2005, have also emphasised US and UK ‘attacks’ on ‘our Muslim brothers abroad’ as being the primary motivation for carrying out their bombings. It is, of course, difficult to assess the degree that these international ‘causes’ of Muslim ‘suffering’ are seen as genuine grievances rather than used as propaganda in a

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broader ideological struggle. The fundamental point, however, is that issues in the international realm are being exploited in order to perpetrate attacks in the UK. There are now many citizens in the UK (as noted above, said to number around 1,600) who are now willing and aiming to facilitate or directly carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks in Britain.

Conclusion The July 7th attacks were the first simultaneous suicide terrorist attacks ever to hit the United Kingdom. They did not, however, come as a complete surprise. The 9/11 attacks and the Madrid bombings served notice to the British that it was just a question of time before the UK too would be subjected to a simultaneous terrorist attack. As a result much progress has been made in recent years in the UK’s emergency preparedness and its ability to pre-empt terrorist attacks through, for example, the Civil Contingencies legislation and the formation of JTAC respectively. There are, however, as described above, many hurdles to be overcome. But another key part of counter-terrorism strategy, and arguably the most important, is to demotivate – to reverse the motivation and recruitment potential of those 1,600 or so individuals that MI5 referred to and, equally importantly, to prevent the radicalisation of many more. The above has argued that the British government has been reluctant to acknowledge the impact that the international realm and some foreign policies have had on domestic radicalisation in the UK. This may be partly why it is looking ‘within’ for solutions to the problem of radicalisation, through the emphasis on integration, societal cohesion and equality. As laudable as these aspirations appear to be, one should not deceive oneself into believing that these initiatives will solve the problem of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. The problems of societal cohesion and lack of integration of minority communities into mainstream society have been with us for decades – a long time before any serious threat of terrorism emerged from within the UK’s Muslim community. If the government is to engage with the Muslim community in its response to terrorism then an acknowledgement of the impact of UK foreign policy on domestic radicalisation would at least better inform that engagement.

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Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Role of Intelligence in Combating Suicide Terrorism: Sharing Intelligence amongst States Dr Ely KARMON Senior Research Scholar, ICT and IPS, Israel

Abstract. International cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including suicide terrorism, is a sine qua non, and various international structures exist in which the cooperation can take place. Suicide terrorism has become a main strategy, not only of Islamist terrorist organizations, but of secular or nationalist organizations like the Tamil LTTE or the Kurdish PKK. The question is what differentiates or characterizes cooperation against suicide terrorism from cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence services in all other fields of terrorism. This paper will try to prove that, because suicide terrorism is a strategic weapon which can produce tremendous human losses and psychological and political consequences, the need to counter it becomes an imperative in the international cooperation between law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and the military. This cooperation includes the fields of legal measures, continuing monitoring and neutralization of the operational infrastructure used by organizers of suicide operations (recruitment, training, targeting, financing), the need to develop educational tools to prevent the proliferation of the concept of istishhad (martyrdom), the exchange of information about counter-terrorist methods and technologies developed by the individual agencies or by academic and private entities. Keywords. Suicide terrorism, counter-terrorism, international cooperation, intelligence

It is an axiom today to claim that intelligence is one the most important prerequisites for the success in the fight against terrorism and that international cooperation is sine qua non in this fight. Suicide terrorism has become one of the main strategies to advance political goals, not only by Islamist terrorist organizations but, through what is known as the “copycat phenomenon,” also by secular or nationalist organizations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka or the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. It is therefore only natural that international cooperation in the fight against terrorism includes also the field of suicide operations and attacks. The question is what differentiates or characterizes the cooperation against suicide terrorism from cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence services in all other fields of terrorism.

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Many practitioners and analysts have stressed the difficulties in the field of cooperation between intelligence agencies, including by the way the cooperation between law enforcement, intelligence and military agencies of the same country. It is known also that until lately the intelligence services have preferred bi-lateral intelligence cooperation and were distrustful as regards multi-lateral forums. As suicide terrorism became a strategic weapon which can produce tremendous human losses and psychological and political consequences, the need to counter it became an imperative in the international cooperation between law enforcement, intelligence services and the military on a permanent basis but with the ultimate goal of acting operationally in order to prevent the attacks, in real time if necessary. But if exchange of intelligence and operational cooperation is a difficult and politically sensitive task even in the case of countries which have a long history of collaboration, how can the cooperation in the specific field of suicide terrorism succeed if there is no previous understanding, knowledge and minimum intimacy in the intelligence relationships? Therefore it must be obvious that bi-lateral and multilateral cooperation to prevent and foil suicide attacks is the last stage in intelligence cooperation and cannot be achieved without previous experience in the common fight against terrorist organizations. This cooperation should include the fields of juridical and legal measures, continuing monitoring and neutralization of the large operational infrastructure used by organizers of suicide operations (recruitment, training, targeting, financing), the need to develop educational and propaganda tools to prevent the proliferation of the concept of istishhad (martyrdom), the exchange of information about counter-terrorist methods and technologies developed by the individual agencies or by academic and private entities, which are today very active in research and investigations in the field of terrorism.

The Infrastructure of Suicide Terrorism In the 1980s suicide terrorism was witnessed in Lebanon, Kuwait and Sri Lanka. In the 1990s it had spread to Israel, India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey, Tanzania and Kenya. With enhanced migration of terrorist groups from conflict-ridden countries, the formation of extensive international terrorist infrastructures and the increased reach of terrorist groups in the post-Cold War period, suicide terrorism was likely to affect Western Europe and North America. All the suicide terrorist groups have support infrastructures in Europe and in North America. Leaders and members of these groups are known to travel to the West, and key activists live either in Europe or in North America distributing propaganda, raising funds, and in some instances procuring weapons and shipping them to the various theatres of conflict. Terrorist groups learn from one another and unlike in the 1970s and the 1980s, postCold War groups share resources intelligence, technology, expertise and personnel. Already before the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States, analysts understood that “the Achilles’ heel of suicide terrorists is that they are part of a large, operational infrastructure.” They called for a counterterrorism effort for the formation of effective networks of informers, the constant monitoring of potential collaborators, and close cooperation among international intelligence services. It was then obvious that ongoing political instability in the Middle East, Russia, and South

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Asia – including Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and possibly India and Pakistan – made these regions high-risk areas, with irregular suicide bombings occasionally extending to other parts of the globe. But some were over-optimistic in believing that “the growing cooperation among intelligence services worldwide gives credence to the hope that in the future only desperate organizations of losers will try to use this tactic on a systematic basis.” 1 What actually happened was an expanding wave of suicide terrorism to most of these areas on a level never known before, as proved by the 9/11 attacks. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command Handbook on Suicide Bombing published in August 2005 presented the complex process of planning suicide operations. The success of suicide operations is dependent on a number of elements, including secrecy, thorough planning and reconnaissance, and good rehearsals. According to the Handbook, there are some basic steps that suicide operations must go through to ensure success:2 x Target selection, dependent on a number of factors, including the overall objectives and sophistication of the terrorist group. x Intelligence gathering and reconnaissance of the target, one of the most important factors in the success of suicide attacks. Planning for the attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi for instance took nearly five years and testimony at the trial of terrorists involved in the bombing stated that Bin Laden studied surveillance photographs of the embassy compound and chose the spot to position the truck bomb. The videos of the World Trade Center towers, as of other potential targets in New York, were shot already in 1997 by a member of the Spanish al-Qaeda cell. x Recruitment is still required to ensure there are sufficient suicide assets available to conduct these types of attacks, although many terrorists volunteer for suicide missions. x Training varies by terrorist group and normally includes both physical and spiritual training and may last anywhere from a few days to several months. For Tamil Tigers, there is an arduous six-month training course. At the end of the training, he/she will swear an oath of personal loyalty to the leader of the LTTE and place a capsule of cyanide around his/her neck to use in case of capture. In the case of some Islamist terrorists, they often undergo religious indoctrination by charismatic clergy who bring them to an ecstatic state and stress that their sacrifice is in the name of jihad. x Rehearsals are conducted to improve the odds of success, and to test security reactions to particular attack profiles. x Preparation of explosives. In the case of the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London the explosive expert was not identified and arrested while it is possible that the second July 24 attempt for a similar attack failed because of the absence of such an expert. x Transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Michael Taarnby identified on the European arena a category of Islamist potential suicide bombers he called “the uprooted terrorists” who represent a formidable challenge to the intelligence community. Taarnby observed that a significant component originated from the Middle East, and the other large group includes either 1 2

Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/ October 2000. Suicide Bombing in the COE, DCSINT Handbook, No. 1.03 at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA439887.

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European citizens or those who had lived part of their life in Europe. They are extremely dedicated and single-minded in the pursuit of their goals. He claimed that seized documents have also revealed a profound interest in weapons of mass destruction, and should they acquire the means to launch a terrorist attacks with WMD they will with almost certainty do so.3 The growing number of converts to Islam could become a kind of fifth column in the Western liberal society. A brief overview of the perpetrators is presented here:4 December 25, 2000: Mohammed Bilal. British citizen of Pakistani origin from Birmingham, UK. Carried out a carbomb attack on the 15th Indian Army Corps headquarters in Srinagar, India. September 9, 2001: Dahman Abdel-Sattar and Burawi al-Wahir. North African immigrants residing in Brussels, Belgium. Conducted the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. September 11, 2001: Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehi. Students from Egypt, Lebanon and UAE residing in Hamburg, Germany. Hijackers and suicide pilots of the September 11 attacks. September 13, 2001: Nizar Trablesi. Immigrant from Tunisia who lived in Germany and Belgium. Arrested and subsequently convicted in Belgium for plotting a suicide attack against U.S. forces in Belgium. Initial reports stated the intended target was the U.S. embassy in Paris. December 22, 2001: Richard Reid, British citizen who converted to Islam, was arrested and later convicted after a bomb concealed in his shoe failed to detonate on board a commercial airliner. April 11, 2002: Nizar Hawar, a Tunisian who resided in France, bombed the synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba. April 30, 2003: Omar Khan Sharif and Asif Mohammed Hanif, British citizens from Derby and London, bombed a nightclub in Tel Aviv. Taarnby concluded that a suicide operation in Europe appears inevitable, because they have already attempted to do so but were fortunately stopped in the planning stage. This pessimistic perspective was shared by senior intelligence professionals from Britain and Germany. In the view of the British government “if Al Qaeda could mount an attack upon key economic targets, or upon our transport infrastructure, they would … If they could inflict damage upon the health of our population, they would.” This evaluation materialized in March 2004 in Madrid and July 2005 in London.

Challenges and Possible Solutions Practitioners like Frank Anderson, former head of the CIA Near East Division, stressed the remarkable challenges that cooperation on suicide terrorism poses to any nation’s foreign intelligence service. He observed that U.S. intelligence presence abroad, and the foreign presence of the intelligence services of other nations, is (despite some popular perceptions) relatively small while the information and resources required to deal with terrorism, on the other hand, can only be obtained by much larger forces.

3 Michael Taarnby, “Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists,” A Research Report for the Danish Ministry of Justice, 27 November, 2003. 4 Ibid.

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To deal effectively with the challenge of terrorist organizations “requires deep integration into the societies from which the terrorists arise and is, almost always, simply impossible for a foreign intelligence service, however efficient it might be.” Police and internal security organizations of most nations, on the other hand, lack the ability to collect, analyze and disseminate vast amounts of data which are routinely gathered and handled by the complex and sometimes highly technical, intelligence organizations of the major powers, which can provide financial and other resources that are unavailable to the smaller, relatively less well-funded, but otherwise highly skilled and effective security organizations of smaller countries. So, he concluded, “with infrequent exceptions, effective work against terrorist organizations requires the involvement of the police or internal security organizations of two or more governments, working in conjunction with their own external intelligence organizations and those of other countries.”5 Combinations of nations, which are unable or unwilling to cooperate openly on most or all issues, nevertheless have a strong interest to cooperate on the issue of terrorism. That makes counter-terrorism an issue on which intelligence organizations, by their nature, can provide by opening sensitive and complex lines of communication and cooperation between countries which are otherwise enemies.6 Richard Dearlove, the former Head of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), stated that the lack of defined structure and organization on the part of contemporary terrorist groups poses significant new intelligence collection challenges to intelligence and law enforcement organizations. As contemporary terrorists groups do not have hierarchical structures, intelligence collection efforts have to be recast in order to more closely mirror the groups they are working against. “The distinction between what constitutes domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence is increasingly blurred to the point where the boundaries themselves are almost irrelevant from a collection and operational point of view. For transnational terrorists such as the jihadists, international borders are irrelevant and do not affect their political or operational views. As such, the intelligence collection and analysis efforts against them need to be able to work in the same manner.”7 According to Scott Atran, “It may take a broad and elastic web of the diverse talent, tolerance, and spare conformity of our democracies, unbound from any nation’s hegemony, calls to ruthlessness, or rigid rules of hierarchy, to snare the virtual hand of born-again jihad that guides suicide missions. Informal bonds may need to grow among diverse experts with idiosyncratic personal skills and the operational branches fighting terrorism, so that a phone call from an expert or operator in one country to another country can trigger specific responses without plodding through official channels – much the way globally networked jihadis now operate. This would help to convert fairly static responses into a dynamic system that would throw open the flow of information that would allow the intelligence and military communities’ technological

5 Frank Anderson, “International Terrorism and International Cooperation,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism, ICT website, at http://www.ict.org.il/var/119/51563-Countering%20Suicide%20Terrorism.pdf. 6 Ibid. 7 Richard Dearlove and Tom Quiggin, “Contemporary Terrorism And Intelligence,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, June 14, 2006, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16521.

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advantages to keep ahead of jihadi innovations without being mired in existing or reformed bureaucracies.”8 The Sri Lankan terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna remarked that due to the need to preserve counter-technologies or political rivalry, there is either a lack of co-operation or no co-operation at all between affected countries. For instance, the British did not share counter remote-control bomb technologies against the Provisional IRA (PIRA) with their US counterparts due to suspicion of access or infiltration of the US military and security industries by PIRA activists and supporters. Similarly, there is no cooperation between Israel and Sri Lanka, the most affected countries. Indian pressure, and subsequently, the Sri Lankan Muslim lobby led to a rupture of Israeli–Sri Lankan ties that included Israeli technical co-operation in training Sri Lankan bomb technicians. An example of how a lack of co-operation between the VIP security divisions of India and Sri Lanka affected security was the failure of the Sri Lankan Presidential Security Division to estimate the kill radius of the suicide device. In India, over 18m is maintained between the political VIP and the public. The distance between the LTTE female suicide bomber and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge, who was partially blinded by an explosion in December 1999, was less than 12m.9 The Israeli expert Ariel Merari, analyzing Israel’s problems, stresses intelligence as the most important factor for thwarting suicide attacks. He also includes the need to control the territory; the need of language capabilities; the need of inter-agency coordination and the need of headquarters-field coordination.10 The Indian analyst B. Raman calls for a “revolution in the intelligence culture” and also calls for the effective networking of national and foreign intelligence agencies and the sharing without inhibition of all relevant intelligence: “The intelligence and counter-terrorism networking has to be as effective as the networking by the terrorists. Such networking was found difficult even in days when the number of intelligence agencies in each nation was small and manageable. How to ensure this in an era of mushrooming agencies is another question which needs urgent attention.” He remarks that there has been some progress toward international intelligence cooperation at the bilateral level, but the “progress toward multilateral cooperation is still years away.” He claims that since “the US is and will continue to be a predominant player in all intelligence cooperation networks, suspicions of its real intentions and fears of its using such networks for serving its hegemonistic and strategic interests would continue to dog any progress towards multilateral cooperation.”11

Existing International Cooperation Frameworks The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) The OSCE, the world’s largest regional security organization, whose 56 participating States span the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, decided to give 8 Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, at http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf. 9 Rohan Gunaratna, “Suicide terrorism: a global threat,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 20, 2000. 10 Ariel Merari, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism,” Suicide Terrorism. Conference Office of Justice Programs Building, Washington, DC, October 25-26, 2004. 11 B Raman, “New jihadis, new threats,” Asia Times, March 23, 2005, at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GC23Ak01.html.

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special attention to the fight against suicide terrorism after such attacks targeted at least ten OSCE participating States and Partners. As part of measures to address this threat, the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU), in partnership with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), organized the world’s first large-scale international workshop on suicide terrorism, which was held in Vienna on 20 May 2005. The workshop, funded with the generous donor support of the United States, brought together representatives from eight international organizations including the UN and Interpol, along with 160 representatives from 60 countries, a third sending experts from their capitals. Importantly, in the resolution on terrorism by suicide bombers taken at its 14th Annual Session in Washington on 5 July 2005, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly welcomed the proactive approach taken by the ATU in addressing this threat (see in annex the OSCE PA Resolution on terrorism by suicide bombers).12 European Cooperation with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism Europe’s abhorrence of terrorism was strengthened by the horror of the train bombs in Madrid, the repeated suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, the series of attacks in Turkey, and the tragic Beslan events in Russia. The global threat requires a global strategy and a global response and according to William P. Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, this is exactly what the U.S. is seeking to do, both bilaterally with its partners, and by aggressively mobilizing the United Nations and other international organizations to fight terrorism in every corner of the globe. In that effort, Europeans have been among US’s closest and most reliable partners: Cooperation has been forthcoming, and rapid response to immediate threats the norm.13 Since the Madrid bombings, EU members have agreed to reinforce operational cooperation, improve the effectiveness of border information systems, and bolster technical assistance to third countries. They have also named an EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, whose job is to monitor and encourage implementation of EU agreements on enhancing counterterrorism capabilities. European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that have made contributions in counterterrorist efforts, including the G-8, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The capabilities of the Western European partners have successfully forestalled numerous incipient mass casualty attacks since 9/11, including some on U.S. facilities in Europe. However, U.S. officials have complained that efforts to combat the threat in Europe “are sometimes complicated by the fact that some countries have legal impediments to taking firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, often stemming from asylum laws that afford loopholes, inadequate CT legislation, or standards of evidence that lack flexibility in permitting law enforcement authorities to rely on classified-source information in holding terrorist suspects. Ease of travel within Schengen visa countries also makes Western Europe attractive to terrorists.” Differing 12

OSCE, Combating suicide terrorism, Secretariat – Action against Terrorism Unit, at: http://www.osce.org/atu/ 17768.html. 13 William P. Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, Washington, DC, September 14, 2004.

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perspectives on the dividing line between legitimate political or charitable activity and support for terrorist groups similarly clouds the picture. For example, the EU as a whole has been reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities linked to Hamas and Hizballah, even though these groups repeatedly engage in deadly terrorist attacks, and the “charitable” activities help draw recruits. EU, US, Russia to Improve Co-operation against Terrorism The European Union, United States and Russia had a meeting in April 2007 and agreed on ways of increasing co-operation to combat terrorism. Their plans include combating “the recruitment of younger generations” by terrorist groups and making Interpol more efficient in tracking people who use false identities. They agreed that the “worst nightmare” the countries could imagine was a nuclear attack by terrorists. They had discussed ways of ensuring that radicals did not obtain the material to make so-called dirty bombs. The officials said they agreed that the opium trade in Afghanistan was financing international terrorism and that more needed to be done to root it out. The meeting was followed by the start of a two-day meeting of interior and justice ministers from the United States, Germany and Portugal – the current and future EU presidents. Central Asia It should be noted that in March and April 2004, suicide bombers attacked a popular bazaar and other locations in Uzbekistan resulting in the death of more than a dozen police officers and innocent bystanders. A further round of bombings in July outside the US and Israeli Embassies and the Uzbekistani General Prosecutor’s Office resulted in the death of four Uzbekistani security officers. The intelligence cooperation in Central Asia was enhanced by the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), born as a border agreement among former Soviet republics and China in June 2001 and comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. One of the major aims of the SCO was to improve the regional response to the rise of Islamic militancy, including China, where the mainly Muslim Uighur minority has become increasingly active in the northeastern Xinjiang Province. Since then, the organization has admitted India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers. The November 2005 meeting of the heads of all the governments of the SCO, plus a delegation from the observer states, signaled a major new development in Eurasian politics. The maturing of the SCO into a grouping akin to a geopolitical bloc has even been hailed as the “NATO of the East” by some observers and policymakers.14 Cooperation in this area takes the form of intelligence exchanges, police cooperation, training of police, training of military forces, and the design of military operations targeting terrorist activities. Intelligence services have closely monitored the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, two groups seeking to overthrow existing Central Asian governments and establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. Member states have conducted two major anti-terrorist exercises, created a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), and signed the “Shanghai Convention on Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism”. The RATS, 14 Yevgeny Bendersky, “Intelligence Brief: Russia In The SCO,” Eurasia Insight, November 5, 2005, at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp110705.shtml.

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governed by a council of permanent representatives headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan is responsible for sharing intelligence on “terrorist, extremist, and separatist” groups and coordinating action against them. Given that the SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight by China and Russia to the United States, Washington stands little chance of ever receiving full membership in the group. Indeed, the United States’ 2005 application to join the SCO was rejected.15 According to an US expert, “the security goals of Russia and the SCO do not fully overlap and Russia itself would be very uncomfortable with intelligence sharing between the Central Asian states and Beijing, if all the SCO members were to share intelligence.” According to this evaluation “some limited intelligence sharing goes on, but not the kind of intelligence sharing that goes on between Russia and the Central Asian states.”16 India – Pakistan From the Indian perspective, political factors come into play in respect of the other components. Pakistan, which uses terrorism as a weapon against India to annex Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), has never co-operated in the past in any of these fields. It remains to be seen whether the Joint Indo-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Mechanism, which had its first meeting in Islamabad on March 6 and 7, 2007, brings about a change in Pakistan’s policy. B. Raman criticizes the Western countries which were not prepared to co-operate with India even though large-scale terrorism broke out in J&K in 1989. They looked upon Kashmir as a disputed territory and were not prepared to characterize what was happening in J&K as terrorism. They started co-operating with India only after the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (now called the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) kidnapped some Western tourists, including an American, in J&K under the name Al Faran in 1995. Raman complains that “the old clichés that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter and one nation’s state-sponsor of terrorism is another nation’s frontline ally against terrorism continues to influence the counter-terrorism co-operation policies of not only the West, but also of many countries in Asia.”17 After 9/11 there has been a mushrooming of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in the form of military-to-military counter-terrorism co-operation, container security initiative, proliferation security initiative, port security, joint or coordinated naval patrolling of the Malacca Straits, joint military and naval exercises, joint cyber security fora, strengthening the physical security of nuclear establishments etc. Raman claims that as there have been hardly one or two acts of jihadi terrorism mounted against the US from Indian territory – the Al Faran kidnapping and the terrorist attack on the security guards of the US Consulate in Calcutta after 9/11 – practically all the post-1992 jihadi terrorist strikes against US nationals and interests had been planned and mounted from Pakistani-Afghan territory. Therefore, there is a 15 Ariel Cohen, “What to do about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Rising Influence,” Eurasia Insight, September 21, 2006, at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106_pr.shtml 16 Testimony of Martha Brill Olcott before US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe as cited in Heather Maher, “Central Asia: US Helsinki Commission Concerned about SCO’s Influence,” Eurasia Insight, January 10, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ pp100106.shtml. 17 B. Raman, “Counter-Terrorism Co-Operation,” International Terrorism Monitor Paper, No. 213, at April, 5, 2007, http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers22%5Cpaper2196.html.

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conflict of interests between the USA’s counter-terrorism policy requirements vis-à-vis Islamabad and those vis-à-vis New Delhi, the requirements relating to Pakistan would have primacy and would receive priority over those relating to India. Political factors will continue to influence the pace and adequacy of the co-operation. Turkey’s Strained Cooperation with the US and EU Concerning the Threat from PKK The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has caused more casualties and injuries than any other terrorist group in Turkey. The Marxist-Nationalist PKK has carried out a total of fourteen suicide attacks against a range of targets since its first campaign started in June 1996, at a time when the organization was facing heavy military setbacks in the southeast of the country, until 1999 when its leader Ocalan was arrested. Currently, the PKK has its major base of action against Turkey in northern Iraq. In addition, its front network – providing political, financial, and logistical support to terrorist activities – is active in about thirty countries, mainly in Europe. The European Union’s past actions against the PKK have been inconsistent. The EU only designated the PKK as a terrorist organization in 2003 although many individual governments had already taken steps against the movement. Yet where Europeans have perceived their security threatened, they have acted quickly. In November 2004, for instance, Dutch authorities discovered a PKK training camp near Liempde where they said Kurds were being trained to carry out attacks in Turkey. The Netherlands launched a police operation and arrested 29 Kurds and closed the camp. In early February 2006, French and Belgian police arrested more than a dozen senior members of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Within days, however, the European authorities began releasing many of the captured PKK members. The episode underlines the difficulties faced by Turkey in both persuading the Europeans that fighting the PKK is also in their interests.18 According to James Brandon, the United States lobbied the EU to take concrete action against the PKK in order to discharge some of Washington’s obligations to Turkey. “The United States also hoped that taking action against the PKK in Europe would allow it to postpone dealing with the much tougher question of how to meet Ankara’s demand that it shut down PKK camps in northern Iraq.”19 Since January 2003, Turkey has sought support to remove the PKK from northern Iraq. Despite negotiations and meetings among government and military authorities at several levels, no substantial progress has thus far been recorded. Although the United States takes active military measures against many terrorist organizations considered a worldwide threat – especially in Iraq and Afghanistan – the fact that it does not take any compelling measures against the PKK contradicts its global war on terror. An increase in PKK-led violence in Turkey would be a serious threat to the nation’s stability. Washington’s reluctance to take action against the PKK has already created much distrust. Action against the PKK would be a necessary first step in rebuilding U.S.–Turkish relations in the post-Iraq war environment.20

18

James Brandon, “PKK Survives EU Arrests,” Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, vol. 5, no. 6, March 29, 2007. 19 Ibid. 20 Selahattin Ibas, “Fighting Terrorism: A Chance to Improve Bilateral U.S.-Turkish Ties,” Policy Watch, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No.1203, February 22, 2007.

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Israel – Palestinians Hamas anti-Israel suicide attacks started haphazardly in 1992 against Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories, but failed to produce glaring results. In 1994 a new wave of successful suicide terrorism eroded Israel’s collective confidence in the peace process. Yet, in 1997 these attacks suddenly came to a complete halt. An Israeli analyst explained this phenomenon as a result of several factors: massive Israeli economic sanctions, the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism and the increasing cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services.21 While the post-Oslo negotiations continued, there was some level of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, particularly in the aftermath of a suicide bombing campaign perpetrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 1995–96. During this period, by most accounts, the PA took tangible steps to prevent attacks against Israeli targets. This author, commenting at the time on the decline in attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in this period, wrote that it “was due to the combined preventive counterterrorist policy of the PA and Israel.” 22 Yoram Schweitzer, another Israeli analyst, noted as an example of this cooperation a March 2000 Hamas attempt to carry out attacks in Israeli cities that was thwarted by the capture of two of the leaders in Nablus by Palestinian forces. With the deterioration of Israeli–Palestinian political relations and the onset of the current unrest, cooperation between Israeli and PA security forces diminished rapidly. From the outset, Israeli authorities accused the Palestinian Authority, and President Arafat personally, of being directly responsible for attacks against Israelis, including a wave of Fatah suicide bombings similar to that of the Hamas.23

Conclusion The threat from international terrorism is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. The supply of potential terrorists among extreme elements of the Islamic world is unlikely to diminish. Eliza Manningham-Buller, the Head of MI-5, stressed the fact that the response to the terror threat is not just a responsibility of the security and intelligence agencies and the police. It is much wider problem and only part of broader government strategy. All of this work must rest upon vigorous efforts to maintain the confidence of the Muslim population both in Western Europe and overseas. Breaking the link between terrorism and religious ideology will be difficult in the short term. Political dialogue and a process of reconciliation are not on the horizon as groups like al-Qaeda have aims that are absolute and non-negotiable. It is thought also that economic and political developments in parts of the Middle East would reduce some of the exacerbating factors that help feed extremism.24

21

Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2000. Ely Karmon, “Hamas Terrorism Strategy – Operational Limitations and Political Constraints,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2000. 23 “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf, October 2002. 24 “Countering Terrorism: An International Blueprint”: Transcript of The Lecture by The Director General of The Security Service, Eliza Manningham-Buller at The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Conference on The Oversight Of Intelligence And Security, June 17, 2003. 22

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Beyond intelligence efforts and operations to thwart the suicide terrorism of alQaeda and its affiliates, primary efforts should be invested to prevent proliferation of the concept of istishhad (martyrdom) by mobilizing spiritual leaders with religious and institutional authority throughout the Muslim world to unite and offer non-violent Islamic alternatives that decry the path of Bin Laden as contradictory to the spirit of Islam.25 The phenomenon of suicide and other forms of terrorism in the Muslim world is first of all a problem of the Islamic states and societies and can be solved only by a long term effort of their religious and political leaders. This effort should strive to convince the leaders of the terrorist groups, on the one hand, and public opinion and the population at large on the other hand, that terrorism is counter-productive in terms of social and economic development, political reform, and the general well-being of the Muslim community.

25 Yoram Schweitzer, Sari Goldstein Ferber, “Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Memorandum, No. 78, November 2005.

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Annex OSCE PA Resolution on Terrorism by Suicide Bombers Adopted at the 14th Annual Session, Washington, DC, 1 to 5 July 200526 Considers that in the light of the provisions solemnly sanctioned by the Statute of the International Criminal Court, it must be agreed that suicide attacks of the terrorist nature constitute “crimes against humanity” in that they are deliberately committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” which involves the multiple commission of murders of defenceless civilians “pursuant to or in furtherance of (...) organizational policy to commit such attack” (Art. 7(I) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court); Supports the recent position adopted by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in its Resolution 1400 of 6 October 2004, stating that “Every act of terrorism... is a challenge to democracy and must be considered a crime against humanity”, and calls on all the OSCE member states of the Council of Europe to adopt and implement the fundamental 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Requests – in the knowledge that the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security gives the organization a comparative advantage in addressing factors across the OSCE dimensions that may engender terrorism – the implementation of the activities put into place within ATU, the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit, instituted in 2002 to report to the Secretary General, above all in order to step up the coordination of all the Organization’s operational instruments to counter terrorism; Welcomes the proactive approach taken by the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) in addressing, in collaboration with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the threat of suicide terrorism through its “Technical Expert Workshop on Suicide Terrorism” held in Vienna on 20 May 2005, which provided the participating states and the OSCE Partners for Cooperation with important information for a better understanding of this phenomenon and with a platform for sharing experiences in countering it, and encourages the Unit to continue its work in this area.

26

See the resolution at http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17767_en.pdf.html.

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How to Prevent a Suicide Attack, Security Measures in Countering Suicide Attacks Mr Rolf TOPHOVEN Director, Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy, Essen, Germany

Abstract. There is no 100% safe strategy to stop suicide missions. There are many security measures which can be implemented to reduce considerably the possibility of such attacks. We can also learn from the experience of countries with long experience of fighting suicide terrorism. One thing we should keep in mind is that a suicide attack is not the act of a lone lunatic. Each suicide operation is well planned with a clear intention by the suicide and his or her organization. As Boaz Ganor put it, countering this wave of terrorism requires a combination of effective intelligence, operational activity, security, and psychological measures, combined with international cooperation in the fight against the organizations responsible. Keywords. Terrorism, suicide attacks, security, security measures

The challenge in countering suicide terrorism demands also that we do not fall victim to psychological paralysis and the sense of being defenceless or powerless that the terrorists hope to achieve. A myth is only as strong as you believe it is. The spread of suicide terrorism worldwide suggests that a lot of countries will not remain immune from this threat. Trends in terrorism already points to suicide terrorism’s rising worldwide popularity. Experiences of countries fighting this phenomenon teach us lessons that can improve our chances to deal with future suicide bombers. For example, the late Professor Ehud Sprinzak, an Israeli scholar with a worldwide reputation and one of the leading experts on terrorism had long argued: “Contrary to popular belief, suicide bombers can be stopped – but only if security authorities pay more attention to their methods and motivations.”

Rings of Defence There is a specific kind of consensus among security services (intelligence circles, military, law enforcement agencies etc.) that there exist some effective defence methods, some key imperatives, against suicide terrorism. 1. Mobilize the whole framework of Security Force. Every security force member must be briefed, involved, and made thoroughly aware of the threat of this type of terror. He must know its possible indicators, the most effective responses and details of the plan to counter it. 2. Profiling does not identify the terrorist.

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3.

Build up concentric rings of defence. Interrogations of failed or captured suicide bombers have revealed that a large police or military presence can be a significant deterrent to the execution of a planned suicide attack. Concentric physical rings of defence and a highly visible security presence are proven ways to thwart suicide attacks. In such cases we should put in our mind that a visible presence of a police officer or a guard in front of a supermarket for example can make the perpetrator nervous so that he misses his main target. So mobile security deployments are important because they can be obstacles in the path of the potential bomber. The idea is to set up a defensive zone that gradually narrows to a single end point. At the perimeter guards are alert and on watch, but their job is only to warn more skilled operatives further inside so that they can isolate the bomber and engage him or her at a place and time of advantage to the authorities. At all layers, the security authorities, either police or private security personnel, must be in a position to be the “hunter”. They must not wait passively until something happens – they must act. The senior commanders must closely supervise and control the environment, making adjustments and changes as necessary. Concentric physical rings of defence consist of three areas: a) a non-target area, b) a pre-target area, and c) the target area. To prevent a terror attack at each area different types of security must be deployed: Non-target Area This is the best layer for law enforcement to work in. This is the widest part of the security zone, typically has more open space and is less overcrowded by vehicles etc. It is easier to limit, if not prevent, casualties and damage. To bolster the security, uniformed personnel will be deployed at roadblocks, checking identity of the pedestrians and/or vehicle documentation. Video cameras and other passive (covert) observers are also watching, analysing the crowd or vehicles for any suspicious behaviour. Pre-target Area From the “hunters’” point of view this area is the best place to engage the suicide bomber, before he or she can reach the intended target. Accordingly this area must be heavily populated by uniformed forces and covert agents ready to approach a suspected attacker at the most favourable time and place. Trained explosives detection dogs and ordinary crowd control dogs (canines) can be effective in this environment. The more dogs are in the area, the greater the chance of prompting the bomber to take an ill-timed reaction or misstep. Three things in particular can cause or prompt the suicide to reveal him- or herself: 1. the terrorist may be unfamiliar with the scene when he is still outside the layer where the target is located 2. the movement of security personnel may force the bomber to react 3. security personnel may intervene if they recognize suspicious indicators; strong confirmation that the person being tracked is a suicide bomber may also necessitate the use of surprise to neutralize the bomber. It is – of course –

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extremely difficult to realize, but the aim or the preference is to capture the bomber alive so that invaluable information might perhaps be obtained about his or her handlers, trainers and leaders. Target Area This is the final chance to stop the suicide bomber. Time is running out for the security personnel because police or agents will have only a few moments to engage the bomber and to resolve the situation after the perpetrator is identified. There is no room for mistake or failure – otherwise it will be fatal, both to the security personnel (officer or agent) and to those around them. Suicide terrorism differs from all other terrorist operations because the perpetrator’s own death is essential to the success of the attack. As Bruce Hoffman says, the suicide terrorist is the “ultimate smart bomb”, a human missile relentlessly homing in on its target but being flexible about timing and access. In this respect, the suicide terrorist can change his or her plan of attack to adjust to the ease or difficulty of approach or density of people or passers-by near the target and whether or not security personnel and other terrorism countermeasures are visible at or around the attack site. Suicide terrorism, like other concepts of terrorism in general, is harder to define than it may appear. In these days, there seems to be a kind of armada of people willing to die in order to commit suicide, or murder, or martyrdom: in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Russia, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, London, Madrid and elsewhere.

Defence and Security Measures against Suicide Terrorism An effective defence against suicide terrorism must be nimble, flexible and adaptable. It must be as dynamic and fluid as terrorist operational planning, reconnaissance and attack execution are. In this respect, law enforcement plans, procedures and policies cannot rest on past laurels or previous success in deterring, preventing or responding to past terrorist threats and/or attacks, but must be able to adapt to existing, historical, emergent and probably future terrorist targeting patterns and modus operandi. Terrorists are at work seven days a week, 24 hours a day; counterterrorism forces must therefore also work constantly. The best defence is an aggressive offence that seeks intelligence about terrorist’s plots at the earliest possible stage. Terrorists are at their most vulnerable to identification and detection when they are meeting and beginning to plan. Both the logistical preparations and the reconnaissance and surveillance activities that attend an attack take time, which provide, which provides the authorities more opportunities for identification and interdiction. According to both Israeli and Sri Lankan authorities, a suicide bomber requires a logistical support infrastructure of upwards of 20 persons, including quartermasters, bomb makers, trainers, drivers and handlers. The larger the operation, therefore, the more opportunities exist to identify the participants and disrupt it, and the greater the possibility of information leaks or the insertion of informants. Also, the time involved in planning the operation and carrying out surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as trial runs in some cases, further enhances the prospects of interdiction and thwarting the attack before it can be mounted. Indeed, according to law enforcement experiences, once a terrorist attack is set in motion, even the best intelligence in the world may be unable to stop it.

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Some Additional Rules for How to Contend with Suicide Terror x

Identify typical suspicious signs – suspect stands out in the environment due to his behaviour, clothing, movement and expression – that may lead to detection. x Distance suspect from activity in a closed place. x Creating of specialized trained manpower to deal with the suicide phenomenon. x Training in this requires specific instruction in mental preparedness for unusual and unexpected circumstances. x Development of a specific combat theory to neutralize the suicide bomber. x Development of a specific combat theory for various regions and facilities according to the type of facility. x Teaching the public to be more aware vis-à-vis suicide attackers. x Define behavioural procedures for the general public in the event of an incident. x Supply appropriate communication and information activity following an attack. x Create comprehensive and systematic international activity against the phenomenon while placing the emphasis on preventing incitement and punishing supporters for these terror attacks and those who condone them in the name of religion. Israeli experience shows that, despite the significant death toll that suicide attacks inflict initially, it is possible to counter this threat effectively through the proper attention, focus, preparations and training. To conclude the aspects of how to prevent suicide perpetrators we have to look again at the Israeli experience in fighting suicide terrorism. Israeli experts specify three important reasons for the decline: x first, quite good intelligence and understanding of the situation as well as analysis of information in a fast and effective way. x second, when you have intelligence you can bring in units or special units and engage quickly. x third, Israel managed to close up the operational circle of suicides; when the authorities had information, they were able to deploy the right unit and weapons quickly. If the authorities are able to infiltrate or to have a concentrated focus on this network, the opportunities to prevent the fulfilment of the suicide’s mission increase. Therefore another very effective approach to countering suicide terrorism is not only based on highly trained elite units, but by instilling a counter-suicide mindset in each and every cop on the street. In this respect, the Israelis argue that all police – traffic police, patrol units, detectives, auxiliary police and private security guards – should be trained to be aware of terrorism. As one expert said, “the street policeman is the most useful, because he is the policeman who will be in the right spot at right time”.

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Conclusion To come to a conclusion: We cannot find and develop a 100 per cent strategy and tactic to stop suicide missions. We have different local and regional conditions in the world, building the background for the raising up of the perpetrators. But we can learn from the experience of countries in fighting suicide terrorism which in the past have been and may be in the future attacked by suicide bombers. One thing we should keep in mind: The suicide attack is not an act of a lone lunatic or desperate terrorist. Each suicide operation is well planned with a clear intention from the viewpoint of the suicide himself and his organization as well. Therefore, as Boaz Ganor, the well known Israeli scholar, says, “countering this wave of terrorism requires a combination of effective intelligence, operational activity, security, and psychological measures, combined with international cooperation in the fight against the organizations responsible for such attack.” The threat of suicide terrorism is likely to spread with time. Suicide terrorism will affect the Far East, the Middle East, Western Europe and North America and especially Iraq as we can see well every day. Terrorist groups are increasingly providing intensive training to their bombers, with the intention of increasing their endurance. For instance, the suicide bomber who destroyed the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 had been resident in Kenya for four years. He had married in Kenya and lived in the capital before carrying out the suicide operation. Terrorist groups are setting a dangerous trend of using suicide bombers to destroy targets far away from their theatres of war. Day by day suicide attacks in Iraq demonstrate how effective this kind of terror warfare is. The huge nature of the threat demands that the free world make every effort to counter the suicides and to prevent these operations.

References Publication of ICT (International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism), Herzliya, Israel, Countering Suicide Terrorism, 2001. Ganor, Boaz, The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon, op.cit., p. 5–11. Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York, 2006. Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Merari, Ariel, “The readiness to kill and die: suicidal terrorism in the Middle East”, in: Origins of Terrorism (ed. by Reich Walter), Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. Kushner Harvey, Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual, in: Political Terrorism, Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21th century; Gordian Knot Books, 2002. Schweitzer, Yoram/Shay, Shaul, The Terror Attack in the United States and the Phenomenon of Suicide Terror, p.153 – 164, in: Schweitzer/Shay, The Globalization of Terror, New Brunswick (USA)/London 2003. Reuter, Christoph, Mein Leben ist eine Waffe, Selbstmordattentäter–Psychogramm eines Phänomens, München 2002. Schmidbauer, Wolfgang, Der Mensch als Bombe, Eine Psychologie des neuen Terrorismus, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. Croitoru, Joseph, Der Märtyrer als Waffe, Die historischen Wurzeln des Selbstmordattentats, München, 2003.

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The Law and Rules of Engagement against Suicide Attacks Mr Jonathan P. Edwards, J.D., M.A., LL.M. Regional Program Director, U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

Abstract. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are a critical command and control tool to guide military and police personnel in defending against suicide attacks. ROE must comply with domestic and international law, which will vary depending upon the context in which the suicide attacks are taking place. This paper provides ROE and related considerations for defending against suicide attacks on land, on the sea and from the air. Keywords. Rules of engagement, human rights law, international humanitarian law, law of armed conflict, suicide attacks, suicide bombings

Introduction1 Critical to an effective defense against terrorist suicide attacks will be the establishment of carefully prepared rules of engagement (ROE) for the guidance of military and police personnel facing this dangerous threat. ROE are orders issued to military personnel regarding the use of force in self-defense and to accomplish an assigned mission.2 Law enforcement agencies usually have some form of "use of force policy" issued to police officers regarding the use of force in self-defense and enforcing the law. For simplicity, I refer only to ROE in this article, although most of the substance of this paper is equally applicable in a law enforcement context. Suicide attacks pose perhaps the greatest threat to a military or law enforcement force engaged in domestic law enforcement, peace or other stability operations. It is a tactic of the weak, a tool used by an enemy who cannot defeat a regular military force by open combat. Instead, the enemy disguise themselves as civilian noncombatants, and use what might be thought of as the ultimate “smart bomb”, an explosive 1 The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 2 The U.S. military uses the term “rules of engagement” to apply to orders relating to the use of force only in military operations and contingencies and routine Military Department functions occurring outside U.S. territory and territorial waters and in air and maritime homeland defense missions in the U.S. When the U.S. military engages in domestic law enforcement and security duties, it uses the term "rules for the use of force" to apply to orders issued by competent military authority that define the extent to which military personnel may use force in self-defense, enforce the law, and protect people and facilities. For simplicity, I use the term ROE in this article as applying both to military operations in another state, as well as in law enforcement operations conducted by a military within its own state.

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controlled to detonation by a person prepared to die in order to ensure the success of the attack. Military and police units that must defend themselves as well as innocent civilians against suicide attacks face a particularly difficult and cruel choice in deciding whether or not to shoot. Failure to identify a hostile act (an attack) or hostile intent (a threat of imminent attack) in time to use sufficient force will likely result in a large number of casualties, most often among innocent civilians. On the other hand, misidentifying an innocent civilian as someone carrying out a suicide attack will lead to the use of force against the very people the military and police seeks to defend. Thus by using the disguise of a civilian, the suicide bomber makes the crucial step of correctly identifying hostile intent or a hostile act especially difficult. By providing its personnel clear ROE addressing the suicide attack threat, a professional military or police force will enhance the likelihood they will not only survive such an attack, but will be more likely to successfully defend innocent civilians as well as carry out their mission. At the same time, clear ROE will ensure everything possible is done to minimize incidental injury to innocent civilians and collateral damage to their property. Each nation necessarily has its own process for the development of ROE. While this article describes the process largely from a U.S. perspective, it is certainly not the only way to do so.

1. Applicable Law Depends Upon Context An essential ingredient in the development of ROE against suicide attacks will be compliance with the relevant domestic and international law. What laws apply depends on the context in which a suicide attack occurs. There are 3 possible contexts, each involving a different, but somewhat overlapping set of domestic and international laws. A more detailed analysis of the law which applies in defending against suicide attacks in these three contexts is provided in the appendix to this article. 1.1. Internal Disturbances and Tensions Internal disturbances and tensions involve ordinary crime such as riots, and other isolated and sporadic acts of violence including acts of terrorism. The domestic law of the state is the principle source of law in this context. However, the state must ensure that its laws meet its obligations under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, as well as with the customary international law of human rights. Police agencies are normally responsible for law enforcement, but a state may also use military forces when necessary to assist the police when the domestic laws of that state authorize it. The most important legal issue in this context will be determining when deadly force may be used. 1.2. Internal Armed Conflict Internal armed conflict involves violent acts committed by citizens of a nation with the goal of overthrowing the government (such as insurgency, guerrilla war or civil war). The citizens involved are organized into one or more groups, and the level of violence

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must involve more than sporadic acts. Again, the domestic law of the state is the principle law to be applied, as informed by the relevant international human rights law. However certain portions of the international law of armed conflict will also apply. In addition to using normal law enforcement means, a state may lawfully use the military to attack citizens taking an active part in the hostilities. Thus, suicide bombers can be attacked not only as they approach their target, but as also as they build their bombs, or even where they live (subject to some restrictions related to targeting). 1.3. International Armed Conflict Acts of international terrorism that rise to the level of an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter are a form of international armed conflict. As stated in the UN Security Council Resolution adopted shortly after the September 11 attack, and restated in later resolutions, all nations have a right to national and collective self-defense in response to international terrorist attacks. As in internal armed conflict, the level of violence and the threat it poses justifies the use of military force against the attackers. The U.S. view is that in this context, the customary international law of armed conflict applies.3

2. Purposes and Considerations in Developing ROE against Suicide Attacks

2.1. National Level At the national (strategic) level, civilian government leaders may require the military to obtain their approval for unit self-defense ROE and mission-accomplishment ROE. In the U.S., both unit self-defense ROE and mission-accomplishment ROE are approved by the Secretary of Defense (although the President may at anytime assume this authority). When suicide attacks are anticipated, the civilian leadership must weigh the need to protect innocent civilians as well as military forces themselves against the probability of civilian incidental injury and collateral damage from the military’s use of force. The military commander can explain to the civilian leadership the difficulties and realities of defending against an enemy disguised as a civilian and who most often intentionally targets innocent civilians. It is beneficial for the military commander to have the commitment of the civilian leadership to a set of ROE for use in such cases. Since the legitimacy of and continued support for the military comes from the elected representatives of the people, there is less chance of misunderstanding or even criticism when the military is forced to react to a suicide attack.

3 “Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense”, see: http:www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon-trans.html, 16 December 2002, 6.

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2.2. Operational and Tactical Levels At the operational and tactical level, military commanders can develop ROE in anticipation of suicide attacks which define when, where, and how much force may be used in response to an attack or imminent attack. They may also specify who is authorized to decide when to use force. The commander must consider the amount of force needed to accomplish the assigned mission, as well as force protection, protection of innocent civilians, and the need to minimize incidental civilian injury and collateral damage. In regard to force protection, ROE are among the measures that can reduce the risk of “friendly-fire” incidents. Military staffs overseeing the accomplishment of missions must continuously assess the need to revise the ROE. As an operation progresses, the situation on the ground will change (especially as the enemy reacts). At the same time, the national civilian leadership may change policy in response to domestic public reaction, foreign diplomacy, or changing events on the ground. Even the law may change, such as when a peace operation taking place with the consent of the parties turns into an international armed conflict when consent is withdrawn. The U.S. learned this lesson the hard way in the first suicide bombing we encountered since World War II, during peace operations in Lebanon in 1984. U.S. Marines initially went to Lebanon at the request of all the warring parties. ROE were written to reflect the relatively low-threat and peaceful mission of the units involved. However, as events unfolded, some of the warring parties resumed their conflict, while at the same time U.S. policy changed to favoring the Lebanese government. The military staffs overseeing the U.S. Marine deployment failed to request changes to the ROE in light of these change in factors. For that reason, guards at the perimeter of the Marine compound at the airport did not have bullets in their rifles and were unable to stop a suicide truck bomber. The bomber was able to drive past the guards and into the barracks where most Marines were staying, killing well over 200.4

3. Unit Self-Defense ROE & Suicide Attacks

3.1. The Element of Necessity When military units defend against suicide attacks in an international peacetime context, the extent of their right of self-defense under international law becomes important. The international legal basis for a military unit to defend itself is the inherent right under customary international law of national and collective self-defense as reflected in UN Charter Article 51.5 Pursuant to this right, a state may use military force in self-defense when it is necessary, and when the force it uses is proportionate to the threat.6 4 Grunawalt, Richard J., “The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer”, Air Force Law Review, Vol. 42, 1997, 245-258. 5 Of course, in a domestic law enforcement context, self-defense, as well as defense of another, is governed by the domestic law of the state concerned, as informed by the relevant international law of human rights. 6 Schmitt, Michael N., "Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law", The Marshall Center Papers, No. 5, November, 2002.

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Many states take the position that necessity exists only when an armed attack occurs (which the U.S. military calls a “hostile act”). Some other states also consider necessity to exist when an attack is imminent (which the U.S. military calls “hostile intent”). This difference is reflected in NATO’s standing ROE (MC 362), which states that when acting in self-defense against attack or imminent attack, NATO personnel and units will act in accordance with their national law. In the context of suicide attacks, a critical issue for a military which limits unit self-defense to when an armed attack occurs is to define the point at which a suicide attack begins. If “attack” is narrowly interpreted to mean only when the suicide attacker sets off the bomb, then such an ROE will place both the soldiers and the civilians they are defending at great risk. 3.2. The Element of Proportionality The U.S. understanding of the obligation to use proportionate force is that military forces may use only that amount of force necessary to respond decisively to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of the defending force.7 What is proportionate can sometimes be open to debate. For example, if a suicide bomber approaches in a car, are soldiers limited to using only rifles against it? Following the November 2003 suicide truck bomb attack on an Italian Carabinieri unit in Iraq, the ROE for Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force there were changed to authorize the use of shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons against a suicide bomber in a car or truck.8 That would seem to be consistent with the U.S. understanding of the requirement for proportionate force. Given the devastating effect of suicide bombs, once the decision is made to use force, there should be no trouble with using overwhelming and lethal firepower to stop the attack. This is not a situation where use of non-lethal weapons or “shooting-towound” are reasonable alternatives. However, the mistaken killing of a Brazilian man by Metropolitan Police in London in 2005 highlighted the tragic danger of mistaking “hostile act” or “hostile intent” given the lethality of a “shoot-to-stop” policy. The man left an apartment building under surveillance as the residence of a man suspected in bombing attacks on the subway and bus system, and generally fit the description of the suspects. Nonetheless, the Brazilian man did nothing unusual as he walked to a nearby subway station and boarded a train. Fearing he intended to set off another bomb, a police officer jumped on top of him and fired five shots into his head, killing him instantly.9 Normally, British police officers are required to give warning, shoot only if no other choice is possible, and then shoot-to-wound. However, London Mayor Ken Livingston said afterwards, a policy of “shoot-to-kill” was authorized in some circumstances. “If you are dealing with someone who might be a suicide bomber, if they remain conscious they could trigger plastic explosives or whatever device is on them.” “And therefore overwhelmingly in these circumstances it is going to be a shootto-kill policy”. 7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CJCSI 3121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces", 13 June 2005, Enclosure A, para. 4a(3). 8 “SDF Troops May Use Antitank Weapons Against Suicide Truck Bomber”, Tokyo Jiji Press, 13 December 2003. 9 “London Police Modify Story”, Washington Post Foreign Service, 23 August 2005, A08.

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Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair added “What we have to recognize is that people are taking incredibly difficult fast-time decisions in life threatening situations”. He noted that there was no point shooting a suspect in the chest as that is where a bomb would most likely be and it would detonate. A former Metropolitan Police Commissioner later added that the terrible truth was that the only way to stop a suicide bomber was to “destroy his brain instantly, utterly, to prevent a dying bomber from activating a device.”10 The U.S. ROE tell commanders that if time and circumstances permit, a threatening person should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease his or her threatening actions. A U.S. commander may attack a hostile person only in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Such an attack may continue only while the hostile person continues to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent. In addition, a hostile person may be pursued only if he or she continue to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent.11

4. Combining ROE with Tactics, Techniques and Procedures The effectiveness of rules of engagement will be greatly enhanced when combined with carefully planned tactics, techniques and procedures for both force protection and mission accomplishment. Suicide bombings can be prevented or minimized by developing methods for such things as conducting roadblocks and checkpoints, or manning sentry positions at military bases and important civilian sites, as well as conducting patrols and convoys. The U.S. Army has found it useful to develop written doctrine on the conduct of such operations.12 While use of the tactics, techniques, and procedures contained in this doctrine is not mandatory, they nonetheless provide military commanders with guidelines, principles and techniques to be considered in carrying out a specific mission. From doctrine, operational and tactical commanders also develop written Standard Operating Procedures that provide more detailed, but still non-binding guidance for unit commanders.

5. ROE in Defending against Suicide Attacks on Land

5.1. ROE against Suicide Attacks at Hasty and Fixed Checkpoints and Roadblocks U.S. military doctrine states that the layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks should be based on consideration of the following factors at the location involved: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available, Time, and Civilians (METT-TC). Checkpoints are fixed position used as a means of controlling movement 10 “British Police Kill Man on Train”, Washington Post, 23 July 2005, 1; "Britain Says Man Killed By Police Had No Tie to Bombings", New York Times, 24 July 2005; "Debate Rages Over 'Shoot-to-Kill', BBC News, 24 July 2005. 11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3121.01B, Enclosure A, para. 4. 12 See e.g. Field Manual (FM) 3-21.9 “The SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad”, Chapter 7: Tactical Enabling Operations. The provisions in the Field Manual regarding the carrying out of checkpoints and roadblocks is repeated in other field manuals.

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of vehicles or pedestrians to enforce circulation measures and other law, order, and regulations. Roadblocks are fixed positions to prevent movement of vehicles or pedestrians along a route or area. Deliberate checkpoints and roadblocks are permanent or semi-permanent, while hasty checkpoints and roadblocks are temporary, and established with less planning and preparation.13 5.2. Suicide Bomb Attacks in Iraq Suicide bomb attacks are taking place in the context of both a determined insurgency and growing sectarian violence. Most of the recent large-scale suicide bombing attacks appear to have been committed by Sunni insurgents, with the intent of setting off widespread secular violence. The numbers of innocent civilians killed and the depravity of the attacks is stunning. In February, twin suicide bombers struck a market jammed with people in Hilla, killing at least 60 people and wounding 150. The residents had been catching up on their shopping after the Shiite holiday of Ashura. Elsewhere in the city, a suicide bomber detonated a minibus near a hospital, killing 6 and wounding 12.14 In March, at least 118 Shiite pilgrims were killed and hundreds injured in suicide attacks during Arbaeen, a commemorative period of mourning for Imam Hussein, the prophet Muhammad's grandson. Most were killed when two male suicide bombers detonated vests packed with explosives near a tent set up for pilgrims.15 In late March, similar attacks in crowded markets in Baghdad, Khalis, and Tall Afar killed at least 212 civilians and injured hundreds.16 That same month, insurgents detonated a car bomb in Baghdad with 2 children in it. The bomber used the children to lower the suspicions of soldiers manning a checkpoint, who let the car pass. The bomber then parked the car and fled, leaving the children inside.17 Also in Anbar Province in March, three suicide bombers driving trucks loaded with chlorine gas and explosives detonated the vehicles, wounding or sickening more than 350 people.18 Suicide bombings are the insurgents’ “weapon of choice” because they can inflict a high number of casualties while sacrificing only the attacker. By contrast, ambushes by gunmen draw withering return fire from Iraq and coalition troops, resulting in heavy insurgent losses.19 Iraqi security forces and civilians are the primary victims, with police stations, markets, military recruiting centers, and even funerals being targeted.20 Of course, U.S. and Iraqi forces are not the only military facing this threat. In November 2003, 5 Italian soldiers, and 12 Carabinieri were killed by a suicide car bomb at their base.21

13 BG Peter Vangjel, USA, AR 15-6 Investigation Into Incident at a Baghdad Traffic Control Point on 4 March 2005, III(B)(1), (declassified version). 14 “Iraq Suicide Bombers Kill 60 and Wound 150 in Market in Southern City”, New York Times, 2 February 2007, 13. 15 “118 Shiite Pilgrims Killed in Iraq Attack", Washington Post, 7 March 2007, 1. 16 "132 Iraqis Killed in Wave of Bombings", Los Angeles Times, 30 March 2007, 1. 17 "Iraq Bombers Blow Up 2 Children Used As Decoys", New York Times, 21 March 2007, 12. 18 "Suicide Bombers Using Chlorine Gas Kill 2 and Sicken Hundreds in Western Iraq", New York Times, 18 March 2007, 16. 19 “Military: Offensive Thwarting Suicide Attacks”, USA Today, 2 December 2005, 6. 20 “Car Bombing Increase Prompts Change in U.S. Forces’ Tactics” USA Today, 9 June 2005, 13; “In Iraq, Death Comes on Wheels”, Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 June 2005. 21 “Probe Begun Into Rules of Engagement After Al-Nasiriyah Shoot Out”, Milan Corriere della Sera, 8 April 2004.

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5.3. Suicide Bomb Attacks in Afghanistan Suicide bombings were rare in Afghanistan until the fall of 2005. The number of attacks has risen from 28 in 2005, to 139 in 2006. Over 30 attacks have occurred so far this year, and the Taliban commander claims he has 1,800 trained suicide bombers ready to strike. While Taliban leaders claim they attack only military targets, 75% of the nearly 300 people killed in Afghanistan last year by suicide bombers were unarmed men, women and children.22 While the Afghan government forces and people have taken the brunt of these attacks, Taliban insurgents have been waging an increasingly violent suicide bombing campaign against Canadian, German, Italian, Portuguese and other NATO troops. Last September, 4 Canadian soldiers and more than 24 civilians were killed when a suicide bomber attacked as the soldiers were giving out candy to children. The attacks have made NATO-led forces more wary, and in recent months at least 10 civilians have been mistakenly or accidentally killed as they walked or drove near military convoys.23 Afghan government officials attribute most of the attacks to foreigners. Says General Raufi, an Afghan National Army corps commander, “It is obvious that the Taliban…have professional people who help fix the wires and assemble the bombs”. “The explosives come from Pakistan, and the drivers come from Pakistan and other foreign countries.” “It is very difficult for an Afghan to persuade himself to commit suicide”. Added one police official “They used to hire Afghans to drive cars to a target, and not tell them that there were explosives inside.” “So now they are sending in voluntary suicide bombers, and their effectiveness has improved a lot”.24 5.4. ROE against Suicide Attacks at Checkpoints and Roadblocks The following ROE should be considered for use at checkpoints and roadblocks: a) suspicious vehicles or persons intruding into restricted areas after warning to stop may be fired upon; b) when possible, use an escalating series of measures to warn with established fixed geographic points at which soldiers are to employ each method; c) whenever practical and available, employ "less-than-lethal" measures to stop vehicles and pedestrians determined to be a threat, with established fixed geographic points at which soldiers are to employ each method; When terrain, time and other factors permit, use of such measures as tire spikes, painfully loud noise and dazzling lights, or aimed fire into the engine of a vehicle should be employed. In many circumstances, such systems offer soldiers alternatives to deadly force, and greatly reduce the lethality of mistaken targeting of innocent civilians. The U.S. military is nearing deployment of the Active Denial System, a 95 gigahertz heat beam, which uses millimeter waves to heat the moisture just below the skin causing an extremely painful burning sensation without lasting injury. It can be mounted on a vehicle such as a HUMMWV and uses a hybrid gasoline-electric drive train, looks like a satellite dish, and is aimed with a joystick.25 22

“The Taliban's New Weapon: Suicide Bombers”, Newsweek, 16 April 2007. Id. 24 “Taliban Turn to Suicide Attacks”, Christian Science Monitor, 3 February 2006, 1. 25 “Energy Beam Weapon May Lower Iraq Civilian Deaths”, USA Today, 25 July 25 2005, 1; “U.S. Testing Nonlethal Weapons Arsenal for Use in Iraq”, Boston Globe, 5 August 2005. 23

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d) as a last resort, use lethal force. 5.5. Related Tactics, Techniques and Procedures at Checkpoints and Roadblocks The following tactics, techniques, and procedures should be considered for use whenever METT-TC allows in combination with ROE. a) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it will be visible to oncoming persons and vehicles and where traffic cannot either turn back, get off the road, or bypass without being observed.26 b) Create clear fields of fire.27 c) Where possible, dig trenches to prevent vehicles from leaving roads; build zigzag barriers with sandbags, barrels filled with sand or water, or heavy concrete blocks to force vehicles to slow down and restrict their movement.28 d) Fly flags and post warning signs in the local language at approaches to checkpoints, and at night (when the tactical situation permits) use flood lights, strobe lights, flares, spotlights, horns and sirens.29 e) Shout warnings in the local language, using loudspeakers if available.30 f) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within sight, and able to engage vehicles attempting to break through or bypass the position, and to deter resistance.31 g) Stop vehicles at a safe distance from checkpoint.32 h) If available, use explosive detection dogs.33 i) Treat with suspicion persons wearing heavy clothing in hot weather.34 j) Order persons approaching with hands in their pockets to remove them, and after a warning, fire on them if they fail to comply.35 k) Treat with suspicion vehicles which are sagging or riding low, have bad body work or are marked with crude symbols.36 The symbols are used by Iraqi insurgents to track their own vehicles in-route to targets. l) Order drivers and passengers out of vehicles with their hands raised before approaching to search.37 m) Develop a public awareness campaign to inform civilians of how to behave when approaching checkpoints and roadblocks.38

26

FM 3-21.9, 7-11b. “Anger and Warning After Suicide Attack”, New York Times, 31 March 2003. 28 FM 3-21.9, 7-11e. 29 “U.S. Changes Guidelines for Troops To Lessen Everyday Tensions With Iraqi Civilians”, New York Times, 2 May 2006. 30 “U.S. Troops Told to Use Tougher Tactics”, Washington Post, 1 April 2003, 1. 31 FM 3-21.9, 7-11b. 32 “U.S. Troops Told to Use Tougher Tactics”, Washington Post, 1 April 2003, 1. 33 Ibid. 34 “U.S. Troops Told to Use Tougher Tactics”. 35 Ibid. 36 “Car Bombing Increase Prompts Changes in U.S. Forces’ Tactics”, USA Today, 9 June 2005, 13. 37 “U.S. Troops Told to Use Tougher Tactics”. 38 BG Vangjel, IV(I). 27

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5.6. Incident at Roadblock 541: Baghdad Airport Road, March 200539 In March 2005 an incident occurred during coalition combat operations in Iraq which illustrates the inherent risk involved in defending against suicide bombing attacks, despite compliance with lawful and measured ROE and related tactics, techniques and procedures. It involved the firing upon a car mistaken as attacking insurgents but which instead was carrying 2 Italian military intelligence officers and an Italian journalist. Iraq at the time was, as it remains today, a high-threat environment. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were over 15,000 attacks against coalition forces throughout Iraq. As a result, the U.S. considered all of Iraq to be a combat zone. The incident occurred on the Airport Road in Baghdad, a city of 6 million people. It is the only available route from downtown to the airport, resulting in a heavy traffic flow and predictable heavy military convoy traffic. This made the road a lucrative target area for insurgents to employ improvised explosive devices, including vehicle suicide bombs. For this reason, the Airport Road was commonly referred to at the time as “the deadliest road in Iraq” by journalists, soldiers, and military commanders. The majority of these attacks occurred at three intersections with overpasses, one of which was the intersection at which the March incident occurred. At 1900 on 4 March 2005, a platoon of 7 U.S. soldiers was assigned the mission of establishing and manning a hasty roadblock, designated 541, on an on-ramp along the Airport Road. Their orders were to maintain the roadblock, preventing all civilian traffic from entering the Airport Road until a convoy transporting the U.S. Ambassador had traveled from the International Zone and arrived at the airport. Other soldiers established similar hasty roadblocks at the other 5 intersections along the Airport Road. The battalion from which the soldiers were drawn had been in Iraq for 4 months prior to the incident, and had conducted over 1000 checkpoints and roadblocks, most of them along the Airport Road. The battalion had suffered a significant number of deaths during its tour in Iraq, including 2 soldiers who were killed by an improvised explosive device at a checkpoint at another intersection on the Airport Road two days before the incident. Nonetheless, prior to the 4 March incident, the battalion had been involved in only one mistaken shooting of a civilian. The investigation into that incident, involving a vehicle at a checkpoint that had approached at a high rate of speed, had been reviewed in-depth with every battalion member. The use of warnings such as signs and spotlights was discussed. The use of graduated force as a means of determining hostile intent of an oncoming vehicle was also emphasized. The battalion had received training on ROE in the U.S. prior to deployment to Iraq. The training included the use of graduated force- the use of escalating non-lethal force measures in order to determine whether an approaching person or vehicle had hostile intent, while minimizing the risk of accidental civilian injury. They were also briefed on the ROE requirement in Iraq that prior to opening fire, a soldier must have “positive identification”- reasonable certainty that it was a proper military target. A month before the incident, the platoon involved received formal refresher training on the ROE for their mission. This training included short examples of situations the soldiers might experience in conducting checkpoints and roadblocks. The use of graduated force in determining hostile intent was emphasized. Finally, all battalion soldiers were briefed on the ROE before going out on patrol each day, including on 4 March.

39

Ibid. (From many portions of the unclassified version of the investigation.)

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Upon arrival at the assigned intersection on-ramp, the platoon was advised that the roadblock would need to be maintained for no more than 15 minutes. Earlier during its patrol, they had also been advised to be on the lookout for a black car and a white car suspected to be used in a vehicle bomb attack. Next to the on-ramp there was a housing complex from which insurgents kept any coalition checkpoint or roadblock under surveillance. Soldiers at such intersections faced not only bombs, but also mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire, as well as hand grenade and small arms fire. Taking advantage of 3 concrete construction barriers already in place on the edges of the on-ramp, the platoon commander established a hasty roadblock. He placed the HMMWVs next to the two barriers nearest the Airport Road, each manned with a driver and a medium machine gun turret gunner. The gunners faced back up the onramp, toward the direction of oncoming vehicles. A fifth soldier was placed outside the vehicle for area security, and the platoon leader remained outside in order to supervise the roadblock. The platoon leader then established rules of engagement for the soldiers acting as gunners in each of the HUMMWV turrets: a) First, the leader identified for them an “Alert Line”, an imaginary line running across the on-ramp from the nearest concrete abutment of the overpass. He told the soldier in the turret of the HUMMWV closest to oncoming traffic to shine a 3 million candle power hand-held spotlight on any approaching vehicle as soon as possible, but no later than when it crossed the Alert Line. The leader then told the soldier in the turret of the second HUMMWV further down the on-ramp to shine a green laser pointer onto the driver’s side of the windshield of any approaching vehicle at the same time. b) Second, the leader identified for the gunners a “Warning Line” closer to the platoon, at the second light pole on the overpass. He told them to fire warning shots if an approaching vehicle continued past this point. c) Third, he authorized the gunners to shoot at approaching vehicles ignoring warning shots. Due to a delay in the departure of the Ambassador's convoy, the hasty roadblock remained in place an hour and fifteen minutes after being established. During this period, between 15 and 30 vehicles approached up the on-ramp toward the Airport Road. In each case, the spotlight and green laser caused them to stop and turn around. None of them got more than a few meters past the “Alert Line” before doing so. At the roadblock, the soldiers manning the turrets of the HMMWVs had recently been relieved to ensure they were alert. Specialist Mario Lozano was the gunner in the HMMWV nearest to on-coming traffic. He had the machine gun pointed down and to his left at a grassy area. Lozano had been a machine gunner in previous assignments, and had last qualified on the weapon five days before. At approximately 2050, a white Toyota Corolla sedan entered the on-ramp where the platoon had its roadblock. Inside the car were three Italians: Giuliana Sgrena, a journalist who had just been released as a hostage by Iraqi kidnappers; Nicola Calipari, a military intelligence officer with the rank of Major General, and who was in charge of the recovery of Ms. Sgrena; and Andrea Carpani, a military intelligence officer in the Carabinieri with the rank of Major. Major Carpani was driving the car. He had years of experience working and driving in Baghdad. Nonetheless, several things distracted him from his driving. The three were coming from the Mansour District, immediately after Ms. Sgrena’s release from a month in captivity. The atmosphere in the car was a mix of excitement over the

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recovery of Ms. Sgrena and the tension from the tasks yet to be completed. The road was wet and it was dark outside. Major Carpani was driving with one hand, and talking on his cell phone with a fellow agent who was waiting for them at the main airport checkpoint. The car’s interior overhead light was on, and Ms. Sgrena and Major General Calipari were in the rear seat talking to each other. None of the Italians in the car knew the on-ramp was blocked, and none of the soldiers knew the Italians were coming. Both U.S. and Italian investigations agreed that the Italians had given no notice that the car would be traveling to the airport that night, or even that agents would be in Baghdad seeking the release of Ms. Sgrena. Major Carpani initially estimated his speed at 70 – 80 kilometers per hour as he exited off Route Vernon. The two turret gunners in the HMMWVs thought the car was traveling in excess of 80 kilometers, which was faster than any other vehicle that had approached that evening. A third soldier, a reservist who was also a New York City Police Officer trained in vehicle speed estimation, believed the car was traveling at 80 kilometers per hour (50 mph), and believed it would not be able to stay on the road around the curb at that speed. The Italian investigation into the incident, however, concluded the Italians were traveling at half that speed – 40 kilometers per hour (25 mph). Specialist Lozano, the turret gunner in the HMMWV closest to the approaching car, saw the car with the Italians as it was approaching the on-ramp, about 140 meters from him. Holding the spotlight in his left hand, he shined it onto the car before it reaches the Alert Line. At the same time, the turret gunner in the second HMMWV saw the spotlight shining on the car, and focused his green laser pointer onto the windshield as it reached the Alert Line. The Italian car did not slow down, and continued across the Alert Line, coming closer to the soldiers than any other vehicle that evening. When the Italian car reached the Warning Line, Specialist Lozano, while still holding the spotlight in his left hand, used his right had to quickly fire a 2 to 4 round burst from his machine gun into a grassy area to the Italian vehicle’s right as warning shots. Major Carpani later told the soldiers at the scene that he heard shots from somewhere, panicked, and started speeding, trying to get to the airport as quickly as possible. The car maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning Line. Specialist Lozano dropped the spotlight and immediately turned his gun from left to right. With both hands on the weapon, he then fired another burst, walking the rounds from the ground on the front passenger’s side of the vehicle and toward the car’s engine block in an attempt to disable it. The rounds hit the right and front sides of the vehicle, deflating the left front tire, and blowing out the side windows. No other soldier opened fire. Major Carpani reacted by saying into the phone “They are attacking us!”, then stepping on the brakes, curling up on the left side of the car, and dropping the cell phone. Specialist Lozano stopped firing as he saw the car slow down and roll to a stop. Approximately 7 seconds had gone by since the car crossed the Alert Line to when it came to a stop next to the first concrete barrier. An examination of the car showed 11 bullet holes: 6 on the right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. 2 went through the front windshield, and 3 through the front section of the car at the bumper, right headlight, and right fender. The rounds killed Major General Calipari, and wounded Ms. Sgrena. The driver, Major Carpani, was unhurt. The U.S. Brigadier General who investigated the incident found that the platoon had complied with the ROE, and recommended no disciplinary

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action against the soldiers involved. The commanding general involved affirmed that finding and decided against disciplinary action. Nonetheless, in April 2007, a trial is scheduled to begin in absentia in an Italian criminal court against Specialist Lozano for the wrongful death of Major General Calipari.40 The U.S. government has refused to extradite Lozano to Italy. The U.S. investigating officer made a number of comments and recommendations with regard to avoiding a similar incident in the future. a) There were significant limitations in the training and “standard operating procedures” for roadblocks in Iraq, especially with regard to clear guidance on what equipment is required for establish a roadblock, including road signs warning of a roadblock ahead. b) He recommended that a comprehensive review of roadblock procedures be undertaken to include site selection, use of clearly visible warnings or indicators, and required equipment. He noted that roadblocks must be established with the viewpoint of the civilian driver in mind- what they will see as they approach. c) He recommended that signs written in Arabic and English should, where possible, incorporate international symbols, and that permanent highway overpass signs warn drivers that they may be approaching a checkpoint or roadblocks. d) He recommended that spotlights be replaced as warnings with rotating colored lights and sirens. e) Finally, he recommended that military forces from other nations participating in the coalition be invited to participate in the ongoing Force Protection Working Group in order to share lessons learned in operating roadblocks in an insurgency environment. In 2006, senior U.S. military commanders in Iraq instituted a number of steps to reduce the number of mistaken attacks on civilians feared to be suicide bombers. Tactics, techniques, and procedures on "escalation-of-force" incidents were standardized and training intensified. Soldiers were warned not to blind drivers with bright lights as they approached a checkpoint. In addition, soldiers were given new equipment to get the attention of approaching drivers. The use of "flash snap" hasty checkpoints was ended as they could be confusing to drivers. As a result, by June 2006, the number of Iraqi civilians mistakenly killed at roadblocks and checkpoints was reduced six-fold over the same period the previous year.41

6. ROE for Defending Against Vehicle Suicide Attack on Convoys & Patrols Consideration should be given to establishing the following ROE. a) Establish minimum safe-distance requirement for civilian vehicles. b) When possible, use an escalating series of measures to warn, such as: hand signals, hand-held stop signs, spotlights, announcements in the local language on loud speakers warning to remain clear, and warning shots. In Iraq, the U.S. military requires all vehicles to stay at least 90 meters (270 feet) away from a convoy. When cars come too close, troops signal them to move back, usually by waving a little stop sign, but sometimes by holding up a clenched fist. 40

“Italy Seeks ‘Justice’' in Iraq Death”, Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2007. “U.S. Curbs Iraqi Civilian Deaths in Checkpoint, Convoy Incidents”, Wall Street Journal, 6 June 2006, 4; “Baghdad Traffic Checks Now Safer”, Washington Times, 17 June 2006, 1. 41

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Unfortunately, the hand signals can be easily missed. In addition, the clenched fist, an infantry signal to other friendly troops to stop, can be confusing to civilians, who better understand the upraised open hand.42 The U.S. rules of engagement in convoys and vehicle patrols in Iraq call for an “escalation of force” when a vehicle comes too close. Soldiers are trained to give hand and arm signals first, then fire warning shots, and ultimately shoot to kill.43 c) Whenever practical and available, employ non-lethal measures to stop vehicles and pedestrians determined to be a threat. Establish fixed geographic points at which soldiers are to use force. Use lethal force as a last resort. Consideration should also be given to the following related tactics, techniques, and procedures: a) Place signs in the local language on vehicles warning civilians to remain clear. Rear bumpers of U.S. military vehicles in Iraq often carry a bilingual sign saying “Keep 50 meters or deadly force will be applied.”44 b) Develop a public awareness campaign to inform civilians of how to behave when approaching convoys and patrols.

7. ROE for Defending against Suicide Boat Attack The October 2000 suicide boat attack against the USS COLE in Aden harbor was a deadly example of this threat. The 35-foot workboat manned by 2 terrorists approached the destroyer, and was misidentified as providing trash-pick up services and not challenged. It was allowed to come directly alongside, where over 600 pounds of plastic explosive aboard was then set off. Besides killing 17 sailors and injuring 47 others, the attack caused $315 million dollars in damage to the $1 billion warship.45 Two years later, a similar attack occurred, involving a speedboat packed with explosives against the French flagged oil tanker LIMBURG. That attack killed one crewmember and spilled 50,000 gallons of oil into the Gulf of Aden. The attack also caused some $45 million in damage.46 Consideration should be given to establishing the following ROE. a) Establish minimum safe-distance requirement for civilian vessels. b) When possible, use an escalating series of measures to warn, such as: radio warnings in the local language, spotlights, police flashing lights, and warning shots. c) Warn whenever possible, but open fire on threatening boats approaching closer than the set distance. In May 2004, Iraqi insurgents attacked Iraq’s Al Basra Oil terminal simultaneously with four explosive laden boats. One blew up when it was intercepted by a picket boat, and the others were destroyed 366 meters from the terminal by fire from guards on the terminal. Three U.S. personnel on the picket boat were killed, but the damage to the terminal was light. 90% of Iraq’s oil exports pass through the terminal, and disabling it would have crippled the Iraqi economy. After the attack, the ROE were modified to 42

“Deadly Case of Mistaken IDs”, Long Island Newsday, 7 February 2005. “Shots to the Heart of Iraq”, Los Angeles Times, 25 July 25, 2005, 1. “When Deadly Force Bumps Into Hearts and Minds”, The Economist, 1 January 2005. 45 “A Lack of Security: Cracks in Cole’s Defenses Allowed Bombers’ Approach”, Newsday, 4 March 2001. 46 “Boat Pieces Found on Damaged Tanker”, Washington Post, 11 October 2002. 43 44

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provide that military forces could open fire if an unauthorized vessel came within 2000 meters of the terminal.47 Consideration should also be given to establishing the following related tactics, techniques, and procedures. a) In port, deploy floating barriers to mark security zones around warships and other protected vessels.48 b) Arm and man warships with heavy machine guns and automatic cannon. At the time of the attack, the USS COLE was defended by two sailors carrying 9mm. handguns. c) In foreign ports, arrange with host nation authorities to provide adequate security and/or provide your own; A U.S. Navy warship visiting Aden prior to the COLE attack had been denied permission by Yemeni authorities to deploy armed picket boats around their vessel. Similarly, Aden port authorities made no effort to monitor small boats leaving the shore and approaching the COLE.49 d) Deploy picket boats to challenge approaching suspicious boats. e) Develop a public awareness campaign including a notice-to-mariners to inform civilians of how to behave when approaching restricted facilities and vessels. Suicide attack at sea is not limited to boats. Scuba divers, underwater motorpropelled sleds and even small submarines have been developed by terrorists for use in such attacks. Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger terrorist movement has been developing this capability for years. In 2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative told interrogators that he planned a scuba attack on U.S. warships in Indonesian waters.50 Defense against weapons of mass destruction carried aboard merchant vessels involves overlapping and complex systems of on-board security measures, ship security alert systems, on-board tracking transponders, pre-inspection of cargo, inspection of cargo at destination, intelligence, and port security measures. The International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code entered into force in July, 2004 as an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. It contains most of these measures.51 The U.S. Coast Guard has worked with U.S. intelligence agencies to establish a large database to track cargo, ships and seamen bound for U.S. ports. Ships intending to enter U.S. ports must give 96 hours notice and provide data on their cargo and crews, recent port calls, and vessel ownership. Suspicious vessels are boarded and searched at sea, using hand-held radiation detectors. Vessels with dangerous cargo, such as liquid natural gas tankers are given special security escort.

8. ROE for Defending against Suicide Plane Attack When U.S. warships faced Japanese suicide kamikaze attacks in the last months of World War II, it was relatively easy to identify the threat – the only aircraft 47

“Sailors Guarding Oil Live on ‘Target No. 1’”, Los Angeles Times, 25 February 2005. “Navy Plans Floating Security Barriers In S.D. Bay”, San Diego Union-Tribune, . 49 “A Lack of Security: Cracks in Cole’s Defenses Allowed Bombers’ Approach”, Newsday, 4 March 2001. 50 “15 Freighters Believed to Be Linked to Al Qaeda”, Washington Post, December 31, 2002, 1. 51 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, Chapter XI-2. 48

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approaching the ships were either friendly U.S. military aircraft, or enemy military aircraft. The threat today is from a so-called “renegade aircraft” – either a large commercial aircraft hijacked by a suicide bomber, or a small aircraft on which the bomber has loaded a bomb and is flying toward a target. Of course, the September 11 attacks were a form of suicide plane attack. But the threat is certainly not limited to the U.S.. French investigators believe that an Algerian radical group planned to fly an airplane into the Eiffel tower in the mid-1990s, and British officials have said that al Qaeda had plotted to hijack an airplane in Eastern Europe and crash it into Heathrow Airport in 2003.52 There is a huge challenge involved in correctly identifying a renegade aircraft. Intentions of the pilots are almost always ambiguous, and combined with the speed of the aircraft make positive determination of a threat and the opportunity to respond nearly impossible. In the U.S. and Canada alone between September, 2001 and May, 2005, military aircraft have intercepted more than 2,000 aircraft thought to be suspicious, but which all turned out not to be renegade aircraft.53 In 2005, the German Air Force scrambled jets 20 times to chase after planes that had lost radio contact for prolonged periods, none of the incidents turned out to be a hijacking. The following considerations are relevant in developing ROE against this threat: a) After warnings, and consideration of incidental civilian injuries and loss of life and property, shoot down threatening aircraft. Warnings may involve radio contact, interception by tactical aircraft “wagging” wings, and deploying flares. In the summer of 2005, a new form of warning was deployed by the Air Force around the perimeter of the Air Defense Identification Zone surrounding Washington D.C. – colored light lasers. Each laser costs $500,000 and is equipped with a camera strong enough to identify a plane in good conditions. The laser is aimed toward an intruding aircraft and sends a beam up to 5 miles long and 100 feet wide, which blinks rapidly three times, red, red, green. No other aircraft can see the beam, which is weak enough not to harm a pilot’s eyes, but strong enough to be seen up to 25 miles away at night. The laser is controlled by military officials at a command center in Washington.54 Of course, not all governments have authorized ROE to shoot down a renegade aircraft. For example, Sweden forbids the shooting down of civilian aircraft under any circumstances. In 2005, Germany passed a law that gives the defense minister the authority to order an attack on a hijacked plane.55 However, Germany’s Constitutional Court later voided the law as incompatible with Germany’s constitution (the Basic Law) which forbids the state from taking the life of any German citizen.56 b) ROE need to differentiate between hijackings and suicide attacks, weigh anticipated injury and damage at the expected target against incidental injury and damage resulting from a shoot down, and shoot down only as a last resort. The Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command has said that just because a plane has been hijacked is not a reason to shoot, it maybe an asylum or ransom seeker, or it may be just a false alarm. The Commander stated that 52 “E.U.’s Patchwork of Policies Leaves It Vulnerable to 9/11 Style Attack”, Washington Post, 18 January 06, 1. 53 “A Small Plane Highlights a Big Security Concern”, New York Times, 13 May 2005. 54 “Lasers Set to Help Protect D.C. Airspace”, Washington Times, 18 May 2005, C8. 55 "E.U.'s Patchwork of Policies Leaves It Vulnerable to 9/11 Style Attack". 56 Press Release, Bundes-Verfassungs-Gericht, February 2006, 11/2006.

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under U.S. ROE, a civil aircraft flying would not be shot down if it was flying straight and level. However, if an aircraft had its nose down, and was judged to be going to attack, then it would be shot down.57 c) Given the speed of aircraft and the complexity in correctly identifying an aircraft intent on carrying out an attack, ROE must clearly state who has the authority to order the shoot down of a civil aircraft, and under what circumstances. The U.S. military was unprepared to effectively use force to stop a civil airliner from intentionally crashing into a high-value site on September 11. Following the attacks in New York and Washington, the President authorized the military to shoot down an incoming plane that did not detour after being instructed to do so. However, the military commander at NORAD did not pass that order on to fighter pilots circling Washington and New York because he was unsure how the pilots would or should proceed under this guidance. U.S. ROE has since been modified to state who has the authority to order the shoot down of a threatening aircraft, and in what circumstances.58 The President has authorized two mid-level Air Force generals to order a civil aircraft shot down in the event that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NORAD commander were out of contact, and the attack were seconds away.59 The ROE are different for fighter jets in wide-open areas than in urban areas, and they require several conditions to be met before a shoot down is authorized.60 Consideration should also be given to establishing the following related tactics, techniques, and procedures. a) Establish air defense identification zones in high-threat areas in which private planes must remain in radio contact with air controllers. The U.S. has established an Air Defense Identification Zone around Washington D.C. roughly within 42 nautical miles of Reagan National Airport, located immediately south of the capital]. Aircraft entering the zone are required to obtain a code number from the Federal Aviation Authority, and then remain in radio contact with air traffic controllers once inside the zone. There is a further “Flight Restricted Zone” within roughly 15 nautical miles of the airport in which aircraft are required to submit a separate written request to operate within this area.61 A U.S. government study indicated that between September 2001 and the end of 2004, 88% of the aircraft failing to follow Air Defense Identification Zone and Flight Restriction Zone requirements were business jets and small civilian aircraft. 7% were military aircraft themselves.62 b) Establish no-fly zones for non-commercial aircraft over high-value sites. The U.S. has done this on a permanent basis over such high-value sites as nuclear power plants, chemical facilities, as well as temporarily over large sporting and other public events. Italy did this for Rome NATO-Russia Summit in 2002.63

57

“Cold Truths”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 September 2004. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 August 2004. (Testimony of Sec. Rumsfeld, and GEN Myers.) 59 “U.S. Trains Pilots to Down Hijacked Planes”, The International Herald Tribune, 6 October 2003. 60 “Aircraft ‘Intrusion’ Over Capital Shows Limitations of Air Defenses”, Associated Press, 8 July 2004. 61 “Confused Fliers Trigger Capital Scare”, Washington Post, 12 May 2005; “A Small Plane Highlights a Big Security Concern”, New York Times, 13 May 2005; www.tsa.gov/public . 62 “Fighter Squadron Scours Washington’s Busy Skies”, Los Angeles Times, 8 August 2005, 1. 63 “NORAD and FAA Sharpen View Inside Borders”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 June 2002; “In Extreme Cases, Fighter Pilots Will Be Able to Shoot Suspected Aircraft Down”, Il Gionale, 26 May 2002. 58

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c) Integrate civil and military radar data to better identify suspicious aircraft activity. This was done by NORAD and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration following the September 11 attacks. In the Washington D.C. area, the national government has established a Domestic Events Network, a special communications system used to notify all agencies that protect the capital’s airspace. The Transportation Security Administration’s Operations Center coordinates the national government’s air defense for the capital region.64 d) In high-threat areas or during time of high-threat, deploy combat air patrols and ground-to-air defenses. For months following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. maintained continuous combat air patrols over New York and Washington, as well as nuclear power plants and other sensitive sites. Over 100 fighters were in the air at any one time. Since then, a combination of random patrols and ground-alert aircraft are maintained.65 The cost of providing continuous patrols over Washington and New York while also flying random flights over other cities was $30 million a week- an amount unsustainable even for the U.S.66 In November, 2001 the Spanish armed forces conducted an exercise to determine whether they could effectively prevent a suicide air attack on Madrid like the September 11 attack. They concluded fighter aircraft would not be able to respond in time to intercept a flight hijacked out of the capital’s commercial airport and on a suicide course for a target in the capital. The distance can be covered in a single minute. They also concluded that the only effective defense would be either have a permanent fighter patrol in the air at all times, or position anti-aircraft missiles along side critical targets. Providing a combat air patrol would exhaust the annual budget of the Air Force within weeks. Spanish military officials also posed the following difficult questions: Their air defense ROE allows for firing on an aircraft when it carries out a hostile act. But what would constitute a hostile act by a commercial airliner? When and how could it be established with all certainty that it is going to deliberately crash into a target? How should the 1998 protocol to the International Civil Aviation Treaty be interpreted?67 It categorically states “All states must abstain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight, and in the event of interception, must not put the lives or safety of the occupants of the aircraft at risk”.68 e) Integrate fighter patrols with ground-to-air defenses and law enforcement aircraft. A layered ground and air defense system was established Italy for the 2002 NATO-Russian Summit integrated air defense radar, destroyer sensors, NATO AWACS, civil air traffic control radar and a chain of spotters with binoculars. Armed helicopters and fighter aircraft were also ready.69 In the Washington D.C. area, interception of suspicious aircraft is first carried out by unarmed “Black Hawk” helicopters and Citation jets operated by the Customs and 64

U.S. Promises D.C. Quick Alert In Crisis”, Washington Post, May 21, 2005. “NORAD and FAA Sharpen View Inside Borders”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 June 2002. 66 “A New Diligence in the American Blue Yonder”, Christian Science Monitor, 16 April 2002. 67 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Article 3 bis, 1984, entered into force 1 October 1998. 68 “Spain Powerless to Stop 11 September-style Attack on Madrid”, El Pais, 11 March 2002. 69 "Rome NATO-Russian Summit: Air Defense Arrangements Described", Il Gionale, 26 May 2002. 65

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Border Protection Agency of the Department of Homeland Security. If the aircraft does not respond to commands to land, then an armed Air Force F-16 fighter is sent. The fighters are maintained on 15 minute alert at Andrews Air Force Base, just south of the Capital. The F-16s have the capability of deploying warning flares.70 f) Establish warning systems to evacuate civilians from high-threat locations. In May, 2005, a small private plane, a Cessna 150, weighing less than 453 kilograms (1,000 pounds) and having a top speed of 240 kilometers per hour (150 mph) violated the restricted airspace around Washington. Audio alarms and emergency lights in the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the White House as well as in related office buildings were set off to evacuate 35,000 people.71 g) The speed of modern commercial aircraft and the size of many nations greatly complicates the ability accurately identify renegade aircraft, intercept them, and make the difficult decision to shoot them down. For example, in Europe, which has some of the busiest commercial air traffic corridors in the world, a plane can pass through the national airspace of a nation within minutes. While NATO’s military capability to detect and intercept renegade aircraft is as good as any place in the world, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made it clear in 2005 that there is no support within the Alliance for leaving the decision to fire upon a renegade aircraft to NATO military commanders. That decision has been left up to individual member countries.72 In the end, effective military measures may not be possible against this treat. In 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted that airplanes fly closely past the Pentagon every five minutes. Any one of those planes could simply lower its nose and within less than a minute could crash into the Pentagon or another major government building in the capital. He concluded that it was not possible to stop such a plane in the air. The only way to stop such an incident was clearly on the ground. That is to say, to have air marshals and to have reinforced doors and to have baggage inspections and to not allow terrorists on aircraft.73

9. Common Issues for ROE in Defense against Suicide Bombing Attacks There are several issues commonly facing law enforcement officials and military commanders responsible for ROE against suicide attacks: a) Who decides when to shoot? Should it be the individual policeman or soldier, an on-scene leader, or even a commander remote from the scene? For example, under the ROE for Italian military forces in Iraq, any cannon fire from their Centauro armored vehicles had to be first authorized by authorities in Rome. This certainly limited the possible response to an approaching vehicle intent on a suicide attack.74 b) How much force can be used? Should only small arms be authorized?

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"Errant Planes May Be Targeted”, Dallas Morning News, 24 May 2005. “Confused Fliers Trigger Capital Scare”, Washington Post, 12 May 2005, 1. 72 “E.U.’s Patchwork of Policies Leaves It Vulnerable to 9/11 Style Attack”, Washington Post, 18 January 06, 1. 73 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 August 2004. 74 “Italian Commander in Iraq Moots Possibility of Suicide Attacks in Al Nasiriyah”, La Republica, 20 May 2004. 71

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Under the ROE approved for Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force in Iraq authorized the use of shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons against vehicles that failed to stop at the checkpoint leading into its base in Iraq.75 The use of "less-than-lethal” weapons such as the heat beam to target suspected suicide bombers must be carefully weighed. Such devices lessen the consequences of mistaken targeting of innocent civilians, but they also increase the chance a suicide bomber will succeed. c) When should warnings be required? Certainly this should be done in all cases in which the hostile intent of an approaching person, vehicle, boat or plane is uncertain. But when hostile intent appears clear and delay in opening fire puts innocent lives at risk, is a warning still appropriate? d) Should warning shots be fired? Training for Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force troops deploying to Iraq included firing warning shots at the feet of suspicious persons at 30, 20 and 10 meters away.76 Yet, warning shots may bounce off the ground and hit someone or, if fired into the air, return vertically and injure. They can also be misinterpreted as an attack causing panic or even a return of gunfire. e) What is the proper balance between ensuring force protection and the protection of innocent civilians on the one hand, and the risk of incidental innocent civilian injury and loss of life and property on the other? In the high-threat environment of Iraq, U.S. forces have faced this cruel choice. In 2003, an American division commander said that strong ROE required to defend against suicide attacks were unfortunate but necessary, but he acknowledged this increased the hardships faced by Iraqi civilians.77 U.S. forces have been involved in many instances in Iraq in which they have fired upon vehicles foolishly or recklessly driven at high speed toward checkpoints, foot patrols, and convoys, only to find the vehicles carried no bomb and the people in them were unarmed. The continued mistaken shooting of civilians has fueled a growing dislike of the United States and is undermining efforts to convince the Iraqi public that American soldiers are there to help. It has certainly also damaged the reputation of American forces in other countries, often aggravated by one-sided media reports.78 Army soldier Craig McNeil wrote to the New York Times newspaper after reading critical accounts of the Roadblock 541 incident.79 He said: “I spent 2004 as a soldier in the Sunni Triangle. We soldiers were painfully aware that shooting people who are not hostile undermines our standing with the Iraqi people and that tragedies like the shooting of Guiliana Sgrena’s convoy [sic] undermine the coalition. How, then, could we even consider shooting at vehicles apparently operated by civilians? Because suicide car bombers have an unfortunate habit of behaving like innocent civilians- right up to the point where their vehicles explode. Any suggestion that military leaders don’t agonize over how to balance our need to defend ourselves from madmen with our desire to protect innocent Iraqi civilians is, at the very least, foolish.”

75

“SDF Troops May Use Antitank Weapons Against Suicide Truck Bomber”, Jiji Press, 13 Dec 2003. “Japan: SDF Iraq Dispatch More Difficult Than PKO”, The Daily Yomiuri, 10 Dec 2003. 77 “Anger and Warning After Suicide Attack”, New York Times, 31 March 2003. 78 “Shots to the Heart of Iraq”, Los Angeles Times, 25 July 2005, 1. 79 Letters to the Editor, New York Times, 9 March 2005. 76

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10. Training on ROE at the Tactical Level Training is a critical step in the process of ensuring that military personnel will follow the ROE.80 Since the use of force is at the heart of the capabilities of any professional armed force, training in ROE which control the use of force can make the difference between mission success and mission failure. Without adequate training, a soldier may fail to act in self-defense when appropriate or may lack fire discipline due to a failure to apply the rules. Training conditions policemen, soldiers (and sailors, airmen, and marines) to respond better and use force more appropriately in actions across the entire spectrum of potential armed conflict. The U.S. military now practices the ROE for shooting down a civil aircraft suspected of being on a suicide mission. The drills uncover shortcomings in readiness, and result in improvements. Military pilots and ground-to-air defense crews are routinely quizzed on the ROE and are asked which officials are authorized to order the downing of such aircraft, and how to verify such orders. Pilots flying such missions are specially certified and trained, and undergo psychological evaluation to ensure they are not “trigger-hesitant” at the moment of decision.81 10.1. General Training Program on ROE ROE training should be part of the ongoing general training program for operational units. Training in unit self-defense ROE as well as on the significance of declaring a force “hostile”, and the protection of persons and property are key foundations upon which later mission-specific ROE can be based. General ROE training should take place along with other the other general training of operational units. The U.S. Army had developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for ROE for use in general training programs which help their soldiers react appropriately in stressful situations without hesitation. 10.2. ROE Scenario Briefings Briefings by legal advisors, training officers, and small unit leaders posing specific situations which policemen and soldiers will likely face test will help to reinforce knowledge of key ROE concepts such as unit self-defense and protection of persons and property. The Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps has developed scenarios for use by military legal advisors in designing training at the unit level.82 10.3. Situational Training Exercises on ROE Small unit exercises involving soldiers going through “lanes” as a squad to encounter a realistic scenario test their application of the ROE in a controlled but realistic environment. Trainers play the role of the enemy, civilians, and persons of uncertain status. Participants are not briefed on what the role players will do, but are issued ROE for their "mission" and expected to apply it. 80 81 82

Center for Law and Military Operations, ROE Handbook, 2-1 through 2-12. “U.S. Trains Pilots to Down Hijacked Planes”, The International Herald Tribune, 6 October 2003. Center for Law and Military Operations, Rules of Engagement Handbook, 2000, Appendix E.

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US Army forces sent to Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003 all received ROE "lane training" before they arrived in Afghanistan. This turned out to be important, because once in-country, there was no opportunity for training as forces were disbursed into small units.83 The U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana provides just this type of training for light infantry units headed for Iraq. A fake Iraqi village of corrugated metal sheds has been set up, through which patrolling units are sent. 200 civilian and military Arab-speaking personnel play the roles of Baath Party loyalists, Islamic clerics, Shiite protesters, armed tribesmen, Iraqi policemen and others. Dozens of the role players are Iraqi-Americans recruited from across the country. The personnel playing the role of Iraqis pose unexpected challenges to the training units, including looting, demonstrations, funerals that turn violent, sniper attacks, and car bomb explosions. A speeding pick-up truck also approaches the trucks bringing the units to the village, and attempts to pass the convoy. Each of these situations tests the training soldiers on their compliance with rules of engagement issued them for their patrol mission. Besides ROE, the units are also trained on tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to carry out their mission while minimizing risk to themselves as well as innocent civilians. They learn how to conduct house-to-house weapons searches while respecting cultural sensitivities, engage in riot control, and operate a roadblock. Hidden video cameras record patrolling troop reactions for later review, and all participants wear laser-sensitive devices that beep when hit by low-energy lasers which shoot from the rifles of patrolling soldiers instead of bullets.84

11. Conclusion ROE are a critical command and control tool which help ensure that defenses against suicide bombing attacks are conducted in accordance with the rule of law. ROE can be an effective method for ensuring civilian control of the military as well as ensuring police and military forces that they have the approval of the civilian national government for the use of the type and amount of force needed to accomplish an assigned mission. ROE increase the probability for mission success as part of the overall law enforcement and military planning process. The law which must be factored into the development of rules of engagement in the defense against suicide bombers will depend upon the circumstances in which the attacks are likely to occur- domestic terrorism, internal armed conflict, or international armed conflict. Training in the ROE against suicide bombing attacks is a last critical step in the process of successfully defending against suicide attacks.

83 “Targeting Issues in Afghanistan”, Colonel David Hayden, USA, 2003 EUCOM Legal Conference, September 2003. 84 “Mock Village Helps Troops Learn Skills for Iraq Duty”, New York Times, 22 February 2004.

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APPENDIX: Law Relevant to Defending against Suicide Attacks

12. Relevant Law in Domestic Law Enforcement During Internal Disturbances and Tensions In general, the principle source of law applicable to the conduct of law enforcement within a nation is that nation’s constitution and national laws.85 Depending upon the constitution and legal tradition of a nation, the courts may provide binding interpretations of that nation’s law relevant to law enforcement. If so, the opinions of courts must also be considered. 12.1. Primacy of Domestic Law In the case of defense against suicide bombing attacks, domestic law will determine when deadly force may be used by police and military forces. It will also guide accompanying tactics, techniques and procedures such as searches of persons and vehicles entering areas secured by the military. For example, in the United States, the rules on the use of force by military personnel in law enforcement and security duties comply with the standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court for civilian law enforcement officers. Interpreting the Constitution, the Court has ruled that law enforcement officers may use deadly force only if a reasonable officer at the scene would believe that: 1) “there is probable cause to believe a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm...to the officer or to others...”; and 2) that deadly force is necessary to effect an arrest (or otherwise stop the threat).86 12.2. Influence of International Human Rights Law International human rights law influences the domestic law applicable to law enforcement within a nation. A nation will be bound to follow those human rights treaties to which it has chosen to be a party, as well as by customary international human rights law. Under the legal systems of some nations, obligations they assume under a treaty automatically become part that nation’s law. Other nations have legal systems that require each new international legal obligation to be separately incorporated into national law. Regardless of which type of legal system a nation has, once it has become a party to a human rights treaty, it is under an obligation to conform its domestic law to its international legal obligations. Relevant to suicide bombing attacks is the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, which is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Currently, 159 of 192 nations are party to this Covenant, which is an international agreement committing them to respect the rights specified in the Covenant and to insure that all individuals within their borders also respect those rights. 85 UK Ministry of Defense, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2004, 15.2.1. 86 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

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Similar legal guarantees against the arbitrary deprivation of life are found in regional human rights agreements, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 4), the American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 4), and the European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 2). The drafting history of the Covenant makes clear that killing in self-defense, in making a lawful arrest, or preventing the escape of a person lawfully detained is not “arbitrary”. It should be noted that while many of the rights in the Covenant may be suspended in case of public emergency that threatens the life of a nation, the right against arbitrary deprivation of life is one of the few rights which may not be suspended. The Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant has commented that nations assuming the obligation to provide this right should prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces.87 Regardless of whether a nation has assumed an obligation not to arbitrarily deprive someone of life, international legal scholars, and the U.S. military recognize that the customary international law of human rights also prohibits it. Customary international law is formed out of the practice of most states over a period of time when done out of a sense of legal obligation.88 12.3. UN Guidelines on Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officers A non-binding set of guidelines on the use of force by law enforcement officers was established by the 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in 1990. The guidelines provided the following basic principles to be taken into account in national law enforcement practices:89 a) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officers. b) Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officers with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. Law enforcement officers should be equipped with self-defense equipment such as helmets, and bulletproof vests and transportation in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. c) Law enforcement officers shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. d) Whenever the lawful use of force (including firearms) is unavoidable, law enforcement officers shall exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved. They shall minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life. 87 de Rover, Cees, To Serve and Protect: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998, 271. 88 The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Operational Law Handbook, 2006, 48. 89 “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials”, 8th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.

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e) Firearms shall only be used against persons in self-defense and in defense of others against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a serious offense involving grave threat to life, arrest of a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient. The intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. f) When the use of firearms is justified as described, law enforcement officers shall first identify themselves and give a clear warning of their intent to fire, with sufficient time for the warning to be understood, unless doing so would place law enforcement officers at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless under the circumstances. g) Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officers is punished as a criminal offense. It should be noted that the guidelines are not law, despite the use of the mandatory word “shall” (normally used only in a legally binding instrument). 12.4. “Shoot-to-Wound” or “Shoot-to-Stop”? There is much debate regarding whether law enforcement officers should “shoot-towound” or shoot-to-kill”. The U.S. Army’s procedures for the use of force in law enforcement and security duties state that personnel will shoot with the intent to make the other person incapable of continuing the activity that prompted the personnel to fire. In short, the U.S. military order regarding this issue is for military personnel to “shoot-to-stop”.90 There is an unfortunately common but false popular impression about the effectiveness of shots aimed at crime suspects, and the United States is mostly to blame for it. The impression left in Hollywood movies and television shows is that a competent police officer should be able to fire one or two well-aimed shots, hitting some non-vital area, and a dangerous criminal will immediately and helplessly fall to the ground. Studies by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation of shooting incidents involving crime suspects and law enforcement officers have shown that such incidents are sudden and unexpected. During such incidents, both officers and suspects engage in rapid and unpredictable movement. Lighting is often poor, and many obstacles obscure the suspects. The added human stress of life-threatening situations and the limited accuracy of handguns adds to the difficulty of firing only slow, well-aimed shots at non-vital parts of the body. Another factor that must be considered is that unless hit in the brain or upper spinal cord, there is no physical reason for a human to be immediately incapacitated by a gunshot wound.91 All these factors lead to the conclusion that once deadly force is justified, law enforcement and security personnel should shoot rapidly at the center of the suspect and continue shooting until he or she is incapable of the threatening behavior that 90

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 190-14 Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993, 3-2(g)(3). 91 Urey, Patrick, “Handgun Wounding Factors and Effectiveness”, Firearms Training Unit, FBI Academy, July 14, 1989.

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prompted them to fire. Aiming at the center of the body simply makes it more probable that a shot will hit the suspect. In the context of the suicide bomber, given their fatalistic intent to take their own life, a policy of “shoot-to-stop” would seem to be required. Because such a policy is likely to result in death, it is also of heightened importance that law enforcement and security personnel correctly identify a person as a suicide bomber. 12.5. Rights of Arrested Suicide Bomber Suspects A suicide bomber who is captured is entitled to relevant international human rights such as prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, prolonged arbitrary detention, murder or disappearance, and certain criminal trial rights.

13. Relevant Law in Internal Armed Conflict Terrorist attacks, including the use of suicide bombers, are often carried out by insurgents during an internal armed conflict. When such bombings are not isolated acts, but part of larger hostilities carried out to overthrow the government, the bombers are not just criminals, but also insurgents to which the broader international law of armed conflict applicable to internal armed conflict will apply. Customary international law acknowledges the right of the government of a nation facing an internal armed conflict to conduct military operations against those citizens taking an active part in hostilities against the government. Therefore, military personnel may engage in combat operations against such citizens, in addition to law enforcement activities. This means that government forces may attack citizens taking an active part in hostilities, and need not attempt to arrest them. This would seemingly include those who maintain an active membership in the insurgency group, even if at the moment they are targeted by the military, they are not engaged in violent acts against the government. However, the military may not attack citizens who are only potential or future fighters.92 In my view, suicide bombers may not only be attacked not only as they approach their target, but as they build their bombs, or even where they live (subject to the obligation to accept surrender discussed below). The law that applies to an internal armed conflict is the relevant domestic criminal law of the nation involved, international human rights law, and the international law of armed conflict. 13.1. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 in each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies in all internal armed conflicts. Because all 192 nations are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is certain that Common Article 3 will apply in any such conflict. Relevant to defending against suicide bombing attacks in an internal armed conflict are the following requirements: 92

UK MoD Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, 388.

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a) to spare from direct attack those persons who do not take an active part in hostilities, and to as far as possible, spare such persons from incidental effects of military operations; b) to provide medical care to an insurgent placed out of action by sickness or injury; c) captured insurgents may be tried for their crimes, but only by a regularly constituted court with all normal domestic judicial guarantees; and d) insurgents placed out of action by sickness, injury or capture shall be protected from violence to life and person including torture and cruel treatment, and from outrages upon personal dignity. 13.2. Customary International Law There are provisions of the customary international law of armed conflict which govern combatants in internal armed conflict. However, further exploration will not be undertaken here as the topic is quite broad, and the content uncertain. However, the question regarding whether or not quarter must be given to insurgents, that is, whether or not soldiers must accept their surrender needs to be addressed in this context. The Rome Statute, which creates and provides the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, lists failure to do so in an internal armed conflict as a war crime.93 This is binding on the nations which are party to that treaty, and is some evidence that the prohibition may also be part of customary international law. (AP I, Art. 40 and AP II, 4(1) prohibits this.) 13.3. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I applies to internal armed conflicts which involve “wars of national liberation”- armed conflicts in which “peoples” are fighting in their right of self-determination against: colonial domination; alien occupation; or racist regimes. Currently, 167 states are party to Additional Protocol I. However, to date, no state party has acknowledged that an internal armed conflict involving a war of national liberation has ever existed within its borders. Should a state party to Additional Protocol I have an internal armed conflict it acknowledges to be a war of national liberation, the following provisions of the Protocol would be relevant in defending against suicide bombing attacks. a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects. (Art. 57(2)) The standard to “do everything feasible” is not further defined, and may leave police and military personnel open to being charged with war crimes when they mistakenly target noncombatants or civilian objects in the defense against a suicide attack. Whether the military personnel involved have done “everything feasible” may be decided upon by a judge with no military experience, such as all of those who currently serve on the International Criminal Court. b) Refrain from any attack that may be expected to cause incidental injury or loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (Art. 57(2))

93

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(e)(x).

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This is the rule of proportionality required for combatants in armed conflict. Police and military personnel may not use force which would likely result in incidental injuries to innocent civilians and collateral damage to their property disproportionate to the anticipated advantage of stopping a suicide attack. c) Insurgents are entitled to prisoner of war status, even when they fight while dressed as civilians, so long as they carry their arms openly during each military engagement and when deploying prior to launching an attack. Prisoners of war may not be tried under domestic criminal law for acts related to hostilities. (Art. 44(3)) A suicide bomber captured in the preparation stage of an attack would be entitled to such a status, and therefore immune from trial under domestic criminal law for acts related to hostilities. This is one of the provisions of Additional Protocol I to which has kept the United States from becoming a party to the Protocol. Notwithstanding the above, as suicide bombers typically choose civilians as their targets, it may be possible to try a suicide bomber for war crimes. There are international legal precedents from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicating that insurgents who intentionally attack civilians not taking an active part in hostilities may be convicted of a war crime. For those states which are party to the Rome Statute, Article (8(c) & (e)), provide for trial and punishment on this basis. 13.4. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol II applies in internal armed conflicts which: do not involve wars of national liberation; involve insurgent forces under responsible command able to maintain discipline so as to ensure compliance with it; and which involve rebel forces in control of national territory sufficient to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Currently, 163 states are party to Additional Protocol II. As in the case of Common Article 3, the focus of Additional Protocol II is on those citizens not taking an active part in hostilities. Should a state party to Additional Protocol II have an internal armed conflict as described, the following requirements are relevant to defending against suicide attacks: a) Civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities shall not be the object of attack, and shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. Acts of terrorism against them is prohibited. (Arts. 13(1) and (2), and 4(2)) b) Captured insurgents may be tried for their crimes, but only by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality and certain specified procedural rights. (Arts. 3(1) and 6(2)) c) Insurgents placed out of action by sickness, injury or capture shall be treated with specific standards of care for medical treatment and detention. (Arts. 8 and 5(1))

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14. Relevant Law in International Armed Conflict

14.1. International Terrorist Attack as an Armed Attack under U.N. Charter Article 51 The UN Security Council has recognized that an act of international terrorism is a threat to international peace and security, and therefore subject to the provisions of the UN Charter concerning the use of military force by nations. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent customary international law right of a nation to use military force in self-defense when an armed attack has occurred. Article 51 also recognizes the right of a nation to use military force in collective self-defense of another nation in such circumstances. The right to employ military force continues until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace and security. Following the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, recognizing the right of nations to act in individual and collective self-defense in response to international terrorism attacks. NATO’s North Atlantic Council as well as the Organization of American States found that the United States had suffered “an armed attack” under Article 51, and committed each of their members to collective self-defense of the United States. Many nations such as Australia, Japan, and Germany have offered ground troops and other military assistance in response to this armed attack. A nation’s right of individual or collective self-defense does not depend upon recognition by the UN Security Council. Article 51 simply notes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense”. Therefore, the Charter does not require recognition of that right by the Security Council in a particular situation. Some nations interpret Article 51 as including a right of anticipatory self-defense when an attack is imminent and no reasonable choice of peaceful means is available. Most of the debate over this interpretation concerns how immediate the attack is thought to be. The classic statement of this right was made in 1841 in the Caroline Case. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that the anticipated attack must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”. But that standard was written in a time of sailing ships, horse drawn wagons, and weaponry no more lethal than a smooth bore cannon. The threat faced by nations today from suicide bombers and other terrorists is from weapons of mass destruction such as chemical agents, radiological bombs, and even large commercial aircraft.94 The severity of such threats making waiting for an attack to occur absurdly dangerous, and the decision regarding when an attack is “imminent” and action in selfdefense must be taken one that must be made earlier if large numbers of innocent civilians are to be protected. 14.2. The Law of Armed Conflict and Armed Conflict with International Terrorists When military forces engage in hostilities against international terrorists, there is a question of whether and to what extent the international law of armed conflict applies. 94 Schmitt, Michael N., “Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law”, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 5, November, 2002, 19, 22 - 23.

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The major international law of armed conflict treaties concern hostilities between the armed forces of two or more nations, and by their terms bind only states that are party to them. International terrorist groups do not qualify to become parties to these treaties. More significantly, as they intentionally target innocent civilians and their property to create terror, they have no reason to do so. The U.S. position regarding its international armed conflict with Al Qaeda (and other international terrorists and those who harbor and support them) is that U.S. military forces will adhere to the customary international law of armed conflict in carrying out military operations against them.95 Relevant to the defending against suicide bombing attacks in an international armed conflict with international terrorists are the following customary laws of armed conflict. a) Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and objects, and combatants and military objects and shall direct their operations only against military objectives. Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects. Military objectives are combatants, and those objects that, by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.96 b) Refrain from any attack that may be expected to cause incidental injury or loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.97 c) Enemy combatants who are out of combat due to surrender, capture, or incapacitated by wounds or sickness must be protected and respected, and provided with medical care.98 d) Captured enemy combatants may be detained until the end of active hostilities; but are entitled to prisoner of war status only if they: are under responsible commanded of a superior; have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; carry their arms openly; and conduct their operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict.99 e) Enemy combatants who do not meet the requirements for status as Prisoners of War are required to be treated humanely and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. 100

95 “Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense”, 6. 96 Additional Protocol I, Art. 52(2). See also Headquarters, U.S. Army, Field Manual FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Change 1, para. 40(a) and (c). See also "Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen", 4. 97 "Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen", 4. 98 Id. 99 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, Arts. 4 and 118; See also Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm, 6 May 2005, Annex 1, 47, 50. 100 Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture, 47, 61 - 62.

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Terrorism, Financing of Terrorism and Suicide Terrorism Dr Nick RIDLEY Associate Researcher, John Grieve Centre for Police Studies, London Metropolitan University, UK

Abstract. Suicide terrorism epitomises the fanaticism of various terrorist groups in the extreme lengths to which they will go in their attempts to achieve their ultimate objectives. It is also an effective tactic and one which groups are using in order to counter the advantages of the security forces and government in terms of having vastly superior resources. This paper will examine the interaction between the tactic of suicide terrorism, in the context of developments in the post-9/11 era, the role of intelligence in countering terrorism, and the element of finances in terrorist attacks. Keywords. Terrorism, suicide terrorism, financing of terrorism

Background In mid-2002 the current Security Co-ordinator of the United Nations stated in a closed meeting: “The events of 11 September have cut through history, and have changed both law enforcement thinking and the priorities as all of us who work in law enforcement formerly knew them.”1 The events caused a rapid and urgent prioritisation in operational investigations on an international scale. In terms of intelligence there was the same urgency, caused by a need for effective strategic assessments of the scale and future threat of various terrorist groups, a realignment of other aspects and methodology of strategic intelligence. A further result was the imperative of collation and effective deployment of practical real time operational intelligence.

The Role of Intelligence in the Financing of Terrorism This revitalisation of the role of intelligence in anti-terrorism resulted in certain areas of knowledge in the area of anti-terrorism being rapidly enhanced. One such area was 1

David Veness, former head of Specialist Operations Metropolitan Police, closed the EU law enforcement meeting, The Hague, 2/2002.

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the financing of terrorism. At a UK national level, past experience of the financing of differing terrorist groups and movements was shared and compared in an attempt to establish a framework on which to scope the terrorist finance structure of Al Qaeda. A significant intelligence blind spot was overcome by late 2002. This was the pre9/11 oft-held tenet that the potential gains from any in-depth operational intelligence work on terrorist financing did not justify the time and effort involved due to the, ‘small amounts’ involved. The logic of this maxim was that, since the costs of mounting terrorist operations were comparatively cheap, and the amounts involved were so small compared to amount involved in other areas of financial crime, it was unlikely that any significant intelligence could be gained. This maxim has now been virtually discarded, partially due to the sheer necessity of identifying all relevant sums, amounts and finances involved, and also due to the fact that significant small linked amounts have come to light in intelligence gathering carried out on various cells within the UK. After 2004 one trend regarding terrorist financing increasingly emerged, that of the pragmatic nature of differing cells in raising revenue. Contrary to other forms of financial crime, where there appeared to be certain continuity of modus operandi, differing terrorist cells in both the UK and in several EU countries engaged in various forms of low level criminality to raise funds for their activities and the day to day running of the cell. These criminal activities would change – in long-term intelligence terms – in a short space of time and the cell would engage in another form of criminal activity to raise funds. This pragmatism meant that differing types of intelligence techniques had to be applied to ensure up-to-date intelligence. From about 2005 onwards, after the Madrid and London attacks, the whole intelligence area of financing of terrorism, on the one hand, continued to be developed as a semi-specialised area of knowledge, but also the emphasis was put on fully integrating the intelligence gained as part of the overall information in investigations of the individual suspects and the supporting information as part of the overall intelligence. The sense of the permanence of the terrorist threat and the necessity of intelligence against the self-financing terrorists and their differing methods of financing, had only been strategically accepted on an entire EU level post-2005, as was stated by the current Director of Europol, “… the threat is still there, it is ongoing and permanent. It may happen today or tomorrow, in London, in Paris, in Stockholm, or in Oslo. … Even some EU Member States that did not think of it before are now much more careful ... 2 the decentralisation of European terrorist operations was evident in their financing.”

Terrorism and Suicide Attacks The key elements identified for targeting against terrorist cells are: x people x equipment x finance x accommodation x storage 2

Max Petr Ratzel, Director of Europol, November, 2006.

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x transport/travel These are elements of what is known as “five strand Police counter-terrorism strategy.”3 Those elements of people, travel, equipment, finance are inextricably linked in the issue of suicide terrorist attacks. The basic advantages enjoyed by most if not all terrorist groups are: x An element of surprise, x The ability to change the targeting at will, x The option of returning to a target if a previous attack was unsuccessful, x Access to individuals who are prepared to die in order to achieve their objectives. All these advantages are fulfilled by the terrorist and especially by the suicide terrorist attacker. In addition, the attacks by suicide terrorists bring a number of unique advantages to terrorist groups, in terms of the enhancing the attack. These are: x A high probability of success, x Operational security, x Guaranteed publicity, x Potential for mass casualties, x No necessity for planning and ensuring an escape route, x Particular psychological impact. (This last aspect is combined with that of the guaranteed publicity in what is a particularly penetrating “echo effect” 4 on public opinion.) Suicide attacks as a terrorist tactic are by no means new, post-9/11 phenomena. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, up to 2000, were responsible for the largest amount of attacks by suicide bombers. From 1987 onwards they maintained a special unit – the Black Tigers – whose members, whilst regular fighters, could be and were deployed at short notice for suicide attacks. The success of these suicide attacks by the Black Tigers was considerable, including in a two year period the assassinations of two regional heads of state. These were, on 21 May 1991, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, assassinated together with 16 bystanders, and, on 1 May 1993, the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadassa, also assassinated by an LTTE operative, killing 23 others nearby. (Following the 2004–2005 gradual erosion and break down of the ceasefire in Sri Lanka, the Black Tigers renewed their attacks, including, on 26 June 2006, assassinating Lieutenant General Parami Sugandika Bandara Kulatunga, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Sri Lankan Army, by driving a motorbike into his military transport vehicle en route to Panipitaya.) In the Middle East, during the various Lebanese civil wars and occupations, on the 23 October 1983, a team of suicide car bombers drove into military installations in Beirut. The fatalities were 241 US Marines and 58 French paratroopers. It is perhaps worthy of note that, throughout the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, where a particularly forward or bullish foreign policy was constantly pursued, the Beirut attacks were one of the few anti-US attacks to which there was no reaction. In the 1990s the Provisional IRA attempted to commence a campaign of suicide bombing. The attacks involved the euphemistically termed tactic of “proxy bombing”. This involved the use of an enforced or a coerced suicide bomber. 3

Keith Weston, former UK senior anti-terrorist officer, now a lecturer at the UK Defence Academy, Cranfield University. 4 Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism, 1987, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, p. 56.

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On 24 October 1990 an individual, whose family were threatened with total extinction if he did not comply, was forced to drive and steer a large vehicle full of explosives into and against military premises at Coshquin, Northern Ireland. On the same day a 64-year-old man was similarly coerced and drove the bomb-loaded vehicle, but managed to abandon the vehicle prior to the explosions. The Coshquin driver died in the explosions, together with five soldiers, 5 the elderly driver survived, but died some months later from trauma-induced illness. When full details became known, there was overall revulsion against this. The last attempts at this tactic made by PIRA were in London on 24 April 1993, when two taxi drivers were coerced into driving their taxis, loaded with explosives, to Downing Street and New Scotland Yard. Both drivers succeeded in shouting warnings and in abandoning their vehicles. By this time the hostility against this, even amongst extreme republican elements in Northern Ireland, compelled PIRA to abandon any more attempts at suicide attacks. Coming forward to the present, there is no lessening of the trend of suicide attacks. In Afghanistan, according to the latest figures as of March 2007, there were five times more suicide attacks in Afghanistan this year than in the corresponding period in 2006.

Suicide Bombing as a Change in Terror Tactics Before the advent of al Qaeda and Islamic extremist groups, the majority of terrorist groups perpetrated attacks and aimed to cause a comparatively small amount of fatalities whilst achieving maximum publicity. The October 1984 bombing by the IRA of the entire British Cabinet whilst in conference at Brighton failed to result in a single fatal ministerial casualty, yet the fact that the attack was mounted was itself some sort of victory for PIRA, as acknowledged by a Cabinet minister: “What a coup for the 6 Paddys – the whole thing has all the sense of the Tet offensive about it.” The Real IRA bombing in Omagh in 1987, causing the largest amount of fatalities of all the troubles in Northern Ireland, was carried out by a hard line faction breaking away from the IRA. Following the almost universal hostility of public opinion, the Real IRA was successfully intimidated by the IRA into ceasing forthwith any such attacks.7 This was fully in keeping with the old rules of terrorist tactics of that era whereby “terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.”8 Al Qaeda and its associated Islamic extremist groups have completely reversed this objective, and have as a principal aim of attacks mass casualties. Suicide attacks are particularly effective in this aim.

5

J. Cassidy “Sinn Fein’s top secret spy,” Sunday World 28/5/2006, found on: http://cryptome.org/mcguiness-spy.htm, and “Birds of a Feather” ,in A Tangled Web-contemporary view of British politics, 29/5/2006 6 Former Defence Minister Alan Clark, in “Diaries”, p.99 Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1993. The Tet offensive referred to was an action by the Vietcong in 1970 across the length and breadth of Vietnam. It was repulsed and was a failure. Nonetheless the fact that the attack took place on such a large scale caused many in US military and political circles to conclude that to defeat the Vietcong was impossible. The scale of the attack included penetration by Vietcong gunmen into the inner compound of the US Embassy in Saigon. 7 T. P.Coogan, chapter on The Peace Process, in “Ireland in the Twentieth Century”, p 687, Arrow Books 2003. 8 A.Sahni, The locus of terror-has the gravity of terrorism shifted to Asia? in R. Gunaratna , “Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific,” Singapore Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

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It has been found that the suicide terrorist, when the attack has been successfully mounted, causes a disproportionate number of casualties compared to other forms of terrorist attack. From 1998 to 2001, in a mere three year period, suicide attacks formed only a 3% proportion of all terrorist attacks worldwide, but accounted for just over 48% of the total deaths. 9 The October 2002 Bali bombing, perpetrated by the Islamic extremist group Jemaa’h Islamiyya, was deliberately planned and co-ordinated. A single suicide bomber detonated himself inside the premises, causing fatalities, but also causing a speedy mass exodus of surviving tourists to the street outside where many more were killed in second explosion of a carefully parked car bomb. In this manner, and in keeping with the whole planned and coordinated attack, we see the bombing had mass casualties as its principle objective. Of all the Islamic terror groups, Al Qaeda emphasises the physical and the psychological aspects alike in the various attacks. All operatives are well prepared and immured to the consequences. The extent of the fanaticism was evidenced in all the 9/11 hijackers, of whom not one hesitated, and comparatively few hours before the attack the leader actually took the time and trouble to remit unspent expenses back to the cause by bank transfers. Some of the Al Qaeda secret training camps specialised in preparing, grooming, and training operatives for martyrdom. The training covered combining the psychological and ideological aspects with the practical details. The practicalities covered target selection and surveillance, the obtaining and transferring of finances to procure the equipment, concealing and assembling the equipment: “More than any 10 other terrorist group, the culture of martyrdom is firmly embedded in its psyche.” Due to its attacks during the period 1998 to 2001, Al Qaeda was the first terrorist group to successfully carry out repeated suicide attacks by land, sea and air (the US embassies in east Africa, the USS Cole bombing off Yemen and the attacks on New York and Washington).

Three Terrorist Attacks Compared In 2002 it was stated by an eminent international counter-terrorism expert: “The preponderance of the use of suicide terrorism by Al Qaeda and its associate groups in the global south will continue … the threat will spread to Europe and North America with time…”11 Taking the period immediately after this prediction, 2003–2004, when it was proven correct, an interesting comparison arises between three terrorist attacks which occurred. The attacks were those occurring in Istanbul in November 2003, in Madrid in March 2004, and in Budapest in mid-2004. Certain differences are immediately apparent, the principal one being that the first two achieved their murderous objectives, whilst the Budapest attacks were thwarted by the Hungarian authorities. However, the common factors are also instructive. All the perpetrators were suicides or potential willing suicides. (The Madrid perpetrators did not kill themselves 9

“Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,” Congressional Research Representative Library of Congress Washington DC, 2003, available on http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058.pdf. 10 R Gunaratna, “Inside Al Qaeda,” Colombia University Press, 2002, p.7. 11 R. Gunaratna, ed. “ The Changing Face of Terrorism,” 2002, Eastern Universities Press, chapter on New Threshold Terrorism, pp. 24 -25.

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in the attack itself, but were fully willing and did sacrifice themselves in the fight with the authorities a short time later.) In each of the cases, the majority of the perpetrators were not inserted, nor did they enter clandestinely, but were had been residing in the country for a period. Those of the Madrid bombings lived a low-level life of crime, those of Istanbul had journeyed to and spent some time in Afghan Islamic training camps, and those of Budapest were led by professional individuals. In two out of the three cases, those of Istanbul and Budapest, a major part of the targets were specifically Jewish religious institutions. In two of the three cases, Budapest and Istanbul, the targets specifically included banks and/or financiers; in the case of the third, Madrid, the human targets were indiscriminate masses. In two of the three cases, Madrid and Budapest, the perpetrators were to a large extent self-financing, and in the case of Madrid only a small part of the funds were spent on the actual equipment and explosives. Finally, in all cases to finance the attack, or to retrieve monies afterwards, the perpetrators relied on the physical transfer of cash, in two cases by cash couriers, one of those being bank transfer then co-ordinated cash withdrawal then couriering.

The Middle East Dimension – The PFLP A hearkening back to the past, forming a link with the present and future trends is formed by the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” (PFLP). This “secular” organisation has used suicide bombings during the post-2003 violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. Founded in 1967 by George Habash, who resigned as the group’s leader in May 2000, the PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that combines its leftist doctrine with Palestinian nationalism and the notion of Arab 12 unity. On its website, for example, the PFLP maintains its remit as that it has “an unequivocal strategy for peace” which is characterized by its commitment to the creation of a democratic, pluralist state where the basic rights of all people are affirmed and protected. The first step in attaining this goal is to bring an end to the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian land. The secularism and Marxist-Leninist theory of the PFLP has not prevented the use of purely Islamic language and the veneration of spiritual martyrdom: “There is a holy duty for all Muslims to defend Jerusalem and Palestine, and suicide activity is istishhad which means paradise.”13 Originally a member of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the group dissociated itself completely after the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles. It is believed to have roughly 800 members and the group reached its pinnacle in the late 1960s and 1970s, when it carried out a number of spectacular airline hijackings. In the early months of the second “Intifada”, the group was led by Abu Ali Mustafa, the successor of George Habash, and after Mustafa was killed by the Israeli army on August 27, 2001, by Ahmed Sadat. This change in leadership was seen as both a radicalization of the PFLP, as well as an attempt to consolidate its presence in the areas under PA control. On February 16, 2002, the group took responsibility for one suicide

12

Michael C. Hudson, “Developments and Setbacks in Palestinian Resistance Movement, 1967-71,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring, 1972): 64-84. 13 Dr Yahya Isma'il, Secretary of the PFLP, quoted in David Bukay, “Total Terrorism in the Name of Allah: The Emergence of the New Islamic Fundamentalists,” Sahrei Tikva: Ariel Centre for Policy Research, 2002, p.108.

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bombing that killed 2 Israelis and injured 29 at the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron. To a certain extent, the lack of definite borderline between radical and secular groups is shown by the formation of the coalitions of organizations engaged in terrorist activity that exist between the Palestinian groups that organize, execute, or provide logistical, financial, material, or moral support to acts of suicide terrorism. This gives the potential to provide the individual groups with more and better resources, since they are more likely to be innovative in terms of tactics than are individual organizations: “Coalitions have the talents, resources, and weapons that are needed to commit new types of acts.”14 These acts particularly comprise those operations which are difficult to plan and execute. However, the very fact that such operations are difficult to organize means that they pose a greater security risk than do single group actions. Groups such as Hamas, Fatah and PIJ have at times cooperated with each other and several of them have close relationships both among themselves as well as with other state or non-state actors. Several documents captured or seized by the Israeli military units suggest close operational cooperation in the Jenin area among Hamas and PIJ on the one hand and among Fatah and Palestinian Authority security services on the other. That cooperation, according to IDF sources, includes actual cooperation in executing large-scale terror attacks in Israel. However, though such apparent ad hoc operational co-operation is ongoing, there are no indicators to date to suggest that there is a sharing or, ‘pooling’ of finances in order to carry out the operations. These are strictly separate, with each organisation maintaining and indeed guarding its own financial resources and the methods of terrorist revenue raising. One important aspect of suicide attacks is that of the groundswell of public opinion within the region. In the case of Palestine there appears to be almost universal support for the suicide attacks amongst all the various parts of Palestine. As early as 2001 an 15 unnamed Palestinian security official cited in a well-known Israeli press daily is reported to have stated that a major problem in the prevention of suicide bombing attacks was the strong support for them among the population. In mid-2001 an extensive survey was conducted among Palestinian adults from the Gaza Strip, from East Jerusalem and from the West Bank, by Dr. Nabil Kukali and the Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO). The findings showed “a substantial majority (76.1%) giving full support for suicidal attacks with only 12.5% declaring themselves as opposed to the attacks outright.”16 This must be contrasted with the situation in Iraq three years later, during a period in 2004, where, according to one contemporary interpretation,17 the Al Qaeda allied terrorist cells encountered unexpected problems in Iraq. This was apparently due to the fact that most Iraqis had become increasingly hostile to al Qaeda’s suicide bombing campaign, with even religious leaders (from whom al Qaeda expected support) openly denouncing the bombing campaign. One result was that Iraqis, as much potential 14

An interesting analysis on the cooperation of terrorist groups can be found in Edward F. Mickolus, “Combatting International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis,” 1981 PhD Dissertation, Yale University. 15 Jerusalem Post 4 June 2001. 16 E Shuman, “What makes a suicide bomber tick,” 4 June 2001 israelinsider, found on: http://www.isrealinsider.com/channel/security/articles/sec-0049.htm. 17 J.Dunning, “Why Al Qaeda is felling Iraq,” July 2004, found on: http://www.strategypage.com/the_war_in_iraq/enemy/20047170.asp.

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victims of suicide bombing attacks as the coalition forces, were actually providing information to the security forces on the whereabouts of al Qaeda members. (Many of al Qaeda in Iraq are foreigners, and comparatively easy to identify). This resulted in a retreat by al Qaeda activists in 2004 from several locations back to Fallujah. The recent (2007) attempts to restore certain general levels of security by the United States in deploying increased amounts of troops on the streets and flooding Baghdad with a high level military presence appear to have had some success. However, it has afforded further opportunities for suicide bombing in that the increased number and levels of security checkpoints with the resulting queues and crowds present easier targets.

Female Suicide Bombers – Initial Regional Reluctance Women have been used by some terrorist organisations for some time. One of the major successes of the LTTE suicide attacks cited above, that of the assassination of India’s head of state, Rajiv Ghandi was carried out by a female Tamil Tiger suicide bomber Thenmuli Rajaratnam. Of the fifteen successful suicide attacks carried out by the PKK in Turkey, eleven of them have been carried out by women members.18 Yet, in one of the most high profile and long-term region of terrorist activity, the Middle East, with its extensive history of suicide bombings, there has been a marked reluctance by several of militant groups to accept and deploy women members as suicide attackers. On January 27, 2002, a 27-year-old female Fatah activist, Wafa Idris, carried a bomb that detonated in central Jerusalem. The explosion killed her, an 81-year-old Israeli, and injured over a hundred more. An Israeli government investigation was carried out due to the fact that the exact circumstances were unclear, and there was a possibility that she was bomb courier and there were doubts as to whether she had deliberately detonated and had intended to die in the attack. However, the Arabic world eulogised the murderous act. The Iraqi media reported that Saddam Hussein had ordered a memorial to be erected in Baghdad to honour Idris. In Egypt a film producer immortalised Idris in a television programme, broadcast at peak viewing times throughout the Arab world. Articles praising Idris appeared in the Egyptian opposition party daily newspaper, Al-Wafd. Pop songs in Arabic immortalised her, whilst primary school children in free expression lessons invariably wrote about her in terms of a role model. Due to the unexpected scale of the popular acclaim, irrespective of the circumstances of her death, it became imperative that Idris was indeed a martyr and Al Aqsa claimed responsibility. Its earlier statements disavowing any link between themselves and Idris were quietly abandoned. A month later, on 18 February 2002, the Al Aqsa formed the Shawaq al-Aqsa group of volunteer female suicide bombers, and placed on record that this group had been formed in honour of Wafa Idris. In 2003 female Islamic martyrs started being ‘officially’ deployed in attacks. On May 19 May 2003 a woman carried out a suicide bombing attack at the entrance of a shopping mall in Afula. Responsibility was claimed both by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. (Subsequent sources indicate that Al-Aqsa 18

Y. Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism (Herzlia: ICT, 2000).

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was more likely responsible). It was the first time that Islamic Jihad publicly positioned itself as an organisation utilising female suicide bombers. The Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin had in January 2002 “categorically renounced the use of women as suicide bombers,” and in March 2002, after a Fatah bombing, reiterated official Hamas position stating “Hamas was far from enthusiastic about the inclusion of women in warfare, for reasons of modesty.” 19 Throughout 2003 Hamas remained reluctant to use female suicide bombers. When confronted with or petitioned by such female volunteers, it “referred” them to Islamic Jihad, who accepted and used them. This policy of Hamas changed in January 2004, when a suicide attack was carried out by a mother of two small children. She was the first woman to carry out a suicide attack in the name of Hamas. In Chechnya and the accompanying wider struggle, the Chechen resistance to the Russian invasions and their overall campaign of violence for an independent state has always utilised both women fighters and women suicide bombers. During the hostage siege of a Moscow theatre in October 2002, carried out by Chechen fighters, 19 of the 41 perpetrators were women, all with explosive belts and packages attached to themselves. On 24 August 2004 two flights leaving Domodedovo Airport near Moscow crashed, killing 90 people. According to Russian sources, two women on board the aircraft had explosives which detonated. On 31 August 2004 a female relative of one of the two women responsible for the aircraft explosions detonated explosives she was carrying outside a Moscow subway, causing 10 fatalities. The women involved in the Moscow theatre were part of a special group of Chechen fighters specifically for suicide attacks. The two women on board the Moscow departing flights, and the third involved in the explosion the following week, were not part of this specific group, but were Chechen fighters. Female Chechen suicide bombers have all the explosives attached to their own persons, but in the majority of attacks the detonation control is carried out, not by the individual herself, but by a male accomplice or ‘handler’. This is in direct contrast to the female suicide bombers utilised by the various Palestinian and Islamic groups, who are each in control of the timing and location of the fatal detonation.

Financial Costs of Utilising the Tactic of Suicide Terrorism In general terms, making a terrorist attack deploying suicide individuals is extremely cost effective to the organisation. The equipment, explosives, detonators and holding belts or attachments, are easily assembled at short notice. Therefore no storage facilities of equipment or materials are needed, and most of the component parts of the explosive can be acquired easily. The total operational costs to deploy a suicide bomber are small, with an average outlay of $10 US for components, and $140 US for reconnaissance and selection of targets. The logistics cost of a suicide attack by Palestinian groups inside Israel can be as 20 high as $200 US. Part of this is due to the necessity of travel due to the fact that most of the recruited Palestinian martyrs are drawn from the Israeli-occupied territories, and 19

A. Regular, “Mother of Two Becomes First Female Suicide Bomber for Hamas,” Haaretz, January 16, 2004. 20 J. Dunnigan, “The rise and fall of Suicide Bombers,” August 2002, found on www.strategypage.com.

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time, effort and expense is needed for successfully passing through the border control crossings. This sum is considerably more than the cost of the actual materials, but is a miniscule sum for the terrorist group when one realises the potential impact of a detonated attack carried out inside Israeli sovereign territory. Over the past two years the Israeli authorities have countered suicide bombing attacks by deploying technical and engineering units of the Israeli Army to the family home of an attacker who has detonated a bomb, and evicting the family and totally demolishing the premises. The costs of taking care of the homeless family are thus added to the potential expense calculations of every proposed suicide bombing attack. Hamas grants monthly amounts of $200–400 US to each bereaved family, with a certain unconscious macabre irony, in free health benefits. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Saddam regime in Iraq provided $20,000 US ex gratia payment to each immediate family. During the Moscow theatre siege of October 2002, one of the Chechen female suicide bombers was intercepted and arrested before the events. Under interrogation she claimed to have been promised by her Chechen group leaders that her relatives would be granted $70,000 US for her fatal role in the siege. Besides ideology and the quest for martyrdom, money was undoubtedly a driving factor for those Chechen 21 suicidists. One individual, Kheda Khajieva, sent an elder and a younger daughter to the Moscow Theatre siege; the daughter received monies from the Chechan groups, and bequeathed it in a will to her mother, executable in Baku Azerbaijan. Another mother did the some for her daughter, and payment was made from an Azerbaijani location. The father of Z. Yupaieva was paid $30,000 US in advance for his daughter’s full and successful participation in the siege.22 These large amounts promised may have been due to the sheer scale of the operation and the necessity to recruit a large number of would-be suicidists. There are also indicators that Chechen operational leaders, when selecting woman suicides, make sure that those selected have no immediate traceable family, and therefore no organisational funds will be needed after the suicide attack. However, this somewhat ruthless selection is not difficult, as many of the women volunteer suicidists 23 from Chechnya are those whose husbands and/or sons have already been killed in the conflicts and their volunteering to die for the cause is partially from a genuine and tragic sense of the pointlessness in their lives.

Conclusion The tactic of deploying and using suicide terrorists has been found to be a significant factor and advantage to the terrorist groups in countering the advantages held by the security forces. These advantages consist of more resources, better trained professional soldiers and law enforcement, technological equipment and governmental support. The financial outlay to a terrorist organisation in obtaining and deploying them is 21

Professor V. Petrishev, Russian Federation Anti-Terrorist Centre, Moscow, Council of Europe expert meeting on terrorist financing Moscow,12/2004. 22 Y.Yu, “The Brides of Allah,” Moscow, 2003 (original text in Russian). 23 Professor Fituni, Director of Centre for Global and Strategic Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Council of Europe expert meeting on terrorist financing, Moscow, December, 2004.

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comparatively small compared to other forms of terrorist attack. These financial advantages are enhanced by the mobility and adaptability of the suicide terrorist, particularly the interchanging use of the pedestrian or vehicle bomb which itself reflects the changing overall trends towards urban terrorism. There is no single countermeasure in the area of financing of terrorism that is effective against suicide attacks. Intelligence in this area of financing of terrorism must be utilised as an integral part of the overall and pragmatic counter terrorist measures. In countering the tactic of suicide terrorism, this is a long term and complex task.

Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Patterns of Terrorism Financing: The Art of Puzzling Dr. Katharina VON KNOP Researcher Program on Terrorism and Security Studies George C. Marshall Center, Research Board, Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts University, Boston, USA

Abstract. Putting together the puzzle how terrorism financing works is a mingle of proven cases, know how, experiences, analysis, institutional and international cooperation, imagination, instinct and drawing the right conclusions. As such working on terrorism financing and how it can be countered is an art not science it is an art. The purpose of the article is to give a general overview of terrorism financing and to emphasize the most recent trends. The terrorism funding resources like the Banking System, Hawala, Money Laundering, Charities, Phenomenon Rich Bankers, States, Criminality and highly important the Internet will explained. The Safa Group Case has been chosen to give deeper insights because this is a textbook case of the most common patterns of terrorism financing and because Nick Ridley will focusing in his presentation on how terrorism financing can be countered in the Middle East. Following the concept of NATO ARW the paper will close with identified future scientific research questions: 1. Evaluation of Refining Anti-Terrorism-Financing Policies, 2. Comparatistic Analysis of Functional Categories, 3. Development of a combined undercover Security System of Human Behavior Patters, Web and Financial Activities, 4. Planting of electronic “agents” within IT Systems, 5. Improving the interoperability of the Software and Analyses of OSINT between governmental institutions and between countries. Finally and most important might be the creation of a relationship of trust and transparency with Sharia banks and charities. Keywords. Terrorism, terrorism financing

1. Introduction In the most basic sense, terrorist groups require funding to achieve their goals. A successful terrorist group, as any other criminal organization, is one that is able to build and maintain an effective financial infrastructure.1 They must have effective financial infrastructure to include: sources of funds, the means to launder funds and the availability of funding. This is a pretty easy concept in reality dealing with terrorism financing is extremely challenging. Over the years terrorists have developed mechanisms and 1

FATF – Guidance for financial institutions in detecting Terrorist Financing http://www.fatf-gafi.org

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infrastructures, both legal and illegal, which have become well insulated and adept at avoiding detection. Terrorist financing is complex and difficult to understand. It cannot be viewed from a generic or all encompassing standpoint. In the most instances, the various types of terrorist and affiliates and entities have unique characteristics. Individuals to include leaders, donors, fundraisers, recruiters, facilitators and operatives by virtue of their positions will have differing funding requirements. Likewise, financial institutions, legitimate or illegitimate businesses, charities and other conduits will have varying funding needs. Financial requirements and flows for the full gamut of terrorists and terrorist supporters carry according to factors to include their role, location and affiliation. As a result of the multidimensional face of terrorism, general characteristics, warning signs or red flags can be helpful but are limited in identifying terrorist financing. Money is important for a terrorist organization to survive and especially to operate. Conventional wisdom suggests that deprivation of funds will bring some corresponding decrease in a given terrorist group’s ability to operate, and, specifically its latitude to carry out attacks. Less money means fewer weapons, reduced recruiting, training and reconnoitring capabilities, less capacity and a demised ability to purchase technology or pay specialists to provide needed expertise. All this inputs are needed to conduct terrorist attacks; should a group have less money to acquire them, conventional wisdom suggests it will be able to mount fewer attacks. That might be true in the case of Hamas which noticed an intense decrease of funding after the US and other countries have established new institutions and laws countering money laundering and terrorism financing after the 9/11 attacks. This development might have been the reason why the number and the quality of suicide attacks carried out declined.

Table 1. Suicide bombing Attacks carried out by Palestinian Terrorist organizations against Israel and Number of killed people2 Year

Number of Suicide Attacks

Number of killed people

2000

4

0

2001

35

85

2002

60

220

2003

26

142

2004

15

55

2005

7

23

2006

4

15

But also other factors might be the reason why the number and quality of suicide attacks declined. For instance Hamas decided to run for the election in 2006 and for political reasons the organization decided to reduce the number of terrorist attacks. 2 Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends and Suicide bombing terrorism during the current Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, The Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center, http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/site/html/search.asp?sid=13&pid=113&numResults=5&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes

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Looking at the recent attacks of the al-Qaeda movement carried out in Madrid and London have proven that the very little money being needed was generated by the private income of the perpetrators.

Table 2. Estimated cost of AQ attacks3 Terrorist Attack

Date

Operational Costs (est)

London Bombings

07. July 2005

ǧ 7,240

Madrid train bombings

11. March 2004

$ 10, 000

Istanbul truck bomb attacks

15. and 20. November 2003

$ 40, 000

Jakarta JW Marriot Hotel Bombing

05. August 2003

$ 30, 000

Bali Bombings

12. October 2002

$ 50, 000

World Trade Center / Pentagon, USA

11. September 2001

$ 303,672 – $ 500, 000

USS Cole attack, Yemen

12. October 2000

$ 10, 000

East Africa embassy bombings

07. August 1998

$ 50, 000

Just looking at the estimated amount being needed for a terrorist attack is misleading. A successful terrorist group must be able to build and maintain an effective financial infrastructure to generate income, store the funds, move them around, lauder the proceeds and make them available for committing terrorist acts and to keep the organization and its infrastructure alive. The ability of the groups to manoeuvre money quickly and anonymously across the globe, encompassing many national jurisdictions and embroiling global markets, has been one of the important dynamics that has made modern terrorism so threatening and destructive. Since the attacks of 9/11, the structure of Islamist armed organizations and their global web has evolved. While before it was small and highly integrated, today it resembles a cluster of decentralized, loosely-connected and often self-financing networks, as investigations into the Madrid and London bombings suggest. Clearly, as with most global systems, Islamist terrorism presents an inverse correlation between size and cohesion. Moreover, since 9/11 Europe has seen the spontaneous emergence of home-grown jihadist groups whose members have been rarely trained in Islamist camps in Afghanistan or Sudan, as it was the case of the cells that carried out the Madrid and London attacks.4 Home-grown jihadist cells carry out attacks funded primarily with clean money. Against this new background, very little movement of money and people is taking place. This new scenario greatly reduces the effectiveness of post-9/11 counterterrorism financing policies. Terrorists are quite adept at avoiding financial detection. They rely on both the formal and informal Banking systems to launder and move funds. Their choice of systems will be dependent upon a number of factors to include geography and the type of financial system more advantageous in specific locations, governmental and 3 4

UN Monitoring Team Report/ Aug. 2004 and NTFIU. James Craaff, ‘Terror's Tracks,’ TIME Europe, 19 April 2004.

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institutional oversight, systemic vulnerabilities and opportunities to exploit the situation. Characteristics in warning signs are non-static. Risk assessments and mechanisms to identify emerging trends are critical components for identifying and disrupting terrorist financing. 2. Development The 9/11 Commission pointed to a core number of financial facilitators involved in raising, moving and storing the money al-Qaeda needs for its maintenance, logistic and operational requirements. They raised funds from donors primarily in the Gulf region, but also from countries round the world. They used bogus and legitimate charities, shell companies and legitimate businesses as covers. They also enabled al-Qaeda to develop a substantial financial network in Southeast Asia, as well as funding sources in Europe, Africa and Asia. Several of these financial facilitators have been captured or identified, while many continue to remain anonymous. The capture of Sheikh Saiid al-Masri, Abdul Rahim Riyadh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, among other top al-Qaeda officials, dealt a serious blow to al Qaeda’s financial network. They reportedly provided names and information that have led to the identification of other facilitators and funding sources. The financial role of al-Qaeda has dramatically changed since 9/11. The September 2001 attacks were the last attacks fully planned, funded and executed under the direct supervision of al-Qaeda’s leadership. The Patriot Act prompted the transfer of vast amounts of Saudi money from the United States to Europe. In August 2002, the filing of a lawsuit by the relatives of the victims of 9/11 against several members of the Saudi elite, the country of Sudan and a number of Gulf banks and charities accused of having funded al Qaeda, led Saudis to withdraw $200 billion worth of assets held in the United States. The bulk of the money was reinvested in Europe in equities, bonds and real estate. Overall, Saudi financiers are believed to have had about $750 billion invested in the United States.5 According to the UN, Saudi funds still find their way to support Islamist terror groups in Arab countries and in Europe.6 The most recent attacks in Europe, including the killing of Théo Van Gogh in Amsterdam and the resultant social unrest, are the work of home-grown, self-funded groups operating under the ideological umbrella. At the end of 2005, a new series of arrests of suspected terrorists in Spain, Germany, France and the Netherlands attest to the presence of a terrorist network in Europe that recruits suicide bombers and fighters for the war in Iraq. In June 2005, Spanish authorities broke up a web of Jihadists that recruited radical Islamists to fight in Iraq, arresting sixteen people - eleven of them suspected of having ties to Al-Zarqawi’s terrorist network. According to Magnus Norell of the Swedish defence research agency, in Europe there is a rise in both the number of recruits and the number of people returning home to develop networks and patiently plan for attacks. The European mosque network continue to be a powerful instrument for recruiting, funding and coordinating the activity of cells and armed groups linked to Islamist terrorism in Europe and abroad. 7 In the spring of 2004, Spanish magistrates discovered that a Spanish cell, Soldiers of Allah, which started in 5

Saudi Investors pull out of United States, BBC News, 21 August 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk. UN Security Council, monitoring group established pursuant o Resolution 1363 (2001), Report S/2003/1070, 2 December 2003, www.un.org. 7 Neil Mackay, ‘Was it ETA or al Qaeda? The Confusion over what was Behind the Madrid Bombing Obscures Intelligence Predictions of an Enhanced Terror Threat,’ The Sunday Herald, 14 March 2004. 6

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Madrid's Abu Bakr mosque in 1994, provided support and money to the Hamburg cell that participated in the 11 September attack.8 Investigation into the London bombings revealed the existence of underground mosques and informal prayer rooms in houses and universities. The bombing cost a few hundred pounds and was almost fully funded with the salaries of those who perpetrated it. Terrorist financing, therefore, continues to evolve. In Europe funding from abroad is today less relevant than before the attacks of 9/11. European jihadists have been encouraged to become self-funded, like the execution of the Madrid and London bombings. Largely as a result of national governments’ efforts to cut off financial support, al-Qaeda and its networks have been forced to further decentralize their financing methods. For people who have no link with al-Qaeda, people who never travelled to the camps, and that after 9/11 felt compelled to join in the fight, it is easier to fund themselves with criminal activities than to get in touch with al-Qaeda and ask for money. Although the core al-Qaeda organization and its associated groups still raise funds and recruit members through front, cover, and sympathetic organizations—organizations used to established charities, human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, community centres, and religious associations—cells increasingly generate their own funds. Cells have adapted to the increasing pressure by becoming self-financing, primarily through criminal activities, as was demonstrated in the Madrid train bombings. Anyhow criminal activity should not be underestimated. About two-thirds of terror financing originates from criminal and illegal activities, which range from large fraud to petty crime.9,10

Table 3. The Development of al Qaeda´s Financing11 Phase

Resource

Organizational Structure

Phase 1

Solicitations of wealthy

MAK infrastructure under

Pakistan 1984-1991

Middle Eastern

bin Laden and Azzam

benefactors, charities Phase 2: Sudan

Companies, Osama

Hierarchical structure in

(1991–1996)

bin Laden’s personal

consultation with

wealth

Sudanese government, plus extended network

Phase 3:

Taliban sanctuary, charity

Hierarchical structure with

Afghanistan

diversion, smuggling,

extensive training camps,

(1996--2001)

solicitations

networks, and partnerships, including with the Taliban

Phase 4: Post--11

Self-financing of cells

September

through petty crime and legal businesses

8

Global Movement

Ibid. See also Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc., London: Penguin, 2004. 10 Dale Fuchs, ‘Spain Gives Details on Terror Cell,’ International Herald Tribune, 15 April 2003. 11 Loretta Napoleoni, Die Ökonomie des Terrors, Auf den Spuren der Dollar hinter dem Terrorismus, Verlag Antje Kunstmann, 2003, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda, global Network of Terror, Columbia University Press, 2002. 9

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2.1.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

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Funding Resources For the purpose of this article not all funding resources will explained. Clean money: Legally earned Revenues from legitimate business operations Cash and High Value Items Diaspora communities Banking system: Islamist terrorist organizations are trying to avoid as far as possible the global financial system. Transactions leave too much of a paper trail, the theory goes. After all, most of the 9/11 money entered the US via wire transfer into US banks from institutions in the United Arab Emirates and Germany.12 But at some point money has to hit the banking system. Al-Qaeda’s facilitators have also been active in establishing their own banking networks to handle and hide financial transactions. Two such networks uncovered by investigators, al-Barakat and al-Taqwa, provide good examples of such activities. Al-Taqwa, with offices in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Caribbean is suspected of provided other important transfer and banking facilities for al-Qaeda. Al-Taqwa acted largely as a money laundering facility for al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups. It also provided “indirect investment services for al-Qaeda investing funds for bin Laden and making cash deliveries on request to the al-Qaeda organization.” According to one report, al-Taqwa even provided a clandestine line of credit for a close associate of bin Ladin. 13 Al-Barakaat’s Hawala operation reportedly spread through some 40 countries. It was estimated that Al-Barakaat handled some $140 million a year in transmitted payments. Service charges ranged from 2% to 5%. This may have generated revenues in the millions for al-Qaeda.14 Hawala: Hawala is a transfer or remittance from one party to another, without use of a formal financial institution such as a bank or money exchange, and is, in this sense, an "informal" transaction. There are several other common aspects to Hawala. First, in most cases, Hawala transactions go across international lines, such as with worker remittances to their home countries. Second, Hawala usually involves more than one currency, although again this is not absolutely required. Third, a Hawala transaction usually entails principals and intermediaries. To accommodate requests of the principals, the intermediaries usually take financial positions. Later these transactions will be cleared amongst the units to balance their books. 15 Hawala operations abound throughout the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific region and Latin America. They also have well established branches in Europe and North America. Hawala has long served the critical function of providing for the remittance needs of guest workers, or as informal banking system where established banking fears to tread. Most Hawala operations are unregulated. Few records are kept and transfers are handled informally and, in most cases, with no real oversight. This offers al-Qaeda, and those supplying it with money, an ideal channel for handling its money transfer requirements. Many Hawalars are

Ibid. The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror, 29. Aug. 2002,http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3380.htm 14 Jimmy Gurule, Update on Tracking the Financial Assets of Terrorists: One Year later, 9. Sept 2002, http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/13337.htm 15 Robert E. Looney, Following the Terrorist Informal Money Trail: The Hawala Financial Mechanism, Strategic Insights, Volume 1, Issue 9, Nov. 2002, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov02/southAsia.asp 13

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7.

8.

16

167

also well connected with banks in Asia and the Middle East. Their transfer accounts raise few questions and are employed for settlement between Hawalars, hiding completely the transactions originator and ultimate receiver. Several countries have begun to crackdown on Hawala operations as part of their anti money laundering and terrorism financing programs. But, few have had any real success in securing oversight over such transactions.16 Launder funds: This requires the use of the formal banking system, the informal banking system or non-financial companies. There must be a conduit that filters the source or origination of funds through a bank, non-bank financial entity or nonfinancial entity making it available and accessible to the individual terrorist, cell or entity at the point of distribution or use. In the majority of instances, financial institutions serve as the conduit or middle ground between the source and distribution of terrorist funding. The two key areas where terrorists are vulnerable when dealing with financial institutions are with respect to Know Your Customer (KYC) practices and Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR). Whether using their true names or false identities, terrorist are at risk of detection through KYC mechanisms SARs have been instrumental in identifying links between information reported in SARs and terrorism investigations through advanced data mining capabilities known as information, data warehousing. 17 Financial institutions are expected to adopt KYC procedures18, if the financial institution has no reasonable explanation for an unusual transaction, this transaction should be considered suspicious and be reported to the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU).19 Charities: Al-Qaeda has a strong reliance on charities to raise, mask, transfer and distribute the funds it needs. Many of these charities are, or were associated with some of the major Islamic umbrella organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, including, but certainly not limited to, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, the al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Blessed Relief (Muwafaq) Foundation, and the Rabita Trust. These organizations have branches worldwide and are, or were, engaged in activities related to religious, educational, social and humanitarian programs.20 The International Islamic Relief Organization has branch offices throughout the world, including 36 in Africa, 24 in Asia, 10 in Europe and 10 in Latin America, the Caribbean and North America. The bulk of its financial contributions come from private donations in Saudi Arabia. The IIRO continues to be closely associated to the Muslim World League with which it participates in many joint activities.21 The IIRO has also been used to channel funds to al-Qaeda. “Evidence produced in Canadian Court proceedings also linked the IIRO directly to groups responsible for the 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The former head of the IIRO office in the Philippines, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, was

See Vaknin, Sam, “Hawala, the Bank That Never Was,” UPI International, October 17, 2001. Dennies Lormel, Understanding and Simplifying Terrorist Financing. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision customer due diligence for banks: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.htm, accessed 20.05.07 19 BSA Guidanc for Bankers and Examiners, http://www.occ.treas.gov/BSA/BSAGuidance.htm, accessed 20.05.07 20 Victor Comras, AL Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups , in: Strategic Insights, Vol IV, Issue 1, Jan. 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Jan/comrasJan05.asp#references 21 Second Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003) on sanctions against Al Qaeda, S/2003/1070 dated 3 December 2003, Paragraphs 40-43. 17 18

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also accused of links to al Qaeda and terrorist activities. 22 The Benevolence International Foundation is another Saudi umbrella charity organization with branches throughout Southeast Asia as well as in Europe and America that has served as an important funding source for al-Qaeda. The al Haramain Islamic Foundation, based in Jeddah, is one of Saudi Arabia’s most active charities in spreading Islamic fundamentalism. According to its web site Al Haramain operates in some 49 countries. It raises some $30 million per year drawing its funding largely from Saudi donors. Al-Haramain is another al-Qaeda funding sources with branches in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kosovo, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tanzania. 9. Rich Bankers: Investigators refer to the existence of well-off individuals who act either as anonymous donors or – occasionally – as active participants in supporting attacks.23 The more recent alternative is for donors to fund one or two individuals, giving them prepaid credit cards loaded up with money. Such cards leave little paper trails connecting the recipient either with the donor – or with the network which introduced them in the first place.24 10. States: Al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations receive assistance form sympathetic foreign states like Iran. The Hezbollah’s budget is estimates at about $100 million per annum, most of which is provided by Iran. This sum is used for financing the organization’s military-terrorists activity, funding social and economic activities and also to cover various organizational expenses. Alongside with Iranian established aid, over the years Hezbollah has endeavoured to acquire secondary financing sources that are deployed throughout the world. These secondary funding sources are mainly based on criminal activity like drugtrafficking. During the 1990s Iranian attempts to spread high quality counterfeit American dollars and to avoid confrontation with the United States, the Iranian preferred to use the Hezbollah as leverage for the production and distribution of counterfeit bills. 25 “Of particular significance and relevance to supporting terrorism among the governmental system of Iran is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, known by its Persian acronym VEVAK (Vezarat-e ettela´at va Amniat-e Keshvar).”26 11. Criminality: The 2004 Madrid bombing used clean money as well as credit card fraud and marijuana smuggling to fund their activities. Jemaah Islamiyah engages in bank robbery and credit card fraud; its 2002 Bali bombings were financed, in part, through jewellery store robberies that netted over 5 pounds of gold. Also one of the London Bombers Mohammad Sadique Khan is believed to have been involved in low-level credit card fraud.27 They are generating more and more their own as criminal gangs. Their scams are as varied as the criminal world: drugs, smuggling, cell phone cloning, identity theft and frauds (including low-level frauds that are lucrative but seldom attract the concerted attention of authorities) are 22 Victor Comras, AL Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups , in: Strategic Insights, Vol IV, Issue 1, Jan. 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Jan/comrasJan05.asp#references 23 Jeremy Scott-Joynt, Warning signs for the funding of terror, BBC News, 20.07.2005. 24 Ibid. 25 Shaul Shay, The axis of evil, Iran Hizballah and the Palestinian Terror, Transaction Publisher, 2005, pp. 223–226. 26 Doron Zimmermann, Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot, Iran and Syria as State supporters of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories, Züricher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, ETH, 2004, p. 59. 27 Interview with Michael Chandler.

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mainstays, but others include car theft, selling pirated CD s, and counterfeiting money.28 12. Drug trafficking: The drug trade has proven irresistible for many. Nearly half of the 41 groups the US government’s list of terrorist organizations are tied to narcotics trafficking according to DEA statistics. The terrorist gang behind the train bombings in Madrid 2004, for example, financed itself almost entirely with money earned from trafficking in hashish and ecstasy with a network stretching from Morocco through Spain to Belgium and the Netherlands. Afghanistan’s opium trade is exploding. The cultivation of opium poppies doubled from 20022003 and from 2004-2005 that amount tripled. Afghanistan now provides 87 percent of the world’s heroin. The narcotics industry now makes up as much as half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. Al-Qaeda strategist reasoned that drug trafficking would expose them to possible detection. It is also assumed that al-Qaeda members do not trust big drug barons. If al-Qaeda itself is staying out of drugs, its allies like the Taliban certainly are not 13. Internet: Nearly every Islamist terrorism organization is using the internet in a variety of ways to raise funds. These ranges from the transfer of cash by electronic couriers to legitimate bank accounts and their activities reflect growing creativity in their Internet fund-raising efforts, to include: direct solicitation for the organization itself, exploit charitable organizations by soliciting in that guise, perpetrate on-line crime, such as identity and credit card theft, to organize and implement other fund-raising activities.29 The Global Jihad Fund published a web site urging donations “to facilitate the growth of various Jihad Movements around the World by supplying them with sufficient funds to purchase weapons and train their individuals.” The site listed bank accounts in Pakistan and featured links to web sites to other terrorist organizations it supported, including the Taliban, Lashkar Taiba, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In addition, terrorist organizations use bulletin boards, chat rooms, and targeted mass e-mailings to solicit donations. For example, one user of an Arabic language Internet forum posted message asking its readers to send “assistance to the families of the Guantanamo captives, for the families of the martyrs of the American invasion of Afghanistan, and for the families of those innocent arrestees detained on account of terrorism.” 30 The technical savvy of terrorist organizations is also growing. According to the National Money Laundering Strategy Terrorists also began using public computers, such as those in libraries and Internet cafes, to prevent authorities from being able to trace the individuals who posted soliciting websites and sent soliciting emails. Now, terrorist organizations take advantage of Internet service providers that can provide anonymous IP addresses, constantly moving among several web-hosting services using false information, or hosting website from out of country areas that are difficult to investigate.31 This money is being used to finance a wide range of front organizations included are here Islamic charities, professional associations 28 David E. Kaplan Paying for Terror How jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics--and profits-to finance attacks on targets around the globe, US News, 27.11.2005: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror_3.htm 29 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy. Departments of Treasury and Justice. Appendix H. p. 56. Available on-line at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/publications/ml2003.pdf as of 20 September. 30 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy. Departments of Treasury and Justice. Appendix H. p. 56. Available on-line at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/publications/ml2003.pdf 31 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, pp. 60–62.

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and similar institutions for supposed social and educational projects, hospitals, orphanages and other humanitarian initiatives. 32 Contributions to these organizations and causes are generally transferred by legitimate, electronic means to bank accounts in the US, Europe and the Middle East. Hezbollah for example, raises money in the US through the website of the Islamic Resistance Support Association, where users are given the opportunity to fund organizations against the “Zionist Enemy”.33 Nearly all Islamist website affiliated websites ask visitors to make donations with either credit cards or through electronic transfers. While many sites are in fact closed just moved and others dedicated to assisting these terrorist groups in an ever-broader range of ways emerge, and frequently in place beyond the reach of governmental authorities. The Fraud Advisory Panel (FAP) has produced a report warning that participants in online communities such as Second Life could transfer large amounts of money with little risk of detection. Second Life, which has 6.2 million users, was created in 2003 by Linden Lab, a US company. Players use “Linden dollars” which are converted from real currencies. Experts claim there are few checks to ensure whether these transfers are legitimate. Potential criminals can hide behind the computer characters they create, making identification difficult. Linden dollars were being exchanged for real currencies on Second Life and eBay using credit cards and PayPal accounts. From the point of view of money laundering it's like operating an unregulated currency exchange. David Naylor, a partner at Field Fisher Waterhouse, the first major law firm to set up in Second Life, said: “Like any frontier environment, there's scope for legitimate and illegitimate activity.” 34 Policy, legal framework and actions in the cyberspace are still in a state of evolution and there is an intense need to develop an international coherent web-based anti-terrorism strategy.

2.2.

Examples x x x x x x x

32

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Colombia) Marxist insurgent force, big profits from narcotics, kidnapping, and extortion. National Liberation Army (ELN) (Colombia) Marxist guerrillas behind hundreds of kidnappings, extortion, drug trafficking. United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) (Colombia) Right-wing paramilitary force heavily involved in drug trafficking and gasoline smuggling. Abu Sayyaf (Philippines) Onetime al-Qaeda ally has degenerated into a crime syndicate, profiting from kidnapping, extortion, drugs, cigarette smuggling. Jemaah Islamiyah (Southeast Asia) The region’s top al-Qaeda affiliate, based in Indonesia, does armed robbery and credit card fraud. IRA (Northern Ireland) Crime is top income source: bank robbery, fraud, extortion, counterfeiting, cargo theft, cigarette and gasoline smuggling. Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Turkey, Europe) Marxist group of largely Turkish Kurds, tied to heroin trafficking, kidnapping, extortion.

Reuven Paz: Targeting Terrorist Financing in the Middle East” October 2003, ict.org.il. See www.moqawama.net Stephen Adams Online Communities face money-laundering, The Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/14/nfraud14.xml, accessed 20.05.2007. 33 34

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x x x x x x x x x x

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Hizballah (Lebanon) Iranian-backed militia engaged in heroin and hashish trade, cigarette smuggling, counterfeiting, extortion, fraud. Chechen rebels (Russia) Guerrillas fighting for Islamic state raise funds through smuggling and trafficking in drugs, arms, and counterfeit currency. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Central Asia) The region's top terrorist threat, but much of it has degenerated into a drug mafia. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) (Morocco, Europe) Funded Madrid and Casablanca bombings with drug profits; also does financial fraud, counterfeiting. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) (Algeria, Europe) and Ansar al Islam/Ansar al Sunna are engaged in kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, drugs, human smuggling, fraud. Iraq insurgency (Iraq) Insurgent groups raise funds from criminal rackets, including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and theft and smuggling of oil. Al Qaeda (Afghanistan/Pakistan) Osama bin Laden’s followers in the region engage in kidnapping, antiquities smuggling, robbery, and financial fraud. Taliban (Afghanistan) Taliban insurgents profit from Afghan narcotics through trafficking and taxes on shipments. D Company (South Asia, U.A.E.) Indian mafia gang allied with Islamic terrorists; engaged in narcotics, extortion, arms smuggling, contract murder, kidnapping. Hezb-i-Islami/Gulbuddin (Afghanistan) Islamic fundamentalists led by warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; thought to be deeply involved in narcotics trade.35 Patterns of Terrorism Financing36

The following patterns are only some of many possibilities, but have been used in the past to finance terrorism especially al-Qaeda and its supporting societies. You may find alterations and variations of these patterns, but in general whenever you find these patterns they could give you a guideline in your search and may lead you into the right direction. All these patterns are indicators that will help the investigator to put the puzzle together. The key and general rule for the investigation should be: look for anomalies compared to the normality, or even anomalies in the anomalies.

3.1.

The Safa Group Case37

The Safa Group case is a textbook case of terrorism financing. It shows very common patterns of terrorism financing and describes how money can be “washed” from white to black. Series of transactions between the companies, charities and for-profit 35 David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. News & World Report, 27.11.2005: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm 36 This part of the article has been written with the support of Dr. Josef Bollag, Institute for Security Analyses and Strategic Networking, Zug, Switzerland. 37 555 Grove Street in Herndon, Virginia, USA is the main address of what is called generally the Safa Group

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companies have taken place. Multiple US$ Million have moved as contributions, loans, grants investments etc. being sent also to offshore trusts and foreign entities. E.G. Out of the contribution to Safa Charity over 70% came from other members of the Safa Group, more than 12% from unidentified contributors from overseas and over 13% from overseas funds in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Out of the grants and allocations made by Safa Charities almost 85% went to other members of the Safa Charities and 14% went to not identified recipients. Between 1996 -2000 out of US$ 54 Million allocations 49% went to entities in the Isle of Man, 37% remained in the US within the Safa Group and 14% to unidentified donees. The donations to Isle of Man entities does not mean, that the individuals of the Safa Group did not have further control over the funds – they only went out reach for the US Authorities. Pattern I 1.

2. 3.

The Safa Group was operating through a network of over 100 different organizations and companies including charitable, cultural and educational organizations but also for-profit business and investment firms. The different organizations are often dissolved and replaced by other organizations but under the control of the same individuals. Most of the charitable and educational organizations are “paper”-organizations, registered almost always at the same addresses but no apparent physical presence.

Pattern II 1.

38

At the beginning money has been provided directly to the terrorist frontorganizations by individuals who where in charge of the Safa Group. The controlling individuals of the Safa Group have sent money to Holy Land Foundation and al-Arian to support Hamas and PIJ. Shiekh Omar Abdel Rahman is considered the spiritual leader of the group who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. He visited Sami al-Arian and spoke in his Mosque. AlArian is somehow one of the early organizers of the front organizations in the USA for financing terrorism. While Ramadan Abdullah Shallah was representing PIJ in USA he was working together with Sami Al-Arian and Basheer Nafi. On a conference in 1992, organized by the Islamic Committee for Palestine and al-Arian he proclaimed Jihad against all enemies including the USA and legitimized the terror and devastating, humiliating and degrading all enemies. Al-Arian who was organizing PIJ from his home in Tampa, Florida received on a bank account in USA, which he shared with Mohammed Taysir El-Khatib38 from the same over US$ 100 000.00 from a Beirut Bank. He also actively encouraged donators to send money to support the Jihad in Palestine. Al-Arian proposed on a memorandum called “The Charter” also a center for studies, intelligence and information against the US in the US. The Charter also proposed to study “legal aspects of establishing charitable organizations in the US”. Al-Arain used Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP) and World Islamic Studies Enterprise (WISE).

Member of the Shura Council PIJ

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Since mid 1990 the above pattern of direct funding has changed. The financing through layers of a convoluted web of multiple transactions between related corporations and charities started to be established that made it purposely impossible to ascertain where the money has left the web of finance the up-front organization for terrorists. But even when the departing point of the money out of the web was found, it was not possible to follow the trace, because it went to an offshore located charity organization e.g. Isle of Man. Various affiliated charities and companies under the control of the same individuals conducted convoluted transactions through a network of interrelated organizations and charities for the purpose to prevent the tracking down of the ultimate recipients and to throw investigation off the trail.

Pattern III 1.

Many terrorist organizations have a financial support structure virtually in every developed country. 2. The organized crime-networks differ in their motives from terror organizations - the ones seek monetary gain, whereas the latter have nonfinancial goals but political influence and legitimacy, publicity and dissemination of ideology. But they need money to attract and retain adherents to support them and to buy media campaigns, political influence and to undertake social projects e.g. hospitals, orphanages, schools to attract sympathetic supporter. Therefore they conduct also “legal” business, but also organized crime business. 3. Terrorist funding comes from contributory knowing the intended purposes, but also from some of them not knowing, especially those, who contributed to apparently legitimate humanitarian social and political efforts. Means to move the funds: a) physical transportation by trusted couriers or even by post packages b) Traditional financial institutions e.g. banks, insurance companies, foundations in the names of trusted nominees, or institutions being controlled by the terrorist networks takeovers. c) Offshore banks, either unknowingly what the purpose of transactions is, or friendly to the cause or owned by the network (Al-Taqwa Bank) d) Charitable organizations are much less scrutinized by governments and often have cash-in/cash-out situations e) Layering means using a complex sequence of financial of financial transactions to make the following of the money trail as difficult as possible, using numerous paths and indirect channels by using many different individuals, corporations, bank accounts false names, front companies and phantom organizations. Also deviating the money to be send to terrorist organizations is an often used technique, such as sympathizers using their own or friends overseas organizations as conduit, or other supporters to send finances not directly to the West- Bank and Gaza, but routing it first to the US 4. The money transferred has other denominations and cover-ups than the real purpose. E.G. the Safa Group specifically pronounced that it did not matter how the money that they have sent to PIJ is characterized. Other donators have underlined that the donations are for “The Group” regardless the façade that is used to accept the donations.

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5.

6.

Another pattern is that the amounts are split to disguise the original payments e.g. the Safa Group Member Mar-Jac Poultry has sent a donation to Sterling Charitable Trust of US$ 250 000. 00. Sterling transferred to Saar US$ 100 000.00 and one month later the remaining US$ 150 000.00 to Saar as well. Another pattern is deviating the transaction through an unusual way e.g. Heritage (a Safa Group member) received from Safa a contribution of US$ 8,6 Mio, and Heritage loaned US$ 5.5 Mio to Mar-Jac Holdings, where Safa is a majority holder. One year later Heritage transferred to Safa US$ 4.1 Mio as a return of the first contribution. Why has Safa not made a direct loan to MarJac Holdings?

Pattern IV: The Bank The bank would be an offshore place, like the Bahamas and would have a full banking license. Unlike other normal offshore banking patterns, where the subscribers of the shares, the directors and the shareholders are local nominees. Maybe after an initial, mostly inactive period the names of the real owners or even more their front men, often cumulating or altering in the above mentioned positions can be found. The capital of the bank will be – maybe after an initial first capitalization – well above the legally required minimum, mostly increased in several steps during a certain time. The bank capitalization from 2 Mio US$ up to 50 Mio US$ will be held by a big number of shareholders, which will be – maybe after an initial founding period - much higher than in normal offshore banks e.g. instead of 5-10 shareholders one would find up to 800 shareholders. The shares would be divided into preference shares without voting right and ordinary shares with all rights fully preserved. The preference shares would be held in small quantities by little shareholders, who will represent the biggest number of shareholders, whereas the ordinary but decisive share would be held in big quantities by a small number of big shareholders. Instead of the normal amount of 1-10 shares with a normal offshore bank, here you may find partition up to 500 000 shares. The customer or investor of the bank has the choice to also become an direct investor in the bank. At this instance the customer or investor will have to open either a “free Mudaraba” account or a “restricted Mudaraba” account, which is simply called “Mudaraba”. “Mudaraba” is used as a terminus for splitting the profit of a Muslim investor/customer according to the Islamic Law, which is leaving a portion to charity and another portion to the investor/customer. “Free Mudaraba” means that the client/investor is free to choose to whom (which charity institution) his contribution should go, whereas only “Mudaraba” (profit sharing) is the used terminology where the investor is restricted to projects, objects and institutions that he has agreed upon signing an account agreement, or he leaves this decision to appoint the projects to the Control Committee. In accordance with the articles of association of the bank one would normally find a sort of control committee with in the organization of the bank, officially to assure, that the bank and the investors/clients are strictly following the Sharia Rules. This is called the “Islamic legal Control Committee” for preservation of the Islamic Law. The election of the members of this committee is very important, as the bank is controlled by the committee these are the few ordinary shareholders that hold the majority of the ordinary shares, decide by simple majority who the members of that committee should be. This proofs that the real owners of the bank exclude any foreign influence and want to govern all the important and decisive positions in the bank. Because this committee has a wide range power (e.g. to review and adapt acts,

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regulations, contracts and methods to be followed by the bank in its activities, investments and banking operations, including the dealings in all different Mudarabaaccounts. The most important function of the committee is to decide on the amount of “Zaka”39 and where this tax should go. Naturally this will include also the decision to which project, object, institution etc. the funds from the Mudaraba account should be sent to. In the “General Terms and Conditions” of the bank, which have to be signed by the customer or investor of the bank, one will find binding undertakings and restrictions for the customer/investor. Even if the bank leaves it to the customer/investor, whenever they want to open a Mudaraba-Account with the bank or elsewhere the client/investor will however open the account with the same bank, in order to make sure that the Control Committee does not invalidate later his free chosen Mudaraba placement, he will agree to open that account with the bank. In that case he has to accept that exclusively this bank will receive the Mudaraba funds in order to invest until the redemption according to their own findings. Naturally within the Islamic Mudaraba rules (Quiradh) it is e.g. totally in the discretion of the bank, where when and into what the funds will be invested and the owner of the main account has no further right to interfere or condition the Mudaraba-account to control the cash flow but to dissolve the account after a relatively long time of given notice. Or the Mudaraba account cannot be ceded to a third party, but the bank may pool it with other Mudaraba-accounts. The profit-sharing of the Mudaraba-account is also described in General terms and Conditions. In case of liquidation of the account even sometimes the totality of the funds goes to Mudaraba. Bearing in mind that the purpose of a bank supporting terrorist organizations is to make disappear the white money and make black money in order to finance these organizations. Through this vehicle of Mudaraba account the bank is eager to cash in as much as “profit” and capital as possible, knowing that this was also the investor’s/customer’s purposes when he was investing in such an offshore bank. The purpose of the establishing of such a bank is to show upfront a normal usual structure where under the pretext of religious purposes funds are being washed in order to them disappear. The major problem with such a washing is that along the line nothing is illegal until the funds have disappeared and only after they disappeared they will be channelled into illegal projects of organized crime and terrorism. But before that the funds have legally been originated, have legally gone into the bank, have legally been split according to religious rules and even sometimes the first receivers of the funds are up front legally working charity-organizations. Concerning the financing of al-Qaeda by different donors we have learned that the charity leaders were in some detected cases a few years ago instructed to pay monthly salaries to the leaders of al-Qaeda, or to pay individuals to buy weapons, or hand out cash amounts to an individual identifying himself by a letter of instruction to the charity organization. One could also think that the small-size shareholders of the bank get an entitlement to receive from the charity organization an amount in cash to donate according to their own ideas. Bearing in mind that to conduct a terrorist attack does not necessarily involve a big amount of money, with a couple of small transactions the relevant people put the necessary amount together. Officially the customer/investor has no influence in deciding about the Mudaraba-funds so the support of terrorism by a customer through Mudaraba funds can hardly be proven. And the instruction to whom 39

Islamic Tax.

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the charity has to be pay out, will certainly not come – even not unofficially - from the customer of the bank. Pattern V: The Management Organization of the Bank If one plans to have an important business set up with a large scale of administrative necessities it would hardly possible to find such a support in an offshore area. Therefore if one places a bank in an offshore area with a lot of administrational needs he also needs to establish a management organization for this bank in a better equipped semi-offshore place or even an onshore place where a sophisticated infrastructure can be provided. If the management company of the bank is also offshore, then it should be at least easily accessible from a nearby onshore place. A common pattern would be also, that the management organization of the bank is divided in an offshore administration company on the one hand, mainly run by individuals sitting onshore and also being owners of the offshore management company, often via another offshore trust or company, and on the other hand in a onshore company. The latter is to appear as a normal company in cases and circumstances, and used where an offshore company would raise suspicions or make things difficult The general purposes of such a management organizations of the offshore bank is to conduct and control and the actual business running through the offshore bank, be it in funnelling the funds from supporters into the bank or in distributing to the final receivers. Everything is controlled exclusively by the washers which let the white money of the supporter/customers disappear into the dark holes and no outsider plays any role, except some nominees for starting up the business. This “washers” are in fact “blackeners”. The main aim of such a management company is to provide the possibility to manage the account for the investor/customer of the bank. Based on the confidence placed into such a management company, this company will be also empowered with extensive powers on behalf of the client.40 All information from the bank to the Investor and customer goes exclusively via the management company. In order to keep the management company out of the shooting line, the investor/customer will have to confirm to the management company that the banking relationship as well as the financial responsibilities are only between himself and the bank and explicitly not been himself and the management company. With this the domicile of the activities is not the place of registration and/or the place of business activity of the management company but only the registered domicile of the offshore bank.41 So the only place where the business relations between the investor/customer and the bank can be judged is the domicile of the bank, which is in an offshore jurisdiction. The paperwork for the transaction and business procedure will most probably not be kept in the location of the management company, especially when it s onshore or Semi-offshore with a well functioning legal system, which is independent from the political powers. The Paper trail starts and ends in the bank itself and does not leave traces elsewhere, if any at all. The operators of the management companies will be the most exclusively people of confidence within the close circle of the key persons, who will be dedicated to the cause and will not bear any risk of treason o the “good cause”. They will be living and 40

This include the verification and the auditing of the client’s accounts in the bank, withdrawals and remittances from and into Mudaraba-Account and the handling of the share of the bank in case the customer is an investor in the bank 41 If the management company is a Swiss letters box company it will not create a place of jurisdiction in Switzerland for the transaction and the business that is has managed.

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domiciled in onshore places as well as established people with a good business reputation; and certainly will not have a criminal record. Most preferably they have established a business network of its own and social relations in their place of domicile, but also relations to political figures and locally important business people. They can rely on a good functioning lobby and good relations – and so they become almost untouchable.42 Pattern VI: Variety of Offshore Holdings and Business Foundations and Trusts with Different Purposes and Beneficiaries The main players in the bank and management company are holding quite a large number of offshore holdings, trusts and foundations compared to the one offshore holding company normally needed, plus one trust or foundation for the ultimate beneficiary. These entities are not necessarily established in the same period, because it is often seen that the structure has grown constantly with the development of the “business-purposes”. It has also been seen, that originally offshore companies and trusts with other purposes have been diverted and changed into new purposes and business reasons according to different needs. The main players secure the structure with a system, that the off shores are interlinked and have crosswise the same individuals as directors or trustees. Different purposes of the companies and trusts allow a multiple use for all kind of situations and grant a high grade of flexibility. You will find different companies with different trusts and foundations with different directions for charity and all this in different directions for charity and all this in different offshore jurisdictions. It is not surprising to even find the names of the main players with the high reputation of the onshore management companies as directors or trustees of the offshore company or charitable foundation, because the good reputation onshore can be extended to offshore-situations as well. It is well understood and accepted by the business community, that money for charity, university support, Zaka-funds, education etc. is coming from an offshore place, especially if a reputable onshore bank is involved as director or trustee of the offshore entity. Even more so, if the players are internationally well known people. VIP´s high ranked in the business and finance community. Whenever these big calibre of individuals appear in offshore companies and charitable foundations any possible doubts disappear and are political “not permitted” – as we have seen in many cases. A variant to the system of offshore companies and trusts are companies and trusts, which are in fact domiciled onshore, but countries, where any international control or the implementation of multinational agreements for help in criminal matters are impossible. International standards are well established on paper, but the reality is quite different. The reality is that in these countries it is not possible to successfully pursue an international case in criminal matters, like money laundering or anti-terrorism. The protection of the wrongdoers and their possibility to hide away with he help of the governments of these countries is almost perfect and it takes a lot of international pressure and a lot sanctions until these countries have their scale pounding to the legal side – and this also only in individual cases and not in general. 42 Especially if the investor/customer has to show to the public authority he is not insider or partner by showing some documentation on the transaction he did, the statements of a reputable onshore company for that offshore bank account he can show give the impression of a unsuspicious and arm length transaction. Sometimes the statement may use very impressing titles such as “Audit Verification” etc..

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It has to mentioned that the last three patterns are also applicable for insurance an reinsurance companies and alike and it has been seen all of this in existence in reality

4.

Future Academic Research

4.1.

Evaluation of Refining Anti-terrorism-Financing Policies

Despite the centrality and level of activity in the financial issues of terrorism, precious little data, analysis of other serious inquiry into the effectiveness of these policies exist. Without a framework of analysis, accurate and usable measure of success, or conceptual understanding of how targeting money affects a terrorist organization’s operations - including access to replacement funding- implementing such a policy is unlikely to be effective 4.1.1.

Comparative Analysis of Functional Categories

Comparisons of counter-terrorism functional categories are difficult for at least two reasons. First, much of the data that could be used to create useful comparative metrics are classified. Second, Specific data such as the number of personnel, size of the budget, time spent, number of new data such as the number of personnel, size of the budget, time spent, number of new laws passed or new organizations created are all useful but incomplete ways of ranking the importance of various counter-terrorist policy approaches. 4.1.2.

Modelling Terrorist Financial Networks

Creating a methodologically rigorous and quantitatively and qualitatively plausible model addressing terrorist financial networks is the first step in refining policies aimed at dismantling those networks and eventually broadening the policy-making horizon with respect to the financing of terrorism 4.2.

Technology and Human Behaviour

Information relevant for financial investigation of terror financing may be categorized into three types of information. Standard financial communication, Semi financial communication, and normal communication (e.g. Fax Telephone, and Email) which the supports the operations of informal value transfer system (IVTS). Not all of this information via the internet, but a growing segment of it is. The financial information is of course coded and otherwise protected, whereas most of the other communication is not. The standard financial information exchanged within the financial system include SWIFT and other payment and clearing systems such as CHIPS 43 , TARGET 44 and CLS45 as well as the more recent RTGS46 mechanisms. Other existing Semi financial 43

Clearing Hourse In Tecbank Payment System. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. Interlinked between the clearing system of the EU member countries with same day payment settlement. 45 Continuous Linked settlement: The global CLS payment system operated by some of the world largest commercial banks, processes currency transactions in the major currencies according to the payment principle. 44

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networks foster international communication between alternative remittance systems. Some of these are large legitimate operations of known international companies, and others are smaller private networks established as competition to the banking system. Meanwhile, the compliance staffing and services industries are booming. Compliance officers' salaries have climbed. Software vendors tout programs that can quickly scan millions of transaction records (big banks typically have more than 150 Mio customer accounts and might have upwards of 20,000 staff). Specialist training programmers are designed to teach bank staff the latest in behavioural analysis. Private firms offer vast databases that allow banks to do background checks on new and existing clients. One such firm, World-Check, offers banks and governments profiles of more than 300,000 people who may present a “heightened risk” to financial institutions. The result has been a veritable flood of data on customer transactions deemed suspicious. In America, institutions file reports on about 13 Mio cash transactions over US$10,000 every day. The total number of “suspicious activity reports” filed nationwide more than tripled between 2001 and 2004, surpassing 685,000 that year. In Britain, about 250,000 such reports will be filed this year, about three-fifths of them from banks. The BBA estimates only 3-4% of the suspicious activity reports filed in Britain involve terror financing. In developing countries, law enforcement is too corrupt or inefficient to process them all. After an attack has been carried out the first priority is the concern of whether there are going to be secondary attacks. Having the difficulty of the detection of homegrown terrorist in mind the good thing is that no one can live in a western country in the long term without leaving some kind of financial trace behind. That is where financial investigators come into their own – particularly when you can start with known individuals. The needed raw data are bank account details, credit card transactions credit card fraud, corporate registry and charity records, as well as data from electoral rolls and police records. Based on these information’s a spiders web of connections between the bombers and the people who have financed, supported or trained them generating a whole set of leads for traditional investigations to take forward. “You build as comprehensive a financial profile as possible, and take it back as far as you can. Then connect it to communication records and so one, and you can put together a chronology between phones and finances, you will see a lot of links to other people”47 Just following money transactions is not enough additional factors have to be included by the investigators. It is necessary to identify suspects, accomplices and human behaviour to identify a suspicious pattern and use these data as the starting point for a financial investigation. I assume that the greatest vulnerabilities of a potential terrorist are behaviour based. Human beings have the tendencies to create patterns because like every human being they are lazy. They do not change their IP addresses, passwords and usernames often enough. They go in the web at specific times they use the same Internet café’s etc. This will lead to specific and general means by which the attacks will be or were financed. The development of a combined undercover security system of human behaviour patterns, web and financial activities might be a useful research to be done. 46 Real Time Gross Settlement system. Clearing system with irrevocable settlement each individual payment without settlement of a counterclaim (gross system). 47 Dennis Lormel, former head of the FBI’s Terrorist Finance Operation Section, The Bombers’ money trail, BBC news.

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Anti-money-laundering technology is focused on identifying suspicious transactions that bear little resemblance to those typically used by terrorists. Current technology could be reconfigured to check for things that better fit the profile of terrorist financing-liquidating accounts, for instance or purchasing high-risk materials. But I am not aware if institutions are doing this now. There's a high probability that institutions have not learned from Madrid, or the London bombings in relation to reenhancing their systems against terrorist attacks. Future development on the extent to which legislators and policy makers will allow security agencies to monitor activities in the private sector. Several initiatives may be considered in this context. Legislators could either mandate reporting of more financial and communication activity to FIUs, or empower intelligence authorities to monitor critical communication and financial junctions and analyze the financial and intelligence in the same way FIUs have been doing. This may be done using institutional or highly sophisticated computerized intermediates, serving as “black boxes” disseminating to the competent authorities only suspicious activity for further review. Another possible direction would be the planting of electronic “agents” within IT systems in the private financial sector or at different “junctions” of the financial activity, equipped with appropriate software tailored to generate alerts to be reported to FIUs If so, tools have to be developed for the monitoring of the flow of financial information, and the regular communication (fax, telephone, email) accompanying the financial transaction. Improving the interoperability of the Software and Analyses of OSINT between governmental institutions between countries would be another scientific research opportunity.

5. Creating a relationship of trust and a system of transparency with Sharia banks and charities.

6.

Conclusion

We will never really know how effective the Anti-Terrorism Financing measures are. The ultimate Goal is to reduce or eliminate terrorist activity; measuring the amount of resources assigned to that task is simply not a valid or reliable way of forecasting whether or not ultimate goal is reached. Because 1. We don’t know exactly when money-laundering and crime is being used to finance a terrorist entity or an attack. 2. We will never know if a new policy or measure was really responsible to prevent a terrorist attack because many counterterrorism and antiterrorism policy are in use at the same time by many countries and political institutions. Draining the swamp may require more than even a seamless approach by intelligence and law enforcement and at the same time democratic countries have to protect their democratic values and rights. Al Qaeda’s financial infrastructure has shown an impressive ability to adapt to adverse conditions, quickly take advantage of available opportunities, pursue creative, non-traditional and unorthodox methods of money management, and geographically move operations to areas where laws are lax or non-existent. Many of the worst groups owe their success to criminality overseas, to failed states and no man’s land from

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Central Asia to North Africa to South America, where the rule of law remains an abstract concept like in the cyberspace. In other places, it is the government themselves that are the criminal enterprises. Patterns may change according to new needs and circumstances you always have to ask yourself when sitting in front of a pile of paper on transactions to be checked: look for anomalies compared to the normality, or even anomalies in the anomalies.

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Closing Remarks Assoc. Prof. Mustafa KøBAROöLU International Relations Dept., Bilkent University; Academic Advisor, COE–DAT, Ankara Quite a number of issues pertaining to the different dimensions of motivations for suicide bombings have been covered in the presentations of distinguished experts and scholars during the five panel sessions. Some of the presentations were quite to the point, both in substance and style, whereas some others have provoked intense debate and thus received some criticism. This is indeed a normal as well as a healthy situation for debates taking place in such a multi-disciplinary and multi-national gatherings. However, I must also underline that the more accurate is the information used in the analyses, the better for the enlightenment of the audience and the authorities who are supposed to make use of the lessons learned from such gatherings. In this regard, I think it would be both relevant and appropriate if I shared an anecdote with you. During my sabbatical year in Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, as a visiting scholar, I used to attend many conferences. In one of these gatherings concerning “Black Sea Security”, a Marine Corps Lieutenant-General, James Sharp, was the keynote speaker. In his address to a multi-national audience, Gen. Sharp talked about, among other things, the US war on terrorism, with specific references to what he called “Islamic terrorism.” After his presentation, the General received some comments and questions. I also made my intervention with some remarks about what was not appropriate, in my view, in the presentation of the Marine Corps General, and what I thought was based on biased or insufficient information. A few days later, I received an e-mail from a Major from the Pentagon saying that Lt.-Gen. Sharp was kindly inviting me to the Pentagon to speak before a group specifically formed by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers, with a view to finding ways and means to deal with international terrorism effectively. After some time, I attended the meeting on “War on Terror” in the Pentagon that was held on June 2005. During that meeting which lasted about an hour and a half, I shared my knowledge and my observations with them and made some suggestions to the group, which were the following: I told the group, first of all, to rely on experts who have been to places about which they made comments and suggestions, and therefore not to rely that much on what I call “desktop experts” whose knowledge does not come from primary sources or expertise on the ground. Because there are too many self-proclaimed experts who do not rely on primary sources and also make bold statements about countries whose airspace they have not even passed through, or cultures which they have never encountered.

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I also told the groups that they should pay utmost attention to the sensitivities of the people in their statements and comments so as not to confront ordinary people head on. More importantly, as an academic, I told the group to make a very careful and clear distinction between the causes and the consequences of the events that they are talking or writing about, researching etc. This is the minimum requirement for a study which claims to be a scholarly research. After my presentation and the Q+A part, I went back to Harvard. Soon after, I received messages praising my performance and inviting me again at a later time. Since I was very much preoccupied with many research topics that I was working on, I did not have time to go to Washington DC from Boston again. Why did I say all these? We have seen here yesterday that even in a secular country like Turkey, and what is more, before an audience full of representatives of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is the most sensitive institution in Turkey regarding the preservation of secular principles in the administration of the country, if people feel frustrated or offended with some of the comments and remarks about Islam, I believe the speakers must seriously consider as to where they have gone wrong. If such remarks frustrate the people in this secular audience, guess what would happen in other places where people are not so much enlightened about Islam or religious issues in general. I must say that, I am afraid, such misguided remarks and comments, which ostensibly aim at finding ways and means to fight international terrorism, will not only not help understand the causes of the problem or suggest proper ways to deal with them, but also will create new problems by widening the front. Why did I use the term “misguided research”? If one takes into consideration in his or her research only those terrorists who commit suicide in the name of Allah, but disregards other such suicide bombings carried out by other ideological groups, if one pays attention to those who control the human, drug, arms and other illegal trafficking activities carried out for Al-Qaeda, but disregards similar activities of other terrorist organizations such as the PKK which controls billions of dollars worth of illegal networks, then these researchers cannot have a complete picture in their analyses which could guide them the correct sources of the problem. Then, we cannot expect those who are the victims of others’ terrorists to cooperate and collaborate with those who do not pay enough attention to their predicament. I would therefore like to suggest sincerely to my colleagues, experts and scholars deliberating in these fields, to quit their one-sided and misguided observations about Islam and the “evildoers” in the name of Islam. Some 20 years ago, when some of my close friends came to me excitedly talking about a “big brother” telling those interesting things about Islam, and they invited me to these sessions, I told them that I did not need a mysterious person to learn about my religion. Then I picked up the Turkish version of Koran and started to read. I must admit that at first I did not understand much and I was confused. Then I continued to read it, several times, over a long period of time lasting many years. In time, my understanding of Islam as a religion settled and is now consolidated. I can safely say that the message of the Koran is indeed very simple, straightforward, and not at all complicated. The first message is that religion is strictly between the individual and the God. Then, another important message is to be a good person, meaning a person who does

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not cause damage to others’ lives deliberately, a person who helps others, who is honest, who is fair and respectful of others’ rights, who does not use tricks in his or her transactions, who keeps his/her promises and who helps the weak and the needy. Another important message of the Koran, in my interpretation, is that a person should leave some things behind once he/she passes away. That could be children, a building, a book, an idea, anything that can benefit others. To me, this is Islam, indeed, this is religion as written in the Holy Koran. But, if one mixes up the impact of various cultures and local traditions on Islam, then, his or her diagnosis cannot be accurate, nor can be the cures suggested to solve the problems. As such, the problems can only get even worse. On this note, I would like to conclude my remarks, hoping that our friends, distinguished guest lecturers, and those who intervened during the sessions may go back to their countries, and their workplaces, having drawn some dear lessons from the two-day deliberations during the workshop.

Suicide as a Weapon Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Author Index Altunbulak, N. Bokhari, L. Edwards, J.P. Eren, S.A. Fishman, B. Gawthrop, W. Karmon, E. Kibaroğlu, M.

15 22, 51 120 28 64 76 102 182

Özeren, S. Richards, A. Ridley, N. Sarıca, H. Stanciu, I.A. Tophoven, R. von Knop, K.

38 88 150 vii, 15 1 115 161

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