BRITAIN’S PLACE IN THE WORLD
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BRITAIN’S PLACE IN THE WORLD
‘The book has some exciting political conclusions…. It will be frequently used by the experts.’ Sidney Pollard, University of Sheffield ‘Pioneering…. It makes an important contribution to the historiography of postwar Britain.’ David Edgerton, Imperial College, London The overambitious foreign policy of British governments in the 1950s has been frequently blamed for the country’s relative economic decline. One aspect of those ambitions was the intention, then as now, to ‘take the lead’ in Europe by resisting schemes for regional economic and political union and leading the continent towards one worldwide international economic system. The authors take the first hard look into the semi-secret and hitherto ignored world of Britain’s import controls in the 1950s and come to fresh and disturbing conclusions. They show that the Labour government after 1945 did have positive policies to develop Britain’s industries, but that these policies were sacrificed after 1949 in pursuit of a worldwide foreign policy. The effect of import controls, they show, has been underestimated. Removing them was a prime cause of the balance of payments crises of the 1950s and thus of the failure to reassert Britain’s place in the world. Is there, then, as is often argued by the Left in Britain and the Right in the USA, a case for a return to import controls as a way of reviving manufacturing? The book reviews the historical evidence on whether after 1945 trade controls did in fact lead to higher levels of employment and output and greater manufacturing diversity in British industry. Trade controls, the authors suggest, were appropriate to one stage in the rise of the executive state; in a different stage of state development they might have little relevance. Alan S.Milward, formerly Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics, and of Economics in Stanford University, is the author of several books on the modern economic and political development of Europe including The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (1992) and The European Rescue of the Nation State (1994). George Brennan is Research Assistant at the London School of Economics.
ROUTLEDGE EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1
ECONOMIC IDEAS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY Contributions to Contemporary Economic History Sir Alec Cairncross
2
THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR MARKETS Modernity, Culture and Governance in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan Bo Stråth
3
CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The Gold Standard and Beyond Edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo, Barry Eichengreen and Jaime Reis
4
BRITAIN’S PLACE IN THE WORLD A Historical Enquiry into Import Controls, 1945–60 Alan S.Milward and George Brennan
5
FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome Francis M.B.Lynch
BRITAIN’S PLACE IN THE WORLD A historical enquiry into import controls 1945–60
Alan S.Milward and George Brennan
London and New York
First published 1996 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1996 Alan S.Milward and George Brennan Routledge is an International Thomson Publishing company This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Milward, Alan S. Britain’s place in the world: a historical enquiry into import controls 1945–60/Alan S.Milward and George Brennan. p. cm.—(Routledge explorations in economic history, ISSN 1359–7892) Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 0-415-13937-6 1. Import quotas—Great Britain—History. 2. Great Britain— Commercial policy—History. I. Brennan, George. II. Title. III. Series HF3506.M55 1996 382'.52’0941–dc20 95–26082 CIP ISBN 0-203-11602-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-16323-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-13937-6 (Print Edition)
CONTENTS
Figures Tables Acknowledgements Archival References Introduction
vii viii x xi xiii
1
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
2
QUANTITATIVE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND THE MODERN STATE
15
BRITISH COMMERCIAL POLICY AND THE OEEC TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME, 1949–51
37
TAKING THE LEAD IN EUROPE The international politics of import controls, 1952–6
78
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF QUANTITATIVE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
130
THE EFFECT OF IMPORT CONTROLS ON BRITISH MANUFACTURING
190
3 4 5 6
Appendix I
1
Examination of Scott’s calculations of the value of imports of food and raw materials excluded by quantitative restrictions, 1946–9 211
v
CONTENTS
Appendix II
Corden’s estimate of import savings in the year 1952 attributable to emergency quantitative controls imposed in November 1951 and March 1952, and our estimate of total savings for the year 1953 217
Appendix III
Government estimate of the probable value of additional imports in 1954 in the absence of quantitative restrictions
238
A survey of the operation of import quotas and other import restriction regimes on United Kingdom manufacturing
240
Appendix IV
Notes Bibliography Bibliography of Official Sources Index
vi
290 306 311 313
FIGURES
1 Cumulative net surpluses or deficits of EPU member countries, July 1950 to November 1953 2 Volume index of United Kingdom imports (goods and services) divided by index of real GDP 3 Volume index of United Kingdom imports (visibles) divided by index of real GDP 4 Share of finished manufactures in total United Kingdom imports 5 Quarterly volume of imports of United Kingdom v. liberalisation 6 Manufactures: volume of imports v. relative prices v. domestic sales 7 Manufactures: import volume v. relative prices v. Liberalisation Index 8 Imports of motor vehicles (volume) into the United Kingdom, 1949–66 9 Volume of imports and exports of OEEC countries 10 Volume of manufactured imports: Switzerland v. United Kingdom 11 Volume of raw materials imports: Switzerland v. United Kingdom 12 Area shares of total United Kingdom imports during liberalisation, deliberalisation and reliberalisation
vii
82 135 136 137 164 166 167 173 177 182 182 219
TABLES
1 United Kingdom trade liberalisation percentage as calculated by the OEEC, 1 November 1951 and 1 April 1954 2 Value of United Kingdom imports from EPU member-states 3 The increase in ‘real’ United Kingdom imports from EPU members in each six-month period, 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1951 4 Volume indices of United Kingdom retained imports and exports 5 OEEC Trade Liberalisation Index results, 1950–8 6 Estimates of the reduction in the value of imports attributable to import controls 7 Domestic sales and imports of manufactures at constant prices 8 Wholesale prices and cost of living, 1937–48 9 An index of real per capita disposable income in Switzerland, 1938–55 10 Volume indices of imports into Switzerland and the United Kingdom, 1938–55 11 Summary of our minimum upward revisions of existing estimates of the reduction in the value of potential imports attributable to import controls 12 ‘Deliberalised’ private imports from the Relaxation Area, 1952 13 United Kingdom output and imports of cotton fabrics, 1951–4 14 Paper and board: production and imports (volume) for 1952 viii
59 73
74 75 127 139 143 179 180 181
186 218 227 229
TABLES
15 Quarterly United Kingdom imports of cotton piecegoods from Belgium, 1952–3 16 Effects of the liberalisation in 1953 of some quotas on imports from the dollar zone 17 Summary of additional value of imports in 1954 after quota liberalisations in 1953 18 Import/income ratios of some manufactures in 1953 for the United Kingdom and Belgium 19 Employment, production and trade in the United Kingdom dyestuffs industry 20 Imports of oil into the United Kingdom 21 The source, number and value of computers delivered to United Kingdom public authorities and others, circa January 1963 22 Annual deliveries of watches and mechanical clocks made in the United Kingdom 23 Imports of watches and clocks into the United Kingdom, 1947–63 24 Import substitution in the United Kingdom paper and board industry (other than newsprint), 1938–65 25 United Kingdom output and imports of hardwood, 1934–53
ix
233 235 236 237 242 244
254 274 276 282 287
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research for this book was financed by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. R 000 233 553) and by the Leverhulme Trust (Grant F. 4BD). The authors wish to express their strong gratitude to both institutions for their positive and flexible support. The authors would like to thank David Edgerton, Peter Hewlett, Professor Sidney Pollard, and Professor Leandro Prados de la Escosura for valuable practical help with particular sections of the work, and Patricia Cooke for practical help throughout.
x
ARCHIVAL REFERENCES
The conventional Public Record Office coding is used for all references to documents in the UK public records. BT CAB FO SUPP T
Board of Trade Cabinet Office Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministry of Supply Treasury
The following abbreviations are commonly used in the text and footnotes. c.i.f. ECA ECSC EEC EFTA EPU f.o.b. GATT IBM ICI ILC MAC MFN NA NRDC NSC OECD
carriage, insurance and freight Economic Cooperation Agency European Coal Iron and Steel Community European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Payments Union free on board General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs International Business Machines Imperial Chemical Industries Import Licensing Committee Mutual Aid Committee most favoured nation National Archives of the United States of America National Research and Development Corporation Newsprint Supply Company Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development xi
ARCHIVAL REFERENCES
OEEC OGL SITC UN
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Open General Licence Standard International Trade Classification United Nations
xii
INTRODUCTION
Our book is a study of the use of quantitative import controls in the post-war British economy. It argues that these were far more effective in achieving their objectives than government and economists concluded at the time. They were responsible for a much greater saving on the import bill than contemporary calculations implied and in many cases provided a significant infant industry protection, allowing certain industries which would otherwise not have been able to stand up to foreign competition to take root or to grow. A hidden industrial policy that operated after 1945 has been left largely undiscovered because of the lack of interest of historians and economists in non-tariff barriers to trade. Because the effectiveness of non-tariff restrictions, particularly of import quotas and state bulk purchasing, was underestimated, it was not understood how far the relative success of British post-war industrial recovery and the relatively favourable balance of trade and payments surplus for the 1950s as a whole depended on their existence. In the 1950s the balance on current account averaged around £200 million annually except in the crisis years 1951 and 1955. A permanent surplus of over £300 million was believed to be in reach. Especially the underestimation of the effectiveness of import quotas against western European exports led British governments to take a stance in international financial and commercial diplomacy that took insufficient account of the increasing competitiveness of continental western European manufacturing with that of Britain. While extensive import quotas against American manufactured imports were maintained until 1958–9, those against western European exports were relaxed first between 1949 and 1951, and after their reimposition in 1951–2, relaxed once more from 1953 onwards in pursuit of an ambitious global design which required that Britain should take the lead in Europe. In this xiii
INTRODUCTION
case, this meant leading western Europe away from regional schemes of economic or political unions and preserving a central role for the United Kingdom and its currency in a western world in which its leadership of the Commonwealth and of western Europe guaranteed its special relationship with the USA as the most significant of that country’s allies. Each major relaxation of quantitative trade controls from 1950 onwards helped to generate a balance of trade and payments shock with the OEEC and the dollar area, demonstrating the inability of the economy and the currency to sustain such ambitious policies let alone to combine them with economic growth. Western Europe created its own system of regulating international trade, excluding Britain as it did so, leadership in the Commonwealth was lost, and the ‘special relationship’ as a consequence became less valuable to the USA. Import controls, which in such existing literature as there is appear as a briefly exceptional and accidental hangover from the wartime economy, thus in their development and their removal in fact played an important part in shaping the course of post-war British history. We do not say that import controls were (or are) the most effective instrument of industrial, regional or employment policy for the modern state. We say that each separate control has to be judged on its own merits against the policy objectives. Because these objectives themselves in post-war Britain were frequently multiple and ambivalent, we find it difficult, perhaps unrealistic, to reach any final judgement abut their overall value in promoting the domestic manufacturing sector. But we are left in no doubt that in many important instances, for good or bad, they did so most effectively. If regional policy was (and is) desirable, quantitative import controls were a crucially important policy tool before 1960. About their effect on raising the national level of employment we are more sceptical, believing them in the circumstances of the 1950s to have had little influence either in their growth or their removal. In general, we see the extensive use of import controls by the United Kingdom, which at the time was the world’s second biggest international trader, not as a purely British episode, but as a stage in the evolution of the modern state. Their use spread as tariffs became less useful, either for revenue or for regulating trade, and diminished as international markets came to be regulated privately by inter-firm agreements. For much of the 1950s, however, the United Kingdom was relaxing quantitative import controls in the hope that they would xiv
INTRODUCTION
be replaced by a worldwide, multilateral, non-discriminatory network of world trade and payments—the post-Second World War approximation to ‘free trade’. This was to seriously misjudge the times as the Treaty of Rome was to show as early as 1957. The misjudgement seems to indicate the dominance of foreign policy considerations over economic realities. It may not have been the last occasion on which a sober assessment of economic realities was sidelined in a vision of Britain’s place in the world that involved a magical attitude to the national currency. Will Britain’s partners in the European Union indefinitely allow imports from the United Kingdom unhindered access to a large Single Market while allowing Britain to retain the sovereign privilege of undervaluing its currency at will? Whether or not Britain is overconfident of its competitive position at present it was certainly so in the 1950s. We do not say that the contemporary underestimation of the effectiveness of quantitative import controls was the only, or even the major, influence in the choice of Britain’s post-war international financial and commercial stance. Nor do we say that any other choice of international commercial policy would have been ultimately possible. But we do say that the large scope and far-reaching importance of quantitative import controls ought to have been taken into account; in the way in which trade was decontrolled, in their effects on the economy in the shorter as in the longer term, and ultimately in the determination of a more appropriate foreign policy in western Europe. Unavoidably, our book has to pass through several lengthy passages of detailed calculation. Unavoidably, these sometimes lead not to statistical certainty but to a balance of probability. These may well be unappetising for economists and economic historians, and to political historians repulsively indigestible. But without them, the work would be mere assertion, and for scholars of particular trades and industries they will have their own value and interest. For political and diplomatic historians they ultimately are the bones, nerves and arteries of an otherwise disembodied idea whose substance they have had some difficulty in fully describing—why Britain’s over-ambitious diplomacy persisted for so long after 1947. We have put as much of this material as possible, without breaking the continuity of the argument, in the Appendices, where readers may choose for themselves whether to disturb it. But we do hope that if they are going to argue seriously with us, they will turn there before they do so. xv
INTRODUCTION
The brief assertions made here are taken up in more detailed narrative and analytical form in Chapters 3 and 4. Necessarily, this involves some detail about certain of the more important trades and industries particularly affected by quantitative trade controls. Further detail still is provided in Chapters 5 and 6 which attempt quantitative measurements of the true impact of these non-tariff trade controls on the economy. Inevitably, in the case of those industries—cars, paper, etc.—where the financial and economic impact of quantitative trade controls was especially significant, there is a further accumulation of detail about them, although we hope no unavoidable repetition. And lastly there are the Appendices. So our book proceeds from generalisation to the detail on which it is founded, which seems to be the opposite way round from that in which history books are typically written. It was done in this way to induce more historians to consider its implications, while leaving those who so wish free to follow us down the funnel of accumulating microeconomic detail.
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1 A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
It is a familiar fact that in the aftermath of the Second World War the United Kingdom’s imports, like much of the rest of its economy, remained for some time subject to government regulation and control. Few people, however, have retained an accurate impression of the scale on which this took place nor of the resources of labour and time which it employed. In 1948 the Import Licensing Department of the Board of Trade issued about a quarter of a million separate licences. Over 300,000 applications for licences were processed. Its daily postbag averaged 2,000 letters. It shuffled 500 individual visitors a day through four separate buildings for interview and it answered a daily average of 3,000 telephone calls.1 A licensing staff of 190 in February 1946 had grown to more than 500 three years later, to say nothing of the secretarial staff, postal clerks, filing clerks, switchboard operators and cleaners they required. To carry out the accompanying task of managing exchange controls the Bank of England required a staff of about 1,400.2 And beyond that there was the administration of other forms of domestic economic controls which in effect were also import controls, such as consumption controls on softwood, which was virtually all imported. The removal of licensing of softwood timber, so the Board of Trade estimated in November 1953, would eliminate the completion of more than half a million forms a year.3 The details seem more reminiscent of an eastern European peoples’ republic than of what was then the world’s second greatest capitalist trader and economy. A measure of its importance was that in 1950 no less than 12 per cent of total recorded world imports consisted of arrivals in the United Kingdom. This does not indicate any inefficacy of the control machinery, for in 1938 the equivalent figure had been more than 19 per cent. This machinery has been generally regarded 1
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
as an accidental episode; survival in the war demanded the centralised control and rationing of all resources and after the war shortages of dollars and goods meant the system could not be immediately dismantled. As far as import controls are concerned this is quite wrong. Such controls were still proliferating at the start of 1949 and were not substantially reduced, apart from a temporary and localised episode between summer 1950 and summer 1951, until 1954. It is also ahistorical to see this development as an accident of war. It should properly be seen as a stage in the evolution of the modern state beginning with the great depression of 1929–32 and, as far as capitalist economies were concerned, ending in the early 1960s. It is by no means a purely British story, indeed it might be more interesting if it could be told about France. It concerns the longrun relationship of the modern developed economy and state to the huge growth in value and volume of international trade on which its inhabitants have come to depend for their wellbeing. How should that trade be regulated in the states own interest? Consult any large library on the subject of the commercial policy of twentieth-century states. Over 90 per cent of the information deals with tariffs. Yet in most of the highly-industrialised countries in the twentieth century tariffs have become increasingly unimportant both as an instrument of commercial policy and as a source of government revenue. To a significant extent tariffs have declined in importance not as a result of any secular movement towards greater freedom of trade but, on the contrary, because of their relative ineffectiveness as a means of regulating trade. In most developed countries since 1918 they have failed to meet the increasingly complicated and sophisticated objectives of government either in commercial or fiscal policy. As international trade in manufactures becomes increasingly dominated by a small number of large companies whose production operations are international in scope this tendency seems likely to be maintained. Quantitative restrictions on imports, the subject of this study, have in comparison attracted little political or economic debate and virtually no theoretical discussion. The secrecy and speed which often surrounds the introduction of such restrictions means that the facts, even if recoverable, seem too chaotic to allow analysis or to reward inquiry. Theoretical discussion is scant and empirical investigations are few. Yet in the twentieth century quantitative restrictions, particularly import quotas, have been a main instrument for regulating foreign trade. This was so in the United Kingdom in the 2
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
decade after 1945 when they were also a cornerstone of post-war reconstruction. It is mainly with that experience that this book deals, but the British experiment was not atypical. In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, the development of a systematic apparatus of import controls arose out of a sense of the inadequacy of tariffs for supporting domestic policy choices and in the longer run is probably best understood as a stage in the transition from reliance on tariffs to the development of other forms of regulating international markets, business mergers, cartels, common markets and the like, so that their behaviour does not too greatly or too frequently disturb the equilibrium of the domestic economy. In spite of the importance of quantitative trade controls, little is known about them, not even about their most familiar variant, the import quota. Often disguised, sometimes secret, they have been an unenticing subject for historians because of the difficulty of assembling evidence. They have been even less enticing for economists, because theorising about them has seemed unrewarding while measuring their effect has seemed arbitrary and uncertain. Protectionism, as it has been defined by most historians and economists, has meant tariffs. Their analysis has spawned intricate and unresolved debates not only in economic and political theory but also in constitutional law. Import controls have been discussed only in a more simplified intellectual context. Everyone acknowledges that forms of protectionism other than tariffs, non-tariff barriers as they are usually called, have been and still are widespread, but their prevalence has yet to be taken into account even in the recent changes of fashion in the theory of international trade.4 Standard works on the international economy usually have little more to say about them other than that they are bad. To some this may seem their only exciting attribute. But that would be to ignore the particular importance they have had in the history of twentieth-century states. Beginning with the collapse of prices of so many products in the great depression of 1929–32, which led states to look for new forms of protecting domestic price levels, quantitative trade controls spread until they probably reached their apogee in 1948. Since then, on trade between developed economies they have diminished in significance, but as a means of protecting such economies against low-wage, labour intensive manufactures in poorer economies they have been spreading since the mid-1950s. While the developed economies have discovered other means of regulating trade between themselves, less inhibiting to its growth, 3
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
quantitative import controls and their effectiveness must remain a live issue in a world where countries like the United Kingdom or the USA have a congenitally high propensity to import manufactures and where Russia and the former republics of the USSR, and soon perhaps China as well, have a huge, highly-skilled industrial labour force willing to work for a tenth of American or German wages. The most typical quantitative import control in the post-war British economy was the import quota. A quota on imports has this essential difference from a tariff, that beyond a fixed maximum volume or value over a specified period no further amount of the commodity in question is allowed to enter the country. There is no price at which an additional amount may enter and be sold, whereas even in the case of a tariff intended to be prohibitive the theoretical possibility remains that the external price will fall so far that the good could still be imported and sold more cheaply than the domestic product. Once the quota, however, has been fulfilled prices no longer come into consideration; there is no market. The Keynesian tradition has been for temporary protectionism, and by this import quotas have often been meant. Keynes himself was an advocate of import controls until the gold standard was abandoned, and several of his followers have at various times advocated forms of import control on particular sectors of the British economy as a way of achieving macroeconomic goals. Such views are now deeply out of political fashion in the United Kingdom, although loudly voiced in recent elections in the USA. But while it may well be that in a perfect and sensible world Britain, Germany and the USA would not, for example, have textile industries, it is also the case that they do have them and the workers they employ are not being retrained to produce semi-conductors. Intellectual fashions do not last and even when, as in the last fifteen years, there has been a mighty tide of political opinion in Britain behind the belief that only an open economy can be competitive enough to deliver a high standard of living, flatly contradictory voices have been heard on the ‘left’ of the Labour Party demanding the direction of investment into protected industries as a better route to technological competitiveness. Other voices have been heard urging the protection of some manufacturing sectors on the grounds that if the manufacturing sector as a whole becomes too small a part of the economy any period of relatively high growth rates of national income will be sharply curtailed by the rising deficit on commodity trade. It is not fully known how often since 1960, 4
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
when this book ends, British governments when faced with exactly that circumstance have considered reimposing import controls. They rejected the idea in 1962, partly because of the administrative apparatus it would require, and temporarily doubled many tariffs instead. When tariffs returned to their earlier level in late 1966 and government was again faced with the familiar problem of a surge of imports it bowed to the wisdom of hindsight and devalued. Protectionist arguments are at the time of writing being loudly made in the USA, by the ‘right’ wing of the Republican Party and by Democrats from states where manufacturing is no longer in the forefront of competitiveness and employment has shrunk accordingly, and quantitative controls have been often mentioned. A ‘bad’ example of the use of import controls dominated and still dominates the contemporary political stage, that of the former communist regimes of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. But if politicians when considering the possibility of reintroducing import controls looked back on the period covered by this book, when they were heavily used, they would be looking back on a golden age, characterised by a high rate of national and personal income growth and full employment. Import controls are rarely credited with having contributed to these happy conditions. They are treated in histories of the period as an emergency measure to cope with the shortage of foreign exchange caused by world trade and payments imbalances; in a ‘healthy’ economy they would have been removed. Our examination of all the import controls on which we could find good evidence shows, however, that it was very rare for any import control to have only one single policy purpose. It is true that saving foreign exchange was the commonest reason for import controls in Britain between 1945 and 1960, but it was most unusual for it to be the sole reason for any particular import control. There were many others and it is these which are missing from most existing accounts of the post-war British economy. Export promotion, by guaranteeing the domestic market to manufacturing industries obliged by other forms of government control to export a fixed high percentage of their total output, was also important. The protection by import quotas of modern, sciencebased, infant industries or single manufacturing processes against American or German competition was widespread. So too was the protection by similar means of industries regarded as strategic, in the sense that their output would be so important in any future war that the country should not rely on foreign supply for what they 5
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produced. Regional policy, too, depended heavily on quantitative import controls to persuade foreign direct investment to settle in the scheduled Development Areas. That, in turn, meant that trade controls reinforced employment policy, because the defining characteristic of the Development Areas was their high pre-war unemployment rates. Some older uncompetitive industries, particularly textiles, clothing and jute, were also protected by import controls to safeguard employment in the regions where they were settled. As Chapter 6 and Appendix IV show this does not exhaust the range of motives for import quotas, but it summarises the more prevalent ones in addition to saving foreign exchange by reducing the import bill. Within this complexity of objectives can be discovered the piecemeal elements of the post-1945 Labour government’s industrial policy, which historians have struggled to find and, not finding very much, have tended to relegate to a rather low order of significance. It did indeed scarcely exist at the level of positive cabinet or party decisionmaking. There was no coherent, centrally directed attempt to develop manufacturing industries. But the outcome of piecemeal decisions to retain or introduce quantitative import controls, decisions taken within different ministries and at an intermediate level, did amount to the protection and promotion of many important new industries and some older, very large ones, like car manufacturing. If ‘policy’ implies a specified priority and the conscious allocation of resources to achieving it, then it would be correct to say the Labour government had no industrial policy. If, however, it implies the persistent operation of a constant predilection or prejudice at a lower level of decisionmaking, there was an industrial policy whose primary instrument was quantitative import controls, essentially import quotas and state purchasing. We estimate (Chapter 6) that in 1954 about 6.7 per cent of British manufacturing output would have been lost to American competition had it not been protected against imports from North America by import controls. In the same year about 16.5 per cent of manufacturing output stood to be lost if all quantitative import controls, including those against western European exports, had been removed. These are static calculations; an unimpeded flow of resources, many would argue, would have maximised efficiency through greater international specialisation, so that the same or a greater volume of output and employment would have been reached without trade controls and the distortions that they introduced. We 6
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recommend the reader, however, to read the detail of the book and consider the great variety of circumstance of the industries in question as well as of the purpose of import restrictions. Some industries, jute goods for example, were protected by quota purely for reasons of regional employment policy and had no future other than under permanent protection. Others, like the production of bulk organic chemicals from an oil feedstock, appear a striking justification of the infant industry argument. Their success suggests that in a highlydeveloped economy a brief period of absolute protection against foreign competition will sometimes suffice to develop a technologically sophisticated manufacturing process which otherwise could not be implanted, and which, once implanted, is in no way inefficient. These are extreme examples. Given the multiple causation of most import quotas within the policy formulation process, most of the examples we consider lie in between these two extremes and it is a matter of judgement whether the gains outweighed the losses. Appendix IV serves to help the reader form such a judgement. But it must be one conclusion of our work that no theory offers a universal basis from which to form such a judgement. Each case of industrial protection by import restrictions was unique in the circumstances of the industry and the purposes of its protection. Although the percentage figures for the extent of manufacturing protected by import restrictions may seem high, we believe we have erred on the side of underestimation. They are certainly high enough to persuade us that it is justified to write of an industrial policy, in the qualified sense in which we have here defined policy. The different objectives for maintaining or imposing quantitative trade controls suggest the underlying reasons for that industrial policy. One was high employment, a commitment given to the electorate by the wartime coalition government. We estimate that in 1954 about 5.4 per cent of total employment in manufacturing was in sectors protected by quantitative trade controls. But this is certainly an underestimate, because in the absence of information clear enough to sustain even the vaguest approximation we have had to omit the textile sector from that calculation. Textiles and clothing were protected by import quotas against imports from western Europe (until 1954) and from the dollar area and Japan (until 1960). Export controls imposed by India provided additional protection to textile, although not to clothing, manufacturers before 1954, and after 1956 ‘voluntary’ export restrictions were imposed by Hong Kong and India in the face of clamour for protection in Britain. Until 1954 the key raw material of 7
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the industry was purchased through a statutory public body, the Raw Cotton Commission. The reader will sense throughout the book how sensitive both Labour governments and their Conservative successors were to removing trade controls when this was likely to endanger a substantial number of jobs. The idea that protecting these jobs in the circumstances of the 1950s when demand was so high was a distortion, because the same national level of employment at higher productivity might have existed without import controls, has much force. It seems to us doubtful whether quantitative controls on imports did have any important impact on the national unemployment rate. Where they did have an impact, however, was on regional and subregional employment rates and this was another important objective of government policy. Controls were used to ensure a more equal geographical distribution of employment in manufacturing. In this, their use reflected a set of predispositions about policy and the national need which had emerged in the inter-war period, when persistent very high unemployment rates had indeed been a regional problem with severe implications. We are unable to say what percentage of employment in, for example, the Scottish Development Area depended on foreign direct investment in manufacturing which would in most cases not have taken place had imports of the same products been freely allowed or merely taxed on the frontier, but it was clearly a much higher percentage than in the country as a whole. Manufacturing behind a protectionist import quota was one concession the foreign investor might win in return for having to site its factory in Scotland or South Wales. Dunning estimated that in 1957 American firms sited in Development Areas, many, perhaps most, of which had been enticed there by trade controls, employed 35,000 people.5 Another motivation for import controls was the warlike world in which the British economy operated. It would have been extremely foolish in the early 1950s to have forgotten the economic lessons of rearmament and war as they had been learned after 1936. A wide range of industrial processes and technologies in the British economy in 1946 were the result of the rearmament drive, the artificial protection given by the Second World War, and massive government investment in what were considered ‘strategic’ industries. In a war of mass production, as the Second World War had been, an astonishing range of output is classifiable as strategic, in the sense that it is indispensable for victory and that it may be unwise or dangerous to rely on imports for its supply. There was no good reason after 1945 to suppose that the world had become safe enough to 8
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
eliminate these considerations. Until the mid-1950s defence strategy was still based on the assumption that future wars might well replicate the pattern of 1939–45, so that what had been acquired during that war in the way of skills, technology and output must be kept, even though the market for it was smaller and in many instances the industries were not capable of facing international competition. From aeroplanes to alarm clocks and from shotguns to silk cloth, goods were classified as strategic and protected by import quotas to guarantee a national manufacturing capacity. The line between this and straightforward industrial protection against the USA and Germany was thin indeed and frequently crossed. There were persuasive arguments for protection against American manufacturing. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of American industry during the war and the ingenuity in technological innovation which accompanied it took place in much more favourable circumstances than those in which British wartime production operated. Constraints on the supply of labour, capital and raw materials meant that investment in new technologies in wartime Britain was governed by one criterion: would they help to win the war within the time frame set by grand strategy? Everything else was postponed. The enormous disparity in size of output by 1945 in some sectors of manufacturing between the USA and the United Kingdom suggested that some form of non-tariff protection was necessary if United Kingdom manufacturing were to expand in those sectors. The argument was easy to win because everyone, including the Americans after 1947, accepted the need for trade controls for balance of payments reasons, to economise on dollar imports. The argument for industrial protection against Germany was a different one. In the future it was still a potential economic rival and enemy. It was thought that a decade would elapse after 1945 before German manufactured exports would return to world markets in sufficient strength to displace those of Britain. Beginning with the occupation of Germany and the opportunities it presented by fair means or foul for acquiring patents, machinery and even people, and continuing through the official reparations programme, British officials in specialised wartime ministries which continued in existence after 1945, notably the Ministry of Supply, attempted to reconstruct certain sectors of manufacturing industry, or to introduce new ones, so that the United Kingdom would compete in the post-war world on a more equal footing against its greatest European trade rival. Import controls were an important support to this policy. 9
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
Protection by import controls against both the USA and Germany was seen as one way of guaranteeing a better place in the world for the United Kingdom than it had had in the 1930s. It was not a purely defensive stance but a deliberately expansionist one, using import controls to boost the post-war industrial reconstruction. Its expansionist nature can be seen in the use of import quotas to promote exports. Drastic restrictions were imposed by agreements and understandings between government and some industries on the proportion of total output that could be sold on domestic markets. There was a brief period when only one-quarter of the cars manufactured could be sold to domestic purchasers and for the first post-war decade the proportion was never supposed to be higher than half the total number produced in any year. Other products too were forced by consumption controls or direct bargains on to export markets; nylon stockings and sewing machines are similar examples. Part of the bargain was that the domestic market was guaranteed to domestic producers. Lastly, as in all cases of quantitative import restriction, private interest could insert itself into government decision-making and policy. Because there were so many different rationales for the use of import quotas it was not all that difficult for private vested interest to coincide with, or masquerade as, public good. Some of the quotas we unearthed on goods whose import would scarcely have been noticed within the total import bill and whose output appeared to have no special significance for the economy are difficult to explain on any other grounds than straightforward protectionism. And as we argue later, in a very large industry like car production, where there were various public motives for stringent import quotas, it was also perhaps within the common private interest of the major car manufacturers not to disturb the quota regime which restricted competition on the domestic market to their own circle. The public reasoning for maintaining import quotas on pulp, paper and board became an important policy issue within government from 1954 to 1956, even a foreign policy issue. There is no doubt that relaxing the quotas in a period of high demand would indeed have strained the balance of payments. But the fact remained that British paper and board producers were probably well content with such effective protection against Scandinavian producers while high domestic demand gave them good, and sheltered, growth opportunities. The line between public and private interest was not so easy to draw. From autumn 1949 onwards this piecemeal industrial policy, in so far as it relied on quantitative trade controls, was increasingly 10
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
threatened by foreign policy issues of the most fundamental kind. Import controls, retained and imposed to ensure for the United Kingdom a better place in the post-war world order, then began to be removed for the same reason. The process was very slow and not continuous. Most import controls against dollar zone goods remained in place for the first 14 to 16 post-war years. While the United Kingdom was the leading force from 1949 in the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Programme which relaxed and removed quotas on trade between western European countries, it was nevertheless the case that even in 1955 import quotas still kept out an important volume and value of potential imports. How important a value are we talking about? ‘Potential imports’ is a slippery concept, and as our book demonstrates there is no entirely satisfactory way of quantifying the extent of import saving to be ascribed to import controls. Most British import quotas were specified by volume and quantity, not value. Once a quota was filled no difference between foreign and domestic prices could have any influence on trade flows (although, as we show later it is not true that quotas had no effect on foreign prices). In measuring the value of excluded imports we have therefore confined ourselves strictly to the subject of the book, quantitative import controls. But the reader needs to be aware that removing an import control was not the equivalent of moving to free trade, its removal brought the tariff into play. Since every method of measuring the effectiveness of quantitative import controls has evident defects, we use a variety of procedures. Over the period 1946–9 our estimate is that the value of potential imports excluded by quantitative import controls represented about 20 per cent of the total c.i.f. import bill. For 1953 we estimate the value of excluded potential imports at about 10.2 per cent of the total f.o.b. import bill as reported at the time, for 1953 about 9.6 per cent, for 1954 about 6.3 per cent, and for 1955 about 5.3 per cent.6 These estimates are higher than contemporary estimates. There were many reasons other than import controls for the ratio of British imports by value to GNP to be much lower in the 1950s than the long-term trend, but import controls were a weighty one. If the effectiveness of import controls is measured by their ability to keep out imports, British trade controls were effective, and more effective than was thought at the time. Given the protectionist stance of the British economy since 1931, of which the increase in the use of quantitative import controls after 1945 was a logical extension, it is interesting to ask why there was a 11
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
change in the direction of relaxing them and not just rhetorically espousing, but actually putting into practice, a policy of greater worldwide freedom of exchange for money and goods. The complex cross-currents of post-war domestic policy priorities—reconstruction, employment, regional development, the need for a powerful national defence production—were all increasingly subordinated to a foreign policy priority. The United Kingdom must remain the most important ally of the USA. For that, it was necessary to be the leading power in western Europe, for it was there that America’s main security interest lay. And because the Commonwealth was thought of as adding great weight to Britain’s influence, especially on the USA, it was necessary to link all three of these areas, North America, western Europe and the Commonwealth, in one common framework, of which as some politicians fondly imagined Britain would be the central point of intersection. It followed that a central thrust of commercial and financial diplomacy had to be to block all suggestions for customs unions and common markets in western Europe. They would be discriminatory against British trade, because Britain would be unable to join them and keep its Commonwealth relations in the same form. They might lead to Britain being replaced as America’s first ally in Europe by a more powerful European entity. Instead of a discriminatory European bloc, Britain pursued from 1952 the goal of the legal convertibility of western European currencies, led by sterling, into US dollars, and a greater freedom of movement of goods across the whole of OEEC Europe (all of western Europe except Spain). These would be guarantees of the ‘one-world system’, as British officials liked to call it, which would successfully guarantee Britain’s place in the world. Assuming British manufacturing industry to be much stronger than its continental rivals’ governments pushed ahead with the European Trade Liberalisation Programme as a counter-thrust to the idea of discriminatory trade associations in western Europe, while fully intending to prolong the discriminatory trade arrangements between Britain and the Commonwealth. However, as we show, after each bout of quota removal and widening under the auspices of the Trade Liberalisation Programme, the trade and payments balance was weakened by the inflow of continental manufactures, ultimately with the painful consequence that in 1955–6 the United Kingdom had to withdraw from reaching the target for quota removals that it had itself forced the other OEEC countries to accept. The only improvement in the 1950s in the ability of the United Kingdom to 12
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
pay its way on visible account in fact occurred in the period of greatest protection by trade controls. What might have happened had quantitative import controls not been imposed, or had they been less effective? Two hypothetical outcomes seem equally probable. One is a further devaluation or devaluations of the sterling exchange rate. The other is a drive towards competitive efficiency by major sectors of manufacturing, car manufacturers for example, and the almost complete loss of other sectors, textiles for example. Given the extreme anxiety about marginal increases in the unemployment rate evinced by the Conservative government between 1951 and 1955, when its majority in the Commons was very narrow, the former seems more probable, for the latter could have worked only if accompanied by drastic deflation of domestic demand. The strong ambitions for the national currency would thus have had to be abandoned earlier than they were. Government was in the ambiguous situation of clinging to import quotas and other quantitative controls as a device to continue the pursuit of sterling convertibility, unless it were to choose higher levels of unemployment. It might, of course, be argued that the pursuit of such ambitious global foreign and financial policies was only possible if more ruthless economic choices had been made; pursued while import quotas remained in place they were founded on an illusion. There were many other reasons for Britain’s over-ambitious foreign policy and international economic stance from 1949 onwards, the underestimation of the effect of import controls on the balance of payments was only one of them. Nor was the United Kingdom alone in following this trajectory; there are striking analogies with France, which also faced a similar problem of declining relative power which it first tried to rectify by quantitative trade restrictions and then, in the 1950s, by gradually removing them. Their relaxation and removal by France, however, took place not in the context of the ‘one-world system’ envisaged by British officials as the ideal framework for sustaining Britain’s influence, but in the context of a regional European discriminatory framework, discriminating also against the United Kingdom. Thus did two formerly great imperial powers reach different solutions, although the commercial problems with which they had both been faced from 1929 onwards had been rather similar. The movement towards quantitative controls on trade after the 1929 crash represented the reaction not only of the United Kingdom and France, but also of other states to the acute trade and payments problems with which they were then at grips and also the political 13
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH IMPORT CONTROLS
tendencies of that period. These could be described as a shift from legislation by parliament to regulation by the executive, from the public to the semi-secret, and to the states interest as the primary need in market regulation. Tariffs having failed, in the eyes of politicians, to guarantee an acceptable form of market management, the state had to intervene with its own regulative machinery. The United Kingdom in its choice of commercial policy was only following a worldwide tendency. Much the same may be said about its gradual abandonment of import controls, for there too it followed an international pattern, this time one in which state regulation of markets was replaced by inter-firm regulation, for which the state merely provided a general policy framework at the highest level to make sure that market regulation did not run counter to foreign or defence policy. The episode of post-war British import controls is thus also part of the general history of the evolution of the modern developed state, as well as having the particular characteristic of being a response to relatively declining power. Seen from a purely British perspective it is difficult to understand it in its full context. Furthermore the removal of import quotas against western Europe was in the context of a common European programme and the removal of those against North America at least required some public obeisance to the idea of international cooperation. We therefore turn in the next chapter to a more general history of the concept of quantitative import controls in order to put the British experience in the wider perspective which alone fully explains it.
14
2 QUANTITATIVE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND THE MODERN STATE
Although tariffs are often handled theoretically as though they were merely a tax on trade, one reason for the extensiveness of the literature about them is that in many countries they became a basic nineteenthcentury instrument of state-building. They provided the money for government expenditure, supported the objectives of foreign policy, occasionally protected and encouraged manufactures and trades that were considered essential to the state’s welfare, and served the constitutional purpose of balancing and compromising the economic and political interests of large and influential social groups. Adjustments of the tariff, usually made by laws debated in a representative assembly, could become so frequent as to elevate import duties to the position of coping-stone of a pluralist parliamentary democracy in evolution. This was strikingly exhibited in the German Empire, where the Reichstag, which had only limited influence over other areas of government policy and virtually no control over ministers, could exercise much greater powers in the frequent and interminable discussions of changes to the national tariff. In doing so it could provide or withdraw a coalition of interest group support which sometimes more accurately represented the interests and wishes of the electorate than did the Chancellors government. Tariff debates in the Congress of the USA fulfilled a similar purpose, because of the independence of the Executive from parliamentary censure. This nineteenth-century constitutional role of the tariff can still be seen in the USA, although now at the point of change. The debate over the proposed North American Free Trade Area has been in many respects a debate over whether the national tariff should now cease to play its constitutional and nation-building role, as it already has done in western European countries. The North American Free Trade 15
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
Area is, in spite of reassurances to Congress, a change of practice for a country in which Congress has always kept the tariff in its hands, relinquishing its detailed parliamentary supervision of variations in customs duty to the President and the Executive’s trade negotiators for only limited periods of time and only under stringent conditions imposed beforehand on the possible outcome of any negotiations. The constitutional importance of customs dues was greater in the nineteenth century because the revenue from them made up so large a part of total state revenue. In 1851 in Norway, for example, it contributed 84.1 per cent of the total, in 1885–6 64.7 per cent, in 1934–5 36.2 per cent and by 1966 only 5.6 per cent.1 This is the typical trend, albeit in the Norwegian case strongly accentuated. Taking another example of a much larger and more industrialised economy with a much more diverse range of government expenditure, Germany, produces the following result. Customs duties produced 59.3 per cent of the tax income of the imperial government in 1905, 13.8 per cent of that of central government in the Weimar Republic in 1925, and only 5.1 per cent of that of the central government in the Federal Republic in 1956.2 For countries which had almost complete free trade in the nineteenth century, such as Britain, the trend is different in so far as there is an increase in the inter-war period in the proportional contribution made to tax income by tariffs. Their contribution in Britain was 38.5 per cent in 1851, falling to 19.3 per cent by 1896, but rising by 1935 to 23.0 per cent and still in 1955 providing 22 per cent of total tax income.3 But there are few such countries. This decline in the share of customs duties in national revenue has taken place against a background of theoretical commentary and discussion which has been often hostile to the very concept of tariffs, on the grounds that they impede the maximisation of welfare. From the mid-nineteenth century some critiques of tariffs called into question the usefulness of demarcating the nation-state’s frontiers in this way and argued that a universal unimpeded market would lead to general prosperity under a universal government. Most typically, such critiques emanated from Britain and it is possible to represent the movement for free trade, trade without protectionist tariffs, as an instrument of British nation-building through commercial imperialism, just as it is possible to do the same for demands for an ‘open-door’ by the twentieth-century USA. Many tariffs had in the nineteenth century a defensive purpose against British goods and in the twentieth century against American. 16
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
But even if the argument for free trade can serve as an ideology of commercial imperialism, it nevertheless in the nineteenth century exposed one weakness of using tariffs as a foundation for statebuilding. That the links between the growth of international trade on the one hand and the growth of prosperity on the other might eventually turn tariffs into a disadvantage for the state was difficult to refute even when tariffs were at the height of their constitutional importance. In replacing tariffs by other devices states have been searching not only for something more appropriate to the times but for something more durable as a foundation. The fact that the debate over tariffs was so clearly connected with the evolution of liberal democracy in the last century is also no doubt responsible for the massive dominance of this subject in the history of commercial policy. But the use of quotas in the twentieth century as a substitute for tariffs also signifies an important historical stage, both in the states adjustment to new economic developments and in the changing nature of parliamentary democracy. Their first substantial use, in the inter-war period, was a response to the difficulties which states encountered when trying to solve twentiethcentury problems with nineteenth-century machinery. The precision, speed and accuracy with which they began to be applied signalled the growing strength of executive government in this century and its ability and willingness to evade parliamentary scrutiny and control. Ultimately, and ironically, import quotas were a response to the bursting of the bonds which restrictive franchises imposed on parliamentary democracies before 1914. Direct executive action by government, especially in the rapidly changing conditions of international trade between 1929 and 1933, was used to achieve constitutional balance and stability when this could no longer be done as it had been previously, and more slowly, on the floor of parliamentary assemblies. With larger, more powerful and new interest groups represented in parliaments through the widening of the franchise, the impatience which the executive power of government felt at the setting of commercial policy terms through parliamentary debate grew. When economic conditions changed as violently as they did from 1929 onwards achieving constitutional balance through lengthy parliamentary compromise was in some countries thought impossible. Even in the USA where the constitutional importance of the national tariff has lingered so long, these pressures can be observed. The growing dependence of the US economy on international trade 17
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
forced an increasing involvement in international tariff bargaining, but also meant a weakening of America’s ability to force tariff settlements on others. Reaching sustainable international agreements required the Administration to escape the constant detailed control of its actions in commercial policy. With persistent pressure from the Administration for more room to manoeuvre came an increasing distrust not only of the Administration but of the effectiveness of tariffs and tariff bargaining. The circumscription of the possible outcome of any tariff bargaining reached by the Administration, reflected in the escape clauses, ‘peril point’ clauses, and the special provisions for national security embodied in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and its subsequent extensions, show this. The extensions of this Act in the 1950s were accompanied by a strengthening of the constitutional facility for domestic pressure groups to claim protection. The United States Tariff Commission was required to determine, before any international tariff negotiation, the point below which the tariff on any product could not be reduced without causing damage to the industry or trade concerned. No tariff concessions could be made beyond that point. If, in spite of this, any trade or industry could still demonstrate to the Tariff Commission that it had been injured, the Commission could recommend withdrawal of a concession already made. After the 1958 extension of the Act concessions could be withdrawn, after a rather lengthy procedure, by a two-thirds majority of Congress. Where concessions were deemed to effect national security they could be withdrawn more speedily. The international difficulties in trade bargaining to which these provisos gave rise showed that the system could no longer serve America’s foreign policy interest. Indeed, the view was frequently expressed in Europe that international tariff bargaining with the USA was pointless because US negotiators were not empowered to guarantee the concessions they made. The survival of these tensions later than in Europe is probably best explained by the fact that even in 1962 there were only six sectors of American manufacturing where the value of imports was more than 4 per cent that of apparent consumption.4 In western Europe a large number of relatively small economies with more limited resources than the USA and with contiguous frontiers only achieved comparable levels of per capita income with imports accounting for much greater shares of apparent consumption. The pressures on their governments to provide speedy protection against sudden changes in the pattern of imports were much stronger in the inter-war period than in the USA 18
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
and the will of their parliamentary assemblies to maintain detailed control of commercial policy proved to be weaker. Although the generalisation that international trade tends in the long run to maximise welfare because it develops the specialisation of function on which the attainment of higher productivity levels depends has been widely accepted by governments and voters in developed economies, it has also been a political reality that foreign trade is conducted between political units which survive by maintaining a viable political system and that unregulated trade can often destabilise that system. When developments in transport opened up the great grain-growing lands of North America and southern Siberia the political demand by farmers and landowners in most western European countries for protective tariffs, even in the period of restrictive franchise, proved irresistible, no matter how much it impeded the specialisation of function. The more responsive the state became to its citizens’ demands through the parliamentary process as the franchise was widened, the more it was expected to moderate the consequences for employment, income, and local political interests of such shifts in advantage. The mounting pressure for industrial protection which so many branches of British manufacturing brought to bear on the Conservative Party after 1918, as it became clear that in many industrial sectors Britain had lost its competitive advantage, illustrates the tendency.5 The use of quotas rather than tariffs to respond to pressures of this kind reflected the new tempo of events as trading conditions altered with greater rapidity, especially after 1929, as well as at the same time an attempt to assert the increased direct executive authority of government when its stability seemed threatened. It was in France that this response was particularly marked and since, like the demand there for protectionist tariffs in the late nineteenth century, it was a response to the falling price of food imports, it illustrates very well the increased speed of response by a more interventionist state. The invasion of western European markets by cheaper North American grain first occurred on a large scale in 1873. It took twenty years of campaigning in France before a systematic tariff law was passed under such a degree of control by the national assembly that it could not easily be breached by trade agreements made by central government outside the assembly’s control. By contrast, it took only two years between the first invasion of French markets by cheap food products from central and eastern Europe in 1929 before a protectionist system of import quotas was 19
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
put in place, over which the national assembly had then to struggle to assert any control. If it was France that conducted the boldest experiments with quotas and other non-tariff barriers as a form of commercial policy after 1929, a similar stage in commercial policy evolution can be discerned at the same time in other states in response to the same volatile trading conditions. Like most aspects of commercial policy, many of the devices used had a pre-history. Examples of quotas on trade can be found earlier, as can most of the other measures which are lumped together under the heading ‘non-tariff barriers’. State support for the regulation of markets by private cartels (‘industrial ententes’ in the language of the 1930s), direct state-trading, bilateral trade bargaining between states, protectionist measures disguised as sanitary or consumer protection measures, exchange control (usually discriminatory), tariff preferences, and export subsidies all existed before the 1930s.6 Bans or quantitative limitations on foreign trade in particular commodities until the mid-nineteenth century, however, were more commonly aimed at depriving the foreigner of some good by preventing its export, as in the ban on exporting certain types of machinery from Britain. The converse, a total ban on imports of certain manufactures, did also occur as a way of protecting employment in certain trades, typically textiles, or as a way of encouraging manufactures that might otherwise not have become established because of more efficient foreign production. The efforts of French governments from the mid-seventeenth century onwards to establish manufacturing industries were backed up by many such import prohibitions. However the application of an import quota which, unlike an absolute prohibition, allows a fixed value or quantity of the good in question to enter, is a more recent development which coincides with the rise of a sophisticated governmental apparatus and particularly with the collection of statistical data in modern form. It is therefore no surprise that import quotas as a central element in commercial policy were first developed during the First World War as a way of rationing shipping space. At the time this was thought of by the combatant powers purely as an adjunct to grand strategy, a temporary affair for the duration of the war. But after the war import quotas and other trade controls were retained in France until 1920 as an aid to reconstruction and the French minister of reconstruction, Etienne Clémentel, envisaged a coordinated international reconstruction based on planned trade where quotas 20
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
would have been a basic instrument of planning. They lingered in some areas of German foreign trade until 1925, before the Weimar Republic proclaimed its allegiance to the earlier parliamentary tradition with the establishment of a new national tariff. As import quotas as devices to support planned reconstructions disappeared, they tended to reappear as a way of protecting currencies from sudden adverse movements in the balance of payments. Some were reimposed in France in 1922 for example. The Geneva Conference for the Abolition of Prohibitions and Restrictions in 1927, attended by 29 states, agreed to ban both import and export quotas within six months, but by September 1929 only 17 countries had ratified the agreement, some of them only conditionally. It eventually came into force for only seven states, Denmark, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the USA, at the start of 1930. By 1934 all had formally denounced it.7 Three of the signatories, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA, were soon to resort to import quotas themselves. It was, however, the violent price movements over the period 1929– 32 which fundamentally called into question the value of tariffs as a protective device and as an aid to political stability. The fact that the price of agricultural commodities fell so much more steeply in central and eastern than in western Europe precipitated the first experiments with quotas as a device for the permanent regulation of trade, as Clémentel had envisaged, and for the long-run replacement or supplementation of tariffs. So violent were price movements and exchange fluctuations that they often eliminated the protective effect of ad valorem tariffs while also breaking up the private international cartels that had supplemented them as a form of market regulation. Competitors scrambled for sales in the face of falling demand and prices; states sought a new basis for stability. Although there was a widespread move towards imposing quotas on food imports in 1931, France was that country which first used import quotas systematically on a large scale. Yet French tariff legislation had probably given the executive greater independent powers to keep out imports by sudden tariff adjustments than those accorded to most other governments by their parliaments. The law of 13 December 1897 had given the government the power to raise duties subject only to a subsequent notification to the national assembly, and the intention of this provision was expressly to allow sudden increases in food tariffs without debate. There were in fact 21
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
three such increases in March, April and July 1931 all of which failed to stem the inward flow of food from central and eastern Europe before quotas were imposed. The increase in the volume of French food imports in 1931 over the average of the years 1927/30 was 50 per cent. The quotas were usually calculated as an average of the imports of that commodity over the period January 1927–July 1931.8 They relied therefore on some concept of ‘normal’ trade and their intention was primarily to restrict imports to that norm. The urgency of the situation permitted these measures to be described in public as purely defensive and temporary, but when more closely inspected they reveal more long-term ambitions. By no means all the foodstuff imports on which quotas were imposed had shown an increase over the preceding period. The attempts to use quotas to replace failed international cartels preceded the quotas on food imports, as in the licensing of all nitrate imports in May 1931 after the collapse of the nitrate cartel. Import quotas were imposed not only on food and raw materials but also on a wide range of manufactures between January and May 1932. Altogether, between July 1931 and May 1932 1,100 separate items on the French tariff schedule, amounting to about 15 per cent of the total items, were subjected to import quotas. By the start of 1934 3,000 items had been covered in this way. These changes were all carried through by administrative decrees; there were 61 such between July 1931 and May 1932. The lesson was not lost elsewhere. By the end of 1932 eleven European countries had introduced import quotas on a wide range of commodities. In almost all of them parliamentary debate and legislation was similarly avoided. Consumers were given little say in the matter, the state acted in concert with groups of industrial or agricultural producers to maintain incomes, employment, and certain areas of output that it did not wish to sacrifice. For example, the Market Supply Committees appointed in Britain by the minister of agriculture under the terms of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1933 to draw up regulations for marketing schemes for agricultural imports excluded consumers’ representatives while they determined maximum levels of imports for that commodity and the system for allocating quotas.9 In France no distinction was made in coal import licensing between industrial coal and coal for household heating, with the result that there were shortages of household fuel.10 If a preference for the use of quotas rather than unemployment had the disadvantage of higher domestic prices, another disadvantage 22
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
was the effect of quotas elsewhere on exports. In a period when world trade declined steeply in value and volume French exporters complained that other import quotas reduced their exports. Partly because of this repercussion the French government came to the London Economic Conference in 1933 with plans to repeat the experiment of the 1927 Geneva conference and attempt a mutual cooperative and progressive abolition of import quotas over a threeyear period providing there could also be a return to a mutually agreed tariff regime. This was to ask for something far beyond the bounds of probability. The failure of the London Conference to agree and France’s consequent decision to keep its currency tied, nevertheless, to the gold exchange standard decided the issue in Paris in favour of quotas. The relatively high domestic price level in France appeared to leave it vulnerable to dumping by countries no longer on the gold exchange standard or intending to return to it, and ready to manipulate their external currency values. It is hardly surprising that in this situation France and other gold bloc countries such as The Netherlands passed quickly to the idea of using import quotas as a bargaining device for export promotion. Whereas before the London Conference quotas and import licences had typically been issued to foreign exporters in accordance with the geographical spread of imports over the previous period, from the start of 1934 the system in France changed so that for many commodities only about a quarter of the total import quota was allocated on the basis of previous import patterns. The remaining three-quarters was reserved for nations which guaranteed, usually by bilateral treaties, advantages for French exports. The Dutch followed a similar policy and in a more limited way so too did the United Kingdom. Quotas were imposed at various dates after 1931 by the United Kingdom on a wide range of agricultural imports: potatoes, barley, oats, hops, bacon, ham, livestock, beef, mutton, milk, and fish. In some cases these arose out of the effort to construct an imperial trade system and were imposed at the request of Commonwealth countries to divert British imports away from European to particular Commonwealth suppliers. Quotas on chilled beef, for example, were the price the United Kingdom reluctantly had to pay at the 1932 Ottawa conference for an agreement on trade with Australia, which saw the beef quotas as a guarantee that its own chilled mutton exports to Britain would not be reduced.11 It is difficult to see much 23
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
consistent intent in the agglomeration of quotas on agricultural imports into Britain, even though agricultural imports were roughly half the value of total imports. As a protectionist device they were haphazard, and as a way of diverting imports to other sources they were piecemeal. Agricultural imports rose in volume in the 1930s although not by so much as falling prices and rising real incomes might have otherwise induced. If import quotas had only a small effect on the volume of British imports, their use led to endless diplomatic wrangles with foreign suppliers. As an instrument for protecting domestic agriculture they were to be of much less significance in the second half of the decade than domestic marketing cartels and direct subsidies, themselves responses to a more systematic encouragement of higher output and incomes in domestic agriculture. Some effort to follow the French precedent and to use quotas within bilateral trade agreements to promote exports was made. British bilateral agreements with agricultural suppliers whose exports to Britain were subject after 1933 to import quotas sometimes included clauses stipulating that in return for their quota a fixed proportion of their coal imports should come from the United Kingdom. In the case of Sweden this amounted to almost half the total quantity of imported coal, of Estonia to 85 per cent.12 This was thought of not only as promoting exports but also as protecting employment in a threatened industry with a very large labour force. The use of quotas, however, was much more extensive in countries that avoided currency devaluation. For those countries remaining on a gold exchange standard they became an essential method of regulating trade while avoiding as far as possible exchange controls. More than half of French and Swiss imports, for example, were subject to quotas and licences in 1937, about a quarter of those of Belgium and The Netherlands.13 In countries where exchange controls and bilateral trade were used to separate the domestic value of the currency from its manipulated external rates—Germany, Italy, and almost the whole of eastern Europe—all trade was effectively subjected to quotas, because it was almost all carried out through bilateral bargaining and bilateral payments, in which the quantities of imports of specific goods or their values were closely specified with little margin for exceeding them. Although these specifications had a different origin from the import quotas imposed by countries like France whose currency remained freely convertible, and thus hard, while being overvalued, they were quantitative import controls, 24
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and taking the world as a whole in the 1930s probably the most common form of them. The political primacy of the origins of quotas, the fact that they were often introduced essentially to resolve a problem of governance rather than an economic problem, for in a different political context the economic problem might have been resolved by quite different methods, such as a devaluation, implies that they may well not have been the optimal choice of economic policy. And indeed they had a poor press from economists. Once filled, they eliminated any relationship between prices and markets. Their use to promote exports was soon seen with economic recovery as less of a stimulus than prices and open markets, and the relatively low level and low rate of growth of international trade in the 1930s was in part caused by the insurmountability of quantitative controls. As the US Department of State after 1932 began to sketch plans for a multilateral, non-discriminatory world trade and payments mechanism as a goal of American foreign policy, this essential characteristic of quotas brought them into increasing disrepute in Washington. During the Second World War they came to be identified there as a barrier to the restoration of a peaceful post-war world order. They were branded both as in restraint of trade and discriminatory and on both counts deemed unsuitable for the worldwide multilateral trade and payments systems to which the State Department looked as the foundation of a durable peace and a prosperous America. In fact, import quotas in the inter-war period had sometimes been limited to one supplier and as such clearly were discriminatory, but sometimes had been global in their application and shared between any number of suppliers. The latter was the case, for example, with some of the earliest French quotas on primary produce, like that on flax. In that instance the government simply decreed in 1931 a maximum volume of imports over a six-month period which could be freely imported from anywhere before the quota was exhausted. Such early examples of non-discrimination were frequent. But the inherent administrative difficulty of operating a quota could often lead to some measure of discrimination even when the original intention was not discriminatory. The announcement of a quota invariably provoked a rush of inward shipments of that commodity. Since reports from customs houses could not be collated, at least in the France of the 1930s, more frequently than every ten days, quotas were exceeded because of the statistical delays in estimating the quotas fulfilment. 25
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
The consequence was the reinforcement of quotas with import licences issued to potential importers. This opened the door to pressures to get a larger share both from associations of those foreign exporters who had dominated the trade previously and from associations of domestic importers whose links were with particular exporters. After August 1931, in order to counteract these pressures and because of the spread of currency inconvertibility and exchange controls, French quotas were almost invariably country-specific. Once import licences specified the country of origin they became in any exchange control country also a permit for the necessary foreign exchange, establishing a direct and easy administrative link between saving scarce currencies and manipulating the geographical distribution of imports. In a non-exchange control country, where quotas were allocated on the basis of the volume, value and origin of the previous three to five years’ imports, the system was still discriminatory, because it made no allowance for shifts in competitive advantages since that time. Indeed, quotas were aimed particularly against those countries whose exports were growing the most rapidly. Once incorporated into the growing network of bilateral trade treaties the discriminatory tendencies of quotas were impossible to eradicate. The response to France’s growing trade deficit with Germany in autumn 1931 was, for example, to force French importers to reach privately agreed quotas for imports with their German suppliers. Import licences were only given, in this case directly to German exporters, after such agreements had been reached. This procedure implied at least a medium-term guarantee that the trade would continue, which in a world of low demand excluded new competitors. Bilateral trade, quotas, and exchange control supported each other. During the Second World War the American denunciation of these practices became a diplomatic onslaught, renunciation of them the price for American aid in post-war reconstruction. There emerged a direct conflict between the American determination to base the postwar world order on a multilateral, non-discriminatory trade and payments system and schemes for national reconstruction which drew on the ideas of the 1930s. As in the pre-war decade there was little consonance between what was agreed in international forums and actual trading practice. The peace and prosperity of Europe in the decade after the war’s end came to depend on the growth of trade through bilateral channels within Europe and on discriminatory lines against the dollar zone. 26
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
Article XI of the 1947 GATT agreement, which reflected American diplomatic pressures, proscribed all new quotas, but allowed exceptions for agricultural products, for reasons of national security, and as a temporary counter to balance of payments crises. These were very large loopholes. Even while the agreement was being negotiated the network of bilateral trade agreements which financed and regulated intra-European trade was becoming more extensive and covering a larger share of that trade than in the 1930s. Although the financial terms of these post-war agreements were more liberal than those of the 1930s, because the amount of credit they allowed on each side of a strict bilateral balance was more generous, they were nevertheless part and parcel of an exchange control system which was directed towards saving any hard currency by controlling the origin and commodity composition of imports.14 As late as early 1950 a future British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, argued that reconstruction and full employment would still demand import controls even when the acute post-war shortages would have disappeared.15 All efforts to reduce the general level of tariffs, beginning with the impending GATT conferences in 1949 and 1950, turned exponents of national reconstruction, notably French planners, towards the ready acceptance of import quotas as a substitute for tariffs to protect, albeit temporarily, the manufacturing sectors they were developing. The number of import quotas in western Europe and their significance measured by the amount of potential trade which was subjected to them is usually estimated to have reached a peak in 1949. From late 1949, under American pressure and initially at British prompting also, the member states of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) launched a programme to eliminate import quotas as an instrument for regulating trade between western European countries. This has led to a simplified account of commercial policy changes in the period; a narrative in which nontariff barriers to trade are said to have proliferated between the great crash of 1929–33 and the Second World War, to have been identified by the architects of post-Second World War reconstruction as causes of the decline in world trade in the 1930s and to have been removed under post-war American leadership from 1949 onwards. The concurrent reduction of tariffs is seen as part of the same process towards removing barriers to trade in the post-war world, both resulting in the remarkable rate of growth of international, and particularly inter-western European, trade throughout the 1950s. 27
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This is too simple. The ambitions of post-war states to reassert themselves by satisfying the demands of their citizens for employment and welfare, and also to industrialise, modernise and develop their economies, meant that quotas, especially on manufactured imports, became more significant at the very moment when international economic reconstruction was supposed to be directed towards liberal multilateralism. It was the existence of this array of quotas which made the initial mutual reductions of tariffs in GATT possible. Once the OEEC began its attack on quotas, tariff reductions in GATT more or less stopped, so that little was achieved internationally to reduce tariffs between 1951 and 1959. Further tariff reductions and eliminations came mainly in western Europe at the end of the decade as a result of the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). While both of these organisations owed much in their origins to the pressure of smaller, low tariff economies, to which the larger countries bowed for complex political reasons, this does not mean that the smaller countries were more liberal in all aspects of their commercial policy. They had learned in the 1930s that countries with small markets can not easily bargain down the tariffs of bigger economies, so that for the small countries tariffs were of less protective value. Some, notably The Netherlands which was a leader in this institutionalised reduction of tariffs, made extensive use of quotas precisely because their tariffs were so low. Conversely, a large and growing economy like Italy could dispense rapidly with quotas because it maintained relatively high protective tariffs. The removal of both tariffs and quotas on intra-western European trade was, furthermore, made easier by the persistence of both as protectionist devices against imports from North America. In a period of dollar shortage it was an encouragement to western European countries to lift restrictions on trade between themselves, that by doing so they were increasing the relative degree of discrimination against dollar imports. The following chapters show how intricately interlinked quotas were with tariffs. The political reality was more usually one in which a choice had to be made between the two and in reducing the incidence of one the relative protection afforded by the other was increased. It was only at the end of the 1950s that most western European countries were prepared to contemplate weakening their quota protection against imports from North America, although their demands for reductions in American tariffs were incessant all through the decade. If it were possible to construct 28
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an index of trade liberalisation which included both quantitative controls and tariffs it would show that trade liberalisation made little headway before 1955–6. It followed, rather than caused, the great surge in international trade. The process of eliminating quotas on trade between developed western European economies in the 1950s can be seen as a transition in the nature of democratic government and the state as marked as that of the 1930s. The growth of international trade, the choice to make national currencies once more convertible into the dominant currency, the US dollar, to ease restrictions on capital movements, to allow the internationalisation of manufacturing and services, represented a persistent if gradual movement towards a different political consensus from that on which post-war states were built in the immediate aftermath of the war. Their concerns after 1945 were with appeasing agriculture, maintaining high employment, establishing military security and generating high enough rates of national income growth to provide a steady increase in personal security and welfare and thus constitutional stability. As we shall see, quotas were used in support of all these objectives. As the future of the state and the welfare of its citizens came to be thought of as depending primarily on success in finding a large and growing market for exports and in satisfying a mass demand for a more sophisticated range of imports, quotas on trade between the most developed manufacturing economies came to be thought of as an impediment, rather than a spur, to national success and thus a danger rather than a support to constitutional stability. Only when that political change had really become established does the conventional narrative which sees quotas and tariffs removed concurrently in a process of ‘trade liberalisation become accurate, after 1958. Even as quotas began to lose their political attractions as a way of regulating trade between developed nations, however, they began to reappear as a way of protecting manufacturing in developed economies against that in developing ones. The Treaty of Rome, while making specific detailed commitments to the removal of quotas by regular stages on the trade between its signatories, was deliberately vague about provisions for removing or widening quotas against the outside world. It seems to have been in 1959 that British Treasury officials, having preached for ten years the virtue of eliminating quotas on intra-western European trade, and beginning their preparations to remove quotas against dollar imports in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of legal sterling-dollar convertibility, realised 29
IMPORT QUOTAS AND THE MODERN STATE
that quotas were actually spreading again in world trade. As one official realistically noted in April in a draft statement on Britain’s commercial policy, ‘quantitative restrictions, which were originally envisaged as a transitory or emergency phenomenon, now seem likely to become consolidated as a normal instrument of commercial policy.’16 By December, the same official minuted, ‘This means, I’m sure, that there is going to be almost automatic pressure to impose new QRs in future against low-cost competition: and we know from our own experience how hard (in fact impossible) it is to resist.’17 Article XI of the 1947 GATT agreement with its exceptions reflected the political interests of the 1930s, which lingered in the 1950s. Although quotas became relatively unimportant as a device for protecting domestic agriculture compared to the many other forms of protection which evolved, some still remained for this purpose. Thus the USA itself, even while leading the attack, continued to play a leading role in the regulation of the international sugar market, part of which was achieved by the use of import quotas. The mandatory quotas which it had imposed on wheat imports in 1941 were kept in place, restricting wheat imports from Canada to less than 1 per cent of national consumption. Quotas on peanut imports, equally restrictive, were imposed in 1953. Imports of short-staple cotton were virtually eliminated by quotas after 1939, while imports of long-staple cotton were confined to 2 per cent of domestic output. Quotas were imposed on dairy products in 1953 and the number of specific items covered increased from 1955. Quotas on beef and bacon were imposed in the 1960s. Under the GATT article the USA justified its imposition of quotas on crude oil and oil products in 1959, claiming that its oil stocks were essential to national security. The licences to import crude oil into the USA under the quota regime of the 1960s were actually a highly profitable subsidy to those who received them. The landed price of middle eastern crude oil in US east coast ports was only 65 per cent of the delivered price of domestic oil there. Inland oil refiners sold their licences to coastal refineries which used imported oil. The cost of these windfall profits to the oil industry, estimated at about $5,000 million in 1969, was carried by US consumers.18 Quotas on fuels remained common in most industrialised countries. The quotas on oil and oil products which France had imposed in 1928, mainly for reasons of industrial policy, remained in force, except of course towards its EEC partners. Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and the United Kingdom all kept quotas on coal imports after 1958, for 30
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which the main reason was that at least half of western Europe’s coal output was uncompetitive in most years with US coal shipped across the Atlantic, although the public argument used in GATT and other bodies was always the need to protect national security. What article XI had not covered, however, was the arrival of manufactures from newly-industrialising countries. A serious problem in the 1920s, it had been much less so after the onset of the depression in 1929. The chief example of such a country in the 1950s was the exenemy Japan. Sterling area exchange controls strictly limited Japanese exports to Commonwealth countries before 1954. As they were relaxed British import quotas were introduced against Japan. Under the 1954 quota grey-cloth could only be imported up to the value of £3 million and only for processing and re-export. Quotas on clothing, cotton and rayon piece-goods, and pottery were all lower than imports of those goods in the 1930s. Other quotas were imposed in 1954 for toys, electric lamps, light bulbs, buttons, paper manufactures, brooms and brushes, lacquer ware, and ivory fancy goods. When in 1955 Japanese textile exports made serious inroads into the United States market the American cotton manufacturers and textile producers, in spite of the extensive extra provision made by Congress for additional safeguards in any extensions of the Trade Agreements Act, saw the survival of their industry as possible only if import quotas were imposed on the Japanese product. The president of the American Cotton Manufacturers’ Institute, inaugurating a campaign for protection, foresaw a new problem in world trade in manufactures, ‘I don’t think that a wage rate one-tenth that of ours can be equalised by a tariff when the Japanese have the same machines we have and the same, or lower, raw material cost.’19 When there had been an earlier surge of imports of Japanese cotton goods in 1936–7 the Japanese manufacturers had agreed to a negotiated quota on exports to the USA. Another inter-industry agreement like that of 1937 seemed likely to be ineffective, because of the more liberal way in the post-war climate of opinion in which US courts were interpreting the anti-trust laws. GATT had proscribed the use of import quotas to meet such a case. The Japanese manufacturers’ association was ‘persuaded’, therefore, in 1955 to announce a temporary voluntary unilateral quota on exports to the USA. Being voluntary, it escaped GATT condemnation. This was not regarded by the American side as a sufficient safeguard and for 1956 the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry officially instituted a regular regime of voluntary export quotas. The US government, 31
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strenuously campaigning throughout the 1950s for the removal of quotas on intra-western European trade and then on trade between North America and Europe, concealed its official involvement in these allegedly voluntary quotas as far as it could, but no one doubted that it was only the US government’s tacit involvement and approval that had made the arrangement acceptable to the American manufacturers, while concealing that same involvement made it not subject to condemnation by GATT. In the 1960s many other Japanese textile and clothing exports to the USA were subjected to similar, if less formalised, voluntary export regulation, including woollen fabrics, silks, rayons, gloves and sweaters. By the end of the 1950s the United Kingdom defended its domestic textile market by similar, allegedly voluntary, export quotas administered by Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan. The voluntary export quotas lasted until 1961, by which time it was evident that excluded Japanese textile exports were being replaced by similar exports from other cheaper producers. Under American government initiative a series of international agreements on trade in cotton textiles was then negotiated in GATT. By 1968 90 per cent of American imports of cotton textiles were imported under this GATT regime.20 So-called voluntary export restrictions are not, of course, matters of pure volition. They are import quotas under a more acceptable name, and one chosen to circumvent those very post-war international agreements, mostly written on terms set by the USA, which sought to prohibit the use of quantitative restrictions. They are imposed by exporters on their own trade solely out of the fear that something even worse will happen to them if they refuse. Under the voluntary quota regime and under the later GATT agreement the value of US textile output in fact grew vigorously.21 It remained, however, of all the major US industrial sectors the one with the lowest value added per employee.22 There developed contemporaneously an extensive armoury of European quotas against Japanese exports. Baldwin estimated that in 1970 Italian quotas on Japanese goods covered 104 items, including cars, refrigerators, alloy steels, electrical equipment, clocks, and medical equipment. French quotas covered 47 items and German quotas 22. One persuasive reason for retaining them was that Japan itself imposed quotas on about 100 items.23 Post-war Japan initially stood outside regional commercial frameworks for eliminating tariffs or quotas. Where such regional 32
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commercial frameworks, of which the common market of the European Community has been the notable example, have functioned successfully, it has been because private traders themselves, within an internationally agreed and occasionally enforced set of guidelines on competition, have been able to regulate or stabilise the markets in important trades. That has itself required a certain degree of trust and even familiarity between the firms concerned. Japanese business and government have had their own methods of reaching the same goals, and by the time Japan was allowed into the comity of trade regulatory agencies it was the close relationship of firm and government that was generally replacing quotas and tariffs as a regulatory device, albeit in a Japanese model which the USA in particular has repeatedly denounced internationally. The instinct of the state machine in the face of growing democratic pressures to seek compromises with pressure groups and vested interests in the pursuit of its own policy objectives, as far as possible outside the purview and immediate control of parliamentary assemblies, has thus remained, after the surge in power and influence of parliamentary assemblies in the first post-war decade. Many of the more modern quotas reflect this, like the arrangements between the US government and its domestic oil producers and refiners. Where intra-firm regulation does not serve the purpose, state officials can still plead the technocratic advantages of import quotas; quickly imposed and quickly removed, they still permit a speed and flexibility of international trade bargaining which tariffs do not. The disadvantage, that they impede exports more than inter-firm regulation probably does, of course, remains. In the immediate post-war period, in the United Kingdom at least, most of the civil servants employed in the administration of import quotas were simply carrying out routine bureaucratic procedures. Actual negotiations with the domestic producers affected by the quota regulations were few. Usually they were confined to the setting of bilateral quota levels, global quota levels being considered only a matter of the governments own balance of payments policy. Industrial sectors protected by quotas were being sufficiently favoured, for reasons of the state’s own choosing, for the state not to feel it necessary to waste the time of its officials in discussions with representatives of the interests concerned, with all the possibility for suggestions of corruption which might arise. When it came to the matter of removing quota protection, government was even more high-handed. In two British industries 33
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massively protected by quotas, lace and handguns, the trade associations, the Federation of Lace and Embroidery Employers’ Associations and the Gunmakers’ Association, were contacted only three days before the government began OEEC negotiations on their bilateral quotas and then only with requests for information. More typically such requests were made at only 24 hours notice or even on the same day.24 The only group which seems to have been strong enough to force anything resembling consultations on the government over the size of bilateral quotas was the car manufacturers. Their cars were in the forefront of government export policy, one of the single largest items in Britain’s export earnings. In part this high-handedness of government was the outcome of an attitude under the Conservative governments from 1951 onwards that import quotas should be primarily an instrument of balance of payments policy. Given the mix of motivations which had led to their introduction this was a point of view which aroused controversy between ministries. When the Treasury was concerned with the balance of payments and the Foreign Office with pursuing its commercial policy initiatives in Europe, other ministries—Supply, the Admiralty, for example—clung to the original motivations for industrial policy. It would not have done to have industrial and trade associations inserting themselves into these disputes. In these circumstances the influence of private firms on the removal and widening of quotas became inevitably small. On the other hand, any international arrangements which private firms made with foreign producers in the same sector were entirely their business, unless they fell foul of legislation on monopolies. When, for example, the watch and clock industry, protected by import quotas from 1945 onwards feared in late 1953 that it might lose its quotas in the cause of the grand strategic design for Britain’s place in the world, it referred to the Board of Trade an approach from the German and Swiss manufacturers’ associations to fix prices in preparation for a freer trade in clocks. It was told that that was not government business.25 The application from the industry for continued protection for clocks was then handled as a straightforward application for tariff protection on the assumption that the quota would be removed. Seen therefore in a British context, the period when quotas and other quantitative import controls played a major role in commercial policy was a result of the incremental decisions to protect incomes in the agricultural sector, the carefully fostered contacts between some industries and government which began to be built up after 1931, 34
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the exceptionally close and urgent nature of some of these in rearmament and war, and the Labour governments attempt to use them as an instrument of industrial policy and economic planning. Underlying the whole period was also the periodic concern, intense after 1945, about the precariousness of the balance of trade and payments. A characterisation of the same period in France, over which quotas and quantitative restrictions were even more significant in national commercial policy, would not read very differently. The pressure for the removal of quotas also had the same origins in both countries, the belief that freer competition within larger markets would increase prosperity more rapidly and the emergence of an agreed international framework of trade and exchange rules which made it safer to widen or remove quotas. In western Europe, at least, this could be done by multilateral agreement which balanced the advantages and disadvantages for all concerned. It was this level of international agreement, quite lacking in the 1930s, which permitted the slow transition from quotas to interfirm market regulation under state and international supervision. It followed that the transfer of regulation to the private domain under loose public supervision would either be tacitly encouraged or treated as a matter of little concern, foreshadowing the permissive attitude to private regulation of markets between major producers taken by the European Economic Community after 1957. In Britain, manufacturing industry in general distrusted government interference. And where it suffered from the withdrawal of government support and protection this was not likely to alter the fact that it paid for and voted for the Conservative Party which held office throughout the rest of the decade. But this change in the relationship of industry to the state was not confined to the United Kingdom, it was merely more abrupt and immediately evident there because of the alleged imperatives of the grand diplomatic strategy of the government of a country which still wished to function as a worldwide power. Were it possible to analyse the post-war history of import quotas in France in the same detail as for the United Kingdom it might well prove to be the case that the contacts between the state and manufacturing remained closer for longer than in the United Kingdom.26 The implementation of at least the first two mediumterm central economic plans required that. For that reason and also because the French balance of payments was in serious deficit for many of the first fifteen post-war years, it was harder to get rid of quotas. Once government had opted for the common market of the 35
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Six, which it saw as a positive step towards modernising French manufacturing by removing some of its protection, there was an intense struggle between industrialists and civil servants who supported that position and those who opposed it. The ratification of the Treaty of Rome, however, was a big step on the road to the private regulation of foreign trade within a set of vague supranational guidelines on competition policy. This change in the relationship between the state and manufacturing industry probably reflected the greater security of both in the 1950s, although this new line of commercial policy could probably not have been pursued unless different systems of protection for the agricultural sector had been developed. These latter also were internationalised, notably in the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC. Delegating the removal of quotas to an international organisation with a programme with its own rules and its own system of supervision was a task from which international economic conferences in the inter-war period had fled. That such a programme could be undertaken so vigorously and go so far is the best demonstration that changes in the nature of the democratic state were beginning to render inappropriate the quota regime which had developed in the inter-war period. There were also, however, specific historical circumstances which led to the initiation of that international programme in 1949. These and the vicissitudes of the programme itself are explained in the next two chapters, because it was within that programme that British import quotas were removed, re-imposed or retained. It is in the detail of these international negotiations and their links to the domestic economy that the significance and purpose of post-war British import quotas best emerges.
36
3 BRITISH COMMERCIAL POLICY AND THE OEEC TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME, 1949–51 A PRELIMINARY NOTE ON BRITISH METHODS OF IMPORT CONTROL Imports came into the United Kingdom through a variety of conduits. Many large-scale manufacturers who used imported materials and components set up their own importing agencies. Some chain retail stores, the Cooperative Wholesale Society for example, imported directly from wholesale suppliers. Some foreign firms for which the United Kingdom was a large, regular market set up their own branches inside the country and some operated their own retail agencies or shops. Staple products which could be easily classified and sampled were bought and re-sold at a profit by import merchants, often specialising in a particular commodity. A kindred spirit of the import merchant, but not trading on his own account, was the import commission agent. The agent sold on behalf of a foreign exporter, finding the market, selling at the best price and deducting a commission. The greatest importer in this period was the government itself, virtually the sole importer at the end of the war and still responsible for 37 per cent of the value of all imports in 1951.1 All goods imported into the United Kingdom in the period had to be covered by an import licence issued by the Board of Trade, but the existence of ‘Open’ licences made this to some extent a fiction. If goods were scheduled in the Board of Trade Journal as being under a World Open General Licence, any trader could import any amount from any source. A World Open Individual Licence meant that only entitled individuals had this right. The World Open Individual Licence was a way of keeping new entrants out of the import business. The National Coal Board, for example, held such a licence to import coal. It was used only in accord with an import programme approved by the government, so that coal 37
THE OEEC TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME
was never claimed as a liberalised commodity in the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Programme. An Open General Licence meant that any trader could import any amount from some designated area or areas. Most Open General Licences were issued for imports from the Relaxation Area, whose geographical boundaries altered with changes in exchange control regulations. Its core was the OEEC countries, their overseas dependencies, and Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Indonesia and Sudan. An Open General Licence thus meant that imports of these commodities were accepted as having been liberalised by the OEEC definition, but only from the relevant zone. ‘Specific’ licences specified limits to the value or volume of permitted imports. They were allocated to recognised importers, usually on the basis of their previous imports. In the case of bilateral trade agreements the specified amounts had to be imported from specified countries. In the case of ‘global’ quotas the importer could, up to the specified limit, seek the cheapest supplier within the permitted area. Some ‘global’ quotas, like that imposed on pulp and other paper-making materials in November 1951 were truly global in that importers could import up to their specified limit from anywhere on the globe, including the dollar zone. This, however, was unusual; most global quotas were in fact for imports from the Relaxation Area only. BRETTON WOODS, THE MARSHALL PLAN AND TRADE LIBERALISATION The caution with which western Europe moved towards removing import controls after 1945 is in stark contrast to the drastic advice given by the west to former Soviet bloc economies after 1989. While eastern Europe was told to move at top speed to free foreign trade as the quickest way to high growth rates and stable democratic government, western Europe after 1945 moved very hesitantly in that direction because of fears that removing trade controls might destabilise democratic reconstruction. Although over most of western Europe from 1945 onwards high rates of growth of national income and high levels of employment replaced the stagnation and unemployment of the 1930s, the postwar debate over the regulation of foreign trade resumed the arguments of the pre-war decade. The smaller western European countries renewed their 1930s campaign to force the larger ones to lower tariffs, 38
THE OEEC TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME
while the larger ones resolutely retained protectionist duties on their frontiers. Within this familiar argument could be heard at first faintly and then ever louder, a third theme; propositions for tariff unions. In a world where states pursued so energetically a wide range of domestic economic and social policies tariff unions were only likely to exaggerate the degree to which non-tariff barriers were maintained between countries in such unions. Thus the Benelux customs union did very little before the mid-1950s to expedite the flow of goods between Belgium and The Netherlands because of the battery of nontariff restrictions, from quotas to fiscal and excise duties, that both countries deployed to regulate trade between them. Conversely, an intense post-war diplomatic negotiation over the future of European tariffs only made it obvious that the removal of quantitative restrictions would strengthen sectoral demands for tariff protection. Yet the first post-war decade is notable for the internationally supervised programme of quota removal by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEEC). How did quotas rather than tariffs become so much the focus of trade liberalisation that the phrase by the mid-1950s had come to exclude tariffs? And how did European states which had so signally failed to cooperate in the 1930s manage to combine in a mutual action to remove quantitative restrictions? These questions are not answered by simply reciting the way that economic conditions had changed so that quantitative trade restrictions seemed otiose. It was probably not before late 1953 that governmental anxieties that the bubble would burst and that a deep post-war slump would arrive were finally allayed. Anxiety was then brusquely replaced in the miracle years 1954–5 by an unbounded confidence that government action had permanently reshaped economic conditions and the idea began to be voiced that with the increase in the state’s ability to control equilibrium at a high level of employment the normal future expectation might be one of high annual income growth. But over the decade it took for that view to crystallise, dominant memories of the 1930s haunted politicians with the idea that the fortunate years would not last, that the new western European political system which they were building would collapse into disaccord. Underneath that fear was the other fear, that its rival system in eastern Europe would prove far more resilient against an internationally transmitted depression, would preserve higher employment levels, and ultimately achieve higher rates of income growth. 39
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If, therefore, it was ultimately the change in economic conditions which undermined quantitative restrictions as a method of regulating trade, it was not that change which determined the timing with which they began to be removed. That was determined by the American intervention in European reconstruction through the Marshall Plan and by the intra-European struggle for leadership of the continent under the Americans. On the American side the political objective of the Marshall Plan was the creation of an ‘integrated’ western Europe, to serve as a bulwark of American security. This was a conscious rejection of European economic policies of the 1930s, whose divisive national protectionisms were thought to have weakened America’s own security in that decade. The integration of western European markets was to be the first step along a road which was ultimately to lead to some form of political integration. This was almost always envisaged in Washington as resting on the removal of trade barriers between the western European economies. The price of American aid and, for many countries more important, American international support, thus became the lowering of tariffs and the widening or removal of quota restrictions on intra-western European trade. Quantitative trade restrictions within western Europe thus came under political attack from the outside as early as 1948, when they were still proliferating. On the European side, winning American favour and support meant being seen to advance the cause of European integration. For the smaller states this meant trying to get American backing for their attempts to bring down tariffs. For European federalists it meant advancing once again their pre-war idealisms of a European customs union as the basis of a European political union. For France, it meant a recurrent political flirtation with different forms of commercial, payments, or tariff unions with its immediate neighbours as the basis of a future security policy against Germany. All of these ideas competed for favour at court in Washington. All were regarded in London as threats to the United Kingdom’s position in the world. The United Kingdom’s own future security was believed to depend directly on the imperative that of all the western European countries it had to be the most important to the USA. Since the priority of America’s own security policy lay in western Europe, the United Kingdom had to seem able to further America’s interest there more successfully than any other European state. All plans for European customs unions and, even worse, plans for European political 40
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federations, were seen as potential threats to the United Kingdom’s position. Britain could not join, and the hope that moves towards European union would not outlast Marshall Aid alternated with fear that such associations might replace the United Kingdom as America’s right hand in Europe. There were episodes when London’s policy was prepared to tolerate the formation of a European customs union excluding Britain, or at least to say in Washington that it tolerated it. But, economically, even when the political opposition was muted, the conclusion was always firm that such a development could only hurt the United Kingdom. There were French approaches to Italy and to the Benelux countries to form customs unions even before the Marshall Plan brought massive American diplomatic support for such initiatives during 1948 and afterwards, so that the need for an alternative policy in London was always present. It was never taken too seriously, however, before the Marshall Plan led to the creation in 1948 of the OEEC. Within the sixteen European member-states who formed that organisation there were only two of genuine weight and influence, Britain and France. While carefully cooperating within the OEEC to make sure that federalist or other unwanted schemes for European integration were pushed aside, London and Paris vied with each other at Washington to attract American support for their separate and rival schemes for establishing their national leadership of Europe. With American enthusiasm for a customs union as the best step towards a political union in Europe, those in Paris who advanced the idea of a customs union between France, Benelux and Italy into which the emerging West German republic could be fitted were in a much stronger position. What before 1949 had been almost as improbable a vision as in the 1930s became something whose chances of fruition were high enough for the British government to need a rival policy which could have the same high level of emotional and practical political appeal in America.2 Its other necessary characteristics were that it should be seen as advancing the cause of economic ‘integration in western Europe, to please the Americans, while making sure, in Britain’s own interests, that Europe was led away from regionalism towards participation in ‘the one-world system’ where Britain could retain unimpeded its existing relationships with the USA, the Commonwealth, and the continent. It must therefore reduce barriers between western European economies while not being discriminatory and it must be a step towards reducing barriers between Europe and North America. 41
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Proposals for tariff reductions would have been dangerous ground. They opened the door wider to French enthusiasts for a customs union. Besides, the tariff that Britain was mainly interested in beating down was that of the USA and officials were more interested in preserving British tariffs at their existing levels as a bargaining counter against the USA, and to a lesser extent as a way of preserving the value of preferences offered to Commonwealth countries. Any tariff proposals would have had to be made in GATT, unless they were proposals for a customs union, and so could hardly be presented as a European initiative by Britain supporting American foreign policy. A proposal to widen and remove non-tariff barriers on inter-western European trade, on the other hand, could give the OEEC something to do and could be presented as a big step towards ‘integration while being a step away from a customs union or a political federation. Removing quotas would make it harder to remove tariffs. Removing them on trade between all the sixteen states in the OEEC would involve countries such as Norway, Portugal and Sweden, where there was no interest at all in a federal Europe or any other form of political union on the continent. Domestically, controls—of all kinds—were becoming unpopular and a greater freedom of trade might revive the fortunes of the Labour government with consumers, to whom the newspapers presented an image of a continent wallowing in the consumption of luxury goods excluded by puritanical British socialist practitioners of austerity. It was through this chain of political reasoning that the Labour government in June 1949 launched a major policy initiative to widen import quotas on intra-western European trade. The initiative did receive enthusiastic American support, although American officials, of course, saw it as something that would run in parallel with moves towards a customs union. This initiative was to become the Trade Liberalisation Programme of the OEEC. As events were soon to show, no matter how appropriate the political timing of this initiative, its economic timing was much less happy. Without the enormous pressure on both Britain and France from the USA through the Marshall Plan to do something to ‘integrate’ western Europe, and without their rivalry for leadership of such a programme, it seems improbable that the United Kingdom would have risked removing its own import quotas so rapidly as was at first attempted. Without the enormous pressure that the Trade Liberalisation Programme then brought to bear on other western European countries it seems even less probable that some of them 42
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would have done the same. Indeed, one of the appeals of the Trade Liberalisation Programme to London was precisely the fact that it would show up France in American eyes, not as a pioneer of a European customs union, but as the most protectionist of western Europe’s economies, ready to prattle about tariff unions but actually practising the full range of non-tariff barriers to trade which it had pioneered since 1929. Clever as the political thinking behind the initiative was, its consequences for Britain’s own economy were much more serious than was thought at the time or afterwards. It was to be an important cause of the huge balance of payments deficit of 1951. No matter how convincing the political rationale for the Trade Liberalisation Programme, so risky a step, endangering the earlier domestic policies which had depended on import controls, would not have been taken had there not also been an economic rationale supporting the decision. That rationale is found in the gradual emergence by 1949 of the ‘one-world system’ not just as a foreign policy but as a coherent international commercial and financial policy as well. Reconstruction and the return to a peacetime economy were interrupted by the brief trauma of the convertibility fiasco of July 1947, and followed by the shock of sterling devaluation in September 1949. Absorption in domestic economic affairs, and the state of emergency which governed international economic and commercial relationships after summer 1947 meant that no clear course of postwar British commercial policy emerged before the Trade Liberalisation Programme. The Bretton Woods negotiations had disappointed Keynes’s hopes for a world clearing union which would be generous to short-term debtors and severe towards persistent creditors, and the subsequent Anglo-American Financial Agreement which provided the dollar loan to the United Kingdom, although generous in its cancellation of war debts, entailed rough handling in other ways for sterling. It demanded ‘non-discrimination’ in trade. On American lips non-discrimination meant the end of sterling area discrimination against dollar goods, whereas on British lips it came to mean no discrimination by a continental European bloc against sterling and dollar goods. After the start of the Marshall Plan, and even more so after sterling’s devaluation, the Bretton Woods agreement had little more than symbolic value. The USA proved quite ready to support discrimination if it believed it to be in its own security interest. Nevertheless, in spite of import controls, exchange controls, bilateral agreements and devaluation, the principle of a 43
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worldwide multilateral trade and payments system based on the legal convertibility of major capitalist trading currencies as laid down at Bretton Woods remained. In Washington after 1947, faced with the immediate, complex, detailed problems of the political and military leadership of the western world, the Bretton Woods agreements, too generalised to be applicable to actual problems, were forgotten as practical politics, to be preserved only in the pages of economics texts. In London they began to be resurrected with the start of the Trade Liberalisation Programme as a description of a world in which the United Kingdom would be of much greater importance than any other western European country. If the USA, faced with the problem of European reconstruction saw the answer in a European customs union it must be led away from this false direction and back to Bretton Woods. Customs unions in western Europe would not, in any case, it was believed in Whitehall, lead to a larger, unified market. On the contrary, it was thought, they would prove of limited size, protectionist, and more divisive in their effects than integratory. In spite of this rediscovery of the statements at Bretton Woods that the future world order would be commercially nondiscriminatory, the British definition of the one world system was one in which the United Kingdom-Commonwealth links helped Britain to play a leading role and one element in those links was trade discrimination. The tariff preferences between the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries through which commercial policy had been reorientated from 1932 onwards were thought politically indispensable, because to weaken them weakened one of the three great circles of Britain’s influence. Both at Bretton Woods and in the subsequent negotiations for the loan to Britain, Washington had pressed for the end of these imperial preferences as the most significant example of discrimination in world trade. The issue had been fudged at Bretton Woods, and in the loan negotiations the United Kingdom had been able partly to get around it because it involved so many countries who were not negotiating with the USA, most of which strongly wished to keep the preferences which the USA wanted to see end. All the United Kingdom was prepared to concede for the loan was to accept the ‘no new preference’ rule of the proposed International Trade Organisation (a rule subsequently adopted by GATT); to accept that preferences would be allowed to be automatically reduced by any tariff cuts; to unbind all bound preferences so that they would be automatically reduced by the same process; and to abandon certain minor preferences.3 In the one non44
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discriminatory world, Commonwealth tariff discrimination would remain, until the distant day when all tariffs would be bargained down in GATT. The tariff in fact was important to the United Kingdom not only because of its value in preserving the preferences on Commonwealth and imperial trade at a significant level but also as a purely national instrument of economic policy. Since the 1929–32 depression the United Kingdom had become a relatively protectionist country. The early postwar rounds of tariff cutting still left Britain in the 1950s with a tariff whose average incidence was rather higher than that of the Federal German Republic, much higher than that of most of the smaller states, and only slightly lower than that of candidly protectionist France and Italy. Programmatic attempts to reduce or remove tariffs in western Europe in the name of integration were not only politically threatening, they were economically threatening as well. In British eyes the United Kingdom tariff would be reduced when the one world system arrived. What mattered to Britain was not European tariffs but the American tariff, and no further concessions would be made, including the ending of imperial preferences, except for the purpose of bargaining down the American tariff, because the core of the one-world system would remain the two great English-speaking powers, the lesser with its special relationship to the greater. Financially, the birth of a true one-world system would be marked by the restoration to full legal convertibility into the US dollar of the pound sterling. In 1949 this was still a millenarian moment, that one, far-off, divine event, To which the whole creation moves. There were no detailed plans for bringing it about; it was awaited. Day-to-day policy was concerned with defending the currency, which for most of that year meant resisting any suggestion of even the most technically limited forms of convertibility. But nowhere in the Labour government was there any coherent plan for the management of the currency or the economy which supposed anything other than its eventual full legal convertibility within the dollar-exchange standard which was beginning to emerge. In this system the pound sterling would still, it was assumed, be a widely-used international currency. The political relationship between the USA and Britain would be reflected in the relationship between their currencies. As conditions in Europe and the rest of the world returned to ‘normal’, and the shortage of dollars in world trade 45
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disappeared, exchange restrictions would be removed and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would begin to play the role foreseen for it at Bretton Woods as the keeper of the convertibility rules. At the same time the need to save foreign exchange, to regulate payments in bilateral trade and to economise on dollars, would be removed, thereby eliminating the most obvious publicly-proclaimed reason for quantitative import controls. Although in 1949 there was still no coherent programme in London to reach the point at which the legal convertibility of sterling into US dollars could be restored, the Trade Liberalisation Programme fitted into all these assumptions about the future. It proclaimed British leadership of Europe towards the free exchange of goods and currency; for reasons which seemed in 1949 too obvious to debate the dollar convertibility of other major European currencies would have to wait on a proclamation of sterling convertibility at a moment chosen in London. When exchange controls went, what would happen to trade controls? The assumption had to be that with the re-establishment of convertibility they too would go, apart perhaps from some which might be insignificant in terms of world trade and payments. This would make the tariff of even greater importance as a defence of the trade balance and the sterling exchange rate. If the regulation of markets by tariffs was also to be reduced this must therefore be in a grand international settlement which guaranteed much greater access for British goods to other countries’ markets. The tariff was thus set aside as an item over which it was pointless to bargain with Europeans, because it would be needed later to defend the trade balance, and because reductions in European tariffs could not offer sufficiently large trade gains to recompense the loss of protection. British markets lay elsewhere, so it was elsewhere that tariffs had to be brought down by mutual bargaining. European reconstruction was indispensable. Some measure of European integration, as long as it helped the United Kingdom’s vision of the future and did not pose a political threat to that vision, was valuable in the interests of British security. If sterling payments were strictly reserved for national control, if tariffs were too dangerous on every ground for negotiation in Europe, a programme to promote market integration in Europe could only mean an assault on the use of import quotas on intra-western European trade. It could appear as integrationist; as embracing all OEEC members (unlike any of the proposed customs unions); as allowing all awkward questions about tariffs and preferences to be relegated to GATT where European 46
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pressures would be more easily resisted; as a major reduction in trade discrimination; as a step towards restoring sterling-dollar convertibility; and, above all, as strengthening the special relationship by reasserting Britain’s capacity to lead western Europe in the general, albeit not the exact, direction in which the USA wanted it to go. The ways by which the ideas of quota removal advanced in Washington and London at first separately and then together until they coalesced in the Trade Liberalisation Programme of the OEEC— trade liberalisation thenceforward referred only to quotas—were intricate and at times conflicting. Although the British initiative received strong support from Washington, it was not so much complementary to more ambitious American aims for Europe as an alternative to them. In Washington the idea of a mutual action by the OEEC memberstates to remove quotas on their intra-trade was present as one of many competing ideas, many of them of greater political scope, to put new life into the idea of European integration, discussed within the US government in summer and autumn 1949. By that date it had become evident that the Marshall Plan and the creation of the OEEC had not been the giant step on the road to political integration which the USA had initially hoped it would prove. Diplomacy within the OEEC remained strictly national and cooperative. Time appeared to be running out for the USA’s capacity to achieve a measure of political integration in western Europe, because the economic leverage of aid was already much less in autumn 1949 than it had been at the start of the Marshall Plan. Officials therefore were seeking some way of linking the continuation of aid with a firmer and more formal commitment to integration on the European side. The British initiative for the removal of quotas can be traced back to early 1949. There was in existence a Working Party on Import Licensing Relaxations whose task was to make periodical recommendations. The first report in which it recommended any widespread relaxation of the import licensing system was 30 April 1949.4 The report seems to have been based on a secret Board of Trade list of goods which were candidates for transfer to a nonquota regime, but only if they were imported from what were then classified as soft-currency countries in the OEEC. Among OEEC member-states this would have excluded imports from Belgium, West Germany and Switzerland. This was furbished as a European-wide initiative in May in response to an American initiative to wake the OEEC from what the USA regarded as its slumbers and drive it once more towards integration. 47
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The American initiative was intended to create some form of payments mechanism between the members of the OEEC which would not depend on bilateral balances but would allow for a certain degree of multilateralism. The Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), the USA government agency in day-to-day charge of Marshall Plan affairs, proposed to set aside as much as 10 per cent of the Congressional appropriation for the next aid year to support a settlements mechanism for intra-OEEC trade that would not rely on strict bilateral balances. The competition to obtain this slice of aid was fierce, led by proposals for a closer payments association with some element of multilateralism between France, Benelux and Italy. This came too close to the integration of the same group of states in the customs union to which the United Kingdom was opposed not to arouse suspicions. Whitehall and the Bank of England were equally opposed to the introduction, on the basis of this American financial backing, of another American idea, the use of transferable drawing rights within Marshall Aid as a means of effecting multilateral payments between the OEEC members. This came too close to foreshadowing convertibility, and only the United Kingdom itself could determine the conditions and timing of sterling convertibility. American pressure to make drawing rights transferable would involve the loss of dollars to European countries. It would be even worse if those dollars were allocated to establishing a quasi-multilateral settlements mechanism between those very countries which France wished to gather into a customs union. ‘If we are to resist American pressure successfully,’ Cripps informed the cabinet, ‘we must ourselves make constructive proposals for liberalising trade and to stimulate economic and competitive production in Europe.’5 These proposals were found in the Working Party’s report. The proposal which Cripps was able to have accepted by the cabinet was that by 1 October 1949 each OEEC member-state should submit its own list of goods on which it would unilaterally remove quotas. This became a formal resolution of the Ministerial Consultative Group of the OEEC on 4 June. Having already done the homework, the United Kingdom was able to publish an impressive-looking list of goods to be transferred to Open General Licence from 5 October. This amounted to about half the trade imported on private account from soft-currency OEEC countries in 1948. French counter-proposals, that these liberalisations should involve a common list of goods on which quotas would be removed by all member-states of the OEEC were firmly rejected. This also 48
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looked too much like a prototype for a customs union; it might become a step towards associating the OEEC with parallel schemes for tariff removals. Each country was therefore to act unilaterally and the OEEC’s role was to be no more than to register the results. It was not the opinion in London that either the British proposal or that of France for a ‘common list’ would be a particularly significant step in improving manufacturing productivity in Europe. That, it was thought, depended on removing protection against North America. One argument for rejecting the French idea of a common list was that it might delay the removal of European quotas against dollar imports.6 Indeed, the British proposals, although trumpeted in Washington as Britain’s contribution to America’s strategy for Europe, were based on very little enthusiasm for any European trading bloc. One of Cripps’ worries was that the anti-discriminatory Section 9 of the Anglo-American Financial Agreements would prevent the subsequent extension of import control relaxations to the sterling area countries. In fact, in June 1949 the OEEC Council agreed to explore both the British idea of unilateral quota removals and the alternative French plan for the removal of quotas on a common list of goods, to be drawn up initially by the OEEC. Although the British proposal obviously fell shorter than the French of the American definition of integration, two factors brought American support. One was the failure of France and its associates to put together a payments mechanism which would include West Germany in any relaxation of bilateral settlements or any common set of trade rules. European integration had to mean integrating West Germany into western Europe and anything which excluded it was certainly not going to get American support. The British proposals did not permanently exclude any member-state of the OEEC. The second element was Britain’s readiness to give its original proposal a more mutual content and to allow the OEEC supervisory powers over it. This, however, it was only ready to do after the head of the ECA, Paul Hoffman, had made it unmistakeably plain in a much-heralded speech to the OEEC at the end of October that continuing aid and support from the USA meant a specific commitment to an agreed programme of trade and payments liberalisation associated with a non-bilateral settlements mechanism for OEEC countries. French attempts to build a less bilaterally based payments association with Italy and Benelux had come to a standstill in September 1949 when details were revealed to the Dutch, who at 49
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once made it clear that no proposals which excluded West Germany were of any interest to them. They were put together in different form with a view to including West Germany only after Hoffman’s speech.7 The speech came as a relief in London, where officials were well aware of how far internal American discussion had ranged beforehand, with some ECA officials even advocating that Hoffman demand a single western European currency and central bank within two years. By adapting their original proposals so as to allow the OEEC a genuinely supervisory role over a programme of quota removal with common rules, British officials were aiming to avoid, probably until the end of the Marshall Plan when the danger would be over, something much worse. That theirs was a correct view of the situation is shown by the way that the French government responded to America’s enthusiasm for the British proposals by including in its new version of a payments association with Italy and Benelux a proposal to remove quotas on a common timetable more quickly than the ‘Plan of Action’, as it was first called, proposed by the British. Hoffman had gone out of his way in his speech to say that narrower regional groupings were valuable. The French project, now known as Finebel, was in fact far from dead. The ECA wanted Britain to support it. Between the participants the discussions about the regional payments project did envisage an eventual economic integration of the kind that so troubled British thoughts, even if the possibilities of achieving it looked very remote. No one was sure what would emerge in the newly-created Federal German Republic and France therefore wanted to use Finebel as an instrument to control the new country by devising a framework of economic regulation akin to the ideas of the first French five-year plan, before fitting the Federal Republic into it. The Dutch still wanted Germany in from the outset. What the French proposals foresaw was essentially the regulation of the market of the six countries by inter-industry agreements to fill the void left by the removal of quantitative trade controls. Tariffs would remain as a second line of defence. This was seen by the American officials, who had at first encouraged the regional plan, as an example of the protectionism that they wished to get away from. It justified much of what the British had forecast would result from a regional association. What the commercial arrangements would be was the crux of the matter, for the liberalisation of payments between the five countries which the French proposed still rested pretty firmly on a bilateral 50
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basis. Commercial policy arguments, however, centred on tariffs. There was as large a measure of disagreement between The Netherlands and France over the necessity to reduce French tariffs as there was over the terms and timing of the Federal Republic’s inclusion; Dutch negotiators wanted to use Finebel to bring down French and Italian tariffs. As the British proposals to remove quotas made their way through the OEEC both France and The Netherlands became increasingly alarmed at the idea that they might be committing themselves to a position where they would both be simultaneously removing quantitative restrictions and reducing tariffs. Some French foreign ministry officials foresaw this with alarm as opening the French and European economies to control by large American companies. There no longer seemed any way forward through Finebel by midFebruary 1950. Since the alternative French idea of the common list of goods on which all OEEC member-states would remove quotas had made even less progress by that time, there was really little choice for the USA but to back the revised British proposals as made to the OEEC Council in November 1949 after Hoffman’s speech, including the idea of formal OEEC supervision of the quota removal programme. The United Kingdom’s diplomatic position was thus a strong one. In the circumstances it seemed worth removing many quotas on British imports which even liberalisers would have preferred to keep for longer in order to take advantage of this. The French government continued to hope throughout the last six months of 1949 for FrancoBritish cooperation in the OEEC in drawing up a common list. But that did not happen, and by the end of the year London could bask in the rare pleasure of American gratitude for an European initiative which was integrationist only in the least committed sense of the word. Would it ever have served as a British programme for Europe had there not been a strong pointer before October 1949 that Europe, including Britain, would be able to keep its quotas against dollar imports? Probably not. This pointer came in the negotiations about repayments on the post-war US loan to Britain, which took place in September 1949 after the sterling devaluation. One of the conditions of the original loan agreement had been that Britain must foreswear trade discrimination and Section 9 of the Agreement specifically required quantitative trade restrictions by either party to be nondiscriminatory. The imminent demise of Section 9 had been prefigured 51
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in the last weeks between convertibility and devaluation when the United Kingdom, followed by the dependent sterling area, imposed swingeing import controls against dollar exports. This was disguised somewhat by the fact that the restrictions took the form in Britain of cutting back government purchasing programmes for 1950. These quantitative restrictions may have had a bigger effect on import levels than the devaluation itself.8 In September 1949 the American and Canadian governments gave a public expression of opinion that British participation in a programme of trade liberalisation confined to western Europe would not be considered a breach of the terms of the loan Agreement under Section 9.9 The prospects of success in any programme of quota removal were obviously very restricted when foreign trade was still dominated by bilateral agreements. Countries would still maintain quotas against those whose currency they lacked or on which they wanted to economise. For this reason Hoffman’s speech had contained an implied demand for a multilateral settlements mechanism for trade between OEEC member-states. That the ECA was well aware that removing import quotas under the British proposals did not in any way imply multilateral settlements is shown by its encouragement of Finebel after mid-February 1950. Even when it was no longer a plan for removing quotas or lowering tariffs more quickly than within the OEEC as a whole, it could still be presented as a genuine advance towards a multilateral payments mechanism which, by rendering many bilateral trade agreements no longer necessary, would strike at the most common cause of import quotas. Few contemporaries or historians seem to have been wholly convinced that this continued American support was genuine, most regarding it as a tactical move by Washington to bring pressure on the United Kingdom to force it to allow sterling to be included in a European multilateral settlements mechanism governed by the OEEC.10 This was what the ECA most wanted in Europe from autumn 1949 onwards and sought to use Marshall Aid to obtain. Its officials saw a new payments mechanism which separated, albeit temporarily, western European currencies from the dollar as now the most likely road to political union. Western European currencies would be automatically transferable into each other through a central settlements agency, while they maintained exchange controls against the US dollar. Because this struck a direct blow at the way officials in London saw the evolution of British commercial policy it took unremitting pressures from the USA on the United Kingdom to achieve this 52
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objective. The ambiguity of the Trade Liberalisation Programme became, therefore, greater as soon as the OEEC had accepted it. For Britain, it had been a policy initiative intended to forestall, among other unwelcome developments, a European settlements mechanism between soft currencies, independent of the IMF and thus of the one world system, and especially one in which sterling was to be forced to accept common rules imposed by the OEEC. For one thing, since the minimum period of time over which such an arrangement could reasonably last could not be less than a year, it seemed to place an unwelcome constraint on the right of the British government and monetary authorities to set independently the date of sterling’s return to dollar convertibility. For another, so it was argued, a soft-currency payments mechanism would postpone the day when the one-world system would be restored. If the settlement terms for debtors were generous, containing a high proportion of credit, as indeed they eventually proved to be, why would European economies hasten to remove trade barriers against American goods? And how, if that were the reaction, would productivity be raised to the level needed to compete with the USA and so allow the one-world system to arrive? It was against this background of pressure, arising from the insufficient nature of the British initiative on quotas to meet America’s longer-term objectives, that the loud plaudits of American officials for what Britain was doing in Europe have to be seen. Without multilateral settlements the need to defend bilateral balances within narrow limits was bound to restrict quota removals. When the British proposal that countries should submit unilaterally lists of goods on which quotas would be removed was first accepted in the OEEC in July 1949, a statistical method of calculating on a common comparative basis what was being done was also devised, the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Index.11 In November a common target of 50 per cent on this index was set for quota removal. All member-states were asked to reach this target by 15 December, when there would be a general examination and report by the OEEC Council on what had been done, followed by a further examination at the end of March 1950. Although the United Kingdom complied with the December target, at least on its own calculations, others did not. When the next balance was struck at the end of March 1950 Denmark, Germany, and Norway still fell short of the December target and Turkey had not yet even begun to liberalise. The network of bilateral payments and the fact that some currencies were considered harder than others meant that 53
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liberalisations were not extended to all members. Britain did not extend them to Belgium, Germany or Switzerland, their currencies still being considered hard. Denmark’s quota removals did not apply to imports from Belgium, Germany, Italy and Switzerland; Holland’s to Germany and Switzerland; Norway’s to Belgium, Holland and Germany; and those of Sweden, like the United Kingdom, did not apply to Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. Austria when removing quotas retained other trade and exchange controls. Italy persisted in the 1930s bargaining mode; the removal of quotas on imports from Austria, Denmark and Switzerland was conditional on the purchase of equivalent values in Italian exports. Before the OEEC Council met in December 1949 to make its first report on the Trade Liberalisation Programme the ECA submitted an ambitious plan for an intra-European payments union which would encourage the speedier removal of quantitative restrictions by allowing balances with one country to be automatically settled in the currency of a third. In Congress in February 1950 the decision was made to withhold as much as one-third of the Marshall Aid appropriation for the aid year 1950–1 and set it in a special fund to support further moves to trade liberalisation. In effect, this meant that the USA was prepared to place working capital from the Marshall Aid appropriations into a multilateral payments system for the OEEC, providing as working balances the hard-currency dollars which countries were finding so hard to earn from trade. It took from the date of this Congressional decision until August 1950 before what became the European Payments Union (EPU) was created. Most of that time was taken up with tense negotiations between the ECA and the United Kingdom over the terms on which sterling would participate. For Hoffman and the ECA it was a condition that the Marshall Aid set aside to support a multilateral payments system, about $600 million, should be used only in support of arrangements in which sterling would be transferable on the same terms as all other OEEC currencies. Hoffman failed, however, in January 1950 to force Cripps into an agreement of this kind.12 Because the ultimate purpose of the payments union was trade liberalisation the struggle was over two vital areas of commercial policy. One was the terms of sterling’s participation in a temporary settlements mechanism in western Europe. The British definition of temporary was that the arrangement would cease in 1952 with the termination of Marshall Aid. The other was the definition of a common set of trade rules for OEEC member-states which would come into force 54
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simultaneously with the EPU. Transferable currencies in a multilateral settlements system would have been obviously of limited value as an expression of trade liberalisation if countries continued to discriminate, as Britain itself was doing, between currencies in their quota liberalisations. The trade rules were intended to eliminate all discrimination between members in the process of quota removal. Before the end of March British proposals for the terms on which sterling would participate fell far short of the full currency transferability for trade settlements at which the USA was aiming. Indeed the proposals made in March, which were intended to be of a ‘thus far and no further’ nature were so unacceptable to the ECA that Hoffman felt obliged to remind Cripps that if the Trade Liberalisation Programme were weakened, ‘the restoration of a cordial relationship between the United Kingdom and the USA will be difficult of achievement’.13 The British proposals envisaged maintaining all United Kingdom bilateral agreements unaltered, but paying off up to certain limits Britain’s bilateral debts through the EPU. Full transferability as an obligation was for the others. Any claims for payment on the United Kingdom beyond the limit of the ‘swing’ on either side of balance which was stipulated by each bilateral trade agreement would be settled only after similar British claims on all the other OEEC member-states had been transferred to the clearing system. If the United Kingdom could maintain its import quotas it would under that system have been able to protect itself against all risk of losing gold, while being in a good position to win it. It was partly on the future of quantitative import restrictions that the argument after March 1950 therefore turned. How far was the United Kingdom really intending to go in removing quantitative restrictions? Beyond a certain deficit to the EPU Britain must, its negotiators claimed, have the right to reimpose import quotas and related measures. This was in some sense a hypothetical point, since what British officials were actually expecting with the return of ‘normality’ was a trade surplus with continental Europe. But in another sense it was not; it was the fundamental stipulation that trade balances with the continent could never be allowed to disturb sterling’s worldwide role. If in the process of trade liberalisation there was a British trade deficit with the continent, quotas would be put back on to protect sterling where it truly mattered. This is exactly what was to be done at the end of 1951. The issue was complicated by the balances in sterling which continental countries held. Continentals, especially the Belgians, were 55
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thought to have played a big role in the 1947 sterling devaluation by rushing to cash their balances for dollars when sterling had been made convertible in that summer. The legitimate worry in London was that creditors would use the proposed new payments machinery to run down their existing sterling balances with a consequent loss of gold or dollars by the United Kingdom. It was through the need for the USA to face up to this genuine problem that a solution was found. Sterling balance holders in the EPU would be able to negotiate repayments, if they wished, over the two-year period to the end of Marshall Aid for which it would last. If the negotiations failed, the United Kingdom would have another two years before it had to repay. Members of the EPU would be allowed to exchange debts owed to them in the Union by Britain against the existing sterling balances. If they did so, and if this meant gold/dollar payments by the United Kingdom because payments would be going beyond that point in the settlement rules where a country had to begin repaying in gold/ dollars, the ECA would reimburse Britain for those gold/dollar payments. Of the aid funds reserved by Congress to back the settlements mechanism one-quarter of the total was further reserved to insure the United Kingdom against sterling losses caused by EPU members using already existing sterling balances to make settlements. The agreement between the acting Chancellor Hugh Gaitskell and ECA officials over the sterling balances was reached over the period 2–4 June 1950 and approved in London on 7 June. It opened the way to final agreement on the trade rules which would be commonly enforced on EPU members by the OEEC. A special OEEC Trade Committee meeting over the period 7–10 June wrote the formal rules under which the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Programme proceeded.14 It was thus a year after the first United Kingdom proposals for quota removal were accepted by the OEEC and almost six months after the OEEC had first gone through its statistical procedures to determine the comparative extent of quantitative restrictions on intraEuropean trade, that the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Programme came into operation with stronger chances of success. With the creation of the EPU there was no longer a motive to discriminate against the goods of OEEC member-states with harder currencies, so that, in the British case for example, Open General Licences could be extended to Belgian, German and Swiss exports on the same terms as those of the other members. Without the creation of the EPU the Trade Liberalisation Programme would have remained an insignificant affair. After its creation, the United Kingdom was 56
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committed to a more comprehensive programme of removal of quantitative restrictions. Fortunately this coincided with a highly favourable swing in the balance of payments and a strengthening of the reserves. The fact that this favourable tendency set in after March played its part in convincing Gaitskell to commit sterling fully to the EPU, and to trade liberalisation. The rules specified that after 30 June 1950 all removals of quotas must be applicable to all members of the OEEC/EPU. From 31 December the registered statistical measure of each country’s private trade that had been liberalised, i.e. that had once been governed by quotas and was no longer, must also be made non-discriminatory. All this simply accepted the reality that ending exchange discrimination in trade settlements removed any financial motive for maintaining commercial discrimination. Other rules, however, showed what a large step the United Kingdom had taken. The trade rules, as we shall see in the description of their statistical measurement which follows, imposed a tight restraint on the use of quotas on different sectors of the economy. The November 1949 decisions in the OEEC Council had required the 50 per cent target figure to be reached not only for total imports, but also in each of three separate categories of measurement: agricultural products, raw materials and manufactures. Furthermore, the criteria for reimposing quotas were also to be defined by the OEEC, and if it disapproved of such reimpositions it could request their annulment. Nevertheless, the last six months of 1950 appeared to confirm Gaitskell’s judgement. It was an excellent period for western Europe’s foreign trade and reserves. The dollar shortage seemed to be disappearing and ‘normality’ returning as dollars flooded into the reserves of European central banks. The Trade Liberalisation Programme was fully in place at the very moment when it could make a dramatic initial impact and that accounts for its surprising initial rate of success and particularly for the speed with which British import quotas were at first removed. Gaitskell, it should, however, be noted, no more than Cripps, was an enthusiast neither for the ‘one-world system’ nor for a European regional bloc. His change of heart in favour of the EPU came with his realisation that because of the EPU’s generosity to debtors it would be easier to pursue the sort of domestic policies at which the Labour government aimed. Gaitskell overrode the arguments of Treasury officials that the settlement terms in EPU were too inflationary and would thus delay the arrival of dollar convertibility.15 The EPU and the trade rules were an acceptable 57
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bargain, he thought, because it was not possible to resist combined American and European pressure, although his personal predisposition may have been to do so.16 The Bank of England was less realistic about accepting the EPU. If the EPU failed, so the Bank argued, the consequence would be a forced return to the gold standard, since no alternative provision was being made. Sterling was not yet ready to face this; it was too early for dollar-convertibility. Better therefore, Bank officials argued, to maintain the framework of bilateral trade and payments agreements constructed since 1945 through which sterling was used in Europe until such time as British authorities decided the moment was ripe for sterling-dollar convertibility. Underlying this argument was the Bank’s wish that western European countries might continue to use sterling to some extent as a reserve currency, as well as its fear that the EPU unit of account, menacingly named the écu although it was essentially a US dollar with limited non-resident transferability between central banks, might replace sterling in its reserve role in western Europe. In reality, European countries had disliked the bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom precisely because they did force them to hold sterling, in whose status they had little confidence, especially after the drastic devaluation of September 1949. In effect, the ratification of the EPU agreement announced the end of bilateral trade and payments agreements between the United Kingdom and OEEC member-states, removing one necessary cause of quantitative import restrictions on balance of payments grounds against those states. MEASURING AND COMPARING QUOTA REMOVALS Once the Trade Liberalisation Programme’s trade rules meant that the widening or removal of any import quota had to be on a nondiscriminatory basis within the OEEC, the comparative method of measuring the extent of trade liberalisation devised and accepted in summer 1949, the Trade Liberalisation Index, came to dominate national decision-making about quotas. The meaning of the percentage figures recorded in this index has been so frequently misunderstood that it is important to explain what these numbers did actually measure, especially as they are the readiest method to hand for explaining the actual extent of quota removal on infrawestern European trade. 58
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They did not measure the actual percentage of quotas removed, much less the percentage of trade actually freed from quota restrictions, as some writers seem to assume. In fact, as we now show, a country’s percentage score in the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Index could actually drop significantly when the value and share of imports entering free of quantitative restrictions rose. The method of calculation measured the extent to which imports were subject to a quota, not the degree to which existing quotas were effective. Goods were deemed as liberalised if private traders could import unlimited quantities from the designated area under ‘open licence’, which meant that no licence was necessary.17 In any given year the ‘liberalisation percentage’ for any country was calculated by dividing the current list of liberalised private imports, weighted in terms of their actual annual 1948 import values, by the current list of total private imports—thus excluding imports on government account—also weighted in terms of their 1948 import values.18 Weighting imported goods by fixed values was intended to exclude effects of changing trade patterns which might occur independently of any liberalisation. The weights were in 1948 values because 1948 was the most recent year on which a calculation could be made.19 To help to clarify this procedure we anticipate our narrative and show an actual example giving the United Kingdom liberalisation percentage on 1 November 1951, when it was 90 per cent, and on 1 April 1954, when it was 80 per cent (Table 1). Table 1 United Kingdom trade liberalisation percentage as calculated by the OEEC, 1 November 1951 and 1 April 1954
59
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It will be seen from this example that as a share of total imports the value and proportion of imports entering the United Kingdom free of quantitative import controls was slightly larger in April 1954 than in November 1951, because the value of imports on government account had dropped, yet the OEEC liberalisation percentage was well below what it had been in the earlier period. On the other hand the high liberalisation percentage in 1951 disguises the fact that government imports, which were effectively subject to quota because the government purchased fixed amounts to correspond with its import programmes, were two and a half times the value of private goods under quota, yet did not count in the calculation at all. It was British advocacy that led to this method of calculation being adopted. Among the advanced countries the United Kingdom was the one with the biggest share of its imports on government account. Even at the end of 1951, at a moment which was a peak in the first phase of liberalisation, 20 per cent of the United Kingdom’s imports from OEEC member-states on a 1948 basis were state purchases. For early 1949 the proportion was about one-third, on current value basis. This method of calculation could have been designed to put the United Kingdom quickly at the top of the percentage league table by the beginning of 1951. Had total trade been used as the denominator, then the reader will calculate that the United Kingdom’s liberalisation percentage at November 1951 would have been only 72, instead of 90. It would have been no smaller in 1954. But when imports were transferred from government account to private account, as they increasingly were by the Conservative government which came to power in 1951, so were their 1948 import values transferred to the denominator of the current calculation. Many food and raw material imports were privatised but not liberalised. They remained under quota and this reduced the liberalisation percentage in the sub-category by 1954, though there were actually fewer restrictions in the latter year. The advantage which Britain gained from this method of calculation therefore was short-lived. Thus, when a private import restricted by quota was liberalised, the liberalisation percentage would rise steeply. When a government import was privatised or liberalised, it would rise slowly. And when a government import became a private import still under quota the liberalisation percentage would fall even though there was no change in the scope of quota restriction. Where there was more privatisation than liberalisation the liberalisation percentage could paradoxically fall even though more goods were becoming free of restriction, 60
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something which actually happened in the agricultural trade of the United Kingdom for the years 1951–4. For this purely arithmetical reason the change in the extent of trade liberalisation by the United Kingdom in the years 1953/5 is understated by the OEEC Liberalisation Index. For some countries, it may also have been understated in 1950–1. Where a country removed quota restrictions but still retained the legal right to reimpose them, this was not counted as liberalisation. This tended to occur in 1950 when countries were still cautious and was strikingly the case with Belgium, which at the end of the year was recorded as having an overall liberalisation percentage of 65 when, had the quotas not actually being imposed but still retained on the statute book been counted as liberalisations, the figure would have been about 80 per cent. However, the effectiveness of the liberalisation programme was more usually overstated by this measure of its extent. The effectiveness of quotas depended on the trade they excluded, and this could vary with changes in the size of particular quotas or with changes in autonomous demand. Both factors might in principle vary drastically without any change at all in the number of quotas revoked or imposed. Quotas which were most protective in terms of potential trade tended to be the last to go. The commodity composition of trade was changing over the period 1948–56, and it was easier to liberalise goods for which demand was slowing down. Even assuming an unchanging pattern of free demand, the use of actual import values in the base year 1948 to weight the calculations made to produce the index could produce striking anomalies. Removing quotas on goods not imported in that year or imported in very small values would not improve a country’s liberalisation percentage, even if it would have permitted a large inflow of trade. Because concerted action in the OEEC never set a target higher than 90 per cent of private imports, there was no pressure within the Liberalisation Index to remove quota restrictions on such goods. Yet one such item, cars, was to be the most rapidly expanding sector of industrial production in the 1950s. A tacit agreement among European car manufacturers not to disturb the silence over this comfortable reservation of dynamically growing domestic markets to national producers was easy to reach.20 It is important to bear in mind therefore that what primarily concerned governments after July 1949 in the Trade Liberalisation Programme was not the liberalisation of potential trade, but liberalising that part of actual 1948 trade which would achieve the 61
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stated OEEC percentage target as calculated in this arbitrary way. Misunderstanding the real significance of the percentages has sometimes led to a much more generous assessment of the extent of trade liberalisation than was actually the case, especially from enthusiasts of and publicists for the Marshall Plan. The disincentive to liberalise items traded only in small quantity in 1948, together with the exclusion of items on government account, were serious limitations on the scope and effectiveness of the Trade Liberalisation Programme. The fact that so much of Britain’s food was subject to state trading was one reason why food exporters like France, Holland and Italy were unimpressed by its liberalisation percentages for trade in agricultural products. State bulk purchasing covered well over 50 per cent of the total value of British imports of food in 1949, 35 per cent in August 1951. At that latter date no less than 87 per cent of private food imports from the OEEC had been liberalised; but this represented only about 56 per cent of total food imports from the same source. By April 1954 23 per cent of British agricultural imports were still imported directly by government. It was always claimed of course that these imports were in accord with the Havana guidelines for state trading and did not constitute unfair protection. Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, who headed the British delegation to the OEEC, perhaps because of his unshakeable conviction that most foreigners, especially the French, were up to no good, suggested that the United Kingdom should devise and initiate an agreed measure within the OEEC for protection of agricultural trade. The Board of Trade was all too aware that if an exercise of this kind were put in hand for OEEC countries the United Kingdom would show up in a very bad light. Probably only Switzerland had a higher level of agricultural protection. Even more important in continental eyes than the high percentage of state trade in British agricultural imports was the fact that the United Kingdom was the biggest prospective market for European food exporters. Since state trading as a proportion of its food imports was large, the absolute amounts, from the exporters’ view, were huge. Of total food imports by OEEC member-states in August 1951 the United Kingdom accounted for 44 per cent, as against 9 per cent for France. The United Kingdom was responsible for 61 per cent of the total OEEC state trading in the agricultural sector.21 At that same date only 14.4 per cent of total French food imports were on government account. 62
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If we turn to other sectors of trade, however, the disparity between the recorded percentage of trade liberalisation and its actual effectiveness can be seen to lie in the persistence of both the United Kingdom and France with state trading. In August 1951, for example, 31.9 per cent of French raw material imports were imported under state trading schemes, against 15 per cent for the United Kingdom, and France accounted for 44 per cent of all state trading in the raw material sector of intra-OEEC trade. In the manufactured goods sector France appeared as the major villain; its imports of manufactures on government account at the same date made up 63 per cent of all state trade in manufactured goods in intra-OEEC trade. This reflected the different commercial strategies of the two countries in adjusting to the post-war world. Adhering to principles which must ultimately at an imprecise future moment mean the sacrifice of quantitative restrictions as a policy instrument, British governments nevertheless accepted the reality that in the future there was going to be no such thing as free or liberalised trade in foodstuffs. Indeed they themselves would not have wanted such a thing. In France, although this reality was also fully accepted, agricultural exports mattered and the domestic food market was less controlled than in Britain, so state trading in agricultural products was not encouraged and was much less important. In the industrial sector, however, while a majority was gradually emerging in favour of a more open economy as the way to competitiveness, growth and prosperity, this was thought of by liberals as a viable choice only after the programmes of state-directed investments initiated by the first Reconstruction Plan in 1947 would have brought French manufacturing to a higher level of productivity. State trading in manufactures was a way of buying time for post-war industrial policies to do their work. Sir Hugh would have been on better grounds had he tried to devise a common measure of industrial protection, for that would have put France, not Britain, on the spot. ‘I think I should say here,’ he reported from OEEC in 1954, ‘that nothing is more displeasing to me and members of this Delegation than for the United Kingdom’s performance to be put in the same category as the French performance, and we attack this procedure whenever we can.’22 This was a matter of pots and kettles, especially when seen from the viewpoint of economies dependent on exports to either country. But it serves as a last cautionary note about the measures of trade liberalisation which are cited in the literature. As for as the effectiveness of the whole 63
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range of national quotas was concerned, treating state trading as quotas, there was little difference between the United Kingdom and France. Performance, as judged by the OEEC, was another matter, being judged solely by the Trade Liberalisation Index percentage. Inevitably, any narrative of quota removal will be constructed around the OEEC data, because this was the data that states were required to generate. It is, accordingly, used as the foundation of the narrative which follows, as it is of existing statistical and narrative accounts of the programme.23 THE TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME FROM ITS ORIGINS TO ITS FIRST FAILURE Liberalisation percentages according to the Trade Liberalisation Index were first calculated when the British programme for unilateral liberalisations was first accepted in the OEEC in July 1949. On average, for OEEC member-states as a whole, they came to 30 per cent, with the Belgian percentage reckoned at 78 and that of France at only 18. In November the OEEC Council agreed on a specific target of 50 per cent to be reached by 15 December. The target percentage in this case had to be reached not only for the liberalisation of total imports, but also in each of three separate categories: agricultural products, raw materials, and manufactures. This was a fairly obvious additional requirement, since countries might otherwise have removed quotas on raw materials, put in place in the 1930s but rendered pointless by changes in economic conditions, in order to reach the overall percentage requirement at the expense of quotas on manufactures. When the percentages were again calculated in March 1950, however, this additional sectoral requirement was far from being met. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Turkey all failed to reach the 50 per cent figure for manufactures. Italy recorded a percentage of only 11.1 on manufactures, Norway only 27.5. All except the United Kingdom and Turkey achieved the target figure for raw materials comfortably. The overall percentage target was surpassed by the United Kingdom only because it was able to record a percentage of 71 for foodstuffs, which of course was easy when most of its food imports were excluded from the reckoning because of the prevalence of state trading. The exercise made it plain that few countries had removed quotas on manufactures which they produced domestically. No doubt aware that real progress would depend on the introduction of a more flexible settlements mechanism, and that this 64
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was likely to come in spite of British lack of enthusiasm, the OEEC agreed in March to move the overall percentage target to 60, and to consider further in June how to move to a target of 75 per cent, on condition that the EPU would begin its operations before any commitment to these targets was made. The obligation to move to the 60 per cent mark became effective only from October 1950 because the EPU was ratified only in August. All except Norway were adjudged at the end of December to have attained the overall percentage figure. Austria, Denmark, Norway and Turkey still, however, fell below it for manufactures. Most of the others just made it, Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands recording a figure of exactly 60 per cent and thus inaugurating that policy of finely calculating the precise effects of each quota on the liberalisation percentage which would occupy so many European civil servants for the next five years. It was in this stage that the United Kingdom moved to the very high figure demonstrated in Table 1, an achievement that was to prove fragile and which reflected the relatively greater easing of the pressure on British currency earnings and reserves in 1950 than on those of other member-states. Ironically, the obligation to extend new liberalisations to all members without discrimination actually resulted in the re-imposition of a small number of quotas which had been eliminated before the EPU agreement. Countries which had removed quotas against particular partners in bilateral trade agreements by allowing in unlimited imports of a particular commodity were not prepared to do the same for all OEEC partners. It can be seen that the situation was delicately balanced. It would need more than one year’s favourable balance of payments results before the tough core of genuinely effective import quotas would be eliminated, especially as so many of them were not purely for balance of payments purposes. Although in making each intra-trade surplus equally and convertibly hard the EPU had abolished the settlements motive for bilateralism, many bilateral quotas were to remain throughout the decade.24 During the OEEC discussions in June 1950 to consider moving to the higher percentage mark much of the talk repeated the reasons given in the 1930s for retaining quotas: protection against lower cost producers; the need for industrialisation by import substitution; the inoperancy of some tariffs and the need to revise them if quotas were to be abandoned; the lack of bargaining power for smaller economies if tariffs again became the principal regulatory device for intra-western European trade; the value of quotas as 65
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bargaining counters for exports; the fear of strong political protest from domestic pressure groups.25 It was for this reason that the trade rules did not immediately proscribe discrimination against fellow member-states by pre-EPU quotas, but allowed a margin of time. By the close of the year, however, when the date drew near to make preEPU quotas non-discriminatory, there were several governments refusing to accept any system for reaching that goal. The further move to the 75 per cent mark was also agreed in October 1950, to be attained by 1 February 1951, although the crucial requirement that this mark should also be attained in each of the three categories of imports was dropped. Several countries refused any further liberalisations of agricultural imports. The opposition of organised agricultural interest groups to anything which might lower their prices on domestic markets had become intense, as had their activities in trying to organise a regulated European market which would allow them to vent their high-priced surpluses without having to take any lower-priced imports. Continuing with a separate target for quota removals on agricultural produce seemed in these political circumstances impossible. The relative success of the programme against the background of rising reserves and the seeming elimination of the dollar gap had enabled it only to travel the faster towards the most obviously foreseeable political obstacle. Refusal to set a higher target figure for liberalisations of agricultural imports, however, could only make the Trade Liberalisation Programme finally unacceptable to countries like Denmark and The Netherlands, where the value of agricultural exports to other OEEC member-states made a massive contribution to total export earnings. For Denmark, the fact that this separate target was now to be temporarily abandoned, when three-quarters of the value of its exports was made up by food-stuffs, provided an excellent argument for refusing to eliminate any more of the quotas which protected its small manufacturing sector. The Netherlands made it a condition of accepting the 75 per cent target that the tariff question would be soon addressed. One reason for the spritely beginning of the Trade Liberalisation Programme was that the core of the OEEC was made up of larger states with a similar structure of output and trade. In expansionary circumstances and given the very limited nature of the quota removals that did take place at first it was possible to increase the percentage scores on the Trade Liberalisation Index at such a rate as to make the programme seem one of the more undisputed successes of Marshall Aid. But Denmark’s objections showed how unrealistic it 66
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was to expect the same level of statistical performance from a country with a different structure of output and exports. The same applied to Greece, Iceland and Turkey, but they were allowed to play by different rules, their EPU trade debts being financed by American military aid. Austria was allowed to follow the rules only when it could and was otherwise given exceptions as a nursling of the west. The concept of identical liberalisation percentage targets for each of the three sectors was also in trouble in autumn 1950 because the expansionary background of the second half of 1950 began to generate severe settlements problems. The impact of the Korean war had first made itself felt in the soaring demand for raw materials, especially in the USA. This was a main cause of the improved dollar position of the United Kingdom, through exports from the rest of the sterling area. The demand for capital goods to sustain European expansion then led to a steep increase in the value and volume of imports into the Federal Republic in the last quarter of 1950, such that the new state could no longer meet its payments obligations within the EPU rules. Technically, therefore, those Bank of England officials who had predicted the possible early failure of the EPU were correct. Politically, however, they were short-sighted; because the essential purpose of European integration was to retain West Germany within the system, and because the Federal Republic was in political tutelage to the former Allied occupiers the new state could not protest an infringement of national sovereignty if the OEEC imposed controls over its domestic policies and even over its foreign trade. It was put under strong warning from the other members to reintroduce the quantitative import controls which it had jettisoned almost with its birth, although between December 1950 and February 1951 it fended off deliberalisation by the use of monetary policy instead. The OEEC experts, Alec Cairncross and Per Jacobsson, who negotiated directly with the German officials, were proved entirely correct in their forecast that the Federal Republic’s negative trade balance would be only temporary. The underlying trend of German exports was powerfully upwards, while the import pattern was demonstrably exceptional. Nevertheless the Federal Republic’s debts had accumulated by February 1951 to the point where its quota in EPU was exhausted and its liberalisations made under the OEEC programme had to be suspended. The reimposition of German import quotas was exactly the demonstration that Denmark and other agricultural exporters needed 67
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to make their point that the Trade Liberalisation Programme was unfair to them, for, after the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic was the OEEC’s biggest food importer. At the February 1951 OEEC Council meeting Denmark, The Netherlands and Turkey, all held to be specially affected by the OEEC’s insistence on reducing Germany’s imports, were excused from the overall 75 per cent target until Germany itself would have reached it. When the OEEC had taken the decision in October 1950 to move the overall percentage target beyond the 60 per cent mark no single item had by then been liberalised by every one of the member states. France more or less made a common list of quota-free goods a condition of acceptance of the next, 75 per cent, stage. The moment was hardly propitious. The least disputed commodities for inclusion in any such list would probably have been raw materials. In the full flush of an improving payments position in 1950, however, the interministerial committee which handled Marshall Plan affairs in the French government had pressed for the 75 per cent target as a way of reducing manufacturing costs in France by opening the economy. When it came to pressing for final acceptance in the OEEC of the new stage of the programme and also the idea of a common list the French government, in the face of a still steeply rising demand, was already perhaps hoping to manoeuvre the American government towards some form of international regulation of raw material supplies.26 The OEEC Secretariat tried to produce a common list of items important in intra-European trade and whose mutual liberalisation would lead to increased productivity. But the exercise was made meaningless by the fact that countries which had not reached, or were excluded from, the 75 per cent overall target were excused from participation in drawing up the common list also. Of what use was a common list of quota-free items which did not have to include imports into Germany? By April 1951 the OEEC Council had nevertheless given a provisional approval to such a list and on 12 August it was adopted by Council and incorporated into the Code of Liberalisation. It makes odd reading. One of its most statistically significant entries was textiles, soon to become one of the industrial sectors most protected against non-European economies. The artificialities that action of this kind brought about are well illustrated by Diebold.27 Most manufacturing industry in Denmark was protected by quotas and by low tariffs. Removing quotas meant that tariffs were not high enough to have the desired protective effect, as indeed was usually 68
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the case in small economies with less to gain from tariff bargaining. Under pressure to conform to the OEEC percentages and to the common list, for it was lagging far behind the percentage targets for the removal of quotas on manufactured imports, Denmark removed quotas on textile imports while at the same time requiring importers to deposit between 120 and 150 per cent of the value of the goods for between three months and a year with the central bank. This foreshadowed the many devices by which France was later in the 1950s to comply with the letter but not the spirit of the OEEC Code of Liberalisation and the trade rules. The determination to go ahead in April 1951 with the idea of a common list reflected the vindicated belief that the setback to the Trade Liberalisation Programme caused by the Federal Republic’s forced reintroduction of quantitative controls was not permanent. The Federal Republic’s liberalisations were all cancelled on 21 February 1951, import licences being immediately required for all previously controlled goods. But existing import orders did not require a licence. Later, we show the average lag between the introduction of import licensing and the consequent fall in imports to have been between six and nine months for the United Kingdom and there is no reason to think it would have been any different for Germany. Yet the Federal Republic’s balance in EPU began to improve in March. Except as a signal, to force the reintroduction of import quotas by the Federal Republic may have been unnecessary. From March 1951 onwards Germany moved inexorably every month from being a virtually bankrupt debtor to its EPU partners to the opposite problem of having a trade surplus with every one of them, so that the EPU’s final problem became that everyone owed the Federal Republic money. Dramatic though the German crisis was for the EPU, the real underlying problem of the Trade Liberalisation Programme in spring 1951 was not Germany’s deficit. It was the refusal of the agricultural exporters any longer to accept what was clearly one of the Programme’s necessary procedures, the equality of percentage liberalisations across the sectors. This raised the fundamental issue of how markets should in future be regulated. It was the more obstinate problem which British commercial policy had to resolve if the European initiative which had won American backing was to keep it. Where any form of genuine liberalisation was politically impossible, as it was in European agricultural markets, what would replace quotas if they had to be removed? 69
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Although this was a problem first raised in 1929 it was one to which the answer was to be postponed. Before British officials could apply themselves to it in the breathing space given to them by the OEEC decision in February 1951 to set only an overall target (which itself could not of course be met by one of its biggest traders, because OEEC appointees were themselves by the end of the month to all intents and purposes controlling German import licences), they found themselves staring at a much worse problem. Whereas United Kingdom foreign exchange reserves rose by £680 million over the period June 1950–June 1951, and EPU balances proportionately, they fell in the third quarter of 1951 by £215 million and in the fourth quarter by £335 million. The United Kingdom’s EPU balances fell by £90 million in the third quarter and by £190 million in the fourth quarter. The collapse of raw material prices after the rush to build stocks in 1950 was partly responsible. Just as the sterling area had been the source of much of the worlds extra value of raw material imports in 1950, so did it bear the brunt of the price falls in 1951. But what was to become the worst run on the United Kingdom’s reserves since the end of the war was by no means caused only by the swing in raw material prices attributable to the Korean War. It was caused also by something equally alarming, not previously considered among the many anxieties about the payments position, a surge of imports from continental Europe into Britain itself and the sterling area. The United Kingdom was in fact from summer 1950 not merely travelling towards another familiar post-war sterling crisis caused by payments swings in the rest of the sterling area, it was also travelling towards becoming the EPU’s biggest debtor. At the start of the United Kingdom’s membership of the EPU the assumption in Whitehall was that Britain would be a long-run or permanent creditor of the Union. The good performance of British exports to 1950 even led the Programmes Committee, which set out forecasts of future needs and financing, to suggest that it had become an urgent matter to reduce the potential size of this prospective export surplus to the OEEC countries. The Board of Trade accepted that the United Kingdom not only was, but ‘must expect to go on being a substantial creditor in EPU’.28 This was still the assumption in summer 1951, when a further round of British quota removals and enlargements took the British liberalisation percentage to 90. By July, though, a deterioration in the balance with the EPU was becoming observable, and during the second half of 1951 the United Kingdom began a seemingly irresistible slide into EPU debt. The inflow of 70
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imports from OEEC countries came as a great surprise, and in circumstances where the Treasury was hoping to build up an overall balance of trade surplus to support the move to convertibility, a nasty one. The rise in imports from the OEEC countries was seen as a particularly dangerous aspect of the balance of payments crisis, because it was against all long-term predictions, whereas a large deficit with the dollar zone had always been expected. This adverse trade movement with western Europe increased the payments in gold which the United Kingdom had to make, so postponing further the move to convertibility, because it exceeded the generous allowance for settlement of deficits by credit under EPU terms. Scott, whose survey of British imports over the post-war period we consider in Appendix I, summed up elsewhere the United Kingdom balance of payments crisis of 1951–2 as ‘to a large extent a gigantic fluctuation in the sterling area’s current balance of payments with the rest of the world, due very largely to an equally gigantic fluctuation in its terms of trade’.29 While certainly not incorrect as a generalisation such a judgement omits what was specifically different about the 1951– 2 crisis in terms of actual trade flows, rather than movements in prices and balances, when compared to the earlier post-war balance of payments crises of 1947 and 1949. It does not, furthermore, distinguish between the separate roles of the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area in the real changes in trade flows which underlay the crisis. While the terms of trade did indeed deteriorate dramatically both for the United Kingdom and the sterling area as a whole and by 1952 were returning equally rapidly to what would be a favourable trend for the rest of the decade, the shift in the pattern of the United Kingdom’s real trade with continental Europe, as opposed to the deterioration in the balance of trade attributable to the temporary fluctuation in the terms of trade, pointed towards a fundamental weakness in the assumptions on which British post-war commercial policy was based. That this passed unperceived at the time, except by Board of Trade officials, is shown by Scott’s additional conclusion that the crisis ‘largely cured itself’ and had reserves been larger the level of the decontrol of the United Kingdom’s trade could perhaps have been left as it was in summer 1950 until the storm was over.30 We need first to distinguish between the separate contributions of the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area to the deterioration in the sterling reserves. The United Kingdom’s own current account balance moved into deficit before that of the rest of the sterling area in 1951, and this was due to the trade account, for 71
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invisible earnings were still increasing until the middle of the year. The deterioration in the trade account was due to a weakening export performance, to a steep annual increase in retained imports compared to the calendar year 1950, and to the shift in the terms of trade. The fall in the reserves coincided with the movement of the rest of the sterling area into deficit and a fall in the United Kingdom’s own invisible earnings. After having benefited in 1950 from United States raw material stockpiling programmes and the soaring inflation in the prices of its raw material exports, the rest of the sterling area now had to adjust to falling raw material prices as well as falling real exports. The discipline which had governed its importing from the dollar zone weakened, as Commonwealth countries saw less reason not to spend their high dollar earnings of 1950 to help them through the crisis.31 They withdrew reserves from London. When this coincided with a fall in the United Kingdom’s own invisible earnings, the loss of sterling area reserves was at its fastest in October 1951 during a general election campaign which only increased uncertainty over the exchange rate. The overlying pattern of events after June 1951 was thus not unlike that of the earlier postwar balance of payments crises. So was the public aspect of the crisis; the run on the all-too-slender sterling reserves and the need to stop it. As far as the overall swing in the balance of payments of the sterling area as a whole was concerned, however, the United Kingdom and the rest of the sterling area were responsible for it statistically in roughly equal proportions.32 The trade performance of the United Kingdom in the first six months of 1951 before the run on the reserves and its continuing trend in the second half of the year received less attention until action was taken in November to stop imports. Analysis concentrated on the problems of Britain’s relationships with the world through the sterling area, appropriately enough given the global ambitions for sterling. The trading difficulties were mainly attributed to the fluctuation in the terms of trade and the unexpected surge in imports from western Europe was overlooked. Using United Nations trade returns Ady calculated an index of the net barter terms of trade33 which gives a figure of only 88 for 1951 on the base of 1950=100.34 The London and Cambridge Economic Service index gives a roughly comparable result. The adverse movement was in fact much worse between the third quarter of 1949 and the end of the second quarter of 1951, before the reserves crisis began to make itself felt. By that date a quarterly index of the terms of trade shows a fall of 25 points against the base of January72
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September 1949.35 Dow suggests that import prices in general rose by 59 per cent between December 1949 and June 1951, half the rise having taken place by the end of December 1950. However, raw material prices show an increase of 115 per cent by June 1951, foodstuff import prices of only 25 per cent. Some of the price rises, as we show below in the case of pulp and paper, were themselves the result of liberalised purchasing by the United Kingdom.36 Import price indices for manufactured goods are notoriously unreliable, but if we assume that the movement in the price of manufactured imports was roughly equivalent to that of the overall import price index we can calculate approximately what the increase in ‘real’ imports from OEEC/EPU members was. The United Kingdom’s imports from OEEC member-states were being freed from quotas over the very twelve-month period when the increase in import prices and the adverse movement in the terms of trade were at their worst. It may be observed at this point that in any trade where quotas had been kept in place the effect of a rise in import prices would in many cases have been a corresponding fall in the volume of imports of that particular good. An increase in volume must therefore have been caused by the removal of the quota, since had it stayed in place demand could not have come into play. How far was the deteriorating trade balance with OEEC a consequence of the swing in the terms of trade and how far of an increase in ‘real’ imports? As Table 2 shows the actual value of imports from OEEC Europe into the United Kingdom increased by 67.5 per cent between the last months of 1950 and 1951, the period over which, except for the last month, they were being liberalised. If we deflate the increase in Table 2 Value of United Kingdom imports from EPU member-states (£000)
Source: United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Accounts Relating to the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom.
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Table 3 The increase in ‘real’ United Kingdom imports from EPU members in each six-month period, 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1951 (£000)
six-monthly values by the corresponding increase in the index of overall import prices we arrive at the result shown in Table 3. In fact the index of import prices probably measures dollar import prices more sensitively than it measures those from the OEEC, whence many exports to the United Kingdom were still made under surviving bilateral agreements, so the real increase in imports from western Europe was probably greater than shown. It can be seen that United Kingdom ‘real’ imports from OEEC Europe were much higher in 1951 than in 1950 and were still higher in the last six months after the rise in import prices had stopped and when the terms of trade were again becoming more favourable. By contrast the increase in actual imports from the USA and Canada, still unliberalised, in the last six months of 1950 was only £7,267,900, in both cases less than the ‘real’ increase in import values from EPU members. Only when the rise in import prices had stopped, in the second six months of 1951, was the increase in dollar imports greater than that in EPU imports. The increase in the dollar trade gap had been forecast as conditions began to deteriorate; a trade gap with the OEEC which widened just as rapidly, more rapidly before July, had not. Indeed, it had been hoped that the trade balance with the OEEC might cushion the blow of the deteriorating dollar balance. While it is correct to see the real value of the increase in imports from either the OEEC or North America as small in comparison to the price movements which were the major cause of the 1951–2 balance of payments crisis, as far as British commercial policy was concerned the increase in imports from the OEEC was, in retrospect, the most significant aspect of that crisis. Firstly, the wholly unexpected fact that the 12.5 per cent increase in the volume of United Kingdom retained imports (Table 4) had 74
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Table 4 Volume indices of United Kingdom retained imports and exports (1950=100)
Source: United Kingdom, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics.
come as much from western Europe as North America led the new British government, once the general election was won, to reverse the Trade Liberalisation Programme and temporarily abandon the one European initiative to which it could point in Washington as evidence of the value of the special relationship. Secondly, the increase was not an isolated phenomenon, it was the announcement of a trend. In the 1950s the United Kingdom would not have a surplus on liberalised trade with western Europe but a deficit. One of the principles on which post-war commercial policy was to be built was thus put in a new light, or should have been had government understood that this was the start of a trend. The world had not stayed in its relative strengths of the 1930s. Higher levels of investment, a more rapid rate of growth of manufacturing productivity, and above all the sheer diversity of the continent’s rapid industrialisation after 1945 were beginning to alter the pattern of trade flows away from the assumptions which underlay British policy. The EPU, which officials had entered with such little enthusiasm (and in the case of the Bank of England strong reluctance) proved a major source of finance in the crisis, providing £443 million by 30 June 1952.37 Having entered the EPU sullenly in order to preserve its bold European initiative of the Trade Liberalisation Programme, the United Kingdom now depended on it and had to put the Trade Liberalisation Programme into abeyance to defend its EPU position. As soon as the new government came into office in November it reimposed import quotas on an extensive range of goods from the OEEC, and imposed new ones on some which had not previously been under a quota regime, while also announcing that there would be further quota restrictions to follow. Its actions showed the true worth of the propaganda made in Washington in 1949–50. 75
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No country was harder hit by this than France. From April 1951 it had been in continuous monthly deficit in the EPU, drawing down the surpluses acquired in 1950. The war in Indo-China weakened the franc throughout the second half of 1951. Rearmament demanded a heavy increase in imports. The indecision of weak and changing governments made the situation worse. The closure of the British market to a range of exports, especially textiles, left France with no particular motive to battle on with a programme which had not been universally popular even when things had been going well in 1950. The British decision in November 1951 to return to quotas on intra-western European trade was followed by a French decision on 4 February 1952 to cancel all liberalisations except those on raw materials and agricultural products. On 19 February quotas were reimposed on those goods as well. The promises by both countries to liberalise remained, as did the political machinery of the programme. The reimposition of quotas was permitted under safeguard clauses which allowed emergency action to protect the balance of payments. Even so, by mid-February 1952 the Trade Liberalisation Programme looked a complete failure. Although both British and French governments insisted on every occasion that their return to an extensive quota regime on their European trade was temporary, the fact that the two largest economies and politically most influential countries in the OEEC had reneged on the programme was overwhelming. The situation was only too reminiscent of the inter-war years. Quotas had been removed under the influence of a good year, 1950, and returned with a vengeance as soon as conditions had deteriorated. The OEEC and its cooperative machinery remained in place, but it was primarily a Marshall Plan organisation and the Marshall Plan was drawing to an end. American pressures on western Europe to ‘integrate’ did not weaken, but the means to persuade it to do so were much less. In the eyes of most British officials the OEEC’s existence had been at the start limited to the term of the Marshall Plan. It had then acquired two important new functions with the 1950 agreement on the EPU; supervising the trade rules of the EPU and supervising the Trade Liberalisation Programme. The initial agreement on the EPU had, however, been for only two years. There was nothing in those agreements which could stop British governments, if they so chose, from leaving the European soft-currency bloc and opting for the ‘one-world system’. The new and reimposed quotas of 1951 were mainly against western European exports—British manufacturing 76
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had not removed its quota protection against US exports—so that apart from the very short-term commitment to the OEEC/EPU British commercial policy was in a position to begin anew. As we shall see in the following chapter, with the 1951 balance of payments crisis which provoked the reimposition of quantitative trade controls the debate within government over whether to liberalise against the dollar or to stick with the European arrangements became intense. The ‘one-world system’—the re-establishment of sterling-dollar convertibility and the abandonment of the European Payments Union—offered many temptations, diplomatic and economic, particularly to a Conservative government less interested in using the generous settlement terms of the EPU to shelter domestic policy choices. Rejecting the EPU and the liberalisation of intra-OEEC trade could be presented as the better way forward to international competitiveness. And it was not now so easy to see what kind of a lead the United Kingdom could take in a Europe against which it had discovered unexpectedly that it had to defend itself commercially.
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4 TAKING THE LEAD IN EUROPE: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF IMPORT CONTROLS, 1952–6
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REVIVAL OF THE TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME From the reimposition of quantitative controls over much of the United Kingdom’s trade with Europe in November 1951 and March 1952 and France’s reimposition in February 1952 of the controls it had removed, the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Programme was moribund until it began to be revived in 1953, when the United Kingdom, very cautiously at first, began once more to free from controls its foreign trade with Europe. Two tendencies explain its revival. One was political: the clearer commitment of the Conservative government elected in 1951 to a vision of future diplomatic and financial greatness. Instead of sterling-dollar convertibility being an undefined event belonging to an indefinite future, it now became an event for which influential officials tried to set a date and for which they had drawn up a specific programme of action. From October 1951 to September 1955 there was unremitting, albeit ultimately unsuccessful pressure on the new Chancellor, R.A.Butler, to adhere to this timetable. The programme was drawn up in the depths of the balance of payments crisis of 1951–2. Its purpose was to preserve the global role of sterling as an international currency by making it convertible as soon as possible. This would be achieved by building up the United Kingdom’s main customers by recycling an imagined permanent current trade surplus into Commonwealth development and by following the active programme of establishing sterling-dollar convertibility irrespective of whether all the EPU currencies could simultaneously follow 78
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sterling in that move. That, it was supposed, would suppress all notions that regional or sectoral tariff-free zones in western Europe were feasible; countries would have to concentrate on dollar convertibility as the first priority. Those that could follow sterling’s lead into convertibility and hard-currency status would do so and the others should be left behind, so argued many officials. Reliberalising British trade with Europe became a step on the road to the one-world system, to the elimination of the EPU, to the banishing of all threats of European customs unions, common markets or political unions, if necessary by dividing the western Europeans into those that could join the one world hard-currency system by establishing convertibility and those that could not. The existence of the OEEC and the political framework of cooperation it provided is often cited as a prime cause for the removal of quotas on western European trade. But while the existence of the OEEC as a forum was a most useful improvement over the lack of cooperative machinery between European states in the 1930s, it was not in the capacity of the OEEC itself, as the events of 1951–2 showed, to generate so great a change; the OEEC was no greater than the sum of its national parts. The renewal of the Trade Liberalisation Programme depended not so much on cooperation as on a political struggle within the OEEC between Britain and France provoked by the British government’s drive to convertibility and the one world system. Europe’s only two world traders at that date became locked in bitter rivalry over the commercial and political future of western Europe. In this rivalry both were forced by their political ambitions to decontrol as far as possible their trade with other OEEC members. Outside western Europe as we have already pointed out in the case of Japanese-American trade, the elimination of quotas was not a particularly dominant feature of the 1950s. Inside Europe it became so because of Franco-British rivalry over western Europe’s stance in the international economy. For France, some form of political and economic construction in western Europe which would increase French security and support the French economy was a persistent theme of foreign policy between 1951 and 1957. For the United Kingdom, western Europe was subordinate and instrumental to visions of future security and grandeur. As the United Kingdom pursued quota removal on intra-western European trade in order to bring western Europe into the one-world system, so was France forced to follow suit in order to build a western European regional framework. 79
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The second tendency was economic: the extraordinarily vigorous growth of European incomes from early 1953 onwards and the even more rapid growth of intra-European foreign trade. There seemed no argument against removing quotas if to do so encouraged growth and won elections and if at the same time it led, or pushed, France and Europe away from regional schemes. Before the balance of payments crisis Britain had found itself a leading member of two discriminatory trading blocs, enjoying the advantage not only of preferential tariffs within the Commonwealth but of discriminatory quota liberalisation within Europe. It was still the world’s second largest importer and about 40 per cent of the worlds trade was transacted in its currency. To solidify that position, once the reimposed import controls had done their job, seemed a plausible strategy, even if in retrospect it is possible to see that it ignored the deeper long-term significance of the 1951/2 balance of payments crisis. Had the British economy followed the biennial pattern of swings in external payments that had prevailed since 1945, 1953 would have been another year of balance of payments crisis. But when late in that year almost every western European economy had been swept into a spectacular foreign trade boom, of which the trade between themselves was the biggest component, the British economy was still sheltered by the quotas reimposed in 1951–2. Ad valorem tariffs did not impede this development, for imports could increase with incomes. The same growth of demand which left tariffs unaffected, however, generated pressures for the removal of quotas. These pressures could be mobilised by Britain behind an energetic renewal of the Trade Liberalisation Programme whose objectives were primarily political. When quotas were dismantled, however, their absence was as much a cause of the additional imports, in a permissive sense, as the growth of demand. As we shall see, the British economy did not cope so well with this growth of imports as most others in OEEC Europe. This might have been predicted from the events of 1951. The background to the growth of trade in manufactures within western Europe was the extraordinary industrial expansion which created large new manufacturing industries in countries such as Denmark, The Netherlands and Spain where the development of manufacturing industry had hitherto lagged and which turned Italy into a major industrial producer. It was the high rates of national income growth which this long industrialisation boom sustained which changed the political attitude to foreign trade. From being 80
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sometimes considered in the 1930s as one source of unemployment, trade came by the mid-1950s to be seen as a strong cause of high employment. From being a source of political instability, it came to be seen as an aid to stability and growth. The timing of this shift of opinion probably was more significant for continental Europe than for Britain. The British attitude, which was based on a large measure of self-delusion, was that British trade controls since 1931 had been essentially an unavoidable and regrettable response to continental trade and exchange controls. This principle was enunciated unambiguously in July 1951 by the Working Party on the Relaxation of Import Licensing Restrictions. ‘As a nation we must export to live, it is our aim to get rid of import licensing restrictions all over the world as soon as practicable.’1 Within nine months British trade controls were more extensive than they had been since the end of the war and their extension could certainly not be blamed on actions by others. Nevertheless, the belief that unrestricted trade must benefit the United Kingdom and was the way forward was predominant among officials, and the impact of Cripps and other Labour Party planners on that had been slight. Officials, however, would have added that this way forward depended on a suitable response by others. For most continental countries the great boom in industrial output and the high rates of income growth came earlier and more convincingly than in Britain; it was in 1953 that fears of a post-war slump and a return to inter-war conditions began to be replaced by a widespread optimism that favourable economic conditions would endure. What was at first essentially a political initiative on the United Kingdom’s part to reinvigorate the Trade Liberalisation Programme thus fell on fertile economic soil on the continent when within Britain itself, for all the liberal language of officials, there was still much caution after the trade shock of 1951/2 about the extent to which decontrol could actually be risked. For British governments the timing of the resumption of trade liberalisation was determined by a pleasant surprise in the trade and payments balances in late 1952, just as its cancellation had been determined by the unpleasant surprise of the same kind in late 1951. The unpleasant surprise of 1951 was that the payments crisis had among its causes a trade deficit with western Europe, when it had been assumed that Britain would have a surplus on commodity trade with EPU member-states collectively. In fact net monthly credits with the EPU became negative in May 1951 and the cumulative balance 81
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Figure 1 Cumulative net surpluses or deficits of EPU member countries, July 1950 to November 1953 (millions of units of account (equivalent to one US dollar)). Source: OEEC Statistical Bulletins: General Statistics (Paris, November 1953). Notea: Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.
with the EPU turned negative in August. Figure 1 shows the dramatic extent of this swing. Over the year 1951 the United Kingdom passed from being the EPU’s greatest accumulative creditor to being its greatest accumulative debtor. The sterling area deficit with OEEC member-states was still the hard core of Britain’s international payments problem in late 1952, although the accumulative debt with the EPU stopped increasing in April, one month after the imposition of a further major batch of import quotas had been reimposed to supplement those of November 1951. The pleasant surprise came in autumn 1952 when on an f.o.b. payments basis the Treasury discovered an overall current account surplus for the first half of the year. When this discovery was made, 82
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import control committees were still examining the few remaining manufactures on Open General Licence to see if the imposition of further quotas could scrape another £5 million off the import bill. However, it was the import side of the account that was most responsible for the good news, through a combination of falling import prices, recession, and the effect of import controls. The Treasury did not at first regard this as a secure foundation for resuming the Trade Liberalisation Programme. A comparison of the trend of imports from western Europe with the first half of 1951 gave fewer grounds for optimism than with the second half. It was not therefore perceived at the time that spring 1952 did in fact mark a turning-point, after which there would be relative balance of payments comfort for almost four years. Although by November 1952 the United Kingdom had moved into a current monthly surplus with the EPU it had accumulatively drawn over £225 million from it and was thus obliged to pay part of its debt in gold. The caution with which the United Kingdom treated the unexpectedly good news about its payments position has to be seen against the background of its positive programme of action to achieve sterling-dollar convertibility as soon as possible.2 This was thought to depend on building up the currency reserves from the low point to which they had sunk in winter 1951–2. For this, it was estimated, a permanent current surplus of the order of £300/350 million annually was needed.3 This was much larger than required simply to build reserves and repay debt. The balancing counterpart of this surplus was supposed to be an outflow of investment capital to the Commonwealth and for the development of the colonies. Because the strong likelihood was that any proclamation of sterling-dollar convertibility would mean the dissolution of the EPU, because by no means all its members would be able to establish convertibility at the same moment, policy also had to aim at reducing the cumulative debt to that organisation against the moment when it had to be repaid or, better, at returning to a cumulative surplus with it.4 Although Britain from early 1953 onwards was winning back gold from the EPU it neither wished nor expected the EPU to have a long life and so had to be prepared to meet the claims in gold or hard currency against its debts at the moment of the EPU’s dissolution. Since a big part of the improvement in the balance of payments was due to the use of import quotas against western European goods, there was an all too evident conflict at the heart of commercial policy, albeit not one easy openly to acknowledge. 83
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The project of making sterling convertible never crystallised into a single precise public plan of action and its definition varied. The full convertibility of the radiant multilateral future was always, of course, intended to mean the end of all exchange controls both on current and capital account for residents of all currency areas, and so implied the end of all import quotas. But on the way to that final objective false starts and deviations were numerous. The first such project, codenamed Operation Robot, which reached and was rejected at cabinet level in early 1952 was a top secret affair. It envisaged a sudden unilateral declaration of sterling-dollar convertibility at a floating exchange rate.5 Robot was eventually abandoned in summer 1952 after once more reaching the cabinet. The Chancellor, R.A.Butler, was thought, however, to be loath to give up the idea that unilateral action was possible, because of his dislike of any scheme allowing the USA to interfere in the affairs of the United Kingdom.6 There followed a publicly advertised policy which was too vague in its timetable and imprecise in its diplomacy to be properly called a plan. The first public hints of this policy were at the time of the Commonwealth Conference in September 1952, more than three months after the definitive abandonment of Robot. At first it was discussed under the heading ‘The Commonwealth Plan’. Only when the ensuing European hostility to it had to be taken into account did it officially become the Collective Approach. It accepted that a unilateral move to sterling-dollar convertibility, ignoring the Americans, was not possible; American support was needed in the event of a run on the sterling balances held outside the country, which the reserves would be too small to combat. The grand policy objective now became an international agreement to replace the fixed rates of Bretton Woods by flexible exchange rates, having a much wider margin on each side of the registered IMF par rate, and to establish dollar convertibility for a small group of European currencies contemporaneously with sterling. The Collective Approach was not, however, an approach to the progressive hardening of all the major EPU currencies to the point of their general convertibility into the US dollar. It was a plan to end the EPU by inducing some of its currencies to follow sterling into convertibility irrespective of whether the rest could do so. At the same time as American support for this objective was sought, unavailingly, a parallel policy of making sterling in effect, if not in law, convertible was also pursued by gradually relaxing exchange 84
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controls. Neither policy took account of western Europe’s own ambitions, leaving European countries to follow the United Kingdom into its own version of the non-discriminatory, multilateral world as they might, separately. Such steps as were rumoured or discussed in 1953 and 1954 were very limited. Convertibility, at that time, meant only that residents of forty-three countries outside the sterling or dollar areas would henceforth be able to use any current earnings of sterling to buy dollars from the central pool of sterling area dollars in London. Exchange controls would still prevent residents of the sterling area, or migrants from it, from converting their sterling capital or savings into dollars. There was already no formal difficulty for residents in getting dollars to finance current imports, if, that is, they could get an import licence. Convertibility in this limited sense therefore was not only compatible with the continuance of import controls, it even depended on it. One of the putative gains from convertibility, apart from prestige, was an increase in invisible earnings from merchanting and financing. As the hoped for trade surplus failed to arrive, at least on the scale envisaged, the wish to build up reserves by invisible earnings became all the stronger. But to encourage foreigners to hold sterling by giving them the freedom to get rid of it could obviously backfire. Two major hopes of commercial policy were to win dollar support for sterling area reserves and to bring about a lowering of American tariffs. That meant converting Washington to the United Kingdom’s vision of its own future world role as consolidator of the west and weaning the Americans away from what seemed in London their dangerous obsession with continental western European integration. There was little chance of this, because western European integration was a basic pillar of US national security policy. London’s hopes, or dreams, were not, however, shattered until 1960 when the Kennedy administration accepted the Republican line of the 1950s in its entirety, refused to support Britain’s creation, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and not only continued to give strong support to the European Economic Community (EEC) but put every pressure it could on the United Kingdom to join the regional European bloc whose development it had tried to discourage. America’s commercial policy evolved on altogether more businesslike lines. Having conceded that the creation of a western European trade bloc was an essential element in its global security system, the United States was to become increasingly interested that this should 85
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not mean the continuation of discrimination against US exports. The decisive turning point in this would be the shock to the US balance of payments in 1958, after which the sacrifice of a certain volume of exports would no longer be willingly made in the interests of a global design. This was to mean not only the end of European discrimination by import quotas against dollar imports within some at least nominal OEEC common plan of action, but also that when American tariffs were thrown into a world trade bargain, it was with the EEC. As it then turned out, the regional bloc had that strength to bargain them down in a mutual process which Britain, with its much smaller market, lacked. Furthermore, although for most trading purposes sterling had been made effectively convertible by 1956, the declaration of its full legal convertibility had to wait for coordinated action with other major western central banks at the end of 1958, and after September 1955 it can safely be said that the declaration would not have been made without some measure of consultation with other European central banks. The positive commercial policy initiated in late 1951 failed therefore to achieve most of its objectives, and indeed they were not realistically attainable without a radical shift of American attitudes. British archives are heavy with melancholy lucubrations by government officials who would have preferred the United States to pursue British interests rather than its own. But they were also unrealistic for a second reason. Should western Europe continue to industrialise and to grow more rapidly than the economy of the United Kingdom, as in fact it did, then the balance of payments episode of 1951 was likely to be repeated. The removal of the import controls on which the pursuit of even the more restricted form of convertibility envisaged in 1953 and 1954 depended would be ever more threatening. Limited convertibility at prevailing exchange rates could bring no obvious advantage to the sterling area’s visible trade, although it might improve the financial balance by removing the motive to acquire dollars by illicitly shunting to the dollar area goods bought from Commonwealth countries with cheaper sterling on ‘transferable account’, for which the exchange rate was lower than the rate for sterling recouped on ‘dollar account’. With convertibility sterling would simply be converted into dollars at the standard rate and no hard currency earnings lost to the sterling area. For the rest, Americans who wanted to import British goods had no difficulty acquiring sterling on ‘dollar account’. Sterling-dollar convertibility would 86
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immediately weaken the financial motive of Europeans and other foreigners to discriminate against the American exports which competed with those of the United Kingdom. Conceivably Japan, which had to preserve a careful bilateral balance with the sterling area, would have been more willing to spend some of the aid it received in dollars, but such expenditure would be small beer. Moreover, as the first leading European trader to make its currency convertible, Britain would first feel the impact of any dollar shortage, because countries which could take advantage of the conversion facility would target exports on the sterling area and reduce their own purchases of sterling goods by reintroducing quantitative import controls. The choice was acute. If Britain were to go it alone, it had to be prepared to take that strain. If it dawdled until other European currencies were also ready to go convertible, sterling might end as just another European currency. Taking the strain meant relying on import controls against western European exports for as long as was possible, that is until retaliation was threatened or until to do so made nonsense of the policy of taking the lead in Europe and preventing the emergence of a regional continental bloc. This was a difficult hand to play. Roughly, until the end of 1953 policy was still to postpone removing quotas for as long as retaliation was not imminent. Thereafter, policy was to take the lead in Europe by encouraging and consolidating liberalisation throughout the OEEC. The primary motivation for this leadership changed over the years 1954–6. At first it was the hope of sterling-led convertibility. As that faded in 1955 it became the fear of a regional tariff scheme led by the entity first known in Whitehall as ‘Schumania’ and then more sinisterly as ‘The Messina powers’.7 THE DECONTROL OF UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTS IN ITS INTERNATIONAL SETTING, 1952–6 In British eyes the sheer size of the accumulated deficit with the EPU was to remain until 1954 a strong justification for delaying the liberalisation of imports. Although the United Kingdom was winning back gold from the EPU, sterling-dollar convertibility would almost certainly end the EPU’s existence and Britain would then have to pay up on its debt. It would have been irrational for any importer to hold on to a sterling surplus within a system where only a part of the surplus could be translated into hard currency 87
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imports, when by leaving it could turn the whole into dollars. A dissolution of the EPU in 1953 would have probably pushed France and other members even further towards autarky and bilateralism and for that reason there was a lively opposition by many officials in Whitehall, as well as in Washington, to any precipitate unilateral declaration of convertibility, on the grounds that it might actually make the attainment of the multilateral world more distant. Nevertheless, hopes for an imminent declaration waxed strong in the Bank of England and in some Treasury circles between the Common-wealth conference of November 1952 and R.A.Butler’s fruitless visit as Chancellor to Washington in March 1953. But as they did so fears in Europe of an Anglo-Saxon fait accompli waxed equally strong. Furthermore, it seemed in Europe that convertibility was to be achieved at the continuing expense of western Europe’s exports, especially those of France and Italy. It was French and Italian exports, particularly textile exports, which were worst hit by the British import quotas of November 1951 and March 1952. It seemed to the French that Albion expected them to be grateful for the freedom to convert their currently earned sterling into dollars while denying them at the same time the freedom to earn such sterling, which they needed in large quantities to purchase sterling area raw materials. Italy was the biggest current net debtor to the EPU in January 1953 and was virtuously near to the 100 per cent target in the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Index. France was the biggest accumulative debtor and, having exceeded its quota, was paying current net debts in gold. And this deficit with the EPU was largely a matter of its sterling deficit. In a political situation where the government was trying to obtain a certain measure of European support, or at least an absence of European opposition, for its plans to restore convertibility, a political gesture in the form of a more favourable commercial policy towards western Europe became essential in order, as officials thought, to prevent retaliation or a return to bilateral trade. Had the USA shown itself willing during the Washington visit to underwrite the sterling area reserves, Britain would have been more capable of liberalising its European imports while pursuing convertibility, even though about £330 million of potentially convertible sterling balances were held in Europe and therefore not subject to direct or indirect control from London. In the face of prevarication tantamount to refusal liberalisation had to be kept to a minimum, but this still meant 88
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responding to the mixture of complaints and threats from France and Italy. French exports to Britain in 1952 fell by 37 per cent in value compared to their 1951 level, a far steeper fall than to any other European market. The value of Italian exports to the same destination fell by 48 per cent and two-thirds of the fall was due to causes other than the decline in price. Total imports of textile manufactures into the United Kingdom in 1952 only reached 53 per cent of their 1951 value, and from France only 19 per cent. British exports to France, by contrast, were not so heavily reduced by French cancellation of quota liberalisation in February 1952. French import restrictions in February 1952 were intended to establish an import programme for the period April-June which embodied a 50 per cent general reduction in imports, but in negotiations with Britain this was changed so that on most of the items to which United Kingdom exports were most sensitive, the reductions turned out to be of the order of only 25 per cent.8 This of course only increased the French insistence in the OEEC that the United Kingdom reliberalise imports of textile manufactures, at least, as its EPU position was improving.9 In November 1952, as a small gesture, quotas on imports of textiles and cheese for the first six months of 1953 were widened by 20 per cent. The Programme’s Committee, which drew up United Kingdom import programmes a year in advance, was left to work out the cost of a larger gesture of the kind Paris was demanding. It estimated in March 1953 that to meet the pressing French and Italian requests would add £26 million to the import bill in terms of increased imports from those two sources and about £30 million in all.10 On the other hand, the situation could not be held static. France and Italy threatened to cut their own imports from Britain at the end of March and to switch their raw material purchases away from the rest of the sterling area, so making the United Kingdom’s balance of payments prospects gloomier than the perspective opened by removing again the textile quotas. Had they done that, it would have seemed in Washington like the death-blow to European integration, and the blame would have fallen on London. Even without the need for European support, maintaining the November 1951 quotas unchanged would have severely harmed Britain’s own grand commercial strategy. It seemed to both Treasury and Board of Trade reasonably certain that unless we can in the very near future make substantial progress in relaxing our restrictions, we must 89
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expect one European country after another to reverse their own liberal trade policies and so precipitate a downward spiral of trade to the serious detriment of our exports. There would be a general revival of bilateralism and it would become extremely difficult to achieve the multilateral objectives of the Collective Approach [general currency convertibility into $US].11 It was the Collective Approach, the return to convertibility in a oneworld trading system implying the end of regional payments schemes and the prevention of new regional tariff blocs, which was the paramount interest.12 This ambition meant that not only would the United Kingdom set the pace at which Europe ended quota discrimination against dollar goods, but that, as a consequence, it would have to lead the way towards quota removal on Europe’s internal trade. Convertibility would reduce the financial incentive for Europeans to maintain restrictions against dollar goods, but at the same time it would increase their incentive to restore quotas against UK exports. Because continental countries might reimpose quotas in the future to save convertible currency, it became important in the absence of American backing to embrace Europe in the collectivity of the Collective Approach. This meant pressing for the revival and consolidation of trade liberalisation across the whole of OEEC intra-trade. Of course, each advance in the OEEC Trade Liberalisation Index percentage was in the short run an intensification of discrimination against dollar imports. But as a precursor of convertibility it could be presented as an alternative concept of European integration to the State Department’s predeliction for political union by way of a customs union. The decision was therefore taken to reliberalise imports of textile manufactures from March 1953. However, confining these reliberalisations almost entirely to concessions beneficial to France, Italy and Belgium meant that the United Kingdom’s liberalisation percentage for all categories of goods moved only from 46 to 58 per cent, although for the sub-category of manufactures it moved to 65 per cent. There was as much an inherent contradiction in the policy of France in its dealings with the OEEC as of Britain. France had had the second largest accumulative surplus with the OEEC in summer 1951 and had passed into accumulative deficit in the same month as the United Kingdom. Although its deficit increased less rapidly than that of Britain, there was for France no reversal of this trend in 1952, indeed its accumulative deficit was still growing at the close of 1953. 90
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Those French officials and politicians who favoured a long-term strategy of securing national security by developing still closer commercial links between the six ECSC countries were necessarily ambivalent about the OEEC’s long-run importance to the French economy. For them it was the requirements that any further deal with those countries might place on French commercial policy which mattered. The common market of the Six, which was eventually proposed by the Dutch in 1953 as the concrete form of that economic integration which they insisted should be written into the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty, was an indication of what France might be required to do if it persevered towards those closer links, even though the EDC Treaty itself by that time probably had no chance of passing the French national assembly. Those requirements were stiff: an automatic progressive removal of tariffs between the members on a fixed timetable and simultaneous commitment to get rid of quotas on their mutual trade, also in fixed unavoidable stages. Of course, the Six would be removing quotas only between themselves; there was no overt commitment to remove them in the same stages and at the same speed from trade with their other OEEC partners. But could France, given its bad situation in the EPU, even contemplate that? If it could not, then the threat from the British thrust to convertibility was serious indeed. If the Deutschmark were to shadow sterling into convertibility against the dollar, as by 1953 it looked well capable of doing, this might mean the end not only of the EPU but also of the European integrationist framework that France had built up for the control of the Federal Republic. With increasing accumulative debts, losing gold, with an overvalued currency, dependent on American aid, with powerful vociferous protectionist lobbies in industry and agriculture who did not wish to give up the quotas which had protected them since the early 1930s, France seemed reduced to policy paralysis. Any relaxation of quotas would make the payments situation worse. For Britain, it seemed the moment, no matter how uncertain the balance of payments prospect, to lead Europe where it wished it to go. It was easy for Britain to expose France within the OEEC as the worst laggard of them all in trade liberalisation, once Whitehall had plucked up enough courage to begin seriously to reliberalise some of Britain’s own trade. Yet France needed the OEEC and the EPU the more as French advocates of a smaller and more closely knit trade group among the Six could not themselves realistically show in 1953 91
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how the French economy could stand the risk. In May and June fierce criticisms were made of France in the OEEC by Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.13 Yet the two countries who vied with each other to take the lead in Europe were each incapable of doing so. Progress in Whitehall towards trade liberalisation, in spite of the politically favourable opportunity, was to prove painfully slow. Weighted in terms of their 1951 import values, nearly half the goods which Britain had deliberalised in November 1951 and March 1952 were still under quota at the beginning of 1955. It was small comfort that France’s record was even worse, for if Britain wished to achieve its own global objectives it had to offer western Europe something more convincing than the American prospect of an economic, followed if possible by a political, union. When the British delegation returned empty-handed from Washington in March 1953 the government tried to cover both its disappointment and the on-going semi-secret nature of its plans to establish virtual, if unofficial, convertibility through technical changes in exchange control by adopting a pro-European stance in the OEEC. It promised in March to study ways of progressing towards convertibility in harmony with its European partners, to agree to renew the EPU for a further year, and increased Britain’s percentage score on the Trade Liberalisation Index to 58 per cent from its existing 46 per cent mainly by removing some of those quotas which particularly affected French and Italian textile exports. The rest of the OEEC had no reason to be contented with trade liberalisations largely intended to benefit the other great defaulter France. Indeed, because of the rebuff in Washington of its plea for financial support for convertibility Britain actually made last minute reductions in the scope of the March 1953 reliberalisations.14 Some of the smaller OEEC member-states, thwarted in GATT in their efforts to reduce the tariffs of the higher-tariff member-states, were ready to support the Secretary-General’s wish to reinvigorate the OEEC by relaunching the Trade Liberalisation Programme in a more ambitious way than these British moves, perhaps even by fixing a 100 per cent target. But while supporting the idea in principle the member-states unanimously refused to fix a timetable for any new commitment before France and Britain had gone a long way further along the road to reliberalisation. The official target was still 75 per cent, but the decision to move back to that percentage would not be taken in London until October 1953. 92
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That the two major OEEC countries maintained their import quotas inevitably drove the smaller states towards plans for the reduction of tariffs on intra-western European trade. One of their favourite proposals was to reduce tariffs on a common list of goods on which import duties were held to frustrate further quota liberalisation by low tariff countries. But the extension of such a common list would have undermined Imperial Preference and was even feared in London as a possible first step to a common market. As long as such schemes were proposed on a preferential basis the United Kingdom could oppose them in the name of GATT as violating the most favoured nation principle. In search of a way to show leadership in a different direction the Board of Trade tried to interest the interministerial Mutual Aid Committee in the notion of a different kind of common list, of goods on which OEEC member-states would abolish all quantitative restrictions. Since such a list would have severely restricted the ability of any member-state to deliberalise these commodities, its advantage would have been that it would have consolidated much existing liberalisation. The United Kingdom had already itself reliberalised textiles, which were the backbone of such lists. However, it would not yet, in summer 1953, contemplate reliberalising other items proposed for such a common list, like pulp and paper. Moreover, properly to serve its purpose a common list of the kind proposed by the Board of Trade would require such tightly drawn escape clauses as to inhibit the United Kingdom’s own actions.15 In the face of a US recession, Treasury officials were by no means sure they wanted as yet to consolidate Britain’s recent reliberalisations. But the overriding objection to the proposal inside Whitehall was that it looked too much like what it was, a diversion from trying to reach once more the 75 per cent target. It was known that at the October 1953 OEEC ministerial meeting Secretary General Marjolin would officially propose a programme to move to the 100 per cent mark. The project was not as Utopian as it seemed; it had rather a shrewd political idea in it. It seems to have been generally accepted that by the methods used before 1951 no overall common target higher than 75 per cent could have been reached. The idea of proposing an ultimate target of 100 per cent was linked to a new institutional method. Instead of claiming credit for what they had done, countries would be asked to justify what they had not done. The Ministerial Council was to be asked to instruct 93
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the Steering Board for Trade to examine, country by country, all remaining quotas and to advise the Ministerial Council by March 1954 if, and by what timetable, the 100 per cent target could be reached. This would oblige member-states to defend the full range of their import quota policies, and where they could make no good argument for them on balance of payments grounds to say on what precise grounds they were maintained in place. This looked attractive to those smaller countries hoping that it might expose the deeper roots of French and British protectionism. It would not, the Mutual Aid Committee decided, be good tactics to come forward with a common list proposal before the OEEC’s attitude to the SecretaryGeneral’s proposals had become clear, otherwise Britain might be accused of blocking progress towards liberalisation by a diversionary tactic. It was understood in London that Marjolin, the SecretaryGeneral, was no particular friend of the idea of a customs union between the Six. The proposed commitment to 100 per cent was met without enthusiasm by most OEEC member-states, but it was difficult to reject the idea that the Steering Board for Trade might ask for an explanation of any quotas which countries intended to hold back from the Trade Liberalisation Programme on other than balance of payments grounds. Member-states were given until March 1954 to prepare a case for such quotas, but there was no compulsion and France declined to cooperate in the exercise. In February 1954 London was still debating whether to organise pressure in the OEEC to force it to do so and decided there was no point; such action would have made no difference to the level of British exports to France and ‘its importance was rather symbolical than practical’.16 British officials were in fact to have stiff problems compiling arguments to defend their own so-called ‘negative list’ of quotas, but the situation was still a relatively safe one in which a British forward move at a pace which Britain itself chose was possible. Since the British version of a common list had been dropped, this had to be a move to a higher percentage on the OEEC index. Balance of payments excuses for not making such a move were wearing thinner with every months increase in the reserves and reduction of the accumulative debt in the EPU. The French, whose situation had not improved, were still there to be embarrassed if Britain could only make a move. And if it could not, there still remained the strong risk of retaliation or reneging by others. ‘If we fail to make a move,’ the Treasury 94
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official R.W.Clarke minuted, ‘there is a real risk of restrictions against our exports; we should certainly have to face strong and continuing pressure and criticism in OEEC, with loss of influence on general trade and financial questions.’17 ‘The advantage,’ as it was put by the Programmes Committee, is of the most general kind, and consists of avoiding odium and the risk of positive disadvantage. There is no compulsion upon us to take the step now; the case for acting now is to forestall pressure and to clear up our record with OEEC in the expectation that in any case we shall be compelled to take this action soon.18 The decision was taken in London to move to a liberalisation percentage of 75 by the end of the year. The announcement on 20 October 1953 was accompanied by an expression of pious hope that France would do the same. The advance from the existing 58 per cent to 75 per cent was achieved not by simply removing import controls, but by liberalising the domestic rationing scheme for imported softwood. Quotas on softwood imports had been removed a year previously but the OEEC had refused to count this as liberalisation because, as had been the case with petrol and was still the case with newsprint, the effective check on imports was consumption controls. These were now removed as one of the last stages of the Conservative governments pledge to end rationing. Although the 75 per cent target figure was regained by November 1953, it was flatteringly enhanced by the continuing relatively high share of government trade. However, for a debtor to the EPU the figure was less open to comparative criticism. Of the nine debtors only Denmark had a higher figure, 76, while five recorded a figure under 50 per cent. In so far as the move was designed to put France under pressure it did have some effect. From a percentage figure of 8 per cent at the time Britain made the move France moved to one of 18 per cent by December. This small change, however, was thought to have provoked an immediate deterioration in the balance of trade and it led to a lengthy committee of enquiry into the overall competitiveness of French manufactures. While the OEEC seemed capable of encouraging liberalisation only negatively, by discouraging retaliation, the EPU could be said to encourage it positively, not only because it provided a multi-lateral settlements mechanism but because of its relatively generous 95
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automatic credits to net debtors. These credits went some way to offset the post-war paucity of reserves. European reserves as a proportion of annual imports were on average about 25 per cent, when before the war more than 60 per cent had been typical. Britain’s reserves in 1952 covered only about one-sixth of its sterling obligations, which before the war they had matched. Whereas in early 1953 the United Kingdom had been looking to put an end to the EPU, the fear generated by the American recession temporarily produced a different attitude. In early 1953 a hardening of the settlement terms of the EPU, while it would have hurt the sterling reserves, would also have meant that there would be less gold to repay if the EPU were suddenly wound up. By early 1954, like any debtor, the United Kingdom wanted to postpone its own gold repayment until more favourable economic conditions. As the major creditors, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland, pressed to have more of their net surplus repaid in gold rather than in EPU credits, Britain was temporarily transformed into the defender of the EPU settlements mechanism as it existed. It was not merely the repayment of its own debts that troubled the United Kingdom. Without EPU credits there would perhaps be no further progress in import liberalisation by the other debtors, without that progress perhaps no sterling convertibility, and thus no end to the EPU, until there was a general move to convertibility in which sterling would not necessarily be the leader. Britain was obliged to feed the hand of the creditor it was hoping to bite. For France, the position was not made more comfortable by this short-term adjustment of British attitudes. In Paris the fear was that those in the German government, like the Minister for the Economy Erhard, who wanted to shadow Britain into convertibility as soon as possible and so break up the EPU, would win the argument in Bonn. Erhard and his followers could present convertibility as having a purely commercial meaning.19 It would advance German trade beyond the confines of the EPU area and allow the Federal Republic to cash in its European winnings and spend them in the USA. As the likelihood of France ratifying the European Defence Community Treaty waned, so that by the start of 1954 ratification of the Treaty as it stood was impossible, German supporters of more European integration among the Six might find their cause difficult to defend in Germany and might lose all patience with Paris. The evidence that French manufactures were not competitive with German goods over a wide range of products was piling up in the committee of enquiry. It was 96
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to be used by deputies in the debate in the national assembly in August 1954 to convince the assembly to reject the European Defence Community Treaty.20 The danger of the relapse in liberalisation which Britain feared was of course greatly enhanced by France’s almost complete failure to reliberalise since February 1952. The complaints which had come from Denmark in 1951, before the British and French retreat, that low tariff countries which depended heavily on agricultural exports had been unfairly discriminated against in the Trade Liberalisation Programme, were heard again over the winter of 1953–4. Denmark had low reserves, as well as low tariffs. If monthly payments of EPU debt were to have a larger gold component Denmark would, it threatened, renounce its liberalisations. The leader of the British delegation to the OEEC, Sir Hugh EllisRees, than whom no stauncher, narrower defender could be found of the idea that Britain’s greatness lay in leading the world back to multilateralism, was strongly in favour of a more forward policy whatever the hesitations in London. Once the United Kingdom had regained the 75 per cent target and was no longer a defaulter, he argued that the moment had come to put pressure on the others, especially France, otherwise controlled trade would linger on interminably. If Whitehall was unwilling to go to a higher percentage, the appropriate move in the new circumstances, where the OEEC Steering Board for Trade was hoping to conduct detailed enquiries into all quotas which countries wished to retain for non-balance of payments reasons, was, he suggested, to challenge the high percentage figures recorded for other countries. He suspected continentals of cheating in a variety of ways to which the British would not stoop. The Board of Trade had to waste a certain amount of time looking for evidence of unfair import licensing practices by the continentals or hidden export subsidies relevant to allegedly liberalised commodities, before sadly reporting back that not only was there little evidence of these malpractices by foreigners but that to denounce the few that existed might be unwise because ‘we had skeletons in our own cupboard’. The Board of Trade concluded Although, as Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees says, there is no longer any reason why the United Kingdom should not adopt more offensive tactics in OEEC discussions, it is difficult to supply him with any subject for attack which could be held to be in 97
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any way comparable in importance with, for instance, our own state trading policies, which have been the subject of particular criticism by other Member countries.21 It was bad news for sturdy Sir Hugh that his colleagues back home regarded the examination of the so-called ‘negative lists’— commodities on which governments felt they must retain quotas for longer-term policy reasons—as an exercise which was likely to present more problems for the United Kingdom than for the others. It might have been easier had they been able like France to treat the whole exercise in an offhand manner. In Appendix IV we illustrate the complicated motivations that underlay the quota regimes on most commodities. There were few cases where the direct effect on the balance of payments was the sole consideration and far fewer where it was so throughout the history of the quota. Clearly, however, the list of quotas to be defended on other than balance of payments grounds had to be kept as small as possible for tactical reasons. It was only a subset of those imports restricted for non-balance of payments reasons. Cars could be excluded from the list, for example, because they had been excluded all along. Coal, also not traded in 1948, could similarly be excluded. But cash registers, whose national manufacture was the object of a small industrial policy initiative which depended on a quota, soon the subject of a serious contention in the OEEC, were also omitted. So were apples and pears, whose growers were protected on what could only by the greatest of ingenuity be argued to be balance of payments grounds. The most acceptable justification for keeping a quota included in the ‘negative list’ was that the good was strategic. This was cited as the defence, for example, of maintaining quotas on dyestuffs, scientific instruments, watches and clocks, jewel bearings, diamonds and calcium carbide. Another was that the supply of raw materials to domestic manufacturers was controlled from outside the country. This, for example, justified quotas on jewellery, leather and hemp. A third was the need to dispose of accumulated government stocks. This justified the quota regime on plywood, linseed oil and dairy products. But many quotas eluded these neater headings and could not be left out without complaints from the foreigners Sir Hugh had hoped to arraign before the OEEC. Silver, iron and steel tubes, cashmere goods, baskets and plums were all examples.22 98
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The final list was a long one, and the process of drawing it up mobilised lesser ministries—Agriculture, Supply, the Admiralty—in defence of quotas which represented their own protectionist interests. The list became longer because the Mutual Aid Committee resisted Sir Hugh’s appetite for the offensive. The French were apparently not prepared to make any real progress in liberalisation and the Italians were likely to deliberalise; with our present balance of payments prospects we could not offer any substantial step forward during 1954 and could not therefore attack the French too hard.23 Denmark and The Netherlands used the negative list procedure to reiterate their complaints that countries with low tariffs and which depended heavily on agricultural exports were unfairly penalised because agricultural trade remained so controlled. Both countries included all their surviving quotas on the negative list, making it clear that they were not intending to liberalise any further until the major countries did something bolder, either with quotas or tariffs. The Secretariat-General of the OEEC estimated that 60 per cent of the ‘negative’ sector was placed in that category on the alleged grounds that the commercial policy of other countries was protective.24 Most of the items on the Belgium-Luxemburg ‘negative list’, for example, were similarly ‘justified’, by a statement that they could be liberalised only if there was a reduction in government trading by other countries, the adoption by them of lower tariffs, and the abolition of dual pricing and dumping. Apart from agricultural quotas, the impression conveyed by the list is that all other quotas imposed by Belgium-Luxemburg were now being retained for bargaining purposes until large concessions were made in London and Paris.25 Given the already high liberalisation percentage of The Netherlands and Belgium such a standpoint might seem to have been acceptable to the defaulters. But in fact the British complained that much of the Dutch negative list was made up of infant industries protected against potential British exports: nylon stockings, paints and varnishes, penicillin and engineering equipment. The inclusion of linoleum on the negative list was attributed to a large stockpile of high-priced linseed oil which could be disposed of only on a domestic market from which exports were shut out.26 A list of Danish quotas which British exporters believed to be intentionally protectionist included leather footwear, 99
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leather goods, paints, bicycles, refrigerators, electrical household machinery, fire-extinguishers and razor blades.27 Even Germany, with a high liberalisation percentage, 92 per cent, was thought to be listing quotas either to protect manufactures in trouble or to nurse infant industries. Carpets, hats, lace, briar pipes, hand-knitting yarns, pottery, plastic and synthetic resins, and plasterboard were all cited as examples of one or the other. Disillusionment with other countries’ attitudes to agricultural exports could hardly be given as justification in this case and the list is a good indication of the reality behind so high a percentage figure. In addition there were German import monopolies of fuels and agricultural products, although these products were classified as liberalised. If we move to a small country which deliberately protected a wide range of manufacturing, Norway, we can see that it was possible to reach the 75 per cent mark by the end of 1953 while maintaining a complete embargo on imports of bicycles, toys, umbrellas and rubber hotwater bottles, and allowing in only nominal values of hollowware, metal office furniture, silver- and electric-plate goods, carpets, wallpaper, pottery and cars, to take but a selection of that already selected list of quotas which Norway felt obliged within the rules to discuss at the OEEC. It was fairly evident from these lists that this new approach by the OEEC would lead nowhere, given the resistance to it in France and the poor record which it revealed the United Kingdom as having. In France the foreign minister, Georges Bidault, denounced his country’s commercial policy at the start of 1954 as ‘harmful to our authority in the relevant international bodies and not advancing our credit in everything that concerns European unification’.28 But the best that this demand for action could produce was a move to the 52 per cent mark in April, mostly made up of raw material liberalisations. The percentage for manufactures rose to only 42 per cent and for foodstuffs to 45 per cent. The move was accompanied by a declaration that there would be a further move to 65 per cent on 1 November. But it was also accompanied by a new, allegedly temporary, tax on foreign exchange transactions for import payments for manufactures and foodstuffs. Nominally set at between 10 and 15 per cent, in practice at rates between 0 and 10 per cent, the tax was supposed to eliminate the difference between French production costs and OEEC production costs. Raw material imports were excluded from the tax to keep down manufacturing costs. While this technically qualified as liberalisation and prevented the French percentage from looking 100
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too disgraceful and while it increased imports from the OEEC into France by virtue of shifting from quotas to what in effect was a supplementary ad valorem tariff, the tax was denounced by the OEEC in September as discriminatory. It was surely distorting the whole meaning of trade liberalisation to replace quotas by supplementary import duties. The French government’s action was probably intended more as a token of its faith that European integration was not a moribund policy alternative, in spite of the approaching death throes of the EDC treaty, than as a response to British efforts to assemble a forward policy, because what could be assembled was so trivial. Apart from its own shortcomings, the United Kingdom had to desist from pressing France too hard lest it have negative consequences for the programme as a whole, or even for the OEEC. The overall trend of France’s balance of payments was improving, but the rise in its reserves was small in relation to the value of its trade and it would have been open to the French to argue that this trend was a temporary phenomenon linked to American aid. The best that could be safely done, it was thought in London, was to put pressure on Bidault to make ‘a reasoned statement of their difficulties and to show that they were preparing to make a genuine effort’.29 As we have just observed, Bidault himself wished to go further than this, even if the way that was found was oblique. This obliqueness did not trouble Whitehall greatly. Britain’s concern was not so much to increase its exports to France as to make sure other countries, particularly Denmark and Italy, did not deliberalise because of a French refusal to move. Had they done so, that would have made a bigger difference to British exports. More seriously, it might, in what British officials from their transatlantic perspective still thought of as recessionary conditions, start a downward spiral of trade restrictions. That policy was still so heavily influenced by observations from trading patterns of the 1930s rather than by the objective facts of intra-western European trade after 1945 is a vivid testimony to the lack of understanding in London of western Europe’s economic development since the end of the war. The counter-cyclical effect of the growth of German imports had meant that other continental western European economies had been left unscathed by the fall in American imports, and that was a contributory factor also to the short and limited impact of America’s recession on Britain itself. As usual, it was European trends in which Whitehall was least interested. Even so, the threats from Denmark had been specific and Danes, 101
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Dutch and Belgians, perhaps even Italians, may well have been considering retaliation against France. And if France was to be persuaded to make a gesture to stave this off Britain had to make one too, even though as the Mutual Aid Committee deemed in midMarch, ‘The United Kingdom, in any case, in the light of present forecasts of the balance of payments position, will scarcely be able to offer any important further measures of liberalisation for some time to come.’30 That judgement was made after a small number of cosmetic adjustments, mainly involving fruit, vegetables and eggs, raised Britain’s percentage figure by a further five percentage points to 80. The widening of quotas on horticultural products was the outcome of an indication that GATT might permit extra tariff protection in this case even though it were preferential. Ironically, the United Kingdom had steadfastly maintained in the OEEC that low tariffs were no justification for quotas. There were increases in global quotas for fruit juices, because of complaints about shortages of raw materials from soft drink manufacturers, and for apples and pears, which was only a matter of making the quota for the first six months of the year correspond to that for the second. Iron and steel tubes went on to Open General Licence, but only after an agreement with Sweden, the main foreign supplier, that the tariff on Swedish exports of these products would rise from 15 to 20 per cent. The Treasury was subsequently firm that there should be no further risks, ‘since the effects of the recent relaxations cannot yet be fully assessed’.31 It is not hard to see merely from an examination of Britain’s own position why the examination of ‘negative lists’ would not speed up trade liberalisation. The quotas which were on them were mostly of two kinds, quotas on agricultural goods imposed in the 1930s and quotas which protected infant industries, many of them deemed strategic, imposed in the post-war reconstruction. Where these hardcore quotas were on agricultural products, like the British quotas on apples and pears or flower bulbs, the universal nature of the problem in western Europe was recognised, as was the universal need for some other solution to the problem of agricultural protection if quotas were to go. The Six, when they signed the Treaty of Rome, acknowledged this in agreeing that there would have to be a common agricultural policy if tariffs and quotas on their intra-trade in agricultural products were to be removed. One solution for the nonSix appeared to be to substitute tariffs for quotas, which was what the United Kingdom had done with horticulture in its move to 80 102
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per cent in March. But that involved long negotiations with suppliers, with GATT, and with the interest groups involved. Where hard-core quotas were on manufactured goods, very little recognition of their justification could be expected in the OEEC except perhaps from some country which had been busy doing the same thing for the same commodity group, but whose support alone would not be sufficient. A rough list of such quotas for the United Kingdom in summer 1954 would have included many whose origins were genuinely strategic: dyestuffs, optical and scientific instruments, precision cameras, scientific glassware, laboratory porcelain, tungsten carbide, watches, clocks, calcium carbide, bandsaw strip, woven wirecloth and diamond dies. It was considered essential for defence purposes before 1954 that each of these products be manufactured in the United Kingdom. The quotas that protected and encouraged their manufacture were in most cases of wartime or immediate postwar origin. These were items on which it was said to be dangerous to rely for imports in wartime, although some, like the quotas on clocks and watches, were also based on wider industrial policy considerations. There were other examples where no strategic issue was involved, protecting the national manufacture of agricultural and office machinery, for example, and these were harder to defend. For reasons established earlier, mainly the controls and tariffs that had strangled certain imports in 1948, even removing all the quotas on the ‘negative list’ would, in October 1954, have improved the United Kingdom’s Trade Liberalisation Index percentage by only about 7.5 per cent. For this small statistical gain a nasty tangle of political problems would have had to be faced. The only OEEC member-state which would not have drawn a similar conclusion was Italy; it had relied throughout on high tariff protection and from 1950 had consistently led the way in quota removal. For the United Kingdom in 1954 therefore any further exemplary pressure on the other OEEC members involved removing quotas that were in fact maintained for balance of payments reasons. The obvious candidate was pulp, the only important raw material deliberated when quotas had been reimposed in November 1951. But pulp could not be liberalised by itself without antagonising the vertically integrated Swedish paper and board industry which also set pulp prices. Removing the quotas on pulp, paper and board would have raised the United Kingdom’s score on the Trade Liberalisation Index by 9.38 percentage points, a bigger effect than removing all the hardcore quotas on the ‘negative list’. 103
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Some of the quotas that would have made a large difference to the percentage figure, including those on pulp, paper and board, had been, in OEEC language, ‘consolidated’. Member countries had been required in 1951 at the 75 per cent stage to ‘consolidate’ liberalisation measures amounting to 60 per cent in each of the three OEEC categories of goods. This meant that there was only a very restricted set of circumstances in which it was permissible to deliberalise them again. One of these was that a country’s deficit with the EPU was increasing at a rate which was endangering its reserves. This had been the grounds