THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, 1951–64
It is widely recognised that Britain’s relative economic growth h...
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THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, 1951–64
It is widely recognised that Britain’s relative economic growth has slowed drastically since the end of the Second World War. The 1950s are often seen as the significant decade in this respect, when a strong government could have checked economic underperformance in its earliest stages. However, in 1964 Labour alleged that the Conservative government had sorely failed to do just this and had led the nation through ‘thirteen wasted years’. Many commentators have agreed with such judgements, yet until now their views have been subject to little serious empirical scrutiny. The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951–64 responds to the need for a full assessment of the Conservatives’ performance in this crucial period. Drawing upon a wide range of archival sources, Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson explore the different aspects of the efficiency question. Beginning with the major issue of attempts in the 1950s to ‘Americanise’ British industry, the authors also discuss Conservative policy on competition, education and training, investment, and research and development. This new survey reveals that the Conservatives were informed about each of these issues, yet shrank from effective reform. They were, rather, reduced to inertia by ideological dilemmas, internal party antagonisms and conflicting strategic objectives. Tiratsoo and Tomlinson conclude that 1951–64 were indeed ‘thirteen wasted years’. The Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, 1951–64 will be of interest to all those concerned with the post-1945 economic and political history of Britain. The wealth of archival material brought together by Tiratsoo and Tomlinson and the quality of their analysis lays a vital foundation for further research into this important area. Nick Tiratsoo is Senior Research Fellow at the University of Luton, UK, and Visiting Research Fellow at the Business History Unit of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Jim Tomlinson is Professor of Economic History and Head of the Department of Government at Brunel University, UK. Their previous co-authored work, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention: Labour 1939–51, was published by Routledge in 1993.
ROUTLEDGE EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1 ECONOMIC IDEAS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY Contributions to contemporary economic history Sir Alec Cairncross 2 THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR MARKETS Modernity, culture and governance in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan Bo Stråth 3 CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY The gold standard and beyond Edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo, Barry Eichengreen and Jaime Reis 4 BRITAIN’S PLACE IN THE WORLD A historical enquiry into import controls 1945–60 Alan S.Milward and George Brennan 5 FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome Frances M.B.Lynch 6 ONETARY STANDARDS AND EXCHANGE RATES M.C.Marcuzzo, L.Officer, A.Rosselli 7 PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY IN DOMESDAY ENGLAND, 1086 John McDonald 8 FREE TRADE AND ITS RECEPTION 1815–1960 Freedom and trade: Volume I Edited by Andrew Marrison 9 CONCEIVING COMPANIES Joint-stock politics in Victorian England Timothy L.Alborn 10 THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL DECLINE RECONSIDERED Edited by Jean-Pierre Dormois and Michael Dintenfass 11 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, 1951–64 Thirteen wasted years? Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson 12 PACIFIC CENTURIES Pacific and Pacific Rim economic history since the 16th century Edited by Dennis O.Flynn, Lionel Frost and A.J.H.Latham
Books published under the joint imprint of LSE/Routledge are works of high academic merit approved by the Publications Committee of the London School of Economics and Political Science. These publications are drawn from a wide range of academic studies in the social sciences for which the LSE has an international reputation.
THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, 1951–64 Thirteen wasted years?
Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson
London and New York
First published 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1998 Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Tiratsoo, Nick, 1952– The conservatives and industrial efficiency, 1951–64: thirteen wasted years?/ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Industrial productivity—Government policy—Great Britain— History—20th century. 2. Industrial policy—Government policy— Great Britain—History—20th century. 3. Great Britain—Economic policy—1945–4. Great Britain—Politics and government— 1945–64. 5. Conservative Party (Great Britain)—History— 20th century. I. Tomlinson, Jim. II. Title HC260.I52T368 1998 98–16857 338.941’009045–dc21 CIP ISBN 0-203-98274-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415-15870-2 (Print Edition)
CONTENTS
List of tables
vii
Preface
viii
Acknowledgements
ix
1
The Conservatives and industrial efficiency, 1900–51
1
2
Conservative economic policy, 1951–64: short-term management and long-term growth
20
3
The American productivity gospel in Britain: agencies and impact
35
4
The American productivity gospel in Britain: implementing change in business practice and shopfloor technique
50
5
The American productivity gospel in Britain: the quest for management professionalisation
65
6
The American productivity gospel in Britain: explaining reactions and responses
81
7
The Conservatives and competition
100
8
Education and training
123
9
Investment and technical change
138
Overview and conclusions
161
Notes
167
Index
203
10
TABLES
2.1 Macroeconomic performance, 1951–64 22 2.2 Excess of French, German and Italian growth over that of the UK, 1873– 34 1973 3.1 The Benton-Moody programme 42 7.1 British export and import patterns, 1951–65 105 8.1 Public expenditure on education, 1951/2 to 1963/4 124 9.1 Share of GDFCF in GDP, 1950–64 142 9.2 Sources of investment funds, 1948–51 to 1961–5 147 9.3 Gross fixed investment by sector, 1951–64 149 9.4 Industrial distribution of investment, 1951–64 151 9.5 Fixed investment in ‘social services’, 1951–64 152 9.6 Measures of R&D, 1962 154 9.7 Growth of enrolment in scientific and engineering courses in higher 154 education, 1950–63 9.8 Public expenditure on civil R&D, 1950/1 to 1963/4 155 9.9 The finance of R&D, 1955/6 to 1964/5 158
PREFACE
This book follows on from our previous volume, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention: Labour 1939–51 (Routledge, 1993), in which we examined the wartime and Attlee governments’ strategies for raising industrial productivity and efficiency. While the outcome of this effort was mixed, its scope and seriousness cannot be denied. After 1951 the Conservatives too were faced with the challenge of raising the performance of the economy, especially in the light of the evident American productive superiority. Their response to this challenge over the next thirteen years is analysed here, with attention being given both to attitudes towards the wide range of US-supported techniques advocated to reform British industry, and the more aggregate issues of policies relevant to efficiency. Is it the case, as one prominent historical economist has recently argued, that policy errors were costly in this period? Is it ‘surprisingly’ true that ‘supply-side policy did not focus effectively on addressing market failures in human capital formation or the diffusion of technical knowledge’? (N.Crafts, Britain’s Relative Economic Decline 1870–1995 (Social Market Foundation, 1997), pp. 44–5). Stimulated by such questions, we have consulted a wide range of archives in order to try and understand the complex and diverse logics which underlay government policies, and the responses of other major actors, principally employers, managers and trade unions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research on which this book is based was partly funded by ESRC grant no. R/000/22/1183, a grant from the British Academy, and resources provided by Warwick and Brunel universities. We would like to thank the various archival experts who have helped us locate documents, especially Sharon Barker and Jennie Butters at the Institute of Management library, Corby; Martin Maw at the Conservative Party archive, the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Richard Storey and staff at the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick; David Pfeiffer and Victoria Washington at the National Archives, Washington; and staff at the Public Records Office, Kew. Finally, we are most grateful to Paul Bridgen, Terry Gourvish, Christine Hayhurst, Tony Hubert, Rodney Lowe, Helen Mercer, Vera Zamagni and Jonathan Zeitlin for discussion, suggestions and support.
1 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, 1900–51
Introduction At the 1925 Conservative Party conference a delegate criticised the Baldwin government in the following words: ‘We are dissatisfied. We want a strong government—a government with a strong industrial policy…. If the government falls it will not fall because of its industrial policy, but because it has no industrial policy.’1 The delegate was quite right; it would be an anachronism to ascribe anything that today would be called industrial policy to the Conservative Party in the early twentieth century. But equally, as the very use of the term by this delegate suggests, the term was coming into use in the 1920s, and arguably around that decade something which could be called industrial policy was beginning to evolve in Conservative circles. The purpose of this chapter is to examine this policy evolution, over the period from the turn of the century up until the Conservatives replaced the Attlee government in 1951. In looking at the notoriously ambiguous term industrial policy the focus here will be a broad one, and in particular will embrace Conservative perceptions of the contemporary efficiency of the British economy and what, if anything, governments could and should do to increase such efficiency, as well as actual policy devices. The Conservative Party and efficiency Before looking chronologically at the development of Conservative attitudes and policies on industrial efficiency it is important to set those issues in the broad context of modern Conservatism. Before the late 1970s the Conservative Party has never been dominated by an ideology of economic liberalism. Rather, this has been one current of thought amongst several. Modern British Conservatism until recently has been self-consciously ‘non-ideological’. Of course such claims should not be taken at face value: there has been a persistent belief in certain principles, notably patriotism, leadership, authority, the rule of law, antiegalitarianism and private property.2 On the other hand, the Party has, very successfully, adapted those principles in order to obtain and retain power, which
2 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
in many ways is its raison d’être. In contrast with both its opponents, the Liberal and Labour Parties, the Conservatives have in consequence been much less of a programmatic party. Equally, whilst by no means a party of conservatism in the literal sense, they have been concerned to defend the existing order rather than radically reform it. All this means that policy development is much more difficult to pin down than in the other parties. Especially before 1939, there are no real Conservative equivalents to Labour and the New Social Order of 1918 or For Socialism and Peace of 1934. The pre-1979 Party was not only guided by a ‘principled pragmatism’ which excluded the dominance of the ideology of economic liberalism, but key aspects of that particular ideology were actively resisted by many in the Party. This is most evident in Party positions on competition, a core doctrine of economic liberalism. On the issue of international competition, the Party majority was clearly protectionist for almost all the years from the early 1900s to the Second World War. Only during that war did a major shift towards free trade views take place, beginning with the leadership and only slowly, it would seem, winning over the rank and file. Julian Amery, the most prominent advocate of protectionism and Imperial Preference amongst senior postwar Conservatives, cited the 1954 Conservative Party conference as a key date for defeat of his cause, but even this may be too early.3 On domestic competition the picture is more complicated but not dissimilar. Conservatives had few problems with the growing trustification and cartelisation of the British economy evident from the late nineteenth century, and in the 1920s and 1930s Conservative governments actively encouraged such movements. Again the Second World War seems to have been something of a watershed, especially amongst elements of the Party leadership, with growing support for the need to formulate some kind of anti-monopoly policy. But this again was an argument resisted by many in the Party, and strong doubts about the merits of competition are evident right down to the dispute over the abolition of Retail Price Maintenance in the early 1960s.4 The attraction of economic liberalism, and its emphasis on competition, is that it gives a straightforward answer to the question: what determines efficiency? Non-liberals, like the Conservatives, lacked any simple alternative vision, and the cause of efficiency became more problematic and historically relative. However, and in common with the Labour Party,5 the Conservatives, especially before 1939, seem increasingly to have believed in the ‘American model’ of industrial efficiency, in which scale economies and mass production play the key part.6 As will be argued in greater detail below, this perception of the sources of efficiency was more important in shaping Conservative attitudes to industrial efficiency, especially in the inter-war period, than the nostrums of economic liberalism and competition. The corollary of this scepticism about economic liberalism was an ambiguity about the role of the state—Middlemas describes the nineteenth- and twentiethcentury Conservative Party as having ‘a tension between paternal istic regulation
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 3
and market economics…which is virtually endemic’. Belief in the rights of private property gave Conservatives a disposition against state action. But lacking the economic liberals’ belief in the always beneficial outcome of the free market, there was a compelling pressure to intervene where the electoral consequences of not doing so threatened to be adverse. Conservatives always wished to balance ‘liberty and order’, or what Anthony Eden called ‘Order and Freedom’.7 1900–1914 At the turn of the century Britain under a Conservative government was engaged in the Boer War, a war which in the broader context of inter-imperial rivalry seemed to reveal many weaknesses in British society. Friedberg has provided a compelling account of the fears that prevailed in British politics about economic, financial and military weakness around this period.8 But this concern with economic performance, did not translate into the issue of economic efficiency, at least for the great majority of contemporaries. The central reason for the absence of such a linkage was that economic performance was almost entirely measured by trade performance. This focus derived in part from the fact that economic data at this time were extremely sparse, and apart from some figures on labour conditions, the (visible) trade figures were about the only systematic national economic data available. More important, however, was the fact that the debate about economic performance in this period was inextricably bound up with the tariff reform versus free trade debate. The attempt by Joseph Chamberlain to convert the Conservative Party to tariff reform in the early years of the twentieth century is one of the most frequently analysed episodes of modern political history.9 Most emphasis has been on the character and paradoxical legacy of that campaign, resulting in the Party decisively losing the 1906 election whilst ensuring that the leadership and majority of Conservative MPs were now protectionists. For the concerns of this chapter, the key feature of the tariff reform debate was that neither side in that debate based their case on any perceived inefficiency of British industry. The tariff reformers for their part wanted to argue that poor British trade performance was the consequence of tariffs elsewhere allied to ‘dumping’ in British markets. Thus for them the trade problem had its roots not in British industry, but in the inactivity of government in the face of those adverse external forces. Free traders on the whole responded by arguing that British trade performance was much better than tariff reformers alleged, and that free trade had none of the disastrous consequences alleged by Chamberlain and his allies. If some trade and industries had declined, this was the normal working of comparative advantage under free trade, and had been compensated by the rise of other successful sectors. This generalisation about the tariff reform debate requires some small qualification. Asquith, for example, a key figure on the free trade side, was
4 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
willing to concede that some industries had been lacking: ‘Defective knowledge, inferior processes, lack of flexibility or versatility, a stubborn industrial conservatism, these are the real enemies of British trade, and have done us infinitely more harm than all the tariffs and all the dumping syndicates that were ever created.’10 Similarly, the economist Alfred Marshall reckoned the problem of British industry had been exacerbated by what later generations were to call ‘entrepreneurial failure’.11 But these were minor aspects of the debate. By focusing on the international trade side of British economic performance, contemporaries ‘strengthened a proclivity for finding the sources of Britain’s problems outside its borders. What could have developed into a broadly drawn discussion of the nation’s economic future became instead a debate about export growth…. By their very nature the trade returns encouraged Englishmen to look outward instead of inward and to find fault with their neighbours rather than with themselves.’12 To put the matter in a slightly different way, we may say that Chamberlain and the tariff reformers saw the problems of export performance largely as a ‘demand-side’ rather than supply-side problem. Protection would expand domestic markets, and Imperial Preference, by easing access to Empire markets, would help British industries achieve economies of scale.13 The protectionist wing of the Conservative Party did raise the problem of ‘efficiency’, but in a sense peculiar to the time. The strategy of the tariff reformers was to use the revenues from the tariff for social reform, to raise the health and educational standards, and therefore the ‘efficiency’ of the working classes. In this way working-class support for the Conservative Party would be enhanced without the need for the progressive taxation advocated by the Liberals.14 Economically, the provision of a healthier and better educated workforce would aid the workings of British industry. This latter notion was the one enthusiastically embraced and propagated by the ‘Efficients’, a small, cross-party group of the intelligentsia who put the issue of ‘national efficiency’ at the centre of their concerns.15 The Efficients offered a broad critique of British institutions, but their main thrust was the inadequacy of government in the broad sense—the civil service, the local authorities, the army —rather than the economy. In particular, they offered no critique of the workings of British companies, and in that sense they were far removed from most later twentieth-century critiques of Britain. However, as part of their criticism of government they did attack what they saw as the paltry efforts in education and in support of technical change. The Efficients suffered because their cross-party base was unstable in a period of growing party conflict, especially over the tariff. They attempted to be neutral on this issue, but eventually fell victim to the force of this central fault line of domestic politics in the early 1900s. However, two of their concerns did find some echo in Conservative Party policies before the fall of the government in 1906.
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 5
The leading Efficient, Rosebery, a committed free trader asked: ‘How are we to fight those hostile tariffs? I believe we must fight them by a more scientific and adaptive spirit—by better education.’16 The 1902 Education Act, which brought education within the control of the new local authorities, was partly driven by such ‘efficiency’ calculations, though whether the continuation of local control, and hence the limits imposed by local finance, aided educational development is a moot point.17 A linked initiative was the creation of the National Physical Laboratory in 1899, based on a German model. Here, too, an ‘Efficient’ concern found an echo within and beyond the Conservative Party.18 These two cases mark only minor exceptions to the general point that the tariff reform debate largely diverted the attention of those concerned with economic performance away from efficiency issues. In addition, it led the Conservatives to play down the importance of competition as a force for efficiency, given that tariffs obviously involved a reduction in competition. Finally, we may say that for pre-1914 Conservativism, in a period of growing, if inchoate worries about British economic performance, tariffs were an alternative rather than a complement to addressing issues of industrial efficiency. After 1906 the tariff reform debate was settled for the foreseeable future, and the domestic political agenda focused elsewhere. But the Conservative Party was now a protectionist party,19 and the coming of the war in 1914 provided an opportunity for that protectionism to gain increased support. The First World War The First World War exposed the vulnerability and weaknesses of the British economy. Externally, that vulnerability was shown by the problem of obtaining key materials for the war effort previously imported from Germany, and by the more general problem of securing enough imports to feed the population and the war machine. This vulnerability increased support for protectionism. This growth has been carefully analysed with respect to businessmen by Marrison. As he notes ‘there can be little doubt that the War itself both encouraged protectionist sympathies amongst businessmen and allowed them to crystallise…it certainly allowed latent protectionists to come out into the open’.20 A Board of Trade Committee in 1916 recorded that: ‘Practically all the representative firms and associations consulted by us asked for a measure of protection.’21 This shift of opinion drew support from the wartime government, which in 1915 imposed the McKenna duties, putting tariffs on luxury goods like cars, in order to reduce the demand for foreign exchange, generate tax revenue and save on shipping space. Yet much of this shift of opinion and policy was related to the short-term impact of war, and the expectation that once the war was over Germany would engage in a ‘trade war’ with the Allies, who would need shortrun protection whilst pursuing postwar reconstruction. But whilst this aggressive, strategic use of tariffs as an expedient necessitated by war conditions was widely endorsed, and alongside the McKenna duties, led
6 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
to quantitative controls on a range of ‘strategic’ imports, the long-run trade policy appropriate for Britain remained a matter of dispute. The key body on postwar trade policy, the Balfour of Burleigh Committee, reflected this uncertainty. It noted that ‘whilst the economic strength of the country has so far borne with remarkable success the strain upon our material and financial resources resulting from an unparalleled war, certain defects in, and dangers to, the great future of British trade and Industry have been revealed’.22 The Report rejected general protectionism, but called for a range of measures falling. short of this. These included anti-dumping rules and a much vaguer call for protection of a range of industries ‘important for the maintenance of the industrial position of the U.K.’.23 The war thus consolidated business support for tariffs, whilst wartime official pronouncements left the long-run issue still open. At the same time the war consolidated business support for the Conservative Party, as the bastion of antiSocialist opinion. But Conservative views on tariffs, as in other areas, were not simply a projection of business opinion. Before the war the Party had been more protectionist than such opinion. During the war it was probably ‘overtaken’ by business opinion in this regard.24 The Party had to balance both the interests of the City and the demands of the electorate against the pressure of industry.25 It was not only on the external account that the war showed weaknesses in the British economy. At home the drive to maximise output led some to question the efficiency of British industry. The issues raised included industrial relations, in its broadest sense, the relations between industry and finance, and the technical performance of British firms.26 In all these areas, questions about the extent to which government should take a more active role were raised. In the war itself such an extended role was inescapable, but as with the external account, the question was how far wartime measures were to be regarded as temporary, for the duration of the war, or as permanent changes. This in turn depended on whether perceived weaknesses were seen as long term, and whether, if so, they could and should be addressed by government. Some small but significant longterm increases in the role of the government were made, as with, for example, the foundation of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in 1916, designed to encourage collaborative research in private industry, especially amongst smaller firms. But on the broad issue of the role of government both business and Conservative opinion was divided. On one side were people like Dudley Docker, a key figure in the foundation of the Federation of British Industry in 1916, and one who called for an ‘industrial Prussianism’ in which the state would play an active role not only in protecting British industry but also in encouraging industrial concentration to secure greater efficiency. But this agenda was problematic for both business opinion and the Conservative Party. Much of the former hankered for a reversal of wartime interventionism not its intensification. Equally, the Conservative Party, whilst divided, had clear memories of the 1906 defeat on protection, as well as fearing the implications of the ‘corporatist’
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 7
aspects of the productioneers programme. At the close of the war, with the end of the wartime mobilisation, and the absence of the anticipated trade war with Germany, the failure of the Docker programme was almost absolute.27 This failure was also contributed to by the Conservative alliance with Lloyd George, an alliance requiring that tariff policy be given a low priority. In the last period of the war ‘reconstruction’ focused not on industry, but on social reform proposals deemed necessary in respond to the growing working-class discontent with the war.28 However, as Kirby and Rose have emphasised, this largely abortive ‘social’ Reconstruction movement was, during the war, underpinned by a widespread concern with the reconstruction of industry, which to a large extent fell outside the prewar parameters of debate on tariffs. For the Ministry of Reconstruction, from which many wartime plans emanated, industrial efficiency seems to have been largely seen as an issue of industrial relations in the broadest sense. Wartime breakdowns of employer-worker relations led to the view that any meaningful reconstruction of industry would have to be based on a radical improvement in those relations. This concern with industrial efficiency led back to the kind of ‘corporatist’ proposals advocated by Dudley Docker, and which were to be realised only in a pale form by Whitley Councils in the postwar public sector.29 However, this did not exhaust the agenda of wartime industrial reconstructionism. For many observers the war had demonstrated the benefits of scale for efficiency, whether this be by units of production, or by greater cooperation between legally separate firms. The Balfour of Burleigh Committee reflected this view with its advocacy of both more standardisation of production, and more co-operation in such areas as research and marketing.30 These proposals were not just rhetoric; the wartime Ministry of Munitions had encouraged mergers and the adoption of best-practice techniques in the engineering industry as part of its wartime efforts.31 The general failure of the ‘productioneers’ to secure their desire for a more active state role in industrial issues was not the result of a reawakened political commitment to all the tenets of laissez-faire. It was certainly true that the Conservatives and the majority of business quickly achieved a reversal of most of the wartime controls over business, and ‘decontrol’ triumphed rapidly, especially after the collapse of the boom of 1919/20.32 On the other hand, neither the strength of protectionist feeling nor the enthusiasm for scale economies resulted in any enthusiasm for policies to encourage competition. This was illustrated by debates on profiteering and trusts around the end of the war. Wartime concerns with ‘profiteering’ led, amongst other measures, to the setting up of a Committee on Trusts to look at the implications of the wartime expansion of combination in industry. This suggested that such trusts were largely benign in their efforts, but to conciliate hostile public opinion suggested that a body be established to investigate their actions, though explicitly repudiating the setting up of tough anti-trust measures as in the USA.33 The 1919 Profiteering Act established an investigative body, and a number of reports were produced, but
8 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
from 1919/20 the collapse of the boom and the related government desire to conciliate labour and ‘progressive’ opinion led to the abandonment of any such policies. At the beginning of 1921 the President of the Board of Trade, Cunliffe-Lister, cited the Committee on Trusts in support of the contention that ‘combinations in the great majority of cases are not abusing the position they have got’. He went on to suggest that legislation on this issue could be introduced ‘in the next session of Parliament’, but nothing came of this.34 Overall, the legacy of the war was to reinforce Conservative and business belief in scale economies as a route to efficiency, and to weaken further any liberal views about the benefits of competition, whilst at the same time greatly strengthening the political division between Labour, as the party of government intervention, and the Conservatives, the Party opposed to such meddling. Initially after the war, it was the latter element which predominated, summarised in the contemporary cry for a return to prewar ‘normalcy’. The 1920s After a frantic boom in 1919/20, there followed a collapse in the economy which drove unemployment up to unprecedented levels, from which recovery throughout the following decade was slow, halting and incomplete. The response of the government (Conservative or Conservative-dominated for all but a brief period in 1924) for most of the 1920s was to try and restore the conditions of the prewar international economy, in the belief that it was wartime disruption of this system which underlay Britain’s problems. This strategy logically followed from the concentration of the unemployment problem in the export-oriented staple industries of coal, cotton, iron and steel and shipbuilding.35 Most famously this strategy led to the British-led attempt to rebuild the gold standard system, symbolised by Britain’s ‘return to gold’ at the prewar parity in 1925. In the British case the prewar international economy had also, of course, been characterised by free trade. During the 1920s this feature was more problematic, at least for Conservative opinion. However, down to 1929, and indeed until the slump of 1931, the Conservatives largely continued with free trade policies, though this was a cause of considerable dispute in their ranks. The exceptions to this generalisation were threefold. The 1915 McKenna duties were continued postwar, despite their allegedly emergency character.36 Second, a small number of ‘key’ industries of strategic significance were protected by the Key Industries Legislation 1919, which was quickly declared unlawful but re-enacted as part of the Safeguarding Act of 1921. (Dyestuffs had their own Act in 1919 with similar intent.) Third were Safeguarding duties. These had originally been framed very much in the strategic context noted earlier of an expectation that at the war’s end there would be a trade war with Germany against which defences would have to be erected. Thus, Safeguarding was
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 9
initially aimed at providing a ‘level playing field’, with provisions for protection against depreciating currencies, subsidies, dumping and low wage labour.37 Safeguarding came to be a considerable bone of contention in the 1920s both within the Conservative Party and between it and its opponents. In 1923 Baldwin, the new leader of the Party, precipitated a general election on the protection issue, and, as in 1906, though less dramatically, this led to the opposition (this time Labour) coming to power. There has been much debate on Baldwin’s motives for this seemingly quixotic act. Partly it was an attempt to unite the Party, partly a response to the level of unemployment, partly it seemed the only ‘positive’ policy available. As John Ramsden comments: ‘The only way forward seemed to be to go back to the politics of tariff reform, the Party’s only positive contribution to political economy, its only real point of positive belief, and a policy that might have been made popular by years of depression.’38 With the idea of general protection rejected by the electorate, the Conservatives, who returned to power at the end of 1924, were left only with the ambiguities of Safeguarding as protectionist devices. Despite the attacks of free trade stalwarts like F.W.Hirst, the amount of protection actually delivered under Safeguarding in the 1920s was minimal, and restricted to eight small industries such as lace and gas mantles.39 In this area the Conservative leadership was apt to try and face both ways, promising the Party faithful that Safeguarding could deliver significant benefits to industry, whilst ensuring that they could not be accused of introducing ‘general protection’ against the verdict of the electorate in 1923. Official publications of the Party paraded Safeguarding as a major plank of policy, whilst on the other hand the appointment of the firmly free trade Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer emphasised the Party’s public recognition of the impossibility of putting protection at the centre of its policies.40 The forum of the Safeguarding legislation did raise the issue of industrial efficiency, because one clause of the 1925 re-enactment of the legislation stipulated that to qualify for such protection, an industry must ‘prove it is conducted efficiently’.41 The Safeguarding enquiries that looked at this issue tended to have a common view. They suggested that the industries did have deficiencies in their productive methods, but that this stemmed from the limitations and uncertainties of their market position, deriving from the intensity of competition.42 Although somewhat circular, these arguments do bring out the way in which it was becoming much more common by the mid-1920s to recognise the inefficiencies of British industry, a marked change from before the First World War. (This point is returned to below.) Discontent in the Conservative Party on ‘industrial policy’ has already been noted in the quotation given at the beginning of this chapter. Inside and outside the government the inadequacies of current policies were increasingly emphasised and alternatives suggested as the 1920s wore on, and the failure of ‘normalcy’ to return became more apparent. On the left of the Conservative Party, Boothby, Macmillan and Loder in 1927 characterised Conservative policy
10 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
on industry as ‘chaotic’. Further, they argued, ‘To many Conservatives government help to industry means first and foremost Protective Tariffs’, whilst they thought such a policy was both electorally impracticable and against the tide of tariff reductions elsewhere in Europe.43 They sought to avoid the protection issue, and proposed a ‘third way’ between individualism and socialism, to include compulsory amalgamation in some industries, and an active Board of Trade becoming ‘economic adviser to the nation’.44 This combination of faith in industrial concentration and a mild corporatism typified much centrist opinion in this period, as for example represented in the Liberal’s Yellow Book of 1928 or the Balfour Committee, whose final report appeared in 1929.45 Although such positions gained some rank-and-file support, many Conservatives regarded them as semi-socialist.46 Whilst it is difficult to summarise a complex of opinions, the rank and file seemed more inclined to favour two other policies. On the one hand, they supported Safeguarding, which, as already noted, the leadership tended to greatly overstate as a practical solution to Britain’s problems, certainly on the scale on which they were willing to apply it. The Conservative conference expressed opposition to the slowness with which the policy was applied, especially to such vital industries as iron and steel.47 Alternatively, the emphasis tended to be on cost-cutting. This, in fact, was the main basis of the criticisms in the debate already noted at the Conservative conference of 1925. It was a common term of Conservative analysis in the 1920s that the rise in taxation as well as labour costs over the war period was fatally undermining the capacity of British industry to compete. The General Election Manifesto of 1922, for example, proclaimed that the burden of taxation was the ‘greatest clog upon the wheels of national industry’.48 This was a view widely shared amongst Conservatives of all shades in the 1920s, and its effects are evident in such events as the ‘Geddes Axe’ of 1922, the setting up of the Colwyn Committee on National Debt and Taxation, which reported in 1927,49 and most strikingly the de-rating of industry of 1929. This latter is particularly important because it signalled a clear belief on the government’s part that ‘demand-side’ explanations of British industry’s problems, which led to an emphasis on policies for reviving the international economy, had proved disappointing. Certainly by 1927/8 it was becoming widely accepted in government and Conservative circles that the problems of the staple industries were not going to go away, and this is evident also in the Industrial Transference Act of 1928. Although on a very small scale, this Act recognised that demand was never going to expand sufficiently to re-employ many of those previously working in such industries as coal, and encouraged migration of such workers to other parts of the country. The De-Rating Act reduced the rates levied on industry by two-thirds, cutting annual bills by about £27m. It followed from complex negotiations between the Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, who was responsible for the rating system and local authorities, and Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Churchill saw the measure as part of equity in rewards for different sectors of the
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 11
population—the bankers and merchants had had the restoration of gold, the personal taxpayer cuts in income tax, the old better pensions, and industry therefore deserved a cut in costs.50 But whatever the politics of de-rating, it was clearly an industrial subsidy by another name. This was especially clear in the case of railways, where relief was granted explicitly on grounds that it be passed on to industry. For a free trader like Churchill it was ‘dammed clever protection’, a useful measure to fight off those who wanted explicit controls on trade. In economic terms it was hardly a rational form of protectionism, benefiting most those with either high rateable values or heavy railway freight charges.51 But it provided a useful method of doing something in response to the range of pressures, within and without the Party, from those who believed too little was being done to revive industry and reduce unemployment. Whilst leading to little action in the 1920s, one final feature of Conservative views on industrial efficiency must be mentioned, indeed emphasised. This was the evidence of growing belief in the need for the ‘rationalisation’ of industry. This term, imported from Germany, was highly ambiguous, but became associated with the idea that British industry was organised on too small a scale, and that it could only revive its efficiency if considerable concentration took place.52 As noted above, this idea had taken root during the First World War, and never entirely disappeared in the 1920s. It may in broad terms be seen in the government’s creation of the Central Electricity Board in 1922, or in the encouragement of the creation of ICI. But it became a much broader issue in the late 1920s, when it appeared evident that the old staples with their typically small scale of production were failing to compete with their counterparts abroad.53 In fact the government took the first step in recognition of this problem in the staples by the Mining Industry Act of 1926, which allowed compulsion to be applied to minorities who opposed pit amalgamations, but left the initiative for change with the industry. This indeed was the great problem for the Conservatives, to fully unfold itself in the 1930s: how were they to combine a belief in the economic benefits of ‘rationalisation’ with a political unwillingness to get involved in the rights of private industry to run their own show? This dilemma was only just beginning to appear in the 1920s, and is best dealt with in the following section, on the 1930s, below. Rationalisation was never a coherent ideology, but it did undoubtedly draw upon the enthusiasm for the (alleged) manner in which the USA conducted its industry. As so often in twentieth-century Britain, feelings of domestic failure led to a search for a foreign model to be praised and hopefully emulated. In the 1920s, enthusiasm for America went far beyond Conservative ranks, with many, though not all, Labour Party supporters also feeling the USA had much to offer them.54 This broad measure of interest and support reflected in part the fact that the US model seemed to offer support for all kinds of prescriptions. Those on the left favoured it as a high-wage economy, those in the centre praised its cooperative relations between employers and workers, those on the right (and
12 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
others) enthused over its scale-based efficiency. Both of these latter two views are apparent in Conservative circles. Boothby, for example, who visited the USA in 1925, extolled the benefits of worker participation, benefits and welfare as the key domestic features of the American system.55 Others saw this as only part of the story, and wanted to encourage a proper investigation into the American system, and in 1926 the Cabinet agreed to send an official mission to the USA for this purpose. 56 The American example for most Conservatives reinforced the case for rationalisation, and in doing so also encouraged hostility to any pro-competitive, anti-Trust policy. Cunliffe-Lister, President of the Board of Trade, attacked the opposition in 1929 for not accepting the logic of this position. We must have rationalisation. It is necessary for efficiency and it inevitably involves the creation of larger units and the making of agreements. Honourable members must make up their minds which horse they are going to ride. You cannot in one speech lecture industry and say ‘It is your duty to rationalise and reorganise and enter into these agreements and combine yourself in the most efficient units’ and proceed in the very next speech you make to attack people or cast aspersions on them for doing exactly what you have invited them to do. He went on to argue that as long as excess capacity existed, this provided sufficient safeguard for the consumer against any exploitation which might otherwise follow.57 Whatever else it might be perceived to be about, the American example was not regarded by inter-war Conservatives as providing a case for rigorous anti-trust policies. On the contrary, by the end of the 1920s there had been a substantial loss of faith in the capacity of competition to resolve Britain’s economic difficulties. The 1930s The return to power of the Conservatives in 1931 (notionally in a National government until 1935) coincided with a sea change in British economic policy. The year 1931 saw departure from the gold standard and the imposition of a general tariff on manufactures. From the point of view of this book the latter was by far the most important. As earlier parts of this chapter have made clear, and as, for example, Capie has emphasised, the protectionism which was introduced in 1931 can only be understood against the background of earlier pressures for such policies. By this time most industrialists seem to have been protectionists, and most Conservatives also.58 In that sense 1931 was the triumph of long bottled-up forces rather than a sharp change of direction. But what was the relation between this measure and the issue of industrial efficiency? It has been argued above that in the pre-1914 period protection was usually seen as an alternative to any discussion of efficiency. British industry was
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 13
not inefficient, but rather unfairly undermined by perfidious foreigners.59 By the 1920s, however, protection and efficiency had become intertwined issues. The discussion of Safeguarding commonly saw protection as a pre-condition for other measures (rationalisation, higher investment) necessary to raise efficiency. The dilemma posed by this inter-relationship was well understood in Conservative circles. When the iron and steel industry in the 1920s had made a claim for Safeguarding, the Minister of Labour had argued against this, saying that the industry was slowly beginning to co-operate in order to rationalise, but that ‘any promise of safeguarding or other alleviation, which may ease the pressure, will undoubtedly retard the whole movement and awake the old reactionary individualism’.60 From this point of view, the granting of protection to iron and steel in 1931, and its extension in 1932, removed the leverage government may have had to force the industry to change its ways. This problem was soon recognised by ministers, but faced with the political impossibility of withdrawing protection in the circumstances of the 1930s, the government found there was little it could do. It had no ‘credible threat’ to deploy.61 The Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC) set up to administer the 1932 tariff had an explicit duty ‘not merely to exclude troublesome imports, but to encourage the industries that came to it for exceptional treatment to reorganise and re-equip themselves’, and it has been argued that in a third of the cases where this body gave a duty above the across the board 10 per cent granted in 1931, this ‘had a specific object of encouraging development or reorganisation’.62 But whilst we lack any study to match Tolliday’s on steel to know definitely whether other industries delivered on such promises, the general evidence suggests it is unlikely that they did. In the absence of the use of tariff as a persuasive bargaining weapon, and a reluctance to use state power directly on industry, the Conservatives in the 1930s had two possible instruments to deploy in trying to ‘rationalise’ the old staples apart from private pressure by ministers or industrialists—‘industrial diplomacy’ and the Bank of England. Industrial diplomacy is the term helpfully used by Roberts to describe the role of government in the 1930s attempting to persuade employers to put their house in order. The terminology of diplomacy suggests accurately that the government was concerned not to be seen coercing industry, but persuading it, like another sovereign power, to do what the government wanted.63 This policy, while fulfilling the political need not to be seen interfering in industry, relied upon business to put together plans which could then be endorsed by government. Yet the staples were internally far from homogeneous, so that the likelihood of their presenting a united policy was always small. These divisions were perhaps particularly acute in iron and steel,64 but evident to a greater or lesser extent in all the staples. It is difficult to point to any obvious success for such ‘diplomacy’, though the Cotton Spinning Industry Act of 1936 was one piece of legislation which built upon a considerable degree of agreement within the industry itself, and provided
14 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
aid for scrapping surplus spinning equipment. Like most rationalisation in the 1930s this was aimed ‘not at overcoming market conditions, but at easing and hastening the operation of market forces’.65 Cotton, like other staples, had already from the 1920s been affected by the other source of pressure for rationalisation—the Bank of England. The Bank originally became involved in the issue due to its banking relationship with some companies in engineering and shipbuilding, but more broadly because of its desire to defend the banking system against the effects of bad debts accumulated in the staples. This role had expanded in the late 1920s, not least to try and preempt any more radical intervention by an incoming Labour government. The Bank created both the Bankers Industrial Development Corporation and the Securities Management Trust to finance and help plan rationalisation schemes. But this did not bring a coherent industrial policy as ‘these agencies proved not to be agencies of rationalisation through a great array of industries; their principal task was rather to oversee the unwinding of commitments into which the Bank had already ventured, or into which it was about to be driven by political pressures’.66 From these various avenues nothing that can sensibly be labelled an ‘industrial policy’ emerged. Roberts argues that: ‘By the mid-1930s Government had not got an industrial policy, but rather had an industrial policy for each industry with which informal discussion had been held.’67 There was no forum for an overall policy on industrial issues to emerge, and the most that can be discerned is a broad recognition of industrial weakness, but little sign of policies or institutions emerging to tackle these weaknesses. This approach, as already noted, included a willingness to grant significant tariff protection, even though this undercut any bargaining with industry. Second, it involved a lack of willingness to get overtly involved with industrial decision-making, a desire to act indirectly and informally. Third, it involved legislation only when a strong case could be made that the industry itself had originated a plan, and the government was coercing a small, intransigent minority. This latter was itself treated in an ad hoc fashion. The government strongly resisted the idea put forward by bodies such as the Industrial Reorganisation League and Political and Economic Planning, and endorsed by a wide range of Conservative opinion, from Amery to Harold Macmillan, and industrialists like Lord Melchett and others, for an ‘Enabling Bill’ to give a general power for such minorities to be coerced. This proposal was first put forward in 1934, and repeated in 1936. On both occasions the government opposed it, saying that given the diversity of conditions in industry, it was imperative that measures were treated individually, and that industry did not have a threat of compulsion hanging over it.68 On the second occasion that the issue came to the House of Lords, the government representative emphasised the difficulties the government had encountered in getting the Cotton Spinning Bill through the Commons, and rightly stressed the depths of Conservative opposition to such interference in private industry.69 Thus the attempt to gain explicit government support for
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 15
‘planning’ via self-government in industry failed, not through lack of sympathy with the idea, but because of worries about the political dangers of such a degree of government interference in private industry. There was also explicit repudiation of the need for legal restraints on monopoly and restrictive practices.70 In the 1930s, overall, rationalisation became the basis of a policy encouraging defensive measures, rather than a means of recapturing lost markets. Alongside tariffs, cartels and market-sharing agreements were encouraged. This approach may be seen as embodying a relatively coherent policy of trying to raise prices in order to raise profits, and thus boost the economy.71 The same actions can be seen as a government—industry conspiracy to exploit the consumer.72 Economic historians have been much divided on the results of this strategy on the staple industries.73 From the point of view of the long-run evolution of Conservative policy on industry, the 1930s mark the furthest distance reached from economic liberalism in this century. The loss of faith in the market (though not, of course, in private ownership) emerging in the late 1920s was consolidated, protection against international competition being combined with anti-competitive measures at home. The underlying assumption of this was the incapacity of competition to generate efficiency in the British economy.74 The scope of this policy stance should not be exaggerated. Whilst protection against imports was general to the manufacturing sector, officially encouraged domestic cartelisation and marketrigging was largely confined to the staples—‘new’ industries largely fell outside government policy.75 Nevertheless, across broad swathes of British industry this was a period when Conservative governments encouraged ‘industrial selfgovernment’, and the Party saw ‘its ideal of an economic system in an orderly organisation of industries, each ruled feudally from above by the business firms already established in it, linked in associations and confederations and, at the top, meeting on terms of sovereign equality such other Estates of the Realm as the Bank of England and the Government’.76 As the pro laissez-faire Economist went on to note this was ‘emphatically not a set of ideas that can be expected to yield the maximum of production, or to give the country wealth in peace and strength in the war’.77 War and opposition The wartime Coalition government’s approach was to focus almost all efforts on winning the war, throwing economic caution to the wind. This strategy was not wholly bad for the long-term prospects of the economy, with, for example, a huge increase in the employment of machine tools and the expansion of engineering capacity which would yield postwar dividends.78 But the conflict, like the First World War, exposed some of the weaknesses of the economy in stark fashion, and this exposure fed into the investigations which were launched during the war into the problems likely to arise in the postwar reconstruction
16 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
period. Churchill was notoriously reluctant to give serious attention to such issues whilst the war remained to be won, but others in Conservative ranks recognised the political importance of responding to the pressure to put forward programmes which would attract an electorate that seemed to be expecting that peace would bring a better world than that of the 1930s. As Rab Butler saw the Conservative predicament, it was ‘to convince a broad spectrum of the electorate, whose minds were scarred by inter-war memories and myths, that we had an alternative policy to socialism which was viable, efficient and humane, which would release and reward enterprise and initiative but without abandoning social justice or reverting to mass unemployment’.79 The Conservatives, like Labour, accepted that any improvements in social conditions would have to be based on better industrial performance than had been achieved in the inter-war years, but no clear view emerged on how this was to be achieved. Bodies such as the Tory Reform Committee on the left of the Party were willing to proclaim expansion as the keynote of future Conservative policy, but official party opinion was much more cautious.80 Many Party members and also many industrialists remained cautious about whether any radical change from the restrictionism of the 1930s would prove possible.81 For political reasons the Coalition endorsed the prospectus of full (or at least ‘high and stable’) employment, which was embodied in the 1944 Employment Policy White Paper, but the nature of the policies which would deliver this happy outcome remained obscure. This is evident, for example, in the sharp differences on the desirable scope of competition, and the extent to which this should be pursued by legislation. Thus, for example, Oliver Lyttelton, wartime Minister of Production, and senior Party figure, argued at the Reconstruction Committee that there was ‘no evidence to show that monopolies had proved more damaging to employment than free competition. Indeed, it was his view that the object of firms entering into monopolistic agreements was usually to preserve continuity of employment.’82 Such a view, widely echoed in the Party, seemed to look back to the contractionary 1930s rather than forward to the hopefully expansionary postwar years. Conservatives were also ambiguous about the future role of the state in the economy. Whilst few, if any, anticipated an immediate destruction of wartime controls when peace came, the extent to which the state’s role would be permanently expanded was not defined. One area where the division between the parties was evident in the 1945 election was nationalisation, but in most other respects the manifestos on which the parties fought were similar.83 Both emphasised the need for economic reconstruction to underpin postwar reform, both agreed controls would have to be continued for some time. Neither party at this stage went into great detail about how the performance of British industry might be improved. Under the Attlee government a diverse agenda of policies did eventually emerge aimed at improving that performance. Nationalisation, whilst of course highly charged politically, was in many ways a ‘technocratic’ policy pursued as a means of ‘rationalizing’ the ailing staple industries. During the war ‘expert’ groups such as
CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRY, 1900–51 17
the Reid Committee on coal had presented nationalisation in this light, so that the Conservatives felt unable to resist all Labour’s proposals for public ownership as simply the result of dogmatic socialism. As a result they often accepted the main thrust of Labour’s policies, whilst waging a ‘bitter and uncompromising struggle over unessentials’.84 The dominant Conservative view of the sources of economic efficiency were not very different from those in the Labour Party which underpinned nationalisation; both parties believed in the economic virtues of scale, high investment and new technology. Labour’s other initiatives in the drive to increase efficiency aroused less public debate but often more intransigent opposition from the Conservatives. Proposals for Development Councils to try and generate co-operation in fragmented consumer goods industries were portrayed by most of the employers in the industries concerned as the thin end of the wedge of a government takeover, and Conservative politicians echoed this stance.85 The idea of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity was bitterly attacked by the Conservatives when proposed by Stafford Cripps in 1948, with suggestions both that it demonstrated the supineness of the government in the face of American overtures, and that it diverted attention from the ‘real’ problems of the economy, such as taxation and excessive controls.86 In other policy areas the Conservative response to Labour initiatives was more ambiguous. On Joint Production Committees, set up to encourage worker cooperation in production issues, the Conservatives were sympathetic to proposals for encouraging workplace co-operation in principle, as long as management prerogatives were not infringed.87 In the case of monopolies, where the Attlee government brought in legislation in 1948, Conservatives remained divided, although there is some evidence of a shift towards a slightly more procompetition stance in the late 1940s. In wartime debates the Conservatives had generally been unenthusiastic about legislation in this area, with some Labour ministers being much more enthusiastic.88 In the face of Labour’s proposals, attitudes shifted somewhat, and indeed by the end of the Attlee years the Conservatives were supporting calls for more effective action to be taken against monopolies than resulted from the 1948 Act.89 But this shift in opinion should not be exaggerated. A widely accepted statement of Conservative policy in this area published in 1948 stressed that: ‘monopoly and restrictive practices are a significant feature British industry today. In most instances they exist as the result of the legitimate pursuit of sectional interests…in some cases these devices have helped to make possible the re-equipment of important industries and they have brought other advantages.’90 This statement was followed by a summary of possible disadvantages of monopoly, but its tone makes clear that there was no great support for the ‘trust-busting’ enthusiasm of a few Labour ministers. For much of late 1940s politics was defined by the Conservative responses to the reform programme of Labour. But there were attempts at positive policymaking by the Conservatives. Most famously, the Party in 1947 produced an ‘Industrial Charter’, which sought to overcome the dilemma posed by Butler
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outlined above through combining a recognition of the role of the state in maintaining full employment and welfare provision with the traditional Conservative enthusiasm for free enterprise. The significance of the Charter probably lay less in the policies it proposed than the political signal it was designed to give that the Conservatives accepted in large degree the ‘postwar settlement’ and were not planning to take Britain back to the 1930s.91 Within the Industrial Charter was a ‘Worker’s Charter’, which sought to establish Conservative support for worker’s rights, including the right to security of employment, the right to incentives for raising production, and the right to ‘status’ whatever the job. In Butler’s words, this Charter ‘sought to combine the Conservative Party with the YMCA’.92 Here again one can see some overlap with Labour’s contemporary enthusiasm for ‘human relations’ and the idea that the happy and involved worker is a productive worker.93 But the Conservative emphasis was on individual rights and voluntarism in this area, and the ideas had little impact when the Conservatives came to power after 1951. How far did the Conservatives have an agenda for raising efficiency by the end of the 1940s? In trying to answer this question it is important to distinguish political rhetoric from serious policy proposals. Harris, for example, has diagnosed a significant shift towards economic liberalism in the years after the peak of ‘radical etatist’ expressions of opinion in the Industrial Charter.94 This seems exaggerated, for two reasons. First, the Charter was not much different from the 1945 Conservative manifesto—it was the political packaging which had altered. Secondly, the higher level of economic liberal rhetoric evident in Tory circles in the late 1940s seems to be more part of the tactical emphasis on ‘setting the people free’ from Labour’s austerity and controls, rather than a major shift in underlying attitudes. An alternative positive vision might have developed at this time around the idea of ‘the property-owning democracy’, which became a popular phrase from about 1947. Such a phrase could logically have embraced policies for ‘democratising’ share ownership, and encouraging co-partnerships and other forms of industrial organisation which moved away from the traditional capitalist firm. Such ideas were not absent from Conservative circles in this period, but ultimately ‘property-owning’ democracy came to mean little more than state support for the middle classes to buy their own houses.95 The Conservative rhetoric of ‘set the people free’ was treated also as a recipe for economic success. In most debates on economic efficiency, Conservatives suggested that it was only the weight of taxation, controls and bureaucracy that was preventing a rapid expansion of the economy.96 Positive proposals were thin on the ground. The acceptance of full employment undermined the restrictionist instincts still widely prevailing in Conservative circles, but there was no wholesale conversion to economic liberalism, nor the devising of any other agenda which would contribute to increased efficiency by state action.97
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Conclusions By the time the Conservatives came to power in 1951 they cannot be said to have developed a clear ‘industrial policy’. While they had increasingly recognised some of the weaknesses of British industry, their response had been limited. Partly this reflected deep divisions over the extent to which they should present themselves as advocates of the free market. There had been some movement away from the restrictionst policies of the 1930s, partly because of the rhetorical emphasis on freeing Britain from the shackles of the state imposed by Labour. On the other hand, many Conservatives realised that untrammelled market forces were likely to be a destabilising rather than conserving force in society, and also that too much emphasis on economic liberalisation might threaten the electoral appeal made on the basis that the Party had changed since the ‘bad old days’ of the 1930s, widely (if inaccurately) seen as a period when the free market was destructively rampant. It is also important to note that the Conservatives had been highly suspicious of the Attlee government’s emphasis on productivity. This was not, of course, because they were opposed to higher productivity, but because they believed, to some extent rightly, that emphasising this objective was likely to lead to an enhanced role for governmental bodies in trying to persuade the private sector to mend its ways. Such a consequence was more likely if the alternative proposed route to higher productivity, greater competition, was not adhered to. All in all, greater efficiency and productivity were not top of the Conservative agenda in 1951, and even in so far as the issue was one of policy concern, the Party had failed to find agreement on the best way forward.
2 CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 Short-term management and long-term growth
Introduction Conservative policy on industrial efficiency and productivity can only be understood against the background of general economic performance and policy. Productivity and efficiency concerns never dominated the economic policy agenda in this period, but existed as part of a wider policy mix, within which these issues broadly grew in importance over time. The shift in the significance of efficiency resulted from a combination of changes in the economic environment, both nationally and internationally, and changes in policy goals. Where in the early 1950s, short-term macroeconomic issues largely dominated official and ministerial thinking, by the early 1960s, at least at the level of rhetoric, growth and efficiency had come to the fore. The emphasis on macroeconomic concerns for the majority of the time was largely a matter of political choice, rather than the result of an absence of information about British supply-side deficiencies or potential policy responses. These weaknesses had been publicised by the Attlee government, and a wide range of initiatives for improvement pursued. Much of this activity was linked to a desire to learn from the USA, and the American interest in persuading the British to follow its lead continued as an important input into the debate throughout the 1950s. Indeed, much of the productivity debate at that time can be characterised as being about how far British industry should be ‘Americanised’. After 1951 the efficiency and productivity agenda was kept alive by some government officials, and occasionally surfaced in ministerial discussions. But there was a complete absence of a drive on this point from a senior minister as had occurred with Stafford Cripps under the Labour government. The Conservatives did, of course, favour higher productivity; few are ever likely to argue against it in principle. Even so, policy action was extremely limited.1 However, in one area concern with productivity fitted well with the rhetoric of the Conservatives, namely that of alleged labour restrictive prac tices. These were a perennial concern of Conservative ministers, beginning with Lord Woolton, Lord President of the Council, in 1951, only a few weeks after the general election.2 But this consistent theme of Party propaganda yielded little in
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 21
the way of practical measures. Primarily this was because, for all the enquiries and investigations that were undertaken, it proved impossible to show that such restrictive practices were widespread and significant across most of industry. While plausible cases could be made for the impact of such practices on printing and shipbuilding, elsewhere the evidence provided was unpersuasive, even when employers were asked to report restrictionist devices to their own organisations on a confidential basis.3 For the most part Conservative attacks on organised labour in this respect were a matter of a political instinct, grounded in little more than middle-class hostility to a working class made ‘uppity’ by full employment. The international environment Viewed from the perspective of the late twentieth century, the 1950s and early 1960s appear as Halcyon days, sandwiched between the crisis-ridden period of postwar reconstruction under the Attlee government, and the increasingly desperate attempts to deal with perceived economic ‘failure’ from the late 1960s. All the macroeconomic aggregates for these years paint the same picture. Unemployment was low by any standards, as was inflation, especially in comparison with what was to follow. Although there were periodic balance-ofpayments ‘crises’, these were much less fundamental than those of the 1940s, where the issue had been whether Britain could finance a full-employment level of imports, and reflected less profound problems, largely relating to monetary movements or election-driven booms (Table 2.1). (There were general elections in 1955, 1959, and 1964.) The good performance largely reflected the benign international economic context. This was the ‘golden age’ of modern capitalism, with the whole of the Western world experiencing a simultaneous boom of unprecedented dimensions. The reasons for this boom remain controversial. Some writers have drawn attention to the technological and investment opportunities created by the combination of wartime technical breakthroughs and widespread capital destruction and depreciation. Others have emphasised the ‘once-off benefits from the huge transfer of resources from low-productivity agriculture to highproductivity industry.4 The degree that policy was responsible for this happy state of affairs has also been much disputed. The simultaneity of the boom in so many countries, with different policy regimes, suggests that the importance of variations in national stances can be overstated. On the other hand, most of these countries shared a new political commitment to full employment which encouraged a general tendency to expansionism. (Compare, for example, the merciless deflationary defence of the French franc in the 1930s with the willingness to subordinate
22 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
Table 2.1 Macroeconomic performance, 1951–64 Unemployment (%)
Inflation (%)
Balance of payments, current account (£m)
1951 1.2 9.9 −369 1952 2.0 6.3 163 1953 1.6 1.6 145 1954 1.3 1.6 117 1955 1.1 3.5 −155 1956 1.2 4.3 208 1957 1.4 3.2 233 1958 2.1 2.8 350 1959 2.2 0.6 164 1960 1.6 1.1 −237 1961 1.5 2.7 35 1962 2.0 4.0 143 1963 2.5 2.0 114 1964 1.6 3.2 −372 Sources: Unemployment: B.Mitchell, European Historical Statistics (London, 1978) Table B. Inflation: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1980 (London, 1980). Balance of Payments: Economic Trends Annual Supplement 1994 (London, 1994).
its value to growth in the 1940s and 1950s.)5 Policy had an international as well as national dimension, and the creation of a ‘liberal’ international economic environment, albeit one which was achieved only gradually through the 1950s, may well be seen as encouraging if not causing the boom.6 Stable exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system, the gradual reduction of foreign-exchange controls, and the even more gradual liberalisation of trade, facilitated an integration of the Western economies which, whilst posing new policy issues, in this period was overwhelmingly favourable to growth. However, for Britain this positive context was somewhat offset by the fact that a large proportion of her exports went to the Sterling Area. This market grew more slowly than others, especially Europe, so that although Britain lost market share at equal rates in both, the initial distribution restricted export growth.7 The booming world economy enabled British exports to expand at about 2 per cent per annum. This growth was despite the loss of advantage stemming from the re-entry of Germany and Japan into world markets and the end of the early postwar sellers market. However, with imports also growing fast, the pattern of current account surpluses in most years was helped by the improvement in the terms of trade, although 1951 was an atypically bad year in this respect, as import prices reflected the crisis purchasing of commodities occasioned by the Korean War.8 Whilst there was a growing realisation, and some worry, about the
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 23
trend of Britain’s declining share of world trade in manufactures from the early 1950s (a point returned to below), for the most part the balance of payments in this period was seen in a short-term framework of demand management. The periodic ‘crises’ of the balance of payments was usually responded to by restrictions on domestic demand, trying to slow the growth of imports. The dominance of this particular approach reflected the constraint on the use of other policy instruments. Devaluation of the currency was ruled out by the commitment to a ‘strong pound’, whilst exchange controls were gradually lifted, though full de jure convertibility of the pound was not achieved until 1958, and some residual controls continued until 1979. Tariffs and quotas on imports remained significant throughout the period, but the trend was towards liberalisation, especially with respect to quotas, the use of which declined sharply in the late 1950s. These various constraints on action with regard to the international aspect of the economy reflected a combination of worldwide commitments and domestic policy concerns. The Conservatives had inherited the support for freeing trade and liberalising payments from the Attlee government’s adherence to Bretton Woods and the GATT arrangements. Coupled to these explicit obligations was a general Conservative commitment to free trade and maximising international transactions, subject to the need to maintain some sort of balance-of-payments equilibrium. This broad stance was not without its difficulties. Whilst the longterm Conservative fantasy of protectionist arrangements like Empire free trade, or Empire Preference, eroded rapidly in the 1950s, the plight of particular industries in the face of trade liberalisation could still provoke considerable dispute in Party and government ranks, as with the cotton industry at the end of the 1950s.9 The defence of the value of the pound is one of the most contentious aspects of Conservative policy in this period. Many have seen this as part of an anachronistic attempt to maintain sterling as a major world currency, without the requisite economic strength to support such a role.10 This commitment has in turn been criticised as imposing costs on the economy, the rejection of devaluation being seen as linked to damaging periodic bouts of deflation. In the growing criticism of economic policy which appeared from the late 1950s, a strong pound was often bracketed with Britain’s high overseas military expenditure as twin symbols of an archaic search for ‘great power’ status.11 How far devaluation would have been an appropriate response to the balance-ofpayments problems in this period is disputable. Devaluation would have been compatible with the Bretton Woods agreement if the balance of payments was suffering from ‘fundamental disequilibrium’, but this hardly seems an accurate description of the British situation. As already noted, in most years there was a comfortable current account surplus, the pressure on the balance of payments arising from the non-trading account, and in particular the combination of heavy long-term overseas investment, large-scale military expenditure, and short-term runs on the reserves. Britain, of course, had a long-standing role as a capital exporter, and this had been quickly rebuilt in the 1940s.12 In the 1950s the scale of capital exports was,
24 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
as always, basically driven by private profit, but the government encouraged this growth, especially investment in the Sterling Area, whose investors had traditionally looked to London for capital, and to which the British government remained committed. There was lively debate at both the official and broader level about the scale of investment, but the government continued to allow it to grow, essentially for political reasons.13 Critiques of the outflow of investment related to both its immediate balance-of-payments consequences and its impact on domestic investment. The second of these issues is returned to in Chapter 9, but on the former it should be noted that capital outflow does, of course, generate foreign-exchange receipts in the form of interest profits and dividends. In purely balance-of-payments terms, all outgoing overseas investment means short-term costs but long-run benefits. However, whilst the dual aspect of the impact of foreign investment led some to argue its overall balance of payments benefits, the information on this remained poor until 1968.14 The policy of encouragement was based on political calculations more than detailed economic knowledge. The same, of course, is true of overseas government expenditure notably on the military. This was a major part of international transactions throughout the period, and like overseas investment, had been a large component of the balance of payments in the 1940s. Manser rightly emphasised that in most years the private sector in Britain generated a substantial balance-of-payments surplus, whilst this was usually wholly offset, or at best reduced, by an ‘official’ deficit.15 Herethere was a straightforward relationship between political pretensions and economic consequences. Only reluctantly did Conservatives concede the scale of burden this expenditure was placing on the economy.16 Finally, monetary movements were a major feature of the balance of payments throughout the period. This stemmed in part from the huge accumulation of liabilities to countries like India and Egypt during the Second World War but also from the longer-term role of sterling as a reserve currency. These factors left postwar Britain with a surplus of liabilities over assets, which undermined confidence in the pound, and no doubt exacerbated ‘runs’ on the currency when doubts about Britain’s international economic position arose. However, Schenk has persuasively argued that, at least in the 1950s, the Sterling Area balances did not have a significant de-stabilising impact on the British balance of payments, as most of these sums were held as monetary reserves or by government for longterm purposes, and so did not readily move in and out of sterling.17 The periodic crises of confidence in the pound were therefore not mainly due to the maintenance of the Sterling Area system. The Conservative government, then, boxed itself in during this period by simultaneously supporting the exchange rate, encouraging overseas investment and spending considerable amounts of foreign exchange in overseas military and political purposes. This stance became all the more problematic as the commitments to free trade and a convertible currency were gradually fulfilled. The most important attempt to break out of this ‘box’ was made by senior Treasury and Bank of England officials in 1951/2 with a proposal known as
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 25
ROBOT (after the initials of its key proponents). This would have involved simultaneously blocking or funding the sterling balances (to prevent their conversion into dollars), allowing full convertibility of externally held sterling, letting the pound float, and restricting capital outflow to the Sterling Area. But such ideas flew in the face of Britain’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) commitment, and were seen as likely to lead to a sharp drop in the value of sterling and thereby stimulate inflation and instability in the British economy.18 Rather than making such a dramatic leap, sterling was maintained at a fixed rate throughout the period, and convertibility achieved in stages as the dollar position eased. Equally undramatic was the liberalisation of trade, which proceeded only as fast as the balance of payments (given all other commitments) seemed to allow. Even at the end of the period quotas dominated trade relations with the Soviet bloc and Japan, but most trade with OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries was affected only by quite low tariffs. (Another major step in liberalisation began with the ‘Kennedy round’ of GATT negotiations, started in 1963 but not completed until 1965.)19 The pace and pattern of liberalisation, it should be emphasised, was set by balance-ofpayments considerations not those of industrial policy. The sectoral pattern of trade restrictions at the beginning of the 1950s was largely established in the 1930s, and such restrictions were not used to privilege particular sectors of the economy. In this sense macroeconomics and external political considerations dominated trade policy.20 In the eyes of contemporaries, the balance of payments was a persistent problem throughout the years of Conservative rule. Policy failed to achieve its objective of a current account surplus sufficient to finance all the commitments without running into periodic crises of confidence. The Treasury committed itself to a target surplus of £350m. in 1953, and raised this to £450m. in 1958.21 Neither of these was achieved. This was a policy failure, and perceived by the government to be a serious one, but the meaning of this ‘failure’ must be seen against the ambitious objectives of international economic policy set out above. Domestic economic policy Most domestic economic policy in this period was concerned with the regulation of aggregate demand. On the one hand, this was driven by concern with the balance of payments. Under a fixed-exchange-rate regime the balance-ofpayments problem can be seen as a reflection of an inflation problem (inflation above the level of international competitors), but it tended to be the balance-ofpayments situation which was the immediate trigger for restrictions on aggregate demand, even if inflation was a growing concern through the period. On the other hand, an ‘unacceptable’ rise in the figures for unemployment was the usual stimulus to the expansionary ‘go’ phase of the cycle. There was a slow drift upwards in what was deemed ‘unacceptable’ unemployment, but this never
26 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
exceeded 2.5 per cent even in the eyes of those who regarded a little more unemployment as a ‘price worth paying’ for its possible effects on inflation. The other stimulus to the management of demand was the general electoral cycle. Even if correlation does not prove causation, the fact that current account deficits in this period occurred around or just after the elections of 1955, 1959 and 1964 (Table 2.1) suggests how far governments recognised that macroeconomic policy could also be a powerful weapon of electoral management. The main instruments of macroeconomic management were fiscal and monetary policy. On the fiscal side, the Conservative governments followed their predecessor which, especially after 1947, had placed growing reliance on fiscal policy to control inflation, albeit alongside significant continuing use of physical controls. How far this use of fiscal policy deserves the epithet ‘Keynesian’ has caused much dispute. Undoubtedly the use of the budget to manage overall demand in the economy, in line with Keynesian precepts from the war period, marked a major shift of policy from the 1930s. On the other hand, fiscal policy in the 1950s and 1960s did not involve a deficit on the current account of the budget, and Conservative ministers and the Treasury were reluctant to even countenance the idea of such deficits at this time.22 Cairncross aptly summarises the position: The Conservatives accepted in principle the use of monetary and fiscal policy in managing the economy but they were reluctant Keynesians and practised demand management only so long as it did not conflict with what they took to be sound principles. Thus they were never prepared to budget for a deficit…demand management relied on gentle nudges rather than body blows.23 The Conservative commitment to using economic management, especially fiscal deficits, to deal with mass unemployment was never put to the test. The sustaining of demand by private investment (helped, perhaps, by the commitment to full employment) and exports (helped, perhaps, by the international economic institutions established by governments in the 1940s) meant there was no threat of a slump.24 A further implication of this argument is that if the Conservatives had been faced by a major collapse of demand in this period, they might well have failed to respond with the use of fiscal policy, given the priority they attached to financial confidence.25 The idea of a Keynesian consensus between Labour and Conservatives, the idea of ‘Mr. Butskell’, is much exaggerated. Conservatives and Labour remained significantly divided on policy, above all on the role of government in the economy.26 Active fiscal policy was accompanied by considerable growth of the absolute level of public expenditure, but until the mid-1950s spending fell as a proportion of national output. By contemporary definitions this proportion went from a low of 32 per cent in 1955 to 36 per cent of GDP by 1964.27 Growth was thus mainly concentrated in the later years of the period. Up until 1957/8 the rise in welfare spending was at least offset by cuts in military expenditure, so that the
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 27
Conservative aim of tax stability, if not huge cuts, was achieved. However, after the rejection in 1958 of the idea of substantial cuts in military expenditure, the overall trend was upward.28 The growth of welfare expenditure was a source of concern and periodic enquiry throughout the Conservative period in office, but despite Treasury and backbench enthusiasm for cutting back, neither a convincing administrative case for the existence of wasteful and unnecessary expenditure nor political support for cuts was forthcoming. On the former, the Guillebaud Committee into the National Health Service (NHS) in 1954–6 is a classic case of body set up to back a case for expenditure reductions making a powerful case for expansion.29 On the latter, the ‘crunch’ came in 1957/8 when Macmillan accepted the resignation of his Chancellor of the Exchequer and two junior ministers rather than agree to cuts in welfare spending.30 Macmillan and most of the Conservative leaders thereby accepted, implicitly at least, the growth of public expenditure, and hence taxation, if neither defence nor welfare were to be cut. This was by no means the view of the Treasury, and the Plowden Committee of 1960–1 was set up fundamentally to try and impose a stop on the growth of expenditure, by strengthening the Treasury’s role and trying to force ministers to link individual spending projects to long-term projections of the relation between total spending and GDP. It did not, however, succeed in constraining expenditure growth, which accelerated in the early 1960s, even if it did reveal the extent of the Treasury’s unease with much of the postwar settlement.31 On the tax side the Conservatives were able in the early 1950s to reduce the ratio of taxation to GDP, but thereafter it was stationary. There was some emphasis on shifting the tax burden from direct to indirect forms, but overall the picture is one of very substantial stability, both in the share of output taken in tax and in the sources of that taxation.32 One exceptional area was the taxation of profits, where from 1953/4 the government began a policy, which was to be long continued, of cutting the effective tax rate on profits, offsetting a parallel trend in the decline of pre-tax profits.33 This reflected both traditional Conservative views on taxation and a growing concern with the aggregate level of investment in Britain. The latter point is returned to below. Right from the beginning of their period in office the Conservatives reintroduced the use of monetary measures as a policy weapon, ending the era of ‘cheap money’ which had lasted two decades. Thereafter, ‘stop—go’ usually involved the use of monetary instruments as a back-up to fiscal manipulation. However, the use of monetary policy was of a particular kind, to be clearly distinguished from later versions. It did not involve focusing on ‘the money supply’ or targeting money-supply aggregates. Rather it centred on trying to manipulate the overall demand for credit by the use of bank rate, the interest rate level set by the Bank of England. This approach came under pressure in the late 1950s with the growth of concern about inflation, which led to the appointment of the Radcliffe Committee on the monetary system.34 The report of this
28 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
committee largely endorsed the existing approach to monetary policy, though there were many critics who wanted a more ‘monetarist’ emphasis. Finally, the Conservatives eventually added the pursuit of an incomes policy to their policy repertoire. Again, this emerged from the growth of attention to inflation after the 1955 election. Initially this concern was reflected in the Report on the Economic Implications of Full Employment of 1956 which emphasised the wage inflation consequences of postwar full employment.35 After this, a debate ensued about how far such inflationary pressure could be reduced either by a small rise in unemployment or, to avoid such an increase, by an agreement with the trade unions. The Cohen Committee of 1957, set up to look at the issue, came to no clear policy conclusions, though its focus on wage pressure as the source of inflation antagonised the trade unions.36 In 1961, the Conservatives attempted to get union agreement to a National Incomes Commission which would oversee trends in wage and salary movements, but they would not co-operate, and the government had to resort to unilateral action. However, the establishment of a tripartite (government/ union/employer) National Economic Development Council in 1962 was seen by ministers as a way of trying to continue the search for an agreement with the trade unions on incomes. This summary of the main lines of macroeconomic policy after 1951 underlines the growth of uncertainty. Whilst some may look upon the 1950s and 1960s as a ‘golden age’, Conservative ministers and senior civil servants increasingly saw the economy as performing badly on the balance of payments, inflation and growth fronts. Growing criticism of the ‘stop—go’ cycle and its alleged detrimental effects on long-run performance added to the perception of failure. This was accompanied by strong criticism of the Treasury, as the major economic policy-making part of the state.37 By 1960 such criticism was finding a response in at least the rhetoric of the government. Worries about the stop—go cycle were reflected in characteristic terms by Macmillan: following the Budget of last year and the election last autumn, a deflationary Budget would either be very foolish or very dishonest. Unless it is supposed that we would be thought very modern and up-to-date; like those young ladies who oscillate daily between the stimulant and the tranquilliser. The new Progressive Conservatism will then turn out to be a policy of alternation between Benzedrine and Relaxa-Tabs. I don’t like it all.38 Over the succeeding couple of years there was much talk of a major rethinking of both policy and its instruments, as well as some new initiatives, ranging from the setting up of the Plowden Committee on public expenditure to the application for British entry to the EEC. But the stimulation to these efforts was not just criticism of stop—go and the existing macroeconomic policy regime. It also reflected the growing sense of (relative) economic decline which was coming to
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 29
pervade public and governmental discussion of economic policy and performance. The emergence of this idea of decline is then deserving of detailed analysis. Growth and decline Whatever the differences between the Attlee government and the succeeding Conservative administrations on issues such as the appropriate scope for market forces or monetary policy in the management of the economy, it was clearly accepted by both that such management was desirable. A crucial legacy of the postwar settlement was a shared understanding that the national economy was both manageable, and that such management was politically inescapable. The electorate came to expect that their economic welfare would be actively sought by government. Commitment to management of the national economy left open the question of what the aims of that management should be. Initially, in the 1940s the answer was clear: mass unemployment had driven economic management to the centre of the political agenda, so full employment seemed to be the policy objective that all governments would have to achieve to secure their political popularity. However, the threat of a return to mass unemployment after 1945 proved chimerical. Consequently, full employment was increasingly taken for granted and other objectives more actively sought. In the 1951 General Election, the Conservatives made great play of Labour’s tight controls over consumption, attacking the extent of rationing, controls and general austerity that Labour’s policies involved.39 From this perspective, the economic welfare of the mass of the population was threatened not by unemployment, but by a failure to allow consumption standards to rise, fundamentally because of socialistic, over-bureaucratic control of the economy. Whilst really only implicit at this stage, the logic of the Conservative argument was that maximising popular consumption could and should be an objective of policy. From this starting point Conservative thinking increasingly focused on the possibility and desirability of a major growth in the standard of living— famously encapsulated in a speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1954, which held out the possibility (without too much extra effort) of a doubling of the standard of living in twenty-five years. This prospect became something of a Conservative catch phrase, and was repeated in the party’s General Election manifestos for 1955 and 1959.40 This emphasis on consumption and living standards led to a growing government commitment to economic growth. If popular welfare was assumed to be no longer threatened by mass unemployment, it could be positively expanded. Enthusiasm for growth had other roots, too. It seemed, for example, to offer the possibility of resecuring the foundations of Britain’s world role, threatened as they were by economic weakness. It also offered an ‘easy’ way of solving conflicts over the use of economic resources, as, for example, between the public and private sectors.41 The 1956 White Paper on the Economic Implications of
30 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
Full Employment included the following pronouncement: ‘This government is pledged to foster conditions in which the nation, if it so wills, realises its full potentialities for growth in terms of production and living standards.’42 By the end of the decade the Radcliffe report was noting the prevalence of talk of the desirability of faster growth, both in government pronouncements and in more general public discussion. 43 Growth had obvious attractions to the Conservative Party, both because of the objectives noted above, but equally because it offered a useful contrast with the Labour Party’s ambivalence about the ‘affluent society’ that growth seemed to promise. Not until after the 1959 election defeat did much of the Labour Party seem willing to accept the possible benefits of such affluence, and seek an adjustment of attitude that would appeal to the electorate in a richer society.44 However, the enthusiasm for growth was not without its difficulties for the Conservatives. First, the same period of the mid-1950s which saw the rise in concern with growth also saw mounting evidence of poor economic performance by the British economy. Whilst the standard of living in Britain was both significantly higher in absolute terms than most of the rest of the world, and growing in an unprecedentedly sustained manner, in relative terms it increasingly emerged that British expansion seemed to be lagging behind its competitors. Evidence for this ‘relative decline’ of the economy came from a variety of sources, but particularly from a range of comparative economic statistics generated by international bodies such as the UN and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, later OECD). Both bodies were involved in compiling and publicising economic statistics to assess the economic performance of their member countries, creating an unprecedented calculation of comparative economic performance. These statistics most notably covered shares of world trade, the growth of industrial production, productivity, as well as GNP.45 From the early 1950s, the poor performance suggested by all these statistics was recognised in British government circles. For example, by 1954 ministers were alert to the evidence of relatively slow growth in terms of both national income and productivity.46 The inadequacy of British industrial production in comparison with Germany was noted in the major public statement on the economy, the Economic Survey, in 1956.47 Because of contemporary sensitivity on the balance of payments, figures showing Britain’s declining share of world trade were given particularly close attention in Whitehall, and the Working Party on Export Trends, established in 1953, analysed in detail the dimensions and significance of what was occurring. 48 The meaning of the data was a subject of some dispute in Whitehall, but the figures received wide publicity—in, for example, the Board of Trade Journal and in the Economic Surveys of 1954 and 1956.49 Such diverse statistical evidence, whilst its precise implications could be disputed in particular cases, conjured up a picture of relative decline which increasingly fitted poorly with the enthusiasm for growth. If the government, as
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 31
its own rhetoric implied, was responsible for Britain’s economic performance, what was it doing allowing decline to take place? This question posed a dilemma for the Conservatives, which increased as their period of office extended. Combined with this dilemma was the problem of what policies could be pursued in order to improve the British growth rate. The Attlee government had focused much of its attention on raising productivity, and set up a range of bodies with this aim in mind. But for most Conservatives this seemed to threaten too much state meddling in the private sector (see chapters 3–6). To some, but by no means all Conservatives, the answer was more competition—this logically flowed from the rhetoric of attacking Labour’s bureaucratic, over-interventionist policies. Nevertheless, an enthusiasm for competition had to be tempered by the fact that any particular practical measure was likely to face significant opposition in Party ranks. For example, the attempt to increase competition in the domestic economy by toughening up policies on restrictive practices or monopolies aroused much dispute. The same problem arose during the attempt to abolish Retail Price Maintenance (see Chapter 7 below). The encouragement of international competition by reducing trade controls was equally fraught with difficulties, as illustrated by the row over the growth of imports of cotton textiles at the end of the 1950s.50 The other general strand of the approach to enhancing growth in the 1950s was a belief in the importance of raising the investment level. Britain’s relatively low proportion of GDP devoted to capital spending was a common theme of OEEC reports, and though the interpretation of the figures was disputed, generally higher investment was accepted both by the government and its opponents as a key underpinning for faster growth (see Chapter 9 below). But higher investment obviously means that, for a given national income, consumption will be lower. So the emphasis on the growth of popular consumption (the usual meaning given to the ‘standard of living’ in this period) conflicted with the desire to raise investment—at least in the short run. Partly because of these difficulties, the Conservatives were eventually put on the defensive about the growth issue. From the late 1950s, a stream of publications appeared criticising both the British economic performance, the government which was deemed responsible for this performance, and the institutions, such as the Treasury, also seen as culpable.51 In addition, after their successive election defeats in 1955 and 1959, the Labour Party slowly took up the ‘decline’ issue. The long ‘stop’ phase of economic management which followed the 1955 election encouraged Labour to attack Tory ‘stagnation’ and to couple that with evidence of the long-run deficiencies in economic performance. For example, Labour’s Plan for Progress in 1958 broke new ground by featuring comparative figures on economic performance (industrial production and the cost of living, 1953–7). It also emphasised Labours commitment to speed up the growth rate—to provide employment, meet the demand for a higher standard of living, and strengthen Britain’s international position.52
32 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
After the 1959 election, the desire to reconstruct Labour’s agenda became much more powerful. By the time of Signposts for the Sixties in 1961, poor relative economic performance was at the centre of Labour’s attack on the government, and faster growth was now the key Labour promise. ‘Thirteen wasted years’, the Labour slogan in the 1964 General Election, was to be based on a critique of the Conservative’s failure on growth. The Conservatives had little option but to respond to this rhetoric, and by 1964 both parties were presenting themselves as forces for economic and industrial modernisation, on the predicate that Britain’s relative decline had to be reversed.53 1960: going for growth? By 1960 a number of pressures had built up on the Conservative Party to change their approach to economic policy. The growing evidence of decline, together with the related attacks from the chattering classes and the opposition on stop— go and its consequences, was increasing in volume. But the pressures were not all external to the government. Within the civil service there was a particular concern with the problems of controlling official spending, and, stemming from this in 1959, came the establishment of the Plowden Committee on the Control of Public Expenditure. In principle, at least, this committee was designed to reassess a key part of the state’s economic agenda, following growing dissatisfaction with how the increasing size of the public sector in the economy was being controlled and managed. The key outcome of the committee was the idea that government spending should be planned over a period of years in relation to prospective resources (essentially GDP).54 Within the Conservative Party and government itself, despite the 1959 General Election victory, there was a sense of loss of direction over economic policy. A Tory Research Department memorandum in 1961 spelt this out: ‘We have virtually exhausted the neo-liberal seam in economic policy. The existing armoury of economic weapons…is admittedly deficient…. Yet…we have done nothing visibly to examine the problems and search for new ones.’55 The battle over the appropriate response to inflation and public expenditure growth had been lost by the deflationists in 1958, with the resignation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his supporters. A tough ‘stop’ was hardly an electorally attractive option, but how was ‘go’ to be sustained given its usual inflationary accompaniment? The government’s answer was incomes policy, designed to reign in wage growth and thus avoid the need, driven by the balance of payments, for deflationary policies. This was to eventually result in the National Incomes Commission in 1961. A constituency usually sympathetic to the Conservatives, the Federation of British Industry (FBI), also played a key part by its criticisms of government policy. In 1960 the FBI annual conference saw vociferous attacks on the government’s stop—go policies and their alleged impact on growth. Against this background, the government in 1961 signalled a change of tack with the creation
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY, 1951–64 33
of the National Economic Development Office (NEDO) as a focus for a ‘tripartit’ effort to raise growth in the economy. Decline was to be tackled by a version of French ‘indicative’ planning, with the government playing a leading but not controlling role in trying to ‘talk-up’ the growth rate.56 The creation of NEDO was the most obvious symbol of the new growth consciousness. From the government’s point of view some such initiative was politically unavoidable, given the various pressures, enumerated above. How far it represented in itself a major shift in the basic conduct of policy may be disputed. It appears that the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself regarded this new creation as ‘old wine in new bottles’. In 1961 he noted: There appeared to be a growing weight of public opinion that the economic direction of the country suffered from the lack of suitable machinery for long-term forecasting. He hoped that the machinery he had in mind would be of value in creating a climate of opinion in which the economic facts were better understood.’ The following year he suggested that the ‘positive idea of growth is a valuable means of presenting many politically difficult decisions, emphasising that such decisions are a means to enrich people and not to impoverish them’ (the decisions referred to related to the desire to achieve an incomes policy and restrict the growth of public expenditure).57 The creation of NEDO is not the only evidence of a change of direction (at least in the rhetoric of economic policy) during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Later chapters will explore Conservative worries on such topics as education and technical change and their impact on economic growth which surfaced in this period. Particular attention will be given here to Brittan’s oftquoted assertion that many of the policy changes proclaimed and pursued by Labour after 1964 had already emerged in the ‘reappraisal’ of 1960/61.58 Conclusions Retrospective calculations make clear that this period saw Britain performing relatively very badly in comparison with near European neighbours. The figures in Table 2.2 undermine the popular but too simple idea of a continuous deterioration of ‘100 plus’ years of the British economy, certainly if this is measured, as is usual, in terms of relative GDP growth. Rather they suggest that decline was at its most significant in the 1950s and 1960s. It is important to emphasise, as has been suggested above, knowledge and recognition of this relative decline was evident in government circles from the early to mid-1950s. Thus, in assessing the Conservative policies of these years in negative terms we are not being anachronistic; contemporaries were far from ignorant of the kinds of problems of economic performance that later commentators have highlighted. The central aim of this book is to explore the responses to this recognition—both weaknesses and strengths, and character and consequence. The following chapters deal thematically with the major aspects of the governments’ policies,
34 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
whilst the conclusion attempts to draw the strands together and assess how far and with what results the Conservatives in this period Table 2.2 Excess of French, German and Italian growth over that of the UK, 1873–1973 (% increase in GDP/man per annum) France
Germany
Italy
1873–99 0.1 0.3 −0.9 1899–1913 1.1 1.0 2.0 1913–24 0.5 −1.2 −0.4 1924–37 0.4 2.0 0.8 1937–51 0.7 0.0 0.4 1951–64 2.0 2.8 3.3 1964–73 2.0 1.8 2.4 Source: R.C.O.Matthews, C.H.Feinstein and J.Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth 1856–1973 (Oxford, 1982), p. 31.
were able to address the issue of economic ‘decline’.
3 THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN Agencies and impact
Introduction Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, determined and unprecedented efforts were made to convince British business that it should modernise on American lines. Much of the campaigning was directed by US government agencies, though British and European organisations also played a part. The overall objective was to help Britain improve its productivity. Those involved often raised grand themes—the great advantages of competitive markets, for example —but much of their everyday effort went into promoting highly specific techniques, ranging from new methods of accounting to advanced forms of welding. A key belief was the possibility of incremental and self-sustaining gains. As productivity evangelists were fond of reiterating, the search for greater efficiency did not necessarily imply large-scale or disruptive changes. Improved results could usually be achieved fairly easily through relatively simple modifications of organisation and technique, or the removal of artificial restrictions. Chapters 3–6 examine how this productivity drive developed and what it accomplished in practice. The aim is to gauge whether the multiple initiatives were successful or not, and uncover the various influences that determined their impact. The following pages serve as an introduction to the later, more detailed discussion. They focus first on some of the key institutions involved and then begin to look at the question of efficacy. The origins and early development of the productivity campaigns In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United States devoted great attention to furthering European recovery.1 Much of the continent lay in ruins. Surviving industrial capacity was often antiquated or inefficient. Moreover, many Americans feared that impoverished populations in the Western European countries might turn to communism. The immediate need was for finance and resources, which led to the Marshall Plan initiative. However,
36 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
American officials recognised that money was not enough. Longer-term economic prosperity and political stability required that Europeans modernise their industries and internalise the kind of productivity consciousness that was common across the Atlantic. This strategy also promised benefits for the United States itself. After all, American manufacturers needed well-off Europeans to buy their exports. The upshot was a second component of US policy, a government-organised technical assistance programme, projected to be worth many millions of dollars per year.2 Henceforth, most Western European governments were encouraged to co-operate with US agencies whenever possible and help implement their prescriptions for boosting productivity. British reactions to these developments were fairly positive. The Labour government elected in 1945 considered Washington to be its major ally. Moreover, Labour was keen to modernise British industry. As Attlee and his ministers had rapidly concluded, their desired welfare reforms would not be feasible on the back of a weak economy. In fact, substantial steps to encourage efficiency had already been taken.3 Thus, when US officials suggested that Britain could benefit from technical assistance, they were in effect pushing at an open door. In 1948, after initial discussion between Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor, and Paul Hoffman, the Director of the US Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), had concluded amicably, the way was open for the Americans to begin serious operations in Britain. The first main initiative was the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) launched later the same year. This sponsored sixty-six joint employer— trade union teams to visit the United States and investigate specific sectors or particular business practices (for example, production engineering). Altogether, the effort involved 956 British participants at a cost of $3 million, 70 per cent of which was supplied by the US government. Teams were encouraged to do as much as they could to publicise their findings once they returned to Britain, amplifying the results. Each was expected to produce a full report and a popular version, and some 650,000 of these documents were eventually distributed throughout industry. All addressed a range of conferences, embracing trades, groups of firms or representative associations. By the mid-1950s, more than 3, 000 such meetings had been held. While the AACP was operating, the London Mission of the ECA decided to launch its own programme of visits to the United States. It made contact with a variety of British ministries and educational establishments to recruit suitable candidates and in the end sent a further twenty-nine teams with sixty-seven members across the Atlantic. The focus here tended to be on specific techniques such as work study or marketing. To complement this activity, the Mission paid for a number of British managers to study in America, using schedules which combined placement with firms and enrol ment in university courses. By the early 1950s, the Mission had sponsored eighteen such educational programmes, involving 311 students and an expenditure of $1.3 million. Finally, this branch of the US effort, too, was alive to the need for publicity. The London Mission
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 37
imported numerous American documentary films on productivity as well as twenty-five new projectors, and was willing to lend either for token payment. In addition, Mission staffers produced at least four films of their own, for example Over To You, a record of the AACP hosiery team’s visit to the United States. One estimate was that films from the Mission library had been shown 41,000 times by 1955, reaching an audience of perhaps 1.8 million.4 A new phase of the productivity drive began during 1952–3. By now, American programmes were running in several other European countries, and Washington officials could assess what was successful and what had failed. The general conclusion was that a ‘broad brush’ approach to the productivity problem, based simply on demonstrating the superiority of American methods, would only ever achieve limited results. Real and lasting gains meant turning productivity into something of a moral crusade. Wide sections in each society, from both sides of industry, must be persuaded to take part and if possible assume responsibility for their own programmes. Moreover, the question of what issues needed to be tackled in which countries required more thought. Participation and involvement, it was concluded, would only grow in so far as policies addressed local conditions and problems.5 These fresh perspectives produced changes in American policy at every level. In overall terms, Washington decided that its priority must be the creation of national productivity centres, if possible linked together by some kind of umbrella body. Amongst other things, this led to the creation of the British Productivity Council (BPC) in November 1952, and the launch of the European Productivity Agency (EPA) early the following year. More specifically, local staff were encouraged to rethink their own objectives, in line with the drive for relevance. The London Mission’s response was to begin developing a new strategic orientation. American officials serving in Britain agreed that they had been so far unable to influence a wide enough spectrum of opinion. As one staffer recorded in August 1952, there were not enough real converts: During the past two years I have talked with more than businessmen…{and} officers of the Board of Trade, the Commission, AACP, officers of Trade Associations industrialists. No one has uttered the words so dear to the Evangelist, ‘What can I do to be saved?6
200 British Monopolies and other heart of the
In future, the Mission would have to take more care with publicity. Furthermore, it was argued, there needed to be greater clarity of purpose. The current policy stance was too diffuse and should be replaced by a tighter focus. A Mission committee was appointed to look into the matter and it concluded that improving the quality of management in Britain seemed to be the most urgent task. It recommended as follows:
38 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
an action programme…should be based on the principle that the main problem in the productivity fields at the present time in the UK is on the management side—i.e., it is necessary to overcome the considerable apathy and lack of interest and perhaps hostility in large segments of management, particularly in the small and medium-sized enterprises, to innovations in production techniques, to the subject of improved management-labour relations, to modifying existing attitudes toward competition, etc., and to impress upon management the necessity of taking steps to increase productivity by appropriate action in the above fields.7 In practical terms, this pointed to the need for better training. The Mission would have to persuade the British that they should follow the American example, and develop thorough-going systems of management education. This evolving period of reassessment had one final twist. In 1952, Senators Benton and Moody successfully sponsored two amendments to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, the effective basis for all US technical assistance activity in Europe. These stipulated that American aid was in future to be administered in such a way as to encourage ‘free enterprise’ and ‘free trade unions’, and discourage ‘cartel and monopolistic practices’. Moreover, funds worth $100 million were earmarked specifically to achieve these purposes. Governments in Western Europe were encouraged to bid for this money, after having discussed their ideas with the local Missions.8 From the early 1950s onwards, therefore, technical assistance programmes in Britain grew larger and more complex. There were new organisations and objectives, and a greater sense of urgency. The following sections look at some of these developments in a little more detail. The British Productivity Council and the European Productivity Agency The BPC was charged with stimulating ‘the improvement of productivity in every sector of the national economy by every possible means’.9 It was viewed as a direct successor to the AACP and ran on broadly similar lines. The BPC brought together representatives from peak organisations on both sides of industry in a common forum and stood entirely independent of any government department. As with the AACP, finance came from constituent members, the Treasury and Washington (with the latter providing about 30 per cent of the organisations’ income between 1953 and 1960).10 Where the BPC departed from the established pattern was in its mode of working. The BPC leadership believed that the AACP had demonstrated the importance of collaboration. The AACP’s greatest successes had been achieved by getting managers and shopfloor workers, sometimes in more than one firm, to solve problems together.11 The immediate need, therefore, was to find a way of extending, and perhaps institutionalising, such co-operation. To BPC strategists, the obvious solution was decentralisation.
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 39
Much responsibility for improving productivity would have to be handed to specially created Local Productivity Committees (LPCs) in the regions. The drive to establish LPCs began soon after the BPC’s launch, and by the late 1950s there were over 100 in existence. Each committee decided its own programme, but most concentrated on propaganda and education. The events held by the Grimsby and District Productivity Committee in 1957 were fairly typical: May—productivity week with competition for shop window displays, illustrating productivity both in the home and in the factory, special supplements in the local press and evening meetings. October—public meeting with MP on ‘Britain’s Place in World Trade’. November—meeting for managers on ‘Work Study in Management Control’. December—public meeting with MP on ‘Britain and the European Common Market’. December—five day appreciation course and practical exercise put on by the BPC work study unit, especially for the fishing industry.12 One important innovation which the LPCs pioneered was the so-called ‘circuit scheme’. This was part of the drive to encourage discussion about productivityimproving ideas. An LDC would set up a circuit of about ten firms and then arrange for teams from the participants to visit each other in fixed rotation. These exchanges were modelled on the AACP example and involved trade unionists as well as managers. One novel feature was that the circuits usually encompassed companies in different sectors. Such mixing, it was declared, stimulated lateral thinking and protected all parties from the scrutiny of competitors. The circuit scheme was particularly popular in the mid-1950s. The BPC claimed that 500 firms were affiliated at this time and that there had been 7,000 visits during the initial eighteen months of operations. In later years, levels of enthusiasm seem to have declined, and by the early 1960s it was reported that visits were running at a total of only 100–200 per year.13 Alongside its local campaigning, the BPC developed two other kinds of activity. First, much emphasis was placed on the dissemination of information. The BPC created its own film unit and this produced an impressive forty-seven documentaries in the years to 1964. Several BPC films were shown on television. Most notably, six medium-length programmes on the general principles of productivity were made specifically for the BBC in 1953–4, and these allegedly attracted an audience of 3.5 million.14 The BPC was equally active with regard to publishing. Each year saw an extensive output of reviews, pamphlets on industrial techniques and case studies. During the early 1960s, 40, 000 of these items were being sold every year.15 In addition, BPC staff continued to organise a constant stream of meetings, lectures and rallies. A high point was ‘British Productivity Year’, beginning in November 1962, which involved
40 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
inaugural ceremonies in seventy industrial centres, a national rally in London addressed by the leaders of the three main political parties, and nearly 2,400 other events.16 Second, the BPC was notably concerned with work study. It set up a special work study unit in 1953 and provided funds for this to grow fairly quickly. The unit gained considerably when ICI, a pioneer in the field, presented it with a substantial amount of data from past investigations. By the early 1960s, the level of activity was substantial. In 1961–2, unit staff organised a total of sixty-two one-day conferences, twenty-seven three- to five-day appreciation courses, and seventy single lectures or film shows.17 The EPA was created by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1953, using Benton-Moody money.18 It was given three aims: 1 To try to bring about a change of attitude in the management, supervisors, staff and workers of firms, both individually and in co-operation with one another; 2 To concentrate on those sectors which, while of relatively high importance for the economic and social life of member countries, have markedly lagged behind in the modernisation of their methods and are faced with special difficulties hampering a rapid rate of progress; {and} 3 To decide on the most suitable action to be taken to provide the necessary assistance to national productivity centres and to international nongovernmental organisations in the performance of their own tasks. This was an ambitious remit and, as a result, the Agency quickly expanded. By the mid-1950s, it employed 100 full-time staff with the same number of consultants, and was running about ninety projects.19 The Agency’s programmes took in a wide variety of issues and problems. Attention was given to both agriculture and industry, while methods used ranged from team visits to seminars and conferences. The scale of work was impressive. Between 1953 and 1957, EPA activity on management questions alone encompassed 340 training courses, one mission to the US, three summer schools, seven international conferences and forty published reports.20 Many EPA projects ran for relatively long periods. Thus, the ‘Joint Mission on the Teaching of Management-Labour Relations in America and Europe’ visited the United States in 1959, Britain, Sweden and The Netherlands in 1960, and France and Germany in 1961, only then reporting.21 British participation in the EPA’s activities was by no means automatic. The BPC sometimes struggled to raise interest in suggested programmes. Furthermore, not every EPA project was relevant. Some were specifically aimed, for example, at the underdeveloped Mediterranean fringe. A survey of 1954 found that Britain had representation on fifty Agency projects, about 60 per cent
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 41
of the total. This was less than France, Italy and Germany, though still a substantial degree of involvement.22 The Benton-Moody programmes Negotiations between the American and UK governments over Benton-Moody money proceeded during 1953, and, in the end, the British were able to secure about $9m of aid, which was used to finance 163 projects involving 81 organisations. The grants issued tended to be ‘of a pump priming nature’, aimed at stimulating interest and thus hopefully leading to ‘the more permanent establishment of services and facilities benefiting smaller and less efficient members of industry and commerce’.23 Some of those projects supported stretched well beyond 1958, the formal end-date of the programme. Benton-Moody money underwrote the establishment of activity and research in many different fields, as Table 3.1 illustrates. Major sums were committed to advisory services, education and training, and economic and social research. In general, grants were fairly small, averaging about £12,000. However, large sums were provided if the project was felt to be particularly important. Imperial College, London, received £190,000 to establish senior positions in heavy electrical and production engineering, while the College of Aeronautics at Cranfield and Loughborough College of Technology were each given £50,000 for new staff appointments. Established research bodies, both in the public and private sectors, also benefited from substantial funding.24 The Benton-Moody programme had two unique features. First, it was the only technical assistance initiative which involved a substantial academic component. Washington officials believed that the British lacked understanding of competition, human relations and management issues, and accordingly insisted that a proportion of Benton-Moody money be spent on projects which would deal with the more theoretical aspects of these questions. Typically, funds were channelled to existing research teams or organisations. Considerable sums, for example, were given to the Joint Committee on Human Relations in Industry, a body run by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Medical Research Council. These, in turn, were used to finance work in the universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Leeds, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Oxford and Wales. Joint Committee contracts with such well-known figures as J.A. Banks, Tom Burns, C.F.Carter, Tom Lupton, Rosemary Stewart and Joan Woodward produced over seventy books and articles in the 1950s, and ensured the circulation of new ideas in publications ranging from the Financial Times to the Operational Research Quarterly.25
42 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
Table 3.1 The Benton-Moody programme : components and amounts committed, 1956 Component
Number of projects
Amount committed (£)
Advisory services
36
523,648
Economic research Social research Production economics Agricultural research Education and training Publicity Revolving loan fund for agriculture Revolving loan fund for industry EPA Implementation of programme (Unallocated)
37 30 15 10 15 16 – – – – –
227,750 189,659 64,018 106,750 520,100 224,941 700,000 300,000 272,143 45,000 55,000
Source: Rogers, pp. 23–33.
The second novel aspect of the Benton-Moody programme was the revolving loan fund. It was agreed that a proportion of the monies available would be used to support firms that wanted to introduce small-scale innovations in their everyday operations. Adverts were placed in the general and specialist press, and this produced several hundred individual proposals. By the end of 1955, loans worth £0.5m had been granted to forty-two firms. The terms stipulated were usually advantageous: the average loan was for three and a half years at an annual interest rate of 5 per cent, less than that charged on the open market. Most of the firms that received funds were in the engineering industry. A typical case involved a Manchester manufacturer of handling plant for coal mines. It was lent £25,000 to purchase new machinery and reorganise at shopfloor level. Such innovation, it was said, would guarantee considerable gains in productivity.26 The question of impact Taken together, these various initiatives represented a formidable attempt to change British methods and attitudes. In the first phase, the Americans had provided an enormous amount of basic know-how about best practice in a wide cross-section of industries. All the different phases of manufacturing were covered—from design, through production engineering, production planning and production control, to the details of actually making the product, and finally marketing and distribution. In the second phase, there had been a gradual shift towards reforming business practice, pivoted around a strong emphasis on management, and involving a plethora of innovative organisational forms. The whole offensive had cost unparalleled sums. Between 1948 and 1958, direct US technical assistance to Britain alone was probably worth about $15 million.27 To what extent did all this activity actually provoke change?
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 43
This is not an easy question to answer for a number of different reasons. First, it needs to be emphasised that official programmes were certainly not the only conduit spreading American ideas in Britain at this time. Some British companies had made their own arrangements for monitoring developments across the Atlantic and as a result had access to a wide range of information about US practices. Meanwhile, American private companies operating in Britain continued to provide a significant ‘demonstration effect’. This was particularly pronounced because their number was increasing dramatically: between 1950 and 1962, US direct investment in the UK grew by a factor of four and a half, totalling $3,805 million at the later date.28 Finally, this period also saw US consulting companies begin to gain a toehold in Britain. McKinsey started work for Shell in 1957, and then completed contracts for Dunlop, ICI and IPC. Emerson and Booz, Allen and Hamilton were equally successful in gaining British clients. By 1964, the American ‘big three’ employed eighty qualified consultants in London, only 5 per cent of the number with the British ‘big ten’, but still a powerful and prestigious force for spreading transatlantic ideas.29 Each of these developments quite obviously complicates any attempt to trace how official initiatives actually worked. Second, attention must be drawn to the fact that little systematic work on what particular programmes achieved was ever completed by contemporaries. The issue of follow-up certainly surfaced on occasion in both Washington and Whitehall, but it remained controversial. For while the Americans favoured quantification whenever possible, the British were aware that any kind of measurement might provoke significant hostility from important interest groups. The result was a series of reports which tended to focus on impressionistic descriptions of cause and effect rather than hard data. The ECA first raised the question of evaluation during the AACP programme. It proposed reviews of team visits which would give the results in ‘statistical form, i.e. increases in output per manhour or decreases in cost’. Accordingly, the AACP began approaching firms in twenty different industries. However, those involved quickly concluded that the whole idea was in reality ‘both impracticable and impolitic’. To begin with, firms would not or could not supply the series required: ‘it was found that there was unwillingness to give figures of costs and that figures showing the trend of productivity were frequently not available in any form, and where available were not in a comparable form’. Behind this reticence lurked a strong antipathy to placing any commercial information in the public domain, and a resistance to the overall objective of making comparisons between firms on either side of the Atlantic. In the end, the ECA was forced to accept what it viewed as a highly unsatisfactory compromise. Reviews of productivity trends were completed for a number of industries, but these largely depended upon assessments provided by trade associations, without any external monitoring.30 The need for follow-up was returned to during the Benton-Moody programme. The Americans were worried that money was being given to disparate
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organisations without any checks being imposed upon their operations. However, once again, British officials underlined their unwillingness to intervene. The Board of Trade informed the Americans of Whitehall’s general stance: It is one of the main conditions of the research projects carried out under Conditional Aid that the results should be published freely in accordance with academic practice and great importance is attached to independent publication. It is the Government’s view that they will carry greater weight if they appear as independent, academic studies than if there were any suggestion that the Government had been connected with their production or had exercised any right to vet the results before publication.31 This approach coloured views on the more specific question of measuring impact. It was argued that such work would be costly and might antagonise research teams. Those involved should be left to liaise with industry about their findings.32 Given such resistance, the Americans were once again frustrated in their desire for appraisal. Assessments and evaluations: the American programmes These are important caveats, but there is still a vast amount of evidence that concerns the question of impact. Civil servants, independent experts and industrialists all discussed the productivity drive and held opinions on its efficacy. The following sections summarise some of the more pertinent views, concentrating first on those that dealt with the various American efforts. Government officials on both sides of the Atlantic believed that the US programmes had been largely beneficial. A thorough British enquiry of 1951, based upon detailed investigations by several different ministries, reached typical conclusions. It argued that technical assistance needed to be evaluated from two viewpoints—‘direct and indirect effects on the U.K. economy’ and ‘broader social and political implications as a contribution towards European cooperation and good relations with the U.S.’ Existing initiatives had produced varied results. The AACP seemed to have been of considerable value. It was judged ‘a most effective instrument for collecting and disseminating information about American industrial practice, and for stimulating thought on productivity problems at all levels in U.K. industry’. On the other hand, the activities of US consultants in Britain had only been ‘of very slight importance’. As a whole, however, the exercise had produced positive results. The enquiry concluded: Technical assistance proper as furnished direct to the U.K. has played a useful part in relation to productivity problems. It is not possible to assess its contribution quantitatively, but it has certainly played its part in the rise
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 45
of productivity in the U.K. over the past eighteen months. Its cost has not been heavy either in public money or in manpower.33 Five years later, a British assessment of the Benton-Moody initiative was equally favourable. The British delegation to the OEEC told the Director of the EPA that it was ‘impossible to identify precisely the effect which any individual grant may have had’ but added that gains were certainly being made. It continued: For instance, the popularity of the phrase ‘work study’ is no doubt largely due to the support…given not only to work study but to all the allied managerial techniques of layout, production planning, quality control etc. There is also evidence that the importance of a proper understanding of these techniques is becoming appreciated: demonstrations, appreciation courses and training courses are well supported… The delegation concluded that though there was ‘still a very long way to go’, Benton-Moody aid had certainly changed attitudes in an important and constructive way.34 American technical assistance staff in Washington and London occasionally felt disheartened by the pace of change, but they, too, were in no doubt of the programmes’ overall worth. A senior US official reported in 1949 that the onslaught was ‘achieving results in England’, with the ‘intangible and psychological influences’ being probably ‘even more important than the many tangible contributions in technique and methods’.35 Two years later, William Joyce, the ECA’s Director of Operations, was reported to be ‘deeply impressed’ with the success of the AACP, and convinced that the UK contribution to this body constituted ‘an inspiration’.36 Later reviews tended to make similar points. Surveying the entire history of postwar productivity policy in 1956, a senior London Mission staffer argued that much had been achieved: The cumulative effect…has been the stimulating of wider interest in improved managerial methods and better techniques and the development of a fresh outlook on the industrial problems facing the country.’ Moreover, he suggested, most of this had occurred directly because of the American government’s policies: the employment of… U.S. aid was necessary to strengthen the hands of those few {British} government officials and…officers of trade and research associations, and educational establishments who recognised the urgency of the need for greater efficiency and improved management but who lacked adequate moral support or financial resources to put into effect schemes that would help overcome deficiencies.37 These official assessments need to be taken seriously but they cannot necessarily be accepted at face value. British civil servants were always sensitive about
46 THE CONSERVATIVES AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
offending their American counterparts and so tended to downplay problems or failures. Those involved in the ECA feared criticism from Congress or the American press and were thus also inclined to be generally positive in all circumstances. In this situation, it is obviously sensible to look outside government circles and examine what other participants and commentators thought of the various programmes. British trade associations were intimately involved in technical assistance (mediating between firms and government) and so their views offer an important perspective on events. Some felt quite sure that the American offensive was producing identifiable results. The British Steel Founders’ Association collected data on what the AACP had achieved in its industry, and demonstrated that progress was being made under six main headings—sales, design, layout, equipment, methods and research, and industrial relations.38 Nevertheless, others saw the matter in rather different terms. Several trade bodies pointed out that their members had a long-standing interest in modernisation and so were unlikely to be overly impressed by the sudden appearance of the American proselytisers. The footwear trade asserted: ‘Even less than in other industries did the Productivity Team’s Report come as a bolt from the blue. It has been one of a series of important influences on post-war developments.’39 Inothercases, it was frankly admitted that the new ideas had been actively disregarded. Progressive manufacturers in the bronze and brass casting industry were aware of this problem and their pessimism coloured a BPC review of 1955: From a cross-section of the industry…it would seem that the adoption of new techniques has not greatly extended in the last two years, although many more firms have come to realise their value. While the more enlightened firms have continued a policy of purchasing new plant, or reconsidering their production programmes, others have been content to look on with an ‘it costs too much’ attitude or have ignored the recommendations entirely.40 The specialist and trade press held equally heterodox opinions. Some journals were quite sure about the US programmes’ effectiveness. In 1950, the Times Review of Industry commented on the AACP: ‘There is little doubt that each of the reports so far issued has made pertinent recommendations which, if adopted, could raise average productivity substantially.’41 Others took a more discriminating line, believing that progress had been rather uneven. The Economist concluded that the AACP’s most important contribution had been psychological: young managers and workers, in particular, were now more aware than ever of the benefits that high productivity could deliver.42 The Engineer agreed in an editorial of 1952: The true value of the {AACP team} visits has lain less in the collection of new technical knowledge than in the stimulus to new thought brought about
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 47
by the contact of executives’ and men from the shopfloor with ‘the American Way of Life’. For the enthusiasm of Americans of all grades for increased productivity and the high degree of productivity ruling in jobbing as well as in mass-production factories proved a revelation to all.43 Finally, a few titles were rather doubtful that anything much was being achieved. The journal Engineering came to the following distinctively down-beat conclusion in 1953: ‘Expenditure on the activities of the…{AACP} must be regarded as a long-term investment which will eventually pay for itself, but from which the annual returns are likely to be small.’44 A parallel observation was that the Americans had only interested a small minority. The Statist claimed: ‘There is now a wealth of examples of what can be done… But for every enterprise which has taken some trouble to improve the quality of its management—and through that, its productivity—there are probably a score which have been content to carry on in a traditional way.’45 What all of this shows is that there was no real consensus about the question of impact. Many believed that the Americans were achieving change, but there were persistent doubts about both the nature and the extent of their successes. How were the BPC and the EPA rated? Assessments and evaluations: the BPC and the EPA Early comment on the BPC tended to be rather negative. The organisation had been created in a rush, it was noted, and lacked coherence and strategy. In 1953, an American Mission official told Washington: ‘There was general agreement that the BPC is a relatively limited and ineffectual organization and that it requires considerable strengthening. All agreed that it lacks dynamic leadership, sufficient drive to see a sustained program through, and funds to organize and mount a sustained program.’46 Later, as the BPC extended its operations, opinions began to change. Initiatives like the circuit scheme and the work study unit were widely applauded as imaginative and fruitful.47 Moreover, it was generally felt that the decision to build up local organisations was entirely appropriate. Surveying LPCs in the mid-1950s, one US veteran of the technical aid programme came to generally positive conclusions: As in all community undertakings, the success of these local… {groups} appears to be varied. Some are still feeling their way, many are carrying on diverse and useful activities, a few demonstrate imagination, enterprise, {and} dynamism in carrying out a far-reaching program which not only stimulates interest in higher productivity but also provides practical means of helping firms to attain it.48
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Nevertheless, there were those who remained rather less convinced. Some pointed out that the BPC was only reaching a fairly small part of industry. It was very indicative, they argued, that 70 per cent of the 1,340 BPC events put on in 1961–2 attracted fewer than fifty persons.49 At the same time, there were doubts that the BPC was really reaching those in most need of its services. The Financial Times believed that ‘a very high proportion’ of those active in the circuit scheme were from ‘big firms already converted to productivity ideas’.50 Whatever the truth here, research on participants at BPC work study unit seminars quite clearly showed that the organisation had failed in its attempt to involve both sides of industry. One report noted: It is difficult to express an opinion upon the nature and the complement of the audiences, but…{there} have been few Full Time Trade Union officials. In the main middle management and supervisory levels have been chiefly represented. As far as representation from the shop floor is concerned the main difficulty is without doubt, with particular reference to trade union representatives, the payment for lost time.51 Finally, commentators in the early 1960s were critical of the BPC’s inflexibility. In this view, ‘revialist meetings’ and the relentless promotion of a limited repertoire of techniques like work study were no longer relevant to industry’s requirements, and the BPC was in considerable danger of being marginalised.52 Evaluations of the EPA were almost universally negative. In the mid-1950s, The Economist dubbed it ‘a little known child of the OEEC’, and both the Times Review of Industry and the Statist published similar assessments.53 British civil servants were equally damning. In a letter to the Board of Trade at the end of 1955, a senior Treasury official declared: ‘It seems doubtful whether in a material sense the United Kingdom gets a very good money’s worth out of the E.P.A. It does not seem to have many strong supporters in this country and in particular there are few signs that British industry rates it at all highly.’54 Four years later, the Cabinet Mutual Aid Committee bluntly recorded that the EPA’s achievements, when balanced against cost, ‘could not be regarded as outstanding’.55 Conclusions Using contemporary opinion to measure impact, it would appear, offers few easy answers. Those who participated in or reported on the technical assistance programmes quite often held very different views about their efficacy. Complicating matters further, few of these assessments were anyway based on hard evidence. The whole discussion tended to revolve around impressions and anecdotes. Even optimists could usually only point to relative intangibles like a changing psychological climate. Convincing examples of cause and effect were
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN 49
few and far between. As a result, judging today between the contending claims remains virtually impossible. One way round this problem is to adopt a rather different approach and focus on the details of the American effort. The US productivity missionaries were keen advocates of particular techniques and methods, ‘best practice’ ways of making products and doing business. The following two chapters concentrate on a range of these specific recommendations, and trace how they fared in British circumstances.
4 THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN Implementing change in business practice and shopfloor technique
Introduction The American technical assistance programmes were predicated on the central belief that Britain’s firms were very often backward in the way they organised and conducted the production chain.1 The British might have real strengths in areas like research and development, it was argued, but these were frequently betrayed by deficiencies at the design, manufacturing and marketing stages. The need, therefore, was for the British to adopt US best practice techniques and methods wherever possible, both on the shopfloor and in the manager’s office. This chapter looks at these American prescriptions and traces what happened when they were applied in British circumstances. It does not claim to be a comprehensive account but rather presents a series of discrete case studies, chosen to illustrate problems and successes across the spectrum of initiatives. Each topic is approached in a similar way, with attention being given in turn to British practice in the 1940s; the American intervention; and the resulting pattern of impact. Production engineering and control2 During the immediate postwar years, production in many UK industries was regulated on lines which had remained essentially unaltered since the late nineteenth century. The immediate shopfloor area tended to be controlled by works managers. Such men had often started out as apprentices and then risen through the ranks. Few possessed formal management qualifications and their thinking was thus usually governed by experience and tradition.3 They also had considerable autonomy, for, further up firms’ management hierarchies, there was relatively little interest in production. Senior managers came from a variety of backgrounds, but only a minority had much real experience of manufacturing. Directors had always seen themselves as responsible for policy rather than arbiters over the minutiae of practice. Moreover, the general conditions dictated that a range of other questions required priority treatment. Firms faced considerable difficulties in the first years of peace—there were raw material
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shortages and new demands from labour—but they also had the promise of healthy profits because of the pent-up demand in many markets. The natural outcome was an emphasis on getting goods to the customer, however this might be achieved. In such circumstances, those in charge of production often felt themselves overlooked, of real importance to their firms but lacking in status and influence. A.P.Young, a well-known manager from Rugby’s BTH company, complained: ‘In a large well organised unit, say, in the Engineering Industry, probably about 85% of the total personnel come under the direct control of the Works Manager. He is thus able, by his authority and responsibility, to exert a powerful influence on the productivity problem—and yet he is often the “forgotten man”!’4 Of course, some firms were rather less neglectful of manufacturing than others. Knowledge of production engineering had spread slowly in the interwar years but the Second World War gave the subject a considerable boost. Significantly, the Institution of Production Engineers (IPE), which had been founded at the beginning of the 1920s, saw its membership grow from 1,200 in 1935 to 7,300 in 1948. However, the influence of new techniques should not be overestimated. Production engineering and control methods were commonly used by some big firms in certain sectors (for instance, the motor industry) yet were almost completely unknown amongst medium and small firms. Moreover, the scope of production engineering as it was understood in Britain tended to be rather restricted, especially compared to the situation in the United States. British production engineers typically focused on machines, and did not deal with the wider questions of factory lay-out and materials flow that were the staples of their transatlantic counterparts.5 Britain’s relative backwardness in these matters was highlighted during the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) programme. Some forty-one teams visited specific American industries and most returned very impressed with their hosts’ use of production engineering and control systems. For example, thirty-four commented on the importance of mechanical aids in the United States, while thirty were impressed by the modern methods of costing that they saw.6 As a result, the AACP decided to send two specialist teams to investigate US trends in more detail, and their reports were published in 1953 and 1954. In general, both teams confirmed that American practice was superior: there were no major novelties amongst the techniques used, but all were applied with a rigour which was almost unknown in Britain. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the general conclusion was that British companies should try harder. Both the teams went out of their way to stress that small as well as big manufacturers could gain by re-examining production procedures and each underlined that useful changes might be implemented at relatively little cost. Finally, it was also emphasised that nothing should be done without due reference to each firm’s overall position. Production needed to be harmonised with the design, accounting and marketing functions.7
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These were themes that subsequently reappeared in many of the other technical assistance initiatives on production engineering that followed in the 1950s. A $30,000 grant from Benton-Moody funds allowed the IPE to put on Britain’s first national production and productivity exhibition during 1954, an event which attracted 40,000 visitors. Meanwhile, the European Productivity Agency (EPA) was also actively involved. For example, it paid for two American consultants to run a series of seminars on ‘company planning and production controls’ during 1956–7.8 To what extent did this activity actually produce tangible results? Some degree of change was certainly evident. The IPE continued to grow and had 18,000 members by 1970.9 Knowledge about theoretical aspects of production engineering and control techniques also increased and was collected in a series of popular and widely sold textbooks. However, accepting this, it is equally clear that much of industry remained largely unenthusiastic about what was being proposed. If some firms innovated, many stuck by traditional techniques. To begin with, it was commonly noted in the 1960s that firms were still often treating production as a rather subordinate part of their overall operations. Control of the shopfloor, in many cases, continued to be in the hands of relatively unqualified managers, and there was a general reluctance to employ trained specialists.10 As before, those responsible for machine shops remained convinced that they were undervalued and ignored when it came to deciding company policy. Ray Wild, an ex-engineer who worked at Bradford University’s business school, ended his 1972 book Management and Production with the following observation: Production occupies a fairy-tale position in both industry and education, but unfortunately the role played is that of Cinderella rather than Prince Charming. Few people would seriously dispute the importance of the production function in business but this importance is frequently unrelated to the importance attached to it in the board-room, and is certainly not reflected in the importance attached to the subject in educational circles.11 Some years later, two academics who had surveyed the relevant literature came to very similar conclusions. They reported: ‘A leitmotif of the studies is the idea that production management is a “Cinderella function”…is disadvantaged with regard to pay and prospects, status and fringe benefits, image and mobility, and… is an area of work the young and ambitious manager will keep out of.’12 Given this situation, it is unsurprising to find that enquiries which dealt more directly with the diffusion of production engineering and control techniques frequently came to overtly gloomy conclusions. A Department of Scientific and Industrial Research examination of seventeen printing firms in 1961 found that ‘work planning of all kinds’ was ‘grossly inadequate’.13 National Economic Development Office (NEDO) enquiries later in the decade painted a similar picture.14 The disappointing rate of progress is best illustrated by looking at two
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specific weapons in the production engineer’s arsenal—work study and materials handling. Work study Work study (an amalgam of method study and work measurement)15 had been widely promoted in the immediate postwar years as part of Labour’s productivity drive. Nevertheless, many companies had not adopted this technique by the early 1950s, and so the Americans decided that it needed to be pushed much harder. The potential gains seemed enormous: studying each job systematically and from an ergonomic standpoint would allow very much more efficient working at virtually no extra cost. Moreover, the general conditions seemed propitious. Work study had originated in Britain, and the country had both a fully functioning specialist society and several world-class experts (notably ICI’s R.M.Currie and the consultant Ann Shaw).16 This seemed to be a case where an American-inspired renewal of vigour really might produce results. The campaign to popularise work study involved a number of initiatives. The British Institute of Management (BIM) was pivotal in the early 1950s, organising several big conferences and publishing a popular handbook called Outline of Work Study in 1956. Colleges put on special work study courses, often aimed at beginners and tailored accordingly. Finally, the British Productivity Council (BPC) work study unit was also very active, spreading information and engaging in consultancy investigation (see above p. 40). Some of this effort had an obvious impact. BIM conferences were well attended and provoked enthusiasm.17 Moreover, there was an obvious increase in applications. Work study spread through some parts of industry and was widely used in the armed forces. Even the trade unions became interested, with the TUC deciding to create its own work study courses. However, it was also clear that the degree of change continued to be rather less satisfactory than many had expected. Some firms claimed to have adopted work study but were in fact misapplying the technique, confining themselves to measurement as part of piecework bargaining, and thus neglecting the rationalisation of effort. Many others were not even at this stage. Indeed, quite a large residue seemed to be completely oblivious to work study’s very existence.18 Later detailed enquiries confirmed the extent of inertia. An enquiry by the Welsh College of Advanced Technology in 1966–7 examined 200 firms, mostly in engineering, and found that half had no work study department. There was, the investigators reported, ‘still widespread apathy in industry to work study practices’. Certainly, the position in Britain seemed to be lagging far behind that in the United States. While firms in the Welsh sample employed an average of 3. 71 work study personnel per thousand workers, the comparative American figure was said to be nearly four times larger.19 Writing in 1983, Keith Lockyer, John Oakland and Clive Duprey from the University of Bradford’s Management Centre came to rather similar conclusions. They analysed questionnaires
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completed by 1,866 members of the Institute of Industrial Managers and found that though there was consensus about the need for work study, less than half of the sample were employed by companies that actually applied the technique regularly. The Bradford team concluded: Perhaps the most disturbing finding of this survey is the overall low usage of…work study, particularly in the small to medium firms, when compared to the knowledge which is available. A high proportion of production operations managers have learned about work study and have proceeded to ignore it.20 The propagandising of the 1950s, it seems, had produced only mixed results. Materials handling It had long been recognised that materials handling—the name given to ‘the art of rationalising handling and movement’ in the factory21—could have a vital bearing on productivity. An enormous amount of effort was expended on moving raw materials, components and finished goods around plants. One estimate for engineering was that fifty tons of materials had to be handled for every ton of finished goods produced. This might represent anything from 15 to 85 per cent of total costs, depending on the particular process.22 What excited British production engineers (and visiting American observers) in the late 1940s was the fact that the potential for making gains in this area seemed enormous. British industry remained wedded to very old-fashioned handling techniques. Indeed, brute strength frequently predominated. It was believed that as much as 80 per cent of movement was done by human muscle.23 Consequently, the experts agreed, any measure of change was simply bound to bring swift and significant rewards. The AACP Materials Handling team did much to confirm these impressions. It reported that US practice was superior but emphasised that this was not because of some magic formula. The Americans were successful simply because of their rigour. As the team explained: ‘No new or unknown mechanical device not available on the British market is responsible for this increase in manufacturing efficiency; it comes mainly from an extensive and intensive application of known methods and equipment.’24 The lessons for Britain were therefore clear. Manufacturers in every sector, the team advised, must review their existing handling arrangements and mount campaigns to innovate and economise. The need was for thought and planning rather than large-scale investment. It was a question of making improvements without necessarily changing existing manufacturing equipment or factory space. As the team emphasised, this was ultimately a management question since managers would have to take responsibility for designing and introducing the new systems.25 If those involved found this daunting, it was added, then they should take
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courage from the likely benefits. Better materials handling could deliver seventeen identifiable benefits—from ‘Reduced volume of work in process’ to Improved outlook of men as a result of their operating mechanised equipment instead of doing hard manual labour’ —and these were all obtainable for every manufacturer.26 In the team’s view, there was simply no doubt about the importance of the issue: ‘Better materials handling offers a greater opportunity to cut production costs and to increase productivity than any other single factor.’27 This was a striking message and there appeared to be several reasons for thinking that it would be heeded. Britain had a strong and well-developed industry producing handling equipment of every type, from conveyors and forklift trucks to simple gravity chutes and trolleys.28 There was an informative trade periodical (Mechanical Handling) and a regular exhibition for producers and consumers at Olympia. It was also apparent that Britain possessed some real experts in the field, most notably Frank Woollard, an innovative practitioner at Morris Motors and author of a classic text-book called Principles of Mass and Flow Production.29 Finally, it was obviously of great significance, too, that many of Britain’s European competitors were taking the issue seriously. Teams from various countries had visited the United States at this time and virtually every one was impressed by the importance of mechanical handling. The emphasis was usually on the low costs but high benefits involved. A specialist Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) team reported: ‘It appears to be possible, by applying correct materials handling techniques, to raise productivity by as much as 15 per cent in an average factory without any replacement of existing buildings or equipment.’30 In the years that followed, it was quite apparent that some of British industry was taking notice of the proffered advice. The AACP team’s report received much coverage in the press and provoked a good deal of discussion. Mechanical Handling noted: ‘Undoubtedly the Report did a lot…to make executives more conscious of the necessity for more efficient methods.’31 Furthermore, there was an obvious growth in creative applications. At one end of the scale, motor companies introduced new transfer machinery. At the other, some small companies were known to be enthusiastically experimenting with better lay-out and simple methods like pulleys and pallets.32 In an editorial of 1955, Mechanical Handling was in no doubt that progress had occurred. It declared: ‘There can be few of Britain’s leading industrial firms who have not introduced some kind of improved handling facilities within the past few years.’33 However, after the early euphoria had worn off, many observers concluded that much less had been achieved than was initially predicted. Writing in 1958, F.R.Ford, the Chief Production Planning Engineer for Austin’s Midland area factories, produced the following balanced but rather pessimistic assessment: A visit to a number of different factories will, I believe, convince many people that on the whole the progress in material handling lags behind the general level of improvements in the processes of manufacture. There are,
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of course, many exceptions, such as the cigarette and bottling concerns where automatic handling has been developed to a very high degree. I am, however, primarily referring to engineering concerns, and in particular, to the motor car industry.34 One year later, Mechanical Handling substantially revised its earlier rather optimistic assessment. Change was occurring, it noted, but only in a minority of cases. An editorial speculated on the balance of innovation and inertia: At a guess, we would say that for every commercial or industrial firm having a vigorous and continuously developing handling policy, there are a dozen or more which have scarcely the haziest notion of the importance of the handling function from the viewpoint of time and cost.35 Later studies, once again, reinforced the impression that the impact of Americaninspired activity had been fairly limited. In 1974, the Department of Industry’s Committee for Materials Handling established a working party to examine current practice in UK industry. This focused on thirty engi-neering companies and reported amongst other things as follows: 1 Storage and materials handling cost at the median value was found to be 12 per cent of conversion cost… 2 Materials handling appears to be costing many of the companies more than it ought… 3 From the sample surveyed there was little evidence to suggest that firms engaged in engineering production in the United Kingdom are aware of their true costs of storage and materials handling… On the basis of these findings, the Committee felt ‘justified’ in urging British industry ‘to take a new look at manufacture by focusing attention on materials flow as well as on the production processes’.36 As will be immediately obvious, this was a very similar exhortation to the one produced by the AACP team some quarter of a century earlier. Quality control British companies had traditionally tried to enforce quality standards by specification and inspection.37 Blueprints collating data on, for example, dimensions and tolerances would be supplied to all departments and then used to check finished goods. During the Second World War, many firms in engineering decided that this system was too lax and so began utilising simple statistical quality control (SQC) techniques. The most popular instrument was the control chart. Machine operators would sample their output, plot variations as a graph,
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and intervene to correct equipment settings when the trend line moved beyond pre-determined magnitudes measuring acceptability. The move to SQC was widely hailed as a major step forward, but in the late 1940s it seemed that the impetus to innovate was faltering. As several observers noted, there was a ‘lull’ in SQC applications, with some firms even discarding the technique altogether.38 Much of this inertia, it appeared, stemmed from market conditions. As a correspondent to the journal Engineering Inspection later explained, industry had little incentive to worry about quality: We were faced with a seller’s market, material shortages, shortage of machine tools, to say nothing to shortage of skilled labour; many manufacturers had fine fat order books. The net result of all these circumstances was inevitably a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ and ‘get-it-outanyhow’ attitude.39 Those involved in the productivity initiatives found this situation rather worrying. Manufacturing without rigorous reference to quality standards was highly inefficient, generating significant amounts of rework and scrap. Moreover, the drive for short-term gain, particularly in export markets, appeared to be jeopardising the chances of longer-term success. Some British goods were acquiring a poor reputation abroad and there was a strong likelihood that many overseas consumers would simply switch allegiances when German and Japanese competition finally re-emerged.40 For these reasons, it was concluded, the quality issue must be included in the technical assistance remit. As a mark of their determination on this point, the AACP decided to dispatch a team across the Atlantic charged with examining current US practice. The visitors were impressed with what they discovered. Many American firms were using SQC techniques. Some had gone further and were pioneering a ‘new and broader conception’ of quality control, built around ‘a continuous cycle of make-test-adjust.’41 They had recognised that inspection by itself was incapable of delivering fully satisfactory results. Even vigilant inspectors routinely passed a proportion of faulty goods. Anyway, siting a control station at the end of the manufacturing process did nothing to diminish the amount of rework and scrap. The ideal, these firms had understood, was to build quality concerns into every stage of production. This meant convincing both managers and workers that quality was ‘their business’. The team was very struck with just how much was being done to put these insights into practice. Slogans noted in American factories included ‘Quality depends on me’; ‘Price will soon be forgotten, Quality will long be remembered’; ‘Quality—where do we get it? It walks into our plant everyday on two legs’; and ‘Quality is your baby too’.42 The team recognised that these developments pointed to the future but it also accepted that many more prosaic things would need to be done in Britain before they could be even contemplated as practical measures. One important requirement, the team argued, was an expansion in quality control courses,
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particularly those that dealt with statistical engineering (statistical methods applied to production, inspection and experimentation). However, the team emphasised, firms did not have to wait for better educated experts but could do much to promote improvements almost immediately. Greater care was required over the positioning and responsibilities of existing inspection staff. Simple SQC could be introduced and gradually diffused throughout any organisation. Above all, it was stressed, managers must take ‘a continuing interest in the quality of the products’. The planning and execution of quality control procedures needed to be accorded ‘the same careful attention in terms of equipment and facilities’ as was given to other facets of business activity.43 Many in the field were excited by these recommendations, and over the next few years some effort was made to keep them in the public eye. The BPC took up the quality control issue and promoted it where possible. The organisation brought experts over from the US to visit British factories; published manuals and case studies, covering industries as diverse as hosiery and brewing; and put on a string of conferences and seminars, some forty in 1958–9 alone. This activity in turn provided the impetus for the launch of the National Council for Quality and Reliability (NCQR), an umbrella organisation of those interested in quality issues which was active in campaigning until well into the 1960s.44 However, despite all this agitation, there was little sign that the wider business community had been stirred. BPC and NCQR events attracted the converted but were largely shunned by the ordinary industrialist. The NCQR’s newsletter had a circulation of only 2,700 in the mid-1960s while its first national conference in 1963 was attended by a mere 270.45 Indeed, a good deal of evidence suggested that many firms were quite content to continue using highly traditional quality control methods. For example, much of the engineering industry dealt with the increasing complexity of production by simply employing more and more inspectors, without ever really questioning how inspection fitted into their wider organisations. Meanwhile, experiments with SQC techniques or attempts to involve the worker over quality remained rare.46 Writing in 1964, Frank Nixon, a senior manager at Rolls Royce and a tireless proponent of modern methods, regretted that British industry had lost an enormous amount of ground through tardiness ‘compared with those countries which embraced statistical quality control with enthusiasm much earlier’.47 The extent of inertia was revealed by several detailed quantitative studies of the 1970s and 1980s. Lockyer, Oakland and Duprey’s survey of members of the Institute of Industrial Managers revealed that less than half of their sample used statistically based sampling schemes at any stage of manufacture. As the researchers noted, the ‘lack of use of SQC at the process stage (c. 38.5 per cent of respondents)’ was ‘particularly striking’ since it was here that labour, material and capital equipment were ‘committed’.48 Further investigation of current attitudes and practices added to the rather gloomy picture:
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Some 20 in-depth, structured, in-company interviews with quality control managers were carried out as follow-up work to the questionnaires. These confirm that there is scope for considerable improvement in QC in British manufacturing industry and that there are rich rewards to be gained both in terms of enhanced quality and increased profits. Several of the companies which claimed, in answering the questionnaires, to use SQC, are either not using it correctly or are in fact not using it at all. There was generally a lack of knowledge and understanding of SQC.49 A further enquiry by Oakland in 1986 was equally revealing. This looked at 123 firms and found that less than 10 per cent made ‘extensive’ use of SQC techniques. The author commented: The major reason for the low usage…is lack of knowledge, particularly among senior managers. Although they recognise quality as important to corporate strategy, they do not appear to know what effective steps to take in order to carry out the strategy. Too often quality is perceived as an abstract property and not as a measurable and controllable parameter.50 Human relations American productivity missionaries saw the ‘human relations’ approach as essential for shaping the internal life of the company. British and European firms, to US eyes, were often run on autocratic and unscientific lines, which ultimately contributed to their overall inefficiency. ‘Human relations’ solutions promised improvements. The Americans were insistent on two principles. First, they believed in the need for teamwork and consultation at all levels of the firm. Complex problems could only be solved by joint action from different specialists within management. Involving workers in decision-making would boost morale, integrate a previously unused source of relevant knowledge, and ultimately advance efficiency. Second, they insisted that choices should be made on as rational a basis as was possible. Too many executives acted on the spur of the moment. The enlightened way to solve problems was to appraise the facts, refer to the most up-to-date corpus of relevant theoretical knowledge, and only then act.51 Much British comment on these proposals was enthusiastic. The Attlee government had encouraged ‘human relations’ thinking in industry, and many civil servants in Whitehall (particularly at the Ministry of Labour) remained committed to the approach in general terms. Britain had important research bodies in the field, most notably at the Tavistock Institute. However, as time passed, it became obvious that, once again, the real impact of American proselytising was much more limited than the productivity missionaries had wanted. The converted minority attended seminars and conferences, but the great majority of managers and directors were simply uninterested.
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It is quite apparent, first, that human relations principles exerted little influence over the character of internal management functioning. Many companies of all sizes were dominated by charismatic chief executives, in line with the generally accepted belief that the senior manager should be ‘an allpowerful, thrustful personality, whose very genius overshadows and detracts from the more modest performance of his subordinates’.52 At lower levels, managers were organised into ranks, differentiated by varying privileges and badges of position. Outside observers were habitually astonished at the elaborate distinctions. Sizeable businesses frequently operated six or seven restaurants and canteens, differentiated by price and comfort, while lavatories, too, were organised hierarchically.53 Nevertheless, the symbols of status rarely stopped here. One study claimed that micro-distinctions coloured virtually every activity both inside and outside the office. For example, the company car was a potent indicator of prestige: the make and number of cylinders of cars figures largely in the mind of the social climbing employee. Another point is the reception given to him once he has his car…does he drive up to the door (and if so which entrance)? Does the commissionaire park it for him or does he have to do it himself? Where in the car park is the precious vehicle placed? In one firm the nearer the managing director’s car it is parked, the higher the employee’s prestige rating. 54 This kind of structure clearly discouraged consultation and team-working, but managers were anyway far from eager to engage in such activity. The codes which bound firms together emphasised duty and obedience. Much reference was made to the ways of the military. The ethos of ‘command and control’ had permeated deep into the collective consciousness.55 Consequently, most managers expected to give and carry out orders rather than indulge in independent thinking. Seniors might discuss issues with juniors on occasion but this was entirely at their discretion. At the beginning of the 1960s, it was sometimes claimed that these arrangements were finally changing. A number of companies were known to be taking management development much more seriously, employing systematic procedures to discover and nurture talent while discouraging nepotism.56 Moreover, there appeared to be a degree of fresh thinking about decision-making. Various commentators heralded the arrival of what they referred to as ‘the new management’.57 An article in Management Today during 1967 argued that the past few years had been ones of dramatic progress: Under the pressure of increasing world competition, many major UK firms have now recognized the need to make…{a} basic change in management philosophy…. How revolutionary and fundamental this change is can only be seen by comparison with the past. The chief executives who have
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successfully carried through this quiet revolution…have made four major changes. They have (1) set stretching targets (2) pushed down responsibilities to middle management (3) demanded fact-founded decisions {and} (4) encouraged a philosophy of constructive dissatisfaction.58 However, these claims were almost certainly exaggerated. Many small and medium-sized companies continued without management development schemes, as the 1965 National Economic Development Council enquiry demonstrated.59 Similarly, power in organisations was still usually highly centralised. Indeed, 52 per cent of the UK’s top 200 companies in 1970 were headed by a chairman who was also the chief executive.60 Change may have been occurring but it had yet to transform the mainstream. ‘Human relations’ principles were little more evident during this period in dealings with the shopfloor. Personnel managers were the great evangelists of the new approach but they had struggled to gain influence. According to a survey of 1959, the discipline was in crisis; if not ‘bankrupt’ then certainly ‘insolvent’.61 The problem was that personnel managers too often found themselves relegated to a peripheral role. At the British Motor Corporation, for example, they were not allowed to attend major negotiations with the unions, and this seemed to be fairly typical.62 Research by Michael Poole of Sheffield University in the early 1970s confirmed that most managers continued to attach ‘comparatively little importance to personnel work, particularly in comparison with production and sales activities’.63 Other classic components of the ‘human relations’ approach to labour were equally underdeveloped. Joint consultation in plants had spread quite widely in the 1940s but thereafter languished. An investigation by the Industrial Welfare Society in 1961, which examined ninety-eight member firms, came to gloomy conclusions. More than half of the sample had no formal consultation machinery. About one-third were using their committees merely as ‘a forum for managerial announcements and employee’s minor grievances’. The author of this study commented: ‘There is an air of disillusionment in industry about the work of formal consultation.’64 The position with regard to parallel methods of involving the workforce was very similar. For example, firms were rarely willing to share financial information with their workers.65 The majority even balked at basic suggestion schemes. An enquiry of 1960 reported: ‘It is probable that well over 500 suggestion schemes now exist in Great Britain. It is, however, quite certain that the number of successful schemes is less than a hundred.’66 Indeed, in most firms, the treatment of the workforce proceeded without almost any reference to ‘human relations’ prescriptions at all. Dorothy Wedderburn and Christine Craig’s research at the end of the 1960s showed that there was ‘considerable inequality in all aspects of the employment relationship’.67 A few years later, the experienced journalist Simon Caulkin told readers of Management Today:
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It has become a truism to say that the factory gates are democracy’s last great frontier, in the loose sense that people who wouldn’t dream of denying a worker’s right to vote for a government also wouldn’t dream of asking him what colour the factory walls should be. But its not just a question of who makes what decisions. There exists within industry a whole range of petty, niggling discriminations which have long since disappeared outside… In his view, the gulf between manual workers and virtually everybody else in industry was ‘not one of degree, of simple differentials on the same scale, but one of kind’. Workers, he concluded, were ‘on a different ladder altogether’.68 This was hardly what the productivity missionaries had envisaged twenty years before. Inter-firm comparison As has already been suggested, the Americans were always keen that the impact of technical aid should be accurately measured. This led to a good deal of theoretical work on the calibration of productivity improvements 69 as well as to some practical measures aimed at helping firms make their own diagnoses. Of particular importance in this latter category was an initiative by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. It had been engaged in compiling case studies of how US firms were performing in relation to productivity, and in 1952 decided that these should be distributed in Britain, so as to provide local industrialists with a standard of comparison. Quite unexpectedly, the reaction was relatively positive. Some 5,000 copies of the Bureau’s studies were distributed in the next four years and, moreover, it appeared that these were having some real influence. Hired to evaluate the programme, the BIM declared: ‘In our view the reports are so valuable because they have succeeded in stimulating managers.’70 Inspired by these events, the BIM, BPC and other interested parties began considering what could be done to keep the momentum going. They agreed that comparison with US data was useful, but accepted that some firms found this difficult because of differences in production processes and product ranges.71 The priority, it was concluded, must be a wholly British series of measurements, which would allow those in any given industry to make unambiguous assessments of their own relative performances. One obvious way forward was for Britain to follow its continental neighbours and adopt a benchmaking technique called inter-firm comparison (IFC).72 The advantages of this strategy were obvious. IFC was relatively simple to operationalise, since it depended on collating information from firms and then supplying them with a few key ratios relating to average and leading performance.73 Equally important, applications seemed to bring impressive results. After attending an EPA conference on IFC in 1956, an executive member
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of the National Union of Manufacturers was so enthused that he made the following public declaration: I believe this…{event} has shown the reason why German industry has made such an astonishing recovery since the war, and why the rate of improvement in British industry in the last few years has slowed down…. For various reasons many British trade organisations are like convoys sailing at the speed of the slowest ship. In regard to German industry, it was quite clear that the Germans were forced by wartime circumstances to take greater measures of standardization in their costing and accounting methods, and this led to IFC on a wide scale after the war. Not only has the German industrialist been forced to work through the necessity of recovering from disaster; he has an incentive shown by IFCs.74 However, as those working in the field knew, the wide-scale introduction of IFC into Britain would not necessarily be easy. Several trade associations had already experimented with the technique but there were reasons for thinking that British industry as a whole might well be resistant. Two BIM specialists reported that there were several major factors holding firms back from taking part in comparisons: 1 Indifference: this seems to be mainly due to a lack of imagination on the part of managers and trade association officials, who find it difficult to envisage what good a comparison can do for the industry and its firms. 2 Fear that the information supplied will fall into the hands of competitors or others who might use it to the disadvantage of the firms concerned. 3 Failure of the organisation conducting the comparison to present the results in such a way that firms can clearly see their usefulness.75 Mindful of such difficulties, the BIM and the BPC decided that they needed a spearhead for change and so launched the Centre for Interfirm Comparison (CIFC) in the spring of 1959. The new unit offered a number of services. It acted as a clearing house for information about IFC, and publicised developments through courses and conferences. However, most effort was put into direct consultancy work. In exchange for a small fee (£300–£50), firms could obtain packages of information summarising how others in their industry were performing together with advice about achieving improvements. Great emphasis was placed on the fact that the CIFC’s operations were entirely confidential. Each firm taking part was given a code number and never referred to by name. In addition, the industry data supplied comprised percentages and rates, formats that defied disaggregation and thus masked the identification of individual participants. The objective was to build trust in IFC, and thus allow firms to become their own ‘management doctors’.76
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In the years that followed, the CIFC developed into a powerful voice for change. It argued that British companies were often routinely working at suboptimal levels. Two ‘striking points’ had emerged from the detailed consultancy work: 1 The wide range of results as between one firm and another in the same industry; for example, in one industry the time taken to produce a ‘standard product’ shows a variation of 2½ to 1; in another industry the number of days required by firms to collect outstanding debts ranged from 54 to 107… 2 Typically, no one firm is best at everything; it usually turns out that all those taking part in a comparison could improve in some respect, even the ‘best’ firms.77 In the CIFC’s view, some of this unevenness could be explained by reference to structural factors (for example, size and location), though most stemmed directly from ‘differences in managerial efficiency’ and was therefore entirely avoidable.78 Thus, what the whole exercise demonstrated, the CIFC believed, was that many firms could become a great deal more efficient if they took some simple steps to organise themselves better. This was a message that gained publicity and some loyal clients, but it was not one that British industry as a whole apparently wanted to hear. Some 1,000 companies from forty trades had used the Centre’s services by the end of 1964. Nevertheless, most of the potential market remained uninterested. An editorial in the Engineer was frank about the very limited scale of take-up: it is estimated that even within the industries covered not more than about five per cent of firms have subjected themselves to interfirm comparison. This figure…applies even where the Centre has co-operated (as it prefers to do) with a trade association.79 Conclusions Taken together, these case studies demonstrate that the American technical assistance programmes had a rather uneven impact on British industry. The US agencies certainly helped spread knowledge of new methods but their impact on applications was less straightforward. There were many success stories. Both big and small companies found that American prescriptions really could improve productivity. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the scale of change was generally disappointing. Wild and Swan looked at fifty small and medium-sized manufacturing companies in West Yorkshire at the beginning of the 1970s and were struck by the low utilisation of accepted and well-proven techniques’. The truth, as Management Today reported in 1971, was that the response of ‘the large mass of British companies’ to innovations in know-how and management could only be described as ‘halting, uncomprehending and limp’.80
5 THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN The quest for management professionalisation
Introduction During the late 1940s and early 1950s, many American technical assistance personnel who crossed the Atlantic were shocked at the poor quality of British management. Fairly typically, a team that visited Lancashire in 1951 concluded that the cotton industry’s managers were mostly ‘dominated by… inertia’.1 As the Americans saw it, the obvious solution to this problem was the introduction of reforms that would make the British manager more professional. The need, they argued, was for a greater degree of training. Britain must follow the American example and teach its managers how to perform. The following chapter describes what happened when the US missionaries tried to implement their prescriptions. It deals with both the push for management education and the history of the British Institute of Management (BIM), since this latter organisation was believed to be crucial in establishing professional values. Management reform in the immediate postwar years: attitudes and initiatives At the end of the Second World War, few in Britain had much inclination to discuss management issues. The journalist Oliver Roskill reported that ‘a small but distinguished minority’ of industrialists was interested in ‘research and questions of organisation generally’, but he also stressed that most of those in business ‘would not have an organisation chart in their office at any price’.2 Symptomatically, activists in the ‘management movement’—a loose aggregation of progressive practitioners, consultants and academics—quite readily admitted that they remained isolated. An editorial in the Manager during early 1945 regretted: ‘For three decades, at least, a band of undaunted enthusiasts have toiled for the acceptance by industry of scientific principles of management. It would be foolish to deny that hitherto the results have been disappointing’.3 In further education, the position was equally uninspiring. A few technical and commercial colleges provided courses, mainly for the qualifying institutions, but these were of variable worth. In addition, one or two universities had
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commercial degrees, or offered management options to economics and engineering students. However, many within the sector remained decidedly hostile to any vocational orientation. The Cambridge University Appointments Board, for example, emphasised that its economics syllabus was meant to address theoretical rather than practical questions: Economics does not provide…training for business even in the sense in which, say mechanical science does for engineering or medicine for the medical profession. It is concerned with the broad social aspects of industry and commerce rather than the problems of day to day administration.4 The incoming Labour government viewed this situation with dismay and, as part of its productivity drive, determined to implement reforms. One idea was to establish a national focus of excellence, and this was realised with the launching of the British Institute of Management in 1948. Additionally, Labour also decided to do something specifically about management education, and appointed the distinguished and pioneering consultant Lyndall Urwick to head a committee charged with making recommendations. This conducted extensive discussion with a variety of professional bodies and eventually reported in 1947. The Urwick committee confirmed that much was wrong with the current position. Britain had between 400,000 and 450,000 managers and required an annual intake of some 12,000 recruits to maintain parity. However, current training facilities were inadequate to provide for even a small fraction of this total.5 The way out of this dilemma, the committee concluded, was to launch a new diploma, and thus replace the existing multiplicity of provision with one syllabus and one course path. Such a qualification would be awarded after five years of part-time study. Students were first to concentrate on ‘background’ subjects (for example, economics) and ‘tool’ subjects (for example, accounting), subsequently proceeding, if proficient, to courses on ‘management’ subjects (for example, factory administration), and thence examinations.6 As a rider, the committee acknowledged that instituting this scheme would require some increase in the supply of competent teachers. It therefore endorsed the recommendation of the earlier Percy enquiry into higher technological education that ‘at least one institution should be selected as a centre for post-graduate study of industrial administration’.7 When Labour accepted these proposals, there were some who concluded that a new era was about to begin. The government received fulsome praise from those in the management movement.8 Moreover, private interests seemed to be following Whitehall’s lead: the Administrative Staff College (ASC), set up in 1946 by a group of industrialists, was the most prominent of various fresh initiatives.9 However, as more sober observers recognised, the superficial signs of change masked a less encouraging reality. For example, it was clear that the BIM remained largely isolated, essentially ignored by those in business.10 Moreover,
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the new courses were only attracting a very small number of students. Some 500 were studying for the Urwick diploma at the beginning of the 1950s, a total which dwarfed the even less impressive 80 who usually passed through the ASC during any one year.11 Most of industry, indeed, was still overtly doubtful about the value of all formal management education. Surveys revealed that the majority of executives, for example, favoured ‘practical’ over ‘bookish’ training.12 The General Secretary of the Institution of Works Managers was one of several who argued this point in print: Good management is mainly an art and, being an art, is largely an innate capacity which cannot be acquired; good managers certainly have qualities of personality and character which enable them to direct an enterprise. These characteristics are developed and enriched by first-hand experience of the job of managing; there is no substitute for ‘going through the mill.13 For Urwick, therefore, the whole situation seemed to be rather depressing. The job of managing people, he constantly reiterated, was one that needed to be learned, using systematic educational techniques. It could not just be ‘picked up’ by someone with ‘a good eye’. On the other hand, the experience with Labour’s reforms tended to suggest that many in business would never accept this, largely because they themselves were often products of the old ‘amateur’ tradition. 14 The American offensive It was at this point that the influence of the United States began to be felt in discussions about British management. The US view was that existing British reform initiatives were on the right track. Management could be taught. Improving standards was therefore largely a matter of creating an adequate level of provision. What Britain needed was new institutions, modelled on the kind that had already proved successful across the Atlantic.15 The first step in the US campaign was the dispatch of an AACP team led by Urwick to study American university and college courses. Some members of this group had visited the United States in the 1930s and were known to have been impressed by its business schools. Not unexpectedly, their final report emphasised the crucial role of management education: The Team was deeply impressed by the steps taken by American business to educate, train and develop its future business leaders, and is convinced that the results of these efforts have had, and will continue to have, a vital bearing upon American productivity.16 The Americans followed this up with the suggestion that Britain should use Benton-Moody funds for management education purposes. Senior mission staff advocated the creation of a ‘British Harvard’, an institution which would be able
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to conduct high-level research and produce management teachers.17 In addition, they wanted to create several chairs of management in British universities, and were particularly keen that one should be established at Cambridge because of its prestigious position. Finally, the Americans made it clear that they wished to see the BIM prosper. This led to the organisation being awarded grants from 1954 onwards, some totalling as much as £40,000 per year.18 From the mid-1950s onwards, US pressure was also exerted through the European Productivity Agency (EPA). This jointly funded body was seen as important because it already operated a large number of programmes on management subjects. Nine of these dealt specifically with education. Soon after its foundation in 1953, the EPA had decided that it ought to connect existing management training centres, and the result was a series of conferences and meetings on subjects like teaching curricula which ran until 1958. At the same time, the Agency continued to be active on the more specific question of how business education teachers should be trained. This entailed taking European practitioners across the Atlantic so that they could gain from an involvement on American courses, as well as providing funds for proven US experts to visit Europe. A final area of activity involved trying to promote greater co-operation between individuals and organisations across the continent. A report of 1958 noted: the Agency seeks to become an information exchange not only between centres for elementary and advanced management training in member countries, but also between member and associated countries. It is already in contact with about 150 European centres and every major American university, has planned an inter-European Exchange Scheme for teachers and has secured the co-operation of American liaison officers.19 All of this amounted to an impressive effort to promote transatlantic ideas and particularly the ethic of professionalism. To what extent were the Americans successful in achieving their goals? Were the British converted to the notion that their managers should be trained? To answer these questions, the next sections look first at management education and then at the fate of the BIM. Management education: the impact of US initiatives in the 1950s Some of those who reviewed the evidence on training concluded that the Americans had indeed made an immediate difference. A significant number of British educational institutions began to offer management courses in the late 1950s, and by the turn of the decade it was estimated that about 6,000 students were studying the subject at some level.20 Big firms also seemed to have become galvanised. Many were experimenting with their own in-house schemes, while several dozen had gone one step further and invested in creating a company
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college.21 Finally, it was apparent, too, that teachers of management subjects had become both more competent and better organised. After meeting on an EPA course, one group had subsequently founded the Association of Teachers of Management, and this was gradually building a reputation as ‘a network for interchange to facilitate understanding and to encourage innovation in a sustained attempt to raise…standards’.22 Each of these developments, it could be persuasively argued, would not have occurred without outside stimulation. However, as the Americans themselves acknowledged, the real degree of change was in fact very much less impressive than this suggested. First, there was no doubt that the Urwick scheme had continued to struggle. About 1,500 students were studying for the diploma in 1959, but most attended classes parttime in technical colleges, institutions that notoriously suffered from poor funding and low prestige. In these circumstances, there was a general feeling that the qualification carried little weight. As one management educationalist observed, it had been ‘slow in gaining the full esteem of employers’.23 Meanwhile, courses run in universities suffered from rather similar problems. Many senior academics refused to concede that management studies had real coherence or merit, and so remained wary about granting the discipline any degree of recognition. Reporting on the position in 1961, a professor at Bristol frankly admitted: ‘Management’ has not yet passed the test of being a study discipline in the universities. It lacks an adequate technique of analysis and there is a shortage of usable material on which to apply such analysis as we have.24 In overall terms, therefore, progress towards an American-style system had been distinctly unimpressive. George Robbins, from the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of California, visited Britain at the end of the 1950s and was struck by a feeling of dismay. He noted that the British still tended to see management education in narrowly instrumental terms. It was viewed as a way of helping existing managers to improve, thereby boosting their chances of promotion. The American ideal of a subject that could be taught in universities had simply not caught on. Robbins noted: There is very little evidence of recognition of need for or value of postgraduate teaching and research in a truly professional school environment aimed at…preparation of highly-qualified persons for careers in management that will lead to the most responsible positions in industry and commerce, and…development of a professional faculty…25 The Americans’ problems were symbolised by their failure to establish a management chair in Cambridge. Negotiations with the university had dragged on for several years during the mid-1950s and ended in stalemate. The Cambridge authorities seemed quite happy about the prospect of an endowment from the
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Benton-Moody account, but could not be persuaded to actually make an appointment. The London Mission was astonished at this prevarication and the prejudice that lay behind it. In the end, one US official proposed that Cambridge should employ an American, as this would side-step the source of the problem. He explained: It should not be difficult to find a professor of repute in the U.S., skilled in this subject, who is perhaps due for retirement and who would be able to set up this course…. This has a psychological advantage. We quite understand that professors of management, industrial relations, and the like are rather looked down upon by the other faculty members at the ancient universities in the U.K. This makes it rather difficult for them and their families socially. An American, being more thick-skinned and perhaps not so perceptive of this class distinction would not be adversely affected and would be able to get on with the job. As I put it to one of the university authorities some months ago,…the Cambridge faculty would not expect an American to be a gentleman and it would therefore present no great problem!26 Not unexpectedly, this suggestion did no more to break the deadlock than any other, and in the end the Americans were forced to leave Cambridge to its own devices.27 What made this whole situation even more depressing for the proponents of management education was the fact that there seemed to be little hope of change. To begin with, it was clear that Britons who wanted an expansion of provision held very different views about what this actually meant. Some favoured the American model but others did not. Indeed, criticism of transatlantic solutions appeared to be becoming more strident. In 1955, a high-level EPA team returned from America expressing rather muted feelings of unease. It reported: ‘while a great and, on the whole, successful system of business training exists in…the U.S., there is, in that country, some concern that the teaching methods and standards are no longer completely appropriate to the needs of commerce and industry’.28 Five years later, a British student who had studied at Stanford told the Director that ‘overcrowded classrooms…generally indifferent faculty, poor quality textbooks, {as well as} fundamental disagreements on policy’ could be found ‘in even the best of the U.S. graduate schools’, and warned that Britain must not under any circumstances ‘ape the American pattern’.29 To make matters worse, there was little sign of any softening in business opinion. Many directors continued to believe that ‘a manager was born not bred’, and so were highly dubious about education in general.30 The Federation of British Industries (FBI) took a slightly less dogmatic line but disputed the need for any major change. The organisation’s view was that few of those who wanted to become managers really had the required innate characteristics for such a calling. Thus, multiplying courses and facilities would simply lead to the
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squandering of resources. An official made this point forcefully at a conference in 1961: The…view widely prevails in industry that it is wasteful and possibly damaging to give large numbers of people management training at the undergraduate level—when there has been no kind of test as to whether these men are destined to be managers or not. It has to be proved that the leadership element in the manager is present before it is really worth spending any time on management training.31 If there was to be any expansion at all, the FBI opined, it should be concentrated on post-experience schemes, since these catered for precisely the kind of manager who had already proven his or her credentials in practical terms. It could not be denied, as those involved openly recognised, that this was in effect ‘the opposite view to that generally held in the United States’.32 Management education: the impact of US initiatives in the 1960s At the end of the 1950s, a new organisation was founded in an attempt to break out of this impasse.33 The Foundation for Management Education (FME) brought together a group of Harvard alumni, several Tory MPs, and the chairman of the University Grants Committee (UGC) (the body responsible for higher education funding). All were passionately committed to the American model but also highly realistic about the scale of difficulties that had to be faced before this could be replicated in Britain. If the FME was to be successful, they agreed, it would have to lobby behind the scenes, gradually converting influential politicians, civil servants and industrialists, so as to create a climate where business schools might be formed. There was little point in public campaigning or bold exhortation: the FME was to operate via the private dinner party and the personal aside. After a year or so of agitation, it was apparent that this strategy was yielding results. An initial approach to sympathetic business contacts raised nearly £30, 000 and allowed the FME to support entirely new management courses at the universities of Bristol, Cambridge and Leeds. Encouraged by this success, the Foundation decided to extend its operations even further, launching a second fundraising campaign to finance more academic programmes. An approach was also made to the government, with the aim of persuading it to provide matching funds. The Conservative administration which held power in the 1959–64 Parliament at first had no very definite views about management education. Some senior figures were certainly very worried by Britain’s faltering growth rate and saw management weakness as part of the problem. The veteran businessman and
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politician Lord Chandos, for example, told the Minister for Education that the government must do something quickly to put the matter right: He said that there was an urgent need to improve the quality of management training, and complained that the universities were not taking the subject seriously. He advocated the establishment of something on the lines of the Harvard Business School suitably adapted to British needs. He felt that if such a School were set up, industry would be willing to pay for it.34 Nevertheless, this was by no means a majority view. Lord Hailsham, the Lord President, warned that intervention would bring its own difficulties. Academic prejudice against management studies was, he noted, ‘deeply ingrained’, with many even maintaining that there was no such subject. Moreover, the universities were ‘also extremely suspicious of government initiative and ready to regard it as interference’.35 Others felt that, if funding was to be increased, then the bulk of the new resources should go to the existing technical colleges, since these had kept the flag of management education flying in the dark days of the 1950s. However, in the end, the FME view emerged triumphant. Keith Joseph, a prominent figure in the group, had entered the government as a junior minister at the Board of Trade and he was able to use his influence to gain allies. It was announced that the Treasury would provide £100,000 in conjunction with the FME to support a further nine university management courses. The FME’s success, and the government’s evident sympathy for its goals, convinced many that further progress was now virtually inevitable. Articles in the business and specialist press discussed the possibility of a ‘British Harvard’ and speculated where it might be situated. At the same time, various universities began positioning themselves to head the field. Manchester expanded its existing facilities and appointed new staff. Cranfield, a college of aeronautics and engineering, sent a senior lecturer to participate in the Harvard International Teachers Programme during 1961–2 and then launched a course that was modelled on the first year of an American MBA. The academic in charge of this development told the press: ‘we need a Harvard-type institution for outstanding men in the 22–33 age group…it is not a question of slavishly copying American methods—we can improve on them…it is a question of filling a gap that exists in no other industrialised country’.36 Meanwhile, Lord Rootes, head of a large car company and the force behind the newly designated University of Warwick, had also become involved. He argued that Warwick, on a greenfield site and near the engineering centres of Coventry and Birmingham, was ideally suited to be a business university.37 All the parties involved were encouraged further during 1963 with the publication of two government reports. In April, the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), set up a year earlier to review Britain’s growth performance, issued a document which made some play of the need for enhanced business education. The key paragraph,
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which had allegedly been partly drafted by a leading academic seconded from Manchester’s management department,38 made an absolutely unambiguous recommendation: There is a need in this country for at least one very high level new school or institute on the lines of Harvard Business School or the School of Industrial Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, either as an independent institution or as part of some existing University or College… This should help to provide better trained managers for industry, more trained teachers for technical colleges, and a much needed national centre for research into problems of management and administration.39 Six months later, the Robbins Committee, which had been appointed to review the entire field of higher education, reinforced the NEDC’s argument that Britain needed better management education. However, Robbins raised the stakes even further by suggesting that not one but ‘at least two’ major post-graduate institutions should be created, and this ‘in addition to other developments already probable in universities and other institutions’.40 These two publications caused great excitement but also exacerbated longstanding tensions and divisions. As those involved began to seriously consider what the magic word ‘Harvard’ really meant, it became obvious that there were still two very different—even mutually exclusive—conceptions of management education in circulation. The FME, its allies in the universities, and the management movement were insistent that Britain should follow the American example. As The Economist explained, they wanted one or more busi ness schools which would ‘(a) have outstanding prestige, (b) cater only or primarily for graduates, (c) operate on a scale that would make most present British university experiments in business education look like penny packets… and…(d) rely heavily on the case study method of teaching’.41 Their intentions were clear. Students would be drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds, and might or might not have business experience. The curricula were to be broadly constructed and include social science subjects like psychology. Staff research was to be vigorously encouraged in order to provide links with the outside world. Those gaining qualifications would be able to prosper in virtually any area of business activity. As one protagonist explained, the aim of exercise was ‘to fit a man to pursue his own self-improvement, and to put him as far along the road to it as fast as possible’.42 However, little of this made much sense to the industrial lobby. It was determined that management education should deal with practical matters. Academic indulgence and theoretical speculation must be avoided at all costs. The need was for short (one to three month) post-experience courses on specific techniques, aimed at managers in the 28 to 35 age range.43 In this view, the only issue that required further thought had to do with administration: who would
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actually be responsible for running any new provision? Lord Rootes held to his belief that the best solution was a business university, but he had to acknowledge that the rather conservative UGC was unlikely to support such an experiment. Other industrialists were in favour of simply going it alone. They argued that any contract with the universities would open the door to unhelpful interference. The ‘Savoy Group’, a loose coalition of executives led by senior directors from the major engineering company GKN, attracted support with its contention that industry should create its own facilities from scratch and then keep them wholly independent.44 In the end, a group of leading figures co-ordinated by the FBI—Rootes, together with representatives from the FME and NEDC—decided that the only way to resolve these controversies was to appoint a mediator, and ask him to recommend a possible way forward.45 Lord Franks, the current Provost of Worcester College, Oxford, and ex-chairman of Lloyds Bank, agreed to take on this role and in December 1963 produced a short report, with five main recommendations. These were: 1 That two Business Schools of high quality be established in Britain. 2 That each be part of a university but enjoying considerable autonomy as a partnership between the universities and business. 3 That these Business Schools be situated within major industrial and commercial conurbations. 4 That these Business Schools offer courses for both post-graduate and postexperience students. 5 That one Business School be associated jointly with the London School of Economics and Imperial College of the University of London, and the other with Manchester University.46 It was immediately obvious from this list that Franks had effectively opted for a lowest common denominator solution. He had rejected certain particularly partisan suggestions—for example, that put forward by the Savoy Group—but made every effort to satisfy the biggest constituency possible. His hope was that the various factions would now see compromise as unavoidable. A civil servant who talked with him at this time reported that he was ‘deeply struck by the ignorance and suspicion in industry of the academic world and vice versa’. In these circumstances, Franks had concluded, it was important ‘to force both sides to a better understanding of the others’ attitudes’.47 A management education revolution? In the years that followed, great efforts were made to expand British management education. Funds gathered via an appeal to industry, together with government support, meant Franks’s proposals could be realised, and the London and Manchester Business Schools were launched in the mid-1960s.48 Other courses
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proliferated at an unprecedented rate. One survey at the beginning of the 1970s found that management education was being provided by as many as 37 schools or designated management departments in universities; five independent colleges; 45 polytechnics; and 150 technical colleges. All told, it was estimated, Britain had 2,300 students on post-graduate management courses, small by comparison with the USA (where 15,000 MBAs graduated annually) but large if measured against the position barely twenty years before, when there were probably fewer than 200 studying management subjects of any kind in the country’s universities.49 Excited by these kind of statistics, some suggested that Britain had finally embraced the American way and was experiencing nothing less than a management education revolution.50 Such claims are worth taking seriously, but they cannot be accepted at face value. The position in Britain was obviously evolving. Some of the new courses were successful and drew in real support from industry. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, far less satisfactory conditions predominated. The unpalatable truth was that, outside of a small circle, neither the academy nor industry showed much sign of having broken with their long-standing prejudices. This point can be illustrated by looking at each side in turn. The universities continued to be distinctly unenthusiastic about management education. Some recognised that they could make money out of the new discipline, but few felt that it deserved mainstream status. Academics tended to see management studies as intellectually inferior. Some worried that any dalliance with business would compromise traditional freedoms. The consequences were predictable. Management was kept very much at the margin. Faculty hired to teach on the new courses often had below average qualifications. Moreover, the syllabuses offered notoriously lacked rigour. Many institutions cobbled together curricula from whatever was at hand, regardless of whether this made any intellectual sense or not. Students were in effect simply offered a selection of modules from other departments. Elsewhere, subjects had been incorporated largely because they reflected staff interests. A visiting American business school professor came across courses that contained components on ‘meat anatomy and science’, ‘poultry inspection’, and ‘footwear and fitting’.51 Finally, and most damagingly, laxity also coloured assessment procedures. Many qualifications were offered without gradation. High pass rates seemed to be normal. A later survey estimated that even the most prestigious business schools were only failing about 5 per cent of their students annually.52 Management might have arrived as a university subject, but it still remained largely in the shadows. Industry was equally unimpressed by the new provision. The appeal to business in the wake of the Franks report raised £4.5 million, but it was widely recognised that a relatively small group of companies had been responsible for most of the total collected. A detailed breakdown of contributors revealed the following:
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‘Large’ donations from the private sector were represented by those of forty-seven industrial and commercial companies. About forty of these were among the 100 largest firms of the day, which suggests that there were a significant number of large firms which did not support Franks’s proposals or at least did not back them with a substantial donation. Whilst companies such as Ford, ICI, Shell, Unilever, GKN, AEI, Courtaulds, Dunlop, English Electric, and Imperial Tobacco gave sums of £100–£150, 000, there were others who seem to have treated the Appeal much as they would have any ‘worthy cause’. EMI, for example, gave a mere £500.53 Outside the converted, opinions continued to be much more critical. Reaction to the first crop of MBAs was indicative. A Taylor, Nelson Group enquiry in 1969, reporting on the views of senior executives in 325 of the Financial Times’s top 500 companies, discovered that few judged the new qualification highly: In large areas of industry, attitudes towards any form of graduate are still ambivalent, while those towards business graduates range from blank incomprehension (‘I don’t really know what they are’) to open hostility (‘business schools are over-rated’).54 Researchers commissioned by the Council of Industry for Management Education reached very similar conclusions. They investigated what forty-seven medium and large manufacturing companies felt about business graduates, and found that most could be described as ‘agnostic’. The new business schools were certainly not evaluated favourably. Indeed, the ‘most common view’ was that post-graduate training provided little or nothing that industry really wanted. A typical comment was reported to be: ‘we let him go to a business school for a year, but he would probably have learnt more by staying here’.55 By the early 1970s, therefore, little of the post-Franks optimism remained in view. Academics from Sussex University believed that a ‘backlash’ was in progress, noting: ‘Hardly a week goes by without some major attack being launched in the press against business schools.’56 For the President of the Confederation of British Industry (the FBI’s successor), the problem was that those involved simply had ‘irreconcilable’ objectives. It had to be finally recognised that ‘business education’ and ‘management training’ were ‘two quite different things’.57 Such controversy and disagreement would continue to hold back progress in the field for many years to come. As all of this shows, the US campaign to promote management education in Britain was ultimately only partly effective. The Americans had won some battles but could hardly claim victory in the war. Successive developments had been achieved by coup d’état—in the later stages, behind the scenes manoeuvring involving conspirators from the FME and the FBI. The mass ranks of industry were barely either involved or interested. These conditions shaped what emerged. The British had gained an infrastructure for enhanced provision
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but continued to disagree about what it should aim to achieve. Were the US missionaries any more successful in their plans for the BIM? To answer this question, it is first necessary to look at how the organisation was developing in the period shortly before their interventions began. The BIM in the early 1950s At the beginning of the 1950s, the BIM appeared to be gradually overcoming some of its earlier difficulties. The organisation had acquired a new headquarters in the West End of London, complete with restaurant, consulting rooms and library, and was embarked upon an ambitious programme of educational work. Its roster of publications was selling well; for example, the Manager had a circulation of nearly 10,000 per month. Moreover, each year’s annual conference received more praise than the last. A civil servant present at the 1953 event recorded: This was the first…{time} I had attended. I went more or less as a matter of duty…. I was completely converted. The discussions were on the whole intelligent and interesting…and the organisation was superb.58 Some hoped that the institution might now be poised to gain real influence as a centre of excellence. However, these outward signs of success hid grave inner problems. Part of the organisation’s troubles were financial. The BIM had always aimed to be selfsufficient but continued to experience difficulty over raising income. Individual subscriptions were buoyant, largely because of an amalgamation with the Institute of Industrial Administration (IIA), a well-established qualifying body. On the other hand, much less progress had been made with attracting corporate interest. In fact, only about 450 of Britain’s 50,000 medium and large manufacturing firms were members.59 As a result, the annual subvention from the Treasury remained crucial. The central worry for the BIM’s leadership was the fact that this was about to be significantly cut. The Churchill Cabinet had mixed feelings about the BIM. Some believed it was making a valid contribution to Britain’s productivity drive. Nevertheless, it was also generally agreed that the organisation had become too dependent on public money. The Chancellor, ‘Rab’ Butler, minuted his colleagues: ‘I like the B.I.M. What is clear is that they are not in earnest about relieving the Government contribution. I am; so any discussions calculated to show the red light will have my support.’60 With this in mind, the Cabinet decided that the level of funding should be considerably reduced. The BIM had received £75,000 in 1951 and 1952, but over the next quinquennium the annual grant was to fall in stages to £30,000. The government wanted to signal that state aid would be eventually withdrawn and yet it would not administer any sudden fatal blow.61
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Nevertheless, the BIM’s problems were by no means only financial. In fact, the organisation was most troubled by the increasingly obvious division that existed within its own ranks. The controversy centred on means and ends. One faction, composed of ex-IAA members and management movement veterans, wanted the BIM to concentrate exclusively on raising professional standards amongst managers. In other words, it wished to prioritise the development of formal qualifications gained through taught courses and examinations. However, most corporate members had very different ideas. They argued that talk of professionalisation was entirely misplaced. Management could not be taught by formal methods, and those who thought otherwise were simply cranks without business experience. The BIM needed to forget abstract theorising and concentrate on what industry really wanted, developing servicing functions as appropriate. Moreover, it was added, there must be no further reliance on state aid. Too many firms believed that the BIM was controlled by the government and shunned membership as a result. Establishing financial self-sufficiency would be a vital first step in encouraging a more positive business response.62 BIM staff did their best to mediate between these two groups but found it difficult to make much headway. The Director, Leo Russell, an ex-civil servant who genuinely tried to accommodate all points of view, became increasingly isolated and subject to personal attacks. Every important level of the BIM’s internal machinery gradually succumbed to factionalism. In this situation, attempts at reconciliation inevitably foundered. To make matters worse, each side began looking for allies amongst outside organisations. Fairly typically, a civil servant reported that the British Employers’ Association was conducting a ‘feud’ against the BIM, in order to discredit the current leadership and prepare the way for the corporate members to gain full control.63 American support for the BIM and after The American Mission in London knew of these various problems but it still believed that the BIM could play a useful role. In spite of the current schism, the organisation seemed to be the only one capable of spreading modern management techniques. Nevertheless, the Americans argued, there was certainly need for a new strategic direction. The BIM had too much of a metropolitan bias. In the future, it must build a regional network and attempt to reach those small and medium-sized enterprises in provincial centres that had previously proved most resistant to modernisation.64 From 1954 to 1959, therefore, some £123,000 of Benton-Moody money was allotted to this purpose.65 The Americans hoped to create a virtuous circle. By operating in the regions, the BIM would both maximise its impact on the productivity problem and gather the extra income that was necessary for financial solvency. However, it soon became clear that the Americans were no more capable of transforming the BIM than anybody else. In fact, the arrival of US funds in some ways increased the organisation’s problems. Both internal factions now felt they
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had more to fight for, and redoubled their efforts accordingly. A Treasury official told a colleague in 1956: ‘My impression is that the Institute is…a very unhappy place, torn by intrigues, and that the atmosphere is not conductive to good work.’ He believed that a ‘process of disintegration was at work’.66 In the end, the situation became so serious that the government was forced to act. Faced with damning reports from civil servants, the Conservatives finally decided that Treasury support would have to be withdrawn. The BIM was instructed to pursue retrenchment.67 In these circumstances, the organisations’ priorities inevitably changed. Some effort was made to pursue the American idea of regionalisation, and BIM offices were opened in Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow, but the general conditions of austerity meant that this initiative produced nothing like the effect intended. Otherwise, the priority remained survival. By the end of the decade, the BIM had stabilised but at some cost. A Board of Trade offi-cial observed: As regards the general affairs of the B.I.M., we here still feel that the Institute has not yet established its prestige with industry and really found its right function. Financially, its affairs have I think been put in reasonable order. But to some extent this has been at the expense of the calibre of its work, and I have found little confidence recently in its ability to make a real impression on industry in this country.68 The US decision to back the BIM did not, therefore, produce the desired results. The Americans had wanted to create a dynamic organisation capable of reaching ordinary firms. Instead, they found themselves bankrolling something of a pariah which was both impecunious and self-destructive. It is a measure of their failure that, ten years after the events described, the BIM was still being characterised as ‘in search of a role’.69 Conclusions In the 1950s, the Americans did much to promote the professionalisation of British managers. Some of their initiatives were partly successful but overall much less was achieved than had been planned. British industry remained wary about training and education. In 1956, the management educationalist Elizabeth Sidney estimated that a mere 1 per cent of the country’s 400,000 to 450,000 managers had received ‘any formal training for their job’. Fifteen years later, Alistair Mant reported that little had changed. He discovered that only 7 or 8 per cent of British managers attended ‘in- or out-company courses of a week or more’ during any given twelve-month period.70 Even the most senior grades largely conformed to this pattern. A 1970 survey of directors at the top 200 UK companies found that while 9 per cent had been to business school, 68 per cent were without professional qualifications of any kind.71 Indeed, when questioned closely, many managers clung tenaciously to the idea that management could
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never be taught. It was, they asserted, much more about instinct than expertise. The British, it seemed, were quite happy to remain devotees of what one consultant called ‘folk management’, regardless of the advice that was so avidly proffered from across the Atlantic.72
6 THE AMERICAN PRODUCTIVITY GOSPEL IN BRITAIN Explaining reactions and responses
Introduction The previous chapters have demonstrated that the US productivity gospel had only a relatively modest impact in Britain. The American effort produced new institutions and no doubt helped make productivity a public issue in the 1940s and 1950s, but its effect on the ground—in factories and boardrooms— can only be described as variable. If real change occurred, it seems usually to have involved a small ‘head’ of already forward-looking firms, with a much larger ‘tail’ continuing to follow their time-honoured conventions. This judgement is in some ways surprising, given the degree of US commitment and the magnitude of Britain’s economic problems during these years, and it clearly needs some careful explanation. The following pages discuss a number of factors that may have inhibited the various productivity programmes, beginning with a close scrutiny of the ways and means through which aid was proffered. The transmission mechanisms and policy implementation Technical assistance was, in essence, a social process. It required experts, on one side, to convince target audiences, on the other, that their prescriptions were logically correct and practically viable. Perhaps surprisingly, these minimum conditions were rarely easy to achieve. The free dissemination of information could be marred by many forces—political, logistical, cultural and personal— and while this ‘friction’ certainly varied in scale, it was rarely ever entirely absent. Taking the American programmes first, it is clear that these had much going in their favour. The US economy was unarguably the most powerful and vibrant in the world and this gave an obvious prestige to those who advocated its constituent methods and techniques. As individuals, too, Americans had great advantages. The British were certainly doubtful about some aspects of life across the Atlantic (a point that will be returned to) but they tended to be impressed by American friendliness and openness. Washington’s emissaries were, therefore, usually liked, an important first step in establishing effective communication.
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Finally, the whole American effort was, of course, underpinned by an impressive array of organisational and material resources. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission in London consisted of over 180 officials in the peak year of 1951.1 They could call on almost unlimited supplies of paper and hospitality products like cigarettes and whisky, important in a country where rationing was still extensive. Those showing British teams around America were similarly endowed with emollients. Visitors typically expressed astonishment at the amount of food and entertainment offered.2 However, the US effort also suffered from a number of characteristic flaws. First, there were ambiguities in American policy itself. Government officials operating at home and abroad frequently disagreed about priorities. One American observer contrasted the ‘rather ridiculous optimism’ of some European missions with Washington’s ‘extremely toughminded’ insistence on asking ‘What is in this for Uncle Sam?’3 In addition, conflicts could easily break out within the technical assistance agencies, particularly since these normally included personnel on secondment from both business and the trade unions. Officials with labour backgrounds were furious when Washington encouraged the European Productivity Agency (EPA) to organise a conference on human relations in 1956, because they believed ‘experience in the U.S. demonstrated… so-called human relations activities were only a device employed by capitalists to undermine trade union activities and to weaken the bargaining position of unions’.4 Implementing policy produced a second category of difficulty. Links across the Atlantic were occasionally tenuous. An evaluation exercise in 1953 found one case where ‘it was 521 days from the time the project was started until goods were obtained to initiate the program’.5 The high rate of turnover amongst staffers in missions was another source of uncertainty. A British civil servant complained: ‘there are so many changes in…personnel that we are constantly being confronted with new men with new ideas they want to plug’.6 Nor were interactions between Americans and their audiences necessarily free of problems. Those hired from business to explain new techniques were sometimes patronising or extraordinarily ignorant of local conditions. One was described as having created ‘active resistance’ because of his overbearing and insensitive manner.7 Conferences, too, could easily prove unsatisfactory. Complaints about poor organisation, weak speakers and banal debate were by no means unknown. An American report of one event noted that it had been ‘amorphous’, with few of the papers stimulating ‘really useful discussion’. The US experts present had not helped, failing to establish much contact with the delegates and resorting to ‘dogmatic utterance’ when challenged about details.8 Finally, team visits, so important in the first phase of US policy, were plagued by their own troubles. The Americans constantly worried about the selection of participants. They did not want shopfloor radicals or boardroom reactionaries, but frequently lacked enough local knowledge to make confident selections.9 Once in America, the teams were usually shown several different plants in a variety of states, and many complained of feeling rushed.10 Snags and hitches cropped up with
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regularity. The drop forging team’s decision to experiment with a dictaphone was not a success due, as their report explained, ‘to lack of experience of its use and to the difficulty encountered by an American typist in attempting to transcribe unfamiliar British dialects and the technical terms of the industry’.11 Unsurprisingly, too, some visitors did not enjoy being thrown together with comparative strangers in a foreign land, while others simply succomed to the pleasures on offer and neglected work. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) team sent to investigate American management education proved particularly controversial, since members not only bickered amongst themselves but also took time off from official engagements to do private business. A confidential report on the group concluded: They have acted as a bunch of individualists, not as a team, have frequently pursued their own interests and not followed the team program, have been discourteous to their hosts and cynical of many of the things they have seen.12 The EPA was hampered by rather similar problems. It had been created using funds from both the US and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and this in itself was an obvious source of tension, as American policy prescriptions collided with simmering intra-European rivalries.13 The whole situation worsened because the EPA expanded very rapidly after its launch but neglected to build appropriate administrative foundations. A later report described the resulting chaos: At the end of the 1953–54 financial year, that is after six months of effective activity, 86 projects had been adopted. In many cases they were in no way connected with one another and the importance of the problems involved varied considerably; finally in many cases it was by no means certain that the results expected would have any practical effect.14 In many ways, the EPA never recovered from this period, and spent much of the later 1950s juggling with organisational reform. Operational activities inevitably suffered. The EPA was very keen to boost participation in its programmes but rather lax about selection criteria. One American noticed a ‘small population of seminar-goers and jaunt takers who avidly encourage these activities for personal reasons’.15 Conferences, too, were sometimes run without much structure. A gathering to discuss productivity measurement in 1955 produced paltry returns for this reason: Despite…{a clear} mandate, and despite the presence of extremely able European and U.S. technicians, no concrete recommendations were forthcoming. Country needs were not adequately surveyed and the problem
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of what the Agency should do was not adequately set forth before the experts for their comments and recommendations.16 Even internal EPA activities suffered. A review of the organisation’s Productivity Committee in 1961 was characteristically self-critical, arguing dryly that too much of this body’s work had been ‘based on oral exchange of views whose length was not always matched by an equal degree of precision’.17 The British Productivity Council (BPC) was obviously in a rather different position as it did not depend upon any degree of international collaboration. Nevertheless, debilitating practical problems existed here as elsewhere. Some argued that the BPC lacked focus. It should concentrate on either propaganda or the provision of practical services, but could not encompass both.18 Moreover, organisational difficulties continued to hamper progress. Establishing local productivity committees proved particularly exacting, as an internal report of 1954 documented: It was perhaps inevitable that, in view of the method of their inauguration, on a very wide scale within a short period of time, the most suitable people were not always attracted to serve on them; indeed, in some cases, they were even unaware that…{a committee} was being formed in their area. It is clear that not really enough preparatory work was done in many areas…. In too many cases there seems to have been no personal approach to leading firms or individuals to secure their support and interest in advance. The normal procedure has been to issue invitations to a large number of local firms to attend an inaugural meeting, many of which did not find it worthwhile to be represented or sent a junior member of their staff to hold a watching brief. The approach to the trade unions was also faulty in many cases.19 In later years, the BPC did much to rectify matters, but its reliance on volunteers at the local level remained a source of weakness. An official enquiry of the late 1960s showed that the organisation was still not fully effective.20 The existence of these tensions and difficulties suggests that the American technical assistance message was, to some extent, dissipated in the telling. The transmission of information and advice proceeded using various mediums, but none was perfect, and a range of obstacles interposed between the parties involved. Nevertheless, this only partly explains why take-up was so modest. The programmes may have been flawed but they still managed to fulfil much of their purpose. An enormous amount of new and detailed know-how was made available to those who wanted it. The question that needs to be answered, therefore, is why the British reaction was so unenthusiastic?
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Explanations: the economic context One obvious starting point here is a body of recent work that emphasises the allegedly pernicious features of modern Britain’s business and institutional arrangements. In a very well-known thesis, Alfred Chandler argues that family dynasties still dominated many British companies in the postwar years, with damaging consequences for innovation. As he sees it, families were more interested in immediate cash returns than long-term growth or profits, and so remained unwilling to experiment with new methods.21 Stephen Broadberry and Nick Crafts, influenced by Mancur Olson, identify a rather different set of pathologies. They believe that a cosy system of restrictive labour practices and encompassing cartels, formed during the 1930s, continued long after 1945 and suggest that this strongly discouraged change of any kind. Hedged in by trade unions and feather-bedded by collusive agreements in what was anyway a sellers’ market, British businesses of the late 1940s and early 1950s simply lacked the will or outside stimulant to become dynamic.22 Are these arguments as useful as they seem at first sight in understanding the response to technical assistance? Chandler’s strictures on the family concern are certainly of some relevance, particularly in relation to Britain’s considerable small-firm sector.23 For example, companies without elaborated management hierarchies rarely employed technical specialists and so were at a degree of disadvantage in handling new information about methods and processes.24 Moreover, borrowing or imitating techniques was not always feasible in financial terms. An article on the pottery industry in 1948 noted: A shortcoming on the part of management which sounds almost incredible is that they find the costing of individual articles to be impracticable because no sufficiently inexpensive system has been devised for allocating accurately to individual items the cost of losses in production, which averages 20–25 per cent of total cost.25 Finally, there is no doubt that some owner-managers were particularly intent upon protecting their own status and power. One civil servant charged with extending the employment of personnel managers in the Birmingham area noted that many firms had extremely unsophisticated industrial relations practices. Several employers told him that they operated on the following maxim: ‘I am the Boss, and they {the workers} have to do what they are told.’26 On the other hand, the argument should not be pushed too far. Productivity agencies were well aware of the problems experienced by small firms and did their best to tailor programmes accordingly.27 A series of publications was aimed at the sector. For example, the EPA published technical digests, which summarised key points from over 1,000 periodicals—more than even the biggest firms would have been able to monitor.28 Steps were also taken to encourage take-up. A Benton-Moody grant financed the creation of the National Union of
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Manufacturer’s advisory service NUMAS in 1953, and this gradually grew into an important consultancy organisation specifically for small businesses, with a roster of nearly fifty trained specialists available for secondment.29 Second, it is important to stress that many of the techniques being recommended were not expensive. Indeed, one advantage of technical assistance was precisely the fact that it focused upon relatively uncomplicated measures which could often be adopted incrementally. As several trade journals constantly reiterated, there were no real barriers preventing small firms from adopting at least some of the measures being proposed.30 Finally, reviewing the albeit imperfect data on applications, it is difficult to find any evidence that companies with professional managements incorporated the new techniques better than those without. In fact, a number of well-publicised examples demonstrated that individual entrepreneurs were quite capable of using what was on offer in highly creative ways. The journal Business, for example, featured an owner-manager in the brass and copper industry who had completely transformed his firm’s operations after taking part in an AACP team visit.31 The Broadberry and Crafts’ thesis also has its limitations. The part of their argument relating to trade unions and restrictive labour practices has little resonance in relation to the technical assistance programmes. Indeed, the reaction of unions and their members to the new initiatives, both in rhetoric and in reality, suggests an almost opposite conclusion. At a formal level, there were certainly few signs of any negativity. Most unions had enthusiastically backed Labours’ ‘battle for production’ in the late 1940s, with its various associated productivity initiatives, and they tended to see American assistance as a continuation of what had already been begun. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) underlined the positive mood by sending its own team to investigate US methods. The result was a report which confirmed the relevance of several American techniques without being simply uncritical. Thus, unions were advised to co-operate with the introduction of ‘scientific management’ systems, since these would boost productivity, but also warned to remain vigilant for any ‘abuses’ that might occur in the process.32 This degree of compliance at first astonished visiting American officials, particularly since unions in other parts of Europe tended to be much more antagonistic. A briefing paper on attitudes to productivity in Britain, produced for the London Mission in 1951, observed with a degree of surprise: ‘It is unusual to find a strong trade union movement voluntarily advocating…measures for the good of the country while knowing full well the inconvenience they will cause to individual union members.’33 Detailed discussions with the TUC productivity team revealed that some union leaders and executives were less committed to the introduction of new methods than others. Moreover, it was clear that rank-andfile members sometimes had quite complex opinions about American-inspired reforms. Typically, many liked effort-saving machines and gadgets but were less sure about suggested organisational changes, seeing them as emblematic of what they believed to be an American trade-union surrender to management.
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Nevertheless, as the US technical assistance staff concluded, none of this invalidated the central point that most trade unions in Britain were notably sympathetic to what was being attempted.34 Given these attitudes and dispositions, it is unsurprising to find that shopfloor resistance to productivity enhancing innovations was rarely very pronounced.35 Some workers opposed the introduction of production engineering measures, particularly work study, and were even prepared to strike in support of their cause.36 However, it is quite clear that poor management and lack of consultation had often inflamed these situations.37 For the most part, change proceeded much as planned. Questioned at an open meeting in 1952, experts from the Institute of Materials Handling were adamant that workplace antipathy rarely proved a problem. They declared: There is far too much talk going around about the opposition received from the shopfloor on the introduction of mechanical or materials handling equipment. The converse is the case. We get pressed by the people who are less fortunate and who have not good materials handling equipment. They want to know what is to be done to relieve them of the fatigue and the outof-date methods to which they are subjected.38 The second component of the Broadberry and Crafts thesis concerns the alleged lack of competition in postwar product markets. British firms, they suggest, faced ‘soft’ conditions both at home and abroad, and, moreover, were able to manipulate prices through collusive agreements, often maintained by a burgeoning network of trade associations. Are these observations consistent with the evidence? Broadberry and Crafts base their characterisation of the home market on the fact that British imports of manufactured goods at this time were extremely low. However, import penetration figures do not tell the whole story. An enormous member of foreign, largely American, enterprises set up operations in Britain during the 1950s, and these inevitably tried to gain market share. Indeed, the government encouraged the influx in part precisely because it would increase competition. In the words of two eminent business historians: ‘The most idiosyncratic aspect of British policy was the pleasure which certain government officials felt about the pain that US investors would inflict on their “inefficient” British competitors.’39 As a number of contemporary empirical studies confirm, therefore, home markets from about 1950 onwards were far less stagnant than the trade figures on their own imply.40 Abroad, British firms certainly enjoyed a sellers’ market in the years immediately after the war, but this ended much more quickly than almost anyone had predicted. The Federation of British Industries (FBI) surveyed its members about competition overseas in early 1949 and was shocked at some of the replies received. The Director of the Telecommunication Engineering and Manufacturing Association reported: ‘we are…seriously perturbed by Japanese
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competition, as their prices are quite definitely below the international level’. His counterpart at the Foundry Trades’ Equipment and Suppliers Association was equally gloomy: ‘We have already learned from our members that such competition is fierce, particularly on the Continental markets, where prices are in the region of 30% below our own.’41 A few months later, the Engineering Advisory Council was perturbed enough about this situation to lobby the Board of Trade, in particular underlining its concerns about ‘the German competition now arising in foreign markets’.42 By 1952, the Iron and Coal Trades Review was arguing that a watershed had been reached: Every year since the war we have been warned by one Minister after another about the growing threat to our overseas markets from Germany and Japan. And almost every year has seen production rising in Britain, Germany and Japan, while a sellers’ market was maintained throughout the world. British exporters have been feeling competition from these ex-enemy countries for some years, but so far the markets have been able to absorb the growing output from all of them. There are now signs that the whole picture is changing. In one trade after another the sellers’ market has gone, or is about to go. This year may well see the first head-on clashes between the world’s large exporting nations.43 Within two or three years, it was quite evident that these predictions were coming true.44 What about the charge of collusion? Evidence unearthed by the Monopolies Commission shows that restrictive agreements bound some industrialists but it is by no means certain that every sector was equally effected. Broadberry and Crafts cite Gribbin’s contention that in Britain in the late 1950s ‘between 50 and 60% of…manufactured output may have been produced in cartelised industries’.45 However, this seems to have been a rather provisional estimate.46 Gribbin included resale price maintenance agreements in his calculations, even though it has always been known that these were often broken in practice—as in the case of cars, for example.47 There are also problems of coverage. Some of the agreements cited by Gribbin relate to only parts of the industry concerned, while others exclude export activity, an important lacuna where competition for overseas sales was fierce.48 The related issue of trade associations is similarly less straightforward than it appears. The number of such bodies certainly grew after the war, but it is clear that in many cases their prime purpose was essentially political—the representation of a particular trade’s interests to government.49 The research group Political and Economic Planning exhaustively investigated these organisations in the mid-1950s and found that ‘restraint of trade’ objectives were only present in a minority of cases: So far as the prevalence of price agreements is concerned…available