Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times
Aamir R. Mufti
This special issue of boundary 2 was meant fro...
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Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction for Perilous Times
Aamir R. Mufti
This special issue of boundary 2 was meant from the start as an engagement with the legacies of Edward Said’s work. It was meant to suggest a number of directions in which the notion of ‘‘secular criticism’’ may now be inflected while remaining true to the enormous critical energies inherent in its appearance in Said’s work. With his sudden passing on September 25, 2003, long feared by those close to him and yet somehow unexpected, this element in the work presented here acquires an aura of inconsolable sadness. What was it that came to us in the form of this person and his work, and what is it that has now passed away? We will be packing and unpacking such questions for a long time to come. Said’s work came to the fore at a time when the world of humanistic knowledge was coming to be shaken to its core, its basic assumptions about the possibilities of knowledge seemingly washed away. In the vernacular, these complex developments in the world of thought and culture have long been collectively dubbed ‘‘postmodernism,’’ often in the form of an epithet. Said himself of course was deeply influenced by the European thinkers—Adorno, Foucault, Derrida, and Auerbach, above all—whose work is an important element in this boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.
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milieu, and he is sometimes seen as belonging fully to it. How little it is still understood that his work was utterly at odds with this contemporary milieu and how differently he read those formative thinkers. Every world he lived in, he inhabited fully, and yet with an uncompromising critical distance. This is the great strength, the beauty, and the paradox of his life. This special issue brings together a number of studies that take as their starting point Said’s relationship to secularism, a relationship that is a critical one in a full and complex sense. At the heart of the Saidian critical project, this collection of essays is meant to propose, is the notion of secular criticism.1 Long ignored as an object of Said scholarship, in favor of the concept of Orientalism or the rubric of culture and imperialism, this term and its significations are now coming to be seen as a constellation that animates Said’s critical practice as a whole. It is the concept that unifies, or brings into articulation, such aspects of Said’s work as anti-imperialism, the critique of colonial knowledge, the insistence on the ‘‘worldliness’’ of language and text, the insistence on the connections between criticism and exile, and the seemingly paradoxical attempt to save the work of art for an ultimately individual and isolated aesthetic contemplation. For years, this emphasis and insistence on declaring his affinities with secularism appeared inexplicable or out of date to many of his readers, who, starting as they thought they did from Said’s critique of Orientalism and of the imperial basis of modern culture, made simplistic and unexamined gestures of renunciation of Enlightenment thought and its legacies as forms of internal and external domination. This recognition of the need to declare oneself for secularism appears now, in light of the escalating forms of religious politics and violence that have come to dominate political life in multiple locations and across the globe, to have been anachronistic in a double sense, both behind and ahead of its time. As a number of commentators have pointed out in recent years, Said’s use of the term secular involves a displacement of its usual significations.2 Secular criticism in Said’s reckoning is, first of all, a practice of unbelief; it is directed, however, not simply at the objects of religious piety but at secular ‘‘beliefs’’ as well, and, at its most ambitious, at all those 1. I have argued this point at some length in Aamir R. Mufti, ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture,’’ Critical Inquiry 25 (Autumn 1998): 95–125. 2. See Bruce Robbins, ‘‘Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said’s ‘Voyage In,’’’ Social Text, no. 40 (Fall 1994): 25–38; Mufti, ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul’’; and the contributions to this issue by Stathis Gourgouris and Emily Apter.
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moments at which thought and culture become frozen, congealed, thinglike, and self-enclosed—hence the significance for him of Lukács’s notion of reification.3 At no point is secular used in his work in simple opposition to the religious per se. Above all, his concern has been with domination through the classification and management of cultures, and of human collectivities, into mutually distinct and immutable entities, be they nations, properly speaking, or civilizations or ethnicities. To the great modern system for the classification of cultures Said gave the name Orientalism and viewed the hierarchies of this system as marking the presence of a ‘‘reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism.’’ The emergence of this modern classification of cultures does not represent for Said ‘‘a sudden access of objective knowledge’’ but rather ‘‘a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism.’’ 4 Secular criticism thus struggles above all with the imposition of national (or civilizational) molds over social and cultural life, against all unmediated and absolute claims of membership in a national (or civilizational) community. This catachrestic use of the term secular carries the implication that the energies of nationalism in its very broadest sense are thoroughly religious in nature, in a sense that has nothing whatever to do with whether or not an organized religion or a certain canonized popular religious life plays any role, symbolic or organizing, in this or that nationalism. In this sense, the secularism implied in secular criticism is a critical secularism, as I am calling it here, a constant unsettling and an ongoing and never-ending effort at critique, rather than a once-and-for-all declaration of the overcoming of the religious, theological, or transcendental impulse.5 It implies a critical engagement with secularism itself, a scrupulous effort at recognizing the reemergence of that impulse in the midst of secular culture. To be critically secular is also to take on board an understanding of the tainted history of secularism and Enlightenment as icons of the superiority of the West and thus of the legitimacy of its civilizing mission. The social for Said is inherently and eminently secular, that is, unassimilable to transcendental narratives of any sort, in particular narratives of uniform national belonging. The cultural critic must therefore be constantly 3. See, for instance, Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 230–34; and Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), 270–72. 4. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 120–21. 5. I am grateful to my friend Jonathan Arac for suggesting this formulation.
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and scrupulously attentive to the dense and secular fabric of social life, making of the conflicts and contradictions of society the ground on which literary and cultural criticism is to be formulated. Secular criticism is thus also an invitation to the crossing of boundaries—boundaries of nation, tradition, religion, race, and language—and carries the implication that the world as a whole can be the only authentic horizon of critical practice. In other words, it conceives of communities of interpretation as inhabiting not self-enclosed life-worlds but rather the world itself, or rather some identifiable but never entirely closed-off corner of the world. At a very basic level, of course, secular criticism, this rather complex notion, built as it is around a series of displacements, inversions, and mediations, still contains within it a critique of the hope for the hereafter, of religious opiate, of the religious impulse per se. Implicit in its elaboration in Said’s work is thus a call for the overcoming of fear: fear of death in the first instance, but also fear as it appears in social life, fear as and when it becomes the basis for social life, which is perhaps the same thing. Overcoming fear of the other is one of the great themes of Said’s work, despite the great distance that separates his writing from the conceptual language of psychoanalysis or abstract ethical theory. He was our most important analyst of all those political and cultural impulses that are based on fear of the other, which has been at work in so many of the catastrophes of the last century. At its most ambitious, secular criticism is a praxis for the management of such fear, and, a quarter century after its publication, Orientalism may now be read fruitfully as a sustained warning about the global atmosphere of fear that is now our everyday experience in the post–September 11 era. There, he charted meticulously the long history in the modern West of dehumanizing the Arab and Muslim worlds and lay down the challenge of surviving ‘‘the consequences humanly,’’ as he put it, of that unequal (but never entirely one-sided) societal and cultural encounter.6 There are many sources for the idea of secular criticism in Said’s work, and I argued some years ago for the place of Erich Auerbach in Said’s development of it. We may of course also point to the dialectical tradition per se, to Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument, first of all, about secularizing, Enlightenment thought and its dialectical reliance on, and reversion to, its purported opposite (that is, myth), and, second, to the philosophical anthropology of fear in their work. That the sources for this governing concept in Said’s work turn out to be critical traditions that emerged out of a 6. Said, Orientalism, 45.
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certain experience of Jewish (and, more specifically, German Jewish) exile is paradoxical in some ways, but it is a paradox that is no longer an entirely unfamiliar one, and one that he himself began to think about out loud, in public and in private, in the last few years before his death. Like the European émigré intellectuals who influenced him and with whom he remained preoccupied for much of his career, Said’s is an intellectual trajectory profoundly affected by the history of the Jews in the modern era. The recurring turn in his work to such figures as Auerbach, Arendt, and Adorno represents a detailed engagement with this tradition of exile from perspectives made possible by the devastation of Palestinian life in the realization of the Zionist ‘‘solution’’ to the Western crisis surrounding the Jews. It also marks his own perception of the continued imbrications of the figure of the modern intellectual, and of the essentially secular vocation of critique, with the history of the so-called Jewish Question. As I have argued elsewhere, in Said’s critical practice, the attitudes and proclivities adumbrated as secular criticism are animated by a concern with, and remain productively tied to, marginality and homelessness, whose exemplary form in the West in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is provided by the Jews.7 Said’s utter refusal to equate Jewishness or Judaism with Zionism at even the darkest moments of Israeli brutality—an equation that is historically shared by anti-Semitism and Zionism alike—and his frank openness to any Israeli willing merely to recognize the basic fact of the dispossession of the Palestinians, spoke not only of the generosity of spirit for which he was known to those who knew him, but of an utterly secular mind, unclouded by nationalist understandings of history and narratives of collective redemption. He asked of Israelis and Israel’s Jewish supporters elsewhere only the basic decency of acknowledging that their deliverance from annihilation in Europe had come at the cost of the Palestinians, who had paid a steep price for it. He often cited a rather quaint-sounding source for this idea: a book called The Other Side of the Medal, by Edward Thompson, father of E. P. Thompson, who argued in the 1920s, as the national movement became under Gandhi’s leadership for the first time a mass movement against British rule, that the British ought to recognize and take responsibility for the brutality of British rule in India, in particular in the aftermath of India’s First War of Independence in the mid-nineteenth century, known to colonial historiography as the Sepoy Mutiny, whose memory lived on, so he argued, in the collective Indian psyche. Said understood like no one else 7. See Mufti, ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul.’’
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the political importance of this ethical gesture of ‘‘atonement,’’ as Thompson calls it, and that appeared quaint and irrelevant to some younger Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, who perhaps thereby considered themselves more radical than he.8 In the last few years of his life, Said returned to the idea of binationalism in historical Palestine, first propagated in the early twentieth century by, among others, the German Jewish intellectuals associated with the founding of Hebrew University, and supported and publicized by Hannah Arendt, and renewed it, through a critique of the colonial-settler nature of Israeli society, as the authentically secular response to the IsraeliPalestinian situation.9 The essays presented in this issue take as their starting point some of these threads in Said’s secular critical practice in order to think anew, and in a critical fashion, points of affiliation with the configurations of contemporary secularism. The issue begins with Said’s recent essay on Auerbach, first published in the fiftieth-anniversary edition of Mimesis in English.10 Said reads Auerbach as secular critic par excellence—a Prussian Jew escaping Nazi violence who provides the fragments of an alternative history of (Christian) Europe as an exiled observer of Europe’s self-destruction. For Said, Auerbach secularizes the history of cultural identifications in Europe and pluralizes it by foregrounding the emergence of the European tradition in interaction with the Jewish culture of the eastern Mediterranean, doing so, furthermore, by displacing this rather large historical question onto the more concrete and philologically graspable question of the mixing or separation of literary styles. In her astute reading of Said’s essay, Emily Apter points to Said’s use of Auerbach for his own project of a critical humanism that takes on board his own earlier critique of the imperial connections of the Western humanist tradition; and in his inspired, even lyrical, defense of the scrupulously non-transcendentalist imagination, Stathis Gourgouris finds at 8. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 206. 9. For a significant rethinking of the historical meanings of binationalism in Palestine, see Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, ‘‘Binationalism and Jewish Identity: Hannah Arendt and the Question of Palestine,’’ in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. Steven E. Ascheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 165–80. 10. See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Fiftieth-Anniversary ed., trans. Willard R. Trask, with a new introduction by Edward W. Said (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). The essay is republished here with the permission of the estate of Edward W. Said. I am deeply grateful in particular to Mariam Said. My thanks also to my assistant, Indra Mukhopadhyay, for his able help with the manuscript.
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the core of Said’s critical practice ‘‘an exfoliation of the repressed politics of transcendence.’’ A critical secularism means, first of all, an insistence on the thisworldly nature of all human experience and a critical practice of unbelief— threads that are picked up by Apter and Gourgouris in their essays on Said, but also by Willi Goetschel in his essay on the irreverence of Heinrich Heine, who parodied the claims of religious-national identifications in early nineteenth-century Europe at the same time as he took apart the smug detachment of their secular critique. But it also implies the inclination to sharing social space with others, explored, for instance, in my own contribution here, as well as in those by Gayatri Spivak and Gil Hochberg. Hochberg’s essay revives and reinterprets the category of the Levantine, with its resonant colonial history, in order to suggest ways of thinking out of the cultural impasse of the Middle East’s political conflict. The essays by Spivak and Ronald Judy take as their point of departure the current global crisis around the figure of the Islamist militant. Spivak’s far-reaching essay explores the ethical situation called up by the existence of the suicide bomber, finding in a critical reading of Kant’s late writing the possibility for a secularism that is not simply reducible to the workings of calculative reason, and arguing that ‘‘[i]f the university is to be secular, it requires a sustained epistemic effort that can only come from the humanities.’’ Judy offers a remarkable reading of the works of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian Salafist philosopher claimed by the jihadis as intellectual forebear and brutally reinscribed as a ‘‘Wahhabi’’ in the ongoing neo-con war with contemporary Arab society. Qutb emerges in Judy’s reckoning surprisingly as a secularizing figure, in whose work Islam becomes a matter of reading, rather than one of fealty to an unchanging tradition. Against the universalist and leveling tendencies of classic secularist thought and institutions, one strategy of revision proposed by contributors to this issue is to rethink the ‘‘vernacular’’ itself as a space for a refashioning of the secular, as in Judy’s essay, but also in Bishnupriya Ghosh’s reading of what she calls ‘‘postcolonial spectrology,’’ the haunting of global Englishes by the repressed vernacular languages and their literatures in the former colonies. My own essay explores imaginings of India against and across the religious divide in the subcontinent and identifies the lyric tradition in Urdu, long infused with the language of Sufi Islam, as the exemplary site for these secular elaborations. Finally, in a different and more philosophical vein, Akeel Bilgrami argues for the possibility of a ‘‘postclassical’’ secularism that neither rests on an exclusive recourse to ‘‘external reasons,’’ as in classical liberal thought, nor collapses into a relativis-
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tic pluralism in the face of the multiplication of value- and commitment-sets known as identity politics. In the very brief time that has passed since his death, it is already becoming clear that Edward Said represented, in a strong sense, the reemergence of the classic figure of the secular universal intellectual, but, paradoxically, in an age—the post-Sartrean age—in which it was thought that the mediations embodied in such a figure had become impossible. Said himself embodied both those mediations and the skepticism about their possibility. His uniqueness in the history of this characteristic figure of the modern era is of course that he emerged to fulfill this role from the formerly colonized world and formulated the question of the struggle against the imperialization of the world as the universal question of the modern era. In this sense, he brought to completion possibilities that had already emerged in such a figure as Frantz Fanon but had remained only partially developed, as evidenced in the patron- and tutor-like relationship that Sartre was able to assume toward the latter, most famously in the preface to The Wretched of the Earth. If the life and work of Said is a unique historical event, if we are right to suspect that there will never again be an intellectual figure like him, this is not just for reasons of individual genius and talent but because he represented the first full development of ‘‘the voyage in,’’ as he himself called it, of the colonized and marginalized world into the global-imperial ‘‘center,’’ which occurred gradually, and for the first time in history, in the course of the twentieth-century, and which transformed both forever.11 He could have appeared only when he did—at the moment of the emergence of a global agglomeration of cultural networks, a conflicted but nevertheless global civilization, if I may be permitted such a seemingly antiquarian (and paradoxical) formulation, but one which seems particularly apt with respect to Said. He was the first, and perhaps last, universal intellectual of this era of globalization and was himself singularly ‘‘Levantine’’ in the sense Hochberg elaborates here, formed at the crisscrossing of languages, cultures, religions, political histories, distinct and divergent historical temporalities, and forms of cultural authority, which will never again be reproduced. Edward Said emerged as a figure in an era of diminished expectations—the aftermath of the revolutionary and anticolonial movements of the early to mid-twentieth century. His work is infused with an attempt to live with this sense of diminishment and loss—the attenuation of utopian hopes for emancipation and transformation of world society, the loss of a sense of 11. See Said, Culture and Imperialism.
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plenitude in collective human life—without sentimental brooding, on the one hand, but also without simple-minded optimism or cheerfulness. He spoke of this dogged and late persistence of the hope for a better life—‘‘once the attempt to change the world miscarried,’’ as Adorno once put it 12—as the essentially secular attitude. Whether and to what degree we, his readers, have been successful in learning this lesson, as individuals or collectively, and whether and to what degree we will be able to live with the loss of his presence among us, it is probably too early to tell. For the humanities in the universities and related cultural institutions, his death poses an enormous challenge—to undertake the effort to secularize our thought and our lives— and we owe it to ourselves, to those we teach or inform, and also to Said himself for the gift of energetic thinking that he gave to us, to repeatedly clarify precisely what this challenge is.
12. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1987), 3.
Erich Auerbach, Critic of the Earthly World
Edward W. Said
. . . human beings are not born once and for all on the day their mothers give birth to them, but that life obliges them to give birth to themselves. —Gabriel García Márquez The influence and enduring reputation of books of criticism are, for the critics who write them and hope to be read for more than one season, dispiritingly short. Since World War Two the sheer volume of books appearing in English has risen to huge numbers, thus further ensuring if not ephemerality, then a relatively short life and hardly any influence at all. Books of criticism have usually come in waves associated with academic trends, most of which are quickly replaced by successive shifts in taste, fashion, or genuine intellectual discovery. Thus only a small number of books seem perennially present and, by comparison with the vast majority of their counterparts, to have an amazing staying power. Certainly this is true of Erich Auerbach’s magisterial Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2003 by Edward W. Said, reprinted with the permission of The Wylie Agency, Inc.
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published by Princeton University Press exactly fifty years ago in a satisfyingly readable English translation by Willard R. Trask. As one can immediately judge by its subtitle, Auerbach’s book is by far the largest in scope and ambition out of all the other important critical works of the past half century. Its range covers literary masterpieces from Homer and the Old Testament right through to Virginia Woolf and Marcel Proust, although as Auerbach says apologetically at the end of the book, for reasons of space he had to leave out a great deal of medieval literature as well as some crucial modern writers like Pascal and Baudelaire. He was to treat the former in his last, posthumously published book, Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the latter in various journals and a collection of his essays, Scenes from the Drama of European Literature. In all these works Auerbach preserves the same essayistic style of criticism, beginning each chapter with a long quotation from a specific work cited in the original language, followed immediately by a serviceable translation (German in the original Mimesis, first published in Bern in 1946; English in most of his subsequent work), out of which a detailed explication de texte unfolds at a leisurely and ruminative pace; this in turns develops into a set of memorable comments about the relationship between the rhetorical style of the passage and its socio-political context, a feat that Auerbach manages with a minimum of fuss and with virtually no learned references. He explains in the concluding chapter of Mimesis that, even had he wanted to, he could not have made use of the available scholarly resources, first of all because he was in wartime Istanbul when the book was written and no Western research libraries were accessible for him to consult, second because had he been able to use references from the extremely voluminous secondary literature, the material would have swamped him and he would never have written the book. Thus along with the primary texts that he had with him, Auerbach relied mainly on memory and what seems like an infallible interpretive skill for elucidating relationships between books and the world they belonged to. Even in English translation, the hallmark of Auerbach’s style is an unruffled, at times even lofty and supremely calm, tone conveying a combination of quiet erudition allied with an overridingly patient and loving confidence in his mission as scholar and philologist. But who was he, and what sort of background and training did he have that enabled him to produce such work of truly outstanding influence and longevity? By the time Mimesis appeared in English he was already sixty-one, the son of a German Jewish family residing in Berlin, the city of his birth in 1892. By all accounts he
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received a classic Prussian education, graduating from that city’s renowned Französisches Gymnasium, an elite high school where the German and Franco-Latin traditions were brought together in a very special way. He received a doctorate in law from the University of Heidelberg in 1913, and then served in the German army during World War One, after which he abandoned law and earned a doctorate in Romance languages at the University of Greifswald. Geoffrey Green, author of an important book on Auerbach, has speculated that ‘‘the violence and horrors’’ of the war experience may have caused the change in career from legal to literary pursuits, from ‘‘the vast, stolid legal institutions of society . . . to [an investigation of] the distant, shifting patterns of philological studies.’’ 1 Between 1923 and 1929, Auerbach held a position at Berlin’s Prussian State Library. It was then that he strengthened his grasp of the philological vocation and produced two major pieces of work, a German translation of Giambattista Vico’s The New Science and a seminal monograph on Dante entitled Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt (when the book appeared in English in 1961 as Dante, Poet of the Secular World, the crucial word irdischen, or ‘‘earthly,’’ was only partially rendered by the considerably less concrete ‘‘secular’’). Auerbach’s life-long preoccupation with these two Italian authors underscores the specific and concrete character of his attention, so unlike that of contemporary critics, who prefer what is implicit to what the text actually says. In the first place, Auerbach’s work is anchored in the tradition of Romance philology, interestingly the study of those literatures deriving from Latin but ideologically unintelligible without the Christian doctrine of Incarnation (and hence of the Roman Church) as well as its secular underpinning in the Holy Roman Empire. An additional factor was the development out of Latin of the various demotic languages, from Provençal to French, Italian, Spanish, etc. Far from being the dry-as-dust academic study of word origins, philology for Auerbach and eminent contemporaries of his, like Karl Vossler, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert Curtius, was in effect immersion in all the available written documents in one or several Romance languages, from numismatics to epigraphy, from stylistics to archival research, from rhetoric and law to an all-embracing working idea of literature that included chronicles, epics, sermons, drama, stories, and essays. Inherently comparative, Romance philology in the early twentieth century derived 1. Geoffrey Greene, Literary Criticism and the Structures of History, Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 20–21.
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its main procedural ideas from a principally German tradition of interpretation that begins with the Homeric criticism of Friederich August Wolf (1759–1824), continues through Herman Schleiermacher’s biblical criticism, includes some of the most important works of Nietzsche (who was a classical philologist by profession), and culminates in the often laboriously articulated philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey argued that the world of written texts (of which the aesthetic masterwork was the central pillar) belonged to the realm of lived experience (Erlebnis), which the interpreter attempted to recover through a combination of erudition and a subjective intuition (eingefühlen) of what the inner spirit (Geist) of the work was. His ideas about knowledge rest on an initial distinction between the world of nature (and of natural sciences) and the world of spiritual objects, the basis of whose knowledge he classified as a mixture of objective and subjective elements (Geisteswissenschaft), or knowledge of the products of mind or spirit. Whereas there is no real English or American equivalent for it (although the study of culture is a rough approximation), Geisteswissenschaft is a recognized academic sphere in German-speaking countries. In his later essay, ‘‘Epilegomena to Mimesis’’ (1953), translated into English for the first time in the Fiftieth-Anniversary edition of Mimesis, Auerbach says explicitly that his work ‘‘arose from the themes and methods of German intellectual history and philology; it would be conceivable in no other tradition than in that of German romanticism and Hegel’’ (571).2 While it is possible to appreciate Auerbach’s Mimesis for its fine, absorbing explication of individual, sometimes obscure texts, one needs to disentangle its various antecedents and components, many of which are quite unfamiliar to modern readers but which Auerbach sometimes refers to in passing and always takes for granted in the course of his book. Auerbach’s life-long interest in the eighteenth-century Neapolitan professor of Latin eloquence and jurisprudence Giambattista Vico is absolutely central to his work as critic and philologist. In the posthumously published 1745 third edition of his magnum opus The New Science, Vico formulated a revolutionary discovery of astonishing power and brilliance. Quite on his own, and as a reaction to Cartesian abstractions about ahistorical and contextless clear and distinct ideas, Vico argues that human beings are historical creatures in that they make history, or what he called ‘‘the world of the nations.’’ 2. See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Fiftieth-Anniversary Edition, trans. Willard R. Trask, with a new introduction by Edward W. Said (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 559–574. All future references to this edition are placed within parentheses in the body of the text.
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Understanding or interpreting history is therefore possible only because ‘‘men made it,’’ since we can know only what we have made (just as only God knows nature because he alone made it). Knowledge of the past that comes to us in textual form, Vico says, can only be properly understood from the point of view of the maker of that past, which, in the case of ancient writers such as Homer, is primitive, barbaric, poetic. (In Vico’s private lexicon the word ‘‘poetic’’ means primitive and barbaric because early human beings could not think rationally.) Examining the Homeric epics from the perspective of when and by whom they were composed, Vico refutes generations of interpreters who had assumed that because Homer was revered for his great epics he must also have been a wise sage like Plato, Socrates, or Bacon. Instead Vico demonstrates that in its wildness and willfulness Homer’s mind was poetic, and his poetry barbaric, not wise or philosophic, that is, full of illogical fantasy, gods who were anything but godlike, and men like Achilles and Patrocles, who were most uncourtly and extremely petulant. This primitive mentality was Vico’s great discovery, whose influence on European romanticism and its cult of the imagination was profound. Vico also formulated a theory of historical coherence that showed how each period shared in its language, art, metaphysics, logic, science, law, and religion features that were common and appropriate to their appearance: primitive times produce primitive knowledge that is a projection of the barbaric mind—fantastic images of gods based on fear, guilt, and terror—and this in turn gives rise to institutions such as marriage and the burial of the dead that preserve the human race and give it a sustained history. The poetic age of giants and barbarians is succeeded by the age of heroes, and that slowly evolves into the age of men. Thus human history and society are created through a laborious process of unfolding, development, contradiction, and, most interestingly, representation. Each age has its own method, or optic, for seeing and then articulating reality: thus Plato develops his thought after (and not during) the period of violently concrete poetic images through which Homer spoke. The age of poetry gives way to a time when a greater degree of abstraction and rational discursivity become dominant. All these developments occur as a cycle that goes from primitive to advanced and degenerate epochs, then back to primitive, Vico says, according to the modifications of the human mind, which makes and then can reexamine its own history from the point of view of the maker. That is the main methodological point for Vico as well as for Auerbach. In order to be able to understand a humanistic text, one must try to do so as if one is the author
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of that text, living the author’s reality, undergoing the kind of life experiences intrinsic to his or her life, and so forth, all by that combination of erudition and sympathy that is the hallmark of philological hermeneutics. Thus the line between actual events and the modifications of one’s own reflective mind is blurred in Vico, as it is in the numerous authors who were influenced by him, like James Joyce. But this perhaps tragic shortcoming of human knowledge and history is one of the unresolved contradictions pertaining to humanism itself, in which the role of thought in reconstructing the past can neither be excluded nor squared with what is ‘‘real.’’ Hence the phrase, ‘‘the representation of reality’’ in the subtitle to Mimesis and the vacillations in the book between learning and personal insight. By the early part of the nineteenth century Vico’s work had become tremendously influential to European historians, poets, novelists, and philologists, from Michelet and Coleridge to Marx and, later, Joyce. Auerbach’s fascination with Vico’s historicism (sometimes called ‘‘historism’’) underwrote his hermeneutical philology and allowed him thus to read texts such as those by Augustine or Dante from the point of view of the author, whose relationship to his age was an organic and integral one, a kind of selfmaking within the context of the specific dynamics of society at a very precise moment in its development. Moreover, the relationship between the reader-critic and the text is transformed from a one-way interrogation of the historical text by an altogether alien mind at a much later time, into a sympathetic dialogue of two spirits across ages and cultures who are able to communicate with each other as friendly, respectful spirits trying to understand each other. Now it is quite obvious that such an approach requires a great deal of erudition, although it is also clear that for the German Romance philologists of the early twentieth century with their formidable training in languages, history, literature, law, theology, and general culture, mere erudition was not enough. Obviously you could not do the basic reading if you had not mastered Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Provençal, Italian, French, and Spanish in addition to German and English. Nor could you if you did not know the traditions, main canonical authors, politics, institutions, and cultures of the time, as well as, of course, all of their interconnected arts. A philologist’s training had to take many years, although in Auerbach’s case he gives one the attractive impression that he was in no hurry to get on with it. He landed his first academic teaching job with a chair at the University of Marburg in 1929; this was the result of his Dante book, which in some ways, I think, is his most exciting and intense work. But in addition to learning and study, the heart of
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the hermeneutical enterprise was, for the scholar, to develop over the years a very particular kind of sympathy toward texts from different periods and different cultures. For a German whose specialty was Romance literature this sympathy took on an almost ideological cast, given that there had been a long period of historical enmity between Prussia and France, the most powerful and competitive of its neighbors and antagonists. As a specialist in Romance languages, the German scholar had a choice either to enlist on behalf of Prussian nationalism (as Auerbach did as a soldier during the First World War) and to study ‘‘the enemy’’ with skill and insight as a part of the continuing war effort or, as was the case with the postwar Auerbach and some of his peers, to overcome bellicosity and what we now call ‘‘the clash of civilizations’’ with a welcoming, hospitable attitude of humanistic knowledge designed to realign warring cultures in a relationship of mutuality and reciprocity. The other part of the German Romance philologist’s commitment to French, Italian, and Spanish generally and to French in particular is specifically literary. The historical trajectory that is the spine of Mimesis is the passage from the separation of styles in classical antiquity, to their mingling in the New Testament, their first great climax in Dante’s Divine Comedy, and their ultimate apotheosis in the French realistic authors of the nineteenth century—Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert, and then Proust. The representation of reality is Auerbach’s theme, so he had to make a judgment as to where and in what literature it was most ably represented. In the ‘‘Epilegomena’’ he explains that ‘‘in most periods the Romance literatures are more representative of Europe than are, for example, the German. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries France took unquestionably the leading role; in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Italy took it over; it fell again to France in the seventeenth, remained there also during the greater part of the eighteenth, partly still in the nineteenth, and precisely for the origin and development of modern realism (just as for painting)’’ (570). I think Auerbach scants the substantial English contribution in all this, perhaps a blind spot in his vision. Auerbach goes on to affirm that these judgments derive not from aversion to German culture but rather from a sense of regret that German literature ‘‘expressed . . . certain limitations of outlook in . . . the nineteenth century’’ (571). As we shall soon see, he does not specify what those were as he had done in the body of Mimesis, but adds that ‘‘for pleasure and relaxation’’ he still prefers reading Goethe, Stifter, and Keller rather than the French authors he studies, going once as far as saying after a remarkable analysis of Baudelaire that he did not like him at all (571).
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For English readers today who associate Germany principally with horrendous crimes against humanity and with National Socialism (which Auerbach circumspectly alludes to several times in Mimesis), the tradition of hermeneutical philology embodied by Auerbach as a Romance specialist identifies two just as authentic aspects of classical German culture: its methodological generosity and, what might seem like a contradiction, its extraordinary attention to the minute, local detail of other cultures and languages. The great progenitor and clarifier of this extremely catholic, indeed almost altruistic, attitude is Goethe, who in the decade after 1810 became fascinated with Islam generally and with Persian poetry in particular. This was the period when he composed his finest and most intimate love poetry, the West-Ostlicher Diwan (1819), finding in the work of the great Persian poet Hafiz and in the verses of the Koran not only a new lyric inspiration allowing him to express a reawakened sense of physical love but, as he said in a letter to his good friend Zelter, a discovery of how, in the absolute submission to God, he felt himself to be oscillating between two worlds, his own and that of the Muslim believer who was miles, even worlds away from European Weimar. During the 1820s those earlier thoughts carried him toward a conviction that national literatures had been superseded by what he called Weltliteratur, or world literature, a universalist conception of all the literatures of the world seen together as forming a majestic symphonic whole. For many modern scholars—including myself—Goethe’s grandly utopian vision is considered to be the foundation of what was to become the field of comparative literature, whose underlying and perhaps unrealizable rationale was this vast synthesis of the world’s literary production transcending borders and languages but not in any way effacing their individuality and historical concreteness. In 1951, Auerbach wrote an autumnal, reflective essay entitled ‘‘Philology and Weltliteratur ’’ with a somewhat pessimistic tone because he felt that with the greater specialization of knowledge and expertise after the Second World War, the dissolution of the educational and professional institutions in which he had been trained, and the emergence of ‘‘new’’ non-European literatures and languages, the Goethean ideal might have become invalid or untenable. But for most of his working life as a Romance philologist he was a man with a mission, a European (and Eurocentric) mission it is true, but something he deeply believed in for its emphasis on the unity of human history, the possibility of understanding inimical and perhaps even hostile others despite the bellicosity of modern cultures and nationalisms, and the optimism with which one could enter into the inner life of a distant author or historical epoch even with a healthy awareness of one’s limitations of perspective and insufficiency of knowledge.
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Such noble intentions were insufficient, however, to save his career after 1933. In 1935, he was forced to quit his position in Marburg, a victim of Nazi racial laws and of an atmosphere of increasingly jingoistic mass culture presided over by intolerance and hatred. A few months later he was offered a position teaching Romance literatures at the Istanbul State University, where some years before Leo Spitzer had also taught. It was while he was in Istanbul, Auerbach tells us in the concluding pages of Mimesis, that he wrote and finished the book, which then appeared in Switzerland one year after the war’s end. And even though the book is in many ways a calm affirmation of the unity and dignity of European literature in all its multiplicity and dynamism, it is also a book of countercurrents, ironies, and even contradictions that need to be taken into account for it to be read and understood properly. This rigorously fastidious attention to particulars, to details, to individuality is why Mimesis is not principally a book providing readers with usable ideas, which in the case of concepts like Renaissance, baroque, romanticism, and so on, are not exact but unscientific, as well as finally unusable. ‘‘Our precision [as philologists],’’ he says, ‘‘relates to the particular. The progress of the historical arts in the last two centuries consists above all, apart from the opening up of new material and in a great refinement of methods in individual research, in a perspectival formation of judgment, which makes it possible to accord the various epochs and cultures their own presuppositions and views, to strive to the utmost toward the discovery of those, and to dismiss as unhistorical and dilettantish every absolute assessment of the phenomena that is brought in from outside’’ (573). Thus for all its redoubtable learning and authority Mimesis is also a personal book, disciplined yes, but not autocratic, and not pedantic. Consider, first of all, that even though Mimesis is the product of an extraordinarily thorough education and is steeped in an unparalleled inwardness and familiarity with European culture, it is an exile’s book, written by a German cut off from his roots and his native environment. Auerbach seems not to have wavered, however, in his loyalty to his Prussian upbringing or to his feeling that he always expected to return to Germany. ‘‘I am a Prussian and of the Jewish faith,’’ he wrote of himself in 1921, and despite his later diasporic existence he never seemed to have doubted where he really belonged. American friends and colleagues report that until his final illness and death in 1957, he was looking for some way to return to Germany. Nevertheless, after all those years in Istanbul he undertook a new postwar career in the United States, spending time at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and as a professor at Pennsylvania State University, before he was appointed as Sterling Professor of Romance Philology at Yale in 1956.
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Auerbach’s Jewishness is something one can only speculate about since, in his usually reticent way, he does not refer to it directly in Mimesis. One assumes, for instance, that the various intermittent and moving comments throughout the book about mass modernity and its relationship with, among others, the disruptive power of the nineteenth-century French realistic writers (the Goncourts, Balzac, and Flaubert) as well as ‘‘the tremendous crisis’’ it caused, are meant to suggest the menacing world and how that world affects the transformation of reality and consequently of style (the development of the sermo humilis due to the figure of Jesus). It is not hard to detect a combination of pride and distance as he describes the emergence of Christianity in the ancient world as the product of prodigious missionary work undertaken by the apostle Paul, a diasporic Jew converted to Christ. The parallel with his own situation as a non-Christian explaining Christianity’s achievement is evident, but so too is the irony that, in so doing, he travels from his roots still further. Most of all, however, in Auerbach’s searingly powerful and strangely intimate characterization of the great Christian Thomist poet Dante—who emerges from the pages of Mimesis as the seminal figure in Western literature—the reader is inevitably led to the paradox of a Prussian Jewish scholar in Turkish, Muslim, non-European exile handling (perhaps even juggling) charged, and in many ways irreconcilable, sets of antinomies that, though ordered more benignly than their mutual antagonism suggests, never lose their opposition to each other. Auerbach is a firm believer in the dynamic transformations as well as the deep sedimentations of history: yes, Judaism made Christianity possible through Paul, but Judaism remains, and it remains different from Christianity. So too, he says in a melancholy passage in Mimesis, will collective passions remain the same whether in Roman times or under National Socialism. What makes these meditations so poignant is an autumnal but unmistakably authentic sense of humanistic mission that is both tragic and hopeful. I shall return to these matters later. I think it is quite proper to highlight some of the more personal aspects of Mimesis because in many ways it is, and should be read as, an unconventional book. Of course it has the manifest gravity of the Important Book, but as I noted above, it is by no means a formulaic one, despite the relative simplicity of its main theses about literary style in Western literature. In classical literature, Auerbach says, high style was used for nobles and gods who could be treated tragically; low style was principally for comic and mundane subjects, perhaps even for idyllic ones, but the idea of everyday human or worldly life as something to be represented through a style
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proper to it is not generally available before Christianity. Tacitus, for example, was simply not interested in talking about or representing the everyday, excellent historian though he was. If we go back to Homer, as Auerbach does in the celebrated and much-anthologized first chapter of Mimesis, the style is paratactic, that is, it deals with reality as a line of ‘‘externalized, uniformly illuminated phenomena, at a definite time and in a definite place, connected together without lacunae in a perpetual foreground [which technically speaking is parataxis, words and phrases added on rather than subordinated to each other]; thoughts and feelings completely expressed; events taking place in leisurely fashion and with very little of suspense’’ (11). So as he analyzes the return to Ithaca by Odysseus, Auerbach notes how the author simply narrates his greeting and recognition by the old nurse Euryclea, who knows him by the childhood scar he bears the moment she washes his feet: past and present are on an equal footing, there is no suspense, and one has the impression that nothing is held back, despite the inherent precariousness of the episode, what with Penelope’s interloping suitors hanging about, waiting to kill her returning husband. On the other hand, Auerbach’s consideration of the Abraham and Isaac story in the Old Testament beautifully demonstrates how it ‘‘is like a silent progress through the indeterminate and the contingent, a holding of the breath . . . the overwhelming suspense is present. . . . The personages speak in the Bible story too; but their speech does not serve, as does speech in Homer, to manifest, to externalize thoughts—on the contrary, it serves to indicate thoughts which remain unexpressed. . . . [There is an] externalization of only so much of the phenomena as is necessary for the purpose of the narrative, all else left in obscurity; the decisive points of the narrative alone are emphasized, what lies beneath is nonexistent; time and place are undefined and call for interpretation; thoughts and feelings remain unexpressed, are only suggested by silence and the fragmentary speeches; the whole is permeated with the most unrelieved suspense and directed toward a single goal (and to that extent far more of a unity), remains mysterious and ‘fraught with background’’’ (11–12). Moreover these contrasts can be seen in representations of human beings, in Homer of heroes ‘‘who wake every morning as if it were the first day of their lives,’’ whereas the Old Testament figures, including God, are heavy with the implication of extending into the depths of time, space, and consciousness, hence of character, and therefore require a much more concentrated, intense act of attention from the reader. A great part of Auerbach’s charm as a critic is that, far from seeming heavy-handed and pedantic, he exudes a sense of searching and dis-
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covery, the joys and uncertainties of which he shares unassumingly with his reader. Lowry Nelson, Jr., a younger colleague of his at Yale, wrote aptly in a memorial note of the self-instructing quality of Auerbach’s work: ‘‘He was his own best teacher and learner. That process goes on in one’s head, and one can become publicly aware of it to the extent of reproducing some of its primeval dramatic unfolding. The point is how you arrive, by what dangers, mistakes, fortuitous encounters, sleeps or slips of mind, by what insights achieved through great expense of time and passion and to what hard-won formulations in the face of history. . . . Auerbach had the ability to start with a single text without being coy, to expound it with a freshness that might pass for naiveté, to avoid making mere thematic or arbitrary connections, and yet to begin to weave ample fabrics from a single loom.’’ 3 As the 1953 ‘‘Epilegomena’’ demonstrates, however, Auerbach was adamant (if not also fierce) in rebutting criticisms of his claims; there is an especially tart exchange with his polymathic Romance colleague Curtius that shows the two formidable scholars slugging it out rather belligerently. It is not an exaggeration to say that, like Vico, Auerbach was at heart an autodidact, guided in his diverse explorations by a handful of deeply conceived and complex themes with which he wove his ample fabric, which was not seamless or effortlessly spun out. In Mimesis, he resolutely sticks to his practice of working from disconnected fragments: each of the book’s chapters is marked not only by a new author who bears little overt relationship to earlier ones, but also by a new beginning, in terms of the author’s perspective and stylistic outlook, so to speak. The ‘‘representation’’ of reality is taken by Auerbach to mean an active dramatic presentation of how each author actually realizes, brings characters to life, and clarifies his or her own world; this of course explains why in reading the book we are compelled by the sense of disclosure that Auerbach affords us as he in turn re-realizes and interprets and, in his unassuming way, even seems to be staging the transmutation of a coarse reality into language and new life. One major theme turns up already in the first chapter—the notion of incarnation—a centrally Christian idea, of course, whose prehistory in Western literature Auerbach ingeniously locates in the contrast between Homer and the Old Testament. The difference between Homer’s Odysseus and Abraham is that the former is immediately present and requires no interpretation, no recourse either to allegory or to complicated explanations. Dia3. Nelson, Jr., Lowry. ‘‘Erich Auerbach: Memoir of a Scholar,’’ Yale Review, v. 69 n. 2 (Winter 1980), 318.
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metrically opposed is the figure of Abraham, who incarnates ‘‘doctrine and promise’’ and is steeped in them. These are ‘‘inseparable from’’ him and ‘‘for that very reason they are fraught with ‘background’ and [are] mysterious, containing a second, concealed meaning’’ (15). And this second meaning can only be recovered by a very particular act of interpretation, which, in the main piece of work Auerbach produced in Istanbul before he published Mimesis in 1946, he described as figural interpretation.4 Here is another instance where Auerbach seems to be negotiating between the Jewish and European (hence Christian) components of his identity. Basically, figural interpretation develops as early Christian thinkers such as Tertullian and Augustine felt impelled to reconcile the Old with the New Testament. Both parts of the Bible were the word of God, but how were they related, how could they be read, as it were, together, given the quite considerable difference between the old Judaic dispensation and the new message emanating from the Christian Incarnation? The solution arrived at, according to Auerbach, is the notion that the Old Testament prophetically prefigures the New Testament, which in turn can be read as a figural and, he adds, carnal (hence incarnate, real, worldly) realization or interpretation of the Old Testament. The first event or figure is ‘‘real and historical announcing something else that is also real and historical.’’ 5 At last we begin to see, like interpretation itself, how history does not only move forward but also backward, in each oscillation between eras managing to accomplish a greater realism, a more substantial ‘‘thickness’’ (to use a term from current anthropological description), a higher degree of truth. In Christianity, the core doctrine is that of the mysterious Logos, the Word made flesh, God made into a man, and therefore, literally, incarnation; but how much more fulfilling is the new idea that pre-Christian times can be read as a shadowy figure (figura) of what actually was to come? Auerbach quotes a sixth-century cleric as saying, ‘‘‘that figure [a character or episode in the Old Testament that prophesies something comparable in the New Testament], without which not a letter of the Old Testament exists, now at length endures to better purpose in the New’; and from just about the same time [Auerbach continues] a passage in the writings of Bishop Avitus of Vienne . . . in which he speaks of the Last Judgment; just as God in kill4. I refer here to Auerbach’s long and rather technical essay ‘‘Figura,’’ published in 1944 and since collected in Auerbach, Scenes from the Drama of European Literature: Six Essays (Meridian Books, Inc., 1959; rept. Peter Smith, 1973). 5. Ibid., 29.
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ing the first-born in Egypt spared the houses daubed with blood, so may He recognize and spare the faithful by the sign of the Eucharist: tu cognosce tuam salvanda in plebe figuram (‘recognize thine own figure in the people that are to be saved’).’’ 6 One last and quite difficult aspect of figura needs pointing out here. Auerbach contends that the very concept of figura also functions as a middle term between the literal-historical dimension and, for the Christian author, the world of truth, veritas. So rather than only convey an inert meaning for an episode or character in the past, in its second and more interesting sense figura is the intellectual and spiritual energy that does the actual connecting between past and present, history and Christian truth, which is so essential to interpretation. ‘‘In this connection,’’ Auerbach claims, ‘‘figura is roughly equivalent to spiritus or intellectus spiritalis, sometimes replaced by figuralitas.’’ 7 Thus for all the complexity of his argument and the minuteness of the often arcane evidence he presents, Auerbach, I believe, is bringing us back to what is an essentially Christian doctrine for believers but also a crucial element of human intellectual power and will. In this he follows Vico, who looks at the whole of human history and says, ‘‘mind made all this,’’ an affirmation that audaciously reaffirms but also to some degree undercuts the religious dimension that gives credit to the Divine. Auerbach’s own vacillation between, on the one hand, his extraordinarily erudite and sensitive care for the intricacies of Christian symbolism and doctrine, his resolute secularism, and perhaps also his own Jewish background and, on the other, his unwavering focus on the earthly, the historical, the worldly gives Mimesis a fruitful inner tension. Certainly it is the finest description we have of the millennial effects of Christianity on literary representation. But Mimesis also glorifies as much as it animates with singular force and individualistic genius, most overtly in the chapters on verbal virtuosity in Dante, Rabelais, and Shakespeare. As we shall see in a moment, their creativity vies with God’s in setting the human in a timeless as well as temporal setting. Typically, however, Auerbach chooses to express such ideas as an integral part of his unfolding interpretive quest in the book: he therefore does not take time out to explain his ideas methodologically but lets them emerge from the very history of the representation of reality as it begins to gather density and scope. Remember that, as his point of departure for analysis (which in a later essay he referred to and discussed 6. Ibid., 46–47. 7. Ibid., 47.
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as the Ansatzpunkt), Auerbach always comes back to the text and to the stylistic means used by the author to represent reality. This excavation of semantic meaning is most virtuosically evident in the essay ‘‘Figura’’ and in such brilliant shorter studies as his fertile examination of single phrases like la cour et la ville, which contain a whole library of meanings that illuminate seventeenth-century French society and culture. Three seminal moments in the trajectory of Mimesis should now be identified in some detail. One is to be found in the book’s second chapter, ‘‘Fortunata,’’ whose starting point is a passage by the Roman author Petronius, followed by another by Tacitus. Both men treat their subjects from a one-sided point of view, that of writers concerned with maintaining the rigid social order of high and low classes. The wealthy and the important personages get all the attention, whereas the commoners or vulgar people are relegated to the fate of the unimportant and the vulgar. After having illustrated the insufficiencies of this classical separation of styles into high and low, Auerbach develops a wonderful contrast with that agonizing nocturnal moment in the Gospel of St. Mark when, standing in the courtyard of the High Priest’s palace peopled with servant girls and soldiers, Simon Peter denies his relationship to the imprisoned Jesus. One particularly eloquent passage from Mimesis deserves quotation: It is apparent at first glance that the rule of differentiated styles cannot possibly apply in this case. The incident, entirely realistic both in regard to locale and dramatis personae—note particularly their low social station—is replete with problem and tragedy. Peter is no mere accessory figure serving as illustratio, like the soldiers Vibulenus and Percennius [in Tacitus], who are represented as mere scoundrels and swindlers. He is the image of man in the highest and deepest and most tragic sense. Of course this mingling of styles is not dictated by an artistic purpose. On the contrary, it was rooted from the beginning in the character of Jewish-Christian literature; it was graphically and harshly dramatized through God’s incarnation in a human being of the humblest social station, through his existence on earth amid humble everyday people and conditions, and through his Passion which, judged by earthly standards, was ignominious; and it naturally came to have . . . a most decisive bearing upon man’s conception of the tragic and the sublime. Peter, whose personal account may be assumed to have been the basis of the story, was a fisherman from Galilee, of humblest background and humblest education. . . . From
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the humdrum existence of his daily life, Peter is called to the most tremendous role. Here, like everything else to do with Jesus’ arrest, his appearance on the stage—viewed in the world-historical continuity of the Roman Empire—is nothing but a provincial incident, an insignificant local occurrence, noted by none but those directly involved. Yet how tremendous it is, viewed in relation to the life a fisherman from the Sea of Galilee normally lives . . . (41–42). Auerbach then goes on unhurriedly to detail the ‘‘pendulation’’ or swings in Peter’s soul between sublimity and fear, faith and doubt, courage and defeat in order to show that those experiences are radically incompatible with ‘‘the sublime style of classical antique literature.’’ This still leaves the question of why such a passage moves us, given that in classical literature it would appear only as farce or comedy. ‘‘Because it portrays something which neither the poets nor the historians of antiquity ever set out to portray: the birth of a spiritual movement in the depths of the common people, from within the everyday occurrences of contemporary life, which thus assumes an importance it could never have assumed in antique literature. What we witness is the awakening of ‘a new heart and a new spirit.’ All this applies not only to Peter’s denial but also to every other occurrence which is related in the New Testament’’ (42–43). What Auerbach enables us to see here is ‘‘a world which on the one hand is entirely real, average, identifiable as to place, time, and circumstances, but which on the other hand is shaken in its very foundations, is transforming and renewing itself before our eyes’’ (43). Christianity shatters the classical balance between high and low styles, just as Jesus’ life destroys the separation between the sublime and the everyday. What is set in motion, as a result, is the search for a new literary pact between writer and reader, a new synthesis or mingling between style and interpretation that will be adequate to the disturbing volatility of worldly events in the much grander setting opened up by Christ’s historical presence. To this end, St. Augustine’s enormous accomplishment, linked as he was to the classical world by education, was to have been the first to realize that classical antiquity had been superseded by a different world requiring a new sermo humilis, or as Auerbach puts it, ‘‘a low style, such as would properly only be applicable to comedy, but which now reaches out far beyond its original domain, and encroaches upon the deepest and the highest, the sublime and the eternal’’ (72). The problem then becomes how to relate the discursive, sequential events of human history to each other within the new figural dispensation that has triumphed conclusively over its
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predecessor, and then to find a language adequate to such a task, once, after the fall of the Roman Empire, Latin was no longer the lingua franca of Europe. Auerbach’s choice of Dante to represent the second seminal moment in Western literary history is made to seem breathtakingly appropriate. Read slowly and reflectively, chapter 8 of Mimesis, ‘‘Farinata and Cavalcante,’’ is one of the great moments in modern critical literature, a masterly, almost vertiginous embodiment of Auerbach’s own ideas about Dante: that the Divine Comedy synthesized the timeless and the historical because of Dante’s genius, and that Dante’s use of the demotic (or vulgar) Italian language in a sense enabled the creation of what we have come to call literature. I will not try to summarize Auerbach’s analysis of a passage from the tenth canto of the Inferno in which Dante the pilgrim and his guide Virgil are accosted by two Florentines who knew Dante from Florence but who are now committed to the Inferno, and whose internecine squabbles between the city’s Guelph and Ghibelline factions carry on into the afterworld: readers should experience this dazzling analysis for themselves. Auerbach notes that the seventy lines he focuses on are incredibly packed, containing no less than four separate scenes, as well as more varied material than any other so far discussed in Mimesis. What particularly compels the reader is that Dante’s Italian in the poem is, as Auerbach puts it assertively, ‘‘a wellnigh incomprehensible miracle,’’ used by the poet ‘‘to discover the world anew’’ (182–183). There is, first of all, its combination of ‘‘sublimity and triviality which, measured by the standards of antiquity, is monstrous.’’ Then there is its immense forcefulness, its ‘‘repulsive and often disgusting greatness,’’ according to Goethe, whereby the poet uses the vernacular to represent ‘‘the antagonism of the two traditions . . . that of antiquity . . . and that of the Christian era. . . . Dante’s powerful temperament, which is conscious of both because its aspiration toward the tradition of antiquity does not imply for it the possibility of abandoning the other; nowhere does mingling of styles come so close to violation of all style’’ (184–185). Then there is its abundance of material and styles, all of it treated in what Dante claimed was ‘‘the common everyday language of the people,’’ (186) which allowed a realism that brought forth descriptions of the classical, the biblical, and everyday worlds ‘‘not displayed within a single action, but instead an abundance of actions in the most diverse tonalities [which] follow one another in quick succession’’ (189). And finally, Dante manages to achieve through his style a combination of past, present, and future, since the two Florentine men
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who rise out of their flaming tombs to accost Dante so peremptorily are in fact dead but seem to live on somehow in what Hegel called a ‘‘changeless existence’’ remarkably devoid neither of history nor of memory and facticity. Having been judged for their sins and placed inside their burning encasement inside the kingdom of the damned, Farinata and Cavalcante are seen by us at a moment when we have ‘‘left the earthly sphere behind; we are in an eternal place, and yet we encounter concrete appearance and concrete occurrence there. This differs from what appears and occurs on earth, yet it is evidently connected with it in a necessary and strictly determined relation’’ (191). The result is ‘‘a tremendous concentration [in Dante’s style and vision]. We behold an intensified image of the essence of their being, fixed for all eternity in gigantic dimensions, behold it in a purity and distinctness which could never for one moment have been possible during their lives on earth’’ (192). What fascinates Auerbach is the mounting tension within Dante’s poem, as eternally condemned sinners press their cases and aspire to the realization of their ambitions even as they remain fixed in the place assigned to them by Divine Judgment. Hence, the sense of futility and sublimity exuded simultaneously by the Inferno’s ‘‘earthly historicity,’’ which is always pointed in the end toward the white rose of the ‘‘Paradiso.’’ So then ‘‘the beyond is eternal and yet phenomenal. . . . [I]t is changeless and of all time and yet full of history’’ (197). For Auerbach, therefore, Dante’s great poem exemplifies the figural approach, the past realized in the present, the present prefiguring as well as acting like a sort of eternal redemption, the whole thing witnessed by Dante the pilgrim, whose artistic genius compresses human drama into an aspect of the divine. The refinement of Auerbach’s own writing about Dante is truly exhilarating to read, not just because of his complex, paradox-filled insights, but as he nears the end of the chapter, because of their Nietzschean audacity, often venturing toward the unsayable and the inexpressible, beyond normal or for that matter even divinely set limits. Having established the systematic nature of Dante’s universe (framed by Aquinas’ theocratic cosmology), Auerbach offers the thought that for all of its investment in the eternal and immutable, the Divine Comedy is even more successful in representing reality as basically human. In that vast work of art ‘‘the image of man eclipses the image of God,’’ and despite Dante’s Christian conviction that the world is made coherent by a systematic universal order, ‘‘the indestructibility of the whole historical and individual man turns against that order, makes it subservient to its own purposes, and obscures it’’ (202). Auerbach’s great
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predecessor Vico had flirted with the idea that the human mind creates the divine, not the other way around, but living under the Church’s umbrella in eighteenth-century Naples, Vico wrapped his defiant proposition in all sorts of formulae that seemed to preserve history for Divine Providence, and not for human creativity and ingenuity. Auerbach’s choice of Dante for advancing the radically humanistic thesis carefully works through the great poet’s Catholic ontology as a phase transcended by the Christian epic’s realism, which is shown to be ‘‘ontogenetic,’’ that is, ‘‘we are given to see, in the realm of timeless being, the history of man’s inner life and unfolding’’ (202). Yet Dante’s Christian and post-Christian achievement could not have been realized had it not been for his immersion in what he inherited from classical culture—the capacity to draw human figures clearly, dramatically, and forcefully. In Auerbach’s view, Western literature after Dante draws on his example but is rarely as intensely convincing in its variety, its dramatic realism, and stark universality as he was. Successive chapters of Mimesis treat medieval and early Renaissance texts as departures from the Dantean norm, some of them like Montaigne in his Essais stressing personal experience at the expense of the symphonic whole, others such as the works of Shakespeare and Rabelais brimming over with a linguistic verve and resourcefulness that overwhelms realistic representation in the interests of language itself. Characters like Falstaff or Pantagruel are realistically drawn to a certain degree, but what is as interesting to the reader as their vividness are the unprecedented riotous effects of the author’s style. It is not a contradiction to say that this could not have happened without the emergence of humanism, as well as the great geographical discoveries of the period: both have the effect of expanding the potential range of human action while also continuing to ground it in earthly situations. Auerbach says that Shakespeare’s plays, for instance, adumbrate ‘‘a basic fabric of the world, perpetually weaving itself, renewing itself, and connected in all its parts, from which all this arises and which makes it impossible to isolate any one event or level of style. Dante’s general, clearly delimited figurality, in which everything is resolved in the beyond, in God’s ultimate kingdom, and in which all characters attain their full realization only in the beyond, is no more’’ (327). From this point on, reality is completely historical, and it, rather than the Beyond, has to be read and understood according to laws that evolve slowly. Figural interpretation took for its point of origin the sacred word, or Logos, whose incarnation in the earthly world was made possible by the Christ-figure, a central point, as it were, for organizing experience and understanding history. With the eclipse of the divine that is presaged in
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Dante’s poem, a new order slowly begins to assert itself, and so the second half of Mimesis painstakingly traces the growth of historicism, a multiperspectival, dynamic, and holistic way of representing history and reality. Let me quote him at length on the subject: Basically, the way in which we view human life and society is the same whether we are concerned with things of the past or things of the present. A change in our manner of viewing history will of necessity soon be transferred to our manner of viewing current conditions. When people realize that epochs and societies are not to be judged in terms of a pattern concept of what is desirable absolutely speaking but rather in every case in terms of their own premises; when people reckon among such premises not only natural factors like climate and soil but also the intellectual and historical factors; when, in other words, they come to develop a sense of historical dynamics, of the incomparability of historical phenomena and of their constant inner mobility; when they come to appreciate the vital unity of individual epochs, so that each epoch appears as a whole whose character is reflected in each of its manifestations; when, finally, they accept the conviction that the meaning of events cannot be grasped in abstract and general forms of cognition and that the material needed to understand it must not be sought exclusively in the upper strata of society and in major political events but also in art, economy, material and intellectual culture, in the depths of the workaday world and its men and women, because it is only there that one can grasp what is unique, what is animated by inner forces, and what, in both a more concrete and a more profound sense, is universally valid: then it is to be expected that those insights will also be transferred to the present and that, in consequence, the present too will be seen as incomparable and unique, as animated by inner forces and in a constant state of development; in other words, as a piece of history whose everyday depths and total inner structure lay claim to our interest both in their origins and in the direction taken by their development (443–444). Auerbach never loses sight of his original ideas about the separation and mingling of styles—how, for instance, classicism in France returned to the vogue for antique models and the high style, and late-eighteenth-century German romanticism overturned those norms by way of a hostile reaction to them in works of sentiment and passion. And yet in a rare moment of severe judgment, Auerbach shows that, far from using the advantages of
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historicism to represent the complexity and social change that were overtaking contemporary reality, early-nineteenth-century German culture (with the exception of Marx) turned away from it out of a fear of the future, which to Germany seemed always to be barging in at the culture from the outside in forms such as revolution, civil unrest, and the overturning of tradition. Goethe comes in for the harshest treatment, even though we know that Auerbach loved his poetry and read him with the greatest pleasure. I do not think it is reading too much into the somewhat judgmental tone of chapter 17 of Mimesis (‘‘Miller the Musician’’) to recognize that in its stern condemnation of Goethe’s dislike of upheaval and even of change itself, his interest in aristocratic culture, his deep-seated wish to be rid of the ‘‘revolutionary occurrences’’ taking place all over Europe, and his inability to understand the flow of popular history, Auerbach was discussing no mere failure of perception but a profound wrong turn in German culture as a whole that led to the horrors of the present. Perhaps Goethe is made to represent too much. But were it not for his withdrawal from the present and for what he otherwise might have done for bringing German culture into the dynamic present, Auerbach speculates that Germany might have been integrated ‘‘into the emerging new reality of Europe and the world might have been prepared more calmly, have been accomplished with fewer uncertainties and less violence’’ (451–452). At the time these regretful and actually understated lines were being written in the early 1940s, Germany had unleashed a storm on Europe that swept all before it. Before that, the major German writers after Goethe were mired in regionalism and a marvelously traditional conception of life as a vocation. Realism, as an overall style, never emerged in Germany, and except for Fontane, there was very little in the language that had the gravity, universality, and synthetic power to represent modern reality until Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks in 1901. There is a brief acknowledgment that Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt were more in touch with their own time, but neither of course was ‘‘concerned with the realistic portrayal of contemporary reality’’ (519). As against the chaotic irrationality ultimately represented by the anachronistic ethos of National Socialism, Auerbach therefore locates an alternative in the realism of mainly French prose fiction in which writers such as Stendhal, Flaubert, and Proust sought to unify the fragmented modern world—with its unfolding class struggle, its industrialization, and its economic expansion combined with moral discomfort—in the eccentric structures of the modernist novel. And these replace the correspondence between Eternity and History that had enabled Dante’s vision,
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and which was now completely overtaken by the disruptive and dislocating currents of historical modernity. The last few chapters of Mimesis thus seem to have a different tone than what goes before them. Auerbach is now discussing the history of his own time, not that of the medieval and Renaissance past, nor that of relatively distant cultures. Evolving slowly from acute observation of events and characters in the mid-nineteenth century, realism in France (and, though he talks about it much less, England) takes on the character of an aesthetic style capable of rendering sordidness and beauty with unadorned directness, although in the process master-technicians like Flaubert, unwilling to intervene in the rapidly changing world of social upheaval and revolutionary change, also formulated an ethic of disinterested observation. It is enough to be able to see and represent what is going on, although the practice of realism usually concerns figures from low or, at most, bourgeois life. How this then turns into the magnificent richness of Proust’s work based on memory, or into the stream-of-consciousness techniques of Virginia Woolf and James Joyce, is a topic that makes for some of Auerbach’s most impressive later pages, though once again we should remind ourselves that what Auerbach is also describing is how his own work as a philologist emerges from modernity and is indeed an integral part of the representation of reality. Thus the modern Romance philology exemplified by Auerbach acquires its special intellectual identity by a kind of conscious affiliation with the realistic literature of its own time: the uniquely French achievement of dealing with reality from more than a local standpoint, universally, and with a specifically European mission. Mimesis bears within its pages its own rich history of the analysis of evolving styles and perspectives. To help one understand the cultural and personal significance of Auerbach’s quest, I’d like to recall the laboriously complicated narrative structure of Mann’s postwar novel Dr. Faustus (published after Auerbach’s work), which, far more explicitly than Mimesis, is a story both of modern German catastrophe as well as the attempt to understand it. The terrible story of Adrien Leverkuhn, a prodigiously endowed composer who makes a pact with the devil to explore the furthest reaches of art and mind, is narrated by his much less gifted childhood friend and companion, Serenus Zeitblom. Whereas Adrien’s wordless musical domain allows him to enter the irrational and the purely symbolic on his way down into terminal madness, Zeitblom, who is a humanist and scholar, tries to keep up with him, translating Adrien’s musical journey into sequential prose, struggling to make sense of what
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defies ordinary comprehension. Mann suggests that both men represent the two aspects of modern German culture: one as embodied in Adrien’s defiant life and his pathbreaking music, which takes him beyond ordinary sense into the irrational demonic; the other as delivered in Zeitblom’s sometimes bumbling and awkward narrative, that of a closely connected friend witnessing that which he is powerless to stop or prevent. The novel’s fabric is actually made up of three strands. In addition to Adrien’s story and Zeitblom’s attempts to grapple with it (which include the story of Zeitblom’s own life and career as scholarly humanist and teacher), there are frequent allusions to the course of the war, concluding with Germany’s final defeat in 1945. That history is not referred to in Mimesis, nor of course is there anything in it like the drama and the cast of characters that animate Mann’s great novel. But in its allusions to the failure of German literature to confront modern reality, and Auerbach’s own effort in his book to represent an alternative history for Europe (Europe perceived through the means of stylistic analysis), Mimesis is also an attempt to rescue sense and meanings from the fragments of modernity with which, from his Turkish exile, Auerbach saw the downfall of Europe, and Germany in particular. Like Zeitblom, he affirms the recuperative and redemptive human project for which, in its patient philological unfolding, his book is the emblem, and again resembling Zeitblom, he understands that like a novelist, the scholar must reconstruct the history of his own time as part of a personal commitment to his field. Yet Auerbach specifically forswears the linear narrative style, which, despite its numerous interruptions and parentheses, works so powerfully for Zeitblom and his readers. Thus in comparing himself to modern novelists such as Joyce and Woolf, who re-create a whole world out of random, usually unimportant moments, Auerbach explicitly rejects a rigid scheme, a relentless sequential movement, or fixed concepts as instruments of study. ‘‘As opposed to this,’’ he says near the end, ‘‘I see the possibility of success and profit in a method which consists in letting myself be guided by a few motifs which I have worked out gradually and without a specific purpose . . . which have become familiar and vital to me in the course of my philological activity’’ (548). What gives him the confidence to surrender to those motifs without a specific purpose is the realization that no one person can possibly synthesize the whole of modern life, and second, that there is an abiding ‘‘order and . . . interpretation of life which arise from life itself: that is, those which grow up in the individuals themselves, which are to be discerned in their
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thoughts, their consciousness, and in a more concealed form in their words and actions. For there is always going on within us a process of formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own self’’ (549). This testimonial to self-understanding is a deeply affecting one, I think. Several recognitions and affirmations are at play and even at odds within it, so to speak. One of course is staking something as ambitious as the history of Western representations of reality neither on a pre-existing method nor a schematic time-frame, but on personal interest, learning, and practice alone. Second, this then suggests that interpreting literature is ‘‘a process of formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own self.’’ Third, rather than producing a totally coherent, neatly inclusive view of the subject, there is ‘‘not one order and one interpretation, but many, which may either be those of different persons or of the same person at different times; so that overlapping, complementing, and contradiction yield something that we might call a synthesized cosmic view or at least a challenge to the reader’s will to interpretive synthesis’’ (549). Thus it all unmistakably comes down to a personal effort. Auerbach offers no system, no shortcut to what he puts before us as a history of the representation of reality in Western literature. From a contemporary standpoint there is something impossibly naive, if not outrageous, that hotly contested terms like ‘‘Western,’’ ‘‘reality,’’ and ‘‘representation’’—each of which has recently brought forth literally acres of disputatious prose among critics and philosophers—are left to stand on their own, unadorned and unqualified. It is as if Auerbach was intent on exposing his personal explorations and, perforce, his fallibility to the perhaps scornful eye of critics who might deride his subjectivity. But the triumph of Mimesis, as well as its inevitable tragic flaw, is that the human mind studying literary representations of the historical world can only do so as all authors do—from the limited perspective of their own time and their own work. No more scientific a method or less subjective a gaze is possible, except that the great scholar can always buttress his vision with learning, dedication, and moral purpose. It is this combination, this mingling of styles out of which Mimesis emerges. And to my way of thinking, its humanistic example remains an unforgettable one, fifty years after its first appearance in English.
Saidian Humanism
Emily Apter
Of crucial importance to Edward Said throughout his extraordinary career as an exemplary literary comparatist was the problem of humanism. In taking up the issue of Saidian humanism, I want to consider what it is; why it was such a fixture of Said’s intellectual trajectory; and how humanist interpretation was complicated by the critique of Orientalism. As is well known, the German philologist Erich Auerbach remains a consistent reference point in Said’s oeuvre, as a figure of secular criticism in exile, a defender of literary worldliness in an era of cultural standardization, and an explicator of Dante who drew Christian ontology into concert with the representation of earthly realism. Drawing on Said’s preface to a new edition of Auerbach’s seminal Mimesis (reproduced in this volume), I want to examine the question of why Said held on so tenaciously to humanist precepts and exegetical practices. In Orientalism, humanism and empire are revealed in mutual compact, but there are other humanisms that survive the compromise with imperialism: emancipatory humanism, the ethics of coexistence, figural paradigms of ontogenesis in world-historical forms of culture, and the ideal of translatio as portal to a universal or sacred language. Such a language may be boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.
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seen as comparable, if not equal, to a linguistic monotheism whose very sound-values—as in the case of classical or Koranic Arabic—are thought to be tangible evidence of paradise.1 Said’s reading of divine language in the preface to Mimesis intimates—though not in any explicit way—that humanism provides a crucial way of dealing with the ‘‘God problem,’’ allowing him to negotiate his way around the categorical imperatives of Christian and Islamic tradition. And this, of course, has significant bearing on definitions of secular criticism indebted to Said’s work. Said was always an accomplished literary critic in a humanist vein, interested in ‘‘great writers’’ even, as he noted in a 1993 interview cited by Jonathan Arac, when those writers are Orientalists and/or imperialists.2 Humanism was integral to his vision of cultural coexistence without coercion as well as to his ascription of Goethean Weltliteratur, which harks back to his translation in 1969 of Auerbach’s ‘‘Philology and Weltliteratur ’’ essay. The back cover of Edward Said and the Work of the Critic: Speaking Truth to Power, an anthology of essays edited by Paul Bové, highlights the inseparability of humanism and politics in Said’s work: ‘‘Perhaps more than any other person in the United States,’’ we read, ‘‘Said has changed how the U.S. media and American intellectuals must think about and represent Palestinians, Islam and the Middle East. Most important, this change arises not as a result of political action but out of a potent humanism.’’ 3 Said’s fidelity to humanism’s synthetic approach to diverse cultures (on the order of Goethe’s ‘‘common world-council’’), to philological credos of translatio studii, and to literature’s ability to settle value on the human person allowed his work to remain congenial to the humanities mainstream, even when his political and theoretical engagements aroused antagonism on the part of conservative critics. His adherence to emancipatory humanism was profoundly in step with that of Frantz Fanon insofar as it embraced values of individual freedom, universal human rights, anti-imperialism, release from 1. Hafid Gafaiti spoke about classical, Koranic Arabic as divine medium in remarks made after his paper ‘‘The Language of the State: National Identities and Cultural Resistance’’ (presented at the Territoires des Langues Conference, Brown University, Providence, R.I., April 12, 2003). 2. Jonathan Arac, ‘‘Criticism between Opposition and Counterpoint,’’ in Edward Said and the Work of the Critic: Speaking Truth to Power, ed. Paul A. Bové (Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 2000), 68. Arac cites an interview published as ‘‘Orientalism and After,’’ in A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals, ed. Peter Osbourne (London: Routledge, 1996), 68. 3. Paul A. Bové, ed., Edward Said and the Work of the Critic.
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economic dependency, and self-determination for disenfranchised peoples. Most recently, I think, Saidian humanism, defined with the Orientalist critique at its crux, pointed to urgent issues in the field of language politics. Saidian humanism in this guise would examine the linguistic and geopolitical objectives of what Amitav Ghosh has referred to as the new ‘‘Anglophone empire,’’ a term emphasizing the role of English-language commonality in cementing allegiances among countries that make up the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ (America, Britain, and Australia).4 In Said’s watershed book Orientalism, humanism is rarely directly indicted, but as the ballast of philological Euro-nationalism, and as the purveyor of Orientalist tropes and archetypes, its complicity with Orientalism becomes evident. Said’s reading of Dante’s Divine Comedy is particularly illustrative in this regard. It focuses on Dante’s encounter with ‘‘Maometto’’ (Mohammed) in the eighth of the nine circles of hell. Mohammed, he reminds us, is lower down than the lustful, the avaricious, the heretics, the suicidal, and the blasphemous. He is second only to Judas, Brutus, and Cassius on the absolute scale of iniquity. Cleft in two from his chin to his anus, his entrails and excrement extruding, Mohammed is punished for the sin of schism. Islam is also antagonized by the anachronistic and unfair placement of pre-Christian luminaries in the same category of heathen damnation with post-Christian Muslims. Even though, as Said notes, the Koran recognizes Jesus as a prophet, Dante fails to acknowledge this important fact. Dante’s ‘‘poetic grasp of Islam,’’ Said avers, thus reveals an instance of the schematic, almost cosmological inevitability with which Islam and its designated representatives are creatures of Western geographical, historical, and above all, moral apprehension. Empirical data about the Orient . . . count for very little. . . . Dante’s powers as a poet intensify, make more rather than less representative, these perspectives on the Orient. Mohammed, Saladin, Averroës, and Avicenna are fixed in a visionary cosmology—laid out, boxed in, imprisoned, without much regard for anything except their ‘‘function’’ and the patterns they realize on the stage on which they appear.5 Said’s interpretation of Dante prepared the way for a larger argument to the effect that the Orient of Orientalism was essentially a ‘‘laicized Chris4. Amitav Ghosh, ‘‘The Anglophone Empire,’’ New Yorker, April 7, 2003, 46. 5. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 69–70.
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tian supernaturalism’’ (O, 122) dressed to modern taste by philology. It was criticism in this vein that one might expect, but does not find, in Said’s preface to the new edition of Mimesis, the reissue of which, by Princeton University Press, was scheduled to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the first English-language publication of the book in 1953. Said’s introduction to Mimesis offers a moving account of Auerbachian humanism, capturing a sense of the vulnerability of subjectivity, or ‘‘individuality,’’ in Auerbach’s magnum opus. Said is particularly appreciative of Auerbach’s Vico-inspired historicism, his capacity for synthesis, holism, and the cosmic view, his sense of the inner mobility, the animation of inner forces that endow great works of literature with vitality. Like Walter Benjamin, Said understands that Auerbach’s hermeneutic philology is interesting because it throws into relief the places where humanism abuts materialist theology. Where Said notes how Auerbachian philology’s ‘‘extraordinary attention to the minute, local details of other cultures and languages’’ shores up the ‘‘spiritual energy of veritas’’ invested in the Christian figura, Benjamin homes in on Auerbach’s literary materialism, associated with his attention to the facticity and facture of esoteric poetry (including that of Mallarmé).6 For Benjamin, the way in which craft value underpins the aesthetic sign parallels the hidden value of labor inside the commodity fetish.7 ‘‘The philological approach,’’ Benjamin writes in his ‘‘Exchange with Adorno,’’ entails examining the text detail by detail, leading the reader to fixate magically on the text. . . . The appearance of self-contained facticity that emanates from philological study and casts its spell on the scholar is dispelled according to the degree to which the object is constructed in historical perspective. The lines of perspective in this conclusion, receding to the vanishing point, converge in our own historical experience. This way, the object is constituted as a monad. In the monad, the textual detail which was frozen in a mythical rigidity comes alive.8 6. Edward W. Said, introduction to Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, by Erich Auerbach, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), xv, xxi. Subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically as M. 7. Walter Benjamin, ‘‘Review of Renéville’s Expérience poétique,’’ in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Vol. 4 (1938–1940), trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 117. 8. Walter Benjamin, ‘‘Exchange with Adorno on ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,’’’ in Walter Benjamin, 108.
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The spell of the textual detail is broken by history, but history (or at least the history with which there is personal identification) also liberates the textual monad from the protocols of philological reification and the frozen bonds of myth. In seeming, once again, to come alive, the monad reachieves the power of the fetish, retaining its materialist origin while acquiring a soul. If Said, like Benjamin, often appears drawn to the way in which Auerbach’s practice of philology tested the limits of secularism within humanist historicism, he is also fascinated by the temporal modalities of Mimesis—the longue durée of the book’s chronological span (Homer to Virginia Woolf) and extended afterlife in literary criticism. Where Auerbach himself tends to stress the circumstantial historical conditions inflecting the making of Mimesis—‘‘Mimesis,’’ he writes in the 1953 Epilegomena, ‘‘is quite consciously a book that a particular person, in a particular situation, wrote at the beginning of the 1940s’’ (M, 574)—Said identifies humanist value in the longevity of Mimesis. If centuries seem to be getting longer—in the Arrighi sense—then Said, we might say, attends accordingly to temporal duration in coordination with the spatial reach of geographic, transnational relevance. Here, he seems to echo his earlier book, The World, the Text, and the Critic, in which he praised Auerbach and Leo Spitzer for being ‘‘extraterritorial’’ critics, ‘‘whose philological scholarship is mainly concerned not with reading but with describing the modes of persistence of texts.’’ 9 Along with Georg Lukács, Auerbach and Spitzer are understood to be ‘‘the great intuitors of textual filiation’’ who have made of the text ‘‘a locus of human effort, a ‘text-ile’ fertility gathering in cultural identity, disseminating human life everywhere in time and space’’ (WTC, 250). In the preface to Mimesis, Said is brilliant on Auerbach’s signature theme—‘‘the representation of reality’’—showing how his concern with the ‘‘transmutation of a coarse reality into language and new life’’ has its roots in Christ’s sermo humilis (M, xx). In literary terms, this translates into ‘‘low style,’’ a representation of the real that is essentially comedic and earthly (irdisch in the sense assigned to that word by Auerbach in his early study Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt, misleadingly translated, as Said notes, as Dante, Poet of the Secular World ). ‘‘What fascinates Auerbach,’’ Said observes, ‘‘is the mounting tension in Dante’s poem, as eternally condemned sinners press their cases and aspire to the realization of their ambi9. Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 148. Subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically as WTC.
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tions even as they remain fixed in the place assigned to them by Divine Judgment. Hence, the sense of futility and sublimity exuded simultaneously by the Inferno’s ‘earthly historicity,’ which is always pointed in the end toward the white rose of the ‘Paradiso’’’ (M, xxvi). ‘‘Having established the systematic nature of Dante’s universe (framed by Aquinas’ theocratic cosmology),’’ Said continues, ‘‘Auerbach offers the thought that for all of its investment in the eternal and immutable, The Divine Comedy is even more successful in representing reality as basically human. In that vast work of art ‘the image of man eclipses the image of God’’’ (M, xxvi). Finally, Said contends that ‘‘Auerbach’s choice of Dante for advancing the radically humanistic thesis carefully works through the great poet’s Catholic ontology as a phase transcended by the Christian epic’s realism, which is shown to be ‘ontogenetic,’ that is [and he is citing Auerbach here], ‘we are given to see, in the realm of timeless being, the history of man’s inner life and unfolding’’’ (M, xxvi). Said’s eloquent reading of Auerbach’s Dante chapter fastens on the crucial association of the Incarnation with realism, a realism brimming over with such aliveness that it eclipses the divine. Said’s preface demonstrates his obvious passion for the great works of Western literature analyzed by Auerbach as well as his critical reaccreditation of Auerbach’s typological model, but there is a noticeable lack of attention to Auerbach’s Eurocentrism. In writing about Auerbach in Culture and Imperialism, for example, Said refers explicitly to the philologist’s phobia of non-Western languages, his reluctance (in contrast to his Istanbul colleague Spitzer) to risk scholarly engagement with cultures falling outside of the Holy Roman Empire. Auerbach’s relative silence on President Kemal Atatürk’s instigation of modern Turkish—a radical reform that severed Turkey’s ties to Ottoman literacy and that directly concerned Auerbach, since he owed his job to Atatürk’s Europeanization of Turkish universities in the 1930s—appears almost aberrant in light of the analogies that begged to be drawn between Roman linguistic imperialism and the Turkish linguistic autocolonization that he was witnessing first hand.10 Written in Istanbul between 1942 and 1945, Mimesis bears scant traces of the site of its writing beyond the famous plaint of the epilogue, in which the author bemoans his intellectual isolation and dearth of adequate research facilities. In reading through Said’s preface, one might expect the Turkish cir10. For more on the Turkish chapter of literary history, see my ‘‘Global Translatio: The ‘Invention’ of Comparative Literature, Istanbul, 1933,’’ Critical Inquiry 29 (Winter 2003): 253–81.
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cumstances of the book’s genesis to be woven into an account of how Auerbachian humanism fares today when viewed from a post-Orientalism, if not postcolonial, vantage point. But there is nothing obviously ‘‘Saidian’’ about the preface, and if the reader covers up the signature, he or she might never guess that it corresponds to that of the author of Orientalism. Perhaps this was a text written in the spirit of confirming the critic’s freedom to address his interests in any way he sees fit, an example of the pure intellectual pleasure Said has always taken in certain forms of traditional humanist scholarship. Or perhaps, submerged somewhere in this Auerbachian homage, there lay the makings of a theory of Welt-humanism that, once adumbrated, would suggest what humanism after Orientalism might be (Said, as I learned shortly after drafting this essay, was, at the time of his death, completing a book on humanism, which will be published posthumously). The centrality of humanism in Said’s oeuvre may be partially understood as a means of preserving the secular foundations of his thought. Aamir Mufti has analyzed multiple ways in which Saidian secular criticism unfolds out of the ‘‘worlded’’ humanism associated by Said with the figure of Auerbach in exile. In Mufti’s ascription, this ‘‘critical secularism’’ is associated with minority consciousness (dislocation, statelessness, psychic unhoming)11 and the traumatic reckoning with ‘‘what it means for a group to become a minority’’ (a condition of becoming-minor, a state of being included but unrelated to or misfitting in the national whole).12 Mufti’s ethics of transnational solidarity among minorities relies on a vector of comparison between Indian Muslims minoritized after Partition and Jewish refugees exiled during World War II. This ethics of relation, posed against unmediated claims of national membership, belongs to a critically secularist project that implies a holding on to anti-imperialism and the ends of economic and social justice; a commitment to the tactical dejuridification of democratic legalism (which allows a superstate to suspend rights in a state of emergency); freedom from religious opiate; a transnational politics of the multitude built on revolutionary social formations and subjectivities; and, not least, a theoretical disposition of critique that hews to the logical rigorism of the collective while challenging the call to arms embedded in sectarian casuistry. Mufti gives us a renewed appreciation of Said’s Auerbach as a model 11. See Aamir Mufti, ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture,’’ Critical Inquiry 25 (Autumn 1998): 96, 99, 102, 105. 12. Aamir Mufti, ‘‘Secularism and Minority: Elements of a Critique,’’ Social Text 45, vol. 14, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 93.
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of minority subjectivity running counter to identity politics. In an interview with Jacqueline Rose, Said confesses, ‘‘I’ve become very, very impatient with the idea of and the whole project of identity: the idea, which produced great interest in the United States in the sixties and which is also present in the return to Islam in the Arab world and elsewhere, that people should really focus on themselves and where they come from. . . . What’s much more interesting is to try to reach out beyond identity to something else. It may be death. It may be an altered state of consciousness that puts you in touch with others more than one normally is.’’ 13 This concern to move ‘‘beyond identity’’—reprised in the opening of his memoir Out of Place, in which he describes the sense that ‘‘there was always something wrong with how I was invented’’ and admits to feeling on some occasions ‘‘nearly devoid of any character at all’’—recalls the intellectual disposition of an entire generation of humanists during the war who, even at their peril, resisted the claims of identity in the name of an ontological something else.14 Dismissed from his position as professor of Romance philology, and certain that he would be deported by the Nazis, Victor Klemperer, for example, confides in his diary that he would rather remain a German (because of his identification with the language and culture) than emigrate to Palestine: ‘‘Belonging to a nation,’’ he maintains, ‘‘depends less on blood than on language. . . . [L]anguage contains the totality of the intellectual.’’ Like Walter Benjamin, exhorted by Gershom Scholem to emigrate to Palestine, Klemperer resisted, remaining fast in his convictions: ‘‘We hear a lot about Palestine now; it does not appeal to us. Anyone who goes there exchanges nationalism and narrowness for nationalism and narrowness.’’ 15 And in December 1944, on the eve of fleeing his Dresden home, he writes, ‘‘Perhaps we Jews always want to be something else—some Zionists, the others Germans. But what are we really? I do not know. And that, too, is a question to which I shall never get an answer. And as a scholar that is my greatest fear of death: that in all probability it will give me no answer to all my questions.’’ 16 For Klemperer, Jewishness is perforce the condition of ‘‘no-answer,’’ a state of statelessness contoured by an abiding commitment to secular humanism. 13. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Edward Said Talks to Jacqueline Rose,’’ in Edward Said and the Work of the Critic, 25. 14. Edward Said, Out of Place: A Memoir (New York: Viking, 1999), 3. 15. Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1933–1941, vol. 1, trans. Martin Chalmers (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 23. 16. Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1942–1945, vol. 2, trans. Martin Chalmers (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 382.
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Auerbach’s national, religious, and cultural affinities were just as complex, a fact that helps explain why he often seems to function as a standin or alter ego for Said himself. We cannot fail to be struck by parallels between Said’s ironic portrait of Auerbach, as ‘‘a non-Christian explaining Christianity’s achievement’’ and his own predicament as a Palestinian with Christian roots, explaining the need for a nonmonolithic understanding of Islam (M, xviii). The figure of the critic, negotiating dissensual ideas, and making his ecumenical filiations the very precondition of humanism, matters a great deal to Said, who writes, In Auerbach’s searingly powerful and strangely intimate characterization of the great Christian Thomist poet Dante, who emerges from the pages of Mimesis as the seminal figure in Western literature—the reader is inevitably led to the paradox of a Prussian Jewish scholar in Turkish, Muslim, non-European exile handling (perhaps even juggling) charged, and in many ways irreconcilable, sets of antinomies that, though ordered more benignly than their mutual antagonism suggests, never lose their opposition to each other. (M, xviii) In comments such as these, one recognizes the familiar compassion and intellectual respect that Said consistently demonstrates toward Auerbach, indicative of the special place he reserved for him as acknowledged precursor of his own version of worldly humanism in exile and ‘‘resolute secularism’’ (M, xxii). When Said characterizes Freud’s Moses as a representative figure of nonexclusivist, nondiscriminatory religious origins in Freud and the Non-European, his Auerbach resembles this Freud: a secular Jew open to non-Jewish traditions and keenly aware of how allegorical typology may be applied—like powers of ten—to the analysis of global humanity.17 Reading Said’s preface a second time, one may appreciate why it would have been uninteresting for Said to harp on the limitations of Auerbach’s Eurocentrist humanism. For Said was taking up the challenge of using Auerbachian humanism to fashion new humanisms, not merely because of a sober conviction that great books, on the grounds of their intrinsic merit, should continue to have traction in a global, increasingly mediatized culture industry but more because of his belief that humanism provides futural parameters for defining secular criticism in a world increasingly governed by a sense of identitarian ethnic destiny and competing sacred tongues. In the preface to Mimesis, it is Goethe’s humanist vision of Weltlitera17. Edward Said, Freud and the Non-European (London: Verso, 2003), 44.
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tur that opens the door to a humanism negotiating analogically between Christianity and Islam. In the decade after 1810, Said notes, Goethe became fascinated with Islam generally and with Persian poetry in particular. This was the period when he composed his finest and most intimate love poetry, the West-Ostlicher Diwan (1819), finding in the work of the great Persian poet Hafiz and in the verses of the Koran not only a new lyric inspiration allowing him to express a reawakened sense of physical love but, . . . a discovery of how, in the absolute submission to God, he felt himself to be oscillating between two worlds, his own and that of the Muslim believer who was miles, even worlds away from European Weimar. (M, xv) Raised as a Christian, the great-grandson of the first native evangelical minister in Lebanon, yet brought up habituated to Muslim culture in Palestine and Egypt, Said clearly forged his secularism in the midst of contesting world religions. One finds traces of their impression in the way in which he evokes Auerbach’s vision of the drama of earthly Incarnation. Auerbachian themes drawn from doctrinal Christianity—the mystery of the Logos, the Word made flesh, God made into a man, theological typology, the notion of figura as the name for the ‘‘intellectual and spiritual energy that does the actual connecting between past and present, history and Christian truth,’’ and the magisterial demonstration of the ‘‘millennial effects of Christianity on literary representation’’ (M, xxi–xxii)—build up to remind us of humanism’s predication on theistic structure. In his bracing account of Auerbach’s reading of Dante’s earthly paradise, Said moves well beyond the commonplace of Einfühling in the service of historicism. Almost seeming at times to be flirting with the temptations of paradise himself, Said identifies the godly within humanism with a logic of extension. Old Testament figures, ‘‘including God,’’ are adduced to be ‘‘heavy with the implication of extending into the depths of time, space, and consciousness, hence of character, and therefore require a much more concentrated, intense act of attention from the reader’’ (M, xix). It is this logic of extension (with its distant echo of a Spinozist ontology of common notions enabling the extension of the one to the many, of the social multiple to the fortified unicity of the multitude) that brings us to Saidian Welt-humanism.18 This is a humanism foreshadowed in Orientalism in the ‘‘enlightened’’ pursuit of theological unity as a governing principle of a plu18. On the logic of extension in Spinoza, see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 110–11.
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rality of worlds, and in the ‘‘summational attitude’’ of the highly educated Orientalist, which carries over in Said’s estimation to the non-Orientalist Western scholar, the philological humanists of the twenties and thirties: Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Curtius, Karl Vossler, Friedrich Gundolf, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Auerbach, Spitzer, and Freud, whose Egypto-Jewish cultural syncretism Said treats in his book Freud and the Non-European. Late bourgeois humanism, Said argues with neo-Hegelian fidelity in Orientalism, with its commitment to understanding culture ‘‘as a whole, antipositivistically, intuitively, sympathetically’’ (O, 258), ‘‘is what made possible the conversion of the discrete particular into a world-historical process’’ (O, 259). If at times in this preface it seems as if Said minimizes humanist Orientalism in order to salvage humanism tout court, it is perhaps because he believed that there was simply too much at stake within the humanist tradition to justify simplistic denunciations. At the late stage of his career during which he composed the new introduction to Mimesis, Said was clearly committed to the future of humanism, conceived as a world system that takes account of the vast traffic in inter-national learnedness informing GreekArab-Judeo-Christian practices of cultural translation from the early Middle Ages to the present. But I would submit further that Said seems to have been urging humanism, in its prospective guises, to take on not only the history of global translatio but also to build on its past tradition as instigator of intellectual fields that de-compartmentalize established discourses and subjects. Following on from the range of questions addressed in Said’s Auerbach preface, one could argue that it is now the mandate of humanism to define a critical secularism that seeks to reconcile the competing claims of theodicy, relativism, ontogenesis, and anti-imperialism. In Orientalism, critical secularism was identifiable with the exposure of Orientalism’s crypto-religious heuristic practice. In tracing historic connections between Herder-inspired studies of the Orient and philological secular humanism, Said describes some of the infelicitous side effects of Herder’s challenge to universalism. For even if Herder introduced a salubrious new awareness of world cultures that encouraged the beginnings of an enlightened cultural relativism and fostered secular modes of inquiry into cultures of the Orient (so that, for example, ‘‘Gibbon could treat Mohammed as a historical figure who influenced Europe and not as a diabolical miscreant hovering somewhere between magic and false prophecy,’’ thus making possible ‘‘a selective identification with regions and cultures not one’s own [that] wore down the obduracy of self and identity, which had been polarized into a community of embattled believers facing barbarian hordes’’), this
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secularizing tendency hardly vaccinated against what Said calls ‘‘a reconstructed religious impulse’’ within Orientalist philology (O, 120–21). According to this model, the Orientalist himself becomes the new God, creating ‘‘the Orient’’ as a culturally reified, historicized object of research, and, in the process, legitimating the ‘‘modern’’ heuristics and doxologies of philology, history, and translation. As an antidote to philology’s inveterate practice of using Orientalism to ‘‘play God,’’ Said, and many of the critics influenced by him, extended worldly humanism to critical secularism. Humanism, of course, has been a tradition shaped and structured historically by tensions between religion and secular culture; tensions that fracture multiply into differences among theology, dogma, popular belief, inner spirituality, individuality, reason, piety, religious telos, and ontology. Secularization arose, at least in part, out of disavowed references by the church fathers to classical authors and texts of antiquity, references in turn drawn on by the quattrocento humanists to legitimate their embrace of classical allusion. In the early fifteenth century, Petrarch swept aside doctrinal strictures against classicism inherited from medieval scholasticism to create a studia humanitatis that absorbed antiquity into a general, secular Italian culture, while Valla extended the reach of humanism to the domains of philosophy, religion, and legal theory. Dante’s invention of what Auerbach calls ‘‘extreme subjectivity’’ in The Divine Comedy advanced secularization yet further, but this new emphasis on human subjective consciousness was hardly at odds with religious purpose, because Dante’s first concern was to transpose sacred, biblical knowledge into the modern form of textuality known as European literature.19 Tensions between religion and secularism remain anchored in humanism, inflecting even the most recent attempts to engender a humanist critical secularism. As a freestanding term, secularism carries problematic connotations as a code word to distinguish ‘‘fundamentalism,’’ or theocratic states in the Middle East, from (Israeli) ‘‘democracy.’’ In this case, secularism becomes all too easily assimilated to the political export of hegemonic models of democracy. Moreover, it repeats and reinforces old Orientalist binarisms that have acquired new currency in Samuel Huntington’s ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ paradigm. Critical secularism, by contrast, seeks to countervail such binarisms by framing the venerable humanist concern ‘‘to connect the renewal of liberal disciplines with the subjective consciousness of such an 19. Edward Said, Beginnings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 212. Subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically as B.
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undertaking’’ within the broader context of colonial history, imperialism, and the critique of nationalism.20 Pointing to the theocratic dimension of nationalism, for example, Bruce Robbins defines secular not in opposition to the religious but as a term for the critique of ‘‘nation and nationalism as belief system.’’ 21 In a complementary vein, Stathis Gourgouris (in his essay for this volume) sees the ‘‘motif of transformation against the grain of transcendence’’ in Said’s work as reaching ‘‘beyond mere opposition of the secular to the religious to another configuration that strips away from the religious (and indeed from metaphysics itself) an assumed imperviousness to the political, so that we may speak of Said’s work, rather dramatically, as an exfoliation of the repressed politics of transcendence.’’ 22 One might say that Saidian secular criticism sublimates a repressed politics of transcendence while unmasking organized religion’s pose of political impartiality. But one might also venture that Said’s attentiveness to theological exegesis in the preface to Mimesis attests to an intellectual curiosity toward cultures of belief, a willingness to engage ‘‘religiously’’ with the matter of how philosophies of transcendence have shaped revolutionary ethical militance and subjective freedom. How, for example, should we interpret paradise, defined as a language of revealed truth embodied in linguistic theism? This question becomes particularly urgent now: the lure of paradise is often invoked in Western denunciations of Islam, especially when it is targeted for caricature as a motivation for suicide martyrdom. The politics of religion, and the very particular complexities attending the sacred status of Koranic Arabic (sometimes characterized as the instructions of God en direct), would be better appreciated if read contrapuntally in relation to the political cosmogony of paradise in Christian humanism, specifically as it emerges in Dante’s language of paradise, in which, according to one commentator, ‘‘all heavenly phenomena are direct utterances of God and of His angels.’’ 23 Auerbach’s Dante monograph, originally published in 1929, and deemed by Said in the introduction to Mimesis to be possibly his best work, 20. Riccardo Fubini, Humanism and Secularization: From Petrach to Valla, trans. Martha King (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), 9. 21. See Aamir Mufti, paraphrasing Bruce Robbins, in his essay ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul,’’ 96. He cites Robbins’s essay ‘‘Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said’s ‘Voyage In,’’’ Social Text 40 (Fall 1994): 26. 22. Stathis Gourgouris, ‘‘Transformation, Not Transcendence,’’ in this volume, 55–56. 23. P. H. Wicksteed, as cited by John D. Sinclair, in notes to Canto II of Dante’s Paradiso, trans. John D. Sinclair (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 45.
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affords a relevant point of departure. Through his close reading of The Divine Comedy, Auerbach sets himself the task of describing how Dante makes paradise linguistically tangible. He begins with a time-honored problem of theodicy confronted by Dante, namely, how to reconcile divine order and the actually lived experience on earth of supreme injustice. It was Augustine, according to Auerbach, who gave man something to hope for in the form of Christ’s story, communicated as ‘‘the idea of a personal God,’’ in such a way as to preserve ‘‘the fundamentally European determination not to abolish reality by speculation, not to take flight into transcendence, but to come to grips with the real world and master it.’’ 24 Auerbach maintains, citing Harnack, that Augustine was ‘‘able to endow Latin and the future tongues of Europe with a ‘Christian soul and the language of the heart’’’ (D, 17). This language of the heart was fully mobilized by Dante in the Inferno and the Purgatorio. Preparing the way for his future arguments in Mimesis, Auerbach shows how crass vernacular inflections, concrete sound values, and metric monotony emerge as the linguistic equivalents of Christ’s mortal and mortified body. Even the preferred verse form of terza rima (hallowing the sacred number three) is seen as essential to Dante’s construction of what Auerbach calls an ‘‘Other World,’’ at once ethereal and irdisch, anthropocentric, and referential to God. When it came to the Paradiso, Auerbach acknowledges, Dante encountered greater difficulty in preserving the human character of the Christian afterlife. Subjective rapture and celestial radiance threatened to disembody the subject, inducing radical depersonalization. And yet, the language of the Paradiso, contrary to common opinion, is far from dull. Yes, there is an abstract, radiant lexicon of beatitude and satisfaction that tends to numb the senses and distance the reader from earthly reality, but if we take Auerbach’s reading of Dante seriously, there is a rhetoric of geometric metaphysics in paradise that achieves a truly ‘‘worlded’’ expressionism: In Paradise all the souls have undergone a transformation which the human eyes cannot penetrate; they are hidden by the radiance of 24. Erich Auerbach, Dante, Poet of the Secular World, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 17. Subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically as D. Auerbach’s reading of Augustine as the guardian of the human connection to God is perhaps subject to contention, especially if one goes back to humanist theological debates over the anthropomorphization of God. In the fifteenth century, Andrea Biglia attacked San Bernadino for losing ‘‘the wholly Augustinian sense of the infinite distance between Creator and creature, and of the enlightening power of grace that excludes a narrowly prescribed ethics.’’ See Fubini, Humanism and Secularization, 68.
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their beatitude and Dante cannot recognize them; they themselves must say who they are, and they cannot express their emotions by human gestures; strictly speaking, personal emotion can only manifest itself here by an increase in radiance. The danger of depersonalization and repetition are evident, and many believe that Dante succumbed to it and that the Paradiso lacks the poetic power of the first two parts of the Comedy. But such a criticism of Dante’s ultimo lavoro springs from the Romantic prejudice of which we have spoken above. . . . The great similarity between the luminous manifestations, resulting from their common beatitude, does not exclude a preservation of the individual personality; the man is almost if not entirely hidden from the eyes, but he is there and finds means of making himself known. (D, 155) The reference to ‘‘luminous manifestations’’ in this passage reveals Dante grappling with the theophanic dilemma of making God manifest in language: ‘‘Although the bodies are hidden, the luminous apparitions of the Paradiso have expressive gestures which accompany their memories of the former lives on earth; these are different modes and movements of light, which Dante illustrates with an abundance of metaphors; the feminine souls of the moon appear as pearls on a white forehead; the souls of the sphere of Mercury gather around Dante like fish in clear water, swimming toward food that has been cast to them’’ (D, 155–56). Auerbach savors these images of effulgent, ghostly bodies, while cautioning the reader against interpreting them as decorative similitudes of ‘‘pure inspiration.’’ They are allegoremes with a distinct purpose, he insists, sensuous images placed before the reader not just to serve as delectable ‘‘food to catch the eyes and so possess the mind’’ but rather—and the distinction is crucial—as diaphanous traces of the real that signify rational thought: God as idea and absolute of justice. The only human shapes figured in paradise are St. Thomas and St. Francis, but their physical forms are encased in veils of light. It is their sacral language that conserves the phantom of their former individuality as material for testing the suffering or enjoyment of divine justice. Reading the Paradiso in the ‘‘right’’ Auerbachian way thus entails reading linguistic theophany as justicium. Why was justice in paradise so important to Dante? Perhaps because, as Auerbach reminds us, Dante was bent on obtaining it. As is well known, much of the polemical import of The Divine Comedy lies in redeeming the Christian faith from ecclesiastical corruption (and, more specifically, from the particularly egregious venality of the church in his home town of Florence).
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Though justice emerges as the preeminent abstract ideal of paradise, it is imbricated within a vision of imperial glory. Auerbach traces Dante’s ‘‘imperialist’’ vision of paradise in the typological surcodage of Roman military and Christian virtues (self-sacrifice, conquest, salvation). A clear example is in Canto XIV of the Paradiso, where the phrase ‘‘Resurgi e Vinci’’ (‘‘arise and conquer’’), which comes to the narrator in a flash of messianic imperial hope, prefigures the representation of all-out redemption as Gloria Patri, the union of church and empire in God’s thought in Canto XXVII. Consider, too, the place in Canto XVIII where Dante plays on the Gothic capital form of the letter M. First the letter is shown to resemble the (FrenchGuelph-Florentine) lily, then an eagle, the movement of the wings, upright and then down, forming the last letter of the word TERRAM (earth, world), taken to stand for Monarchia (empire).25 It might strike the modern observer as strange, Auerbach says, but Dante introduces the idea of the special mission of Rome and the Roman Empire in history. From the very beginning Divine Providence elected Rome as the capital of the world. It gave the Roman people the heroism and the spirit of self-sacrifice necessary to conquer this world and possess it in peace; and when the work of conquest and pacification, the sacred mission announced to Aeneas, was accomplished after centuries of bitter battles and sacrifices and the inhabited world lay in the hands of Augustus, the time was fulfilled and the Saviour appeared. . . . Rome was the mirror of the divine world order. (D, 122) Dante’s allegory focuses subsequently on earthly Rome’s fall from grace as it yields to the greed-driven institutions of church and state, but the version of the Roman Empire which is, so to speak, ‘‘made in paradise’’ represents the unity of all peoples in a just world order, an ‘‘empyreal’’ imperium, as it were. This upper reach of the celestial spheres transcends dialectical striving; even the millennial desire to recover a new king is replaced by the will of a collection of souls forming a spirit of the multitude and held together in a space-time continuum commonly known as the Primum Mobile.26 If, in the 1920s, Dante’s paradise served Auerbach as a figure for a reconstituted humanism, in the present era the work of the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish endows it with contemporary resonance. Dante and Darwish may seem initially to share little ground of comparison, but on closer 25. See notes to Canto XVIII of Dante’s Paradiso, 266–67. 26. John D. Sinclair, in notes to Canto XVIII of Dante’s Paradiso, 266.
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reading, Darwish’s volume of poetry Unfortunately, It Was Paradise offers interesting parallels. In the poem ‘‘Like the Letter ‘N’ in the Qur’an,’’ the letter N (referring to a chapter of the Koran that uses a dual rhyme scheme ending in N) renders God alphabetically perceptible, recalling Dante’s designation of the imperial TERRAM, with its final M in Gothic script. In the work of both writers, paradise emerges as a placeholder for political utopia— a just world—that looks more like a perfected secular society than a holy land beyond representation. In Darwish’s ‘‘Earth Presses against Us,’’ much loved and often quoted by Said, paradise—located somewhere ‘‘after the last sky’’—is the name for the dream of a restituted homeland: Earth is pressing against us, trapping us in the final passage. To pass through, we pull off our limbs. Earth is squeezing us. If only we were its wheat, we might die and yet live. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Where should we go after the last border? Where should birds fly after the last sky? 27 Christian and Islamic paradise, in the work of Dante and Darwish, respectively, resembles an Auerbachian figura—a term Said, in Beginnings, credits Auerbach with ‘‘finding’’ in the course of his research on Dante. An Ansatzpunkt, or keyword, springing directly from historical context, figura functions as an X-term, assuming an algorithmic function in the meaningproduction of humanism. For Said, this X-term carries maximal significance since it allows epistemes to crystallize and enter history (B, 68). ‘‘No longer mere words or unknown symbols,’’ Said writes, these mots-thèmes in Auerbach’s writing ‘‘enact the combination of past and future woven into the historical fabric of language. A mute term, relatively anonymous, has given rise to a special condition of mind and has evoked the poignancy of time’’ (B, 69). For a term to become a piece of ‘‘reconstructed history,’’ it must be fortunate to find—in the manner of Benjamin’s text of the original in search of the ideal translator—an interpreter capable of conferring an afterlife. For Said, the term figura becomes ‘‘incarnate’’ (that is to say, a term of agency, ready to change and be changed) only by virtue of being discovered by Auerbach in the course of his scholarly research (B, 69). One could say the same 27. Mahmoud Darwish, Unfortunately, It Was Paradise, trans. Munir Akash and Carolyn Forché with Sinan Antoon and Amira El-Zein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 9.
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about the term Orientalism, which lay dormant in Western philology until Said plucked it from the fusty shelves and galvanized it as a critical episteme, a foundational Ansatzpunkt for an anti-imperialist understanding of world culture. And perhaps, as I am proposing here in conclusion, one could perform the same function on the word paradise, transforming it from a term connoting nonsecular utopias and the desire for self-sacrifice unto death into an Ansatzpunkt defining future humanisms through the theory of ‘‘possible worlds.’’ Without relinquishing the commitment to exposing religion’s threat to a politics of the here and now, or forgetting the need to hold steadfast against manipulative invocations of transcendentally authorized injunctions, humanism, informed by critical secularism, might be well advised to consider once more the temptations of ‘‘imparadising’’ oneself (to borrow Dante’s phrase), that is to say, of attaining ‘‘God’’ for the love of justice. For though it may seem an antique dilemma, understanding the relationship between theophany and justicium would seem to be the political order of the day. In other terms, whether it is conceptualized as justice divined as the expressionism of sacred language, or as the transformation of an imperialist rhetoric of Christian salvation into a rhetoric of planetary utopianism, or as the space between physics and metaphysics that in today’s theoretical parlance might be called ‘‘possible worlds’’ or ‘‘parallel universes,’’ paradise— as the signature expression of a politics of utopia—assumes new relevance to global humanism. Edward Said’s legacy will unfurl into the future of comparative literary studies in ways that cannot even be imagined in the present moment. In paying tribute to Said as a reader of Erich Auerbach, the concern has not just been to confer the Auerbachian mantel on Said (he assumed that mantle quite naturally by refurbishing the Auerbachian project of ‘‘philology and Weltliteratur ’’ for a late industrial, neo-imperialist age and by extending the political stakes of Jewish exile to Palestinian refugees). I have been interested, rather, in exploring specifically how Said’s reception of Auerbach—particularly Auerbach the reader of Dante—defined a whole new set of questions and programmatic concerns for comparative literature and the humanities at large. Saidian humanism, as I have sought to define it, prompts an activist return to the ‘‘great works’’ of humanism, with the understanding that humanism itself be rezoned to avoid misleading cartographic divisions between European and non-European cultures. Like his lifelong exemplars, Vico, Dilthey, Hegel, and Auerbach, Said aspired to the flash of learned cultural synthesis in a historicist frame, and yet like Auerbach (or for that matter Benjamin), he remained chary of totalizing interpretations
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that lent themselves to hegemonic application. Auerbach said of Mimesis that ‘‘the book is no theoretical construct; it aims to offer a view, and the very elastic thoughts or ideas that hold it together cannot be grasped and proven wrong in single, isolated phrases’’ (M, 562), and Said, unlike many of Auerbach’s critics, appreciates the lack of seamless narrative in Mimesis, seeing in its fragmentary structure and the quirky, very personal drift of literary analysis the mark of the human. Said, in his own work, never lets the reader forget the human in the humanities. ‘‘Auerbach,’’ he writes, ‘‘is bringing us back to what is an essentially Christian doctrine for believers but also a crucial element of human intellectual power and will’’ (M, xxii). The same, of course, could be said about his own work. Mining the humanist tradition for a utopian politics of paradise—despite the association of humanism with Eurocentrism and Orientalism—Said not only circumvented crude oppositions between cultures of belief and the critical secularism of technological modernity but made palpable the effects of ‘‘human intellectual power and will’’ in the sacred narratives of divine ontogenesis.
Transformation, Not Transcendence
Stathis Gourgouris
This essay belongs to a series of meditations on the secular imagination, by which I mean, very broadly, the capacity of humanity (occasional though it is) to conceptualize its existence in the absence of external and transcendental authority, and thus to exercise its radical potential for transforming the conditions of its existence in full cognizance of its historical character. Obviously, such a meditation also involves an interrogation as to what constitutes the historical subject, the subject of history, as well as, of course, the subject in history, and would thus require equally an investigation of subjectivity’s psychic dimensions. (Hence, the simultaneous interest of the overall project in the politics of sublimation, though on this occasion this will be broached only tangentially.) The central figure in this essay is what Edward Said has called ‘‘secular criticism,’’ a notion I take to be indicative of an intransigent intellectual position that seeks to critique and transform existing conditions—and this holds true both in matters of aesthetic form (literature, music) and social-political action—without submitting to the allure of otherworldly or transcendent solutions. The motif of transformation against the grain of transcendence is the core element in Said’s conboundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.
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ceptual framework. It reaches beyond mere opposition of the secular to the religious to another configuration that strips away from the religious (and indeed from metaphysics itself) an assumed imperviousness to the political, so that we may speak of Said’s work, rather dramatically, as an exfoliation of the repressed politics of transcendence.1 If Said’s core understanding of these elements tends to elude the majority of critics in favor of discussing his other, more explicitly political aspects, the events and aftermath of September 11 underscore ever more profoundly the urgency of what he calls ‘‘secular criticism.’’ The present historical moment, I believe, marks a watershed of a range of positions (often held with dire political consequences) on the relation between religion and politics, which I draw here in the broadest sense to include our most elemental decisions as to what constitutes our encounter, as historical subjects, with the world. Hence the impression of real methodological and epistemological confusion over the global significance of the events of 9/11, particularly as revealed by certain voices in—let us say, for the sake of argument— the ‘‘secular Left,’’ who are so conscious of the historical ground slipping into uncharted waters that they either fall into silence or into rapid declaration. It is difficult not to acknowledge that the continuous and yet still indeterminable unfolding of this historical moment has produced a sense of being suspended before a confounding crossroads of histories made and unmade, known and to be known. In full recognition of this sense of suspension, I begin by considering a curious incident that emerged alongside the initial ripple effects of September 11 as an allegorical instance of the wider psychosymbolic dimensions framing the events. Placing oneself within these dimensions makes imperative precisely the mode of interrogation needed in order to break down the deadly social-historical logic that produced these events in the first place and yet continues to be strengthened by their occur1. This essay is indebted to Bruce Robbins, who first articulated that Said’s secularism should not be opposed strictly to religion but rather to nationalism, and to Aamir Mufti, who extends this further by perceiving Said’s secular mind to be implicated in an episteme of homelessness and a political adherence to minority positions. See Bruce Robbins, ‘‘Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said’s ‘Voyage In’’’ (1994), in Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 115–26; Aamir R. Mufti, ‘‘Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture,’’ Critical Inquiry 25 (Autumn 1998): 95–125. On the contrary, William D. Hart’s Edward Said and the Religious Effects of Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) fails profoundly to understand these nuances of Said’s grasp of the secular imagination, expending instead enormous energy to prove that Said’s discourse is rather replete with unwitting religious metaphors.
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rence: namely, a mode of interrogation that begins with the question, How can the secular be philosophically articulated apart from its traditional opposition to the religious? This is exactly the interrogation that Said’s thought performs with such subtlety and incisiveness. On Wednesday, September 19, 2001, in the back pages of one of the New York Times sections, a tiny unsigned article was introduced by the astonishing headline ‘‘Attacks Called Great Art.’’ What followed was a hastily and scantily reported news item that hardly justified the stunning claim. It reported that Karlheinz Stockhausen, surely one of the leading figures in contemporary music, described the attacks of September 11 as ‘‘the greatest work of art ever,’’ going on to reproduce a relatively long and awkward quotation by the composer himself: ‘‘What happened there—they all have to rearrange their brains now—is the greatest work of art ever. That characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot dream of, that people practice madly for ten years, completely, fanatically, for a concert and then die. That is the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos. I could not do that. Against that, we, composers, are nothing.’’ Then the article concluded with a quizzical statement, which really belongs to the world of a novel, not a news report: ‘‘Mr. Stockhausen was reported to have left Hamburg in distress.’’ This last sentence, I suppose, refers to the immediate consequences that the composer’s statements provoked, though this short article barely touches on them. Apparently, the scandalous remarks were made during a press conference that Stockhausen had given in Hamburg, on the occasion of a performance of his recent work in the yearly festival, which this year carried the title Welt-Raum, a theme whose multiple significations become all the more pertinent at this juncture. The scandalous remarks prompted a scandalous response, and the performance was summarily canceled by the city’s commissioner for culture. The significance of this scandal in German (and more generally, European) circles, at both the state level and the cultural community ranks, was obviously not newsworthy to this New York Times correspondent. Neither was, apparently, the labyrinthine process of correcting this apparent misquotation in the original German press report, nor the laborious story of how the city of Hamburg dealt with the event. It is likely that the whole lot was considered irrelevant because it pertained to the complex relation between public funding and art production one finds in Germany but, of course, would never find in the United States in a million years. I shall lay aside the sequence of these events and their significance
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for Germany, for the European framework of cultural production, and surely, for Stockhausen himself, all of which is exceedingly fascinating as a nationalhistorical document. I shall also lay aside, however, for reasons that will become apparent as we go, the problem emerging from the fact that the remarks I just quoted are in effect a misquotation—apparently, a deliberate act by a hostile reporter. Indeed, I would insist that the trouble with word accuracy is merely symptomatic of the entire problem, because, even though Stockhausen was certainly misquoted (as taped transcripts reveal), the gist of his thinking was curiously preserved. It almost seems as if the hostile reporter was so caught up in Stockhausen’s logic that he could not but reveal its inner fold in misquoting him. So, any turning to Stockhausen’s actual, accurate, comments would best be conducted not in the spirit of correction but in the spirit of enhancement. Examining the composer’s response to the misquotation indeed enhances the overarching problematic of both his thinking and the grim historical events he addresses.2 Arguably, the most likely reaction to hearing that Stockhausen called the horrific acts of September 11 ‘‘the greatest work of art ever’’ is to consider it yet another instance of the extreme aesthetization of violence that decidedly characterizes the fascist tradition. Hence the anxious response of the German authorities, who are as attuned to refined fascist overtones as they are astutely committed to the continuation of German aesthetic expression. That Hitlerian fascism conceptualized war and violence in the purest aesthetic terms is indisputable in retrospect, and German intellectual and artistic minds, from Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno to Heiner Müller and Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, have gone a long way, ultimately by negative ritualization, to isolate and disintegrate the phenomenon’s many insidious folds. That Stockhausen’s universe bears real affinity to this latter againstthe-grain tendency does not necessarily preclude it from falling into this sort of problematic aesthetization; this is in itself indicative of the extremely complex and contradictory conditions of German modernity since the late eighteenth century, of which I have spoken extensively elsewhere.3 To put 2. The entire and rather baroque sequence of events, including numerous explications, clarifications, justifications, retractions, and so forth, from all parties involved (including Stockhausen and his entourage, the German senator Christina Weiss, the original reporter from North German Radio who is credited with the mendacious reportage), can be found in detail in Karlheinz Stockhausen’s official Web site, www.stockhausen.com. 3. See Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 123–54; and ‘‘The Gesture of the Sirens,’’ in Does Literature Think? Literature as Theory for an Antimythical Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 161–97.
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it bluntly (and to allude to what lies ahead), negative ritualization of fascist aestheticism better deploy the most inventive antitranscendentalist imagination if it is to guard itself against the danger of reproducing the forces of the object it aims to disintegrate. Yet, if we merely remain at this level—the suspicion that Stockhausen’s aestheticism is crypto-fascist—we shall miss the profound inroads opened by his remarks, misquoted though they were. Let us play a devilish game for a moment and take seriously the comments I quoted from the New York Times. If we do not merely settle into thinking of art as personal expression within the canonically bounded domain of the aesthetic, and we ascribe to art an active involvement (however difficult to define precisely) in the transformation of social conditions—which I hardly mean in the lazy Marxist sense of carrying out the order of political economy into the cultural battlefield—then we better be ready to come to terms with art as a realm in which humanity exercises its utmost creative/destructive potential, and not in the so-called (since Hegel) world of the spirit but in the world itself. At its best, this exercise takes place within—and takes on as a challenge— the entirety of society’s imaginary significations: its foundational images and symbols, its implicit or explicit assertions and preconceptions, its basic organizational principles, whatever a community takes for granted and reproduces thoughtlessly. To speak of society’s poiēsis is to speak of society’s self-alteration, of nothing less than the capacity of society to alter the terms and conditions of its very being. This involves a profoundly radical gesture of transforming terms and conditions, where the creative force can never be philosophically disentangled from the destructive force. Opting out of art as purely bounded within the aesthetic, we thus lend to the poiētic an overarching scope, relevant to the broadest range of human creativity, which opens the way for a better understanding of the interwoven condition of the poetic with the political beyond the traditional (and often mechanical) infusion of art with a didactic moral imperative. From this standpoint, the conventional reading of the aesthetization of the political as characteristic of fascism does not hold its ground. On the contrary, only if one effaces the basic dialectical entwinement of the poetic with the political at all levels of human/social activity does one practice a fascist aesthetization of politics, whose unacknowledged content, after all, is to depoliticize society, indeed to anesthetize society to politics. Stockhausen claims that in order to comprehend what happened on 9/11 we have to rearrange—to reset, as he actually said—the wiring of our brains. So, instead of rejecting his alleged aestheticization of these events, let us take it as a point of departure. In aesthetics, praxis entails a compo-
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sition, a creative/destructive refiguration of present and imagined elements so that presumably a new relationality emerges. Oftentimes, if the composition demands a truly radical refiguration, this praxis signals a rupture with instituted meaning that throws everything into a whirlwind. The aesthetics of modernity has always yearned for the one composition that would signify in all senses the end of composition—because it would exceed all possible points of reception and interpretation, including the point of its creation. To practice fanatically for years for one act and then die in executing it is the aesthetic essence of the sublime performance, the performance that exceeds both the agency and the temporality of its praxis. Such performance also requires the obliteration of its identity, which I take to mean the ensemble of traces that makes a subject’s and an object’s historical existence decipherable. Identicide is in this sense the supreme logic of Mallarmé’s project, to speak of a celebrated instance of impossible (and from a certain point of view, self-destructive) aesthetics. No doubt, as the history of modern aesthetics suggests, this sublime yearning is also associated with failure; its power is predicated on the knowledge that it will remain forever immaterial. Mallarmé’s Livre owes its conceptual existence and creative drive to the impossibility of its actualization. Any evidence that the sublime praxis of identicide in art is actualized in history profoundly disturbs the autonomy of the aesthetic, as if in a perverse sense it reminds us that the aesthetics of the sublime (from Kant onward) is actually terrified of history, terrified of history’s outmaneuverable contingency, which is by definition impervious to excess, indeed impervious to the sublime. Whatever his immersion into pure aesthetics, Stockhausen cannot but bow before history, concluding his remarks with the desperate admission that, in the foreground of the events of September 11, ‘‘we, composers, are nothing.’’ Whether accurately rendered or not, this statement is entirely sincere. But what makes it dramatic is what belies it, namely, the composer’s unwieldingly gothic and otherworldly conceptualization of his work and the world, which makes it all the more susceptible to the aesthetic allure of the literally spectacular signature of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Its susceptibility is due to two factors: On the one hand, Stockhausen’s work has been characterized since the beginning by relentless commitment to the technology of sound as the medium for the invocation of the transcendental, an attitude bearing the precarious duplicity of conceiving technology itself as an immaterial, transcendental language—as sound pure and simple, devoid of any instrumentality. From the sumptuous Gesang der
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Jünglinge (1955), in which real voices are combined with electronically produced vocal sounds so that all distinction between the ‘‘natural’’ and the ‘‘technological’’ is blurred, producing a rather uncanny choral effect, to the inimitable (and, from a certain conventional standpoint, insufferable) Helicopter String Quartet (1995), in which the string players perform each in his own helicopter, with the sound of the rotor blades providing the consistent rhythmic backdrop to a barrage of disembodied glissandi, Stockhausen has sought not merely to enlist technology’s aid in musical composition but much more: to render possible, audible, by virtue of composition, the sound of technology as such, in an intransigent gesture of making the Kantian object speak its own uninstrumentalized language. On the other hand, however, Stockhausen’s aesthetic and psychic universe, which arguably culminates in the ultra-Wagnerian gesture of his current opera-in-progress, Licht (officially begun as a composition in 1977 and, if ever actualized in performance, to last seven days, according to the seven days of Creation in Genesis), suggests a rather traditional expression of transcendence. Constructed entirely along biblical motifs, whereby the archangels Michael and Lucifer are locked into the originary and definitive battle between Good and Evil, this work is profoundly religious. And though Lucifer here is drawn in Miltonian fashion through and through—as literally the heroic bearer of light who seeks to destroy Light—the mythological conceptualization of this work is hardly emancipatory. The opera merely serves to confirm, beyond any of his previous works, Stockhausen’s aesthetic cosmos, which hinges on articulating the material power of technology as consubstantial with metaphysical excess, precisely the deadly combination of the events of September 11. From this standpoint, it hardly matters that Stockhausen attributed the assessment of September 11 as the ‘‘greatest work of art ever’’ not in fact to his person but to the Luciferian protagonist of his opera. This character figures, in the composer’s mind, as a veritable spiritual force. As he put it in the corrective statement he issued to the press three days after the notorious remark: At the press conference in Hamburg, I was asked if Michael, Eve, and Lucifer were historical figures of the past and I answered that they exist now, for example Lucifer in New York. In my work, I have defined Lucifer as the cosmic spirit of rebellion, of anarchy. He uses his high degree of intelligence to destroy creation. He does not know love. After further questions about the events in America, I said that such
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a plan appeared to be Lucifer’s greatest work of art. Of course, I used the designation ‘‘work of art’’ to mean the work of destruction personified in Lucifer. . . . I cannot find a fitting name for such a ‘‘satanic composition.’’ 4 Stockhausen’s aesthetic principles dictate that Lucifer is a mythic figure with historical presence—the presence of destruction that has disengaged itself from its dialectical entwinement with creation. Stockhausen might be said to have responded to the events as if he were William Blake.5 There is indeed something hallucinatory about his response, although, unlike Blake, his hallucinations show disdain for the materiality of myth in favor of the mystifying incorporeality of metaphysics. There is a bottom line that Stockhausen’s own attempt to modify and clarify his reported comments cannot efface: namely, his aesthetics is religious in essence. And thus, like Mallarmé and perhaps Wagner (who is obviously the Oedipal figure to be outdone), Stockhausen aspires to an aesthetics that, though it claims to hold a hand over history, is actually anesthetized to historical materiality, if only because it cannot comprehend the enormous and undeconstructible significance of humanity’s finitude. In his case, the recognition that the artistic sublime is doomed to failure (‘‘we, composers, are nothing’’) resounds in the backdrop of the terrifying failure of history itself: the annihilation of the world in the name of religious transcendence of the world. But this resonance reveals yet one more twist in this circuitous story, which is worth considering. The occasion of Stockhausen’s commentary on the events of September 11, which flash in his horizon as the hallucinatory translation of his religious aestheticism into historical reality, leans directly against the nominal religious-terrorist logic behind the events. In outrageously aestheticizing an event whose horror defies measure, Stockhausen unwittingly serves to plunge the declared transcendentalist ideology of its perpetrators back into the pool of historical finitude to which they belong. An avowed act of religious martyrdom is irreparably damaged by being construed as artwork, once we hold on to the profound entwinement of the poetic with the political. It cannot extricate itself from the worldly universe within which it is executed; moreover, the worldliness of its terms of execution surpasses whatever might be the alleged transcendental intention. In a way that arguably pushes all our experiential buttons, the fact that 4. This excerpt is from a statement with the title ‘‘Message from Professor Stockhausen,’’ dated September 19, 2001, www.stockhausen.com. 5. I thank Martin Harries for this figure.
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this horrifying event exists by virtue of its spectacularization enables us to counteract its proclaimed logic, to see it, first and foremost, as a political act that deserves a political response. Here Stockhausen’s art actually falls short. At this specific historical juncture, a political response cannot rely on the allegorical terms of the archaic religious battle between Good and Evil, Michael and Lucifer, because these are precisely the terms of ‘‘God Bless America’’ and ‘‘fundamentalist Islam’’ (or ‘‘Holy Islam’’ and ‘‘America as Satan’’—the four terms bear exactly the same content). Such allegory may be said to fail even as evidence of the presumed utopian function of art, speaking aesthetically, because its unwitting proximity to history dramatically unveils an otherwise occluded aspect of utopian art, namely, that certain utopian visions of art often harness, for their own alleged gain, the transcendentalist element of religion. Ultimately, such allegory fails because history has rendered it too proximate to the literal plane. It is rather rare that the literal can achieve such spectacular actualization of the psycho-symbolic elements that animate it, but this may be the crux of what brought the events of September 11 so perilously close to a certain aesthetic realm, a peril that Stockhausen’s remarks (accurate or inaccurate, regardless) splendorously evoke. The Stockhausen incident may have been otherwise trivial, if its peculiar (and rather incidental) logic did not ultimately echo, as Edward Said would understand it, the contrapuntal nature of the aesthetics-religion equation. Understanding the contrapuntal nature of complicity between events and things, concepts and beliefs, may be the most succinct task of secular criticism, as Said encapsulates it in his Culture and Imperialism project, beyond the actual texts and details taken up in the book. In an idiosyncratic and surely ingenious way, he creates a unique methodology by proceeding from a Gramscian sense of spatial complexity (a sense of asymmetrical, multilateral, geographical relation) to a musicological sense of co-incidentally entwined figures that testify to a polyphonic simultaneity understood as internal to the object of inquiry. In other words, a contrapuntal reading does not seek a presumed order of things that might arise from various external forces bearing upon the object, nor does it settle for an interpretive framework that privileges singular identities emerging from an otherwise assumed and unexamined totality. Rather, it perceives both singularities and external forces as internal instances within a complex orchestration, where they might be privileged provisionally and always in distinctive relation, indeed are accented by this provisional distinction, which itself then becomes internal to the dynamic, and so on.
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Said’s sense of contrapuntal reading has both a spatial and a temporal component. His keen geographical mind, sharpened by his perception early on that Antonio Gramsci’s thought introduced in the Marxist dialectical tradition the primacy of the concept of territory, enables him to appreciate and gauge precisely the multiversality of a situation, a political event, a text, an artwork. At the same time, his acknowledged allegiance to Georg Lukács and his groundbreaking understanding of the reification of consciousness—the cornerstone of so-called Western Marxism—remains at the core of Said’s constant reminder that the force of identity (as a concept, form, psychic state, mode of thinking) must be battled and resisted at all costs. Resistance to identity means profound alertness to history, to the temporal fluidity and multiplicity we inhabit in our being in the world. The temporal and the spatial—or as Said prefers, the historical and the geographical—are thus distinguished by a shared multidimensional configuration, and the Saidian methodology, throughout its complex and multivalent trajectory over the years, settles for nothing less. The musicological expression that Said lends to this methodology harkens back to his deep-seated veneration for Adorno, whose remarkable intellectual edifice, Said argues, must be read primarily as the multifaceted work of a musical sensibility. Indeed, in Adorno, Said’s own personal investment in the figures of displacement (the intellectual as an exile) and nonidentity (the thinker as a performative subjectivity) finds precise and elaborated resonance. This triptych of intellectual figures might well serve as a referential network for those primary significations animating the language of secular criticism. This does not mean that the three thinkers form a nucleus of influence, from which Said’s thought can then be derived. They belong to a group of twentiethcentury figures with whom Said remains consistently in dialogue (much like Erich Auerbach, Frantz Fanon, C. L. R. James, Michel Foucault, or Glenn Gould), but they are distinct insofar as they preside over the methodological coordinates of the task of secular criticism, which Said’s work conducts in such uncompromising fashion. Let us consider some of Said’s own descriptions—so as not to say definitions—of the task of secular criticism: The secular intellectual works to show the absence of divine originality and, on the other side, the complex presence of historical actuality. The conversion of the absence of religion into the presence of actuality is secular interpretation.6 6. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, Community,’’ in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 131.
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A secular attitude warns us to beware of transforming the complexities of many-stranded history into one large figure, or of elevating particular moments or monuments into universals. . . . Secular transgression chiefly involves moving from one domain to another, the testing and challenging of limits, the mixing and intermingling of heterogeneities, cutting across expectations, providing unforeseen pleasures, discovering experiences.7 If secular criticism deals with local and worldly situations and is constitutively opposed to the production of massive, hermetic systems, then it must follow that the essay—a comparatively short, investigative, radically skeptical form—is the principal way in which to write criticism.8 Right off, one perceives two elemental figures that animate the conceptual framework of these statements. First, an unequivocal sense of mobility characterizes Said’s encounter with the realm of objective phenomena: not only the worldly realm as such—the order of things—but also the less tangible but equally objective realm of concepts, ideas, desires, affects. This sense of mobility, of restlessly moving from object to object, of denying the stability of any presumable ground, produces an equivalent philosophical sense of mobility regarding the subject-object relation as such—indeed, a condition of mobility that is just as much a condition of mutability, particularly as it pertains to forms. This leads to the second elemental figure in this framework, namely, the consistent characteristic of what Said calls in multiple contexts elaboration, a working upon the plasticity (mutability) of form that denies the frequent theoretical compulsion to engulf matters in impermeable and lasting structures. Converting thus ‘‘the absence of religion into the presence of actuality,’’ which is admittedly an abstract statement, can be read as the epitome of the critical secular attitude, not merely because it recognizes the concealed void of religion (which arguably exists in order to fill the void of existence) but because, more importantly, it describes a transformative process whereby the metaphysical void is elaborated as an actual condition in the world with definitive consequences. This elaboration presupposes that form is both material force and mutable ground, and that one’s engagement with it is the most tangible confirmation of one’s significance as historical subject. 7. Edward W. Said, Musical Elaborations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 55. 8. Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 26.
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Said’s essentially modernist outlook, in both matters of literature and music, exemplifies this understanding of elaboration as transformation and, as he says above, transgression. The epistemic co-incidence of transformation and transgression is crucial in determining the meaning of the secular, a term which is, in turn, not locked into an a priori signifying framework, given once and for all (even if in a figure of opposition to a rival signifying term—presumably, the religious), but points instead to an attitude, perhaps we might even say a method, that is experimental at the core. The meaning of secular in the term secular criticism does not designate an ensemble of properties—to be therefore enacted in the critical practice—but characterizes the substance of the critical act itself. This is, in my opinion, the profound gesture in the reverse formulation of ‘‘critical secularism’’ to which this gathering of texts aspires. The etymological ground of criticism—the Greek notion of krisis means not merely judgment or decision but also distinction, investigation, interrogation, interpretation, all under the rubric of a performative mind—underlines this elaborative, contingent, mutable, nonsystemic, experimental nature of critique. This is why Said explicitly selects the essay as the form of writing that formally exemplifies critique: the kind of provisional and interrogative trial of bringing together contrapuntally the contentious but intertwined aspects of human activity, of history. And though the very notion of elaboration grasps precisely the meaning of essai as Montaigne initially conceived it, it is the intransigent manner of Adorno—which Said characterizes indicatively as ‘‘dogged stubbornness’’—that animates his distinct use of the form. It is important to remember that Adorno explicitly names the essay as the critical form par excellence because it is formally bound to its own self-reflection on every turn. This self-reflection does not just take place at the level of argumentation—in other words, it is not merely a conceptual self-reflection— but, more importantly, at the level of signification, of language itself. Thus, Adorno claims, the essay is marked by a resistance to ‘‘the ambitious transcendence of language beyond its meaning,’’ which is the characteristic element of transcendental philosophy, whereby language consists of ‘‘words [that] tremble as though possessed, while remaining secretive about what possesses them.9 Adorno is making here a cryptic reference to Heidegger, but the comment reaches beyond the specific insinuation. It links selfreflection, and indeed critique, with resistance against transcendence, with 9. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘‘The Essay as Form,’’ trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederick Will, New German Critique 32 (Spring/Summer 1984): 155.
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exposing the tendency of a certain language to render itself sacred and to do so, moreover, by veiling the mode of its own sacralization. Adorno sees the essay as a form of praxis that belongs to what he calls ‘‘emancipated intellect,’’ which he characterizes variably as homeless, mobile, experimental, heretic, unbinding, nonidentitarian (all these are his terms). The essay is a form that recognizes the force of contingency and finitude in history, and, hence, the importance of elaborating a kind of thinking process that does not owe itself to (or, is not possessed by) any preconceived or predetermined principles, forging instead its own way through a problem on the terrain that the problem itself constitutes each time anew. This is what Adorno means when he says ‘‘[the essay] proceeds, so to speak, methodically unmethodically.’’ 10 That un-method is the formal method of the essay is not some sort of sophistic cleverness. It provides actually an opening to thinking about method much more rigorously than merely defining (if not in fact confirming, codifying) a writer’s or a text’s retrospectively predictable ways and modes of operation. Though Adorno does not quite say it, his sense of the method in the essay is linked to its performativity. When Said oftentimes focuses on musical performance in the midst of discussions of literature, philosophy, or politics, he is shifting our attention to an ephemeral and finite figure of humanity’s imprint on the world in order precisely to dispossess those discourses of their reverential hold on their own certainty. Thinking from the standpoint of performativity means breaching the structure of an immovable core of identity. It is a transgressive act. And the transgression in this sense becomes tangible in the manner in which ideas, concepts, thoughts, art forms, textual figures, and so forth, break open the presumable closure of their existence and become entwined with the fluidity of social-historical forms and events. ‘‘The transgressive element in music is its nomadic ability to attach itself to, and become part of, social formations,’’ 11 says Said, and I suggest we take this further than the specifically musical—or, rather, expand the musical reference to include the broader consequences of Said’s notion of ‘‘performance as an extreme occasion’’—in order to underline the precarious relation of critique with the experimental, which is always connected, in some way or other, to the profoundly social-historical sense of the experiential. Grasping the matter in this way is confirmed by the fact that historical experience can never be retrieved intact but only through its experimental 10. Adorno, ‘‘The Essay as Form,’’ 161. 11. Said, Musical Elaborations, 70.
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transmutation into form (in essence, its transformation). This is one of the central aspects of modernist thinking and applies distinctly to Said’s own attempts in relation to identity both to record his memoirs and to articulate the significance of his right to return to Palestine. Before we take this up, however, I want to consider the way in which Said broaches dialogically a kind of pedagogy of performativity in his discussions with Daniel Barenboim. A good part of their conversation is taken up with an attempt to articulate the relation between performance and interpretation. Both Said and Barenboim focus on performance in the musical domain, while Said returns repeatedly to interpretation as a figure that pertains to the act of reading, constituted primarily by the experience of reading literature. In this respect, the meaning of performance (and, more broadly, the implicit significance of performativity as a particular quality) partakes strongly of the language of music, which leads Barenboim in fact to certain astute remarks on the phenomenology of sound, the profound dialectical relation of music to silence, and music’s defiance of the physical laws of nature. Surely, one can argue that interpretation in music (by an orchestra conductor or an instrumentalist) is inevitably subsumed to the discourse of performance and that the most crucial questions pertain to the domain that Barenboim rightly emphasizes: namely, using Said’s language, the profound materiality of sound in its extreme relation to the occasion of its emergence—space, time, body. Yet, insightful though it is, this side of the argument unwittingly casts its shadow over a whole range of other instances, like the very act of reading texts, where grasping the precise nature of interpretive performance itself is at stake. Though reading belongs to a literary universe where orality is no longer primary and is thus unavoidably individualized and silent, its constitutive performativity does not cease. It may become less tangible, it may become implicated in the technological capacity for repetition, for returning to a printed text whose words on the page do not change, but there is no convincing epistemological ground on which to argue that each occasion of reading, even the same text by the same person, loses hereby its occasionality, its singular, ephemeral, contingent relation to the act of reading. And though the bodily dimension of reading a text is rather elusive compared to the musical and theatrical arts (which confront directly the physical laws of nature, as Barenboim formulates it), it does not mean that the corporeality of reading, the actual sensation of engagement and apprehension in the occasion of reading, is not a presence to be reckoned with in assessing the experience of interpretation. I would signify this experience as essen-
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tially performative. The limit point between interpretation and performance is not determinable with any certainty; in the ancient use of hermēneia, to interpret means literally to perform. I insist on this point because it is crucial to Said’s understanding of the secular. Said never hesitates to remind us that the critical faculty (for him linked directly to the interpretive condition) requires a gesture of transgression against one’s identity—more precisely, a displacement of identity so as to position oneself in or as a certain ‘‘otherness.’’ Addressing Barenboim, Said says that as ‘‘an interpreter—an interpreter of literature and literary criticism, one has to accept the idea that one is putting one’s own identity aside in order to explore the ‘other.’’’ 12 Exploring this other should not be understood here as the gesture of an empirical desire to enter unknown, strange territory, if only because the elementary sense of explorer, in its traditional meaning, requires an intact sense of self, an integral subject that pursues a presumably discoverable object. Instead, Said seems to demand a radical disintegration of the self (in the way that Adorno would use the term), producing a self-induced condition of homelessness within one’s own subjectivity. This kind of deconstitution of the subject is achieved by positing an otherness at the core of one’s identity in the act of interpretation, which is tantamount, in the sort of language familiar to us from the theater, to an act of impersonation, of taking on the attributes of an other.13 Thus, the requisite gesture for the interpreter and the performer—Said often brings the two together—is self-alteration, the elemental meaning of the radical critical faculty, a poetically transformative, revolutionary gesture in the best sense. The vocabulary of secular criticism is all over this gesture—mobility, mutability, displacement, nonidentity, transgression, transformation—and the gesture is exemplary in its performativity. Nowhere does Said exercise this performative deconstitution of the subject more extremely and more astutely than in his meditation on the significance of his own name that opens his book of memoirs, Out of Place. It is essential to quote at length:
12. Daniel Barenboim and Edward W. Said, Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society, ed. Ara Guzelimian (New York: Pantheon, 2002), 12. 13. I discuss the poetics and politics of impersonation at length in ‘‘Lucid Drunkenness (Genet’s Poetics of Revolution),’’ South Atlantic Quarterly 97, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 413–56. Said’s affinity for Genet (and particularly for his ability to enter the world of the other without appropriating it) is well known. See Edward W. Said, ‘‘On Jean Genet’s Late Works,’’ Grand Street 36 (1990): 27–42.
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All families invent their parents and children, give them a story, character, fate, and even a language. There was always something wrong with how I was invented and meant to fit in with the world of my parents and four sisters. Whether this was because I constantly misread my part or because of some deep flaw in my being I could not tell for most of my early life. Sometimes I was intransigent, and proud of it. At other times I seemed to myself to be nearly devoid of any character at all, timid, uncertain, without will. Yet the overriding sensation I had was of always being out of place. Thus, it took me about fifty years to become accustomed to, or, more exactly, to feel comfortable with, ‘‘Edward,’’ a foolishly English name yoked forcibly to the unmistakably Arabic family name Said. True my mother told me that I had been named Edward after the Prince of Wales, who cut so fine a figure in 1935, the year of my birth, and Said was the name of various uncles and cousins. But the rationale of my name broke down when I discovered no grandparents called Said and when I tried to connect my fancy English name with its Arabic partner. For years, and depending on the exact circumstances, I would rush past ‘‘Edward’’ and emphasize ‘‘Said’’; at other times I would do the reverse, or connect these two to each other so quickly that neither would be clear. The one thing I could not tolerate, but very often would have to endure, was the disbelieving, and hence, undermining, reaction: Edward? Said? 14 For any student of literature, the literariness of this passage is striking. There is a Proustian self-irony, the consciousness of how perilous it is to apply oneself to the task of self-representation in writing, but there is also a daring clarity about the theatricality of self-fashioning—familial invention, (mis)reading one’s part in the drama of life, attempting to fit into a character, a kind of Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt on the utterance of the name(s) Edward Said—all of which defies any sort of propriety in the gesture of autobiographical self-reference. The literary effect consists in the double gesture of simultaneously foregrounding the principle of fictionalization present in any process of fashioning an identity with an unabashedly genuine staging of the process of being named. Thus, the author Edward Said begins to take on the genre of memoir by instantly dismantling whatever metaphysical qualities traditionally authorize the proper name. His first ‘‘autobiographical’’ gesture is to cast the authorial personality in uncertain light, to problematize the otherwise assumed seamlessness of self-recognition across space 14. Edward W. Said, Out of Place: A Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3–4.
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and time by staging a contradictory situation of othering oneself. A phrase from Proust comes to mind that encapsulates this contradictory aspect of recognition: ‘‘For to ‘recognize’ someone and, a fortiori, having failed to recognize someone to learn his identity, is to predicate two contradictory things of a single subject; it is to admit that what was here, the person whom one remembers, no longer exists, and also that what is now here is a person whom one did not know to exist.’’ 15 Said’s self-referential point of departure is to immerse the name into the flux of historical contingency, so as to set up an interpretive mode that is radically skeptical toward the minutest tendency to grant the principle of identity a natural and transparent authority. It is not merely that Edward Said is out of place, that his story and the story of his people (his family, of course, but, by inference, the Palestinian people themselves) is a story of displacement; it is that identity itself is out of place. But in the incisive irony of the passage one also reads a certain urgency, perhaps even a compulsion, to register the epistemic significance of this inaugural placelessness, as well as the history of social and cultural displacement that inevitably expands its meaning. Said has alluded elsewhere, in reference to what animated his theoretical study on beginnings in the 1970s, to just this sense of inaugural self-authorization in the absence of even the most elemental authorities, such as home, family, religion, nation, language: ‘‘This was then my autobiographical impetus [in writing Beginnings], to rethink the whole question of what it means to start again, to begin. It involved acts of choice, acts of designation, rather than things coming from heaven. That is why the emphasis on the secular is so great, as far as I’m concerned. It is a congeries of things, a number of things, working at the same time.’’ 16 Much like his sense of contrapuntal thinking, thinking in secular terms for Said involves an irreducible plurality at the core of signification, even the inaugural signification of one’s own being. This plurality is marked by both contestation and entwinement; Said is not content merely to posit a fragmented self, as is often nowadays fetishized. He has a definite grasp of the authorial ‘‘I.’’ Authors of all kinds, including composers and artists, occupy a central position in his referential network. But they are never impervious to the worldly conditions that permeate them. On the contrary, an author’s relative autonomy is predicated on recognizing the contingent 15. Marcel Proust, The Past Recaptured, trans. Andreas Mayor (New York: Vintage, 1971), 186. 16. Edward W. Said, ‘‘People’s Rights and Literature,’’ interview by Jonathan Rée (Cairo, 1993), in Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward Said, ed. Gauri Viswanathan (New York: Pantheon, 2001), 257.
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nature of his or her authorization and on sustaining an oppositional stance in respect to the dominant terms of authority all around. Standing along with Adorno in tireless resistance to the forced reconciliation of the subject-object antinomy in the world, Said remains vigilant against the tendency of thinkers to be co-opted by enveloping structures of ideas, systems, beliefs, even political alliances. Even though he generally distances himself from psychoanalytic frameworks of explanation, he accentuates the radical importance of subjectivity in the worldly domain. He has never hesitated publicly to affirm the significance of personal pleasure in the things one chooses to engage above and beyond the commitment to respond politically to those social and historical exigencies that permeate one’s daily existence. He often speaks of literature and music, of reading, listening, and, of course, writing, as something profoundly motivated by a not quite analyzable sense of personal pleasure—an unadulterated instance of plaisir du texte, to use a now forgotten term of Roland Barthes. This is a crucial dimension of secular subjectivity, for which objects that merit one’s psychic investment (sublimation) do not provide the certainty and safety of permanence or transcendence. Sublimation—a concept entirely absent from Said’s vocabulary—is hardly a psychogenetic condition, emerging from the innermost needs of an impermeable subjectivity, but a condition that says as much about the society that makes it possible as about the individual who is produced by it. In other words, sublimation has a politics; the objects in which one invests are always indicative of a particular socialization, never neutral or singular.17 Said’s memoir provides, perhaps unwittingly, a chronicle of a specific politics of sublimation in the very same gesture that it provides, altogether consciously, a chronicle of a lost world, a lost socialhistorical experience. Oftentimes in interviews, which constitute for Said a veritable genre of developing orally and improvisationally the interrogative composition he attributes to essay writing, Said will seize on a detail that unlocks the methodological underpinnings of a project. Consider his elaboration on the impetus for writing his memoir: I have resisted the use of the word ‘‘autobiography.’’ I call it a memoir because I don’t try to account for a public trajectory. I felt that I had something to understand about a peculiar past. . . . We had 17. I elaborate on the politics of sublimation, in specific reference to the way Cornelius Castoriadis conceptualizes it, in ‘‘Philosophy and Sublimation,’’ Thesis Eleven 49 (Spring 1997): 31–43.
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an extremely strange—because my father sort of invented it—a very strange, constructed life. . . . I think probably the main thread of the memoir is to trace the effects of this sort of imprisoning or limiting life that I had as a child, perhaps because my family felt they had to protect me. . . .18 The intriguing thing in this rumination is not so much the final qualifying phrase as to whether a sense of limitation might be due to parental overprotectiveness (which returns us rather to a recognizable literary tropos) but the immediately prior part of the sentence that ties the writing of a memoir to threading together a way out of the perceived labyrinth of a constructed and constrained childhood. The stated intention, an authorial intention, is to weave the strands of memory so as to ponder the enigma of a particular childhood in a distinctly traceable, though actually now perished, social world: in other words, a particular sublimation that is, no doubt, also a cultural-historical experience which exceeds its avowed uniqueness. Said’s indefatigable resistance, in his subsequent ‘‘public trajectory,’’ to any sort of structure that limits life could be interpreted as the response to this childhood experience and, in effect, the extension of this initial sublimation. But this would be just a psychoanalytic explanation. What is more important is the expressed intention to achieve some sort of commensurable relation between the odd familial experience and the altogether pervasive socialhistorical drama that surrounds it and, indeed, at times, remains shielded by it: Palestinian victimization and exile. The phrase ‘‘I felt I had something to understand about a peculiar past’’ resonates entirely, contrapuntally, with other such phrases spoken in other instances and perhaps with other things in mind but still hanging in irredeemable suspension, perfectly clear yet inscrutable in their own isolation: ‘‘My own past is irrecoverable. . . . I don’t really belong anywhere, but I’ve resolved that that’s the way it is.’’ 19 Or: ‘‘What return does mean to me is return to oneself, a return to history, so that we understand exactly what happened, why it happened, and who we are.’’ 20 The relation between the ‘‘I’’ and the ‘‘we’’ here is a matter of co-incidence; the two subjects are entirely consubstantial in their antithesis. The homeless ‘‘I’’ may be settled in its irrecov18. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Returning to Ourselves,’’ interview by Jacqueline Rose (London, 1997–98), in Power, Politics, and Culture, 421–22. 19. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Orientalism and After,’’ interview by Eleanor Wachtel (Toronto, 1996), in Power, Politics, and Culture, 226. 20. Said, ‘‘Returning to Ourselves,’’ 429.
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erable condition, but this is precisely what enables it to articulate the necessity of achieving a home for the exiled and disenfranchised community. Said has often been maligned for this dialectical position, which is the envy of many who do not dare the risk of being committed to personal homelessness and yet, simultaneously, to political community. Regarding the memoir specifically, the charges of elitism or narcissism from various quarters of both American and Arab cultural-intellectual terrains dovetail perfectly with slanderous attempts by Zionist propagandists to discredit Said’s claim to familial and territorial connection to his native Palestine. In all cases, of course, a profound disdain, even contempt, is reserved for what remains defiantly personal in the worldly encounter with the other, even though in fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is precisely this radically personal imaginary that fuels one’s unwavering commitment to communal affairs, one’s responsibility toward the polis. Throughout his activist trajectory on behalf of the Palestinian cause, Said has remained consistently vehement in his critique of both nativism and separatism. He has always made a point of reiterating Fanon’s crucial lesson that all nativism signals the victory of the colonial/imperial project (or in a Saidian language, confirms the domination of Orientalism) by bearing out to its endpoint the fetishist logic of identity, singularity, and abolition of the other. In the same way, he rejects all separatist discourses as epitomes of nationalism, as politics of exclusion, dispossession, deterritorialization. For this reason, Said has insisted that the grave task of resolving what he calls the ‘‘sublime conflict’’ between Israel and Palestine cannot be conducted under a politics of partition. Partition, he reminds us, is the legacy of British colonialism and has already left its mark on the Palestinian conflict—indeed, its inaugural mark—much as it has done on the ongoing conflicts between India and Pakistan and in Cyprus. In this respect, from The Question of Palestine onward, Said has advocated, both politically and theoretically, that the coexistence of the two peoples has become historically insurmountable. In an interview I conducted with him in 1990 for a Greek journal, Said responded skeptically to a deliberately provocative question about a future Palestinian national history inevitably embracing the typical identitarian ideology of ancestry and ascendancy, claiming instead that what made Palestinian history and society different was the impossibility of disengagement from its adversarial other.21 The force of identitarian principles that fuels the writing of national history, he argued, is in this case 21. Stathis Gourgouris, ‘‘Conversation with Edward Said’’ (New York, 1990), Planodion (Athens, Greece) 16 (June 1992): 392–401.
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disrupted by an antagonistic entwinement between two ongoing complicitous histories, which can neither be ignored nor dissolved. Some years later, Said wrote a bold article in the New York Times Magazine that elaborated on the one-state solution as the only historically possible outcome short of total annihilation of both cultures; this drew support from certain Israelis but was disparagingly rejected by many American Jewish commentators. Drawing on the region’s centuries-old (though now severely torn) tradition of multiethnic and multicultural coexistence, which he then grafted onto a theoretical privileging of civil society over religious-nationalist community, Said put forth the thesis that ‘‘there can be no reconciliation unless both peoples, two communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and that it has to be dealt with as such.’’ 22 This activist theoretical and political trajectory, which is made possible by virtue of an intellectual mind that rejects totalizing and transcendentalist figures, has never been quite appreciated in these terms. On the contrary, the secular vision is summarily discredited, arguably because its historical power is tangible and perfectly real. When Zionist critics assail Said for being ‘‘the professor of terror,’’ one gets the impression that they do so because they desire to silence a Palestinian voice that articulates the profound historical reality of such coexistence. Though nowadays, in the context of such extreme adherence to nationalist/religious dogmatism on both sides, this position seems utopian, the actual historical reality to which it focuses our attention is ultimately more threatening to Ariel Sharon’s position than are scores of suicide bombers, precisely because it casts an insurmountable shadow over the Zionist dream-wish to do away with the Palestinian factor altogether, so as to clear out the territories for the unimpeded establishment of Eretz Israel. Said has trained his eye on this annihilating logic since the seminal essay ‘‘Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims’’ (1979), in which he argues that, even at the simplest discursive level, the nationalist dream of Zionism was predicated on the vision of a pristine, uninhabited land inherited from time immemorial via the privilege of ancestry. It was thus inevitable that the foundation of the Israeli state in the wake of the Holocaust and the brutal militarization of the Zionist dream would spin forth a logic of unacknowledged but tacitly justified and altogether totalizing victimization of the other. ‘‘We are the victims of the victims,’’ Said repeatedly declares. This phrase is formidable in its utter simplicity because it exposes the unsayable 22. Edward W. Said, ‘‘The One-State Solution,’’ New York Times Magazine, January 10, 1999, 39.
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belief that occupies the imaginary core of post-Holocaust Zionism, namely, ‘‘We are the last, the ultimate victims.’’ From a psychoanalytic point of view, this unutterable conviction is drawn from the same compulsion toward a monopoly of signification that animates the inaugural imaginary signifier of Hebrew ancestry: ‘‘we are God’s chosen people.’’ The monopoly of victimization is, in other words, religious in essence. I mean this not in the sense of emerging out of a specific ecclesiastical dogma (and thus pertaining to Jewish religious practice) but rather in the same way that nationalism is proximate to religion, insofar as it obliterates the multivalent and contentious worldliness within which it exists. In this respect, to echo both Bruce Robbins’s and Aamir Mufti’s positions, Said’s secular critique of Zionism (and, one must add, of both Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Arabist nationalism) is predicated on a configuration of the secular in opposition, not to the religious per se but to the nationalist. This is exactly why the Zionist response to Said’s secular criticism has been so enraged. When he was first slandered as a promulgator of terrorism, it was in response to the use of the term secular criticism in The World, the Text, and the Critic, where the term bears an explicit literary meaning. Said’s use of secular was linked by a certain writer on the American Jewish Committee to Yasir Arafat’s mandate for Palestine as a ‘‘secular democratic state.’’ 23 I would argue, again with a certain psychoanalytic slant, that there is real substance to this otherwise absurd and boneheaded syllogism. Said’s critical secularism threatens Zionism at its core. No monolithic identitarian principle, which is essentially theologically grounded (and here certain Islamist positions mirror Zionist ones in ways that neither would tolerate), can withstand the exfoliation of the identity principle that Said’s critical secularism takes as a point of departure. The denouncement of the secular as terrorist marks an instance where, like the Stockhausen incident at the outset, a fraudulent logic exposes the inner verity of the matter, in this case the accuser being driven by genuine, though unconscious, fear that his position will be exposed for what it is: ‘‘National identity becomes not only a fetish, but is also turned into a kind of idol, in a Baconian sense—an idol of the cave, and of the tribe. That produces, pulls along with it, the rise of what I would call a kind of desperate religious sentiment.’’ 24 23. Said relates the episode at length in ‘‘Literary Theory at the Crossroads of Public Life,’’ interview by Imre Saluzinsky (London, 1987), in Power, Politics, and Culture, 69–93. 24. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Criticism and the Art of Politics,’’ interview by Jennifer Wicke and Michael Sprinker, in Edward Said: A Critical Reader, ed. Michael Sprinker (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 232.
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Because it is conducted as a critical secular project, Said’s uncompromising critique of Zionism has stayed explicitly clear from any of the discursive traps that mirror the adversary’s tactics. Hence his insistence against any notion of de-Zionization, any sort of annihilating gesture in return. He has been too deeply involved in the experience of communal erasure, deterritorialization, and bona fide bulldozing of history to learn of the danger of monological principles. He continues, rather, to advocate the dialectical entwinement of societies and histories, and the continuous rediscovery of the making of history by real people in the real world. Instead of the security of a religious-nationalist Palestinian vision, he prefers the secular uncertainty of a state, a home, that is no one’s singular property: ‘‘I suppose part of my critique of Zionism is that it attaches too much importance to home. Saying, we need a home. And we’ll do anything to get a home, even if it means making others homeless. . . . I want a rich fabric of some sort, which no one can fully comprehend, and no one can fully own.’’ 25 It is no surprise, then, that in this, a recent interview for an Israeli journal, Said is recognized by the interviewer to ‘‘sound very Jewish.’’ Said’s response, the last words of his recent collection of interviews, which I can imagine being spoken with a great deal of humorous subversiveness, should be nonetheless taken seriously: ‘‘Of course. I’m the last Jewish intellectual. You don’t know anyone else. All your other Jewish intellectuals are now suburban squires. From Amos Oz to all these people here in America. So I’m the last one. The only true follower of Adorno. Let me put it this way: I’m a Jewish-Palestinian.’’ 26 For those claiming to represent the allegedly real world of politics, Said’s critical secular vision is at best utopian, its sense of the future immaterial, literary. Yet I would argue, perhaps in a more philosophical vein, that, on the contrary, the politics of comments such as the one above is drawn from the mature cognizance of humanity’s finite existence, of the corporeality and mortality of subjective experience, in addition to a defiant lack of interest in transcendent solutions—all of which, together, generate a sharpened and radical focus on the actual historical future. It is possible to consider that Said makes such comments in the spirit of ‘‘lateness,’’ or Spätstil (late style), as Adorno theorized it, a notion forming the basis, during the last decade, of Said’s main literary and theoretical inquiry.27 According to 25. Edward W. Said, ‘‘My Right of Return,’’ interview by Ari Shavit (Tel Aviv, 2000), in Power, Politics, and Culture, 457. 26. Said, ‘‘My Right of Return,’’ 458. 27. See Edward W. Said, ‘‘Adorno as Lateness Itself,’’ in Adorno: A Critical Reader, ed. Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 193–208.
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Adorno, lateness exceeds what is acceptable and normal in the world, and hence submits one’s presumed unity with historical time and social environment to irreconcilable dissonance. Lateness reaches beyond its present time in history, or, more precisely, it makes its mode of expression achieve a suspended presentness that fissures time, disrupts the beguiling assurance of controlled temporality, and thus enables a radical historical consciousness to emerge. Said diagnoses this kind of consciousness at work in a variety of literary and artistic contexts; in addition to Adorno himself, he has spoken specifically of Beethoven, Strauss, Proust, Beckett, Genet, Cavafy. But I find particularly insightful, in this context, his discussion of ‘‘late style’’ in Sigmund Freud’s bold gesture of writing Moses and Monotheism as the last response of a profoundly secular mind to a world of single-minded identities and totalizing violence. Freud’s own unresolved sense of identity (on many registers, not merely the cultural, but also the scientific and professional) produces a way of fissuring the imaginary core of monotheism by tying its emergence to the constitutive presence of the stranger, the foreigner, the other, within the instituted communal body. Said recognizes in what sense this remarkable gesture attests as well to how an ethnic/national exclusionary institution is also irreparably entangled with the stranger, the foreigner, the other, at the origin. The strength of Freud’s thought, Said argues, ‘‘can be articulated in and speak to other besieged identities as well, not through dispensing palliatives such as tolerance and compassion, but rather by attending to it as a troubling, disabling, destabilizing secular wound, the essence of the cosmopolitan, from which there can be no recovery, no state of resolved or stoic calm, and no utopian reconciliation even within itself.’’ 28 Only a critical secular response that attends to this ‘‘wound’’—that realizes the limitations of history and yet recognizes the limitless capacity of the historical imagination—would cast its eye upon the future without becoming enchanted by its conjured irrelevance, apocalyptic abolition, utopian promise, or transcendence. It is this transgressive, transformative desire to resist the will to transcendence that animates Said’s conviction that ‘‘all criticism is postulated and performed on the assumption that it is to have a future.’’ 29 The conviction of having a future against all odds is this paradoxical affirmation of our historical being that emerges out of the acceptance of our existential 28. Edward W. Said, Freud and the Non-European (London: Verso, 2003), 54. 29. Edward W. Said, ‘‘The Future of Criticism,’’ in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, 171.
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finitude. Disappointingly, this is becoming more and more rare in our historical present. The religious imaginary revealed in the events of September 11, whether intended this way or not, suggests the casualty of envisioning a future—a future in the world, of course, for the future of martyrdom is no future, strictly speaking; it is submission to a heteronomous plenitude, to the supreme authority of the Other, which knows no temporality. Sadly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the response of the American state, institutionally a secular state, exhibits a similar monological (so as not to say outright monotheistic) attitude toward history, which might be said to cancel history’s capacity to remain unpredictable, uncertain, in flux. The scandalous White House document titled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—a document of enormous significance, if only because of its unabashed declaration of the projected terms of global domination—envisions a future so narrowly self-referential and wishfully guaranteed by sheer military power and ideological conviction in the transcendental authority of the market and its brand of civilization that it leaves one wondering if that’s any future at all. The faith that certain policies and courses of action, whether directed by the will of God or by the pseudorational analysis of national security specialists, will unilaterally transcend the contradictions of the present and be fulfilled in a redemptive future means lack of thinking critically, historically. It actually abdicates humanity’s responsibility and selfconsciousness in the making of history, making of the future a mere game of power in order to confirm the status quo of power in the present. The grave problem laid before us is how to conduct a fight for the future that takes as supreme values, first, the untranscendable finitude of human existence; and second, the absolutely teleological danger of the destruction of the whole planet (that is, total finitude). To this extent, I argue, the tradition of transcendental thinking has never offered humanity anything better than the blissful pill of oblivion, while a transgressive, transformative thinking takes one’s individual finitude as the point of departure and draws from it the energy to combat whatever forces might risk humanity’s irreversible end.
Terror: A Speech After 9-11
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
1 These ruminations arose in response to America’s war on terrorism.1 I started from the conviction that there is no response to war. War is a cruel caricature of what in us can respond. You cannot be answerable to war. Yet one cannot remain silent. Out of the imperative or compulsion to speak, then, two questions: What are some already existing responses? And, how respond in the face of the impossibility of response? When I thus assigned myself the agency of response, my institutionally validated agency kicked in. I am a teacher of the humanities. In the humanities classroom begins a training for what may produce a criticism that can possibly engage a public sphere deeply hostile to the mission of the humanities when they are understood as a persistent attempt at an uncoercive rearrangement of desires, through teaching reading. Before 1. The first version of this paper was delivered at a conference—‘‘Responses to War’’—in the Feminist Interventions series run by the Institute for Research of Women and Gender at Columbia University. I thank Rosalind Carmel Morris for inviting me to participate in it. boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
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I begin, I would like to distinguish this from the stockpiling of apparently political, tediously radical, and often narcissistic descriptions, according to whatever is perceived to be the latest Euro-US theoretical trend, that we bequeath to our students in the name of public criticism. Uncoercive rearrangement of desires, then; the repeated effort in the classroom. Thus I found myself constructed as a respondent. A response not only supposes and produces a constructed subject of response, it also constructs its object. To what, then, do most of these responses respond? The ‘‘war’’ on the Taliban, repeatedly declared on media by representatives of the United States government from the president on down, was only a war in the general sense. Not having been declared by act of Congress, it could not assume that proper name. And even as such it was not a response to war. The detainees at Guantanamo Bay, as we have been repeatedly reminded by Right and Left, are not prisoners of war and cannot be treated according to the Geneva Convention (itself unenforceable) because, as Donald Rumsfeld says, among other things, ‘‘they did not fight in uniform.’’ 2 The US is fighting an abstract enemy: terrorism. Definitions in Government handbooks, or UN documents, explain little. The war is part of an alibi every imperialism has given itself, a civilizing mission carried to the extreme, as it always must be. It is a war on terrorism reduced at home to due process, to a criminal case: US v. Zacarias Moussaoui, aka ‘‘Shaqil,’’ aka ‘‘Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,’’ with the nineteen dead hijackers named as unindicted co-conspirators in the indictment. This is where I can begin: a war zoomed down to a lawsuit and zoomed up to face an abstraction. Even on the most general level, this binary opposition will no longer stand. For the sake of constructing a response, however, a binary is useful. To repeat, then, down to a case, up to an abstraction. I cannot speak intelligently about the law, about cases. I am not ‘‘responsible’’ in it. I turn to the abstraction: terror-ism. Yet, being a citizen of the world who aspires to live and prosper under ‘‘the rule of law,’’ I will risk a word. When we believe that to punish the per2. This is not as silly as it may sound. In an interesting article in The American Prospect, Anne-Marie Slaughter also mentions this as an important reason: ‘‘[t]he convention governing prisoners of war defines unlawful combatants as participants in an armed conflict who abuse their civilian status to gain military advantage: those who do not carry arms openly and do not carry a ‘fixed distinctive sign’ such as a uniform or other insignia that would identify them as soldiers’’ (Slaughter, ‘‘Tougher than Terror,’’ The American Prospect, January 28, 2002, 2).
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petrators as criminals would be smarter than, or even more correct than, military intervention, we are not necessarily moving toward a lasting peace. Unless we are trained into imagining the other, a necessary, impossible, and interminable task, nothing we do through politico-legal calculation will last, even with the chanciness of the future anterior: something will have been when we plan a something will be. Before the requirement of the emergence of a specific sort of ‘‘public sphere’’—corollary to imperial systems and the movement of peoples, when different ‘‘kinds’’ of people came to live together—such training was part of general cultural instruction.3 After, it has become the especial burden of an institutionalized faculty of the humanities. I squash an entire history here. Kant’s enlightened subject is a scholar.4 In ‘‘Critique of Power’’ Benjamin writes, ‘‘what stands outside of the law as the educative power in its perfected form, is one of the forms of appearance of divine power.’’ 5 I happen to be a Europeanist, but I have no doubt at all that historically marked intuitions about the importance of the educative moment is to be found in every cultural system. What seems important today, in the face of this unprecedented attack on the temple of Empire, is not only an unmediated intervention by way of the calculations of the public sphere— war or law—but training (the exercise of the educative power) into a preparation for the eruption of the ethical. I understand the ethical, and this is a derivative position, to be an interruption of the epistemological, which is the attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge. Epistemological constructions belong to the domain of the law, which seeks to know the other, in his or her case, as completely as possible, in order to punish or acquit rationally, reason being defined by the limits set by the law itself. The ethical interrupts this imperfectly, to listen to the other as if it were a self, neither to punish nor to acquit. Public criticism today must insist that no amount of punishment, legal upon individuals, or military and economic upon states and collectivities— indeed, military and economic rewards such as invitation into alliances or 3. Livy, History of Rome, bk. 1, 58–60, recalling the founding of the Roman Republic, places it in Lucretia’s fear that she should be represented as having slept with a ‘‘man of base condition.’’ 4. Immanuel Kant, ‘‘What Is Enlightenment?’’ in What Is Enlightenment? EighteenthCentury Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 58–64. 5. Walter Benjamin, ‘‘Critique of Violence,’’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken, 1978), 297; translation modified.
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entry into the World Trade Organization—is going to bring lasting change, an epistemic shift, however minor. We must also attend upon a preparation for the ethical upon which we must attend. And that is where the public responsibility of the humanities may be situated. By contrast, the ‘‘War on Terrorism’’ has generated an intense resurgence of nationalism, consolidated by an act of Congress: the Patriot Act. There was an unexamined assumption by academic intellectuals that, because the world economic system acts multi- and trans-nationally, even globally at the top, a seamlessly ideological postnationalism is the contemporary episteme. That bit of irresponsible thinking has been given an indecent burial—an unintended consequence, but a consequence nonetheless. Women are prominent in this war on terrorism, this monstrous civilizing mission. We cannot ignore the very vocal fresh-faced women, shown by CNN, at the helm of a US aircraft carrier. One of them, unnervingly young, said to the viewers, ‘‘If I can drive an aircraft carrier I can drive any truck.’’ This was in response to the most bizarre example of single-issue feminist patter that it has been my good fortune to hear from the mouth of a male CNN correspondent: ‘‘No one will be able to make sexist jokes about women drivers any more.’’ All women? The ‘‘women of Afghanistan’’ are coded somewhat differently. Given this gender-prominence, a feminist critical theory must repeat that expanding the war endlessly will not necessarily produce multiple-issue gender justice in the subaltern sphere. The most visible consequences, the exacerbation of state terrorism in Israel, Malaysia, India, and elsewhere, have nothing to do with gender justice at all. If ruined Kabul is an ‘‘international city’’ of a rather different kind from Abd-ur Rahman’s dream at the end of the nineteenth century, with perhaps a UN peacekeeping force in place, and constant access to the globalized version of US local culture, something consonant with US and UN gender politics will again emerge as part of social consciousness.6 But these gender-sensitive groups will represent 6. Abd-ur Rahman Khan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). The issue of ‘‘gender,’’ the abstraction of sexual difference, itself discursive since always posited as a difference, for both dominant and subordinate, is never absent from a society. I say ‘‘again’’ because, as I say in my text, the issue of civil justice for women can be charted along the story of the often-thwarted development of the Afghan intelligentsia. As far as I know, that story has not been put together between covers. One can start from the loss of the Silk Road monopoly, or from Abd-ur Rahman.
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the subaltern as little as, indeed possibly less than, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). There is no possibility, in an American protectorate, of gender holding the repeated and effortful turning of capital into social, which is the best of the counter-globalizing struggle. That happened in the era of the seventies’ ‘‘new’’ social movements in what we now call the ‘‘global South.’’ The most difficult thing as the emancipation of women by the US is celebrated over and over again is an assessment of the Soviet regime. Middle-class women are emerging from where they were before the Taliban sent them underground. Everybody knows the US created the Taliban. Indeed, in these times of quick-fix political education to match the flavor of the week, this is often the acme of left-liberal knowledgeability. But why were these women flourishing as professionals under the Soviet regime? There is a singular ignoring of the history of the development of the Afghan intelligentsia and its genuine involvement with the Left.7 There is an internal line of cultural difference within ‘‘the same culture.’’ The emancipation of women has forever followed this line, and that story is bigger than wars, if anything can be. I comment on it in my forthcoming book Other Asias.8 Another response to Terror has been to put quotation marks around it—to commodify it, relexicalize it for History and Geography, museumize it. At the soft end of this is the marketing of a sentimentalized 9-11 that is altogether offensive. To this a superficial but scrupulous public criticism of the visual culture industry can surely apply. Contained within it there are arresting metonyms that negotiate the area between the hard and soft: Behind an adjacent tarpaulin-cloaked fence topped with barbed wire [at Ground Zero] . . . splinters from the soaring television antenna that marked the highest point in New York City—1,732 feet into the sky— sit on their sides, right next to the punctured, debris-choked remains of Fritz Koenig’s great spherical bronze sculpture, the former center7. Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917–1979): An Appraisal (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1997). 8. I am beginning to chart out this argument in a piece entitled ‘‘Gender,’’ initially presented at Womens Studies, University of Pennsylvania (November 14, 2001), and next at Hong Kong University (June 3, 2002) and the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University (June 20, 2002).
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piece to the trade center’s ground-level plaza, interpreted as a symbol of world peace through trade. And nestled against the Koenig globe is . . . a charred and pitted lump of fused concrete, melted steel, carbonized furniture and less recognizable elements, a meteoritelike mass that no human force could have forged, but which was in fact created by the fiery demise of the towers.9 An objet trouvé, because ‘‘world peace through world trade’’ is a lie. And the forces are human. The Koenig globe—marked as was Yeats’s lapis lazuli— has now been installed as a memorial at Historic Battery Park on the Eisenhower Mall near Bowling Green, adjacent to the Hope Garden. The Sphere, as it is called, is lexicalized into the text of New York as the capital of capital, into a phrase in the imaginary that will contain the signifiers History (Eisenhower, Battery Park), Space (Battery Park, Bowling Green, Garden), and Hope. Close to the event, there were the conceptual banalities accompanying what is no doubt much more interesting architecturally, at a number of shows, from which I choose at random a show called ‘‘A New World Trade Center’’ at the Max Protetch Gallery in New York.10 At one end, the most lasting memorial—a response to the time of terror by spacing—the classic model of writing—Stonehenge-model slabs fixing the exact position of the sun during the two attacks, ‘‘Zero Zones,’’ designed by Raymund Abraham. At the other end, the typical pomo exhortation to active forgetfulness: ‘‘Let’s not even consider remembering. . . . What for?’’ offered by Foreign Office architects for their plioform snakelike towers. In between there were other conceptualities, including a vaguely leftish criticism of the towers as buildings: ‘‘Jet(tison) the past, out-of-sync anyway (US=bigness, power). Out of the Tower ruins will emerge generative matter’’ (Thomas Mayne, Architects). The wildest of them, twin towers of light, representing the inscription of the towers as noumenal rather than phenomenal, was the temporary memorial chosen by the city. Of all the responses I find this middle-of-the-road trend the most reassuring. Europe has always been good at museumization. The quotation marks neutralize, although here too political art can fuel martial art, and the task of responsibility is never closed. This response is now mired, of course, 9. Eric Lipton and James Glanz, ‘‘A Nation Challenged: Relics; From the Rubble, Artifacts of Anguish,’’ New York Times, Section 1, January 27, 2002, 1. 10. ‘‘A New World Trade Center: Design Proposals,’’ Max Protetch Gallery, New York, January 17–February 16, 2002.
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in the conflict between competition sculpture, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, and the conventions of mourning. I come now to my second question: What response to offer in the face of the impossibility of response. The stereotype of the public intellectual, from Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek International to Christopher Hitchens, the freelance British gadfly, would offer statements describing US policy, coming out promptly in response to every crisis. This is undoubtedly worthy, often requiring personal courage, but it is not a response. It enhances the charisma of the intellectual and produces in the reader a feeling of being in the thick of things. This type of cognitive mapping, heavily dependent upon the fieldwork of frontline investigative journalists and humble gatherers of statistics, legitimates by reversal the idea that knowledge is an end in itself, or that there is a straight line from knowing to doing politics as human rights or street theater. But to respond means to resonate with the other, contemplate the possibility of complicity—wrenching consciousness-raising, which is based on ‘‘knowing things,’’ however superficially, from its complacency. Response pre-figures change. Reading Aristotle and Shelley, students typically ask, What is the difference between prediction and pre-figuration? The difference is, negatively, in the intending subject’s apparent lack of precision, in the figure; positively, it is the figure’s immense range in time and space. The figure disrupts confidence in consciousness-raising. That is the risk of a response that hopes to resonate through figuration. When we confine our idea of the political to cognitive control alone, this does not just avoid the risk of response, it closes off response altogether. We end up talking to ourselves, or to our clones abroad. Predictably, on Left and Right, you lose support when you stop us-and-them-ing, when you take away the unself-critical convenience of doing good or punishing. It is for such situations that Mahasweta Devi wrote, ‘‘there are people for passing laws, there are people to ride jeeps, but no one to light the fire.’’ 11 The response is in the fire. You get burned if you are touched and called by the other. If anything in what follows outrages you or seems not political enough, please remember this. The traditional Left here in the US and in Europe has by and large understood the events of September 11 as a battle between fundamentalism and the failure of democracy. Being Indian, I look more at the Indian press, 11. Mahasweta Devi, ‘‘Douloti the Bountiful,’’ in Imaginary Maps, trans. Gayatri Spivak (New York: Routledge, 1995), 88.
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and the tone on the Left there is less exclusivist. ‘‘Nineteen Arab men . . . brought their various frustrations onto four commercial aircraft,’’ writes Vijay Prashad, ‘‘[t]he impoverishment of other languages of social protest leads many young people to adopt the garb of Islam to articulate their alienation.’’ Prashad’s tone is fairly representative.12 By contrast, Noam Chomsky can be read as representing the dominant line on the US Left: ‘‘‘globalization,’ or ‘economic imperialism,’ or ‘cultural values,’ [are] matters that are utterly unfamiliar to bin Laden and his associates and of no concern to them.’’ 13 If, on the other hand, we think of the actants involved, politicized graduate students, rather unlike Chomsky’s stereotype, we do not have to withhold from them the bitterness of understanding that, as the stakes in the Great Game shift, and Russia and the US maneuver to come together over the black gold of the Caspian, bypassing the Taliban, who were flourishing on September 11, 2001, there was no hope that their cities would participate, to quote one of the innumerable World Bank Policy and Research Bulletins—this one entitled ‘‘Creating Cities That Work in the New Global Economy’’—‘‘in the changes [attendant upon world trade reaching more than $13 trillion in 1998, that] carry the promise of large gains for developing countries, but [only] expos[ure] to greater risks’’ to some among them.14 Why can’t Islam be a liberation theology for radicals from the middle-class elite as a great culture—called ‘‘Islam’’—continues to get separated from the mainstream toward modernity? I hold no brief for liberation theology. Indeed, in the heyday of the gender-compromised Latin American liberation theology, I would often ask, ‘‘Why can’t we have the liberation without the theology?’’ But the possibility must be granted if one is trying to imagine something different from the sorry stereotype. I would agree with Professor Chomsky that the hijackers cannot be fully explained by globalization. But I would also agree with Vijay Prashad that 9-11, as it is being called now, is not just about religion. There is neither mourning nor execution without imagining the transcendental, and the transcendental, when imagined, has cultural names. But that is another matter, and, as I will argue in the final section, this set should not be given the blanket name ‘‘religion’’ too quickly. It is also true that a millennial confrontation is 12. Vijay Prashad, War Against the Planet: The Fifth Afghan War, Imperialism, and Other Assorted Fundamentalisms (New Delhi: LeftWord, 2002), 7, 27. 13. Noam Chomsky, ‘‘The Theatre of Good and Evil,’’ http://www.zmag.org/chomskygsf. htm. 14. ‘‘Creating Cities That Work in the New Global Economy,’’ World Bank Policy and Research Bulletin 10, no. 4 (October–December 1999): 1.
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on record, as soon as Islam emerged out of its tribality, of which I as a Europeanist know the European side rather more. George W. Bush, if he were literate, could tap the Chanson de Roland. Was it ever thus? I cannot know. Culture is its own explanations. Sayyid Qutb and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin tap into this too. If this intuition—that culture is its own explanations—is credited, then anthropological ideas of culture and Marxist ideas of ideology hang out together. That ‘‘Muslims’’ explain things in terms of ‘‘Islam’’ and ‘‘Americans’’ in terms of ‘‘freedom’’ begins then to make a different kind of sense. The fragility of both under stress can then move, perhaps, toward understanding. The impersonal narrative of globalization: capital-formation producing, as much as managing, its crisis, explained as the progression from absolute state b colony b imperialism b empire, is then less persuasive as the rational explanation of 9-11.15 The explanation is contained rather in the ideology of thinking oneself the proper shadow of the transcendental—hence ‘‘global’’—in a historical as well as contemporary sense. Thomas Aquinas wrenching Aristotle away from Ibn Rushd at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century is an example of this. This shadowy self-concept, unencumbered by history, but alive to visible injustice—military, political, and economic—is provided a semblance of access, speed, momentaneity by the Internet, producing a collectivity soldered by the intense male bonding of students living together, a political phenomenon well-known by all tertiary educators. It happens to soldiers too, of course, and guerrillas—but I have easier access to the foreign-student phenomenon. Through this access, I am trying to go toward these uncanny young men. If MSNBC is to be believed, the one who actually flew the plane into the tower was eighteen years old! When Terry Castle writes with embarrassment about her fixation on the young soldiers in the First World War, I perceive the risk-taking of a real response such as I too am attempting.16 No doubt the millennially imagined confrontation was present and communicated among the young men who executed the attack and who lie, unremembered, among the aggressively remembered twenty-eight hundred. Although common sense would tell us that, once embarked upon the plan, it was the dream itself that enchanted them, and the millennial confrontational imaginary became the deepest of deep background. 15. This is the general argument of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). 16. Terry Castle, ‘‘Courage, mon amie,’’ London Review of Books, April 4, 2002, 3–12.
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Unremembered, yes. But when, in May 2002, New York presented a memorial, European and military in the spectacularity or visuality of its culture of mourning, it could not not welcome the seven hijackers who lie in that ground into the economy of Nature. There is no apartheid in the transcendental. I will now quote at some length from the article ‘‘Temple Desecration in Pre-Modern India’’ by Richard Eaton, published in Frontline.17 But first I want to mention a tiny but important detail that Sayad Mujtaba Ali recorded in his unpublished writings, that for centuries the Balkhi Afghans came to India to learn Farsi rather than go to Iran, and the major premise of Asia Before Europe, that the Indian Ocean rim was a much more important motor of cultural change than today’s ‘‘national or religious identity-’’ based thinking.18 It is also true that the connections between South Asian Islam, Iran, and Central Asia are historically strong. Thus, even if we want to accept Chomsky’s dismissal—they knew nothing of globalization—we can cite a cultural imaginary. Eaton writes of ‘‘the sweeping away of . . . prior political authority,’’ and continues: ‘‘[w]hen such authority was vested in a ruler whose own legitimacy was associated with a royal temple . . . that temple was normally looted, redefined, or destroyed, any of which would have had the effect of detaching a defeated [king] from the most prominent manifestation of his former legitimacy. Temples that were not so identified but abandoned by their royal patrons and thereby rendered politically irrelevant, were normally left unharmed.’’ ‘‘It would be wrong,’’ Eaton continues, ‘‘to explain this phenomenon by appealing to an essentialized ‘theology of iconoclasm’ felt to be intrinsic to the Islamic religion. . . . [A]ttacks on images patronized by enemy kings had been, from about the sixth century A.D. on, thoroughly integrated into . . . political behavior [in the area]. . . . In short, from about the sixth century on, images and temples associated with dynastic authority were considered politically vulnerable.’’ 19 17. Richard M. Eaton, ‘‘Temple Desecration in Pre-Modern India,’’ Frontline 17, no. 25 (December 9–22, 2000): 62–70. 18. Syed Mujtaba Ali, Works, vol. 7 (Kolkata: Mitra and Ghosh Publishers, 1974–). Kirti N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 19. Eaton, ‘‘Temple Desecration,’’ 64–65. To understand why the distinction between ‘‘India’’ and ‘‘Afghanistan’’ is in this context spurious, see Martin W. Lewis, Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 213, 13, 14. A version of this argument has now been published in Centennial Review (forthcoming).
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I am not speaking of intended rational choice. I am speaking of a cultural imaginary producing ‘‘reason,’’ somewhat like the repeated marching band arrangement of the ‘‘Battle Hymn of the Republic’’ and the lavish use of African Americans in the preamble to the declaration of this altogether catachrestic ‘‘war.’’ It is possible to add to this by doing a riff on the notion of dynasty displaced into lineages of class-mobility in the US context. I will do no more now than represent the confrontation in September as the destruction of a temple—world trade and military power—with which a state is associated. It may not be a referential message about the inequity of an ideology of trade and arms at all; not an intended rational choice. And it helped that the buildings were tall, a fact not unconnected with the representation of power. It is certainly reflected on the other side in the Stonehenge-type projects, in the project that reflects twin beams of light as tall and thin as the erstwhile towers, ‘‘beacons of light as symbols of strength,’’ or builds a World Art Tower behind an exact replica of Tower One, a hollow square arch flanking the filled one. If the other side needs a temple, this side needs at least a word: terror. Something called ‘‘terror’’ is needed in order to declare a war on it—a war that extends from the curtailment of civil liberties to indefinite augmentation of military self-permission. Without the word terror, this range of things, alibied in the name of women, cannot be legitimized. I have been trying to open up that abstraction—‘‘terror’’—to figure out some possibilities. During these efforts, it has seemed increasingly clear to me that ‘‘terror’’ is the name loosely assigned to the flip side of social movements—extra-state collective action—when such movements use physical violence. (When a state is named a ‘‘terrorist state,’’ the intent implicit in the naming is to withold state status from it, so that, technically, it enters the category of ‘‘extra-state collective action.’’)20 ‘‘Terror’’ is, of course, also the name of an affect. In the policy-making arena, ‘‘terror’’ as social movement and ‘‘terror’’ as affect come together to provide a plausible field for group psychological speculation. The social movement is declared to have psychological identity. In other words, making terror both civil and natural provides a rationale for exercising psychological diagnostics, the 20. Former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger did not know what New Social Movements were at the conference ‘‘Does America Have a Democratic Mission,’’ University of Virginia, March 19–21, 1998. The useless definition of terror is quoted in Chomsky, 9-11 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001), 54. Derrida has recently written an entire book on the possibility of rogue states (Voyous [Paris: Galilée, 2003]).
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most malign ingredient of racism. I have neither the training nor the taste for such exercises. But I must still say that in the case of ‘‘terror’’—sliding imperceptibly into ‘‘terrorism’’—as social movement, the word is perhaps no more than an antonym—for ‘‘war,’’ which names legitimate violence, but also, paradoxically, for peace. And here we could wander in the labyrinth where war and peace become interchangeable terms, although the status of war as agent and peace as object never wavers. We have come to accept the oxymoron: ‘‘peacekeeping forces.’’ The United Nations High Commission for Refugees and Save the Children-UK, in a report of February 2002, asked peacekeeping missions to stop trafficking in women and girl children. Feminists agitate against the sexually rapacious behavior of ‘‘peacekeeping personnel.’’ 21 The scandal of rape within the US Army is now well known. At the same time, Barbara Crossette offers the conventional wisdom, in an article entitled ‘‘How to Put a Nation Back Together Again,’’ that ‘‘fastermoving armies are necessary.’’ 22 Here is the usual division between the various spheres of discourse, but they work within the same cultural imaginary, this time almost global: Conquering armies violate women. Where ‘‘terror’’ is an affect, the line between agent and object wavers. On the one hand, the terrorists terrorize a community, fill their everyday with terror. But there is also a sense in which the terrorist is taken to be numbed to terror, does not feel the terror of terror, and has become unlike the rest of us by virtue of this transformation. When the soldier is not afraid to die, s/he is brave. When the terrorist is not afraid to die, s/he is a coward. The soldier kills, or is supposed to kill, designated persons. The terrorist kills, or may kill, just persons. In the space between ‘‘terrorism’’ as a social movement and terror as affect, we can declare victory. Although civil liberties, including intellectual freedom, are curtailed, and military permissiveness exacerbated, although racial profiling deforms the polity and the entire culture redesigns itself for prevention, and although, starting on September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council adopts wide-ranging antiterrorism measures, we can still transfer the register to affect and say, ‘‘We are not terrorized, we have won.’’ And the old topos of intervening for the sake of women continues to be deployed. It is to save Afghan women from terror that we must keep the peace by force of arms. I want to distinguish the suicide bomber, the kamikaze pilot, from these received binaries. 21. UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, Note for Implementing and Operational Partners on Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, February 2002. 22. Barbara Crossette, ‘‘How to Put a Nation Back Together Again,’’ New York Times, Week in Review Section, November 25, 2001, 3.
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Single coerced yet willed suicidal ‘‘terror’’ is in excess of the destruction of dynastic temples and the violation of women, tenacious and powerful residual. l l l l
These comments on suicide bombing have provoked so much hostility that I include here some words of explanation that I offered to Dr. Michael Bernet, in response to a specific query: I believe responsible humanities teaching strives at uncoercive rearrangement of desires in the student. An extreme violation of this responsibility is seen in groups such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, which coercively rearrange desires until coercion seems identical with the will of the coerced. I, like many others, think that the conduct of these groups is tied to the extremist politics of the state of Israel. It must, however, be admitted that these groups are now out of control, not a little because it is not possible to credit any offer of ‘‘peace’’ as reliable. Those whose desires are rearranged so as to undertake suicide bombing are invariably the young, whose attitude to life is peculiarly vulnerable to such coercion. I am a pacifist, I cannot and do not condone violence, practiced by the state or otherwise. I therefore also believe that violence cannot be brought to an end by ruthless extermination. I believe that we must be able to imagine our opponent as a human being, and to understand the significance of his or her action. It is in this belief—not to endorse suicide bombing but to be on the way to its end, however remote— that I have tried to imagine what message it might contain. Of course this does not mean each suicide bomber has these specific thoughts in mind! Here, too, I think things are out of control and whole generations have been affected. Mine may therefore be seen as the counsel of despair, but certainly not as an endorsement of violence. It is convenient for the laws of war to distinguish between civilians and soldiers. It is just that there be law, but law is not justice. In view of justice and the discourse of the ethical, human life cannot be marked for death by positive law.
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Single coerced yet willed suicidal ‘‘terror’’ is in excess of the destruction of dynastic temples and the violation of women, tenacious and powerful residual. It has not the banality of evil. It is informed by the stupidity of belief taken to extreme. It is we, who can no longer die young, who are banal, albeit with the banality of the merely quotidian. The Kantian sublime is, strictly speaking, and from the point of view of the spectator, for whom alone the sublime ‘‘is’’ sublime, stupid. The sublime is mindless. We bring it under something like control because ‘‘the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty’’ kicks in.23 If in what I now say you feel distaste, even rejection, you will be tasting the risk in response. But do not mistake this for Stockhausen’s aesthetic gush.24 To legitimize the largest number killed by diagnosing ‘‘evil empire’’ is no good either way. That too is to close off response. I am not suggesting that violence or the exercise of power, legitimized or delegitimized, is sublime in the colloquial sense. For me the word ‘‘sublime’’ (more than the German Erhabene, such is the force of English) has been forever marked by Kant. It names a structure: the thing is too big for me to grasp; I am scared; Reason kicks in by the mind’s immune system and shows me, by implication, that the big thing is mindless, ‘‘stupid’’ in the sense in which a stone is stupid, or the body is (OED sense 2). I call the big mindless thing ‘‘sublime.’’ I am also not suggesting that political analyses and resistances and, on another level, aid and human rights, are unnecessary. I am suggesting that if in the imagination we do not make the attempt to figure the other as imaginative actant, political (and military) solutions will not remove the binary which led to the problem in the first place. Hence cultural instruction in the exercise of the imagination. Even within this suggestion, I am not describing all the acts of September 11, 2001, as ‘‘sublime’’ in the Kantian sense. It is an imaginative exercise in experiencing the impossible—stepping into the space of the other— without which political solutions come drearily undone into the continuation of violence. To paraphrase Devi: ‘‘there are many to offer political analyses and solutions, but no one to light the fire.’’ Cultural instructions through the imagination in time of war is seen, at best, as aestheticization and, at worst, as treason. But that too is situational. 23. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 141. The Analytic of the Sublime goes from 128–212. 24. It was widely reported that the composer Karlheinz Stockhausen had, days after September 11, made remarks to journalists in Hamburg to the effect that the attack on the World Trade Center was a work of art. ‘‘Attacks Called Great Art,’’ New York Times, September 19, 2001, Section E, 3.
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Suicide bombing—and in this case the planes were living bombs— is a purposive self-annihilation, a confrontation between oneself and oneself—the extreme end of autoeroticism, killing oneself as other, in the process killing others. It is when one sees oneself as an object, capable of destruction, in a world of objects, so that the destruction of others is indistinguishable from the destruction of the self. The scary thing is that the destruction of the royal temple can be referenced as so transcendental a task that mere human lives become as nothing, theirs as mine. This is the moment one cannot, in principle, imagine—but no use covering that inability with that word again. We have no idea if these men had killed before—they don’t seem different from foreign students anywhere. We hear from those phone calls from the planes that one of them cut a passenger’s throat. It is a horrible detail. Was it to bring the aura of death into this ‘‘licensed lunacy,’’ not merely to think it and have it happen, but to pretend to have control over that peu profond ruisseau calomnié la mort? Whatever it was, this act of global confrontation was neither resistance nor multitudinous. There is no such thing as collective death. It cannot be punished, despite the efforts at due process. It cannot be condoned as a legitimate result of bad US policy abroad, as in the usual US-centered political analyses. Such a gesture matches the media overkill to ‘‘mourn’’ the dead with every possible sentimentality and thus attempt to contain the sublimity of Ground Zero. Many of us saw the second plane hit the second tower live (if that is the word) on that morning of September 11. That enclosed object, moving across a sunny sky quickly, with no special effects, hitting the tower and bursting into thick fire is ‘‘beyond Ate’’—beyond ‘‘the limit that human life can only briefly cross.’’ 25 Its unremarkable progress contained a collection of heterogeneous personal terror, connecting so desperately to transcendentality, that cannot be grasped. I am a pacifist; I cannot support violence rationally. But we must acknowledge the sublimity of terror, as in the inadequate name of a human affect beyond affect, rather than the catch-all name for any act of violence not authorized by the state. The second plane, hitting, as seen live, can be imagined within the structure of the Kantian sublime conceived as a limit to imagining. On May 21, 2002, on Late Show with David Letterman, Diane Sawyer kept saying, ‘‘Charlie [Charles Gibson, the other anchorperson] and I were in denial as we were commenting’’—and that denial is the moment in the structure described in the Analytic of the Sublime when the subject feels ‘‘displeasure 25. Jacques Lacan, ‘‘The Splendor of Antigone,’’ in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959– 1960: Seminar Book VII, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: Routledge, 1992), 262–63.
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from the inadequacy of the imagination.’’ 26 I was watching that channel. I have no memory of their ‘‘denial,’’ and that too computes. Commenting on the May 30, 2002, memorial for the removal of the last standing column of the World Trade Center, Richard Meyer said, ‘‘The moment I saw the second plane, I knew we were at war.’’ That too can be a moment in the structure of coping with the sublime. It is the moral will at its most restricted: I can destroy the thing that scares me by force of response: war is a caricature of what in us can respond. I have suggested that suicide bombing undoes the difference between the bomber and his or her enemy. And I have suggested that, behind the smoke screens, the definitive predication of terrorism was ‘‘violent extra-state collective action,’’ that a ‘‘terrorist state’’ disqualifies itself for stateship. Insofar as the United States makes its own rules as it expands its war on terrorism, it allows ‘‘terrorist states’’ to concentrate and legitimize their policies. I am thinking, of course, of Israel and India, but so-called preventive antiterrorism now spans a good part of the globe. It would be out of place here to offer accounts and analyses of such state terrorism. I hope you remember that I was lukewarm about the potted analyses that accompany each crisis. I will comment in closing on one isolated point for each case, points that relate to the question of public criticism—the training for ethics in the humanities. First, then, Palestine. If 9-11 was a boy thing, in the struggle against Israel in Palestine we encounter female suicide bombers. I do not think this is a gendered phenomenon. Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed in the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other, where you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared death. It is only the young whose desires can be so drastically rearranged. I have no sympathy for those who train the young in this way. It is the extreme case of cultural instruction—coercion at the full, simulating choice, imagination represented as revealed truth. And this is where the dialogue must start—between a humanities training trivialized here and in extremis there. It is the history of this failure of cultural instruction, recoded as triumph, that we must question, not the instruction itself. For that history, leading now to apartheid and unspeakable violence in their homeland, can be so narrativized as to persuade the young to die. The female suicide bomber, thus persuaded, does not make a gendered point. Put them over against those female warriors on CNN and you 26. Kant, Power of Judgment, 141.
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will see that in suicide bombing there is no recoding of the gender struggle. When the dust settles, and at the moment it does not seem likely that it will settle over anything but the ruins of Palestine, the gender divisions will perhaps settle into the same or similar lines. Bhubaneswari Bhaduri, the subaltern in ‘‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’’ was a woman who used her gendered body to inscribe an unheard message; the bomber who died with Rajiv Gandhi, also a woman, did not.27 (It is interesting that in the male imaginary, the female suicide bomber is gender-marked by the reproductive norm. I am thinking of The Terrorist, a film made by an Indian Tamil about Sri Lanka, and of The Cyclist, the brilliant novel by Viken Berberian, a brave attempt to imagine the inner world of the suicide bomber.)28 Even though I am trying to imagine suicide bombing without closing it off with the catch-all word ‘‘terror,’’ the real lesson for the young potential suicide bombers may be that their message will never be heard. Even if a terrifying number of children become suicide bombers, they will remain exceptional, even as suicide is always an exceptional death—an impossible phrase. The most pathetic and most powerful thing about suicide bombing is that, like the ghost dance, its success is that it cannot succeed. In the face of this, public criticism can only repeat, taking the risk of responding with the utmost banality: it is not worth the risk. I come, finally, to India. The conflict that emerged in the visuality of our everyday, in the context of the War on Terrorism, in the summer of 2002, was Kashmir. But if, in the Palestinian case, no one ever mentions that the West Bank is occupied territory, in the Indian case, the state of Gujarat, where genocidal violence against Muslim citizens is condoned by state and police, never makes it into the visualization of international public culture. Indeed, The Economist calls the Hindu attacks on Muslims in Gujarat ‘‘true but irrelevant.29 In closing this section, I want to cite these few words from a poignant piece by Harsh Mander—a former government official who resigned after writing this piece, which is available on the Internet.30 ‘‘I have never known a riot which has used the sexual subjugation of women so widely as an instrument of violence as in the recent mass bar27. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’’ in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313. 28. The Terrorist, directed by Santosh Sivan, 1998; Viken Berberian, The Cyclist (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). 29. The Economist, June 1, 2002, 11. 30. Harsh Mander, ‘‘Cry, the Beloved Country: Reflections on the Gujarat Massacre,’’ http://www.sabrang.com/gujarat/statement/nv2.htm.
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barity in Gujarat,’’ Mander writes. He then goes on to comment on the rule of law: As one who has served in the Indian Administrative Service for over two decades, I feel great shame at the abdication of duty of my peers in the civil and police administration. . . . The law . . . required them to act independently, . . . , impartially, decisively. . . . If even one official had so acted in Ahmedabad, she or he could have deployed the police forces and called in the army to halt the violence and protect the people in a matter of hours. No riot can continue beyond a few hours without the active connivance of the local police and magistracy. My piece describes the long-term effort that subtends such necessary and immediate decisions. At the end of his piece, Mander invokes the ethical by way of a story: I recall a story of the Calcutta riots, when Gandhi was fasting for peace. A Hindu man came to him, to speak of his young boy who had been killed by the Muslim mobs, and of the depth of his anger and longing for revenge. And Gandhi is said to have replied: If you really wish to overcome your pain, find a young [Muslim] boy, just as young as your son, . . . whose parents have been killed by Hindu mobs. Bring up that boy like you would your own son, but bring him up in the Muslim faith to which he was born. Only then will you find that you can heal your pain, your anger, and your longing for retribution. If so far I have urged the humanities to train the imagination so that the ethical interruption can postpone the attempt merely to know the other— even in Cultural Studies occupied with one’s ‘‘own culture’’—here the tables are turned. What is offered as the identity of the subject must be accessed in the imagination when every impulse is to repudiate it. It is no use saying, with the reverse fundamentalists, true Hinduism is not like this; or to exclaim, with the secularists, I am a secularist, I do not vote with these people. The toughest task is to imagine myself a Hindu, when everything in me resists, to understand what in us can respond so bestially, rather than merely to show cause, or to impose rules that will break, in every polity but a police state, unless prepared for by a sustained and uncoercive rearrangement of desires with moves learned from the offending culture. As the humanities instruct us to instruct, critical theory distinguishes the discriminations of a global culture dominating our pitifully local mind-sets.
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2 I taught at the University of Hawaii–Manoa in the spring of 2003. Part of the job was to deliver public lectures. I had proposed ‘‘Terror’’ in advance of arrival. By the time I spoke, Iraq had broken. The university was profoundly politicized. There was a small enclave of native Hawaiian students and faculty, there was Pearl Harbor and the military base—what one of them described as ‘‘weapons of mass destruction under the Turtle[-shaped island].’’ The protest carried a peculiar poignancy, since the military base was one of the largest employers of the Hawaiian underclass, in this place that had been forcibly annexed by ‘‘the Bayonet Constitution’’ of 1887.31 I could not recycle the initial script. I have attempted to indicate its embedding in this short second section. In the midst of what seemed to be a disastrous engagement with Iraq, I went back to reading Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘‘Beyond Vietnam,’’ the 1967 speech he delivered at Riverside Church in New York, a minute’s walk from where I live now. Again and again in the text of the speech, I found Dr. King exhorting us to ‘‘speak for those who have been designated as our enemies,’’ because ‘‘the human spirit [does not] move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within one’s own bosom and in the surrounding world.’’ ‘‘How do they judge us?’’ King asked. ‘‘When we ask why they do not leap to negotiate, these things must be remembered,’’ he said. It was first in Hawaii that I was able to connect my efforts to imagine the suicide bomber with these exhortations. I spoke there of the fact that this resonance with Dr. King’s effort had received hostile responses from various persons and journals and this in itself was cause for alarm. I referred to the speech given in Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta on April 30, 1967, which contained these powerful words: ‘‘Don’t let anybody make you think that God chose America as His divine messianic force to be—a sort of policeman of the whole world. God has a way of standing before the nations with judgment, and it seems that I can hear God saying to America: ‘You are too arrogant! If you don’t change your ways, I will rise up and break the backbone of your power.’’’ I wondered—even as I repeated the apologia offered to Dr. Michael Bernet—if these words applied to the curtailment of civil liberties, including intellectual freedom, the exacerbation of military permissiveness, the deformation of the polity through racial profiling, and the re31. On the Bayonet Constitution, see Jon Kamakawiwoole Osorio, Dismembering Lahui: The History of the Hawaiian Nation Until 1887 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
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designing of the entire culture for the prevention of autoimmunity, of which I spoke in section 1. I pointed out that we are now so used to the idea that it is the United States’ responsibility as the new Empire to police the world that we quibble over containment or war, war over oil as opposed to a just war, assassination as opposed to regime change. I shared with that audience my comments, made to the then provost of Columbia University, after listening to a crazy debate on Iraq between Alan Dershkowitz and George P. Fletcher: I felt that I could not actually ask only a question—to an extent the response could not come from what the debaters had presented. It was pretty unsettling to hear ‘‘It is sometimes better to do the right thing rather than the legal thing.’’ This is of course the grounds for civil disobedience, but precisely because it is civil. We cannot speak of states operating in this way. When it comes to state practice, it turns to vigilantism, precisely because there is no authority to ‘‘disobey.’’ I was also a bit unnerved that there were hands up in the room for condoning the right ‘‘to kill.’’ Even one hand up for this is unnerving—since we were not speaking of capital punishment, which I do oppose, but which at least can be discussed within an idea of law. It is not correct to think that, because ‘‘inalienable’’ rights have been again and again violated, they do not exist. Surely, the difference between having torture warrants and having an individual policeman decide that torture was okay is that the latter can be punished if discovered! The problem with deciding in favor of legalized targeted assassination is surely that if a covert targeted assassination is discovered, then, at least, in perhaps a utopian vision of the rule of law, such a thing can be retroactively punished? It was troublesome to see how a debate presumably on our right to invade Iraq turned into such a rhetorical tirade against Palestine. (Here I would want to use stronger words.) The repetitive condemnation of Palestinians showed no ability to imagine them in a material context where Israel figured as anything other than ‘‘a good figure.’’ This is where George Fletcher’s idea in Romantics at war, that romanticism was simply a variety of irrationalism, may be questionable.32 We must call the glass half full rather than half empty. Romanticism was a strike for a robust imagination—for me, it is summarized in Shelley’s remark, precisely 32. George P. Fletcher, Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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in the context of the beginnings of capitalism, that ‘‘we want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know.’’ 33 It is the ability to imagine the other side as another human being, rather than simply an enemy to be psyched out, that is the greatest gift of romanticism. What I was saying the other day about the humanities comes in here, because this is the terrain where a solid grounding in the humanities allows one to think the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and not think of the imagination as mere unreason. Although I do think that Mike Davis, in his new book Dead Cities, is somewhat over the top, he certainly does have a good deal of documented material that would not allow us to think that we are above the law because we will never be irresponsible with weapons of mass destruction.34 Not to mention Agent Orange! I grant that I am somewhat outside the grounds of the debate because historical experience makes me very uncomfortable with the pre-comprehended assumption on both sides that America should think of itself as having an imperial mandate. I admit that George Fletcher’s repeated assertion that there are no good or bad states, but equal states, can be read as a questioning of this pre-comprehension. It troubled me then that there were student hands up in that Law School auditorium condoning murder, albeit to be carried out by the state. This too is a coercive rearrangement of desire. And such a possibility makes it necessary to call upon the robust imagination, once again, to undo the binary opposition between bad cop and good cop—and remember that they are both cops. The impulse to help by enforcing human rights, by giving things, giving money, commodifying literacy, ignoring genderconsciousness, has a relationship with the impulse to kill. I quote Kant: ‘‘Although . . . there can still be legally good actions, [if] . . . the mind’s attitude is . . . corrupted at its root . . . the human being is designated as evil.’’ 35 Today, with the endorsement of the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the backbone of the rule of law is broken. Martin Luther King Jr. was a Christian, ‘‘the field of his moral vision’’ 33. Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘‘The Defence of Poetry,’’ in Shelley’s Critical Prose, ed. Bruce R. McElderry (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 8. 34. Mike Davis, Dead Cities, and Other Tales (New York: New Press, 2002). 35. Immanuel Kant, ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,’’ in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 78. Hereafter, subsequent pages are cited parenthetically in the text.
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was religious, and he was by profession a man of God. It was his reliance upon the transcendental that gave him his strength. In ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,’’ Kant investigates if a secularism is possible without some intuition of the transcendental that cannot be reasonably enforced. His answer is ‘‘no,’’ because mere reason is by nature unwilling to a moral working through (Bearbeitung) (95). It merely likes to patch a minus with a plus, push legally good actions with no attention to the mind’s corrupt attitudes. Kant has the courage, in this text, to compare the bloody violence of the Aboriginal to the bloodless malice of the academic scene. In the house of mere reason, he cannot allow himself to move from determinant to reflexive judgment, to philosophize without the Aboriginal as human example, as he had done in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, two years before.36 In the same way, we would say that the heavenly rewards, sounding so medieval in English translation (as a translator I have something to say about this), that we associate with Islamic ‘‘terror’’ may be compared with the calculative or carrot-and-stick push-and-pull with which the management of peace and war is undertaken by the new imperial interests: here a human rights violation, there an economic sanction, as it were. Kant calls this titfor-tat approach to salvation Nebengeschäfte, generally translated ‘‘secondary tasks,’’ relegating the work of the ethical state to the moral will alone. I believe Jacques Derrida is right in suggesting that a persistent critique of these Nebengeschäfte, calculative reason standing in for moral labor, must be taken as a primary task in a multicultural and multifaith world.37 This task is absolutely crucial today. Those sanitized secularists who are hysterical at the mention of religion are quite out of touch with the world’s peoples and have buried their heads in the sand. Class-production has allowed them to rationalize and privatize the transcendental, and they see this as the welcome telos of everybody everywhere, without historical preparation for this particular class-episteme. Radical alterity, an otherness that reason needs but which reason cannot grasp, can be given many names. God in many languages is its most recognizable name. Some have given it the name of ‘‘man,’’ some ‘‘nation,’’ ‘‘nature,’’ ‘‘culture.’’ Kant’s good faith was reflected in his acknowledgement that mere reason ‘‘needs’’ the transcendental. It is this good 36. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 26–29 n. 32. 37. Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Faith and Knowledge,’’ in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2001), 42–101.
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faith that allows our more stringent position, recognition of a repeatedly detranscendentalized radical alterity, to coexist, however discontinuously, with faith itself, always watchful for the calculative. These are untimely words in a world of urgency. But times are always urgent and cultural preparation—now reflected in the teaching of the humanities—is always for the long haul. 3 I had begun making the connection to Kant and that led me to secularism. The disclaimer in the paragraph below is a continuation of the unwillingness to recycle that had set in in Hawaii, I think. Our session at the MLA had been set at the same time as a memorial panel for Edward W. Said, who had died three months earlier. I was unhappy to be absent from that session and realized how much my comments were a supplement to Said’s magisterial work on the secular critic, who resembles the scholar, the Gelehrte, the hero of the Kantian Enlightenment, in being ‘‘oppositional’’ to every system, the individual who resists systems.38 I wanted to look at ‘‘ordinary people.’’ Here, then, is that third text, with its recalcitrant opening: This is not a polemic against the current state of war. There are others more capable of offering informed polemic. It is also the case that, given the indifference and arrogance of the war-makers, the recitation of polemic in non-policy-oriented conferences has limited usefulness. Further, I do not believe stockpiling of details about what is obviously true—that politics is misrepresented as religion by war-makers when the occasion suits— will do anything for secularism. Secularism is not a mind-set—it is an abstraction that must be protected. It is no use thickening it with affect, like narrative ‘‘new math.’’ No. Located as we are at the university, it is both the university and the secular that we need to rethink. The university is in the world. And the world’s universities are, no doubt, of the ‘‘European model [which], after a rich and complex medieval history, has become prevalent . . . over the last two centuries in states of a democratic type.’’ 39 Yet that structure does not operate everywhere with the same degree of efficiency, the same degree of informed consent or critique, 38. Edward W. Said, ‘‘Secular Criticism,’’ in The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 1–30; ‘‘Gods That Always Fail,’’ in Representations of the Intellectual (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 120. 39. Jacques Derrida, ‘‘The University without Condition,’’ in Without Alibi, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 202.
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with the same quality or connection with the state. As the best in the United States think more and more of world governance, in the name of sustainable development and ethical globalization, and human rights—to oppose the murderous collusion of the military and the economic—in the context of world governance, then—we must think of all of these different kinds of universities, rather than just generalize from the universities we know, as if the world were one. If we move through the spectrum, the ideas we will see circulating among students and teachers will be ‘‘cultural identity,’’ ‘‘cultural difference,’’ ‘‘national sovereignty,’’ ‘‘minority politics.’’ More often than not, these issues shade off into varieties of religious freedom. I hasten to add that this is not invariably the case. The historical place and nature of state religions are of course important. But since an active culture is the least tangible part of human behavior, the signs that spell ‘‘culture’’ for a mobilized collectivity are often indistinguishable from signs that can easily spell ‘‘religion.’’ Religion in this sense is the ritual markers of how we worship and how we inscribe ourselves in sexual difference. These are performative gestures of being-human, needing no referential ‘‘evidence,’’ being between nature and super-nature, a precarious place that needs such semiosis constantly. It is a place that captures and controls the possibility of the transcendental by writing it as that which is worshiped. We have seen that Kant dismisses this ground-level institutionality of religion, synonymous, as it were, with the automatic negotiations of culture, as Nebengeschäfte. This eighteenth-century point of view is still around in those who preach ‘‘the true religion has been hijacked into something terrible’’ or ‘‘a few bad examples are corrupting the whole.’’ There is nothing necessarily wrong with those sentiments. But if we are thinking secularism, we must come to terms with this perennial level of something that we might as well call religion, but just as well call culture, which is always ready to bite because it is a species of proto-public sphere, in Said’s word an ‘‘affiliation-in-filiation,’’ for brothers and sisters of brothers, honorary brothers. It is neither possible nor desirable to be precise here. And Samuel Huntington is so wrong because he performs a precise identification between religion and culture.40 In this imprecise and imbricated normality, it is not a question, strictly speaking, of belief, but of something like linguistic competence. And the competence is called on, demanding different levels of semantic negotiations, in different psychopolitical situations. Gendering 40. Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997).
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plays a strong role here, with different levels of acquiescence, even consensuality. Indeed, it can be said that this is the groundrock of the semantics of gender, the weave of permissible narratives. The preparation for secularism is political: to work for a world where religion can shrink to this mundane normality. In order to sustain such a world, assuming its establishment, it is the skills we teach in the humanities that we need. I am speaking, of course, of the skills of reading, of catching the generic difference between registers of language, with the hope of a ‘‘setting to work’’ to meet the world in which we live, in order to read Martin Luther King Jr.’s example of one who so loved his enemies that he died for them as a narrative, singular and unverifiable. It should be clear from my description of the situation of religion that secularism—which I will define in a moment—is a persistent critique; a persistent setting to work to recognize language as system rather than ground for belief. If we are to keep working for such a world, we must partially (only partially) undo the lesson of the last few European centuries and massively redo the program of disenfranchised histories. It sounds pretty scary put this way. But if we think of it as a collective enterprise that we undertake in the classroom, it need not work that way. If the signs that spell ‘‘culture’’ for a collectivity are often indistinguishable from signs that can easily spell ‘‘religion,’’ this can also be true of a ‘‘culture’’ that fetishizes mere reasonableness. In its most sublime mode, Kant shows this in ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.’’ I have spoken of this text in passing. Let me spend a few moments on it now. Although he made an attempt to show that all religions tended toward dramatizing the role reason must play in order to ensure an ethical collectivity, there was no doubt in Kant’s mind that Christianity is ‘‘the first true church’’ (181). This conviction, that the judeo-christian is the secular religion, is the prejudice that still rides us and is only legitimized by reversal, as in Sayyid Qutb’s work on Islam. If the judeo-christian is seen as the religion of reason, de-transcendentalized into secularism, that is also a description of capturing and controlling the possibility of the transcendental as that which is worshiped, the characteristic of religion-as-culture that I advanced above. My point is that, whatever your politics or your religion, the place of reason in whatever secularism might mean remains implacable. If reason is to be our ally, and there is no compromise on that one, it cannot be fetishized, as in the most common version of secularism, laundered judeo-
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christianity. Today’s soft option, ‘‘teaching tolerance,’’ is of course a good thing. But as Kant’s real effort at tolerance two centuries ago, at the end of ‘‘Mere Reason,’’ shows us, tolerance allows you to de-transcendentalize all other religions but the religion-culture language that governs your own idiom. Basically, it is the same problem as with cultural relativism. Tolerance, such an easy virtue in theory, is difficult to practice. It is, at best, a private virtue. A ‘‘tolerant’’ state is a secular state. We are talking the juridico-legal, not the psychological. It flourishes best when religion is detranscendentalized into something like linguistic competence, which is most easily done in the absence of the need to mobilize, not when it is privatized by a particular class. It is clear, in other words, that the two pieces of machinery bequeathed to us by the European eighteenth century—the separation of church and state and the separation of the public and the private—are too race- and class-specific and indeed gender-specific to hold up a just world. Privatization of the transcendental works for a handful. Our world shows us that secularism is not an episteme. It is a faith in reason in itself and for itself, protected by abstract external structures—the flimsiest possible arrangement to reflect the human condition: under the circumstances, I invite you to think of secularism as an active and persistent practice, an accountability, of keeping the structures of agency clear of belief as faith. Secularism is too rarefied, too existentially impoverished to take on the thickness of a language. It is a mechanism to avoid violence that must be learned as mere reasonableness. It is as thin as an ID card, not as thick as ‘‘identity.’’ What role can we play in promoting the practice of secularism rather than simply ‘‘being secular’’? Think of the role religious belief has in fact come to play in the contemporary multicultural university, and you will see that ‘‘being secular’’ is often a matter of preserving the letter of secularism. What I am going to suggest is not going to insist that there is some enlightened spirit of secularism for which we ought to initiate new conversion rites, but that we ought to acknowledge that secularism is only ever in the letter, and that we ought to train fiercely to protect it as such. No religion has a special privilege to it. (At the 2003 Annual Convention of the Modern Language Association, I was fortunate enough to receive many proofs of resonance. One of the most important came from my old friend Phil Lewis, who commented that this was my most important contribution to the thinking of a broad-based secularist practice: that it was only ever ‘‘in the letter.’’ ‘‘But,’’ said Phil, ‘‘it will be difficult for people to understand, Gayatri.’’ I think the training that is
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now required is for the sake of this understanding, that secularism is a set of abstract reasonable laws that must be observed to avoid religious violence.) At this point, it should also be clear that any assertion of the ‘‘universalism’’ of reason-based secularism is suspect for me because it finesses the fact that such assertions are based on the assumption that the university—the place designated for the training in deep subjective change—is not only an institution of class-mobility, but of a specifically European-style class-mobility. However European the model of the modern university may be, our commitment to multiculturalism resists that scenario. Indeed, even the description of the forum at the MLA reflected that in its goal of presenting ‘‘visions of the contemporary university that go beyond the Europe–North American axis.’’ It is precisely the figure of ‘‘the universal secular intellectual’’ that will no longer suffice for what the university must produce today. It is in order to think the alternative that I turn to Kant, for he was the philosopher who gave the best articulation to the universal secular intellectual as produced by the university: it is when a scholar writes for all times and all places that he is enlightened. For singular individuals of our generation, that is still a noble ideal, and that is where I have placed Said’s thinking of secular criticism. Yet accompanying Kant’s wonderful statement about publishing comes exhortations to be obedient on the job where we would expect a statement of public freedoms. If we look at Kant’s philosophical writings, especially ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,’’ written at the end of his life, we will see that Kant’s idea of a common ethical life—a gemeines Wesen for which the translation ‘‘public sphere’’ would be altogether inadequate—is based not on the separation of the public and the private but on the fact that all human beings have the same reason and therefore the goal of humanity is collective. (The church, which is a public institution, also messes with the private.) As I have tried to argue, it is upon the universality of reason that the promise of secularism is also based. Because Kant was deeply aware of the limits of reason, he asked himself if it was possible to forge a species of what we might as well call secularism, which would incorporate intuitions of the transcendental. Let us see how he solved his problem and what we, who must be fair to our debt to Kant and yet must undo him, can learn from him. To begin with, although reason is one, and indeed that is the ground of ethical commonality, Kant fractures that unity, rather more than we do when we put our blind faith in secularism as we understand it. (Kant himself always asserted that the various reasons were different forms of appear-
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ance of the same reason. What I am describing here can take that on board.) Between the fractured functions of reason, Kant establishes a skewed relationship. Pure reason, of which Kant is most suspicious, is the highest function of reason. And mere reason, which is what we work with every day and which can only be accountable—zurechnungfähig rather than responsible— is inimical to moral labor. Therefore, in describing how we would philosophize the moral in pure reason, Kant asks us, literally, to make room for— einräumen—the effects of grace. If this is too Eurocentric, it is because I need to question the reading of Kant that is used to justify world governance.41 There is a certain degree of self-confidence in such justifications, whereas Kant’s relentless honesty makes him shackle reason. In the spatial institution of pure reason, then, we must make room for ‘‘the effects of grace.’’ And, in the last section of this last ‘‘critique,’’ where he is speaking of world governance, with repeated theological references (since he is fighting the theological faculty), he insists that a global institution based on ethical commonness of being is impossible. The ethical cannot be immediately institutionalized. I learn many of my ways of reading the past from Marx, and this is where I want to read Kant as Marx read Aristotle, with admiration but with the historical acknowledgement that he could not imagine the value-form. Even within his brilliantly fractured model of the oneness of reason, Kant spoke of ‘‘effect of grace’’ because he could not imagine a European-style university where the theology faculty was not dominant. We have to run with the revolutionary force of the word ‘‘effect,’’ clear out of the theological into the aesthetic. ‘‘Effect’’ comes as close as Kant can get to de-transcendentalizing Grace. Grace is caught in the figure of something like a metalepsis—the effect of an effect. Since pure reason—or indeed any kind of reason—cannot know the cause, all that is inscribed is an effect. Hannah Arendt commented on the political potential of Kant’s thinking of the aesthetic.42 What I am proposing links up with that thought. Most of us are familiar with the slightly off-key English translation of the aesthetic: 41. It would require a great deal of space and time to support this statement adequately. Suffice it to refer to the close of the document signed by Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas in the Frankfurter Allgemeine on May 31, 2002. Derrida’s position on Kant is altogether more nuanced, as evidenced by his many writings on Kant throughout his career. 42. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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purposiveness without purpose. We know that Kant tells us that the aesthetic gives practice to the faculty that can represent without objective concepts. Then, ever the thinker of checks and balances, in the Third Critique, Kant straps in the tendency of the imagination to shoot too far by emphasizing the task not of reason but of understanding. In ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,’’ Kant implicitly, and to a large extent without acknowledgement, shifts the task of representation-without-concept—figuration—to the figuring of Grace as nearmetalepsis—unverifiable effect of an effect—to a parergon or outside-work of pure reason. It is not understanding that is now a check on the Imagination, as it was in the Third Critique. It is figuration that supplements mere reason’s calculative moral laziness. I apologize for the abstruseness of this last paragraph. Universalist multiculturalism would go down much better. But bear with me for just a few more pages. In support of my reading, I offer the fact that ‘‘Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason’’ is an extended allegorical or dis-figuring reading of the New Testament—a species of liberation theology. And I am now going to make a suggestion that I hope won’t rattle you. We will go back to suicide bombing. Liberation theology works because it literalizes the metaphorology of a religious culture. Suicide bombing works the same way. I am not equating the two, nor am I endorsing either. The only thing they share is bad gender politics. Over the past few years, I have been trying to imagine suicide bombing because I am convinced that to dismiss it as pathological, murderous, or aberrant is to speak from the positions I have already discussed. Have you ever heard Palestinian mothers lament the transformation of their sons and daughters to suicide bombers by the current situation? This is what I was speaking of at the outset when I said that the ever-accessible bilinguality between religion and culture as idiom becomes mobilized in situations. If liberation theology mobilizes by literalizing the metaphor, in the case of suicide bombing we see the recoding of religious narrative as referential in the narrowest sense. But training in the humanities does neither of these two moves— it teaches us to learn from the singular and the unverifiable. If the university is to be secular, it requires a sustained epistemic effort that can only come from the humanities. The idea that secularism can be supported by training in political science and law alone belongs to privative disciplinary formations, where the subject’s control is customarily left unquestioned. It
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is the humanities that can provide continuing practical instruction in detranscendentalizing the radically other—re-inventing grace as necessary metalepsis—a lesson learned by undoing the prophet of that earlier style.43 The humanities must learn to de-trivialize themselves and to stake their suitable place at the university of this troubled century. I am utterly appalled by conservative young colleagues who insist with amazing insularity on teaching ‘‘only literary skills’’—what are they?—because the students arrive untrained; as the world breaks around them. If we want to take up the challenges of the twenty-first century, we must also learn languages. The simplified reading I have offered of Kant would be impossible from even the best translations into English. And we must not look for the vicissitudes of the translation for the word ‘‘secular’’ as applied to states and societies in ‘‘the rest of the world.’’ No. The task is to find something like the ‘‘secular/transcendental’’ binary in the many languages of the world rather than offer abstruse translations of the English or the metropolitan words. Din aur dunya and jagatik o pamarthik are the two I work with as candidates for undoing: the two major religions of India. Indeed, I came up with the definition of religion as ritual markers of how we worship—ki korey thakur pujo kara hoy—as I was speaking to a rural woman in West Bengal on December 16, a barefoot teacher who was completely incapable of explaining the lesson on religion written in the elementary school textbook. I close as I began, exercising my institutional validation as a teacher of narrative. I open Baby No-Eyes, a novel by the Maori writer Patricia Grace.44 My friend and colleague Carolyn Sinavaiana helped me teach this book and gave an impressive account of the Maori worldview that acknowledged not the distinction between public and private but rather a circulatory commonness among all its members. I mention above Kant’s notion of the ethical common being and the oneness of reason. As I argued about Buchi 43. Derrida had warned in ‘‘Différance’’ that an effect without a cause would lead to a first cause. Kant’s near-metalepsis of grace still has God in the offing, although Kant is careful to bind this possibility in every way, one of the most important being the discussion of the hypothetical use of reason (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 590–604). Derrida’s argument would be that to locate the effect of grace in texts would not necessarily invoke a causeless cause (Derrida, ‘‘Différance,’’ in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982], 17). This, put another way, is the de-transcendentalization of the radically other, the causeless cause, the persistent effort of a training in the humanities. 44. Patricia Grace, Baby No-Eyes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 293.
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Emecheta’s rewriting of the Enlightenment some years ago, these characteristics of Kant’s thought allow it to be pliable outside its European provenance.45 But what it remained for me to point out was that the last chapter of the novel ended at a university where the newest Maori learns to ‘‘Try Opposite,’’ the most succinct lesson in the imagination moving away from identity as reference. If Toni Morrison’s Beloved is a novel about the shift from Africa to African-America, this novel is on the cusp from the move from Aotearoa to New Zealand. It is upon such historical changes that the persistent effort at keeping the university secular—by persistently de-transcendentalizing the radically other into a space of effect, persistent acknowledgement of religio/culture as idiom rather than ground of belief—is placed into the hands of the pedagogy and scholarship of the humanities.
45. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘‘Interview with Jane Gallop,’’ in Polemic: Critical or Uncritical, ed. Jane Gallop (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
Sayyid Qutb’s fiqh al-waqii, or New Realist Science
Ronald A.T. Judy
No reader of al-Adāla al-ijtimāīya fil-Islām (Social Justice in Islam) can help but remark the pronounced way in which Sayyid Qutb begins his earliest effort at elaborating the conceptual basis for an Islamist resistance to classical liberalism and its heirs with a near total disregard for the complex history of Islamic thought’s efforts to grapple with the question of divine immanence.1 It is true that there are far more recurrences of explicit reference to divinity (uluhīya) in the sixth and last edition, published in 1964, than in the preceding five, whose publication record runs from 1949 to 1958. Nonetheless, those later additions of the term merely make more explicit and emphatic what was already fully in play in the original 1949 edition, which is that uluhīya is immanent in every particular of existence. This attention to divinity is not, however, as a problematic of legitimate knowledge or 1. Sayyid Qutb, Al-Adāla al-ijtimāīya fil-Islām, 1st ed. (Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 1949). Henceforth, this work is referred to in the essay as Social Justice in Islam and cited parenthetically as SJ. All translations are my own and are based primarily on this edition, with the occasional inclusion of variations taken primarily from the sixth edition published in 1964 by Matbaāt Isa al-Babī al-Halabī wa-shurukauhu. boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Ronald A.T. Judy.
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authentic faith—that is, it is neither a topic of doctrinaire apologetics and systemic elaboration, as it was for ilm-ul-kalām (rational theology), nor a constellation of systematic contemplations on the workings of inner faith, as it was for Sufism. Instead, it is an aspect, albeit a key one, of a fundamental comprehensive concern with Islam as a historical system of life. In that concern, divinity is not a mystery commanding contemplation or a question fostering speculation; it is a doctrinal point of departure that enables the articulation of a complex system of thought and praxis. Divinity is the principal institution of the historical Islamic system (niẓām). This is why William Shepard discerns in the multiple editions of Social Justice in Islam published after 1949 an increased theocentrism that foregrounds the history of the doctrine of divine sovereignty while disregarding the history of speculation on the concept of divinity itself. Shepard offers this reading in support of a theory of development, by which account Qutb’s concept of divine sovereignty becomes increasingly radical in response to textual influence—particularly Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi’s Al-Muṣṭalahāt al-arbaa fil-Islām (The Four Key Terms in Islam)—and as a consequence of Qutb’s active involvement with the political movement al-Ikhwān-ul-Muslimūn just before the 1952 Egyptian revolution, which eventually led to his repeated prolonged imprisonment and torture by the Nasser regime and ultimately to his execution in 1966. Adhering to this theory, it is possible through textual analysis of the sequential editions of Social Justice in Islam to expose the way Qutb’s concept of theocentrism developed from being merely the point of departure for the elaboration of a theory of social justice in 1949 into a prominent theory of political power by 1964. Despite the care taken with this exposition, however, what Shepard’s reading draws attention to—in fact, what it succeeds in describing—is Qutb’s increasingly emphatic reiteration of theocentrism as the principal concept of a system of material political power. For example, in the 1949 edition, the second chapter, ‘‘Tabīya aladāla al-ijtimāīya fil-Islām’’ (‘‘The Nature of Social Justice in Islam’’) states: One begins the serious research of Islam by clearly understanding its general foundational conception about the totality of the universe, life and humanity before considering its views on government and finance, or the relations between nations and individuals, etc. Certainly, all of these derive from this totality concept and cannot be adequately understood without a profound and correct understanding of it. . . . Islam comprehends the nature of the relationship between the creator and creation, between humanity, the physical universe, and life,
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as well as the relationship between humanity and itself, between the individual and the collective and the entirety of human aggregates, and between generations of [humans]. All of this begins with a total concept whose outline is readily discernible in the processes of the [various] branches of knowledge and detailed expositions [of thought]. This is the philosophy of Islam. (SJ, 21–22) The first of these paragraphs is amended in the 1964 edition to read: ‘‘One begins the serious research of Islam by clearly understanding its general foundational conception about divinity, the totality of the universe, life, and humanity.’’ This additional reference to divinity still does not change the orientation of the research, which is to understand the historical institutions of Islam as a system that derives from a first principle; although it does spell out more explicitly that divinity is the principal aspect of this principle. The subsequent iterations in the sixth edition of the emphatic statement that divinity is the focus of the Islamic principle of total absolute unity of existence—for example, the text adds the terms rubūbīyah (divinity or divine lordship), manhaj rabbānī (divinely ordained methodology), niẓām ulIslām-ur-rabbānī (the divinely ordained system of Islam)—are in fact little more than an emphasis of what was already stated in the 1949 edition, where Qutb asserts, ‘‘As for the relationship between the Creator and creation (the physical universe, life, and humankind) it is latent in the force of the word; it is the immediate will from which the entirety of created things issue: ‘Verily, when He wills a thing, his command is ‘‘Be,’’ and it is.’ 2 Accordingly, there is no mediation between the Creator and the creature in force or substance. All existence emanates immediately from His perfect absolute will; and by His immediate perfect absolute will existence is sustained, ordered, and dynamic’’ (SJ, 23). Theocentrism was always the governing concept of Social Justice in Islam, from the first to the sixth edition, and it was always foregrounded as the principal concept of a system of material political power predicated on absolute universal divine sovereignty—tauḥīd-ul-hākimīya. The increasingly emphatic reiteration of this predication in the last three editions is what brings this early articulation of Qutb’s Islamist project in line with his mature ideology as expressed in Maalim fi aṭ-ṭarīq, in which he pronounces the generalized apostasy of all current Muslim states and their cooperative citizenry—a judgment known as takfir, which has been referenced by presentday Islamist movements such as Takfir wa Hijra, whose members assassi2. Quran, Sura Ya Sin: 82.
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nated President Anwar Sadat in 1980, and FIS, which engaged in a bloody campaign of insurgency against the whole of Algerian society in 1992 in order to legitimate campaigns of destructive violence against Muslim states and populations. There is something else, even more significant, that is elided in Shepard’s theory of development, and that is the way Qutb begins Social Justice in Islam by elaborating a genealogy of the historical institution of Christianity in Europe. The title of the first chapter, ‘‘Ad-Dīn wa al-mujtama bayn al-masiḥīya wa al-Islām’’ (‘‘Religion and Society, Between Christianity and Islam’’), provides a clear indication of the purpose of this genealogy, which is twofold. On the one hand, the purpose is to challenge the practice by modern Muslim states and society of adopting wholesale Western principles, systems, and legal structures—Qutb explicitly refers to Europe, America, and Russia as the particular sources of these—in order to solve their ‘‘corrupt social reality’’ (SJ, 5), while at the same time disregarding any of the solutions that might be available from the intellectual and spiritual heritage of Islam. In this wholesale procurement of either democratic, socialist, or communist principles, Islam is proclaimed as the official religion of state, but with the understanding that religion is a private affair that does not govern or otherwise effect the politics of government or general finance. Nor do any of these things have a place in religion. Qutb’s charge is not merely that this radical distinction between religion and politics, which is ‘‘foreign to the nature and history of Islam,’’ is adopted, but that it is adopted with total ignorance of its genealogy, of ‘‘its origins or beginnings, and without ever knowing its foundations or well-spring’’ (SJ, 6). Recalling the conceptual framework of the institutional history of Europe is merely a pretext, however, for what is the main purpose of Qutb’s genealogy, which is to deconstruct Western political philosophy’s distinction between state and religion with its postulate that religion is a wholly private matter, protected by law but also impervious to the law. What Qutb offers as a history of European Christianity turns out to be a historical criticism of European secularism. More precisely, the aim is to reveal that classical liberalism’s postulate of individual liberty has its ultimate origins in a misconception of Allah and the world that is the constitutive idea of Pauline Christianity. And that is the idea of personal salvation through the resurrected Christ. In Qutb’s analysis, Paul’s project of Christianity is recognized as superseding the divide between the Hellenic and Judaic world, between pagan cosmology and revealed law, with the idea of personal salvation through the resurrected Christ. The institutional expression of this is Paul’s
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concept of apostolic knowledge, which is fundamentally and irreducibly subjective and personal—the truth of resurrection as the Christ-event of redemption was revealed to Paul on the road to Damascus. The absolute subjectification of knowledge of truth as personal revelation logically and historically yields the concept eternal election and the distinction between divine will and the world, which is coincidental with the distinction between the law as basis of right society and the salvation of man’s immortal soul as an event of grace. This is the fatal error constitutive of European Christendom, according to which the sphere of faith, which belongs to religion, is impenetrable by the force of law, which belongs to sovereign worldly power, and the sphere of law is a potential contaminant to faith. The subsequent formation of Western Christendom as a domain constituted on the basis of two heterogeneous dominions—the secular dominion of Roman and feudal law, and the religious dominion of church canon law—establishes the pattern of social and political development in Western Europe that culminates in terms of a dialectical struggle between the secular and the religious, whose synthesis is the modern secular state, in which religion is restricted to the private realm of personal life and fancy. The summary history of European Christianity proffered in Social Justice in Islam pays scant attention to the Augustinian elaboration of eternal election into a history of the career of the two cities. Nor does it address in any explicit coherent way Calvin’s systemization of that election into a system of Reformation theological polity. Nevertheless, Qutb’s account recognizes that the conceptual principals of Europe’s secular modernity are indissolubly linked with its historical institutions of power and knowledge, particularly the juridico-theological. Registering the full significance of Bacon’s postulate that the realization of any organization of knowledge is contingent upon its having a determinate relation to power, Qutb understood that the establishment of scientific knowledge Bacon heralded attended to the formation of the modern imperialist European nation-state as an instrument of its power. His own effort to elaborate the conceptual framework for an Islamic resistance to that formation is predicated on the same Baconian postulate.3 Social Justice in Islam is merely the principal, and to a large 3. This lends some credence to Marshall Hodgson’s characterization of the modernist antiimperialist intellectual and political tendency emergent in Muslim countries after World War II, which he called ‘‘neo-Sharism,’’ as working on the premise that if, as Hodgson puts it, a ‘‘technicalistic mutation’’ had occurred within the precolonial Islamic society before it had in the West, then Sharīa would have evolved under its own momentum along similar lines as had modern European political and juridical thought without the moral corruption
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extent propaedeutic, text in that effort. The fuller elaboration occurred subsequently in the two-part work, Khaṣaiṣ at-taṣawwur al-Islāmī (Conditions of the Islamic Conception) and Muqawwimāt at-taṣawwur al-Islāmī (Components of the Islamic Conception).4 It is in Social Justice in Islam, however, that Qutb lays out the aims and scope of the project as well as its fundamental presuppositions. The stated aim is to arrive at an Islamic conception of the right or just society that is historical, both in the sense of being based on the known institutions of practice and thought, and in the sense of approaching those institutions in terms of their material record over time, rather than approaching them as manifestations of theological development. Hence the apparent disregard for the history of speculative knowledge of divinity. Qutb restricted his study of Islamic institutions to those material institutions of Muslim discourse that could verifiably be traced from Muslims’ primary engagement with revelation—that is, those discourses of interpreting and applying the meaning of the Quran in this world according to the documented practice of the Prophet Muhammad. From these sources, Qutb extrapolates the principal idea of Islam: Islam, which is mandated to organize the totality of human life, does not attend to the diverse aspects of that life blindly or randomly, nor does it treat them as fragments or parts. That is because it has a universal integrated concept of the physical universe, life, and humanity, from which all the divisions [of thought] and detailed expositions begin and return, and to which are linked all its theories, legislation, prohibitions, rituals of worship, and its social relations. All these things are founded on this universal integrated concept. Islam does
that plagues the latter. See Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 3, The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 385. 4. The first of these two works was published in 1962 and republished in an eighth edition by dar-ul-Shuruq in 1983 under the title Khaṣaiṣ at-taṣawwur al-Islāmī wa muqawwimātuhu (Conditions of the Islamic Conception and Its Components), which, in fact, contains only the first part. The second part, Muqawwimāt at-taṣawwur al-Islāmī, was completed in the last years of Qutb’s life and published posthumously. It should be borne in mind, however, that, in modern Arabic philosophical discourse, taṣawwur denotes concept in the Kantian sense. This philosophical meaning may very well remark the intervention Qutb makes in the discourse of modern epistemology, most pointedly his explicit effort to place the conceptual framework he articulates on a par with the Kantian edifice. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that this is a critical intervention that seeks to dispose of the philosophical tradition in elaborating an Islamic conceptual framework.
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not improvise an opinion for every given occasion, or treat every given problem as separate from the rest of the problems. (SJ, 28) This existence emanating from the immediate perfect absolutely comprehensive will is an integrated unity, a singularity each of whose particulars are in perfect symmetry: Islam is the religion of the unity between all the forces of the universe; it is unquestionably the religion of singular unity [tauḥīd ]: the singular unity of Allah, the singular unity of all religions in the religion of Allah, and the singular unity of The Messenger [Muhammad] in the evangelizing of this one religion since the dawn of life. . . . Islam is the religion of unity between worship and work, ideology or creed and behavior, spirituality and materiality, economic and symbolic value, the world and immortality, heaven and earth. (SJ, 28) Islam here is an abstraction, the force of which is formulated as the doctrinal creed of unity, on which is based all precepts, legislation, orientations, prohibitions, as well as political philosophy and political economy (SJ, 28). When Qutb says religion, or, better yet, dīn, he means a historical way of life that entails all these institutions and more like them, based on a coherent, clear doctrinal answer to the question, What is the meaning of it all? The answer to which is that there is one, unified integral event and consciousness underlying all particular appearances and expressions. The way to truth that is life is to bind oneself perpetually to that unity, accounting for the multitude of divergent expressions and institutions as moments of development in accord with the purposefulness of the singular unity. A familiar name for this in modernity is providence. Qutb calls it the absolute harmonizing unity of divine singularity—tauḥīd. The human endeavor to discover and understand the laws of the physical universe flounders if it loses sight of this unity, resulting in fragmentary and momentary understandings of reality that cannot provide the basis for a universal and sustainable social justice. Attaining that basis requires a new realist science—fiqh al-waqii—whose foundations are the Quran and Ḥadīth. Three fundamentals of this science form the conceptual basis for Islamic social justice. The first of these fundamentals is at-taḥrir al-wajdānī—literally translated as ‘‘affective or emotional liberty,’’ and translated by Shepard as ‘‘liberation of the inward soul,’’ but arguably better rendered in English as ‘‘liberty of conscious.’’ 5 The second 5. A full and proper elaboration of the reasons for this preferred English-language translation are beyond the scope of this current essay. All that will be remarked here in explanation
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fundamental is al-musāwa al-insānīya al-kāmila (complete human equality). The third is at-takāfil al-ijtamāī (secure social solidarity). Once the first fundamental is grasped, the other two fall into place (SJ, 34). The realization of complete social justice (adāla ijtimāīya kāmila) is not attainable, nor is its sustained implementation assured, without relying on an inherent human feeling that any particular individual has a right to justice and that society needs justice. This feeling (shuūr ) is motive; it is an affective state that finds expression in the doctrinal principle (aqīda) that social justice leads to the highest human objective. That same principle becomes identified with the individual’s desire to achieve the best material condition so that he will take up the security and defense of social justice as a necessity. Such an identification of social justice with individual desire cannot be achieved through law before it is achieved in affect, and for that to happen there must be established the material conditions that foster such identification (SJ, 35). Liberty of conscious does not result from radically rejecting or even transcending material reality. Qutb’s remarks in this regard are rather pertinent to discerning just how he thrusts his criticism of secularism: For the life drives [dawāfia al-ḥayā] cannot be suppressed in every instance, and the material necessities of life cannot be eternally conquered. Of necessity, humanity yields to the pressures of these drives most of the time. Indeed, the perpetual suppression of life’s drives is not good, because Allah has created life, and he has not done so in vain, nor has he created life for humans to neglect or hinder its development. Undoubtedly, it is good for humanity to exceed its physical necessities and transcend its desire, but not to disregard life in the process. The soundest and safest way is to unleash the constitutive potentiality of human nature so that humanity can supersede the humiliating submission to its physical necessities. This is the aim of Islam when it unites the physical necessities and the passions of the spirit into a system, securing the absolute individual liberty with inherent feeling and practical possibility, neglecting neither. (SJ, 35) Islam begins with the liberation of individual human consciousness from servitude to anything other than Allah, and from submission to anyis that there are obvious structural parallels between Qutb’s three fundamentals of Islamic social justice and Oliver Cromwell’s four fundamentals of English constitutional government, which Cromwell proffered in argument for the institution of the commonwealth.
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thing other than Allah. There is no ruler over the liberated individual other than Allah, nor is there anything that kills or sustains human life other than Allah. Consciousness of the absolute unity of Allah brings about the recognition that there is no true sovereignty besides that of Allah, and it is this recognition that brings about a profound sense of freedom. Absolute liberty of conscious is attained, then, in freedom from fear of anything other than Allah. Qutb is insistent that this means freedom from fear of death at the hands of other humans, or homicide. It is not that the absolutely freed individual thinks homicide is unlikely or not a prevalent danger but rather that the significance of individual death is measured against the immortality of the soul. Liberty of conscious forms the basis for the social contract because each individual’s becoming fully aware of his absolute equality with every other human being, in accord with divine ordinance, fosters a strong sense of solidarity and cooperation. This concept of liberty of conscious seems to be in direct contradiction to Hobbes’s fundamental postulate that fear of homicide forms the basis for the social contract. Hobbes is a significant figure in Qutb’s criticism of classical liberalism. After all, he is credited with laying the foundations of modern political science, or civil philosophy, with De cive and Leviathan.6 In large measure, critical engagement with Hobbes’s theory of the social contract is the point of departure for Qutb’s elaboration of modern Islamic political theory. A more lucid understanding of the conceptual orientation of that theory is achieved when it is read in relation to Hobbes’s exposition of human nature, most pointedly his elaboration of the ‘‘two most certain postulates of human nature.’’ This is not to suggest that Qutb is a Hobbesian, however. Although it is significant that he does accede to the Hobbesian postulate that the principal condition of humanity is motive. The life drives Qutb refers to entail both desires for and aversions to things, both of which are motives. Affect—or the passions in Hobbes’s language—does not issue from the will; it is the will.7 6. Thomas Hobbes, De cive, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1990); Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Henceforth, these works are cited parenthetically as DC and L, respectively. The first of these books Hobbes himself claimed to be the beginning of civil philosophy. Leviathan is generally regarded as marking the beginning of modern political science as a branch of knowledge that is coincident with the modern natural sciences as defined in the work of Bacon and Galileo—the latter of whose resolutive-composition method Hobbes applies in elaborating his study of power—but is fundamentally independent of it. 7. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law, Natural and Political, trans. G. A. J. Rogers (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1994), 69. Henceforth, this work is cited parenthetically as E.
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The first of Hobbes’s postulates concerning human nature is natural appetite. His conclusion that the natural condition of man as the war of everyone against everyone stems from his psychology, according to which human appetite, while originating in momentary sense impressions as it does with animals, in contrast to that of animals, extends beyond the momentary desire. The traditional Aristotelian distinction between the zoological and biological is the conceptual framework; accordingly, the principal distinction between animal and human is the latter’s possession of reason. Animal desire is absolutely bound to the moment—it is, in reality, no more than an immediate reaction to external impressions—so that the animal desires only finite objects. It is always hungry now. The human can imagine moments that are not immediate, those of a past and future hunger. Human desire is, through reason, spontaneously infinite; it is infinite because it is an endless striving for absolute satisfaction that is not limited by immediate percepts. This is not an increasing desire in proportion to, or in response to, the necessities of survival, or even the want to enhance the conditions of living. It is a spontaneous desire for infinite dominion over everything imaginable. And the imagination generates the sense of sequential event, or time. It is the human capacity to imagine the constancy of change that transforms the animal desire, common to the entire zoological world, to which Homo sapiens belong, into a spontaneous infinite and absolute desire for everything. The desire for absolute dominion over everything is coincidental with human being so that it is without reason—in other words, irrational. Because this irrational striving after everything does not stem from necessity—that is, it is not a function of perception and zoological necessity—it springs from a primal pleasure that humans derive from imagining their own infinite power, the congenital pleasure each human takes in triumphing, at least in imagination, over all others. Hobbes calls this primal pleasure vanity, which he postulates is the origin of human appetite. Desires, for Qutb, are never wholly, or even primarily, physiological. Nor are they functions of an anthropomorphic psychopathology in which imagination is the driving force. Humanity, whether considered as a species or with particular focus on the individual, is an integrated unity—that is, its apparent differentiations are, in fact, all functions of a single orientation (muwaḥḥda al-ittijāh). In this respect, it is in accord with the singular unity of the universe. Ignorance of this singular unity is the basis for distinguishing between the material and the spiritual aspects of humanity—that is, between the psychological and the physiological. Both human percepts and concepts are functions of the same singular law, in the sense that they
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are mutually harmonious aspects of it, as well as function according to it in their own particular ways. The foundational Islamic principle, according to Qutb, is that there is one substance in the universe, and all particulars are expressions of it. Unity of the universe and the individual is a function of the state of nature. Nature is not divinity but the creation of divinity (SJ, 24–26). This is in contrast to the Christian doctrine as instituted by the church councils—specifically those of Nicaea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon—according to which the distinction between ouisa (substantia: essence or nature) and hypostasis (persona: entity) established that the physical and the spiritual are perpetually at odds. This doctrine determined the historical circumstance in Europe, prompting the necessity for the scientific explanation of natural appetite arising from perception and forming the basis for imagination’s concepts. Hobbes’s postulate that the infinite capacity of imagination for abstraction is what drives natural appetite to such an extreme that the war of everyone against everyone (al-maaraka qāma bayn hadihī al-quwwa wa tilka) is humanity’s natural condition is the result of the historical institution of Pauline Christianity. As a distinct historical institution, Islam has no such necessity. Its principal thought is the universal law of hypersymmetry, which is what drives both natural appetite and imagination: ‘‘The universe is a singular unity which is a complex of perceivable phenomena and what is beyond perception and unknowable. So too, life is a complex of material and immaterial forces that is not reducible to one or the other unless there is an imbalance of these forces. Humanity is also a complex unity of spiritual desires aspiring to the heavens, and physical inclinations adhering to the earth’’ (SJ, 26–27). Because humanity is constitutively like the universe, essentially a singular force with numerous aspects that are ultimately articulations of the ‘‘infinite and eternal force’’ that created and sustains the universe, the transient individual, as Qutb puts it, possesses the means to connect with this eternal force as something immanent in his life. Just as the original principle of the universe is the hypersymmetry of all its particular aspects, the proper state of human consciousness is to be in conscious harmony with the universe. This harmony is, Qutb asserts, ‘‘the unity between the particular aspects of the universe and its force, the unity between every aspect of life, and the unity between humanity and itself, between its reality and dreams. It is the unity that assures perpetual peace between the universe and life, life and living creatures, between the aggregate and the individual, between the individual’s desires and inclinations, and, in the end, between the world and religion, between heaven and earth’’ (SJ, 28).
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Postulating that the proper state of human consciousness is peace of mind achieved through recognizing its being in harmonious unity with the universe emanating immediately from the unique force of creation, Allah, gives Qutb the warrant to remove the psychological question about the origin of human nature from the field of Islamic contemplation. More precisely, he preempts the question of how humans know the laws of nature with the answer: by Allah’s will. And it is an answer that is accessible only through direct guidance in revelation, not through the exercise or disciplining of unaided reason. In dismissing reason as incapable of achieving true understanding of natural law, Qutb contradicts the second of Hobbes’s most certain postulates concerning human nature: natural reason. This postulate is formulated as the principle of the avoidance of death, on the logical assumption that the continuance of life is the requisite condition for the satisfaction of any appetite. According to Hobbes, the continuance of life is the primary good, because only in life is the unhindered continual pleasure of prospering, of having everything, possible. The possibility of having everything, that is, of pursuing everything, is happiness. Happiness is the greatest good, in a radically accumulative sense. Because Hobbes denies the immortality of the soul—the only eternity natural man can imagine is the eternity of prosperity—there is no supreme good, in precisely the sense that Qutb means liberty of conscious as a transcendent state of mind. There is only the greatest good of perpetual accumulation. Death, however, is the primary and supreme evil, because only death can end life and so negate all good. It is important to recall here that, according to Hobbes’s theory of human nature, liberty as the unhindered power of each man to do as he will for selfpreservation is a right of nature. In the natural human condition, because every man is equal in his power of self-preservation, in his liberty, every man has a right to everything, even to another’s body. Hence, the war of every man against every man is the natural condition of humanity in its natural rights. Whereas natural rights find expression in the motive animal aspect of human nature, the cognitive aspect of humanity, reason, gives expression to the laws of nature. A law of nature is a precept or general rule, discovered by reason, according to which a man is prohibited from doing that which is destructive to his life, or is enjoined to do that which will best preserve his life. Right is the liberty to do; law is the binding determination and restriction of that liberty. On their own, the affective natural rights foster the condition of insecurity and permanent anarchic war between all men, which threatens the
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destruction of all men. This threat of destruction is recognized by reason as ‘‘that danger from the equality between men’s forces’’ (E, 92) and compels reason to formulate the principal law of nature, which is to seek peace as far as possible, but to resort to war when peace cannot be achieved directly. The second law follows from this and stipulates that every man be willing to seek peace, as long as others are, too, and in peace find selfdefense by giving up his right to everything, as others do theirs, agreeing to the mutual and equal limiting of liberty (L, 92). It is fear of homicide—which is an affective state—that compels humanity to reason, which formulates laws in response. The security of life stipulated in the natural laws cannot be achieved unilaterally by the individual human unless all other humans agree to surrender their equal right to everything; and given the force of natural rights, such an agreement cannot be enforced unless there is a greater agent than that of any individual, one that is constitutively the sum of the collective human agency. The solution is the institution of the sovereign as that entity constituted with the natural rights surrendered in equal proportion by individual men, which exercises the unique authority of that agency in order to secure every man’s liberty in safety. These principles of natural law signal Hobbes’s overcoming a fundamental distinction of political philosophy since Aristotle, that between the natural and artificial state. In overcoming it, Hobbes establishes the distinctive break between his and traditional political philosophy, and so achieves the foundations of modern political science. In Aristotle’s Politics, patrimonial monarchy is the natural state formation, arising from the exercise of superior might, and democracy the artificial or institutional formation, arising from the exercise of reasoned choice. The key distinction is in motive. Fear forms the basis of monarchy; and hope, democracy. Although Hobbes, in the Elements and even in De cive, adheres to this traditional distinction, arguing for the principality of monarchy over democracy in nature if not in legitimacy, by Leviathan, he overcomes it through the reduction of the two motive forces to the one principal force of homicidal fear. With this, he successfully abandons the traditional Aristotelian concept of natural monarchy versus institutional democracy by revealing that all institutional, qua artificial, state formations are ultimately based on the same motive force as the natural state. The institution of the sovereign as the solution to homicidal fear is a function of natural law that, at its base, is the reasoned response to the fact of nature. Both fear and reasoned response are constitutive forces of human nature. Fear is constantly externalized in the natural state of absolute liberty. Reason is an internal potential that can be externalized only after
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establishment of the security that occurs with the institution of sovereignty. Through discovering that the motive of hope is based in fear, Hobbes demonstrates that what was traditionally understood to be the basis of the natural state—patrimonial monarchy—is also the basis of the institutional state. The natural fact of power is thus identified with the consensual legal institution of power, so that the natural legal institution of power is that of monarchy. Institutional monarchy is the realization of the laws of nature, providing the requisite security for their externalization as the framework for society. The very natural law that institutional monarchy realizes has its foundation in the intelligence of God. This is the explicit argument of Elements, which states that ‘‘forasmuch as law, to speak properly, is a command, and these dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands, they are not therefore called laws, in respect of nature, but in respect of the author of nature, God Almighty’’ (E, 109). It would seem, then, that Hobbes and Qutb are in agreement, if the following passage from Social Justice in Islam is read in tandem with this argument from Elements: When the [human] conscious is liberated from the feeling of servitude to and sanctification of any of Allah’s creatures, and is full of the feeling that it is in immediate contact with Allah, then it is not effected by fear for its life, or property, or reputation. These are ugly fears, suppressing an individual’s sense of himself, which may induce him to accept humiliation and to surrender much of his nobility and many of his rights. Islam, on the contrary, fosters an adamant desire in people for honor and nobility, as well as a sense of pride in truth and the preservation of justice. By these means—as well as by legislation [ilāwa alā at-tashrīa]—it ensures absolute social justice, neglecting no one. All of which means it takes special care to resist fear for life, property, and reputation; for life is in Allah’s hands and no creature has the power to shorten it by one hour or less. Indeed no creature has the power to shorten it by even a single breath. . . . In this way we must understand the Quran’s precepts [taujīh] and the general orientation of Islam; this is the true understanding corresponding to its general methodology (idea and philosophy) regarding precepts and law. (SJ, 39) Although Hobbes does offer scriptural evidence in support of the assertion that the institution of monarchy is in accord with divine law, this appeal to Scripture does not signal any theocentrism on his part. Instead,
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it is symptomatic of a criticism of Christianity that is quite similar to Qutb’s but, unlike Qutb’s criticism, extends to revealed religion in general. Hobbes’s point in Elements is not to subordinate reason’s natural law to revelation but to establish that reason is in accord with revelation: ‘‘Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against the law divine: for God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be a light unto him. And I hope it is no impiety to think, that God almighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of judgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here, notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalist now a-days, to rational and moral conversation’’ (E, 116). Conversation between natural reason and divine law implies an argument for natural theology, that there is a natural knowledge of God as the Principal Cause. Yet, regarding natural knowledge of God unaided by revelation, Hobbes argues in De cive: ‘‘It is therefore almost impossible for men, without the special assistance of God, to avoid both rocks of atheism and superstition’’ (DC, 310). Revelation shores up natural reason’s knowledge of God by providing a historical record of the covenant between man and God, Scripture, that underwrites the conversation between divine and natural law. The danger in natural theology is that it formulates ‘‘an opinion of right reason without fear,’’ which means that there is no necessity or compulsion to adhere to the laws of natural reason, except the expediency of circumstance, which tends toward being mutable. Such expedients are precepts or rules ‘‘by which a man is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever’’ (L, 356). Without any coercive force that compels one to obey them under fear of immanent penalty, such rules are not law. Law proper has the force of the civil sovereign to compel compliance. Here is where Qutb and Hobbes part ways sharply. On the Hobbesian side of things, if Scripture offers evidence that the laws of natural reason are in accord with divine law in order to support the postulate that institutional monarchy is the only naturally legitimate formation of state power, the question is, What is the power to make the Scriptures Law? Hobbes’s well-known final answer to this question is the civil sovereign. Moses is the exemplary case where God’s law and civil authority coincide, because Moses was the sovereign of the commonwealth of Israel. It was his sovereign power that instituted the commandments as law, so that the Books of Moses are received as law proper. The Gospels of the apostles, in contrast, are canonical—that is, they are rules of guidance, precepts— but they can have the force of law only if a civil sovereign says they do. The distinction Hobbes draws between the Old Testament as law and the New
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Testament as canon turns on the fact that Israel was a worldly monarchal commonwealth, while Jesus Christ’s Kingdom of God is not of this world, in which case any interpretation of the Christian Scriptures can acquire the force of law only by being sanctioned by the civil sovereign. And, insofar as such interpretation is a function of the teachings of any given church, whether Episcopal, Independent, or Congregational, its power in law issues from the civil sovereign authority. The teachers teach the gospel of salvation in Jesus Christ at the sufferance of the earthly monarch. Religion is subordinated to the state in a manner that, Hobbes hopes, will dispel the disruptive tendencies of confessional dispute, and so overcome the doctrinal error Qutb discovers plagues European Christianity. What is most pertinent to our concerns here is that Hobbes reads the Scriptures in a manner that subordinates the interpretive force of reading to civil authority. Salvation may indeed come from Jesus Christ, but belief in that salvation is an act of confession mandated by the sovereign. In other words, the force of interpretation is the will of the sovereign, who has the only legitimate power to determine the material circumstances of any methodology of interpretation. Hobbes’s methodology is historical and materialist, which is why certain scholars of Hobbes have read it as a form of Bible criticism in complement with Spinoza’s. The appeal to Scripture, rather than sustaining a theological principle of power, occasions a historical analysis of power. The focal point in that analysis is the distinction between precept as a rule and law as a force of domination. Bacon had already discerned that scholasticism’s chief weakness was ignorance of history. His primary concern was with the authority of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In that same vein, Thomas Blundeville remarked about Aristotelian moral philosophy that because it consisted only of general precepts and rules, it offered no concrete examples of the fact, or human experience, of power. Such examples, Blundeville argued, could not be arrived at through philosophical teaching, but only through what ‘‘the historiographers doe teach.’’ Hobbes’s distinction between precept and law is an expression of the distinction between political philosophy and political science. The method of the one is careful elaboration of the conceptual structures of thought about the just society, based on dogmatic principles. The method of the other is contemplation of the material history, the human experience, of power, based on historiographical evidence. What Hobbes offers as a psychological anthropology of human nature is an elaboration of the Epicurean account of primitive, oversexed humans without religion, language, or law, who inhabited solitary caves in the primeval forest, subsisting on nuts, berries,
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and crudely slaughtered animal flesh. The expressed natural theology of that anthropology implied a historical criticism of revealed religion. It is not revealed religion but history that aids natural reason in realizing its precepts as civil law. Scripture is read as a document of evidence in an incipient materialist history of civilization as the natural institution of power. In this way, the doctrine-driven wars of religion spawned by the Reformation are recognized as instances in the war of every man against every man. This is the main thrust of Hobbes’s beginning political science. There have been those readers of Hobbes, like Michel Foucault, who recognize in his postulate of the war of every man against every man a conceit meant to obfuscate rather than depict the historical circumstances of societal and state formation. For Foucault in particular, there are two targets of Hobbes’s obfuscation. One is the very real and, for Hobbes, rather immediate, material conditions of the English Civil War, with its scandal of regicide. The other is the conceptual framework that, in some measure, enabled the war by legitimating Puritan claims that reason was their law. This latter target Foucault refers to as what he calls the historiography of race war articulated in the English chroniclers’ account of the fact and continuity of Anglo-Saxon law before and after the Norman Conquest, but most elaborately formulated in the work of Henri de Boulainvilliers. This work, Foucault effectively argues, recognizes society to be constituted in war and a form of war, rather than as a solution to it. In such a reading, Hobbes’s absolute sovereign as the anthropomorphic personification of collective human agency is not the best and only true means of preempting absolute anarchy and social destruction. Instead, this concept of the sovereign is revealed to be a figure through which Hobbes disqualifies from consideration, if not contemplation, the violence constitutive of society by placing voluntaristic choice as the constitutional act of commonwealth. The whole point of the homicidal fear postulate is to make choice necessary as the prerequisite of sovereign legitimacy—no matter the particular institutional form the anthropomorphic abstraction achieves, whether monarchy (the most natural form), aristocracy, or the constitutional parliamentary state, it is founded in the willful choice of all its human elements to live under the sovereign power rather than die at human hands. For Hobbes, this is universally so, even in the case of conquest, for it is not the moment of defeat on the battlefield that constitutes the commonwealth but the moment of surrender to the conqueror as sovereign rather than being killed by him. If it can be successfully established as axiomatic in the historiography of legitimate power that society is constituted in the moment of willful surrender in
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and under the law, and not that of violence, then all other variant historiographies of power are disqualified as illegitimate. The underlying contractual nature of every instance of legitimate sovereignty makes any assault on the sovereign ultimately a violation of natural law. Hobbes’s war of every man against every man appears to be, then, a war without any dead bodies, to put it crassly. It establishes not fear as the basis from which society is formed but choice, a choice that is based itself on an abstract fear—that of vanitydriven homicide, which is abstract precisely because, in Hobbes’s account, it is purely psychopathic without any discernible sociological elements. It is as if, and Hobbes very nearly states this to be so, in nature everyone exists principally in a state of solipsistic imagination, where the congenital pleasure of absolute dominion over everything is fulfilled. This natural state of solipsism—which for Hobbes is an illusion of perspective—is disrupted only by the equally imagination-driven fear of homicide. In order to deracinate the historical circumstances of the commonwealth’s establishment as an act of war, Hobbes posits psychotic phobia as the foundation of society. Fear of homicide is the only factual basis for humans achieving immediate consciousness of self as distinct from the external world of danger, so that it is in homicidal fear that all outward virtuous activity begins. Qutb was not the historiographer Hobbes was. He invests no effort at all in elaborating a theory of the origins of civilization, or the nature of pre-Adamite humanity. Whether civilization was begun by brute beast or erudite thinkers is simply not a problem that concerned Qutb. Nonetheless, he shared with Hobbes one of the fundamental presumptions of modern historiography that distinguishes it from the historiography of the classical Mediterranean world and Christian Europe. Qutb understood humans to be peculiarly historical beings, subject to forces of change that transcend any individual, national, or racial drive, to repeat in a different context what was stated earlier about his understanding of life drives. He need not have learned this from Hobbes, however. Ibn Khaldun postulated the same some three hundred years before the publication of either De cive or Leviathan in Al-Muqaddima, the introduction to his history of civilization, Kitāb ul-ibar. Indeed, Qutb’s realist science owes a good deal to Khaldun’s ilm-ulumrān (science of civilization). The etymology of the term umrān indicates that the subject of this science is not civilization in the sense of civitas— juridical and legislative order—but temporal duration in relation to human being. The root is amara (to live long, prosper, and endure). This gives umr and amār (duration of life, lifetime). It also gives imāra (architectural structure), which is why umrān is generally translated as ‘‘human civilization,’’
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in the sense of material culture as a sign of development. Ibn Khaldun’s project was an attempt to temporize social constitution as an event of duration in order to understand the historicality of human being. Undoubtedly, this entails a specific concept of change. In fact, theorizing change was the key innovation of his science. Hence, the question of history is theoretical for Ibn Khaldun. This is a question of how one thinks about the force or power expressed with social change. In Khaldunian historiography, power is understood epistemologically, and the subject of epistemology is the condition of human being—this is evident in the organization of both Kitāb ul-ibar and its more well-known introduction (Al-Muqaddima). Much more attention needs to be paid to what is invested in the term umrān, as a conceptual category, than can be given here. That attention will lead to a fruitful comparative analysis of Marxist, neoliberal, and Khaldunian historiographies. This, in turn, will lead to a closer examination of the question of ideology, which, like change, is a crucial category for Ibn Khaldun. Indeed, the relationship of knowledge, and its organization, to societal structure is the focus of his work. What is pertinent to our concerns with Qutb is the way the Khaldunian concept of historical time relates to revelation as an institution of Islam. If al-Islām—and this we should carefully translate as ‘‘the time of Islam’’—is the conclusion of all knowledge and the completion of all things, then this means that nothing can occur in the future that is not foreseen by it. The time of Islam, of course, is identical with zaman-al-wahī, ‘‘the time of revelation.’’ They are the same time. Revelation, then, is the eternal present. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between two temporalities: the time of revelation, and historical time, the emergent—that is, transient time. In other words, there is an eternal essence behind every transient event; and that eternity is the eternal present. There is no return to a place reserved for the future, because there is only the present that is always arriving. So that the guaranteed praxis is revelation, it is to live in the present of revelation, that is, the future. The temporality of revelation is contrary to the Greek temporality of Chronos, which brings things into being and annihilates that which it brings into being. In contrast, the temporality of revelation is transcendent to the activity of creation and annihilation, the activity of change and transience. The temporality of revelation is what it is from its emergence to eternity. In other words, revelation is not known in time; on the contrary, time is known through it. Even more precisely, revelation is the agency of time; time is not the agency of revelation. This means that religious thought (al-fikra ad-dīnīya) is transcendent to time, that is, history. Historical evolution is transient marginalia; it has no value in itself. Value
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is exclusively with revelation—the thinking that transcends history and its developments. There is, in other words, a sense of continuity against which transitory events (waqiat ) occur, and this is the eternity that is the now. Just because occurrences are in time does not mean that they have time. Rather, they are encountered as events that pass through a permanent present, so that every encounter of every event is in a now that is carried on to another now in a determined sequence. The events of history can be explained as a sequence that is on a curve, moving back to its beginning. Still, the direction of the sequence is irreversible; it moves in one direction forward, back to its beginning. Within the domain of revelation, every now is just like every other, and every event moves toward the same inevitable end. The homogenization and irreversibility of now is a pronounced characteristic of zaman al-wahī. What this achieves is the assimilation of time to space, precisely because all dynamic change is expressed into a permanent present. Time is mathematized, or as Aristotle maintains in Physics (bk. IV, pt. 11, 219b), time is the calculable measure of dynamic change, αριθμος κινησεως. Arguably, zaman al-wahī is the reduction of time to arithmetic sequence change. Eternity is conceived of as a domain that is comprehensive in totality. This comprehensiveness is expressed in historical time through revelation (alwahī ). That is to say that zaman al-wahī, expressed as the Islamic state, is the repetition of eternity in space. It is with all this in mind that Ibn Khaldun’s account of change can be read as duration. Again, a closer look at ilmul-umrān discovers an attempt to come to an understanding of the human through a careful consideration of the possible modes of being known to Ibn Khaldun. Precisely in this sense, his concept of human is historiographical and not derivative of an ideal type abstracted out of a specific ideology (asabīya), which is why ideology is always a problematic category for him. It is a function of power; remember, authenticity equals asabīya in Ibn Khaldun’s analysis. In the same fashion, for Qutb, authenticity equals the proper Islamic ideology. Still, the notion of humans as historical beings is why Qutb’s history of Islam focuses on institutions and economic and social formations rather than intellectual treatises and narrative disputation about authentic lines of transmission. In this aspect, his historiography is one of the institutions of authority as well as power. The proper history of authority and power does not begin, as Hobbes conjectured, with human nature, however. It begins with the origin of human nature, knowledge of which is achieved exclusively through contemplating the signs of divine revelation. The social contract does not emerge out of homicidal fear. Its basis is the liberty of
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conscious, or the Islamic spirit, as Qutb also calls it, achieved in individual submission to Allah through reading qua contemplation of the signs of divine revelation. Once the Islamic spirit is awoken, it is subject to the supervision of Allah’s force, and not the force or power of the state as instituted in its legislation. Sharīa does not cause or even sustain consciousness; it is symptomatic of it. Sharīa is a legislative institution whose sovereign power is Allah. This sovereignty cannot be personified, precisely because it is not the issue of human agency or desire. Humans do not institute sovereignty through their willful or coerced surrendering of their agency to an anthropomorphic abstraction, whether the monarch or the constitutional state. Nor is Allah’s sovereignty delegated to any mortal person. There is no High Priest like Moses in Islam, so that Hobbes’s argument for the conjunction of divine law and natural reason in the person of the civil sovereign does not carry. Here Qutb is careful to quote the Quranic statements about the limitations of Muhammad’s authority as a human: ‘‘It is said of Muhammad (SAW): ‘Muhammad is nothing but a messenger; messengers have been created before him. If he were to die or be killed will you turn back on your heels.’ 8 And it addresses the Prophet directly with forceful candor: ‘Not for you [but for Allah] is the decision: Whether he turn in mercy to them or punish them’’’ 9 (SJ, 37). The legitimate civil authority, whether Muhammad or, after him, the Caliph, rules only in accordance with divine ordinance, with the mandate to institute the societal conditions under which the possibilities for contemplating the signs of Allah’s absolute immanence, and so achieving liberty, are preserved and guaranteed. Any system of human knowledge and social organization that rejects the truth of Allah’s immediate and eminent guidance of the universe, or otherwise preempts the possibility of engaging that truth, is the very definition of ignorance, jahīlīya, according to Qutb. To imagine, then, that humanity exists in a state of nature in which it is free in concept and action from the truth of divine unity is the purest form of jāhilīya. So, too, are any and all formations of power, including Muslim, that deviate from the truth of Allah’s sovereignty. Qutb’s postulate of Allah’s sovereignty is the conceptual foundation for a historiography of power that is oppositional to what he called the fable of liberalism’s society in security. The extent to which this fable informs not only the Muslim misconception of liberalism’s danger to its way of life but 8. Quran, Sura Al Imran: 144. 9. Quran, Sura Al Imran: 128.
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also the self-delusion of liberal society Qutb described in a series of correspondences written immediately after completing Social Justice in Islam while residing in the United States from 1949 to 1952. These letters were subsequently collected and published under the title Amrīkā allatī raaytu: fi mīzān al-qīm al-insānīya (The America I’ve Seen: In the Measure of Human Value). In them, Qutb struggles to think about the significance of America as the exemplary instance of the most advanced and positive political and social realization of classical liberalism. Referencing Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land, he observes that violent struggle is the American’s first nature: The nature of the American population is competitive struggle, whether that of class, factionalism, or the struggle between nations and ethnicities. I have no idea on what basis the world, especially the Orient, has come to accept the fable of the peace-loving American people. In fact, in his constitutive nature, the American is warring, a lover of violent struggle. The thought of war and struggle is predominant in their blood and expressed in their behavior. This is in accord with their history. The first wave of [Europeans] arrived in America with the explicit aim of colonial domination, competition, and struggle. Accordingly, they murdered each other in large numbers and waves, then they murdered nearly all the original inhabitants (the American Indian), and are still waging a war of annihilation against them up to this very moment. The Anglo-Saxons murdered the Latins [Hispanics] and expelled them to Central and South America. The American colonials, under the leadership of George Washington, waged a war against their own nation, the English, until they achieved independence from the British Crown.10 This state of constant war is not a function of human nature. It is an aspect of America’s historical formation as a state predicated on classical liberalism’s concept of absolute liberty. No matter that Locke’s solution of institutional democratic sovereignty is the immediate point of reference in the founding war, that war was conceivable on the basis of the Hobbesian concept of natural rights. The theory of security under sovereignty, which Qutb calls a fable, is an instrument of American power deployed in the continual war that is American society. Qutb recognizes that the personification 10. Sayyid Qutb, Amrīkā allatī raaytu: fi mīzān al-qīm al-insānīya, in Amrīka min ad-dakhil bi-minẓār Sayyid Qutb, ed. Salah Abd al-Fattah al-Khalidi, 2nd ed. (Jiddah, al-Saudiyah: Dar al-Manara; al-Mansura, Misr: Dar al-Wafa, 1986), 104.
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of this instrument is the normative white man, the subject of law. He calls this the greatest enemy to humanity, because the progressive dissemination of this subject—a dissemination he understood to be a chief function of the universal rule of law then being promulgated by the United States in the new institutions of Bretton Woods and the United Nations—meant that the American war was planetary in its scope, putting all other ways of being human at risk of annihilation. Both the fact of constant war and the fable of peace under institutional democratic sovereignty rest on the same conceptual error of absolute human liberty, whose ultimate origin is the constitutive idea of Pauline Christianity. It is not so much that Qutb misconstrued the deployment of modern historiography in antithesis to Scripture as simply another form of Christianity. Rather, he understood the thesis to provide the historical circumstances for which the antithesis became necessary. The Pauline doctrine of salvation through Christ in the kingdom that is not of this world, incorporated into the juridical structures of Imperial Rome, is what called for the secular solution. The fact that the doctrine is in fundamental error about the nature of the universe and life, and that the secular solution responds only in terms of that error—producing the sort of perpetual warfare characteristic of American society—is what places it within the scope of the doctrine. In other words, classical liberalism’s concept of individual liberty results not from the abandonment of knowledge of the universe as immediately emanating from divine will—nature as the signification of Allah’s will—for the subject of knowledge, but from this constitutional idea of European Christianity, which misconstrues God’s immanence as a matter of personal faith rather than an objective fact. There is ample basis in text for this reading of Qutb’s having attempted an Islamic materialist historiography of power, analogous to Hobbes in its understanding that the evidence of the true nature of power— and through it the proper conditions for the just society—is discernible in the material history of human institutions, but opposed to Hobbes in its conceptual orientation. The fundamental difference between Qutb and Hobbes is their respective historical examples of legitimate power. Hobbes draws his from what he supposes to be the full breadth of human experience, Scripture being one historical institution of this. Qutb draws his exclusively from the history of Islam, the Quran being the divine beginning of this. Yet, a discernible conflict is apparent between Qutb’s piety as a true believer (mumin) and the eminently secular orientation of his historiography. Meditating on the Islamic just society based on the fundamental con-
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cept of divine singularity as the only legitimate understanding of sovereignty, Qutb explicitly excludes every inconvenience resulting from the epistemological political endeavor of al-falāsifa—specifically the work of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd—whose epistemological arguments for prophecy amount to anthropologies of human thought that do little more than delineate the limits of conscious human intelligence but do not discover its origin in singular unity. These are Greek—that is, pagan in orientation and method— elaborations of why humanity of necessity postulates Allah’s existence to preserve the reasonable meaning of the world. Such elaborations are finally apologia for reason’s capacity to discover the full meaning of revelation— implying that the text or Quran is allegorical or otherwise obscure, and that Ḥadīth falls short in clarification—in order to secure its relative liberty from revelation. Qutb’s own engagement with the texts of the Quran and Ḥadīth dispenses so completely with the theoretical controversies associated with the philosophers, however, that even the legalist tradition of ilm-u-Sharīa (jurisprudence), with its attendant exegetical corpus, is put aside in favor of a methodical reading and utilization of the texts as documentary evidence for his historiography. In a way remarkably similar to how Michael Servetus’s work in criticism of the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity documented the divergence of the two main momentums of the Protestant Reformation—on the one hand, his work precipitated the Protestant reinvestment in creedal community; on the other, it precipitated the anti-Trinitarianism that would develop into Unitarianism—Qutb’s criticism of Islamic philosophy and theology fostered a radically critical attitude toward reductivism while at the same time it became the basis for that very reductionism. His having left no record of ever resolving this conflict contributed, in some measure, to the rather intense pamphlet war that ensued between various constituencies of Muslim intellectuals and ideologues in the last few years of the twentieth century over whether his views—particularly the theory of ḥākimīya (Allah’s sovereignty) and the assertion of takfir (the declaration of the generalized apostasy) against all current Muslim state governments and their subject populations—were heretical. The specific charge being that his work instituted a school of thought called Qutbīya (Qutbism), which is the modern expression of the extremism of Khawārijīya.11 There were considerable high stakes in 11. The focal point of this dispute is a Web site called Salafipublications.com, where a series of pamphlets making this assertion were circulated. The original Kharijite, as they are termed in English, were a group of Ali’s supporters in his contestation with Muawiya
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this pamphlet war, being heavily invested in the ideological foundations of the Algerian Civil War, as well as the then emergent campaign of al-qāida against the Saudi regime. The intensity of this dispute was fueled by the historical complexity informing Qutb’s effort to formulate an Islamic historiography of power, which called for considerable methodological innovation. This effort to elaborate a rather materialist historical understanding of Islamic thought was dependent on a Quran criticism—whose text is Qutb’s voluminous fi Ẓilāl-il-Quran (In the Shade of the Quran)—the methodology of which is remarkably minimalist, effectively dispensing with any philological complexities, and pronouncedly historicist in orientation with a great deal of certainty invested in the capacity of the modern reader to comprehend the totality of Islamic thought in concreto, as it were, without relying on the speculations of antecedents. The critical apparatus of Qutb’s approach, or its determining figure, ẓilal ul maanā (traces of meaning), was first articulated in his 1936 book of modernist literary criticism, Kutub wa Shaksīyāt (Writing and Identity). The methodology of that criticism is fundamentally humanistic in the sense that, while presuming the immanence of divine will in human intelligence, Qutb’s formulation of Islamic thought is in terms of material practices of reading and interpretation as the exclusive historical institutions of that thought, not as a continuous unchanging methodology of thinking but as documents of possibility for thinking in an Islamic way. Qutb’s concern is not to continue the practice of ilm-u-Sharīa but to formulate an Islamic political theory based on the postulate of absolute divine sovereignty. In other words, in lieu of either the natural theology implicit in modover succession to the Caliphate after Uthman’s murder. After the battle of Siffin in 657–658, these supporters rejected the terms of arbitration by neutrals between Ali and Muawiya on the question of the legitimacy of Uthman’s murder. Legitimating their rejection with a radical renunciation of all prevalent forms of Muslim governance, except that of democratic populism based exclusively on the Quran, they withdrew from Ali’s party— a literal translation of Shia Ali—and formed a camp of extreme opposition that waged war against both Muawiya and Ali. The overall effect of identifying Qutbīya as the most current expression of Khawārijīya was to both dismiss it as a completely heretical, and so illegitimate, innovation and to underscore its being profoundly dangerous to the integrity of any legitimate Islamic polity. Efforts were made to legitimate this assault on Qutb’s thinking by claiming that it was based on explicit statements of condemnation made by some of the most prominent scholarly intellectual leadership (mashāyikh) of Salafīya, such as Shaykh Saalih al-Fawzaan, Shaykh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz, Imam al-Albani, as well as the widely renowned scholar Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Saalih al-Uthaymin. The dispute became rather intense, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Office of the Presidency of Islamic Research and Legal Verdicts stepping in, in 1997, to defend Qutb.
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ern historiography or the rational theology of philosophy and ilm-ul-kalām, Qutb substitutes a sort of rational civil theology of divine providence. For all its disavowal of the abstractions of intellectualism, in which direct immediate engagement with the text of revelation is displaced by an elaborate semiotics that itself assumes the role of transcendent referent, Qutb’s theory of a civil Islamic polity based on absolute divine sovereignty results in an Islam that of necessity is inhuman in its methodology. In fact, there is much mystery about Islam, and precisely the Islam Qutb is supposed to be referencing. It is, as he asserts, a complexity of ways of thinking whose historical expressions and institutions are appreciably dynamic and variegated. Those expressions and institutions involve a perpetual mimetic relationship to the primitive scriptural event of prophecy—the historical events of revelation and the Prophet Muhammad’s life as the Messenger of Allah—that is properly understood as poetic. Each occasion of encounter with the primitive event—and the encounter is profoundly worldly in the sense that the event is represented institutionally, habitually, as well as literally as a historical problematic—entails a striking inadequacy of language and concept, married with the unavoidable call to make it make sense for the moment. The poetic character of the relationship stems from its being the human effort to make the incomprehensible understandable in a way that sustains a praxis, a doing of thoughtful life. The actual complexity of expressions and institutions are the material trace of that doing. The problem is how to engage in any coherent way this complexity as a way of life. The poetic response is to do so dynamically. Each encounter with the primitive event is a beginning that institutes its own series of interpretations whose divergence is informed by a myriad of elements from politics and culture to communal histories and geography. At its crux, the fundamental problem Qutb’s work grapples with is a recalling and revitalization of the ijmā (consensus) of Muhammad’s original Medinan umma, particularly in situations pertaining to the authentic Islamic attitude or orientation—madhab, in the sense of the directional plane— toward immediate historical events and circumstances. The Arabic term umma is a complicated term to translate. It is generally translated into English as ‘‘community.’’ This is a rather misleading translation, however, because it suggests a limited customary horizon to Muhammad’s project in instituting Medina out of Yathrib—the name of the city prior to Muhammad’s hijra. A better sense of how this term works is needed in order to gain a richer perspective of the principal constitutive element of the historical Medina for Qutb’s theory of a civil Islamic polity.
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Etymologically, umma derives from the verb ummata, meaning ‘‘to give birth or become a mother.’’ This same root verb gives us the substantive imām, meaning ‘‘the head or leader of a collective’’—usually religious, as in the imām of prayer or the mosque. It also gives us the substantive al-ummu, meaning ‘‘original,’’ in the sense of foundation or principal beginning as institution (institutio). This is the sense of such phrases as Mecca umm-ul-qurā, ‘‘the foundation of all towns.’’ 12 The substantive umma itself means both ‘‘the mother’’ (al-wālida), in the same sense of origin as al-ummu, so it refers to an aggregate (jamaa) of people, the majority of whom have a common origin.13 Although this approaches the classical Latin sense of gentius/gentium, it would be in error to translate umma as ‘‘nation,’’ because the term also means ‘‘the collecting of people’’ as a function of heritage, convention, or faith, or even way of life (dīn). It is noteworthy that the Latin gentius is derived from genera. Besides meaning ‘‘to beget, bear, bring forth, produce’’ (in the passive, ‘‘to be born, to spring, arise, proceed’’), this same root gives us the French term agencer, a transitive verb meaning ‘‘to arrange, to dispose, to organize an aggregate by a combination of elements.’’ The substantive of this is agencement, and a cognate agence, meaning ‘‘agency,’’ in the sense of the office or function of an agent or factor. This last sense is related to the English agency, which as a verb means ‘‘the faculty of an agent or of acting; active working or operation; action, activity; as well as action or instrumentality embodied or personified as concrete existence.’’ Of particular interest to us here is the sense in which agencer, echoing its derivation from gentius, evokes the agency by which something is ‘‘brought forth.’’ In this sense, it not only marks the action of aggregation by which arrangement takes place, but it also marks the disposition of the arrangement. This sense of umma as agencement, as the arrangement of an aggregation of elements into an ordered disposition, is supported by the etymology of the term, which cites two Quranic verses as examples.14 The verse ‘‘Therefore We made you a justly balanced umma’’ 15 clearly indicates the sense of an aggregation of elements into an ordered disposition. Then there is the verse ‘‘Abraham was indeed an exemplary original [ummatan], devotedly obedient to Allah and true in faith [ḥanīfan],’’ 16 which indicates foundational matrix or institution. In precisely this double sense of agency and arrangement, the Medinans con12. al-Muajim al-Wasit, bab-ul-hamza, 27. 13. al-Muajim al-Wasit, bab-ul-hamza, 27. 14. al-Muajim al-Wasit, bab-ul-hamza, 27. 15. Quran, Sura Al-Baqara: 143. 16. Quran, Sura Nahl: 120.
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stituted themselves as an aggregate. In terms of historiographical concerns of Qutb’s civil theology, they formed a civitas, a civil order, under the sovereignty of Allah, whose authorized administrator was Muhammad (SJ, 37). As a historical institution, Medina replaced the society of Yathrib with the civitas of Islam. More precisely, society was subsumed under and made identical with Islamic civilization, which is absolute in its universality. The principal basis of aggregation in the new civil order was the members’ explicitly consenting to adhere to Muhammad’s Sunna. Even prior to Islam, the Arabs referred to a customary habitude that was accepted as normative and practiced by the entire community as sunna—a more literal-minded translation would be ‘‘the well-worn path,’’ recalling the substantive’s metaphoric derivation from the verb sanna, which describes the repeated action of wearing something into a desired form, whether that means to sharpen a blade or mold a rock. Muhammad’s Sunna was profoundly dynamic, articulating the most authentically Islamic attitude to the material situation of any given moment in complement to divine communication. In Muhammad’s case, however, the source of knowledge about authenticity was not the ancestral habitude but the divine communication personally given to him and for which he was the principal and sole human agent of articulation. This was subjective experience, which meant that authenticity in attitude was immanent with his personal life-practice, with his Sunna. If adherence to Muhammad’s Sunna was the principal constitutive element of the historical Medina, the second was that this adherence established a personal relationship in law between all individuals that superseded and displaced prior relationships of family, tribe, origin of birth or nation, and caste, constituting them as members of a civil order rather than persons subject to a limited community. Because Medina was constituted in common adherence to the Sunna of Muhammad, there was a homogeneity of lifestyle, albeit one of common Arab custom, but modified by the collective allegiance to Muhammad. Together, these elements sustained a consensual conscious submission to the immanence of divinity in the world. This is a key point in Qutb’s anthropology of the concept of divine immanence. As an idealized model or primitive institution, on the other hand, Medina is characterized by a set of three principles parallel to those of the historical Medina. The first of these is that Muhammad was the living agency through which the principles and terms by which authentic daily life was to be lived were realized. Because of his personal relationship to revelation, he was the guarantor of correct interpretation, and so the human executor of divine sovereignty. This authority did not derive from his character but
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from his election by Allah to be an example. Although, Muhammad’s character was a determining factor in his being believed in the early days of his prophethood and was the substantive object of emulation in formulation of Ḥadīth. The second principle follows from this, and it is that civil order in Medina is not constituted based on a tradition of legislation inherited or deduced from a set of universal principles passed down in memory like the Roman concept of jus genitum. It is dynamically constituted in the everyday empirical experience of practice—Muhammad’s Sunna—that is immanently sanctioned by divinity. The third principle, then, is that the immediate experience of this civil order in action is second only to the Prophet’s personal enactment of revelation in authenticity. It is its constitution qua Muhammad’s Sunna that makes Medina ideal. This exemplary umma is limited to the first three generations of the original society of Medina under Muhammad, consisting of the Companions of the Prophet, their children and grandchildren, for whom the livedexperience of Muhammad’s prophecy—the eventfulness of Quranic revelation and Muhammad’s associated habitual life-practice (Sunna) as an institution of revelation—was within living memory.17 The authenticity, and, hence, authority, of that experience is a matter of temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, with the generation of his lifetime Companions the most authentic, and the generation of their grandchildren the limit. The ways in which these salaf (founding fathers) articulated that principal experience are the historical institutions of Islam. In restricting his historical examples to the institutions of the founding fathers in order to elaborate a legitimate rational civil theology, Qutb is unquestionably in line with the Salafīya reform movement, whose intellectual roots begin with the work of the nineteenth-century Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abdu. Strict adherence through reasoned analysis to the historical example of the institutions of the founding fathers is what gives Salafīya its name. The key concern is sustaining the authentic Islamic attitude toward these principal institutions, which is fundamentally a question of the authoritative determination of the authentic Sunna as habitual practice. That is, it is an issue of methodology, according to which the techniques of method articulate the object of analysis, so that the validity of the object is established only through valid methodological attitude. 17. Throughout this essay, Sunna is capitalized when referring to Muhammad’s habitude in keeping with the established convention of romanization. Otherwise, it is italicized and in lowercase when referring to other habitudes or habitude in general.
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Qutb’s demonstrable Salafī orientation is why the charge of Khawārijīya made against him is so highly charged and politically complicated on two counts. Besides the depiction of Qutbīya as heretical, the charge presents what is purported to be the correct Salafīya understanding of Islam, according to which Islam is profoundly homeostatic. It is represented as a system that retains and preserves its internal equilibrium—an internal dynamic whose terms remain constant and immutable in their relationships to one another—in the face of disruptive external environmental conditions. Not only is Islam homeostatic, but so is the supposed proper Salafīya way to think about historical events. Both the conceptual frame of reference as well as the events perceivable within it are presented as symptomatic of the system’s own internal dynamic. There is no change in the sense of emergent events and attending innovative ways of thinking—that is, ways of thinking whose innovation presumes possibilities completely beyond the range or logic of the internal dynamic. There is only change within the scope of the dynamic—an immutable pattern of perspectives and orientations. Within the scope of so homeostatic an understanding, the epitaph Kharijite designates a cancerous pathology congenital to Islamic civilization that must be aggressively treated from time to time. Such an understanding is a perverse radicalization of what Muhammad Abdu postulated as Salafīya. While he represented the first three generations of Muhammad’s Medina umma as the genetically defining population—in Vico’s sense that genesis is nascence— which articulated the constitutive ethical attitudes of Islam, he discovered them to be more flexible theoretically. The homeostatic change postulated in Abdu’s reform was the constancy of ethical orientation in the course of considerable theoretical and political acclimatization. In other words, the homeostasis of Abdu’s Salafī was ethical and not conceptual. How Muslims approach and understand the Salafī is subject to tremendous nonhomeostatic change, in accordance with the open-ended dynamics of human thinking. The conviction that the absolute horizon of human interpretive understanding was already achieved within the first three generations of Islam is not in accordance with the Salafīya reform initiated by Abdu, or with those, like Qutb, who explicitly engage his project. Such a conviction is attributed to what is perhaps more fittingly called neo-Salafīya. It cannot altogether be ignored that the neo-Salafīya portrayal of Qutbism is in keeping with that offered recently by the recognizable neoconservatives Daniel Piper, Stephen Schwartz, Stanley Kurtz, and Dinesh D’souza. While distinguishing between Qutbism and what they refer to as ‘‘mainstream Islam,’’ Schwartz and Piper, in particular, attribute the root causes for
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Qutbism to the corrupt social conditions of the Arab world and specifically associate it with Salafīya itself. To underscore the connection between the image of corrupt despotic Arab rulers and reactionary Islamic tendency, they anachronistically label Salafīya ‘‘Wahabism,’’ after the eighteenth-century Najdi founder of the movement that has become the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia. Schwartz’s and Piper’s assertions that Wahabism has deliberately laid the grounds in which Qutbism can flourish is in harmony with the tale proffered in more politically diverse U.S. and British circles that Qutbism is a Western-oriented deviation from mainstream Islam, a claim to which the anti-Qutbism pamphleteers now tenaciously cling, recirculating quotations from sundry Western journalists—mainly analysts associated with conservative far-right think tanks—and even secularist Muslims. The collection is astounding in its ideological variety, from John Gray and Malise Ruthven—the latter, significantly enough, has been a visiting fellow and lecturer at the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, England, which is supported by the Aga Khan Development Network—to Robert Worth and Amir Taheri, as well as Ladan and Roya Boroumand, founders of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation for the Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Iran. As far as the neoconservative attack is concerned, there is a certain cynicism in its being embraced by elements among previously staunch one-time Reaganite allies of the Saudis in the U.S. government, who in effect are now holding the Saudi government chiefly responsible for failing to hold up its end of the alliance by not curtailing or otherwise policing the destructive forces of Qutbism. It was with U.S. consent and cooperation during the Reagan presidency that the Saudis aggressively established institutions of Salafīya in former Soviet central Asia; and with a particular domestic disregard, the U.S. government studiously ignored the serious inroads made by Saudi-financed Salafīya institutions among the rapidly growing Muslim population in America’s inner cities and federal penitentiaries. The immediate political pertinence of all this policy-oriented attention to Qutbism notwithstanding, its complete disregard for the documentation of his thinking preempts any erstwhile attempt to understand and so grapple with the serious efforts of Muslims such as Qutb to articulate a constitutive function for Islam in modernity. Indeed, preemption of thinking is a hallmark strategy of the neoconservatives—and in the instance of Islamic thinking, it is a strategy with which the U.S.-based Left concurs. With an eye toward the broader stakes of imagining a truly historical critical secularism, however, while not altogether ignored, the political facts of the moment cannot be permitted to occlude the thinking at issue here. And what is at issue is
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whether Qutb demonstrated the feasibility of a critical Islamic historiography of power. Bear in mind that the point of Qutb’s historiography is to recall the conditions of umma Muhammad in Medina and revitalize its principles as the authentic dynamic way to achieve the pious individual who is a member of what we now more properly understand as the pious civility. We have, then, a problem of how to make dynamic a situation lost in time. The answer Qutb proffers is a literary attitude: the principal institutions are approached as textual documents of the Islamic civilization’s historical beginning, which is the exemplum, bar none, of just society. Accordingly, the practice of understanding is that of reading, which, as a practice, is highly dynamic and historical. It is impossible to undertake such a practice without an acute awareness of complete contemporaneity or temporal duration. One is always reading now, even when engaging antecedent readings, such that the relationship one’s own reading has to those antecedents is one of adjacency. The literary attitude, then, is a dynamic practice of engaging the historical customary habitude of communal understanding—meaning a habitude that is contemporaneous with the moment of the understanding. Authenticity remains an aspect of the lived-experience of the salaf, which is recounted and transcribed as an elaboration of precepts. As a corpus, these recordings of direct experience of the Prophet’s life-practice are what became known as Ḥadīth. Equating knowledge with experience poses very real practical problems. Foremost among these is the incongruence between telling and recording stories of past events and the experience of them, and the experience of imminent events and situations. The problem is how to—as in, by what authentically prophet-derived method—adduce the authentic Muslim attitude toward imminent events without the Prophet’s agency. From the early days of Islam’s conquests and expansion, the way of adducing the authentic Islamic attitude toward questions of legal and personal life was called fiqh (understanding), a hermeneutic practice in which authoritative inferences were drawn first from interpretive readings of the Quran text—as is attested to by the example of Ibn Abbās—then from recollections of pertinent prophetic utterances or practices (Sunna), and then from recognized communal practice (sunna) and reasoning (ijtihād ) among the Prophet’s Companions. The dispersal of the Companions across the emerging polity meant that many equally authoritative understandings were occurring, so that the practice of fiqh was remarkably localized in its beginnings, with each garri-
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son town formulating a normative code of law based on the norms immediately at hand. The most prominent of the localities were Kufa in Iraq, whose preeminent faqīh was Abu Ḥanīfa, and Medina in the hijaz, whose leading legate was Mālik ibn Anas. Both Abu Ḥanīfa and Mālik understood fiqh to be a practice of legal criticism in opposition to Umayyad, and initially Abbasid, imperial policy. They were engaged in an explicit effort to formulate and realize, at least locally, an authentically Muslim subjectivity based on individual responsibility to revelation and prophetic Sunna directly, rather than through the mediating political institutions of power. Abu Ḥanīfa, who publicly refused to swear allegiance to the Abbasid, maintained the view throughout his tenure as the preeminent Iraqi faqīh that, besides the Quran and Ḥadīth, local consensus and ijtihād was a valid source on which to base the normative code of piety. Mālik, in contrast, held to a narrower view, according to which the legitimate sources for legal understanding beyond the Quran and Ḥadīth are limited to the consensus and ijtihād of the original community of Medina under Muhammad. The eventual ascendancy of the Medinan school was due in large measure to the formulation of Mālik’s legal criticism into a theory of law and jurisprudence by his student, Abu Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Idris as-Shāfii (767–820). Imam as-Shāfii systematically standardized the various efforts of fiqh, excluding all sunna except for Ḥadīth—effectively eliminating all other living sunna—and establishing the now familiar hierarchy of sources or foundations of understanding (usul-ulfiqh) that became the basis for ilm-u-Sharīa. Restricting sunna to Ḥadīth made more pronounced the problematics entailed in basing legitimacy on authentic experience. Shāfii’s restriction meant that experience must now be verifiable through an objective method. The evaluation of Ḥadīth as a source of legal understanding second only to the Quranic text underscored the need to regularize the process by which the events of Muhammad’s Sunna were presented in the record and to establish objective criteria for verifying the authenticity of transmission. The subsequent endeavor at regularization and verification became the discipline of ilm-ul-Ḥadīth—literally translatable as ‘‘the science of Prophetic habitude as narrative’’ and commonly translated as ‘‘Prophetic tradition,’’ but more aptly rendered as ‘‘the archaeology of knowledge about the Prophet.’’ The methodology by which authentic transmission was achieved was isnād—the supporting genealogy of transmission. This is a specific narrative form through which the chain of transmission of any particular prophetic utterance or act is recorded and authenticated. Authentication is determined according to the authoritative arrangement of the collected enunciations of the Medina consen-
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sus—the literally recorded speech acts of the Prophet’s Companions, their children, and grandchildren. As the authenticating narrative mode of transmission, isnād is a normative logic for the transmission of knowledge. Each isnād exhibits the genealogy of its own composition and compilation, recording who received what from whom when, all the way back to the principal interlocutor with Muhammad, or witness of the event of record. It is in this sense that ilm-ul-Ḥadīth is best translated as ‘‘the archaeology of knowledge about Muhammad’’ and best understood as a narrative practice of authorship and not a policing action, which is to say it is a way of formulating authoritative lines of transmitting readings, genealogies, if you will, and not an institution of imperial hermeneutics. It provides us with genealogies of knowledge that define our understanding of the Medina consensus. Shāfii did not, in fact, exclude all living Arab sunna from the foundations of understanding. He excluded only those that could not be verifiably traced back to the Medina consensus, the presumption being that as a sunna, the continued habitude of the Medinans and their immediate descendants perpetuated the homogeneity of orientation of the original umma. If ijmā still meant consensus in the sense of an umma of judgment, it was made as conservative as Ḥadīth, so much so that Shāfii restricted juridically binding consensus to the first three generations of the original society of Medina. This is an extreme posture that Qutb did not hold, concurring instead with Muhammad Abdu’s position that ijtihād is still available as the agency of consensus for subsequent generations. This reopening of the door of ijtihād is what enables the historiography that characterizes Qutb’s project, in which the consensus achieved by the original umma becomes a determinate fact fixed in time. For Qutb, the relationship between umma and ijmā is indissoluble. Proper knowledge of this relationship is treated as a constant order of thought translated across time and space with no loss of value or meaning. The consistent integrity of this knowledge is conditio sine qua non for authentic legal judgment and is guaranteed both through the regularization of the written record and the way it is read. As a conservative practice of reading, his historiography constitutes and sustains in a worldly way the Allah-ordained civil order of Muhammad in the present by reiterating the methodology of the salaf as regularized by Shāfii. As Shaykh Muqbil ibn Hadi al Wadii is reported to have said, Qutb was an adīb—literati. It is simply not humanly possible to preserve the purity of the principal situation of the revelation of Muhammad at Medina—neither the individual nor collective awareness, let alone consciousness, of the Medinans can be ‘‘returned to’’ as a permanent or constant state of being-in-the-world.
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What can be achieved, indeed, what is achieved, is a recollection of their attitude as a function of literacy—The Stories of the Companion, Sira nabawiyah (The Biography of the Prophet) by Ibn Hisham, and the recognized compilations of Ḥadīth. These are figura insofar as they appear as exempla to be realized in the world. As a model, the Medina community is an appearance accessible only—and this point is absolute—as an attitude of thinking in literature. As an attitude of thinking, even the Sunna is a train of ideas or thinking about things that passes through our minds in the course of reading rather than a constancy of events. Another way of looking at this situation is to recall that it is precisely the authority of the genealogy of thought described in and by ijmā—the material expression of which is isnād—that forms the basis for what is designated in Islam as ilm. The polysemia of the term ilm is best echoed in the German Enlightenment concept of Wissenschaften. This is an interpretive translation that is not simply fortuitous but speaks directly to Qutb’s principal assumption that his Islamic political theory is an epistemological project for individual liberty. In this way, ijmā can be reimagined as the collective process of reading, characterized by a principal attitude toward the infinite. This familiar problem of the relationship between justice and transcendence is what Qutb’s thinking grapples with. Can there be a humanistic Islam whose constitutive principle is divine immanence in all particulars of life? The answer Qutb proffers is the grounding of justice in a transcendent inhuman intelligence, which means that the principal concern is with the institution of an Islamic polity in which it is possible to foster and sustain ways of human life that are neither simply anthropological and rational— in the way that positive law is—or solipsistically reverential. The challenge that Qutb faced was how to assume an attitude toward infinity while avoiding both the risk of historicizing the activity of thinking as the expression in the world of the transcendent law (Allah) and the tendency to think the infinite as a horizon to be approached with the expectation of subjective fulfillment. Qutb clearly fell prey to both risk and tendency. But the way of his failure is instructive. Having come to understand America as a dynamic force that articulated and disposed of communities as a matter of course and to no end, Qutb sought to discover the condition for sustainable community in an inhuman intelligence. Qutb held that such an intelligence is a transcendent personified force manifested with revelation and enacted in habitual practices of reading and interpretation. This is not a question of morality but one of narrative possibility or ethics. His own enactment of the habitude of lit-
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erary Islam compelled him to supplant the rule of law with divine judgment as the only way to achieve social justice and the preservation of human intelligence against global ignorance. Plainly stated, Qutb’s Social Justice in Islam is concerned with answering the question, What is the alternative to the global ignorance of immanence? To the extent that the answer he proffers is the grounding of civilization in a transcendent inhuman intelligence, then the principal concern is not with the institution of an Islamic polity but with the instituting of an Islamic region of humanity in which those possibilities of the ways of man that are neither anthropological or rational—in the way that positive law is—can be sustained. The pertinence of Sayyid Qutb’s effort to the issue of secularism lies in the simple fact that it engages us in thinking about what it is to be human in the historical circumstances of opposing a discourse of universal justice derived from the Pauline doctrine of salvation.
Heine’s Critical Secularism
Willi Goetschel
Heinrich Heine’s secularism is of a particular kind. Occupying a prominent, if not dominant, place in his writing, the secularist impulse plays a central role in his poetry and prose. But rather than taking secularization as a universal yardstick to measure success or failure of the project of Enlightenment and historical progress, his poetic project reflects the problem of secularism in a critical fashion. Heine resists the temptation of unreservedly subscribing to the imperatives of secularization, as if they would not warrant careful examination of their hidden assumptions and implications. Rather, and more critically, he inscribes and rewrites secularization in a manner that offers a self-consciously creative reinscription of the past and present. As a consequence, Heine’s critical secularism presents an alternative approach that prompts us to take a fresh look at current discussions on secularism. In resolutely critical response to the exigencies of his time, Heine engages in the cause of secularization with a different sense of urgency than his contemporaries. Yet, in doing so, he never loses sight of the profound ambivalence of the implications of secularization for the meaning of modernity. Heine’s writing addresses secularization as the formidable problem and boundary 2 31:2, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press.
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challenge of modernity rather than simply as the solution. Liberating, yet, at the same time, profoundly challenging, secularism is for Heine a constitutive moment in the experience of modernity. As a result, modernity emerges in Heine’s work as a project deeply steeped in the problems of secularization. But Heine’s project sets itself apart from other discourses of secularism. Against the impasse of the alternative of either forsaking all religious intentions for a modern atheism or invoking some religious authenticity that would acknowledge secularization simply as validation of its own deeper truth, he takes a different approach. Born and raised as a member of the generation of the grandchildren of Moses Mendelssohn, the great champion of German Jewish emancipation, Heine responds to the predicament of the precarious legal, social, political, and cultural status of German Jews with a keen sense of the problem of secularization in modern society. From the point of view of Heine and his Jewish contemporaries, secularization never would nor could present an unproblematic final answer to theology’s long anachronistic hold. In their eyes, even the most advanced forms of secularism at hand betrayed too much of a Christian particularism to justify any claim to universalism. In a way, their Jewish particularity served as a critical test case for gauging exactly how nineteenth-century variants of European secularisms would work out. For Heine, who once quipped that the entry ticket to European culture came in the form of baptism,1 secularism presented a project that called for a critical grasp of the problem of religion. After all, he soon was to learn that instead of gaining acceptance and respectability, his baptism stamped him once more as a stereotypical Jew, only this time without the possibility to wash off his Jewishness by holy water.2 Reducing religion to either universal theological truth or socially acceptable form of superstition was no longer a viable option for him. As early nineteenth-century forms of European secularism showed their theological underpinnings, it became increasingly clear that no gesture of radically cutting off the theological and religious roots would ever lead to complete secularization that would no longer privilege one form of religion 1. Heinrich Heine, Sämtliche Schriften, ed. Klaus Briegleb, 2nd ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997), 6.1:618. Subsequent references to this edition are cited parenthetically as Briegleb, followed by volume and page number. 2. See Heine’s letter to Moser, in Heinrich Heine, Werke, Briefwechsel, Lebenszeugnisse: Säkularausgabe (Berlin and Paris: Akademie Verlag and Editions du CNRS, 1970), 20:234.
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over others. Rather, it became increasingly clear that secularization meant an ongoing process whose success would depend on the continuing recognition and critique of its theological and religious underpinnings. Heine’s signal contribution to the genealogy of a critical notion of secularism consists in the creative recovery and working through of this problematic. While other critics posit the process of secularization as narrative following a simple, straightforward trajectory from religion to its disenchantment, demise, and dissolution, Heine presents a theory and practice of secularization that engages religious difference as a critical force that highlights secularization in both its enabling and disabling aspects. Whimsically, but with a critical purpose, moving back and forth between Judaism and Christianity, and free of any anxieties of denominational allegiance and fixation, Heine presents secularism as a force not outside but within, or more precisely, between, religions. He stages secularization through the shifting of perspectives, presenting Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism from the ever-changing point of view of an observer whose loyalties remain strategic but are, at the same time, guided by a knowing appreciation of the redeeming function of the critical force of religion in whatever guise it might manifest itself. What on the surface seems for many critics of Heine like a shifty and supposedly shaky outlook reveals itself, upon closer examination, as a thoughtful and artfully mounted appreciation of the fundamental significance of the legacy of religion for modernity. Not unlike the Marrano experience of the Sephardic Jews of the seventeenth century and of their philosophical exponent Spinoza—Heine’s declared hero—Heine finds himself caught between the conflicting claims of Judaism, Christianity, and the challenge of modernity.3 For Heine, just as for the Marranos, an exclusionary privileging of one over the other religious tradition does not seem to be a viable option, because, according to their experience, Judaism, Christianity, and modernity present too much of an intertwined complex to isolate one from the other as the singularly universal truth. But in contrast to Marrano culture, whose profound skepticism separates them from their Jewish legacy in ways too radical for Judaism to provide any possibility for positive 3. Klaus Briegleb calls Heine a Marrano Jew. See Klaus Briegleb, Bei den Wassern Babels: Heinrich Heine, jüdischer Schriftsteller in der Moderne (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977). For the role of Spinoza for Heine, see Willi Goetschel, Spinoza’s Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); and ‘‘Heine’s Spinoza,’’ Idealistic Studies 33 (2003): 207–21.
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identification, Heine considers Jewish tradition a fundamental but ignored, if not repressed, part of Christian tradition and modernity. This allows him to take a sovereign stand toward religious traditions, which provides the groundwork for a critical platform for theorizing secularism. Heine, the baptized Jew, does not need to return to Judaism, which he never left in the first place. Stubbornly resistant against any urge for religious or cultural supremacy, the double exposure to both Judaism and Christian culture allows him to understand secularization to be a matter of perspective. What Nietzsche will later develop into a full-fledged theory of perspectivism is already prefigured in Heine. Heine launches his secularism as a contrastive perspectivism that views secularization as an everchanging differential movement addressing one particular religion in critical difference to the religious and theological theory and practice of its other. In switching positions between Christian and Jewish points of view, the critical force of Heine’s lyric and narrative trajectories emerges in its unique poetic voice. This continuing religious code switching opens the horizon that throws secularization into sharp profile as it provides a critical space for expressing the undiminished complexity of the process of secularization. This oscillating movement at the heart of Heine’s secularism makes for a distinctly post-Romantic notion of religion. His provocative blend of postEnlightenment and historico-philosophical tenets provides the framework for a critical recognition of religion as a modern phenomenon. Heine thus understands secularization as a critical concept in the Kantian sense.4 For him, secularization does not denote a doctrinary project whose truth claims simply erase or overwrite tradition. Rather, he casts secularization as a process that sheds light on the complicities and hidden affinities between a fully emancipated rationalism and its other, that is, religion, tradition, even superstition. This mutual dependence of religion and secularism is what, at times, gives the world of Heine’s poetry its haunted outlook. But far from simply presenting a self-obsessed anxiety of the uncanny, the staging of this haunting interdependence signals the moment of the critical in Heine’s work, for such haunting does not derive from the return of religion but from secularism’s zealous rigor, eager to deny and suppress the claims of religion. In critical distinction, Heine’s poetry and prose propose that only a consistently self-reflective critique of religion, one that 4. For a discussion of Kant’s concept of critique and the critical, see Willi Goetschel, Constituting Critique: Kant’s Writing as Critical Praxis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 1–8.
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poetically imagines its own blind spots as constitutively connected to what it critiques, will succeed in the release of the emancipatory power that secularization promises. What appears in his early poetry to be subtly interwoven with a heightened post-Romantic sensitivity articulates itself over the course of Heine’s writing career in ever-sharper and more palpable terms, as his critical secularism becomes ever-more outspoken and distinct. But the pulsating energy of this critical secularism, responsible for the pointed irony for which Heine is so notorious, registers already in his earliest and seemingly romanticizing texts. Book of Songs Secularizing the canon of metaphors in a cheerfully playful but consistent manner, Heine’s early poetry represents a coherently executed project of the secularization of German classic and Romantic poetry. His poetry removes the theme of love and longing, of lost love, desire, and lust, from its traditional context, in which the world was presented as metaphysically secured by the safety net of the decor of a Christian worldview, which was either implicitly present or explicitly invoked. While paganizing poetry, like Goethe’s early poems, or Schiller’s classicizing ones, would propose an alternative to Christian worldviews, their poetry would not reflect, address, or engage in the kind of radical secularization project typical for Heine. For in his love poetry, the ironic turn that leads to the dismantling of both the expectations of the reader and the longings of the lyrical I directly challenges and undermines the mind/body dichotomy underpinning Christian worldviews. The recurrent theme of excess sensualism that runs through Heine’s poetry like a leitmotif carries a secularizing force no other German poet would express with such persistent determination before Heine. The love poems, which have become widely known through Robert Schumann’s lieder cycle Dichterliebe, express this tendency in a remarkably subliminal yet distinct fashion. While the romanticizing compositions often seek to cover up this tension or domesticate it into a Romantic mood, the poetry’s breaks and disillusionments create a unique secularization effect. Much of the sting of Heine’s poignant irony derives from this shocklike repetition of the moment of secularization. His poetry rejects the traditional canon of love. Loss of love, rejection, and disappointment are no longer transcended or ‘‘sublimated.’’ Instead, the sting of the pangs of love is given unmitigated expression. Nothing exists in this poetic universe that can soften the pain of love
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and existence; nothing can redeem it. The melancholy and woe are set free from any metaphysical or religious meaning. Running counter to both classic and Romantic poetic conventions, Heine’s lyrical subject stands abandoned and in defiant rejection of any metaphysical consolation. Heine’s most famous and popular poem, ‘‘Lorelei,’’ exemplifies this kind of secularism in a paradigmatic manner. A careful reading of the poem, whose notoriously longing voice has been given prominent status as an expression of heightened German national sentiment, reveals a dimension of critical reflection that calls for attention. Beneath the powerfully suggestive but, at the same time, precariously thin surface of Romantic veneer, the poem performs an intriguing poetic act of secularization. The pretended ignorance and loss of cultural memory is given its interminable resolution in what follows the enchanting, singsong-like opening lines: ‘‘I don’t know the reason why / I should be feeling so sad.’’ 5 What seems irretrievably lost and unfathomable to the rational subject is retrieved—through the poem’s act of remembrance—through the figure of loss. As the poem recalls the fatally bewitching powers of Lorelei, it expresses a mourning that laments, beyond the recovery of memory, what escapes the grasp of the secular mind. The poem’s stirringly soothing style gives voice to the powerful hold of the mythical, whose spell transfixes the gaze of the secular the more it desires to break that spell. But rather than an expression of anxiety or fear,6 the poem articulates a critical comment on the predicament of secularism: as it figures secularization as disenchantment, whose loss remains incommensurable with the promise of secular hope, it reminds the reader of secularization’s loss as its curse. Secularization is, then, not an unproblematic process but fraught with uneasy difficulties that haunt the secular: ‘‘A tale of times gone by / Keeps running through my head’’ (Heine/Pollak, 9). The suggestive tension between the unknowing melancholy of forgetting and the obsessive memory of an old-time tale brings out the aporia that defines the project of 5. ‘‘Lorelei,’’ trans. Felix Pollak, in Heinrich Heine, Poetry and Prose, ed. Jost Hermand and Robert C. Holub (New York: Continuum, 1982), 9. Subsequent references to ‘‘Lorelei’’ are to this bilingual edition and are cited parenthetically as Heine/Pollak. 6. Jakob Hessing, ‘‘Heil und Unheil: Zur Umformung religiöser Motive in Heinrich Heines feüher Lyrik,’’ in Das Jerusalemer Heine-Symposium: Gedächtnis, Mythos, Modernität, ed. Klaus Briegleb and Itta Shedlitzky (Hamburg: Dölling and Galitz, 2001), 65–78, gives an interesting reading that stresses the moment of anxiety of loss. But his verdict that transcendence has become silent in Heine (74) seems problematic in the face of Heine’s jubilation of double entendres. It is important to note that Heine’s is a poetry that always gives both sides of every aspect its voice. Anxiety and fear are thus always counterbalanced by the liberating joy and celebration.
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disenchantment as ambivalent in nature. The poem stages this ambivalence in programmatic manner: its melancholy sadness is not only prompted by the forgetting and the anxiety that results from such forgetting. More critically, melancholy figures in this poem also as remembering, a remembering that remains melancholy as long as it remains unable to recognize the source of its sadness as the problem of secularism. As the poem begins to speak of olden times, it appears to move seamlessly into the past, a past that the poem, however, stages in the present. It is not until the final line that the poem changes to the past perfect, but not without another curious twist added. While Lorelei’s seductive powers bewitch the boatman, evoking his deadly desire and longing, the text performs a curious move that both enforces and undermines the illusion of the quasi-mythological image the poem conjures. If we are told that the lyrical I believes now that both boatman and boat sink, the issue of the status of this story emerges with underhanded virulence. What is a reader, who stumbles over this ‘‘Ich glaube’’ (I fancy), to think of the story, then, as a whole? This ‘‘Ich glaube’’ both makes and unmakes the narrative fundament on which the narrative seems to stand: the tradition of a tale that is at the same time both remembered and not quite remembered. Signaling indecision, the past becomes transparent as mediated through a present that is linked to the past it does and does not remember, a past that breaks into the present in fragmented form to light up, if only for an instance, to disappear again. Instead of a continuous narrative that links past and present in uninterrupted form, ‘‘Lorelei’’ reminds the reader that continuity remains a precarious and fragile specter, and that connection with the past is an ever-new challenge to the present it haunts: Ich glaube, die Wellen verschlingen Am Ende Schiffer und Kahn; Und das hat mit ihrem Singen Die Lore-Ley getan. [I fancy the waves will cover Both boatman and boat before long; And that was done to her lover By the Lorelei and her song.] (Heine/Pollak, 8–9) While the rhythm seems to suggest a smooth transition into the final stanza, the lyrics undermine this appearance. In ironic suspense, as belief rather than knowledge, the words Ich glaube (I believe) highlight the problematic
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character of this production of the past as one that becomes legible as a fiction of the present. The semblance of simplicity is subverted here and the fictional character of the past exposed. The melancholy sense of loss gives voice to the mourning of a past figured as present. What gives this poem its uncanny force is not its mythological or fairy-tale dimension but the way the narrative is inscribed in the lyrical I’s own present. Beyond a nostalgic return to the past and a celebration of the present, the text expresses a heightened sense for the precarious fragility of the present that defines modernity. In this poem, the contemporary and the noncontemporary can no longer be neatly kept apart. They cannot be contained as two distinctly separate entities. Instead, their interdependence emerges as an uneasy, conflicted condition. The Lorelei’s singing reaches into the present and haunts it as the vanishing trace of the past. But the poem does not allow the reader to settle comfortably in nostalgic sentimentalism. Nor can the haunting impulse of the poem be explained away as the trace of the Romantic uncanny. Instead, the poem presents an irresistible enactment of the feeling and the recognition of the noncontemporary as the constitutive moment of the present: the simultaneity of a past invoked that remains elusive but just strong enough to operate the powerful call of the past for those who wish to live exclusively in the present: Er schaut nicht die Felsenriffe, Er schaut nur in die Höh. [He sees not the cliffs approaching, His eyes are fastened above.] (Heine/Pollak, 9) The one who does not look down but only up, who only looks ahead but fails to look back, is doomed, the poem reminds us. But, then, a particular kind of doubt underlies this poem: Ich glaube, die Wellen verschlingen Am Ende Schiffer und Kahn. [I fancy the waves will cover Both boatman and boat before long.] (Heine/Pollak, 9) This is not an absolute doubt but rather a qualifying doubt, a doubt that hesitates to pass for history, or fact. It is a legend, a tale. But while the lyrical I cannot forget it, remembering it does not cure it of melancholy. Part of the poem’s potent melancholy stems from its insight that the past can
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be addressed only head-on, as the present, and that the present can be grasped only as the past. Read as a tale of modernity and the problem of secularization, ‘‘Lorelei’’ reminds us that emancipation and liberation from the irrational forces come with the cost of a loss whose mourning may produce the enticing beauty of poetic magic. But this loss will always leave the mourner with the recognition that reason rests on the precariously fluid grounds of the irrational it ‘‘fancies’’ to have secularized.7 To highlight the moment of secularization, let me, on a lighter note, compare Heine’s poem with a later version of the Lorelei song by two other Jewish authors/composers. If the Gershwin brothers’ ‘‘Loreley’’ takes the myth of Lorelei to the extremes of secularization, reducing her to a lascivious seducer in the age of bimboism, where the inexplicable is reduced to sexiness, their version highlights, by contrast, Heine’s concern to comprehend secularization as an open-ended affair that provides the ground for emancipation only as long as this process is understood as an ongoing project in progress. In the age of the early-twentieth-century mass culture industry, one could say, this process had to come to an end if it was not to jeopardize the self-congratulatory assuredness of the man of the ‘‘free world.’’ Secular Kissing In his ‘‘City of Lucca’’ (1831), Heine stages the problem of secularism in all its critical urgency. As his narrator reaches the city of Lucca at night, a Catholic procession is under way. To escape the somber atmosphere of this festivity, the narrator drops by a church. In a corner, he spots the lady of his dreams, who takes him in her arms and kisses him. But being kissed by the sensual Italian beauty is not the kind of complete wish fulfillment the reader might have expected. For her kisses are accompanied by the passionate whispering: ‘‘Cecco, Cecco, caro Cecco!’’ This passionate embrace and kissing, the narrator comments, are meant for someone else— for Cecco, a young abbot from Bologna, and thus a servant of the Roman Catholic Church. Confusion follows, but no embarrassment. For Heine’s narrator has no scruples in accepting such favors: 7. For background information on Heine’s sources for the myth of Lorelei, see Heinrich Heine, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Manfred Windfuhr (Düsseldorf: Campe, 1973), 1.2:877–86. The folklore and the Romantic elaborations by Chamisso and others conjure a Christian framework that Heine’s version effectively undercuts.
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Als Protestant machte ich mir kein Gewissen daraus, mir die Güter der katholischen Geistlichkeit zuzueignen, und auf der Stelle säkularisierte ich die frommen Küsse Franscheskas. (Briegleb, 2:495) [As a Protestant I had no scruples about appropriating the goods of the Catholic clergy, and I secularized Francesca’s pious kisses on the spot.] 8 This is, even for Heine, a densely packed sentence brimming with ironies. Already the opening, ‘‘As a Protestant,’’ does not lack ironic double entendre. While Heine certainly was a certified Protestant by baptism, he quickly came to regret his decision to undergo baptism, as it, ironically, stamped him ‘‘indelibly’’ a Jew, a Jew whose Jewishness could not be washed off by holy water. ‘‘As a Protestant’’ thus covertly signals ‘‘as a Jew.’’ As a Jew and Protestant, or, rather, a Jew who appears in the guise of a Protestant, the narrator appropriates the properties of the Catholic authorities without hesitations, secularizing them on the spot right then and there, inside the sanctuary of the sacred sphere of the church. This scene complicates the notion of secularization in a striking meaning. Foregrounded by the complex setting of the scene in the narrative and the text, the narrative’s complication creates a conceptual short circuit that challenges the neatness of the common notion of secularization as it is understood and used by the opposing parties involved in the secularization debate of the nineteenth century. As Heine’s narrator performs an act of secularization, taking the meaning of secularization literally, he breaks the barriers and transgresses the hermeneutic horizon of his reader’s expectations. Exposing the blind spots of the tacit arrangements that drive the secularization debate, this intervention necessitates a principal rethinking of the meaning of secularization. At a closer look, the kind of piety that Franscheska’s pious kisses suggest harbors a this-worldly tendency which the church, represented by the beloved abbot, would be only too willing to accept. If secularization comes as easy as offering yourself as recipient of the goods of institutionalized religion, the passive receptive part of the narrator points to the fact that secularization is already on its way and that the point consists in simply stating what happens ‘‘naturally.’’ Following this idea to its logical conclusion, the text leads up to a radical performance of secularization. Thriving on the 8. Heinrich Heine, Selected Prose, trans. and ed. Ritchie Robertson (London: Penguin, 1993), 162. Subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically as Robertson, followed by page number.
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double entendre of the central religious event of Catholic experience, the moment of transubstantiation, in which the symbol of the wafer assumes the properties of Christ’s body, the narrator’s praise of the physical beauty of his beloved Franscheska imitates the exact wording of the Catholic doctrine: [‘‘]Ich liege in deinen Armen . . . das Wort wird Fleisch, der Glaube wird versinnlicht, in Form und Gestalt, welche Religion! Ihr Pfaffen! Jubelt unterdessen Eur Kyrie Eleison, klingelt, räuchert, läutet die Glocken, laßt die Orgel brausen, laßt die Messe von Palestrina erklingen—‘das ist der Leib’!—ich glaube, ich bin selig, ich schlafe ein—aber sobald ich des anderen Morgens erwache, reibe ich mir den Schlaf und den Katholizismus aus den Augen, und sehe wieder klar in die Sonne und in die Bibel, und bin wieder protestantisch vernünftig und nüchtern, nach wie vor.’’ (Briegleb, 2:496) [(‘‘)I will lie in your arms . . . the word will become flesh, faith will become sensual in shape and in form—what a religion! You priests! chant your Kyrie Eleison meanwhile, tinkle, ring the bells, swing the censer, let the organ boom, let Palestrina’s Mass resound—‘this is the body!’—I shall believe myself among the blest as I fall asleep— but as soon as I wake up next morning, I shall rub the sleep and the Catholicism from my eyes, and again see the sunshine and the Bible clearly, and be rational, sensible and Protestant, as before.’’] (Robertson, 163) This passage paradigmatically performs the act of secularization. Its amusing quid pro quo underscores a crucially critical moment: secularization is not a primary act that initiates the undoing of a hitherto unquestioned religious claim. Rather, and more subtly, this staging of the narrator’s wild mixing of religion and sexual desire highlights the fact that the institution of religion does not spring from divine revelations alone but is always already constituted as spiritualization of the secular from which it takes its cues, albeit in order to transcend, deny, and suppress them. Secularization is thus grasped as continuous with the movement religion itself initiates. Finally, this passage hammers home the point of Catholicism and Protestantism as each other’s opposite, whose agonistic coexistence is not the whole of the story but rather conceals a shared monopoly that excludes other forms of religiosity. While these two denominations might fancy sharing their power the way day and night rule together all life on earth—an aspiration perhaps prefigured in the pope’s 1494 arbitration between Portugal and Spain
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to split the world into two equal hemispheres—the Protestant wake-up call brings with its forced sobriety and sensibility the silent memory of what goes unmentioned but what Heine’s text recalls as Christianity’s repressed: the Jewish body that Christian religion celebrates or secularizes. This uniquely Heinean double entendre that confuses and mixes flesh and spirit effectively undoes the key distinction on which the entire Christian universe hinges. Heine links here his interest in the reinstatement of the senses and the resurrection of the body directly to his secularism. Besides its more frivolous aspects, this reclaiming of the rights of the senses presents a crucial moment of his critical secularism, as Heine strips Christian symbolism from its spiritual content and reduces it in radical manner to its literal meaning, thus literally secularizing religion. But this provocative secularization amounts to more than simply an iconoclastic affect. For Heine, the program of reinstating the flesh, the senses, and joy expresses not just his anticlerical penchant but is also part of his critical secularism that seeks to free us from both obsolete notions of outdated morality and its modern versions that aim at yet another subjection of the individual who still awaits emancipation. Secularized Jewish Jesus As Heine’s secularism does not shy away from a direct engagement with religion, it subjects Jesus and even God to a bold and provocative treatment of radical secularization. In the case of Jesus, Heine’s seemingly infidel attitude produces a stunning portrayal that functions as a critical intervention in the discourse of Jewish emancipation. What the conscientious friar in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Nathan the Wise had done in diplomatic manner, namely, point out that Jesus was, after all, a Jew, Heine now turns into a critical point of contention. If Jesus was the man he was said to be, a fair look at the history of religion would have to admit that it was, after all, the Jewish contribution that provided Christianity with its religious substance, so often claimed to be superior to Judaism. For Heine, reclaiming Jesus as a Jew means more than just the conciliatory gesture it was for the kindhearted friar in Nathan the Wise. For Heine, the Jewish claim to Jesus signals a particular kind of secularization, one that secularizes Jesus from divinity into human being, but not in order to devalue him as a figure. On the contrary, this secularizing move signals, in the case of Jesus, that recognition of his humanity calls for a fundamental reevaluation of the Jewish role in the construction of European culture. As a consequence, a secularized
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Jesus does not cause the end of religion per se but, rather, the end of the claim to universalism of one particular religion and the opening of modernity to a degree that allows Judaism as equal participant in its secularizing project.9 In Heine’s appropriation of Jesus, Jesus and his symbolism mark the points of rupture where the Jewish theme makes its appearance.10 Jesus comes to stand for the Jews, and the Jews come to stand for Jesus. This poetic equation creates a point of reference that links secularization to religious freedom and equality. It thus prefigures twentieth-century notions of secularization as a genuine chance for religion to reinvent itself.11 Heine imagines Jesus, the Jew and compassionate brother of the Jews, as a figure who not only presents Judaism as equal to Christianity but one who brings home the point of Judaism’s importance as origin of Christianity. Furthermore, Heine’s Jesus also redefines modern spirituality in terms of the emancipatory secularist aspects of his gospel. And indeed, who other than Jesus performs the ultimate act of secularism, as he is sent down to earth among the humans? Yet Heine gives this theological doctrine of Jesus’ secularism his own, one could say, ‘‘Jewish’’ turn. This reclaimed Jesus has not come to redeem the world, for where could the traces for such redemption be found? Instead, Heine’s Jesus serves as a symbol for all that calls for and awaits redemption. This Jesus stands for the irreducible particularity that alone can provide the solid ground to anchor any nonexclusionary ecumenical universalism. In contrast to the church, which casts Christ, as Heine points out, as the founder of a religion for delinquents, Heine salutes Jesus, his fellow brother, as the one who brought mankind the great teaching of freedom and equality that, in the guise of the French Gospel, inspires today’s world (Briegleb, 2:493; Robertson, 160). And it is precisely in this context that Heine sums up for the first time his theory of secularization: 9. The programmatic reclaiming of Jesus by the Jewish historian Abraham Geiger as a sign of the cultural significance of Judaism for Christianity and, as a consequence, for Western civilization is most likely inspired by Heine, who was also a source of inspiration for other nineteenth-century German Jewish historians, such as Heinrich Graetz. For more on Abraham Geiger, see the exemplary study by Susannah Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 10. In addition to the passages discussed, see also the opening of Shakespeares Mädchen und Frauen (Briegleb, 4:173). 11. For a discussion of secularization as an opportunity for religious self-examination, see Hermann Lübbe, Säkularisierung: Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: K. Alber, 1975).
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Nur so lange die Religionen mit anderen zu rivalisieren haben, und weit mehr verfolgt werden als selbst verfolgen, sind sie herrlich und ehrenswert. . . . Wie den Gewerben ist auch den Religionen das Monopolsystem schädlich, durch freie Konkurrenz bleiben sie kräftig, und sie werden erst dann zu ihrer ursprünglichen Herrlichkeit erblühen, sobald die politische Gleichheit der Gottesdienste, so zu sagen die Gewerbefreiheit der Götter eingeführt wird. (Briegleb, 2:518) [Only when religions have to compete with one another, and are persecuted rather than persecuting, are they magnificent and admirable. . . . A system of monopolies is as harmful to religions as to trade; they remain alive through free competition, and they will only return to their original splendour when political equality of worship is introduced—free trade in gods, as it were.] (Robertson, 182) If this passage in ‘‘The City of Lucca’’ seems to extol the American model of freedom of religion and trade, this is not Heine’s last word. But we must remember that for the European secularists, America was the country that pointed to the future, a country where, indeed, freedom of religion presented a crucial aspect of the constitution of the new world. Yet Heine does not allow himself to be blinded by crude economism. Instead, his application of economic terms to expose the reality of organized religion does not imply any value other than a heuristic one. Translating religious practice into its economic consequences, Heine succeeds in exposing, at the same time, the hypocrisy of religion and the lie of supposed economic freedom, just as in his On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany he focuses on the social consequences religion produces across the board. As he expresses it polemically in ‘‘The City of Lucca,’’ Ist es doch eine bekannte Bemerkung, daß die Pfaffen in der ganzen Welt, Rabbinen, Muftis, Dominikaner, Konsistorialräte, Popen, Bonzen kurz das ganze diplomatische Corps Gottes, im Gesichte eine gewisse Familienähnlichkeit haben, wie man sie immer findet bei Leuten, die ein und dasselbe Gewerbe treiben. . . . Die geistlichen Kaufleute, solche die von Religionsgeschäften ihren Unterhalt gewinnen, erlangen daher auch im Gesichte eine Ähnlichkeit. (Briegleb, 2:486) [After all, it is a familiar observation that priests all over the world, rabbis, muftis, Dominicans, consistory counsellors, Orthodox popes, Chinese bonzes, in short, God’s entire diplomatic corps, have a cer-
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tain family resemblance in their faces, such as is always found in people who practise the same trade. . . . Hence spiritual merchants, who make their living in the religion business, acquire a similarity of features.] (Robertson, 154–55) If it is the economic occupation and station that determine individual appearance, Heine’s insistence sounds quite close to Marx’s point that it is the material base that determines consciousness rather than the other way around. However, Heine takes this insight literally but playfully, as he continues formulating a striking parallel to modern trade practice: Freilich, einige Nuancen entstehen durch die Art und Weise wie sie ihr Geschäft treiben. Der katholische Pfaffe treibt es mehr wie ein Commis, der in einer großen Handlung angestellt ist; die Kirche, das große Haus, dessen Chef der Papst ist, gibt ihm bestimmte Beschäftigung und dafür ein bestimmtes Salär; er arbeitet lässig, wie jeder, der nicht für eigne Rechnung arbeitet und viele Kollegen hat, und im großen Geschäftstreiben leicht unbemerkt bleibt—nur der Kredit des Hauses liegt ihm am Herzen, und noch mehr dessen Erhaltung, da er bei einem etwaigen Bankerotte seinen Lebensunterhalt verlöre. (Briegleb, 2:486) [Admittedly, some nuances result from the manner in which they pursue their business. The Catholic priest pursues his like the clerk employed in a large company; the church, the great commercial house whose chairman is the Pope, gives him a specified occupation and pays him a specified salary for it; he works sluggishly, as does anyone who is not working on his own account, has many colleagues, and can easily remain unobserved in the great hubbub of business— he cares only about the credit of the company, and still more about its survival, since he would lose his source of income if it were to go bankrupt.] (Robertson, 155) And while the Catholic priest’s attitude is that of a little employee of a big corporation who is less concerned about actual sales than the longevity of the company that provides for his needs, Heine’s Protestant reverend foreshadows key features of the Protestant entrepreneur of Max Weber’s theory of the ride of capitalism: Der protestantische Pfaffe hingegen ist überall selbst Prinzipal, und er treibt die Religionsgeschäfte für eigene Rechnung. Er treibt keinen Großhandel wie sein katholischer Gewerbsgenosse, sondern nur
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einen Kleinhandel; und da er demselben allein vorstehen muß, darf er nicht lä