Contention and Trust in Cities and States
Michael Hanagan
l
Chris Tilly
Editors
Contention and Trust in Cities and States
Editors Michael Hanagan Adjunct Professor of History Vassar College Poughkeepsie, New York USA
Chris Tilly Institute for Research on Labor and Employment University of California Los Angeles USA
ISBN 978-94-007-0755-9 e-ISBN 978-94-007-0756-6 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6 Springer Dordrecht New York Heidelberg London Library of Congress Control Number: 2011923979 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
To Chuck and Louise Tilly: parents, teachers, scholars, friends
v
Introduction Michael Hanagan
l
Chris Tilly
Charles Tilly got us thinking about contention and trust in cities and states. When he died in 2008, he left a table of contents and first chapter from a planned manuscript titled “Cities and states in world history.” We took this very preliminary, but wide-ranging, work as a provocation to explore cities and states, the relations and interactions that link them, and the networks of trust and fault lines of contention that striate their relations with their populations. We extended that provocation to a set of scholars of cities and states, contention and trust. We did so first in a double issue of Theory and Society (Hanagan and Tilly 2010) that collected 13 of the essays in the current volume. We then newly provoked a wider circle of researchers, generating ten additional, complementary articles to complete this collection. Five are longer empirical essays in the same vein as the first group, and five are short Spotlight pieces that each zooms in on an issue demanding particular attention. The result is no festschrift. Our approach throughout, and that of the contributors, has not been so much to celebrate Charles Tilly’s work, as to use it as a point of departure. For some authors, his work serves as an inspiration, others see Tilly’s work more critically. All take the discussion of cities and states to new settings, ask new questions, and formulate new analyses. But let us take a step back. Preoccupation with the power of the state, with the social organization of cities, with the connections between the two, and with the implications of both for the lives of ordinary people dates back to the origins of social science. Charles Tilly shared these preoccupations. His attention to state-making (e.g., Tilly 1985, 1990), to states’ roles in repression and contention (e.g., Tilly 1986; McAdam et al. 2001), and to the determinants of democratization and de-democratization (e.g., Tilly 2005, 2007) are well known. But Tilly also returned repeatedly to examination of cities, in early work as an urban sociologist (e.g., Tilly 1965, 1974), in mid-career reflections (Stave 1998; Tilly 1998), and in his lifelong work on revolution, collective violence, and contention that scrutinized the urban context of many such activities. Thus, the unfinished “Cities and states in world history” marked a return to recurrent themes for Tilly. The issues raised by his one completed chapter, “Cities, States, and Trust Networks” (which immediately follows this Introduction), concerning relations among cities, states, politics, and trust
vii
viii
Introduction
networks, touch on themes long central to his work. Tilly’s growing interest in world history also makes this work a new departure. On to the process of provocation. We invited a number of distinguished scholars, 26 in all, to contribute research and commentary on cities and states. The group is exuberantly interdisciplinary, comprising geography, history, political science, sociology, and urban planning. These researchers’ subject matter spans from prehistory to the present, sprawling across six continents. Some were collaborators or students of Charles Tilly’s, some more distant colleagues in the social sciences or history, and some had little or no connection to Tilly and his work. The tether uniting these pieces is that all authors looked at “Cities, States, and Trust Networks,” and were enjoined to engage in some way with Charles Tilly’s work. (The first wave of essayists were also sent Tilly’s seminal 1996 article “What Good is Urban History?” and the second wave were sent our Introduction to the 2010 collection.) The result is, in our view, a rich, multilayered dialogue among diverse scholarly viewpoints. The dialogue coalesces around five main themes, around which we have organized the volume. The remainder of this introduction consists of discussion of the five themes as they thread through the 23 papers. The themes are: (1) historicism and historical legacies, (2) state-making, remaking, and unmaking, (3) city–state relations, (4) trust networks and commitment, and (5) democracy and inequality. Conceptually, we start at the lofty level of history and epistemology, descend from there to the still commanding heights of the national state, and then proceed downward to cities and the more grassroots phenomenon of trust networks, closing with the core political, economic, and social consequences of the interplay of these varied levels. The papers do not crisply sort themselves by theme; most touch on more than one of the five themes. Consequently, we have built a little repetition into this introduction in an attempt to do justice to the authors’ multifaceted analyses. We hope the resulting limited redundancy enlightens more than it stultifies.
Historicism and historical legacies: contingency and endurance Charles Tilly intended his book on world history to discuss big structures and large processes by means of huge comparisons. Working to scale, our introduction begins with a brief discussion of an enormous methodological issue, that of historicism. Many of our contributors discuss historicism although there is sharp disagreement about its utility. In an opening dialogue Rod Aya and Lynn Eden debate the extent and nature of Tilly’s commitment to historicism and pay quick tribute to a beloved mentor. Essays by Ariel Salzmann, Marcel van der Linden, and Hwaji Shin illustrate the variety of historicist perspectives. Tilly was known as a student of state formation who explored the emergence of modern, consolidated states and the growth of cities in a historicist vein. He defined historicism as the idea that “past social relations and their residues—material,
Introduction
ix
ideological, and otherwise—constrain present social relations, and consequently constrain their products as well” (Tilly 1996). As Marcel van der Linden points out in this volume, Tilly agreed with the sociologist Robert Merton that historicist approaches were necessary because even the most rational and considered actions often yielded “unanticipated consequences.” Actions often resulted in outcomes far different than their initiators expected or individual need required. But Tilly also raised a related question. How, despite unanticipated consequences, did social action nonetheless produce systematic, durable, social structures? To answer this question, he forged a chain from trial and error to self-correction to incremental but systematic and ultimately durable changes in social relations and culture (Tilly 1996, p. 709). Tilly’s emphasis on structure and contingency gets at the heart of any sophisticated historicist argument. Contingency is a powerful force. Small events can have wildly disproportionate outcomes. A degree or so fall in average temperature led to the abandonment of the Greenland colony, closing the Scandinavian route to North America in the fourteenth century. Two centuries later, in a warmer Atlantic, an Italian seaman sailing for Spain charted a new route to North America. It might be diverting to ask what would have happened if Norwegians had settled in North America in 1350, but the ramifications are so great that the game loses much of its interest (Fagan 1999). What role is left for structure? The relationship between structure and contingency has been hotly debated with regard to class. Some, such as Friedrich Engels (1970), have argued that class consciousness is an inevitable product of worker exploitation, and that the working class will sooner or later become a “class for itself.” In contrast, E.P. Thompson (1964) depicted class formation as a conjuncturally specific set of historical events. Echoing this viewpoint, Marxist Eric Hobsbawm colorfully commented that class consciousness is not like a bus, in that if you miss the first one you can catch the next. Enduring structures emerge from contingent origins. Social historian Tilly, of course, lined up with this latter view. In the lead Spotlight essay in this early portion of our collection, Roy Aya and Lynn Eden adopt a dialogic format to discuss Tilly’s commitment to historicism and the extent of his rejection of rational choice approaches and methodological individualism. Aya sees a giant contradiction in Tilly’s work and finds him, despite his protests, to be a secret methodological individualist. Formally to be sure, Tilly rejected as inadequate rational choice theories centered on the premise “that people will do what they think will get them what they want.” But Aya claims that Tilly’s emphasis on causal mechanisms and the primacy of social relations and his relational realism are “just rational choice under different constraints.” When we examine what Tilly actually does, Aya argues, we find “a model whose elements are people trying to make the best of their situation as they see it over time.” In response, Eden de-emphasizes the elements of contradiction and underlines Tilly’s effort at synthesis and his effort to bring together diverse strands of social analysis. According to Eden, Tilly was driven by a “tension between two sensibilities”—an openness to contingency and an effort to generalize. Tilly was not alone in his effort. Numerous essays in this collection walk the tightrope
x
Introduction
between contingency and structure, balancing Merton’s emphasis on unintended consequences with Marx’s interest in durable structures. As you read the essays by Salzmann, van der Linden, and Shin imagine how they would be told by historicists, by structuralists, or methodological individualists. Contingency and structure play key roles in all their analyses. Many of the essays in this collection weigh in on the historicist debate and, in a sense, all do so fashioning arguments that employ different methods of explanation. Ariel Salzmann, Marcel van der Linden, and Hwaji Shin launch particularly interesting and relevant historicist departures from Tilly’s works. Salzmann’s analysis of the treatment of groups whose religion was different from the ruler shows how contingent actions can harden into durable structures—in this case focusing on cultural understandings, religious communities, and institutions. Salzmann compares the treatment of Jewish minorities in Western Europe with that of Jews and Christians in the Islamic world between 600 CE and 1914 CE. She asks: why were entire Jewish and Muslim communities expelled from Western nations while Christian and Jewish communities were successfully integrated into a Muslim state, without being completely absorbed? Salzmann’s answer points to the historically contingent roots of sturdy structures of inclusion and exclusion. At least part of her argument hinges on the unique and never-to-be repeated historical context in which social compacts were established in the societies conquered by the Arabs in the seventh and early eighth centuries. This founding understanding was also strongly shaped by the existence at the time of Christian majorities in the Near Eastern and North African lands that the Arabs had conquered. While the results of these compacts were quickly embedded in institutions and laws, Salzmann argues that such compacts, when reinforced by concrete institutions, established a broad cultural consensuses about relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims that would endure in the Islamic world for centuries to come. Salzmann discusses several of the principal religious trust networks of the period: Christians and Jews in the Islamic world, Muslims and Christians in the European world. But Jews form the chief object of her study. Jews were a minority in both the western Catholic and the Muslim world and present a classic example of a trust network, defined as “major, long-term, collective enterprises at risk to the malfeasance of others” (Tilly 2005, p. 4). Of course, Jews shared a common religion; they also spoke a second language common to the group. In a world where charitable giving was monopolized by religious institutions, Jews developed their own institutions to help fellow believers. In worlds where their religion was not hegemonic, Christian and Muslim minorities formed similar networks. Accepted by the Arab conquerors, Jewish and Christian trust networks were able to integrate themselves into Islamic society in a variety of contexts. In contrast, she argues that Jews came late to Western Christendom, arriving at a point when some niches typically filled by Jews in the Muslim world—literate bureaucrats, capital providers, and people with contacts throughout the Mediterranean—had already been filled by Christian clergymen who regarded the Jews as rivals. Never strong, the position of Jewish minorities in Europe weakened, weakness opened them up to
Introduction
xi
plunder and thus to further weakening—and so on in an ever-descending spiral. European Jews found themselves increasingly confined to ghettos which imposed occupational limitations on them and made it more difficult for them to integrate into the larger community than for their compatriots living in the Muslim world. It was a relatively short step to expulsion. Salzmann identifies with Tilly’s historicist approach at the same time as she takes his argument in a new direction. Not only does the construction of the trust network itself include a large cultural component, so do the ties relating it to the larger society. The picture that Salzmann draws is of Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Islamic society sharing a vision of appropriate roles and relationships. Trust networks and commitment are not things apart but exist in a larger cultural context. Marcel van der Linden also provides a striking demonstration of a historicist point, showing how the actions of abolitionists, missionaries, and the British navy produced historical outcomes that would have utterly surprised all actors and shocked many. In response to the power of the abolitionist movement the British government introduced a series of practices to combat slavery that were later, in a stunning turn of events, used to facilitate British imperialist domination in Africa. Over time, responses to the durable inequality of slavery created other structures designed to dismantle it. After the 1807 passage of the “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade,” to respond to slavers’ subterfuges British authorities pursued one strategy after another. Each proved fruitless and each increased British control in West and South Africa, moving Britain down a contingent path toward new structures of domination. In retrospect, this gradual penetration and control over large portions of the African continent seems to have led almost inevitably to the expansion of imperialism on the African continent in the 1880s. But this is to ignore the intent of most of the staunch abolitionists who had initiated and long sustained the process of British expansion into Africa. No one in the early 1800s could have foreseen the partition of Africa in the late 1880s. Hwaji Shin’s article on the formation of Japanese identity in the first half of the twentieth century focuses on the formation of national identity that persists to this day. In so doing, her work helps explain the mechanisms that contributed to the replication of inequality for Korean migrants over decades. She argues that the particular exclusionary identity that appeared in post-1945 Japan must be understood, not as an eternal conflict between Japanese and Koreans, but as linked to official efforts to deal with the legacies of imperialism in the defeat in war. According to Shin, modern Japanese identity—with its focus on the ethnic homogeneity of the homeland—was an image produced and sustained by the post–World War II collapse of empire. In the era of imperial expansion that preceded World War II, Japanese imperialists had encouraged the idea of pan-Asian identity, promoting a front of Asian peoples united by a common culture against Caucasian imperialist domination. On these terms hundreds of thousands of Korean workers entered Japan to labor in industry. The end of the war and the loss of empire created a “Korean question” in Japan. Politicians sought to deal with restive Korean workers, some suspected of Communist sympathies; Koreans occupied jobs seen as rightly belonging to Japanese colonists fleeing advancing Chinese armies. Japanese bureaucrats
xii
Introduction
responded by reinventing Japanese identity to include only those within the nation sharing a homogenous cultural identity, consigning Koreans to deportation or semi-clandestine assimilation and inferior status in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1980s and 1990s, years of Japanese boom and bust, this same policy of deportation, discrimination, and denial of citizenship to Koreans and newer immigrant groups was pursued unreflectively. The 1950s policy was re-implemented without debate or discussion, according to Shin, in large part because a bureaucracy that imposed the 1950s policy was still intact in the 1980s and applied the very policies it had initiated then. Hwaji Shin shows us the origins and impact of this trust network, a network of Japanese imperial officers posted in the colonies, where they formed ties of mutual aid among the few Japanese. What renders this network so significant is that its members became responsible for the formulation of a Japanese citizenship policy crucial to national identity formation. In the wake of imperial collapse a small part of the Japanese bureaucracy, the Immigration Bureau, imposed a narrow definition of Japanese identity on a defeated population, and later reconstituted itself to impose this definition even in the very different climate of the 1980s and 1990s. Like the trust network described by Salzmann this one was based on longstanding ties. Where van der Linden’s networks built new institutions, Shin’s preserved old ones within a preexisting institution, the Japanese state. In Shin’s postwar Japan, an “insider” network (made up of those formerly “outsiders” in the colonies they administered) enacted policy decisions that resonated with popular fears and suspicions of Koreans and quite literally shaped a new Japanese culture and identity. Here culture was not just, as in Salzmann, a context for the functioning of trust networks, but a consequence of that functioning. (One suspects there is yet another trust network story to be told about how Koreans banded together for mutual support in postwar Japan.) Though Shin rounds out the group of essays that make up our part headed Historicism, other chapters also address this cluster of issues. For instance, a number of essays other than Shin’s take a closer look at the process of identity construction so critical to the maintenance of durable social structures. A key element of any historicist argument concerns the mechanisms for both the spawning of innovation and the reproduction of tradition, and identity formation can bridge the two. Wim Blockmans’s contribution shows how after 1000 CE a new mercantile class emerged in growing cities to assume civic and commercial responsibilities that had disappeared after Roman emperors and Germanic kings had dropped the reins of government. Originally stepping in to perform occasional commercial chores, merchants gradually expanded their competence and became conscious agents of urban capitalism. Contingent interventions accreted into structural roles. Nine hundred years later, Elisabeth Clemens also shows how business communities—in this case in urban America—organized themselves into collective bodies and forged distinctive identities. But in this case the typical identity was a political one basing itself in the broad middle classes and using charity to sustain a claim to represent the general good. Though US urban elites stumbled onto this identity through experimentation, they developed a vested interest in the role, and fiercely
Introduction
xiii
defended it. Interestingly, at the outer end of both Blockmans’s and Clemens’s accounts, we see these structures being displaced—by formalized state institutions and national charities, respectively. We further examine those transitions below. Sidney Tarrow, in his reexamination of the French revolution, and Antonina Gentile, in her analysis of the rise of neoliberal governments in Europe and the USA, also scrutinize how contingent political coalitions, platforms, and reforms hardened into enduring structures; we discuss their accounts in the next part, State-Making. Of course, historicist approaches are only one set of weapons in the quiver of social scientists and historians. Not everyone in this collection agrees either in whole or in part with historicism. Edward Soja criticizes the foregrounding of time as against an emphasis on spatial analysis. Beginning like Tilly in the era of the Neolithic revolution in the Near East, he thoughtfully criticizes Tilly’s definition of the city. In his essay in this collection Tilly defines the city as a “human settlements combining significantly denser resident population than their surrounding territories, differentiation, and inequality within the resident populations, some central authority, and nodal locations within existing networks of communication.” Soja, however, argues the first cities were formed by egalitarian bands of hunters and gatherers, preceding inequality and authority but laying the foundations for their later development. Soja criticizes Tilly’s definition for teleologically combining urbanization and state formation, distracting us from understanding how urban population concentration in itself has propelled social change. In sum, discussions of historicity in this collection offer a rich grab-bag of ideas. They show us repeatedly how path-dependent contingency shapes enduring structures—structures that may then be reshaped or shattered by a later wave of historically contingent events. The authors highlight identity formation as one key step in processes connecting contingent human actions and choices with persistent social realities. Several of them spotlight empires, exploring worlds that parallel the world of Westphalian states that drew most of Charles Tilly’s attention, and probing the applicability of Tilly’s concepts in these parallel worlds. And one paper, that of Edward Soja, offers an explicit, spirited challenge to historicism, proposing instead a “geohistory” that puts spatial differentiation at the center of social change.
State-making, unmaking, and remaking In one of his most memorable article titles, Charles Tilly (1985) described “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” The making, unmaking, and remaking of states was a persistent preoccupation for Tilly, dating back to his dissertation and first book, The Vende´e, about the French counterrevolution of 1793, and extending through decades of work (for example, Tilly 1964, 1975, 1978, 1990, 1993; Tilly and Blockmans 1994). Perhaps inevitably given this output, and especially given the state’s central role in other Tilly literatures on contention, democracy, identity, and citizenship, Tilly’s
xiv
Introduction
work embodies some of the tensions present in social scientific and historical treatments of the state in general. Thus, Antonina Gentile, in her contribution to this volume, identifies at least two Tillys studying the state: the “polity model Tilly” analyzing the give and take of contention, concession, and repression, and the “statist Tilly” scrutinizing top-down processes of state formation. Not to be outdone, Sidney Tarrow discerns three Tillys, studying revolution, war, and state-building, respectively (though on closer examination this troika regroups into a revolutionand-contention Tilly and a state-and-war-making Tilly quite similar to Gentile’s dyad). Clearly, Tilly figures here both as a thinker in his own right, and as a proxy for distinct literatures that have not sufficiently engaged each other. How do we explain the sometimes violent and extractive, sometimes permeable and responsive, nature of states? Can we link the processes involved in toppling and remaking states with those entailed in making states in the first place? How can widening our field of vision beyond Tilly’s favored terrain of European national states over the last millennium enrich our understanding of the determinants of state form and content? Start with Tarrow, who takes as his case study the canonical case of state unmaking and remaking, the French revolution. Tarrow discards accounts explaining the course of the revolution in terms of class interests or political philosophy, instead directing a Tillyan (and Tarrovian) attention to political processes and the recurrent mechanisms that give them a somewhat systematic (if still contingent) character. Tilly, he notes, described long-term state-making processes in terms of bargains struck and repeatedly renegotiated between rulers controlling a war-making apparatus and elites controlling commerce and wealth—between coercion and capital. The initial result was precisely the “protection racket”—pay me and I’ll make sure nothing bad happens to you—that led Tilly to characterize statemaking as organized crime. Over time, however, states bargaining with citizens shifted toward added duties of “adjudication, distribution, and production.” Tarrow’s claim is that the French revolution, in a compressed period of a few years, recapitulated this process that took centuries the first time around. He traces how the revolutionaries quickly centralized control and administration, made war with established European elites, and crushed contenders for localized power or rollbacks of the revolutionary mandates. But the revolutionary government’s claim to legitimacy also quickly led to the need to organize the provision, distribution, and pricing of food, “[laying] the foundation for the machinery of the modern secular state.” Mounting a citizen army to consolidate revolutionary power and to attempt to extend it abroad via invasion soon led to the need for conscription. The new social pact implied in this large-scale mobilization of citizens helped produce “both modern citizenship and its inequalities.” In short, state-making seems to follow similar patterns whether undertaken slowly and incrementally, or rapidly in the whirlwind of revolution. If states take different forms depending on the relative weight and position of coercion and capital, national states emerging from empires mark an important special case of this process. Miguel Angel Centeno and Elaine Enriquez consider the transition between empire and post-imperial state(s). How does the persistence of imperial legacies shape successor states and former colonies? Centeno and
Introduction
xv
Enriquez trace the origins of their essay to their search for some area of scholarly interest “under-explored” by Tilly. Looking at empire, they sought to explore ways in which he “may have approached the sociological phenomenon of empire. . . using his characteristic forms of inquiry and interest to suggest links between imperial phenomena and national state outcomes.” Like Tilly, Centeno and Enriquez seek “to develop a discourse around state transformation.” Centeno and Enriquez advance a list of propositions about the impact of imperial legacies that draws on the discourse that Tilly developed in analyzing the consolidated state. The concern for warfare, money, the state’s ability to extract it, and the role of capital in politics are central to Centeno and Enriquez’s analysis of empire formation as they were central to Tilly’s study of state formation. Their propositions neatly embody the tension between structure and contingency. Each proposition starts by stating an expected legacy of empire, but each such statement is followed by an exception to the rule: “Under some circumstances, however. . . .” Thus, Centeno and Enriquez argue that empires generate complex administrative structures that are inherited by post-imperial states, except when they rely on indirect rule that retards the development of bureaucracy; that empires “require efficient capital-extraction systems, which lead to well-developed state fiscal structures,” except when they prove so lucrative that they obviate the need for tax collection; and so on (in these cases, Spain falls into the “exceptional” category). The imperial context discussed by Marcel van der Linden, Hwaji Shin, and Centeno and Enriquez raises questions of special interest to historians (Centeno 2003). What are the forces in empire formation and how similar is the process of empire formation to that of the consolidated state formation so thoroughly studied by Tilly? They push us to look at the character of decision-making under conditions of multiple sovereignty and the question of how consolidated states develop from transnational polities, in situations of differently empowered polities, governed by local rulers with supreme power within their domain but subordinated to an often distant metropole. Centeno and Enriquez present an effort to adapt Tilly’s approach to the study of empire but we might also consider the limitations of his approach for the study of empire. Tilly’s analysis of state formation focused on the competitive state system in which the threat of war forced every country to fight to survive. It was a world in which a change in the balance of power was sufficient justification for a declaration of war. But as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, pp. 16–17) pointed out, such a world was atypical and infrequent in world history; empires have been more common (Wallerstein 1974, pp. 16–17). As Karen Barkey has argued recently (Barkey 2008, p. 14), empires were often based both on force but also on administrative and political flexibility as well as on constant negotiation with potential troublemakers. Empire-ruled worlds were not worlds in which states continually stretched every last resource to engage in war. Indeed, one legacy of empire might be its generation of less cutthroat state systems among the nations emerging from imperial dominions. Both the Spanish empire and the British empire as they sloughed off the raiments of empire left relatively
xvi
Introduction
noncompetitive state systems in their place among their heirs in Latin America and among the North American colonies south and north of the St. Lawrence River. Fernando Lopez-Alves looks at this other side of the imperial coin, contemplating the formation of newly independent states in Latin America, including a brief contrast with their northern neighbor the United States of America. In the Americas we see a string of successful revolutions extending from the American revolution in 1776 to Cuba’s independence in 1898, concentrated in the explosion of independence movements in New Spain in the early 1800s. If Tarrow cocks his eye for similarities across history, Lopez-Alves trains his eye on differences across geography. As Lopez-Alves observes, Tilly noted that though the nation-state is the archetype of the modern state, nation-states (i.e., states containing a single nation in ethnic terms) were rare in the Old World. Far more common were national states agglomerating various nations and national minorities, such as Great Britain’s collage of English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish. In the New World, given the presence of native peoples and African slaves, states faced even more extreme ethnic diversity. However, Lopez-Alves points out that upon independence the new states of the Americas rapidly consolidated nation-states. Why and how was this the case? Lopez-Alves argued that the newly empowered elites of Latin America saw ethnic diversity as an existential threat. Unlike their forebears and counterparts in Europe, they were not able to draw on centuries of tradition and historical symbolism to shore up their state’s legitimacy. Nor, as weak states, did they have the wherewithal to launch invasions of neighbors, rallying citizens with war-making and external threats. Instead, they embarked on highly deliberate accelerated nation-building projects—the term proyecto de nacio´n remains in common use in Latin America to this day—using appeals to a bright, shared future to construct robust new shared imaginaries uniting their populations across ethnic, racial, and class lines. This drive was reinforced by the dominant European political philosophies of the early nineteenth century, which emphasized the desirability of consolidating smaller nations into larger ones. The new Latin American republics also consciously promoted European immigration to “whiten” their populations and further anchor the new national identities. This highly planned and rapid process of nation-building in some ways echoes Tarrow’s Jacobins, who quickly built a new state. But the Europeans on the western side of the Atlantic had different tools at hand, inventing a vision of the future rather than invoking the glories of the past. The echo is stronger when comparing Latin America with the USA, another new nation founded on dreams of the future. But, Lopez-Alves says, the new Latin American states constructed a secular vision of material progress, whereas in the case of the USA moral progress was central to the national vision. Given this moral claim, and, we might add, the fact that most of the continent west of the original 13 American colonies was colonized lightly or not at all, the USA incorporated into its identity a conception of “manifest destiny” for regional dominance, and a vast process of territorial expansion largely absent in Latin America. Leaving aside revolutions and war-making, Smita Srinivas tackles the softer side of state-making, the construction of welfare states, a process Charles Tilly gave
Introduction
xvii
relatively little attention. Srinivas traces the differential development of social insurance schemes in early industrializing countries and late industrializers, with special attention to India. Like Lopez-Alves, she reveals again that European templates are not necessarily replicated in the rest of the world. Research on early industrializers, especially in Europe, has led to a notion of a standard trajectory from localized mutual insurance systems based in affinities such as family, church, and community, to national-level, unified, government-run systems via processes of incorporation and displacement. Even in the early-industrializing category, Srinivas deconstructs this hypothetical trajectory in two ways. First, she distinguishes between insurance institutions based in place (residential location), work (labor force status), and work-place (employer provision of benefits). The US system, leaning heavily on employer-provided health and retirement benefits, looks quite different—and responds quite differently to a changing economic environment— than European systems with redistributive, government-guaranteed social insurance. Second, she points out that even among nations that ended up with similar systems, the historical trajectories varied widely: for instance, Britain accommodated residential mobility far earlier than nearby Holland. In the interim between community-based and national systems, a welter of “corporations” took up the slack, including “fraternities, mutual insurance guilds, universities, communes, military orders, and city-states.” Adding late industrializers to the mix yields even wider variation in the lines between local and national coverage, Srinivas demonstrates. Japanese universal health insurance, while in many ways resembling European systems, combines workplace-based coverage with national community-based health insurance rooted in community-level jyorei health programs. More typical of late industrializers, Srinivas argues, is the Indian case. Outside of islands of coverage the Indian state offloads the insurance function onto local institutions rather than incorporating or linking up with these institutions: “evolution remains stunted and local, never merging into any grand ocean of national solidarity and industrial welfare.” For much of the Indian population, social insurance depends on localized organizations akin to medieval Europe’s corporations rather than on national stateconstructed rules. Of course, the recent shift to neoliberal economic governance regimes means that even among many early industrializers, safety net responsibility has increasingly been outsourced from the national state to regional and local authorities, affinity groups, and individuals themselves. Antonina Gentile examines the reversal of state trajectories represented by this neoliberal turn. Gentile starts from the contrast between the “two Tillys” cited above and a third Tilly, he of “Globalization Threatens Labor Rights” (Tilly 1995). This added Tilly depicts a state that, unlike the stern states of “polity model Tilly” and “statist Tilly,” protects workers from the ravages of an unfettered market; he argued that since globalization shifted markets’ increasingly out of states’ control, it would undermine hard-won working class gains. Not so fast, says Gentile. She contends that changes in state policy itself, not state-bypassing global markets, account for labor’s weakened state in many
xviii
Introduction
countries. Understanding these shifts requires examining a unit of analysis distinct from the state itself, namely parties contending for political power. Furthermore, she holds, today’s neoliberalization continues a process promoted by a hegemonic USA since the end of World War II, though interrupted in significant ways by the Cold War. She reviews histories of late twentieth century Britain and Australia, and mid-twentieth century Italy and Germany, to make her case. Gentile’s account directs our attention away from broad economic changes and toward historically and politically determined, and therefore highly contingent, shifts at the level of the individual state and of international alliances. This is a case of remaking the state, not through revolutionary change as in Tarrow’s essay, but through domestic and international contention reverberating in existing state structures. Gentile notes that her two main Tillys hang their analyses of the state on a Weberian notion of state monopoly of organized means of violence. Javier Auyero, Carmenza Gallo, Diane Davis, and Jeff Goodwin, however, highlight important current exceptions to this monopoly, raising the specter of displacing the state to a greater or lesser extent. Auyero, in a shorter Spotlight piece, discusses “violent specialists” (Tilly 2003), professionals at fomenting and carrying out targeted violence for political purposes. His particular focus is extrastatal violence carried out on behalf of powerful groups—parties, elites—often with the collusion of state agents. Such violence is often wrought in the name of “order,” but blurs the boundaries of the state, not incidentally undermining democracy and the rule of law. Carmenza Gallo, illustrating the differential implementation of varied sets of rights with the case of Colombia, also examines the use of extrastatal violence even in situations where democratic rights per se are well entrenched. She argues that in fact, rights to security in person and property are far more difficult to implement than basic democratic rights. Davis examines the growing role of private armed forces, in particular those mobilized by criminal networks (gangs, drug cartels). As criminal enterprises, such as smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband, go global, these networks have done so as well, as Davis illustrates with examples from Mexico, Brazil, and El Salvador. Rather than doing the state’s dirty work as in Auyero’s examples, such criminal networks build significant coercive power that unmakes the state in important ways, for example offering Mexican law enforcement officials the choice of plata o plomo (“silver or lead,” i.e., a bribe or a bullet). We discuss Auyero, Gallo, and Davis further elsewhere in this introduction. Goodwin, another Spotlight author, considers violence that seeks directly to unmake the state via attacks on civilians: oppositional terrorism. Oppositional terrorism is in some ways the mirror image of Auyero’s subject matter: rather than using extrastatal violence against civilians to extend the reach of state power, terrorists use such violence to challenge state power. They consciously undermine the “protection racket” at the heart of Tilly’s account of state-building, seeking to demonstrate the state’s inability to protect its civilians. Goodwin’s concern is less with the process of terrorism than its rationale: why violently attack civilians? He concludes that oppositional forces adopt terrorism most commonly when broad groups of civilians are seen as complicitous in state attacks on an oppressed and excluded group: “Extensive state terrorism. . . begets extensive oppositional
Introduction
xix
terrorism when the state has popular support, usually because the dominant ethnic group has significant democratic rights and political influence.” In this tour of state-making, unmaking, and remaking, we have cycled from the storming of the Bastille to the Battle of Algiers. Thanks to the contributors, we have encountered two, three, many Charles Tillys contemplating the state from varied vantage points. We are reminded that states are at times much like a Mafia don, at other times powerful contenders with popular and sectional interests, at still other times protectors of labor rights and vulnerable populations. Perhaps most importantly, we are reminded that how states are made—whether by slow accretion, imperial rise or disintegration, or revolution—and remade, places enduring imprints on their form and function. Zooming in to the relation between cities and states affirms all of these insights on a somewhat different terrain.
City-state relations Charles Tilly’s essay in this collection poses the question of “how our incredibly connected world emerged from the once-fragmented relations between cities, states, and trust networks.” Tilly was interested in more than the degree of world integration, he was also interested in the character of that integration. In the concluding sections of his paper he asks about power relations between cities and states and about the integration of cities into states. The essays in this collection respond to this challenge in two related ways. First, they address the importance of scale in the relationship between states ruling larger territories and cities occupying smaller subsets of those territories. Second, they examine the political articulation between cities and states, on the whole making a stronger case for wide variation in that articulation than for a modal or tendential pattern. In Charles Tilly’s formulation, the rise of the nation-state is a triumph of scale. Tilly’s Figure 1 summarizes the direction of evolution of city-state relations with a large arrow pointing toward integration of cities and states, and toward state domination of that integrated complex. Despite the continued existence of some city-states, and of cities that evade the writ of their national states, Tilly argues, over the long sweep of history power has shifted to nation-states. Wim Blockmans adds historical detail to Tilly’s schematic proposition, showing the importance of increasing urban scale in precipitating a greater state role. Blockmans documents that in the early centuries of the last millennium, to a large extent merchant trust networks organized life in European cities. But as cities grew, they outstripped the ability of trust networks to govern them, and increasingly urban actors established and expanded institutional state structures. (We discuss Blockmans’s analysis further in the section on Trust Networks.) We can see a Tillyan arrow pointing from city-state segregation to integration. In this process, territorial rulers often intervened and helped build local states accountable to national ones—generating a second Tillyan arrow from city dominance to state dominance.
xx
Introduction
But before we accept this account of scaling-up of power, we must take account of an elaboration and a riposte that also crop up in this set of articles. The elaboration is empire. As noted above, Miguel Centeno and Elaine Enriquez, Marcel van der Linden, Ariel Salzmann, and Hwaji Shin remind us that over much of the populated territory of the world, over most of human history, empires rather than nation-states represented the dominant form and scale of territorial power. A unidirectional arrow from autonomous cities to centralized states may offer a good approximation of the earliest centuries of human history, as cities gave way to empires, and also of the last thousand years of European history. But in between, elsewhere, and even within recent European history many empires have crumbled—at times displaced by competing empires in a scale-preserving process, but at other times scaling down into localized states or even cities. Today, the empires that survive are the ones that have successfully incorporated hinterlands into a unified nation-state, such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and the USA (though ongoing struggles by Chechens, Kashmiris, Puerto Ricans, Tibetans, and Yanomami remind us that such integration is not always definitive). In place of a single scaling-up arrow, it would be plausible to argue that the global trend has been scaling up to empire followed by scaling down to the nation-state. At a minimum, the “many a wiggle” Tilly acknowledges in the process of centralization and integration merit closer examination. Beyond the elaboration on empire, there is an even more incendiary riposte. Edward Soja ignites the blaze by throwing three bombs. Soja’s bunker-buster, as we have observed, is a thorough-going reinterpretation of world history. “There may indeed be a trend toward increasing state vs. urban power,” he allows, but this misses the main point: “cities and the urbanization process have provided perhaps the most important generative force behind every major breakthrough in human geohistory” (geohistory, recall, is Soja’s term for a reconceptualization of human experience that restores space to a rightful equal status with time). States may have the power, but cities have the spark that has repeatedly generated social, technological, and cultural advances. According to Soja, a one-sided focus on change over time at the expense of variation across space has blinded not only Tilly but most social scientists and historians to this regularity. Soja’s other two projectiles are more modest in scope. His second blast, also previewed above, posits that cities preceded centralized authority of any kind. His evidence is the ruins of Jericho in modern-day Jordan, C¸atalho¨yu¨k in Turkey, and other ancient locales in the region, dense and differentiated settlements with no archeological evidence of hierarchy or authority that predate by thousands of years cities showing the residues of state power. As Soja notes, Tilly nods toward these settlements but concludes that they are not cities precisely because his definition, following much historical convention, includes “some central authority.” So Soja’s conclusion directly contradicts Tilly. Ironically, however, at the same time it reinforces Tilly’s arrow. If urbanization preceded the creation of even a local state by thousands of years, that implies a Tillyan shift toward integration of cities and states over time. But Soja’s third missile flips Tilly’s arrow by introducing the concepts of rescaling and regionalization. In the last three decades, Soja argues, globalization
Introduction
xxi
and the flexibility of economic processes have shaken up established hierarchies of scale, diminishing the significance of the national state and increasing the power and prominence of both multinational regional entities (such as trade blocs) and subnational metropolitan regions. Although Soja stops short of arguing that cities are gaining power at the expense of states, he does insist that metropolises are becoming more important and that conventional conceptions of the geographic and power structures of nations are becoming obsolete. Diane Davis’s contribution illustrates the process of rescaling. As we alluded to above, she describes how, in countries like Mexico and Brazil, non-state actors, most notably organized crime groups involved in the drug trade, bypass the state by forging direct economic connections between their city-based organizations and the global economy and by creating their own groups of armed enforcers. The result is “subnational and transnational communities of allegiance,” newly flourishing illicit trust networks like the Salvadoran-originating Mara Salvatrucha and the Mexicanoriginating La Familia Michoacana that use global-scale economic muscle to challenge the state on its home turf of monopoly of repressive power. Thus, this collection’s discussion of scale in city-state relations shapes up to be something of a brawling debate. Tilly and Blockmans tell a familiar story of the scaling up of the locus of authority. But empire-gazers van der Linden, Salzmann, and Shin suggest that the scale of power has followed a more zigzag path. Urbanists Davis and Soja point to contemporary rescaling processes that shift key activities and networks both above and below the national level. And Soja goes farther to preach outright subversion of conventional state-centered historicism. Turning to the political articulation between cities and states, the contributions offer up some debate as well, but rather more exploration of the dimensions of variation in that articulation. Few giant arrows here: rather, primarily a set of historically grounded maps of many possible relations between city and national state. Peter Marcuse does erect a large arrow. It points from the national and international conflict between dominant and subordinate classes, to the reproduction of that conflictive interface on the urban scale. But Marcuse points out that this central conflict only goes part of the way to explaining urban form and processes. Along with a logic of domination, urban space is governed by a functional logic based on which land uses it is efficient to co-locate and to separate. Functional spatial logic dictates that housing should be located near shopping facilities, and far from slaughterhouses and chemical plants. A cultural logic also shapes urban form: ethnic enclaves and gay zones may result in part from exclusion, but in large part from self-selection. Nonetheless, the central axes of urban contention are shaped by broader economic and social divisions, particularly those of class. Susan Fainstein, in a brief Spotlight contribution, brings a different lens to bear on the struggles between dominant and oppositional forces that power Marcuse’s story, using the term urban social movements to categorize a range of oppositional struggles centered in cities. While Marcuse focuses single-mindedly on opposition from the left, Fainstein notes that right-wing anti-tax and anti-immigrant movements have been among the most successful urban mobilizations in the USA. However, she agrees with Marcuse on the democratic and progressive potentials
xxii
Introduction
in this form of movement, particularly its ability to cross community-labor divides that have persistently stymied working class politics in the USA (Katznelson 1981). She distances herself from more sweeping claims about the importance of urban social movements, such as those of Manuel Castells (1983), describing them as one important social actor among many, and judging that in the global north their power peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. She concludes that their effectiveness has depended crucially on their ability to influence or directly control significant parts of the local state or party system. Implied here is a significant degree of relative autonomy of the local state from the national one. Patrick Heller and Peter Evans pick up on the theme of relative autonomy to parse the links between city, national state, and social movements in Brazil, India, and South Africa. Implicitly challenging Marcuse’s arrow, they point out that despite similar progressive, populist regimes, South Africa and Brazil manifest utterly different state-city relations: in the former case top-down, in the latter case far more decentralized and bottom-up. Indeed, their second case gainsays Tilly’s arrow toward greater national state dominance as well, since Brazil’s urban empowerment is new, with roots in a recent social movement upsurge and a new constitution. More broadly, Heller and Evans problematize the relationship between national and local democracy, and thus between national-level democracy and local lived relations of inequality, based on a comparison of cities in the three countries. They conclude that in India and South Africa, national-level democratic impulses have been channeled into top-down, technocratic reforms that constrain local autonomy, ultimately compelling redistribution-minded national governments to form alliances with entrenched local political machines, freezing local inequalities in place. They approvingly cite Arjun Appadurai’s (2002) phrase “citizens without cities” to capture this juxtaposition of national democracy with local exclusion. In Brazil, in contrast, decentralization and institutionalization of participatory processes have forged a virtuous circle between national democracy and local democracy fueled by social movements, opening the way to successful assaults on categorical inequality. Heller and Evans’s exercise bridges the theme of city-state relations and our final theme of linkages between democracy and inequality, and indeed the duo’s ideas will make another appearance in our discussion of that theme. Smita Srinivas’s comparative history of the social safety net also spotlights the interplay between localities and the national state. In her telling, among many late industrializers the state has failed to build a national welfare system, leaving local communities (along with religious groups and families) responsible. In effect, she argues, countries like India have not (yet?) traveled up Tilly’s giant arrow to national centralization when it comes to social welfare. Teleporting from Srinivas’s modern Bangalore to a collection of early twentieth century US cities, we observe through Elisabeth Clemens’s eyes local urban elites grappling with yet another local-national dilemma: how could they retain control over organized charity (another “corporate” system for assisting those in need) in the face of federal government attempts to privilege national-level organizations? Whereas Srinivas primarily fingers a low-capacity national state for continued reliance on local welfare systems, Clemens points out that even within modern
Introduction
xxiii
capitalism, turf-conscious local influentials may also contest nationalization. This clash puts Theodore Roosevelt’s designation of the national Red Cross as the organization responsible for relief efforts following the 1906 San Francisco fire and earthquake in a different perspective. As Clemens shows, far from welcoming this endorsement of private charitable initiative, Bay Area worthies scrambled to reverse the decision. Clemens’s story sheds light on two of our Big Arrows. It conforms with Charles Tilly’s schema with regard to centralization, since we know the Rotary Club and the Community Chest (now the United Way) have in fact ceded ground to the Red Cross, nationally regulated systems of unemployment insurance and welfare, and FEMA. But it challenges Peter Marcuse’s mapping of national interests onto local ones, reflecting in inverted fashion Heller and Evans’s rejoinder. Heller and Evans show that when champions of the subaltern hold national government, their attempts to implement a redistributive program may, willy-nilly, contribute to disempowerment and marginalization of popular classes at the city level. Clemens adds that local ruling classes may resent and resist the centralizing impulses of their national-level counterpart. On the relationship between cities and states, then, our authors have much to add to Charles Tilly’s two-by-two diagram showing increased city-state integration and state dominance over cities. Some amplify his story by fleshing out historical detail. Others nuance it by showing continuing variation in the degree of integration and dominance. Still others challenge Tilly’s summary by extending history backward, forward, or sideways to different regions. Though nearly half the contributions in this volume could comfortably fit under the heading of City-State Relations, our nod to the cross-cutting nature of the central themes is to include four in the part of the book with that heading. We start with Fainstein’s evocation of contemporary urban social movements, and then move progressively backward in time to Clemens’s early twentieth century US cities and Blockmans’s European cities circa the turn of the first millennium, closing with Soja’s essay that takes us back to the (urban) dawn of geohistory.
Trust networks and commitment Common to the world of empires and consolidated states and binding together many different kinds of political and social structure are the links that Tilly defined as trust networks. They can undertake responsibilities sometimes performed by states; they may support and reinforce state structures; and they are often a tempting target for predatory states seeking resources. Reinforcing and elaborating Tilly’s idea of the trust network is his emphasis on commitment. According to Tilly trust networks are “commitment-maintaining” connections expressed in “common languages, secret lore, distinctive communication lines.” They take the form of “shared religion or ethnicity, trading ties, work-generated solidarities, communities of taste.” Commitment is reproduced by “birth within households or by person-by-person enlistment.”
xxiv
Introduction
Tilly’s definition of trust networks and commitment was capacious, including many different types of social and cultural formations. Contributors to this collection provide striking ways of thinking about various kinds of trust networks and using them in empirical research. Their essays address several important questions emerging from Tilly’s work. First, how are trust networks formed? Tilly devoted a good deal of attention to the operation and dissolution of trust networks but relatively little space to the manner of their creation. From a medieval and early modern perspective, as Wim Blockmans shows us trust networks that involve multistranded relations between individuals and groups. They may start with simple relations, single strands, maybe only casual encounters, but as the number and variety of ties increase they bring individuals more intimately together. Blockmans’s medieval European trust networks were the product of face-to-face encounters at markets and intermarriage among mercantile families, which compounded into new networks within and between cities. As cities grew, merchants took responsibility for providing security and guaranteeing financial transactions, activities earlier undertaken by states. Between 1000CE and 1600CE merchants in the great commercial belt from the southern Low Countries to northern Italy, constructed networks: to facilitate travel, to administer growing cities, to organize confraternities and guilds, to form jointstock corporations for long-distance commercial transaction, to participate in urban political factions, and to provide a literate and secular officialdom to serve expanding states. Over time they created a mercantile identity not only within the community but within an entire trading network. Each of these projects intertwined with the others and strengthened commercial identities. As we have noted above, where Blockmans focuses on trust networks as based on personal contact, Elisabeth Clemens shows us middle-class reformers working to construct an institutionalized trust network that would capture civic consciousness for the emerging US urban elites. Such an institution fused personal ties and institutional structure. In the early twentieth century, laissez-faire advocates decried what they saw as the corruption of charitable giving. They mocked what they believed to be the crowds of skillful shirkers who feigned illness or incapacity. One laissez-faire solution was to recruit solid middle-class volunteers, often women, who were charged with the task of sorting out charities and deciding which ones were worthy of sponsorship and which were not. Decision-makers, largely members of the elites, were recruited via networks based on informal contacts and reputation. Over time, this organized volunteerism created a network of institutions. Such a system was exemplified in the Community Chests of the 1920s, which played an important role in many communities. Essentially the Community Chest, predecessor of the modern United Way, was an organization of organizations. Hwaji Shin shows us the origins and impact of another trust network, that of Japanese imperial officers posted in the colonies, where they formed ties of mutual aid among the few Japanese. What renders this network so significant is that its members became responsible for the formulation of a Japanese citizenship policy crucial to national identity formation. As we have seen, in the wake of imperial
Introduction
xxv
collapse a small part of the Japanese bureaucracy, the Immigration Bureau, imposed a narrow definition of Japanese identity on a defeated population, and later reconstituted itself to impose this definition even in the very different climate of the 1980s and 1990s. Like the trust network described by Clemens this one was based on longstanding ties. While there may not be any honor among thieves, there is trust. Diane Davis presents yet another case of trust network construction and expansion, in which localized gangs follow the paths of drug networks and other criminal activity to escape local confines and become a transnational organization. Contemporary Latin American gangs initially formed in urban environments that offered comfortable rewards for criminals and little danger of repression from semi-powerless, and often corrupt, local authorities. The evolution of gang life follows the migration networks of these young men, for example, jumping from El Salvador and Guatemala to Mexico City and Los Angeles and recruiting in each location. Returnees deported or fleeing police in foreign countries help to maintain the two-way connections across this transnational network. Borders no longer loom large in group calculation nor in the construction of group identity. In a second question about trust networks, many of our contributors follow Tilly in asking about the conditions under which trust networks are segregated and entirely distinct from states and under what conditions are they integrated into states. Blockmans presents a classic case of the dissolution of segregated trust networks by predatory rulers. Blockmans’s trust networks ended as the power of the European state increased and, he argues, as the scale of human communication and interaction reached its limits. As cities grew, financial trust networks split and factionalized. Mercantile communities outgrew their face-to face informality and, lacking communicative technologies to keep in sustained contact with their fellows, were forced to institutionalize. But institutionalization further encouraged factionalism and made trust networks sitting ducks that could easily be incorporated by growing states that craved their resources, both in money and in personnel. Desperate for public servants who were literate, informed, and secular, rulers recruited state officials from the urban commercial classes, freeing states from dependence on the church. Though integration of trust networks into the state may expand state capacity, it may actually destabilize the state. The fractiousness of the urban elites in the medieval and early modern city is mentioned by Blockmans as one of the reasons for the collapse of mercantile polities. Charles Tilly argued that capital-intensive states were characteristically unstable. The reason for this instability, Sidney Tarrow has posited, is precisely that mercantile interests were integrated into states in a way that favored the perpetuation of special interests and discouraged any concern for the commonweal. Following the chain of city states and autonomous regions that ran down the center of Western Europe from Amsterdam to Florence, the phenomenon of bitter urban rivalry and suicidal factionalism was most prominent in the south. Taking the case of Florence, Tarrow (2004) shows that wars were undertaken as interest-earning investments; government decisions were often made by short-lived pacts of private interests; and underlying all decision-making was a fear of popular revolt. In such a polity it was all too easy to make foreign
xxvi
Introduction
policy decisions by looking at the account book. Penny-wise and pound-foolish merchants refused to invest in personally unprofitable wars even if they redounded to the long-term good of the commune. Complementing Blockmans’s account of the capture of commercial trust networks by the state, Tarrow reinterprets the event as the capture of the state by commercial trust networks. Clemens provides a dramatic example of the integration of trust networks into government, that of Theodore Roosevelt’s tapping a nearly moribund Red Cross to mobilize national resources to help an earthquake-ravaged San Francisco. Rather than create a federal authority to perform this task, the US president encouraged the growth of an independent, private volunteer organization. Looking over the longer historical sweep, what is remarkable is that unlike European monarchs in the early modern period, Roosevelt did not view trust networks as a threat to state power nor did he seek to seize their resources. Instead he supported the growth of independent volunteerism as a way of mobilizing reformers for national purposes. Although Clemens does not discuss the situation in her brief paper, it is worth recalling that the president’s enthusiasm for voluntary organization was partial. He did not try to extend rights to radical groups such as the Industrial Workers of the World nor endorse the civil rights agenda of the Niagara Movement. He did try to promote a middle-class, private volunteer organization, probably for the same reasons that urban elites supported the Community Chest: because it brought middle-class men and women into government to pursue universally approved tasks. The Latin American polities described by Diane Davis and Carmenza Gallo at first glance seem to show a contrary pattern of separation and in some cases outright hostility between trust networks and the state. In Davis’s Mexico and Gallo’s Colombia, despite regular and competitive elections and other trappings of democracy, groups of armed men with no state sanction—gangs, paramilitary squads, private security forces, vigilantes—circulate more or less freely, defending the interests of a variety of trust networks. The model looks more like warlordism than what we think of as modern governance. But upon closer examination, manifold links emerge between the state and the freelancers. The armed groups’ free circulation is itself premised on buying off or otherwise enlisting the support of police, military, and government officials. Criminal enterprises may enjoy support from elites or even broader publics if they provide economic benefits and physical security. So while official government discourse deplores extrastatal violence, invariably shadowy ties connect the state with the perpetrators of that violence. Javier Auyero’s Spotlight essay in this collection further considers cases like those analyzed by Davis and Gallo. He stresses the continuum between statesanctioned violence and private violence. Violent specialists can be found within armies and police forces as well as among criminal gangs and vigilante groups. But often, as in the cases instanced by Davis, a gray area exists, underpinned by tacit or explicit understandings between gangs and police, vigilantes and soldiers. Auyero suggests the importance of such groups and also the difficulty of studying them when information is more plentiful and easier to obtain about private groups than about relationships between public and private violence specialists.
Introduction
xxvii
Businessmen, middle-class volunteers, and gangsters may belong to trust networks but so do members of mutual aid societies. Smita Srinivas’s discussion of welfare states underlines one of the enduring problems of late industrializing states. By absorbing welfare trust networks, the states could greatly increase the commitment and identity of the citizens, as well as pooling risks more broadly. Yet the cost of such integration is so substantial that only partial integration is possible. As a result, the injured, sick, aged and incapacitated remain dependent on particularistic institutions, reinforcing their loyalty to these non-state groups. She points out that in European history national welfare states developed out of and incorporated local institutions. The modern Indian state has established a welfare system based on compulsory workplace insurance, but given the relatively small formal sector this scheme’s reach is quite limited. Meanwhile, the state has proven unable or unwilling to integrate myriad local relief mechanisms based on community, caste, language, religion and jati (occupational/caste/clan categories peculiar to Indian society). A variant of the question about state-trust network integration inquires: under what circumstances do trust networks engage in collective political action? For most of their long history most trust networks have tried to remain outside politics for fear that political engagement would attract the attention of predatory rulers. Tilly noted that democratic governance provides a climate in which they could participate in political action. Of course, as Gallo points out, even in regimes with competitive parties and regular elections, trust networks are not likely to enter politics in force when there is every chance that critics of the elite will be assassinated. A number of papers in the volume take on the question of political action by trust networks by examining the special case of social movements, which themselves typically incorporate trust networks. A less violent version of democracy than that sketched by Gallo offers a more encouraging environment for trust network mobilization, but that does not ensure that government will incorporate the networks. Patrick Heller and Peter Evans, analyzing what is often called the political opportunity structure (though they do not use the term), depict democratic governments that exclude trust networks from meaningful participation. Their contribution, which we have discussed above, compares Brazil, India, and South Africa, three stable democratic politics. In all three cases, vibrant local civic and social movement organizations are active in politics. But top-down governance in India and South Africa locks out such organizations. The contrary case is Brazil, where integration of local grassroots networks is widespread due to the construction of decentralizing institutions and political traditions. In addition to Heller and Evans, Fainstein, Marcuse, and Tarrow all analyze urban social movements, though their concerns center on outcomes—democratization, reform, defense or rights, and in Tarrow’s case revolution and state reconstruction—rather than the functioning of the networks themselves. Marco Giugni takes another tack by focusing broadly on the concept of political opportunity structure, asking whether that concept still packs an analytical punch and how it could be strengthened. Political opportunity structures (POS) were an important element in the political process orientation to which Tilly subscribed in the 1990s. Definitions of POS abounded but they generally referred to features of
xxviii
Introduction
regimes and institutions that facilitate or hinder a political actor’s collective action. Tarrow and Tilly identified six dimensions of opportunity: “(1) the multiplicity of independent center of powers within the region, (2) its openness to new actors, (3) the instability of current political alignments, (4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers, (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates political claim making and (6) decisive changes in any and all of these regards” (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p. 189). Despite the efforts of scholars such as Tarrow and Tilly to define the term more precisely, sometimes it almost seemed that the whole universe of political contention was divided in two. On the one hand there was the social movement seeking to win concessions by mobilizing masses and searching to frame demands to make them acceptable to the larger society. On the other hand, there was the POS, which included all the rest of the political world. Some scholars considered POS as structures shaping social movement behavior while others saw them as dynamic factors that altered political prospects. No wonder many complained that the concept was too broad and unwieldy. Giugni argues for a reshaping of the term: (1) to take account of discursive opportunities, (2) to look at opportunities as specific to fields (3) to examine how activists perceive alternatives and (4) to approach the study of social movements more dynamically through attention to mechanisms and processes. His essay is filled with suggestive ideas. Perceived opportunities are a generally neglected area of investigation, despite Kim Voss’s important article on labor movement framing. Voss sought to explore why some labor movement defeats were viewed by labor militants as catastrophic and final while others were portrayed as temporary setbacks in a great and ongoing struggle. In 1885–1886 a devastating defeat led to the destruction of the American Knights of Labor while defeats on a similar scale of the British New Unionists proved only temporary losses in the construction of a mass unionism in Britain. Part of the reason for these outcomes was the Knights’ own perception of massive defeat while the New Unionists spoke of a moral triumph and proclaimed their faith in the eventual triumph of their class (Voss 1998). The issue of perception also suffuses Ann Mische’s discussion, in this volume, of recent decades of youth activism in Brazil in ways that focus on trust and distrust. Such activism flourished in a highly factionalized political environment, with intense trust within factions and sharp distrust and competition between them. Mische discovers that rather than finding the splintering distrust demoralizing, activists reported that it added to their exhilaration and commitment. Giugni’s call for dynamic POS analysis is perhaps his most challenging point. On this score, students of historical state formation may feel a bit frustrated by Giugni’s omission of one important dimension of dynamics, the role of POS in state formation or state dissolution, which could have built interesting links with some of the papers in our State-Making part. Situations of fragmented sovereignty and composite states are the everyday material of many historians and trust networks can play a significant role in filling political lacunae. But certainly other papers in the volume implicitly rise to Giugni’s challenge. One example is Wayne Te Brake’s discussion of the unexpected emergence of religious tolerance in daily
Introduction
xxix
life in post-reformation Europe. Te Brake, whose work we discuss in more detail below, presents a dynamic view of political contention in which an emphasis on conditions that defines POS is joined with an emphasis on dynamic factors that constitute processes and mechanisms. His analysis takes into account the wide variation in state forms in early Modern Europe. Te Brake’s essay presents a striking example of the use of mechanisms to explain the emergence of religious coexistence. In his study, religious diversity was sheltered and ultimately preserved by a variety of mechanisms rooted in trust networks: secrecy, dissimulation, casuistry, private education, indifference, connivance, and toleration. Here trust networks play a new role in the explanation of contentious action. Giugni also argues that the changing relations of states with transnational actors, increased integration of states and private interests, and a globalizing economy require the reformulation of the POS idea. His mention of Tarrow and della Porta’s emphasis on the need to study “multilevel opportunity structures that challenge traditional, state-centered conceptions of political opportunities” is intriguing (Tarrow and della Porta 2005). Of course the need for such an approach is reinforced by Davis’s study of Latin American violent entrepreneurs. Her essay shows criminal gangs ignoring states and operating across borders from Central America to the USA as state power, at least in some settings, dissolves in favor of trust networks extending across borders. POS might seem to dissolve along with states but we would argue, following Giugni, that this represents instead an opportunity to rethink the nature of the linkages binding political trust networks within state systems. A third broad question shifts the focus from the trust networks’ relationship with politics and the state, to their relationship with culture and society. How can we relate trust networks with the broad feelings that emerge from citizenship or from other forms of broad-scale allegiance? Again, Wayne Te Brake, in addition to Ariel Salzmann whose work was also discussed above, offers useful contributions in this vein. Te Brake presents what initially seems like a familiar discussion of persecuted religious groups as trust networks, but his story takes an unusual turn. Te Brake argues that in Reformation and Post-Reformation Europe religious toleration moved upward from local trust networks, not downward from rulers as is often claimed. His portrait has important differences and similarities from the emergence of tolerance in the medieval world depicted by Salzmann. Salzmann shows us how tolerance came to predominate in the Mediterranean Islamic world, partly as a result of a publicly established, social covenant, enshrined in state institutions, early on in the Muslim conquest, which regulated inter-religious attitudes. In contrast, Te Brake goes beneath the level of European state politics where religious beliefs were sometimes imposed on all subjects to a local world where religious diversity might flourish. The mechanisms that preserved diversity were numerous. Sometimes sustainable agreements were made among local communities before the ultimate religious settlement adopted by rulers was in place. Negotiation came more easily where treaties regulating local practice allowed some leeway for maneuver. Occasionally religious toleration emerged in an easygoing, everyday world where people did not inquire too deeply into their neighbor’s religious practices. In other places diversity was preserved where priests were protected from murderous attack
xxx
Introduction
by solidary peasant communities. Looking at people and at states, Te Brake reveals how the concept of religious toleration evolved from violent religious encounters through pragmatic local negotiations by local communities. Te Brake develops his argument beautifully by examining the physical sites of diversity and looking at how it was sustained. He looks at the Cathedral Church of St. Peter in Bautzen, Germany, shared by Catholics and Protestants for centuries; the Mennonite chapel in Lutheran Friesland that continues as a legacy of the PostReformation compromise; as well as Irish Mass rocks that served as foci of community spirituality and secret sites of religious practice when it was publicly suppressed. Te Brake argues that, in some but not all situations, interstate agreements ultimately followed the trends in diversity preserved by local level agreements worked out by mediation and negotiation or simply carried out clandestinely. One of the difficulties with Tilly’s idea of the trust network is the great variation among such networks. On the one hand trust networks include relatively small mercantile networks based on personal contact, and on the other they include Indian castes and religious groups embracing hundreds of millions. They include “outsider” networks far from the centers of power, which particularly attracted Tilly’s, Fainstein’s, Salzmann’s, and Te Brake’s attention, but as Blockmans, Clemens, and Shin describe, they also include “insider” networks of well-positioned elites. The wide-ranging essays making up this collection span a large slice of this variation. By examining network origins and the degree and nature of networkstate and network-society linkages across this diverse spectrum, they teach us about variation, but also help make the case for common elements in trust networks. Out of this wide-ranging set of discussions, we have selected Te Brake, Davis, Auyero, and Giugni to make up the part on trust networks.
Democracy and inequality Not surprisingly, this set of essays about cities and states has a great deal to say about inequality and democracy, and the relationship between the two. This is to be expected because Charles Tilly wrote extensively about those subjects (notably in Tilly 1998, 2007). Though Tilly’s introduction to Cities and states in world history does not directly analyze democracy or inequality, its preoccupations with the locus and forms of power, and the importance of trust networks, echo themes in his writing on these topics. Equally importantly, inequality and democracy command attention in explorations of cities and states simply because they are issues of great current concern. In broad terms, the authors in this collection make four main points about democracy and inequality. First, they point out that ex post redistribution is only a small part of how states act on inequality, and that in fact all rights are, to a greater or lesser extent, redistributive. Carmenza Gallo reminds us that democratic political rights, property rights, and civil rights all facilitate or bar various kinds of redistribution. Indeed, the very concept of “ex post” redistribution misleads because it posits a particular
Introduction
xxxi
“state of nature” that in actuality includes many products of state action, such as a stable distribution of assets. Gallo goes beyond this observation to argue that it is more difficult to institute rights that are more directly redistributive (thus engendering opposition from vested interests) and that require a denser set of rules (and thus demand greater state capacity). Based on this framework, she hypothesizes that electoral democracy (limited redistributive implications, modest regulatory demands) should be easier to implant than civil rights (which require a denser net of state regulation for support) and especially property rights (highly distributive and high maintenance). She bolsters this argument with evidence from the recent history of Colombia, where electoral democracy thrives but property rights and civil rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and even freedom from violent attack have all weakened under assault from armed groups, often in concert with local elites. Ariel Salzmann and Hwaji Shin also join this conversation, affirming that citizenship itself is a crucial redistributive right. States typically set criteria for citizenship in ways that ratify preexisting categorical inequality, for example, discriminating based on ethnicity or national origin (Shin) or creed (Salzmann). This in turn conditions individuals’ access to livelihood, rights to hold property, and even their right to continued residence within a nation-state’s territory. Salzmann in particular traces a complex interplay between citizenship rights for minority religions and states’ (redistributive) confiscation of their resources. Whereas in Muslim central Eurasia rulers taxed minorities for broad redistribution in a relatively stable arrangement, in the Christian West higher levels of state-sponsored plunder of Jews and Muslims undermined these groups’ usefulness to national elites, with destabilizing consequences that often culminated in expulsion. A second point emerging from these essays is that though democracy constrains the domination of capital, concentrations of capital also constrain the operation of democracy. Though stated in this way the point hardly seems contentious, in fact it significantly complicates the relation between democracy and inequality, as contrasting strands in this set of articles attest. Let us trace this complicating trajectory. As a starting point, Patrick Heller and Peter Evans offer a first-order statement of the relation between democracy and inequality: increases in democracy reduce inequality. They ground this proposition in Charles Tilly’s (2004, p. 128) definition of democratization as movements toward “greater categorical regularity, breadth, equality, binding consultation, and protection,” pithily summarizing the relationship as follows: “Democratization is best understood as an expansion in the quality of citizenship, which is about the institutionalized quality of a subject’s relation to government and its authority, which in turn exists in inverse proportion to the degree to which a subject’s relations to government are mediated by categorical inequalities.” As we have stated, Heller and Evans primarily examine the relationship between national and local democracy. But even setting aside the national/local disjunction, there is an evident limitation with using this logic to understand the relationship between democracy and inequality: Tilly, Heller, and Evans incorporate reductions in the impact of inequality into the definition of democratization, which risks rendering the relationship tautological.
xxxii
Introduction
While this broad definition of democracy is satisfying in many ways, it does not tell us much about how a more narrowly defined democracy is likely to affect inequality. Elisabeth Clemens adds a level of complexity. Her account of the role of business in local US systems of charity demonstrates that democratization of urban politics drove businesses to get involved in charity. But businesses’ strategic approach to charity limited the redistributive impact of this shift. Businesses used their involvement in giving to win legitimacy and to control the flow of resources directed toward social problems, forestalling more extensive redistribution that might challenge their interests. In short, the linkage between democracy and inequality is mediated by the strategies of key actors—in this case elites, in other cases social movements. Diane Davis, Javier Auyero, and Carmenza Gallo point to darker possibilities, emphasizing that even in circumstances of formal democracy, those controlling capital can short-circuit attempts at equalization by funding coercion independent of the state. As we have noted, Gallo uses the Colombian case to demonstrate that rights to property and even life are harder to ensure than democracy. Though we tend to think of insecurity of property rights as particularly affecting the rich, Gallo notes that Colombia’s dissolution of rural property rights has fallen most heavily on the poor, with 1.5 million peasants displaced in the 1990s. Auyero offers a more general reflection on how organized violence nominally outside the state, but often overtly or covertly supported by it, can be used by elites to consolidate their power and weaken democracy. His description applies to dirty wars in Latin America, but also to communal violence in India and white race riots in the USA. Diane Davis depicts another pattern of extrastatal coercion, limning symmetrical processes at work in countries like Mexico: on the one hand, new accumulations of capital through illicit activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and contraband sales give criminal entrepreneurs the wherewithal to organize paramilitary forces; on the other hand, the wealthy assemble their own private armies to insulate themselves from attack. In both cases, impunity mounts. Davis emphasizes that these corrosive processes are taking place in stable democracies—the degree of democracy is debatable in the case of Mexico, but Brazil meets even Heller and Evans’s exacting definition. Democracy does not necessarily offer sufficient tools to curb capital-driven coercion. In the cases Davis examines, such coercion in turn degrades democracy by marginalizing the state, implicating it, or feeding repression and surveillance. Broadening the frame beyond local and national states to encompass empires additionally complicates matters. Hwaji Shin stretches the democracy–inequality connection still further, turning Heller and Evans (and Charles Tilly) on their heads by exploring a case in which democracy and equality moved in opposite directions. In Japan’s shift from pre–World War II empire to postwar parliamentary democracy, Japan’s relation to other Asian nationalities morphed from imperialist, exploitative inclusion to democratic exclusion. Democracy set the framework for hardening of categorical inequalities. Miguel Centeno and Elaine Enriquez, also analyzing empires, observe that the USA forged an inclusive democracy out of empire via a combination of genocide and the spread of Eurasian epidemic diseases that essentially eliminated the original denizens of the country’s territory—echoing the
Introduction
xxxiii
construction of citizenship on the basis of mass expulsion of “others” in Salzmann’s account of European history. Centeno and Enriquez add that accentuation of inequality between metropole and periphery may underpin reductions in inequality in the parent state (see also Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). After all, apartheid, one of the most notorious expressions of categorical inequality, resulted from Afrikaners’ opportunity-hoarding attempt to overcome their subordinate status within white South African society. Many of this collection’s authors also make a third observation about democracy and inequality: the relationship between the democratic state and inequality is two-edged. The dual nature of the state is not a new idea: Karl Polanyi’s (1967) “double movement” oscillating between liberalization and regulation and James O’Connor’s (1973) twin imperatives of legitimation and accumulation anticipate some of the arguments advanced here. But this group of social scientists and historians offer fresh and forceful formulations of the issue. Michael Katz makes the basic point most directly: asking whether the state is the problem or the solution as regards social equality, he replies that it is both. He couches his discussion in a wry contrast between earlier left critiques of US systems of education, welfare, and urban policy, and more recent left defenses of the same systems in the face of conservative onslaught. The state is both a defender of inequality when compared to more radical alternatives, and an equalizing force when compared to more neoliberal ones. Katz calls on scholars to more clearly state their criteria for “success” or “failure” of government, since different criteria call for distinct responses to failure. He points to the need for scholars on the left to move beyond critiques, which may be harnessed to a conservative anti-government discourse, to a “comprehensive and coherent counter-narrative.” Davis’s and Gallo’s analyses also speak to the two faces of the state. Any social scientist or historian of Latin America must recognize that the state can shore up inequality—the recent history of dictatorships closely tied to economic elites makes a prima facie case. But both articles show how inadequate state capacity and the breakdown of the state’s monopoly on organized force can also have dramatically disequalizing effects. But not all the issue’s authors line up behind a dual conception of the state. Peter Marcuse determinedly marches to a different drummer. His essay depicts a capitalist state that, despite concessions to social movements, remains committed to defending economic privilege and heading off redistribution. While endorsing struggles for rights and reforms and conceding that opportunities for revolution by means of force are rare to nonexistent, he expresses skepticism about the electoral and policy battles that absorb the attention of many of the other authors. A fourth and final point about democracy and inequality is that while trust networks are building blocks of democracy, distrust may also play a productive role. Here Spotlighter Ann Mische raises a lone voice, but a compelling one. Drawing on her research on contemporary activists in Brazil, she argues for the importance of competition between parties and factions—hence, distrust—in building a healthy democracy and moving forward struggles against inequality. Trust and distrust function constructively at different scales: trust within a political grouping, distrust among groupings that spurs debate and mobilization. Writ large, this simply sings the
xxxiv
Introduction
virtues of contention, a tune familiar to Tilly and other scholars in the field, but Mische describes how even factionalism among oppositional forces energized activists and sharpened discussion. Indeed, she laments the unifying advent of Workers Party (PT) hegemony on the left as shifting left partisan politics back toward habitual, stagnant clientelist routines.
Concluding remarks Charles Tilly will never write his book on “Cities and states in world history,” and that loss gives us one more reason to mourn his passing. But as this collection demonstrates, the study of cities, states, contention, and trust networks is in good hands. These articles build on and extend Tilly’s analyses geographically and temporally, particularly by addressing the global South. They scrutinize important phenomena to which he devoted little attention, informing us about empires and their aftermath, and about elite trust networks as well as outsider ones. They include challenges to Tillyan generalizations, pitting geohistory against historicism, posing rescaling against a hypothesized trend toward national state dominance, and revealing disjunctions between equalization and democratization pace Tilly’s argument about the linkage of the two processes. And they break entirely new ground, surfacing questions, puzzles, and hypotheses about structure and contingency, state-making, city-state relations, trust networks, and the interplay between democracy and inequality that, like Tilly’s own work, will occupy scholars for generations to come. Charles Tilly would doubtless have responded to this collection with a combination of applause, hard questioning, vociferous counter-argument, and the formulation of new research agendas informed by the essays’ insights. We hope the readers will respond similarly.
References Appadurai, A. (2002). Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics. Public Culture, 14(1), 21–47. Barkey, K. (2008). Empire of difference: The Ottomans in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Castells, M. (1983). The city and the grassroots. London: Edward Arnold. Centeno, M. A. (2003). Blood and debt: war and the nation state in Latin America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Engels, F. (1970) [1880]. Socialism, Utopian and scientific. In Marx/Engels selected works (Vol. 3, pp. 95–151). New York: Progress Publishers. Fagan, B. (1999). Floods, famine, and emperors: El Nino and the fate of civilization. New York: Basic Books. Hanagan, M., & Tilly, C. (2010). Cities, states, trust, and rule [Special Issue in Memory of Charles Tilly, 1929–2008)]. Theory and Society, 39(3–4). Katznelson, I. (1981). City trenches. New York: Pantheon. Korzeniewicz, R. P., & Moran, T. P. (2009). Unveiling inequality: A world historical perspective. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Introduction
xxxv
McAdam, D, Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Polanyi, K. (1967) [1944]. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon. Stave, B. M. (1998). A conversation with Charles Tilly: Urban history and urban sociology. Journal of Urban History, 24, 184–225. Tarrow, S. (2004). From comparative historical analysis to ‘local theory’: The Italian city-state to the modern state. Theory and Society, 33(2004): 443–471. Thompson, E. P. (1964). The making of the English working class. New York: Pantheon Books. Tilly, C. (1964). The Vende´e: A sociological analysis of the counterrevolution of 1793. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tilly, C. (1965). Migration to an American City. Newark, Delaware: Division of Urban Affairs and School of Agriculture, University of Delaware. Tilly, C. (1974). An urban world. Boston: Little, Brown. Tilly, C. (Ed). (1975). The Formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, C. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. In P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the state back in (pp. 169–187). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (1986). The contentious French. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital, and European states, A.D. 990–1990. Oxford: Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1993). European revolutions, 1492–1992. Oxford: Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1995). Globalization threatens labor’s rights. International Labor and Working-Class History, 47, 1–23. Tilly, C. (1996). What good is urban history? Journal of Urban History, 22, 702–l719. Tilly, C. (1997). How empires end. In K. Barkey & M. von Hagen (Eds.), After empire: Multiethnic societies and nation-building: The Soviet Union, and the Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires (pp 1–11). Boulder: Westview. Tilly, C. (1998). Durable inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768–2004. Boulder: Paradigm. Tilly, C. (2005). Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2007). Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C., & Blockmans, W. P. (Eds.) (1994). Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800. Boulder: Westview Press. Voss, K. (1998). Claim-making and the interpretation of defeats: The interpretation of losses by American and British labor activists, 1886–1895. In M. Hanagan, L.P. Moch, & W. Te Brake (Eds.), Challenging authority: The historical study of contentious politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world-system 1: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-system in the sixteenth century (pp. 16–17). New York: Academic.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Hanagan and Chris Tilly
vii
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xli
1
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Charles Tilly
Part I
Historicism and Historical Legacies
2
SPOTLIGHT: Historicism, theory, and method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rod Aya and Lynn Eden
3
Is there a moral economy of state formation? Religious minorities and repertoires of regime integration in the Middle East and Western Europe, 600–1614 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ariel Salzmann
4
5
1
Unanticipated consequences of “humanitarian intervention”: The British campaign to abolish the slave trade, 1807–1900. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marcel van der Linden Colonial legacy of ethno-racial inequality in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hwaji Shin
19
27
43
61
xxxvii
xxxviii
Part II 6
Contents
State-Making, Remaking, and Unmaking
The French Revolution, war, and state-building: making one Tilly out of three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sidney Tarrow
79
7
Legacies of empire? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Miguel Angel Centeno and Elaine Enriquez
8
Nation-states and national states: Latin America in comparative perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Fernando Lo´pez-Alves
9
Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered . . . . . . . 129 Smita Srinivas
10
Party governments, US hegemony, & a tale of two Tillys’ Weberian state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Antonina Gentile
11
SPOTLIGHT: Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Jeff Goodwin
Part III
95
City-State Relations
12
SPOTLIGHT: Urban social movements, citizen participation, and trust networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Susan S. Fainstein
13
From city club to nation state: business networks in American political development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Elisabeth S. Clemens
14
Inclusiveness and exclusion: trust networks at the origins of European cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Wim Blockmans
15
Cities and states in geohistory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Edward W. Soja
Contents
Part IV
xxxix
Trust Networks and Commitment
16
The contentious politics of religious diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Wayne Te Brake
17
Irregular armed forces, shifting patterns of commitment, and fragmented sovereignty in the developing world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 Diane E. Davis
18
SPOTLIGHT: A gray area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Javier Auyero
19
Political opportunity: still a useful concept? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Marco Giugni
Part V
Democracy and Inequality
20
Institutions and the adoption of rights: political and property rights in Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 Carmenza Gallo
21
Taking Tilly south: durable inequalities, democratic contestation, and citizenship in the Southern Metropolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Patrick Heller and Peter Evans
22
Was government the solution or the problem? The role of the state in the history of American social policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 Michael B. Katz
23
The forms of power and the forms of cities: building on Charles Tilly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Peter Marcuse
24
SPOTLIGHT: Distrust in democracy: complex civic networks and the case of Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Ann Mische
Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Contributors
Javier Auyero Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University State A1700, Austin, TX 78712-0118, USA
[email protected] Rod Aya Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, OZ Achterburgwal 185, 1012 DK Amsterdam, The Netherlands
[email protected] Wim Blockmans Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, Wassenaar, Netherlands
[email protected] Wayne Te Brake School of Humanities, Purchase College, State University of New York, 2006 HUM Building, Purchase, NY 10577, USA
[email protected] Miguel Angel Centeno Sociology and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
[email protected] Elisabeth S. Clemens Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
[email protected] Diane E. Davis Department of Urban Studies, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
[email protected]
xli
xlii
Lynn Eden Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6165, USA
[email protected] Elaine Enriquez Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Peter Evans University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
[email protected] Susan S. Fainstein Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, 48 Quincy St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
[email protected] Carmenza Gallo Department of Sociology, Queens College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA
[email protected] Antonina Gentile Cariplo Fellow, Facolta` di Scienze Politiche, Dipartimento di Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare, Universita` degli Studi di Milano, Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milan, Italy
[email protected] Marco Giugni Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, 40 Boulevard du Pont d’Arve, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
[email protected] Jeff Goodwin Department of Sociology, New York University, 295 Lafayette Street, Room 4115, New York, NY 10012-1106, USA
[email protected] Patrick Heller Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
[email protected] Michael B. Katz History Dept., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
[email protected]
Contributors
Contributors
xliii
Marcel van der Linden International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
[email protected] Fernando Lo´pez-Alves Professor of Sociology, Global and International Studies, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, 93106 CA, USA
[email protected] Peter Marcuse Professor Emeritus of Urban Planning, Columbia University, New York City, USA
[email protected] Ann Mische Department of Sociology, Rutgers University, 54 Joyce Kilmer Avenue, 08854 Piscataway, NJ, USA
[email protected] Ariel Salzmann Department of History, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
[email protected] Hwaji Shin Department of Sociology, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CAUSA
[email protected] Edward W. Soja Department of Urban Planning, School of Public Affairs, University of California-Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CAUSA
[email protected] Smita Srinivas Urban Planning Program and Technological Change Lab (TCLab), Columbia University, New York, NYUSA
[email protected] Sidney Tarrow Cornell University, 102 McGraw Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, USA
[email protected] Charles Tilly Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1478, USA
[email protected]
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History Charles Tilly
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract An introduction to a vast but uncompleted survey of world history, this article argues that the study of the changing relationships among cities, states and trust networks can help us understand key elements of the emergence of our modern world. Beginning in ancient Uruk in modern-day Iraq, roughly five thousand years ago, the essay defines each of its central categories: city, state and trust network. It poses four questions to be pursued throughout the rest of the study. What determines the degree of segregation or integration of cities and states? What determines the relative dominance of cities and states? What determines the extent of separation or integration between cities or states, on one side, and trust networks on the other? What difference do these variable configurations make to the quality of ordinary people’s lives?
The now-small Iraqi city of Al Warka lies about 300 km south of Baghdad, not far from where the joined Tigris and Euphrates rivers empty into the Persian Gulf. The Bible calls the place Erech, but five millennia ago local people knew it as Uruk. Within a few hundred years after 3600 BCE, it grew into a dynamic power center, a center of long-distance trade, and a religious magnet. At its height, Uruk was probably the world’s largest city, with 50,000 inhabitants or more living in 6 square kilometers of walled area. For centuries, rulers of Uruk dominated the area of southern Mesopotamia then called Sumer. As the city grew, hinterland populations abandoned peripheral settlements and moved closer to the dominant metropolis (Adams 1972, p. 739). City and hinterland taken together, Uruk has a claim to have been the world’s first C. Tilly (*) c/o Chris Tilly, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1478, USA
M. Hanagan and C. Tilly (eds.), Contention and Trust in Cities and States, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6_1, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
1
2
C. Tilly
substantial state. Some time between 2800 and 2500 BCE a great king named Gilgamesh ruled Uruk. Soon after Gilgamesh’s time, the region’s people were remembering him as a god and reciting visionary, often violent stories about him. Scribes eventually recorded those stories on clay tablets as different versions of the Gilgamesh epic. In one version of the epic, Gilgamesh boasts about his city: See if its wall is not as straight as the architect’s string, Inspect its...wall, the likes of which no one can equal; Touch the threshold-stone—it dates from ancient times. Approach the Enna Temple, the dwelling of Ishtar, Such as no later king or many will ever equal. Go up on the wall and walk around, Examine its foundation, inspect its brickwork thoroughly, Is not its masonry of baked brick, Did not the Seven Sages themselves lay out its plans? (Postgate 1992, p. 73) The first texts of the epic that archaeologists have—literally—unearthed date from around 2100 BCE, some 500 years after Gilgamesh actually ruled Uruk. The stories pit their flawed hero Gilgamesh against the anti-hero Enkidu, against the monster Humbaba, and against the avenging Bull of Heaven. At first, tyrannical, restless Gilgamesh behaves like a young punk, molesting Uruk’s young women and attacking its young men. The gods answer Uruk citizens’ exasperated prayers by sending a brutish giant, Enkidu, to check Gilgamesh’s excesses. But Gilgamesh subdues wild man Enkidu. He does so not by means of armed combat, but by sending out the whore Shamhat to tame him. Shamhat seduces Enkidu, teaches him about civilization, and brings him into the city, where Gilgamesh and Enkidu wrestle to a draw, then form a fearsome alliance. From their urban base, the heroes conquer enemies in the surrounding mountains and plains. They also go out to fetch great cedars for construction of Uruk’s temples. When Gilgamesh spurns the goddess Ishtar, Uruk’s protectress, Ishtar sends the Bull of Heaven to destroy Gilgamesh along with his city. He and Enkidu vanquish the magic bull and save Uruk, but the outraged gods condemn Enkidu to die. Gilgamesh wanders mourning his lost friend until he reaches the wise Utnapishtim in Dilmun— most likely today’s Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf. The sage relates the story of a great flood remarkably like the Bible’s later account of Noah’s adventures. Utnapishtim then tells aging, grieving Gilgamesh about a plant that gives eternal youth. Gilgamesh dives into the sea, retrieves the plant, but loses it to a serpent. Disconsolate Gilgamesh returns to Uruk and dies. The Gilgamesh epic, however mythical, lifts some of the heavy clouds that obscure the first emergence of cities and states. It emphasizes that cities and states first formed together: rulers based in substantial, socially differentiated, and commercially active settlements conquered hinterlands and drew on hinterland resources (remember those great cedars Gilgamesh and Enkidu fetched!) to reproduce their rule. It underlines the importance of religious claims for early rulers’ legitimacy. Notably in the form of that massive wall, it dramatizes the constant threat of invasion and destruction by rebels from the hinterland or (more often) rival kings based in other cities. These distinctive features of early cities and
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
3
states deserve our attention because now cities and states interact very differently. These days, cities and their surrounding states often struggle with each other, citysustaining resources typically come from across the world rather than from the cities’ immediate surroundings, and few rulers of cities or states make serious claims to speak for the gods. No longer do states typically consist of a single city’s grip on its hinterland. The Gilgamesh epic also takes some unpacking that the ancient scribes did not provide. Implicitly, it distinguishes three kinds of connection between rulers and subjects, as well as among subjects: coercion, capital, and commitment. Coercion involves the threat or use of force, capital the deployment of goods and services, commitment the operation of ties that facilitate mutual recognition and coordination. The earliest cities and states would never have formed at all without substantial coercive connections; think of how young tough Gilgamesh treated his fellow citizens of Uruk. But no city or state can last long without renewing its supplies of goods and services, its capital. And some form of shared commitment connecting rulers with subjects as well as subjects with subjects—although not necessarily cults of living, jealous gods such as Ishtar—sustains every viable system of rule. A system of rule is a set of social relations among subjects and between rulers and subjects that a) reinforce subjects’ compliance to rulers’ directives and b) reproduce relations between rulers and ruled. Both cities and states have their own systems of rule, sometimes closely coordinated, sometimes at swords’ points with each other. Systems of rule vary from brutally authoritarian to gently democratic, but throughout the range reinforce compliance and reproduce ruler-ruled relations. Within systems of rule, we can usefully distinguish between relatively impersonal and relatively intimate connections among persons. For reasons that will become clear in a moment, I call the relatively intimate connections trust networks. One of this book’s major themes stresses the crucial importance of trust networks for the texture and efficacy of systems of rule.
A look across human history Cities and States in World History examines how cities, states, and trust networks have interacted during the five millennia for which we have clear evidence concerning the existence of cities and states. It spans from about the time of Gilgamesh to the present. Sketching and schematizing furiously, it leaps across continents and centuries in search of principles that help explain the enormous variation of cities, states, trust networks, and their interactions. It serves poorly as a sourcebook for detailed history. But it clarifies how and why momentous changes occurred. For changing relations among cities, states, and trust networks have caused some of the largest alterations in the quality of human life across the centuries. If you need detailed histories of cities, states, or trust networks in one part of the world or another, you have generations of historians to choose from. Historian-critic Lewis Mumford, for example, wrote a magnificent series of urban panoramas, culminating in his The City in History (1961). For a long time, general histories in all parts of the world concentrated largely on states and their rulers (see, e.g., Finer 1997, Hall 1986). For the millennium after 990 CE, I have tried my own hand at a
4
C. Tilly
synthetic history of European states (Tilly 1992). Historians of war (e.g., Gat 2006; Glete 2002) inevitably center their accounts on states, which are both the chief executors and principal products of warfare. Histories of trust networks come thinner on the ground as such, but in the guise of kinship, long-distance trade, local solidarities, or religion often appear in general histories (see, e.g., Agulhon 1970; Curtin 1984; Marques et al. 2001; Pastor et al 2002; Raggio 1990; Wheatley 2001). The earlier the period, the thinner the available evidence concerning trust networks. Nevertheless, the value of seeing cities, states, and trust networks interact justifies the risk of stretching the evidence toward informed speculation. In the timetables of human history, cities and states soon followed the invention of agriculture. The “invention of agriculture” means a shift to full-fledged, durable domestication of plants and animals as a way of life. So far as the archaeological record can tell us, that happened first in Southwest Asia, by around 8500 BCE. Along the Mediterranean’s east coast, global warming caused a dramatic spread of wild grains after 12,000 BCE. Their abundance allowed hunter-gatherers to form more permanent settlements than before. Between 9000 and 8000 BCE, however, cold, dry weather reduced the availability of grain, inducing villagers to plant and cultivate field grains they had previously simply gathered. Then: By 8000 [BCE], when conditions again became more favourable, these first farming communities had grown in size and number and they began to spread into other suitable areas. Initially these new economies combined cultivated cereals with wild animals, but around 7000 [BCE] domesticated sheep and goats began to replace gazelle and other wild game as the main source of meat (O’Brien 2002, p. 18). All such dating is risky, for two reasons. First, subtle differences in definitions of agriculture (the first humanly controlled growth of plants? the full complement of farms, plants, and domesticated animals?) produce dating differences of a millennium or more. Second, new archaeology almost never pushes the dates of innovations forward, but regularly pushes them back. Nevertheless, all currently available estimates place the emergence of agriculture in Eurasia within a few thousand years after the global warming that almost certainly did occur around 12,000 BCE. China had developed agriculture by 7500 BCE, the Indus Valley (most likely through diffusion from Southwest Asia) by 7000 BCE, New Guinea (most likely through independent invention) and Mesoamerica (surely by independent invention) likewise by 7000 BCE, then Egypt and Western Europe (diffusion!) after 6000 BCE (Diamond 1998, p. 100; Smith 1995, pp. 6–7; with some disagreement between the two). To be sure, any detailed chronology requires much more nuance. In Great Britain, for example, people started practicing mobile slash-and-burn agriculture with its temporary settlements widely around 4000 BCE, but did not often found permanent agricultural villages until about the time when metalworking spread toward 2500 BCE (Hayes 1993, pp. 41–52). Between the two dates, inhabitants of the British Isles began constructing ceremonial centers with their spectacular megaliths, of which Stonehenge provides the best known example (Pollard 2002). In Britain and elsewhere, settled agricultural villages compounded into larger and more differentiated political units. The growth process proceeded rapidly, according
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
5
to anthropologist Robert Carneiro; full-fledged states soon emerged (Carneiro 1994, p. 14). Cities formed initially as part of the same growth process. It happened first in the Middle East, but the rest of Eurasia and the Mediterranean did not lag far behind. Cities are human settlements combining significantly denser resident populations than their surrounding territories, differentiation and inequality within the resident populations, some central authority, and nodal locations within extensive networks of communication. Because archaeological evidence leaves us to judge differentiation, inequality, central authority, and nodal locations from physical remains, we can’t be sure when cities, thus defined, first appeared in human history. Jordan’s Jericho, for example, had a concentrated settlement, substantial walls, and at least a thousand residents toward 7000 BCE. But Jericho could still have been essentially a large farming village. In that case, unlike Gilgamesh’s formidable Uruk rampart, Jericho’s early wall could have served mainly to protect stored crops from surrounding groups of hunter-gatherers or simply to keep out invading water (Gat 2006, pp. 170– 172; Smith 1995, p. 3). Similarly, the excavated levels of Turkey’s Chatal Huyuk site (from between 6859 and 6300 BCE) contain remarkably decorated rooms suggesting religious shrines as well as the remains of enough houses to accommodate 5,000 inhabitants. Yet the site does not yield enough other evidence of central authority, differentiation, inequality, or nodal location to qualify Chatal Huyuk unambiguously as a full-fledged city (Roaf 1990, pp. 43–46). Only after 4000 BCE, can we be confident that differentiated cities were operating and exerting wide-ranging power. Once they emerged, however, new city-builders could imitate the models established by their predecessors or try to improve on them. Gilgamesh boasted about the superiority of Uruk’s city, wall, temple, and king to its predecessors and rivals. Cities, then, first appeared in the same periods and regions as states. Like cities, states can only exist in symbiosis with agriculture that produces enough to support significant non-agricultural populations. Cities differ from strictly agricultural settlements, furthermore, by virtue of substantial populations, differentiated and specialized activities, and location as nodes in far-reaching networks of trade and political coordination. Cities and states maintain ambivalent relations: urban merchants and intellectuals seek the protection that states can provide, but resist the extraction and control that states’ rulers impose on them. Rulers of states, on their side, commonly try to combat urbanites’ independence, but also seek to benefit from concentrations of resources in cities as well as from the relative defensibility of compact cities as compared with scattered rural populations. What of the state? A state is a structure of power involving four distinctive elements: 1) major concentrated means of coercion, especially an army, 2) organization that is at least partly independent of kinship and religious relations, 3) a defined area of jurisdiction, and 4) priority in some regards over all other organizations operating within that area. Although the four elements had existed separately for some time, no one put all four of them together before the Middle East’s creation of both cities and states. No states existed anywhere in the world before 4000 BCE. By the era of Gilgamesh’s Uruk, however, full-fledged cities and states were flourishing across significant parts of the Middle East, and possibly forming in other parts of Eurasia as well. Over the next millennium, states became
6
C. Tilly
permanent fixtures across much of Eurasia. Once they existed, furthermore, existing states provided models for emulation by other rulers and conquerors. Then and now, cities and states vary in their relative emphasis on coercion, capital, and commitment. Predatory states such as Mongol empires of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries CE got their way largely through the threat and use of armed force, as did Russian frontier fortress towns of the seventeenth century CE. The rich civilizations of South Asia’s Indus Valley (roughly 2500–1900 BCE) left little trace of armies, but seem to have thrived on a combination of intensive trade and unifying culture. Although Italian city-states of the Renaissance usually backed their commercial enterprises with militias and mercenaries when necessary, their patrician merchants centered their connections with each other and their subjects on sizeable applications of capital. Cities and states therefore vary in their relations to each other. Figure 1 sketches the most obvious of those variations: in dominance and integration. In some regions and eras, cities dominate states, either because the cities enjoy autonomous resources or because they subordinate states to their own priorities. Cities and surrounding states also vary from greatly segregated (little interplay between one and the other) to highly integrated (intensive interaction and mutual shaping between them). Four extreme types mark the limits of variation: autonomous cities, city-states, centralized states, and nomadic empires. In our own time, the Vatican and Hong Kong represent something like autonomous cities despite their extensive external connections, Singapore operates more like a city-state within its compact hinterland, China counts as a formidable example of a centralized state, but nomadic empires have disappeared except for scattered remnants in Central Asia and East Africa. To trace cities and states in world history, then, is to examine change and variation in a given region’s location within the space described by Fig. 1. With many a wiggle, the overall trend in city-state relations follows the arrow in the figure: from cities dominant to states dominant and (especially) from segregated to integrated. Later, however, we will see evidence that great cities such as Tokyo, London, and New York are now regaining some of the dominance they lost over most of history. The inventions of cities and states enormously expanded human capacities for accumulation, innovation, and coordination. Cities created settings in which diverse Fig. 1 Variable relations between cities and states
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
7
populations could interact without incessant warfare while connecting with their counterparts in distant locations. They promoted complementarities among human activities, and facilitated the production of collective goods such as secure public spaces and reliable supplies of water. States, on their side, established large zones in which people could move freely, exchange their goods, and even call on authorities to protect their property. Eventually they freed the bulk of humanity from living in small, closed, weapon-heavy population clusters. In these ways, cities and states multiplied human power for collective action. They did so at a cost, sometimes a terrible cost. In cities, either rampant capital or flagrant coercion gave tycoons and rulers the means of imposing their wills on reluctant people who had contrary projects of their own and of subjecting inhabitants to living conditions more deadly and demoralizing than most hunters and gatherers had ever experienced. In states, arbitrary power and unwanted warfare intermittently devastated routine lives, substituting new, more massive forms of uncertainty and death for the daily struggles that beset every locality before the invention of states. In both cities and states, human experience felt the powerful effects of increasing scale.
Trust networks Cities and states did not act alone. Every city and every state interacts with and to some extent depends on an ever-present form of commitment-maintaining connection: the trust network. Seen in two-person terms, trust is a relation in which at least one party places a valued enterprise at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failure of another party. Trust is often, but not always, mutual; in the mutual case, Amy trusts Betty, while Betty also trusts Amy. Trust sometimes connects larger numbers of people who are carrying on some weighty, high-risk, long-term collective enterprise such as procreation, long-distance trade, political conspiracy, workers’ mutual aid, or clandestine religious practice, and placing the enterprise at risk of members’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failure. When that happens, members can typically call on each other for aid on the simple basis of shared membership. In such a case, let us identify the connections among the members as a trust network. Trust networks existed across the world millennia before the emergence of cities and states, and significantly affected the operation of cities and states once cities and states emerged. Big-game hunting parties, kin groups, and (most likely) sworn brotherhoods, for example, all played significant roles in human life long before cities and states existed. In general, they qualified as trust networks. Just as cities and states fall far short of exhausting or even representing all topdown structures of power—think of corporations, churches, and international organizations—trust networks form only one part of social life’s bottom-up structure. Neighborhoods, communities, markets, voluntary organizations, and ethnic groups often contain or overlap trust networks, but rarely constitute them. In watching the interplay of cities, states, and trust networks, we are simply on concentrating on three distinctive forms of social organization whose interactions significantly affect the quality of human life.
8
C. Tilly
Like cities and states, trust networks vary in their relative emphasis on coercion, capital, and commitment: some punish defection with death, and others make defection unattractive by providing their faithful members with reliable incomes, even if all rely on substantial commitment, expressed in common languages, secret lore, distinctive communication lines, and other reinforcers of trust. Binding commitments can take the form of shared religion or ethnicity, trading ties, work-generated solidarities, communities of taste, and much more. They have the common property of promoting trust. Over the long run of human history, trust networks, rather than cities, states, firms, churches, or other organizations, have formed the social basis for most weighty, high-risk, long-term collective enterprises (Tilly 2005). Ethnic trading networks, for example, have sustained long-distance trade from the origins of cities and states onward (Curtin 1984; Stein 1999). Only rarely and (on the whole) recently have such arrangements as social insurance and labor unions connected risky, valued, popular collective enterprises directly with cities and states. Indeed, prudent members of trust networks have generally tried to insulate them from predation or incorporation by cities and states. Struggle between existing trust networks, on one side, and cities or states, on the other, has therefore gone on unceasingly, as for example when states try to conscript for military service young men who bear the hopes of their kin groups or when states seek to annihilate dissident religious sects. If we want to understand historical change and variation in cities and states, then, we have no choice but to take this distinctive form of organization—the trust network—seriously. Despite great historical variation in the relative prominence of capital, coercion, and commitment as forms of connection, on the average cities, states, and trust networks each give greater emphasis to one of the three. Whatever else they do, states place significant weight on coercion. Cities serve as storehouses and headquarters for capital. Trust networks rely heavily on commitment: operation of ties that facilitate mutual recognition and coordination. To an important extent, encounters of cities, states, and trust networks therefore involve struggles for priority among capital, coercion, and commitment. As later chapters of the book will show in detail, members of trust networks have historically engaged in those struggles by means of four main strategies: evasion, resistance, patronage, and integration. Evasion ranges from staying secret to dissimulating your character, masking your connections, and hiding your assets. Resistance, almost always dangerous, consists of confronting the capital and coercion of rulers or would-be rulers with forceful counter-claims. Resistance has often led to patronage, as powerful intermediaries have provided protection from rulers in return for tribute and loyalty. Integration has occurred in two different ways: as members of trust networks (for example, conquering religions such as Islam) have become rulers themselves, and as leaders of trust networks have bargained, however asymmetrically, with rulers, for assured places in the system of rule. Twentieth-century totalitarian regimes forcibly integrated some trust networks into their systems of rule, but democratic regimes have also achieved some partial integration of trust networks through systems of social security and worker representation. Over the five millennia surveyed by this book, however, integration has rarely occurred. In general, relations between trust
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
9
networks and rulers (whether of cities or of states) have taken the form of evasion, resistance, or patronage. Cities and States in World History traces the dynamics of interaction among cities, states, and trust networks from the first traces of cities and states to the present. In a single small book, I have no hope of providing comprehensive descriptions of cities and states in all world regions across known human history. The long-term history of trust networks, furthermore, remains to be reconstructed and reported; I will simply refer to trust networks as part of my explanations for the operations of cities and states. Instead of providing a continuous chronicle of the world’s cities, states, and trust networks, this book examines and explains essential features of variation and change of cities and states in four main regions—Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe—on the way to thinking about how interactions between cities and states have been changing in the contemporary era. History has performed a rough but valuable natural experiment in relations among cities, states, and trust networks. Cities and states first emerged in Eurasia, including Europe, and within a thousand years or so all their major sites across the Eurasian land mass were communicating with each other. North and East Africa soon joined the same connected complex, followed much later by western, central, and southern Africa. On that side of the experiment, we have a history of extensive mutual influence. On the other side, the Americas provide a case of absolutely independent invention: even though the original human inhabitants of the Americas crossed the Bering Strait from Asia, we have no reason to think of America’s pre-Columbian cities, states, or particular forms of trust networks as offshoots of their Eurasian counterparts. Meanwhile, New Guinea and other parts of the Pacific region where agriculture developed early have so far not yielded enough evidence on the long run of cities, states, and trust networks to permit their effective integration into the comparison. To a lesser degree, the same is true of western and southern Africa. Our strong comparison therefore sets off the Americas from Eurasia. Moreover, it looks as though agriculture, cities, and states initially grew up independently in two separate American sites: central Mexico and the Andes. (Agriculture also seems to have begun independently in eastern North America, but without the subsequent independent development of substantial cities and states [Smith 1995]). Despite some earlier forays of Europeans across the North Atlantic to America, the Eurasian and American histories of cities, states, and trust networks proceeded in essential independence until European exploration and colonization began in 1492. Thus we can think of similarities in the initial emergence of cities, states, and trust networks in Eurasia and the Americas as stemming from parallel causal processes rather than from diffusion. What processes? Radically simplified, they run like this: Cities: accumulation and coordination of capital States: accumulation and coordination of coercion Trust Networks: accumulation and coordination of commitment In each case, “accumulation” refers to an increase in sheer quantity, “coordination” to the approach toward a single connected set of interpersonal connections exerting collective control over the relevant activities. Cities depend on a region’s
10
C. Tilly
passing of some threshold in the sheer quantity of available capital as well on the formation of a nucleus controlling a significant share of that capital. In parallel, states depend not only on the presence of substantial coercive means but also on concentration of a significant share of those means under the control of a bounded territorial organization. (Conversely, if coercive means multiply without coordination, small fighting bands multiply rather than states.) Likewise, trust networks require both the proliferation of risky relations (those in which persons are participating jointly in significant collective enterprises that are at risk to their participants’ failures, mistakes, or malfeasance) and the creation of larger sets of interpersonal connections that exercise collective control over the enterprises. Capital, coercion, and commitment reproduce themselves according to different logics. Capital renews itself through production of goods and services in sufficient abundance to provide for the next round of production. Cities reflect that reproductive cycle by nurturing institutions for the storage of capital: banks, warehouses, wealthy households, and more. Reproduction of coercion occurs through an openly competitive process in which wielders of coercive means use those means to deprive rivals and potential rebels of their own access to coercion. To the extent that coercive means involve expensive weapons, massive manpower, extensive food supplies, and substantial forms of transportation, to be sure, reproduction of coercion also entails sustained access to capital, either through direct application of coercion or through exchange of already accumulated wealth for coercive means. Reproduction of commitment proceeds in quite a different manner: via recruitment and birth. New members of trust networks arrive through person-by-person enlistment or through birth within households already belong to the network. These differences in reproduction generate contradictions among the dynamics of capital, coercion, and commitment. Storage of capital offers incentives for coercionwielders to seize it for their own advantage, but the possession of capital allows capitalists to buy off coercionists and thus divert them from their pursuit of raw power. Person-by-person recruitment to webs of commitment operates less freely in the face of counter-pressures from coercion and capital. The relative dominance of capital, coercion, and commitment therefore creates marked variation in the qualities of ordinary people’s lives. In all three cases, other causal processes initiate the accumulation and coordination in question. As we have already seen, the growth of productive agriculture on a relatively large scale stands behind the emergence of both cities and states, just as the expansion of trade promotes the formation of cities. In the case of trust networks, initiating causes vary by type of network; they include the spread of religious cults, the growth of long-distance trade, growing opportunities for the placement of offspring, rising threats from neighboring populations, and (for crafts) intensifying competition or exploitation. All of them simultaneously increase threats to valued collective enterprises and the returns from increased coordination of such collective enterprises. These principles apply both to the vast web of Eurasian cities and states and to the spheres where cities and states emerged independently of the Eurasian experience, notably in the Americas. History’s natural experiment generated both similarities and differences. The more separate the cluster of cities and states, the more distinctive the patterns of cities, states, and trust networks. Through diffusion, interaction, and mutual modeling, cities, states,
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
11
and trust networks of the vast Eurasian system acquired some common properties that set them in contrast to the long-isolated cities, states, and trust networks of the Americas. Zapotec areas of Central Mexico, for example, produced a strikingly distinctive pattern of mountaintop cities dominating adjacent valleys, grouping together ceremonial and administrative structures, but not specializing in commercial, agricultural, or craft activities (Marcus 2003, p. 358). Given that pattern, we can be fairly certain that their trust networks had distinctive properties as well. Following the work of paleoanthropologists Joyce Marcus and Kent Flannery, Charles Mann describes Zapotecan civilization as one of four or five complexes that made the transition to cities and states during the second millennium BCE: The Zapotec were based across the mountains from the Olmec, in Oaxaca’s high Central Valley—three forty-to-sixty-mile-long bowls that intersect in a ragged Y. By about 1550 [BCE], they were abandoning the life of hunting and gathering to live in villages with defensive palisades. These early villages had wattle-and-daub houses, fine pottery, and some public architecture. They were controlled by “big men,” the social scientist’s term for the alpha male who is able in such informal settings to enforce his will through persuasion or force. Within a few hundred years, the big men acquired rank—that is, they began to wield power not only because of their personal charisma, but also because their societies had given them an elevated official position (Mann 2005, pp. 211–212). Soon the whole region consolidated into three chiefdoms, each a state centered on a city. In Zapotec territory, agriculture rapidly led to accumulation and coordination of coercion, capital, and commitment.
The Silk Road On the Eurasian continent, a much larger scale of accumulation and coordination had already developed two millennia earlier. The Silk Road illustrates the connectedness of the Eurasian system. The name Silk Road only dates from the Baron von Richtoven’s writing about it in 1877 (Wood 2002, p. 9). By then, however, the phenomenon itself was already two thousand years old. From China’s Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) onward, that skein of east-west strands has carried precious goods, missionaries, and adventurers between eastern China and the Middle East, and thence into Europe. All strands counted, the Silk Road ran roughly from Chang’an (Xi’an) in northeastern China to Tyre and Antioch on the Mediterranean. In today’s political terms, portions of the road transited China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with offshoots into adjacent countries. Although the conquests of Alexander the Great (334-323 BCE) included the western segment of the road, we should probably not speak of it as an East-West thoroughfare until early Han emperors began deliberately sending out mercantile missions as far as the Ferghana Valley (now in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) during the second century BCE. Soon after then, Chinese silk became a known and much admired commodity in Rome. Jade likewise traveled westward from China. Although the road brought many products into China from intermediate points, regions at and beyond the western terminus sent amber, pearls, red coral and, of all things, the chair
12
C. Tilly
(Wood 2002, pp. 85–86). Yet it took centuries before people at the road’s eastern and western extremities had a clear idea of what lay at the other end. In Antioch, where he finished his own long, dangerous journey from east to west, travel writer Colin Thubron described beliefs about the road two millennia earlier: And still the Romans did not know the land the silks came from. Somewhere edging the easternmost sea, they heard, the country of the Seres escaped the influence of the stars, and was guided only by the laws of its ancestors. Mars never drove its people to war, nor Venus to folly. They had no temples, no prostitutes, no crimes, no victims. The king’s women—seven hundred of them— rode in golden chariots drawn by oxen. But this land of Serica, by some divine spell, was impossible to reach. Meanwhile the Chinese, in mirror-image, came to believe that in a great city to the west—Rome, Alexandria or Constantinople—the people were ruled by philosophers, peacefully elected. Their palaces rose on crystal pillars, and they travelled in little white-draped carriages, and signalled their movements by the shaking of bells (Thubron 2007, p. 343). Yet exchanges along the Silk Road eventually built up a steady stream of trade, and increasing mutual awareness. With many an interruption and deviation resulting from struggles for control of the territories between Rome and China, caravans have been plying the multiple silk roads in both directions ever since. Technologies and beliefs likewise traveled the Silk Road. Gunpowder and Nestorians provide only two examples of the Silk Road’s importance as a conduit. Gunpowder (probably invented in China during the ninth century CE) arrived first in Muslim lands and then in Europe between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. By that time, Nestorian Christianity, a version of the faith originating in the Middle East, had been spreading in China for about six centuries. When European missionaries arrived to convert the Mongols or Chinese about the same time that gunpowder was heading west, they often encountered well established Nestorian priests and congregations. The reports of two 13th century CE European voyagers to the East— William of Rubruck and Marco Polo—illustrate the large extent of Silk Road connections between East and West. When Flanders-born Franciscan missionary William of Rubruck traveled to Karakorum, the Mongol capital, in 1254 CE, he encountered a number of Europeans, as well as an entrenched Nestorian priesthood, who looked like heretics to him. Of Karakorum itself, William reported: There are two quarters in it; one of the Saracens in which are the markets, and where a great many Tartars gather on account of the court, which is always near this (city), and on account of the great number of ambassadors; the other is the quarter of the Cathayans [Chinese], all of whom are artisans. Besides these quarters there are great palaces, which are for the secretaries of the court. There are there twelve idol temples of different nations, two mahummeries [mosques] in which is cried the law of Machomet, and one church of Christians in the extreme end of the city. The city is surrounded by a mud wall and has four gates (Saad 2005, p. 89).
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
13
At the time, Mongols controlled most of the territory from Moscow and Kiev south to Baghdad and east to Korea. They ran the largest contiguous land empire that has ever existed. Karakorum’s profusion of coercion, capital, and trust networks reflected its position as a center of large-scale coordination, now facilitated by Mongol control of almost the entire Silk Road. Instead of building a tight perimeter around their conquered territories, the Mongols drew tribute from trade (Barfield 1989). After Muslim expansion began in earnest during the seventh century CE, trading Europeans found themselves blocked from direct contact with the East. The rise of the Mongols gave traders new opportunities. By drawing on those opportunities, Marco Polo made himself Europe’s most famous medieval traveler along the Silk Road. The irony is that even today we can’t be sure how much of what Polo described he witnessed directly, how much he invented, and how much he pieced together from other travelers’ tales. If we believe the stories he dictated to a fellowprisoner in 1298, however, he and his family made fabulous voyages to the East. In 1298, Venice had once again gone to war against its great commercial rival, the city-state of Genoa. From the Venetian viewpoint, the war’s worst moment arrived with the Battle of Korčula, a Dalmatian island controlled by Venice. After sacking Korčula, a Genoese fleet trounced its Venetian enemy and captured many galleys, including one outfitted and commanded by Marco Polo. The Genoese put Marco in prison, where a fellow captive, Rustichello, wrote down Marco’s Description of the World, a mixture of memoir and travel guide. In his account, Marco offered vivid images of China’s wealth and technical advancement over Europe. With wonder, he noted China’s coal, paper currency, iron manufacturing, road networks, great canals, beautiful women, and magnificent cities. Marco Polo’s father and uncle had traveled widely in Persia and Central Asia. Then they had gone to the court of the great Mongol khan Qubilai (often called Kublai Khan), grandson of Genghis Khan. Drawing on Mongol legend, Marco wrote a surprisingly benign retrospective portrait of Genghis: Some time after the migration of the Tartars to [Karakorum], and about the year of our lord 1162, they proceeded to elect for their king a man who was named Chingis-khan, one of approved integrity, great wisdom, commanding eloquence, and eminent for his valour. He began his reign with so much justice and moderation, that he was beloved and revered as their deity rather than their sovereign; and the fame of his great and good qualities spreading over that part of the world, all the Tartars, however dispersed, placed themselves under his command. Finding himself thus at the head of so many brave men, he became ambitious of emerging from the deserts and wildernesses by which he was surrounded, and gave them orders to equip themselves with bows, and such other weapons as they were expert at using, from the habits of their pastoral life. He then proceeded to render himself master of cities and provinces; and such was the effect produced by his character for justice and other virtues, that wherever he went, he found the people disposed to submit to him, and to esteem themselves happy when admitted to his protection and favour (Polo 2006, p. 81). By the time that Marco’s father and uncle met Qubilai, different groups of Mongols controlled a major chunk of Eurasia, and Qubilai’s forces were conquering
14
C. Tilly
southern China as well. The elder Polos may have reached Changdu (Xanadu to later Europeans), the khan’s summer capital, from 1264 onward. Qubilai asked the brothers to return home so they could encourage the pope to send back oil from the lamp at Jerusalem’s Holy Sepulcher as well as a hundred men “acquainted with the Seven Arts” who would teach his people about Europe. As a safe conduct, the Polos carried a 30 cm.long golden tablet from the khan, inscribed “By the strength of the eternal Heaven, holy be the khan’s name. Let him that pays him not reverence be killed.” It worked. They reached Italy safely in 1269. When the Polos set off again in 1271, 17-year-old Marco accompanied them. They originally planned to go east by ship from Hormuz on the Persian Gulf, a departure point for South and East Asia already well known to Arab seafarers. They abandoned that plan when they saw the leaky vessels that were supposed to carry them, “wretched affairs... only stitched together with twine made from the husk of the Indian nut.” They shifted to an overland journey through Afghanistan, across Kashmir and Pamir, via the great Takla Makan desert, then along the steppe’s southern edge back to Changdu. The Polos traveled and traded widely in China, advised the khan, and accompanied him in his yearly migrations between Changdu and the khan’s winter residence in Cambulac, later known as Beijing. On their return trip to Venice, they traveled by sea to Indochina, Indonesia, India, and back to Hormuz. They lost most of their accumulated riches when officials in the Byzantine state of Trebizond, at the southeast corner of the Black Sea, seized their goods. After seventeen years in China plus seven years of longdistance travel, the Polos reached Venice in 1295. By that time, 41-year-old Marco had spent more than half his life on his momentous Asian journey. As of 1295, the Silk Road was dangerous, but thriving. It was connecting Asia’s cities, states, and trust networks with those of Europe. The Mongols ran their own distinctive variety of state, but other formidable states intersected the path from Xi’an to Baghdad. Despite their origins as nomadic predators, the Mongols sustained and benefited from the long string of commercial cities that a thousand years of East-West interaction had built up along the Silk Road’s broad path. European priests and merchants benefited from the long reach of their trust networks along the thoroughfare. By the thirteenth century CE, Eurasian cities, states, and trust networks were interacting over vast distances. No one would then have mistaken Venice for Karakorum. Yet in some regards a connected Eurasian system of cities, states, and trust networks had formed. It extended into Africa as well as into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. After many mutations, it still exists today. Fig. 2 Interactions of cities, states, and trust networks
Cities, states, and trust networks: chapter 1 of Cities and States in World History
15
Both in Eurasia and elsewhere, the long-run historical story of cities, states, and trust networks features rising connectedness through ties of coercion, capital, and commitment. As the case of the Mongols has already suggested, fluctuations and reversals often occurred. But once European imperialism flourished during the fifteenth century CE, increasing—and increasingly asymmetrical—connectedness prevailed. We live in an incomparably more connected and more unequal world than our ancestors of a thousand years ago. Figure 2 schematizes the interactions and changes we are analyzing. Sometimes we concentrate on relations between trust networks and cities, sometimes on relations between trust networks and states, sometimes on relations between cities and states, and sometimes—but more rarely—on the whole triangular set of interactions. We are, furthermore, tracing long-term transformations in those interactions. Over the long run, we want to know how our incredibly connected world emerged from the oncefragmented relations among cities, states, and trust networks. The process of fluctuating but finally increasing connection sets the problem for Cities and States in World History. The problem falls into four parts: 1. What determines the degree of segregation or integration of cities and states? 2. What determines the relative dominance of cities and states? 3. What determines the extent of separation or integration between cities or states, on one side, and trust networks, on the other? 4. What difference do these variable configurations make to the quality of ordinary people’s lives? Pursuing these four questions, the rest of my book will follow the Eurasian system and its American counterparts from early in history to the present. Chapter 2 provides an overview of cities, states, and trust networks from their origins onward. Chapters 3 to 6 close in successively on Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe. Chapter 7 considers cities and states in the age of capitalism. Finally, chapter 8 looks at the futures of cities, states, and trust networks in the light of their long, turbulent history. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: Contents as planned in 2008 for Cities and States in World History Preface Chapter 1. Cities, States, and Trust Networks Chapter 2. Historical Lives of Cities, States, and Trust Networks Chapter 3. Asia Chapter 4. Africa Chapter 5. The Americas Chapter 6. Europe Chapter 7. Capitalism, Cities, and States Chapter 8. Futures of Cities and States References Index
16
C. Tilly
References Adams, R. M. C. C. (1972). Patterns of urbanization in early southern Mesopotamia. In M. J. Ucko, R. Tringham, & G. W. Dimbledy (Eds.), Man, settlement and urbanism. Cambridge: Shenkman. Agulhon, M. (1970). La vie sociale en Provence intérieure au lendemain de la Révolution. Paris: Société des Études Robespierristes. Barfield, T. J. (1989). The perilous frontier, nomadic empires and China. New York: Blackwell. Carneiro, R. L. (1994). War and peace: Alternating realities in human history. In S. P. Reyna & R. E. Downs (Eds.), Studying war. Anthropological perspectives. Langhorne: Gordon and Breach. Curtin, P. (1984). Cross-cultural trade in world history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Diamond, J. (1998). Guns, germs, and steel. The fates of human societies. New York: Norton. Finer, S. E. (1997). The history of government from the earliest times. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gat, A. (2006). War in human civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Glete, J. (2002). War and the state in early modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500–1660. London: Routledge. Hall, J. A. (Ed.) (1986). States in history. Oxford: Blackwell. Hayes, A. (1993). Archaeology of the British Isles. New York: St. Martin’s. Mann, C. C. (2005). 1491. New revelations of the Americas before Columbus. New York: Knopf. Marcus, J. (2003). A synthesis of the cultural evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec. In K. V. Flannery & J. Marcus (Eds.), The cloud people. Divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Clinton Corners: Percheron Press. revised edition. Marques, M. M., Santos, R., & Araújo, F. (2001). Ariadne’s thread: Cape Verdean women in transnational webs. Global Networks, 1, 283–306. Mumford, L. (1961). The city in history. Its origins, its transformations, and its prospects. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. O’Brien, P. K. (Ed.) (2002). Oxford atlas of world history. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pastor, R., Pascua, E., Rodríguez-López, A., & Sánchez-León, P. (2002). Beyond the market. Transactions, property and social networks in monastic galicia 1200–1300. Leiden: Brill. Pollard, J. (2002). Neolithic Britain. Princes Risborough: Shire Publications. Polo, M. (2006). The travels of Marco Polo. New York: Cosimo Classics. Postgate, J. N. (1992). Early Mesopotamia. Society and economy at the Dawn of History. London: Routledge. Raggio, O. (1990). Faide e Parentele. Lo Stato Genovese visto dalla Fontanabuona. Turin: Einaudi. Roaf, M. (1990). Cultural atlas of Mesopotamia and the Ancient Near East. New York: Facts on File. Saad, R. (Ed.) (2005). William of Rubruck’s account of the Mongols. Rockville: the editor. Smith, B. D. (1995). The emergence of agriculture. New York: Scientific American Library. Stein, G. J. (1999). Rethinking world-systems. Diasporas, colonies, and interaction in Uruk Mesopotamia. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Thubron, C. (2007). Shadow of the Silk Road. New York: HarperCollins. Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European states, 990–1992. Oxford: Blackwell. Revised edition. (2005), Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2005). Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wheatley, P. (2001). The places where men pray together. Cities in Islamic Lands seventh through the Tenth Centuries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wood, F. (2002). The silk road. Two thousand years in the heart of Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Charles Tilly (1929–2008) held faculty appointments at Delaware, Harvard, Toronto, Michigan, and the New School University, and finished his career as the Joseph L. Buttenwieser Professor of Social Science at Columbia University. His work focused on large-scale social change and its relationship to contentious politics, especially in Europe since 1500. His over 50 books and monographs included a number quite relevant to the essay in this issue, such as An Urban World (1974), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990 (1990), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, AD 1000–1800 (1994), Expanding Citizenship, Reconfiguring States (1999), Trust and Rule (2005), and Democracy (2007). Tilly served as Senior Editor of Theory and Society for many years. A member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and the Ordre des Palmes Académiques, he received numerous international prizes and honorary degrees.
Part I
Historicism and Historical Legacies
SPOTLIGHT: Historicism, theory, and method Rod Aya Lynn Eden
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract Is historicism for Tilly a fact or a framework—the fact of history’s “contingent complexity” or the framework of his social thought? And how does he explain social and historical facts? With models whose elements are people trying to make the best of their situation as they see it? Or with causal mechanisms different from rational choice under specified situational constraints? Does his rejection of rational choice and methodological individualism contradict his own theoretical method? Or does it reflect a creative tension between historical explanation and sociological theory? These questions provoke an intense but amicable debate between kindred spirits who studied with Tilly yet have divergent opinions on theory and method. Argument is risky and unpredictable, therefore educational. —Christopher Lasch (1995, pp. 170–171) The argument here is a critical but cordial dialogue between two old friends about Charles Tilly’s historicism and issues of theory and method it raises. Our format is like history as Tilly views it: unscripted, unrehearsed, interactive, openended, and cumulative. Where the argument will lead, we do not know—and will not know until we get there. Argument is volatile not only because it can be lost through errors of fact and logic, but also because it can arrive at surprise R. Aya (*) Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, OZ Achterburgwal 185, 1012 DK Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail:
[email protected] L. Eden Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6165 e-mail:
[email protected]
M. Hanagan and C. Tilly (eds.), Contention and Trust in Cities and States, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6_2, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
19
20
R. Aya and L. Eden
conclusions and change minds. In a Platonic dialogue, the author works the speakers as a ventriloquist works puppets. In this one, the authors are the speakers and speak for themselves: each tries to persuade the other, and both risk being persuaded in turn. RA: To preclude misunderstanding, I think we should say what we mean by historicism, then say what issues of theory and method we will discuss. LE: It’s your party—you roped me into this . . . RA: Historicism for Tilly means the opposite of what it means for Popper. For Tilly, historicism is a fact—the “uniqueness of sequences, unrepeatable in their contingent complexity” (Gould 2002, p. 102). He invokes Gould in an interview he gave Daniel Little five months before dying.1 For Popper, historicism is a theory—the “fraudulent theory of historical prediction” whereby supposed laws of history or social development warrant prophecy of “what the future will bring” (Popper 1998, p. 57). Martin Jay—great man, nice guy—says Popper’s terminology is passé.2 He is probably right about academic discourse. Look what happened to essentialism, Popper’s word for Platonic realism.3 But prophecy—especially self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1968, pp. 475–490)—is rampant in world politics today. LE: I hate to be disagreeable so soon into our discussion, but I disagree. I don’t think it’s a correct reading of Tilly to say that for him historicism is a fact. What were facts for Tilly? Tilly was entirely consistent in his stance: historians aren’t allowed to—and other social scientists certainly should not, though they are somewhat prone to—“make up” facts, to construct them as they please. Tilly was a realist, but he never thought that his vast interpretive apparatus was “fact.” For him, all interpretation is subject to revision, as we discover new archives or other new sources, or devise new methods, or, most important, change our minds because further investigation and thinking is likely to lead—if one is as openminded as Tilly—to a different understanding of causal mechanisms and processes at play. The Tilly of From Mobilization to Revolution (1978) with its interest-based economic style of analysis is not exactly the Tilly who later emphasized relational analysis, the importance of mechanisms, the role of trust, and the trouble with and importance of stories. We can summarize Tilly’s prefaces and introductions to his many books as: when I wrote this, I did not fully understand x, and therefore overemphasized y, and understated the importance of z. In the interview with Little, Tilly explains his many “errors” in The Vendée (1964) and his several changes of mind since he first thought about the French counterrevolution. Tilly did this throughout his intellectual life. So, I’m arguing that for Tilly, historicism is not a fact; it’s a framework that drives the questions to which he sought answers. Tilly was committed to it because of its 1
Go to www.changingsociety.org and click interviews. E-mail to RA, 26 November 2009. 3 “Realism . . . is the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them” (Quine 1980, p. 14). 2
SPOTLIGHT: Historicism, theory, and method
21
efficacy in addressing the range of problems and processes he studied. You invoke Tilly’s quotation of Gould as evidence that for Tilly, historicism is fact. I have a hunch that Gould, and Tilly, are working with the idea of historicism as approach, not as fact. Tilly was extracting from Gould’s fuller statement: “History presents two special problems: (1) frequent absence of evidence, given imperfections of preservation; and (2) the uniqueness of sequences, unrepeatable in their contingent complexity, and thereby distancing the data of history from such standard concepts as prediction, and experimentation” (Gould 2002, p. 102). However, if someone convincingly demonstrated that some sequences were repeatable, then Tilly would have taken that on board. He would still have been a historicist, but he would have revised his understanding of history and historical process. RA: If you prefer to give Tilly’s interpretive framework the label historicism and to give complex, unique, contingent, unrepeatable sequences another label (say, historicity) be my guest. The labels do not matter if they do not confuse. But the distinction between historicism-as-theory and historicism-as-fact (or historicity) does matter. Tilly’s take on the history of state-making (1975, 1990, 2006) refutes modernization and political development theory, that is, American historicism (in Popper’s sense) devised to answer Marxist-Leninist historicism. Tilly is an antihistoricist historicist in that sense. For the rest, you describe Tilly as the ideal-untypical scientist. I cannot disagree: I never met anyone so willing (even eager) to revise own ideas in view of evidence. He hewed to the code implicit in these four questions: Are conclusions to be consistent with premises (maybe even follow from them)? Do facts matter? Or can we string together thoughts as we like, calling it an “argument,” and make up facts as we please, taking one story to be as good as another? (Chomsky 1992, p. 52) Tilly answered the first two questions yes, the last two no. “Consistency and responsibility to fact” (Chomsky 1992, p. 52) were his ground rules. You are right about his intellectual attitude. LE: But, Rod, even your description of Tilly contra modernization and political development theory—an attack by him on too-neatly repeatable sequences, or “stages”—can at least as easily be read as historicism as approach or framework, not as “fact.” You refer to Tilly’s “take” and modernization “theory.” What are takes and theories if not frameworks of interpretation of historical process? Anyway, why don’t we move on? What issues of theory and method are you getting at anyway? RA: In the same interview that cites Gould, Tilly also cites Stinchcombe—in particular his book on how social theory explains history (1978). Tilly ran that book in the Social Discontinuity series, commends it in print (1981, pp. 7–12), and laments its neglect by colleagues in the interview with Little. Stinchcombe says history’s “infinitely branching tree of causal sequences” (historicism-as-fact) “looks queer” from a “generalizing social science theory” point of view, though social theorists (as a rule) do theory best when they explain history—not when they theorize abstractly—and they all explain history the same way: they break it up into “theoretically
22
R. Aya and L. Eden
understandable bits,” that is, social actions; they explain social actions by “what people want and what they think they have to do to get it,” that is, motivating reasons; and they recombine understood actions into a “cumulative causal model” (1978, pp. 2, 13, 17, 64, 119). A historical explanation is a model whose elements are people trying to make the best of their situation as they see it over time. Stinchcombe on historical explanation describes the “méthode des modèles” (Boudon 1992, pp. 229–230) ruling social science and historiography since classical antiquity.4 This theoretical method involves figuring out “what is to be done” in the situation people face on the rationality principle that they do what they think will get what they want—the result they prefer among the likely results of feasible actions. On that principle, which is the (usually tacit) major premise of explanatory argument, people’s situational constraints—the actions they think they can take, the results they think these actions will have, and the result they think they will like best—are the reasons that motivate their choice of action. Concluding by invitation a book of Tilly’s essays in the sociological explanation of social history, Stinchcombe says, “Tilly’s key proposition about history” is “people are intentional and calculating animals, who build history out of their pictures of the future,” which are “always wrong,” thereby making historians indispensable (1997, p. 387). Tilly says Stinchcombe not only “has it right” but “has done it again,” expounding theory “more effectively than the author” (1997, pp. 12–13).5 Tilly also called Stinchcombe “one of the two living geniuses in sociology.”6 But Stinchcombe’s argument on historicism, theory, and method, which Tilly accepts, assumes rational choice and methodological individualism, which Tilly rejects (1997, pp. 7–9).7 LE: Ha! That’s interesting. So, we could accept this and say that Tilly’s caught up in a very bad contradiction. Or we could say that Tilly’s work embodies a tension between two sensibilities, which is manifest in his foci and even his styles of writing: he did see contingency, in which people work to make the best of their situations, and he did want to generalize, and he did so very powerfully. However, just because Tilly, not surprisingly, had a very high regard for Stinchcombe does not mean that Stinchcombe has fully characterized Tilly’s thinking as a historian-social scientist. I think it’s more accurate to say that Tilly’s view of human intention, building history out of frequent error is only part of what Tilly saw. The other part that Tilly saw, and tried to account for, was enduring structures and their effects. This “structural Chuck,” the historian as engineer (who usually saw three possible answers for every question), focused on the enduring and large-scale social institutions built over time by collectivities of people which greatly affected the range of choice available—social structures or institutions such as states, economies, revolutions, social protests, and wars. It is true that Tilly often emphasized how such enduring institutions constrained. As quoted by Michael Hanagan and Chris Tilly in the introduction to this book, 4
The argument is sketched elsewhere (Aya 2001, 2005, 2006, 2009). He adds, “Read Stinchcombe to learn how uncertain representations of the future derived from past experience constrain present social interaction” (1997, p. 13). 6 Table talk in Amsterdam, 3 June 2006. 7 Homans spotlights the assumption of rational choice in a brilliant review (1983). 5
SPOTLIGHT: Historicism, theory, and method
23
Tilly in 1996 argued that “past social relations . . . —material, ideological, and otherwise—constrain present social relations, and consequently constrain their products as well” (emphasis added). At the same time, for Tilly, structure does not only constrain. For him, structure is process, iterated and reiterated interactions over time that both provide stability and are subject to both gradual and, in some cases, rapid discontinuous change. By this logic, so-called structure is as enabling as constraining—enabling by opening new avenues of calculation, action, and sensibility. For Tilly, as for Stinchcome and, of course, Marx, people make their own history—if inadvertently and by often or always reading the future wrongly. But, as important, for Tilly, and of course, Marx, is that people do not make history just as they please. And yet, the circumstances in which history is made, shaped by both the past and present, do not simply constrain, but equally enable by providing social connections, resources, repertoires, and the stuff of changing sensibilities. So, we can see Tilly as caught in a serious contradiction. Or we can see him as more capacious, and to see his accounts of human action, big structures, and large processes as both constraining and enabling. RA: The contradiction is between the theoretical method Tilly deploys when explaining social facts and social history, namely, the “méthode des modèles,” and his rejection of rational choice and methodological individualism, which the “méthode” entails. 8 The tension is between the “explanation of a particular case and the search for generalizations” (Moore 1966, p. xvii). Contradiction and tension are not the same thing. The contradiction shows when Tilly insists on causal mechanisms and the primacy of social relationships, but the causal mechanisms are just rational choice under different situational constraints, and relationalism (as he calls it) is just exchange theory or transactionalism—to use labels from sociology and anthropology in the 1960s.9 The tension is the logical difference between explanation and generalization—between explaining facts and discovering theories (Popper 2002, pp. 540–541). Stinchcombe says social theorists usually explain better than they generalize, and the theory they actually use—the one that animates the explanatory model—is often different from the one they propound. As for social action constituting social structures and structures constraining action, I quote an old friend: “Structures are only persons doing structure” (Gouldner 1980, p. 102). Terminate the rewards and punishments that constrain people to keep “doing structure,” and structures vanish like snow on a warm spring day. Constraint (as defined above) and enablement are two words for the same thing: I agree with what you say. LE: I like what you say about tension, but I’m hesitant to agree with what you say about contradiction, particularly as you quote Moore. I think the problem lies in your statement that “causal mechanisms are just rational choice under different situational constraints” (emphasis added). What is “just” rational choice? For Tilly, “rational choice,” or better, choice, is best understood as a social phenomenon, shaped not 8 The “méthode” stipulates (1) “considérer tout phénomène collectif comme le produit d’actions individuelles” and (2) “interpréter l’action individuelle comme rationnelle” (Boudon 1992, pp. 282–283). 9 The then-standard authors (Homans 1974; Barth 1981) both rejected these labels as misleading.
24
R. Aya and L. Eden
only by constraints but by repertoires, past and present, and by future opportunities. I think you’re squeezing Tilly’s understanding of the primacy of the social into a box of individuals maximizing interests. So, we’re left with either a lack of clarity and/or a disagreement on how to characterize historicism in Tilly’s work; a more serious disagreement on the degree to which Tilly was, or was not, engaged in methods of rational choice that cut against his emphasis on the social; and we are in entire agreement on what a beautiful mind Tilly had. RA: One last shot at clarity. Let me try some synonyms. Nisbet prefers to call historicism-as-theory developmentalism (1969). Stinchcombe prefers to call it grand theory of history or epochal theory, and calls for “tossing out the epochal garbage to get at the causal core” (1978, p. 13). Tilly does that throughout his oeuvre, which is why Stinchcombe takes up “one of Tilly’s masterpieces,” and says studying masterpieces teaches most about the “integration of theory and research that constitutes methodology” (1997, p. 408). Historicism-as-fact occasions another Gould one-liner: “The law of gravity tells us how an apple falls, but not why that apple fell at that moment, and why Newton happened to be sitting there, ripe for inspiration” (1989, p. 278). If you prefer to call Tilly’s explanatory models historicism, go right ahead. But historicism-as-fact is what the models explain. The only logical difference between sociological and historical explanation is chronology. To many, rational choice and methodological individualism appear absurd or obscene because of a big mistake—the “ungeheure Mißverständnis” of confusing them with rationalism and individualism as political ideologies (Weber 1968, pp. 557–558). There is nothing unsocial about rational choice or methodological individualism. To say Tilly’s causal mechanisms are “just” rational choice under different situational constraints is to say his explanatory models have no other animating principle. Tilly (like everyone else who makes good sense of society and history) cannot help but be a rational-choice theorist and methodological individualist. You are too in your Merton Award–winning book—Tilly called it a classic—on official underestimation of the devastation nuclear war would cause (Eden 2004). Repertoires and opportunities are situational constraints, as defined above. Maximizing interests? Better to say satisfying interests—take Simon’s Nobel Prize–winning point (1997). But consider that “interests and passions” may coincide (Smith 1981, p. 630). A beautiful mind? Absolutely. Powerful, acute, lucid, creative, and erudite. Despite his gigantic talent and awesome oeuvre, however, Tilly was disarmingly modest. Unpretentious and devoid of envy, he treated students and colleagues as equals: he never tried to overawe them in argument, much less pull rank, though he could not abide a prima donna. Immensely generous with intellectual and practical assistance, he enjoyed intellectual camaraderie, but disliked cliques. Typically, when he named sociology’s other living genius, it was not himself. Bismarck said the measure of a person is intelligence minus vanity (Brenan 1975, p. 269). By that standard, Tilly was off the charts. He had only two proud boasts: he never gave his books subtitles, and he never was chairman of a university department or president of an academic professional association.
SPOTLIGHT: Historicism, theory, and method
25
References Aya, R. (2001). The third man; or, agency in history; or, rationality in revolution. History and Theory, Theme Issue 40, 143–152. Aya, R. (2005). Theory of revolution from Thucydides to Tilly. In M. Kousis & C. Tilly (Eds.), Economic and political contention in comparative perspective (pp. 89–98). Boulder: Paradigm. Aya, R. (2006). Theory, fact, and logic. In R. E. Goodin & C. Tilly (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis (pp. 114–128). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Aya, R. (2009). Rationality and relativism. In M. Cherkaoui & P. Hamilton (Eds.), Raymond Boudon: A life in sociology (Vol. 2, pp. 49–66). Oxford: Bardwell (4 vols.). Barth, F. (1981). Process and form in social life. London: Routledge. Boudon, R. (1992). L’idéologie ou l’origine des idées reçues (2nd ed.). Paris: Fayard. Brenan, G. (1975). Personal record, 1920–1972. New York: Knopf. Chomsky, N. (1992). Rationality/science. Z Papers, 1(4), 52–57. Eden, L. (2004). Whole world on fire: Organizations, knowledge, and nuclear weapons devastation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gould, S. J. (1989). Wonderful life: The Burgess Shale and the nature of history. New York: Norton. Gould, S. J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gouldner, A. W. (1980). The two Marxisms: Contradictions and anomalies in the development of theory. New York: Seabury. Homans, G. C. (1974). Social behavior: Its elementary forms (2nd ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Homans, G. C. (1983). Review of Theoretical methods in social history, by Arthur L. Stinchcombe. Theory and Society, 12, 681–684. Lasch, C. (1995). The Revolt of the elites and the betrayal of democracy. New York: Norton. Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press. Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Boston: Beacon. Nisbet, R. A. (1969). Social change and history: Aspects of the Western theory of development. New York: Oxford University Press. Popper, K. R. (1998). The world of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic enlightenment. London: Routledge. Popper, K. R. (2002). The open society and its enemies (5th ed.). London: Routledge. Quine, W. V. (1980). From a logical point of view (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in administrative organizations (4th ed.). New York: Free Press. Smith, A. (1981). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Indianapolis: Liberty. Stinchcombe, A. L. (1978). Theoretical methods in social history. New York: Academic. Stinchcombe, A. L. (1997). Tilly on the past as a sequence of futures. In C. Tilly (Ed.), Roads from past to future (pp. 387–409). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Tilly, C. (1964). The Vendée. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tilly, C. (Ed.). (1975). The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, C. (1981). As sociology meets history. New York: Academic. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1990. Oxford: Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1997). Roads from past to future. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Tilly, C. (2006). Why and how history matters. In R. Goodin & C. Tilly (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis (pp. 417–437). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weber, M. (1968). Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (3rd ed.). Tübingen: Mohr.
26
R. Aya and L. Eden
Rod Aya took a buyout from the University of Amsterdam. Articles and reviews of his appear in American Anthropologist, American Journal of Sociology, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, History and Theory, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, International Review of Social History, Irish Journal of Sociology, Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Revue française de sociologie, and Theory & Society. Lynn Eden is senior research scholar and associate director for research at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. She holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan. Eden’s current work focuses on U.S. nuclear weapons policy in historical perspective, public and private rhetoric, narrative, jokes, and euphemism.
Is there a moral economy of state formation? Religious minorities and repertoires of regime integration in the Middle East and Western Europe, 600–1614 Ariel Salzmann
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract This article asks how state formation processes informed the normative frameworks of late-Medieval and early-Modern Latin European and Muslim Middle Eastern regimes. The question at hand is not why pre-Modern regimes discriminated against religious minorities (as well as other groups) during the pre-Modern period, but why Western European states consistently engaged in mass expulsions of their non-Christian subjects from the late thirteenth century onward and the neighboring states of the Middle East did not. Rather than addressing these peculiar policies as a function of religion, culture, or law the article adopts a comparative, contextual method. With the aid of Charles Tilly’s theoretical perspectives it isolates critical variables in pre-Modern Middle Eastern state formation. These variables are then used to shed light on the circumstances and relationships that led to Latin Europe’s mass expulsions of Jews and Muslims between 1290 and 1614. A marvel of Renaissance technology, the ornate astrological clock on the Old Town Hall dominates the central square of historic Prague. It is flanked by two pairs of partially moving figurines that date from the seventeenth century. On the right side, a skeletal Death rings in the hour. His partner, a turbaned Turk, holds an oud, a lute-like Middle Eastern stringed instrument. On the left side is the figure of a “miser” holding a bag of specie. His figure, which before its postwar rehabilitation might have been more readily recognized as a Jew, is paired with Vanity, preening before a golden mirror. Prague’s promotional brochures and tourist guides may attribute these figures to the moral fears and the mortal dangers of Bohemian Christians during the violence of the Wars of Religion. But a scholar of early-Modern Mediterranean state formation might consider this iconography in more prosaic terms. These masques of war and taxes, death and luxury—or what Charles Tilly (1990) would have called coercion and capital—suggest that religious classifications and confessional A. Salzmann (*) Department of History, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada e-mail:
[email protected] M. Hanagan and C. Tilly (eds.), Contention and Trust in Cities and States, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6_3, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
27
28
A. Salzmann
identities played an intimate role in shaping the infrastructure of states as well as the terms of political commitment under different religious regimes. Indeed, with xenophobia and racism directed toward Europe’s new, often non-Christian citizens on the rise, the question of whether there is a peculiar moral economy of state formation—that is, whether a normative order determining the exclusion of religious minorities took shape with the rise of the Western European state from the medieval period onward (Moore 2007)—holds more than antiquarian interest. Both the anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish platforms of many parties in the new European Union Parliament and religious fundamentalisms within and outside the West have spurred new research on the topic of religion, politics, and violence that enlists sociological, anthropological, psycho-analytical, and literary theories (Pahl 2003; Asad 2003; Fassin 2005). For those like Samuel P. Huntington, who subscribe to “holistic” arguments, religious civilizations are molds containing immutable cultural and political characteristics that play out in inter-cultural contact and geopolitical rivalries (Huntington 1996; Tilly 2003:7). Although the “clash of civilizations” represents an extreme position on this spectrum, most social scientists still accord an integral place to religion in the evolution of cultural identities and political processes, including nationalism (cf. Giddens 1987:72–74; Rae 2002; Marx 2003). Indeed, few social scientists relegate religious or cultural affiliations to simply one identity among many; or, as a recent study of religious party affiliation in Turkey, to a conservative, political posturing that serves to consolidate the “politics of reputation” (cf. Toprak et al. 2009; Tilly 2005b:17). Yet, the presentist focus of many social scientific studies contributes to a rather reductionist approach to religion and the blurring of important distinctions in historical political practices and policies that led to the modern state. Historically, discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation was widespread on both sides of the Mediterranean. Both Muslim Middle Eastern and Latin Christian states slaughtered enemies of different faiths. Religious minorities in both regions suffered institutionalized liabilities and mistreatment, as evidenced by unequal taxation, forcible conversion, loss of life, expropriation, and flight. In the early-Modern period, Catholic and Muslim states uprooted, relocated, and confined religious minorities within cities and lands under their sovereignty; after 1500, they engaged in long intra—religious, sectarian wars that are still reflected in the borders of modern political maps. But the emerging territorial system of Latin Christendom did something that their neighbors, including Christian Byzantium (cf. Bowman 2006) and more importantly, the Muslim Middle East, to the south and east did not: from the late thirteenth century to the eighteenth century, they repeatedly expelled their non-Christian subjects en masse from their borders (cf. Kedar 1996). If the social scientific literature offers little to explain this peculiar facet of the Western European past, it may also owe to the way that the question of relations between state and religion have been posed. Instead of asking why Latin Christian Europe persecuted its religious minorities and expelled them with such regularity, perhaps we should ask why their contemporaries across the Mediterranean, especially the religiously and ethnically heterogeneous Muslim societies of the Middle East, from the seventh century Umayyads to the seventeenth century Ottomans, did not treat their Christian and Jewish subjects in a similar fashion? Can the difference between these regional regimes be explained by reference to legal status, religious doctrine, and culture alone?
Is there a moral economy of state formation
29
(Kymlicka 1985; Cohen 1994) Or did the very process of state formation in the pre-Modern Muslim Middle East shape a distinctive form of accommodation that allowed religious majorities and minorities to coexist without recurrent mass murder and mass expulsion? In approaching the question of Western Europe’s historic exclusion and the Middle East’s historic inclusion in terms of a “moral economy” (Thompson 1971), my goal is twofold: to problematize the terminology of investigation and to prod scholarly reflection on inter-cultural and inter-religious violence toward a new conceptual terrain. Focusing on the normative grid or framework governing unequal treatment prevents reduction of norms and practices to often reified notions of religious belief—its doctrines, dogmas and interpretations (Cornell 2008). The absence of a common category of analysis, one that explicitly addresses the norms governing negotiations between ruler and ruled also tends to reinforce assumptions that political developments east and west were incommensurate and hence, remain incomparable. Rather than attributing Western European intolerance to Christian theology or cultural traditions (cf. Kaplan 2007) or ascribing Muslim “tolerance” to a legal convention owing to the Qur’anic concept of “ahl el-dhimma” (that protected communities had the right to practice their religion so long as they paid tribute to the Muslim state), a common unit of analysis permits us to focus on the actual hierarchies of privilege and patterns of redistribution as they affected religiouslydifferentiated groups. Beyond offering a new category for comparative analysis, the proposition that a moral economy may have been a by-product of state formation itself, and thus concomitant with inter-group negotiations and regime integration, challenges researchers to account for religious discrimination as a facet of long-term statesociety relationships. If E. P. Thompson’s use of the term (1971) to account for the economic claims of workers in early-Modern England is worthy of further discussion, a new model for framing and formalizing the role of the moral economy is not possible without a more analytical grasp of political processes and social structure. Without discarding discursive evidence and other narrative references to norms, this article departs from Charles Tilly’s perspectives on state formation and regime integration: a comparative approach to state formation, in particular, the dialectic of coercion and capital (Tilly 1990) and reflections on “trust networks” as critical parties in regime-building as well as contentious and non-contentious politics (Tilly 2005a, b, 2006), inform our approach. Medieval and early-Modern Middle East historiography on state formation and non-Muslim communities offers a unique opportunity to map out in the most general terms the variables that will also help us investigate Latin Europe’s peculiar history comparatively. The longue durée of Middle Eastern state formation highlights the importance of foundational compacts or commitments between subjects and states, networks and regimes. It also points to the way that such commitments structured, preserved, or were undermined by the “infrastructural power” (Mann 1986), that is, the institutional capacity of states and changing socio-economic conditions. Multireligious societies endured in the pre-Modern Middle East, this article maintains, because the relative institutional capacity of early regimes with respect to the resources (demographic, technical, and economic) of non-believers led to commitments that brought minorities directly into the polity and shaped the state’s
30
A. Salzmann
institutions and property relationships. From this perspective, the “moral economy” should not be seen as independent variable, but as the cumulative effect of capacity (institutions of administration, mediation and mobilization of resources) and capital (general economic conditions, levels of urbanization, and community resources) that shaped the terms under which regimes and networks negotiated power, participation and inclusion. These dimensions of Middle Eastern state formation help explain the continued inequality and subordination of their non-Muslim subjects as a group, without the unsustainable exploitation and ultimately rejection en masse (deportation and liquidation/general redistribution of their remaining resources) of Jews and Muslims that became one of the hallmarks of regime integration in late-Medieval and early-Modern Western European territorial states.
Capacity, capital, and commitment: the foundations of a moral economy? By opening a discussion concerning the treatment of Medieval and early-Modern religious minorities with a concept like “moral economy,” this article acknowledges the contested legacy of E. P. Thompson’s inquiry into the forms of solidarity and notions of equity informing protest in the pre-Modern period (Thompson 1993; Randall and Charlesworth 2000). Thompson’s claims on this concept were never exclusive (cf. Scott 2000, 2005). Moreover, as Tilly pointed out, Thompson was inconsistent in his own usage (Tilly 2000). On the one hand, he referred to the moral economy of groups such as the mentalité of the English working classes that he attempted to document between the eighteenth and nineteenth Centuries. And on the other hand, in a manner that more closely approximates this article’s usage, Thompson cited it as shorthand for an unwritten constitution, or “paternalistic ethos” that guided political interactions between elites and subalterns (Tilly 1995:7–36). Yet, Thompson’s inconsistencies may be less important than his recognition that structural accounts of social and political change tend to ignore or misplace normative frameworks (by freighting notions like “religion” or “tradition” with much of their ideational content). Attributing these forms of negotiation of power and inequality to a generic paternalism, or as Tilly (2000) described it, to “traditional rights and customs” does not resolve this problem; indeed, contextual and transactional analyses should specify what tradition meant as well as when and where customs carried the force of rights (claims). Given the variances of time, place, and circumstance, no generic Gemeinschaft suffices to explain principles by which power, goods, and resources were distributed. (Arnold 2001). Whether we consider the moral economy as bonds of social solidarity or as the underlying, often unspoken, understanding between subordinates and elites, what Tilly would call “commitment” between groups and organizations (Goodin and Tilly 2006:429; Tilly 2005b:31, 50–51) requires that we account for its specificity and to the extent possible, explain its continuity and change. Tilly did not entirely avoid these questions. In his essay Trust and Rule (2005b), he may have circumvented questions of commitment. However, in postulating a meta-theoretical approach to politically significant groupings or networks and the resources that enabled them to bargain for inclusion in regimes, he unpacked new pieces of a complex puzzle. Avoiding Thompson’s self-limiting category of class, he
Is there a moral economy of state formation
31
distinguished between types of networks on the basis of investments: kinship, shared risks, long term goals, and penalties of membership built trust into networks. (Tilly 2005b:12) Rather than accepting the declaration of a belief, emotion, or central doctrine as the defining feature of these groupings, he attempted to document the internal cohesion, collective resources, and investments by describing form, connections, and membership—particularly those features that gave these groups endurance and made them prey to or partners in regimes, and hence, state formation processes. Persecuted religious groups, as well as merchant companies or credit unions, served as the paradigmatic examples of “trust networks.” Although Tilly assumed the existence of commitment among members of a network without examining the specificities of belief, his theoretical argument to some degree hinged on the larger sense of commitment as an underlying set of norms connecting networks to regimes and to other social sites. The foundational agreement that united parties and participants in regimes was not entirely malleable; it could be the source of rivalry between trust networks (such as dissidents from established churches or ideologies) and a decisive barrier to integration within regimes. This larger sense of the meaning of commitment brings us beyond a model that relies solely on cost calculation or political opportunity, but toward an examination of the bargains struck in political processes, the trust networks that are included and excluded, and relevance of their ties to other organizations. It seems appropriate to approach the sense and reference of commitment among social sites, networks, and regimes not simply as an unwitting cognate to Thompson’s notion of the moral economy as ethos. Rather, it is a problem that demands we approach it as Tilly did in his examination of the “trust” in trust networks. That is, we should be able to document the emergence of compacts and commitments as an outgrowth of political processes—that they represent, over time, shared investments, the interests of constituent groups, and terms of alliances. Indeed, it is the heavy weight of past commitments and the entrenched relationships that sustains them and makes them so difficult to transform. A successful revolution, as Tilly discussed with respect to the relationship between trust networks and the French Revolution (2005b), necessarily eliminates competing networks in order to create new institutions and new social norms (cum democratic ideals and republican constitutions.) However remains to be explained how the commitments of religiously-identified regimes first emerged and why they constrained bargains among networks, social sites, and entire populations for centuries. It is here that recent research in early-Modern Middle Eastern history might offer some guidance. Given the abundance of Ottoman administrative documents, scholars have given considerable thought to the relationship between forms of “commitment” and institutional change. Linda Darling has reexamined narratives about just rule, in particular the so-called “circle of justice,” a trope concerning the need for equitable rule that is widely cited in pre-Modern political literature in both Muslim and nonMuslim West Asia and North Africa (Darling 2002, 2007). Ascribed to classic Greek philosophy at times, the extended metaphor stresses the presumed mutuality of interests that sustain a polity: subjects pay the taxes that provide salaries for the soldiers and bureaucrats who protect them while the sovereign assures equitable treatment of all through mediation, enforcement of law, and redress. Given her research on sixteenth and
32
A. Salzmann
seventeenth-century Ottoman practices, Darling’s appreciation of the trope as a shared vocabulary between ruler and ruled does not stop at the discursive level: she demonstrates how this peculiar form of political “commitment” was reflected in and refracted through revenue collection and resource distribution (Darling 1996). Bringing her research on commitment and capacity together with Tilly’s emphasis on the negotiation between trust networks and regimes may furnish an analytical approach to the formation and endurance of “moral economies” over the longue durée of state formation. With respect to the historical relations between Muslim states and their non-Muslim subjects, contemporary narrative is also useful because it guides us to focus on certain aspects of the historical interaction between important trust networks and early state formation. For example, the contents of the “Pact of Umar,” one of the foundational texts upon which both non-Muslim demands and Muslim legal disputation concerning minority religious rights has been based, provides important clues about the nature of this commitment. The “pact” traditionally refers to the special dispensation granted the Christians of Palestine that was purported concluded between the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn Khattab (d. 644) and the patriarch of Jerusalem in the mid-Seventh Century CE/ First Century AH, that was later extended to all the “peoples of the book.” (Tritton 1930). In its various renditions, it extrapolates from a limited number of Qur’anic passages bearing on the subject to construct an administrative model: in exchange for tribute (special taxation, sumptuary codes, restrictions on the public expression of religion, and prohibitions on the use of weapons and other acts of deference to the majority) religious minorities were assured of a place within the polity, protection of their lives and property, and rights to practice their faiths. Recent research on the first half-century of Islamic rule reveals that Muslim administrative and fiscal policies lacked consistent application. In fact, the codification of many administrative laws, including those affecting non-Muslims, only took place during the early Abbasid period, that is, during the eighth and ninth centuries (Donner 2005; Wilfong 1998; Dennett 1950). Nevertheless, the survival and replication of the “pact” in multiple manuscripts, from Medieval Egypt to early-Modern Syria, in both Muslim and non-Muslim traditions remains meaningful in and of itself (Cohen 1999). It reminds us that for more than a 100 years, even as Islamic institutions took shape, a new state came to terms with a majority population of non-believers (Bulliet 1979). Whatever accommodation that was reached necessarily took into account the relative bargaining power (and support) of non-Muslim trust networks and especially the large, literate, and urbanized communities of Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq (Donner 1981; Robinson 2000; Choksy 1997). No less importantly, because regime integration, state formation, and formation of a new religious organization were coeval events, any compromise struck by non-believers with the “state” was coextensive with the early Muslim community as a whole. However the interpretation and application of the “pact” may have differed among Muslim states, it set forth the basic terms of indemnities and the beneficiaries. The direction and form of taxation, notably the graduated cash poll taxes (jizya) levelled on minority wealth paralleled zakat (the tithe paid by Muslims), both of which contributed, in theory, to the commonweal (bayt al-mal) rather than the privy purse of caliphs or sultans. By the ninth century, Hanafi jurists determined that conquered non-Muslim lands also constituted public resources. Christian tenants
Is there a moral economy of state formation
33
who remained on the land paid their rent or taxes to Muslim soldiers who became the collection agents of such tax grants (iqta); as such non-Muslim resources were broadly distributed among the dominant religious group. (Cahen 1977) Although some of these conventions may have had precursors in Sassanid and late-Roman practices (Rabie 1972), other demands on non-Muslim communities reflected the commercial orientation of the Meccan elite and “court societies” engaged in conspicuous consumption (Richards 1970; Rodinson 1978). A growing corpus of Islamic law on contract and partnership, emerged along with a tiered tariff system that accorded Muslim traders a fiscal advantage over non-Muslims, albeit privileging both groups economically with respect to foreign merchants (Goitein 1960; AmitaiPreiss and Morgan 1999). Without any pretense of doing historical or analytic justice to a millennium of complex and interdependent changes in Middle Eastern law, society, and political economy or neglecting notorious episodes of anti-minority persecutions under Muslim rule during the late-Middle Ages (particularly in North Africa and Iberia), this schematic approach highlights certain features that may have sustained the status of non-Muslim communities in Middle Eastern states long after Islam became the majority faith. Despite institutionalized discrimination, relative freedom to participate in other social, cultural, and economic activities fostered the articulation of multiple social ties and shared identities (Cohen 1982a, b; Greene 2000). Although some early-Modern North African cities did have minority quarters, such as the Jewish mellah of Marakesh (Gottreich 2003), residential quarters in eastern Mediterranean cities after the Ottoman conquest of early sixteenth century became more religiously diverse. In part, this was the product of policies of forced, internal relocation of populations, including Iberian Jewish refugees and Muslim tribes. The growing burden of cash taxation (including the jizya) on Ottoman Jews and Christians may have also driven urbanization (Inalcık 1993). At the same time as conditions for minorities deteriorated in the West, emerging regimes like the Ottoman not only struck new bargains with large, affluent, and literate Christian and Jewish populations but also articulated a new relationship between mosque and state. Inspired by Seljuk antecedents, the Ottoman judicial hierarchy or ilmiye curbed the autonomy of Muslim scholars and lawyers (Zilfi 2006). Perhaps more consequential for quotidian inter-faith relations was the profound transformation of Muslim piety and religious practice following the Mongol invasions. Mystical networks, the Sufi tariqat, formed around spiritual guides who eschewed the legalism of the Baghdadi schools (Karamustafa 1994; Meri 2002) A syncretistic “middle ground” of belief was given physical expression in an infrastructure of shrines and meeting halls across the Balkans and the Black Sea region (Barkan 1942; Lowry 2008). To summarize the relevant points: if we are to make any sense of an overarching normative grid, a “moral economy,” that took shape along with state formation, it must be considered the result of foundational relationships between parties (trust networks) and early regimes. Their negotiations and resolutions were determined by the relative resources or capital of politically significant religious communities and the relative capacity of incipient states. Early commitments were consequential and durable to the extent a): that they patterned state infrastructure and property relations (by locking in subordination while minimizing points of social and political friction)
34
A. Salzmann
and b): that economic conditions overall allowed religious minorities to renew resources and thus, renegotiate the terms of commitment from one regime to the next. Middle Eastern state formation of the Medieval and early-Modern period reproduced forms of legal and social inequality without the extremes of exclusivity found in the states of the contemporary Latin West.
Distrust and rule: late state formation, competing networks, and offshore capacity This schematic, long term view of the history of minorities and state formation of the pre-Modern Middle East certainly runs counter to the more recent historiography of pre-Modern inter-faith relations in Western Europe which has adopted more microhistorical and ethnographic approaches (cf. Nirenburg 1998). Although this scholarship wisely cautions against unwarranted generalizations and teleological extrapolations (cf. Netanyahu 1992), the weight of research continues to support the thesis of R. I. Moore’s classic essay, the “Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western European, 950–1250 (first edition, 1987).” State formation in Latin Christendom from the first millennium onward was the crucible in which institutionalized distrust was put to the service of power. Violence against lepers, heretics, and religious minorities spurred the institutionalization of new organizations of surveillance, coercion, and control, from the inquisition to the crusade and the ghetto. Marginalized in Pauline and Augustinian theology or targets of religious wars, Jews and Muslims living under Christian rule became victims of mob violence and institutionalized persecution by the majority religious community, churchmen, and the emerging state. Yet, a moral economic perspective highlights another set of factors that may have been decisive in destabilizing minority integration in medieval Christian society. Long before the rise of territorial polities, Rome’s former imperial hinterland including the peoples north of the Pyrenees and west of the Elbe underwent a cultural colonization by monks and priests (Bartlett 1993). Distance from competing intellectual networks of the Mediterranean preserved the Latin clergy’s monopoly over literacy and education. It also assured them of a central role in developing political structures and integration in the feudal economic order. But princes came to view this dependency on the church differently. Charlemagne’s invitation to Jewish settlement in his realms secured sources of luxury commodities and new cash revenues; this “trust network” also offered the keys to greater institutional autonomy from the church. Although this arrangement between a minority religious trust network and Carolingian princes proved, at least initially, mutually beneficial, Jews operated at an inherent disadvantage: they remained late arrivals in a political setting in which ideologically and institutionally dominant networks like the Christian clergy had established the terms of commitment between ruler and ruled (Blumenkranz 2006; Chazen 2007). Legally, too, Jewish status was tenuous: not subjects of a state, they were the personal “chattel” of a lord (Moore 2000:154). Associated with the premier territorial power, they were resented by lesser lords, who as in the case of thirteenth century England, feared that the king would use his feudal claim over his serfs’ property to call in debts and take over collateral. Given their role in the extension of
Is there a moral economy of state formation
35
state power and the collection of taxes, as well as their association with the cash economy, Jews furnished a convenient, confessional masque over a more intrusive state apparatus (Moore 2000:156). If heresies like Cathars prompted the institutionalization of violence and the categorization of difference in the Crusades and the Medieval Inquisition, (Hamilton 1999), it was Jewish networks whose administrative skills posed the greater long term challenge to clerical influence in temporal authority (Moore 2007:143). It was the crusades against Islam that unleashed a torrent of violence against the Franco-Jewish communities of the Rhineland. Although the murder and plunder carried out by predatory armies and mobs led by anti-Jewish preachers has been well documented (Chazen 1987; Cohen 1982a, b), the impact of these incursions into the Mediterranean undermined the structural conditions that had supported minority communities in Latin Christendom. In contrast to Iberia’s “clergy of the sword” who renewed claims on regimes in Christian Spain during and after the conquest of al-Andalus, the French and English princes who participated in the overseas crusades actually wrested greater autonomy from the church and found replacements for their minority clients. Defense of the “true faith” entitled noblemen to church indulgences, justified the imposition of the new taxes by Louis of France (1214–1270) (Jordan 1979), and permitted lords to renegotiate debts with Jewish bankers (Lasker 1999:28). Returning crusader nobility retrieved new techniques of statecraft (Lopez 1955). The Normans of Sicily built their states upon the preexisting foundations of Arab rule (Mathew 1992). Not only did the crusades against Islam enhance the capacity of these states, but they also compromised the privileged access to markets that Jewish merchants had enjoyed (cf. Tilly 2003:10). Crusader plantations in Cyprus and Palestine produced valuable commodities like sugar cane; Christian raids on Muslim shipping yielded slaves and ransom for captives (Prawer 1972; Verlinden 1970). The merchants of Venice commandeered the armies of the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) to advance their interests in the Eastern trade. With Latin rule established in Constantinople and Venetian domination of the entrance to the Black Sea, Genoese merchants turned westward, replacing Jewish bankers in England, France, and, later, Spain. By the early thirteenth century, the crusades had realigned the protection system between territorial states and Mediterranean merchants (Abu-Lughod 1991). Although the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) called upon Christian rulers to segregate Muslims and Jews in city quarters and to severely restrict their occupations, canon law merely sanctified earlier princely decrees (Chazen 2007:146). Mob violence, segregation, new financial demands, limited occupational opportunities, as well as the reorganization of Mediterranean trade networks stripped Jewish communities of their livelihood. Long before their deportation in 1290 and 1492 respectively, the Jews of England (Chazen 2007:125; Mundill 1998) and the Jewish subjects of Castile and Aragon (Kamen 1988:33) had been impoverished by these conditions. The 1306, deportation of French Jews provided a pretext to seize remaining assets; subsequent threats of exile or the promise of return became a means of extorting money. Expulsion provided a windfall to local Christians, when with the decrees of 1492 and 1609, Spain’s Jews and Muslims were forced to liquidate their property in haste. In the Italian cities, the threat of exile hung over refugees: the charters governing the Venetian ghetto were premised on residence of
36
A. Salzmann
limited duration; improvement or deterioration in their terms owed to community wealth and the interests of the oligarchic state (Ravid 2002). Religious stigma, economic distress, pandemics, and cultural distrust hardened popular attitudes toward Jews and Muslims during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Nevertheless, expulsion of minorities remained a “royal prerogative” (Stow 2005:217). In the multi-sided political struggles in the realms of the Holy Roman Empire, princes deported Jews from Austria (1420–21) and Bavaria (1442– 50); burgers and prelates expelled them from Cologne (1424); Salzburg (1498), and Reginsburg (1519). King Manuel I’s 1497 ultimatum of conversion or exile to Portugal’s Jews and Muslims, which fulfilled Queen Isabella of Castile’s prenuptial condition for the betrothal of their children, epitomized the use of expulsion as a repertoire of regime integration. Although Spanish treatment of its religious minorities has often been considered exceptional and excessive even by the standards of its neighbors, the treatment of the Iberian Jews under the rule of the united kingdom of Castile and Aragon, and later under the Spanish Habsburgs, conformed in large measure to the precedents established north of the Pyrenees. What distinguished the Iberian pattern from the rest of Latin Europe was the use of forced, mass conversion, deemed irreversible for the Jews of 1390s and for the Muslims of the 1520s, that allowed elites to retain the resources and labor of large minority populations. Yet conversion complicated relations between the aristocracy and the Old Christian clergy who bitterly opposed converso assumption of ecclesiastical and government offices (Kamen 1965). They leveraged intermarriage with New Christians against the “reputation” of the nobility. Nonetheless, the spoils of the victims of the new inquisitions, founded in the 1480s in Castile and Aragon, which initially targeted Jewish conversos, especially those affiliated with the state, (Rawlings 2006:68–69), but that after 1540 overwhelmingly prosecuted Muslims (Contreras and Henningsen 1986; Haliczer 1990), flowed into both the inquisition administration and state coffers. It is Catholic Spain’s policies toward its Muslim populations that represents a notable departure from earlier, European patterns of minority religious expulsion. Given the size of these communities, varied occupations (from silk merchants and soldiers to tenant farmers), and multiple ties to Christian societies, as well as to foreign powers (Protestant princes and sultans), Muslims possessed greater social and economic resilience than the Jews before 1492 or the Jewish conversos. Despite concession of a writ of tolerance from the United Kingdom to Grenada’s Muslim elites after the conquest, the suppression of Islam across the peninsula over a quarter century paralleled the Spanish Habsburg state’s protracted territorial integration. Yet it was not merely a different cult that challenged Christian rule, but the sheer diversity of Muslim societies that mirrored the fissured infrastructure of a state still compromised by a potent provincial nobility and conflicting jurisdictions. It would take nearly a century of mob violence, catechization campaigns, rebellion, internal exile, and branding via the “violent rituals” (Tilly 2003:81) of the inquisition and imperial legislation, such as Philip II’s infamous 1567 decree that criminalized dress, cuisine, burial rites and language, to impose a unified legal identity (morisco) on Iberian Muslims (Harvey 1992:224). Andrew Hess argued that the expulsion of the moriscos—the largest deportation of a religious minority in Europe’s early modern history—was an inevitable
Is there a moral economy of state formation
37
consequence of their real or imagined collaboration with Spain’s Muslim foes (Hess 1978). Yet its occurrence almost a century after this population’s formal conversion to the dominant faith sets off this event from expulsions from those that had preceded it. Post-Tridentine clergy and certain members of the aristocracy had waged a concerted campaign to forge a consensus of the necessity to dispatch New Christians and their baptized children toward “infidel” states (Ehlers 2006). In the end, domestic worries may have been at least equal to fears of foreign intervention. The Royal Council issued the deportation decree in 1609 on the same day that it concluded the 12 Years’ Truce with the Dutch estates. The deportation began with the hardworking morisco tenant-farmers of the Aragonese and Valencian nobility. The deployment of an army and bureaucracy necessary to carry out the order was a monumental demonstration of state power: after clerks duly registered the possessions of thousands of deportees, over the course of 5 years, and most within the first two, soldiers marched 300,000 to 330,000 moriscos to the coastline.
Conclusion: expulsion as moral economy or repertoire of regime integration? This article began with two questions: how might social scientific and historic research benefit from addressing discrimination and violence against religious minorities in the pre-Modern period in terms of the moral economy that emerged with state formation processes? Can such an approach help us to compare the important differences in the treatment of religious minorities among pre-modern state systems and especially Latin Christendom’s recurrent tendency to expel its Jewish and Muslim communities? In attempting to provide an answer to the second question, this article made an unorthodox methodological decision: by turning the question around and, putting aside the often legalistic or doctrinal explanations for the relative inclusiveness of the pre-Modern Middle East, we asked why Muslim regimes did not expel their nonMuslim subjects. Using discursive, socio-political, and institutional lenses through which to decipher the impact of the historic “commitment” between religious minorities and religious regimes, the record suggests that despite substantial restrictions and liabilities, Christians and Jews in the medieval and early-Modern Middle East were able to recover sufficient resources to renew their subordinate but well integrated place in the social and political order. These insights helped to refocus our attention on other factors involved in state formation that may have accounted for why religious minorities fared so differently in the emerging political order of Latin Europe. Key differences emerge. First, unlike the coeval evolution of state and religious institutions in the Muslim Middle East, limited state capacity in Western Europe allowed the Latin clergy to play a critical and enduring role in feudal polities. Second, while the non-Muslims who formed the majority of the population when caliphal dynasties were established were able to negotiate the terms of inclusion (commitment) within first Muslim polity, religious minorities in the West, notably the Franco-German Jewish communities, entered after such commitments were made and at the discretion of princes. Third, while religious minorities in the late medieval and early modern Middle East continued to practice a wide range of occupations and
38
A. Salzmann
interact closely with Muslims, increased restrictions on the residence and occupation of the Jews and Muslims in the Latin West coupled with the reorganization of markets and state finance during and after the anti-Islamic crusades sped social marginalization and undermined sectoral dominance. Finally, as the Ottoman emirs emerged from Anatolia and struck new compacts with large Christian populations in the early fourteenth century, Latin Christian princes and burgers had begun expelling religious minorities in order to extort resources, assert territorial sovereignty, or facilitate regime integration. Having established these comparisons between the treatment of religious minorities in the pre-Modern Middle East and Western Europe in terms of capacity, capital, and commitment, the initial question remains: Do these patterns of treating religious minorities in the context of state formation, demand recognition of the specificities of these “moral economies” as a contingent or as an independent variable? On the one hand, Tilly’s approach to state formation and political processes provides an analytical framework with which to document the interactive, contextual, and organizational facets of what might otherwise be attributed to norms, doctrines, prejudices, and cultural stances. On the other hand, even taking into account relative state capacity, minority resources, and formative commitments does not fully explain the persistence of such policies in anomalous situations. Did the Habsburg decision to expel the prosperous morisco population from Spain a century after their conversion to Catholicism owe to a moral imperative alone? Perhaps. It is not only the Habsburg persecution and expulsion of the moriscos, but also the Ottoman response to it that suggests that quite disparate moral economies prevailed within the Mediterranean throughout the early-Modern period (Salzmann 2008). As the Spanish crown imposed Catholicism throughout its realms in the 1520s, Iberian Muslims directed pleas for assistance to the southern Mediterranean (Harvey 1992: 208; Van Koningsveld and Wiegers 1999). Facing persecution and the prospect of deportation, they requested that the Ottoman sultan threaten to retaliate in kind by expelling the Christians of newly conquered Syria. While Ottoman authorities followed the plight of Spain’s Muslims closely, dispatching soldiers to assist in the ill-fated second revolt of the Alpujarras (1568–70) and hiring Venetian vessels to transport the morisco exiles of 1609–1614, there is no record that the imperial divan ever contemplated expulsion as a policy option (Temimi 1989). Instead, they advised their beleaguered co-religionists to join forces with the Protestants of the Low Countries who were also fighting the tyranny of the Catholic emperor (Harvey 2005).
Acknowledgments The author thanks Linda Darling, Michael Hanagan, and Adnan Husain for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
References Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1991). Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Amitai-Preiss, R., & Morgan, D. O. (Eds.). (1999). The Mongol Empire and its legacy. Leiden: Brill. Arnold, T. C. (2001). Rethinking moral economy. The American Political Science Review, 95, 85–95.
Is there a moral economy of state formation
39
Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Barkan, Ö. L. (1942). Les fondations pieuses comme méthode de peuplement et de colonisation. Les dervisches colonisateurs de l’époque des invasions et les convents (zaviye). Vakıflar Dergisi’nin Yabancı Dil Bölümü, 2, 59–65. Bartlett, R. (1993). The making of Europe: Conquest, colonization and cultural change, 950–1350. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Blumenkranz, B. (2006). Juifs et chrétiens dans le monde occidental, 430–1096. Paris: Louvain. Bowman, S. (2006). Jews in Byzantium. In S. T. Katz (Ed.), The Cambridge history of Judaism. The late Roman-Rabbinic period (vol.4 ch.39). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bulliet, R. (1979). Conversion to Islam in the Medieval period: An essay in quantitative history. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cahen, C. (1977). Les peuples musulmans dans l’histoire médiévale. Damascus: Institut Études arabes de Damas. Chazen, R. (1987). European Jewry and the First Crusade. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chazen, R. (2007). The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom, 1000–1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Choksy, J. K. (1997). Conflict and cooperation, Zoroastrian subalterns and Muslim elites in Medieval Iranian society. New York: Columbia University Press. Cohen, M. R. (1994). Under crescent and cross, the Jews in the Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cohen, M. R. (1999). What was the pact of ‘Umar’? A literary-historical study. Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 23, 100–157. Cohen, A. (1982a). On the realities of the Millet System: Jerusalem in the 16th century. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, (vol. 2, 7–14). New York: Holmes & Meier. 2 vols. Cohen, J. (1982b). The Friars and the Jews. The evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Contreras, J., & Henningsen, G. (1986). Four-four thousand cases of the Spanish inqusition (1540–1700). Analysis of an historical database. In G. Henningsen & J. Tedeschi (Eds.), The inquisition in early modern Europe: Studies in sources and methods (pp. 100–129). Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Cornell, V. J. (2008). Theologies of difference and ideologies of intolerance in Islam. Religious tolerance in world religions west (pp. 274–296). Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation. Darling, L. (1996). Revenue-raising and legitimacy: Tax collection and finance administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1660. Leiden: Brill. Darling, L. (2002). ‘Do justice, do justice, for that is paradise’: Middle Eastern advice for Indian Muslim rulers. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 22, 3–19. Darling, L. (2007). Islamic empires, the Ottoman Empire and the circle of justice. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 49, 329–357. Dennett, D. C. (1950). Conversion and the poll tax in early Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Donner, F. M. (1981). The early Islamic conquests. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Donner, F. M. (2005). The Islamic conquests. In Y. M. Choueiri (Ed.), A companion to the history of the Middle East (pp. 28–50). Hoboken: Wiley. Ehlers, B. (2006). Between Christians and Moriscos: Juan de Ribera and religious reform in Valencia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Fassin, D. (2005). Compassion and repression: the moral economy of immigration policies in France. Cultural Anthropology, 20, 362–387. Giddens, A. (1987). The nation-state and violence: Vol. 2 a contemporary critique of historical materialism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goodin, R. E., & Tilly, C. (2006). Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goitein, S. N. (1960). The unity of the Mediterranean world in the ‘Middle’ Middle Ages. Studia Islamica, 12, 29–42. Gottreich, E. (2003). On the origins of the Mellah of Marrakesh, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 35, 287–305. Greene, M. (2000). A shared world: Christians and Muslims in the early modern Mediterranean. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haliczer, S. (1990). Inquisition and society in the Kingdom of Valencia, 1478–1834. Berkeley: University of California Press.
40
A. Salzmann
Hamilton, B. (1999). The Albigensian Crusade and heresy. In D. Abulafia (Ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History c.1198-c.1300 vol. 5 (pp. 164–181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harvey, L. P. (1992). The political, social and cultural history of the Moriscos. In S. K. Jayyusi & M. Marín (Eds.), The legacy of Muslim Spain. Leiden: Brill. Harvey, L. P. (2005). Muslims in Spain, 1500–1614. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hess, A. C. (1978). The Moriscos: An Ottoman fifth column in sixteenth century Spain, American Historical Review, vol. 74 (pp. 1–25). Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking World Order. New York. Inalcık, H. (1993). “Osmanlilar’da Cizye.” Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi: Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 8 (pp. 45–48). Istanbul: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi. 35 vols. (1988–2008). Jordan, W. C. (1979). Louis IX and the challenge of the crusades: A study in rulership. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kamen, H. (1965). The Spanish inquisition. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Kamen, H. (1988). The Mediterranean and the expulsion of Spanish Jews in 1492. Past and Present, 46, 30–55. Kaplan, B. J. (2007). Divided by faith: Religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern Europe. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Karamustafa, A. T. (1994). God’s unruly friends: Dervish groups in the Islamic later middle period, 1200–1550. Salt Lake: University of Utah Press. Kedar, B. Z. (1996). Expulsion as an Issue of World History. Journal of World History, 7, 165–180. Kymlicka, W. (1985). Multicultural citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lasker, D. J. (1999). The impact of the Crusades on the Jewish-Christian debate. Jewish History, 13, 23–36. Lopez, R. S. (1955). East and West in the early Middle Ages: Economic relations. In S. del Medioevo (Ed.), Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche. Roma. Vol. 3 (pp. 112–163). Florence: Sansoni. Lowry, H. W. (2008). The shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350–1550: The conquest, settlement & infrastructural development of Northern Greece. Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publications. Marx, A. W. (2003). Faith in Nation: Exclusionary origins of nationalism. New York. Mann, M. (1986). The sources of power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2 vols. Mathew, D. J. (1992). Norman Kingdom of Sicily. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meri, J. W. (2002). The Cult of the Saints among Muslims and Jews in Medieval Syria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, R. I. (2007). The formation of a persecuting society: Authority, deviance in Western Europe, 950– 1250 (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. Moore, R. I. (2000). The first European revolution, 970–1215. Oxford: Blackwell. Mundill, R. R. (1998). England’s Jewish solution: Experiment and expulsion 1262–1290. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Netanyahu, B. (1992). The origins of the inquisition in fifteenth century Spain. New York: Random House. Nirenburg, D. (1998). Communities of violence: Persecution of minorities in the Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pahl, J. (2003). Violence from religious groups. In W. Heitmeyer & J. Hagan (Eds.), International handbook of violence research (pp. 323–338). New York: Springer. Prawer, J. (1972). The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European colonialism in the Middle Ages. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Rabie, H. (1972). The financial system of Egypt, A.H. 564–741/A.D.1169–1341. London: Oxford University Press. Rae, H. (2002). State identities and the homogenisation of peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Randall, A., & Charlesworth, A. (2000). The moral economy: Riots, markets and social conflict. In A. Randall & A. Charlesworth (Eds.), Moral economy and popular protest: Crowds, conflict and authority (pp. 1–32). London: MacMillan Press, St. Martin’s Press. Ravid, B. C. I. (2002). An Introduction to the Charters of the Jewish Merchants of Venice. In E. Horowitz, M. Orfali (Eds.), The Mediterranean and the Jews: Society, culture, and economy in early modern times (pp.203–241). Ramat Gan, Israel: 203–241. Rawlings, H. (2006). The Spanish inquisition. Oxford: Blackwell. Richards, D. S. (Ed.). (1970). Islam and the Trade of Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rodinson, M. (1978). Islam and Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce. Austin: University of Texas Press. Robinson, C. F. (2000). Empire and elites after the Muslim conquests: The transformation of Northern Mesopotamia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Is there a moral economy of state formation
41
Salzmann, A. (2008). The moral economies of the pre-modern Mediterranean. Preliminaries to the study of cross-cultural migration during the long 16th century. In V. Costantini & M. Koller (Eds.), Living in the Ottoman ecumenical community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi (pp. 453–478). Leiden: Brill. Scott, J. C. (2000). The moral economy as an argument and as a fight. In A. Randall & A. Charlesworth (Eds.), Moral economy and popular protest: Crowds, conflict and authority (pp. 187–208). London: MacMillan Press, St. Martin’s Press. Scott, J. C. (2005). “Afterword” to “Moral economies, state spaces, and categorical violence.” In “Focus: Moral economies, state spaces, and categorical violence: Anthropological engagements with the work of James Scott.” American Anthropologist, n.s. 107:395–402. Stow, K. R. (2005). Expulsions: High Middle Ages. In R. S. Levy (Ed.), Antisemetism: A historical encyclopedia of prejudice and persecution (pp. 216–218). Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Temimi, A. (1989). Le Gouvernment ottomane e le probleme morisque, Zaghouan Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d’Information. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge: Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1995). Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tilly, C. (2000). Review of Adrian Randall and Andrew Charlesworth, moral economy and popular protest: crowds, conflict and authority. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 31(2), 259–260. Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2005a). Identities, boundaries, and social ties. Boulder: Paradigm. Tilly, C. (2005b). Trust and rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2006). Regimes and repertoires. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thompson, E. P. (1971). The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century. Past & Present, 50, 76–136. Thompson, E. P. (1993). Customs in common: Studies in traditional popular culture. New York: Merlin. Toprak, B., Şener, N., Morgül, T., & Bozan, İ. (2009). Turk Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak Din ve Muhafazakârlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler. Istanbul: Metis. Tritton, A. S. (1930). The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim subjects: A critical study of the covenant of ‘Umar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Koningsveld, P. S., & Wiegers, G. A. (1999). Appel des Maures au sultan mamelouk et à son homologue de la cour ottomane: analyse de texte, contexte et arrière-plan historique au sens large. Al-Qantara, 20, 161–189. Verlinden, C. (1970). The beginnings of modern colonization: Eleven essays with an introduction. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wilfong, T. (1998). The non-Muslim communities: The Christian communities. In M. W. Daly & C. F. Petry (Eds.), The Cambridge history of Egypt. Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, vol. 1 (pp. 175–197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2 vols. Zilfi, M. C. (2006). “The Ottoman Ulema.” The Cambridge history of Turkey.Vol. 3 The later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839 (pp. 209–225). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4 vols. Ariel Salzmann currently holds the position of Associate Professor of Islamic and World History at Queen™s University (Canada). In addition to teaching in universities in North America between 1994 and 2000, she helped found New York University™s graduate and undergraduate program in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Her publications address topics in the political economy of Ottoman state formation, the culture of early capitalism, the cartography of West Asia, and the history of citizenship in the Mediterranean.
Unanticipated consequences of “humanitarian intervention”: The British campaign to abolish the slave trade, 1807–1900 Marcel van der Linden
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract Building on Robert Merton’s theory of unanticipated consequences of purposive action and Charles Tilly’s theory of error correction, the present article presents a stylized narrative about the British campaign to abolish the trading in African slaves, from its beginning in 1807 until the end of the nineteenth century. In the end, this campaign was largely successful, though it required error corrections that had extremely far-reaching consequences. The colonization of Africa was, to a certain extent, a second-degree unanticipated consequence. This case study suggests that three sorts of error correction can be distinguished, namely (a) measures that are taken to facilitate the effective implementation of the purposive action; (b) measures that are taken to minimize unintended consequences, after the purposive action has been carried out; and (c) new purposive actions that widen the objective and are more far-reaching than the original purposive action. We all have the tendency to interpret developments in the past more rationally than they in fact were. But historical processes that at first look “logical” and driven by necessity, at closer inspection, often seem significantly less straightforward. Even the most well thought out and carefully planned social actions are somewhat erratic if observed from nearby (Watter 1996, p. 22). Robert Merton raised an important aspect of this problem when he pointed out, in his famous article published in 1936, on the “Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Action,” that actions don’t always lead to the objectives that have been set. We do not know enough to gain a picture of all their implications; we assume, incorrectly that actions that were successful in the past, will also be successful in the future; we allow short-term evaluations to weigh more heavily than long-term concerns; we let ourselves be led by basic values that incite us to take immediate action, even though we have not considered the consequences thoroughly enough; or we rely for our actions on a forecast of what M. van der Linden (*) International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail:
[email protected] M. Hanagan and C. Tilly (eds.), Contention and Trust in Cities and States, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6_4, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
43
44
M. van der Linden
will come, that influences the course of things, and by so doing, is self-defeating (Merton 1936, pp. 895–896).1 While Merton’s analysis points to the reasons why actions do not lead to the desired result, sixty years later, Charles Tilly has raised the question of the other half of the problem: how is it possible that sometimes, despite all the unanticipated consequences, purposive social action leads, nevertheless, to the desired results? “All life,” Tilly claimed, “is filled with erroneous interactions, therefore with unanticipated consequences. But life also teems with error correction and responses, sometimes almost instantaneous, to unexpected outcomes” (Tilly 1996, p. 594). Such responses to error are, says Tilly, “neither instinctual nor random; they draw on historically accumulated shared understandings, from culture. They also take place within constraining webs of previously established social relations, and, in the process, alter those webs incrementally” (Tilly 1996, p. 598). It is the combination of Mertonian unexpected outcomes and Tillyan error corrections that gives us a proper understanding of social processes, and allows us to withstand the seductive power of “ex post facto rationalization” (Tilly 1996, p. 600). The campaign: Phase I In the present article, I build on the work of Merton and Tilly, using a stylized narrative about the British campaign to abolish the slave trade. This campaign started on 25 March 1807, when the “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” received Royal Assent. My reconstruction stops at the end of the nineteenth century, when the British campaign had gained broad international support—support that was consolidated in 1919 with the establishment of the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization, two institutions meant to universalize the fight against trading slaves and slavery. From 1 May 1807 onwards, the “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” prohibited British citizens from participating in the purchase, sale, and transfer of African slaves— with the exception of ships that had left Britain before that date, and delivered slaves in the West Indies up to March 1, 1808. Just exactly what the motivation was for this Act is a matter of ongoing and passionate controversy, but it is clear that it definitely made the whole of the Atlantic slave trade illegal for British citizens, and, in that sense, it represents a real milestone in the history of human rights. This, in itself, should be both remembered, and studied critically.2 Note, that “unanticipated” and “unintended” are not exactly the same, even though these concepts are often taken to be congruent. Purposive action can have unintended, though anticipated consequences (for example, in a situation where a general undertakes a military action, although he knows that there will be “collateral damage” that, in principle, he would rather avoid), or intended but unanticipated consequences (for instance, when someone faced with a hopeless situation, does something in desperation without having any confidence at all that the action will be successful). Even the best of us sometimes lose sight of this difference. So, for example, do Tilly and Goodin (2006, p. 22 and 30), who maintain that Merton was writing about “unintended consequences.” 2 A few weeks earlier, on 2 March 1807, the US President, Thomas Jefferson, had signed the internationally much less well-known “Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves,” that determined from 1 January 1808 onwards that, “it shall not be lawful to import or bring into the United States or the territories thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of such negro, mulatto, or person of color, as a slave, or to be held to service or labor.” However, contrary to the British situation, in the United States at that time, the overseas slave trade was not so very extensive (Goldfarb 1994). Later in the century, however, it would resurface as illicit smuggling. 1
Unanticipated consequences of “humanitarian intervention”
45
The “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade” was the pinnacle of a 20-year campaign by abolitionists, probably “the world’s first social movement” (Tilly 2004, p. 33; Tilly 2005, p. 173, 199). Already, in the first months of it being established in 1787, the committee that had played a key role in this decided that, in its campaign in the years to come, they would not target slavery as such, but only the slave trade. At a later date, Thomas Clarkson, one of the co-founders of the committee, summarized the arguments behind this decision. Two considerations turn out to have been of overriding importance. In the first place, they assumed that after the abolition of the slave trade, slaves’ living standards would improve. For, the planters and others being unable to procure more slaves from the coast of Africa, it would follow directly, whenever this great event should take place, that they must treat those better, whom they might then have. They must render marriage honourable among them. They must establish the union of one man with one wife. They must give the pregnant woman more indulgencies. They must pay more attention to the rearing of their offspring. They must work and punish the adults with less rigour (Clarkson 1808, vol. I, pp. 284–285). In the second place: They would not incur the objection that they were meddling with the property of the planters, and letting loose an irritated race of beings, who, in consequence of all the vices and infirmities, which a state of slavery entails upon those who undergo it, were unfit for their freedom. By asking the government of the country to do this, and this only, they were asking for that, which it had an indisputable right to do; namely, to regulate or abolish any of its branches of commerce; whereas it was doubtful, whether it could interfere with the management of the internal affairs of the colonies, or whether this was not wholly the province of the legislatures established there (Clarkson 1808, vol. I, pp. 286–287). From the beginning, the British State realized that abolishing the slave trade would have no effect, if Britain were the only country to do so. The other European slave-trading nations would then simply take over the British share of the trade, so that, in the end, Britain would just be helping its competitors economically, to its own disadvantage. Therefore, it was of great importance to convince France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and other slave-trading nations to stop trading too. The negotiations to achieve this objective often proceeded very laboriously. Tactics such as offering enticements were tried, for instance in 1814, by offering France “a West Indian Island or a sum of money” in exchange for immediate abolition, or by offering Spain large subsidies if it would restrict its slave trade to the area south of the equator and abolish the trade completely in 5 years time (Nelson 1942, pp. 195–196). The first symbolic success was booked when the Congress of Vienna of 1815 added an appendix to the agreement made there in which the undersigned agreed that the trade in “negro slaves” “has been seen by all just and enlightened men of all times as repugnant to principles of humanity and universal morals” (Berding 1974; Frowein 1994, p. 361). Although the practical implications of these words in Europe seemed to be limited, this declaration had a
46
M. van der Linden
deep impact on the freedom fighters in Latin America. This partly explains why a number of anticolonial governments in Latin America abolished slavery and the slave trade between 1810 and 1830 (King 1944, pp. 388–389; Corwin, 1967). After Vienna, other agreements, the purpose of which were much the same, followed (Paris 1815, Aix-la-Chapelle 1818, Verona 1822), but these did not have much effect. The other European states mainly considered it as a pretext allowing Britain to dominate the Atlantic Ocean as a kind of international policeman (Coursier 1960, p. 442; Adams 1925, pp. 609–611). There was no significant decline in the slave trade in the Atlantic region after 1807–8, and that is putting it mildly. The volume of the trade was temporarily reduced because of the Saint Domingue revolt (1791–1804) and the Napoleonic wars (1803–15), but then it revived again. During the years 1801–10, 683,000 slaves were transported across the Atlantic Ocean, during the years 1811–20 the number decreased to 599,600, but during the years 1821–30 it increased again to 694,400 (Lovejoy 2000, p. 146). At the same time, all sorts of reports reached Britain that seemed to indicate that the treatment of slaves in the Americas was getting worse. In the 1820s, veteran abolitionists published critical surveys intended to prove that slave mortality was extremely high, that slave families lived under very difficult conditions, and that religion was suffering damage. In particular, in the West Indies, the exploitation of the remaining slaves appeared to be on the increase. The price of cane sugar decreased between 1815 and 1834, after the Napoleonic Wars, which led the planters to try to maintain their profit margins by enlarging overall production. As a result, the quality of life for the slaves involved became even worse (Blackburn 1988, p. 421, 428). Despite the initial ineffectivity of the campaign, it was also rigorously continued in the years that followed. But a complementary campaign came into being at the same time, that had more radical objectives. An escalation of objectives: toward a second type of purposive action According to many abolitionists, the tactics agreed on in 1787 had obviously not worked well enough, and in their opinion, that was why it was now necessary to go a step further and work on the gradual abolition of slavery as such. From 1823 onwards, they set a new campaign in motion that appeared to be widely supported by the British public. Various factors contributed to the fact that, in 1833, an “Act for the Abolition of Slavery” was passed that, from 1 August 1834 onwards, forbade slavery in the West Indies, Cape of Good Hope, and Mauritius. One factor was that West Indian agriculture had slumped; sugar could be obtained easily from other parts of the world; and the Jamaican slave revolt of Christmas 1831 had made a great impression on the public. Trying to abolish slavery as such, marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle. People no longer directed their efforts on the symptoms, but on the disease itself. The campaign rapidly developed its own dynamics. It spread to other parts of the Empire, especially to India (Banaji 1933, pp. 333–404), and it gained support from abolitionists in other countries, which became evident, for example, during the “World Anti-Slavery Convention” (London 1840), in which also American and French abolitionists took part (Maynard 1960). With this escalation, entirely new anticipated and unanticipated consequences arose, which, in turn, led to new error corrections. But that is another story.
Unanticipated consequences of “humanitarian intervention”
47
Table 1 The abolition of the slave trade and right-of-search treaties by various states, 1802–1862 Date
Slave trade abolished by
1802
Denmark
1807
Great Britain, United States
1813
Sweden