CONTENTS PREFACE TO VOLUME 25
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INTRODUCTION: AUTHORITY IN CONTENTION Daniel J. Myers and Daniel M. Cress
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PART I...
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CONTENTS PREFACE TO VOLUME 25
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INTRODUCTION: AUTHORITY IN CONTENTION Daniel J. Myers and Daniel M. Cress
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PART I: AUTHORITY IN CONTENTION: BEYOND CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY: RESISTANCE TO AN EMERGING CONCEPTUAL HEGEMONY David A. Snow THE TARGETS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: BEYOND A FOCUS ON THE STATE Nella Van Dyke, Sarah A. Soule and Verta A. Taylor
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PART II: EXPANDING NOTIONS OF REPRESSION CONTROLLING PROTEST: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF PROTEST Jennifer Earl
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SOFT REPRESSION: RIDICULE, STIGMA, AND SILENCING IN GENDER-BASED MOVEMENTS Myra Marx Ferree
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PART III: CULTURE AND MOVEMENT CHALLENGES PERFORMING PROTEST: DRAG SHOWS AS TACTICAL REPERTOIRE OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT Verta Taylor, Leila J. Rupp and Joshua Gamson
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DISCIPLES AND DISSENTERS: TACTICAL CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCES IN THE PLOWSHARES MOVEMENT Sharon Erickson Nepstad
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CULTURE IN AND OUTSIDE INSTITUTIONS Francesca Polletta
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PART IV: CHALLENGES IN CORPORATE SYSTEMS WORKING IT OUT: THE EMERGENCE AND DIFFUSION OF THE WORKPLACE MOVEMENT FOR LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL RIGHTS Nicole C. Raeburn
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THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT’S (SURPRISING) ECONOMIC IMPACT: HOW UNIONS CHALLENGE CONSUMERISM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Teresa Ghilarducci
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EMBODIED HEALTH MOVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES TO THE DOMINANT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PARADIGM Stephen Zavestoski, Rachel Morello-Frosch, Phil Brown, Brian Mayer, Sabrina McCormick and Rebecca Gasior Altman
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AUTHORITY IN CONTENTION Daniel M. Cress and Daniel J. Myers
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
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SUBJECT INDEX
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PREFACE TO VOLUME 25 Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change is celebrating a significant anniversary, the publication of its 25th Volume. I can think of no better way to mark this occasion than with this collection of fine papers from the 2000 conference, “Authority in Contention: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” sponsored by the Collective Behavior and Social Movements section of the American Sociological Association. Daniel Myers and Daniel Cress, guest editors for this volume, have done an exemplary job of selecting and editing the papers. The RSMCC series and scholars writing in the field of social movements are each in their debt. Conference organizers wisely conceived of both contention and authority broadly, freeing researchers from a restrictive state-centric approach to authority that has enjoyed too much influence for too long in much social movement scholarship. The result is that these papers, individually and collectively, make important contributions to our understandings of the full range of sites of contention, of the multiple forms of repression faced by challengers, of the roles of culture in social movement theorizing, and of tactical repertoires and tactical choices, to name but a few. For over a quarter-century, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change has published innovative research on social movements, social conflicts and political change. Previous volumes have not only contributed much to the empirical body of research available on the topics reflected in the series title but have made substantive contributions to theory-building as well. This volume certainly carries on that tradition in fine fashion. It will undoubtedly move the debate over conceptions of authority forward in ways that are likely to impact scholarship for quite some time. I warmly welcome its addition to the series. Patrick G. Coy Editor, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change Kent State University
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INTRODUCTION: AUTHORITY IN CONTENTION In the summer of 2002, the Collective Behavior and Social Movements section of the American Sociological Association held one of its periodic workshops at the University of Notre Dame. The theme of the workshop and the title of this volume, Authority in Contention, was originally suggested by David Snow and later refined by the workshop committee. The conference theme was inspired in part by the ideas developed and published in Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow’s Dynamics of Contention, and a good portion of the conference developed in reaction to the ideas presented in the book. But although the conference itself was reacting to the DOC agenda (along with just about everyone else in the social movements field at the time), the agenda was broader in scope. As important as the contentious politics agenda has become, the conference organizers wanted to take a step back and look more broadly at empirical terrain that might reflect what we collectively consider to be social movement research and theorizing. In part, this means moving beyond a state-centered view of contentious politics and toward a more open definition of what might be fruitfully examined by social movement theories – and in turn what might inform those theories even as we use them in more traditional social movement arenas. The danger of the contentious politics framework, as articulated by David Snow in his chapter on resisting the hegemony of the approach, is that much important social movement activity would be defined out or, or at least severely neglected, by contentious politics thinking and that a broader frame of mind is necessary to guide social movement scholarship. Approaching this agenda necessarily involves at least some consideration of what social movements are – that is, deciding what kinds of empirical events fit into a recognizable cluster (or clusters) that can be understood through similar theoretical mechanisms. Yet as can be seen in the chapter in this volume, those seeking to define social movements are trying less to draw boundaries that exclude, but instead are trying to include more kinds of collective social behavior and think about how ideas about social movements can be extended to environments which, although perhaps not excluded from the social movements literature, have been less central under state-dominated approaches to understanding collective contention with political content. This in fact, is the main aim of Snow’s xi
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chapter which describes a series of phenomena that are not tied to state political institutions, yet deserve attention under the social movements rubric. But do the kinds of protest neglected by the contentious politics approach figure heavily, or even significantly, into the body of events that we should consider protest? Or, do they represent a negligible minority of protest that can be parsed out of empirical work on social movements and treated as minor, special cases? Does, for example, state-focused social movement activity numerically dominate the empirical reality of protest in the same way that it dominates the academic literature and social movement theorizing? Nella Van Dyke, Sarah Soule, and Verta Taylor examine the targets of protest in a particularly volatile period of U.S. history, 1968–1975, and determine how often the state was the central target compared to non-state institutions and less discrete targets such as public opinion. Their results show that although some movements and issues did focus primarily on the state, many others chose non-state targets, and most had more than one kind of target at the center of their activities. A key role the state plays in challenges to its authority, of course, is repressing dissent and maintaining the orderly functioning of society. But just as Snow suggests less formal kinds of challenges and bodies of challengers, so too are there less formal mechanisms of suppressing dissent other than the violence and influence wielded by the state. Jennifer Earl takes up the broader issues of the social control of protest and develops a typology of protest control that points out the wide varieties of strategies that both state and non-state actors use to suppress and derail dissent and challenges to political and cultural authority. Given the extant focus on repression as a state-sponsored activity, Earl focuses on understanding the roles that private protest control plays and culls from the literature key examples that will forward our thinking and research on repressing protest activity. Myra Marx Ferree dives even further into non-state repression by carefully delineating three key kinds of “soft repression,” ridicule, stigma, and silencing. These three strategies carry out repressive functions by disarming cultural challengers and by thwarting attempts to build collective identities. A key non-state site of contention is culture and three chapters explore the dynamics of cultural challenges from three angles. First, Verta Taylor, Leila Rupp, and Joshua Gamson explore drag performances as an example of how politics and culture combine in key social movement processes of expressing identity, forging solidarity, and performing resistance. This particular piece of the tactical repertoire show how ideas about contesting authority reach across the boundaries that separate thinking about the political and the cultural. Second, Sharon Erickson Nepstad explores the religious sources and consequences of the tactical choices made by the Plowshares movements. Although much of the activity of Plowshares is oriented toward the state, the movement
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is also challenging the authority of the Catholic church and demanding changes in its public stance toward war. Furthermore, the choices made by these activists have roots beyond political instrumentality and have symbolic and cultural consequences beyond the manifest political purposes of the actions. Culture has broad impacts on social behavior and relations of all kinds, of course, and Francesca Polletta’s essay attempts to draw the importance of culture more into the center of theorizing about social movements and protest. Rather than treating culture as a residual category, Polletta argues that we should theorize it as the key foundational piece that underlies collective challenges to authority, whether targeted toward the state or elsewhere, because culture creates the political opportunities necessary for mobilization, defines and operationalizes rationality, and conditions tactical choices. Nicole Raeburn’s case study of workplace activism demonstrates that challenges to authority in the workplace mirror many processes of state focused social movements. She demonstrates how some arguments, for example about opportunity structures, can be effectively mapped to the inside of the corporate domain. A second case study, by Teresa Ghilarducci, examines the impact of unions and pension activism on the far-reaching authority of employers and the corporate/consumerism culture. The final case study, by Zavestoski, Morello-Frosch, Brown, Mayer, McCormick, and Altman, examines health social movements and the collective attempts by patients to change the delivery of health care including its distribution across the population, the mechanics and outcomes of diagnosis, its dependence on science, and even the patients ability to exit the traditional medical system. These health social movements provide a key exemplar of how movements attack multiple authorities beyond the state – ranging from the concrete practices of local health providers to the more abstract cultural reliance on technical science. In the final chapter, we discuss the key contributions of Authority in Contention effort and discuss where it points for future work in the study of social movements and related collective phenomena. In the course of conducting this conference and putting together the subsequent volume, the editors have incurred a long list of debts beginning with David Snow’s vision of the conference theme. Two members of the original conference committee, Jeff Goodwin and Ann Mische, put in many hours making arrangements for the conference, developing its theme, and reviewing the many papers submitted to the conference. Two graduate students at Notre Dame, David Ortiz and Eugene Walls, helped with all of the conference logistics from hotel reservations to web page support. The conference staff at Notre Dame, led by Harriet Baldwin, made the conference flow smoothly and produced an event pleasurable for all of the attendees. We also wish to thank all of the units at the University of Notre
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Dame who provided funding for the conference: The Department of Sociology, the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, the Department of Political Science, the Department of American Studies, the Higgins Labor Research Center, and the Office of Research. Since the conference ended, we have had the pleasure of working with our dedicated authors to produce a truly outstanding set of papers. We also thank the group of anonymous reviewers who helped the authors sharpen their arguments through their insightful and helpful critiques. We have also benefited from the guidance of the series editor, Patrick Coy, who prevented missteps along the way and kept the project moving toward completion. Daniel J. Myers and Daniel M. Cress Editors
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY: RESISTANCE TO AN EMERGING CONCEPTUAL HEGEMONY David A. Snow ABSTRACT This chapter argues against the recent crystallization of “contentions politics” as the anchoring concept for the study of collective action on the grounds that it is overly restrictive, foreclosing consideration and analysis of much social movement activity not tied directly to government or the state and which thus falls beyond the bailiwick of the political arena. The problematic character of the contentious politics frame is discussed and illustrated both empirically and conceptually, and a more inclusive and elastic conceptualization is proposed and elaborated, one that conceives of movements broadly as collective challenges to systems of authority. This alternative conceptualization includes collective challenges within and to institutional, organizational, and cultural domains other than just the state or the polity. Not only are direct challenges to authorities included, but also movements that challenge authorities indirectly either through covert means, as in the case of terrorist movements, or by exiting the system, as in the case of separatist and communal movements and other-worldly religious “cults.”
Authority in Contention Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 25, 3–25 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(04)25001-7
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In this chapter I articulate a troubling concern and elaborate a tenable resolution with respect to the conceptualization of social movements. I begin with the troubling concern, dissect it empirically and conceptually, provide a more inclusive and elastic conceptualization of movements, and conclude by considering some complexities and questions regarding this broadened conceptualization.
THE TROUBLING CONCERN My concern emanates from what I perceive as an increasingly constricted conceptualization of collective action and of social movements in particular. During the past 30 years social movement theorization and research has been dislodged – some would say liberated – from the clutches of the so-called collective behavior perspective and the substantive domain of social psychology, and reconfigured under the conceptual umbrella of contentious politics and the substantive domain of political sociology. Over the course of the 30 or so years traversed, not only have there been numerous conceptual and theoretical advances, but few, if any, serious scholars of social movements would discount those advances. Nor would I, but I do have a gnawing concern. It is not with any particular model or perspective – be it resource mobilization, political process, framing, or the rediscovery of culture and emotion and their integration into the study of social movements. Rather, it is with the current fashion of anchoring – both wittingly and unwittingly – all of these advances to contentious politics, and correspondingly the state, within the port of the political institution. Before detailing why I find this trend troubling, let me provide some markers of this current fashion. Although the term contentious politics has been bandied about for years now, it was until recently used interchangeably with such kindred terms as collective action, protest, and social movements. This unbounded and non-specific use of the term changed, however, with McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (1996, 2001) project to reconceptualize and retheorize how we think about social movements, cycles of protest, and revolution. From their vantage point, these overlapping collective phenomena can be subsumed conceptually and analytically under the canopy of contentious politics. Noting a great deal of overlap and interaction among these phenomena, as well as corresponding disciplinary fragmentation in terms of their discussion, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly proposed “contentious politics” as the overarching cover term for research on and theorization of these phenomena. Contentious politics was thus proffered as an anchoring concept. But what precisely is contentious politics? Here McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly are very clear. It is conceptualized as:
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Collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects. That is “episodic” in the sense of not being regularly scheduled on the political docket. “Public” in the sense of excluding claim-making “that occurs entirely within well-bounded organizations, including churches and firms.” And “manifestly political” in the sense that a government is involved as a claimant, target, or mediator (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001, p. 5). Inasmuch as contentious politics is linked to government in some fashion or another, and thus the state, then it follows that contentious politics, so defined, occurs predominantly within or in relation to the political institution or domain of social life. Contentious politics, then, is “collective political struggle” (2001, p. 5), but, I would add, with a capital “P” because of its ligature to the political arena and the state. Although McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly have gone the farthest in crystallizing the notion of contentious politics into an anchoring concept, and thus bounding and clarifying the range of collective phenomena it encompasses, there are numerous other scholars who appear to have joined the chorus, as evidenced by the number of recent books on social movements that have contentious politics, the state, or politics more generally referenced in their titles or subtitles. Consider, for example, the following titles: The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998), Social Movements and American Political Institutions: People, Passions, and Power (Costain & McFarland, 1998), Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics (Hanagan et al., 1998), and Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Aminzade et al., 2001) [Underline added for emphasis]. In addition to the fact that these works pay homage to the link between social moments and the political arena, including the state, it is interesting to note that the presumed link is not, upon closer inspection of some of the contents of these books, always self-evident and articulated. This suggests to me that the concept of contentious politics is coming to function not only as a synecdoche for the study of social movements but also as a kind of imprimatur, thus suggesting, perhaps, an emerging hegemonic conception of social movements in the sense of limiting or constraining how scholars think about such phenomena.
THE PROBLEM WITH THIS LIMITING CONCEPTUALIZATION What’s my beef with this current fashion? Why is the conceptualization and analysis of social movements as contentious politics a troubling concern? Because
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I think it is too restrictive, foreclosing consideration and analysis of much social movement activity that is not tied directly, in some fashion or another, to government, and thus falls beyond the bailiwick of the political arena.1 The problematic character of this restrictiveness can be illustrated both empirically and conceptually. Empirical Limitations Empirical instances of collective, movement-like phenomena that appear to be excluded from the contentious politics conceptualization are not hard to find. Consider several examples of such activity that I encountered during the course of various routine, everyday kinds of engagements. The first materialized in early July 2002 as I was driving south on the 405 Freeway in Los Angeles, shortly after dropping someone off at LAX. It wasn’t an instance of protest, such as a freeway sit-in or closure. Instead, it was a large, billboard advertisement, announcing a forthcoming two-day rally sponsored by Promise Keepers, the Christian men’s movement launched in 1990 to promote Christian integrity and family values among males. I wondered as I drove on just how Promise Keepers and its activities might be conceptualized in terms of contentious politics, especially since the state is not its proximate target or ally.2 This same curiosity resurfaced a few days later when working-out at the university exercise facility and the disk-jockey of the classical rock station I was listening to broke away from the music for an interview with Dr. Phil, Oprah’s self-help guru. I wasn’t so interested in situating Dr. Phil and Oprah in some confluence of social and temporal space, but in trying to figure out what to do conceptually with the self-help movement, for which Oprah and Dr. Phil are two of its more prominent inspirational, albeit commercial, leaders. And then, before I went to sleep one night during the same week, I encountered indirectly, through the medium of Time magazine, a story about a disgruntled group of Catholics who call themselves the “Voice of the Faithful.” The story begins with the following vignette: They used to meet Sunday nights at St. John the Evangelist Church in Wellesley, Mass., but the crowd got too big, so now they have broken into cells, gathering nightly by the dozen in parochial school cafeterias or places like this spare church cellar, plotting and testifying under flickering institutional lights. First up is a man in a gray suit. “If the church were an institutional business,” he says, “the hiring manager would be out of a job, and the CEO would be on the next boat out.” Next comes a psychiatrist, who calls the Roman Catholic Church a dysfunctional family. Then a theology student, then a young father, then the mother of an abused boy and, finally, Marie Darcy. Darcy has 10 children back home in Merrimack, NH, but left them tonight to conspire with the Catholic lay group Voice of
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the Faithful because, well, because it touches on her status as part of the body of Christ. “We are all heirs to Christ, but it doesn’t feel that way,” says Darcy. “The decisions come down from above, and that’s it. The people in the pews quake, wondering what’s going to happen.” Into the night the group discusses how to change that, imagining the radical reinvention of the relationship between the flock and leaders that the Voice claims is the American Catholic Church’s only road to salvation. Like many Catholics, they are suffering a crisis of confidence as a result of the sexual scandals of the past months, but unlike some others, they see in it opportunity. “If there was ever a time for reform,” argues Gisela Morales-Barreto, who attended her first meeting in April, “this is it.”
Titled “Rebels in the Pews” (Van Biema, 2002, pp. 54–58), the story goes on to note that this contentious lay activity is occurring in one parish after another throughout the U.S. So what is going on here? What kind of collective activity is this? Is it only the spasmodic behavior of a handful of parish malcontents? Is it reflective of what some students of collective behavior have called “crisis crowds?” Or is it the outcropping of an emerging social movement? While the initial impulse of some students of social movements would be to classify it as an instance of the latter, consideration of the foregoing conceptual crystallization of contentious politics should give us pause, in large part because this festering “rebellion in the pews” is not connected to the government and occurs within a well-bounded organization, which we are told is grounds for disqualification of collective claim-making as an instance of contentious politics and thus as a social movement (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001, p. 5). Mine is hardly the first voice to express this concern about the narrowness of the contentious politics frame. In their more general critique of political process theory, Goodwin and Jasper (1999, p. 34) suggested that in focusing “attention on protestors interactions with the state, and those movements or activities that challenge existing laws, state policies, or states as such,” the perspective “ignored . . . movements populated by the middle class, especially those challenging extant ‘cultural codes,’ ” as well as “movements that do not target the state as their main opponent.” And many other scholars, through their empirical studies, indirectly question the analytic utility of nesting the conceptualization of social moments primarily within the political domain, as illustrated by Taylor’s (1996) examination of the movement to do something about postpartum depression within the contexts of feminism and self-help, Chaves’s (1997) research on the movement for the ordination of women within religious organizations, Katzenstein’s (1998) study of feminist protest inside the military and the church, and recent analyses of the role of narrative in various self-help (Rice, 2002) and new age (Brown, 2002) movements.
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Conceptual Limitations Another way to get a handle on the question of where to place, within conceptual space, movements like the Promise Keepers, self-helpers, new agers, and contentious parishioners, is to consider a number of the axes of debate implicated in the conceptualization of social movements. One such axis of debate concerns the focal unit or organizing concept for theorization and research. A second axis concerns the institutional locus of social movements. And a third axis of debate directs attention to the kind and level of change associated with social movements. Focal Organizing Concept Although one can find in the literature competing and overlapping answers with respect to the axial questions implied, the contentious politics conceptualization narrows stringently the range of debate about these conceptual axes. Consider, for example, the alternatives proffered over the years regarding the issue of the focal unit or organizing concept. Some 25 years ago McCarthy and Zald (1977) proposed “social movement organizations” (SMOs) as the orienting, focal unit of analysis, a proposal seconded more recently by Lofland’s book (1996) bearing that title, in large part because SMOs are the most visible accessible carriers and promulgators of the grievances and interests of a set of constituents. A contrary proposal, proffered by Della Porta and Diani (1999, p. 16), rejects the idea that social movements are organizations, even of a special kind, arguing, instead, that “they are networks of interaction between different actors which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances.” And a third alternative is Zald’s proposal (2000) to reconceptualize social movements as “ideologically structured action.” I note these alternative conceptual proposals not with favor or prejudice in one direction or another, but merely to suggest that the emerging hegemony of the contentious politics conceptualization forecloses not only consideration of these and other prospective alternatives but empirical assessment of which ones work best across a range of social movements and forms of collective action. Institutional Locus Regarding the axis of debate concerning the institutional locus of social movements, we know that the contentious politics conceptualization points to political institutions, and principally “the state,” as the primary institutional loci and/or targets of social movements and related forms of collective action. And we know that there are numerous other works which suggest that it is the state, polity, or institutionalized political arena that is fundamental. But there are some scholars of social movements who would ask: Why is it only the state or polity that constitutes
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the significant reference point for the conceptualization of movements? What about extra-institutional challenges within the religious order, such as the rebellion in the pews captured in the previous vignette? Are not denominational challenges, for example, whether they are referred to as cults or sects, movements as well? If extra-institutional challenges have all the characteristics of a movement except that their antagonist lies within an institutional sphere other than the established polity, should they not be counted as social movements? If not, then apparently most challenges within the religious arena constitute something other than social movements. And the same conclusion would hold for organized, collective challenges within other institutional spheres as well, such as the corporate world, the medical and health domain, and educational institutions. So the question of the institutional basis for the conceptualization of movements continues to smolder. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, being the trenchant scholars of collective action that they are, are neither oblivious to nor skirt altogether this issue of the institutional locus of social movements. But they wait until the final pages of the final chapter of their programmatic statement on contentious politics to suggest that their initial conceptualization may be a bit too rigid and inelastic. Here they write: Contention is not something peculiar to the realm of politics. It is a generic phenomena inextricably linked to the establishment of institutionalized power relations . . . Accordingly, we see no reason ultimately to restrict the application of our approach to the political realm, narrowly defined (2001, p. 343).
Unless this apparent retreat from the ligature of contention to politics in their opening conceptualization of contentious politics is little more than the ritualistic embrace of alternative interests and points of view that comes almost routinely at the end of new theoretical syntheses, hard-fought elections, and sermons hailing the advance of religious initiatives, it would appear that McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly would endorse broadening the institutional locus of collective action and social movements beyond the political arena.3 To do so would appear to call for a conceptualization somewhat different from theirs, however. Level of Change The last conceptual axis for debate concerns the kind and level of change associated with social movements. There is generalized acknowledgment that social movements are in the business of seeking or halting change, but there is a lack of consensus as to the locus and level of changes sought. Again, however, the contentious politics conceptualization provides a clear answer: the change is primarily at the political institutional level. But here again it seems reasonable to ask whether the changes or objectives sought must be in terms of seeking
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concessions from or altering political institutions? What about changes at the individual or personal level? Do other kinds of changes count, such those associated with so-called self-help groups, or cultural representations and stereotypes, or animal rights, and so on? Although some hardliners would scoff that concern with change at the individual or personal level takes us back to a “hearts and minds” emphasis, such a view overlooks the extent to which affecting changes in hearts and minds, or what is more commonly called consciousness-raising, is not only sometimes a necessary condition for moving people from the balcony to the barricades, but also for implementing and sustaining the changes sought. Ralph Turner (1983) makes this point emphatically in a rarely cited but insightful assessment of figure and ground in the analysis of social movements. He writes that the study of social movements was once . . . strongly influenced by examples of religious movements and humanitarian movements that conveyed new ways of viewing and practicing human relations . . . Movements for the abolition of slavery, for women’s suffrage, for the termination of child labor, and even for the prevention of cruelty to animals all required that patterns and relationships heretofore accepted as natural and proper should be reconceived as abhorrent. Although some of these movements culminated in legislative encounters, even the legislative proposal was unthinkable until a tremendous task of altering people’s views of reality had been accomplished. For each of these movements, effectiveness did indeed depend upon reaching the hearts and minds of vast numbers of people (Turner, 1983, p. 177).
While theoretical elegance and conceptual tidiness may be gained by limiting the conceptualization of movements institutionally and in terms of the kinds of changes sought, it is important to ask about the costs of doing so? If movements are conceptualized under the rubric of contentious politics, not only are “collective efforts at escape or self-renewal” excluded (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 1996, p. 21), but many other species of social movements – such as non-state related religious movements, various identity-based movements, and countercultural movements – are excluded from analysis as well.4
TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE AND ELASTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION Given the foregoing questions and the attendant observations on which they are based, I wonder whether we are best served conceptually and analytically by ignoring or redefining as something other than social movements collective phenomenon that do not fit neatly under the umbrella of contentious politics? Obviously I think not, as I believe the study of social movements would be better served, both empirically and theoretically, if our orienting conceptualization
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was more inclusive and elastic. Thus, my preference is for a conceptualization which: (a) includes not only contentious politics, that is movements that are “manifestly political,” but collective challenges within or to other institutional and cultural domains as well; (b) includes collective efforts to affect change at various levels of social life, from the individual level to the state to even international organizations consisting of a consortium of national states, such as the World Trade Organization; and (c) acknowledges that the organizational form of social movements is quite variable rather than limited to a particular kind of organization or network cluster. It is with these considerations in mind that I propose that we think of social movements broadly as collective challenges to systems or structures of authority or, more concretely, as collectivities acting with some degree of organization (could be formal, hierarchical, networked, etc.) and continuity (more continuous than crowd or protest events but not institutionalized or routinized in the sense of being institutionally or organizationally calendarized) primarily outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging extant systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems, in the organization, society, culture or world order of which they are a part. In order to clarify this conceptualization, it is necessary to elaborate what I mean by collective challenges and systems or structures of authority. I begin with the latter because it is the bedrock for this alternative conceptualization.
Structures/Systems of Authority In clarifying what I mean by “structures or systems of authority,” I begin denotatively by considering various concrete examples, of which there are many. Within the political domain or sector of society, the state or national government is the most obvious and visible example. But other governmental units – such as the “state houses” located in the capital cities of each of the 50 states comprising the U.S., county seats, and city hall or the mayor’s office – are all governmental and thus political structures of authority. Non-governmental, for-profit corporations, such as Ford Motors, Shell Oil, and Enron, also constitute systems of authority. So do non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations that range broadly from educational institutions, like Stanford University and Orange Coast Community College; to foundations, like the Ford Foundation and the Mellon Foundation;
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to professional associations, like the American Psychiatric Association and the American Sociological Association; to religious denominations, like the Methodist, Lutheran, and Southern Baptist denominations. And various congeries of beliefs and understandings can constitute systems of authority as well, albeit cultural or subcultural. This is no small point inasmuch as social movements often challenge and seek to change existing cultural understandings that function in an authoritative manner. So what do all of these disparate so-called systems of authority, be they structurally or culturally based, have in common that make them such? Two things. First, in accordance with a host of sociological commentators on structures of authority – from Weber (1947) through Dahrendorf (1959) and Sennett (1981) to Coleman (1990) – they are the recognized seat of decisions, regulations, procedures, and guidelines influencing some domain or aspect of the lives of some category of individuals, variously referred to as constituents, adherents, members, believers, practitioners, stockholders, stakeholders, and the like. To say that a particular system of authority is a recognized seat of decisions regarding some category of relevant interests is to note that adherents or members typically act in accordance with the rules and procedures associated with that system of authority, and in doing so they are, whether intended or not, granting it a veneer of legitimacy.5 This does not mean that members or adherents or stakeholders agree with the rules, procedures, or decisions. Nor does it mean that they may not complain and gripe about the procedures and rules, but “institutional bitching,” which is widespread in most institutional and organizational contexts, is not the same as contesting collectively and seeking to change the operating rules, procedures, and/or decisions, even though it may be the springboard for the evolution of such challenges. So one thing structures or systems of authority have in common is that they are the acknowledged seat of rules and decisions relevant to some set of interests or activities for some category of individuals. A second but less well articulated feature of systems of authority is that they typically are undergirded by, and thus carriers of, sets of interconnected values, beliefs, and conceptualizations. Variously referred to as informing points of view (Burke, 1965), universes of discourse (Mead, 1962), ideologies (Geertz, 1973), or primary frameworks (Goffman, 1974), these interpretive modalities typically rationalize the distribution and exercise of the domain-relevant authority. But they also provide vocabularies of motive that can be used not only to justify adherence to the regulations or procedures but to challenge their perceived violation or abuse as well. Both the behavioral and interpretive functions of systems of authority are highly interactive in that they reinforce and enhance the legitimacy of each other. They do so in large part because the behavioral and interpretive functions of systems
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of authority can typically be traced to an organizational or institutional entity that gives empirical or material substance to the associated claims and guidelines. Because of this anchoring function, these organizational or institutional entities constitute what Berger and Luckmann refer to as “plausibility structures” (1967, pp. 154–155) in that their very existence renders their claims and directives plausible, if not always compelling. Thus, the legitimacy and force of all institutional or organizational systems of authority flow not only from the actions and inactions of those to whom their regulations and directives apply, but also from the anchored plausibility of underlying beliefs, claims, and narratives. Although this second characteristic of structures of authority is shortchanged in much sociological work on the topic, it is especially relevant in relation to social movements because oftentimes it is the disjunction between what authorities command or do and the underlying principles or beliefs they presumably subscribe to and/or are entrusted to uphold that constitutes the grievance base for challenge, as in the case of the mentioned rebellion in the pews. A note of caution needs to be introduced here, lest we assume that all authoritative directives, behavioral codes, and modes of interpretation are nested in structures of plausibility, be they organizational or institutional. Some also flow from the articulations and ritual behaviors of individuals responded to as if they are “charismatic” and thus stand above or beyond some organizational or institutional structure; others may, for some people in some places, flow from writings that have been sanctified and fetishized, such as the Bible, the Koran, and Marx’s Das Capital; while still others can be traced to core values and beliefs, to founding myths and narratives about a people, or to a set of activities that come to be identified as a salient aspect of a collectivity’s culture. Each of these alternative sources of authority may be a target of challenge or the inspirational basis for challenge of another authority. And sometimes evidence is marshaled that suggests that aspects of a culture, albeit different ones, have functioned in both ways, as in the case of the “hippie” or countercultural communal movement (Berger, 1981; Zablocki, 1980). In sum, I have suggested that structures or systems of authority – be they institutionally, organizationally, or culturally based – function, in a kind of Foucauldian fashion, to coordinate patterns of behavior and orientation, typically among a fairly large number of people, such that the activities, orientations, identities and/or interpretations of one set of actors is subordinated to the directives, mandates, and perspectives and framings of another set of actors (superordinates) or privileged cultural texts, narratives, or codes. The relevance of systems of authority to social movements, as argued, is that they typically are the targets of, and sometimes the inspirational sources for, the challenges mounted by social movements.
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Complexities and Questions Having clarified what I mean by systems of authority, and having made a case for tying the conceptualization of social movements to authority systems more generally, let me briefly introduce a number of complexities regarding that relationship which are suggestive of various questions and lines of inquiry. The first such complexity relates to the observation that many, and perhaps most, movements challenge several systems of authority, rather than being nested in a single institutional or cultural domain, in terms of their goals and activities. Whether at a single point in time or at different points in a movement’s career, different systems of authority may be targeted in conjunction with different movement grievances and goals. The women’s movement amply demonstrates this point. As Ferree and Hess (1985, p. 141) tell us in their assessment of the aims and accomplishments of what they called the new feminist movement: Diversity is really the key, since feminists differ over both goals and methods of change. Career and radical feminists see the means of change in women realizing their own power and potential; socialist and liberal feminists stress transforming social institutions, such as law, the economy, and the schools, in ways that would liberate women.
In the case of the women’s movement, then, different segments or wings of the movement charted somewhat different courses with different objectives and targets. This clearly was the case for the civil rights movement as well. Movements constitutive of what Gusfield (1963) dubbed “symbolic crusades” also have multiple targets, seeking not only to change laws but also to change or reassert selected cultural standards and practices. Similarly, Turner (1983, p. 178) has argued that movements that seek to affect “transformations of social relationships between categories of people” and “changes in popular values and tastes” are unlikely to realize their objectives “without a strong admixture of personal transformation with societal manipulation,” which implies challenges to both cultural and structural authority. Such examples and observations indicate that the relationship between movements, their objectives, and targeted systems of authority may often be layered in ways that caution against premature categorization of any particular movement. A second complexity concerns the variation in the reach or pervasiveness of a system of authority. To how many domains of life is it relevant, and to how many activities does it extend or cover? Certainly in the modern world it is arguable that the reach of “the state” is far greater than most other authority structures, yet there is considerable variation across national or state governments in the scope of authority. In the U.S., as well as in most other western democracies, freedom of religious choice is not only regarded as a sacred cultural value, but it undergirds the constitutional separation of church and state. In such societies, it is relatively
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easy to follow the historical Christ’s alleged directive to “Render onto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” In countries in which Islam is the dominant religion, there is little to no constitutional separation of church and state, as the two domains are merged into a theocracy. But even in Muslim countries, there can be noteworthy variation in the reach of the theocratic state, as evidenced by the pervasive intrusiveness of the former Taliban government in Afghanistan in contrast to the less intrusive regime of Jordan. Under the Taliban regime, for example, there were few aspects of life not touched by its edicts (Rashid, 2000). Such observations suggest that it may be useful to consider carefully the relationship between movements and the relative reach or pervasiveness of the authority systems they challenge. For example, does the character and operation of movements that challenge domain specific authorities, such as the American Psychiatric Association and its Diagnostic Statistical Manual or the University of California’s admission criteria and procedures, differ from the character and operation of movements that challenge more global or pervasive systems of authority, such as non-democratic political regimes or cultures grounded in fundamentalist religious traditions? Along the same lines, would we expect the frequency and character of movement challenges to differ in societies in which authority is specialized and compartmentalized, such that there is a multitude of domain specific systems of authority, in contrast to those in which authority is more concentrated and pervasive and thus more hegemonic structurally and/or culturally? A third complexity concerns the basis of attachment or commitment to an authority of those under its sway. On what grounds do individuals adhere to the decisions, directives, rules, and guidelines of the systems of authority with which they are associated? What is the character of the relationship between authorities and adherents? Coleman (1990) suggests the answer is lodged in two types of authority relations: conjoint and disjoint authority relations. In the case of the former, the subordinate assumes that the decisions and actions of the authority will be beneficial – that is, in keeping with the subordinate’s interests. In the case of the latter, there is no such correspondence or mutuality of interest. Instead, the subordinate acts in accord with the directives of the authority in exchange for some form of compensation (Coleman, 1990, pp. 72–81). In both cases, subordinates are said to be acting rationally inasmuch as they are benefiting directly or indirectly (compensation) by transferring control to or acting in accord with the directives of authorities. Although the concepts of conjoint and disjoint authority relations cover a large number of extant authority relations, their coverage may not be exhaustive. As Parsons and Shils (1962) reminded us sometime ago, there are at least three forms
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of object orientation: instrumental, cathectic, and moral. Coleman’s two categories of authority relations clearly exhibit the instrumental orientation in that they are based on calculative, interest-maximizing considerations. But do not individuals sometimes act in accordance with the directives of an authority on the basis of intense cathectic attachment or moral considerations (see Goodwin et al., 2001, and Jasper, 1997)? If so, then our understanding of the bases of authority relations would have to be broadened beyond instrumental considerations. And even if a case were made that cathectic and moral attachments could be theorized as variants of the rational or instrumental, we would still be left with the observation that authority relations can be layered, such that they can be based on more than one of the three types of object orientation. Either way, questions arise about the character of the authority relations and social movement activity. For example, are some relations or modes of attachment more prone to social movement activity than others? And is the character of social movement activity likely to vary in terms of the orientation or attachment to the authority. If the basis for the challenge is an authority’s perceived violation of certain moral standards or principles, might the objectives sought be less negotiable than in the case of material, compensational matters? Or are the latter always layered with moral considerations in order to heighten the appeal or credibility of the claims? I raise these issues and questions, however undeveloped they are, only to underscore the complexity of the relationship between social movements and systems of authority, and to invite research and theorization on that connection.
Collective Challenges Having clarified what I mean by systems of authority, and having suggested that social movements entail collective challenges to an array of systems of authority beyond the polity, I now want to elaborate what I mean by collective challenges. To do so, it is useful heuristically to think about challenges to authorities in terms of at least two intersecting dimensions: (1) whether the actors and their actions are individuals or collectivities engaging in joint and coordinated action; and (2) whether the challenge is direct or indirect. Direct challenges include straightforward, undisguised, overt appeals and demands, such that the targeted authorities are aware of both the claims and their carriers; indirect challenges are those that are either covert and/or ambiguous – covert in terms of the action and its carrier, and ambiguous in terms of the action and the claims – or that seek to divest themselves of the authority by escaping it. The cross-classification of these two dimensions yields four types of challenge as displayed in Table 1. Type 1 includes direct, individual-level appeals and
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Table 1. Types of Challenge. Level of Action
Direct Challenge
Indirect Challenge
Individual action
(1) Appeals to authority for adjustments (e.g. raise) (3) Various forms of targeted protest
(2) Everyday forms of resistance and withdrawal (4) Exiting from or divesting of authority
Collective action
demands that seek to improve some aspect of the individual’s life-situation relevant to the authority context in question. Type 2 includes actions that are individualized in the sense of involving little if any coordination, as in the case of various indirect, seemingly disconnected forms of everyday resistance, such as bitching, pilfering, and foot-dragging (Hodson, 1991; Morrill et al., 2003; Prasad & Pushkala, 1998; Scott, 1985). Type 3 encompasses direct, collective challenges of the kind typically analyzed by social movement scholars, ranging from movement-organized marches and rallies to sit-ins and office or building takeovers to attempts to revoke extant authority, as in the case of the prototypical revolution.6 And Type 4 is exemplified by indirect collective challenges, in which the connection among the actions, actors, and their demands or interests is often ambiguous or covert, perhaps as in the case of terrorist movements,7 or in which the collectivity leaves, thereby divesting the authority of its right to control them. As students of social movements, we are most interested in the collective challenges encompassed by Types 3 and 4, although both Types 1 and 2 probably often contain the seeds for much movement activity. As suggested, the kinds of movements encompassed by Type 3 comprise most of what social movement scholars study. However, the cases exemplified by Type 4 are too rarely considered by students of social movements, with the exception of a few studies such as Mueller’s (1999) insightful analysis of exit episodes from the German Democratic Republic between 1961 and 1989. Why this is the case is, as Mueller has mused, somewhat puzzling. No doubt it is due in part to the exclusion of collective escape as a form of contentious politics (see McAdam et al., 1996, pp. 21–22). It may be due as well to a misunderstanding or misapplication of Hirschman’s (1970) analysis of the ways in which the members or constituents of a corporate actor (e.g. a firm, organization, community, or state) can respond to its unsatisfactory and/or unsteady performance in terms of three generic responses: exit, voice, and loyalty. In the exit option, the dissatisfied member picks-up and leaves the organization, community, or state. In the case of the voice option, the dissatisfied member actively expresses that dissatisfaction. And in the case of loyalty, the dissatisfied member swallows the dissatisfaction and stays put.
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It is my sense that this tripartite scheme generally has been applied to contentious politics and social movements as if these generic responses were mutually exclusive, such that “voice” was analogous to collective action, and “exit” was therefore irrelevant. In addition to reifying the three modes of response, this reading and application clearly fails to appreciate the connection between exit and voice. Exit, under some conditions, may not only constitute a form of voice, but sometimes it may even speak louder than the voices commonly associated with direct collective challenges. For members of a society, a community, a political group, or a religious order to sever their ties and exit is not only to challenge, albeit indirectly, the existing structure of authority or regime, but it may even threaten the exited order in numerous ways. As Hirschman notes: Exit is unsettling to those who stay behind as there can be no “talking back” to those who have exited. By exiting one renders his arguments unanswerable. The remarkable influence wielded by martyrs throughout history can be understood in those terms, for the martyr’s death is exit at its most irreversible and argument at its most irrefutable (1970, p. 126).
Hirschman is only partly right as the exited order often “talks back,” as repeatedly illustrated by various responses to the new religious movements of the 1970s (Beckford, 1985; Hall, 1987; Shupe & Bromley, 1980). But Hirschman deftly underscores the point that exit may sometimes not only be a form of voice, but a very strong one as well, a point he accented even more forcefully in the wake of the late-1980s mass exists from Eastern Europe (Hirschman, 1993). Caution needs to be exercised about presuming that mass exits in general are social movements, especially since parallel behavior, as in the case of much immigration, is not the same as joint or collective action. There are, however, abundant examples of collective escapes or exits in the social movement literature broadly construed, ranging from various communal movements (Berger, 1981; Kanter, 1972; Zablocki, 1980) to separatist and secessionist movements (Bonwick, 1991; Hall, 1977; Kapur, 1986) to so-called religious cultic and sectarian movements (Barker, 1983; Robbins, 1988; Wallis, 1984), with mass suicide being the ultimate form of escape or exit (Balch, 1995; Hall, 1987, 2000). Yet, social movement scholars today generally tend to gloss over or ignore altogether these forms of social movement activity because, I would contend, they typically are only indirectly and secondarily politically-oriented, and therefore do not fit neatly under the contentious politics umbrella. As Aminzade and Perry note in their recent effort to give voice to religion in the study of contentious politics, they focus only on “those groups that engage in contentious politics,” thus intentionally ignoring “other-worldly communal sects that seek sanctuary by establishing ‘heavenly kingdoms’ beyond the reaches of the secular world” (2001, p. 158). But I would argue that these neglected religious movements constitute forms
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of indirect, extra-institutional challenge that invite research and theorization as much as the more familiar specimens that cluster in Cell 3 of the typology.
CONCLUSIONS The crux of what I have suggested is that we need to broaden our conceptualization of social movements beyond contentious politics. I have not recommended that we throw aside the idea of contentious politics. Rather, I am suggesting that since not all social movements fall within the political domain of social life, we need to broaden our conceptualization of movements to include collective challenges to systems or structures of authority beyond the government and state. Additionally, I have argued that we focus not just on social movements that challenge authorities directly, but also on movements that challenge authorities indirectly either through covert means, as in the case of terrorist movements, or by exiting the system and thus the bailiwick of the authority, as in the case of communal movements and other-worldly religious “cults.” In arguing that we broaden our conceptualization of social movements in these two ways, I have not meant to suggest that there is little to no research that examines social movement activity beyond the political domain of social life. Clearly there is an abundance of such work (e.g. Chaves, 1967; Katzenstein, 1998; Smith, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Van Dyke, Taylor & Soule, 2002; Williams, 2001). The problem, from my vantage point, is that this work is rarely used as the basis for refining and sharpening how we conceptualize social movements. In other words, the relation between the specific phenomenon studied and the broader category or genera of phenomena of which it is presumably representative is too rarely elaborated. Doing so would, I believe, buttress further the argument I have propounded. What do we gain by broadening the conceptualization of collective action and social movements in this fashion – that is, beyond contentious politics, with its focus on government and the state? The most obvious analytic benefit is that it forces us to consider more carefully social movement activity in other institutional and cultural spheres of social life. I have wondered for years – at least since the mid-1970s when I was doing my dissertation research on the spread of a Japanese Buddhist movement in the U.S. (Snow, 1993) – why the literatures on religious movements and political movements typically glided by each other, much like two trawling vessels passing on a fog-ridden evening, with only the vaguest acknowledgment that both might be trawling in the same channel. More recently, some students of religion have drawn on social movement concepts and theories to inform their analyses of the religious phenomenon investigated, but students of social movements appear to have been less likely to turn the study of religion
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or religious movements for conceptual and theoretical edification. The mentioned Aminzade and Perry (2001) inquiry, which is part of the McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly contentious politics project, acknowledges this problem and takes a step forward in trying to mend it, but is constrained by the contentious politics conceptualization to which it is beholden. By thinking of movements as collective challenges to authority, we are less apt to continue to proceed in such a fashion, asking not only how movements in different institutional and cultural spheres may differ but also what they have in common and in what ways and how they influence each other.8 A second analytic benefit of broadening the scope of the conceptualization of movements along the lines suggested is that it forces us to examine even more carefully whether the conditions and mechanisms postulated to account for the emergence and operation of contentious politics apply more generally to movements challenging structures of authority in institutional domains outside the polity. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, p. 342) bet that their “framework can be readily adapted to the analysis of contention within any system of formal institutionalized power.” But that clearly remains an empirical question that invites careful investigation. A third analytic benefit of the expanded conceptualization propounded above is that it enables us to think more broadly about repertoires of contention and the tangible markers of social movement activity. It may well be the case that collective challenge in different institutional domains is associated with different repertoires. That is an empirical question, of course, but not one we are likely to ask or investigate without moving beyond the political domain. A fourth analytic benefit of the proposed conceptualization is that it expands and concretizes conceptually what a number of scholars of collective action and social movements have hinted at but not developed: the anchoring of social movements to authority. Barrington Moore (1978), for one, features authority as a central element in his analysis of the social bases of obedience and revolt. And Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982) also make authority central to their experimental analysis of encounters with authorities defined as unjust. But in neither case is the connection between collective action and authority pushed beyond the boundaries of bureaucratic political contexts or the state. The conceptualization proposed herein can be construed as a call to do just that. A final benefit of conceptualizing social movements as collective challenges to authority systems, both institutional and cultural, is that it anchors what we do, as scholars of collective action and social movements, to one of sociology’s central coordinating concepts – authority. Not only do “human beings use authority to coordinate the activities of a large number of people,” but, as Barrington Moore (1978, p. 15), among others, has reminded us, “(i)t reaches into all spheres of social
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life and exists to some degree in all known societies . . .” By linking the study of collective action and social movements to one of the discipline’s core concepts, it makes our enterprise even more central to the broader sociological enterprise of understanding the dynamics of institutional and cultural challenge and change, and thus allows us to move beyond the clich´e that what we study is merely just “politics by other means.”
NOTES 1. Since presenting an earlier but quite similar draft of this paper at the August 2002 conference on which this volume is based, there has been a good deal of discussion of and debate about the merits and demerits of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (see for example, the critiques of Diani, Koopmans, Oliver, Rucht & Taylor, and the responses of McAdam & Tarrow, in the symposium in Mobilization, Vol. 8, 2003). I do not join or engage these other critiques herein, but focus instead on McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s concretization of “contentious politics” and its implications for conceptualizing and theorizing about collective action and social movements more generally. For a useful summary of the book and some of the debates and critiques, see Tindall’s review essay (2003). 2. For an elaborated examination and analysis of Promise Keepers, see Williams (2001). 3. And this would clearly appear to be the case for McAdam, who has worked with Gerald Davis on social movement activity in relation to formal organizations (cf. Davis & McAdam, 2000). Given this joint enterprise and the recent flowering of interest in the character and functions of social movements within organizations (see for example, Morrill, Zald & Rao, 2003; Rao, Morrill & Zald, 2000), it is somewhat of a puzzle as to the rationale for McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s restrictive, formal conceptualization of contentious politics as elaborated earlier. 4. It is interesting to note that a number of European scholars have recognized the need for more inclusive, typological conceptions of contemporary social movements because of their interest in the “new social movements” and their corresponding realization that not all social movements are focused on the political domain. See for example, Kriesi et al. (1995). 5. Following Weber (1947), it is this granting of legitimacy, however fragile, that distinguishes authority form sheer, coercive power. But authority is a form of power nonetheless, albeit a legitimated form. 6. Social movements are not the only set of collective actors engaged in the business of challenging authorities. Formally established organizations, both for-profit and non-profit, and interest groups do so as well. But they differ in a number of ways along a number of continua: salience of affecting change in relation to their overall purpose; formality of organization; official recognition; access to authorities; and use of institutional versus noninstitutional means of action. Affecting change is the raison d’ˆetre of social movements; they generally exhibit much greater variability in terms of organizational formality and official recognition; they typically have less regularized access to authorities; and their means of action generally are more skewed towards the non-institutional end of the continuum. For elaboration of these distinctions, see Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004).
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7. See Morrill et al. (2003) for a discussion of the complexities of distinguishing between overt and covert political conflict in the context of formal organizations. 8. For a recent example of such an inquiry that is not anchored to the contentious politics frame, see Kniss and Burns’ (2004) examination of religious movements, and particularly their discussion of the relationship between religious movements and other social movements.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I want to acknowledge Rob Benford, Mark Chaves, Dan Cress, John McCarthy, Cal Morrill, Francesca Polletta, Sarah Soule and Mayer Zald, all of whom graciously took the time to read and comment on earlier drafts of this paper. Some but not all of their suggestions have been incorporated into this draft, although perhaps not necessarily to their satisfaction. I also want to thank members of the UCI Social Movement and Social Justice Seminar, including David Meyer and Su Yang, for reading and commenting on an earlier draft. Again, their views on matters discussed herein probably do not always accord with mine.
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Chaves, M. (1997). Ordaining women: Culture and conflict in religious organizations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Costain, A. N., & McFarland, A. S. (Eds) (1998). Social movements and American political institutions: People, passions, and power. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and class conflict in industrial society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Davis, G. F., & McAdam, D. (2000). Corporations, classes, and social movements after managerialism. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 193–236. Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (1999). Social movements: An introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Ferree, M. M., & Hess, B. B. (1985). Controversy and coalition: The new feminist movements. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Gamson, W. A., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). Encounters with unjust authority. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. Geertz, C. (1973). Ideology as a cultural system. In: The Interpretation of Cultures (pp. 193–233). New York: Basic Books. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. New York: Harper Colphon. Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (1999). Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. Sociological Forum, 14, 27–54. Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds) (2001). Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gusfield, J. R. (1963). Symbolic crusade: Status politics and the American temperance movement. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Hall, J. R. (1987). Gone from the promised land: Jonestown in American cultural history. Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Hall, J. R. (2000). Apocalypse observed: Religious movements and violence in North America, Europe, and Japan. London: Routledge. Hall, R. (Ed.) (1977). Black separatism and social reality: Rhetoric and reason. New York: Pergamon Press. Hanagan, M. P., Moch, L. P., & Te Brake, W. (Eds) (1998). Challenging authority: The historical study of contentious politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to declines in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hirschman, A. O. (1993). Exit, voice, and the fate of the German Democratic Republic – An essay in conceptual history. World Politics, 45, 173–202. Hodson, R. (1991). The active worker: Compliance and autonomy at the workplace. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 20, 47–48. Jasper, J. M. (1997). The art of moral protest: Culture, biography, and creativity in social movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kanter, R. (1972). Commitment and community: Communes and utopias in sociological perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kapur, R. (1986). Sikh separatism: The politics of faith. London: Allen & Unwin. Katzenstein, M. F. (1998). Faithful and fearless: Moving feminist protest inside the church and the military. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kniss, F., & Burns, G. (2004). Religious movements. In: D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 694–715). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
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Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. (1995). New social movements in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lofland, J. (1996). Social movement organizations: Guide to research on insurgent realities. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (1996). To map contentious politics. Mobilization: An International Journal, 1, 17–34. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. New York: Cambridge University Press. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82, 1212–1241. Mead, G. H. (1962). Mind, self, and society. C. Morris (Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meyer, D. S., & Tarrow, S. (Eds) (1998). The social movement society: Contentious politics for a new century. Boulder, CO: Roman & Littlefield Publishers. Moore, B., Jr. (1978). Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt. White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Morrill, C., Zald, M. N., & Rao, H. (2003). Covert political conflict in organizations: Challenges from below. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 391–415. Mueller, C. (1999). Escape from the GDR, 1961–1989: Hybrid exit repertoires in a disintegrating leninist regime. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 697–735. Parsons, T., & Shils, E. A. (1962). Toward a general theory of action. New York: Harper & Row. Prasad, A., & Pushkala, P. (1998). Everyday struggles at the workplace: The nature and implications of routine resistance in contemporary organizations. Research in Sociology of Organizations, 15, 225–257. Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M. N. (2000). Power plays: How social movements and collective action create new organizational forms. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 237–281. Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban: Militant Islam, oil & fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rice, J. S. (2002). Getting our histories straight: Culture, narrative, and identity in the self-help movement. In: J. E. Davis (Ed.), Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements (pp. 79–99). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Robbins, T. (1988). Cults, converts & charisma: The sociology of new religious movements. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sennett, R. (1981). Authority. New York: Vintage Books. Shupe, A., & Bromley, D. G. (1980). The new vigilantes: Deprogrammers, anti-cultists, and the new religion. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Smith, C., (Ed.) (1996). Disruptive religion: The force of faith in social movement activism. New York: Routledge. Snow, D. A. (1993). Shakubuku: A study of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement in America, 1960–1975. New York: NY: Garland. Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., & Kriesi, H. (2004). Mapping the terrain. In: D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (pp. 3–16). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Taylor, V. (1996). Rock-a-bye baby: Feminism, self-help, and postpartum depression. New York: Routledge.
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Tindall, D. B. (2003). From structure to dynamics: A paradigm shift in social movements research? Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology, 40, 481–487. Turner, R. H. (1983). Figure and ground in the analysis of social movements. Symbolic Interaction, 6, 175–181. Van Biema, D. (2002, June 17). Rebels in the pews. Time, 54–58. Van Dyke, N., Taylor, V., & Soule, S. A. (2002). Cultural targets and confrontation: ‘New’ versus old social movements, 1968–1975. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association. Wallis, R. (1984). The elementary forms of new religious life. London: Routledge. Weber, M. (1947/1922). The theory of social and economic organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, R. H. (Ed.) (2001). Promise keepers and the new masculinity: Private lives and public morality. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Zablocki, B. (1980). Alienation and charisma. New York: Free Press. Zald, M. N. (2000). Ideological structured action: An enlarged agenda for social movement research. Mobilization: An International Journal, 5, 1–16.
THE TARGETS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: BEYOND A FOCUS ON THE STATE Nella Van Dyke, Sarah A. Soule and Verta A. Taylor ABSTRACT Among students of social movements, the prevailing view is that, in Western democracies, most social movements target the state and its institutions. Recently scholars have questioned this definition of social movements, associated with the political process and contentious politics approaches, arguing that public protest is also used to shape public opinion, identities, and cultural practices and to pressure authorities in institutional arenas not directly linked to the state. In this paper, we take up this debate by examining the targets of recent social movements. Our analysis draws from data on 4,654 protest events that occurred in the United States between 1968 and 1975. The protest events in our dataset encompass a variety of tactics used by social movements organized around a number of different issues. We find that, although virtually all movements in the United States direct some public protest at the state, there is considerable variation in the targets of modern movements. During this period, environmental, peace, international human rights, single-policy, and ethnic movements were more likely to direct their appeals to the government, while the civil rights, gay and lesbian, and the women’s movement were more likely to target public opinion and other, non-state institutions. Our analysis calls into question excessively
Authority in Contention Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 25, 27–51 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(04)25002-9
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state-centered conceptions of social movements that view social movement activity as directed primarily at the formal political domain of social life.
INTRODUCTION According to advocates of resource mobilization, political process, and contentious politics approaches, the relationship between social movement actors and the state is crucial for understanding collective action. Tilly (1978, 1995) contends that the forms and targets of public protest associated with modern social movements are part of a larger repertoire of contention that emerged in the 19th century with the rise of the nation-state, centralized decision-making, and the development of capitalist markets. These macrohistorical changes were accompanied by a shift in the scale of claims-making from localized and parochial targets to the major concentrations of capital and political power, particularly the nation-state (Tilly, 1983). Prevailing definitions of social movements reflect this view and virtually all political process conceptions treat the state as the primary target of social movement action. For example, Tilly (1999, p. 257) argues that a social movement “consists of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.” In a recent elaboration of political process theory, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, p. 5) analyze 20th century rebellions, revolutions, nationalism, and contentious democratization outside the Western world. In this work, the focus on politics in the narrow sense of the term is even more pronounced. Tilly and his collaborators argue that the field of social movements should reorient itself to the study of what they term “contentious politics,” by which they mean “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when: (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims; and (b) the claims would, if realized affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001, p. 5). As important as the political process approach has been to advancing our understanding of collective protest, attention to the state as the primary target of movement activity recently has come under fire (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, 2004; Taylor, 2003; Young, 2002; see also other chapters in this volume).1 While it is undeniably true that many social movements direct their grievances and concerns to the state or state institutions, it is also the case that modern movements target other entities, such as religious, medical, and educational organizations, professional associations, and private employers. A considerable body of research shows the extent to which protest in the United States is exercised in multiple
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institutional arenas, such as women campaigning for the right to priesthood in the Catholic Church, equality in the military, and recognition of postpartum depression by the medical establishment (Katzenstein, 1998; Taylor, 1996), AIDS activists seeking acknowledgement as experts by the medical establishment (Epstein, 1996), and marginalized racial, ethnic, and sexual identity groups demanding inclusion in higher education (D’Emilio, 1998; Van Dyke, 2003) the professions (Taylor & Raeburn, 1995) and the workplace (Fonow, 2003; Kurtz, 2002; Raeburn, 2004). Research has also shown that movements within faithbased institutions target these institutions for changes in their cultural practices (e.g. adoption of Sunday schools, youth groups, and gospel choirs) (see review in Chaves, 2004). Scholars have also documented the way social movements use cultural forms of political expression not simply in pursuit of policy change but to influence public opinion, for example the use of street performances, cross-dressing, gender transgression, media appearances, and alternative underground magazines (“zines”) by the modern gay and lesbian movement (Gamson, 1995, 1998; Rupp & Taylor, 2003). According to Blee (2002), the cross-burnings and personalized political strategies of contemporary hate movements, such as the Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazis, and Skinheads, are geared primarily at promoting racist ideas among the general public. Faith-based movements also rely on public performances, such as parades, mass celebrations, public chanting, and prayer to both stake out moral positions and win converts (Heath, 2003; Pattillo-McCoy, 1998; Snow, 1979). As these studies demonstrate, collective efforts for social change by social movement actors are directed toward the realms of culture, identity, and everyday life, as well as in direct engagement with the state (Fraser, 1997; Melucci, 1989; Taylor & Whittier, 1995). Failure to recognize the multiple targets of collective claims-making paints a biased view of what modern social movements are and what they do. In this chapter, we examine the extent to which different social movements target the state. Despite the obvious importance of the topic, no one has previously examined the targets of different social movements. We begin by discussing the literature that argues that different social movements are based on different fundamental logics or goals, and that these differing orientations influence their actions and targets of change (Rucht, 1988, 1990). We then use a dataset of 4,654 protest events that occurred in the United States from January 1968 through December of 1975 to examine differences in the targets of these social movements. The protest event data used in this chapter involve a number of different issue areas associated with a variety of social movements including the environmental, peace, international human rights, women’s, gay and lesbian, civil rights, a variety of ethnic movements, and several single-policy movements. These data allow us to examine the more fine-grained differences in the targets of specific movements.
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While we find that all movements represented in the dataset target the state in some of their protest actions, there are significant differences between movements in the frequency with which they direct public protest at the political domain. Some movements target the state in nearly all of their actions, while other movements direct their appeals at individuals, other institutions, and the general public. We argue that these findings offer an important corrective to definitions of social movements that limit their focus to collective claims-making directed only at the state.
THE TARGETS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS The relationship between social movements and social change has been a central issue for scholars of social protest. To understand this relationship, most writers have tended to classify social movements on the basis of fundamental differences in their issues and goals (McAdam & Snow, 1997; Rucht, 1988). According to this line of analysis, variations in the targets of social movements stem from the fact that social movements have fundamentally different goals. Early formulations defined movements either as instrumental or expressive based on whether a group’s actions and strategies are oriented toward social change or personal change (Aberle, 1966; Breines, 1982; Gusfield, 1963; Jenkins, 1983). More recently, this dichotomy of movement types is reflected in the work of scholars who differentiate between “strategy-oriented” and “identity-oriented” movements (Cohen, 1985; Touraine, 1981) or between movements that use instrumental tactics oriented to external targets (e.g. the law and the state) and movements engaged in what Bernstein (1997, p. 531) terms “identity deployment,” or those oriented to cultural transformation and the recognition of new identities (Bernstein, 2002; Duyvendak & Giugni, 1995). This dichotomous model reveals fundamental differences in the way political process and contentious politics approaches (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978) and new social movement theorists (Melucci, 1989, 1996; Touraine, 1981) and recent critics of the state-centered approach (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, 2004; Rupp & Taylor, 2003; Taylor, 2003; Young, 2002) view the targets of contemporary social movements. Reflecting this debate, Tilly (1995) excludes claims-making focused on cultural institutions and the affirmation of identity from his definition of modern repertoires of contention. Tilly and his collaborators argue that, with the increasing dominance of the nation-state in the affairs of citizens that accompanied the transition to advanced capitalism, it is the government that often plays the critical role in implementing the reforms advocated by social movement actors. The centrality of the government in implementing law
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and public policy advocated by social movements is confirmed in a burgeoning literature on the policy outcomes of social movements (Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy & Bernstein, 1994; Amenta & Halfmann, 2000; Andrews, 1997, 2001; Burstein & Linton, 2002; McCammon, Campbell, Granberg & Mowery, 2001; Soule et al., 1999; Soule & Olzak, 2004). On the other side of the debate, driven in part by the work of new social movement scholars (Buechler, 1995, 2000; Castells, 1997; Cohen, 1985; Eder, 1993; Giddens, 1984, 1991; Habermas, 1984, 1987; Melucci, 1988, 1989; Offe, 1985),2 is a body of research on contemporary social movements that do not direct their claims exclusively at the state (Gamson, 1989; Jasper, 1997; Katzenstein, 1998; Kurtz, 2002; Raeburn, 2004; Staggenborg, 2001; Taylor, 1996; Taylor & Rupp, 2003; Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Whittier, 2001). New social movement scholars argue that the expansion of the state has brought about the blurring of the boundaries between the public and private spheres, and that the targets of modern movements are, in part, the bureaucratization and the rationalization of social life and the misrecognition of identities (multiracial, sexual, racial, gender, etc.) and status subordination (of women, gays and lesbians, ethnic and racial minorities) expressed in cultural values and beliefs, social norms and practices, and administrative and professional codes in civil society (Fraser, 1997). Scholarship in the new social movements tradition advocates that we widen the lens to consider the variety of targets of public protest in postindustrial societies (Buechler, 2000; della Porta & Diani, 1999). For example, Taylor (1996) argues convincingly that postpartum depression self-help groups are part of a larger national and international social movement in which participants are struggling to overcome stigmatized identities and challenge dominant constructions of motherhood encoded in public opinion, medical practices, and the law. Rucht (1988, 1990) attempts to resolve the debate over movement targets by offering a model that recognizes that social movements have distinctive logics in terms of their orientations to social change. A “movement’s logic defines a general field of action, the substantive matter of conflict between the movement and its opponents, and the movement’s internal ‘rationale’ ” (1988, p. 319). Rucht (1988) hypothesizes that movements operating under different fundamental logics define their opponents, or the objects of their claims, differently. He categorizes two types of movements based on differences in their fundamental logics: expressive movements and instrumental movements. Expressive/identity movements, such as the women’s and the gay and lesbian movements, are oriented primarily to cultural transformation and identity recognition through expressive actions and alternative institution building. In pursuit of these goals they target cultural norms and institutions, institutional and professional authority, as well as public opinion and beliefs. Contrasted with this type of movement are instrumental or
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strategy-based movements, such as the environmental and peace movements, that attempt to influence state policy and the law through tactical repertoires directed at the government. Implicit in Rucht’s (1988) classification is attention to the relationship between the goals, the tactics, and the targets of social movements. Rucht (1988) provides a convincing theoretical description of these two different logics of collective action. We doubt that most movements fit neatly into one of the two categories, and numerous studies call into question the bifurcation of movement types by demonstrating that most social movements combine both expressive and instrumental action (Bernstein, 1997; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak & Giugni, 1995; Soule, 1997; Staggenborg, 2001; Whittier, 1995). Although we did not design our study as a test of Rucht’s dichotomous model, this typology provides a rationale for examining the diversity of modern social movements in terms of their targets. We turn now to a detailed description of our protest event data and methods followed by a discussion of the set of descriptive statistics we used to examine the targets of the different social movements in our sample. After presenting these descriptive statistics, we present logistic regression analyses designed to examine the probability that each of the social movements we examine will target the state at public protest events.
DESCRIPTION OF PROTEST EVENT DATASET We use a dataset of 4,654 protest events that occurred in the United States between January 1, 1968 and December 31, 1975 to examine the targets of different, leftoriented social movements.3 The dataset includes protests on the part of virtually every movement on the left that was active during this time period, and therefore includes actions on the part of the peace, civil rights, environmental, women’s, ethnic, gay and lesbian, and international human rights movements, as well as protests around tenants’ rights, freedom of speech, gun control, education, labor, and welfare benefits, as shown in Table 1.4 The protest event data come from The New York Times (NYT), one of the most commonly used data sources for collective action event data (Earl, Martin, McCarthy & Soule, 2004). Data collection and coding took place in two stages: first, assistants scanned the entire daily editions of the newspaper and photocopied all articles that reported events. Then, assistants coded the content of these articles. At both stages, periodic inter-assistant reliability checks were performed to assure that consistency and reliability estimates were consistently at or above 90% agreement. To be included in the dataset, events had to meet three basic criteria. First, in order to be considered “collective” action events, they had to involve more
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Table 1. Representation of Different Movements in the Dataset.
Civil rights Environment Gay and Lesbian Human rights Other Ethnic civil rightsb Other single policy issuesc Peace Women’s Other movementsd
Events (%)
Na
17.3 3.7 1.0 3.2 4.6 20.6 19.8 4.0 33.4
803 171 46 149 215 960 923 184 1552
a Total number of events is 4,654. Events could have multiple issues, hence the N appears larger in this table. b Other Civil Rights category includes Asian American, Native American and Latino Civil Rights. c Other Single Policy Issues include single issue policies such as gun control, prison policy, welfare policy, drug control. d Other Movements includes labor, tenants rights, ideological stances such as imperialism, capitalism and socialism, anti-poverty, education issues, large scale public spectacles like the Olympics, and various ethical and religious claims articulated by movements.
than one person. While it is tempting to include individual acts of protest (e.g. self-immolation), we only include protest events in which two or more people participated. Second, the event had to express some sort of claim or grievance. Finally, the event must have occurred in the public domain.5 The events included in our dataset include conventional political activities such as petitions, letter-writing campaigns and lawsuits, along with more confrontational actions such as marches and civil disobedience. We did not include public, collective events such as block parties, concerts, and fund-raising campaigns unless they explicitly articulated a claim or grievance. There are many virtues of event data collected from national news sources such as the NYT (Earl et al., 2004). Most importantly, the NYT covers an extensive variety of event forms or tactics associated with an extensive list of different social movements, targeting a variety of different entities. In other words, not only does the NYT cover action on a wide variety of social movements, as described above, but it also includes coverage of a wide variety of social movement actions including non-confrontational and confrontational tactics. And, importantly for our purposes here, the events covered in the NYT target numerous different audiences and authorities. The use of newspapers as a source for data on protest is not without its critics, although the purpose of this paper is not to address all of the criticisms of newspaper data (but see Earl et al., 2004). We have, however, attempted to take these criticisms
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seriously and, as such, introduce three different means of reducing potential biases associated with newspapers as a data source. First, our data collection effort was designed to minimize sampling error. Rather than using the NYT Index to identify stories, we read the entire newspaper, scanning virtually every article in every section.6 Therefore, we do not experience the bias that may be introduced by using only the limited information available in the index to identify events, and we are able to locate events that may not have been indexed accurately (Earl et al., 2004). Second, scholars have shown that protest events are more likely to be reported on certain days of the week (Oliver & Maney, 2000). To minimize these effects, rather than sampling from the newspaper in a given period, such as using one day of the week, we have complete daily coverage of the entire time period. Finally, because research on selection bias finds that certain types of events, including those that are larger and more confrontational, are more likely to be reported in the newspaper (see review in Earl et al., 2004), we include several variables in our analysis to control for and minimize the effect of sampling bias. These are discussed below in the variable definition section of the paper. Our use of data on protest events from this particular period (1968–1975) offers both advantages and disadvantages. Research on movements of this era played an important role in the development of resource mobilization and political opportunity theories, which we have argued above have a bias toward the state as the target of social movement action (e.g. Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Freeman, 1979; Jenkins, 1983; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 1978). Therefore, because this is arguably the most heavily studied period of American social movement mobilization, our results are relevant to the significant body of research and theory that has been developed using studies of this time period. This advantage notwithstanding, it is possible that the movements active during the 1968–1975 time period targeted the state and other social institutions, individuals or the public, to a greater or lesser degree than did movements active during other time periods. For example, it is possible that progressive social movements are more likely to engage in action that targets the state when a friendly and more receptive administration is installed in the White House, as suggested by political opportunity theory. The time period we examine is marked by the presence of Presidential administrations that were relatively hostile to movements of the left, and therefore it is possible that progressive movements are less likely to target the government during the time period under study than they might be in other circumstances. We have attempted to minimize the potential biases associated with this particular period by including a time period variable in our analyses, as we discuss later in the variable description section. However, American politics, including both the institutional arena as well as the social movements sector,
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are influenced by the historical context, thus caution should be exercised before generalizing the results of this study to other periods in U.S. history.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PROTEST EVENTS AND THEIR TARGETS As noted above, one of the most important features of our protest event data is that the events are not limited to a single movement, or even a limited set of movements. As a result, these data allow us to examine virtually all movements that protested during this period and received New York Times coverage. Table 1 shows which movements were responsible for staging the 4,654 events described in our dataset. This table shows that in this period, not surprisingly, the peace movement and the civil rights movement staged the largest number of protest events. The civil rights movement staged 803 of the 4,654 events (17%) in the time period, while nearly 20% of the events reported (N = 923) were staged by the peace movement, primarily in opposition to the Vietnam War. The gay and lesbian movement, which was still in its formative stage, had the fewest reported events among the movements active during this time period, with only 46 events reported between 1968 and 1975. Since we are chiefly concerned with the targets of these protest events, it makes sense to next examine which entities were targeted by these 4,654 protest events. Using information on activist claims and on the location of the protest event, we have identified eight types of targets from the protest events in our dataset: the state or government (including all levels – local, state, and federal), educational institutions, business, the general public, individuals, cultural and religious organizations, labor unions or occupational groups, and medical institutions. Some examples of how we used these two pieces of information are illustrative. If protesters gathered outside of a federal office building and argued that the United States government should get out of Vietnam, we coded the state as the target of action. If protesters gathered outside of a location where a controversial figure (e.g. media personality) was speaking, we coded the target as an individual. If a protest occurred on a college campus but targeted the state as the agent responsible for taking action on the issue (e.g. campus anti-war protest in which there was no evidence that the protesters thought the university should do something about the war) then the state rather than the educational institution was coded as the target.7 We define an event as targeting the general public if it was staged in a public location and the protesters’ claims did not describe a specific institutional, state, or individual target (e.g. gay activists staging a kiss-in at a local mall). Table 2 shows that the most common target of protest events is the state, as we expected. Our coding of government targets includes all levels of the government
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Table 2. Representation of Different Targets in the Dataset.
State/Government Educational institutions Public Business Individuals Cultural and religious organizations Unions/Occupational groups Medical institutions a Percentages
Eventsa (%)
Nb
52.5 23.7 9.3 8.3 4.3 2.1 1.1 1.0
2443 1102 431 385 201 98 50 46
sum to greater than 100% because an event could have multiple targets.
b Total number of events is 4,654. Events could have multiple targets, hence the N appears larger in this
table.
(local, state, and federal) as well as components of these levels (e.g. local police forces). Just over half (52.5%) of the events that occurred from 1968 to 1975 targeted the government as the agent responsible for fulfilling movement demands. Educational institutions were the second most frequent target, with nearly 24% of the events focused on them. Only 1% of the events targeted medical institutions, making them the least likely target in this period. While it is interesting that so many of the events targeted the government, it is significant that almost 50% of events did not target the government. This means that if, when collecting these data, we focused only on events that target the state, we would have missed nearly 50% of the protest events that occurred and were reported during this period. This is a fairly important revelation given the tendency of newspapers to inconsistently report on protest using less publicly conspicuous tactics, such as those often used by identity-based struggles, which might also be less likely to target the state (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004). Finally, Table 3 shows that when we cross-tabulate social movements with targets, there is interesting variation among social movements with respect to their targets. The most important thing to note in Table 3 is that some social movements were far more likely to target the state than others in the 1968–1975 period. For example, only 31.5% of protests around African American civil rights targeted the government, whereas 61.9% of civil rights actions by other ethnic groups were aimed at the government. And, importantly, the African American civil rights, women’s, and gay and lesbian movements in this period all targeted the government less than half of the time. The most frequent target of African American civil rights protest was educational institutions (33.8% of events). Of all of the social movements, the gay and lesbian movement was the most likely to target the
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Table 3. Social Movements and Targets. Government Public Education Business Other Non-Govt. Orgs.c Civil rights Environment Gay and Lesbian Human rights Other ethnic civil rightsa Other single policy issuesb Peace Women’s Other movementsd
31.5 55.6 45.7 72.5 61.9 78.8 73.9 41.3 37.4
17.7 12.3 28.3 7.4 7.0 6.7 8.6 15.8 5.3
33.8 1.8 2.2 7.4 14.4 9.3 13.8 13.6 41.2
6.9 27.5 4.4 10.7 10.7 4.2 3.3 15.8 9.5
8.0 5.9 10.9 5.4 11.2 2.7 2.8 14.1 8.4
a Other
Civil Rights category includes Asian American, Native American and Latino Civil Rights. Single Policy Issues include single issue policies such as gun control, prison policy, welfare policy, drug control. c Other non-governmental targets include religious and cultural organizations, medical institutions, unions and occupational groups, and individuals. See Table 2. d Other Movements include labor, tenants rights, ideological stances such as imperialism, capitalism and socialism, anti-poverty, education issues, large scale public spectacles like the Olympics, and various ethical and religious claims articulated by movements. b Other
public, with 28.3% of the gay and lesbian rights events aimed at influencing the general public. The women’s movement had the most even coverage of non-state targets, and was the most likely to target other non-governmental organizations or institutions, including religious and cultural institutions, unions and occupational groups, and medical institutions. In contrast, some social movements, including the environmental, peace, international human rights and other ethnic civil rights movements, targeted the state in the majority of their actions. Fifty five point six percent of the environmental actions were aimed at the state, while 78.8% of single-issue policy actions targeted the state. The environmental movement also put a substantial amount of pressure on private industry, with 27.5% of their events targeting businesses. Nearly three quarters of the peace and international human rights events targeted the government in their actions. These descriptive statistics illustrate that while the government is targeted in just over half of the 4,654 protest events reported, nearly half of the protest events were directed at some other entity, including other institutions, individuals, and public opinion. Also, these findings suggest that there is variation among social movements with respect to the extent to which they target the state. It seems reasonable to next investigate whether these intriguing descriptive findings hold up to multivariate statistical analysis.
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LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS Dependent Variable Because we are especially interested in the extent to which different social movements target the state, we conduct a multivariate analysis using a dichotomous dependent variable which we construct by collapsing the eight target categories described above (see Table 1) into two categories. This variable is coded “1” when a protest event targeted the local, state, or national government and “0” when it targeted some other, non-governmental entity (e.g. business, cultural institutions, educational institutions, and so on). If an event targeted both the state and another institution, group or individual, we coded it as a government-targeted event.
Independent Variables Our multivariate analysis is designed to explore whether different left-leaning social movements are more or less likely to target the government than are other movements. Therefore, we created eight dummy variables for each of the social movements listed in Tables 1 and 3 (civil rights, women’s, gay and lesbian, peace, international human rights, environmental, other single policy, and other ethnic civil rights). We use the primary issues articulated at the event as our criterion for assigning events to a particular social movement, consistent with the practice typical of this literature. We analyze these variables in reference to an omitted category, which includes events staged around various other issues (see Table 1), including labor, tenants’ rights, ideological stances such as imperialism, capitalism and socialism, anti-poverty, education issues, large scale public spectacles like the Olympics, and various ethical and religious claims. In addition to these variables, which are designed to explore whether different social movements have a differential probability of targeting the state, we also include a number of control variables in our model. We include two variables measuring the involvement of organizations in protest. Research suggests that more institutionalized and formalized movements may be better able to target the state because they are more likely to possess the skill, finances, and know-how to do so (Andrews, 2002; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Koopmans, 1993; Kriesi et al., 1995; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Staggenborg, 1988; Zald & McCarthy, 1997). To get at the degree of institutionalization or formalization, we include two measures of organization at a protest event. The first is a dummy variable coded “1” when a local or state organization was listed as participating in the protest event. The second is a dummy variable that is coded “1” when a national organization participated at the event. The omitted category includes events that did not involve any organizational
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participation. We suspect that national organizations will be most likely to target the state, while events with no organizational presence will be least likely. We measure national scope by coding whether or not each organizations was present in the Encyclopedia of Associations (1968, 1970, 1972, 1975) a yearly volume that lists every organization of national scope in the country. Our model also includes two variables designed to control for the possible biases introduced by uncontrolled historical conditions as described earlier. One variable measures the effect of similar events in the previous month because we expect there to be continuity in protest activity and timing effects. This is a continuous variable measuring the proportion of events in the previous month that targeted the government. Second, we also include a dummy variable coded “1” if the event occurred during the years 1968–1970. We include this variable because, after running models with separate dummy variables for each year of the study, we determined that the years 1968–1970 had a similar relationship and degree of association with our dependent variable, while the years 1971–1975 were similar.8 Our model also includes several variables to control for potential newspaper reporting bias effects. Research on newspaper selection bias suggests that events near government centers are more likely to be reported and that there is a regional bias in newspaper event data (Oliver & Maney, 2000; Oliver & Myers, 1999). Because we are especially interested in comparing events targeting the government with other protest events, we include a variable coded “1” when the event took place in Washington DC. Our inclusion of this variable ensures that our results are not driven by characteristics of events that are unique to the Washington DC area.9 Research has also shown that the intensity of an event increases the probability that the event will be reported in the newspaper (Barranaco & Wisler, 1999; Hug & Wisler, 1998; McCarthy et al., 1996, 1999; Oliver & Maney, 2000; Oliver & Myers, 1999). To control for the possibility that larger events and/or those with police present were more likely to be covered by our data source (two indicators of event intensity), we include a dummy variable that is coded “1” when police were present at the event and a dummy variable coded “1” when more than one thousand protesters were present at an event.10 Finally, we also include a variable controlling for article length in every model because of the possibility that longer articles will include more complete information about the protest events, including information on the target of the protest events.11
Logistic Regression Findings Our regression analysis examines whether the eight different social movements described above (see Tables 1 and 3) are more or less likely to target the government.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis of the Government as the Target of Protest, 1968–1975.a  (Standard Error)b African American civil rights Environmental movement Gay and Lesbian movement Human rights movement Other ethnic civil rights Other single policy issue movementsc Peace movement Women’s movement Control variables National organization State or local organization Proportion of previous events targeting government Washington DC area Year of event 1968−1970 Police present Over 1000 participants Length of article 2 df
−0.4638*** (0.0945) 0.3978* (0.1728) −0.2223 (0.3265) 0.9075*** (0.2019) 0.8550*** (0.1550) 1.6949*** (0.0944) 1.5093*** (0.0951) −0.4272* (0.1686) 0.4224*** 0.1879*** −0.7385* 1.2771*** −0.8872*** 0.2295** 0.2458* 0.0010
(0.0873) (0.0823) (0.2967) (0.1364) (0.0707) (0.0765) (0.0968) (0.0015)
1142.8817 16
= 4,654 events. Civil Rights category includes Asian American, Native American and Latino Civil Rights. c Other Single Policy Issues include single issue policies such as gun control, prison policy, welfare policy, drug control. ∗ p < 0.05, two-tailed test. ∗∗ p < 0.01, two-tailed test. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, two-tailed test. aN
b Other
As suggested by the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3, the results of the regression analysis show significant variation in the likelihood of targeting the government among the eight different social movements (see Table 4). The civil rights movement, gay and lesbian movement, and the women’s movement were all less likely to target the government than our reference category, while all of the other individual movements were more likely to choose the government as the target of their actions. A protest held around a women’s movement issue has a 40% probability of targeting the government (see Fig. 1); while an African American civil rights protest has a 41% likelihood of targeting the government. The results also suggest that the gay and lesbian movement is less likely to target the government in this time period, however the coefficient is non-significant.
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Fig. 1. Predicted Probability of Targeting the Government.
Interestingly, other ethnic civil rights movements are more likely to target the government than are the miscellaneous reference movements, a finding that is also reflected in our descriptive statistics in Table 3. This category includes numerous protests on the part of the American Indian movement, Mexican Americans and other Latino groups, and Asian Americans. This finding makes clear intuitive sense with regard to Native Americans, since the government has been a major force dominating both the distribution of land to American Indians and recognition of tribes (Nagel, 1997). That the government would be the target for other ethnic
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groups may also be less than surprising, given the ability of the government to make policy and intervene in the relationships between other social institutions and their recognition and treatment of minorities. These findings do suggest that blanket statements made about “identity” movements may be misleading; social movements organized on behalf of minority group interests, according to our data, vary in terms of the targets they select to effect social change. The peace movement is one of the movements most likely to target the government, with a 78% probability of choosing the government as the target of its actions, as shown in Fig. 1. Stated differently, the peace movement is more than four times as likely to target the government than the other movements included in the reference category. This is not surprising, given that the federal government controls U.S. war-making policy. Protests around miscellaneous specific policy issues, including policing, gun control, and drug laws are even more likely to target the government (80% probability, as shown in Fig. 1). Again, these are issues under the regulation and control of the government, and therefore it is logical that protestors would direct their grievances at governmental entities. The environmental and international human rights movements are also significantly more likely to target the government, with predicted probabilities over 50%. Several of the control variables are also significantly associated with targeting the state. Not surprisingly, the involvement of any type of organization increases the likelihood that the government will be the target of action, and national organizations are more likely to target the government than are state or local organizations. This lends support to resource mobilization theory’s thesis (Zald & McCarthy, 1997) that organizations possess the tools, finances, and knowhow to target the government. Events occurring in the Washington DC area are significantly more likely to target the government than events that took place elsewhere. Contrary to our expectation that there would be continuity in the targets of action, the variable for the proportion of events in the previous month that target the government has a significant negative association with the subsequent targeting of the government. Perhaps this is driven by repression; that is, if the government is more likely to repress movements directed at the state, perhaps repression of previous events serves as a disincentive to target the government in future events. Two of the variables we include to control for potential newspaper reporting bias have a positive and significant association with targeting the government. Net of movement claims, more intense events (e.g. those with over 1,000 participants and those with police presence) were more likely to target the government. Thus, events targeting the state tended to draw more participants than those not targeting the state, and, events targeting the state were more likely to elicit policing. The final control for reporting bias, article length, was non-significant.
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DISCUSSION Perhaps the most significant contribution of nearly three decades of research in the political process and contentious politics traditions has been to paint a vivid portrait of the role that social movements play in the political process both through conventional means (e.g. lobbying, electoral politics, etc.) and through unconventional means, such as protest. The argument presented in this paper stresses the relationship between protest and social change, and we look at the protest actions of a variety of important social movements in recent U.S. history to question whether the most crucial element that defines social movements is overt challenge to state authorities. We are not surprised to find that all of the movements that we examined did, as predicted, direct some of their actions at the state and its institutions. That this was the case, even in a period in which government policies did not strongly favor either the social bases (e.g. racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, women’s rights advocates) or the grievances of protestors (e.g. peace, environmental protection, international human rights) provides strong evidence that modern social movements do not, as was once believed, avoid politics “through proper channels.” Rather, most modern social movements direct their campaigns to conventional political institutions and elites. The multiple venues in which power is exercised in complex societies requires, however, that we think about protest opportunities and targets in considerably broader terms. That we have found such variation among movements compels us to think in a more complicated way about the targets of modern social movements. Certainly it makes sense intuitively, as new social movement scholars and others have postulated, that the goals and collective identities of challengers would be critical for determining the nature and scope of a movement’s overt challenge to authorities (Melucci, 1996). Thus, it is the case that some of the movements in our sample, including the peace, environmental, and international human rights campaigns, single-policy, and racial and ethnic movements by American Indians, Latino groups, and Asian Americans overwhelmingly directed their campaigns to the state and conventional political authorities. There were, however, several movements for whom social and cultural change, more broadly speaking, were as significant as policy and political change. It is notable that three of the most influential movements over the past several decades of American history – the women’s, civil rights, and the gay and lesbian movements – were less likely to direct protest actions at the state. This finding is consistent with research that suggests that these movements have historically combined tactics such as consciousness raising, self-help, and discursive forms of resistance oriented to cultural and social change with mass demonstrations, direct action,
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and conventional political actions aimed at bringing about changes in government policy (Ferree & Hess, 1994; Rimmerman, 2002; Whittier, 1995). If our analysis is correct, our study provides additional and more rigorous empirical support based on a comparative analysis of a variety of different social movements for the critics of state-centered definitions of social movements. This brings us to the question of potential biases in the method we have used in this research, the coding of protest events from the The New York Times. Critics of this data source suggest that newspapers are more likely to cover issues that are of concern to lawmakers, and protests that occur outside of governmental offices (Oliver & Maney, 2000). If anything, then, our data are weighted toward public challenges to conventional political authorities and against less conspicuous and less public institutional venues. This suggests that our findings have yielded a fairly conservative estimate of the extent to which social movements target nonstate institutions, authorities, and locations. We think that these results have important implications for the field of social movements. How we define and conceptualize social movements influences the questions and the methods that drive our research. The practice of conceptualizing all social movements as focused on government policy (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 1983, 1995, 1999) has led students of social movements to concentrate our attention on the political impact of social movements rather than the role social movements play in broader processes of cultural and social change (Earl, 2000). More importantly, our theoretical ideas about the origins and development of social movements are, to a certain degree, based in the study of particular types of movements to the exclusion of others. In response to their critics, proponents of the political process and contentious politics approaches recently have suggested that, although their framework may be readily applied to contention in any system of institutionalized power, they leave it to other scholars to propose theoretical frameworks for non-state oriented movements (McAdam, 2003; Tilly, 2002). Our research highlights the importance of doing so. If we examine only movements directed at the state, we risk overlooking some of the powerful ways that social movements help shape modern societies.
NOTES 1. See also the alternative definition of social movements offered by Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004). 2. Increasingly scholars agree that the new social movements are not really new. Calhoun (1995), for example, demonstrates that many of the characteristics argued to be distinctive about new social movements, including a focus on identity, quality of life issues, and the
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use of disruptive tactics, were also common to social movements active in the 19th century. Others suggest that the NSMs are modern manifestations of movements that periodically reoccur and have historical continuity (Brand, 1990; Tarrow, 1991; Taylor, 1989). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a full review of the NSM paradigm, but see Buechler (1995) and Pichardo (1997). 3. These data were collected as part of a larger, NSF-funded, project conducted by Sarah A. Soule, Susan Olzak, Doug McAdam, and John McCarthy. For other uses of these data, see Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) and McAdam and Su (2002). 4. Approximately 5% of the events in the dataset were initiated by right-wing social movements, such as the anti-abortion movement. Because we were interested in comparing different left-oriented social movements, we deleted the right-wing events from our analyses. Inclusion of the right-oriented events and a dummy variable to measure them does not significantly alter our results. 5. We did not code private events for two reasons. First, private meetings do not convey a group’s message to either the public or their target unless reported in the newspaper, and, second, we suspect that the newspaper inconsistently reports on private events. 6. We examined all sections of the NYT except the Letters to the Editor, Editorials, Movie Listings, Sunday Magazine, Book Reviews, and Wedding and Anniversary Announcements. Because short articles on protest events were sometimes included in the Classified section, we included this section in our search. Each page of the newspaper was searched systematically, starting from the upper left corner and moving to the bottom right corner. Following this initial screening for headlines, subtitles, photographs and captions, each article on the page was skimmed for events that were embedded in articles which were not obviously about protest events. 7. Because many educational institutions are public and under some degree of governmental control, we considered the possibility that educational institution targets should be included in the government target category. We ran models with the two institutions combined, and the results did not differ significantly from those presented here. We continue to keep educational institutions as a separate target category because of the fact that private schools are not under governmental control, and even public colleges and universities operate with a significant degree of autonomy from the state. 8. We use a dummy variable to represent year rather than a continuous variable for several methodological reasons. First, the effect of time was non-linear for the models predicting the target of action, and this non-linearity would not be captured with a single continuous variable. The fit of the models including the dummy variable rather than the continuous variable was better. Finally, there were significant multi-collinearity problems with the continuous time variable and the variable measuring the effect of previous actions with the same target. 9. We also ran models including a dummy variable coded “1” if the event occurred in New York or a surrounding area, including Connecticut or New Jersey. This variable was not significant, and therefore, we do not include it. For the 1968–1973 data, we also ran models including a dummy variable measuring whether the event occurred on a college campus, based on research which suggests that on-campus events may be less likely to be covered (Oliver & Myers, 1999). The inclusion of the variable did not significantly change our results. We were unable to include this variable in models examining the entire eight year time period because specific information on event location was not recorded for the 1974 and 1975 events.
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10. Information on the number of participants at an event was only available for approximately half of the events in the dataset. For the other events, coders did their best to approximate the number of participants using six categories: less than 10; 10–49; 50–99; hundreds; thousands; and tens of thousands. We initially ran models including a categorical variable for number of participants, as well as models including dummies for each event size. The categorical variable was non-significant, and the only dummy that was significant was thousands of protesters. Therefore, we include a dummy variable measuring whether over 1,000 protesters participated in the event. 11. We use logistic regression analysis to model the probability of an event targeting the state. In logistic regression, coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood methods and are interpreted as the change in the log odds resulting from a one unit change in the independent variable. Results are interpreted as likelihoods and/or as predicted probabilities. In the text, percentage differences in likelihood are calculated using the formula: [exp (coefficient)−1] × 100. Predicted probabilities are calculated using the formula p = 1/(1 + e−x ), where the sum of coefficients (x) is transformed to a predicted probability (p).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9709337, SBR-9709356 and SES 9874000). Additional funding from the University of Arizona Vice-President for Research Small Grants Program was used to support data collection. We would also like to thank Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Susan Olzak for their role in collecting the data used for this project.
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Van Dyke, N. (2003). Crossing movement boundaries: Factors that facilitate coalition protest by American college students, 1930–1990. Social Problems, 50(2), 226–250. Whittier, N. E. (1995). Feminist generations: The persistence of the radical women’s movement. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Whittier, N. E. (2001). Emotional strategies: The collective reconstruction and display of oppositional emotions in the movement against child sexual abuse. In: J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds), Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (pp. 233–250). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Young, M. P. (2002). Confessional protest: The religious birth of U.S. national social movements. American Sociological Review, 67, 660–688. Zald, M. N., & McCarthy, J. D. (1997). Social movements in an organizational society. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
CONTROLLING PROTEST: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF PROTEST Jennifer Earl ABSTRACT Work on repression within the social movements literature has largely focused on state-based and coercive repression, despite both the empirical importance of private and non-coercive forms of protest control and the theoretical leverage studying other forms of protest control could offer. This paper argues that scholars should shift from studying repression, which as a terminology carries connotations about state-based and coercive action, and instead focus on the “social control of protest.” The paper then manufactures a literature on private forms of protest control, culling existing work from disparate fields and literatures. These works are organized using a previously published typology of repressive forms that covers such diverse actions as vigilantism and countermovement violence. This organization reveals that empirical research has been done on private protest control even if it has not been named as such or been connected to a coherent body of scholarship on the subject. The paper then examines possible directions for future research that could facilitate the growth of scholarship on private protest control.
Authority in Contention Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 25, 55–83 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(04)25003-0
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INTRODUCTION The history of social movements has been as much about state power as it has been about the persistence of insurgency. States have shown their capacity and willingness to repress dissent, discourage insurgency and muffle protest. An increasingly prolific and sophisticated set of scholars have focused on explaining state-based repression and this research has brought great rewards. Unlike prior research that attempted to explain the consequences of state-based repression, this strand of research focused primarily on state-based repression as the dependent variable and has worked to understand variations in the “allocation of repression” (Cunningham, 2003). However, largely left out of this renaissance in repression research has been the discussion of private actors, which is critical to full and rich understanding of repression and protest control.1 Civil society, private organizations, and other private actors have been ignored by all but a few students of repression. I argue that this is a costly and problematic omission. One of the costs of this omission is direct: we cannot fully understand the history of many movements or the repression that those movements faced without considering the role of private groups and actors. Consider two clear examples: one cannot make sense of the trials and tribulations of the American labor movement without considering the role of companies (Griffin et al., 1986), private security firms (e.g. Pinkertons; Kowalewski, 1996), and contemporary “union-busting” consulting firms. Similarly, our understanding of the civil rights movement would be quite perfunctory if research on the KKK (McVeigh, 2001), White Citizens Councils (McMillen, 1971), and lynchings (Soule, 1992) did not exist. In both examples, state actors certainly affected protest and were major repressive actors, but the totality of costs imposed on these movements and their participants is not reducible to that state action. More importantly, many of the scholastic costs of ignoring private repressors are “opportunity costs.” I argue that movement scholars generally, and repression researchers in particular, give up a great deal of theoretical leverage by failing to consider private repression. The central goal of this paper is to outline what could be gained if researchers were to more carefully consider and study private repression. In order to accomplish this, I will: (1) discuss why researchers may want to re-consider their collective use of the term repression, arguing that the more inclusive study of “protest control” (or the “social control of protest”) could help to recover neglected research questions; (2) review a previously published typology of protest control that situates private protest control within a larger matrix of control; (3) examine existing research on private protest control in an attempt to manufacture a literature on the topic; and (4) suggest directions for future research.
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CONCEPTS OR BLINDERS? REPRESSION AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF PROTEST States have figured centrally in the formal study of repression. In fact, much of the growing literature on repression within the study of social movements does not focus on private actors.2 In a recent review of repression research, Earl (2003) shows that the majority of scholarship has focused on state-based repression, leaving private repression seriously under-studied. Recent interest in protest policing (della Porta & Reiter, 1998), covert state-based, counterinsurgency programs such as COINTELPRO3 (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988; Cunningham, 2003), and authoritarian regimes (Ball, 2001; Francisco, 2001) all demonstrate this trend, as does the dated nature of many pieces on private repression within the social movements literature. Further, the focus of leading scholars in repression research continues to be on states: at a recent conference on repression, only one of 16 papers addressed non-state repression (Ferree, 2001). There have been opportunities within social movement studies to examine nonstate repressors: Tilly (1978), for instance, invited this type of investigation by defining repression broadly as “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (p. 100). However, these opportunities have not been seized by social movement scholars, allowing subsequent scholarship on repression to increasingly assume that repression is an almost exclusively statebased phenomenon. Over time, this assumption has ossified, firmly anchoring research on repression to states. While social movement scholars have not studied private repression often, a smattering of contributions across a number of fields demonstrates the promise of research on private repression. It is important to note, though, that even though this paper will manufacture a literature on private repression from existing works, these contributions are drawn from a wide array of fields ranging from labor history, political science, and political sociology to social movement studies. Further, these existing works have not, at least up to this point in time, composed an identifiable and coherent body of scholarship within the social movement repression literature. Instead, these works have been directed toward empirical and theoretical questions motivated by their “home” literatures, suggesting that researchers from other fields have much to offer the study of repression within social movements. It is not simply that research has focused on state-based action, research has also predominantly focused on coercion and violence.4 A recent dissertation summarizes a very common definition of repression: “any actions taken by [government] authorities to impede mobilization, harass and intimidate activists, divide organizations and physically assault, arrest, imprison and/or kill movement participants” (Stockdill, 1996, p. 146). Earl’s (2003) review of the repression
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literature also found that researchers had rarely focused on less coercive, non-violent, or more indirect means of repression (save notable examples such as McCarthy et al., 1991; Oberschall, 1973; and work attempting to explain co-optation). This is surprising considering that Oberschall (1973) introduced the distinction between channeling and coercion over 30 years ago and Tilly’s (1978) definition explicitly creates theoretical space for such a distinction. Similarly, researchers have not focused much attention on toleration or facilitation (Tilly, 1978). Tilly (1978) argued that movements could be facilitated, tolerated, or repressed and suggested hypotheses explaining each reaction. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore facilitation and toleration, it is important for researchers to realize that protest can be shaped by friendly, merely tolerant, and hostile actors and actions. That is, sometimes carrots shape the contours of protest as much as sticks. Even limited recognition of the possible role of facilitation could inform debates over the channeling. Taken together, these criticisms suggest that there is an ample frontier for researchers to explore in repression research. However, I argue that in order for social movement researchers to seriously undertake that exploration, the object of our study must be re-defined. That is, the terminology of repression now carries so many connotations – including being state-based, violent, and hostile – that it does not precisely define an area of interest and it obscures important theoretical and empirical questions. Instead, I suggest that scholars take a proverbial step back from the study of repression, considering that our collective pursuits might be more appropriately directed at the social control of protest more broadly, which I shorten here to protest control. At its intellectual core, repression research has not been motivated by an interest in violence, or even entirely by an interest in states, but by an overriding interest in understanding how non-movement actors can shape the level and form of protest. To the extent to which the connotations carried by repression have pushed scholars away from fully embracing this question, focusing instead on how state actors can coercively shape the level and form of protest, this has been a theoretically unfortunate narrowing. Just as ethnomethodologists have helped to reveal the assumptions and institutions that grease the wheels of everyday life, so too can a change in conceptual vocabulary reveal the slippage between the motivating interest behind work on repression and the study of repression itself. Indeed, thinking of the social control of protest instead of repression greatly expands the territory with which students of protest control are engaged. As I mentioned with brief examples from the American labor and civil rights movements, this is both an empirically and theoretically necessary move. Further,
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this widening of focus re-positions research on private actors, non-violent action, and toleration and facilitation so that such research can move from an interesting diversion from coercion to an important area of study in its own right. Most importantly, this broad view of protest control can help reveal the ways in which protest control is not a limited and debatably consequential area for movements research but instead a core area that speaks to fundamental movement processes and theories about those processes. Since these may seem to be quite general claims, the central focus of this paper is to outline the specific theoretical gains made possible by this expansion, paying particular attention to private actors who engage in protest control. Before moving on though, it is important to clarify one point. I am suggesting the use of social control as a sensitizing concept, one which I hope makes previously invisible research terrain vibrantly apparent. I recognize that major problems exist with the terminology of social control (Meier, 1982; Sutton, 1996) and I am not advocating its use because the term offers surgical theoretical precision. Instead, I am arguing that in the current research context the over-inclusive and broad meaning of social control is exactly the kind of less bridled guiding concept that students of protest control need in order to expand the set of empirical phenomena to which we attend. Without such a re-adjustment, we may collectively continue to ignore important and productive areas of study within protest control.
SITUATING PRIVATE PROTEST CONTROL If researchers are to more seriously consider private protest control, two questions immediately arise. First, how does private protest control relate to other forms of protest control? That is, if researchers are to allow for private forms of protest control, where do such forms fit within the larger field of protest control research? Second, are there different types of private protest control and how can researchers theoretically parse different examples of private protest control? I will address each of these questions in turn. I begin by reviewing a typology of repression introduced in a prior publication (Earl, 2003), which can be thought of more generally as a typology of protest control. This typology was initially developed to theoretically arrange disparate research findings from previous research on repression and protest control but has the added advantage of creating space for the theoretical consideration of private protest control. The typology of protest control introduced in that paper focuses on three key theoretical dimensions. The first dimension is the identity of the control agent: is the agent a federal political actor, local political actor, or private actor? The relevance of this dimension to the topic of private protest control is clear, but
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as noted above, this dimension has not been attended to in the literature on repression. The second dimension is the character of the action taken. Principally, the concern here is whether the action was a type of coercion or a type of channeling (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978): Coercion involves shows and/or uses of force and other forms of standard police and military action (e.g. intimidation, harassment and direct violence). Channeling involves more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to movements (Earl, 2003, p. 48).5
The third dimension is the visibility of the control action. The typology attempted to simplify this empirically continuous dimension by employing “a stark contrast between observable and unobservable actions even though the level of visibility could actually be placed on a continuum from entirely invisible actors, actions, and intentions to entirely visible actors, actions, and intentions” (Earl, 2003, p. 48). Further, since channeling is frequently “overbroad” in its regulation – meaning that both protest and non-protest activities are constrained – the typology avoids the more familiar language of covert and overt which could be misleading when applied to channeling. For instance, while U.S. Internal Revenue Service regulations on non-profits apply to both non-profit social movement organizations and other nonprofits that are not associated with any social movement, these same regulations have been argued to strongly shape social movement organizing (McCarthy et al., 1991). This results in some level of invisibility for the protest control aspects of a policy because the general public does not readily connect the policy with protest control (but the regulations themselves are not secretly or “covertly” created and policed). The crossing of these three dimensions yields a 12-celled typology. Table 1 reproduces an abbreviated version of that typology. Even with this shortened examination of the entire typology, it clearly situates work on private protest control within a wider matrix of protest control forms. In addition to clarifying the location of private protest control vis-`a-vis other forms of protest control, it is also worth briefly remarking on examples of the four forms of private protest control suggested by this typology. First, there is observable, coercion by private agents. As will be discussed in more detail below, countermovements can openly attempt to repress their opponents. Bromley and Shupe (1983), for instance, discuss anti-cult activists attempts to discredit cults and “de-program” cult members. Second, there is also unobserved, coercion by private agents. Anonymous death threats, threatening phone calls to activists and other forms of vigilantism would be categorized here. Less “ideal typical” examples of this type of protest control
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Table 1. A Typology of Protest Control.a Coercion
Channeling
Observable
Unobserved
Observable
Unobserved
State agents tightly connected with national political elites
Military control
Counterintelligence program
Obstruction of funds
U.S. tax law on non-profits
State agents loosely connected with national political elites
Local protest policing
State or local counterintelligence
Protest permitting requirements
Financial aid restrictions on students convicted of crimes
Private agents
Countermovements
Private threats
Preferences of elite patrons for specific protest goals or forms
Company towns
a This
is a condensed version of the typology introduced as Table 1 in Earl (2003). For citation to this typology, please consult and cite the original article in which it appeared.
also exist. For instance, some activists are attacked, and even killed in retribution for their activist efforts. Such instances are semi-covert in that the identity of the perpetrator is meant to remain unknown even while the act and its motivation are meant to serve as a public warning to activists. In addition to the two forms of coercive protest control, there are also two forms of private channeling.6 Discretionary elite patronage is a good example of observable channeling by private agents. While this will be discussed in more detail below, prior research on financial support suggests the possibility that elite patronage may shape the agenda and tactics of resource-dependent organizations (McAdam, 1982).7 Finally, unobserved, channeling by private agents has been observed frequently in labor-capital interactions. For example, “company towns” are built to make protest unthinkable, and if considered, impossible to actually undertake. A less totalizing approach by companies has included disciplinary policies that limit the kinds of activities in which employees can engage both inside and outside of work and the formalization of individualized grievance proceedings that prevent the collectivization and radicalization of employee troubles. Despite their less proximate or obvious relation to protest, these corporate tactics can nonetheless strongly shape the emergence, form, and frequency of protest. I will discuss research on each of these four types of protest control in more detail in the next section, but it is important to first remark on the totality of the
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typology. One of the key advantages of this typology is that it situates private protest control within a wider matrix of social control measures directed toward protest. In highlighting some of the distinctions between private protest control and different forms of state-based protest control, the typology suggests that we should treat the distinction between public and private as an interesting and important theoretical variable, instead of as a litmus test for whether an action could be properly described as repressive. For instance, researchers could expect that the processes that drive private protest control may be distinct from the processes that drive local and/or national state-based protest control. This is an important theoretical and empirical issue, but one which is being side-stepped presently. Second, the typology also suggests that some of the same dimensions that can help distinguish between different forms of state-based protest control can also be used to distinguish between different kinds of private protest control. In both instances, researchers should attend to: (a) whether private or public agents employ coercion or attempt to channel protest; and (b) whether those agents do so visibly or less perceptibly. Such distinctions suggest that even researchers who are exclusively interested in state-based protest control can gain from this typology. For instance, a strong test of the peculiar institutional power of states is to ask whether the processes behind state-based, observable coercion are more similar to the processes behind private, observable coercion or more similar to the processes behind state-based, unobserved channeling. If states are as theoretically dominant as researchers treat them, their institutional characteristics should decisively pattern the processes of protest control, overwhelming the causal effects of either perceptibility or coercion/channeling. However, if the processes underlying state-based, observable coercion were found to be more similar to the processes underlying private, observable coercion, then it would seem that the institutional fingerprints of states are less dominant than researchers now assume. In addition to suggesting how private protest control may relate to other forms of protest control, the typology also illustrates that even within private protest control, there are important distinctions. The next section of the paper elaborates on those distinctions and reviews existing research on private repression in more detail.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON PRIVATE PROTEST CONTROL Prior research on what could be characterized as private protest control has been spread out across a wide array of sub-literatures in political sociology, political science and the study of social movements. In this section of the paper, I attempt
Coercion
Vigilantes Unconnected to the state Semiconnected Regime supported
Observable
Unobserved
Stop or Contain Active Protest
Stop or Contain Active Protest
Channeling Observable Prevent Mobilization
Countermovements Grass-roots
Elite-driven
Shape Form of Insurgency
Law Enforcement Group (LEG) Guatemalan death squads
“Fight off” reactionsa Strike breaking; union-busting campaigns
Anti-cult movements; pro-life movement; pro-Scientology AF of California
Black-listing; intelligence gathering
“Preventative strategy”a “Open shops”
Funding trends and donation decisions “Buy off” reactionsa Workers councils and company unions
Group charity appeals; charity watchdogs
Company towns
Company mandated grievance proceedings
White supremacy movement with such groups as White Citizens Councils and the KKK Astroturf movements
These names are taken from Lammers (1977).
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a
Prevent Mobilization
Physical attacks on activists
Formal organizations Funders
Educational institutions Business enterprises
Shape Form of Insurgency
Unobserved
Controlling Protest
Table 2. Research on Private Protest Control.
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to bring some of these seemingly unrelated research projects together into a manufactured literature on private protest control. My synthesis of this work stresses three points: (1) although most of the research I will review does not label itself as research on private repression, there is in fact a surprisingly wide variety of research that students of private protest control could draw upon; (2) despite this variety, there are important silences that represent opportunities for further research; and (3) while there are many potential private protest control agents, only a few of these agents seem to use an assortment of protest control tactics. Table 2 organizes prior research to illustrate these three points.8 Along the columns are the types of private protest control suggested in Table 1, with one significant elaboration. I have further discriminated in this table between channeling that is aimed at limiting the capacity to mobilize and channeling that attempts to shape the form or goals of existing protest. Thus, this table actually outlines six types of private protest control: (1) observable coercion; (2) unobserved coercion; (3) observable channeling directed at preventing mobilization;9 (4) observable channeling directed at shaping existing protest; (5) unobserved channeling directed at preventing mobilization; and (6) unobserved channeling directed at shaping existing protest. Arrayed along the rows of the table are various actors that have appeared in research on private protest control.
Vigilantes While the table may seem complicated at first, the results break down quite easily. For instance, beginning with the least corporately organized actors, vigilantes and vigilante groups have been widely acknowledged as private, coercive protest control agents (Kowalewski, 1996). As the blank cells for vigilantism and channeling show, research has not identified instances of vigilante channeling. Instead, vigilantes seem to exclusively use violence, harassment, and intimidation in their attempts to stop or contain existing protest. Despite this major similarity, vigilantes have been found to vary in the extent to which they can be thought of as fully private actors. For instance, just as hate crimes generally tend to be perpetrated by private, and often solitary, actors (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002), it is likely that many physical attacks against activists, are also committed by vigilantes that lack formal connections to the state. As well, while many suspect deeper linkages between the pro-life movement and those who attack pro-choice advocates and abortion providers, many of the formal functionaries of the prolife movement have tried to distance those attackers from the pro-life movement (Blanchard, 1993).10 Similarly, while I do not know of any systematic studies on the harassment of movement workers and participants through death threats, letters,
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and phone calls, there is a great deal of anecdotal support for both the rampant existence of such private protest control and also for its negative effects on unlucky recipients. In contrast, some vigilantes have a loose connection to state actors, even if state actors cannot control their actions. In the U.S., a prime example of this type of vigilante would be the Law Enforcement Group of New York (LEG), which was a right-wing spin-off of the NYPD’s Policeman’s Benevolent Association (PBA). When the already conservative PBA was seen by some white rank-and-file officers to be too lenient and liberal, a small group of officers formed LEG in the late 1960s. Among other LEG activities, members were purportedly responsible for attacks on members of the Black Panthers (Astor, 1971). None of LEG’s actions were state-sanctioned but I label this group semi-connected to the state because their dual membership as police officers and vigilantes afforded them more leeway in committing and getting away with illegal behavior and intimidation. Finally, some vigilantes essentially operate with the permission of local or national authorities. Thus, even though these vigilantes are technically private, state actors supply them with weapons and training as well as virtual immunity from prosecution for their acts. Guatemalan death squads are a classic example of this type of public/private repressive hybrid (Kowalewski, 1996).
Formal Organizations In contrast to vigilantes, formal organizations have been quite inventive private protest control agents, using a range of tactics to prevent, co-opt and oppose social movements. Indeed, as Table 2 reveals, different types of formal organizations have run the gamut of protest control measures, ranging from engineering work environments to create worker quiescence to the extremely violent suppression of protest. Further, many types of organizations have the potential to engage in protest control. In particular, research on private protest control has focused on three types of formal organizations: (1) funding-related agencies; (2) educational institutions; and (3) business enterprises.11 Funding-Related Agencies The protest control that funding-related agencies engage in is more well-known to students of social movements. Studies exist on two possible types of protest control. First, there are issues related to elite funding, which I have labeled observable channeling with the goal of shaping existing protest. Largely, this revolves around a familiar debate over funding, co-optation, and flank effects. McAdam argues that the “twin dangers of co-optation and the withdrawal of elite support” (1982,
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p. 29) threaten social movement organizations (SMOs). On the one hand, external funding can be used to channel dissent in more conventional and institutional directions. McAdam argues that such funding is offered in a implicit exchange relationship: “elite support is offered as an inducement to insurgents to pursue movement goals through normal political means” (1982, p. 28). On the other hand, organizations that come to depend on elite funding may refuse to moderate their goals or tactics, thereby risking de-funding. Once dependent on these elite funding sources, McAdam (1982) argues such organizations are likely to fold if elite patrons withdraw support. Further, recent research suggests that this is still a dilemma that SMOs and other non-profits face today (Silver, 1998). Research that has attempted to examine the seriousness of these charges has been inconclusive in its findings. Jenkins and Eckhert (1986), for instance, studied this phenomena only to argue that elites may prefer moderate groups because of a genuine belief in the likely success of more moderate groups compared to radical groups. Thus, instead of being motivated by a desire to channel protest, elite benefactors may believe that they are helping to build a stronger movement. In fact, their research shows that while elite patronage was reactive and favored moderate SMOs, radical groups were not punitively de-funded. Instead, potential benefactors never considered more radical groups. Other research has gone farther in contesting McAdam’s claims on funding by empirically demonstrating that some funding-related relationships can increase contentious action instead of moderating movements. Cress and Snow’s (1996) study of homeless-related SMOs suggested that benefactors could increase activism by providing resources connected to SMO viability on a dependable basis. Instead of distracting SMOs from activism, benefactor relationships seemed to allow homeless SMOs to focus on activism and organizing instead of on resource flows. Further, in contrast to findings of reactive funding or reactive de-funding, Cress and Snow suggest that funding tended to precede upswings in activism, implying that benefactors were attracted to certain styles of SMO activism and then funded those styles without seeking to control or limit activism. Finally, they did not find a relationship between benefactor support and the use of nonmilitant tactics. Haines’ (1984) findings further complicate the empirical debate over elitefunding and channeling. His study of “radical flank effects” argues that the existence of radical groups actually increases funding provided to more moderate groups, suggesting a “positive radical flank effect.” However, these results do not completely resolve the channeling debate. Funding to more moderate groups should have given more moderate groups a relative advantage over radical groups, ultimately propelling the movement in a more moderate direction. In this way, the channeling that occurred may have used selective facilitation instead of
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selective de-funding to nonetheless shape the form of the movement. If repression researchers narrowly construe the subject of their study and ignore the potential that selective facilitation holds for protest control, the literature will lose valuable leverage over understanding channeling. A second type of funding-related channeling is more obscured but nonetheless can shape the goals and tactics of SMOs. McCarthy et al. (1991) argue that both combined charity appeals and private monitors of charities exert conservative influences on SMOs seeking elite patronage. In the case of combined charity appeals, SMOs may try to become part of larger funding drives, such as the United Way’s drive, so as to raise more money. However, in order to participate in such a combined charity appeal, SMOs must comply with the operational and spending regulations set forth by the organizing agency. McCarthy et al. (1991) also argue that two charitable accreditation boards, the National Charities Information Bureau and the Philanthropic Advisory Service, create pressure for more moderate action by SMOs. Even though these boards cannot directly provide or withdraw funding, the ratings they create serve as important gatekeeping devices. For instance, SMOs that spend “unacceptable amounts” on grass roots fund-raising or other activities may find that their ratings suffer as a result. Educational Institutions Educational institutions, and universities in particular, have also had a long history of preventing, shaping, and confronting insurgency. I rely heavily here on Lammers (1977) excellent study of a wide range of university responses to protest and research on those responses. Lammers argued that universities have a variety of responses to protest from which they can choose. Perhaps the most obvious choice is to coercively control protest using what Lammers refers to as “fight-off” tactics. Fight-off tactics involve applying negative sanctions, including disciplinary and police action, to protesters as well as attempts to diminish the space open to protesters through restrictions on the use of university facilities. In this very adversarial view, “authorities try to subdue recalcitrant students and ‘roll back’ or at least ‘contain’ the opposition, which is considered to be non-legitimate” (Lammers, 1977, p. 176). Of course, sometimes universities use carrots instead of sticks and encourage protest so long as that protest follows certain guidelines. When universities use “buy-off” tactics (Lammers, 1977), universities provide rewards for actual and potential insurgents who seem willing to negotiate or limit protest in certain ways. In some uses, this tactic is most like channeling in that universities attempt to reward moderate behavior and goals. Taken to its fullest, it can be a more “concessive strategy” (Lammers, 1977) in which universities are no longer trying to channel protest but to end it through providing protesters with the outcomes they seek.
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Finally, some universities use a “preventive strategy” (Lammers, 1977). In such a circumstance, a university may alter its organization to make it less objectionable to students, hence avoiding future protest. Alternatively, universities might attempt to install grievance proceedings, such as ombudsman programs, that can funnel off potential protest supporters. Again, universities can vary in their use of this strategy. Some universities may use a preventive strategy out of a desire to better meet students’ needs. Others may use such a strategy merely to avoid potential protest. While Lammers clearly leans toward the former motivation, it is not clear that universities must have such a good-natured view in order to engage in a preventative approach to protest control. Business Enterprises Out of the pool of potential private protest control agents reviewed here, businesses have used the widest array of tactics in preventing and handling protest. The most notorious tactics have been coercive in nature. Labor history is replete with examples of private security, most infamously in the case of “Pinkertons,” being employed to physically control and suppress protest (Kowalewski, 1996). Whether attempting to break a strike or a unionizing campaign, these private police forces have historically armed businesses with often well-equipped and under-policed cadre of personnel willing to suppress protest at almost any cost. The willingness and ability of such private forces to violently quell protest has declined in recent years in the U.S., but the imprint of such forces on labor history is clear nonetheless. Businesses have not always been as openly coercive. Research suggests that U.S. corporations have made extensive use of covert coercion including the use of spies, intelligence gathering, black-listing, and intimidation (Griffin et al., 1986). In some labor disputes this intimidation and violence has reached deadly proportions; labor organizers and strikers have been killed, allegedly at the hands of business mercenaries (Gaventa, 1980). Businesses have also worked to alleviate the need for coercive protest control by attempting to channel dissent. As shown in Table 2, corporations have pursued four different types of channeling strategies. When more obvious attempts are concerned, labor history suggests that industry lobbied for and tried to maintain “open shops,” as a way of curtailing unionization (Griffin et al., 1986).12 Closed shops require that all workers financially support the union, whether or not they are members. This has proven to be a critical mobilizing tool for unions. Open shops, to the contrary, allow workers to participate or donate at their own discretion, which has historically diminished unionization. By striking at workers’ capacity to protest (represented by unions), businesses tried to ensure that workers were not provided an organizational setting in which individual problems could develop into
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collective grievances. Further, to the extent to which grievances were collectivized, businesses preferred that workers lack an organizational vehicle through which to press those claims. For some, this attack on the capacity to organize and protest may seem distant from the types of coercive protest control that industries also employed. However, as Cunningham’s (2003) work on state-based repression points out, attacks against the capacity of individuals to organize and movements to pursue their goals can have very serious results. When some form of collective organizing seemed impossible to avoid, corporations have sponsored workers councils or company unions (Griffin et al., 1986), seeking to divert workers energies away from independent, aggressive, and effective unions. This second form of observable channeling attempted to shape existing insurgency into a controllable, if not fully domesticated, form. I have labeled these councils as observable because the connections between workers councils and company unions were clear to industry leaders and workers alike. As Griffin et al. (1986) note: In exchange for loyalty and commitment to the firm, capital was willing to extend to labor a “voice” in plant operations and a concern for its material and psychological well-being. The “voice” was to be exercised through company unions, known initially as “works councils” or “employee representation” plans; the well-being of the worker was to be achieved through “welfare capitalism.” Company unions, which enrolled about a million and a half workers in 1928 . . . were essentially formal grievance committees formed and controlled by management and, after the wartime gains or organized labor, were increasingly established as a “safety valve” to counter labor’s self-organization, often during an organizing drive or strike (p. 158).
Industries have also pursued less obvious forms of channeling. For instance, internal, formal grievance proceedings are a less noticeable form of channeling that attempts to shape the form of grievance expression (Hebdon & Stern, 1998). In some ways these requirements mimic the workers unions just discussed. Like workers unions, these grievance proceedings attempt to channel the expression of grievances into comfortable formats (from a corporation’s perspective). However, unlike more collective formats, grievance proceedings often further limit protest by individualizing or particularizing grievances and their remedies. Put differently, since most grievance proceedings are based around individual complaints, workers have less of a capacity to realize their common concerns. Further, even if workers were to recognize their shared concerns, the format of most grievance procedures ensures that workers must pursue their grievances in isolation if they hope for a satisfactory resolution. I label these procedures unobserved channeling because the connection to protest control has been less public than it was for company unions. Finally, the company town has proven to be one of the most pernicious forms of unobserved channeling, attempting to entirely pre-empt protest. Gaventa’s (1980)
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path-breaking research on the manufacturing of quiescence in Appalachian coal mines provides an excellent window into the way in which company towns have served to incapacitate workers, turning miners in the region into “docile diggers.” Company towns are towns in which a dominant firm controls access to employment, housing, retail shops, political positions, and legal posts. Virtually every aspect of a worker’s day-to-day life depends on the company, creating multiplex relationships of dependency that render workers particularly vulnerable to company control. Gaventa’s (1980) research demonstrated the profound effects. Most frequently, workers came to construct their own interests as congruent with the company’s interest, making unionization or protest incomprehensible. This construction of interest, Gaventa (1980) argues, represents a third face of power where actors do not even realize that they are subject to another’s interest and will. In such a town, when individual workers did have a problem with or concern about the company, they were branded trouble-makers. These trouble-makers (and frequently their extended families as well) could then find that the entire town had turned against them. For example, if a worker complained about working conditions, that worker might be fired and find their family and their extended families evicted from their rental housing. Even where work conditions were not in question, companies still made clear that any non-conformity was to be avoided. Gaventa suggests that even refusing to purchase goods from a company store could result in dismissal, eviction, or black-listing. Whether as a result of perceived interests or fear of reprisals, company towns were able to affect private as well as public behavior. Gaventa (1980) demonstrates that even voting behavior, which is allegedly secret, depended on whether one lived in a company town or a town with less company control. In addition to preventing institutionalized action against company interests through affecting voting, company towns effectively limited unionization and protest as well. In the few historical moments in which the “docile diggers” he studied did attempt to unionize, the company controlling the town had begun to fail to paternalistically provide for its employees. Mass layoffs had the paradoxical effects of freeing workers from the company’s iron grip while also casting workers into further poverty. Gaventa suggests that at such moments the ideological beliefs that promoted worker quiescence were challenged, the costs of activism were temporarily diminished, and grievances spiked. The result was a switch from passivity to defiance. In total, this discussion suggests that businesses have utilized a wide and diversified arsenal of protest control tools. Indeed, this arsenal in many ways undergirds a primary claim of this paper: we cannot fully understand the social control of protest (or “repression”) without reference to a large variety of private protest control tactics.
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Countermovements Perhaps one of the most overlooked connections between repression research and other social movements research has been the role of countermovements in protest control. This is surprising since many well-known movements and countermovements have worked to limit the mobilization of their opponents. Put differently, some countermovements have moved beyond advocacy for their own goals by working to actively thwart the mobilization of their opponents, even resorting to clandestine activities and violence to do so. Yet, instead of conceptualizing such confrontations as protest control, they have been subsumed under a more general framework of movement-countermovement interaction. I maintain that we should not assume that protest control conducted by countermovements operates in a fundamentally different manner than other forms of private protest control. At the least, whether or not countermovements engage in protest control differently from other protest control agents is an open empirical and theoretical question that is presently entirely ignored in the literature. In reviewing prior research on countermovements, protest control has been featured in two different types of countermovements: (1) grass-roots countermovements; and (2) elite-driven countermovements. In both cases, countermovements make use of observable and unobserved forms of coercive protest control. Grassroots Countermovements Research suggests that coercive protest control has been the primary protest control tool of grassroots countermovements. In particular, if we think of coercion as actions aimed at immediately curtailing or stopping protest, including violence but also intimidation and spying, countermovements have certainly engaged in such activity. Bromley and Shupe (1983) studied a religious movement – the Moon Unification Movement – and the Anti-Cult Movement (ACM), which developed to oppose the Moons. Using formal organizations, a small network of “deprogrammers,” family networks, and more accepted churches, the ACM attempted to force the de-mobilization of the Moons and to prevent further participation in the Moons by their families and friends. Although many ACM actions would be best characterized as simple advocacy of an anti-cult position (and thus should not be thought of as related to protest control), the ACM also engaged in “de-programming,” in which family members who had joined the Moons were kidnapped in hopes of separating them from the Moons permanently. In typical de-programming attempts, kidnapped Moon family members would be held against their will in hotels while so-called de-programmers worked to psychologically coerce them into renouncing Moon membership and beliefs (Bromley & Shupe, 1983). Of course, family members believed that this temporarily negative state of affairs was legitimated by the overall best interest of
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the family member involved. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the ACM used tactics that could be considered coercive and were meant to directly impede the mobilization of the Moons (Bromley & Shupe, 1983). More recent work on the pro-life movement has shown that beyond the sorts of vigilante acts discussed above, the pro-life movement also uses direct intimidation to try to limit the pro-choice movement. This happens most clearly in protests that attempt to block reproductive health and abortion clinic entrances or by pro-life protesters who survey such clinics, hoping to gather information on the women who enter such clinics and their friends and families. Whether by directly intimidating women so that they choose not to enter clinics or by disclosing information about a possible abortion to the friends and family of women seeking care at a clinic, the clear objective is to prevent women from seeking and/or having abortions. The climate created around such clinics is also meant to intimidate staff and doctors in hopes that the pro-choice movement will wither under the stress of providing services to women. To the extent to which pro-life movement activists correctly understand that there is no meaningful right to an abortion if women cannot actually access abortion services – either because providers have been scared away from offering abortions or because visiting a clinic is too dangerous – it is clear that these actions are meant to challenge the pro-choice movement. Of course, research suggests that countermovements do not have a monopoly on coercive tactics. At times, movements react to countermovements in equally coercive ways. For example, in the new world of “e-contention” (Earl & Schussman, 2003), or computerized contention, Peckham (1998) examined the interactions between the Church of Scientology and its on-line opponents. He found that both opponents of Scientology and the Church tried to limit the resources available to the other and to harass and intimidate opponents. In the area of more conventionally understood countermovement tactics, opponents of Scientology threatened to publish copyrighted and sacred Church documents, spread the stories of ex-Scientologists who renounced the Church and viewed it as a cult, and otherwise discredit Scientology. In reaction, the Church threatened Internet providers who allowed anti-Scientology rhetoric on their servers, infiltrated and disrupted online forums for those opposed to Scientology, in addition to pursuing a range of civil and criminal actions against opponents. In addition to this fairly public coercion, some movements and countermovements have attempted to coerce their opponents less visibly. In many instances, this coercion is meant to be a warning to the movement and thus somewhat visible, although the identity of those committing acts of violence and intimidation are often hidden. As well, the violence and intimidation that is publicly acknowledged probably only scratches the surface. However, this violence differs from the
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vigilante violence discussed above in that it is more of a coordinated and collective effort. Examples of such actions include secretive harassment, intimidation and violence committed by white supremacist groups such as the KKK and White Citizens Councils. Stealthily committed night-time violence against blacks was a hallmark of the KKK. Histories of the civil rights movement leave no doubt as to the terror and intimidation that the KKK inspired. White Citizens Councils, on the other hand, were largely considered the “more respectable wing of the resistance movement” (McMillen, 1971, p. vii) because they claimed to use legal means to oppose desegregation and the civil rights movement. In fact, in some cases White Citizens Councils were quite distinguishable from the secretive but exceptionally violent KKK. Yet, in other cases White Citizens Councils more “nearly resembled the Klans than Councils” because they were “prone to violence and strident anti-Semitism, committed to secrecy and other behavioral patterns associated in the popular mind with hooded night-riders” (McMillen, 1971, p. vii). Indeed, some of violence associated with White Citizens Councils was even quite public. For instance, Nat King Cole was assaulted at a Birmingham auditorium by members of the North Alabama Citizens Council. Despite McMillen’s persuasive attempts to distinguish between more legally-minded White Citizens Councils and the more coercive KKK, even McMillen acknowledges that intimidation (whether economic, social or physical) was a cornerstone of White Citizens Council action: But in at least three states, whites answered with a vengeance. Spurred by local Citizen’s Councils, militants in Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina met the black challenge with economic reprisal, social pressure and in some cases violence. Although repeatedly denying its role in white retaliation against Negroes, the Council, from its inception, advocated the use of intimidation as a means of quelling desegregation (McMillen, 1971, p. 209).
McMillen goes on to quote from Mississippi council leaders who suggested that lawful economic pressure could be placed upon blacks to dissuade them from desegregation attempts. In light of existing evidence, it would be difficult to assert that White Citizens Councils did not work behind the scenes to intimidate and harass “militant” blacks: housing rentals and mortgages, credit, employment, and sometimes one’s own physical safety came to depend on eschewing an interest in desegregation. Elite-Driven Countermovements In addition to grassroots countermovements, elite-driven countermovements have also resorted to coercive protest control tactics. According to Pichardo (1995), elitedriven movements are movements where “elites are responsible for the generation
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and leadership of the movement and its movement organizations, are highly involved in the process of mobilizing and recruiting participants, and determine the movement’s agenda” (p. 24). In short, such a movement is “activated, promulgated, and supported by elites” (Pichardo, 1995, p. 24). In his rich and innovative work on the topic, Pichardo argues that in many ways these elite-driven movements look and operate like grassroots countermovements. I argue that this similarity extends to the way in which elite-driven countermovements have used observable and unobserved coercion to immobilize their opponents. For instance, in his analysis of the Associated Farmers of California (AF), which opposed farm worker unionization in the 1930s, Pichardo argues: The AF was perhaps the most virulent and notorious right-wing American group, with the possible exception of the Ku Klux Klan. Borne out of the labor turbulence in the agricultural fields of California during the 1930s, the power elite created and mobilized vigilante groups, organized under the auspices of the AF, that engaged in a reign of terror and intimidation targeted against the efforts of the farmworkers to agitate and organize (1995, p. 25).
Organized and funded by leading growers and industrialists dependent on agriculture (such as canners), the AF mobilized local citizens into vigilante groups that attacked and sometimes killed farmworkers and organizers. Pichardo labels this action vigilantism, but I have chosen to discuss the AF under countermovements because, as was true with the KKK and White Citizens Councils, this vigilante violence was actually more organized and collective than other forms of vigilante behavior. As well, organized violence was only one tactic in a wider arsenal that included institutional lobbying and public relations campaigns. Nonetheless, I will discuss below the theoretical importance of possible empirical slippages between vigilantes and countermovements. In addition to quite overt violence by the AF, other elite-driven countermovements have relied on more covert forms of intelligence and action. For example, numerous corporations and industries have recently launched a variety of so-called “astroturf” movements. Stauber and Rampton (1995) explain: Unlike genuine grassroots movements . . . these industry-generated “astroturf” movements are controlled by the corporate interests that pay their bills. On behalf of the Philip Morris tobacco company, for example, . . . the world’s largest PR firm . . . created the “National Smokers Alliance” to mobilize smokers into a grassroots lobby for “smokers’ rights” (pp. 13–14).
Further, these astroturf movements have been able to fuse corporate PR with grassroots mobilization: the impossible sounding National Smokers Alliance had 3 million members in 1995 (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). Frequently orchestrated by major PR firms, these astroturf movements are constructed, organized, maintained,
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and funded through corporate initiatives out of a belief that “grassroots” (or, at least seemingly, grassroots) pressure is more effective in lobbying and more effectively counters social movements that threaten corporate interests. Akin to fighting fire with fire, astroturf movements have exploded even while going relatively unnoticed to outsiders. Of course, many of the actions of astroturf movements could be categorized as standard countermovement advocacy. However, there are aspects common to many astroturf movements that suggest a seamier underside to their activities. In particular, a number of PR firms orchestrating astroturf movements have employed spies and other covert intelligence gathering devices. For instance, Stauber and Rampton (1995) reported that one astroturf representative posed as a potential funder in order to request extensive financial and planning documentation from a local activist who was forming a SMO. The purpose of this data gathering was to get an insider’s view of the organizing potential of the group so that targeted tactics could be used to destroy the incipient challenge. Other SMOs have reported infiltration by astroturf representatives. Still other astroturf organizers have impersonated activists from opposing movements to cancel press conferences by the opposing movement and provide false information about the opposing movement. Even falsified documents, allegedly produced by the opposing movement and “recovered” by astroturf representatives, have been circulated in hopes of discrediting the opposing movement or its representatives. In surveying this range of tactics, it is as if many astroturf movements took their intelligence, disinformation, and harassment training straight from the pages of the FBI’s COINTELPRO programs (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988). Like COINTELPRO, the secrecy of these anti-movement endeavors are critical to their success.
THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF STUDYING PRIVATE PROTEST CONTROL After reviewing a wide-range of scholarship in an attempt to manufacture a literature on private protest control, we can more productively return to questions over the importance of and implications of private protest control. As I argued in the introduction, the overly coercive and state-based focus of repression research has led researchers to concentrate on only a select few types of repression. In arguing for a broader conceptualization that focuses on the social control of protest instead of more narrowly on coercive, state-based repression, I have cataloged research on a wide variety of private protest control measures. This catalog suggests several advantages to the general study of private protest control and to the specific template offered here for interpreting that research.
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The Advantages of Studying Private Protest Control There are many advantages to studying private protest, but for brevity I will focus on three here. First, whether or not one agrees with the particular construction of a private protest control literature presented here, prior research demonstrates that private protest control has been too palpable and prevalent of a force to ignore. Researchers of any ilk would likely agree that theoretical distinctions and theories themselves are useful to the extent to which they address such important empirical phenomena. When theories must avoid important empirical occurrences to retain their validity or when theoretical distinctions obscure important theoretical phenomena, those theories and distinctions must be questioned. I have attempted to raise such questions by focusing on the importance of private protest control, and the conceptualization of repression more generally. Second, the study of private protest control will force even state-based repression researchers to re-consider existing theoretical paradigms. For instance, many repression researchers currently argue that repression is part and parcel of political opportunities (for instance, see della Porta, 1995). However, if future work on private protest control reveals that private protest control operates similarly to statebased protest control, that theoretical understanding could be called into question. Alternatively, political opportunities theorists may use such a finding to expand the terrain for which they argue political opportunities are relevant. Thus, the study of private protest control would substantially contribute to the theoretical debate over political opportunities by allowing for either an important correction or an important expansion. Similar arguments could be made for other major theoretical perspectives. Third, and most importantly from my perspective, a focus on private protest control helps to enliven a discussion over the importance of protest control to the overall study of social movements. Given the focus on coercive repression by states, most repression research has been regarded as important to understanding the dynamics of contention once at least some insurgency is underway. That is, a focus on states and violence inherently suggests that: (a) states must have a target since there must be something against which states take coercive action; and (b) these targets must be sufficiently active to have raised state concern in the first place (Boudreau, 2001). However, as the forms of channeling directed at preventing any protest showed, protest control may be occurring long before insurgency is evident. In fact, protest control may play an important role as a switchman, effectively preventing protest mobilization around some grievances and ineffectively allowing some troubles to boil into protest.
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Put more plainly, the forms of private protest control reviewed here have affected almost every part of movement emergence and mobilization. Specifically, in the examples reviewed above, protest control arguably affected: (1) the construction of grievances (e.g. Gaventa’s company towns); (2) capacities for handling grievances (e.g. open versus closed shops); (3) formats for handling grievances (e.g. internal, company-mandated grievance proceeding and company unions versus independent workers unions); (4) organizational formation and maintenance (e.g. elite patronage); (5) recruitment, micro-mobilization and retention by altering the costs of movement participation (e.g. coercion); (6) strategic and tactical decision-making (e.g. elite patronage and increases in the cost of certain types of activism); (7) movement survival through the creation of excessive costs for activism (e.g. coercion); and (8) movement outcomes (e.g. Bromley & Shupe’s ACM). In this way, we can see that protest control occurs at all points across a movement – it does not just affect in-progress protest; it affects whether movements form, how they mobilize, and then the extent to which they mobilize. Thus, protest control should be a much more central concern in the social movements literature.
How to Manufacture a Literature on Private Protest Control In addition to suggesting general advantages to the study of private protest control, I have outlined a specific way of arranging or manufacturing a literature on private protest control, represented in Table 2. This particular arrangement has several noteworthy advantages, but I will focus primarily on the advantages it offers in terms of raising new research questions. For instance, it is interesting to note that research has found that vigilantism and countermovements predominantly use coercive protest control measures. For vigilantes, this may be because they lack the kind of continued contact with their opponents that is required for channeling. For countermovements, this may result from competitive movement-countermovement interactions (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). This similar reliance on coercion suggests that scholars may want to consider more carefully the relationship between vigilantism and countermovements. Instead of creating a strict distinction between vigilantes and more collective and organized countermovements, researchers may more critically ask: “What are the meaningful similarities and differences between vigilantism and
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countermovements?” It is possible that the answer to this question could speak to on-going debates over the definition of countermovements. As well, an answer to this question could help address other problems in the literature, such as concerns over the proper relationship between vigilante violence, large-scale ethnic violence, and social movements. Finally, it is possible that some vigilante action eventually grows into a countermovement. Recognizing the relationship of vigilantism and countermovements to protest control may in turn raise other questions, such as: “Under what conditions will vigilantism become a countermovement?” The flip side to the common use of coercion by vigilantes and countermovements is also revealed by Table 2: why is it that formal organizations have been able to develop and deploy such a wide-range of protest control tactics? As well, why do counter-movement SMOs seem to lack this same diversification even though they can also be formal organizations? Attempts to answer these two questions suggest a major entr´ee for organizational researchers into the study of protest control. For example, it may be that formal organizations tend to have certain institutional capacities that allow for this diversification. Alternatively, formal organizations may simply play the role of repeat-players that are less encumbered in their interactions with movements than competitive countermovements. One may be able to gain further leverage over this issue by noticing that business enterprises, in particular, have had the most diversified repertoire. Does this extreme diversification result from the sheer length of capital-labor interactions or do businesses distinguish themselves even from other formal organizations with special institutional capacities for protest control? Alternatively, do business enterprises enjoy a mantle of legitimacy, shielding their actions from some scrutiny and allowing tactical diversification to occur with fewer challenges? This review of private protest control also suggests that while there were many examples of private protest control, there were far fewer pieces that were able to explain the occurrence or rate of private protest control. Future research on private protest control should attempt to develop on this typology by exploring the application of existing explanations of repression to private protest control (see Earl, 2003 and Earl, Soule & McCarthy, 2003 for reviews of current explanations of repression). This research should also include attention to whether or not there are relationships between public and private protest control. For instance, do certain state-based forms of protest control make selected types of private protest control more or less likely?
CONCLUSION I have argued that current research too exclusively focuses its attention on statebased and coercive repression. In order to offer a correction, I have suggested a
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change in focus from repression to the social control of protest more generally. As well, I have documented a wide array of research examining private protest control and sought to manufacture a literature based on that review. Finally, I have suggested what advantages researchers may reap if they were to consider private protest control more seriously. In closing, this paper was meant as an invitation for future work and an invitation to reconsider existing work. I have tried to show that the study of private protest control could provide significant rewards for both students of protest control and the study of social movements more generally. The accuracy of that claim, however, will ultimately be decided by the extent to which researchers accept this invitation and are able to make use of the insights and arguments provided here.
NOTES 1. I am not arguing that either private or state-based repression is more prevalent and/or important. These are empirical questions that cannot be addressed until private repression has been studied more fully. Rather, I am arguing that scholars cannot fully understand the range of externally imposed obstacles that social movements face without examining both private and state-based protest control. 2. This paper does not address: (1) why existing empirical examinations of private repression have not developed previously into an acknowledged body of scholarship; or (2) why social movement scholars have been so focused on state-based repression. Both of these questions are intriguing and undoubtedly have complex answers, but the answers are not integral to the major contributions of this paper and thus are not discussed here. 3. COINTELPRO was a covert operation carried about the FBI with the express intention of disrupting selected U.S. protest movements. 4. This is not to suggest that scholars outside of the social movement literature have not addressed such matters. Nonetheless, Jackman (2002) suggests that scholars from other subfields also focus on physical violence and thereby tend to discount other types of coercive and/or harmful actions. 5. As Earl (2003) notes: “Channeling may still be subjectively experienced as ‘coercive’ in that individuals and SMOs may feel pressured, constrained or forced into actions they would not otherwise take. However, this subjective feeling of ‘being coerced’ is different from Oberschall’s more technical use of coercion. His distinction between force or threats of force (i.e. coercion) or other negative sanctions (i.e. channeling) does not attend to the subjective interpretation of those sanctions (p. 48).” 6. As Earl (2003) notes, channeling can be harder to identify. In part, this added difficulty results from the bias toward research on coercive protest control discussed above; many researchers may consider channeling to be a sort of regulation instead of a type of repression. However, regulation must be considered a less virulent form, although not less effective form, of protest control (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). After all, channeling can influence future activism just as police action can influence the range and frequency of future activism. 7. Another possible example of observable, private channeling involves Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). Research by Pring and Canan (1996) suggests that individuals and companies may be suing protesters and protest organizations,
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among others, to order to limit future activism. When that is the case, SLAPPs would be a particularly malicious form of observable, private channeling since they would impose direct and observable costs on insurgents in order to shape future protest. However, others who have reviewed Pring and Canan’s research have argued that many SLAPP filers are individuals with no strategic or future-oriented motivation; they are simply individuals seeking retribution for what they saw as a public slight (Milner, 1997). Given these competing claims, I do not discuss SLAPPs in the main text and instead suggest that more research on SLAPPs and the motivations of various SLAPP filers needs to be done. 8. Table 2 is meant to serve as a foundation for a literature on private protest control. As with any foundation, it invites additions, elaborations, and further construction. 9. SLAPP lawsuits that are filed with the motivation of quelling future protest – for instance, lawsuits filed by repeat players such as real estate developers or builders who frequently clash over new developments with environmentalists – should be considered as observable channeling directed at preventing future mobilization. However, I do not discuss SLAPP suits more extensively in the main text for two reasons. First, as was raised in Note 5, it is not yet clear how strategic all SLAPP lawsuits are meant to be. Second, it is not clear which actors tend to systematically use SLAPPs in a strategic manner. While one could speculate on this topic, future research is needed before a more definitive classification of SLAPPs in this paper’s typology could be made. 10. Many abortion providers understand themselves to be activists and certainly many pro-life advocates also believe these providers are movement activists. 11. I limit my review to funding-related agencies, educational institutions and businesses because the bulk of research has focused on these formal organizations. However, it is important to acknowledge that limited work has been done on other formal organizations. For instance, Stalp and Winders (2000) examined the way in which the Catholic Church and its local dioceses exerted control over nuns and priests in the civil rights movement. Their study of civil rights activism in Cairo, Illinois finds that while the Catholic Church was tolerant of nuns participation and that more intolerant local dioceses lacked organizational control over nuns, activism by priests was not tolerated by the local Bishop, to whom the priests were organizationally beholden. In turn, this threatened to limit priests’, but not nuns’, activism and certainly increased the severity of consequences that priests faced for such activism when compared to nuns. 12. In contrast to research that attempts to explain how businesses seek to control unions and employees, some research has examined the ways in which unions seek to control their members. Given that union unity is central to collective success, unions should have a vested interested in member discipline. This is particularly true where participation in strikes and non-participation in wildcat strikes are concerned (Summers, 1950). While work that examines the mechanisms by which SMOs control their own members represents an interesting connection between the literatures on SMO decision-making, participation, and protest control, it is beyond the scope of this paper to more fully elaborate on that connection.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Jenny Irons for her comments on previous drafts of this manuscript as well as the organizers and participants of the Authority
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in Contention Conference, the Editors of this volume, and the anonymous reviewers.
REFERENCES Astor, G. (1971). The New York cops: An informal history. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Ball, P. (2001). On the quantification of horror: Notes from the field on statistical analyses of human rights violations. Paper presented at the Conference on Mobilization and Repression: What We Know and Where We Should Go From Here? University of Maryland at College Park. Blanchard, D. A. (1993). The anti-abortion movement and the rise of the religious right: From polite to fiery protest. New York: Twayne Publishers. Boudreau, V. (2001). Contentious interactions and state repression: Toward an interpretive framework. Paper presented at the Conference on Mobilization and Repression: What We Know and Where We Should Go From Here? University of Maryland at College Park. Bromley, D. G., & Shupe, A. D. Jr. (1983). Repression and the decline of social movements: The case of new religions. In: J. Freeman (Ed.), Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies (pp. 335–347). New York: Longman. Churchill, W., & Vander Wall, J. (1988). Agents of repression: The FBI’s secret wars against the black panther party and the American Indian movement. Boston: South End Press. Cress, D., & Snow, D. A. (1996). Mobilization at the margins: Resources, benefactors, and the viability of homeless social movement organizations. American Sociological Review, 61(6), 1089–1109. Cunningham, D. (2003). State versus social movement: FBI counterintelligence against the new left. In: J. A. Goldstone (Ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements (pp. 45–77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. della Porta, D. (1995). Social movements, political violence, and the state: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. New York: University of Cambridge Press. della Porta, D., & Reiter, H. (Eds) (1998). Policing protest: The control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Earl, J. (2003). Tanks, tear gas and taxes: Toward a theory of movement repression. Sociological Theory, 21, 44–68. Earl, J., & Schussman, A. (2003). The new site of activism: On-line organizations, movement entrepreneurs, and the changing location of social movement decision-making. Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change, 24, 155–187. Earl, J., Soule, S. A., & McCarthy, J. D. (2003). Protests under fire? Explaining protest policing. American Sociological Review, 69, 581–606. Ferree, M. M. (2001). Soft repression: Ridicule, stigma and silences in the gender wars. Paper presented at the Conference on Mobilization and Repression: What We Know and Where We Should Go From Here? University of Maryland at College Park. Francisco, R. A. (2001). The Dictator’s dilemma. Paper presented at the Conference on Mobilization and Repression: What We Know and Where We Should Go From Here? University of Maryland at College Park. Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and powerlessness: Quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian valley. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
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Griffin, L. J., Wallace, M. E., & Rubin, B. A. (1986). Capitalist resistance to the organization of labor before the new deal: Why? how? success? American Sociological Review, 51(2), 147–167. Haines, H. H. (1984). Black radicalization and the funding of civil rights: 1957–1970. Social Problems, 32(1), 31–43. Hebdon, R. P., & Stern, R. N. (1998). Trade offs among expressions of industrial conflict: Public sector strike bans and grievance arbitrations. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51(2), 204–221. Jackman, M. (2002). Violence in social life. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 387–415. Jenkins, C. J., & Eckhert, C. M. (1986). Channeling black insurgency: Elite patronage and professional social movement organizations in the development of the black insurgency. American Sociological Review, 51, 812–829. Kowalewski, D. (1996). Countermovement vigilantism and human rights. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 25, 63–81. Lammers, C. J. (1977). Tactics and strategies adopted by university authorities to counter student opposition. In: D. Light, Jr. & J. Spiegel (Eds), The Dynamics of University Protest (pp. 171–198). Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers. McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, J. D., Britt, D. W., & Wolfson, M. (1991). The institutional channeling of social movements by the state in the United States. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 13, 45–76. McMillen, N. R. (1971). The citizen’s council: Organized resistance to the second reconstruction, 1954–1964. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. McVeigh, R. (2001). Power devaluation, the Ku Klux Klan, and the democratic national convention of 1924. Sociological Forum, 16(1), 1–30. Meier, R. F. (1982). Perspectives on the concept of social control. Annual Review of Sociology, 8, 35–55. Meyer, D., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), 1628–1660. Milner, N. (1997). Decentering the first amendment: Review essay. Law and Society Review, 31(4), 823–844. Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Peckham, M. H. (1998). New dimensions of social movement/countermovement interaction: The case of Scientology and its internet critics. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 23(4), 317–347. Pichardo, N. A. (1995). The power elite and elite-driven countermovements: The associated farmers of California during the 1930s. Sociological Forum, 10(1), 21–49. Pring, G. W., & Canan, P. (1996). SLAPPs: Getting sued for speaking out. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Silver, I. (1998). Buying an activist identity: Reproducing class through social movement philanthropy. Sociological Perspectives, 41(2), 303–321. Soule, S. A. (1992). Populism and black lynching in Georgia, 1890–1900. Social Forces, 71, 431–449. Stalp, M. C., & Winders, B. (2000). Power in the margins: Gendered organizational effects on religious activism. Review of Religious Research, 42(1), 41–60. Stauber, J. C., & Rampton, S. (1995). Toxic sludge is good for you: Lies, damn lies, and the public relations industry. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
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Stockdill, B. C. (1996). Multiple oppressions and their influence on collective action: The case of the AIDS movement. Unpublished Ph.D. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. Summers, C. (1950). Disciplinary powers of unions. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 3(4), 483–513. Sutton, J. R. (1996). Rethinking social control. Law and Social Inquiry, 21, 943–958. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Turpin-Petrosino, C. (2002). Hateful sirens . . . who hears their song? Journal of Social Issues, 58(2), 281–301.
SOFT REPRESSION: RIDICULE, STIGMA, AND SILENCING IN GENDER-BASED MOVEMENTS Myra Marx Ferree ABSTRACT If the concept of repression is to be useful when the state is not the primary target of social movement action, it needs to conceptualize how changes in values, perspectives, culture, norms, expectations and behavior in the public at large are contested through political interaction in civil society. Although non-state actors can sometimes use violence, their typical forms of repression of social movements are non-violent or “soft.” I suggest three forms of action – ridicule, stigma and silencing – that are commonly employed by non-state actors to repress challengers. Because women’s movements include challenges to non-state authorities, they have long been targets of soft repression. Examples of the use of power against challengers to the gender status quo are used to illustrate all three forms of soft repression. Once upon a time, social movement scholars lived in a world in which the only form of social protest that they could recognize was directed against the state. In this state-centered world, political elites wielding formal authority over governments were the only real targets for movement concerns, and the troops protecting the castle of political power were the armies, police forces, and prisons that the authorities could, and did, send into battle against those who would challenge their authority in general, or their policies in specific. As protests in democratic states Authority in Contention Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 25, 85–101 © 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd. ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(04)25004-2
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became more legitimate, ritualized and non-violent, the scholarly focus remained on the interaction between states and challengers to their formal political authority. Whether the scholar thought the good guys were in the castle or on the offensive outside the walls made a difference in how the particular strategies of attack or defense were judged, but explaining the rules of engagement was the central task. The way that the castle was defended from attack, violent or not, generally fell under the rubric of repression, particularly if one’s sympathies were – often with good reason – on the side of those outside the walls.1 Like all fairy tales, there is a good bit of mythical exaggeration in this story. There is also a central and important truth, namely that the concept of repression is bound up with a state-centered view of social movements. Repression evokes an image of a central political authority using the formal apparatus of the state to put down rebellions, whether overtly or covertly holding the reins and directing the actions being taken in its defense. Repression is what states do, especially bad states that cannot manage dissent in more democratic and disarming ways. However, for at least the past two decades, social movement scholars have generally been widening their understanding of what protest is, and where, and how it occurs to encompass a broader and less centralized landscape than the image of the castle under siege would suggest. From so-called new social movement theories through the cultural turn in social movements to the current focus on discourses, the terrain of protest has been reconceptualized to include a variety of non-state institutional targets and change strategies that depend on cultural subversion as much or more than stone-throwing confrontation. Whether looking at ACT-UP die-ins aimed at directing public attention to the AIDS crisis, student protests against the corporations that produce their university’s athletic apparel aimed at changing their reliance on sweatshops, environmentalists relying on recycling, organic foods, and less energy dependent lifestyles – what Vice President Dick Cheney derided as the politics of personal virtue – or feminists going out and building alternative institutions such as shelters for battered women, rape-crisis centers, and women’s studies programs, scholars have recognized and studied a great variety of protest that has been decentralized and directed at institutions other than the state.2 My question is whether the concept of repression is useful at all in the wider and more varied landscape of social movement action that has been discovered and studied. Certainly, the state is not directly the target of any of these protest actions, and typically, if the state actively responds to them at all, it does so relatively late in the process, largely to co-opt rather than to quash them. Thus, once public concern has been mobilized by social movements about violence against women, AIDS, sweatshops, or the environment, states may get involved in providing subsidies, regulations, and services that help to institutionalize this new way of seeing the
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world. But it is the change in values, perspectives, culture, norms, expectations and behavior in the public at large that is the real goal of the movement, and state action, if any, is one of many means to its end, not an end itself (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995). The castle looks less like a fortress on a hill and more like a service station. In this view of contentious political action, where the castle of the state is not so much under siege as surrounded by competing demands for services and support, is the idea of repression obsolete or irrelevantly narrow? Might repression only be a useful concept for those truly state-centered conflicts in which protest movements are contending for control over the political system as such or where state dominance is being used to keep contenders off the map? Does a focus on repression necessarily return us to apparently old-fashioned definitions of social movements and their tactics that keep more cultural and de-centralized forms of protest out of sight and out of mind? Clearly, I think a return to the castle image would be a mistake. The fairytale version of social movements, for example, has no room for the princess who smashes the mirror, cuts off her hair, and makes a bolt for the drawbridge, deciding that happy-ever-after endings are not her style. Women’s movements in particular are scarcely to be found in the familiar catalogues of contention over state power. Even though feminist protest is as old as Lysistrata, confronting the state with the expectation of replacing the current elite is not how it is done. Instead, women’s movements are, and have been for generations, the very epitome of movements focused on making change in (and experiencing resistance from) civil society.3 Although the idea persists that class-based movements are “old” and genderbased social movements are “new,” both were actively engaged with each other and with state and social definitions of family, work and personal freedom in the nineteenth-century as well as today. Rather than a chronological difference, the distinction between them is one of focus and strategy – working-class movements were often contenders for state power, and women’s movements were not. Women’s movements addressed changes in values and norms directly in the institutions of religion, medicine, family and economy. Women’s movements worked in, on and through civil society as much as or more than on the state as such.4 In this sense, women’s movements provide a useful, long-term lens on the decentralized and cultural strategies of social protest that have since become more familiar among men. Ever more social movements direct themselves to civil society rather than the state.5 Especially in modern, industrial democracies with a wide range of formal social institutions outside the state that observe, direct and sanction behavior, issues of power and autonomy are not only to be found in direct interaction with the state and its minions. Understanding social movements in civil
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society as being just as important as social movements directed at the state, as most scholars now do, should mean that women’s movements take a central place as one of the oldest and most globally widespread forms of such protest. Alas, research on women’s movements has generally not been mainstreamed into the study of social protest. Thus, the question of when and how women’s movements have been repressed is not taken as a significant challenge to conventional state-centered models of repression, but has been of interest only to feminist scholars working on gender issues. But if women’s movements are indeed, as I have argued, forerunners and exemplars of how decentralized social movements in civil society operate, then social movement theorists are missing an important opportunity to use the history of feminist protest to expand their understanding of movement dynamics in this arena in general. Looking at repression in relation to feminism and women’s mobilizations certainly takes us away from the castle-like, state-centered model of responses to challenge. I offer the term soft repression as a consciously gendered image of the forms that repression frequently takes in civil society, in contrast to the more conventional, male-gendered imagery of hard repression in which states more typically engage, even though both soft and hard forms of repression can in principle, be used by any agent. Whereas hard repression involves the mobilization of force to control or crush oppositional action through the use or threat of violence, soft repression involves the mobilization of non-violent means to silence or eradicate oppositional ideas. Not all forms of non-violent resistance to challenging ideas merit the label soft repression, either. Normative theories of discursive democracy include the potential for much contentious speech that is not polite or respectful, but also establish criteria of fairness in debate that place sharp limits on any person’s or institution’s use of power to restrict others’ ideas.6 The distinguishing criterion of soft repression is the collective mobilization of power, albeit in non-violent forms and often highly informal ways, to limit and exclude ideas and identities from the public forum. Also, although there are continuities between the uses of power for social control over individuals and for silencing and excluding social movements, as pointed out below, I think the concept of soft repression is most usefully applied to the non-violent uses of power that are specifically directed against movement collective identities and movement ideas that support “cognitive liberation” or “oppositional consciousness” (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984, 1992). Although both states and institutions of civil society may engage in either soft or hard repression, it seems likely that some patterns of association between types of actors, opportunity structures, and types of repression may be found. After all, unlike states, the institutions of civil society do not have privileged control over the means of violence. Conflicts within civil society should thus be more
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likely to be expressed in conflicts over naming, speaking, labeling, defining and knowing, but they may spill over into overt violence if and when state power permits its use. For example, violence against women in the form of rape and spousal abuse has long been permitted by many states, and non-state paramilitaries from the Ku Klux Klan to Guatemalan landlords, Colombian drug barons and Hindu nationalists have been allowed to act violently against ethnic minorities and social critics. That states monopolize the means of violence to a greater or lesser degree does not prevent them from also using non-violent means of censorship and exclusion to repress disturbing ideas, and sometimes civil society endorses and facilitates state use of soft repressive measures (as the McCarthy period in the United States illustrates). However, because the notion of soft repression includes the presumption that there exist some autonomous public forums in which ideas and identities could be formed and articulated, the concept may be limited to situations in which the state does not completely dominate or destroy civil society’s institutions. In the rest of this paper, I offer a few selective examples from studies of genderbased mobilizations in democratic states to consider how soft repression can work in civil society to limit or eliminate collective challenges to dominant forces in a variety of decentralized social institutions. I place each type of example of soft repression directed at movements after discussion of similar, but not identical, processes of social control that are directed at non-organized members of disempowered groups, in order to draw out both the continuities of means and the differences in targets that distinguish soft repression from these more omnipresent uses of power as social control. The evidence here is eclectic and can only be suggestive. Whether the concept of soft repression is actually fruitful for understanding conflict in civil society awaits examination by studies directly designed to address this. I organize these examples into three rather loose and possibly overlapping categories – ridicule, stigma and silencing – roughly corresponding to the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. All three of these levels must surely interact with each other in practice, a complexity that would require an extended single case study to explore. Contradictions and disjunctions between them are also certainly points at which we might expect social movements to find cracks in the system of social control where leverage can be exerted. In fact, social movement scholars may be better at recognizing the cultural and discursive strategies that movements adopt in response to soft repression than the operations of soft repression itself.7 Thus I do not wish to suggest that these processes are a monolithic whole nor to imply that they are unconnected or alternative strategies, but rather to argue that studying the relationships among them would be a way to begin to understand how soft repression operates and can be overcome.
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MICRO-LEVEL RIDICULE I begin at the micro-level of ridicule directed at individuals and groups by others in face-to-face interaction, and thus with the sort of use of social power that is rarely associated with social movements at all. The use of ridicule to mock “fags,” “queers” and “dykes” begins even in elementary school to police the boundaries of appropriate gender behavior. Stepping out of line brings interpersonal retaliation in the form of name-calling at any age. Such attacks, more or less vehement or subtle, can be emotionally painful, and learning to pay careful attention to respecting these boundaries and calculating when or how they could be crossed without bringing ridicule is an early form of self-defense. Boundary-policing at the interpersonal level can limit the ability of both men and women even to recognize similarities across gender and differences within gender categories.8 But ridicule is not only a widespread means of enforcing gender conformity in general and on a routine basis; it is also a tool explicitly put to use to diminish and disarm cultural challengers who are mobilizing or mobilized. Here is where soft repression enters in. Recall, for example, women’s early efforts to redirect the energy of the social movements of the 1960s in which they were participating to include their own claims for gender justice. National liberation movements were happening around the world, and the more radical elements of the civil rights movement in the U.S. spoke of black liberation as well. But when women mobilized and raised the parallel demand for women’s liberation, the immediate response was a mocking abbreviation to call this “women’s lib.” Similarly, the draft-card burners of the anti-war movement in the U.S. inspired feminist demonstrators to throw bras and girdles and high-heels into a “freedom trash can” in Atlantic City, earning them the collective media sobriquet of “bra-burners.” More recently, consider the term “feminazi” that Rush Limbaugh coined to ridicule feminists, and that my students report is widely used by on campus to attack any woman who stands up for her rights. Of course, ridicule as a form of soft repression from civil society is met with resistance on its own terms and on its own ground. Social movements take the language that is used to mock and attempt to intimidate them and turn its meaning around to be a positive self-description. Queer politics reclaims the word queer and inverts it to be a proud term, as feminists earlier attempted to do with terms ranging from blue-stocking to dyke and crone.9 So-called “tree-huggers” and “peaceniks” are no strangers to this strategy. The underlying reality here is that the ability to convey social values through labeling is a valuable political resource in civil society and thus a fiercely contested domain. Contests over meaning often take the form of struggles over the word to be used and the connotation to be attached to that word. The use of the term “politically correct” to ridicule social concerns
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of various sorts provides a familiar case in which ridicule is being deployed as a strategy of soft repression (Pollitt, 1994; Smith, 1999). It is, not surprisingly, being met with efforts to resist the labeling process and reclaim the label from the connotations of ridicule that are now attached to it. Although such civil-society-based struggles over labels and names are increasingly common today, feminists faced such attacks first and most frequently. Ridicule is a decentralized weapon that is, not coincidentally, rarely deployed by the state. It is used to secure power and privilege in and for a variety of nonstate institutions. Feminists confronting male domination within such institutions were historically at the forefront of facing repression from them, and thus, the characteristic targets of ridicule. They were mocked more than socialists or black liberation fighters, not because feminism is by nature funnier, but because the civil society terrain on which gender battles are characteristically fought made ridicule a preferred weapon.
MESO-LEVEL STIGMA Of course, one outcome of ridicule at the interpersonal level is stigma at the group level. But stigma is more than active acts of ridicule, no matter how frequently repeated and widespread they become. Stigma means an impaired collective identity, where connection with the group is a source of discredit and devaluation because that is how the group as a whole is viewed, whether or not anyone makes an issue of it through name calling or other forms of ridicule. A classic example of stigma attached to a collective identity is found in the sensitive exploration by Sennett and Cobb (1999) of what they call the “hidden injuries of class.” The implied lack of intelligence and initiative attributed to the white men who work with their hands that makes them ashamed to think of themselves as working class has parallels, of course, with more commonly recognized gender and race stigma that attach to groups such as “welfare moms.” Seccombe’s study (1999) of welfare ideology in the United States provides an example of how such soft repression works to demobilize recipients from asserting their rights. Many women on welfare at the end of AFDC, she found, accepted the culturally dominant image of “most women” on welfare as less intelligent and even as less moral, and struggled to differentiate themselves from this image and justify their own need to rely on state support. Not seeing any other way to take care of their children, they took aid, and then feared being seen as just like the other women who were in fact in similar positions of need. Back in the 1960s, Betty Friedan skewered the prevalence with which achieving women could accept the most derogatory stereotypes of women while exempting
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themselves from the implications of their disrespect for women as a group as being a “three-sex theory” namely, that “there’s men, there’s women, and there’s me.”10 Stigma as a form of soft repression is a cultural strategy to prevent collective action by actively discouraging identification with a group that could make claims against an institution. Negative stereotypes of groups that are socially subordinate are the classic means by which civil society represses the formation of a positive collective identity. The social movement literature has often acknowledged the way that mobilization efforts have attempted to defang some of these most pernicious forms of entrenched stigma through such appeals as “Black is beautiful,” “woman-power” and “gay pride.” It has not been so apt to acknowledge the strategic mobilization of stigma as a means of repressing and resisting social movements. While I do not want to minimize the repressive effect of racism and sexism nor downplay their general usefulness in constructing and feeding into other stereotypes, not all forms of stigma are as broad, longstanding and deeply institutionalized. Such existing stigma, however, is a generalized resource that can be used by counter-movements to advance their agenda. Narrow and specific uses of stigma can be brought to bear to limit and silence movements and discredit their members and policies, and it is in understanding these strategic uses of stigma where I think the concept of soft repression is most useful. For example, stigmatization of affirmative action as an unmerited benefit going to unqualified recipients, rather than a change of the preference structure of a particular institution to reduce the built-in preference for members of dominant groups, can be seen as a political tactic by non-state forces to defend an institutional status quo in civil society. By setting themselves up as ending the supposed stigma of association with being an unqualified recipient of preference, conservative opponents of affirmative action in fact defined the program in terms of stigma and group association, inviting individuals whose interest was served by the program to be reluctant to step forward and be identified with it.11 In such skirmishing over the stigma of affirmative action in recent years, I have frequently been reminded of an interview in the Harvard Crimson back in the early 1970s, when the first woman was appointed as a full professor at the medical school, and the reporter asked whether she thought her being a woman had something to do with receiving this appointment, implicitly suggesting that some illegitimate preference was being exercised. The professor nimbly responded, “I certainly think my being a woman had everything to do with my not having been appointed until now.” Soft repression in the form of stigma, I suggest, also can illuminate the declining proportions of individuals in national surveys who are willing to apply the term “feminist” to themselves, even as the proportion of respondents who say that the women’s movement in this country has made things better for most women and for them remains stable or even increases. At the high point of feminist self-identification in this country (in the late 1980s), approximately
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one in three American women described herself as feminist or said the term feminist fit her “very well.” However, the very newspapers and magazines that had commissioned these polls reported their results in stigmatizing terms: “only a third” of all women, they said, called themselves feminist, so where had the women’s movement gone wrong (Hall & Rodriguez, 2003)? By stressing that feminism was a “minority” point of view and claiming that “most women rejected feminism,” while acknowledging that strong majorities favored most of the changes that the movement had brought, the media constructed a division between feminism and its goals. This division then allowed conservative women in notably small groups such as the Independent Women’s Forum to create a specter of what they called “victim feminism” and load it with every stereotype available, while approving of the actual changes that the women’s movement had brought about.12 As a result, even though more adults identified themselves as supporters of the women’s movement in 1995 (42%) than in 1986 (30%), the percentage of women who call themselves ‘feminist’ declined (from 33% in 1989 to 26% in 1999) and the proportion of women who considered the term “feminist” to be an insult increased (from 16% in 1992 to 22% in 1997).13 Both of these examples involve the active and deliberate use of stigma by non-state groups to undercut group identity and to repress the mobilization potential of a social movement that had achieved some success. Unlike ridicule, using stigma as a means of soft repression does not imply that the movement is trivial or a laughing matter. Directed at a movement that has already achieved some credibility in civil society, stigma as a weapon seeks to limit further gains by making identification with the group more costly. Stigma deliberately used as weapon of resistance to social change in civil society makes use of, bleeds into and is reinforced by the more widespread and non-deliberate forms of stigma that are prevalent in relations of domination already; thus resistance to affirmative action and welfare rights makes use of stereotypes that already demean African Americans (Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001), and resistance to feminism evokes anti-sex, anti-male stereotypes that are culturally attached to older women and lesbians. But the impossibility of totally separating ordinary forms of stereotyping associated with ongoing relations of domination from the active use of stigma for strategic purposes by certain groups at certain times should not deter us from considering how this type of soft repression operates.
MACRO-LEVEL SILENCING Finally, at the macro-level, I want to consider silencing as a form of soft repression that can be imbedded in the ordinary institutional practices of a social system. Although both ridicule and stigma can accumulate to produce silence at the
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macro-level, I want to suggest that silence can also be achieved directly through processes that act at the level of the system as a whole. Understanding silence is the other side of the coin to understanding voice. Mobilization processes that are aimed at producing voice for groups in civil society can face soft repression in the form of system processes that specifically block such voices from being heard. In modern industrial democracies, the main vehicle for voice in the society at large is the mass media, and the proliferation of point-to-point media of communication such as email and the internet does not change the role of mass media in creating a shared reality that is simultaneously known to be shared. Pointto-point media allow for pluralistic ignorance: everyone may in fact know the same thing, but there is no common knowledge that everyone has this knowledge.14 The ability to have a voice in the mass media is still therefore a powerful influence on creating the collective reality within which civil society’s separate institutions function. Similarly, to be silenced or excluded from having a voice in the mass media is a powerful form of repression. States can exercise hard repression on the media in the form of censorship, of course, but my focus here is instead on the soft repression by which civil society, including institutionalized media practice, excludes voices and produces silence, even when there is no direct censorship.15 The issue is therefore not whether the media is free or not, but what a free media does. There has been no dearth of media criticism pointing out that making news is a social process and reflects the social interests that underlie the media: the financial concerns of advertisers for example, may make it seem less significant to cover stories that affect the poor or urban communities of color, if they do not seem to be a market where selling newspapers will also get advertisers the attention they want from the demographic groups they care about. What makes news is also generally understood as a process that reflects the values, expectations and perspectives of those who construct the stories (Cohen, Adoni & Bentz, 1990; Gans, 1979; Oliver & Maney, 2000). Whether from the vantage point of the media consumer, understood as a market, or from the perspective of the workers who produce the media reality that is consumed, it is hard to overlook the selectivity – some would say bias – built into the ordinary operation of mass media in modern society. At the institutional level, therefore, analysts have to assume that silences are what are being produced along with speech. Producing silences can range from a mere side effect of the ordinary relations of domination in civil society to a more deliberate strategy of exclusion that blocks social movements, and it is to this latter process particularly that I would apply the label of soft repression. Again, women’s movements provide examples of contesting the underlying institutional power structure of silencing directly. The strong growth of
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independent women’s media in the 1970s was one marker of the extent to which mainstream media had not included women’s voices; bringing women journalists, publishers and film-makers into positions where they could in turn create voice for other women was a major social movement strategy among feminists. It is almost hard to imagine today the climate in which women were seen as incapable of reading the news on television, relegated to writing for the women’s pages of the newspapers, and seen as an inherently apolitical group rather than a significant voting bloc. The 1968 so-called bra-burning incident, for example, was reconstructed as important only in retrospect from alternative media; at the time the mainstream newspapers and magazines did not waste space on this protest. Were one to rely only on the New York Times or Reader’s Guide, one would have to conclude it never took place at all.16 What concerned women politically was simply not news, and this has changed. These norms did not change all by themselves, of course, and if such struggle is recognized, it would seem important to acknowledge not only that the women’s movement engaged from one side, but also that there was another side engaged in struggle, resisting change.17 But recognizing such change also should be a warning sign that the ups and downs of media coverage of social movements are driven by factors other than what events are occurring. The choice of speakers to interpret and give meaning to events is even more at the mercy of media standards of importance, and these are themselves contested values within civil society. These factors also may vary significantly between countries. To draw just one example from the study of abortion discourse in Germany and the United States in which I and several colleagues have been engaged, we find dramatic differences in the extent to which speakers in civil society have voice at all in the newspapers of these two countries (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards & Rucht, 2002).18 In Germany, statebased speakers make up 58% of all voices quoted or paraphrased as interpreting abortion, compared to 38% of U.S. speakers who are state-based actors. Moreover, the civil society voices heard from in Germany on this issue are overwhelmingly the institutionalized voices of the churches. Compared to the U.S., the silence of social movements in the German media is deafening: over the 25-year period from 1970 to 1994, speakers associated with social movements account for just about 2% of all voices and 6% of civil society voices in West Germany but 23% of all and 39% of civil society speakers in the United States.19 By comparison, the churches are 55% of German and 17% of U.S. civil society speakers. This is not because there are no feminist or right to life mobilizations in Germany, but because the media have a strong preference against giving voice to less institutionalized speakers like these, at least in relation to a gender-based conflict. Individuals not officially associated with any organization or group also form 18% of the U.S. discourse, but only 8% of the German speakers. While
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fully seven of eight of these German speakers are enlisted as experts into the debate, only half of the non-institutional speakers in American media are experts, rather than people directly affected by the conflict. Media norms about what deserves coverage and how stories should be told are part of what works to silence less institutional voices. For example, individual women and doctors who are prosecuted for illegal abortion are not sought out to tell their side of the story in Germany, nor are advocates on either side of the issue given space to reflect on why and how they came to have the positions that they do, both of which are relatively common ways of discussing the issue in the U.S. In fact, the structure of articles in the U.S. formally institutionalizes the idea that there are two sides to every story and gives non-state actors the opportunity to comment on and rebut assertions from state actors in a way that is rarely found in the German media. I would suggest that, for better or worse, the mobilization potential for social movement mobilization is enhanced in the United States and repressed, softly, in Germany by the institutional forms by which movements relate to civil society in media practices. But the ability of media to reduce movement mobilization potential by withdrawing attention from them is also available as a conscious and deliberate strategy of soft repression. Covering protest events is not equivalent to providing a voice in the media for those who are protesters, and soft repression may be particularly an issue of excluding the perspectives and frames that make sense of the actions of the movement (movement actors as speakers providing their point of view) rather than trying to ignore the existence of the movement at all (event-based coverage). I draw another example from feminist research in Germany to illustrate this process of soft repression and its potentially demobilizing effects on social movements. Ingrid Miethe followed women involved in dissident politics in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) through the process of unification and into their subsequent political careers or lack thereof in the unified, dominantly West German state (Miethe, 1999a, b). She found that quite a few of the women were disconcerted by the lack of response that their demonstrations and protests engendered in the new democratic Germany. In their old state-centered and directly repressive milieu, any protest activity was assessed for its effectiveness by how strongly the state acted against it, and although this yardstick may have been misleading, it provided a standard for evaluation that continued to feed their sense of efficacy and importance. However, they discovered that protest actions in unified Germany did not elicit state responses and typically did not even draw media attention. Their self-doubt as political actors grew, and a substantial proportion withdrew from political activity despite having just as profound disagreements with the new state as they ever had with the old.
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I draw my examples from Germany because it is familiar to me, not because I want to suggest that it has a particularly repressive form of civil society. But I do think that the variation between countries as well as over time in the exercise of soft repression against social movements in general or specific subtypes and categories of social movements in particular is an institutional aspect of civil society that deserves more investigation than it has received. Recognizing that states are democratic does not necessarily say much about the degree or focus of the soft repression that may characterize their civil societies. Women’s movements, in being particularly attuned to trying to make change in the institutional structure of civil society, may be especially aware of and responsive to such variation. But social movement theory in general might well consider the nature of the media structures and practices that create silences about specific issues or for particular constituencies when attempting to explain the resistance and opposition that movements in civil society confront.20
CONCLUSIONS This essay suggests that the conventional understanding of repression only in terms of violence and state action, or what I have called hard repression, takes us away from the wider and more complex views of social movements as contending in and against institutions of civil society and not just against states. The turn toward more cultural and decentralized views of social movement activity in recent years has brought gains, not least in allowing scholars to recognize the way that women’s movements have been ahead of their time in fighting their battles on this postmodern terrain. Studies of feminism thus offer clues to scholars of other movements about how civil society is a different sort of target than the state, and yet also remind us that resistance to change comes from a variety of sources and takes multiple forms. Soft repression, especially when it arises in and is expressed through the institutions of civil society, will be neither as centralized as state action nor as visible as hard repression, but it can still be powerful and effective in blocking or disarming social movements. Decentralized forms of soft repression can exist at the micro, meso or macro levels, and I have taken the examples of ridicule, stigma and silencing to suggest how such soft repression of social movements operates on all three of these levels. Studies of women’s movements may be particularly effective means of seeing how soft repression has operated in the past, but it seems likely that overall tendencies toward movements operating in and on civil society in the post-modern world will make the findings from such research ever more generally applicable. Research on feminism and the reception given to it can offer scholars of all social
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movements a wide variety of insights into soft repression that will be ever more useful as we move away from the castle model toward a more complex view of social conflict and protest.
NOTES 1. A classic example of the state-centeredness of even accounts sympathetic to the protestors agenda is Gamson (1990). The issue of cycles of protest related to repressive responses is raised by Tarrow (1989) and the specific focus on repression as a matter of state/police response to even “new” social movements is exemplified by the studies done by della Porta (1996). 2. Paul Lichterman’s study (1996) of the mix of personal and collective environmental action strategies and Verta Taylor’s study (1996) of women’s self-help groups confronting with the medical establishment provide excellent, explicit arguments for the widening of this lens as well as specific cases. 3. Verta Taylor (1996) explicitly addresses this civil society focus, but it is also evident in the catalogues of demands raised by feminists from the Seneca Falls declaration forward (Rossi, 1973) and in second-wave documents (Baxandall & Gordon, 2000). 4. The struggle for suffrage would seem to contradict this view, but although winning the right to vote was an important political milestone, whether, when and how a focus on gaining the suffrage – or formal equal rights – was a considered a primary goal, a means to an end, or a diversion from other organized efforts to change educational systems, family culture, sexual practices and other social relations has always been controversial in women’s movements (Black, 1989). A sense of how peripheral the state was to feminist activists in the early twentieth-century in the U.S. is conveyed by Cott (1987). 5. The discovery of such forms and tactics by relatively privileged men concerned about issues that did not fit a conventional left-right spectrum (e.g. environmentalism, anticolonialism) spawned their conceptualization as being “new” but it seems increasingly evident that such cultural tactics were integral to working class mobilization in the nineteenth-century (Calhoun, 1995). 6. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) offer an extremely extensive and inclusive set of rules that creates considerable space for contentious speech, but they still focus attention on the ways that powerholders can and do limit speech “unfairly.” It is the variety of forms that such unfair silencing can take that I consider under the rubric of soft repression, and also suggest that the power-holding that permits unfair strategies is at least as characteristic of civil society as of states. 7. There is often acknowledgement of the significance of movement strategies to rename themselves or their issues, to find alternative forums in which positive identities can be formed apart from the mainstream, and to produce new media through which to circulate alternative ideas but studies of these forms of resistance rarely name the repression against which the resistance is being mounted. It is important to recognize that such cultural conflicts involve two sides, both of which can be acting strategically. 8. Barrie Thorne (1993) offers a revealing look at the dynamic processes involved among children policing each other’s behavior for deviations, and West and Zimmerman (1987) offer a more general model of how all culturally competent persons are held accountable for gender conformity.
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9. Mary Daly is one of the most active feminist exponents of this linguistic strategy among the second-wave in the U.S. See for example her “dictionary” done “in cahoots with” Caputi (Daly & Caputi, 1987). 10. The idea of the “three-sex theory” first appears in Betty Friedan’s (1976) introduction to her account of feminist emergence. 11. See discussions of the language and politics of affirmative action by race in the U.S. in Skrentny (1996) and by gender in various national contexts in Bacchi (1996). 12. See discussions of the Independent Women’s Forum in Pollitt (1994) and their own web page at http://www.IWF.org. The membership of the IWF is small but elite, being largely dominated by hard-right politicians and columnists such as Lynn Cheney, Linda Chavez and Mona Charren, who have excellent access to conservative media such as the Wall Street Journal. 13. Because different questions were asked in different years, it is difficult to be certain about which way and when public opinion changed. For details on time trends see Hall and Rodriguez (2003) and Huddy, Neely and Lafay (2000). 14. Noelle-Neumann (1993) specifically analyzes polling data to show the way that pluralistic ignorance can be produced by the media’s failure to include certain frames or arguments that are then believed to be idiosyncratic concerns, and focuses on when and how surveys are distorted by this but also can reveal some of the process. 15. The “symbolic annihilation”of women by their utter invisibility in mass media of the 1950s and 1960s was critiqued in the classic introduction by Tuchman et al. (1978). 16. This omission from standard media references is something of which I became aware as I attempted to find the original wording used by reporters to cover this protest; for the most part, this event was not covered at all. 17. Some women reporters of the period provide first-person accounts of the editorial resistance they faced when trying to get coverage for women’s political action (see, for example, Robertson, 1992). 18. Actual access to abortion is similar in the United States and Germany, although Germany makes abortion in the first trimester “illegal but unpunished” if appropriate counseling is certified and the U.S. imposes parental consent and counseling rules that make some abortions extra-legal even though in principle women’s choice of abortion is supposed to be permitted. 19. The percentage of all voices applies to all non-journalists quoted or paraphrased whether or not their comments included substantive framing about abortion. Percent of civil society voices were calculated on a base of non-state, non-party speakers other than journalists who were quoted or paraphrased in saying something framing abortion. The former is the widest and the latter the narrowest relevant calculation of the base for comparison. 20. As Shaping Abortion Discourse points out, advocates of violence in the abortion debate get virtually no space in mainstream newspapers to make their case, even though some such anti-abortion activists, especially in the United States, actively justify bombings and murders of abortion providers within their own media (newsletters and webpages). There appears to be a deliberate strategy by the newspapers to deny such advocates voice, presumably in the interest of limiting their effectiveness, which would be a good example of soft repression at work. However, in this instance it may have had the opposite consequence, since such radical appeals could widely circulate in anti-abortion circles without becoming obvious or being taken seriously by those outside these circles. When they did surface,
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after several murders of doctors, they were perceived as very discrediting to the whole anti-abortion movement.
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