Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa

Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa

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Pambazuka Press and Pambazuka News are published by Fahamu (wwwjahamu.org)

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Inese an rican on

ers ectives •

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Ina In

rica

Edited by Axel Harneit-Sievers , Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu

Pambazuka Press An imp rint of Fahamu Books

HEINRICH BOLL STiFTUNG EAST & HORN OF AFRICA

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Fountain Publishers Kampala - Uganda

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Published 2010 by Pambazuka Press, an imprint of Fahamu Books Cape Town, Dakar, N airobi and Oxford www.pambazukapress.org www.fahamubooks.org www.pambazuka.org and Heinrich Boll Foundation, Regio na l Office for East & H orn of Africa www.boell.or.ke Fa hamu, 2nd floor, 51 Corn market Street, Oxford OX1 3HA, UK Fahamu Kenya, PO Box 47l58, 00100 GPO, Na irobi, Kenya Fahamu Senegal, 9 Cite Sonatel 2, PO B 25021, Dakar-Fann, Dakar, Senegal Fahamu South Africa, c/o 27 A Es her St, Claremont, 7708, Cape Tow n, South Africa H einrich Boll Founda tion, Regional O ffic e for East & Horn of Africa, Forest Road , PO Box 10799-00100 GPO, N airobi, Kenya Published in Uga nda in 2010 by Fo untain Publishers Ltd 55 N krumah Road, PO Box 488, Kampala, Uga nda First published 2010 Copyri ght © Pambazuka Press 2010 A ll ri ghts reserved. Redistribution of the material presented in thi s work

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British Library Ca taloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

UK ISBN: 978-1-906387-33-4 pa perback UK ISB N: 978-1-906387-34-1 ebook Uganda ISBN: 978-9970-25-001-1

Contents Acknowledgements About the contributors Introduction Axel Harneit-Sievers, Sanusha Naidu and Stephen Marks

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Part I Ongoing debates African studies in China: a historiographical survey Li Anshan China in Africa: a maturing of the engagement? Sanusha Naidu Matching China's activities with Africa' s needs

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Sanou Mbaye

Part II Macroeconomic dimensions

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China' s strategic relations with Africa

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Zeng Qiang Chinese development assistance to Africa: aid, trade and debt Nancy Dubosse Trade , investment and legal cooperation between China and Africa Hong Yonghong

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Part III Country case studies

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Ethio-China relations: challenges and prospects

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Cedion Camora and K. Mathews China' s impact on Kenya's clothing industry Paul Kamau The impact of Chinese imports on Nigerian traders Edwin Ikhuoria The dragon is not green enough: the potential environmental impact of Chinese investment in the DRC Claude Kabemba Disappearing forests , disappearing hope: Mozam bique Daniel Ribeiro The West ' s retreat and China' s advance in Angola Elias Isaac

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Part IV China, the African Union and the quest for peace

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Th e Darf ur iss ue and Chin a's ro le He We nping Th e role of Chin a in peace and security in Afri ca Desire Assagbavi Th e role and p lace of t he African Un ion in th e eme rging Chin a-Afri ca partn ers hi p Francis Ikam e

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Part V Perspectives for civil society participation Chin ese pe rce pt ions of Afri can CSOs: how shoul d Afri can CSOs engage Chin a? Xiaa Yuhu a Sin o-Afri can re lati ons: refl ecti ons on civil society engage ment Anton y Otiena Ong 'aya Th e Global En viro nm ental In sti t ute : reg ul atin g t he ecolog ical impact of Chin ese ove rseas ente r prises Zhi Yingbiaa and 8ai Jie Conclusion

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Chin a-Afri can civil society dialog ue in perspecti ve 256 Axel Harn eit-Sieve r s, Li Ansha n, Sanu sh a Naid u and Stephen Mar ks In dex

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Acknowledgements The 'China- African Civil SOcie ty Dialogue' conference, held in Nairobi in April 2008, has been a wond erful example of constructive cooperation be tween China and Africa. First of all, w e would like to thank all participants - from about 15 differe nt countries on two continents - for their valuable input, much of which has been incorporated into the various contributions to this volume. We also wish to thank Katrin Altmeyer and he r team at the Beijing office of the H einrich Boll Foundation (HBF) who pro vided d ecisive links be tween China and Africa in the pre paration of the conference. A special thank you is extende d to Wanjiku Wakogi and Susan Ndung'u of HBF's Nairobi office, and to H akima Abbas and her team at Fahamu in Nairobi, for organising the logistics and other arrangements that made the conference possible .

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About the contributors Desire Assogbavi is head of Oxfam International's liaiso n office with the Africa Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Bai Jie is with the Global Environmental Institute (GEl), Beijing, China. Nancy Dubosse is head of research of the Economic Governance's Pro gramme, based with the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) in Pretoria, South Africa. Gedion Gamora completed his master's in p olitical science and international relations in 2007 at Addis Ababa University. He is currently working as a consultant at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Axel Harneit-Sievers is a historian and political scientist specialising in African studies. H e is direc tor of the East Africa/Horn of Africa regional office of the H einrich Biill Foundation, the German Green political foundation, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He Wenping is professor and directo r of the African studies section of the Institute of Wes t Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Acad emy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China. Hong Yonghong is director and professor of the Centre for African Laws and Society (CALS) at Xiangtan University, China. Edwin Ikhuoria is head of communications and advocacy at the National Association of Nigerian Traders. Francis Ikome works with the Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa. Elias Isaac is country programme manager with the Open Society for Southern Africa (OSISA) in Luanda, Angola. Claude Kabemba is the director of the Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW), Johannesburg, South Africa.

Paul Kamau is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi.

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ABOUT THE CONTIBUTORS

Li Anshan is director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies at Peking University, Beijing, Chin a. Stephen Marks is coordinator and research associate of Fah amu's China in Afri ca programme, b ased in Oxford, UK. K. Mathews is p rofessor of internation al relations a t A ddis Ababa U ni versity.

Sanou Mbaye is a London-based Senegalese p olitical and econ omic commentator and a form er senior offi cial a t the African Development Bank. Sanusha N aidu is the research direc tor of Fahamu's C hin a in Africa programme, base d in Ste llenbosch, So uth Africa. Antony Otieno Ong' ayo is a PhD fellow at the School of Governan ce, M aastricht University, as well as a research fellow at the European Centre for Development Poli cy M an agem ent (ECDPM). H e is also an associate researcher w ith the Tran sn ation al Institute in Amsterd am. Daniel Ribeiro is one of the founders of and programme offi cer at Ju stica Ambiental, an environmental and social justi ce NGO b ased in Mozambique. Xiao Yuhua is an assistant research er at the Institute of Afri can Studies, Zhejian g Norm al University, Jinhua Province, China. Zeng Qiang is a professor at the China Institute of Co ntemporary Interna tion al Rela tion s, based in Beijing, China. Zhi Yingbiao is with the Global Environmenta l In stitute (G El), Beijin g, C hina.

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I ntrod uction Axel Harneit-Sievers, Sanusha Naidu and Stephen Marks Exchanges between Africa and China have grown tremendously in recent years, as has China's economic and political ro le in Africa. China has long-standing links with Africa, but the intensity and diversity of its recent engagement on the continent, driven by the search for resources and markets for its rapidly ex panding economy, is historically unprecedented. The rest of the world is watching with much interest and, sometimes, amazement. A rapid ly increasing need for knowledge and contacts between both sides accompanies the new boom in China-Africa exchanges. Since 2006-07, numerous meetings and conferences have brought together political and economic actors from Africa and China, and this process is likely to continue and even expand in the future. The majority of these contacts take place at the government-to-government level, or within the business communities. Furthermore, Chinese experts on Africa - many of them in policy-consulting functions - often meet Africa's government officia ls or private sector leaders. By contrast, until now there h as been little dialogue between China - both on the policy and expert level - and civil society in Africa, that is, the broad spectrum of non-governmental institutions and organisations around the continent that play such a prominent ro le in African political and intellectual life today. Civil society in Africa has expanded considerab ly since the 1990s, resulting from (and often helpin g to bring about) a return to democracy in many African cou ntries. This has included independent media, university scho lars and research centres, hum an rights and women's organisations, advocacy groups and numerous service-delivery NGOs (non-governmenta l organisations), all of whom play an important role today in Africa's political and socia l reality. They support Africa's political and socia l develop-

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INTRODUCTION

ment and often prov ide a counter-balance to sometimes weak government institution s and authoritarian p oliti cal tradition s. In m any instances, African civil society provides the 'indep endent voice' of Africa. As yet, Chinese actors interested in Africa h ave d one little in practice to acknowled ge the relevance of Africa's civil society, and h ave made even less direct contact and interaction with African representatives. Mean while, m ost African civil society actors sh are the sense of am azem ent about the recent growth of China's ro le in Africa, but h ave little inform ation and even fewer avenues for di alogu e . To be sure, there are some exceptions. The Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University in South Africa provides a platform for research and dialogue." It is largely, but not exclusively, oriented towards high-level exch an ges aro und business and m arket-development issues. Second, there is the 'Asian Drivers' project initiated by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC),2 headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, which focuses on country case studies on the impact of China's trade, investment and aid footprint in African econ omies. Third, the South African Institute of International Affairs also h as a 'China in Africa project', which essentially draws on a mix between China's economic and political en gagem ents in Africa and the impact this broadly has for Africa's develop m ent prospects. Finally, there are various individual African researchers who are currently undertaking proj ec ts w ith a China slant as it represents the new impetus for d onors and hen ce funding opportunities. What is interesting in all of these studies is that deb ate on China is defined thro ugh eco nomi c imperatives and led by the assumption that only political and eco nomic elites from both sides are the main actors in this en gagem ent. Recognising that an African civil society organisation (CSO) p erspec tive extends beyond the scholarship of academics and p oli cy-makers, Fah amu 3 - a pan-African social justice organisation b ased in Cape Town, South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Nairobi, Ken ya; and Oxford, UK - has sought to strengthen pan-African voices on China's engagement in Africa. Its prize-winning weekly n ewsletter, Pambaz uka News: provides consistent coverage of a w ide range of topics on social justice in Africa, including regular xi

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

analyses of China-Africa relationships published in its Emerging Powers in Africa Watch co lumn. The China-Africa programme draws on Fah amu 's 2007 publication African Perspectives on China in Africa,s a valuable collection of essays that provid es insights into the diversity of views held by civil society activists from a varie ty of African co untries on China's role on the continent and in their respective countries, along with the 2008 book China's New Role in Africa and the Global South, which emerged as a result of the dialogue organised between African and Chinese civil society organisations during the African Development Ban k's annual m eeting in Shanghai in May 2007. 6 Both these publications shift the trajectory of the China-Africa debate to bring the CSO p erspective into greater foc us. Although civil society organisations h ave represented very important actors in African politics since the 1990s, a non-governm ental civil society sector is only em ergin g in China. Currently, there are relatively few actors in Chinese civil society interested in and knowled geable abo ut African affairs. Besides a small number of non- governmental organisations, the m ost p rominent among these actors are acad emics b ased at Chinese universities and research institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Against this b ackgro und, Fahamu and the H einri ch Boll Fo undation's offi ces in Nairobi and Beijing develop ed the idea of a 'China-African Civil Society Dialogue', bringing together Chinese academic exp erts on Africa with representatives of African CSOs and African academics w ho are working in thematic areas with relevant Chinese en gagement. Little exchan ge of this kind had taken place at this pOint, thus the pro gramme provided a unique opportunity for dialogue and deb ate on issu es of mutu al concern, creating an entry pOint for future discussions and research on China-Africa relations. The di alogue workshop took place in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21-22 April 2008, and was supplemented by a visitors' programme and a number of m ore specialised m eetings and forums .7 The dialogue workshop brought together 10 academics from China specialiSing in African studies and working in vario us universities or resear ch and policy-consulting institutions in China with representatives of African CSOs and African academics fr om 15 different co untries. x ii

INTRODUCTION

All of the latter work or specialise in areas where China's engagement in Africa plays an important role. But it was also about en abling a dialogue to ensure that each si de would learn from the other. The dialogue workshop was organised around five m ajor thematic areas: • Mutual p erception s between China and Africa • Chinese trad e and investment in Africa and their econ omic and environmental imp acts • Chinese aid and fin ancial p oli cies • Trade, labour and immigration issues • The role of civil society in Africa and China. The p apers presented and discussions at the plenary critically analysed and so u ght to understand the n ature of China-Africa relations in the context of these broad them es, foc using on patterns and challenges p osed by the relationship. In addition to the them atic p anels, a number of country case studies foc u sed on m ore specific dimen sions - and their interaction - in the relationship between China and Africa. This volume contains pap ers presented at the dialogue workshop , as well as addition al material that emerged in the co urse of the dialogue. Part I of the book prov ides insights into mutual p erceptions between China and Africa, and into their knowledge of each other. In a broad overview article, Li Anshan looks at the develop ment of African studies as an academi c discipline in China since the 1950s. H e demons trates how China's lon g-established interest in Africa has grown conside rably, especially since the 19905, as well as identifying m ain research trend s, sketching p ossible future research agendas and providing a bibliography of important Chinese sch olarly work abo ut Africa. Following on from this, Sanusha Naidu asks whether the d eb ate on China's foo tprint in Africa is reaching maturity. She highlights that forging a new China-Africa consensus must incorporate more than a 'business as usual' approach . Instead she advises that a people-centred approach to development must accomp any this en gagement. Against the background of this differentiated picture, Sanou Mbaye outlines Africa's p olitical xiii

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

option s for en gagem ent with China and m akes a plea for a common Afri can approach . Contribution s in Part II an alyse the m acroeconomic dimen sion of co ntemporary Sino-African relation s. Zeng Qian g p rovides an overview of the d evelopment of the p olitical and commercial relation s between China and Africa, discu ssing their enorm o us growth since the 1990s w hile identifying systemi c problems su ch as trad e imb alan ces an d issu es of the quality of m anufactured goo d s. Nan cy Dubosse presents the results of a study conducted by AFRO DA D - a network of NCOs working on development fin an ce and lobbyin g for debt relief - and sh ows the differen ces between Ch in a's fin an cial en gagem ent in Africa and that of the West, as well as evaluating how far Chin a's role m ay qu alify as 'aid'. Finally, as Sino-African comm ercial relation s inten sify and become m ore regul arised, H on g Yonghon g argues for greater system ati c coo p eration in the area of law and legal fram eworks. Part III comp rises six co untry studies, focusing on d ifferent dimension s of China's en gagem ent in Africa. Cedion Cam ora and K. M athews an alyse China's relation ship w ith Ethiopia, a p olitical h eavyweight and a country that plays a strategic role in China's African p olicy as a m ajor imp orter of Ch inese m anufactured goo d s. In a case study of the Ken yan textile industry, Paul Kam au shows how Chinese in ves tment forms an integral part of the glob al econom ic integration of East Afri ca while, at the sam e time, Chinese glob al textile exp orts end anger local m anufacturing. For Nigeri a, Ed win Ikhuoria takes the p ersp ective of those w ho profit fro m China's exp ort ex p an sion - local trad ers and consumers able to access ch eap p ro du cts - while also p ointing to widespread problem s su ch as low product quality and 'fake p ro du cts'. Cla ude Kabemb a appreciates China's large scale investments in infrastructure and mining in the Dem ocrati c Republi c of Co n go, w hile p ointing to the high risk of severe en vironmental d am age res ulting from them . Daniel Ribeiro prov ides a case study, set in Mozambique, from a grassroo ts persp ecti ve, which describes the fores t destruction res ulting fr om illegal logging for the east Asian m arket. Examining Angola, Elias Isaac questions large-scale Chinese lending to the co untry's government for infras tructure d evelopment, to be p aid b ack w ith futur e oil exp orts. H owever, Isaac as well as Kabemb a and Ribeiro d o not hold x iv

INTRODUCTION

Chinese comp anies solely responsible if things go wrong. Instead they argue strongly that African governm ents often fail in their responsibility toward s their own societies, lacking transp arency in their use of public fund s and failin g to enforce the environmental standards they h ave set themselves. While Chinese companies take advantage of such d eficiencies, the responsibility to effect improvements lies primarily within Africa itself. In this regard, African CSOs can playa m ajor role in highlighting problems and advocating for change. Part IV an alyses China's growing role in p eace and security on the African co ntinent. He Wenping looks at China's role in Sudan and focuses on the Darfur crisis, argu ably the sin gle most controversial asp ect of China's engagem ent on the continent. While d efending the principle of 'non-interferen ce' in the internal affairs of o ther co untries as a tradition al tenet of Chinese diplom acy, she also shows that China's p olicy h as in fact been resp onsive to international criticism, h aving begun to exert press ure on the Sudanese government and providing supp ort for the jOint United Nations-Afri can Union mission in Sudan. Desire Assogbavi argues that Chinese foreign p olicy sho uld n ot remain stuck on the principle of 'non-interference' in the affairs of other co untries at a time w hen even the African Union has moved 'from non-interference to non-indifference' since 2000. Analysing Sino-African relations from an African Union perspective, Francis Ikhome notes a discrepancy between China's panAfrican rhetori c on the one h an d and the practice of primarily enterin g bilateral agreem ents with single African governments on the other. In ord er to strengthen Africa's negotiating p osition towards China, he argues for a concerted approach at the African Union level. Part V explores the possibilities for an intensified engagement of civil society organisations fr om Africa wi th government institutions, companies and other actors from China. Xiao Yuhua shows h ow little is known in China about' civil society', especially from Africa. H e en co urages African CSOs to interact more sys tematically with China, ad vising them to take proper notice of China's political and cultural sp ecifics at the same time. Antony Otieno Ong'ayo takes up the ch allen ge from an African civil society perspective, asking which typical m odes of interaction of

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African CSOs may also work with regard to China and discussing p ossibilities for joint action between CSOs from both areas. Finally, taking the example of the Global Environmental Institute (GEl), Zhi Yingbiao and Bai Jie describe the mode of op erati on of a Chinese environmental non-governmental organisation working w ith Chinese government institutions to improve the en vironmental standards for Chinese logging companies op erating internationally. They also invite African CSOs to coop erate in this field. The co ncluding section of this volume emphasises that advancing China-Africa civil SOCiety di alogue is significant for m onitoring and shaping the trajectory of the Sino-African relationship, esp ecially on the back of the outcom e of the m ost recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting held in Cairo in November 2009. By pursuing jOint efforts and developing mutual understanding, this volume marks the first attempt towards achieving a shared China-Africa civil SOCiety vision of responsibility that can be directed towards holding policy-makers from bo th sides acco untable in achiev ing a sustainable development path in Africa that impacts p OSitively on the livelihoo d s of ordinary African people. Notes 1. http://www.ccs.org.za/. accessed 25 November 2009.

2. http://www.aercafrica .org/, accessed 25 November 2009. 3. http://www. fah am u .org/, accessed 25 N ovember 2009. 4. http://www.pambazuka.org/, accessed 25 November 2009. 5. http://faham ubooks.org!book/ ?GCOI=90638100636300, accessed 25 November 2009. 6. http://fahamubooks.org!book/?GCOI=90638100618100, accessed 25 November 2009. 7. Besides the dialogue wor kshop on 21-22 April 2008, from w hich the majority of the contributio ns to this vo lume are derived, the w ider dialogue programme between 19 and 26 Ap ril 2008 included a stra tegy meeting of A frican CSOs interested in interacting with China as well as a vis itor 's programme for the Chinese acad emic group. The latter included visits to Na irobi-based NGOs and a discuss ion about the crisis after the 27 December 2007 general elections in Kenya, a public lecture on 'China in Africa', a visit to the China Road and Bridge Co., a m eeting w ith representati ves of the Kenyan Foreign Ministry and a workshop on China's relation ship w ith th e

A frican Union.

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Part I Ongoing debates

African studies in China: a historiographical surveyl Li Anshan Afri cani sts outside China are unfamili ar w ith Afri can studi es in C hin a owing to the langua ge barrier and lack of involvem ent in intern ati on al acad emi a by Chinese sc ho lars'> Thi s chapter tries to p rovid e a genera l survey of African studies in C hin a in the 20th century and its contemporary presen ce in C hinese di scou rse . It will also give a general intro du ction to research instituti on s in C hin a and, fin a ll y, o ffer som e thou ghts on p resent studies and a p ersp ec tive on th e future. It tries to cov er the sp ectrum of hi story, p oliti cs, culture and other fi eld s with an an alysis of the factors contributin g to Afri can studies in C hin a. Whil e it mu st be recogni sed th at co ntact between Africa and C hin a dates bac k to the p eri od before Jesu s Chri st - a nd ind ee d to subsequ ent d yn asties su ch as durin g the p eri od 1405-33 when th e C hinese eunuch offici al Zhen g H o led a large fl eet across south-east Asia and the Indi an O cean som e seven times und er the au spi ces of the Min g d yn asty - du e to the con straints of sp ace thi s ch apter w ill sp eci fi ca ll y focu s on th e p erio d after 1949 w hen the new Chinese com muni st state was born.

Supporting Africa (1949-65) During the republican period (1 911-49), Africa was seldom to uched. This is because m ost of Africa was under colonial rule and h ad no political status in internation al affairs, w hile China itself was undergoing a ch ao tic experien ce. Moreover, few people were interested in Africa. The fir st book on Africa b y a Chinese scholar was Wu Zuncun and Xie Defeng's Ethiopia, published in 1936. The fo unding of the People's Republi c of China in 1949 was an important p art of n ational liberation movem ents across the world 2

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

after the Second World War. African studies began in the late 1950s and concentrated on the nationalist indep endent movements. Booklets were published, m ostly on indep endence movements in North Africa. A few academic journals had articles on the stru ggles against colonial rule in different countries (N a Zhong 1957; Zheng Daochu an 1957; Ma Ton g 1959; Wan g Junyi 1959; Wan g Zhen 1959), or the n ation alist m ovements in Africa as a w hole. Two universities were pioneers in African studies. Nankai University in north China started to probe North Africa, w hile the South China Normal University began to study Central Africa. 3 Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) en co uraged African studies. On 27 April 1961, Chairman Mao Zedon g m et a gro up of African and Asian friends in Beijing." H e admitted that h e h ad n o clear understanding of Africa and called for an institute of Africa to be established that wo uld focus on the' stud ying [of] African history, geography and [the] so cio-economic situation' (Mao Zedon g 1994, p . 465) and an understanding of African political p rocesses under imperialism and the struggle for indep endence. This, Mao encouraged, should be done with the assistance of African scholars to produ ce a concise publication. On 4 July 1961, the Institute of Asian-African Studies under the Internation al Department of the CCP and the Chinese Academy of Sciences was founded. Zhan g Tiesheng, an expert on Sino-African relation s, was appointed as the first director of the institute. On 30 December 1963, the Group of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the CCP issued a rep ort on strengthening the study of foreign co untries. Accordingly, three institutes in three different universities were se t up speCifically for the study of foreign countries. Pekin g University was chosen to set up the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, in light of its solid b ase in the humanities and social sciences.' Peking University also had the advantage of h ousing the Dep artment of Oriental Studies, w hich covered various lan gu ages spoken in Afro-Asian countries. Ji Xianlin, a scholar who receive d his PhD in German y, became the director of the institute. Professor Yan g Renpian of the dep artment of history, who received hi s degree in France, switched from French history to African history and b egan to train graduate students of African history. Different institutions were also involved in African studies, 3

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

and the most prominent was the Institute of Asian-African Studies under the dual leadership of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (which subsequently became the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1981). African Introduction, prepared especially for the purpose of Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Africa, was published by the institute and internally circulated among government departments. The institute also had two Neibu Kanwu (internally circulated journals), Yafei Yicong (translations on Asia and Africa, started in 1959) and Yafei Ziliao (data on Asia and Africa, started in 1963). An impressive aspect of African studies was the introduction of international scholarship, including books, conferences, institutions and studies. The works were published in the two journals mentioned above, which served as a major channel for Chinese scholars to familiarise themselves with African studies abroad. 6 The translation of books generally included four types: works by African nationalist leaders; academic works by western or Russian scholars; reports to government; and popular readers.7 Some books were chosen specifically for an understanding of the contemporary situation, such as The African Awakening (Davidson 1955) and Les Trusts au Congo (Joye and Lewin 1961). As for the Chinese scholars' works, two important books are worth mentioning: History of Sino-African Relations: A Primary Research (Zhang Tiesheng 1963) and A Concise History of Modern Egypt (Na Zhong 1963). Zhang's work is a compilation of five articles on SinoAfrican relations from the Han dynasty to Ming dynasty, covering China's contact with East and North Africa and contact through the sea route. A graduate from the University of Alazhar in Egypt in the 1940s, Na Zhong studied Egyptian history from the ancient period up to the Second World War. Linked to political orientation, Chinese African studies in this period were pragmatic rather than academic. China strongly supported the national liberation movements and wanted to win new friends from African nations. 8 It was departments of history at universities that took the lead. The reason for this was that both anthropology and political science were regarded as 'capitalist' in China at the time. Studies were generally done collectively and concentrated on national independence move4

AFRICAN STUD IES IN CH INA

ments or anti-co lonialist struggles." China also drew on the emphasis of African studies, which had gained in momentum in other parts of the globe.

Understanding Africa (1966-76) During the Cultural Revolution (1966--76), China suffered a setback in its intellectual life. Universities closed for several years, and later enro lled students according to their 'political performance'. There were few studies on foreign issues. All cu ltural life was manoeuvred or contro lled by political need, and some elements were used in the struggle of particular political factions. High education was used 'to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship'. The study of social sciences and hum anities was almost stopped. Yet surprisingly, African studies continued in China. The International Department of the CCP had its own section to study Africa and to provide support to African liberation movements. Various studies by this section contributed a great deal to decision-making at the central leve l. A few publications were on ly accessible at a certain level. The section concen trated more on information collection or data ana lysis than academic research. In 1971 two important events occurred which indi cated that China had ended its political isolation and was returning to the international community: the beginning of the normalisation of Sino-American relations and the entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations. Owing to a long-time neglect of cu ltural issues, the Central Committee of the CCP realised the serious problem in the academic field. A nationwide meeting of publishing companies was held in 1971, organised by the State Council, which decided to publish important books of history such as the 24 classic histories of every dynasty in Chinese history and the history of republican China. In order for leaders at different levels to understand foreign affairs, histories or general surveys of different countries were translated. This extensive project covered almost all the countries of the world and continued into the 1980s. As regards Africa, histories of different countries were translated, together with areas such as black Africa, North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa, southern Africa and the Mascareignes islands. 5

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

The purpose of the project was not for academia; the translations were purely for government use. As China opened up however, all the books were sold publicly. As a format, every translation had a preface of criticism of the content by the translator, a measure to protect the translator as well as to warn the reader. This is a typical feature of the Cultural Revolution, a result of the persecution of intellectuals. Related to this, translations were generally done by a group rather than by an individual, so that if anything went wrong, responsibility would be taken collectively.'° In the period 1967-78, 117 books on Africa were published, 111 were translations, five were pop ular readers and one a reference book. In other words, 95 per cent of the books were translated from other languages (Zhang Yuxi 1997, p. 272-73).

Studying Africa (1977-2000) After the fall of the 'Gang of Four', university life resumed l l The period 1977-2000 was a most productive time for African studies. There are three branches of African studies in Chin a: universities, academic institutions and institutions attached to government ministries. There are two nationwide organisations of African studies in China: the Chinese Association of African Studies (CAAS) (1979) and the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies (CSAHS) (1980). The Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the CASS established the Centre for South African Studies in 1995, followed by the Centre for African Studies at Peking University in 1998 and the Centre for African Law Studies at Xiangtan University, also in 1998. Nanjing University has a research group specialising in African geography, Yunnan University has a group speciali sing in African studies and

Table 1 Publications in African studies in China Monograph Before 1949 1949-66

6

Popular reader

Reference

Total

35

6

111

14

10

1967-78 1979-94

Translation

60

19

111 41

68

117 48

9

166

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

Zhejiang Normal University recently established a Centre for the Study of African Edu cation. From the end of the 1970s, articles in acad emic journals generally covered three topi cs: 1) The primary resistance or resistan ce during the colonial p eriod, su ch as the Mahdi m ovem ent in Sudan, the Ethiopi an war against the Italian invasion, the M aji Maji uprisin g in Tan ganyika and the Ma u Mau in Kenya; 2) African n ation alist m ovements since the First World War; and 3) Important fi gures, either am on g the first generation of nation alists such as Felix H oupho uet-Boign y, Kwame Nkrum ah, Gnassingbe Eyaciem a, Robert Mugabe, Kenneth Dav id Kaund a, Quett K.J. M asire, Leop old Sedar Senghor, Muammar al-Gaddafi, Ahmed Seko u To ure and Habib Bourguiba, or influential fi gures w ho m ad e stro ng co ntributions to the lib eration m ovem ent such as Mar cus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, George Pad m ore and Frantz Fan on. During the 1980s, African studies m ad e m ore p rogress . Several text books and m onographs were published (Zhao Shuhui 1981; Xun Xingqiang 1983; Yang Renpian 1984; CSAHS 1984; Zen g Zungu et al 1984; Yang Haochen g 1985; Lu Ting-en 1986; Chen Zhon gd e and Wu Zhaoji 1987; Tan g Dadun 1988). In the Mysterious Chiefdom is the fir st book about a black African country by a Chinese wh o had p ersonally been there. The author studied Cameroon and listed two impo rtant laws regarding the status of the chief (Yang Ron gjia 1986). Chinese scholars also began to switch their interest to sp ecific topics. Lu Ting-en used various d ata to show David Livingston e's dual roles in the exploration of Africa. Wu Bingzh en, Xu Jiming and others studied the slave trade, esp ecially its links to early capitalist d evelopment in Africa. Wu also criticised John Fage's view on the slave trad e. Qin Xiaoying touched on a sensitive subject: the n ational bourgeoisie's role in liberation movements. The CCP tradition generally d enied the positive role of the national bourgeoisie, which was the target of the proletarian revolution . Using Kenya as an example, Qin argued that the nation al b o ur geoisie co uld play an active role in the anti-colonialist struggle. Wang Chunliang made the same paint in his study on the nationalist m ovement in Zaire. Li Anshan tried to analyse the formation, ch aracteristics and the role of the m o dern intellectual in West Africa. 7

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

The study of Africa was greatly promoted in the period 1990-2000. Monographs (Liang Gencheng 1991; Shu Yunguo 1996; Ai Zhouchang and Mu Tao 1996; Luo Jianguo 1996; Xia Jisheng 1996; Lu Ting-en and Liu Jing 1997; Liu Hongwu 1997) and historical materials (Ai Zhouchang 1989; Pan Guang and Zhu Weilie 1992; Tang Dad un 1995) were published. South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana (Chen Zhongdan 2000) are included in the study of the British Commonwealth, and in the History of Colonialism the volume Africa was published (Zheng Jiaxing 2000). A three-volume history of Africa was published in 1996 as a collective work by the CSAHS (He Fangchuan and Nin Shao 1996; Ai Zhouchang and Zheng Jiaxing 1996; Lu Ting-en and Peng Kunyuan 1996). Chinese scholars tried to synthesise their earlier work. The first systematic study of African nationalist movements was published, the best part of the work being that it also covered Portuguese colonialism (Wu Bingzheng and Gao Jinyuan 1993). The first case study in African history in China was on southern Ghana, and an English version was published later (Li Anshan 1998a, 2000). During the 1990s, African studies in China focused on several subjects, such as socialism, democratisation, the ethnic issue, international relations, South Africa, cultural studies, economic studies and Sino-African relations. With the coming of the third wave of democracy, the question of what would be the future of African socialism became the focus of inquiry. As a collective project, A New Analysis of African Socialism began from 1989 and involved 16 scholars. It discussed the origins, development and typology of African socialism and compared different forms of socialism in Africa. It was argued that socialism contributed a great deal to the consolidation of national independence, the building of national culture and the control of the national economy, along with raising greatly the status of African countries in the world political arena. Socialism in Africa was, however, not successful, and the decline of the movement was due to several factors: the internal factor (the forces of production and internal policy), the impact of the decline of the socialist bloc of Soviet and East Europe, and pressure from western countries. Socialist countries had three options: dropping out, self-adjustment and democratic socialism. According to the author, the rise of democratic socialism in Africa is inevitable (Tang Dadun et aI1994). 8

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

There was a debate around the process of African democratisation. Some have considered internal demand for a more democratic society as the major cause for the process (Xu Jiming and Tan Shizhong 1998). Their explanation for disturbances during democratisation was either the natural outbreak of long-time oppression and mal-governance or new conflicts generated from the process itself. Others have regarded democratisation in Africa as the result of both the decline of the Soviet bloc and pressure from western countries, and indeed argued that western-style democracy does not fit the African reality (Cui Qinglian 1995; Lu Ting-en 1995). The ethnic issue is another topic of debate. There has been heated discussion among Chinese scholars on the use of the term 'tribe' and 'tribalism' (Wu Zengtian 1996; Li Anshan 1998b). Some think that the use of 'tribe' is appropriate, while others consider it a derogatory term and prefer to use 'nationalism' or 'local nationalism' instead. Yet all agree that the ethnic conflict has been an obstacle to nation-building in Africa. Also in the 1990s, South Africa became a topic of major interest in China, especially following the normalisation of Sino-South African diplomatic relations. The 'African renaissance' project also aroused interest among Chinese scholars. Even before the normalisation of relations, both sides set up a research centre in each other's capitals, playing a role of semi-diplomatic affairs and also promoting academic exchange between China and South AfricaY Biographies and autobiographies of Nelson Mandela and his ex-wife Winnie Mandela were written or translated (Yang Lihua 1995; Wen Xian 1995). Several books on South Africa were published in the late 1990s, covering politics, the economy, ethnic relations and modernisation (Yang Lihua et al 1994; Ge Jie 1994; Chen Yifei 1994; Zhu Chonggui et al 1994; Xia Jisheng 1996; Xia Jisheng et al 1998; Zhang Xiang 1998; Ai Zhouchang et al 2000). Equally, Chinese scholars have been working to introduce the study of Africa in other parts of the world to China's academia, while the number of PhD students pursuing African studies has been growing since the late 1990s.

9

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

New interests and achievements: beyond 2000 Since the end of the 20th century, the world h as focused on ChinaAfrica relations. This trend has had som e imp act on Afri can studies in China. With the expansion of China-Africa relations w here China's trad e with African countries has increased drama tically, African studies is facing ne w opportunities and challen ges. On the one hand the discipline is pro gressing, but on the o ther it d oes not seem to be catching up with the fast-changing nature of the en gagem ent, nor d oes it appear to be m ee ting the needs of socie ty at large, especially those of exp anding Chinese enterprises in Africa . A ccording to sta tistics, in the period 2000- 05, 232 boo ks on or about Africa were published. If we include bo oks published in 2006- 07, the total number w o uld reach 300 during this pe rio d, including transla tions. These boo ks co ver a wide r an ge of fields such as religio n, politics, foreign affairs, law, econom y, culture, Table 2 Classification of articles on specific African countries (1997-2005)* Subject!

Egypt

Ethiopia

Kenya

Nigeria

country

South

Total

Africa

Politics and law

42

2

15

31

118

208

Economics

107

31

41

44

201

424

Foreign

61

14

6

43

127

20

22

33

39

7

79

affairs Ethnicity Re ligion

2 15

20

Military History and archaeology

68

Culture

44

2

15

19

99

179

Socie ty

10

6

25

10

67

118

Important

9

2

27

40

361

63

620

1256

figures

Total

101

111

11 Some adju stment has been made in order to make the classification more adequate.

10

AFRICAN STUD IES IN CH INA

history, geography and ethnology. In 2006, the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAA) of the CASS, the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies and the Centre for African Studies at Peking University published a bibliography of African studies in China (1997-2005). The result showed that besides books, more than 4,000 articles had been published in more than 800 journals. As Table 2 indicates, five countries attracted the most attention, with articles focusing on those countries accounting for more than one quarter of the total (Chen Hong and Zhao Ping 2006). This classification is not strictly defined, since, for example, ethnicity and religion or politics may be intertwined, just as culture and society are. Geography is usually classified in either society or culture since it is linked to tourism, heritage and the environment. This notwithstanding, we can see from the statistics that articles on economics stand out as the most popular in the list for all five countries, reflecting China's focus today. There are more works on politics and law or foreign affairs for Ethiopia and Nigeria. History occ upies second place in Egypt since Egyptology is included in the subject. The fact that the majority of works on culture and society are for South Africa indicates that more Chinese have visited this co untry. The most striking feature is that writing abo ut South Africa is at the top of the list, with 620 items. Another remarkable feature is graduate theses, with 238 MA and PhD theses altogether and 73 titles about Africa in general, including 17 on politics, 13 on economics, 26 on foreign affairs, 12 on history and 5 on culture. As for theses on the issues of particular regions, there are four on East Africa, seven on West Africa and two

Table 3 Statistics on graduate theses on African countries (1981-2005) Egypt Kenya Nigeria Mali South Africa Sudan

35 2 18

36 5

Somalia Cameroon Congo-Brazzaville Lesotho Libya

1

2 2

Tanzania Benin Democratic Republic of Congo Madagascar Algeria Uganda Togo Mozambique Mauritius Morocco

Burundi Ghana

Botswana 4 3 4 2 1

Zimbabwe Ethiopia Niger Cote d'ivoire Zambia

1

2 2 2 4

7 2 Total

152

11

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

on southern Africa. As for individ ual co untries, according to Table 3 there are 152 titles on 29 countries. Again, South Africa comes out on top, with 36 theses (Chen Hon g and Zhao Ping 2006). This current interest in China-Africa relations is also being supp orted by various conferences, workshops and symposiums on the top ic. These are bein g coor dinated and undertaken by various institutions.

Institutions: old and new The Institute of West Asian and Afri can Studies (IWAA) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is th e largest institute involved in African studies in China. The institute was ori ginally set up on 4 July 1961 with the name of the Institute of Asian African Studies and was governed jOintly by th e Intern ational Department of Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which subsequently became known as the CASS in 1981. The institute has been a lea din g unit in African research in China. In recent years, it has contributed a grea t dea l to the stud y of Africa in terms of holdin g conferences, publishin g an aca demic jou rnal and an annu al report on the Middle East and Africa, producing an encyclopedi a and organisin g the compilation of its Guides to World States series 13 The institute also takes th e lead in chairing the work of the Chinese Association of African Studies, set up in 1979. In ad diti on to aca d emi c research, the sc holars of the institute also t ake an active role in consultative work for the governm ent. Another two government institutions, the China Institute of Interna ti on al Studies and the China Institute of Contemporary Internati onal Relations, are also involved in African studies. Peking University started its academic exchange with Africa immedi atel y after 1949 with bilateral, scholarly v isits between China and Egypt. Established in 2000, the Centre for African Studies at Peking University organised a ' Nati onal conference of universities' teachin g, research on and aid to Africa' on 13-14 December 2006, with p articipan ts from universities, instituti ons and various government mini stries. Contributions to it covered different aspects of studying Africa, includin g teachin g experiences, research resu lts and trainin g seminars. Since 2000, the 12

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

centre has published a series of books on different topics (Centre for African Studies 2000, 2002; Lu Ting-en et al 2005; Li Baoping et aI2006). With the increase in China-Africa relations, an African studies group was set up by students at Peking University in 2007 which has organised several activities, including expert lectures and African students introducing their countries. The African Students Association at the same university has likewise organised several seminars to discuss China-Africa relations, attracting African students from other universities. There are several centres for African studies at universities in China, such as Nanjing University, Yunnan University, Shanghai Normal University, Xiangtan University, Zhejiang Normal University, Suzhou University, Nanjing Agriculture University, Nanchang University and Tianjin University of Technology and Education. The Centre for African Law and Social Studies in Xiangtan University was established in 1998, and since then it has been very active in the study of African law. In 2006, the centre held an international seminar entitled 'Law and socio-economic development in Africa' with 15 participants from six African countries. It has published several books on law and a number of articles in academic journals. Zhejiang Normal University set up the Centre for African Education in 2003, which held the first China-Africa 'University Presidents' Forum' with 30 presidents from 14 African universities. In order to promote African studies, in 2007 the university set up a new Institute of African Studies with a vision of building up a platform for experts to carry out academic exchanges and undertake systematic and comprehensive research on Africa. Recently the research centre for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was also established. In order to implement the principles of FOCAC, the Ministry of Education decided to establish speCial centres for the mission. In 2003, the first centre for national educational assistance for Africa under the Ministry of Education was set up in Tianjin University of Technology and Education, followed by a further three in 2004 and six others in 2008, a development certain to enhance academic exchange between Chinese and African universities.

13

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Conclusion and afterthoughts African studies in China is gradually transforming from a political co ncentra tion to an academic orie ntation. The quality associated with the discipline is improving, advancing from mere introductions to m ore specific and d etailed studies. Academic ex changes are takin g pl ace between China and the world, gradually bringing China into international academia. With the opening-up o f China and an increasing need to d evelo p knowledge abo ut the African co ntinent, African studies in China is certain to be promo ted. 14 Ye t there are challenges. The bibliography included within this ch ap ter reveals tha t fe w original studies s upp orted by fi eld work have been d one.IS Not a single Chinese anthropologist has been to Africa specifically for study. There is no African lan g uage study save for training purposes 16 N either the CAAS nor the CSAHS has its own jo urnal. 17 Moreover, Chinese scholars seldom h ave their research published in English-lan g u age jo urnals and publi catio ns. There are several core features around African studies in China a t the current time. With the increase in m o nographs, m ore acad e mics now conce ntrate on the present situation from a p olitical, economic, African cultural or social p erspective, with an economic perspective the m ost common. South Africa is the m os t studied state among African co untries, some thing which indicates the m ore active exchange between China and South Africa. Seve r al se ries were published to cover Africa o r related topics, such as the Yellow Book of International Politics, Guides to World States, China-Africa Series, British Commonwealth Countries, Diplomats Look at the World and the Chinese Diplomat Series. This shows the openness of the Chinese pres s and related policies. Equally, yo ung scholars are m a turing, bringing with the m a broad knowledge and be tte r und ersta nding of Africa. Gradually playing a m ore promine nt part in inte rnation al acad emia, the availability of Chinese scholars' works in English is incr easing and their vie ws are progressively catching internatio nal a tte ntion. Finally, with m ore and more Chinese going to Africa, there are more and more books by a uthors writing about their exp eriences in Africa. At the beginning o f the 21st century, the Chinese government called for a grand diplomacy, requiring multifaceted effort: 'It 14

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

is recognisable that there should be more cooperation between practical work and acad emic research. The government needs information, analysis and assessment, while acad emi a needs fundin g, stimulus and feedback' (Li Anshan 2005 ). The situation is chan ging dramatically with more academics invo lved in consultation and policy-makin g. With the strengthening of China's soft power in general and the exp ansio n of China's en gagem ent in Africa in p articular, there will be more opportunities for Chinese Africanists. Yet real scholars are those w ho can bear the solitude. Whether idealistic or not, Chinese Africanists should do more solid work if they are to m ake a big leap forward in their study of Africa. The study of Africa in China is promising, but need s yet more effort and har d work. Notes 1. This is a revised version o f two of my articles 'African s tudi es in China in the twentie th century: a historiographica l s urvey' (African Studies Review,

48:1, A pril 2005) and 'Gii studi africanistici in Cina agli ini zi d el XXI secolo' (Afriche e Orienti, no. 2, 2008, as part of the collection La Cina in Africa, ed ited by C ristia na Fia mingo). I would like to thank the tw o jo urnals for the ir permission to publish the articles e lsewhere. My thanks also goes to Katrin Altmeyer, the director of the H einrich Boll Foundation, Beijing office, and Axel Harne it-Sievers, th e directo r o f the H e inrich Boll Foundation, East A fri ca office, for providing this opportuni ty to s hare m y know ledge w ith A fri can colleagues.

2. In the 20th century few C hinese A fri ca nists p ublished forma l a rticles in English in the wes tern world (Gao Jiny uan 1984; He Fangc huan 1987; Li An shan, 1994, 1995, 1996; Ge Jie 1997). 3. In the la te 1950s, the Departme nt of History a t Na nkai Uni vers ity published several articles o n natio nal ind ependence movem en ts in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and A lgeria in Ushi Jiaxue (Teaching History). The Department

of History at South China Normal U ni verSity published articles on Congo a nd Ca meroon in ZhongxlIe Ushi JiaoxlIe (Teaching Histo,'Y in Middle School) . 4. They were from the followi ng countries: Guinea, Jord a n, South Africa, Senegal, North Rhodesia, Uga nda and Kenya (Mao Zed ong 1994, p. 463 a nd p . 465). For the names of the participants, see Mao Zedong 1996, p. 478, note l. 5. The People's UniverSity in Beijing was chosen for the study of socialist countries, w hile Fudan University in Shanghai was chosen for the stud y of cap italist countries .

6. Take the articles published in Yafei Yi cong, for example. Conferences include: 'The first international Africanist conference', 1963, no. 2; 'Selections o f the s peCial re po rts o f the firs t interna ti o nal Africanist conference', 1963,

15

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA no. 3; 'The fifth an nual confe rence of African Studies Associatio n in the U.S.', 1963, no. 3; 'Special reports and articles presented by delegations in the first international Africanist conference: 1963, no. 4; 'Academic confe rences in East Africa', 1963, no. 10. Institutions include: 'About the Institute of Afri ca n Studies at University of Ghana', 1962, no. 5; 'Introduction of the Institute of African Studies in Spa in', 1963, no. 7; 'Introd u ction of the Institute of Afri ca n Studies in Italy', 1963, no. 8; 'Introduction of the Department of A frican Studies at Delhi University in India', 1963, no. 9; 'Institute of African Studies in Uni versity of Edinburgh', 1964, no. 2; 'The origi n of the Institute of African Studies in Japan', 1964, no. 4; 'Institute of Ethiopian Stud ies a t Addis Ababa', 1964,no. 6; 'The Institute of African studies in France', 1964, no. 11; 'The Institute of African Studies in H olland ', 1964, no. 12; 'Centre for Afri can Studies a t University of London', 1965, no. 8. Studies include: 'African studies in Wes t Germany', 1963, no. 4; 'Recent African studies in the USSR', 1963, no. 6; 'The project of Africa n studies and coord ination of Ford Founda tion in the U.s.', 1965, no. 3; 'A frican studies at H oover Institute of Stanford Uni versi ty', 1965, no. 5. 7. Around 60 books were transla ted during this period, among them 29 from the USSR and Eastern Europea n countries. In other words, a lmost half were translated from Russian or related lang uages (Zhang Yuxi 1997, p. 260). 8. The relationship between China and Afri ca during the 1960s is a very important topic. Besid es the works mentioned below, former Minis te r of Foreign A ffairs Qian Qichen published his m emoir recentl y, which included a w hole cha pter on A fri ca. See Qian Q ichen 2003, pp. 243-87. 9. In 1965, the Institute of Asian African Studies (w hich la te r became the Institute of Wes t Asia n a nd African Studies, the CASS) decided that the stud y s hould be concentra ted on fi ve fie lds: the d evelopment a nd characteris tics o f the contempo rary nationa l libera tion movement; the contemporary socia-economic situation wi th a focus on the s tructure of social classes; th e bourgeo is id eology of nati o nalis m; the rev is io nis ts' false v iew points abo ut the national liberatio n movement; and the policy o f imperialist countries towards the na tional libera tion movement (Institute o f

West Asia n a nd Afri ca n Studies 2001, p. 9). 10. Such as the Shandong University Transla tion Gro up, or the Shanghai Foreign Language School Translation Group. 11. Jiang Q ing, Wa ng H ongwen, Zha ng Chunqiao a nd Yao Wen yua n formed a politica l clique durin g the Cultural Revolution. They were rega rd ed as ultra-leftists and were very unpopular in C hina. Their d ownfall represented the end of the C ultura l Revolution. 12. For example, Professor Ken Smith, the chair of the Dep artment of History at UN ISA (Uni versity of South Afri ca), visited Peking Universi ty on a trip arranged by Leslie Labuschagne, the director o f th e South Afr ican Centre for Chinese Studies in Beijing at the time. 13. Recentl y, it organ ised several important internatio nal conferences related to A frica, s uch as 'China and Afri ca : shared d evelopment' (December 2006), co-orga nised with the UK Department for International Development

16

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA (DFID), and th e 'Interna tio na l conference o n China-Sud an relations' (Jul y 2007), co-o rga nised w ith th e Centre for Foreig n Policy Analysis, UK. 14. In October 1997, the Chinese Society of A frican Historica l Studies held its co nference in Beida ihe. Li A nshan a nd Liu Hongwu were requested by the socie ty to draft a letter to President Jiang Zemin, emphasising the importance of A fri can s tudies . The lette r was la ter sent to the president, w ho comm e nted o n th e iss ue, 'In recent yea rs, I have stressed many times that the work on A frica s ho uld be taken very serio us ly. This iss ue s hould be paid g reat attentio n to, no t o nl y in po litics, but a lso in th e d evelopm ent of economic cooperat ion. The Centra l Com mittee and the related units of th e State Council s ho uld all suppo rt this work' (Chen Go ngyua n 2000, p. 244). 15. This is also linked to th e attitude of Chinese acad emia towa rd s a nthro po logy, a discipline that w as for a lo ng time regard ed as biased and restored only in the early 1980s. 16. H a usa and Swahili a re tau g ht in two uni versities in Beijing, m a inl y for the training o f pe rsonnel fo r Xi nhu a News Agency a nd o ther media. 17. West Asia and Africa is a journal run by the Institute of Wes t As ian and A fri ca n Studi es, CASSoStarted in 1980 as a n internall y circulated jo urnal, it became openl y published w ithin China in 1981. It beca m e ava ilable to readers both at ho m e and abroad from A u gu s t 1982. West Asia and Africa has s ince served as the m ajor acad emic jo urn al for A fri can s tudi es in China.

Bibliography A i Zho uchan g (ed) (1989) Selection of Materials on Sino-African Relations, Sha ng hai, East Norm a l U ni versity Press -(ed) (1999) African Black Civilisat ions, Beijing A i Zhouchang a nd M u Tao (1996) A History of Sino-African Relations, Sha ng hai, East Norm a l U ni versity Press Ai Zho uchang and Z heng Jia xing (1996) A History of Africa: Volume of Modem Time, Shan g hai, Eas t Norma l Univers ity Press A i Z ho uchang et al (2000) A Study on M odernisation in South Africa, Shang hai, Eas t No rma l Univers ity Press Centre for Africa n Studies, Pekin g U ni versity (ed) (2000) China and Africa, Beijing, Peking U ni vers ity -(ed) (2002) Africa: Change and Development, Beijing, Peking Univers ity C hen Gongyua n (1985) Friendly Contact between Africa and China in Ancient Times, Beijing, Commercial Press -(ed) (2000) 'Strategic report for th e d evelo pment 01 Sino-A fri ca n relatio ns in th e 21st cen tury', special collection of th e 20th anniversary of the C hinese Assoc iatio n of Afri can Studies, Chinese Association of African Studies Chen Hansheng (ed ) (1984) 'Compilation of data of Chinese labour abroad', Chinese LabOllr in Africa, vol. 9, Beijing C hen H o ng and Zhao Ping (eds) (2006) Bibliography of Chinese Writings on Af,.ican Issues 1997- 2006, Institute of West Asia and A frica, C hinese Academ y o f Social Sciences, C hinese Society of A fri can Historical Studi es

17

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA and Centre for Afri ca n Studies, Peking U niversity Chen Li (ed) (1959) Camemon People's Anti-Colonialist Struggle, Tianjin, Hebei People's Publishing H ou se C hen Xiaohong (2007) A Study on De Gaulle and African Decolonisation, Beijing, C hinese Socia l Sciences P ublishing H ouse Chen Yifei (ed) (1994) Explore the Market in SOllth Africa: Environment and Opportunity, Beijing, Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House C hen Zhongda n (2000) Ghana: Lookingfor a Basefor Modernisation, Chengdu, Sichuan People's Publishing H ouse C hen Zhongde a nd Wu Zhaoji (1987) Stlldy on the Strategy of Economic Development in Africa SOllth of Sahara, Beijing, Peking University Press Chen Zhongd e, Yao Guimei a nd Fan Yushu (ed) (2000) Generalisation of Agriculture Development in African Nations, vol. 2, Beijing, Chinese Financial Econo mic Press Chinese SOCiety of African Historica l Studies (CSAHS) (1982a) Collection of Papers on African History, Beijing, Sa n Lian Press -ted) (1982b) Bibliogmphy of African Studies in Chinese 1949- 1981, Beijing, Printed Ma teria l -(1984) A General History of Africa, Beijing, Beijing No rmal Uni ve rsity Press C ui Q inglian (1995) 'Multiparty democratic m odel of the West d oes not fit the reality of black Africa', Xiya Feizholl (West Asia and Africa), no. 1 Fan Yong (ed) (1957) The National Independent Movement in Momcco, Tllnisia and Algeria, Shanghai, People's Publishing H ouse Fang Jigen (1986) Selection of Data of the History of Overseas Chinese in Africa, Beijing, Xinhua Press Feng Jia nwe i (1994) Notes on the Exploration of River Niger Area, Beijing, Beijing Language College Press Gao Changro ng (1983a) Selection of Dramas in Africa, Beijing, Foreign Literature Publishing Compan y -(1983b) Selection of Novels in Contemporary Africa, Beijing, Foreign Literature Publishing Company Gao James (2001) 'Book review: a History of Chinese Overseas in A fri ca', African Studies Review, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 164--{)5 Gao Jinyuan (1984) 'China and Africa: the developm ent of relations over ma ny centuries', African Affairs, vol. 83, no . 331, pp. 241-50 -(2007) Selection of Gao finyuan's Works , Beijing, C hinese Academ y of Socia l Sciences Ge Gongs hang a nd Li Yifu (1981) 'Afri can nationalities: popula tion and distribution ', Institllte of Ethnic Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Ge Jie (1994) South Africa: A Rich Land with Bitterness, Beijing, World A ffairs Press -(1997) 'China', in Middleton, John (ed) Encyclopedia of Africa SOllth of the Sahara, vol. 4, New York, Cha rles Scribner 's Sons -(2000) Concise Encyclopedia of sub-Saharan Africa, Beijing, Chinese Social Sciences Publishing H ou se

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Ge Jie et al (1989) Origin of the Disturbance in Southern Africa, Beijing, World Affairs Press Gu Zhangyi (1997) "'Buzu" or " nation" ?' Shijie Minzu (World Ethno-national Stu dies ), no. 2 Guo Chaoren (2000) Notes on Africa, Beijing, Xinhua Press Guo Jing-an and Wu Jun (2006) The Years as Diplomats in Africa, C hengdu, Sichuan People's Publishing H ouse He Fangchuan (1987) 'The relationship between China and African history', UC LA (University of Californ ia, Los A ngeles ) African Studies Center new sletter, fall He Fangchuan and N in Sao (1996) A History of Africa: Volume of Ancient Tillie, Shanghai, East Normal University Press He Li-er (1995) A Pead in Southern Africa: Ji nbabuwei, Beijing, Contempo rary World Press H e Qinhua and Hong Yong hong (2006) A History of Development of African Law, Beijing, Law Press He Wenping (2005) The Stu dy of the Democratisation Process in Africa n Countries, Beijing, C urrent Affairs Publisher -(2006) 'China-Africa relations moving into an era o f rapid development', i nside AiSA, nos. 3 and 4, October and December, pp. 3-
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CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA -(2004) St udy on African Nationalism, Beijing, China International Radio Press

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(2005) 'A frican studies in China in the twentieth century: a histori ographical s urvey', African Studies Review, vol. 48, no. 1, April, pp.59--87 -(2006) Social History of Chinese Overseas in Africa: Selected Documents, Hong Kong, H ong Kon g Press for Social Science Ltd -(2007) 'China and Africa: policies and challenges', China Security, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 69- 93 Li Baoping (1997) Tradition and Modernisation in Africa, Beijing, Peking Univ ers ity Press

Li Baoping et al (ed s) (2006) A Study on the Development of Portuguese-Speaking Countries in Asia and Africa, Beijing, World Affa irs Press Li jidong (1997) An Analysis on Delayed Modernisation in Africa, Beijing, Chinese Econo mic Press

Li Miao (1988) Sculpture in Black Africa, Beijing, Wo rkers Publishing Company Li Tongche ng a nd jin Buoxiong (2005) Chinese Diplomats in Africa, Shanghai, Shanghai People's Publishing House Li Xinfeng (2005) A Reporter's Ex ploration Following Zheng He's Footsteps in Africa, Kunming, Cheng uang Press - (2006) My Experience as a Jou rnalist in Africa, Kunmin g, Chenguang Press Li Xing (2003) 'The power of logo: the implication of the Chinese revolution on pan-Afri canism', TINABANTU: journal of African National Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, June

Liang Gencheng (1991) U nited States m, d Africa, Beijing, Peking University Press

Liang Yu (2000) Enter Black Africa, Changchun, jinlin People's Press Liu Haifang (2006) 'China and Africa: transcending "threat or boon''', China Monitor, March, pp. 7- 10 Liu Hongwu (1997) A Study on Black African Cultll re, Sha nghai - (2000) From T"ibal Society to Nation -State: the Olltline of the Development of Nigerian State, Kunming, Yunnan U ni vers ity Press Lu Miaogeng, Huang Shejiao and Lin Ye (ed s) (2006) United Hearts as Cold - a Clorious Passage of China-AjI'ican Friendly Relations, Beijing, World Affairs Press

Luo jianbo (2006) African Integration and Sino-African Relations, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press

Lu Ting-en (1986) Africa and Imperialism, Be ijing, Pekin g Uni ve rsity Press -(1995) 'West countries' multi-party system d oes not fit Africa', Cuoji Shehui yu jingji (i nternational Society and Economy ), nos. 3 and 4 - ted) (2000) Brief History of Development of African Agriculture, Beijing, Chinese Financial Eco nomic Press

- (2005) T"eatises on Africa, Beijing, World Affairs Press Lu Ting-en et _I (ed s) (2005) African Leaders who Effect History, Beijing, Wo rld Affairs Press

20

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

Lu Ting-en a nd Liu Jing (1997) African Nationalist Parties and Party System, Shanghai, East Normal University Press Lu Ting-en and Peng Kunyuan (1996) A History of Africa: Volume of Contemporary Tilne, Shang hai, East Normal Uni vers ity Press Luo Jianguo (1996) A Study of African National Bourgeoisie, Shanghai, East Normal U ni vers ity Press

Luo Ke (ed) (1956) Egypt, Holding High the Banner of Anti-Colonialism, C hangsha, Hunan People's Publishing House Ma Tong (1959) 'The national liberation struggle in Algeria', Lishi Iiaoxue (Teaching History), no. 1 Ma Wenkuan and Meng Fanren (1987) The Discovery of Chinese Ancient Porcelains in Africa, Beijing, Forbidden C ity Press Mao Zedong (1994) Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxian (Selections of Mao Zedong's Works on Diplomacy). Beijing, Central Documentation Publishing Hou se and World Affairs Press -(1996) Iian Guo Yi Lai Mao Zedong Wen Gao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts, Speeches and Articles since the Founding of the People's Republic of China), vol. 9, January 1960-December 1961, Beijing, Central Documentation Publishing House Mu Tao (2003) Study on South African External Relations, Shanghai, East China Normal Un ivers ity Press

Na Zhong (1957) 'Egyptian people's stru ggle against Na poleon and the national awakening', Renwel1 Kexue Zazhi (Humanities Science Journal), no. 1 -(1963) A Concise History of Modern Egypt, Beijing, Joint Publishing Nin Sao (1993) Black African Culture, Hangzhou, Zhejiang People's Publishing House Pan Guang and Zhu Weilie (1992) Translated Materials on Arabic Africa, Shanghai, East Normal University Press Qian Qichen (2003) Waijiao Shi Ii (Th e Stories of a Diplomat), World Affairs Press

Shen Fuwei (1990) China and Africa: Relations of2000 Years, Beijing, Zhonghua Press Shu Yunguo (1996) A Study on African Population Increase and Economic Development, Shanghai, East Normal University Press -(2004) The Failed Reform: Structural Adjustment in sub-Saharan Afi·ican Countries at the End of the 20th CenillrY, Changchun, Jilin People's Publishing House Su Shirong et al (1984) African Natural Geography, Beijing, Commercial Press Tan Shi zhong (ed) (1998) Reflection and Development: African Economic Adjustment and the Sustainability, Beijing, Social Science Documentation Press Tang Dadun (1988) African Socialism: History, Theory and Practice, Be ijing, World Affairs Press -(ed) (1995) Documents ofPan-Africanisll1 and Organisation of African Unity, Shanghai, East Normal U ni vers ity Press

Tang Dadun et al (1994) A New Analysis of African Socialism, Beijing, Educational Press

21

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA Tang jiaxu an (ed) (2000) Dictionary on China's Diplomacy, Beijing, World Affairs Press Wa ng Dongm ei and Wang Gu ota i (2000) Enter Africa, Beijing, China Inte rnational Radio Press Wa ng Juny i (1959) 'South African p eople's fig ht against racial discrimination', Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Study ofIntemational Affairs), no. 4 Wang Shu (2007) Stories of Five Continents, Shanghai, Shanghai Dictionary Publications Wa ng Zhen (1959) 'Imperialist invasion into Congo a nd the struggle of the Congo people', Guoji Wentin Yanjiu (Study of International Affairs), no. 8 Wen Xian (1995) Mandela: Son of the Black People, Beijing, Contemporary Wo rld Press Wen Yunchao (2000) Development and Utilisation of African Agricultural Resollrces, Beijing, Chinese Financial Economic Press Wu Bingzheng and Gao jinyuan (1993) A Concise History of African National Independence, Beijing, World Affai rs Press Wu Xiu (ed) (1956) The Struggle of the Egyptian People to W in Independence and Peace, Beijing, Popular Read ers Publishing H ou se Wu Zengtia n (1996) 'A survey of the issue of tribe in the study of black Africa in China', Xiya Feizhou (West Asia and Africa), no. 5 Wu Zuncun a nd Xie Defeng (1936) Ethiopia, Shanghai, Zhengz hong Press Xia jisheng (ed) (1996) Apartheid and Ethnic Relations in South Africa, Shanghai, East Normal Uni versity Press - (2005) Two African Parliaments, Beijing, China's Financia l a nd Economic Press Xia Jisheng et al (1998) Contempo/"anj World Political System: SOllth Africa, Lanzho u, Lanzho u U nivers ity Press Xu jiming and Tan Shizhong (ed) (1998) Political Transformation in Contemporary Africa, Beijing, Econo mic Science Press Xu Yongzhang (2004) R esearch on the Hist ory of Relations between China and Asia-African Countries, Hong Kon g, Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences Ltd Xun Xingqiang (1983) Conc ise Hi story of Niger, Beijing, World Affairs Press Ya n jin (1958) The National Liberation Movement of Algerian People, Beijing, World Affairs Press Ya ng Dezhen and Su Zeyu (ed s) (1994) African Market Economy System, Lanzho u, Lanzhou U nivers ity Press Yang Gua ng and H e Wenping (ed s) (2007) 'Annual report on d evelopment in the Middle East a nd Afri ca 2006- 2007', History and Realities of Sino-African Relations, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press Yang Guang and Wa ng jian (eds) (2002) Middle East and Africa Development R eport, 2001-2002, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press -(2003) Middle East and Africa Development Report, 2002- 2003, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press - (2004) Middle East and Africa Development Report, 2003- 2004, Beijing, Socia l Sciences Academic Press Yang H aoc heng (1985) The Modern History of Egypt, Beijing, Chinese Social

22

AFRICAN STUDIES IN CHINA

Sciences Publishing H ouse Yang Haocheng and Jiang C hun (1997) Egypt in Nasser and Sadat's Period, Be ijing, Commercial Press

Yang Lihua (1995) Mandela; Father of National Unity, Changchun, C hangchun Press

Yang Lihua et al (1994) Political and Economic Development in SOllth Africa, Beijing, C hinese Social Sciences Publishing H ouse Yang Renpian (1984) A Con cise History of Africa, Beijing, People's Publishing House

Yang Rongjia (1986) In the Mysterious Chiefdom, Beijing, Current Affairs Publishing House Yang Xu elun and Zheng Xi zhen (2001) The ClI lture of TlInisia, Beijing, Culture and Arts Press Zeng Qiang (2002) 'Some reflections on expanding Sino-African trade and economic cooperati ve relations in the new century', TTNABANTU; Journal of African National Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, Ma y Zeng Zungu et al (1984) Ag"icllltllral Geography in Africa, Beijing, Commercial Press -(1999) African Pol itical Development from a Multiple Perspective, Beijing Zhang Junyan (1986) The Contact between Ancient China and West-Asia-Africa, Beijing, Ocean Publishing House Zhang Ron gs heng (1986) Sculpture in Africa, Shanghai, Shanghai People's Painting Publishing Company - (1988) Black Arts in Africa, Beijing, People's Painting Publishing Company Zhang Tieshan (1999) Friendship Road; a Report on the Const ruction of TanzaniaZambia Railway, Be ijing, China's Fo re ig n Eco nomic and Trade Press Zhang Tiesheng (1963) History of Sino -African Relations; A Primary Research , Beijing, Joint Publishing Zhang Tongzhu (1992) Stll dy on the Strategy of Eco nomic and Social Development in Africa, Beijing, People's Publishing House Zhang Xiang (ed) (1998) A Rainbow Cou nt ry; New South Africa, Beijing, Contemporary World Press Zhang Yun (2000) Personal Experience in Black Africa, Beijing, People's Daily Press Zhang Yu xi (ed) (1990) Bibliography of African Studies in Chinese, 1982-1989, Beijing, Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, Peking University, Chinese Society of African His torical Studies, Chinese A ssociation of African Studies -ted) (1997) Bibliogmphy of African Studies in Chinese, 1990- 1996, Beijing, Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, Peking University, C hinese Society of African His to rical Studies, Chinese Associatio n o f A frican Studies Zhao Guo zhong et al (ed s) (1998-2001) Yellow Book of International Situation; the Report of the Development of Middle East and Africa, Beijing, Social Science D ocumentati o n Press Zhao Guozhong (ed) (2000) Concise Encyclopedia of West Asia an d North Africa;

23

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA Middle East, Beijing, C hinese Social Sciences Publishing House Zhao Shuhui (1981) Concise History of Zaire, Beiji ng, Commercial Press Zheng Daochuan (1957) 'Nasser's id eology of anti-colonialism ', Xu eshu Luntan (Academic Fortun), n o . 1 Zheng Jia xing (ed) (2000) History of Colonialism: Africa, Beijing, Peking U ni vers ity Press Zhong Zhicheng (2006) For a More Beautiful W odd: Record o!Jiang Zemin's Visit A broad, Beijing, World Affa irs P ublis hers Zhou Na njing (ed) (1999-2002) En cyclopaedia of Chinese Overseas, 12 volumes, Beijing, Chinese Overseas Publishing House Zhu Chonggui et al (eds) (1994) Economy in South Africa: euide to Trade and Investment, Beijing, Curre nt Affa irs Press

24

China in Africa: a maturing of the engagement? Sanusha Naidu

The continuing debate on China's deepening footprint is part of what has become a new genre in the study of Africa's international relations. The unfolding debate reflects a growing concern in academic circles to contextualise China's behaviour across the African continent within the theoretical frameworks that have guided most of our thinking about how states act and behave in international politics. Most academics and mainstream commentators are exp loring the factors and conditions that underlie China's Africa policy and asking what the implications of this will be for the continent's sustainable development and who will be the real winners and losers. A plethora of China-Africa focused scholarly journals, popular commentaries and books have eloquently assessed China as both an opportunity and threat to Africa. Some are more inclined to interpret China as an opportunity for Africa in terms of a changing international power structure brought forth by a new system change in the form of South-South cooperation that will be politica ll y and economically beneficial to Africa. But others are less convinced, and often warn against 'wishful thinking' by maintaining a cautious optimism. Indeed, such contributions to the literature raise significant issues about whether China does indeed represent a new dawn for Africa or whether in the end, as some detractors claim, it merely offers more of the same. I will use the latter statement as my point of departure in this debate and perhaps cross-reference this to the current global financial crisis. To this end, the core issue for this author is whether China's African engagement is about stabilising itself. This possibility in its turn forces a more nuanced assessment of Beijing's behaviour, which also engenders a maturing of the debate. 25

CH INESE AND AFR ICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

Is the honeymoon over? The trade and investment factor in China's engagement with Africa is undeniable . Over the last 50 years the rela tionship between China and African co untries has undo ubtedly shifted from a purely ideological relationship to one of economic pragmatism (Taylor 2006, Alden 2007, Ampiah and Naidu 2008). This is demonstrated in Fig ure 1, which shows a dramatic increase in trade wi th Africa from just US$5 billion in 1995 to over US$106 billion at the end of 2008. This trajector y in the en gagement is fu elled by China's booming industrial o utput. With spectacular grow th rates of over 10 per cent for the last five years, China's economi c footprint in Africa h as certainly presented resource-rich co untries with a comm odi ty boom. M os t observers h ave agreed that the trade burs t has much to do with China's export-led growth strategy that is dependent on raw materials and o ther n atural resources to fuel its industrial output. This was confirmed by a 2006 De utsche Bank Report which highlighted that 'China w ill remain hungry for co mmodities over the coming 15 years' while also predicting tha t 'China's import dem and until 2020 ... will rem ain in lower do uble digits fo r m ost co mmodities over the next d ecade' (Trinh and Voss 2006, p. 1). If these predictions are acc urate, then China's comFigure 1 China ' s trade with Africa 1995-2008 60,000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----1 50,000--,=========~------------1

o China's imports from Africa B 40 ,000 - --I E • China's exports to Afri ca ~=>

30 ,000

------'==========-----~

20 , 000 ---------------~c_I

10,000 - - - - - - - - - - - - ----r_ _H

So urce: Wo rld Trade At las

26

MATURING ENGAGEMENT?

modity surge will indeed continue. But, then again, the ongoing financial crisis and the depressed global commodity prices have introduced new variables to the game, the implications of which are still being assessed, particularly for those African economies that are dependent on a single primary commodity. Nevertheless, at least until the current global crisis unfolded in the latter half of 2008, China's thirst for Africa's raw materials and other natural resources, underpinned by Beijing's booming domestic economy meant a greater demand for overseas exp loration. Figure 2 provides an overview of China's top imports from Africa.

Figure 2 China ' s top imports from Africa 1995-2008

• • D D

100%

~

80%

-

60%

I

Cotton

•

Raw ore

Manufactured goods

D

Oll and petroleum products

Tobacco

Di amonds

= • IIi i = = • _r-I • = ~

~

"" f-

~

....

-

f-

Wood

-

-

'-

-

-

'-

-

l-

r r-

r-

f-

f-

-

'-

-

'-

-

'-

r-

40% '--

'--

r-

20%

1995 1996 1997 1998 19992000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: World Trade At las

27

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Yet as is often commented, this trajectory in relations h as not only elevated Africa's geo-strategic significance but h as also increased the leverage of African governments with the traditional northern development partners. This may be seen as a p ositive outcome in terms of SouthSouth cooperation and a reordering of the global structure of p ower in which Africa co uld be a m ajor beneficiary. But it should be remembered that the South is a diffuse bloc with competing interests . This is best illustrated by the reality that the idea of South-South cooperation is as much about the North-South divide being repl aced by an East-South axis. And within this framework, Africa still remains on the fringes of the Southern co re with South Africa, perhaps, being the exception. This begs the question of w hether the interests of Africa intersect with the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which dominate this South-South frame work. Other examples illustrate this, none more so than the current global financial crisis. China is currently at a significant economic crossroads. The US$586 billion stimulus p ackage that President Hu Jintao's administration unveiled to keep the Chinese eco nomy buoyant by increasing domestic spending, increasing the social welfare net and expanding the public works infrastructure programme provides a critical platform to gauge where Africa fits in the bro ader scheme of things. For the optimists, this m ean s that China will continue to be interested in Africa's commodities if the ' new eco nomic d eal' is to boost the domestic economy in the way that is en visage d. The optimists believe that predicting a Chinese withdrawal from Africa is premature and short-sighted. It is indeed the case that the current d ownwar d trend in comm odity prices is cyclical, and therefore as China-Africa watchers we should be asking whether at the FOCAC summit in Cairo 2009 we will see any more of the big concessional loans that China had nego tiated with Angola and m ore recently with the Democratic Republic of Congo. This is important because from informal dis cussions with commentators in China it seems that there is no new money to invest. What we should be co ncentrating on is how China is affected by the finan cial meltdown. In this regard, we must bear in mind that China's US$2 trillion reserve is a ttr active but that China's sover28

MATURING ENGAGEMENT?

eign wealth fund, China Investment Corp, has been investing in western financial institutions like Blackstone which have not been insulated from the crisis. And now Chinese financial pundits are cautious not only about the losses they may have incurred but also about the economic slowdown in the US and the EU. This has had a domino effect in China where there have been factory closures and retrenchments due to weaker global demand. As a result China is, indeed, currently more inclined to appease domestic pressures. And the question for us, the commentators and analysts, is what future impact will this have on the trajectory of Africa-China relations.

No signs of a scaling down The immediate signs seem to indicate that there is no scaling down of economic relations. In the first half of 2009, despite the global financial economic crisis, President Hu Jintao pledged during hi s friendship and cooperation visit to the Middle East and Africa in February 2009 th at it was indeed 'business as usual' for the Chinese, with more deals and contracts signed with African countries (Naidu 2009b). These included: • A US$280 million deal with Mauritania to extend the port at Nouakchott • Construction of a hospital in Nairobi • A US$77 million economic development package in Uganda • Installation of government internet in Senegal • A US$11.5 billion aid package to Senegal for sports, cultural and sanitation projects • An aid and cooperation agreement to further ties with Rwanda • A US$2.6 billion agreement to develop Liberia's iron ore minethe biggest ever investment in the West African nation • A new agreement with Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited to replace the nation's first communications satellite, which failed in orbit in November 2008 • US$l billion to revamp national stadiums in Angola for the 2010 Africa Cup of Nations.

29

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

According to Reuters Ne ws Agency (2009) neither h as China's thirst for African minerals slackened. If anything the glob al economic crisis h as renewed China's d eepening interest in Africa's ex tractive sector. Some of the deals to date include: • In January 2009, China Union signed a US$2.6 billion contract to develop Liberia's Bong iro n ore dep osits, estimated at 300 million tonnes of low-grade ore. The fir st iron ore p ellets are exp ected in mid-2010. • In May 2009 NFC Africa, a s ubsi diary of China Non-ferrous Metals Corporation (CNMC), was chosen by the Zambian government to op erate its Luanshya Copper Mines, which had to close in December 2008 due to the co llapse in global co pper pri ces. It was envisaged that the mine would reop en by late May 2009. • CNMC and Yunnan Copper Industry are about to commission a US$300 million co pper sm elter produ cing 150,000 tonnes p er year in Zambia's Chambishi to wn, which h as been tran sform ed into a tax-free economic zone to attract Chinese investment. • In April 2009 China granted Niger a US$95 million preferential loan for the SOMINA uranium mining op eration, a jOint venture between China Nation al Uranium Corporation and the Niger government. The mine is due to come on line in 2010. Therefore, it would seem from the trade and investments deals highlighted above that China is consolidating its African en gagements. This was reflected again during President Hu Jintao's 2009 visit and the subsequent operationalisation of the US$5 billion China-African Development Fund (CADF). Investments through the fund seem to indicate a timeframe of between eight and ten years (Marks 2009), which demonstrate that the honeymoon is not over just yet.

Where to from here? The an swer to the qu estion raised in the previous section wou ld therefore seem to be that China's en gagement in Africa in 2009 h as not ab ated and d oes not indicate a country whose economy is directly affe cted by the current financial crisis. Perhaps commentators 30

MATURING ENGAGEMENT?

should ask if there is any indication that future relations will be m arked b y less grandstanding and will reflect m ore what is doable and can be implemented. The first si gnal for such an inquiry w ill be the 4th FOC AC summit in Cairo in November 2009. In w h at h as becom e an annu al feature in China's new-year diplom atic calendar, Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi noted that 2009 m arks a significant assessm ent of the 2006 FOCAC commitments. In p arti cular he stressed, during his four-nation African tour, that understanding how far Beijing h as succeed ed in implem enting the eight m easures, announce d b y Presid ent Hu Jintao at the 2006 Beijing FOCAC summit, is critical if China is to d eliver on proj ect and investment goals (N aidu 2009a). By impli cation this m eans that China seems to be m aking a m ore pragm atic assessment of its engagem ent in Africa and the next steps. But by the sam e token China has rem ained steadfast in as suring African governments that Beijing is co mmitted to continuing its trade, investment and aid to the continent (N aidu 2009b). While these rhetorical affirm ations are supp osed to alleviate any fears am on gst Afri can governments about China's Afri can p oli cy, it mu st be highli ghted that China's impressive gro wth rates for 2009 have been d own graded to about 8 per cent by the World Bank. And w ith commodity prices still not completely out of the danger zon e, African governments are beginning to feel the pinch in their bud getary commitments to su ch items as publi c infrastructure and social service spending. Therefore, in the lead up to FOCAC 2009 it is difficult to predict that China's economic largesse w ill co ntinue as b efore in spite of the economic deals reflected above.

Striking the balance Perh aps the greatest ch allen ge facing China ri ght now is strikin g the b alan ce between dom estic challen ges and an aggressive overseas exp ansion. But striking a balance also h as to take into con sideration how Beijin g resp onds to the new Obam a administrati on. The interdep end en cy between the economies of the US and China will be important in stabilising the glob al fin an cial architecture and, not least, global security. A key point w ill be wh ether the new US presid ent w ill enforce 31

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

his campaign pledges of making sure that the US econom y is safeguarded against cheap Chinese imports and trade loopholes. This must certainly be a consideration for both sides and d efinitely raises the question of how mu ch China is willing to align with the new US administration to protect its own economy and workers. Put bluntly, President Hu Jintao's governme nt probably sees a priority in offsetting further social unrest and protests by advancing a more pragmati c agenda w ith the US and other Northern actors. This then raises the question of where Africa fits in to this new foreign p olicy emphasis in light of the global credit crisis. China certainly believes that working together w ith Africa is significant and, indeed, strategic when dealing with the crisis, esp ecially at the global institutional level. But China is also aligned to work m ore closely with its Northern partners to protect its n ational interest. And right now the financi al crisis is as much a nation al issue as it is a foreign p olicy consideration for Beijing. In view of this and as I have argued elsewhere, China's aspiration s domestically and globally 'mean that it needs to calibrate and augment its relations with Washington', which ' may sometimes be inconsistent with Africa's interests' (Naidu and Mbazim a 2008, p. 759). Therefore, as much as China offers a new leverage for African countries vis-a.-vis the North, Beijing's own assessment of the global structure of power and its economic interdependence in this international configuration m ay not always be a comfortable fit for Africa. This was further illustrated in November 2008 w h en the G20 m et to discuss the financial crisis . African countries felt irked by their marginalisation. This was definitely an opportunity missed by China to insist o n greater African representation, apart from South Africa (Marks and Naidu 2008).

The development impasse? The conundrum remains whether China is 'Africa's n ew partner in developm ent' or if it is 'Africa's neocolonialist'. Th e real thrust of the latter claim centres on the African response. Th e debate is really about whether Africa's leverage from its Chinese engagement vis-it-vis its northern d evelopment p artners is viable. Palat (2009), however, argues to the contrary that 'neither the Chinese co rporations nor the Chinese government h ave done anythin g 32

MATURIN G EN GAG EMENT?

to benefit trade union s or socia l justice m ovem ents in Afri ca'. This, indeed, d em on strates that the ' leverage' argument m ust d istinguish between the actors we are discussing: Afric an leaders, wom en, soldiers, businessmen, children, workers, rich peo ple, p oor peop le? Ap art fro m su ch vertical differen ces within Afri can society, h orizontal differen ces also h ave to be taken into con sideration since African s from different countries and across varied social fabrics certainly d o not h ave the same exp erien ce of interacting w ith China. Certainl y, these issues are critical in contextu ali sing the m ore p ractical elem ents of the China-Afri ca en gagem ent. They also raise the question of whether the relation ship with China creates an en abling en vironment for d evelopment or perp etuates cl ass co nfli ct and wid ening inequ alities within African societies. In line w ith the question raised at the beginning of thi s ch apter, it is app arent that the China-Africa en gagem ent h as a class dynami c to it. The very n ature of the state-to-state en gagem ent en genders an elite p act. In Afri ca the elite rep resents both the ruling cl ass and the private sector. Therefore the assumption that China's en gagem ent in Africa can lead to m eaningful d evelopment tend s to oversimplify the class contr ad ictions and widening inequalities this relation ship embed s. This can be felt and seen at variou s levels of African society. The ten sion s wh ich have been n oted in Z ambia and elsew here across the continent w here Chinese workers h ave either been kidnapped (in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria) or killed (in the oil-ri ch area of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia) h ave less to d o w ith anti-Chinese sentiment than with fru stration s d irected at African p olitical and econ omic elites becau se of the skewed n ature of wealth accum ulation w ithin the African state. A case in p Oint is the Angolan oil-b acke d deal. Co rkin (2008, p . 111 ) n otes that the creation of the sp ecialised Gabinete de Reco n strUl;ao Nacion al (GRN) in the Presiden cy was sp ecially establish ed to m an age p arts of the Chinese cre dit line and to exec ute the large co nstruction projects. Yet, sh e hi ghlights that there is little tran sp aren cy in the m an agement and tendering process w hile it is not clear how the revenue from the oil receipts is being in vested to revitalise the co untry's ailing econ om y (Corkin 2008). Speculation and in some cases genuine co ncern by internation al agencies like 33

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

Global Witness and non-governmental agencies in Luanda point to President Dos Santos and other political elites' expansive business interests, which includes control of strategic sectors ranging from telecommunications to energy. And herein lies the dilemma: transparent management of Africa's natural resources by political and economic elites and accountability to Africa's people for the revenue from these resources. Therefore, as Clapham notes, 'one very important reason why China's involvement in Africa has been so widely welcomed and readily accommodated has been that it fits so neatly into the familiar patterns of rentier statehood and politics with which African rulers have been accustomed to maintain themselves' (2006, p. 3). There are populist tendencies in the discourse that blindly interpret China's deepening engagement in Africa as creating a new framework, a 'Beijing Consensus'. But these claims seem somewhat disconnected from the political realities within Africa, not to mention the manifested socio-economic inequalities that China's impressive economic prosperity has unleashed in today's Chinese society. Seemingly, then, the development impasse is really about whether China's dramatic arrival in Africa's markets has created any substantial change in the continent's relationship to the global economy as a primary producer and supplier of raw materials. More importantly is whether this shift has realigned the political economy and social dynamics of the African state. Unfortunately, the answer remains complex with empirical evidence only assessing one side of the development conundrum, and much remaining for African governments to do in order to pursue an industrial policy that makes for global competitiveness. These issues were further complicated by the financial shock in global markets.

Conclusion: crystal ball gazing? The outcomes from FOCAC 2009 certainly represent the way forward on China-Africa engagement. China has recorded a spectacular trade record of US$106.8 billion with Africa since FOCAC 2006, but it is difficult to gauge whether China w ill do the same over the next three years leading up to FOCAC 2012, especially 34

MATURING ENGAGEMENT?

w ith the uncertainty in glob al trade and oil prices. Perhap s China co uld take co mfort from its achievement in meeting the US$100 billion two years ahead of the 2010 p rojection. Second , as African governments begin to ex perien ce the full impact of the glob al fin ancial crisis as a result of lower remittances and export earnings, social justice protests will also increase in African societies, especially around unfulfilled promises. This means that China w ill also h ave to assess how the political instability m ay affect its trade, investment and aid interests in Africa, especially w here there ar e populist leaders ch ampioning the rights of the economically m arginalised who use the threat of China trying to steal n ation al resources as a pretext for their aggression . At the same time, Beijing will be h ard presse d to justify to its own d om esti c constituency w hy it is sending money abroad when there are serious social ch allen ges at home. This lead s to the third con sideration . With the commodity boom still subject to cyclical swings, Chinese corporations may n ot h ave the headline earnings that they on ce enj oyed and therefore co nsider their operations more cautiou sly. This is despite the current b argain hunting by Chinese companies and the en co uragem ent they receive fr om Chinese authorities to increase their overseas involvem ent. Finally, in so far as China may be seeking to strengthen its relation s with African co untries, it is not lost on Beijing that it is n ot just competing with traditional actors across Africa but also with the new set of emerging powers from the South. Therefore, w hile it m ay be accurate to be ca utiously op timisti c about Africa's con tinuing China en gagem ent it sho uld be pointed out that African governments have also com e to realise that the array of emerging actors provide op portunities in instances where Beijing may not be able to deliver on its economi c and investment largesse. So while attention is currently focused on whether China w ill co ntinue to assist in Africa's development agenda, Africa is also becoming susceptible to the persuasions of India, Brazil, Russia, the Gulf States and rising Southeast Asian giants such as Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. This should lead observers to assess h ow China may react to these em erging actors in Africa. Thus as China and African lead ers prep are for the 4th FOCAC summit it wo uld seem that forging a new con sensus has already 35

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

become the them e for the next three years. This was p articularly highlighted during Presid ent Hu Jintao's 2009 African to ur w here h e delivered a keynote address entitled 'Work together to op en a new ch apter of China-Africa frie nd ship' at the University of Dar es Salaam . His speech wove together China's tr adition al friendship and the forging of a new con sen sus between Beijing and Africa. It indicated how Beijing seeks to cem ent its ties with the co ntinent, in a ch an ging glob al env ironment of instability and eco nomi c uncertainty, b ased on a five-p oint p ro p osal that was to co ncretise this new con sen su s: 1 Cem enting solidarity and extending mutual support to cop e with the internation al fin ancia l crisis 2 Improving mutu al trust and co n solidating the p olitical fo und ation of China and Africa's tradition al friend ship 3 Lifting up the mutu ally beneficial and prac tical trade and econ omi c coop eration between C hina and Africa 4 Widening exch an ges and deep ening cultural and education al coop eration 5 Collaborating closely and stepping up coordination in international affairs . At a cursory level the speech and the five-p oint plan seem ed to m erely reiterate previo us historical rhetoric w ithout offering anything substantial. But on closer examination it revealed a subtle shift towards reinforcing a m ore pragm atic China-Africa coop eration that entailed : • Greater m an agem ent of relation s within the context of the economic crisis • A m ore foc u sed app roach to assist Africa by working thro ugh the co ntinent's multilateral agen cies of the AU and NEPAD • Further debt can cellation s that can accelerate Africa's socioeconomic d evelopment • Definin g a m ore foc u sed social corporate resp on sibility culture that would enhan ce job opportunities and be tter relation s with local communities • Stren gthening m ore people-to-p eople contact (Marks and N aidu 2009). 36

MATURING ENGAGEMENT?

This new consensus, however, is already being challenged by ano ther set of risks, namely agri cultural land grabs, new forms of debt risk - with Angola recently negoti ating another loan from Beijing - climate change, environmental con cerns and what is becoming an era of mercantilist alli ances between transnational corporations from the So uth (i.e. the Standard Bank-ICBC d eal) in anticip ation of breaking the Euro-American economi c hegemo ny. Therefore, much will be anticipated aro und the outco mes of FOCAC 2009. Will Beijing continue with its large-scale co ncessional finance, which seeks to push ahead with its reso urce infrastructure fundin g that enables more access to raw m aterials, or will we see a more temp ered Beijing trying to be more focused on the human development aspects of its en gagement? This chapter is a revised versio n of the conference paper originally presented in April 2008 and was updated in October 2009.

Bibliography Alden, Chris (2007) China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon, London, Zed Books. A mpiah, Kweku and Na idu, Sanusha (eds) (2008) Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu N atal Press. Clapham, Christopher (2006) 'Fitting C hina in', Brenthurst Discussion Paper 8/2006, Johannes burg, Brenthurst Foundation. Cork in, Lu cy (2008): 'A ll 's fair in loa ns a nd war: the d evelopment of ChinaA ngola relations', in Ampiah and N aidu (ed s) Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu N atal Press. Ma rks, Stephen (2009) 'China and Obama: small clouds on a bright horizon?', Pambazuka News, no. 416, 22 January, http://www.pambazuka. org/e n/ca tegory/a fri ca_china/53462, accessed 6 November 2009. Ma rks, Stephen and N aidu, Sanusha (2008) 'China announces a US$586 bn inves tment programme', Pambazuka News, no . 406, 13 November, http:// www.pamba zuka.org/en/ca tegory/a fri ca_china/51959, accessed 6 November 2009. Naidu, Sanusha (2009a) 'China's a nnua l New Year A fri can safari ', Pambazu ka News, no. 415, 15 Ja nu ary, http: //www.pambazuka.org/en/ ca tegory/africa_china/53255, accessed 6 November 2009. Naidu, Sanusha (2009b) 'Beijing reaffi r ms its A frica n agenda', Pambazuka News, no . 416, 22 Ja nuary, htt p://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/ africa_china/53461, accessed 6 November 2009. Naidu, Sanus ha and Mbazima, Daisy (2008) 'China-Afri can relatio ns: a

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CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA new impulse in a chang ing continenta l land sca pe', Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futul'e Studies: Special Issue on Emerging Futures, vol, 40, no , 8, pp, 748-{;l, Palat, Ra vi Arv ind (2009) 'Rise of the Global South and the e me rging contours o f a new world o rder', in Pieterse, Jan Nederveen and Rehbein, Boike (ed s ) Globalization and EmCl'ging Societies: Development and Inequality, Bas ings toke, UK, Pa lg ra ve Mac milla n, Reuters News Agency (2009) 'Factbox - China's qu est for A frica 's minerals', Reuters Africa, 21 May, http://aLreuters,com/article/d rcNews/ id A FLL421l 75 2009 0 5 2 1?s p~ tru e, accessed 6 November 2009, Tay lor, Ian (2006) China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, New York, Ro utled ge, Trinh, Ta m a ra a nd Voss, Silja (2006) 'China's commodity hunger: implica tio ns for A frica and Latin Am erica', Deutsche Bank Research: C hina SpeCia l Report, 13 June, http://www.d bresearch.com/PROD!DBR_ IN TERNET _DE-PROD/PROD0000000000199956,pd f, accessed 6 November 2009,

38

Matching China's activities with Africa's needs Sanou Mbaye

China's emergence as a world power Coo peration between China and Africa sho uld be seen in the historic al context created by China's revolution in 1949 and the ensuing support that Africa h as received from the Chinese in its o wn struggle for em ancip ation and d evelopment. Fo r centuries China stood as a leading civilisation, outpacing the res t of the world in the arts and sciences. But in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the co untry bec ame beset by civ il unrest, m ajor famines, military d efeats and foreign occ up atio n. After the Second World War, the communists under Mao Zedo n g established a co mmand, planned and controlled eco nomy whi ch en sured China's sovereignty and laid the fo undations on w hich, after 1978, Mao's successor, Den g Xiaoping, and the o ther leaders who follo w ed in his foo tste ps built a m arke t-oriented form of economic development. By 2000 o utput h ad quadrupled and fo r much of the po pulation living standards have continued to improve dram atically.

Africa's economic heritage A s fo r Africa, its glorio us p ast - which h as w itnessed the birth of su ch great empires as that of Kush, Gh an a, M ali, Son gh ai and the Zulu kingdo m - was blighted by centuries of slave trading and co lonialism . Likewise, following the Berlin Conference in 1884 and w h at Leo p old II, the king of Belgium, dubbed ' the sh aring of Africa's cake', western co untries assumed exclusive rights over the co untries of sub-Saharan Africa . For African co untries, centuries of struggle for p olitical and eco nomi c freed om to liberate 39

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

themselves from co lonial rule, remove ap artheid and win their independence did not dent this domination. These countries h ave co ntinued to be held hostage by the West through a combination of comprehensive and exploitative trade deals, western market access restrictions, d enial of b orrowing on international markets, aid addiction, restrictive dom estic investment, crippling debts, p olitical meddling and military intervention.

China's African market penetration strategy China' s agenda This fro zen balance and imbalance of p ower is bein g challenged, h owever. China h as develop ed a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for its engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. Beijing's appro ach to d oin g business with Africa is b ased on an agenda articulated around the key areas of p olitics, diplom acy, investm ent, trade deals, energy, aid packages, debt forgiveness, military assistance, health, education and tourism.

China' s African political goals With regard to politics, alongside a stated dedication to the principle of non-interference in each o ther's internal affairs, China is also tapping into the historical exp erien ces it shared w ith Africa, w ith both having long sympathised with and supported each other in their struggle for n ational liberation. The China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) was found ed in 2000 to promote stronger trade and investment relations between China and African co untries b oth in the public and private sectors. The FOCAC has produced two m inisterial m eetings and four m ee tings of senior officials with the view to increasing trade and investment. At FOCAC m eetings in August 2005, China's pro position to upgrade the m ee ting in 2006 to the level of heads of state was welcomed by p articip ants originating from 46 different African co untries, toge ther with observers from six African regional organisations.

40

CH INA 'S ACTIVITIES, AFRICA'S NEEDS

China' s diplomatic agenda in Africa On the diplomatic front, since 2004 Chinese dignitaries such as President Hu Jintao, Vice-President Zeng QUinghong and the National Peop le's Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo have v isited many African countries on several occasions, including Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, Senegal, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia. This flurry of activity has three objectives: 1) The consolidation of the security of energy and mineral supplies; 2) Curtailing Taiwan's diplomatic ties in Africa - four of the 23 countries that have full diplomatic representation s in Taipei are African (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome & Principe and Swaziland); and 3) Increasing China's burgeoning influence around the globe.

China' s investment in Africa China has invested billions of dollars in Africa in sectors such as oil production, mining, transportation, electricity production and transmission, telecommunications and other infrastructure. China's largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), has purchased a 20 per cent stake in Standard Bank, South Africa's largest bank by assets and earnings, for US$5.5 billion. This represents the largest foreign direct investment (FOI) in the country to date. Chinese representatives also advanced US$2.27 billion to acquire a 45 per cent stake in one of Nigeria's offshore oilfields and promised to invest an additional US$2.25 billion in field development. Angola, which currently exports 25 per cent of its oil production to China, was granted a US$2 billion loan in exchange for a contract to supp ly Beijing with 10,000 barrels of oil per day. This loan agreement stipulated that the loan coupled with an aid package would be reinvested to build schools, roads, hospitals, bridges, offices, a fibre-optic network, a training programme for telecommunications workers and 1,300km of railways. The Tanzanian railway was similarly funded by China. Sudan, which now supplies 7 per cent of China's total oil imports, has benefited from the largest Chinese investments. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds a 40 per cent sh are in the Greater Nile Petroleum Company and has invested US$3 billion in refinery and pipeline construction in Sudan. China's foreign direct investment stock in Africa repre41

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

sented US$900 million of the continent's US$15 billion total in 2004. It had reached US$1.6 billion by 2005, with 674 Chinese public companies present in 48 African countries and involved in sectors as varied as mining, precious timber, telecommunications, fishing and oil exp loration. Thousands of projects are underway, and the countries that have attracted the bulk of China's FDI are Sudan (the largest recipient), Algeria and Zambia. China also regards the travel and tourism industry as having the p otential for tremendous opportunities for generating revenues, creating jobs and alleviating poverty. Learning from each other, China and Africa will draw upon each other's experience in developing their respective travel and tourism industries by encouraging investments in education, culture and capacity development. Such collaboration is already paying dividends, with China's increased involvement in Africa's transportation industry catalysing the construction of roads, railways, seaports and airports.

China' s trade and cooperation with Africa Sino-African trade grew by 700 p er cent during the 1990s, doubling to US$18.5 billion from 2000 to 2003. According to figures released in Nove mbe r 2007 by the Chinese trade ministry, trade between China and Africa has r eached US$52.3 billion. It is in large part due to China's burgeoning activities that the very serious coll apses in economic growth in Africa that characterised the 1970s, 1980s and even the early 1990s are being reversed. A large number of African countries have begun to show sustained eco nomic growth. In addition to inves tment and trade, China cancelled US$10 billion in bilateral debts from African countries. Since the 1960s, over 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47 African states, treating nearly 180 million patients. China also hosts thousands of African workers and students in Chinese unive rsities and training centres. In 2004, China contributed 1,500 peacekeepers to UN missions across Africa, including Liberia and the Democratic Re public of Congo (DRC). Furthe rmore, Beijing sends military trainers to train their Afr ican counterparts. Recently, China reaffirmed its inte ntion to strengthen military co llaboration with Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan. 42

CH INA 'S ACTIVITIES, AFRICA'S NEEDS

The downside of China 's involvement in Africa

There is no doubt that China's emergence onto the African scene is good for the continent. As a new actor willing to invest, it a lso gives Africans an opportunity to chart a different path to social and economic development than the unfettered capitali sm forced upon them by western countries. But there are nonetheless some question marks to be raised about the more controversial aspects of Chinese's frantic activities in sub-Saharan Africa, to whic h I will now turn.

Arms sales One such aspect relates to weapons sales to Africa. African countries are regu lar buyers of Chinese weapons and military equipment. Between 1955 and 1977, China sold US$142 million worth of military equipment to Africa, and the pace of sales has picked up significantly since then. China's arms sales to Africa made up 10 per cent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent between 1996 and 2003. China's clients include: • Sudan: According to the aerospace industry journal, Chinese sales to the Khartoum government include US$100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes and 12 supersonic F-7 jets. Experts say any military air presence exercised by the government - including the helicopter gunships reportedly used to terrorise civilians in Darfur - comes from China. • Equatorial Guinea: China has provided military training and specialists in heavy military equipment to the leaders of the tiny West African nation, whose oil reserves per capita approach and may even exceed those of Saudi Arabia. • Ethiopia and Eritrea: China sold Ethiopia and its neighbour, Eritrea, an estimated US$l billion worth of weapons before and during their border war from 1998 and 2000. • Burundi: In 1995, a Chinese ship carrying 152 tonnes of ammunition and light weapons intended for the army of Burundi was refused permission to dock in Tanzania. • Tanzania: According to the Overseas Development Institute, China has delivered at least 13 covert shipments of weapons labelled as agricultur al equipment to Dar es Salaam.

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• Zimbab we: The Zimbab wean government ordered 12 FC-1 fi ghter jets and 100 military vehicles from China in late 2004 in a deal worth US$200 million, ex perts say. In M ay 2000, China rep ortedly swapped a shipment of small arms for eight tonnes of Zim b abwean ivo ry. In su ch an unstable region as Afric a, alread y saturated w ith d ead ly weaponry u sed against civ ilian s across the co ntinent, po uring m ore guns in this volatile situation can no t be welcom e. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wen zh on g's reply to these con cerns that 'business is business and Chin a sep arates business fro m p olitics' so und s rather cynical. This is esp ecially so if we co nsider that Chinese troops are p articip ating in p eacekeeping mission s in the co ntinent to avert these very killin gs.

World power rivalry Ch ina, within a d ecad e, h as overhauled the b alan ce of p ower in Africa, challen gin g the US as the first economic and trading p artner of the continent and relegating Fran ce and Great Britain resp ectivel y to third and fourth r ank. This on slaught on western interests did not go d own well w ith China's co mpetitors. Fran ce or dered all its diplom atic mi ssion s and m ajor comp anies in Africa to file a rep ort on China's activ ities in the region . Former British Prim e Minister Tony Blair cam e up w ith a 'Commi ssion for Africa', w hich his peers failed to end orse in spite of the fact that Blair 's initiative in no way distan ced itself from free m arket liber alism - it was its very embodiment, esp ecially with its NEPAD-induced (New Partnership fo r Africa's Development) beatification of the private sector. Fran ce, the d ominant architect of Euro pean p olicy in Africa, was opp osed to Blair 's willin gness to phase out Europ ean agri cultural subsid ies, subsidies which are driving Afri can farm ers into abj ect p overty as a res ult of the Europ ean Union's Common A gricultural Policy (CAP). As for the US, its policy toward s Africa can be summed up as ' d o as we say and not as we do', sti ckin g to its aid p ackage tied to condition alities around eco nomic liberalisation, the deregulation of capital m ovem ents, suppression of subsidies, liquidation of public assets, bud get au sterity, 'good governan ce', eradication of corruption, and p rom o tion of dem ocracy. In the era of Abu

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Ghraib, G uantan am o Bay, rendition fli ghts, m assive corp orate fin ance mism an agem ent, disastrou s m onetary poli cy, an econ om y in the d oldrums, murky p arty p olitical financing, lavish subsidies to US farmers and the Bush administr ation 's failure, at the rest of the world 's expen se, to put its fin an ces in order, this type of lecturing seem s d aily m ore Kafk aesque. As the p oor state of Afric an s testifies, the liberal m edicine disp en sed to sub-Sah ar an Africa for d ecades under the gUidance of the Bretton Woo d s institution s (the IMF and the World Bank) h as dem on strated its limits.

The potential risks of confrontation O il represents a lifesaver for all industrialised co untries. Until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on America's soil, they h ad taken for granted free access to a stead y oil supply with, in addition, the latitude to be able to control its tradin g pri ce. Since then, the Middle East has becom e a p o wder keg, just as Latin American oil and gas p ro ducers su ch as Venez uela and Bolivia are slipp in g away from the US. The Bush administration and its cortege of neocons are so fixated on the Middle East as to b e un able to do anythin g about it, w hile Russia under Vl adimir Putin's co ntinued influen ce is u sing its gas and oil as an eco nomi c weap on and p olitical too l to recap ture its lost great power status. Con sequently, Africa is the only so ft target left for mineral reso urces pred ators to b attle it o ut. The USA, which imports 1.5 million b arrels of oil p er d ay from West Africa, h as established its own strategic b ases to safegu ard o utputs. Under the guise of the' war on terror ', the US h as set up the African Crisis Resp on se Initiative (ACRI) and the Djiboutib ased Tran s-Sah aran-Counter-Te rrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Likewise, the aircraft carrier D wight D. Eisenhower p atrols the Indian O cean to pro tec t the US's supply. For its p art, Fran ce m aintains five military b ases in Ivory Coast, Djibo uti, Gab on, Senegal and Chad, with 10,000 m en placed in p ermanent state of alert to pro tec t French interests in the co ntinent. With all these occupying armies, another area of con cern is the risk of som e kind of a p etrol-induced cold war in the region . But the last thing Africa wants is to be the b attlegro und in an econ omi c and p olitical cold-war style confronta tion . Given that oil represents a virtual life and dea th question for these econ omies, such a conflict co uld even escala te to an o pen military confronta45

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

tion between these latent aggresso rs, but co nveniently for them, in a continent far from their own shores w here each one of them h as a m ilitary presen ce. Africa kn ows fro m p ast exp erien ce that there are no friend s amo n g other co untries, only interests. It is a huge p aradox for both the West and China that it is the forces of capitalism that h ave p ermitted this d evelopment. In a way, both the West and China are trapped w ithin them - w hether throu gh a multi-p arty or on e-p arty system - a testimon y to the p ower, the ad aptability and the m on strosity of free m arket forces.

China 's stand on Darfur The Darfur conflict is a perfect illustration of this fear. In sp ite of its decl ared faith in non -interference, China, becau se of its exten sive interest in Sudanese oil, continues to im p ede any resolution at the UN Security Council over p otential san ction s again st the Arab ruling class of the Sudanese governm ent, wh ose troop s and government-align ed m ilitias are p erpetrating genocid e against Sud an's black citizen s, u sing Chinese-m ade helicopter gunships, b ased at airstrip s m aintained by Chinese oil comp anies.

The human rights equation Dem ocrati c d eficit s and poor hum an ri ghts record s beset both Afri ca and Chin a. Econom ic growth w ithout soci al ju sti ce is just anoth er way of den yin g the m ajority of th e p eop le their rights to d ecent livin g conditions for th e benefit of a tiny ri ch minority.

China and Africa ' s corrupt business culture Combined with the ramp ant corruption plaguing Afri ca, the trad ition of bribery en shrined in the way China d oes business co uld pro duce an explosive chemistry, hi ghly d am aging to the antico rruption camp aign underway in the African region . It com es as no su rprise that the m ost invited and fe ted Afri can head s of states in Beijing are Om ar Bon go O ndimba and Denis Sassou Ngu esso, two leaders wh ose corrupt practices h ave b een w id ely d ocumented and reported, m aking headlines in the world press and earning a three-m onth suspen sion for the Gabonese news o utlet w hi ch d ared to rep ort on these practices. 46

CHINA 'S A CTIVITIES, AFRI CA 'S NEEDS

China' s influence on social conflicts in Africa Social co nfli cts re lated to co ntrov ersial C hinese practices in Afri ca h ave also beset co untries su ch as Zambia, Sen ega l, So uth Afri ca, Ni geri a, and Cam eroon . In Zambia, the C hinese publi c com pany NFC Africa, a sub sidiary of the C hinese state-owned Foreign En gineerin g & Con stru ction Comp an y, in 1998 bou ght an 85 per cent stake in the Chambi si copper mine. Ten sion s between the n ew owners and their African employees are rife becau se o f low sa laries and p oor work condition s, conditions which, in 2005, cost the life of 49 miners. The followin g year a p oli ce anti -ri ot squ ad repressed a rall y of wor kers p ro testin g against the lack of secu rity, lea din g to the death of one p rotester w hil e fi ve others were hospitalised . So severe was th e situ ati on th at in th e presid enti al electi on of 2006, one of the candid ates, Mi chae l Sa ta, even ran on an explicitl y anti -Chinese camp aign. Chin a th rea tened to sever eco nomi c ti es with Zambi a were Sa ta to be elected. This should be a m atter of con cern for all Afri ca n countries as a sign th at C hin a w ill not hesitate to m ake forays into African p oliti cs if it fee ls its eco nomi c interests are th reatened.

Chinese-African trade im balances China's 'win-w in' p aradi gm - according to which no Chinese p artner can turn o ut to b e a loser - so unds increasingly hollow. Indeed, it is even regarded by som e as little different to a disguised n eocolonial m arket pen etration strategy. African co untries sell raw m aterials to China w hile buying m anufactured goo d s from Beijing. This trade p attern reinforces Africa's role as a provid er of b asic produ cts in the world labo ur division . The China-Africa coop eration m odel should, ideally, lead to economic m odernisation and diversifi cation . In South Africa, the m ain Chinese p artner on the continent, this situation has led COSATU, the co untry's p owerful trade union, to level threats of boycotting the trad ers of Chinese products accused of co ntributing to the increase of unemploym ent. The sam e tune is being played in the streets of African capitals su ch as Dakar, filled w ith cheap Chinese shoes and drugs while textile factories are on the brink of clos ure due to Chinese competition . Ano ther area of concern is the p erceived Chinese practice of importing lab our from m ainland China and of

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flooding African markets with goods of extremely poor quality, in stark contrast to the selected articles of particularly good quality destined for western markets. This sounds distinctly like discriminatory trade practices. African products face marked competition from low-cost imported Chinese goods, particularly in the textile sector. The growth of the informal sector is also stifled, provoking acute tensions as Chinese traders drive their African counterparts out of business. Factories are closed and jobs are lost.

China' s contribution to Africa ' s growth However, no matter how valid these criticisms levelled against China's activities in Africa, they are only too familiar to all those acquainted with African affairs. They are the same criticisms that are levelled against the western powers, the IMF, the World Bank, co lonialism an d indeed much of the policy around Africa and its people. In the case of China, if these criticisms contain some unpalatable truths, they tend, nonetheless, to overlook the fact that it is China's activities in the continent that have improved the economic outlook for Africa after a decade of an average growth of 5.4 per cent, a rate similar to those in the res t of the developing world and which today actually exceeds the rate of growth in most of the world's advanced economies.

A unified approach to Africa's cooperation with China Whatever China's goodwill towards Africa, it remains purely a great power looking after its own interests, and it is up to Africans to do the same. When 48 African heads of state met with the Chinese leadership in 2006 in Beijing, they arrived without a concerted common development programme. As usual they came to listen and rubber-stamp whatever proposal China had in store for their respective countries. That was a sh ame, for here was a moment to put to the Chinese, in order to secure their backing, a blueprint development programme for the continent whose main objectives would be to rebuild black people's identity, an identity shattered by hundreds of years of slavery and colonial48

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ism . Such a blueprint wo uld en able African countries to break free o f the finan cial straitj acket in w hi ch they a re being held hostage b y weste rn countries a nd their institutio ns, and to arti cula te the p o litical, social, econo mic and m one tar y p o licies tha t wo uld lead eventually to a cu sto m s uni on, the establishment of a co mmon m ar ket and the integr ation o f their econo mies. These are the preconditio ns to fulfil for the unification of the contine nt a nd its ren aissan ce - a very lon g and costly endeavour tha t need s stron g p o litical will, reso u rces, solid arity, security, stability a nd time. Only p eople tha t subscribe to a common ide ntity can unite . The m ayh em that h as befallen bl ack peo ple over the centuries h as altered durably their identity and their cap acity to r elate to each o the r. With w hite p eople h aving institutio n alised skin colo ur and fu elled racism that goes with their quest for d o minan ce, the re is a need for black p eople to learn to rebuild their identity alo n g the co lour line.

Setting up an African confederation of raw materials It is inco mpre hen sible, and contra ry to human logic, tha t an Africa endo w ed w ith such unimaginable rich es sho uld be starved o f wealth. These riches - raw m a terials and miner als - should be harnessed thro ugh the establishment of a confed e r a tion o f rawmaterial p roducers w hose m ain objec tives wo uld be to regula te the price o f these r a w m a terials and minerals, to give to Africa the m eans and the lever age to break free from neo libe ral policies, and to provide the m assive fin ancial reso urces necessa ry for the implem enta tio n of refo rms leading to a custo ms union, a co mmo n marke t, and to politi cal and m o n e tary union. C hina co uld be an ideal p artne r to establish this cartel. It wo uld be a stake holder in the proj ect and, in exch an ge, w o uld be g uarantee d the steady supply of the r a w m a terials, p e trol and o ther minerals it need s at a nego tia ted price, subject to review a t mutually agreed d eadlines. With regard to such an endeavo ur, it is worth m entioning the cartel that Russia, Ve nezuela and Iran are planning to set up to control the gas m arket, a cartel which Algeria and Boliv ia m ay also join.

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A blueprint for integrated African economic development Breaking away from the d eadly embrace of the West would also entail policies such as: • Support for regional trade: It is of paramount importance to boost regional trade, provide ex port fac ilities to the smalland m edium-sized local e nterprises in order to mitigate the d es tructive forces of globalisation and give absolute priority to an auto-centred r egional economic d evelopment strategy. • Structural and cohesion funds: Major socio-economic d isparities p ersist be tween the different countries of Africa. These funds would aim to reduce disparities in d evelopment and promote eco nomic and social cohesion. Their objectives would be to endorse the development and structural adjustment of countries whose d evelopment is lagging be hind, to support the economic and social conversion of areas experiencing structural difficulties, and to promote the adaptation and mode rnisation of education, training and employment policies . • Capital control: With the amount of capital transferred abroad exceeding the total amount of d e bt accumulated by African countries, capital contro ls have to be put in place to stem the unabated and unrestrained flight of capital that is transforming countries into n et creditors. • Protectionism: Whenever n ecessary, African countries should put in place protectionist m easures to help local producers to ward off foreign competition . • Subventions: Key sectors such as education, health, agriculture, nascent industries, social housing and scientific research have to be subsidised to provide African countries with sound economic and social foundations. • Technology transfer: A viable d evelopment strategy shou ld require from all investors the elaboration of partnerships that focus on technology transfe r and training in order to provide added value to local output and create for local entrepreneurs the requ ired conditions to compete favourably with their comp etitors. • Regulating foreign investments: This measure is necessary to channel foreign investments properly to where they are 50

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needed, to thwart speculation and to keep control of Africa's strategic assets. • Aid reform: 'Aid' as it stands is an ind ustry allowing the West to keep hostage Africa starve d, bound and addicted to handouts. This h as to change to make room for the financing of projects and programmes that are finan cially viable and econ omically justified. • Transition from informal to formal sectors: It is the informal sector that generates the bulk of the jobs created in Africa. It acco unts for 75 per cent of job creation in agriculture, the craft industry, mutual savings and auto-financing, social protection, and mutual primary health care. Econ omic revival requires the inj ection of massive micro-credit allocations into the informal sector to revitalise, m odernise and reinsert it into the economic mainstream while conserving its flexibility, creativity and vitality. • Sustainable industrial strategy: Originating directly from the ever-increasing consumption of petrol, climate change cannot be ignored. For both the West and China it is the forces of capitalism that have p ermitte d the prevailing world environmental crisis. Africa can, for its p art, sell its own petrol to earn export revenues. As for Africa's industrialisation, policy makers should bear in mind that Africa is a continent rich in energy. For example, two-thirds of the world's reserves of hydroelectric power are concentrated in Africa. These reserves of thousands of billions of kilowatt-hours represent about half the world's total reso urces. The Congo River alone holds more than 600 billion kilowatt-hours of annual reserves. The Sanaga (Cameroon) and the Ogooue (Gabon) hold half as much. Transpor ting electrici ty over lon g distances was impeded by a considerable loss of en ergy. Technological breakthroughs in energy transp ortation via high-voltage direct current, as opp osed to alternating current, have made it feasible to transport electricity over long distances without incurring great losses (loss in transit being only about 3 per cent per 1,000km). Consequently, carbon-free hydroelectric p ower must be the right choice as the principal source of energy for sub-Saharan Africa. Harnessing the hydroelec tric power of the Congo Basin alone thro ugh the Inga and Kisangani dams would be eno ugh to m ee t 51

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all African energy needs or to light the entire continent of South America. Establishing an African grid would allow for power from the DRC to be delivered to power-poor southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. What is relevant to hydroelectric power is also applicable to solar energy. The Sahara desert is a vast source of energy that can provide a carbon and a nuclear-free electrical future for all Africa and Europe, if not the world. However, given that 90 per cent of world reserves of hydraulic energy are concentrated in underdeveloped regions, that likel y solar farms would be located in the Sahara desert and that technologies harnessing concentrated solar power (CSP) and high-voltage direct current (HVDC) are the preserve of developed countries, there is a need for a strategic vision to be shared both by Africa, China, the developed and the developing countries to help build global energy and climate security.

Conclusion: pan-Africanism vs globalisation Karl Marx predicted that states wou ld wither away in anticipation of an idyllic communist society capable of auto-regu lating economic imbalances and empowering the masses. So he wou ld have been flabbergasted to see his prophecy realised, not by communism, but by the globaJisation of Anglo-American economic liberalism. Opening up markets to the free flow of capital, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, has rendered state power obso lete in all but a few countries in the world. Today's capital markets raise money for governments, corporate clients, and individual customers, manage pension fund investments, and bet on the level of interest rates or the stock market. Trading in derivatives by investment banks, hedge funds, and other market participants reaps huge profits for traders whi le depriving the real economy of productive investment and job creation. No population in the world is spared from the harsh treatment of such a system. Some two-fifths of the world's 6.5 billion people live in poverty - with a sixth in extreme poverty - and the world's black populations are the prime victims. The politics and economics of globalisation have stripped African countries of their assets and natural resources and left them with an unbearable debt 52

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burden. As a result, the p ercentage of Afri ca's p opulation living in extrem e poverty increase d fro m 41. 6 p er cent in 1981 to 46.9 p er cent in 2001. So far, the reinforcement of region al grouping su ch as the Association of Southeast Asian N ations (ASEAN, co mprised of Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, Singap ore, Thailand and Vietnam ), Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Urugu ay, Paraguay and Venezuela) and the Shan gh ai Coop eration Organisation (SCO, comprised of China, Kazakh stan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ) h as proved to be the m ost p otent weap on against the destructive forces of glob alisation. If African co untries want to ch allen ge the negative effects of glob alisation and end their plight, they will h ave to achieve their own unity alon g the lines of the development strategy spelled above. The recon struction and development of Africa can provide the world with the millions of jobs it need s to steer itself away fro m the imp ending social, economi c, finan cial and environmental disasters that are threatening the very existen ce of o ur lives and our pl anet. In this endeavour, African s w ill be b etter off emulating the Chinese in their unco mpromising stand over China's unity, their fierce n ation alism and their entrepreneurial spirit. It is therefore of p aram o unt importan ce that Afri can s put the building of a pan-African identity and their unity at the top of their agend a for progress. H owever important the am o unt of inves tment and trade w ith China m ay be, the bedrock o f lasting peace and p rosperity in the region rem ains stabili ty, a steady increase in trade between the co untries of the region, the rule of la w and the fulfilment of the p an-African dream of unity. Economic unity and social cohesion o ught to be the African Union's overarching priorities in dealing w ith the rest of the world, including China.

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Part II Macroeconomic dimensions

China's strategic relations with Africa Zeng Qiang Sin ce the intro du cti on of the Forum o n C hina- Afri ca Coop era tion (FOC AC) in 2000, C hina-Africa relation s have entered a n ew p erio d o f cooper ation, with both sid es striving fo r the d eve lop m ent o f a new typ e of strategic p artnership base d on principl es su ch as p o litical equ a lity and mutu al tru st, economic win-win coop er ation and cultural exc ha n ge. Sin cerity, equ ality, mutu al benefit, solid arity and co mmon d evelopme nt have becom e m ajo r them es for C hin a-Afri ca exchan ge and coo p era ti on and the drivin g fo r ce fo r the furth er d eve lopment of C hin a-Africa r elati on s . To better und erstand the char acteri stics o f present C hina-Afri ca stra tegic rela tio n s, a revi ew o f the d evelopment o f C hina-Afri ca relati on s is necessary.

A brief review of the past China and Afri ca's friend ship is embedded in a lo n g histo ry o f inter ch an ge. Sharing simil ar his tori cal experie n ces, C hina and Africa h ave lon g symp a thi sed w ith and s uppo rted each othe r in the struggle fo r n a tional liberatio n and inde p enden ce, and h ave forged a profo und frie ndship w hich has stoo d m a n y tests over the past 50 or so years . Fo r over h alf a century, the two sides h ave enj oyed close po liti cal ties, and the frequent exch an ge o f high level visits and peo ple-to-p eople co ntac t. Jus t as bilater al trad e and econo mic coo pera tio n h ave grow n rapidly, coo pe ra tion in o ther field s h as yielded goo d res ults, w hile con sulta tion a nd coordina tio n in inte rna tion al affairs h ave also inten sified. C hina h as provid ed assistan ce to the best o f its ability to African co untries, while African co untries h ave also re ndered stro n g support to C hina o n numero u s occasio ns. Thus o ne may say w ith co nfid en ce 56

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that the strategic relationship between China and Africa is the direct result of a long and intimate interaction. With the care and cultivation of both sides, such relations will be further developed and strengthened.

China-Africa relations The history of C hin a-Africa relations can be roughly divided into three periods, each of which has distinctive features. China-Africa relations (1949-79) The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era for China-Africa relations. China, following its liberation in 1949, actively sought the establishment of diplomatic relations with newly independent African countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence - mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. By the end of this period, China had established diplomatic relations with 44 newly independent African countries and had laid a solid foundation for the further development of China-Africa relations. In this period, China gave its unreserved support to the struggles of national liberation and for the independence of the African countries, and provided assistance to the best of its ability to these countries for their economic reconstruction and the consolidation of their national independence. This period saw numerous Chinese aid projects for African countries, among which the Tazara railway stood out most conspicuously and remained an everlasting testimony to China's sincere friendship towards Africa. One has to remember that China provided this multi-billion US dollar aid project when China itself was deep in economic difficulty, and a great many Chinese workers made huge sacrifices for the completion of this aid project. Quite a few of them never returned alive. At the same time, African countries gave their unwavering support for China in the international arena; the best example the Chinese are likely to cite is African suppor t for the restoration of 57

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China's seat at the UN. The great Chinese leader, the late Chairman Mao Zedong, once said with great gratitude that 'we are carried into the UN by African friends'. Of course, there are many other examples of African support the Chinese will never forget. However, we have to admit that the chief feature of ChinaAfrica relations in this period was strategic or politically oriented. Relations were affected by ideological differences, especially the Soviet factor. What is more, some Chinese domestic factors, such as the Great Cultural Revolution, had to some extent hindered the smooth development of China-African relations in the latter half of this period.

China-Africa relations (1979-99) In this p eriod, both China and Africa were undergoing profound changes. China was e merging from the d ecad e-long socio-political chaos and economic crisis brought about by the Great Cultural Revolution. Africa was forc ed to e ngage in the economic r eforms and structural adjustment d esigned by the World Bank and IMF, and later on ex pe rienced the shock waves of the multiparty d emocratisation movement that engulfed the continent in the early 1990s. In this p eriod, both China and Africa adjusted their respective orientations, took economic d evelopment as their first priorities and longed for closer economic cooperation as well as a be tter international environment and fairer world order in which to realise their resp ective d evelopment goals. As a res ult, this period witnessed the qUick growth of bilateral trade and dive rsification o f economic cooperation be tween China and Africa, and mutual support in the inte rnational arena for a just political and eco nomic order. China began its 'open door policy' in this period, becam e fully engaged in practical eco nomic reforms and put social as well as economic d evelopment at the centre of its national d evelopment str ategy, while ideology reced ed into the background. This was especially so after 1991, when China began to pursue its 'go ing out policy' aimed at exp loiting exte rnal marke ts and resources. In this period Africa becam e one of China's major policy targe t areas, where China fully engaged both politically and economically. Africa over this same period also began to be less obsessed

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with ideology and becam e m ore practical, trying desperately to achieve social and economic development and eliminate poverty. This resulted in sustained economic growth from the mid-19 90s. This p eriod saw the further d evelopment of China-Africa relations on the tr adition al basis of friend ship, with the emphasis on both economic and p olitical coo p eration, w hi ch presented some new features. First of all, bilateral trade relation s developed by leaps and bounds, with the total volume of trade reaching US$S.S billion in 1998, over six times m ore than that of 1979, when China first opened its d oor to the outside world. Meanwhile, the composition of China's ex p orts to Africa gradually shifted from m ainly labour-intensive products such as textiles and other li ght industrial products to machinery and electrical appliances with hi gher technology and added value. Second, high-level visits between the two sides became ro utine, with then President Jian g Zemin's to ur of six African n ations in 1996 highlighting the frequent visits of high-ranking Chinese officials bo und for Africa, just as m ore and more head s of African states and governments were visiting China each year. Third, the form of economic cooperation becam e diversified. In addition to traditional aid, China began to prov ide preferential loans of various kinds and actively engaged in contract bidding for construction in Africa. At the same time, China's dire ct investm ent in Africa was also beginning to increase. Fourth, African countries became m ore supportive than ever for the' one China policy' as well as China's stance and n ation al interests with regar d to the Taiwan issue. With the sincere support of African countries, China successfully defeated Taiwan's co untless attempts for official recognition and admission into international organisations. In 1998 alone, three African countries, including South Africa, normalised their relations with China, leaving only eight African countries which had diplomatic relations with the regim e in Taiwan. Fifth, China and Africa worked closely at the multilateral level, supporting each other 's causes and making concerted efforts to create a better international environment for their common d evelopment. Last but n ot least, African countries became more and more interested in China's success in economic d evelopment, as the 59

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'China model' or 'Beijing consensus' was increasing its appeal to African countries. In sum, China had a clear policy agenda toward Africa in this period with three clearly defined areas of interest, namely in the form of close cooperation with Africa in the international arena for a just wo rld order, the exploration of African markets and resources for China's socio-economic development, and gaining support from African countries on the Taiwan issue. In this period, China-Africa relations were becoming m ore intimate and balanced on the basis laid by the first generation of leaders of China and Africa, a basis which paved the way for the even greater development of China-Africa relations in the 21 st century.

China-Africa relations in the new century At the turn of the century, new circumstances, both domestic and international, brought China and Africa closer together and raised their bilateral relations to a new level. The idea of an African renaissance prevailed, with African co untries making every effort to achieve p eace and stability, pro mote socio-economic d evelopment and realise the Millennium Development Goals. Faced with the danger of Africa's marginalisation by the growth of globalisation, African countries, after m eticulous consultation and coordination, worked out their grand plan for African d evelopment, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). They also engaged themselves in the organisational construction of the African Union - which re placed the Organisation of African Unity in 2002 - so as to build a solid foundation for collec tive efforts to achieve commo n social and economic development and speak with one voice to the outside world. As Africans are taking their d es tiny in their own hands and can make their own choices, China has becom e the first choice of African countries for closer cooperation. As for China, after more than two decades of fast economic growth, it continues to consolidate its position as a rising p o wer. China began to assume more and more international responsibilities and need ed to work out a grand international strategy to accompany its peaceful rise. The common destiny of China as the larges t developing country and Africa as the continent with the

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most developing countries has brought the two closer together, as well as calling for both sides to coordinate their efforts for common development in a world dominated by developed, western powers. In light of these new circumstances, a new mechanism of cooperation is badly needed for China and Africa so as to facilitate the further development of China-Africa relations in the new century. At the international level, emerging from the chaos of democratisation and achieving sustained economic growth from the mid-1990s, Africa's strategic importance and great potential has begun to be felt by the world's powers, who at the turn of the century were busy adjusting their policies towards Africa. Africa is no longer neglected or marginalised. It is moving from the periphery to the world's centre-stage and becoming the prize for another round of fierce strategic contention, increasing Africa's strategic importance. It is against this background that FOCAC was introduced, with the common efforts of both China and Africa in 2000 to serve as a platform for collective dialogue, consultation and coordination. Over the past eight years FOCAC has held three ministerial conferences in 2000, 2003 and 2006, as well as a summit in 2006 in Beijing, in a process of consistently furthering China-Africa cooperation. With the mechanism provided by FOCAC, China-Africa cooperation has reached new heights and yielded even greater results.

Features of new China- Af rica strategic relations As we have seen, FOCAC was introduced in accordance with new circumstances, and served as a practical and effective platform for the common development of China and Africa in the new century. With the introduction of FOCAC, China-Africa relations entered another phase of development, which presented some entirely new factors. First, China-Africa relations have come to occupy an important place in China's external strategy as expressed in its first ever African policy paper, issued in January 2006, which announced to the world that China intended to develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa based on political equality, mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchange. 61

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Such a strategic p artnership is rooted in princip les of sincerity, friend ship and equality, mutual b enefit, recip rocity and co mmon p rosp erity, mutual su p p ort and close coo rdination, learnin g from each other and seekin g common development. During his visit to three African co untries in April 2006, Chinese Presid ent Hu Jintao presented a five-point p roposal for su ch a strategic p artnership, w hi ch con sisted of stren gthening p olitical m utu al trust, ex p anding w in-win economi c cooperation, increasin g cultural interaction, coop eration on security issues and close coordination in internation al affairs. Indeed, these proposals echoe d principles put forward in China's African p olicy p aper. Second, China-Africa bilateral coop eration h as becom e m ore d iversified and clearly d efined . This is reflected in China's African p oli cy p ap er, w hich identifies in greater detail the fo llowing m ajor areas of bilateral coop eration: • The political fi eld, wh ich includes hi gh-level visits, exch an ges b etween legislative bodies, exch an ges between political p arties, coo peration in international affairs and exch an ges between local governments • The economic fi eld, which includes tr ad e, in vestment, finan cial cooperatio n, agriculture coop eration, infrastru cture, reso urce exploration, coo peration on extrac tion, cooperation on tourism, debt reduction and relief, econ omic assistan ce, and multil ateral cooperation • The education, scien ce, cultural, health and social aspects, w hich include coo p eration on human reso urces development and education, on scien ce and technology coop eration, cultural exch an ges, cooperation on med icine and health, m edia cooperatio n, ad m inistrative coop eration, consular coo p eration, p eople-to-people exch an ge, en vironmental cooperation, di saster reduction, relief and humani tarian assistan ce • Peace and sec urity, which in clude military coop eration, confli ct settlem ent and peacekeeping op eration s, judicial and p oli ce coo peration, and n on -tradition al sec urity cooper ation . Thir d, the d evelop ment of China-Africa relation s is both well pl anned and m an aged . The p ast three mini sterial conferences and the Beijing summit h ave p ro du ce d a number of doc uments as well 62

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as follow-up plans w hich n ot only set the tone for China-Africa coop eration, but also promote the realisation of the goals set by each conference. During the Beijing summit in 2006, China anno unced important initiatives for further strengthening strategic relation s w ith Africa, as well as Ei ght Measures to help African co untries accelerate their development while further p romo ting China-Africa cooperation over the three years following the summit. These measures include: • Do ubling China's 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009 • Providing Africa with US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential buyer's credits • Setting up a China-Africa development fund worth US$5 billion • Building a conference centre for the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia • Cancelling debt owed by heavily indebted poor co untries and the least d eveloped co untries in Africa • Further opening up China's market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number of export item s from the 29 least d eveloped co untries in Africa that h ave no tariffs lev ied against them • Establishing several trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa and creating o ther measures to promote Sino-African cooperation in the socio-economic field. Furthermore, in the field of socia-cultural cooperation China h as promised to train some 15,000 African professionals, to send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa, to set up 10 special agri cultural technology d emonstration centres, to build 30 hospitals, to d on ate 300 million yuan in grants for anti-malarial medication, to build 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres, to dispatch 300 yo uth volunteers, to build 100 rural schools and to increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African stud ents from the current 2000 p er year to 4000 p er year by 2009. Thus on e can say with confidence that the proposals made by the FOCAC summit meeting in Beijing will be a maj or driv ing force towards mutu al! y b enefi cial coop eration between China and Africa. 63

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Fo urth, many African co untries h ave adopted a 'looking east' p oli cy, eager to learn from China's success in socio-economic d evelopment and longing for closer cooperation with China so as to improve their administration and governance. There h ave been frequent high-level visits by African ruling p arties to China, actively comparing notes and discussing w ith their Chinese counterp art, the Communist Party of China (CPC), abo ut how to run their respective countries well. M ean while, there h ave also been frequent high-level visits by the CPC to Africa, with the party en gage d in exchanging its administrative experiences w ith its African counterparts. Exch an ges between these p arties h ave been further con solid ated since the Beijing summit. Over the p ast 18 m onths, 40 d elegations or gro ups from the African ruling p arties v isited China, while abo ut 25 delegations or gro ups sent by the CPC visited Africa. Fifth, the development of China-Africa relations is accelerating with the focus on mutual prosp erity and an outcom e of win-w in, as some of the followin g satisfying results dem onstrate: • Bilateral trade has grown rapidly. In 2007, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Africa reached US$73.57 billion, m ore than seven times that of 2000 and with a grow th rate of 32.7 per cent on that of the previous year. One might also notice that since 2000, China's trade surplus with Africa h as b een greatly red uced and ind ee d its trade h as at times been in defi cit. Such a phenomenon h a d rarely been seen prior to 2000. It seems that there will b e n o p roblem for China to achieve its goal of bringing bilateral trade with Africa to a level of US$1 00 billion by the year 2010. • By the end of 2006, China's total investment in Africa reached US$6.64 billion, 14 times that of 1999. At presen t, China's investm ent in Africa represents 9 p er cent of its to tal external investm ent, a total comprised of investments in 49 African countries and covering areas such as trad e, processing, reso urce exploitation, tr ansportation and agriculture. According to some new statistics, China has invested in abo ut 900 projects in Africa, and its investment totals US$I1.7 billion. • In 2006, China finished co ntract projects in Africa worth US$9.5 billion, which covered such areas as resi dential construction, 64

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p etrol-chemistry projects, electricity, communication, transpo rtation and hydraulic projects. From 2004 to 2006, 10,000 talented Africans of various backgro unds were trained b y China, as promised at the second FOCAC ministerial conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2003. At the Beijing summit in 2006, China once again promised to train another 15,000 talented Africans in three years' time. In 2006, another nine African co untries, including Algeria, Gabon, Rwanda, Mali, Mozambique and Nigeria, were ad ded to the list of tourist destination s for Chinese nationals, amounting to 27 in total. China h as successively established trade relations with over 50 African countries and regions, signed bilateral tr ade agreem ents with m ore than 40 countries, set up jOint (mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation with 35 co untries, signed agreements on bilater al facilitation and protection of investments w ith 28 countries and agreements on avoi d ance of do uble taxation with eight African countries. These mutually benefici al agreem ents, mechanisms and p olicies h ave undoubtedly played a p ositive role in p rom oting the sustained development of Sino-African trade rel ations and eco nomic cooperation. Since 2000, Chinese comp anies h ave b een contracted to build m ore than 6,000km of highways in Africa, 3,000km of railways, as well as eight medium- and large-sized p ower plants. China h as taken an active part in peacekeeping missions in Africa. At the present time, China is engaged in some seven p eacekeeping operations in Africa, contributing some 1,400 p eacekeepin g troops. In addition to these p eacekeeping troo ps, China also contributes both financially and m aterially to peacekeeping operations in Africa. China has written off 10.9 billion yuan deb t owed by some 30 African countries since 2000, and h as promised to w rite off another 10 billion yuan owed by the heav ily ind ebted poorest African countries before the year 2009. Ambassador Liu G uijin, a veteran diplom at and sp ecial envoy on African Affairs appointed by the Chinese government, is playin g a very positive role in helping to reso lve the Darfur issue and o ther urgent issues on the continent. 65

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Sixth and last but not least, the Beijing summit brou ght ChinaAfrica strategic relations to a new high, with China going all out to h ono ur its promises made in the form of the Eight Measures, while African countries are cooperating closely to facilitate their implementation. Chinese top leaders lost no time in p romo ting the implementation of the Eight Measures, and their African co unterp arts responded favourably. In less than three months after the summit, President Hu Jintao visited eight African co untries, for whom h e anno unced m easures such as ai d provision, preferential loans, debt relief, tariff exemptions, and ai d in building rural schools and h ospitals. H e also attended in person the inau guration ceremonies of China's first econ omic and trade coop eration zone, agricultural technology dem onstration centre and m alaria prevention and treatment centre in Africa. Later on, Mr Wu Bangguo, chairman of China's NPC (National People's Congress) and Mr Jia Qinglin, chairman of China's CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), visited five African countries to further prom ote the implem entation of the Eight Measures. Chinese leaders h ave delivered the results of this implementation to the hands of African p eople in person, fully reflecting China's aspirations to h ono ur its commitments, helping with Africa's development and improving the living standards of African p eople. Since January 2007, there h ave been six presidents, three vice-presidents, four speakers of p arliament and two prime ministers from Africa visiting China to discuss the d evelopment of China-Africa relations. These players have reached a broad consensus on promoting the implem entation of the Eight Measures, strengthening friendly coop eration and furthering the n ew strategic partnership between the two sides. In much the same vein, ministries and d epartments resp onsible for overseeing these developments in b oth China and Africa are working strenuo usly to ensure the implementation of the Eight Measures. Over the p ast year or so, the relevant departments of the two sides have strengthened co mmuni cation, consulted on an equal footing and worked closely, providing a sound gu arantee mechanism for the implementation of the measures. The Chinese side attaches great importance to the advice and suggestions of the African side to ens ure that every m eas ure is in line with the n eeds of African p eople with maximum economic and social

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benefits . Following the Beijing summit, MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce) sent fiv e working group s to 15 African co untries. Since 2007, MOFCOM's ministeri al leaders h ave visited 21 Afri can co untries on 10 sep arate occasion s, and con sulted with m ore than 20 visiting Afri can ministers and m ore than 30 Afri can ambassadors in China on specific proj ects. In addition, the Chinese side has sent m ore th an 20 working teams to Africa. As these interaction s d em o nstrate, ne w m ech anisms and agreements h ave brou ght the two sides closer together. The m echanism of con sultation at the foreign ministry level agreed at the Beijing summit h as go t underway, with September 2007 witnessing the first ro und in New York, w hen the Chinese foreign minister and foreign ministers from Africa were at the UN co nference. At present, China h as sign ed bilateral aid agree m ents w ith 45 African countries, as well as prefer ential loan fr am ework agreem ents w ith 10 African co untries to pro vide preferential exp ort buyer 's credit to these co untries. China h as also sign ed d ebt relief protocols with 32 of the world's 33 highly indebted p oor countrie s (HIPCs) and least develop ed co untries (LDCs) in Africa, relief whi ch am o unts to a total of 10 billion yu an. True to the anno uncement of the 2006 Beijing summit, 454 types of co mmodities exporte d to China from 26 LDCs h ave enj oyed zerotariff treatment since 1 July 2007. Other noticeable achievem ents in hon o uring the Eight Measures include: • The construction of the AU conference centre, which is alread y underway and will be completed in 2011 • The China-Africa Development Fund, which started function ing in June 2007 and which h as the first allocation of US$1 billion already in pl ace • Trade and economic coo per ation zones already started or under construction in Zambia, Mauritius and Nigeria • The first malaria prevention and treatment centre opened in Liberia. Thirty-one other such centres will be built in two years' time, and China w ill d on ate m edicine, di agnostic and treatment equipment to these centres. China w ill also send gro ups of doctors to Africa to pass on malaria prevention and treatment exp ertise, provide clinical gUid ance and train local m edical 67

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p ersonnel. China has also presented Artemisinin drugs to 18 African countries to d ate. Providing 2,700 government scholarships for 50 African countries in 2007 The selection of 100 agricultur al experts to be sent to 35 African countries to h elp host countries with their agri cultural development planning, agricultural p erson al training, cultivation techniques and management Promising to build 14 agricultur al d emonstr ation centres in Africa. Construction is due to be completed before the end of 2009 Followin g the Beijing Summit, the organisation of some 165 training pro grammes p ro du cing 6,432 talented Africans from 49 different co untries in various areas including quality contro l, new m edia, en vironmental protection, culture and agriculture The construction of 78 of the 100 schoo ls planned, with ano ther 16 due to start in late 2008 The co nstruction of 19 of the 30 hospitals promised b y the Chinese government, to be completed by the end of 2009 President Hu Jintao's invitation to 500 African young people to visit China within three years during his visit to Africa early 2007. Arrangements are being made for their visits The 75 Chinese volunteers currently working in Ethiopi a, Zimbabwe and the Seychelles. These volunteers teach Chinese, conduct physical education, provide computer training and traditional Chinese medical treatment. In total, China will be sending a total of 120 youth volunteers to 10 African countries in 2008 The developm ent of further China-Africa cultural exch an ges. There have been frequent mutual visits between Chinese and African cultural groups since the Beijing summit. Five plans for implementing bilateral cultural agreements h ave been renewed, and eight Chinese art troupes toured Africa while two African art troupes performed in China in 2008.

New challenges Since the introd ucti on of FOCAC, China-Africa relations h ave been undergoing three principle transformations: 1) From an elite relationship to both an elite and popular on e; 2) From an offici al

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relationship to both an official and unoffi cial one; and 3) From a bilateral relationship to both a bilateral and multilateral one. With these transformations, as Professor Li Anshan of Peking University correctly pOints out, five challenges h ave emerged: 1) China's (or Chinese enterprises') interests versus African (or African enterprises') interests; 2) China's national interests versus Chinese enterprises' interests; 3) China's interest versus the western powers' vested interests; 4) China's need for natural resources versus Africa's expectations aro und sustainable development; and 5) Chinese and African short-term versus long-term interests. These ch allenges h ave already caught the attention of the Chinese government as well as that of academi cs. There h ave already been several round-table discussions in China between governm ent offi cials and scholars en gaged in African studies in this regard, especially those in p olicy an alysis. Some co nsensus h as been reached that these ch allenges should be taken seriously and studied from a lon g-term perspective before practical solution s are found. There h ave also been suggestions that dialogue w ith the West as well as African countries (including non-governmental organisation s (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)) sho uld be encouraged so as to exchange ideas, identify co mmon gro und for cooperation and eliminate misunderstandings. On the wh ole, the Chinese are confident that tho ugh these ch allenges pose obstacles to the development of China-Africa strategic relations, their resolution may surely promote its furth er d evelop m ent.

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Chinese development assistance to Africa: aid, trade and debt Nancy Dubosse It has been widely acknowledged that aid has not accomplished what was intended with respect to the role it was meant to play in economic growth and development. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid was necessary - aid to Africa in particular - and was the main objective of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The emphasis has been placed on supporting recipient-led development strategies. It was in this context that the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRO DAD) commissioned country studies in 2007 examining the extent of Chinese development assistance in the Southern African region. The objectives of the research were to identify convergences and divergences between the case country's development agenda and the Chinese aid; assess the roles of the case country's domestic institutions (pub li c, private, and civil sOciety) and review avenues of collaboration with China; and examine the impact of Chinese aid on the case country's state of indebtedness. In a nutshell, the genera l objective of the project was to ascertain the extent to which Chinese development assistance was in conformity w ith the Paris Declaration principles. The researches were undertaken in the countries of Ango la, Mo zambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As far as the respective national development plans are concerned, the countries tended to be very similar, highlighting the need to emphasise education and health, governance and law and order, sustainable resources management, and rural development. Analysis of national frameworks also uncovered similar structures. There are institutions focused on procurement, stand70

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ards and foreign investments. One notable difference is that aid coordination is handled by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development in Zimbabwe, whereas it is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the other countries. At the same time it should be noted that negotiations with the Chinese appear to be exempt national protocols and are centralised at very high levels of public administration. Aid dependency featured prominently as an implication in the imbalance of power in favour of China, particularly with respect to negotiating the terms of the assistance agreements. Further, national parliaments do not appear to be involved with either aid management and coordination or loan contraction. This raises questions as to the nature of the ownership of the development trajectory adopted by the respective countries. In summary, though alignment to the Paris Declaration is apparent for Mozambique, it is not apparent for Angola or Zambia. The case of Angola is most glaring with employment generation being a stated and widely acknowledged concern, yet Chinese intervention is persistently in the oil and minerals sectors. It was not possible to determine alignment in the case of Zimbabwe, as it does not have a current national development strategy and its governments is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy.

The aid effectivenes s agenda The Paris Declaration (2005) was the cu lmination of a number of world gatherings devoted to discussions on aid and poverty. At the Millennium Development Summit (2000), parties resolved to have specific targets for economic development. The Monterrey Consensus (2002) recognised that official development assistance had failed to remedy poverty in a satisfactory manner. The Paris Declaration can be seen as the bridge to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It was acknowledged that enhancing the effectiveness of aid was necessary and pOSSible, as aid to Africa, in particular, had not resulted, in any measurable way, in economic growth or poverty reduction. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the subsequent document refining a number of the targets - the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) - is best described as a framework for 71

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improved aid delivery. It emphasises supporting recipient-led development strategies, with five reinforcing principles to ensure uniform thought on the donor-partner relationship: • Ownership refers to exercising effective leadership over development policies and strategies, coordinating development plans via consultative processes, and translating these into programmes with budgets and targets. • Alignment refers to donors linking their funding to reCipient countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures. • Harmonisation refers to a more collectively effective aid delivery, implementing where feasible common arrangements regarding disbursement, monitoring and evaluating and reporting at country level. • Managing for results relates to improving planning and decision-making structures in a way that focuses on desired results. This mainly entails strengthening the link between national development strategies and annual budget processes and evaluating outcomes against key indicators for which data is available. • Mutual accountability is meant to place both donors and partners acco untable for results, upholding transparency in the use and distribution of resources.

Background to Sino-African relations Chinese intervention in Africa dates back to various national liberation struggles on the continent. Many countries in Southern Africa received assistance during the 1960s and 1970s in the forms of finance, arms, and military training. More recently, th e Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has created both new opportunities and challenges for the continent's development efforts. The opportunities come from chances to tap into China's experiences and acquire the technology and financial resources needed to move rapidly towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. There are also chall enges in directing and regulating Chinese interests in the continent to the mutual benefit of both China and Africa 72

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w itho ut end an gering the continent's social-cultural heritage and env ironment. In 2006, China formulated its African Policy Pap er in w hich China-Africa bilateral coo p eration focuse d on the following areas: • Political: high-level visits, exch an ges between legislative bodies, p olitical p arties and local governments, and coop eration in internation al affairs • Economic: trad e, investment, fin an ce, agriculture, infrastructure, n atural reso ur ces, touri sm, d ebt reduction, debt relief, investment and multilateral coo p eration • Human resource d evelopment: focusing on education, science, culture, h ealth, technology, m edi a, administration, con sul ar services, en vironment, disaster mitigation, humanitarian cooperation and p eople-to-p eople exchan ge • Peace and sec urity: focusing on the military, co nflict settlem ent/p eacekeeping, judicial m atters and the p olice. China further anno unced a number of m easures to enhance African development in various areas . In the area of aid, it pled ged d oubling assistan ce b y 2009, the p rovision of US$3 billion of preferentialloan s and US$2 billion o f preferenti al buyers' credits, the creation of a US$5 billion Afri ca-China development fund, and the can cellation of debt owed b y the h eavily indebted least develop ed co untries. In the area of construction, China pled ged to build a co nferen ce centre for the Afri can Union and 100 rural schools. In the area of trade, China pled ged to op en up its m arkets from the present 190 to over 440 zero-rate d produ cts from least d evelop ed co untries, establish trad e and economic coop eration zones and other m easures for the prom o tio n of coo p eration, and establish 10 sp ecial agri culture technology dem onstration centres. Finally, in the area of human reso urce development, China pled ged to train 15,000 African profession als, send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa, build 30 ho spitals, don ate 300 million yuan for anti-m alaria ac tivities, build 30 malari a prevention and treatment centres, disp atch 300 yo uth volunteers, and increase Chinese government scholarships from 2,000 to 4,000 a year by 2009.

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AFRODAD study on Chinese development assistance It was in this context that AFRODAD commissioned country studies' in 2007 to examine the extent of Chinese d evelopment assistance in the Southern African region. The objectives of the research were to:

• Identify convergences and divergences between the case country's d evelopment agenda and the Chinese aid • Assess the roles of the case country's domestic institutions (public, private, and civil society) and review avenues of collaboration with China • Examine the impact of Chinese aid on the case country's state of indebtedness. The general objective of the proj ect was to ascertain the exte nt to which Chinese d evelopment assistance was in conformity with the Paris Declaration principles. The research was undertaken in Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe The countries' national d evelopment plans tended to be very similar, highlighting the need to emphasise education and health, governance and law and order, sustainable reso urces managem ent and rural d evelopment. Analysis of national frameworks also uncove red similar structures: institutions focused on procurement, standards and foreign inves tments. One notable difference is that aid coordination is handled by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Developme nt in Zimbabwe, whereas it is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the other countries. It should be noted that nego tiations with the Chinese appear to be exempt from national protocols and are centralised at very high levels of public administration.

Angola The structure of Angola's economy has not changed over time. Its main source of revenue is, and has been, from petroleum and refined oil products (57 per cent of GOP in 2006). Commercial banks, insurance, and telecommunications contribute approximately 15 per cent to GOp, and fisheries and agriculture contribute

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8 per cent. For the m ost p art, these industries are capital intensive, leaving a significant gap in terms of sectors w hich create employm ent. According to Chinese government d ata, in 2004, business between Ango la and Chin a was v alued at US$4.9 billion, and rose to $11 billion by 2006. Trad e vo lumes reached $6.95 billion in 2005, w ith Angola running a surplus. The African Development Bank rep orted a total value of $40 billion for China-Africa tran saction s in 2006. The m ain Chinese development fin ancing instrument to Angola is in the form of commodity-secured loans. The gu arantor of the loans is the Nation al Bank of Angola. A total of US$2 billion has been extended to Angola. The credit agreem ents also provide for the engagem ent of Chinese technical assistance. Examples include civil construction works and the re-installation of the electricity supply network, which are being done m ostly b y Chinese workers. China h as offered Ango la the loan in two phases. The value of the first phase of the credit is US$l billion. A down p aym ent of 10 p er cent of the contract value was required. The reimbursem ent p eriod is 12 years . The interest accrual is the London interb ank offered rate (Libor) to three m onths plus 3 p er cent, w ith a m anagem ent commi ssion of 0.3 p er cent for each project and a commitment commission of 0.3 p er cent of the value, w hich is not to be utilised by the individual projects. There is also an ' assembly' co mmission, which is 1 p er cent on top of the finan cing value, that m ay be o wed to a syndicate or ganising the finan Cing with Chinese b anks. If there is no syndicate, then the commission w ill n ot be p aid. Reimbursem ents of the loan are to be in trimester instalments thro ugh receipts of co ntracts of oil sales, sp ecifically 10,000 b arrels p er d ay in the fir st two years and 15,000 in the rem aining years . To d ate, 23 p er cent of Angola's exports are to China, and this is mainly crude oil. The second phase of the loan, also valued at US$l billion, can only be requested by Angola one year after the reimbursem ent of the fi rst phase. The condition s for the second phase are the same in terms of gu arantee. The op ening of credit lines led to an upsurge of Chinese direct investment requests in 2004. During the p eriod 2004-06, 20 private investment projects were approved w ith a total value of appro ximately US$30.5 million . 75

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While China is the second-largest consumer of Angolan oil, after the United States, it h as also demonstrated interest in entering other pOints of the petroleum value chain. Sonangol Sinopec International (SSI) holds shares in different oil blocks with reserves up to 3.2 billion barrels. Tenders from Chinese builders for the rehabilitation of the associated infrastructure also rose, to a value of more than US$4.5 billion. Chinese assistance has also come in the form of partnership. Other sectors of interest to the Chinese include diamonds. In 2005, the Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers reviewed an agreement for a partnership between a public diamond company from Angola, Endiama-Ep, and China International Fund Limited. The council also authorised Endiama-EP to take part in this partnership and base a branch in Hong Kong named Endiama China International Holding Limited. This company deals with prospecting, research, production and commercialisation of diamonds, including cutting and jewellery setting. The m ajor part of Angola's external debt is commercial and bilateral. It is estimated that half of this debt is to the public sector. The stock of medium and long-te rm external debt, including those that were late, was approximately US$7.6 billion as of December 2006, which was US$2.6 billion less than that of 2005. As a pOint of comparison, Angola's GOP in 2005 was US$24 billion.

Mozambique Mo zambique is highly d ependent on foreign aid. Official d evelopment assistance (ODA) amounted to 20.8 per cent of GOP in 2004. It accounted for all of capital gross formation, as almost total investment expenditures are financed by foreign aid. According to the African Development Indicators of the World Bank, ODA makes up 84.3 per cent of central government exp enditures. Chinese aid in Mo zambique consists of loans and technical agreements, and direc t inves tments in trade and services. A significant proportion flows to infrastructure, with particular attention to the rehabilitation of roads and bridges and public buildings. They are mainly medium term loans, with repayment periods of approximately 10 years. Concessional loan agreem ents signed between 2001 and 2004 amounted to approximately US$15.6 million. 76

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More recently, the government of Mozambique took out new loan s w ith the Exp ort-Import Bank of Chin a. The loans are attached to m ajor construction p rojec ts, m ainly infrastructure. They are valued at approximately US $2.7 billion. An example is a preferential credit protocol for re newal of publi c ministry buildings and houses for m agistrates. The credit is for US$40 million. The rep aym ent conditions include a 20-year m aturity plus five free years, at an interest r ate of 2 p er cent, immobilisation rate of 0.75 per cent and a m an agerial rate of 1 p er cent. Chinese development assistan ce h as also com e in the form of investments. The bulk of investments are clearly con centrated in the m anufacturing sector. Formally registered investments are valued at US$9.7 million. Agri culture and agro-industry h ave received the hi ghest valued investments, approximately US $65 million, sp read o ver three ventures . The co untry's ex ternal d ebt was US$3,226.4 million in 2006. The level of indebtedness in 2006 represented 41 p er cent of GOP, 130 p er cent of exp orts and three times the state revenues for the sam e year. The stock of dom estic debt was estimated at 6.9 billion m eticais in December 2006. Generally, in Mozambique it was fo und that there were few local substitutes for Chinese goo d s. H owever, there was little technology transfer evid ent and additional co nditions pertained to the employm ent of Chinese lab our and hiring of physical capital. There was som e abuse implie d in the public finan cial m an agem ent system, thou gh it was not unlike that of western donors. Finally, it was discovered that loans fr om the Internation al Development Association of the World Bank are cheaper.

Zambia Chinese ODA h as com e to Zambia in three form s: grants, loans and economic and technical cooperation agreem ents. China h as made a foray into a number of sec tors in line with China's Africa Poli cy Paper: agri culture, mining, m anufacturing, construction, communi cation and tran sport, and health. Investments include a bran ch of the Bank of China and a trade and commercial cen tre in Lusaka. China also acquired the Ch ambishi Co pper Mine, thereby transforming its status from a buyer to a pro ducer. China

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has opened a cotton ginnery in Eastern Province of Zambia in response to the Zambian government's encouragement of rural development. Zambia's debt to China stood at US$217 million as of 12 December 2006, making China the highest non-Paris Club creditor to the country. Zambia's indebtedness to China is concentrated in two areas: loans for the TAZARA project at 36.5 per cent (approximately US$21 million) and from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), with 27.9 per cent, which involved the purchase of planes and earthmoving equipment. China has been sympathetic to Zambia's economic problems and signed a protocol with the Zambian government on partial debt remittances in July 2001 to support the country's efforts to develop its national economy and reduce its debt burden. Though Chinese investments are large scale and capital intensive, there was no evidence of technology transfer, and there has been considerable space created for Chinese companies. It is also noted that the development of infrastructure has been accompanied by increased indebtedness.

Zimbabwe In Zimbabwe, Chinese d evelopment assistance has been in the form of concessional loans, ex port credit (including buyer's and seller's credits) and grants. The government of Zimbabwe has benefited from many concessionalloans extended by the Chinese government. As an example, in 2006 the Zimbabwe Farmers Development Company took loans to acquire various pieces of agricultural equipment and graders. The agriculture equipment, worth about US$25 million, has been sold on a loan basis to farmers through banks. The Chinese government's basic criteria for funding a proj ect through concessionalloans stipulates that it is technically feasible and can generate favourable economic returns, that Chinese enterprises should be selected as contractors or exporters in preference to other countries and that, again, preference be given to Chinese firms for the purchasing of equipment, materials, tech nology or services for the project; no less than 50 per cent of the procurem ents have to come from China. 78

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The exp ort buyer 's credits are m edium- and lon g-term credits offered by the Exp ort-Import Bank of China to creditworthy foreign borrowers to supp ort the exp ort of Chinese capital goo ds and services and overseas co nstruction projects. In August 2006, the government of China extende d a US$200 million buyer 'S credit loan facility to the go vernment of Zimbab we for the procurem ent of fertilisers, agro chemicals, agriculture equipment and tools, irrigation and other equipment and animal health p ro du cts. The terms of the agreem ent include the following . The value of the co mmercial co ntract should be more than US$2 million . The p ortion of the Chinese content o f exp orted goods sho uld be no less th an 50 p er cent of the total value. The cash p aym ent (down payment) m ade by the importer to the Chinese exp orter sho uld n ot be less than 15 per cent of the total contract value or 20 p er cent in the case of a ship export contract. Generally, the exp ort buyer 'S credit p rovided by the China Exim Bank for an exp ort project of goo d s or services sho uld n ot exceed 85 p er cent of the total co ntract value, and 80 p er cent in the case of a ship exp ort co ntract. On a related issue, China Development Bank (CDB) and Infrastru cture Development of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) are in the process of furtherin g economi c coop eration between Zimbabwe and China through equity particip atio n b y CDB in the IDBZ: prov ision of lines of credit by CDB to the IDBZ; project co-fin an cing, with CDB contributing towards the foreign currency requirem ents of projects and IDBZ the local fin an cing; and cap acity building, w hich wo uld entail IDBZ staff training by CDB, including staff secondments and attachments. The two agreed to a US$30 million fram e work credit faCility agreem ent in No vember 2006 to fin ance projects in agriculture, mining and infr astructure in Zimb abwe. Chinese comp anies will participate in these projects. As at O ctober 2007, Zimbabwe's internation al d ebt am ounted to US $4.1 billion including arre ars. Total arrears am ounted to US$2.7 billion of which US$1.2 billion is with multilateral creditors w hile the remaining US$1.5 billion is for bilateral creditors. Outstanding loans fr om China, which are about US$300 million, co nstitute approximately 20 p er cent of Zimbab we's total external d ebt stock, US$I.4 billion .

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Main observations and conclusion There are a few key issues that ran across the studies. Some implicate gaps in d om es tic accountability. O thers implica te a d eparture from the current aid architecture. These countries have the exp ected regulatory frameworks o n paper. There are standards addressing occup a tional heal th and safe ty, procurement, inves tment promotion centres, but they are, by and large, no t op erational with Chinese development assistance. For example, in the case of Z ambia, there has been significant Chinese commercial inves tment in the mining sector in keeping with China's lon g-term strategy. Chinese investors have been observed to offer poor conditions of service, insufficiently adhere to safety regulations a t places of work and disregard labour laws/regulations and environme ntal considerations. However, the maj or p roblem lies with the Z ambian a uthorities' inability to effectivel y enforce relevant legislation and regulations. The countries studied are overly d e pe ndent on d evelopment assistance. This implies an imbal ance of power in favour of China, particularly when nego tiating the terms of the assistance agreem ents. For example, Mozambique is highly d ep ende nt on foreign aid. ODA makes up approximately 80 p er cent o f central governm ent expe nditure. Public administration in these countries e ntails a high level of bureaucracy, which dissuades foreign inves tors, though this has no t ha mpered Chinese inves tment, as it is both tied to grants and takes place at executive levels at the stage of nego tia tion. H owever, the Side-stepping of institutions promotes corruption and undermines current good governance initiatives. Parliam ents in these countries do not appear to be involved with eithe r aid m an agem ent and coordination o r loan contraction. This raises questio ns as to the nature o f the ownership of the d evelopm ent trajec tory adopted by these co untries. China is no t p art o f any group of d evelopment partners, which implies its assistance is not subjected to h armonisa tion initiatives, acco untability standards and peer review as throu gh the Paris Declaration. For example, all Zambian agreem e nts with China are confidential, making them closed to public scrutiny and at variance with both Zambia and China's increase d commitment to openness, public transparency and accountability.

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Nearly all the co untries under study had employm ent creation and sm all- and m edium-sized enterprise d evelopment listed as p art of their d evelopment p riorities. By co ntrast, Chinese assistan ce is generally targeted toward s capital-inten sive sectors. In Zimbabwe, in the case of exp ort's buyer 's credit and concession al loans, the Chinese contractors and suppliers are appointed by the Chinese government and there is no h ard cash di sburse d, but only pro du cts. Chinese investments tend to be concentrated in the extractive sector: oil and minerals. The countries und er study need to minimise the risk of interacting w ith China, as con centration in these sectors is capital inten sive, w ith technology n ot w holly tran sferable to other ind ustries. In summary, tho ugh alignment to the Paris Declaration is app arent for Mozambique, it is not app arent for Angola or Zambia. The case of Angola is m ost glaring with employm ent generation being a widely acknowled ged con cern, yet Chinese intervention is persistently in the oil and minerals sectors. It was n ot p ossible to determine alignment in the case of Zimbab we, as it does not h ave a current nation al development strategy and its government is sufferin g from a crisis of legitimacy. Chinese d evelopment assistan ce appears to create sp ace and provid e leverage for African co untries to n egoti ate with western d onors. H owever, Chinese grants and loan s are linke d to com m odity produ ction (e.g. oil in Angola, and minerals and tob acco in Zimbabwe) and include the requirem ent of a minimum of 50 p er cent of all project proc urem ent from Chinese co mpanies. This h as resulted in little employm ent creation, few b ack ward linkages, a disruption in local trades and no eviden ce of technology tran sfer. Ju st as Chinese assistan ce has again hi ghlighted Africa's d ependence on external assistan ce, the lesso n from an alysing Chinese d evelopment assistan ce is that diversification (o f d on ors, of exports, of sec tor d evelopment, etc.) will ultimately p rove to be the key to economic d evelopment in Afri ca. Note 1. AFRODAD (2008) Mapping Ch inese Developmen t Assis tance in Africa: A n Analysis of the Experiences of Angola, Moza mbique, Za mbia, an d Zimbabwe,

Harare, AFRODAD.

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Trade, investment and legal cooperation between China and Africa Hong Yonghong

The development of trade and investment There is a long history of trade, investme nt and legal cooperation be tween China and Africa. This chapter d eals only with the relations of the n ew China and the inde pe ndence of African countries, beginning in the 1950s. For over half a century, both sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits. Peo ple-to -p eople contacts, bilateral trade, and legal cooperation have witnessed rapid growth. In 1950, trade be tween China and Africa was only US$1.2 million. In 1980, it stood at US$l billion, but in 2000 it jumped to US$10 billion. Be tween 2002 and 2003, two-way trade climbed SO p er cent to US$18.S billio n. In 2006, the trade volume reached US$SS.S billion, which has made China Africa's third most important trading partner, be hind the US and France . According to Pre mier Wen Jiabao, Sino-African trade should reach the US$100 billion mark in 2010, doubling the 2006 figure . M eanwhile, China is also vigorously promoting export by Africa to China and has take n various effec tive m eas ures to balance bilate ral trade . To date, China has granted "most favoured nation"(MFN) trading status to 41 African countries and exempted 190 kinds of products from custom duties from the 28 leas t d eveloped African countries. Such m easures have produced the d esired results. From January to October 2004, China had a trade d eficit of US$1.16 billion (Ministry of Commerce, n.d.) for the first time, with exports to Africa of US$10.98 billion and imports from 82

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Africa of US $12.14 billion (Gon g 2005). In 2005, the gross trade volume reached US$39. 7 billion, including US$21.1 billion in imports from Africa, with a trad e d efi cit of US$2.5 billion . In the US$55.5 billion vol ume of trade in 2006, exp orts to Afri ca reached US$26.7 billion and imports from the region US$28.8 billion . Alon g w ith the rapid d evelopment of trade, Chinese investment in Afri ca is also is go ing sm oo thly. The Chinese governm ent h as put forward a series of effective m easures to en co urage well-established and reputable enterprises to invest in Afri ca. According to preliminary statistics, China's total investment in Africa reached US$6.27 billion b y the end of 2005 (Gon g 2007). China h as launched over 800 n on-finan cial investment p rojects in 49 African co untries, co vering m anufacturing and processing, reso urce exploration, communications and agriculture (Tan g 2006). Meanwhile, China h as also taken active m easures to en co urage Africans to invest in China. So far, China h as signed bilateral agreem ents on the promotion and protection of investment with 28 African co untries, and agreem ents on the avo id an ce of do uble taxation w ith eight other African co untries. More Afri can co untries are enco uraged to conclud e such agreements w ith China to prom ote investment in both directions (Forum on China-Africa Coo peration 2006). More and m ore Afri can enterprises or individ uals h ave realise d business o pportunities in b ooming China, and they h ave made great profit fr om their investment or trade in China (Timberg 2007, China View 2006). The Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Coop eration (FOCAC) held in 2006, the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplom atic ties between New China and Afri ca, brou ght m ore opp ortunities for bilateral trade and investment between both sides. In his op ening address at the FOCAC Beijing summit, Chinese President Hu Jintao anno unced a p ackage of maj or assistan ce, investment, trad e and othe r key coo p eration m eas ures with Africa in an effort to forge a ne w type of strategic p artnership. The Beijing Declaration (2006) and Beijing Action Plan (2007- 09)1 subsequently adopted by the summit reaffirmed or reiter ated Hu's m easures and m ade them m ore concrete and feasible.2 The 2006 Beijing summit has inspired m ore interest from Chinese enterprises wanting to invest in Africa and a series of activities h as been sponso red in China to implem ent the Beijing 83

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Action Pl an. On 14 March 2007, the Chinese State Co uncil approved the establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund, w hich will be used to support Afri can co untries' agriculture, m anufacture, energy sector and transp ortation and the d evelopment of Chinese enterprises in Africa. In May 2007, the annual board m eeting of the African Development Bank was held in Shan gh ai - its first-ever m eeting in Asia. Themed 'Africa and Asia: Partners in Development', the m eeting focused on infrastructure development in Africa, region al integrity and poverty relief. Just before the m eeting, the African/Chinese Enterprises Forum, foc using on African investment, was held in Shan gh ai under the jOint sponsorship of So uth African Stand ard Bank and China Exp ort Insuran ce Company. There have also been other activ ities organised by public or private institutions in China to provid e gUidelines to Chinese enterprises for investing in Africa. 3 All these efforts h ave created a practical res ult: in the first h alf of the year 2007, direc t investme nt to Africa from China reached US$480 million, and newly si gn ed contracts with African co untries are worth US$11.27 billion (MOFCOM 2007). Most of these m easures and efforts are p olitical and econ omic in n ature, rarely addressing the legal p roblems arising out of these bilateral business tran sactions. In m y opinion, this does not go far enough for the sound d evelopment of mutual trad e and investment. A better understanding of the legal system, esp ecially co mmercial la w, in the host country can stren gthen the investors' confiden ce. As Kalidou Gadio, chief co unsel for the Afri can Development Bank, on ce vividly said, 'If I know the law, you know the law, and yo u kno w I know the law, that is h alf the battle' (Turner 1999). Man y people in China h ave expressed con cern abo ut Chinese inves tors' poo r knowled ge of the law in the Afri can h ost country; they suggest that China needs m ore African law research and a frequent and regul ar exchange of legal informa tion w ith African p eople, so that p eople from bo th sides gain a better understanding of each other's laws.

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Legal cooperation There is a long history of legal cooperation between China and African countries. The earliest legal rela tionship be tween China and Afric a can be traced back to 1874 when Ghana, then an English colony, applied Hong Kong law that the English enacted in 1865. In 1947, two Egyptian legal scholars visited China. But real cooperation began in 1955 when the Asio-African Confe rence was held. At that conference, China advanced te n principles for d ealing with international relationships. These principles were agreed by African countries such as Egypt and Libya, and are the foundation of the legal cooperation be tween China and African states. The history of legal cooperation can be divided into three phases. The first phase is from 1955 to 1971, the second from 1971 to 2000 and the third from 2000 to the present. During the first phase, China and some African states Signed several bilateral agreements. These agreements were the m ain forms of SinoAfrican legal cooperation. In the first phase the bilateral agreem ents contained joint communiques on establishing diplomatic relations and agree m en ts on se nding Chinese m edical teams to African countries. In the second phase, the agreem ents included eco nomic and trade cooperation and cooperation in culture, education, science and technology. After the 1990s, the re were new d evelopments in the r elationship. The two parties began to sign documents which were visibly characteristic o f legal cooperation. For example, China, Mauritius and other countries Signed agreem ents to avoid d o uble taxation, tax dodging and tax evasion. China, South Africa, Nigeria and Sudan Signed agreements on mutual encouragem ent and investment protection. China, Tunisia and others signed treaties on civil and commercial judicial assistance. China, Egypt and others signed agreements on civil, comm ercial and criminal judicial assistance and so on. In 2000, FOCAC was held in Beijing. Since this conference, Sino-African legal cooperation had b een d eve lope d d ee ply and widely. In the same year, the Introduction to Africa n Law was published by Hunan Peo ple's Press. This is the first book edited by Chinese scholars on African law. In October 2004, the Sino-African Human Rights Conference was held in China and 85

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representatives from 27 African co untries attended. The p articip ants held intensive discussions on three subjects: the relationship between hum an rights and sovereignty, the prote ction of human rights in judicial pr actices, and cooperation in international human rights. In September 2005, the 22nd Worldwide Law Congress was h eld in Beijing and Shanghai with justice ministers from Mozambiqu e, Nigeria, Zambia and many other African co untries. It was the second time that China had h eld such a worldwide law congress since 1990. The co n gress dealt with 22 subjects s uch as the rule of law, human rights, antiterrorism and justice, its main topic being the 'rule of law and harmonio us international society'. After my attend an ce at the Beijing summit of FOCAC in 2006, I told a jo urnalist from People's Daily that legal cooperation was a n ew highlight of the forum. The Beijing Action Plan of the forum prescribes that the linkage of legal institutions is very important for China and African states. But, what should we d o to promo te Chinese investment in Africa in the future? Some suggestions follow. To begin with, academic research is the forerunner of legal cooperation. Chinese p eople know little about African law, especially African states' investment law. M any of them do not know ho w to open a comp any or do business in Africa. Informed Chinese sch olars can raise awareness of African law amon g Chinese people, or hold training courses on African commercial law. Xiangtan University h as been a pioneer in this area. As early as 1978, following instructions from the Chinese central government, Xiangtan University set up the Office of African Studies, which was the first academic institution for African studies created after the Cultural Revolution . In 1998, 20 years later, the Institute of African Laws was established, which developed into the Centre for African Laws and Society (CALS) in 2005. The centre h as published a series of related papers and seven books: Introduction to African Law (Hong Yonghong et al, Hunan People's Press, 2000), African Criminal Law Review ( H ong Yonghon g, China Jiancha Press, 2005), The African History of Legal Development (He Qinhua and Ho n g Yonghong, Law Press, 2006), A Study on Private Intemational Law in RSA (Zhu Weidong, Law Press, 2007), A Study on African Legal Culture (Xia Xinhua, China 86

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Social Science Press, 2008), A Study on ICTR (Hong Yonghong, China Social Science Press, 2009) and Research on the Legal Environment for Chinese In ves tmen ts in Africa (Salvatore Mancuso and H on g Yonghong, Xiangtan University Press, 2009). As far as the development of African law is concerned, African cu stom ary laws are the original laws of the continent. In the 7th century, Islamic law spread to Africa. Later, in the 15th century, Europ ean law was forcibly transpl anted to Africa. At indep endence, African co untries inherite d the law of their former colonial rulers while still preserving their tradition al customary law. Nowad ays, the African continent is a 'kaleidoscope' of world w ide law. It also provides a broad tes ting gro und for the transplant and fu sion of law from different systems. Studying the characteristics of African law is beneficial for China and African states. Second, academic exch ange is necessary to p rom ote academic research. Its b asic forms includ e scholars' exch an ges, students' exch an ges and academic conferences between China and Africa. When I lived in South Africa in 2003-04, Professor KK Prah, the director of the Centre for Advanced Study of African Society at UniverSity of Cape Town, often rem arked to m e that we lacked acad emic exchanges (Hong 2004). Three of m y p ostgraduate students h ave now been to Tan zania, Nigeria and Kenya to study African law. A 'Symposium on Law and Socio-Economic Developm ent: A Comparative Study of China and the African States' (the Xiangtan sy mposium) was held in Xiangtan UniverSity from 21 October to 9 Novemb er 2006. It was attended by 15 African legal scholars an d officials, from Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, South Africa, Tan zania and Uganda. It was the fir st opportunity for Chinese an d African legal scholars and offi cials to discuss a ran ge of legal issues including constitutional law, criminal law, commercial law, labour law, criminal procedure law, civil procedure law, an d international law, as well as socio-economic d evelopment in China and African states. In la te 2009 the International Forum on African Law and Society Development was held at Xiangtan University, with over 100 p articip ants fr om Italy, Fran ce, Belgium, Benin and China. Third, judicial assistance is the key to Sino-African legal cooperation. China and African states h ave reach ed agreem ents on a 87

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number of issues, including taxation, the protection of investment, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments and awards. Recently several African universities have attracted many Chinese sch olars to visit and study. China h as established a p ermanent organisation for exch an gin g and training Chinese or African peo ple who work in public security authorities, pro curatorates (a Chinese judicial institution) and other legal supervision or gans, or the judiciary. With the development of communication on politics, economic trade, culture, science and technology between China and Africa and the ch an ging internation al situ ation, the area of ChinaAfrican legal cooperation will co ntinue to grow. China-African legal cooperation co ntinues to develop on solid found ations. China-African legal cooperation is an organic part of establishing goo d relations between China and Africa. We believe that it will playa p ositive and benefi cial role in m otivating this traditionally friendly relationship. This chapter is a part of the national project on 'The his tory and development of Sino-African legal cooperation ' by the Na tional Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science of China and the University of International Busin ess and Economics.

Notes l.The documents can be found a t the FOCAC website, http://www.focac.org/ eng, accessed 11 November 2009. 2. The measures put forwa rd that are especially conducive to the developm ent of mutua l trade and inves tment are: to provide U5$3 billion in prefere ntial loa ns a nd US$2 billion in preferential bu yer'S cred its to A fri ca in the next three yea rs; to set up a C hina-A frica development fund w hich w ill reach U5$5 billio n to encourage Chinese companies to inves t in Africa and provid e suppo rt to th em; to furth e r open up China's marke t to Africa

by increasing zero-tariff treatment from 190 to over 440 the kinds of good s going to C hina from the least d eveloped countries in Afri ca w hich have diplomatic ti es with China; and to es tabli sh three to five trad e and econo mic cooperatio n zones in A frica in the next three years.

3. For example, the China-Afri ca n Trade and Investment Seminars held in Zhe ngzhou a nd Wuhan on 26 April a nd 3 Jul y 2007 res p ecti vely, the ChinaA frican Trade and Inves tment Forum h eld in Shanghai on 11 November 2007 and the latest Meeting on the Inves tment Env ironment in Africa held in Xiamen on 8 September 2009.

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References C hina View (2006) 'Out of Guangzhou, African trade booms', 23 May, http: // www.china view.cn. accessed 25 October 2009 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (2003) 'Addis Ababa Ac tion Plan', http ://www.iocac.org/engizyzl/hywj/tl57710.htm. accessed 13 October 2009 Forum on China-Africa n Coop eration (FOCAC) (2006) 'Beijing Summit adopts declaration, highlighting C hina-Africa strategic partnership', http://english.focacs ummit.org/, accessed 10 October 2009 Go ng We n (2005) 'The China-Afri can trade volume s urpassed US$20 billion for the first time', People's Daily, 12 January Gong We n (2007) 'The China-African trade volume reached US$55.5 billio n', People's Daily, 15 May Hong Yonghong (2004) 'African studies in C hina', Journ al of African Nat ional Affairs, issu e 1 Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China (n.d.), numerous documents, http://xyf.mofcom. gov.cn/date/date.html, accessed 22 July 2009 MOFCOM (2007) http://ww w.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h zz n /200708/20070805041937.html, accessed 11 June 2009 Tang Jiaxuan (2006) 'China- African relationship a nd the significance of the FOCAC Be ijing s ummit' http://www.scio .gov.cn/zgxw ybd/ en/2006/22/200612/ tl03738.htm, accessed 13 October 2009 Timberg, Craig (2007) 'In venti ve South Africa firms thri ve in booming C hina ', W ashington Post, 11 February Turner, Mark (1999) 'Commercial law plan in Francophone Africa', Financial Times, 13 May

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Part III Country case studies

Ethio-China relations: challenges and prospects Gedion Gamora and K. Mathews

Background In recent years the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become an important and influential actor on the African continent. Trade relations b etween China and Africa in particular have been growing by leaps and bounds. The trade volume be tween the two r eached US$55 billion in 2006, and is expected to hit US$100 billion in 2010. As a rising powe r, China is increasingly turning to Africa as a source of en ergy r eserves and raw materials to fuel its expanding economy. Chinese multinational companies are engaging in key commercial sectors across Africa, particularly in infrastructure, mining, ICT (information and communications technology) and agriculture. Foreign aid complements economic investme nts, and China's d evelopment assistance is increasingly pragmatic and aligned with its growing commercial interest in the continent. China's first contact with Africa can be traced back to ancient times, d es pite the vast distance between them. Various sources reveal that China and Africa have a long though unofficial history of relations dating back as far as 202 BC. Some scholars attribute China's early contact with the Horn of Africa, and es pecially with Ethiopia, to the fact that the Chinese were importing rhinoceros from Abyssinia. It has also been suggested tha t there was a d egree of phone tic Similarity be tween Hough Chih (the the n Chinese language) and Geeze (the then literary language of Ethiopia) (Dilnessa 2005, p. 241). In more recent years, the Asian-African Bandung conference of 18-25 April 1955 had a great effect on the es tablishme nt of mode rn 92

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diplomatic relations between China and African co untries. At the co nference were representatives from Liberia, South Africa, Libya, Egypt, Sud an and Ethiopi a (Fraser 1956, p . 1418; Gaye 2008, p. 5). Subsequently, Chinese delegations visited Ethiopia, Sud an and other African countries in 1956 and 1957 (Larkin 1971, p. 29). The then Chinese premier, Chou En-Iai, also v isited a number of African countries in 1963 and 1964, including Ethiopia from 30 Janu ary to 1 February 1964 (Larkin 1971, p. 69). H owever, Ethiopia did not establish diplomatic relations at this p oint. Ethiopia was then under the conservative, feudal Empero r H aile Selassie, who feared the p ossible dissemination of communist ideology if diplom ats from China were to come to his country (Abir 1974, p. 131). In addition, H aile Selassie's regime was oriented to the West and closely tied to the United States, w hi ch was then strongly opposed to China (Abir 1974, p. 131). China was supporting the s ubversive activities of the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), both m orally and materially. H owever, Ethiopia and China did finally establish diplomatic relations on 1 December 1970 (Dilnessa 2005, p. 245). Although Ethiopia and China h ad comparatively good relations for a short p eriod after the 1974 Ethiopian p opular revolution, their relations would deteriorate con siderably from 1977 because of the military government's close relations w ith the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). After the western coalition defeated Iraq's aggression against Ku wait in 1990-91, President George Bush sp oke of a ' n ew world order' that co uld bring about the end of competing ideological divisions in the world. This n ew world ord er h as been characterised by the prom otion of human rights, good governance, dem ocratisation and the exp ansion of the wo rld economy throu gh free trade (Henderson 1998, p . 51). The aforem entioned features of this n ew world order h ave affected relations between western countries and o ther parts of the world. Led by Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian People's Revolution ary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government took p ower in 1991 and set out to d eliver democracy and to transform an Ethiopian political system b ase d on ethnic fed eralism. Its foreign p oli cy called for peaceful coexisten ce and a fr ee market econom y (except with regard to the ownership of land ). The West and the United States 93

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supp orted the EPRDF government. For the US, it was an oppo rtunity to 'get Ethiopia b ack', w hich it h ad 'lost' in the wake of the 1974 revolution . At a conferen ce in London, the EPRDF lead ership was called upon to establish a d emocratic government in return for assistan ce. US Secretary for African Countries H erman Cohen said 'no d em ocracy, no assistan ce' (Ochall a 2005, p . 6). After the cold war, China began to direct its attention m ore toward s economic and, to som e extent, p oliti cal asp ects. It d evelop ed bilateral relation s with Ethiopia and m any other African co untries in an all-ro und way w itho ut en couraging the features of the ' new wo rld order' su ch as d em ocracy, good governan ce, human rights and p olitical tran sp aren cy. Accordingly, Chinese activ ity in Afri ca in creased very qUi ckly from year to year. Today China can get m ost African co untries' attention easily, because of its prin ciples and policies. Both durin g and after the tr an sition al government of Ethiop ia, relation s between the two countries h ave stren gthened, exemplifie d for example b y Prime Minister Meles Zen awi's v isit to China in 1995. The visit was reciprocated b y the presid ent of China, w h o visited Ethiopia in 1997. O ther h igh -level visits were also exch an ged and con so lid ated the mom entum b ehind stron ger relation s. As stated in the foreign affairs and nation al security p olicy and strategy of the Federal Dem ocratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'currently China h as very goo d relation w ith Ethiopia'. The d ocu m ent adds, 'We sho uld p ay special attention to the stren gthening of relation s with China' (Ethiopi an Foreign Policy Document 2002, p . 27). Ever since the d awnin g of the new millennium, bilateral ties h ave progressed within the context of the Forum on China-Africa Coo peratio n, established in October 2000, which aime d to create a new typ e of lon g-term and stable strategic p artnership between C hin a and Afri ca. The t wo sides h ave also consulted on a series of p ro minent international issues, as well as cooperating closely and supporting each o ther. Ethiopia, in collaboration with China, h osted the second m inisteri al conferen ce of the Forum on China-Afri ca Coop eration (FOCAC) in December 2003. This was the fir st time the ministerial co nference h ad been held on the Afri can continent (Ping 2005, p. 229). The year 2006 was uneqUivocally declared b y the Chinese lead ership to be the year for 94

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China-Africa relations. January 2006 heralded the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing, in which 48 African heads of state and government participated. The Beijing summit saw the release of a new 'China's African policy paper', which reiterated China's declared policy of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. The paper affirmed former president Jian Zemin's declaration in 1996 that the five cornerstones of China's Africa policy were 'sincere friendship, equality, unity and cooperation, common development, and looking to the future'.

Growth of relationship A number of factors have enhanced bilateral relations on the Ethiopian side. China has helped Ethiopia in all its economic development efforts, including in areas such as aid, debt reduction, loans and technical assistance, and without any political strings attached except for the 'one China ' policyl Ethiopia's quest for development has led it to forge closer relations with China. As Meles Zenawi said at the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: 'Our chall enge now is not to fight co lonialism, but fighting poverty and backwardness and achieving economic independence. Africa needs the support of its friends to overcome these challenges' (African Business 2006, p. 39). During the two-day official visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Prime Minister Meles called on the Chinese government to extend development assistance to Ethiopia (Ethiopian Herald 2008, p. 1). Seyoum Mesfin, the Ethiopian foreign minister, said: 'China is an important partner for us. It is involv[ed] in the area of our priorities such as agricu lture [and] infrastructure, including roads and rural hospitals and schoo ls' (Daily Monitor 2008, p. 1). The Chinese foreign minister for his part underlined his country's interest in further strengthening the existing good relations with Ethiopia (Daily Monitor 2008, p. 3). Ethiopia also sees China as an alternative to th e West. For example, China has offered to make good any shortfall in assistance following the suspension of European Union aid due to alle ged human rights violations during and after the 2005 Ethiopian election. Thus China's foreign policy of non-interference has helped 95

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Ethiopian and African leaders to act freely in their dealings with China. In his briefin gs to p arliament on the US Congress HR 2003 bill,> Meles Zen awi said that h e did not think the bill wo uld be ad opted as law, but if it were to be then there wo uld be alternative sources of aid. The strength of this argument is enhan ced by Robert Mugabe's speech at the 25th anniversary of Zimb abwe's independence in May 2005: 'We h ave turned east where the sun rises, and given our b acks to the west, w here the sun sets' (Vines 2007, p. 14). Tr ade statistics show th at China was Ethiopia's top trading partner in the year 2006, with Ethiopi a calling China its ' m ost reliable trading p artner ' (Vines 2007, p. 214). It was interesting to note that one of the fir st governments to congratulate the EPRDF on its 'electoral' victory was China. Just as Jonas Savimbi in Angola was supp orted by Mao Zedon g in the 1960s and then Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, so Meles and the EPRDF h ave been supported both by China and US Presidents George Bush and Jimmy Carter. China's development is also considered as a role m odel for Ethiopia. In the past two decades, China has helped millions of its p eople out of p overty and transformed itself from a backward agricultural co untry into a country with the highest grow th rate in the world (Gaye 2008, p. 15-19; Ndubisi 2006). Moreover, there is a very practical yet profound reason for the ap peal of China's m od el to Ethiopia: its historic achievem ents in economic reform and national construction and its su ccessful leap from a backward to a d eveloping n ation (Obiorah 2006). China is also a diplomatic ally to Ethiopia on different issues, such as the d emocratisation process and other issues at international forums like those of the United Nations and the G77. There are several fa ctors causing China to tilt towards Ethiopia. Ethiopia plays an important role in African politics b ecause of its strategic location in the region as the seat of the African Union (AU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and o ther specialised organs of the UN. Ethiopia has thus become a reflection of China's w ider ambitions in Africa and the changes it p ortends for the region. A p oor, landlocke d n a tion, Ethiopia lacks the vast natural reso urces that have drawn China's interest in o ther countries. But Ethiopia is the source of the Blue Nile, the river that quenches Egypt's thirst. It is also the m eeting ground

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between largely Muslim North Africa and the largely Christian so uth of the continent. The other important factor which has strengthened bilateral relations is China's need for m ar kets. Decad es of an industrially led comm and eco nom y h ave resulted in gross over-supply in many sectors of China's d omesti c market, driving down prices (Ming and Willi amson 2003, p. 96). In addition, regional comp etition between companies is co nsequently so fierce that produ cts so ld but not made in any given pro vin ce are heavily taxe d. Expansion into international markets prov ides greater sco p e for a p ro duct to attain a bigger m arket distribution with fewer tax obli gations (Ming and Williamson 2003, p. 96). It also stimulates foreign demand for products substantially cheap er than the glob al average due to the saturation of the Chinese domestic market. The need to find new markets for p ro ducts that are in over-supply h as become a m atter of survival for m any Chinese companies. Ethiopia, w ith a p opulation of abo ut 81.5 million p eople, is p otentially a very lucrative m arket for Chinese products, trading and investment opportunities. China is a m ajor glob al p ower in geop oliti cal and economic competition with the US, the EU and other major and emerging powers such as India. It is therefore in China's interest to gain access to the markets and resources of Africa, including Ethiop ia. Furthermore, m arket-hunting Chinese comp anies which are n ot yet confident eno u gh to atte mpt penetration into developed co untries h ave also adopted the approach of entering less competitive developing country m arkets . In the wake of increased dip lomati c and co mmercial traffic between China and Ethiopia, the latter h as becom e a favoured 'testing gro und' in which Chinese co mpanies can test their strength. These m oves aside, on e of the most important motives for Chinese commercial forays into Ethiopia and Africa a t large is the growing need for raw m aterials and oil to feed its burgeoning econom y. China becam e a net oil importer in 1993. It was ranked as the second largest oil importer after the US in 2004 (Luft 2004, p. 1). Particularly due to its strategic importance for economic grow th, the procurement of secure oil supplies is a principal nation al interest and forms a fundamental p art of China's foreign p olicy. Ethiop ia is one of the largest co untries on the African conti97

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

nent and is believed to have significant, if as yet unid entified, natural resources. Chinese companies clearly recognise the reso urce and market p otential and attach considerable importance to Ethiopia. One example was the Chinese company Zhonguan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) exploring oil around the Gambella and Ogaden areas before the Abole incident. In April 2007, rebels from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked Abole, a site in northern Ogaden where ZPEB workers were camping, killing 65 Ethiopi ans and 9 Chinese workers. Another factor is the competition for diplomatic recognition with the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). In terms of China's p olitical and security interests, preventing Taiwanese indep endence h as been the predominant focus of China and Ethiopia and other African countries from the late 1980s. A strong relationship played an important role in resp onding to Taiwan's 'fl exible diplomacy' and in opposing their 'One China, one Taiwan ' p olicy. Some sch olars believe that China's m ain interest in Africa is to prevent Taiwan 's authorities fr om m aking trouble for China by taking advantage of small countries (Tubilewicz 2002, p. 810). This policy has been firmly followed by Ethiopia since the Haile Selassie regime. It is noteworthy here th at Prime Minister Meles Zen aw i h as in his three visits to Beijing consistently confirmed his government's adherence to the 'one China' p olicy and its firm supp ort to China on Taiwan and human rights issues. General historical factors have also contributed towards enhancing bil ateral relations. China and Ethiopi a have cooperated closely and supported each other in internation al affairs. During the rule of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia and China both suffered from fas cist aggression - especially Ethiopia as a first victim of fascism - despite the fact that the two countries were m embers of the League of Nations . At that time, China strongly opposed the Italian aggression over Ethiopia and in return Ethiopia supported China's cl aim to becom e a m ember of the United Nations Security Council, even tho ugh at the time Ethiopia h ad not es tablished diplomatic relations with China (Fraser 1969). Moreover, when China regained its legitimate seat at the United Nations in 1971, among the 76 favo urable votes, 26 were from African countries including Ethiopia, accounting for more than one third of the total. Since the 1990s, with strong support from Ethiopia and

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many African countries, China foiled for 10 times in succession Taiwan's scheme of 'returning to' the UN and 10 times successively has also defeated western countries' anti-China proposals at the UN Conference on Human Rights. Furthermore, to support the AU's effort to strengthen unity and integration at the continental level, China has committed to building a new headquarters for the AU in Addis Ababa. By constructing a new conference centre at the headquarters of the African Union at a cost of US$150 million, China has demonstrated a commitment to strengthening its bilateral relations with Ethiopia and, more broadly, with Africa as a whole. In addition, Ethiopia and China also have commenced cooperation under FOCAC since 2000.

Challenges Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China have developed greatly since the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front came to power in 1991. However, there have been many challenges to these relations. First, on the economic front bilateral relations remain imbalanced and tend to replicate Ethiopia's asymmetrical relationships with the West, which makes China a 'West Beijing' despite its claims to be different from the West. Although the value of imports and exports has been increasing significantly, the balance of trade is heavily tilted towards China. Ethiopia's exports to China reached US$132 million in 2006, a figure dwarfed by the value of Chinese exports to Ethiopia of US$432 million. Moreover, Ethiopia's heavy reliance on the primary sector as the dominant component in its export to China is compounded by a distorted international system that facilitates the export of raw materials but inhibits and restricts the trade in processed goods from Ethiopia. China does not show any meaningful deviation from this well-entrenched international practice. Second, one of its most pernicious side effects has been the dumping of low-price export goods such as textiles and clothing, industrial products, electronic devices and machines, which meet with huge demand on the Ethiopian market. Competition from China in the emerging plastic and textile manufacturing industries is a particularly acute problem for Ethiopia. Consumers

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CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

m ay rejoice b riefly over falling p rices, but in the end domesti c Ethiopian pro ducers are forced out of business b ecause they cannot compete w ith su ch low p rices. Moreover, the low-p riced Chinese goo d s can undermine Ethiopi an goo d s an d services. Third, China h as becom e a m ajor player in the field of infrastructure - su ch as road s, d am s and p ower pl ants - and over 60 p er cent of all con struction projects are undertaken by Chinese co mpanies w hich h ave wo n tenders. Strictly sp eaking thou gh, m ost of these projects are n ot commercial. Som e are finan ced throu gh ' tied ' Ch inese aid. Others are not profitable because the Chinese tend to set costs below m arket rates. H owever, it h as the effect that the Chinese comp anies are underbidding local comp anies. This en ables Ch in a to gain p olitical influen ce, which often op ens d oo rs to commercially or strategically m ore attractive busin ess in other sectors. Politically, one set of in compatible n ational interests in the relation s between Ethiopia and China is ideology. Despite its apparently d eclining significan ce in the p ost-cold war world, ideo logy co ntinues to play a role in affectin g each si de's interpretation of wo rld events, as well as the n ature of bilateral interaction s between states. The iss ue is at a crossroad s in Ethiopia; however, it co uld appear that Ethiopia and China are following d ifferent ideo logical p aths. The p ream ble of the Ethiop ian constitution provid es for ' building a political community found ed on the rule of law, cap able of en suring a lasting p eace, guaranteeing a dem ocratic order, and advan cing their economic an d social d evelopment' (Con stitution of the Federal Dem ocratic Republi c of Ethiop ia). O n the co ntrary, the People's Rep ublic of China is one of the world's few rem aining communist states. According to the country's co n stitution of 1982, China is a 'sociali st state un der the p eo ple's dem ocratic dictatorship led b y the wo rkin g cl ass and an alli an ce of workers and peasants' . H owever, in practice neither country adheres to socialism as its ideo logical an chor in the way it did in the p ast. Accordingly, ideo logy is no t a ch allen ge as s u ch, unless the d em ocrati sation process in Ethiopia fl o urishes and gives ri se to a new government w h ich co uld ali gn ideologically with the West. C urrently, m utual interest in eco nomic development remains at the forefront. Both 100

ETHIOPIA AND CHINA

Ethiopia and China seem to be following the principle that economic development needs to be achieved before real democratic political development is possible. Unlike western states, the promotion of democracy is not an objective of China's foreign policy. This view has had a negative effect on the democratisation process in Ethiopia.

Assessment Clearly, other things being equal Ethio-Chinese political and economic linkages will continue to strengthen. Ethiopia has benefited from specific bilateral relations, and China is helping Ethiopia to build its infrastructure. Chinese construction firms dominate the road construction industry. Moreover, it was Chinese construction companies that spearheaded China's engagement with Ethiopia. They are among the primary actors in relations between the two countries and have made a clear contribution to Ethiopia's development. Chinese companies have also contributed to cost reduction. This is especially the case in construction, where Chinese companies reportedly charge 20-25 per cent less than their competitors. Since pushing out foreign competition in road construction they are making healthy profits and have begun to move into other sectors of construction, such as government buildings and housing. The infrastructure improvements help Ethiopia to secure other loans and investment opportunities, contributing to an atmosphere of development that may one day change the country. China is also using the UN's 'five-point proposal' to assist developing countries in accelerating development, including granting zero-tariff treatments for some exports from the least developed countries; increasing aid to the heavily indebted poor countries and least developed countries and cancelling debts contracted by them; providing concessional loans and effective medicine for treating malaria; and training professionals. China is helping Ethiopia to reduce poverty and foster a developmental endeavour. China has emerged as the major donor to Ethiopia. Ethiopia has received over US$500 million in concessional loans from the Chinese government and a further US$1.5 billion in investments 101

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

in telecoms infr astructure, as well as US$1.5 billion in short-term trade credits. In 2003, the second phase of the Addis Ababa ring road was opened . Zero-tariff export item s to China increased from 130 to over 440. China h as financed a number of development projects in Ethiopia, including the Gotera flyover project in Addis Abab a, which is under construction with 60 million yu an, and the construction of the Maganagna-Kebena-Menelik hospital and Keben a Bridge-Arat Killo road project with 40 million yu an. Some Chinese enterprises h ave also been involved in Ethiopia's co nstruction sector. These are noteworthy d evelopments and are further evid ence of China's intention to play a major role in Ethiopia's developm ent. It is interes ting that China h as chosen to establish its own m etho d for assistance, rather than work within the existing framework of international institutions. Nevertheless, it is p ossible that China feels that this structure w ill be m ore effective and easier to m an age as a bil ateral p artnership between China and Ethiopi a. China also regul arly reaffirms its commitment to the delivery of bilateral assistan ce co mp atible with the m eans at its disp osal. Foc used on mutual prosp erity, China proclaims to have no interest in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia and this can be very attractive to the Ethiopian government. Finally, China is a source of investment for Ethiopia. It is in Ethiopia's interest to h ave a diversity of investors in order to avoid having its sovereignty undermined by any kind of econ omic, p olitical or military strategic d ep endence on one power such as the US. Currently some 250 Chinese companies have registered in Ethiopia, with investment of 3.1 billion y uan in different sectors su ch as manufacturing, construction, mining and other service sectors. Manufacturing is the lar gest component of current and pledged Chinese investment in Ethiopia and is continuing to show significant grow th . While the impact of su ch investment in Ethiopia is no t as yet felt by local industry, there will be significant potential for growth if local industry can be restructured to supply Chinese-invested fac tories. The existing friendly relationship could therefore be further promoted and conso lid ated in the future, so long as the two countries reap ben efits from it in spite of the m any challenges dis cussed earlier in this chapter.

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Conclusions and policy recommendations This chapter has shows that there are many challenges, but also bright prospects for relations b etween China and Ethiopia. Bilateral political and economic cooperation remains sound. As we have noted, there are many challenges. First, in the economic field the bilateral relationship is unbalanced and it is impossible to engage on an equal footing as long as the parties are not on the same level. The balance of trade is tilted in favour of China. Moreover, China is coming in as a donor and Ethiopia as a r ecipient, much as it has been with the West. Second, the dumping of low-price export goods such as textiles and clothing, industrial products, electronic devices and machines, which m ee t with huge d emand, is a particularly acute problem for Ethiopia. It has forced domestic Ethiopian produce rs out of business beca use they cannot compete on price. Third, China has become a major player in the field of infrastructure with the effect that Chinese companies are underbidding local companies. This enables China to gain political influence, often opening doors to commercially or strategically more attractive business in other sectors. Whenever Ethiopia has sought Chinese aid, loans, inves tm ents and arms, China has respo nded positively by providing d ebt reduction and technical assistance, with no political strings attached. Ethiopia considers China as an alternative trade partner to the West. China becam e Ethiopia's first trade partner in 2006. Ethiopia takes China's d evelopme nt as a role model. China also has important inte rests in Ethiopia and hence attaches importance to d eveloping its bilateral relations. As the source of the Blue Nile, the seat of the African Union and the m eeting ground be tween predominantly Muslim North Africa and the Christian south, Ethiopia is situated at a strategic location and plays an important role in African politics. A number of exchanges and visits by high level d elegations have therefore been conducted between the two countries since 1991. With a population of 81.5 million, Ethiopia potentially offers a very lucrative marke t for Chinese products, trading and investm ent opportunities. China's inte res ts in Ethiopia and Africa at large are guided primarily by economic impe ratives, using the 103

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

co ntinent as a commercial la unch p ad . In this resp ect Chinese en gagem ent is little different fro m western multinationals. In the wake of increased diplom atic a nd commercial traffi c between China and Ethiopia, the latter has becom e a favo ured testing gro und in w hich aspirant Chinese multination als can cut their teeth . In light of China's growing need for raw m aterials and oil to fee d its do uble-digit eco nom ic growth, Ethiopi a is one of the largest co untries on the Afric an continent in area and p opulation and is believed to h ave significant n atural reso urces, althou gh very few h ave been identified so far. Common factors h ave also enhan ced bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China in the p ost-1991 p eriod . China and Ethiopia h ave coop erated closely and supp orted each o ther in internation al affairs. To suppor t the AU's effort to stren gthen unity and integration on the continent, the PRC h as dem on str ated a commitment to stren gthen in g its bilateral relation s w ith Ethiopi a and, m ore broadly, w ith Africa as a w hole. Puttin g econ omic rights over p olitical rights and assigning the highest priority to the right to d evelopment is also on e of the common factors to h ave enhan ced bilateral relations. Con sequently, it can be argued that relation s between Ethiopi a and China h ave p rogressed well since 1991 after EPRDF cam e to p ower. Finally, one gets the im pression from Chin a's p oli cy toward s Africa - unveiled in January 2006 - that China is m ore an asset to Africa than a threat. There is an emphasis on multil ateral coop eration, investment, trade, comm on d evelopments, solidarity and equality as som e of China's primary con cerns in Afri ca. But a critical examination of China's relation with m an y co untries in Africa shows that China's co re interest lies in raw m aterials, such as oil and minerals. It is no wonder that China views Africa as a significant so urce of oil and minerals for its industrial exp an sion . Perhaps in the fi eld of tr ad e China is a threat to Africa and Ethiop ia. H owever, in the p oliti cal arena both Afri ca (including Ethiopia) and Ch in a stand to ben efit, esp ecially when it com es to multilateral issues. In brief it m ay be said that China's presen ce in Africa is as a res ult of its own interest. Base d on the aforem entione d findin gs we wo uld like to recommend the following p Oints, w hich co uld be implem ented 104

ETHIOPIA AND CHINA

unilater ally by Ethiopi a as well as bilaterally with China. The implementation of these recommendations m ay enhance prosp ects and minimise challenges for bilateral relations: • Preferential treatm ent for Ethiop ia must be fully exploited and maximised to redu ce the negative balance of trade. • Leveragin g China's investment in special eco nomic zo nes and special development initiatives for greater local development. This is app arently p art of China's m ove from infrastructure to other sectors in Ethiopia. The PRC government co mmitted itself, at the FOCAC summit in November 2006, to the establishment of three to five industrial zo nes in the African continent. • The Ethiopi an government sh o uld ensure that China's investm ent in sp ecial economic zo nes m aximises its developmental imp act on the p oor and vulnerable in design ated geographical areas by including the local p opulation in the development agend a. • The Ethiopian government should encourage m ore jOint ventures by Ethiopian firms with their Chinese counterparts. As can be seen in the economic relation ship, especially in the investment sector, the Chinese do h ave plans to invest in m anufacturing and other sectors of the econom y. The government should also encourage jOint ventures to protec t dom estic firms and companies. • At the continental level there sho uld be a clear regional or con tinental strategy to d eal effectively with the m yriad of actors. Another important initiative would be the d evelopment of a comprehensive African p olicy on China. This would result in more structured, secure and beneficial relationship and potentially create a platform for a true 'win-win' situation. A continental African p oli cy on China wo uld h ave to be developed thro ugh a continen tal bod y such as the AU with multi-stakeholder collaboration at all levels, beginning at the grassroots level and through organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Econ omic Community Of Wes t African States (ECOWAS). Such a policy wo uld increase African co untries' security and m ake 105

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

it easier for them to deal with big powers rather than making individual approaches that are easily susceptible to m anipul ation. To facilitate governmental interaction between Africa and China, m ore centres of Chinese studies should be established to facilitate, support and promote the process of building healthy China-Africa relations. These centres would facilitate and support African governments and non-governmental organisations with the PRC throu gh a policy of research and analysis. Notes 1. The 'one China' policy argues that Taiwan is an integral part of China. It is one of the principles of C hina's Africa policy. 2. HR 2003 was a bill introduced to the US Congress in 2005 with a declared

interest to 'encourage and facilitate the consolidatio n of peace and security, respect for human rig hts, d emocracy, and econo mic freedom in Ethiopia', Fo r

further informatio n see ht!p:llwww.ethiomedia.com/ace/ united_we_stand . html. If approved, the bill would cut off security- related s upport to Ethiopia until such tim e as th e US executi ve certifies that Ethiopia's government is

adhering to the 11 prescribed conditions.

References Abir, Mord echai (1974) Oil, Power and Politics, Lond on, Frank Cass African BlIsiness (2006) 'China and Africa tie the kn ot', no. 326, 40th yea r, December Daily Monitor (2008) 'Chinese fore ig n minis ter v isited four A fri ca n states', vo l. XV, no. 10, 12-13 January Dilnessa, Addis (2005) 'Relations between Ethiopia and C hina: an Ethiopian perspective', in Kinfe, Abra ham (2005) China Comes to Africa: the Political Economy and Diplomatic History of China's Relation with Africa, Addis Ababa, ElIPD Publisher Ethiopian Fo re ig n Policy Document (2002) 'Fore ig n affairs and natio nal security policy and strategy', Press and Audiovis ual Department, Ministry of Information, Addis Ababa Ethiopian Herald (2008) 'The two d ays official visit of Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi', vo l. LXIV, no. 105, 11 January Ethiopian Road Authority (2006) 'Ethiopia n government construction sector stud y' Fraser, Robert (ed) (1956) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, no. 24331, London, Longman Group Ltd Fraser, Robe rt (ed) (1969) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, Longman G roup Ltd Gaye, Ada ma (2008) 'China and Africa: the dragon and the ostrich', paper presented at th e African Commissio n confere nce o n 'China-A fri ca relationships', 18 Janua ry

106

ETHIOPIA AND CHINA Henderson, Conway W. (1998) [nternational Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Tltrn of the 21st Centltry, Mexico City, McGraw-Hili Kinfe, Abraham (2005) China Comes to Africa: the Political Economy and Diplomatic History of China's Relation with Africa, Addis Ababa, ElIPD Publisher Larkin, Bruce D. (1971) China and Africa 1949-1970, Berkeley, Uni versity of Ca li fornia Press Luft, Gal (2004) 'Fueling the dra go n: C hina's race into the oil market', Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, http://www.lags .org/china.htm. accessed on 3 April 2007 Ming, Zeng and Williamson, Peter (2003) 'The hidden dra gons', Harvard Bltsiness Review, 1 October, vol. 81, n o. 10, pp. 92-9 Obiorah, Ndubisi (2006) 'Africa : w ho's afraid of C hina in Africa?', Pambazltka News, 14 December, htlp:llwww.pambazuka.org/en/ca tegory/ comment/38853, accessed 24 September 2007 Ochalla, Ojulu Token (2005) 'Foreign policy and the dimension of internatio nal politics in Ethiopia' Ping, Ai (2005) 'Sino-African relations - Ethiopia in the new century: a C hinese perspective', in Kinfe, Abra ham (2005) China Comes to Africa Tubilewicz, C. (2002) 'The Baltic states in Taiwan's post-cold war diplomacy', Eltrope and Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 791-810 Tull, Denis M. (2006) 'China 's engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences', Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 459-79 Vines, A lex (2007) 'China in A fri ca: a mixed bleSSing?', Current History, vol. 106, no. 700, May

107

China's impact on Kenya's clothing industry Paul Kamau

Background China, a country with a population of 1.3 billion in 2006 and covering 9.6 million square kilometres, is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Its annual real growth in gross d omestic product (GOP) was 11 p er cent in 2006. Over the period 19962006, China's annual GOP growth averaged 9.9 per cent. In 2006, annual inflation stood at less than 3 p er cent and p er capita GOP averaged US$1,860. Available statistics show that China's exports grew 27.2 p er cent in 2006, while imports expand ed by 20 p er cent, res ulting in a trade surplus of US$177.5 billion, compared to US$100 billion the previous year. As the fastest growing eco nomy, China overtook Britain in 2005 to beco m e the fourth bigges t in the world after the United States, Japan and Germany. It is likely to surpass Germany by the year 2010 (Zafar 2007; Mwanawina 2008; Rocha 2007). By the year 2010, economists predict that China will be the leading global exporter, with an average p er capita GOP of US$2,400. In addition, by the year 2018, China is predicted to be the world's second biggest eco nomy after the United States. The sheer size of China, with its phenomenal rates of growth, d emand for natural resources, and growing economic and political power, is likely to reshape the world economy, offering both opportunities and threats to d eveloping countries (Rocha 2007; Goldstein et al 2006; Kaplinsky e t al 2006). Studies have found that developing countries are affected in different ways by the expansion of China d epending on their endowment with natural resources and commodities in the ir trade with the em erging Asian giant (Broadman et al 2007; McCormick et al 2006; Alemayehu 108

KENYA'S CLOTHING INDUSTRY

2006; Stevens and Kennan 2006). Countries endowed with natural resources such as oil and timber are likely to experience a boom as a result of trading with China, while those without such resources experience a deficit. In the latter category, Kenya is likely to experience a trade deficit with China and is unlikely to reap many benefits from China's sustained growth. With the body of research on this subject still at a formative stage, this chapter examines the impact of China's ascendancy on Kenya by focusing mainly on the clothing, or apparel, industry, an industry which produces the leading commodity in China-Kenya trade. The main object of this chapter concerns how opportunities can be maximised and threats minimised as the two countries conduct trade in apparel, suggesting approaches for Kenya's strategic positioning in order to take advantage of opportunities available to it.

Why the apparel industry? The apparel industry is of significant importance to developing countries. It is often perceived as one of the strategic industries within the manufacturing sector which spearheads the early stages of the development process. In other words, it is a typical 'starter' industry for countries engaged in export-oriented industrialisation and is also a first rung on the industrialisation ladder for developing economies (Kamau 2006; McCormick and Rogerson 2004; Gereffi 1999). Evidence shows that even industrialised countries once depended heavily on this industry in the early stages of their industrialisation 1 Similarly, evidence from newly industrialised countries (NICs) in east Asia shows that the industrialisation process was sparked by labour-intensive export processing, particularly in the apparel industry (Thoburn et al 2004). Given the labour-intensity of this sector, it provides an avenue for the creation of employment, particularly with regard to the unskilled and semi-skilled labour found in abundance in developing countries. In addition, the vast majority - nearly 75 per cent - of workers in this industry are women, whose income-earning opportunities have far-reaching effects on household welfare and poverty reduction. The industry offers strong backward and forward linkage 109

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

Table 1 Percentage share of world ex ports in clothing in 2002 Country

% share of exports of clothing

European Union

32.2

China

23.3

Turkey

4.6

Mexico

4.4

India

3.4

USA

3.4

Republic of Korea

2.2

Bangladesh

2.2

Indonesia

2.2

Tunisia

1. 5

Vietnam

1.5

Morocco

1.4

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.1

Others

16 .6 100

Source: Pinaud (2007)

through the agricultura l and export sectors, respectively. In the early stages of deve lopment, the apparel industry provides opportunities for diversification away from agricu lture and the export of raw materials to the export of value-added products. Through the export of apparel Kenya is integrated into globa l trade and markets. Apparel products are trade-intensive, implying that there is great potential for international trade in them (Tho burn et al 2004; EPZA 2005). The export of appare l contributes significantly to foreign exchange earnings and foreign direct investment, as well as technological transfer. Final ly, the ease of entry enables sub-contracting, with obvious benefits to sma ll -scale producers. One can draw similarities and differences between the apparel industry in Kenya and that of China w ith a view to analysing how the ascendancy of China impacts on Kenya's apparel industry. First, in both countries, the apparel industries depend to a large extent on export markets. Second, women workers constitute a 110

KENYA'S CLOTHING INDUSTRY

majority of workers. Third, the apparel industry in China is more developed in terms of size and productivity, while that of Kenya is emerging. Fourth, most of the raw materials used, especially in Kenya's export-oriented production, are imported from Asian countries, including China, which makes Kenya reliant on China. Fifth, most of the investors in the Kenyan apparel industry are from Asian regions including China and the attraction to invest in Kenya is driven by the need to access the otherwise restrictive US market. Sixth, China, with its increasing competitiveness and urge for market expansion, poses a threat to the survival of the Kenyan apparel industry in both the domestic and the US market. In sum, China dominates the world market in apparel due to its high productivity and low-cost inputs, while Kenya is struggling to sustain itself in the global clothing trade, as demonstrated in Table 1. In 2002, China was the leading exporter of apparel after the EU, commanding 23.3 per cent of global apparel exports. During this period, the market share of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was only 1.1 per cent. Since the expiration of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2005, many apparel-producing SSA countries, including Kenya, have suffered while China has registered significant gains in the global apparel trade (Broadman 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris 2006; Kaplinsky et aI2006). The MFA, which governed the trade in textiles and clothing between 1974 and 1994, gave prerogative powers to developed countries to impose quotas on the amount of textiles and clothing exported to each country. In other words, developed countries allocated different quotas for the low-income exporting countries. In the wake of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) establishment, the MFA was abolished through the Agreement on Textile and Clothing. Available statistics indicate that in 2006, China commanded more than 30 per cent of global apparel exports. China's rise in the sector coincided with a dramatic shrinkage in Kenya's apparel industry.2

Framework for analysing China's impact Research on the impact of China's economic rise on other developing countries is still at an early stage and there are a number of key areas where current knowledge remains limited (Alemayehu 2006). These limitations are even more marked in the case of 111

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

sectoral an alysis. Furtherm ore, acad emic interest in stud ying the imp act of China on African econ omies is only just beginning to em erge, which m akes it d iffi cult to di scuss the imp act of China's rise in any co mprehen sive way. Scholars h ave, however, begun to d evelop fram ewo rks for an alysin g the imp act of China on Afri can co untries (see for example McCo rmick 2007, Kaplinsky et a12006, and Asian Drivers Team 2006). These fr ameworks recogni se that assessing the imp act of China on African co untries is fairly com plex. First of all, we need to talk of imp acts, rather than imp act and we nee d to recognise that these imp acts are channelled in d ifferent ways (McCormick 2007). Fo ur typ es of imp acts h ave been identified : 1) The imp act on growth; 2) Distribution; 3) Governan ce; and 4) The en viron m ent (Kaplinsky et al 2006). The m ain ch annels throu gh w hich these imp acts occ ur are trad e, foreign direct in vestment (FDI), aid, and human reso urce flows . We can also distin gui sh between co mplem entary and competing effects. Complem entary effects occur w hen, for example, African countries import textile fabri c fro m China to en able them to take ad vantage of trade preferen ces in clo thing, such as th at offered by the US thro u gh the Africa Growth and O pp ortunity A ct (AGOA ). In this case, China's ascendan cy in textiles m anufacturing is complem entary to Kenya's ability to m ake garments and also in the provision of cheap con sumer apparel. Due to the size of China's p opulation and the anticip ated growth in de m and for co n sumer goo d s, this m ay trigger a rise in the price of com mo dities that Ken ya exp orts to Chin a or the world m arket to the benefit of Kenya. Kenya is, h owever, negatively affected in o ther ways, su ch as for example w h en China competes directly w ith Ken ya in the produ ction of app arel for the Kenyan markets. Furthermore, som e effec ts w ill be direct, w hile others will be indirect. Direc t effec ts are fairly clear : China's competition w ith Kenya in the latter 's home m arket is an ob vious example (McCormick 2007; Tegegne 2007). Indirect imp ac ts are less w idely acknowled ged . They are diffi cult to m eas ure, as they occur in third-co untry m arkets and in stitutions. For example, China's trade with the US may op en up or close opportunities for Kenya to exp ort to that m arket (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006) . Similarly, Ken ya's ability to exp ort app arel to its neighbouring Afri can 112

KENYA'S CLOTHIN G INDU STRY

Table 2 Framework for assessing the impact of China on Kenya Channel

Impacts Complementary Direct

Indirect

Competitive Direct

Indirect

Trade Investment Aid Migration Source: Adapted from McCormick (2007) and Kap linsky et al (2006)

co untries may be constrained by the volume of relatively cheap garments that China exports to those countries. The framework displayed in Table 2 can be used to assess the impact of China on Ke nya's apparel industry. Each cell of the table may include qualitative or quantitative information about one of several of the possible outcomes. Thus, for example, the cell re presenting the impact of China's complem entary direct trade on Kenya might include information about the level and types of tex tile imports that h ave allowed Kenya to produce clothing for the AGOA market. Some cells may be empty because either there is no impact or the impact is not known.

The structure of the Kenyan apparel industry Textiles and clothing manufacturing in Kenya dates back to the colonial period. As early as 1954, there were 74 enterprises employing aro und 3,000 workers. At independence, this industry was identified as one of the core industries that would spearhead the industrialisation process in Kenya. It was therefore protected against competition from impo rts, and the government invested h eavily in the industry. As a res ult of this support the industry developed rapidly during the first two decad es of indep endence. By 1980, it acco unted for abo ut 30 per cent of the labour force in the manufacturing sector (Kinyanjui et al 2004; Omo lo 2006). Analysts argue that the success of the industry at that time was du e to the protectionism provided during the importsubstitution period and huge investment by the government in 11 3

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

textile manufacturing. 3 While the state played a key role in textile manufacturing, apparel m anufacturing rem aine d in the h ands of the private sector. With the transition from import-substitution to an ou twardoriented industrial p olicy in the mid-1 980s, the textile and clothing industry - like all other manufacturing activities - started to wane. This was as a result of weak and artificial backward and forward linkages that were created in the industry during the import-substitution p eriod. In an attempt to revitalise the industry during the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the government establi shed two major programmes aimed first at making it p ossible for companies to obtain inputs at border prices so that their export prices would be co mpetitive, and second at rem oving negative trade distortions in ex p ort tr ade . These included the Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB) pro gramme, established in 1987 to persuade local industries to switch to exp ort activities, and the export pro cessin g zones (EPZ) established in 1990 m ainly to attract foreign investments in the export-oriented manufacturing activities (Akoth 2006; EPZA 2005; USAID 2005). Several incentives exist for firms operating under the EPZ, among them a 10-year tax holiday, thereafter a 25 p er cent tax reb ate for 10 years; unrestricted foreign ownership; duty and VAT (value added tax) exemption on machinery, raw materials and intermediate inputs; 100 per cent repatriation of profits; an d permission to op erate under on e licence. The Kenyan apparel industry is quite diverse in terms of size, ownership, technology and market orientation . It consists of micro, small, medium, large and very large firms forming a pyramidal structure with three tiers. The base of the p yramid is formed by the micro and small enterprises (MSEs) that produce mainly for the d omesti c market, which are estimated to number around 6,000. The next tier consists of firms ranging from m edium to fairly large tha t produce for the domestic market, but with some forays into other countries within the African region. The third tier consists of large and very large scale firms w hich are export-oriented . Nearly all firms in this tier operate within the EPZ programme and are fo reign owned (see McCormick e t al 2007 for details, pp. 211-13). Interes tingly, available n ation al statistics on app arel relate to only the third tier. 114

KENYA' S CLOTHIN G INDU STRY

The EPZ p rogramme in Ken ya was established in 1990 by an act of p arliam ent in an effort to p rom ote exp ort-oriented foreign direct investment, industrial growth job creation, technological tran sfer, the development of backward linkages and diversified exp ort m arkets (EPZA 2005). Investment in the apparel sector rem ained mod est until the year 2000 wh en it increased dram atically due to the introdu ction of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The central aim of AGOA is to boost trade and investment in Africa and p ro mote the growth of su stainable d evelopment thro ugh preferential trade con cessions, foreign investors' loan s and gifts of developmental goo d s and services:' In reality, the surge of app arel FOI in the EPZ was brou ght about b y the m odest rules aro und the origin of m aterials, which allowed producers to so ur ce for raw m a terials outside the US or AGOA benefi ciaries and yet qualify for duty free exp orts. McCormick et al (2006) and Akoth (2006) argu e that the surge in investments by east Asian investors was driven b y the need to u se Kenya as a platform for quota-hopping to access the US m arket, which m ay h ave d windled after the expir ation of the MFA quota regime in 2005. The p erforman ce of Ken ya's app arel sector h as gone thro ugh different phases since the year 2000. It was impressive between 2001 and 2003 but started to d ecline from 2004 on ward s. It is important to pOint out that in comp arison to other African app arel-producing co untries, Kenya's p erforman ce was least affected by the imp act of the MFA termin ation (Kaplinsky and Morris 2006; McCormick et al 2006). Table 3 illustrates different indicators of the app arel industry between 2000 and 2005. The number of enterprises increased gradually fr om six in 2000 to 35 in 2003 but declined to 22 in 2005. Similarly, employment rose from about 5,000 p eople in the year 2000 to 36, 000 in 2003, but then d eclined to about 24,000 in 2005, a d evelopment w hich serves as a clear indication of the creation of employm ent. The number of exp atriates working in the app arel sector rose from 235 in 2000 to 912 in 2003, but then d eclined to 784 in 2005 . Unlike in other co untries w here increases in app arel FOI h as been accom p anied by increased numbers of migrants competing w ith locals for job opportunities, statistics show that exp atriates co nsistently represented less than 5 p er cent of the to tal labour force in the sector thro ughout the period (see also Kaplinsky and Morris 2006). 11 5

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Table 3 Performance of the Kenyan export processing zones (EPZ) clothing sector (2000-05) 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Number of enterprises

6

17

Employment (number)

5,565

12,002

30

35

30

22

25 ,288

36,348

34,614

Expatriates (number)

235

314

701

24,234

912

837

740

Exports (US$ million)

30

55

104

146

221

195

Investment (US$ million)

16

48

88

128

108

132

Number of visas issued (AGOA)

983

1,060

1,986

2,979

4 ,185

4,867

Average unit price (US$)

4.96

4.82

4.19

4.30

4.26

3.66

Annual average

76.2

78.6

78.7

75.9

79.3

75.6

exchange rate (KSh/US$) Source: EPZA (2005) and McCormick et al (2006)

The year 2005 was particularly challenging for EPZ firms in Kenya as the industry was faced with two major issues. First, there was uncertainty surrounding the extension of the AGOA rule of origin allowing third-country inputs beyond 2004 and second, investors were apprehensive about the termination of the MFA on 31 December 2004. With the exception of investment, nearly all other indicators declined. My own interpretation is that increased investment in 2005 was associated with the existing apparel firms acquiring modern machinery to enhance their competitiveness in a post-MFA context. Now that the flexible rule of origin within AGOA has been extended to 2012, there is some hope that the performance will stabilise or increase.' Apparently, the average unit price of clothing exports to the US declined from US$4.96 to US$3.66 between 2000 and 2006. The export-oriented apparel sector's impressive performance over the last five years was boosted by its access to the US market under the AGOA trade preferences. Table 4 shows that more than 90 per cent of all apparel exports are destined for the US market. While this offers an opportunity for industrial growth, it is a risky market because the market is not based on competitiveness but trade preferences in the hands of the US government. Should something go wrong between the US government and Kenya, the 116

KENYA'S CLOTHIN G INDU STRY

market would be gone and firms would be unlikely to switch to other markets. We observe that between 2000 and 2006, the US market on average accounted for more that 90 per cent of all the apparel exports from Kenya. The lowest was in 2001 when it accounted for 93.08 per cent, while the highest was 2002 accounting for 98.83 per cent.

Trade between China and Kenya Analysing trade between Kenya and Chin a shows a growing deficit in favour of Chin a. Total trade between the two countries grew more rapidly during the period 1995-2004 than during the period 1979-94. Nonetheless, the growth of trade during the period 1995-2004 was associated w ith an increased deficit, such that imports indeed grew at a higher rate than exports over the period. As a proportion of Kenya's tota l exports, China accounted for 0.43 per cent on average between 1979 and 1994, accounting for 1.42 per cent of tota l imports during the same period. During the period 1995-2004, exports to China as a proportion of total exports on average increased to 0.63 per cent, while imports as a proportion of tota l imports doubled to 2.85 per cent. Major exports from Kenya to C hi na include hides and skins, sisal, fibre, coffee, tea, fishery products, horticultural products and scrap metals. Imports from China include textiles, readymade clothes, shoes, electronics, computer accessories, machinery and equipment, glassware, pottery, iron and steel wire, tubes and Table 4 Kenya ' s apparel ex ports 2000-06 (US$ '000)

USA

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

46,701

68,967

135 ,180

201 ,749

295 ,520

270,511

262 ,887

EU

1,661

1,694

989

1,338

3,225

3,024

1,026

Canada

47

20

327

1,911

2,647

2,757

1,694

Others

3,118

3,413

3,111

3,478

4,056

4, 362

7 ,664

Tota l

51 ,527

74,094

139,607

208 ,476

305 ,448

280 ,654

273 ,271

So urce: Kama u (2006)

11 7

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Table S Textiles and clothing trade between Kenya and China (2000-05) (Ksh million) 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Textiles

21. 43

16.56

14.81

6.05

1.49

2.24

Clothing

0.34

Total

21.77

16.56

14.81

6.32

1.49

2.43

Imports

Textiles

454.91

915.57

567.58

592.71

1,030.23

2,125.71

from China

Clothing

145.35

156.24

62.94

119.50

217.59

383.55

Total

600.25

1,071.81

630.63

712.21

1,247.82

2,509.26

Textiles Ii clothing

-578.48

-1 ,055.25

-615.82

-705.89

-1 ,246.33 -2 ,506.84

Exports to China

Trade balance

0.26

0.19

Source: Author's own calcu lation s based on Centre for Business Information in

Kenya (CBIK) data

pipe fittings (Kenya 2008). In comparison to other African countries, trade between Kenya and China is relatively small, arguably because Kenya does not have the oil, minerals, or timber which appears to propel trade between China and other African countries (Broadman et al 2007). From Table 5, we observe that trade between Kenya and China in the textiles and clothing sectors is highly skewed in favour of China, as is the case with overall trade. This trade deficit increased more drastically between 2003 and 2005, perhaps due to increased demand for raw materials for Kenya's apparel industry. It is important to note that textiles and clothing represent the single most dominant product in the trade between Kenya and China.

Third-market competition To help us understand competition in a third market, we w ill now examine the impact of China on Kenya's clothing exports to third markets and particularly to the US, which takes up a high proportion of the total exports from both countries. We also take into

118

KENYA'S CLOTHIN G INDU STRY

account the two countries' exports of knitted and woven clothing products to the US. Table 6 shows the share of each country in the US market between 2001 and 2006. Overall, we observe that China dominates the US market for both knitted and woven clothing products. In 2001, China accounted for about 11 per cent of total imports to the US market, a share that increased to 27 per cent in 2006. In the case of Kenya, the market share in the US was less than 0.5 per cent during the period 2001 to 2006. The highest share was registered in 2004 when Kenya accounted for 0.41 per cent, but thi s declined to 0.36 per cent in 2006. Between 2004 and 2006, we observe that the market share for Kenya in the US declined, while that of China increased. Therefore, we can infer that the exports of woven and knitted clothing from Kenya face stiff competition from China in the US and are partly crowded out of the market. In the East African regional market, Kenya's share of clothing exports h as declined in the recent past. The UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2005) estimates that Kenya's export of manufactured products in the region declined by 20 per cent between 1997 and 2003. In a survey carried out by the author on the Kenyan clothing industry in 2006, most of Table 6 Percentage share of ex ports to the US clothing market (2001-06) Country

China

Clothing

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

HS 61 Knitted

3.89

4.46

5.09

6. 14

9.29

10.91

HS 62 Woven

7.09

7.63

8.73

9.89

14.45

16.15

Total HS 61-62

10.98

12.09

13.82

16.03

23.74

27.06

HS 61 Knitted

0.00

0.04

0.08

0.12

0.11

0.09

HS 62 Woven

0.11

0.16

0.22

0.29

0.28

0.27

Total HS 61-62

0.11

0.20

0.30

0.41

0.39

0.36

or Crocheted

Kenya

or Crocheted

Source: Author's own calcu lations based on US import data. HS is a United Nations commod ity class ificatio n.

119

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

the local firms exporting to Uganda and Tanzania had actually stopped doing so, citing the competition of Chinese products in these neighbouring markets.

China's FDI in the industry The presence of Chinese FOI in the Kenyan clothing industry is strong, particularly when we look at the export-oriented firms. Most FOI in the clothing industry all over the world has been attracted by the export platform. Therefore, in this chapter we trace both the nature of firms that were in operation within the EPZ in 2005 and the origin of the capital behind them. In the local textiles and clothing industry, the dominance of Kenyans of Indian origin is high in medium- and large-sca le firms (McCormick et aJ 2007; Kinyanjui et aI2004). However, due to the lack of data on local textiles and clothing production and trade, our analysis is limited to EPZ. For 2005 we find that a total of 24 appare l-manufacturin g firms were operating in Kenya's EPZ. Out of these, 20 (83 per cent) were foreign-owned, three (13 per cent) were joint-ventures between foreign and Kenyan investors, and on ly one firm (4 per cent) was fully Kenyan. The origin of these firms' capital was somewhat diverse, but the dominance of China and India is reasonably evident. Of the 24 firms, eight had Indian capital, while six had Chinese capital, representing 33 and 25 per cent respectively. Other countries from which investment originated included two firms from the US, three from Sri Lanka, two from Bangladesh, and one each from Bahrain, Qatar and Kenya (Table 7). FOI in the appare l sector in Kenya is fairly recent as most firms were established between 2001 and 2003. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, FOI in the industry was largely a response to the US-AGO A trade preference. Apart from one firm established in 1997, all th e others were established after 2000: seven in 2001, 12 in 2002 and four in 2003. In 2004 and 2005, the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) did not register a single firm in clothing activities. There was on ly one textile firm in the EPZ established in 2001, a jOint-venture between Kenya and the UK. On technology transfer, most of the Kenyan EPZ firms recruited people without experience in the garment industry who were 120

KENYA' S CLOTHIN G INDU STRY

Table 7 Origin of capital in apparel EPZ firms (2006) Country India

No. firms 8

%

32 20

China

Taiwa n

8

Sri Lanka

12

Ban gLadesh

8

Kenya

4

Qatar

4

Bahrain

4

us Tot aL

8

25

100

So u rce: EPZA (20 0 6)

then tr ained within the factory. In this case, the EPZ firms d o not compe te directly w ith the local firm s. Equally, so m e former EPZ employees leave form al employment to start their own sm all-scale garment firm s u sing the training and ex p erien ce they ac quired while wo rking in the EPZ. More importantly, so m e ex p atriate p ro du ction workers left EPZ firm s to team up w ith local investors to establish garment factories. There are so m e locally-owned (non -EPZ) firms sp eciali sing in high -value activ ities su ch as embroi d ery, sand-blas ting, ston e-washing and printin g, activities that en sure regular subcontract or d ers from EPZ firm s. In thi s way, local fi rms are able to p articip ate in the glob al app arel value chain indirectly. Last but not leas t, local garm ent firms are increasin gly pur ch asing m achinery from EPZ firms, either wh en EPZ fi rm s up grad e their m achinery inven tory or at times wh en they close down . This h as resulted in local firms using relati vely m o dern technology in their p ro duction activities.

1 21

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA

Chinese workers in the Kenyan clothing industry Generally speaking, the entry of p eo ple of Chinese origin (PCO) to Kenya is fairly recent and their population is still low. Our discussion with Ke nya's Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs and with the Chinese embassy in Kenya r eveale d that no official statistics exist on the number of PCO in Ke nya. However, our r esponde nt at the Chinese embassy estimate d that the 2006 figure cou ld have been around 10,000. It was argued that the prese nce of PCO in Ke nya b ecam e more notice able over the last decade . In Kenya, the small number of PCO and their separation from the r es t of the local peo ple contribute to their b eing le ss visib le. The peo pl e of Chinese origin living in Nairobi have settled in the n eighbourhood of the Chinese embassy. Similarly, most of the Chinese companies with operations in Kenya have their national head office close r to the Chinese embassy and arguably close r to other Chinese p eopl e. Most of the Chinese people in Ke nya are engaged in trading and manufacturing activities. They are involve d in the importation of various products from China which they distribute either to r e tailers or through outlets they have opened to sell their products to the public. Since the year 2000, they have been actively involve d in apparel manufacturing. More recently, a numbe r of them have ventured into the motor vehicle industry, wher e they are involve d in the import of spare parts from Asian countries, but statistics on this remain scant. Since the year 2000, people of Chinese ori gin have been actively involved in the apparel-manufacturing sector. The presence of Chinese people in the sector is noticeable, particularly in those firms whose investme nt is from China. Interestingly, our survey revealed that even in these firms, Chinese avoid d ealing direc tly with the local p eo ple . They tactfully emp loy local people as human reso urce managers and accountants to handle issues related to local Kenyans. Our survey in the apparel sector did not show significant diffe rence in the way e mployees were treated be tween those firms owned by Chinese and those owned by peo ple from other countries. Salaries and working hours w e re more or less in the same range to all other exporting firms. 122

KENYA'S CLOTHING INDUSTRY

However, in the Chinese-owned firms, management was more concerned about the low productivity of workers in the industry and also about interruptions by trade unions, in contrast to the situation in China.

Conclusion and policy recommendations This chapter has shown the effects of China's rise on Kenya's apparel sector. It is clear that the China-Kenya relationship yields a mix of both positive and negative effects on the sector, at least in the short run. In the long run, negative impacts are likely to be greater than the positive unless Kenya can draw upon its own counter strategy on how to relate with China. The China-Kenya economic relationship has been identified as benefiting traders and households in Kenya, who now have access to cheap consumer goods from China. Exporters from China enjoy a wider African market in Kenya. On the one hand, producers of apparel get inputs at relatively lower costs from China, but on the other, they are being crowded out of the domestic market by China's cheap clothing. The Kenyan government is expected to both lose and benefit at the same time. The loss is on account of lost income from tax revenue caused by lower employment opportunities at both the firm and household levels, while the gain is in the form of increased revenue from trade taxes. The net effect is yet to be determined. Fundamentally, the trade between China and Kenya has grown dramatically during the last five years. However, analysis shows that it is China which has been favoured by this growth in trade. In other words, China enjoys a surplus trade balance with Kenya. The key losers are local producers, who stand to gain from cheap inputs from China but who at the same time are unable to compete with China's cheaper products on the local market. Local labour and trade unions are also seen to lose on account of lost employment opportunities for competing industries. Moreover, local contractors lose out due to conditionalities around Chinese-Kenyan bilateral agreements, the lack of access to cheap capital and the high cost of skilled and unskilled labour. The middle-ground is occupied by academia and civil society organisations who can play an indirect role to influence govern123

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

m ent thinking thro u gh p roviding eviden ce-b ase d p olicy adv ice an d thro u gh ad vo cacy activ ities. Chinese FDI in Kenya is growin g at an exp onential rate and in diverse sectors. In the case of ap p arel, it is worth n oting that the FDI is new but significant. Interestingly, the m ain attraction of FDI in this sector is the need to access the US m arket. As m arketseeking FDI, it is highly footloose and its sustainability p articularly in the post-MFA p eriod is question able. Other sectors w here Chinese FDI is n oti ceable are the con struction and mineral exploration activ ities, argu ably linked to Chinese bilateral aid agreem ents. Equally important is the growing p resen ce of Chinese p eo ple in the app arel sector. O ur an alysis shows that w ithin those firms w hose capital originates fro m China, m anagem ent team s are m ade up of Chinese p eople . Nevertheless, their presen ce is so m ewh at hidd en and they appear not to comp ete w ith locals employed in p rodu ction activities. Interestingly, we do not find eviden ce to su ggest that Ch inese-own ed app arel fi rm s treat their local workers differently from other exp ort-oriented firm s. In conclusion, we would like to m ake the following recom m end ation s: • Kenya need s to develop its own strategic agend a on how to p osition itself with regard to China. China will n ot do this on b eh alf of Kenya. To achieve this, civil society organ isation s need to take acti ve advocacy and ad visory roles. • There is a need to d evelop a clear strategy that w ill allow tech no logy tran sfer from foreign-own ed firm s to local firms in the app arel sector, so that w hen these firm s finally relocate from Kenya, locals w ill h ave appropriate skills to sup p ort the sector. • The Kenyan government sho uld give attention to re-examining the role of incentives so as n o t to unnecessarily deprive the n ation of much-needed untie d publi c revenue, and it sho uld also streamline the rules created b y donors so as to redu ce tran saction al costs and improve reso urce m an agem ent. There is a need to d e-classify confidenti al non-military agreem ents b etween China and Ken ya to allow for tran sparen cy and public acco untability. Civil society need s to lobby app ro priate a uthorities and institutions on this issue. 124

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• Strategic relationship s ou ght to be devised with civil society organisations in the implementation, m onitoring and evaluation of such programmes in order to mitigate against misapplication of reso urces and ensure compliance. • There is a need to continue lobbying the US government for the ex tension of AGOA, and p articularly the third-co untry fabric rule beyond 2012 to en able the appropriate development of b ackward linkages and to sustain FDI in the foreseeable future. • The need to address the export supply-side constraints is pressing given the fact that the co mpetitiveness of the sector is dep endent on infrastructural and logistical support. • Further research on the impact of China's FDI in Kenya is necessary, p ar ticularly given the p aucity of d ata. Equally important is research to examine the overall effect on net household welfare of China-Kenya economic relations. wou ld like to acknowledge the financial support of the OECD Development Centre, which facilitated the study from which this chapter is drawn. I am also g rateful to participants in the China-Africa Civil Society Dialogue Workshop in Nairobi for constructive comments on this paper. Ho wever, all errors and omissions are solely mine.

Notes 1. See Kathuria et al (2001) for a d etaile d discussion of the significance of the textile and clo thin g indu s tries among d eveloped countries.

2. Between 2005 and 2006, Kenya 'S apparel exports d eclined by 11 per cent, w hile about 12,000 jobs were lost w ithin the EPZ firms alone (EPZA 2007). 3. Through the Indu strial and Comme rcia l Development Corpora tion (ICDC), the government inves ted hea v ily in textile manufacturing firms s uch as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), Rift Valley Textiles (RIVATEX), Kenya Textile Mills and Mountex, to m entio n jus t a fe w. In additio n, th e government assisted coope rative societies to buy g inneries fro m colonial

settlers (see Kinyanjui et al 2004). 4. AGOA g r a nts beneficiary countries the unres tricted export o f qualified

textiles, ready-made apparel and expanded product coverage under the generalised system of preferences (GSP), a World Trade Orga ni zation programme that g ives developing countries tariff concess io ns. Consequentl y,

w hen combined wi th existing GSP statutes, AGOA gra nts preferential trade benefits to nearly 7,000 farm and non-farm products originating from A fri ca. However, among all the AGOA qua lify ing produ cts, ap parel p rodu cts form

1 25

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA the largest share of exports from Kenya . Pl ease see www.agoa.gov for further

details. 5. Kenya is classified as a lesser-d eveloped country und er AGOA, w hich allows the country duty-free entry into the US market for clothing cut and made up in Kenya, even w hen the fabric is imported from sources outside

the US or outside the eligible AGOAAfrican countries . This has helped make the clothing competitive wi th similar imports from Asia in the US market.

Bibliography Akoth, 5.0. (2006) "'Made in Kenya": the implications of export manufacture o n wo men w o rkers o n export process ing zones' .. in Kinyanjui, M. N . (ed)

Gender in International Agricultural Trade Agreements: a Kenyan Synopsis, Nairobi, H einrich B611 Foundation, pp. 73--86 A lemayehu, G. (2006) 'The impact of C hina and India on A frica : trad e, FDI, and the manufacturing sector', framework draft paper prepared for Afri can Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Nairobi Asian Drive rs Team (2006) 'The impact of Asia n dri vers on the d eveloping world', IDS Blll/etin, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 3-11 Broadman, H.G., Isik, G., Plaza, S., Ye, X. and Yoshino, Y. (2007) Africa'S Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier, World Ba nk, Washington DC. Export Process ing Zones Au tho rity, 'Annu al reports', various issues, EPZA, Na irobi Gereffi, G. (1999) 'International trade and indu strial upgrading in apparel commodity chain', JOllrnal of International Economics, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 37-70 Goldstein, A., Pinaud, N ., Reisen, I-I. and Chen, X. (2006) 'China and India : w hat is in it for A frica', DECO, Paris Kamau, P. (2006) 'The d evelopmental impa ct of Asian drivers on Kenya, wi th

particular emphasis on clothing and textile manufacturing', final report prepared for OECD Development Centre, OEeD, Paris Kaplinsky, R. a nd Morris, M. (2006) 'Da ngling by a thread: how sha rp is the Chinese scissors?', mimeo, Institute afDevelopment Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton Kaplinsky, R., McCormick, 0. and Morris, M. (2006) 'The impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa', IDS Working Paper No. 291, Institute of Development Studies, Un ivers ity o f Sussex, Brighton Kathuria, 5., Martin, W. and Bhardwaj, A. (2001) 'Implicatio ns for south Asian countries of abolishing the multifibre arrangements', World Bank research paper based on revised paper presented at the NCAER-World Bank-WTO 2000 south Asia worksh op, 20-21 December 1999, New Delhi Kenya, Republic of (2008) 'Economic s urvey', Government Printer, N airobi Kinyanjui, M. N ., McCormick, 0. a nd Lig ulu, P. (2004) 'Clothing and footwear in Kenya: po licy and research concerns', in McCormick, D. and

Rogerson, C. (eds) Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization, Africa Ins titute o f South A fri ca, Pretoria

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KENYA'S CLOTHING INDUSTRY McCormick, D. a nd Rogerson, C. (2004) 'Introd u ction: researching clothing and footwear in A frican industriali za tio n', in McCormick, D . and Rogerson, c., (ed s) Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization, Africa Jnstitu te of Sou th A fri ca, Pretoria

McCormick, D ., Kamau, P. and Ligulu, P. (2006), 'Post-multifibre arrangement ana lys is of the tex tile and garment sectors in Kenya', IDS Bulletin, vol. 37, no. I , pp. 81-9 McCormick, D . (2007) 'Impact of C hina and India on Ethiopia and Kenya w ith particular emphaSiS on tex til es and footwear', final report prepared for OECD Development Centre, Paris, OECD McCormick, D ., Kimu y u, P. and Kinyanjui, M.N. (2007) 'Textiles and clothing: global players and local stru ggles', in McCormick, D., A lila, P.O. and Omasa, M. (eds) Business in Kenya: Institutions and Interactions, University of N airobi Press, N airobi Mwa na w ina, Inyambo (2008) 'China-Afri ca relations: the case of Zambia', resea rch report prepared for the African Eco nom.ic Research Consortium, Nairobi O molo, j.O . (2006) 'The textiles and clo thing industry in Kenya', in jauch, H. and Traub-Merz, R. (ed s) The Flttltre of the Textile and Clothing Industry in sltb-Saharan Africa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn Pinaud , N . (2007) 'Nipping Africa n clothing in a post-MFA bud?', paper presented during th e 'Africa and China: econo mic and bus iness perspectives' workshop, 14-16 May, Shanghai Rocha, j. (2007) 'A new frontier in the ex ploitation of A fri ca's natural resources: the emergence o f China' , in Manji, F. a nd Marks, S. (eds) African Perspectives on China in Africa, Oxford , Fahamu Books, pp. 15-34 Stevens, C. and Kenna n, j. (2006) 'H ow to identify the trad e impact of C hina on small co untries', IDS Bulletin, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 33-42 Tegegne, Egzaibher Gebre (2007) 'The d evelopmental impact of China and India o n Ethio pia with emphaSiS o n small scale footwear producers', fin al report prepa red for OECD Development Centre, Paris Thoburn, B.T., Nad vi, K., Thang, j.T., Thanh Ha, N .T., Hoa, N .T., Le, D.A. a nd De Armas, E.B. (2004) 'Vietnam in the global ga rment a nd textile va lu e chain: impacts o n firm s and wo rkers', Journal oflnternational Development, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 111-23 United Na tions Economic Commission for A frica (2005) 'Compendium of intra-Africa n and related foreign trade sta tistics', UNECA, Addis Ababa USAlD (2005) 'Impact of the end of MFA quotas and COMESA's textile and apparel ex po rts under AGOA: can th e s ub-Sa haran Afr ica tex tile and apparel industry s u rvive and grow in the post-MFA wo rld ?', report prepared for USAID East and Central Africa Global Competitiveness Trad e Hub Zafar, Ali (2007) 'The grow ing relationship between China and sub-Sa hara n A frica : macroeconomics, trade, in ves tment and aid links', World Bank Research Observer, adva nce access, published A pril

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The impact of Chinese imports on Nigerian traders Edwin Ikhuoria

Introduction In view of the growing influence of Chinese imports throughout Africa, an analysis of the impact of Chinese trade in Nigeria is timely. This impact should be examined within the fr a m ework of the official trading structure b e twee n Nigeria and China. This chapter ther efor e examines trading trends between the most pop ulated African nation and the most populated Asian nation and shows the impacts of these trends on the economy of the Nigerian traders, whose activities affect the socio-economic well-being of the Nige rian nation and the generality of her p eo ple. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first part summarises the official dimensions of N igerian-Chinese commercial relationships, identifying structural impediments to trade flows and their attendant effects on trading be tween the two countries. Information in this section is drawn largely from Chinese official sources. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of the role of goods imported from China on the Nigerian marke t. Finally, the third part summarises the results of a survey conducted by the National Association of Nigerian Traders on the 'Pe rception of Chinese products by the Nigerian public', conducted in January 2008. The aim of the survey was to d e termine the pote ntial of trade relations between Nigeria and China from the point of view of the consuming public, comparing the influence of imports from China with that of other products, ide ntifying common advantages and problems with these goods, and their impact on Nigerian traders as well as on the Nige rian economy more generally. 128

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Imports from China to Nigeria: the official dimension Although Chinese trad ers and industrialists had a foothold in Nigeria in the 1960s (Mochizuki 2003), formal bilateral relations between the two d emographic giants did not commence until 1971. Since then there have been many visits involving top political and d efence officials as well as business people from both countries. China-Nigeria relations have been framed within Sino-African diplomacy since the 1950s. More recently, these relations have evolved into a new China-Africa 'strategic partnership' based on a win-win relationship: trade; appropriate and cheap( er) technology and goods; financing; and aid/development cooperation. It is clear that these are based on China's quest for reso urces, space and influence in global affairs, as well as Africa's quest for be tter terms of trade, increase d resources and less interventionist and conditionality-laden models of d evelopme nt (Obi 2008). China-Nigeria trade volumes more than tripled from US$1.1 to US$4.3 billion be tween 2002 and 2007 while in 2008 they totalled US$7.3 billion (tralac 2009), making Nigeria the fourth larges t African trading partner of China, after Angola, South Africa and Sudan (George 2009). Signifying Nigeria's importance to China, Beijing signed a m emorandum of unders tanding with Abuja in January 2006 on the establishment o f a strategic partnership, its first such agreem ent with an African country. China primarily exports motorcycles, machine ry eq uipme nt, auto parts, rubber tyres, chemical products, textiles and garments, footwear and cement. It is, however, widely believed in Nigeria that much more than is declared in the official customs' figures of Chinese imports find their way into the country. In spite of the bilateral cooperation be tween the two countries, Nigeria has instituted some structures for administering the trade flows be tween her and other countries including China. These are d escribed below (Ministry of Commerce 2006).

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Tariff system In 2008 Nigeria had an average tariff rate of 28.6 per cent, with the average tariff rate for agricu ltura l products reaching 50 per cent. The Common External Tariff for West Africa adopted at the time of writing put the hi ghest tariff at 20 per cent, mainly for manufactured goods. Various goods relevant to investment (such as industrial machinery and equ ipment) and hea lth (pharmaceutical products) are duty free for one year while others have reduced rates of import duty. Chemica l fertiliser imports are exempt from duty and valu e-added tax.

Import and export administration While Nigeria abolished general import licensing following the introduction of its structural adjustment programme in 1986, various restrictions on imports remain in place. All goods exported to Nigeria must be inspected by certified companies. Imports into the country are administered by various institutions. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for trade policies and trade administration. The Nigerian Customs Service handles the administration of import duties. The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is responsible for the control and safety of products that affect the health and wellbeing of the Nigerian public, mainly processed food, drugs and other consumed chemical products. Furthermore, the Standards Organisation of Nigeria is responsible for the quality control of locally manufactured goods and those imported into the country, performing quality tests and inspection of products to ensure compliance with the Nigerian standards for manufacturing.

Effect of structural impediments to trading From the perspective of Chinese ex porters, vario us features of Nigeria's trade administration operate as impediments to their business . • Certain categories of goods - es pecially fruit and vegetable products, beverages, tobacco products and textiles - attract very high import duties ('tariff peaks'), aimed at protecting local producers and industries. 130

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• In a similar vein, the tariff structure is generally weighted against the importation of finished products. Generally, raw materials to be used in production within Nigeria attract lower duties. All this operates, in principle, against the import of finished prod ucts from China and other countries. • Since 2004-D5, an outright import ban has been imposed on a wide range of goods, including many food products, consumer goods and secondhand items. Among these are approximately 20 kinds of Chinese products, including textiles, footwear, cases and bags, cement and ballpoint pens. China, as well as other member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has questioned the rationale for such prohibitions and their consistency with relevant WTO rules. • Various licensing requirements apply to a number of restricted products, and the awarding of these licences by the authorities is not transparent. Certification requirements for certain categories of goods such as electrical products, of which China exports large amounts to Nigeria, are cumbersome and expensive. Furthermore, customs procedures are lengthy and prone to corruption.

'Made in China' goods in Nigeria There is an unprecedented level of imports of Chinese goods into the country even with these impediments occasioned by the trade policies and regimes of Nigeria. In this context, the ro le of smuggling by Nigerian importers and Chinese nationals cannot be overlooked. Colloquially speaking, it is not unusual today to see a Nigerian girl who is basical ly 'made in China', wearing a Chinese blouse over jeans, with belt, bag, shoes and even accessories all made in China, in spite of the Nigerian government's campaign for 'Made in Nigeria' goods. All over the country, Chinese products are the mainstay of most markets, no matter their size. In fact, they have found their way into boutiques which hitherto sold only American or European products. Initially, Chinese products were found only in one spot: the 'China town' in Lagos. But now, Chinese products are found in every corner of Nigeria where there is a store. China town has 131

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become a buying site for retailers. It is the Dubai of Lagos and enjoys visits from people from all parts of Nigeria. Chinese products are successful on the local market because of their very low prices. This is a result of the belief that many Nigerians cannot afford expensive products. 'Nigerians love cheap things, so the Chinese produce products that fit into the importers' budget. The Chinese are only business-wise. They give each country what they can afford: is the common perception of most importers of Chinese products. An illustration of the relative cheapness of Chinese products can be seen in the difference in the prices of Chinese and Japanese motorbikes. New Chinese products, which include brands like Ferjeng, Jincheng and Quinqi, are cheaper than secondhand Japanese motorcycles such as Yamaha or Suzuki and they are imported into the country in large quantities. Motorcycles, electric/electronic products, children's products, cameras, kitchen utensils, generators, textile materials and shoes form the bulk of Chinese exports to Nigeria. China has taken over Nigerian markets, and the Chinese are here to stay. The key issue is what Nigerians think of Chinese imports. An understanding of this will explain what motivates Nigerian importers to buy or sell Chinese goods. The general perceptions relate to price, packaging and design as well as ready availabili ty.

Impact assessment of Chinese imports on Nigerian traders For Nigerian traders, business has been good. The Chinese products have created a buying and se llin g boom. A common saying is 'Nigerians now have a choice'. An assessment of this impact reveals two main trends: a shift in attention from manufacturing to trade and higher vo lume of trading in new manufactured products.

Shifting attention from manufacturing to trade The enormous influx of inexpensive Chinese textiles has resulted in the shrinking of Nigeria's domestic textile ind ustries as Nigerian fabrics have been unable to compete with Chinese competition. 132

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Business leaders have attributed the decline of Kano 's manufacturing to the influx of Chinese products as trade restrictions fell. Chinese companies have more modern machinery, more reliable sources of electricity and easier access to capital, said Saidu Oattijo Adhama, owner of a textile factory whose payroll has dropped from 335 workers to 24. H e also stated that even the raw cotton produced by Chinese farmers is stronger and yields more fabric per pound. As Issa Aremu, the general secretary of the Textile, Tailoring and Garment Union, notes, the mass importation of textiles - both secondhand from Europe and new garments, mostly from China - has led to the closing of 65 Nigerian textile mills and the layingoff of a total of 150,000 textile workers over the past ten years. Some of the laid-off workers and business owners, however, now resort to buying and selling Chinese products to make a living. Even when the earnings from such trade are far lower than for manufacturing, trading in Chinese products has become a haven for many. Signs of China's growing prominence in Nigeria are easy to spot in Kano, a bustling, thousand-year-old city of 3.5 million people that was long a regular stopover for trade flowing through the nearby Sahara. Now the city's gaze has shifted to the Far East, with Chinese restaurants spreading across the city and Chinese goods filling shops.

Higher volume of trading Though there has been much debate around this issue, it is evident that increased trade results in growth and poverty reduction for stakeholders, as well as in increased consumer choice, depending on peop le's purchasing power. Effective d emand of goods and services indicates that the consuming public has the purchasing power for products which happe n to be mainly from China. Even if the economic position of most Nigerians has not changed much, cheaper alternatives to the usually expensive products, whether locally produced or imported, are now available, enabling people to make their choices. This effective demand has increased the volume of trade with its res ultant effect of increased income for the traders.

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Fairly used and new products Traders have also benefited from the imports of Chinese goods in so far as the high status associated with buying brand new products in Nigeria has strongly increased the demand for cheap new products instead of buying the popu lar tokunbo (secondhand) goods. The demand resu lting from this has brought about an unprecedented level of imports of Chinese products. This increased tra de shows the level of prosperity being enjoyed by Nigerian traders. Having examined what may constitute the positive imp acts, it would be helpful to see the negative side as it affects Nigerian traders as well as the Nigerian economy.

Loss of livelihoods from bad products Nigeria has yet to develop a mechanism for recalling substandard products. The only way of dealing with this situation is to seize and destroy the goods. This results in losses for the traders, but has no effect on the manufacturer in China. The problem has sometimes left traders bankrupt after a seizure by government authorities, thereby further entrenching poverty among the struggling few.

Loss of livelihoods from closing industries Several struggling industries in the country are collapsing und er the weight of the liberal trade regim e which the Chinese as well as local importers are exploiting. The example of the textile industry has been m entioned earlier. Also strongly affected are the smalland m edium-scale industries which are still trying to find their feet in the production of goods consumed in Nigeria. Most of these industries were established as a result of the government's import substitution policies. Many product lines were developed in the very difficult b u siness environment of Nigeria, where entre prene urs have to struggle with power and other infrastructural d eficiencies. At the stage when these nascent industries are trying to mature into sustainable enterprises, a deluge of cheaper and more competitive products seeps into the country, making local products less competitive. Such unbridled influx has led to many entreprene urs closing down and some resorting to trading in Chinese products instead. 134

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M any people have lost their livelihoods in this process, thereby creating deeper levels of poverty. The traders now have m ore m ouths to feed with implications on expend able income. A major example is seen in the pasta and macaroni producers in Kano.

Losses from buying substandard products Nigeri ans pay heavily for products that d o n ot serve the purpose for which they are purchased. The Nigerian market is currently flo od ed with cheap Chinese goods which are being specifically manufactured for poor developing economies. There is hardly a product that does not have a ' M a de in China' brand. With the high level of imports such as m otorcycles, h andsets, baby walkers, prams and bouncers, baby toys, electric irons, televisions, video sets, VCO and OVO players, refrigerators and freezers, cameras, fans, cookers, fryers, kitchen utensils, generators, clothing m aterials and sho es that come in different brands from China, one would expect that life would be easier given that these products are sometimes not manufactured in Nigeria. Instead, China has becom e a big drain on the pocket of Nigerians and the economy at large as products that are not durable are sold to the public, o nly for them to malfunction after short usage, usually making people re turn to the market to spend more money, which in turn leaves the local economy in the hands of manufacturers in China.

Smuggling and loss of revenue The official trading structure put in place by the governm ent to maximise trade benefits for the nation has frequently been vio la ted. Smuggling has become the norm instead of the exceptio n. As stated earlier, the growing concerns over the impediments to trading with Nigeria have seen m any importers resortin g to smuggling Chinese goods, d e priving the government of revenue from imports. Items on the prohibited list of imports still find their way onto the Nigerian market and little or no customs duties are paid. This was the major reason for the Chinese market in Ikoyi being closed down in 2003, only to be re-op ened not long afterwards fo r unknown reasons. Corrupt practices by o fficials of the Nigerian regulatory agencies are also a major part of the problem. 1 35

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Hazardous products Kn owin g th at m any Ni gerians still live below the p overty line and th at quite a large n umber are illiterate, som e importers are rep orted to d e liberate ly as k for p ro du cts to be m anu fac tured to a specifi c bud get, in order to m axim ise their pro fits. Chinese m anu fac turers obli ge them . Ni geri a asked retailers in 2007 to hand over for destru cti on all imported toothpaste on their shelves after its foo d and dru gs watchdog N AFDAC di scovere d a harmful substan ce in a C hinese-m ad e bran d . The ord er fo ll owed a sp ate of scares in the US about C hinese pro du cts, incl u din g seafoo d tainted w ith anti bi oti cs, and toothp aste and ani ma l foo d in gredients containi ng toxic chemic als. N AFDAC said it had fou nd di ethy l glyco l - an anti -freezi n g agent w hi ch can d am age the ki d n ey and li ver - in some tooth p astes m anu factured in Chin a and in all bran ds of Co lgate tooth p aste. The agen cy said it would p uni sh d ealers w ho d id not disp ose of all foreign-made toothp aste because it was not registered for u se in Nigeri a and its sa fety could not be guaranteed (Herald Sun 2007). The warehou se of the Stand ar d s Organi sa ti on of Ni geri a is also b ri mmin g w ith substand ard p ro du cts m ad e in Chin a, worth mil li on s of n aira, w hi ch have been decl ared un safe for u se .

Passing-off of registered products Imported Chinese goo d s so m etimes carry the b rand n am es of registered Nigerian products or a close vari ation of them . Examples of p ro d ucts that h ave suffered this fate are the Bic biro and the Jord an toothbrush . Bic biro, m arketed by the renowned com pany CFAO, h as a Chinese imitation known as BIG, which looks like the original BIC and can easily be m istaken for it. The Jord an too thbrush, p ro du ced by Rokan a industries, is also at the receivin g end of thi s Ch inese invasion . The Chinese started importing a too thbrush called Jord an into the Nigerian m arket that was much cheap er and also less durable than the original. Its success almost forced the Nigerian producer to close shop .

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Conclusion The present smiles o n the faces o f Nigeri an s will soo n becom e a nightmare if the sp a te of fake and subs tand ard pro ducts traced to C hinese businesses is n o t co ntrolled. The high level o f trading presently evide nt m ay n o t be s ustained if complaints from the public co ntinue to raise alarm over the quality of p roducts from C hina . While vario us m assive investments b y the C hinese are n o tice d in the eco nom y, trad e rs in C hinese p ro du cts ar e keen o n m aking excessive p ro fits b y buying p ro ducts of low quality and dumping them on con s umers. This is no t healthy, as it w ill spell a so u r trading future if a bl an ket b an is placed on C hinese p ro du cts beca use o f p ublic an ger. H aving examined these imp acts, it sh o uld, h owever, b e repeated tha t C hinese p ro du cts in Nigeria h ave com e to stay. What is n ow imp ortant is for the relevant a uthorities to ensure tha t the quality o f the imported good s is up to standard and tha t cu stom s duties as well as o ther r evenues due to the co untry are no t evad ed. Even at the level o f political collabor ation, d eep er com mitments are being m ad e b y Nigeria and China seeking ways to exch an ge and coop er a te tha t w ill s u stain and even surp ass the current level o f trad e and inves tme nt. Wha t is impo rtant, however, is tha t as ' Nigeria is w illing to learn from C hina', there mu st be a fram ework w ithin w hich this level o f collabo ra tion w ill truly leave Nigeria and, indeed, h er citizen s be tter off, b ased o n the ' w in-win' p rinciple of Sino-Afri ca r ela tio nship s .

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CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA the N iger Delta ', Review of African Political Economy, vol. 35, no. 117, pp. 417-34 Trad e Law Centre for Southern A frica (tralac) (2009) Africa-China tradi ng relationship - Update 2009, http://www.tra lac.o rg/cau se_data /images/1694/ Africa-C hina09.pdf, accessed 28 October 2009

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The dragon is not green enough: the potential environmental impact of Chinese investment in the DRC Claude Kabemba Our comments on C hina should not be rea d in iso lati on from the impa ct of western investm ent on the envi ronment in the Democrati c Republic of Con go (DRC) . Centuri es of mineral ex trac tion by western co mpani es have not d one any goo d to the Congo lese environm ent. We are focu sin g on C hin a simply becau se it is the m atter und er di scussion. C hinese comp ani es and banks are now invo lved in billions of d oll ars worth of d ea ls to extract n atura l reso urces and build infrastructure in Africa. It is estimated th at in 2006 Sino- African trade reached a total of US$55 billion and is expected to almost double to US$100 billion by 2010 -' C hin a's interest and en gagement with the Afri can continent has stirred animated d ebate in the recent past. The d ebate focu ses on different aspects of Sino-African relati ons, includin g economi c, politica l, cultural, envi ronmental and d evelopmental. This debate has been driven more from western capitals th an from Africa. Most of the literature on Chin a and Afri ca seem s to su ggest th at Chi na's growin g presence has a 'bad influ ence' on govern ance in Africa 2 The argument has been that 'if countries are borrowin g to su ch an extent th at th eir d ebt becomes un su stain able th en th at und ermin es all the work th at h as been d one (by th e West) in tryin g to tac kl e un su stain able d ebt.'3 In creasin gly Chin a is also bein g criticised for failin g to resp ect hum an rights an d protect the env iro nment. Consid erin g C hina 's growin g investment, w hi ch is mostly focu sed on securin g resource deals, ' there is a legitimate 139

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concern on the sustainability of natural resource extraction and the resulting impacts on the environment in Africa.' 4 China has in recent years increased its investment and interest in the DRCs natural resource sector. There is fear that China's investment in the country will do more harm than good, especially to the environment. The DRC is emerging from a long and protracted war and from decades of misrule. The country has no proper policy framework to protect its environment against the massive investment coming in from either its traditional or new partners. What impact will Chinese investment have on the environment in the DRC?

Chinese relations with the DRC Political facts C hin a has maintained good political re lationships with successive governments in the DRC, from Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sese Seko to Laurent Kabila and now his son Joseph Kabila. China officially recognised the Congo lese government shortly after it declared independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. In February 1961, Chin a and the DRC established diplomatic relations. In 1961 China ca lled back its ambassador after the DRC established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In 1972, China and ZaIre normalised relations. President Mobutu Sese Seko visited China five times during hi s stay in power (in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1982 and 1994). Chinese officials who h ave visited the DRC include Huang Hua, minister of foreign affairs (June 1978) and Li Xiannian, vice-premier of the State Counci l (January 1979). Economic activities China has had very little identifiable formal activity in the DRCs extractive industries and forestry. There are small Chinese mining dealers in the Katanga province involved in the artisanal mining of copper and cobalt. There is a multitude of Chinese smelters in the Katanga province. They are not involved in mining. They are accused of polluting water and air by Congolese citizens. 5 Some of the well-known Chinese smelters are Feza Mining, Quota Mining and Huachin Mining. 140

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China h as supported the ORC in building facilities and p roviding tr aining to the Con golese. C hina built the People's Palace in 1979 and a soccer stadium in Kinshasa in 1994. It also built a su gar refinery in Kisan gani in 1970. China h as also p rovid ed h andmade agri cultural tool plants to the ORe. It also trained Congolese in rice planting techniques and established the trade centre and the Kinshasa m ail distribution centre . In 1997, the two co untries signed an agreem ent on mutual p rotection and enco uragem ent of investment. In 2000, the China H o ngxing Telecommunication s Co . Ltd and the Con go lese government together d ecided to u se the preferential loans of the Exp ort-Imp ort Bank of China (China Exim Bank) for setting up the telecommunication s comp an y in the ORe. China and the ORC h ave also sign ed a preferential loan agreem ent worth US$33.6 million, to be finan ced b y the Export-Import Bank of China for the reconstruction of n ational fibre-o ptic trunks in the ORe. 6 This project w ill be undertaken by the China Internation al Telecommunication Co n stru ctio n Corpor ation . The Co n golese p eople appreCiate these investme nts, sm all as they might be .

A new China-DRC economic deal In 2007, the relationship between the two co untries took a new turn w ith China's d ecision to authorise a US$9 billion loan to the ORC (it is important to no te tha t under pressure from the IMF (Internation al M on etary Fund ) and the World Bank the Con golese government and China agreed to reduce the am o unt to US$6 billion). This is the bigges t Chinese deal on the continent. The deal follow ed a landmark election in the ORC held in 2006 and won by President Jose ph Kabila. With increasing peace and stability in the ORe, foreign mining comp anies h ave been p ositioning themselves to access the co untry's abundant mineral reso urces . Und er the agreem ent, Beijing h as earmarked funds for m ajor road and rail co nstruction projec ts and to reh abilitate the ORCs mining sector - a treasure ches t of copper, co balt, gold, m an ganese, zinc and diamonds yet to be fully tapp ed. The rep ayment terms proposed include mining co n cessions and toll-revenue d eals to be given to Chinese co mp anies. The China-ORC d eal is a re sponse to the d eclara tion of a n ew stra te gic partnership between China and Africa during the Be ijing Forum on China-Africa Coo p era ti on (FOCAC) 141

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summit in November 2006 signed by African lead ers, including President Kabila. The negotiations started in 2007. The d eal was signed in Kinshasa by the DRCs Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction Pierre Lumbi and the representative of the Chinese companies, Li C h an gjin, in 2008. The Chinese companies co ncerned include the China Exim Bank, China Railways Engineering Corporation (CREC) and Sinohydro Corp. The initial phase of negotiations was for an amo unt of US$6 billion; US$3 billion was a dded la ter. The first US$6 billion loan will cover big infr astru cture projects . These include a 3,400km hi gh way b et ween the north-eastern city of Kis an gani and Kasumbalesa on the DRCs southern bor d er w ith Zambia; a 3,200km railway to link the co untry's southern mining h eartland to its western p ort of M atadi, with access to the Atlantic; and 12 roads, a rail way, 32 h ospitals, 145 clinics, two universities and 5,000 h ouses. According to the deal's terms, the remaining US$3 billion w ill go towards reh abilitating the mineral-rich ORCs crumbling mining infrastructure and setting up jOint ventures in the mining sector. The agreement specifies the creation of a jOint-venture mining co mpany between Chinese and Congolese mining companies. The deal allows Chinese companies to extract 10 million tonnes of copp er, 400,000 tonnes of cob alt and 372 tonnes of gold for a period of 30 years. The distribution of benefits for the new jOint-venture companies is exp ected to happen in three stages.' In the first stage, the total revenue from the exploitation will go towards the repayment of the investment in mining, including interest. In the second phase, 66 per cent of the net proceeds of exploitation of the jOintventure company will go on the paym ent and reimbursement of infrastructure. The total amount is evaluated at US$3 billion. The remaining 34 per cent will be distribu ted between the two parties equally. The third and final stage con cerns the commercial side. It w ill comm ence after the reimbursement (including interest) of the entire amount invested. The Chinese party will receive 68 per cent and the Congolese 32 per cent. This Chinese investment will b e exemp t fr om all fees and import taxes linked to mining ac tivities. China will also be free to choose the materials and equipment it wants to bring in, includ142

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ing technology. It will also be free to approach the question of employment as it wishes. I expect the Chinese investment to go beyond this agreement. I also expect China to show great interest in the ORCs forest, dam construction, oil and fisheries. Likewise, the ORC has some of the biggest hydroelectric power potential in the southern hemisphere, surpassing the well-known Inga dam. Both the ORCs chain of rivers and the Atlantic Ocean offer great potential for industrial fishing. In general, most Congolese citizens appreciate the contribution of China and welcome the agreement, but at the same time criticise the secrecy and lack of preparedness that accompanied its signing by the Congolese government. Criticism therefore is directed more at the Congolese government rather than at the Chinese.

Chinese investment and its environmental impact To understand the impact on the environment of Chin a's investment in a country like the ORe, we need to analyse Chin a's capacity and willingness to integrate environmenta l safeguards into its investment on the one hand, and the environmenta l contro l mechanisms and capacity to implement them in the host country on the other.

China and its own environment China's economy has grown dramatically in the past decade. China is the world's most populous country and has a rapidly growing economy. The country's real gross domestic product (GOP) is estimated to have grown at 9.9 per cent in 2005, down slightly from the 2004 rate of 10.1 per cent, with real GOP increasing by a further 9.9 per cent in 2006. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FOI) into China totalled US$86.1 billion in 2005, a new record and roughly double the value in 2001. China's merchandise tr ade surplus soared to US$102 billion in 2005, its largest surplus ever and roughly three times larger than the 2004 figure. The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) forecasts that China's oil consumption will increase by almost half a million barrels per day in 2006, equ ivalent to 38 per cent of the total growth in global oil demand. China is the world's third-largest net 143

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importer of oil behind the United States and Japan, an important factor in world oil markets . This economic explosion has created an ecological implosion. It is estimated that China's en vironmental degradation is costing the country nearly 9 p er cent of its annu al GOp.s China's rapid economi c growth over the last two decades has brought w ith it several energy-related en vironmental problems, and the co untry's eco nomi c development h as been criticised for being founded on eco logical destruction. 9 Environmental p ollution from fossil fuel co mbustion is damaging human health, air and water quality, agriculture, and ultimately the econom y. Many of China's cities are amo n g the m ost p olluted in the world. China is the world's second-largest so urce of carbon dioxide (C0 2) emissions behind the United States, and EIA forecasts predict that China will exp erience the world's largest growth in CO2 emissions between now and the year 2030. Critics of Chinese investment abroad, esp ecially in developing co untries with weak environmental policies, argu e that if China has n ot b een able to protect its ow n environment, there is no guarantee that it will do so o utside its borders. In resp onse to this criticism and in an effort to miti gate the worsening environmental impact in its ow n backyard, the Chinese government has taken several steps to improve en vironmental co nditions. Chief among these is the law on renewable energy, which took effect on 1 Janu ary 2006. The law seeks to prom ote cleaner energy technologies, with a stated goal of increasing the use of ren ewable energy to 10 per cent of the country's electricity consumption by 2010 (up from ro ughly 3 per cent in 2003).

Environmental impact of Chinese investment in the ORC It is diffi cult to measure the current impact of Chinese investment

on the environment in the ORe. Chinese inves tment remains relatively small and it is focused in the Katanga province within the mining sec tor. H owever, the am ount China is proj ec ted to put into the ORC under the recently signed, aforementioned agreem ent raises legitimate concerns over the sustainability of n atural resource ex traction and the resulting impact on the environment. Problematic features of the agreement include the wilful ignoring of co nditionalities d esigned to improve African governance, the 144

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acco mp anying lack of transp are n cy in finan cial supp ort (primarily w ith regard to con cession al loan s) for investment p rojects, and the condu ct of som e Chinese co mp anies (state and n on-state owned ) in violating labour and en vironmental standard s. ' o Under the agreem ent China's public work in the ORC w ill be ch aracteri sed by the large-scale infr astructure d evelopment of road s and rail ways and m ajor mining extr action acti vities. The agreem ent signed between the two countries d oes not outline h ow the investment will p ro tect the en vironment. China's foc us on infr astructure development is earning it esteem on the continent. Africa needs to up grad e its infrastru cture - sp ecifically its ro ad s, railways and energy - to be able to respond to social ch allen ges. Building big dams can certainly raise p eople's living stand ards. Africa h as only d evelop ed about 8 p er cent of its h yd ro p ower potential. Europe and North America, two of the world's richest region s, h ave already exploited aro und 70 p er cent of their hydrop ower potential, according to the Internation al Commission of Large Oam s (ICOLO). China's investments are m ore sl anted toward infrastructure (roads and telecommunication s) than western investments. In p art this is because western co untries ' h ad all but ab andon ed bi g infrastructure and industrial ventures in Africa decad es ago, d eeming them unprofitable or too risky.'" Only 10 per cent of the US$22 billion of US FDI in Africa in 2005 was in m anufacturingY wes tern inves tment goes to ' soft' issues such as health and education . While this is of great importan ce, m ajor infr astructure develop m ents are in m ost cases accomp anied b y consid erable d am age to the environment. Critics say it is difficult to see how China will protec t the en vironment in the ORe. Human rights activists fear that China will repeat abro ad many of the sam e mistakes it has made at h om e.

Construction of dams , roads and railways The same companies which have been criticised for ignoring environmental protection in China are ex pected to build m ost of the infrastructure in the ORe. For ex ample, the China Three Gorges Projec t Corporation (CTGPC), the quasi-state company that m anaged the constru ction of the immense Three Gorges Dam alon g the Yangtze River in China, is co nsidering forming 145

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a p artnership with western p ower comp anies that are currently weighing up pl an s for a d am in the DRC that would yield tw ice as much power as Three Go rges. C hina is h om e to almost h alf of the world 's 45,000 biggest d am s and has emb arked on a push to ex p ort its hyd ro p ower know-h ow to developing countries, even as it contends w ith en vironmental d am age and social upheaval at hom e fro m Three Gorges. Iro nically, the Three Gorges d am is being p rom oted by China as a m o d el to be ex p orted to other p arts of the developing world . Criticism of the d am - w hich is the largest in the world by m an y m eas ures - h as becom e so established that the Chinese go vernment h as recently begun to acknowled ge the issues. The d am h as b een d ogged by problem s ran ging fro m spir alling costs and the unrest caused by the forced relocation of m ore than 1 million citizen s to rapid land erosion and increasing p ollution. This sam e scen ario is h appening in m any p ar ts of the Afri can continent. At the US$2 billion Merowe d am alon g the Nile Valley in Sud an, fin an ced in p art by the Exp ort-Import Bank of China, several villagers p ro testing forced resettlem ent were killed b y local p olice in April 2006. China is also exp ected to build road s and rail ways that will cut across the DRC's vast land m ass. Dam s, roads and rail way con struction can destroy m assi ve areas of forest and indigeno us plants. Such con struction also displaces population s from their land and h ouses. O ther propose d d am s in Africa could threaten n ation al p arks in Gh an a and Zambi a, putting p arts of them under water and alterin g the ecosystem.!' And even hy d rop ower ad vocates o utside China are anxious, worry ing that any p roblem s in China's high-profile foreign bUilding camp aign co uld cast a sh ad ow over the entire industry. Premrudee Daoro ung, a Thai activist w ith the Ecological Recovery and Region al Allian ce (TERRA), argues that 'China is using its p oliti cal p ower to con vince lower Meko n g co untries to accept p rojects and investment. '"

Mining Mining lead s to environmental d estruction. China is expec ted to ex trac t 10 million tonnes of co pper and 400,000 tonnes of cob alt. We know that sulphur minerals found in copper ore can pollute surface and gro und water. The sm elting of copper and cob alt 146

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also cau ses these sulph ates to be released into the air. China is also exp ected to extract up to 372 tonnes of gold. We know that mercury is used to refine go ld and can p ollute both the land and water surro unding the mines. China's exp erien ce of m ining in other co u ntries is not en co ur aging. For example, the Ramu nickel m ine in Papua New Guinea, finan ced b y both the China Developm ent Ban k (COB) and the China Exim Ban k, p rop oses the use of the controversial practi ce of submarine tailings disp osal as a m ech anism for disp osin g of toxic mine waste. The p rop osal to utilise submarine tailings disposal at this mine site h as b een discredited by indep endent scientifi c studies. Clem ent Kunandi, an env iro nmentalist, argues that 'The p ossible imp acts of the submarine tailings disp osal of tailings from the Ramu nickel mine co uld h ave a m ajor effect on the commercial fishery in the Mad an g p rovince.'!5 The use of this practice, p articul arly in a region kn own for up welling currents th at can bring these toxic wastes to the surface, p oses significant en v iro nmental h arm . As in the case of infrastru cture, m assive areas of forest and indi genous plants can also be destroyed when m in es are established. It is no t clear if studies h ave been undertaken to calcul ate the cost the m assive destruction w ill h ave. Without a serio us assessm ent of these ' m ega p rojects', it is the Co ngolese peo ple in the lon g run w h o w ill h ave to bear the costs of the destru ctive n ature of minin g. There is little ind ication that adequate en vironmental assessm ent h as been d on e on China's investment in mining in the ORe. The DRC-China agreem ent is quiet on the need fo r environmen tal assessm ent before mining can commen ce.

Forests The DRC is hom e to the world's seco nd larges t rainfores t after the Amazon. China is a m ajor pl ayer in the global fores t p ro du cts m arket, both as a p roducer and con sumer. With relatively limited forest reso urces, China's woo d impor ts are likely to exp and dram a tically to meet the increasing dem and for woo d and p ap er pro du cts. It is expec ted tha t Chin a, alread y ex tracting timber in Tan zania and Mozambique, w ill also start logging in the ORe. The experien ce of Chinese comp anies in Mozambique in this area h as no t been p ositive.

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Weak environmental standards in Chinese banks' lending policies China's financial institutions play the key role in bankrolling industrial d evelopment within the country, and today these institutions are also beco ming important players in financing e nvironmentally and sOcially sensitive activities around the world. In 2007, according to BankTrack, the inte rnational NCO ne twork monitoring the financial sector, and Frie nds of the Earth USA only two of China's 10 most important banks - the CDB and China Exim Bank - have disclosed their e nvironmental policies l6 The re port also adds that both banks' policies fall short of inte rnational best practice, w hile the remaining eight banks surveyed had no publicly available environmental financing standards. Chinese banks have also been accused of having a te ndency to obey client countries' environm ental laws in theory, only to ignore them in practice. It is not clear what environmental financing standards Chinese banks are using to finance China's ORC proj ec ts. There is a clear need to fill the gap in public knowledge on the e nvironmental impact: 'By adopting world -class environmental financing standards, Chinese banks can play an important role in advancing sustainability of their projects in the ORe. There are international standards already in place to which Chinese banks could simply conform. Otherwise, they threaten to drag down whatever progress that has been made in d eveloping such standards for the international banking sector.'17

Lack of transparency in Chinese banks ' lending policies A lack of transparency seems to characterise most Chinese investments on the African continent, manifesting itself in the total lack of consultation with Congolese people. Before any work can begin, proper consul tation with Congo lese people is therefore necessary, especia ll y in the areas where these projects will be implemented. The Congo lese public has a right to know about and to question borrowing from new and old lenders before loan agreements are signed. It is also necessary that overseeing and watchdog institutions such as parliament, the auditor general and the attorney genera l have clear authority over the loan contraction process, which is not currently the case in the ORe. 148

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In the case of the ORe, we need to insist that Chinese companies and banks disclose their environmental policies and assessment studies. This will be helpful for the advancement of public understanding and dialogue among parties that are interested in protecting the environment in the ORe. We believe that the public disclosure of environmental information at all stages of project support, including pre-project approval, project examination and approval, and post approval monitoring, is an essential part of public engagement.

China's response to criticism There are two positions on China's aggressive penetration into Africa. The first position suggests that we are seeing Chinese co lonialism in Africa. Critics from this position argue that more and more companies from China are entering Africa that simply focus on profit, with minimal regard for their harmful influence on African society in the form such as environmental pollution, excessive development and exp loitation of local labour. The second position maintains that China's behaviour is entirely consistent with the logic of market capitalism and liberal trade and does not make China a colonialist, but merely 'a successful capitalist in Africa.' l8 These are practices that China's elites used to denounce, but now come close to extollin g as dynamic capitalism 19 China itself disputes both positions. Instead, it argues that its actions are designed to help nations to develop. And as far as the environment is concerned, China is doing no harm. Li Ruogu, who is a Princeton-trained economist and has worked at China's central bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), argues that the accusation is unfair: 'It's not right to say we don't care about the environment and social responsibility.' China knows that it needs Africa's resources to sustain its economic growth, but for thi s end it also needs to ensure that its activities do not compromise its presence and the welcome it has received from the African continent and its people. Increasingly, Africans are incorporating in their development agenda' a clean and healthy environment as one of the building blocks for the desired harmonious sOciety'.2o 149

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Ch in a believes that Africa can learn fro m its mistakes. The argu ment is that China, w hich h as suffered from d eveloping its eco nom y at the cost of the environment, co uld p ass on to Afri ca the lesson s it h as learned so that the continent may avoid these sam e mistakes. Zh an g Shigan g, China's deputy p ermanent rep resentative to the United Nation s Environmental Programme (UNEP), h as argued that 'China, w hose en vironment suffered co nsiderably in its rapid economic d evelop ment over the past d ecades, w ishes Afric a co uld learn from its lesson s and is w illin g to sh are w ith Afr ica its recent experien ce in enviro nmental p rotec tion. China claims that it h as established a set of en viron m ental protection schem es that are suitable for the situation of d eveloping co untries. Civil society in general accept[s] that China is in a unique p osition to offer adv i[c]e and supp ort to Afri can co untries. But, Chin a sho uld learn fro m the mistakes of western governments, and should not turn a blind eye to corr uption and en viro nmental destru ction in the p roject it p rom otes.'2! The Ch inese central lead ership h as m ad e efforts to ali gn key Chinese business interests w ith its new diplom acy. China is aware that its investment will need to b e built on so lid norm s an d standard s if it wants to continue to enj oy an extended welcom e in the ORe. China h as taken step s to d eal positi vely to criticism . In Au gust 2006, for example, China con vened the Politburo, the largest policy gathering in China's recent history, w hich was attended by government m inisters, Ch inese ambassadors, provincial governors, p arty secretaries, officials from state-owned enterprises, and senior officials from the People's Liberation Arm y at the Central Foreign Affairs Wo rk Co nferen ce. Parti cip ants d iscu sse d how the beh av iour of Chinese comp anies abroad risked d am aging the co untry's im age, alon g with the need to establish a m ore coherent grand strategy, and how to stren gthen Chinese's soft p ower. Equally, on 12 No vem ber 2007 in Beijing, China co-organised w ith the Glob al Environmental In stitute (GEl), the University of Internation al Bu siness and Econ omics (UIBE), and the Chinese Academy for Environm ental Pl anning (CAEP) of the State Environmental Pro tec tion A d ministration (SEPA) a m eeting to celeb rate the offi cial beginning of the Chinese overseas industries en vironmental po licy project. The p roject is a co ll aborative effort 150

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am on g GEl, CAEP and VIBE, and the event m arking its offi cial beginning brou ght together representatives from m any sectors involve d in environmental p olicy m aking. Within China, the go vernment h as started to rethink bi g d am s, p aying m ore attention to the env iro nment and m arsh allin g p opular supp ort by enforcing requirem ents such as imp ac t assessm ents and public hearings. In 2006, China and African lead ers agreed to coop erate on env ironmental protection, share exp erien ces and boost su stainable development during the two-d ay FOCAC summit coop eration that took place in Beijing. The m eeting also agreed to p ro m ote dialogue and exch an ges in en vironmental protection and coop eration in human resources development. Within its own b orders, China in 1998 imposed a b an on logging as p art of a b roader effort to p rotect its forests. Available d ata su ggest that forest cover in China increased 15 p er cent between 1980 and 1993, and forest volume h as recovered sh arply in the p ast decad e following a lon g, stead y decline. Much of the newly fores ted area covers land that was originally b are and hi ghly susceptible to erosion . The m ost recent d ata su ggests that these trends are continuing. The optimism must be guarded , however, since China still faces a number of ch allen ges. With regard to foreign aid, Chinese officials say their aid p olicy is evolving alon g w ith the co untry's grow ing involvem ent abro ad. China Exim Bank recently publicised its lending gUidelines, and is considering joining the World Bank in undertaking projects in Africa. Despite the criticism levelled against the China-ORC deal, there are p ositive signs em erging from China that b anks h ave been urging clients to p ay atte ntion to en vironmental issues before extending fundin g to comp anies. The People's Bank of China h as for example recently d eveloped a new credit database which includes borrowers' en vironmental co mpliance data. This w ill allow Chinese b anks to eva luate how well comp anies h ave follo wed environmental laws b efore offering lo ans. Congolese civil society co uld dem and that this standard is applied to all co mpanies op erating in the ORe. But w hile b anks might h ave p oli cies in place, their implem entation remains questionable. In light of these po sitive developments, it seems tha t problems in the relationship between China and the ORC will n ot so much 1 51

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lie with China but rather w ith the shortcomings of the Con golese system of governance to engage and m onitor Chinese activ ities. This is w hy a ch an ge of beh av io ur should not only be exp ected fro m China, its comp an ies and b anks, but also from the DRC government to build and imp rove its n ation al enviro nmental regulatory bod y to en able it to fulfil its statutory role - to review and comm ent on the so cio-en vironmental imp act of p otential investment p rojects, investigate alleged violations of n ation al laws, and follow up an y identifie d v iolation s thro u gh prescribed legal mean s and enforcem ent. Id eally, the resp on sibility fo r effective pro tection wo uld lie fir st and forem ost with the Con golese state, which mu st create the n ecessary laws and m onitoring m ech anism s and san ction corporate beh aviour. But to be able to create a sustain able society, each and every business - from the sm alles t corner shop to the largest Chinese con glom erate - w ill h ave to increase their efforts to b ecom e socially and ecologically resp onSible. With their newfo und influen ce, reso urces and growing imp act, Chinese co rporation s h ave the responsibility to show leadership, esp ecially in situ atio ns where the state is weak. Put d ifferently, if Chinese comp anies plan to m aintain their domin an ce in the DRe they will need to use their influen ce to improve society and not just their own m argins.

Conclusion C hinese banks and comp ani es operati ng in the African co ntinent mu st strive at all costs to avoid th e mi stakes th at western fi na n cial in stitu tions an d co mp ani es have m ade, and to ad dress environ m ental and govern ance co n cern s in their lendin g and natural resour ces ex traction decisions. Su ch actions will help comp anies to establish p ositive images, som e thin g w hich w ill p rove essenti al for lon g-term business d evelopment. Chin a h as littl e option but to do d eals w ith Afri ca in order to take its 1.3 billion people throu gh a socio-economic revo luti on . This situation puts Africans in a p osition to negotiate far better d eals w ith China th an th ey were abl e to do wi th the West. It is for Africans them selves to en sure that these deals h ave a lasting and p ositive impact on their environm ent. To thi s end, I recomm end:

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• A China-DRC civil society workin g gro up to m onitor and exch an ge info rmation on Chinese investment should be created. The two group s w ill work by m onitoring Chinese comp anies in the DRC and undert akin g enviro nmental assessment studies together. • An open civil society and a free press in both the DRC and China sh ould be en cou raged . It w ill be difficult to exp ose the beh aviour of Chinese comp anies in the DRC w ithout a p ro fession al press and vib rant civil society operating in both countries. • Chinese press and civil society must be en co urage d to be m ore p roactive in en surin g that they m onitor their co mp anies abroad . China is taking seriou sly the tran sformation of its p olitical system towards a m ore op en society. Presid ent Hu Jintao h as called d em ocracy ' the common pursuit of m ankind' during his 2006 visit to the United States . Likewise, Premier Wen Jiab ao, in his address to the 2007 N ation al Peo ple's Co n gress said that ' Developing dem ocracy and imp roving the legal system are b asic requirem ents of the socialist system '.22 It looks as if there is an increaSin g window that civil society can capitalise on . • The Con go lese government need s to be m ore p roactive to en gage China in its development plan . For this to h appen the asymmetric b alance of p ower and information between China and the DRC need s to be addressed . The DRC nee d s to set the terms and rules of en gagem ent with Chinese co mp anies, esp ecially with regard to the p rotection of the en vironment. The DRC, w ith all its reso urces, is in a p osition of stren gth to negotiate a better d eal w ith China, including con sen su s on the protection of the en vironment. Notes 1. Davies, Ma rtyn j . (ed ) (2007) 'The en v ironmenta l im pact of China's e ngageme nt in Africa', Th e China Monitor, Centre for Chinese Stu d ies,

Stellenbosch University, South A frica, Ma rch . 2. See Schoema n, Maxi (2007) 'China in A fri ca: the rise of a hegemony?', in China and Afiiea: Partn ers in Development and Security?, Da nis h Institute o f Interna tiona l Studies, Copenhagen, 23 A ugust. 3. McG real, Chris (2007) 'Chinese aid to A fri ca ma y d o more harm than good', Guardian, 8 Febru ary.

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4. Davies (ed) 'Environmental impac t' . 5. Author's interview with Congolese citizens (2009) Katanga, DRC, November. 6. This ag reement was signed by the Congolese minister of forei g n affairs A ntipas Mb usa Nyamwisi and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi in January 2008 in Kinshasa. 7. Cros, Ma rie-France (2007) 'Ce que dit Ie megacontrat chinois', Blog dll CDF/FCD - Afrique, 7 December, http ://cdfafrique.afrikblog.com/ arc hives/2007/12/i nd ex.h tml. 8. Turner, Jennifer L. a nd Ellis, Linden (2007) 'China's growing ecological footprint', The China Monitor, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch Uni versity, South A fri ca, p. 153. 9. Ibid . 10. Taken from notes presented by Chris A ld en at the meeting on 'Commodities, governan ce and poverty reduction' orga nised by th e

European Commission on Development, Brussels, 14 Ap ril 2008. 11. Bengali, Shas hank (2006) 'An A frican building boom made in China', Star Tribune (Minneapolis), 18 September, p. 13. 12. Jackson, James K. (2006) 'US direct inves tment abroad: trend s and curren t issues', Congressional Research Service, p. 3. 13. Oster, Shai (2007) 'China: new dam builde r for the world ', Wall Street JOllrnal, 28 December. 14. Ibid . 15. Kunandi, Clement (2007) 'Ra mu 's ta ilings plan a concern', Mines and C01Ylnlunities, 9 February, http://www.nlinesa ndco mm uni ties.org//a rticle. ph p? a~70 79& hi g hli g ht~ C l em e nt, Kunandi.

16. BankTrack (2007) 'Time to go green; env iron mental responsibility in the Chinese banking sector', San Francisco, Utrecht, 9 May, http ://www. pacificenvironmen t .org/article. p hp ?id ~2 362. 17. Ibid. 18. Junbo, Jian (2007) 'China 's role in Africa' , Beijing Review, vo l. 50(6), 8 February. 19. Sautma n, Barry a nd Ha iro ng, Ya n (2008) 'The forest for the trees: trade, investment and the China-in-Africa discourse', Pacific Affairs, vo1.81, no. 1, s pring, pp. 9-29. 20. Oster, Shai (2007) 'China: new d am builde r for the world ', Wall Street JOllrnal, 28 December. 21. Shigang, Zhang (2007) 'NCOs to C hina: d on't repea t the West's mista kes in Afri ca', International Rivers Network (IRN), 14 Ma y, http://www. in terna tional ri vers .org/en/chi na/ch inas-globa I-role/ngos-chi na -d on t-repea twes ts-mistakes-a frica. 22. Thornton, John L. (2008) 'Long time com ing : the pros pects for d emocra cy in China', Foreign Affairs, Janu ary/Febru ary, p. 3.

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Disappearing forests, disappearing hope: Mozambique Daniel Ribeiro At the beginning of the n ew century the reality of the fores try sector in Mozambique was grim, w ith even government rep orts statin g th at ' cl and estine timber p ro du cti on in Mozambiqu e m ay be between 50 p er cent and 70 per cent of the total n ation al produ cti on' (quoted in Gatto 2003). A s the end of this d ecad e draws closer, I fi nd m yself refl ecting on the present rea lity and sadly co ncludin g th at not mu ch has ch an ged . Ju st to li st a few ' lowli ghts' from recent years: 2006 ended with the seizure in N am p ula province of m ore than 170,000m 3 o f illega ll y taken woo d, w hile 2007 started w ith the seizure of over 1,000 logs of illega l woo d at th e p ort of Pemba in Ca bo Delgad o p rovin ce. The woo d w as w aitin g to be exp orted to Chin a and be lon ged to a Mozambi can-C hinese joint venture ca lled MOFI O, whi ch is prim arily run by Chinese n ational s. In Febr u ary the log yard s aro und the Zambezi ci ty of Quelim ane were extrem e ly full, with unoffici a l counts estimatin g that they held almost double the vo lume o f w oo d of the total p ermi ssibl e annu al cut for Zambezi p rovin ce. Numerou s o ther rep orts of ill egalities in the fores t sector have continu ed to em erge in the m edi a. Onl y the rainy season seem s to slow the activity, fl oodin g road s and bl ocking access to the trees in som e areas of the country, but by mid -year the loggin g p roblem is again at full throttl e. Ju sti ~a Ambiental is a Mozambi can non -governmental organi sation found ed in 2003, but was onl y offici all y registered in 2004 as a NGO. Its m ain objective is to p rom ote advocacy and envi ronmental ju stice aw areness am on gst grassroots communities. As p art of its mission, Ju s ti ~a Ambienta l has und ertaken fi eld 1 55

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research to evaluate the volume and impact of environmental issues such as logging, dam pollution, oil exploration and access to clean water on the daily lives of ordinary Mo zambicans. With Mo zambique becoming an attractive destination for foreign companies interested in the country's untapped timber resources, the activities of the group are increasing as new actors from the South enter Mozambique's forestry sector. One such actor is China with its deepening trade and investment engagements in the Mo zambican economy. This chapter provides a summary of recent research work undertaken by Ju sti~a Ambiental, outlining the ecological impact of logging, harsh working conditions, and the problematic role played by many individuals and institutions within the Mozambican state in the timber business that enables foreign investors to exploit the sector.

A hostile working environment Our research into the problems of the Moza mbican forestry sector p laces us in direct contact w ith these issues. As bad as the media reports are, the reality can be worse and goes beyond the number or cubic metres of logs sto len from our forests. In August 2007, wh il e researching the illega l logging in the north of Zambezi province, we came across a logging camp run by ano ther Mozambican-Chinese joint venture ca ll ed, ironica ll y, Green Timber, which was operating within the buffer zone of the Gi le National Reserve. The workers surrounded us to complain about unpaid wages and a hostile working environment. After a few interviews we learned of 10-hour-plus working days, sevenday weeks for a wage equiva lent to US$30-50 a month, below the minimum wage for the sector. The area is off the transport grid, the closest major town a day's drive away. The workers have no way of making their voices heard and other job opportunities are non-existent. Their desperation forces them to take jobs that work against their own best interests and decimate natural resources that have supported their communities for generations. We managed to speak with the head of operations for the logging camp. He was a Chinese national and his friendly reception contradicted the tense and exploitative atmosphere with which 156

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we are n ow familiar. The licen ce that he presented was offici al in the sense that it was issued by the Provincial Forest and Wildlife Serv ice, but it was illegal. It was a 'simple licen ce', w hich can only be issued to Mozambi can n ation als and is for a m aximum of 500m3 of timber p er year. His op eration m et neither of these requirem ents, but we lacked the authority to take the issue any further and end ed up just taking a photo of the licen ce. We followed the road s m ade b y the logging comp any and saw the all-too -common scene of logged forests and ab andoned woo d. The m ain logging p ath led north towards Nampula p rovince and was a thin dirt road w hose width b arely accommod ated two vehicles. We later discovered an illegal brid ge across the Ligo nha river that locals claim was used and built by Green Timber. The brid ge is m ade m ainly of old logs and can only fully function during the dry season, but it is eno u gh to allow the logging trucks to transp ort the logs o ut of the Z ambezi p rovince and to the p ort city of Nacala in N ampula p rovince, byp assing the m ain control pOints. Locals living alon g this p ath commented on frequent logging trucks that p ass load ed w ith logs. We were told they often com e o ut a few at a time, with the first truck serving as the lookout by carrying the legal vo lume of timber and d ocuments, and two to three others following at a safe distan ce, waiting for a signal from the loo ko ut to turn b ack. The p ort city of Nacala is o ne of the m ain exit p Oints for Mozambican h ard woo ds, ev iden ced by the numero us log yard s h eap ed w ith piles of precio us h ard woo ds . H owever, when we arrived, rumo urs around tow n indicated that even larger am o unts of illegal woo d were in the docks awaiting exp ort. While we were trying to confirm these rumours, the p ort officials prevented us entering and the custom s offi ce bogge d us down with p ap er work, m aking information gathering very difficult. After a few weeks, the rumours were co nfirmed. In late Au gust over 700 co ntainers of illegal h ard woo ds were fo und and seized at Nacala p ort. The offi cial number decrease d to just over 500 containers of illegal h ardwood s belon ging to several Mozambican- Chinese jOint ventures and Chinese exp orting comp anies. At the sam e time we heard news from o ur colleagues in Sofala province that m ore than 14,000 illegal logs, also belon ging to Mozambi can Chinese jOint ventures and Chinese exp orting comp anies, had 157

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been cleared for export by the National Directorate of Forests and Wildlife and were being loaded at the Beira port into a vessel fl ying a Chinese flag.

Logging in Cabo Delgado province Our work continued and took us farther north in the cou ntry. In early September we were in Cabo Delgado province, living with a logging team in the Mueda district. Hearing and reading about the conditions in which these logging teams work is one thing, but during the time we spent li ving with them the harshness of their reality sank in even deeper. Due to the lack of water in the area the day started before Sam with a walk out into the open grass field that was once a forest to use the dew that had collected on the long grass during the night for a rough sponge-bath. Breakfast was often, if not always, skipped and by 6am the teams were in the field, hard at work with empty stomachs. The lookout teams went out in search of new cutting areas with high densities of high-value species while the larger cutting team went to the previously identified cutting areas to commence logging. The 'before and after' was shocking and sad: we saw a part of a forest w ith trees well over 300 years old cut down in a mere day's work. We used 10km transects ana lysing a 20m radius every SOOm in both logged forests and soon-to-be-logged forests. The results confirmed the sad images of our experiences, with unexplored areas showing as many as 10 times more trees. Even though on ly up to 20 per cent of the trees are of current commercial interest, the process of cleari ng to create access for the equipment and workers damages the surrounding forests. The practice of using fire to clear dense bush was often mentioned, a practice also used extensively by the local communities for hunting, clearing fields and for soil nitrification, making burnt forests the most common sight during the late winter and early spring. The impacts of the formal logging sector are but one contributor to an imposing and diverse complex of environmental and social impacts caused by logging. The large number of illegal loggers, both nationals and non-Mozambicans, cut large numbers of trees. The communities were aware of the illegal loggers that operated in their areas and knew their names, habits and other gossip, but 158

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felt helpless to ch an ge the reality. Many m entioned p ast attempts to inform forest guard s of the illegal op eration s occurring in the area, but that nothing was d one. In som e cases w here the illegal op erator becam e aware of the community compl aints, threats were m ade to the individu als th at h ad compl ained. Som e com munities h ave a clear interest in h elping to control illegal logging, but the combination of intimid ation, lack of offi cial support and p ower m ake it impossible. While sp ending the d ay w ith the loo kout team s we crossed a sector that h ad been cut by illegal loggers, with numerou s trees still m arked b y the illegal loggers for futur e cutting. One of the looko uts told us how the situation is so b ad that som e formal op erators and communities are considering illegally logging their fores ts b efore outside illegal loggers com e to their area and steal their logs. H owever, communities dep end on buyers, cau sing so m e communities to wo rk in co njunction with the illegal loggers (u su ally Chinese or locals wo rking for Chinese comp anies) by identifying, cutting and then piling up the logs for later co llection. These logs are sold at ridiculou sly low prices, ran ging between US$2 and US$8 p er log. The buyer som etimes does not com e b ack and on average only five to seven of every ten logs cut fulfil the requirem ents of the buyer. It is n ot exploitation by the p oor, but ex ploitation of the p oor. The unwanted logs are a fir e h azard, with large quantities of ab andoned and dry woo d lying around the forest. The frequent fires burn both the abandoned logs and, at times, both the legal and illegal loggers' stockpiles, forcing the loggers b ack into the fores t to restart the process, all of w hich rem ains unregistered in the offi cial d ata. We visited another fo ur districts in the p rovince and found a similar reality.

An inspection team is formed Back in the provincial capital of Pemba, it becam e clear that the governor of th e p rovin ce h ad been fi ghtin g these issues and tryin g to gain support, but even he was a sm all fi sh w hen comp ared to som e of the big n am es th at are benefiting from th e illegal fo rest sector. H e too k som e ri sks b y giving our research team full supp ort and access to all inform ati on . With the help of certain 159

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provincial government directors we managed to get authorisation to form a multi-stakeholder team with the authority to inspect any institution or business linked to loggin g. The joint presence of all d epartments d ecreased the chance of bribes and the less-corruptible dep artments strengthened that control. The team included rep resentatives from the department of agriculture (host of the National Directorate of Forest and Wildlife), health, customs, labour, immi gration and the provincial police. Within a d ay the first raids were conducted of some of the m ajor logging and exp ort companies. The comp anies with the high est numbers of infractions were the first ones visited as those visited later wo uld b e alerted by the earlier raids. One of o ur team members went with the insp ection team, while the rest of the team observe d the m ovement of the other comp anies. It becam e clear that there was communication between the companies as trucks were observed leav ing the log yards of other co mpanies a little while after the first few companies were raided . H owever, every comp any visited had major illegal issues and all d ep artment representatives found m ajor irregularities. The dep artment of immigration found illegal immi grants from diverse origins such as China, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, Gh an a and Israel without visas or documents. The labour department representative found that the comp anies had n o formal contracts with certain workers, paid below the minimum wage and had working sc hed ules above the legal number of working h ours. The health d epartment identified a lack of safety gear for the workers such as gloves, eye protection, h elmets and mouth masks, and an unhealthy working environment due to pollution and h ygiene problem s. The customs representative found containers packed with illegal wood already in possession of customs clearance, which was a major co ncern. The agriculture d epartment was the m ost ac tive, finding numero us illegalities ranging from logging above the licence limit and/o r logging species that were not included in licen ces; false licences or/and traffi cking of d oc uments such as transp ort permits, logging licen ces and certificates of origin; the purchase of illegal wood without d oc uments; and logs with diameters below the legal limit.

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Unwanted side effects The multi-sector initiative was a success, but caused some unwanted side effects. In addition to receiving death threats, which is a common occurrence when doing research in the forest sector, the following day the team came across some problems. We were stopped by police who said they wanted to charge us with speeding and confiscate our vehicle. Not only was this the first time we were stopped in three months of travel, but confiscating vehicles is also not the usual process for dealing with such infractions; we were driving below the speed limit, and the police officers had no equipment for testing our sp eed. After two hours of heated debate and phone calls, we were allowed to continue towards Montepuez district to finish our work. On arrival a representative of the Direc torate of Forest and Wildlife m entioned that the ' confusion' that we had caused in Pemba had reach ed the ears of the loggers in the district and he advised caution. Later that day our vehicle was stoned and we spent the evening in the police station writing up the re port. The following day w e were forced to continue our work with two fores try guards, but the tension increased and we were advised to cut our research short and leave the province to allow for things to cool down. Sadly, a few months late r the Cabo Delgado governor was removed from his post and the ne w governor has not taken up the initiative, so w e are back to square one: disappearing forests and disappearing hope. Fast-forward to early 2008, a n ew year, but with the same old problems. We are back in Zambezi province and this time we are looking into the over-exploitation of one of Mozambique's most precious hardwoods, the black wood Dalbergia melanoxylon. The central government placed a logging limit of 100m3 for the whole province, but the province lice nsing d epartme nt ignored this order and approved over 400m3 of Dalbergia melal1oxylon. The harbour company registered a total exported amount of 700m3 for the province, but what is disturbing is that all these contradicting amounts are all unde restimates. Due to the high d ensity of Dalbergia melanoxylon, one cubic m e tre is more or less equal to one ton and therefore is sold in tons instead of cubic m e ters. However, there are only two w eighing locations that have the required equipment and during one weekend at only one of the weighing 161

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stations more than 1,000 tons were weighed - ten times the allotted amo unt for the year, goin g o ut in one weekend. Almost all of the Dalbergia mela l1oxylol1 was exp orted to China. In 2007 the per ton value of Dalbergia melal1oxylol1 reached 15,000 y u an, but the huge am ounts that entered the co untry during late 2007 and early 2008 created a surplus that h as caused the value to crash to as low as 8,000 yuan per ton. This in turn has left large stockpiles of Dalbergia melanoxylol1 throu ghout the province. What makes this crime so sad is that Dalbergia melal1oxylon is rare and one of the slowest growing species, w ith even Chinese loggers estimating a growth perio d of over 200 years for the sp ecies to reach the minimal legal diameter of 20cm. Once gone it will take forever before we see some of the amazing 50cm wide Dalbergia melanoxylol1 that can still occasion ally b e found in our forests - that is, if they ever co m e b ack. At the end of the d ay we Mozambicans must take the lion's sh are of the blame for this environmental tragedy. Moz ambique set the corrupt rules of this game and Mo zambique invited the corrupt players. China is just good at exploiting our rules of injustice, co rruption and ab use. Now that we are losing the game we are trying to externalise the blame and h ave found a wealthy player to help throw stones towards the east. Yes, the 'we' Mozambicans that set the rules are not the same as the 'we' Mozambicans who are suffering the loss, but that is exac tly where the problem lies. Civil society has to be more vocal and ac tive. If we d o not rise to the ch allenge, o ur future looks grim indeed.

Reference Ga tto F. (2003) Forest Law Enforcem ent in Moza mbique: A n Overview, Maputo, Na tional Directory of Forestry a nd Wildlife, M inistry of Agriculture, http://www.fao.orglforestry/12933-2-0.pdf, accessed 10 November 2009.

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The West's retreat and China's advance in Angola Elias Isaac

Historical background For 27 long year s, Angola was d eeply immersed in a bloody and destructive civil war that was ideologically fuell e d and supported by the then two sup erpowe rs. The bloody conflict was sustaine d on one side by western countries le d by the United States and apartheid South Africa and on the other by the communist countries le d by the Soviet Union and Cuba, who irresponsibly traine d and armed UNITA and the ruling party MPLA respec tive ly. Some peo ple called it a war of ideologies be tween Marxist dictatorship and the w es tern capitalist 'free world'. But for the vast majority of Angolans, like me, it was a war of political domination, ideological subjugation for the control of material and natural reso urces. During the 27 years of the civil war (1975- 2002), there was no visible evidence of China's eco nomic presence and interests in Angola. The only traces of China's political presence date d back to the 1960s and 1970s when it gave limite d military support to liberation move m ents such as the FNLA and UNITA. It was only in 1983, seven years after inde p endence, that China es tablishe d diplomatic relations with Angola, having clearly d ecid e d to keep away from the post-independence bloody civil war. It was only after the e nd of the civil war in 2002 that China's eco nomic thirst be came so evident and its drive into Angola became so aggressive, a situation for which most Angolans were unpre pared apart from the political elite who were responsible for making the d e cisions and doing the d eals. The e nd of the war brought new and serious challenges to Angola such as the massive reconstruction of destroyed and ransacked infrastructures; a paralysed economy; 163

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and heavy dependence on diamonds. Coup led to this was an accentuated inefficiency, massive corruption, and the enrichment of the political elite alongside the systemic impoverishment of the vast majority of the population. Since the military defeat of UNITA and the death of its leader Jonas Savimbi, political life has been strongly controlled by one person, the president, who became all powerful, facing virtually no opposition and unchecked even by his own political party. The parliament is very weak and ineffective, controlled by one party that has been in power since 1976 and has recently shown itself to have no new ideas for moving the country forward. MPs operate as party loyalists and are not accountable to citizens. Opposition political parties are weak and internally divided, not trusted by the population and do not represent a political alternative. The judicial system is also weak and dependent on the preSident, who nominates and dismisses all the judges whenever it pleases him. Lastly, civil society is faced with a lack of skilled human resources and viable funding to carry out its activities in a more professional and sustainable manner.

Western retreat In April 2002, when the civil conflict came to a final stop, the Angolan government desperately needed to estab li sh its au thority and political control over the country, consolidate the peace process and reconstruct the country. Angola is indeed a wealthy country in terms of its vast raw material resources with oi l and diamonds being exp loited over many years, but in 2002 the Angolan governmen t was on the verge of bankruptcy, surviving by conducting advance sa les of o il as a way of securin g cash. As many Angolans saw it, the country was being sold for generations to come. It was at this stage th at the Angolan government asked western donors and individuals to host an international conference to raise some meagre funds to help in national reconstruction. The traditional western donors, including countries that had enormous economic interest in Angola, started backing off and putting forward unjustified pre-conditions before they would consider sponsoring such a conference. The pre-conditions included that the Angolan 164

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government restart negoti ations w ith the World Bank and IMF on fi scal m onitoring and co ntrol of p ubli c exp enditure and that they op enly d emon strate som e level of political will and commitment to nation al reco n ciliation and to holding free and fair elections. Given that Angola was a ri ch country ex trac ting revenues from oil, diam ond s and fi sheries, the government was also required to co mmit itself to using these for reconstruction and to put in place a plan to comb at corruption and p rom ote tran sp arency. The nego tiation s w ith the World Bank and IMF to organise the 'd onors' conference lasted for about two years. By 2004 it was very clear that the western fin an cial institution s and bilateral d onors were n ot interested in providing assistan ce to Angola for the consolidation of p eace and the recon struction of its destroyed infrastructure. With the end of the war the don or fundin g for humanitarian assistan ce was d Windling dr asti cally and n othing significant was b ein g received fo r d evelopment. The West m ade a d ecision to give up on Angola, a m ove which m any Angolan p olitician s and economists saw as a classic blackmailing strategy to force Angola to adhere to IMF and World Bank condition s and prescriptions w hich, acco rding to the ruling elite, h ave failed in m ost p arts of Africa. Therefore, 2004 was a critical m om ent for the co untry and particularly for the government, which h ad to deliver som ething to the people after the lon g p erio d of war. It was also faced with elections to legitimise its rule after the derailed and catastrophi c 1992 election s. The Angolan gove rnment was put against the wall w ith very few options; it was b ankrupt with enormous corruption scandals in which m ore than U5 $700 million were not prop erly acco unted for. So, w h at could it d o?

China's advance: a threat or an opportunity? Whi ch sid e you are on determines how you d efine the Chinese presen ce in Ango la. For the m ajority of Angolan ci ti zen s the Chinese presen ce is very p roble m ati c. It is seen as neocolonialism in w hi ch the rulin g p oliti cal elite sold the co untry to Chinese capital without any con sid erati on of the need to p rotect n ation al interests. But the ruling p oliti cal elite sees it d ifferently. They see it as an opportunity to obtain h ard cash for the reco nstru cti on of 165

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the d evastated infrastructure for w hich p aym ents are m ade w ith raw m aterials su ch as oil and fish . The justification for China's presen ce in An gola can be simply defined as: Angola's desp erate need for h ard cash to rebuild its infrastructure; the Chinese search for cheap raw m aterials, especially minerals, to feed and su stain its growing econom y; and China's need for alternative m arkets for its cheap p roducts. As a result of this situation, Angola - a country destroyed and impoverished by a brutal civil war, plunder and corruption yet rich in n atural reso urces - became a fertile ground for Chinese finan cial exp an sion and invasion behind the ch eap prop aganda that there were ' no strings attached' and that China was different fro m the West. There are no reliable or credible so urces of information on the terms of the agreem ents between An gola and China or on the am ounts of money th at h ave alread y b een loan ed to Angola. According to the Angolan Ministry of Finan ce, there are two typ es of loan s that h ave been n ego tiated with the C hinese. In 2004 the two governments negotiated a m em orandum of understanding that p ro duced three agreem ents w hich allowed China to give three loan s to Angola (US$2 billion, US$500 million and US$2 billion, totalling US$4.5 billion s); these are controlled and m an aged by the Ministry of Finan ce. The seco nd typ e of loan co nsists of complem entary agreem ents under the direct control of the president; these are implem ented b y the Offi ce of Nation al Recon struction w ithin his office. The precise sum of m on ey involved in the co mplem entary agreem ents controlled by the presiden cy is unknown . The Office of Nation al Recon stru ction (GRN) is respon sible for m ost of the m ajor con stru ction and recon stru ction work in the country, w hi ch invo lves n ation al road s, brid ges, the new internation al airport and the three m ajor railway lines. Most of this wo rk is b eing d one by Chinese co mp anies, w hich in reality h ave no com p etition because the adjudication is d one directly. Con sidering the size of the public wo rks that this offi ce is resp on sible for, one can p res ume that the volume of the C hinese loan being m an aged b y the GRN is mu ch bi gger than the one offi Cially disclose d and co ntrolled by the Ministry of Finan ce. Unfortunately, in Angola information is the privileged m onop oly of the p olitical elite and n ot available to the p oor. Access to cre dible and tran sp ar166

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ent information on the terms of the agreem ent and am o unts of m on ey involve d is not avail able. In a conference organi sed by the An golan Centre for Strategic Studies on 10 April 2007 to di scuss China's involvem ent in Angola, the then Mini ster of Finan ce, Pedro d e Morais, op enl y avoid ed m entionin g any am o unts involved in the co mplem entary agreem ents controlled by the Presid ent's Offi ce. In effect the Chinese m oney h as becom e a m atter of state security and the privilege of the sm all ruling elite w ithin the d ecision-m akin g and p owerful inner circle. H owever, according to m any other so urces, C hinese loan s to Angola h ave exceed ed US$l1 billion . We believe that China's p resen ce in Angola is not tran sitory. The Chinese h ave com e to stay. Tod ay there is n o town, village or town ship w here the Chinese p resen ce is no t a reality. The fl oo d of Chinese peo ple into Angola is constant and in huge numbers; they h ave becom e the seco nd lar gest gro up of p eople in the co untry after the An go lan s. The Chinese are no t only following the billions that their government is giving but they are also competing in the m arket, including the informal m arket. Today it is not unusu al to see a Chinese p erson selling secondhand shoes and clothes in a sh anty town or ghetto m arket. Chin a's thirst and hunger fo r n atural reso urces to feed and su stain its econom y and p rov ide for its huge p opul ation will m ake it mu ch m ore aggressive in the years to co m e. The Chinese are said to be co ncerned w ith the slown ess and lack of cap acity with w hich An golan s are taking and ab sorbing the loan s. China wants to m ove fast but the Angolan s are worried at the sp eed with w hich the Chinese want to give m oney and invest in the country. If it is true that b y 2020 China m ay beco m e the world 's m ajor superpower, we should be mu ch m ore serio us and con cerned abo ut this drive into An gola. This is in no way a condemnation or p ainting a negative picture of China or an ap ology for the West. I h ave no love for wh at the West h as done in Africa througho ut colonialism and after independen ce. Bo th the West and China's interes ts are very clear in Angola - ex ploitation of its n a tur al reso urces and the imp overishment of its p eople. China is n ot doing ch arity and neither did the colonial p owers. China h as a strategic interest in building and sustaining its econ omic power 167

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There is no question that the Chinese loans are benefitin g Angola w ith infrastructure developments, but China is benefiting tw ice over : Angola is rep ayin g these loan s with oil (about 500,000 b arrels of oil are exported to Chin a every single d ay) and fi sh, and only Chinese comp anies are being contracted to implem ent the projects under these loan s. This m ean s that the money goes b ack to China tw ice: it is creating wealth for Chinese co mpanies and improving the well-being of the Chinese p eople becau se these comp anies are brin ging in Chinese n ation als to d o almost everything and in reality taking away jobs fro m struggling and unemployed Angolan youths. Ap art from the infrastructure d evelopment, nothing rem ains in An gola. The Chinese assistan ce d oes n ot foster the wealth and well-being of Angolan citizens. The p rimary benefici aries of these loan s are the Chinese government, co mpanies and p eople w ho directly benefit fr om them . There are over 50 registered Chinese comp anies operating in An gola, but the actual number is much bigger because m any private and sm all businesses are no t p art of the m ainstream. There are also a lot of Chinese working in the informal m arket outside the Angolan government's control and regulation s. The Chinese investments in Angola are m ore a challenge than a threat becau se of the secretive n ature of the agreem ents and contracts between the two governments and Chinese companies; the complete exclusion of the National Assembly (the only dem ocratic institution in the co untry) from all the n ego ti ations and signing of the agreem ents and contracts; the huge sums of m on ey bein g loaned outside the tradition al western international finan cial institution s, and the president's offi ce's direct control of the fund s; the lack of accountable and transp arent m echanism s and system s to govern the m an agem ent and monitoring of the loan s and the m ethods of p ayment; the conditions of the agreements w hich benefit the Chinese governm ent, businesses and people but comple tely exclude Angolan businesses; the takeover of unskilled jobs by the Chinese; the Chinese stance of n on -interferen ce in internal affairs, which translates into lack of con cern for human rights and the condition s of the workers (cheap, p oorly p aid labour); and unfair comp etition with low prices that give Chinese businesses preferential treatment. Lack of tran sp aren cy and corr uption have always been iss ues in An gola am on g the ruling elite d espite their co nstant deni al. 168

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These were problems before China arrived and they w ill continue after China has gone. The only concern many Angolans, in particular civil society organisations, have is that China does not care about systems and mechanisms for transparency and accountability to protect the loans. Critics are also concerned about China's own internal position and behaviour on human rights and civil and political liberties. Therefore it is feared that China's current levels of investment in Angola will further entrench and strengthen political arrogance and disrespect for human rights. It will also accentuate the lack of transparency and accountability in the country in particular among the political and military ruling elite who hold most of the economic and social power. Such massive, unchecked financial resources are bound to encourage social, political and economic exclusion because access to these funds is limited to those who control it. This is an open threat to the values and principles of democracy based on the rule of law.

A transparency advocacy campaign The promotion of transparency and accountability in governance in Angola has to be und erstood in con text. Since] 975 Ango la has had a history of protracted war with no democracy at all until after 1992 when the country; for a short period, tried to open up its political systems. But sudden ly in 2002, with the end of the civil war, Angola became one of fastest growing economies in the world due to its increased oil production of 1.9 million barrels per day and mining of over 10 million carats of diamonds per annum. The absurd and astronomica l rise in oil prices in the international markets has given Angola a balloon of oxygen, a miracle for its destroyed economy. The 2008 national budget of US$34 billion was approved and not a single dollar came from donors. It is all Angolan money. This budget represents a 30 per cent in crease over 2007. Very few countries in the world can afford such an annual increase in its budget. Angola's economic growth for 2008 has been projected at 23 per cent and from 2004 to 2006 the Angolan government was for the first time able to accumulate in 'reserves' more than US$10 billion. These are currently being invested in offshore banking and investment systems, mostly in Portugal, by the state-controll ed company Sonangol. Ango la Significantly 169

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lacks the cap acity and political will to translate these economic gains and opp ortunities into sustained economic development that will lead to improved living co nditions for the majority of its 17 million people. Sadl y, the co untry is rated one of the most corru pt in the world, with poor governance. According to a 2007 UNICEF report the co untry h as the second highest mortality rate for under-fives in the world (260 out 1,000), life expectancy stands at 42 years and only 58 per cent of children attend school. About 40 per cent of adults are illiterate; the government h as a massive classroom (not schoo ls) building programme all over the co untry but is far from m eeting the need of the school p opulation in terms of access and quality of education; only 35 p er cent of ho useholds consume iodised salt in a co untry which has a vast coastline; only 53 per cent of the population h as imp roved drinking water; only 31 per cent use prop er sanitation facilities; and less than 40 per cent h ave access to electricity The Open Society Fo und ati on-Angola's (OSF/A) Public Transparency and Budget Advocacy (PTBA) programme h as been striving to support Angolan civil society organisations and actors to d evelop their capacity, kn owledge and skills. The aim is to enable them to en gage with transparency and accountability issues in a m ore proactive and constructive m anner and to acquire and deploy factual information with which to influence practices and policies. H owever, any transp arency work in an environment such as Angola's - where d emocracy is n ot sustained by state institutions but by individuals - h as strong limitations and presents huge ch allenges. One of those limitations is a lack of credible information and the knowledge of how to access it. Transparency and acco untability work can easily be done in a context where there is the p olitical will and state/public institutions tha t are independent. In Angola, however, government actors see transp arency work as a dangerous p olitical activity that has to be crushed and silenced. There is no incentive from the government for civil society organisations to work on transparency, but, on the contrary, only threats and subtle intimidation to stop. In order to address this issue OSF/A h as been building the capacity of journalists and civil society actors 170

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with training and internships in Brazil to strengthen their expertise so that they can undertake research and produce specific information for advocacy. We have already conducted an analysis of the Angola legal framework that promotes transp arency. The western donors, paralysed b y the Chinese econo mic drive, have lo st the vision behind their original support for transp arency work in Angola. They seem to have been crippled by a fear of losing their economic interests to the Chinese, and no one wants to be seen as supporting h ardcore transp arency advocacy work that could expose the Angolan government. The western retreat h as gone so far that everyo ne cries o ut about the Chinese drive and the increase in co rruption, but n o one is willing to d o anything about it because to d ay they can easily be replaced by the oriental n eocolonialists. This is one of the main reaso ns why civil SOCiety organisation s in Angola are so weak, ineffective and not viable for transp arency work. We are consciously aware that corruption and lack of accountability are Angolan problems and it is o ur responsibility to d evise o ur own initiatives to prom ote transparency, good governance and acco untability. The social demand, the processes and campaigns have to start from within the country and thereafter link and contribute to global processes and campaigns such as Publish What Yo u Pay (PWYP) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). It is important to emphasise that the establishment of national processes concentrates all local energies. Meeting the resulting demand is the biggest task that OSFjA is faced with. There is an urgent need to empower local initiatives and give ownership to local actors. For the last three years OSFjA has been trying to assist the establishment of a PWYP network, but this has fail ed because there has been no social d emand as opposed to national need. The need for transp arency work is there but we have to work to generate the social demand. The Angolan social fabric has not ye t realised the seriousness and the urgency of the matter and the n eed to mobilise aro und it. OSFjA has also been working with members of p arliament (MPs) -mostly from the opposition -on the need to create systems that give MPs access to m onitoring the implementation of the national budget and make their job more effective. The objec1 71

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ti ve of this en gagem ent is to m ake MPs con stantl y aware of the serio u sness of the lack of tran sp aren cy and to establish a strategic alli an ce throu gh a gro up called M Ps for Tran sp arency. A series of co nferen ces and radio d eb ates h ave been scheduled to suppo rt thi s awareness camp aign and create the social d em and. OSF/A h as also initiated a p oliti cal en gagem ent activ ity that in volves m eeting w ith variou s government institutions and bilateral and multilateral donors who h ave investment interests in the Angola oil and di am ond industries, oil and minin g comp anies, trade union s, p olitician s and others, in order to seek their co mmitm ent and to lobby for the need to constantly raise the tran sp aren cy agenda. Two case studies are under way. One is in the diam ondp ro d u cing areas and w ill address the beh avio ur of security and d iam ond companies and their social corp orate resp on sibilities (edu cation, health, housing, employm ent and foo d security) . The second examines the supply of water in the capital with regard to the investments that are being m ade in the sector w ith Chinese loans . OSF/A's strategy in prom oting tran sp aren cy centres on building individual and institutional cap acities and also producin g d ata to create social dem and w ith accurate information that can be u sed for criti cism and ad vocacy. The biggest ch allen ge for this work in Angola is the ap athy of m os t western donors. We cannot expect the Chinese government to give m oney to Ango lan civil society to d o ad vocacy on their loans . As we all kn ow there are no genuine and authentic civil society organisation s in China. It wo uld also not be ethical for western d onors to p rovide fund s to An golan civil society organisation s to track Chinese fund s. There should be a much m ore co mprehen sive plan that will address the whole issue of tran sp aren cy in the extracti ve industries, C hinese and western loan s (from Brazil, Portugal, Sp ain, Germ any) and also bud geting. As m entioned before, the Chinese presen ce in Angola is not tran sitory and if the western co untries h ad no t arrogantly retreated fro m h ostin g the donors' conferen ce in 2002, they could still h ave m aintained their leverage. But they h ave lost it and w ill lose m ore if they do n ot shift fro m their arrogant approach to doing business w ith Angola. To d ay, beca use of the Chinese p resen ce, Angola's d ependen ce on the West w ill continue to decline. It is very clear 172

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that Chinese influence in Angola w ill grow tremendou sly and it is foreseen that by 201 0 China will be the m ajor Angolan business p artner, surp assing the ED. We Angolans have to devise more intelligent and su stainable ways to keep talkin g to the Chinese. We cannot fi ght them and get rid of them. They have the money that our country need s for reco n stru ction, money which no one else can give us. It is high time that we coach our selves on how to live with them so that we learn how better to protec t the interests of the poor m ajority b y p romoting transp arency, acco untability and improved social and economic justice.

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Part IV China, the African Union and the quest for peace

The Darfur issue and China's role He Wenping Sin ce early 2003, the Darfur issu e has been the cynosure of the w or ld 's eye, thanks to the sp eci a l attention dev o ted to it by the w estern m edia, hum an ri g hts organi sa tio n s and p oliti cian s. Sin ce C hin a and Sud an have had a lo n g tra ditio n of friend shi p and cl ose p oliti cal and econo mi c ties, the Darfu r issu e has al so becom e an excu se fo r som e organisa tio ns to attack Chin a, thu s fu ellin g the m edi a fren zy even m o re . Wh at, then, are the real issu es be hind thi s problem, and wh at is C hin a's ro le in resolvin g them ?

Ecosystem deterioration: the root cause of the crisis Located in west Sud an and bordere d by Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic, Darfur covers an area of 500,000km2, abo ut o ne fifth of the to tal area of Sudan . There are abo ut 80 tribes in this region - the leas t-develo p ed area of Sud an - the two bigges t tribal gro up s being Ara b and Afri can. The fo rmer are a n om adi c tribe distributed over the no rth of the area, and the la tter an agricultural tribe inhabiting the central and so uthern p arts. Ap art from occasion al conflicts over land and water, the two tribes h ave m o re o r less always coexisted peacefully. In the early 20th century, all tribes in Darfur united and fo ught against British co lonial aggressio n . In the 1970s, d ro u ght d rove Arab tribes fro m no rthern Darfur and fro m neighbo uring co untries like Ch ad to central and so uthern Darfur, leading to a po pul atio n increase from 3 millio n peo ple 20 years ago to the regio n 's current 6 million peo ple . This fac tor, combined w ith famine, began to prove disastro us for the

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fragile ecosystem, and frequent land and water disputes erupted. According to statistics given by Sudanese scholars, there were only three co nflicts from 1968 to 1976, and five from 1976 to 1980, but this increased to 21 from 1980 to 1998.1 In Febru ary 2003, two armed forces organise d by the Darfur Afri can tribes - n am ely, the Sud an Liber ation Army (SLA, con sisting m ostly of land -tilling villagers) and the Ju stice and Equ ality Movem ent (JEM) -launched a large-scale anti-government camp aign d em anding autonom o us rule. This military conflict cau se d a con siderable number of casu alties and the Darfur issu e h as been p rominent ever since. In terms of the roo t causes of the Darfur iss ue, the secretary general of the United Nation s, Ban Ki-m oon, wrote an article called 'A C limate C ulprit in Darfur ', published in the W ashington Pos t on 16 June 2007. In the article the secretary general p ointed o ut, 'Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur co nfli ct began as an eco logical crisis, arising at leas t in p art from climate ch an ge.' H e said the rains in so uthern Sud an h ad declined so m e 40 per cent since the early 1980s, and that thi s h ad coincided with a rise in temperatures of the Indian Ocean, disrupting seaso n al m on soo n s. This su ggests that the dryin g of sub-Sah aran Africa derives, to som e degree, from m an-m ade global warmin g. H e then ar gued that p eace in Darfur sh ould be built on solution s that address the roo t causes of the confli ct, that is, global warmin g; o ther wise, similar problem s to the Darfur crisis m ay occ ur in m any other p arts of the world .2 The Sud anese government also establish ed a research com mittee to in vestigate the roo t cau ses of the Darfur crisis after the armed confli ct broke o ut in 2003. Following thorough resear ch into the b ackground and all related factors con cerning the issu e, the committee co ncluded th at the roo t cause of the conflict is the ecosystem d eterioration cau sed b y d ro ught in the region over the p ast two d ecades. The region 's growing p opulation is obliged to fi ght for limited reso urces su ch as water and land, fighting w hich can gradually lead to armed conflict.3 Since d ro u ght and glob al warmin g are the root causes of the Darfur iss ue, how then did ecological confli ct turn into a p olitical and reli gious war?

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Reasons for the escalation of the crisis In 2004, the Darfur issue developed from a mere domestic conflict to one featuring prominently in the international arena. There were several reasons behind this change. Firstly, the d e terioration of the regional situation. From February 2003, the two military forces, the SLA and JEM, began anti-government action in the name of protec ting themselves from Arab militia attacks, which h ad killed over 10,000 people and had left about 1 million hom eless (a figure stated and admitted by the Sudanese government)4 While the number of casualties varies from differ ent calculations and sources, the fact is that the situation in Darfur d e teriorated markedly in 2004, with fighting leading to a large-scale humanitarian crisis. Secondly, in 2004 o rganisations in various countries aro und the world held pho tographic exhibitions and lec tures to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rwanda n genocide in a bid to prevent such an atrocity from occurring again. As the Darfur issue also encompasse d elem ents of tribal conflic t and religious dispute, as well as locals' fr ac tious rela tions with central government and the war in southern Sudan, it seemed easier to link this issue with another genocide. Throughout 2004 there was heated d ebate about whether the Darfur issue could be d efined as 'genocide' or not. In the West, es pecially among some right-wing Chris tian organisations and anti-Arab interest groups in the US, ther e were d esperate calls to label the Darfur conflict as a 'genocide' in an effort to pave the way for m or e sanctions against the Sudanese government and p ossible future western military intervention led by the US. In doing so, these groups p layed up the Islami c backgro und of northern Arabs and the Islamic Sudanese government supposedly behind them, seemingly for getting that, unlike the southern black Sudanese who believe in traditional religions and Christianity, the black peo ple and Arabs in Darfur are all Muslim. As American scholar Scott Straus pointed out during the Rwandan genocide, State Dep artment spokes persons in Washingto n were instructed not to utter the 'g-word', since, as on e inte rnal government m em orandum put it, publicly acknowledging 'genocide' might commit the US government to strong action a t a time when President 178

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Bill Clinton 's White H o u se was entirely unw illing to intervene. s The Khartoum government also refuted this p owerfull y w hen it cl aimed that the Darfur issue h a d become ' the scap egoat of the internation al society and the UN w hen they feel a prick of con scien ce for their not d oing anything in Rwand an gen ocide'. The use of the term 'genocide' w ith regard to Darfur is 'a pure lie', Khartoum h as stated, becau se ' to a great extent, the ethnic gro ups in Darfur h ave mixe d together for a lon g p eriod of time' . The Sud anese government h as also argued that it is in reality quite d iffi cult to m ake ethni c di stinctions such as 'Arab ' or 'African ' simply b ased on skin colo ur and appearan ces, and that there are no so-called pure 'Arab' tribes or pure 'Afri can ' tribes that h ave never inter-m arried w ith others. The government argues that ' the years of ethnic mixing together h as m ade the accusation of ethnic discrimination and "ethnic clean sin g" or "gen ocide" unbelievable' .6 Finally, the key factor is that US involvem ent m ad e a significant differen ce. The unim aginably stran ge d evelopment, esp ecially for the Sud anese government and p eople, is that the US h ad n ever taken much interest in Sudan 's conflicts and its human rights situation, su ch as wh en Sudan was exp erien cin g the second civil war between its north and so uth - the lon gest civil war in African history, w hi ch from May 1983 until early 2005 cl aim ed 2 million d eaths and left 4 million hom eless. The relatively n ew Darfur iss ue that broke o ut in early 2003 h as by co ntrast led to an unusu al degree of US 'care' and ' attention '. The interest of the US government in the Darfur issue in fact stems fr om the p residential elec tion in 2004. During the camp aign, George W. Bush's tou gh and un ilateral diplom atic strategy was attacked by the Dem ocrats. In order to achieve m ore votes among African-Am erican s and Christian s and effectively ch allen ge the Dem ocrats' record under the fo rmer Clinton administration w h ich h ad d one nothing during the Rwandan genocid e - w hile at the same time deflecting do m esti c m edia attention away from the m ess of the Iraq war and mo unting criticism, the Bush adm inistration used the Darfur issue as p oliti cal leverage ? Althou gh the UN, the African U nion and the EU h ad all refu sed to use the term ' genocid e' to d escribe the Darfur iss ue - with the UN categorisin g the issue as a humanitarian crisis - US Congress still passed a resolution in July 2004 labellin g the Darfur iss ue as 179

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a 'genoci de' and dem and in g that the US government p romptly impose san ction s on Sudan . This led to the internation alisation of the Darfur issu e. From then on, the US government h as put for ward a number of sanction initiatives in the UN Security Co uncil, initiatives which h ave failed to p ass due to disagreem ent among the p erman ent m embers o n the cou ncil. Therefore, accordin g to William Engd ahl, 'genocide was the p referred them e, and Washington was the orchestra co nductor. .. only Washington and the NGOs close to it u se the ch ar ge d term " genocide" to d escribe Darfur. If they are able to get a p opular acceptan ce of the ch arge of genocide, it op en s the p ossibility for drastic "regime ch an ge" intervention by NATO and de facto b y Washington into Sud an's sovereign affairs." In essen ce, the fund am ental reason that the US h as m agnified the Darfur iss ue internation ally in recent years is that Sud an, unlike Rwand a, h as been of important US strategic and econ omi c interest. Firstly, in terms of geop olitics, Sud an's strategic location h as h ad a crucial m eaning for the US global anti-terror war after 9/11 . The US anti-terror war in Africa is m ainly concentrated in the H orn of Africa and central-west region of the Sah ara, and Sud an is the important link with these two region s. Since the mid-1990s, Osam a b in Laden 's presence in Sudan led the US government to worry abo ut w hether extrem ist Islamic terrorist organ isation s wo uld be cap able of p en etrating Africa on a lar ge scale were the Darfur confli ct to get out of co ntrol. Sudan h as abundant n atural reso urces such as oil and gas, in p articular, and there are ample oil reserves w ithin so uth Sud an between the Upper Nile and the Darfur region's b ord er w ith Ch ad , which m akes the Darfur region m os t important in this regard . The US, of co urse, is also eager to gain access to these reso urces, as are the multination al oil comp anies such as Ch evron and Exxon that were on ce in a position to exploit oil in Sudan in the 1970s and 1980s. The internation alisation of the Darfur iss ue is therefore benefi cial for the US objective of putting further pressure on the Sudanese government and favo urably altering oil reso urce distribution in the region . As William Engd ahl ri ghtly p ointed o ut, 'Oil, not human misery, is behind Washington's new interest in Darfur.'9

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The Darfur issue and its links to China Normally China would have nothing to do with an issue like Darfur, located far away from Beijing as it is in west Sudan. As China's special envoy to Darfur, Liu Guijin, has commented, 'it is not China's Darfur, it is first Sudan's Darfur and then Africa's Darfur. .. '10 In the West, howeve r, the Sudanese government has been widely regard ed as the supporter for Janjaweed militias attacking 'African' villagers. Conversely, China and Sudan have traditionally enjoyed sound relations and have in recent decades been jointly developing oil exploration and generating profitable results. As already pOinted out, China has long insisted on the principles of 'non-interference in other countries' domestic issues' and 'no-strings attached eco nomic assistance poliCies' . It is natural, therefore, that some organisations and people in the West should link China with Darfur, and say that China's investment in Sudan and its cooperation with the Sudanese government are worsening the regional conflict, and that as China only emphasises its own economic interests while ignoring the human rights situation in Darfur, it should take some responsibility for the region's humanitarian crisis l l At the official level, western countries led by the US have also exerted press ure on China to take a tougher stance against the Sudanese government in the name of 'caring about human rights' and 'isolating autocratic regimes' . In September 2005, then assistant secretary of the US State De partment Robert Zoellick put the Darfur issue onto his agenda whe n he came to Beijing to talk with the Chinese lead ers to encourage China to behave as a responsible stakeholder on the international stage. Some have gone even furthe r. With the approaching of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, in 2007 some organisations such as the Save Darfur Coalition and figures such as French presidential candidate Fran,ois Bayrou and Hollywood actors George Clooney and Mia Farrow joined in the criticism of China and called for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics. 12 Furthe rmore, in May 2007, over 100 US m e mbers of Congress later threate ned the Chinese President Hu Jintao in a le tter, pointing out that if China did not take m easures with regard to Darfur, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games might be jeopardised 13 He nce, without rhyme 1 81

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or reason, the Darfur iss ue h as been linked w ith China and even w ith a non-political internation al sp orts event. In fact, these links conceal significant ch anges in Sudan 's p olitical and economic en gagem ent w ith China over the last d ecade, fro m Sino-S ud an oil and other fo rms of eco nomic coop eration, to the p ositive role su ch developments h ave b ro u ght to the mainten an ce of the Comprehensive Peace A greement (CPA) between Sud an's north and so uth as well as the general p olitical stability in the w hole co untry. First of all, Sudan 's stro ng eco nomic recovery is closely linked with China's involvem ent. Chin a and Sudan enjoy a tradition al friendship and since diplom atic ties were establish ed in February 1959, their relation ship h as develop ed sm oothly. The fi rst trade treaty b etween the two governments was signed in 1962. Up to the present d ay, C hin a h as help ed to build m an y projec ts includin g the Friend ship H all in Khar toum, a textile factory, bridges for road s, hospitals and p ower station s. In terms of the oil industry, China's energy coop eration w ith Sudan h as dram atically imp roved Sudanese oil cap acity. Chinese comp anies started to ex plore for energy reso urces in Sud an in the late 1990s. By the end of 2003, their investment totalled US$2.7 billion, with wh ich they built 1,506km of oil pipelines, a crude oil p rocessing plant w ith a cap acity of 2.5 million tonnes p er year and several gas station s. Fro m being an oil-impo rting co untry, Sudan h as develop ed into an oil-exp orting co untry w ith the h elp of Chinese investm ent. More importantly, it h as establish ed its own oil industry co nsisting of p rosp ecting, explo itation, refinin g and tran sp ortation facilities and sales networks w ith Chin a's help . In addition, by the end of 2006, the China Nation al Petroleum Corporation (CN PC), China's largest oil producer, h ad sp ent over US$32 million in building schools, hospitals and d rilling water wells for the co untry. Over 1.5 million local p eople h ave benefited from these facilities.!' For example, the CNPC built a sewage treatment facility near the Nile to improve the quality of drinking water. For the first time in centuries, resid ents w ho drink from the Nile h ave access to purified water 1 5 Ap art from the imp rovem ent of ' h ard ware' cap acity, Chinese co mpanies h ave also p aid great attention to 'soft ware' capacity building, su ch as b y improving local employees' technical and 182

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m an agem ent skills. A ccording to Zhu Junfen g, general m an ager of the C NPC's Sudan p roject, the C NPC h as employed m any locals, w hose percentage of the total number of employees h as reached over 90 p er cent in som e joint p rogrammes. Zhu h as p ointed out that training for local Sud an ese h as m eant not only satisfying Chinese oil p erso nnel nee d s in Sud an, but also those of Sud an's oil industry at large. Sino-S ud an coop eration is mutu ally benefici al, prov iding a w in-win situ ation .!6 Likewise, according to an article in China Daily, up to November 2006 the C NPC h ad invested in the con struction of 22 p rimary schoo ls and helped 65, 000 p eople to receive form al education . The comp any h as also p rovided million s of doll ars for Sudanese students to study undergr adu ate and m asters degrees in China, and to receive short-term training .!' In contrast, Shell h as been en gage d in oil exploitation in Nigeri a for over 50 years. Ni geria still exp orts crud e oil and imports gasoline. Not owning sufficiently fun ctioning p rocessing facilities, Nigeria rem ains a raw-m aterial exp orting co untry. As the largest oil tran sn ation al in Nigeria, w hi ch acco unts for m ore than 50 p er cent of the co untry's total oil p ro du ction, Shell h as been heavily criticised for degra ding the environ ment of its host co mmunities in the Niger Delta, gener ating sustained protest fro m the regio n's inhab itants. A senior research fellow at the Nigeri an Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) think-tan k on ce told a rep orter from Xinhua News Agency that western oil com p anies h ave b adly polluted the oil-p ro du cing area, worsening the li ving co ndition s of local inhab itants. H e commented sadly, 'no m ore fresh water and no fi sh in the river, and the p eo ple can 't d rink water from the river ever since.'!' Despite its rich n atural reso urces, Sud an is an extrem ely p oor co untry both by region al and intern ation al stand ard s. Poor economic m an agement, co upled with the severe econ omi c disruption and imbalance caused b y the lon g period of civil war, h as blocked development. In the last 10 years, Sudan 's eco nom y, thanks to p rogress around p eace between North and So uth, and d riven by the stren gth of its 'oil dollars', h as recovered fairly well. O il production h as improve d dram atically, increasing from 2,000 b arrels p er d ay (bpd) in 1993 to its current level of m ore than 500,000 bpd. C rude oil exp orts am o unted to ro ughly 84 per cent 183

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of total exports in 2006,19 and Sudan's economic growth rate h as been at around 8-12 per cent annually, ranking it as on e of the highest am on g north-east African co untries. The co untry's inflation rate has also dropped from 135 p er cent in the 1990s to 5 per cent in 2006, and p er capita GOP income h as risen from US$280 to US$1,080. Foreign exch an ge reserves reached US$1.44 billion at the end of April 2005. Sudan was then able to repay the loan provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its voting rights in the IMF were restored in 2000. 20 Secondly, the development of Sudan's oil industry with China's h elp h as to some extent played a very active role in the successful signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Since the ex p ort of oil started in 1999, Sudan's foreign exch an ge reserves h ave increased annually. According to statistics given by the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining, total oil revenue from 1999 to July 2005 reached US$15 billion. Oil income accounted for 53.7 per cent of n ation al fis cal revenue in 2003. 21 Only with oil revenue in h and co uld the Nation al Congress Party (NCP)d ominated central government in Khartoum and the Sudan Peo ple's Liber ation Army (SPLM)-led a utonomo us Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) fin ally reach a d eal over a 50-50 sharing of Southern and Abeyi oil resources, after a 2 p er cent direct allocation of revenue to the oil-producing regions themselves. At present, the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Nation al Eco nom y publishes a m onthly report on oil revenue, prep ared with the assistance of the Energy and Mining Ministry and southern offi cials. According to d ata given by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the GOSS had received US$473 million in oil revenue for the first fiv e m onths of 2006. During this period, the south's rep orted m onthly share of oil receipts increased from US$72 million in Janu ary to US$112 million in May.22 There is n o d o ubt that the increased oil inco m e received either by the central government in Khartoum or GOSS in the south greatly eased bud ge tary constraints in the two p arts of the country and improved peo ple's standard of living as a whole, something which was very helpful for the consolidation of the CPA. According to H am ad Elneel A. Gadir, deputy secretary general of the Sudanese Energy and Mining Ministry, 'oil h as become a main fac tor for d evelopment, peace and unity in Sudan. Sanctions against Sudan 184

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are sanctions against Sudan's development, peace and unity. '23 Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has also praised the success of Sino-Sudan cooperation on energy and its impact on Sudan's petroleum industry and political stability. He said that without the CNPC, there would be 'no oil industry in Sudan, not to mention [no] peace in [the] south and north of Sudan'.2'

China's role in the Darfur crisis There are two major allegations levelled at China by the western media and international organisations. One, that China objected to using sanctions on Sudan when the UN Security Council was discussing the Darfur issue, and two, that China has not pressurised the Sudanese government enough to change its stance. The Chinese government has in fact long taken the position that regional and international conflicts should be settled through diplomatic means, such as dialogue and negotiations. This applies not on ly to the Darfur issue, but also to North Korea and Iran. History tells us that sanctions can only deepen poverty, and that poverty deepens conflicts. Those hit hardest by sanctions are the common people, not the authorities. Sanctions and strongarm tactics against Sudan will only succeed in complicating matters. The fact is that, rather than improving, the conflict in Sudan has intensified since the US imp osed sanctions in 1997. Isolating the Sudanese government only creates new confrontation. The root of the Darfur crisis is poverty, meaning economic development and cooperation are the solution. This is China's method of attacking the problem, based on dialogue, negotiation, development and cooperation. As the Chinese Darfur special envoy Liu Guijin outlined, 'Too much pressure or expanding sanctions will not be helpful for the peaceful settlement of the issue, but [will] further complicate the situation, and many previous cases harvel already prove[n] that issues like Darfur [will] never be properly addressed without the country's internal political process'.2S Since the emergence of the Darfur issue, China has been in constant communication with the relevant players, playing the role of mediator, promoting dialogue between leaders, dispatching envoys and discussing the problem in the UN assembly. President Hu held discussions with Sudanese President al-Bashir 185

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on the Darfur issue during the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006 and during his visit to Sudan in Febru ary 2007. H e m ade four principle p Oints on the issue. Firstly, Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity sho uld be respected, and the settlement of the issue should be helpful for Sudan's reco nciliation process, its n ation al unity and region al p eace and stability. Secondly, the issu e should be reso lved by p eaceful means and by sticking to dialogue and coop eration b ased on equality. Thirdly, the Afri can Union and the United Nations should play constructive roles in p eacekeeping missions to Darfur. Wisdom and creativity should b e employed in order to improve the efficiency of the peacekeeping mission to create fav o urable conditions for achieving p eace in the region . Finally, it is imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and the living co nditions of its locals. For this purpose, China h as offered assistan ce valued at SO million yuan (US$10.93 million) to the Darfur region, and has donated US$l.S million to the pe acekeeping or ganisations of the African Unio n. In November 2006, at a conference held in the Ethiopi an capital Addis Ababa featuring representatives of the five p ermanent m embers of the UN Security Council, alon g with the African Union, Sudan and other African countries, form er UN Secretary General Kofi Annan o utlined a three-phase pl an (the Annan Plan) to offer assistance to African Union tro ops stationed in Darfur. In the first phase, the UN would send in military equipment valued at US$21 million, and dispatch nearly 200 police officers and officials as intelligence offici als and councillors. In the second phase, the UN will disp atch ab o ut 3,000 military troops and police officers, plus m ore than 1,000 civ ilian officers, with an overall budget of nearly US$300 million . In the third phase, a UN-AU united force would be establishe d in Darfur with 17,000 soldiers and 3,000 police, under the command of the UN. China supports the Annan Plan, and believes it is practical and acceptable to Sudan as it addresses the co n cerns of all sides involved and is closest to what Sudan has in mind. China hopes that Sudan and other relevant p arties will dis cuss d etails on an equal footing and reach a consensus as soon as p ossible. The Chinese government h as so far disp atched fi ve special envoys and their ento ur ages to Darfur to see the situation there 186

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fir st h and. In 2007, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun p aid two v isits to Sudan, actin g as China's envoy and m aking a thorou gh survey of the situ ation in Darfur during his second visit in April of that year. More importantly, h e also m ade a three-p oint p rop osal regarding a so lution to the Darfur issue, outlining first of all that the Sudanese government is w illing to talk to and coop erate w ith the internation al co mmunity on Darfur. The internation al co mmunity should, for its p art, p ay sp ecial attention in the future to its m ethod s of conducting di alogu e with the Sudanese governm ent to m ake its work m ore effec tive. Secondly, the Darfur iss ue in essence is an issue of develop m ent, and the p eacekeeping op er ation s and the p olitical pro cess sho uld be pushed ahead in a b alan ced m anner. The b ackward Darfur region h as few n atural resources and suffers from extrem e p overty. The essential m ean s of reso lv ing the issue is economic recon struction and d evelopment. Witho ut eco nomi c growth, it w ill be impossible to imp rove living condition s, p eople will continue to fi ght for b asic living m aterials and the roo t cau se for local co nfli ct will not be eradicated . C hina appeals to the internation al co mmunity to prov ide development assistan ce to the people in Darfur, in addition to humanitari an assistance. Meanwhile, p eacekeeping is closely linked with the political p rocess . Advocating p eacekeeping on the one h and and supporting the armed confro ntation of rivals with the gove rnment on the other w ill undermine the reunifi cation and territorial integrity of Sudan and go against the con sensus of the intern ation al community. Finally, China is w illing to continue to playa con structive role on the issue of Darfur. It is the b a sic objec tive of the Chinese government to realise p eace, stability and economic recon struction in Darfur thro ugh nego tiations. Chin a is full y aware of the situation in Darfur and h as offered exten sive humanitarian assistan ce and d on ation s to the region and to the African Union mi ssion. China expects to co ntinue to m ake contributions to the p eace, stability and d evelopment of the Darfur region. 26 On 10 M ay 2007, the Chinese government app ointed Amb assador Liu G uijin as the special representative for Afri can affairs. Hi s work is primarily foc used on Darfur at the present time. Li u is a veteran diplom at to Afri ca, h aving serve d as the Chinese ambassad or to Zimbab we, director general of the 187

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Dep artment of African Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and the Chinese Ambassador to South Afri ca. This is the third time that the Chinese government has appointed a special envoy for regional issues, having also d one so in relation to the Middle East confli ct and the Democratic People's Rep ublic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear issue. This clearly shows the importance the Chinese government attaches to Africa and parti cularly to the Darfur issue at present. After assuming office, Amb assador Liu immed iately m ad e a fi ve-d ay trip to Sud an, discussing the plight of Darfur with high-ranking Sud anese lead ers so as to accelerate a political settlement of the iss ue and afford local people imp roved livelihood s and security. Subsequently, th anks to China's co nstru ctive efforts, the Sud anese government anno unced its co mplete acceptan ce of the second phase of the Annan Plan and the d eployment of the h yb rid UN-AU peacekeepin g force in Darfur, as outlined in resolution 1769 p assed by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2007. It is fair to say that the role China h as pl ayed in bringing Sud an's official stand on the peacekeeping mission from absolute rejection early on to ultimate, full acceptance has been pi vo tal and effective. Moreover, China is co mmitted to goin g beyond word s and taking action . In order to promote the implem entation of reso lution 1769, China has d ispatched 315 military en gineers to Darfur as part of the fir st gro up of U N peacekeepers, becoming the fir st nation o utside Afri ca to do so.

China's Darfur policy: challenges ahead While Chi na has moved increasin gly toward s a m arket-based system, its prin ci ple of non-i nterference in the intern al affairs of other countries rem ains, and the country's aid to Africa is unconditi onal. 27 Chin a believes th at uph olding non-interference and offerin g u nconditional aid are important to its ai m of developin g lasting relations with Afri ca. These relati ons mu st be rooted in a basic respect for national an d territorial integrity, as well as deference to the ruling power of legitimate governm ents. These factors form the found ati on of an essenti al equality between Chi na and African cou ntries. However, these p rin ciples have been under heavy fire in the 188

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West in recent years, with certain sections of the western m edia cl aiming that Chinese principles h ave emp owered Afri can 'rogue states' and governments presiding over supposed human rights abuses to secure their regimes and hinder dem ocracy and governance. With regard to the Darfur issu e, these principles h ave been regarded as the Chinese government's excu se to completely ignore western pressure and continue to do nothing on the issue. China h as, as a result, been dragged into a dilemma: n am ely, how to seek a b alance between its tr adition al principle of non-interferen ce w hile satisfyin g the requests of the internation al community. As the Belgian scholar Jon athan H olslag has put it, ' Darfur exigently tested China's diplom atic agility. It compelled Beijing to veer between its tradition al norms and economic interests on the on e side, and on the other side the internation al p ress ure and the n eed for lon g term stability.'28 From Presid ent Hu's v isit to Sud an in Febru ary 2007 on ward s, p eo ple observing Darfur around the world h ave begun to noti ce China's greater pragm ati sm and flexibility in co mbining universally conducted norms with its own ideals and principles. On the one h and, ap art from the appoin tment of a sp ecial envoy for Darfur and in creasing humanitarian assistan ce to the region, China began acti vely persu ading the Sudan ese government to coop erate with internation al SOCie ty. On the other h and, Chin a h as always insisted that Sud an 's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respec ted and that its government's con sent sho uld be the preco ndition for an y internation al intervention. By d oing so, China h as to som e extent su ccessfully addressed stron g criticism and pressure from the West and repaired its so m ewh at d am aged internation al reputation, while maintaining goo d relations with Sud an and relevant African and Arab countries. H owever, in the eyes of som e wes tern m edia, NGOs and p olitician s, even though China's' quiet diplom acy' is becoming much more assertive than before, so lon g as the co untry continues to m aintain a stan ce of non-interferen ce, that ac tion w hich it h as taken will rem ain far from suffi cient. The Darfur issue h as undo ubtedly b een a co n stant ch allen ge for China's diplom acy. In mid-July 2008, just a co uple of d ays before the opening of the Beijing Olympic Gam es, the H agueb ased, Internation al Criminal Co urt (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis 189

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Moreno-Ocamp o ch arged Sudan ese Presid ent Omar al-Bash ir w ith gen ocid e and crimes against humanity and asked the co urt to issue an arrest warrant. Imme diately, the internation al media rep orted the news together w ith sp ecul ation abo ut Chin a's reaction, questioning how China wo uld resp ond, or whether or not it would take a lead in the UN Sec urity Council for a 12-m onth su sp en sion of the ch arge. Given the b ackgro und and timing of the ICC's indictment, it was h ard for m an y p eople to b elieve that it h ad nothing to d o w ith the Beijin g Olympic Gam es. Even thou gh it was quite clear that the ICC's indictment was likely to complicate the situation in Darfur and push the Sud anese government fr om its p osition of cooperation to one of confrontation with internation al society (it seem s that lon g-held suspicion s of so-called 'regime ch an ge' cam e into play), Ch in a, on ce again, becam e dragged into another dilemma. Condemning the ICC's indi ctment or pushing thro u gh a 12-m onth susp en sion initiative in the U N Sec urity Council wo uld n o d oubt h ave drawn m ore criti cism fro m the West and n aturally h ave h ad an undesired effect on the Olympic Gam es. Con versely, supp orting the ICC's indictment wo uld h ave put Sino-Sud an and Sino- Arab co untry relation s at risk. In the end, the dilemma China now faces relates to its own d isp arities. O n the one hand, China is currently the fo urth largest econom y in the wo rld in terms of overall economi c size and value, and its economic d evelopm ent h as been on the b ack of globalisation and its ad aptation and integration within the intern ation al system, a system still d ominated by the West . On the other, requ ests directed at C hina to act as a resp on sible glob al stakeh older are bo th external and internal. Given the co untry's huge p opulation and increasing gaps between rich and p oo r and coastal cities and inland areas (China's per capita GOP is und er US$2,OOO - far below tha t of som e African co untries), China h as much in common w ith Africa and will need the continent's political and moral support to become a great p ower. In the futu re, China's Darfur p oli cy and those toward s Africa in general will need to ad apt to the ch an ges of the continent itself. Glob ali sation and Africa's own p rogress h ave altered its strategic and p oliti cal cir cumstan ces. For example, the African Union h as replaced the former Organization of African Unity (OAU ), w hich 190

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has resulted in a change from the OAU's principle of 'non-interference in member states' internal affairs' to the African Union's principle of 'non-indifference', that is, 'conditional intervention in member states' internal affairs'. In Article 4 of the AU charter, sovereign equality and non-interference are stressed, but 'the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in grave circumstance such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' is also emphasised. This demonstrates a realisation by African nations that conflict in one area of the continent can affect neighbouring countries and that collective responsibility is required for a strong and stable Africa. The heads of African countries are finding their way to maintain a balance between 'non-interference' and 'nonindifference', while China exp lores how to adjust to Africa's new policies in a new era. Notes 1. Takana, Yousef (1998) 'Effects of tribal strife in Darfur', in A I-Zein Mohamed, Adam and Ibrahim Weddai, AI-Tayeb AI-Tayeb (eds) (1998) Perspectives on Tribal Conflicts in Sudan (in Arabic), Khartoum, Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, pp. 195-225. 2. Ki-moon, Ban (2007) 'A dimate cu lp rit in Darfur ', Washington Post, 16 June, http://www.was hingtonpost.com/w p-d yn/con ten t/a rtide/2007/06/15/ AR2007061501857.html, p. 15. 3. Sudanese Embassy in Beijing (2004) 'The endeavor Sudan government has made for resolving Darfur crisis'. 4. Figures for the number of people to have died in the conflict va ry, from the 10,000 given by the Sudanese government to the 70,000 estimated by the World Health Organisation (WTO), even up to the 200,000 widely used by th e western media. 5. Straus, Scott (2005) 'Darfur and the genOCide d ebate', Foreign Affairs, January/February, p. 129. 6. Sudanese Embassy in Beijing (2004) 'The facts and truth about Darfur cri sis' ,

7. See Hoile, David (2005) 'Darfur in perspective', The European -Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, p. 97. 8. Engdahl, F. William (2007) 'Darfur? It's the oil, stupid .. .', Finan cial Sense Cuest Editorials, 21 May, http://www.fiancialsense.com/editorial/ engdahI/2007/0521.html. 9. Ibid. 10. Anon (2007) 'Darfur issue unfairly played up: envoy', China Daily, 27 July. 11. See eAfrica (2004) 'SpeCial feature: Darfur and the politics of genOCide', eAfrica - Th e Electronic Journal of Governance and Tnnovation, vol. 2, November. 12. See Danna Harman (2007) 'Activists press China with "genocide

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CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA O lympics" label', The Christian Science Monitor, 26 June, http: //www. csmoni tor.com /2007106 26/p 13s01-woaf.h tml ?page=2, and Associated Press (2007) 'Ad campaign seeks to shame China into loosening ties wi th Sudan', International Herald Tribune, 29 May, http://ww w.iht.com /articles/ a p/2007105/29/a merica/NA -G EN -US-China -Su dan. p h p. 13. Ruibal, Sal (2007) 'Beijing boycott h ot topic on Capitol Hill', USA Today, http://w ww.usa today.com/s ports/olympics/2007-06-08-beijing-da rfurboycott_N .htm. 14. Bo, Liu (2007) 'China-Sud an energy cooperation: model of A fri can foreign economic CO-OP ', 21st Century Business Herald, 5 Febru ary. 15. Delong, C hu (2006) 'Oil giant's commitment', China Daily, 3 November. 16. Jinwei, Ming (2007) 'The consensus of C hina-Afri ca s ummit has generated good res ults', Beijing Youth Daily, 16 Jul y. 17. Delong, 'Oil giant's commitment' . 18. Xinhua News Agency (2006) 'China set a good example for Africa n coun tries', interv iew with senior research fellow with the Nigerian Ins titute of International Affairs (N IIA), 20 April. 19. Presenta tion by H amad Elneel A. Gad ir, d eputy secretar y genera l of Suda nese Energy and Mining Min istry, international conference of 'ChinaSudan relations', Beijing, 26 Jul y 2007. 20. See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 'Sudan: country profile', 2005 and 2006. 21. Ibid . 22. Ibid. 23. Presenta tion by Hamad Gad ir, Beijing, 26 July 2007. 24. Kan, Te (2006) 'CNPC in Sudan, model of south-south co-op', China Daily, 3 November. 25. A non (2007) 'Chinese envoy: sa nctions wouldn't help to resolve the Darfur issu e', Xinhua Net, Beijing, 29 May. See also Q iang, Su (2007) 'Confrontati on over Darfu r "w ill lead u s now here"', Ch.ina Daily, 27 July. 26. http://news.eastd ay.com/eas tday106new s/c hina/c/20070412/u 1a2758565. html. 27. The five principles of peaceful coexistence are: mutual res pect fo r sovereignty and te rritorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's interna l affairs; eq uality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. See Zhu qi ng, Jia ng (2004) '''Fi ve PrinCiples" still sha ping g loba l peace', China Daily, 29 June, http ://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/ d oc/2004-06/29/content_343578. htm. 28. Holslag, Jo natha n (2007) 'China's diplomatic v ictory in Darfur ', Bn/ssels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BlCCS), Asia paper, vol. 2(4), 15 A ugust.

Bibliography AI-Zein Mohamed, Adam and Ib rah im Weddai, AI-Tayeb (ed s) (1998), Perspectives on Tribal Conflicts in Slidan (in Arabic), Khartoum, Institute of A fro-Asian Studies, Uni vers ity o f Khartoum

192

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Flint, Julie a nd d e Waal, Alex (2006) Darfur: a Short History of a Long War, London, Zed Books H ai le, David (2005) ' Darfur in pers pective', The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London Holslag, Jona than (2007) 'China's diplomatic v ictory in Darfu r', Brussels In stitute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS), Asia paper, vol. 2(4), 15 August

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The role of China in peace and security in Africa Desire Assogbavi In recent years, China's activities in Africa have expanded dramatically: Africa-China trade increased tenfold between 1999 and 2006. Chinese political and business leaders visit the continent regularly, and the country is pouring investment and aid into Africa. In exchange, China is securing access to the continent's natural resources, which Beijing considers essential for China's further development. Some analysts argue that China-Africa relati ons have opened up a new era for Africa's development and a new style of cooperation. But the Chinese engagement is questionabl e in terms of peace and security, which is now the main problem facin g Africa and the fundamental obstacle to the continent's integrati on. In this chapter, I will be looking particularly at the impact of the new China-Africa 'alliance' o n peace and security in our continent by considering the case of Darfur.

A strong economic interest China is now the world's second largest consumer of oil. More than 25 per cent of its oil imports come from the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan. China's inves tment in Africa now stands at US$1.5 billion a year. There are at leas t 700 Chinese enterprises operating in the continent. In terms of deb t relief, China recently wrote off US$1 .3 billion owed by African countries, which has led to a fresh injec tion of good feeling in Africa towards China. China's new strategic p artnership with Africa effectively took off at the November 2006 Beijing summit. This marked an historic moment in China-Africa relations. At this m ee ting, 48 African d elegations including 44 heads of state lined up in front of the 194

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Chinese presidential palace to greet the Chinese president. It is rare - even during the African Union summits - to see so many important African heads of state at a single meeting. Something very attractive must have been promised! In fact, it is rising global energy demands that have caused China to turn to Africa as a major supplier of oil. In addition, Africa seems to have become an open market for comparatively 'cheap' Chinese manufactured products.

A challenge for peace and security in Africa Armed violence is one of the greatest threats to Africa's development. Africa currently gives the impression of a continent riddled with territorial disputes, armed ethni c confli cts, civil wars, violence and the coll apse of governments and states. In the last 40 years there have been at least 30 major conflicts in Africa, which have claimed the lives of seven million people and displaced more than 20 million. In a report published in 2007 IAN SA, Oxfam and Saferworld estimated the economic cost of armed confli ct to Africa's development. Findings showed that around US$300 billion since 1990 has been lost by Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda. Yet 95 per cent of the weapons used during th ose conflicts come from outside of the continent - many of them from China or marked 'made in China'. Reports further revealed that most of those weapons are so ld to governments in Africa and end up in the hands of whoever wants to use them. Behind the so-called principle of 'non-interference in other's domestic issues', China's relations with Africa create challenges for governance, peace and security in the continent. Supporting and reinforcing despots and genOCidal and undemocratic regimes that systematically terrorise their citizens in order to remain in power is just not useful for a continent that has suffered for many decades and that has been trying to escape from this situation.

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A negative influence in Darfur China is not the cause of the ongoing conflict in Darfur but Chinese oil investment in Sudan undermines international efforts to end the Darfur crisis. China has acted as Sudan's key international patron and has been crucial to the ruling National Congress Party's (NCP) foreign relations on the question of international intervention in Darfur. The NCP would not have been able to pursue its strategy in the absence of Chinese support. China has so far played a largely n egative role in the crisis - it has repeatedly obstructed meaningful UN Security Council resolutions and shielded the government of Sudan from international press ure. There are also numerous reports implicating China as a key provider of military equipment and establishing arms factories in Sudan,' and Darfur rebels have recently targeted Chinese oil interests in r esponse. However, if China is encouraged to play a more constructive role on Darfur, then potentially it could be a crucial catalyst for change due to its enormous eco nomic leverage over the government of Sudan. China is Sudan's larges t bilateral trading partner, respo nsible for buying up to 71 per cent of Sudan's exports. China continues to support the government of Sudan, but its increased diplomatic e ngagement and more critical posture toward the regime can contribute to peace. Chinese relationships with some African governments reinforce dictatorship and provide new opportunities for authoritarian regimes that oppress their citizens. This is undermining all the efforts of the continent to build democratic institutions and states. The same applies to Zimbabwe. President Robert Mugabe has repeatedly said that he prefers to forge strong relation with China because, unlike the West, China does not place any political conditions on its investme nt aid. Yet Mugabe, in power for the last 27 years, is seen today as the worst dictator of the region. Deborah Brautigam, a professor of international development at the American University, Washington DC said: 'The Chinese are now finding their peop le being take n in hostage in Southern Nigeria. They are finding that people are now yelling and protesting as their lead ers come to town - just as they did when they said "Yankee go home" when American presidents visit their country' (Taylor 2007). 196

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From non-interference to non-indifference The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 reflected a new moral awareness of the need to provide the continent with a political framework and legal tools to deal with issues of 'nonindifference'. The provisions in both the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) are in proximity with the notion of 'non-indifference' when faced with massive and heinous crimes committed against civilians in Africa. This constituted a major difference between the AU and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity. The AU founders recognised the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in order to protect human rights and constitutional order. This is enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act 2000, which clearly states that the AU has a right to intervene in the affairs of a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly of heads of state in respect of 'grave circumstances', namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as a serious threat to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability in a m ember state. In order to implem ent this significant shift, the AU has put in place a strong and effective institutional framework to support and sustain that political will. This realisation provided the impetus for the elaboration of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which recognised the importance of investing in the anticipation and prevention of conflict and of putting in place structures to resolve conflicts effectiv ely once they have broken out. APSA consists of the Peace and Security Council, the Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Developme nt. In addition, in September 2005, world leaders at the UN General Assembly, made a historic commitment to their collective responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and e thnic cleansing, including a willingness to take action where the national government - which has primary responsibility - is manifes tly failing in this regard. 197

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These new developments, coupled with international and civil society pressures have probably impacted upon China's thinking and behaviour in Africa.

Positive signs from China Due to both civi l society and international pressure, Beijing is learning that separating business from politics is easier said than done. Therefore, over the last two years there have been signs that Chin ese language and engagement on the situ ation in Darfur is improving and that China wants to be seen and credited as a positive actor in the crisis. After years of repeatedly obstructing United Nation Security Coun cil Resolutions, China agreed to Resolution 1769 authorising the deployment of UN AMID (the United Nations-African Union Mission in Dafur) - and spent considerable diplomatic time and effort lobbying Sudan to accept it. The appointment in the summer of 2007 of the first Chinese special envoy, Liu Guijin, is another indication that Chin a at least wants to be seen to be doing something, even though the profile of the special envoy has been very low key since his arrival in Khartoum, where he prefers to do things qUietly and behind closed doors. While this may be an alteration of policy more in form than substance, it still presents an opportunity for pressure to be placed on Khartoum via a Chinese interlocutor. At the same time, it all ows China to promote its own interests through more voca l diplomacy and participation in multilateral forums on Darfur. At the January 2008 AU summit, the Chinese delegation issued an unprecedented public warning to the government of Sudan that the world is 'running out of patience on Darfur'. Prior to that the Chinese ambassador to Sudan, Wang Guangya, was reported as saying, in February 2007, 'Usually China doesn't send messages, but this time [on the occasion of Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to Sudan] they did ... It was a clear strong message that the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it' (Falconer et al, 2007, p. 12). To try and improve public perceptions of its role, China has also increased humanitarian aid to Sudan, including assisting 198

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in the construction of 120 schools and hospitals. However, at around US$10 million, this is still relatively small compared to China's economic interests. Some Chinese companies are building an 85km-long water project in South Darfur and 315 Chinese engineers were deployed to Darfur in October 2007 to take part in UNAMID.

The way forward Despite this progress, there is sti ll much more that Chin a could be doing. As such an important all y, Chin a needs to be encouraged to: • Promote a peaceful environment in Africa as a cata lyst for a good business • Improve their ro le at the UN Security Counci l • Sustain diplomatic pressure on the government of Sudan and rebel groups to cease hostilities in Darfur and reach a political solution to the conflict • Stop the sa le of weapons to the government of Sudan. China has previously exported mili tary helicopters to a number of countries including Sudan and there have been a number of documented cases of helicopters killing civilians in Sudan's conflicts • Press for full and unimpeded UNAMID deployment and performance • Contribute more funding, military and police assets, and personnel to UNAMID. A greater Chinese involvement in peacekeeping operations in Darfur cou ld substantiall y enhance peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians • Encourage the government of Sudan to cease any support of actors destabilising and exacerbating the crisis in Darfur and Chad • Contribute more financially to the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture.

The opil1iol1s expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect the view of his organisation.

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Note 1. C hina is the larges t arms supplier to Sudan, officially selling the country

US$83 million in wea pons, aircraft and spare parts in 2005, accordin g to A mnesty International USA. That is the la test yea r for which figures are available. China p rovided Sudan with A-5 Fantan bomber aircraft, helicopter gunships, K-8 military tra ining/attack a ircraft a nd lig ht weapons used in Sudan's proxy invasio n of Chad in 2007.

Bibliography Downs, Erica S. (2007) 'The fact and fi ction of Sino Afri can energy relations', China Security, vol. 3, no. 3 Falco ner, H., Percy, D. and Wea the rh ead, J. (2007) Mat ching Words With Action: How to pressure Sudan to stop its genocidal campaign in Darfur, London, Wagin g Peace and Sudan Devestment UK, http://www. wagingpeace.info/files/20070325_MatchingWordsWithAction.pdf, accessed 24 November 2009 JANSA, Oxfam a nd Saferworld (2007) 'Africa's missing billions: international arms fl ows and the cost of co nfli ct/~ Oxfa m Briefing Paper, no. 107 M ugum ya, Geoffrey (2007) s peech as African Union Director of Peace and Security on the responsibility to protect, Addis Ababa, 8 June Said, Djinit (2007) speech as Africa n Union Commissioner for Peace and Security on the responsibility to protect, Addis Aba ba, 8 June Taylor, Darren (2007) 'Analys ts explain the significa nce of the evolving relationship between China and A fri ca', Voice o f America, Washington

DC, 3 May

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The role and place of the African Union in the emerging China-Africa partnership Francis Ikome

Introduction and background China has e m erged as an incontrove rtible and formidable player in to day's regional and international arenas, wielding e normous power and influence and forcing readjustments in the conduct and attitudes of both the powe rful and the dispossessed regions and countries of the world. In Africa, China's growing power and influence and its everexpanding foothold across the continent have been sources of both hope and anxiety. There is hope that China, in the spirit of the long history of South-South solidarity, could offer Africa a n ew and truly genuine partnership that would increase the prospects of the continent achieving its d evelopment aspirations. But there are concerns as w ell, for example, about the possibility that China may end up conducting itself like Africa's traditional partn ers, more interes ted in their own d evelopment than in Africa's. Indeed, it is difficult to predict how China would use its power and influence . Would China, for ex ample, be a rational, peaceful and pragmatic powe r or would it turn out to be irrational, bellicose and even expansionist? China has an outstanding record of long and fruitful historical ties with many African countries, dating back to Africa's liberation years. But its growing power and influence have the potential to alter fundamentally the rules of engagem e nt. For example, China's economic boom and its growing appetite for natural resources, including pe trole um, have increased its interes t in Africa and raised worries about the dangers of a new form of impe rialism. 201

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Yet, China is not alone in courting Africa. Rather, at this juncture in the continent's history, it is w itnessing w h at som e h ave tagged the 'seco nd scramble for Africa' . The continent h as been likened in som e quarters to a brid e w ith multiple suitors, none of w h om appears to h ave the welfare of the br id e at heart. There are therefore con cerns that if the co ntinent does not p rop erly man age these multiple suitors, including China, it is m ost likely going to be a loser on ce again. Within this context and in light of the rather complex ch aracter of Africa's relation s w ith C hina, there is tacit agreem ent am on g both academi cs and practitioners that individual African co untries cannot go it alon e in their en gagements with China. Rather, a con certed and unified form of en gagem ent holds the greatest p rom ise for the co ntinent. There is a stron g b elief that the African Union (AU), Africa's m ost broad-based region al bod y, and its economic p rogramme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (N EPA D), must playa coord in atin g and pivo tal role in p roviding a stro n g multilateral fr am ework to gUide both Africa's region al eco nomic communities and m ember states in their en gagem ent w ith China. In sp ite of the recognition of the need for con certed action and the imperative of assigning the AU an imp ortant role in SinoAfrican relation s, very few m ember states h ave been willing to effectively allow the union su ch a role. Most of their efforts h ave rem ained in the realm of rhetoric and China itself d oes not appear to be keen on en couraging su ch a development. This is in spite of the very real d an ger that the Sino-Afri can p artnership may n ot be too different from Afri ca's p artnership s w ith the so-called tradition al allies. Moreover, the AU's in volvem ent in Sino-African relation s has brought to the fore contradiction s between the recognition by African states of the need for multilaterali sm in their en gagem ent with China and their continued p referen ce for bila teral d ealings in practice. Equally worrying is the fact that it is doubtful that the AU h as the capacity and wherewithal to play the role that h as been mooted for it or that it wants to arrogate to itself. Within this context, this ch apter exam ines wh at the role and p lace of the AU should be in Sino-African relations; it also p Oints at the visible co ntradiction s between the rhetoric for con certed multilateralism and the contin202

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ued emphasis of direct bilateralism with China. The chapter interrogates the notions of old and new partnerships, with a special focus on an appraisal of the extent to which China's partnership with Africa is different from Africa's traditional partnerships.

Sino-African relations as seen by the AU Africa's new institutional frameworks, especia ll y the AU and its economic programme NEPAD, emphasise the need for the continent to speak with one voice in its dealings with the rest of the world. The AU has strong faith in an overa ll partnership framework that would also provide gUide lines to various bilateral partnerships between individual or/and groups of African countries and emerging powers, including China. The AU believes in the need to recast the modalities of Africa's partnerships and to rid them of the asymmetries that characterised Africa's cooperation with its traditional partners. The AU views this as the on ly way to ensure that such partnerships, including that with China, will contribute effectively to sustainable development in the continent. And although the AU sees China as a partner that shares the same concerns as Africa, it sti ll believes that there is need for African countries to initiate a joint framework of engagement with China. The AU recognises that the partnership between Africa and China is not new, but that what is new is the level and nature of the partnership. The AU acknowledges that the new partnership between Africa and China represents a delicate choice between varying levels of multilateralism and bilateralism and as a result, the continent wou ld need to be careful in exercising its judgment in determining the mix that wou ld constitu te an optimal balance. The African Union strongly believes that the content of the emerging Sino-Africa partnership is crucial and that the continent must be clear about the nature of opportunities that exist, what it has to offer and what it expects as tangible benefits. Africa needs to have a clear vision and a development strategy and be able to absorb and apply global best practices in the management of its development process. It must avoid appearing as a helpless development partner and also shed its inordinate tendency to beseech partners for development assistance, which in the past was a constant in Africa's engagement with the rest of the world. 203

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The AU's view of the Sino-Africa partnership The kind of partnership that the AU would want to see emerge between Africa and China is one that would have, among others, the following tenets: • A true and equal partnership should be anchored in mutual trust and benefits rather than like the relationship of donor and recipient. • The approach to the partnership should be one of co-development that is human-centred and in which both parties agree to commit their r eso urces and assets to common interests. • The partnership should be consistent with the vision and development strategy of the AU, articulated both in the Strategic Plan of the AU and the NEPAD programme and must provide answers to questions such as what Africa wants, what Africa is offering and receiving and on what terms, and what Africa's priorities are. • Africa must face China and other emerging powers as a united continent and strengthen its integration agenda. • The priorities of Africa in the partne rship should include acceleration of industrialisation, infrastructure development, agricultural d evelopment, technology and knowledge d evelopment and acquisition, human capital d evelopment, e nhancem e nt of marke t access, and the d evelopment of a modern services sector. • The immediate objective of the partnership is effec tive industrialisation of the continent, the d evelopment of service industries, and the diversification of African eco nomies. • The AU should e nsure a SMART (Specific, Measurable, Accessible, Realistic and Time-bound) approach in the implem e ntation of the African strategy towards China and other emerging partne rs. Overall, the AU sees the em erge nce of China and its partnership with Africa as presenting both opportunities and challenges for the continent. As far as the AU is concerned, what becomes of this n ew partnership will d ep end on how well Africa manages both dime nsions. 204

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Opportunities The opportunities offered by Sino-Africa relations, as seen by the member states of the AU, are: • Prospec ts for expanding existing friendly relations between China and Africa • The policy of non-interference by China in partne r countries' domestic governance conditions • The d emand for Africa's natural resources by China for its growth and d evelopment needs • China's membership of the UN Security Council • China's growing influence in the multilateral trading and financial systems and as a major partner in South-South cooperation • China as a force to r eckon with in world geopolitical affairs • The emergence of China on the global scene, which is forcing Africa's traditional partners to rethink their cooperation policies and strategies • The harnessing of Africa's economic advantage in agriculture, mining, exploration and processing of natur al reso urces, and the promotion of tourism to take advantage of Chinese economic growth and partnership with Africa • The advancem ent of m o d ern a nd traditional m edicine • Technology acquisition and improvem ent of Africa's productive capacity and human reso urces d evelopme nt • Increased investme nt opportunities in Africa and improvem ent in the quality of African products and trad e pe rformance • Boos t to Africa's industrialisation and economic growth and the resultant job creation and gradual reduction of the tide of emigration • The possibility of achieving positive effec ts from bilateral agreements at the level of r egional economic cooperation organisations whereby, unlike the economic partnership agreem e nts promoted by the European Union, the Chinese governm e nt and la rge-scale firms would be involved in the eco nomic d evelopment programmes of African countries.

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Challenges In spite of the number of opportunities opened to Africa by the Sino-Africa partnership, the partne rship, from the AU's perspective, is surrounded by numerous challenges that include : • Raising the productivity of labour and enhancing output from manufacturing in order to be able to compete with China in those same areas where it has a strong comparative advantage • Developing effective strategies to d erive maximum benefits from China's growing demand for energy, minerals, etc, while being aware that growing demand could potentially lead to an increase in prices of productive inputs, which could, in turn, affect grow th and d evelopment in some African countries • Vigorously pursuing technological d evelopment so as to improve the capacity to compete and enhance Africa's share of the global marke t • Exer cising caution in the nego tiation of agreements, as Chinese agreements are very often carefully cr afted to ensure maximum benefit to that country, whereas African countries do not exercise the same care in pre paring and evaluating agreements and projects • Ensuring that the partnership is result oriented and capable of d elivering concrete results • Strengthening efforts to understand Chinese culture and language • Improving the structure of trade with China, ensuring that trade is based on processed products rather than raw materials and that trade is gUided by comparative advantages of countries • AVOiding increasing Africa's d ebt burden in the emerging partne rship with China • Placing more e mphasis on regional integration and for the African Union to unite Africa and harmonise and synchronise trade positions with China • Striking a balance be tween bilateralism and multilate ralism in the partne rship with China • Giving a lead ership role to the AU in the organisation of FOCAC m ee tings

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• Being aware of and addressing the tendency by Chinese companies to play down capacity development in the partner countries and to import labour from home. The use and development of local capacity is vital and central to the success of skills and knowledge transfer • Ensuring that China pays more attention to the protection of the environment in its investment practices. To this end, appropriate mechanisms are required • Ensuring that Chinese investment practices do not undermine Africa's efforts to promote financial transparency and combat corruption • While it is good that China does not subject its grants and concessionary lending to conditionalities, it should strive to use its support to leverage for good governance within the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism • While China imposes no specific development model to gUide its relations with countries, it should be encouraged to place a significant level of emphasis on regional integration in Africa. China is at present not very visible in this area in its cooperation with Africa • Encouraging China to relocate some of its industries to Africa as a reflection of the true spirit of partnership and use available local capacity in their operation • Starting to reflect on appropriate policy responses to the problems of labour unionism that the influx of Chinese firms and workers may give rise to.

Multilateralist rhetoric but bilateralist preference African leaders have repeatedly underscored the need for a unified and common stance in their engagements with China and other emerging powers. They also recognise the imperative of assigning the African Union and its economic programme NEPAD a coordinating and pivotal role in providing a strong multilateral framework to gUide the continent's engagement with China. However, it wou ld seem that both the notion of a united front and the idea of assigning the AU a coordinating role in SinoAfrica relations are mere rhetoric and that practically, individual 207

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Afri can states an d China appear to be worshiping at the altar of bilater ali sm under the d ictates of sovereign n ation al interest. Many African co untries face the same challen ges, esp ecially p overty, underdevelopment, p oo r health and low levels of industrialisation. But the tenden cy to present Afri ca as a hom ogeno us entity is very m isleading. The reality is that the 53 or so odd states that make up the Afr ican continent still have distinct nation al interests and co n cerns. Moreover, not all Afric an states are at the same level of d evelopment and, therefore, their priorities in their en gagem ent w ith the continent's p artners m ay differ from each other. And althou gh region al integration and continental unity h as em erged as a priority con cern for a m ajority of Afri can co untries, the continent is still a lon g way away from con stituting a con tinental government w ith a continental foreign p olicy. Under these circumstan ces, it is not surprising that individual Afri can co untries continue to p ro mote and p roject p ositions that best serve their specific realities - even w hen this appears to be at variance with com m on p osition s p rojected b y the AU or any other region al bod y. For its p art, China recogni ses the importan ce of the African Union and is d isp osed to supporting its work throu gh, for exam ple, its pled ge to build a co nferen ce centre complex for the AU Commission in Addis Abab a and also to sup p ort its p eacekeep in g op eration s. H owever, China does not seem keen to con cede a leading role to the AU in its dealings w ith African states. It prefers wh at co uld be described as diluted multilateralism within the fr amework of the Forum for China and Afr ica Coop eration (FOCAC), which brings together indivi dual African states and Ch in a, with each Afr ican state re tainin g its sovereignty and total freedom of action. Under su ch an arran gem ent, the struggle by African states to prom ote their respective n ation al interests give China much more leverage than it wo uld h ave if an African multilateral institution su ch as the AU were to nego tiate on b eh alf of the entire continent. The FOCAC m ee ting in Beijing in 2006 registered deliberate and conscio us efforts by both som e African states and China to sideline the Afri can Union durin g the meeting. This development clearly revealed the ten sion s be tween the rhetoric of m ultilateralism and the practical disposition to bilateralism in Africa's en gagem ent w ith Chin a. 208

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Althou gh African head s of state in a d ecision taken in Banjul clearly defined the ro le of the AU in forums between Afri ca and em erging p owers, the Afri can Union h ad great difficulty being allowed to p articip ate in the FOCAC m eeting. China and som e African countries wanted the Afric an Union excluded, alon gside other multilateral organisation s such as the United Nation s and the Europ ean Union . It was after hours of w ran gling at the instan ce of som e m oder ate m ember states that an exception was m ade to allow the AU to p arti cip ate in the forum m eetings at all three levels - offiCials, ministerial and summit. The FOCAC m eetings in Beijing were of m onumental importan ce. They reviewed the expanding fri endship and coop eration between China and African co untries in the 50 years since the inception of diplom atic relations, reviewed p rogress of the p eo ples of China and Africa in the p ast six years since the formation of FOCAC, assessed the d elivery of the commitments in the Addis Abab a Action Plan (2004-06) adopted at the 2nd ministerial co nferen ce, and evolve d jOint efforts to ad vance the new type of strategic p artnership between China and Africa. The summit and conference also ch arted the course for China-Africa coop eration in all areas over the follo wing three years and, m ore imp ortantly, a dopted the Beijing Decl aration and the Beijing Plan of Action (2007-09) to prom ote fri endship, p eace, coop eration and d evelopment. Regrettably, h owever, the d eclaration and plan of action failed , at the insisten ce of som e AU m ember states, to m ake an y referen ce to the C onstitutive A ct of the Union . The sidelining of the A U, w hi ch African leaders them selves h ave identified to play a coordinating and gUiding role in the em erging p artnership with China, underscores the fact that the id ea of a united and concerted front is still a pipedream in inter-African relations . Afri can states are still intent on protecting and projecting their individual national interests in their d ealings w ith China. The sp ectacle of deb ates and disagreem ent am on g m ember states' d elegates about the relevance of the AU in the FOCAC process was a huge disappointment and embarrassment. The disagreem ent was a clear refl ection of the tensions between Afri can states' rhetoric of co llective en g agem ent with China and their practical inclination towards direc t bilateralism. This is clearly 209

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inconsistent with the common goal of African unity and the need for the continent to speak with one voice in its engagement with the rest of the wo rld, especially with p owerful partners such as China. While Morocco was a major divisive factor am on g African co untries vis-a.-vis the role of the union in the FOCAC process, a co ntributory fac tor ap p ears to be the inadequate understanding of the fact that a coordinating role for the AU would not preclude bilater al coop eration arrangements between China and African co untries under the framework o f FOCAC. Indeed, many African participants were unable to comprehend w hy reference to the Constitutive Act should be excluded from documents em anating from a meeting that brings many AU m embers together. The AU strongly believes that a coordinating role for the union in the FOCAC process will indeed be in the interest of not only African co untries but also of China. It w ill provide a greater opp ortunity for a m ore foc use d and b etter-organised engagement w ith China. It w ill prevent an unhealthy competition among African co untries for the' carrots' of Africa-China p artnership. Greater involvem ent of the AU in the FOCAC pro cess w ill p ermit issues of regional integration to be accorded the priority they deserve in Africa-China cooperation. The AU also b elieves that it will enable African co untries to develop a collec tive response to the future challen ges that m ay emerge from the Africa-China partnership. On China's part, anch oring its en gagem ent with Africa on p olicies jOintly adopte d by African leaders within the framework of the AU and involving the AU Commission in the FOCAC process w ill shield China against some of the criticisms being made, esp ecially by Africa's tradition al partners, about its increasing en gagem ent in Africa. Despite the disagreements, the AU recognises th at the Beijing FOCAC meetings and summit were historic and con stituted a major mileston e in Africa-China partnership and South-South coo p eration. The two major d oc uments that were ad opted (the Beijing Decl aratio n and the Beijing Action Pl an ) co uld, if faithfully and effec ti vely implemented, lead to the realisation o f a virile p ar tners hip that is anchored in the principles of equ ality and mutual respect. The p artnership co uld assist Africa in meeting some of its development chall enges. It has huge potential to assist the co ntinent to diversify its exter210

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nal economic relations and reduce its excessive dependence on the developed western economies. The AU still believes that it needs to playa pivotal coordinating role in the Sino-African partnership and that the error of sidelining it during the FOCAC meetings in Beijing will be rectified in subsequent meetings, beginning with the ministerial meeting that is to be hosted by Egypt in 2009.

The new versus old partnerships debate It is common knowledge that China's foothold in Africa poses

a serious threat to the interests of Africa's traditional partners, especially former colonial powers and their allies. As a result, the West has struggled to demonstrate that China's economic forays in African are exploitative and detrimental to the continent's development. Some have responded to this by arguing that Chinese economic interventions in Africa are no different from that of the so-called traditional allies; it is capitalism pure and simple, with the main goal being the interest and profit motive of the capitalist. In the eyes of many, China comes through in the ongoing riva lry as a more credible partner, which has something new and potentially beneficial to offer the African continent. China has couched its case very firmly in terms of a commonality of interests and realities between itself, Africa and the broader South - especially within the ambit of historically recorded South-South solidarity. An important component of China's foreign policy is the enhancement of solidarity and cooperation with African countries. This is reflected in the Chinese government's African Policy Paper, which articulates China's goals of building a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, based on political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, cultural exchange and consultation in international affairs. Although the AU subscribes to the view that China offers something different to the continent, it has concerns that, if care is not taken, the emerging partnership between Africa and China might follow the same paternalistic pattern of relations with the West. 2 11

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Conclusion China's growing econo mi c and p olitical influence in the world and its ever-increasing foo thold across the African co ntinent present b oth o pportunities and ch allen ges fo r the African con tinent. Afri can lead ers acknowle d ge the need for so m e level of concerted actions and a united front to mitigate the negative effects o f China's e m er gen ce in the continent while a t the same time m aximising the gains flowing from it. The AU, the body ch ampio ning the continent's integration and unity, feels it sho uld play a co ordina ting and pivo tal role in the em er ging p artnership with China. While many African governm ents appear to be dispo sed to con ced e a leading role fo r the AU in the continent's partnership with China, o thers are oppo sed to su ch an arran gem ent. Mo reover, the diversity of African co untries and the differ ences o f the realities they face seem to en co urage the projection o f n a tion al interests over and above continental co mmon alities in Afri can co untries' engagem ent with China. And while China r ecognises the importance of the AU and suppo rts its work, including its integra tion agenda, it d oes no t app ear to be too keen to allo t the co ntinental b o dy a leading role in its p artnership with the continent.

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Part V Perspectives for civil society partici pation

Chinese perceptions of African CSOs: how should African CSOs engage China? Xiao Yuhua The strengthening of Sino-African relations h as attracted interest across the world. As a matter of fact, the red-hot relationship between the Middle Kingdom and African countries is so significant that it might be a prelude to the formation of a new world economic and political order which favo u rs not on ly the developed North, but a lso the und erdeveloped South. In this process, civil society has an irreplaceable ro le to p lay, as inter-cu ltural exc hanges and understanding w ill not come automatica lly as by-products of growing economic and political ties. Exchanges and understanding between cultures are highly important for building a peacefu l world, without which the common evils of conflicts and confrontations - be they ethnic, religious, po litica l or cu ltura l - cannot be resolved. It is in these areas that C hinese and African civil society organisations (CSOs) can demonstrate their unique functions. It is imperative to stress, however, that Chinese and African CSOs have different characteristics, thus presenting challenges for mutual und erstanding and dialogue. In this chapter I w ill discuss the mainstream opinions of Chinese people about African CSOs and how African CSOs shou ld present themselves to China.

Chinese perceptions of African C50s It would not be proper to generali se about the opinions of Chinese peop le as the country and its peo ple are much more diverse than most p eople think. The much-hailed and publicised Sino-African relations are an important factor in shaping Chinese perceptions 214

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about African CSOs, generating different views in different sectors about African CSOs. Therefore, it is necessary to examine Chinese perceptions of African CSOs from the different perspectives of the government, the general public, academic circles, businesses and Chinese CSOs.

The government Although some people still doubt the existence of civil society in China, the truth is that the country's civil society has a long history and has always been interes ted in the outside world 1 The Chinese government keeps a close watch on domestic CSOs, but is beginning to realise and acknowledge their r elevance in pro moting good governance, social welfare, environme ntal protection and various social services. As the government cannot m ee t all the needs of its people, esp ecially in times of natural disaste rs and in the fields of social services, the Chinese lead ership has becom e more tole rant of sectors outside the government, allowing more space for the activities of civil society. The improvem ent in policies related to the activities of civil society in China do es not m ean the government necessarily has the same opinions about all for eign CSOs operating in China indiscriminately. For those involved in environmental protection, poverty reduction and social services, governments at all levels are more hospitable, and in some cases, officials even provide h elp for these organisations to imple m ent their programmes. But there are also for eign CSOs who take the common 'naming and shaming' approach to embarrass the government, albeit to no avail. This is because such organisations do not truly unde rstand the Chinese ideology and have taken the wrong m eans to achievem ent of an honourable end. In traditional Chinese culture, to maintain a certain kind of 'face' is vital for the government, as well as for individual citizens, to retain honour, and hence authority. Over two millennia of centralised fe udal rule (221Bc-1911) have left an indelible mark on the mind of both the ruling and the ruled. When it comes to building a modern d emocratic system with the consent of all parties involved - incl uding the ruling and the ruled - this history the refore poses a dramatic challenge to a Chinese government undergoing a period of significant eco nomic, political and social transformation. 215

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In the context of contemporary Chinese politics, it is not realistic to assume that the overall environment for CSOs - be it domestic or foreign - will be changed radically in a short time. CSOs operating in the country need to understand the culture of the Chinese nation and the diversity of the people, so that programmes can be oriented to conditions on the ground. African CSOs have little, if any, influence in China. Save for some African communities in a number of business hubs, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Yiwu, African CSOs are mostly unknown when compared to CSOs from other regions of the world. However, the historical and friendly ties between Chinese and African governments may serve as a bridge for civil exchange between the two sides. With large amounts of Chinese commodities being exported to African markets by African as well as Chinese traders, some African CSOs have voiced concern over the impact of these goods on local producers - the exploitation of natural resources notwithstanding - especially in terms of the profits accrued and benefits enjoyed by Chinese and African political and economic elites. Therefore, governments on both sides of the relationship need to listen to the voices of CSOs.

The general public The majority of the Chinese public has little knowledge about the African continent, let alone African CSOs. Some people think Africa is mysterious and has a variety of indigenous cultures, but their knowledge is mostly from books, magazines, newspapers and other mass m edia. CSOs occasionally come into their sight when political turmoil, conflicts and wars happen. They are more often seen as humanitarian entities rather than advocacy groups. This perception is in line with political conditions inside China. The general public's impression of African CSOs evolves with the transformation of the government's policies. In recent years, positive aspects of African CSOs have been more frequently covered in the Chinese m edia. A growing number of Chinese people have come to the knowledge that CSOs are the forces not only serving the needs of the needy, but also fighting against governm ent injustices and contributing to the democratisation process.

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Academic circles Aca demics are beginnin g to show m ore interest in African CSOs. This is becomin g a trend as the government is loosening its con tro l over d om estic CSOs in a bid to build a m ore harm oniou s so ci ety and world. Pap ers have been published discu ssin g the ro le of CSOs in facilitating d em ocratisati on . But it is n ecessary to p oint out th at African studies had lon g been a m argin ali sed di sci p line in Chinese universities and researc h-oriented institution s. The recent 'Afri ca ru sh' am on g scholars is m ainl y du e to spira llin g Sino-Afric an re lati on s, its direct objective bein g to serve the co untry's foreign strategy. Up to now, scho lars invo lved in seriou s African studies are estim ated to number not m ore than 100. Even that number is believed to be optimi sti c. Those sc ho lars w hose m ain interest is Afri can CSO s are of the youn ger generation of Africani sts. These youn g Africani sts, w ith a m ore open p ersp ective about the contemporary world and the future of the C hinese n ation, see m ore common features between C hin a and Africa. By stud yin g African CSOs, th ey are able to see the importan ce of combinin g western id eas and stru ctural d esign s w ith the conditi ons of a given co untry. Furthermore, Chinese acad emi cs are becomin g m ore knowl ed geable about Africa n cultures . Th ey also h ave a mi ssion to promote und erstandin g of Afri ca and African p eopl es in Chin a. In recent years, Africani sts in Chin a h ave h ad m ore ch an ces to visit Africa. Their contribution is essential to enli ghtening the Chinese public about African CSOs.

Businesses Chinese businesses are m ost known for their labour-inten sive pro duction m od e. Outsourcing to Africa can b e beneficial to both sides. Businesses are u su ally profit-dri ven, but they are und er p aram ount pressu re fr om local p eople in Africa to listen to the voices of Afri can civil society. Al so, Chinese business p eople in Africa are no t as well-p ositioned as their western co unterp arts becau se of lan guage b arriers and their limited knowled ge abo ut Africa. Most Chinese business p eo ple h ave no idea at all about Afri can CSO s. Small Chinese 217

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businesses are more used to dealing with Africans directly rather than going through trade unions or rights groups. In those African countries where the rule of law is more mature, Chinese businesses are learning the lessons of fitting in. The charges of ignoring workplace safety measures, deplorable working conditions and low wages levelled against Chinese businesses have forced them to adapt to local requirements. CSOs Compared with their African counterp arts, Chinese CSOs are more cooperative with the government. The question of the level of indep endence and/or closeness to government reflected in the behaviour of trade unions and the lack of rights groups has led some analysts to conclude that Chinese CSOs are governmentoutreach branches. I see no point in d ebating the inde p endence of Chinese trade unions, but it is worth noting that apart from trade unions, international CSOs operating in China are pioneering ways of facilitating people-to -people exchanges. It is hard to deny that aid and endowments from western donors are important for Chinese and African CSOs to have first-hand information about each other, and then to conduct joint programmes. Cooperation and dialogue between African and Chinese CSOs lag far behind red-hot trade ties. Eliminating this imbalance is the key to long-term sustainable development.

How should African CSOs engage China? As different parties hold different opinions about African CSOs, it is necessary for African CSOs to adopt different approaches in dealing with China if they wish to build a relationship with the Middle Kingdom in line with their own agendas.

The government To start with, we should note that the Chinese government is much more open than the outside world, espeCially the West, likes to think. Constructive dialogue w ith the government can h elp African CSOs to present their concerns, and therefor e to gain access to this enormous and diverse country. Government

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approval and supp ort also in crease African CSOs' ch an ces of realising their agendas on the gro und. In or der to build a healthy relation ship w ith the government, it is imp ortant to understand the government's con cerns about CSOs. Chin a's 'o ne-p arty rule, m ulti-level coop eration' p olitical system influen ces the overarching environm ent in w hich CSOs - be they d om esti c or foreign - h ave to op erate. The politi cal system is flexible as it h as the in gredient of ' multip arty coop eration', thus justifying the acti vities of factors o ther than the ruling p arty, but it also sets the bottom line - no one is allowe d to ch allen ge the authority of the ruling p arty. This bottom line is regarded as essential for the stability of the C hinese n ation and h as also con tributed to the fast econ omic and social development of the p ast three d ecad es. Afri can CSOs - w hich up to n ow h ave h ad little contact with China - can and should w in the recognition and supp ort of relevant Chinese government dep artments so that they can access the co untry in the fir st instan ce. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (in ch arge of dom estic non -governmental organisation (NCO) affairs) and the International Dep artment of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (in ch ar ge of foreign NCO affairs) are co mmissioned to deal with iss ues relatin g to CSOs. As most African co untries m aintain friendly ties with the Chinese government, African CSOs w ill enjoy an equ al, if not m ore favo urable, treatment if they choose to op erate in China. Particul arly for those ad vocacy group s w hi ch h ave p reVio usly employed ' n aming and sh am ing' tacti cs, by coming to China they can h ave direct contact w ith the Chinese people and avoid being described in the m edia as an alien 'other '. H owever, there is one thing that Afri can CSOs h ave to keep in mind: the Chinese government stron gly rejects interference in its dom estic affairs (esp ecially on p olitical iss ues). CSOs, be they African or western, sho uld understand this reality and take a flexible app roach w hile n ot co m promising their principles.

The general public The Chinese public is always cautious about new things and new peo ple, but on ce they perceive fri end ship, they w ill be m os t w illing to embrace new ways of life . 219

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African CSOs should first come to China to publicise their agendas so that Chinese people can understand Africans and their cultures. Prejudices against the African continent, its cultures and its peoples exist not only in developed countries, but also in the Middle Kingdom, whose people had for thousands of years seen themselves as part of the greatest civilisation in the world. However, modern science and technology developed in the West, crushing this dream a century ago. Knowledge of and contact with African cultures, if well-publicised, will help the Chinese people to appreciate other cultures and to reconsider issues which used to seem so far away from them. Contributing to this process could become a focal pOint of African CSOs' mission.

Academic circles Academics are the pioneers in understanding African CSOs. African CSOs should take the initiative to set up links with various institutions of higher learning and research to share information. This is the most effici ent way to make their voices heard in a nation of 1.3 billion people. Although Beijing provides the greatest convenience for the exchange of information and its dissemination, it is not the only place where African CSOs can operate. As a matte r of fact, the vast regions of west China and some booming Chinese cities have many similarities with Africa, and exchanges in the fi elds of d evelopment and grassroots governance are important for longterm development. Organising joint conferences with Chinese universities or research institutions is a good way to use the knowledge of academics to boost understanding of African CSOs. Currently, the Institute of West Asian and African Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, based in Beijing, and the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, based in the city of Jinhua in Zhejiang province, are the two biggest entities in China involved in African studies. Centres of African studies have also been set up in other universities such as Peking University, Shanghai Normal University, Xiangtan University and Yunnan University. These centres might be smaller in size, but their scholars are long-time Africanists whose contributions have been the driving force behind the d evelopment of African studies in China. 220

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African CSOs can also include C hinese Africani sts in their programmes for inter-cultural exch an ges. A s academics, Chinese Africanists m aintain a degree of inde p endence which is lacking in m ost government dep artments. It is also m ore constructive for Chinese Afri canists to p oint out p roblem s existing in China's p oli cy toward Afri ca (su ch as on the Darfur issue); the sh aming China camp aign or ganised by so m e western civil society activists before the Beijing Olympics h ad little if an y p ositive imp act o n the p olicy of the Chinese government. It is high time that CSOs wor ked with acad emics to pursu e their objectives .

Businesses Pressure levelled against Chinese businesses o pera ting in Africa can be helpful in regularising corporate beh avio ur, but violent incidents only cause las ting d am age to the alread y difficult relatio nship am on g involved p arties. Nego tia tion and legal litigation sho uld be stren g thened. A s more and m ore Chinese comp anies rush into Africa to d o business, the wo rking condition s and treatment of their emplo yees need to be better supervise d and rep o rted objectively. It is also important to recognise tha t wo rkplace safety in Chinese businesses is no t o nly a problem in Africa, but is also a serio u s problem w ithin China . Medi a re p orts of accidents at sm all mines and kilns h ave caused frequent o utcr y in China . African environmental NGOs and rights gro up s can present their co mpl aints to relevant Chinese government de partments in o rder to regula te the practices of Chinese businesses in their co untry. They sho uld use Chinese m e dia m o re than western m edi a to publicise their info rmation so that the m essage w ill no t lead to a n a tion alistic respo nse but rather to a ratio n al re-evalua tion of China's role in Africa. CSOs While academi cs enlig hten the government as well as the general publi c o n issu es relating to Africa, Chinese CSOs can be the best partners in executing joint pro grammes as they are m o re famili ar with Chinese conditio ns. Statistics fro m vario u s sou rces show that the number of N GO s 221

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registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs reached 266,000 by the end of 2003, growing at an annual 34 per cent. These figures do not even include NGOs operating either on the fringe or outside of state margins. Different CSOs in China have different agendas. For African CSOs seeking to set up cooperative relationships with Chinese CSOs, the China International Exchange Association (CIEA) may be a springboard to an ocean of Chinese CSOs. With close relations with the Chinese government, the CIEA is commissioned to facilitate non-governmental economic and cultural exchanges and to promote mutual understanding and friendly cooperation with foreign countries. It also aims to make contributions to world peace, in which field African CSOs can present their concerns about issues such as Darfur.

Conclusion After a tentative discussion of the topic, I have come to the following conclusions: • Sin ce the country adopted its reform and opening-up policies 30 years ago, opinions about African CSOs in China have been diverse. • The political atmosphere in Chin a has become more and more open and inclusive over the past three decades, and the space for the activities of both domestic and foreign CSOs has also expanded dramaticall y. Especially in the wake of China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, more international CSOs are flooding into the long-isolated country. • There is a lot of work which African CSOs can do to improve their knowledge of China, and they can first get into China through government-affiliated entities, research institutions or through partnerships with other Chinese CSOs to achieve their goals. • There is enormous potential for Chinese and African civil society to strengthen cooperation and dialogue. Mutual understanding can be achieved if African CSOs engage China in different ways with different approaches, and vice versa.

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Speaking generally, the role o f CSOs in Sino-African relations requires greater attention as a p otenti ally effective alternative to so lv ing so me of the p roblems hindering the healthy development of the relationship between China and Afri ca. Note 1. While not as well-organised as mod e rn CSOs, p ublic venues in traditiona l Chinese socie ti es such as tea ho uses were ins trum ental in the disseminati o n o f in formatio n and contributed to socia l mobilisatio n in diffe rent phases o f

history.

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Si no-African relations: reflections on civil society engagement Antony Otieno Ong ' ayo C hin a-Africa relati on s have beco me p art of a broad de bate. The issues di scu ssed ran ge fr om investment to 're-co lo ni sati on' and C hin a's relatio ns w ith re pressive Afri can regimes (Norberg 2006). Oth er discu ssi on s have focu sed o n C hin a's ru sh fo r Africa's n atural resources . C hinese involvem ent h as been described as a ' new scramble fo r Afri ca' . Western governments and researc hers from the North have also focu se d on ' issu es and pl aces o f v iolence, disorder and corruptio n over o th er n egative issues su ch as trade imb alan ces, [w hi ch have] und ermin[ed] do m esti c m anufacturin g sectors' (Mawd sley 2008; see also Sautm an 2006). Different p erspectives fro m A fri ca itse lf a lso compli ca te the C hin a-Africa d ebate w here p o liti cal lea ders and civil society or ganisation s contest the impli catio n s o f the C hinese approach to d eve lopment o n the continent. Su ch contested areas include the ' unconditi ona l aid ' given by Chin a, as we ll as its p olicy of n on interferen ce, a p oli cy whi ch reson ates we ll with m an y African regimes w hose exp erien ce with western d onors (Sand brook 2005) is the op posite of C hina's ap proac h. As p Ointed out recentl y, C hin a is no lo n ger a to pi c, it is a dimensio n (M arks 2008). H owever, despite these genuine concerns over Chin a-Afri ca relati on s, qu estio n s still rem ain as to whether 'Chin a is the p ro blem in Afric a o r [w hether] it is the n eo-libera l econ omi cs th at shap e [the] world econo m y and p olitics' (Sautm an and H airon g 2007). While th e debate about Chin a-Afri ca relatio ns rages on, mu ch of th at d ebate rem ai ns abstr act. There is little input from grassroots voices in creatin g awareness or an exc han ge of ideas and

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ex perien ces aro und the imp act of China's involvem ent in Africa (Mawd sley 2008; Sautman and H airon g 2007). There are three m ain arguments in this ch apter. First, d espite the inten sive deb ate on China- Africa relation s, m u ch of the discu ssion shows a great lack of knowled ge on the p art of Chinese civ il society about wh at China is doing in Africa, but also on the p art of African civil sOciety about condition s within China itself, esp ecially in relation to the econo m y. Second, thi s lack of information undermines the p otential for d eveloping counter arguments to p olicies em an ating from both the Chinese and variou s Afri can governments. Third, due to cultural differences and sp ecial inte rest m ediation by internation al capital, en gaging w ithin p oliti cal contex ts su ch as China's or those of non-d em ocratic African governments becom es much m ore diffi cult. There is therefore a need for new strategies that are culturally relevant, but these alternative approaches sho uld be d evelop ed thro ugh an exch an ge of ideas and exp erien ces between civil society organisation s and acad emia in China and in Africa. The ch apter therefore argues for the need for new strategies that are culturally relevant, but equally that these alternative app roaches sho uld be d eveloped thro ugh an exch an ge of ideas and exp erien ces between civil society or ganisation s and academia in China and in Africa. The ch apter concludes by p rop osing a number of m easures for civil society and academic en gagem ent in the SinoAfrican relation s deb ate and p olicy-related iss ues. It ends with question s for reflection , the an swers to w hi ch h ave the po tential to address the prerequi sites for civil society or ganisation s' effective en gagem ent within China-Africa relations.

Framing Chinese involvement in Africa The economic dimension

C hin a's en gagem ent in Afri ca is not a new phen om enon, but m ore attenti on h as been given du e to 'Chin a's in creased presen ce, whi ch began in th e 1990s w hen Chin a-Africa trade grew by 700 p er cent' (Sa utin an 2006, p. 7). H owever, recent eco nomi c d evelopm ents w ithin China and its inten sive engagem ent w ith Afri ca have eli ci ted mi xed reacti on s and raised qu estion s as to 225

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whether 'China is just the latest in a line of exploiters of Africa's rich natural resources who put their own economic interests above humanitarian, environmental or human rights concerns, or [whether] China's engagement [is simply] an ex tension of "South-South solidarity'" (Manji and Marks 2007). Chinese involvem ent in Africa h as both eco nomic and p olitical dimensions. On the economic fr ont, China sees Africa as a new destination for direct investment and a source for n atural reso urces. The Chinese government is noted as h aving 'enco urage[d] Chinese firms to invest in Africa in various fields such as trade, agriculture, infrastructure con struction, mining and tourism' (Singh 2006). For instance, between 1991 and 1994 Chinese direct investment in Africa increased dramatically, from less than US$5 million doll ars p er year to around US$25 million (Qiang 2002). Since 2005, around 750 Chinese companies op erating in Africa have been en gaged in trade, m anufacturing, n atural resource exploitation, transportation, agriculture and agricultural processing (Bello 2007). Other areas of Chinese involvem ent include 'financial assistance, prestige construction projects and arms sales' (Alden 2005, p. 148). Chinese companies are estimated to have invested about US$135 million and US$280 million in Africa in 2004 and 2005 respectively of the total US$3.6 billion and US$6.9 billion in Chinese overseas direct investment (Sautman 2006). As Sautman n otes, 'Africa's average annual FDI intake in 2001-04 was estimated at $15-18 billion, d espite Africa provi ding the world's highest returns on FDI, averaging 29 p er cent in the 1990s and 40 per cent in 2005.' Furthermore, 'China's realised FDI in Africa stood at only $1 billion of Africa's $96 billion', comp ared to 'two-thirds of Europ ean and one-fifth North American' (Sautman 2006). China's trade with Africa h as been n ote d to 'comprise a tiny p art of its 2005 $1.4 trillion world trade, but that is also observed to b e growing fast'. China also ' imported 40 p er cent of the 7.2 million bpd [barrels p er day] of oil it used in 2005, with Africa accounting for 30 p er cent' (Chen 2008). Also 'more than 60 per cent of the oil produced in Sudan goes to China, while Angola sends a quarter of its production to China, as does Nigeria' (Sautman 2006). In terms of bil ateral trade, it is estimated that 'trade vo lume between China and Africa rose from US$12.11 million in the 1950s 226

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to US$10.5 billion in 2000 and US$29.4 billion in 2004, and that 'to date, direct Chinese investment in Africa has reached US$1.25 billion' (He Wenping 2006). Other estimates indicate that 'trade with Africa reached $39 billion in 2005, a total not far short of the US's $44 billion 2004 trade with Africa and almost a tenth of Africa's $435 billion world trade (70 per cent of it with the EU)' (Sautman 2006). In an effort to facilitate the country's access to African goods, China exempted the tariffs on 190 categories of goods from the 29 least developed African countries in 2003. In 2005, Africa recorded a trade surplus of $2.4 billion with China. In addition, 'China cancelled 156 debts owed by 31 heavily indebted African countries totalling about $1.3 billion' (Wenping 2006). With this background, China is considered the third largest trader with Africa after the US and France (Sautman 2006). But because of a perceived rivalry, China's activities in Africa are overwhelmingly portrayed in the West as taking advantage of helpless Africans (Sautman and Hairong 2007). In terms of development projects, China is reported to 'have spent about $6.3 billion assisting African countries with over 800 projects, including textile factories, hydropower stations, stadiums, hospitals and schools' (He Wenping 2006). Unlike much of the developed-world aid subject to conditions that benefit the donor economically and politically (Sautman and Hairong 2007), China offers' an increasing amount of assistance with no political strings attached' (He Wenping 2006). While some western donor conditionality is directed at improving governance and transparency, espeCially of government institutions, the Chinese non-conditionality is an attractive arrangement to many African governments, though many African civil sOciety actors regard it with mixed feelings. However, be it western conditionality or the Chinese approach of no-strings-attached, approaches used by these major actors need to be analysed in a differentiated manner, since the underlying motivation for much of their engagement with Africa has been historically shown to tilt largely towards their own interests and not for benefit of Africa. The question now is how to engage with China and the West in such a way that Africa is not disadvantaged. Therefore, the reemergence of China as a major player in Africa could offer an 227

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opp ortunity for a paradigm shift in terms of Africa's relatio nship with its western and Asian' development' p artners. Mike M orris, who hi ghlights some important aspects of Chinese involvem ent in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), provides a more representative picture. H e observes that: China's import of commodities either directly fuels export growth or indirectly raises the price of commodities in global markets (for example, China's demand for oil raises energy prices in global markets and Nigeria gains from hig her oil revenues, even though its exports to China are small); China's direct imports of intermediate manufacture s from 55A promotes manu facturing in 55 A; China's exports to 55A provide cheap and appropriate products to enhance consumer welfare and to boost productive efficiency; China's exports to global markets lea d to a fall in global prices, undermining the profitability of 55A exporters (Morris 2006, p. ii). From whichever angle o ne views it, China's role has both direct and indirec t impacts, some of which are positive and some negative. For instance, 'China's expansio n has significant implications for industry and growth. Indirectly, it excludes outward-oriented African producers from glo bal m arkets, and direc tly it squeezes locally-focused producers' (Morris 2006, p. ix). With such mixed outcomes it beco m es difficult to reach a simple overall assessment or to draw clear p olicy conclusions. To address these questions, requires the enhancem ent of civil society's organisational capacity at the grassroots level, combined with m easures that address national and international structures and power relations.

The political dimension China's Africa policy before the 1990s was purely political and aimed at fosterin g anti-colonial and post-colonial so lid arity (Alaba 1974). Acco rdin g to Sautman (2006, p. 8), 'China's practice then of supporting developin g state initiatives and providing aid that did n ot enrich elites still resonates with Africans today.' China's invo lvem ent in Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was primarily ideologica l, and lar ge ly directed toward s agricultural projects and educatio n in technical skills, alth ough its practical aid was in reality rather limited. China was an inspiring examp le 228

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for African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Oginga Odinga and Julius N yerere. But the reality of China's politics was qUite different from the romanticised image dominant within western and African circles. After the 1980s - in parallel with the change in China's domestic economic policy - the Chinese involvement with Africa became much more determined by economics. It has been observed that 'since the 1990s, China's activism on behalf of developing states has waned and much of its activity in Africa is now profit-centred (Taylor 1998). This change of policy has been described as 'China's trade-driven industrial power integrated into the world system and the practices of realpolitik of aggrandising national wealth and power' (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2005). The shift to more structured China-Africa relations started with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. This was followed by China's African Policy white paper, 'ChinaAfrica strategic partnership', as a framework for future relations (Wenping 2006). These steps provided an institutionalised platform for bilateral exchange and cooperation, which then led to the head of states meeting in 2006 and the hosting of the first African Development Bank meeting outside of the African continent in 2007 in Shanghai (Manji and Marks 2007). African responses have been, however, mixed, in part due to the fact that Africa had not experienced such volumes of inward flows, especially in its dealing with the West. As noted elsewhere, 'there is nothing new about the looting of Africa' (Melber 2007, p. 6). Others have also pointed out that the Chinese approach to Africa is merely another face of 'neo-liberalism with Chinese characters' (Harvey 2005). Bond (2006) adds that 'Chinese penetration only presents the ugly face of predatory capitalism: African responses have also been mixed over the impact of such economic ties with non-democratic regimes, raising more questions about China's honesty and motives. China's role within the UN Security Council has become a pOint for discussion, especially in dealing with perceived rogue states in Africa, as have the implications of its investments on human rights in emerging natural resources-endowed countries (Bello 2007). Nonetheless, as Sautman (2006, p. 35) pOints out, 'China provides a model for developing states based on rapid industrialisa229

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tion fue lled by a high level of investment and concentration on exports and unlike the West, its low-tariff, low-subsidy regime allows other developing countries to export freely to China and compete with it in wo rld markets.' This approach is the opposite of western-led neoliberalism where 'the underlying thrust of neoliberal and glob ali sed development "discourse" is for a deeper integration of African economies into global capital and market circuits, witho ut fundamental transformation' (Shivji 2007, p. 23). But it is this 'fundamental transformation' which is one of the key preconditions for a real change, and for a strategy to attain real national (regional) African freedom (Uhuru). In this context, it is the 'practices of western states associated with past colonialism or present imperialism that make Chinese practices appear distinctive to Africans' (Sautman 2006, p. 36). However, it is important to note that the western critique of the growing influence of China in Africa h as also centred on the issues of 'democracy, human rights, good governance, accountability and transparency' (Mawdsley 2008). These criteria are in themselves just and valuable. But they have a high ideological ch aracter if combined with the concrete practices and consequences of western developmental aid and the one-sided policies of the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund), as exhibited in the disastrous outcomes of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Beckman 2001).

Civil society state relations Why the need for engagement? Even though most civil society organisations operate within constrained environments, 'they continue to playa vital role in addreSSing citizens' concerns regarding the impact of global political and economic forces' (Miranda 2007). However, there is a problem in providing a valid justification for civil society engagement in China-Africa relations, which is mainly a government-government relationship. Attention should therefore be paid to the actions, challenges and possibilities of intervention by 'alter-globalist' forces and recognition given to 'the tensions within civil society and how the state and various forces interact' (Sjogren 2001 ).' 230

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The engagem ent of civil society w ith the state is som etimes v iewed in p ositive terms; it curbs and m onitors th e state's p ower w h ere it might be arbitrarily used and abused. Civil society also stimulates p oliti cal p arti cip ation by citizens, helping to inculcate d em ocratic or civic norms that facilitate the p eaceful, d em ocrati c regulation of conflict throu gh p articip ation and civic education. Civil society creates ways of articulating, aggregating and representing interests outside of p olitical p arties . It recruits and trains new leaders and improves the dem ocratic process throu gh election-m onitoring, human rights-m onitoring and public corrup tion -m onitoring, and it can disseminate alternative and indep endent information. Some of these d escriptions do n ot necessarily v iew the state's relationship with civil SOCiety as antagonistic, but as warned b y Beckman (2001), it is important to be aware of how civil SOCiety h as been connec ted w ith a neoliberal p olitical agenda in which state- society relation s are di chotomised. H owever, the en gagem ent of civ il SOCiety in China-Africa relation s also requires insight into the nature of association al sp ace in China and Africa. While in the western tradition the notion of a civil SOCiety is directly linked to the em ergen ce of the bourgeoisie and the subse quent efforts b y this cl as s to sep arate private spheres from state action, it is also n oted to refer to a social sp ace that is ' distinct fr om government and that government is but one of several institution s coexisting in a pluralistic social fabric' . Such differentiation s in civil SOCiety p ersp ectives seem p roblem atic in the case of China. For instan ce, China is often viewed as h aving a severely res tricted association al sp ace. In su ch a situation, n avigating this terrain requires a d eli cate balan cing act on the p art of Chinese civil SOCiety and NC Os. For example, care is always taken w h en addressing non-co ntroversial topiCS, working in co ncert w ith state actors, building trust and forging allian ces. The em ergen ce of an NC O sector in China h as been a direct co nsequen ce of the ch an ges to bo th the Chinese state and socie ty since the beginning of the reform s in 1978. For instan ce, in 1994 the environmental Chinese NC O the Friends of Nature was established, and b y 2007 several NCOs had em erged. This was a reflection of the greater sp ace and op ennes s that Chinese society is currently experien cing co mp ared to previo u s d ecad es. These ch an ges took pl ace after the reform p rocess of the 1980s. These reforms not only 231

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led to the relaxing of state co ntro l over the eco nom y and society, but also to the state's actively creating and sp onsoring NGOs in order to bestow upon them certain fun ction s w hich it u sed to p erform itself under the command system. From the Chinese offici al p ersp ective, the term ' non-governmental organisation ' implies a 'pop ular organisation ' comprising two sub categories, n am ely, 'social organisation ' and a ' private n on-enterprise unit' (PNEU). While both typ es of organisation are non -p rofit, the difference is that social organisation s are m embership-b ased and PNEUs are n ot. Nonetheless, these m argins of association al sp ace h ave been carefully explored and are slowly bein g exp anded by a number of Chinese civ il SOCiety or ganisation s. As noted b y Lu, ' the Ch inese government h as adopted a p olicy of forestalling the formation of NGOs w hich m ight challen ge it p olitically, weaken its control over SOCiety, or con strict its a uton om y in formulating eco nom ic and social policies.' Furthermore, due to a lack of cap acity and the con strained en vironment in w h ich m ost Chinese civil SOCiety organisation s operate, 'both officially organised and p opular NGOs dep end on the government for vital supp ort and resources' . For these reason s, amon g o thers, it is imperative to seek a d eep er k nowled ge and understandin g of the co ntext in wh ich Chinese civil SOCiety op erates, h ow organisatio n s are con stituted and how they articulate their identity. As su ccinctly noted by Woo d s, 'civil SOCiety refl ects the constitution of social groups in the m anner in wh ich they struggle to articulate identities for them selves and society'. This und erstanding is crucial for an eventual African-Chinese civil society and academi c co ll aboration and engagem ent w ith co untries' resp ective govern m ents in the contex t of China-Afri ca relation s. In the case of Afri ca, it can be arg ued that post-colonial countries h ave been m arked by the overlapping of formal and info rm al layers of the state. As p Ointed out by Bratton, civil society in Africa ' refers to the em ergence of new p atterns of p olitical p articip ation o utside of formal state stru ctures and one-p arty system s'. The form al layer in thi s case refers to ' the nation state with [its] multiparty system, p arliam ent [and] election s', w hile info rm al layers of state' comprise the ne tworks of person alised and vertical relations between rulers and citizen s, between p olitical 232

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elites and the p opulation' . The ab sen ce of cap able and fun ctioning state institution s h as led to a shift in w hi ch diverse social actors h ave been creatively devisin g various str ategies to surv ive w h at Doornbos h as called ' the nested cri ses of state action, eco nomi c d evelopment, and p oliti cal legitimacy' . Civil sOciety organisation s in Africa are am on g the m an y forces that have played a significant ro le in the dislocation of entren ched authoritarianism on the continent. It h as been thro u gh their efforts, at v ario us levels, that formal d em ocratic sp aces began to appear in the 1990s in a p rocess that h as been described as a ' third wave d em ocratisation '. This process was, however, not only influen ced b y internal factors but also thro u gh 'external influen ces su ch as the fall of co mmunism and press ure from foreign d onors. It was often the reso urcefulness, dedication, and tenaCity of dom estic civil society that initiated and su stained the p rocess of tran sition '. In several co untries in sub-Saharan Africa, these gro ups played a significant role in the agitation for the 'op ening of on ce-forbidden d ebate on new p olitical direction s; the decrimin alisation of dissent and the acceptan ce of pluralist p olitics; the co nvening of sovereign nation al conferen ces and con stituent as semblies; opening of associational sp ace and subsequent agitation for competitive elections' . H owever, the role of civil society in Africa h as been shifting in the aftermath of the fir st ph ase of d em ocrati sa tion, a phase that is n earin g co mpletion in som e cases. The focus is now on ' dem ocrati c con solid ation ', but also on issues su ch as govern an ce, corruption, the en vironment, human rights and p opular p arti cip ation in the p olitical p rocess, elem ents w hich are ye t to b e realise d in m any African co untries. Som e attention is also b eing given to the geo p olitical and eco n omic dimen sion s of inter-state relation s, as we ll as bilateral and multilateral re lation s that h ave implicatio ns for local p opul ation s. In this regard civ il society organisation s in Afri ca h ave a role to play on ce again in the current relation s between Africa and em erging economic p owers s u ch as China. H owever, the n a ture of su ch in volvem ent is still unclear due to the lack of knowle d ge abo ut China, som e of which is dis cus se d in the section s that follow. Despite an increasing level of association al sp ace, Afri can civil society organisation s still face en ormo us ch allen ge s in terms 233

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organisational capacity, resources and sustainability, but also around how to remain relevant in the context of changing geopolitical and economic conditions.

Sharing of experiences For the civil society dialogue on China-Africa relations to have an impact, a framework for exp erience and information sharing must be built on the terrain of civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 640). What is missing from the ongoing intensive d ebate on the impact of China's involvement in Africa are empirical accounts of concrete socio-economic and political exp eriences in other countries, especially in the global South (including China), which are often similar to concerns raised in Africa. Such exp eriences include working conditions and other forms of exploitation in export processing zones (EPZs), human rights violations in the working environment, health and safety conditions for workers in n ew areas of investment, and threats to human security and the environment. These conditions are rarely brought to the attention of African populations and civil society organisations in Afri ca, yet they offer critical pe rspec tives for analytical differentiation and inSights for comparative analysis of the impact of both the West and China in Africa. Due to this omission, African civil socie ty organisations suffer from a lack of p erspective on the social and political conditions under which Chinese civil society groups operate. They also lack knowledge about what China is doing in Africa due to the absence of adequate studies on China, its people and culture by African institutions. In this context, civil society organisations and similar groups that may opt to intervene in various issues wi th regard to China-Africa relations consequently fail to unde rstand what role civil society can playas an autono mous counterbalance to the state. The lack of understanding of the context in which Chinese civil society organisations operate and the nature of Chinese relations with governments in Africa therefor e has serious implications for African civil society engage m e nt in China-Africa relations. First, civil society approaches in Africa, Latin Ame rica, the United States, Europe and Asia var y markedly. Second, the adoption of a similar approach in China-Africa relations by African civil

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society organi sation s w itho ut a m ore nuanced understanding of the und erpinnings of the Chinese approach in government-togovernment or government-civ il society relation s might not be pro ductive. Third, becau se of the variatio ns in the app roaches used by African civil society organisations, w hi ch also vary from co untry to country (an glophone or fr an cophon e), there is the likelihoo d of a fr agm ented app roach, hen ce, a less effective interven tion at the n ation al and continental levels. In this context, there is a n eed for further deb ate on and design of civil society strategies that are appropriate in d ealing w ith China in Africa. Strategies that take into acco unt the diversity in the Afric an co ntinent as well as one that seeks to understand the d yn amics within the Chinese context. Such an understanding is also cru cial for collaborative undertakings that m ay invo lve Chinese civil society organisation s and research institutions, thro u gh a strategic dialogu e fr am ework. The importan ce of a strategic di alogue fr am ework and pro cess between African and Chinese civil society and acad emia lies in its p otenti al to improve mutual knowled ge on p olicy issues and relevant n ation al legislation, as well as sh aring examples, experien ces and lessons. This fr am ework can be b ase d on p artnerships and programmes focusing on learning m ore ab out h ow CSOs (civil society organisation s) u se eviden ce to influen ce p olicy processes, and improving information and communi cation . Chinese and African CSOs can take advantage of n ew circumstances; for instan ce, by focusing on h ow to make use of interactive technology. This will also enhan ce access to appropriate information from governments as a way of findin g issues to disc uss w ith them . On the p art of African civil society and academia, being p art of a bro ader China-Africa di alogue fr am ework would enlarge opp ortunities to miti gate the perceive d threat of Chinese relations w ith Africa, but also to influen ce their own government's p olicies toward s China. As pointed out b y Marks (2008), there is a need ' to sep arate fact from fi ction, and di sentan gle reality from the myths, an indispensable first step must be to ac quaint o urselves w ith the actual and often surp rising deb a te taking pl ace within China itself'. The en gagem ent of civil society and academia in the transformation of n ation al, internation al and tran sn ation al p olitical 235

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space would, however, require consultations in different parts of the developing world. This would enable them to learn more about the role that CSOs currently pl ay in using evidence to promote development policy and practices, and to exp lore ways and means of addressing these challenges together. Chinese and African civil society organisations could work together to generate improved practices and identify opportunities for small-scale co llaborative work and exchange.

Challenges for African CSOs One of the k ey issues facing civil society organisations is the nee d to establish their integrity with and accountability to the communities with whom they work in Africa and China. Good communication with communities is also important for CSOs to establish their legitimacy to speak with or for the rural poor, and to share information regarding the impact of Chinese investment among local populations. In Africa it is common for government officials to challenge the legitimacy of civil society organisations. CSOs must therefore consider the sources of the ir legitimacy carefully, and be exemplary in terms of their transparency and accountability. Preventing corruption and d eveloping trust are key issues for civil society organisations. These issues are particularly important for the credibility of all NGOs who play any sort of 'watchdog' role on government and donors or on investors. Unless NGOs develop systems to ensure their own integrity, they will always be on weak ground in the ir dialogue with the state and agents of global capital. In the context of contested te rrain, such as legitimacy over re presentation of the people on important national matters, or on the m erits and d em erits of some national projec ts with political, economic, social, environme ntal and political impact, roles and relationships have to change. This re quires n ew skills and attitudes, which will take time to develop both within civil society organisations and government.

Challenges for Chinese CSOs Non-profit organisations established by the government of China to mobilise resources for public bene fit work are fr e que ntly regarded by foreigne rs as fake 'government-organised non236

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governmental organisations' (GONG Os). H owever, it h as been observed that there is an em ergin g community of m ore autonomo u s, 'grassroots' gro up s and that China's p olitical leadership sees all the m ore reason to m aintain its own stake in the non p rofit sector (China Development Brief 2007). Som e h ave seen this development in terms of ' two opposing logics' sh aping the evo lution of Chinese civil society organisation s. One logic posits that 'China's enduring systemic interests, rooted in the p ower of the Chinese Co mmunist Party and state structures - and that system 's in stinctive su spicion toward indep endent or pluralist societal influen ces - will pred omin ate; hen ce likel y to confine CSO s to relati vel y m arginal significan ce well into the future and co ntinue to withhold or severely con strain their legitimacy, legal standing, and su stained access to essential resources' (Gill et al 2007, p. v). The o ther logic holds that ' multiple em erging forces op erate to som e degree o utside state control and increasingly drive chan ge in Chinese so ciety' . These include ' the generation of private wealth, the rise of a middle class, and the ten sions borne of rising class inequities and environmental d ecline' . It h as therefore been argu ed that, 'even without an y clear nation al p olicy gUidan ce or d ecision s, m any scattered, largely local d ecisions will enlar ge the sp ace for civil society organisation s that are competent, entrep rene urial, and p olitically savvy (Gill et al 2007, p. v). Unlike in Afri ca wh ere som e st ates h ave endeavo ured to co-opt civil society group s, the Chinese authorities created GONGO s in so m e profession al sectors as 'a m ean s for government offi cials to interact with the outside wo rld in an " unoffi cial" cap acity' (China Development Brief 2007). China's government-b acked and citizen-initiated non-profit organisations m ay be far from the idealised western notion of civil sO ciety. But despite the limitation s for the development of vibrant CSOs, it h as been observed tha t ' the lack of western-style p oliti cal pluralism enhan ces the role of "insider intellectuals" and their d eb ates' (Marks 2008). As noted by Young (2004 ), ' the res ult will not be very neat and tid y for the purposes of taxo nom y; and nor will it look much like the NGO sec tor in Ban glad esh, Belgium, or Brazil. ' Indee d, n either does it resemble the ch ar acter of CSOs in Kenya or So uth Africa. What, tho ugh, are the implication s for su ch developments 237

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in civil society dialogue between African and Chinese CSOs? While there is no simple answer to this question, new strategies could be developed in which civil society organisations relate to governments as advocates, and work around some key issues. In the case of China-Africa relations, specific working groups could be used as meeting grounds for CSOs and academics working in particular sectors. In order to realise such an objective, civil society organisations will have to juggle their roles as advocates and their efforts to be partners with the government for development. This may not always be an easy balance to maintain, as at times they w ill find themselves being critical of the government. The Chinese experience shows that a confrontational approach based on western models applied in most African countries might not produce the desired outcomes. Likewise, in the absence of a proper dialogue framework between African and Chinese CSOs and academia, there will remain a considerable amount of ambiguity, uncertainty and contradiction around the nature and role of Chinese civil society organisations. This is also underpinned by the dissimilarities in CSOs' development and differences in political and cultural contexts. The dialogue between African CSOs and their Chinese counterparts will therefore need to address the ex tent to which Chinese CSOs resemble or differ from CSOs in Africa. What impact would the dialogue between Chinese and international CSOs have on their relationship and functions in both contexts?

Strategies for engagement In order to hold state actors accountable, civil society organisations themselves need to have standards of accountability. They must themselves be transparent and accountable to their' constituents', a delicate act due to the problem of the 'source of the resource' they need to in order to function. Academia is also a crucial player in providing this essential critique since the building up of real democratic societies requires academics and the media to be an indispensable voice. Without the input of academia, Chinese and African citizens will remain vulnerable to distortions in the interpretation of the intentions, policies and outcomes of China's involvement in Africa. Academia's ro le would therefore 238

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be to underpin the understanding of the socio-political and econ omic problems facing bo th Africa and China and combined with civil society's input wo uld provide a formidable challenge to the h egem o ny o f global capital and the po litical elites overseeing its op e rations . As p art o f a broader and multilevel en gagem e nt, civil society organisations and academia in Africa and China co uld seek to collaborate on a number of strategic areas, as set o ut in the examples below.

A dialogue framework and process Through a comprehensive dialogue fram ework those p a rticipating in China-Africa r elations could engage with the African and Chinese governments, investors and financial institutions co n cerned as an alternative voice to influence policy on behalf of communities affected by either political or economic policies that are implem ente d under Sino-Africa relations. This process can a lso be broaden e d to build transnationa l alliances in the spirit and framework of global civil society and transnational activist coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Tarrow 2001; Evans 2005) to link struggles across the glo be. Of significance here as a first step towards a dialogue fr amework is unity within and be tween civil society and academia. The ex te nt to which the two actors are capable of establishing co llaborative initiatives is criti cal for a ny progress in the dialogue process. As can be observed in m a ny African countr y contexts, civil society is often fragm e nted and competitive, the reby making it easy for states to dominate p olicy processes. Likewise, this applies to academia, whose pote ntial in poli cy input in Africa h as n o t been e ffectively maximised.

Data gathering and information sharing Unde rta king research in any area of China- Africa re lations, esp e cially on the impact of Chinese inves tment from various p erspectives, is crucial. Examples include research on labour and human rights issues, on the imp ac t of Sino-Africa agreements on African governments' a bility to d e liver d evelopme nt, and o n the broad er socio-economic and environmental imp acts o f Chinese investme nt in Africa. Writing for publications in China and Africa represents a crucial input for a long-term strategic partnership. In 239

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this context, concrete measures and action plans can be developed to include joint activities in the form of research or surveys, as well as experience and information sharing between civil society organisations and academia in China and Africa. A comprehensive and consistently updated database of current policy in China and individual African countries is needed in order to facilitate an in-depth analysis. However, the ability to analyse various positions and data from respective country contexts would require joint effort and collaboration around capacity building and exchanges between civil society organisations and academia in China and Africa.

Advocacy and policy inputs Due to the scientific research capabilities in academia, and the extensive empirical knowledge and exp erience within civil society, a powerful source of information emanating from joint initiatives of the two could produce the basis for policy inputs. Policy recommendations can be d eveloped for use in the dialogue process with Chinese and African governments on specific issues through the facilitation of increase d regional policy dialogue among civil society organisations, states and the private sector. However, this will require a strategy shift from the oppositional stance that has been historically adopted by civil society organisations in engaging with governments and policy-makers. The success of the engagem ent in China- Africa relations will largely d epend on the understanding of the current policy architecture in China and individual African countries. It is through such insights that civil society and academia could be able to unpack the strengths and weaknesses in such policy-making frameworks and offer concrete suggestions with far-reaching consequences in terms of policy around Sino-Africa relations.

Towards an 'African consensus ' As pointed out by Mawdsley (2008), 'Africa is one place in which China and western nations, notably the US, are likely to find themselves in a position of competition' . This observation is critical for reflections on civil society dialogu e over China-Africa relations, since there w ill be competing views that are likely to 240

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oversh adow objective an alysis. There is a need for a p aradigm ati c shift towards the creation of an 'Afri can con sensu s'. Whether v ia the Washington or p ost-Washington co nsen su s neoliberal agenda (Ad esina 2006) or the ' neo-liber alism with Chinese ch aracteristi cs dubbed [the] "Beijing Con sen sus''', Africa still stands to lose unless there is som e p ragm atism in its political leadership to work out an African eco nomic development agend a w hich can be u se d in its nego tiation s w ith glob al forces. But a continen tal p oli cy agend a requires a form of 'Afri can con sen su s' w here mutual listening and resp ect toward s different visions and ar gu m ents are key comp onents of the dialogue process. Approaching China-Africa relation s as a fr agm ented ho use wo uld lead to the sam e unequ al relation s that h ave been observed between Africa and the West . While it can be ackn owled ged that Afri ca as contin ent is diverse in terms of cultures, traditions, lan gu ages and the d evelopmental p rocess, a common denominator in all the cases is underdevelopment, or stagn ation, w hi ch has to do with Africa's relation s with the West, but also the dysfun ction al state of its institution s and lead ership p roblem s. Lack of a p an-African 'co nsen su s' position on economic matters in relation to other continents was exhibited during the 1980s and 1990s, when a wave of regional integration processes em erged p artly in resp on se to or as a result of inten sified neo liberal glob ali sation. As no ted b y Breslin and Higgo t (2003, p. 170), 'Glob alisation was tho ught to be a spur to region al cooperation to the extent that p articip ants in region al sch em es thou ght it might m ake them m ore glob ally competitive.' Region al cooperation blocs su ch as EAC (East Afri can Community), ECOWAS (Econ omi c Community of West African States), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and SADC (So uthern Afri can Development Co mmunity) h ave been established, but for m otives other than uniting Africa in its economic agend a towards glob al institutions and d evelop ed countries. Instead they h ave ended up pl aying into the h ands of imperialism (Shivji 2007). For instan ce, it has been observed that SA DC's geo-strategic objec tive was to provid e eco nomi c indep enden ce from and to isolate ap artheid So uth Africa (G ibb 2007). H owever, like other region al bodies, it is currently being arm-twisted by external forces to sign agreem ents that are collectively binding on m embers. A case in p Oint is the 241

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European Union agreements under economic partnership agreements (EPAs), which are targeting individual co untries as well as regional economic cooperation. Another response to the failures of the SAPs saw the eme rgen ce of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), but here too neoliberal principles were embodied during the p artnership 's formation, much in the same way as the IMF and World Bank's SAPs (Lesufi 2004). In recent times, Africa has been negoti ating within WTO rounds such as Cancun and Doha, as well as with the US over AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act), with the EU and the ACP gro up (African, Caribbean and Pacific co untries) over EPAs and with China over the 'China-Africa strategic p artnership' (He Wenpin g 2006), without a co mmon position. With all these past and current agreements, it is clear that the economic 'cooperation' agend a is already set for Africa in the context of political and economic arm-twisting by the d eveloped co untries and China's 'soft power' approach . China-Africa relations are likely to follow the same script unless other perspectives are found throu gh pan-African disco urse and pragm atic policymaking. This is because 'China will forge bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in Africa, followin g the West's p ath of going beyond WTO requirements to open developing states to even higher levels of penetration by overwhelming external economic forces' (Draper and Ie Pere 2005). These co ncerns are raised despite the view that 'China presents its poliCies as benign opp osites of the West ignoring African aspirations for a more equitable international distribution of wealth and power ' (Sautman 2006, p. 4).

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has sought to emph asise a number of key issues for consideration in the ongOin g debate on civil society en gagement within China-Africa relations. First, it is crucial for sou thern civil society organisations in Chin a and Africa to m ake an important contributi on in challenging existing power relations in the two societies. Second, competing forces such as global instituti ons, western governments an d companies will greatly influence the nature and direction of China-Africa relations. There is a 242

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need to explore app ropriate ways for civil society organisation s to en gage with China-Africa relation s in fr agile and non-d emocrati c states, and also to explore w h at wo uld be required to enhan ce ex isting civil society and academia relation s in order to effec tively en gage w ith C hinese and African governments. Third, becau se CSOs are essential for a dem ocratic culture, Chinese and African CSOs can d evelop common strategies for d em anding resp ect for human rights p rinciples within SinoAfrica relation s, the en co uragem ent of a plurality of v iews and action - p articularly those o utside the circles of p ower - to achieve gender equality, op enness to p olicy and development alternatives. There is also the diffi cult question of how CSOs can pursue their overall objectives while at the sam e time preserving civil society autonom y as a basis for ad vocacy and con structive p artn ership . This question w ill always rem ain for as lon g as CSOs' fin ancial b ase is not neutral. The sam e applies to academi a, w hich also relies on the state for m ost of its fundin g. Indep enden ce in terms of the so urce of the reso u rce is therefore a crucial issue to be addressed by both CSOs and acad emia as they broach the subject of en gaging with the state, an en gagem ent w hi ch might so m etimes becom e co nfrontation al. Fo urth, there is a need to seek ways thro u gh w hi ch CSOs can playa constru ctive and stabiliSing role in achieving a m ore h arm onious society under the current p oliti cal system (in China and in different Afri ca countries). To address this requirem ent wo uld n eed further exploration of inter-CSO dialogu e with a focu s on the steady evolution and exp an sion of CSOs in China, rooted in Chinese pragm atism, values and socio-political realities. Afri ca is n ot exempt from thi s app roach either. The em ergen ce and d evelopment of CSOs m od elled according to western thought h as h ad its defi cien cies in m an y African co untries, therefore a p aradigm shift which incorporates persp ectives from the South is critical in the development, dem ocracy and contemporary intern ation al relation s disco urses. Fifth, the other urgent task is to re-think the role of universities and CSO researchers and how they can be positioned m ore con SCio usly as intermediaries within Sino-Africa relation s. This will involve efforts to bring on board the bottom -up knowled ge and critique of government ac tivities provided by CSOs and academia, 243

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as well as the emerging contest between the Washington/postWashington consensus and the Beijing consensus. Finally, in the context of China-Africa relations, the following questions still require answers from within the African continent and as solutions based on home-grown perspectives: what aspects need to be handled at the pan-African level? How can China-Africa policy coherence be attained? In what areas can civil society organisations be strengthened with regard to South-South cooperation? And how can China-Africa civil society dialogue help in that respect?

Note 1. The term 'a lter-globalist' is used to refer to a variety of organisations established towards the end of the 19905. They are d iffe rent networks explicitly or implicitly all ied together around the identification of a common,

homogenous opponent, a model of policies symbolised by and sometimes

imposed by multilateral institutions s uch as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO (World Trade Organisation).

References Ad esina, ).0. (2006) 'Development and the challenge of poverty: N EPAD, post-Washington consensus and beyond ', in Ad esina, ).0. et al (ed s) Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millenniu",: the NEPAD Debate, London, Zed Books Alaba, O.A. (1974) Ch ina's Policy in Africa 1958- 1971, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press A ld en, Chris (2005) 'China in Africa', Survival, vol. 47, no. 3 Beckman, B. (2001) 'Civil society and a lliance politics', in Beckman, B., Hansson, E. and Sjogren, A. (eds), C ivil Society and Authorita rianism in the T hird Worl d, Stockholm, Politics of D evelopment Group (PODS U) Bello, W. (2007) 'China provokes debate in Africa', Foreign Policy In Focus, 9 March, http://www.fpif.org/fp iftxt/4065, accessed 2 December 2009 Bond, P. (2006) Looting AJrica: the Eco nomics oJ Exploitation, London, Zed Books and Pietermaritzburg, University of Kwa Zulu-N atal Press Breslin, S. and Higgott, R. (2003) 'New regionalism(s) in the global poli tical eco nomy_ Co nce ptual understanding in his torical pers pective', Asia Eu rope Journa l, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 167--82

C hen, S. (2008) 'Motivations behind C hina's foreign oil quest: a perspective from th e Chinese government and the oil co mpanies', Jo urnal a/Chinese Political Science, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 79-104 Cohen, j.L. and Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory , Cambridge, MIT Press

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CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT Draper, P. a nd Ie Pere, G. (eds) (2005) Enter the Drago n - Towards a Free Tmde Agreement between China and the Solt titern Afri can Cu stoms U nion, Johannesburg, South A frican Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Evans, P. (2005) 'Cou nter-hegemonic globa lisa tion: transnationa l social movements in the contemporary g lobal political economy', in Janoski , T., Hicks, A . and Schwartz, M. (eds) Handbook of Political Sociology, New York, Cambrid ge University Press, pp. 655-70 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (2005) 'Panel on: "China in Africa: focus on trad e and investment''', leafl et distributed at WTO NGO forum, H ong Kong, 13 December, cited in Sa utman, B. (2006) 'Friends and interests: China 's distincti ve links with Africa', Centre on China 's Transnational R elation s, The H ong Kong Uni versity of Science and Technology, workin g paper no. 12 Gibb, R. (2007) 'Regional integration in post-apartheid southern Africa', Tijdschrift Voor Economiscite en Sociale Geografie, vo!' 98, no . 4, pp. 421-35 G ill, B., Morrison, S.J. and Lu, X. (2007) 'China's civ il society orga ni za tions', Washington DC, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/p ubs/071102_ chinacivilsociety.pdf, accessed 2 December 2009 Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of N eD lib eralism, Oxford, Oxford Uni ve rsity Press H e Wen ping (2006) 'Partners in d evelo pment', Beijing R eview, vo!. 44, http :// www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-44-e/sp-l.htm. accessed 2 December 2009 Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1999) 'Transnational advocacy networks in internatio nal and regional politics', International Social Science Journal, vo l. 51, no. 159, pp.89-101 Lesufi, I. (2004) 'South Africa and the rest of the continent: toward a critique of the political econo m y of N EPAD: OllTent Sociology, vo!. 52, no. 5, pp. 809-29 Manji, F. and Ma rks, S. (eds) (2007) A frican Pe rspectives OIl Citina in Afri ca, Nairobi a nd Oxford , Fahamu Books Ma rks, S. (2008) 'What does C hina think?', Pambazltka N ews, 23 Ma rch, http:// www.pambazuka.org/en/ca tegory/comment/46949, accessed 2 December 2009 Mawdsley, E. (2008) 'Fu Ma nchu versu s Dr. Livingstone in the dark continent', Pambazuka N ews, 22 Ja nuary, http://www.pamba zuka.org/en/ category/comment/45593, accessed 2 Decembe r 2009 Melber, H. (2007) 'The (not so) new kid on the block: C hina and the scramble for Africa's resources', in Melber, H., China in Afri ca, Up psala, Nordic A fri ca Institute (NAI) Miranda, M. (2007) 'Global civil society and democracy - a difficult but una voidable tas k: vis io n fro m the south', D evelopment Dialogu e, no. 49, November, Up psa la, Dag Hammars kjold Foundation, pp. 97-108 Norbe rg, J. (2006) 'China para noia dera ils free trade', Far Eastern Economic R eview, vo!' 169, no. 1, pp. 46-9 Q iang, Z . (2002) 'Some reflections on e xpa nding Sino-A fri ca n trad e a nd economic coo perative relations in the new century', Tinabantu, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 65-71

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CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA Sandbrook, R. (2005) 'Africa's g rea t tran s fo rm ati on?',]ou rnal of Development Studies, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1118-25 Sa utman, B. (2006) 'Friends and interests: China's distin cti ve links w ith Africa', Centre on China's Transnational Relatio ns, The Hong Kong Univers ity o f Science and Technology, working paper no. 12 Sa utrnan, B. and Hairo ng, Y. (2007) 'East mo untain tiger, w est mo untain tiger: C hina, the West and "colon ia lis m ''', Africa: Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 187, Baltimore, Un ivers ity of Maryland School o f La w Shivji, I.G. (2007) Silences in NCO Discourse: the Role and Fu tu re of NCOs in Africa, Oxford, Fahamu Books Sing h, A . (2006) 'China and Africa: fri e nd and foe', Financial Mail, 3 March,

pAl Sjogren, A. (2001) 'State, civil society and d em ocratisatio n : theoreti cal d ebates pas t and present', in Beckman, B. et ai, Civil Society and Authoritarianism in tile Third W orld Tarrow, S. (2001) 'Transnational politics: contention and institutio ns in internatio nal po litics', Annual Review of Political Science, vo l. 4, pp. 1-20 Taylor, l. (1998) 'China's foreig n po li cy toward Africa in th e 19905', Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 443--{j0 Young, N . (2004) 'NGOs: the diverse o ri g ins, cha ng ing nature a nd grow ing intern a ti o nalisatio n of the s pecies', China Development Brief, Beijing, http:// www.c hinadevelopm entbrief.com/n o d e/297. accessed 2 December 2009

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The Global Environmental Institute: regulating the ecological impact of Chinese overseas enterprises Zhi Yingbiao and Bai Jie As the forces of globali sa ti on hav e continu ed to accelerate, C hina h as secured d eve lopment opportuniti es and hi gh-speed economi c growth . Und er the C hinese government's 'Go outward ' po li cy, C hinese comp anies (m ainl y large-sca le, state-owned enterprises) are now invo lved in investment activities in n atural reso u rce industri es aro und the globe. These activ ities rem ain large ly unmonitored as they fall outsi de of the scop e of C hinese po li cy. While these enterp rises have created abund ant economic ben efits, they have often d one so at sizeable environmental and social costs to local areas. In the mid st of its 'Go outward ' economic phil osop hy, C hin a h as begu n to confro nt the qu esti on of how best to establish its p ositi on as a resp on sibl e n ation w ithin the intern ati on al com munity. As development inten sifi es, achi evin g a comprehen sive approach to su stain ability now invo lves an swerin g world w id e env ironmenta l, social, economi c and n atu ra l resource nee d s. The Glob al Enviro nmental In stitu te (GEl ), b ased in Beij in g, is a non -governmental organisa ti on (NGO) providin g m arket-based so luti ons to enviro nmental p roblem s. Jin Jiaman, the GEl's execu tive di rector, describes the ro le o f th e in stitute: ' To be a responsible p ower is not a mi ssion o f the governm ent alon e. Every enter prise, every civil organi sa ti on and every m ember of society h as a share in it.' Specifi ca lly, th e GEl was a key presen ce behind th e scenes of the dr afti ng of the overseas forestry m an agem ent gUid eli nes. The 247

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GEl is working with several governmental and financing institutions to tackle the damaging impact of logging and to publish an overall gUideline balancing the economic and ecological impacts of Chinese enterprises operating overseas.' Furthermore, the GEl is currently in the process of analysing China's international environmental policy. The project was financially supported by the US-based Blue Moon Fund. The GEl has established a new project team to help meet these challenges. The team's project is called 'Integrated policy packages: balancing economic and ecological impacts of Chinese overseas enterprises'. It hopes to bring new tools for creating sustainable development policy to government officials for the purpose of implementing responsible economic activity in Chinese industries operating overseas. The project team hopes to address the challenges of China's rapid development by collaborating with government organisations as well as research and ed ucational institutions to develop a multifaceted, effective and sustainable environmental policy model, such as that developed by the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing.

Background: China's investment overseas An important part of the economic reform process in China has been the encouragement of foreign d irect investment (FDI). Investment began to pour into China after 1992, and annua l inflows have been over US$40 billion since 1996. With a steadil y upward trend, FDI infl ows were around US$70 billion in both 2005 and 2006. These inflows are by far the largest of any developing country and have remained remarkably stab le and robust, despite substantia l fluctuations in the Asian and globa l economies. China has accoun ted for about one-third of total developing-country FDI inflows in recent years. In 2006, inflows to China reached an estimated US$69 billion, which represented 10 per cent of world FDI fl ows. China is not simply a magnet for FDI but is increasingly itself also a source of FDI. Although its ou tward direct investment (001) is sti ll small in absolute terms, especiall y when compared to the huge inward flow, Chin a's overseas enterprises have been 248

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qUietly gaining importance as new sources of international capital. China's FDI outflows reached US$16.1 billion in 2006, a 32 per cent increase on the 2005 level. A considerable part of this investment goes into the mining sector, as China's dependence on raw m aterial imports is high. Metals provide a good example. China has to import m ore than half of its needs of copper and nickel. Even in the case of iron ore - where China's self-sufficiency rates at about 78 per cent - huge amounts h ave to be imported . More than 80 per cent of China's iron imports come from three countries (Australia, India and Brazil), while South Africa supplies another 5 p er cent. Thus the share of China's ODI into mineral resources is high, though this is decreasing: in 2003, nearly h alf o f all Chinese ODI went into mining; in 2005, it was only about 15 p er cent. Table 1 Highlights of Chinese investment in Africa (2006-07) January 2006

China NationaL Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) agrees to purchase a stake in oil and gas fields in Nigeria , worth

US$2.3 billion. April 2006

China and Kenya sign an offshore oil expLoration agreement

November 2006

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC ) is heLd in Beijing. China and African countries sign 16 agreements wi th a total va lue of US$1.9 billion. China's President Hu Jintao offers

February 2007

Hu Jintao visits Africa once again (Cameroon, liberia , Sudan , Zambia , Namibia , South Africa , Mozambique and the Seychelles) and signs contracts worth millions of dollars for resource exploitation.

September 2007

Shenzhen Energy Investment Co. Ltd . is to invest US$137.2

with a totaL area of 115,343km'.

loans of US$5 billion to African countries.

million in the construction of a gas-fired 200 ,000 kilowatt power plant in Ghana .

September 2007

China provides a loan of USS5 billion to the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), with US$3 billion for highway and railway projects , and the remaining USS2 billion for the rehabilitation of the country's mining industry.

October 2007

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China invests

US$5.6 billion to buy a 20 per cent share of the Standard Bank of South Africa. Source: li Guifan (2008) 'Chinese enterprises ' fore ign direct investment' (Chinese language) , Beijing , China Eco nomic Publishing Hou se, pp. 79-98

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The Chinese government and state-owned enterprises are investing billions of dollars in African countries, and expectations for further rapid economic growth imply an even higher demand for natural resources. These investments also strengthen the Chinese government's political influence in developing countries and the friendship between China and Africa.

GEl's programme on environmental policy With regard to the background to accelerated investment by C hinese actors in Africa, th e GEl's programme aims at integrating existi n g tools into a holistic poli cy package. The instruments include: • Environmental impact assessments (ETAs) • Conservation concession mechanisms to provide gUidelines • Payment for eco logical/environmental services (PES) to provide compensation for eco logica l damage • Conservation incentive agreements • Corporate social responsibility (CSR) • Civi l society communication and community development. The programme aims to transfer these policy tools into national policies, as well as regional agreements. It also aims to engage the business sector to make use of these policy tools, thus reali Sing the benefit of imp lementing environmenta ll y sound, financially sustainable and socia ll y responsible business development plans. W hil e targeting th e legislati on gUiding Chin ese business activities overseas, the programme enables both development organisations and local communities to be involved in conservation projects wh ile continu in g to develop economicall y profitable enterprises.

Chinese NGOs and government in action The GEl is co llaborating with the National Forestry Bureau and the Chinese Academy of Sciences' (CAS) Institute of Policy and Management to introduce and implement regulations to help Chinese companies to pay more attention to environmental issues.

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As a result, on 27 August 2007, China's State Forestry Administration and the Ministry of Commerce jOintly released the 'Guidelines for su stainable forestry m anagem ent by Chinese enterp rises op erating overseas', w hich included p olicies for afforestation and ecological protection as well as community development. Based upon these guidelines, the Nation al Forestry Bureau later release d the 'Greater Asia r egion forestry renewal and su stainability m an agem ent' p rop osal. The d ocument received further acknowled gem ent at the 15th APEC (Asia-Pacifi c Economi c Coop eration ) economic leaders' m eeting, w here President Hu Jintao incorp orated the gUidelines' call for the greater Asia region's forest restoration and su stained grow th into the co nferen ce's 'Sydney Declaration'. A t the 17th n ation al con gress of the Communi st Party of China (CPC) in October 2007, CPC Central Co mmittee General Secretary Hu Jintao called on the p arty to build an 'ecological civilisation'. According to Chinese offi cials, this was the first d oc ument in the world aimed at regulating the overseas op eration s of a co untry's businesses with regard to sustainable d evelopment. Since then, the G El h as been en gaging relevant governmental agen cies in Chin a to ad apt the con cept of the' integrated p olicy p ackage', to familiari se itself w ith the relevant internation al agreem ent an d con vention s and to initi ate bilateral talks with other countries and organ isation s. The GEl also intends to facilitate the m ore lon g-term d evelop m ent of strategies that link Chinese and international civil society gro ups in order to effec tively improve en vironmental and social p erforman ce. Over all, the GEl's existing efforts h ave been well-received by government institutions. On 19 September 2007, the GEl and the Chinese Acad em y for Environmental Plannin g (CAEP), a government-led group, signed an agreement establishing the CAEP's leadership for work on an auxiliary p roject, the G uidelines for Ch inese Enterp rises Overseas, a programme comp atible w ith the G El's philosophy of d eveloping eco nom ically viable solution s to en vironmental problems. Furthermore, the GEl h as p artnered with domestic fi nan ce or ganisation s to begin logistical work on asp ects of the p rogr amme relating to overseas en v ironmental credit risks . 251

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GEl cooperation with government efforts to make globalisation green To the en vironmentally conscious, the recent comments by China 's leaders are encou raging. Government officials and academics responsible for China 's environmental protection recently gathered in Beijing to discuss environmental issues beyond China's borders . The GEl is cooperating with the government , research institutions , universities and banks such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China , the Ministry of Commerce of China , the Chinese Academy for En vironmental Planning (CAEP ) and the University of Business and Economics (UIBE) to map out a technical structure for environmental guidelines . Such guidelines wi ll be researched and drafted early next year. More seminars wi ll be organised to discuss the proposed guidelines. So far, the GEl has successfully worked with the Chinese Forestry Administration and the Ministry of Commerce in conceiving, drafting and officially promulgating guidelines for logging businesses overseas . The 'Guidelines for sustainable forestry practices overseas' were officially promulgated on 28 August 2007 . The Integrated Environmental Policy Project is being undertaken by the CAEP and the UIBE. To prevent potentially hazardous effects on local people , enterprise should also set aside funds for remedies or ecological compensation to help local residents increase their income and engage in new environmentally friendly operations . This represents a win-win model for all parties - Chinese enterprises , host countries and local communities . It requires managers to look beyond short-term profits . The concept of ecological civilisation and the 'Scientific outlook on development ' wi ll no doubt facilitate such a vision . That is why we applaud the concept of an ecological civilisation and the idea of green policies accompanying Chinese enterprises overseas . This arrangement could be the beginning of a new mode of globalisation - green globalisation . The e xisting model of globalisation mobilised by global capital has been too ' brown' and has benefited too fe w. It has tarnished many developing countries ' air, water and land and deprived many people of their health . Based on the concepts of an ecological civilisation and the 'Scientific outlook on development', green globalisation is sure to become a popular way to make this planet a better place to live on for e veryone . It may require time and difficult decisions to achieve the goals of green globalisation , but we have the conceptual frame work , determination and measures like the forestry gUidelines on our side . Source: People's Daily overseas edition (2007) 9 October, translated from Chinese

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Perspectives The GEl, in cooperation with Chinese government agencies, h as successfully taken steps towards the be tter regulation of the environme ntal impact of Chinese businesses overseas. Substantial challenges r emain however. At the root of the problem are: • The lack of local regulations to protec t na tural reso urces and the environment, due to political difficulties • The lack of social responsibility on the part o f d evelopers, including some Chinese overseas companies • Global consumers' high d emand, which creates huge profits from industrialisation and business, es pecially from the precious n a tural reso urces o f d eveloping countries. The GEl suggests a numbe r of actions: • Promote global citizen r esponsibility among large-scale natural reso urce exploitation companies and financi al institutions • Each NGO should work with its government to promote environmentallegislation • Call on consumers worldwide to boycott non-environme ntally friendly products made from the illegal exploitation of n atural reso urces • Promo te the consumption of certified products • Create a global marke t system to allow this work to be carried out through a sustainable business model. Environmental workers should be among the best paid of all industries, and certainly more than those involved in illegal natural r eso urce exploitation.

Please send environmental regulations and laws in your country to the GEl website at www.geichina.org. or by emailing lhkong@geichina. org.

Note 1. Department of Silviculture, State Forestry Ad ministration (2008) 'A guide o n s us tainable overseas s il viculture by Chinese enterprises' (English and Chinese versions), Chinese Fores try Press.

253

Conclusion

China-African civil society dialogue in perspective Axel Harneit-Sievers , Li Anshan, Sanusha Naidu and Stephen Marks The 'China-African Civil SOciety Dialogue' conference, held in Nairobi in April 2008, has been an innovative undertaking. For a number of years now there have been frequent encounters between leaders from China and Africa in the form of visits of d elegations, diplomatic exchanges and official meetings. However, the promotion of bilateral relations needs to extend beyond the governmental and business levels to include the exchange of opinion among civil society actors. The dialogue in Nairobi was the first opportunity for civil society from both sides to sit down, exchange ideas and enlighten each other on an equal footing and without the hegemony of official discourse . During the conference in Nairobi, African participants showed their appreciation about China's involvem ent in Africa, but also voiced their concerns about human rights and eco nomic issues . Chinese participants talke d about their own unde rstanding of China's role in Africa and e mphasised the African initiative within Sino-African relations. Mutual understanding and trustbuilding will promote further cooperation in the future . This concluding chapter summarises the major lines of discussion at the conference. During the dialogue, participants analysed numero us dimen sions and impacts of China's involvem ent in Africa. It was generally agreed that the entry of emerging powers into Africa has h elped to move an economically marginalised Africa back to a more central position in the global eco nomic system. Investment from China and other - mostly Asian - countries has offered Africans an array of alternatives and opportunities. China's 256

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investment, esp ecially in infrastructure, h as helped Africa to stren gthen its own cap acity for development, w hile at the sam e time improvin g conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) in general. China's assistan ce to African development is generally acknowled ged, and h as com e in a varie ty of forms, including fin an cial supp ort, the exch an ge of experien ces in p overty redu ction, and coop eration and assistance, esp ecially in health and edu cation. Som e of the frequently raised con cerns about the entran ce of China and other em erging p owers into Africa appear exaggerated ; China rem ains a 'latecom er ' on the co ntinent. The commercial value of all Chinese oil investments in Africa was just 8 p er cent of the combined value of intern ation al oil comp anies' investments in African oil. In 2006, the to tal Afri can o utput produce d by Chinese oil comp anies was only one-third of that p roduce d by a single multinational oil comp an y, ExxonMobiJ.1 During the exch an ge of ideas, both sides also identified several areas of disagreem ent. The m ost pressing iss ue was abo ut human rights. Sever al African p articipants of the conferen ce expressed co ncern about China's role in the Darfur co nflict in Sudan, and abo ut China's support for gove rnments in co untries with poor governan ce, esp ecially Zimbab we. The Chinese p arti cip ants ex plained China's two principles in regard to African aff airs, n am ely, non-interferen ce and respect for the stand of the United Nations and the Afri can Unio n. While critical rep orts ab out human rights violations in China abo und, the West continues to d o business with China som e po inted o ut, so w hy sho uld China act differently with regard to co untries like Sudan? Furthermore, so m e p articip ants stressed, human ri ghts should also include the right of survival and development, and it should be the respon sibility of African governments to decide abo ut their priorities. At the sam e time, many African p articip ants in the dialogue co ntinued to criticise China's support for and cooperation with certain Afri can governments that are not accountable to their own p opulation. Other areas of con cern and disagreem ent revolved around asp ects of trade, labour and the en vironment. Trade between China and Africa h as been increasing rapidly. The overall fi gures and the variety of commo dities involved reflect both sides' n eed s. 257

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Africa h as h ad a trade surplus with China in recent years. The price advantage of Chinese goods provides advantages and convenience for the d aily lives of millions of Africans. Complaints are frequently made abo ut the low qu ality of cheap Chinese good s. But the problem lies not only with Chinese manufacturers but also with African traders w ho demand cheap products specifically designed for the African market. African participants in the dialogu e also worried about the impact of Chinese exp orts on the African textile industry and market. As a remedy and in addition to the tariff exemptions that Beijing provides to African goods entering the Chinese market, it was argued that China should offer African countries a voluntary export restraint facility - as it did in its d eal with South Africa to further assist African countries to update their technology by coop eration. 2 Africa, for its part, should increase its competence. Otherwise, textile producers from other countries may rush in even if China cuts its own exports to Africa. Common complaints about labour conditions in Chinese companies op erating in Africa, especially in the construction sector, were also raised. The Chinese participants agreed that, while differences in efficiency, lan gu age and working culture have to be taken into account, Chinese enterprises have to address this problem if they want to establish them selves sustainably in Africa. Their awareness of this need appears to be rising, d em onstrated, for example, by an August 2007 meeting in Beijing of 67 stateowned Chinese companies around the issue of corporate social responsibility. H owever, in contrast to earlier periods, many Chinese companies active in Africa today are no t state-owned but private, making governmental control difficult. At any rate, many participants agreed that it is primarily the duty of African governments to regulate and monitor the labo ur conditions of companies op erating in their co untries. African civil society has an important role to play in exerting pressure on governments to improve these standards. The same argument can be made regarding the environmental problems frequently associated with the activities of Chinese co mpanies in Africa, esp ecially in the extractive sector of oil, mining and timber. China itself faces great environmental challenges 258

CONCLUSION

at home. Participants from China and Africa agreed that the failure of companies from other, often western, countries to act responsibly with regard to environmental sustainability cannot serve as an excuse for bad practices on the part of certain Chinese co mpanies operating in Africa. Protecting the environment is a key issue for both developed and developing countries - a common concern of mankind - even (and especially) under co nditions of widespread poverty. Several African participants at the Nairobi dialogue raised question s about the reasons behind the rapidly expanding Chinese investment in Africa. China and Chinese companies, it was largely agreed, pursue a legitimate economic self-interest in Africa. It is first and foremost the duty of African governments to ensure that China's econ omic engagement serves African interests as well. H owever, concerns were raised about this, as China interacts primarily with individual African states and their governments (often those with weak negotiating p ower and sometimes d oubtful governance credentials), rather than at the level of the African Union or regional eco nomic communities. Furthermore, African participants raised concerns that the patterns of China's overall economic engagement in Africa - centring on the ex traction and export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods - were simply foll owing, and thereby reprod ucing, long-established patterns of African dependency and underdevelopment. In reply to this argument, Chinese participants argued that China, due to its rap id developm ent, requires natural resources and openly acknowledges this fact; that investment in natural reso urces provid es an opportunity for Africa to transform its potential into real wealth; that it is a global business and new actors, including those from China, increase competition and thus opportunities for suppliers; and that China's engagement in this field is not only direc ted towards Africa, but also to countries as diverse as Russi a, Australia and Canada, where it is welcomed and has contributed to economic developm ent. Furthermore, Chinese p ar ticipants stressed that Chinese investments in the extractive sector in Africa are frequently connected with the building of large-scale infrastructure, technology transfer and technical assistance, a strategy quite different from that of investors from other countries. 259

CHINESE AND AFRI CAN PER SPECTIVES ON CHIN A IN AFRI CA

Issues of d evelopment assistan ce were another important topi c in the Nairobi dialogue. Even b efore the current boom in SinoAfrican relation s, China tried its best to p rovide variou s form s of assistan ce to Africa, as for example w ith the TAZARA (TanzaniaZambia Rail way Authority) rail way (65 Chinese died during its con struction in the 1970s) and w ith Chinese m ed ical teams, w h ich h ave been sent to m ore than 40 Afri can co untries. Som e African civil so ciety activists h ad d oubts about China's claim that its aid p olicy co m es 'with n o strin gs attached', and question ed its tran sp arency. Chinese p articipants stressed that China pursu es a philosophy different from the West; d oes not view aid as an in strument of political condition ality; understands assistan ce as a relation ship b ased on mutuality and thus avoi d s op enly u sing co ncepts su ch as ' d on or' and 'recip ient'; and d oes not publish figures for p olitical and cultural reason s. Still, several African p articip ants in the dialogue felt that China sho uld in crease its en gagem ent and coo peration with the established ' development co mmunity' in order to increase tran sp aren cy, including incorporating the m easurem ent of results (' aid efficiency'). The Nairobi dialogue p rovided an opportunity for the Chinese p articip ants to glean a deep er understanding of the vitality and diversity of civil SOCiety and n on-governmental organisation s (NGOs) in Africa. African and Ch inese participants compared civil SOCiety in Africa, which plays a core role in building democracy, with civil society as it exists in China, which often works closely in con cert w ith the Chinese government and does not resemble the African NGO model. Chinese p articipants acknowled ged the important role played by NGOs in Africa, but also pointed to the problem that African NGOs, depending to a con siderable extent on fund in g from outside, m ay not always be as independent as claim ed . Examples of p ractical action and coop eration were presented during the Nairobi dialogue. The Global Environmental Institute (GEl), a Chinese en vironmental NGO, explained how it works closely with government institution s in order to develop standard s for the improved en vironmental sustainability of Chinese enterprises active in the timber industry. New opportunities for African NGOs interested in engaging frUitfully with government and private sector actors from China were explored, as well as p ossibilities of coo peration between NGOs from China and from Africa. 260

CONCLUS ION

Both sides agreed that China and Africa need more exchanges, especially among civil society and academics. Knowledge gaps are still wide, both sides can learn much from each other and their mutual understanding can promote improved cooperation in the future.

Recent trends in Sino-African relations Since the 'China-African Civil Society Dialogue' conference took place in April 200S, China's engagement in Africa has deepened further. China's investment increased from US$491 million in 2003 to US$7.S billion by the end of 200S,' while trade grew tenfold from the beginning of the decade, reaching US$l 07 billion at the end of 200S 4 By late 200S, Beijing had signed contracts on projects worth US$126.3 billion with various African countries, and the total turnover of these projects co llectively was US$6S.l billion. At the beginning of 2009, specu lation was rife that Chin a's trade and investment footprint in Africa wou ld slow down due to the financial crisis and resu ltin g globa l economic recession. This was based on the assumption that with the economic downturn, C hin a's burgeoning demand for African commodities to sustain its export-led growth stra tegy wou ld dry up as its largest market, the US, was at the centre of the international financial storm. Yet during the annua l African diplomatic new year visit, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reaffirmed China's commitment to its African agenda and promised to work together to provide support to enable African countries to continue with their market-led imperatives.' In fact, even in 2009 Chinese engagement in Africa has continued to grow. From January to September 2009, Chin a's engineering businesses in Africa collectively reached a turnover of US$17.84 billion, up 41.2 per cent on the previous year. During the same period, China's FDI footprint in Africa amounted to US$875 million, representing an increase of 7S.6 per cent on the previous year in spite of the global economic downturn. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, held in November 2009 in Egypt, signalled that Beijing was becoming more aware of its global statu s. It became clear that if China wanted its image and behaviour to accord with this standing, then it had to start doing things in a sustainable way, taking 261

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

into consideration the issues and challenges that its trade, investment and aid packages raised amo n g communities in African societies. The FOCAC summit, aim ed at strengthening a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership over the next three years, worked toward s building a new consensus between Beijing and Africa for sustainable d evelopment. It indicated h ow Beijing seeks to cement its ties w ith the continent in a ch an gin g global en vironment of instability and economic uncertainty, geared toward s en abling Africa to develop its capacity and address its development ch allen ges. The highlights of the summit were the following eight m easures that China committed to undertake: 1 To prov ide US$10 billion in con cession al loans to Africa to build up financing cap acity and support Chinese financial institutions in setting up a US$l billion fund for loans to sm alland medium-sized African companies. China w ill also can cel m ore African d ebt 2 To phase in a zero-tariff treatment poli cy for 95 per cent of pro ducts from the least d evelop ed African co untries with whom it h as diplom atic ties, starting with 60 p er cent of produ cts becoming zero-tariff from 201 0 3 To establish a partnership to respond to climate change and build 100 clean energy projects in Africa including so lar p ower, biogas and small-scale hydro-power 4 To boost African food security by sending 50 agriculture tech n ology team s to Africa and training 2,000 agricultural technology personnel for Africa 5 To provide 500 million y uan in medical equipment and antimalarial materials to 30 hospitals and 30 malaria treatment centres in Africa and train 3,000 d octors and nurses 6 To build 50 schools and train 1,500 teachers for Africa. By 2012, China will increase the number of scholarships available to African students to 5,500 7 To enh an ce science and technology coop eration and host 100 African postdoctoral fellows to cond uct scientific research in China 8 To exp and cultural exch an ges with Africa.

262

CONCLUSION

These measures, a nnounce d during the November 2009 FOCAC meeting, indicate that China has realise d the need for greater convergence between Africa's development needs and its own economic interests. They also reflect Beijing's desire to ex tend beyond state-to-state engagement to intensify people-top eo ple cooperation. When fl esh ed out, it becom es obviou s that the Chinese authorities have noted that over the next three years China's fo otprint in Africa cannot be 'business as u su al'. This was an ob viou s theme undersco ring Premier Wen Jiab ao's speech to the summit, and it became explicit in two areas. First, in assisting Africa towards realising its human reso urce developm ent needs, the premier emphasised that m eeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and improving the livelihoo d s of the African p eople can only be achieved if 'economic developm ent, p overty eradication and [the] improvement of p eople's lives are top priorities for African countries. China w ill co ntinue to increase assistance to Africa and reduce or can cel d ebts owed by African co untries within the realm of its cap abilities. We will restructure our assistance pro grammes to better m eet the needs on the gro und . We will put more emphasis on agriculture, education, health, p overty reduction and clean drinking water and other areas that are vital to p eople's well-being when providing assistance, and help Africa attain the MDGs at an early date." This is closely aligned to the second issue: giving real impetus to expanding greater people-to-people and cultural exch an ges. The launch of 'a China-Africa jOint research and exchange programme ... will enable scholars and think-tanks to have more exch anges and cooperation, share development exp erience and provide intellectual support for formulating better cooperation policies by the two sides' .'

Conclusion Clearly, co n cerns about the social imp act of some Chinese investm ents, as raised by African civil society and others, have registered in Beijing, sh api n g China's FOCAC commitments to help to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to con solid ate people-to-people co ll aboration. But there is also an emphasis on forgin g amicable relations wi th local communities, which provides th e space for African and Chinese civil society and social 263

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

movements to play an active, shadow p eer-review role in the China-Africa engagement. The promotion of greater research co ll aboration w ill only become meaningful if it enables a wider public understanding of the effe cts and p otential op ened by China's involvement. China's engagement in Africa h as significant social, en vironmental and economic impacts. All of them bear directly on the lives and livelihoods of the majority. But decisions abo ut concessions, agreements and investments are still being made with hardly any publi c dialogue or discussion. The actual negotiation and conclusion of agreements with overseas states and companies in the national interest is obvio usly the role of government. At the same time, much of the current deb ate on the ChinaAfrica en gagem ent remains p arochially defined b y scholars trying to determine w hether China's presence in Africa can be conceptualised thro ugh an academic disco urse on ' d evelopment'. Instead, the 'China-African Civil Society Dialogue' conference tried to provide a platform for conceptualising a people-centred p oli cy dynamic. Based on an honest exchange of ideas and sharing of knowledge and information aro und how the China-Africa engagement is perceive d from Chinese and African civil society and acad emic stakeholders, this volume also indicates a number of directions and dimensions where the China-Africa en gagement could and should go in the future. Contributions in this volume soberly analyse the impac t of China's footprint on Africa, with various counterposing arguments. Some case studies question China's treatment of governance issu es and ask whether and how human ri ghts concerns feature in China's en gagem ents across Africa. Others inquire whether Chinese investments genUinely create op portunities for local lab o ur, along with askin g to what ex tent technology transfer and skills development are part of investment-led projects and what the long-term social and environmental cos ts and human d evelopm ent challenges of this engagement are. At the same time, co ntributions to this volume indicate that China is often judged unfairly when compared to other foreign actors in Africa. Undeniably this underscores the pOint that as China's engagement in Africa is growing so too are its respo nsibilities: to be transp arent in its activities, to evalu ate honestly the impacts of its 264

CONCLUSION

engagement and to en gage in an op en debate with a bro ad range of actors on the African continent. Perhaps the most profound m essage in this volume is that African civil sOciety stakeholders are beginning to make their voices heard about China's engagement. While African governments remain the primary custodians of this relationship, this volume represents a crucial step in raising awareness about the opp ortunities and threats of China's engagement in Africa among ci vil society organisations, media workers and others. This pOints to a significant trajectory towards a wider dialogue between civil society members and their own governments, meaning an effective and transparent China-Africa partnership can monitor the nature of the deals m ade between various African governments and Beijing. But as much as this is abo ut initiating the p olicy-discussion space for African civil stakeholders to engage their governments, it is also about the need for African civil SOCiety actors to understand the mushrooming of civil SOCiety in China so that mutual co llaboration can be forged. The issues and concerns of African civil SOCiety overlap considerably with those being raised within China by a d eveloping Chinese civil SOCiety. Furtherm ore, they have considerable relevance to d omestic and SOCial-policy issues within China itself. China and Africa need more exch ange, especially among civil SOCiety. Therefore, it is critically important to make the most of the space created by the announcements made at the recent FOCAC summit, as summarised above. This will be essential if both sides are to learn from each other, enhance mutual understanding and promote a sustainable development cooperation between Africa and China that extends beyond the interests of African and Chinese political and economic elites. To d o this it is necessary, first of all, to overcome mutual suspicion and misperception and not speak past each other, but rather to focus on seeking and strengthening a common vision of shared accountability. Only then can civil society stakeholders ask the necessary questions to maximise transp arency and ensure that China-Africa cooperation really do es deliver a 'win-win' outcome for all concerned.

265

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA

Notes 1. Erica S. Downs (2007) 'The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations', China Security, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 43-7.

2. In 2006 a nd follow ing intense protest from the Cong ress of South A fri ca n Trade Unions (COSATU) around the haemorrha ging of jobs in South A fri ca's beleaguered clothin g and textile industry, the Chinese government offered the South A fri ca n governm en t a voluntary restri cti on on cheap

Chinese clothing and appa rel exports entering the South African market. Accord in g to the Chinese embassy in South Africa, this import quota was

ad opted out of political goodw ill to ass ist the South A fri ca n trade a nd industry department to improve the sector's competitiveness by providing a g rant fo r technica l and techno logica l cooperatio n. U nfo rtunate ly, th e

import quotas did not prevent the South African market from being fl ooded wi th cheap clothing and textile imports from other Asian producers like Vie tnam and Banglades h because o f weak mo nito ring and regulatory frameworks . Moreover, the voluntary impo rt qu ota has exp ired and the Chinese authorities ha ve seen it as a failure because the g rant that was

mad e available to assist the industry ha d not been used approp riately, w ith indu stry ex perts say in g that th e Department of Trade and In ves tme nt ca nno t

account for the money. Finally, it must be noted that des pite the fact that China and South A fri ca are bo th members of the Wo rld Trade Orga nisa ti on

(WTO), the Chi nese were willing to all ow a voluntary export restraint facility that went against the free market principles and trade libera lisation protocol of the WTO. 3. Hindustan Times (2009) 'China set to expand role in Africa at s ummit', 8 November, http://www.hindustantimes.com /C hina-set-to-expand-role-inA fri ca-at-summit/Hl-Articlel-474062.aspx, accessed 1 December 2009. 4. Tarek El-Tablawy (2009) 'Chinese premier: A fri ca trad e p ush is "selfless''', Associated Press, 8 November, http://www.google.com/ hostednews/ap/article/ ALeqM5 hFELtH5zHiMUEKJJyC m2Gri 1y4Qw D9BQSIUOO, accessed 1 December 2009. 5. See Sa nusha Naidu (2009) 'Beijing reaffirms its Africa agenda', PambazlIka News, 22 Ja nuary, http://www.pa mbazuka .org/en/ca tegory/africa_ china/53461, accessed 1 December 2009. 6. Wen Jiabao (2009) 'Building a new ty pe of China-Africa strategic partnership', Xinhua News Agency, 9 Novembe r, http://englis h.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90883/6807390. html, accessed 1 December 2009. 7. Ibid .

266

Index academics

Afri can studies in China 2- 15,

nL 220-1 civ il socie ty engageme nt 238-9, 2!l3.

Accra Agenda for Ac tion (2008) 71-2 A frica

C hinese inves tment 29-30,41-2, 64-5, l!J..lli,. 248-9, 261 civ il society organisations (CSOs) 214-23,232-4, 236 colonialism 39-40 env iro nmental issues 258-9 natural resources

~

97--8,

201-2, :u1, 225~, 249-50 policy on China 10 5~ strategic relations with China 56~9

trad e with China 26-7, 42. 47-8, Q2.. ~ 82-4, 226-7, 257-8 trad e with Ethiopia 'l6, 99-100 A fri ca Grow th a nd O pportunity Ac t (AGOA) l1L 115-16, ~ 242 African/Chinese Enterprises Forum &l 'African consensus' 240-2 African Cris is Response Initiative (ACRI) 45.

African Development Bank ful222 Afri ca n Forum a nd Network on Debt and Development (AFRO DAD), country studies 70-1,74-81 A fri ca n Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) i l l Afri ca n studies, in C hina 2-15, 220-1 Afri can Union (AU)

nz.

China-A frica rela tio ns 201-12 Darfur crisis J1lQ. 190-1 forma tion of .6.Q Forum on Ch ina-Afri ca Cooperation (FOCAC) role 208-11 headquarters 'l6, 9.'t 'non-indifference' 19.Z agricultural d evelopment 6S aid China to Afri ca 5Z. 70-81, lJl2 effectiveness 71-2 reform 51. see also developme nt ass istance al-Bos hir, Omar ~12ll Angola Chinese d evelopment a id 70-1, 7~, 80-1 Chinese in ves tme nt 33-4, 41Chinese presence 165-73 civil war 163-4 oil reSOll fees & 16.8 trans parency campaig n 169-73 western d onors 164-5 Annan, Kofi 18.6 appa re l industry see clothing industry arms trade 43-4, l.'l5 Assoc iati o n o f Southeas t As ian

N ations (ASEAN ) 53 Bandung Conference (1955) 92-3 Ban Ki-moon 1ZZ banks, environmental po licies ~

l5l Beijing Action Plan (2007-09) 83-4, ~m2lD

'Be ijing Consens us' ;H. 35-7, QQ. i l l Beijing Declaration (2006) l!J.. 21D

m

267

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA bilateral trad e 64.65.,. 82-4, 226-7, 257-8 Blair, Tony 44 Bongo, O mar !!6 Brautigam, Deborah 19h BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), relations with Africa

:fll.35 Burundi, arms trade 43 Bus h, George W. i l l businesses, Chinese in Africa 217-18, 221 cap ital contro l 5.Q capitalism, China accu sed of H2.,

ill 22'1 China Afri can policy paper 61-2,

n

~JM.,ill22..'l

A fri ca n studies 2- 15, n.z, 220-1 agenda fo r African involvement 40...{i as alternative to \,\Iestern powers

95...{i, m banks 148-9, 151 civ il society organisations (CSOs) ~ 221-2, 231-2,236-8 clothing indu stry 110-11 criticisms of in volvement in

Afri ca 43-8, 149-52, 229-30 Darfur involvement 181-91, 196- 9 as development mod el 2ti diplomatic agenda 41 economic grow th ~ 1llil.. 143-4 Eight Measures 'li.. g 66-7, 262-3 env ironmental policy 143-4, 247-8,250-3,258-9 forest resources 12L 250-1 'Go outwa rd ' policy 24Z government and CSOs 215-16, 218-19

268

government-o rga ni sed non-

governmental organisa tio ns (GONGOs) 236-7 inves tme nt in Africa 29-30,41-2, 64-5, ~ llQ, 248-9, 261 N ational Forestry Bureau 250-1 non-governmenta l orga nisa ti o ns

(NGOs) 231-2 oil supply 97-8, lQIh 194-5 po litical mo ti ves in Africa :ill.. 228-30 relations w ith United States 31-2 strategic relat io ns with Africa 56...{i9 Three Gorges Dam 145...{i trad e with Afri ca 26-7, ~ 47-8, ,22. Q±. 82-4, 226-7, 257-8 trade with Ethiopia 26. 99-100 trade with Kenya 117-18 China -Africa Development Fund (CADF) 3l4gB&! China- Africa n Civil Socie ty Dialogue conference (Nairobi, 2008) 256...{i0, 264 China Development Bank (COB) 'Z'i.. HZ,..1A8 China Exim Bank lfL HZ,. ~ 151 China Internationa l Exchange Association (CIEA) 222 China Na tio nal Aero-Techno logy Import and Export Corpora tion (CATIC) za China Na tional Petroleum Corp ora tion (CNPC) 'li., 182-3 China Na tio nal Uranium Corp oration .3.Q

China Non-ferrous Metals Corp ora tion (CNMC) 3D China Union 3D Chinese Academy for Environmental Pla nning (CAEP) 150-1,

mm

INDEX C hinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 12 220 Chinese Association of African

Studies (CAAS) 6. Z C hinese Communist Party (CCP), African studies ~ 5-6 C hinese Society of A frica n Historical Studies (CSAHS) !i.l!, 14 C hou En-Lai 23 civ il society, dialogue 256-65 civ il society organisations (CSOs) accountability 238-42 Africa 214-23, 232-4, 236 challe nges for 236-8 C hina 218,221-2,236-8 C hina-Africa relations 224--44 C hinese perce ptions 214-18 data ga thering 239-40 dialogue framew ork 2.39. engageme nt with China 218-22 experience sharing 234-6 policy inputs 24Q relations w ith the state 230-4 see also non-governmental organisa ti ons

climate change, Darfur cris is 1ZZ

C linton, Bill i l l clothing industry C hinese workers 122-3 exports 110-11, 118-20 foreign direct inves tment (FDI) 120-1, 124 Kenya 113-17 see also textile indu stry Comm ission for A frica

44-

Commo n Marke t for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA) i l l conflicts, Africa 125 corru ption '!Q.]JJ.. 1Qb ~ 1Q2.

lZlhlZl cultural excha nges 68 C ultural Revolution 5-6, 58

Dalbergia melalloxylon 161-2 dams, De mocra tic Re public of Congo (DRC) 145-6 Darfur conflict causes of 176-7

Chinese involvement '!Q. 181-91, 196-9 esca lation of 178-80 data ga thering, China-Africa relations 239-40 debt relief 65 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Chinese inves tment 141-3 environmental impacts 143-53 forests i l l infrastructure projects lib 145-6 mining li1 146-7 relations with C hina 140-3

m

democrati sation

Africa 233 studies of '< Deng Xiaoping 3'l development assistance

Chinese to Africa 70-81, 227-8, 26D Ethiopia 101-2 partners hip or neocolonialis m

32-4 diamonds, Angola Z6 diplomatic relations 'll52. 92-3 drought, Darfur 176-7 East African Community (EAC) i l l Economic Community of W es t

African States (ECOWAS)

~ ill

economic development

blueprint for 50-2 China 'l'l., llIS econom ic partnership agreements

(EPAs) 242 ecosystem d e ter ioration, Darfur

176- 7

269

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA Eight Measures ;rr. & 66-7, 262-3 eli tes, A frica 33-4 Endiama-EP 16 e ne rgy sources, A fri ca 51-2 Engda hl, Wi lliam JBQ environmental impacts C hina 143-4, 247--<; Chinese companies in Africa 258- 9 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 143-53 Global Environmental Institute (GEl) policy 250-3 Equatorial G uinea, arms trad e 43

Eritrea, anns trade 43 Ethiopia arms trade 43 challenges to China relationship 99-101 Chinese develo pment aid 102 infras tructure develo pment

p rojects lQQ, 101-2 as market fo r Chinese products

2Z natural resources 97-8 recommendation s for future

rela tions 105--
270

Chinese to N igeria 128-37 clothing industry 110- 11, 118-20 fake prod ucts, N igeria 13Ji financial crisis, g lobal see g lobal financial crisis FOCAC see Forum on China-Afri ca Coopera tion

forei gn direct inves tment (FDI) 29-30,41-2, 50-1, 64-5, ~ 248-9 Kenya 120-1, 124 forestry China 15l

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) i l l env iro nmental policies 250-1 Mozambique 155--
governmental orga nisa ti o ns (GONGOs) 236-7

INDEX graduate th eses, A fri ca n studies

11- 12 Green Timber, Moza mbique 156- 7 ha za rdo us pro ducts, N igeria 13.6 Hu Jintao 22. J§., Ii£, ~ ~ 185--{j,

2.51 human resource develo pme nt Z1 human rights 46--S legal cooperation 85--{j v io latio ns 25Z hydroelectric p ower Africa 51-2 Democratic Republic o f Congo (DRC) 145--{j

id eology, national differences 100- 1 Ind ustrial a nd Commercial Bank of C hina (ICBC) 3Z. 41 industrialisatio n clothing industry :lll2 s ustainable 5.1 info rmal sector 5.1 information sharing, civil society orga nisations (CSOs) 239-40 infras tru cture develo pment Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Hb 145--{j Ethiopia lQQ. 101- 2 Infrastru cture Development of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) Z9 Institute of Afro-Asia n Studies, Peking University 3 Institute of Asian-A fri ca n Studies J.. 4 Ins titute of Wes t As ian and A fri can Studies (IWAA) 12. 22ll ins titutio ns, Africa n s tudies in China 3-4, 5, 6-7, 12-13, 220- 1 Intergovernmental A uthority on Development (IGAD) 105 Interna tiona l Monetary Fund (1M F) @,~m242

A ngola 165

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 141 Sudan 1&1 in ves tme nts African in China 83 Chinese in Africa 29-30, 41-2, 64-5, 83-4, lli.. 248-9, 261 Jiang Zemin 52. 'is Jia Q inglin 6.6 Jin Jiaman 24Z Ji Xianlin 3 Ju s ti ~a Ambiental 155--{j Kabila, Joseph 140,141 Kenya Chinese foreig n direct investment (FOI) 120-1, i l l Chinese workers in clothing industry 122-3 clothing industry 113-17 export processing zones (EPZ) 114-16 exports 118-20 impact o f China 111-13 Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB) programme i l l trade with China 117-18 law, C hina-Africa cooperation 85--S Li Anshan Z Libe ria, iro n o re 3.Q Li Ruogu 14'l Liu Gu ijin 1& ll!L ~ 187--S, l'1S Lu Ting-en Z malaria trea tment centres Ql.. 67--8,

2:,1 262 Mao Zed ong 3,39,58 markets, for C hinese prod ucts 'lZ Marx, Ka rl 52 med ical care 67--S Meles Zenawi 9.3. ~ 2,2. 2Q., 'l8

271

CH INESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CH IN A IN AFRICA Mercosur 53

NFC Africa 3ll,..AZ

Mesfin, Seyoum 'l5 micro and small enterprises (MSEs), Ken ya clothing industry 11.4 Mi llennium Development Goals !ill,

Nguesso, Denis Sassou 4:6 N iger, uranium mining 3D. N igeria

Chinese imports 128-37 hazardous products 136. impact of imports on N igerian traders 132--{j import licensing 131 industria l d ecl ine 132-3,134-5 Na tional Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) 136. smuggling 135 tariff system 130, 131 textile indu stry 132-3

ZL 2.6.1 mineral extraction, Africa 30 mining C hinese imports 242 env ironmen tal impacts 146-7 Monterrey Consensus (2002) 21 Morris, Mike 2.2.S most fa vo ured nation (MFN) statu s

m

m

82

Mozambique C hinese development aid 70-1, 76-7,80-1 C hinese logging 156--S illegal logging 155--{j2 Mugabe, Robert 2Q, 15lli Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) i l l 115-16 multinational companies, Chinese

non-governme ntal organisations

(NGOs) Africa 26Q China 231-2 see also civil society organisations Ogaden Nationa l Libera tion Fro nt

2bllil

(ONLF) 2S oi l

Nankai U ni vers ity 3 nationalist movements, s tudies of

~

4-5,7--S natural resources, Chinese

exploitation of Africa's 97--S, 201-2, ~ 225--{j, 249-50, 25't Na Zhong 4 neocolonialism 32-4, 165--{j, 201-2, ~230

neolibera lism

Anglo-American 44-5, 52.242 China accused of H2. 229-30, 241 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
Zl!b l!!Z. 242 'new scramble for Africa'

new world order 93-4

272

m 224

Africa as source of 194-5 Angola 76, 168 Ethiopia 97--S Sudan 182-4 threats to 45--{j Oly mpic Games, Beijing (2008) 181- 2, l'ill Ondimba, Omar Bongo 46 'one China' policy 22.. 'l& Open Society Foundation-Angola (OSF/A) 170-3 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 190-1 pan-Africanism 52-3,241-2, 244 Paris Declaration o n Aid

Effectiveness (2005) ZQ, 71-2, lU peacekeeping operations 65

INDEX peace and security, China's ro le in A fri ca 194-9 Peking University, African s tudies 3, 12-13, 22Q policy-making, civil society orga nisations (CSOs) 2!lO po lit ical motives, China-A frica rela tions 40 228-30 pollution, C hina 144 priva te no n-enterprise units (PNEUs), China 232 pro tectio nism 50. publica tio ns, Afri can studies in C hina 5-{i, 7--B, 10- 11, 2.'i

Q in Xiaoying Z regional cooperation 241-2 Rwanda, genocide 178-9 Selassie, Haile ~ Shanghai Coopera tion O rga nisa tion (SCO) 53 Shell,Sudan 183 Sino-African Human Ri ghts Confe rence (2004) 85-{i smuggling, Nigeria 13.'i socia l conflicts 4Z socialis m, studies o f .s social o rg anisatio ns, China 232 solar energy, Sa hara d esert 52 South Afri ca, studies of 't,]A South C hina Normal University 3 Southeas t Asian countries, relatio ns w ith Afri ca 35 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 105.241 Sou th-Sou th coop era tion 2'i, 2.8, Wl,21O s pecial econo mic zones 105. Standard Bank 3Z,A1 s tate, relations w ith civil society 230-4

strategic relat io ns current features 61-8 future challenges 68-9 history of 56-{il stru ctural adjustment 5ll. 58. 230 substanda rd good s, N igeria ill 13fi subventio ns 50 Suda n arms trade .u, i l l

Chinese investment 11 182-4, i l l oil industry 182-4 see also Darfur susta inab le industrial strategy 51 Taiwan issue 5't, 614 'l8 Tanzania, arms trade 43 TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia Railway A uthority) railway

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technology transfer 5ll Kenya clothing industry 120-1 terrorism, war o n 45-6 textile indu stry Africa 258 N ige ria 132-3 see also clo thing indus try toothpaste, ha zardous 13fi tourism ind ustry 42, 65 trade China w ith Afri ca 26-7, 42, 5't, ~ & 82-4, 226-7, 257--B China with Ethiopia 2!i. 99- 100 China with Kenya 117-18 China with N ige ria 128-37 imbala nce 47--B,99-100 Trans-Saharan-Counter-Terroris m Partnership (TSCTP) !IS United N ations China 's membership 98-9 Da rf u r 1l1!i,. 1llli, 197--B United Na tio ns Eco no mic Commission for Africa (ECA) 'l6

273

CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA U nited N ations-African U nion

World Trade Orga nisa tion (WTO)

Missio n in Darfur (UNAMID) 198- 9 United States A fri ca Grow th and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 115-16,

Worldwide Law Congress (2005) 86 Wu Ba ngguo 6.6. Wu Bingz hen Z

m

J.g242

Xiangtan U nivers ity, African s tudies 11, 86-7, 220

Darfur in volvement 178-80

o il s upplies 45 relations w ith Africa 44-5, 93-4 relations w ith C hina 31-2 trad e with Kenya 115-17 uni vers ities, China 'h 11,:nz, 220-1 U ni vers ity of Internati o nal Business and Economics (UIBE) 150-1, 252 v is its Afri cans to China 64

C hinese to Africa fL 22.,

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66-7

Wang Chunliang Z Wang G ua ngya 1.'l8 weapons see arms trad e Wen Jiabao ~ lQl, 263 western powers A fri ca in vo lve ment 44-5 China as alternative in Africa 95--{j, 21l

women, clothing industry 109- 10 Wo rld Bank ~ 1& ~ m 242 A ngola 165 Dem ocrati c Republic of Congo (DRC) 1A1

274

l1.Lmm242

Ya ng Jeichi 31. 95, 261 Yang Renpian 3 Za mbia Chinese d evelopment a id 70-1, 77-8,80-1 copper mining 30 debts Z8 social conflict
Bureau (Z PEB) 'l8 Z hou Wen zhong 44 Z hu Junfeng 183 Zimbabwe arms trade 44 Chinese d evelopm ent aid 70- 1, 78-81, l'l6 debt Z9

China's New Role in Africa and the South Edited by Dorothy Guerrero and Firoze Manji Chin a's global expansion is u su ally talked about from the viewpoint of the West. These essays, by sch olars and activists from China and the global South, provide diverse views on the challenges faced by Africa, Latin America and Asia as a result of China's rise as a global econorrtic power. Chinese aid, trade and investments - driven by the needs of its own economy - present both threats and opportunities for the South, requiring an analysis that goes beyond simplistic caricatures of 'good' and 'evil'.

' ... important new perspectives on this emerging issue within international relations.'

Johanna Jansson, The China Monitor, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University ISBN 978·1·906387·26·6

February 2008

258pp

£16.95

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African Perspectives on China in Africa Edited by Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks Chin a's in volvem ent in A fri ca h as provoked much discu ssion . Is China just the latest exploiter putting its own economic inte rests above environmental or human rights concern s? O r is Chin a's engagem ent an extension of 'South-South solidarity'? Does China's in volvem ent en able A fri can countries to free them selves fro m debt and condition ality? O r is A fri ca swapping on e tyrann y for another? Lost in the discu ssion h ave been the voices of A frican analysts and activists. They are heard in these essays dem onstrating that there is no single 'A fri can view' about Chin a in A fri ca.

'This book is an interesting and easy read, granting the reader access to an enriching debate and opening new questions.' Tania Adam, Centre d'Estudis Africans, Barcelona • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

ISBN 978-0-9545637-3-8 February 2007

174pp

£11 .95

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Africa's Liberation: the Legacy of Nyerere Edited by Chambi Chachage and Annar Cassam

AFRICA'S LIBERATION

TheLegecy of Nyerere ,

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The death in 1999 o f Juliu s Nyerere, Tanzania's first president, left a cavern in the con sciou sn ess and con science o f the p eople of Tan zania and A fri ca. Nyerere w as a Pan A fricanist and intern ation alist and a giant of the liberatio n m ovem ent. This book includes contribution s from leading commentato rs, those w h o fou ght impe riaUsm alon gside Nyerere, m embers of a yo unger gen eration and Nyerere in his own words. Th eir writings reflect on Nyerere and liberation, the Commonwealth, leadership, econ omic development, land, human rights and education . A bove all, they are a testament to the n eed to rekindle the fires o f African liberation to w hich N yerere was deeply committed . ISBN 978 -1-906387 -71 -6 May 2010

216pp

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£12 .95

SMS Uprising: Mobile Activism in Africa Edited by Sokari Ekine SM S Uprising brings together som e of the best-

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known and exp erienced developers and u sers of m obile phone technologies in A frica to provide a unique insight into how activists and social change ad vocates are u sing these technologies to facilitate change and address Africa's many challen ges from within. These essays examine issues of inequality in access to m obile technologies and provide an overview of lesson s learned witho ut any of the romanticism so often associated w ith the u se of new technologies for social change.

'This is a handbook for the small NGO or social change activist who is daunted by technology. Help is at hand, and SMS Uprising will help you find it.' The Guardian • • •••••••••• ISBN 978· 1·906387·35·8

January 2010

152pp

£1 2. 95

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Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger for Justice Eric Holt-Gimenez and Raj Patel

Crisis and the Hunger for Justice (ric

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Food Rebellions! is a powerful handbook both examining our vulnerable food systems to reveal the root causes of the food crisis and proposing solutions. Democratising food systems can end hunger and poverty. Sustainable approaches to production must be supported and spread. In local, national and international policy arenas we need dialogue, transparency and a change to the 'rules' currently holding back agroecological alternatives.

'As Food Rebellions! demonstrates, ... using traditional farming methods enhances environmental conservation and preserves local biodiversity ... key to the survival of the many African families headed by women.'

Wangari Maathai, Nobel peace prize winner • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ISBN 978·1 ·906387· 30· 3

July 2009

264pp

£16.95

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Ending Aid Dependence Yash Tandon Developing countries can liberate them selves from aid that pretends to be develo pmental but is n ot. This book caution s against the collective colonialism of rich don or countries. Ending aid dep enden ce requires a radical shift in the mind set and the d evelo pment strategy of countries dep endent on aid.

'Yash Tandon shows that "aid" is an instrument of imperialism's strategy of domination ... which he strongly contrasts with proposals for "another aid", one rooted in the principles of international and anti ·imperialist solidarity.'

Samir Amin, director of the Third World Forum

'The message of this book needs to be seriously considered and debated by all those that are interested in the development of the countries of the South.' Benjamin W. Mkapa, former President of Tanzania (1995-2005) ISBN 978· 1·906387·3 1·0

September 2008

144pp

[9.95

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Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa The deepening engagement of China in Africa since the end of the cold war has led to debates about the evolving nature of this relationship. Yet the focus of analysis has largely been confined to the interactions between states. Little attention has been paid to the growing dialogue between Chinese and African civil society organisations (CSOs). This collection of essays, written by scholars and activists, explores the interaction between African and Chinese non -state actors and argues that the future of Africa-China relations rests on including such voices if a robust and vibrant engagem ent and a meaningful relationship are to be sustained. Arising from a workshop held in Nairobi in April 2008 and co-hosted by Fahamu with the H einrich Boll Foundation (Kenya), this is the third in a series published by Pambazuka Press attempting to develop an authentic AfricaChina discourse among civil society organisations around social justice. Chinese and. African Perspectives on C hina in Africa assesses China's activities in Africa through patterns of investment, legal cooperation, effects on the environment, trade, aid and labour links, questions of peace, security and stability, the African Union response, possible regulatory interventions and the future strengthening of an Africa-China CSO dialogue. This is a thoughtfully structured book, backed by notable contributions from African and Chinese scholars, which provides new data and real insights i,llo the burgeoning relationship behveen China and Africa.

Dr Chris Alden, London School of Economics Any book on Africa-China relations which steers away from hegemonic western perspectives and paradigms is welcome. This is one such book.

Is sa G. Shivji, Mwalimu Nyerere Professor of Pan-African Studies, Un ivers ity of Dar es Salaam

Thi s volume adds valuable lIew insights to the necessary ongoing debate. It brings together a varieh, of differellt perspectives alld approaches, both from Chinese and African points of view, on a wide range of themes, and helps us understand the range of African responses to China's role.

Dr Henning Melber, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation ISBN: 978-1-906387-34-1

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Pambazuka Press An imprint of Fahamu Books

I I HEINRICH

BOLL STIFTUNG EAST & HORN OF AFRICA

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