Abstract Book of the International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstracts The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology

Qom, Iran March 9-10, 10, 2011

Contents

Contents

The Message of the Conference Chairman ................................. ................................ 15 A Report of the Conference .................................................... .................... 16 Introduction ................................................................................. ................. 19 The Scientific Council of the Conference .................................... ................................ 21 5 Part I

The Soul and Body in the Quran and Ḥadīth ............................. 25 Reza Berenjkar

Multi-Dimensionality Dimensionality and Immortality of Humans in the Quran ................................................................................................ ...................................... 26 Alireza Alebouyeh

Fakhr Rāzi's Religious Arguments for the Immateriality of the Soul .............................................................................................. .............................. 27 Mahdi Zakeri

The Son of the Mud and the Darkness of the Unknown Self .... 28 Shafiq Joradi

A Critique of the Implication of the Quranic Verse “They Ask Thee about the Spirit” for Immateriality of the Soul ................ 29 Rouhollah Beheshtipour

Contents

Exegetical and Scriptural Issues about Mind-Body Relation

The Role of the Body in Quran ................................................... ................... 30 Amri Harboush

The Distinction or Sameness of Rūḥ and Nafs in the Quran ..... 31 Gholamreza Parhizkar

The Soul-Body Problem in Early Muslim Theologians ............. 32 Mohammad Taqi Sobhani

The

Soul-Body

Theories

among

Mid-Century Century

Shiite

Mutakalimīn and their Implications for the Doctrine of Resurrection ................................................................................ ................ 33 Alinaqi Khodayari

The Soul and the Resurrection in Sayyid Murtaḍā’s ā’s View ........ 34 Alireza As’adi

The Immateriality of the Soul in Some Ash'arite Views: The 6

History, Textual Evidence and Implications ............................. 35 Ahmed Abdeljabbar Snobar (Jordan)

Ghazālī and the Nature of the Soul and its Relation to the Body: The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

the Conflict between the Quran and Philosophy ....................... 36 Mehdi Akhavan

The Soul in the Quran from Tirmidhī 's View ........................... 37 Mohammed Soori

A Comparison of Ṣadrāean View of the Soul-Body Body Relation to the Quranic Conception of the Man ........................................... ................................ 39 Mohammad Abbas-Zadeh Jahromi

Soul and Spirit in Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahānī's View ....................... 40 Mohammad Biabani

Soul and Body in Allāmeh
āṭabā'ī’s View ..............................41 Mansour Nasiri

An Exegesis of 1 Corinthian 5:5 .................................................. .................. 42 Daniel Bediako

PART II

Afterlife 2.1. 2.1. The Doctrine of Intermediate State ............. 47 The Intermediate-State Perfection............................................. Mahdi Nekouyi Samani (Iran)

Perfection in Barzakh ................................................................ .................................. 48 Ahmad Efshagar (Iran)

Perfection and Volition in Barzakh ............................................ ................................ 49 Ahmadreza Honari (Iran)

Luke 16:19-31: Intermediate State of the Soul? ......................... 50 Daniel Berchie

Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Development of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility with the Biblical Bibli

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Teaching on the Afterlife ............................................................. ............................. 51

2.2. 2.2. Resurrection and the MindMind-Body Problem An Analysis of Ṣadrāean adrāean Quranic Eschatology in light of the Mind-Body Problem................................................................ .................................... 55 Hamed Shiva

A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist Account of Resurrection ................................................................................ ................ 56 Ali Sana'ei

The Ethereal Body and Quranic Resurrection............................ ............................57 Mostafa Mo'meni (Iran)

The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical Psychology for his Eschatology.................................................................................. .................. 58 Sadeq Mirahmadi Sarpiri (Iran)

The Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife Doctrines ............. 59 Yasser Khoshnevis

Contents

Robert Osei-Bonsu

The Problem of Resurrection and the Mind-Body Body Relation in Ibn Sina and Mullā Ṣadrā ........................................................... ........................... 60 Zahra Alemi (Iran)

The Sameness and Likeness of Afterlife Bodies in the Quran ... 61 Akbar Qorbani (Iran)

The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men in Different Forms ................................................................ ........................................... 62 Marzieh Rezaee (Iran)

The Dualist Afterlife: Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā ...................... 63 Jari Kaukua

Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity from Early to Reformation-Era Christianity ............................. 65 Michael J. Sigrist

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Augustine and Ibn Sina on Souls in the Afterlife ...................... 69

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Gareth B. Matthews

Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Resurrection: Mapping Philosophical Conclusions Onto Faith-Based Faith Doctrines ..................................................................................... ..................... 70 Richard Taylor

Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect (Rational Soul) and the Denial of the Individual Immortality ............................ 71 Hassan Yousofian

The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal World (‘ālam al-mithāl) in the Illuminationist tradition (ḥikmat ikmat al-ishrāq al) of th the 13 century. ................................................................ ........................................... 73 Roxanne D. Marcotte

The Implications of Avicenna’s Conception of the Soul for his Conception of Survival ................................................................ .................................75 Reza Akbari

Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection in Islamic and Christian Doctrines ...................................................................................... ......................77 Akbar Faydei (Iran)

Bodily Resurrection ................................................................ .................................... 78 Kobra Rahimi, Nasrollah Shameli (Iran)

Resurrection and the Soul-Body Relation in Ibn Sina .............. 79 Kobra Majidi Bidgoli (Iran)

The Implications of Ṣadrāean adrāean Psychology for Eschatology ...... 80 Mohammad Reza Haji Esma'ili, Zahra Alafchian (Iran)

The Immortality of the Soul in Quran ........................................ ................................ 81 Qorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki (Iran)

The Soul-Body Body Relation in Resurrection: A perspective from Islamic Philosophers and Theologians ...................................... ................................ 82 Mohammad Es’haq Arefi (Iran)

The Soul-Body Body Relation in the Resurrection and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in Ṣadrā...................................................... ...................... 83 Ahmad Sa'adat

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Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of the Soul and the Bodily Resurrection ....... 84 Gholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani

Relations and an Account of the Bodily Resurrection .............. 86 Askari Soleimani Amiri

The Survival of the Soul in Mullā Ṣadrā's View ......................... 89 Hadi Mousavi (Iran)

Thomistic Hylomorphism and Human Persistence: Connections and Prospects between Christianity and Islam ......................... 90 Stephen R. Ogden

2.3. 2.3. Metempsychosis and Raj’a Correct Metempsychosis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s adrā’s View and his Explanation of Maskh Verses ..................................................... ..................... 95 Vahideh Ameri (Iran)

Metempsychosis in Quran and Ḥadīth ....................................... ................................ 96 Mohammad Taqi Yousofi

Contents

Soul-Body Monism with a Dual-Aspect Aspect Theory of their

The Soul-Body Relations and Raj'a ............................................ ................................ 97 Hossein Elahi-Nijad

2.4. 2.4. Heaven and Hell The

Soul-Body Body

Problem

and

the

Heaven’s

Unusual

Characteristics ............................................................................ ............ 101 Mohammad Hossein Heshmatpour

The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its Attachment to the Soul and the Body ................................................................ ..................................... 103 Rajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah Al-Mentawi

Hell in the Quran and Ḥadīth .................................................... ....................105 Shokoufeh Gholami, Sousan Goudarzi (Iran)

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2.5. 2.5. Do Persons Exist before this World? World? ................................ 109 Soul and Body in the Worlds of Dhar ...................................... Ali Afzali

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Ṣadrāean View on ḥodūth and Qedam of the Soul ................... 110 Mohammad Miri

The Grounds for the Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of Material Origin and Spiritual Survival of the Soul ...................................................... ......................111 Morteza Pouyan (Iran)

Muslim Mystics’ View of the ḥodūth and Qedam of the Soul .. 112 Mohammad Miri

A Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin and the Spiritual Survival of the Soul ................................................................ .................................... 113 Gholamreza Fayyazi

Out of Eden: Evolution and the Fall ......................................... ................................ 115 Martin Lembke

An Analysis of the Objections of Mulla Shamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq Ardistani to Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of the Soul . 117 Abolhassan Ghaffari (Iran)

PART III

The Nature of Human Persons, Morality and God-Human Relations Ṣadrāean View f the Role of the Body in Cognition................. 121 Ahmad Va’ezi

The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the Method of Disjunction (faṣl) and Conjunction (waṣl): A Discussion of the Limits of the Religious and Philosophical/Scientific Thought in the Explaining the Phenomenon of Consciousness .............122 Samir Abuzaid (Egypt)

The Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition in Islamic Philosophy and Quran ............................................................... ............................... 125

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Morteza Erfani

Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Consciousness and Existence ..........126 The Influence of the Non-doxic doxic on the Doxic Dimensions of the Soul in Ghazālī ................................................................ ...........................................128 Zahra (Mitra) Poursina

Islamic Philosophical Psychology and the Doctrine of Fitrah in Quran .......................................................................................... ..........................129 Zolfaghar Nasseri

In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart of philosophy of mind ................................................................ ................................... 130 Charles Taliaferro

The Moral Aspect of the Soul: The Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral Issues in Ghazali and Aquinas ................................... ................................ 131 Zohreh Sadat Naji (Iran)

Islamic Ethics without Souls ..................................................... .....................132 Aliakbar Golghandashti

Contents

Mehnaz Zainab

Images of the Body in Rumi’s Mathnavi ................................... ................................ 133 Ebrahim Alipour

The Gender of the Mind and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justice ......................................................................................... ......................... 135 Hadi Sadeqi

The Real Happiness (Sa’adah) in Ṣadrāean adrāean Philosophy ..........136 Mohammad Ghasem Elyasi

Human Happiness and the Role of Religion in Fārābi's View 137 Yarali Kord Firouzjaei

Human Dignity on the basis of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla Ṣadrā ........................................................................................... ...........................138 Sima Mohammadpour Dehkordi (Iran)

The Soul-Body Body Relation in the Philosophy of Malebranche, the 12

Islamic Philosophy and Ash'arite Thought and Its Implications for the Free Will and Divine Agency ......................................... ................................ 139

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Majid Zia'i (Iran)

PART IV

God, Prophecy and the Mind-Body Body Problem Does God Have a Mind? ............................................................ ............................143 Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen

Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles in Terms of his Mind-Body Theory ................................................................ .....................................144 Hamidreza Khademi (Iran)

The Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination in Aquinas ....... 145 Alireza Fazeli

A

Philosophical

Explanation

of

Imamah in Peripatetic

Philosophy .................................................................................. ..................146 Mortaza Yousofi-Rad

Human as the Vicar of God and the Nature of the Soul ........... 147 Seyyed Mohammad Akbarian

PART V

Mind-Body Body Problem and the Religious Belief Psychological Philosophy between Aristotle and Ibn Sina ...... 151 Hossein Rostami Jalilian (Iran)

An Approach to the Soul-Body Body Relation: The Plan of a View .. 152 Ahmad Shahgoli (Iran)

A Comparative Examination of the Soul-Body Body Relation in Aquinas and Ibn Sina ................................................................ ................................. 153 Zahra Zare' (Iran)

Soul-Body Problem in Ibn Sina, Ṣadrā and Zonouzi................ 154 Rahmatollah Karimzadeh (Iran)

The Soul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean Philosophy..................... 155

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Seyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah

A Critique of the Principles of the Ṣadrāean adrāean Philosophy ......... 156 Cartesian and Neo-Cartesian Arguments for Dualism ............158 Edward Wierenga

Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists? .............................159 Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen

A Defense of Ibn Sina’s Theory of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survival ...................................................................................... ...................... 160 Seyyed Hassan Sa’adat Mostafavi

Soul, Body, and their Interrelations .......................................... ................................ 161 Ali Abedi Shahroudi

Rational Character and Immortal Happiness: Ibn Sina’s View on the Role of Intellect in Afterlife Happiness .........................164 Amir Divāni

Persons Without Immaterial Souls ........................................... ................................ 165 Lynne Rudder Baker

Contents

S. Yahya Yasrebi

What is Dualism and Its Relation to Science and Religion?.... 167 Uwe Meixner

Unity and Subjectivity: the Plotinian Perspective and Its Aftermath................................................................................... ................... 168 Douglas Hedley

The Soul-Body Relation in Ibn Ḥazm's View ............................169 Khaled Amohammad Faraj Alohaishi

The Concept of Soul and Spirit in the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's View .................................................................................. ..................170 Bahloul Mohammad Hossain Taha

A Philosophical Explanation of the Soul-Body Body Relations in Ṣadrāean View ............................................................................ ............ 171 Ahmad Sa'adat

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Soul-Body Body Relation in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Ṣadrā ................................................................ ......................................... 172 Es'haq Shirdaqi

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

The Soul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean Philosophy..................... 173 Mehri Changi Ashtiani (Iran)

Emergentism: How Mind May Become Body-Free ................. 174 Rouhollah Ramezani Varzaneh

Swinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soul.................................. ................................ 175 Amir Dastmalchian

A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem................................................................ ................................... 176 Yasser Pouresmail

The Message of the Conference Chairman

The Message of the Conference Chairman The Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology has focused its research programs on macro-projects projects in order to enrich the intellectual-cultural cultural heritage, propose new inquiries, discover novel grounds, correct and comprehensive reformulation of the issues in the he heritage, pave the path for theorization and

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pushing the boundaries of knowledge. In this direction, the Center has on its agenda the translation of important issues and

Because of the significance of anthropological issues for Islam and other Abrahamic religions and the theological implications of mind-body body theories, the Center decided to found studies about the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology, psych in order to reformulate and reintroduce the Islamic traditional theories of the philosophical psychology (ilm al-nafs nafs) with a consideration of, and comparison with, contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind. Therefore, the macro-project project of "the "th mind-body relation" was established in 2006. Some published or nearly-published published (Farsi) works of this macro-project project ever since then are: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, A Descriptive Bibliography of the Philosophy of Soul, An Examination of Physicalistic ysicalistic Theories of

The Message of

regarding the topics of the macro-projects.

the Conference Chairman

holding academic seminars, in addition to research works

the Mind, Emergentism and Consciousness, Faculties of the Soul and the Modularity of the Mind, Christianity and the Mind-Body Body Problem, Dualism and Behaviorism, The Identity Theory, Functionalism and Eliminativism. Given the desirable progress of this macro-project project and because of the role the mind-body body theories play in our accounts of most religious doctrines, the Center decided to hold the International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Body Problem, which was welcomed byy thinkers and philosophers around the world. Great Islamic scholars of Islamic Seminary (Hawzah) such as Ayatollah Javadi Āmoli, Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Mosṭafavi, afavi, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Ahmad Va'ezi, Seyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah, 16

Gholamreza

Fayyazi,

Amir

Divani, vani,

Reza

Berenjkar, Iranian university professors such as Mohammad Saeedimehr, Reza Akbari, Hossain Sheykhrezaee, and foreign

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

visitors such as Lynne Rudder Baker and Edward Wierenga.

A Report of the Conference After the approval of the conference in the Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, the conference posters and the brochures (in three languages of Farsi, Arabic and English) were sent to over 70 Iranian academic centers and 120 centers abroad.. 103 Farsi papers, 9 Arabic papers and 21 English papers were ere received by the Secretariat of the conference, both through the call-forcall papers and by the Iranian and Non-Iranian invitees. In order to introduce the contemporary theories of the soulsoul body relation in Islamic philosophy, some dialogues were made with contemporary figures in the field, such as Ayatollah Mostafavi, Ayatollah Seyyed Razi Shirazi, Seyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah, Ali Abedi Shahroudi, Gholamreza Fayyazi, Muhammad Hossein Heshmatpour, Gholamhossein Ebrahimi

Dinani, and Seyyed Yahya Yasrebi. Also two pre-conferences conferences have been held; "The Soul-Body Soul Relation in Sadraean Philosophy and Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy" by the contribution of Ayatollah Mostafavi, Abdorrasul Oboudiat and Ali Afzali on January 20,, 2011; and "The Soul-Body Relation in Quran uran and Hadith" by the contribution of Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Reza Berenjkar, and Mahdi Zakeri on February 17, 2011. Also in order to introduce some Western mind-body body theories and their accounts of the resurrection, 8 weekly seminars were held as follows:Lynne Lynne Baker's constitution view and its account of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two sessions: December 22 and 29, 2010), emergentism and its account of resurrection (by Yasser Khoshnevis in two sessions:: January 5

17

and 12, 2011), Peter van Inwagen's en's eliminativist view and its account of the resurrection (by Mahmoud Morvarid in two

in two sessions: February 9 and 16, 2011). Finally ly I should thank Ebrahim Alipoor, the head of the Philosophy Department where the conference was organized, Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, the Scientific Secretary of the conference, Yasser Pouresmail, the director of the conference, Mohammad Reza Zekavat, the Conference nference Ceremonial and Information Secretary, Ghaffar Shave'ei, the Conference Finance and Sponsorship Secretary, Habib Ghahramani, the Conference International Secretary. I should also thank the members of the scientific council of the conference, Reza Akbari, kbari,

Reza

Berenjkar,

Lynne

Rudder

Baker,

Charles

Taliaferro, Mohsen Javadi, Mohammad Taqi Sobhani, Mahdi Zakeri,

Mohammad

Saeedimehr,

Gholamreza

Fayyazi,

The Message of

dualism and its account of the resurrection (by Mansour Nasiri

the Conference Chairman

sessions: January 19 and 26, 2011) and Alvin Plantinga's Plantinga

Muhammad Legenhausen, Uwe Meixner, Mansour Nasiri, Edward Wierenga. I shall appreciate the efforts off the paper evaluators, faculty members, office managers and colleagues of the Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology. It is hoped that the conference helps enrich the literature on the topic and make the grounds for the religious inter-dialogue between n Christian and Islamic scholars. Alireza Alebouyeh Head of the Center for Islamic Philosophy and Theology Chairman of the International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Body Problem

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

18

Introduction

Introduction The question of the human ultimate nature was one of the oldest questions of the mankind, and perhaps this was the question with which the humans recognized themselves as distinct from other animals and acquired aware of their own selves. The antiquity of the question can be demonstrated by

19

what one might see in the scriptures and ancient philosophies. On the other hand, most religions and schools of thoughts have modern Western philosophy, losophy, though there was disapproval and reluctancy towards most parts of the old metaphysics, which was emphasized by the slogan of the consummation of the metaphysics, the problem of the self and the human nature still remained as one of the main concerns, ns, and new approaches were offered. The heritage of the monotheistic religions has a distinguished position among the thoughts and doctrines about the nature of the human person. This valuable heritage can be explored not only the scriptures, but also in the innumerable works of the religious scholars. It seems that within the last centuries, sufficient attention was not paid to this heritage. One of the purposes of the "International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Body Problem" is to pay enough e

Introduction

the knowledge of the self at the focus of their attentions. In

attention to this domain and show the depth of the issues which can be good subject-matters matters for researchers of the field. The religious knowledge is much dependant on the mind-body mind problem, and we can say, without exaggeration, that few faithfaith related propositions can be found which are not somehow related to the mind-body body problem. The topics of the conference papers which only illustrate part of the domain (and more topics should be dealt with in the future) reflect the significance the mind-body problem lem for our understanding of religious doctrines. Some people might still think that the mind-body mind problem is relevant only to the doctrines of resurrection and after death, but the fact is that it is closely relevant to other religious doctrines such as our ur knowledge of the God, his 20

attributes and the divine acts, the nature of the revelation (vaḥy), prophecy, imamah, and other foundations of the religious belief. The papers of the International Conference of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem –abstracts abstracts of which are published in this volume- is evidence for the relation between religious doctrines and the mind-body body theories. This conference which is the result of the common efforts of intellectuals and scholars of two great religions –Christian Christianity and Islam- can be a pattern for a religious inter-dialogue dialogue in academic domains. We hope this step to be the first stage of an extended research program of "religious philosophy of mind". Mohammad Taqi Sobhani The Scientific Secretary of the Conference

The Scientific Council of the Conference

The Scientific Council of the Conference

University of Qom, Iran

Mohammad Taqi Sobhani

Mahdi Zakeri

Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

University of Tehran, Iran

Reza Akbari

Ebrahim Alipoor

Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

Mohammad Saeedimehr

Gholamreza Fayyazi

Tarbiat Modarres University, Tehran, Iran

Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Reza Berenjkar

Muhammad Legenhausen

University of Tehran, Iran

Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran

Lynne Rudder Baker

Uwe Meixner

University of Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

University of Regensburg, Germany

Yasser Pouresmail

Mansour Nasiri

Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

Charles Taliaferro

Edward Wierenga

St. Olaf College, USA

University of Rochester, New York, USA

21

Council of the Conference

Mohsen Javadi

The Scientific

Alireza Alebouyeh Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

Part I

Exegetical and Scriptural Issues about Mind-Body Relation

Abstracts

The Soul and Body in the Quran and Ḥadīth Reza Berenjkar University of Tehran (Iran)

There have been different issues regarding the soul-body soul relation: soul-body body distinction, variety of souls, faculties of the soul, its temporal emergence (ḥudūth) and eternity (qedam), its motion and perfection, its immortality and the soul-body soul interaction. In this paper I will try to give an account of the

25

soul-body relation consonant with the Quran and Ḥadīth adīth which

Keywords: soul, body, Quran, Ḥadīth, immortality.

Abstracts

touches the main soul-body issues.

MultiMulti-Dimensionality and Immortality of Humans in the Quran Alireza Alebouyeh Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

In this paper I will deal with the question of the nature of the human person in the Quran; does the Quran take humans to be one-dimensional or multi-dimensional? dimensional? I shall examine three 26

claims in this regard: (1) The Quran takes humans to be multidimensional, (2) the other dimension of humans (besides besides his material, bodily dimension) is not the soul as a substance in the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

philosophical sense, (3) since the material dimension corrupts after death, the other non-bodily bodily dimension is immortal. This entails ils that the criterion for the personal identity of the worldly and afterlife person is his non-bodily bodily dimension, and the bodily dimension is merely peripheral. This paper has two sections, one of which deals with the verses which demonstrate the multidimensionality ensionality of humans and the other with the verses which show their immortality. Keywords: soul, spirit, immortality, Quran, human dimensions.

Fakhr Rā Rāzi's Religious Arguments for the Immateriality of the Soul Mahdi Zakeri Tehran University (Iran)

Fakhr Rāzi in his Al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ wa Sharḥ Quwāhuma tries to make religious-textual textual arguments for the idea of an immaterial soul distinct from the material body; the chapter in which he discusses the issue is "on the arguments from the

27

scripture for the idea that the soul is distinct from the body". body 8 of his 10 textual arguments are Quranic ones and two of them which the word nafs is used; two are the ones in which the stages of the human creation n are mentioned; the other two are about the survival after death; one argument employs the human cognizance, and the last one makes an appeal to the distinction between the world of spirits and bodies in religious texts. In this paper I try to give an analysis lysis of these arguments. Keywords: Fakhr Rāzi,, immateriality, soul, Quran, survival after death.

Abstracts

are from Ḥadīth.. Four of these arguments focus on texts in

The Son of the Mud and the Darkness of the Unknown Self Shafiq Joradi Joradi AlAl-Ma’ā Ma’ārif AlAl-Ḥikmiah Center (Lebanon)

Ancient philosophies usually took the soul to be the ultimate entity of the human and the body to be worthless and negligible. This Gnostic thought has affected our philosophical theories too. In this paper, having talked about the meanings of the 28

words rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), and jasad (body), I will show that Quran and Ḥadīth –in in consonance with the views of early Muslim mutakalimīn (theologians)- take the body to be an

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

important factor of the human entity. Also in this paper, I will point to the Christian stian theory of incarnation and show that the Bible and the early Church Fathers emphasize the significance of the body as an inseparable part of the humans in all the worlds. Only in the modern Western philosophy, Descartes proposed soul-body dualism and challenged the role of the body in the human entity. Finally I will consider some religious textual evidence about the creation of the human, Ḥadīth of

Anwār, Ḥadīth of ṭinah (mud), and bodily resurrection to show that the body has an important role in the nature of the humans. Keywords: rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), body, mutakalimīn, Quran,

ṭinah, bodily resurrection.

A Critique of the Implication of the Quranic Verse “They “They Ask Thee about the Spirit” for Immateriality of the Soul Rouhollah Beheshtipour Imam Khomeini International University (Qazvin, Iran)

One of the main Quranic arguments for the immateriality of the soul is Isrā: 85: “they ask thee about the spirit, telll them the spirit is of my Lord's amr”. According to some exegesis, the

29

verse refers to the human soul and provides a support for its the world of the spiritual, immaterial entities. But in this th paper, I will show that this interpretation fails, since the word rūḥ (spirit) has never been used in the Quran to refer to the human person. Rūḥ refers instead to certain knowledge that prophets and Imams possessed, which gave them the ability to receive rece revelations and do miracles. Keywords: the verse of rūḥ, immateriality, world of amr, ism

a'ẓam.

Abstracts

immateriality. On this interpretation, amr is taken to refer to

The Role of the Body in Quran Amri Harboush Mentouri University (Algeria)

Islam does not take the body to be accidentally or randomly created; rather God has created the soul and the body and never considers the body and its needs in a negative way, nor allows for its humiliation or harm or violence. Instead Quran calls for meeting the biological or bodily needs in accordance with the demands of faith and divine teachings. All body-related related affairs 30

from eating and drinking to sleeping and sexual intercourse count as sacred as far as they are in accordance with divine commands. In Quran and the Islamic thought, the body has a

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

significant role. In addition to existential, moral and aesthetical characters, it has a religious character too, and this allows for the talk of an Islamic body. However, the body has historically been marginalized in the Islamic culture and there have not been much talk about it. An examination of the body’s transformations in Quran –e.g. e.g. its transfer from the worldly life to the afterlife- shows that the body is not in the same status all the time; your worldly body is not your barzakhī body, your

barzakhī body is not your resurrected ed body, and your resurrected body is not your body in heaven or hell. In this paper, I will talk about these transformations and the role of the body all throughout. Keywords: body, Quran, resurrection, heaven, hell, forms of body.

The Distinction or or Sameness of

Rūḥ Rūḥ and Nafs in the Quran Gholamreza Parhizkar Hawzahof Qom (Iran)

In this paper I will talk about whether or not the words rūḥ (spirit) and nafs (soul) refer to one and the same thing. An examination of Quranic verses and Ḥadīth shows that they have one and the same meaning and I have classified 5 categories of

31

arguments for this view. However there is a slight difference between the two: rūḥ refers to the immaterial aspect of human

Keywords: rūḥ (spirit), nafs (soul), Quran, Ḥadīth,, body.

Abstracts

person and nafs includes the man's material aspects as well. well

The SoulSoul-Body Problem in Early Muslim Theologians Mohammad Taqi Sobhani Islamic Sciences and Culture (Qom, (Qom, Iran) Iran)

Anthropological issues came into currency among Muslim theologians (mutakalimīn) and philosophers only since the 4th century A.H. and there is not much information available about 32

the mutakalimīn’s views on the matter in the first three centuries. More research shows that the issue was a matter of serious discussion in the mid-second second century A.H. and raised

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

controversies among mutakalimīn. Interestingly a variety of theories about the immateriality and materiality of the soul were at stake from the dawn of this discussion. In this paper, I will examine and compare the views of Hishām ibn Ḥakam Ḥ and Hishām ibn Sālim (of Shiite mutakalimīn) on the one hand, and Abulhodhail 'Allaf and Naẓām m (of Mu’tazilites) on the other, and will finally compare these with the views of the late Shiites Shiite and Mu’tazilites such as Sadūq, Mufīd, Murtaḍā, and Qāḍ ḍī 'Abd alJabbār. Keywords: nafs (soul), mutakalimīn, Mu’tazilites, s, Shiites, materiality, immateriality.

The SoulSoul-Body Theories among MidMid-Century Shiite

Mutakalimīn and their Implications for the Doctrine of Resurrection Alinaqi Khodayari Imam Khomeini School of Religions and History (Qom, (Qom, Iran) Iran)

In this paper I will introduce some of the views of the midmid century Shiite mutakalimīn (from 4th to 7th century A.H.), their historical development, and their implications for the doctrine

33

of resurrection. In the introduction of the paper, some

mutakalimīn will be reviewed. Keywords: nafs (soul), mutakalimīn, resurrection.

Abstracts

Mu’tazilite views which count as backgrounds to Shiite

The Soul and the Resurrection in Sayyid Murtaḍ Murtaḍā’s View Alireza As’adi Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

A comprehensive account of some religious doctrines depends on our views about the humans and their characteristics. characte Different anthropological theories yield various accounts of 34

religious doctrines. The main anthropological problem is that of the ultimate nature of humans. In this paper, I will talk about the soul-body problem in the view of one of the main Shiite Shii

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

theologians, Sayyid Murtaḍā, and some challenges that his view might face in accounting some of the religious doctrines. Keywords: nafs (soul), body, resurrection, anthropology, Sayyid Murtaḍā.

The Immateriality of the Soul in Some Ash'arite Views: The History, Textual Evidence and Implications Ahmed Abdeljabbar Snobar (Jordan) Jordan)

In this paper I will talk about the views of some Ash'arites who believe that the soul is an immaterial, a-spatial spatial substance which is not described as physical and is not characterized by material features such as penetration and separation; rather it is

35

attached to matters as a governing principle. Ghazālī and Rāzī R – proponents of this view. However, this view is against the mainstream of Ash'arites who believe in the materiality of the soul. Here I will examine the textual evidence of the proponents of this view and their implications –specially of late Ash'aritesAsh'arites and point to the theory of Hanbalites who conclusively reject the immateriality of the soul and make textual arguments for the materiality of the soul. Keywords: immateriality, rūḥ (spirit), Ash'arites, Ash'arites Quran, Ḥadīth.

Abstracts

in some of his opinions- and Baiḍāwī are the most famous

Ghazā Ghazālī and the Nature of the Soul and its Relation to the Body: the Conflict between the Quran and Philosophy Mehdi Akhavan Allameh Tabatabei University (Tehran, (Tehran, Iran) Iran)

Ghazālī’s ’s philosophical psychology has positive and negative aspects. One of the most important problems roblems in which Quranic 36

doctrines are denied by the philosophical intellect is in the field of philosophical psychology. His negative views can be inferred

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

from his attacks on philosophical views in the Questions 18 & 19 of Tahāfut al-Falāsifah. In his view, falāsifah (Muslim philosophers) have provided 10 arguments for the immateriality of the soul, all of which fail to prove the claim. Ghazālī Ghaz also criticizes the falāsifah’s view that the soul is immortal, since it entails that bodies cannot be resurrected, ed, thus he accuses

falāsifah of heresy. Thus in Ghazālī’s ’s works, religious doctrines and philosophical views in issues concerning the soul meet.

Falāsifah such as Ibn Rushd and Ṣadrā have adopted different approaches to such challenges. This paper will discuss di the dispute between Ghazāī and falāsifah. Keywords: nafs (soul), Ghazāī, āī, immateriality, resurrection,

qiyāmah.

The Soul in the Quran from Tirmidhī 's View Mohammed Soori Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

Though Tirmidhī has no independent work on Quranic exegesis, some of his discussions about the human soul throughout his works are of exegetical character. The most important of his works about the soul is Qawr al-Ūmūr which is the main

37

reference of this paper. Tirmidhī usually appeals to Quranic verses, and rarely does he recourse to other sources such as novel and unique in his time,, and it remains novel even today, though it had impacts on some mystics such ass Ibn Arabī. Arab Tirmidhī distinguishes between two types of souls: inward (bāṭin) and outward (ẓahir). The essence of the inward soul is of the most inferior type of mud, since the mud was the footstep of the Lucifer (Iblīs) before the creation of Ādam. Tirmidhī Tirmi argues that the footstep of each person is part of him. This is why the Lucifer sees at least part of Ādam dam as his own and thus did not prostrate (sajdah) for him. The inward soul has different states and it should be challenged with, in order for the person p to achieve happiness. The outward soul, unlike the inward, has no particular tendencies and merely obeys anyone who dominates it. If knowledge which is the light and intellect dominates the outward soul, it would become intellectual, and if the inward inwar

Abstracts

Ḥadīth. It seems that his account of the soul was completely

soul dominates it, it would become Satanic. Tirmidhī did not talk about the materiality or immateriality of the soul directly (in fact the issue seems to have been strange, unknown to him), but his talks imply that he took the soul to be fine-grained fin matter (jism laṭīf). Keywords: nafs (soul), Quran, Tirmidhī, inward soul, outward soul.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

38

A Comparison of Ṣadrāean adrāean View of the SoulSoul-Body Relation to the Quranic Conception of the Man Mohammad AbbasAbbas-Zadeh Jahromi The Higher Education Complex (Jahrom, Iran)

The soul-body unification in Ṣadrāean philosophy hilosophy is based on some principles, which can be compared with the Quranic picture of the man. Some of these principles are as follows: human persons are individuated by their souls, their souls are

39

not specifica, the soul is created out of the body, it is subject to evolution, immaterial, hierarchical (tashkīkī) in character, In this paper, I will try to give Quranic evidence for the Ṣadrāean view. The Quran ascribes various attributes to the human person: dignity, superiority to all other creatures, being created in hardship, ungratefulness, being in loss, weakness, hastefulness, voraciousness, and ignorance, which can all be explained in Ṣadrāean terms. Keywords: soul, body, Transcendental philosophy, Quran, religious doctrines.

Abstracts

unified with its faculties, and its unity is not numerical.

Soul and Spirit in Mī Mīrzā rzā Mahdī Mahdī Eṣfahā fahānī's View Mohammad Biabani Āl alal-Bait Institute (Qom, Iran)

In this paper, I will talk about Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahā ānī's views about the soul and spirit. Mīrzā Mahdī is the founder of a theological movement in Iran which is often known as the 40

school of tafkīk or ma'ārif which emphasizes on the separation between religious beliefs and philosophical arguments. I will talk about the meaning and nature of the soul and the spirit and

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

the difference between them, the way of knowing the soul, types of souls and spirits, the need of the soul to the body, the role of the soul and the spirit in the nature of human beings, the stages of human creation ion (as composed of the body and the spirit), the soul and spirit in the uterus, in the world, in barzakh (purgatory) and in the afterlife. Keywords: Mīrzā Mahdī Eṣfahānī, ī, soul, spirit, human essence.

Soul and Body in Allā Allāmeh abā abāṭabā'ī abā'ī’s ā'ī’s View Mansour Nasiri Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, (Qom, Iran) Iran)

As to the problem of the soul, Allāmeh abāṭabā'ī is generally a dualist and specifically a defender of Ṣadrāean ean transcendental (muta'āliyah) philosophy, though his view has its own characteristics. istics. Firstly, he widely appeals to the Quran and

41

Ḥadīth; secondly he is in disagreement with Ṣadrā on various points, for instance, in the way he states the soul-body body relation. regarding the significant gnificant problems of the soul, such as the meaning of rūḥ (spirit) and nafs (soul) in the Quran and Ḥadīth; the proofs of the existence of the soul, the immateriality of the soul, the nature of the human and their implications for an account of religious doctrines, such as the afterlife and the resurrection. Keywords: Allāmeh abāṭabā'ī, soul, body, dualism.

Abstracts

In this paper, I will investigate Allāmeh abāṭab abā'ī's view

An Exegesis of 1 Corinthian 5:5 Daniel Bediako Valley View University (Ghana)

First Corinthians 5:5 reads, “To To deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus”” (KJV). This text presents both exegetical and theological difficulties that relate to the spiritspirit 42

body dichotomy. For example, questions that are often asked includee the following: How is the church to "deliver" the incestuous man to Satan? What does "destruction of the flesh"

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

mean? What about the salvation of the "spirit" in the day of the Lord? What implications does this text have for church discipline? The articlee focuses on three areas. The first briefly surveys various scholarly views on the passage; the second establishes its historical and literary contexts; and the third provides a lexical analysis of the relevant lexical items of the text (i.e., “deliver,” “destruction,” destruction,” “flesh,” “spirit,” “save”), indicating how they fit into the context of 1 Corinthians 5 and the Pauline writings in general. Keywords: 1 Corinthians, body, flesh, spirit, save, duality. duality

PART II

Afterlife

2. 1. The Doctrine of Intermediate State State

The IntermediateIntermediate-State Perfection Mahdi Nekouyi Samani (Iran)

One of the main issues in philosophy and theology is the problem of the naturee of the soul, its immateriality and life in

barzakh. The problem of the perfection and change in the soul after its separation from the body is one of the most complicated and yet rarely discussed philosophical issues. Can we give a philosophical explanation of this religious doctrine?

47

This is an acknowledged doctrine on the basis of Ḥa adīths: the ones which show that persons in barzakh will be rewarded by completely narrational (naqlī) in character and it cannot be rationalized by philosophical explanations. But others try to give philosophical explanations for the perfection in barzakh. In this paper I will try to give a philosophical explanation on the basis of Ṣadrāean philosophy. Keywords: soul, immateriality, immortality, imaginal body,

barzakh.

Abstracts

what their survivors do. Some people believe that barzakh is

Perfection in Barzakh Ahmad Efshagar (Iran)

The perfection in barzakh is an issue which has not been much discussed. In his return to God, the human person passes from different worlds to reach the divine neighborhood (whether rewarded or punished). When entering each of these thes worlds, both body and soul acquire new properties and lose some 48

defects; this is perfection, that is, a change towards the better.

Barzakh is one of the worlds in which every person will reside after their death and gets perfected. Philosophers have trouble trou The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

accounting for the perfection in barzakh though it is an established religious doctrine. The problem arises because (1) the soul is considered to be immaterial, (2) any perfection, perfection motion or change is restricted to matters and it is impossible for immaterial entities to change, and (3) in afterlife there are no actions which are subjects to rewards and punishments. In this paper I will try to solve the problem by rejecting (2)), that is, I want to argue that there is motion in immaterial entities. Keywords: Keywords: perfection, barzakh, human, resurrection, soul, body.

Perfection and Volition in Barzakh Ahmadreza Honari (Iran)

One of the stages of the human life is the material, worldly one. In this stage humans undergo essential changes on the basis of the substantial motion (ḥarikat jawharī) and gradually change to become actualized. According to religious doctrines, humans move to the world of barzakh after death, and enjoy an intermediate-state state life between their death and the general

49

resurrection. Religious doctrines show that the human perfection does not stop by their death, and they will continue accounted for in terms of the substantial motion and the principle of the renewal of the similar (tajadud amthāl). Keywords: material world, substantial motion, perfection,

barzakh.

Abstracts

to change even in the world of barzakh. This doctrine doctri can be

Luke 16:1916:19-31: 31: Intermediate State of the Soul? Soul? Daniel Berchie Valley View University (Ghana)

This study seeks to determine the meaning of Luke 16:19-31. The question is whether this passage teaches intermediate state of the disembodied soul after death or not. Having studied the setting in which Jesus told this parable and Lucan context, this 50

paper concludes that the presentation of the unseen world represents the eschatological judgment.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Keywords: immaterial soul, death, intermediate state.

Purgatory: A Study of the Historical Development of the Doctrine of Purgatory and its Compatibility with the Biblical Teaching on the Afterlife Robert OseiOsei-Bonsu Valley View University (Ghana)

When it comes to the afterlife, Seventh-day day Adventists advocate “soul sleep” condition, in which thee dead person is in some sort of suspended state until the final judgment. On the other hand,

51

many Evangelical Christians believe that the dead go directly to purgatory is considered as the place where the dead believers expiate their remaining sins before entering the visible presence of God. This doctrine has been criticized extensively both by Catholics and Evangelicals in spite of its massive defence by the Holy office. Several alternative views about out the resurrection of the dead have been propounded by some twentieth century Protestants and some notable Catholic theologians. Although the doctrine of purgatory has been approved and reaffirmed by several Church councils, the question still remains: is i the doctrine of purgatory biblically justifiable? Does the work of salvation extend beyond the grave? This study is an attempt to find satisfactory answers to these questions. This study therefore surveys the doctrine of purgatory in the light of the biblical iblical teachings about death. The first chapter surveys the

Abstracts

Heaven to be with the Lord. But in Roman Catholicism,

background to the doctrine with reference to the Judaism, the Apocrypha, the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and Church Councils. The second chapter looks at the nature of purgatory, the duration tion and the nature of the punishment meted out to those who go to purgatory; and how souls are released from purgatory. The third chapter will also examine the biblical teaching on death. The study concludes that the purgatory is based on tradition rather er than the Bible. The Bible emphasizes the finality of one’s destiny in this life rather than after this life. When it comes to our salvation, human efforts have no merits. Keywords: Bible, purgatory, afterlife.

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2. 2. Resurrection and the MindMind-Body Problem

An Analysis of Ṣadrāean adrāean Quranic Eschatology in light of the MindMind-Body Problem Hamed Shiva Mofid University (Qom, (Qom, Iran) Iran)

This paper will provide a report of Mullā Ṣadrā’ss view on resurrection in light of the mind-body body problem. Here I shall categorize Mulla Ṣadrā’ss view with an eye on his exegetical work, and will show that he gives a different interpretation of

55

Quranic resurrection, though he is against ta’wīl, in a coherent coher way. I will then talk about the views of Mullā Ṣadrā’ss opponents, Ṣadrā;; a Quranic and a philosophical one, and secondly, that his opponents fail to provide a better explanation of the resurrection. Keywords: Ṣadrā, resurrection, soul, body, Quran.

Abstracts

and show first that it is wrong to ascribe two different views to

A Critical Review of Lynne Baker's Materialist Account of Resurrection Ali Sana'ei Semnan University (Semnan, (Semnan, Iran) Iran)

It seems that the religious doctrine of resurrection is not compatible with materialism, but Lynne Rudder Baker as a materialist tries to philosophically account for resurrection. She distinguishes between matter, living organism, and human 56

persons. She regards the mental life of humans as wholly material which is formed by way of evolution. The mental life transfers from the material body to an intermediate--state body

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

by way of a miracle. This argument is of a theological character, which shows a weakness in her philosophical explanation of the resurrection. Her criterion forr the personal identity of persons in this world and the next is not compatible with her functionalist view, and cannot adequately account for the intermediate states of persons between death and the general resurrection. In order to give a more adequate account of the resurrection it seems that we should better appeal to the theory of the existential degrees of humans in Islamic philosophy, since an imaginal (mithālī) body accounts for the metaphysical relation between the material world and the intermediate intermedi state, and counts as a criterion for the personal identity of persons in this world and the hereafter. Keywords: Ṣadrā, adrā, Lynne Baker, Resurrection, soul, mind, body.

The Ethereal Body and Quranic Resurrection Mostafa Mo'meni (Iran)

Bodily resurrection is one of the essential Islamic beliefs which resist a philosophical argumentation. Ibn Sina has admitted that this doctrine cannot be philosophically proved and accepts it only because of the textual religious evidence. However, Mullā Mull Ṣadrā believes that the doctrine can be philosophically accounted for on the basis of some principles such as the

57

principality of existence (aṣālat wujūd),, hierarchy of existence, and substantial motion, and concludes that an ethereal body about whether this ethereal body can account for the bodily resurrection that is cited in Quran or not. I will show that the Ṣadrāean ean account is not compatible with the Quranic resurrection except if we make ake unusual interpretations of Quranic verses. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Mullā Ṣadrā, adrā, bodily resurrection, ethereal body.

Abstracts

will be resurrected ted in the afterlife. In this paper, I will discuss

The Implications of Avicenna's Philosophical Psychology for his Eschatology Sadeq Mirahmadi Sarpiri (Iran)

Avicenna accepts the doctrine rine of bodily resurrection only as a religious belief and thinks that it cannot have a philosophical proof. However, he tries to prove another type of resurrection which is based on the rational happiness and miserability of the 58

men and calls it "spiritual resurrection".. He talks about the survival of the souls, their unification after death, their the happiness and miserability and bodies, their perfection and

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

imperfection,

the

rejection

of

metempsychosis,

the

immateriality of the soul, the soul-body interaction, ion, the soulsoul body relations in order to achieve perfection and other eschatological issues which are affected by his psychological view. This paper will discuss the implications of Avicenna's psychology for his eschatology. Keywords: Ibn Sina, soul, bodily ly resurrection, spiritual resurrection.

The Ontological Emergentism and Afterlife Doctrines Yasser Khoshnevis Sharif University (Tehran, Iran)

In this paper, I introduce the causal version of property emergentism as an alternative for reductionism. After that, I show that the property of qualitative consciousness has the characteristics of emergent properties. Then, I elaborate the substance emergentism thesis and distinguish three versions of

59

it. In the final section, I consider the relationship between etween four mentioned versions of emergentism with afterlife doctrines, necessary conditions for consistency of the considered versions with the afterlife doctrines. Keywords: emergentism, consciousness,, reductionism, bodily resurrection.

Abstracts

both in embodied and disembodied states and identify

The Problem of Resurrection and the MindMind-Body Relation in Ibn Sina and Mullā Mullā Ṣadrā Zahra Alemi (Iran)

Different views about the mind-body body relations lead to different accounts of death and resurrection. In this paper I will talk about the commonalities of two Muslim philosophers in this regard 60

(the

soul's

being

ḥādith-

being

proceeded

by

nothingness, the perfection rfection of the soul and its unification with intellect after death, the spiritual and bodily resurrection, the rejection of metempsychosis, the rejection of the eternal

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

punishment) and their disagreements (the materiality or immateriality of the soul in its ts origin, the kind of the attachment of the soul and the body to one another, and the possibility or impossibility

of

a

philosophical

argument

for

bodily

resurrection). Thus I will give a comprehensive presentation of their perspectives on the problem of resurrection. I conclude with the contention that Mullā Ṣadrā has given a more adequate account of resurrection which is compatible with Quranic teaching. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Mullā Ṣadrā, adrā, soul, body, resurrection.

The Sameness and Likeness of Afterlife Afterlife Bodies in the Quran Akbar Qorbani (Iran)

One of the main issues regarding the mind-body body problem is whether afterlife bodies are the same as (or identical with) worldly bodies or are just like them (or similar to them in all aspects, without being identical)? tical)? Some Quranic verses seem to testify to the sameness and some seem to demonstrate the

61

likeness. In this paper, after a brief introduction of the accounts given by Ghazālī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Price, I will examine the which is the criterion of man's identity is, in fact, the same as man's worldly soul, but his afterlife body will be like his worldly body. Thus the changes in his worldly body do not give rise to any problems about his personal identity. Keywords: Quran, soul, body, sameness, likeness, afterlife.

Abstracts

Quranic verses and conclude that in n Quran, the human soul

The Substantial Motion and the Resurrection of Men in Different Forms Marzieh Rezaee (Iran)

The resurrection of humans in different forms is one of the Islamic doctrines and is not compatible with philosophical views. According to Quran, some people will be resurrected as dogs and pigs (moreover, it says that some people are in these 62

forms even in n this world). If we take humanness to be a

specifica proximus and rationality as its differentia, we cannot account for the above doctrine. This is why some exegetics have The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

interpreted these verses as metaphorical. If we accept the principle of the validity of appearances (ẓawahir) of the verses, we should seek for a philosophical explanation for such verses. In this paper, I will talk about the troubles for Ibn Sina's view in the explanation of this doctrine, and then defend the Ṣadrāean explanation as plausible. One of the Ṣadrāean ean philosophical grounds in explaining this doctrine is the substantial motion and his theory of the soul-body body relation. According to the substantial motion, human persons do not count as stable entities; rather they are perdurant entities which can be reduced to an animal degree. Keywords: resurrection, substantial motion, qiyāmah, perduant entity.

The Dualist Afterlife: Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā adrā Jari Kaukua University of Jyväskylä (Finland)

Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Quranic account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent

63

precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with Revelation risk neglecting important

variations

between

theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of possibilities in the concepts involved. From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially ally central to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense of the kind of first-personality personality that must be an irreducible constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in

Abstracts

case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or

this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines to which Avicenna and Mulla Ṣadrā subscribe, individuality entails materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have a distinctly first-personal personal existence only when some kind of connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition of one's individuation. (2) How do we account for f the emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed reve account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor. In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's 64

dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife. He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal first afterlife, e, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to the second d question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms. On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first question, Mulla Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the human soul in much broader termss than his predecessor. By means of the concepts of mental existence (wujūd dhihni) and the world of images ('ālam al-mithāl), he ends up with a conception of human afterlife that is richer in terms of experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent coh with the revealed account. Keywords: Avicenna, Ṣadrā, afterlife, dualism.

Resurrectionism and the Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity from Early to ReformationReformation-Era Christianity Michael J. Sigrist George Washington University (USA)

This paper explores early and Reformation-era era Christian attempts to render the idea of an afterlife coherent. The specific focus is on early Reformed Christians’ unequivocal belief in a bodily criterion of personal identity and of a physical afterlife. I

65

trace race how the differences that emerge from this endeavor are partially sourced in Jewish divisions over the same. Lending sustained critique of Princeton philosopher Mark Johnston’s recent agenda-setting setting series of lectures published as Surviving

Death. Christian thinking about the afterlife and immortality can be traced to two conflicting sources. The first is the Pharisaic doctrine of resurrection. Not all Jews during the time of the early Roman an Empire believed in an immortal soul or an afterlife. The Gospel book of Mark records that during his trial a group of Sadducees attempted to confound Jesus by putting to him questions that made the notion of an afterlife conflict with the laws of marriage ge (proof, thought the Sadducees, that resurrection was impossible) (Mark 12: 18 – 27). By contrast, contrast the Pharisees—importantly, importantly, the Apostle Paul was a committed

Abstracts

focus and structure to this broadly reconstructive project is a

member of this group—believed believed in resurrection, an explicitly material afterlife in which the bodies dies of the dead are physically raised and reconstituted. The reconstituted body was clearly understood to be the same person as had died. The notion of an afterlife that I will call—following following accepted precedent— precedent ‘resurrectionism’ clearly presupposes a bodily ly criterion of personal identity. Immortality in the afterlife is achieved by the fact that one will after the Great Day enjoy the same body as one enjoys now. The second source of Christian thinking about the afterlife comes from Greek philosophical and especially Platonic influences. While it is unlikely the earliest Christians (from the first century CE) were very conversant in Hellenic philosophy, 66

by the fourth and fifth centuries—significantly, significantly, the time which witnessed the important Councils from Nicea ea to Chalcedon—the Chalcedon Church ‘doctors’ who would decide the basic orthodox tenets of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

the Christian religion (most importanty, Origen, Tertullian and Augustine of Hippo) certainly were. It is from these sources and Plato especially that the notion of an afterlife life came to rest upon the notion of an immaterial soul that could not be destroyed and therefore would survive the death of the body. These two traditions vie uneasily throughout the period of prepre Reformation Christianity. The first portion of my paper (roughly a third) briefly outlines and comments upon the juxtaposition of these conflicting sources and remarks upon attempts by Catholic philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and Anselm of Canterbury to marry them in ways which were not explicitly inconsistent. The majority of the paper, however, focuses upon the fundamental rethinking of the matter enabled by Reformed Christian thinkers who would reject accepted Catholic doctrine.

Specifically, Reformed Christian and Lutheran thinkers nearly universally rejected the Platonic conception in toto and resolutely affirm the Pharisaic tradition of resurrectionism. That is to say, nearly all Reform m Christian thinkers of the 16th and 17th centuries insist upon a bodily criterion of personal identity vis-à-vis the afterlife. Histories of this era that touch upon matters of dispute over the afterlife tend to explain the emergence of resurrectionism mainly inly by appeal to doctrinal forces: a desire to return to a conceived ‘early church’ and an associated deep mistrust of anything Hellenic. By contrast, philosophical work on personal identity rarely reaches back to sources such as the early Reformed Christians ians due to the professional burden that arguments should not rest upon assumptions about the supernatural. I therefore turn to these

67

texts and history with a philosophers’ eye and re-construct re attempts by early Reformed and Lutheran Christians to develop criterion of personal identity assumed by resurrectionism. This latter, longer portion of the paper is organized around the recent attempt at refutation of Christian physicalism by Mark Johnston. hnston. Johnston claims that the very idea of personal identity by virtue of bodily identity after death and physical corruption is ‘incoherent.’ I examine the writings and arguments

of

Reformed

Christian

resurrectionists

and

mortalists (those thinkers who believe that the person literally ceases to exist from the period after death to the period of Judgment Day, at which time God brings the person back into existence) in order to show that (1) they are aware of the sorts of objections which Johnston raises and (2) offer rejoinders that, that while not obviously refuting Johnston’s argument, subject them to reasonable rejection. Specifically, Johnston offers a modal

Abstracts

a fully physical conception of the afterlife based upon the bodily

argument that he claims is based upon a wholly ‘mundane’ notion of necessity. He claims that the mundane undane laws of necessity hold regardless of one’s views of the supernatural. I provide an argument to show that Johnston’s demonstration of this claim is weak, and therefore that how one views the supernatural, most significantly the purposes and nature of God, in fact influence how one conceives of the afterlife. This point is further reinforced by an examination of writings on precisely this point by Reformed Christians (which explains in part why esoteric disputes in this area were regularly so heated). I lay out the problem as early Reformed Christians conceived it of determining exactly what constitutes the same body (by virtue of what is the resurrected body the same body as the one 68

that had died?) and why the same body can be understood as being the same person. My general conclusion is that Christian resurrectionism—or or at least, the best forms of it as presented by

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

some of the more astute Reformed Christian thinkers—is thinkers at least a coherent idea regardless of whether or not it is true. Keywords: Early Christianity, Reformation Era, resurrection, personal idenittu.

Augustine and Ibn Sina on Souls in the Afterlife Gareth B. Matthews University of Massachusetts, Amherst (USA)

Despite remarkable similarities between Augustine and Ibn Sina on the soul’s ’s knowledge of itself, there seem to be important differences between these two thinkers on issues concerning souls in the afterlife. The question of what

69

individuates a soul after bodily death is a serious and difficult question for Ibn Sina. He seems to find this matter quite directly. Nevertheless, Augustine does make various claims about the afterlife that would give him at least the basis for an account of soul individuation after physical death. One might well wonder, however, whether either Augustine or Ibn Sina should be satisfied with the account I offer. Keywords: Augustine, Ibn Sina, soul, body, afterlife.

Abstracts

perplexing. By contrast, Augustine does not address this topic

Aquinas, the Separated Soul, And the General Resurrection: Mapping Philosophical Conclusions Onto FaithFaith-Based Doctrines Richard Taylor Marquette University (USA)

It is well known that Thomas Aquinas argued for the continued existence of the individual human soul after separation at the 70

death of the body with reasoning founded unded on his philosophical understanding of the soul and its nature as intellectual knower

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

using reasoning from his study of the Muslim Philosophers Avicenna and Averroes. Aquinas also argued on philosophical grounds for the unity of the human person with Aristotelian teleological reasoning that entails the post-mortem mortem resurrection of the body and its reuniting with the soul. And on the basis of his Christian faith Aquinas also held as a matter of doctrine that the soul does not die with the body and that att the end of time the soul would be reunited with the body in a general resurrection. This paper provides a critical analysis of the reasoning of Aquinas on these two issues evaluating carefully the extent to which the philosophical conclusions reached map onto the religious beliefs he held by faith. Keywords: Aquinas, soul, death, general resurrection.

Ibn Rushd’s Theory of the Unity of the Intellect (Rational Soul) and the Denial of the Individual Immortality Hassan Yousofian Imam Khomeini Education Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

One of the theories of Ibn Rushdd (Averroes) which brought about serious attacks from the Church in the 13th century was the theory of the unity of the intellect (rational soul) in all

71

humans, its consequence taken to be the denial of the individual Proponents

of

Ibn

Rushd d

admitted

the

consequence and in order to defend this view along with the doctrine of individual immortality they had to subscribe to the weird theory of the double truth (the possibility of the truth of two contradictory propositions in two different domains). The source of the theory of the intellectual unity is in Aristotle’s view of the active and passive intellects. According to Ibn Rushd’s Rush interpretation of Aristotle, the active intellect is –besides besides the passive one- an intellect which separates from the human body at death and enjoys an immortal life. However, given the fact that the active intellect is numerically one and it is not the case that each human person has their own active intellect and the passive intellect dies with the death of the body, we should come to the conclusion that the theory of intellectual unity entails the denial of the resurrection and individual immortality. According

Abstracts

immortality.

to this theory, what remains after death th is one universal immaterial entity (the active intellect). Ibn Rushd Rush has sometimes been explicit on this consequence and took philosophers to think that each human individual does not enjoy their own souls. The underlying reason for this claim is that the source of numerical plurality is matter; therefore, if the soul is immortal, there will only be one soul when the bodies disappear. Nonetheless Ibn Rushd d proposes the possibility of there being a fine-grained grained matter, which might be the grounds for the plurality of the souls after death. Keywords: Ibn Rushd, rational soul,, individual immortality, active intellect, passive intellect, resurrection.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

72

The Posthumous Life of the Soul and the Imaginal World (‘ālam alal-mithāl) in the Illuminationist tradition (ḥikmat alal-ishrāq) of the 13th century. Roxanne D. Marcotte University of Queensland (Australia)

This paper will explore the function of the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) imaginal realm (‘ālam al-mithāl) in the posthumous life of souls (especially those that have yet to attain their

73

perfection) in the works of Ibn Kammunah (d.672/1277 672/1277), Shams Shirāzi (d.710/1311) who all wrote commentaries on the works of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d.1191), the founder of the Illuminationist tradition. Of significance are the various functions that Suhrawardī ascribed to this fourth imaginal realm he introduces (a departure from traditional Avicennan Peripateticism), a world that is also equated with the world of immaterial apparitional forms (al-ashbāḥ al-mujarradah mujarradah) and of suspended forms (al-muthul al-mu‘allaqah) through which Suhrawardī claims that the resurrection of bodies (ba‘th al-

ajsād) occurs. This paper aims to explore how those three authors conceived of the relation between this imaginal realm and the posthumous life fe of souls with close readings of the following edited works: Ibn Kammunah’s Tanqiḥāt āt fī Sharḥ Shar al-

Talwīḥāt (ed. Ḥabībī, 2009), a commentary on Suhrawardī’s al-

Abstracts

al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d.after 688/1289) and Quṭb b al-Din al al-

Talwīḥāt (ed. Ḥabībī,

2009), and his al-Kāshif Kāshif (ed. Nājī

Isfahānī, 2008), also known as al-Jadīd fī al-Ḥikmah; Shams alal Dīn al-Shahrazūrī’s Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (ed. Ziai,, 2001), his

Rasā’il

al-Shajarat

al-Ilaḥiyyah

fi ‘ulum

al-Haqa’iq Haqa’iq

al al-

Rabbaniyyah (ed. Habīb, 2009), and his (iii) al-Rumuz Rumuz wa alal Amthāl

al-Lāhūtiyyah

fī

al-Anwār

al-Mujarradah Mujarradah

al-

Malakūtiyyah) (ed. Privot, 2008); and Quṭb al-Din Din al-Shirāzi’s al Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and his Taḥqīq ‘Ālam al-Mithāl Mithāl (ed. Walbridge, 1992). It is hoped that this paper will highlight significant elements of the 13th century legacy of the Illuminationist tradition’s eschatology. Keywords: soul, world of mithāl, Suhrawardī, resurrection of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

74

bodies.

The Implications of Avicenna’s Conception of the Soul for his Conception of Survival Reza Akbari Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, (Tehran, Iran) Iran)

For Avicenna, the soul oul is essentially the intellect and the other faculties such as the vegetative and the animative belong to the soul in virtue of the soul’s attachment to the body. The intellect as the essence of the soul is immaterial and the other faculties

75

are material because of their embodied realization. This psychological foundation in Avicenna’s philosophy is the basis spiritual resurrection can be proved by reasoning, but reasoning can in no way prove ove a bodily resurrection. The spiritual resurrection is nothing but the pleasures and pains of the intellectual faculty which are the results of the virtues and vices in the person. Since the intellectual faculty is immaterial and survives the bodily death, h, a philosophical explanation of its pleasures and pains is possible and this is what Avicenna has done. However, given that vegetative and animative faculties have embodied realizations and are evolved from the soul’s attachment to the body, they don’t survive urvive the bodily death and their pleasures and pains cannot be philosophically explained for Avicenna. That is why Avicenna has given up the bodily resurrection to the revelations. It seems that this intellectual

Abstracts

of his specific view about the resurrection. According to him, the

modesty (putting the religious propositionss regarding the resurrection beyond the limited human intellect) is much better than the unsuccessful attempts of those who seek reasoning for bodily resurrection. It appears that bodily resurrection is a nonnon reasonable religious doctrine and we still need more theoretical apparatus for proving it. Keywords: Ibn Sina, intellect, soul, immortality, bodily resurrection.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

76

Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection in Islamic and Christian Doctrines Akbar Faydei (Iran)

Resurrection is one of the common beliefs of all monotheistic religions.

This

paper

will

comparatively

examine

the

resurrection in Islamic and Christian beliefs, and will emphasize that the simple conception of resurrection in Christianity has evolved to a comprehensive and complex one in Islam. Though Thou

77

Christianity has put much emphasis on resurrection, it has not mentioned its details, but Islam has mentioned many details of

Keywords: Islam, Christianity, bodily resurrection, spiritual resurrection.

Abstracts

this doctrine.

Bodily Resurrection Kobra Rahimi, Nasrollah Shameli (Iran)

Bodily resurrection is one of the controversial philosophical and theological issues. There is no doubt about the implication of the Quran and Ḥadīth for bodily resurrection, but it is still subject to religious challenges, such as incompatibility with the resurrection of people in the form of their actions (like animals), 78

Ḥadīthss which show that the residents of heaven are beautiful and young, but the residents of the hell are ugly, the consciousness of the limbs and members of the body and their

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

oration,

the

unusual

wideness ness

of

the

heaven

or

the

extraordinary abundance of the heavenly blessings, all of which are not compatible with a worldly body. In this paper we will deal with this apparent contradiction. Keywords: bodily resurrection, Ḥadīth,, animal resurrection.

Resurrection and the SoulSoul-Body Relation in Ibn Sina Kobra Majidi Bidgoli (Iran)

Making a distinction between rational and imperfectt souls and maintaining the survival of all souls after death, Ibn Sina makes a picture of the bodily and spiritual resurrection; he acknowledges the bodily resurrection merely by an appeal to scriptural evidence, and believes that the spiritual resurrection resurrecti

79

can be philosophically proved. Ibn Sina believes that the spiritual resurrection and the rational happiness of the souls practical faculties. For him, only simple souls can have a kind of bodily dily resurrection in heavenly bodies. His views seem to be in conflict with the religious doctrines about the resurrection and this is what I will examine in this paper. Keywords: Ibn Sina, soul, body, resurrection.

Abstracts

after death are based on the perfection of its theoretical and

The Implications of Ṣadrāean adrāean Psychology Psychology for Eschatology Mohammad Reza Haji Esma'ili, Esma'ili, Zahra Alafchian (Iran)

Mulla Ṣadrā has presented a novel view about the resurrection on the basis of his Transcendental philosophy hilosophy (ḥikmat

muta'āliah).

Upholding

the

origination

(ḥudūth udūth)

and

immateriality of the soul, Ṣadrā believes that the soul is material in its origin, spiritual in its survival, though there is no duality 80

between them. In his discussion of the different degrees of the soul, he tries to prove the imaginal (mithālī) immateriality materiality which is very important in his eschatology, since the faculty of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

imagination will survive the death and can feel pains and pleasures. Ṣadrā takes the images to be immaterial, thus they remain with the soul; this is the first stage of the afterlife afterl and the last stage of the material world. Notwithstanding all his efforts, he has just proved the sameness of the afterlife body with the worldly body, since he believes that the soul will create his own body in the afterlife by employing his faculty of o imagination. But such a resurrection seems incompatible with the religious doctrines. In this paper I will talk about the implications of his psychology for his eschatology in order to see whether his formulation of the doctrine of resurrection is compatible with religious texts or not. Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, body, resurrection.

The Immortality of the Soul in Quran Qorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki (Iran)

The immortality of the soul has been approached to in philosophical, theological, mystical and Quranic ways by Muslim thinkers. In this paper I will classify what Muslim thinkers have said about this issue within five views. And then I will talk about the usage of the words nafs (soul) and rūḥ rū (spirit) in the Quran and their implications for the immortality of the

81

soul. I will conclude that the Quran makes a tripartite claim about the immortality: (1) the continuity of the human life after resurrection of the bodies in the Day of Judgment, and (3) the creation of an appropriate afterlife body. Keywords: Quran, immortality, theology, Islamic philosophy,

barzakh.

Abstracts

death and before the general resurrection in barzakh, (2) the

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in Resurrection: Resurrection: A perspective from Islamic Philosophers and Theologians Mohammad Es’haq Arefi (Iran)

The bodily resurrection is one of the issues which Islamic thinkers 82

adopted

different

approaches

to

account

for.

Mutakalimīn on the basis of their understandingg of the religious texts and falāsifah on the basis of their argumentative principles presented different accounts. Mullā Ṣadrā has formulated one of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

the most novel views in this regard, about the weakness and strength of which I will talk in this paper. soul Keywords: mutakalimīn, Muslim philosophers, soul-body, bodily resurrection.

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in the Resurrection and its Role in Bodily Resurrection in Ṣadrā Ahmad Sa'adat AlAl-Mustafa University (Gorgan, Iran)

There are at least 4 views about the soul-body body relations in resurrection. Some people believe that there is no body in resurrection; this is called "spiritual resurrection". Others believe that there is only body and no immaterial soul is

83

involved; this is called "bodily resurrection". Others believe that the worldly body returns to the afterlife soul; this the "bodily"bodily that the afterlife body has an extention (three dimensions), but it does not consist of matter (hylo). In resurrection, the soul and body have a causal relation, and not an active-passive active (hylomorphic) relation; that is to say, in the afterlife the soul creates or brings about the body. This is compatible with the Quranic resurrection, tion, since the Quran says that in resurrection there will be both body and soul, but it does not say anything about what the body is; it might be hylomorphic one or nonnon hylomorphic. Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul-body body relation, bodily resurrection.

Abstracts

spiritual resurrection", and the last view is the Ṣadrā adrāean view

Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of the Soul and the Bodily Resurrection Gholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani1 Dinani1 University of Tehran (Iran)

Though the relation of the mind-body body problem with the religious doctrines is an awesome task, we can dare say that the Ṣadrāean account of the bodily resurrection is the best 84

explanation and better than that is the account given by Zunūzī. Z Outstanding scholars like Eṣfahānī Kumpānī have subscribed to Zunūzī’s account of the bodily resurrection. Ṣadrā adrā does not

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

believe in souls which exist prior to bodies, and maintains that what exists before bodies is the intellect. Human persons are in this world individuated by their material bodies, though they share their human quiddity; that is, if there is no matter, there will not be any individuation in the intellectual (aqlānī) world. The material origination of the souls means that the soul is a matter in its origination, not that it originates when the body is formed. Thus the soul is a matter in the origination, and once the perception begins in the animal mal or human, it develops to have an imaginal (mithālī) immaterial existence, and once it starts to have a universal (rational) cognition, it will have a rational immaterial existence. The soul has many degrees, the most primary of which is the matter and the highest of which is 1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.

the super-rational rational stage. The soul is thus a hierarchical entity which is at the same time both material and immaterial. Thus the Ṣadrāean ean view of the soul is monistic and not dualistic, and he takes this to be compatible with the religious eligious conception. However what appears to be meant by the Quran and Ḥadīth is not compatible with the immaterial soul and the Ṣadrāean bodily resurrection, and they should be reinterpreted in order to become compatible with the appearance of the religious religio textual evidence. adrā, material origination, spiritual survival, bodily Keywords: Ṣadrā, resurrection.

Abstracts

85

SoulSoul-Body Monism with a DualDual-Aspect Theory of their Relations and an Account of the Bodily Resurrection Askari Soleimani Amiri Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

The human person is indubitably a material creature, but should we reduce him to this perceived material object, or 86

should we maintain that he has another immaterial aspect? According to physicalism, human persons ons are reduced to this

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

complicated, evolved matter, without any immaterial aspect. However many philosophers claim that human persons have an immaterial entity. There are different groups of immaterialists: (1) Plato and Platonists believe that humans are immaterial, aa temporal entities which have existed before this world, and have been attached to a worldly body. The soul, on this conception, is a prisoner in the body, (2) Aristotle and his Muslim proponents maintain that human persons are immaterial, a-temporal a entities created and attached to the body as its form. The soul on this conception did not exist before the creation of the body; rather it was created once the body was created, though it has an immaterial nature. These two theories cannot account accoun for the

bodily resurrection; the only thing they can show is the spiritual one (the rational happiness and miserability). That is why Ibn Sina explicitly says that he cannot prove the Quranic

resurrection, (3) Ṣadrā believes that human persons are primarily ily mere pieces of matter without any immaterial aspect. According to Ṣadrāean ean philosophy, the matter with which the human persons are identified at their origination will be subject to intensive (ishtidādī) substantial motion, and it undergoes the solid, vegetative, and animal stages and finally finds its way to the rational stage. The subject of this motion will in each of the stages be a form unified with its matter as one and the same existence. The human sperm has a solid form at first, and will attain a vegetative form which is unified with its matter and will constitute one and the same existence. From this it will evolve to the animal stage developing sense and volitional motion with an animal form unified with its matter. However at this stage human perceptions and imaginations are immaterial, and thus

87

his animal form will be immaterial too. This will constitute one and the same being with a hierarchical (tashkīkī) existence, one animal form m will continue to evolve through its substantial motion, and will transform into an actual human being with rational immateriality which will constitute one simple hierarchical existence. It might still continue to evolve so much that it loses its matter and elemental body and finally dies. At this stage the soul will be accompanied by a body which has been created by its perceptions and imaginations, since whenever the soul imagines an object, it will be unified with that image, and since these images are immaterial, their owners should be imaginal too. Thus the soul has an imaginal (mithālī) body in which these images are recorded. This imaginal body will

accompany

the

soul

in

barzakh (purgatory)

and

resurrection. Ṣadrā tries to justify the bodily resurrection on the basis of some principles: the principle of the priority of

Abstracts

aspect of which is material and the other is immaterial. The

existence (iṣālat wujūd), the hierarchy of existence, the intensiveness of the substantial motion, the form-based form approach to identity, the immateriality lity of the faculty of imagination, and some others. Proponents of Ṣadrā adopted two approaches to the problem of bodily resurrection: some take the Ṣadrāean ean account of the bodily resurrection to be compatible with the Quran, like Sabzawārī and Imam Khomeini, ni, and some acknowledge the Ṣadrāean ean notion, but take the Quranic notion of the bodily resurrection to be wider than this and try to present philosophical accounts for the Quranic resurrection. According to the latter, though the soul separates from the elemental lemental body in the course of its substantial motion, the corpse because of its materiality goes on its substantial motion 88

until when the whole world changes and transforms into the afterlife. The transformed elements of the world are thus attached to their ir respective souls and will be governed by the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

soul. Therefore, each person will be resurrected by his own body, and they will be the one and the same thing, their duality being a matter of a conceptual analysis. Keywords: Platonists, physicalism, monism,, bodily resurrection, Ṣadrā.

The Survival of the Soul in Mullā Mullā Ṣadrā's adrā's View Hadi Mousavi (Iran)

Mullā Ṣadrā gives a novel account of the survival of the soul, which counts both as a philosophical proof of the resurrection, and a plausible analysis of the personal identity of resurrected people. Ṣadrā employs his principles of the emergence of the soul, the unificatory combination of the soul and the body, the

89

substantial motion of the human being, and soul-body body relation in a comprehensive account of the survival of the soul. He soul-body body relation in the framework of the substantial motion. The soul for the survival of which he argues, includes not only all the immaterial stages of the soul,, but also the body as the soul's lowest stage. Thus it seems that Ṣadrā is able to account for the bodily resurrection on the basis of his analysis of the survival of the soul. Keywords: Ṣadrā, adrā, survival, soul, body, bodily resurrection.

Abstracts

argues for the survival on the basis of his own notion of the

Thomistic Hylomorphism Hylomorphism and Human Persistence: Connections and Prospects between Christianity and Islam Stephen R. Ogden Yale University (USA)

While the hylomorphic view of human nature as expounded by Thomas Aquinas was prominent within the historical Christian 90

tradition, it boasts few proponents among contemporary Christian philosophers. The latter have followed suit with most

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Anglophone philosophers in the mind-body body debate, separating into camps of dualism or materialism.

In contrast, the

Thomistic approach hass been dismissed as an untenable augmentation of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Contemporary

Muslim philosophers might also reject Aquinas’ theory for similar reasons, remaining unconvinced of its coherence. In addition, they may recall Aquinas’ vehement rejection ction of the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd’s shd’s interpretation of Aristotle, particularly regarding the human soul and the active intellect. Hence, Aquinas might seem an unfitting resource for the exploration of Islamic doctrines of human nature (al-insān -insān) and resurrection (al-qiyāma).

This paper will first argue for the

coherence of Aquinas’ conception of the persistence of the human person (i.e., personal identity over time), including the survival of the human soul at death and subsequent

resurrection. On this point, I will demonstrate how Aquinas is importantly indebted to the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā for the view that the soul can subsist of itself once individuated by the designated matter of a particular human body. Then, I will consider how Aquinas’ nas’ hylomorphism may offer fruitful prospects for the explanation of human nature and resurrection not only for Christianity but also for Islam by comparing it to other

modern

Christian

interpretations

(of

Aquinas

or

otherwise) as well as to a more thoroughgoing ghgoing Muslim proponent of resurrection than Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rushd—namely, Rushd the philosophical theologian al-Ghazālī Ghazālī and his preferred option for explaining the possibility of resurrection in the Tahāfut alal

Falāsifa. I conclude that Thomistic hylomorphism can more powerfully account for bodily resurrection and a true “return”

91

(Quran 17:15)) of identically the same human body to the same

Keywords: materialism.

Christianity,

Islam,

form,

matter,

dualism,

Abstracts

human soul.

2.3. 2.3. Metempsychosis Metempsychosis and Raj’a

Correct Metempsychosis in Mullā Mullā Ṣadrā’s adrā’s View and his Explanation of Maskh Verses Vahideh Ameri (Iran)

Metempsychosis (tanāsukh) means the belonging of the soul to a new body after leaving a previouss body. In the opinion of Muslim philosophers, especially Mullā Ṣadrā, metempsychosis is unacceptable and impossible. But in Ṣadrā's 's words there is a kind of metempsychosis that is the perfection of soul by good or bad deeds that will be manifested in the Hereafter. He called this the correct metempsychosis in the corporeal resurrection.

95

With a little reflection it is clear that the true metempsychosis of one and the same fact. Otherwise some verses ses of Quran have talked about metamorphosis (maskh) of a group of people into monkeys and pigs. But if metempsychosis is wrong, how can this doctrine be justified? Ṣadrā maintains that these verses are about the hereafter and introduces it as a case of true tr metempsychosis and corporeal resurrection. Some followers of the Ṣadrāean Philosophy, such as Āyatollah Javadī Āmolī Ā and Allāmeh abāṭabā’ei, ’ei, believe that these verses are about this world, and present some philosophical explanations to make it justified. d. According to their opinion, metempsychosis proposed in these verses does not mean that the human persons are replaced by individual monkeys or pigs. Rather it should be defined as "human ape". Keywords: Ṣadrā, metempsychosis, metamorphosis,, soul, body.

Abstracts

Mullā Ṣadrā and corporeal resurrection are two expressions of

Metempsychosis in Quran and Ḥadīth Mohammad Taqi Yousofi AlAl-Mustafā Mustafā University (Qom, Iran)

Metempsychosis has been dealt with not only in Islamic philosophy, but also in Islamic theology (kalām), Ḥadīth, Ḥ and Quranic exegesis, and there have theological or textual arguments for or against metempsychosis. Proponents of 96

metempsychosis take some texts of Quran and Ḥadīth adīth to be consonant with the necessity of metempsychosis, but others maintain that evidence from Quran and Ḥadīth shows the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

impossibility of the metempsychosis. In this paper, the two views will be examined and then it will be demonstrated that Quran and Ḥadīth do not show that the metempsychosis is impossible; rather they show that a particular case of metempsychosis

–that that

the

Hindu

type

of

permanent

metempsychosis- never occurs, though it is logically possible. Keywords: metempsychosis, metamorphosis, death, bodily resurrection, soul, body.

The SoulSoul-Body Relations and Raj'a Hossein ElahiElahi-Nijad Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

In the Shiite Ḥadīths there are words such as raj'a, karrah,

raddah, 'awd, awb which all mean something like return or regress. The Shi'ite doctrine of raj'a is the belief in the Second Coming or the Return to Life of given past historical figures after their physical death; the figures include the believers who

97

were oppressed and unbelievers who have oppressed. They will return with the same physical and psychological characteristics questions regarding souls and bodies. How can the return be accounted for; do their souls return to their previous bodies or to new bodies or to other people's bodies or to imaginal (mithālī) bodies? Keywords: Shiite, raj'a, soul, body, metempsychosis.

Abstracts

that they had in this world. This doctrine will give rise to

2.4. 2.4. Heaven and Hell

The SoulSoul-Body Problem and the Heaven’s Unusual Characteristics Mohammad Hossein Heshmatpour1 Heshmatpour1 University of Qom (Iran)

Heaven is generally illustrated as the highest joy and beauty conceivable and this is why the characterizations of the heaven are usually in bodily terms, though most philosophers believe in the immaterial soul and the spirituality of the resurrection.

101

However Ṣadrā tries to reconcile the intellectual and religious doctrines. His account of the bodily resurrection depends on He takes the body to be a combination of elements which has the disposition n to receive a form and have a substantial motion in which both matter and form are subject to perfection. The form is the soul which is material in its origin (though not a matter; that is, it indwells in the matter) and through substantial motion, it evolves lves into an immaterial entity. Hence the Ṣadrāean well-known known slogan: the soul is material in its origination and immaterial in its survival. The changes in the elements of the body do not bring about changes in the identity of the person. The soul as a form rm of the body which evolves from bodily characters to the spiritual ones is what goes to barzakh. The matter has three layers: elemental, intermediate (barzakhi) 1 The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.

Abstracts

what he concludes from the nature of the mind and the body.

and afterlife (ukhrawī). When the person moves from the world to barzakh, his elemental body is separated and when he moves to the afterlife his intermediate body is separated. In the world of barzakh all material properties exist except the material stuff. Thus the material heaven exists without the material stuff. Thus the concept of matter should ld be generalized to include the elemental, celestial (falakī), imaginal (mithālī), and afterlife bodies. Mulla Ṣadrā believes that the heaven is inside us; our joyful imaginations are our heaven in the afterlife, and this is a concrete, objective joy and not a mental one. The Ṣadrāean theory is supplemented with the view that there is an external heaven besides this internal heaven. The material heaven is created by God as a plateau, and its trees and palaces are 102

created by our deeds. This is what religiouss texts also express. Our deeds have two effects; an effect inside us and an effect outside of us. Thus for Ṣadrā, the afterlife rewards and

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

punishments are objective. The only incompatibility of the Ṣadrāean ean view with the Quran seems to be the verse “who will revive the bones when they are rusty” (71:36). In this paper we will discuss the Ṣadrāean ean view on the nature of heaven and its characteristics. Keywords: Ṣadrā, soul, body, heaven, hell.

The Blessings of Heaven and the Extent of its Attachment to the Soul and the Body Rajab Abelmonsef Abdefattah AlAl-Mentawi Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (Egypt)

The Quran bestowed on the blessings of heaven psychological perfections and motivations which make the believer hasten for the pleasure of the Lord,, meeting his commands. On the top of these intellectual perfections is the God's pleasure (riḍwān)

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which is the greatest joy and happiness. Of forms of this blessing is what is mentioned in the following Quranic verse: "in and in Ḥadīth qudsī, "I have provided for my righteous servants what no eye has seen and no ear has heard and has never occurred to the heart of any person". Moreover, there are colorful perceptual delights and pleasures. This shows the error of some orientalists who say that "Quranic description of heaven is in terms of perceptual properties", as it is not true that Muslims agreed on describing their heaven which is full of perceptual joy as psychological. The truth is that the th Quranic description has combined the perceptual and intellectual blessings in an equal way in order to equally meet the psychological motivations and bodily tendencies. Peripatetic philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes interpreted the heaven verses as intellectual perfections only and took the apparently

Abstracts

heaven they have what the souls long for and the eyes enjoy",

perceptual blessings as approximations to the laymen, since the pleasure of the human essence in the afterlife when he is perfect cannot be compared to the worldly pleasures, but mutakalimīn such as Ghazālī, Rāzī and Ṣūfiah and most Muslims acknowledge the apparent Quranic indication that there are perceptual and intellectual blessings in the same manner, for who is not moved by the pleasure of seeing the streams of heaven with eye-catching vistas? Keywords: Keywords: Quran, soul, body, heaven.

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Hell in the Quran and Ḥadīth Shokoufeh Gholami, Sousan Goudarzi (Iran)

The hell is the great fire place where sinners are tortured. In the Quran and Ḥadīth there are different names for the hell, each of which designates a specific degree or state of the punishment. According to the religious textual evidence, the hell is already created but humans fall short of grasping it. The punishment in the hell is the fruit of the person’s deeds. There are detailed

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descriptions of these punishments in the Quran and Ḥadīth; their foods are bitter named zaqūm which make them more descriptions. Keywords: Quran, Ḥadīth, hell, punishment.

Abstracts

hungry. In this paper we will talk about these detailed

2.5. 2.5. Do Persons Exist before this World?

Soul and Body in the Worlds of Dhar Ali Afzali Iranian Institute of Philosophy (Tehran, (Tehran, Iran) Iran)

The world of dhar –as a world in which humans existed before their birth- was a matter of dispute among Muslim thinkers. Disputes over whether such a world exists at all, its nature, the way humans existed there, whether they existed in a collective or individual way, and whether er humans are immaterial in the

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world of dhar or have material bodies as well. This paper concerns the question whether humans in dhar were only bodies, what were the properties of this body and itss relation to the soul. What we can know from Ḥadīth is that firstly, humans had an existence before their birth, and secondly the world of

dhar is not a single world; rather it has hierarchical degrees in one of which humans were disembodied souls and in another one, they had a kind of material bodies which was composed of

dhar matter which had an interaction with their souls. Keywords: soul, body, world of dhar.

Abstracts

immaterial or had material bodies as well, and if they had

Ṣadrāean adrāean View on ḥodūth and Qedam of the Soul Mohammad Miri Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

Among the most prominent views about the problem of ḥodūth and qedam of the soul in the history of Islamic philosophy, there are three mainstream ones: the platonic view of eternity 110

(qedam), the Peripatetic view of spiritual ḥudūth (origin), and the Ṣadrāean view of material ḥudūth and spiritual survival (baqā) of the soul. In this paper I shall argue that Ṣadrā adrāean view

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is more compatible with religious doctrines. Keywords: Ṣadrā, ḥudūth, eternity (qedam), Plato, Peripatetic philosophers.

The Grounds for the Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of Material Origin and Spiritual Survival of the Soul Morteza Pouyan (Iran)

In this paper I will talk about the Ṣadrāean ean theory of the material origin and the spiritual itual survival of the soul. To do this I will talk about the following: the soul-body body relation in Islamic Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental philosophies, ūsī's 's trouble for philosophers regarding the immortality of the

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soul after the corruption ion of the body, the motivations of the Ṣadrāean view, Ṣadrā's answer to ūsī's 's objection, and the

Keywords:

ā, Ṣadrā,

philosophers, soul, body.

Peripatetic

philosophers,

Ishrāqī

Abstracts

arguments for the Sadrean view.

Muslim Mystics’ View of the ḥodūth and Qedam of the Soul Mohammad Miri Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

Muslim mystics ('urafā), centuries before Ṣadrā, took human persons to be eternally originated (ḥādith azalī); that is, they are originated as to their existence in this world and they are 112

eternal as to their existence in the worlds before this world. Mystics talked about this in their discussions about the "depository (istīdā’i) stages and the ascending (mi’rāj) of the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

soul’s composite”, “the place of the essence of the Perfect Man in previous worlds”, “the alast Promise”, etc. Moreover, there are plenty of evidence in their words which refer to the materiality of the soul’s origination as to its existence in this world. In the Quran and Ḥadīth there have been texts which refer to the souls’ having been created long before the bodies on the one hand and texts which refer to the materiality of the soul’s origination in this world on the other. This shows that the mystical view can account for the religious doctrines on the origination of the persons and the previous worlds. Keywords: mystics ('urafā), Ṣadrā, ḥudūth, soul.

A Critique of the Theory of the Material Origin and the Spiritual Survival of the Soul Gholamreza Fayyazi Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, (Qom, Iran) Iran)

Ṣadrā takes the soul to be the principle of the life in the body. The soul is primary material, dependent on the body; this is what is called a vegetative soul and has the properties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. This vegetative ative life evolves

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to a sentient, animal life and develops to be low-level level imaginal (mithālī) immaterial entity; that is, it has no material stuff, volume and weight. Most people, in Ṣadrā’s view, merely enjoy these two levels of the soul. The soul might continue to evolve into rational immateriality which has the function of universal cognition. The immaterial survival of the soul might have two meanings: (1) the soul is both material and immaterial aterial before death, or (2) the soul is merely immaterial in its survival when it is wholly separated from the body. Therefore Ṣadrā believes that the three stages of the soul (material, imaginal, and rational) exist as one thing, and this unity is explained ned by his theory of the existential hierarchy. But it seems that this is a complete contradiction; one and the same thing cannot be both material and immaterial, and thus it cannot account for the bodily resurrection. The main reason why Ṣadrā is committed committe to this

Abstracts

though it has some material properties such as the shape, color,

account of the bodily resurrection is the impossibility of metempsychosis, but the fact is that it is not impossible; rather it is religiously incorrect when one is committed to it without a commitment to the doctrine of resurrection. Keywords: Ṣadrā, adrā, soul, body, material in origination, spiritual in survival, hierarchy of existence.

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Out of Eden: Evolution and the Fall Martin Lembke Lund University (Sweden)

Following physicist and Anglican priest John Polkinghorne, I shall focus on ‘the major Christian doctrine that I find most difficult to reconcile with scientific thought’, namely, the Fall, including the closely related notion of Original sin. Like Polkinghorne, I admit that this doctrine is a ‘rather extreme test

115

case’ and that reconsiderations iderations thereof should be offered with appropriate tentativeness, but still I wish to see whether or to with our present scientific understanding ding of biological evolution and hence of pre-human n and early human history. Now the doctrines of the Fall and Original sin (as traditionally understood) seem to imply at least three highly problematic ideas: (i) the historicity of a primordial human couple (Adam and Eve); (ii) an original sinful act through ugh which this first couple was subjected to biological death; and (iii) the biological transmission of this sinful act as a hereditary tary stain to all subsequent human generations. Pace Polkinghorne, I shall argue that these ideas can be squared with evolutionary tionary theory only if one is prepared to posit the existence of a non-material non soul: a postulate which wholly accords with another Christian doctrine, which may be called the Necessity of the soul: namely, the doctrine that human beings essentially depend on

Abstracts

what extent orthodox Christian belief can be made consonant

immaterial soul-substances substances for their existence. Seen from an evolutionary point of view, of course, this latter doctrine raises deep difficulties of its own. In particular, one needs to clarify the function of the immaterial soul in relation to the materially mat grounded evolution of the mind, as well as the causal relation between the material body and the soul. Trying to shed some light on these issues, I shall conclude that the doctrine of the Necessity of the Soul is yet to be confuted or made redundant redundan by our knowledge about the interrelatedness of mind and brain. Keywords: fall, original sin, orthodox faith, science.

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An Analysis of the Objections of Mulla Shamsa Gilani and Mohammad Sadiq Ardistani to Ṣadrāean adrāean Theory of the Soul Abolhassan Ghaffari (Iran)

Mullā Shamsa Gilānī takes the soul to be spiritual in origin and spiritual in survival, and rejects the theory of the material origin of the soul as incompatible with religious evidence. Mulla Ṣadrā's primary answer to this objection is based sed on the

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distinction between the soul (nafs) and spirit (rūḥ); thus rūḥ in origin, though spirits are immaterial in their origins. However, Mullā Ṣadrā is not always committed to this distinction. distinct His main answer to this objection is that the soul's existence before this world is to mean that they exist in their causes, not that they exist as souls. Mullā Muḥammad Sādiq Ardistāni ni also defends the theory of the spiritual origin of the soul. In his opinion, to say that the soul has an origin is to contradict both the immateriality of the soul and its survival. This is why Mulla Ṣadrā adheres to the theory of the material origin of the soul, and since he accepts the arguments for the immateriality of the soul, he modifies his view through an appeal to the substantial motion of the body to become immaterial and thus spiritual in survival. But according to Ardistānī what is in the matter ter cannot be otherwise, and it is

Abstracts

religious texts does not mean the soul; souls are material in

impossible to move from the matter since there would not then be any subject for such a movement. In this paper, I will defend the Ṣadrāean ean view and its compatibility with the religious doctrines. Keywords: Ṣadrā, Mullā Shamsa Gilānī, Mullā Muḥammad M Sādiq Ardistāni, soul, body.

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PART III

The Nature of Human Persons, Morality and God-Human Relations

Ṣadrāean adrāean View f the Role of the Body in Cognition Ahmad Ahmad Va’ezi Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom)

Muslim philosophers, including Ṣadrā, maintain that the human soul benefits from bodily organs in its acts and cognitions. This gives rise to different questions. Does the employment of the body include all manners of cognition or is

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restricted to some sorts of cognition? Should we take cognition and perception to be existentially dependent on the bodily cognition to be of different degrees; es; the higher the cognition the more independent it is from the body. Thus the relation of the perceptions to the bodily organs differs in degree on the basis of the place of the various perceptions; for example, the intellectual cognition as the highest degree of the human cognition is not mediated by any bodily organs. Finally I will deal with the relation of the faculties of the soul to bodily organs, the existential relation between the soul and its faculties, the way the cognitive forms exist and theirr relations to the soul. Keywords: acts of soul, body, faculties of the soul, perception, intellectual cognizance.

Abstracts

organs or the soul? In this paper I will show that Ṣadrā adrā takes the

The Problem of Consciousness in the Framework of the Method of Disjunction (fa faṣṣl) and Conjunction (wa waṣṣl): A Discussion of the Limits of the Religious and Philosophical/Scientific Thought in the Explaining the Phenomenon of Consciousness Samir Abuzaid (Egypt)

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The problem of consciousness has a special place in the contemporary philosophical thought. With the great scientific progress of the he humans and the developments in computer

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

technology, artificial intelligence, biology, biochemistry, brain research and neurology and the possibility of knowing the behavioral centers in the brain and the influence of the electrical charges and chemical drugs on the human behavior, the dominant belief is that it is eventually possible to explain the human mind in biological terms and claim that the mind is nothing but an enormous computational apparatus. However, by the end of the twentieth century difficulties culties were raised against this explanation. Notwithstanding the scientific and theoretical progress in explaining the workings of the human brain and the possibility of knowing the different cerebral centers for perception and behavior, there are two basic bas problems which resist against the biological explanation: intentionality and consciousness. The two problems merged so that consciousness was related to intentionality in different

ways. The basic question here is the way "physical" inputs of perception (like wave of light, sound waves, and chemical composites) transform intro visual, auditory and tactile sensations. This is the problem which is called "the hard problem". Because of the intractability of this problem in direct scientific ways, it changed into an inter-disciplinary disciplinary problem in which

physics,

quantum

mechanics,

organic

chemistry,

neurology, artificial intelligence, psychology and cognitive sciences besides philosophy are involved. This way several scientific and philosophical theories emerged d which focus on different

positions

such

as

exclusionary

materialism,

functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, in addition to theories of mystery which regard the human consciousness as unexplainable. In light of this general contemporary form of the

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problem em of consciousness, I will present a conception of the correct methodology of explaining the human consciousness in philosophy and science. This methodology sets limits for religious and philosophical/scientific l/scientific thought in the process of explaining the phenomenon of consciousness, and this relies on a basic categorization of the phenomenon of consciousness as a "mystery" for science, and this demands for reliance on the method of disjunction and conjunction, nction, which is focused on works of Shaykh Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (11 a.cc.). I will therefore begin by a brief introduction of the problem of consciousness in contemporary philosophy and then a brief introduction of the method of disjunction and conjunction conjunct and its foundation in the works of Jurjāni ni and the methodological steps that can be drawn from it and the way it can be employed in scientific and philosophical propositions which are marked by mystery. I will then explain how this method can greatly

Abstracts

the framework of the correct relation between religion,

contribute in solving some common religious-philosophical philosophical propositions. After this, I will apply this methodology to the phenomenon of consciousness, and illustrate how our reliance on this method can prevent the religious thought from trespassing its limits and becoming an anti-scientific scientific religious thought, and how can this method prevent the rational philosophical/scientific thought from trespassing its limits and becoming an anti-rational and anti-scientific belief. Keywords: scientific thought, human mind, nd, intentionality, consciousness, religion.

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The Immateriality of the Soul and Cognition in Islamic Philosophy and Quran Morteza Erfani Sistan University (Zahedan, Iran)

In Islamic philosophy, cognition or consciousness is taken to be characteristic of immaterial entities. An immaterial entity can at the least cognize herself (auto-cognition), cognition), even if it does not cognize others (hetero-cognition). cognition). Therefore, hetero-cognition hetero

125

is grounded in auto-cognition and auto-cognition cognition is grounded in turn in the immateriality. Thus material entities have no seem to contradict this philosophical view; for example, the verses in which all worldly beings are said to glorify (tasbīḥ) God, and since glorification on is impossible without cognition, these verses would indicate that all beings have cognition. I will argue that both science and the Quran show that cognition is not restricted to immaterial beings and that each being enjoys a degree of cognition. Moreover, auto-cognition cognition does not constitute hetero-cognition; cognition; rather it is grounded in the cognition of cognition (or self-cognition). Keywords: Quran, Islamic philosophy, immateriality of the soul, cognizance, perception.

Abstracts

cognition of themselves or others. But many Quranic verses

Iqbal’s Concept of Mind, Consciousness and Existence Mehnaz Zainab Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (Pakistan)

In this paper I would analyze Pakistan’s philosopher-poet philosopher Iqbal’s concepts concerning mind, consciousness and the material reality, and how these factors interact to form the 126

organic whole called Life. Although Iqbāll was writing in the modernist Bergsonian perspective, his philosophy of Ego or

Khudi can be analyzed in the context of contemporary mindmind The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

body theories.

His theory relates to how mind and an

consciousness in combination with the human will form an extension of Divine Consciousness and Will and how the human act can be reflective of Divine Act. He adheres largely to an existential point of view; but his ideas about the mind and body are also inspired by modern empiricism and objectivity. However, his conclusions about the mind- body problem are based on his Islamic faith and the theories of the medieval Islamic philosophers, which could be analyzed in contemporary perspective for interesting insight nsight into Islamic concept of mindmind body problem in the post modern world. The naturalist and phenomenologist theories of mind overlook the

aspects

of

mind-body body

problem

encompassing

the

transcendent human consciousness and its Divine sources. The

Islamicc perspective combined with contemporary empirical findings about mind and consciousness could add some interesting aspects to the mind-body body problem and its implications for contemporary knowledge. Keywords: Iqbal, soul, consciousness, existence.

Abstracts

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The The Influence of the NonNon-doxic on the Doxic Dimensions of the Soul in Ghazā Ghazālī Zahra (Mitra) Poursina Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Tehran, Iran)

One of the most important problems in epistemology is whether knowledge is only acquired merely through the human cognitive and perceptive capacities or it is influenced by other aspects of 128

the human person? In this paper I will examine Ghazāli's Ghaz answer to this question. I will first focus on the different relations and interactions between the aspects of the human

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soul ul and then show that these interactions involve the mutual influences of the soul and body, one of which is the influence of the non-doxic doxic (for example, emotional or volitional) aspects on the doxic ones (and the process of the knowledge acquisition). Keywods: Keywods: dimensions of the soul, body, Ghazāli.

Islamic Philosophical Psychology and the Doctrine of Fitrah in Quran Zolfaghar Nasseri Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

Several verses of the Quran concern the fundamental doctrine of fiṭrah. Fiṭrah rah consists in the innate religious ideas and tendencies, such as the idea of God and the loving or needing tendency towards Him. In this paper I will talk about the views

129

of some contemporary Ṣadrāean scholars (abātab tabā’i, and Muṭaharī) about fiṭrah, and will then talk about the of the soul-body relation. Keywords: Quran, fiṭrah, Ṣadrā, soul, body.

Abstracts

explanations of fiṭrah in terms of dualistic and Ṣadrā adrāean views

In Defense of Integrative Dualism; Placing values at the heart of philosophy of mind Charles Taliaferro St. Olaf College (USA)

"Substance dualism" or the thesis that a person is an embodied nonphysical being (mind or soul) is systematically caricatured in philosophy of mind literature as involving an untenable 130

bifurcation. Instead off such a splintered, divided concept of the person, I defend integrative dualism, the thesis that while a person is a nonphysical subject (and thus a being that can

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survive the death of the body), in this life he or she functions as a united, embodied being. g.

Embodiment consists of six

nonmoral goods (they are good but not as in "moral goods" such as justice and courage): the virtues of sensations, agency, causal constitution, cognitive power, intelligible coherence, and affective incorporation. This united d concept of an embodied person places values at the heart of the philosophy of human nature. This value-oriented oriented concept of embodiment can be a rich, common resource for Christian-Muslim Muslim dialogue. Keywords: substance dualism, integrative dualism, moral values, philosophy of mind.

The Moral Aspect of the Soul: The Place of Soul in the Solution of Moral Issues in Ghazali and Aquinas Zohreh Sadat Naji (Iran)

Ghazālī and Aquinas, as religious philosophers, take souls and bodies as distinct. Though this view is as old as ancient Greek philosophy, their religious perspective on the issue has different consequences. On the other hand, they have both dealt with

131

moral issues. es. In this paper I will talk about the relation between body distinction, the immortality of the soul and the rewards and punishments in the hereafter for their moral philosophy. At the end of the paper, I will talk about the impacts of the scriptures on their philosophical views. Keywords: soul, morality, Ghazālī, Aquinas.

Abstracts

these two issues: the implications of their views about the soulsoul

Islamic Ethics without Souls Aliakbar Golghandashti Mofid University (Qom, Iran)

Ethics is one of the main branches of practical philosophy (or wisdom). Many books have been written about this branch by Muslim thinkers. Virtue ethics has been widely accepted in the Islamic thought. Part of reason to adopt such an approach to 132

ethics was its compatibility with Islamic lamic doctrines. The subject of Islamic ethics with this approach is the soul, since it is the soul that can acquire moral virtues and is perfected by them.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

The main question of this paper is the following: what will happen to Islamic virtue ethics if someone one denies the soul? Can we defend a virtue ethics in which there is no soul or there is material soul? Keywords: morality, Islamic philosophy, soul, body.

Images of the Body in Rumi’s Mathnavi Ebrahim Alipour Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, (Qom, Iran)

Soul (nafs), corpus (tan), body (badan), flesh (jism), spirit (rūḥ), psyche (ravān) and life (jān) are frequently used with a moral function in Rūmī’s Mathnavī, and words “souls”, “life” and “psyche” are used in the philosophical sense of the soul. so Rumi’s use of the words “corpus”, body, flesh in contrast with “life” and

133

“psyche” is evidence of his dualistic conception of the soul-body soul relation. Because of the frequency of the words regarding the psychology through the images, and to do this, I will try to show the presuppositions and implications of the images of the body in Mathnavī. Rumi is also influenced by Quranic verses and Ḥadīth.. Occasionally he refers to the self or soul and its transcendence by making an appeal to verses such as "I breathed into him from my spirit" (nafakht), "fall from Eden" (ihbiṭū) and "the spirit is from my Lord's amr (command)" (amri rabbī).

ihbitu (fall from Eden) threw the soul in the body/So that the pearl of Eden hide in the mud Rumi believes that humans have fallen from the heavens and divine reed-place (neyestān) and from the Throne ('arsh) to the Floor (farsh):

Abstracts

souls and bodies in Mathnavī, I will try to examine examin Rumi’s

He says, O' my inferior lowly parts/My distance is bitterer, [for] I am Heavenly He takes death to be the soul's fly-away away from the earthly body: When the soul steps away from the life/It would be so that the body will lose life He takes the soul to be immaterial, infinite, a-spatial, spatial, and immortal. However, he concedes the interactions between the t soul and body. Keywords: soul, spirit, body, morality.

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The Gender of the Mind and the Islamic Doctrine of Gender Justice Hadi Sadeqi Dar alal-Ḥadīth College (Qom, Iran)

The problem of the gender of the mind is the following: is the human mind (regardless of the body) subject to gender distinction (masculinity and femininity)? This is a metaphysical issue about the role of gender distinction in human entity,

135

which was not a subject of discussion until recently. Some people believe that men and women's mind or soul (on the basis different

specifica

philosophers

reject

(or the

types). above

On

the

view w

by

contrary, rejecting

some the

psychological or personality differences between men and women, and some reject it while maintaining the differences. In this paper I will talk about the space of possible views in this regard on the basis of Islamic philosophy, and then discuss its implications for the doctrine of gender justice in Islam. Keywords: gender, soul, mind, justice.

Abstracts

of dualism) ontologically differ and thus they belong to two

The Real Happiness (Sa’adah) in Ṣadrāean adrāean Philosophy Mohammad Ghasem Elyasi Graduate Institute of Khatam alal-Nabiyyin (Kabul, Afghanistan)

In this paper I will try to talk about the aspects of happiness in this world and the afterlife. I will examine theories of material happiness, spiritual happiness and internal happiness as 136

alternatives to the Ṣadrāean ean view of comprehensive happiness. This will be done by theoretical principles such as the principality

of

existence,

existential

hierarchy,

material

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origination and spiritual survival of the soul, the substantial motion, human free will, the relation between this world and the afterlife, the unification nification of the soul with faculties, and the intellecting-intellected unity. According to Ṣadrā,, happiness is of two kinds: real and unreal, each of which is worldly and afterlife. These 4 types of happiness are of two sorts in turn: turn dependent on externall and internal perceptions and appetitive faculties, or resultant from theoretical and practical intellect. The real happiness is what refers to the human intellect. Keywords: transcendental philosophy, happiness, substantial motion, soul.

Human Happiness Happiness and the Role of Religion in Fā Fārābi's View Yarali Kord Firouzjaei Baqir alal-Olum University (Qom, Iran)

Fārābī has discussed the human happiness in many of his works. Humans are composite of souls and bodies, and souls can become immaterial beings, though hough they are primarily material or hylic. The rational soul can reach to the stages of

137

actual reason and mustafād reason through cognizance of the intelligible (ma'qūlāt),, and become immaterial beings that can abstraction from matter (immateriality) and conjunction with the immaterial intellects. Since most people cannot grasp this mode of existence and do not know how to achieve it, they should be guided by people who have grasped them, and they are the prophets. The prophet has an intellectual cognizance of happiness and most people have an imaginary cognizance of it. Keywords: Fārābī, religion, soul, happiness.

Abstracts

survive without material bodies. The human happiness appiness is his

Human Dignity on the basis of the Quranic Dcotrines of Mulla Ṣadrā Sima Mohammadpour Mohammadpour Dehkordi (Iran)

The human dignity (kirāmah) is recognized by all religions, and is more widely referred to in the Quran. Influenced by religious doctrines, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a version of philosophical, religious and mystical anthropology according ing to which the 138

human person is one and the same entity with a divine aspect in all their natural, psychological and rational stages. Thus Mullā Mull Ṣadrā takes humans and the Quran to be equivalent to each

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other, both having an outward and an inward. In Ṣadrāean philosophy rationality is taken to be the most important ground for the human dignity. In Ṣadrā's 's mystical views, human is taken to be the universal being (kawn jāmi') and one of the main aspects of this feature is that humans are successors or substitutes of God on the earth. Though Mullā Ṣadrā adrā thinks about the training of ideal men, his ideas about the grounds of the human dignity are not worked out and need to be more elaborated. Keywords: Quran, religious doctrines, Mullā Ṣadrā, adrā, human dignity.

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in the Philosophy of Malebranche, the Islamic Philosophy and Ash'arite Thought and Its Implications for the Free Will and Divine Agency Majid Zia'i (Iran)

The soul-body body relation and their interaction is one of the main issues in the philosophy of Malebranche and the Islamic

139

philosophy. This problem will have implications for the problem of

free

will

and

divine

agency.

Some

scholars

take

will show that this is not true. His view on the soul-body soul relation does not entail the deterministic conception of the human will, rather it entails something in the middle of both determinism and indeterminism, and thus he would better be compared with Muslim philosophers (though not exactly). Keywords: Malebranche, Ash'arite,, soul, body, vaporous soul, determinism, free will.

Abstracts

Malebranche's view to be akin to Ash'arite line of thought, but I

PART IV

God, Prophecy and the Mind-Body Problem

Does God Have a Mind? Hajj Muhammad Muhammad Legenhausen Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

Theists sometimes describe God as a mind without a body. In this paper several questions related to this claim are considered: Is it possible for there to be minds without bodies? es? Do minds have to have parts? Do minds have to be temporal? What is the nature of consciousness? I will argue that in a plausible sense of

143

“mind” God does not have a mind. Furthermore, I will try to show that there are important theological traditions, including understood as having a mind, but is nevertheless knowing, willing, and living. Keywords: God, mind, body.

Abstracts

the dominant stream in Islamic philosophy, in which God is not

Ibn Sina’s View of Revelations and Miracles in Terms of his MindMind-Body Theory Hamidreza Khademi (Iran)

Ibn Sina takes the soul to be the governing principle of the body, instead of the Aristotelian view of the soul as the vital principle. Thus Ibn Sina does not acknowledge the materiality of the soul and its indwelling in thee body, unlike Aristotle. Thus 144

the soul, despite its unity, has faculties which enable it to have a relation to the body. In his view, the animal faculties do not act without the body, and their existence is not separated from their

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

agency. He then concludes es that every particular perception is done through a material organ. In Ibn Sina’s philosophy, imagination is an internal faculty which enable the soul to receive revelations. Revelation (vaḥy) is a divine speech received by the prophet through an angel. Prophets have three characteristics: perfection of the theoretical faculty or the faculty of guess, the perfection of imagination and the perfection of the governing (mutaṣarifah) faculty. Ibn Sina accounts for the miracles in terms of these three characteristics. characte Keywords: Ibn Sina, revelation (vaḥy),, miracle, soul, body, faculties of the soul.

The Characteristics of Prophetic Imagination in Aquinas Alireza Fazeli Yasouj University (Yasouj, Iran)

In his detailed discussion of prophecy, Aquinas talks about the way the prophetic knowledge is acquired, and takes the most appropriate supernatural cognition of the prophet to be an imaginational one. In this paper I will talk about the

145

characteristics of this special cognition. I will first talk about the faculty of imagination in Aquinas, then discuss about his to be a perfection of the faculty of imagination. Aquinas takes the prophet as a normal rmal human individual and takes his prophecy to be a divine intervention without there being any capacity inside the prophet which distinguishes him from other human beings. In order to reject the interference of the prophetic imaginations with the images of the perception, Aquinas upholds the isolation of the prophet's perceptions at the time of receiving the prophecy. This is against the account given by some Muslim philosophers such as Fārābī. Keywords: imagination.

Aquinas,,

prophecy,

prophetic

knowledge,

Abstracts

position against Ibn Sina which takes the prophetic knowledge

A Philosophical Explanation of Imamah in Peripatetic Philosophy Mortaza YousofiYousofi-Rad Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

Islamic peripatetic philosophers such as Fārābi and Ibn Sina tried to give philosophical explanations as to the nature and existence 146

of

imāms

in

Shiite

doctrines.

They

gave

comprehensive explanations of the nature and capacities of the rational soul and its degrees of perfection, and accordingly tried to explain imāmah as a perfection of the soul. On this account,

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

imām has a cosmic governance (velāyat takvīnī) because of the way he exists. Keywords: Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, imamah, soul.

Human as the Vicar of God and the Nature of the Soul Soul Seyyed Mohammad Akbarian Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (Qom, Iran)

The problem of divine vicariate of human beings is related to the problem of the soul in some respects. The divine vicariate of humans and the cosmic (takvīnī) and legislative (tashrī'ī) governance (velāyat) of the Perfect Man (insān kāmil) in

147

religious doctrines and the writings of the Muslim thinkers show an anthropocentrism in the world. The world in religious evolution on to realize the Perfect Man. In this paper I will examine the divine vicariate of humans on the basis of the Quran and Ḥadīth,, and then generalize it to the human kind. Finally I will talk about its implications for the nature of the human soul and its degrees on the basis of the Ṣadrāean view. Keywords: human, vicar of God, soul, body, cosmic governance, legislative governance.

Abstracts

and philosophical works is envisaged as being directed in its

PART V

Mind-Body Problem and the Religious Belief

Psychological Philosophy between Aristotle and Ibn Sina Hossein Rostami Jalilian (Iran)

We will discuss the Aristotelian definition of the soul and then talk about issues such as the unity of the soul, its immateriality and immortality, and its faculties. Within the discussion we will point to Ibn Sina's views which are influenced by the Aristotelian psychology. We will try to show that the

151

Aristotelian view that the soul is the form of the body and his view that the corruption of matter brings about the corruption c that the intellectual soul is wholly independent of the body and thus completely immaterial. Therefore he should not count as a materialist. Ibn Sina has made modifications in the Aristotelian A definition of the soul and considered sidered it to be a definition of the relational nature of the soul and not of its essence, which will have implications for his views about the soul. Keywords: Aristotle, Ibn Sina, soul, body, immortality.

Abstracts

of the form (and vice versa) are compatible. Aristotle maintains

An Approach to the SoulSoul-Body Relation: The Plan of a View Ahmad Shahgoli (Iran)

This paper aims to introduce some of the issues concerning the soul-body body relation from a different perspective. The paper consists of some sections, the second problem of which is more central. The most important problems in this paper are: are (1) anything which occurs in the soul or in the body will affect only 152

that part (the soul or body), (2) the mutual interaction of the soul and the body; that is, any state, idea, or belief that at occurs in the soul will affect the body too; likewise any volitional bodily

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

act will affect the soul, (3) in addition to this universal interaction, each psychological character has a manifestation suitable with the bodily aspect; in fact the body and its i acts are translation or reflections of the psychological characters and properties; likewise each volitional bodily act has a particular expression in the soul. That is why the plurality of the types and individuations of an act leads to the plurality off the function of the soul, (4) I will examine the different forms of relations between objects and the place of the soul and body in this regard, and will introduce the paths of the soul-boy boy interaction and I will give a philosophical explanation of the cases ases which seem to be counter-examples to this general rule. Keywords: soul-body relation, reflection, interaction.

A Comparative Examination of the SoulSoul-Body Relation in Aquinas and Ibn Sina Zahra Zare' (Iran)

Thomsitic account of the nature of the soul has any similarities with Ibn Sina's views. Adhering to an Aristotelian perspective, Aquinas takes the soul as the form of the body or the first actuality of the body, in light of which the living organism can perform its vital tasks. He takes the human man soul to be an

153

immaterial substance and immortal. In his arguments for the existence of this immaterial substance, he takes the soul to be Platonic view of the soul-body body relation as a captain-ship capta relation. What distinguishes Aquinas' view from Ibn Sina's is that the former maintains that soul cannot acquire all its actualities without the body, though it is an independent substance, and that a combination of the soul and body constitutes thee human person, but Ibn Sina takes the soul and not the body as the constituent of the human person. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Aquinas, soul, body.

Abstracts

imperfect, which has the tendency to perfection. He rejects the

SoulSoul-Body Problem in Ibn Sina, Ṣadrā and Zonouzi Rahmatollah Karimzadeh (Iran)

Ibn Sina takes the intellectual tual soul to be immaterial, and thus the soul –as integrated with the intellect- will be immaterial too. Bu this gives rise to the problem of how an immaterial entity can belong to a material body. Ṣadrā proposes to solve the 154

problem on the basis of the substantial bstantial motion, saying that the soul is material in origination and that the soul is united with the body. Finally we will deal with Zunūzi’s zi’s view of the soulsoul

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

body relation as unificatory combination. n. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Ṣadrā, Zunūzi, soul-body relation.

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean adrāean Philosophy Seyyed Yadollah Yazdanpanah1 Yazdanpanah1

The most important issue in Islamic philosophical psychology is how the soul exists. Muslim Peripatetic philosophers take the vegetative, animal and human composites to have souls as their specific forms. The soul is immaterial in essence, material in its governing relation to the body. However, in Ṣadrā’ss view the

155

relation to the body lies in the essence of the soul, since if the soul were immaterial in its essence, it could not have any is the form of the body is discussed. According to Ṣadrā, adrā, the soul is essentially in need of a body, though it is rational in character. The soul will have a substantial motion due to its relation to the body, but the motion will lead to its independence from the body at death, and it will survive the death, because of its immaterial rational character. In this paper we will extensively discuss the Ṣadrāean soul-body theory. Keywords: transcendental philosophy, soul-body, body, substantial motion, happiness.

1. The paper is rewritten by Mohammad Reza Fallah.

Abstracts

relations to the material body. Moreover, the view that the soul

A Critique of the Principles of the Ṣadrāean Philosophy S. Yahya Yasrebi1 Yasrebi1 Allameh abaṭ abaṭaba'ei University

The Ṣadrāean ean principles such as the principality of the existence and the substantial motion are seriously problematic, hence the theories based upon them, hem, such as his theory of the bodily 156

resurrection. As to the principality of the existence, we should distinguish between the mystical and Ṣadrāean ean versions. On the mystical version, nothing exists except God which is the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

absolute existence (personal unityy of existence). On the Ṣadrāean ean version, everything can be analyzed to a whatness or quiddity (māhiyah) and a being (existence), but what exists in fact is the existence and not the quiddity. My objection is that the distinction between whatness and being is a mental analysis, and this duality does not exist in the external world. For example, when there is a tree outside, there is only one phenomenon, regardless of its quiddity or existence. However, the point is that whenever Ṣadrā employs this principle to solve problems, it is the mystical version that he has in mind. One of these cases is the immateriality of the soul. The belief in the spiritual immaterial soul is a Greek heritage and is not rooted in the scriptures. As to the bodily resurrection, philosophical losophical views 1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.

are not compatible with the textual evidence of religious doctrines. Recent Muslim philosophers such as Āqā Alī Mudaris, Muhammad Taqī Āmolī, Mirzā Aḥmad mad Āshtianī, Sayyid Abolḥassan Rafī’eī Qazvīnī and Allameh aba abaṭaba'i find the Ṣadrāean account of resurrection to be incompatible with religious evidence. Keywords: transcendental philosophy, principality of existence, substantial motion, bodily resurrection, immateriality of the soul, survival.

Abstracts

157

Cartesian and NeoNeo-Cartesian Arguments for Dualism Edward Wierenga University of Rochester (NY)

This paper considers a series of arguments for substance dualism. The first are suggested by passages in Descartes; others, due to Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga, are of 158

more recent vintage butt seem to be inspired by Descartes’ arguments.

For the ones that seem plausible the paper

discusses the bearing of their conclusions on the question of The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

survival of death and resurrection. Keywords: substance dualism, Cartesian arguments, survival.

Should Christians or Muslims Be Dualists? Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (Qom, Iran)

Charles Taliaferro has defended dualism in the philosophy of mind as the best position available to Christians on the subject. Since ince Christians and Muslims are in basic agreement on many religious doctrines, such as the existence of God, angels, and the afterlife, one might plausibly suppose that if dualism is the

159

position Christians should take, Muslims should follow suit. In this paper I argue that the reasons given by Taliaferro against Christians to reject materialism. Furthermore, I argue that the religious doctrines of Christians and Muslims are indeterminate with respect ect to some important issues in the philosophy of mind, that is, that there are versions of materialism and dualism that appear to be no less consistent with religious teachings than their rivals. Finally, I offer a brief discussion of the philosophy of mind of Mullā Ṣadrā in order to illustrate how positions may be developed that do not correspond to current understandings of either materialism or dualism. Keywords: dualism, God's existence, afterlife, Christians, Muslims.

Abstracts

Christian materialism do not provide conclusive reason for

A Defense of Ibn Sina’s Sina’s Theory Theory of the Soul’s Spiritual Origin and Survival Seyyed Hassan Sa’adat Mostafavi1 Mostafavi1 Imam Sadiq University (Tehran, Iran)

Ibn Sina maintains that the soul is not eternal and it was not created before bodies; rather it is originated when the body was created. The soul as an immaterial form governs the body in its 160

developments, though in the first stages, only its vegetative and then its animal characters manifest. The body is the occasion of the soul’s perfection, not its essence. The perfections that the

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

soul acquires are not changes in the essence of the soul; rather they are necessary incidents of the soul, and thus they never separate from the soul even after death. According to Ibn Sina’s theory the bodily resurrection is possible, though it is not necessitated tated by philosophical proofs. Only the spiritual resurrection is necessary on the basis of philosophical reasoning. Keywords: spiritual origination, spiritual survival, soul, Ibn Sina.

1. The paper was rewritten by Hadi Mousavi.

Soul, Body, and their Interrelations Ali Abedi Shahroudi Hawzah of Qom (Iran)

In this paper we will first give a picture of the Islamic Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental theories of the soul-body body problem, and then talk about our own theory. In our view, the nature is by itself inertial such that even its ts substantial motion is in line with the existential width. For the course of

161

nature to transform, its direction should change by an outside cause. Also an outside cause should continuously exert change its direction and make the perfection possible. The main cause of the existence of the nature and its perfections is the cause of whole of "the best order" (neẓām aḥsan), thus the necessary being (wājib al-wujūd) is the source of the whole order and the changes without a change in His necessary essence; rather the necessary being as the adequate cause (ellat

tāmmah) creates the intellects, souls, humors, and the totality of the world, and through His causal dominance, He passes His existential effects ects through the horizontal and vertical chain, brings the nature to the substantial motion and determines its direction along with the vertical order of the existence, in addition to the horizontal one. Moreover, since the necessary being is super-adequatee cause, He has an adequate effect through a path other than the vertical order, without the

Abstracts

horizontal and vertical actualities on the nature in order to

falsification

of

the

vertical

and

horizontal

order

or

predestination (jabr) and divine resignation (tafwīḍ) in rational beings. Thus the substantial motion is not only linear, but vectorial. The soul originates by the origination of the fertilized ovaries, and its human growth continues through the vectorial substantial motion. Vegetative and sentient souls and their faculties are stages of the human soul, though they th have independent existence in plants and animals. The human soul is united with all the faculties. There are three types of relation between the soul and the body: (1) existential (and and not material) material connection, (2) existential unification, (3) governing relation. The bodily existence needs its complement, because of its existential 162

incompleteness,

and

since

the

soul

is

the

complement of the existence of the body, it should exist in the horizon of its existence, though the stage of its realization is distinct inct from that of the body. Thus while the soul is immaterial

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

even in its lowest stage, it has bodily characters (though not a body itself) because of its existential connection with the body as a matter (hyle) for the soul. The nature's substantial motion is all-encompassing encompassing motion which crosses the horizontal order of the world, and thus brings about transformations in respects of the substantial intensification (ishtidād), quantitative, qualitative and spatial motions. Moreover, the repetitive (tajadudī) substantial motion changes to a vectorial and tensor substantial motion via the influence of the universal soul and the universal intellect, and this paves the path for the existential perfection which is governed by rules different from those of the incidental dental perfection. The nature is subject to change via universal souls and the universal soul which are paths of the divine act throughout the existential degrees and have the dispositional and occurrent possibilities of higher acquirements.

Thus parts of it will be detached to be transformed into organic material body for substantial and accidental changes. The detached parts are incomplete existences whose complete existences are disturbed, and they can thus admit of complementary existences and transform m into other kinds of being. The soul which has stages is a being which can be completed and is thus incomplete. Its unificatory combination with an organic natural body is possible. Though the soul and the body have a unificatory combination, but since this th combination just falls in the stage of their existential connection, they gradually distance from one another and continue their tensor substantial motion in the ends of the existence where the soul is separated from the body and has received its actualities ities and the body becomes complete through

163

the substantial motions, and thus in resurrection, the soul

Keywords:

soul,

body,

substantial

motion,

existential

attachment, the best order, rational beings, resurrection. tion.

Abstracts

existentially belongs to the material body.

Rational Character and Immortal Happiness: Ibn Sina’s View on the Role of Intellect in Afterlife Happiness Amir Divā Divāni Mofid University (Qom, Iran)

Muslim philosophers regard the intellect or the rational soul as the constituent of the nature of men which is what distinguishes 164

humans from other creatures. The intellect has two major powers: the power to know and the power to act. In this paper I will deal with the role of the intellect in happiness and its

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

degrees on the basis of the degrees of the soul’s rational faculty. According to Ibn Sina, the happiness and miserability of humans in the afterlife depends on the theoretical and practical position of the rational soul and since the immortal happiness and miserability depend on the theoreticall condition of the intellect, there will be two main groups of people: those who have achieved the theoretical perfection of the intellect (thus enjoy happiness), and those who do not enjoy such a perfection (thus in miserability). Therefore, Ibn Sina merely ly emphasizes on the spiritual and intellectual immortality and believes that bodily characters do not bring about any changes in the essence of the rational soul. Keywords: immortality.

Ibn

Sina,

rational

faculty,

soul,

happiness,

Persons Without Immaterial Souls Lynne Rudder Baker University of Amherst (Massachusetts, USA)

Traditionally, Christians and Muslims have held that a human person is (or has) an immaterial soul. Since there does not seem to be a place for immaterial souls in the natural world, I offer

an

alternative

view

that

I

call

‘Person ‘Person-Body

165

Constitutionalism.‘ Person-Body Body Constitutionalism holds that there are no (finite) Instead of distinguishing

between souls and bodies, Constitutionalism distinguishes distingui between whole persons and bodies.

Human persons are

essentially embodied, but do not essentially have the bodies that they in fact have at any given time. So, human persons, though spatially coincident with their bodies, are not identical to their bodies. odies. Persons are distinguished from their bodies by having first-person perspectives essentially. I shall try to show that Constitutionalism is consistent with Christian doctrines. First, I set out Constitutionalism. Then, after

critically

Resurrection,

discussing I

discuss

Thomas omas the

Aquinas’s

compatibility

view

of

between

Constitutionalism and the Resurrection, and an intermediate state between death and a general resurrection (e.g., Purgatory).

Abstracts

immaterial entities like souls.

Finally, I have a brief discussion of Constitutionalism m and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The conclusion is that Person-Body Body Constitutionalism is congenial to these central Christian doctrines, and the existence of immaterial souls is not required for traditional Christianity. Keywords: immateriall soul, constitution view, person, body.

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166

What is Dualism and Its Relation to Science and Religion? Uwe Meixner Regensburg University (Germany)

The paper distinguishes various forms of (psychophysical) dualism and inquires into the reasons for the widespread wi (almost

unanimous)

rejection

of

dualism

by

Western

intellectuals. It is argued that dualism is very well compatible

167

with science (in fact: good for it). The contrary impression is due to the confusing of science with materialist metaphysics. religious attitude. But, in fact, dualism –in the senses explicated in the paper- does not require the truth of the Christian or any other religion. However, it is argued -contrary ontrary to what some believers believe- that the Christian religion requires the truth of dualism (if most of what the Scriptures tell about the resurrection of the dead is to be believed). Keywords: dualism, science, religion, materialism.

Abstracts

Often,, the rejection of dualism is simply the outcome of an antianti

Unity and Subjectivity: the Plotinian Perspective and Its Aftermath Douglas Hedley Cambridge University (UK)

In my paper I consider the anti-materialistic materialistic arguments of Plotinus about the simplicity of the soul, their reception in both 168

Christian and Islamic theology, and conclude with ith an account of the relevance of

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

such arguments for contemporary philosophy of religion. Keywords: Plotinus, simplicity of the soul, Christian theology, Islamic theology.

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in Ibn Ḥazm's View Khaled Amohammad Faraj Alohaishi AlAl-Jabal alal-Gharbi University (Libya (Libya) Libya)

The problem of the soul-body body relation is one of the most difficult philosophical issues. Since Ibn Ḥazm azm was a soul-body soul dualist, he had to explain the nature of this relation and since he found it hard to explain the relation between an immaterial

169

entity (soul) and a material one (body), he tended to accept the idea of the soul as a fine-grained matter (jism laṭīf) through a and the religious doctrines that he learned from the Quran. One thing that supports this conclusion is that many philosophers and theologians had tendencies toward this view. For example, while Ibn Sin takes the soul to be an immaterial, spiritual soul, he had to make an appeal to a fine-grained grained matter as intermediate between the soul and the body. Keywords: Ibn Ḥazm, soul, body, dualism.

Abstracts

reconciliation between philosophical views (Greek or Islamic)

The Concept of Soul and Spirit in the Scriptures and Fakhr Razi's View Bahloul Mohammad Hossain Taha National University (Malaysia)

In this paper, I will first talk about the meaning of nafs (soul) and rūḥ (spirit) in the Quran and Ḥadīth and the relation between them. I will then go on to briefly point to falāsifah's 170

view about the soul, and finally talk about Ghazālī's 's and Rāzī's R views about the soul and the spirit.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Keywords: Rāzī, Ghazālī, soul, body.

A Philosophical Explanation of the SoulSoul-Body Relations in Ṣadrāean View Ahmad Sa'adat AlAl-Musṭ Musṭafā University (Gorgan, Iran)

For Ṣadrā, the soul is a perdurant entity which is subject to constant change and motion, and has many different hierarchical degrees from a material, hylic one which has no actuality to a complete actuality and the unification with active

171

intellect. Thus we cannot talk about one type of relation between the he soul and body; rather there can be four types of at the time of the origination (ḥudūth), (2) the innovative relation in which the soul creates an imaginal (mithālī) body appropriate to its characters, (3) the perfectional relation in the super-imaginal imaginal stage of the soul when the actual theoretical intellect is not yet achieved, and (4) the intellectual existence of the soul (without a body) in which the soul is unified with the active intellect. Keywords: Ṣadrā, adrā, soul, active intellect, perfection of the soul, actuality of the soul.

Abstracts

relations: (1) the existential attachment of the soul to the body

SoulSoul-Body Relation in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Ṣadrā Es'haq Shirdaqi Razavi University of Islamic Studies (Mashhad, (Mashhad, Iran) Iran)

How can an immaterial soul interact with a material body or be combined to constitute a single entity? This is the problem of the soul-body body relation. In this paper, the solutions to this 172

problem by Ibn Sina, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā adrā will be examined.

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Keywords: adrā, soul, body. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā,

The SoulSoul-Body Relation in Ṣadrāean adrāean Philosophy Mehri Changi Ashtiani (Iran)

One of the characteristics of the Ṣadrāean ean philosophy is that it is based on or inspired from religious teachings besides the philosophical reasoning. This philosophical system tries to give a systematic account of most religious doctrines on the basis of some principles such as the hierarchy off existence, principality

173

of the existence, substantial motion, the knower-known known unity, and the perfection of the humans. In this paper I will illustrate his principles, and will show that it will ill give coherent explanations of key religious doctrines such as the bodily resurrection and the embodiment of the deeds (tajasum a'māl). Keywords: transcendental philosophy, soul, body, bodily resurrection, embodiment of the deeds (tajasum a'māl).

Abstracts

the Ṣadrāean account of the soul-body body relation on the basis of

Emergentism: How Mind May Become BodyBody-Free Rouhollah Ramezani Varzaneh Shahid Beheshti University (Tehran, Iran)

As an alternative to both monism and dualism, emergentism, on the version I would defend, aims at securing the initial dependency of mind on, and at the same time its final 174

independence from, matter. Emergentists differ on whether what emergent are there, just some properties or a substance as well. In my paper, I shall argue that among dualist views

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

substance emergentism is the least problematicc in accounting for a body-attached attached mind susceptible of becoming (partially or wholly) independent of the body. I also argue that when emergentism were proved true, there would be a good ontological explanation for a kind of explanatory gap regarding mind-body body interaction. Finally, I would argue that in accounting for some principal religious doctrines (resurrection, purgatory, etc.) the best option to choose is a form of substance emergentism. Keywords: emergentism, monism, dualism, matter, mind.

Swinburne, Swinburne, the Gift of Life, and the Soul Amir Dastmalchian The Islamic College (London, UK)

In his attempt to make plausible the Christian doctrine of Atonement, Richard Swinburne faces many objections. One objection has been that no sense can be made of the he belief that life is a gift and hence humans have no responsibility to God and no subsequent need to atone to God for wrongdoing. One

175

way out of this objection requires belief in a soul. I explain why

nement, Christianity, Swinburne, dualism. Keywords: Atonement,

Abstracts

and show a link with Islamic teaching.

A Prolegomenon to the Research on Islamic Doctrines and the MindMind-Body Problem Yasser Pouresmail Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy (ISCA)

In this paper I shall present an outline of the research on Islamic doctrines and the mind-body body problem. To do this, I will first enumerate the Islamic doctrines which have implications 176

for theories of the mind-body body problem or are accountable in terms of some theory of the mind-body body relation, such as different versions of dualism or materialism. The JeudoJeudo

The International Conference of Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem

Christian doctrines will be mentioned by way of comparison. I will then give dualistic, materialistic or other accounts for each of these doctrines. If there is any literature about the doctrine, I will give an introductory ry formulation of it and if there is no literature, I will try to carve the logical space of the possible theories which can explain the doctrine. In the introduction of this paper, I will make general remarks about religious dualism and materialism in both h Christian and Islamic traditions and the religious motives behind them. Furthermore, I will discuss the presuppositions and the methodology of this research. Keywords:

religious

dualism, materialism.

doctrines,

the

mind-body body

problem,