A History of Greek Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day (Maritime History)

A HISTORY OF GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING

MARITIME HISTORY Series Editor: Lewis R.Fischer A History of Finnish ShippingYrjö Kaukiainen

A HISTORY OF GREEKOWNED SHIPPING The making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day

Gelina Harlaftis

London and New York

First published 1996 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1996 Gelina Harlaftis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-99332-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-00018-1 (Print Edition)

To my father, Basil Harlaftis, who taught me to love and respect the Sea

CONTENTS

List of tables

viii

List of figures

xii

List of plates

xv

Acknowledgements

xv

Introduction

xix

Part I The nineteenth century 1

TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BLACK SEA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

2

2

GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME NETWORKS: THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830s–1860s

38

3

GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL NETWORKS: THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s–1900s

71

4

SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

107

5

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN

147

Part II The twentieth century 6

GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914–39

183

7

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEK-OWNED FLEET IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

224

8

THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THE BASIS FOR THE ‘LEAP FORWARD’

243

9

INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

264

vii

10

THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK OF THE GREEKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

288

Appendices

304

Notes

460

Select bibliography

488

Index

498

TABLES

1.1 The main ports of the Mediterranean and northern Europe 1.2 The growth of the Black Sea grain trade 1.3 Destinations of wheat exported from Odessa in 1838 1.4 Grain exports from Egypt 1.5 Egyptian cotton exported by Greek-owned firms 1.6 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea 1.7 Destination of Russian wheat exports 1.8 Tonnage of Greek-owned ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea 1.9 Return of Greek-owned ships reported as British in 1842 1.10 Main liner steamship companies covering the sea-routes of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, 1860–1910 1.11 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to the ports of England, 1860–1910 1.12 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to Marseilles 2.1 Vessels entered for loading at the port of Liverpool from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean 2.2 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea at the ports of England 2.3 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea at the port of Marseilles 2.4 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports to Marseilles by the five principal merchant houses in 1840 2.5 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports to Marseilles by the five principal Greek merchant houses in 1850 2.6 Exports of the commercial houses of Odessa to Great Britain, 1841– 5 2.7 Exports from Taganrog distinguishing Greek merchant houses, 1851–2 2.8 Greeks as consuls in various port-cities, 1830s–1860s 2.9 List of Greek members of the Baltic Exchange, 1886 2.10 Greek merchants as shipowners, 1830–60 2.11 Ship arrivals at Marseilles and the ports of England 3.1 River fleet of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895 and 1900 3.2 Origin of shipowners of the riverboats of the Rumanian Danube in 1900 3.3 Corp of pilots of the Danube in 1901

8 12 17 18 20 22 25 27 30 34 35 36 40 42 44 45 46 48 49 56 58 61 63 73 74 75

ix

3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7

The ten biggest owners of riverboats on the Danube in 1895 Tonnage of ships leaving the Danube List of the principal Greek exporters in the Azov, in 1886 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Azov Sea, Taganrog, Kertch, Berdiansk, Mariupol 3.8 Exports of the commercial houses at Nicolaieff 3.9 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia 3.10 List of principal exporters in Novorossisk 3.11 Tonnage of ships clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea, Batum, Poti and Novorossisk 3.12 Tonnage of ships clearing the south-western ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Burghaz 3.13 Tonnage of ships clearing Constantinople 3.14 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean at the port of Marseilles 3.15 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean at the ports of England 3.16 The Vagliano fleet 3.17 The fleet of the Embiricos family 3.18 Greek steamships owned or financed by members of the Ionian network 4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1835–1914 4.2 Shipbuilding in Greece, 1843–58 4.3 The voyages on which sail and steam were competitive for bulk cargo 4.4 Steamships owned by members of the Chiot and Ionian networks, 1860–85 4.5 Greek shipping offices in London 4.6 Age structure of new acquisitions of Greek steamships, 1895–1910 4.7 Steam tonnage as percentage of total tonnage of the main maritime nations, 1880–1910 4.8 Investing groups of the Greek-owned steamship fleet, Syros and Piraeus ship registries, 1880–1910 4.9 Numbers of shareholders on Greek steamships registered in Syros and Piraeus, 1880–1910 4.10 Ship finance from the Bank of Athens for the total Greek fleet, 1900– 14 4.11 Number of ships owned by Greek shipping companies 4.12 Masters as shipowners in Greek-owned shipping, 1879 4.13 Owners of Syros and Piraeus steamships by occupational categories, 1880–1910 5.1 The voyages of Odysseas, 1837–41 5.2 The voyages of Anastassia, 1881–98

75 77 80 81 84 84 87 87 88 90 93 94 96 98 102 110 119 122 126 130 133 135 136 138 138 139 144 146 149 152

x

5.3 The voyages of Theofania, 1873–6 5.4 Voyages of ss Calliope Nicolopulo, 1880–1 5.5 Voyages of ss Demetrius S.Schilizzis, 1895–1902 5.6 Voyages of ss Leonidas, 1905–7 5.7 Voyages of ss Andriana, 1906 5.8 Average number and duration of voyages per year 5.9 The profits of the voyages of Andriana, 1906–9 5.10 Greek seamen, 1839–1910 5.11 Composition of crew in an ocean-going Greek cargo sailing vessel of about 250 NRT 5.12 Composition of crew in an ocean-going Greek cargo steamship vessel of about 2,000 GRT in 1910 5.13 Mean wages for able-bodied seamen on sailing vessels in selected ports 5.14 Monthly wages for Greek and Norwegian ABs for deep-sea-going vessels 6.1 Ships larger than 2,000 GRT as percentage of total national fleets in 1914 6.2 Taxes and profits of shipping during the First World War, 1915–19 6.3 Top twelve merchant fleets, 1914–37 6.4 Greek-owned fleet, 1919–38 6.5 Ownership structure of the Rethymnis and Kulukundis ships 6.6 Single-ship companies and the Greek fleet 6.7 Single-ship companies in the various national fleets, 1931–2 7.1 Greek seamen in the interwar period 7.2 Composition of seamen on cargo ships 7.3 Composition of crew in ocean-going Norwegian and Greek cargo vessels in 1925 7.4 Seamen on board Greek flag steamships in 1910 and 1930 according to places of origin 7.5 Greek seamen’s wages on deep-sea-going vessel 7.6 Wages for able-bodied seamen on steamships on Greek, Norwegian, British, German, Dutch, Spanish and Japanese fleets 8.1 Standard national rates of pay for ABs, Britain and Greece, 1933–65 8.2 Distribution of the 100 Liberty ships in 1947 8.3 The Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1938–62 8.4 Structure of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets 9.1 Development of world seaborne dry cargo and oil trade, 1948–89 9.2 World seaborne trade of main bulk commodities 9.3 Development of world fleet, 1948–93 9.4 Tanker fleets by the seven oil companies 9.5 Greek-owned fleet according to type of ship 9.6 The ten biggest fleets, 1939–63 9.7 The ten biggest fleets, 1973–93

158 162 163 166 167 172 172 173 174 175 179 180 186 187 189 192 200 221 222 225 226 227 232 238 241 250 254 259 261 266 269 272 275 278 282 285

xi

10.1 The Greek maritime network, 1914–90 10.2 Main headquarters of Greek-owned shipping firms, 1914–90 10.3 Origins of the main Greek shipowning families, 1914, 1938, 1958 and 1975 10.4 Places of origin of Greek seamen, 1930, 1959 and 1980 10.5 Real ownership of the principal cargo carrying fleets in 1992

289 291 294 296 299

FIGURES

1.1 Main islands of origin of twentieth-century shipowners (Map) 1.2 The main Black Sea ports (Map) 1.3 Maritime geography of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (Map) 1.4 Arrivals at Marseilles from eastern Mediterranean ports 1.5 Arrivals at British ports from eastern Mediterranean ports 1.6 Tonnage of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean 1.7 Tonnage of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean 1.8 Maritime geography of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea(Map) 1.9 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports 1.10 Percentage of Greeks in the bulk trade from eastern Mediterranean to French and British ports 1.11 Greek ships in British ports 1.12 Growth of Black Sea grain trade 1.13 Growth of Black Sea shipping (departures) 1.14 Greek-owned shipping in Black Sea (departures) 1.15 Percentage of Greek-owned shipping of total Black Sea shipping (departures) 2.1 The Chiot commercial and maritime network, 1830s–1860s (Map) 2.2 The network of Ralli Brothers, 1830s–1860s (Map) 2.3 Ports for orders 3.1 The Ionian commercial and maritime network, 1870s–1900s (Map) 3.2 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Southern Russia shipowners and merchants (Map) 3.3 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Shipowners and merchants of the Danube (Map) 3.4 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Merchants, bankers and shipowners of Constantinople (Map) 4.1 Growth of Greek-owned fleet, 1835–1914 4.2 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1835–75 4.3 Freight rates of tallow, Odessa-England 4.4 Freight rates of wheat, Odessa-England 4.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships 4.6 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1876–1914 4.7 Freight rates of coal and wheat

3 7 10 10 10 13 13 13 20 21 21 22 26 32 32 40 53 60 72 104 104 105 108 116 117 117 119 124 126

xiii

4.8 Tramp shipping freight rates, 1866–1913 4.9 Headquarters of steamship firms 4.10 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1900–14 4.11 From sail to steam, 1875–1914 6.1 Position of ships lost in the First World War 6.2 Tramp shipping freights, 1910–36 6.3 Percentage of ships lost during the First World War 6.4 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1919–39 6.5 Geographical activity of Greek ships 6.6 Tramp dry-cargo fleets, 1936 6.7 Arrivals at the River Plate 6.8 Growth rates in Greek and world fleets 6.9 Growth rates in Norwegian and world fleets 6.10 Growth rates in British and world fleets 6.11 Tonnage represented by London Greek offices according to the islands of origin of the shipowners 6.12 London Greek shipping offices 6.13 London Greek shipping office Rethymnis and Kulukundis 6.14 Tramp freight index 7.1 Comparative data of wages of ABs 8.1 Position of ships lost in the Second World War 8.2 Percentage of ships lost during the Second World War 8.3 Growth of the merchant fleet under the Greek flag 8.4 Growth of the Greek-owned merchant fleet 8.5 Percentage of distribution of flags in the Greek fleet 9.1 Growth of top fleets, 1949–93 9.2 World sea-trade in the 1920s (Map) 9.3 World sea-trade in the 1980s (Map) 9.4 Major sea-routes of oil, 1958 (Map) 9.5 Major sea-routes of oil, 1984 (Map) 9.6 World trade, 1948–89 9.7 Iron ore: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 9.8 Coal: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 9.9 Grain: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 9.10 World trade, 1948–74 9.11 World fleet, 1950–74 9.12 Tramp freights, 1948–74 9.13 World trade, 1974–89 9.14 World fleet, 1974–93 9.15 Freight indices, 1975–90 9.16 Greek-owned fleet: types of ship 9.17 Greek-owned fleet, 1949–93 9.18 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations 10.1 Greek maritime network, 1914 (Map)

126 131 134 135 184 185 186 188 192 192 194 194 194 196 198 200 216 241 244 245 253 260 262 265 266 266 269 269 269 272 272 272 277 278 278 278 278 278 279 285 286 293

xiv

10.2 Greek maritime network, 1990 (Map)

293

PLATES

(between pp. 200 and 201) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Commercial and maritime networks, nineteenth century The traditionals, Ithaca and Andros: Stathatos and Embiricos The traditionals, Kassos: Kulukundis The traditionals, Cephalonia: Lykiardopulo and Co The traditionals, Myconos: Dracopoulos The traditionals, Chios: Livanos Post-Second World War shipowners: the Onassis Group Post-Second World War shipowners: the Eletson Corporation Post-Second World War shipowners: Tsakos Shipping & Trading Post-Second World War shipowners: Sarlis Container Services Post-Second World War shipowners: Costamare Shipping Greek seamen, nineteenth century Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1900s–1940s Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1950s Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1960s–1970s Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1980s–1990s

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would never have been written without Professor Lewis R.(Skip) Fischer. Professor Fischer entrusted me with writing this book at a turning point in my career and his academic guidance, hard-working example and friendship have proved invaluable along the way. Professor Fischer has been the driving force and inspiration behind the organisation of maritime history on an international basis, and I thank him from this position for giving me the chance to find my ‘place’ in maritime history. It was of course Professor Peter N.Davies who first introduced me to the international circle of maritime historians and I would like to thank him again for his long-standing support since my student years. I would also like to thank David M.Williams who introduced me to the complex ‘world ’ international historical associations, committees and editorial boards. His work, advice and friendship combined with a marvellous sense of humour have made me realise that it is not only Scots who are interesting on that northern island. Finally, I would like to thank all my colleagues in the International Maritime Economic History Association from whose knowledge I have benefited during our meetings and conferences. If it was an Anglo-Canadian triumvirate that navigated me through international waters, it was a Greek triumvirate that oriented me to find my way among the islands and reefs of my home waters. Professor Spiros Asdrahas, Professor Vassilis Panayotopulos and Philipos Iliou are the three historians to whom history in Greece and a large number of young academics owe a great deal. They have established in the past decade one of the most respected and scholarly historical journals in Greece, Historica, and I thank them for supporting and promoting my work at the early and difficult stages of my career. I also thank Professor Christos Hadziiossif for providing valuable information, especially regarding the importance of Sémaphore de Marseilles; my trip to France took place only after the discussion I had with him. I have profited a lot from discussions with Dr Helen Thanopulou, my colleague at the Department of Maritime Studies at the University of Piraeus, who has convinced me along with her students that learning maritime economics is an ever-lasting, exciting and continuous adventure. Her friendship, her help and comments on various parts of the book, and particularly at times when I needed them most, have proved an invaluable source of strength along the way. I would also like to thank John Theotokas, PhD candidate at the Department of Maritime Studies, who gave me data from his own research regarding the Piraeus shipping companies today and for proving to be such a reliable fellow-worker for the past three years. I am grateful to the family of Admiral Anastassios Zografos, through whom I was able to discover the extremely valuable archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas. Captain Syrmas worked as a master of sailing vessels and steamers of big Greek-owned shipping firms from the 1860s to the 1910s. A well-respected family man, the captain was literate and very pedantic in his work. He bequeathed to his sons and grandsons a treasure of a maritime archive: logbooks and accounting books, professional and personal correspondence, an

xvii

autobiography and numerous receipts from suppliers, bills of lading and charterparties. Admiral Anastassios Zografos collected systematically and thus saved all the ‘useless papers’ of his maternal grandfather. I thank him, his wife Mania and his daughter Maria for their warmth and hospitality during the many months I spent in their house. I am also grateful to the President of the Aegean Maritime Museum, Mr George Dracopoulos, who generously gave me access not only to the museum’s archives but also to those of his family. Mr Dracopoulos is a unique example of a Greek shipowner who not only loves maritime history but also has shown it in numerous ways. Apart from establishing the Aegean Maritime Museum on his home-island in Myconos, he is the only Greek shipowner to have established ship museums: the cargo sailing ship, Evangelistria, and the cable ship, Thalis o Milissios. I would like to thank him very much for supporting me in all aspects of my research. I would also like to thank Mr Elias M.Kulukundis for giving me the important logbook of Anastassia and for information regarding his family history. Mr Manos Haritatos, the founder and director of the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Association, has also provided me with important information and archival material. I have benefited from discussions with Mr Nicos Vlassopulos, who has also given me archival material from his own work. Dr Demetrios Polemis has kindly allowed me to micro film the Archangelos registry books from the Kairios Library in Andros. Dr Jesus Valdaliso kindly gave me UK statistical abstracts. For the photos included in this book I would particularly like to thank the President of the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee Mr John Ad. Hadjipateras, Mr Elias M.Kulukundis, Dr Demetrios Polemis, Mr George Foustanos, Mr Dimitri Paizis, Mr Vassilis Kertsikoff, Captain Vassilis Constantacopulos, Captain Panayiotis Tsakos, Mr Michael Sarlis, the Aegean Maritime Museum and, of course, Admiral Anastassios Zografos. I would also like to thank the President of the Masters’ Union Captain Yannis Tsouras, the exPresident of the Pensioned Masters’ Union Captain George Abouselam, as well as Captain George Petrolekas, Captain Nicos Vranas, Captain Ioannis Madianos, and Second Mate Nicos Fournarakis. My special thanks go to Dr David Jenkins and the National Museum of Wales for the photos of Master Elias Kulukundis, Daphne and Eugenie Livanos. I have also used photos from the books of Timotheos Catsiyannis, Pandias Stephen Rallis, M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, the World Biographical Dictionary of Athens Ekdotiki, from Manolis Kulukundis’ Ships Loved and Painted, and Voyages on my Father’s Ships and Others, Efthimios Gourgouris’ Galaxidi in the Times of the Sailing Vessels, Peter Evans’ Ari, Gerassimos Kolaitis’ The Chronicle of Ithaca from the journal Eikones of 14 October 1994 and the journal Status of January 1994. The Board of Directors and Librarian of the Hellenic Maritime Museum in Piraeus have also been very helpful in giving access and information on various

xviii

bibliographic references. Eftichia Liata, the Director, and the staff of the exHistorical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, and Zissimos Synodinos of the Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece, have been extremely helpful not only in providing access to the microfilm reading/printing machines but also in other ways. The students of the Department of Maritime Studies at the University of Piraeus Athina Syrimi, Stephania Kollia, Katerina Vourkatioti and Vaso Resiti helped me process the vast data I had to handle. But my greatest thanks go to my husband, Dimitri Chryssis. It is only through his total support, love and patience that I had the peace of mind and time to work. I enjoyed writing this book. ‘Travelling’ on Greek ships and ‘meeting’ Greek merchants and shipowners from Taganrog, Braila and Marseilles to London, New York and Buenos Aires proved an exciting experience. I only regret the time it took from fully enjoying little Cressida’s early years.

INTRODUCTION

Proudly as always, the ship will set sail for Madras, Algeria and Singapore; in an office bent over some nautical maps I’ll make calculations in ledger books. ‘Mal de depart’ The Collected Poems of Nikos Kavadias, transl. Gail Holst-Warhaft (Amsterdam, Adolf M.Hakkert, 1987) This book follows the development of Greek-owned merchant shipping in international waters from the formation of the Greek state in 1830 to the present. In 1894 Greeks owned 1 per cent of the world fleet and had the thirteenth biggest merchant marine; 100 years later they owned the largest fleet, with 16 per cent of world tonnage. This study examines Greek international networks, their access to commercial and maritime markets and their share of sea transport. It distinguishes the cargoes carried in the last 160 years, the routes followed, the interests served and the organisational and structural patterns. The aim is to distinguish continuity from change over the past two centuries; to establish the main contours of the development of the fleet; and to raise important questions about why the Greek merchant marine was so successful. This study is mainly concerned with the activities of Greeks outside the boundaries of the modern state. Greek maritime history cannot be conceived as anything less than the history of the actions of Greeks dispersed in various ports, following the patterns of international trade. As the wellknown Greek historian, Nicos Svoronos, put it, ‘Greek history cannot be understood as the history of the Greek state but as the history of the Greek people.’1 The merchant fleet owned by Greeks was based on commercial and maritime networks consolidated in the Mediterranean and northern Europe after the 1830s. It became an international ‘tramp’ fleet engaged in the cross-trades carrying bulky, cheap cargoes and meeting the demand for transport in an increasingly integrated international economy. In the nineteenth century the main offices of Greek commercial and

xx

shipping enterprises were found in Odessa, Taganrog, Braila, Galatz, Constantinople, Smyrna, Syros, Cephalonia, Piraeus, Alexandria, Trieste, Livorno, Marseilles and London; their ships flew the Ionian, British, Russian, Moldavian, Wallachian, Egyptian, French, Italian, Ottoman and Greek flags, as well as those of Malta, Jerusalem and Samos. In the twentieth century the head offices of shipping companies with Greek interests were found in Piraeus, London, New York, Montreal, Buenos Aires, Monte Carlo, Paris and Zurich, and Greeks used the flags of the US, Egypt, Greece, Britain, Panama, Liberia, Canada, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, Vanuatu, Bermuda, Honduras, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Malta, Bangladesh, the Cayman Islands, the Marshall Islands, Saint Vincent, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Bahamas and Hong Kong. In the last two centuries the choice of flag used by ships under Greek control has been highly opportunistic—hence the term ‘Greek-owned’ rather than ‘Greek’. This distinction is more than semantic: members of nineteenth– and twentieth-century commercial and shipowning communities who lived all their lives abroad and were Russian, British, Italian or American subjects retained their ‘Greekness’, which was pivotal for their success and preserved by tight kinship and social circles. The successful progress of Greek-owned shipping was partly based on the fact that this identity guaranteed access to the informal ‘club’ of Greek merchants and shipowners abroad. The book follows a chronological division and is divided into two parts: the first, comprising Chapters 1–5, covers the period from 1830 to the First World War, while the second (Chapters 6–10) examines the interwar and postwar eras. The first chapter discusses the organisation of maritime trade from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. Moreover, it examines the emergence of a new division in international transport —liner versus tramp shipping —indicating Greek specialisation in the latter. It also looks at the origin of bulk cargoes and aggregate Greek participation in the trade and shipping of the eastern Mediterranean. Chapters 2 and 3 refer more analytically to the formation, organisation and structure of the ‘panMediterranean Greek commercial and maritime networks that carried the areas trade and shipping. Two phases are distinguished: Chapter 2 covers the ‘Chiot’ phase from the 1830s to the 1860s, while Chapter 3 examines the ‘Ionian’ era from the 1870s to the First World War. Both chapters examine in detail the structure, organisation and business methods of the members of each network. The fourth chapter deals with the growth of the fleet and its relation to the Greek state. The growth is analysed in detail for sailing ships as well as during the transition from sail to steam in the three decades before 1914. Ownership patterns and methods of finance are also treated. At the turn of the century the old structure based on Black Sea trade was transformed into a specialised maritime network based on a Piraeus-London axis, around which the edifice of Greek shipping was built during this century. The final chapter of the first part looks at Greek shipping from the inside through seven case studies from the 1830s to the 1910s, derived from logbooks and other papers. Using the valuable

xxi

archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, various forms of interpersonal relations are analysed. The second part of the book covers the period from the First World War to the present day. Chapter 6 deals with the era from 1914 to the Second World War. The activities of Greek ships during the First World War are analysed, as is the importance of the conflict in the expansion and internationalisation of Greek shipping. During the interwar period the Greeks, taking advantage of the decline of the British fleet, were able to capture an important segment of tramp shipping and to establish themselves on the Atlantic. In the 1930s, contrary to contractions elsewhere due to the world shipping crisis, Greeks bought at rock bottom prices ships disposed of by others and doubled the number of their shipping offices in London. Chapter 7 examines labour relations during the first half of the twentieth century. The transition from sail to steam, the industrialisation of the workplace and the internationalisation of the fleet brought important changes. The hierarchy on Greek steamers is analysed, taking into consideration the importance placed at least until the late 1930s on the master’s co-ownership of the vessel. The percentage of single-ship companies in the Greek fleet was higher than in any other during this period. Meanwhile, Greek seamen organised highly politicised unions, among which the communist trend was easily recognisable. In the 1930s, basic demands for a unified payroll, eight-hour day, and a specified victualling scale were voted by the Greek Parliament but only implemented during the 1940s, when the Greek Seamen’s Movement reached its peak. Chapter 8 discusses the main issues in the extremely important 1940s. The principal routes sailed by Greek ships during the Second World World war are presented in detail. The Second World War generated not only large profits for the Greeks but also unprecedented opportunities. The final decline of British hegemony was paralleled by the rise of the US, traditionally a weak maritime power. Since they were unable (or unwilling) to operate a dominant fleet, the Americans invented a US-controlled flag-of-convenience fleet. For various reasons, Greeks were able to profit more than other traditional maritime nations from this innovation; during the 1940s and 1950s the flag-of-convenience fleet was owned mainly by Greeks and Americans. Coupled with the inexpensive purchase of a large number of war-built Liberty ships and an aggressive entrance into tankers, Greeks were able to expand their fleet more or less continuously. The 1940s and 1950s were also marked by a transfer of operations from the eastern Mediterranean to London and New York. This created several problems with the Greek state, particularly during the 1940s. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on the postwar years.2 Chapter 9 deals with the international division of world maritime transport. Two periods are distinguished. The first covers the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, when the Greeks were mainly carriers of bulk tramp cargoes for the US and European nations. The main routes and cargoes are briefly analysed; the Atlantic remained the main centre. The second period spans the late 1960s to the present day and witnessed a move that transformed the Pacific and Indian Oceans into the main centres of world

xxii

sea routes. Likewise, during the 1960s Greek alliances changed and they became mainly carriers for Japan, south Asia and the socialist and developing countries. The Greek flag also followed this trend: flags of convenience featured in the 1940s and 1950s, only to be replaced by the Greek flag in the late 1960s. The 1980s was a decade of crises and readjustments, which the Greeks survived better than most maritime nations. The last chapter deals with the organisation and structure of Greek-owned shipping firms and the main operational centres of the fleet in the twentieth century. The organisation and structure of Greek firms retained many characteristics of the nineteenth century. The main islands of origin for shipowners remained the same as at the turn of the century: Andros, Chios, Cephalonia and Ithaca. Kinship and common origins continued to play important roles in manning not only the shipping offices but also the vessels. Branches of the shipping offices were established in London and New York in the 1940s and 1950s. From the late 1960s, however, Piraeus started to challenge and today more than two-thirds of the fleet is operated from there; London forms the second operational centre, while New York has almost totally lost its importance for the Greek-owned fleet. The emergence of Piraeus brought significant transformations in the ranks of the shipowners. The importance of the traditional class of shipowners who lived and were brought up abroad diminished, and the new blood that entered the business in the 1960s displaced many of the Chiots, Andriots and Cephalonians from the list of leading shipowners by the 1980s. Within the last twenty years Piraeus has been transformed from a provincial to an international centre. Most of the data in this book come from primary materials not used before in Greek maritime history. The statistical sources were vast: more than 40,000 entries of ships containing detailed information were processed by computer. In order to analyse nineteenth-century eastern Mediterranean trade, British consular reports for twenty-five ports over a seventy-year period were examined. To trace the destination of Greek-owned ships clearing eastern Mediterranean ports, details on tonnage, captains, crews, destinations, ports of origin, cargoes, merchants and agents involved were required. Through the French journal, Sémaphore de Marseilles, valuable daily information was unearthed on arrivals from all eastern Mediterranean ports for every decade from 1840 to 1910. The same was done for London from another extremely valuable source, the London Customs Bills of Entry. Data from both sources yielded about 12,000 entries. One of the most vexing problems was the lack of detailed nineteenthcentury statistics on Greek shipping. Some years of the extremely rare Greek ship registers of Archangelos (a company that operated for more than ten years) were processed, involving about 10,000 entries. Due to the lack of official statistics on Greek-owned shipping offices and the ships they owned, all information was derived from selections from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping every five years from 1880 to 1939. This task involved about 8,000 ships, including name, date of build, tonnage, shipowner and shipping offices.

xxiii

For the interwar period further data came from consular reports of the British Department of Overseas Trade, a monthly Greek journal published by the Greek Ministry of Shipping (Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou) and the fortnightly Greek shipping journal Naftika Chronika. For the postwar period the statistics were based on annual Greek shipping directories published by the Piraeus-based firm Skoularikos since 1958. These had the further advantage that they contain information on all Greek-owned firms and ships that would otherwise have been unrecognisable; these were the Greek-owned ships and firms under flags of convenience, or ‘open registries’ as they are now called. Processing data for 1958, 1975 and 1990 involved a final 10,000 entries. Despite these efforts, the complete history of Greek shipping remains unattainable at this point. What I have attempted here is more modest: to provide an international framework into which to place the development of the Greek fleet; to advance a preliminary interpetation for the reasons behind its rise; and to raise some important questions that will, I hope, stimulate further research. Despite the importance of the material on the actions of Greeks abroad preserved for us by ‘foreigners’, it is only after Greeks are able systematically to collect and preserve private and public maritime archives domestically that the full maritime history of the Greeks will start to be written by the ‘hands on deck’ rather than by those ‘in the office’.

Part I THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1 TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BLACK SEA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Three centuries after the fifteenth-century destruction of the Byzantine Empire, Greeks once again became important in the maritime and commercial affairs of the eastern Mediterranean. In the interim, the Genoese, Venetians and Raguzans in the sixteenth century, the Dutch and English in the seventeenth, and the French and English in the eighteenth controlled the trade and shipping of the Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic seas.1 In the ‘most hospitable sea of the globe’, the Aegean archipelago was part of the commercial and maritime empires of the Genoese and Venetians.2 Throughout the fifteenth century the Italians took advantage of the Ottomans’ naval weakness and concentration on the Balkans to establish themselves on strategic islands. Their commerce had an important impact on subsequent developments. The island of Chios, home of the most important eighteenth–,nineteenth–and twentieth-century Greek merchants and shipowners, was a Genoese colony for more than two centuries; even after it was conquered by the Turks in 1566 it was granted special privileges and a high degree of autonomy. The islands of Syros and Andros, as well as the other Cycladic islands that formed the core of nineteenth-century Greek shipping, were ruled by Venice for three centuries before coming under the Ottomans in the sixteenth century. Andros was conquered in 1566 and Syros in 1537. Their large Greek Catholic populations combined with their seafaring traditions provided them with special privileges within the Ottoman Empire and protection from the western powers that lasted until the nineteenth century.3 The other area with a long maritime tradition was the Ionian islands, part of the Venetian maritime empire from the fourteenth to the late eighteenth century. The activities of Ionian merchants and shipowners who established themselves throughout the Black Sea in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proved fundamental to the development of nineteenth-and twentieth-century Greekowned shipping. Extensive piracy by both Muslims and Christians plagued the Aegean from the fourteenth century and caused great suffering to Greeks. The Porte allowed and

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 3

Figure 1.1 Main islands of origin of twentieth-century shipowners

instigated Turkish pirates in order to extend its sphere of influence while Sicilian, Italian, Catalonian, Genoese and French pirates, along with the Order of the Knights of Saint John of Rhodes, raided ships, cargoes and local populations with the ultimate goal of blocking Turkish expansion.4 Although Greek maritime activities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries remain a topic that still needs investigation, there is enough evidence to show that the people of the Aegean archipelago and the Ionian sea manned, operated and built ships for all the nations that sailed their seas. The Greeks built their own small coastal craft and carried on trade between the numerous islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas. Islands that remained prosperous from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, such as Chios, Crete and the Ionian islands, owned a significant number of ships which they used to carry cargoes to the large regional urban centre, Constantinople. Wars, pirates and lack of naval protection destroyed any attempts to establish a significant merchant marine. Instead, Greeks built ships for Venetians, manned the Ottoman imperial fleet and the ships of Barbary corsairs (the famous Barbary corsair and eventual Turkish

4 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

admiral, Kayr al Din Barbarossa, was a renegade Greek from the island of Lesbos) or became small-scale pirates. The Greek pirates from Sfakia (southern Crete) or Mani (southern Peloponnese) were noted for their atrocities.5 Greek privateers appeared in the eighteenth century during the Russo– Turkish War when the Russians granted protection to the small-scale pirates from Sfakia, Mani and the Aegean islands of Spetses, Hydra and Psara. The poverty and the barrenness of most of these islands meant that piracy was a welcome part of a shadow economy that used illegal transactions ultimately to invest in legal enterprises, such as shipbuilding. Greek and western pirates had close relations and even protection from local merchants and Turkish officials and sold stolen cargoes cheaply. Some Cycladic islands, such as Milos, Kimolos and Myconos, owed their prosperity to special relations with the pirates.6 It seems that piracy and privateering were the first methods to accumulate substantial amounts of capital in the eighteenth century with which to engage in legal commercial and maritime activities. A striking example is Ioannis Varvakis, a privateer from Psara, who in the 1770s invested his profits in the first Psariot three-masted sailing ship. In 1774 Varvakis, who was wanted by the Ottomans, emigrated to Russia, where he managed to obtain fishing concessions in the Caspian Sea from his base in Astrahan. When Varvakis moved to Taganrog in 1815 he was extremely rich, perhaps the first successful Greek merchant in southern Russia.7 This chapter analyses the nineteenth-century commercial and maritime activities in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea and specifies the Greek role. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals briefly with developments in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century international environment that determined the nature of maritime commerce in the area; it further traces the movement of Greeks into Mediterranean ports. The second section looks at the main trade routes and cargoes hauled from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Finally, the last section examines the ships that carried this trade. Greek participation is traced at both the ports of origin and also the ports of destination; the arrival of goods and ships from all Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean ports in the two main recipient areas of western Europe, Marseilles and the British ports, is studied at the beginning of every decade. THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE DIASPORA OF THE GREEKS IN THE MAIN MEDITERRANEAN PORTS By the end of the seventeenth century it was evident that not only the Venetians but also the Turks were declining in the eastern Mediterranean. The eighteenth century saw competition among the European powers for a share of the Ottoman Empire: the Habsburgs and Russians advanced by land and the English and French by sea. The eastward expansion was to be to a great advantage to the Greeks. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed tremendous economic

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 5

growth in western Europe.8 England and France competed for colonial and commercial hegemony around the globe, but especially in Europe. It has been estimated, for example, that in about 1800 40 per cent of British exports of finished manufactures and 84 per cent of British exports of all other goods were directed to Europe; at the same time, 70 per cent of Frances foreign commerce took place with other Europeans. While English trade surpassed the French in the northern Europe, France was predominant in central Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.9 Although Europe had been trading with the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century, it was really in the eighteenth century that a commercial surge occurred. Trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire increased by both overland routes and the sea. The first commercial agreements were made with France and contained many provisions that were advantageous to Europeans. Most important were regulations concerning extra-territoriality that gave foreign consuls jurisdiction over their citizens.10 None the less, European merchants allowed to trade with the Ottomans faced great obstacles. Added to the Turks’ great hostility to foreigners was the Europeans’ complete lack of knowledge of the Ottoman language, customs and methods of trading. The Greeks proved to be just the intermediaries required. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, the middle men became independent merchants and shipowners with their own entrepreneurial networks. Among the Christian populations in the Ottoman Empire, Greeks played the most important roles in government and trade by the eighteenth century. Greek became the language of commerce in the Balkans to such an extent that the term ‘Greco’ (or ‘Görög’ in Hungarian) came to mean ‘merchant’ in several languages.11 The leading role of the Greeks in handling Ottoman external commerce characterises the second half of the century. The conquests of Ottoman lands by the Habsburg and Russian empires were followed by policies that ultimately favoured Greek merchants. Both countries needed to expand their commercial and maritime activities; having no subjects willing or able to carry out such activities, they adopted preferential policies to attract foreigners. Political, economic and religious freedom were guaranteed to newcomers at Trieste at the beginning of the eighteenth century, while the treaty of Passarowitz (1718) secured a century’ peace in south-eastern Europe, during which trade and navigation thrived. Special concessions were provided to Greek immigrants, who were the best-known merchants of the Levant.12 The Greek community in Trieste ensured Austrian prosperity, as well as close economic relations with Smyrna, Constantinople and Alexandria through trade and shipping. Much more massive was Greek immigration to southern Russia. Until the eighteenth century the Ottomans viewed the Black Sea as a mare nostrum and restricted navigation to Turkish subjects. The scene changed completely after the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of the 1770s. The treaty of KutchukKainardji (1774), its Explanatory Convention (1779), and the Treaty of Commerce (1783) not only established Russian dominance on the northern coast

6 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

of the Black Sea but also secured a long-desired direct sea route to southern and western Europe. Another fifty years were needed, however, to secure the right of free navigation for ships of all nations. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9 ended with another Russian victory, codified in the Treaty of Adrianople which provided Russia with absolute freedom of trade in the Ottoman dominions and guaranteed all peaceful nations complete freedom of navigation. This virtually internationalised the Straits and Black Sea, although the treaty made no such explicit statement. When the Russians pushed into the Black Sea there was virtually no commerce in the area. Since the vast new area was almost totally unpopulated and the fertile soil uncultivated, the first concern of the Russian government was to stimulate population growth by attracting immigrants using land, agricultural equipment, and even building materials as inducements. In addition to encouraging native Russians to move to the new territories, new settlers were attracted from the Aegean archipelago and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The encouragement of Greek settlements in southern Russia coincided with the establishment of a Russian protectorate over the Ionian islands. As a result, a great number of Greeks migrated to southern Russia from the Aegean and Ionian islands. The Greek revolt in the 1770s (which was supported by the Russians); the eventual Russo-Turkish war; the Greek war of independence (1821–9); and the second Russo-Turkish War of the nineteenth century (1877–8) stimulated continuous waves of Greek immigrants, not only to southern Russia but also to that part of Rumania under Russian protection. The economic prosperity of the Black Sea ports encouraged immigration that lasted until the end of the century. The incentives to live there were so great that the population of ‘New Russia’ increased from 163,000 in 1782 to 3.4 million in 1856.13 The Greek population in Russia before 1914 was estimated at about 600,000, of which 115,000 lived along the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa to Theodosia; 160,000 on the shores of the Sea of Azov; and 270,000 along the eastern coast of the Black Sea from Novorossisk to Batum.14 The Greek element was also very important on the south-east shores of the Black Sea, which continued to belong to the Ottomans. Throughout the nineteenth century a large number of Greek immigrants to Russia came from this area. In 1872, the entire population of the province of Trebizond was reported to be 938,000, one-seventh of whom were Greek.15 The south-western shores of the Black Sea, which until the 1870s formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, were characterised by a constant population movement which has made it impossible to calculate the exact number of residents in the numerous Greek communities. The pro-Russian Christian population of this area was the first to experience Ottoman retribution after the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1828–9 and 1877–8. The Greeks along the coast from the Bosporus to Kustendjie (Constanza), in contrast to those from the southern shores who engaged more in landborne commerce, were known for their seafaring and carried a large part of the Black Sea coasting trade.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 7

Figure 1.2 The main Black Sea ports

If the Austrians and Russians promoted colonisation policies to attract a large number of Greek merchants and seafarers to their new lands, the British promoted their penetration by supporting Ionian and Greek merchants. The principal wheat suppliers to Britain prior to the Crimean War had been Russia and Prussia. Seeking alternative supplies, the British pursued closer ties with the Ottomans and tried to stimulate grain production in the Danubian Principalities.16 Between 80 and 90 per cent of the Greeks who engaged in commercial activities on the Danube in the nineteenth century were British subjects, emigrants from the Ionian islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca. The main Danubian outlet to the sea was at Sulina; the main river ports were Braila, 113 miles upriver, and Galatz, 93 miles from Sulina. According to the 1860 census, Galatz had a population of 36,000, Braila some 26,000, and Sulina 3,000.17 There were 14,000 Greeks in the United Rumanian Principalities in 1865, most of whom resided in these three ports. If these figures are correct, approximately onefifth of the population in the main Danubian ports was Greek. The Greek presence was evident not only in Black Sea ports but also in all the main eastern Mediterranean harbours: Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria and of course Syros and Piraeus, the five main regional ports in the last third of the nineteenth century (see Table 1.1). Constantinople, which was by far the most important, contained the largest concentration of Greeks (17 per cent of the populace of 852,000).18 Smyrna, one of the busiest ports of the eastern Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, held fourth place in the last third of the nineteenth century; in 1850 it was home to 60,000 Greeks out of a total

8 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

population of 125,000.19 Alexandria (and Cairo) came next with a rising Greek community that in the midnineteenth century numbered approximately 36,000;20 by 1907 there were 63,000 Greek citizens living in Egypt.21 The Greek presence also extended to the main western Mediterranean ports: Marseilles, Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Trieste. Although we do not have exact figure for the precise number of Greeks in each port, we do have names of merchants and shipowners and enough evidence to indicate prosperous merchant communities in all.22 Table 1.1 gives us further information on the main ports of northern Europe. In 1900 London dominated, followed by Hamburg, Antwerp, Rotterdam and Liverpool. The Greek commercial and maritime communities of London and Liverpool were very important, as the next chapter will show, but they remain to be studied; research on the other ports for which we have evidence of Greek commercial activity is non-existent. It is evident that the Greeks spread around the Mediterranean and northern Europe following the main maritime routes. MARITIME TRADE The cargoes carried by sea between the eastern Mediterranean/Black Sea and the western Mediterranean/northern Europe can be divided into general and bulk. General cargo consists mainly of expensive goods of limited volume, while bulk cargoes are usually cheap goods that occupy a sizeable Table 1.1 The main ports of the Mediterranean and northern Europe (in 000 NRT) Port A.Western Mediterrane an Marseilles Genoa Livorno Napoli Trieste B.Eastern Mediterrane an Constantino ple Alexandria Smyrna Syros Piraeus C.Black Sea

1870

1880

1890

1900

1905

2,159 1,362 875 716 889

3,634 1,884 1,203 1,818 1,111

4,887 3,371 1,416 2,421 1,471

6,163 4,812 1,840 3,336 2,165

7,824 6,422 2,307 4,698 3,002

5,090

6,054

9,996

9,821

14,786

1,199 630 746 235

1,142 1,040 833 1,158

1,632 1,405 1,039 2,070

2,376 1,578 839 2,188

3,591 2,334 1,240 2,845

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 9

Port

1870

1880

1890

1900

1905

Ports of 2,502 2,585 6,259 6,016 9,199 Southern Russia Ports of 601 658 1,539 1,252 1,756 Danube D.Northern Europe London 9,437 Hamburg 7,765 Antwerp 6,872 Rotterdam 6,223 Liverpool 6,152 Sources: R.Folin, ‘Ports et Navigation en Méditerranée Essai Statistique 1870–1905’, in Navigations Méditerranéennes au XIXe Siècle, vol. 1, Cahier no. 9, Institut des Recherches Méditerranéennes, Université de Provence, 1987; ‘Annual Reports from British Consuls in Russian, Turkish, Rumanian and Bulgarian Ports on Trade and Navigation’, British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXVI (1871), vols LXXXIV–XCI (1881), vols LXXXIV–LXXXVIII (1891), vols XCI–XCVI (1900); Angeliki Pardali-Lainou, The Evolution of the Port of Piraeus and its Influence in the Economic Development of the Wider Piraeus Area from 1835 to 1985’, PhD thesis, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Athens, 1990, table 4.9, p. 145. For the ports of the Black Sea, see Table 1.6

space. Figure 1.3 shows in detail the maritime geography of general cargo from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It is evident that ships with general cargo left almost exclusively from Constantinople, Smyrna, Patras, Zante, Cephalonia, Syria and Alexandria. Four groups of goods are distinguished: foodstuffs (currants, other dried fruit, fresh fruit, wine, spices and sweets); textiles (carpets, silk, rags and embroideries); pharmaceuticals and dyes (liquorice roots, scammony, opium, yellow berries, madder roots, indigo, etc.); and miscellaneous goods (tobacco, cigarettes, jewellery, perfumes, sponges, valonia, etc.). Figures 1.4 and 1.5 indicate arrivals at Marseilles and English ports from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes. Up to the 1870s vessels carrying general cargo comprised about 40 per cent of tonnage entering Marseilles, whereas after the 1880s this percentage rose to around 60 per cent. From 1880 to 1910 bulk cargoes constituted 40 per cent of the total volume arriving at Marseilles. According to Figure 1.5, bulk cargoes, consisting mainly of grains (wheat, maize, barley, oats, sesame), cotton, wool, cotton seed, linseed, rapeseed, tallow and sugar, accounted for around 80 per cent of tonnage entering English ports, particularly after 1870. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 support statistically the information furnished by Figures 1.3 and 1.8, which show that the Black Sea was the main supplier of bulk

10 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.3 Maritime geography of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (nineteenth century)

cargoes, while the eastern Mediterranean was the main shipper of general goods. North-eastern harbours include Constantinople, the ports of Greece, and the

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 11

Figure 1.4 Arrival at Marseilles from eastern Mediterranean ports source: Appendix 1.16

anchorages of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, while south-eastern include the ports of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus. Figure 1.6, however, shows the decline after 1880 of Constantinople and Smyrna, and the Black Sea seems to become the main supplier of general goods for Marseilles. This is partly fictitious, owing to the fact that steamers called first at Smyrna and Constantinople to load general cargoes and then at Batum, Trebizond or Varna before returning to Marseilles; the statistics are calculated according to final port of call. Bulk trades are the most important for shipowners, since ‘what really mattered to the shipowner was weight and volume, not value. What created the demand for shipping was mass, not price.’ For this reason, ‘a ton of coal worth a few shillings and a ton of silk fabrics worth a few thousand pounds are more or less the same to the shipowner; it costs no more to transport the one than the other’.23 Grain was by far the most important bulk cargo, and it increased exponentially during the nineteenth century, especially from the Black Sea region. The growth of the grain trade was the result, on the demand side, of increasing disincentives for western European farmers to produce enough grain to meet the rapidly increasing demand of the industrial populations, and on the supply side by the agricultural and commercial development of southern Russia, Rumania and

12 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.5 Arrivals at British ports from eastern Mediterranean ports source: Appendix 1.32

Bulgaria. After 1830 western European imports from the Black Sea accelerated. In 1846–7 an unprecedented harvest in the Black Sea coincided both with a total crop failure in western Europe and with the introduction of free trade in Britain. Black Sea grain exports to western Europe increased continuously throughout the century: the two million imperial quarters exported in 1837 became twelve million in 1871 and more than fifty million by 1906 (see Table 1.2). From the 1820s to the 1850s the organisation of Mediterranean cereal commerce was characterised by the ‘deposit trade’.24 Grain from the Black Sea was not delivered directly to the ultimate purchaser. Instead, it was shipped to Livorno, Genoa, Trieste and Marseilles, the main deposit ports, where it waited for purchasers. Table 1.3 indicates the importance of this trade and particularly of Livorno as the main ‘deposit port’. In 1838 Table 1.2 The growth of the Black Sea grain trade (in imperial quarters) Year

Southern Russia*

1830 1831

854,760

Danube

Bulgaria

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 13

Figure 1.6 Tonnage of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean sources: Appendices 1.16 and 1.32 Year

Southern Russia*

1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846

1,217,691 448,226 95,491 513,720 1,096,128 1,427,867 1,733,938 2,018,230 1,269,877 1,051,443 1,235,412 1,414,082 1,841,977 2,032,120 2,430,740

Danube

479,000 530,000 671,000 744,605

861,617 1,028,639 971,393 984,306

Bulgaria

14 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.7 Tonnage of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean Sources: Appendix 1.16 and 1.32 Year

Southern Russia*

Danube

1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861

4,103,222 2,170,435 1,631,517 1,734,813 1,554,114 3,357,802 4,843,506 655,854 89,813 2,298,260 2,339,863 3,182,114

1,836,647 930,812 1,015,991 793,920 1,591,500 1,682,577

3,009,175 3,649,674

Bulgaria

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 15

Figure 1.8 Maritime geography of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (nineteenth century) Year

Southern Russia*

1862

3,066,091

Danube

Bulgaria

16 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Year

Southern Russia*

1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898

2,579,544 3,299,439

Danube

Bulgaria

3,624,144 3,205,071 3,412,696 3,514,720 3,177,535 4,893,727 816,261 4,582,863 4,851,748 4,138,959 5,294,583 6,386,074 5,432,784 4,211,338 5,627,665 5,697,332 7,632,732 8,541,270 9,990,853 9,839,782 9,067,961 9,087,934 13,864,499 11,061,830 10,214,807 13,358,968 9,563,883 10,355,788

421,180 584,284

4,866,309 6,509,315 4,567,479 8,187,129 8,453,010 6,906,971 4,539,071 6,321,991 6,906,838 6,401,371 1,993,226 13,525,825 10,331,740 5,007,281

10,381,274 9,950,479 13,734,678 10,390,601 15,647,291 24,680,960 21,410,519 20,506,192 17,023,473 9,711,717 23,185,814 33,269,875 30,773,797 24,665,684 23,190,364 21,137,224

1,060,680 1,792,720 2,397,832 2,146,920 2,029,144 2,074,672 3,138,448 2,208,672 2,056,172 (794,298)** (406,401)** (420,568)**

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 17

Year

Southern Russia*

Danube

Bulgaria

1899 16,129,604 6,121,754 (312,274)** 1900 15,981,800 9,042,163 (253,197)** 1901 12,585,767 1902 28,047,471 17,363,392 1903 36,811,570 14,528,569 1904 35,389,011 8,838,103 1905 36,584,781 11,674,626 1906 33,716,704 16,086,125 1907 30,597,169 15,364,135 1908 22,946,031 9,410,864 1909 40,663,086 1910 47,478,254 Sources: Southern Russia: M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley, University of California, 1938, appendix F; Danube, 1837–40: Foreign Office (FO) 359/1; Danube, 1843–52: P.Cernovodeanu B. Marinescu, ‘British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1857’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 8, no. 3, winter 1979, pp. 707–42. Remainder: British Parliamentary Papers, 1856–1911, Annual Reports from the British Consuls in Russian, Turkish, Rumanian and Bulgarian ports on trade and navigation Notes:* Includes exports of wheat, rye, barley and oats. From 1885 the figures were given in puds and have been converted into chetwerts: 1 cwt wheat =10 puds, 1 cwt rye = 9 puds, 1 cwt barley=8 puds, 1 cwt oats=6 puds. Chetwerts have been converted into imperial quarters: 1 chetwert=5.77 bushels, 8 bushels=1 imperial quarter. ** Figures for Varna

Table 1.3 Destinations of wheat exported from Odessa in 1838 Places of destination

Quarters

% total exports

Livorno Genoa Marseilles England Trieste Malta Constantinople Holland Belgium Gibraltar Ionian Islands

446,842 177,099 93,758 82,453 58,326 44,486 30,455 28,914 16,909 4,348 3,829

45 18 10 8 6 4 3 3 2

18 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Places of destination

Quarters

% total exports

Greece Austria Total exports from Odessa

2,215 1,230 990,864 Source: Patricia Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 45–68. The data are from Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), Affari Esteri, Filza 2528, 29 February 1839

45 per cent of Odessa’s total exports were directed to Livorno, from where they were re-shipped to England, France and Spain.25 The trading method that made Livorno the ‘English port’ in the Mediterranean was due to various measures imposed by the main consuming countries that rendered direct imports impossible. In order to protect local producers England, the first industrial nation, established ‘Corn Laws’ under which grain imports were prohibited except when local production was inadequate. This practice was followed by most of northern Europe. Increased industrial production, however, led to a gradual inability to feed the growing urban populations. The ultimate refinement to the Corn Laws was the ‘sliding scale’, introduced in 1828 by the English and imitated by Sweden (1830), France (1832), Belgium (1834) and Holland (1835). This was a system of variable tariffs designed to attract only enough foreign grain to keep local prices from varying outside certain limits, to assure consumers ‘reasonable prices’ and to protect producers from ruinous competition. Still, uncertainty rendered deposits in the main western Mediterranean ports necessary.26 The deposit trade to which Livorno owed much of its prosperity began to be replaced by direct exports in the 1850s for several reasons. First, Britain abolished the sliding scale in 1846, followed by Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Sardinia and the Papal States in the 1850s, by France in 1861 and the German Zollverein in 1864. Second, an age of more liberal trading was introduced with the abolition of the British Navigation Laws in 1849.27 Finally, the introduction of steam and the telegraph revolu Table 1.4 Grain exports from Egypt (in quarters) Beans Wheat Maize Barley Lentils Total To Britain To France

1863

% total

1867

% total

331,955 540,792 94,240 71,858 40,300 1,079,145 465,660 613,485 1863

30 50 9 7 4

377,355 502,677 43,648 77,810 27,820 1,029,310

37 50 4 7 3

1867

% total

43 57 % total

Source: ‘Report by Mr Consul Stanley on the Trade and Commerce of Alexandria for the Year 1867’, British Parliamentary Papers, vol. LIX, 1868–9

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 19

tionised communications and led to a total reorganisation of trade from the Black Sea to northern Europe. The second most important area for cereal exports was the south-eastern Mediterranean, with Egypt as the main source. Table 1.4 shows that about one million quarters of cereals were exported from Egypt in 1863 and 1867, almost half of which were directed to Britain and more than half to France. In the eighteenth century the Levant supplied the cotton, wool and silk needed by the flourishing textile industries; these were carried mainly by French and English ships from Salonica, Smyrna, Syria, Cyprus and Egypt. Although the rise of American production in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries diminished its importance, cotton continued to be the second most important cargo from the eastern Mediterranean throughout the nineteenth century. Egypt remained the most important supplier and Britain the largest purchaser. By 1860 Egypt was the sixth most important exporter to Britain, which absorbed 65 per cent of the crop.28 The American Civil War (1861–5) provided a short-term incentive for Egyptian cotton producers, and between 1864 and 1866 the cultivation of grain was abandoned almost completely for cotton.29 The US continued to be by far the biggest cotton exporter (in 1867, 2,500,000 bales when only 238,060 bales of cotton were exported from Egypt), but it was still far from its pre-civil war levels (4,700,000 bales in 1860).30 The continuous growth of Egyptian cotton exports is shown in Figure 1.9. Despite the fact that Greek shipowners were involved in both general and bulk cargoes, their specialisation was decidedly in the latter. Figure 1.10 shows that from 1860 to 1910 more than half the tonnage carrying bulk cargoes to Marseilles from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea was chartered by Greek merchants or carried by Greek-flag vessels. Similarly, Greek participation in the bulk trades from the region to England from 1860 to 1880 was about 50 per cent; after 1880, however, there was a significant decrease. At the same time, as Figure 1.11 indicates, there was a five-fold increase in the departure of Greek ships from British ports between 1870 and 1890 and a ten-fold increase from 1890 to 1914. The solution to this apparent contradiction lies in changes in trading patterns. Until the 1880s Greek ships carried grain from the Black Sea to Britain and brought back coal. But after 1890 Greek vessels brought grain to ports like Antwerp, Rotterdam, Le Havre or Dunkirk, before sailing to British ports in ballast to load coal for the Mediterranean (for the change of the destination of Black Sea grain, see also Table 1.7). This shift can be seen clearly from the actual logbooks of the first Greek steamships (see Chapter 5). The tremendous increase in Greek clearances from British ports in the 1890–1914 period reflects increased participation in the British coal export trade.

20 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.9 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports. Source: Appendix 1.17

Evidence from the producing countries supports the evidence in Figures 1.10 and 1.11 that Greeks kept carrying bulk commodities to and from the eastern Mediterranean right up to the First World War. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse extensively the participation of Greek merchants and shipowners in the Black Sea trade. Table 1.5 indicates their involvement from the south-eastern Mediterranean: on the eve of the First World War Greeks in Egypt controlled 24 per cent of total cotton exports. Table 1.5 Egyptian cotton exported by Greek-owned firms Years

Bales exported by Greeks

%

Total

1911–12 210,448 22 964,301 1913–14 229,148 24 970,263 Source: Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. A Communal Response to Change’, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1983, appendix VI

SHIPPING The great upsurge in trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea was paralleled by an unprecedented increase in shipping in these areas; shipping clearly followed demand for carrying capacity. The last section of this chapter

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 21

Figure 1.10 Percentage of Greeks in the bulk trade from eastern Mediterranean to French and Brtitish ports Sources: Appendices 1.16 and 1.32

examines the shipping that served the region, Greek participation, and the main changes in Mediterranean shipping with the introduction of steam. Since the Greeks were involved mostly in bulk trades, which dominated exports from the Black Sea, it is useful to analyse shipping from this area in more detail. Table 1.6 indicates the tremendous increase of tonnage clearing Black Sea ports. The 228,000 tons in 1831 increased to almost twelve million tons by 1910. The correlation between the grain trade and shipping from this region is indicated in Figures 1.12 and 1.13. To handle the statistics I have distinguished three major port groupings that constituted the main bulk cargo exporters. The first is the south Russian Black Sea ports, which can be further divided into three major groups: the first consists of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia on the northern coast; the second group includes the Azov ports of Taganrog, Berdiansk, Mariupol, Kertch and Rostov-on-Don; and the third is the Caucasus ports of Novorossisk, Poti and Batum (see Figure 1.2). Apart from the south Russian ports, the other two major groupings include the south-western harbours of Varna and Burghaz and the Danubian ports of Galatz, Braila and Sulina (see Figure 1.2).

22 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.11 Greek ships in British ports. Source: Appendix 1.33

More than 2.5 million tons departed from the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia in the mid-1890s, when sixty years before the figure was about 200,000 tons.31 About 100,000 tons departed from the ports of the Azov Sea in 1841, a figure that increased ten-fold to more than 1,000,000 tons by the end of the century. The tonnage clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea, Batum, Poti and Novorossisk, saw a tremendous increase within twenty-five years: from about 80,000 tons in 1872 it became about 2.5 million in the mid-1890s. Three hundred thousand tons of shipping departed from Danubian ports in 1847, while in 1902 the Table 1.6 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea (in NRT) Year

Southern Russia

1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838

227,560 311,536 254,414 166,754 181,604 294,246 382,828 444,278

Danube

Bulgaria

Total 227,560 311,536 254,414 166,754 181,604 294,246 382,828 444,278

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 23

Figure 1.12 Growth of Black Sea grain trade. Source: Table 1.2 Year

Southern Russia

1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856

499,416 375,004 316,700 334,818 353,920 505,020 541,720 600,646 1,025,282 581,932 459,226 459,626 452,024 805,430 1,091,276 381,980 87,334 841,362

Danube

298,975 185,607 310,413 220,591 300,465 356,724 334,577 111,559 329,896 334,063

Bulgaria

Total 499,416 375,004 316,700 334,818 353,920 505,020 541,720 600,646 1,324,257 767,539 769,639 680,217 752,489 1,162,154 1,425,853 493,539 417,230 1,175,425

24 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Year

Southern Russia

Danube

1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891

873,632 924,144 1,014,014 1,051,292 1,002,354 976,890 769,190 769,190 1,007,454 113,920 1,436,790 1,385,648 1,206,546 1,901,728 1,959,648 1,551,976 1,400,546 1,666,828 1,803,720 1,657,362 458,976 3,542,230 3,117,364 1,927,348

272,063 331,055 369,039 515,772 450,770 450,018 519,332 585,894 442,229 427,449 394,020 641,122 676,960 600,790 549,720 498,290 533,659 514,519 521,735 748,363 184,417 700,163 797,554 658,063 793,454 903,063 831,486 697,686 895,824 950,567 1,203,683 1,332,907 1,473,345 1,539,445 1,512,030

2,536,024 2,734,620 3,172,096 3,014,902 3,716,106 4,670,446 4,413,078 4,261,198 3,876,080

Bulgaria

Total 1,145,695 1,255,199 1,383,053 1,567,064 1,453,124 1,426,908 1,288,522 1,355,084 1,449,683 541,369 1,830,810 2,026,770 1,883,506 2,502,518 2,509,368 2,050,266 1,934,205 2,181,347 2,325,455 2,405,725 643,393 4,242,393 3,914,918 2,585,411

202,482

3,634,788

336,515

4,301,984

375,672 365,612 45,818 513,750

6,379,025 6,252,035 6,258,826 5,901,860

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 25

Year

Southern Russia

Danube

1892 2,942,518 1893 4,591,216 1894 6,189,142 1895 5,981,268 1896 5,607,304 1897 5,262,230 1898 4,876,001 1899 4,649,942 1900 4,203,055 1901 4,203,055 1902 5,866,229 1903 6,847,374 1904 6,901,634 1905 6,099,743 1906 5,873,963 1907 5,645,787 1908 5,162,340 1909 6,848,448 1910 7,424,379 Sources: As for Table 1.2

1,427,087 1,893,506 1,619,703 1,554,698 1,770,544 1,397,917 1,476,119 1,070,367 1,252,509 1,830,002 2,302,980 2,042,994 1,447,054 1,756,243 2,275,812 2,205,061 1,607,627 1,474,933 2,274,493

Bulgaria

Total

638,979 7,345 815,972

8,447,824 8,270,505 8,193,820

782,141 560,445 880,469 625,355 1,786,580 1,683,993 1,342,832 1,300,003 1,535,934 1,258,983 1,592,320 2,022,318

6,502,450 6,016,009 6,913,526 8,794,564 10,676,948 10,032,681 9,198,818 9,449,778 9,386,782 8,028,950 9,915,701 11,721,190

figure became almost 2.5 million tons. And the amount of tonnage that left the Bulgarian ports Varna and Burghaz in 1886 more than doubled in ten years. Together with the growth of shipping went improvements in port and shipping facilities. Harbours were constructed and dredged, and obstructions barring the entrances of rivers and straits were removed, thus greatly improving the navigability of the Black Sea. At the other end of the trade, the main recipient countries of the Black sea grain exports and ships were France and England, followed by Germany, Holland and Italy. Table 1.7 gives us detailed data of the destination of Table 1.7 Destination of Russian wheat exports % of total Russian an exports Years

To Britain

To France

To Holland

To Italy

To Germany

1861–5 1866–70 1871–5 1876–80 1881–5

48 57 45 34 37

19 20 19 22 12

0 0 2 3 8

9 6 7 5 6

9 6 8 16 16

26 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.13 Growth of Black Sea shipping (departures). Source: Table 1.6 % of total Russian an exports Years

To Britain

To France

To Holland

To Italy

To Germany

1886–90 42 11 7 13 7 1891–5 28 16 8 15 6 1896–1900 18 18 15 20 7 1901–5 19 13 18 23 6 1906–10 20 12 21 18 7 1911–13 15 15 21 24 6 Source: M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley, University of California, 1938, p. 246 Note: * These figures include all Russian ports. An average of more than two-thirds of the country’s total wheat exports came from the southern Black Sea ports

wheat exports from the Russian ports. We notice that from 1860 to 1890 an average of 44 per cent of wheat exports from Russia were destined for Great Britain and for the same period an average of 17 per cent of the total wheat exports from Russia were destined for France. After 1890 we notice a decline in the exports of Russian wheat to Britain and an increase of the Russian wheat exports to Holland, Italy and Germany. Exports to France remained more or less the same up to the eve of the First World War.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 27

Greek seamen and merchants played a pivotal role in the development of Black Sea trade and the growth of the areas exports. Table 1.8 indicates a continuous growth of Greek-owned shipping from the Black Sea. At this point I think it is important to examine in more detail what is meant by the term ‘Greekowned’ at this particular period. This term has been used to refer not only to ships under the Greek flag but also those that were Greek-owned but used alternative flags. The issue of flags of convenience has proved a difficult problem for Greek historians. The importance of Greek shipping in the Levantine trade has long been obscured by the fact that almost all Greeks until the 1820s were technically Turkish citizens. Even after the independent Greek state was founded in 1830, its population was approximately 800,000, while 2.5 million other Greeks remained in the unredeemed provinces.32 In most European archives before (and after) the formation of the Greek state there are references to ‘Ottoman’ or ‘Ottoman and Greek’ ships. Although the Turks had a limited coasting trade of small ships, the bulk of the ‘Ottoman’ or ‘Ottoman and Greek’ ships were in fact Greek-owned.33 To complicate matters further, between 1801 and 1830 Greek ships mainly used the Russian flag. In their desire to secure carriers for their commerce, the Russians by the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainartzi in the 1770s allowed Greeks to do so. The Ionian flag was also Greek since it belonged to the United State of Ionian Islands, a British protectorate from 1815 to 1864, when it was united with Greece. Consequently, before the formation of the Greek state, all the ships reported as Ottoman, Greek, Ionian or Russian in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean, were in fact Greek. The frequent change of flag by Ionian shipowners under British protection irritated the British consul at Constantinople who wrote to his opposite number at Odessa in 1821: The opinion of the British and Ionian governments, has been so decidedly expressed against permission being given to Ionian vessels which have abandoned their nationality, to resume the Ionian flag, that I do not conceive you should be warranted in attending to the applications, for that purpose, which have lately been made to you. The subjects of the Ionian States must be taught that their flag is too respectable to be converted into a mere matter of occasional convenience.34 Table 1.8 Tonnage of Greek-owned* ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea (in NRT) Year

Southern Russia

1830 1831 1832 1833 1834

7,081 49,788 40,261 48,300 29,334

Danube

Bulgaria

28 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Year

Southern Russia

1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1865 1866 1867 1868 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880

38,901

Danube

Bulgaria

42,764 43,516 38,171 96,390 52,347 95,969 126,686 166,157 200,860 234,157 153,041 136,088 69,741 219,859 361,267 127,414

184,591 90,610 132,056

171,017

203,885 ** 163,636 ** 106,763 ** 111,170** 118,696** 202,772 175,754 38,729

193,552

158,332 195,626 135,264 123,783 128,374 145,459 37,617 147,115 231,256 194,828

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 29

Year 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912

Southern Russia 173,358

300,175

279,950 436,249 461,892 438,749 184,170 469,328 537,349 633,107

752,712

Danube 163,310 138,714 122,308 113,809 151,543 135,600 155,081 163,827 206,632 246,585 244,168 275,566 312,291 318,600 352,178 318,522 80,853 ** 213,443 ** 167,964 ** 256,128 ** 324,965 ** 471,208 ** 561,927** 404,516** 404,208 ** 507,959 ** 494,687 ** 395,699 ** 309,482 ** 359,060 **

Bulgaria

21,060 98,609 132,751 128,830

215,918 184,558 115,442

267,671 ** 229,005 ** 196,260 ** 127,438 ** 152,300** 155,060** 166,494 ** 166,401 **

558,311** Source: See Table 1.2 Notes: *Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

30 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

After the formation of the Greek state, a number of Greek-owned ships continued to use the Ottoman, Ionian and Russian flags. In presenting the shipping statistics of the Black Sea ports, in this and the following chapters, I treat as Greek the ships under Greek, Ottoman, Ionian and Russian flags until the Crimean War. After the Crimean War I exclude Russian ships, although some Greeks continued to use the Russian flag. The establishment of a number of Russian state steam navigation companies meant that Russian ships no longer counted as Greekowned and it becomes impossible to distinguish those that actually were Greek. Lloyd’s Register provides us with convincing evidence that most Ottoman ships of more than 100 NRT were Greek. Vessel names are often a good guide: it is difficult to believe that a ship named Panaghia (Holy Virgin), Ayios Nikolas (St Nicolas), or Ayio Yorghi (St George) belonged to a non-Greek Ottoman subject.35 The British consuls at various Black Sea ports provide abundant evidence that Ottoman ships in the Black Sea (which formed a very low percentage after the Crimean War) were Greek. The evidence provided by Sémaphore de Marseilles from 1840 to 1910 shows that all ships under the Ottoman flag that arrived at Marseilles were Greek-owned. There is also sufficient evidence to support the argument that a significant percentage of British ships mentioned in the shipping statistics by the British consuls were Greek-owned. There are indications like the one presented in Table 1.9, that Greek-owned ships were counted as ‘British’. In sending his report for 1842 the consul sent a catalogue of all ‘British’ ships that carried the trade with Taganrog. This particular catalogue contained the names of the masters of the ships from which we find that 53 per cent of the tonnage considered as British is actually Greek-owned. The use of various flags, especially after the formation of the modern Greek state, was to a large extent a matter of convenience. A change of Table 1.9 Return of Greek-owned ships reported as British in 1842 Name of master

NRT

% (A)

A.Greek (Ionian) Catergarachi P. Cuppa Sp. Dandria Cosm. Dendrino A. Divari Sp. Inglessi Ger. Inglessi G. Manzavino S. Michaliziano L. Mussuri C. Palieso P.

3,138 128 164 210 300 100 126 201 136 117 135 200

53

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 31

Name of master

NRT

% (A)

Rossolimo C. Rossolimo Her. Rossolimo L. Travlo Ger. Vergotti G. Vergotti Sp. Vergotti Sp. Vlassopulo Eust. Vlassopulo G. B.British C.Total Taganrog Source: Foreign Office (FO) 359/1

26 152 155 130 153 133 133 179 260 2,821 5,959

47 100

flag depended not only upon politics but also on economics—especially taxation —a phenomenon that continues to influence the use of twentieth century flags of convenience, such as Liberia or Panama. British consul Zohrab, in his report on the Trade of Berdiansk for 1872, noted that considerable increase of vessels under the Russian flag must not be attributed to any increase in Russian shipping, ‘but arises out of the number of Greek vessels which have to escape the heavy dues now imposed on Greek shipping in French ports [and] passed under the Russian flag’.36 In 1873, vice-consul Wrench reported that ‘the Russian flag is represented at Constantinople by a large number of Greek vessels that have obtained the privilege of hoisting Russian colours’.37 From the 1860s onward, however, most Greek merchants trading not already protected under other nationalities took Greek registration; by the 1890s, most Greeks, whether at home or abroad, flew the Greek flag. Figure 1.14, on the one hand, indicates in real numbers the rise of Greekowned shipping from the Black Sea. Greek-owned shipping from all three areas, South Russia, the Danube and Bulgaria, shows the same upward trend. We notice an important rise in the 1840s and 1850s, a decrease and stagnation in the 1860s and 1870s, and an impressive rise from the 1880s to 1910. The decline in 1877–8 and in 1896–7 is owed to the Russo-Turkish and Greco-Turkish wars, respectively. Figure 1.15, on the other hand, pictures the relative participation of Greek-owned shipping in the points of departure. Contrary to Figure 1.14, which indicates an upward trend of Greek-owned shipping, Figure 1.15 depicts a downward trend of the participation of Greek-owned shipping in total Black Sea shipping. More specifically, from 60 per cent of the deep-sea-going Danubian shipping in the 1850s, the Greeks handled around 30 per cent of the Danubian deep-sea-going shipping in the first decade of the twentieth century. From 50 per cent of South Russias shipping that they handled in 1850, they handled only 10 per cent in the 1900s.

32 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 1.14 Greek-owned shipping in Black Sea (departures). Source: Table 1.8

The main reasons for the relative decline of Greek-owned shipping in the Black Sea lie in the structural changes in world and Mediterranean shipping after the 1860s. The massive introduction of steam in the Mediterranean after the 1860s brought a significant change in the organisation of the sea-trade. This is the division of the shipping market as it exists to the present day: the division between liner and tramp shipping. The type of cargo, the type of ship and the area it trades determines the market in which a ship works. In this way at the last third of the nineteenth century until the First World War, liner steamships tended to call at a large number of ports of the eastern Mediterranean and to carry general cargoes and passengers, whereas during the same period tramp steamers and sailing ships tended to call at one port and to carry bulk cargoes directly to ports of western Europe. In this way it is evident that the percentage of tonnage of ships carrying general cargoes is overestimated together with the operators of the liner steamship companies in the total trade of the area. The introduction of steamships and their evident advantages over sailing ships induced most European nations into a wild competition for the control of the seas into establishing steamship companies on state subsidies. These subsidies were given mostly in the form of mail subventions by their states. The steamship companies of a certain nationality that carried the mail of particular countries with which they traded for free, enjoyed particular advantages with tax exemptions with these countries; their obligation was to serve a particular route a certain number of times per week or month. Britain, France, Germany, Italy,

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 33

Figure 1.15 Percentage of Greek-owned shipping of total Black Sea shipping (departures). Sources: Table 1.6 and 1.8

Austria, Holland, Denmark, Russia, even Greece, established such steamship companies which competed in cargo and passenger transportation in the Mediterranean.38 Table 1.10 furnishes us with information regarding the main steam liner companies that serviced eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea routes. Steam made possible what was impossible for sail: regularly scheduled sailings. In this way, the P&O, Cunard, Leyland, Burns and MacIver, Moss, Papayanni, Prince, Johnson and Westcott and Laurence steamship companies traded regularly between the eastern Mediterranean/Black Sea and Britain, each ship calling at three to twelve ports per voyage. The same happened with the French Messageries Maritimes, Fraissinet, Paquet, Transantlantique and Franco-Belge steamship companies that traded between the eastern Mediterranean and French ports, and with the rest of the German, Dutch, Danish, Austrian, Italian and Russian steam companies. The ships of these liner companies usually loaded most of their cargo in one port and complemented small amounts or passengers from other ports. The amount of tonnage counted in the ports’ shipping statistics, however, involves the whole ship, exaggerating the importance of the steamships of a certain nationality in the trade of a particular port. For example, the 1,381–ton steamer Palmyra, belonging to the Burns Steamship Company, called at Genoa, Naples,

34 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Trieste, Patras, Corfu, Palermo, Valencia, Lisbon and Gibraltar in January 1880.39 At Patras it may have loaded ‘3 packages of sweetmeat’ when at the same time a Greek sailing ship of 380 tons may have brought from the Black Sea the grain the local mills needed. The aggregate shipping statistics wrote, however, the arrival of 1,381 British tons and 380 Greek tons; it is evident that the introduction of liners blurred the picture as to the real carriers of the trade of the area. Tables 1.11 and 1.12 indicate the main routes the liner companies followed from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea to Marseilles and the ports of England. We distinguish five main groups of the routes of these ships according to the geographical area they covered. The first covered the ports of the southeastern Mediterranean. The 1,356–ton Egyptian, for example, owned by Leyland, called at Alexandria, Alexandretta, Table 1.10 Main liner steamship companies covering the sea-routes of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, 1860–1910 A.BRITISH Peninsular & Oriental Steamships & Co Cunard Steamship & Co Leyland P. & Co Burns & MacIver Moss & Co Papayanni & Co Prince Line Johnson Wm & Co Westcott & Laurence B.FRENCH Compagnie Fraissinet Messageries Maritimes Compagnie Paquet Compagnie Transantlantique Ligne Franco-Belge C.GERMAN Deutche-Levante-Linie Freitas & Co D.AUSTRIAN Lloyd-Austriaco E.ITALIAN Florio e Rubatino E.DANISH Danoise Ferenede Damps Kids

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 35

G.DUTCH Hollandaise Navigation a Vapeur H.RUSSIAN Russian Steamship Company I.OTTOMAN EMPIRE Courtgi Steamship (Greek-owned) Hadji-Daout-Farkouh (Greek-owned) Sources: London Customs Bills of Entry, 1860–1910; Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1860– 1910; Sp. Gorgorinis, Shipping Law, vol. 2, Athens, National Printing House, 1906, p. 441

Beirut, Larnaca, Malta and Malaga, loading most of its cargo at Alexandria before returning to England.40 The second covered the ports of the north-eastern Mediterranean. The 1,221–ton Arcadia of the Papayanni Steamship Company, loaded in Constantinople and Rodosto the bulk of its cargo, and called at Syra, Smyrna and Malta before returning at the port of Liverpool.41 In these early days the distinction in the cargoes carried by liner and tramp companies was still not very clear. For example, the Papayanni steamer Ararat (1,305 tons) called at Constantinople and Sulina, Table 1.11 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to the ports of England, 1860– 1910 A. (covering south-eastern Mediterranean) 1. Beirut-Alexandretta-Alexandria-Malta-Gibraltar 2. Alexandria-Beirut-Latakia-Alexandretta-Mersyne—Accra—CaifFa—Jaffa 3. Alexandria—Larnaca—Patras—Cephalonia 4. Patras-Cephalonia, Alexandria-Beirut-Jaffa 5. Patras-Mersyne-Alexandretta-Jaffa-Accra 6. Corfu—Patras—Alexandria B. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean) 1. Constantinople—Salonica—Syros—Smyrna—Malta 2. Constantinople—Smyrna—Syros—Patras—Zante 3. Piraeus-Syros-Salonica-Gallipoli-Constantinople C. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean including the Black Sea)—after 1890 1. Batum-Trebizond-Kerrassund-Samsoun-Constantinople-Cavalla-Smyrna-Syros 2. Syros—Odessa—Constantinople—Smyrna 3. Braila-Galatz-Constantinople-Syros D. (covering all eastern Mediterranean) 1. Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros-Alexandria-Malta E. (covering all eastern Mediterranean including Black Sea)—after 1890 1. Batum—Trebizond—Galatz—Constantinople— Salonica—Smyrna—Syros— Larnaca—Lattakia—Beirut

36 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

2. Odessa-Constantinople-Alexandria-Syria Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, 1860–1910

from where it returned to Liverpool carrying 6,000 quarters of maize from Sulina and wool and general cargo from Constantinople.42 Towards the end of the century, however, the distinction between these two trades had become clear. As steam technology developed and enabled ships to sail longer routes—after 1880 to Marseilles and after 1890 to the ports of England—the Black Sea ports were included on the north-eastern Mediterranean liner routes forming the third, fourth and fifth categories of sea routes. Figure 1.4 shows a decrease of the total tonnage of ships carrying bulk cargoes and arriving at Marseilles after the 1860s. The frequent calls at many ports of liners increased their relative importance in the shipping statistics when the relative importance of bulk cargo shipping was diminished. In the same way the decreasing role of the Greeks in Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean shipping in Figure 1.15 is partly fictitious; all evidence indicates that the Greeks remained the main operators of bulk cargoes and shipping from and to that area up to 1914. All the previous analysis has supported the argument of a steady and Table 1.12 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to Marseilles A. (covering south-eastern Mediterranean) 1. Alexandria-Smyrna-Metelino-Syros-Patras 2. coast of Syria-Smyrna 3. Alexandria-Jaffa-Caiflfa-Beirut, Larnaca-Mersyne—Smyrna—Calamata—Catacolo B. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean) 1. Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros 2. Constantinople-Piraeus 3. Constantinople-Rodosto-Salonica-Smyrna-Syros—Piraeus C. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean including the Black Sea) — after 1880 1. Batum-Poti-Mariupol-Samsoun-Constantinople 2. Batum-Terbizond-Kerasund-Samsoun-Constantinople-Syros-Smyrna 3. Danube-Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros 4. Galatz-Sulina-Constantinople-Salonica 5. Odessa-Constantinople-Piraeus 6. Odessa-Burghaz-Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros Odessa-Constantinople-SmyrnaChios-Piraeus 7. Poti-Trebizond-Constantinople-Smyrna 8. Berdiansk-Batum-Trebizond-Samsoun-Constantinople D. (covering all eastern Mediterranean) 1. Constantinople-Levant

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 37

2. Alexandria-Port Said-Jaffa-Beirut-Larnaca-Latakia-Alexandretta-Myrsine-LimassolSmyrnaSalonica-Piraeus Source: Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1860–1910

even rising participation of the Greeks in the trade (and particularly bulk trade) and shipping from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea during the second half of the nineteenth century. This chapter has examined the development and organisation of the sea-trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. It has further focused on the participation of Greeks in this trade throughout the nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War. Greek participation was traced to both destinations and origins: arrivals of goods and ships were studied at the beginning of every decade from all Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean ports to the two main recipient areas of western Europe, Marseilles and the main ports of England. The orientation of the Greek merchants and shipowners in the transportation of bulk cargoes proved fundamental for the process of the Greek-owned fleet in the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, Greeks had already established the basis for their specialisation: an international tramp fleet carrying bulk cargoes.

2 GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME NETWORKS: THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830s-1860s

European seaborne trade has traditionally been connected with the establishment of foreign merchants in major ports like Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Seville, Marseilles, Livorno, Venice or Trieste, where the terms ‘merchant community’ and ‘community of foreign merchants’ were often synonymous.1 The foreign merchant communities were characterised by solidarity, mutual aid, kinship and a desire to preserve their culture. These tendencies were even more conspicuous ‘among large ethnic formations of eastern origin, which stood out against the purely European western background’, namely Jews, Armenians and Greeks.2 During the French Wars (1793–1815) a wave of merchant emigrants, including Huguenots and Dutch Jews, swept England. A new surge followed from the 1820s to the 1840s in which German Jews and Orthodox Greeks, who ‘had a similar international commercial outlook’ as well as ‘sufficient capital, credit or connections, and adequate commercial experience’ came to Britain. Moreover, ‘they shared a sectarian outlook that interlocked families in chains of partnerships and marriages’.3 As already indicated, in the century before 1914 eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea commerce was organised largely by an entrepreneurial network of Greek merchants dispersed among the main Mediterranean and Black Sea ports. This tight commercial web, which originally started in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by the 1830s had assumed a panMediterranean character.4 A limited number of Greek mercantile and shipping families wove its pattern after a successful fight against western European competition. The development of Greek-owned shipping in the nineteenth century was founded on the networks of these Greek diaspora merchant communities. Along with the commercial web that stretched across the Mediterranean and northern Europe, a maritime network was created that opened the way to the transition from sail to steam. Moreover, the organisation, structure and trading methods of the Greek diaspora merchant/shipowners who prospered in the last century have been imitated by the shipowners of this one. 5 In the next pages I will examine the traces that the Greek merchant/ shipowners left while establishing both their own network and Greek-owned shipping. An attempt is made to locate merchants, cargoes and ships involved at

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 39

the various termini of the trade, particularly in the Black Sea, Marseilles, and English ports. The aim is not to provide an integrated analysis of the entrepreneurial network of the Greek merchant communities but to identify the ways in which their activities influenced the growth of Greek-owned shipping in the nineteenth century. To that end, two phases of the Greek entrepreneurial network are identified: the ‘Chiot’ and the ‘Ionian’. The merchant/shipowners from the island of Chios who prospered between the 1830s and the 1860s founded the former, only to be succeeded by the merchant/shipowners from the Ionian islands, who formed the Ionian network from the 1870s to the beginning of the twentieth century. The Ionians successfully made the transition from sail to steam and from merchanting to shipowning. This chapter will deal with the Chiot phase, while the next will examine the Ionian phase. THE CHIOT NETWORK, 1830s–1860s The Chiot network was formed by members of about sixty Greek families (Appendix 2.1). Although almost half were not from the island of Chios, most were either related to the Chiots by marriage (see Appendix 2.2) or started their careers in Chiot offices and had their support. None the less, the Chiot families were the largest and richest. The trade involved mainly bulk cargoes, such as grain, wool, cotton, linseed and tallow, from the eastern Mediterranean and particularly the Black Sea to western and northern Europe; manufactured goods, especially thread and textiles, were carried on return voyages from western Europe to the eastern Mediterranean. The main nodes of the network were England and the Black Sea, with a chain of branch offices throughout the Mediterranean: in Marseilles, Livorno and Trieste; in the cotton markets of Alexandria and Cairo; in the maritime centre of the Aegean archipelago, Syros; and in the two financial markets of the eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople and Smyrna. Vital to the networks success was its ability to penetrate not only the main markets of the recipient western European countries, particularly England, but also the difficult and unexploited hinterland of the Black Sea. Most Greek merchants went to England in the late 1810s or during the Greek revolution in the 1820s. These traders came mostly from Chios, especially after the slaughter of the islands population in 1822. In the 1850s there were fifty-eight Greek merchant houses in England, concentrated in London, Manchester and Liverpool, including almost all the families of the network (see Figure 2.1). Information gathered from the Liverpool Journal of Commerce indicates that in the 1850s Greek merchants largely controlled Liverpool’s trade with the eastern Mediterranean.6 More specifically, Schilizzi, Papayanni and Tymbas handled 41 per cent of the tonnage that entered Liverpool in 1850 from Alexandria, Beirut, Constantinople, Galatz, Braila, Mariupol and Odessa. St. P.Schilizzi & Co, the largest operator of both Greek and English brokers (Table 2.1), was the Liverpool branch of Ralli Brothers (see Figure 2.2). Papayanni, a merchant and shipowner, was known as the carrier of Chiot merchants. Unfortunately, except for three or

40 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 2.1 The Chiot commercial and maritime network, 1830s–1860s. Number of families at the port-cities of the network

four years, the Liverpool Journal of Commerce does not provide such detailed information as appears in Table 2.1.7 None the less, the London Customs Bills of Entry, which provide data on all ships entering the most important British ports from abroad, give extensive information about the activities of the Chiot network in England. Table 2.2 indicates that in 1850, 31 per cent, and in 1860, 57 per cent of all tonnage entering British ports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea was handled by Greek merchants. The Greeks in England were not only involved in bulk cargoes but also in this period handled most of the general trade from Alexandria, Constantinople and Smyrna. Moreover, as the Bills of Entry attest, in 1860 Ralli, Rodocan achi, Spartali, Fachiri Pana, Cremidi, Franghiadi, Gerussi, Geralopulo, Georgacopulo and Cucussi handled almost exclusively the currant trade from Patras.8 It is difficult to identify the amount of tonnage each merchant operated, since often as many as ten to twelve Greek merchants chartered a single ship for general Table 2.1 Vessels entered for loading at the port of Liverpool from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean (Alexandria, Beirut, Braila, Constantinople, Corfu, Galatz, Malta, Mariupol, Odessa, Patras, Salonica, Smyrna and Syros) 1850 Chartered or owned by Greek

Ships

1853 Tons

Ships

Tons

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 41

1850 Chartered or owned by

Ships

1853 Tons

Cassaveti Brothers Cavafy & Co Frangopulo Gianacopulo Mavrogordato Papayanni 26 3,944 Schilizzi 52 8,229 Spartali & Lascaridi Tymbas 9 1,403 A.Total 87 13,576 Other Bahr, Behrend 18 3,559 Burns & Mac’iver Dixon Lamport & Holt 14 4,171 Nichols & Maunder 10 2,907 Pothonier Preston & Watson 26 4,676 Various 16 4,392 B. Total 84 19,705 Total (A)+(B) 171 33,281 Greek participation (A)/[(A)+(B)] 41% Source: Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 1850, 1853

Ships

Tons

1 1 1 9 4 9 14 3 2 44

270 221 95 2,654 608 1,944 2,344 733 650 9,519

5 12 7 16 4 8 12

1,477 9,461 2,780 4,341 886 2,887 2,511 12,157 36,500 46,019

64 108

21%

and bulk cargoes. The Bills of Entry report in detail every single quantity destined for each particular merchant, but to measure the importance of each merchant according to the amount and kind of cargo is beyond the scope of this study. Still, it is clear that Ralli, Rodocanachi, Schilizzi, Cassavetti, lonides and Spartali were the biggest merchants trading with the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea during this period, and most of the commerce involved Liverpool. Marseilles was the other main recipient in western Europe of cargoes sent by Greek merchants in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Tables 2.3–2.5 are based on information in the leading French commercial and shipping journal, Sémaphore de Marseilles, which began in 1827 and contains systematic information on ship arrivals (and departures), including

42 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Table 2.2 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea at the ports of England 1850 Merchant

1860 Tons

Merchant

Argenti Argenti Armero Agelasto Cassavetti Avierino Cavafy Callimassioti Chiriaco Carajahnaki Christaki Cassavetti Cortazzi Cavafy Geralopulo Corgalegno lonides Couvelas Omero Cremidi Papayanni Cucussi Petrocochino Cuppa Psicha Delta Proios Dumas Ralli Bros Eumorphopulo Ralli C. Eustratiadi Ralli P.T. Fachiri Rodocanachi Frangopulo Schilizzi Franghiadi Sechiari Galatti Sevastopulo Georgacopulo Sofiano Georgala Sotirichos Geralopulo Spartali Gerussi Tamvaco Giannacopulo Tymbas Hajopulo Zarifi Homere Ziffo lonides Zizinia Lascaridi Galatti Melas A. Total Greeks 42,306 B. Total British 135,727 (A)/(B) 31% Sources: Appendices 1.18 and 1.19

Tons Negroponte Nicolopulo Nomico Pezali Paleologo Pana Papayanni Potous Ralli Rodocanachi Scaramanga Schilizzi Spartali Tambaco Vagliano Xenos Ziffo Zizinia Zarifi

176,126 308,860 57%

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 43

the port and date of departure, the name of the ship and captain, tonnage, cargo, consignor and consignee, and broker. While it contains a small percentage of errors (like different information for the same ship), it does on the whole provide extremely valuable statistics that can give a picture of the port‘s activities and firms. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to differentiate between a charterer and a shipowner. For example, the journal may print le navire a M.Dromocaiti but the merchandise could be on his own account, for M.Dromocaiti, à ordre or pour divers. Still, it appears from the data that Greek merchants in Marseilles handled more than one-third of all commerce and shipping entering from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea between 1830 and 1860 (Table 2.3). Members of twenty-one families of the network had branch offices in Marseilles, whose Greek merchant and shipping community thrived until the end of the century. The Rodocanachi firm by far outstripped the rest, receiving in 1840 the amazing number of forty-eight ships loaded exclusively with grain from Odessa, Berdiansk, Taganrog, Braila and Galatz (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Zizinia Brothers were the next largest, importing cotton, wheat, maize, linseed and barley from Alexandria, followed by Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, the branch office of the Ralli Brothers of London, who imported mainly wheat and linseed from Odessa and Taganrog. Argenti was the fourth largest firm, importing wheat, maize and linseed from Galatz and Braila, while Dromocaiti was the fifth largest, handling cotton, linseed, hides and colonial goods from Constantinople and Smyrna. Ten years later, Zizinia Brothers, Dromocaiti and Rodocanachi were still in the top five, while Petrocochino & Agelasto, a small firm found in the 1835 list (see Table 2.3) had worked its way up to fifth. But the most important newcomer was Zarifi who, according to the information in Table 2.5, had become the second largest importing firm. By 1860 trade from the eastern Mediterranean more than tripled and the Greeks followed the trend. Spartali was the main Greek importer, followed by Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, Rodocanachi, Melas Brothers and Papudoff (Table 2.3). Greek expansion and consolidation in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea trade from the 1830s to the 1850s took place after wild competition with western and Levantine merchants. The Greek take-over of the Levant trade did not bother the English as much as it did the French, and especially the Marseillaise merchants who had traditionally carried Levantine commerce since the eighteenth century.9 By 1850 there was an evident contraction of the operations of Marseilles firms: only two chartered more than ten vessels. Despite steady exports of French textiles, eventually the Greeks proved the best promoters of Manchester and Liverpool textiles in the Levant to the detriment of French producers, merchants and shipowners. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the types of cargo the main Greek merchants at Marseilles imported. The information clearly demonstrates that by the 1840s and 1850s the main Greek merchants specialised almost exclusively in the trade and transport of bulk cargoes from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.

44 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

At the other end of the trading system, Odessa was the main grain export port. According to the Journal d’Odessa (28 January 1847) the firm of Theodore Rodocanachi (brother of Emmanuel in Odessa and George in Livorno) was the largest in the city, handling goods valued at nearly 3.5 million rubles (a million larger than its closest competitor) and accounting Table 2.3 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea at the port of Marseilles Merchant Agelasto Ambrosi Ambanopoulo Apalyras Argenti & Co Argenti & Sechiari Baltazzi Bros Bati G. Caracoussi Carissi & Vrissachi Christodulo Dromocaiti Janoti Katsikoyani Lazaridi Marulla Bros Mavro & Co Mavro & Basilio Melas Bros Mavrogordato Microulaci & Mavrocordato Monopulos Papudoff Pascalis Petrocochino Petrocochino & Agelasto Ralli & Scaramaga Ralli & Vlasto Ralli & Caramanya

1835

1840

1850

1860

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

2 1

227 228

4 –

817 –

3,608 – 1,355 – – 2,596 2,052 – 1,303 215 – 1,723 – – 246 – – 1,121 6,156 454 498

– – – 3 – – – – 7 – – – – – – – 7 –

– – – 433 – – – – 1,190 – – – – – – – 1,185 –

– 12 – – 1 – – – 7 – – – – – – – 11 –

– 2,174 – – 122 – – – 1,424 – – – – – – – 2,137 –

8 – – 5 – – – 4 18 1 1 – 1 9 – – – –

1,649 – – 1,439 – – – 1041 3,648 280 370 – 118 2,169 – – – –

16 – 5 – – 13 8 – 4 2 – 9 – – 1 – – 5 29 2 2

– – – 2 2

– – – 318 353

– – – 2 –

– – – 276 –

– 6 – 5 13

– 1,663 – 886 2,255

1 19 2 – 10

277 4,592 409 – 2,165

– – –

– – –

– – –

– – –

– – –

— – –

4 3 –

1,203 1,162 450

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 45

Merchant

1835

1840

1850

1860

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

Ships Tons

– 13

– 1,648

1 46

277 9,962

11,952 14 – – – –

2,553 – –

294

12

2,393

38 4 2 6 –

9,835 1,447 535 1,202 –

– – –

– 5 –

– 575 –

61 – 2

12,353 – 325

Ralli & Negroponte – – – Ralli, Schilizzi, & 3 503 19 Argenti Co Rodocanachi & Co – – 48 Satzilli – – – Scaramanga – – – Sechiari Sechiari & Argenti 2 & Co Spartali – – – Spartali & Lascaridi – – – Tamvaco, – – – Microulachi & Mavrogordato Vlasto & Co – – 5 Zarifi & Zafiropulo – – – Zarifi Bros – – – Zizinia Bros 7 1,269 29 A.Total Greek 31 5,251 139 B.Total Marseilles – 16,809 – (A)/B) 31% Sources: Appendices 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4

– 3,789

1,102 2 – – – 20 6,211 28 29,936 169 91,380 – 32%

468 – – 13 4,685 – 6,610 7 35,267 316 84,696 – 42%

– 3,645 – 1,648 72,814 232,249 31%

Table 2.4 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports to Marseilles by the five principal merchant houses in 1840 Merchant

Origin

Merchandise

Rodocanachi & Co

Braila Galatz Constantinople Odessa Berdiansk Taganrog Smyrna Alexandria Alexandria Braila

2,518 quilots (Moldavian) wheat 10,000 kilos (Turkish) wheat 49,498 (Turkish) wheat 38,202 chetwerts wheat 13,936 chetwerts wheat 5,134 chetwerts wheat 420 casks olive oil 253,359 ardeps grain 4,539 bales cotton 424 quilots wheat

Zizinia Bros

46 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Merchant

Origin

Merchandise

Galatz Constantinople Constantinople Odessa Taganrog Galatz Constantinople Salonica Galatz Galatz Braila Smyrna

613 quilots wheat 13,703 kilos mais Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti 15,409 kilos wheat 8,299 chetwerts wheat 11,547 chetwerts wheat 8,420 kilos wheat 9,070 kilos mais 322 bales wool, 9 bales silk Argenti & Co 3,478 quilots wheat 55,000 kilos wheat 18,500 kilos wheat Dromocaiti 152 bales silk 1,642 bales cotton 1,107 bales wool 153 hides Constantinople 81,000 kilos wheat Odessa 759 chetwerts linseed Source: Compiled data from Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1840

for a tenth of Odessa’s overseas commerce. According to the same list, John Ralli owned the fifth largest commercial house in the city, handling 5.2 per cent of overseas trade.10 The Rodocanachi firm exported mainly wheat and linseed to England and Marseilles (Tables 2.4–2.6), whereas the importance of the Rallis in England made them by far the largest exporters to Britain of tallow and wool from Odessa and Taganrog (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). In any case, it is evident that the Chiot network controlled almost 40 per cent of the export trade from Odessa to Britain in the mid-1840s. The network extended to the Sea of Azov where the firm Ralli and Scaramanga (a branch of Ralli Brothers of London), Rodocanachi, Papudoff and Avierino exported more than half the grain and almost all the tallow and wool to Britain (Table 2.7). The other Greek merchants operating from the ports of the Azov and the Danube prospered during the Ionian phase Table 2.5 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea ports to Marseilles by the five principal Greek merchant houses in 1850 Merchant

Origin

Merchandise

Zizinia Bros

Alexandria

3,374 bales cotton 4,053 ardeps wheat 4,759 ardeps sesame 70,000 ocques sesame 610 bales cotton

Constantinople

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 47

Merchant

Origin

Merchandise

Caiffa Salonica

17,000 kilos wheat 3,020 kilos sesame 22 sacks linseed 350 bales wool 19,200 ocques sesame 100 bales cotton 3,184 casks olive-oil 2,519 quilots wheat 1,673 quilots wheat 8,400 kilos wheat 17,530 chetwerts wheat 1,500 chetwerts wheat 15,390 chetwerts wheat 950 chetwerts wheat 681 quilots wheat 2,9 16 quilots wheat 2,400 kilos wheat 12,600 kilos wheat 10,673 kilos wheat 19,280 kilos sesame 4,219 bales cotton 2,550 parcels dried fruit 8,887 ardeps sesame 720 bales cotton 916 bales wool 60 bales cotton 4,640 chetwerts wheat 3,000 chetwerts linseed 395 tons linseed 1,187 bales wool 2,700 hides 2,110 chetwerts linseed 2,250 chetwerts wheat 282 bales wool 1,630 chetwerts wheat 150 quilots wheat 585,066 ocques sesame 88,000 ocques linseed 42 bales wool

Orphano Smyrna Galatz Braila

Zarifi

Dromocaiti

Odessa Taganrog Odessa Theodosia Braila Galatz Varna Caiffa Constantinople Smyrna

Jaffa Alexandretta Enos Rodocanachi & Co

Odessa

Taganrog

Petrocochino &

Berdiansk Braila Agelasto Tarsous

48 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Merchant

Origin

Merchandise

183 bales cotton Odessa 4,055 chetwerts wheat Berdiansk 6,574 chetwerts wheat Cyprus 201 bales cotton Source: Compiled data from Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1850

Table 2.6 Exports of the commercial houses of Odessa to Great Britain, 1841–5 Merchants

1841

1842

1843

1844

1845

A.Exports of wheat and linseed (chetwerts) * Rodocanach 7,460 38,431 17,302 23,694 42,881 i Ralli 17,646 25,071 13,445 27,123 15,544 Papudoff 8,410 5,800 2,350 12,405 11,688 Sevastopulo 2,827 Mavro 4,410 4,385 Total Greek 33,516 76,539 37,482 63,222 70,113 Total 159,858 295,424 109,421 182,940 181,903 Odessa Participatio 21% 26% 34% 35% 38% n of Greeks B.Exports of tallo and wool (poods)* Ralli 143,014 224,484 84,689 68,139 35,715 Rodocanach – 6,232 17,387 15,210 8,975 i Papudoff 4,173 – 1,327 – 859 Scliri 350 Total Greek 147,187 230,716 103,403 83,349 45,549 Total 371,254 611,582 357,934 460,736 264,036 Odessa Participatio 40% 38% 29% 18% 17% n of Greeks Source: Compiled from data in Foreign Office (FO) 359/1 Note: * An approximate weight equivalence is 1 chetwert=5.77 bushels (8 bushels=1 imperial quarter, 4 imperial quarters=1 ton); 1 pood=36 lbs

from the 1870s to the turn of the century. Thirty members of the Chiot network were established in Odessa and Taganrog (see Figure 2.1).

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 49

The Danubian Principalities for centuries provided grain almost exclusively to Constantinople and began to supply other markets only after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Ionian merchants began to become established at Danubian ports immediately thereafter under British protection and members of the Chiot network penetrated the market gradually between 1829 and 1856. Pandia Argenti and F.Sechiari were among the first few Chiots to settle and were the largest exporters of grain to the Argenti firm in Marseilles (Tables 2.3–2.5).11 Members of the Ralli, Vouros and Melas families, as well as an agent of the firm of Xenos in England, settled in Braila to provide cargoes for the branch offices in Marseilles and England. According to the Sémaphore de Marseilles, one-quarter to onethird of the ships and tonnage chartered by Greek merchants arriving in Marseilles from the Black Sea originated in Danubian ports. The contraction of the imports of Rodocanachi and Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti in Marseilles in 1850 (Table 2.3), combined with increased grain Table 2.7 Exports from Taganrog distinguishing Greek merchant houses, 1851–2 Wheat and linseed (chetwerts) Tallow and wool (poods) Merchant houses

1851

1852

A. The ‘Chiots’ 174,019 368,500 Ralli & Scaramanga 119,980 260,500 Rodocanachi Figli 26,176 76,500 Aless. Avierino Figli 13,011 24,500 Papudoff & Lascharachi 14,852 7,000 B. The ‘Ionians’ 70,423 171,995 Mariolakis 24,835 79,620 Maris Vaglianos 27,130 54,435 Aless. Focas 13,428 20,640 G. Dallaporta 5,030 10,000 Const. Mussuri 7,300 C. Total Greeks (A+B) 244,442 540,495 Total Taganrog 306,912 646,410 Participation of Greeks in 80% 84% the total exports of Taganrog Source: Compiled from data in Foreign Office (FO) 359/1

1851

1852

170,761 170,761 – – –

173,000 173,000 – – –

170,761 197,938 86%

173,000 202,420 85%

exports of both Rodocanachi and Ralli from Odessa and Taganrog to Great Britain (Tables 2.6 and 2.7), signalled a major transformation in the Mediterranean grain trade in the 1840s. Until then grain was shipped to the main deposit ports of Livorno, Genoa, Trieste and Marseilles to be re-shipped as necessary to Britain and northern Europe. But Britain’s new free trade policy promoted direct commerce and bypassed intermediate Mediterranean ports.

50 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Livorno, by its status as port franc, had been the first recipient of wheat cargoes from the Black Sea; in the 1820s and 1830s wheat was re-shipped mainly to England and ships came back to Livorno full of textiles. Indeed, Livorno became one of the main outlets for English industry in the 1820s and 1830s. In addition, a large part of English textiles arrived at Alexandria via Livorno in 1820 and 1830.12 A large part of this trade was in Chiot hands. Patricia Herlihy reports that ‘in 1839, a few large commercial houses, no more than eight to ten in number, had dominated Livorno’s overseas trade, and these houses were all foreign, Greek and Jewish’.13 The Greek merchants were Rodocanachi, among the first Greek merchants of Livorno, Sevastopulo (also President of the Chamber of Commerce of Livorno in 1850), Mavrogordato and Papudoff, related to the Rodocanachi and Sevastopulo families by marriage. We find also Constantine Tossizza, brother of Michael Tossizza, the wealthy merchant of Alexandria. From Trieste, the main transit port of the Habsburg Empire, the Greeks were able to channel grain to Austria and Germany and to provide the Levant with industrial goods. The majority of the merchants from the Chiot network arrived in Trieste in the 1820s, where we find members of the Ameros, Galati, Petrocochino, Ralli, Rodocanachi, Scaramanga, Sevastopulo, Vlasto and other Chiot families (see Appendix 2.1).14 Trieste also became home for a number of insurance companies formed by Greeks.15 In Alexandria, Greek merchants had special relations with the government. Until 1829 Muhammed Ali sold cotton in Europe on his own account using Greeks with strong connections as intermediaries. To overcome his financial difficulties, from 1829 he sold the greatest part of the harvest to the big merchant houses, most of which were Greek. Michael Tossizza, Etienne Zizinia and D’Anastassy were the most important merchants in Egypt.16 Eleven other members of the Chiot network also traded from the city About 10–15 per cent of total tonnage arriving in Marseilles in 1840 and 1850 came from Alexandria. The amount of actual trade from Constantinople, Smyrna and Syros to Marseilles and Liverpool in 1850 amounted to less than 15 per cent of the total tonnage chartered by Greek merchants. Yet these three cities had a particular role to play in the network beyond actual trade: they were the three corners from where the network started and expanded, the bases without which the network could not have been built. They were the seedbeds of the merchants who eventually went abroad, the centres where they were educated and served their apprenticeships. Constantinople and Smyrna were cities where all banking services, including lending and arbitrage, were available. Constantinople and Syros were maritime centres providing seamen, ships, shipbuilding, repairs, maintenance, sales and purchase, chartering, insurance and, most important, market information. Constantinople contained the largest urban Greek population in the eastern Mediterranean and was the areas biggest commercial, banking and maritime centre. The firms of Zarifi, Zafiropulo, Lascharidi, Ralli and Schilizzi, found in Appendix 2.1 as the main Chiot firms in Constantinople, represent but a fragment of the reality and do not really reflect the importance of this eastern

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 51

capital to the network. It is reported that in 1868, of the 1,100 persons involved in trade, banking, manufacturing and services in Constantinople, 348 were Greeks; of this number, 133 Greeks were traders.17 Smyrna was the main trading centre for the Marseilles merchants in the eighteenth century and those of Trieste in the early nineteenth. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Chiots controlled the retail trade in cloth, linen and silk in Smyrna, with correspondents in Vienna, Trieste, Livorno, Genoa, Marseilles, Paris and Amsterdam.18 In fact, there were 500 Chiot mercantile houses operating in Smyrna at the end of the eighteenth century.19 The firms of Baltazzi, Homere, Schilizzi and Ralli (Appendix 2.1) represent only a few of the Chiot families in the city. Syros was the main maritime centre of the young Greek state. Its development was almost entirely connected with the Chiot network. It is thus not surprising to find that in 1845 fifteen of the twenty most prominent merchants were members of families in the Chiot network. Apart from handling the islands commerce, the merchants financed the development of the Greek-flag fleet, more than half of which was built in shipyards on Syros by Chiot shipwrights between 1843 and 1858.20 Maritime loans either for shipbuilding or operations were important for the Chiot merchants of Syros, who also sold maritime intelligence, insurance and chartering. Syros’ prosperity and decline followed that of the Chiot network; it lasted one generation—by the 1870s Piraeus had started to replace it. The circuitous path of the Greeks around the Mediterranean and northern Europe established many prosperous merchant communities that in the midnineteenth century controlled the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea trades. But it is not the increase in the number of interconnected commercial establishments that made the network work, but rather the elaboration of a common commercial strategy which relied first on the organisational structure of the firms and second on the methods of trading.21 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRMS The usual structure of a Greek merchant house in some ways resembled a modern multinational firm. One office fulfilled the function of a mother company while the others acted as branches. The partners divided the direc tion of the various divisions while the role of the central house, which determined the ‘nationality’ of the firm, was given to the most capable. All directors appeared equal to third parties and all had signing authority. A variant occurred when the branches were legally independent but shared profits. But in either, the multinational character of these companies often created legal complications. Yet this multinationality and this complexity have been the bases in this century from which Greek shipping companies have avoided taxes in all countries. At a time when the post was the only means of communication, family control was a prime characteristic of the network. Kinship and common place of origin implied trust and facilitated entrance into the ‘club’.22

52 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Even more than with other Greeks, the power of the Chiot families derived from the discipline dictated by the hierarchy and cohesion of the family. Intermarriage was extensive: Chiots married their uncles, aunts, cousins—even first cousins, contrary to the laws of the Greek Orthodox church—to keep business within the family. Each family sought to mix with equals, and because the circles were so limited, competition for appropriate matches began early. Intermarriage made the family even more powerful.23 Appendix 2.2 provides a rough sketch of the various families and is constructed solely to provide some idea of Chiot relationships. The families depicted were related by first-degree kinship—marriages of the merchants or their siblings, parents, and siblings of their parents. An attempt has been made to limit these to the era between the 1820s and 1860s. All twenty-eight Chiot families were closely related by intermarriage.24 The Rallis were the largest and most influential family not only within the Greek community in England but also in the entire network. The Ralli Brothers were the most senior, the wealthiest, and the most imperious of the Greek houses. Its founder and pater familias was Sir Pandia, who was also considered the titular head of the Greek community in London. For every occasion, the rest waited for the pronouncement of ‘Zeus’ so they could follow his example.25 There were sixty-six members (siblings and first and second cousins) of the Ralli family active during this period who married within the twenty-four families reported in Appendix 2.1. The Rodocanachis, the most important family in the Black Sea ports, were the second most numerous, followed by Schilizzi, Scaramanga, Negroponte and Sevastopulo. The other non-Chiot families in the network worked the same way. Imitation and internal competition were two of the first rules of the network. It will be useful to have a more detailed account of the operations of a Chiot and non-Chiot firm to see how the Greeks functioned. We shall examine here the network of the Ralli firm based in England and that of Mavros based in Odessa. In 1818, when John and Stratis Ralli went to London from Livorno, their brother Avgustis was already established in Marseilles. In 1823 the firm of Ralli & Petrocochino was founded and in 1824 the other younger brother, Pandia, joined the others in London. Pandia, the main ‘brain’ of the firm, remained in London, Stratis went to Manchester, John to Odessa in 1827 and Tomazis to Constantinople. The various branches of the firm are shown in Figure 2.2: Ralli Brothers in London; E.Ralli, first in Syra and then in Manchester; St. P.Schilizzi & Co in Liverpool; Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti in Marseilles; Tomazi Ralli & Co in Constantinople and Trebizond until the early 1850s and thereafter replaced by St. P.Schilizzi and Co; Ralli Brothers in Odessa; Ralli & Scaramanga in Taganrong; St. Scaramanga in Rostov-on-Don; Ralli & Agelasto in Tauris; and Petros Pandia Ralli in Resht (Iran). The Rallis covered the main Mediterranean ports, while in those where they did not have branches they had connections via other relatives. They were thus always consignors and consignees. From Odessa and the Azov they shipped tallow, linseed and grain and from Trebizond, Resht,

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 53

Figure 2.2 The network of Ralli Brothers, 1830s–1860s

Tauris and Constantinople colonial goods. The return cargoes were Manchester textiles. Ralli Brothers widened their commercial horizons and successfully entered the cotton trade from Calcutta, Bombay and New York where they opened branch offices in 1851, 1861 and 1871, respectively. In the 1850s the Rallis employed 4, 000 clerks and 15,000 workmen. As Stanley Chapman notes, together with the Rodocanachis, these two leading Greek firms ‘most probably had the largest organisations and capitals of any merchants operating in London. Only Rothschilds were substantially richer’ and they were ‘financiers rather than merchants’. The death of John Ralli in the late 1850s and of Pandia in 1863 led to the total reorganisation of the firm. The Levant trade was abandoned by closing down the branches in Trebizond, Constantinople, Resht and Tauris, while the Russian grain trade was handed over to the Scaramanga family. The new man in charge, Stephen Ralli, turned instead to the much more lucrative Indian and American trades.26 In the early 1820s Stephanos Mavros from the Cyclades established in Odessa a small but successful firm. One of his major disadvantages was the lack of a large commercial family, a ‘handicap’ he partially overcame by marrying Euphrosyne Basiliou, a member of a prosperous mercantile family in Vienna and Leipzig. One of them, Michael Basiliou, married a Chiot (Sevastopulo); these were the parents of Euphrosyne. By his marriage Mavros thus became a member of a Chiot clan and acquired mercantile connections. He expanded his firm by appointing as directors of the branch offices his wifes brothers or brothers-in-law.

54 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Soon the Mavros merchant house of Odessa had branches in Taganrog (directed by George Melas, his wifes brother-in-law), Livorno (by Dimitrios Basiliou, his wifes brother, and Ilias Panas, his wifes brother-in-law), Marseilles (by Alexander Basiliou, his wifes brother), and London (by Basil and Leon Melas, his wifes nephews). The Crimean War and the death of the old directors led to a subsequent restructuring. Basil and Leon Melas in 1854 formed their own independent firm based in London. By marrying their sister Euphrosyne in 1850 to the important Marseilles merchant, Andreas Vagliano, they entered the ‘Ionian’ network and continued their activities successfully. Basil Melas remained in London, Leon and Constantine went to Marseilles in 1857, and the youngest brother, Michael, went to Galatz.27 The second generation of directors in both Ralli Brothers and the Mavros firm reorganised their houses to meet new demands and hence were able to continue operations in the last third of the nineteenth century. The majority of firms collapsed, however, and the Chiot network declined after the late 1850s. Apprenticeship and commercial education started at a very young age for the male members of mercantile families. Their main education was in foreign languages and the family business, where they learned advanced commercial techniques, such as bills of exchange and double-entry bookkeeping. As Demetrius Vikelas remembered: [Since I was 13–14 years old] my fathers main concern was my commercial education. The time that I was not busy learning two languages, I passed in his office copying commercial correspondence. At the same time the partner of my father taught me double entry bookkeeping, and I kept some of the books of the company under his guidance and supervision.28 Recruitments and choice of partners were made from the most able of the numerous relatives and was dictated by the older members of the family. As Vikelas wrote: I had just become 17 years old [when I left from Constantinople to London on 16 May 1852].… [Melas Bros] hired me in their office and were willing to teach me all about commerce…. It was after [some years] that I realized how grateful I should have been to my grandfather who dictated to my uncles, and they accepted without objection, his wish of my employment at their office. Really, the system of mutual aid among relatives and of family collaboration was very much in effect then, more than today, and it was because of this [system] that the Greek merchant houses, and especially the Chiot ones, prospered to that extent.29 Greeks in the various diaspora merchant communities did not mix with local populations and generally socialised with each other; in fact they often lived

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 55

together in compact neighbourhoods. They clung to their Greek identities and usually did not look upon the host city as a permanent home. In many cases, however, they adopted the nationality of the country in which they resided to enjoy the privileges of the local merchants. The main Greek merchants in Odessa, for example, took Russian citizenship after a very simple procedure. As the British consul in Odessa revealed in 1850: In reply to your despatch of the 5th of February which reached me only two days back, I hasten to state first that any foreigner may become a Russian subject at any time and in the course of a few hours, by a simple formality, and that he will be encountered by the Russian law as such in every way and without distinction from a native. Of the merchants of Taganrog named by you, Ralli & Scaramanga is a firm acting as agents and for account of Ralli & Scaramanga of Odessa who are inscribed in the Guild as Russian subjects; the same with B.Melas who acts for S.Mavro of Odessa, a Russian subject.30 Many members of the Greek networks took out Austrian, French and British citizenship. In order to acquire higher social distinction and political protection the most prominent members of each merchant community in the various ports became consuls of Greece or other nations, as is clear from Table 2.8. Ultimately, it is the common economic origin, the characteristic business strategy and the organisation of these commercial houses more than the ethnic origin of the merchants that characterise them as Greek and that distinguish them from their competitors. The citizenship of the merchants is connected with the advantages that it can bring to the commercial house, that is, more or less opportunistic.31 METHODS OF TRADING The second important leg of the Chiot commercial strategy was its methods of trading: first, penetration into the markets of both producers and consumers and, second, a particular method of organising shipping and trade.32 Both were designed to cut costs and control markets. An essential element in Greek commercial strategy was to purchase goods directly from producers in the eastern Meditrranean and Black Sea, which permitted them to buy cheaply and to avoid intermediaries. Wheat from Odessa, for example, was sold at the time of delivery either from the warehouses where it was held or inland from the farms and at bazaars. Grain sold from the warehouses usually belonged to landlords who could afford to hold stocks and was more readily available but more expensive, while grain from small peasants was bought inland and was cheaper. A system of local agents in the hinterland was established to provide regular

56 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Table 2.8 Greeks as consuls in various port-cities, 1830s–1860s City

Name

General consul of

London Marseilles

Pandia Ralli Greece George Zizinia Greece Paul Rodocanachi Tuscany Livorno Const. Tossizza Greece Alexandria Michael Tossizza Greece Etienne Zizinia Belgium D’Anastassy Sweden Odessa John Ralli United States Th. Rodocananchi Tuscany Pandia Zizinia Greece Taganrog C.N. Mavrogordato Greece Rostov-on-Don C.N. Mavrogordato Greece Sources: Christos Hadziiossif, ‘La Colonie Grecque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980; Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794– 1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986; Herlihy, ‘Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukranian Studies, vols 3–4, 1979–80, pp. 399–420; Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, The Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, pp. 45–68

shipments of export produce. Usury was a means to control the producers. Extensive lending by local agents of Greek merchants induced the peasants to pre-sell their harvest at reduced prices. An internal network in the hinterland of each port thus worked in parallel with the external network.33 Azov and Danube trade was less organised than that in Odessa and there was even more scope for buying inland, providing even larger profits for exporters. The lands around the Black Sea and in the Ottoman Empire where the Greeks moved were highly underdeveloped. Knowledge of local languages and customs made access to local markets easier for them than for merchants of other nationalities. Besides, the Black Sea region, which supplied the bulk of trade for the network, was very primitive by European standards, especially before the Crimean War. To emphasise the hostile environment the ancient Greeks called it exactly the opposite, Euxine, which means ‘hospitable’. Most of Europes great rives—the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper, Bug and Don—flow into it. Hundreds of miles of swamps covered the coasts, which had almost no natural harbours. The Black Sea was noted for its strong currents, sudden gales and thick fogs. The rivers from the Danube to the Azov froze for up to three months during the winter, and sudden frosts were common. Malaria and cholera were also serious threats. Ships passing through Constantinople had to be quarantined in Russian ports, which became a major source of delay. Most ports had poorly

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 57

constructed harbours (if they had any at all) and in many cases ships had to load in the roads. The streets of the cities were unpaved and there were repeated complaints about the impossibility of crossing certain streets on foot because of mud in spring and autumn. In most ports there were no banking or insurance facilities and communications were difficult. The mails presented particular problems for foreign merchants and shipowners. As late as 1877 Consul Barrow at Kertch irritably described a Russian postman as: a man who can neither read nor write, but still delivers the Russian letters most correctly; but English letters, and any characters not Russian, are shown to any passer-by who wishes to inspect them, and an ill-intentioned person by giving a few copecs to the postilion, may appropriate any letter he wishes on merely stating that it is addressed to him.34 At the other end of the trade network, goods—particularly tallow, linseed and grain—found their way to the British market through the Baltic Exchange. The name originally referred to trade with the countries bordering the Baltic Sea and it remained synonymous with overseas trade, despite the widening of the geographic origins of cargoes.35 In the course of the nineteenth century the Baltic became London’s central freight market, the main place to exchange information about ships and cargoes. The Baltic Coffee House was established in 1823 to close ranks against unwanted speculators and it had 300 subscribers. An 1845 description noted that: It is a long narrow apartment, having no peculiar characteristic beyond a slight effluvia from the samples exhibited, and the dingy appearance of the place, besmeared with ink from the pens of the juveniles, or clerks in attendance for principals who are not buyers, and who, from the age of twelve upwards, may be seen either marking the prices paid in their catalogues, or designing figures, after the antique, upon the deal tables appropriated to their use. The sales occupy about a couple of hours.36 In 1854 Pandia Ralli became a member of the twenty-member Baltic Coffee House committee, which made the rules and decided various issues.37 In 1857, after the Crimean War, the Baltic Coffee House was reorganised as The Baltic Company Ltd; two of its twelve directors were M.E.Rodocanachi and Antonio Ralli, and thirty-seven shareholders were Greek.38 By 1886, 7 per cent of the 1,384 members were Greek, largely from the Chiot network (see Table 2.9). Access to the Baltic Exchange, the main British (and ultimately world) freight market was extremely important for Greeks. Fortunately, Greek membership served everyone’s interests. From a British perspective, large

58 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Table 2.9 List of Greek members of the Baltic Exchange, 1886 A.Greeks Agelasto John M. Agelasto Stephen A. Argenti George A. Argenti Leonidas Basilio Aristides J. Boyazoglu Nicolo Caralli Nicholas M. Caralli Paul J. Cavafy George J. Ceffala George Constantinidi Alexander Constantinidi Demetrius S. Constantinidi Sophocles Corgialegno Marin Coronio Theodorie J. Cuppa Leonidas J. Damala Emanuel M. Eumorphopulos Aristides G. Eumorphopulos George Franghiadi Stephen E. Frangopulo James S. Galatti Constantine S. Galatti Nicholas C. Garofallo John A. Gregoropulo George Ionides Alexander A. Ionides Constantine A. Ionides Luke A. Katinakis Demetrius M. Kessissoglu John Lambrinudi Leonidas Lenos Panaghioti D. Margariti Antony J. Mavrogordato Michael E. Mavrogordato Michael G. Mavrogordato Nicholas A. Mavrogordato Pandely A.

Potous Demetrius Ralli Ambrose J. Ralli Ambrose J.C. Ralli Demetrius T. Ralli Emmanuel J. Ralli John A. Ralli Lucas E. Ralli Pandia P. Ralli Stephen A. Rodocanachi Emmanuel M. Rodocanachi John T. Rodocanachi Michel E. Rodocanachi Michel M. Rodocanachi Pandia P. Rodocanachi Peter P. Scaramanga Emmanuel G. Scaramanga George E. Scaramanga John P. Schilizzi Demetrius G. Schilizzi Demetrius S. Schilizzi John Schilizzi John S. Schilizzi Michael G. Schilizzi Theodore E. Sclavo Panaghi C. Sechiari Pandeli Sechiari Parasqueva Sevastopulo Demetrius S. Sevastopulo George M. Sgouta Stuliano L. Sinanides Alexander Spartali Demetrius M. Spartali Eustratius M. Theologo Sophocles Tzocanaki Demetrius A. Vagliano Alexander A. Vagliano Alcibiades Vagliano Panaghi

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 59

A.Greeks Mavrojani Alexander Vlasto Alexander A. Nicolopulo John D. Zarifi John M. Nomico Pericles Zarifi Michael Paspatti Philip Zarifi Theodore M. Peroglou Dr Nicholas Ziffo George S. Petrocochino Alexander P. Ziffo Miltiades L. Petrocochino Demetrius Zigomala John C. Petrocochino Eustratius E. Zizinia Demetrius Petrocochino John A. Zula Speridion S. Petrocochino Pandia E. A Greeks Pitzipios Michael D. Pitzipios Stephen D. B.Others Polychroniadi Speridion Total Source: Baltic Exchange, List of Members, 1886

97

7%

1,287 1,384

scale corn imports meant that a merchant had to trust his money to foreigners whose scruples were not always known. Having the foreigners in the club, however, solved much of the problem. Eventually, ‘the wily Greek and the almost wilier Hebrew, the cute Yank and the German with spec tacles on both outer and inner eyes’ were members, ‘together with some of the shrewdest Britons, metropolitan and provincial’.39 The main foreign houses in Britain were owned by Germans, Jews, Greeks and Americans. The Greeks promoted trade with eastern Europe and the Middle East.40 Greek firms cheaply and regularly imported the goods Britons needed, while exporting and promoting Britain’s industrial goods. In fact, one of the great achievements of the Greeks in England rested on the fact that they succeeded in finding new markets for textiles in a part of the world where the British presence was weak. Exports of cotton goods to the Ottoman dominions increased from 9.5 million yards in 1820 to 194 million yards by 1850 and to 670 million yards in 1870, a fifth of total export sales.41 From the Greek perspective entry into the worlds largest freight market ensured direct access to the buyers and sellers of cargoes, ships and transport services. From the mid-1850s, the faces, firms, cargoes, ships, routes and networks all changed, but what remained permanent was the presence of Greek shipowners in the Baltics membership rolls. The establishment of Greek merchants on the Exchange in the mid-nineteenth century was crucial to the continued growth of Greek-owned shipping. But it was the efficient combination of trade and shipping that initially made the merchants of the Chiot network so successful. Greek merchants relied on permanent agents in foreign ports, always members of the same family, to receive and dispatch the cargoes. They thus handled the trade at both ends without third-party involvement, always buying and selling on their own

60 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Figure 2.3 Ports for orders. Cargo trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, nineteenth century

accounts. This ensured a personal presence in local and foreign markets. For example, John Ralli in Odessa might load a cargo of wheat in one of his own or a chartered ship. He would then post the bills of lading and a sample of the cargo to his brother Pandia in London. Pandia Ralli might then sell the merchandise through the Baltic Exchange to another party, even though the ship had not yet arrived in Britain. The third party might even sell the wheat to a fourth. In this way the cargo could change hands three or four times while still afloat and the person delivering it might not be Pandia Ralli but a French firm in Dunkirk. Because the ultimate purchaser was not known to the master of the vessel carrying the cargo, he had to touch at a ‘port for orders’ to learn his ultimate destination. In the Mediterranean such ports included Constantinople, Malta and Gibraltar, and in northern Europe they were most often Falmouth and Cork (see Figure 2.3). This ‘cargo trade’ facilitated the growth of the eastern Mediterranean grain trade and its origin is probably with the merchants of the Chiot network.42 Such trade in its more specialised form was later carried by tramp vessels and to this day forms the basis of Greek shipping; over time, however, the ‘ports for orders’ have been replaced by the wireless, telex and, more recently, fax machines. Shipping was vitally important in the function of the network. In the Black Sea area where there was no general trade, inward cargoes were difficult to get. Greek merchants were able to overcome this difficulty to a certain extent by carrying British textiles and other manufactured goods to the larger cities, such

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 61

as Constantinople or Smyrna, and then sailing the last leg of the trip in ballast. The merchants of the Chiot network were also shipowners. Table 2.10 shows the extent to which fifteen of the fifty network families invested in shipping. The first part of the Table is based on data from the Sémaphore de Marseilles and ownership is estimated from available information.43 Zizinia Brothers seem to have invested extensively in shipping; from 1835 to 1850 they were the owners of nine sailing ships. In 1840 alone they owned eight vessels of 1,916 tons. Dromocaiti was the next largest shipowner, owning five craft in 1840; he traded his goods almost exclusively using his own ships. Papudoff, Petrocochino and Agelasto, Rodocanachi, Ralli, Schilizzi, Argenti and Zarifi owned one to three ships each. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping furnished the data in the second part of Table 2.10; unfortunately it is not available before 1860. By 1860 the Table 2.10 Greek merchants as shipowners, 1830–60 Merchant France Zizinia Bros

Dromocaiti

Papudoff

Petrocochino & Agelasto Chariklia Rodocanachi Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti

Name of ship

Tons

Date of information

Jeune Menandre Jeune Cleanthe Penelope Cleopatre Fanny Nouvelle Adeline Leonidas Themistocle Cleanthe Nicolas-et-Aristide Aristide Laurent-et-Fanny Aspasie-et-Hennette Nicolas-et-Heracles Perle Constantinos Pandias Catingo Pegasus

246 126 260 196 251 190 300 347 326 189 168 195 138 199 138 347 416 150 198

1835, 1840 1835, 1840, 1850 1835, 1840 1835, 1840, 1850 1840 1840 1840 1840 1850 1835, 1840, 1850 1835 1840, 1850 1840, 1850 1840, 1850 1840 1850 1850 1850 1835

155 Rodocanachi Jeune-Fanny

1835, 1840, 1850 350 94

1840 1835

62 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Merchant

Name of ship

Tons

Date of information

Lycurgue Argenti & Co

314 St. Nicol Achille Alexandros

1840 277 220 231

1840 1840 1850

Zariffi England J.Schilizzi

Medea 199 1860 Pantoleon 449 1860 Sea Nymph 246 1860 Senator 318 1860 Evangeline 374 1860 Gough Bg 211 1860 Michigan (steam) 846 1860 L. Melas Aphroezza (steam) 133 1860 P.T.Ralli Francisco 500 1860 Spartali Demetrius 418 1860 Papayanni Agia Sofia (steam) 977 1860 Arcadia (steam) 1,164 1860 Omonia (steam) 464 1860 Thessalia (steam) 1,169 1860 Xenos Kanaris (steam) 927 1860 Asia (steam) 1,093 1860 Coletis (steam) 318 1860 Olympius (steam) 280 1860 Bozzaris (steam) 659 1860 Modern Greece 753 1860 (steam) Petrobeys (steam) 262 1860 Scotia (steam) 1,196 1860 Smyrna (steam) 322 1860 Zaimis (steam) 259 1860 Sources: For the years 1835–50, data are from Sémaphore de Marseilles, and for 1860 data are from the list of owners and shipowners, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1860

introduction of steam is evident. According to Lloyd’s Register, the Schilizzi firm based in London owned six sailing vessels ‘and one steamer in 1860; Schilizzi was the main carrier for the Ralli Brothers. Melas, P.T.Ralli and Spartali also owned single ships while Papayanni owned four steamships and Xenos had an extraordinary fleet of ten steamers. It is interesting to note that almost all fifteen Greek families in Table 2.10 used French and English masters on those

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 63

ships they owned and operated under French or English flags. The choice of flag or the nationality of the master depended on the western European ports in which the Greeks were established. The Greek merchants in the Chiot network were not large-scale shipowners. While they owned some vessels, for the most part they chartered the ships that carried their cargoes. THE CHIOT NETWORK AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING The overall influence of the Chiot network in the growth of Greek-owned shipping was vital in three ways. First, it organised the trade and provided cargoes for a Greek-flag fleet. Second, the commercial network helped to establish a shipping network that stretched from the Black Sea across the Mediterranean to northern Europe; this shipping network also generated the infrastructure for the growth of Greek-owned shipping during the nineteenth century. Third, and most important, it opened access to London, the leading maritime centre of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first influence of the Chiot network on the growth of Greek shipping was that its members chartered Greek-flag sailing vessels to carry their cargoes. The Sémaphore de Marseilles provides ample evidence of this connection. Between 1840 and 1860 the arrivals of Greek-flag ships more than tripled. According to Table 2.11, 37 per cent of the ships chartered by Greek firms in Marseilles in 1840, 47 per cent in 1850 and 60 per cent in 1860 flew the Greek flag. In this way, more than half of all the Greek-flag ships arriving at Marseilles were chartered by members of the Chiot network. On the other hand, it is evident that in the same period the Greek merchants in England used almost no Greek-flag ships; only 3 per cent of the vessels in 1850 and 1 per cent in 1860 were Greekflag craft. The Chiot network in England used the ships owned by its own members that sailed under the British flag. For the most part, this meant vessels owned by Xenos, Papayanni, Spartali and Schilizzi. The needs of the commercial network determined the pattern of trade routes and infrastructure for Greek shipping throughout the Mediterranean, Black Sea, northern Europe and Great Britain. Greek shipowners and captains in every Black Sea port where cargo was sought were bound to find compatriots whom they could trust and with whom they could Table 2.11 Ship arrivals at Marseilles and the ports of England Year

(A) Total (B) All % (B)/(A) (C Greek ships flag ships chartered by Greeks

Arrivals at Marseilles 1840 91,380 29,636 1850 84,696 35,267

32 42

16,857 24,256

% (C)/(A) (D) Greek % (D)/(B) flag ships chartered by Greeks 18 29

10,035 16,444

37 47

64 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Year

(A) Total (B) All % (B)/(A) (C Greek ships flag ships chartered by Greeks

1860 237,085 72,814 31 53,988 Arrivals at the ports of England 1850 135,727 42,306 31 4,271 1860 308,860 176,126 57 2,933 Sources: Appendices 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.18 and 1.19

% (C)/(A) (D) Greek % (D)/(B) flag ships chartered by Greeks 22

43,380

60

3 1

2,254 1,143

5 1

communicate. Similarly, a network of Greek shipping agencies was established in all the main Mediterranean and north European ports. The presence of numerous Greek ships and seamen became a source of wealth for numerous small entrepreneurs in the Greek communities in every port that supplied, equipped and repaired the Greek ships. For example, in various private shipping archives we can find receipts from Greek shops abroad that provided ancillary services. There are also receipts from special ‘agent-translators’ who dealt with all the bureaucratic procedures masters had to face when entering a port. This meant that an illiterate master, or one who could not speak the language of the port, could load, repair and equip his ship without any insurmountable problems. The third most important impact of the Chiot network on the development of Greek shipping was that it opened the way to London, the world’s primary maritime centre. The first important step, as we have seen, was to gain entry to the Baltic Exchange. The second was to get access to the actual shipping market and consequently to new technology, especially to steam. The merchants of the Chiot network never really invested in steamers on a massive scale with two exceptions, both non-Chiots. The first large-scale buyers of steamships were Stephanos Xenos and Basil Papayanni. Stefanos Xenos was in every respect a pioneer in Greek shipowning in the mid-nineteenth century. A multi-talented risk-taker, Xenos managed to amass a fleet of ten steamers (Table 2.10) within an incredibly short time, dazzling all his contemporaries, only to lose it five years later.44 His ideas were those of a twentieth-century shipowner: he purchased his steamers with loans from British financial institutions, contrary to his contemporaries who never borrowed from ‘foreigners’. When he ran into financial difficulties he did not turn to Greek houses because: I could not attempt to enter into arrangements with any of the Greek houses because, in doing so, I should be obliged to give details concerning my business—I should be obliged to tell how I had purchased my fleet, who were the capitalists concerned, and who were my partners…. Any other Greek house on learning that I had out acceptances for so many thousand pounds for the value of the steamers, would have told their

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 65

correspondents to have nothing to do [with me]. …[Besides] I shall open their eyes; and the result will be that, being exporters and importers themselves on a large scale, having all the means, they will try the business, and will go themselves in the shipowning—as already Messrs Spartali and Co have begun at Liverpool —the Greeks unfortunately following each other in a transaction.45 Xenos was prescient, but his plans suffered from a series of practical problems. First, he tried to implement them too early, when long-term finance for ship purchases was not yet fully developed in London. Second, he was inexperienced in shipping and totally misunderstood its cyclical nature. Third, he entered the Greek commercial community as an outsider (although he was brother-in-law to the rich Ionnides) and lacked the necessary kinship links on which the other commercial houses relied. And last, but not least, because of his political convictions and provocative lifestyle he lost the support of his fellow Greek merchants in London exactly when he needed it most. None the less, he left us a book entitled Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which he published at his own expense several years after the collapse of his firm. In the book he provides a valuable account of the rise and decline of his firm, Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation, and its relations with the rest of the Greek commercial community as well with the British financial firm, Overend, Gurney and Co. For the half-dozen years that he operated, Xenos’ steamers carried the names of heroes of the Greek revolution. Yet they sailed under the British flags with English masters and crews. Basil Papayanni’s shipping company, on the other hand, survived into the twentieth century. In the early 1840s George was the first of the three Papayanni brothers to arrive in Liverpool, where he soon established a successful commercial house. A few years later he was joined by his two brothers, of whom Basil proved to be the most dynamic.46 The firms success rested on its early investments in steamers, which it employed on a regular line between the Levant and Liverpool, and successfully continued its activities throughout the nineteenth century as the owner of a large steam fleet.47 A detailed account of Basil Papayanni’s activities in Liverpool is given satirically in Fairplay, the leading British shipping journal: Though Don is a Spanish title, the people of Spain do not hold the copyright of the same…now you are introduced to a Grecian Don —Don Basilio, the shipowner…. The Levant trade has invariably been chiefly carried on by Greek houses, and the one in question [the Papayanni firm] is, perhaps, the oldest now in existence, as it must already have seen its forty-fifth birthday. The firm formed a line of steamers to run between Liverpool and the Levant, and seem always to have had a good hold on the trade, though of course competitors soon came into the field. Being

66 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

merchants as well as shipowners, they had a large connection in the manufacturing towns, principally among their own countrymen and the Armenians. These foreigners naturally preferred those who could speak their languages to call upon them for freights, and the firm therefore adopted the principle of having both a Greek and Armenian representative in their branch offices. …For many years there have been four lines of steamers in the Liverpool and Levant trade—viz., the Mighty I’s, the Earl of Margate’s Don Basilio ‘s and another of less importance—the first three until recently working together as a conference…., and the latter being known as the opposition.48 …When his was one of the three conference lines to the Levant the other two couldn’t make out how it was that the shippers preferred supporting his line so unanimously, as, nevertheless, was the case. Some shippers would positively keep their goods back for Don Basilios steamers, which fact was anything but a pleasant one for the other lines to contemplate. The rates of freight were the same by the three lines, so that there was no inducement in that respect. Basilio was certainly a Greek and friendly with the Armenians, but surely that was not a sufficient reason for their keeping their goods from the other lines…. Now it must be remembered that our friend has always been a generous man, and it came to light that he had been making the shippers a present equal to half-a-crown a ton on all the goods they shipped by his steamers. This act of generosity was not appreciated by the other lines as much as it was by the shippers, and a little coolness between Don Basilio and his coworkers…. Don Basilio is one of those men who never predict without being sure— in other words, he is always wise after an event…. He is streets behind Socrates in this respect. Like many other men, he looks a knowing individual, and his manner of talking and habit of biting the words before they get out of his mouth suggest that he knows a great deal more than he is allowed to say. He has his peculiarities, like all men, it is not long since that he boasted about his dress not costing him ten pounds a year, but, judging by appearances, there was no occasion for him to mention the fact, so that, for a wonder, he wasted words. Don Basilio deserves the credit of being a clever man. He is shrewd, full of tact and ability, and though well on in years, is as energetic as many a man twenty years his junior. What is more, perhaps, he is popular in most quarters, though there are some men of business who think he looks too much after his own interests. Who doesn’t? He pays his servants liberally and treats them unlike most masters; the consequence is that you seldom see a fresh face in his office. As an instance, I think it is correct to say that his manager has been with him for over a quarter of a century and is as faithful to his chief now as in the days of his youth…. In treating his servants well, Don Basilio receives in return from them a cheerful service, which added to his own ability and character, have made

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 67

the line under his management a very successful one. If all the Greeks were like Basilio, and business remained at a standstill in this country much longer, we might [soon go out of business]. But then there are bandits in Athens itself; and has not Edmond About written that in Greece the brigands are the only men who never lie?49 We do not include either Xenos or Papayanni in the Greek-owned merchant fleet despite their strong Greek connections because they ran their steamships mainly with English crews. The Papayanni line was one of the four main British steamship lines that traded to the Black Sea. The influence of Papayanni on the growth and transformation of the Greek merchant fleet was highly important because of his knowledge of the British maritime market. There is evidence that he served as an intermediary between English and Greeks parties in the first purchases of steamers and collaborated closely with other Greek shipowners. Papayanni worked only for independent Greek shipowners but also facilitated the steamship purchases of the state-controlled Greek Steamship Company.50 Papayanni’s role was also attested to by contemporaries. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, who will feature in Chapter 5, served as master on a vessel for which Papayanni had been the middle man: [In 1868 the Cosmas Bros] transferred me as second mate to another ship they owned, called Comna, that was loading cargoes from Piraeus to Liverpool, from Piraeus I sailed with the said ship as second mate to Liverpool, there at the exhortation of the Master of the ship Cosma Cosmas and at the request of Captain George Kivotos I accepted to go as Master at Newport of England to take over at the order and authorization of Kivotos a ship that he had bought through Papayanni for his brother-in-law Mr D.Matsis of Syros.51 Similarly, there is evidence of a business collaboration in a letter written on 12 September 1875 from Panaghi Vagliano to Basil Papayanni. The bearer of this letter is Mr Anastassios Syrmas who has served as Master for a number of years, and because he has worked for our firm, and because we know him as an honest and reliable man and he comes at your firm for employment we send you this recommendation letter by which we fully recommend him to you to take him under your protection and we do not doubt that he can please you in any position that you employ him. Please accept in advance our thanks and our regards.52 It seems that throughout the 1860s and 1870s the Papayanni shipping firm served as the main source of information about the British maritime market for Greeks. In the 1880s a number of prominent Greek merchants of the Ionian network, led by the Vagliano Brothers, invested in steamers. The Vagliano Brothers

68 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

established the first and largest Greek shipping office in London that flourished from the 1860s into this century as a chartering, insurance, sales and purchase shipping broker, as well as a shipping bank. This shipping office, the main link between Greek sailing shipowners and the London maritime market, proved of prime importance in the transition from sail to steam in Greek shipping: through this office the first massive purchases of steamers took place. THE TRANSITION FROM THE CHIOT TO THE IONIAN NETWORK There was a distinct decrease in the commercial activities of the merchants of the Chiot network after the 1860s. Adjusting to the new international developments in world trade, in the last third of the nineteenth century the Greek commercial and maritime network of the diaspora communities passed into a new Ionian phase, which was more maritime than commercial. At least three factors led to the withdrawal of many merchants of the Chiot network after the late 1850s: major changes in the Black Sea trade, technological revolutions, and internal factors that diverted Chiot firms into other directions. After the Crimean War a series of socio-economic changes took place in southern Russia and the Danubian Principalities that brought about a new economic order. Social reforms in Russia, the most important of which was the emancipation of serfs in 1861, had the immediate effect of raising labour costs and increasing the number of small property owners. Large estate owners who found it difficult to adjust to a ‘free market’ sold their properties. The new purchasers were mostly Jews; in the area of Odessa they bought about 75 per cent of the land put on the market.53 Commercial reforms that enabled foreign merchants to enjoy the same privileges as locals deprived the Greeks of an important comparative advantage gained through taking out Russian citizenship. Odessa stopped being a free port in 1857 and thus lost its prime importance for imports. In addition, a series of bad harvests in the Odessa hinterland in the late 1850s brought slimmer profit margins to grain exports. Competition from other production regions, such as Rumania, America and India, added to the diminishing returns of the old exporting mercantile houses. The big Greek merchant houses of Odessa were thus gradually replaced by a great number of Jewish brokers, speculators, agents, commissioners who were prepared to accept slimmer profits, as well as by some large Jewish firms that specialised in grain exports on a world-wide basis, like Louis Dreyfus of Paris and M.Neufeld of Berlin.54 Moreover, the Azov and Caucasus ports were becoming developed through massive infrastructure projects. The result was that Odessa became less dominant. Indeed, in the last third of the century exports from the neighbouring city of Nicolaieff and the ports of the Azov and Caucasus surpassed those of Odessa. Also, grain exports from the Danube increased incredibly and formed almost half of the exports of the Black Sea region. The Crimean War actually proved a major source of prosperity for a number of

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 69

newcomers in both the Azov and Danube trades. One of the best known cases involved the Vagliano Brothers, the leading company in the Ionian network, based in the Azov. There remained a small number of families from the Chiot network that continued their commercial activities from the newly developed areas of southern Russia, Nicolaieff and the ports of the Azov Sea in collaboration with the Ionians. The second group of factors that contributed to the transition from the Chiot to the Ionian network derived from the technological revolution in world maritime transport and communications: the introduction of steamers and the telegraph. The control of Black Sea trade that the Greeks enjoyed until the Crimean War was based on exclusive market information that enabled speculation on cargoes that took two or three months to reach Britain. Telegraphic and railway communications were installed in the whole of southern Russia in the 1860s and 1870s. The introduction of steam in the Black Sea trade after the Crimean War further facilitated access to western European markets. These economic changes opened the trade to smaller merchants, and facilitated the knowledge and ultimately the unification of world markets. The third group of factors that helped to bring about the withdrawal of a large number of Chiot merchants were internal. First, the first generation of leading figures in Chiot commerce, like the Ralli and Rodoconachi, died in the late 1850s and 1860s. Second, many of the sons and grandsons found it more profitable to invest in real estate in Odessa, Marseilles or London and to become rentiers, or ‘gentlemen of means’. Third, some Chiots invested in the stock exchange and were ruined in the financial crisis of 1858–9. The large number of Chiot names in the membership list of the Baltic Exchange for 1886 suggests that shipbrokerage became the main activity of many of the descendants of the Chiot merchants in London. They probably only followed the trend of the times in the world’s biggest maritime centre. In the last third of the nineteenth century many of the sons of London merchants who were also involved in shipping followed the new profession of the nineteenth century: shipbroking.55 We must not forget that shipownership had also been a new profession in the previous century. As Ralph Davis informs us, ‘only when the Industrial Revolution was changing the scale of English commerce did shipowning become an occupation in its own right; the London shipowner, so described in the directory, does not appear until 1815’.56 Before concluding this chapter, it is worth noting that the co-existence of shipping and trading was not unique to the Greeks in the nineteenth century. In Norway, for example, ‘most men who provided the investment capital for the shipping industry were in fact merchants, and most used the vessels that they purchased to carry goods on their own accounts to traditional Norwegian markets in the Baltic, North Sea and Mediterranean in the mid–1860s’.57 In the AngloAustralian trade in the 1840s Brooks, a merchant and shipowner in London, owned a fleet of sailing vessels trading on his own account.58 Research on the shipping industry of Atlantic Canada has also shown that the combination of

70 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

merchanting and shipowning was prevalent in shipping there.59 Like many members of the Chiot network, Canadian merchants and shipowners, instead of investing in steam and specialising in shipowning, diverted funds to land-based investments; in this way the Canadian fleet declined. The organisation and structure of shipping firms based on kinship and common origin is also not a unique Greek feature. In Atlantic Canada, the major Halifax shipowners, who were also the towns major merchants, formed ‘a mercantile elite with interlocking family and business connec tions. Of the twenty-nine major owners before mid-[nineteenth] century, fifteen were members of six families’60 And, ‘the merchant family remained the dominant form of [ship]ownership in the major ports of the Maritimes until the end of the nineteenth century’.61 Equally, family and common port of origin played an important role in the structure of Norwegian shipping until the beginning of the twentieth century.62 What is probably unique in Greek shipping is that these characteristics continued to be prevalent throughout the current century.

3 GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL NETWORKS THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s– 1900s

By the 1870s the dwindling of the Chiot network and its replacement by Ionian shipowners and merchants was evident. The archival material presents us with new names, new shipowners and merchants, the largest number of whom came from the Ionian islands. The Ionian network lasted from the 1870s to the beginning of the 1900s and covered the transitional period not only from sail to steam but also from a combined profession to specialisation. By the beginning of the twentieth century the final exodus from commercial activities and a specialisation in shipowning was evident. The most successful shipowning families of the twentieth century were directly linked with the Ionian network. Three main characteristics differentiated the Ionian from the Chiot network. Most members of the Ionian network were of maritime origin; most were shipowners who combined this with commerce when possible. Second, the Ionian merchant/shipowners in the last third of the nineteenth century became even more specialised than the Chiots in the carriage of specific bulk cargoes, like grain and coal. Third, the large number of branches in the Mediterranean was diminished, and members of the Ionian network were concentrated in the Black Sea ports, Constantinople, Marseilles and London. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will analyse the structure and development of the shipowners and merchants of the Ionian network; the second their organisation and business methods; and the last their influence on the transition from sail to steam in the Greek-owned fleet. THE IONIAN NETWORK The Ionian network comprised about 140 families, half of which were Ionian. Although there were Greeks from other islands and areas that were part of the network (as was the case with the Chiots), we call it ‘Ionian’ since it was mainly Ionian families—and more specifically Cephalonians and Ithacans—that were the most powerful members. Figure 3.1 shows clearly the establishment of the network along the Black Sea and in the western European ports. The bulk of the families were in the Danubian ports of Braila, Galatz and Sulina: their members formed at least seventy-five shipowning and commercial companies as well as

72 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Figure 3.1 The Ionian commercial and maritime network, 1870s–1900s. Number of families at the port-cities of the network

shipping agencies. While there were numerous small shipping companies (see Appendix 3.3), we will concentrate on the main ones. Besides the Danube, the Ionian network was also strong in the cities of southern Russia. Three geographic groups may be distinguished: the most popular comprised the ports of the Sea of Azov, where thirty families were found in Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don, Berdiansk, Yeisk and Kertch. The second included Nicolaieff and Odessa (ten families), while the last comprised Caucasus ports, Novorossisk and Batum, with six families (see Figure 3.1 and Appendix 3.1). The third area of concentration (another ten families) was the largest economic centre of the eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople. The newly emerging port of Piraeus, used as a fuelling and supply station at the end of the nineteenth century, also attracted ever-increasing numbers of network families. In western Europe, the branch offices of twenty-seven families were concentrated in Marseilles and thirty-six in London. In the rest of this section we will analyse the structure and the development of the merchant/shipowners of the Ionian network in each of the areas in which they worked and prospered. The Danubian Principalities received a great number of Ionians after the Crimean War, particularly from the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca. These Ionians adjusted to conditions on the Danube and created a closed shipping and commercial network, which they controlled for most of the nineteenth century. The Principalities, which gained their independence as Rumania in 1878, were the second largest grain exporter after Russia, exporting 30–40 per cent of total grain

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 73

exports from the Black Sea during the period 1830–1914 (see Table 1.2). Major transformations took place after the Crimean War which accelerated the area’s participation in international trade and shipping. The European Commission of the Danube was formed in 1857 by Austro-Hungary, Prussia, the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, Sardinia, Italy and Russia. Its purpose was to police and regulate navigation and implement badly needed engineering works to make the river accessible to larger vessels. After a vessel entered the rivers mouth at Sulina, navigation presented many difficulties because of varying water depth, the narrowness of the channel, and the many curves, all of which contributed to groundings and collisions. The problem persisted even after the deepening of the channel by the Commission. The great navigational difficulties that the Danube presented to foreign masters were not limited to natural obstacles. Before the establishment of the European Commission, pilots, lightermen and others charged non-Greeks exorbitant sums of money in order to ‘save’ them. Mr Jackson, Acting British Vice-Consul at Sulina, rather aggressively reported that: [Before the Crimean War] British shipping and that of all the other flags of northern Europe were of course considered fair prizes by this piratical set [pilots, lightermen, ship chandlers, port officials] and pillaged accordingly the lightermen even frequently withholding a portion of their cargoes…and it was the Greek and Turkish vessels which stood any chance of moderately fair play, as they knew the tricks of their countrymen, were better acquainted with the intricacies of the navigation of the river, could speak the language of the country, and in case of necessity, were known to be as ready to defend their interest, knife in hand, as their compatriots were to prejudice them.1 Sulina, despite being merely a transit port, proved to be one of the most important ports in the Black Sea. The bar at Sulina, and navigational difficulties thereafter, forced large vessels to load there, while their cargoes were sent down from Galatz and Braila, mostly in iron lighters called schleps. The volume of cargoes lightered in relation to the total volume of cargoes carried by sea-going vessels between 1882 and 1902 was 6–13 percent.2 The nature of the Danubian grain trade meant that Ionians had to Table 3.1 River fleet of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895 and 1900 1895

1900

Schleps No

Tugs Carrying No capacity (in tons)

A. Total flee

Schleps Horsepo wer

No

Tugs Carrying No capacity (in tons)

Horsepo wer

74 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

1895

1900

Schleps No

Tugs Carrying No capacity (in tons)

Schleps Horsepo wer

No

Tugs Carrying No capacity (in tons)

Horsepo wer

455 354,217 88 4,043 502 413,579 77 16,296 B. Greek-owned fleet 306 254,315 46 2,230 271 198,760 31 5,226 (B)/(A) Participation of Greek-owned fleet 67% 72% 52% 55% 54% 48% 40% 32% Source: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks on the River-traffic of the Lower Danube, Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975. The statistics are based on L’Annuaire du Danube, 1894–5 and 1902–3.

combine merchanting and shipowning to succeed. As Table 3.1 indicates the Ionians owned 72 per cent of the total carrying capacity of the schleps, and 55 per cent of the steam tugs on the Danube in 1895. The Ionian element was nowhere as prominent as on the Rumanian Danube. As Table 3.2 clearly shows, the term ‘Ionian’ was here virtually synonymous with ‘Cephalonian’ and ‘Ithacan’. Despite a decrease of their participation in schleps in 1900 (Table 3.2), even in 1901 83 per cent of the pilots on the river were Greek (Table 3.3). They virtually controlled the traffic of the Danube. ‘The “River”,’ wrote Spyridon Fokas, ‘had for the Greeks the same value that the cultivated “land” had for the Rumanian farmer.’3 Most of the owners of the schleps were prominent grain merchants, owners of sea-going vessels, shipping agents and industrialists. The Greeks were engaged in a wide range of activities in the area. But after 1895, Table 3.2 Origin of shipowners of the riverboats of the Rumanian Danube in 1900 Place of origin Number of shipowners

%

Number of schleps

%

Number of tugs %

A. Ionians 114 Cephalonians 93 Ithacans 21 B. Others 81 Total 195 Source: See Table 3.1

58 47 11 42 100

233 159 74 38 271

86 59 27 14 100

28 20 8 3 31

90 64 26 10 100

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 75

Table 3.3 Corp of pilots of the Danube in 1901 Nationality

Number

Greek Rumanian Other Total Source: See Table 3.1

73 7 8 88

83 8 9 100

largely for political reasons, they started leaving and moved to Piraeus and London, from where they continued as prominent shipowners in the twentieth century. The ten biggest owners of schleps on the Danube were Stathatos Brothers, Stathatos Othon, Theophilatos Brothers, Theophilatos Jean & Sons, Chryssoveloni Brothers, Kouklelis & Michaelides, A.P. Maroulis, A.Embiricos, X.Karuso, G.A.Karavias (see Table 3.4). These ten owned 36 per cent of the schleps and 43 per cent of the carrying capacity of the Greek-owned river fleet. The Ionians competed with the British for Danubian trade. In 1885 Fairplay reported on their monopolistic tendencies: Table 3.4 The ten biggest owners of riverboats on the Danube in 1895 Shipown

Number of schleps

Carrying capacity (in tons*)

Tugs

No

HP

Origin

1. Stathatos Bros 2. Theofilatos Bros 3. Stathatos Othon 4. Theofilatos J. 5. Chryssovelo ni Bros 6. Kouklelis & Michaelides 7. Maroulis A.P. 8. Karavias A.G.

22

20,775

3

165

Ithaca

15

15,172

2

160

Ithaca

13

14,100

3

170

Ithaca

13

13,525

2

160

Ithaca

14

11,475

3

200

Chios

9

7,800

1

50

Cephalonia

7

7,725

1

40

Cephalonia

6

6,480

1

70

Santorini

76 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Shipown

Number of schleps

Carrying capacity (in tons*)

No

HP

Origin

Tugs

9. Karouso 6 6,375 2 190 Cephalonia X. 10. Karavias 5 5,725 2 115 Santorini A. Ten 110 109,152 biggest owners B. Total 306 254,315 Greek fleet (B)/(A) 36% 43% Source: Appendix 3.3 Note: * S.Fokas states that in the original statistics the volume of the boats is given in Braila kilos (= kilo Braila), which are equivalent to ½ of a ton, when 1 ton = 1, 000 kilos. In this way, 1 ton=2 Braila kilos

How shipowners are protected (?) by their agents at Sulina…will appear from the following remarkable document, which we publish for the benefit of shipowners trading to the Sulina mouth of the Danube. Through the operation of this arrangement, the cost of loading grain cargoes at Sulina has been greatly increased. The measure of this increase can be guessed at when it is added that the stevedoring charge on grain exceeds three times what it is in the adjoining Port of Odessa: CONTRACT…. Between the undersigned Messrs. Stathatos Brothers, Watson and Youell, Foscolo and Largologo, K.Wright, Giaccomo and Pilarino, G.Juglessi, E.Loria, Agent to Mendl’s Commercial House; N.Zifa, Agent to Sechiari Brothers’ Commercial House; S.Draculi, G.Marato, S.Carvuni, and the Stevedores’ Company, which is composed of Giovanni Narulli, Dionisio Canulli, Pietro Callinico, G.Dorisa, Athanasio Tambisigo, Constantin Narulli, Andrea Austriaco Buro, it is agreed as much as follows: 1. The above-mentioned parties create an Association whose object it will be to undertake the loading of any steamer that is to take cargo in this port of Sulina. 2. The members of the Association, instead of working separately, will work for the general benefit of the whole Association, and in conformity with the following tariff established in one accord. 3. For steamers loading in the port at the rate of one penny per quarter from the 1st of May, N.S., to the 31st of August, N.S., but at the rate of one penny and a farthing per quarter from the 1st of September, N.S., till the 31st of April, N.S., for the whole of the cargo, according to the Bill of

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 77

Lading. For filling bags, an extra pay of five pounds sterling per every one thousand bags during the months of May, June, July and August, and of six pounds sterling per thousand bags during the other eight months of the year. For each day’s work in the Roads an extra of three pounds sterling, and of four pounds sterling for the winter months. 4. On the completion of the loading of each steamer, an orderly account will be made out, and the expenses being deducted the profit accrued from it must go at once into the cash-box of the Association, accompanied by a copy of the account, signed by the captain of the steamer…. 9. The profits which the business will bring to the Association will be divided amongst its members as follows: Stathatos Bros will take 11½ percent; Watson and Youell 11½ per cent; H.Wright, 11½ per cent; Foscolo and Largologo, 11½ per cent; Giacommo and Table 3.5 Tonnage of ships leaving the Danube (in NRT) Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1847 – 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1865 1866 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886

171,017

22,614

298,975

203,885** 163,636** 106,763** 111,170** 118,696** 202,772 175,754 158,332 195,626 135,264 123,783 128,374 145,459 37,617 147,115 231,256 194,828 163,130 138,714 122,308 113,809 151,543 135,600

25,957 23,419 35,497 52,736 64,155 82,679 178,858 148,089 217,152 216,845 259,750 452,414 119,702 417,796 412,706 332,258 498,994 608,443 549,942 448,990 584,525 623,470

329,896 334,063 272,063 331,055 369,039 442,229 427,419 549,720 498,290 533,659 514,519 521,735 748,363 184,417 700,163 797,554 658,063 793,454 903,063 831,486 697,686 895,824 950,567

78 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1887 155,081 796,360 ,203,683 1888 163,827 947,533 ,332,907 1889 206,632 1,000,773 ,473,345 1890 246,585 983,862 ,539,445 1891 244,168 990,935 ,512,030 1892 275,566 866,758 ,427,087 1893 312,291 1,287,762 1,893,506 1894 318,600 1,034,097 1,619,703 1895 352,178 906,043 1,554,698 1896 318,522 1,097,737 1,770,544 1897 80,853** 854,585 1,397,917 1898 213,443** 694,773 1,476,119 1899 167,964** 446,170 1,070,367 1900 256,128** 458,921 1,252,509 1901 324,965** 804,304 1,830,002 1902 471,208** 1,109,328 2,302,980 1903 561,927** 759,605 2,042,994 1904 404,516** 498,477 1,447,054 1905 404,208** 705,240 1,756,243 1906 507,959** 982,611 2,275,812 1907 494,687** 1,014,869 2,205,061 1908 395,699** 647,863 1,607,627 1909 309,482** 548,235 1,474,933 1910 359,060** 1,039,493 2,274,493 – 1912 558,311** 548,217 1,786,713 Average participation 1841–50 57% 8% 100% 1851–60 43% 8% 100% 1861–70 43% 17% 100% 1871–80 26% 48% 100% 1881–90 15% 66% 100% 1891– 17% 58% 100% 1900 1901–12 22% 43% 100% Sources: See Table 1.2 Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 79

Pilarino 10 per cent; E.Loria, 7 per cent; Nicola Ziffa, 7 percent; Spiro Draculi, 3 percent; G.Juglessi, 5 per cent; G.Marato, 1 percent; S.Carvuni 1 percent; the Stevedores’ Company 20 per cent…. 11. The Association appoints and recognises as its cashier and secretary Mr G.Juglessi…. 13. The Association will not acknowledge any other expenses for each steamer, except the pay of the labourers employed in the loading, a remuneration to the captain of 10 per cent, upon the whole amount of the account, and fifty francs to the foreman…. 17. All partners in general bind themselves to persecute, by all means they can dispose of, any stranger who does not belong to the Association, as also any new stevedore who might attempt to do business same as the Association. 18. If by chance it might be discovered that any of the partners protects a stranger, or a new stevedore, he will be subjected to a fine of 1,000 francs; besides, in case of a relapse he will lose all the money which up to that time he will have deposited as a guarantee [consisting of 2,500 francs]…. 33. The Association leaves to Mr S.Draculi the right to do ship chandlering only for the Scandinavian steamers, which are not sought after by the Association.4 The involvement of the Greek-owned fleet in the carriage of deep-sea trade from the Danube is indicated in Table 3.5. Before the 1860s about half of all tonnage leaving the Danube was Greek-owned, but in the 1870s, due to competition from British steamers, this percentage declined to a quarter. The worst decline was in the 1880s and 1890s, the period of the transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet; this was also the peak of British participation in Danubian trade. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Greek share again increased, while the British declined. The Greek decline in Danubian trade, as well as a similar trend in Black Sea commerce (see Chapter 1), is somewhat misleading because of the large number of liners that made repeated calls at the various ports. In fact, the actual amount of Greek tonnage leaving the river more than doubled between 1871 and 1895 and quadrupled by 1912. The biggest owners of schleps (see Table 3.4), who were also owners of deep-sea sailing ships, gradually bought steamers beginning in the 1880s (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Appendices 4.9–4.14). Greek maritime activities on the Danube provided experience for the transition from merchant/shipowner to shipowner. It was in Sulina, Galatz and Braila that

80 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

the new profession of ‘shipping agent’ emerged. The European Commission of the Danube forced every vessel trading on the river to provide official papers showing its registered tons, cargoes and crew, and to pay port, entrance and cargo dues. Since all the paper work needed to be done in French, English or Italian, a new breed of shipping agents emerged who gradually expanded their activities in chartering and shipowning. The second area that attracted the members of the Ionian network was the Sea of Azov, an area ‘inherited’ from the Chiot network. A significant number of the remaining Chiot families were integrated within the Ionian network here, especially by intermarriage with the most powerful Ionian family, the Vaglianos from Cephalonia (see Appendix 3.2). The ports of the Azov were the most important export district of southern Russia after the Crimean War, providing 40– 50 per cent of total southern Russian exports and competing in importance with the ports of Odessa and Nicolaieff.5 The dominant export, especially after the Crimean War, was grain; imports formed a comparatively unimportant part of total trade. Greek wines, oil, dried fruit and tobacco were the principal articles always available for sale. Taganrog, the foremost port on the Azov, developed slowly during most of the nineteenth century, but in the 1880s and 1890s the astonishing growth of its neighbouring port, Rostov-on-Don, prevented a larger and more spectacular development. The shallow waters of the Azov, the navigational difficulties and inadequacies of its ports, the long delays caused by the required quarantine for all the ports at Kertch, and the bar across the Kertch Straits at Yenikale all contributed to higher freight and insurance rates and consequently to slower growth than in Odessa before the Crimean War. Thereafter, the quarantine at Kertch was abolished, the narrow channel Table 3.6 List of the principal Greek exporters in the Azov, in 1886 Ports

Exporters

Taganrog

M.Vagliano* Scaramanga, Manousir & Co J.A.Scaramanga Scanavi & Scaramanga Diamantidis & Sons D.A.Negroponte G.Stagno S.J.B.Mav P.Papageorgacopulos A.D.Mussuri A.Crendiropulo C.Beltzo N.Papastamatiadi

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 81

Ports

Exporters

F.Svorono E.N.Mavrogordato N.A.Scanavi P.Petrocochino J.E.Scaramanga Ziffo Brothers S.Sevastopulo G.L.Ziffo & Co George Livas Berdiansk G.Cuppa H.Cuppa Curi Bros N.Ambanopoulo Source: ‘Report by Consul Wagstaff on the Navigation and Trade at the Ports of the Sea of Azov for the Year 1886’, British Parliamentary Papers, vols. LXXXVLXXXVI, Russia, p. 535 Note: *Also in Rostov-on-Don Rostov-on-Don

was widened and eventually dredged to give twenty-four feet of water across the bar and to open the Azov to large steamers. In the late 1860s and 1870s, a railway connection was constructed, and banks were established. Still, there were numerous difficulties to be faced on the Azov. Taganrog, which provided two-thirds of all exports, was so situated that all vessels had to load in the roads, thirty miles from the town (and in the case of large steamers, some fifty miles away). Before the introduction of steam tugs in the 1870s, this caused many difficulties for masters and crews, who were obliged to travel to Taganrog on boats, sometimes travelling two or even three nights. The men often had to remain in an open boat for Table 3.7 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Azov Sea, Taganrog, Kertch, Berdiansk, Mariupol (in NRT) Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848

55,628 48,740 50,535 77,536 75,343 73,016 111,806 71,383

5,141 14,749 14,806 21,447 24,955 26,358 63,736 42,676

101,573 129,541 115,207 166,550 146,436 143,062 307,410 145,165

82 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1849 1850 1851 1852 — 1857 1858 1859 — 1876 — 1879 1880 1881 1882 — 1888 — 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 — 1907 1908 1909 Average participation 1841–50 1851–60 1861–70

55,103

14,687

96,585

148,180 285,065

35,626 115,773

268,284 621,429

97,803 90,610 132,056

47,821 42,026 66,107

238,560 223,518 351,057

117,654

110,101

354,052

132,946

132,946

411,429

101,764 140,824

156,840 387,265

322,433 594,865

204,285

700,879

1,081,314

161,487

450,942

768,065

265,527 266,144 240,963 263,033 87,411* 258,395* 317,104* 348,684* 357,640* 367,559* 494,826*

522,901 744,526 777,331 612,667 587,530 525,858

966,393 1,183,650 1,210,327 1,100,170 1,208,819 976,216

402,406

1,076,738

403,779 497,875

1,094,852 1,332,119

313,408* 340,875* 599, 729

385,126 428,307 671,161

964,926 963,020 1,599,318

46% 44% –

17% 18% –

100% 100%

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 83

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1871–80 33% 32% 100% 1881–90 22% 62% 100% 1891–1900 26% 54% 100% 1901–9 42% 40% 100% Sources: See Table 1.2 Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

days while the master settled his business. Consul Carruthers, however, found that this inconvenience had positive aspects, since’ [shipmasters and crews] are confined more strictly to their duties instead of wandering about the town…and thus preventing them running into mischief’.6 At Mariupol vessels had to anchor at a distance of six miles, and at Berdiansk and Kertch five miles, so transshipment losses were high. All cargoes had to be transferred to lighters and then transferred to the vessel; when crossing the bar of the Kertch Straits, a portion of the cargo had to be trans-shipped a third time. The losses incurred were estimated at 1 per cent of the value of each outward cargo from the Azov.7 Many cases of theft were also reported. The Greeks, as on the Danube, controlled the trade of the Azov during the entire century. The similarities of the two not only gave them expertise but also the possibility of establishing a ‘rotation’ system between the two areas. In 1851– 2, they handled 80–90 per cent of the exports and more than half for the period after 1880 (see Chapter 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that a large share of tonnage leaving the Azov was Greek-owned. Before the 1870s almost half of the tonnage clearing Azov ports was Greek-owned. In the 1870s, despite the rise of British shipping, Greeks still controlled one-third of all tonnage clearing the Azov (Table 3.7). As was the case on the Danube, in the 1880s and 1890s their participation decreased to a quarter, due to the rise of British vessels, but the Greeks again controlled more than one-third in the first decade of the twentieth century. The port that was most important to the Chiot network was Odessa. After its decline the Greek merchant houses there were partially replaced by a great number of Jewish brokers, speculators, merchants, agents, and firms, such as Louis Dreyfus of Paris and M.Neufeld of Berlin.8 After the Crimean War Nicolaieff became the fastest growing port in the area and attracted a small number of Greek families. The Chiots, Rodocanachi and Sevastopulo; the Cephalonians, Lykiardopulo, Caridia and Dandria; and the Mavros all established themselves in Nicolaieff (see Table 3.8). By 1882 these merchants were responsible for half of the exports of the city. Yet the decrease of the Greek role in this area is evident from Table 3.9. Before the 1870s Greek-owned ships carried one-third of exports, a share that plummeted to 2–4 per cent after 1870. The same pattern observed in the Danube

84 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

and on the Azov was also found here: British participation in the trade peaked in the 1880s and 1890s. In the first decade of the twentieth century there was a substantial decrease in British shipping and a small increase in Greek. Data from the Sémaphore de Marseilles and the London Customs Bills of Entry indicate that the Greek merchants that continued to trade in the region chartered ships of various nationalities— and very seldom Greek craft. Moreover, the last third of the nineteenth Table 3.8 Exports of the commercial houses at Nicolaieff Commercial house

Quantity (chetwerts)

A.GREEK 705,438 A.Z.Caridia 255,739 Mavro fils & co 220,361 Th.P.Rodocanac 88,027 G.Lykiardopulo 42,216 Lykiardopulo Bros 38,332 E.Sevastopulo 33,964 N.S.Serbos 13,882 Dandria Bros 12,917 B.OTHERS 734,692 C.TOTAL 1,440,130 Participation of Greek merchants in total exports: 49% Source: British Parliamentary Papers, vols. LXXIII–LXXIV, 1883, Russia, Report by Vice Consul Wagstaff on the trade and commerce of Nicolaieff for the year 1882

century marked a period of economic decline for the port that had once been the ‘queen’ of Black Sea commerce.9 Rather than fight a losing battle, the Ionians opted instead for the most dynamic areas of the period, the Danube, Azov and the Caucasus coast. The growing commercial importance of ports in the eastern Black Sea Table 3.9 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia (in NRT) Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835

7,081 49,788 40,261 48,300 29,334 38,901

23,070 13,398 12,189 23,783 12,039 19,001

232,008 112,098 146,491 157,736 73,186 98,020

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 85

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853

42,764 43,516

28,342 37,038

189,476 192,279

38,171 40,762 36,607 45,434 49,150 90,814 127,844 122,351 81,658 80,985 69,741 71,679 76,202 127,414

52,559 31,673 44,929 45,483 47,372 33,848 54,370 67,621 81,403 60,800 37,932 38,834 71,823 62,126

175,491 130,391 141,283 201,325 247,673 297,980 351,738 434,010 277,610 238,779 223,075 203,842 337,325 487,357

1857

85,788

49,822

246,704

1872

26,178

323,073

678,412

1875

20,863

232,049

864,924

1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891

60,606 49,738

788,898 475,542

1,413,475 991,704

32,534 14,294

678, 41 1,127,504

1,284,094 1,571,334

37,801

1,139,264

1,781,675

42,081 32,759 32,096 28,408 39,288

1,566,348 1,622,550 1,291,040 1,227,400 1,186,357

2,183,376 2,340,312 2,039,880 1,960,389 1,997,047

86 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898

53,870 47,734 59,599 99,348 55,771** 37,983**

825,170 1,339,030 1,971,681 1,608,693 1,374,772 1,580,355

1,484,914 2,099,676 2,741,627 2,547,596 2,375,828 2,436,318

1901 134,052** 916,919 1,993,419 1902 195,548** 1,156,517 2,433,713 Average participation 1830–40 25% 16% 100% 1841–50 29% 20% 100% 1851–60 22% 17% 100% 1861–70 – – 1871–80 4% 46% 100% 1881–90 2% 66% 100% 1891–1900 3% 63% 100% 1901–2 7% 47% 100% Sources: See Table 1.2 Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

in the 1880s and 1890s was spectacular. From nothing in the 1880s, by 1900 they accounted for 38 per cent of the tonnage leaving all southern Russian ports. The development of these ports enabled exports of the rich mineral resources of the Caucasus. The desire of the Russian government to develop this part of the country was realised with the construction of basic infrastructure: ports, quays and the opening of the Trans-Caucasian railway in 1883. The first port to achieve some importance was Poti. But this was short-lived, for it soon lost its predominance because of unsafe port conditions and the acquisition of Batum from the Turks in 1878. In the 1880s and 1890s Novorossisk became the main outlet of the northern Caucasus, exporting grain, petroleum and cement. The steady growth of this new port caused a considerable reduction in the amount shipped from Taganrog. In winter, when the Azov was frozen, Novorossisk was accessible to shipping and grain held in Rostov-on-Don could leave from there. Batum drew the government’s particular attention by rapidly constructing a maritime infrastructure and becoming the most important port in the Transcaucasus. Its importance lay in the fact that it had the safest harbour along the coast from Kertch to Sinope. Its growth was almost exclusively due to the

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 87

increasing export of petroleum from Baku. The annual production of petroleum increased from 500,000 barrels in 1873 to 3–4 million barrels in the early 1880s.10 Illuminating, heating and lubricating oils occupied the largest part of the trade. By 1892 kerosene was exported to India, China, Japan and other eastern ports, thus giving Greek ships entry onto these routes. Greek exporters were also important in this part of the Black Sea. In Novorossisk, the British Consul reported that in 1888 three out of the eight principal exporters were Greek: Scaramanga, Vagliano and Sevastopulo (see Table 3.10). The most important Greek oil exporters and shipowners trading at Batum were Siderides and Arvanitides. These two were established in Table 3.10 List of principal exporters in Novorossisk Greek

Other

J.Scaramanga Vagliano Sevastopulo

L.Dreyfus J.Dreyfus Bros Waller Bros Yeames Cherutti Lampe & Muller Source: Information supplied by Mr Thomas Sterne at Novorossisk included in the Report of Consul-General Th. Sandwith on the trade and shipping of Odessa and the rest of South Russian ports for the year 1888, British Parliamentary Papers, vols LXXX–LXXXI, 1889, Russia, p. 294

Table 3.11 Tonnage of ships clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea, Batum, Poti, Novorossisk (in NRT) Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1872 1873 – 1876 – 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894

3,132 4,696

3,830 7,511

85,838 107,858

9,546

8,458

65,938

42,814 63,131 90,820 75,586 79,175 19,145 122,988

173,707 240,848 322,149 591,326 406,634 479,367 685,393

667,463 592,369 725,325 1,149,176 920,498 1,179,304 2,082,942

88 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1895 121,581 854,734 2,237,872 1896 119,945 754,566 2,292,846 1897 58,776** 639,363 1,267,590 1899 76,135** 825,618 1,453,605 1900 117,955** 839,579 1,524,559 Average participation 1871–80 7% 8% 100% 1881–90 9% 42% 100% 1891–1900 6% 42% 100% Sources: See Table 1.2 Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

Constantinople, from where they financed a large number of Greek purchases of steamships. Chrussaki, who appears as a shipowner in the 1890 Lloyd’s Register, owned one of the three factories in the Caucasus making licorice, most of which was shipped from Batum to the US.11 Greek shipping participated in 6–10 per cent of total tonnage clearing the eastern ports in the 1880s and 1890s, while the British controlled about 40 per cent (see Table 3.11). After the 1880s, Batum was included in a large number of lines that called at the main ports of the northeastern Mediterranean. These were owned by big steamship companies that usually carried general cargo, and their presence thus blurs the picture as to the share of bulk cargoes carried from the port by Greeks* We cannot close an examination of the Ionian presence in the Black Sea without referring to the south-western ports. Bulgaria became an autonomous principality in 1878 and was united with eastern Rumelia, becoming an independent state in 1885. Thereafter its trade increased substantially. The wealth of this area depended almost entirely on cereals; Table 3.12 Tonnage of ships clearing the south-western ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Burghaz (in NRT) Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

1868 – 1886 – 1888 – 1890 1891

38,729

15,422

202,482

21,060

49,100

336,515

98,609

36,035

375,672

132,751 128,830

69,933 105,232

458,183 513,750

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 89

Year

Greek-owned*

British

Total

– 1894 215,918 178,001 638,979 1895 184,558 171,450 734,539 1896 115,442 230,955 815,972 – 1899 37,685** 133,984 782,141 1900 48,544* 77,744 560,445 1901 87,992* 148,159 880,469 – 1903 257,671* 269,296 1,786,580 1904 229,005* 273,994 1,639,468 1905 196,260* 210,764 1,342,832 1906 127,438* 194,060 1,300,003 1907 152,300* 221,109 1,535,934 1908 155,060* 171,944 1,258,983 1909 166,494* 204,973 1,592,320 1910 166,401* 202,834 2,022,318 Average participation 1881–90 16% 13% 100% 1891–1900 18% 22% 100% 1901–10 12% 14% 100% Sources: See table 1.2 Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only

Anchialo salt was the only other significant product. Grain exports increased about seven-fold within ten years, from 3 per cent of total Black Sea grain exports in 1885 to 7 per cent by 1894 (Table 1.6). Imports consisted largely of colonial and manufactured goods. In the 1880s a sixth of the total tonnage clearing Varna and Burghaz was Greek-owned. This increased to 25 per cent in the 1890s, enabling Greek shipowners to maintain a lead over the British (Table 3.12). When a substantial part of the Greek-flag fleet left the region in the first decade of the twentieth century, average Greek participation decreased to 15 per cent. Although we have little evidence on members of the Ionian network in the Bulgarian ports, we do know that some trade was carried by members of the network. Steamers of the Courtgi Company, based in Constantinople and using the Ottoman flag, carried the mails and some cargo between Constantinople, Burghaz, Varna and Kustendjie. The Vaglianos reportedly loaded grain in Varna and Burghaz in 1885.12

90 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

It is also very little known that the Greeks along the coast from Bosporus to Kustendjie (Constanza), renowned for their seafaring tradition, owned sailing vessels that carried the coastal trade of the Black Sea. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping in 1895 revealed this side of Greek-owned shipping along the southwestern coast of the Black Sea. Agathoupoli, Vassiliko, Sozopoli and Anchialo had a combined fleet of thirty sailing vessels of about 20,000 NRT in 1890. The local merchants handling grain exports were apparently also Greek.13 Constantinople comes after the Black Sea ports as the next most important nexus of the network. Of the ten companies in Constantinople that belonged to the Ionian network, two categories can be distinguished: the shipping agent/ shipowners and the merchant/bankers. In the first category belong Foscolo, Mango, Valsamachi, Evangelatos, Dandria, Destounis, Courtgis and Michalinos, and in the second, Zarifis, Arvanitides and Siderides. Constantinople remained a necessary stop for ships entering and leaving the Black Sea in order for masters to get instructions from their offices, money, coal and other supplies. A new profession, the shipping agent, flourished in Constantinople and the most successful also became shipowners. The heavy Greek involvement in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean meant that they carried 12–19 per cent of the maritime commerce of this great port during the 1870s and early 1880s. There was a decrease in the 1890s to 7–8 per cent, and then a doubling of Greek participation in the first decade of the twentieth century (see Table 3.13). The second category that we distinguish in Constantinople comprised three families: the Zarifis, merchants and bankers, and the Siderides and Arvanitides, merchants who imported oil from Batum. All three through their mercantile activities were also shipowners and ultimately financiers to a significant number of Greek sailing shipowners we will analyse in the last section of this chapter. Marseilles and London constituted the two main ends of the Ionian network in western Europe. The position of Greek merchants and shipowners in Marseilles remained steady until the eve of the First World War. Figure 1.3 clearly shows that Greek merchants and shipowners handled more than half of the city’s bulk trade from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea between 1870 and 1910. In 1870, Greeks were responsible for 60 per cent and in 1880, 56 per cent, of the bulk maritime commerce. There was a decrease to 34 per cent in 1890, but by 1900 the Greeks had almost recovered their position (48 per cent). By 1910, however, Greeks had captured 59 per cent of the commerce. There were twenty-eight Greek Table 3.13 Tonnage of ships clearing Constantinople (in NRT) Year

Greek

%

British

Total

1873 1874 1875 1876

445 482.1 775.8 507.1

12 13 19 12

1,245.3 1,466.6 1,350.7 1,852.1

3,576.4 3,825.3 4,137 4,380.2

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 91

Year

Greek

%

British

Total

1877 275.8 15 687 1,851.7 1878 102.3 6 467.9 1,806.2 – 1881 530 11 2,578 5,010.1 1882 691.4 12 3,170.9 5,857.4 1885 3,649.2 1887 4,907.2 6,465.7 1888 6,903.5 8,689 1890 6,349.1 9,996.5 1891 5,620.9 9,346.2 1892 4,342.4 7,899.3 1893 877.2 8 6,481.8 11,081.2 1894 927 7 8,363.2 12,681.3 1895 1,001.5 8 7,738.5 12,257.9 1896 1,012.1 9 6,999.4 11,835.3 1897 435.4 4 6,505.1 10,867.4 1898 1,176.8 5,518.3 1899 1,236.3 14 4,256.6 9,033.5 1900 1,535.7 16 4,343.9 9,821.1 1901 1,714 5,640.8 1902 2,023.6 7,476.3 1903 2,525.6 15 8,096.4 16,340 1904 2,354.1 7,291.3 1905 2,595 6,796.6 Source: R.Folin, ‘Ports et Navigation en Mediterranée. Essai Statistique 1870–1905’, Navigations Méditerranéennes au XIXe siècle, vol. 1, Cahier no 9. Institut de Recherches Méditerranéennes, Université de Provence, 1987

families in Marseilles, one-third of whom were Ionian: Vagliano, Couppa, Cicellis, Corgialegno, Pana, Romano, Miliotti, Dellaporta and Lazarachi (see Figure 3.1 and Appendix 3.1). Table 3.14 shows in detail the main merchant/ shipowners in the city.14 A comparison between Tables 2.3 and 3.14 shows clearly the transformation of the network at Marseilles. The indisputable masters of the 1870s and 1880s were the Vaglianos, who replaced the Rallis as the leaders of the network. The main Greek merchants of the previous period—Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, Zizinia Brothers and Dromocaiti—disappeared from the scene and were replaced by Scaramanga (who inherited part of the south Russian trade from the Rallis) and Spartali, both of whom first appeared as minor merchants in the 1860s. The only Chiot firm that remained strong was Rodocanachi. In 1870 there was still a

92 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

mixture of the two networks, but after 1880 very few of the old Chiot merchants remained active. The transformation of seaborne trade with the advent of steam meant that by 1900 consignees were no longer mentioned in either the Sémaphore de Marseilles or the London Customs Bills of Entry. This makes it difficult to carry the analysis past this date. English ports were the other recipients of grain from the Black Sea and of cotton from the south-eastern Mediterranean. There were thirty-six Greek families in London (see Figure 3.1), of which only one, the Vaglianos, had a shipping office for more than thirty years when, at the end of the 1890s, S.G.Embiricos and Michalinos opened offices. The Vagliano shipping office in the last third of the nineteenth century kept the monopoly among the network not only as the main Black Sea merchant house but also as the main shipping office for sales and purchase, chartering and financing. London, however, was the one place where the traces of the old Chiot network were left: the long list of Chiots who were members of the Baltic Exchange suggests that an important number of the descendants of the Chiot network became the shipbrokers and shipping agents that served the Ionian network. There were also a number of families that traded from London, as Table 3.15 and Appendix 3.1 indicate. The Chiot families that traded with the Black Sea, however, were almost exclusively Rodocanachi, Scaramanga and Sevastopulo, while other merchants in the trade included Spartali, Mavro and Valieri. The remainder of the Chiots and Ionians traded general and bulk cargoes from Alexandria and Constantinople, and currants from Patras. ORGANISATION AND BUSINESS METHODS As was the case with the previous network, the Ionians devised a common business strategy which relied on organisational structure and business methods. The first part had to do with organisation. The same principles which were prevalent in the Chiot network applied to the Ionians. Kinship and common island of origin were again used to keep the ‘club’ closed. Appendix 3.2 provides a rough sketch of first-degree relations of the most powerful families. Thirty of the 120 families of the network were related. Of these the Vaglianos proved the most important and were related to fifteen other network families. The Vaglianos in a way linked the two networks together. Andreas Vagliano, established in Marseilles, married a sister of the Melas family and in turn saw seven of his nine children married to prominent merchant families. Four of his children married into the three prominent Chiot families of Ralli, Negroponte and Petrocochino, and four into the main Azov and Marseilles merchants and shipowners, Couppa,

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 93

Table 3.14 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean at the port of Marseilles (in NRT) Merchant/ shipowner

1870

1880

1890

1900

Ship

Tons

Ships

Tons Ships

Tons Tons

Tons

Vagliano Scaraman ga Couppa

131 81

32,297 25,093

92 44

31,157 19,103

25 12

10,492 13,403

–

–

45

17,474

15

8,425

Zouros Spartali Miliotti Rodocana chi Melas Bros Ambanop oulo Nicolopul o Caramano Corgalegn o Basily & Valieri Zarifi & Zafiropul o Vuccina Serbos Lazarachi Sechiari Salvago Mavrocor dato Sevastopu lo Microulac hi For various merchants

– 74 66 49

– 27,207 21,574 14,808

– 12 – 30

– 3,927 – 15,678

18 – – 9

7,784 – – 5,289

38

10,448

–

–

–

–

36

9,455

25

8,739

–

–

–

–

12

8,539

–

–

7 23

7,962 5,266

7 –

1,670 –

– –

–

22

6,700

17

7,020

3

1,027

17

3,733

3

1,405

4

2,177

– 14 11 11 8 6

– 3,685 3,514 3,160 2,789 2,019

11 7 – – – –

3,521 3,124 – – – –

– – – – – –

– _ – _ – –

2

480

3

651

10

2,443

2

380

1

235

20

7,378

13

4,191

12

14,053

–

–

1910

No information on individual merchants

94 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Merchant/ shipowner

1870

Ship

Tons

Ships

1880

1890

1900

Tons Ships

Tons Tons

Tons

145,917

161

78,739

205,575

203,675

653,507

766

698,588

601,724

878,927

23

21

11

34

23

Total 603 203,185 344 Greek Total 1,503 592,582 990 Marseilles % Greek 44 34 33 Sources: Appendices 1.5–1.9

1910

Mussuri, Ambanopoulo and Zarifi. The Vaglianos were also related to other prominent Cephalonian shipping families, such as Rossolimo, Lykiardopulo, Destouni, Yannoulatos, Phocas, Frangopulo and Cambitsi. As each network had its own particularities stemming from the different traditions of each island, the Ionian network did not prize kinship and marriage as highly as the Chiots, nor did it consider blood relations more important than common island of origin. For the Cephalonian or Ithacan, to be a compatriot was the same as being a relative; in this way, for Azov and Danube shipowners and merchants access to the club was provided by common island of origin. The first main characteristic of the Ionian network that differentiated Table 3.15 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterranean at the ports oF Englan 1870 A.Ionian Vagliano B.Chiots Argenti Agelasto Avierino Nicolopulo Paspatti Sevastoptdo Sechian Ralli Rodocanachi Schilizzi Scanavi Scaramanga

1890

1900

A.Ionian Vagliano Frangopulo

A.Ionian Vagliano Frangopulo

B.Chiots Paspatti Ralli Bros

B.Chiots Scaramanga Rodocanachi C.Others

Rodocanachi Schilizzi Sevastopulo Sechiar Scaramanga C.Others Cassavetti Casdagli Eliadi Eumorphopulo

Eliadi Bulgarides Joannou Protopazzi Vouvalis

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 95

1870 C.Others Cavafy Cassavetti Costi Cristodulo Eustratiadi Georgala Geralopulo lonides Maximo Mavro Mavrojanni Melas Moschoudi Notara Bros Paleologo Psicha Scrini Bros Theologo Tambaco Valieri Vafea Zarifi Cremidi Gerussi Georgacopulo Paparritor Spiropulo A.Greeks 231,330 tons B.Total ports of England 518,439 tons (A)/(B) 45% Sources: Appendices 1.20, 1.22 and 1.23

1890 Eugenides Georgiadi Georgacopulo Ionides Macris Mavro Micrulachi Papazianni Petrides Protopazzi Rigopulo Spiropulo Tamvaco Tezicoglu Valieri Vouvalis Zarifi Zanetto Zecchini

154,968 tons 1,205,547 tons 13%

1900

Ionides

27,667 tons 724,011 tons 4%

them from the Chiots was that most members were of a maritime origin and commerce was a supplementary rather than a primary activity. A more detailed account of the activities of an Ionian and a non-Ionian firm, in this case the Vaglianos and the Embiricos, will give further insight into this and related points. Contrary to the Rallis, the most powerful family in the Chiot network, the Vaglianos, started as typical Greek sailing shipowners did in the late eighteenth

96 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

or the beginning of the nineteenth century: from the start, merchanting was fully combined with shipowning. Indeed, one of the first forms of a Greek trading company was a sailing vessel and its crew. In many cases, the shipowner was also the master; together with the crew and members of his family and friends, he raised a sermagia (capital) and bought a cargo. The vessel would call at a foreign port and sell, buy or barter goods which would in turn be sold in other markets. The profits or losses from such an endeavour would be shared with the people who had originally contributed to the sermagia (see Chapter 4). The eldest brother, Maris Vagliano, left his native Cephalonia in the early 1820s as a seaman on an Ionian sailing ship and disembarked at Taganrog.15 Shortly thereafter he was able to buy more sailing vessels and to carry grain on his own account between Constantinople and the Azov. In the late 1830s and early 1840s he was joined by his two younger brothers, Panaghi and Andreas. Data on the purchases of Ionian ships and their registration in Constantinople, or from the licences that the British Consul in Constantinople gave Ionian ships, indicate that the Vagliano Brothers were owners of a number of sailing ships before the 1860s. According to Table 3.16, the Vaglianos purchased eighteen ships between 1822 and 1830, nine between 1844 and 1850, and twenty more between 1851 and 1860.16 They were also among the three most important exporters of grain and linseed in Taganrog in 1851 and 1852 (see Table 2.7). During the Crimean War the Vaglianos carried illegal grain exports from the Azov to Constantinople, earning extraordinary profits. In 1858 Panaghi Vagliano was sent to England to open a branch in London to represent not only his own interests but also those of Theophilatos and Milas, Danubian grain merchants.17 He gained access to the Baltic Exchange fairly easily, perhaps with the aid of the Rallis or other Greek merchants in England. In the 1860s Panaghi went a step further than his contemporaries, establishing the first shipping office in London which dealt exclusively with Greek shipping. This office, which served as a model for other London offices in the twentieth century, was for forty years the main link between Greek shipping and the London maritime market. Thus, the Vagliano Brothers became wealthy and famous by working as shipping agents for their compatriots. But it is also significant that throughout their entrepreneurial lives the Vaglianos owned and operated the largest Greek-owned fleet (see Table 3.16). From 1870 to 1905 the Vaglianos continually possessed between Table 3.16The Vagliano fleet Sailing ships Year

Ships

1822–30 1844–50 1851–60

18 9 20

Steamships Total NRT

–

Ships

–

NRT

Ships

NRT

–

18 9 20

–

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 97

Sailing ships Year

Ships

Steamships Total NRT

Ships

NRT

Ships

NRT

1870 17 3,520 – – 17 3,520 1874 19 4,251 – – 19 4,251 1879 13 2,928 – – 13 2,928 1885 9 2,625 7 7,144 16 9,769 1890 9 2,625 7 6,746 16 9,371 1895 5 2,161 16 12,293 21 14,454 1905 11 17,582 11 17,582 Sources: For the years 1822 to 1860, data are from FO/195, where the selection has been done according to the surname of the master of the ship; data on 1870, 1874 and 1879 from Archangelos register of shipping; data for the steamships of the years 1885–1905 from Table 4.4 and Appendices 4.9–4.12, and for the sailing ships from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1885–95

thirteen and twenty-one vessels, accounting for more than 10 per cent of the Greek fleet in each year. The Vagliano office also functioned as a shipping bank, which proved fundamental for the transition from sail to steam for many shipowners. It granted loans at 7–8 per cent interest for the purchase of steamers if the borrower provided half the necessary amount in cash and put up the ship as collateral.18 Because the loans from the Vagliano office were 1 per cent higher than the official rate of the Bank of England, it has been estimated that its profit from each client was about 14 per cent of the amount of the loan.19 This kind of loan— mortgaging—was illegal under Greek law before 1910, so that loans from Greek or foreign banks for such purchases were out of the question. The number of those who purchased steamships through the Vaglianos was large and will be further discussed in the last section of this chapter. The other important shipowning family that emerged from the Ionian network, but which came from Andros, were the Embiricos.20 The Embiricos became the most powerful family of the first three decades of the twentieth century. One reason for its success was the activities of the numerous male members of the family in the nineteenth century. The family’s patriarch, Leonar dos Embiricos, was born to a Chiot father in Andros in 1765. By the turn of the nineteenth century he had seven sons, Anthony, Nicholas, Mathew, John, George, Michael and Constantine, who all worked as masters and shipowners. But it was Leonardos’ twenty-five grandsons who got involved in the Ionian network by becoming shipowners and grain merchants on the Danube in the last half of the nineteenth century, and his 127 great-grandsons who were involved in shipping in the first third of the twentieth century, that made the family name. The Embiricos daughters also helped, marrying into other important Andriot shipowning families, such as the Goulandris, Cambanis, Maris and Coulouthros. The Embiricos descendants are still active shipowners in London today.

98 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

The most important branches of the family came from Leonardos’ last three sons, George, Michael and Constantine. The first shipping and commercial house of the Embiricos family was established in the last third of the century by Constantines sons. The most important of the five brothers were Leonidas, Alcibiades and Epaminondas in Braila, of whom Alcibiades proved particularly significant. The Embiricos in Braila invested heavily in shipping, and one of Michael’s grandsons, Stamatios Embiricos after working at his uncles’ office in Braila, in 1896 opened the first Andriot office in England, S.G.Embiricos Ltd. Georges grandsons, Leonidas, Michael and Maris, also after working in Braila, in 1908 founded the liner passenger company, National Steam Navigation of Greece, and in 1916 Byron Steamship Ltd, while the other brother, Antonios, established in London the highly successful Anglo-Hellenic and Anglo-Ionian companies.21 The Embiricos fleet was already important by the 1870s. By 1914, they were the largest shipowning family in Greece, owning thirty steamships of about 100,000 GRT. This was 13 per cent of the entire Greek fleet (see Table 3.17). Apart from shipping, the Embiricos family was heavily involved in Greek economic and political life in the first third of the twentieth century. In 1894 one of Constantines sons, Epaminondas, founded the Bank of Athens Table 3.17 The fleet of the Embiricos family Sailing ships

Steamships

Year

Ships

NRT

Ships

1870 1874 1879 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910

5 6 6 6 6 1 – –

1,509 1,544 1,693 2,554 2,330 144 – –

– – – 2 4 9 13 22

Total NRT

Ships

NRT

– 5 1,509 – 6 1,544 – 6 1,693 3,539 8 6,093 5,718 10 8,048 14,519 10 14,663 23,311 13 23,311 39,671 22 39,671 (GRT) (GRT) 1914 – 30 92,522 30 92,522 Sources: Appendices 4.9–4.14, Archangelos register of shipping 1870, 1874, 1879 and Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890–1905

which, as we will see in the next section, provided finance for the transition from sail to steam. Moreover, Epaminondas Embiricos, an MP for a number of years, became Minister of Shipping (1908–9) and was largely responsible for the Shipping Law that legalised mortgages in 1910 (see Chapter 4). In the same way, a number of descendants of the Embiricos family continued active participation in the political life of the country during the First World War and the interwar

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 99

period, making along the way a number of investments in the Greek economy. The sons of Epaminondas Embiricos established the Bank Stringos-Embiricos in Piraeus in the interwar period, sat on the board of the National Bank of Greece, and were elected as MPs. The sons of Andreas George Embiricos, Leonidas, Michael and Maris, established the insurance companies Ethniki Zoi and Kali Pisti during the interwar period, as well as the Bank of National Economy in 1918. They were also the main shareholders of the most important shipbuilding/ repair yard, Vassiliades Engine Works. Leonidas Embiricos, who was a consultant on the supply and distribution of food in the temporary Thessaloniki government and Minister of Food Supplies in the Venizelos government in 1917– 18, undertook to provide privately the supplies needed by the Greek army. Leonidas Embiricos—the father of the well-known Greek poet, Andreas Embiricos—was the driving force behind the shipping and investment activities of the three brothers. The maritime historian of Andros, Dimitrios Polemis, called him ‘an entrepreneur par excellence’.22 Another grandson of George Embiricos, George Miltiades Embiricos, came from Rumania in 1909 to found a ginning/shelling company in Levadia. In order not to leave the supplies of the Greek army out of the family business, he became Minister of Food Supplies in the Krokidas government in 1922 and in the Gonatas government in 1923. In this way the tentacles of the Ionian network affected not only the evolution of the Greek fleet but also the economic and political life of the country. The second part of Ionian entrepreneurial strategy involved business methods: first, penetration into both producing and consuming markets and second, an emphasis on shipping that never ignored trade. We have already discussed the penetration of the Greeks into the hinterland of each Black Sea port using the system of local agents to provide regular shipments of export products, especially grain. But at the other end of the trade, grain found its way to the northern European markets via the Baltic Exchange. As indicated in Table 2.9, by 1886 ninety-seven Greeks were already members of the Exchange, comprising 7 per cent of total membership. Fairplay, one of the most prominent British shipping journals, contains frequent sneering and pejorative reports on these ‘invaders’, always implying an inherent proclivity for fraud and a complete lack of culture and ethics. These were, admittedly, characteristics shared by many Greeks and were not entirely created by British prejudice: These Easterners were always wily people, not even given to trusting each other…. Whatever may have been the case 2,000 years ago, the Greeks of that period have no parallel in their descendants of to-day. The world of art is open to all and the purse of buyers of works of art is inexhaustible; but there are no Greek poets, no Greek sculptors, no Greek painters, to profit by a demand to which there is practically no limit. On the contrary, the modern Greek of means buys works of art, but does not produce them, and he thinks his own country the best country in the world to live out of. He amasses money in all countries in which he finds the natives softer than

100 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

himself, and he spends his money like an open-handed prince—but not in Athens. He prefers the Baltic Coffee House to the Acropolis, with the Parthenon thrown in; and a deal in wheat is more in his line than a lecture by Socrates. For all this he is not to be blamed; but why make him a hero, and invest him with all the invisible virtues under the sun because 2,000 years ago Greece could and did produce sculptors who never have been, and never will be rivalled, and won battles against numerical odds as Britons are doing every day all over the world?23 Greek penetration into the City of London Marine Insurance Company did not do much to improve this public image: The meeting of the shareholders in the City of London Marine Insurance Company, to which we called attention last week, has been held at the Cannon-street Hotel, and has resulted in the dismissal of the underwriter Mr Wright…. The Company has lost money; everyone knows that;…the unfortunate underwriter who took his Director’s risk, has been kicked out; a successor, who will probably advise the countrymen of Pericles to take their risks elsewhere, has been appointed; and order reigns once more in Greece. For to read the names on the directorate of the Company one might fancy oneself in the Archipelago once. Agelasto, Canevaro, Scaramanga! Heaven and Earth! What could a poor English underwriter hope to do with this lot? Do men make money out of Greeks? They may, for all we know to the contrary, but we never knew anyone that did…. We used to read a great deal in our youth of the famous Greek Phalanx. It was the habit of that warlike body to charge its enemies. We have changed all that. It is the habit of the modern Greek Phalanx to charge its friends, and the devastation it creates in their ranks is equal to the most fabulous performance of the bygone warriors.24 All these unfriendly remarks of course reflected British fear that ‘We hear a great deal about foreign competition in trade, and of the danger of losing our supremacy, but the British humbug, like the ancient Greek sculptor, stands unrivalled and alone, and may defy the whole world to match him.’ These words were written in Fairplay in 1897, on the eve of the century that witnessed the decline of British supremacy. Today, almost 100 years later, they sound even more ironic since the statistics show that modern Greek ‘humbugs’ retain supremacy over their British counterparts, while the ancient Greek sculptors stand where they always had. Neither British bias nor the prejudice of Fairplay stopped all reporters from being fair. Another Fairplay reporter found, to his amazement, that impartiality was not unknown in the Greek vocabulary25 And some of the same Greeks that had built their bad reputation tried hard to restore it:

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 101

The members of the Baltic are always sarcastic on transactions in which Greeks and Jews are mixed up together, those two accomplished sections of traders being always on the alert when brought face to face in business. The latest excitement of the kind has arisen out of the following circumstances. During the great freight advance towards the close of last year, a Greek firm, Messrs. Foscolo, Mango & Co., chartered their s.s. Marietta Ralli at 20s., to Messrs. Neufeld & Co. who are Jews, to load in November from Yenitchesk, in the Azov, with 16 running lay-days. It appears that 8,000 chetwerts were shipped in about the first five or six days, and that during the remainder of the time no more cargo was sent, although, it was alleged by the captain and owners of the steamer, the weather was good and the sea open, that is sufficiently free from ice to leave the navigation unimpeded. This, it was stated, was proved by the shippers having loaded and despatched other steamers. The captain, who was seemingly of the opinion that Messrs. Neufeld wished to avoid loading his vessel because of the high freight at which she was chartered, protested, and on the fifteenth day, as the story goes, ‘hooked it’ to save being icebound, and proceeded to Odessa to fill up. The owners of the steamer then made another contract with Messrs. Neufeld to complete the loading at Odessa at about 10s. 6d. freight. Both the parcels were for Lisbon, and when the steamer arrived at that port demurrage was incurred, but the receivers declined to pay it, on account, they said, of rain and bad weather having interfered with the discharge…. Before making the contract to fill up at Odessa the owners of the boat and Messrs. Neufeld agreed that all matters in dispute should be referred to arbitration, and this brings us to the interesting development which has proved so attractive a theme on the Baltic. Messrs. Neufeld, the Jews, nominated as their arbitrator a Greek merchant and shipper, Mr Eumorphopulos; and seeing that the Jews had fixed on a Greek, Messrs. Foscolo, Mango & Co. hastened to follow suit, and nominated the well-known Greek shipowner and shipper, Mr Vagliano, to represent them. Before going into the pros and cons of the affairs these two gentlemen agreed on a third Greek, Mr P.P.Rodocanachi to act as umpire. Thus was constituted what the Balticers call an ‘amateur Greek tribunal’—composed of three of the sharpest businessmen in the Room—with a Greek firm and a Jew firm as the parties to the arbitration…. After two days’ sitting the award was given against the Greek steamer on the question of dead freight, but in her favour in respect of the demurrage at Lisbon. What is felt on the Baltic is that Messrs. Neufeld showed great confidence in nominating a Greek as their arbitrator, and that the ‘amateur Greek tribunal’ distinguished itself greatly by its absolute impartiality unmoved in the slightest degree by the double temptation to which it was subjected. A further opinion entertained in the Room is that a grand example is herein afforded to arbitrators connected with the Corn Trade Association, whose awards are by no means always so satisfactory

102 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

to the Greeks and Jews as the decision now referred to has been. It should be added that although the three Greek gentlemen sat on the case for two days their charge was only fifteen guineas, half paid by the shipowners and half by the merchants. Shipping was vitally important in the function of the network. Cargo trade, as analysed in the previous chapter, continued in the same way, only the cargoes now were almost exclusively grain and coal. The nature of Black Sea, Azov and Danube trade virtually mandated vessel ownership. Tables 3.16 and 3.18 indicate clearly that all prominent members of the network were heavily involved in shipowning. Their involvement with steamers was vital for the survival of the Ionians. At all times the question of shipping was vitally important for the grain trade. In an area where inward cargoes were difficult to obtain, lack of shipping was an acute problem. The advantages of steamers soon became evident. Around 1880, steamers took twenty days to sail from England to Odessa and twenty-two days to the Sea of Azov, whereas sailing ships took an average of seventy-five days for either journey.26 Moreover, grain was a cargo which could easily deteriorate on the voyage and suffered badly from damp; shorter voyages diminished the chances of the damage. It was evident that purchasing steamships was the sine qua non to remain competitive in business and to keep their share of the trade. The biggest merchant/shipowners of the Azov, the Vaglianos, and their counterparts on the Danube, the Theofilatos, were pioneers in steam. The rest only followed a path that was already open. Members of the network in 1879 owned eighty-seven vessels of about 22,000 NRT, which constituted 9 per cent of the total Greek-owned fleet (see Appendix 3.4). Ionian merchant/shipowners made their final transition from merchanting to shipowning only after they acquired steamers. As Appendices 4.10 and 4.11 and Table 3.18 indicate, the main members of the Ionian network purchased the majority of steamers in the Greek-owned fleet: in 1895 74 per cent, and in 1900 61 per cent, of total steam tonnage in the fleet belonged to them. Table 3.18 Greek steamships owned or financed by members of the Ionian network Year

Shipowners

Ionian network

Total Greek fleet

NRT

GRT

Total NRT

Total GRT

%

–

55,883 90,708 142,091 259,239 375,770 –

–

66% 74% 61% 71% 59% 56%

1890 24 37,002 1895 37 66,693 1900 33 87,165 1905 72 182,950 1910 83 220,216 1914 97 – Sources: Appendices 4.9–4.14

– – – 463,643

– – – 822,906

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 103

THE IONIAN NETWORK AND TWENTIETHCENTURY GREEK SHIPOWNERS This last section will deal with the influence of the Ionian network on the development of the Greek fleet in the twentieth century. Network members in the Black Sea trade were particularly important in the transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet from the 1880s to 1910s. In fact, their acts defined the structure of the Greek shipowning in the twentieth century. One of the main problems faced by the owners of sail in the late 1870s was the lack of sufficient capital to invest in steam. The largest amount of capital for the transition came from the members of the Ionian network, especially during the first stages in the 1880s and 1890s, as we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter. A significant number of the masters employed on these ships were partowners; many times when the steamers became too old they bought them and became shipowners themselves. In this way in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century there was a massive entry of small-scale shipowners, a large number of whom were financed by members of the Ionian network. It is useful to examine the geographic origin of the masters who were financed by the members of the Ionian network to invest in steam. Almost all came from Cephalonia, Ithaca, Andros, Chios and Kassos. The fact that Greek merchant/ shipowners, whether in Constantinople, Taganrog, London or Marseilles, financed individuals from these five particular islands is proof not only of their maritime traditions but also of the cohesion and common business strategy of the Ionian network. There were other prominent maritime centres, like Galaxidi or Spetses, for example, whose sailing shipowners were not financed by the Ionian network and whose fleets eventually disappeared. Figure 3.2 presents the shipowners financed by the members of the Ionian network in southern Russia. The powerful Vagliano Brothers financed fourteen shipowners from Cephalonia, Chios, Andros and Syros, as well as one from the small Aegean island of Leros. We must not forget that the Vaglianos were related to the Chiots by marriage. Sifneos Brothers from Lesbos financed the future shipowner Hadjilias. The Chiots Sevastopulos, Scaramangas and Negroponte provided capital to the Cephalonians, Vergottis and Metaxas, the Andriot N.Embiricos, and the Chiot Saliari Brothers. It is interesting to note that the successful Chiot shipowners of the twentieth century were not on the whole financed by the remaining members of the old Chiot network. In fact, the members of the Chiot network were not in any way related to the Chiot shipowners of the twentieth century. The shipowners that members of the Ionian network on the Danube financed were exclusively compatriots or relatives (see Figure 3.3). This was the case because the big Danube riverboat owners and merchants were themselves heavily involved in the ownership of deep-sea shipping. When Theofilatos, Stathatos and Embiricos transferred their activities to Piraeus and London at the turn of the century, they continued their entrepreneurial activities as shipowners.

104 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Figure 3.2 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Southern Russia shipowners and merchants

It is not clear whether the Theofilatos financed the Stathatos but we do know that they were related and that the Stathatos worked in the Theofilatos business on the Danube before starting their own. Dracoulis Brothers initially worked at the Theofilatos and Stathatos enterprises before starting their own and in partnership with their relatives, the Gratsos, bought a number of deep–sea vessels before 1914. Vlassopulos worked as master on the Draculis’ steamships before opening his own office with his brothers. The Embiricos family, coming from Andros, presented the only outstanding example of successful nonz–Ionian shipowners and merchants on the Danube. The Embiricos, apart from financing or recruiting into shipowning most members of their large family, also recruited all their related families from Andros, the Goulandris, Cambanis, Kidoniefs, Maris and Coulouthros. This further strengthened the Embiricos’ claim to being the most powerful shipowning family of the first third of the twentieth century. Figure 3.4 presents the shipowners that the merchant/shipowners of Constantinople financed. Siderides and Arvanitides, as we have already mentioned, imported oil from Batum, while the Zarifis, grain merchants in Odessa, the Danube and later Marseilles, became among the biggest bankers in Constantinople.27 Spyridon and Xenophon Siderides, Constantinople Greeks with Russian citizenship, established themselves as representatives and merchants of Russian petroleum in Constantinople. Siderides Brothers owned a number of steamers during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century (see Appendices 4.11–4.14). The beneficiaries of their involvement in shipping were

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 105

Figure 3.3 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Shipowners and merchants of the Danube

a number of Chiot masters, some of whom eventually became among the biggest twentieth-century shipowners: Livanos, Carras, Pateras, Hadjipateras and Lemos. The choice of Chiot masters was not accidental; and Siderides’ wife, Theofano, was a Chiot. Probably out of gratitude, Stavros Livanos, one of the five biggest Greek shipowners of the mid-twentieth century, named his shipping company Theofano. Cosmas Arvanitides also appears as a big shipowner in Constantinople in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. An importer of illuminating oils who combined commerce and shipping together with Siderides, he financed the Kassian masters Rethymnis and Pneumaticos, who eventually became major shipowners. Arvanitides continued as co-owner of the Rethymnis’, Pneumaticos’ and Yannaghas’ ships during the interwar period. Leonidas Zarifis, an extremely successful banker in Constantinople, was also a shipowner during the period and financed the masters A.Palios and Diakakis. The Constantinople merchant/ financier/shipowners followed the pattern of the rest of the network in financing mainly masters from the islands of Cephalonia, Chios and Kassos. Table 3.19 presents aggregate data on all members of the Ionian network who eventually became shipowners in addition to those they financed. This shows that two-thirds of all Greek steamships from 1890 to 1914 were owned or financed by the Ionian network. It is evident that the transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet was almost entirely defined by the acts and preferences of members of this Greek maritime network.

106 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

Figure 3.4 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Merchants, bankers and shipowners of Constantinople

4 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Thus far we have traced the trade routes of Greek ships and the activities of Greek shipowners and merchants abroad. This chapter will deal with the growth of the Greek-flag fleet and the main domestic maritime centres. After the formation of the independent Greek state in 1830, a new era began for the merchant marine. Within twenty years Greeks were able not only to reconstruct their pre-revolutionary fleet but also to expand to unprecedented numbers of ships and tonnage.1 Indeed, the uninterrupted development of shipping and commerce throughout the nineteenth century was one of the most impressive achievements of the Greek economy Yet there was very little relation between these two sectors, since Greek foreign commerce occupied very little space in Greek ships.2 The Greek fleet sailed in international waters and comprised mainly mediumsized vessels carrying bulk cargoes from the eastern to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe along the lines of the Chiot and Ionian commercial and maritime networks. How did this unique fleet, that for the most part flew the Greek flag, develop? The evolution of the Greek fleet is clearly portrayed in Figure 4.1. The steady growth is obvious. From about 60,000 NRT in 1835, the fleet expanded to almost 600,000 NRT on the eve of the First World War, a ten-fold increase in little more than seventy years. To analyse this process in detail we can divide this period into two sections. The first, comprising the years to 1875, was almost entirely the preserve of the sailing vessel. Apart from two four-year crises (1848– 52 and 1859–63) this era was characterised by continuous growth. The four decades up to 1914, however, were much different. For starters, they were marked by the long international shipping crisis from 1875 to 1885, characterised by a sharp drop in freight rates (see Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.8). While part of this tremendous decrease was a reflection of falling transport costs due to the massive introduction of steam in international shipping, it is indisputable that at least some of it was due as well to the international economic crisis.3 From the beginning of the 1890s there was an impressive increase in the Greek fleet that continued up to 1914. It is during this second period that the transition from sail to steam took place. Since Greek shipping worked in the international arena, it was subject to all the freight rate fluctuations of the industry. There was

108 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.1 Growth of Greek-owned fleet, 1835–1914. Source: Table 4.1

a clear relation between investment in the Greek fleet and freight rates (compare Figures 4.1, 4.3 and 4.8). One historian —not taking into consideration the cyclical nature of freight rates—has argued that ‘in 1849 the bad economic condition of the deep-sea-going Greek merchant marine…marks the beginning of its decline’.4 Others talk of small vessels and a reliance on the outdated technology of the sailing vessel.5 Indeed, some display dismay that even in 1875 —at the apex of the ‘golden age’—96 per cent of the Greek fleet was in sail. Greece is compared with Britain, the world’s leading industrial and maritime nation, and not with Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Canada or even the US. Others go even further in misunderstanding the trends and see in the last third of the nineteenth century a continuous decline in long-distance deepsea Greek shipping and a ‘specialisation’ in coastal shipping, when in fact it is evident that exactly the opposite happened.6 It is an almost complete lack of statistics and misinterpretation of those that exist, combined with a dearth of comparative analysis, that has produced such misguided arguments. This chapter provides a new interpretation of the existing statistics and introduces a new set based on Lloyd’s Register and the books of the Archangelos shipping registry. The aim is to show what is clearly evident from Figure 4.1: that the Greek fleet underwent a continuous rise in the nineteenth century, and that the transition from sail to steam not only did not come late but was contemporary with most maritime

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 109

nations. This chapter has three parts. The first discusses the sail fleet from 1830s to the 1870s; the second deals with the shift from sail to steam from the 1880s to the 1910s; and the third examines the patterns of ownership and finance in the sail and steam eras. THE ERA OF THE SAILING VESSELS (1830s–1870s) Before we proceed to analyse the Greek sailing fleet it is important to discuss the statistics on which Table 4.1 is based and on the problem of tonnage measurement in the nineteenth century. There are two problems with the statistics on the nineteenth-century Greek fleet: the first concerns the lack of reliable official statistical series and the second the comparability of the statistical data stemming from changes in various laws concerning the tonnage measurements of Greek ships. The first problem stems from the fact that the existing national statistics are sporadic and the gaps have to be covered using secondary data; especially for the period 1830 to 1880, some aggregate statistics can be found but no detailed information about the shipowners, ships, places of registration, and the like. In fact, it seems that between the 1830s and 1880s the Greek sailing fleet was covered substantially by the Bureau Veritas and by the Registro Italiano. Since Greek sailing vessels were insured by Italian and French companies, both registries wanted to include as much information about them as possible. Yet neither provided systematic aggregate statistics; fortunately, we can use data from the reliable Greek journal Pandora, which utilised statistics from the Ministry of Shipping for the period 1834–66. Pandora stopped publishing shipping statistics in the latter year because, as it explained, ‘after the ousting [of King Otto], the port authority officials were replaced as well. The officers were either fired, or continuously transferred, or replaced by incompetents, or by ones showing minimum desire for work, or they sent no information or very incomplete statistics’.7 The data we have for the 1870s are presented for the first time and are derived from the archival material in the Archangelos shipping register, the first Hellenic register that started on 1 January 1870. The driving force behind it was its Director, Ioannis Skaltsounis, who in 1854 had established in Cephalonia the successful insurance company Archangelos. This latter company was replaced by a much bigger public firm which, according to its statute of incorporation, was authorised as a marine insurance company, shipping bank and register for Greek ships. Its directors were quite an impressive group, including important contemporaries like Markos Renieris (the Director of the Greek National Bank), Leon Melas, Constantine Dossios, Tryfon Moutsopulos, Nicholaos Meletopulos, Athanassios Zografos, Theodoros Retsinas and Ioannis Christofidis. In his inaugural speech on 24 December 1869, Skaltsounis reported that as an insurance company Archangelos had made 17,728 insurance contracts.8 Since 1854 he had gathered much information on Greek ships, and over the next

110 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

decade and a half the company was able to produce at least a dozen unique register books. Following the format of the Bureau Veritas, they provided detailed descriptions of all Greek ships, as well as their owners and masters. The company recruited an international network of agents to gather information. According to the 1879 book, it had agents in Alexandria, Ancona, Andros, Antwerp, Braila, Bristol, Cephalonia, Chios, Constantinople, Corfu, Cumes, Cyprus, Falmouth, Galatz, Galaxidi, Geneva, Giurgevo, Hydra, Ismail, Livorno, London, Malta, Marseilles, Messina, Naples, Nea Mitzela, Newcastle, Newport, Odessa, Patras, Palermo, Questown, Riposto, Salonica, Santorini, Skiathos, Scopelos, Smyrna, Spetses, Sulina, Syros, Taganrog, Trieste, Venice and Zante. The company eventually went bankrupt at the beginning of the 1880s, partly because it had not properly calculated the risks and partly because of the shipping crisis and the decline of sail after 1875.9 Still, for the first time we have enough detailed information on all Greek ships, their owners, masters, date and place of build, tonnage, type of ship, place of registration (whether in Greece or abroad) to analyse the structure of the fleet.10 We lack solid statistics for the 1860s and 1880s, but for some years I have been able to use data from the rare 1926 publication, Greek Merchant Shipping, which presents an impressive body of statistics.11 Its two authors —shipping analysts for years on leading Athenian and Piraeus journals– state that their sources are ‘official statistics’, but unfortunately they do not specify which ones. This is a problem with many twentieth-century Greek maritime historians: for example, K.Antonopulos, a prolific writer who gives detailed statistics of the Greek sail and steam fleets, never mentions his sources. From the 1890s onwards the statistics of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping are used. Although there is reference to a number of Greek steamships since the 1860s, Lloyd’s Register presents us with complete data of all Greek-owned steamships only from 1890, while its data on sailing ships are unfortunately incomplete. To analyse the structure of the Greek-owned fleet not only for this chapter but also for Chapter 6, Greek agent/owners have been selected from the ‘World List of Owners and Shipowners of Lloyds’ at five-year intervals from 1890 to 1940. As is evident, nineteenth-century shipping statistics leave much to be desired. There is still a need to collect and analyse annual data from the Bureau Veritas from the 1830s to the First World War, in combination with Lloyd’s and the Registro Italiano, as well as the existing registries of the Port Authorities and the Archangelos registries, to obtain a fully Table 4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1835–1914 (B’ Class*, converted into Moorsom net registered tons **) Sailing ships

Steamships

Total

Year

Ships

Tons

Ships

Ships

Tons

1835 1838

760 1,046

57,858 62,128

760 1,046

57,858 62,128

Tons

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 111

Sailing ships

Steamships

Total

Year

Ships

Tons

Ships

Ships

Tons

1839 1840 — 1843 1844 1845 — 1848 — 1850 1851 1852 1853 — 1855 — 1858 — 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 — 1868 — 1870 1874 1875 1876 1879 — 1883 — 1887

1,070 1,018

62,929 77,704

1,070 1,018

62,929 77,704

949 1,014 1,114

95,455 102,042 112,182

949 1,014 1,114

95,455 102,042 112,182

1,456

185,573

1,456

185,573

1,482 1,437 1,375 1,329

193,542 179,847 177,883 174,063

1,482 1,437 1,375 1,326

193,542 179,847 177,883 174,063

1,525

206,236

1,525

206,236

1,254

188,321

1,254

188,321

1,212 1,330 1,153 1,425 1,230 1,661 1,355

183,508 177,388 173,687 184,297 189,412 209,843 215,611

4 4 4 4 4 6 11

1,535 1,535 1,535 1,535 1,535 2,196 5,240

,216 ,334 1,157 1,429 1,234 1,667 1,366

185,043 178,923 175,222 185,832 190,947 212,039 220,851

1,450

220,569

11

5,240

1,461

225,809

1,484 1,518 1,565 1,567 1,256

268,375 271,927 279,682 291,278 231,478

27 20 25 24 41

8,230 5,971 8,096 6,925 9,617

1,511 1,538 1,590 1,591 1,297

276,605 277,898 287,778 298,203 241,095

1,318

203,816

50

24,161

1,368

227,977

1,423

203,533

82

39,774

1,505

243,307

Tons

112 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Sailing ships

Steamships

Total

Year

Ships

Tons

Ships

Tons

Ships

Tons

1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 —

1,834 1,859 1,838 1,816 1,834 1,121

194,984 200,842 204,031 192,430 211,035 245,035

98 82 97 105 162 96

32,325 40,589 44,684 54,987 76,996 80,113

1,932 1,941 1,935 1,921 1,996 1,217

227,309 241,431 248,715 247,417 288,031 325,148

Year 1895 1900

Sailing ships Ships Tons 1,059 246,196 – 183,677

Steamships Ships Tons 125 89,907 191 143,436

Total Ships 1,184 –

Tons 336,103 327,113

910 1,030

175,999 145,032

1,096 1,229

357,530 351,028

1,095 — 1,135

145,631 — 147,402

1,309 – 1,390

366,743 – 414,317

1,267

430,523

1,106 1,153

508,596 525,084

1,187

592,516

1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913

980

126,093

760 788

101,459 101,671

186 199 212 214 231 255 282 287 298 322 346 365

1914

780

100,000

407

181,531 205,996 223,020 221,112 236,322 266,915 304,668 304,430 312,798 349,581 407,137 423, 413*** 492, 516***

Source: Appendix 4.1 Notes: * B’Class from 1835 to 1858 included all sailing ships above 30 tons, from 1858 to the 1890s above 60 tons, and from then onwards above 100 tons. When no evidence is given about the B’ Class ships from Appendix 4.1, it has been calculated from the existing evidence, that 32 per cent or the total number and 90 per cent of the total tonnage of ships belong to the B’ Class. ** From 1838 to 1869 the data from Appendix 4.1 has been multiplied by 0.78; from 1870 to 1878 by 0.97. *** Data from Appendix 4.1 give us only gross tonnage for these particular years and we have converted it to net tons: 1 net ton is approximately 60 per cent of a gross ton

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 113

reliable time series on Greek shipping.12 Appendix 4.1 presents the results from the various existing primary and secondary sources that it is possible to obtain at this stage. The data from this Table, however, were further modified in Table 4.1 in order to represent the real trend of nineteenth-century deep-sea shipping. These were what Greek law classified as B’ Class ships. From the existing evidence these ships comprised an average of 32 per cent of the total number of ships and 90 per cent of total tonnage. But the main contribution of Table 4.1 is the conversion of tonnage into Moorsom tons for the data before 1878. The main problem with nineteenth century shipping statistics is the incompatibility between different periods. The difficulty stems from changes in methods of tonnage measurement. Tonnage measurement has a complicated history but it has always being indispensable to estimate a vessels size and carrying capacity. The method of measurement has also been of great importance since it was used globally to calculate freights, port dues, pilotage, towage and quarantine charges, as well as insurance premiums and taxes. In England and France it was traditional to measure volume in cargo tons, or so-called deadweight tons, according to the wine barrels used in the Bordeaux wine trade called ‘tonneau’. The term derives from ‘tun’, denoting a large barrel used in the wine trade and derived from the French tonnerre, or ‘thunder’, named for the rumbling it produced when rolled. The problem for tonnage measurement with a weight unit lies in the fact that weights differ for varying cargoes. For example, a ship fully loaded with cotton does not carry all the weight it can because cotton takes a lot of space and is very light. On the other hand, a ship that carries iron might be half empty and still carry all the weight it can. These are the loading coefficients that all experienced masters know about. In this way, because the weight of the cargo varied but the volume of the ship was permanent, volume rather than weight was chosen as a measurement unit. Tonnage measurement in the first third of the nineteenth century was based on the so-called Builders Old Measurement (BOM) rule voted by the British Parliament as follows in 1773: [(coef.) keel length]×breadth×[(coef. debth)]/94 The idea was that if the ship were a parallelogram, the volume would be measured by the product of the length, breadth and depth, and would be expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet by dividing by 100. However, the vessel being rounded towards the keel and sharpened at the ends, its sides are not parallel and consequently it has a volume considerably less than the above product. The rule of BOM was an attempt to estimate the space of the vessel by the product of length, breadth and depth modified by some coefficients and a divisor intended to deduct a fraction of the result obtained to allow for such rounding off.13 This rule remained valid in Britain, with some modifications in 1836, until 1854. The introduction of steam rendered the old type of measurement obsolete and a new method was needed. When this was developed, the result of the works of a committee presided over by Admiral Moorsom, it set the basis for what we call today gross and net registered tonnage. It set the ton as

114 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

a unit equal to 100 cubic feet or 2.83 cubic metres. The new method was based on more accurate measurements of the ship by dividing it and calculating various parts of it at a time. Within the next thirty-five years all nations adopted this type of measurement. The necessity of having a tonnage for all Greek ships was recognised by the Greek state from its very inception when the government decided to adopt the French Law with the Royal Decree of 17 November 1833. The French had adopted the rule of BOM since 1794 to provide their ships with the same rules that prevailed in the larger British fleet. But when the British made some modifications in 1836 it meant that a British ship of 80 tons was equivalent to a French ship of 100 tons. To maintain their competitiveness and not pay higher dues than the British, the French diminished this difference to 3 per cent with a new law in 1838. The Greek government, however, continued to use the old system until 1867, despite continuous protests from shipowners, masters, merchants and insurers, who claimed that Greek merchant ships were penalised compared to their foreign counterparts by outmoded measurement practices.14 Finally, in 1867 Greece adopted the 1838 French law. While this was better, the Greek ton continued to be 3 per cent higher than the Moorsom ton until 12 February 1878, when Greece embraced the] ton as defined in the Constantinople Conference of 1873.15 If these problems are ignored, any analysis will yield totally erroneous results, since from 1833 to 1867 the Greek ton was 22 per cent bigger than the Moorsom ton and from 1867 to 1878 3 per cent bigger.16 In Table 4.1, tonnage from 1833 to 1869 (Appendix 4.1) has been multiplied by 0. 78, and from 1870 to 1875 by 0.97, to provide rough comparability. The sequence of legal changes has led to many problems in explaining the growth of the Greek fleet. For instance, the data in the Archangelos register and the statistics presented by A.N.Vernadakis in his book About the Trade of Greece indicate different trends for the 1870s (see Appendices 4.2 and 4.3). On the one hand, Vernadakis depicted 1870 as the peak year for the Greek sailing fleet and claimed that it declined by almost 45 per cent by 1872; despite a slight increase in 1875, the sailing fleet remained at much lower levels than five years earlier. On the other hand, data derived from Archangelos suggest a continuous rise to a peak in 1876. Why are there such discrepancies between the two sources? Since Vernadakis’ figures are probably from official sources, what happened between 1870 and 1872 to explain this enormous contraction of the Greek-flag sailing fleet in only two years? Part of the answer must lie in the time-lag for implementing the 1867 measurement law, which meant that by 1870 the Vernadakis figures inflated the deep-sea Greek fleet by 19 per cent. But some of the difference must be a result of a change of flag. As the British consuls at Berdiansk and Constantinople reported, in 1872 and 1873 a large number of Greek vessels hoisted the Russian flag to avoid the heavy dues imposed on Greek shipping in French ports (see Chapter 1). Indeed, as the Archangelos register reveals, the proportion of the Greek-owned fleet sailing under foreign flags jumped from 5 per cent in 1870 to 15 per cent in 1874.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 115

Table 4.1 converts into Moorsom tons the Figures from the Archangelos registers for the 1870s. Since it only began operating in 1870, it is probable that Archangelos did not include all Greek ships in that decade. It is also likely that the upward trend in the Archangelos figures for 1870–6 was a function of the fact that it was continually updated to include ships omitted in previous years; as a result, it was probably better at charting its own evolution rather than that of the Greek fleet. None the less, the enormous decrease shown by Vernadakis during an era of high freight rates and general shipping prosperity in the eastern Mediterranean leads to the conclusion that, despite its problems, the Archangelos figures at least reflect the real trend. Now we come to a further complication, the question of flags. Table 4.1 depicts mainly the Greek-flag rather than the Greekowned fleet. But evidence from Chapter 1, Appendix 4.4 and Table 4.4 imply that there were a large number of Greek-owned vessels that used other flags. By Greek-owned I mean a vessel owned by a Greek and manned mainly by a Greek crew.17 This definition certainly has practical consequences. First, from 1835 to 1864 the Ionian fleet is excluded since these islands were under British jurisdiction. Also, a large number of Aegean islands, such as Chios, Kassos, Samos, Castelorizo, Lemnos and Leros, which became part of Greece in the early twentieth century, along with numerous ports along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts of Asia Minor, owned significant tonnage yet flew the Ottoman flag (see Appendix 4.5). Further evidence from Archangelos and Lloyd’s Register also reveals that Greeks used the Russian and Moldavian flags. In short, to provide a meaningful time series on the growth of the Greek fleet requires a combination of various Greek and foreign registries. As if these problems were not enough there is a further complication in the late nineteenth century concerning gross and net tonnage (GRT). The gross registered tonnage of a ship is a measure of the internal volume of all enclosed spaces and is equal to the tonnage below the upper deck of the ship. Net registered tonnage (NRT) is the residual tonnage after the deduction of spaces for crew accommodation, navigation and propulsion. The exclusion of engine and fuel rooms renders net tonnage more compatible with sailing ships and thus I have used net tonnage. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, in its pre-1914 aggregate statistics, provides net tonnage for sailing ships and gross and net tonnage for steamships. In order to give a country’s total tonnage, however, it adds sailing ship net tonnage to the gross tonnage of steamers.18 The use of secondary sources in various Greek statistics should be used with care in order not to confuse the two since the ratio of a net ton to a gross ton is roughly 0.6. Figure 4.2 depicts clearly the ascendancy of sail in the Greek fleet prior to 1875. From 1835 to 1875 there is an upward trend with peaks in 1848, 1855 and 1875 and two three-year interruptions of troughs (1850–3 and 1859–62). This trend was the result of freight rates that reached unprecedented levels in 1847 and 1853. Bad harvests from 1845 to 1848 in western Europe necessitated large imports of grain from the Black Sea; the abolition of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 and the Navigation Laws in 1849, followed by the other western European

116 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.2 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1835–75. Source: Table 4.1

countries, further facilitated the increase of grain exports from the Black Sea. As a response to the increased demand, freight rates shot up for three years (see Figure 4.3), only to plummet in 1849 causing a crisis for the Greek fleet, which was entirely dependent on this trade. As a result of the high freight rates the Greeks had built too many ships at high prices, which they could not amortise when freight rates returned to ‘normal’. This over-investment in times of prosperity leads to an oversupply of ships, brings the freight rates down and leads to a crisis typical in tramp shipping over the last 150 years.19 Tramping is entirely dependent on exogenous demand and thrives on the cyclical fluctuations of freight rates. Apart from the better western European harvests after 1848, the shipping crisis was deepened by the European economic and commercial crisis of 1847–8 that was felt in the Greek shipping market in 1849.20 The result was a series of fraudulent sinkings and similar acts by Greek masters.21 Such actions brought bankruptcy to most Syros insurance companies, which could not cope with such an abnormal number of wrecks. The international character of Greek shipping and its heavy involvement with Marseilles trade had repercussions felt outside the Greek kingdom. The French Minister of Commerce sent a letter to the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce warning French insurers of the risks involved in insuring Greek ships and cargoes.22 Under such pressure the Greek government passed a law in November 1851 ‘concerning shipping loan books’ by which each Greek ship was obliged to carry a book (libretto) in which every single loan concerning the ship was to be included. With this book it was

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 117

Figure 4.3 Freight rates of tallow, Odessa-England Source: Harvey, 1938, p. 187

hoped that insurers could have a much clearer view of the financial burdens and thus act accordingly. The Crimean War caused freight rates to rise to extremely high levels once again (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) and their decline after the war brought another contraction of the Greek fleet from 1859 to 1862. This crisis was reinforced by another European financial crisis in 1857–8 which hit Britain especially hard and led to a panic on the British Stock Exchange in April and May 1859. Moreover, it was exacerbated by a series of poor harvests in the Black Sea region until the beginning of the 1860s.23 This crisis hit a number of Chiot merchants, who went bankrupt with a concomitant effect on the availability of credit to all merchants in the network. Despite a contraction from 1859 to 1862, the fleet quickly resumed its strength and expanded until the mid-1870s. In fact, if we look at the freight rates in Figure 4.4, we notice that from 1855 to 1874 freight rates varied mildly between thirty-seven and twenty-eight shillings per ton of wheat. During the same time there was a continuous increase in grain exports from the Danube and southern Russia in which Greek merchants played an important role. And just when the exports of grain had reached a remarkable level in the early 1870s and freight rates seemed to have stabilised, increased competition and lower grain prices, in combination with the effect of lower transport costs induced by

118 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.4 Freight rates of wheat, Odessa-England Source: C.Knick Harley, 1989

steam, brought an abrupt decrease of freight rates. Between 1874 and 1885 freights dropped by two-thirds. The connections of the Greek sailing shipowners and masters based in Greece with the Chiot and Ionian networks determined the path of the Greek sailing ship fleet. We can distinguish three main maritime areas which constituted the home of Greek shipping. The first is the Aegean islands, the second the mainland and the third the Ionian islands. Figure 4.5, which divides the maritime areas of Greece into these categories, shows clearly the predominance of the Aegean fleet throughout the nineteenth century. The indisputable centre of the Aegean islands, and the main maritime and commercial capital of the small Greek state for the first fifty years of its existence, was the island of Syros. Ermoupolis, its capital, was built by Chiot refugees in 1822. Chios, one of the most prosperous Aegean islands in the Ottoman Empire, was destroyed in 1822 by the Turks in retaliation for the beginning of the Greek Revolution in 1821. Syros, due to the protection granted by France during the decade of the revolution and its advantageous position in the centre of the Aegean, became Greece ‘s bigge port.24 In 1870 it was still the third biggest port in the eastern Mediterranean (see Table 1.1), after Constantinople and Alexandria. Syros was the first shipbuilding centre of the Greek fleet. In

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 119

Figure 4.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships Source: Appendix 4.4

Table 4.2 we can see that during the period 1843–58 52 per cent of all tonnage built in Greece came from Syros, followed by Spetses (17 per cent) and Galaxidi (7 per cent). In 1879 there was an even higher concentration in the same shipbuilding centres: during this year 64 per cent of the ships built in Greece came from Syros. We notice the ascendancy of Galaxidi, renowned for its fine large ships, to second position. Spetses was still a substantial Table 4.2 Shipbuilding in Greece, 1843–58 Place built

Deep-sea-going

Brigs

Gollettes Gabaras Other*

Coastal Total ships

Total tons

% total

134, 318 44,337

52

Various **

A. 1843–58 Syros 524

123

7

126

129

909

Spetses

–

2

26

390

643

225

17

120 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Place built

Deep-sea-going

Coastal Total ships

Total tons

% total

Brigs

Gollettes Gabaras Other*

Various **

Galaxid i Scopel os Other* ** Total

62

28

–

58

14

162

17,982

7

52

22

1

8

69

152

11,981

5

167

102

109

180

1,229

1,720

47,053

18

3,586

255, 671

100

104, 921 20,772

64

B. 1879 (including above 50 tons) Syros 337 123 33

46

539

Galaxid 77 7 3 9 96 12 i Spetses 56 2 – 11 69 12,726 8 Kassos 43 2 4 3 52 9,720 6 Other* 41 113 15,800 10 *** Total** 869 163, 100 *** 939 Sources: For the period 1843–58 see Constantine Papathanasopoulos, Greek Merchant Marine, (1833–1856). Development and Re-adjustment, Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1983, p. 96–7; data from Pandora, vol. 9, 1858–9, pp. 517–18. For 1879 see Appendix 4.6 Notes: * Other: bombarda, sakoleva, mystika and vratsera. ** Various: trechandiri, tserniki, perama, caique, trata and lemvos. For more on Greek types of ship see Kostas Damianidis, ‘Vernacular Boats and Boatbuilding in Greece’, PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, Scotland, 1989; and Damianidis and Tassos Leontidis, Greek Wooden Sailing Boats of the 20th Century, Crete, Museum of Cretan Ethnology, Gavrielides Editions, 1992. ***Other: Hydra, Piraeus, Poros, Koronis, Mykonos, Santorini, Andros, Milos, Skiathos, Chalkis, Amaliapolis, Kymi, Messolonghi, Patras, Pylos, Calamata. **** See Appendix 4.6. ***** Total: It does not include the Greek-owned ships built abroad, see Appendix 4.6

shipbuilding place despite its proportional decline. Interestingly, we find Kassos replacing Skopelos as the fourth most important island for ship-building. It is evident that throughout the sailing ship period the brig was the main type of deep-sea vessel followed by the gollettes and gabaras. Gabaras (barques) were big ships and thus appear more frequently in 1879 than earlier. The other types of ship were usually built to be less than 100 tons. The archival material shows

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 121

that after the 1850s deep-sea-going vessels were rarely below 100 tons (see Appendix 4.5). In the Archangelos register we can examine other features of the fleet that we have not been able to trace before the 1870s. It seems that the Greeks always purchased a percentage of their ships secondhand from abroad. This percentage must have been at its highest in the 1870s because of the transition from sail to steam, especially in western Europe, when secondhand sales of sailing ships at reduced prices increased. According to the data available in 1879 (see Appendix 4.6), 17 per cent of the Greek-owned fleet was built abroad, in western Europe (11 percent), the Ottoman Empire (4 percent) and the countries of the Black Sea (2 percent). Apart from being the largest shipbuilding site for Greek sailing ships Syros was also the main maritime market for the Greek fleet. The Greek master who arrived at Syros not only found experienced shipbuilders and materials to build or repair his ship but also market information, seamen, brokers, insurance and shipping loans.25 Its large populations of Chiot merchants ensured its position as an important base in the Chiot network. The Chiot and other merchants established on the island made short-term credit available for commerce and shipping (see Appendix 4.7). Despite the existence of an insurance market it seems that Greek masters preferred the insurance companies of Constantinople, Odessa or Trieste, usually owned by Greeks of the Chiot network.26 The second and third most important Aegean islands in 1855 were still the islands of Spetses and Hydra, which constituted the traditional maritime islands of the pre-revolutionary years. If we consider, however, that in 1821 they held 71 per cent of Greeces tonnage, the fall in their share of merchant shipping was dramatic.27 The second biggest maritime area of Greece pictured in Figure 4.5 was the mainland. This area mainly consisted of two ports, Galaxidi and Piraeus, both involved with deep-sea vessels. Piraeus in 1855 was still very little developed and represented only 5 per cent of total Greek tonnage. Galaxidi in 1855 owned 8 per cent of the total fleet and was a flourishing maritime community throughout the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Galaxidi stands out in Greek maritime history because it disappeared from the shipping scene in the twentieth century due to its failure to invest in steam.28 The inability to invest in steam was probably caused by the lack of Galaxidiot merchants in the Black Sea and the absence of any kinship relations with the Ionian network. The other ports on the mainland, Kranidi, Patras, Kymi, Chalkis and so on, were all involved in coastal shipping. The third maritime area of Greece, and the real competitors to the Aegean islands, was the Ionian islands. Although they only became part of Greece in 1864, it has been estimated that they had approximately 40,000 tons in 1854 and accounted for 12 per cent of the total Greek-owned fleet.29 The islands of Zante, Cephalonia and Ithaca owned the bulk of the deepsea vessels, whereas Corfu was involved into coastal shipping. As we have already discussed Ionians prospered

122 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

in the grain trade and its transport from the Danube and the Azov. Moreover, they pioneered the transition from sail to steam. The low percentages of Ionian shipping that appear in Figure 4.5 for 1895 and 1914 are misleading. Figure 4.5 presents evidence of where the vessels were registered and not to whom they belonged. But if we look at the origin of the steamship owners from 1890 to 1914 as they appear in Appendices 4.9–4.14, we can see that the Ionians present the most important group of shipowners in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Comparing the years 1855 and 1879, we notice that in about twenty-five years the importance of the Aegean fleet diminished while it retained its importance by keeping 60 per cent of total Greek tonnage; we also notice an increase of the mainland and an increase of the Ionian islands (see Appendix 4.4). In 1879 we have evidence of Greek-owned ships registered in the Ottoman Empire, and the islands of Chios, Kassos, Samos, Castelorizo, Lemnos, Leros and Mytilene which eventually became part of Greece, held 4 per cent out of the total of 11 per cent found registered in the neighbouring country. After 1875 the decline of the Greek sailing fleet started due to the abrupt decrease of freight rates and the prolonged shipping crisis from 1877 to 1884. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8 further aggravated the problems and in the 1880s, the decade when the British steamship fleet surpassed its sailing ship fleet (see Table 4.7), the Greek merchants of the Ionian network made their first steamship purchases. Although the introduction of steam into Mediterranean maritime transports was evident from the 1840s, its massive penetration into the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea really only began in the 1870s. Sailing vessels, however, continued to operate for another thirty to forty years, despite the great competition they encountered from the new iron beasts. As C.Knick Harley has written, ‘The new technology did not emerge as decisively superior as some in the history of science seem to suggest, but rather overtook the old in a process of continuing improvement.’30 One of the main advantages of the sailing vessels was that they had lower costs on longer voyages, while steamers had an advantage on shorter routes. Because the steamships had to devote a large part of their cargo capacity to carrying fuel, the final triumph of steam came when technological improvements reduced coal consumption in the marine steam engine. The result was that the costs of steamers were reduced more quickly than those of the sailing ships.31 Table 4.3 shows a calculation of the routes from Britain on which sailing ships and steamers were competitive. Table 4.3 The voyages on which sail and steam were competitive for bulk cargo Date (approximate)

Voyage

Distance

1855 1865 1870

–Northern Europe –Mediterranean –North Atlantic –Calcutta

500 miles up to 3,000 miles 3,000 miles 8,200 via Canal; 11,200 via Cape

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 123

Date (approximate)

Voyage

Distance

1895 –West coast of America 13,500 to San Francisco Source: C.Knick Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850–1913’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds.), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St Johns, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, Table 1

It is evident that sailing ships remained competitive with steamers in the longer routes until the end of the century. In the 1870s sail was still competitive in the Atlantic grain trade of about 3,000 miles, so we can safely assume it was equally competitive in the Black Sea grain trade. Despite the fact that the final replacement of sail by steam in the Mediterranean took place in the 1880s, a number of 200–300 ton wooden vessels continued working until the 1890s. The main reasons were that sailing ships continued to carry cheap bulk cargoes at low rates and were still preferred, especially when freight rates were low. It was only when freight rates became so low that they could not cope that sail was driven out of business. The traditional maritime nations continued building large sailing ships throughout the last third of the nineteenth century, but now mainly of steel and utilising the new steam technology for the handling of gear. Although the British had already replaced wooden sailing vessels with iron ones by 1860, other countries continued to build wooden vessels. For example, the shipyards of Atlantic Canada continued to do so until the 1880s and beyond.32 On the other side of the ocean, Norwegians continued building wooden vessels until the 1890s. The concentration of Norwegians on a few bulk trades rendered their cheap sailing vessels efficient and gave them a comparative advantage.33 The productivity of steam increased the productivity of the sailing vessels in the longhaul trades. Although the first blow to the sailing vessels was the opening of the Suez Canal, the final one was the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, since it shortened the route around South America by 5,000 to 7,000 miles. INVESTMENTS IN NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE ERA OF STEAMSHIPS, 1880s–1910s The second period in the evolution of the Greek-owned merchant fleet occurred between about 1880 and the First World War and was marked by the successful transition from sail to steam. As Figure 4.6 indicates, after a rather stagnant period in the 1880s, there was a clear upward trend to 1914. This section will analyse the structural and qualitative changes that underlay this expansion. While the transition from sail to steam in the Greek-owned deep-sea merchant marine started in the 1880s, steam was first introduced in the Greek fleet with the establishment of the Greek Steamship Company (GSC) in 1856. Following the

124 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.6 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1876–1914. Source: Table 4.1

trends of the other European nations the Greek state, together with the National Bank and a small group of diaspora merchants, established the GSC with subsidies to cover the needs of coastal transportation in 1856. Britain was the first to provide subsidies to new steamship companies in the form of mail subventions, a practice that continued until the First World War. The GSC experiment, for various complex reasons, proved a total commercial and economic failure, and after an almost forty-year life the company was wound up in the 1890s.34 Its establishment had very little effect on the ultimate transition. Indeed, the factors that led to the formation of the GSC were completely different from those that prevailed in the rest of the fleet, 90 per cent of which was engaged in deep-sea trade. The GSC fleet, according to Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, in 1865 consisted of six steamships of 2,653 NRT, and constituted 1 per cent of the total Greek fleet (see Appendix 4.1). The first massive purchases of steam were not consummated by the owners of sailing vessels within Greece but by the merchants and shipowners from abroad. As we have already seen, prominent members of the Chiot network were steamship owners from the 1850s but we do not consider their fleet as ‘Greekowned’ because it not only flew the British flag but also used British crews. The decline of the Chiot network in the 1860s led to a contraction in their steam ownership by 1870, with the exception of Papayanni, who continued to prosper throughout the nineteenth century (see Table 4.4). The first purchasers of Greek-

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 125

owned steamships were prominent members of the Ionian network: the Vagliano Brothers, Stathatos and Theofilatos, Stathopulos, Embiricos, Cicellis, Foscolo and Mango, Nicolopulo, as well as the descendants of the Chiot network who were integrated with the Ionians, like Rodocanachi and Scaramanga. From 1880 to 1885 they acquired twenty steamships of 17,446 NRT, almost all newbuildings. In fact, we have a contemporary account of the purchase of one of these early ships. In June 1880 the Nicolopulos, established in Galatz (Demetrius Nicolopulo) and Marseilles (his son Ioannis), ordered a new steamship at the British yard of Bartram Haswell in Sunderland. The man they sent to supervise construction was the future master, Captain Anastassios Syrmas, whose valuable testimony we have from his correspondence with the Nicolopulos. Captain Syrmas, apart from his correspondence, also left us with a rich archive of logs, ships’ accounts, letters and other documents (Syrmas is discussed in detail in Chapter 5). From this correspondence we know that this particular shipyard was chosen because the Vagliano Brothers had already ordered a steamship from there. Captain Syrmas reports that in July 1880 the Vaglianos had ordered another new steamer that was ‘255 feet long, 35 wide and 6 feet high, about 2,100 NRT and was going to cost £21,000’.35 The Vaglianos were Nicolopulos’ formal agents, handling the payments and formally supervising construction. Half the payment for the Nicolopulos ship was given at its completion and the other half in London (in sterling) during the next six months without interest on a guarantee by the Vaglianos. Captain Syrmas reported each week to the Vaglianos in London and to the Nicolopulos in Marseilles and Galatz on the progress of building. The steamship, named Calliope Nicolopulo, took five months to finish, and had a GRT of 1,550 tons and an NRT of 1,004 tons. Her building cost £9,750 and she was registered at Lloyd’s as 100 A1. Calliope Nicolo pulo, Captain A.Syrmas, with an English chief engineer, a Greek crew and a charter arranged by the Vaglianos, sailed from Sunderland on 10 November 1880 to Constantinople at nine miles per hour. She was registered at Syros on 22 December 1880. During his five-month stay Captain Syrmas received several letters from merchants or shipowners inquiring about the cost of steamships, methods of payment and the time required. More specifically, as Syrmas reported to the Nicolopulos, the Stathopulos from Naples asked permission from the Vaglianos to build a similar steamer as that being built in Sunderland.36 The Syros-based Matheos Calvocoressis in July 1880 asked Syrmas about secondhand steamer prices, and in August the sailing shipowners Cosmas Brothers and G. Kulukundis based in Syros inquired about building a 1,200–1,500 ton steamship.37 The stabilisation of freight rates at the end of the 1880s and their consequent peak at the turn of the century due to the Boer War, not only in the main bulk cargoes but also in all tramp trades (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8), led to massive

126 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.7 Freight rates of coal and wheat Source: C.Knick Harley, 1989

purchases of steamships in the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century. Two phases can be distinguished in the Table 4.4 Steamships owned by members of the Chiot and Ionian networks, 1860–85 Shipowner 1860 A. Chiot 1. Melas L. 2. Papayanni

3. Xenos S.

Name of ship

Tons

Built

Registered

Aphroezza Agia Sofia Arcadia Omonia Thessalia Kanaris Asia Colettis Olympius Bozzaris Modern Greece Petrobeys

133 1,437 798 464 1,169 927 1,093 216 280 659 753 562

1857 1857 1855 1858 1855 1858 1858 1856 1860 1858 1859 1860

London Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool London London London London London London London

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 127

Figure 4.8 Tramp shipping freight rates, 1866–1913 Sources: Fischer and Nordvik, 1986; Isserlis, 1938 Shipowner

Name of ship

Tons

Built

Registered

Scotia Smyrna Zaimis Demetrius Michigan

1,196 322 259 418 856

1857 1859 1860 1856

London London London London London

2. Papayanni

Spartan Toscoff Demetrius Agia Sofia Arcadia Macedonia Thessalia

1,200 1,199 419 977 1,164 1,686 1,169

1868 1868 1856 1856 1855 1867 1855

London London London Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool

B.Ionian 1. Vagliano 1880

Cephalonia

114

1865

Braila

4. Spartali 5. Schilizzi 1870 A.Chiot 1. Spartali

128 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Shipowner A. Chiot 1. Spartali 2. Papayanni

3. Rodocanachi 1. Lambrinidi 2. Theofilatos 3. Theofilatos & Stathatos Mentor 4. Vagliano 5. Stathopulo 1885 A.Chio 1. Papayanni

Name of ship

Tons

Built

Registered

Demetrius Spartan Agia Sofia Arcadia Macedonia Thessalia Ararat Laconia Lord Clive Lord Glough Orontes Roumelia Theodore R. B.Ionian Lambrinidi E. Ithaca Icarius

418 1,200 977 1,164 1,686 1,169 1,305 1,295 2,206 2,370 538 1,418 246

1856 1868 1856 1855 1867 1855 1871 1856 1871 1879 – 1877 1869

London London Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Odessa

Parthenon Mari Vagliano Vagliano Bros Cephalonia

1,869 698 45 34 853 948 1,087 766

1869 1873 1877 1878 1877 1880 1878 1878

Galatz Cephalonia Ithaca Ithaca Ithaca London London Naples

Agia Sofia Arcadia Macedonia Thessalia Ararat Laconia Lord Clive Lord Glough Orontes Roumelia

1,437 1,164 1,686 1,169 1,305 1,295 2,206 2,370 538 1,418

1856 1855 1867 1855 1871 1856 1871 1879 – 1877

Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 129

Shipowner

Name of ship

Tons

Built

Registered

2. Rodocanachi

Theodore R. Eugenie R. Vera Chios

246 353 532 1,106

1879 1878 1881 1884

Odessa Odessa Odessa Syros

Livanthos Lixuri Lesbos Zakynthos Mathilda

449 860 845 973 111

1869 1880 1879 1882 1883

Marseilles Marseilles Naples Naples Constantinople

3. Scaramanga B.Ionian 1. Cicellis 2. Stathopulo 3. Foscolo & Mango 4. Embiricos

Constantinos 1,109 1884 Andros Embiricos 991 1873 Andros 5. Nicolopulo Calliope Nicolopulo 1,004 1880 Syros 6. Stathatos Andriana Stath. 1,068 1884 Ithaca Antonios Stath. 976 1883 Ithaca 7. Theofilatos Stathatos & Icarius 45 1877 Ithaca Mentor 34 1878 Ithaca Parthenon 853 1877 Ithaca 8. Vagliano Mari Vagliano 948 1880 London Vagliano Bros 1,087 1878 London Adelphi Cuppa 890 1880 London Andrea Vagliano 1045 1880 London Nich. Vagliano 1,101 1883 London P.A.Vagliano 962 1880 London Spyr. Vagliano 1,111 1883 London Sources: Selected data, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1885

transition from sail to steam. The first one lasted roughly from the mid–1880s to the late 1890s, and the other for fifteen years from 1900 to the beginning of the First World War. The first phase was characterised by the domination of members of the Ionian network and the emergence of the shipping agents and shipowners of Constantinople. As is evident from Table 4.4 and Appendices 4.9 and 4.10, the merchants and shipowners of Rumania, southern Russia, Marseilles and London were the main steamship owners up to about 1895, when 52 per cent of the total tonnage of Greek-owned steamers belonged to them. These first steamship owners bought primarily newbuildings; according to Table 4.6, 36 per cent of steam tonnage bought between 1890 and 1895 were 0–5 years old (cf. also Table 4.4). The members of the Ionian network who invested in steam gradually

130 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

abandoned their other commercial activities and specialised in shipowning. Knowledge of trade, abundance of capital and connections with London eventually made them among the most successful shipowners of the first third of the twentieth century. The other distinctive feature of this first phase was the rising importance of a new breed of shipowners and shipping agents situated in Constantinople. Apart from being the main port and financial centre, Constantinople was also the main maritime centre of the eastern Mediterranean. An important port of call, it had a large number of shipping agents and shipowners who could find information, charter, insure and finance ships. Between 1890 and 1895 there emerged a number of successful new Greek shipowners who by 1895 owned 22 per cent of the total tonnage of Greek-owned steamers. Foscolo & Mango, Michalinos and P.M.Courtgi were among the most prominent (see Appendices 4.9 and 4.10). The second phase of the transition was characterised by the decline of the Ionian network and the establishment of a new order in Greek shipping: the consolidation of the new steam shipowners in the new maritime centres from where they continued their activities throughout the twentieth century, Piraeus and London. There was a distinct transfer of the operational activities of some Ionian shipowners to Piraeus and a massive entrance into steam of medium and small shipowners from Greece. The transfer of the operational centres from the Black Sea and Constantinople to Piraeus and London is clearly shown in Figure 4.9. In a two-decade period, the operation of steamships from the Black Sea dropped dramatically from 33 per cent in 1895 to 12 per cent in 1914; the equivalent percentage from Constantinople dropped from 25 per cent in 1895 to 22 per cent in 1900 to 13 per cent in 1914. In contrast, steam tonnage operating from Greece rose from 24 per cent in 1895 to 41 per cent in 1900 and 63 per cent in 1914. At the other side of the Greek-controlled maritime network, the percentage of Greek-owned steam tonnage with headquarters in London, Marseilles and other European ports varied between 10 and 20 per cent. Table 4.5 Greek shipping offices in London Shipping 1900 office/ representi ng

1905

1910

1914*

1

Ships

NRT

%

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

Ships GRT %

A.Ionian Islands

9

13,764

43

3

4,982

4

29

4

6,231

1

1,220

5

7,533

2

3,762

Vagliano Bros Mango & Doresa

7,833

79,424 34

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 131

Figure 4.9 Headquarters of steamship firms Sources: Appendices 4.10–4.14. Shipping 1900 office/ representi ng 1

Ships

NRT

%

1905

1910

1914*

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

Ships GRT %

4

7

19,757

7

14,440

7

23,652

1

622

3 4

8,978 11,975

Doresa C. Lykiardo pulo & Co A.Frang opulo Theofilat os D.J. Vergottis Ambatiel lo Bros

–

–

7,833

132 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Shipping 1900 office/ representi ng

1905

1910

1914*

1

Ships

NRT

%

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

Ships GRT %

B.Andros

4

6,780

21

8

14,108

19

33,927

28

S.G.Emb iricos C.L.Emb iricos A.A.Em biricos C.Chios

4

6,780

5

9,095

6

11,573

11

90,906 40 34,891

–

–

3

5,013

3

5,013

4

10,892

10

17,341

13

45,123

5

8,416

Michalin os Scarama nga Bros Sechiari D. Other Mango & Co Galbraith & Wigham & Total

4

9

16,511

20

35,534

21

6,581

4

7,398

14

23,787

10

57,501 25 22,329

1

1,835

3

5,926

4

7,642

8

24,241

2 –

2,839

2 1 –

3,187 1,476

2 11 4

4,105 3 17,861 1 6,495

10,931 2,323 1

Pembrok e2 Richards on 20

2,839

1

1,476

2

2,839

5

8,527

1

2,323

54

95,155

79

230, 154100

31,799

27

9

100

21

37,077

Sources: Appendices 4.16–4.19

New developments in international shipping and trade meant that specialisation in shipowning no longer meant dependency on a particular trade but rather attachment to a large international centre. Thus, on the one hand, A.A.Embiricos and Embiricos Brothers from the Danube and Michalinos Ambatiellos and Mango from Constantinople moved to London, while D.J.Theofilatos transferred to Rotterdam and London. On the other hand, the companies of Othon A.Stathatos, Dionyssios A.Stathatos, Constantine A.Stathatos, A.N.Theofilatos, N.D.Lykiardopulos, Dracoulis Brothers, G.M. Embiricos and N.G.Kyriakides from the Danube, along with Yannoulatos from Constantinople moved the headquarters of their firms to Piraeus. While until 1895 Vagliano Brothers was the only shipping office in London, by 1900 there were five and in 1914 a dozen Greek shipping offices operating there (see Table 4.5). In 1900 there were four shipping firms with headquarters in

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 133

London and one shipping agency while in 1914 there were six firms with headquarters in Britain and seven shipping agencies. In 1900 the shipping firms/ agencies in England owned or represented 22 per cent of the tonnage of the Greek fleet, while in 1914 the London offices represented or owned 28 per cent (see Appendices 4.16–4.19). It is thus evident that on the eve of the First World War Piraeus and London were already the main maritime centres from which Greek shipowners grew and expanded their business throughout the twentieth century. The expansion of the Piraeus shipping market was due to the massive entrance of many small sailing shipowners after 1905 through co-ownerships. The seventy-two shipping companies situated in Piraeus in 1905 became 125 in 1910 and 156 in 1914 (Appendices 4.12–4.14). The steamship tonnage acquired during the decade 1900–10 more than doubled that acquired in the 1890s (see Table 4.6). One of the main reasons for this was that the high freight rates at the turn of the century were followed by a period of relatively low rates which also meant low prices for ships (see Figure 4.10). It was during this period that many of the prominent twentieth-century shipowners from Kassos and Chios bought their first steamships. The limited capital of these small owners meant that the age structure of the steamers deteriorated, particularly after 1905. Between 1900 and 1905 30 per cent of the tonnage acquired consisted of newbuildings while the equivalent percentage between 1905 and 1910 was 16 per cent. Moreover, 40 per cent of the newly acquired Greek steamship tonnage between 1905 and 1910 was between fifteen and twenty-five years of age. Equally the average age of new acquisitions during the period 1890–1910 doubled (see Table 4.6). Table 4.6 Age structure of new acquisitions of Greek steamships, 1895–1910 Years

1890–5

1895–1900

1900–5

1905–10

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

Ships NRT

0–5 28 25,275 14 17,968 28 47,265 18 5–10 14 10,850 14 17,025 13 20,325 14 10–15 29 18,953 11 12,809 32 40,564 24 15–20 11 5,489 18 15,766 7 8,504 42 20–5 6 3,589 8 6,326 21 16,019 25 25> 16 5,706 10 5,181 24 11,123 83 Not found 5 5,587 23 22,303 Total 104 69,862 80 80,662 148 166,103 206 Average date built 1882 1885 1889 1886 (8–13 yrs) (10–15 yrs) (11–16yrs) (19–24 yrs) Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1914

31,554 21,813 24,131 55,620 22,394 43,898 199,410

The final transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet took place in 1902–3 when steam tonnage surpassed sail (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.11). It has often

134 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Figure 4.10 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1900–14 Source: Appendix 6.4

been written that the Greeks replaced their sailing vessels with steamers very late. A lack of any comparison with other maritime nations has led to this belief. Table 4.7, however, shows the transition from sail to steam in the leading fifteen maritime nations. In 1880 no traditional maritime nation had more steam than sail tonnage, and as late as 1880 73 per cent of the British fleet still consisted of sailing ships. From 1880 to 1890 steam in Great Britain, Germany, Spain and Belgium surpassed sail; from 1890 to 1900 Italy, Holland and Denmark joined the club; and it was from 1900 to 1910 that steam took over in the US, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Greece. In fact by 1910, 69 per cent of the Greek fleet was steam, while in the US only 56 per cent was and in Norway only 59 per cent. Greeces transition thus took place well within the period that all maritime nations replaced their sailing tonnage with steam. PATTERNS OF OWNERSHIP AND FINANCE To investigate the exact patterns by which the transition was financed, the ship registries of the main maritime centres of Greece need to be studied. These are scattered in the port authorities of the ports and islands of Greece and contain detailed information about ownership and partnerships of every ship. The fact that many Greek merchant/shipowners, whether in Taganrog, Braila, Constantinople, Marseilles or London registered their vessels either in their

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 135

Figure 4.11 From sail to steam, 1875–1914. Source: Table 4.1

island of origin or in Syros, the main Greek maritime centre, makes this information particularly valuable. For the purpose of this analysis, we Table 4.7 Steam tonnage as percentage of total tonnage of the main maritime nations, 1880–1910 Britain USA Germany Norway Canada France Italy Sweden Spain Russia Holland Denmark Greece Finland

1880

1890

1900

1910

27% 14 11 2 5 20 5 9 18 15 12 14 3 3

63% 30 62 10 7 61 24 26 60 26 46 38 16 10

79% 40 71 35 19 60 60 50 83 50 76 69 48 15

91% 56 84 59 34 64 63 76 91 76 89 85 69 22

136 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

1880

1890

1900

1910

Belgium 55 94 97 98 Source: Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914’, in Wolfram Fischer, R.Marvin McInnis and Jurgen Schneider (eds), The Emergence of a World Economy 1500–1914, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986, table IV

have examined the registries of the island of Syros and the port of Piraeus for the period 1880–1910, a total of 188 ships of about 190,000 NRT, representing 35 per cent of all steamships and 37 per cent of the total tonnage purchased by Greeks during this period. The Syros registries in Hermoupolis contain information for the whole period, while the Piraeus registries only start in 1900.38 As Table 4.8 indicates, the capital for the transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet came first from the members of the Ionian network in south Russia, the Danube and Constantinople, second from the Bank of Athens which was directly connected to the Ionian network, third from the bankers and merchants from the island of Syros, and fourth by their own or other sources. In this way the south Russian, Danubian and Constantinople merchant/shipowner/ bankers were responsible for one-third of the tonnage of steamships registered at these two ports between 1880 and 1910. This group of investors, the members of the Ionian network, were the first owners of steamships in the 1880s and 1890s; as Table 4.9 indicates the ships registered during these two decades at Syros and Piraeus were mostly owned by them individually. There was a significant number of Greek masters, however, employed on these ships who became partowners of the vessels on which they served; many times when the steamships became sufficiently old they bought them with other members of their family as co-owners. In this way, after 1900 large joint-partnerships appeared, a sign of the entrance of the older sailing shipowners into steam. Table 4.8 Investing groups of the Greek-owned steamship fleet, Syros and Piraeus ship registries, 1880–1910 Investing groups

Ships

NRT

%

Merchant/ shipowners of South Russia Merchant/ shipowners of the Danube Merchant/ bankers of Constantinople Bank of Athens Merchant/ bankers of Syros

13

11,880

6

10

18,100

10

38

31,260

17

22 63

30,837 59,980

16 32

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 137

Investing groups

Ships

NRT

%

Self-finance 34 28,516 15 Other 8 8,607 4 (A) Total number of steamships in Syros and 188 189,180 100 Piraeus Registries (B) Total acquisitions of the Greek steamship fleet 538 516,037 1880–1910 (A)/(B) 35% 37% Sources: Port Authority of Syros, Ship Registries 1880–1910; Port Authority of Piraeus, Ship Registries 1900–10; Table 4.6 Note: * Owners of more than 50 per cent of the vessel

The Bank of Athens constitutes the next important source of capital for the Greek steamship. It was established in 1894 by a group of investors who brought capital from abroad—Ep. Embiricos, Al.Lambrinudis, A.Kallergis, M.Iordanopulos and N.Triantafillidis—and by 1939 had become the second most important commercial bank in Greece. A.Lambrinudis was appointed as the first president; he came from Chios/Smyrna and had been manager of the branch offices of Ralli Brothers in India; A.Kallergis from Constantinople was General Manager. The Bank opened branch offices abroad in London, Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, Smyrna and Khartoum. It was established with 10 million drachmas nominal capital and 2 million real capital. In 1904, the banker/ shipowner Leonidas Zarifis from Constantinople joined the board, and in 1907 D.Eugenides.39 The Bank financed 16 per cent of the newly acquired tonnage on the Syros and Piraeus registries for the period 1880–1910 (Table 4.8), and one third of total acquisitions in the entire Greek-owned fleet for the period 1900–10 according to Table 4.10. It appears as owner of these vessels, and the ‘real ‘owne rs as the mana companies. Most of the ships were bought by the Bank during the period 1906–10, a period of both low freight rates and low ship prices. Buying secondhand vessels during periods of low freight rates became an instrumental business strategy of the Greeks in the twentieth century. It was the knowledge of the shipping business by the board of directors that led them to conclude such successful transactions. The newly purchased ships within one or two years were all purchased by co-ownerships of small Greek shipowners.

138 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Table 4.9 Numbers of shareholders on Greek steamships registered in Syros and Piraeus, 1880–1910 1880–9 Shareholders

Ships

1 9 2 2 3–5 _ 6–10 – 11–20 – 21–30 – 31–4 – 41–50 – 51–60 – 61–70 – No data – Sources: See Table 4.8

1890–9

1900–10

NRT

Ships

NRT

Ships

NRT

6,295 1,261 _ – – – – – _ – –

31 4 6 3 – – – – – – –

20,823 2,170 5,628 3,935 – – – – – – –

58 18 29 3 9 5 3 – – 1 7

63,992 20,614 31,601 1,782 12,308 6,689 4,767 – – 1,702 5,613

Table 4.10 Ship finance from the Bank of Athens for the total Greek fleet, 1900–14 Dates

Number of ship

Tons

1900* 2 2,170 1900–5* 3 3,388 1905–10* 23 33,351 A.Total steamships 28 38,809 financed by the Bank of Athens 1900–10* B.Total steamships 50 (122,000)*** financed by the Bank of Athens** C.Total acquisitions of s/s in Greek fleet, 1900–10 365,513 % (A)/(B) 11% % (B)/(C) 33% Sources: Appendix 4.15. The figures from Hadziiosif are from the Archives of the Bank of Athens and are found in Christos Hadziiosif, The Aged Moon. Industry in the Greek Economy, 1830–1940, Athens, Themelio, 1993, p. 62, in Greek Notes: * figures from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. ** Figures from Hadziiosif. *** Authors estimates

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 139

Apart from the capital provided by members of the Ionian network established abroad and shipping finance provided by the Bank of Athens, 32 per cent of total steam tonnage registered at Syros and Piraeus was purchased by the merchant/ bankers of Syros which, until its replacement by Piraeus at the end of the century, was the main Greek maritime centre. Its large Chiot population, and the establishment of members of the powerful families of the Chiot network, gave it the financial potential and expertise to finance ships. The Syros merchant/ bankers financed steamers mainly in the second phase of the transition from sail to steam during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. Such merchant/ bankers were the descendants of the important families from the Chiot network, Avgerinos, Negroponte and Mavrogordatos, as well as the local factors Tsiropinas, Calvocoressis, Gangos, Pangalos, Ladopulos, Vafiadakis, Karellas and others. The Syros merchants also financed Chiots, Andriots and Kassiots, of whom the shipowning families Kulukundis, Andreadis, Los, Pithis and Vattis went on to greater fame. The first steamship companies that appeared in the 1880s were firms owned by the big merchant/shipowners of the Ionian network and held several ships each. Table 4.11 indicates the number of companies and ships as they appeared in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping in 1885, when 70 per cent of the steamship owners owned two to ten steamships and only 30 per cent were single-ship companies, suggesting that it was the large capitalists Table 4.11 Number of ships owned by Greek shipping companies Number of ships (size group) Number of companies % total of companies in each size group 1885 5–10 2–5 1 Total 1895 15–20 10–15 5–10 2–5 1 Total 1914 15–20 10–15 5–10 2–5

1 6 3 10

10 60 30 100

1 1 6 14 30 52

2 2 12 27 57 100

1 – 14 62

0 0 6 24

140 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Number of ships (size group) Number of companies % total of companies in each size group 1 179 70 Total 256 100 Sources: Processed data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1885, 1895, 1914

who bought steamers in that period. Ten years later, only 43 per cent of the total number of companies owned two to ten ships, while the number of single-ship companies had risen to 57 per cent. The expansion of single-ship companies in the 1890s can also be seen in other European fleets, such as the Spanish or the British. In the decade 1900–10, however, the drop in freight rates and the contraction of the market forced single-ship companies in the Spanish and British steamship fleets to go out of business, to merge, or to become absorbed by bigger companies.40 In the Greek steamship fleet, however, this did not happen: by 1914 the percentage of single-ship companies rose to 69 per cent. As we have already indicated it was during this time the Greeks applied on a massive scale one of the golden rules of their twentieth-century success, ‘buy when everybody else sells’. Despite the importance of the Chiot and Ionian merchant/shipowners situated abroad in forming the backbone of a Greek-controlled international network, the flesh came from the shipowners on the Greek-populated islands of the Aegean and the Ionian seas. These were the men who carried out the maritime activities of the network. Joint ownership characterised nineteenth-century Greek sailing ship ownership. This pattern had long been common in many countries; one can easily compare the joint ownership practices of the Greeks, British, Norwegians, French or Spanish.41 Similarly, co-ownerships with strong local island or kinship ties and merchant family networks were not unique to Greek shipping in the nineteenth century. The system of co-ownership ‘continued to operate in Spain and Scandinavia throughout the 1860s and 1870s and also, contrary to previously held beliefs, in the coastal traffic and tramp shipping of England’.42 Equally, family or common port of origin played an important role in the structure of the Norwegian and Atlantic Canada shipping firms until the beginning of the twentieth century.43 As was the case with the members of the nineteenth-century Greek commercial and maritime networks, merchants constituted the main sailing shipowners in most maritime nations during the same period. This was the case at Bergen, Norway, in the mid-1860s and in Atlantic Canada in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 2). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that a large part of the shareholders of the first steamship companies in Bilbao, Marseilles or Liverpool were also merchants.44 Shipping absorbed a large portion of human and financial resources of many Greek island communities and was frequently the main economic activity. The number of shares in a Greek ship was not set by law but was usually between two and twenty-four.45 Each share could be sold independently by its owner

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 141

without the consent of other shareholders, providing in this way great flexibility. Joint-ownership constituted a particular type of enterprise; indeed, according to the modern Greek Private Legal Code, it is not a company but a method of combined ship operation. It is considered a sui generis type of company that is not subject to rights or obligations itself (although the owners are) and the manager represents the joint-shipowners and not the joint-shipownership. Following the French, Greek commercial law provided limited liability for the shipowner(s) from the deeds of the manager/master. The shipowner(s) was discharged of any further liability by surrendering the ship and the freights to creditors, and even the liability of the co-owner/master was limited to the value of his participation in the ship.46 Traditionally, the partners were related, or at least came from the same island. Three reasons explain shipowning partnerships in Greece: insuffi-cient capital to build a ship; the necessity to spread the risk involved; and the need for an outlet for residual capital where several vessels are controlled. There are different interpretations of the relative importance of these factors in explaining the persistence of joint ownership in Greek ships throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.47 There were three types of investor in Greek shipping. The first type was the seamen themselves, mainly masters whose job it was to sail and administer a ship; the second was their relatives, or other co-islanders, who had small amounts of capital with no other outlet; and the third was the big merchant capitalists who saw shipping as a profitable venture and a necessary supplement to their business. For the first two types of investor, a lack of capital seems to have been the main reason for joint-ownership —although the risk of the seas was severe. But for the third type of investor, ships had the dual advantage of providing them with control over several ships while still spreading the risk. In Greek shipping concentration of ownership led to the separation and specialisation of merchant and shipowner in the last third of the nineteenth century; the merchants who invested in many joint-ownerships disappeared or became shipowners themselves. The first two types of investor remained, however, and the lack of capital led to the continuation of substantial jointownerships that formed single-ship companies. Unfortunately, little research has been done on the patterns of ownership of the sailing ships that would give detailed information about the investors. In order to examine the transformations in the nineteenth-century patterns of ownership, as well as in the functions of the shipping companies, we will distinguish three periods: the first spans the first third of the century until the formation of the Greek state, the second covers the second third of the century until the 1860s, and the third the last third of the century. The main characteristics of Greek-owned sailing ships in the first third of the nineteenth century was the combination of trade and transport. The sailing vessel of this period was also a merchant trader and in this way it comprised two functions: commercial and maritime. The master, whose role was vital to the

142 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

success of both tasks, managed the vessel and usually was also the main owner. The tendency for the Greek ship to act as a merchant trader as well meant that its profits came not only from freights but also from commerce. The beginning of a commercial voyage started with the raising of capital (sermagia) to purchase a cargo. This might be raised from a small or large group and enabled the master to have something to sell on the voyage. Either way, it was the accumulated capital invested in the cargo for the duration of a specific voyage, and it was different from the investment in the shares of the vessel that lasted irrespective of the number of voyages. The investor/creditor did not receive interest but rather a share in the profits of the expedition.49 Sermagia was collected from a wide variety of capitalists. Half of the amount, however, was usually collected from the ships shareholders and the other half from an extensive kinship circle. For example, during a period of eight years in the late eighteenth century, forty-nine individuals (mainly compatriots, friends and relatives) gave 411 times sermagia in the ten ships in which the merchant/ shipowner Hadjipanagiotis was a joint-owner.50 The loss of the ship usually meant that the sermagia investors and the shareholders lost their money. Although marine insurance was not obligatory by Greek law, the masters of deepsea vessels who contracted maritime loans had to insure their ships; the largest number of Greek vessels were insured by firms in Constantinople, Trieste and Odessa. In most cases, however, insurance only partially covered the value of ship or cargo.51 During the second third of the nineteenth century, the most important difference from the previous period was that the sailing ship was no longer a merchant trader but usually only a carrier. Representative samples of charterparties and other data indicate that extremely few masters carried cargoes on their own account during this period. Sermagia as a method of finance continued to be used only in coastal shipping to the end of the century. The combination of merchanting and shipowning continued in the small coastal ships, in many cases forming the basis for further expansion. An interesting example of the continuation of such practices is given in the autobiography of the founder of one of the twentieth-century Chiot shipowning families, Constantine I.Hadjipateras. As late as 1879, from January to December, Hadjipateras, with the 120–ton sailing vessel Evangelistria, worked on his own account carrying and selling lumber and coal from wood in the Aegean. He continued working with this particular ship, mainly on his own, until 1885, when it was wrecked. With his brothers he bought in 1886 another sailing vessel, the 220-ton Dimitrios, and worked on freight thereafter. Three years later, he sold it and bought the 450-ton vessel Kyvernitis, sailing it until 1897 when the Hadjipateras brothers bought a 1, 150-ton sailing ship ‘built in Europe’ which they named Constantinos. In addition to Constantinos, in 1900 they bought the sailing ship Petros (750 tons) and in 1901 Taxiarchis (850 tons). The first steamship the Hadjipateras family acquired together with the families of Lemos and Pateras was the thirteen-yearold Marietta Ralli in 1905.52

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 143

The other method of finance used extensively in shipping was shortterm loans with interest. Shipping loans at the beginning of the journey were almost an integral part of shipping. The master needed money to prepare the ship for the next journey and in most cases had to borrow to supplement the cash available: the ship always needed small repairs, new equipment and foodstuffs. As Appendix 4.7 indicates, these loans were usually contracted for a few months and the interest was high, in the 1840s varying between 2 and 2.5 per cent per month (24–30 per cent per year).53 The high interest rates were justified by the high-risk nature of shipping. The loans were not guaranteed by mortgages and the loss of the ship took with it all contracted loans. Appendix 4.7 presents the result of a random sample of loans from the archive of the notary Andreas David during the summer 1846 where it is evident that loans on shipping were given either for shipbuilding or as a working capital.54 Joint partnerships continued and masters were the appointed managers, but now the rule was that they are not the main joint co-owners of the ship. It is indicative of this trend for that in twentyfive of the fifty-two ships owned on Andros in 1857, the master appeared neither as shareholder or part-owner.55 The formation of the Greek state brought more formalised relations between the shipowners and the master. Contracts from the local notary regulated the relations between ownership and management, that is the shareholders (in Greek nautical argot, parcinevelo) and the master. There are plenty of such contracts in notarial archives on the various islands. A typical contract in 1838 gives us a clear idea of the obligations of the master towards the shipowning group. Captain Francesco Fakis from Andros built a brig in Syros and took as partners for onequarter of the ship a medical doctor, Georgiadis Syngros, and Demetrios Kondylis, to whom he promised the following: one-quarter of the profits and a clear account of all income and expenditures; the equivalent of the share of an AB; and up to 1,536 kilos of grain. In addition, the master promised to employ a scribe chosen by the partners; to consult his partners on all business decisions; not to carry out trade on his own account; and not to leave as master without the consent of the partners.56 Joint-partnerships continued to the same degree and masters were the appointed managers, but now the rule was that they were not the main co-owners. In the last third of the century the growth of the fleet and its concentration in international waters further altered the structure of shipowning. Management became even more detached from ownership. Data from the Archangelos ship registers indicate that in 1879 less than one-third (only 27 per cent) of all ships above fifty tons had masters as owners (see Table 4.12); even in the small coastal ships below fifty tons only 55 per cent of the masters were also owners. The 1870s marked both

144 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Table 4.12 Masters as shipowners in Greek-owned shipping, 1879 Masters = Shipowners Port

Ships % total fleet

Tons

Andros 1,546 Cephalonia 2,885 Chios 2,545 Galaxidi 4,297 Milos 3,009 Piraeus 5,471 Santorini 1,733 Skiathos 1,991 Spetses 3,417 Syra 29,743 Zante 3,288 Other 15,994 Total 796 38 75,919 Ships >50 tons 390 30 65,291 Ships <50 tons 406 52 10,878 Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1879

Total fleet % total fleet 41 28 33 33 56 30 32 38 26 31 20 23 29 27 55

Ships

Tons

2,033 1,259 774

3,784 10,260 7,679 13,175 5,340 18,119 5,386 5,162 12,933 94,477 15,986 68,838 261,139 241,358 19,781

the growth and the decline of the Greek sailing ship fleet; almost at the same time that the fleet peaked in 1875, it started a decline from which it never recovered. Greek deep-sea sailing vessels continued to operate to a limited degree up to the Great War. The future lay with the new technology, steam. Sailing ship masters and investors had to find ways to enter this capital-intensive market. Demetrios Polemis, a shipowner and historian of Andros shipping, correctly notes that ‘The sailing ships did not make the steamships. However strange this may sound, the fact remains that the capital for the purchase of the steamships did not come from the sailing ship owners.’57 One of the main problems of the Greek fleet in obtaining finance lay in the prohibition of maritime mortgages under the Greek legal system. Neither the state nor the main financial institution, the National Bank of Greece, pursued policies to help an earlier transition from sail to steam. The direct involvement of both was confined to the creation of the Greek Steamship Company to carry the coastal passenger and cargo trade, although the state did establish the institutional framework for shipping and developed the maritime infrastructure by building quays, ports and lighthouses. Other than that, however, it did nothing to secure an effec tive instrument for ship loans. Not until after the transition to steam had occurred did the government enact a ship mortgage law. From the late 1880s to 1910 there were heated debates about revising the legal framework to facilitate shipping finance.58 One of the most important concerned mortgages. The only

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 145

type of maritime finance permitted under Greek law was the shipping loan or the ‘loan of necessity written on the libretto of the ship. Under this system the sailing fleet flourished and few saw any reason before the introduction of the steamer to amend the law. But the purchase of steamships was quite different than sailing vessels. The sailing ship, a relatively inexpensive asset, needed only small shortterm financing, which under the current system could be obtained at high interest rates. Expensive steamers, on the other hand, needed large loans at low interest rates. Mortgages, which limited the creditors risks, reduced the necessary interest rates.59 Taking into consideration the contraction of the sailing fleet and the need to promote investment in steam, the Greek Parliament voted a mortgage law on 12 July 1890, an act drafted by Ilias Potamianos to introduce maritime mortgages. The law, however, required a royal decree that never came. The main problem was that the law contained a contradiction by allowing the co-existence of the loans of necessity and maritime mortgages. The lawmakers passed another such law on 17 April 1910 that formally introduced maritime mortgages. This twenty-year delay in passing such an important piece of legislation presents a conundrum. Although the subject needs further research, I believe that it had to do with the economic interests of the merchants and bankers of Syros and their strong political supporters in the government. Syros was the main Greek maritime centre of the age of sail, and the main financiers of sailing vessels were its prosperous merchant/bankers. In 1890, when the first law was passed, 80 per cent of the Greek fleet was still propelled by sail; ten years later, it was still 56 per cent. The Syros merchant/bankers thrived on the high interest rates of short-term maritime loans. It may have been that there was a conscious attempt by this group to prolong the survival of sail in the Greek fleet and to delay the entrance of steam. As Table 4.8 indicates, this powerful group financed one-third of the steamers registered in Syros and Piraeus but only after the turn of the century The law that introduced ship mortgages was finally passed after one of its most prominent supporters, Epaminondas Embiricos, became Minister of Shipping. To a great extent, the expansion of the interwar Greek fleet was based on the legal framework provided by this law. The lack of mortgages meant that until 1910 bankers and merchants who wanted to invest in shipping had to buy the ships in their own names. This is why almost half of the steamship owners on the Syros and Piraeus registers in 1910 were bankers and merchants (see Table 4.13). Similarly, fifty-eight newly purchased steamships during the period 1900–10 were owned by individuals (Table 4.9). Both these numbers, however, disguised more than they revealed. They are fictitious because banks were counted as individual owners. Usually banks, shortly after a purchase, sold parts of their ships to joint-partnerships. There is also confusion as to who is considered a ‘banker’ or a ‘merchant’; there are cases when the same person declares for one ship that he is a merchant and for another that he is a banker. ‘Mariners’ appear to have purchased 16 per cent of steam tonnage; they were usually sailing shipowners or steamship masters

146 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

purchasing steamers for the first time. It is interesting to note, though, that nowhere in the Syros registries does the term ‘shipowner’ appear, although it does turn up in the Piraeus records in the early years of the twentieth century, Table 4.13 Owners of Syros and Piraeus steamships by occupational categories, 1880– 1910 Occupation

Ships

NRT

% total

Merchants 65 53,387 28 Bankers/Banks 27 34,531 18 Mariner 31 31,093 17 Shipowner 17 21,367 11 Joint-stock companies 19 13,415 7 Other 29 35,387 19 Total 188 189,180 100 Sources: Port Authorities of Syros and Piraeus, Ship Registries 1880–1910

usually attached to previous masters of steamships who were already owners or co-owners of at least one steamer or individuals who entered shipping directly with steamships. The ‘other’ category that owned the last 20 per cent of the Piraeus and Syros steamships in the period 1880–1910 includes owners who have not declared any profession on the registries. Although the transition to steam, particularly in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, was mainly due to merchant family networks outside the boundaries of the small Greek state, the patterns of ownership and finance continued previous practices. Co-ownerships or joint-partnerships among members of the island communities of the Aegean and Ionian seas provided impetus for the growth of the steam fleet in the early twentieth century.

5 VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN

This chapter is written through the eyes of merchant seamen, in so far as we can see what they did from logs, account books, correspondence and other documents. In this way Greek shipping can be viewed from the inside through the voyages of three sailing vessels and four steamships. The aim is to reveal the daily lives of the men, as well as the operation of the ships and the working relationships. Moreover, it is an attempt to reconcile the view of the Greek maritime historian, Captain Tassos Tzamtzis, who has written ‘that seamen do not write and those that write about the sea are not seamen’.1 Through the voyages and activities of the seven ships examined, which sailed from the 1830s to the 1910s, it is easy to distinguish the history of Greek shipping as presented in the previous four chapters. It can be argued that these ships were not necessarily typical of a fleet composed of an average of 1,300 deep-sea Greek-owned vessels in any year during the period under examination, and more so since the selection of sailing ships and steamers was restricted by the availability of accessible archival material. All ships, however, came from typical maritime islands, such as Ithaca, Syros and Andros, and belonged to some of the typical shipowning families, like Kulukundis and Embiricos, who are still active in modern Greek shipping. The three sailing ships were all partly owned by masters situated in Greece who commanded the ships themselves, while the four steamers belonged to members of the Ionian network residing on the Danube and in Constantinople and Marseilles, as most of the early steam owners were, and were commanded by waged masters. Based on the information provided, important conclusions can be drawn about the operation and management of the ships and the organisation and conduct of voyages during the nineteenth century. ON BOARD The voyages of the three sailing vessels tell similar, yet different, stories. The tales are similar because all are about wooden ships, loading and unloading cargoes, hoisting and furling sails, confronting violent winds and rough seas, and calculating latitudes and longitudes. Yet they are different because each ship represents a different era. Odysseas worked in the late 1830s when Greek vessels were limited to the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. The story of Odysseas

148 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

is about traditional navigational methods adopted centuries ago, but it also illustrates an important transitional period in which vessels earned income both on their own account and as a carrier. Anastassia worked almost half a century later in the 1880s and 1890s and gives us a picture of sail in the modern era. The craft used steam tugs to pass through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Azov, it expanded its activities to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe, and it worked only for freights. Moreover, it tells the story of the decline of sail, and its gradual replacement by steam at the end of the century. Theofania worked almost exclusively in the Atlantic and was one of the forerunners of the internationalisation of the Greek fleet that fully took place during the First World War. During the 1870s there is evidence of a number of Greek vessels in the Atlantic. Contrary to steamers, for which we have been able to trace a large collection of logs, accounts books and other documents, we do not have any financial statements to show the administration or profitability of these three sailing vessels. Odysseas was a 204–ton brigantine registered in Ithaca which flew the Ionian flag and was owned by an Ithacan master, Antonis Petalas-Maratos. There is an extant log covering the period 1837–41, when the ship carried grain and olive oil between the Ionian islands and the Black Sea. Odysseas gives us valuable information on merchant sailing vessels in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea in the first half of the nineteenth century.2 According to the log, at the end of 1837 Odysseas arrived from the Black Sea loaded with grain and sold it in Corfu. This was its last trip for the year; next it sailed to its home island, Ithaca, for the three winter months, a pattern that was repeated for the next three years. In the 1830s there were still no lighthouses in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, where the many islands, peninsulas and reefs rendered night travel dangerous. For this reason, Odysseas sailed only during the day, spending the hours of darkness in harbours or protected bays; in fact its only recorded night travel in the Aegean was when there was a full moon. Otherwise, night passages took place only in the Black Sea. The brigantine often faced enormous difficulties passing through the Dardanelles because of the adverse currents and winds. Many times when the seas were rough at the bottom of the Aegean sailing ships gathered outside the straits. When ‘we moored between Giaourkioi and Troada,’ the master wrote,’ there were in front of us and behind us moored fifty-three ships of various nations’. In March 1839 Odysseas took seventeen days from the entrance of the Dardanelles to Constantinople; when there was no wind the ship was moved by ropes tied to the shore and pulled. Although there were steam tugs in the Dardanelles and Bosporus, they must have been very expensive to use. At the time the logbook was written the master and owner of Odysseas, Antonis Petalas-Maratos, was fifiy-two years-old, and had probably spent at least forty years at sea. Captain Antonis did not know how to write very well, and made many spelling mistakes, but he was extremely observant and recorded many details during his voyages. He did not know how to find precise longitudes

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 149

and latitudes, but his navigational skills were excellent and he recognised every wind, star and shore on his route. In fact navigation through the Ionian and Aegean Seas was made by sighting landmarks on the coasts, while deep-sea navigation outside the view of coasts took place only from Bosporus to the Crimean peninsula for two or three days, during which time masters had to calculate their positions in other ways. Captain Antonis, like most Greek masters, did not like to travel to ports that he or members of his crew had not visited. Despite the more widespread usage of maps, this attitude persisted well into the steam era. Although he knew his routes well, before entering the Black Sea he agreed to sail with other ships—in counserva, as he wrote—to make certain that he did not make any miscalculations: ’[From Yenikoy on 9 March 1838] … all the ships went to the shallow waters and there was north wind and all the twenty-eight ships moored…. We stayed there until midnight and then there was some south wind and…we also put up our sails.’ Because sailing ships had limited storage space for food and water, the master made sure to approach ports to spend the night where he could ‘make water [sic]’. The straits and Constantinople were regular sources of food; the master made sure that there was always wine and raki on board, as well as a variety of food. During the period under examination, Captain Antonis carried grain on his own account from the Black Sea to Zakynthos and Corfu and as freight on charter by olive oil merchants from Lefkas and Paxoi. In 1838, the ship made three round trips to the Black Sea, two of which were in ballast outward, with return cargoes of grain to Zakynthos and Corfu. On the third trip barrels of olive oil were loaded by merchants in Paxoi and Lefkas and two supercargoes (sofrocarico) sailed to sell the cargo in Kertch. On 17 March 1838 in Odessa, he wrote in his giornale (log) that ‘at 10 o’clock two servants of Mr Serafim came and we gave them 10 thousand kolonata (Spanish dollars)’, the value of the grain to be loaded. It took him seven days to load and on 12 April 1838 the ship arrived in Zakynthos, where the master wrote that ‘I gave mostra [a sample] of grain to my racomandatario [shipping agent] Panayotakis Liontaritis’ in order to sell the cargo (see Table 5.1). In 1839 the ship left Ithaca in search of a charter and went to Kertch, where it was time-chartered for six months by the Russian government which was trying to establish itself in the newly acquired Caucasus. On 23 June Captain Antonis copied in the log a report he had sent to the local authorities: ‘the undersigned Antonios Petalas-Maratos Master of Table 5.1 The voyages of Odysseas, 1837–4 Voyages/Dates

Cargo

1837 Black Sea-Corfu 1838

Grain

Charterer

150 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Voyages/Dates

Cargo

Charterer

Laid up for winter months December 1837-February 1838 Zakynthos—Odessa— Grain, fish Own account Papudoff Zakynthos February 1838April 1838 Zakynthos-EupatoriaGrain Own account Zakynthos May 1838-July 1838 Ithaca-Kertch July 1838Olive oil Merchants from Paxoi August 1838 Kertch-Corfii September Grain Own account 1938–November 1838 1839 Laid up for winter months November 1838-February 1839 Ithaca-Kertch February Ballast 1839-March 1839 Kertch—Circassian coast Horses, armaments, Time-chartered by Russian April 1839-September 1839 provisions government Taganrog—Ithaca Grain Own account September 1839-October 1839 1840 Laid up for winter months November 1839-March 1840 Paxoi—Lefkas—Kertch Olive oil Merchants from Lefkas and April 1840-August 1840 Paxoi Taganrogo–Corfu July Grain Own account 1840-November 1840 1841 Laid up for winter months November 1840-March 1841 Lefkas-Kertch March 1841- Olive oil Merchants from Lefkas April 1841 Taganrog—Zakynthos grain Own account April 1841-July 1841 Source: John S. Vlassopulos, Odysseas. A Ship from Ithaca, 1837–1841, Athens, Melissa, 1992

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 151

the Ionian merchant vessel Odysseas 204 tons was chartered by the Russian Royal Authorities on 15 April 1839 in Kertch from Mayor Panfiloff for 102 lasts for 35 rubles…prepaid every month’. But on 6 September he curtailed his collaboration with the Russians to prepare for the return voyage and the winter back in Ithaca. Odysseas, which retained many of the eighteenth–and early nineteenthcentury characteristics of eastern Mediterranean merchant vessels, was armed with two guns, sixteen rifles, six bayonets, two swords, four pistols and four spazzacoverte. With the extinction of piracy and the establishment of peace in the eastern Mediterranean after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the armaments had become obsolete and were never used except once or twice for signals. After the establishment of lighthouses, the widespread use of steam and the increased demand for longer deep-sea routes to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe, the navigation methods of sailing ships changed. These shifts are clear when comparing Odysseas to Anastassia, which sailed forty years later in the same geographic area. The first entry in Anastassias log reads as follows: ‘Undertaking the command of the Greek brig, called Anastassia, of 162.85 tons, registered at the Registry Books of the Port of Syros with the number 337, owned by Messrs N.Stathopulos and G.Kulukundis, ready to sail and chartered by Mr M.Vagliano to receive a whole cargo of wheat from Sevastopol or Nicolaieff’3 Half the ship belonged to N.Stathopulos, who was probably a merchant from Lesbos, while the other half was the property of George E.Kulukundis, a master from the island of Kassos. In fact Kulukundis was probably owner of the vessel along with his brothers John, Nicholas, Basil, Anthony, Martis and Constantine.4 In 1881 and 1882 Constantine Kulukundis was the master, while George’s son, Elias G.Kulukundis, was second mate. Elias took command of the vessel in October 1882 and continued in this capacity for ten years, when he handed it over to A.Mavrantonis, a relative. In 1893, according to the log, Elias appears as the owner of the other half of the vessel, purchased from Stathopulos.5 In 1893 and 1894, Elias’ brother, John G.Kulukundis, commanded the ship, while from 1894 to 1897 it was sailed by A.Mavrandonis. From 1897–8 until it was eventually sold, Anastassia was commanded by Elias G. Kulukundis. During the whole period members of the family served as second or third mates. Anastassias log is extremely valuable because it covers the voyages of a sailing ship from 1881 to 1898, a period characterised both by the full activity of the sailing ships and their replacement by steamers, as well as because it was a typical, family-owned and operated sailing vessel and because it sailed the typical routes carrying the most likely cargoes of the time, chartered repeatedly by members of Greek commercial and maritime networks. From 1881 to 1883 Anastassia worked on the Black Sea-northern Europe route carrying grain from Sevastopol and Varna and returning with cargoes of coal from Cardiff and Swansea to Syros and Smyrna. As we have already seen, after the repeal of the British Navigation Laws in 1849 a significant number of

152 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Greek sailing ships sailed between British and eastern Mediterranean ports with coal and grain. Apart from the London Customs Bills of Entry, other evidence of Greek involvement can be found in variety Table 5.2 The voyages of Anastassia, 1881-98 Voyages/Dates 1882 Sevastopol-Rotterdam October 1881-March 1882 Swansea—Syros March 1882-August 1882 Nea Effessos-Passages September 1882December 1882 1883 Passages—Swansea December 1882-January 1883 Swansea-Varna February 1883-March 1883 Varna—Cardiff April 1883-August 1883 Cardiff— Smyrna September 1883-December 1883 1884 Dedeagach-Naples December 1883-February 1884 Laid up in Constantinople* March 1884-July 1884 Yeisk-Marseilles August 1884-November 1884 1885 Laid up in Syros December 1884-February 1885 Nicolaieff—Venice March 1885-May 1885 Venice—Cephalonia—Patras June 1885-July 1885 Laid up in Constantinople July 1885-September 1885 Burghaz-Marseilles September 1885-February 1886 1886 Laid up in Syros March 1886-June 1886 Rhodes-Odessa June 1886-October 1886 Nicolaieff-Trieste October 1886-December 1886 1887 Trieste—Nauplion—Piraeus January 1887March 1887 Odessa-Venice April 1887-June 1887

Cargo

Charterer

Rye Coal Grain

Vagliano Kassinieris (Smyrna)

Ore Coal Grain Coal

Nikolaides Petrocockinos Zarifis

Grain

Vagliano

Grain

Ambanopoulo

Grain Morfrugo & Co (Trieste) Lumber

Grain

Vagliano

Gypse Grain

Ouble Mavros

Lumber Grain

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 153

Voyages/Dates

Cargo

Venice-Corfu-Patras-Lavrion July 1887–September 1887 Temriuk-Ancona November 1887–February 1888 1888 Taganrog-Marseilles April 1888–August 1888 Burghaz-Marseilles September 1888–November 1888 Laid up in Syros December 1888–January 1889 1889 Santorini-Trieste January 1889–March 1889 Trieste-Piraeus-Lavrion April 1889–June 1889 Kassos-Odessa June 1889–August 1889 Batum-Alexandria August 1889–November 1889 1890 Salonica-Genova December 1890–April 1890 Taganrog-Constantinople May 1890–September 1890 Galatz-Cette September 1890–January 1891 1891 Laid up in Syros and Constantinople February 1891–March 1891 Taganrog-Savonna April 1891–June 1891 Laid up in Kassos June 1891–August 1891 Burghaz-Marseilles September 1891–December 1891 1892 Laid up in Constantinople December 1891–March 1892 Galatz-Genoa March 1892–June 1892 Repair in Syros July 1892–September 1892 Taganrog-Catania October 1893–February 1894

Lumber Grain Dreyfus

1893 Laid up in Syros March 1893-May 1893 Laid up in Constantinople May 1893-August 1893 Taganrog-Patras September 1893-December 1893 1894 Zakynthos-Cette December 1893-April 1894

Grain Grain

Charterer

Vagliano Nikolaides

Mineral Lumber Gypse Oil Oats Grain Grain

Wechsler

Grain Grain

Svoronos

Lumber Grain

Grain Grain

Mussuri

Falieros

154 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Voyages/Dates

Cargo

Charterer

Port-St-Louis du R.-Porto Lago April 1894-June Lime 1894 Laid up in Constantinople July 1894 Batum-Constantinople August 1894-December Oil 1894 1895 Batum—Alexandria December 1894-March 1895 Oil Batum-Alexandria April 1895-June 1895 Oil Batum-Alexandria August 1895-December 1895 Oil 1896 Kassos-Alexandria December 1895-April 1896 Gypse Repair in Syros-Laid up in Constantinople April 1896-May 1896 Batum-Constantinople June 1896-October 1896 Oil Kazigra & Sideridis Ports of Marmara—Marseilles October 1896Grain February 1897 1897 Marseilles—Syros—Poti February 1897French tiles November 1897 (In Syros from April 1897September 1897 because of the GrecoTurkish War) Batum-Constantinople November 1897-January Oil 1898 1898 Ports of Marmara-Naples February 1898-June Grain 1898 Odessa-Jaffa August 1898-October 1898 Lumber Source: Logbook of Anastassia, Private Collection of Elias M.Kulukundis Note: * Recorded only when ship is laid up more than one month

of documents, such as the following testimonial written on 24 July 1856 in Cardiff, signed by the Austrian Vice-Consul, J.K.Smith, in Cardiff and the Greek Consul, A.K.lonides, in London: ‘We the undersigned hereby certify that the San Spyridione of Greece D.Catchoulis Master with 18 persons on board and bound for Athens with a cargo of coals sailed from Cardiff on or about the twentieth day of December 1855.’6 Additional evidence is found in the personal correspondence of the masters. For example, George P.Dracopoulos of Myconos, master of the sailing ship Philadelphos, in a letter to his wife from Glasgow on 18 August 1877 where he was loading coal reveals that he had travelled on board a Greek sailing vessel to Britain in 1853 and had not since managed to return:

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 155

We came here yesterday and from tomorrow we will start unloading the cargo, here at the same place we will load the coal and I hope to God not to take more than 12 days, I will ask for a charter to Marseilles and if I do not find I will try for Italy or Malta…. Here, we have not had any summer our sails have rotted from the rain. … The freight rates of the coals were never worse than now, I came to England after 24 years but I managed to do this voyage.7 Although Captain Dracopoulos was right to say that freight rates for coal were at their lowest level in years, little did he know that the worst was yet to come. Tramp shipping freight rates tumbled from the mid-1870s to the mid-1880s, when they were finally stabilised (Figures 4.7 and 4.8). The shipping crisis hit Anastassia in 1884 and the ship was laid-up in Constantinople from March to July: ‘Due to slack times in charters we were held up in Constantinople and fired the crew we stayed there around 110 days, until 20 July 1884 on which day we were able, with the agreement of the owners of the ship, to charter it to carry a cargo of wheat that belongs to Messrs Ambanopoulo and Co in Yeisk.’8 Apart from grain, coal and oil, the ship carried lumber, non-ferrous minerals and even tiles from Marseilles. The ship worked on charter, and the charterers included a large number of important Black Sea merchants apart from Ambanopoulo, such as Vagliano, Petrocockinos, Zarifis, Mavros, Svoronos, Mussuri, Siderides and Nicolaides, along with Dreyfus, Wechsler, Falieros, Kassinieris of Smyrna, Morfrugo & Co of Trieste and Ouble of Rhodes (see Table 5.2). In 1886 the vessel was again laid-up in Syros from March to June. From 1884 to 1898, when it was sold, Anastassia traded mainly between the Black Sea and the western Mediterranean; that is from Yeisk, Nicolaieff, Burghaz, Odessa, Temriuk, Taganrog, Batum, and Galatz to Naples, Venice, Ancona, Trieste, Genoa, Savonna, Catania, Marseilles and Cette. The exception to this east—west trade was a north—south route which holds a special interest. From 1894 to 1898, the year she was sold, Anastassia undertook consecutive voyages between Batum and Alexandria with oil from Baku. The oil trade was in fact one of the last refuges of deep-sea sailing, providing a new lease of life in European waters up to the First World War. Norwegian and Greek sailing shipowners were among the first independent European oil carriers. Oil transport was none the less risky because leakage from the barrels could lead to the loss of between 5 and 12 per cent of the cargo. Although on land this was just another messy problem, in the confined space of a cargo-hold the vapours could turn the ship into a ‘floating bomb’.9 Trading in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean was very different to that in the time of Odysseas. Anastassia sailed day and night as a result of the construction of lighthouses in the eastern Mediterranean, while the Dardanelles— and the Straits of Yeni Kale in the Azov Sea—were negotiated with the help of steam tugs: ‘[In July 1886, when we reached the entrance of the Dardanelles],

156 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

with the help of a steam tug we went through the Straits up to Kallipoli…. We saw both lights of Bosporus.’10 Equally, the difficulties of navigating on the Danube were diminished with the help of steam tugs, which as we saw in Chapter 3, belonged largely to Greeks: On 16 March at 1 p.m. we arrived fortunately at Sulina and obtained our free pratique [visa] where that same day the steam tug Penelope of Mr Theofilatos towed us together with other ships and we reached Galatz…. On the 18th of the same month we received orders and we took the ship to the loading point. Anastassia also sailed all year, and spent a good deal of time confronting bad winter weather: On the 1st January 1884 in latitude 37 25’ and longitude 18 35’ …the wind became a tempest and the sea became wild…although we were heaving with only the two foresails we still could not have peace or security. The sea was coming violently on deck and a huge wave washed off everything on its way…. The ship was tossed about on the stormy sea in such a way that the cargo was gradually moved to the lee side and because of that reason it keeled over about one and a half feet, so that her left side was almost constantly under the waves…. We continued sailing with the speed of 9 miles per hour.11 Anastassias logbook tells the same story as Figure 1.11: that Greek steamers replaced Greek sailing ships on the routes from the Mediterranean to northern Europe from the mid-1880s. Until 1883 Anastassia traded between the Black Sea and northern Europe; after 1884, however Anastassias activities did not go beyond Gibraltar. All the members of the Kulukundis family that commanded the ship must have had quite good schooling because their handwriting is very good and there are no spelling mistakes, in contrast to A.Mavrandonis, whose spelling is quite poor. Latitudes and longitudes are given systematically and the names of foreign ports are all given in correct Greek translation or transliteration, while voyage descriptions are always detailed. What is astonishing, however, is that during the eighteen years of voyages only one accident and one desertion were reported and no troubles from seamen or any illnesses were discussed. The logbook of Anastassia ends in 1898 and we lose track of the ship but not of its owners. Anastassia was sold in 1898, the same year the Kulukundis family bought its first steamship. Manolis Kulukundis, one of the leading twentiethcentury Greek shipowners and son of the master of Anastassia, Elias G.Kulukundis, reports: ‘I was born in 1898 the same month when my father purchased his first steamship, the Alexios Gangos, and sold the last family brig, the Anastassia.’12

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 157

If Anastassia worked during the decline of sail, Theofania sailed in the 1870s during its heyday and on completely different trade routes. Theofania was a 232– ton brig owned by its master, Anargyros B.Comnas from the island of Spetses. According to data in the Archangelos ship registries of 1870, A.B.Comnas appears as the owner and master. The ship sailed under the Greek flag, was built in 1865, and was registered in Spetses in 1867. The log, which gives us details of the ship’s voyages, covers the period 1873–6, was ‘counted and stamped’ by the General Consulate of Greece in London, and ‘contains forty-six pages…to be used as the logbook of the brig Theofania’.13 The importance of Theofania lies in the fact that it reveals a reluctant but nevertheless systematic penetration of Greek sailing ships into the Atlantic in the 1870s. The first Greek-flag ship to reach an American port is reported to have been the 300-ton brig Alexandros, which arrived at Boston on 14 August 1835 with a cargo of wine, olive oil and sultanas.14 After the 1870s, however, we have a series of reports from various sources of a number of Greek vessels trading in the Atlantic. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, for example, in his autobiography writes that: I commanded the [sailing] ship Comna from the month of November 1870, for four years and eight months continuously working in voyages between Asia Minor and Europe and my last trip with the said ship was from Syros to Taganrog (during the month of May 1874), Dunkirk, Cardiff, Sierra Leone, from Sierra Leone to Sherbro (Africa in North Latitude 8) where I met my brother Theodoros as Master on the ship of Dimitrios Koukoudakis from Hydra. From Sherbro we loaded a cargo of oil palm for Hamburg in Germany, from Hamburg I went at the river Thyne of England and from there to Corfu where we delivered cargo, from there I brought the ship to Syros and I delivered her to the owners in good condition and the voyage was profitable while I made all this round during thirteen months and 10 days.15 It is evident that the ‘Mediterranean captain, Anastassios Syrmas, made one trip in the Atlantic, from Africa to northern Europe, while his brother Captain Theodoros Syrmas seems to have continued to trade on Atlantic routes. In March 1876 Captain Anastassios was jobless in Marseilles when he received news from West Africa that Theodoros had gone to work in Rio de Janeiro. Anastassios decided to join him; while trying to find a passage to Rio, he reported on another Greek ship trading with Brazil: ‘During that time there was in Marseilles a ship from Andros belonging to Goulandris brothers, for Rio de Janeiro, and I asked the Master, Achilles Goulandris, to take me as a passenger.’16 Reports of Andriot ships trading in the Atlantic during the last third of the nineteenth century are also provided by the maritime historian of Andros, Demetrios Polemis, who notes that Matheos Embiricos’ sailing ship Lord Byron

158 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

sailed repeatedly to Philadelphia and other US ports between 1867 and 1871. Leonidas M.Embiricos on the brig Alcibiades travelled to North and South America and to the Indian Ocean in the 1880s, while the Athenian press reported in September 1898 that the Andriot sailing ship Goulandris arrived in Syros from America.17 Sailing ships from Ithaca seem also to have travelled in the Atlantic since the 1830s, while it is reported that ships from Kassos in the last third of the nineteenth century sailed in both the Atlantic and Pacific.18 Data are very scarce and most often come from oral history. What is extremely interesting is evidence, from both Greek and foreign sources, of Ithacan seamen serving on foreign ships to Australia.19 Indeed, an interesting if unstudied topic is the number of Greek seafarers manning foreign ships, dispersed around various world ports during the nineteenth century.20 The signs of the internationalisation of the Greek fleet in the twentieth century and its expansion to all oceans were already clear in the last third of the nineteenth century. Theofania was one of these pioneer Greek ships that paved the way for Greek penetration of the Atlantic routes. As Table 5.3 indicates, almost all Theofania’s voyages took place between West Africa and Europe, or between North America and Europe. In 1873 the ship made four passages, from Swansea to Philadelphia and back, from Britain to Sierra Leone, and from West Africa to Marseilles.21 Upon arrival at Swansea on 27 July: the cook Vasilios Ydraios from Spetses and the seaman Constantinos Michalbeis from Psara with a debt the first of three and a half pounds sterling and the second of six pounds sterling escaped stealing from the Master’s cabin various clothes and from the fo’castle a shirt and a coat of the seaman Constantine Coutouris from Chios, they took their clothes and the oilskins of the scribe. The loss of two seamen meant that the master had to hire whomever he could find at Swansea; in fact, one of the foreign seamen engaged was Italian, who caused serious problems later on. On the way to Marseilles Table 5.3 The Voyages of Theofania, 1873-6 Voyages 1873 Swansea-Philadelphia Philadelphia-Great Yarmouth Great Yarmouth-West Africa 1874 Sierra Leone-Marseilles Marseilles-West Africa

Dates February 1873-May 1873 June 1873-August 1873 August 1873-November 1873 December 1873-March 1874 April 1874-May 1874

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 159

Voyages

Dates

West Africa-Marseilles June 1874-September 1874 Marseilles-Dunkirk October 1874-January 1875 1875 Dunkirk—Demerara February 1875-May 1875 Demerara-Liverpool July 1875-August 1875 Liverpool-West Africa October 1875-February 1876 1876 West Africa-Falmouth-Havre March 1876-September 1876 Source: Logbook of Theofania, Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum

from West Africa, the ship experienced harsh weather conditions and was often in danger, especially on 14 February 1874 in the open sea of the Bay of Biscay: There was a west/south-west wind, extremely rough, so that at 2 a.m. we left the ship with the lower topsail and the foresail, the sea had become unbearable and we bore away the ship towards east/north-east wind. At 3 a.m. the deck was all flooded and the ship almost sank; then we broke the small boat with the hatchets and threw it in the sea and we broke two big barrels full of water in order to lighten up the ship; we wanted to throw the big boat too but we were afraid that we might do worse damage on the ship…we wanted to empty some of the cargo but we could not because of the restless waves that came from astern and flooded the deck. The ship began to spring a leak. We were in latitude 37 23′N and longitude 15 25′E. The tempest lasted 36 hours. A week after this storm, leaving Gibraltar, Theofania encountered another tempest that shifted the cargo and ‘tilted [the ship] two beams on the right hand side’. Next day when near Malaga, when the wind was calm, ‘we opened the hatches’ and straightened the ship. The trip from Sierra Leone to Marseilles took eighty-three days. In 1874, Theofania made three passages, one from Marseilles to Guinea and back and one from Sfax to Dunkirk. On the way from Sfax to Dunkirk Theofania saved the crew of a Neapolitan barque from Bona loaded with ore. In 1875 she made another three passages, one from Swansea to Demerara, another back to Liverpool, and a third from Liverpool to Brass 0in West Africa. This last trip proved fatal for the master, Anargyros Comnas. According to the log: Today [Monday 1/3/1876] the whole crew became sick except for the Master and one seaman. We brought immediately the doctor and with various medicines everybody started getting better apart from one. [On Friday] the Master got sick from a headache and a pain in the breast, and

160 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

the doctor came immediately and gave him medicine but he felt no relief. [On Saturday] he was not able to talk, the doctor kept coming every two hours but it was impossible to make him talk, so despite all medical care it was impossible to save his life, so that at 9 p.m. he gave up his spirit to the eternal monasteries giving inconsolable grief to his son who was on board and to the whole crew. Thus, Captain Anargyros Comnas from Spetses was buried in a small village on the West African coast and the Governor nominated Nicholas Comnas, his son, as master. A few days after the old master died the authority of the new master was challenged by a ‘foreign’ member of the crew: The master said to the Italian seaman Giovanni Krispo who was not ill to pull [the boat], the seaman replied that it is breakfast time and he does not do anything, then the master went in front of him and grabbed his hand and he told him that when I order you, you should listen, do you hear, so go and pull the boat, the seaman then took out a knife (that fortunately had no point) and gave the Master two stabs in his intimate parts with no success and a third one to his knee that hurt him a bit, and he jumped to the small boat that was next to the ship and cut the two ropes and went ashore and abandoned the boat and damaged it a bit, nobody could stop him because we were all sick. Then the master put the flag at half mast and the scribe of the nearby steamship came on board and took the Master to the steamship in order to narrate everything; the Master of the steamship told to the Master whether he wants him to put him to jail in Bona but the Master said no, but to keep him in the steamship until the ship is ready to sail and to bring him on the ship because he can find no seamen here. The ship, under the command of Nicholas Comnas, continued to Gabon and then to Falmouth, where it received orders to go to Havre to unload. This is where the log ends. At the end, however, an attachment tells us that D.Episcopulos, a Greek merchant/shipowner in Britain, purchased Theofania and changed her name to Phoenix. Captain Anastassios Syrmas was master of a brig similar to Theofania in the mid-1870s before he managed to become master of a steamship in 1880. He commanded all the four steamers we are going to examine. It is from his unpublished autobiography, the logbooks, books of expenses and correspondence all written in his own hand that we can follow so closely the activities of some of the first Greek-owned steamships. His writings and the careful collection of his professional and personal papers indicate a highly honest, knowledgeable and pedantic man who spent sixty of his eighty-two years at sea. It is illuminating to chart his path to command since Captain Syrmas provides a typical example of the generation of waged masters who moved from sail to steam.

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 161

Captain Syrmas was born in 1842 on the island of Hydra, the son of a bosun ‘who was washed overboard’ in 1847 and the grandson of a master. He went to school until the age of nine and at ten signed on as a ships boy on the sailing ship on which his uncle was bosun (later master). He remained under his uncle’s protection until 1864, serving under him as seaman, bosun, scribe and second mate. At the age of twenty-four, after a months classes on Syros, he passed the exams which permitted him to become a master. It seems that he had repeatedly visited Marseilles and Britain because after he became a master and left his uncles vessel, he was immediately asked in 1867 to take a ship to Marseilles and to command another one on a voyage to Newport in England. Although he had limited formal education, his handwriting was clear and he made few spelling or grammatical mistakes. He knew Italian, in which he received and replied to telegrams from his owners; he also learned to read and write English well during a five-month stay in Sunderland in the 1880s.22 Captain Syrmas served as a master of sailing ships owned by the Cosmas brothers from 1867 to 1875, during which time he made voyages to and from the main Mediterranean ports, as well as northern European harbours such as Rotterdam, Liverpool, Newport and Cardiff, and West African ports. The shipping crisis that began in the mid-1870s left him unemployed from 1875 to 1877, during which time he tried unsuccessfully to find work on steamers. He went to Marseilles to look for his brother Theodoros, also a master. Not hearing any news he went via Paris to London, to the only Greek shipping office, Vagliano Brothers. He asked Panaghi Vagliano for a job but Vagliano, not having one, sent him with a recommendation to another large shipowner, Basil Papayanni in Liverpool. Papayanni also had nothing to offer so Syrmas asked for a position as an AB, which he got. In this way, Captain Anastassios Syrmas at the age of thirty-five became an AB on Papayanni‘s Arcadia for a Liverpool– Malta– Syros-Smyrna-Constantinople-Liverpool voyage at a monthly wage of £3.5. His experience was so traumatic that after his return to Liverpool he asked Papayanni for a ticket home: I suffered a lot from the seamen during the voyage; they even hit me for something I did not do as it was later proven… I thought that I struggled in vain and that I lost my time on the English steamship, since I saw and learned that it is impossible for a foreigner to live with the English if he does not follow their ways, and forget every sacred thing, so I decided to return to the Homeland. In Greece, however, Syrmas did not find a suitable job and he returned to Marseilles to find a ship for Rio de Janeiro, where he had learned his brother was. Captain Syrmas reached Rio de Janeiro on the Dutch golette Reprise on 17 June 1876, where he found his brother employed as an officer on a 1,000-ton sailing vessel belonging to the Greek consul, Othon Leonardo, and trading along the Brazilian coast. Both brothers returned to Greece in September 1876 and

162 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘much to his sorrow’, returned to the command of a sailing ship belonging to his previous employers, the Cosma brothers, for another three years. In 1880 he resigned ‘because this is no job for me anymore to live with all my sacrifices’. That same year his luck changed and ‘Holy Providence that protects me always because I could not live anymore in that job’ found him an exciting new job that proved a turning point in his career and made him a steamship master. Captain Syrmas was to supervise the building of a new steamer ordered by the Chiot merchant/shipowners Nicolopulo Brothers in the shipyard of Bartram Haswell and Co in Sunderland and then to command that same ship. His employment on Calliope brought him luck in his personal life as well. In October 1881 he carried as passengers from Braila to Constantinople D.I.Polemis, a member of the well-known Andros shipping family, and his two daughters; eight months later, on 21 July 1882, the forty-two-year-old captain was married to twenty-two-year-old Anna Polemis. The couple made Andros their home and hence Anastassios Syrmas became an ‘adopted’ Andriot.23 Captain Syrmas commanded Calliope Nicolopulo for Nicolopulo & Son of Marseilles and Braila from 1880 to 1883, when the shipping crisis again left him jobless for almost three years; he served briefly on Scaramanga of O. Condostavlos of Andros in 1886. Subsequently, he worked for seventeen years for Foscolo & Mango of Constantinople on their ships, Thiresia (1887–92), Marietta Ralli (1892–5), and Demetrius S. Schilizzis (1895– 1904); for ten years for A.Embiricos of Braila, on Leonidas (1904–6), Andriana (1906–10) and Katina (1911–13); and spent his last working year on Styliani Bebi (1913–14) for K.Bebis and Sons of Bulgaria. He retired in 1914 and died ten years later.24 We are going to follow some of Captain Syrmas’ voyages on Calliope Nicolopulo, Demetrius S.Schilizzis, Leonidas and Andriana. Our information on Calliope Nicolopulo is based on a letterbook of Captain Syrmas that covers the years 1881–2; the letterbook contains mainly copies of his professional correspondence with the Nicolopulos. Calliope Nicolopulo (1,004 Table 5.4 Voyages of ss Calliope Nicolopulo, 1880–1 Voyages/Dates 1880 Sunderland-Syros November 1880– December 1880 1881 Sulina-Dunkirk December 1880–February 1881 Newport-Odessa March 1881 Braila-Stettin April 1881–May 1881 Riga-Newport May 1881 Newport-Marseilles June 1881

Cargo [Register of ship]

Maize Coal Grain Lumber Coal

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 163

Voyages/Dates

Cargo

Sulina-Hull August 1881–September 1881 Grain Cardiff-Marseilles September 1881– Coal October 1881 Sources: Professional correspondence of Captain Anastassios Syrmas with Nicolopulo Bros, letter books 1880–1, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos

NRT) made her maiden voyage on 10 November 1880 with a Greek crew and English first and third engineers. ‘We left today from Sunderland. …We came out of the port well until we regulated the compasses… We sail at about 9 miles per hour. The engine burns about 10.5 tons per day and night,’ wrote Captain Syrmas in his letter to D.Nicolopulo that same day. The ship and its cargo of coal arrived at Syros on 20 December 1880, where it was registered and then sailed for Constantinople, where it received orders for Sulina. From Constantinople on 31 December 1880 Captain Syrmas sent a letter to Panaghi Vagliano in London: My owner Mr Demetrius Nicolopulo told me to write to you about the behaviour of the steamship Calliope Nicolopulo at sea…. The ship is well built because despite the storms at sea from our voyage from England it did not leak at all…. It steers well when loaded but it suffers from the sea because it seems that it carries more cargo than it should according to the proportions of the shipbuilder. In 1881, when we have evidence of its whereabouts, Calliope made seven voyages from Braila, Sulina and Odessa with grain to Dunkirk, Stettin and Hull, with return cargoes of coal from Newport and Cardiff for Marseilles (see Table 5.4); once, in May, she carried lumber from Riga to Newport. Table 5.5 Voyages of ss Demetrius S.Schilizzis, 1895–1902 Voyages/Dates 1895 Nicolaieff-Genoa October 1895–November 1895 Odessa-Genoa November 1895–December 1895 1896 Smyrna-Hull January 1896–February 1896 Cardiff-Rio de Janeiro February 1896–March 1896 Buenos Aires-Bahia Blanca Dettford-Antwerp April 1896–June 1896 Laid up in Constantinople July 1896–August 1896 Yeisk-Southampton August 1896–October 1896

Cargo Grain Grain

Coal Animals, paper Grain

164 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Voyages/Dates 1900 Braila-Rotterdam July 1900–August 1900 Cardiff-Piraeus August 1900–September 1900 Taganrog-Marseilles September 1900–October 1900 Constantinople-Alexandria October 1900–November 1900 Braila-Galatz-Rotterdam November 1900–December 1900 Sunderland-Piraeus December 1900–January 1901 1901 Varna-Gijon February 1901–March 1901 Cardiff-Alexandria March 1901–April 1901 Achtary-Marseilles May 1901–June 1901 Sulina-Greenock June 1901–July 1901 Cardiff-Piraeus-Zarzis July 1901–August 1901 Benghazi-Hull September 1901 Cardiff-Alexandria September 1901–October 1901 Alexandria-Greenock November 1901–December 1901 Glasgow-Alexandria December 1901 1902 Alexandria-Hull January 1902 Cardiff-Constantinople January 1902– February 1902 Constantinople–Bristol March 1902 Bristol-Constantinople April 1902 Galatz–Antwerp May 1902–June 1902 Cardiff-Venice June 1902–July 1902 Mariupol–Bristol July 1902–August 1902 Taganrog-Yeisk-Mariupol-Falmouth September 1902–October 1902 Cardiff–Constantinople November 1902 Varna-Burghaz-Constanza-NaplesGenoa December 1902

Cargo Grain Coal Grain Grain Coal Grain Coal Grain Grain Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal

Coal Rye Coal Grain Grain Coal Grain

Sources: Books of expenses of ss Demetrius Schilizzis, 28/9/1895–19/10/1896, 8/5/1900– 13/3/1903; rough logbook of ss Demetrius Schilizzis, 7/6/1904, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 165

The method of trading remained the same as in the sailing ship era of the Chiot commercial and maritime network (see Chapter 2), calling at Constantinople, Malta, Gibraltar and Falmouth for orders and sending samples of grain to agents in the Baltic. On 7 September 1881 Captain Syrmas arrived at Falmouth for orders and on 12 September, still at Falmouth, sent a letter to D.Nicolopulo: ‘I telegraphed to Messrs Alatini Brothers in London. The same day I sent a sample of our cargo to London that was found in excellent condition…. Today, at 3:30 p.m. I received orders to proceed with Calliope to Hull.’ The Nicolopulos were typical merchants who became steamship owners. The main force in the company, and the main recipient of Syrmas’ letters, was Demetrius Nicolopulo, who was in Marseilles, while his son, Ioannis, was established in Braila. Their agents in Constantinople were Foscolo & Mango, while in London the Vagliano Brothers provided charters from northern Europe. When Syrmas arrived at Stettin on 9 May 1881 he wrote to D.Nicolopulo that ‘I received your telegram as follows: “Telegraph state of grain follow Vagliano instructions for all steamship affairs”. Today unloading started and the cargo is well and cold. Only part of the middle hold is hot and spoiled.’ Syrmas continued commanding Calliope Nicolopulo until May 1883 when ‘I was fired by the owners…without any hard feelings, they gave me a recommendation letter for my three years service accompanied with 40 Turkish lira.’25 Syrmas remained jobless for about three years, but from then until 1914, when he retired, he worked non-stop as a steamship master. In 1887 he was hired by Foscolo & Mango, with whom he remained for the next seventeen years until the company was dissolved. We can trace some of the voyages of the third steamship that Syrmas commanded for Foscolo & Mango, the Demetrius S.Schilizzis, from two books and two rough logs. Demetrius S.Schilizzis was a 1,277-NRT steamship built in 1893. Apart from one trip to Rio de Janeiro in 1896, all took place between the Mediterranean, Black Sea and northern European. From the four years that we have voyage data, Demetrius S.Schilizzis served a wide range of ports. On westbound voyages she carried grain almost exclusively from Braila, Galatz, Varna, Burghaz, Constanza, Taganrog, Achtary, Mariupol and Yeisk, and the north African ports of Alexandria and Benghazi, to Rotterdam, Antwerp, Greenock, Hull, Bristol, Marseilles, Naples and Genoa. On east– bound voyages she carried coal from Cardiff, Sunderland and Glasgow to Piraeus, Alexandria and Venice (see Table 5.5). Demetrius S.Schilizzis was sold in June 1904 to the Marseilles company, La Societe de Navigation a vapeur, and renamed Sainte-Helene. Syrmas learned the news in Constantinople and wrote in the logbook: On Thursday 9 June I received by the owners of the ship 1,500 French Francs for the expenses of this voyage and at 4:30 p.m. I was ordered by the owner Mr Albert Dajer to leave Constantinople. Speed of the ship 9 miles per hour. We passed through the Straits of Dardanelles, the Straits of

166 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Tenedos, on 11 June we moored in Andros to put ashore the Captains luggage…. On 14 June we passed by the island of Malta…. At 10.p.m. we entered the port of Sfax. After Sfax, Syrmas took the ship to Marseilles for its new owners. From July to December 1904 Captain Syrmas probably went home to Andros where he was hired by the most powerful mercantile and shipowning family of the island, the Embiricos. The first Embiricos ship he commanded was the 1,750–NRT Leonidas, built in 1896 and owned by Alcibiades Embiricos of Braila; Alcibiades’ agent in London was C.L.Embiricos. On 1 December 1904 in Piraeus, Captain Syrmas wrote in Leonidas log that ‘I undertook the command of the steamship Leonidas as a waged master with a monthly wage of 400 golden French Francs.’26 Leonidas logbook is the first example of an official log written by Syrmas, who gives a detailed and systematic account of each voyage, referring one after the other to all the capes, islands or shores that he passes, the nautical miles covered, his position at sea, and the speed of the ship (usually eight Table 5.6 Voyages of ss Leonidas, 1905–7 Voyages/Dates 1905 Taganrog-London March 1905–April 1905 Cardiff-Naples June 1905–July 1905 Taganrog-Amsterdam August 1905– September 1905 Cardiff-Torre Annunziato September 1905–October 1905 Taganrog-Marseilles October 1905– November 1905 1906 Novorossisk-Burghaz-Antwerp December 1905–February 1906 Cardiff-Genoa February 1906–March 1906 Taganrog-London April 1906–May 1906 Cardiff-Naples May 1906 Yeisk-Achtary-Liverpool June 1906– July 1906 Cardiff-Savonna August 1906 Galatz-Rotterdam September 1906– October 1906

Cargo Charterer Grain Coal Grain Coal Grain Sifneo, Kamillo, Fredebeck, Diamantides Grain Coal Grain Svoronos & Sons Coal Grain L.Dreyfus Coal Grain

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 167

Voyages/Dates

Cargo Charterer

Cardiff-Savonna October 1906– November 1906 Braila-Antwerp December 1906 1907 Cardiff-Venice January 1907– February 1907 Source: Logbook of ss Leonidas

Coal Grain Coal

or nine knots per hour). In 1905 and 1906, the ship exclusively carried grain from Taganrog, Yeisk, Achtary, Novorossisk, Galatz, Braila and Burghaz to London, Liverpool, Amsterdam and Rotterdam on westward passages, and coal from Cardiff to Marseilles, Naples, Torre Annunziato, Genoa and Savonna on eastward legs (Table 5.6). In 1906, Captain Syrmas was transferred from the twelve-year-old Leonidas to the new Andriana (1,867 NRT). He went to Sunderland to receive the ship and had his son, Theodoros, as second mate. He was apparently pleased by this transfer and on 8 August wrote to Alcibiades Embiricos: Table 5.7 Voyages of ss Andriana, 1906–10 Voyages/Dates 1906 Newcastle-Marseilles July 1906–August 1906 Achtary-Bremerhaven August 1906–September 1906 Cardiff-Naples September 1906–October 1906 Braila-Antwerp November 1906–January 1907 1907 Cardiff-Livorno January 1907–February 1907 Cardiff-Venice February 1907–April 1907 Berdiansk-Bremen April 1907–June 1907 Cardiff-Livorno June 1907–July 1907 Braila-Antwerp July 1907–September 1907 CardifF-Genoa September 1907–November 1907 Cardiff-Naples November 1907–December 1907 1908 Cardiff-Genoa December 1907–January 1908 Cardiff-Genoa February 1908–March 1908 Braila-Galatz-Rotterdam April 1908–May 1908 Cardiff-Naples May 1908–June 1908 Braila-Rotterdam June 1908–August 1908 Cardiff-Genoa August 1908–September 1908

Cargo Charterer Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal Coal Coal Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal

Louis Dreyfus

Russian exporters

168 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Voyages/Dates

Cargo Charterer

Cardiff-Livorno October 1908 Cardiff-Spezzia November 1908 Cardiff-Brindisi December 1908–January 1909 1909 Cardiff-Naples January 1909–February 1909 Cardiff-Venice March 1909 Taganrog-Rotterdam April 1909–May 1909 Cardiff-Genoa June 1909– July 1909 Taganrog-Emden July 1909–September 1909 Cardiff-Spezzia October 1909–November 1909 Braila-Rotterdam December 1909–January 1910 1910 Cardiff-Naples January 1910–February 1910

Coal Coal Coal Coal Coal Grain Coal Grain Coal Grain

Coal

Sources: Professional correspondence of Syrmas with the Embiricos in the letterbook, 19/ 7/1906–4/3/1909, logbook of ss Andriana, 5/3/1908–12/7/1909, and book of expenses of Andriana, 5/6/1906–5/2/1910 in the Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos

I received your letter of 6 of this month and I answer you that everything on s/s Andriana is fine and it is not short of anything—even a pin— without flattery she is beautiful, powerful and quick enough, her normal speed reached 9 knots with consumption of about 21 tons of British coal and we estimate with the first engineer of the ship that with a normal speed of 9 knots she will consume around 19 tons of the usual Cardiff coal. I am very pleased with the behaviour of the ship at sea, and of all the divisions of the holds of the ship that give great flexibility in receiving all kinds of cargoes, and I wish she has a good luck. On her first voyage to the Azov, however, Andriana had her first minor accident (see Table 5.7). On 10 September 1906 Captain Syrmas sent the following telegram to the Embiricos companies in Braila and London: ‘Andriana sailing

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 169

from Achtary grounded on bank 35 miles off Achtary. Jettisoned 60 tons bunkers and 70 tons cargo. Aground 6.5 hours. Passed Yenikale bar yesterday. Lloyd’s surveyed bottom. No damage. Engines small damage. Sailing today. Bound one port river Weser. Coaling Zongouldak.’27 According to Table 5.7 the voyage pattern of Andriana was almost identical to Leonidas, the only difference being that Andriana made a larger number of round-trips from Cardiff to Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Spezzia and Venice with coal and returned to Wales in ballast. As with Leonidas, Andriana carried grain from the Danube and Azov, as well as the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burghaz, but the destinations were not British but rather Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Emden and Bremen. The important activity of Greek steamships in British ports in the 1900s, as shown in Figure 1.11, was to carry coal to the Mediterranean coaling stations. The routine of Andriana’s voyages between the Black Sea and northern Europe was interrupted briefly on 30 October 1908 by an event that led to Captain Syrmas receiving a medal from the Italian government. Andriana was off the north-western coast of Spain bound for Cardiff when she met an Italian steamship: in a dangerous situation and distinguishing it from its red lights we approached and we asked them if they need help and they told us that they sink because of waters at the same time we saw them bringing down the life-boats. After half an hour we saved five people from a semi-sunk lifeboat…. The rest of the crew that was on board the sinking ship were shouting continuously for help to save them and we replied three times with the steam-whistle as a sign that we are going to salvage them holding our ship [in the same position] as much as we could. In this way we stayed for eight hours. At seven o’clock in the morning we verified that the ship was Italian from Genoa called Prudenzia and they were shouting to save them because they did not have another life-boat. Because of this we took down our big life-boat with four men, the second mate, the donkeyman, a seaman and an Italian of the already saved five, who on their own will followed my orders and went at the side of the sinking ship and they took the other 11 and brought them back on board safely…. From the 21 crew of the Italian ship we saved 16 that were disembarked in Cardiff. ORGANISATION AND PROFITABILITY OF VOYAGES The voyages of the seven ships examined were determined by the charters contracted between the shipowners and the shippers; all voyages have been calculated from the time that the ship loaded to the time it unloaded. As Alcibiades Embiricos dictated to Captain Syrmas, ‘every voyage will start from the day of departure from the port of unloading and will finish the day before [the day of departure from the port of unloading]’.28 The

170 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

specifications for each voyage were included in the charter party, which was in a standardised printed form in Italian, French or Greek in the Mediterranean trade since the early nineteenth century.29 Samples of charter parties of the last third of the century were found in the archive of Captain Alexander Arvaniti from Galaxidi, who was probably co-owner with Captain D. Katzulis of the brig Aghios Panteleimon in the 1870s. By that time charter parties were handled by special shipping agent/translators called courtiers maritimes in French, mediatori in Italian and mesites in Greek. In Marseilles in August 1873, D.Katzulis contracted the following chartepartie: CE JOUR Trente Août MIL HUIT CENT SOIXANTE et treize PAR L’ENTREMISE DE NOUS F.Parran COURTIER MARITIME PRES LA BOURSE DE CETTE VILLE DE Marseilles, LE CAPITAINE D.Katzuli COMMANDANT LE Brick grec APPELE Aio Pendaleimon en Registre Italien 100.1.1 DE cent quarante tonneaux de Jauge grecque ACTUELLEMENT ANCRE en ce port LE DIT CAPITAINE A NOLISE ET FRETE A Messieurs P & E. Rodocanachi Negociants de cette ville SON DIT NAVIRE pour aller directement à Galatz ou à Ibraile suivant les ordres qu’zil recevra à Galatz par Messieurs Ergastiriari et Platis d’Ibraila aux quels le dit capitaine écrira dès son arrivée a Galatz, et c’est pour recevoir dans un de ces points son plein et entier chargement de blé, le transporter et conduire directement a Livourne ou dans les quarante huit heures de son arrivée lui sera dit s’il doit débarquer dans ce port ou bien suivre son voyage pour Marseilles… LE PRESENT AFFRETEMENT EST FAIT ET CONVENU AU PRIX DE cinq franc par chaque cent soixante libres30 A few months later Captain Alexander Arvanitis took command of the ship and entered into another charter, a contratto di noleggio, in Constantinople on 28 April 1874. It seems that Captain Arvanitis worked well in 1874, because we have another charter party, navlosymfonitikon in Greek, signed in Constantinople on 1 October 1874 with the merchant Andreas Vagliano for a voyage for ‘Berdianska where in 24 hours, she should be ordered to load there in Mariupol, Yeisk or Taganrog’, from where she was to sail: for Zakynthos, where she will be ordered to unload there, or in one of the Ionian islands, or to continue in a safe Italian or French port to Marseilles included, taking second orders in Malta or Messina in 48 hours…. For freight rate of the present voyage the two parts have agreed for 3 francs and seven eighths if she is loaded in Taganrog …for every cargo of grain according to the measure of Marseilles.31

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 171

After signing the contract and loading grain in the Azov or on the Danube, Greek vessels always stopped in Constantinople for documents, supplies, watering’ and orders from shipping agents; this pause was a necessary part of the voyage, whether in sail or steam. The difference between the two was that sailing vessels took much more time in the straits and in Constantinople. During the age of sail, ships seeking charters waited in Constantinople. If they did not find one, frequently they sailed for the producing areas: ‘[After waiting in vain for charter in Constantinople we left for the Azov]…. Sailing under various winds in the sea of Azov, we reached Taganrog on the 28th April and we got out to the town the same day. On the 30th April we were chartered by the Vaglianos to carry a whole cargo of wheat from Taganrog for a Mediterranean port.’32 In the islands of origin or residence for the shipowners, like Syros for Anastassia or Andros in the case of Leonidas and Andriana, there were stops for manning, which gave the crew an opportunity to see their family for a short period of time.33 While Syros was the main maritime centre for repairs for sailing ships like Anastassia, the steamers that Captain Syrmas commanded were all repaired in Britain. While for many sailing vessels Syros was a necessary stop on the way to or from the western Mediterranean, not only for crewing and repairs but also for loans or chartering, by the last third of the century westward-bound steamers from Constantinople stopped not in Syros but at Piraeus for coaling. Subsequently, they stopped at Zakynthos, Messina, Malta, Gibraltar or Falmouth for orders from the shipowner. The efficiency and extent of the Greek maritime network was quite astonishing: at all Italian and French Mediterranean ports, as well as in northern Europe, there were agents who could handle everything the master might need. The average sailing ship was able to make about three voyages per year, while the average steamer could make eight. Similarly, voyage duration on a sailing vessel was around four months compared to six weeks on steamers. Apart from Odysseas, which sailed in the eastern Mediterranean, and Theofania, which operated mainly in the Atlantic, the remaining ships worked more or less on the same routes, from the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe (see Table 5.8). The fact that Greek sailing ships and the steamers that replaced them continued to travel the same routes until 1914 suggests that they were profitable. The intriguing question is ‘how profitable?’ The amounts that the Greek shipowners earned, whether recently or 100 years ago, are known to have been high, but the precise levels have never been known. Anything written on the subject is based on assumptions and generalisations. Two

172 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Table 5.8 Average number and duration of voyages per year Name of ship

Sample number Average of voyages number of voyages per year

A. Sailing ships Odysseas 9 Anastassia 45 Theofania 11 B. Steamships Calliope N. 8 Demetrius Sch. 25 Leonidas 15 Andriana 28 Sources: See Tables 5.1–5.7

Average duration of voyages year (months)

Laid-up time (months)

2.3 2.7 3.3

3.9 3.9 3.6

3 1.3

8 8.3 8 7.7

1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6

– –

Table 5.9 The profits of the voyages of Andriana, 1906–9 (in pounds sterling) Year

Number of A voyages Estimated * value of ship

B Estimated ** total revenues

C Voyage expenses

B-C Net profit

B-C/A % profit

1906 4 27,600 5,981 1,789 4,192 15 1907 7 27,600 11,348 2,278 9,070 33 1908 9 27,600 12,972 2,763 10,209 37 1909 7 27,600 9,796 2,814 6,982 25 Sources: Book of expenses of Andriana, 5/6/1906–5/2/1910; logbook of Andriana, 5/3/ 1908–12/7/1909 Notes: * We have calculated the price of Andriana using the price of £6 per deadweight ton given by ‘Angiers Brothers Steam Shipping Report 1906’, Fairplay, 3 January 1907. The deadweight tonnage of Andriana is estimated at 4,600 tons. ** From evidence given in the logbook and book of expenses we assume that Andriana carried an average of 4,600 tons of coal and 5,000 tons of grain in every charter, using the freight rates of coal (London– Mediterranean) and of wheat (Odessa–London) in C.Knick Harley, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850–1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 26, 1989, pp. 311–38

factors explain this situation: first, the lack of publicly available shipping data and, second, the secrecy of the profession. It is sheer luck that we have had access to expense books of the various steamers examined.34 Only Andriana, however, had enough archival material to enable the creation of Table 5.9.

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 173

Andriana was bought new in 1906 for about £27,600, and in the first four years of its life yielded an average of 28 per cent net on the original investment. In other words, within this time it was fully amortised. Considering that these years were characterised by low freight rates, we can understand why the Greek steamship fleet continued to grow to 1914 and after. The profitability of the Greek-owned fleet in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot, of course, be derived solely from the example of Andriana. This topic belongs to another chapter of Greek maritime economic history that remains to be written. MASTERS AND SEAMEN The number of seamen manning deep-sea vessels from the 1830s to 1914 ranged between 10,000 and 20,000 seamen annually, while the number on coastal craft fluctuated between 5,000 and 15,000 (see Table 5.10). Some official statistics on the number of seamen for the period 1839–75 are in the journal Pandora and A.N.Vernadakis’ book, About the Trade in Greece. Unfortunately, for the next forty-five years there are no government statistics. Table 5.10 therefore has been estimated by assuming an average of nine seamen per sailing ship, a number deduced from evidence for GreekTable 5.10 Greek seamen, 1839–1910 Deep-sea-going vessels*

All Greek vessels

Year

Number of sailing ships*

Number of Estimated steam ships* number of seamen

Number of ships

Seamen**

1839 1840 1843 1845 1851 1852 1853 1855 1860 1862 1864 1866 1868 1870 1874 1875 1876

1,070 1,019 949 1,114 1,437 1,375 1,329 1,525 1,212 1,153 1,230 1,355 1,450 1,484 1,518 1,565 1,567

_ – – – _ – – – _ – – 4 11 27 20 25 24

3,345 3,184 3,169 3,584 4,327 4,230 4,153 5,063 4,073 4,338 4,528 5,512 5,422 5,833 5,202

13,679 18,958 19,005 15,000 27,566 27,372 26,032 30,000 23,842 23,849 24,949 30,700 31,299 38,080 25,838

9,630 9,170 8,541 10,026 12,933 12,357 11,889 13,725 10,908 10,377 11,070 12,299 13,336 14,058 14,182 14,735 14,727

174 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Year

Deep-sea-going vessels*

All Greek vessels

Number of sailing ships*

Number of ships

Number of Estimated steam ships* number of seamen

Seamen**

1879 1,256 41 12,370 1883 1,318 50 13,162 1887 1,423 82 14,939 1888 1,834 98 19,152 1889 1,859 82 18,863 1890 1,838 97 19,064 1891 1,816 105 19,074 1892 1,834 162 20,718 1903 1,030 199 14,444 1905 1,095 214 15,419 1907 1,135 255 16,845 1909 980 287 16,282 1912 760 346 15,836 1913 788 365 16,582 1914 780 407 17,602 Sources: Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.1 Notes: * Estimated number of seamen on sailing ships over 60 tons, nine; estimated number of seamen on steamships over 100 tons, twenty-six. ** Includes fishermen

flag ships in the London Customs Bills of Entry and the French Sémaphore de Marseilles. The average crew on steamers was assumed to be twenty-five, based upon data from the nautologia (crew lists) in the archives of the Aegean Maritime Museum for the period 1908–14. These are similar to a remarkable set of British records known as the ‘Agreements and Accounts of Crew’. The Greek documents not only contain information on crew, Table 5.11 Composition of crew in an oceangoing Greek cargo sailing vessel of about 250 NRT Capacity

Number

Master First mate Carpenter Bosun ABs Total

1 1 1 1 4–6 8–10

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 175

Capacity

Number

Sources: Processed data of number of crews on Greek-fla sailing vessels; London Customs Bills of Entry and Sémaphore de Marseilles 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1890

including name, age, place of birth, wages, place and time of joining, place and time of discharge, and contributions to the Seamen’s Pension Fund (NAT), but also provide a wealth of detail about the vessels and their voyages. The nautologia were kept by the NAT to keep track of Greek seamen and to calculate their contributions to the fund. The crew of a deep-sea Greek cargo sailing vessel of about 250 NRT consisted of the master, mate, carpenter, bosun and four to six seamen, making a total number of eight to ten people (see Table 5.11). Ocean-going cargo steamers around 1914 carried crews of twenty-three to twenty-eight, about one-quarter of whom were officers, including the master, mates and engineers, while the remainder were ratings, such as the bosun, carpenter, ABs, firemen, coal trimmers, steward, cook and deckboys (see Table 5.12). Much of the good operation of a ship depended upon the master. As Eric Sager has correctly observed, there is no parallel to the master on land. At sea he ‘was employer and employee, wage-earner and business agent, working man and trustee of capital in his industry,35 The professional correspondence of Captain Anastassios Syrmas with Alcibiades Embiricos and his associates gives us an insight into the relations between waged masters and shipowners. Captain Syrmas communicated with his owners by mail and telegraph. Whenever he reached a port, his first duty was to send a telegram reporting his safe arrival. He then wrote letters every two days, reporting on the progress of loading or unloading, accompanied with excerpts from one of the logs, depending on what the shipowner asked for. The master’s education was based mainly on experience on board. Until the end of the nineteenth century the qualifications to become a master in Greece were determined by the 1836 royal decree ‘about policing the merchant marine’ and its amendments. Article 14 stated that to become a master of a B’ class merchant vessel, a man had to be twenty-two years of age, have at least four years’ experience at sea, and pass the state exams Table 5.12 Composition of crew in an oceangoing Greek cargo steamship vessel of about 2,000 GRT in 1910 Capacity

Number

Master Second mate Third mate Carpenter

1 1 1 1

176 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Capacity

Number

Bosun 1 ABs 4–6 Deck boys 2 First engineer 1 Second engineer 1 Third engineer 1 Engine boy 1 Firemen 4–6 Coal trimmers 1–2 Cook 1 Steward 1 Assistant steward 1 Total 23–8 Sources: Crew lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum

organised by a committee of masters in Athens, which were usually taken after a couple of months’ training with navigation masters in Syros, Nauplion or Hydra.36 But nothing could replace experience, and the best teachers were often the older seamen. Most masters were basically self-taught, which was also more or less true of their abilities in foreign languages as well. For example, Captain Syrmas knew Italian (the basic tool in the Mediterranean), could communicate in French, and learned good English during the five months he spent supervising the construction of Calliope. In fact, during the time that Syrmas was jobless in the mid–1880s, he translated a book from the English examination for a steam engineer because: From my own experience I saw the need, that every master or second mate of a steamship should have some knowledge of the engine as it happens in England…. Motivated hence by the eagerness to promote our Marine, that has no such books, I attempted with my own weak forces to translate this booklet…that describes clearly and briefly all about the engine. The majority of masters who commanded deep-sea sailing vessels were coowners to some extent. A large number of the masters on Greek-owned steamers in the last third of the nineteenth century, however, worked for wages and did not participate in ownership. This shift occurred because the largest number of steamships belonged to the large merchant/shipowners of the Ionian commercial and maritime network and were either newbuildings or just a few years old, which made them too expensive for masters. Given the ownership of these ships, it is also not surprising that the ‘aristocracy’ of waged masters came

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 177

overwhelmingly from Cephalonia and Ithaca. According to the Chiot shipowner, Andreas Lemos: The Cephalonian and Ithacan masters and other officers were the best among their colleagues from the Aegean islands…. They had better education and knew English which was the language of the international sea-trade…. They were preferred from the big shipping and commercial Houses—and especially from the Ionian ones—and were remunerated highest of all…. The Cephalonian masters constituted the aristocracy of the profession…. After the mooring of the ship and during the loading and unloading time they stayed in the best hotels and lived a luxurious life. While their Chiot, for example, colleagues stayed in their vessels that as a rule belonged partly to them, and they supervised the various port activities taking even part in them, because their ship was on credit and every possible economy had to be made.37 The masters were in most cases well-respected family men on their home islands, men of dignity and independent spirit. Such a man was Captain Anastassios Syrmas, whose fame in Andros as a just man outlived him.38 In July 1909, the sixty-seven-year old Syrmas wrote to his boss, Alcibiades Embiricos, the following, in response to pressure to lower Andriana’ victualling expenses to 1,000 francs per month: I also received your letter of 23/6 and I was sorry to see your writings. I am not selfish and my duty to my superiors I know because it is not the first time that I have served as an employee. The bosses have the right to make comments on the operation of the steamship because these help the Master to do his duty, but not to tell him off because the Masters are not slaves but the representatives of the shipowners…. Concerning the victualling expenses in the 23rd voyage, these are 1810.70 francs for 54 days, which means that for 30 days they are 1005.90 per month…. You see that all they are writing are false accusations…. Of course I owe my job to you but, with all due respect, your nephews are not worthy even to look at my picture, I mean Messrs Peraki and Leonidas [employees in the C.L.Embiricos office in London]. I am sorry, Sir, to upset you but these gentlemen have exhausted my patience. For the ten years he worked for the Embiricos, Captain Syrmas did not have any break from the sea, but a few months after writing the above letter he asked ‘to have little time to rest’. He was told that this could not be done unless he left his job. Captain Syrmas answered that ‘Since it is not possible [to have a little time to rest and] I do not wish to retire from the command of your steamship, hence please communicate to the Management that I will not leave my position until the time comes to be replaced by my son as you write to me.’39 It is quite

178 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

possible that Captain Syrmas remained with the Embiricos for longer than he wished because of his son, Theodoros. In fact, it seems that the Embiricos used his recruitment of his son to lower his wages and to control him: Thank you for your good will towards me, I wrote today to my son Theodoros that you give him the position of second mate with me in Andriana, in our next approach to Andros, concerning the wage 140 francs I believe he accepts and I also accept the wage of 350 francs, concerning the wages of the others I will announce it to them in time and I will write to you.40 In the year 1909, however, freight rates touched bottom. This may have been one of the reasons that Embiricos decided to lower the wages not only of the master (from 400 to 350 francs) and second mate (from 170 to 140 francs) but also of the whole crew.41 The nineteenth-century system, inherited from the sailing ship era, whereby the crews of Greek ships were either relatives or had common island origins continued in steam in the early twentieth century. From the logs of Odysseas, Anastassia and Theofania we have evidence of high-ranking officers who were sons, cousins or uncles of the master. Detailed evidence on the origin of the entire crew, however, exists for Leonidas and Andriana and verifies that most came from the island of Andros (see also Chapter 7). Captain Syrmas, as already mentioned, was an ‘adopted’ Andriot. In 1907, when Andriana had a crew of twenty-eight, the third mate was Syrmas’ son, Theodoros, and the fourth engineer his other son, Demetrius; apart from a British first engineer, almost all the rest of the crew came from Andros. In fact, investigation on a sample of steamships from their crew lists in 1910 has revealed that 71 per cent of the crew of Andriot steamships came from Andros. The equivalent percentage for steamships from Cephalonia and Ithaca was 50 per cent and for the Chiot ones 60 per cent.42Common island of origin contributed to the peaceful labour relations on board which proved a great advantage to Greek shipping. It is quite astonishing that in all logs practically no desertions were recorded; of course, the fact that in most cases the seamen’s salaries were paid to their families rather than directly to them might also have contributed. It seems that contrary to the common belief of contemporaries and maritime historians, Greek seamen were not paid significantly worse than their European counterparts. Table 5.13 gives the wages of an able seaman (AB) on the brigs Aghios Panteleimon and Phoenix from Galaxidi, which in 1875 traded between the Black Sea and Marseilles, compared with the

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 179

Table 5.13 Mean wages for able-bodied seamen on sailing vessels in selected ports (sterling/month) Port

1875

[Greek ports] [2.14]* Tonsberg 2.54 Dunkirk 2.62 Gothenburg 2.78 Copenhagen 2.98 London 3.05 Antwerp 3.39 Hamburg 3.52 Rotterdam 3.53 Sources: Appendix 5.1; Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Times of Sailing Vessels, 2nd vol., Athens, 1983, p. 597; Lewis R.Fischer, Around the Rim: Seamen’s Wages in North Sea Ports, 1863–1900’, in L.R.Fischer, Harald Hamre, Poul Holm and Jaap R.Bruijn (eds), The North Sea. Twelve Essays on Social History of Maritime Labour, Stavanger, Association of North sea Societies, 1992 Note: * Evidence from the crew of two sailing ships

mean wages of colleagues in the main northern European ports. Making the assumption that both vessels were typical vessel, we see that the AB on the Greek vessels had a wage of £2.14 per month, whereas colleagues in the Norwegian port of Tonsberg or the French port of Dunkirk had only 16 per cent more, in London 30 per cent more and in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg about 37 per cent more.43 Similarly, Table 5.14 gives the wages of Greek and Norwegian ABs and proves that on the eve of the First World War they were very similar (see also Appendix 5.1). Considering the enormous differences that existed in the last third of the nineteenth century in the standard of living between Greece and northern Europe, the differences in the ABs’ wages were small. Moreover, all the early Greek steamships, and certainly all those on which Captain Syrmas served, had British first engineers because of a shortage among Greek officers. The wages of first engineers were always the same as the masters and I doubt that British engineers would have preferred Greek steamships were wages not up to British standards. This is at the end of the nineteenth century when the integration of the world shipping market had taken place and certainly when the European shipping market conformed—for once—with the definition of neo-classical economies that a market is a geographic area in which the prices of a product tend to become unified. But as Marcus Rediker has pointed out, seamen’s wages were composed not only of the actual monetary remuneration but also of the so-called social wage comprising the small illegal trading he was able to do, living

180 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Table 5.14 Monthly wages for Greek and Norwegian ABs for deep-sea-going vessels (in French francs) Year

Greek

Norwegian***

1905 60* 65 1907 70* 70 1908 65* 78 1909 65* 74 1914 65** 77 Sources: Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘From Namsos to Halden: Myths and Realities in the History of Norwegian Seamen’s Wages, 1850–1914’, Scandina vian Economic History Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 1987, pp. 41–66; Appendix 6.1; books of crew wages of Andriana and Leonidas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos; crew lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum Notes: * Average wages of ABs of two steamships. ** Average wages of ABs of a hundred steamships. *** We have calculated 1.4 French francs=1 Norwegian kroner

quarters on board, and food.44 That seamen added to their wages with smallscale smuggling was (and is) a common practice. Proof of such practices on the ships examined here can be found in the logbook of Leonidas, where two Greek seamen tried to smuggle into Britain twenty-four tons of tobacco and were caught by British authorities.43 There is little evidence on the living conditions on the seven ships we have investigated. The only direct information is given by Captain Syrmas, who wrote to the sailing ship master, N.Gioni of Hydra, whom he had hired as a second mate on Calliope in 1880: ‘It is a fine ship and in your cabin you will have a bathroom, and you are going to be taken care of well, there will be, however, bugs.’46 Although there is no other information on quarters, there is ample evidence on the quality and quantity of food from the expense books and letterbooks. It has often been said by seamen as a joke that the cook is the most important man on board. In the limited space available food was a highly important part of daily life, and more often than not a permanent source of complaint. Captain Syrmas seemed to purchase good supplies for his crew. In March 1905, for example, in Taganrog he bought fifty pairs of chicken, two pigs, 700 eggs, beans, fresh meat, caviar, salt, vegetables, fresh fruit, flour, fresh bread and ships biscuits (galette). In August 1906 he bought twenty-eight chickens, 250 eggs, ten loaves of bread, thirty watermelons and twenty-five smoked fish at Yeni-Kale, while in Antwerp he bought meat and eggs; in Genoa, potatoes, onions, rice, and parmesan cheese; and in Naples, fresh meat, bread, pasta, olive oil, olives, beans, onions, fruit, eggs, preserved tomatoes, lemons, fish and vegetables. Alcohol was not prohibited on Greek ships, since alcoholism was not an issue among Greek seamen. Thus, Captain Syrmas bought wine in Constantinople, beer in Antwerp and ‘Jamaica rum’ in Britain.47 Of course, not all seamen were lucky enough to have Syrmas as a master, but he was probably

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 181

not unique. Syrmas had lived on ship food since he was nine years old, and having as a measure of comparison the food he ate on Greek sailing ships, he found the food and living conditions he had to put up with on the Dutch sailing ship Reprise in 1876 on his passage from Marseilles to Rio Janeiro unacceptable: After six days I fell sick from distress and I suffered extremely from headache so much that I never remember to have suffered so in my life… I suffered because of the place they had given me to sleep and secondly because of the lack of food appropriate for us for the way we live in our ships, although they all ate on the same table with the master and the second mate. Every day, however, they ate preserved meat, veal and pork, potatoes, salted vegetables, very little breakfast only tea in the morning…. The Dutch have a habit of drinking tea and coffee without sugar (only on Sunday) and I suppose this for the sake of economy, because I saw and I was surprised for the economy they do in everything, it is almost stinginess, may be it seems to me because their way of living is so calculated in everything, because we, it seems, do not know yet what is poverty, and they live in poverty although they are great nations.48 But of course good quality food on board costs more and thus Syrmas received letters from the Embiricos throughout 1908 asking him to limit the expenses for wages and victualling. But Captain Syrmas answered: Concerning the wages [and victualling] expenses of Andriana that are bigger than in your other steamships… I have written to you already. …. Every ship has a separate book and every Master a different administration, therefore my colleagues of the other steamships should look at their other expenses and not only to lower the wages and the victualling of the crew.49 Economy of operation is still something shipping managers expect of masters and is often a matter of continuous dispute between office and ‘bridge’. But the quality and cost of food, or the level of wages, are not under the jurisdiction of the Greek master of the 1990s. Still, it is quite astonishing to see how similar vessel operations and management were in 1914 compared to today. Captain Syrmas, who commanded a wind-driven 250–ton wooden vessel in 1864 and a 2, 000–ton steam-powered steel cargo vessel in 1914, would not find command of a 25,000–ton diesel-powered ship very different. Moreover, he could still be hired by, and would be able to argue with, an Embiricos—in this case Alcibiades’ grand-nephews, who to this day operate ships from London.

Part II THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

6 GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914– 39

The First World War confirmed the internationalisation of the Greek fleet, and the interwar period consolidated this position. Despite the transition from sail to steam at the turn of the century, the spatial activity of Greek ships remained centred on the Mediterranean, Black Sea and northern Europe. While a number of ships operated in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, this was exceptional. The First World War had a subversive impact on Greek shipping by limiting traditional markets while providing opportunities to transfer to the Atlantic from a base in London. The interwar years were transitional in the international division of labour in maritime transport, and changes that occurred then prevailed until after the Second World War. One of the main characteristics of these years was a distinct decline in British hegemony and the rise of the subsidised American liner fleet. A significant portion of the tramp trades were taken over by the Greeks, Japanese and Norwegians. The Greeks in particular were able to dominate on a number of bulk dry cargo routes. This chapter investigates the factors that led to these developments, focusing on the importance of the Greek shipping offices in London and their key role during the interwar years. There are four parts. The first deals with the Greek fleet during the First World War, and the second with the interwar period, distinguishing the sea lanes Greek ships traversed and the way they survived the international shipping crisis of the 1930s. The third and fourth parts trace the reasons for the rise of Greek shipping through an examination of the structure, function and interrelation of the Greek shipping offices in London with those in Greece. THE GREEK FLEET DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR The Great War started in August 1914 and ended officially in November 1918. Greece remained neutral until 1917, when it entered the war. The war marked the path for Greek shipping in two ways: first, it opened opportunities for new markets and new routes; second, it generated unprecedented profits for a large number of shipowners.

184 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.1 Position of ships lost in the First World War. Source: Appendix 6.1

Before the outbreak of the First World War most of the Greek merchant fleet carried bulk cargoes, especially grain, coal, cotton, wool and lumber, between the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. The closing of the Dardanelles in the autumn of 1914 meant the loss of Black Sea markets. Yet the war increased demand for maritime transport; Greek ships were chartered by the Allies and sent to all parts of the globe. They were particularly active in the Atlantic grain trade and European commerce, transporting coal from England to the Mediterranean and returning to England and France with phosphates and iron ore for the war industries. There was thus a distinct shift of Greek ships into the Atlantic and northern seas. Figure 6.1 indicates the areas where Greek ships were lost during the First World War; these are indicative of the routes the Greek merchant fleet sailed. Figure 6.1 shows that 26 percent of Greek ships were lost on the Atlantic, 12 per cent on the North Sea and only 31 percent in the Mediterranean. The strong demand for sea transport during the war led to an impressive increase in freight rates which made shipping extremely profitable, particularly for neutrals. Yet despite its neutrality Greece faced a number of difficulties. The division of its population between the Venizelists, supporters of the Entente, and the royalists, faithful to the Germanophile King Constantine II, led to the landing of Anglo-French troops in the country and the embargo of Athens/Piraeus. Since the Greek shipping offices in Piraeus were obliged to work through the British

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 185

Figure 6.2 Tramp shipping freights, 1910–36. Source: Appendix 6.3

legation in Athens, I was able to find a rich collection of telegrams from the Embiricos, Stathatos, Michalinos, Lykiardopulo, Pantaleon and other shipping offices in Foreign Office (FO) 286/602 at the Public Record Office in London. These messages indicate a much larger Greek participation in the Indian Ocean than is evident in Figure 6.1. As Figure 6.2 indicates, the years 1915–19 had the highest freight rates in a quarter-century. In addition, the Greek merchant fleet had the advantage that deep-sea vessels were particularly in demand; by that time a full 47 per cent of Greek ships were larger than 2,000 GRT, the highest percentage among the European Allies, apart from Britain and France (see Table 6.1). In fact the average size of Greek ships sunk during the First World War was 2,493 GRT (Appendix 6.1). As a result, in 1914–15 Greek shipowners earned about £8 million in net profits (about 200 million francs) at a time when the value of the merchant fleet was only about £4.5 million.1 Apart from high profits, the freight rates brought a large amount of money by enabling Greeks to sell a substantial portion of their fleet at good prices. Ship prices usually follow fluctuations in freight rates (cf. Figures

186 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.3 Percentage of ships lost during the First World War Source: Appendix 6.2 Table 6.1 Ships larger than 2,000 GRT as percentage of total national fleets in 1914 Country

% GRT

Greece 47 Netherlands 33 Spain 30 Italy 27 Norway 11 Denmark 11 Sweden 9 Source: A.Andreades, Les Effets Economiques et Sociales de la Guerre en Grèce, Paris, 1928, p. 107

6.2 and 6.4). During the war the Greeks sold almost 30 per cent of their prewar tonnage, 114 steamships of 259,617 GRT, to ‘foreigners’.2 Another 41 per cent of prewar tonnage, or 147 ships of 366,408 GRT (see Appendix 6.1), was lost due to the war. In fact during the first two years of the war, when the Greeks were neutral, 35 per cent of their wartime losses occurred, while the year they entered the war (1917), 51 percent of all their losses took place (see Figure 6.3). By the end of the war the Greeks had lost 626,025 GRT or 70 per cent of prewar tonnage. This percentage was the highest among European maritime nations: Britain lost 9,031,828 GRT (43 per cent of its fleet); France, 700,000 GRT (33 per cent); Norway, about 1,000,000 GRT (40 per cent); Italy,

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 187

862,000 GRT (52 per cent); and the US, about 530,000 GRT (10 per cent of its prewar fleet).3 During the war years, Greek shipowners earned an estimated £30 million from freights, sales and indemnities, of which half were net profits (see Table 6.2). The Greek state, in an attempt both to secure some proportion of excess war profits at a time of desperate need and to assure the rehabilitation of the lost fleet, in 1917 passed Law 1043/1917 ‘on taxing exceptional profits’. This law imposed two new taxes, one of 21.5 per cent on exceptional war profits and another of 22 per cent on the difference between the price of a ship purchased before the war and the amount of its war indemnity or sale. Both were imposed retroactively to the beginning of the war. The second tax, shown in column (A)− (B) in Table 6.2 and amounting to £3.5 million, was to be returned to the shipowners if within two years of the end of the war they had built or bought a vessel to replace the one lost or sold.4 The tax on exceptional war profits was annulled in 1918 and replaced with a tax exemption for profits earned by ships under the Greek flag. The attempt to avoid taxes, and the common belief that postwar economic reconstruction would bring long-term high freight rates, led many shipowners to hasten to buy ships at high prices. As a result, between 1919 and 1922 the Greek merchant fleet almost doubled (see Table 6.4). After 1920, however, there was a large and continuous fall in freight rates (Figures 6.2 and 6.14). Although the interwar period began with high hopes, the prevailing international climate significantly limited world sea trade. The Table 6.2 Taxes and profits of shipping during the First World War, 1915–19 (in pounds sterling)* Year

(A) Income from sales or indemnity

(B) Initial (A)−(B) value of ships Surplus profits

Final tax on Estimated surplus profits total profits (freights sales or indemnity)

1915 2,715,901 1,587,787 1,128,114 178,735 (4,000,000) 1916 5,744,491 1,773,983 3,970,508 862,871 (8,800,000) 1917 11,471,562 3,384,590 8,086,972 1,863,495 (7,480,000) 1918 3,537,005 1,102,894 2,434,111 504,647 (6,000,000) 1919 548,167 132,791 415,376 98,858 (4,000,000) Total 24,017,126 7,982,045 16,035,081 3,508,606 (30,280,000) Sources: D.G.Papamihalopulos, The State and the Merchant Marine, Athens, 1925, p. 88; Michel Lheritier, La Grèce, Paris, F.Rieder, 1921, p. 93, for the estimated numbers in brackets Note: * We have calculated 1 pound sterling=25 French francs

Black Sea grain trade was reduced substantially as a result of the Russian Revolution and the division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the same time, China and India underwent deep economic crises and ceased to provide large

188 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.4 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1919–39 Source: Appendix 6.4

markets for consumption. Meanwhile, virtually all countries were adopting protectionist policies. Together with the abrupt fall of the freight rates, there was a sharp drop in the prices of ships after 1920 (see Figure 6.4). The Greek shipowners who expected a continuation of high freight rates, as well as those who wanted to take advantage of the £3.5 million tax concession, spent about £12.1 million during 1919 and 1920 for ships whose value decreased by twothirds in 1921. This bankrupted a number of Greek shipowners, the most notorious example being Nicolas Ambatielos. On 17 July 1919, the Cephalonian shipowner, Nicholas Ambatielos, entered into a contract with the British government for the purchase of nine steamships at a total price of £2,275,000.5 These ships were under construction in British dockyards at Hong Kong and Shanghai. Delivery, according to Ambatielos, was to be made on dates fixed by the parties. Not one of the ships, however, was delivered on the promised date. At the time of the actual deliveries, the freight market had fallen considerably in comparison with the charges prevailing when the ships had been promised. As a result, Ambatielos was unable to realise the profit of £1 million which he had reckoned to make simply by sailing from the ports of construction to Europe. He did indeed make a net profit of £100,000 per ship with the first two ships, which were delivered after only comparatively short delays. The rest

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 189

of the ships were delivered three to six months late, which proved disastrous for Ambatielos. The tremendous plunge in the freight market in 1920 (see Figure 6.2) deprived him of the profit he would have earned had delivery been made at the times agreed. Hence, in November 1920, he was unable to meet the obligations provided in the contract and the British Ministry of Shipping and its successor, the Board of Trade, refused to deliver the last two ships. Finally, the British government seized the first seven as well. Ambatielos claimed arbitration and asked for damages. Mr Justice Hill, sitting in the English Admiralty Court, pronounced judgement on 15 January 1923, deciding that since no actual delivery dates were found in the 1919 contract, Ambatielos was not entitled to damages. The Greek shipowner was, of course, ruined financially.6 With the outstanding exception of this unfortunate story, however, the bulk of Greek shipowners re-entered the industry on a much smaller scale during the 1920s and more dramatically in the 1930s when ship prices were extremely low. THE GREEK FLEET DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD Despite the fact that during the First World War 40 per cent of the Greek fleet was engaged in trade outside the Mediterranean, when world commerce resumed its normal pace in the early 1920s, 80 per cent of the Greek fleet was again engaged in Black Sea and Mediterranean commerce (Figure 6.5). The internationalisation of the fleet, however, was not reversed and ten years later the shift to global routes was evident. By 1936 there was a significant change: the Mediterranean and Black Sea accounted for only 44 per cent of entrances, while 30 per cent occurred in northern Europe and 27 per cent in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. From 1914 to 1938 the Greek merchant fleet soared from thirteenth to ninth place among the largest national merchant marines, accounting for 3 per cent of world tonnage (see Table 6.3). More importantly, however, Greece now owned the second largest dry-cargo tramp fleet; its 16 per cent share trailed only Britain (39 per cent) and was ahead of Japan (11 per cent) and Norway (8 per cent, see Figure 6.6). Although we have no equivalent data with which to isolate the situation immediately prior to the First World War, we can safely assume that the shares of the dry-cargo tramp shipping market enjoyed by Greece, Norway and Japan came largely at the expense of the declining British tramp fleet. Moreover, these three newcomers also sustained the most dynamic shipping industries after the Second World War.7 Table 6.3 Top twelve merchant fleets, 1914–37 (ships above 100 GRT, in million GRT) 1914

1937

Country

1914

%

1921

1925

1930

1937

%

Britain

21.0

43

22.0

22.2

23.4

20.6

31

190 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.5 Geographical activity of Greek ships Source: Appendix 6.5 1914

1937

Country

1914

%

1921

1925

1930

1937

%

Germany USA Norway France Japan Italy Holland Sweden AustroHungary Russia/ USSR Spain Greece

5.5 5.4 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.0

11 11 5 5 4 3 3 2 2

0.7 17.0 2.5 3.6 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.2 –

3.0 15.4 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.0 2.6 1.3 –

4.2 14.0 3.7 3.5 4.3 3.3 3.1 1.6 –

3.9 12.4 4.3 2.8 4.5 3.2 2.6 1.5 –

6 18 6 4 7 5 4 2 –

1.0

2

0.4

0.3

0.5

1.3

2

0.9 0.8

2 2

1.2 0.6

1.2 0.9

1.2 1.4

1.0 1.9

1 3

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 191

1914 Country

1914

%

1937 1921

1925

1930

1937

%

World 49.1 95 62.0 64.6 68.6 66.7 90 Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30, using statistics of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1937/8

In 1919 and 1920, freight rates remained at record levels because of a shortage of ships due to war losses. The British shipbuilding project for standard ships was not yet complete and the disposal of the intact German fleet to the Allies did not begin until 1921. Thus, both freight rates and ship prices stayed abnormally high until late 1920. Following a sharp plunge, they then stabilised at much lower levels between 1922 and 1929 (see Figure 6.14). Although the Tokyo earthquake and the 1925 British general strike led to short-term surges, margins were always fairly tight in the 1920s. One of the most frequented new itineraries for Greek ships was between Britain and Argentina. This particular route provides the clearest example of the loss by the British tramp fleet of a significant long-distance market to the Greeks. Figure 6.7 indicates the arrivals of Greek ships at the River Plate. In the 1920s the involvement of the Greek fleet increased from nothing to a million net tons and, after coming to a complete standstill in 1930, it rose to 12 per cent of total arrivals in Argentinian ports. This accounted for a presence of 1.5 million tons, making the Greek flag the second biggest visitor to the River Plate after the British. By the late 1920s the British fleet had fully recovered its prewar importance in the Argentinian trade. The year 1929, however, marked the beginning of a decline in its share, which dropped by about 1.5 million tons in the course of the next decade, thereby decreasing the British fleet‘s importance in the Argentinian trade by a full 10 per cent (see Appendix 6.6).8 The problem in dealing with aggregate tonnage statistics from various ports is that it is impossible to separate the different trades involved. For example, there is no way to distinguish liners from tramps. Nevertheless, from the reports of the British Commercial Secretaries in Buenos Aires, we know that the proportion of tramps to liners sailing the British flag was much bigger than for other nationalities. Moreover, Stanley Sturmey has calculated that in 1937 there was a decrease of 1.5 million tons in the British tramp fleet. This fleet was mainly engaged in the coal trade, and Argentina was the terminus for one of its most important long-distance routes.9 Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the decline in the British share of Argentinian carriage was mainly due to a fall in its share of the tramp trade. This happened at a time when freight rates were at their nadir. Even so, as the Commercial Secretary of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires noted in 1932, ‘Greek vessels continue, however, to obtain an increasing proportion of these freights, and appear to be able to make ends meet when tonnage under other flags finds it impossible to do so.’

192 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.6 Tramp dry-cargo fleets, 1936. Source: Appendix 6.7

Indeed, the most extraordinary characteristic of the Greek fleet in the interwar period was its expansion during the world shipping crisis of Table 6.4 Greek-owned fleet 1919–38 Dry cargo Year

Ships

GRT

1914 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930

– – – – – 280 305 330 335 347 387 401 429

– – – – – 690,000 730,000 820,000 840,000 905,000 1,088,722 1,118,275 1,293,913

% total

Ships

Total GRT

90.5 88.1 89.8 90.3 81.4 87 82.8 91.5

475 282 335 440 418 432 437 467 472 504 528 547 559

893,650 430,237 494,269 685,000 737,450 762,353 828,635 912,609 929,619 1,111,052 1,256,965 1,350,157 1,413,020

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 193

Figure 6.7 Arrivals at the River Plate. Source: Appendix 6.6 Dry cargo Year

Ships

GRT

% total

Ships

1931 436 1,333,156 89.6 575 1932 429 1,323,967 92.5 558 1933 467 1,501,000 95.5 565 1934 501 1,666,658 95 600 1935 520 1,749,915 99.5 600 1936 509 1,722,867 96 605 1937 615 1938 638 Source: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1937, pp. 278, 313

Total GRT 1,487,623 1,430,418 1,572,159 1,755,223 1,758,731 1,793,659 1,894,631 1,889,269

the 1930s. After losing more than two-thirds of its tonnage by 1919, the Greek fleet surpassed its prewar level by 1925 and continued to increase. These high growth rates were sustained throughout most of the 1930s; by 1938 the 638 Greek ships totalled 1.9 million GRT, over 96 per cent of which was in cargo ships (Table 6.4). Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 compare the growth of the Greek, Norwegian and British merchant fleets with the world fleet. Figure 6.8 shows that for the entire interwar period the growth rate of the Greek fleet was substantially above the world average. In the 1920s annual growth exceeded 10 per cent for

194 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.8 Growth rates in Greek and world fleets Source: Processed data, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30

all but three years, while in the 1930s it varied between 5 and 10 per cent per year except for 1931 and 1933. What is really surprising, however, is that although both Norwegian and British shipping tracked the low to negative world growth rates during the worst. years of the slump, between 1932 and 1935 the Greek fleet grew rapidly in all but one year. This response to the world shipping crisis is a phenomenon that a Greek maritime economist has called ‘anticyclical investment behaviour’ by which Greek shipowners made purchases when the freight market was at its nadir and ships were cheap.10 While this anticyclical behaviour is no Greek invention, what is unique about the Greeks is that they practise it far more than any of their competitors. They buy ships not only to replace old tonnage or to serve a particular trade but also as speculative assets, buying cheap and selling dear. This habit, which has continued to the present day, makes the Greeks dominant in the London sale-and-purchase market and has contributed to the expansion of the fleet since the beginning of this century. But it was first identified as a strategic maritime policy of Greek companies during the shipping crisis of the 1930s. Pursuing this practice, the Greek shipping offices in London were able to exploit the crisis in the British fleet. Their strength lay in their knowledge of—and connections to—the London maritime market on the one hand, and on the structure of the Greek fleet —based on kinship, common island origin and single-ship ownership—on the other.

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 195

Figure 6.9 Growth rates in Norwegian and world fleets Source: Processed data, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30

THE LONDON SHIPPING OFFICES As indicated in Chapter 4, by 1914 the eleven Greek shipping offices in London handled about 230,000 GRT, accounting for 28 per cent of the fleet. Most tonnage was managed by offices owned by shipowners from Cephalonia and Andros (see Figure 6.11). By 1938, seventeen offices handled almost 1,000,000 GRT, or 48 per cent of the fleet. The new force was the offices of the shipowners from the small island of Kassos. Indeed, a single company, Rethymnis and Kulukundis (R&K), which accounted for four-fifths of Kassian tonnage, represented mainly Chiots. Thus, although shipowners from Cephalonia and Andros established a few additional offices, the Chiot owners were the dynamic force in the Greek fleet, either with their own firms or under R&K. The categorisation of the London offices by island of origin is vital to understand the way Greeks functioned. A London office not only represented the interests of Greek companies but also took shares in practically every ship administered. Thus, rather than being simply shipping agents or brokers, the London offices formed a group of companies with fragmented ownership. In what amounted to a reliance upon trust, a Chiot preferred a fellow-islander to represent his interests, as did a Cephalonian or an Andriot; offices like R&K, which represented the interests of shipowners from other islands, were the exception rather than the rule. It was perceived that a compatriot from the same

196 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.10 Growth rates in British and world fleets Source: Processed data, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30

island—or better still, from the same village or the same family—would handle his interests better than a ‘foreigner’. Islands were small independent entities with tightly knit communities and in Greek shipping this was reflected in the cooperative character of the London offices. The Greek shipping offices in London operated their own ships as well as those of other companies based in Greece. They were first and foremost agencies of shipowning companies established in Greece to avoid taxes otherwise payable in Britain. In Lloyd’s Register these offices were mentioned not in the List of Owners and Shipowners but rather by the provision of alternative addresses cited as ‘London agencies’ in small italics beneath the details for a Greek owner. Despite the indication that many companies were based in Piraeus or elsewhere in Greece, the London agencies were in fact usually the owners of a number of the companies they represented. Figure 6.12 depicts the structure of these London offices operating ships for their own Greek firms or other Greek companies. In most cases, the London offices and the companies represented had shares in each other’s ships. The purchase of a ship for a client usually required the latter to advance half the amount, with the other half secured by the London office or other collaborating British companies. Moreover, the London offices handled sales and purchases of used ships, provided chartering through the Baltic Exchange, and took care of insurance and fuel. A number of shipowners, by handing over half the purchase

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 197

Figure 6.11 Tonnage represented by London Greek offices according to the islands of origin of the shipowners. Source: Appendices 4.19 and 6.10

price of a ship, thereby had their ship chartered, insured and fuelled, leaving them to provide only crews and maintenance. This system apparently reduced overheads sufficiently to cover the payments on borrowed capital and commissions. According to the shipowner Nicholas B.Metaxas, before the First World War ‘the offices’ profits earned from each client is estimated at an average of 14 per cent on the amount of the loan’.11 By 1931 this percentage of profits was sustained. The Greek Committee for the Merchant Marine reported that ‘these commissions surpassed £1,000 per ship annually. In this way, a cargo ship worth £10,000, with a mortgage on half of its value, gives to the lender-administrator £1,500 annually. This means that there was 30 per cent interest rate on capital-loans.’12 Greek shipping companies collaborated with a number of British firms that provided finance or brokerage services. Such enterprises usually employed experienced Greeks. The most famous of these employees were Evangelos Ambatielos and Angelo Lusi who, after working for R.Wigham-Richardson for years, each opened his own shipping office. Wigham-Richardson provided finance for the Michalinos office, while Lambert Bros extended loans to a large number of Greek owners through R&K.13 A closer analysis of the workings of R&K will shed further light on the activities of the Greek offices.14 The R&K office was situated at Holland House, Bury Street, London EC3. Established in 1921 by Manolis Kulukundis, a member of an old shipowning family, and his cousin, Captain Minas Rethymnis, by 1938

198 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.12 London Greek shipping offices

it operated fifty ships of 230,000 GRT—12 per cent of the entire Greek fleet. R&K in that same year represented twelve Greek shipping companies from Piraeus. Figure 6.13 depicts its structure. Of the fifty ships it handled, thirty-four were under the four companies of Kulukundis and Rethymnis while the remainder belonged to other Greek firms. From the Piraeus ship registries I was able to trace the ownership of twenty R&K ships (see Table 6.5). Four members of the Rethymnis family and eight of the Kulukundis clan owned an average of 42 per cent of the ships concerned. Wives and sisters at least nominally owned a significant portion, while the rest were owned by other Kassiots or Chiots. The collaboration with the Chiots began just three years after R&K’s founding, winning the trust of large numbers of Chiots contributed enormously to its success.15 As we can see from Figure 6.13, seven of the companies represented by R&K were from Chios (predominantly single-shipowners), while another two came from the Aegean islands of Leros (Roussos) and Samos (Inglessis). The Chiots also owned shares in most of Kulukundis’ own ships. Two companies represented by R&K accounted for almost half the tonnage and belonged to the Kulukundis family; both appeared in Lloyd’s Register as Greek-based, although in fact they were operated from London.16 The third company that was important

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 199

for R&K was Kassos Steam Navigation, in which the Rethymnis family held 40 per cent of the shares. Kassos was formed with Rethymnis’ cousin Michael Pneumaticos, and his brother-in-law Stathis Yannaghas. By 1938 the company had seven ships and its Syros office was staffed by two employees, who kept the books of all seven, and provided crews preferably from Kassos and Syros.17 R&K’s growth relied on its knowledge of the London secondhand market and its successful exploitation of opportunities. In fact, it was Lord Inchcape who gave R&K its first deal. At the beginning of 1921 Inchcape, on behalf of the Inter-Allied Commission in Britain, began to dispose of the German ships seized as reparations. R&K bought a 6,000-GRT long-bridge cargo ship for E.Hadjilias at the bargain price of £17,000 (at the beginning of 1920, it would have cost triple the amount, see Appendix 6.4).18 Manolis Kulukundis reportedly spent his weekends photographing these ships for clients. Eventually R&K bought another nine ex-German vessels for Chiot owners, thus establishing the offices reputation among this group.19 Between 1922 and 1925 R&K purchased at least forty secondhand ships.20 Its assured financing came from Greek shipowners and subsequently from Lambert Brothers. R&K’s collaboration with this British firm proved extremely important, since British banks were not inclined to finance purchases of older ships. In 1937, for example, only 8 per cent of British, 11 per cent of Japanese and 16 per cent of Norwegian craft were older than twenty-five years, while 45 per cent of Greek ships were at least this old, the highest percentage among the twelve leading maritime countries. Similarly, only 6 per cent of the Greek-owned fleet was newer than fifteen years, while 49 per cent was between fifteen and twenty-five years old.21 R&K’s major success was its massive purchases between 1932 and 1934 of the First World War standard ships. This time it was Lord Kylsant who ‘helped’ the leading Greek tramp brokers after the shipping crisis caused the collapse of his own maritime empire. His Royal Mail Group, which controlled a large number of British companies, represented nearly 15 per cent of the entire British fleet. Its 2.6 million GRT was liquidated in 1930.22 Kylsant had bought seventyseven of the government’s standard wartime ships in 1919 and put them up for sale in the early 1930s, further depressing already low ship prices.23 If R&K considered it a success to purchase a ship for £17,000 in 1922, ten years later it purchased ships of a similar age for £4,500–7,500 (Table 6.5). In the end, R&K bought at least twelve ships from the Kylsant-controlled Elder Dempster, UnionCastle and Pacific Steam Navigation companies. The early 1930s also marked the appearance of the first successful twentiethcentury Greek liner company, Hellenic Lines, founded by Pericles Kallimanopulos. This firm, which was able to participate in various conferences, survived for more than fifty years before perishing with its founder in the 1980s.24 This raises the question of why Greeks did not enter liner

200 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 6.13 London Greek shipping office Rethymnis and Kulukundis Table 6.5 Ownership structure of the Rethymnis and Kulukundis ships Kulukundis family

Rethymnis family

Nameship

Built

Bought Price (pounds) ( % ownership in the 100 shares)

1. Aeas

1915

1934

11,000

0

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 201

Kulukundis family Nameship

Built

Rethymnis family

Bought Price (pounds) ( % ownership in the 100 shares)

2. Akti 1920 1924 34 3. Atlanticos 1919 1934 70 4. Delphoi 1915 1934 9,750 30 5. Kyriakoula 1918 1934 30 6. Marietta 1913 1935 10,000 10 7. Marpessa 1919 1934 10 8. Mount Athos 1913 1932 4,550 40 9. Mount Dirfys 1924 1937 9,157 56 10. Mount 1918 1935 80 Helicon 11. Mount Ida 1918 1933 6,125 40 12. Mount 1918 1937 6,410 71 Kassion 13. Mount 1907 1937 8,500 35 Mykale 14. Mount 1920 1932 7,300 42 Olympus 15. Mount 1921 67 Parnassus 16. Mount 1917 1933 4,550 45 Parnes 17. Mount 1917 1934 99 Pentelikon 18. Mount Pera 1918 1933 5,500 15 19. Mount 1920 1937 7,320 72 Pindus 20. Mount 1919 1934 7,500 0 Rhodope Ownership participation of R&K in 20 of the operated ships: 42% Sources: Greek Ministry of Shipping, Ship Registries, Port Authorities of Piraeus, books 1–10

shipping in any great numbers. The most important, if tentative, answer would stress the lack of a significant national industrial market, the dominance of large western European and American liner companies, and a dearth of adequate domestic infrastructure. These three factors are not meant to be all-encompassing nor do they necessary apply to all nations, since today ‘small’ countries like Israel and Taiwan operate some of the worlds largest container lines.25 The international shipping crisis also hit Greek shipping. In 1932, 118 ships, or 27 per cent of all cargo vessels, were laid-up.26 In 1933 a number were sold to

202 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Italian scrapyards for £1,800–2,000 each, but this was insufficient to cover the amount owed to Lambert Brothers, the main lender to R&K clients.27 Manolis Kulukundis negotiated an extension of the loans, on the grounds that this would increase the likelihood of repayment. R&K then launched a massive sale and purchase programme based on the principle of ‘scrap and build’, a method already practised by several European governments. In this way it was able to renew its fleet as well as to bring more Greek shipowners into the London market. Indeed, a number of Chiot owners at this time bought their first ship since the end of the First World War. Between 1932 and 1934 R&K made thirtyeight deals in London’s secondhand market.28 Each new ship was designated by the preface Mount, followed by the name of a Greek mountain; by 1938 R&K operated twenty-seven of these ships.29 R&K’s response to the crisis served as an example to the other Greek offices in London, and Greek owners thus survived by expanding rather than decreasing their fleets.30 On the one hand, then, successful negotiations with their lenders gave Greek owners the opportunity to renew and expand their fleets. On the other, Greek shipping offices in London further protected their interests and those of the shipowners they represented by contributing to the formation of the Tramp Shipping Administration Committee (TSAC) in Britain in 1935. In an international move towards protectionism, various European governments responded to the crisis by introducing operating subsidies for tramps: Germany and Holland did so in 1933, France in 1934 and Britain in 1935 through the British Shipping (Assistance) Act.31 Greek shipowners, unable to get such subsidies from their government, took advantage of the fact that they controlled the second most important world tramp fleet to protect themselves by initiating in 1935 through their London offices— according to Manuel Kulukundis—the Minimum Rate Scheme (MRS). This was an agreement among the shipowners of various European countries to set minimum freight rates in international tramp shipping, as well as to avoid further price deterioration by proscribing voyages in ballast by unfixed vessels in administered trades.32 According to Manuel Kulukundis: On the 14th of January of 1935 an historic meeting took place between the British and the Greek Tramp Shipowners which resulted in the establishment of the Minimum Rate Scheme. The Scheme, devised and proposed by the Greeks, was adopted by the British and within a week the Norwegians and Dutch adhered too as did a little later the French and Italians. It became operative on the 15th of March 1935 and an international Committee was formed to administer it.33 The TSAC, with international support, successfully supervised the operation of the MRS until 1939. At the same time, the London Greeks decided to form a corporate entity to advise the Union of Greek Shipowners on the scheme; thus in 1935 the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, which has remained an important policy-maker to this day, was formed.34

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 203

Plate 1 Commercial and maritime networks, nineteenth century

204 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 2 The traditionals, Ithaca and Andros: Stathatos and Embiricos

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 205

Plate 3 The traditionals, Kassos: Kulukundis

206 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 4 The traditionals, Cephalonia: Lykiardopulo

The MRS helped to avoid further deterioration in tramp freight rates, which indeed increased considerably after 1935 (see Figure 6.14). Apart from the positive influence of the MRS, the profits of the London offices remained high

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 207

Plate 5 The traditionals, Myconos: Dracopoulos

208 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 6 The traditionals, Chios: Livanos

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 209

Plate 7 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Onassis Group

210 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 8 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Eletson Corporation

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 211

Plate 9 Post-Second World War shipowners: Tsakos Shipping & Trading

during the second half of the 1930s because of the Spanish Civil War, the ItaloEthiopian War of 1934–5 and the sales of Greek ships to Germany, which although prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles proved extremely profitable. The high profits induced the opening of more Greek shipping offices. Where in 1929

212 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 10 Post-Second World War shipowners: Sarlis Container Services

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 213

Plate 11 Post-Second World War shipowners: Costamare Shipping

214 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 12 Greek seamen, nineteenth century

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 215

Plate 13 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1900s–1940s

there were thirteen such offices, by 1939 there were seventeen (see Appendices 6. 9 and 6.10). Britain was the nation most directly affected by the expansion of the Greek merchant fleet, which consisted almost entirely of tramp cargo ships. British shipowners tried to weaken the Greeks by lobbying underwriters to stop issuing

216 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 14 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1950s

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 217

Plate 15 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1960s–1970s

218 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Plate 16 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1980s–1990s

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 219

Figure 6.14 Tramp freight index. Source: Appendix 6.3

policies or at least to raise substantially insurance premiums for their ageing ships in the late 1920s and 1930s. That they had some success is not surprising, since many British shipowners were underwriting members of Lloyd’s. The confrontation started in the Argentinia where the Greeks were gradually displacing the British. The year 1925 was dismal for shipowners in general, but especially for tramp owners. The Commercial Secretary of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that ‘the depressed condition of the market resulted in many steamers laying up in the river, and at one time some thirty Greek vessels alone were tied up at Villa Constitucion for several months’.35 After a short upheaval in 1926, freights fell again in 1927, which was when Lloyd’s underwriters took a hard line. According to Manuel Kulukundis: During September 1927, Bunge, the big Merchant House of grain in Argentina started negotiations with Lloyd’s for the renovation of the cover insurance of the cargoes transported from Plate to Europe. The insurers offered Bunge a big discount on premiums if they accepted in excluding Greek ships from carrying their cargoes. Bunge accepted under the condition that some Greek shipowners were included and gave Lloyd’s a list of some Greek offices in London that represented around 60 ships; that was the famous ‘approved’ list…. Since that was disastrous for the Greek merchant fleet…. I asked immediately for an interview from the Lloyd’s

220 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Committee and the leader of the cargo underwriters. I asked for the abolishment of the ‘approved’ list of the Greek ships and we agreed on a specific additional premium which all Greek ships would pay, even the newly built ones.36 In broking this compromise, Kulukundis ensured a common approach towards all Greek shipowners, including his present and future clients. Although some shipowners on the ‘approved list’ protested, the agreement guaranteed the fair treatment of all Greek shipping and removed an obstacle to future expansion. Apparently R&K had the appropriate information about Lloyd’s plans, since it wash eavily involved in the Argentinian trade.37 Ten years later, as Kulukundis writes, Lloyd’s underwriters struck again: On the pretext that most of the Greek Tramp ships were old, they revived the demand of extra premium on the insurance of the cargoes carried by Greek vessels, even though we had solved the problem, by agreeing, years before, to a scale of extra premiums, for all the ships, even the new ones. Our insurance brokers advised us of the trouble that was brewing. Justification for this demand was the argument that the Greek ships had caused losses to the Underwriters, on the River Plate cover, but they were not giving us figures to support it! There was no loss of Greek ships carrying Plate cargoes in that period. We sought a meeting with Lloyd’s to discuss with the Underwriters and Mr A.Luzi, the vice-president of our Committee, and myself, met with Sir Eustace Pulbrook and other underwriters. The result was that ‘Sir Eustace promised that the Underwriters would reconsider their position.’ Thereafter the subject remained dormant and Greek owners never paid extra premiums. The close connections of the Greek shipping offices to the British market proved fundamental in the protection and continuation of the fleet’s activities in particular trades. It is evident that the successful Greek competition generated sharp reactions in Britain. To many, the foreigners were guilty of using British infra-structure (chartering, finance, and insurance companies) to develop at their expense. British rhetoric against the Greek shipping industry in the House of Commons sometimes became inflammatory: Let’s come to the Greeks, now. When two Greeks meet, they become partners, buy a ship and turn it into a family residence. A load of wives and children work on the ship under conditions which according to British seamen’s standards are unacceptable. When they multiply through births they buy another ship and move there the part of the family that is superabundant. And we allow them to approach our ports! They are able to work with costs and under conditions which enable them to compete with

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 221

us and decrease freight rates to very low levels and seize our commerce from our hands.38 Disregarding the ethnocentricity, the speaker did make a few valid points. Family ties, which characterised not only ownership but also manning, were important; Greek ships, which in 1938 averaged twenty-seven years, were old; and labour relations were pivotal to low running costs. But what he missed was the importance of the fact that half of Greek ships were managed by single-ship companies. SHIPPING COMPANIES IN GREECE During the interwar period two main ownership characteristics provided strength and flexibility to the activities of the London offices. These were the family/ island ties that linked them with the shipping companies situated in Greece and the nature of the single-ship companies. The Greek shipping company of the interwar years was based upon a cooperative form of organisation, initially stemming from family/kinship ties, and later extending to local island coownerships. The basic factors of production were recruited primarily from the family; when these became insufficient, they were drawn from the extended family and later from the same island Table 6.6 Single-ship companies and the Greek fleet Year

Total fleet

Single-ship fleet

Companies Ships GRT

Companies %

Ships %

GRT

%

139 210

139 210

254,570 606,608

31 34

1914 256 454 822,906 1938 308 671 1,796,635 Sources: Appendices 4.14 and 6.11

54 68

31 31

population. Local historians always refer with great pride to the opening of an island’s first London office, regarding it as only natural that this office would work for the prosperity of the whole shipping community. Indeed, the Greek fleet in the interwar period was characterised by the collaborative character of the relations between each London office and the shipping companies it represented. The unity based on island/kinship ties was sufficiently tight to generate, in effect, a single entrepreneurial group. In this way, single-ship owners and other small investors concentrated their activities around the island’s biggest owners, who were able to open an office in London. And if many of the founders of these London offices became successful shipowners, so did many of their clients. In the interwar era it was the London office which made it attractive to compatriots, relatives and friends to purchase ships and then operated the vessels in their best interests. The fact that such people trusted their life’s savings to a rich

222 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

compatriot’s London office rested on a relationship that went beyond the purely economic and was shaped by social and personal relations.39 Most interwar shipowners who came from the ranks of the officers of the merchant marine started as single-shipowners. As Table 6.6 shows, in 1914 54 per cent of the Greek shipping companies were single-ship entities, operating one-third of all ships and tonnage. In fact, the entrance of a significant number of new shipowners in the 1930s increased these proportions. As Table 6.7 indicates, in 1931 Greece had the highest percentage of single-ship companies, followed by Denmark and Holland while on the eve of the Second World War this percentage was slightly smaller at 68 per cent. Single-ship companies contributed to Greek competitiveness and ultimately to the consolidation of its hold on a significant portion of international tramp shipping. This was largely due to the fact that between 1924 and 1934 crew wages decreased by 40 per cent and the number of crew members by 30 per cent (see the next chapter). The high elasticity of Greek wages lay in the particular characteristics of Greek companies, especially singleships firms. Single-ship companies were distinguished by two important characteristics that gave them the ability to decrease costs during the crisis. First, the Table 6.7 Single-ship companies in the various national fleets, 1931–2 Country

(A) Total number of (B) Single-ship companie companies

(A)/(B) %

Greece 281 207 74 Denmark 269 188 70 Holland 428 282 66 Germany 612 399 65 Japan 643 407 63 Italy 836 529 63 Sweden 578 356 62 Spain 359 219 61 Norway 867 529 61 France 565 319 56 USA 1,016 542 53 Great Britain 2,800 1,472 53 Sources: Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910– 1939. The Coexistence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia, 1991, table 23; data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1931–2, and Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, October 1932, p. 938

presence of so many owners on board as masters or chief engineers enabled them to keep costs under control and to keep up maintenance. Moreover, profit maximisation was not always the main point; survival even at a loss was not an unusual goal in these troubled times.

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 223

Not all single-ships were represented by the London offices. In fact, according to Lloyd’s Register, in 1935 only fifty, comprising 22 per cent of the number and 27 per cent of the tonnage of all single-ships, were represented by London offices. Most of the sales and purchases of such craft, however, went through these offices. The activities of single-ships took place largely in the Mediterranean, where they accounted for 85 per cent of the activities of the fleet in 1926 and 42 per cent in 1938. Despite the internationalisation of Greek shipping in the 1930s, Athens, Piraeus, Syros and Chios were still important operational centres throughout the interwar period. Moreover, despite the importance of the London shipping offices/agencies and the fact that they represented 45 per cent of the fleet, according to Lloyd’s 96 per cent of the total tonnage was owned by firms based in Greece. This was a time during which the Greek flag was used to the greatest extent; the famous mortgage law of 1910, in combination with minimal taxes, ensured this. The London offices proved vital for the optimal utilisation of this law, alleviating the tightness of credit by providing finance from their own or British sources. During the interwar period the Greek merchant marine rose to become the second most important fleet in world tramping. One set of reasons for this involved the activities of the Greek shipping offices in London. The London offices were able not only to survive the world economic and shipping crisis but also to manipulate it to the advantage of the entire Greek fleet by making timely purchases. They assisted the British tramp shipowners in setting up the Tramp Shipping Administration Committee in order to ameliorate freight rates, a move which safeguarded their own interests as well. They were able by means of personal negotiations to diminish British competition in the form of the London underwriters and to unite under the Greek Cooperation Committee, a body that enabled them to confront all future competitors. In this chapter we located a second set of important factors that contributed to the success of Greek shipping during this period by investigating the interrelation of the Greek shipping offices based in London with those in Greece. On the one hand, the shipowners based in Greece had direct access through the London offices to international freight markets, finance, purchasing opportunities, and generally to the experience, organisation and connections of these offices. The London offices, on the other hand, relied on the Greek shipowners’ technical experience in maintaining and running the ships and on their ability to survive hard times.

7 LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEKOWNED FLEET IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The ability of shipowners to survive the interwar crisis was to a large extent a function of labour relations on board and ashore. The interwar period proved transitional for Greek maritime labour relations. The internationalisation of the fleet had a direct impact by disrupting some long-standing traditions. For the first time Greek seamen were not able to visit home regularly. The traditional Black Sea-Mediterranean-northern Europe route gave crews an opportunity to visit their home islands, even if only for a few hours, while the shipowners had a chance to make necessary crew changes. This change threatened the survival of the traditional crew structure under which most people on board were either related or came from the same island. The rise of trade unionism and the gradual alienation of employers and officers vis-à-vis the ratings also exacerbated the situation. Industrial relations in shipping, however, cannot be considered as merely the interaction between factors of production or the history of a particular trade union. The deep-sea merchant vessel constitutes a unique working environment that bears no relation to work ashore. Labour relations in shipping can only be examined in an international framework, taking into consideration the social origins of the various actors, their economic and political behaviour, and the institutional structure of their country of origin. This chapter examines the labour relations of Greek seamen during the interwar years and the extent to which these have contributed to success in the international arena. There are three parts. The first examines the overall structure of Greek maritime labour based on available statistical evidence. The second deals with the seamen on board, examining their organisation, working and living conditions and relations while at sea. Finally, the third section looks at the labour relations of Greek seamen ashore, their organisation of trade unions, and the way this development was connected to the domestic and international environment.

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 225

Table 7.1 Greek seamen in the interwar period Year

(A) Total number of seamen

(B) Unemployed (average)

% (B)/(A)

1924 1,865 1925 1,455 1926 14,000 1,400 10 1927 1928 16,459 2,173 13 1929 18,800* 1,800 10 1930 18,711 2,000 11 1931 18,500 2,500 14 1932 18,500 3,000 16 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 18,500 744 4 Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1938, p. 665; EEN, 1930, pp. 291–6; EEN, 1931, pp. 284–90, pp. 1168–9; EEN, 1938, pp. 663–7 Note: * Estimations of the Ministry of Shipping

THE GREEK SEAMEN The number of Greek seamen working on all types of ships increased during the 1920s (see Table 7.1). From 15,000 in the pre-First World War years, it reached almost 19,000 in 1929 and remained at that level throughout the 1930s. The unemployment rate in these two decades indicates the trouble seamen faced: from the mid- to late 1920s, unemployment ranged between 10 per cent and 13 per cent, while in the 1930s it reached an unprecedented height of 16 per cent. By the late 1930s, however, things returned to normal and unemployment among Greek seamen dropped to 4 per cent. The structure of Greek seafaring labour in 1910 and 1930 is indicated in Table 7.2, based on crew lists for 183 cargo steamships in the former and a 1930 census of 429 cargo ships for the latter. These provided details on 4,500 and 10, 000 seamen, respectively. Data on both years reveal that one-quarter of the crew were officers, while the remaining three-quarters were ratings. In both cases more than half were seamen and firemen, the majority of whom were less than thirty years of age. This implied that employment at sea for the ratings was not a lifetime profession.1 But the opposite was true for skilled personnel, such as donkeymen, bosuns and carpenters, most of whom were over thirty-five years of age, and for officers, who generally were over thirty. The average age of masters in both samples was forty years. Table 7.2 is also most revealing regarding

226 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

working conditions on Greek ships, especially compared to five years earlier. In 1925 the official review of the Ministry of Shipping, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), published statistical data which enables us to compare crew composition on Greek and Norwegian ocean-going cargo ships (Table 7.3).2 According to this data, the mean number of seamen on Greek ocean-going vessels was twenty-eight, while on Norwegian ships it was thirty-six. If we look, however, at the evidence provided by Table 7.2, we see that in 1930 the average number of a crew on a Greek cargo vessel was nineteen. Reduced manning translated into extra hours of work for the crew, since shifts and work had to be carried out regardless of the number of crew. The average number of ABs and firemen on Greek ships was four, which meant that each AB’s shift at the rudder or firemans in the boiler room was six hours. Moreover, the AB and fireman also had to work another six to eight hours on deck or in the engine room to maintain the often aged ship. The result was that the daily hours of work for these men averaged Table 7.2 Composition of seamen on cargo ships* 1910** Capacity

Number

1930 % total

Number

% total

A. Officers 1,136 26 2,060 26 Masters and 493 980 Mates Engineers 578 903 Cadet mates 35 65 Cadet engineers 30 112 B. Ratings 3,209 74 5,975 74 Wireless – 236 operators Bosuns 178 328 Chief firemen 188 307 Carpenters 36 100 Firemen 865 1,681 ABs 1,064 1,716 Deck boys 65 277 Greasers – 45 Coal trimmers 302 535 Stewards 323 451 Cooks 188 299 Total 4,345 100 8,035 100 Sources: Crew Lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum; Census of seamen on the 30th December 1930, Ministry of Shipping, Department of Merchant Marine, published in Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1931, pp. 1164–207.

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 227

1910**

1930

Capacity Number % total Number % total Notes: * Passenger ships are excluded. ** Composition of Greek seamen on board 183 Greek cargo steamships above 1,000 GRT

Table 7.3 Composition of crew in ocean-going Norwegian and Greek cargo vessels in 1925 Capacity

Norwegian vessel: number of seamen

Greek vessel: number of seamen

Master 1 1 Second mate 1 1 Third mate 1 1 Wireless operator 1 1 Carpenter 1 1 Bosun 1 1 ABs 9 5 Deck boys 2 1 First engineer 1 1 Second engineer 1 1 Third engineer 1 1 Greasers – 1 Engine boy 1 – Firemen 9 6 Coal trimmers 2 3 Victualler 1 – Cook 1 1 Assistant cook 1 – Steward 1 1 Total 36 27 Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1925, based on data from Scandinavian Shipping Gazette, 22 May 1925 in ‘The U.S.A Seamen’s Wages in Comparison to the Danish and Norwegian Ones’; EEN, 1925 in ‘Crews in Greek steamships’

twelve to fourteen. It should be noted that Norwegian ABs and firemen worked half the hours of their Greek colleagues: three- to four-hour shifts for about the same wage in the mid-1920s (see Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1). Table 7.2 also reveals that in 1930 half the Greek vessels had no wireless operators. The meagre numbers of greasers and carpenters suggests that in most cases their tasks were

228 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

an extra duty for the ABs and firemen. One-third of the Greek ships did not have a cook, meaning this work was carried out by the steward assisted by deck boys. The lack of bosuns and donkeymen on one-quarter of the ships implied extra work for the mates and second engineers. Moreover, the number of masters, mates and engineers suggests that, in 1930, 90 per cent of the vessels had no second mates or third engineers; again, this meant additional work on top of the twelve-hour shifts for the rest of the officers. On Greek ships, it would appear that officers worked as long as the ratings. Reduced manning, entailing long hours and harsh working conditions for the entire crew, combined with decreasing wages in the first half of the 1930s, resulted in a sharp reduction in operating costs for Greek ships, which were thus able to compete successfully on international routes, often at the expense of other European fleets, especially the British. But how were shipowners able to reduce the number and wages of their crew and why did the Greek crews tolerate it? The reasons lie beyond economics and go to the essence of Greek maritime organisation: to the base of the kinship or common island of origin of Greek crews and hence their personal relations with the shipowner or master of the ship. ON BOARD Work at sea is much different to work on land. Seamen toil in small male communities of twenty or thirty on each ship and are obliged to live for months, or even years, in a narrow space. Moreover, each has specific tasks to perform under a hierarchical and often dictatorial regime. Work at sea also means not only separation from family and friends but also isolation from the ordinary world. Life on board is a chain of restrictions: restricted space, restricted freedom, restricted movement, restricted choice of friends, entertainment and nourishment. Only the view of the sea is unrestricted. In addition, work on board could be extremely dangerous. ‘Huge waves, tons of sea were crushing on deck,’ wrote the Ithacan captain, Spiros Ferendinos, in 1929 after a trip to the South Seas, and various objects on board were snatched away like baubles. We set the ship to storm staysail, as an indicated measure of defense although this did not mean that we were saved from the obvious danger. Our position was desperate, and was made more desperate by the fact that our wireless could not get in touch with any station.3 The average age of Greek-owned deep-sea steamers in the 1930s was twentyeight years. The advanced age of the vessels entailed a continuous fight against rust and cockroaches. It also meant confronting the shiny eyes of rats inside the ventilators. The problem of rats, which enter the ship from port sewers by following the easy path of the ropes with which the vessel is tied to the pier, still persists. The size of the problem is shown from the ‘Regulation of work on board

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 229

Greek cargo vessels of 800 GRT and over’ (Royal Decree 6/12/39) according to which (Article 23), ‘the Ship Master is responsible for following the time intervals at which rat extermination must take place according to sanitary stipulations and the orders of Health Service’. On many ships pet cats were used to alleviate the problem. Seamen shared a common social life within a very limited space. Accommodation was elementary and the frugality of the sailing ship era continued. Ratings still slept in the focsle, a practice inherited from sailing ships. Abrupt climatic changes, from icy blasts to scorching heat, and the lack of heating or cooling, often made work a torment. As Captain George Abouselam remembers: The Gulf of Bengal, a true furnace [with temperature over 48 Celsius] was scalding everything…from the ship’s iron-plates to our bodies tortured by insomnia…. Looking at the thick black smoke, I was thinking of the people down there in the stokwall-hell, these heroic firemen that were feeding the boilers’ furnaces with plenty of coal so that the steam keeps up.4 A vessel’s production requires change of location. Its purpose is the transportation of goods from one place to another and the division of labour is established to serve this purpose. The crew composition of a 2,000-GRT deepsea cargo vessel consists of three groups of workers: deck, engine, and general services personnel. Deck personnel in the interwar years comprised a master, chief mate, second mate, one to three cadet mates, bosun, carpenter, four to six seamen, and one or two deck boys. The engine crew comprised a chief, second and third engineer, one to three cadet engineers, one donkeyman, one or two greasers, four to six firemen and one or two coal trimmers. General personnel often consisted of a wireless operator, cook, assistant cook, steward and assistant steward. Excluding cadet officers, the usual crew was around twenty-eight to thirty-four people. As we have already indicated in Chapter 5, the profession of master cannot be compared to any land-based occupation. A master is both employer and employee, paid by a company but also acting as its agent, a worker yet simultaneously the owner’s trustee. Although the shipowner owns the means of production, he actually has limited control over his property. The captain is responsible for the management, safety and productivity of the vessel and crew. The captain is in charge of proper navigation, timely and safe transport of goods, discipline, victualling and medical care of the crew, hygiene and the general order of the vessel.5 The extent of his responsibility implies that he must enjoy the complete confidence of the owner. Therefore, in Greece the rule was that captains had direct ties, financial or otherwise, with the vessel or the shipowner. They either owned a share of the vessel, were the shipowner’s relatives, or originated from the shipowner’s home island. Such ties, of course, were not exclusively Greek. Co-

230 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

ownership, kinship or common origin, especially in the case of small companies, were common features between masters and shipowners in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British merchant marine or nineteenth-century Scandinavian fleet.6 The peculiarity of Greek shipping was that this type of relation persisted during the interwar and postwar eras.7 Almost half of Greek ships in the 1920s and 1930s were operated by single-ship companies and in most cases the masters were co-owners or even the sole owner of the ship. The first and second mates were often related to the captain or came from the same island. The chief mate was the master’s closest working associate and potential replacement. He supervised deck and kitchen duties, inspected the vessel daily and attended to the mooring, loading and unloading of cargo and provisions and supplies. The other mates assisted the chief mate. The bosun or lostromo (from the Italian nostromo) was the chief petty officer, essentially an experienced AB. He was under the command of the chief mate and supervised the maintenance of the vessel, its mooring equipment, pulleys, wires, ropes and lifeboats, and handled much of the primary discipline. The carpenter was also a junior officer who assisted or substituted for the bosun. His name came from the days of wood when a carpenter’s ability was essential for safety. As in sailing ships, the carpenter was concerned with keeping an iron or steel ship watertight and performed all carpentry required on board. The seamen were under the command of the bosun and the carpenter. They served four- to six-hour shifts at the rudder and the rest of the time cleaned, maintained, loaded and unloaded the ship. Daily they had to battle with years of rust and continuously had to chip or paint the ship en route or in port. The icy cold of northern European ports or the unbearable heat of the tropics often made these tasks terribly difficult. The penetration into the maritime sector of industrial capital in the form of steam had been completed by all important shipping nations by 1914. The industrialisation of maritime transport led to considerable changes in the structure and organisation of ships. The engine crew became the new industrial proletariat, and it was no accident that the first seamen to strike were firemen and engineers. The head of the engine crew was the chief engineer, responsible for the engines and the men who worked with them. Until the turn of the century, due to the lack of marine engineering schools in Greece, a significant percentage of chief engineers on Greek ships were British. By the eve of the First World War there were trained Greek engineers, often related to, or from the same island as, the master or shipowner. The second engineer was the assistant to the chief and allocated shifts and general work. The third engineer and cadets assisted him. The dokoumanis (from the English ‘donkeyman’) or chief fireman was accountable to the second engineer and responsible for the work and discipline of the firemen, the driving forces of the vessel. According to the official work regulation of the time, there had to be six of these working four-hour shifts during which they fed tons of coal to the furnaces.8 The rest of time they spent chipping rust in the engine room. The harsh and monotonous work of the

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 231

fireman, which resembled factory work more than any other task on board, encouraged the firemen to be militant. The coal trimmer carried the coal to be shovelled by firemen, while the greaser or oiler was responsible for greasing the engine and all other auxiliary work in the engine room. The general service personnel, under the orders of the chief mate, consisted of the wireless operator (marconi), steward (stouart), and the cook, one of the most important members of the crew for the good humour of those on board. Apart from dividing the crew into deck, engine and general services personnel, the hierarchy also separated them into officers and ratings. The first category comprises all officers, including cadets, while the rest of the crew belong to the ratings. A strict social hierarchy existed, promoting discipline and assuring rewards. Social discrimination was reinforced by the separation in accommodations; indeed, this was guaranteed by the structure of the vessel. ABs, OSs and firemen, lowest in the hierarchy, slept together, in the foc’sle, where crew accommodation had been provided in sailing vessels. This is the worst place to rest on a ship, especially in rough seas. The junior officers, including the bosun, donkeyman and carpenter, slept in the poop, less affected by rough seas but the point at which engine noise was loudest. The best part of the vessel was amidships, where in a superstructure below the bridge slept the officers and wireless operator. The dining room for the officers was also there, while the rest of the crew dined separately below the main deck, usually in a room at the hatchway of the hold.9 But such working conditions on board were not unique to Greek seamen; they were shared by tars in most other ships as well. A British rating working in an over forty-year-old 5,000-dwt tanker in 1934 described his working place as a ‘steel workhouse’. The foc’sle accommodated nine seamen, along with cockroaches, bugs, flies and rats, in a space little bigger than the single cabins that were the norm in the 1950s. A coal bogey belched out smoke, the stink a conglomeration of smells, coal fumes, hot oil, foul air, human sweat and urine…. A drunk got up, and used a bucket near my head. The bucket was for washing up plates and mugs, but also for sluicing down the lavatory and bathing in.10 The great difference on board Greek ships, even compared to new British vessels, was not so much the quality of the ships as the quality of labour relations. Wages were not the only determining factor in such relations, any more than the common working space and accommodation were the only links between crew members. In interwar Greek shipping ‘wage relations appeared simultaneously as economic and social relations, as relations between men, not as payment for services and things’.11 Kinship and common island of origin, at the centre of these relations, were further strengthened by local traditions and the lack of formal maritime education in Greece. As shown in Table 7.4, in both 1910 and 1930 almost two-thirds of

232 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Greek crews came from the islands, mainly the Cyclades, Chios and Cephalonia, the centres most important in the Table 7.4 Seamen on board Greek flag steamships in 1910 and 1930 according to places of origin 1910 Place of All seamen % origin

1930 Deck officers and Bosuns, ABs, engineers % boys %

Donkeymen, firemen, greasers heavers %

A. 2,484 57 1,646 66 1,951 67 1,969 66 Islands Cyclad 852 852 622 905 es Chios 415 415 688 555 Cephal 486 236 296 247 onia Others* 731 143 345 262 B. 386 9 311 12 234 8 350 12 Attica C. Rest 748 17 377 15 513 18 376 13 of Greece D. 727 17 165 7 214 7 256 9 Abroad ** Total 4,345 100 2,499 100 2,912 100 2,951 100 Source: See table 7.1 Notes: * Includes Astipalea, Aegina, Amorgos, Corfu, Evoia, Ikaria, Ios, Ithaca, Karpathos, Kassos, Kasterlorizo, Kea, Kimolos, Kithira, Kithnos, Kriti, Lefkas, Leros, Milos, Lesbos, Myconos, Psara, Naxos, Paxoi, Poros, Samos, Santorini, Serifos, Sifnos, Simi, Skiathos, Skiros, Skopelos, Tinos. ** The number of seamen from ‘abroad’ in 1910 includes a large number of islands, apart from Chios, that belonged to the Ottoman dominion and became part of the Greek state after the Balkan wars

nineteenth century. The region of Attica, with its large urban population, came next, supplying one-tenth of the seaman, while another tenth came from abroad. Greeks from Asia Minor and other parts of the Ottoman dominion comprised the largest part of this last group. As evidence from the 1910 crew lists proves, they formed a more important part of the seafaring labour force before the Great War. The ‘rest of Greece’ category covered seafarers mainly from the Peloponnese and Galaxidi. The fact that most seamen came from maritime centres in three specific areas of Greece had a prodigious impact on the development of Greek shipping. First of all, according to samples of crew lists of Greek steamships in 1910, a

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 233

considerable number of vessels were manned by crews originating not merely from the same island but often from the same village. On steamships owned in Cephalonia and Ithaca almost 50 per cent of the crew came from the same island, while 60 per cent on Chiot steamers came from Chios. Andriot seamen almost exclusively manned Andriot ships; 71 per cent of the men on steamships in our sample investigated came from Andros.12 Family relations, a common phenomenon among officers, extended also to the ratings. The bosun was not normally a relative of the captain, but the AB or deck boy might well have been his son, nephew or cousin. When ss Margarita sank on 8 October 1925 in the mid-Atlantic, thirty-six men, most from Metaxata in Cephalonia, went down with her.13. Common origin also functioned as a safety valve in the maritime labour market. When a master from Chios, for example, was left without a fireman or an AB, he would look for an unemployed Chiot in Piraeus, Rotterdam or Buenos Aires, depending on where the ship was. Chiot society was small, and the seafarers’ villages limited, making it easy for masters and engineers to know the reputation of some 1,200 sailors (see Table 7.4). Besides, news of a sailor’s deeds on board soon reached his family and village circles. Isolation from land and lack of professional or social mobility created a particular culture, a nautical mentality shared only by members of this specific social group. Language—an important testimony of the existence of a particular social class or group—holds a special place among seamen. Learning nautical jargon is part of a seaman’s education, a necessary tool for his work. Greek seamen, as do seamen around the world, shared (and still share) a unique idiomatic language that mixes Greek technical terms with hellenised Spanish, Italian and English words, inherited from the dominant maritime empires of the last five centuries.14 Despite class discrimination, the master and AB spoke the same idiom, belonged to the same social group, and shared the same environment and dangers. Work on board had a collective character which under certain circumstances, promoted productivity that could not be explained merely by financial rewards. In half the Greek ships during the interwar period, the employer/master/ shipowner was not to be found in his safe house in Chios, Cephalonia, Athens and London but rather on the ships bridge. Unwritten maritime ethics demanded that the sailor work as much as required. Besides, the absence of formal maritime training up to the 1930s turned ABs, firemen, bosuns and donkeymen into practical shipping instructors. ‘In those tough years of misery, there were seamen on board that were irreproachable trainers,’ wrote Captain George Abouselam. I learned a great deal about our work from the bosun from Lagadas, things that one does not find written in any book…. But I can’t forget also the donkeyman from Santorini. He taught me all about the stockwall, the boilers, the furnaces, the steam, the engine and the machinery. His lecture room was the hatchway of hold no 5, where we used to have dinner.15

234 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The rise of a deck boy to the position of master, or a dokoumanis to engineer, was fairly common. The hope to rise in the hierarchy, perhaps even to become a shipowner, was not utopian on early steamers. Yet over time a stricter division of tasks and greater specialisation led to more defined class barriers between the crew. Indeed, class consciousness among Greek seamen was already strong in the interwar years: [In Melbourne, Australia] I was painting from the deck with a spear-brush the left side of the boat, when I heard the cabin boy telling me that the crew went on strike. I stopped immediately and, carrying the pot with the paint and the brush, headed hastily to the ladder … I heard the bosuns voice. ‘Where do you think you are going, George, why did you stop?’ ‘But we are on strike, aren’t we?’ I replied. ‘Listen George, you go back to your work, we, the ratings, are on strike, not the officers and you are a cadet mate, tomorrow an officer, you have nothing to do with the ratings, do you get me?’ I did not understand what he meant then, but I know now. That bosun from Lagadas gave me my first lessons in trade unionism.16 MARITIME LABOUR ASHORE The First World War had a dramatic effect on the organisation of seamen into trade unions all over the world. The reduction in the number of vessels due to war losses resulted in unemployment for thousands of seamen for a number of years and a remarkable level of rank-and-file militancy. The long maritime crisis in the early 1920s, combined with the lengthy shipping crisis of 1929–34, led to successive strikes and widespread radical, often communist, leadership.17 Militancy among seamen extended from the aged British tramp ships to the giant luxury liners of the Hamburg-America line. ‘Who can be surprised by the fact that the rooms of the firemen and stewards on the large luxury liners are breeding grounds for desperate anarchic and bolshevik ideas!’ wrote Siegfried Heckscher in the 1910s.18 Such communist control could in the 1920s be observed not only in most European societies, where communism had begun to constitute a political force, but also in solidly capitalist societies, such as Australia, where political communism was utterly ineffective, and especially in European colonies and other countries of what later was to be called the ‘third world’.19 Greek seamen proved no exception to the rule and the Greek seamen’s movement bears many similarities to the rest of the world. Syndicalism during the interwar period played a fundamental role in the development of both socialism in Greece and the ‘social breach’ of the 1940s that led to civil war from 1945 to 1949. The first strike among Greek seamen was the firemen’s strike of March 1910.20 The First Panhellenic Socialist Congress was held on 4 November 1918 at the offices of the Union of the Merchant Marine Engineers at Trumba of Piraeus.21

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 235

The organisation of seamen took place in the second decade of the twentieth century. The Union of the Firemen ‘Ayios Spyridon’, the Panhellenic Union of the Merchant Marine Engineers and the Panhellenic Union of the Merchant Marine Masters were founded around 1910. The Panhellenic League of Merchant Marine Stewards and the Panhellenic Union of Marine Cooks were founded in 1913. The Panhellenic League of Wireless Officers was founded in 1917.22 The dispersion of seamen’s syndicalism into numerous other unions was also characteristic of other European countries. The Italians first set the example of unifying all seamen, from master to ordinary seaman, into the Federazione Italiana dei Lavoratori del Mare in 1911. On the basis of this model the Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation (PNO) was created in 1920, its members being the aforementioned trade unions. PNO adhered to the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), founded in 1918, and to the International Transport Federation (ITF). Following the GSEE’s call for strikes, seamen participated actively in strikes from 1922 to 1924. At the same time, disputes between reformers and communists inside both PNO and GSEE led to the weakening and eventual disintegration of GSEE, with left-wingers creating an alternative federation that in the case of seamen was called the Seamen’s Union of Greece (NEE). During the long shipping crisis between 1929 and 1934, freight rates reached rock bottom (see Figure 6.14), while marine unemployment peaked (Table 7.1). PNO, supported by NEE, called for a strike. In 1932, more than 3,000 seamen participated in a ‘starvation march’ from Piraeus to the Ministry of Shipping in downtown Athens. Strikers demanded unemployment allowances, free food and residence, and of course work. The Venizelos government agreed to their demands concerning free food and accommodation and asked shipowners to consider unemployed seamen when changing their crews.23 But of course strikes were not limited to the shore but simultaneously took place at sea. The Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou from 1925 referred constantly to the ‘indiscipline which overruns the Greek cargo steamships after the war resulting to the discredit of the Greek flag at the various ports of the world’. Seamen were divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The good were the ‘professional seamen, prudent family men with no intention of creating trouble’. The bad were those described as ‘criminal elements, in trouble with the Greek authorities who, embedded with the well-known communist ideas, gradually ceased all relations with their own families and their country and became instruments and victims of swindlers, shrewd procurers, in dens of whose they live’.24 The main way for the crew to protest actively was to stop work. The principal reasons for continual daily friction were working time, victualling and wages. These issues were also the cause of disputes between captain and crew since at least the eighteenth century.25 The eight-hour working day was introduced by the Treaty of Versailles and was immediately applied in land-based industry. In shipping it was only voted almost two decades later, in 1936, at the Fourth Maritime Conference, fifteen years after its introduction by France at the First

236 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Maritime Conference in 1920. The deep maritime crises of the 1920s and 1930s had a conciliatory effect on some European seamen’s unions, such as the British, which were threatened by massive lay-off. The application of an eight-hour working day to shipping had substantial economic consequences, since seamen were not asking for a reduction in hours but for remuneration for overtime. When a ship sailed from Sulina to Rotterdam, a voyage of about twenty days, it did not stop sailing on Sundays or holidays. The fireman still had to shovel coal and the sailor had to steer. Legal recognition of the eight-hour working day and of basic holidays meant an increase in seamen’s income and a consequent rise in the vessel’s costs. Implementation of the eight-hour day in Greek shipping took place only in the 1940s when Greek seamen’s unions were more militant and exercised their power. Organised crews during the interwar period could, however, support demands for overtime pay in various ways. Towards the end of the 1920s, Captain A.S.Ferendinos’ ship was loading grain on a Saturday afternoon in Argentina when the harbour master ordered him to move his ship to give priority to an English cargo vessel which was to load a pressing cargo that night. The crew refused to assist, alleging they could not work so late. Ferendinos was not able to find other workers at that time, so the Argentinian authorities levied a £250 fine. The crew had made its demand for overtime pay clear to the shipowner. The lack of a commonly accepted list of holidays could prove equally costly, ‘since at present our seamen celebrate with religious devotion all the saints of the Greek orthodox calendar, some of them entirely obscure’.26 The victualling scale was also a permanent source of protest throughout the interwar era. In Greek shipping, the master was responsible for the provision and quality of the food, while in Norwegian shipping there was a victualler with these duties. The problem of holding the master responsible for alimentation was that it all depended on his conscience. Crew victualling was a cost for the shipowner; when the master was also a co-owner, he had a strong interest in reducing such costs to their lowest possible levels. If he were not a co-owner he received a sum of money for crew victualling which he used at his discretion. Every day, as soon as we would get to the hold, before we started to eat [the donkeyman from Santorini] would turn to me and ask me in a confidential way, ‘Say George, when you become a master, will you cheat?’ ‘No,’ says I, ‘Master Giakoumis I will not cheat, why should I? I am going to become a captain, not a thief.’ I could see a bitter smile at his worn out face. Who knows what he had been through, after so many years on board wooden and steel boats.27 The lack of refrigeration and abrupt climatic changes made the preservation of fresh food impossible during voyages lasting two or three months. Keeping livestock on board, to be slaughtered during the voyage, was common. ‘One of my tasks when I was cadet mate,’ remembers Captain George Abouselam, ‘was

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 237

to feed and water the calves, oxen and sheep residing at the hatchway, a task I had to perform with exceptional care and attention.’28 During the interwar period the Greek shipping offices in London tried to introduce salted and preserved meat (salado), a basic nourishment for northern European crews, into the menu of the Greek crews, which reacted in various ways. ‘Once,’ Captain S.Ferendinos wrote: fifteen whole days after our departure and near the equator, a seaman asked very seriously for eggplants imam [eggplants cooked with fresh tomatoes and onions]. Minor strikes break out often on board because the crew asks for a specific dish that needs ingredients known to be missing from the ships storeroom and therefore cannot be provided.29 Although Law 4005 of February 1929, provided for a unified and defined menu on all merchant vessels, the unions and shipowners did not agree on an official menu until 1948. It has often been written by syndicalists that on many Greek ships the ‘official ’menu contained, for lunch and dinner, olives, lard and bean soup.30 The absence of a unified payroll also caused numerous disputes. During the 1920s all European countries and the US established systems to regulate wages through collective agreements between unions and shipowners. Despite the fact the wage of a Greek AB throughout the 1920s remained stable at £7, this had not always been the case (Table 7.5). The preamble to the law for a unified payroll contained the following: The extent of damage inflicted to seamen by the free operation of the law of supply and demand during times of economic crisis can be easily understood. The regulation of wages under such circumstances during the past has led to a wage mosaic, the result of moral pressure exercised by the shipowners who replaced high-waged seamen by lower-wage ones if available ones were found in the next port, and by the seamen for a rise in wages when they knew the shipowners could not find any replacement at the next port.31 The 1924 wages (Table 7.5) are unofficial, and were submitted by Greek shipowners operating from England to the Greek Consulate in Cardiff. Moreover, these wage quotations do not provide for overtime pay or indemnities. Still, according to the Direction of Merchant Marine, they were ‘valid in practice’.32 The 1933 reduction of wages by 40 percent took place with the consent of the conservative PNO but not of the communist NEE, which fought to invalidate them. These ‘wages of starvation’, as they were called by communist leaders, finally became the first collective agreement between the PNO and the shipowners. Wage cuts also took place in most other European fleets during the 1930s, but this was of small consolation to Greek seamen. Although this wage

238 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

scale continued until 1937, improvements in freight markets provoked new strikes that resulted in certain Table 7.5 Greek seamen’s wages on deep-sea-going vessels (in pounds sterling) Capacity/ Year

1914

1924

1932

1933

1937

Master 18.0.0 20.0.0 16.0.0 22.10.0 Chief mate 8.0.0 15.0.0 13.0.0 10.10.0 18.0.0 Second mate 6.0.0 12.0.0 10.0.0 8.0.0 15.0.0 Chief 18.0.0 20.0.0 18.0.0 20.0.0 engineer Second 10.0.0 15.0.0 14.0.0 16.0.0 engineer Third 6.8.0 12.0.0 12.0.0 13.0.0 engineer Fourth 9.10.0 engineer Wireless 11.0.0 12.0.0 13.10.0 operator A′ Wireless 10.0.0 12.10.0 operator B′ Bosun 4.0.0 9.0.0 6.10.0 5.0.0 8.0.0 Carpenter 9.0.0 6.0.0 5.0.0 8.0.0 AB 3.4.0 7.0.0 5.10.0 4.0.0 7.0.0 Donkeyman 4.8.0 9.0.0 7.0.0 5.0.0 8.10.0 Fireman 4.0.0 7.10.0 6.0.0 4.10.0 7.10.0 Greaser 9.0.0 Heaver 2.16.0 6.10.0 4.0.0 3.10.0 6.4.0 Deck boy 4.0.0 2.10.0 2.0.0 4.14.0 Cook 4.8.0 9.0.0 7.0.0 6.0.0 9.0.0 Steward 4.0.0 9.0.0 6.10.0 5.0.0 8.0.0 Officers’ 5.0.0 3.10.0 2.10.0 5.4.0 steward Sources: 1) ‘Crew Wages on Greek Ships’, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1925, for 1914 and 1924 wages. 2) ‘By Which a Unified Payroll for Cargo Steamships is Stipulated’, Circular of the Direction of Merchant Marine, rec. no. 23013/50 and 23014/51 of 19 August 1932, in EEN, 1932, pp. 751–8. 3) ‘Agreeement on Wages on Board Cargo Steamships Between the Greek Shipowners’ Union and the Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation, 26 April 1933’, Circular of the Direction of Merchant Marine, rec. no. 10518, in EEN, 1933, pp. 544–55. 4) Sub-Ministry of Shipping, Shipping Direction, Research and Statistical Department, Bulletin of Laws, Decrees, Circulars, etc. of the Administration of Merchant Marine for the Year 1937, Adiens, Ethniko Typografio 1937: ‘Agreement on Wages on Board Cargo Steamships Between

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 239

Capacity/ Year

1914

1924

1932

1933

1937

the Greek Shipowners’ Union and the Panhellenic Professional Union of Merchant Marine Masters’ 16 September 1937; ‘On the Wages of Engineers and Wireless Operators of Cargo Steamships’, rec. no. 2564, 25 January 1937, Ministry of Shipping, Dept C; ‘On Contractual Wages of Ratings of Cargo Steamships’, rec. no. 32195, 13 September 1937, Ministry of Shipping, Dept C

informal increases before a new collective agreement was finally signed. As the PNO’s newspaper, Naftergati kos Agon, wrote on 19 September 1948 Shipowners always claim to be facing a crisis and they always allege that freight rates have fallen, and that the Greek ship is in a disadvantageous position in comparison to the other fleets…. It is also a fact that whenever Greek ships work at a profit—often huge —seamen never asked for a rise in their salary on the basis that the ships make such profits. Still, despite the reductions, Greek wages at sea were better than those ashore in the 1930s. Seamen also profited from the fact that they were paid in sterling rather than drachma. In 1931 a fireman received a monthly wage of £6 (2,250 drachmas; exchange parity was £1=375 drachmas); five years later, despite a wage reduction to £4, his wages in drachmas were still 2,184 (the exchange parity then was £1=546 drachmas); and in 1937, when his wages rose to £7, he received around 4,000 drachmas. At the same time the wages of a textile worker ranged between 1,500 and 2,250 drachmas per month.33 All the main problems for the seamen had their origin in the almost complete lack of legal protection of seafaring. This led to their organisation and active demand of the amelioration of their working conditions throughout this period. As a port official ascertained in the 1920s: The Greek legislator of 1911 did not approve of the system of wage contract, perhaps because he did not consider seamen capable to comprehend and sign the constantly changing contracts of work on board…. [Only 15 years later] the legislator of today has before him a seaman who is socially progressed, is represented and more than sufficiently protected by trade unions and who has been raising demands at the expense of shipowners…. The consciousness of the seamen has changed after the war.34 Until the 1920s Greek seamen hired to serve on merchant vessels did not sign work contracts defining their tasks and rights. The master could hire and fire crew members at his discretion. Thus, if a seaman and a master had a dispute, the latter could—without any legal consequences— discharge the former at the first port. If this were abroad, the seaman had to pay for the trip back to Greece or live on his savings until he could secure employment. The prospect of months

240 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

without work made many seamen victims of local crimps. The maritime labour market in the largest Greek port, Piraeus, was in the hands of these ‘shrewd procurers’ or bordinadori (boardinghouse keepers). Exploitation of seafarers in the various ports of the world was as old as the profession.35 In Greece the main mustering centres were located in the islands; according to Table 7.3 two-thirds of the ratings originated from there. In this way the important ports of Chios, Syros, Andros and Cephalonia were the main labour markets. Exploitation by crimps was limited in these ports due to the closed character of the communities and their long maritime traditions. But for the remaining one-third of seamen and firemen, who did not originate from the traditional maritime areas, things were different. During periods of high unemployment the seamen from non-traditional maritime areas often became victims of crimps of their own free will. According to Captain George Abouselam: With the exception of the Master, all of us had been recruited in Piraeus that had at the time a large number of unemployed colleagues due to the crisis in shipping markets. As I found out, some of the ratings had been obliged to pay a ‘senseless rodent’ at Truba [of Piraeus] three or four pound sovereigns in order to be mustered. … [After we sailed from Piraeus to Danzig where we loaded coal] …we unloaded coal at Livorno in Italy, and from there, in absence of freight, we laid the ship up in Abelakia off the island of Salamis. We were fired on that same day while many of crew, experienced seamen with families to support, had not even had the time to earn enough to make up for what they had spent in order to get recruited at those difficult years. We had been on board only two and a half months.36 The lack of legal protection for seafarers extended to wages, crew composition, and hours of work, all depending on the discretion of the master. There were no diplomas to attest to competence; the school for masters in Hydra was founded only in 1930. The interwar period was fundamental for the institutionalisation of protection for seamen in the context of a general trend urged by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). As soon as the ILO was formed, the Commission Paritaire Maritime was created to study and internationalise various maritime labour issues. To facilitate the codification of an international statute for seamen, which would help to make their rights and duties better known, the 1920 International Conference of Labour at Geneva recommended that all ILO members (including Greece) proceed to a concrete codification of national labour legislation.37 Five assemblies took place from 1920 to 1939, in which Greeks participated. The issues dealt with included hours of work, crew composition, age limits, indemnities and insurance. The ‘indiscipline of crews on deep-sea-going cargo vessels’, seamen’s strikes in Piraeus and Athens and the activities of international labour organisations led to a series of laws to protect basic rights for seamen in the late 1920s and early 1930s. On 15 April 1927, the Direction of Merchant Marine of the Ministry of

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 241

Figure 7.1 Comparitive data of wages of ABs Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1931,1934

Shipping established the Oikos Naftou (House of Seaman) to provide food, shelter and health care for temporarily unemployed Greek seamen abroad. In 1936 the state Bureau of Work at Sea (GENE) was established to provide employment and protection to out-of-work seamen. Law 4005 ‘on the menu of merchant cargo vessels’ was voted in 1929; Law 5231 ‘on the composition of merchant ships’ crews’ in 1931; Law 6202 ‘on the protection of unemployed seaworkers and their families’ in 1933; and Law 6209 ‘on a unified payroll of seaworkers’ in 1934. These laws, however, did not actually apply until almost ten years after they were voted, and this under the pressure from seamen’s unions during the Second World War. The establishment of Greek ships in a large portion of the interwar tramp shipping market was due to their international competitiveness, which of Table 7.6 Wages for able-bodied seamen on steamships on Greek, Norwegian, British, German, Dutch, Spanish and Japanese fleets (in pounds sterling) Country

1914

1924

1925

1927

1928

1934

Greece

3.4.0

7.0.0

7.0.0

7.0.0

7.0.0

4.0.0

242 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Country

1914

1924

1925

1927

1928

1934

Norway 3.9.11 5.18.1 7.6.3 8.10.3 8.14.4 7.4.9 Britain 5.5.0 10.0.0 9.0.0 9.0.0 9.0.0 8.2.0 Germany 3.13.5 4.6.9 4.7.3 4.17.7 5.12.6 8.5.8 Holland 3.12.8 8.13.6 8.5.7 8.4.9 8.5.6 10.16.3 Spain 4.13.3 3.13.8 Japan 4.6.3 2.5.0 Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1925, p. 67; EEN, 1927, pp. 22–3; EEN, 1931, p. 948; EEN, 1934, p. 64

course rested on the reduction of costs. The elasticity of wages and manning scales in Greek shipping can be explained partly by poor labour organisation and partly by the lack of an institutional framework to protect seamen’s rights. Greece, however, was not the only country to reduce wages during the early 1930s. Figure 7.1 shows comparative data for ABs in the Greek, Norwegian, Spanish, Japanese, Dutch, German and British fleets in 1928 and 1934. According to Table 7.6, in 1914 the Greek wages were almost the same as the Dutch and German, in the 1920s were higher than the German, Spanish and Japanese, and in 1934, despite their great reduction, Greek wages were still higher than the Spanish and Japanese. In all seven fleets, there was a sharp decrease between 1928 and 1934 in all but the German and Dutch. But the success of the Greeks was not only due to their being able to reduce costs but also because they maintained productivity at the same time. The reasons they could do so reflect the particular labour relations on Greek ships which, despite an increase in trade unionism, continued to a large extent to be built on close relations between crew, masters and shipowners, based on kinship and common origins.

8 THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THE BASIS FOR THE ‘LEAP FORWARD’1

The 1940s proved extremely important in the development of twentieth-century Greek-owned shipping. The Second World War and subsequent changes in the maritime division of labour brought unprecedented opportunities to those Greek shipowners who were able to exploit them. The shift of world economic and maritime hegemony from Britain to the US after 1945 ushered in a new era in world shipping. ‘Flags of convenience’, as they were called then, or ‘open registries’ as they are more tactfully called today, became the key manifestation of postwar American shipping policy, guaranteeing low-cost, Americancontrolled shipping. This left space for traditional European nations, such as Greece and Norway, to engage in cross-trading or to transport goods between third countries under various flags of convenience. Greek shipowners, in order to avoid their confinement in Greece as during the First World War, and to administer their vessels better, at the outbreak of the conflict left for London—but more important, for New York, where they were able to enjoy the advantages of being resident in a country that became the main postwar economic power. Their involvement in the oil trade through connections with the major oil companies, the adoption of flags of convenience, and the replacement of their pre-Second World War fleet with the new Liberties set the stage for their expansion after 1945. The first part of this chapter examines the activities of the Greeks during the Second World War and the problems that arose in their relations with the state; the second part looks at the purchase of the Liberties; and the third at the involvement of Greeks with flags of convenience. THE ‘TROUBLED 1940s’ At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Greek merchant fleet ranked ninth in the world in terms of gross tonnage, comprising 607 ships of 1.8 million GRT. Among the nine largest fleets, three belonged to the Axis powers, which made the Greeks particularly important to the Allies. By the end of the war the Greek merchant navy had lost about 1.3 million GRT, or 72 per cent of its total fleet, a higher percentage than was lost in the First World War; even the British only lost 63 percent. The bulk of the Greek fleet was engaged in the most dangerous

244 THE TROUBLED 1940S

Figure 8.1 Position of ships lost in the Second World War. Source: Appendix 8.1

Atlantic and North Sea trades and to a lesser degree in the Mediterranean, Pacific and Indian Oceans (Figure 8.1). Fully 57 per cent of Greek losses occurred before 1942 (Figure 8.2). The ‘troubled 1940s’, as they are often called, were characterised by the alienation of shipowners from Greece and a breach in their relations with the Greek state. Indeed, state intervention during the Second World War has long been used by shipowners as a rationale for their subsequent adoption of nonGreek flags. Yet during the 1940s most—if not all—of Greeces leading shipowners left the country for London and New York and began on a massive scale to use flags of convenience. This temporary exodus, which continued in the 1950s, triggered postwar Greek shipping policy and gave shipowners an argument they use to this day. Postwar Greek maritime policy has been based on the principle of epanapatrismos (repatriation) and rests on two broad principles— non-intervention by the state and tax liberalisation—to wean Greek-owned vessels back to the domestic register. Whenever the state makes any move that resembles intervention, however, shipowners always draw parallels with the 1940s.2 The series of controversies during the war concerned the Anglo-Greek agreement, restricted accounts in England, taxation and Greek seamen. The first to arise was over the Anglo-Greek Agreement, which formed the basis for the Allied requisition of the Greek fleet. After the occupation, the Tsouderos

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 245

Figure 8.2 Percentage of ships lost during the Second World War Source: Appendix 8.2

government based in Crete requisitioned all Greek ships under a special decree (LD 3009/1941). After signing the Anglo-Greek agreement on May 1941, the state formally time-chartered all Greek ships above 4,000 dwt to Britain.3 Between 1939 and the German occupation in April 1941, the Greeks attempted to negotiate an agreement with Britain that would allow shipowners to charter ships privately. In order to secure neutral tonnage and to prevent interAllied competition, Britain formed the Neutral Tonnage Policy Committee of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in 1939. In a meeting of the War Cabinet on 4 September, it was noted that ‘the main sources of neutral tonnage are Norway (which is specially important as regards tankers) and Greece’.4 Since shipowners had made enormous profits in the First World War by chartering ships privately, the Allies proceeded to charter requisitioned fleets at fixed rates; consequently, profits in the Second World War were lower. This ‘loss’ gave the Greek shipowners cause to protest and to accuse the Greek government of ‘selling out’ to the British. This accusation was thoroughly unjustified: the Greek fleet was treated similarly to the Norwegian, under the Anglo-Norwegian agreement of 11 March 1940.5 And the British fleet was administered in exactly the same way. Another controversy concerned the revenues received by the Greek government from shipping. The largest share came from the operation of twentyseven newly built ships which had been requisitioned.6 Through an agreement with the Allies, the Greek government was allowed to operate them in the private market, for which it received $7 per ton carried. Since the standard freight rate payable to the owners of requisitioned ships was $3.50 per ton, the government made a sizeable profit.7 The owners of these twenty-seven ships—the most

246 THE TROUBLED 1940S

prominent Greek shipowners, as it happened —considered this agreement highly unjust and after the war complained loudly about their ‘exploitation’.8 Revenues from shipping were the main source of finance for the Greek government-in-exile; two-thirds of its expenses were covered by income from marine transport. The income received by the state during the war totalled between £6 and £7 million, but shipowners claimed that the state had actually collected more than £12 million.9 At the end of the war, the owners received from insurance and freight income about £50 million.10 It seems unreasonable to speak of exploitation when a mere quarter of the revenues were paid in taxation, especially during wartime. It is possible to provide an additional perspective by comparing the earnings the Norwegian government received from its requisitioned fleet under a similar agreement. The Norwegians formed an organisation called ‘The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission’, better known by its telegraphic address as ‘Nortraship’. Nortraship was a state organisation with offices in London and New York, established to administer the Norwegian merchant marine. The Norwegian government relied on Nortraship for financial resources and it ‘proved to be the most valuable asset the Norwegian government had during the war. The profits generated made the government-in-exile economically independent’11 The income the Norwegian government received from shipping was £40 million (819 million Norwegian kroner).12 The Norwegian merchant fleet totalled four million GRT at the outbreak of the Second World War. Greece owned two million gross tons and its government received £7 million. On a per ton basis, the Norwegian government derived almost three times as much revenue than did Greece. The second controversy between the Greek government and its shipowners concerned the restricted accounts established to receive shipping revenues in London. In order to regulate its relationship with the shipowners, the government gave the administration of the requisitioned ships to the twenty-three Greek shipping offices in London, which were to act as nominees under its control. It subsequently formed the Greek Shipping Committee in London (ENEL), consisting of the Greek ambassador and two shipowners, who were given power to decide on all administrative matters concerning the requisitioned ships. According to Article 8b of the Anglo-Greek agreement all insurance and revenues from the ships chartered to the Allies were to be deposited in restricted trust accounts held by the Greek government. The existence of these accounts, a restriction imposed principally by the British, was interpreted by the shipowners as an attempt by the Greek government to sequester funds that were rightfully theirs. This restriction, combined with the fact that the shipowners had complete control of the administration of the requisitioned ships, generated a series of problems which culminated in the famous ‘Vergottis case’. The Vergottis case arose from the loss in July 1942 of the Greek ship Emmy, which belonged to A.Vergottis. Vergottis Ltd, acting as his agents (as well as agents for the Greek government), received a sum of £79,200 from the insurance, which was paid into a restricted account in its name in trust to the

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 247

Greek government. Subsequently, Vergottis Ltd applied to ENEL for permission to transfer this sum to A.Vergottis. Although ENEL refused consent, Vergottis Ltd in fact transferred the funds. The Greek government responded by taking Vergottis Ltd to court. In March 1945, Judge Atkinson decided in favour of Vergottis, rightly basing his decision on Clause 8 of the Anglo-Greek Agreement. It appeared that the clause had been drafted to overcome difficulties created by the occupation of Greece; if so, the only people who should have been affected were Greek shipowners living in Greece and not those resident in Britain, as was A.Vergottis. The attitude of the shipowners toward the restricted accounts and the Vergottis case was clearly expressed in the Report of the Greek Shipowners’ Union in 1946: It is true that these restrictions were imposed in order to conform to the principles of international law and the exchange policy of the British policy, but on these grounds the Greek government aspired to give to these formal restrictions another form incompatible with any logic or legal rights of the shipowners…. We have heard from some state officials that shipping capital should not be given to the shipowners to whom it by nature and by law belongs but that it should be subject to some other administration in which the state would be the main decision-maker…. Typical of the governments reasoning is the fact that the Greek state took into the British court a Greek shipowner (Vergottis) who received the insurance indemnity which belonged to him while it was restricted by the Greek government. The result of this trial was the vindication of the shipowner and the ignominious loss of Greeces prestige. As this event demonstrates, the Greek state has been reduced to a ridiculous position by certain officials who insist on appropriating foreign assets, contrary to any law.13 The British Public Record Office contains an interesting file on the Vergottis case, which clearly shows that the decision to ask for a writ was the choice of Britain, which exerted considerable pressure. This can be seen in a letter from Eustace Roskill at the Ministry of War Transport to Rowe-Dutton at the Treasury on 26 June 1945: the fact that [there is the Greek shipowners’] money in the restricted accounts does not, however, enable the Bank of England on behalf of the Treasury to exercise any control over those moneys…unless the person entitled (and a fortiori ceases to be an enemy), the Bank of England can not prevent the money being transferred by the nominee to the shipowner. The only way in which the transfer of such money can be stopped is by the Greek government establishing a claim of right to the money. We had always assumed (quite wrongly as it turned out in the ultimate result) that the Greek government would have tied a control of the total loss moneys

248 THE TROUBLED 1940S

up as a matter of contract between their nominees and themselves…. The Greek government have singly failed to exercise any proper control over Greek shipowners or their London representatives who in main are persons ultimately financially interested in ships. If we had not sought to force the Greek government by telling them, that we held them responsible for a breach of the Agreement, to bring the Vergottis case. … These moneys could therefore become free at a time long before that which any Department had contemplated as the proper time for allowing the moneys to become available to the Greek shipowners concerned.14 British interests were ultimately served by delaying the case in the courts for about two years and by discouraging other shipowners from taking any insurance money during this period. Since Greece was within the British ‘sphere of influence’, the Greek government had no choice but to pressure the Londonbased owners to accept British terms, thereby bringing upon itself a great deal of hostility.15 The ‘Vergottis case’ has since been used as the prime example of unfair state intervention in shipping. Taxation was the third area of dispute between the Greek government and the shipowners during the 1940s. The annual income from taxation for the pre-1940 years (an average of about £22,000) equalled 0.003 per cent of the earnings from shipping.16 In 1939 the government imposed a new temporary tax (LD 2075/ 1939) which brought large revenues by taxing a ship’s excess value, defined as the difference between the purchase price of the ship and the value the shipowner received from its sale or insurance settlement.17 Taxation on excess value was transformed by LD 2288/1940, according to which the tax imposed was to be deposited in special accounts in Greek banks, to be returned to the shipowner in three years if he were to replace the ship. The controversy over this issue continued, and various legislative decrees were issued, but none satisfied both sides. The final law on this subject was LD 545/1945, which placed a 30 per cent restriction on indemnities received from insurance, which could be used for the replacement of lost tonnage for up to seven years. There were, however, extremely few cases of ships bought from this restricted account and very few shipowners who actually deposited the legal amount from the insurance. The law essentially proved useless and, with LD 2149/1952, shipowners who had not met this obligation were able to deposit 5 to 35 per cent of the initial amount by paying NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) or the Fund for Maritime Education.18 During the time the original law was in force (between January of 1940 and March of 1941), the government earned £964,377, an enormous amount compared to the minuscule revenue collected in previous years. The tax collected under this law (and its modifications) totalled £1,218,765. The promulgation of a 1948 law (LD 567/1948) ‘concerning the taxation of the profits of motor ships’ created another point of acute controversy between the state and the shipowners.19 According to this bill, a 50 per cent tax was imposed upon presumed rather than real shipping profits. The new tax, which was

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 249

calculated on existing freight rates and tonnage owned by each shipping company, was made retroactive to January 1947. The state’s motivation was clear: to obtain a share of the obviously high profits being earned in shipping. This justification was well stated in 1949 by G.Drosopulos, then the MP for the Cyclades: We do not believe that there could be anyone who would support the idea that in such a national struggle…justice would permit a certain number of citizens to evade any contribution to their country, having as only justification that their individual economic development would be hindered or delayed.20 As the government doubtless expected, the law elicited strong protests from shipowners. As a result, the act was never implemented as originally drafted, although a modified version with substantially reduced taxes due for 1947–9 was enacted. Another law that caused a good deal of friction between the shipowners and the state for about a decade was a bill ‘concerning the taxation of the wealthy (LD 889/1949).21 This legislation required all Greek citizens to declare their foreign assets with the intent of eventual repatriation. According to this law a special tax, amounting to 15 million drachmas, was imposed on Greek-flag shipping, while an additional levy of 40 million drachmas was assessed for vessels operating under foreign flags. The shipowners accepted the tax on Greek-registered vessels, but refused to pay for ships sailing under foreign flags. A lawsuit initiated by the shipowners over this bill dragged on for many years. This act was the culmination of attempts by the state to exert some degree of influence over its shipping industry. Unfortunately for the state, the most visible result of the policy was the departure of 80 per cent of its shipowners to London and New York; most had no apparent intention of returning. The great irony was that the acts or omissions of Greek maritime policy had little to do with the exodus during these two decades. The ‘repatriation’ of the Greek shipowners in the following decades, either by adopting the Greek flag or opening shipping offices in Piraeus, depended more on developments abroad than at home.22 The activities of Greek seamen in the 1940s represented the fourth cause of concern for both the government and the shipowners. A series of strikes at the beginning of the 1930s eventually led to an organised seamen’s movement during the war, which in turn resulted in substantial pay increases. Indeed, Greek crew members were better paid than their British counterparts from some time in the 1940s until 1956 (see Table 8.1). In 1933 the pay of an AB in the Greek fleet was half the pay of a British AB; by 1939 this gap was reduced to one-third. But between 1943 and 1951 the monthly pay of a Greek AB was £28 when the standard British rate was only £24. In 1951 the Greek seaman was still better paid, but by 1956 British pay had reached Greek levels. From then until 1965 British pay grew more rapidly than Greek remuneration.

250 THE TROUBLED 1940S

Table 8.1 Standard national rates of pay for ABs, Britain and Greece, selected years, 1933–65 (monthly wages in pounds sterling) Year

Britain

Greece

Year

Britain

Greece

1933 8.10 4.00 1952 24.00 n/a 1934 8.10 4.00 1954 25.50 n/a 1937 9.00 7.00 1955 27.50 32.00 1938 9.63 n/a 1956 29.50 32.00 1939 12.63 7.00 1957 31.50 35.00 1940 15.63 n/a 1958 33.25 35.00 1941 17.63 n/a 1960 35.75 35.00 1942 22.63 n/a 1961 37.14 38.00 1943 24.00 28.00 1962 39.53 38.00 1947 20.00 28.00 1964 39.53 40.00 1951 22.00 30.00 1965 40.68 40.00 Sources: Great Britain, Chamber of Shipping, Annual Report, 1958–9 and 1967–8; Greece, Ministry of Shipping, Acts, Decrees and Collective Agreements Regarding Greek Seamen, Athens, 1951, 1954, 1956, 1961 and 1964; Table 7.5; John Holevas, The Greek Merchant Marine in Figures, Piraeus 1971, table 3 Notes: Britain: 1939 includes £3 war bonus; 1940 includes £5 war bonus; 1941 includes £5 war bonus and £2 differential pay; 1942 includes £10 war bonus and £2 differential pay; 1943 includes £10 war bonus (differential pay merged in basic rate); 1947–65 excludes efficient service’ pay after five years’ service (1947– 56, £4; 1957–60, £4.25; 1961–5, £4.50); 1955–65, excludes bonus for AB certificate (1955–60, £5; 1961–5, £1); 1961–5, excludes compensation for weekends at sea (1961, £1.75; 1962, £1.86; 1964, £1.98; 1965, £12.20). Greece: 1939, excludes war bonus (varied between 45 and 300 per cent of monthly wage); 1943 includes £17 war bonus; 1951 excludes Korean war bonus (varied between 100 and 200 per cent of monthly wage

According to Alexander Kitroeff’s analysis of the Greek seamen’s movement, one of the most crucial strikes, involving 1,500 seamen on vessels berthed in British ports, occurred in December 1940. While the three-week stoppage yielded no immediate results, it did lead to a collective agreement in August 1941 between the shipowners and seamen in England. This contract provided wage increases approved of by the official seamen’s union (PNO, or Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation) and NEE (Greek Seamen’s Union), the more powerful leftist union based at Marseilles from 1936 and New York from 1940. In March 1943, the leadership decided to abolish NEE and to replace it with the Cardiffbased Federation of Greek Maritime Unions (OENO). OENO set two main objectives, one economic and the other political. In September 1943, it achieved success on the first: ‘The collective agreement signed in 1943, introducing such basic amenities as bedding, a vastly improved victualling scale, and of course, the eight-hour working day, was hailed by the seamen as a great victory.’23

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 251

At the same time, it was no secret that politically the majority of OENO’s leadership was composed of communists or their sympathisers. Shipowners had to live with unheard-of situations on their ships: Eugene Eugenides lived then at the famous Plaza Hotel at Buenos Aires. Every morning his Argentinian driver brought him in a shiny limousine to the vessel exactly at eight o’clock in the morning…. Wearing a black coat, and a grey hat Eden-like…he walked slowly astern. Passing outside the crews dining room he halted, looking at the picture of Joseph Stalin, who was very close to the heart of many of the crew. Eugenides looked carefully at Joseph for exactly five seconds, shook his head, let a groan of disapproval from his mouth, and continued his slow walk astern.24 OENO regarded the war primarily as a struggle against fascism and therefore encouraged its members to keep overseas shipping routes open and to disregard all possible dangers; the union’s slogan was ‘keep the ships moving’. Its determination, along with broad support from the crews, enabled it to present a strong front to the shipowners. The increased importance of overseas transport and the general labour shortage meant that both the Greek and British governments adopted restrained attitudes towards OENO. This ‘friendly’ posture towards seamen during the 1940s was, of course, another reason for dispute between the shipowners and the state. One has to remember that war did not end for Greece in 1945 but continued internally until 1949. It was thus only at the beginning of the 1950s that the government solved the problems that Greek seamen posed to shipowners by proscribing OENO and controlling PNO. New collective agreements in 1951 (the first after the agreement of 1943 between the shipowners and PNO) and 1954 specified decreased wages for certain skilled workers, diminished overtime pay, and reduced the number of crew. At the same time, the pacts increased the number of years a seaman had to serve to be entitled to a pension from ten to fifteen. Moreover, beginning in 1951, another series of royal decrees on topics such as crew composition ensured that no organisation like the more militant OENO could everrise again. Seamen’s militancy during the 1940s, however, required implementation of the 1930s legislation on Greek ships. Furthermore, the replacement of the aged First World War-built steamers by three- or fouryear-old diesel Liberties meant better working conditions on board. THE LIBERTIES The heavy losses suffered by the Allies in the first two years of the war meant that the safe carriage of goods by sea became of primary importance. Between 1941 and 1945 the US and Canada launched the most massive shipbuilding programme the world had ever known to meet the demand for maritime transport during the war. Over these four years, about 3,000 so-called ‘Liberty ships,

252 THE TROUBLED 1940S

averaging 10,000 dwt (7,371 GRT), were built in the US alone.25 By adopting assembly-line techniques from the Detroit automobile industry, Americans revolutionised shipbuilding. The idea was to build standard vessels in large numbers by prefabricating sections on sites near shipyards, while the hull itself was being assembled on the berth. The programme also introduced welding to shipbuilding. Previously, rivets had been used to join the metal plates out of which the hull was constructed; welding was considered unsafe and hence unsuitable. The fact that the Liberties depended on welding was regarded with suspicion by most shipowners and not without reason: some of the first Liberties eventually split in half. Nevertheless, welding techniques improved considerably during the war and Liberty ships survived for the next twenty-five years. Welding allowed lighter and stronger hulls that could be assembled quickly. The Greeks continued to purchase Liberties throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The peak year for Liberty ownership was 1963 when the Cuban blockade encouraged high freight rates. The decline of the Liberties that started in 1964 was completed by 1974. In 1966 there were still 722 Liberties operating on world trade routes, of which 603 were Greek-owned.26 In 1946 the Greek merchant marine was at its nadir, having lost more than 70 per cent of tonnage during the war (see Figure 8.3). In 1939 the fleet comprised 1.8 million GRT; by 1946 only a half million GRT was still afloat. In October 1945, Manolis Kulukundis, a highly respected shipowner, wrote that ‘we depend on Liberties for the replacement of our sunken ships’.27 The Ships Sales Act, by which American ships could be sold to foreign purchasers, was passed by Congress in March 1946. In July the United States Maritime Committee, which was responsible for the sales, decided to sell ships on credit to Allied governments or to individual shipowners on state guarantee. The shipowners who possessed capital in American banks bought Liberties for cash and registered them under the Panamanian flag. The majority of the shipowners, however, did not have sufficient dollars, since capital from chartering and insurance was mostly in sterling. Because of currency controls, the ability to convert sterling into dollars was limited; for most shipowners, it was impossible to purchase Liberty ships.28 Faced with this dilemma, Greek owners requested state guarantees, which would enable them to buy Liberties on credit. On 9 April 1946, the Greek government guaranteed the purchase of 100 Liberties on behalf of its shipowners. The war may have led to a decline in Greek tonnage, but in one important way it benefited shipowners: in 1945 they found themselves with £47.5 million in cash from insurance payments and freight revenues.29 This money, supplemented by the loan guarantees mentioned above, enabled them to buy 100 Liberty ships at the extremely low price of £16.5 million, a third of their original price (the Greek owners are listed in Table 8.2). Of this amount only about £4.1 million, or 25 per cent, was paid in cash, with the remaining £12.1 million in credit from the Americans backed by Greek government guarantees. The loan from the US was to be paid off within seventeen years at an interest rate of only 3.5 per cent.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 253

Figure 8.3 Growth of the merchant fleet under the Greek flag. Source: Table 8.3

The purchase of the 100 Liberties was followed by the purchase of seven 16, 500-dwt T2 tankers. As with the Liberties, these came from the US. The American government decided to dispose of tankers on the same favourable terms as the Liberties. Seven of the tankers were allotted to Greece, which resulted in a major internecine conflict among Greek shipowners to control this offer. Since the shipowners could not decide how to divide this tonnage, Aristotle Onassis suggested that he would buy the tankers for cash and contribute part of the profits to the NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) and other institutions for public benefit. His offer brought an immediate reaction from the rest of the shipowners: the seven tankers were bought for cash by N.Lykiardopulos, S.Andreades, S.Livanos, G. Nicolaou, P.Goulandris & Sons, M.Nomikos and Chandris Brothers.30 Aristotle Onassis, who had not participated in the purchase of the 100 Liberties, responded to his colleagues’ actions by focusing publicity on them. In a highly revealing article, written in 1947 but not published until 1953, he calculated that in 1947 alone these 100 ships generated incomes of £9 million and net profits of £2.8 million. That same year, the shipowners were thus able to buy another 277 ships (see Table 8.3), which they put under flags of convenience and which yielded equally sizeable incomes. Criticising the tax evasions of the shipowners and their minimal contribution to the Greek state, Onassis wrote:

254 THE TROUBLED 1940S

I ask what did the Greek nation receive in taxes or foreign exchange? Nothing, while the English and the Norwegians took almost everything. As if this was not enough, the Greek nation presents us with a gift of 100 Liberties, valued today at $70 million and with an income of 35 million dollars annually. During the period of spring 1947 to spring 1948 the total income of the 377 ships [owned by the Greeks] is more than $100 million. You owe everything, all, to the nation, which owes you nothing and moreover has treated you with scandalous favour…. It is no exaggeration or jest on my part when I say that the 100 ships were given as a present from the Greek people, and let me make this clear: the average advance payment for the purchase of one of the 100 Liberties was, as you know, $150,000 and £14,000 guarantee. Anybody could pre-charter for at least one year continuous trips with coal cargo for $9.5 to $11.0 per ton. This means that under the worst conditions, the income of $1,400 daily minus $150 for depreciation and $50 for reparations and others would still leave us with $1,200 net revenue per day. That is, the $420,000 in revenues during the first eleven and a half months, minus $70,000 for delays and unforeseen payments, leaves $350,000. We receive advance payment for 3/ 4 of these revenues with a time-charter and a second mortgage, which means that we have $262,500 in cash the day after we deliver the ship. If we subtract the $150,000 we paid as Table 8.2 Distribution of the 100 Liberty ships in 1947 Shipowner

Name of ship*

Registered

1) AnastassiouFafalios

Othon

Chios

Psara Alexandros Koryzis Georgios F.Andreadis Navarchos Kountouriotis Fotini Eugenia Chandris Panayotis Coumantaros Stavros Coumantaros Eleni D. Asteris Michalakis Krios Petalioi Georgios Panoras

Chios Chios Chios Chios

2) Andreades S. 3) Carras I.C. 4) Carras I.M. 5) Chandris Bros 6) Coumantaros P.

7) Dambassis D. 8) Drakoulis E. 9) Efstathiou N. 10) Embiricos Michael 11) Embiricos Maris 12) Epiphaniades T.

Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Andros Ithaca Piraeus Andros Andros Pireaus

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 255

Shipowner

Name of ship*

Registered

13) Goulandris J.Bros

Kechrea Konistra Evanthia Ioannis P.Goulandris Chryssi

Volos Piraeus Andros Andros Andros

Georgios D.Gratsos Kastor Audrey Triton Sounion Agios Nicolaos

Ithaca Ithaca Ithaca Ithaca Piraeus Pireaus

K.Hadjipateras

Piraeus

Samos Grigorios K. III Hellenic Beach Hellenic Star Hellenic Wave Hellenic Sky Panayia Kathariotissa Anna Kondyli Vasilios E.Kulukundis Ioannis G.Kulukundis Captain Farmakides Maria G.Kulukundis Megalochari

Samos Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Ithaca Andros Piraeus Syros Piraeus Piraeus Zakynthos

Nicolaos G.Kulukundis Nicolaos Kairis Mount Athos Santorini Stathis J.Yanaghas Syros

Syros

Akti Aliakmon Aliki

Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus

14) Goulandris P. & Sons 15) Gratsos Bros

16) Hadjilias-Manthos 17) Hadjipateras N. & A. 18) Hadjipateras N. & A. 19) Inglessis D.Sons 20) Kallimanopulos P. (‘Hellenic Lines’)

21) Karavias A. 22) Kondylis N. 23) Kulukundis M.

(40% J.Theodoracopulos)

(50% I.Kairis) (60% Scarvelis K.)

(Georgopulos 20%, Karellas 24%) 24) Livanos Stavros (‘Theofano’)

Andros Piraeus Piraeus Syros Syros

256 THE TROUBLED 1940S

Shipowner

Shipowner

25) Lemos C.M. 26) Lemos G. 27) Lemos Panagiotis 28) Lemos S.A. 29) Livanos J., G.P. 30) Los BrosPezas 31) Markessinis P. 32) Mavrofilipas Bros 33) Michalinos K.

34) Moatsos G. 35) Niarchos Stavros

36) Nicolaou G.

37) Nomikos E. 38) Nomikos M. 39) Pantaleon Bros

Name of ship*

Registered

Alfios Axios Atalanti

Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus

Name of ship*

Registered

Evros Kyma Meandros Nedon Nestos Pinios Michael Ellas Kostis Lemos

Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Chios Chios

Antonis Panayotis

Chios Chios

Igor

Chios

Kostis Los Evrymedon Mariam

Chios Piraeus Pireaus

Kostas Michalos Leonidas Michalos Kriti Captain I.Mataragas Captain K.Papazoglou Nicolaou Georgios Nicolaou Zografia Loula Nomikos Petros Nomikos Demosthenes

Piraeus Pireaus Chania, Crete Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus Piraeus

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 257

Shipowner

Name of ship*

Registered

40) Papadakis A. 41) Pateras D.A.

Virginia Anastasios Pateras Nicholas

Piraeus Chios

Konstantis

Piraeus

Nicolaos Pateras Kalliopi Dirphys

Chios Chios Piraeus

Eleni Stathatou Eptanisos Maria Stathatou Leontios Aeroporos Vassiliades Demosthenes Themistocles Pericles Stylianos Vlassopulos Themoni

Ithaca Ithaca Ithaca Piraeus Chios

Hadiotis Helatros Ameriki

Syros Syros Piraeus

Era

Piraeus

42) Pateras Charalambos 43) Pateras N., G. & D. 44) Pateras N.Sons 45) Pateras P.D. 46) Pateras V. & Livanos S. 47) Stathatos D.

48) Teryazos T. 49) Vassiliades V. 50) Vergottis G.

51) Vlassopulos Bros 52) RethymnisPneumaticos (‘Kassos’ S.A.) 53) ‘Marathon S.A. 54) ‘Emboriki Efoplistiki’

Piraeus

Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia Ithaca Syros

Olga Piraeus 55) ‘Galaxias’ Richard D.Lions Pireaus Sources: Archives of the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, London; A.I.Tzamtzis, The Liberties and the Greeks, Athens, Hestia, 1984, pp. 267–86 Note: * The names of the ships have been translated from their Greek names as they were registered at the time of their delivery, and in this way there might be some discrepancies in the spelling of their names found in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping

an advance payment for the purchase, we are left with a net profit of $112, 500. In other words, with the signature of all the Greek women and

258 THE TROUBLED 1940S

children dressed in rags, and without paying one penny we are left with a surplus of $112,500.31 It is worth noting that Onassis’ polemical article was targeted at the traditional shipowners, a group which included his father-in-law, Stavros Livanos.32 Although the state guarantee for the Liberties was supposedly given to help medium and small shipowners, if we compare Appendix 6.11, which lists the Greek Shipping Offices in London in 1937–8, and the allo cation of the Liberties ten years later (Table 8.2), we find that more than half the Liberties were bought by the most powerful Greek firms. These shipping companies, already foreignbased, were able to use the inexpensive Liberties at a time of particularly high freight rates to expand their businesses internationally and to detach themselves more than ever from the Greek state. One of the results was that the impressive rate of increase in Greek-owned vessels under flags of convenience and the expansion of London and New York-based Greek firms was not matched by a similar increase of the Greek-flag fleet and the Piraeus shipping market. Indeed, the fleet stagnated and only reached pre-Second World War levels twelve years later (Figure 8.4). The purchase of the Liberties proved to be fundamental for the subsequent development of the Greek-owned fleet. The Korean war in the early 1950s escalated freights again and generated extraordinary profits for Greek shipowners. This ‘golden’ period is still remembered in Greek shipowning circles as the era when ‘one journey made two ships’. In this way Greek shipowners became among the best customers of European, American and Japanese shipyards in the 1950s. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE ‘Flagging out’ from traditional registers to flags of convenience has been a major feature of post-Second World War international shipping. Flags of convenience are registers which provide low taxes and lax conditions of employment and operation.33 The first important flag of convenience was the Panamanian, which was initially used as a flag of convenience in 1922 to carry alcoholic beverages during American prohibition. Panama’s subservient position to the US through American control of the Canal made it an ideal locale, since US owners had no reason to fear that a change of government would affect their interests. During the Second World War, the Panamanian flag proved of great use; by switching tonnage to the Panamanian flag, American ships maintained their neutrality after the US entered the war. In 1948 US oil interests assisted in establishing another flag of convenience in Liberia. There were striking parallels between Panama

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 259

Table 8.3 The Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1938–62 (in GRT) Year

Greek

%

Liberian

%

Panamanian

%

1938 1,889,269 1939 1,780,666 1946 501,593 1947 1,204,444 1948 1,286,161 1949 1,301,512 50 52,016 2 1,025,726 40 1950 1,264,977 43 133,655 5 1,147,680 39 1951 1,238,868 34 396,116 11 1,668,025 46 1952 1,175,986 29 696,212 17 1,769,687 44 1953 1,139,609 24 1,309,620 28 1,847,601 39 1954 1,242,075 21 2,397,896 40 1,756,413 30 1955 1,270,221 18 3,236,550 47 1,729,236 25 1956 1,444,904 17 4,678,244 55 1,722,549 20 1957 1,575,899 15 6,414,910 61 1,903,253 18 1958 2,274,925 19 7,224,562 61 1,805,054 15 1959 3,892,392 31 6,366,303 51 1,691,779 14 1960 5,574,621 46 4,773,032 39 1,247,642 10 1961 6,519,185 49 4,903,567 37 732,789 6 1962 7,008,726 53 4,753,619 36 616,552 5 Sources: Naftika Chronika, 1 January 1974 Note: * Includes Greek, Panamanian, Liberian and other flags

Total Greek-owned*

2,591,855 2,929,584 3,641,782 4,029,663 4,738,322 5,944,617 6,905,706 8,533,360 10,542,998 11,899,383 12,456,159 12,200,764 13,212,844 13,299,617

and Liberia. Both were small countries formed with American assistance and remaining under effective American control.34 The adoption of cheap flags by various small developing countries directly dependent on either American or European interests became a characteristic feature of the second half of the twentieth century. There has been an ever-increasing number of countries that have ‘opened’ their registries; in addition to Panama, Liberia and Honduras (the infamous ‘PanHoLib’ flags), Costa Rica, Bermuda, the Isle of Man, Cyprus, Vanuatu, Lebanon, Malta, Bangladesh, the Marshal Islands, Saint Vincent, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas and Hong Kong, among others, have established such registries. The use of foreign flags has of course been common for Greeks since the nineteenth century. Indeed, the interwar years were the only period when the Greek flag was widely employed. None the less, the Panamanian flag had been used by a few Greek companies since 1933 and the 1940s marked a decisive turn away from the Greek flag to other registries. In 1946 what was left of the Greekowned fleet still sailed entirely under the Greek flag. By 1949, however, 50 per cent of the fleet was on foreign registers (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.4). The widespread adoption of foreign flags during this decade was perhaps the most

260 THE TROUBLED 1940S

Figure 8.4 Growth of the Greek-owned merchant fleet. Source: Table 8.3

important characteristic of the postwar development of the Greek merchant marine. The percentage of Greek-owned tonnage actually operating on domestic registry decreased continuously until 1958, while the percentage of craft sailing under flags of convenience increased until 1957, when it reached 87 per cent of the total. Although the shipowners generally attribute their use of non-Greek flags after 1945 to hostile domestic maritime policy, political instability, and the power of Greek unions, the main reasons for their behaviour in fact appear to be external. The American government explicitly supported the growing use of flags of convenience in the immediate postwar era through its financial institutions; most Greek shipowners who bought ships on credit from American banks were ‘urged’ to sail under flags of convenience. The high labour costs at home, which kept US ships from being competitive, and the need to retain control over a large part of the world’s merchant fleet for strategic and political reasons, led US maritime policymakers to support the flags of convenience. The adoption of such flags by US-controlled oil companies and independent owners meant that powerful lobbies were established to ensure their continued existence.35 During the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, 80 to 90 per cent of the Liberian fleet and 45 per cent of the Panamanian fleet were operated by Greeks (Table 8.4). The adoption of flags of convenience was not without hurdles. The first problems, which arose with the first postwar depression in the freight market

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 261

Table 8.4 Structure of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets (in 000 GRT) Liberian Year

(1) Greekowned

Panamanian (2) Total

(1)/(2) %

(3) Greekowned

(4) Total

(3)/(4) %

1949 50 50 100 1,025 3,020 34 1950 136 240 57 1,148 3360 34 1951 396 590 67 1,668 3,610 46 1952 696 900 77 1,770 3,740 47 1953 1,310 1,430 92 1,848 3,910 47 1954 2,378 2,380 100 1,756 4,090 43 1955 3,236 4,000 81 1,729 3,920 44 1956 4,687 5,580 84 1,722 3,920 44 1957 6,415 7,470 86 1,903 4,130 46 1958 7,225 10,080 72 1,805 4,260 42 1959 6,366 11,940 53 1,692 4,580 37 Sources: Compiled from Naftika Chronika, 1958–75; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1965, 1970 and 1977

from 1948 to 1950, stimulated organised opposition to flags of convenience, especially Panamanian. Many old and sub-standard ships had been registered under the Panamanian flag after the war, which led to low safety standards and poor working conditions on these vessels. Thus, when competition became more intense during the freight depression, some shipowners and seamen’s unions attempted to put an end to flags of convenience. In 1948, the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) threatened to boycott ships that sailed under the Panamanian and Honduran flags. The boycott, which never actually materialised, received world-wide publicity and support from several European maritime nations, with the result that some safety regulations were imposed upon the Panamanian government.36 This led to the gradual abandonment of the Panamanian flag (see Table 8.4 and Figure 8.5); in 1949 40 per cent of the Greekowned fleet was under the Panamanian flag, while by 1958 this had declined to 15 per cent. The adoption of the Liberian flag is evident from Figure 8.5: from 3 per cent in 1949, the Greek-owned fleet on Liberian registry increased to 65 per cent in 1958. The Liberian flag continues to be the major flag of convenience today. But it was the second big post-Second World War freight rate crisis at the end of the 1950s, combined with the first international boycott against flags of convenience in December 1958, that led to a ‘return’ to the Greek flag (Figure 8.4). In 1958 freight rates reached their lowest point in the postwar era and a large number of vessels were laid-up. The cause of the crisis was not only lower demand but also a surplus of tonnage, largely attributable to the overordering of new tonnage by Greek shipowners. The boycott by the ITF in 1958

262 THE TROUBLED 1940S

Figure 8.5 Percentage of distribution of flags in the Greek fleet Source: Table 8.3

against flags of convenience took place mainly in the ports of the US, the UK and northern Europe. The polemic against flags of convenience was encouraged by the British, Norwegians, Dutch and others, in order to diminish competition from the Greeks, who controlled more than half the flag-of-convenience fleet at the time. The Greek flag proved a safe refuge in those difficult times and its tonnage increased steadily after 1958 (Figure 8.4).37 Part of the success of the Greek shipowners in the immediate postwar years was based on their decision to make the US, the world’s leading economic power (but a weak maritime power), their main trading partners, as they had done on a smaller scale with Great Britain in an earlier period. This was the advantage of the cross-traders and of tramp owners: by serving international trade rather than the needs of a particular nation, they were able to adjust to changes in the international environment. For their part, Greek tramp owners served the US well: the Americans needed a low-cost tramp fleet that they could control, something they achieved with the Greeks through credit and flags of convenience. The fact, however, that Greece was the only traditional maritime European nation to take such extensive advantage of flags of convenience during the postwar period may be attributed not only to the choices made by US policymakers but also to the internal structures of the country. Great Britain and

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 263

Norway did not rely to a similar extent on flags of convenience; the reasons may lie first with the powerful labour unions in their countries that prohibited the use of such flags and second with financial incentives by their governments. The economic and political structures of Greece meant that successive governments were able to weaken the Greek seamen unions’ power after 1951, but unable to provide financial support to the ever-growing merchant fleet. In this manner, the use of flags of convenience by the Greek-owned merchant fleet was ensured. Apart from financial support, the US provided access to major oil companies and entrance into the tanker market, as we shall see in the next chapter. Moreover, the purchase of the Liberties provided the basis for the development of a Greekowned dry-bulk fleet and subsequent entrance into the bulk carrier market.

9 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The second half of the twentieth century was an era in which the Greek-owned fleet rose to the apex of world shipping in terms of tonnage. After continuous growth during the 1950s and 1960s, the Greek-owned fleet after 1970 was larger than the Japanese, Norwegian, British or American fleets (see Figure 9.1). The Greeks in the postwar period constituted the worlds biggest group of tramp shipping operators, managing an international fleet under various flags and carrying dry and liquid bulk cargoes for third countries. During the 1940s and 1950s the Greeks sailed their ships under flags of convenience, carried cargoes for the US and the northern Europeans and were involved mainly in the Atlantic and European sea routes. Developments in world sea transport led them subsequently to change trading partners and routes. In the 1960s and 1970s they increasingly carried cargoes for developing and socialist countries and Japan, increasingly operated under the Greek flag, and sailed more in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In the 1980s their trading partners and routes remained more or less the same but they began again to ‘flag-out’ from Greece in favour of more ‘open’ registries. The 1990s have witnessed a reluctant ‘return’ to the Greek flag and a small increase in the fleet. This chapter will investigate developments in world trade from the 1950s to 1990s, the world division of maritime transport, and the growth and role of the Greeks internationally. Demand for shipping has always been dependent on trade; analysis of the pattern of maritime trade is therefore essential to understand the development of shipping in the second half of the twentieth century. We will first discuss the geographic pattern of world seaborne trade and the main cargoes involved. Throughout the postwar era the principal sea routes remained unchanged but the whole pattern of world trade changed. The growth and ascendancy of the US economy combined with the reconstruction of Europe meant that the Atlantic continued to be the busiest maritime route in the 1940s and 1950s (see Figure 9.2). The remarkable growth of Japan, however, combined with the growing economies of less-developed and socialist countries until the 1970s and the new South Asian ‘tigers’ thereafter, resulted in a shift away from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the second half of the century (see Figure 9.3).

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265

Figure 9.1 Growth of top fleets, 1949–93. Sources: Appendices 9.1 and 9.2

From 1945 to 1973 the world economy experienced almost uninterrupted economic and commercial growth. The volume of seaborne trade between the end of the Second World War and 1973 expanded more than six-fold, from 490 million metric tons in 1948 to 3,210 million metric tons in 1973 (see Table 9.1). After 1974, however, maritime commerce was characterised by lower and often negative growth. International trade grew only about 20 per cent in fifteen years, from 3,250 million metric tons in 1974 to 3,940 million metric tons in 1989. Seaborne trade can be divided into two major categories, oil and dry cargo. About 60 per cent of the large increase between 1948 and 1973 was caused by an almost nine-fold increase in oil shipments, from 210 million metric tons to 1,860 million metric tons, or from 43 per cent of total seaborne trade in 1948 to 57 per cent by 1973 (Table 9.1 and Figure 9.6). In 1973, however, a steep rise in oil prices by OPEC triggered severe recession in western economies and a decrease in the seaborne oil trade. The main oil exporting countries were in the Middle East and the principal sea routes for oil radiated from the Persian Gulf to Japan, Europe

266 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.2 World sea-trade in the 1920s Table 9.1 Development of world seaborne dry cargo and oil trade, 1948–89 (in 000,000 metric tons) 1

2

%

(3)

Year

Dry cargo

Oil

(2)/(3)

Total

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958

280 291 300 360 350 360 390 450 490 510 480

210 219 225 255 285 295 320 350 390 420 440

43 43 43 41 45 45 45 44 44 45 48

490 510 525 615 635 655 710 800 880 930 920

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 267

Figure 9.3 World sea-trade in the 1980sWorld sea-trade in the 1980s 1

2

%

(3)

Year

Dry cargo

Oil

(2)/(3)

Total

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

490 540 570 600 640 720 780 830 860 930 990 1,110

480 540 580 650 710 790 860 940 1,010 1,130 1,260 1,420

49 50 51 52 53 52 52 53 54 55 56 56

970 1,080 1,150 1,250 1,350 1,510 1,640 1,770 1,870 2,060 2,250 2,530

268 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Year

1

2

%

(3)

Dry cargo

Oil

(2)/(3)

Total

1971 1,120 1,520 58 1972 1,190 1,650 58 1973 1,350 1,860 58 1974 1,440 1,810 56 1975 1,373 1,652 55 1976 1,471 1,838 56 1977 1,515 1,898 56 1978 1,602 1,949 55 1979 1,731 2,038 54 1980 1,833 1,871 51 1981 1,866 1,693 48 1982 1,793 1,480 45 1983 1,770 1,461 45 1984 1,912 1,498 44 1985 1,923 1,459 43 1986 1,945 1,514 44 1987 1,987 1,518 43 1988 2,119 1,616 43 1989 2,212 1,728 44 Source: OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, various years

2,640 2,840 3,210 3,250 3,025 3,309 3,413 3,551 3,769 3,704 3,559 3,273 3,231 3,410 3,382 3,459 3,505 3,735 3,940

and the US. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and again between 1967 and 1975, diverted maritime commerce around the Cape of Good Hope (Figures 9.4 and 9.5). Such a change of itinerary increased the demand for oil transport in ton-miles, since the length of the routes to Europe and the US almost doubled with the canals closure (London-Bombay via Suez: 6,260 nautical miles; LondonBombay via Cape of Good Hope: 10,700 nautical miles). Until 1960, seven oil companies—known as the ‘seven sisters’: the American Chevron, Esso, Gulf, Mobil and Texaco, the British BP and the Dutch Shell— dominated world production, distribution and sales. In 1960 five producing countries—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela —formed the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in an attempt to prevent the powerful oil companies from depressing prices. In 1973, however, OPEC had a more dramatic effect, as oil prices more than doubled, decreasing oils share of international trade from 58 per cent in 1973 to 44 per cent in 1989. If almost half international seaborne trade is composed of oil shipments, the other half is composed of dry cargo. There are five main bulk dry-cargo commodities which, during the entire period, accounted for more than 40 percent of total dry-cargo sea trade: iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphates

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 269

Figure 9.4 Major sea-routes of oil, 1958

(Table 9.2). The remainder of the dry cargoes consist of a host of minor bulk commodities and manufactured goods. The minor bulk commodities, which constitute about one-third of dry cargoes, include steel products, pig and scrap iron, fertilisers (especially sulphur and potash), non-grain agricultural commodities (soya beans, rice, and sugar), and products like coke and cement. Finished and semi-finished manufactured goods constitute the rest of the drycargo market and as a rule are carried by liners. All the other bulk cargoes are carried by tramps and bulk carriers. Greek concentration on tramp shipping will focus the analysis mainly on dry-bulk cargoes. Iron ore is the single largest dry bulk cargo, representing approximately 20 per cent of the total dry-cargo market in the 1960s and 1970s and Table 9.2 World seaborne trade of main bulk commodities (in 000 metric tons)

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

(1) (2) (3) (4) Iron ore Grain Coal Bauxite/ Alumina

(5) (6) (7) Phosphate Total Total dry s 1+2+3+4 cargo +5

% (6)/(7)

101 98 102 107 134 152 153

18 19 20 22 24 25 27

42 42 41 42 43 42 41

46 57 53 59 71 70 76

46 48 53 64 60 59 61

17 17 18 17 19 21 23

228 239 246 269 308 327 340

540 570 600 640 720 780 830

270 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.5 Major sea-routes of oil, 1984

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

(1) (2) (3) (4) Iron ore Grain Coal Bauxite/ Alumina

(5) (6) (7) Phosphate Total Total dry s 1+2+3+4 cargo +5

% (6)/(7)

164 188 214 247 250 247 298

68 65 60 73 76 89 139

67 73 83 101 94 96 104

25 26 30 34 35 35 38

28 32 32 33 35 38 43

352 384 419 488 490 505 622

41 41 42 43 43 42 46

292 294 276 278 327 314 303 273 257 306

137 146 147 169 182 198 206 200 199 207

127 127 132 127 159 188 210 208 197 232

41 42 46 46 46 48 45 38 36 44

38 37 44 47 48 48 42 40 43 44

635 646 645 667 762 796 806 759 732 833

860 930 990 1,125 1,140 1,216 1,346 1,440 1,373 1,471 1,515 1,602 1,731 1,833 1,866 1,793 1,770 1,912

46 44 43 42 44 43 43 42 41 44

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 271

Figure 9.6 World trade, 1948–89. Source: Table 9.1 (1) (2) (3) (4) Iron ore Grain Coal Bauxite/ Alumina 1985 321 181 1986 311 165 1987 319 186 1988 348 196 1989 362 192 Source: See Table 9.1

272 276 283 304 321

40 41 45 48 49

(5) (6) (7) Phosphate Total Total dry s 1+2+3+4 cargo +5

% (6)/(7)

43 41 42 44 41

45 43 44 44 44

857 834 875 940 965

1,923 1,945 1,987 2,119 2,212

16 per cent in the 1980s. The seaborne iron ore trade is dominated by two exporters, Brazil and Australia, which control about 60 per cent of the market, while the two principal import regions are Europe and Asia (see Figure 9.7).1 The latter includes Japan and, from the 1970s, the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), South Korea and Taiwan. Coal, used to produce steel and to generate power, is the second most important dry-bulk cargo and the most rapidly increasing in the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s (see Table 9.2). The three principal sources of supply for coal are Australia, the US and South Africa, while the main importing regions are Europe, Japan and, in the last two decades, the NICs (Figure 9.8).

272 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.7 Iron ore: seaborne trade, 1980s

Although grain ranks last among the three principal seaborne dry-bulk trades, it is considered the principal dynamo in world shipping markets. This is because, unlike the other commodities, the grain trade fluctuates according to harvests that depend on weather and soil conditions, and political manipulations. The US, Canada, Argentina and Australia constitute the four main exporting countries, while the former Soviet Union, Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan are the main importing countries (Figure 9.9). International trends regarding volume, type of cargoes and patterns of international trade are reflected in the developments of transport services during the postwar period. We can distinguish two major shipping markets: tankers and dry cargo. The spectacular growth of oil shipments led to an equivalent increase in the demand for tankers. The rise in the share of tankers in the world fleet is evident since the war: from 20 per cent in Table 9.3 Development of world fleet, 1948–93 (ships of 100 GRT and over, in 000,000 GRT) Year

Oil tankers

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

17.1 18.4 20 22 24.6

Ore and dry bulk carriers 21 22 23 24 26

Other types

Total*

64.5 65.8 67 68.1 69.5

81.6 84.2 87 90.1 94.1

79 78 77 76 74

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 273

Figure 9.8 Coal: seaborne trade, 1980s Year

Oil tankers

1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974

26.5 28.2 29.8 33.4 37.7 41.5 43.8 45.3 47.1 50.6 55 60.2 64.2 69.2 77.4 86.1 96.1 105.1 115.4 129.5

Ore and dry bulk carriers 27 28 28 29 31 32 32 32 32 33 34 35 35 36 37 38 39 39 40 42

16.7 18.8 23.3 29.1 34.9 41.8 46.7 53.8 63.5 72.6 79.4

11 12 14 16 18 20 20 22 24 25 25

Other types

Total*

70.6 73.6 77 81.2 83.7 88.3 92.1 94.7 98.8 85.7 86.6 87.6 88.8 90.1 92.5 94.7 97.3 99.7 101.9 102.4

97.1 101.8 106.8 114.6 121.4 129.8 135.9 140 145.9 153 160.4 171.1 182.1 194.2 211.7 227.5 247.2 268.3 289.9 311.3

73 72 72 71 69 68 68 68 68 56 54 51 49 46 44 42 39 37 35 33

274 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.9 Grain: seaborne trade, 1980s Year

Oil tankers

Ore and dry bulk carriers

Other types

Total*

1975 150.1 44 85.5 25 106.6 31 342.2 1976 168.2 45 91.7 25 112.1 30 372 1977 174.1 44 100.9 26 118.6 30 393.6 1978 175 43 106.5 26 124.4 31 406 1979 174.2 42 108.3 26 130.5 32 413 1980 175 42 109.6 26 135.3 32 419.9 1981 171.7 41 113.1 27 136 32 420.8 1982 166.8 39 119.3 28 138.6 33 424.7 1983 157.3 37 124.4 30 140.9 33 422.6 1984 147.5 35 128.3 31 142.9 34 418.7 1985 138.4 33 134 32 143.9 35 416.3 1986 128.4 32 132.9 33 143.6 35 404.9 1987 127.7 32 131 32 144.8 36 403.5 1988 127.8 32 129.6 32 146 36 403.4 1989 129.6 32 129.5 31 151.4 37 410.5 1990 134.8 32 133.2 31 155.6 37 423.6 1993 125.8 27 125.5 27 217.8 46 469.1 Sources: See Table 9.1 and N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 12 March 1993

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 275

Year

Oil tankers

Ore and dry bulk Other types Total* carriers Note: * For the years 1950–9 the Great Lakes fleets of Canada and the United States and the United States reserve fleet are excluded; for the rest of the years they are included

1948 to 32 per cent in 1960 and 45 per cent in 1975 (see Table 9.3). From 1975, when tanker tonnage peaked, there has been a distinct decrease in their share of the world fleet; in 1990 tankers in relative terms had resumed the level of 1960 at about 32 per cent. The results of the oil shocks of the 1970s were reflected in the composition of the world fleet. Although the oil industry was highly oligopolistic, the same was not true for the tanker market. Throughout the postwar era the seven oil companies owned about one-third of the world tanker fleet (Table 9.4). To meet their needs beyond that capacity they time-chartered tankers from independent shipowners. The longer routes via the Cape of Good Hope (Figures 9.4 and 9.5) and the increasing volumes favoured larger vessels, which lowered the cost per ton. Between the 1950s and 1970s maximum tanker sizes grew spectacularly, from 30,000 dwt in the 1940s to 100,000 dwt in the 1950s, 200,000 dwt in the 1960s, and 500,000 dwt in the 1970s. Despite the impressive increase in tankers, the dry-cargo fleet comprised more than two-thirds of the world fleet for most of the postwar period (Table 9.3). In Chapter 1 we mentioned that the variety of cargoes, specialisation of ships, and geographic patterns of maritime trade created two further subdivisions in the drycargo market in the last third of the nineteenth century: tramp and liner shipping. Tramp shipping involves the transport of bulk commodities on an irregular basis according to demand, while liners engage in the transport of goods on regular schedules over particular routes. About a quarter of the total dry-cargo market is carried by liners while the rest is served by tramps.2 Since Greek shipowners are almost exclusively in the latter sector, we will focus on this form of shipping. The main revolution in postwar dry-bulk shipping was the introduction of bulk carriers. Traditionally, bulk cargoes have been carried by the classic all-purpose tramp ship, represented by the Liberty ship in the first two postwar decades. The increasing needs of industrialised nations—and Table 9.4 Tanker fleets by the seven oil companies (000,000 dwt) Company

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

BP Chevron Exxon Gulf Mobil Shell

6 7 14 2 4 12

6 8 16 3 6 14

5 9 18 4 6 15

5 9 18 4 5 15

4 8 17 3 5 13

276 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Company

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

Texaco 6 7 7 6 6 Total 51 60 64 62 56 Sources: Mike Ratcliffe, A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1985, p. 161; OECD, Maritime Tmmport, Paris, 1990

particularly of Japan and Europe—for large quantities on a more or less regular basis of the above-mentioned five bulk commodities led to the creation of the bulk carrier. The economies of scale which applied to tankers also applied to bulk carriers, but their growth in size was less spectacular as a result of the lack of port facilities and large quantities of cargo. Most bulk carriers are of a maximum size of 75,000 dwt (this is also the maximum permitted dimensions for passage through the Panama Canal, the so-called Panamax size). The increase of the share of the bulk carriers in the world fleet was spectacular: it reached 20 percent in 1970 and more than 30 per cent in the 1980s (Table 9.3). In the 1980s in particular the total tonnage of bulk carriers reached and even surpassed tankers. The bulk carrier market has similarities with the tanker market. While the market for bulk cargoes is highly oligopolistic, the bulk carrier market remained competitive, since shippers partly own vessels but mainly charter them from independent owners.3 The bulk carrier took away from the all-purpose tramps a large portion of the cargoes they traditionally carried. In the early 1960s the classic tramp carried all bulk cargoes, but from the late 1960s to the present it has been restricted to the transport of the minor cargoes like sugar, pig iron, ferrous scrap, fertilisers, timber or cement. The change of cargo mix for multipurpose cargo ships, a large proportion of which was owned by Greeks in the 1960s and 1970s, affected the trade routes. The main trading partners of the Greek-owned dry-cargo vessels shifted from the US and Europe to Japan and the socialist and developing countries.4 To facilitate further analysis, we will divide the postwar years into two subperiods: the period from 1945 to the oil shock of 1973 and the period from 1974 to the present.5 Figures 9.10–9.12 indicate the relation between the demand for the transport of oil and dry-cargo shipments, the supply of such services, and freight rate fluctuations from 1948 to 1974. As Figures 9.10 and 9.11 indicate there was an impressive and continuous growth of the world fleet, as well as of world trade, during the 1950s and 1960s. Freight rates in the 1950s had two peaks, one during the Korean war in 1951 and the other with the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956; in the 1960s, however, the upward trend was continuous until 1973.6 The period from 1974 until the late 1980s was characterised by a succession of crises (Figures 9.13–9.15). The oil crisis of 1973 resulted in a short-term decrease in the dry-cargo and oil trades with no immediate decrease in the total world fleet but with a continuous decline in tanker tonnage after 1976. Freight

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 277

Figure 9.10 World trade, 1948–74. Source: Table 9.1

rates, which plummeted from 1974, show renewed strength after 1977 and peaked in 1979–80, only to start downward in the 1980s, with the worst periods in 1982–3 and 1985–6. Developments on the demand side in the 1980s were disappointing, particularly in the oil trade, while the dry-cargo trade (and hence the dry-bulk fleet) showed a better overall performance. This long period of crisis, however, ultimately resulted in a decrease of the world fleet in the mid-1980s. The shipping world obviously welcomed the revival of markets in the late 1980s. Figure 9.16 shows the composition of the Greek-owned fleet by ship type and Figure 9.17 the development of the fleet under the Greek and other flags. As Figure 9.16 indicates, tankers constituted almost half of Greek-owned ships from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. The continuous increase of tankers stopped in 1976, from which date their relative share declined steadily to reach one-third by 1993. The importance of bulk carriers in the Greek-owned fleet grew, reflecting the better state of that market in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 9.5).7 Part of the success of the Greeks in the postwar period lies in their massive entry into the tanker market in the late 1940s and 1950s. The first people responsible for this were Aristotle Onassis and Stavros Niarchos; they borrowed Norwegian expertise and international conditions did the rest. The main independent tanker owners of the interwar period were the Norwegians. As Stanley Sturmey reports, it was when Norwegians bought a few dozen tankers from Anglo-Saxon Oil on time-charters in the late 1920s that the Norwegian

278 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.11 World fleet, 1950–74. Source: Table 9.3

tanker fleet flourished and became the largest independent tanker fleet by the Second World War.8 Onassis and Niarchos also purchased tankers on timecharters from American oil companies in the 1940s and 1950s; in fact they further improved on the method by Table 9.5 Greek-owned fleet according to type of ship (in 000,000 GRT) Year

(1) Oil tankers

% (1)/(4)

(2) Ore and dry bulk carriers

1958 1959 1960 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

5.5 5.7 5.2 4.5 5.3 6.5 8.2 8.3 9.4 10.5 12.7

49 46 43 34 35 39 44 42 43 44 47

– – – – – – – – – 4.2 5.5

% (2)/(4)

18 20

(3) Other types

(4) Total

5.7 6.7 7 8.8 9.7 10 10.4 11.4 12.4 9.2 8.7

11.2 12.4 12.2 13.3 15 16.5 18.6 19.7 21.8 23.9 26.9

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 279

Figure 9.12 Tramp freights, 1948–74. Source: British Chamber of Shipping, 1977 Year

(1) Oil tankers

% (1)/(4)

(2) Ore and dry bulk carriers

% (2)/(4)

(3) Other types

(4) Total

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985*

14.7 15.9 18.2 19.7 21.8 23.1 23.6 23.2 21.3 21.3 21.9 22.1 21.6 21.5 20.2 19.2

48 47 47 46 48 48 47 45 41 40 41 41 40 38 38 41

7.2 8.4 10.4 12.1 13 14.2 15.2 16.9 18 18.8 19.2 19.7 20.4 22.5 24.1 22.9

23 25 27 28 29 29 30 32 34 36 36 36 38 40 45 49

9 9.8 10.4 10.8 10.6 11 11.8 12 13.2 12.8 12.5 12.5 11.4 12.1 9.3 4.8

30.9 34.1 39 42.6 45.4 48.3 50.6 52.1 52.5 52.9 53.6 54.3 53.4 56.1 53.6 46.9

280 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.13 World trade, 1974–89. Source: Table 9.1 Year

(1) Oil tankers

% (1)/(4)

(2) Ore and dry bulk carriers

% (2)/(4)

(3) Other types

(4) Total

1986 20.6 46 21.2 47 3.3 45.1 1987 21 44 22.7 44 3.8 47.5 1988 20.9 44 22.9 44 4.2 48 1989 21.1 46 21.9 46 2.5 45.5 1990 21.6 46 22.6 46 2.4 46.6 1993 18 32 22.7 32 56.9 Sources: Processed data from Naftika Chronika, Annual Statistics, 1958–90; N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 12 March 1993 Note: *Data before 1985 include all merchant and passenger ships above 100 GRT. After 1985 they include bulk carriers, tankers, combination carriers and cargo ships of 1,000 GRT and above

ordering a standard series of vessels at one shipyard, thus reducing costs and guaranteeing employment in the war-torn shipyards of Germany and England. Their entrance into tankers was facilitated by the postwar Norwegian foreign exchange crisis; because of foreign currency reserve short-ages, Norway banned the import of ships from late 1948 until 1951.9 Norwegian shipowners were thus

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 281

Figure 9.14 World fleet, 1974–93. Source: Table 9.3

unable to benefit from the trade boom induced by the Korean war. The gap was immediately filled not only by Onassis and Niarchos but also by other Greek shipowners who followed their example. Moreover, European shipyards were increasingly replaced by low-cost Japanese yards, which also cut costs. The other successful Greek strategy regarding ship types in the immediate postwar era was the purchase of the ‘blessed ships’, the Liberties, which provided the core of the dry-cargo fleet for more than twenty years. The introduction of the bulk carrier in the mid-1960s found Greek entrepreneurs ready to enter this market as well. Indeed, within a decade they comprised a third of the Greek-owned fleet. In fact, the problems encountered by tankers in the late 1970s and 1980s convinced a large number of Greek shipowners to diversify into bulk carriers; since then tankers and bulk carriers have been rather equally distributed in the Greek-owned fleet. Who were the owners of the world fleet in the last fifty years and what were the main changes that occurred in the maritime division of labour during this period?10 In 1948 the tonnage owned by the US had almost tripled compared to 1939 due to the massive shipbuilding projects of the First World War. Half of the mostly new fleet became the US Maritime Administration Reserve Fleet kept for strategic reasons, while the rest was sold to the Allies and to American citizens. In the same year the British fleet found itself with almost the same tonnage as it had before the war, while the Japanese and German fleets, the third and fifth biggest before the war, had been almost completely decimated (see Table 9.6).

282 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.15 Freight indices, 1975–90. Source: OECD, Maritime Transport, 1990

Norway, from fourth position before the war, rose to third in 1948. It was by 1963, however, that the new state of things became evident: in that year the US, the UK and Norway occupied the first three positions while Japan had climbed to fifth. The new rising ‘force’ of the flags of convenience were represented by Liberia in fourth place; the main owners of this fleet were the Greeks, which meant that the Greek-owned fleet was in reality the third largest in the world. The group of the ten biggest fleets had changed significantly by 1973. During this period the flags of convenience increased their share to about 23 per cent, an almost four-fold gain. The Greek-owned, Japanese and Norwegian fleets were the most dynamic, while Britain and the US declined significantly in relative terms. The ten biggest fleets—apart from Liberia and USSR—belonged to developed nations and represented more than two-thirds of world tonnage during this period; the developing nations’ share of Table 9.6 The ten biggest fleets, 1939–63 (in 000,000 GRT) Country

1939

% 1948 world fleet

% 1963 world fleet

% world fleet

Great Britain USA* Japan

17.9

26

18.0

22

21.6

15

11.4 5.6

17 8

29.2* –

36 –

23.1 10.0

16 7

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 283

Figure 9.16 Greek-owned fleet: types of ship. Source: Table 9.5 Country

1939

% 1948 world fleet

% 1963 world fleet

% world fleet

Norway Germany Italy Holland France Greece (Greekowned) Sweden Panama USSR Canada Liberia Total of first ten World fleet

4.8 4.5 3.4 3.0 2.9 1.8

7 6 5 4 4 3

4.3 – 2.1 2.7 2.8 – –

5 – 3 3 3 – –

3.7 – 5.6 5.2 5.2 7.0 (15.0)

9 – 4 4 4 5 (10)

1.6

2

2 2.7 2.1 2.0

3 3 3 2

56.9

83

67.9

84

– – 5.4 – 11.4 108.3

– – 4 – 8 74

68.5

100

80.3

100

145.9

100

284 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Country

1939

% 1948 world fleet

% 1963 world fleet

% world fleet

Sources: Helen Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour in Shipping. The Case of the Greek Merchant Fleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994, tables A.2.I, A.2.II, B.2.VI and B.2.VII Note: *Including the Great Lakes and the US reserve fleet

the world fleet in 1973 was 7 percent, while the socialist countries’ share was 8 per cent. The Greek-flag fleet, for reasons explained in the previous chapter, remained at very low levels in the 1950s, while its rise was induced by the international boycott against flags of convenience in 1958. The gradual shift of the main charterers of the Greek dry-cargo fleet since the 1960s to the socialist and developing countries contributed to the increase of the Greek flag since these states promoted national flags (Figure 9.17). The prolongation of the crisis resulted in the 1980s to an international trend of flagging-out, which was also followed by the Greeks. The beginning of the 1990s marked a return to home registries. The period from the first oil shock until the market revival in about 1987 was characterised by further significant changes. There was a definite decrease in the fleets of all the traditional maritime nations, a trend that was especially noticeable in the top ten fleets, which declined from 75 per cent of world tonnage to less than 65 per cent (Table 9.7). The period also experienced an impressive increase in flags of convenience, from 23 per cent of tonnage in 1973 to 31 per cent by 1991, as well as an increasing share for the fleets of the developing countries (7 per cent in 1973 to 22 per cent in 1991). The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s signalled the death knell for the British fleet, which dropped out of the top ten in the 1980s, while the US-owned fleet also showed a steady decrease (Figures 9.1 and 9.18). In 1989 the British fleet was smaller than South Koreas, while the Peoples Republic of China joined the elite levels of world shipping. The rise of the developing countries was due largely to the south Asian NICs which together with China formed a group of new maritime countries that brought hints of a new era in world shipping.11 The crisis again led an increasing number of traditional maritime nations to resort to cheaper flags. Figures 9.1 and 9.18 indicate the decline of the national flags and the adoption of others by the top four maritime nations during the 1980s. Data on the beneficial ownership of the open registries —with the exception of the Greek-owned fleet as indicated in Figure 9.1 —are not continuous. Figure 9.18 indicates that until 1973 the open registries’ fleets belonged essentially to Greek and American shipowners, while in the 1980s it was shared with the Japanese and Norwegians and other traditional maritime countries.12 Figure 9.18, however, shows the main owners from OECD countries to be Greeks, Japanese, Americans and Norwegians, while the ascent of Hong

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 285

Figure 9.17 Greek-owned fleet, 1949–93. Source: Appendix 9.1

Kong and other developing countries in the use of these flags should not be neglected (see Table 10.5).13 The Norwegian fleet, which plummeted after 1976, started increasing Table 9.7 The ten biggest fleets, 1973–93 (in 000,000 GRT) Country

1973

% 1983 world fleet

% 1992 world fleet

% world fleet

Liberia Japan Great Britain Norway Greece (Greekowned) USSR USA* Panama Italy France Bahamas

49.9 36.8 30.2

17 13 10

67.6 40.8 19.1

16 10 4

55.2 25.4 –

12 6 –

23.6 19.3 (42.6)

8 7 (15)

19.2 37.5 (56.1)

5 9 (13)

22.6 24.5 (56.9)

5 6 (12)

17.4 14.9 9.6 8.9 8.3 –

6 5 3 3 3

24.5 19.4 34.7 10 10 –

6 5 8 2 2

26.4** 18.2 49.6 – – 20

6 4 11 – 5

286 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

Figure 9.18 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations Source: Appendix 9.3 Country

1973

% 1983 world fleet

% 1992 world fleet

% world fleet

China Cyprus A. Total of top ten B. World fleet (A)/ (B)

– – 218.8

75

– – 282.8

2 1 67

13.9 20.4 276.2

3 5 62

289.9

100

422.6

100

444.3

100

Sources: See Table 9.6 and Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee, 12 March 1993 Notes: *Including Great Lakes and Reserve Fleet. **Data for 1991; data for 1992 not available

again after 1987 due to the establishment of NIS (Norwegian International Register). The Greek-owned and Japanese-owned fleets, despite a small decrease in absolute and relative terms in the 1980s, remained in first and second

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 287

positions, respectively. Greece in fact was the only leading European maritime nation to have survived the crisis without much loss. Actually, in 1993 the Greekowned fleet surpassed its 1983 peak, and for the first time in its history comprised more than 100 million dwt (see Table 10.5).

10 THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK OF THE GREEKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Why would Greeks, members of a small European country of fewer than ten million people, own the world’s largest fleet? And why would a fleet sailing under various flags and carrying cargoes for many nations be identified as ‘Greek-owned’? What does being Greek have to do with the operation of such multinational shipping enterprises? The answer to these questions has been hinted at throughout the book: the same reasons that led us to identify the international commercial and maritime networks of the Greeks in the nineteenth century apply to twentieth-century Greek shipping. These lie within a certain common business strategy practised by Greek shipowners, whether in New York, London or Piraeus, that allow us to identify an international Greek maritime network. This chapter analyses this network by investigating its structure, organisation and entrepreneurial methods. In the first half of the twentieth century, there were about 250 firms with shipping offices, mainly in Greece and London. Before the Great War, Constantinople constituted an important nexus of the network but disappeared thereafter due mainly to the Greco-Turkish War that lasted up to 1922. The number of branches in other ports was very small; the numerous shipping offices of the lonian network in south Russia disappeared and those in Galatz diminished to two, while there was only one office in Alexandria and one in Rotterdam. For the first time, shipping offices appeared outside Europe and the Mediterranean in the late 1930s: one in Buenos Aires (belonging to Onassis) and one in Shanghai (Yannoulatos). In 1914, 62 per cent of the tonnage was held by Greek shipping firms with headquarters in Piraeus, while 9 per cent was controlled from London and 14 per cent from Constantinople (see Table 10.2). In 1914, the amount of tonnage represented by Greek shipping agencies in London was 28 per cent. By 1938, after the establishment of Greek-owned ships on the Atlantic, the seventeen London shipping agencies represented 45 per cent of Greek-owned tonnage, but the headquarters of these firms, which owned 96 per cent of the fleet, were in Greece (see Table 10.2).

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 289

Table 10.1 The Greek maritime network, 1914–90 Number of shipping offices/agencies Port/City A. Western Europe PIRAEUS/GREECE LONDON Antwerp Arlesheim (Switzerland) Barcelona Clarence (Switzerland) Genoa Fribourg Geneva Hamburg Lausanne Lisbon Madrid Marseilles Monte Carlo Paris Ravenna Rome Rotterdam Stockholm San Vitale Vigo Trieste B. Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea CONSTANTINOPLE/ SMYRNA SOUTH RUSSIA Galatz/Braila Alexandria Beyrouth Cairo Limassol Nicosia C. North and South America NEW YORK Baltimore Buenos Aires

1914

1938

1958

1975

1990

155 13 – – – – – – – – – – – 4 – – – – 1 – – – 1

283 17 – – – – 1 – – – – – – – – 2 – – 1 – – – –

58 105 1 – 1 – 3 – 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 4 – – – 2 – – –

652 177 – – – – – – 1 3 1 – – 1 3 3 – – – – – – 1

815 150 – 1 1 1 1 1 – 4 1 1 – – – – 1 1 – – 1 1 1

47 27 8 – – – – –

2 – 7 6 – – – –

– – – 2 1 – – –

– – – – 1 – – –

– – – 1 1 13 1

– – –

– – 1

138 1 1

88 – 1

40 – 1

290 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Number of shipping offices/agencies Port/City

1914

1938

1958

1975

1990

Cleveland Connecticut Halifax Hamilton Houston Jackonsville Los Angeles Miami

– – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – –

– – 1 – 1 – – 1

1 – – 1 1 1 1 –

– 2 – – – – 1 1

Number of shipping offices/agencies Port/City

1914

1938

1958

1975

1990

Montreal – – 12 3 1 Monte Video – – – – 1 New Orleans – – 1 1 1 New Jersey – – – – 4 Rio de – – – – 1 Janeiro San – – 1 – 1 Francisco Savannah – – – – 1 D. Other Ajman – – – – 1 Hong Kong – – 1 – – Johannesbur – – 1 – – g Manila – – 1 1 1 Melbourne – – – 1 – Port Sudan – – 1 – – Sharjah – – – – – Singapore – – – – 1 Tokyo – – – 2 2 Total 256 320 352 857 1,057 Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1913/14, 1937/38; Skoularikos Shipping Directory, 1958, 1975, 1990

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 291

The second half of the twentieth century was characterised by confusion over the amount of Greek ownership and the location of the headquarters of Greekowned firms. The difficulty stemmed from the extensive adoption of flags of convenience and the fact that many Greek-owned shipping firms had two or more agencies in different cities. The purchase of a new ship by a Greek shipping management firm meant the creation of a new Liberian, Panamanian or Honduran company which had to be operated by an agent situated, for example, in London. The agent, who was actually the shipowner, appeared as the representative of the managing company in Piraeus or New York. Conversely, the supposed managing company of various Liberian, Panamanian or other companies in Piraeus appeared as the delegate of the managing company in London or New York. This organisational scheme was geared towards the avoidance of taxes and various other claims, as well as the minimalisation of legal problems. After the First World War Greek-owned shipping firms continued to use Piraeus and London as their main centres, but numerous others were added as the network expanded from Europe and the Mediterranean, as depicted in Tables 10.1 and 10.2. The former shows the number of shipping offices/agencies in each city, while the latter illustrates the headquarters of the various firms in the network. ‘Shipping firm’ is here defined as ‘the Table 10.2 Main headquarters of Greek-owned shipping firms, 1914–90 (percentage of ship tonnage) Main 1914 headqua rters

1938

1958

1975

1990

Piraeus 62% 96% 18% 34% 66% ** London 9% (28 %)* 1% (45 %)* 45% 39% 22% Constan 14% – – – – tinople NewYo – – 37% 18% 7% rk Other** 15% 3% – 9% 5% * Sources: For the years 1914 and 1938, see Appendices 4.11 and 6.11; for the years 1958 and 1975, see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993, appendix I; for 1990, see loannis Theotokas, ‘The Greek-owned Shipping Companies of Piraeus. Organizational and Managerial Methods, 1970–1990’, PhD thesis, Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus, forthcoming Notes: *Tonnage represented by the London Greek agencies. **The centre of the activities of the various companies in 1914 and 1938 was found not only in Piraeus but also in Syros, Andros or Chios. For the purpose of the analysis,

292 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

however, we have put them all under Piraeus. ***For 1914 it includes Rumania, South Russia, Marseilles and Rotterdam; for 1938 inclusdes Genoa, Paris, Alexandria, Buenos Aires, Rumania and Trieste; for 1975 includes Monte Carlo, Zurich and Montreal; for 1990 includes Zurich and Monte Carlo

decision-making body which engages in the provision and sale of maritime services’.1 Each such firm had its headquarters in one of the nodes of the network and branches in one or more of the others. The headquarters of each firm is synonymous with the operational or decision centres in which decisions were made and in which the shipowner resided most of the year.2 If in 1938 the number of Greek shipping offices in Piraeus, London and other cities numbered around 320 (Table 10.1), in 1958 they exceeded 350, by 1975 they topped 800, and in 1990 more than 1,000 (see Figure 10.2).3 After the Second World War Greek-owned offices were established in almost all the main ports of Europe, North and South America, Southeast Asia and South Africa. In the first two postwar decades, London and New York were home to the largest number of offices, followed by Piraeus. From the 1960s onwards, however, the number of offices in Piraeus rose speo tacularly to over 600 in 1975 and more than 800 in 1990. The largest number of shipping firms was always found in Piraeus because the port concentrated all the small and single-ship companies. Table 10.2 indicates the operational centres of the various firms. In 1958, 45 per cent of the fleet was operated from London and 37 per cent from New York. The adoption of flags of convenience, the rapid increase of tankers, and the close relations of Greek shipowners with the US in the immediate postwar era made the American city the second most important operating centre after London. The volume of tonnage with headquarters in Piraeus dropped dramatically, from 96 per cent in 1938 to 18 per cent twenty years later, for reasons explained in Chapter 8. From the mid–1960s onwards, Piraeus started slowly but steadily to resume its prewar importance as the main operational centre of the Greek-owned fleet; from 18 per cent in 1958, the tonnage operated from Piraeus rose to 34 per cent in 1975 and 66 per cent by 1990.4 In the last decade of the twentieth century the Greek-owned fleet had the same operational centres (Piraeus and London) as at its beginning (cf. Figures 10.1 and 10.2). The structure of Greek-owned shipping firms has been heavily based on family and common island ties. The management, as well as all the branch offices, was in the hands of members of the same family or co-islanders. The main source of shipowners from the 1910s to the 1960s were the Aegean islands and particularly Andros, Chios, Kassos, and the lonian islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca. Table 10.3 depicts the number of families (not firms) that came from each island and the amount of tonnage they owned.5 There were about 100 families

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 293

Figure 10.1 Greek maritime network, 1914. Number of shipping firms/agencies in the various port-cities

from the Aegean and lonian islands, a large proportion of whom came from sailing ship owners in the nineteenth century and who were the main shipowning families of the Greek-owned fleet until the last third of this century. In 1914 Andros and Cephalonia provided the main shipowning families, due mainly to the Embiricos family from Andros and to the descendants of the lonian network from Cephalonia and Ithaca. After the 1930s the Chiots proved the most dynamic shipowners and in both 1938 and 1958 owned almost one-third of the Greekowned fleet. The Aegean and lonian islands were the main places of origin of Greece’s shipowners for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century; they constituted about 75 per cent of the shipowning families and about 80 per cent of the total fleet from 1914 to 1958. The spectacular increase of the fleet in the post-Second World War era was marked by the entrance of a large number of new companies, particularly since the 1960s. These new firms brought a certain ‘class’ division to the ranks of the shipowners: ‘traditional’ versus ‘non-traditional’ shipowners. In order to differentiate between these two groups I define as traditional shipowners those who after the Second World War were at least second generation shipowners— those who inherited their firms from their fathers. Non-traditional shipowners are those whose fathers were not shipowners and who entered shipowning after being involved in another profession.6 The largest number of the branch offices in London and New York belonged to traditional owners, whereas Piraeus was the centre of most of the non-traditionalists.7

294 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Figure 10.2 Greek maritime network, 1990. Number of shipping firms/agencies in the various port-cities

The attitude and practices of the traditional shipowning families in the twentieth century resembled those of the nineteenth century. Intermarriages were used extensively to keep the business within the closed circles. Respect for tradition continued to be very important and beliefs were passed on carefiilly to new generations. Each firm was run by one man, who controlled the greatest part of ownership and decision-making; occasionally a firm was Table 10.3 Origins of the main Greek shipowning families, 1914, 1938, 1958, 1975 (in 000 GRT) 1914

1938

1958

1975

Place of Number GRT origin of families

Number GRT of families

Number GRT of families

Number GRT of families

A. Aegean islands Andros Chios Kassos Other* B. lonian islands

74

416

113

1,309

83

6,908

124

22,589

16 18 8 32 26

151 114 18 133 205

46 32 10 25 21

341 577 227 164 212

14 27 12 30 19

2,085 3,051 1,096 676 833

12 56 11 45 17

5,530 12,903 1,729 2,427 1,357

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 295

1914 Place of Number GRT origin of families

1938

1958

1975

Number GRT of families

Number GRT of families

Number GRT of families

Cephal 20 152 14 169 14 715 11 889 onia Ithaca 6 53 7 43 5 118 6 468 C Crete – – – – 2 29 9 1,352 D. 3 8 4 34 7 1,182 11 3,856 Pelopo nnese E. Rest 43 115 87 191 82 843 257 6,677 of Greece F. 12 79 7 51 6 989 18 5,153 Abroad Total of 158 823 232 1,797 199 10,784 436 40,984 shipow ning families Total of 256 308 198 765 shippin g firms Sources: See Appendices 4.14, 6.11 and 10.1; Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975 London, Athlone, 1993 Note *Includes Amorgos, Euboia, Hydra, Kea, Kithyra, Leros, Lesbos, Psara, Samos, Santorini, Sifnos, Spetses, Skiathos, Syros

run by a group from the same family, usually brothers. The most closed circle of all was the so-called ‘London Greeks’, and particularly the Chiots. More specifically, those from Oinoussai continued almost identical practices to the nineteenth-century Chiots. Marriages between members of the same family, for example in the Lemos family, continue to the present. Even more impressive is that Greeks who were born and have lived all their lives in England speak Greek with the particular island accent, follow the local customs, and return to get married or to be buried. Many Chiots, Kassians, Cephalonians and Andriots who were born and raised abroad come back to Piraeus to run the family shipping agency Others may not speak good Greek—especially those brought up in the US —but still are aware of the family’s traditions and work in the family firms abroad. Males

296 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Table 10.4 Places of origin of Greek seamen, 1930, 1959, 1980 Place oforigin

1930

% total

1959

% total

1980

% total

A. 5,347 66 31,638 49 21,558 36 Islands* B. Attica 895 11 11,550 18 14,371 24 C. n/a 2,548 4 6,760 12 Peloponne se D. Rest of 1,793 23 18,453 29 16,845 28 Greece** Total 8,035 100 64,179 100 59,534 100 Sources: For 1930 see Table 7.4; for 1961, K.Antonopulos, ‘Results of the Census’, Naftika Chronika, January 1961; for 1980, Census of Seamen, 31 May 1980, Ministry of Shipping, Direction of Maritime Labour Notes: *Includes lonian Islands, Cyclades, Dodecanese, Lesbos, Samos, Chios and Crete. **Includes Greeks from the Ottoman Empire

are still brought up within closed circles where discussions are always about shipping. To this day apprenticeship starts at an early age and the young heirs are sent on board for at least a few months every summer.8 Many who do not attend universities are sent to maritime academies in Greece, England or the US. Kinship and island ties were not limited to the manning of the offices but also extended to the ships. Traditional shipowners tended to employ seamen from their islands of origin, and retained the officers for long periods of time. It is thus not surprising to find that before the Second World War two-thirds of the seamen came from the islands and that from 1945 to the late 1960s half did (see Table 10.4). The most maritime islands were of course Chios, Andros, Cephalonia and Ithaca; most of their employed population were seamen.9 The growth of the fleet and the relative decline of traditional shipowners after the 1970s decreased the relative number of seamen from the islands. By 1980 36 per cent of Greek seamen came from the islands, while the main new sources of seamen, as with the new shipowners, were the Peloponese and the Athens/ Piraeus area. The new blood in Greek shipowning after 1945 were non-traditional shipowners, who in 1958 formed half of the Greek-owned shipping firms yet owned only about 30 per cent of total tonnage. By 1975 non-traditional shipping firms accounted for three-quarters of the number of firms and about half the tonnage.10 The importance of the older firms was diminished, a fact clearly reflected in their departure from the list of largest owners. The biggest shipowners of the 1950s—Stavros Niarchos, the sons of Petros Goulandris, Aristotle Onassis, Kulukundis, the sons of N.J.Goulandris, George S.Livanos, Costas M.Lemos and Chandris Brothers—remained near the top until the 1970s. Apart from Onassis and Niarchos, who were non-traditionalists but related to the

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 297

Livanos family by marriage, were all traditional shipowners. At the list of the top ten of 1990, only George S.Livanos remained, while another two (S.Polemis and G.P.Livanos) came from traditional families. All the others were non-traditional shipowners: Hadjiioannou, Latsis, Martinos, Tavoulareas, Frangistas, Kallimanopulos and Papachristides.11 Those that entered the business after the mid-1960s were the so-called ‘Piraeus Greeks’ because, in contrast to the London Greeks, they operated from Piraeus. In fact, within twenty years Piraeus grew from a parochial port to a world-class maritime centre operating the world’s largest fleet. During the Greek dictatorship from 1967 to 1974, Laws 89/67 and 375/68 provided a tax-free and highly advantageous institutional environment for shipping agencies in Piraeus, similar to that of the City of London, which attracted not only new men from the shipping industry but also a large number of local businessmen. Half the tonnage owned by postwar non-traditional firms belonged to former masters, first engineers or employees of established shipping firms; a significant number of these came from the five most important maritime islands. The other half, however, belonged to a large number of new shipowners from the Athens/ Piraeus area, from the Peloponnese and from the island of Crete. Their former professions were highly diverse: industrialists, civil engineers, doctors, lawyers, and so on.12 Investing in ships was looked upon as a highly lucrative business and expectations of quick and easy profits were similar to what one would expect from stock speculators. The organisation and structure of the new shipping firms closely followed the pattern of the traditional shipowners. The typical Piraeus shipping firm was an agency of various Panamanian, Liberian or other ‘foreign’ companies, and other branch offices were opened in London or elsewhere. Family members or close friends were recruited to man the offices. Moreover, the most capable officers were kept more or less permanently and a number of them eventually became members of the chartering and operational departments ashore. In this way kinship, island and ethnic ties ensured the cohesion of the international Greek maritime network. The unofficial but exclusive club of these cosmopolitan entrepreneurs clung to its Greek character; ‘Greekness’, beyond any cultural or patriotic aspirations, was extremely important for their economic survival. It provided access to all the expertise of shipping: market information, chartering, sales and purchase, shipbuilding, repairing, scrapping, financing, insurance and P&I clubs. It also provided consultancy from older and wiser members and information about the activities of the most successful members of the group. Imitation proved an extremely usefiil ‘rule-of-thumb’. Apart from common organisational and structural patterns, the second most important part of the business strategy of the Greek maritime network had to do with entrepreneurial methods. Before I proceed to analyse these methods, however, I must refer briefly to some tactics certain Greek ship-owners have adopted which have given the whole group a certain unwholesome reputation.

298 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

These include the exploitation of various political crises and a disregard of intergovernmental agreements. The ‘tradition of ignoring blockades, a practice continued to the present day, started in the previous century. Early in the nineteenth century, the Greeks broke the French blockade during the Napoleonic wars; this led to an important increase in the fleets of some of the Aegean islands like Hydra and Spetses. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Vagliano Brothers made their fortune by exporting grain from Russia during the Crimean War, despite the blockade by the Great Powers. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8, similar actions were repeated. The British consul in Odessa in 1877 reported that the ‘loading of five Greek vessels and their safe arrival at Constantinople was freely commented upon and severely criticized by the Russian press. It was even rumoured that the wheat was destined for the Turkish troops in Bulgaria.’13 For the Greeks, shipping transcends both borders and alliances. During the First World War, when Greece was neutral until 1917, Greek shipowners sold 30 per cent of their prewar tonnage to foreigners, many of whom were Germans, at very high prices. Greek shipowners transported weapons and other materials during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s for both sides. During the Korean War the leading shipowner, Stavros Livanos, was accused by the Americans of carrying cargoes for both South and North Korea. When China was embargoed by the Americans during the 1950s, Greek ships continued to carry its trade; China became one of the main charterers of Greek dry-cargo ships throughout the 1960s. When Cuba was embargoed by the US at the beginning of the 1960s, Greeks invented the Cypriot flag under which to carry sugar between Cuba and the USSR. They did the same during the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. Vardinoyannis, a leading shipowner of the last thirty years, started its successful career by breaking the British blockade of Rhodesia in 1965. It is clear that profit has no political alliances and Greeks operate an international fleet par excellence. The age of the Greek-owned fleet has been referred to as its weak point. According to Table 10.5 the average age of the Greek-owned fleet in 1992 was twenty-one years old, only one year older than the American-owned fleet and two years older than the Norwegian fleet. Insurance companies and P&I clubs have tended to charge higher premiums because they consider the age of a ship as a factor contributing to marine casualties. It has however been widely accepted by the shipping community that 80 per cent of shipping casualties or incidents are caused by human error and not by the age of a ship. Good operation and good maintenance combined with the good relations between the shipowner and crews have more than compensated this particular ‘disadvantage’ in the case of the Greek-owned fleet. Greeks are accused by their competitors of maritime fraud and higher loss ratios than other fleets. Piracy and maritime fraud are as old as the ships and in any big fleet there have always been ‘pirates’ and the Greeks have had their share.14 But a fleet which has been important for over 150

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 299

Table 10.5 Real ownership of the principal cargo carrying fleets in 1992 (in million dwt) Nationality

Tonnage

Greece 100.6 Japan 90.2 USA 59.1 Norway 54.1 Hong Kong (British) 31.6 China 27.5 UK 23.6 Russia 19.2 Korea (South) 18.2 Germany 16.9 Denmark 12.8 Sweden 12.2 China (Taiwan) 11.9 Italy 11.7 India 10.9 Brazil 9.9 Singapore 8.7 Iran 8.3 Turkey 7.5 France 7.0 Cyprus 6.3 Ukraine 5.7 Netherlands 5.2 Spain 5.1 Pnilippines 4.7 Indonesia 4.2 Source: Lloyds Statistical Tables, December 1992

Age 21 9 20 19 14 16 17 16 14 15 14 24 14 20 14 22 16 20 22 16 19 16 13 19 20 21

years and shipping companies that have operated throughout this period have certainly not achieved success by such methods. Concerning the loss ratios, numbers and statistics alone do not always take into consideration qualitative factors. The biggest tramp fleet in the world carries all types of cargoes, in many cases things that no one else will transport. Whether old or new, Greek ships suffer more than those of many other countries since they serve all kinds of difficult ports in underdeveloped areas, where loading and unloading often damages the hull. Operating tramps and working freelance can exact a toll, after all. The successful operation of the Greek fleet and the maintenance of its international competitiveness throughout this century lies on a series of

300 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

entrepreneurial practices that, together with the organisation of their shipping firms, form their maritime business strategy. The first is to achieve access to the main world maritime markets, London and New York; the second, to specialise in bulk cargoes; the third, to have direct access to the purchasers of transport services; the fourth, a particular pattern of sales and purchases; and the fifth, to continue the high productivity of Greek crews. The practice of establishing Greek shipowners in London was already 100 years old by the mid-twentieth century. Greek membership in the worlds biggest freight market, the Baltic Exchange, goes back to the 1850s. In 1886 there were ninety-seven Greek members of the Baltic, or 7 per cent of the membership; by 1993, there were 263 representatives of Greek companies (18 per cent of the total). The Greeks had long-standing connections with all other facets of British maritime infrastructure: insurance companies, financial institutions, P&I clubs and all the other services ancillary to shipping. In fact, the establishment of Greek shipping companies in the City of London has provided such an important source of income for the British maritime infrastructure that any attempts to tax them have always been resisted.15 In the immediate post-1945 era New York aspired to surpass London and become itself the world’s main maritime market. Indeed, it had many advantages, including the fact that five of the main oil companies were established there and that American shipyards had launched such massive shipbuilding programmes in the 1940s that there was a large amount of tonnage available. Moreover, the postwar reconstruction of Europe made America the world’s biggest exporter and purchaser of transport services. A significant number of European shipowners who fled to New York during the war stayed there and opened shipping offices. The Greeks in particular, with the adoption of flags of convenience and their entry into the tanker market, were able to borrow from American financial institutions for purchases of both secondhand and new vessels. Various conflicts with the American government in the 1950s, however, led many Greeks to move their operations back to Europe.16 The final blow to New York as a maritime centre was the American taxman; shipping companies based in the US were taxed according to a law promulgated in the early 1960s. New York never recovered its short-lived prominence in the maritime field. The second factor that has contributed to the spectacular success of the Greeks was the kind of transport services they offered and the type of cargoes they carried: in other words, their specialisation in tramp shipping and bulk cargoes. Greeks developed this tradition in the nineteenth century by forming commercial and maritime networks to carry the bulk trades from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. Tramp shipping provided the flexibility to carry any country’s cargoes and not to be dependent on the economic health of a particular nation, as fleets like the British were. In this way, when the First World War presented the opportunity the Greeks moved into the Atlantic and in the interwar period became the second most important tramp-shipping fleet (see Chapter 7). In the post-1945 era, they

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 301

transferred their activities from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans according to existing demand (see Chapter 9). In this way, the same shipowning family that had carried grain from the Black Sea to Marseilles, London and Antwerp in the early twentieth century, hauled grain from Buenos Aires to London in the interwar period, and from Australia, the US and Argentina to China and India in the post-Second World War years. Involvement in tramp shipping also enabled the Greeks to adjust to new demands in international markets, whether this involved new types of cargoes or ships. For example, when there was increased demand for oil, Greeks bought the appropriate ships to carry it; when there was increased demand for the five main bulk cargoes (Chapter 9), Greeks bought bulk carriers to transport them. The involvement of Greeks in the oil trade reminds us of the connections of Greek shipowners with American oil companies and brings to the fore their third entrepreneurial method—exercised by others as well in the postwar period— direct access to the purchasers of transport services, bypassing the Baltic and other freight markets. Apart from American oil companies, Greeks are also known to have direct connections with some of the worlds main commercial and industrial houses. The socialist countries were also among their main clients; chartering in these cases took place through direct negotiations with the appropriate governments. China, for example, is reported to have time-chartered the largest number of Greek dry-cargo vessels in the 1960s to cover its needs for imports of grain and fertilisers. The USSR chartered Greek ships in the early 1960s to carry sugar from Cuba and even maintained an appropriate chartering office called Transmed in Piraeus. The other socialist countries that also maintained offices in the Greek port were Rumania (Navolmar), Poland (Polfracht), and Bulgaria (Bulfracht).17 The other main factor in the successful business strategy of the Greeks is a systematic method of sales and purchases. This can be described simply as ‘buy when everybody sells, and sell when everybody buys’. This has been described as the ‘anticyclical method of the Greek shipowners’ who, following this golden rule, buy when freight rates and ship prices are low and sell when they are high.18 This method started during the transition from sail to steam (see Chapter 4). As indicated in Chapter 6, the method became clearer in the 1930s’ crisis when the Greek-owned fleet, unlike the merchant marines of other traditional maritime nations, exhibited a positive rate of growth. The method continued during the post-1945 period when medium and small shipowners followed the methods (and the instinct) of their big and most successful colleagues. In fact, there are many small shipowners who use shipping exactly as a stock exchange, entering the market when prices of ships are low and leaving when prices rise. The other side of this method involves the kind of ships they buy. Greeks are known to be major purchasers of secondhand vessels that they keep in good repair and operate as long as possible. In fact, purchasing secondhand vessels has been the backbone for a large segment of Greek shipowners.19

302 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

It was the two World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century that gave them the basis for ‘the great leap forward’: in the 1930s they bought the fifteenyear-old Standard B steamships built during, or immediately after, the First World War, and in the 1940s they bought the two- to five-year-old Liberties. Apart from these big purchases, which brought huge profits to their owners, the Greeks kept buying secondhand vessels during the entire post-1945 era. This practice is one of the factors that kept capital costs low and hence contributed to international competitiveness. There are fbur economic factors that determine the competitiveness of a fleet: its specialisation and adaptation to international demand; level of technology and efficiency; fixed costs; and variable costs (essentially labour).20 The last—and by no means least important—factor concerns the efficiency with which this secondhand tonnage is operated to keep fixed and variable costs low. We have discussed in Chapter 7 how this was related to the structure and organisation of Greek seamen as well as to their relation to the shipowners and shipping offices ashore. Although this kind of relationship has gradually deteriorated and the ‘good old seamen’ are getting lost, there is still the belief among officers and shipowners, whether in Piraeus, London or New York, that ‘Greek seamen are the best in the world’. And it is this way of thinking, closely related to Greek seafaring traditions and inherited by young officers from the older generation, that has led to a productivity that cannot only be measured in numbers. As recently as 1980 almost 40 per cent of Greek seamen came from the islands and two-thirds of the crews on Greek-owned vessels were Greek. On board Greek-owned vessels with such crews, daily maintenance is of primary importance. Loading is carried out to the maximum and loading and unloading are done with maximum care under the close supervision of the officers. No econometric models can measure the quality of work by seamen who maintain and operate assets worth millions of dollars. The success of Greek shipowners and the myth of Greek tycoons have led to paroxysms of pride in a nation that has developed an inferiority complex by comparing its poor modern face with its glorious past. On the eve of the twentieth century a British reporter from Fairplay wrote that ‘these Easterns were always wily people, not even given to trusting each other…. Whatever may have been the case 2,000 years ago, the Greeks of that period have no parallel in their descendants of today.’21 The fact that the Greek-owned fleet has maintained its position in international shipping in the second half of this century has provided reasons for a number of maritime economists and historians to think that this parallel can be drawn. In this way, more often than not, modern economic analyses of twentieth-century Greek maritime activities begin with the Trojan War or with the triremes of the 5th century BC. The success of the Greeks in the maritime field of course has its metaphysical explanations and many a time ‘the Greek postwar shipping miracle’ is justified by the ‘maritime nature’ of the Greek race or by the fact that ‘the sea is in the blood of the Greek’. The success of twentieth-century Greek shipowners,

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 303

however, is usually attributed to the ‘entrepreneurial genius of the Greek people’, best described by Master Mariner Byron Michaelides, who worked for at least half a century on the deck and at the desk: The famous genius at sea is something beyond any rules of logic or rationalisation. It is something like what Zorba, the hero of Kazantzakis, says: ‘“I cannot explain it with words, so I will explain it with dancing.” It is sailing against the mainstream; it is the exploitation of certain opportunities in critical periods of shipping. It is to buy when others sell, to sail when others lay up, to order newbuildings when the others do not even dream of it. It is the deep belief of the Greek that the sea “becomes ill but she never dies ”.’22

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.1 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1835 Merchant

Ships Tons

A.Greek 31 Baltazzi Bros 3 Dromocaiti 7 Mavrocordato & Co 7 Petrocochino 2 Petrocochino & Agelasto 2 Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Co 3 Zizinia Bros 7 B.Other C.Total Marseilles Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1835

5,251 433 1,190 1,185 318 353 503 1,269 11,558 16,809

Greek tons as % of total Marseilles 31

Appendix 1.2 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1840 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships

Tons

%

Tons

% of various flags

A.Greek Agelasto Ambrosi Argenti & Co Bati G. Dromocaiti Mavrocordato & Co Petrocochino Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Co

139 2 1 12 1 7 11 2

29,636 227 228 2,174 122 1,424 2,137 276

32

10,035

34

19

3,789

APPENDICES 305

Various flags Merchant

Ships

Tons

Rodocanachi & Co Sechiari & Argenti Co Vlasto & Co Zizinia Bros

48 2 5 29

11,652 294 1,102 6,211

Greek flag %

Tons

% of various flags

Various flags Greek flag Merchant

Ships Tons

B.Other Greek flag ships chartered by foreign merchants C.Total Marseilles Total Greek flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1840

% of Tons various flags

61,744 6,822 91,380 16,857 18

Appendix 1.3 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1850 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships Tons

%

Tons

% of various flags

A. Greek Agelasto Apalyras Baltazzi Bros Christodulo Dromocaiti Janoti Katsikoyani Marulla Bros Mavro & Co Papudoff Petrocochino Petrocochino & Agelasto Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Co Rodocanachi & Co Sechiari & Argenti Spartali & Lascaridi Vlasto & Co Zarifi Bros

169 4 8 5 4 18 1 1 1 9 6 5 13 13 14 12 5 2 20

42

16,444

47

35,267 817 1,649 1,439 1,041 3,648 280 370 118 2,169 1,663 886 2,255 1,648 2,553 2,393 575 468 4,685

306 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant

Ships Tons

Zizinia Bros B.Other Greek flag ships chartered by foreign merchants C.Total Marseilles Total Greek flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1850

28

Greek flag %

Tons

% of various flags

6,610 49,429 7,812 84,696 24,256

29

APPENDICES 307

Appendix 1.4 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1860 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships Tons

% Tons

% of various flags

A.Greek

316

72,814

31 43,380

60

Ambanopoulo

5

1,355

Agelasto

16

3,608

Argenti & Sechiari

13

2,596

Baltazzi

8

2,052

Caracoussi

4

1,303

Carissi & Vrissachi

2

215

Dromocaiti

9

1,723

Lazaridi

1

246

Mavro & Basilio

5

1,121

Mavrocordato

2

454

Melas Bros

29

6,156

Microulachi & Mavrocordato

2

498

Monopulos

1

277

Papudoff

19

4,592

Pascalis

2

409

Petrocochino & Agelasto

10

2,165

Ralli & Scaramanga

4

1,203

Ralli & Vlasto

3

1,162

Ralli & Caramanya

1

450

Ralli & Negroponte

1

277

Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Rodocanachi Satzilli Scaramanga Sechiari Spartali Tamvaco, Microulachi & Mavrocordato Zarifi & Zafiropulo Zizinia

46 38 4 2 6 61

9,962 9,835 1,447 535 1,202 12,353

2 13 7

325 3,645 1,648

308 APPENDICES

Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships Tons

% Tons

% of various flags

A.Greek

316

72,814

31 43,380

60

Ambanopoulo

5

1,355

Agelasto

16

3,608

Argenti & Sechiari

13

2,596

Baltazzi

8

2,052

Caracoussi

4

1,303

Carissi & Vrissachi

2

215

Dromocaiti

9

1,723

Lazaridi

1

246

Mavro & Basilio

5

1,121

Mavrocordato

2

454

Melas Bros

29

6,156

Microulachi & Mavrocordato

2

498

Monopulos

1

277

Papudoff

19

4,592

Pascalis

2

409

Petrocochino & Agelasto

10

2,165

Ralli & Scaramanga

4

1,203

Ralli & Vlasto

3

1,162

Ralli & Caramanya

1

450

Ralli & Negroponte

1

277

B.Other 159,435 Greek flag ships chartered by foreign merchants C.Total Marseilles 780 232,249 Total Greek flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1860

10,608 53,988

23

APPENDICES 309

Appendix 1.5 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1870 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships

Tons %

Tons

% of various flags

A.Greek Agelasto Ambanopoulo Anarghiro Basily-Valieri Caramano Corgialeeno Cristodulo Dellaporta Dimitracopulo Fenerli Geralopulo Ghioni Lazarachi Mavrocordato Melas Bros Microulaki Miliotti Mitrelly Modiano Nardelli Nicolaidi Pana Petrocochino Piti Prassacachi Rodocanachi Romano J. Salvago Scaramanga Sechiari Serbos Sevastopulo Sidericoudi Spartali Tamvaco, Micrulachi &

680 1 36 5 22 7 23 3 6 1 1 1 3 11 6 38 2 66 3 5 1 2 7 2 1 5 49 6 8 81 11 14 2 3 74

203,185 34 206 9,455 1,935 6,700 7,962 5,266 1,032 1,127 310 145 186 556 3,514 2,019 10,448 380 21,574 669 1,135 270 500 1,405 851 260 1,150 14,808 1,297 2,789 25,093 3,160 3,685 480 1,648 27,207

167,502

82

310 APPENDICES

Merchant

Various flags

Greek flag

Ships

Tons

Mavrocordato 7 Theocarides 1 Vagliano 131 Vassiliou 1 Vuccina 3 Xenophontides 1 Zaffiropulo & Zarifi 17 For various Greek merchants 13 B.Other 823 Greek flag ships chartered by other merchants C. Total Marseilles 1,503 Total Greek flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1870

Tons %

% of various flags

2,549 206 32,297 272 542 173 3,733 4,191 389,397 20,610 592,582 188,112

32

Appendix 1.6 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1880 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships Tons

%

% of Tons various flags

A.Greek Ambanopoulo Caramano Couppa Darras & Zizinia Micrulachi Nicolopulo Rodocanachi Scaramanga Sechiari Serbos Sevastopulo Sidericoudi Spartali Vagliano Valieri

344 25 7 45 2 1 12 30 44 15 7 3 4 12 92 17

22

109,159

145,917 8,739 1,670 17,474 416 235 8,539 15,678 19,103 8,101 3,124 651 688 3,927 31,157 7,020

83

APPENDICES 311

Various flags Merchant

Ships Tons

Vassiliades 2 Vuccina 11 Zafiropulo & Zarifi 3 For various Greek merchants 12 B. Other 646 Greek flag ships chartered by foreign merchants C. Total Marseilles Total Greek 990 flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1880

Greek flag %

% of Tons various flags

406 3,521 1,415 14,053 507,590 18,052 653,507

127,211

20

Appendix 1.7 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1890 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant

Ships

Tons

%

Tons

% of various flags

A. Greek Ambanopoulo Caramano Couppa Zouros Manolopulo Micrulachi Piti Rodocanachi Scaramanga Sevastopulo Stamos Vuccina Vagliano

161 13 22 15 10 2 20 1 9 12 10 3 4 25

78,739 8,085 9,327 8,425 3,208 145 7,378 254 5,289 13,403 2,443 589 1,921 10,492

11

42,557

54

Various flags Merchant

Ships

Tons

Valieri Zarifi & Zafiropulo Zouros B.Other Greek flag ships chartered

3 4 8 605

1,027 2,177 4,576 630,282

Greek flag % Tons

%of various flags

312 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant

Ships

Greek flag

Tons

% Tons

by foreign merchants C.Total Marseilles 766 709,021 Total Greek flag ships Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1890

%of various flags

61,668 104,225

15

Appendix 1.8 Greek ships at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1900 Nationality

Ships Greek as % of total Marseilles

Tons

A.Greek 236 49 B.Other 245 C.Total Marseilles 481 Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1900

Greek as % of total Marseilles

205,575 34 396,149 601,724

Appendix 1.9 Greek ships at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, 1910 Nationality

Ships Greek as % of total Marreilles

Tons

A.Greek 144 30 B.Other 333 C.Total Marseilles 477 Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1910

Greek as % of total Marseilles

203,675 23 675,152 878,827

Appendix 1.10 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1860 Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (Q/(B) Total (tons)

Alexandria Berdiansk Beirut Braila

35,679 – 12,748 –

23,607 9,636 4,592 21,068

6 36 – 60

1,405 3,466 – 12,702

59,286 9,636 17,340 21,068

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Caiffa Calamata Crete Cavala

– 843 118 720

375 – – –

– – – –

– – – _

375 843 118 720

APPENDICES 313

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

Constantinopl 36,768 5,786 e Enos – 485 Eupatoria – 1,233 Galatz – 12,589 Ismail – 727 Jaffa – 656 Kherson 926 – Kiparissi 510 – Larnaca – 266 Maratonisi 131 – Mariupol – 5,504 Nauplion 197 – Odessa 1,246 16,018 Orfano – 429 Piraeus 215 – Rhodes – 105 Salonica 465 1,402 Samsoun – 195 Skiathos – 492 Smyrna 6,829 1,435 Syros 426 250 Taganrog – 20,985 Tarsous – 2,551 Theodosia – 134 Varna – 2,590 Volo 596 222 Total 98,417 133,832 Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1860

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

–

–

42,554

485 – 6,718 511 445 – – – – 3,155 – 10,819 246 – – 373 – – 594 250 15,210 1,424 – 2,590 – 60,393

100 – 53 70 68 – – – – 57 – 68 57 – – 27 – – 41 100 72 56 – 100 – 45

485 1,233 12,589 727 656 926 510 266 131 5,504 197 17,264 429 215 105 1,867 195 492 8,264 676 20,985 2,551 134 2,590 818 232,249

Appendix 1.11 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1870 Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (Q/(B) Total (tons)

Alexandria Alexandretta Berdiansk Braila

123,076 913 – –

11,695 316 20,732 32,556

21 – 67 82

2,511 – 13,817 26,645

134,771 1,229 20,732 32,556

314 APPENDICES

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (Q/(B) Total (tons)

Burghaz Caifta Calamata Cephalonia Constantinopl e Corfu

– – 217 – 73,182

3,337 405 – 436 7,845

3,337 – – 436 2,779

100 – – 100 35

3,337 405 217 436 81,027

–

148

148

100

148

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Galatz Genitchek Ismail Jaffa Janatochi Kalamata Kertch Larnaca Mariupol Mersina Nicolaieff Odessa Port Said Poti Rodosto Salonica Samos Samsoun Scamandre Selefkia Smyrna Sulina Taganrog Theodosia Varna Volo

– – – 537 – 306 149 – – 361 – – 14,171 – – 2,126 273 – – – 3,579 – – – – –

19,561 205 210 306 420 – – 1,618 25,496 3,245 12,638 118,202 899 1,049 446 2,965 – 450 150 222 6,137 4,357 86,867 469 785 239

87 100 100 52 100 – – 79 60 100 71 28 – – – – – 100 100 100 56 54 91 – 100 100

17,083 205 210 158 420 – – 1,286 15,302 3,245 8,947 32,913 – – – – – 450 150 222 3,442 2,335 78,914 – 785 239

19,561 205 210 843 420 306 149 1,618 25,496 3,606 12,638 118,202 15,070 1,049 446 5,091 273 450 150 222 9,716 4,357 86,867 469 785 239

APPENDICES 315

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

Yeisk – 7,172 Zante 700 1,414 Total 219,590 372,992 Source: Semaphore de Afarseilles, 1870

6,862 954 223,795

% (C)/(B) Total (tons) 96 67 60

7,172 2,114 592,582

Appendix 1.12 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1880 Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Alexandria Batum Berdiansk Beirut Braila Burghaz Calamata Cephalonia Cyprus Constantinopl e Constanza Eupatoria Galatz

88,568 5,396 – 564 8,861 – 2,688 680 530 68,852

12,348 – 26,565 – 42,434 915 – – – 1,163

– 26,565 – 20,964 915 – – – –

– 100 – 49 100 – – – –

100,916 5,396 26,565 564 51,295 915 2,688 680 530 70,015

1,272 – –

776 2,371 8,503

327 2,371 8,503

42 100 100

2,048 2,371 8,503

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

250 3,563 – – 833 – – – – – 9,776 1,412

1 3,563 – – 363 – – – – – 5,979 892

– 100 – 2,482 44 – – – – – 61 63

Port

Gaza – Genitchek – Jaffa 5,253 Katacolo 2,482 Kertch – Kumi 337 Kyrenia 367 Piraeus 920 Leonidio (Gr.) 199 Larnaca 2,790 Mariupol – Mersina 1,405

250 3,563 5,253 833 337 367 920 199 2,790 9,776 2,817

316 APPENDICES

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Neokari (Gr.) 146 – Nicolaieff – 47,249 Odessa 125,300 33,358 Patras 2,680 – Poti 17,205 187 Pyrgos (Gr.) 151 – Salonica – 1,054 Samos 1,017 – Samsoun – 599 Santa Maura 59 – Santorini 94 – Sevastopol – 11,816 Smyrna 33,615 1,512 Sulina 2,236 9,929 Taganrog – 50,559 Theodosia – 3,024 Trebizond 556 – Varna – 2,042 Yeisk – 3,221 Zante 3,825 – Other – – Total 378,048 275,459 Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1880

– 27,510 5,346 – – – 396 – 599 – – 7,491 1,512 6,333 40,717 1,055 – – 3,221 – – 164,622

– 58 16 – – – 38 – 100 – – 63 100 64 81 35 – – 100 – – 60

146 47,249 158,658 2,680 17,392 151 1,054 1,017 599 59 94 11,816 35,127 12,165 50,559 3,024 556 2,042 3,221 3,825 2,482 653,507

Appendix 1.13 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1890 Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Anchialo Alexandretta Alexandria Berdiansk Batum Beirut Braila

– 1,747 58,374 7,726 63,194 1,576 38,182

1,982 1,152 11,396 21,383 4,368

580 281

29 24

21,383

100

2,592

12

22,238

1,982 2,899 69,770 29,109 67,562 1,576 60,420

APPENDICES 317

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

% (Q/(B) Total (tons)

Burghaz Calamata Catacolo Cavalla Cephalonia Constantinopl e Constanza Coroni Cyprus Dedeagh Eghion Galatz Jaffa Karadash Kuluk Kumi Larnaca Piraeus Mariupol Mersina Nicolaieff Novorossisk Odessa Patras Piraeus Poti Prevesa Rodosto Salonica Samos Samsoun Sayada (Ott.) Sevastopol Selefkia Skiatho Smyrna Sulina

1,630 7,620 6,007 – 195 42,518

3,833 – – 882 – 3,681

3,833 – – 882 – 280

100 – – 100 – 8

5,463 7,620 6,007 882 195 46,199

– 193 830 – 450 1,743 2,632 – – 948 – 4,498 – 2,689 – 5,849 66,518 2,377 34,601 4,914 161 – 3,679 4,221 1,400 360 – – 165 1,361 –

2,198 – 220 2,970 – – 2,878 308 281 – 1,908 – 18,321 12,870 14,704 15,842 76,234 – 1,151 7,243 – 982 5,128 – 2,244 – 16,005 1,265 – – 9,360

2,198 – – 2,506 – – – 308 281 – – – 9,774 8,987 – 1,202 – – – 4,655 – 982 705 – 2,244 – – 1,265 – – 2,162

100 – – 84 – – – 100 100 – – – 53 70 – 8 – – – 64 – 100 14 – 100 – – 100 – – 23

193 1,050 2,970 450 1,743 5,510 308 281 948 1,908 4,498 18,321 15,559 14,704 21,691 142,752 2,377 35,752 12,157 161 982 8,807 4,221 3,644 360 16,005 1,265 165 1,361 9,360

318 APPENDICES

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk (Greek)

Taganrog – 62,177 Theodosia – 1,202 Varna 1,470 7,561 Yeisk – 5,226 Total 369,828 339,193 Source: Stmaphore de Marseilles, 1890

42,412 – 2,416 5,226 116,971

% (Q/(B) Total (tons) 68 – 32 100 34

62,177 1,202 9,031 5,226 709,021

Appendix 1.14 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1900 Port

Achtary Alexandria Baltchick Batum Berdiansk Beirut Braila Burghaz Caiffa Chio Constantinopl e Corfii Eupatoria Galatz Jaffa Kertch Kuluc Kumi Larnaca Limassol Mariupol Mersina Nicolaieff Novorossisk Odessa

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

53,840 – 59,971 – 127,344 24,590 300 2,433 – 17,021

348 3,187 885 – 16,084 – 11,199 – – 376 1,896

348 2,059 885 – 3,153 – 4,133 – – 376 –

100 65 100 – 20 – 37 – – 100 –

348 57,027 885 59,971 16,084 127,344 35,789 300 2,433 376 18,917

504 3,825 – 3,182 – – 2,176 – 330 – 1,947 – 35,466 27,947

– 10,894 3,561 – 5,737 1,013 – 1,112 – 11,184 1,366 46,164 12,141 35,477

– 5,377 – – 4,387 1,013 – – – 7,093 1,366 22,360 5,572 5,221

– 49 – – 76 100 – – – 63 100 48 46 15

504 14,719 3,561 3,182 5,737 1,013 2,176 1,112 330 11,184 3,313 46,164 47,607 63,424

APPENDICES 319

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Parga 187 – Piraeus 4,206 – Poti 1,130 7,296 Rethymno 311 – Rodosto – 254 Salonica 782 332 Samos 1,468 – Smyrna – 717 Sulina 3,707 – Taganrog – 33,071 Theodosia 6,111 3,973 Varna 1,330 – Volo 679 340 Yeisk – 3,008 Cyprus 300 – Zongouldak 3,434 5,588 Total 384,521 217,203 Source: Simaphore de Marseilles, 1900

– – 4,099 – 254 332 – 717 – 30,441 2,773 – 340 3,008 – – 105,307

– – 56 – 100 100 – 100 92 70 – 100 100 – – 48

187 4,206 8,426 311 254 1,114 1,468 717 3,707 33,071 10,084 1,330 1,019 3,008 300 9,022 601,724

Appendix 1.15 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1910 Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Alexandria Baltchick Batum Berdiansk Beirut Braila Caiffa Constantinopl e Constanza Corfii Cyprus Eupatoria Galatz

7,218 – 80,883 66,240 113,064 54,278 891 14,660

3,594 864 – 58,559 – 33,820 – 1,780

3,594 864 – 39,947 – 17,686 – –

100 100 – 68 – 52 – –

10,812 864 80,883 124,799 113,064 88,098 891 16,440

14,546 439 300 3,321 7,150

3,192 – – 5,002 _

3,192 – – 3,548 –

100 – – 71 –

20,650 439 300 8,323 7,150

320 APPENDICES

Port

(A) General (tons)

(B) Bulk (tons)

(C) Bulk (Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Jaffa 30,969 – Kertch – 1,069 Kuluc – 297 Kumi 263 – Piraeus 819 _ Mariupol 23,328 NicolaiefF 25,251 65,446 Novorossisk 60,558 6,047 Odessa 54,088 18,103 Piraeus 6,105 – Port Said 3,377 – Poti – 2,242 Prevesa 161 – Rethymno 183 – Salonica 4,668 1,099 Smyrna 9,942 1,088 Stratoni (Gr.) – 3,768 Sulina – 6,990 Taganrog – 62,089 Theodosia 1,391 10,913 Varna 3,239 – Samos 1,938 – Yeisk – 3,595 Total 565,942 312,885 Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1910

– 1,069 297 – – 17,099 11,304 6,047 3,380 – – 2,242 – – – 1,088 3,768 5,527 58,239 5,607 – – 1,509 186,007

– 100 100 – – 73 17 100 19 – – 100 – – – 100 100 79 94 51 – – 42 59

30,969 1,069 297 263 819 23,328 90,697 66,605 72,191 6,105 3,377 2,242 161 183 5,767 11,030 3,768 6,990 62,089 12,304 3,239 1,938 3,595 878,827

Appendix 1.16 Arrivals of ships at the port of Marseilles from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes Port

General cargo %

1860 Black Sea North-eastern South-eastern Total

2,172 47,818 48,427 98,417

2 90,589 49 10,072 49 33,171 42 133,832

General cargo

%

Port 1870

Bulk cargo %

Bulk cargo

Greek* bulk Greek as % of bulk

67 55,171 7 1,948 25 3,274 58 60,393 %

56 19 10 45

Greek* bulk

Greek as % of bulk

APPENDICES 321

Port

General cargo

%

Bulk cargo

%

Greek* bulk

Black Sea 149 – 334,086 90 207,595 North-eastern 80,383 37 20,200 5 8,568 South-eastern 139,058 63 18,706 5 7,422 Total 219,590 37 372,992 63 223,795 1880 Black Sea 162,251 43 257,720 93 161,676 North-eastern 117,725 31 3,729 1 2,054 South-eastern 98,072 26 14,010 6 892 Total 378,048 60 275,459 40 164,622 1890 Black Sea 192,626 52 292,121 86 100,494 North-eastern 109,354 30 14,997 4 1,867 South-eastern 67,848 18 32,075 11 12,363 Total 369,828 52 339,193 48 116,971 1900 Black Sea 167,811 44 205,725 95 97,965 North-eastern 23,128 6 5,813 3 3,917 South-eastern 189,376 49 5,665 2 3,425 Total 384,521 64 217,203 36 105,307 1910 Black Sea 370,945 66 300,395 96 176,396 North-eastern 39,478 7 5,128 2 2,249 South-eastern 155,519 28 7,362 2 7,362 Total 565,942 64 312,885 36 186,007 Source: Appendices 1.10–1.15 Note: * Ships chartered by Greek merchants and/or carried Greek flag ships Appendix 1.17 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports (000,000 qantars) Year

Volume

Year

Volume

1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867

0.5 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.3 1.3

1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884

2.4 2.6 1.7 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.1 2.6

Greek as % of bulk 62 43 40 60 59 55 6 60 34 12 39 34 48 67 60 48 59 44 100 59

322 APPENDICES

Year

Volume

Year

Volume

1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876

1.2 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.6 2.2 3.0

1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893

3.5 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 4.0 4.7 5.1

Year

Volume

Year

Volume

1894 5.0 1905 6.4 1895 4.8 1906 6.0 1896 5.2 1907 7.0 1897 5.8 1908 6.9 1898 6.4 1909 6.8 1899 5.6 1910 5.0 1900 6.5 1911 7.5 1901 5.4 1912 7.4 1902 5.5 1913 7.4 1903 5.9 1914 7.4 1904 6.1 Source: Alan R.Richards, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Egypt, 1798–1882’, in Huri Islamoglu-Inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire andthe World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1990, table 9.5 Appendix 1.18 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1850 Merchant/Shipowner

Tons** (various flags)

% (A)/(B)

Tons (Greek flag)

A.GREEK* Argenti Cassavetti Proios Spartali Zizinia Galatti Ralli C. & Sons Amero lonides

42,306

31

4,271

APPENDICES 323

Merchant/Shipowner

Tons** (various flags)

% (A)/(B)

Tons (Greek flag)

Tymbas Chiriaco Cortazzi Rodocanachi Geralopulo Omero Sechiari Papayanni Petrocochino Ralli P.T. Ralli Bros Schilizzi Tamvako Sevastopulo Sotirichos Psicha Christaki Zarifi Merchant/Shipowner Tons** (various flags)

% (A)/(B)

Tons (Greekflag)

Cavafy Ziffo Sofiano B.Total arrivals to 135,727 31 4,271 England from eastern Mediterranean Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1850 Note: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.19 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1860 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant/Shipowner

Ships

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

A.GREEK* Argenti

226

176,126

57

10

2,933

324 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant/Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Agelasto Avierino Calimassioti Carajhanachi Cassavetti Cavafy Corgialegno Couvelas Cremidi Cucussi Cuppa Delta Dumas Eumorphopulo Eustratiadi Fachiri Frangopulo Franghiadi Galatti Georgacopulo Georgala Geralopulo Gerussi Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner Giannacopul o Hajopulo Homero lonides Lascaridi Melas Negroponte Nicolopulo Nomico

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

APPENDICES 325

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Pezali Paleologo Pana Papayanni Potous Ralli Rodocanachi Scaramanga Schilizzi Spartali Tambaco Vagliano Xenos Ziffo Zizinia Zarifi B.Total 775 308,860 57 10 2,933 arrivals to England jrom eastern Mediterrane an Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1860 Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.20 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1870 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant/Shipowner

Ships

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

GREEK* Argenti Agelasto Avierino Cassavetti Cavafy

1,086

231,330

45

5

1,274

326 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant/Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Costi Cristodulo Cremidi Eustratiadi Gerussi Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner Georgala Geralopulo Georgacopul o lonides Maximo Mavro Mavrojanni Melas Moschoudi Notara Bros Nicolopulo Paspatti Paleologo Psicha Sevastopulo Sechiari Spiropulo Scrini Bros Theologo Ralli Rodocanachi Schilizzi Scanavi Scaramanga Spartali Tamvaco Valieri

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

APPENDICES 327

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Vafea Vagliano Zarifi B.Total arrivals to England jrom eastern Mediterrane 873 518,479 45 1,274 an Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1870 Notes * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.21 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1880 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant/Shipowner

Ships

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

A.GREEK* Anagnostopulo Athanassiou Burlumi & Co Callira Canelopulo

136

93,131

15

27

15,622

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner Cassaboglu Cassavetti & Co Condostavlo Cremmidi Sons Frangopulo Gavas

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

328 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Georgacopul o Georgiades Gerussi A.M. Gregoriades C. loannides A. & Co Lambrinidi Marinos Mavro & Valieri & Co Mavrocordat o Messinesi Panagopulo Papparitor & Co Paspatti Petrides D.N. Pittas Polychronia des Protopazzi & Co Psara Rodocanachi Sons & Co Scaramanga Sechiari Sevastopulo D.S. Spartali Spiropulo G. Stamos Tamvaco & C. Vagliano Bros Vourlaris Zarifi Bros

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

APPENDICES 329

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

B.Total 780 628,735 15 27 15,622 arrivals to England from eastern Mediterrane an Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1880 Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.22 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1890 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

A.GREEK* Cassavetti Casdagli Eliadi Eumorphopu lo Eugenides Frangopulo Georgiadi Georgacopul o Ionides Macris Mavro Micrulachi Paspatti Papazianni Petrides Protopazzi Ralli Bros Rodocanachi Rigopulo

113

154,968

13

20

21,611

330 APPENDICES

Various flags Merchant/ Shipowner

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Scnilizzi Sevastopulo Sechiari Scaramanga Spiropulo Tamvaco Tezicoglou Vagliano Vafieri Vouvalis Zarifi Zanetto Zecchini B. Total 1,018 1,214,898 13 20 21,611 arrivals to England from eastern Mediterrane an Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1890 Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.23 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1900 Various flags

Greek flag

Merchant/ Shipoumer

Ships

Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

A. GREEK Bulgarides Eliadi Embiricos Frangopulo Joannou Petridis Protopazzi Scaramanga

20

27,667

4

6

8,000

APPENDICES 331

Various flags Merchant/ Shipoumer

Ships

Greek flag Tons**

% (A)/(B)

Ships

Tons

Rodocanachi Vagliano Vouvalis B. Total 498 724,011 4 6 8,000 arrivals to England from eastern Mediterrane an Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1900 Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major or minor space Appendix 1.24 Greek flag ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in 1910 Flag

Ships

Tons

A.GREEK 32 47,747 B.Total arrivals to England from eastern Mediterranean 501 852,497 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1910

% (A)/(B) 6

Appendix 1.25 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1850 Port of origin (A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

Black Sea Berdiansk Braila Galatz Kertch Odessa Taganrog Varna

– 649 875 3,168 20,506 6,051 343

826 – 444 –

272 369 317 941 4,254 1,575

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

826 649 1,319 3,168 20,506 6,051 343

332 APPENDICES

Port of origin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

North-eastern Constantinopl 6,547 6,205 1,166 e Cephalonia 2,256 170 – Corfu 127 127 127 Missolonghi – 178 – Patras 8,154 – 158 Preveza – 160 – Smyrna 10,538 – 653 Volo – 208 – Zante 2,988 – – South-eastern Alexandria – 62,397 23,709 Alexandretta 260 250 – Caiffa – 644 644 Jaffa – 1,520 285 Tarsus – 136 136 Total 32,140 103,587 34,334 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1850

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

12,752 2,426 254 178 8,154 160 10,538 208 2,988

33

62,397 510 644 1,520 136 135,727

Appendix 1.26 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1860 Port oforigin Black Sea Berdiansk Eupatoria Galatz Braila Mariupol Odessa Sevastopol Sulina Taganrog Theodosia Varna North-eastern Athens

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

– – 160 186 – 6,415 338 448 – _ –

4,630 1,471 2,441 12,934 2,046 32,024 – 19,014 22,709 1,113 378

– – 601 1,810 451 10,677 – 5,303 7,153 – –

4,630 1,471 2,601 13,120 2,046 38,439 338 19,462 22,709 1,113 378

–

153

–

153

APPENDICES 333

Port oforigin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

Candia Cavala Cephalonia Constantinopl e Corfu Patras Salonica Smyrna Syros Zante

216 260 743 12,930

329 216 552 28,477

– – – 18,543

545 476 1,295 41,407

1,123 14,835 1,927 16,264 288 2,201

– – 671 549 – –

– – – – – –

1,123 14,835 2,598 16,813

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

Port of origin

Southeastern Alexandretta 2,343 – 738 Alexandria 54,516 61,536 48,956 Beirut 418 1,930 1,930 Jaffa 76 76 Total 115,687 193,173 96,238 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1860

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

2,201 % (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

50

2,343 116,052 2,348 76 308,860

Appendix 1.27 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1870 Port oforigin Black Sea Berdiansk Galatz Kertch Mariupol Nicolaieff Odessa Poti Sulina Taganrog Theodosia

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

– – 474 – – – 1,074 – 1,514 260

2,769 5,094 – 4,668 6,650 76,488 – 40,353 35,953 –

– 1,176 – 330 545 21,163 – 4,705 5,218 –

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

2,769 5,094 474 4,668 6,650 76,488 1,074 40,353 37,467 260

334 APPENDICES

Port oforigin North-eastern Calamata Catacolo Cavala Cephalonia Chesme Constantinopl e* Corfu Gallipoli Lemnos Mytilene Nauplia Patras Pireaus Rhodes Rodosto Salonica Smyrna Syros Vostizza Zante South-eastern Alexandria

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

182 1,061 162 3,638 254 212

– – – – – 28,665

– – – – – 26,407

182 1,061 162 3,638 254 28,877

2,787 2,841 238 112 493 18,631 93 168 349 – 16,002 5,559 1,656 3,790

9,267 – – – – – 1,416 – – 287 430 21,152 – –

7,077 – – – – – 1,416 – – – – 19,947 – –

12,054 2,841 238 112 493 18,631 1,509 168 349 287 16,432 26,711 1,656 3,790

46,133

175,668

116,554

221,801

Port oforigin (A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

% (C)/(B)

(D) Total tons

Beirut 520 – – 520 Gazza 307 – – 307 Larnaca 538 – – 538 Lattakia – 571 – 571 Total 109,048 409,431 204,538 50 518,479 Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1870 Notes: * Although it appears that ships from Constantinople mainly carried bulk careoes, they carried a large variety of general cargo. I have calculated, however, that the largest amount of the space of the ship was taken up with bulk cargoes. For example Dalmatian of Bibby, (1,599 NRT) that came from Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria carried 2,218 qrs Indian corn, 3,844 bales of cotton, 661 bales of wool and a large variety of small amounts of general cargo: waste silk, opium, fruit, caviar, dyewood, rags, yellow berries, sweetmeats, raisins,

APPENDICES 335

Port oforigin (A) General (B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk % (C)/(B) (D) Total tons Greek tons valonia, sultanas, emery stone, shumac, gum, paste, dates, onions and olive oil. When the largest amount of space is taken up with bulk cargoes I classify the ship under the bulk cargo category Appendix 1.28 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1880 Port oforigin Black Sea Berdiansk Braila Galatz Kertch Mariupol Nicolaieff Odessa Poti Sevastopol Sulina Taganrog Various Black Sea ports North-eastern Catacolo Cephalonia Constantinopl e Corfu Gallipoli Greece Gythion Patras Piraeus Rodosto Salonica Samos Smyrna Vostizza

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

– 955 872 – – – 632 753 – – – –

1,690 4,008 11,220 1,338 2,118 13,268 56,970 – 5,500 52,102 33,672 8,108

485 1,750 668 529 728 3,782 7,799 – 3,002 2,269 8,964 –

1,690 4,963 12,092 1,338 2,118 13,268 57,602 753 5,500 52,102 33,672 8,108

3,938 1,334 18,173

– – 10,548

– – 1,193

3,938 1,334 28,721

661 1,000 1,875 – 15,961 284 714 991 638 22,099 4,969

– 242 – 161 153 – – – – 765 –

– – – – – – – – – 765 –

661 1,242 1,875 161 16,114 284 714 991 638 22,864 4,969

336 APPENDICES

Port of origin (A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (Q Bulk Greek

% (C)/(B)

D Total tons

Zante 2,334 2,334 Various NE Mediterrane 46,016 7,607 – 53,623 an ports* Southeastern Alexandria 11,609 235,226 7,948 246,835 Beirut 341 – – 341 Cyprus – 4,172 550 4,172 Port Said _ 2,254 _ 2,254 Rhodes 276 – – 276 Various SE Mediterrane 940 40,248 1,345 41,188 an ports Total 137,365 491,370 41,777 8 628,735 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1880 Notes: * The Bills of Entry refer to a group of port-cities in the equivalent areas Appendix 1.29 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1890 Port oforigin Black Sea Azov Batum Berdiansk Braila Galatz Ismail Kertch Mariupol Nicolaieff Novorossisk Odessa Poti Samsoun Sevastopol Sulina

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

– 5,102 8,027 1,887 829 – _ – – 7,482 11,485 6,160 _ – –

874 86,531 1,393 38,360 7,949 2,482 6,598 16,071 26,583 56,039 198,504 10,759 1,553 22,368 90,767

– 12,189 _ 2,953 7,949 – _ – 6,290 _ 16,774 – _ 1,177 1,811

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

874 91,633 9,420 40,247 8,778 2,482 6,598 16,071 26,583 63,521 209,989 16,919 1,533 22,368 90,767

APPENDICES 337

Port oforigin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

Taganrog Theodosia Trebizond Varna Yeisk Northeastern* Catacolo Constantinopl e Greece Marathonisi

– _ – – –

113,626 1,184 1,139 4,752 5,706

19,024 _ – – –

113,626 1,184 1,139 4,752 5,706

4,043 3,556

– 16,557

– 16,557

4,043 20,113

2,299 175

– –

– –

2,299 175

Port oforigin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

Naxos 1,154 Gallipoli 146 – – Patras 14,639 – – Rodosto 784 _ _ Salonica 2,205 _ _ Smyrna 6,950 50,056 8,241 Syra 2,693 16,781 16,781 Vostizza 5,855 _ _ Zante 3,697 – – Southeastern* Accra – 3,053 – Alexandria 3,398 283,096 4,263 Beirut – 838 – Cyprus 2,721 – – Gaza 908 _ _ Latakia 1,415 – – Mediterrane 12,897 30,729 – an Mersine – 1,820 – Port Said – 8,223 – Total 110,507 1,104,391 114,009 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1890

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

% (C)/(B)

(D) Total tons 1,154 146 14,639 784 2,205 57,006 19,474 5,855 3,697

3,053 286,494 838 2,721 908 1,415 43,626

11

1,820 8,223 1,214,898

338 APPENDICES

Port oforigin

(A) General (B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk % (C)/(B) (D) Total tons Greek tons Notes: * Apart from the major ports, like Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria the tonnaee shown as departing from the other minor ports does not usually represent the amount of cargo loaded. That is true, for example, for ships that are shown to come from Syros; in all cases they come to the island after having loaded cargoes at Constantinople or Odessa Appendix 1.30 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1900 Port oforigin Black Sea Batum Braila Galatz Mariupol Nicolaieff Novorossisk Odessa Samsoun Sulina North-eastern Catacolo Constantinopl e Marathonisi Patras Piraeus Salonica Smyrna

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons (C) Bulk Greek

(D) Total tons % (C)/(B)

80,180 – 4,388 – 1,182 25,870 9,107 – 2,603

11,056 3,453 – 6,689 4,253 37,522 96,208 1,136 30,977

– – – – – 1,017 1,501 – 2,976

91,236 3,453 4,388 6,689 5,435 63,392 105,315 1,136 33,580

780 4,453

_ 7,664

_ –

780 12,117

221 8,312 126 964 8,215

– 1,152 _ _ 47,558

– _ _ _ 10,259

221 9,464 126 964 55,773

Port of origin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons

(C) Bulk Greek

(D) Total tons

Susa Syros Volo Vostizza South-eastern Alexandria Beirut

1,341 5,302

– 3,722 2,427

–

1,341 9,024 2,427 2,636

264,980 3,307

1,017

–

2,636 28,830 7,019

293,810 10,326

(%) (C)/(B)

APPENDICES 339

Port of origin

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons

(C) Bulk Greek

Jaffa 1,916 Larnaca 919 – – Lattakia – 1,114 – Limassol – 3,993 – Syria 2,436 Total 194,884 529,127 16,770 Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1900

(D) Total tons

(%) (C)/(B)

1,916 919 1,114 3,993 2,436 724,011

3

Appendix 1.31 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes in 1910 Port of origin Black Sea Batum Berdiansk Braila Galatz Kherson Mariupol Nicolaieff Novorossisk Odessa Poti Sulina Taganrog Theodosia North-eastern Calamata Catacolo Constantinople Corfu Paros Patras Piraeus Salonica Smyrna Syros

(A) General tons

(B) Bulk tons

(C) Bulk Greek

(D) Total tons

62,143 – 2,464 – – – 2,285 2,072 – – 1,407 –

– 6,416 22,211 13,126 1,803 15,114 104,360 53,398 88,883 1,344 16,635 15,203 14,173

– 1,378 4,372 4,359 1,803 5,390 3,311 3,068 1,469 – 3,140 1,612 3,342

62,143 6,416 24,675 13,126 1,803 15,114 106,645 55,470 88,883 1,344 18,042 15,203 14,173

2,598 3,704 3,980 91 416 15,898 – – 19,438 5,833

– – 20,302 5,360 364 1,337 5,442 4,947 38,309 3,999

– –

2,598 3,704 24,282 5,451 780 17,235 5,442 4,947 57,747 9,832

– – – 2,449 1,525 6,673

% (C)/(B)

340 APPENDICES

Port of origin

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

%

General tons

Bulk tons

Bulk Greek

Total tons

(C)/(D)

244,293 10,524 9,338 2,257 21,693 1,402 4,865 3,070 852,497

7

South-eastern Alexandria 46,815 197,478 Beirut 10,524 – Cyprus 1,394 7,944 Faro – 2,257 Jaffa 12,142 9,551 Larnaca 1,402 – Limassol 4,865 – Mersyna – 3,070 Total 199,471 653,026 43,891 Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1910

Appendix 1.32 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes 1860-1910 Port 1860 Black Sea North-eastern South-eastern Total 1870 Black Sea North-eastern South-eastern Total 1880 Black Sea North-eastern South-eastern Total 1890 Black Sea North-eastern South-eastern Total 1900 Black Sea

General cargo

%

Bulk cargo

%

Greek* bulk

% total bulk

7,547 50,787 57,353 115,687

7 44 50 37

98,760 30,947 63,466 193,173

51 16 33 63

25,995 18,543 51,700 96,238

26 60 81 50

2,848 48,702 57,498 109,048

3 45 53 21

171,975 61,217 176,239 409,431

42 15 43 79

33,137 54,847 116,554 204,538

19 90 66 50

3,212 120,987 13,166 137,365

2 88 9 22

189,994 19,476 281,900 491,370

40 2 58 78

29,976 1,958 9,843 41,777

15 10 3 8

40,972 48,196 21,339 110,507

37 44 19 9

685,289 83,394 327,759 1,104,391

63 8 30 91

68,167 41,579 4,263 114,009

10 50 1 11

123,330

63

191,294

36

5,494

3

APPENDICES 341

Port

General cargo

North-eastern 32,350 South-eastern 39,204 Total 194,884 1910 Black Sea 70,371 North-eastern 51,958 South-eastern 77,142 Total 199,471 Sources: Appendices 1.26-1.1

%

Bulk cargo

%

Greek* bulk

% total bulk

17 20 27

62,523 275,310 529,127

12 52 73

10,259 1,017 16,770

16 – 3

35 26 39 23

352,666 80,060 220,300 653,026

54 12 34 77

33,244 10,647 – 43,891

10 13 – 7

Appendix 1.33 Departures of Greek ships from British ports (in NRT) Date

Sailing ships

Steamships

Total

1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891

8,800 6,421 9,564 21,160 9,434 23,429 67,490 26,994 39,237 49,327 61,722 21,309 16,330 19,630 42,205 31,963 20,853 15,404 7,925 7,349 3,203 4,582 3,797 7,011 4,394

– – – – 241 – 3,303 5,658 2,605 3,421 6,763 5,850 13,608 25,988 48,831 48,300 77,232 78,021 71,124 71,409 66,109 72,315 101,774 130,455

8,800 6,421 9,564 21,160 9,434 23,670 67,490 30,297 44,895 51,932 65,143 28,072 22,180 33,238 68,193 80,794 69,153 92,636 85,946 78,473 74,612 70,691 76,112 108,785 134,849

342 APPENDICES

Date

Sailing ships

Steamships

1892 6,694 141,973 1893 2,956 99,607 1894 4,583 126,446 1895 7,676 119,179 1896 2,348 120,586 1897 1,139 170,325 1898 1,579 112,755 1899 517 178,368 1900 1,301 246,133 1901 3,410 256,589 1902 734 358,609 1903 – 330,621 1904 – 349,539 1905 – 308,197 1906 – 401,589 1907 – 481,065 1908 – 533,169 1909 – 510,963 1910 – 445,526 1911 – 567,366 1912 – 870,728 1913 – 1,090,289 1914 – 1,240,126 Source: Statistical abstracts for Britain, various years Appendix 2.1 The Chiot network, 1830s-1860s ENGLAND (London, Manchester, Liverpool) A.Chiots 1. Agelasto 2. Argentis 3. Amero 4. Avierino 5. Baltazzi 6. Calvocoressi 7. Chryssoveloni 8. Condostavlo 9. Galatti 10. Frangiadi 11. Damala

Total 148,667 102,563 131,029 126,855 122,934 171,464 114,334 178,885 247,434 259,999 359,343 330,621 349,539 308,197 401,589 481,065 533,169 510,963 445,526 567,366 870,728 1,090,289 1,240,126

APPENDICES 343

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. B.Others 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Mavrogordato Negreponte Nicolopulo Paspatis Petrocochino Ralli Rodocanachi Salvago Scanavi Schilizzi (Skilizzi) Sekiari Sevastopulo Scaramanga Vlasto Vouro Ziffo Zizinia Zygomala Cavafy (Smyrna) Cremidi Cucussi Eumorphopulo Frangopoulo (Ceph.) Giannacopulo Georgacopulo Georgiadi Gerussi Homere (Smyrna) Papudoff Qannina) Spartali Zarifi (Constantinople) Zafiropulo (Jannina) Cassaveti (Thessaly) Fachiri Georgala Geralopulos lonides (Asia Minor) Lascharidi (Ceph.) Melas (Jannina)

344 APPENDICES

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. MARSEILLES A.Chiots 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. B.Other 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. LIVORNO A.Chiots 1. 2. 3. B. 4.

Nomico Pana (Ceph.) Papayanni (Smyrna) Potous Psicha Tambakos Tymbas Xenos (Smyrna)

Agelasto Baltazzi Argenti Dromocaiti Mavrogordato Negroponte Petrocochino Ralli Rodocanachi Schilizzi Scaramanga Sechiari Spartali Zizinia Vlasto Basilio Mavro Melas Papudoff Zarifi Zafiropulo

Mavrogordato Rodocanachi Sevastoptdo Others Pana

APPENDICES 345

5. 6. TRIESTE A.Chiots 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Papudoff Tossizza

Agelastos Ameros Avgerinos Basiliou Homere Galatti Mavrogordato Negreponte Petrocochino Ralli Rodocanachi Scaramanga

13. 14. 15. 16. B. Others 17. 18. ALEXANDRIA A. Chiots

Sevastopulo Vlasto Vouros Ziffo

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. B. Others 13.

Avierino Cassavetti Cavafy Mavrogordato Negroponte Proio Salvago Scaramanga Sevastopulo Vouro Zaccali Zizinia

Karavias Karidias

D’Anastassy

346 APPENDICES

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Stavronachi Tossizza Yoannides Riga Giro Braggioti

20. CONSTANTINOPLE A. Chiots 1. 2. 3. 4. B. Others 5. 6. SMYRNA A. Chiots 1. 2. 3. 4. SYROS A. Chiots 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. BLACK SEA: ODESSA A. Chiots 1. 2. 3.

Popolani

Ralli Schilizzi Zafiropulo Zarifi Lascaridi Melas

Baltazzi Homere Schilizzi Ralli

Cassavetti Damala Franghiadi Galatti Mavrocordato Petrocochino Ralli Rodocanachi Salvago Vlasto Vouro

Mavrogordato Negroponte Ralli

APPENDICES 347

4. Rodocanachi 5. Scanavi 6. Sevastoptdo 7. Zizinia 5. Ofl&ro 8. Lascharachi 9. Mavro 10. Melas 11. Papudoff 12. Scliri 13. Zarifi BLACK SEA: AZOV A. Chiots 14. Avierino 15. Ralli 16. Salvago 17. Sevastopulo 18. Scaramanga 19. Spartali B. Others 20. Lascaridi BLACK SEA: DANUBE A. Chiots 22. Argenti 23. Chryssoveloni 24. Nicolopulo 25. Negroponte 26. Ralli 27. Sechiari 28. Vouro B. Others 29. Pana 30. Xenos Sources: For the merchants in England the followine sources have been used: The Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 1850, 1853; Lloyd’s List 1830, 1850; Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, 1840–60; London Customs Bills of Entry, 1840–60; Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869; and B.Tsimpidaros, The Greeks in Englandy Athens, Alkaios, 1974, in Greek. For Marseilles, Semaphore de Marseilles, 1830–60. For

348 APPENDICES

Alexandria, Christos Hadziiossif, ‘La Colonie Grecqe en Egypte, (1833— 1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Universite de Paris—Sorbonne, (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980. For Trieste, Olga Katsiardi —Hering, The Greek Community in Trieste (1751–1830), 2 vols, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, table 16, selected names of merchants from this table. For the Black Sea, Gelina Harlaftis, ‘The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik (eds), Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History, Yorkshire, Lofthouse Publications, 1990. For Syros, V.Kardassis, Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857), Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987. For Livorno, Patricia Herlihy, ’Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno’, Journal of Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 45-68. For the Danube, Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869 and Paul Cernovodeanu, ‘L’ Activite des Maisons de Commerce et des Negociants loniens du Bas-Danube durant l’Intervalle 1829–1853’, Economies Méditerranéennes. Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe–XIXe Siècles, Athens, Centre of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, 1985, 91-106 Appendix 2.2 Kinship (first degree) of the Chiot group, 1820s–1860s Family name

Place of origin

Related to the families

A.Chiots 1. Agelasto

Chios

2. Argenti

Chios

3. Avierino

Chios

4. Baltazzi

Chios

5. Calvocoressi

Chios

1. Ralli 2. Rodocanachi 3. Negroponte 1. Ionides 2. Ralli 3. Rodocanachi 4. Schilizzi 1. Negroponte 2. Ralli 3. Sevastopulo 1. Homere 2. Mavrogordato 3. Negroponte 4. Petrocochino 5. Scanavi 6. Sevastopulo 1. Chryssoveloni 2. Petrocochino

APPENDICES 349

Family name

Place of origin

6. Chryssoveloni

Chios

7. Condostavlo

Chios

8. Dromokaiti 9. Damala

Chios Chios

10. Galatti

Chios

Family name

Place of origin

11. Mavrogordato

Chios

12. Negroponte

Chios

Related to the families 3. Ralli 4. Rodocanachi 5. Scanavi 6. Schilizzi 7. Sekiari 1. Calvocoressi 2. Lascharaki 3. Nicolopulo 4. Paspati 5. Sekiari 1. Ralli 2. Rodocanachi 3. Sevastopulo – 1. Petrocochino 2. Ralli 1. Ralli 2. Rodocanachi

Related to the families 3. Scanavi 1. Baltazzi 2. Negroponte 3. Ralli 4. Rodocanachi 5. Scanavi 6. Schilizzi 7. Sevastopulo 8. Zizinia 1. Agelasto 2. Avierino 3. Baltazzi 4. Frangiadi 5. Mavrogordato 6. Ralli 7. Rodocanachi 8. Scanavi

350 APPENDICES

Family name

Place of origin

13. Paspati

Chios

14. Petrocochino

Chios

15. Ralli

Chio

Related to the families 9. Schilizzi 10. Sevastopulo 11. Synodino 12. Zarifi 13. Zizinia 1. Chryssoveloni 2. Ralli 3. Rodocanachi 4. Schilizzi 5. Vouro 1. Baltazzi 2. Calvocoressi 3. Damala 4. Ralli 5. Rodocanachi 6. Scanavi 1. Agelasto 2. Argenti 3. Avierino 4. Calvocoressi 5. Condostavlo 6. Damala 7. Frangiadi 8. Frangopulo 9. Galati 10. Homere 11. Mavrogoradato 12. Negroponte 13. Paspati 14. Petrocochino 15. Rodocanachi 16. Salvago 17. Scaramanga 18. Schilizzi 19. Sekiari 20. Sevastopulo

APPENDICES 351

Family name

Place of origin

16. Rodocanachi

Chios

17. Salvago

Chios

18. Scanavi

Chios

19. Scaramanga

Chios

Related to the families 21. Spartali 22. Vlasto 23. Ziffo 24. Zizinia 1. Agelasto 2. Argenti 3. Condostavlo 4. Calvocoressi 5. Galati 6. Eumorphopulo 7. Mavrogordato 8. Negreponte 9. Papudoff 10. Paspati 11. Petrocochino 12. Ralli 13. Salvago 14. Scanavi 15. Scaramanga 16. Schilizzi 17. Sekiari 18. Sevastopulo 19. Synodino 20. Vlasto 21. Zizinia 1. Ralli 2. Rodocanachi 1. Baltazzi 2. Calvocoressi 3. Galati 4. lonides 5. Mavrogordato 6. Negroponte 7. Petrocochino 8. Rodocanachi 9. Sevastopulo 10. Schilizzi 11. Zizinia 1. Eumorphopulo

352 APPENDICES

Family name

Place of origin

20. Sekiari

Chios

21. Sevastopulo

Chios

Family name

Place of origin

22. Schilizzi

Chios

23. Synodino

Chios

24. Vlasto

Chios

25. Vouro

Chios

Related to the families 2. Ralli 3. Rodocanachi 1. Calvocoressi 2. Chryssoveloni 3. Ralli 4. Rodocanachi 5. Schilizzi 6. Zizinia 1. Avierino 2. Baltazzi 3. Condostavlo 5. Mavrogordato 6. Negroponte

Related to the families 7. Papudoff 8. Scanavi 9. Ralli 10. Rodocanachi 1. Argenti 2. Calvocoressi 3. Homere 4. Mavrogordato 5. Negroponte 6. Paspati 7. Ralli 8. Rodocanachi 9. Scanavi 10. Sekiari 11. Vouro 12. Zygomala 1. Negroponte 2. Rodocanachi 1. Ralli 2. Rodocanachi 1. Paspati 2. Schilizzi

APPENDICES 353

Family name

Place of origin

26. Ziffo 27. Zizinia

Chios Chios

28. Zygomala B.Others 29. Basiliou

Chios

30. Cassaveti 31. Eumorphopulo

Thessaly

Epirus

32. Frangiadi 33. Frangopulo 34. Homere

Smyrna

35. lonides

Asia Minor

Family name

Place of origin

36. Lascharaki 37. Laskaridi

– –

38. Melas

Epirus

39. Mavros

–

Related to the families 3. Zarifi 1. Ralli 1. Mavrogordato 2. Negroponte 3. Scanavi 4. Sekiari 5. Ralli 6. Rodocanachi 1. Schilizzi 1. Mavros 2. Melas 1. lonides 1. Rodocanachi 2. Scaramanga 1. Ralli 2. Negroponte 1. Ralli 1. Baltazzi 2. Ralli 3. Sevastopulo 4. Schilizzi 1. Argenti 2. Cassavetti 3. Lascharidi 4. Scanavi 5. Xenos

Related to the families 6. Zafiropulo 1. Chryssoveloni 1. Ionides 2. Xenos 1. Basiliou 2. Mavros 1. Basiliou 2. Melas

354 APPENDICES

Family name

Place of origin

40. Papayanni 41. Papudoff

Smyrna Jannina

Related to the families

– 1. Rodocanachi 2. Sevastopulo 42. Spartali Chios 1. Ralli 43. Xenos Smyrna 1. lonides 2. Lascharidi 44. Zarifi Constantinople 1. Vouro 2. Zafiropulo 45. Zafiropulo Constantinople 1. Ionides 2. Zarifi Sources: M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983. B.Tsimpidaros, The Greeks in England, Athens, Alkaios, 1974 Appendix 3.1 The lonian network, 1870s–1900s DANUBE A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Antyppa Bros Aravandinos M. Ardavanis M. Athanassoulis P., N.M. Avgerinos Barbatis Barounos P.D. Curcumellis Dernikou Bros Drakoulis Bros Frangopulos A.P. Kakoulatos G. Kallinikou Bros Kamoulis I. Katsigeras P.N. Karadinos G. Karouso X., P. Kavadias Bros Kontaras A. Kouklelis and Michaelides Koukles Kourvisianou A.

APPENDICES 355

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. B.Chiots 58.

Koutava Bros Kyriakides N.G. Lekos Levidis G. Lykiardopulos Bros Manesis K.L. Maniatis Bros Maratos A. Markopulos R. Maroulis A.P. Mataragas D. Melissaratou Bros Monarchides Morakis N. Paraschakis D. Petalas I. Pierrou Bros Podimatopulos Portolos Simatos P. Soulariotis N. Stathatos Bros Stathatos Othon Telemachos Bros Tetenes O. Theofilatos Bros Theofilatos I. & Bros Theofilatos & Stathatos Theologos Troianos Bros Tzanatos G. Vaglianos P. Valeriano Bros Valsamos S.D. Vlassopulos D.E., N.P. Compethecras

356 APPENDICES

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. C. Others 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

AZOV A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. B. Chiots 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Cryssoveloni Bros Nicolopulos Negreponte O. Syngros Vouro Embiricos (Andros) Karavias A.G. Karavias E. (Santorini) Mavridis Melas (Jannina) Milas Nikas E. Poulopulos (Peloponnese) Platis (Santorini) Moskoff Sarantopulos Sigalas N. (Santorini)

Couppa Bros Focas Mussuri Svoronos Synodinos Theofanis Travlos Valsamakis Vagliano Bros Mavrogordato Negreponte D. Petrocochino P. Scanavi Scaramanga Bros Sevastopulos Ziffo Bros

APPENDICES 357

17. C. Others 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. NICOLAIEFF A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B. Others 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. ODESSA A. Ionians 1. B. Chiots 2.

Ziffo G.I. & Co Ambanopoulos N. (Myconos) Axiotis P.A. Beltsos K. Crendiropulos A. Diamantidis & Sons Kouri Bros Livas G. Mavros S. Papageorgacopoulso P. Papastamatiades N. Roussos G. (Leros) Sifneo Bros (Lesbos) Tarlas M.

Dandria Bros Karidias A.Z. Lykiardopulo Bros Lykiardopulo G. Troiannos D. Mavros Sons & Co Rodocanachi Th. P. Servos N.S. Sevastopulo Sklavos Bros

Inglessi Rodocanachi Th.

NOVOROSSISK A. Ionians 1. B. Chiots

Vagliano

358 APPENDICES

NOVOROSSISK 2. 3. BATUM A. Others 1. 2. 3. CONSTANTINOPLE A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. B. Others 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. MARSEILLES A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. B. Chiots 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Scaramanea Sevastopulo

Arvanitides Siderides S. Chrussaki

Destounis Foscolo & Mango Foscolo & Valsamachi Evangelatos Dandria Bros Arvanitides Courtzis (Lesbos) Michalinos (Chios) Siderides Zarifi

Ambanopoulo Dellaporta Vagliano Bros Couppa Bros Cicellis Corgialleno Lazarachi Miliotti Pana Romano Mavrocordato Nicolopulo Rodocanachi Salvago Scaramanga Sechiari

APPENDICES 359

NOVOROSSISK C. Others 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. NAPLES 1. LONDON A. Ionians 1. 2. 3. B. Chiots 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. C.Others 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Spartali Anarghiro Basiliou Caramano G.P. Melas Bros Micrulachi Valieri Vuccina Zarifi Zafiropulo Zouros D.N. Stathopulo

Dandria Bros Vagliano Bros Frangopulo Michalinos Paspatti Ralli bros Rodocanachi Schilizzi Sevastopulo Sechiari Scaramanga Bulgarides Cassavetti Casdagli Eliadi Eumorphopulo Embiricos Eugenides

360 APPENDICES

19. Georgiadi 20. Georgacopulo 21. lonides 22. Macris 23. Mavro 24. Micrulachi 25. Papazianni 26. Petrides 27. Protopazzi 28. Rigopulo 29. Spiropulo 30. Tamvaco 31. Tezicoglu 32. Valieri 33. Vouvalis 34. Zarifi 35. Zanetto 36. Zecchini Sources: British Parliamentary Papers, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, London Customs Bills of Entry, Sémaphore de Marseilles, various years; Appendix 3.3 including owners of boats above 1,000 tons; Andreas G.Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, 1971; M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Genealogiqtie des Grandes Familles de Grèece, dAlbanie et de Constantinople, Paris 1983

Appendix 3.2 Kinship (first degree) of the Ionian group (1870s–1900s) Family name

Place of origin

Related to the families

A. Ionians 1. Barbatis 2. Cambitsis 3. Cicellis 4. Couppa

Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia

5. Curcumelli 6. Destouni 7. Doresa 8. Frangopulo 9. Inglessi

Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia

1. Markopulo 2. Vagliano 1. Saliaris Bros 1. Inglessi 2. Vagliano 1. Scaramanga 1. Yannoulatos 1. Markopulo 1. Vagliano 1. Couppa 2. Synodinos

APPENDICES 361

Family name

Place of origin

10. Kallinicos 11. Mussuri

Cephalonia Cephalonia

12. Rossolimo 13. Lykiardopulo 14. Phocas 15. Pierro

Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia Cephalonia

16. Stathatos

Ithaca

17. Theofilatos

Ithaca

18. Synodinos 19. Vagliano

Cephalonia Cephalonia

20. Yannoulatos

Cephalonia

Related to the families 3. Valsamakis 1. Stathatos 1. Vagliano 2. Synodinos 1. Vagliano 1. Vagliano 1. Vagliano 1. Vagliano 2. Synodinos 1. Kallinicos 2. Negroponte 3. Theofilatos 1. Kallinicos 2. Stathatos 1. Mussuri 1. Ambanopoulo 2. Couppa 3. Frangopulo 4. Mela 5. Mavro 6. Negroponte 7. Petrocochino 8. Ralli 9. Zarifi 10. Inglessi 11. Mussuri 12. Rossolimo 13. Lykiardopulo 14. Destouni 15. Yannoulatos 16. Phocas 17. Zafiropulo 18. Cambitsis 1. Destouni 2. Vagliano

362 APPENDICES

Family name

place of origin

Related to the families

B. Chiots 1. Chryssoveloni 2. Negroponte

Chios Chios

3. Nicolopulo

Chios

4. Petrocochino 5. Rodocanachi

Chios Chios

6. Saliari Bros 7. Scaramanga

Chios Chios

8. Sevastopulo

Chios

9. Sechiari

Chios

10. Schilizzi

Chios

11. Vouro

Chios

1. Nicolopulo 1. Sevastopulo 2. Schilizzi 3. Stathatos 4. Vagliano 5. Zarifi 1. Chryssoveloni 2. Zarifi 1. Vagliano 1. Sevastopulo 2. Scaramanga 3. Zarifi 1. Cicellis 1. Curcumelli 2. Rodocanachi 3. Pierro 1. Negreponte 2. Rodocanachi 1. Schilizzi 2. Zarifi 1. Neereponte 2. Secniari 3. Vouro 1. Schilizzi 2. Zarifi

C. Others 1. Ambanopoulo 2. Mavro

Myconos –

3. Mela

Jannina

4. Zarifi

Constantinople

5. Zafiropulo

Constantinople

1. Vagliano 1. Mela 2. Vagliano 1. Mavro 2. Vagliano 1. Negroponte 2. Nicolopulo 3. Rodocanachi 4. Sekiari 5. Vagliano 6. Vouro 1. Vagliano

APPENDICES 363

Family name

place of origin

Related to the families 2. Zarifi

Source: As for Appendix 3.1

Appendix 3.3 Greek-owned riverboats of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895 Shipowner

Schleps number Canying capacity in tons*

Akatos Dem. Ambatiellos A. Ambatiellos S. Anninos S. Antypas I. Aravantinos & Ardavanis M. Argitis P. Arsenis A. Athanasoulis P. Athanasoulis N.M. Avgerinos M. Avgerinos & Kottis Avgerinos F.G. & Barounos P.D. Chryssoveloni Bros Demetriades L. Dernikou Bros Dimisianos L. Demetriou I. Diomos Pericles Drakoulis K.G. & Drakoulis A.K. Drakoulis Bros Embiricos A. Embiricos I. Fokas A. Fostinis G. Fostinis I. Franeopulos F. Gardelis & Marketos

1 1 1 1 1 1

500 215 390 140 1,150 1,250

1 1 1 3 1 2 3

150 48 250 940 125 1,900 3,600

14 1 1 1 1 1 2

11,475 500 1,175 900 190 370 2,500

1 6 1 1 1 1 7 1

615 4,690 1,000 500 100 250 4,825 740

Tugs number HP

1

25

3

200

1

22

2

60

2

150

364 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Schleps number Canying capacity in tons*

Gazis Elias Gazis Marinos Kagelaris N. Kakoulatos G. Kakousis N. Kalamatas G. Kaloudis & Diomos Kalimanis P. Kallinikos A.D. Kallinikos D. Kallinikos Bros Kamoulis I. Karademas I. Karadinos G. Karavias A.G. Karavias Karouso P. Karouso X. Katsigeras P.N. Kelaiditis I Kokolis P.

1 2 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 6 2 1 1 6 5 2 6 2 3 1

Shipowner

Schleps number Carrying capacity in tons*

Konidaris G. Konstantinidis G. Kontaras A. Kountouris Gr. Kouklelis Bros & Michaelides Kountouris A. Kouratos I. & Kourvisianou A. Koutava Bros Lachanas A. Lekos

1 1 2 1 9

190 600 1,450 750 7,800

1 3

520 4,185

5

2,075

3

1,950

135 740 2,750 2,080 950 125 58 190 1,125 2,750 6,500 1,300 225 1,350 6,480 5,725 2,125 6,375 2,145 2,875 475

Tugs number HP

1

35

1 2

70 115

2

190

Tugs number HP

1

50

1

25

APPENDICES 365

Shipowner

Schleps number Carrying capacity in tons*

Linardatos E. Lykiardopulos M. Makris Bros Makris P. & Makris S. Manesis K.L. Maniatis Bros Maratos N. Maroulis A.P. Maroulis R & Maroulis V. Maskas C. Mataragas D. Matsoukis G. Melissaratou Bros Messaris D.K. Monarchides & Curcumellis Morakis N. Mylonas I. Negreponte O. Neofytos B. Neofytos B. & Pagoidatos F.G. Neofytos B. & Stefanidgis P. Simatos P. Nikas E. Oikonomou E. Pagoulatos G. Panas P.A. Paraschakis D. Petalas I. Pierratos I. Pierrou Bros Pipinos Kyr. Pipinos Const. Platis P.K. Poulopulos D. Sarantopulos G.

1 1 4 1 2 4 3 7 1

225 700 885 590 1,225 2,440 1,685 7,725 515

1 1 1 2 2 1

175 1,250 900 1,925 2,175 1,100

2 1 3 1 2

2,240 875 1,565 400 50

1

600

2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 5 1 1 6 1 3

2,800 1,050 1,000 1,000 900 2,325 3,530 135 4,950 600 400 3,180 3,600 2,050

Tugs number HP

1

70

1 1

40 15

1

40

1

45

366 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Schleps number Carrying capacity in tons*

Tugs number

HP

Simatos P. & Antippas S. Skoutarakos D. Soulariotis N. Stathatos Bros Stathatos O. Stathatos O. & Kaliinikos P. Stefanitsis P. Stratiotis N. Synodinos N. Tetenes O. Theofilatos J & Sons Theofilatos Bros Theofilatos S.K. Theologos M. & Travlos Th. Tsouchlos & Tzanatos G. Valerianou Bros & Frangopulos A.P. Vagliano Ath. Vagliano Panaghis Valsamos S.D. Vandoros L. & Varnalis G. Vlassopulos D.E. Vlassopulos N.P. Zafiratos TOTAL

1

450

2 5 22 13 1

380 4,700 20,775 14,100 1,050

2 3 3

92 165 170

1 1 1 1 13

1,048 900 100 225 13,525

1

35

2

160

15

15,172

2

160

1 1

800 140

1

1,100

2

1,425

1 1

500 140

2 3

1,950 815

2

5,000

3

120

1

775

2 297

580 248,745

1

30

APPENDICES 367

Shipowner

Schleps number Carrying capacity in tons*

Tugs number

HP

Source: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Loiuer Danube, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, processed data from table on pp.378–89. The statistics are based on L’Annuaire du Danube, 1902–3 Notes: * S.G.Fokas states that in the orieinal statistics the volume of the boats is given in Braila kilos (=kile Braila), that are equivalent to half a ton, when 1 ton=1,000 kilos. In this way, 1 ton=two Braila kilos Appendix 3.4 Greek-owned deep-sea-going fleet of the Ionian network, 1879 Shipowner

Number of ships

Type

Net tons

Registered

Ambanopoulos Ambatiellos E. Antippas D.N. Ardavanis M. Kakoulatos & Vlassopulos Kallimasias K. Karadinos Ch. Karouso Chrussakis M. Embiricos E.L.

3 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 1

wind ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″

956 334 179 233 270 94 530 726 520 504

Myconos Cephalonia Syros Cephalonia Cephalonia Ithaca Zante Constantinople Syros Andros

Shipowner

Number of ships Type

Net tons Registered

Embiricos I. Embiricos M. & Sons Embiricos N. Embiricos A. Embiricos C. Foca G. Focas G. & Mussuri Focas A.N. Frangopulos N. Inglessis A. & G. Yannoulatos D. Maratos Th. Marcopulos A. Maroulis P.A. Monarchidis

1 1

294 309 350 118 133 120 341 162 320 1,081 283 198 222 93 739

1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 4

″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″

Syros Syros Syros Andros Andros Galatz Syros Syros Cephalonia Zante Ithaca Cephalonia Syros Syros

368 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Number of ships Type

Net tons Registered

Mussuri A. & G. Negreponte O. Nicolaides Nicolopulos Pierros D. Platis G.M. Petrocockino Rodocanaki J. Scaramangas J. Sclavos M. Sevastopulos

5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4

″ steam wind ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″ ″

999 95 125 157 196 96 266 223 217 327 1,168

Svoronos Stathatos Th. Stathatos & Theofilatos Theofilatos Bros

4 1 5

″ 914 steam 102 steam 922

Ceph./Piraeus Syros Constantinople Syros Ithaca Santorini Syros Syros Syros Cephalonia Syros Zante Ceph./Zante Piraeus Ithaca

2 1 1 13 1 2 87

steam wind steam wind steam wind

Braila Braila Syros Ceph./Zante Syros Zante

Theofilatos G. Vaglianos

1,280 540 760 2,928 832 486 21,742

Vlassopulos Bros A. Total owned by members of the Ionian network B. Total Greek-owned 1,256 231,478 B class ships % (A)/(B) 7% 9% Sources: See Appendix 4.1 and Archangelos register of shipping 1879

Appendix 4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1834–1914 (original raw data) Sailing Ships A′class* Year

Ships

1834 1835(a) 1838

2,183 _ 2,410 – – –

B′ class*

Tons** Ships

708 760 –

Steamships

Total

Tons**

Ships Tons* NRT (GRT)

Ships

_ – –

_ – –

2,891 _ 3,170 82,420 3,269 88,502

_ – –

Tons

APPENDICES 369

Sailing Ships A′class* Year

Ships

1839 1840(a) 1843 1844 1845(a) 1848 1850(a) 1851 1852 1853 1855 1858(a) 1860(a) 1861(d) 1862(b) 1863(d) 1864(b) 1865 1866(b) 1868 1870(c) (b) 1872(b) 1874(c) (b) 1875(c) (b) 1876(c) 1879(c) 1883(d) 1887(d) 1888(d) 1889(d) 1890(d) 1891(d)

– – – – 2,220 15,180 2,400 15,880 2,470 17,280 2,527 17,309 2,534 18,070 2,890 – 2,852 19,696 _ _ 3,538 32,396 _ – 2,857 29,193 – – 3,181 34,556 – – 3,297 37,356 3,495 28,394 4,146 47,150 3,961 46,880 605 18,785 4,138 50,856 3,659 59,563 703 21,784 4,097 42,877 903 25,779 4,303 43,712 – – 736 20,044 – – [A′+B′] [A′+B′] [A′+B′] [A′+B′] [A′+B′]

B′ class*

Tons** Ships

– – 949 1,014 1,114 1,456 1,482 1,437 1,375 _ 1,525 – 1,212 – 1,153 – 1,230 1,661 1,355 1,450 1,484 1,733 1,093 1,518 1,085 1,565 1,107 1,567 1,256 1,318 4,447 5,731 5,809 5,744 5,675

Steamships

Total

Tons**

Ships Tons* NRT (GRT)

Ships

Tons

– – 122,378 130,823 143,823 237,914 248,131 _ 228,055 _ 264,405 _ 233,732 – 222,612 – 242,836 269,030 276,425 282,781 276,676 347,847 194,391 280,337 199,367 288,332 210,079 291,278 203,816 203,816 226,148 216,649 223,158 226,702 213,812

– – – – – – – – – _ – – – – 4(f) – 4(f) 6 11 11 27 12 15 20 20 25 27 24 41 50 82 98 82 97 105

3,345 3,184 3,169 3,414 3,584 3,983 4,016 4,327 4,227 4,153 5,063 3,918 4,069 4,156 4,338 4,452 4,531 5,162 5,512 5,422 2,116 5,833 4,767 2,241 5,202 2,493 5,440 – 2,033 – 4,529 5,829 5,891 5,841 5,780

89,642 110,690 137,558 146,703 161,103 255,233 266,201 256,193 247,751 247,953 296,801 268,264 262,925 252,689 258,703 262,531 281,727 299,620 328,815 334,901 303,691 404,063 259,947 308,092 250,077 322,207 262,032 – 261,139 – 265,922 248,974 263,747 271,386 268,799

– – – – – – – – – – _ – – – 1,535(0 – 1,535(f) 2,196 5,240 5,240 8,230 5,360 5,993 5,971 7,833 8,096 8,241 6,925 9,617 24,161 39,774 32,325 40,589 44,684 54,987

370 APPENDICES

Sailing Ships A′class* Year

Ships

1892(d) 1893(f)

[A′+B′]

B′ class*

Tons** Ships

Steamships

Total

Tons**

Ships Tons* NRT (GRT)

Ships

5,894 311,840 – –

–

5,732 1,121

234,484 245,035

162 96

1895(e) – 1896(d) – 1897(d) – 1900(f) – 1901(f) –

– – – – –

1,059 – – – (d)1,140

1902(f)

–

–

(g)910

1903(f)

–

–

(d) 1,030

246,196 – – 183,677 175,896 (d) 175,999 (g) 145,032 (d)

Tons

125 123 141 191 158

76,996 80,113 (128,469) 89,907 (144,345) (175,592) 143,436 (231,541)

– – – – –

327,113 –

186

181,531

1,096

357,530

199

205,996 (325,895)

1,229

351,028

–

Sailing Ships A′class* Year

Ships

1904(f)

B′class*

Steamships

Total

Tons**

Ships

Tons**

Ships

Tons*

Ships NRT (GRT)

Tons

–

(g)889

170, 147 (g)

212

223, 020 (335, 049) 221, 112 236, 322 (373, 222) 266, 915 (421, 743) 304, 668

1,101

393, 167

_

–

–

–

1,390

414, 317

1905(0

_

_

_

_

214

1906(f)

_

_

_

–

231

–

(g)1, 135

147, 402 (g)

255

–

–

–

282

1907(f)

1908(f)

–

APPENDICES 371

Sailing Ships A′class* Year

Ships

B′class* Tons**

Ships

Tons**

Steamships

Total

Ships

Ships NRT (GRT)

Tons*

Tons

(482, 055) 1909(f) – (g)980 126, 287 304, 1,267 430, 093 (g) 430 523 (484, 193) 1910(f) _ _ _ – 298 312, – – 798 (499, 184) 1911(f) – – – – 322 349, – – 581 (560, 475) 1912(f) – (g)760 101, 346 407, 1,106 508, 459 (g) 137 596 (648, 667) 1913(f) – (g)788 101, 365 (705, 671 (g) 897) 1914(f) – – – 1 00, 407 (820, – – 000 (g) 861) Source: No letter: Pandora, 1852–3 pp. 216, 285–87, 1854–5, pp. 8–13, 160–1, 163–6, 1853–4, pp. 108–10, 174–5, 192; 1866, p. 239. (a) Official state statistics, found in M.Panopulou, Economic and Technical Problems in the Greek Shipbuildine Industry, 1850–1914, unpublished PhD thesis, Athens, 1991. (b) A.N.Vernadakis, About Trade of Greece, Athens, 1885, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias, repr. 1990, p. 231. (c) Archangelos register of shipping. (d) A. Metaxas and S.G. Georgopulos, Greek Merchant Shipping, 1821–1924, Athens, 1926, estimating 90 per cent of the sailing ship fleet for ships above 60 tons. (e) The Bureau Veritas. (f) Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. (g) Data from K.Antonopulos, ‘From Sail to Steam’, Nafiika Chronika, no. 699, January 1964, p. III Notes: * From 1836 to 1858 A′ class includes ships equal to or smaller than 30 tons, while from 1858 onwards it includes vessels equal or smaller to 60 tons. Accordingly B′ class from 1836 to 1858 are ships above 30 tons, while from 1858 they are above 60 tons. ** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1868 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton

372 APPENDICES

Appendix 4.2 The growth of the greek-owned fleet according to Archangelos register of shipping, 1870–9 Sailing Ships Year

A′ class*

B′class*

Ships

Ships

Tons**

Tons**

Steamships

Total

Ships

Ships

Tons*

1870 605 18,785 1,484 276,676 27 8,230 2,116 1874 703 21,784 1,518 280,337 20 5,971 2,241 1875 903 25,779 1,565 288,332 25 8,096 2,493 1876 999 27,790 1,567 291,278 24 6,925 2,590 1879 736 20,044 1,256 231,478 41 9,617 2,033 Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1870, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1879

Tons 303,691 308,092 322,207 325,993 261,139

Notes: * A’ class include ships equal to or smaller than 60 tons, while B’ class from 1858 onwards include ships above 60 tons. ** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1868 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton. Appendix 4.3 The growth of the Greek fleet according to Vernadakis, 1870–5 Sailing Ships A′class*

B′class

Year

Ships

Tons**

Ships

1870

4,138

50,856

1,733

Tons**

Ships

Steamships

Total

Tons*

Tons

Ships

347, 12 5,360 5,833 404, 847 063 1872 3,659 59,563 1,093 194, 15 5,993 4,767 259, 391 947 1874 4,097 42,877 1,085 199, 20 7,833 5,202 250, 367 077 1875 4,303 43,712 1,107 210, 27 8,241 5,437 262, 079 032 Source: A.N.Vernadakis, About the Trade of Greece, Athens, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias, 1885, repr. 1990, p. 231 Notes: * A‘ class includes ships equal to or smaller than 60 tons, while B’ class from 1836 to 1858 includes ships above 60 tons. ** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1868 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton

APPENDICES 373

Appendix 4.4 Registration of Greek-owned ships according to ports Port/Island A.GREECE AEGEAN ISLANDS Syros Spetses Hydra Santorini Andros Scopelos Milos Skiathos Myconos Poros MAINLAND Galaxidi Piraeus/ Athens Kranidi/ Cheli Patras Amaliapolis Kymi Chalkis Messolonghi Nauplion Kalamata Limni Eub.

1855*

1879

1895

Greek tons %

Greek tons %

NRT

%

GRT

%

(226,789)

67

140,330

60

131,227

38

211,706

26

(121,342) (31,138) (22,965) (14,494) (8,465) (7,723) (6,339) (5,527) (5,508) (3,288) (70,072) (27,430)

36 9 7 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 21 8

94,477 12,933 5,001 5,386 3,784 3,481 5,401 5,162 3,061 1,644 68,491 13,175

40 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 26 5

89,680 7,171 5,669 8,041 10,802 3,278 501 4,360 921 804 48,606 20,619

26 2 2 2 3 1

119,147 165 822 2,939 86,678 1,132

15

1

823

17 6

267,788 5,947

32 1

(18,331) (5,678)

5 2

18,119 2,877

8 1

23,395

7

265,623

39

(5,014) (3,835) (2,969) (2,767) (1,940) (1,114) (974) –

2 1 1 1 1 – – –

4,163 – 1,973 1,397 625 130 832 –

2 – 1 1 – – – –

1,825 – 713 158 – – – 125

1 – – – – – – –

5,236 – 152 – – – 548 –

1 – – – –

1855*

1879

%

GRT

%

7 2

_ 2,869 _ – 2,304 –

_ – – – –

Port/Island

Greek tons %

Trikeri Volo Laurion Other IONIAN ISLANDS Zante

–

1895 Greek tons %

–

–

–

(40,000) –

12 –

_ – 25,190 35,044 15,986

_ _ _ – 15 7

1914

11

– –

1914 NRT 867 473 431 10,613 25,025 7,415

374 APPENDICES

1855*

1879

1895

1914

Port/Island

Greek tons %

Greek tons %

NRT

%

GRT

%

Cephalonia Corfii Ithaca Lefkas OTHER ISLANDS*** Chios Kassos Samos Castelorizo Lemnos Leros Metelino B. OTTOMAN EMPIRE Constantinople Kerassund Smyrna Enos Barten Bigados Bulbuljeh Cashot Cisme Evranyiet Ickehumin Irekera Katirlee Midelee Mureftah Mysia Nea Mitzela Oonia Shakis Simire Sinope Terebolie Trebizond

– – –

10,260 4,952 3,075 771 11,977

5 2 1 – 5

13,807 _ 3,803

4 _ 1 – 7

2,245 _ 59

– _ –

28,046

3

7,679 1,015 722 – – 1,237 1,324 17,284

4 – – – –

13,779 4,421 2,273 1,149 2,077

4 1

24,999 715 2,088

7

59,139

5,613 2,255 – _ – _ – _ _ – – _ _ _ _ – _ _ _ _ –

2 1 – _ – _ – _ – – – _ _ _ _ – _ _ _ _ –

_

_

40,172 765 2,890 225 514 160 731 2,096 301 190 125 445 112 142 680 3,696 _ 1,029 137 405 634 284 162

– – – – –

– – –

– – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – –

– – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – –

26,260

244 –

_

17

103,045

13

11

94,660 – 8,233 _ – _ – _ 152 – – _ _ _ _ – _ _ _ – –

11 – – _ – _ – _ – – – _ _ _ _ – _ _ _ – –

_

_

_

APPENDICES 375

1855*

1879

1895

1914

Port/Island

Greek tons %

Greek tons %

NRT

Abahnah Agvah Aionoros Maiz Ada Canea Sakyz

– – – – – –

_ _ _ _ _ –

271 196 132 1,646 372 213

1855* Port/ Island

Greek tons

C SOUTHEASTERN MEDITERRANE AN Alexan dria Port Said Beirut Tombro ok D. RUSSIA Taganro g Berdian sk Eupator ia Kertch Mariup ol Rostov Sevasto pol Odessa Nicolai eff St. Petesbu rg

– – – – – – 1879

%

Greek tons

_ – _ _ _ – 1895

%

NRT

%

%

_ – _ _ _ –

_ – _ _ _ –

1914 %

GRT

783

501

_

501

132

_

141 510

–

8,403

GRT

%

_

3

68,633

2,829

9,928

466

1,223

413

–

362 159

2,346 29,148

1,582 264

29,589 1,262

1,473 99

249 _

756

–

8

376 APPENDICES

1855* Port/ Island

Greek tons

1879 %

Greek tons

1895 %

NRT

1914 %

GRT

%

E. 8,083 2 BULGA RIA Agatho or 5,167 501 poli (Aktarp olee Aktebol i) Vassilik 2,475 _ o Szusabo 170 – li Constan 271 _ za Roustch – 3,603 ouck F. 21,594 6 36,927 4 RUMA NIA Braila 20,922 30,165 Galatz 672 1,190 Sulina 5,572 G. Western 12,920 3 94,211 12 Europe London 6,619 72,083 Cardiff 498 _ Marseill 5,803 14,956 es Rotterd 3,189 3,189 am Trieste – 2,983 Total (336,861) 261,139 353,977**** 822,906**** Sources: Data for 1855, Pandora 5/Z, 1854–5, pp. 10–11, and 7/PNA’ 1856–7, pp. 163– 5; for the estimates of the lonian islands, see N. Vlassopulos, note 23, ch. 4; for 1879, register of shipping Archangelos 1879; data for 1895 and 1914 from Lloyd’s Register ofShipping Notes: * Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1869 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton ** The lonian islands became part of the Greek state in 1864. *** Became part of the Greek state in die early 20th century. **** Includes Greek-owned fleet under all flags

APPENDICES 377

Appendix 4.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships according to ports in 1879 Port/Island

Ships

Tons

Syros 455 94,477 Piraeus 144 18,119 Zante 102 15,986 Galaxidi 101 13,175 Spetses 102 12,933 Cephalonia 92 10,260 Chios 73 7,679 Constantinople 31 5,613 Santorini 56 5,386 Milos 38 5,401 Skiathos 42 5,162 Ydra 47 5,001 Corfu 71 4,952 Patras 51 4,163 Andros 37 3,784 Scopelos 25 3,481 Ithaca 26 3,075 Myconos 14 3,061 Kerassund 22 2,255 Other 749 37,176 Total 2,278 261,139 Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1879

%

Average tonnage

36 7 6 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 14 100

208 126 157 130 127 112 105 181 96 142 123 106 70 82 102 139 219 218 103 50 115

Appendix 4.6 Greek-owned ships in 1879 according to place of building Type of ship Place of build A.GREECE Andros Kassos Castelorizo Chalkis Corfu Cumes Egina Galaxidi Hydra Ithaca

Brig

43 4 1

77 2

Gollette

2 1 1 1 3 7 1

Total Gabara

4

Barque

2

1

1 3

3

Ships*

Tonnage

869 2 51 5 3 1 3 1 96 3 5

163,939 185 9,720 1,152 265 52 209 60 20,772 356 462

378 APPENDICES

Type of ship Place of build Laconia Lefkas Limne Limnos Messolonghi Nio Patmos Patra Piraeus Rhodes Samos Santorini Scopelos

Brig

Gollette

Total Gabara

Barque

Ships*

Tonnage

3 14 3 8 1 23

63 60 144 264 83 90 75 231 2,580 437 937 60 3,935

1 1 2 2

10 3 5

1

1

2

Type of ship Place of build

Brig

Gollette

Skiato Spetses Syros Zante Other B.ABROAD OTTOMAN EMPIRE Chios Constantinople Dardanelles Enos Gallipoli Kerassunda Lesbos Monopoli Pontos Simi Sinopi Thrace Trebizond

13 56 337

16 2 123

Total Gabara

33

Barque

11

Ships

Tonnage

29 69 539 1 1 216 72

3,530 12,726 104,921 60 510 40,569 9,970

31 4 1 2 3 18 4 2 2 2 1 1 1

4,602 544 213 205 398 2,230 296 410 520 202 200 81 69

APPENDICES 379

Type of ship Place of build

Brig

Gollette

Total Gabara

Barque

BLACK SEA Azov Black Sea Braila Danube Euxene Galatz Rostov Toulza Vassilico WESTERN EUROPE Germany England Bristol Antwerp Atalia Austria Belgium Castelamare Copenhagen Scotland Espagne Fiume Genoa Holland Livorno Lussine Malta Naples Norway Palermo Type of ship Place of build Sorento Spalato Trieste

Brig

Gollette

Ships

Tonnage

21 2 1 5 2 1 2 1 2 5 123 1 33 1 2 2 3 1 7 2 1 1 4 15 2 1 3 9 11 1 1

3,292 154 195 851 270 147 403 93 440 739 27,307 150 8,667 240 215 137 691 290 1,071 309 251 108 896 3,968 197 227 343 2,025 3,029 332 170

Total Gabara

Barque

Ships

Tonnage

5 1 12

1,328 50 2,085

380 APPENDICES

Type of ship Place of build

Brig

Gollette

Total Gabara

Barque

Ships

Tonnage

Tripoli 2 Venice 2 C. Unknown 948 Total 2,033 Source: Data compiled from Archangelos register of shipping, 1879 Note: Includes all types of ships

150 378 56,631 261,139

Appendix 4.7 Shipping loans in Syros, 1846 Lender/Interest

Purpose

Tons

Amount*

Rate*

A. FOR SHIPBUILDING/REPAIRS Merchants M.C.Salvago Completion – 442 spd. Share D. Apostolopulos Completion – 2,480 dr. Monthly 1% & share (Trieste) Shipbuilders M. Poutous Shiprepair 198 1,716 fr. Monthly 8% M. Poutous Completion – 12,000 dr. Share N.D.Perdikas Completion – 1,300 dr. Monthly 2.5% Others K.Petsalis (police Completion – 3,000 dr. Monthly 1% & share officer) B. FOR WORKING CAPITAL (to equip and rig the ship for the voyage, for wages and food supplies) Chiot Merchants Zanni. A.Vouro 224 10,000 dr. Yearly 22.5% Leo. Eumorphopulos 224 2,000 dr. Yearly 18% Leo. Eumorphopulos – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.25% P.Geralopulos 150 1,600 spd. Monthly 2.25% Z.Th.Avgerinos – 764 spd. Monthly 2.5% Z.Th.Avgerinos – 50 spd. Monthly 2.75% Z.Th.Avgerinos 180 100 spd. Monthly 2.5% Z.Th.Avgerinos – 1,000 spd. Monthly 2.75% Ambrosios Damalas 223 650 spd. Monthly 2.25% M.Salvagos 150 2,900 dr. Monthly 2.5% M.Salvagos 241 560 spd. Monthly 2.5% E.Z.Negreponte 137 4,000 dr. Share ¾ of ship Z.Negreponte – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.33% P.Ralli – 774 spd. Monthly 1.75%

APPENDICES 381

Lender/Interest

Purpose

Th.Petrocockino (Constantinople) Others George Yiourdis I.Peridis Lender/Interest

Purpose

Tons

Tons

Amount*

Rate*

–

510 spd.

Monthly 2.5%

– 174

1,800 spd. 1,000 spd.

Monthly 2.25% Monthly 2.25%

Amount*

Rate*

I.Peridis 238 500 spd. Yearly 20% F.I.Kyriakou – 540 dr. Monthly 2% I.Peridis 238 300 dr. Monthly 2% D.Vafiadaki – 500 spd. Monthly 2.5% I.Peridis – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2% P.Psycha – 4,400 dr. Monthly 2.5% M.K.Karali – 3,000 dr. Monthly 2% P.Kaniskeri – 175 spd. Monthly 2.5% C.Naxos – 5,000 dr. Monthly 2.5% Ioa. Pardalaki – 450 spd. Monthly 2.75% N.Zaroulaki – 250 spd. Monthly 2.75% D.Michail – 2,500 spd. Monthly 2.5% G.Calvocoressi – 1,550 dr Monthly 2.5% s G.D.Koutsodon 180 640 spd. Monthly 1.75% tis Kousoulenti – 400 spd. Monthly 2.25% Em. – 600 spd. Monthly 2.5% Konstantinou Kyparisis & – 1,402 dr. Monthly 2% Sarafis G.Theologis 226 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.25% Chr. 226 6,593 dr. Monthly 2.5% Emmanouel I.Kontoudi – 3,090 dr. Monthly 2% Source: Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades, Archive of the Notary Andreas David, Notarial Acts 1838–59, Syros 1846 Note: * Currency: dr.=drachmas, spd.=spanish dollars, fr.=francs. ** Loans on monthly rates were usually to be repaid after six months Appendix 4.8 Sales, purchases and newbuildings in Syros, 1846* A. Newhuildings 1) Ambrosios Th. Ralli built a eabara of 192 tons named Pandias, by shipbuilder Poutous, that cost 100,000 drachmas.

382 APPENDICES

VALUE=520 dr. per ton 2) Newbuilding brig of 83 tons for 43,000 dr. VALUE=518 dr. per ton B. Second hand sales and purchases 1) Sale of ship from agent A. Ladopulos, bought by D. Glykas (lumber merchant), of a brig 187 tons for 750 spd. VALUE=4 spd. per ton 2) Pandelis Maskas, shipbuilder sells brig 148 tons for 18,000 dr. VALUE=122 dr. per ton 3) Philippos Kyriakou Isidorou sells half goelette 23 tons for 1,312 dr. VALUE=114 dr. per ton 4) Ap. Apostolopulos sells sells brig of 121 tons for 18,609 dr. to loannis Efstathiou. VALUE=154 dr. per ton 5) Pantelis Pnevmantikos sells brig of 112 tons for 17,000 dr. VALUE=152 dr. per ton 6) Sale of half a brig of 116 tons to Z.Th. Avgerinos (merchant) for 1,360 spd. VALUE=23 spd. per ton 7) Sale of one Fourth of a brig 226 tons for 4,773 dr. VALUE=85 dr. per ton Source: Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades, Archive of Notary Andreas David, Notarial Acts 1838–59, Syros, 1846 Note: * Currency: dr.=drachmas, spd.= spanish doilars fr.=francs Appendix 4.9 Greek owners of steamships in 1890 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner*

Ships NRT

A. Greece Arvaniti E. Calamaris N. Carava Limnios Compethecra C. Costalas J. Goudis D.P. Hellenic Steam. Nav. Markas & Coutsokeri Pandermaly Bros Panhellenic Steam. Nav. Papalla Bros Proveleghios A. B. Rumania

40

5 17 1 1 9 1 1 16

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionian network

18,173 32 195 706 199 33 653 2,202 7,594 587 14 5,384 444 162 13,625 24

Yes

APPENDICES 383

Shipowner*

Ships NRT

Chryssoveloni Embiricos A. Embiricos G.M. Stathatos Bros Theofilatos Bros Theofilatos & Stathatos C. Southern Russia Cuppa R. Foca C.A. Comneno J.E. Theofilatos Mavrogordato Mussuri J. & Ferraponte Negroponte D.A. Rodocanachi P.T. Scaramanga P.P. D. Constantinople & Smyrna Courtgi P.M. Foscolo & Valsamachi Foscolo & Mango Michalinos & Co Pantaleon** Spiteri Andrea Stamadiades MJ. Stathopulo G. E. Westem Europe Marseilles Cicellis P.G. Liverpool Lambros C.G.

1 2 1 7 3 2 10

Shipowner*

Ships

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionian network Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

2 2 1 20 7 1 3 2 1 1 2 3 10

958 2,430 1,109 5,695 3,297 136 4,490 8 940 36 305 538 258 403 515 464 1,031 10,901 20 2,910 1,044 1,152 2,406 223 31 217 2,918 8,694 16

2

1,864

Yes

1

84

Yes

NRT

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

% total

Belonged to or financed by the lonian network

London Vagliano 7 6,746 Yes Bros Total 96 55,883 100 37,002 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890 Note: * Spelling of names as found in Lloyd’s Register. ** Smyrna

384 APPENDICES

Appendix 4.10 Greek owners of steamships in 1895 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships

NRT

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by lonians

A. Greece Calamaris N. Carava Limnios Compethecra C. Cosmetto P. Coutzis G.

51 Hermes Anatoli George 1st Lykavias Georgios Koutsis Crete Spetzie Nauplion Peloponessos Parnassos Phoenix

21,937 706 199 33 140

24

558 302 110 309 272 587 587

1890

Poseidon

363

1855

Margarita Euboia Thetis Era Mitir Argyri Iris

133 131 317 502 830 400

1891 1874 1859 1855 1882

Sfactirea Theseus Elpis Panellenion Chios Hermoupolis Eptanisos Pelops Pinios Omonia Karteria Hydra Egina

690 773 606 195 537 493 332 596 435 3,167 317 218 96

1884

Goudis D.P.

Marlas Marquides Bros & Macris MacDowall & Barbour

Michalinudis J.A. New Hellenic Steamship Navigation

Pepas

1870

1884

Yes Yes

1863 Yes

1859

APPENDICES 385

Shipowner

Ships

NRT

Policantriti G. Portolos G. Proveleghios A.

Polycantriti 74 Agios loannis 59 Samson 162

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by lonians Yes 1864

Shipowner

Ships

NRT

Navigation a Vapeur Panhellenique

Ionia

881

1887

247 456 881 809 460 477 881 290 1,132 910 87

1862 1887 1872 1862 1864 1881 1879 1893 1891 1883

52

1894

Argolis Macedonia Thrace Samos Epirus Thessalia Albania Paros Saliaris A.K. Aristea Heleni Serpieri Eucl. Siphnos & Eubee Synodinos Ch. Prinkipos Georgios Sinodinos T. Damaskini Vatis G.L. Adelphi Vlassopulo E. Annika Zygomalas M.T. Artemisia B. Rumania 27 Chryssoveloni Z.M. Bros Chryssoveloni Adelphi Cnryssoveloni Embiricos A. Embiricos Maria Andriana

93 761 991 150 26,421 858

% total Date of buila Belonged to or financed by lonians

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

29 Yes

1,498

1891

Yes

1,743 1,692 1,174

1893 1893

Yes Yes Yes

386 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships

NRT

Embiricos G.M. Milas J.

Constantinos Joannis Milas Eleni Milas Andriana Stathatos Antonios Stathatos Telemaque Dionyssios Stathatos Hellespont Constantine Stathatos Poseidon Charilaos Trikoupis Euxine Athelete Othon Stath. Mentor

1,109 1,327 1,503

1882 1892

Yes Yes Yes

1,610

1891

Yes

976 29

1883 1877

Yes Yes

1,274 116

1889 1894

Yes Yes

1,501 1,666 1,626

1890 1895 1892

Yes Yes Yes

18 12 1,169 34

1889 1894 1888

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Hellespontes Dionysios Ithaca Odysseus Parthenon

102 23 1,081 983 853

Ships

NRT

Stathatos Bros

Stathatos Othon

Stathatos & Theofilatos Sulariotes Theofilatos Bros

Shipowner

C. Southern Russia Curcumelli D.N. Feonfani F. Foca C.A., GA.

Princess Sophia 1,491 Thrace 953 10 3,603 Elena Couppa Sophia Couppa Phoenix Eptanisos

223 243 275 36

% total Date of buila Belonged to or financed by lonians

1883 1882 1884 1877

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by Ionians 1889 1887

Yes Yes

1893 1891

Yes Yes Yes Yes

4

APPENDICES 387

Shipowner

Theophilatos C. Mavrogordato C. Negroponte D.A.

D. Constantinolpe & Smyrna Courtgi P.M.

Dandria Bros Daoud Farkouh Hadji*

Evangalatos E. Foscolo & Valsamachi Foscolo & Mango

Ships

NRT

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by Ionians

Focas Gretzia Pietro

1,480 318 258

Yes Yes Yes

Akibiades

255

Yes

Ambrosios N. Negroponte D. 33

258 257 22,412

Yes Yes

Odissos Cardiff Chios Crete Heraclia Massalia Panormos Polis Mytilene Smyrne Stefano Dandria

1,241 352 194 194 478 868 138 686 415

1880 1866 1881 1881 1864 1879 1882 1880 1879

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

1,203

1885

Yes

Alexandros Aphroditi Georgios Sofia Enossis Ernesta

624 717 430 429 57

1883 1869

Foscolo Demetrio S.

1,044

1870

Yes

Schilizzi Eptalofos Georrios P Bouooulis Marietta Ralli

1,277 1,680

1893 1890

Yes Yes

1,613 1,501

1890 1891

Yes Yes

25

Yes

388 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships

NRT

Lambros C.G.

Mathilda Fosc. Pietro Foscolo Thiresia Halcyon Triton Dio Fili Ariadne Mich.

111 561 580 186 186 18 653

Laneoussi N. Micnalinos & Co

Cornelia G. Michalinos Despina G. Michalinos

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by Ionians 1883 1864 1869 1876 1878 1885 1873

1,141 1,141

1889

Ships

NRT

1,994

1893

Pantaleon*

Georgios Michalinos Eleni Smyrna Olga

223 443 34

1883

21

16,335

Rodocanachi M.E. Vagliano A.A.

Livorno Rodinis Naples Stathopulo G.

Maris Vaglianos Sophia Couppa Esther

Yes Yes

Yes

Shipowner

Stamadiades MJ. E. Western Europe Marseilles Couppa N.

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by lonians Yes

1879 18

485

Yes

1,350 184

1891 1864

Yes Yes

Cephalonia Cephalonia Zakynthos

473 929 973

1864 1878 1882

Yes Yes Yes

Fides

1,007

1878

Lesbos

1,016

1879

Yes

APPENDICES 389

Shipowner

Ships

NRT

% total Date of build Belonged to or financed by lonians

London Vagliano Bros

Adelphi Vagtiano 1,010 1883 Aghios Ioannis 1,093 1885 Andrea Vagliano 1,045 1880 Mari Vagliano 891 1880 Nicholaos 1,119 1883 Vagliano P.A.Vagliano 964 1880 Alexandros 26 1894 Flying Arrow 26 1882 Ecaterini 883 1878 Couppa Ambatiellos 1,074 1889 Despina 779 1890 Ithaka 703 1873 Astrea 305 Total 141 90,708 100 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1895 Note: * Smyrna

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 66,693

Appendix 4.11 Greek owners of steamships in 1900 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

A. Greece Athanassulis N.M. Bank of Athens Bassian A.

80 1 2 1

41

58,432 121 1,247 1,109

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Bassian A. & N.Couppa Bassian A. & Foscolo Calvocoressi J. Caracalo & Fustanos Castriottis C.N. Cosmas A.

1

1,032 1,044 1,074 102 757 619

19,048 Yes Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

390 APPENDICES

Shipowner Cosmetti P. Coutzis Diakiki A. Embiricos A. Embiricos B. Embiricos G.M. Gangos Alex. Goudis D.P. Ladopulo E. Leousi G.E. Manianis B. Marlas MacDowall & Barbour Moraitis D.G. Navigation a Vapeur Panhellenique (Psacharopulos) New Hellenic Navigation Northwest Railway Co Papaleonardos S. Psaroudas & Rassoyiannis Roussos N. Spetzoyannis Stathopulo S. Stathatos Othon Theofilatos A.N. Thou N. Vagliano M. Vatis A.L., J.L. Vergotis Tsiropinas C. B. Rumania Embiricos L.M. Stathatos Bros Stathatos & Theofilatos C. Southern Russia Curcumellis D.N. Diamantidis D.

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

2 2 3 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 8 3 10

178 1,716 668 3,442 2,839 1,595 1,546 1,138 1,439 114 152 587 1,853 4,345 7,297

11 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 7 2 4 1 26 3 2

4,712 136 143 912 2,341 150 1,016 3,842 1,491 682 1,139 2,244 991 2,619 9,938 7 3,305 6,531 102 13,793 10 729 1,168

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes 9,836 Yes Yes Yes 9,466 Yes

APPENDICES 391

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Dmetrief P. Feofani F.A. Sifneo Bros

3 2 1

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Sifneo J.Th. Theofilatos C. Manoussi D. Mavrocordato C., M Negroponte D.A. Svorono C. Synodino P. D. Constantinople & Smyrna Courtgi P.M. (Navigation a Vapeur Egée) Daoud Farkouh Hadji* Dandria Bros Foscolo & Mango (Mango & Doresa, London) Lambros C. Langoressis N. Pantaleon P* (Navigation Orientale) Saliaris A.K. Siniossoglu S. Zarifi L. E. Western Europe Marseilles Caramano G.P. Cicellis P.G. Couppa N. Micnalinudis Zouros D.N. London Embiricos S.G. Michalinos Scaramanga Bros Vagliano Bros (Shipping Agencies) (Embiricos S.G.)

1 2 2 3 4 2 1 47 11

1,005 756 558 1,636 1,064 992 1,081 30,668 5,947

10 1 4

3,865 1,202 6,071

2 1 8

628 140 2,165

2 2 6 20

1,813 2,283 6,554 29,260

1 1 2 1 1 4 4 1 5

1,333 1,534 3,004 830 1,132 6,780 6,581 1,835 6,231

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

2,601 580 1,623

Yes Yes % total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes

22

Yes Yes Yes Yes 20,385 Yes

Yes

Yes

20

Yes 28,430 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

392 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

(Mango Doresa) (Michalinos) (Vagliano Bros) Total 180 142,091 100 87,165 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1900 Note: * Smyrna Appendix 4.12 Greek owners of steamships in 1905 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

A. Greece Ambatiellos E. Anareyros S. Angelis E. Athanassulis N.M. Baltagi S. Baltagi S. & Marlas Benecos J.D. Calvocoressis J.G. Calvocoressis & Trofimoff Co Canakis P.C. Caracalo & Fustanos Castriotti C.N. Chalikiopulo D. Constanti D.E.Hadji Cosmas A.A. & Co Cosmas Bros Cornilakis M. Cosadinos Cosmetto P. Coutzis J.G. Curenti A. Dambassis A.J. Destuni & Yannoulatos (Navigation Ionienne a Vapeur) Diakakis J. & Calvocoressis J. Diakiki A.

137 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

147,360 3,084 1,630 2,415 121 1,450 1,126 94 1,074 1,204

50

2 1 1 1 2 1 1 8

1,070 102 741 54 104 1,117 2,152 ,736 1,735 403 1,716 1,044 1,588 3,793

1

1,460

3

1,569

61,698 Yes

Yes

Yes

APPENDICES 393

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Embiricos G.M. Embiricos A. Embiricos B.L. Embiricos Basilios Foustanos P. Gangos Alex. Goudis D.P. Goulandris Bros Katsoulis N. Ladopulo E. Leonardus Papa Leousi G.E. Lykiardopulos N.D. Mandakas G.B. Manianis B. Margaronis P. Mavroleon G.B. McDowall & Barbour Moraitis D.G. Negroponte Z.P. New Hellenic Steam Nav. Nicolaides C.

4 3 2

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Nicolaou G. Niotis, Mavrogordato & Mitarakis Navigation a Vapeur Panhellenique (Psacharopulos) Northwest Railway Co of Greece Nostragis A. Papadiamantopulos Pappaleonardos S. Picoulis J.P. Polemis C. Psaroudas Rassojannis

1 1

859 1,119

10

8,438

1

136

1 1 1 1 1 1

993 1,071 143 1,405 1,573 912

2

2 1 8 7 1 9 1

7,783 5,013 3,941 1,476 1,631 3,109 1,138 1,312 990 1,489 193 114 1,614 1,407 636 2,379 782 2,573 13,881 1,520 3,474 1,493

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes

Yes

Yes

394 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Roussos N.G. Roussos N.P. Stathatos Othon Theofilatos A.N. Tsiropinas Constantine A,. Typaldo-Bassia A. Typaldo-Bassia A. & N.Couppa Vafiadakis S. Vagliano A.S. Vagliano C.S. & A.S. Vatis A.L. & J.L. Vergottis Verveniotis N.M. Vlassopulo E. Vlassopulos S. & Papapetro B. Rumania Aravandino & Karavia Cosmetto P. Drakoulis G.C. Embiricos Bros Kyriakides N.G. Stathatos Bros Stathatos & Theofilatos C. Southem Russia Comninakis P.S. Curcumellis D.N. Destuni G.G. Diamantidis D. & Son Diamantidis K. Diamantidis K. Dimitrieff P. Feofani EA. Feofani F. & I.Frangopulo Ferendinos A.G. Koussis & Theofilatos* Mavrogordato A.V.

2 2 3 2 1 1 1

3,007 2,942 5,764 2,699 1,598 1,109 1,032

1 4 2 3 1 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 2 1 6 1 54 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1

384 6,807 4,478 5,000 991 1,557 1,479 1,334 17,477 7 26 71 1,846 5,098 1,552 8,782 102 29,290 11 2,731 750 334 1,578 280 217 1,916 554 288 295 553 314

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 17,380

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 29,041 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

APPENDICES 395

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Mavrogordato C.C. Mussouri N. Negreponte D.A. Negrepontis & Societe de Nav. Samienne Sifneo Bros Sifneo Th. Skarnavi & Sevastopulo Svorono Constantine & Sons Svorono Fotius C. Theofani C. Theofani F. Theofani R & I.Frangopulo Theofani Th. A. Theofani T. & G.Diacroussis Theofilatos C* Vagliano & Co Vagliano M. & Frangopulo I. Vagliano M.S. D. Constantinople & Smyrna Abadjis P.A. Calogero D. Christidi Ph. & M.Kyriakou Compagnie Hellenique de Navigation a Vapeur ‘La Phocéene’ ** Courtgi P.M. (Navigation a Vapeur ‘Egée’) Dandria Bros Daout Farkouh Hadji** (Paquebots Poste ‘L’Archipel’) Foscolo & Mango Gafos A. Lambros P.G. Negrepontis & Caroussis Pantaleon P** Pappadachis G.Filicos Patrikios

3 1 6 1

608 192 1,026 133

Yes Yes Yes Yes

2 3 1 3 3 3 1 1

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

2 49 1 1 1 3

3,033 2,788 190 1,395 1,361 890 286 249 177 1,721 354 550 393 4,134 39,331 3,10 1,493 192 3,453

5

4,136

Yes

1 9

1,202 3,791

Yes

1 1 1 1 8 1 2

1,501 1,237 188 903 2,165 1,573 1,476

Yes

15

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 24,929

Yes

Yes

396 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Rethimnis B.N. Saliaris A.K. Siderides S.A. & X.A. Zarifis L. (Fitilis Z.Co) (Fitilis, agent) E. Western Europe Marseilles Couppa N.

1 2 2 8

1,005 2,529 2,597 9,580

14 3

25,781 4,774

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes Yes 10

24,951 Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Cicellis P.G. 1 1,534 Yes Michalinudis J.A. 1 830 London 10 18,643 7 Mango & Doresa 1 2,132 Yes Michalinos 4 7,398 Yes Scaramanga Bros 3 5,926 Yes Sechiari P.A. (Shipping 2 3,187 Yes Agencies) (C.L.Embiricos) (S.G.Embiricos) (Galbraith & Pembroke) F. Other 2 739 Alexandria Sigalas St. 1 184 Zalichi J. 1 555 TOTAL 269 259,239 100 182,950 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1905 Note: * St. Petersberg. ** Smyrna Appendix 4.13 Greek owners of steamships in 1910 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Behnved to or financed by the Ionians

A. Greece Ambatiellos E. Anargyros S. Anagnostis Sp. Andreadis D.E Andreadis G.D. Angelis E.

214 1 1 1 1 1 1

61

228,950 1,119 1,630 449 1,055 358 1,736

89,625 Yes

APPENDICES 397

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Assimacos M.D. Athanassulis N.M. Callimasiotis DJ. Calvocoressis G. & Trofimoff Capparis A.A. (Compagnie Hellenique de Navires a Vapeur de Syra) Chalikiopulo D. (Navigation a Vapeur Hellenique Jean Cominos) Charopulos J. Constanti D.E.Hadji Cornilakis M. Coroneos K.A. Cosmas A. Cosmas C. & D.J.

1 1 1 1

1,889 121 1,748 1,204

3

3,202

2

617

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Cosmas M. Cosmas J. Cottaropulos G.L. Coulouras G. Coulouthros A.M. Coutsodontis S.A. & Papanastassopulos Cozzika P. Coutzis Bros Crinos A. Cyclades Steam Nav. Dambassis G.J. Dambassis Jean G. Daniolis L. Destouni & Yannoulatos (Navigation Ioniénne a Vapeur) Diakakis A. (La Navigation Hellenique A.Diakakis) Diakakis J.

1,534 104 1,790 1,259 1,202 1,437

1,117 1,273 316 1,872 350 1,762 2 4 1 6 1 1 1 14

3,174 5,254 2,081 2,534 1,758 1,588 160 4,605

5

2,854

2

3,027

% total Behnved to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes % total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

398 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Domestinis & Oeconomou Domestinis G.D. Economou L. Embiricos B. Embiricos G.M. Embiricos E.C. & N.M. (administrator John Goumas) Embiricos Bros Fafalios Fameliaris B. Ferendinos A. Filinis N.M. Focas A. Foustanos E.A. Foustanos P. Frangiscatos G.N. Frangopulo G. Gicas & Vafiopulos Goudis D.P. Goulandris Bros Grohman G. Hadjipateras K. Hadjoulis A. Hellenic Transatlantic Steam Navigation Katsoulis N. Katrakis G. Katramandos I. Ladopulo E. Lembisis N.

2 1 1 1 6 1

2,354 1,613 414 1,476 12,105 1,869

Yes

2

Yes

4 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 2

4,351 314 2,030 921 1,845 740 1,283 1,631 768 135 109 1,453 1,312 130 1,047 1,509 7,699

1 1 1 2 1

991 250 484 2,615 143

Yes

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Lemos P. Leousi G.E. Limbirikis T. Lykiardopulos N.D. Mandakas

1 1 1 3 2

886 114 110 5,153 2,880

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes

Yes

APPENDICES 399

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Margaronis P. Mavrogordato A.E. Mavroleon G.B. Mavromatis G.G. McDowall & Barbour (Hellenic Steam Navigation) Metaxas B.N. Michalaros G. Michalitsianos E.M. Mitropulos Bros Murphy W., Crowe & Stevens (Achaia Steam Navigation) Navigation a Vapeur Panhellenique (Psacharopulos) Negroponte D.A. & C.Saliaris Nicolau George Nicolaides Bros & V.Cokkinis Niotis & Mavrogordato Nomicos N. Northwest Railway of Greece Palios P. Panoutsos N.G. Papadopulos I.C. Papageorgacopulos Papapetrou Papaleonardos S. Perris S. Petritzis E. Petrochilos & Goudis Pittas G. Ponticos P. Portolos G.D. Psacharopulos Rethymnis & Pneumaticos Rigopulos S. Roussos N.P. Sactouris P.T.

1 1 1 1 7

1,600 471 781 288 2,550

1 1 1 1 2

1,904 1,010 1,545 256 578

10

11,181

1 1 1

1,619 859 724

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 2 1

1,493 297 136 1,024 1,405 110 1,386 1,334 280 774 1,381 1,526 387 497 133 11,181 1,904 920 2,942 959

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

400 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Sideropulo N. & Zissimos Speranza G. Stamatiades & Riginos Stathatos Const.

1 1 1 2

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

1,389 502 1,444 3,503

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Stathatos D.A. Stathatos Othon Synodino Bros Tetenes Othon Theophilatos Ant. Togia C. Trofimoff Jean Tsiropinas C.A. Tsouros Typaldo-Bassia & N.Couppa Vagliano A.S. Valmas N. Vatis A.L. & J.L. Vergottis C. Vernicos N. Verveniotis N.M. Vulgaris T. Xenios J.E. Xenios X. Zerovos C. B. Rumania/Bulgaria Bebis C.D. (Roustchouck) Dracoulis G.C. Harocopos C.G. Lykiardopulos B.E. C. Southern Russia Barbati M.G. Couppa H. Destuni G. Diamantidis D. & Son Logotheti P.S.

3 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1

5,433 5,744 1,109 2,338 2,701 102 1,563 1,598 463 1,032

5 1 4 11 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 3 1 1 52 1 3 1 1 3

11,754 1,416 6,218 2,301 804 1,557 1,939 727 518 447 12,263 2,216 6,728 1,848 1,471 25,350 857 750 334 375 335

Yes

Yes % total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

3

7

12,263 Yes Yes Yes Yes 24,680 Yes Yes Yes Yes

APPENDICES 401

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Mavrogordato C.C. Negroponte D.A. Panagiotato G. Svorono EC. Sifneo Bros Skanavi A.D. Svorono C. & Sons Svorono EC. Synodinos P.G. Theofani A.A. Theofani Ch.A. Theofani Heirs of Th. Zizo G. D. Constantinople & Smyrna Abadjis Per.A. Ambatiellos P. Andreou G. Arvanitidi Bros Byron

3 3 1 3 2 1 8 1 1 3 8 8 1 62

708 732 192 6,947 1,738 291 2,989 112 842 988 4,475 2,390 295 38,091

2 1 1 2 1

913 1,220 953 1,475 192

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Cardiacopulos N. Cosmetto Nicolas P. Courtgi P.M. Dandria S. Delagrammatica Dem. Foscolo & Mango Gira & Vernudaki Lagoudaki A. Lambros P. Levantis E. Negroponte DA. & Caroussi Nicolaou M. Pandeli Bros Pandeli D. Pandeli V.

1 2 5

1 1 1 3 1 1

1,151 1,100 3,265 2,244 1,089 657 453 418 188 247 903 422 877 474 945

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10

23,362

Yes Yes Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

402 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Pandermaly St. 1 424 Pantaleon P* 9 2,412 Petzalis & Dounias 2 765 Poriaz A. 1 528 Potamianos J. 1 314 Siderides S.A. & X.A. 5 7,066 Yes Siniossoglu S. 1 1,254 Svorono F.C. 1 112 Yes Svorono Const. 7 2,933 Yes Vafopulo Bros 1 249 Vernicos N. 1 124 Yamaly 1 190 Zarifi L. 2 2,534 Yes E. Western Europe London** 40 71,116 19 70,286 Ambatiellos E. 4 7,307 Yes Embiricos A.A. 8 12,990 Yes Embiricos Bros 2 4,351 Yes Embiricos C.L. 4 6,880 Yes Mango & Co 1 2,031 Yes Metaxas B.N. 1 1,904 Yes Michalinos 8 1,4955 Yes Scaramanga 4 7,642 Yes Sechiari 2 4,105 Yes Marseilles Cicellis PG. 2 3,101 Yes Couppa N. 3 5,020 Yes Michalinudis J.A. 1 830 Yes Total 374 375,770 100 220,216 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1910 Note: * Smyrna. ** Shipping agencies not included Appendix 4.14 Greek owners of steamships in 1914 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

A. Greece Ambatiellos E. Anagnosti S.

265

63

1

521,087 1,740 768

APPENDICES 403

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Antonopulos Andreadis G.F. Angelatos G. Angelis Elie Antonacopulos & Maroulis Athanassulis N.M. Bank of Athens Benardos P. Benecos J.D. Bistis M.A. Caloutas A. Calvocoressis Calvocoressis & Trofimof Caristinakis Caroussis Bros Chalikiopulo Charopulos J. Cokinos Ch. Condylis L.N. Constanti Hadji Cornilakis CM. Coroneos C.A. Coroniadis Bros Corvissiano P.D. Cosmas J. Cottaropulos G.L. Coulouras Ghicas Coulouthros A.M. Coutsodontis S.A.G. Coutzis Bros Couviellos G. Culucundis E.M. Cyclades Steam Nav. Daniolos Bros Diacakis D. Diacakis J Diapoulis & Voulgaris Domestini & Oeconomou

1 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 6 1 2 2 1 2

125 1,973 1,166 2,707 3,240 310 140 1,336 124 2,622 1,275 2,993 1,850 2,347 2,570 1,085 2,415 2,117 2,899 204 2,831 1,901 2,269 1,994 1,951 548 4,940 2,461 2,795 8,235 988 2,942 4,111 2,508 4,786 5,405 2,898 5,019

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

404 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Embiricos A. Embiricos Basilios Embiricos Bros (National Steam Navigation of Greece) Embiricos E.C Embiricos G.M. Fafalios J. & S. Fameliaris Basilios Filinis N.M.

4 l 5

10,892 2,323 18,116

Yes Yes Yes

2 9 1 1 1

4,431 30,017 627 3,189 2,862

Yes Yes

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Focas A. Foustanos P. Foustanos E.A. Frangiscatos G.N. Frangopulo G. Galeos G. Georgandis A.N.A. Georgopulos D. Giagakis S. Goudis D.P. Goudis G. Goulandis Bros Goulandris John P. Goulandris Petros D. Goumas John Gregos G. Grohman G. Hadjipateras C. & Pateras D.** Hardavelas E. Hellenic Transatlantic Isaias E.A. Inglessis D. Sons*** ossifoglu S. Kallimassioti D.J. Katrakis George

1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

3,301 2,540 2,785 952 1,893 129 1,132 671 387 2,390 1,832 2,123 3,153 3,744 2,899 2,462 227 3,909

1 2 1 1 1 1 1

2,138 12,787 569 2,088 3,560 2,690 460

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

APPENDICES 405

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Katsoulis N. & D. Krinos A. Kyriakopulos Ladopulos E. Lelekopulos & Christides Lambisis N. Lemos P. Lemos Michael Leoussi J. Levantis E. Lioris A. & D.Cairis Los D.** Lukissos & Voyazides Lykiardopulo N.D. Lymberakis Th. G. MacDowall J. Navigation Hellenique Mandacas G. Marengo J. Marearonis P. Markettos G. Mavrogordatos A. Mavroleon G.B. Melis Mesolongitis P. Michalinos Maritime Michalitsianos E.M.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 6 1 7

1,460 2,922 822 2,336 778 223 2,510 2,485 220 2,404 1,653 883 3347 14,440 187 5,632

2 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1

5,386 1,496 2,491 398 3,771 1,435 501 3,581 19,352 2,430

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Michalos N.** Navigation Hellenique Navigation d’Egée Negreponte J.D. & A.D.Saliaris Nicolaides Bros Nicolau G. Nicoludis C.

1 7 1 2

3,406 5,632 292 5,526

1 1 1

964 3,125 2,212

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians Yes

406 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Niotis & Mavrogordatos Northwest Railway Co Palios & Cambourides Pandermaly & Yannaghas Pageorgacopulo Panoutsos N.G. Papandopulos I. Papaleonardos S. Pappas J. & Spanoudakis C. Pateras C. Payavlas G. Petritzis E. son Polemis C.A. & Boyazides Polemis V.A. Portolos G. Navigation a Vapeur Panhellenique (Psacharopulos C.) Psiachi Ralias D. & N. Rethymnis & Pneumaticc Rigopulos S. Roussos John Roussos N.P. Sachtouris P.T. Saliaris Seretis D. Sideropulos N.P. Societe de Orychia Stakos & Nanopulos Stathatos Constantin Stathatos Denys A. Stathatos Othon Synodinos Bros Tetenes Othon Theodorides A. Trandavelonis N.

1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2

2,306 234 6,184 3,370 5,236 2,318 193 584 2,367 2,899 2,372 5,878

1 1 1 10

2,996 3,278 257 17,763

2 1 1 1 2 2

5,626 2,255 2,931 1,432 4,787 5,681 1,471 2,700 1,474 2,201 132 2,744 5,477 9,511 9,167 1,781 3,651 2,039 383

2 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 1

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

APPENDICES 407

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Trofimoff J. Tsiropinas C.A. Tsouros Vagliano A.S. Valmas N. Vardavas J.

1 2 1 5 1 1

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

2,437 5,505 761 18,126 2,231 138

Yes Yes

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Vatis A.L. Vatis J.L. Vergottis G. Verveniotis N.M. Vulgaris T. Xenios J.E.** Xenios X. Yannoropulos Yannoulatos Bros (Navigation Ionienne a Vapeur) B. Rumania/Bulgaria Aravadino & Karavia Bebis C.D. & Sons (Bulgaria) Dracoulis Bros (Vlassopulo and Gratsos) Embiricos M. Kyriakides N.G. Nicolaides bros Stathatos & Theofilatos Vaziryandjikis C. C. Southern Russia Barbatti M.G. Couppa H. Couppa Nicolaos Couppa O. Couroupos P. Destuni G.G. Diamantidi D.L.

1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 16

2,382 5,018 8,978 2,397 3,046 1,124 998 111 11,991

15 1 1

35,930 128 3,603

6

20,414

Yes

1 2 2 1 1 64 1 1 3 2 1 1 2

101 5,572 5,776 143 190 68,633 1,465 398 7,932 825 488 473 3,151

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

4 Yes

8 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

408 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Ferendinos A. Frangopulo I. Logotheti P.S. Methinity Moussouri A. Panagiotato G. Sifneo Bros Sifneo J. & P. Inglesselis Sifneo W.I. Skanavi A. & Sevastopulo G. Svorono Constantine Svorono Fotius C. Svorono F.C. Theofani A. Theofani Ch.A. Theofani Heirs of Th. Theofani M. & V. Theofani Th.A. Theofani W.S. Varvatis P.

1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 19

1,447 851 455 857 1,581 316 2,856 7,206 731 401 5,034

Yes

1 7 2 8 2 1 3 1 1

105 20,117 863 6,681 1,264 821 1,400 664 251

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Shipowner

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

D. Constantinople & Smyrna Abadji & Co Aivadoglou Bros Ambatiellos P. Anghelatos & Tsitsilianos Antippa Bros Arvanitidi J. Arvanitidi L. & Son Atychides S. Calafatas Caruso Clonisi Cosmettos & Filicos Demetriades

77

13

7 2 1 1 1 1 1

103,045 274 3,603 2,429 2,464 3,188 11,905 500 1,621 935 2,265 703 2,426 3,100

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

APPENDICES 409

Shipowner

Ships NRT

Elides & Mouca* Focas Glossoiis D.C. Karasoul & Anastasiades Lambros P. Los Pandelis Loyadis G. Mavris Michalos L. Nicolaou M. Nicoloudis C. Nikiforos J. Pandeli Bros Pandermaly St. Pantaleon R* (Navigation Orientale) Papandopulos I. Pappaleondardos Stam. Pappas J. & Spanoudakis Pateras Const. Petritsis E. sons Petzalis & Dounias Policantriti G. Potamianos J. Rieo M. Siderides S.A. Stathi Cornello Triandafilides & Kalias Vernico Nicol. Vernicos N.J. Yannoulatos A. Zarifi L. E. Western Europe Marseilles Cicellis P.G. Michalinudis J. Couppa N. Theonlatos C.

1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 8 1 10

1,821 2,677 597 1,083 301 772 635 785 3,406 2,054 2,212 300 9,867 698 5,020

1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 33

193 584 2,367 2,899 5,878 4,533 135 604 1,724 9,597 107 1,489 1,513 803 816 2,159 94,211

1 1 3 2

2,387 1,464 7,932 4,173

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes 12 Yes Yes Yes Yes

410 APPENDICES

Shipowner London Ambatiello Bros Embiricos A.A.(AngloHellenuc & Anglo-Ionian) Embiricos P & L.N. Scaramanga Bros Sechiari G.P. Theofilatos D.J. (Shipping Agencies)

Ships NRT

% total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

3 8

9,546 23,992

Yes Yes

1 8 3 1

2,751 24,241 10,931 622

Yes Yes Yes Yes

(Doresa C.) (Lykiardoptdo & Co) (Frangopulo A.) (Embiricos S.G.) (Embiricos C.L) (Michalinos) (Vergottis) Trieste Costomeni S. & Valmadis 1 2,983 Rotterdam Theophilatos D. 1 3,189 Total 454 822,906 Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1914 Notes: * Smyrna. ** Chios. *** Samos

100

Yes 463,643

Appendix 4.15 Shipfinance from the Bank of Athens, 1900–14 Date

Borrower/Shipowner

Name of Ship

Tons

A.Currenti

Aglaia Currenti Galaxidion

1,044 1,126

N.Katsoulis A.Nostragis J.P.Piccoulis

Eftimios Vrisiis Beby

990 993 1,405

G.Andreou Assimacos M.D. Callimassiotis DJ. Cosmas Andreas

Marica Assimacos Pytheas Melpomeni

953 1,889 1,748 1,202

Built

1900

1905

1910 1889 1890 1895 1885

APPENDICES 411

Date

Borrower/Shipowner

Name of Ship

Tons

Built

Cosmas C. & DJ. Cosmas M. Cosmas J.

Demosthenes Aris Zafirios Matsas Miaoulis Agia Paraskevi Orion StefanoDandria Mitylene Elpis

1,437 1,117

1889 1889

1,273 1,872 1,762 2,081 2,244 1,613 1,071

1889 1893 1890 1896 1892 1891 1879

Coulouras G. Coutsopontis S.A. Crinos A. Dandria S. Domestinis G.D. Domestini & Oekonomou Date

Borrower/Shipowner

Name of Ship

Tons

Built

K.Hadjipateras Michalaros Palios P.

Leandros J.Pesmatzoglou Principessa Aliki Frosso Leonardos Zeus Agios Nicolaos Rokos Stefania

1,047 1,010

1888 1882

1,024 920 959 1,389 1,416 2,301 1,939

1883 1882 1889 1889 1887 1890 1896

1900

Rigopulos S. Sachtouris P.T. Sideropulo N. & Zissimo D. Valmas N. Vergottis C. Vulgaris T. 1914

Arvanitidi Sons Chalkydon 2,870 1894 N.A. Dallas & A.Gaetano Osmanie 667 1884 Karasoul & Athanasiades Carassoul 1,083 1881 A.Lioris & D.Cairis Messolonghi 1,653 1874 L.Nikolaides Euxeinos 2,891 1901 Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1900, 1905, 1910 and 1914 Appendix 4.16 Greek shipping offices in London in 1900 Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships NRT

Headquarters

A. Ionian Islands 1. Vagliano Bros 2. Mango Doresa Foscolo & Mango B. Andros

9 4 1 4 4

London London Constantinople

13,764 6,231 1,462 6,071 6,780

412 APPENDICES

Shipowners/Representing offices 3. S.G.Embiricos Embiricos A. Embiricos G.M. C. Chios 4. Scaramanga Bros 5. Michalinos D. Other 6. Galbraith & Pembroke Embiricos B. E. Total NRT represented by London Offices F. Total NRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1900 % (E)/(F) Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1900

Ships NRT

Headquarters

3 1 5 1 4 2

5,185 1,595 8,416 1,835 6,581 2,839

Andros Andros

2

2,839 31,799 142,091 22%

Andros

London London

Appendix 4.17 Greek shipping offices in London in 1905 Shipping office/Representing

Ships NRT

A. lonian islands 1. Mango & Doresa Anargyros S. 2. Vagliano Bros B. Andros 3. C.L.Embiricos Embiricos A. 4. S.G.Embiricos Embirikos G.M. Goulandris Bros C. Chios 6. Michalinos & Co 7. Scaramanga Bros 8. Sechiari P.A. D. Other 9. Galbraith & Pembroke Embiricos Bas. E. Total NRT represented by London Offices F. Total NRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1905 % (E)/(F) Source: Lloyd’s Register of shipping, 1905

3 1 1 1 8

4,982 2,132 1,630 1,220 14,108

3

5,013

Andros

4 1 9 4 3 2 1 1 21

7,783 1,312 16,511 7,398 5,926 3,187 1,476 1,476 37,077 259,239

Andros Andros

14%

Headquarters London Spetses

London London London Andros

APPENDICES 413

Appendix 4.18 Greek shipping offices in London in 1910 Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships

Net tons

Headquarters

A. Ionian islands 1. C.Doresa Lemos Pand. G. Svorono F.C. B. Andros 2. Embiricos A.A. Embiricos Bros 3. Embiricos S.G. Embiricos G.M. Goulandris Bros 4. C.L.Embiricos C. Chios 5. Michalinos & Co Michalinos & Co L.Zarifi B.N.Metaxas D.Negroponte & Saliaris Pittas G. Verveniotis 6. Scaramanga Bros 7. Sechiari

4

7,833

1 3 19 8 2

886 6,947 33,927 12,990 4,351

5 1 3 20

10,260 1,313 5,013 35,534

Athens/Andros Andros

8 2 1 1 1 1 4 2

14,955 3,365 1,904 1,619 387 1,557 7,642 4,105

London Constantinople Cephalonia Piraeus Chios Piraeus London London

Chios Mariupol London Syros

Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships Net tons

Headquarters

D. Other 8. Mango Co Anargyros Roussos N.G. 9. Wigham & Richardson Ambatiellos E. Ambatiellos P. 10. Galbraith Pembroke Embirikos B. E. Total NRT represented by London Offices F. Total NRT of Greek Fleet in 1910 % (E)/(F) Source: Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, 1910

11 1 1 2

17,861 2,031 1,630 2,834

London Spetses London

4 1

7,307 1,220

London Constantinople

2 54

2,839 95,155 375,770 25%

Syra

414 APPENDICES

Appendix 4.19 Greek shipping offices in London in 1914 Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships

Gross tons

Headquarters

A. Ionian islands 1. Ambatiello Bros Ambatiello P. 2. Lykiardopulo & Co Lykiardopulo N.D. 3. A.Frangopulo & Co Negroponte J.D. & Saliaris Bros A.S.Vagliano 4. C.Doresa Svorono F.C. 5. Theofilatos D.J. 6. Vergottis Vergottis G. B. Andros 7. C.L.Embiricos A.A.Embiricos 8. Embiricos A.A. Embiricos Bros (National Steam Nav.) 9. Embiricos S.G Embiricos G.M. Goulandris Bros 10. Embiricos P. & L.N. C. Chios 11. Michalinos & Co Lemos Michael Michalinos Maritime & Commercial G.Payavlas

29 3 1

79,424 9,546 2,429

Constantinople

7

14,440

Piraeus

2 5

5,526 18,126

London Athens

7 1

19,757 622

Cephalonia London

3 23

8,978 90,906

London

4 8 5

10,892 27,007 18,116

Andros London Piraeus

9 1 1 21

30,017 2,123 2,751 57,501

Athens Andros

1 6 1

2,485 14,087 2,372

London Piraeus London

Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships Gross tons Headquarters

N.M.Verveniotis G.Couviellos 12. Scaramanga Bros 13. Sechiari D. Other

1 1 8 3 1

2,397 988 24,241 10,931 2,323

Hydra

14. Galbraith Pembroke Embirikos B. E. Total GRT represented by London Offices F. Total GRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1914

1

2,323 230,154 822,906

Andros

Chios Chios

APPENDICES 415

Shipowners/Representing offices

Ships Gross tons Headquarters

% (E)/(F) Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1914

28%

Appendix 5.1 Average wages on Greek ships (In French francs/month)* Wages on Andriana

Speciality

1905

1907

Average wages on 100 steamships 1908

1909

1910

Master 400 400 375 375 330 Second mate 130 170 160 160 160 Third mate 80 125 110 110 115 First 400 400 375 378 320 engineer Second 225 250 225 225 195 engineer Third 140 165 150 150 130 engineer Bosun 80 100 90 90 90 Donkeyman 90 110 90 90 95 Carpenter 75 – 85 85 – Fireman (4) 80 110 80 80 80 Seaman (4) 60 70 65 65 65 Trimmer 60 60 60 60 50 Cook 80 95 90 90 80 Steward 80 – 75 75 – Engine boy 35 45 35 35 35 Deck boy 30 40 30 30 30 Source: Crew lists of 100 Greek steamships in 1910, Aegan Maritime Museum; book of crew wages of Andriana, 23/6/1908–16/4/1909; Correspondence of A.Syrnas to A.Embirikos 19/7/1906–4/3/1909 Note: Exchange rate of 1 pound sterling and French Franc: 1875, £1 =25.41FF; 1905, £1 =25.31FF; 1907, £1=25.43FF; 1908, £1 =125.32FF; 1909, £1=25.36FF Appendix 6.1 Geographic position of ships lost in the First World War Area where lost

Number of Ships

GRT

% total

Mediterranean Atlantic North Sea Pacific

49 30 19 1

114,337 93,843 42,955 3,092

31 26 12 1

416 APPENDICES

Area where lost

Number of Ships

GRT

% total

Indian 1 4,140 1 Accidents (not 10 12,258 3 related to war) Unknown 35 95,783 25 Total 147 366,408 Average date of 1,894 build Average size of lost 2,493 ships Source: Processed data from catalogue of lost ships in Christos E.Dounis, Greek Shipping during the First World War. Chronicle oflost Ships, Athens 1991 Appendix 6.2 Yearly losses of Greek ships during the First World War Year

Number of ships

1915 18 1916 40 1917 69 1918 16 1919 4 Total 147 Source: See Appendix 6.1

GRT

% total losses

38,115 90,226 186,167 42,341 9,559 366,408

10 25 51 11 3 100

Appendix 6.3 Tramp freight indices 1910–39 Year

Index 1869=100

Index 1913=100

1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924

50 58 78 68 67 199 365 695 751 490 374 166 130 123 121

427 162 127 121 126

APPENDICES 417

Year

Index 1869=100

Index 1913=100

1925 1926

110 133

108 124

Year

Index 1869 = 100

Index 1913 = 100

1927 122 120 1928 112 110 1929 115 98 1930 93 82 1931 90 85 1932 88 80 1933 85 77 1934 85 81 1935 88 81 1936 103 96 1937 146 Sources: For index (1869 = 100), see L.Isserlis, ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 101, 1938, pp. 53–146, table VIII; for index (1913=100), see Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 606 Appendix 6.4 Purchasing value of a newbuilding cargo ship of 7,500 dwt, 1900-39 Year (June)

Value in sterling pounds

1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917

54,000 49,250 43,000 50,500 38,750 36,500 43,000 41,000 36,000 36,250 36,500 43,000 50,500 54,000 42,500 82,500 180,000 178,500

418 APPENDICES

Year (June)

Value in sterling pounds

1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935

180,500 195,800 180,000 63,750 62,000 62,500 60,000 55,500 52,500 63,000 57,000 55,000 31,000 12,000 4,500 6,500 10,500 15,000

Year (June)

Value in sterling pounds

1936 32,000 1937 62,000 1938 34,000 1939 55,000 Sources: For the years 1900 to 1928 see Nafiika Chronika, 1 January 1932; for the years 1929 to 1939 see Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Mercant Marine, 1910– 1939, The Co-existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 1991, table 17, p. 90 Appendix 6.5 Geographic activity of Greek steamships in 1926 and 1936 Area

Ships

NRT

% total

1926 A. Northern Europe Cardiff London Antwerp Hamburg B. Mediterranean Sea Constantinople

314 145 36 64 69 1,338 101

745,964 337,490 92,617 161,769 154,088 1,524,948 115,537

17

34

APPENDICES 419

Area

Ships

NRT

% total

Malta Tunis Sfax Algiers Marseilles Genoa Naples Catania Brindisi Trieste Beirut Rhodes Alexandria Myrsini Smyrna C. Black Sea D. South America Total 1936 A. Northern Europe English ports Hamburg Antwerp Rotterdam Stettin Gdansk Oslo B. Mediterranean Sea Venice Naples

24 48 14 173 88 82 63 16 176 24 58 140 275 13 43 496 63 2,211

40,548 23,056 18,916 356,458 154,667 144,504 92,684 17,312 95,926 36,246 61,244 57,864 277,588 9,414 22,984 2,007,088 161,612 4,439,612

45 4 100

849 197 51 169 281 50 90 11 890 41 21

2,262,086 495,583 105,524 493,464 643,193 292,028 212,938 19,356 1,671,741 103,039 39,386

Area

Ships

NRT

Genoa Tripolis Oran Alexandria Syria/Lebanon Marseilles

45 12 134 331 124 44

117,635 12,775 301,807 700,794 135,233 91,529

30

22

% total

420 APPENDICES

Area

Ships

NRT

% total

Casablanca 16 26,538 Tunis 17 34,096 Smyrna 105 108,909 C. Black Sea 1,630 1,495,607 20 D. South America 394 1,075,063 14 E. Indian Ocean 95 214,410 3 F. Pacific Ocean 252 786,759 11 Valparaiso 6 15,823 Japan 246 770,936 Total 4,110 7,505,666 100 Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1926, pp. 38–44; EEN, 1936, pp. 334– 43 Appendix 6.6 Arrivals of ships at the port of La Plata, 1920-38 British

Greek

Total

Year

ships

NRT

% total

ships

NRT

% total

ships

NRT

1920

164

61

2

5,571

1

273

1921

91

1922

925

540, 969 249, 394 3,117, 116

887, 900 561, 053 6,895, 055

1923 1924

1,343

4,689, 945

47

2,949

10,011, 331

1925 1926

1,242

45

2,784

1927

1,563

47

3,376

1927

1,410

4,419, 301 5,620, 181 5,110, 235

44

292

746, 449

6

3,323

9,723, 449 11,862, 737 11,716, 053

1928 1929

1,375

43

333

3,325

1,064

43

94

3

2,557

1931

1,402

44

282

7

3,216

1932

1,164

43

239

885, 677 259, 578 769, 900 650, 630

8

1930

5,085, 712 4,289, 082 5,116, 496 4,395, 198

6

2,744

44 45

232 84

210, 692

3

2,075

11,701, 924 9,886, 812 11,547, 715 10,128, 146

APPENDICES 421

British Year

ships

1933

844

Greek NRT

% total

ships

Total NRT

% total

ships

NRT

3,441, 37 300 822, 9 2,511 9,253, 059 470 939 1934 933 3,706, 37 414 1,158, 11 2,751 10,075, 340 472 594 1935 1,069 4,154, 40 394 1,132, 11 2,852 10,389, 924 140 175 1936 934 3 ,788, 38 394 1,075, 11 2,766 10,047, 264 063 353 1937 1,064 4,214, 37 519 1,425, 12 3,245 11,408, 163 602 981 1938 661 3,041, 34 169 468, 5 2,349 9,021, 158 521 010 Sources: Data compiled from the Reports on the Financial, Commercial and Industrial Situation of Argentina and Greece, Department of Overseas Trade, London, HMSO, 1920–38 Appendix 6.7 International fleet of dry-cargo tramp-ships (ships over 2,500 GRT) Flag

GRT

% total

British 3,826,000 39 Greek 1,583,000 16 Japanese 1,100,000 11 Norwegian 800,000 8 Italian 660,000 7 German 480,000 5 Swedish 225,000 2 Spain 220,000 2 Netherlands 180,000 2 Denmark 150,000 2 France 134,000 1 Others 474,000 5 Total 9,832,000 100 Sources: Statistical data calculated by the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee, published by EEN, 1938, p. 1019 Appendix 6.8 Geographic position of R&K steamers in September 1938 Area A. Northern Europe Rotterdam Rotterdam

Ships

GRT

% total

119,062 4,729 6,042

49

422 APPENDICES

Area

Ships

Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Rotterdam Avonmouth Workington Emden Liverpool Nordenham Hamburg Hamburg Barry London Antwerp Antwerp Hull Hull Ahus London Gdynia Emden B. Mediterranean Sea Mytilini Piraeus Volo Salonica Area C. Black Sea Odessa Odessa Odessa Odessa Kertch Nicolaieff Poti

GRT

% total

4,386 3,986 4,386 4,853 5,295 5,687 4,261 5,446 3,816 4,739 4,230 3,325 5,324 4,207 3,876 4,292 5,252 5,403 3,201 5,896 5,729 4,826 5,875 18,583 3,489 5,685 5,188 4,221 Ships

8

GRT

% total

32,403 4,151 5,275 4,340 4,732 3,742 5,182 4,981

14

APPENDICES 423

Area

Ships

GRT

% total

D. Atlantic Ocean 39,677 16 Rio 5,548 Rio 3,578 Rio 5,000 Tampa 6,651 Port Campha 5,820 Port Campha 5,166 Mobile 7,914 E. Indian Ocean 10,692 4 Fremantle 5,476 Fremantle 5,216 F. Pacific Ocean 21,568 9 Wakamatsu 4,371 Sydney 5,214 Port Lincoln 6,696 Wallaroo 5,287 Total 241,985 100 Sources: Weekly report of the position of steamers on 26 September 1938, Rethymnis & Kulukundis Ltd, Private Collection of Yannis Diniakos Appendix 6.9 Greek shipping offices in London, 1929–30 Office

Ships

GRT

A. Cephalonia/Ithaca 1. Stathatos & Co 2. Vlassopulo Bros 3. A.Frangopulo 4. Vergottis Ld. 5. Dracoulis B. Andros 6. S.G.Embiricos 7. J.D.Corcodilos C. Kassos 8. Rethymnis & Kulukundis D. Chios 9. C.Michalos & Co 10. S.Livanos & Co E. Others 11. Alec Gripaios 12. Pandelis & Co

11 1 4 3 2 1 8 6 2 11 11 18 9 9 5 1 3

46,309 4,274 14,328 14,316 9,845 3,546 35,331 27,809 7,542 46,154 46,154 59,955 26,730 33,225 20,955 5,081 11,747

Representing 1 company 4 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 3 1 1

424 APPENDICES

Office

Ships

13. Neil & Pandelis 1 Total 53 Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1929/30

GRT

Representing

4,167 208,64

1

Appendix 6.10 Greek shipping offices in London, 1938–9 Office/Represented firms

Ships

GRT

% total

A. Cephalonia/Ithaca 1. Dracoulis Ltd Dracoulis G.C. Dracoulis G.A. Vlassopulos El. 2. Vlassopulo Bros Vlassopulo Bros Vlassopol Spir. 3. Stathatos D. Stathatos D. Callinicos A.D. 4. Adelphi Vergottis Eptanisos Steam. Vergottis Rokos 5. Vergottis Ld. Myrtoon Steam. Aegeon S.S. Co Vergottis Andreas 6. A. Lusi Ld Laimos C.P. & C.P.Ponticos Panas P.E. Lyras P. Galaxias Steam. 7. Lykiardopulo Lykiardopulo N.D. Yannoulatos Pan. B. Andros 8. Goulandris Bros Goulandris E.A. Goulandris E.A. Goulandris N.J. Goulandris Heirs of late Petros

36 7 5 1 1 2 1 1 6 4 2 3 2 1 6 1 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 8 7 1 36 22 16 1 1 1

170,061 30,976 22,101 5,329 3,546 7,693 4,083 3,610 30,375 19,958 10,417 17,656 11,323 6,243 28,887 4,706 15,927 8,254 16,942 3,845 3,299 4,798 5,000 38,162 33,585 4,577 146,588 87,985 69,248 3,470 191 3,551

20

17

APPENDICES 425

Office/Represented firms

Ships

GRT

% total

Kyrtatas A.A. Valmas M.L. Koutsoukos B.&J. 9. Embiricos S.G. Embiricos G.M. Embiricos S.G. Embiricos G.N. Embiricos C.E. Embiricos Leon. N. D. Chios 10. C.Michalos & Co Michalinos Marit. Lagoutis Maria Hadjipateras J.C. Hadjipateras C. & Sons Hadjipateras J.C. & N.C. Pateras Ch.N. & Co Pateras Costas N. & Elias N. Pateras Ch.N. Margaronis

1 1 1 14 2 8 1 3 1 46 16 7 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

4,784 2,080 4,661 58,603 1,615 36,738 3,470 12,660 4,120 197,449 59,363 19,090 2,216 9,649 4,573 4,573 4,202 4,362 5,719 4,979

23

Office/Represented firms

Ships GRT

% total

11. Michalinos & Co Tachmindji M. 12. S.Livanos Livanos N.G. Livanos S.G. Livanos Maritime Livanos S.G. & Livanos Maritime Pateras Vas. J. Ktistakis Georgios Proios Brothers 13. Lemos & Pateras Lemos Ant.G.Sons Lemos G.Ch. Pateras Anastas. Pateras DJ. & Sons C.Kassos

1 1 21 12 3 2 1 1 1 1 8 3 1 2 2 64

36

4,343 4,343 100,500 57,223 14,414 10,877 4,835 4,240 4,291 4,620 33,243 11,775 3,862 7,651 9,955 302,960

426 APPENDICES

Office/Represented firms

Ships GRT

14. Rethymnis dr Kulukundis Kulukundis Shipping Rethymnis & Kulukundis Kassos Steam Navigation Cosmetto J.A. & Kulukundis Inglessi D. fils Margaronis Isidoros Los S. & E.C.Andreadis Pateras Bros Roussos A. & Co Xilas Bros Xilas Bros & A.Constant. Lemos Brothers & Theseus Lemos Dem. Pan. Milt. G. 15. George Nicolaou Nicolaou (Hellas)Ltd Yannaghas 16. Hadjilias Ld. Hadjilias Elias E. Hadjilias E.P, G.P., P.E. Hadjilias Manuel E. Other Fred Hunter Pappas Andreas Cosmas A.I. Stavrou 17. Neil & Pandelis Nikiforos J.M. Proios C.M. Pateras DJ. Angelos John Total GRT operated from London Total GRT of Greek fleet % total GRT operated from London to total GRT of Greek fleet Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1938–9

50 22 2 7 3 5 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 8 1 5 3 1 1 8 3 1 1 5 2

190

% total

229,626 111,977 7,785 31,557 16,437 10,607 14,989 3,816 9,305 4,576 3,742 5,875 4,221 4,739 22,654 45,997 4,683 22,634 13,442 4,352 4,860 36,548 4 14,266 14,266 4,181 5,152 22,282 8,981 4,620 4,330 4,351 853,606 1,889,269 45%

APPENDICES 427

Appendix 6.11 Greek owners of steamships in 1937–8 according to the headquarters of their firms Shipowner

Ships GRT

% total Other office

A. Greece Aegeon S.S. Co., Ld Agrioyiannis A. Alexatos J. Alexatos Sp. & Marettos H. Andreadi Mrs P.G. Andreadis G.F. Andreatos A. Andreou G. Andronicos N. & G. Angelidis George Angelos John Antipas P.S. Antoniou N.D. Athanassulis, Heirs of Gabriel N. Baikas, Pothitos E. Benierakis B.E. Boyazides N.D. & Co Boyazides Thras.L. & Co Bulgaris Charalambos Bulgaris N.Th. Canellopulos A. & Co Callimanopulos P.G. (Hellenic Lines) Callinicos Anast.Denis Callinicos Anast.Theod. Cambanis, The Heirs of the late L.Z. Caravias E.D. Caravias G.G. Carras Brothers Carras John Castanos S. & Sons Chalaris Antonios G. Chandris John D. Christofides John Christofidi Stavrou Christopulos P. Condylis Dimitrios L.

647 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 6 2 1 4 4 1 4 1 1 2 9 1 1 1 1

96

1,727,182 20,286 107 1,406 1,406 4,111 4,227 5,172 4,391 1,518 2,107 4,351 3,651 1,393 3,921 1,334 5,438 6,290 7,846 4,603 4,567 464 13,118 10,417 5,655 18,402 18402 3,843 19,065 4,355 5,217 1,720 37,695 725 1,437 2,038 3,923

Vergottis Ld

Neil & Pandelis

Stathatos & Co

A. Lusi

428 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Condylis George N. Cosmas A.I. Cosmetto J.A. & Kulukundis Bros Cotzias N.D. Coulouras Ath. Coulouthros J.A. & N.N. Embiricos Coumantaros Bros Coumbis D., Xenios D. & Co Criezis D.N. Dambassis D.J. Daniolos John G.

1 1 4 2 3 4 4 1 1 3 1

4,439 4,933 26,835 4,025 13,280 18,362 19,541 3,574 143 13,216 5,143

% total Other office S.G.Embiricos Ld Fred Hunter Ld R&K

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Destounis Panaghis B. Dilaveris & Nicolarakos Dracoulis George A. Dracoulis G.C. Eleftheriades Mme Z. Eleftheriades Michael Embiricos C.E. Embiricos George Milt. Embiricos Geo.Nic. Embiricos Leonidas A. (National Steam Navigation) Embiricos Leonidas N. Embiricos S.G. Epiphaniades, T.N. Epirotiki Steamship Navigation Co ‘George Potamianos’ Eustathiou Nicolas & Co Fafalios Stamatios & Dim. Fatsis Lambros M. Filinis M.N. Fouskas E. & A. Frangos Markos Galakis John Th. Georgandis Antonios G. Georgandis Brothers Georgilis G.A.

1 1 1 5 1 1 3 2 1 3

3,299 269 5,329 18,555 164 170 12,660 1,615 3,470 14,195

Wigham & Richardson

1 7 6 5

4,120 27,651 13,690 3,060

Embiricos S.G. Embiricos S.G.

3 2

16,752 7,252 3,646 3,111 314 3,442 4,211 1,187 11,929 3,748

R&K

3 1

% total Other office

Embiricos S.G.

A. Lusi

Neil & Pandelis

APPENDICES 429

Shipowner

Ships GRT

% total Other office

Georgilis P. & A.Cosmas Georgopulos D. Goulandris Bros Goulandris D.J. Goulandris D. & M. Goulandris E.A. Goulandris J.N. Goulandris N.J. Goulandris Heirs of the late Petros J. Goumas J.G. Gounaris A.Z. & G.Z. Gounaris G.Z. Gratsos George D. Sons Gripaios A. Hadjiconstanti Bros Hadjilias Elias E. (Nereus S.N. Co Ld) Hadjilias E.P., G.P., P.E. Hadjilias Manuel Hadjipateras J.C., N.C., & A.C Hadjipateras John C. & Adamantios C. Hadjidakis George F. Handris Steamship Co Ld Hellenic Coast Lines Co. Ld (Yannoulatos)

1 1 16 1 1 1 1 1 1

4,461 3,681 74,480 3,531 1,190 3,470 3,651 191 3,551

1 1 1 3 1 1 5

3,429 4,407 2,238 11,662 3,892 468 24,395

Hadjilias & Co

1 1 1 2

4,352 4,860 3,661 8,371

Michalos & Co Ld Michalos & Co Ld

2 1 29

589 1,706 31,737

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Hellenic Shipping & Commercial Iliopulos Ilias Inglessi D. fils SA. (Navigation de Samos) Ionion Steamship Co Ld lossifoglu Socrates (Hellenic Tramp S.S. Co Ld) Karagiorgis Michail A. Karavias Emmanuel Kassos Steam Navigation (Rethymnis, Pneumaticos and Yannaghas)

1 1 5

875 2,527 10,593

2 3

12,995 17,512

2 1 8

1,768 294 35,416

Goulandris Bros* Goulandris Bros* Goulandris Bros* Goulandris Bros* Goulandris Bros* Goulandris Bros*

R&K

% total Other office

Vergottis Ld

R&K

430 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships GRT

% total Other office

Katopodis S. Kottakis P.Th. Katsourakis G. Kavounides N. & Ch. Kerambos D. & Co Keranis Leonidas G. Kirtatas Bros Koletsis Panos N. & Georges M. Katzourakis Koniordos Brothers Koryzis Stylianos Koufos Demetrios N. Koutsoukos Basil & John Krinis Georgios S. Ktistakis Georgios K. Kulukundis Brothers (Tramp Shipping Development; Theseus S.S. Co Ld; Proteus S.S. Co Ld; Rethymnis & Kulukundis Hellas) Kulukundis Brothers & C.N. Pateras Kulukundis Brothers & Nikitas Kampouris Kulukundis Brothers & Partners Kydoniefs D.A. Kydoniefs Michael E. Kydoniefs N.A. Kydoniefs Petros A. Kyriakides K. Kyriakides N.G. Kyrtatas A.A. Lagoutis Mme Maria N. & Evang. G.Angelidis Laimos C.P. & J.C.Ponticos Lakoniki Steam Nav. Co Lemos Andr. Geo. & Dem. and Tramp Shipping Dev. Lemos Brothers & Theseus S.S. Co Ld Lemos Constantine Marcou Lemos Constantine Michael

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3,175 1,070 858 223 317 3,508 2,529 667

1 2 2 1 1 1 16

489 955 3,687 4,661 365 4,291 83,072

Goulandris Bros

1 1

5,313 3,693

R&K Kampouris N.

1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1

3,566 3,874 4,215 4,393 4,129 313 9,481 4,784 2,216

R&K

1 2 1

3,845 1,626 4,340

A.Lusi

1 1 1

4,221 1,364 4,144

R&K

S. livanos & Co Ld R&K

C.Michalos

R&K

R&K

APPENDICES 431

Shipowner

Ships GRT

% total Other office

Lemos Costis E. Lemos Dem., Pan., Milt. G. Emm., Pan., and Rethymnis & Kulukundis (Hellas Ld) Lemos George Christos Lemos P.C. & G.C. Lemos S.A. & P.A. Lemos Spiros A. Livanos Bros Livanos J.G. Livanos N.G. (Theofano Maritime Co Ld) Livanos S.G. Los Dimitrios M. Los S. & C.M. & E.C. Andreades Louloudis G.N. Loverdos Theodore S. Lykiardopulo N.D. Lykiardopulo RN. & G.N. Lykouris J. Lyras MJ. & Co Lyras P. Malamos C. Macris Pandelis N. Maniatis N.G. Mantacas Bros Marchessini P.D. Margaronis D.P. Margaronis Isidoros, Anastassios & George (Oceanos Maritime Steamship Co) Maris N. Martis S.S. Co Ld Matsas Loucas & Sons Matsoukis D. Mavris J.G. & P. Diacon Zadeh Mavros B.G. & S.N. Mendrinos Mazaraki A. & C. Mazarakis D.C. & J.C.

1

4,707

1 1 1 2 1 3 1 13

4,739 3,862 4,419 8,046 3,729 13,249 1,926 57,059

R&K

3 1 1 2 1 8 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3

14,455 1,882 3,816 5,191 509 36,286 5,085 868 8,082 4,798 4,299 2,082 149 3,246 3,557 4,979 143,989

S. Livanos*

1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1

4,195 2,483 586 751 2,143 3,726 3,553 5,411

S. Livanos S. Livanos S. Livanos* S. Livanos* S. Livanos*

Goulandris Bros Lykiardopulo* Lykiardopulo

A. Lusi

C. Michalos R&K

R&K

Diacon Zadeh

432 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Michalinos Maritime & Commercial Co Ld Michalitsianos E.M. Moraitis N.A. & E.G. Loucas Moraitis N.G. Nasos E. & Th. Antippas Nausicaa Shipping Co Ld Neil & Pandelis (Greece) Nicolaou Georgios Nikiforos John M. Nomicos Loukas N. Nomicos Petros M. Ld Pagasitikos Steamship Co Palaiocrassas J.D. Panas G.E.

7

22,106

C. Michalos Vergottis Ld

6 1 5 14 2 1 1

4,937 330 3,576 303 6,559 3,714 34,680 4,745 5,381 39,865 720 1,457 2,495

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Pandakis Demetrio Z. Pantaleon D. Sons Papadeas John Papadimitriou Theo. Papageorgiou Const. Papayannakis George J. Papoulias D. & K.Tsesmelis Pappas Andreas Pappas G. & S. Eleftheriades Pappas John & Co Patazis A. & G. Goumas Pateras Bros

1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2

367 4,248 5,709 6,726 389 2,240 792 4,181 1,054 153 118 8,521

Pateras Ch.N. Pateras Ch.N. & N. Pateras Costas N. & Elias N. Pateras DJ. Pateras Demetrius A. Pateras Diamantis J. & Sons Pateras Vas. J.

1 1 1 1 2 2

5,719 4,202 4,362 4,330 7,651 9,955 4,240

% total Other office

Neil & Pandelis George Nicolaou Neil & Pandelis

% total Other office

Fred Hunter

(R&K for 4,729 GRT; Michalinos for 3,792) C.Michalos & Co C.Michalos & Co C.Michalos & Co Neil & Pandelis

S.Livanos & Co

APPENDICES 433

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Peppas Christos Perivolaris S. Perris S. D. & D.A. Tsatsaronis Petas K. Petroutsi C.A. Petsalis K. Pezas A.K. Pheax Shipping Co Ld Piangos M.N. Pinotsis G. Pittas G.N. Bros & Co Politis J. & W. Coums Polychronidou Olga & K. Liakasitis Proios C.M. Protopapas Panos Rallias N.D. Raptakis Anthony L. & Nicolas G.Roussos Rethymnis & Kulukundis (Hellas) Ld & Const. Scarvelis 5 Rigas M. & E. Rossolimos Basile S. Rousso Bros & Louloudi Bros Roussos A. & Co Sachtouris P. Th. Samothrakis Zacharias A. Seretis D. Seretis E. & G. Sifneo Brothers Sigalas Brothers Sigalas G.Th. Sitinas M. & Co

1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3

% total Other office

1,800 4,584

1 2 2 1 1

128 3,435 231 4,218 7,188 4,499 387 6,868 319 123 8,856 7,330 3,860 3,547

2

7,785

1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2

137 4,540 904 4,576 146 3,885 388 129 1,005 6,275 2,425 8,646

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Societe Commerciale et d’ Armament Soc. Anon. Stafilopatis Th.F. Stathatos G.N.

3

11,819

2 2

3,625 9,414

S.Livanos & Co

Petroutsis

Goulandris Bros

Neil & Pandelis

R&K

R&K

S.G.Embiricos % total Other office

434 APPENDICES

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Stavrou J. & Co Steriotis M.J. Stoforos Ef. (Atmoploia Parnassidos) Strifoulis E. & K., A.Siatras & Mme S.Hadjiconstanti Stringo George C. Synodinos Bros Tachmindji John A. Tachmindji Michael A. Tatakis A.M. Teryazos Theodoros L. Theofanides S. Theophilatos E. Theseus Steamship Co Toyias Alcibiades Toyias E.K. Toyias John S.S. Co Tricoglu E.M. Trilivas G. Tsanopulos B.D. Valmas Michael L. Vassiliou John

1 1 2 1

5,152 2,399 534 125

1 4 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

276 7,651 3,313 4,343 4,271 16,359 1,134 2,282 4,371 489 1,092 1,433 5,175 4,514 268 2,080 1,781

1 1 1 1 1 1

523 1,192 423 5,005 3,895 5,123 919

Vergottis Ld Vergottis Ld C.Michalos

3 1 1 3 1 1 1

14,316 591 1,594 948 6,067 3,404 3,546

Dracoulis Ld

Vayannis & Caraictides Veliotis Eleftherios Venetzianos P. & A. Venizelos K.E. Vergottis Andreas Vergottis Georgios Vergottis Gerassimos, Cargo Steamship Co Ld, & G.Vergottis Sons Vergottis Rokos Vernicos E.N. Vernicos M.N. Vernicos N.E. Vestarchis A. Vlachakis Leonidas Vlassopulos Eleftherios

% total Other office Fred Hunter

Michalinos & Co

R&K

Goulandris Bros P.Wigham Richardson

APPENDICES 435

Shipowner

Ships GRT

Vlassopulos Aristotle G. Vlassopulos I.N. & others Vlassopulos Stylianos N. Vrionis E. Vrondisis J.A. Xenios E. & Christoforides Xylas Bros Xylas Bros & A. Constantinidis Xylas Michael M. Yannoulatos George

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

Shipowner

Ships

GRT

Yannoulatos Panaghis Zoiopulos Ath. B.Western Europe Genoa (Agency) (Vintiadis E.) London Stathatos Demetrius D. (Agencies) (Dracoulis Ld) (Vlassopulo Bros) (Vergottis Ld) (Lusi Ld) (Lykiardopulo) (Goulandris Bros) (Embiricos S.G.) (Michalos C.) (Michalinos) (Livanos S.) (Rethymnis & Kulukundis) or (R&K) (George Nicolaou) (Hadjilias Ld) (Fred Hunter) (Neil Pandelis) (Wigham Richardson)

1 1 6

4,557 1,354 25,113

4

19,958

3,283 4,225 4,083 313 2,690 3,699 3,742 4,574 4,810 8,156

% total Other office Vlassopulo Bros Vlassopulo Bros

R&K R&K

% total Other office Lykiardopulo & Co Ld

436 APPENDICES

Shipowner Paris Embiricos Andrew Maris, Maris Pericles Kokotos George H. (Agencies) (Naftilos) C. Other Alexandria Antoniou George Deftereos Basilios P. Hamozlou Marie Pithis Bros & Co Sapovalos Basile (Agency) (Kampouris N.) Buenos Aires Onassis A.S. Constantinople (Agencies) (Diacou Zadeh) (Pappas G.) Rumania Courouclis Nicolaos D. Georgiades D.B. & Sofianos Matsoukis Jean G. Papadakis A.G. Portolo George Shipowner

Ships

Ships

GRT

1 1

4,785 370

17

44,340

1 1 1 2 1

151 1,383 339 7,726 3,338

2

10,843

1 S.A. 1 1 3 2

1,755 2,187 122 6,086 6,800

GRT

% total Other office

% total

Other office

Vlassopol 1 3,610 Vlassopulo Spiridion N. Bros (Agencies) (Petroutsis C.A.) Total 671 1,796,635 Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1937–8 Note: * These agencies do not appear in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping in these particular companies but from other information we know that they were represented by these particular London offices

APPENDICES 437

Appendix 8.1 Geographic position of ships lost in the Second World War Area where lost

Number of ships

GRT

Atlantic Ocean 70 295,218 Mediterranean Sea 144 244,168 North Sea 42 179,365 Indian Ocean 14 55,376 Pacific Ocean 19 59,165 Unknown 140 539,061 Total 429 1,372,353 Average size of lost ships 3,199 Source: Processed data from catalogue of lost ships in Babouris, The Greek Merchant Marine during the Last War, Athens, 1949 Appendix 8.2 Yearly losses of Greek ships during the Second World War Year

Number of ships

1939 16 1940 87 1941 156 1942 63 1943 26 1944 12 Unknown 69 Total 429 Sources: See Appendix 8.1

GRT

% Total losses

61,939 341,144 377,123 251,753 111,598 30,258 198,538 1,372,353

5 25 27 18 8 2 15 100

Appendix 9.1 The evolution of the Greek-owned fleet in the second half of the twentieth century, (in thousand GRT) Year

Greek flag fleet Greek-owned fleet

1949 1,301 1950 1,265 1951 1,239 1952 1,176 1953 1,140

2,377 2,930 3,642 4,030 4,738

Rate of increase %

World fleet Rate of increase %

23 24 11 18

82,300 84,600 87,200 90,200 93,400

3 3 3 4

Year

Greek flag fleet

Greekowned fleet

Rate of increase %

World fleet

Rate of increase %

1954 1955 1956

1,242 1,270 1,444

5,945 6,906 8,533

25 16 24

97,400 100,600 105,200

4 3 5

438 APPENDICES

Year

Greek flag fleet

Greekowned fleet

Rate of increase %

World fleet

Rate of increase %

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

1,576 2,275 3,892 5,575 6,519 7,009 7,503 7,267 7,198 7,518 7,665 8,739 10,564 12,850 14,562 18,660 21,832 22,741 25,108 28,661 33,752 36,314 38,570 41,422 42,289 42,289 38,057 35,781 27,765 * 24,183 21,007 19,759 19,250 20,750 22,752 24,542 25,486

10,543 11,899 12,456 12,201 13,213 13,300 15,025 16,498 18,575 19,725 21,821 23,897 26,932 30,899 34,102 39,068 42,625 45,368 48,298 50,585 52,864 52,508 52,950 53,626 54,318 53,455 56,139 53,601 46,909 45,104 47,537 48,046** 45,554** 46,580** 47,907** 53,891** 56,918**

24 13 5 −2 8 1 13 10 13 6 11 10 13 15 10 15 9 6 6 5 5 −1 1 1 1 −2 5 −5 −13 −4 5 1 −5 2 3 12 6

110,200 118,000 124,900 129,800 135,900 140,000 145,900 153,000 160,400 171,100 182,100 194,200 211,700 227,490 247,203 268,340 289,926 311,323 342,162 372,000 393,678 406,002 413,021 419,911 420,834 424,742 422,590 418,682 416,268 404,910 403,498 403,406 410,481 423,627 436,026 444,304 469,151

5 7 6 4 5 3 4 5 5 7 6 7 9 7 9 9 8 7 10 9 6 3 2 2 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −3 0 0 2 3 3 2 6

APPENDICES 439

Year

Greek flag fleet

Greekowned fleet

Rate of increase %

World fleet

Rate of increase %

Sources: Naftika Chronika, 1974, 1990; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables, 1990; OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, 1990; Helen Thanopulou, International and Greek Shipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour. The Case of the Greek Merchant Fleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994, tables A.1.VIII, A.1.IX, B.4.I, B.4.VIII and appendix 1.3; N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 12 March 1993 Notes: * Data on Greek flag and Greek-owned flag fleet from Naftika Chronika before 1985 include all merchant and passenger ships above 100 GRT. After 1985 they include bulk carriers, tankers, combination carriers and other cargo ships of 1,000 GRT and over. ** Data from N.E.Mikelis Appendix 9.2 Merchant fleets of selected traditional maritime nations under national flags, 1948–92, (in million GRT) Year

Japan

Norway

USA

UK

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

1 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.4 5.5 6.3 6.9 7.9 8.9 10 10.8 12 14.7 16.9 19.6 24 27 30.5 34.9

4.3 4.9 5.4 5.8 5.9 6.3 6.8 7.2 8 8.5 9.4 10.4 11.2 12 12.5 13.7 14.5 15.6 16.4 18.2 19.7 19.7 19.3 21.7 23.5

29.2 27.8 27.5 27.3 27.2 27.2 27.3 26.4 26.1 25.9 25.6 25.3 24.8 24.2 23.3 23.1 22.4 21.5 20.8 20.3 19.7 19.5 18.5 16.3 15

18 18 18.2 18.5 18.6 18.6 19 19.4 19.5 19.9 20.3 20.8 21.1 21.5 21.7 21.6 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.7 21.9 23.8 25.8 27.3 28.6

440 APPENDICES

Year

Japan

Norway

USA

UK

1973 36.8 23.6 14.9 1974 38.7 24.8 14.4 1975 39.7 26.1 14.6 1976 41.7 27.9 14.9 1977 40 27.8 15.3 1978 39.2 26.1 16.2 1979 40 22.3 17.5 1980 40.9 22 18.5 1981 40.8 21.7 18.9 1982 41.6 21.9 19.1 1983 40.7 19.2 19.6 1984 40.3 17.7 19.3 1985 39.9 15.3 19.5 1986 38.5 9.3 19.9 1987 35.9 6.4 20.2 1988 32.1 9.3 20.8 1989 28 15.6 20.6 1990 27.1 23.4 21.3 1991 26.4 23.6 20.3 1992 25.4 22.6 18.2 Source: Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, Statistical Tables, June 1992

30.2 31.6 33.2 32.9 31.6 30.9 27.9 27.1 25.4 22.5 19.1 15.9 14.3 11.6 8.5 8.3 7.6 6.7 6 6

Appendix 9.3 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations, (million deadweight tons) Greekowned Greek flag f.o.c. U.SA.owned U.S.A. flag f.o.c. Japaneseowned Japanese flag f.o.c.

1984

1987

1988

1989

1990

1992

98.6

87.9

85

81.9

84.4

100.6

62.2 36.4 78.9

42.8 45.2 68.1

29.1

29.1

49.8 87.5

39.0 88.5

64.6

54.7

22.9

33.8

36.4 48 59.1

90.2

APPENDICES 441

1984

1987

1988

1989

1990

1992

Norwegia 38.6 26.3 41 44.1 55.4 54.1 n-owned Norwegia 30.6 9.6 n flag f.o.c. 8 16.7 Sources: See Appendix 9.1 and C.J.Dean, ‘The Fleet Controlled by the European Community. Present Status and Some Historic Trends’, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, a paper for the 5th International Congress of the International Maritime Association of East Mediterranean, Athens, 28 May–1 June 1990; Table 10.5 Appendix 10.1 Twentieth century shipowning families according to place of origin (1900– 94)*** GREECE A. AEGEAN ISLANDS Amorgos Vekris Vlavianos Dendrinos Matsas Fostieris Andros Andreou Assimacos Beis Bistis Caristinakis Condylis Coulouthros Dambassis Daniolos Diapoulis Embiricos Fakis Falangas Fountos Goulandris Gounaris Hadoulis

Enter*

Leave**

i/war pWWII 1910s 1890s 1937

i/war

1930 1907 1923 1913 1911 1906 1900s 1899 1911 1926 1882 1915 1923 1971 1902 1925 1923

1942 1930s 1932 1924 1930

WWII

1934 1932 1920 1932

1940

442 APPENDICES

Enter* Kairis Kambanis Keranis Konstadakis Kottakis Koutsoukos Kydoniefs Kyrtatas Loukissas Logothetis Louloudis Malamos Mandakas Maris Mavros Moraitis Palaiocrassas Pantazis Piangos Polemis Porfyratos Rallias Sakelliou Symbouras Syrmas Tatakis Trikoglou Tsatsomoiros Vestarchis Vlachakis Voyatzides Voulgaris Vrondissis Chios Andreades Angelakos Angelos Angelicoussis Angelidis

pWWII 1907 1925 1924 1930s 1928 1911 1910 1911 1922 1931 1933 1899 1921 1931 1893 1926 1963 1928 1905 pWWII 1921 1926 1925 1923 1925 1919 1926 1928 1926 1910 1923 1925 1900s 1970s 1931 1950 1910

Leave**

1929 1940

1915 1933 1962 1930

1908

1941

1933 1930

1937 1940 1934 1933 1937

i/war

APPENDICES 443

Enter* Apodiakos Aspiotis Bachas Belegris Bousses Caminis Carras Caroussis Chalkoussis Chalkias Chandris Choulis Christoforidis Demades Fafalios

pWWII pWWII 1970s pWWII pWWII 1963 1907 1900s 1960 1947 1914 1969 i/war i/war 1924 Enter*

Fatsis Fisfis Frangos Galakis Gerimoglou Georgantis Georgilis Glyptis Katsambis Kallimasias Kallimassiotis Katsikas Karavolos Kastanos Kefalas Kokalis Kolonas Kontomanis Kontos Kouloukas Ktistakis

1932 pWWII 1924 1921 1978 1909 1918 1928 pWWII 1978 i/war 1960s 1961 1908 pWWII pWWII pWWII pWWII pWWII pWWII 1911

Leave**

1962

Leave**

1940s

i/war

1960s

444 APPENDICES

Enter* Livanos Los Madias Mamalis Martakis Mattheos Margaronis Mavrogordatos Melis Michalinos Michalos Negrepontis Nikolakis Notias Palios A. Palios S. Pantelidis Papalas Papalios Pappas Pappis Perris Platis Ploumis Pikoulis Pithis Pittas Peratikos Perivolaris Poulmentis Poutous Prinias Proios

Psilos Revithis

1902 1916 pWWII i/war i/war 1964 1897 1905 i/war 1892 1910 1900s 1897 pWWII 1916 1972 pWWII 1890 1950s 1930s i/war 1910s pWWII pWWII 1963 1910s 1907 1950s 1923 pWWII i/war pWWII 1923

Leave**

1960s 1960s

i/war 1940 i/war i/war 1919

i/war

i/war

1951

Enter*

Leave**

Psaros 1923 pWWII

i/war

APPENDICES 445

Saliaris Sarantis Sideris Skarvelis Skoufalos Stravelakis Tachmintzis Tsangaris Tsakos Tsimblis Tsouros Vassilakis Vassiliades Veniamis Volikas Xenios Xylas Yemelos Zafirakis Zanaras Chios (Oinoussai) Angelidakis Andreadis Arkadis Chalkias Hadjiandonakis Hadjipateras Georgilis Kolakis Kostis Kritikos Lemos Lignos Lyras Mantzavinos Mattheos Mavrophilipas Nikiforos Nikolos

Enter*

Leave**

1893 pWWII 1923 1926 1961 1962 1928 pWWII 1970 1964 1910 1898 i/war 1977 1900s 1912 1914 1968 1910s i/war

1930s

pWWII i/war pWWII i/war i/war 1905 1918 pWWII 1969 1960 1905 1925 1908 pWWII 1938 i/war i/war 1947

i/war 1930s

i/war

1930s

446 APPENDICES

Enter* Papapontikos Pateras Pontikos Samonas Skinitis Tserdos Yannakis Euboia Benakis Toyias

Hydra Coulouras Brouskos Kyriakopulos Methenitis Martinos Protopappas Rassoyanis Sachtouris Verveniotis Ikaria Raptis Spanos Karpathos Diakomanolis Kassos Antoniou Diacakis Emiris Hadjiilias Kambouris Kapotas Kathreptis Kulukundis Lendakis Makris

Leave**

1958 1905 1908 pWWII 1937 pWWII pWWII i/war 1922

1950s

Enter*

Leave**

1914 1935 1910s 1964 1964 1931 1900s i/war 1905

1950s

1913 WWI

pWWII pWWII 1970 1913 1901 1904 1902 1935 1944 1960 1899 1948 1940s

1941 1916 1955 1962 1977

1964

APPENDICES 447

Malandris Markou Mastrandreas Mavroleon Mavris Minakoulis Nikolaou Nikolaidies Papadakis Papadimitriou Papanicolaou Pneumaticos Protopappas Rethymnis Sitinas Sorotos Tsampouniaris Vardavas Vidiadis Yannaghas Kea Kozadinos Leventakis Maroulis Kimolos Roussos Ventouris

Enter*

Leave**

1896 1925 1959 1900s 1919 1933 1901 1938 1928 1891 1967 1898 1937 1903 1933 1954 1920 1910 1930 1902

1916

1904 1959 1910s

1907

1965

1958

1929

1964 1956 Enter*

Ventouris Kithira Coroneos Katrakis Leros Antonellos Matantos Nikoloudis Roussos

1937 1973

Leave**

1960 1904 1910s

1912

1910s i/war 1910s 1900

i/war i/war

448 APPENDICES

Tomazos Lesbos Arapoglou Courtzis Mitrelias Sifneos Tyropoulis Milos Zoulias Myconos Dracopulos Sigalas Psara Cosmas Domestinis Filinis Hadjikyriakos Kalafatis Kalimeris Pappas Velissarios Samos Inglessis Soutos Santorini Alafouzos Baikas Belonias Dakoutros Halaris Karavias Koutsofios Manolessos Nomicos Platis Pothitos Psychas Roussos Sigalas

Enter*

Leave**

1900s

i/war

pWWII 1883 1972 1900s 1920s

i/war 1910s 1938

1962 1914 i/war 1971 1906 1910s 1910s 1910 1909 1910s 1960

1910s 1940s i/war 1916

1910 1969 1960 i/war i/war pWWII i/war 1910 1971 i/war 1909 i/war 1963 1920s 1955 1912

WWII i/war

WWII

1935

APPENDICES 449

Sifaos Cosmettos Depastas

Psacharopulos Stafylopatis Vernicos Vernicos-Eugenides Skiathos Epifaniades Koubis Frangistas Spetses Anargyros Coutzis Goumas Goudis Kastriotis Petsalis Syros Cornilakis Coroniadis Cosmas Coutsodontis Droutsi Femeliaris Foustanos Gangos A. Georgopulos Calvocoressis Kokinos Gregos Kapparis Karellas Kotzias Krinos Kostomenis

Enter*

Leave**

i/war 1950s

1938

Enter*

Leave**

1884 1930 1870s 1954

1910s

1930s i/war 1951 1903 1895 1909 1910s 1902 1909 1910s 1910s 1900s 1910 i/war 1911 1901 1899 1938 1910s 1910 1909 1900s i/war 1893 1912 1913

1951

1915 1912 i/war 1910s i/war i/war

1915 i/war i/war 1914 i/war 1930s i/war

i/war

450 APPENDICES

Pangalos Petritsis Psiachis Rigopulos Tsiropinas Trofimoff Valmas Vattis Vafiadakis B.CRETE Angelakis Dimitriadis Kambalios Lefakis Lelakis Lianantonakis Mamidakis Marcakis Marcantonakis

Enter*

Leave**

1900s pWWII 1900s 1910s 1900 1900s 1907 1891 1900s

1916

1930s i/war 1970s i/war

1960 pWWII pWWII 1966 1971 1960 1960 1974 1947 Enter*

Moatsos Sfinias Stavroudis Tsourinakis Vardinoyannis Venizelos Voyatzakis C.IONIAN ISLANDS Cephalonia Angelatos Athanassoulis Ambatiellos Anastassatos Andreatos Antypas Antonatos Bassias-Typaldos

i/war

1935 1960s 1910s 1946 1966 1930s 1948

1912 1898 1900 1930s 1930s 1911 pWWII 1900s

Leave**

i/war

1960s WWI 1920s

WWI 1924

APPENDICES 451

Destounis Diakroussis Doryzas Couppas Cicelis Frangopulos Fokas Lalis Lusis (Luzi) Lykiardopulos Magliveras Mazarakis Marchessini Markettos Matsoukis Metaxas Michalinudis Michalitsianos Monopolis Neofytou Panayotatos Panas Papadakis Patrikios Portolos Potamianos Rossolimos Strintzis Svoronos Synodinos Tetenes Theofanis Theotokatos Typaldos Vergottis Vagliano

Enter*

Leave**

1902 1901 1902 1880s 1892 1909 1904 1935 1929 1897 i/war 1907 1929 1908 1914 1906 1910s 1902 1900s 1957 1900s i/war pWWII 1908 1910 1910s 1915 1960 1900 1900 1906 1895 1914 i/war 1898 1879

1936 1913 1910s 1912 1930s 1915 1950s

1960s

1916 1960s WWII 1917 1917

1914

i/war i/war WWI 1920s 1929 1960s 1910s

452 APPENDICES

Enter* Vassilatos Yannoulatos Corfu Paramithiotis Ithaca Anagnostatos Gratsos Dracoulis Kallinicos Moraitis Stathatos Theofilatos Vlassopulos Vlismas Zakynthos Theodorakopoulos Mylonas MAINLAND Athens/Piraeus Agapitos Agoudimos Alexandratos Alexatos Angelakis Angelis Angelis Arapoglou Arapis Assimomitis Athanasiades Caloutas Catsogiorgis Chalikiopulo Christopulos Comninos Constantinides Corvissiano Coustas Daifas

Leave**

1960 1902 i/war 1970 1907 1890s 1910s 1970s 1880 1879 1912 pWWII 1947 1968

1953 1970s 1971 1930s 1970s 1910 1976 pWWII 1970s 1930s 1958 1910s pWWII 1910s 1930s 1966 1930s 1910s 1970s pWWII

1950

1950s WWII

1980s

i/war

APPENDICES 453

Enter* Dalacouras Davaris Dedes Deligiannis Diamantis Dontas Douros Drakos Economou Efthimiades Efthimiou Efstathiou Eleftheriadis

1969 1930s 1972 pWWII pWWII 1970s 1970s pWWII pWWII i/war 1950 1977 1925 Enter*

Frangoudakis Frangoulis Fostiropulos Gabriel Georgopulos Giacoumis Giannakis Gianniotis Giatzoglou Gotsis Hadj iconstanti Hadjieleftheriades Hadjis Iliopulos Isaias Kakomanolis Kalamoutoussis Kalis Kalitsis Kampalios Kararotias Karastamatis Karayannis

Leave**

1960 1976 1970s 1947 1957 pWWII 1979 1970s 1980s 1970s 1910s 1966 1980s 1980s 1911 1970s 1970s 1980s 1966 pWWII 1971 1960s 1977

Leave**

1916

454 APPENDICES

Enter* Karypidas Katounis Katsoulakos Katsoulis Kazakos Kertsikoff Klavdianos Kontominas Konstantopulos Koros Koufos Kosmas Ktistakis Kyriakou Ladas Laios Laliotis Laskaridis Lekanides Lelekopulos Lendoudis Leopulos Leoussis Levantis Leventakis Logothetis Loukides Louloundis Lyberopulos Manios Marangopulos

1967 1970s 1939 pWWII 1958 1966 1967 1960s 1967 1970s 1930s 1970s 1970s 1968 1977 1972 1969 1970s pWWII 1910s 1950s 1980s 1910s 1910s 1959 1980s 1964 1930s pWWII 1985 1970s Enter*

Marengo Marinakis Markakis S. Mavrakakis Meletis

1910s 1970s 1974 1968 1963

Leave**

i/war

Leave**

APPENDICES 455

Enter* Messolonghitis Moundreas Nkaroyannis Oikonomakis Panayotides Papadimitriou Papaleonardos Papadeas Pappas Papathomas Papayannakis Paraschis Parissis Pavlidis Payavlas Petrakis Politis Pothitos Prokopiou Restis Riniotis Rigas Sarantopulos Sarros Simetas Sachinis Seretis Sotiriadis Soutos Stavrou Tavlarios Tavoulareas Teryazos Tomazos Trifides Trivilas Tsaoussis Tsafos Tsavliris

1910s 1966 1980s 1970s 1967 1930s 1910s 1930s 1964 1970s 1930s 1968 pWWII pWWII 1910s 1980s 1970s 1963 1970s 1970s 1973 1923 1970s 1980s 1960 1963 1910s 1968 1964 1930s 1961 1970s 1930s 1960s 1979 1930s 1973 1956 1940s

Leave**

456 APPENDICES

Enter* Tzortzatos Tragakis Vafias Vassilatos D. Veliotis Velissarios Veniazis Vergos Vlassis Vourlides

1976 1980 1970s 1971 1930s 1960 1977 1978 1941 1960 Enter*

Vrettos Zachariou Zafirakis Zerelakis Zoiopulos Zorzos Epirus Tsakalotos Macedonia Gigilinis Papachristides Theodoridis Peloponnese Alevizos Angelopulos D.N. Angelopulos D. Th. Antonopulos Apostolou Bilinis Constantacopulos Cottaropulos Coumantaros Dragonas Gourdomichalis Kallianis Kallimanopulos

Leave**

Leave**

pWWII 1975 pWWII 1955 1930s 1970s pWWII pWWII 1946 1910s 1970s 1951 i/war 1913 1970s 1925 1974 1910s 1932 1965 1950s 1969 1924

WWI

APPENDICES 457

Enter* Kapelacos Karageorgis Katsogiorgis Katsoulakos Kollentzas Kolokotronis Kotsovilis Krialakos Lambrou Latsis Maltezos Niarchos Panagopulos Bros Panagopulos P. Panoutsos Papadopulos Papageorgacopulo Papas Sarlis Stathakis Topalis Tsitouras Vassilakopulos Vertsiotis Zoulas Sterea Ellas (Galaxidi)

Angelis Charopulos Hardavellas Merintzos Mitropulos Sideropulos Vlassopulos Zissimos (Itea)

1975 1934 1970s 1939 1960 1960s 1961 1977 1972 1950s 1972 1932 1949 1971 1906 1960s 1910s 1964 1951 1972 1951 1969 1974 1957 1948

Leave**

1970s

WWI

Enter*

Leave**

1904 1900 1910s i/war 1907 1910s 1900s 1912

1920s 1915 i/war i/war 1910s i/war

458 APPENDICES

Enter* Alogoskoufis Rigas (Other) Karailias Kouremenos Thrace Eugenides Hadjiyannakis Kessaniotis Thessaly Antonopulo Draikis Nanopulos Staikos Varsamis ABROAD Russia Anastassiades Constantinople Arvanitides Critikos Efthymiades Kedros Kiosseoglou Mango Manopulos Tsikopulos Siderides Zarifis Propontis/Asia Minor Anastasiou Efstathiades Efstathiou N. Elides lossifoglou Hadji-Daout F. Kavounides Konialides Konstas

Leave**

pWWII i/war 1971 1954 1923 1944 1970s 1910s 1956 1910s 1964

1971 1910 1960 pWWII 1951 1964 1890 1964 1963 1900 1900

1930s

1933 1914 1924 1910s 1913 1874 1928 1932 1933

1968 1955

1910s

1914 1912

1930s i/war

APPENDICES 459

Kyriakides Onassis Pandelis Pantaleon Enter*

Enter*

Leave**

1907 1933 1908 1875

1935 1960s

Leave**

Pezas 1920s 1960s Vlachos pWWII Cyprus Efstathiou 1968 Hatziioannou 1930s Xydas 1980s Other (Beirut) Carapiperis 1967 (Cairo) Economakis 1971 Marinos 1971 (Sudan) Revinthis 1960s Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years; Greek Shipping Directory, Piraeus, Skoularikos, various years; ‘Who is Who of Shipping’, Argo various issues 1965–85; Naftika Chronika, various issues 1933–85; Andreas Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, 1971; Hellas’ Shipowners, 1981–1982, Athens, Marad Hellas; Leonidas E.Bistis, The Steamship Fleet ofAndros, 1882– 1945, Andros, the ‘Andros Society’, 1982; Minos D.Komninos, Kassiot Shipowners in the 19th and 20th Century, Adiens, 1990; various interviews Notes: * The date of entry is counted at the first purchase of steamship or the establishment of a shipping company, or participation in co-ownership. I/war accounts for interwar, and pWWII for postSecond World War including the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. ** The date of leave is stated when known. *** There are a number of shipowners who are not included in the catalogue. These were usually small, short-term shipowners who entered and left the business according to the level of the freight rates

NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. Nicos G.Svoronos, The Unsaid on Modern Greek History and Historiography, Athens, Themelio, 1987, in Greek, p. 36. 2. The chapters dealing with the postwar period are less extensive than some of the others. Readers interested in greater detail on these years can consult Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945–1975. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, London, Athlone, 1993.

1 TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BLACK SEA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1. There is a vast bibliography on the subject. Among the most important works are: Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols, New York, Harper and Row, 1986; Frederic C.Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; G.V.Scammell, The World Encompassed. The First European Maritime Empires, c. 800–1650, London, Methuen, 1981; Carlo Cippolla, Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000–1700, New York, W.W. Norton, 1980; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 2 vols, Berkeley, Academic Press, 1974; J.H.Parry, ‘Transport and Trade Routes’, in E.E.Rich and C.H.Wilson (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. IV, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1980; Ralph Dayis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, Macmillan, 1962. 2. Braudel, op. cit., p. 115. For a review article on developments in the area, see G.Leontaritis, ‘Greek Merchant Marine’, in S.Papadopulos (ed.), Greek Merchant Marine (1453–1850), Athens, National Bank of Greece, 1972, pp. 13–56. 3. The largest part of the Turkish fleet was manned by Greek seamen. In fact, this was part of the ‘taxes’ levied on the sançak (province) of the Aegean archipelago. The establishment of this sançak in the mid-sixteenth century coincided with the formation of the institution of dragomani (interpreters). When the Ottoman government was obliged to communicate with European powers it used

NOTES 461

4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

dragomani, most of whom by tradition were Greek. The official, with the title ‘dragoman of the fleet’, based in Constantinople, followed the admiral to the Aegean for the collection of taxes and other administrative fees. The ‘dragoman of the fleet’ proved vital to the inhabitants of the islands as a problem-solver within the Ottoman bureaucracy. See Vassilis Sfyroeras, The Dragomans of the Fleet. The Institutions and the Bearers, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1965, in Greek. See Alexandra Kradonelli, History of Piracy during the First Years of Turkish Domination (1390–1538), Athens, Hestia, 1985 and History of Piracy during the Middle Years of Turkish Domination, 1538–1699, Athens, Hestia, 1991, in Greek; Tryphon Konstantinides, Ships, Captains and Seamen, 1800–1830, Athens, Royal Navy Historical Editions, 1953, pp. 5–29, in Greek. Kradonelli, op. cit., Leontaritis, op. cit., p. 21. Konstantinides, op. cit., pp. 20–1. W.A.Cole and Phyllis Deane, ‘The Growth of National Incomes’, in H.J.Habakkuk and M.Postan (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VI, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1979, pp. 1–44. Ibid.; see also Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution andBritish Overseas Trade, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1979, table 22. Barbara Jelavich, Balkan History. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1987, pp. 179–82. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, The Greek Community in Trieste, 1751–1830, vol. 1, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, p. 32, in Greek; Traian Stoianovich, ‘Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 20, 1960, pp. 234–313; Spiros Asdrahas, The Economic Structure of the Balkan Countries, 15th–19th Centuries, Athens, Helissa, 1979, in Greek. Katsiardi-Hering, op. cit., pp. 27–32. Patricia Herlihy, ‘Russian Wneat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 79–80. E.Pavlides, The Greek Population of Russia and the 33 Years of the Association of the Greeks from Russia, Athens, 1953, pp. 38–9, in Greek. Although these numbers must be handled with care, the author, president of the Association of the Greeks from Russia for a number of years, is reliable. Eleftherios Pavlides, born in 1876 in Trebizond, was a successful general merchant in Odessa. A Russian citizen, he left in 1918 only to return, to Moscow this time, from 1926 to 1928 as commercial attaché of the Greek embassy. He died at the age of ninety-eight in 1974 (personal interview with his son, Danis Pavlides, and his grandson, Professor Eleftherios Pavlides, December 1990). House of Commons, Parliament, Great Britain, ‘Report by Consul Palgrave on the Trade and Commerce of Trebizond during the Year 1872’, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), vol. LXV, 1872, p. 489. Vernon John Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935, pp. 215–16; P.Cernovodeanu and B.Marinescu, ‘British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1857’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 8, no. 3, winter 1979; Paul Cernovodeanu, Relatiile Comerciale Romano-Engleze in Contextul Politicii

462 NOTES

17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30.

31. 32.

Orientale a Marii Britanii, 1803–1878, Cluj-Napoor, Editura DACIA, 1986, in Rumanian. This book was translated for me in part by Dr Florin Marinescu. ‘Report by Mr Consul General Green on the Trade and Agriculture of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia for the Year 1866’, BPP, vol. LXIX, 1866, p. 460. S.Shaw, ‘The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century’, International Journal of Middte East Studies, no. 10, 1979, pp. 265–77. For more on the activities of the Greeks in Constantinople, see Harris Exertzoglou, ‘Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850–1881’, PhD thesis, King’s College, University of London, 1986. Pavlina-Maria Nassioutzik, ‘Protestantism and Enlightenment in Smyrna in the nineteenth Century: The Case of the Apothiki Ofelimon Gnoseon’, PhD thesis, University of Thessaloniki, 1992. For more on the Greek merchants in Smyrna, see Elena Frangakis, ‘The Commerce of Izmir in the Eighteenth Century (1695– 1820)’, PhD thesis, London University, 1986; and Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1990. Christos Hadziiossif notes that at mid-century there were about 6,000 families in Cairo and Alexandria. If we consider each family to consist of six members, then approximately 36,000 Greeks lived in Alexandria. See Christos Hadziiossif, ‘La Colonie Greque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980, p. 89. Alexander Kitroeff, The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. Ethnicity and Class Oxford, Ithaca Press, 1989. For detailed bibliographic references on the Greek merchant communities, see Chapter 2, notes 4–12. Davis, The Rise, p. 176. Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 104–5. Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno,’ pp. 45–68. The preceding analysis is based largely on Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 101–7; and Herliny, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno’. See Sarah Palmer, Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1990; Alan Cafruny, Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987, chapter 2. Alan R.Richards, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Egypt, 1798–1882’, in Huri Islamoglu-Inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1990, p. 226. ‘Report by Mr Consul Stanley on the Trade and Commerce of Alexandria for the Year 1867’, BPP, vol. LIX, 1868–9. The London Customs Bills of Entry provide valuable data about the activities of Ralli Brothers in the United States and India; they were among the earliest importers of cotton direcdy from Savannah and jute from Calcutta in the late 1860s. For the detailed shipping statistics of each group of Black Sea ports, see Tables 3.5, 3.7, 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12. J.K.Campbell and Ph.Sherrard, Modern Greece, London, Ernest Benn, 1908, p. 93.

NOTES 463

33. Vassilis Kremmydas, Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, vol 1, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985–6, pp. 36–44, in Greek. 34. Great Britain: Foreign Office (FO) 257/1: Russia: Odessa, Embassy and Consular Archives, 1819–1829. 35. For a highly interesting article on ships’ names (and more), Christos Hadziiossif, ‘Social Values and Business Strategies in the Naming of Ships in Greece, 18th– 20th Centuries’, in Speros Vryonis Jr (ed.), The Greeks and the Sea, New York, A.D.Karatzas, 1992. 36. BPP, vol. LX, 1873, p. 317. 37. BPP, vol. LXVII, 1874, p. 879. 38. The Greek Steamship Company assigned to fulfil Greece’s internal and external communication needs was established in 1856; see Chapter 4 for more details. 39. London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 6 January 1880. 40. Ibid., 24 January 1880. 41. Arcadia arrived from Bombay in England on 22 June 1880. Data on other arrivals of the same company’s ships at Liverpool indicate that Papayanni carried out regular trips to Bombay. 42. London Customs Bills of Entry Bill A, 2 February and 22 June 1880.

2 GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME NETWORKS: THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830s–1860s 1. Frederic Mauro, ‘Merchant Communities, 1350–1750’, in J.D.Tracy (ed.), The Rise ofMerchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World (1350– 1750), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 285. 2. Ibid., p. 266. 3. Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From Industrial Revolution to World War I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 131. 4. This term has been used by Patricia Herlihy in reference to the Greek commercial network. See Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986. 5. Although Nicos Svoronos, Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe Siècle, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956, has indicated the importance of the growth of diaspora merchant communities in Greek historiography since the 1950s, a great deal of research still needs to be done in order to get the full picture of the works of the networks. The most integrated theoretical analysis of the network of the Greek merchant communities has been done by Christos Hadziiossif, in his excellent ‘La Colonie Grecque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980, who examined the works of the network from Alexandria. Another significant study of the merchant community of Trieste has been done by Olga KatsiardiHering, The Greek Community in Trieste (1751–1830), 2 vols, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, in Greek. Spyridon Fokas has studied the works of the Greeks at the ports of the Danube in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Lower Danube, Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, in Greek. Susan Fairlie was the

464 NOTES

first to analyse in detail the methods of ‘Anglo-Greeks’ trading in ‘The AngloRussian Grain Trade, 1815–1861’, PhD thesis, University of London, 1959. B.Tsimpidaros, The Greeks in England, Athens, Alkaios, 1974, in Greek, is the only detailed source I know or about the Greek merchants in England, while the local museums or orthodox churches of Manchester, Liverpool and London as well as the Municipality of London are reported to have data on the Greek population. There are also two masters’ theses on the Greeks of London: D.Mangriotis, ‘The Greek Population in London, 1837–1881’, MSc thesis, London School of Economics, 1984; and M.W. Vidali, ‘Chiot Shipowners in London and the Persistence of Ethnicity’, MPhil thesis, Polytechnic of Central London, 1988. See also D.Mangriotis, ‘The Demographic History of the Greek Merchant Community of London, 1837–1881’, Historica, vol. 3, no. 6, December 1986, pp. 349–68, in Greek. The most recent and interesting account of the Greek merchants in Britain is found in Chapman, op. cit., chapter 5. Patricia Herlihy provides a mine of information on the activities and the network of the Greeks in Odessa: Patricia Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 45–68; Herlihy, ‘The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1977, pp. 53–78; Herlihy, ‘Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vols 3–4, 1979–80, pp. 399–420; Herlihy, Odessa; Herlihy, ‘The Greek Community in Odessa, 1861–1917’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 7, 1989, pp. 235–52. For the first years of the Greeks in Odessa see Viron Karidis, ‘The Greek Communities in South Russia: Aspects of their Formation and Commercial Enterprise, 1774–1829’, MA thesis, University of Birmingham, 1976; and Karidis, ‘A Greek Mercantile Paroikia: Odessa 1774– 1829’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, London, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 111–36. More studies of the Greek merchant communities in the main knots of the commerce in the Black Sea, the ports of England, Marseilles and Livorno are, however, badly needed in order to get the overall picture of the commerce and shipping involved, of the social and economic organisation of the communities involved, as well as of the organisation, structure and business strategies of the Greek firms. Olympia Selekou of the National Centre of Social Research is preparing a doctoral thesis on the Greek merchant community of Taganrog. Anna Mandilara is preparing a PhD thesis on the activities of the mercantile community of Marseilles at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and Despina Vlami at the same university for the Greek mercantile community of Livorno. For the early years of the Greek community in Marseilles, see Pierre Echinard, ‘Grecs et Philhellènes à Marseilles de la Révolution Française à l’ Indépendance de la Grèce’, thèse de doctorat, Institut Historique de Provence, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973; Nikos Psiroukis is also among the first to bring to the fore the importance of Greek settlements abroad. See N.Psiroukis, Greek Settlers in Modern Times, Athens, Epikairohta, 1974. 6. One of the most visible features of British mercantile enterprise in the first half of the nineteenth century was the rise of Liverpool from a small port as a challenger to London. Indeed, by mid-century the Mersey port had over-taken London in total tonnage. See Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports, Surrey, (UK), World’s Work, 1983.

NOTES 465

7. Brief mention of the Greeks at Liverpool is made by P.L.Cottrell, ‘Liverpool Shipowners, the Mediterranean, and the Transition from Sail to Steam during the Mid-Nineteenth Century, in L.R.Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies, St. Johns NF, 1992. 8. A highly interesting account of the merchant activities of the Gerussi family is given by Maria-Christina Hadjiioannou, ‘The Merchant House Gerussi, (1823– 1870). From the Ottoman Empire to the Greek State’, University of Athens, PhD thesis, 1989, in Greek. 9. Elena Frangakis, ‘lzmir—An International Port in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Economies méditerranéennes Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe—XIXe siècles, Athens, Center of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, vol. 1, 1985, pp. 107–27; Hadziiossif, op. cit., 262–72. 10. See Herlihy, ‘Greek Merchants’, pp. 399–420. 11. Paul Cernovodeanu, ‘L’activité des Maisons de Commerce et des négociants loniens du Bas-Danube durant l’Intervalle 1829–1853’, Economies Méditerraneennes. Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe—XIXe Siècles, Athens, Centre of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, 1985, pp. 91–106. 12. Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 138. 13. Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat’. 14. Katsiardi-Hering, op. cit., pp. 431–4, 537–56. 15. Ibid., pp. 468–74. 16. Hadziiossif, op.cit., p. 113. 17. Harris Exertzoglou, ‘Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850–1881’, PhD thesis, King’s College, University of London, 1986, pp. 78–9, 84. 18. Frangakis, op cit. 19. Katsiardi-Hering, op cit., p. 556. 20. V.Kardassis, Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987, table 26 and p. 172. 21. Hadziiossif, op. cit., pp. 262–72. 22. See also Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 1. 23. D.Vikelas, Loukis Laras. Autobiography of an Elderly Chiot, Athens, Odysseas, repr., 1988, pp. 116–17. According to Tsimpidaros, op. cit., p. 146, the tale or Loukis Laras was based on Loukis Zifo, a Chiot merchant in England. 24. For more details see Mangriotis, ‘Demographic History’. It is worth noting that the same practices are prevalent in the twentieth-century Chiot shipowning community in London; see Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners, chapter 1. 25. D.Vikelas, My Life, Athens, 1908, p. 327. 26. See Mikes Syriotes, ‘The House of Ralli Brothers’, Chiaka Chronika, vol. A’, 1911, pp. 101–9. Information on the Rallis firm is also based on the account of one of its employees, Christos Moulakes, The House of Ralli Brothers, Athens, 1964; Chapman, op. cit., pp. 131, 158–9; and T.Catsiyannis, Pandias Stephen Ralli, London, 1986, p. 118.

466 NOTES

27. The account of the Mavros firm is derived from Vikelas, My Life, and M.D. Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983. 28. Vikelas, My Life, pp. 89–90. Demetrius Vikelas became a merchant in England before becoming a well-known Greek writer. He was a nephew of Euphrosyne Mavros and his successful commercial career started in the London branch office of the Melas firms. 29. Vikelas, My Life, pp. 168–9. 30. Letter of Consul Yeames in Odessa to Consul John Green in Athens, 13 March 1850, Foreign Office (FO) 257/1. 31. Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 185. 32. See also Fairlie, op. cit., pp. 241–91. 33. Hadziiossif, op. cit., pp. 262–72. 34. ‘Report by Consul Barrow on the Trade and Commerce of Kertch for the Year 1877’, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), vol. LXXV, 1878, p. 86. 35. See H.Barty-King, The Baltic Exchange, London, Hutchinson Benham, 1977. 36. H.Barty-King, op. cit., p. 68. 37. Ibid., p. 97. 38. Ibid., pp. 113–14. 39. From a series of satirical pieces written by ‘Baltico’ in Fairplay, 1895–96 as quoted in Barty-King, op. cit., p. 237. 40. Chapman, op. cit., p. 165. 41. Chapman, op. cit., p. 157. 42. Fairlie, op. cit., pp. 341–65, attributes the development of this trade to Pandia Ralli. 43. The criteria used to determine Greek ownership were the following: a) whether the same ship appeared in 1835, 1840 and 1850; b) whether there were repetitive voyages in the same year; c) whether the ship had a Greek name and a Greek captain; and d) whether there were data from other sources indicating that a vessel was owned by a Greek merchant. 44. He was the author of a number of patriotic novels concerning the Greek revolution, and also the general editor and owner of the political and literary journal The British Star, by which he advocated in tne entire Levant his Anglophile ideas supporting Prince Alfred as the successor of King Otto. The British Star ran for roughly three years at the beginning of the 1860s, a period during which Xenos was involved in financial troubles concerning his steamship company. 45. Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869, pp. 48 and 76. 46. Fairplay, 19 September 1884. For more on the Papayanni firm and family, see James Taylor, Ellermans. A Wealth of Shipping, London, Wilton House Gentry, 1976, pp. 177–81. 47. The Papayanni firm established its steamship company in the early 1850s with the support of most of the Liverpool and Manchester Greek commercial houses. Pandora, no. 215, 1 March 1859, pp. 521–2. 48. The author is referring to the steamship lines of Maclver, the Leyland and the Moss companies. 49. Fairplay, 19 September 1884.

NOTES 467

50. See Constantine Papathanasopulos, Greek Steamship Company. The Impasses of Protectionism (1855–1872), Athens, National Bank of Greece, Cultural Foundation, 1987, chapter 2, in Greek. 51. Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos, ‘Autobiography. 52. Panaghi Vagliano to Basil Papayanni, 12 September 1875, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 53. Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 170–3. 54. Lewis Siegelbaum, ‘The Odessa Grain Trade’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 9, spring 1980, pp. 131–2. 55. Ralph Davis, ‘Maritime History: Progress and Problems’, in Sheila Marriner (ed.), Business and Businessmen. Studies in Business, Economic and Accounting History, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1978. 56. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, Macmillan, 1962, p. 81. 57. Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘From Broager to Bergen: The Risks and Rewards of Peter Jebsen, Shipowner, 1864–1892’, Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok, 1985, Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1986, p. 41. 58. Frank Broeze, Mr Brooks and the Australian Trade. Imperial Business in the Nineteenth Century, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993. 59. Eric W.Sager with Gerald E.Panting, Maritime Capital. The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990, chapters 4 and 7. 60. Ibid., p. 83. 61. Ibid., p. 147. 62. Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850– 1914’, in Lewis R.Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, pp. 117–48.

3 GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL NETWORKS: THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s–1900s 1. Reports on the Danube Trade, BPP, vol. LXVII, 1874, Turkey, p. 117. 2. Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Lower Danube, Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, p. 84. 3. Fokas, op. cit., p. 316. 4. Fairplay, 11 September 1885, p. 425. 5. M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley University of California, 1938, Appendix F. 6. ‘Report by Consul Carruthers on the Trade and Commerce of Taganrog for the Year 1876’, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), vols. LXXII–LXXXIII, 1877, Russia, pp. 101–2. 7. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Colledge on the Trade and Commerce of Kertch for the Year 1881’, BPP, vol. LXXI, 1882, Russia, pp. 357–8.

468 NOTES

8. See also Lewis Siegelbaum, ‘The Odessa Grain Trade’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 9, spring 1980, pp. 131–2. 9. Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794–1914, Cambidge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986 chapter 9. 10. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Peacock on the Petroleum Trade of Baku, and Batum as its Future Oudet’, BPP, vol. LXXIV, 1983, Russia, p. 364. 11. ‘Report of Consul P.Stevens on the Trade and Commerce of Batum for the Year 1892’, BPP, vols IIIC–IIC, 1893–4, Russia. 12. ‘Report on the Trade and Shipping of Bulgaria’, BPP, vol. LXV, 1886, Bulgaria, p. 208. 13. RJ.Crampton, ‘Bulgarian Society in the Early 19th Century’, in R.Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, London, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 157–204. 14. The discrepancies shown between Table 3.14 and Appendix 1.16 of the Greek participation in Marseilles, especially for the years 1870, 1880 and 1890, is owed to the fact that Table 3.14 indicates only ships chartered by Greek merchants, whereas Appendix 1.16 includes ships chartered by Greek merchants under various flags and also ships under the Greek flag chartered by other foreign merchants. 15. Information about Vaglianos comes from Andreas G.Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopulos, 1971, pp. 77–8; and M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire historique et généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983, pp. 442–3. 16. I am grateful to Mr Nicos Vlassopulos for providing me all the data I needed from his own research on the PRO on this particular point. Details on each of these ships, and generally on Ionian shipping, to be found in his book, The History of lonian Shipping, forthcoming. 17. Nicholas B.Metaxas, ‘London Shipping Offices’, in Andreas G.Lemos (ed.), The Greeks and the Sea. A People’s Seafaring Achievements from Ancient Times to the Present Day, London, Cassell, 1976, pp. 156–7. 18. E.Embiricos, About Our Steam Shipping, Athens, P.Leonis Printing House, 1900, pp. 37–8. 19. Metaxas, op. cit., p. 157. 20. The analysis of the Embiricos is based on A.N.Embiricos, History of the Embiricos Family, 1765–1981, Athens, 1983, in Greek. 21. George Embiricos had six sons; it was the grandsons from his sons Andreas and Miltiades that excelled in the first half of the twentieth century: these were Andreas’ sons, Leonidas, George, Michael, Antonios and Maris, and Miltiades’ son George M.Embiricos. See Demetrios Polemis, ‘Andreas Embiricos Writes the Biography of his Father’, Petalon, vol. 5, 1990, p. 12. 22. Ibid., pp. 3–27. 23. Fairplay, 18 March 1897, p. 438. 24. Fairplay, 31 August 1883, pp. 378–9. 25. Fairplay, 4 February 1897, pp. 175–6. 26. Susan Fairlie, ‘The Anglo-Russian Grain Trade, 1815–1861’, PhD thesis, University of London, 1959, p. 352. 27. For more details on the banlang activities of the Zarifis in Constantinople, see Harris Exertzoglou, Adaptability and Policy of Greek Capital. Greek Bankers in

NOTES 469

Constantinople: The ‘Zarifis-Zafiropulos’ Office, 1871–1881, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1989.

4 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914 1. About the pre-revolutionary fleet see Vassilis Kremmydas, Greek Shipping, 1776– 1835, 2 vols, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985– 6, in Greek. 2. As late as 1900 Epaminondas Embiricos, an MP and Minister of the Merchant Marine, doubted that total exports were more than 100,000 tons annually; see Epaminondas Embiricos, About Our Steam Shipping, Athens, P.Leonis Printing House, 1900, p. 27, in Greek. Greece’s main export was currants, which were traditionally carried by English ships, since Britain was the main consumer. They were high-value—in the last third of the nineteenth century, they represented 40–53 per cent of the total value of exports—and low-space; as a result, the majority of sailing vessels that carried them were smaller than 100 tons. See British Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860 and 1870. 3. For detailed analysis not only of wheat freights from the Black Sea but also of all bulk freights of the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, see C.Knick Harley, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 48, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 851– 76; Harley, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850–1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 26, 1989, pp. 311–38; Harley, Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850–1913’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, pp. 169–86; and Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914’, in Wolfram Fischer, R.Marvin Mclnnis and Jurgen Schneider (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500–1914, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986, pp. 519–44. 4. Maria Synarelli, Roads and Ports in Greece (1830–1880), Athens, Cultural and Technological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1989, in Greek. 5. George Dertilis, The Greek Economy and Industrial Revolution (1830–1910), Athens, Sakoulas, 1984, in Greek pp. 32–3; Vassilis Kardassis, From Sail to Steam. Greek Merchant Shipping, 1858–1914, Athens, Cultural and Technological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1993, p. 137, in Greek. 6. Synarelli, op. cit., p. 141. Synarelli’s erroneous analysis in her otherwise useful book is based on totally inadequate and undigested statistics. She goes so far as to state that ‘the steamship consolidates itselr only after the First World War: in 1918 the tonnage of steamships has surpassed the tonnage of sailing ships (p. 128). The author has made a mistake of fifteen years: Greek steamship tonnage surpassed sailing tonnage in 1902–3 (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.11). 7. Pandora, 15 July 1866, p. 239. The Bavarian King Otto reigned in Greece from 1832 to 1862. As he had no heirs, and for various other political reasons, he was

470 NOTES

8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

17.

deposed in 1862 and was replaced by the young King George of Hanover in 1863. King George I reigned in Greece from 1863 to 1913. Shipping Bank Archangelos, Archangelos, Athens; from the printing house of Perri and Vamba, 1869. For a brief reference to the company see, Shipping Conference in Syros on 1st September 1902, reprint, Athens, Greek Association of Economic Sciences, Municipality of Ermoupolis, Syros, and Greek Hellenic Association for Ship and Aircraft Insurance, 1973, p. 152 in Greek. The works and the importance of the Shipping Bank Archangelos, however, have been almost totally neglected and remain totally unresearched by Greek economic historians. More research and information about this company will shed light on the problems of the sailing ship fleet at a very crucial time. I first ‘discovered’ these valuable volumes in summer 1989, at the Aegean Museum of Myconos where its founder, Mr George Dracopulos, kindly allowed me to microfilm them. A.Metaxas and S.G.Georgopulos, Greek Merchant Shipping, 1821–1924, Athens, 1926. The data they give are approximately the same as in Mari Panopulou, ‘Economic and Technical Problems in the Greek Shipbuilding Industry, 1850– 1914’, PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1991, pp. 341, 357. Dr Panopulou uses data for thirteen years for the period 1835–1901, from the official state statistics that she was able to trace in the Statistical Tables of Greece’s foreign commerce of the period. Since the fiill series of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Registry Books of the Bureau Veritas and Lloyd’s do not exist in Greece, the Department of Maritime Studies of the University of Piraeus has undertaken to order the full series and to process the data by computer. Another project has undertaken to microfilm from all the ports of Greece all the old surviving Registry Books with an aim to construct a complete shipping series of the Greek fleet. Until both projects are complete, nineteenth-century statistical data on the sailing ship fleet will only be fragmentary. See Michael Marshall, Ocean Traders, New York, Facts-on-File, 1990; R.Riegel, Merchant Vessels, D.Appleton & Co, New York, 1921, pp. 185–90. S.Zarkos, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Measurement of Greek Ships’, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, vol. 26, July 1927, pp. 8–18. The Constantinople Conference of 1873 introduced two measurement rules according to the Moorsom system, Rule A and Rule B.Rule A was the accurate way of measuring the vessel but the problem was that the ship had to be empty for a few days to take the measurements. To give ships provisional measurements until they were re-measured under Rule A, the Conference provided that if a ship were loaded it could be temporarily measured by Rule B, a method based on the old BOM system which yielded approximate results. A large number of vessels that came to Greek ports were laden and hence were measured by Rule B. The problem with the Greek law was that it did not specify that this was temporary and hence most remained measured under Rule B. As a result there are many small discrepancies between Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and the Greek registries. S.Gorgorini, ‘Document of the Ministry of Shipping 3922, of 30 June 1880 to the Ministry of Economics: About the Moorsom Measurement System in Comparison to the Previous Systems’, Marine Code, Athens, 1896, pp. 408–13. By the latter criterion the Papayanni fleet, for example, is excluded.

NOTES 471

18. It has been found in recent decades that deadweight tonnage provides the most accurate measurement of carrying capacity. The carrying capacity of a vessel is expressed in tons of 2,240 lbs. The deadweight capacity is equal to the difference between the vessels displacement in salt water when loaded and the displacement on her light draught. The draught of a vessel is the vertical distance between the waterline and the keel. For rough calculations one assumes that 1 grt=1.5 dwt. 19. See Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp Shipping, London, Athlone Press, repr. 1981. 20. For more about this economic crisis, see D.Morier Evans, The Commercial Crisis, 1847–48, London, Letts, Son & Steer, 1848. 21. For a scholarly analysis of this crisis and its effects on Greek shipping see Christos Hadziiossif, ‘Conjunctural Crisis and Structural Problems in the Greek Merchant Marine in the Nineteenth Century: Reaction of the State and Private Interests’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 12, no. 4, winter 1985, pp. 5–20. See also Vassilis Kardassis, Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987, pp. 200–7. 22. This letter was published for the first time in the daily newspaper Sémaphore de Marseilles, 25 July 1850, and then republished in the Athenian newspaper Eon, 14 October 1850. See Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 6. 23. D.Morier Evans, The History of the Commercial Crisis, 1857–58, and the Stock Exchange Panic of 1859, London, Thomas Harrild, 1859. See also M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1938, chapter 4. 24. Christina Agriandoni, The Beginning of the Industrialization of Greece in the 19th Century, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1986, pp. 84–105, in Greek. Constantine Papathanassopulos, Greek Merchant Marine. Development and Re-adjustment (1833–1856), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1983, pp. 92–8. See also Kardassis, Syros. 25. Christos Hadziiossif, ‘Constructions Navales et Constructeurs de Navires en Grèce. De l’Independance à l’Introduction de la Navigations a Vapeur (1833–1856)’, Navigations et Gens de Mer en Méditerranée, Paris, 1980; see also Kardassis, Syros pp. 168–89. 26. Kardassis, Syros, pp. 190–1. 27. Papathanassopulos, op. cit., p. 92. 28. For a detailed and a highly interesting account of the history of Galaxidi, see Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Time of Sailing Vessels, 3 vols, Athens, 1983, in Greek. 29. These are estimations of Nicos Vlassopulos in The History of Ionian Shipping, forthcoming. I am grateful to Mr Vlassopulos for sending me part of his work at this stage. For 1854 he has calculated that Cephalonia had 146 vessels of 24,800 lonian tons; Ithaca had eighty-one craft (8,815 tons); and other regions had 105 vessels (12,360 tons). Given the possibility of a 10 per cent error, this means that there may have been as many as 365 Ionian craft (39,575 tons). 30. Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping’ p. 174. 31. Ibid., pp. 173–5. 32. See Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping’; Harley, ‘On the Persistence of Old Techniques: The Case of North American Wooden Shipbuilding’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 33, June 1973, pp. 372–98.

472 NOTES

33. See Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850–1914’, in Fischer and Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation, pp. 137–9. 34. The Greek Steamship Company is very well researched by Constantine Papathanassopulos, op. cit.; Papathanassopulos, Greek Steamship Company, The Impasses of Protectionism (1855–1872), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1987 in Greek; Papathanassopulos and Vassilis Kardassis ‘European Steamship Companies and the Trade of Syros’, Historica, vol. 2, no. 3, May 1985, pp. 125–48. 35. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘Professional Correspondence of Captain A. Syrmas with Nicolopulos, 1880–1881’, Sunderland, 17/8/1880, Archive of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 36. Ibid., Letter of Syrmas to Nicolopulo, Marseilles, 17 July 1880. 37. Ibid., Syrmas to Aristide Cosmas, 30/8/1880, where he informs Cosmas that a newbuilt steamship of 1,300 NRT costs £14,000; Syrmas to G.Kulukundis, 25/8/1880, where he informs Kulukundis that a 1,400 NRT steamship costs £17,000. 38. The Department of Maritime Studies at the University of Piraeus is currently undertaking a project to microfilm all existing ship registries from 1830 to 1939 from Syros, Andros, Chios, Santorini, Myconos, Skiathos, Skopelos, Piraeus, Galaxidi, Patras, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Corfu, and to enter these on computer. It is due to this project that we have access to the ship registries of Syros and Piraeus. 39. See Panellinion Lefkoma Ethnikis Ekatontaetiridos, 1821–1921, vol. A, Athens, National Bank ot Greece, 1921, pp. 94–103. 40. Jesus Valdaliso, ‘Spanish Shipowners in the British Mirror: Patterns of Investment, Ownership and Finance in the Bilbao Shipping Industry, 1879–1913’, International Journal of Maritime History, vol. 5, no. 2, December 1993. 41. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London; Macmillan, 1962, pp. 82–3; Sarah Palmer ‘lnvestors in London Shipping, 1820–1850’, Maritime History, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 46–68; Nordvik, op. cit.; R.Caty and E.Richard, Armateurs Marseillais au XIXe Siècle, Marseilles, Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Mars,eilles, 1986, pp. 45–6; Valdaliso, op. cit. As all authors point out, the vessel’s ownership was divided among a number of individuals, generally merchants and mariners. Co-owners or partners in a ship were called in the Greek nautical argot parcineveli. 42. Valdaliso, op. cit. 43. Nordvik, op. cit.; Eric W.Sager with Gerald E.Panting, Maritime Capital. The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990, chapters 4 and 7. 44. Valdaliso, op. cit. 45. See G.A.Rallis, Interpretation of the Greek Commercial Law, Book 2, Athens, Printing House of Andreas Koromilas Sons, 1863, p. 74. According to V. Kremmydas for the period before the formation of the Greek state the number of partners in the sailing ships was usually from two to sixteen. See Kremmydas, Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, vol. 2 Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985–6, pp. 20–5, in Greek. D.Polemis, who draws his conclusions from a sample or 805 notarial documents on sales and purchases of shares of sailing ships during the period 1830–50, indicates that the number of shares on the big sailing snips was usually around sixteen. See Demetrios Polemis, The Sailing Ships of Andros, Andros, Kairios Library, 1991, p. 44, in Greek. The

NOTES 473

46.

47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

introduction of steam brought the adaptation of one hunderd as the usual measure of the shares of ships. Report on the Situation of the Greek Merchant Marine and the Government Measures that Should be Taken for its Encouragement and its Growth, Ministry of Shipping, Syros, Renieri Printezi Printing House, 1899, p. 53. Professor Kremmydas supports the view that the third reason must be regarded as the main reason for tne joint-shipownership practice. His view is that ‘the predominance of the institution of this type of company must be interpreted as the behaviour of capital in a specific time of the Greek economy, and must be considered as a clear and conscious entrepreneurial practice implemented by a certain category of capitalists: it is about the expansionist character of capital in an internationally tried type of commercial company’. See Kremmydas, op. cit., pp. 20–5. According to Kremmydas, op. cit., p. 54, even as early as this period the master was not usually the main owner of the ship. On the definition of sermagia, see The Syros Shipping Conference of the 1st September 1902, reprint, Atnens, Hellenic Association of Economic Sciences, Municipality of Syros, Hellenic Company of Ship and Aircraft Insurance, 1973, pp. 152–3, in Greek. According to Kremmydas ‘sermagia is a company capital destined to cover the expenses of the cargo of the ship’; Kremmydas, The Hadjipanagiotis Archive, 1973, pp. 70–104, in Greek; D.Gofas further extends this definition and supports tne view that sermagia apart from being a company capital, determines the company relation that is based on the given company capital. Sermagia is also often used in the nautical jargon to define a maritime loan. However, the difference between sermagia and the maritime loan lies in the fact that the first aims at a share in the profits whereas the second at interest rates. See D.Gofas in ‘Maritime Loans, Sermagias and Vlissidia‘, Analekta Naftikou Dikaiou, vol. 1, 1988, pp. 287–311. Kremmydas, Hadjipanagiotis Archive, pp. 49–151. For more about marine insurance and credit, especially about the local market of Syros see V.Kardassis, Syros, chapter 4. John Hadjipateras (ed.), Autobiography of Constantine I. Hadjipateras, London, 1963, in Greek. Polemis, op. cit., p. 51, presents equivalent data for the same period from the notarial archives rrom Andros. Notarial Archives are an extremely valuable and completely unused source for the Greek maritime history. To give an example, Andreas David, who was a notary from 1832 to 1859 had made 31,505 notarial acts, all found in the Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades on the island of Syros. From the samples we took it seems that half of these were in shipping. If we take into consideration that the Archive of Syros has the archives of another forty-six notaries and if we include the notarial archives of another fifteen important maritime islands or city-ports, we end up with an enormous amount of material. A research programme that will process by computer large samples of this material will give us important results about the Greek and eastern Mediterranean maritime economic history. For more details on the Local Historical Archive of Syros, see Christos Loukos and Popi Polemi, Guide to the Municipal Archive of Ermoupolis, 1821–1949 Athens, Association for the Study of New Hellenism, 1987.

474 NOTES

55. 56. 57. 58.

Polemis, op. cit., p. 74. Ibid., pp. 48–9. Ibid., p. 105. See the long debate between Petros Chrysanthopulos, Jurist and Manager of the New Greek Steamship Company, who supported the implementation of the French legal system and Epaminondas Embiricos, shipowner and MP who supported the English legal system. For the details of tne debate see, Report on the Situation of the Greek Merchant and Marine and the Government Measures that should be Taken for its Encouragement and its Growth Ministry of Shipping, Syros, Renieri Printezi Printing House, 1899; and Study on the Articks 216 and 407 of the Commercial Law, Ministry of Shipping, Athens, Printhouse of Alex. Papageorgiou, 1891. All the main factors of shipping met on 1 September 1902, at tne Syros Shipping Conference, where they discussed extensively all the problems that had risen with the introduction of the new technology ships. The main subjects discussed at this highly interesting conference were about maritime mortgage, the establishment of a shipping bank and insurance, and the education of masters and engineers. 59. G.Diovouniotis, ‘About Maritime Mortgage’, The Syros Shipping Conference of 1 September 1902 2nd edn, Greek Company of Economic Sciences, Municipality of Hermoupolis in Syros, Greek Insurance Company of Ships and Aircraft, Athens, 1973, pp. 86–7.

5 VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 1 A.I.Tzamtzis, ‘Preface’, to John S.Vlassopulos, Odysseas. A Ship from Ithaca, 1837–1841 Athens, Melissa, 1992. 2 The information on Odysseas is based on Vlassopulos, op. cit., and it is the only ship of the seven presented here whose information is based on published material. Mr Vlassopulos did an excellent job in processing and presenting the logbook of the ship found in the Historical Archive of Ithaca by providing translation of the difficult language of the text—Ithacan dialect in combination with nautical argot— and important information on the various customs and aspects of the seamen’s lives. He pedantically follows the routes of the ship by checking out the given latitudes and longitudes, provides detailed maps with the snips itineraries, winds, sketches of the brig and the various tecnnical terms of the ship. To my knowledge, it is the first annotated and published logbook of a nineteenth-century Greek merchant vessel and a very important one; logbooks of sailing ships of the first twothirds of the nineteenth century are extremely rare to find. The only other published logbook about which I know is that of the merchant ship Alexandros which, during the Greek war of Independence, was converted into a warship; the logbook covers exactly the period of the war (1821–8). See Zoe Kolikourdi, Alexandros of Hadzi Alexandri. A Warship from Psara in Action. Logbook and Action (1821–1838), Athens, 1972. Parts of logs of sailing ships from Galaxidi during this period are published in Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Time of Sailing Vessels, 3 vols, Athens, 1983, in Greek.

NOTES 475

3. The log of Anastassia was given to me by Elias Martis Kulukundis. It was presented to him by the Kassian master, Antonis Hadjipetrou. 4. For more about the Kulukundis family, see Minos D.Komninos, Kassiot Karavokirides in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Athens, 1990. 5. Elias G.Kulukundis’ five sons, George, Nicholas, Manuel, John and Michael, became among the top twentietn-century Greek shipowners and the Kulukundis family remains an important shipowning family to the present day. See Chapter 6 for the family in the interwar period. 6. The document was found in the Arvanitis Archive, Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Society (ELIA). The master and owner of the ship, D. Katzulis, came from Galaxidi and the ship was insured by Alexander Mavros —who probably acted for Katzulis—in the insurance company Gli Uniti Assicuratori, established in Odessa. The insurance contract is dated 28 November 1850. 7. Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum, documents of the Dracopoulos’ family. 8. Logbook of Anastassia, Private Collection of Elias M.Kulukundis. 9. Mike Ratcliffe, Liquid Gold Ships, A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1985. 10. Logbook of Anastassia Private Collection of Elias Kulukundis. 11. Ibid. 12. Manuel E.Kulukundis, Voyages on My Father’s Ships and Others, Piraeus, Naftika Chronika, 1986, p. 9. 13. The original logbook is found in the Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum. The book was kept by the scribe of the ship. In comparison to the other logbooks presented it is kept very insufficiently, never mentioning the type of cargoes involved and giving relatively brief descriptions of the activities on board. 14. See Kolikourdi, op. cit., p. 149. The writer has combined evidence from Greek sources and from the Boston Post of 14 March 1835. According to the same source, Alexandros made two further voyages to the US in 1836 and 1837. 15. ‘Autobiography of Anastassios Syrmas’, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zographos. 16. Ibid. 17. Demetrios Polemis, The Sailing Ships of Andros, Andros, Kairios Library, 1991, pp. 83–4. 18. For Ithaca see Gerassimos Kolaitis, The Chronicle of Ithaca, Piraeus, Hellenic Maritime Museum, 1988, p. 44. 19. Ibid., and Hugh Gilchrist, Australiam and Greeks vol. 1, Melbourne, Halstead Press, 1992. 20. For the sailing vessels from Kassos see D.Komninos, op. cit., p. 209. 21. A great problem arises in all Greek documents with regard to the Greek version of the names of the various ports or geographical places. For example, in the logbook of Theofania Hull is ‘Ouli’, Dunkirk is ‘Doger’, Gibraltar is ‘Ziberalta’; in Anastassia Duke was ‘Thouk’. The appropriate names have usually been traced only by the given longitude and latitude. 22. The ship named Calliope Nicolopulo took five months to finish and was launchea on 20 October 1880. See also Chapter 4, Section 2. 23. Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’.

476 NOTES

24. Discharge Book of Anastassios Syrmas, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1910. 25. Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’. 26. Logbook of ss Leonidas Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, 17/7/1904–4/5/ 1906. The information on Leonidas is based on this log, on the book of expenses for the period 1/4/1905–10/9/1905 and on the professional correspondence of A.Syrmas with the Embiricos in a letterbook that covers the period 12/3/1905–2/5/ 1906. 27. The information on Andriana is based on the professional correspondence of Syrmas with the Embiricos in the letterbook that covers the period 19/7/1906–4/3/ 1909, and on the logbook of the ship for the period 5/3/1908– 12/7/1909, and the book of expenses for the period 5/6/1906–5/2/1910. 28. Syrmas to Embiricos, 24/10/1905 Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 29. A substantial number of charter parties and bills of lading from 1805 to the 1840s can be found in the Arcnive of the Aegean Maritime Museum and in DekoziVouros Archive in the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Society. 30. Arvanitis Archive, Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Society. Capitals in the original. 31. Ibid. 32. Logbook of Anastassia. 33. Altnough the Kulukundis were from Kassos, they were established in Syros. 34. A very limited number of accounts books of sailing ships can also be found at the Archives of the Museum of Galaxidi. See Gourgouris, op. cit. 35. Eric W.Sager, Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820– 1914, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1989, p. 81. 36. Ministry of Shipping, Collection of the Main Laws, Decrees and Circulars Related to the Greek Merchant Marine and the Ports Service, Athens, National Printing House, 1893, p. 34. According to A.N.Vernadakis, with the Law of 11 April 1867, marine schools were established in Ermoupolis of Syros, Hydra, Spetses, Galaxidi and Argostoli of Cephalonia and, with the Law of 22 June 1882, Patras, Piraeus, Syros, Cephalonia, Galaxidi, Hydra, Spetses and Santorini. All these, however, were either elementary or high schools with some classes on maritime subjects. See A.N.Vernadakis, About the Trade of Greece, Athens, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias 1885, repr. 1990, pp. 214–15; Constantine Papathanassopoulos, Greek Merchant Marine. Development and Re-adjustment (1833–1856), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece 1983, in Greek. A proper school that provided formal training for masters of merchant marine was only established as late as 1931 in Hydra and remained the only one in Greece until 1956 when the Aspropyrgos School for Masters of the Merchant Marine was established. See I.Kyriazikidou, ‘The Marine Education in Greece and the Needs of Greek Shipping for a Better Manpower’, PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1968, chapter IV. 37. Andreas G.Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, pp. 23–24. 38. In a discussion I had with the Andriot historian Demetrios Polemis, Director of the Kairios Library in Andros, in June 1993, I was told commonly known stories of Captain Syrmas’ honesty and justice.

NOTES 477

39. A.Syrmas to C.L.Embiricos in London, October 1909, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 40. A.Syrmas to A.Embiricos, 28 May 1909, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 41. Theodoros Syrmas actually became master on Embiricos ships before the First World War. In fact we find Theodoros Syrmas as master not of Andriana but of A.Embiricos’ ss Rozina (1677 NRT) in 1913, crew lists, 1913, found in the Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum. Theodoros honoured his father a decade later, when he acquired his first steamship and named it Anastassios Syrmas. Archive of Captain Theodoros Syrmas, Private Collection of Anastassios Zografos. 42. For more details see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve of the First World War, Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994, pp. 80–1. 43. Research on nineteenth-century seamen regarding their numbers, origin and wages based on archival material is almost non-existent in the Greek historicalliterature. Fortunately the Aegean Maritime Museum with the help of the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive has recently acquired the largest known archival collection on Greek seamen for the period 1860–1918. These archives, which originate from the Seamen’s Pension Fund, consist first of large books of ‘Registers of the Workers of the Sea’ from 1860–1900, and second of naftologia or crew lists which every ship had to have and renew in every change of crew at the first available port with Greek Port Authorities. These crew lists which cover the period 1908–18, were used by the Seamen’s Pension Fund in order to calculate the contributions to the Fund. Only when this valuable material is processed will we be able to have a clearer view of the structure and wages of Greek seamen. 44. Markus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 126–7. 45. Logbook of Leonidas, October 1905, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 46. Syrmas to Gioni, Sunderland 5 August 1880, in the Letterbook of Captain A.Syrmas to Nicolopulo, 1880–1, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos. 47. Embiricos apparently was outraged by the fact that Syrmas ordered ‘Jamaica Rhum’ and wrote so. Syrmas replied on 22 March 1906, ‘Regarding the Rhum we asked after the proposal of the second mate who thought it useful to have on the ship, I also protested on the brand “Jamaica Rhum” but he convinced me it was the cheapest and best for the ship.’ 48. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’. Compare also with the food on board Odysseas. 49. A.Embiricos to C.L.Embiricos, Newport, 1 January 1908, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

6 GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914–39

478 NOTES

1. A.Andreades, Les Effets Economiques et Sociales de la Guerre en Grèce, Paris, 1928, p. 108. 2. See Christos Dounis, Greek Merchant Shipping, Athens, 1991, p. 82. These ‘foreigners’ were in most cases Norwegians and Germans. The English and the French created many problems for the neutral Greek ships by delaying them in the various ports of the Mediterranean and the North Sea for inspection on the suspicion of war contraband. 3. Dounis, op. cit., p. 83; Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping, London, John Murray, 1990, pp. 349–56. 4. K.Antonopulos, ‘The Greek Shipping Policy’, Naftika Chronika, January 1976; D.G.Papamihalopulos, The State and the Merchant Marine, pp. 90–5. 5. There were actually three C-standard type ships at £145,000 each and six Bstandard type ships at £220,000 each in addition to £500,000 for timely delivery. The account of Ambatielos’ case is based on the rich file on the subject found in Britains Public Record Office, Maritime Transport 53/6/150058. 6. Ambatielos’ case lasted for more than thirty-five years until his death in 1956. In 1925 the Greek government took over his case for unfair treatment of its subiect but the British government refused to re-open the case. After more useless appeals in the 1930s, the Greek government referred the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague in May 1949. In 1953 the International Court ruled that Britain was obliged to submit the claim to arbitration. Ambatielos claimed £8,000, 000 for financial damages but died at the age of seventy-one before the International Arbritration Commission sat. The Commission, which finally sat in London on 6th March 1956, announced its decision. The compensation claim had failed. 7. The reasons behind the success of the various nations were of course different. The rise of the Japanese fleet was linked to the economic rise of the country; see Tomohei Chida and Peter N.Davies, The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries, London, Athlone, 1990. The growth of the Norwegian fleet in the interwar period and after was related to their success in tanker shipping; see Stanley G.Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition London, Athlone, 1962, chapter 4, pp. 61–97. The expansion of the Greek shipping fleet was due to postwar involvement in tankers and bulk-carriers as well as the use of flags or convenience in the 1940s and 1950s. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993. 8. Apart from British and Greek ships, a further 50 per cent of the Argentinian trade in the interwar period was carried by nine other nationalities, which were apparently involved almost exclusively in passenger or liner trade. Among the top three were Italy and Germany, in connection with emigration from Europe to Latin America on Italian passenger liners of Navigazione Generale Italiana, the Lloyd Sabaudo and Societa Triestina as well as tne German liners of North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-South American Line. In the economic conditions of the 1930s, a working arrangement had to be made between these two principal German passenger lines, while the French and Italian passenger lines had to make agreements among themselves. See, Report on the Financial, Commercial and Industrial Situation of Argentina, Department of Overseas Trade, London, HMSO, 1932, p. 133. As well, the Dutch, Spanish and Belgians participated. Two Japanese firms

NOTES 479

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK), maintained regular services to Buenos Aires until the former ceased operations in the early 1930s. According to the British Commercial Secretary in 1937, regular services between Japan and Argentina were launched by two other Japanese companies, the Yamashita Line and the Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Line, together with Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line. Sturmey, op. cit., chapter 4. See Helen A.Thanopulou, ‘The Anticyclical Behaviour of Greek Shipowners, 1974– 1989.’, unpublished paper, University of Piraeus, 1992. I thank Dr Thanopulou for making the paper available to me. Metaxas to Andreas Lemos, published in Andreas G.Lemos, The Greeks and the Sea. A Peoples Seafaring Achievements from Ancient Times to the Present Day, London, Cassell, 1976, p. 157. Cited in Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910–1939. The Coexistence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia, 1991, p. 131. Lambert Bros Ltd have been shipowners since 1841, and at the last third of the nineteenth century were known to be owners of several colliers. At the turn of the century the company extended its activities to deep-sea trading and during the interwar period they were owners of several tramp cargo steamers. See Sea Breezes, vol. 32, December 1961; I would like to thank Mr Alan H.McCleveland for providing me with this information. Not much else is, however, known about their ship-financing business apart from occasional references by Greek ship-owners tnemselves. Greeks often refer to them also as ‘coal merchants’. R&K retained its leading position in the 1940s and 1950s. One of its founders, Manolis Kulukundis, was among the top five Greek shipowners in 1956. Sturmey, op. cit., pp. 359–62, in 1962 called R&K the most important London trampshipping office. Although it is still operating, after 1945 it became part of the Kulukundis shipowning group witn branches in London, New York and Piraeus. Minos D.Komninos, Kassiot Shipowners in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century, Athens, 1990, p. 58. Manolis Kulukundis and his four brothers created a number of companies for various purposes—some probably to avoid taxes, others to take advantage of local opportunities. Tramp Shipping and Development, Atlanticos, and Hymettus Steamship, for example, were companies that owned shares in Kulukundis’ or his clients’ ships. According to Minos Komninos, apart from those operated under the Greek flag in 1939 R&K also ‘owned another 60 ships under the British and Canadian flags operated by “Counties Ship Management” that it had established in England’ (Komninos, op. cit., p. 76). R&K’s British fleet was owned by London Overseas Freighters Ltd (LOF), founded by R&K just prior to the Second World War and operating about fifteen ships; LOF continues its activities to the present day. On Canadian operations, Komninos is apparently confused: the Greek-owned Canadian flag fleet did not exist until after 1945 when Nicholaos Kulukundis (Manolis’ brother) persuaded Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Canadian Marine Administration to sell on credit sixty-eight Victory ships to his Acadia Shipping Co. Very little is known about this fleet; it would be interesting to examine its ownership structure through Canadian archival materials.

480 NOTES

17. In June 1991 I was able to interview the last surviving member of this company at its empty but daunting offices in Hermoupolis. Eighty-four-year-old Yannis Diniakos, who worked for the Rethymnis family for fifiy-eight years, was employed since the firms formation in 1925. 18. Manolis E.Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’. Naftika Chronika, 15 January 1982. 19. Komninos, op. cit., p. 57. 20. Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’. 21. Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN) 1937, pp. 153–5. 22. Ronald Hope, op.cit., p. 364. 23. Ibid. See also Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and Sea’; Kulukundis, In the Service of Shipping, 1960–1984. Articles of M.Kulukundis in Naftika Chronika, Piraeus, Naftika Chronika, 1984, p. 89. 24. Kallimanopulos’ son founded and still runs a successful tramp company. The only liner container company in Piraeus today is Sarlis Containers, a small but successful firm operating in the Mediterranean. 25. At this point I have profited from discussions with my colleague Helen Thanopulou. This subject, however, requires further investigation. 26. EEN, 1937, p. 313. 27. Diniakos, interview, June 1991. 28. This is reported by Comninos, op. cit., p. 62, but has not yet been confirmed independently. 29. This information is based on Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1938. 30. Mount Ida, for example, bought by R&K for £6,200, was sold to German owners before the Second World War for £55,000. The same strategy was followed very successfully by Stavros Livanos and Chandris Brothers. See Ship Registries, Piraeus Port Authorities. 31. Hope, op. cit., p. 366. 32. On the economics of MRS see Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp-Shipping London, Athlone, repr. 1981, pp. 229–34. Metaxas’ father, the shipowner Nicholas B.Metaxas, was an active member of the Greek Co-operation Committee set up in London in the 1930s to supervise the implementation of the MRS. See Metaxas to Lemos, in Lemos, op. cit., pp. 156–69. 33. Manolis E.Kulukundis, ‘Fifty Years 1935–1985, Greek Snipping Co-operation Committee’, in Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee, 50 Years, Piraeus, Dioptra, 1985, pp. 57–62. 34. Manolis E.Kulukundis wrote on the fiftieth anniversary or the Committee in 1985: ‘I am perhaps the last surviving member of the original group and until June of 1940 I was in London and can enumerate the contribution that the Committee made to the Shipping Industry during the first five years of its existence. First and foremost the spirit of co-operation it had engendered among the London owners as it was reflected during the frequent meetings we had and helped us to face up to the crises we were confronting. The success of the Minimum Rate Scheme initiated the steady progress that was recorded during the period, until the advent of the Second World War and the increase of tonnage under the Greek control to the discomfiture of the British owners—our chief competitors.’ Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, p. 57.

NOTES 481

35. Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Financial, Commercial and Industrial Situation of Argentina, London, HMSO, 1926. 36. Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’. 37. For example, on 20 February 1928, fifteen of the thirty-three steamers that R&K operated in 1928 had left from Argentinian ports (see Appendix 6.8). ‘Position of Steamers, 20 February 1928’, Private Collection of Yannis Diniakos. This kind of report was made weekly by R&K for their clients. A copy of this report was given to us by Yannis Diniakos in June 1991. 38. Naftika Chronika, Review of 25 Years: 1931–1956, January 1956. 39. See Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910–939. The Coexistence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia, 1991.

7 LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEK-OWNED FLEET IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 1. All references to the age of seamen for 1910 are based on table 3.5 in Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve of the First World War, Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994; for 1930, the data come from Table 4 of the Census, as published in Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEE), 1931, pp. 1164–207. 2. This Review, wnich produced its first issue in 1925 gives us valuable publications and consistent data for the rest of the interwar period. The body of the Port Authorities Officials was formed in 1919 and one of the first tasks it undertook was to start running a Review that would contain all appropriate data on the statistics of the Greek Merchant Marine and to keep the shipping world informed of international maritime affairs. The new Review sustained its high standard throughout the interwar period, but unfortunately did not keep it up in the postwar period. As a result, in the Library of the School of the Port Authorities Officials one finds complete series of the Fairplay, Scandinavian Shipping Gazette, Journal de la Marine Marchande, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and other valuable editions only for the interwar years. 3. Spiros A.Ferendinos, ‘The Sailing of the Greek Cargo Vessel loannis Th. Vlassopulos to the Southern Polar Seas’, EEN, 1929, pp. 514–25. 4. George Abouselam, Memories of the Sea, Piraeus, 1990, pp. 163–4, in Greek. 5. Royal Decree 6/12/1939, ‘Regulation of Work on Board Greek Cargo Vessels of 800 GRT and Over’. A detailed and illuminating analysis of the master’s responsibilities on board nineteenth-century Canadian vessels is to be found in Eric W.Sager, Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820– 1914, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989, pp. 81–8. 6. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, Macmillan, 1962, chapter 5; Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850–1914’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, pp. 130–7.

482 NOTES

7. Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1979, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 1. 8. A vessel built in 1924, of a tonnage of 4,000–5,000 GRT and of an average speed of 9 to 9.5 miles, consumed 27–8 tons of coal per day. See N.Katsambis, Greek Cargo Shipping, Athens, 1940, p. 32. On the basis of this data, six firemen shovelled 460 kilos of coal in every four-hour shift. 9. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20. 10. Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping, London, John Murray, 1990, p. 378. For the impact of steamships on Britisn maritime labour force, David M.Williams, ‘Industrialisation, Technological Change and Maritime Labour Force: The British Experience 1800–1914’ in C.Koninckx, Proceedings of the International Colloquium ‘Industrial Revolutions and the Sea’, Brussels, 28–31 March 1989, Wetenschappelijk Comit voor Maritieme Geschiedenis. 11. Markus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 149. 12. Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships, chapter 3. 13. Margarita belonged to N.B.Metaxas; Interview with his son, Professor Basil N. Metaxas, December 1991. 14. There exist very few dictionaries of the nautical language. One of the first from Greek to Greek is by P.E.Segditsas, Our Commonly Used Nautical Terms and the Romanic Languages, Athens, E.Eugenides Foundation, 1954. The more recent ones that are Greek-Greek, Greek-English and vice versa are by Roy Papangelou, The Language of the Vessel, Athens, Okeanida, 1991, and by John S.Vlassopulos and Peter R.Brodie, Dictionary of Shipping Terms. Greek-English and English-Greek, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1989. 15. Abouselam, op. cit., pp. 19–21. 16. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20. 17. Frank Broeze, ‘Militancy and Pragmatism. An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 1870–1914’, International Review of Social History, vol. XXXVI, 1991, pp. 165–200. 18. Cited in Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Yannis Kordatos, The History of the Greek Workers’ Movement, 3rd ed., Athens, Boukoumanis, 1972, p. 191. 21. Ibid., p. 309. 22. George Stefanatos, Greek Seamen’s Movement, Athens, Sychroni Epochi, 1978, pp. 38–9. 23. See Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greek Seamen’s Movement, 1940–1944’, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 7, fall/winter 1980, pp. 73–97. 24. Head Port Autnorities’ official N.Courbelis, ‘Crews of Greek Steamships’, EEN, 1926. 25. Rediker, op. cit., chapter 5; Sager, op. cit., chapter 6. 26. Spiros A.Ferendinos, ‘Discipline in the Greek Merchant Marine’, EEN, 1929, pp. 886–97. 27. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20. 28. Ibid., p. 27. 29. Ferendinos, ‘Discipline’, pp. 886–97.

NOTES 483

30. See Naftergatikos Agon, 19 September 1948. 31. Preamble to Law 6209, ‘On Wages of Sea Workers’, Government Gazette, 250 A, 31/7/34. 32. ‘Crew Wages on Greek ships’, EEN, 1925. 33. Michalis Riginos, Productive Structures and Workers’ Wages in Greece, 1909– 1936, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1987, p. 206. I calculated an average of twenty-five working days per month. 34. Port Authorities’ official B.Skarpetis, ‘Terms and Conditions of Work on Board English Merchant Ships’, EEN, 1927. 35. For crimping in nineteenth-century Britain, see Conrad Dixon, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Crimp 1840–1914’, in Stephen Fisher (ed.), British Shipping and Seamen 1630–1960: Some Studies, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1984, 49–67. See also C.I.Hamilton, ‘Seamen and Crime at the Cape, 1860–1880’, International Journal of Maritime History, vol. I, no. 2, December 1989, pp. 1–35; J.Stevenson, ‘The London “Crimp” Riots of 1794’, International Review of Social History, vol. 16, 1971, pp. 41–2. 36. Abouselam, op. cit., pp. 211–13. 37. Sotiris A.Agapitides, Current Trends in the Protection of Sea-labour, Athens, 1940, pp. 16–25, in Greek. For an excellent analysis of the works of the ILO and its impact on the development of the organisation of labour in Greece see Antonis Liakos, Labour and Politics in Greece during the Interwar Years. The International Labour Office and the Rise of Social Institutions Athens, Institute of Research and Education, 1993.

8 THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THE BASIS FOR THE ‘LEAP FORWARD’ 1. Part of this chapter has been published in a very different form in Gelina Harlaftis, ‘Greek Shipowners and State Intervention in the 1940s: A Formal Justification for the Resort to Flags-of-Convenience?’, International Journal of Maritime History vol. 1, no. 2, December 1989, pp. 37–63. 2. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1979, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 7. 3. United Kingdom, Public Record Office (PRO), Maritime Transport, ‘The AngloGreek Agreement’ in ‘The Vergottis Case’, MT 59, 1552. 4. United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Maritime Transport, ‘Neutral Tonnage Policy Committee’, MT 59, 1405, 106993. 5. Atle Thowsen, Fra Nøytral til Alliert Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1985, p. 60. 6. PRO, ‘The Vergottis Case’. 7. Aristotle Onassis, ‘Our Post-war Shipping, the State and the Shipowners’, [Memorandum to the president of tne Greek shipowners in New York, M.Kulukundis in 1947], Ethnikos Kyrex, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25 March 1953, in Greek. 8. Greek Shipowners’ Union (GSU), Greek Shipping During the War and After, Athens, 1946, in Greek.

484 NOTES

9. E.Babouris, The Greek Merchant Marine during the Last War, Athens, 1949, p. 24, in Greek; A.I.Tzamtzis, The Liberties and the Greeks, Athens, Hestia, 1984, p. 133, in Greek; GSU, op. cit. 10. Onassis, op. cit.; O.Eidikos, ‘The Greek Fleet and its Reconstruction’, Nea Oikonomia, vols 3 and 5, 1947, in Greek. 11. Thowsen, op. cit., p. 62. 12. Ibid., p. 8. 13. GSU, op. cit., pp. 19–20. 14. PRO, ‘The Vergottis case’. 15. Along these lines the Greek government tried to strengthen its power over the shipowners through a series of laws. LD 3140/1943 altered ENEL’s composition to seven persons appointed by the government and three shipowners. See Eleftherios Georgandopulos, The Greek Shipping Policy (1931–1961), Piraeus, 1964, p. 48, in Greek. 16. Angeliki (Gelina) Harlaftis, ‘The Greek Shipowners, the State and the Economy (1958–1974)’, DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1988, p. 55 and table 1.12. 17. Govemment Gazette 487/A, 14.11.1939. 18. The government attempted to reissue the same law it had passed twenty-six years before under the Venizelos government but at that time it had more control over shipowners who were using the Greek flag, and who had not yet adopted flags or convenience. The wholesale degeneration of implementation of the law is a typical example of the extremely loose control the Greek government maintained over the shipowners during the 1940s. For more details see Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, The Deduction of Insurance Indemnities, London, 1949, and Georgandopulos, op. cit. 19. Georgandopulos, op. cit., p. 47. 20. G.Drosopulos, ‘The Issue of the Taxation of Ships’, Report to the Inter-party Committee of Merchant Shipping by the Cyclades MP, 10 May 1949, Athens, pp. 29–30. 21. Government Gazette 45A/1949. 22. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 7. 23. Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greek Seamen’s Movement, 1940–1944’, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 7, fall/winter 1980, pp. 73–97. 24. George Abouselam, Memories of the Sea, Piraeus, 1990, pp. 53–5, in Greek. 25. For detailed account on Liberty ships see Frederic Lane et al., Ships for ‘Victory’: A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S.Maritime Commission in World War II, Historical reports on War Administration, US Maritime Commission, Baltimore, 1951. L.A Sawyer and W.H.Mitchell, The Liberty Ships, Devon, Davis and Charles, 1970. 26. See Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 3. 27. Cited in Tzamtzis, op. cit., pp. 79–80. This book provides the most integrated account of the purchase of Liberties by Greek shipowners. 28. According to Onassis there was a sterling market in New York in which many shipowners sold one sterling pound for $3 while the legal equity was $4 per £1. The sale of sterling pounds in that market by the various Greek shipowners was estimated to be around half a million pounds sterling. Onassis, op. cit. 29. Onassis, op. cit.

NOTES 485

30. Efstathios Batis, ‘The Chronicle of the Miracle (1947–1961)’, Naftika Chronika, 1 January 1962. 31. Onassis, op. cit., 17/3/53. 32. Traditional shipowners are defined as those who after the Second World War were at least second generation shipowners, i.e., those who inherited their positions from their fathers. In 1950 they owned 80 per cent of the Greek-owned tonnage, a percentage that decreased by half by 1975. For more details see Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 1. 33. Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp Shipping, London, Athlone, repr. 1981, p. 197. For a detailed discussion of flags of convenience see Metaxas, Flags of Convenience, London, Gower Press, 1985. 34. For a detailed analysis on the formation of the Liberian flag of convenience see Rodney P.Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale. The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1981, pp. 115–33. 35. Alan Cafruny, Ruling the Waves: The PoliticalEconomy of International Shipping, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987, p. 87. Mike Ratcliffe, Liquid Gold Ships: A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyds of London Press, 1985, p. 314. 36. R.Doganis and B.N.Metaxas, The Impact of the Flags of Convenience, London, Polytechnic of Central London, Transport Studies Group, 1976, p. 7. 37. For a more integrated analysis on the subject see Harlartis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapters 3 and 7.

9 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1. For a detailed analysis of the three principal dry-bulk cargoes, see Paul J. Velduizen, Freight Futures. Targeting the 90s London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1988. 2. H.L.Beth, A.Hader and R.Kappel, 25 Years of World Shipping, London, Fairplay Publications, 1984, pp. 10–15. 3. For more details see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece: From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 3. 4. Harlaftis, op. cit., chapters 3 and 7. 5. This division of the post-Second World War period and the analysis that follows is based on the excellent book by Helen Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour in Shipping. The Case of the Greek Fket Athens, Papazissis, 1994. 6. The long-term development of the tanker freight market and of the dry-cargo ships’ freight market was more or less parallel during the period under examination. See Thanopulou, op. cit., p. 51; and P.Faust, The Influence of Exogenous Factors of Freight Rate Development Bremen, Institute of Shipping Economics, 1976. 7. Part of the abrupt decrease of the Greek-owned fleet as shown in Figure 9.16 is fictitious and is due to a change in the collection of statistical data since 1984–5 from Naftika Chronika which, since that date, started collecting data for ships of 1,

486 NOTES

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

000 GRT and over, thus excluding smaller ships. See also Thanopulou, op. cit., p. 312. Stanley G.Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition London, Athlone, 1962, pp. 61–97. Atle Thowsen, Shipping and a Planned Economy, Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1986, p. 35. For a detailed analysis, see Thanopulou, op. cit., pp. 64–71, 233–8. For an early discussion on these trends in world shipping see Helen Thanopulou, ‘La Marine Marchande Grecque dans la Marine Marchande Mondiale: Les Enjeux Récents’, DEA, Université Paris I–Sorbonne, 1984; also Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping. Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping, Table A.2 and Appendix, Table 1.5. Helen Thanopulou, ‘The Growth of Fleets Registered in the Newly-Emerging Maritime Countries and Maritime Crises’, Maritime Policy and Management, vol. 22, no. 1, 1995, pp. 51–62.

10 THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK OF THE GREEKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1. Basil Metaxas, Flags of Convenience, London, Gower, 1985, p. 11. 2. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 2. 3. According to G.Gabriel these firms are operated by 350 managing companies in Piraeus. Lecture of G.Gabriel, 12 November 1993, in the Third Cycle of Open Lectures organised by the Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus. 4. Nikos Karellis, director of the Piraeus branch of the Midland Bank, has calculated the market value of the fleet managed out of Piraeus and found it to be 63 per cent of the total Greek-owned fleet, while the equivalent percentage for London was 25 per cent, for New York 8 per cent and for Monte Carlo/Switzerland 5 per cent. Nikos Karellis, Midland Bank Report, September 1991. I thank Mr Karellis for this information. 5. There were many families like the Lemos and Goulandris that had not only one but many shipping offices each. There were also other families who together owned the same firm, such as Pneumaticos, Rethymnis and Yannaghas, or Vattis and Gregos, etc. 6. See Harlaftis, op. cit., chapter 1. 7. See Harlaftis, op. cit., appendix 1. 8. Matheos D.Los, ‘Les Armateurs Grècs et les Transports Maritimes Internationaux des Marchandises en Vrac’, thèse, l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Université de Lausanne, 1981, part three, chapter 1. 9. For 1910, see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve of the First World War, Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994, table 3.5. For 1930, Epitheorisis Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1930, pp. 291–6; for 1961, K.Antonopoulos, ‘Results of the Census’, Naftika Chronika, January 1961; for 1975, see A.Corres, The Greek Seamanpower, Athens, Institute of Economic and

NOTES 487

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

Industrial Research (IOBE), 1974; for 1980, Census of Seamen on 31 May 1980, Ministry of Shipping, Direction of Maritime Labour. Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 2. Ibid. Ibid. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Wagstaff on the Trade and Commerce of Nikolaev for the Year 1877’, Bitish Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1878, vol. 75, p. 88. Barbara Conway, Maritime Fraud, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990. Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece chapter 10. Ibid., chapter 7. Ibid. See Chapter 6; and Helen Thanopulou, ‘The Anticyclical Behaviour of Greek Shipowners, 1974–1989’, unpublished paper, University of Piraeus, 1992. Helen Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour in Shipping. The Case of the Greek Fleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994, pp. 133–65. Ibid., p. 148. Fairplay, 18 March 1897, p. 438. Roundtable discussion organised by Argo and the Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus, May 1993.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED ARCHIVES Britain Public Record Office, UK: Foreign Office, FO 359/1 FO 60/294–380 FO/195 Maritime Transport, MT 59, 1552, ‘The Vergottis Case’ MT 59 1405, 106993, ‘The Ambatiellos Case’ MT 53/6/150058, ‘The Neutral Tonnage Policy Committee’ Greece Aegean Maritime Museum: Archive of Captain George P.Dracopoulos Logbook of Theofania Crew Lists, 1908–1914 Hellenic Historical and Literary Archive (ELLA): Archive of Captain Alexander Arvanitis Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades: Archive of the Notary Andreas David, Notarial Acts 1838–59, Syros 1846 Panhellenic Seaman’s Federation (PNO): Naftergatikos Agon 1950s Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos: Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas Private Collection of Elias M.Kulukundis: Logbook of Anastassia Private Collection of Yannis Diniakos: Weekly Reports of R&K Port Authorities of Piraeus, Syros, Chios, Andros, Galaxidi, Ithaca, Patras, Santorini: Ship Registries 1865–1939 STATISTICS, JOURNALS AND OTHER PUBLISHED SOURCES Britain Baltic Exchange, List of Members, 1886, 1995.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 489

British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Reports from British Consuls in Russian, Rumanian and Turkish Ports on trade and navigation, 1868–1914. British Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1840–1910. Chamber of Shipping, Annual Report, 1958–9, 1967–8. Department of Overseas Trade: Reports on the Financial, Commercial and Industrial Situation of Argentina and Greece, London, HMSO, 1922–38 Fairplay, 1883–1914. Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee: List of Liberty ships guaranteed by the Greek State. N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, 12 March 1993. Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 1850–3. Lloyd’s List, 1830–50. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1860–1938. Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, 1840–60. Greece Archangelos register of shipping, 1870–9. Argo, 1865–1915. Greek Shipping Directory, Skolarikos Publications, Piraeus, 1958–90. Ministry of Shipping: Acts, Decrees ana Collective Agreements Regarding Greek Seamen, Athens, 1951, 1954, 1961 and 1964. Bulletin of Laws, Decrees, Circulars etc. of the Administration of Merchant Marine for the Year 1937, Athens, National Printing House, 1937. Collection of the Main Laws, Decrees and Circulars Related to the Greek Merchant Marine and the Ports’ Service, Athens, National Printing House, 1893. Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1925–40. S.Gorgorini, Marine Code, Athens, 1896, 1902. Report on the Situation of the Greek Merchant Marine and the Government Measures that Should Be Taken for its Encouragement and its Growth, Ministry of Shipping, Syros, Renieri Printezi Printing House, 1899. Study on the Articles 216 and 407 of the Commercial Law, Athens, Printing House of Alex. Papageorgiou, 1891. Naftika Chronika, 1933–83. Pandora, 1852–66. Sfaira, 1885–1905. France Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1835–1910. Other OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, 1975, 1990. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1965, 1970, 1975.

490 BIBLIOGRAPHY

LITERATURE Abouselam, George, Memories of the Sea, Piraeus, 1990, in Greek. Agapitides, Sotiris A., Current Trends in the Protection of Sea-Labour, Athens, 1940, in Greek. Agriandoni, Christina, The Beginning of the Industrialisation in Greece in the 19th Century, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1986, pp. 84–105, in Greek. Asdrahas, Spiros (ed.), The Economic Structure of the Balkan Countries, 15th–19th Centuries, Athens, Melissa, 1979, in Greek. Babouris, E., The Greek Merchant Marine during the Last War, Athens, 1949, in Greek. Barty-King, Hugh, The Baltic Exchange, London, Hutchinson Benham, 1977. Batis, Efstathios, The Archipelago that Travels, Athens, Pitsilos, 1994, in Greek. Beth, H.L., Hader, A. and Kappel, R., 25 Years ofWorld Shipping, London, Fairplay Publications, 1984. Broeze, Frank, ‘Militancy and Pragmatism. An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 1870–1914’, International Review of Social History, vol. XXXVI, 1991. —, Mr Brooks and the Australian Trade. Imperial Business in the Nineteenth Century, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993. Cafruny, Alan, Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy of International Shipping, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987. Campbell, J.K. and Sherrard, Ph., Modern Greece, London, Ernest Benn, 1968. Carlisle, Rodney P., Sovereignty for Sale. The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1981. Catsiyannis, T., Pandias Stephen Ralli, London, 1986. Caty, R. and Richard, E., Armateurs Marsellais au XIXe Siècle, Marseilles, Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Marseilles, 1986. Cernovodeanu, Paul, ‘L’ Activité des Maisons de Commerce et des Négociants Ioniens du Bas-Danube durant l’Intervalle 1829–1853’, Economies Méditerranéennes. Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe–XIXe Siècles, Athens, Center of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, 1985, vol. 1. —, Relatiile Comerciale Romano-Engleze in Contextul Politicii Orientale a Marii Britanii, 1803–1878, Cluj-Napoca, Editura DACIA, 1986, in Rumanian. — and Marinescu, B., ‘Britisn Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Brailabetween 1837 and 1857’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 8, no. 3, winter 1979. Chapman, Stanley, Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From Industrial Revolution to World War I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. Chida, Tomohei and Davies, Peter N., The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries, London, Athlone, 1990. Chlomoudis, Costas, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910–1939. The Co-existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia, 1991. Cole, W.A. and Deane, Phyllis, ‘The Growth of National Incomes’, in H.J. Habakkuk and M.Postan (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol VI, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1979. Conway, Barbara, Maritime Fraud, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990. Corres, A., The Greek Seapower, Athens, Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 491

Cottrell, P.L., ‘Liverpool Shipowners, the Mediterranean, and the Transition from Sail to Steam during the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, in L.R.Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies, St John’s, NF, 1992. Crampton, R.J., ‘Bulgarian Society in the Early 19th Century’, in R.Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, London, Macmillan, 1981. Davis, Ralph, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, Macmillan, 1962. —, ‘Maritime History: Progress and Problems’, in Sheila Marriner (ed.), Business and Businessmen. Studies in Business, Economic and Accounting History, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1978. —, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1979. Dertilis, George, The Greek Economy and Industrial Revolution (1830–1910), Athens, Sakoulas, 1984, in Greek. Doganis, R. and Metaxas, B.N., The Impact of the Flags of Convenience, London, Polytechnic of Central London, Transport Studies Group, 1976. Dounis, Christos, Greek Merchant Shipping, Athens, 1991. Echinard, Pierre, ‘Grecs et Philhellènes à Marseilles de la Révolution Française à l’Indépendance de la Grèce’, thèse de doctorat, Institut Historique de Provence, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973. Embiricos, A.N., History of the Embiricos Family, 1765–1981, Athens, 1983, in Greek. Embiricos, E., About Our Steam Shipping, Athens, P.Leonis Printing House, 1900. Evans, D.Morier, The History of the Commercial Crisis, 1857–58, and the Stock Exchange Panic of 1859, London, Thomas Harrild, 1859. —, The Commercial Crisis, 1847–48, London, Letts, 1848. Exertzoglou, Harris, ‘Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850–1881’, PhD thesis, King’s College, University of London, 1986. —, Adaptability and Policy of Greek Capital. Greek Bankers in Constantinople: The ‘Zarifis-Zafiropoulos’ Office, 1871–1881, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1989. Fairlie, Susan, ‘The Anglo-Russian Grain Trade, 1815–1861’, PhD thesis, University of London, 1959. Faust, P., The Influence of Exogenous Factors of Freight Rate Development, Bremen, Institute of Shipping Economics, 1976. Fischer, Lewis R., ‘Around the Rim: Seamen’s Wages in North Sea Ports, 1863–1900’, in L.R.Fischer, Harald Hamre, Poul Holm and Jaap R.Bruijn (eds), The North Sea. Twelve Essays on Social History of Maritime Labour, Stavanger, Association of North Sea Societies, 1992. — and Nordvik, Helge W., ‘From Broager to Bergen: The Risks and Rewards of Peter Jebsen, Shipowner, 1864–1892’, Sjofartshistorisk Arbok, 1985, Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1986. — and Nordvik, Helge W., ‘Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914’, in Wolfram Fischer, R.Marvin McInnis and Jurgen Schneider (eds), The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500–1914, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986.

492 BIBLIOGRAPHY

— and Nordvik, Helge W., ‘From Namsos to Halden: Myths and Realities in the History of Norwegian Seamen’s Wages, 1850–1914’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 1987. Fisher, Stephen (ed.), British Shipping and Seamen 1630–1914: Some Studies, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1984. Fokas, Spyridon G., The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Lower Danube, Thessalomki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975. Folin, R., ‘Ports et Navigation en Méditerranée. Essai Statistique 1870–1905’, Navigations Mediterranéennes au XIXe Siècle, vol. 1, Cahier no. 9, Institut des Recherches Mediterranéennes, Université de Provence, 1987. Foustanos, George M., Foni Voontos…(During a Difficult Time in Shipping, 1982–1988), Piraeus, Dioptra, 1990, in Greek. Frangakis, Elena, ‘Izmir—An International Port in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Economies Méditerranéennes Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe–XIXe Siècles, Athens, Center of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, vol. 1, 1985. Georgandopulos, Eleftherios, The Greek Shipping Policy (1931–1961), Piraeus, 1964, in Greek. Gilchrist, Hugh, Australians and Greeks, Melbourne, Halstead Press, 1992. Gofas, D., ‘Maritime Loans, Sermagies and Vlissidia’, Analekta Naftikou Dikaiou, vol. 1, 1988, in Greek. Gourgouris, Efthimios, Galaxidi at the Time of Sailing Vessels, 3 vols, Athens, 1983, in Greek. Greek Shipowners’ Union (GSU), Greek Shipping During the War and After, Athens, 1946, in Greek. Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 50 Years, Piraeus, Dioptra, 1985. Hadjiioannou, Maria-Christina, ‘The Merchant House Gerussi (1823–1870). From the Ottoman Empire to the Greek State’, University of Athens, PhD thesis, 1989, in Greek. Hadjipateras, Constantine I., Letters to his Children, Athens, Akritas, 1994, in Greek. Hadjipateras, John A. (ed.), Autobiography of Constantine I. Hadjipateras, London, 1963, in Greek. Hadziiossif, Christos, ‘La Colonie Greque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980. —, ‘Constructions Navales et Constructeurs de Navires en Grèce. De l’Independance a l’Introduction de la Navigation à vapeur, (1833–1856)’, Navigations et Gens de Mer en Méditerranée, Paris, 1980. —, ‘Conjuctural Crisis and Structural Problems in the Greek Merchant Marine in the Nineteenth Century: Reaction of the State and Private Interests’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 12, no. 4, winter 1985. —, ‘Social Values and Business, Strategies in the Naming of Ships in Greece, 18th–20th Centuries’, in Speros Vryonis Jr (ed.), The Greeks and the Sea, New York, A.D.Karatzas, 1992. —, The Aged Moon. Industry in the Greek Economy, 1830–1940, Athens, Themelio, 1993, in Greek.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 493

Harlaftis, Gelina, ‘The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea’, in Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik (eds), Shipping and Trade, 1750–1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History, Yorkshire, Lofthouse Publications, 1990. —, Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945–1975. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdepedence, London, Athlone, 1993. —, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve of the First World War, Mykonos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994. — and Helen Thanopoulou, ‘Transport of Power’, in Lewis R.Fischer and David Williams, Maritime Europe, London, Scolar, 1995. Harley, C.Knick, ‘On the Persistence of Old Techniques: The Case of North American Wooden Shipbuilding’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 33, June 1973. —, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850–1914’, in Lewis R.Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St. John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985. —, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 48, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 851–76. —, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850–1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 26, 1989. Harvey, M.L., ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley, University of California, 1938. Herlihy, Patricia, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, 1976. —, ‘The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1977. —, ‘Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vols 3–4, 1979–80. —, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986. —, ‘The Greek Community in Odessa, 1861–1917’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 7, 1989. Hope, Ronald, A New History of British Shipping, London, John Murray, 1990. Isserlis, L., ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes and Freights’, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, vol. 101, 1938. Jackson, Gordon, The History and Archaelogy of Ports, Surrey (UK), World’s Work, 1983. Jelavich, Barbara, Balkan History. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1987. Kandylis, G., Three Families of the Great Diaspora, Chios, Pontos, Russia, 1822– 1924, Athens, Ermis, 1994. Kardassis, V., Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987. —, From Sail to Steam. Greek Merchant Shipping, 1858–1914, Athens, Cultural and Technological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1993. Karidis, Viron, ‘The Greek Communities in South Russia: Aspects of their Formation and Commercial Enterprise, 1774–1829’, MA thesis, University of Birmingham 1976. —, ‘A Greek Mercantile Paroikia: Odessa 1774–1829’ in Richard Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, London, Macmillan, 1981.

494 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Katsiardi-Hering, Olga, The Greek Community in Trieste, 1751–1830, 2 vols, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, in Greek. Kitroeff, Alexander, ‘The Greek Seamen’s Movement, 1940–1944’, Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 7, fall/winter 1980. —, The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. Ethnicity and Class, Oxford, Ithaca Press, 1989. Kolaitis, Gerassimos, The Chronick of Ithaca, Piraeus, Hellenic Maritime Museum, 1988. Kolikourdi, Zoe, Alexandros of Hadzi Alexandri. A Warship from Psara in Action. Logbook and Action (1821–1838), Athens, 1972. Komninos, Minos D., Kassiot Karavokirides in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Athens, 1990. Konstantinides, Tryphon, Ships, Captains and Seamen, 1800–1830, Athens, Royal Navy Historical Editions, 1953, in Greek. Kradonelli, Alexandra, History of Piracy during the First Years of Turkish Domination (1390–1538), Athens, Hestia, 1985, in Greek. —, History of the Piracy during the Middle Years of Turkish Domination, 1538–1699, Athens, Hestia, 1991, in Greek. Kremmydas, Vassilis, The Hadjipanagiotis Archive, 1973, in Greek. —, Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, 2 vols, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985–6, in Greek. Kulukundis, Manolis E., Ships Loved and Painted, London, Krikos, 1977. —, In the Service of Shipping, 1960–1984. Articles of M.M.Kulukundis in Naftika Chronika, Piraeus, Naftika Chronika, 1984. —, Voyages on My Father’s Ships and Others, Piraeus, Naftika Chronika, 1986. Lane, Frederic et al, Ships for ‘Victory’: A History of Shipbuilding under the United States Maritime Commission in World War II, (Historical Reports on War Administration, US Maritime Commission) Baltimore, 1951. Lemos, Andreas G., Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, 1971. —, The Greeks and the Sea. A Peoples Seafaring Achievements from Ancient Times to the Present Day, London, Cassell, 1976. Leontaritis, G., ‘Greek Merchant Marine’, in S.Papadopoulos (ed.), Greek Merchant Marine (1453–1850), Athens, National Bank of Greece, 1972. Liakos, Antonis, Labour and Politics in Greece during the Interwar Years. The International Labour Office and the Rise of Social Institutions, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, 1993, in Greek. Loukos, Christos and Polemi, Popi, Guide to the Municipal Archive of Ermoupolis, 1821– 1949, Athens, Association for the Study of New Hellenism, 1987. Mangriotis, D., ‘The Greek Population in London, 1837–1881’, MSc thesis, London School of Economics, 1984. —, ‘The Demographic History of the Greek Merchant Community of London, 1837– 1881’, Historica, vol. 3, no. 6, December 1986. Marshall, Michael, Ocean Traders, New York, Facts-on-File, 1990. Mauro, Frederic, ‘Merchant Communities, 1350–1750’, in J.D.Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World (1350–1750), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Metaxas, A. and Georgopoulos, S.G., Greek Merchant Shipping, 1821–1924, Athens, 1926. Metaxas, Basil, The Economics of Tramp Shipping, London, Athlone, repr. 1981. —, Flags of Convenience, London, Gower, 1985.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 495

Moulakes, Christos, The House of Ralli Brothers, Athens, 1964. Natkiel, Richard and Preston, Antony, Atlas of Maritime History, New York, Facts-onFile, 1985. Nordvik, Helge W., ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850–1914’, in Lewis R.Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985. Onassis, Aristotle, ‘Our Post-War Shipping, the State and the Shipowners’, Ethnikos Kyrex, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25 March 1953, in Greek. Palmer, Sarah, ‘Investors in London Shipping, 1820–1850’, Maritime History, vol. 2, 1973. —, Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1990. Panellionion Lefkoma Ethnikis Ekatontaetiridos, 1821–1921, vol. A, Athens, National Bank of Greece, 1921. Papamichalopulos, D.G., The State and the Merchant Marine, Athens, 1925. Papathanassopulos, Constantine, Greek Merchant Marine. Development and Re adjustment (1833–1856), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1983, in Greek. —, Greek Steamship Company. The Impasses of Protectionism (1855–1872), Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1987, in Greek. — and Kardassis, Vassilis, ‘European Steamship Companies and the Trade of Syros’, Historica, vol. 2, no. 3, May 1985. Pavlides, E., The Greek Population of Russia and the 33 Years of the Association of the Greeks from Russia, Athens, 1953, in Greek. Polemis, Demetrios, ‘Andreas Embiricos Writes the Biography of his Father’, Petalon, vol. 5, 1990, in Greek. —, The Sailing Ships of Andros, Andros, Kairios Library, 1991. Psiroukis, Nikos, Greek Settlers in Modern Times, Athens, Epikairotita, 1974. Puryear, John Vernon, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935. Rallis, G.A., Interpretation of the Greek Commercial Law, book 2, Athens, Printing House of Andreas Koromilas Sons, 1863. Ratcliffe, Mike, Liquid Gold Ships, A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1985. Rediker, Markus, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. Richards, Alan, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Egypt, 1798–1882’, in Huri IslamogluInan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the Wond Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1990. Riginos, Michalis, Productive Structures and Workers’ Wages in Greece, 1909–1936, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1987. Sager, Eric W., Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1989. — with Panting, Gerald E., Maritime Capital. The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1990. Sawyer, L.A. and Mitchell, W.H., The Liberty Ships, Devon, Davis and Charles, 1970.

496 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sfyroeras, Vassilis, The Dragomans of the Fleet. The Institutions and the Bearers, Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1965, in Greek. Shaw, S., ‘The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteentn Century’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 10, 1979. Shipping Conference in Syros on 1st September 1902, Athens, Greek Association of Economic Sciences, Municipality of Ermoupolis, Syros, and Greek Hellenic Association for Ship and Aircraft Insurance, repr. 1973, in Greek. Siegelbaum, Lewis, ‘The Odessa Grain Trade’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 9, spring 1980. Stefanatos, George, Greek Seamens Movement, Athens, Sychroni Epochi, 1978. Stoianovich, Traian, ‘Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 20, 1960. Sturdza, M.D., Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983. Sturmey, Stanley G., British Shipping and World Competition, London, Athlone, 1962. Svoronos, Nicos G., Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe Siècle, Paris, Presses Universitaire de Frances, 1956. —, The Unsaid on Modern Greek History and Historiography, Athens, Themelio, 1987, in Greek. Synarelli, Maria, Roads and Ports in Greece (1830–1880), Athens, Cultural and Technological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1989. Syriotes, Mikes, ‘The House of Ralli Brothers’, Chiaka Chronika, vol. A, 1911. Taylor, James, Ellermans. A Wealth of Shipping, London, Wilton House Gentry, 1976. Thanopulou, Helen A., ‘La Marine Marchande Grecque dans la Marine Marchande Mondiale: Les Enjeux Récents’, DEA, Université Paris I-Sorbonne, 1984. —, ‘The Anticyclical Behaviour of Greek Shipowners, 1974–1989’, unpublished paper, University of Piraeus, 1992. —, Greek and International Shipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour in Shipping. The Case of the Greek Fleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994. —, ‘The Growth of Fleets Registered in the Newly-Emerging Maritime Countries and Maritime Crises’, Maritime Policy and Management, vol. 22, no. 1, 1995, pp. 51–62. Thowsen, Atle, Fra Noytral til Alliert, Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1985. Tsimpidaros, B., The Greeks in England, Athens, Alkaios, 1974, in Greek. Tzamtzis, A.I., The Liberties and the Greeks, Athens, Hestia, 1984. Valdaliso, Jesus, ‘Spanish Shipowners in the British Mirror: Patterns of Investment, Ownership and Finance in the Bilbao Shipping Industry, 1879–1913, International Journal of Maritime History, vol. 5, no. 2, December 1993. Veldjuizen, Paul J., Freight Futures. Targeting the 90s, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1988. Vernadakis, A.N., About the Trade of Greece, Athens, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias, 1885, repr. 1990. Vidali, M.W., ‘Chiot Shipowners in London and the Persistence of Ethnicity’, MPhil thesis, Polytechnic of Central London, 1988. Vikelas, D., My Life, Athens, 1908. —, Loukis Laras. Autobiography of an Elderly Chiot, Athens, Odysseas, repr. 1988. Vlassopulos, John S., Odysseas. A Ship from Ithaca, 1837–1841, Athens, Melissa, 1992. Williams, David M., ‘lndustrialisation, Technological Change and the Maritime Labour Force: The British Experience 1800–1914’, in C.Koninckx, Proceedings of the

BIBLIOGRAPHY 497

International Colloquium ‘lndustrial Revolutions and the Sea’, Brussels, 28–31 March 1989, Wetenschappelijk Comite voor Maritieme Geschiedenis. Xenos, Stephanos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869.

INDEX

Abouselam, Captain George 212, 216, 219– 20, 222–3 accident rates 278 Adrianople, Treaty of (1829) 48, 147 age of ships 235, 278 ‘Agreements and Accounts of Crew’ 170–1 alcohol 176–7 Alexandria 9, 14; and Chiot network 40; Greek merchants in 50, 399n. Ambatiello family 128 Ambatielos, Nicolas 186–7, 414n. Ameros family 50 Anastassia (sailing ship) 144, 147–53, 168; voyages 147–52 Andreades, S. 237 Andriana (steamship) 163–6, 168, 412n.; profits 169 Andros 158, 168; continuing influence 274; Ottoman rule in 3; see also Embiricos family Anglo-Greek Agreement (1941) 228 anticyclical investment behaviour 193–4, 281 Ararat (sailing ship) 36–7 Arcadia (sailing ship) 36 Archangelos company xxiv Archangelos shipping register 106–7, 111– 12, 117–18 Argenti & Co 44, 46 Argenti, P. and Sechiari, F. 48 Argentina 414n.; British trade with 189–91 Arvanitides, Cosmas 102 Arvanitides family 84–5, 87, 102

Arvanitis, Captain Alexander 166, 167 Atlantic trading 153–4, 246–7 Australia, Greek seamen on ships to 154 Avierino 46 Azov ports, bulk cargo 25; commuaications difficulties 78–80; and Ionian network 78–81 Bahamas, flags of convenience 241 Baltazzi firm 51 Baltic Coffee House 57 Baltic Exchange 57–9, 63; Greek members 57–9, 68, 95–8, 280; Jewish members 97–8 Bangladesh, flags of convenience 241 Bank of Athens 94–5, 133–4 bankruptcy, insurance firms 113; merchants 115 banks 62, 133–4, 140; established by shipping families 93, 94– 5; as shipowners 141–2 Barbarossa, Kayr al Din 5 Basiliou, Euphrosyne 53–4 Batum (port) 84–5 bauxite/alumina trade 251, 253 Berdiansk (port) 79 Bermuda, flags of convenience 241 Black Sea, communications 57; grain trade 25; hostile environment of 56–7; Ionian network in 82–7; land ownership 67; nineteenth-century shipping 24–38;

498

INDEX 499

reduction of trade in First World War 185–6 blockades, Greek disregard of 277–8 Britain, cargo 13; and Chiot network 40–1; decline of tramp fleet 188–9; and flags of convenience 245; and grain trade 20–1; Greek ships using flag of 32; Greeks handling Eastern Mediterranean trade 91; and growth of Greek tramp fleet 201– 2; merchant communities in 39; Navigation Laws (1849) 21; route to Argentina 189–91; size of fleet 265, 266; and textile trade 21, 59; tonnage measurement 110–11; transition from sail to steam 130; wage levels 233; see also Baltic Exchange; London Bulgaria 85–7 bulk cargo 9, 10, 12–14, 21–3, 34, 182; diminishing importance 37; Greek specialisation in 38, 280–1 bulk carriers 245, 257–61, 264 Bureau of Work at Sea (GENE) 223 business strategy 277–83 Cairo 9, 14; and Chiot network 40 Calliope Nicolopulo (steamship) 158–62, 176 Canada, shipowning networks 69 cargo, of liner and tramp companies 36–7; trading in 59–60; see also bulk cargo; dry cargo; general cargo; oil trade Cassavetti firm 42 Caucasus ports, bulk cargo 25 Cayman Islands, flags of convenience 241 Chandris Brothers 237, 276 charter parties 62, 166–7

China 278, 281; size of fleet 266 Chios, destruction by Turks 115; as Genoese colony 3; maritime tradition 4–5; shipping network see Chiot network Chiot network, becoming shipbrokers and agents 89; differences to Ionian network 90–5; and Rethymnis and Kulukundis (R&K) 197; role of Syros 118; shipowning 40–51, 60–7; survival of traditional practices 274–6; transition to Ionian network 67–9; and twentieth-century Chiot shipowners 100–3 Chrussaki family 85 Chryssoveloni Bros. 74 Cicellis family 88; purchasing steamships 121, 125 citizenship, benefits of 55 City of London Marine Insurance Company 96 co-ownership 134–8, 408–9n.; share-holders 133, 134–8, 195–7 coal trade 163, 164–5, 251, 253, 254, 255 Comnas, Anargyros B. 153, 156 Comnas, Nicholas 156 Constantinople 9, 14 Constantinople, and Chiot network 40, 50; and grain trade 48; and Ionian network 85, 87; as necessary stopping place 167; steamship owners in 126 consuls, Greeks as 55, 56 convenience, flags of see flags of convenience Corgialegno family 88 Corn Laws 20, 112 Costa Rica, flags of convenience 241 cotton 21, 24 Couppa family 88 Courtgi, P.M., as steamship owners 126 Cremidi family 41 Crete, maritime tradition 4–5 crew see seamen Crimean War 68, 278

500 INDEX

crimps 222–3, 418n. Cuba 278 Cucussi family 41 currants 405n. Cyprus, flag of convenience 241, 278 D’Anastassy 50, 56 Danube area, European Commission of the Danube 72, 78; Ionian network in 71, 72–8 David, Andreas 138, 409n. Davis, R. 69 Dellaporta family 88 Demetrius S.Schilizzis (steamship) 160–1, 162 deposit trade 14–21 desertion 153, 154, 174 Dracoulis Brothers 101, 128 Dracopulos, George P. 151 Dreyfus, Louis 81 Dromocaiti family 44, 46, 47, 88; shipowning 60, 61 Drosopulos, G. 232 dry cargo trade 245, 247, 250, 251–5 duration of voyages 168 education, maritime 157, 171–2, 223, 418n.; for merchant families 54 Egypt, and grain trade 21; and textile trade 21 Egyptian (liner) 35–6 Embiricos A.A. 128 Embiricos, Alcibiades 94, 162, 163–5, 166, 173–4 Embiricos, Epaminondas 94–5, 141, 405n. Embiricos family 93–5, 101, 128, 274; employment of Captain Syrmas 162–3, 173–4, 404–5; political activities 94–5; purchasing steamships 121, 125 Embiricos, George Miltiades 95, 128 Embiricos, Leonardos 93–4 Embiricos, Leonidas 94–5 Embiricos, Leonidas M. 154 Embiricos, Matheos 154 Embiricos, S.G. and Michalinos 89

Embiricos, Stamatios 94 entrepreneurial methods 277–83 Eugenides, Eugene 234 exploitation of seamen 222–3, 418n. Fachiri family 41 Fairplay (journal) 64–6, 74–5, 95–8, 282 Fakis, Captain Francesco 139 family, as basis of shipping companies 203– 4; relations in crews 215–17; role in Chiot trade 51–5, 59 Federation of Greek Maritime Unions (OENO) 234–5 Ferendinos, Spiros 211, 218, 220 financing, by London shipping offices 195–203; mortgages 93, 94, 140–1, 205; short-term loans 138; of steamships 132–4 Firemen, Union of 217 First World War, Greek role in 181–7, 278; loss of Greek ships 182, 183–5; profits 228 flags of convenience 29–33, 111, 112, 226, 227, 240–5, 264; advantages 242, 243–5; boycott against 243–5, 265; countries offering 240–1; disadvantages 242–3; move away from 245, 265 Fokas, Spyridon 73 Foscolo & Mango 161, 162; purchasing steamships 121, 125, 126 France, tonnage measurement 110–11 Franghiadi family 41 fraud, sinkings 113 freight rates 114; falls in 151; in First World War 187; fluctuations 113, 115; inter-war 189; Minimum Rate Scheme (MRS) 200–1; and purchase of steamships 122–3, 126, 129; in Second World War 228–9; and unemployment 218

INDEX 501

frequency of voyages 168 Galati family 50 Galaxidi, as maritime centre 115, 118, 119 general cargo 9–14, 34–5 Georgacopulo family 41 Geralopulo family 41 Gerussi family 41, 401 n. Goulandris, P. & Sons 237, 276 grain trade 14–21, 251, 253, 255; and Azov ports 78; Bulgaria 85–7; in Danube 72–8; trading methods 55–6; use of steamers 98 Greco-Turkish war (1896–7) 33 Greek Committee for the Merchant Marine 195–6 Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) 218 Greek Merchant Shipping 107 Greek Revolution (1821) 115 Greek Seamen’s Union (NEE) 234 Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee 201, 206 Greek Shipping Committee in London (ENEL) 229–30 Greek state, foundation of 29 Greek Steamship Company (GSC) 66, 120– 1, 140, 400n. gross and net tonnage (GRT) 112 growth rate of fleets 191–4 Hadjioannou family 277, 278 Hadjipateras, Constantine I., autobiography 138 Harley, C.Knick 119 Heckscher, Siegfried 217 Hellenic Lines 199 Herlihy, P., on Livorno 49 Homere firm 51 Honduras, flags of convenience 241 Hong Kong, flags of convenience 241 Hydra, as maritime centre 118 Inchcape, Lord 197 insurance 96, 137–8, 278;

fraudulent claims 113 International Labour Organsation (ILO) 223 International Transport Federation (ITF) 218, 243–5 Ionian islands, as maritime centre 3, 4–5, 118–19 Ionian network, and Azov ports 78–81; in Constantinople 85, 87; in Danube 71, 72–8; differences to Chiot network 90–5; investment in steam 98, 99–103, 133– 4; location 71–2; in London 87, 89; and Marseilles 87–9; organisation and business methods 89– 99; structure of 70–1; transition firom Chiot network 67–9; in twentieth century 99–103, 274 Ionides 42 iron ore trade 251, 253–5 Isle of Man, flags of convenience 241 Italy, as maritime power 3; seamen’s union 218 Japan 246, 247, 414n.; shipbuilding 264; size of fleet 264, 268 Jewish merchant communities 39, 68, 96–7 joint ownership 134–8, 408–9n.; shareholders 133, 134–8, 195–7 Kallimanopulos, Pericles 199 Karavias A.G. 74 Karouso X. 74 Kassos Steamships 197 Katzoulis, D. 166–7 kinship ties 51–5, 59, 203–4, 215–17, 275– 6 Kitroeff, A. 234 Kondylis, Demetrios 139 Korea, size of fleet 266 Korean War 240, 264, 278 Kouklelis & Michaelides 74 Kulukundis, Elias G. 147, 153

502 INDEX

Kulukundis family 152–3, 276, 411 n., 415n.; buys steamship 153; owner-ship of Anastassia 147 Kulukundis, Manolis 153, 200–1, 202, 235, 415n., 416n.; establishment of R & K 196, 197 Kylsant, Lord 197–9 Kyriakides, N.G. 128 labour relations 203, 233–5, 282; quality of on Greek ships 214–15 Lambert Bros. 196, 197, 415n. Lambrinudis, A. 133 land ownership, and Black Sea trade 67 Lascharidi firm 50 Lazarachi family 88 Lebanon, flags of convenience 241 Lemos, Andreas 173 Lemos, Costas M. 276 Lemos family 275 Leonidas (steamship) 162–3, 168, 412n. Liberia, flags of convenience 240–1, 243– 4, 264 Liberty ships 235–40, 264, 282 lighthouses 144, 152 liner shipping 34–7, 199–200, 253, 257 Livanos, George S. 276 Livanos, G.P. 277 Livanos, Stavros 102, 237, 240, 278 Liverpool 9, 42, 401n. Liverpool Journal of Commerce 40–1, 41– 2 living conditions of crew 176–7, 210–12, 219–20 Livorno, and Chiot network 40; and grain trade 14, 20, 49–50 Lloyds, and ‘approved’ list 202; asking for extra premiums 202–3 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping xxiv, 60–2, 85, 107, 121, 134–5, 205 loans, ‘loan of necessity’ 140; mortgages 93, 94, 140–1, 205; short-term 138, 140 logbooks 410n., 411n. London, development as operational centre 126–7, 128–9;

Greek merchants in 9, 400n.; Greek shipowners in during Second World War 226, 227; Ionian network and 87, 89 London Customs Bills of Entry xxiv, 41, 81–2, 147 London shipping offices 128–9, 194–203, 269–70, 279–80 London shipping offices, based on island of origin 194–5; collaboration with British firms 196–7; collaboration with companies 204; profits 195–6, 201; in Second World War 229–31; as shareholders 195–7; and single-ship companies 205; structure 195–6 Lykiardopulos, N.D. 128, 237 Malta, flags of convenience 241 marine schools 412n. Maroulis A.P. 74 marriage, in Chiot network 51–5; in Ionian network 89–90; and owner-ship structure 275 Marseilles 9, 37, 38; cargo 12, 14, 15–16, 23; and Chiot network 40; Greek merchants and shipowners in 44; and Ionian network 87–9 Marshall Islands, flags of convenience 241 master, as co-owner 172–3; foreign languages 157, 172, 173; qualifications 157, 171–2, 223; relationship with owners 212; role of 138–40, 171–2, 212 Mavrandonis, A. 152 Mavrogordato, C.N. 56 Mavrogordato firm 49 Mavros family 48, 53–4, 89 Mavros, Stephanos 53–4 Melas family 44, 48, 54; shipowning 61, 62 Melas, L. 124 merchant communities 39, 68, 96–7, 400–1 n. merchant houses, Chiot network 49–51;

INDEX 503

structure of 51–5 Metaxas, Nicholas B. 195 Michaelides, Byron 283 Michalinos family 128; as steamship owners 126 migration, in Mediterranean 9; to Black Sea ports 7–9 Miliotti family 88 Minimum Rate Scheme (MRS) 200–1 mortgages 93, 95, 140–1; mortgage law (1910) 205 NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) 171, 232, 237, 413n. National Bank of Greece 140 navigation 72, 145 Navigation Laws 112; repeal (1849) 147 Negroponte family 52 net registered tonnage (NRT) 112 Neufeld & Co. 97–8 Neufeld, M. 81 New York, shipping offices 272, 280 Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) 247, 255, 266 Niarchos, Stavros 262–4, 276 Nicolaieff (port) 81; bulk cargo 25 Nicolopulo Brothers 158, 159, 161–2; purchasing steamships 121, 122, 125 night sailing 144, 152 Nikolaou, G. 237 Nomikos, M. 237 Norway 69, 414n.; British requisitioning of ships 228, 229; and flags of convenience 245; inter-war growth of fleet 192; and oil trade 152; sailing vessels 120; size of fleet 264, 266–8; tanker ownership 262–4 notarial archives 409n. Odessa 44–6, 67–8, 81; bulk cargo 25; and grain trade 20;

Greek merchants in 401n. Odysseas (sailing ship) 144, 168, 410n.; arming of 147; voyages 145–6 Oikos Naftou (House of Seamen) 223 oil trade 151–2, 226, 245, 247–51, 252, 256–7, 280–1 Oinoussai, traditional practices of shipowners 274–6 Onassis, Aristotle 262–4, 276, 420n.; on tax evasion 237–8 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 251 Ottoman Empire, decline 6; and piracy 4–5; and Russia 7; trade with Europe 6–7 Overend, Gurney & Co. 64 ownership, definition of 29–33; occupational categories of 141–2 Palmyra (steamer) 35 Pana family 41, 88 Panama, flags of convenience 240–1, 243– 4 Pandora (journal) 106, 169 Panhellenic League of Wireless Officers 217–18 Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation (PNO) 218, 220–1, 234–5 Panhellenic Socialist Congress 217 Panhellenic Union of Marine Cooks 217 Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Engineers 217 Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Masters 217 Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Stewards 217 Papayanni, Basil 62, 64–7, 157 Papayanni family 41, 400n., 403n.; purchasing steamships 121, 124, 125; shipowning 61, 62 Papudoff family 44, 46, 47; shipowning 60, 61 passenger lines 34, 414n. Pavlides, Eleftherios 398n.

504 INDEX

Petalas-Maratos, Antonis (master of Odysseas) 144, 145–6 Petrocochino & Agelasto 44, 47; shipowning 60, 61 Petrocochino family 50 phosphates trade 251, 253 piracy 4–5 Piraeus, increasing influence 277; as maritime centre 51, 118, 126–7, 129; registration of vessels 132, 141–2; shipping offices 272–4 Polemis, Demetrios 95, 140, 154 Polemis, S. 277 ‘ports for orders’ 59–60 postal system 57 profits, in First World War 181, 182, 183– 7, 228; of London shipping offices 195–6, 201; of routes 168–9; in Second World War 228–9; taxation of war profits 185 protectionism 186 Ralli & Petrocochino 52 Ralli, Antonio 57 Ralli, Augustis 52 Ralli Brothers 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 399n., 402n.; branches of 52–3 Ralli family 50, 52 Ralli, John 52, 53, 56, 59 Ralli, Pandia 52, 53, 56, 57, 59 Ralli, P.T., shipowning 61, 62 Ralli and Scaramanga 46 Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti 44, 46, 48, 60, 61, 88 Ralli, Stephen 53 Ralli, Stratis 52 Ralli, Tomazo 52 Rediker, Marcus, on wages 175–6 Renieris, Markos 106–7 repairs 168 Rethymnis and Kulukundis (R&K) 194–5 196–9, 415n.; and Chiot families 197; and Lambert Brothers 196, 197; ownership structure of ships 199;

purchasing secondhand ships 197–9; structure 198 Rodocanachi & Co 44–6, 47, 48 Rodocanachi family 41, 42, 48–9, 50, 52, 89; purchasing steamships 122, 125; shipowning 60, 61 Rodocanachi, M.E. 57 Rodocanachi, Paul 56 Rodocanachi, P.P. 97 Rodocanachi, Th. 56 Romano family 88 Roskill, Eustace, on Vergottis case (1945) 231 Rostov-on-Don 78, 79 Russia, development of Black Sea ports 82– 5; Greek settlement in 7–8; Greek ships using flag of 31, 33; see also Black Sea Russo-Turkish War, (1770s) 7; (1828–9) 7, 8; (1877–8) 7, 8, 33, 119, 278 Sager, Eric 171 sailing ships, combination of trade and transport 137–8; competitiveness with steam 120; crew 169, 171; and development of Greek fleet 106– 20; duration of voyages 168; frequency of voyages 168; ownership patterns 136–7; transition to steamships 120–30 Saint Vincent, flags of convenience 241 Scaramanga family 50, 52, 53, 88–9; purchasing steamships 122, 125 Schilizzi family 42, 50, 51, 52; purchasing steamships 124; shipowning 61, 62 Schilizzi, St. P. & Co. 41 schleps (lighter ships) 72, 73 Scliri firm 48 seamen, archives on 413n.; class consciousness 216–17; composition of 171, 172, 209;

INDEX 505

exploitation by crimps 222–3, 418n.; introduction of employment legislation 223; kinship or island ties 174, 276, 282; lack of legal protection 222–3, 225; language of 216; living conditions 176–7, 210–12, 219– 20; numbers of 169–71, 209; overtime pay 219, 220; ratings and officers 208–9, 211, 213, 214; trade unions 217–25; umemployment among 208, 217, 218; wages 174–6, 204, 210–11, 220–2, 224– 5, 233–5; working hours 209–10, 213, 218–19 Seamen’s Pension Fund (NAT) 171, 232, 237, 413n. Seamen’s Union of Greece (NEE) 218, 220 Second World War, British use of Greek ships 228; effect on Greek fleet 226–9; profits 228–9; taxation in 231–3 secondhand vessels 281–2 Sémaphore de Marseilles (journal) xxiii, 32, 42–3, 47, 48, 60, 62, 81–2, 170 sermagia (capital) 137–8, 409n. Sevastopol, bulk cargo 25 Sevastopulo family 48, 49, 50, 52, 89 shareholders 133, 134–8; London shipping offices 195–7 shipbroking 68–9 shipbuilding 115–17; coastal 117; deep-sea 117; Japanese 264; Liberty ships 235–40; in Second World War 235; tankers 262–4 Shipping Law (1910) 95 shipping offices 63, 78, 168; in America 270–1; in Buenos Aires 269;

in London see London shipping offices; and ownership structure 271–4; in Shanghai 269; socialist countries 281 ships’ names 399n. Ships Sales Act (1946) 235 Siderides family 84–5, 87, 101 Siderides, Spyridon 101–2 single-ship companies 203, 204–5, 212 Skaltsounis, Ioannis 106–7 Smyrna 9, 14; and Chiot network 40, 50; Greek merchants in 50–1 Spanish Civil War 278 Spartali firm 41, 42, 44, 89; purchasing steamships 124 Spartali firm, shipowning 61, 62 Spetses, as maritime centre 115–17, 118 Stathatos Bros 74, 75–6; purchasing steamships 121 Stathatos, Constantine A. 128 Stathatos, Dionyssios A. 128 Stathatos family 100–1 Stathatos, Othon A. 74, 128 Stathatos and Theofilatos, purchasing steamships 121, 125 Stathopulos family, purchasing steamships 121, 125 steam tugs 72–4, 144, 152 steamships 34–7; competitiveness with sail 120; crew 170, 171, 172, 209; duration of voyages 168; introduction of 68; and Ionian network 98, 99–103; main companies 35; necessitating changes in financing 140– 1; patterns of ownership and finance 130– 42; as proportion of national fleets 130, 131; routes 35–6, 37–8; secondhand 133; shareholders in 133, 135–8; single-ship companies 134–5; size of holdings 134–5;

506 INDEX

subsidies for 120; superseding sailing vessels 120–30; use in grain trade 98 strikes 217, 218, 220–1, 233–4 Sturmey, Stanley 191 subsidies, for steamship companies 120; for tramp shipping 200 Suez Canal 251 Sulina, importance as port 72–3, 75, 78 Svoronos, Nicos, on Greek history xx syndicalism 217–18 Syngros, Georgiadis 139 Syrmas, Captain Anastassis 66–7, 156–7, 408n.; autobiography 153–4, 157–8; as commander of Calliope Nicolopulo 158–62; communications with owners 162–3, 171, 173–4; on living conditions 176–7; marriage 158; as master of Leonidas 162–3; and purchase of steamship 122; rescues Italian crew 166; treatment by Embiricos 173–4; voyages 157–8 Syrmas, Captain Theodoros 153–4, 157, 158 Syrmas, Demetrius 174 Syrmas, Theodoros 163, 174, 412n. Syros 168; and Chiot merchant network 40, 50, 51; as maritime centre 115, 117–18, 134, 140–1; Ottoman rule in 3; registration of vessels 130–2, 141–2 Taganrog 78, 79 tankers, rising share of world fleet 255–64; T2 237 tax evasion 237–8 taxation, London shipping offices and 195, 280; in Second World War 231–3; in United States 280 telegraph, introduction of 68

textiles 21, 24; British-Ottoman trade 59 Theodosia, bulk cargo 25 Theofania (sailing ship) 144, 153, 154–6, 168 Theofilatos A.N. 128 Theofilatos Bros 74 Theofilatos D.J. 128 Theofilatos family 98, 100–1; purchasing steamships 125 Theofilatos J. 74 tonnage measurement 109–12, 406–7n.; gross and net tonnage (GRT) 112; owners of world fleet 264–8 Tossizza, Const. 50, 56 Tossizza, Michael 56 trade, postwar patterns of 246–62 trade unions 217–25, 234–5, 245; and communism 217; Greek organisation 217–18 trading, Greek strategy 277–83 trading methods, Chiot merchants 55–62 traditional and non-traditional shipowners 274–7, 420n. tramp shipping 34, 59, 257–61; British decline 188–9; and fluctuating freight rates 113; Greek specialisation in 280–1; growth of Greek tramp fleet 197–203; subsidies for 200 Tramp Shipping Administration Committee (TSAC) 200–1, 206 Trieste, and Chiot network 40; Greek merchants in 50 tugs 72–4, 144, 152 Turkey, and piracy 4–5; size of fleet 397–8n. Turkey see also, Ottoman Empire Tymbas family 41 Tzamtzis, Captain Tassos 143 United States, and flags of convenience 240–1, 242; as Greek trading partner 245, 281; Liberty ships 235–6; New York shipping offices 272, 280;

INDEX 507

settlement of Greek shipowners in 226; shipbuilding 280; size of fleet 265, 266 USSR 281 Vagliano, Andreas 92 Vagliano Brothers 68, 278; London shipping office 67, 92, 93; purchasing steamships 121, 122, 124, 125 Vagliano family 78, 88, 89, 92, 98, 404n.; banking activities 93, 100; ship ownership 92–3 Vagliano, Maris 92; Panaghi 66–7, 92 Valieri family 89 Vanuatu, flags of convenience 241 Vardinoyannis family 278 Varvakis, Ioannis 5 Vassiliades Engine Works 95 Vergottis case (1945) 230–1 Vernadakis, A.N., About the Trade of Greece 111–12, 169 Vietnam War 278 Vikelas, Demetrius 54, 402n. Vlassopulos, Nicos, The History of Ionian Shipping 407n., 410n. Vlasto family 50 Vouros family 48 wages 174–6, 204, 210–11, 220–2, 224–5, 233–5; overtime pay 219, 220 weather conditions 152, 155, 211–12 Wrench (British vice-consul) 33 Xenos firm 48; shipowning 61, 62 Xenos, Stephanos 63–4, 403n.; purchasing steamships 124; Depredations 64 Yannoulatos firm 128 Zafiropulo firm 50 Zarifi family 44, 47, 50, 87, 101; shipowning 60, 61

Zizinia Brothers 44, 46, 47, 88; shipowning 60, 61 Zizinia, Etienne 50, 56 Zizinia, George 56 Zizinia, Pandia 56 Zohrab (British consul) 33