Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Hermann Cohen's Thought (Studies in German Idealism)

YEARNING FOR FORM AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HERMANN COHEN ’S THOUGHT

Studies in German Idealism

Series Editor: Reinier Munk, Leiden University andd Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Advisory Editorial Board: Frederick Beiser, Syracuse University, U.S.A. George di Giovanni, McGill University, Montreal, Canada Helmut Holzhey, University of Zürich, Switzerland Detlev Pätzold, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Robert Solomon, University of Texas at Austin, Texas, U.S.A.

VOLUME 5

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

YEARNING FOR FORM AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HERMANN COHEN’S THOUGHT

by

ANDREA POMA Torino, Italy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations

vii

Introduction Hermann Cohen: A Philosophy Classic?

ix

Chapter One Hermann Cohen’s Response to Anti-Judaism

1

Chapter Two Plato’s Idea of the Good in Its Different Interpretations by Cohen and Natorp

21

Chapter Three Authentic and Historical Theodicy in Kant and Cohen

43

Chapter Four Correlation in Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of Religion: A Method and More than a Method

61

Chapter Five Cohen and Mozart: Considerations on Drama, the Beautiful and Humaneness in Cohen’s Aesthetics

87

Chapter Six Religion of Reason and Judaism in Hermann Cohen

111

Chapter Seven Similarity and Diversity of the Other: The Foreigner. Topical Motives in Hermann Cohen’s Ethical Idealism

129

Chapter Eight The Portrait in Hermann Cohen’s Aesthetics

145

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Nine Religion as a Fact of Culture and the System of Philosophy

169

Chapter Ten Humour in Religion: Peace and Contentment

203

Chapter Eleven Lyric Poetry and Prayer

227

Chapter Twelve Suffering and Non-Eschatological Messianism in Hermann Cohen

243

Chapter Thirteen Autonomy of the Law

261

Chapter Fourteen The Existence of the Ideal in Hermann Cohen’s Ethics

273

Chapter Fifteen The Holy Spirit out of the Sources of Judaism and Kantianism

295

Chapter Sixteen Yearning for Form Hermann Cohen in Postmodernism

313

Sources

381

Index of Names

385

ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of abbreviations of Hermann Cohen’s Works with explanations and some essential bibliographical references. W

Werke, hg. vom Hermann-Cohen-Archiv am Philosophischen Seminar der Universität Zürich unter der Leitung von Helmut Holzhey (later: im Auftrag des HermannCohen-Archivs am Philosophischen Seminar der Universität Zürich und des Moses-Mendelssohn-Zentrums für europäisch-jüdische Studien Universität Potsdam, hg. von Helmut Holzhey, Julius H. Schoeps, Christian Schulte), Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 1977 ff.

S

Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, 2 Bde, hg. von Albert Görland und Ernst Cassirer, AkademieVerlag, Berlin 1928.

J

Jüdische Schriften, 3 Bde, hg. von Bruno Strauß, mit einer Einleitung von Franz Rosenzweig, Schwetschke, Berlin 1924.

KTE

Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, Dümmler, Berlin 1871, 18852; Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 19183; repr. in W 1//I-III. Quotations normally come from the third edition. When it is necessary to specify the edition, the abbreviation will be accompanied by a superscript.

KBE

Kants Begründung der Ethik, Dümmler, Berlin 1877; Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 19102, from which quotations are taken.

KBA

Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, Dümmler, Berlin 1889.

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ABBREVIATIONS

PIM

Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seineGeschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisskritik, k Dümmler, Berlin 1883; repr. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1968; repr. in S 2 1-170 and in W 5//I, from which quotations are taken.

E

Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu F. A. Langes Geschichte des Materialismus, Baedeker, Leipzig 1896, 19022; Brandstetter, Leipzig 19143. The last of the three editions, published with the ninth edition of the Lange’s work, was reprinted in S 2 171-302 and in W 5//II (with variations from other editions), from which quotations are taken.

LRE

System der Philosophie. Erster Teil: Logik der reinen 2 Erkenntnis, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1902, 1914 ; the latter edition was reprinted in W 6 (with variations from the first edition), from which quotations are taken.

ERW

System der Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Ethik des reinen Willens, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1904, 19072; the latter edition was reprinted in W 7 (with variations from the first edition), from which quotations are taken.

ÄRG

System der Philosophie. Dritter Teil: Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, 2 Bde, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1912; repr. in W 8/9, from which quotations are taken.

BR

Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Töpelmann, Gießen 1915; repr. in W 10, from which quotations are taken.

RV

Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, hg. von Benzion Kellermann, Fock, Leipzig 1919; Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, hg. von Bruno Strauß, J. Kaufmann, Frankfurt a. M. 1929; repr. J. Melzer, Köln 1959, from which quotations are taken; English translation, with an introduction by Simon Kaplan, introductory essay by Leo Strauss, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., New York 1972.

INTRODUCTION

HERMANN COHEN: A PHILOSOPHY CLASSIC?

Hermann Cohen’s philosophy has now, finally, received the Recognition it deserves. His Ethik des reinen Willens has recently been included among the classic works of philosophy.1 This recognition is certainly an act of justice and truth, not only towards Cohen, but also to the history of philosophy, and it is all the more to be appreciated since it was not necessarily obvious, not so much for the value of Cohen’s thought in itself, as for the somewhat problematic history of his reception. As soon as he left Marburg in 1912, where he had taught for thirty six years at the city’s university, which he had made famous to the extent of turning it, in the words of Thomas Nipperdey, into the «Mecca of continental philosophy»,2 all traces and recollecttion of the philosophy of Cohen and his school soon disappeared, as a result of historical events and the arrival on the scene of new perspectives and new stars in the philosophical firmament, in the first place Martin Heidegger, who, in 1923, began teaching at Marburg. During the years following Cohen’s death, his thought and work were seriously neglected and only in the late 1960s, with the thesis by Dieter Adelmann,3 did new interest for them slowly develop. In the following years, with the setting up of the Cohen-Archivv at the University of Zurich and the beginning of the new edition of Cohen’s

1

Cf. Klassische Werke der Philosophie. Von Aristoteles bis Habermas, hg. von R. Brandt und Th. Sturm, Reclam, Leipzig 2002; the chapter on Cohen, Hermann Cohen: Ethik des reinen Willens, was written by Helmut Holzhey. 2 CF. TH. NIPPERDEY, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, Bd. 1, C. H. Beck, München 1990, p. 681. 3 D. ADELMANN, Einheit des Bewußtseins als Grundproblem r der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Diss., Heidelberg 1968.

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INTRODUCTION

Werke,4 both the result of the work of Helmut Holzhey, also the author of the fundamental study Cohen und Natorp,5 research on Cohen took a decisive turn. A small, but seriously engaged group of researchers, in constant, fruitful contact with the Cohen-Archiv, arrived at many stimulating results in re-publication, translation, analysis and Interprettation of his works. Cohen’s output was again brought to the attention of readers of philosophy. More recently Cohen has attracted attention and research as a front rank protagonist of Jewish thought.6 It is thus understandable that this limited group of researchers, who have been working so hard together, over the years, on the rediscovery and representation of Cohen’s philosophy, should see the present, rightful recognition of its value, with a sense of satisfaction. Cohen’s thought undoubtedly has all the characteristics of a classic. It faced the great problems of philosophical tradition, with full critical awareness and, at the same time, with the capacity to open up new, original routes. It represents one of the last expressions of great systematic thought. Cohen’s system is not so only in name, which was actually more due to publishers’ needs than a deep rooted intention of Cohen himself. The systematic character does not even come out in the architectural structure, which, as a matter of fact, has several weak, problematic points. It is thus not a question of a philosophical system as a solid, complete doctrinal construction, in the traditional scholastic sense, nor as an all embracing, totalitarian procedure of thought, in which a sense of security and infallible method reduces all otherness to itself, in Hegel’s sense. We are dealing with systematic thought, rather than a completed construction, with philosophical procedure, whose method is a system because it is critical, i.e. because it moves 4

The publication of Kleinere Schriften in this edition has been edited up to the present by Hartwig Wiedebach. 5 H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986. 6 I have attempted to provide a somewhat more detailed survey of contemporary research on Cohen in my essay entitled Hermann Cohen: Judaism and Critical Idealism, which has not been included in this book, since it is awaiting publication in The Cambridge Companion to Modern Jewish Philosophy, ed. by M. L. Morgan and P.E. Gordon. See also U. SIEG, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus. Die Geschichte einer philosophischen Schulgemeinschaft, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1994, pp. 11-24.

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incessantly in the direction of a system, in the awareness of never being able to possess it, incessantly putting it up for discussion. This thought is profoundly systematic because it rejects all grounds, all stable structures and fulfilment in the name of the most radically systematic requirements of foundation, method and task. Nevertheless, Cohen was also able to consider the philosophical system from an external perspective, and reflect on the system with its unity as his starting point. His works on the philosophy of religion are not only philosophical interpretation off the contents of religion, of Jewish monotheism, but also consideration, by means of the «method» of monotheism, as it were, of the contents of philosophical thought, starting off from the systematic unity that critical philosophy must always have before it as a regulative idea, but can never take up as a constitutive concept, since it must rigorously remain in the sphere of the methodological distinction between logic and ethics imposed by the scientific method. At the same time, Cohen’s works on the philosophy of religion are such a wide ranging, detailed reflection on all the most important themes of religious tradition in the light of Jewish monotheism, that he can be rightly included among the greatest interpreters, not only of Judaism, but also of monotheist religion in general. Like all great classics, he was also able to reconcile the abstract nature of the system with concrete intellectual engagement in the historical, political, social and religious context of his own time. His considerable, uninterrupted activity as an essayist is evidence of this close tie between his systematic research and active participation in his historical situation. There is, however, another characteristic, shared by great classics, which needs foregrounding in Cohen’s thought, i.e. the fruitful nature of his weak points. On the whole, his philosophy is anything but complete and entirely satisfactory. A number of examples of incoherence, inconsistency, problems and difficulties can be, and have been pointed out. Despite this, however, I believe it is fair to say that, owing to a paradox common to great classics (such as Plato, Leibniz and Kant), these problematic aspects not only do not undermine the overall value of Cohen’s philosophy, but that they are actually often its most lasting, fruitful aspects, since they «provoke thought», re-launch philosophical thought beyond the very results achieved by Cohen. The

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INTRODUCTION

most «classic» trait of a philosopher, and Cohen saw this in both Plato and Kant, does not lie in the solutions he proposed, but in the ability to pose questions, set up problems, open up horizons, where philosophical research will always be able to find the room to move on. Since I have also been working, in close, cordial contact with other scholars, on the analysis and interpretation of Cohen’s philosophy, for the last twenty years (my first essay on the subject having come out in 1983), I hope that I can be included among those who, nowadays, are satisfied with this new general interest. However small my contribution may be, I think that some useful purpose can be served in collecting selected papers in one volume in English (with the exception of my book on The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen,7 and a few other essays). The papers collected together in the present volume deal with different aspects of Cohen’s thought, especially ethical, political, aesthetic and religious ones. But I have almost always attempted to follow the ubiquitous presence of certain important themes in Cohen, their capacity for containing meanings that cannot be limited to a single philosophical sphere: themes that are keys to reading unity of inspiration in his thought, which is more deeply imbedded than the exteriorr architectural unity of his work. In my view, the search for the fundamental themes behind Cohen is an important task, if, nowadays, we wish to see this philosopher as a present day vital point of reference, and not only as a monument of the past. Recognising Cohen as a philosophy classic, as I have already mentioned, is an element of historical justice and scientific truthfulness and reason for public satisfaction. Now I should like to add that it could be a misleading, counterproductive result. If seeing Cohen as a philosophy classic means distancing him from present day debate, only to canonise him on a far off altar, turning him into a mere object of respectful homage, then his heritage will have been totally lost. There is a monumental, museum like way of seeing classics, only leading to historical research, and, at worst, a devout scholastic attitude towards them. This way of turning a classic into a corpse to be honoured is an obvious betrayal, especially in the case of someone, 7

A. POMA, La filosofia critica di Hermann Cohen, Mursia, Milano 1988; Eng. trans. by J. Denton, State University of New York Press, Albany (New York) 1997.

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like Cohen, whose greatest achievement lies in the critical, challenging character of his thought. So as to avoid this risk, in the last essay in the book, I have attempted an initial reflection on the present relevance of Cohen’s philosophy. I am certainly not pretending that Cohen can be seen as a postmodern philosopher, but that important themes for the inspiration of philosophical reflection in contemporary culture are to be found in n him. If this inspiration were to be taken up, interesting routes could be opened up for understanding and elaborating our present condition. This is why this last essay provides the title for the whole volume, since, by recognising the classic nature of Cohen’s thought, precisely in the name of his critical teaching, we shall not pause even for a second over sterile celebration, but refer to him so as to continue to research and think. I should like to thank Prof. Reinier Munk for accepting this book in the series Studies in German Idealism he edits and Springer for publishing it. I would also like to thank Dr. Luca Bertolino for his role in preparing this book for publication. Turin, February 2005 Andrea Poma

CHAPTER ONE

HERMANN COHEN’S RESPONSE TO ANTI-JUDAISM

1. The Controversy with Treitschke In November 1879 Heinrich von Treitschke, a leading historian and professor at Berlin University, published an article entitled Unsere Aussichten in «Preußische Jahrbücher», the review he edited. In it he added the prestige and authority of his name to the anti-Jewish campaign which had been revived at the time in Germany. This article gave rise to a lively controversy involving several prominent members of the German Jewish community and which lasted until the end of 1880. Treitschke also wrote a series of answers to his critics and reinforced his views on the matter. Admittedly, Treitschke was anxious to distinguish his arguments «from the filth and ignorance»1 characteristic of contemporary anti-Jewish writings. He was making no claims for «Christianity», like Adolf Stoecker, or the purity of the German race, like Wilhelm Warr, as a justification for not including the Jews in German society. Actually, his declared aim was to speed up their assimilation. This was why he invited the Jews to give up their arrogant separatism and aspirations to supremacy and power. Their sincere objective should be «to become Germans» as soon as possible, putting aside the specificity of their culture and adhering to the customs and traditions of German culture. In Treitschke’s view, it was only this kind of option that would have overcome the obstacle represented by the Jewish presence in Germany at the time with regard to the consolidation of German national unity. Once these necessary 1

H. V. TREITSCHKE, Unsere Aussichten, in «Preußische Jahrbücher» (November 1879); repr. in Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, hg. von W. Boehlich, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 1965 [= BA], p. 7.

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CHAPTER ONE

distinctions have been made, objectively speaking, Treitschke’s arguments actually reinforced the anti-Jewish movement. Although he never sank to the level of verbal violence and ignorance shown by other exponents of the movement, he did accept many of their religious, nationalist and racial arguments, to the extent that the most fanatical anti-Jewish faction had no difficulty in considering him a prestigious supporter and exploiting his fame in favour of their cause.2 As has already been mentioned, Jewish responses were many and various. They ranged from personal opposition by the historian Heinrich Graetz (who had been singled out with particular vehemence), to point by point rejection e of Treitschke’s specific accusations and more wide ranging historical and theoretical contributions (like the ones by Harry Bresslau and Moritz Lazarus respectively).3 Among those who came to the defence of Judaism there was also «a Jewish colleague from a small university». This is how Treitschke himself described Hermann Cohen, who had been full professor at Marburg University since 1876. In December 1879 Cohen wrote Treitschke two letters, in which, though making no secret of his critical stance, he was particularly insistent over the possibility of and need for conciliation and mutual understanding. Cohen’s decision to make his first approach to Treitschke in private is clear enough evidence of his conciliatory intentions. He ended his letter of 13 December 1879 with an invitation to Treitschke to publish it in his «Preußische Jahrbücher» «or else – something that would please me even more! – that you might change your mind after a benevolent 2

See, for example, W. ENDNER, Zur Judenfrage. Offene Antwort auf das offene Sendschreiben des Herrn Dr. Harry Bresslau an Herrn von Treitschke, Berlin 1880; repr. in BA 96-124; H. Naudh (= H. G. NORDMANN), Professoren über Israel, von Treitschke und Bresslau, Berlin 1880; repr. in BA B 180-204. Zöllner’s and Förster’s anti-Jewish petition requires mention here. It led to an argument between Treitschke and Mommsen in the context of the more general controversy (cf. BA). 3 Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, cit., a collection of most contributions to the controversy, provides details. See also: H.-J. v. BORRIES, Deutschtum und Judentum. Studium zum Selbstverständnis des deutschen Judentums 1879/80, Diss., Druckerei R. Himmelheber & Co., Hamburg 1971 and M. A. MEYER, Great Debate on Anti-semitism. Jewish Reaction to New Hostility in Germany 1879/81, in «Leo Baeck Institute Year Book» 11 (1966), pp. 137-170.

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3

perusal of it»,4 Cohen being so convinced that his views could be reconciled with those of Treitschke! Nothing actually came of either alternative. In fact, in January 1880, Treitschke published an even more radically hostile piece than the previous ones.5 As a result, Cohen decided to return to and develop the views expressed in his letters, thus publicly entering the controversy with Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage.6 «We are again obliged to bear witness».7 These were the words Cohen used to begin not only his 1880 essay, but also his active profession and defence of Judaism, which was to last uninterruptedly throughout his life. In his reply to Treitschke, Cohen put aside all the specific features of the controversy, the technical and statistical arguments over the number of German Jews, the extent of Jewish influence on the press, quarrels over interpretations of Tacitus and countless other points brought up by those taking part. His aim was to identify the core of the Jewish question and anti-Judaism. Right from the start, he affirmed that, in its essence, the Jewish question was a religious one and that the political and racial aspects, together with their solutions, were but a consequence of the religious aspect. This conviction was to remain unchanged as the unitary motif of his nearly forty year long profession of Judaism. However, the religious question between Christians and Jews in Germany should not be posed in terms of conflict: «I am unable to recognise any difference between Israelite monotheism and protestant Christianity in the scientific concept of religion».8 Jewish monotheism is characterised by the two ideas off the spirituality of God and the messianic promise, while Christianity, in its acceptance of Greek culture, undertakes a process of the humanisation of religion, 4 Cohen’s two letters have been published and commented on by H. HOLZHEY, Zwei Briefe Hermann Cohens an Heinrich von Treitschke, in «Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts» 12 (1969), pp. 183-204; quotation p. 197. 5 H. . TREITSCHKE, Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage, in «Preußische Jahrbücher» (Januar 1880); repr. in BA 77-90. 6 H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage, Berlin 1880; repr. in BA 124-149 and in J 2 73-94. 7 Ibid., d p . 73. 8 Ibid., d p . 75.

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expressed in the dogma of the humanity of God. Without this Christian contribution the ethical conception of the autonomy of reason would be impossible, as would the consequent ethical foundation of idealism. «This kind of Christianity – wrote Cohen – belongs to all us modern Israelites, whether we are aware of the fact or not».9 Actually, the acceptance by modern Judaism of the Christian message of the humanisation of religion (which is nothing more than an explicit rendering of a trend already present in the Jewish tradition) in no way implies acceptance of the dogma of the humanity of God, since Judaism contrasts this with faith in the idea of the spirituality of God, which should also be proper to Christianity: «We know that together with every necessary humanisation of the moral sphere, a core of the ancient God of the prophets must be preserved and this is inaccessible to anthropomorphic reduction: “With whom do you wish to compare me, that I resemble him?” In this eternal core of faith in God, which is not merely cosmological, all Christians are Israelites».10 Thus German Jews can, or rather must share in the German people’s religious unity, as was the case in the past. Their duty is to profess the monotheist idea as the message and specific f task kept alive by them in the development of the German spirit, up to the point when the realisation of a «purer form of Christianity» will allow common profession by all monotheists. Treitschke had already dealt with this «purer form of Christianity», but in the light of the ideal of a future reunification of the various Christian denominations. He foregrounded the exclusion of Judaism, while Cohen extended its meaning, making it the ideal of complete unification of Christianity and Judaism, as a consequence of a total retrieval of the monotheist idea by both Christians and Jews.11 Thus Cohen rejected Lazarus’ view of the absence of the religious identity off German culture, and acknowledged its Christian character, as claimed by Treitschke. However, he argued that German Christians and Jews (and all modern Judaism) both equally shared in this «Christian» character. Therefore it could neither 9

Ibid., d p . 77. Ibidem. 11 Cf. H. . TREITSCHKE, Noch einige Bemerkungen k zur Judenfrage , cit., BA 87 and H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage, cit., J 2 87. 10

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be an obstacle to religious unity nor a reason for seeing Judaism as «the national religion of a race, in origin, alien to us», as Treitschke had put it.12 On the contrary, Cohen saw Judaism as one religious denomination among many, a «mode of faith» (Glaubensartt is the Kantian term he used),13 within the single religion of the one and only God. Professing monotheism is, then, in Cohen’s view, the only true task of Jews, both in Germany and the rest of the world. In all other respects, their aim should be assimilation in the German nation and loyal co-operation in building its unity. This is why he was unable to accept either Graetz’s Jewish nationalism (which he strongly rejected) or the position of Lazarus, who tended to undervalue all aspects (be they religious, cultural or racial) off national unity, in the belief that accepting it was merely a matter of subjective, individual choice, implying no kind of objective unity. Cohen, on the other hand, was convinced of the importance of national unity, not only from the religious viewpoint, as already stated, but also from the political and cultural ones. German Jews should be ready to give up a national spirit and feeling and become devoted, sincere German patriots. He also believed that Treitschke’s concept of racial identity was not in itself a barbaric instinct, but rather a natural orientation of possible psychological and emotional usefulness in the building of national unity. This is why he thought that the assimilation of the German Jews should also mean gradual reduction of racial characteristics. If this had still not fully taken place, it was only a question of time and generations. In any case, the Jews should not have anything against it in principle. Claims to racial identity only degenerate into negative barbarism when, for some supporters of anti-Judaism, not including Treitschke, the empirical fact of race is arbitrarily turned into an ethical norm, on the basis of which individuals are accepted or excluded by a nation. The nation is an ethical fact and belonging to it is measured by actual, individual co-operation in the building of the national ideal, not on the presence 12

H. v. TREITSCHKE, Noch einige Bemerkungen k zur Judenfrage, cit., BA 86. I. KANT, Zum ewigen Frieden, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 8, p. 367; H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage, cit., J 2 75. 13

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or absence of specific natural characteristics, which can be useful for national unity but cannot constitute founding norms. Nevertheless, Cohen did also criticise Treitschke in this context. The latter’s real intentions did actually come out of his writings. When he invited the Jews to accept assimilation and become Germans, he was really expecting them to convert to Christianity. He was repeating the previous blackmail of the edict on emancipation, which required conversion to Christianity or the risk of not being considered real Germans. In Treitschke’s view a state was free to adopt the laws it wanted, in contrast with a presumed natural right of all to participate in running it.14 Cohen’s reply was that it was not so much a question of natural law establishing Jews’ rights as that of ethical law of the state itself. Any state giving up its freedom, accepting the subjection of its sovereignty to a particularr religious denomination would not only be falling short of its duty to its citizens, but, above all, its duty to itself: it would be betraying the very idea of State. The essay closes with an appeal to orthodox and reformed Jews. To the former Cohen points out that no one can be a loyal citizen of a nation only in a superficial sense, while keeping to their different traditions and customs. Faith in the state cannot be contrasted with faith in religion, since service to the state is just as sacred as service to God. To the latter, who held that they had to give up Judaism in order to become Germans, he recalls the message of Jewish monotheism: if they were better acquainted with the essence of their religion, they could feel fully in agreement with the so-called «spirit of Christianity» while still remaining faithful to their Judaism. Religious unity, he concludes, is a crucial element in national unity. It is the objective criterion of the reality of a people and individual belonging to it, which allows this reality to be separated from the subjective realism to which Lazarus had reduced it and the false naturalist objectivity of race. This common religious ground between German Christians and Jews «exists, even though obstinate, hostile people may not acknowledge it».15

14 15

Cf. H. v. TREITSCHKE, Noch einige Bemerkungen zur Judenfrage, cit., BA 79. H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage, cit., J 2 94.

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2. Germanism and Judaism Cohen’s piece gave rise to lively reactions in Jewish circles,16 including his friend and former fellow seminarist Rabbi Adolf Moses, in the USA.17 In a strongly worded reply, Moses accused Cohen of betraying loyalty to Judaism and taking sides with the enemy. He had given in to the moloch of nationalism and expected the German Jews to convert to Protestantism, in exchange for their emancipation and assimilation. Cohen’s reply was entitled Zur Verteidigung.18 In it he distinguished between his own profession of Judaism as a historical faith and recognition of Christianity as a cultural value, foregrounding the meaning of his proposed encounter between Christianity and Judaism, repeating his conviction thatt loyalty to Judaism consisted in profession of monotheism with all its ethical and social implications rather than attachment to a nationalist tradition: «We must be Jews in spirit and mind, but not in the flesh and instinct!»19 To back up his views, the following year (1881), he published a lecture held in Berlin in 1869 on the origins and meaning of the Jewish Sabbath, once again in «Zeitgeist», the review edited by Adolf Moses.20 In a Nachwortt he stated his willingness to identify the Jewish Sabbath with a «national Sabbath», i.e. Sunday, which would coincide with the assimilation in national customs and traditions he believed in. This would not be a violation of the religious substance off Judaism, but rather the bearer of its message in the world. Cohen’s analysis of the religious aspect of the Jewish question to be found in these writings is of crucial importance for understanding his overall position. We shall return to this later on. Lastly, Zur Verteidigungg states that Judaism cannot be an alternative to patriotism and thatt German patriotism can only exist 16

Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, in J 1 xxx. A. MOSES, Prof. Dr. Hermann Cohen in Marburg und sein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage. Eine Reminiszenz und Kritik, k Milwaukee (Wisconsin) 1880. 18 H. COHEN, Zur Verteidigung, in «Der Zeitgeist», Milwaukee a (Wisconsin), (5 August 1880), pp. 256-257; repr. in J 2 95-100. 19 Ibid., d p. 98. 20 H. COHEN N, Der Sabbat in seiner kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung, in S. A. des «Zeitgeist», Milwaukee (Wisconsin), (1881); repr. in J 2 45-72. 17

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through respect for the Christian religion. Above all, Cohen insists on his desire for conciliation and his rejection of polemical, gut opposition: «On one side the Jew, on the other, the Christian! Let’s see who’s right!»:21 such an inflexible attitude would exclude any hope of conciliation and would be, above a all, a defeat for reason. Over the following years, though the idea of and hope for conciliation had not died out as a principle, the serious problem of persecution was in the forefront of Cohen’s mind. He became ever more conscious of the fact that it was a question, for the Jews, of a struggle for survival against their «enemies»22 whose aim was their religious annihilation, especially by means of conversion (and, given its premises, religious annihilation for Cohen meant total annihilation of Judaism). He thus took up a more rigid stance. He now placed more emphasis on the need for defence of the specificity of Judaism in its preservation,23 alerted readers over the damage caused by conversions,24 underlined the differences between Judaism and Christianity,25 condemned the immorality and absence of scientific 21

H. COHEN, Zur Verteidigung, cit., J 2 97. H. COHEN, Über die literarische Behandlung unserer Gegner, in «Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums» (29. August 1902), pp. 412-414; repr. in J 2 360-368 (especially 360). 23 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Gedanken über Jugendlektüre, in «Wegweiser für die Jugendliteratur», hg. von Grossloge für Deutschland VIII U.O.B.B., 13 (September 1906), pp. 49-51; repr. in J 2 126-132; ID., Zwei Vorschläge zur Sicherung unseres Fortbestandes, in «Bericht der Grossloge für Deutschland U.O.B.B.», Fest-Ausgabe, 2 (März 1907), pp. 9-12; repr. in J 2 133-141; ID., Religiöse Postulate, Berlin 1907; (in an expanded edition) in «Ost und West» (1909), coll. 70-82; repr. in J 1 1-17; ID., Die Liebe zur Religion, in «Gemeindeblatt der Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin» (10. Februar 1911), coll. 1-4; repr. in J 2 142-148. 24 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Der Religionswechsel in der neuen Ära des Antisemitismus, in «Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums» (2. Oktober 1890), pp. 489-490; repr. in J 2 342-345; ID., Unsere Ehrenpflicht gegen Dreyfus, in «Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums» (9. Juni 1899), pp. 268-270; repr. in J 2 346-351; ID., Die Zugehörigkeit zur Gemeinde, in «Gemeindeblatt der Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin» (6. Oktober 1916), pp. 115-116; in J 2 156-161/W 17 7 279-286. 25 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Die Errichtung von Lehrstühlen für Ethik und Religionsphilosophie an den jüdisch-Theologischen Lehranstalten, in «Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums» 48 (1904), pp. 2-21; repr. (in an expanded edition) in J 2 108-125; ID., Gedanken über Jugendlektüre, cit.; ID., Die 22

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credibility of the persecutors of Judaism,26 demanded full civic and political equality for Jews as a right not a concession27 and warned the state that this equality is its ethical duty, failure to observe it draining the state itself of its meaning.28 The main cause for concern shown by these writings was, however, the accusation of immorality made against Judaism (by de Lagarde, for example).29 Thus they are frequent demonstrations, not only of the profound ethical value of Judaism, but also of the origins in Judaism of Western ethical consciousness.30 Events in 1914, with the outbreak of the war, opened up a new chapter, as it were, in the development of Cohen’s Jewish thought. He did not set aside the Jewish cause to engage in German nationalist propaganda, nor was he solely concerned with anti-Jewish persecution at a time when the whole of Germany was suffering in the war, as his friend and associate Paul Natorp accused him of being.31 During this period Cohen fought doggedly, bothh on behalf of Judaism, and Germany. He, actually, managed to balance these two tasks admirably, developing to the full all the implications of his previous stances. This is a fundamental pointt in fully understanding the theme dealt with here. religiösen Bewegungen der Gegenwart, Leipzig 1914, repr. in J 1 36-65/W 16 123-162. 26 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Über die literarische Behandlung unserer Gegner, cit. 27 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Der geschichtliche Sinn des Abschlusses der Dreyfus-Affäre, in «Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums» (27. Juli 1906), pp. 352-355; repr. in J 2 352-359 (especially 358). 28 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Emanzipation. Zur Hundertjahrfeier des Staatsbürgertums der preußischen Juden (11. März 1912), in «Israelitisches Familienblatt» (7. März 1912), pp. 1-3; repr. in J 2 220-228. 29 For further details see Bruno Strauß’s note to H. COHEN, Die Nächstenliebe im Talmud, d in J 1 338. 30 The following is of particular importance m in this context: H. COHEN, Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie, in «Jahrbücher für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur» 10 (1907), pp. 98-171; expanded reprint in book form, Berlin 1907; repr. in J 3 98-168. Many other important titles could be added. It is worth mentioning here the publication in 1904 of the second volume of Cohen’s system: Ethik des reinen Willens, Berlin 1904. 31 Cf. the letters exchanged between Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp in November 1916, in H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 2, pp. 454-466.

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Especially in the highly lucid 1915 essay entitled Deutschtum und Judentum32 as well as in other contemporary writings,33 Cohen dealt with the profound, inseparable union of German and Jewish culture, highlighting idealism as the essence, message and task of both. He reaffirmed his loyalty to the German nation, in opposition to Zionism and defended the value of the German spirit in the face of international Judaism. Cohen now hoped that Germany, under the burden of criticism and suffering, would become aware of its close links with Judaism, both because being under great pressure inevitably brought it closer to the condition of the persecuted Jews, and also because self reflection, made necessary by these historical circumstances, the search for its foundations and meaning of its suffering, would enable it to rediscover idealism and humanism, as the very essence of its culture and the task it was fighting for. In this way, it would be united with Judaism in an effort to achieve a common mission. This awareness on the part of Germany could only reveal the real meaning of anti-Judaism to it: an attempt to annihilate, not only Judaism, but also Germanism and humanism in general. This brief, anything but exhaustive discussion of the main themes of Cohen’s response to anti-Judaism still requires an analysis (albeit a 32

H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, Gießen 1915 (2nd expanded edition 1916: note 33 below); repr. in J 2 237-301/W 16 469-560. 33 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, ««Du sollst nicht einhergehen als ein Verleumder». Ein Appell an die Juden Amerikas, in «Israelitisches Familienblatt» (24. Juni 1915), pp. 9-10; repr. in J 2 229-236/W 16 301-310; ID., Deutschtum und Judentum, in Vom inneren Frieden des deutschen Volkes, hg. von F. Thimme, Leipzig 1916, pp. 541-562; repr. in J 2 302-318/W 177 111-132; ID., Zionismus und Religion. Ein Wort an meine Kommilitonen jüdischen Glaubens, in «K.-C. Blätter» 11 (Mai-Juni 1916), pp. 643-646; repr. in J 2 319-327/W 177 211-221; ID., Antwort auf das offene Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen, in «K.-C. Blätter» 12 (Juli-August 1916), pp. 683-688; repr. in J 2 328-340/W 177 243-260; ID., Was einigt die Konfessionen? Vortrag, gehalten in der Freien Wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung zu Berlin am 9. Juni 1917, in «Protestantenblatt», Supplement, 28 (14. Juli 1917) and 29 (21. Juli 1917), coll. 441-445 and 457-464; repr. in J 1 66-86/W 177 455-486; ID., Der Jude in der christlichen Kultur, in «Neue Jüdische Monatshefte» 10 (25. Februar 1917), pp. 291-294, 11 (10. März 1917), pp. 322-325, 13 (10. April 1917), pp. 387-389 and 17 (10. Juni 1917), 509-514; repr. in J 2 193-209/W 17 7 419-446.

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brief one, for reasons of space) of the fundamental concepts underlying it, so as to foreground the meaning and coherence of his arguments. Firstly, Cohen’s idealist conception of history must be constantly kept in mind. He was frequently accused of lack of realism, of not considering the real historical circumstances and seeking refuge in an abstract world of ideas. As early as 1916 Martin Buber had entitled his reply to Cohen over the Zionist controversy, Begriffe und Wirklichkeit, alluding to opposition (developed later in the piece) between the abstract world of Cohen’s concepts and the factual reality of Judaism and its historical condition. Cohen is still the object of such accusations. Walter Boehlich, for example, when commenting on his arguments against Treitschke, blamed him for dissolving «all the juridical, social and political problems in the abstract heavens of Neo-Kantianism».34 But, as noted by Steven Schwarzschild,35 Cohen’s reiterated, convinced affirmation of the unity and harmony between Germanism and Judaism in no way implies that he did not or could not see the real, serious historical and cultural conditions contributing to the conflict between the two sides. Schwarzschild clearly highlighted Cohen’s idealist perspective. The latter did not view history as a mere chain of empirical facts, but as a phenomenon endowed with profound ideal, ethical meaning. Understanding history cannot be restricted to recording events, but involves being able to identify the realisation of an idea in the chain of facts. It is the idea, transformed into ethical law, that constitutes the truth of history, and truth is the supreme criterion for understanding and judging reality. Cohen did not see history in terms of Hegel’s identity of idea and reality or in the irreconcilable separation and opposition between the ideal and the real. History is, in the Kantian sense, the inexhaustible task of the realisation of the idea. The inexhaustible nature of this task does not mean illusion or utopia. The essence of ethical idealism consists in the complementary character of the two aspects: the engagement of free will in its infinite task and faith in the power of the 34

W. BOEHLICH, Nachwort, in BA 250. Cf. S. SCHWARZSCHILD, «Germanism and Judaism». Hermann Cohen’s Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis, in Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: The Problematic Symbiosis, ed. by D. Bronsen, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1979, p. 138. 35

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realisation of the good. For Cohen, the profound identity of idealism and monotheism emerges from this double aspect. When Cohen affirms the profound unity of Germanism and Judaism or Christianity and Judaism, he is not simply considering mere factual reality, but rather sees this reality in the light of the idea constituting its meaning and truth. This position is foregrounded with a number of different expressions in his writings: for example, «Germany is only true in its idealism».36 For Cohen Germany is the «originative land of Humaneness (Humanität ( )»,37 the «nation 38 of Kant», thus Christianity for Cohen is a «purer form of Christianity»,39 or «Christianity thought in a historical spirit».40 d mind», not «in the flesh and Judaism is also seen as thatt «in spirit and instinct»,41 it is Judaism «in the spirit of the prophets».42 Many more examples could be provided. What needs to be pointed outt is the normative meaning of Cohen’s statements of unity between Germanism and Judaism and Christianity and Judaism. This normative meaning does not have anti-historical intentions, since, on the contrary, in an idealist conception of history, like Cohen’s, idea is truth, and truth is the only reality at which historical action must aim.

3. Nation and State This idealist conception should also be kept in mind for understanding concepts like that of nation. Admittedly, in Ein Bekenntnis in der 36

E 121. H. COHEN, «Du sollst nicht einhergehen als ein Verleumder». Ein Appell an die Juden Amerikas, cit., J 2 236/W 16 310. The German word «Humanität» is so rich and peculiar in meaning as to defy adequate translation into English. Here, and elsewhere in this book, it was decided to translate it by «Humaneness», because it seems to me to be the most satisfactory option and because itt allows the reader to recognise all references to the term throughout and distinguish it from «Menschheit», which has been n translated by «humanity» or «mankind». 38 H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage, cit., J 2 73. 39 Ibid., p. 87. 40 Ibid., p. 78. 41 H. COHEN, Zur Verteidigung, g cit., J 2 98. 42 H. COHEN, Der Sabbat in seiner kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung, g cit., J 2 72. 37

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Judenfrage, Cohen made rather vague use of concepts such as «nation», «nationality», «people», «race» and «stock». He enlarged on these concepts later on, but the definition of their meaning and mutual relations still remains a complex problem. Schwarzschild suggests a pattern, albeit with reservations: «individual, i.e. “natural man” ĺ “nationality” ĺ Volkk (territory) ĺ state (from “power state” to “legal state” = from “community” to “society”, i.e. socialism) ĺ federation of states ĺ humanity».43 I cannot deal thoroughly with this analysis here, since it would require a separate study. I will restrict myself to some remarks of use for the subject under consideration. We have already seen how, in 1880, Cohen kept his distance from Lazarus’ idea of nation. He would not accept the relativism of someone who held that «the people, each person decides on it subjectively, and includes himself in it».44 Cohen stood at an even greater distance from naturalist conceptions of nationality, grounded in «objective», anthropological or biological identification such as race or stock. At the veryy end of his life he strenuously opposed the position of Bruno Bauch,45 who saw the historical and cultural aspects of national identity only as the expression and realisation of a naturalistically determined «national character». Bauch defined a nation as a «natural community grounded in common descent, which, under the restraint of a common history, y goes through a process of continual elaboration of cultural identity».46 In the not always coherent development of the concepts dealt with above, Cohen appears to have defined «people» and «nationality» in naturalistic terms and «nation» and «state» in purely ethical ones. The conclusion of this development appears to be the scheme in accordance with which the plurality of nationalities makes up the ethical unity of a nation by means of the setting up of a state. There are, in fact, many references in his writings to «nationality» and «people» as a

43

S. SCHWARZSCHILD, «Germanism and Judaism». Hermann Cohen’s Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis, cit., p. 149. 44 M. LAZARUS, Was heißt national? Ein Vortrag, Dümmler, Berlin 1880, p. 13. 45 On this position see B. BAUCH, Vom Begriff der Nation (Ein Kapitel zur Geschichtsphilosophie), in «Kant-Studien» 31 (1917), pp. 135-162. 466 Ibid., p. 157.

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natural entity,47 but when Buber blamed him for seeing «a mere “fact of nature”» in nationality and treating «nationality» and «stock» or «descent» «as synonyms», arguing that «nationality should not be defined with the concept of fact of nature. It is a historical reality and ethical task»,48 Cohen’s reaction was a strong one: «So it is somewhat strange when Buber is shocked because I claimed that nationality is a fact of nature and tries to instruct me, as though I were not a well known opponent of the materialist conception of history, even in social democracy. Thus, when I say that Jewish nationality needs to be preserved in the name of the subsistence of religion, I am elevating it to the level of an undeniably valuable historical factor. In the new edition of my Deutschtum und Judentum, I even argue for reform of international law to safeguard nationality in the event of naturalisation. Such is my boundless respect for the ethical character of nationality, even in the face of the problem of a new state, that it is freely chosen».49 He then elaborated on the meaning of his distinction between «nation» and «nationality»: «This immediately allows identification of the general reason behind my attempt to define the difference between nation and nationality as follows: admittedly nationality remains a fact of nature with moral characteristics (eine sittliche Naturtatsache), while it is only through the state that a nation is set up by a pure act of political morality».50 The expression «sittliche Naturtatsache», used here to define nationality, reveals Cohen’s true thought. It is not a question of classifying certain concepts as naturalistic, and others as ethical, but of distinguishing between a naturalistic conception of history and an ethical, idealist one. In the latter, as has already been mentioned, the idea is the a priorii of the fact, truth the a priorii of reality, the universal the a priorii of the particular. 47

Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, cit., J 2 273/W 16 521 f.; ID., Zionismus und Religion. Ein Wort an meine Kommilitonen jüdischen Glaubens, cit., J 2 322/W 17 214 f.; ERW W 33 f., 80, 240, 251, 589, 629. 48 M. BUBER, Begriffe und Wirklichkeit. Brief an Herrn Geb. Regierungsrat Prof. Dr. Hermann Cohen, in «Der Jude» 5 (August 1916), pp. 281-289/W 17 223-240. 49 H. COHEN, Antwort auf das offene Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen, cit., J 2 329/W 17 245. 50 Ibid., p. 330/246.

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In such a perspective the empirical, «natural» elements, such as «race» and «stock», which belong to nationality, are not removed, but rather idealised. They become the means for setting up an ethical reality: «ideal moments» are already part of the biological and anthropological meaning of «nature»,51 an idealised nationality takes on a new meaning in the light of its ethical task: setting up a national state. Thus nationality becomes an «inalienable willingness towards all degrees of ethicisation».52 In the specific case of the Jews, preserving nationality is only relevant to loyalty to their religious identity, the profession of monotheism, and cannot, therefore, be the foundation of nationalist isolation inside or outside the German national state, but, on the contrary, the foundation of universalism, coherent with the messianic meaning of monotheism, which cannot be realised outside the ethical objectivity of the state, and of the German state in particular: «There can be no doubt that nationality can stand in relation only to religion. The concept of the nation has already been deprived of its anthropological, or ethnic, element, and its idealization was realized only in the state. The tribe, with its physical basis, was not thereby depreciated; although it is true that one no longer recognized ideality in the tribe itself, the possibility of its being idealized by the highest human ideal – by the state – was acknowledged. The idealization of nationality follows the same method. Nationality is in no way irrelevant or inferior, although the ideal does not lie in nationality; rather, it is elevated to the ideal insofar ad it serves as a means to the establishment and continuation of religion. For the establishment of religion the people of Israel was necessary. That is what it means for Israel to be the chosen people».53 A naturalist, materialist conception of history, on the other hand, reduces the ethical aspects of political reality to the natural ones. Metaphorically speaking, one could say that it places the past of empirical nature, not the universal future of the idea at the base of reality. This is why it cannot overcome the limits of exclusive, and thus anti-humanist

51

Ibid., p. 329/pp. 244 f. H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, cit., J 2 274/W 16 523. 53 RV V 422; Eng. trans. cit., p. 363. 52

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particularism. Nationalism, whether it be German or Zionist, is nothing more than naturalism, rejection of the ethical value of political reality, and, therefore, also a rejection of the state: «The concept of the state is the ethical concept of civilisation. It represents the final aim of historical development. The national concept is useful and acceptable as a means to this end. It is unnecessary to reject this means owing to mistaken suspicion of naturalism. However, as soon as the concept of people becomes independent and absolute, it becomes barbaric. There is certain evidence for recognition that this judgement is not illegitimate and unjust. It consists and continually reappears in the contradiction that nationalism constitutes and raises against the idea of the state. Nationalism turns into anarchism. The latter consists, as we have seen, in abandoning the concept of the state as a principle of ethical self-consciousness. Nationalism also neglects this principle. It presents itself as a means to an end, while the people is the only means for the state».54 Therefore, anti-Judaism, in its racial and nationalist aspects, is not only a violation of individual rights and those of the Jewish minority, but also of the state and humanity.

4. Judaism, Christianity and Idealism The state is undoubtedly the main, essential element in the setting up and maintenance of unity and mutual tolerance among different nationalities and religious denominations. Cohen, nevertheless, also acknowledged cultural, religious, even racial unity with a view to national unity, these conditions also being realised in the case of Judaism and Germanism. Even from the racial viewpoint, he believed in an undeniable affinity between the two. The Jews had settled in Germany many centuries before, and they had been continuously present, been assimilated and had adopted the German language and customs. Cultural and religious unity was much more important to him than racial unity. 54

ERW W 255.

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Let us return, for a moment, to the 1880 controversy involving Treitschke and Adolf Moses’ criticisms of Cohen. Moses had blamed Cohen for expecting German Jews to convert to Christianity as a condition for emancipation in the German nation.55 In Zur Verteidigung, Cohen had answered, making a distinction between his profession of Judaism and «historical-cultural» acknowledgement of the «historical trend of Protestantism».56 What did he mean by this expression, that he also used elsewhere? In his view Lutheran Protestantism is not so much characterised by Christological dogma, which had become of only marginal interest,57 as by other characteristics and trends which I shall attempt to list rapidly here. Firstly, the critical method of truth as a hypothesis and faith as a rational test of it: this is the essence of idealism, which German Protestantism took from Greek culture, Plato in particular. It can thus be claimed that «the historical spirit of Protestantism has been independent since the Wittenberg Reform»,58 its origins lying in a previous period. The idealist trend in Protestantism is also characterised by the distinction between science and faith, where the latter is not abandoned to scepticism, but turned into moral teaching. The idea of universal priesthood, together with the great ideal of humanism gave rise to the socialist idea in Protestant culture. Furthermore, it was Protestantism that took the step from the universal Christian state to the national, non-religious dominated state, not as an obstacle, but as a condition for the political realisation of humanist universalism, in accordance with the great Kantian idea of the federation of states and perpetual peace. In Cohen’s view these trends of German Protestantism are in profound harmony and have a real historical relationship with the great themes of Jewish monotheism: the uniqueness and spirituality of 55 A. MOSES, Prof. Dr. Hermann Cohen in Marburg und sein Bekenntnis in der Judenfrage. Eine Reminiszenz und Kritik, k cit., pp. 5 ff. 56 H. COHEN, Zur Verteidigung, cit., J 2 95 ff. 57 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Gedanken über Jugendlektüre, cit., J 2 127; ID., Der Jude in der christlichen Kultur, cit., J 2 204 ff./W 17 436 ff.; ID., Religion und Sittlichkeit, cit., J 3 156. 58 H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, cit., J 2 242/W 16 476.

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God, the purity of the soul, messianism and the ideal of the Kingdom of God are in perfect agreement, actually constituting a fundamental feature of the historical and cultural origin of German idealism, of its critical requirements (which can countt Maimonides, in his rationalism, as an illustrious predecessor), of its ethical essence, conception of a state not dominated by religion, and of its humanism and universalism. Cohen’s «historical trend of Protestantism» and Christianity, which is identified with it, is nothing more than German idealism, in its historical and theoretical development, which Germany still needed to follow in order to attain its universal task. This is Christian and Protestant, inasmuch as it reached historical maturity in the context of German Christian, Protestant religious culture. Jewish monotheism, which Cohen professed, was none other than idealism: «Acknowledge and fill your spirit with the idea that our Jewish idealism is grounded in this faith in the unique being of God and is capable of competing with pure scientific idealism in all the practical relations of ethics».59 Thus unity of the two religious denominations takes place in the truth of idealism, though their history was different (this difference not implying independence, given the dimensions and importance of their mutual influence). Here, at last, we have the profound meaning of Cohen’s reiterated conviction that the fundamental point in the Jewish question, and therefore in the struggle against anti-Judaism is the religious aspect. In conclusion, Cohen believed, especially in his last years, during the war, in an ever clearer view of true unity, rather than an analogy in the destiny of Germany and Judaism, not only because he saw they were sharing suffering, owing to the odium generis humani. Theirs was a common mission grounded «in the most intimate essence of the religious spirit, and thus of the moral one, and therefore also, albeit indirectly, of philosophy and all the intimate driving forces of spiritual culture».60 Just as Judaism must stay as it is, overcoming all the 59

H. COHEN, Mahnung des Alters an die Jugend, d in «Mitteilungen des Verbandes der jüdischen Jugendvereine Deutschlands» (10. Dezember 1917), pp. 162-175; repr. in J 2 175-192/W 17 577-601; quotation p. 184/589. 60 H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, cit., J 2 295/W 16 552.

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threats by anti-Judaism to its religious identity, so as to profess and realise the truth of monotheism in the world, so Germany, in its ethical and spiritual value, must keep faith with itself and develop its religious and cultural identity, so as to realise the truth of idealism in the world, i.e. social justice and equality, the federation of states and perpetual peace: «Germanism must become the focal point of a federation of states, which will be the foundation of peace in the world, where the true foundation of a civilised world will be laid. A just war is preparation for perpetual peace».61 The ideal constituting the essence and meaning of Germanism thus coincides with the messianic ideal of the Kingdom of God. It can be said that, paradoxically, the choice of Israel, which was not made to bring about religious and political isolation, but for the «divine choice of humanity»,62 will bring its universalist task to fulfilment by means of ethical realisation of the German state. However, this will only fully realise its idea as a reference point for a federation of states and foundation of perpetual peace. There is no need to recall that Cohen’s hopes were not to be fulfilled in subsequent German history. This, however, does not justify their condemnation and removal as abstract illusions, since «the philosopher cannot permit the course of history to prescribe for him either the disposition or the solution of his problems. But as little can he prescribe to history the course it should have taken».63 The task common to idealism and monotheism, Jewish and Christian ethical humanism is posited for all time, since «ethical tasks cannot ever have been; they must always continue being, however subject to amplification and modification».64 This task goes well beyond the borders of Germany, to reach the whole of humanity.

61

Ibid., p. 287/541. H. COHEN, ZIONISMUS und Religion. Ein Wort an meine Kommilitonen jüdischen Glauben, cit., J 2 323/W 17 217. 63 RV V 204; Eng. trans. cit., p. 175. 64 H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum. Mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, cit., J 2 273/W 16 522. 62

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Even criticism of Cohen’s stance, like that of Jacob Klatzkin,65 highlighting the unilateral and insufficient nature of his reading of the history of German Jewish and Christian culture, is, in my view, very useful, not inasmuch as it challenges his conclusions, but in their being reduced to essentials. As clearly shown by Schwarzschild,66 Cohen’s selective reading of history has, above all, the merit of clearly revealing that, behind the historical categories of Christianity, Judaism and Germanism, the core of his message is especially a theoretical and ethical idea. Through a process that we could call overturned, though analogous in respect of that of utopia, he describes the real present, so as to propose the ideal future as a task: it is only in this perspective that his partiality and selectivity in the reading of history can be understood and justified. But this aspect is what makes his message universal and permanent. Historical categories fall into the background, and a message for everybody, be they Germans or others, Jews or Protestants or members of other denominations, emerges. His message is that of idealist humanism proposed as a task, in which Cohen, in his loyalty to the concrete historical context in which he lived, saw the possible unification of German Christians and Jews, and in the betrayal of which he saw the error of German anti-Judaism. It could be advanced as an ideal category and yardstick for every historical situation.

65

J. KLATZKIN, Deutschtum und Judentum: eine Kritik, in «Der Jude» 2 (1917/18), pp. 245-252 and 358-370. 66 Cf. S. SCHWARZSCHILD, «Germanism and Judaism». Hermann Cohen’s Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis, cit.

CHAPTER TWO

PLATO’S IDEA OF THE GOOD IN ITS DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS BY COHEN AND NATORP*

One of the numerous merits of the Marburg school is undoubtedly that of providing an original, fruitful interpretation of the history of philosophy, as can be seen in Cassirer’s important historiographical work and the large number of pertinent writings by Cohen, Natorp and their pupils on Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and many others. They are never episodic glances at a particular individual or stage in the history of philosophy, but rather aim at a new look at and evaluation of the historical tradition of «critical idealism» constituting the horizon common to the whole school. History of philosophy thus became inextricably intertwined with Marburg theoretical philosophy, to the extent that, whereas the school’s historical research cannot be fully understood without considering its theoretical views (i.e. what it found in tradition cannot be understood, if what it was looking for is unknown), on the other hand, the investigation of its historiographical interpretations often sheds light on the understanding of its theoretical elaborations. Therefore, the theoretical differences between its various representatives or the various stages in the development of their thought are precisely and significantly matched with the different interpretative threads of this orr that aspect of the history of philosophy. *

This essay is dedicated to the memory of the late Prof. Steven S. Schwarzschild. He is well known for his important contributions to the study of the thought of the Marburg school. He will also be remembered for his sincere, enthusiastic adherence to the human and social ideals of the philosophers belonging to that school. His moral and civic commitment bears living, enduring witness to the validity and lasting relevance of those ideals.

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Seeing that it has now been demonstrated and is widely accepted among the interpreters of Marburg that, in the history of critical idealism reconstructed by the members of the school, Plato occupied a place of equal importance to that attributed to Kant, and that the former’s influence on Marburg philosophy was in no way inferior to that of the latter (Leibniz’s name at least needing to be added to the other two), I am now in a position to outline and briefly justify my aim in the following pages. My purpose is to provide an overview of the development of the interpretation of an important theme in Plato’s philosophy: the idea of the good, in the work of Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, both leading members of the Marburg school, so as to identify the relationship in it (since the term «reflection» would be insufficient) with the significant diversity of approach dividing the two philosophical systems and with the respective developments they underwent. Both for Cohen and Natorp, though in very different ways, Plato’s idea of the good was not only a historiographical problem, but, above all, a crucial theoretical one, which was ever present in their philosophy.

1. The Good as an Idea and the Idea of the Good in Cohen Of the two main meanings implied by Plato’s idea of the good: the ), Ÿ good as idea and the idea of the good as unconditioned (Ÿnypøueton Cohen fully highlighted the former and showed great interest, albeit tinged with embarrassment, for the latter.1 He argued that one of Plato’s greatest merits with regard to critical idealism was the fundamental contribution of his theory of ideas in the discovery and development of the critical method of foundation. The meaning of «idea» as «hypothesis» was Plato’s fundamental methodological achievement, to which Cohen referred in the 1

As far as Cohen is concerned this essay is based on the more detailed analysis in my book The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, Eng. trans. by J. Denton, State University of New York Press, Albany (New York) 1997. Readers are invited to refer to this study for more detailed treatment.

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formulation of his «method of purity». Idea as «hypothesis» was a decisive further development of the Socratic «concept». In respect of the concept, which essentially and inexhaustibly means a question: «What is it? ( )», ) the Platonic idea is a hypothesis, inasmuch as it is the «giving account ( løgon didønai))» of the concept, and thus thought as «origin» and «foundation» of the concept itself: «The Socratic concept only asks, and the correctly understood meaning of concept actually goes no further. On the other hand, idea is the self-consciousness of concept. It is the logos of concept, since it gives account of concept. In connection with the verb to “give” logos actually means “account” (løgon didønai))). This juridical meaning now becomes the most profound foundation of logic. Idea is the giving account of concept. In the grounds or principles of the forms of pure knowledge reason posits its giving account in the mathematical science of nature».2 Therefore, for Cohen, Platonic ideas are, above all, hypotheses, i.e. «foundations» of knowledge. Cohen’s «method of purity» made reference to this meaning of Plato’s teaching. This method saw itself as a development of the latter, inasmuch as it followed on in the conception of philosophy as critical foundation of concept, i.e. of the object of knowledge, in idea, still meaning, and this needs to be made clear, idea as hypothesis, i.e. foundation, not ground: ««Idea became the justification of concept, in the sense that thought produced its own ground in it. “Giving account” (løgon didønai)) and laying ground (Ø ºu u ) become synonyms. Logos is the same concept. But when it becomes logos by itself, then it becomes self-foundation. And this foundation by idea means and guarantees the true being. There is no truth, no knowledge, no being beyondd this, just as on this side there is no being and no science».3 For this reason Cohen principally saw the validity of Plato’s idea of the good in consideration of the good too as idea, thus allowing ethics to be restored to the level of foundation, i.e. of philosophical, critical and scientific consideration: «The Goodd is the expression ( ) used by Plato for the other line of enquiry, which he 2 3

LRE E 15 f. Ibid., p. 211.

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distinguishes from that on the being of nature, which is the mathematical (tÅ mau hmatikå))). If the latter are collected together under the concept of logic, that of ethics arises for the former. But ethics too is investigation and it is philosophy; thus it is connected with logic; the doctrine of ideas, therefore, must posit and consolidate this connection. Thus the good becomes the idea of the good». d 4 On the other hand, Cohen realised the importance of Plato’s consideration of the idea of the good as Ÿ ø u , as unconditioned, though he also noted in it the risk of ontological hypostatisation, beyond the limits of critical philosophy. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the problems of the ultimate ground of knowledge and being, coinciding with the ultimate end, while rejecting the transformation of the idea of the good into an absolute metaphysical principle, and, even more firmly, any theological interpretation of it: «Thus thought is trapped here in the worst alternative. Either the idea of the good is idea: then it cannot expect a higher, different value from that of foundation, or it must mean a higher value and thus one that is different from that which belongs to the ideas of nature: thus it gives up the fundamental logical value of idea. By coining a term that presents and requires antithesis in respect of hypothesis, Plato teaches the perspicacious thinker near to him, centuries after him, that he does not mean to have resolved the alternative in either sense; otherwise he would have to have put aside even the name idea for the idea of the good».5 In Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen decidedly opted for the first meaning of the idea of the good, thus abandoning any implication with the problem of the unconditioned. Nevertheless, in the same work, Ÿnypø ueton in the need to found he had to face anew the problem of Ÿn immanence between logic and ethics. This is admittedly a the methodological requirement, to which he responded with the «fundamental law of truth». The problem went beyond its methodological aspect, however. It also posited the need for a true transcendent ground of the realisation of morality in nature, to which, in Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen responded with a rigorously 4 5

E 32. Ibid., p. 33.

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transcendental consideration of the idea of God, while coherently remaining within the limits of «scientific» philosophy, though this response was unable to entirely satisfy the question. In Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis,6 Cohen newly posited the unresolved matter: «Indeed, even the Good may not claim to exceed its status of idea, and hence of hypothesis. However, the contentt of ethics distinguishes the Good as idea from anything in the heavens above and on earth below. By virtue of this axiological distinctiveness, the Good deserves as hypothesis a preferential terminology. Thus we may term the idea of the Good a sufficient hypothesiss (Òkanøn).Whereas the idea in general merits the predicate reliability (ô’ Póöáëcò ôyò ›ðïèÝóåùò ), the idea of the Good may be defined as that hypothesis which constitutes the telos or end of reason, and thus plainly terminates the report of its accountability. (…) It does not make sense to engage in yet more retrogressive reduction to find a root or provenance beyond and behind ethics. The Good constitutes the foundation of the world. In the light of more exacting scrutiny and conceptual analysis, we find that “hypothesis” takes the role not of an ultimate destination and telos, but rather of a point of origin and departure. Non-foundation turns out to be the origin of grounding. In this prominent example, the significance of the “infinite judgement” proves itself again to be the judgement of origin. Hence, by employing the terminology of hypothesis, Plato combines the problem of ethics and ethical certainty with the problem of paradigmatic or mathematical cognition. Two points are important here: the Good constitutes an idea, just as mathematics consists of ideas; and the methodology of retrogressive reduction [as applied to the idea of the Good] differs radically from the methodology of other ideas. This difference obtains only in the reductive process backward; the methodology of forward motion applies equally to the cognitive process of all ideas. There is no other methodology for problems of ethics but that implied in the idea of Good qua idea; only with respect 6

H. COHEN, Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis (1908), in J 3 225-227; Eng. trans. by A. Sh. Bruckstein, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison (Wisconsin) 2004, pp. 11-14.

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to its retrogressive motion of rendering account for its hypothesis, does the ethical idea differ from the accountability of other ideas. Herein lies the difference between ethics and mathematics: insofar as the latter is based upon the logic of ideation, it distinguishes ethics from logic. The idea is shared by ethics and logic; the idea of the Good separates ethics from logic». In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie,7 Cohen re-stated the legitimacy of the problem of transcendent ground, posited by Plato’s Píõðüèåôïí: «Does not the reality of morality seek and require a higher guarantee than the one that idea as hypothesis can provide? Does the good stand on the same level of validity, of need to know and right to validity, t where mathematical ideas are situated, inasmuch as they constitute the ground of nature? Can I also believe here that I shall find total peace in the ultimate conclusion of this wisdom: that greater certainty would only be illusion, that the ultimate guarantee of truth also consists here in the value of idea as foundation? And if it were true that another kind of certainty is simply not possible, at least the question should not be a necessary problem, so that, with reference to this question, a methodological formulation can be found of the difference of the problems between morality and the nature of existing reality? The very question has a methodological meaning and thus also productivity, even if its positive solution should not occur in every sense». The subsequent solution, however, as we shall see, was to consist in shifting the problem of the idea of the good to the idea of God.

2. The Idea of the Good as “the principle of the logical” in Natorp Even a brief analysis of Platos Ideenlehre8 clearly shows that Natorp’s interpretation of Plato’s idea of the good was entirely different from

7

BR 36. P. NATORP, Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, Dürr, Leipzig 1903, 19222 (repr., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1961). The 8

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Cohen’s, right from the start. Natorp’s 1903 work provides a thorough interpretation of Plato’s Dialogues and was, undoubtedly the most successful and influential study on Plato to emerge from the Marburg school. In his Vorwort, Natorp acknowledged that Cohen was the scholar «who, for Plato as well as Kant, opened our eyes»,9 rightly so, since Cohen’s previous writings on Plato, primarily Platos Ideenlehre und die Mathematik,10 were crucial for the line of interpretation followed by Natorp in his work. Nevertheless, there are also considerable divergences in it from Cohen’s interpretation, showing the different theoretical approach between the two and containing the partial premises of the ultimate results of Natorp’s philosophy. One of the most revealing aspects of this is the interpretation of the idea of the good. Firstly, Natorp, unlike Cohen, showed no interest in the specifically ethical meaning of this Platonic theme. He saw it as a residue of the Socratic concept of the good as the unity of the virtues, to be found mostly in Plato’s early dialogues but irrelevant in the later ones. In Natorp’s view, it was only gradually that Plato developed the meaning of the good as «knowledge» and «law», present, though only implicitly, in the Socratic concept, reaching the full meaning of «idea», through subsequent further elaborations («knowledge of self» in the Charmide and the good as «lawfulness» in the Gorgias). It reached fulfilment in Plato’s full doctrine of ideas, i.e. in dialectic as the fundamental method of idealism to be found in the main mature dialogues: Phaedrus, Phaedo, Symposium, The Republic etc. Although Natorp, like Cohen, rejected all theological interpretations of the good,11 the former identified the crucial importance for idealism precisely in the meaning of this idea as Ÿ Ÿnypø u eton, as an unconditioned principle. The good, then, is not simply «idea», but rather the «supreme idea», «idea of the idea»;12 not quotations in this essay are taken from the 1961 reprint of the second edition; they were compared with the first edition and do not differ from it significantly. 9 P. NATORP, Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, cit., p. X. 10 H. COHEN, Platos Ideenlehre und die Mathematikk (1878), in S 1 336-366. 11 Cf. P. NATORP, Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, cit., pp. 198 ff. 12 Ibid., p. 50.

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merely «law», but «the ultimate law is therefore the ultimate foundation of every scientific thesis (Setzung) and every scientific context»,13 «the law of law itself».14 In this guise it is «the very fundamental unity»,15 the originative, unconditioned principle, which is immanent in knowledge, inasmuch as it can only be understood as its transcendental principle, though it is at the same time transcendent, since it is no mere logical principle, but «the principle of the logical»: «Therefore this is all that can be legitimately understood under the idea of the good: not an ultimate logical principle, but the very principle of the logical, where every particular position of thought ( (Denksetzung ) and thus every particular being – being only meaning position of thought – must be ultimately grounded; it must be grounded in it not as in an ultimate being anterior to thought, previous with respect to thought – nothing is more radically rejected than this – but solely as in its own ultimate law. Since the “beginning” of a deduction is called a law. It is generally the law which constitutes the object; this very law, that the object must be grounded in law, is therefore beyond in respect of the object, and also in respect of every specific law (Lø )): it is not a law, but the law; it clearly emerges from this, at the same time, why this ultimate principle may also be beyond in respect of the knowledge of science».16 This transcendent status of the idea of the good, «beyond» ideas, in the sense of «positions of thought», beyond the knowledge of nature, and thus also of logic as a cognitive process, should not, however suggest that Natorp had given in, in respect of a metaphysical conception of the idea of the good, even less so of its hypostatisation. The idea of the good is beyond the cognitive activity of thought, i.e. any «position» or «thesis» (Setzung) of thought, not inasmuch as it is other with regard to thought, but precisely inasmuch as it is «thought itself (aªtØj š Løgoj)»: «It is not Á Lø because it is aªtØj š Løgoj, it is not a thesis (Setzung), because it is the pure thesis, the ultimate law (Gesetz) itself of the position of thought, from which all the 13

Ibid., p. 192. Ibid., p. 195. 15 Ibid., p. 177. 16 Ibid., pp. 194 f. 14

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particular theses of thought must come by deduction, and be understood through this deduction».17 Natorp warded off all suspicion off a metaphysical interpretation of Ÿ ueton ѽҏ continuously and insistently re-stating that Plato’s Plato’s Ÿnypø idea of the good only means «method, method again and nothing but method».18 In Natorp’s view, the «methodological meaning of idea» is «the principle» of «methodological» or «critical idealism».19 The reason why, then, the supreme idea of method is, for Plato, the idea of the good is not to be sought in ethics, since the idea of the good, as we have seen, has an essentially logical meaning; it is «the principle of the logical»: ««Idea as method, d as the method of the radical grounding of sciences in the fundamental law of thought itselff (aªtØj š Løgoj), in this strengthened meaning, of their logicall grounding: this and nothing else is the last word of Plato’s dialectic».20 This reason should rather be sought in the teleological meaning of this principle, for which it is fully a «transcendental principle»:21 «Already in the Gorgias we thought we had found that the good, for Plato, means lawfulness (das Gesetzliche) and nothing more. Nevertheless, this is insufficient as an explanation, since, at least in the first instance, it only means the lawfulness of action; but this would only be one lawfulness beside another one: therefore just one idea not the idea. This must not be what was intended; the subsequent, purely logical explanation would be by no means compatible with this. Rather, the good itself, as the ultimate end to which everything is finally directed, not only human action, but also becoming and going on, actually being in general, must be thought in an entirely intimate and immediate relationship with what is beyond every particular law, with law “itself”. This was also indicated as the “unconditioned” Ÿ ueton can also be translated in this way), i.e. (since, undoubtedly, Ÿnypø This teleological character makes the unconditioned lawfulness».22 T

17

Ibid., p. 194. Ibid., p. 332. 19 Ibid., p. 154; cf. ibid., pp. 84, 199, 330, 393 f. 20 Ibid., p. 216. 21 Ibid., p. 197. 22 Ibid., pp. 195 f. 18

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idea of the good a general principle of logical, ethical and cosmic «order».23 In the closing chapters, in which Natorp, comparing Aristotle’s philosophy with that of Plato, provided a masterly picture of the antithesis between dogmatism and critical philosophy, he identified the characteristic feature of Plato’s critical philosophy precisely in the concept of knowledge as the infinite task. This infinite task does not only lie in the process from the centre to the periphery (to use Natorp’s terms), i.e. in the determination of the object, but also in the process from periphery to centre, in «the progressive further development of the very principles».24 And this is perfectly coherent with «the principle of the logical» inasmuch as it is a methodological principle: «precisely because he [Plato] conceived the logical as a method, d as a process, as an infinite movementt and development, [the principle of the logical] will not be enclosed and fixed in any definitive formula».25 Natorp appears, then, to have harmonised the absolute, as it were, character of Píõðüèåôïíҏ as fundamental, originative unity with its methodological character, as infinite lawfulness of the system. However, this is only true, on condition that an exact definition of what he meant by «method» can be given. This will also shed further light on where he differed from Cohen. Natorp’s method, as we have just seen, was a synonym of process. Method is the very advance of knowledge, but also of being, in the infinite direction of ever further determination. This is why the «given» (Gegebene) is always a «task» ( (Aufgegebene ), the «factum « » is always ««fieri» (to use Natorp’s characteristic terms), of which the unconditioned unity of the logos is the immanent principle, precisely inasmuch as it is its infinite beginning and end, i.e. inasmuch as the methodological process, which is infinite in both directions, is, nevertheless, immanent development within the principle itself. Plato’s Ÿnypø Ÿ ueton was, in Natorp’s view, the first, fundamental model of the supreme principle of his very critical philosophy: the logos as the identity of totality and 23

Cf. ibid., pp. 198 ff., 345 f., 348 f. Ibid., p. 393. 25 Ibidem. 24

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infinity, of principle and process, being and becoming, i.e. of thought as system. It is now commonly acknowledged by scholars that this conception of system and method differed considerably from that of Cohen.26 One example, connected with the interpretation of the interpretation of Plato’s idea of the good, is the originally unpublished series of critical notes by Natorp to Cohen’s Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (now published by Holzhey).27 This explicit intertwining of both approaches is interesting, since it provides evidence of their parallel development.28 It should be pointed out that Natorp’s critical reading of Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, as soon as the work came out in 1902, in preparation for a review in «Kant-Studien», which he never actually published, so as to avoid publicly stating his misunderstanding and disagreement over Cohen’s logic, accompanied the completion of the former’s Platons Ideenlehre published in 1903. In his notes, Natorp presented Cohen’s logic through the filter of the conceptuality and terminology peculiar to his system: thought as an infinite process, “origin” as immanent unity of this infinity etc. After this he had no difficulty in stating that he stood «on exactly the same ground» as Cohen.29 Natorp’s common «ground» was precisely Plato’s theory of ideas, though he was clearly straining Cohen’s referring the «method of purity» to Plato’s «idea» as «hypothesis» when connecting it with his own considerably different interpretation of the principle of the logoss as the translation of Plato’s Ÿnypø Ÿ ueton : «Ourr common source for this mostly mutually independent conception, despite frequent discussion, is Plato. For the correctness of this statement, which may scandalise many, that this form of idealism, and none other, is Plato’s, I refer readers to my book, which has just come out: Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus (Leipzig, Dürr, 1903). 26 A thorough comparison of the views of Cohen and Natorp, foregrounding their considerable differences over fundamental themes such as the conception of the system, its principle and method, can be found in H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 1. Readers will find there more detailed treatment of the themes touched on above. 27 Paul Natorp: Zu Cohens Logik, k in H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 5-78. 28 See also Natorp’s letter to Albert Görland dated 21 November 1902, ibid., pp. 299. 29 Ibid., p. 11.

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Plato (in the Phaedo) did not only conceive of pure knowledge, his “ideas”, as hypotheses, foundations, originative positions of thought, but then (in The Republic) coherently returned from ideas a to the idea, from foundations n to the foundation with no presuppositions u at all, from pure positions of thought (Lø ) to the pure position of thought (aªtØj š Løgoj), to ground and (in his words) radically anchor all of them in this. And he set up, as the ultimate law off thought, of the position of thought in general (in the Philebus), the law of the unity of the manifold, or rather infinity. He developed, with an unequalled acumen, (especially in the Parmenides), thought as “method”, as process (kºnhsij i ) as the process of that eternal self-renewal of the very very procedure towards higher and higher degrees».30 As a consequence of this strain Natorp then found insufficient deduction of the various kinds off judgement from the supreme principle in Cohen’s system: actually Plato’s foundation of the system, on which Natorp fell back,31 was aªtØj š Løgoj, Ÿnypø Ÿ ueton, while for Cohen it was idea as hypothesis (Êpø uesi j ). Owing to the same misunderstanding, Natorp limited Cohen’s principle of origin to the meaning of his «originative law of synthetical unity».32 Here also the strained identification of the method of the hypothesis with the Ÿ methodological principle of Ÿnypø ueton was explicit: «thus Plato’s Ÿ Ÿnypø ueton, transcending the entire procedure of hypothesis, return: not only, but the required reference of every conditioned thesis to the no longer conditioned law of every thesis, in which it must be grounded and assured (…). But it is precisely these great historical examples that teach that nobody has ever reached, or been able to reach the true ground of thought, at its origin, except for going backwards, starting from something as given, i.e. the problem, the task, by way of its negation».33 The same differences and misunderstandings are to be found in an unpublished work by Natorp dating from about 1910, in which Cohen’s principle of origin was identified with Plato’s «logos of the 30

Ibid., pp. 11 f. Cf., ibid., p. 17. 32 Cf., ibid., pp. 23 ff. 33 Ibid., d p. 25. 31

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logos»,34 and he was seriously criticised for having subsequently separated Plato’s ideas from Socrates’ concepts.35 Here Natorp was being coherent, since his interpretation of Plato, strongly foregrounding the idea of the good as «the idea» and «the law» (Gesetz), on the other hand limited «ideas» to simple «positions» (Setzungen), thesis of thought, not essentially different, at least in their need for grounding, from the Socratic concepts. Cohen, however, saw things very differently: the fundamental character of Plato’s idea as hypothesis (Êpø uesi j) was not that of reference to an Ÿnypø Ÿ ueton, as its grounding, but, on the contrary, that of being itself foundation, «giving account». Other unpublished notes by Natorp to Cohen’s logic, dating from around 1914, again refer to Plato36 in an exposition of the principle of origin in accordance with Natorp’s typical conception and rectification of Cohen’s conception of it.

3. Plato’s Idea of the Good in the Cohen-Natorp Debate on Religion The differences highlighted above in the conception of the system and its principle in Cohen and Natorp can be clearly seen again in Natorp’s originally unpublished notes (which have now been edited by Holzhey)37 to Cohen’s Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, most probably dating from 1915. In them Natorp evaluated the book from a rather different viewpoint than that in his own 1894 study, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität,38 the new viewpoint being clearly characterised by the philosophy of his 34

Cf., ibid., p. 46. Cf., ibid., p. 63. 36 Cf. Paul Natorp: Synthetische Einheit und Ursprung (aus einer ‘Einleitung zur Allgemeinen Logik’), in H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 92. 37 Paul Natorp: Zu Cohens Religionsphilosophie, in H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 105-140. 38 P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpädagogik, Mohr, Freiburg i. Br. 1894; J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 19082. 35

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last years. Here I will only examine the passages explicitly dealing with Plato’s idea of the good. They do, however, reflect the main points in Natorp’s criticism of Cohen, thus confirming the great importance of this interpretative problem in both Marburg philosophers. Natorp’s first reference to Plato’s Ÿnypø ueton was significantly a reservation over Cohen’s rejection of intuition as an organ of knowledge, which the latter associated with mysticism, which he also rejected.39 Natorp observed: «Further development: Plato. Hypothesis = idea, “vision” (Schau). But idea only, absolutely belongs to the apparatus of scientific thought (mathematical and that analogous to it). On the other hand, intuition the contradiction to authentic scientific thought {??}. But where is anypotheton left?/ {My divergence is conditioned by my distinction of generall logic from theoretical philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics (…)}».40 Natorp was certainly by this time convinced that there could and must be intuitive and mystical thought of Ÿnypøueton, in accordance with the etymological meaning of «idea», which, in his own words «means contemplate (Schauen) or contemplated (Geschautes)»:41 identity of subjective and objective. Natorp associated the reference to Plato’s Ÿnypøueton in these notes with his two main criticisms of Cohen’s philosophy of religion: on the one hand, not having seen religion as reflection on the limit, on the other, not having been able to dissociate it from ethics, thus limiting it to mere method. Natorp saw (theoretical, ethic or aesthetic) philosophy as method as «objectivisation», i.e. «particular knowledge of the object».42 But his «general logic» already «goes beyond (darüber hinaus)» this knowledge: it is «knowledge in general (überhaupt)», t different from «particular knowledge» and its ground; it is «relation of being in general (Seins-beziehung überhaupt)», t «knowledge in general» of

39

Cf. BR 30. H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 109. 41 Ibid. d , p. 111. 42 Cf., ibid., d p. 109. 40

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«what alone is (das Nur-Sein)», of «being which is beyond d (das Über-Sein)».43 If general logic is knowledge of this «being in general» as the ground of «particular knowledge of the object», religion, on the other hand, draws on this «beyond being», this «limit», not in its function as foundation of every limitation and determination, but rather in the opposite direction, as identical, unconditioned unity, beyond any limitation. Here, then, the primacy of the meaning of idea as Píõðüèåôïí over idea as hypothesis is evident and explicit: «This is the idea of creation. “Idea” not as hypothesis, but referring all hypotheses to anypotheton. (Since it is not correctt that idea in general = hypothesis. It also covers anypotheton – the idea of the good. But the ultimate meaning – not only formally the identical unity of the objective (the infinitely distant reference point) – this by finite will – but ultimately the preservation of life, duty, the spiritual, which is an ®p™keina oªsºaq beyond all finite limitations – in this sense, however, it is certainly no longer being but being-beyond (Über-Sein), here also no longer a being, in any limitation, but being, absolutely – not objectivisation (not even qualitatively), but rather subjectivisation, though ultimately also beyond this opposition, idea precisely inasmuch as it means, etymologically, contemplation or contemplated».44 Therefore, while for Cohen religion remained in the field of «method», it went beyond it, for Natorp: «{(…) In Cohen religion becomes a science of the spirit, such as history, for example. For me it goes beyond the science of nature and science of the spirit and includes the whole (das Ganze) of life, for which every science only means method. Religion is no longer a method. “Panmethodism” cannot be stretched so far. Religion is a full vital current – for which method only digs the bed, it is elevated life itself}».45 Thus Natorp was modifying his own approach, correcting the excessive subjectivism in the interpretation of religion to be found in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität. He no longer saw 43

Cf., ibid., d p. 110. Ibid., p. 110 f. 45 Ibid., p. 110. 44

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religion as «only (bloß) subjective».46 This correction was explicit: «Compared with my previous formulations: actually, the opposition has already been overcome in them – but with an excessive appearance of mere subjectivity».47 Philosophy as method is still, nevertheless, particular knowledge of the object. Even though it sees the object of its determinateness as an infinite task, for this very reason it is able to draw on unconditioned unity only as an end, never as ground. This means that it can take it on only as a «negative limiting concept».48 It is only religion, inasmuch as it transcends the method of hypothesis, that «refers back» ( (zurückweist ) «to grounding beyond hypothesis» (auf einen überhypothetischen Grund). d 49 Here another important difference between Cohen and Natorp emerges. Whereas Cohen’s entire investigation of religion aimed at understanding its role within culture, for Natorp, on the other hand, posited as transcendental, but also transcendent for certain aspects, ground,50 for all methodological knowledge, it is also posited outside culture: «{The cultural meaning of religion for him is a stable point of departure – that it may go beyond culture is not taken into consideration!}».51 Thus, for Natorp, religion becomes thought of the limit, that very limit to which philosophy as method also tends; but that which is an infinite problem in the various directions of objectivisation, in religion is an absolute, originative solution. Once again Natorp explained all this with direct reference to Plato’s teaching of Ÿnypøueton: «{(…) Object means, above all, problem, but religion will not only be problem and question, but that which would solve all questions. It is in no way a particular objective relationship, so is not included in logic, inasmuch as the latter aims at particular objective determination – the logic of hypothesis –, the question here, on the other hand, solely regards the groundd of every hypothesis in the anypotheton. And not even the transfinite object inasmuch as it is what ought to be – the one and only 46

Ibidem. Ibid., p. 139. 48 Cf., ibid., p. 132. 49 Cf. ibidem. 50 Cf., ibid., pp. 112, 131. 51 Ibid., p. 113. «For him» refers to Cohen. 47

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good, as what is required. It is precisely this which is opposed by the “I am he who is there (da ist)”. It is being – but ®p™keina oªsºaq, i.e. beyond all particularisation of being – it truly remains the form of the ontological relationship in general, of knowledge in general. Therefore, religion becomes, albeit in the sense explained, transobjective, not, for this reason, subjective (rather, it must also overcome the objectivity-subjectivity t opposition, otherwise soul-God would not be reached, i.e. all particularisation of consciousness versus the universal soul). l In Cohen religion appears to become a science of the spiritt (like history) – for me also beyond the nature-spirit opposition. It posits the question on the total concept of life, which means overcoming any relativising limitation. Religion cannot avoid criticism of the method, but it itself is no longer method, in any sense, but rather the vital current for which the method digs the bed}».52

4. Ÿnypøueton in Natorp’s Last Works Idea as originative, absolute unity took over entirely from idea as method in the Anhang g Natorp added to the end of the new edition of his Platos Ideenlehre in 1922. At the beginning of this appendix he pointed, once again, to the continuity between Plato’s ®p™keina and Kant’s transcendental.53 However, this connection actually had a quite different meaning from that in the 1903 text: Kant himself was now being read by Natorp in the light of his new interpretation of Plato.54 This new interpretation placed Plato’s dialectic in direct relation with «originative intuition» (Uranschauung)55 of the identity of logos and psyche, in Natorp’s view, the fundamental principle in the philosophy of Heraclitus. Thus, with explicit self-criticism in respect of the 1903 text, Natorp acknowledged the mystical character of Platonic philosophy, even placing it at the head of a line of development of 52

Ibid., p. 136 f. Cf. P. NATORP, Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus, cit., pp. 463 f. 54 Cf. ibid., p. 469. 55 Ibid., p. 466. 53

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Western mystical thought, named representatives of which being: Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz (with monadology in mind: precisely the aspect of his thought rejected by Marburg historiography!) and the post-Kantian mystics.56 As can be seen, Natorp placed Plato at the head of a philosophical tradition which is as distant and antithetical as could possibly be imagined from the tradition of critical idealism usually to be found in the Marburg school. This reinterpretation of Plato by Natorp had already completed the process of draining the meaning of idea as hypothesis, i.e. as method, in favour of idea as Píõðüèåôïí, i.e. as an absolute principle. Ideas as hypotheses are now just partial, imperfect phenomena, revealing the One, from which they emanate, more in the negative sense of referring back to it owing to their inadequacy, than in the positive one of being its actual mirror. Entire value and meaning, however, is assigned to originative unity-totality, the first, ineffable ground of being and knowledge: «Idea remains “hypothesis”. But what is the exact meaning of this hypothesis? Limitation, without doubt; extraction of every single ray of the infinite fullness of light, which, if it were allowed to totally affect us, could only blind us. In this sense, and only in this sense, originative light, which, like the sun, lights up our souls, only through which we “know”, nevertheless, remains unreachable and transcendent ( jenseitig), in itself, for us. However, it is not less certain in this transcendence, inasmuch as we understand it in ourselves only in what it radiates and through which it makes itself visible by us, thus only in the manifoldness of its radiations, not in its totality, inasmuch as we can become certain of it only as the originative, luminous source».57 Plato’s Píõðüèåôïí was thus interpreted by Natorp, who referred explicitly to Plotinus, in the sense of One-whole, from which the articulation of the manifold emanates and in which it is realised.58 Natorp reaffirmed, however, with evident, though implicit, m reference to Cohen, his rejection of the interpretation of Plato’s teaching of the 56

Cf. ibid., p. 467. Ibid., p. 469. 58 Cf. ibid., pp. 501, 532. 57

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idea of the good in the sense of the primacy of ethics.59 His mystical turning point, however, also modified his very interpretation of Plato’s idea of the good as the «principle of the logical»: «The last unitarian ground of the world of ideas, expressed as ®p™keina, does not only mean merely logical unity of the system, but rather it also means this, but the unity of the originative living, of the originative concrete, i.e. more than just concrete, which means, in itself, certainly no longer a unity, an idea, a logos, but the ultimate unity of unities, the idea of ideas, the “very logos” of all logoi. Inasmuch as it is living, however, it enters into a close relationship with “psyche itself”».60 Thus Natorp developed the absolute principle in the double direction of unity and totality, so that all duality is included in it and removed at the same time in a dialectical process which is infinite only inasmuch as it is originatively wholly present in the absolute One. The duality of objective and subjective, logos and psyche, episteme and doxa, abstract and concrete, universal and individual, and also that of transcendence and immanence are annulled in the unity-totality of the absolute principle. In particular, Natorp saw the fulfilment of Plato’s long search for overcoming all duality in the coming to maturity of the teaching of eros, in the Symposium.61 In Natorp’s view, the function of Plato’s eros was that «of universal mediator»62 in respect of all dualism, any limitation, and any fall from the originative One. Therefore he had no hesitation in identifying Plato’s eros with his own new concept of religion: «Thus, however, eros places itself very close to our concept of religion. This means precisely “newly linking” the broken tie – actually only in appearance, for the dimmed consciousness of the finite, intimately estranged from its origin – but through which, in accordance with the ultimate truth of the thing, it is preserved for ever in the transfinite, totality, (…) because the “whole” (das ‘Ganze’) (…) does not simply come, but is eternally connected “in itself ”».63 59

Cf. f ibid., p. 532. Ibid., pp. 467 f.; cf. ibid., pp. 532, 533. 61 Cf. ibid., pp. 489 ff. 62 Ibid., p. 506. 63 Ibid., p. 508.; cf. ibid., pp. 512 f. 60

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5. Cohen: From the Idea of the Good to God’s Goodness Natorp’s thought, then, contains clear, undeniable features supporting Cohen’s criticism of the former’s «pantheism».64 Admittedly Cohen was referring to the second edition of Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanitätt published in 1908, i.e. the work presenting Natorp’s initial approach to the philosophy off religion, not later developments. Nevertheless, Cohen already noticed the emergence of features of the «pantheistic identity», which, as we have seen, reached maturity in the following years. Cohen already contrasted «correlation», the hub and foundation of his later philosophy of religion, with Natorp’s pantheistic identity. Quite independently and differently from Natorp, Cohen was developing his own reflections on religion, and, in connection with them, a new approach to the question of Plato’s idea of the good. We have already mentioned how, in Plato’s idea of the good, Cohen highlighted the importance off considering ethics in accordance with the critical method and acknowledgement of the primacy of ethics, and how, on the other hand, he was sensitive to the problem of transcendence, though not accepting Plato’s solution of the transcendence of the good. While the ethical importance of the idea of the good was reiterated with ever increasing emphasis in the philosophy of religion of Cohen’s last years, especially in his posthumous work, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, the problem of transcendence followed a gradual path towards a solution in transference from the idea of the good to the idea of God. As has already been mentioned, this path had already been somewhat laid down in the acknowledgement of God’s transcendence in Ethik des reinen Willens. Nevertheless, in this work only the preliminary signs of subsequent development are to be glimpsed,

64

In the notes to Natorp’s Religion, originally unpublished and now to be found in H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 99-102: critical reference to «pantheism» appears on p. 101.

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especially because the argument, at least in accordance with Cohen’s intentions, was still being developed wholly within the «scientific» method. An explicit step in the direction of the final solution is to be found, subsequently, in Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis.65 The final result was only to come, however, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, also thanks to methodological development, by means of which Cohen now acknowledged for religion (in particular Jewish monotheism), albeit within the critical, rational method, a different method from the scientific one, though complementary to it: the method of correlation. In this work Cohen reconfirmed his recognition of Plato as the founder of ethics, precisely inasmuch as, with his teaching of the idea of the good, he founded ethics as knowledge, on the one hand, still distinguishing it from the mathematical knowledge of nature, on the other.66 Here Cohen saw the most profound point of contact between Greek philosophy and Jewish prophetism. To this agreement, however, should be added, in Cohen’s view, further development of Judaism in respect of Greek philosophy: «it is, perhaps, the greatest triumph of Judaism that it derived its moral superiority, even with regard to Platonism, from its theology».67 What Cohen meant here was precisely transference to God of the attribute of transcendence, which Plato gave to the idea of the good: this transfer, with all its implications, is connected with the recognition of correlation between God and man, which is never identification, with the «humility of recognizing the limits»: «This humility of recognizing the limits of human knowledge, which at the same time is the greatest human pride, is surmised by the Greek mind in the Idea of the Good. d But the latter, in the Greek mind, becomes a God, and thus there is no correlative link to the holy spirit of man. Because there is no unification, one has to look for a mediation».68 Thus, for Cohen, the good as transcendent ground becomes an attribute of God; the good is not transcendent, but God, the 65

Cf. H. COHEN, Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis, cit., pp. 224 ff., 250; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 8 ff., 86 f. 66 Cf. RV 464 ff; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 400 ff. 67 Ibid., p. 505; Eng. trans. cit., p. 437. 68 Ibid., p. 124; Eng. trans. cit., p. 107.

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Transcendent, is «the Good One» and enters into correlation with man, making him capable of morality and giving him its fulfilment in the redemption from sins: «God, even in the ethical sense, is not good (das Gute) but the Good One (der Gute). The object of morality is thus elevated to God’s being, and through this unavoidably elevated to the concept of a subject».69 Cohen saw the «goodness» of God as a particular aspect of His «holiness», in special respect of the individual sinner and of redemption from sins. More generally, therefore, «holiness» is the religious name of the correlation between God and man, which has its transcendent ground in the originative holiness of God and its correlate in the holiness derived from man, i.e. in his morality, both as a gift and as infinite task. Thus we can say, more generally, that in the theme of «holiness», i.e. of the «holy spirit», of God and man, the Platonic problem of the transcendence of the good is transferred. Cohen saw this transfer as a further development, because it is not holiness that becomes God, but God is holy and gives his spirit of holiness to man. The ethical character of the idea of the good and its primacy, originating in Plato, and the novelty of monotheism, correlation of God with man, were thus joined by Cohen in the teaching of the holy spirit, where the divine attributes are contained and recapitulated. Precisely with reference to correlation, Cohen uses Plato’s expression for the idea of the good: «beyond being», ®p™keina t q oªsºaq, literally: «What does purpose mean in the case of God? This question already implies the problem of correlation. For, properly speaking, with regard to being there can be no question of its purpose. The question of the purpose of being transcends being properr (geht über das Sein selbst hinaus) and relates itself to correlation».70

69 70

Ibid., p. 243; Eng. trans. cit., p. 208. See also the following pages. Ibid., p. 110; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 94 f.; the italics are mine.

CHAPTER THREE

AUTHENTIC AND HISTORICAL THEODICY IN KANT AND COHEN*

1. Authentic Theodicy in Kant This paper looks back at an essay by Kant, two hundred years after its first publication. At first sight it may appear strange to commemorate the anniversary of an essay in which he admitted to and definitively acknowledged a resounding defeat, or, to use one commentator’s even sharper, though no less legitimate term, «failure»1. In the very title Kant announced, from the outset, «the defeat of any philosophical essay on theodicy»,2 permanently blocking and eliminating a route for philosophical development. This was undoubtedly a strict, definitive judgement, not concerning this or that attempt to formulate philosophical theodicy, but the very possibility of doing so in general. Even those who oppose religion most radically might well have been overjoyed, from their viewpoint, because human culture had overcome superstitious ideologies, though they could not be happy with acknowledging that philosophical reason had followed a centuries long path leading nowhere. As Kant correctly pointed out at the beginning of the essay, theodicy is the defence of God’s cause, but it is also no less the defence of the cause of reason. As shown by previous (the case of Pierre Bayle being sufficient example) and * On the occasion of the 200th. anniversary (1791-1991) of the essay by I. KANT entitled: Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee. This paper was read on 19 April 1991 at the conference on Kant as a critic of theodicy organised by the Lombard branch off the Società Filosofica Italiana. 1 Cf. S. LANDUCCI, La teodicea nell’età cartesiana, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1986. 2 I. KANT, Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 8, pp. 253-271.

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subsequent history in respect of Kant, rejection of philosophical theodicy leaves the way open for atheism and libertinism, as well as fideism. These two positions, which are only in superficial conflict, have proved to be incapable, not only of refuting each other, but also of keeping each other at bay. Conflict between them actually often caused mutual reinforcement. If, nevertheless, commemoration of this essay is legitimate, even timely, the reason is that, in this case, as in others, Kant’s genius did not only simply accept defeat, but also pointed to a new programme. When closing one door in the face of philosophy, he also opened a, more solidly grounded, more promising one. The intrinsic, lively fertility of Kant’s philosophical thought had already passed even more arduous tests. It is enough to think of how Kantian critical philosophy, on the basis of the same principles and through the same operation by which it severely and definitively declared the illegitimacy of speculative metaphysics, at the same time founded a new opportunity for metaphysics, within the sphere of practical reason. Kant himself was well aware of the anything but destructive character of his operation, actually claiming that it provided new openings.3 He made a similar move in this essay on theodicy, albeit a less well worked out one, which was almost only a first draft. The radical criticism of «doctrinal» theodicy, was not an end in itself, but had the purpose of founding the possibility for «authentic» theodicy.4 This passage has nothing to do with the choice between rationalism and fideism; it actually concerns the precise delimitation and rigorous distinction of powers and tasks between theoretical and practical reason, or rather, in more exactly Kantian terms, so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding, between the theoretical and practical uses of one and only, selfsame reason. Kant was very precise in this respect. He defined authentic theodicy as the interpretation of the will of the divine lawgiver given by the lawgiver himself,5 though explaining, and this is a fundamental clarification: «one cannot deny the name 3

I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Auflage 1787, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 3, pp. 16 ff. 4 I. KANT, Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, cit., p. 264. 5 Cf. ibidem.

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theodicy for mere rejection of all accusations made against divine wisdom, when this is the result of a divine decree, or, what in this case is the same thing, of a decree by that reason, by means of which we necessarily, and before all experience, form a concept of God as a moral, wise being. It is God himself who by means of our reason becomes the interpreter of his will made manifest in creation; and we can call this interpretation authentic theodicy».6 Therefore, as I was saying, the choice for Kant was in no way between rationalism and fideism, butt rather arrogant, presumptuous use7 of reason and a critical one, for which it «has the right (…) to put to the test, before accepting it, any claim, or doctrine which requires its respect, so that this respect may be sincere and not hypocritical».8 It would be a limitation to posit a terminal point for the critical use of reason, in a merely negative sense, and this was certainly not Kant’s intention. Indeed, in the name of that very «sincerity», to which he devoted the Schlußanmerkungg to the essay, but which is actually crucial throughout, particularly in the interpretation of Job, human reason can itself become the «authentic» interpreter of divine will, and can, thus, bring about «authentic theodicy» as «sovereign practical reason, which, being in absolute command in lawgiving, can be considered the immediate expression and voice of God, by means of which he makes sense of the literal meaning of his creation».9 Therefore, authentic theodicy, in Kant’s view, meant something quite different from blind trust in the letter of Holy Scripture, without critical, informed examination of its meaning. The «literal meaning» of divine revelation is, on the other hand, «creation». The interpreter of its meaning is «practical reason», and Holy Scripture is an «allegory» of this authentic interpretation.10 One must therefore come to the conclusion that the title of this essay by Kant does not correspond exactly to its contents, since, though, on the one hand, he stated all philosophical theodicy was actually impossible and 6

Ibidem. The second italics are mine. Ibid., p. 255. 8 Ibidem. 9 Ibid., p. 264. 10 Cf. ibidem. 7

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illegitimate, in the purely theoretical and speculative case, he did acknowledge, on the other, the possibility and validity of another kind of theodicy, which is also philosophical, in the widest meaning of the term, in the name of which reason opens up to its practical use. As already noted, this «authentic» philosophical theodicy was announced as a possibility, though without being developed and formulated. Kant did, however, supply some important, albeit problematic guidelines. The first, fundamental condition for authentic theodicy is the one shown by Kant in the biblical example of Job, which is the ground of the validity of the latter’s theodicy (since Kant applies the term to Job as well),11 in contrast with the mistaken, iniquitous theodicy of his friends: sincerity (Aufrichtigkeit ( ). Job’s frankness (Freimüthigkeit ( ) in speaking, would, however, be worthless, if it were not the expression of «sincerity of the heart» (Aufrichtigkeit ( des Herzens).12 Sincerity, therefore, does not only consist in «not falsifying one’s own thoughts when announcing them»,13 but involves thought itself, the «admission of the impotency of our reason».14 Again the inevitable defeat of reason in the face of the reality of evil emerges. But of what reason? «(Speculative) reason that quibbles with its arguments», «speculative reasonableness», «excellence of knowledge»,15 which the friends of Job hypocritically appropriated, rather than practical reason, the sound rational conviction of morality, which nothing, not even the doubt of faith, can shake. This is Job’s reason, who, paradoxically and «surprisingly», recognised the «ignorance» of reason with the very authority of moral reason, even when the authority of the explicit revelation of God appears to be absent.16 The sincerity of Job and all authentic theodicy, thus, is not 11

«Both sides [Job and his friends] (…) present their own theodicy»: ibid., p. 265. Ibid., p. 266. 13 Ibid., p. 267. 14 Ibidem. 15 Ibid., pp. 264, 266. 16 «The faith that was then born in him from such a surprising solution to his doubts, i.e. only from conviction of his own ignorance, could only rise up in the soul of a man, who, in the midst of his most lively doubts could say (27:5,6): “Until my end comes I shall not fail my piety”, etc. Actually, in this disposition he showed that he was not grounding his morality in faith, but faith in morality; and, in this case, faith, however weak, is of a purer and more authentic kind than any other, to the extent of 12

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the wild cry of a man who no longer recognises God’s presence either within or outside himself, but is, rather, the courageous expression of a man who, no longer recognising the presence of God outside himself, «does not fail his piety», thanks to the inalienable experience of the revelation of God within himself, of his own morality. This is why «Job’s frankness» is perhaps «on the verge of arrogance»,17 without ever going beyond this limit: it is not impious.18 This is why Job’s sincerity has universal, not merely subjective value (and we know that universality for Kant was an unmistakable sign of rationality): «Job speaks his mind, following his feelings and those of any other man in his place».19 Thus authentic theodicy was, in Kant’s view, the exercise of practical reason. It is precisely at this point, however that his indications became problematic. As already noted, he saw practical reason as the «immediate expression and voice of God, by means of which he makes sense of the literal meaning of his creation».20 Thus practical reason is the true, divine interpreter of creation. But how can there be a theodicy grounded in this presupposition, if creation, its debased, corrupt condition, evil, is the apparently unsurmountable problem before which any theodicy appears to break down inevitably? In this very essay (as elsewhere) Kant stated that the order of nature does not reveal moral order, that by means of teleology and physical theology we can find «ample proof» f in experience of the «artistic wisdom» of God, but none of his «moral wisdom»,21 «because the law of nature and moral law imply completely different principles, and the proof of the latter wisdom [the moral wisdom of God] must be entirely taken a priori, and cannot be grounded in the experience of what happens in the world».22 Kant also noted bitterly that «the fact in the moral sphere of the only species that one can hope to see in some way founding a religion which does not consist in the search for favours, but in good conduct»: ibid., p. 267. 17 Ibid., p. 266. 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibid., p. 265. 20 Ibid., p. 264. 21 Ibid., p. 256. 22 Ibidem.

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in this world» is «that an evil person (…) should not leave this world unpunished»: and this is also «something that rarely happens».23 I called this a bitter remark, because it means that the only «phenomenon» of morality that we are permitted to see is the suffering of an evil person: admittedly a manifestation of justice, but still, nevertheless, a manifestation of the reality of evil, in the double guise of guilt and suffering; anything but the triumph of good! Kant actually made a further comment. He did not only state that we «do not have (…) a concept of the unity of the agreementt of that artistic wisdom with this moral wisdom in a sensible world», but that «we cannot even hope to possess it».24 Even God’s direct revelation to Job, in answer to his doubts, only showed the latter grand examples of His artistic wisdom, which led Job to obedience and faith in God’s moral wisdom, «although his ways which for us are inscrutable must remain secret».25 The character of unsurmountable mystery of God’s moral wisdom, however, may well paralyse speculative, but not practical reason. For the latter mystery is not a condition of impossibility, but rather the necessary horizon, within which it can and must set itself up as an infinite task: «to be a creature and, as an entity of nature, only follow the Creator’s will, but also be susceptible to accusation as an entity acting freely (i.e. with a will that is independent from external influence and can, on many occasions, oppose the Creator) and still, at the same time, see its action as the effect of a Supreme Being: here we have a union of concepts that we must think of as joined in the idea of a world as supreme good. But only he who moves as far as knowledge of the supersensible (intelligible) world and understanding the way in which it stands at the ground of the sensible world, reaches comprehension of it, however. It is only in this knowledge that proof of the Creator’s moral wisdom in the sensible world can be grounded, since the latter presents us only the appearance of the supersensible one: but no mortal being can reach it».26

23

Ibid., p. 260. Ibid., p. 263. 25 Ibid., p. 266. 26 Ibid., p. 263. 24

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All this brings us back to practical reason, morality, law and history, as authentic theodicy, and to its well known characteristics, in the sphere of Kantian critical thought: a priori foundation and the character of infinite task.

2. Historical Theodicy in Cohen An interesting attempt to carry out Kant’s project can be found in the philosophy of Hermann Cohen. Since its development certainly cannot be examined here in detail, we will limit ourselves to considering its specificity: its fidelity, but also profound innovation in respect of Kant’s indications. Cohen rigorously returned to Kant’s theme of the distinction between «Being» (Sein) and «What Ought to Be» (Sollen), not only as a problem, but also as a principle, even identifying one of the fundamental characteristics of critical philosophy in this distinction, to the extent of seeing the fundamental cause of every philosophical error in the abandonment of this principle, whether it be philosophy of identity or mysticism, pantheism, orr naturalism, a term Cohen used to cover all these errors. The distinction between Being and What Ought to Be was recognised by Cohen as «Kant’s eternal worth»:27 only by maintaining this principle is a priori foundation of ethics possible, which does not claim to justify the moral What Ought to Be on the basis of verification in nature (which it would be useless to look for), but, owing to this very limitation, is able to affirm and found a priori What Ought to Be as an absolute value. On the other hand, complementary to, rather than in contradiction with this principle, in his rigorously anti-formalist28 interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy, Cohen also praised the other characteristic of Kantian ethics, i.e. the configuration of morality as an infinite task for the realisation of value in natural and historical reality. 27

ERW W 14. By this expression I do not mean the non-recognition of the formal character of Kant’s critical philosophy, butt rather refusal to interpret it as an empty shape, incapable of accessing concrete reality. 28

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Already in Ethik des reinen Willens and, even more profoundly, in his late works on the philosophy of religion, Cohen recognised «truth» as the transcendent guarantee and unconditioned ideal of the unity of nature and morality. In the former work he identified the principle of truth with the idea of God. «This fundamental law [of truth] is represented by the idea of God. God means that nature endures with the same certainty through which morality is eternal».29 But, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums Cohen took a further step forward: God, as «truth», was no longer only the still too abstract ideal guarantee of the unity of nature and morality, but the transcendent ground of the human task of unification of the two realms, of historical realisation of morality in nature. In this new perspective, we could say, using the terminology in Kant’s essay from which we started out, the moral wisdom of the Creator, although being inscrutable in the manifestation of his artistic wisdom, at the same time, and without contradictions, is made manifest, albeit always partially and incompletely, in the concrete historical realisation of man’s infinite moral task. In Religion der Vernunftt Cohen summed up human virtue in all its aspects, the work of unification and moral improvement of man, in a concept which deliberately referred back to Kant’s thought, as it also appears in the essay on theodicy: «truthfulness, sincerity» (Wahrhaftigkeit). This virtue, frequently foregrounded by Cohen throughout his work, was acknowledged in Religion der Vernunft as «absolute virtue»,30 in correlation with the «truth» as the fundamental meaning of the unique God of religion: «In truthfulness, God appears as the other link of the correlation. God is the God of truth, and man is to become the man of truthfulness. Therefore, man prays to God. Man would be perfect, and he would be able to redeem himself without looking to God, if he were able to establish and accomplish his truthfulness without praying to God. This is the main prayer, as the psalmist expresses it: “Create me a clean heart, O God; and renew an established spirit within me” (Ps. 51:12)».31 On the other hand, again 29

Ibid., p. 446. RV V 492; Eng. trans. cit., p. 424. 31 Ibid., p. 443; Eng. trans. cit., p. 381. 30

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in harmony with Kant,32 «falsity» (Unwahrhaftigkeit) was considered by Cohen as «absolute sin».33 We are thus led, in Cohen’s view as well, to the specific problems of theodicy, in the terms in which it was depicted by Kant. This quick excursus among some of the fundamental themes of Cohen’s ethical and religious thought was arguably necessary to include his approach to the problem of theodicy among the cornerstones of his wide-ranging, systematic thought. I shall now take a brief look at this aspect. Given, as we have seen above, that the possibility of authentic theodicy was removed by Kant from theoretical reason, only to entrust it to practical reason, the need, which was implicit in Kant’s programme for practical reason as the interpreter of divine will in creation, persisted for theodicy, though having a priori foundation as its condition, not to remain abstract, for this reason, but to be able, instead, to satisfactorily explain the sense of creation as the fruit of God’s moral wisdom. And since this explanation must be practical, not theoretical, the problem of authentic theodicy is the very problem of history. Practical reason has its a priori foundation, but, at the same time, the transcendental value of the practical a priori exists only in its actually being the condition of the possibility of experience. Since experience, as has already been mentioned, offers no examples of realisation of the practical a priori, «facts of a moral order», the reality of morality is not constituted as given, but as an infinite task, in accordance with the fundamental distinction between the theoretical and practical uses of reason, for which, in the first case it determines the object «that must be given on the other hand», while, in the second, it «realises» it.34 But what is history, if not the sphere of realisation of the moral a priori in what happens in the world? If not «making sense of the literal meaning of creation» by morality, as the voice of God? This is, at least, the meaning of history for Kant’s and Cohen’s critical philosophy. Thus theodicy can only be successfully 32

«The inclination to falsehood ((Falschheit) and duplicity (Unlauterkeit), t which is the deadly vice of human nature» (I. KANT, Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, cit., p. 267). 33 RV V 491; Eng. trans. cit., p. 423. 34 I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Auflage 1787, cit., p. 8.

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faced if mediatory concepts can be identified, leading to the application of the a priori principles of practical reason to history. Thus Cohen, surprisingly, in more than one way, identified the key concept of a possible theodicy of «suffering» ((Leid d, Leiden). This development in Cohen’s thoughtt is surprising for at least two reasons. Firstly, because it was a total novelty in respect of Kant’s philosophy, where this concept is practically absent and does not play a significant role, either in ethics or the philosophy of religion. Secondly, because, in this way, Cohen took up one of the most serious aspects of the very problem of theodicy as the key concept in which to ground it. Cohen was successful, thanks to a transformation of the meaning of suffering in the direction of idealisation. Idealisation of suffering is an essential stage for Cohen’s critical thought, since no empirical fact has philosophical meaning in itself, from the viewpoint of critical idealism. An empirical fact is significant for philosophy inasmuch as the latter must start out from it, as its outset and circumstance. Nevertheless, it is not here, but in idea that philosophy finds the principle, by means of which it can fill the phenomenon itself with meaning. Thus, in the first instance, suffering, as an empirical phenomenon, is the fact that requires and finds its meaning in the response to «compassion», as moral action aiming at the elimination of suffering. Secondly, Cohen gave ideal meaning to suffering itself, as a stage in the moral process of the individual’s self-liberation from guilt. Finally, suffering reaches its full ideal meaning, inasmuch as, as free taking on of suffering for humanity, as messianic suffering, it is set up as the climax and fulfilment of moral action. Before pausing briefly over these meanings of the idealisation of suffering, it seems worth pointing out that idealisation is in no way dismissal or draining of the existential drama of suffering, but rather increases its value and confers a purpose r on it in the sphere of the correlation between God and man. The objection that idealisation of suffering would drain it of its dramatic reality is not valid. Or rather, this objection is nothing more than one of the many possible variations of the more general objection against idealism, which consists in denying idea reality. This subject has often been raised, on occasion as a definitive sentence against idealism itself. It is not for me to take on the task here of disproving this objection, given the size and importance of the problem. I will restrict my observations to two

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lines of argument, among the many possible ones, concerning the specific subject of suffering: one factual, the other a matter of principle. At the factual level, the above mentioned objection would lead to denial of any value, and the very possibility, of free, voluntary bearing of suffering, of which the host of martyrs of all religions and outside religion, are ample evidence. Their choice can only be interpreted as elevation of suffering from a mere empirical phenomenon to bearing witness, thus to the level of value and idea. Non recognition of the value of this bearing witness would be even more limiting and scandalous than the claim to drain suffering on the part of idealism. Concerning the matter of principle, rejection of the idealisation of suffering would inevitably lead, as actually happened more than once, to the exclusion off this concept from all philosophical ethics, except for mere moral pragmatism, or, vice-versa, to the exclusion of all philosophical ethics in the name of misunderstood loyalty to the reality of suffering. Suffering, not as an empirical phenomenon, but as idea and task of practical reason can be considered, no longer as an unsurmountable obstacle of speculative theodicy, but rather as the focal point of practical theodicy, only if philosophical consideration of it is possible, not as the contradictory opposite of virtue and morality, as appears in the experience, which is, at first sight, scandalous, of the unhappiness of the righteous man, but, on the contrary, t as the climax and fulfilment of virtue itself. This philosophical consideration of suffering is just what we find in Cohen’s thought, in a series of articulations, which I shall now attempt to outline. The critical-idealist conception of suffering is only possible in the context of non eudaemonist ethics. The radical abandoning of happiness as the end of morality and recognition of holiness as the only moral end characterise Cohen’s ethics and philosophy of religion, in a more rigorous way than is the case with Kant, where its roots actually lie. In this context, the most serious question for theodicy, the unhappiness of the righteous man, takes on a completely new meaning: it is no longer a stumbling block for the religious man, a cause of scandal in respect of God’s justice, but becomes a principle of morality in the light of faith, a key to the religious interpretation of history.

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The suffering of one’s fellowman, the Mitmensch, identified with the «pauper», therefore social suffering, is certainly totally detached from guilt, but not for this reason abandoned in a vacuum with no meaning. It must arouse the ethical reaction of «compassion», not as a passive feeling, but a concrete, productive action to eliminate suffering itself. In this ethical task, this historical and social action, which it provokes, the suffering of fellowman finds its meaning. «This is the profound meaning of social suffering: that the entire consciousness of culture is implicated in it».35 Thus Cohen went further in this direction, as far as daring to identify here, albeit with the caution of «paradox», an initial meaning of practical theodicy. «If the meaning of physical suffering, of physical ill in the human world, has always been a question for theodicy, then one could perhaps state this meaning in a paradox: the suffering, the passion (Leiden ( ) is for the sake of compassion (Mitleiden). Man is so much in need of the affect of compassion that suffering itself is explained through it».36 But man’s compassion for another man is grounded in divine mercy. Thus the correlation between God’s love for man and man’s love for man, inasmuch as it bears its fruits in moral and social action for eliminating suffering, in «compassion», dispels doubt on divine justice, founds practical theodicy, inasmuch as God’s justice is made manifest as identical to his mercy by the reality of human compassion.37 Further meaning of suffering was discovered by Cohen in the suffering of the very social subject, when it has been transformed, in idealisation, from the empirical phenomenon, as mere passivity, into moral idea, as action, the climax of moral action, as free taking on suffering as «readiness (Bereitwilligkeit) to accept punishment».38 In this meaning, it is certainly «acknowledgment of suffering as the just punishment»,39 but this acknowledgment is purely subjective, in response to the need for «repentance» of the moral subject, not the meaning of objective compensation for the sin, of which God’s mercy 35

RV V 158; Eng. trans. cit., p. 136. Ibid., d p. 19; Eng. trans. cit., p. 17. 37 Cf. ibid., d p. 502; Eng. trans. cit., p. 433. 38 Ibid., d p. 264; Eng. trans. cit., p. 226. 39 Ibid., d p. 265; Eng. trans. cit., p. 227. 36

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has no need, and thus is more closely connected with redemption than guilt: «Suffering is related not so much to sin as to its forgiveness, and to redemption, insofar as the latter is dependent on self-sanctification».40 Suffering, thus understood, as a «prelude»41 to redemption, more than as a consequence of sin, becomes the most efficient lever of theodicy. «Thus the correlation between man and God as theodicy is also clarified. Suffering is not the cause of pessimism. It does not contradict God who grants grace, whose operations it prepares, without being the determining cause. Man takes upon himself suffering as punishment. This is how punishment fades. As suffering it transfigures both God and man. Man suffers punishment for his guilt inasmuch as his suffering represents the preliminary stage of his redemption. Suffering belongs to the preparatory study for the labor of penitence, but already touches the limit, which the idea of man constitutes under divine glory. Thus man and God are linked in this correlation, which shows itself as theodicy at the same time. Suffering is no longer a question mark against God’s being, and not even against that of man. Neither is it only a pedagogical means, because trees do not grow in the heavens; to deny the opinion that the sweetness of joy can be better tasted in contrast with suffering. Suffering as punishment belongs to the ethical concept of man and, on this ethical ground, the palm of redemption rises up, for the peculiarity of religion».42 These two meanings of suffering unite and are fulfilled in its messianic meaning. In this latter meaning, the individual’s suffering as the essential moment of his moral liberation from sin and «compassion», i.e. the moral response to the other man’s suffering, open up the universal historical value of suffering for humanity. In this way suffering no longer only has meaning for individual or social morality, but also becomes a central concept of the philosophy of history. If «messianism, however, means the dominion of the good on earth»43 and, if, on the other hand, the realisation of this dominion is 40

Ibidem. Ibid., d p. 274; Eng. trans. cit., p. 235. 42 BR 69 f. 43 RV V 24; Eng. trans. cit., p. 21. 41

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not to be expected by means of the instrument of power, since «religion cannot be the worship of power»,44 then the true messianic instrument is vicarious suffering. For it concrete historical man becomes the bearer of the idea of humanity and actually realises it, showing here the unity of divine justice and mercy. «Thus justice, counterpointed by love, becomes the principle of theodicy. Justice becomes the lever for vicarious suffering, which is separated from punishment».45 In this «absolute theodicy of suffering»,46 divine reality and human history are connected in accordance with the structure characteristic of Cohen of «correlation»: on the one hand, the unique God, at the same time just and merciful, is not only the ideal guarantee, but the Creator of good in history, the Lord of history; on the other hand, his dominion, which theodicy purposes to defend against doubts and accusations, is made manifest in man’s concrete moral, historical action, culminating in accepting vicarious suffering, in the messianic task, the true drive and decisive instrument of history. Accepting suffering freely has a vicarious function for the whole of humanity, and thus an actual realisation of the dominion of good in history, above all as witness. «The Messiah, who is the representative of suffering, brings with his dark shadow the most shining light upon the history of mankind. Poverty is the moral defect of previous history. But the poor have become the pious. And the pious are the forerunners of the Messiah. The representative of suffering brings into the world this teaching, and with it the foundation of the ethical concept of history: that every eudaemonistic appearance is nothing but an illusion; and that the genuine value of life for the entire history of peoples lies in moral ideas and is therefore represented among men only by those who are accredited as carriers of these ideas».47 Secondly, on the strength of this witness, Israel in its suffering acquires authority and ability to convert humanity: «in suffering for the peoples Israel acquires the right to convert them. This historical suffering of Israel gives it its historical dignity, its tragic mission, 44

Ibid., d p. 288; Eng. trans. cit., p. 246. Ibid., d p. 502; Eng. trans. cit., p. 433. 46 BR 132. 47 RV V 309; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 254 f. 45

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which represents its share in the divine education of mankind. What other solution is there for the discrepancy between Israel’s historical mission and its historical fate? There is no other solution but the one which the following consideration offers: to suffer for the dissemination of monotheism, as the Jews do, is not a sorrowful fate; the suffering is, rather, its tragic calling, for it proves the heartfelt desire for the conversion of the other peoples, which the faithful people feels».48 Thus man finds the meaning of history in suffering, rather than scandal, only inasmuch as, on the one hand, he abandons the eudaemonist ideal of happiness as the ultimate end of history, and, on the other, takes on suffering as his most profound, meaningful historical and moral action to change the world and set up the dominion of good in it. This action, the suffering of the righteous man, becomes itself theodicy. Not that Cohen wanted to replace happiness with suffering as the end of history. Suffering is always and only a historical means entrusted to man, but without him humanity could not be ready to receive the true end, given by God himself, peace. «Only Isaiah could have said aboutt his God: “He makes peace and creates evil”. In this brave surpassing of Zoroastrianism, evil rather means ill. God cannot be the creator of evil, yet he makes the ill, which men, in their delusion, consider evil. But God is the creator of peace, and in peace, according to the Hebrew root of the word, the creator of perfection transforms the seemingly unsuitable ill into its highest end».49

3. Conclusion As already emerges from the above outline, we can actually find the realisation of Kant’s programme for authentic theodicy in Cohen’s philosophy of religion. This was for Kant «interpretation (…) of a sovereign practical reason, which, being in absolute command when lawgiving, can be considered the immediate expression and voice of God, by means of which he makes sense of the literal meaning of his 48 49

Ibid., d p. 330; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 283 f. Ibid., d p. 302; Eng. trans. cit., p. 259.

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creation».50 This authentic «interpretation» was for Cohen history itself as the infinite task of realisation of an ideal meaning: authentic theodicy is historical theodicy. In a short answer to Martin Buber, with reference to the question of Zionism, Cohen himself used the expression «historical theodicy». «The fall of the Jewish state is a typical example of historical theodicy for us (…). It is our proud awareness to continue living like divine dew in the midstt of peoples, and remain productive among them and for them. All the prophets place us thus among peoples. The universal mission of the “remains of Israel” is their unitary perspective. And only by starting out from this perspective can the natural idea of the return to their homeland of these “remains” be understood. Actually, hardly ever is it only the “remains” who must return to their homeland, it is nearly always “many” and “all peoples” who will flock towards the light of God, towards that light the very prophets feel placed within them by God for all peoples».51 History as theodicy, then: not as a fact where, instead of indifferent or evil nature, God’s justice and man’s happiness are made manifest in themselves, but as an infinite moral task for the realisation of divine peace, by means of man’s action and, above all, his vicarious suffering. This is, admittedly, an optimistic conception of history, but not in the sense of that vulgar, illusory optimism, which is deliberately and guiltily blind in the face of the historical reality of evil. It is rather a priori optimism, which, certainly in the name of faith in God on the ultimate realisation of good in creation, works for it historically, despite all appearances to the contrary. Thus historical theodicy reveals itself as the only possible authentic theodicy, since, from an idealist viewpoint, it is precisely a priori theodicy. In its a priori character Cohen’s historical theodicy recovers the heritage of that of Leibniz52 and Kant. 50

I. KANT, Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, cit., p. 264. 51 H. COHEN, Antwort auf das offene Schreiben des Herrn Dr. Martin Buber an Hermann Cohen, in J 2 335/W 17 252 f. 52 Apriority is a characteristic feature of Leibniz’s theodicy, which is too frequently neglected. Though this is not the place for detailed examination of this topic, it is still important to mention it, so as to show that he was in the front rank of the authentic

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If, as we have seen, Kant correctly pointed out, at the beginning of his essay on theodicy, that the latter is also always ‘logodicy’, it must now be added that it is also always ‘historiodicy’. If nature and history, owing to the presence of evil in them, are an opportunity for accusation against God’s justice, they are involved in this very accusation, inasmuch as their meaning is in doubt. As is well known, scepticism has the role of main prosecutor in the tribunal of theodicy: that selfsame scepticism which denies history any meaning. Authentic theodicy, defending God’s justice a priori, makes reason the true interpreter of his will, inasmuch as it realises, as practical reason, divine justice and mercy in history. Cohen’s historical theodicy, therefore, must be seen as a faithful development of Kant’s authentic theodicy, inasmuch as it returns to apriority, its essential character. This is the real difference between doctrinal and authentic theodicy, according to Kant in the crucial part of his essay on the subject, which has already been partially quoted above: «we can also see the world, inasmuch as it is the work of God, as a divine manifestation of the intentions of his will. But seen in this way, it is often a closed book for us, and it is always so when aiming to deduce from it, a mere object of experience, God’s final intention which is always moral. Philosophical attempts of this kind of interpretation are always doctrinal, i.e. they constitute theodicy proper, which can, therefore, be called doctrinal. One cannot, however, deny the name theodicy for mere rejection of all accusations made against divine wisdom, when this is the result of a divine decree, or, what in this case is the same thing, of a decree by that reason, by means of which we necessarily, and before all experience, form a concept of God as a moral, wise being».53

theodicy tradition, carried on by Kant and Cohen. It would admittedly be necessary to verify the continuity of this tradition with precise historical investigation of the extent to which Kant’s criticism of theodicy was directed against Leibniz, and to what extent it involved other conceptions of theodicy, which had nothing to do with Leibniz’s or distorted its meaning. 53 I. KANT, Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, cit., p. 264. The last italics are mine.

CHAPTER FOUR

CORRELATION IN HERMANN COHEN’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A METHOD AND MORE THAN A METHOD

1. Correlation and Its Interpretations In his Einleitung to Cohen’s collected Jüdische Schriften,1 Franz Rosenzweig saw the former’s late philosophy of religion as a radical turning point in respect of his philosophical system and an exit from the «magic circle»2 of idealism, within which he had built up his system, in the direction of philosophy of existence. Rosenzweig identified «correlation» as the « «fundamental concept»3 of Cohen’s new line of thought, the meaning of his philosophical turning point being concentrated in this concept. In Rosenzweig’s view, this concept, which Cohen, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, identified with that of the «holy spirit»4 is close to that of «relation» in Martin Buber’s dialogic philosophy.5 Rosenzweig’s interpretation has been widely followed, though opposition to it has been equally lively. Alexander Altmann is especially conspicuous among the latter group with his article: Hermann Cohens Begriff der Korrelation.6 His position is the opposite of Rosenzweig’s, in his contention that there was substantial 1

F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, in J 1 XIII-LXIV. Ibid., p. XLVIII. 3 Ibid., p. XLV passim. 4 Cf. ibid., p. LIV. 5 Cf. ibid., p. LIX. 6 A. ALTMANN, Hermann Cohens Begriff der Korrelation, in In zwei Welten. Siegfried Moses zum 75. Geburtstag, hg. von H. Tramer, Verlag Bitaon, Tel Aviv 1962, pp. 377-399. 2

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continuity between Cohen’s late religious philosophy and his system and that it remained in the sphere off the idealist character of the whole of his philosophy. Altmann’s opposition to Rosenzweig is based precisely on the discussion of the concept of correlation. In Rosenzweig’s view this concept «certainly had (…) elsewhere, in Cohen’s system, a methodological role, but never as a fundamental concept».7 Altmann, on the other hand, showed that this concept has a meaning and important role in Cohen’s system, to the extent of being a fundamental element for the idealist character of his whole philosophy. The above is well known and it is unnecessary to dwell over the details of these two positions, which have now taken their place in research on and interpretation of Cohen’s philosophy. Actually, Altmann’s article soon found favour with many scholars. His merit is undoubted, above all, in my view, with respect to the clarity and persuasiveness with which he demonstrated the idealist character of Cohen’s late philosophy and the central position occupied in it by the concept of correlation, in the sense of a method of idealist-critical philosophy, rather than a fundamental concept of a new orientation in Cohen towards the philosophy of existence, as Rosenzweig had argued. My aim in this short essay is further development of a more precise consideration of the methodological meaning of correlation in Cohen’s philosophy of religion, which has already been highlighted by Altmann, showing some of the characteristics to which the latter failed, in my view, to devote adequate treatment. Secondly, I intend to show how the meaning of correlation, in Cohen’s thought, reaches out to the limits of method, albeit not in the sense of going beyond idealism, as Rosenzweig would have it.

2. Correlation is a Transcendental Method There are no doubts about Cohen’s conviction that the religion of reason too cannot avoid the transcendental method of philosophy. He specifically stated that religion and philosophy are methodologically 7

F. ROSENZWEIG, op. cit., in J 1 XLVIII.

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united, claiming validity for the transcendental method also in the case of religion.8 In what sense is the transcendental method applied to the examination of religion? When positing the question on the transcendental character of the correlation method, first of all the fundamental features of the transcendental need to be established, since, as is well known, this anything but uniform notion (even in Kant) was subjected to continual re-elaboration by Cohen. In the first edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrungg Cohen provided the well known definition of transcendental idealism for the method and formal idealism for the content of Kant’s critical philosophy.9 Subsequently, however, partially owing to the effects of his thoughts on Plato and Leibniz, Cohen gradually put aside the aspect of formal idealism and arrived at identification of critical philosophy with transcendental idealism. Already in the second edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrungg he toned down the meaning of the sensible as given in favour of the conception of the forms of sensibility as methods, and, as a consequence, the concept of «synthesis» lost more and more of its Kantian meaning in favour of an accentuation of the constructive and productive character of the critical method. This took place, however, in connection with the strengthening of the reflective character of the transcendental method, starting out u from the «fact» of science. The «method of purity», the fundamental development of the transcendental method in Cohen’s philosophy, also responded to the requirement of the grounding of knowledge in thought. One could even say that it is this very requirement turned into method. If grounding of knowledge in thought is conceived as «production», it is also true that this production only comes about within reflection on 8

«It must be pointed out, ever more clearly and precisely that philosophy is a homogeneous factor with religion, if true cultural maturity is ever to be the dominant factor in philosophy. The question cannot have a different development than that of the other fundamental cultural phenomena. We start off from its being a fact and then pose the question concerning its right. Physics and mathematics, as well as law and the State and, lastly, the cultural fact of artt have had to subject themselves to this transcendental investigation. How could religion fail to be dealt with as a similar cultural fact that could escape the question on the ground of the right to its existence and stability?» (BR ( 8). 9 Cf. KTE1 252.

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the «fact» of science.10 Cohen wrote that «thought is the thought of knowledge»,11 and since knowledge is identified with the principles of science, for Cohen «the thought of logic is the thought of science».12 The productive character of the method of purity cannot, therefore, be in any way confused with the systems of speculative construction of the object, which Cohen himself condemned in what he termed «romantic idealism». On the other hand, the method of purity does not found merely formalist knowledge (i.e. empty of content), but is only formal inasmuch as it is rich in content.13 In Cohen’s ethics and aesthetics the transcendental method underwent even further transformations, both regarding the more or less scientific character of the «fact» which is its starting point, and the continually re-elaborated meaning of «hypothesis». Despite this incessant process of transformation, some fundamental aspects of the transcendental method remain constant, in their belonging to its specificity. At least three can be highlighted here: 1) philosophy must start out from a «fact»; 2) it must return to the a priori conditions of this fact; 3) the meaning of the a priori lies entirely in its function as a condition of the possibility of the fact. Though generic, these three aspects of the transcendental method allow identification of some fundamental constant features of transcendental philosophy. Firstly, philosophy is always reflection, since it cannot do without starting off from a fact and referring to it. Secondly, it is productive, since the justification of the fact lies entirely in its grounding in idea, i.e. in law, or rather «lawfulness», which is synonymous with reason. Both characteristics are essential, 10

The following also supported the recognition of the transcendental character of Cohen’s method of purity: H. HOLZHEY, Einleitung, in W 6 (LRE) ix f.; E. WINTER, Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft. Eine historisch-systematische i Untersuchung zur Ethik-Konzeption des Marburger Neukantianismus k im Werke Hermann Cohens, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1980, p. 193. 11 LRE E 36. 12 Ibid., p. 19. 13 «Nothing could be further from the truth than the layman’s suspicion that “pure” is empty, freed of its content. Impure content, which is not real content, is the sole opposite of “pure”, and this is only the case in the sense off the extension of “pure” to impure content, in order to turn it into pure content. This is the inevitable relationship of “pure” with content. Without this “pure” becomes senseless» (ibid., p. 5).

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but only in this order: reflective and then productive characters; the productive character being within the reflective one, and not the opposite. Finally, transcendental philosophy is opposed to any kind of metaphysical speculation, inasmuch as it does not consider the a priori an ontological absolute, but always a critical hypothesis. The correlation method, in Cohen’s religion of reason, satisfies these characters. It is reflection on the «fact» of religion, as it appears in the literary sources of Judaism: starting from (aus) these sources, reason founds the validity of the contents of religion; i.e. it produces the fundamental concepts of religion, the Mitmensch and the individual, and all connected concepts, constituting them in correlation with the idea of God. Besides, the religion of reason, considering the idea of God solely in its meaning within correlation, presents itself as an alternative to the metaphysical-speculative, or mystical consideration of religion.14 14

Thus the object of the religion of reason is revelation, even though it is more exact to speak, in Cohen’s terms, of «sources of Judaism», since, from his point of view, the problem of faith, of whether these sources are to be considered divine revelation or not should be of no concern to reason. In Kant’s Der Streit der Facultäten (cf. Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 7, pp. 22 ff. and 27 f.) the same distinction was already posited between the biblical theologian’s and philosopher’s approaches to the Bible. For Cohen philosophical thought on religion is reflection on the sources of Judaism starting from the other «source», which is the principal one, i.e. reason (cf. RV V 5 f.). Secondly, the religion of reason does not thus start out from empirical facts, but rather from a «fact of culture», i.e. from religion as formulated in the sources of Judaism. This does not mean that, in justifying the contents of religion by means of the correlation method, the religion of reason shows the ideal meaning of empirical facts. For example, it exalts poverty t and suffering to their ideal meaning in the concepts of Mitleiden and Mitmensch, sinful man in the concept of redeemed man. The relationship of the correlation method with that of purity, which, as is well known, is Cohen’s mature formulation of the transcendental method, clearly emerges in this operation: in both methods there is the transformation of an impure content («which is not a real content») into a pure one (cf. LRE E 5). A further problem needs to be mentioned: on the one hand, the correlation method is the method of the religion of reason, on the other, it is highlighted by reason as the method of historical religion itself: Jewish monotheism. Once both the unfounded hypotheses t that Cohen intended to found a new philosophical religion and that he was only practising biblical theology, in the Kantian sense, have been rejected, this must pose the problem of the relationship between positive historical religion, i.e. Judaism, and the philosophy of religion, i.e. the religion of reason. It is not possible to face this problem here, and I have dealt with it elsewhere.

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So Rosenzweig was right when considering correlation in Cohen as a concept breaking the magic circle of idealism.15 But the concept of «production», considered a defect of idealism by Rosenzweig, who contrasted it with Cohen’s «correlation», is not Cohen’s concept, precisely because the latter only maintains its legitimate meaning within philosophy as reflection. Rosenzweig’s «magic circle of idealism» had already been broken by Cohen in his system, inasmuch as this is a system of transcendental philosophy. Thus Altmann had the perfect right to underline the continuity of the religion of reason with the system.

3. Correlation is a Critical Method It is well known that the substitution of «critique» by «logic» in the definition of theoretical philosophy in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis16 was only at the expense of formal Kantian idealism and the concept, which was by then ambiguous for Cohen, of «synthesis», in Kant’s meaning. Far from being put aside, transcendental idealism was strengthened to the extent, as some scholars have pointed out,17 that the method of purity was presented as transcendental enquiry claiming to found the transcendental itself. The reasons why Cohen preferred «Erkenntniskritik» k to «Erkenntnistheorie» in Kants Theorie der Erfahrungg and in Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode were not denied but rather developed further along the route leading up to «Logik der Erkenntnis». These reasons, explained by Cohen in Das « Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode,18 substantially derived from the very reflective character of philosophy, albeit in its productivity, which Cohen contrasted with the metaphysical deduction of science,

15

Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG, op. cit., in J 1 XLVIII f. Cf. LRE E 11 ff. 17 See A. GÖRLAND, Ethik als Kritik der Weltgeschichte, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig/Berlin 1914, p. 52; J. GORDIN, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des unendlichen Urteils, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1929, p. 131; H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 1, p. 184. 18 Cf. PIM M 5 f. 16

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proper to the «Wissenschaftslehre» of Fichte and romantic idealism in general.19 The transcendental method, i.e. that of foundation, is thus the first, fundamental characteristic of critical idealism, although not the only one. The meaning of idea is not entirely included in the concept of origin: this needs to be completed by the meaning of idea as task. Idea as «end» and «task» already plays a fundamental role in the theoretical field, both in the unification of mathematical science and the descriptive science of nature, i.e. in the systematic conception of the knowledge of nature,20 and in the very conception of truth. As Cohen explained in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, the latter is grounded in the principle of origin, but only in the «concept», as end and task, does it realise its full meaning as «system».21 Nevertheless, the full unfurling of the meaning of idea as task takes place, in Cohen’s view, in ethics. This is why ethical idealism is an «enlargement» of critical idealism.22 If, on the one hand, this enlargement means the adoption of the method of foundation for ethics too, on the other, it can in no way be reduced to this, since ethics introduces the problem of «What Ought to Be» (Sollen) into the critical system, in its distinction of and independence from the logical problem of «Being» (Sein). I shall not deal with Cohen’s fundamental enquiry into the relationship between logic and ethics in the system, since it is certainly well known to any Cohen scholar. I shall only recall that this series of problems, in its various articulations (the precedence of Being in respect of What Ought to Be, the primacy of What Ought to Be, the Being of What Ought to Be etc.) contributes essential enrichment to Cohen’s critical idealism. Cohen himself 19 Here, for obvious reasons, I must suspend the problem of how well founded Cohen’s historical judgement on Fichte and «romantic idealism» was. 20 Underlining this connection, in KTE E2 Cohen included the analysis of the theory of teleological judgement formulated by Kant in Kritik der Urteilskraft, as integration of the theory of nature by the description of nature in a «system of nature»: cf. KTE E2 701 ff. 21 Cf. LRE E 397. 22 Cf. H. COHEN, Der deutsche Idealismus und die Antike (1916), in S 2 311/W 17 160; ID., Das soziale Ideal bei Platon und den Propheten (1916, first published in 1924), in J 1 309/W 17 303 f.

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actually acknowledged that, only starting out from ethics, it is possible to posit the «fundamental law of truth» in its systematic meaning.23 Altmann was right then to see a fundamental character of the continuity between the concept of correlation in Cohen’s late philosophy of religion and his philosophical system in the connection between correlation and end. Nevertheless, the most important trait of this continuity still concerns another aspect, albeit linked to those dealt with so far. It is well known that Cohen saw critical idealism, i.e. his own philosophy and its historical precedents, as being in radical antithesis to all philosophy of identity. All the philosophical errors he condemned one by one in the history of past and contemporary thought, were in the end included in the «philosophy of identity», or, with what he considered an analogous meaning, «pantheism» or «naturalism». Thus, the philosophies of «romantic idealism», Fichte (above all), Schelling and Hegel were also included in «pantheism» and condemned for this reason. Cohen very often defined his own «critical idealism» in antithesis to such pantheism; this antithesis consisting in rejection of unity as identity. The concept of correlation already had a fundamental meaning in this context in Cohen’s critical system. It is the alternative concept to that of identity. It appears at several important points in Cohen’s logic: to define the relationship between «separation» and «unification» in the process of judgement,24 between the «interior» and «exterior» in the concept of space25 and between «time» and «space»,266 between «conservation» and «transformation», as well as «substance» and «movement»27 (also 23

«It is not simply a question of transferring the productive method of logic to ethics, so as to see whether it will also be productive in this case. Ethics goes beyond the sphere of logic, as it presupposes and requires the unity of the method for the two interests of reason. This presupposition is the enactment of the fundamental law of truth. What takes place here is not a transfer, but rather a retroactive move. The principle of truth sheds new light over the fundamental f method of logic: the fact that it, in turn, requires ethics» ((ERW W 90). 24 Cf. LRE E 60 f. 25 Cf. ibid., p. 188. 26 Cf. ibid., p. 198. 27 Cf. ibid., pp. 71, 236, 238 ff., 286 f., 291, 588 f.

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with reference to the ethical correlation between «subject» and «action»),28 «general» and «particular»29 and, as already mentioned, between «means» and «end» in the «concept».30 At the end of Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, Cohen explicitly indicated correlation as the fundamental concept of critical idealism, in opposition to absolute, pantheistic idealism.31 In Ethik des reinen Willens the concept of correlation is not so frequent,32 despite its being fundamental, not only for ethics, but also for the whole system, because it contributes to the definition of the «fundamental law of truth», and especially its connection with the idea of God. Cohen wrote: «The fundamental law of truth finds in the fundamental methodological idea of knowledge agreement between the two problems: at the same time, however, also maintenance of the distinction in the direction of this fundamental idea».33 This relationship of unity and distinction, of the conservation of one in the other and vice-versa, is just what Cohen meant by «correlation», and is the very method of critical idealism. He saw that it is already implicit in the «method of purity», inasmuch as it does not abstract from reality, but rather finds its very legitimacy in the task of «realisation».34 Here we are facing a fundamental meaning of critical 28

Cf. ibid., pp. 253 f., 300. Cf. ibid., pp. 552, 554, 593; cf. also ERW W 71. 30 Cf. LRE E 389 ff. 31 «The logic of judgement and origin invalidated the fundamental concept with which that false, unscientific metaphysics operates: it is the Medieval concept of the absolute. Absolute substance became, not only the presupposition of relation, but also correlation. In this correlation the mathematical science off nature brings its idealism to fulfilment, inasmuch as it is able to free itself of both the materialism of matter and that of force. This scientific idealism makes any pantheism not only null, but also superfluous, inasmuch as it carries out on its own the fruitful motives in this» (ibid., p. 606). 32 However, the use of this concept for the definition of the I-Thou relationship should be mentioned at least: cf. ERW W pp. 212 f., 249, 256. 33 Ibid., p. 397. 34 «Is it perhaps enough to accomplish the negative meaning of purity to free oneself from false empiricism and conservatism? Does not the positive sense of purity lie in the productivity of application? It is only of this that the logical legitimacy of the pure will consists for ethics: that this purity is applied in the subject of will and action, as it occurs in nature and history. The latter two are then the inevitable presuppositions of purity. Not only the principle of truth places ideal and nature in correlation: this is rather the very first natural presupposition from which the method of purity starts off. Natural will is not pure will. Natural man is not pure man. The empirical Ego is not 29

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idealism: this is so not only inasmuch as it remains strictly within the limits of reason, i.e. inasmuch as it is the method of purity, but also inasmuch as it is oriented in the direction of these limits in the guise of an infinite task. This is how Cohen had already indicated the task of critical idealism in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung: «The system [of critical idealism] originates in the distinction between the mathematical science of nature and the metaphysics of morality; it reaches fulfilment in the idea that the asylum ignorantiae of the barrier (Schranke) can be turned into the place of knowledge of the limit (Grenze)».35 It is readily evident, as actually foregrounded by Altmann, that the correlation between God and man (and that between God and the world), in Cohen’s late works, kept and confirmed these characteristics, thus being posited in total continuity with the system of critical idealism, keeping its alternative, antithetic character in respect of any form of pantheism.

4. Religious Correlation is not a Scientific Method So far an attempt has been made to show how correlation, inasmuch as it is «conservation» of «separation» and «unification», is not only the method of the «religion of reason» against all forms of pantheism, but the fundamental principle of all critical idealism, in opposition to all philosophy of identity. One of the most important aspects of the method of critical idealism concerns, as has been seen, the relationship between Being and What Ought to Be, nature and morality, logic and ethics. This point is worth pausing over. In his 1914 essay Vom ewigen Frieden,36

the pure Ego. But if there were no natural man with a natural will and self-consciousness, the method of purity could not begin; it would have no sense at all» (ibid., pp. 436 f.). 35 KTE 783. 36 H. COHEN, Vom ewigen Frieden (1914), in S 2 342-346/W 16 313-318.

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Cohen wrote: «Truth, as we know it, as the fundamental idea of critical idealism, consists in the distinction of idea as the infinite task for every moral end of the human race, as of each individual, in the distinction of this ethical meaning of idea from any real existence of nature and from any historical experience. Both are necessary: the distinction, but, at the same time, the maintenance of both elements in their logically equal value, so that real existence affirms its value in the face of idea, and idea only establishes its specific meaning in warning and guidance, with which it takes charge of real existence. This truth of idealism, which, at the same time, pays homage to real existence, guarantees our personal truthfulness in all our thoughts, investigations and actions».37 Cohen attributed great importance to this distinction, to the extent of acknowledging Kant’s «eternal worth» where he «is in agreement with Plato», precisely because he made a rigorous distinction between logic and ethics.38 Loss of this distinction was, in Cohen’s view, Fichte’s fundamental error, in which all his other errors and those of all romantic idealism originated.39 The distinction between Being and What Ought to Be, as we have seen, constitutes the fundamental law of truth, i.e. the method of correlation between logic and ethics. But equally essential to the constitution of this correlation is the unification of the two terms. As is well known, in Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen placed this unity in the idea of God: «The idea of God constitutes this particular unity, which consists in the independentt task of unifying nature and morality; unifying them as required and permitted by the fundamental law of truth. This unity has the ancient classical Platonic meaning of unification (’nosiq), in which the concepts to be united remain in their difference; unification is limited to harmonisation».40 The «scientific» character of ethics, like that of logic, however, only allows this unity to be considered as a limit, an infinite task, constituting the regulative horizon of the system, without ever being able to be the object of scientific investigation. The complementary aspect of this limit of scientific ethics consists in being obliged to 37

Ibid., p. 343/pp. 314 f. Cf. ERW W 14. 39 Cf. KBE E 290 f. 40 ERW W 462. 38

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consider the realisation of the idea of «humanity» too as an equally infinite task, the programme of which, however, cannot be provided by ethics, which can only ground it in pure principles. Besides, this is the reason why the idea of God, nonetheless introduced by Cohen into ethics, and through it into the system, as legitimate, actually necessary, also only enters the meaning of «transcendence of God», not that off «correlation» of God with man and the world. God’s transcendence means, above all, the extraneousness of the idea of God from the foundation of logic and ethics.41 Secondly, it means the regulative idea of the harmonious unity of nature and morality, which still remain separate as an object of scientific philosophy, but which find the ideal of their connection in this regulative idea. Therefore, it also means the ideal guarantee of the realisation of moral action.42 41 «Nature consists in the compendium of its laws, which have their ground in logic. God is in no way involved in all this. Morality consists in the compendium of ethical concepts, whose grounds ultimately refer back to the logical method. God is not involved here either. Thus for the two types of knowledge he constitutes transcendence. As soon as this is eliminated in favour of any kind of immanence, the two members of nature and morality are wounded in their specificity. Immanence is an illusory advantage» (ibid., p. 464). 42 «The idea of God establishes the internal methodological concordance between our morality and our nature. Both are ours; they are the creations, the products of our foundations. And thus ours is also the harmony, which certainly preserves the difference between nature and morality, but protects them from two mistaken conceptions: from the opinion that nature and morality are distant from one another, two different worlds, with no common interests, problems or methods; and similarly from the other opinion, which presents this difference as a contradiction, as though between nature and morality there were and should be an unbridgeable opposition, and irreconcilable contradiction. This difference requires, on the contrary, harmony which it finds in the idea of God. Now God is undoubtedly transcendent, both in respect of nature and morality. But this transcendence does not mean anything more than the fact that, thanks to it, nature is not transcendent in respect of morality, nor morality in respect of nature. The advantage of God’s transcendence is that the transcendence between nature and morality is eliminated; that morality can look back on nature, and that this is not done in vain. Likewise, the advantage is that nature is no longer a desert, owing to its being abandoned by morality, and that I am not forced to seek refuge in aesthetics, or even less in some psychological feeling, so as to establish a link between nature and morality. The idea of God establishes this connection securely. This connection, this unity is grounded in the two members of the system of philosophy, in accordance with its distinction from identity» (ibid., pp. 465 f.).

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For Cohen critical idealism is «scientific», not only because its object is «scientific facts».43 This aspect is undeniably important, and it is certain that, when writing Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode and Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, he considered it an essential character of the critical method. Precisely for this reason, on the one hand, he also made every effort to identify a «scientific fact» on which transcendental reflection could be carried out in the elaboration of his ethics, and, on the other, the not entirely convincing result of this search and the passage, which is entirely explicit in aesthetics and the philosophy of religion, from the «facts f of science» to the «facts of culture» gave rise to numerous problems and a number of doubts, among Cohen’s interpreters, over the rigour of the transcendental method in these spheres of his philosophy. The problem is one of the most delicate questions of interpretation which it is not my task to discuss here. I shall restrict myself to remarking, with reference to the philosophy of religion (but the other spheres are also involved), that Cohen’s insistence on considering the object a «fact of culture» nevertheless satisfies the requirement of maintaining, in this sphere where reference to a «science» cannot be made, the rigorously objective character of the research,44 without giving in to any kind of subjectivism (as is well known, opposition to all subjectivist interpretations of religion is constant in Cohen’s works). So, from this point of view, it could be said that, in a context in which, as I shall show, Cohen denied the scientific character of the religion of reason, referring back, as an object of investigation, to religion as a «fact of culture», in his intention of preserving the rigorously objective character of critical investigation, represented, despite appearances, the only true element of continuity with the scientific character of the system. Therefore, critical idealism is «scientific», not only because its object is «scientific facts». It is thus, above all, because it proceeds with the method of «foundation», i.e. of the idea. But, precisely in this way it is able to found What Ought to Be with a priori objective

43 44

Cf. PIM M 6. On this see, for example, RV V 8 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 7 f.

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validity, independent of the Being of nature.45 This is what Cohen meant by «the Being of What Ought to Be».46 What Ought to Be is not only placed beside Being, as a simple subjective aspiration, but is the object of autonomous critical investigation, even though, and precisely inasmuch as, it is carried out with the method of foundation, which is also common to logic. It appears clear, actually, that the rigorous distinction between Being and What Ought to Be, which makes logic and ethics as scientific investigations possible, does not, however, allow consideration of the unity of nature and morality, though it cannot be removed from the horizon of the critical system, except as a regulative ideal, and the realisation of morality as an infinite task. All this is already indicated in ethics, in the idea of God, but only in the sense of his transcendence, not in that of his correlation with man and the world. We now come to religion. Altmann, quoting from Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie,47 correctly noted that, in Cohen’s view, God is the «centre of gravity» of religious correlation.48 I do not think, however, that he really grasped the importance of this.49 Monotheism is the true foundation off Cohen’s religion of reason, not only in the ideal sense, but also in the methodological one. In this regard it needs to be said that, despite the fact that he had always underlined his conviction concerning the central position occupied by monotheism, his interpreters have nott taken this seriously enough on too many occasions, looking for the main inspiration of his philosophy of religion in themes that are undoubtedly important, though consequent, such as the individual, guilt, the Mitmensch etc., while he 45

«Since the task of ethics is to teach What Ought to Be, then it must teach what is not. Its task, therefore, is to dispense with the “Being” of experience, and, as there is no Being beyond it to which our concepts off experience can refer, it must go further than experience. In practical philosophy it is thus not a case of “positing principles of what happens, but rather laws of what ought to happen, even if it never does happen”» ( (KBE 14). 46 ERW W 13 passim. 47 Cf. BR 137. 48 Cf. A. ALTMANN, op. cit., p. 397. 49 Siegfried Ucko had highlighted d this character of Cohen’s philosophy of religion to a much greater extent: cf. S. UCKO, Der Gottesbegriff in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Siegfried Scholem, Berlin 1927, pp. 22, 35.

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himself clearly stated that monotheism was the true source of his religious thought. For Cohen the peculiarity ((Eigenart) of religion consists in placing the principle of foundation in God, i.e. reconsidering the content of ethics, above all, and, more generally, that of the whole system, in the perspective of correlation with God. This is why Cohen denied religion «independence» in respect of the parts of the system, inasmuch as religion does not have a different object from them, but affirms their «peculiarity» and, in the apt words of Rosenzweig,50 their «systematic ubiquity». The novelty of religion in respect of the system is, first of all and above all, methodological: it consists in the theocentrism of religious discourse, in monotheism. But it is precisely this methodological dislocation that, at the same time, places religion beyond the scientific, but not the critical method. Cohen certainly identified the critical method with the scientific one in the philosophical system. Denying or underestimating this conviction would be unwarranted distortion in the interpretation of his thought. This is not my intention here. In a way, it is precisely the fact that Cohen did not include, nor intended to include the religion of reason in the system, as a specific part of it, which confirms his fidelity to the conviction of the undeniable scientific character of systematic philosophy. It is admittedly also true that, during the last phase of his thought, i.e. in his late works on the philosophy of religion, he concentrated on that aspect of critical philosophy which was and remained outside (except as a regulative horizon) the scientific method, i.e. on the unity of Being and What Ought to Be. He did so adopting the new critical, but not scientific method of religious correlation, whose specificity lies in positing this very unity as its ground: the unity of the idea of the God of monotheism. This position was not yet entirely clear in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. This may be due, on the one hand, to the theme itself of the essay, programmatically highlighting the relationship of religion with the system (not, however, as a specific part of it) and, on the other, perhaps to the fact that Cohen had not yet 50

Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG, op. cit., in J 1 who is in agreement.

XLVII.

See also A. ALTMANN, op. cit., p. 377,

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given adequate consideration to the problem. It is, nevertheless, undeniable that efforts to affirm that the characteristic of science is essential for truth, and thus for all methods of knowledge, including that of religion, are uppermost in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie.51 This does not mean, however, that Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie does not also contain some occasional cracks, through which future developments can be glimpsed.52 Only in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, however, can full awareness and mature development of this point be found. In this work Cohen underlined, on several occasions, the non scientific character of Jewish religious thought, explicitly linking it to monotheism; i.e. the model of religious thought is not scientific inasmuch as it centres on the idea of God.53 Therefore, while, in the system, Cohen identified critical with scientific thought, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums these two characters are separated.54 Thus monotheism is a kind off critical knowledge, since it 51

Cf. BR 8, 19, 65, 111 f. Cf., for example, ibid., p. 27: «It can never be forgotten that monotheism is only a point of view of the spirit on the world, which requires completion by other points of view. Monotheism is certainly not the principle of the science of nature. But the science of nature is certainly not the only point of view of the spirit on the world, inasmuch as this is also the moral world». d 53 «That this religious people, with the share its religion has in reason, should not have taken part in science would not be intelligible if its spirit had not been filled with this world-historical one-sidedness: there is only one unique being, and only this has to be thought through in all its foundations and consequences. Nature, however, is and remains nothing in comparison with the being of God’s I. Only in this way could the metaphysics of monotheism be the origin off the unique God of ethics. Only in this way could the causality of nature be the origin of the teleology of morality» (RV ( V 54; Eng. trans. cit., p. 47). In his essay Mahnung des Alters an die Jugend d (1917), now in J 2 175-192/W 17 577-601, Cohen wrote: «Now, however, I want to speak to you with a Jewish spirit and heart, as if I wanted to transmit my last will and testament. Acknowledge and fill your spirits with the thought that our Jewish idealism, which in any practical situation of ethics can compete with pure scientific idealism, is grounded in this faith in the unique being of God» (ibid., p. 184/589). 54 «Monotheism arose in a spiritual culture, that was without any creative share in scientific culture. However, the spirituality t of monotheism demands a share in reason, a share in knowledge, especially if monotheism is also to create ethics. Ethics, however, in the Greek sense, in the scientific f sense, is dependent on logic. And the 52

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also proceeds in accordance with the method of foundation,55 though being non scientific knowledge. The alternative character to science, though not in contrast, but rather complementary to it, consists precisely in the theocentrism of religious correlation, i.e. in monotheism itself. Cohen pointed this out specifically, referring to the theme of the holy spirit, which, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, constitutes the further development and most mature articulation of the concept of religious correlation. Cohen wrote: «The cultural peculiarity of Israel constitutes an important predisposition for the creation of a Messiah. Israel is a people without interest or creative participation in science. People were therefore mistaken about the general spirituality of Israel’s culture, and therefore also about the originall peculiarity of the people. Because of this deficiency and the psychological interpretation given to it, people also drew conclusions about the general validity of religious culture. And these considerations become more weighty because along with the deficiency in the sciences there is also lacking independent philosophy in this one-sidedly religious literature. However, this doubt about the creativity of monotheism must also be limited or even cease to be entertained. We have already recognized the share of reason in monotheism, and therefore considered it as a kind of philosophy, although not a scientific one».56 Cohen went on57 to point out the limits of «scientific idealism», founded by Plato, which is the same as that of his system, and the merits of religious idealism, which he defined precisely with reference to the concept of the holy spirit, i.e. religious correlation, concluding: «The Jewish one-sidedness becomes through this more and more understandable. Not only has the isolation from all other problems furthered Messianism, but the concentration upon the single value of the knowledge of God is the key to it. But, of course, there is a reciprocal progress of logic in turn is dependent on the advancement of science. The prophets have no science, and therefore no scientific, no philosophic logic; therefore no scientific, no philosophic ethics, and yet prophecy must gain a share in knowledge» (RV V 105; Eng. trans. cit., p. 90). 55 Cf. ibid., p. 106; Eng. trans. cit., p. 91. 56 Ibid., p. 298; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 255 f. 57 Cf. ibid., pp. 299 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 256.

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effect here. Without this one-sided restriction the concept of God in his correlation with man would not be so exhaustively marked out. This restriction to religion produced the holy spirit, as the spirit of holiness, as the spirit of moral knowledge».58 As has already been said, the fundamental law of truth, the ultimate criterion of thought, implies both the unity and distinction between Being and What Ought to Be: systematic philosophy, for its scientific method, must rigorously remain within the limits of distinction, without ignoring the regulative idea of unity. Religion, on the other hand, starts out from unity, because its starting point is the idea of God: the primacy of God, in religious correlation, was not, therefore, for Cohen an unimportant detail. The methodological «peculiarity» of religion actually consists in it: this peculiarity distinguishes it from the various «directions» of systematic philosophy, since it is placed outside the scientific method, not in opposition to it, however, but positing it as a necessary integration, within «pure», i.e. critical, thought, precisely inasmuch as it makes a specific response to the requirement of unity, which is just as essential for critical philosophy as distinction. All this emerges explicitly from the passages already quoted from Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, as well as from others.59 Identification of the characteristics of pure, i.e. critical, thought, independently from its «scientific» character, from which the former’s belonging to religion can be justified, despite its difference from the 58

Ibid., p. 300; Eng. trans. cit., p. 257. For example: «The cohesion of religion and rational knowledge is the secure ground for the virtue of truthfulness in all human concerns, particularly in all questions of science and in all problems of inquiry. Truthfulness presupposes a foundationd of truth upon which it rests. For the systematic connection of all the questions of knowledge, God is the principle of truth. For the particular kinds of knowledge this root of truth has as its offshoots the particular principles of method. Thus, for ethics the general principle of the moral law becomes this offshoot of the truth. Without this principle, ethics deteriorates to skepticism and sophistry, which abolish the objective foundation of truthfulness. For politics as well as for private life, morality then becomes an illusion or a matter of expediency. The condition of the truth, which ethics claims on the basis off its method, saves for it the privilege of truthfulness. If in religion God is elevated to the absolute foundation of truth, then accordingly its fundamental meaning for the security of human truthfulness is also increased» (ibid., p. 489; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 421 f.). 59

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latter, is one of the guiding themes of the pages devoted to «reason» in the Einleitungg to the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, a term used by Cohen, in his new approach, for critical knowledge a broader concept than scientific knowledge, which certainly includes the latter without identifying with it. «Reason», in its critical meaning, is not simply human «consciousness»; it is characterised by the method of foundation: «Reason is the organ of concepts».60 Religion is part of it inasmuch as it participates in this method, just like «every science».61 However, this does not mean that religion can be identified with science and scientific philosophy.62 Religion is not scientific thought, though it is critical thought, i.e. it is actually «religion of reason»: «reason remains the distinctive mark and the systematic criterion».63 Once the critical character of reason, i.e. the method of foundation, in which religion also takes part, has been detached from its scientific character, which is not part of religion, what remains as the characteristic of the scientific method is clear as is the specificity of the method of religion, on the other hand. As I have already said, the scientific method remains rigorously within the sphere of the distinction between Being and What Ought to Be, nature and morality, while religious correlation lays the ground u of their unity, the idea of God, as the very principle from which all religious knowledge starts out and to which it makes reference. A no less important consequence of this difference is that the scientific method of systematic philosophy is 60

Ibid., p. 6; Eng. trans. cit., p. 5. Cf. ibid., p. 12; Eng. trans. cit., p. 10. «Philosophy is the science of reason. And if the concept is the preeminent witness for all science, then all science and all possible knowledge have in the concept their entire content and in reason their common source. Reason is the organ of concepts. What holds true for every science holds no less true for religion. Insofar as religion, too, consists of concepts and is based on concepts, its ultimate source can only be reason. This connection with reason determines and conditions its connection with philosophy, understood as the universal reason of human knowledge» (ibid., p. 6; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 5 f.). 62 «Nor is it the case that he who has a share in science and philosophy thereby and therein possesses religion; rather is it religion which has a share in reason, and this means: reason does not exhaust itself in science and philosophy» (ibid., p. 8; Eng. trans. cit., p. 7). 63 Ibidem. 61

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only able to elaborate universal concepts, and therefore is also limited in respect of the problem of realisation. Religion, on the other hand, precisely inasmuch as it is monotheism, i.e. thanks to the method of religious correlation, is able to found, beyond ethics, though in continuity with it, the connection between individual and universal, and thus to respond more adequately to the problem of realisation.64 The importance of this peculiarity of religion, of the method of religious correlation, within the critical method, needs underlining. It represents the perspective of unity, as completion of distinction, the perspective of realisation, only within which is abstract scientific methodology, the historical perspective necessary for the ideal of unity of nature and morality, t legitimate. It is no accident that Odo Marquard,65 seeing that he considered his system a pluralist inventory of facts of culture, which allegedly abandoned the Kantian problem of the unity of nature and morality, the problem of realisation, in his overall evaluation of Cohen’s philosophy, completely neglected the religious stage This is why Cohen’s philosophy of history, an elaboration of which is certainly also present in the works on ethics, found its most complete formulation in his posthumous work on n religion: this being because the key concepts of his philosophy of history, and especially the connection between individual and universal, individual and humanity, which is essential for the theme of realisation, only find an adequate 64

«It must not be a matter of indifference whether my morality and all men’s morality remains dutiful striving only, sufficient in itself; rather, I have to take an interest in the question whether the ideall has life and actuality. Even though this identity can only be achieved in the approximation to the ideal, the inexorable goal of the approximation is the permeation of actuality with the ideal. However, this proper goal of ethics has to recede in face of the scientific rigor of ethics, because of which it has to maintain the separation of actuality from the ideal, and generally between idea and actuality. This rigor brings about the illusion that ethics deals only with law and rule, but never with human actuality. Religion opposes this kind of “rotten reasoning”, and thereby establishes its own worth. The God of whom religion teaches means nothing else but the repeal of this prejudice of ethical rigor» (ibid., p. 24; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 20 f.). 65 Cf. O. MARQUARD, Transzendentaler Idealismus – Romantische Naturphilosophie – Psychoanalyse, Jürgen Dinter, Köln 1987, pp. 112 f. H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, cit., Bd. 1, p. 346, on the other hand, correctly noted: «This connection between What Ought to Be and future Being constitutes, in my view, the concrete content of the correlation between man and God».

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methodological framework in religious correlation. This is the case for messianism,66 and especially for the idea of the individual and his redemption from guilt.67 In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie68 as well Cohen insisted on the problem of the individual in humanity: this is the object proper to the philosophy of history, and it can only be adequately understood in religious correlation.

66 «We have depicted the messianic God as the God of ethics, but in the interest of historical clarification we must add that in our Ethic of the Pure Willl this messianic God appears only as the God of ethics. Just as scientific ethics must use all its literary sources correctly, so have we transplantedd this God from the religion of monotheism into ethics. And yet this God, derived from religion, is an ethical God merely in virtue of the connection that exists between monotheism and morality; he is not yet the God of religion proper» ((RV V 25; Eng. trans. cit., p. 21). 67 «Here lies the boundary of ethics. And where practical care begins, insofar as it is possible in such a case, there ethics borders on religion. When the man is declared a criminal, in accordance with the facts, and he is not able to help himself in the narrower correlation between man and man, in this deepest distress arises the problem of his I, and the broader correlation between man and God offers at this point the only possibility of help (…). If man is not permitted to lay aside the consciousness of his guilt then it is ethics itself which refers man to religion, to the correlation with God. Ethics can only set up the first principles which determine the possibility of this correlation. To prescribe the boundary of the applicability of the correlation is in contradiction to the insight of ethics into its own limitations. Man looks into the eyes off men; only God looks into the heart. The guilt and the merit of man remains hidden from man. This is not the fault of ethics, but of science, which in turn u receives its limits from logic. For ethics, man is, in the last analysis – one can see it clearly now – only a point to which it relates its problems, as for science also he is only a particular case of its general laws. In relation to the laws, however, only the particular a man originates, and indeed as nothing other than a case (…). We repeat: if we claim that religion is concerned with man’s guilt, and if we impart to religion the origin of the I as individual, we do not dissolve its connection with ethics, but, on the contrary, make the connection effective, so that ethics itself must demand the transition to religion, just as it will also have to demand that transition for the concept of God» (ibid., pp. 195 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 167 f.). 68 Cf. BR 55 ff.

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5. More than a Method Correlation, then, as the method of the religion of reason, puts the latter in its rightful place in the sphere of critical idealism, and, on the other hand, owing to its characteristic of methodological theocentrism, i.e. monotheism, confers «peculiarity» on it (together with ubiquity) in respect of all the parts of the system, though still within critical idealism. Before concluding, I should like to briefly show, as I announced in my title, that, at least for one point, religious correlation in Cohen takes on a further meaning: i.e. that it is more than a method. It is well known that Cohen identified a particularly important aspect of the general meaning off religious correlation in the relationship between man the sinner and God the redeemer. Admittedly, this aspect is also part of the general scheme of correlation: the holy spirit, for which the idea of God is at the same time origin and end of man’s moral activity. Origin and end are the two fundamental meanings of the idea as method, and as such also appear in this context. Forgiveness and redemption by God are, in Cohen’s view, the end (Ziel) l of human «moral activity» for freeing themselves from guilt. Cohen was very careful and intransigent in denying any meaning of redemption as divine collaboration in human activity of self-sanctification, in his conviction that any weakness on this point would be an opening to Christianity, and thus, from his viewpoint, to pantheism, i.e. to the elimination of the distinction and distance between God and man, which constitutes the fundamental sense of distinction in opposition to identity. This position was rigorously maintained by Cohen in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums69 and puzzled his readers, 69

«In no way can God cooperate in this human activity. How could God enter into a common enterprise with man? Just as redemption cannot be God’s gracious gift, so it cannot be the product of his cooperation in moral activity, since God’s being resides above it. No pantheism and no lowering of the contrast between God and man can be attempted here. While man in correlation, which now constitutes our problem, is thought only as an active factor, God, on the other hand, is thought as the end, d towards which the moral activity proper to man is oriented. In this way, the end still certainly remains part of moral activity; one could even speak of a factor creating the end; but the end must not be made identical to the factor. All activity resides in man: he cannot be excused, but only be helped. But success of this moral activity, which must be thought as something internal fulfilling the concept of action, does not depend, however, exclusively on man and his work» (ibid., p. 63).

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especially Natorp.70 But criticism from outside is of less interest here than the development of this position within Cohen’s thought. Cohen also kept to his previous position in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums: «Only man himself can actualize self-sanctification; no God can help him in this. God already effects [leistet] much in giving the commandment; and he will effect more [und er wird noch mehr leisten]. But he may not put a spoke in the wheel of man’s work, which the commandment demands of man. The task is put upon man; it is infinite because the solution is infinite. God as a collaborator would have to bring the solution to a final end. Since such an end contradicts the concept of this solution, it would also contradict the concept of the task if God should have a share in the handling of this task».71 A few lines later he repeated the same concept as that referred to in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie: God, he wrote, «although not a collaborator, is the goal of self-sanctification».72 Nevertheless, even though his attitude remained substantially identical, it developed and improved in an aspect that was anything but unimportant, already implicit in the previously quoted words: «and he will effect more» (und er wird noch mehr leisten). Within correlation of holiness another aspect emerges, one of God’s attributes specifically linked to the forgiveness of sins: God’s goodness. «God the Good One» is in correlation with man inasmuch as he is the «son of man».73 The «son of man» is the individual in his unresolvable condition as a sinner, despite his moral efforts; God’s goodness is certainty, in faith, of being forgiven, despite this situation.74 This is, in Cohen’s own words, «the most important content of the correlation of God and man».75

70 See the unpublished work by Paul Natorp on Cohen’s philosophy of religion in H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, cit., Bd. 2, pp. 115, 138. 71 RV V 240; Eng. trans. cit., p. 205. 72 Ibid., d p. 240; Eng. trans. cit., p. 206. 73 Cf. ibid., pp. 246 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 210 ff. 74 «Everything which belongs to man, both outside of himself and within, cannot give him the certainty that the preparations for his rebirth, which are his own, will be successful. Therefore only God can help him. God’s goodness is his only refuge. Therefore he puts his confidence in it. Thus arises trustt in God» (ibid., p. 247; Eng. trans. cit., p. 211). 75 Ibid., p. 249; Eng. trans. cit., p. 213.

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God’s holiness is the ground of man’s self-sanctification inasmuch as it is the origin, He «gives the commandment»,76 and it is the end, He is the «archetype» (Urbild) d 77 of moral action. These are the fundamental methodological meanings of the idea of God for the individual sinner. But the attribute of «goodness» confers further meaning on the idea of God, going beyond idea as origin and end, and thus beyond correlation as a method. God is the sole redeemer:78 this gap between self-sanctification and redemption, this transcendence of the redeemer in respect of man’s moral activity, is a remainder, further meaning of the idea of God in respect of its connotations of «origin» and «end». Cohen was aware of this: «Now, however, the question might arise: if forgiveness belongs to repentance, does not a heterogeneous element enter the work of penance in that God represents this goal and thus has to effect forgiveness? Does not forgiveness, which is with God, then violate the independence and purity of self-sanctification? The question must be put more precisely: is not the entire element of forgiveness through God external to the idea of self-sanctification? And should not forgiveness be replaced by self-sanctification insofar as the latter contains in itself the infinite solution, even though it ever remains an infinite task, so that self-sanctification would be identical to forgiveness? Ezekiel says “yes”: “Cast away from you all your transgression … and make you a new heart and a new spirit” [Ezek. 18:31]. Does he not thereby identify f the task with forgiveness and does he not thereby eliminate redemption through God?»79 Nevertheless, Cohen maintained his position, acknowledging it as «the new sense» of correlation, in which the religion of reason is stretched to the limits of its methodological meaning by the latter’s very needs.80

76

Cf. ibid., p. 240; Eng. trans. cit., p. 205. Ibid., p. 251; Eng. trans. cit., p. 215. 78 Cf. ibid., pp. 235, 243; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 201, 207 f. 79 Ibid., p. 242; Eng. trans. cit., p. 207. 80 «However, the idea that the goal belongs to the work of penance cannot have the consequence that the goal is put in man himself, and not in God, for then the main scaffolding of religious knowledge, which we erected in the correlation of man and God, would collapse. If, however, our methodological framework must remain 77

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Reason stops at this limit. To speak of a «Leistung « » of the idea of God is a limiting expression for critical reason, beyond which one can go no further. But neither can one stay on this side of it, owing to the essential character of critical philosophy, which cannot do without flanking discourse within the limits of reason with discourse on the limit, the latter point of view being peculiar to religion.

standing, then we have to recognize the new meaning of the correlation in the meaning of God as the redeemer from sin. Regardless of whether we would be able to achieve the solution of the task by our own independent work, and to succeed in liberating ourselves from sin, it is necessary for the notion of the correlation with God, for the concept of God himself, thatt he and only he be the redeemer, it is necessary that he only accomplish this redemption by pardoning, by forgiving the sin. In the spirit of the theodicy one could say: sin is explainable through God’s forgiveness of it. God’s being could not be conceived as understandable in his perfection, if the forgiveness of sin were not his proper achievement» (ibid., pp. 242 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 207 f.).

CHAPTER FIVE

COHEN AND MOZART: CONSIDERATIONS ON DRAMA, THE BEAUTIFUL AND HUMANENESS IN COHEN’S AESTHETICS

When I was invited to speak at the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Hermann Cohen’s birth in Marburg, where he lived longest and wrote so much of his philosophical works and which was the birthplace of his school, and I had to choose a subject for my paper, I remembered an essay published by Cohen in the 31 December 1905 and 3 and 4 January 1906 issues of the «Frankfurter Zeitung» entitled Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages.1 In 1991 the 200th anniversary of Mozart’s death was solemnly celebrated: in 1992 we are celebrating the 150th of Cohen’s birth. In 1906 Cohen had contributed his essay to the celebrations for the 150th anniversary of Mozart’s birth. I hope that this convergence of anniversaries will be accepted as sufficient stimulus for the choice of the subject, Cohen and Mozart. Nevertheless, this theme is not only justified by a happy coincidence of dates and anniversaries. Cohen showed special interest in Mozart’s operas. They could be called a major area of analysis and experiment for some important themes in his aesthetics, especially the theory of drama, and then that of the sublime and humour as «subordinate concepts» (Unterbegriffe) of the beautiful, and, finally, for the value of Humaneness and the general meaning of aesthetics in Cohen’s overall thought. I shall examine here, though briefly, these three subjects, with reference to their emergence in Cohen’s analysis of Mozart’s operas. As is only right and proper, I shall not restrict myself to the 1906 essay, but shall also 1

Now in S 1 490-519.

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situate it in the context of Cohen’s major work on aesthetics, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls and the previous work commenting on Kant’s aesthetics, Kants Begründung der Ästhetik. It should be noted that Mozarts Operntexte, which, as has already been mentioned, dates from 1906, came out seventeen years after the publication of Kants Begründung der Ästhetikk in 1889 (and that in this interval of time Cohen published the first two volumes of his system, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis and Ethik des reinen Willens) and six before that of Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls in 1912. So, from the chronological point of view as well, Mozarts Operntextt is an interesting point from which to observe possible developments in Cohen’s aesthetic thought.2

1. The Theory of Drama First of all, then, Cohen saw Mozart’s operas as a decisive stage in the history of a major artistic genre such as drama: «Mozart – he wrote – is the opera dramatist».3 This statement in itself placed Mozart in an important position in Cohen’s aesthetic perspective, since, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, he acknowledged drama as the most important of poetic genres, even of all artistic forms in general: «Drama thus rightly constitutes the supreme form of poetry and one of the most authentic artistic forms in general».4 This primacy was due to the fact that it is only in drama that the aesthetic concept of «action» ( (Handlung ) is realised, and, in connection with it, the «supreme degree»5 of «internalisation» (Verinnerlichung) and the most complete form of the «aesthetic Self», of the «aesthetic individual».6 In Cohen’s 2

This is why I shall consider here the 1906 essay and not Cohen’s re-working of 1916 published with the title: Die dramatische Idee in Mozarts Operntexte (Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, now in W 17 3-108). In the new 1916 version numerous modifications were introduced, which, harmonising the text with the positions now stabilised in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, removed the character of documentary evidence of an ongoing development which interests us here. 3 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 491. 4 ÄRG 1 397. 5 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 396. 6 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 396 passim.

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view, this important result is achieved in drama through the intimate exchange of feelings between actor and spectator, in accordance with his new, original interpretation of the ancient Aristotelian theory of catharsis,7 so that the new aesthetic individual, the dramatic subject, is neither actor nor spectator, but actually the unity of both.8 To a greater extent than in ancient tragedy and comedy (Aeschylus and Aristophanes), it is in modern drama thatt all this is realised, and, as we shall see, the cause is the unification in it of both tragedy and comedy; the true creator of modern drama being Shakespeare.9 If one passes on from poetry to music, the musical genre connected to the poetical one of drama is opera10 and Mozart was the creator of dramatic opera.11 This appreciation took on even greater importance in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, inasmuch as Cohen considered Mozart an exception, as it were; he was the only true composer of dramatic operas, since Gluck before, and also Beethoven after him, were actually composers of lyric operas12 (apart from these composers, Cohen also favourably mentioned Rossini,13 but without attributing to him a particular role in the development of dramatic opera). So much so that if, as we have seen, Cohen saw opera as the musical correspondent of drama, only realising as such its full artistic value in the guise of dramatic, rather than lyric opera, then Mozart is an isolated figure, who was not and could not be matched in the history of music and art in general, since «opera in Mozart is ideal fulfilment, which has only appeared once in history up to our time».14 If we now look at Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, Cohen’s first work under discussion, we can find, curiously, all the elements of this evaluation, but not the evaluation itself. In Kants Begründung der Ästhetikk Cohen attributed Kant’s inadequate consideration of humour, 7

Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, p. 75. Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 65, 74 passim. 9 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 86 ff. 10 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 401; Bd. 2, p. 169. 11 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 169, 175. 12 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 169 ff. 13 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 177, 181. The 200th anniversary of Rossini’s birth was celebrated in 1992! 14 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 169; cf. p. 181. 8

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among other things, to the latter’s low opinion of Aristophanes and Shakespeare,15 acknowledged the peculiar novelty of modern in respect of ancient art in the unification of tragedy and comedy,16 highlighted the uniqueness of Mozart in the history of music, as that of Shakespeare in the history of literature, precisely because he had brought about this unification,17 but did not come to the above mentioned conclusions on the artistic primacy of literary drama and dramatic opera. Perhaps because he was negatively influenced by his disgust for the music of Wagner and the latter’s theories on music drama18 (but this motivation is not certain, and, in any case, was not the sole, or most important one), Cohen did not yet consider drama the supreme form of poetry: he considered it, together with epic, an inferior artistic genre with historical-political content, while awarding lyric poetry, with which he associated all music, the crown of artistic superiority.19 As a consequence, his appreciation for Mozart, in this work, was limited to references to Die Zauberflöte, owing to the ethical, historical and political ideals exalted in this opera (this is also an important theme, however, to which I shall return in the third section of my analysis). In the 1906 essay, on the other hand, all these elements were combined to make up a mature judgement on drama and dramatic opera. Love, the pure aesthetic feeling is the content of drama, in its implications with ethics, i.e. the «action of feeling».20 Here Mozart was following in the footsteps of Shakespeare, «the spirit of the new

15

Cf. KBA 300. Cf. ibid., p. 303. 17 Cf. ibid., p. 432. 18 Cf. Cohen’s criticism of Wagner’s Oper und Drama, in ibid., pp. 320 ff. 19 «Epic and drama sing and preach legendary history and the history of the fatherland and are thus at the service of civic purposes. Only music and lyric poetry do not belong to this public world; they only know and sing the private, egoistic world, yet so full of renunciations, of the feelings dominating man’s heart. Thus, among all the miracles of art, the greatest ones could always be those representing the most immediate, strongest symptoms of aesthetic consciousness. These are music and lyric poetry, which use its means» (ibid., p. 431). 20 Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., pp. 491 f. 16

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age»,21 who, unlike Aeschylus and Aristophanes, «the double spirit of Antiquity»,22 united tragedy and comedy in the single form of modern drama.23 The peculiarity of drama is the realisation of action not only by the author on stage, but in a «dialogue» between actor and spectator, in a spiritual exchange between the two.24 In short, we can conclude, this essay already exhibited the mature theory of drama that Cohen had not yet presented in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, and which he did present, in a more developed form, though using basically the same arguments, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls.

2. The Sublime and Humour As I have already mentioned, in Cohen’s view, modern drama (i.e. in its maturity, in contrast with the «immaturity of Antiquity»)25 is characterised by the unification of tragedy and comedy. Plato had already prophesied this unification,26 in the Symposium. However, it was necessary to go further and dig deeper than this. It was not enough for the same author to write tragedies and comedies; tragic and comic needed to be interwoven in a single play. Plato’s prophecy was realised in Shakespeare: «His new style, in which the maturity of a new age is manifest, consists in mixing tragic and comic. In this Mozart followed him».27 With this, Cohen provided a direction, but not yet an exhaustive explanation: what does mixing tragic and comic mean from the aesthetic point of view? How is this realised technically from the theatrical and musical points of view? This is the central question, around which the whole 1906 essay rotated: Cohen looked for and expounded, in the series of Mozart’s operas, the progressively 21

Ibid., p. 493. Ibidem. 23 Cf. ibidem. 24 Cf. ibid., pp. 493 ff. 25 Ibid., p. 493. 26 Cf. ibidem and ÄRG 2 100, 110. 27 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 493. 22

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detailed, developed solution to this problem. So, it could be said, Mozart’s operas constituted the initial main experimental material on which Cohen tested the above mentioned hypothesis, with an analysis begun in the 1906 essay, continuing in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (as is well known, he carried out a similar, equally extensive one on Shakespeare’s plays, but this concerned literary drama and thus only appeared later, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls). It must be admitted that, precisely concerning this central theme, Mozarts Operntexte is somewhat incoherent and disjointed. One suspects that, in some passages, Cohen collected together previous partial not entirely homogeneous analyses (though, to my knowledge, there is no documentary proof of this suspicion), which, for this very reason, turn the essay into interesting documentation of the development of his thought on problems connected with the link between tragic and comic, on the one hand, and the sublime and humour, on the other. That there was a connection between these two pairs of concepts had been clear right from the time of Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, where, as I have already recalled, Cohen adduced, among the reasons for Kant’s failure to theorise humour, the fact that the latter did not appreciate Aristophanes and Shakespeare; but the nature of this connection is what needed to be researched by analysing the librettos of Mozart’s operas. In Mozarts Operntexte Cohen firstly attempted to test the hypothesis of the mixture of tragic and comic by means to the intermingling of the characters’ roles. Thus, in Die Entführung aus dem Serail, Belmonte’s and Costanza’s «tragic yearning for love (tragische Liebessehnsucht)» opposes, as a «comic counter-motive», Osmin’s «simple, rough sensibility, in which love does not rise up to morality (sich nicht versittlicht)». t 28 The contrast and tension between the 29 «healthiness of love» and the «morality of love»,30 on the one hand, and the «natural power of sensibility (…) for which human love has not yet awoken»,31 on the other, produces the dramatic effect. 28

Ibid., p. 497. Ibid., p. 496. 30 Ibid., p. 497. 31 Ibid., p. 498. 29

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In Le Nozze di Figaro the mixture of tragic and comic was even tighter, in the sense that it is present in a single character, Count Almaviva. The other characters surrounding the Count obviously have their role in the plot but none of them is the comic counterpart of the Count, since he is, at the same time, both tragic and comic figure.32 The unification of tragic and comic in a single character was possible thanks to the peculiar relationship in drama between actor and spectator. The Count «behaves like the most serious and solemn person in the world and there is the most sacred, extreme seriousness in all his actions; only when his seriousness happens not to be matched, exceptionally, do doubts about his dignity suddenly appear in him. But the most important thing remains hidden from him and must remain so, since he presents himself as independent in the face of the whole moral world: a superior power of that world faces him in the spectator. Before the spectator he becomes ridiculous; no, not ridiculous at all, but rather comic, a bearer of the comic».33 Here Cohen saw, however, a shift in the meaning of tragic and comic, in respect of the previously analysed opera; here the tragic does not have ethical content; it is not human love uplifted to a moral value, but «the natural power of passion»:34 «It is with a heavy, dark seriousness that he sings “Crudel! Per che fin ora farmi languir così” (“So lang hab’ ich geschmachtet”). His passion increases (wächst … herein) here in a tragic atmosphere. The tragic element in the Count constitutes his real (wirklich) passion».35 For our purposes, it is interesting to note what Cohen underlined here: he wrote that the comic, which, together with the tragic, made up the dramatic character of the Count, was different here from humour and was not to be confused with it.36 So, up to this point, drama was seen by Cohen as the unity of comic and tragic: the 32

I should like to point out here that both in Mozarts Operntexte and Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Cohen strangely neglected the figure of Cherubino and his role in Le Nozze di Figaro. 33 Ibid., p. 501. 34 Ibid., p. 502. 35 Ibidem. In the text published in S 1 the words «Crudel! Per che fin ora farmi languir così» are mistakenly attributed to Figaro. However, the context shows that it is a mere slip. 36 Cf. ibid., p. 501.

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concepts of the sublime and humour did not come into the picture, but were deliberately left out. Nevertheless, this approach already showed some cracks; for example, when Cohen highlighted the final forgiveness, as an expression, of fundamental importance, of harmony and peace, which are essential components of drama, precisely because he had deliberately left out humour, he was forced to consider forgiveness a comic motive, which, as anyone can grasp, is totally inadequate.37 In the progressive development of the mixture of tragic and comic, Mozart’s next opera Don Giovanni, would necessarily be a further, more complete step forward. Thus Cohen announced an even more complex structure and intermingling of roles: «A new, developed task must have opened up for him [Mozart]: that of preserving the mixture in the main character, but, at the same time, placing a contrasting figure beside him and repeating the mixture of the two motives in him too, albeit under different conditions».38 The construction appears rather complicated and artificial: it seems to be more of an abstract, technical variation on the theme, imposed extrinsically on the opera to maintain a thesis, than the objective result of analysis of the opera itself. Actually this laborious scheme was not much exploited by Cohen for his interpretation of Don Giovanni. What prevails was the use of a much more important aesthetic category, that of humour. Don Giovanni is the tragic hero of ««passion as the originative force in man»,39 and the other characters are also linked with him by the unbreakable tie of tragedy. The universal meaning drawn by Cohen from the tremors of the naive Zerlina in the face of Don Giovanni’s passionate advances («Mi trema un poco il cor») is particularly fine: «This – Cohen wrote – is the tragic in man’s life: that beauty can 37 «The supreme justification lies in the celestial conclusion that Mozart’s dramatic art composed. Now no moralism can be maintained; it is no longer absolutely either necessary or possible. The purest harmony has been introduced in this complete circle, and it has brought about the wisest and most blissful peace, forgiveness which makes one happy. Woman has become an angel, and, through h her, the male, a man. In this opera the comic motive brings about victory in the souls who see themselves in this harmony; the tragic could not be absent from it. And the fact that both motives are upheld by the same character is a climax in Mozart’s dramatic art» (ibid., p. 503). 38 Ibidem. 39 Ibid., p. 504.

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become a trap for him. There is no other aesthetic means against the domination of passion but trembling in its face».40 The figure of Don Giovanni cannot bear any comic trait,41 but the unity of tragic and comic, which, on the other hand, characterises the figure of Leporello,42 also involves the protagonist, inasmuch as he and his servant «belong to each other».43 It was at this point that Cohen, somewhat incoherently, since he had also denied this opera «a humorous character»44 and «humorous intonation»,45 foregrounded humour, as the true meaning of the unity of tragic and comic in drama: «it is only from their [Don Giovanni’s and Leporello’s] connection that the new force of the drama arises, which Mozart, after Shakespeare, produced. This new sense, that modern drama conferred on modern art in general, is humour. Humour is not hilarity, nor the tired calm of the world. It is the tragic and comic in unity».46 This new meaning of the unity of tragic and comic in Mozart’s operas opened up a much more interesting perspective, from the aesthetic point of view, than the previous approach embarked on by Cohen, and now abandoned, of the intermingling of roles: it brought to light the connection of the unity of tragic and comic with the subordinate concepts of the beautiful, even though, at this point, unilaterally defining this connection only with humour. The sublime was not so amply foregrounded in the 1906 essay,47 and the above mentioned definition of humour does not seem to leave any room for the sublime in drama. Actually, it is present in the essay, wherever

40

Ibid., p. 506. Cf. ibid., p. 508. 42 Cf. ibidem. 43 Ibid., p. 509. 44 Ibid., p. 504. 45 Ibid., p. 507. 46 Ibid., p. 509. 47 The term appears only rarely: Cohen wrote that the figure of the Commendatore in Don Giovanni, «makes manifest Mozart’s dramatic musical art in its religious sublimity» (ibid., p. 507); and, with reference to Die Zauberflöte, he noted: «the sublime solemnity and dignity pervading the entire opera» (ibid., p. 518) and «the profound seriousness of the sublime morality» (ibid., p. 519) linking it to the Requiem. 41

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human striving for moral values appeared, and appealed for recognition, even though recognition, in this essay, was not adequately achieved. The route undertaken reached fulfilment in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls by means of a decisive step: Cohen acknowledged that Mozart fully achieved the mixture of tragic and comic in drama only by abandoning these literary genres in favour of the more fundamental aesthetic concepts of the sublime and humour: «Here the transformation that only a genius can bring about takes place. He abandoned the antimony between the tragic and the comic and returned to the originative moments of the beautiful in the sublime and humour». r 48 In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls Cohen, who, in his 1906 essay, had restricted himself almost exclusively to consideration of the librettos of Mozart’s operas, now showed much more interest in the music, and this change in perspective, apart from producing a less extrinsic analysis of Mozart’s operas, was undoubtedly favourable to Cohen’s new interpretation, since tragic and comic are literary categories, which are ill adapted to music, while the sublime and humour are universal aesthetic concepts, which can be translated into and applied to any artistic genre. In Cohen’s new interpretation, the tragic and the comic (he dealt especially with the latter) emerging in the librettos of Mozart’s operas, lose importance in respect of the music accompanying them and which does not correspond to them, and is often in contrast with them. Actually, this contrast expresses the effectively important aesthetic meanings of the sublime and humour: «Osmin, as a theatrical character, becomes a comic figure, but he is no such thing in his musical representation. There he takes the sublime flight, when he rejoices in excitement, “ah, how I desire to triumph” (“Ha, wie will ich triumphieren”), and enters the sign of humour in the aria “I cannot be deceived” (“Mich betrügt man nicht”)».49 At the end of Cohen’s investigation of Mozart’s operas, drama turned out to be the unification of the sublime and humour, and this unification was much tighter than the mixture of tragedy and comedy, from which we started out. As Cohen explained in connection with Shakespeare’s plays (the same being entirely true for Mozart’s musical drama): «Tragedy and 48 49

ÄRG 2 176. Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 177; cf. also the following pages.

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comedy do not remain separate forms of drama, because the sublime and humour are not independent ideal concepts, but only moments in the sole ideal concept of the beautiful». l 50 This was not in contradiction with Cohen’s above mentioned statement that tragedy and comedy were unified in humour.51 In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, still with reference to Shakespeare, we find the two statements n joined together: «The greatness and uniqueness we clearly acknowledge in Shakespeare’s humour consists in this co-penetration of humour and the sublimee in his dramatic art».52 The unification of the sublime and humour takes place, thanks to the critical action of humour on the sublime, «since the dimension (Maß ( ) of the sublime can only be maintained through the limitation ((Mäßigung g) added by humour».53 Thus humour has the critical function of contributing a limit and moderation, but also objective reality to the infinite upward thrust of the sublime,54 of bringing to fulfilment the infinite process of the sublime,55 and to peace its infinite activity.56 The unity of these two moments, which must be present in all artistic production, since it is a question of the constitutive moments off the beautiful, is achieved in drama in a specially complete way, almost like a fusion, because it takes place in the dynamics of action. As Cohen showed in Mozart’s Don Giovanni, in drama the intermingling of the sublime and humour is so tight, their dynamic relationship so compact, that the sublime cannot be defined outside the horizon of humour and vice-versa.57 50

Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 116. Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 509. 52 ÄRG 2 116. 53 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 113. 54 «Tragedy would remain exaggerated pathos, if it did not hold self-criticism within itself (…). What was a necessity for ancient poets must become a virtue for modern ones. They are exposed to the full sunlight off criticism, of critical culture. They would be the victims of emotion, iff they could not in the meantime free themselves with the comic. Here humour becomes a decisive moment» (ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 110 f.). 55 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 272 f. 56 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 348. 57 «Thus here sublimity is not simply the work of theoretical activity or the supreme artistic faculty. It is the outlet of co-penetration of the theoretical with the ethical link. 51

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Humour, however, in its critical function, in supplying moderation and fulfilment to the infinite upward thrust of the sublime, at the same time raises up the finite and confers dignity on it. This is the other aspect of humour, which is complementary to the first one, since, in general, this correlation between finite and infinite, i.e. the grounding of the finite in infinity and the realisation of infinity in the finite was one of the most profound, fundamental meanings of critical philosophy for Cohen. Humour bears witness before the sublime that its infinite activity must be realised in finite reality, if it does not want to fade away and lose consistency, but, on the other hand, it also bears witness that finite reality is actually able to take on the infinite value, and, to a certain extent already bears traces of it. If we try to briefly catalogue the meanings of humour that emerge from the 1906 essay, we can identify three fundamental ones. Humour is «the aesthetic consciousness of grace», inasmuch as it «moderates severe judgement, without respect for persons, or rather springs up at a free gaze, which it illuminates with greater indulgence and transfigures with greater clarity, peacefully therefore, the baseness of existence and life».58 The greatest expression of humour, in this sense, is the «only yardstick of authentic love», the «peak of true feeling», «forgiveness» (Verzeihung), g for which, «even the weaknesses in all human propensity for their intimate happiness appear as a moment of this propensity»:59 through it «art shows itself to be the founder of peace».60 Cohen highlighted this meaning of

And the purity of this co-penetration is the peculiarity of Mozartt (…). In Beethoven conflictt remains (…). This is his greatness. But the sublime in the dramatic sense is not so much conflict as victory alone. Conflict is only sublime in the consciousness of victory. Thus the sublime in Mozart is not a content concluded in itself, but only a moment, by the side of which humour is continually placed. While the Stone Guest reveals that other world, not only has Don Giovanni just sung: “It is not worth living without her”, but, during the whole scene to just before the end the figure of contrast is present and vigorously active. It is only with the solemnity of sublimity that humour can remain linked» (ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 182 f.). 58 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 501. 59 Ibid., p. 513. 60 Ibidem.

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forgiveness in his analysis of Le Nozze di Figaro61 as in that of Così fan tutte.62 Besides, humour is «improvement» (Nachbesserung ( g) and «idealisation» of «evil» (das Schlechte).63 In my view this meaning can be understood as very near, and different only in terminology, in respect of the idealisation of the «ugly» (das Häßliche), to which Cohen devoted particular attention in the theorisation of humour in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls.64 What there is in common is the raising of man’s animal nature to spiritual meaning and dignity. Cohen’s judgement of the figure of Susanna in Le Nozze di Figaro was also in this sense.65 Finally, humour is the barrier of art and culture against scepsis. In the face of the doubt that art and beauty, the ideals of fidelity and love, faith in truth and dignity are only vanity and illusion,66 only «this humour of the intimate wisdom of life» is «the universal spirit» which allows the «faith of art»67 to triumph

61

Cf. ibid., p. 503; cf. also ÄRG 2 178. Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 513. The hypothesis that Cohen, in this context, used the term «Verzeihung» for an aware, deliberate distinction of this aesthetic context from the one with a religious meaning he called «Versöhnung» appears improbable, because, in ÄRG 2 178 the two terms were used together or interchangeably («“Oh angel, forgive me (verzeih mir)”, with this simple tune, with this Mozartian r tune of the most holy sweetness is forgiveness (Versöhnung) celebrated, the absolution of all earthly sins»). This does not mean, obviously, that, subsequently, in his works on the philosophy of religion, Cohen did not enrich the concept of Versöhnungg with entirely new, different meanings. 63 Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 513; cf. also ibid., d p. 495. 64 Cf. ÄRG 1 281 ff. 65 «She is adorned with all the stimuli off passion. She is in a freedom bordering on humour; she lets her sensibility die away. The breath of this passion is sipped and she spreads this passion over the landscape in the garden scene on that night. And yet everything remains only free, pure play; but deeper down, more intimate, because it is at the service of something alien, something superior» (H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr r seines Geburtstages, cit., pp. 502 f.). 66 Cf. ibid., p. 512. 67 Ibid., p. 514. 62

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over scepsis. This important meaning of humour was, in Cohen’s view, the key to the interpretation of Così fan tutte,68 also emerged in Don Giovanni.69 If we now return to the series of Cohen’s works and examine the meaning of humour in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, we will note substantial similarity with what has emerged from our examination of Mozarts Operntexte. It is well known that in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik,70 Cohen argued for the need for a theory of humour and complained about its absence in Kant. Nevertheless, he did note some elements in the Kritik der Urtheilskraft, from which Kant could have developed such a theory, even though he did not do so. These elements are Kant’s statements on laughter, the ugly and naiveness. In each of them Cohen glimpsed a meaning of humour, which Kant had not developed, but which constituted an aspect of the former’s subsequent theory. With reference to laughter, Cohen highlighted the meaning of humour as a barrier against scepsis. He interpreted Kant’s 68

«Thus Mozart must have been assailed by the thought that, in the end, his beautiful art was only illusion and fancy and that his modest self-consciousness, which, nonetheless, guided him in clear glory, as far as the value of his creation was concerned, was only self-deception and simulation of an imaginary value, because, in the end, any struggle by men for love and fidelity would be a wasted effort and vain illusion; in this way, however, all the raw material of art would dissolve in a void and nothingness. If he had remained in this scepsis, he would not have remained that creative idealist. But he did remain so, like Plato and Shakespeare. And like Shakespeare, he had no other means of decapitating this Hydra, except his eternally youthful art. This opera, Così fan tutte, marks this period in the development of his idealism. Through all the jokes, frivolities, impudent games with the holiest feelings of the heart, joyous faith resounds clearly and comfortingly; f and it is rather an appearance that all love is appearance (…). It is the superior power of humour, through which d [Shakespeare]» (ibid., pp. 512 f.; cf. Mozart joins his dramatic archetype (Urbild) ÄRG 2 180). 69 «The dramatic poet cannot say: grace is deception and beauty futility, but associating the comic with the tragic, with h reference to man’s tragic pride in his beauty and its glory, love, and showing to what extent, in his impetuosity and desire for change (Wandelsucht) this pride of the human heart frustrates itself, he could seem to some rhetorical. Humour saves from such distancing from the vanity fairr of human existence» (H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 509). 70 Cf. KBA 295 ff.

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definition: «Laughter is an affection deriving from the sudden transformation into a nothing of a tense expectation»,71 commenting: «The intellect, and moral reason particularly r finds such a nothing in the situations and events of this earthly world. So it is necessary to oppose confidently punitive sarcasm and contempt, without arrogance, but with a full, warm gaze at what has been achieved in the midst of everything to which one has aspired. In this cleansing of nothing humour shows its worth».72 In respect of the ugly Cohen already acknowledged for humour the idealising function which I mentioned above: «But after the ugly has been discovered and produced as the work of aesthetic consciousness, beautiful art takes possession of it, not only to transform it simply into the beautiful, but to interweave it into the beautiful, without, for this reason, losing its essential appearance. In this, which is the most difficult of all arts, in the risky endeavor of lowering the ugly into the beautiful, of annexing and including it, the magic of humour becomes powerful to the point of arrogance. There is nothing small orr disgusting here, but everything is transported to the species aeterni of feeling».73 From consideration of naiveness, finally, Cohen extracted the third meaning: «But when nature is naive through its own sublimity, i.e. through its preaching morality, unveiling man’s weakness in his intellect and imagination and reawakens its greatness, the producer of the sublime, only in its ability to think moral law, then art, consciousness, manages to accomplish the moment of the naive, the moment of humour in man, even though he betrays weakness and error, not only in the maturity of thought, but no less in the culture of moral concepts: as long as the disposition for morality, vocation for moral law, aspiration to the realm of spirits, the community of moral entities shines out through all earthly defects and thus offers the possibility of an aesthetic goal of consciousness, of harmony of nature, however narrow, with morality, however wounded it may be».74

71

I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 54, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 332. KBA 298. 73 Ibid., p. 300. 74 Ibid., pp. 302 f. 72

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If we now turn to Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, we find the same meanings of humour. Lack of space does not allow me to analyse Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls adequately on this theme, but since it is Cohen’s most important and best known work on aesthetics, anyone can easily test this statement. Everybody certainly recalls Cohen’s extensive treatment in it of the ugly as the object of humour: we are dealing with an idealist aesthetics of the ugly of great philosophical importance, both from the aesthetic point of view, and for its general philosophical implications, which, in my view, has not been sufficiently appreciated up to now, and over which, if it were possible, I should like to pause longer. Analogously in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls we can find the meanings of aesthetic fulfilment, peculiar to the moment of humour, as the idealist overcoming of scepsis75 and (despite the fact that humour is here distinguished from naiveness)76 as moral appreciation of man in his weakness and finiteness.77 We also find the same meanings of humour in the new analysis of Mozart’s operas in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls.78 Let us now consider the meaning of the sublime, which, as I have already noted, was also dealt with in Mozarts Operntexte, though the term itself hardly ever appeared. Don Giovanni and Die Zauberflöte were, in Cohen’s view, Mozart’s operas in which the sublime had the greatest importance. The figure of the Commendatore in Don Giovanni expresses the «religious sublimity» of the «victory of morality over the natural power of lustful sensibility».79 Actually, this definition of the sublime appears very close to the meaning of humour, inasmuch as it is seen as a victory, more than a struggle. But here we are dealing with the close dramatic link between the sublime and humour, which I have already referred to above, of mutual reflection. If this meaning of the sublime is lit by a different perspective and from a different angle, it takes on more recognisable traits, though remaining the same. So the sublime appears (this is how 75

Cf., for example, ÄRG 1 230. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 277 f. 77 Cf., for example, ibid., Bd. 1, p. 297. 78 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 178, 180. 79 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 507. 76

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Cohen interpreted Die Zauberflöte) as the victory of virtue and wisdom of the powers of darkness by means of love.80 In the pages in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls on Mozart Cohen returned to this meaning of the sublime: man as «the stairway in heaven between animal and divinity».81 In a particularly significant passage, with reference to the second finale of Don Giovanni, Cohen wrote: «May it be repeated: the character of this sublimity is not dismay, nor even bliss on the basis of it, but simply ecstasy. Man becomes another being, because another world opens up before him».82 Thus Cohen intended to underline the fact that the feeling of the sublime was not the result of a conflict between finite and infinity («dismay», Erschütterung) nor of mystical annihilation of the finite in infinity («bliss», Beseligung), but of man’s «ecstasy» (Entrückung) in the face of the ideal of Humaneness ( (Humanität ), of the realisation of mankind (Menschheit) and universal peace, which he posits as an infinite task. This is precisely the main characteristic of the sublime in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, what distinguishes the critical-idealist conception of the sublime from any romantic conception:83 infinity not as a barrier (Schranke) but as a limit (Grenze) and task (Aufgabe ( ) of man.84 80

Cf. ibid., p. 518. ÄRG 2 182. 82 Ibidem. 83 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 9 ff., 255 ff. 84 «The finite is not happy to remain finite, but has the courage to overcome the distance from infinity. The limitation ((Beschränktheit) of the finite is eliminated, there is an aspiration to elevation (Erhebung ( ) to infinity. Infinity must not remain something alien, external. It may well be that it must be and remain something transcendent. This is unimportant, as long as it must nott be something external or heterogeneous. But is what happens in this aesthetic sublimity ((Erhabenheitt) arrogant, or a presumption (Überhebung)? This cannot be right, since presumption is contrary to moral law, but the latter is the indispensable a premise, concerning matter and method, of aesthetic purity. The sublime upward thrust towards infinity is not at all presumption, otherwise sublimity ((Erhabenheit), as well as elevation (Erhebung ( ), would be presumption (Überhebung). The aesthetic upward thrust towards infinity is nothing more than pure love for nature and man, which itself is infinite in its capacity for fulfilment, in its infinite development, not only in biological transformations, but also, and no less, in the infinite movement of history, which, in the history of peoples, makes the history of mankind infinite. Pure artistic r production is always only infinite yearning g (Sehnsucht) towards the infinity of mankind in man’s nature, and this belongs to history. The aesthetic upward thrust towards infinity is thus not arrogance, but rather, like all pure love, the most profound, intimate modesty. Only true r modesty can spur that powerful solicitude, which must slowly and surely confirm the favour of the moment in the passing of the hours. Only the true modesty of the artist can strengthen the 81

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This same peculiar critical-idealist meaning of the sublime was already present in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, k where Cohen underlined the fact that, in the feeling of the sublime «the narrowness ((Beschränkung g) [of the imagination] is, however, perhaps a limitation ((Begrenzungg)».85 When reaching a conclusion on this point, first of all, I must dispel any suspicion that may have arisen in those t who have followed my reflections so far. The particular stress placed on the continuity of meaning of the sublime and humour in Cohen’s three works under consideration certainly does not aim at neglecting, even less denying Cohen’s reversal in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, in respect of Kants Begründung der Ästhetik, k identifying the prominence off the theoretical impulse (Ausschlagg) in the sublime and of the ethical one in humour. This difference between the two works is clear and has been highlighted and commented on by several

untiring capacity for work, only in which the upward thrust towards infinity can last and reach stability» (ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 266 f.). 85 KBA 287. This statement was presented by Cohen as the result of his reading of Kant in the Kritik der Urtheilskraft: «Kant expresses the above mentioned explanation, firstly, thus: “sublime is whatt in comparison with which everything else is small”. This everything else, however, is every “thing that can be the object of the senses”, the “magnitude of the world” of “telescopes”, as well as the “infinitely small” of “microscopes”. Small is all this in the face of that which is not sensible, that is supersensible. Nevertheless, imagination tends “to progress in infinity” (…). Though it cannot reach it, cannot lead it to the expression of a magnitude, however precisely its “inadequacy” in the face of idea is “the reawakening of the feeling of a supersensible capacity in us”. It is thus reason itself that, certainly, demands absolute totality, but in the solution of its antimonies it is instructed on the fact that infinity can never be “given” (gegeben ( ) for it, but can always only remain a “task” (aufgegeben). In this way, imagination enters the service of reason which disciplines itself; and thus this “use” of the imagination, not the object off the senses, not the object of the senses which it addresses, is simply great. “In the face of it any other use is small”. Thus the explanation, finally, is “sublime is that which, through the fact that it can just be thought, attests to a faculty of the spirit overcoming any measure of the senses”. It is this “faculty of the mind”, equal only to itself, this imagination progressing in infinity, that works with the means of sensibility for the ends of reason. But these ends of reason, to which the imagination devotes itself in the sublime, are not exclusively moral ones; those of the exact sciences are promoted by it in no lesser way than the others; but not for knowledge, rather only for the widening of the faculty: to make the direction of consciousness infinite» (ibid., pp. 286 f.).

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Cohen scholars;86 I also noted this in a previous work of mine on Cohen.87 It should not be ignored or underestimated, since it is especially significant in more than one aspect. I think it is worth briefly mentioning at least two important meanings of this reversal: on the one hand, its determining function in the attack on the romantic aesthetics of the sublime, and, on the other, the mirroring in it of Cohen’s conception of ethics, which strongly stressed the moment of realisation, thus definitely removing any accusation or suspicion of formalism from the critical-idealist conception of ethics. In the latter sense, Cohen’s theory of humour coherently drew the consequences from the results of Ethik des reinen Willens, without actually fully satisfying the requirements posited in that work and, in this sense, needed to be superseded, equally coherently, though not rejected, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. What I was aiming to show here is, rather, the co-existence with this reversal of a continuity of meaning of the sublime and humour in Cohen’s thought. Change and a continuity do not contradict each other in this case, but shed light on each other: it was in greater maturity and further development of questions already posed in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik that Cohen shaped the new arrangement of the theory in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls. The piece written in between them in 1906, Mozarts Operntexte, constituted, as I hope to have shown, an important stage in this process.

3. Humaneness Die Zauberflöte, in Cohen’s view, was the climax of Mozart’s operas, celebrating «the ideal of ethics», i.e. «the brotherhood of men, peace 86 Cf., for example, P. STERN, Review of H. COHEN N, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, in «Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Kunstwissenschaft» 8 (1913), p. 300; W. KINKEL, Hermann Cohen. Eine Einführung in sein Werk, Strecker und Schröder, Stuttgart 1924, p. 291; H.-.L. OLLIG, Religion und Freiheitsglaube. Zur Problematik von Hermann Cohens später Religionsphilosophie, Forum Academicum, Königstein/Ts. 1979, p. 188; G. WOLANDT, Einleitung, in W 8/9 X*. 87 Cf. A. POMA, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, Eng. trans. by J. Denton, State University of New York Press, Albany (New York) 1997, pp. 142 ff.

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on earth, in the reality of politics, in the lives of men and peoples».88 This open, undisputed proclamation of Humaneness as the supreme ideal value of art diminished the dramatic value of Die Zauberflöte,89 but also made it «the miracle and peak of Mozart’s operas», since «in it, for the first time, the religious solemnity and profound simplicity of German popular song (das deutschen Volkslieds) remained the dominant atmosphere, upon which the entire harmony of Die Zauberflötee is built up».90 The ideal of Humaneness, in Cohen’s view, is the highest content of art, its peculiar religious content, of which it, in its unconditioned freedom, becomes the bearer, beyond any positive religious faith: «the highest religiousness, without the religion of the book».91 Humaneness as an ideal and supreme subject of art is also an important recurrent theme in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik922 and in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls.93 It consists in «love for man», in its aesthetic form, «love for the nature of man»;94 thus it is oriented towards the political realisation of universal brotherhood among men and of peace. The roots of this ideal in Jewish messianism m95 96 and German culture do not limit this universal value of Mozart’s art, but 88 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 514. The interesting pages on Hermann Cohen and W. A. Mozartt by William Kluback deal principally with this theme (cf. W. KLUBACK, The Legacy of Hermann Cohen, Scholars Press, Atlanta (Georgia) 1989, Chapter Nine, pp. 139 ff.). 89 Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 517; ÄRG 2 183. 90 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 515; cf. ibid., p. 517; ÄRG 2 183 f. 91 H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 515; cf. ibid., p. 518. «If the preconditions of pure feeling join together harmoniously in one point, this happens in the conviction that religion in its positive forms, in its dogmas as well as in its symbols, is not absolute in any historical form. We shall see how this conviction is simply the presupposition of art in its classical age. If, on the other hand, dogmatic prejudice limits the artist’s heart, free Humaneness must suffer under it. It is only in free Humaneness that true, vital love for men breathes» ((ÄRG 1 228). 92 Cf. KBA 80 f., 220 f. 93 Cf. ÄRG 1 229 ff.; 2 414 f. 94 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 229. 95 Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., pp. 515, 516. Cohen also linked Mozart to Jewish messianism in Die Messiasidee, in J1 122. 96 Cf. KBA 432; S 1 515 f., 519; ÄRG 2 184.

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actually found it.97 Humaneness as a common value and hub of the meeting and complementariness between Judaism, Germanism and cosmopolitanism: this, as is well known, was one of the themes most passionately maintained and defended byy Cohen throughout his life. It was precisely on this point that he was the object of constant, bitter criticism from all sides: he was forced to bear accusations of lack of faith in and betrayal of Judaism, Germanism and cosmopolitanism, precisely inasmuch as he tried to safeguardd and deepen his fidelity to each, conciliating their values. Even in the face f of misunderstanding and criticism, he maintained what history r has tragically taught with facts: i.e. that these values are only realised if they are inter-connected and that separation and confrontation, far from purifying them, actually wrecks them, turning them into destructive ideologies. It is well known that these ideas off Cohen’s on Humaneness, on the role of art as the supreme realisation of morality in nature, on the overcoming of positive religious faiths in the religion of Humaneness were to be modified in a subsequent stage in his thought;98 that he was to enter into a profound conflict of ideas with the aesthetic conception of religion of his friend Natorp; that in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie and in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums he acknowledged the limits of art in respect of religion and further developed, in the religious sense, the meaning of Humaneness in connection with messianic peace.99 This naturally imposed a limitation 97

Cf. KBA 432; S 1 519. In an unpublished comment on criticism from Natorp, in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpädagogik, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 19082, p. 117, in whose view w Cohen’s conception of religion in Ethik des reinen Willens could have led to going beyond the «limits of mankind (Menschheit)», Cohen replied: «However, the right to “go beyond the limits of Humaneness (Humanität ( )”» (in H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 2, p. 100). This causes a problem in dating this unpublished comment. If it had been written only shortly after 1908 (the year of publication of Natorp’s work containing the above mentioned criticism of Cohen), this would then be evidence of a change in Cohen’s position, but would give rise to a problem of coherence in the development of his thought on this point, since in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (1912) Cohen was still arguing for his earlier position. If one wished to save this coherence, one would have to hypothesise dating to after 1912. 99 Cf. RV V 515 f. 98

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on Cohen’s aesthetic considerations on Humaneness and removed their definitive character in the eyes of an interpreter. Nevertheless, as is usually the case with Cohen, subsequent thought modified and further developed its predecessor, without rejecting essentials. The bulk of the meanings of Humaneness highlightedd by Cohen in his aesthetics also retained their validity for his subsequent thought. What was profoundly re-elaborated was the horizon in which it was placed, its ground and ends. In my view, Franz Rosenzweig’s judgement on Cohen’s aesthetics deserves special appreciation: it sheds light on the limits and insufficiency in the context of Cohen’s philosophical conception. With reference to the problem of the connection between ethics, aesthetics and religion, perhaps on the basis of points emerging from private conversations with Cohen, which are unknown to us, but certainly on the basis of objective elements available to readers of Cohen’s writings, he wrote: «that already noted contradiction between his [Cohen’s] treatment of religion in the ethics and his most profound knowledge of it evidently is grounded in the circumstance that he, at the time, thought of placing further contents in aesthetics. Thus this work was still to be written, this intellectual experimentt was to be carried out, before the thinker could be convinced that something was still missing».100 Even though, as I have explained elsewhere, I do not entirely agree with Rosenzweig in his definition of this «most profound knowledge» that «was still missing» from Cohen’s aesthetics, I do believe that Cohen looked for the definitive solution to the problem of the unity of nature and morality, of the realisation of morality in the sphere of aesthetics, and that, having found a valid, though partial a and still too abstract one in art, he was spurred by this to return to the problem and develop the problem in the direction of religion and history. I am aware that this brief remark is quite unsatisfactory: this judgement on Cohen’s aesthetics should and could be worked through and justified more substantially; but, unfortunately, thatt would take this discussion much further beyond the limit I have imposed on myself than can be done here. At this stage putting the question up for discussion is sufficient. In conclusion, I should like to refer to one of these results, one of the meanings of Humaneness, which Cohen highlighted in his aesthetics, and also, especially, in his analysis of Mozart’s operas: Humaneness as 100

F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, in J 1 XLVII f.

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the antithesis of scepsis and resistance to it. This meaning of Humaneness strongly links it with humour, as I have shown above, and, at the same time, already evokes the development and further elaboration of the concept in the subsequent u works on the philosophy of religion. So Cohen recognised, as a meaning of Humaneness «at the limits of ethics», and thus as its aesthetic meaning, «faith « in the goodd», «confidence (Zuversicht) t in the realisation of the good in men’s history».101 In the face of this faith «all scepsis is unilateralness and immaturity».102 If we now return to Cohen’s considerations on Mozart’s operas, we find that he generally defended the libretti from criticism, to which they were already subject, like today.103 But with reference to the libretto of Die Zauberflöte, Cohen’s reaction to the snobbish disdain of the critics was particularly lively: and this was because, in my view, he was reacting with all his moral passion to the increasing scepsis of so-called intellectuals. He defended the high rank and moral dignity of 101

«Humaneness is a self-sufficient criterion; it is based on a unification of the affect of love with that of honour; therefore, as a way of virtue, it goes beyond the competence of love. Nevertheless, it is opportune to try out another expression as an aesthetic criterion. Faith in the good could be this other expression. This faith is also an ethical opinion and conviction; but as such it only belongs to a moral precondition. Thus this faith is at the limitt of ethics, where, therefore, art can also come into play already. Faith in the good means confidence in the realisation of the good in men’s history. But the nature of man belongs to this history. And so here aesthetic feeling can already come into play. This faith in the good, as faith in its realisation in the history of peoples, must have its deepest roots in faith in the nature of man, and in this faith love for the nature of man must have its ultimate ground. Works of authentic art, from archaic examples to classical art, give off this faith in the good in man. We have already dealt with the development from the stiff benevolence of the archaic images of the gods to the solemn seriousness of classical art. Art here really appears to go beyond ethics. In ethics this faith constitutes the last limiting concept, in which it takes on the idea of God d in the content of its teaching. This does not represent for it anything else than the idea that the good becomes reality in men’s history. In ethics this idea remains a requirement, a foundation. In art, on the other hand, actualisation takes place. Fulfilment, constituting its mark, expresses itself in this actualisation. Now one is not left with requirement; and the hope of religion is also insufficient, art bringing that actualisation to its own fulfilment» ((ÄRG 1 229 f.). 102 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 230. 103 Cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, cit., p. 491.

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a text in which «the elevation from prince to man is proclaimed», in which «the sovereign of the high priests is wisdom and thanks are given to it “in the name of humanity”», against «educated people» (Gebildete), who consider all this «tired, verbose rhetoric», over which one can do nothing but laugh.104 Certainly empty rhetoric must be unhesitatingly unmasked, especially moralistic rhetoric, and Cohen was the first to accept this;105 but healthy criticism of rhetoric, nowadays, often goes too far, goes beyond its limits and becomes sterile cynicism, which, paradoxically, ennobles morally its scepticism towards any value. Cohen always unconditionally opposed this scepsis, recognising in art the power and responsibility, albeit in total freedom in respect of morality, of proclaiming «faith in the good». He admired in Mozart, not so much the superficial, unruly genius, nor the diabolical one, but the herald of Humaneness. If, when celebrating the 150th anniversary of Cohen’s birth, we still loudly proclaim or profess these ideals of his, this is evidence that his thought, his critical idealism is still alive.

104 105

Cf. ibid., pp. 514 f. Cf. ibid., p. 496.

CHAPTER SIX

RELIGION OF REASON AND JUDAISM IN HERMANN COHEN

If Hermann Cohen’s thought on philosophy and Judaism, the theme dealt with here, is investigated, one is placed in the perspective of the general problem of the relationship between philosophy and religion, since the positive form of religion to which Cohen mainly referred was Judaism.1 Cohen had already devoted lengthy, detailed attention to this theme in Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu F. A. Langes Geschichte des Materialismus, then in Ethik des reinen Willens and Religion und Sittlichkeitt2 up to his last works: Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie and Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. The theme of the relationship between religion and philosophy, understood as method and system, was always important for Cohen, actually becoming more so as his thought developed. Relevant questions were posited everr more clearly and rigorously and the answers became ever more articulated and convincing. Cohen’s wide ranging attention to this problem and rewarding engagement in its solution provide readers with a satisfactorily clear picture of his conception of the relationship between religion and philosophy, in its basic points and development. This picture has already been reconstructed with adequate clarity by Cohen scholars, in a context of and thanks to divergent opinion and interpretative discussion. For this reason, I shall not return to this theme. Nevertheless, the theme of philosophy and Judaism in Cohen can also be considered in another different, narrower, though obviously 1

Cohen also, on occasion, treated Christianity, but to a far lesser extent, often in a hostile, negative manner. 2 Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie, in J 3 98-168.

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not entirely independent perspective. The question can be posited of how Cohen conceived the relationship between Judaism and the philosophy of religion,3 that he elaborated with reference to it. As is well known, the philosophy of religion can be posited, and has been posited historically, in several ways and with several methods, all of them very different, in the face off the religion, or religions under consideration. Over time there have been metaphysical, psychologistic, sociologistic, phenomenological, existentialist, and hermeneutic philosophies of religion, among others. None of these approaches, however, can be attributed to Cohen. We cannot find the same amount of material on this theme and the same clarity in his works as we can find on the above mentioned general question. Only a few pages do provide some indications of or clues to his thought on this point. And yet the question is by no means of secondary importance, especially considering the fact that one of his main, most interesting works has the particularly problematic title of Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. What does «religion of reason» mean? Cohen has even been attributed with the intention of founding a new religion. This thesis certainly has no justification: the «religion of reason» is without doubt a philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, how can a philosophy of religion be justified in the case of Cohen, who often strongly maintained that religion was methodologically alien to philosophy? Furthermore, if the religion of reason is a philosophy of religion, what meaning and methodological ground can its connection with the «sources of Judaism» have? In other words, what meaning can be attributed to that extremely elliptical expression in the title of Cohen’s last work: «aus den Quellen des Judentums»? t In this limited space I shall attempt to shed some light on all these problems, by referring to what Cohen himself revealed on his thought in some of his writings, even though I shall not be able to provide an exhaustive, definitive clarification, which is perhaps impossible.

3

I am using the term “philosophy of religion” provisionally. Even though it was occasionally used by Cohen himself, it is not entirely appropriate to define his «religion of reason». I shall be more precise on this point later.

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1. Cohen and Kant The title of Cohen’s posthumous work immediately brings to mind, in its similarity and diversity, that of a famous work by Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.4 Thus it is only natural to look for some initial clarification of our problem through comparison with this work. Cohen discussed Kant’s philosophy of religion in the second edition of Kants Begründung der Ethik, published in 1910: so let us look for some useful points here. The most important thesis for our purposes is Cohen’s severe criticism of Kant for not having written Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunftt as a philosopher, but as an essayist; i.e., in its aims and methods this work is not an example of the philosophy of religion but rather ideological support and detailed theoretical exposition of the official religion and institutionalised denomination of the writer’s society. Cohen wrote: «Kant’s precision and thoughtfulness of expression is well known, especially in the choice of a book title. Troeltsch thus correctly pointed out that the title of this work on religion does not use the term “out of” (aus), but “within” (innerhalb) reason. So, in this case, Kantt does not intend to start out from reason itself, but from positive religion, for which, as mentioned once in one of his lose Blätter, he is looking for “rectification” through rational religion. Certainly, this rectification must also be carried out in the best manner; in the meantime, the work’s title immediately places its author on the terrain of positive facts, and to put them to the test only the superior guide of reason is indicated. Therefore it is not really the philosopher who is speaking here, but the historian, the politician standing on the terrain of positive facts, with the obligation of administering and improving them. We certainly cannot see Kant, strictly speaking, as a historian and the role of Church politician does not suit him either. At most, we must appreciate him as a very stylish essayist in all his works taking this direction».5 4

I. KANT, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 6, pp. 1-202. 5 KBE E 468.

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There are essentially two inter-connected reasons behind this accusation then, as can be deduced from this passage: a) that the argument does not start out from reason (aus der Vernunft), but takes place simply within reason (innerhalb der Vernunft), i.e. it is not grounded or justified starting out from a philosophical, a priori concept of religion; b) that, on the contrary, it presupposes a positive religion, on which reason only carries out non philosophical activity, so as to «administer it» and «improve it». This accusation clearly shows what Cohen thought the philosophy of religion should and should not be. Cohen posited this alternative, by critically pointing out what Kant had not done (and should have done as a philosopher of religion), and what he did (and should not have done as a philosopher of religion) in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft: «Thus for Kant the problem was not posited in this way: what is the historical meaning of religion as monotheism, for the application and realisation of moral law in the life of peoples? Its declared purpose was the ethical idealisation of Christianity, actually only in accordance with its sources in the New Testament, drastically denying all the fundamental moral content of the Old Testament. In the second preface he clearly states this intention. “If this were successful, it could be maintained that between reason and Scripture there is not only compatibility, but also union, in such a way that he who follows the one (…) will not be able to avoid agreeing with the other too”. Otherwise – he finds the courage to say – there would be “either two religions, (…) or one religion and one worship in one and the same person”. So Kant himself states his intention of showing “union” between religion and ethics, which must mean between Christianity and rational religion».6 Cohen attributed Kant’s two defects to the «clumsy diplomacy negatively influencing this exposition, in whole and in part».7 This concern supposedly made Kant, on the one hand, submit philosophical theology to the authority of biblical theology, justifying this with the presumed moral importance of the «command to obey authority»,8 6

Ibid., pp. 462 f. Ibid., p. 461. 8 Ibid., p. 460. 7

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and, on the other, take as his object not religions, or rather religious faiths or denominations, in their scientifically and critically examined «literary sources», but a single denomination, i.e. official Lutheran Christianity, uncritically taken as «revelation» and «historical system».9 As a matter of fact, Cohen’s radical criticism of this work of Kant’s was later moderated and partially newly balanced in appreciation of the latter’s attack on clericalism, where, in his loyalty to the most authentic Lutheran tradition, he emphasised the priority of the moral meaning of religion over its historical meaning and the superiority of theology to clericalism.10 Cohen wrote: «Beside the weakness, which, in conformity with the essayist’s intent, is innate in the way the problem is presented for this application, one is all the more surprised and convinced by the natural reawakening and relentless interference of the original systematic principles, also present here where Kant’s intentions follow different directions. By means of the pedagogical golden rule: first morality, and only afterwards religion, from a practical point of view, the damage caused by the methodological one, subordinating morality to religion, is repaired. And more than by this profound pedagogical norm, it is by recognising the struggle of theology against the clergy that legitimising the Church is again overtly threatened. Since, if it is theology, not the clergy, which must guide the Church, theology must, however, give precedence, in theological culture, to moral interpretation, showing that this is the rule for preserving faith, so that morality alone is entitled to the last word, also for guiding the Church».11 In Cohen’s view, the serious defect f of Kant’s approach to the philosophy of religion, as set out in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, was to be entirely overcome and corrected in Der Streit der Facultäten:12 «In the new work, therefore, the old problem rises up to an entirely different level, in the face of the

9

Ibid., p. 461. Ibid., pp. 482 ff. 11 Ibid., p. 484. 12 I. KANT, Der Streit der Facultäten, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 7, pp. 1-116. 10

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true and proper forum of philosophy».13 Here the authoritative relationship between «revelation» and «reason», «theology» and «philosophy» was overturned: philosophy is now the supreme authority, which, thanks to its a priori concepts and principles, judges the validity of the contents of theology; God himself within us, i.e. moral reason, is the authentic interpreter of Scripture. This new approach was now possible, since, in this work, Kant clearly affirmed the relationship of philosophy with science and truth, thus taking the role of the ultimate requirement of truth away from theology and bestowing it on philosophy: «Now theology is denied truth, which is defined as the methodological object of philosophy and the exclusive duty of the philosophical faculty».14 In this initial enquiry, then, we have already been able to identify the two fundamental cornerstones of the philosophy of religion, in Cohen’s view: first of all, it must start out from reason (aus der Vernunft), i.e. it must be grounded in the a priori concept of religion formulated by philosophy; secondly, it must verify this a priori concept in the historical reality of the forms of positive religion: not, however, by means of a subservient attitude to the institutional forms of religion, but by means of a critical examination of its literary sources.

2. The Concept of Religion and the History of Religion We can find useful points shedding light on Cohen’s conception of the philosophy of religion in his discussion of the prevailing trend in research on religion, as well as in comparison with Kant, i.e. with the classical philosophical tradition. Cohen’s last major works on religion: Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie and Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums both begin with attacks on the history of religion. This discipline, which appears to aim at a monopoly of research on religion, in Cohen’s view, was invalidated

13 14

KBE E 490. Ibid., p. 491.

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by a fundamental methodological defect: it claimed to understand religion by means of a merely inductive method. Such a unilateral methodological approach can be understood historically as a reaction to opposite, equally unilateral deductivism, which had characterised previous research, though not justifiable for this reason. In Der Begriff der Religion im System t der Philosophie15 Cohen attacked the dogmatism of the philosophy of religion, both that of theological-confessional and philosophical-metaphysical origin, which claimed to entirely deduce all content and every aspect of religion from an absolute, predetermined concept of it, either denominationally by theology, with the result of reducing the universal meaning of religion to the contents of a single positive religious faith, absolutised a priori as true, or metaphysically by the philosophy of Hegel and his followers, with the result of frustrating all the positive historical aspects of religion, in favour of a conception of it which is also dogmatically absolute, though being philosophical. In Cohen’s view it was understandable that the reaction to this situation had turned research in the direction of a merely inductive method, which, rejecting all a priori concepts of religion, pursued a definition and understanding of the concept of religion only as the result of historical examination of the diverse materials of the various positive historical religions and the identification of historical development through these traditions. But if the affirmation of this approach in research was historically understandable, it could not be justified for this reason. Investigation of this kind leads nowhere, because it is methodologically defective. The defect could already be easily identified and criticised within the very perspective of the history of religion. Cohen argued that it was clear how, in this case, there was an unjustifiable, incorrect application of the method of biological evolutionism. Biology explains the living organism by means of its evolution, though maintaining the presupposition of a defined concept of the organism itself, illuminating and guiding research on evolutionary lines and dynamics. On the other hand, the history of religion, claims to apply the same evolutionist patterns to a phenomenon which it declines to define in advance, awaiting the 15

Cf. BR 2 ff.

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concept of religion as the result of evolution, without knowing or wanting to clarify what the subject of evolution is, i.e. the object of its research.16 This same criticism of the history of religion took on an even more radical, definitive meaning in the more general perspective of philosophy. In no field of culture is the phenomenal datum understandable and interpretable except in the light of an a priori concept supplied by philosophy: this is the fundamental principle of critical idealism, to which Cohen, like Kant, remained steadfastly faithful: «The place where the problem of the concept always arises is none other than that of the question, inasmuch as it is the sense and value of something originative, eternal, r ulterior in respect of any evolutionary possibility, something that can and must be only a principle, for every investigation of experience in its factual data just as for any excogitation of its problems. It is everywhere the same question: whether the requirement of the a priori is a vain illusion or, without it, all investigation remains a blind search. It is everywhere a case of this single question: whether the conceptt can only be found as idea or whether the idea is a chimera and only induction is able to discover the concept. In every philosophical question what is at stake is the right of idealism».17 Investigation of religion can only start off from the «concept of religion», and this can only be the object of philosophy: «Philosophy is the science of reason. And if the concept is the preeminent witness for all science, then all science and all possible knowledge have in the concept their entire content and in reason their common source. Reason is the organ of concepts».18 Here we have already reached initial clarity, which goes beyond criticism of the history of religion: not only is the history of religion incapable of producing valid results, because it refuses to ground itself in an a priori concept of religion, but also, and above all, the philosophy of religion has the concept of religion as its sole legitimate object. This concept must not be dogmatic or metaphysical, as in the 16

Cf. RV V 2; Eng. trans. cit., p. 2. BR 5 f. 18 RV V 6; Eng. trans. cit., p. 5. 17

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philosophies of religion criticised above, and for this reason clarification is still required of what Cohen meant by the concept of religion: but what has been recognised up to now is that what philosophy can define and understand a priori of religion, in other words, what Cohen called religion of reason, cannot be identified either with one or any positive historical religion, but is the concept of religion. So Cohen, even in his last works, re-stated the undeniable difference between religion and philosophy (in this case understood as the philosophy of religion), which can be reconciled with the close, vital relationship between them: and this difference is also a guarantee of the irreducibility of religion to philosophy, though our argument requires further amplification of this point. Certainly the fact that the philosophy of religion defines the concept of religion a priori and that, unlike the history of religion, involves a deductive phase, does not mean that Cohen wished to return to the dogmatism of previous philosophy of religion. This does not happen because the a priori concept of religion is a critical, not a dogmatic one, and the method is not that of metaphysical deduction, but that of transcendental, critical deduction (although the transcendental must be understood here in a broad sense, since the «fact» to be founded is not a fact off science but one of culture; in the broad, but not metaphorical sense). Therefore, the concept of religion is a priori, but must be found starting out from a historical fact, a fact of culture, and must display its founding value in the capacity to find realisation in that fact of culture. Thus the philosophy of religion requires another source, besides reason, which is its a priori source,19 and this other source is the historical fact of positive religion. Certainly this historical fact cannot be arbitrarily identified with a specific religious faith or denomination, since it must be the bearer, in its reality and historical development, of the universal meaning of religion. Cohen justified his consideration of Judaism, maintaining that it does not desire this dogmatically reductive meaning: in his view, Judaism is only given preference because of its character of

19

Cf. ibid., p. 6; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 5 f.

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originativeness in respect of the historical emergence of religion in its essential meaning, i.e. as monotheism and messianism.20 What is most important is that the historical fact of religion, from which and for which critical philosophy produces the concept of religion, cannot be considered either a fact of faith, as revelation, or an institutional system, as a Church (in whatever meaning the term be used): it must be understood as a fact of culture, and thus only in its «literary sources», investigated by an objective historical method, since only thus, as an analogue of science, is the fact of religion methodologically homogeneous with the philosophy that must investigate it, and, besides, is the bearer of universal meaning. Thus an indispensable, bilateral relationship is set up between reason and the literary sources, the two sources of religion, in the critical philosophy of religion. It is the critical relationship between the fact and its foundation, in one sense, and between the concept and its realisation, in the other: «The concept, like everything spiritual, requires history for its own development. However, history by itself does not determine anything about the essence and peculiarity of the concept, which, in the course of history up to now, may not yet have developed to its final realization. If, however, we connect the concept of religion with the literary sources, if we relate the concept of Judaism to its literary sources, then we acknowledge that history, literary history, is the factor by virtue of which the actuality of Judaism comes to its realization. However, this factor, to be sure, does not possess the value of a criterion, a value possessed only by the concept, considered both as problem and as method, as task and as presupposition».21 Interaction between reason and the literary sources of Judaism, the two sources of the religion of reason, also involves a relationship and interaction between the religion off reason and positive historical religion expressed by the literary sources. This interaction is not only a result, but above all a presupposition of the critical philosophy of religion. The immanence of philosophy in respect of the fact of which it is the ground was an important methodological principle for Cohen. 20 21

Cf. ibid., pp. 9 f; Eng. trans. cit., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 3 f; Eng. trans. cit., p. 3.

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Just as philosophy, inasmuch as it is logic, is immanent in the science of nature, and, inasmuch as it is ethics, is immanent in law and the State, it must also be immanent in religion, whose concept it supplies.22 But this methodological immanence must be better explained, so as not to enter into conflict with the diversity between philosophy and religion, and so as not to be understood, in the sense of a certain enlightened demythologisation or in that of Hegelian rationalisation, as the mere reduction of religion to philosophy.

3. Philosophy and Judaism In Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums Cohen wrote: «The religion of reason turns religion into a general function of human consciousness».23 In this sense it does not only belong to the whole of humanity but is also made manifest in the forms of expression of any people. Cohen’s concept of reason, however, was not reduced to that of «consciousness».24 For Cohen reason had a more determined, objective meaning: it is foundation, origin, lawfulness and method; it is the reason of philosophy and science: «reason as such is not identical with the human spirit, butt only with the specific form of human spirit in science and philosophy».25 In this sense reason still belongs to the whole of humanity, but this had not always been the case, to the same extent for all cultures and peoples, but is rather a historical task for every people, which coincides with the ideal of historical realisation of humanity. But what connection can there be between philosophy and Judaism if, as Cohen openly stated, Judaism also «has no share in philosophy?»26 Science and philosophy were inherited from the Greeks: it was only Greek culture that gave reason that «peculiarity « of method»,27 by means of which it became philosophical and scientific 22

Cf. BR 8 f. RV V 8; Eng. trans. cit., p. 7. 24 In his logic Cohen had already distiguished reason from consciousness. Cf. LRE E 3 f. 25 RV V 8; Eng. trans. cit., p. 7. 26 Ibid., p. 10; Eng. trans. cit., p. 9. 27 Ibidem. 23

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reason; it was only through the contribution of Greek culture that universal human culture started out along the road of science and philosophy. This road is the heritage and development of Greek tradition. Judaism «has no share in philosophy», as it has no share in science: it represents another different, peculiar tradition in respect of the Greek one. And yet Judaism, like other non Greek cultural traditions, during its historical development, also came under the influence of Greek philosophy, but, unlike other cultural traditions, did not receive it simply as an external, extrinsic contribution: this meeting between Judaism and Greek k philosophy was grafted onto a profound consonance between the two traditions, onto originative affinity, and this happened because, in its tradition, Judaism had also developed reason in an analogous, complementary, though a different, peculiar direction in respect of Greek k philosophy. That is, Judaism had developed reason in religion: «Therefore it will be our task to investigate in the sources of Judaism the original philosophic motives in which, and by virtue of which, the religion of reason succeeds in making its way. And we shall have to pay attention to the fact that it was not only in the later history of the Jews, when the Greek influence had already become an actuality, thatt this original force of reason began to stir, but that already in the original religious thought itself this connection with philosophical reasoning emerges. These traces have to be considered as reason’s older monument and are in no way to be suspected, on the basis of any historical schematization, as later interpolations. The religion of reason preserves for the sources of Judaism their original, natural, human connection with philosophic speculation, which therefore is as little an imitation of the Greeks as it is a borrowing from the Greeks. The philosophical element in the biblical sources has to possess the same originality as belongs in general to the share religion has in reason».28 As can be seen, here Cohen was attempting a non superficial, or reductive solution to the problem posited by the evident fact, which he himself frequently acknowledged,29 of the intimate connection and exchange between philosophy and religion. Though rigorously 28 29

Ibid., p. 11; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 9 f. Cf., for example, BR 2.

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keeping to the distinction between philosophy, for which connection with science is indispensable, and religion, to which, on the other hand, this connection is alien, he found the common origin of both, and thus the ground of their convergence, in reason, understood as idea or «lawfulness» (Gesetzlichkeit),30 the antithesis of all sensibility or naturalness. On the other hand, in the theological sense, it is still reason, or better «truth», which is «the ideal of reason», the common, convergent end of religion and philosophy: «truth unites the theoretical with the ethical and hence more than holiness becomes the ideal of reason. Truth, therefore, is the binding link between science, including ethics, on the one hand, and religion, on the other».31 Thus Cohen’s solution to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and religion was not founded on reduction of religion to philosophy, but on amplification of reason, which, though without giving up the characters it made manifest in its philosophical development, does not identify or reduce itself to this development: «We should not gloss over the fact that the concept of philosophy is changed and distorted if it is not practised as scientific philosophy; but the universal character of reason, even if science is excluded, connect religion with philosophy».32 The religion of reason, inasmuch as it is a concept of religion or philosophy of religion, can find a reply or realisation in the literary sources of Judaism, because the latter was already originatively, in its historical development, inasmuch as it is monotheism and messianism, religion of reason and, thus, intrinsically close to philosophy, despite its methodological peculiarity, which is and remains different from the scientific method of philosophy. So the religion of reason is not simply «philosophy of religion», since it is not only the product of the reflection of philosophy on the literary sources of Judaism, but is already contained, in another form, in these very sources. The common origin of philosophy and Judaism in reason founds the intimate connection between the object proper to the philosophy of religion, i.e. the concept of religion, and religion in 30

RV V 11 f; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 10 f. Ibid., p. 441; Eng. trans. cit., p. 380. 32 Ibid., p. 11; Eng. trans. cit., p. 9; cf. ibid., p. 298; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 255 f. 31

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its positive historical form, the literary sources of Judaism, so that it can be explained how philosophy, though keeping to its peculiar method of foundation and concept, can and must produce the concept of religion «out of the sources off Judaism», and how, on the other hand, Judaism already contains and supplies philosophy, not only inasmuch as it is philosophy of religion but also inasmuch as it is ethics and system, with essential themes and concepts of its tradition. Paraphrasing Kant, we could say that reason, inasmuch as it is philosophy, finds in religion what it itself has placed there. Therefore, the religion of reason is not only philosophy nor only positive religion: it is both of them, not in extrinsic proximity, even less in contrast, but in intrinsic connection and complementarity, which, however, never eliminates difference. We could point to this connection by expanding the title of Cohen’s posthumous work Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums in its more detailed meaning: the religion of reason is the concept of religion starting out from the sources of Judaism, or it is Judaism itself, interpreted and expressed in the concept of religion. Therefore, despite the title of the above mentioned work, one cannot criticise Cohen on the same grounds that he criticised Kant, as we have already seen, since his religion is actually aus der Vernunft, before being aus den Quellen des Judentums. I should like to recall, finally, that, as already mentioned, Cohen’s exclusive consideration of Judaism as the source of religion does not mean, at least in accordance with his own stated intentions, the absolutisation of Judaism as the only true religion (in his view, a serious mistake, similar to the one he had attacked in Kant), but simply acknowledgement of the fact that universal religion, standing on the supporting columns of monotheism and messianism, has its originative, though not only, literary sources in Judaism. Therefore, these sources must be uppermost in investigation aiming at the formulation of the concept of religion.33 Actually this attitude of Cohen’s and its motivation are only partially convincing. It is difficult to accept the fact that, though only recognising the originative, not sole, source in Judaism, he never referred to other sources and other 33

Cf. ibid., pp. 39 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 34.

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religious faiths. In fact, the only faith he did not ignore, apart from Judaism, in his research, i.e. Christianity, not only did not constitute a positive point of reference for the concept of religion, but was criticised and denied legitimacy as a source of the religion of reason, inasmuch as it was accused of pantheism.34 So, from this point of view, it would appear that Cohen not only saw Judaism as the originative, but also the only source for the religion of reason. If this were the case, his attitude would be very close to the dogmatic absolutisation of one religious faith over which he attacked Kant and which would seriously question the general conception of the religion of reason, as it has been set out so far. But this aspect, which remains somewhat unconvincing, of Cohen’s view of Judaism and its relationship with the religion of reason is, at least partially, corrected and newly balanced by another aspect, to which, in conclusion, I shall briefly refer.

4. The Concept of Religion and Judaism It has been said that the religion of reason does not have religion as its content, but rather the concept of reason. This is why we must recall the basic traits of Cohen’s conception of the concept. In his logic, he emphasised the non conclusive, non absolute, but open and opening character of the concept.35 Concept is system, inasmuch as it is the result of the meeting of the logical activity of «methods»,36 though not being, for this reason, a definitive arrival point, closure or fulfilment. Cohen wrote: «Concept is a question and remains one, nothing but a question. The answer it incorporates must also be a new question, must provoke a new question (…). No solution can be definitive. Concept is not an absolute totality».37 So, for Cohen, concept is itself a question, in a meaningful sense, i.e. not only theoretically, but also 34

Occasional appreciation of some aspects of Christianity by Cohen, though interesting, are not important and cogentt enough to modify this basic judgement. 35 Cf. LRE E 15 f., 29 f., 92, 378 f. 36 Cf. ibid., p. 325. 37 Ibid., p. 378.

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practically: it is «unity of solution and task»,38 both for theoretical investigation and practical realisation. There is no contradiction between the apriority of the concept and its teleological meaning. On the contrary, there is complementarity: precisely as a task the concept is the ground and law of historical development and, only inasmuch as it has the a priori universal validity of law can it be end and task. This correlation between ground and task, and thus the open, non conclusive i character of concept and system, are important, indispensable aspects of Cohen’s critical idealism. Returning to the question of the concept of religion, in the light of what has just been said, it must be emphasised that the affirmation of the need for an a priori concept as the ground of investigation of religion, on which, as we have seen, Cohen insisted, also as an attack against a merely historical-inductive investigation, is a true, though unilateral, affirmation, if it is not completed by foregrounding of the meaning of the concept as a task. Cohen frequently wrote of the concept of religion as a «problem»,39 and this should not be taken simply in the sense that the concept of religion is an antecedent problem in respect of historical investigation, i.e. that it must be defined before embarking on this investigation, and as a presupposition of it. Certainly, the a priori concept of religion is presupposed in historical investigation on religion,40 but plays its role as a presupposition and guide of research, not inasmuch as it is resolved as a problem, but inasmuch as it is retained as such. Only thus can the relationship between concept and historical data be a truly intrinsic, basic and non-unilateral one. As I have already pointed out, not only must historical data be interpreted in the light of the concept, but the concept itself is also only realised in its history. Therefore, the concept of religion founds and guides the history of religion as a task: it is not, in the Hegelian sense, the absolute truth of religion, from which its historical contents can and must be deduced, but its inchoative truth, which is progressively realised in its historical contents. This progress does not come to an end in the present, but is 38

Cf. ibid., pp. 381 f., 385 ff., 390. Cf. RV V 2, 3, 5; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 2, 3, 5. 40 Cf. ibid., p. 6; Eng. trans. cit., p. 5. 39

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open to the future, actually having its most important dimension in the future.41 Here I recall the passage quoted above: «The concept, like everything spiritual, requires history for its own development. However, history by itself does not determine anything about the essence and peculiarity of the concept, which, in the course of history up to now, may not yet have developed to its final realization».42 So not even Judaism, as realised up to the present and revealed in its literary sources, is identical to the religion of reason. There is a gap between Judaism and the religion off reason called «task»: it is not a small gap either, since it is nothing less than the difference between the infinity of task and the finiteness of its historical realisation. This undoubtedly disqualifies all accusations against Cohen for having exalted Judaism as absolute religion; even though, on the other hand, it does not weaken his high valuation off Judaism, since, for the latter, one, and certainly not the least important of its qualities, which assures it a place in the religion of reason, is its unique, inimitable sensibility for the dimension of the infinite task, its unquenched and unquenchable yearning for idea, truth, the good, and in the end, for God.43 If the concept as an open, infinite task is characteristic of Cohen’s religion of reason, in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy of religion, this concept, on the other hand, should not be confused with utopia. Task is never utopia: in one aspect it is actually the opposite. Utopia is placed in a necessarily eschatological future, which is antithetical to the present; looking at a future opposed to the present, it judges and condemns the latter. Task, however, stays within a historical, moral sphere: it can, actually must, have a critical function in respect of the

41

On the importance of temporality, and primarily the future dimension, also for Cohen’s logic, see the article by P. FIORATO, Storia e temporalità nel pensiero di Hermann Cohen. Per un approccio al problema, in I filosofi della scuola di Marburgo, a cura di B. Antomarini, «Il Cannocchiale» (gennaio-agosto 1991), n. 1-2, pp. 195-211. 42 RV V 3 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 3. 43 It is enough to recall here, for example, the important chapter in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums on prayer: cf. ibid., pp. 431 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 371 ff.

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present, but never in antithesis to it. The future of task is in historical continuity with the present, since, while utopia can only be realised by annulling the present and taking its place with an unhistorical event, task can be realised, without ever being exhausted, and, nevertheless, it is realised only by means of historical progress of the present. Furthermore, the moral character of task requires being able to appreciate, in the present, not only the conditions of the future realisation of idea, but also, to a certain degree that only humourr44 can glimpse and value, an already effective realisation of the task itself. This non utopian aspect of the moral task is the methodological condition for being able to legitimately recognise in Judaism, as it has been historically realised up to the present, i.e. in its literary sources, the «fact» from which to conduct investigation on the concept of religion, even though Judaism as a historical and present fact does not coincide with the concept of religion. Certainly, Cohen looked towards the final horizon of the fulfilled realisation of task: where Judaism and philosophy, but also Judaism and Germanism, and, in one sense, Judaism and Christianity (at least inasmuch as Christianity, like philosophy, is an integral part of German culture), will meet and reach accomplished unity.45 In this sense Cohen’s last works also preserved the idea of going beyond Judaism in philosophy. But, unlike his previous attitude (and it is not an unimportant difference), he left this horizon in the infinite distance of ideal. And what counts most is that this distance is infinite, but not for this reason incapable of producing effects in the present of history, and these effects are not directed towards draining and «euthanasia» of Judaism, but rather in the opposite direction: as a taskk this ideal shows the way of the religion of reason to Judaism, which, inasmuch as it accepts this mission remains vital, actually becoming ever more vital, in history, and to the whole of human culture.

44

I am obviously using here the term in n the meaning given it by Cohen in his fascinating, valuable, as well as profound theory of humour. 45 Cf., for example, in the same years as the last works on religion, Deutschtum und Judentum mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus (1915, 19162), in J 2 237-301/W 16 469-560.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SIMILARITY AND DIVERSITY OF THE OTHER: THE FOREIGNER. TOPICAL MOTIVES IN HERMANN COHEN’S ETHICAL IDEALISM

1. Similarity and Diversity Contemporary ethical approaches to interpersonal relations have foregrounded the alterity of the Other, his irreducible diversity and transcendence. One of the reasons is certainly a reaction against idealism, taken as a whole, on the model of Hegelianism, as a «magic circle»1 of totalising thought, which, owing to its intrinsic, essential character, rejects transcendence and reduces all diversity to the identity of the Ego, of idea. Another reason is the absolute central character taken on, in contemporary philosophical thought, of the existential given. Whether they be existentialist philosophies or not, these ethical approaches to interpersonal relations are, nevertheless, convinced of the need to look for the fundamental traits of anthropology, and thus the data required for building up ethics, in existential experience, in concrete and immediately experienced life. There is no doubt that those who especially rely on existential experience to understand interpersonal relations mainly come into contact with the experience of the diversity of the Other, which often takes on the form of antagonism. These two reasons are inter-connected: just as turning to existential experience with the greatest degree of confidence and expectation is, to a certain extent, an effect of disappointment and rejection in respect of idealism, on the other hand, this is, in a way, a symmetric reversal in respect of the 1

F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, in J 1 XLVIII.

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effort, on the part of a certain idealism, to bridge the gap between the Ego and the Other, obstinately put forward by the existential given. What is, however, important in this state of affairs is the central character of the theme or the irreducible diversity of the Other in interpersonal relations; of Urdistanzierung, to use one of Buber’s terms,2 without which there are no interpersonal relations. Without this irreducible transcendence the Other is not constituted as an autonomous person, neither is the Ego constituted as a person, since, without this self-limitation, the Ego, far from positing itself as unique individuality, being different from any other, expands in a bloated whole eliminating its limits and, with them, also determination and freedom. Without fundamental distance no authentic relationship is thus possible and it is impossible to account for interpersonal relations, nor understand their vocation, destiny and sense. All this is true, but it is also necessary to consider the fact that interpersonal relations are also founded on similarity. At the very roots of the understanding of interpersonal relations in our JewishChristian culture stands the strong, normative affirmation of similarity: «Love thy neighbour, because he is like yourself» (Lev. 19:18). This commandment, also present in the New Testament, constituted, and still does, the principle and ground of ethics in the whole Jewish and Christian tradition. We are clearly not dealing here with recognition of an existential given, but the formulation of an imperative, and yet it is so real as to constitute the inspiring rule behind all ethical action. Is it then a question of diversity or similarity? Actually, this alternative is not well posited: neitherr in the existential given, nor in the normative principle is there a real alternative between these two elements, but rather composition between them. This composition can take place in various ways, and has actually taken on many different forms in human cultural history: the important point is that not all these forms of composition of the two terms are equivalent in the ethical perspective. An ethnological, sociological investigation may restrict itself to collecting and studying t these forms from an evaluatively 2

Cf. M. BUBER, Werke, 3 Bde, Kösel und Lambert Schneider, München und Heidelberg 1962-1964, Bd. 1, p. 412.

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neutral viewpoint, for purely cognitive reasons, but an ethical investigation cannot avoid attempting to distinguish the ethically positive one among these forms, or rather the principles allowing characterisation of the positive, in respect of the negative ones, in the context of cultural pluralism, without its being transformed into sceptical indifferentism. Marcello Massenzio, a historian of religions, has recently published a book with a significant title: Sacro e identità etica. Senso del mondo e linea di confine («The Sacred and Ethical Identity. Sense of the World and the Borderline»).3 In his interesting research Massenzio analysed a ritual feast among the Fouyoughé tribe in Papua, showing the central role played by attention to regulating the similarity-diversity relationship between the various protagonists ritually (the living and dead, the tribe and foreigners, men and women, men and pigs) so as to make this relationship the generator of culture and not destructive for the community. The ritual management of the «border» (those of ritual spaces, the village and district borders, those between clearing and forest etc.) and its crossing in either direction, from inside to outside and vice-versa, is carefully directed towards balancing the similaritydiversity relationship in a positive, fruitful meaning and protecting the tribe from the possible catastrophe of such a relationship. In his book La violence et le sacré,4 René Girard analytically showed that violence originated in the mimetic crisis, in which, precisely, diversity and similarity, in n their unresolved relationship, are the factors that give rise to destructive violence, in both interpersonal and group relations. The expiatory sacrifice in mythical religions is a ritual form of re-elaboration of this mimetic relationship with the purpose of directing the mimetic crisis in forms of manifestation, which, by discharging violence on a single individual, the sacrificial victim, protect the community from its destructive effects. Girard’s precise analyses showed that both mimetic and sacrificial processes 3

M. MASSENZIO, Sacro e identità etica. Senso del mondo e linea di confine, Franco Angeli, Milano 1994. 4 R. GIRARD, La violence et le sacré, Grasset, Paris 1972 (cf. also ID., Des Choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, Grasset, Paris 1978).

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are generated or nourished by neitherr the identification nor feeling of the absolute diversity from the Other, but, rather, by a delicate, complex feeling of similarity-diversity, which, in the first case, spontaneously, and, in the second, ritually, lead to a violent crisis. Even from elementary phenomenology of interpersonal relations and their failure it is possible to note rather easily that these failures are only apparently caused by absolute identification of the Other with the Self in a perception of the Other as totally alien: actually, in the taking over of the Other by the Ego, awareness of diversity is also always at work, just as, in the consideration of the Other as alien, awareness of his similarity is always present, at least in the sense of his possible hostility. The consideration is also common among philosophers of interpersonal relations that, in cases where the Ego does not authentically open up to the Other, he can never set up a true dialogue, but under the fictitious form of dialogue, actually carries on a monologue with himself, in which the Other is reduced to a mirror for the Ego’s narcissistic activity. This is certainly the case, though the very possibility of self reflection in a mirror directs the Ego to this attitude, which is only apparently dialogic: the desire for self projection in another is different from autistic type solipsistic closure, and the difference lies, precisely, in exploitation of the diversity of the Other. It is also true that consideration of the Other as totally alien prevents interpersonal relations, butt the question remains whether this situation is real. Actually, the deviant attitude most seriously threatening dialogue is not this situation of total alienness, which has no counterpart in reality, but only in imagination, albeit with limits here too (for example, in science fiction, the hypothesis of the existence of extraterrestrial beings is still imagined in terms of hostility or cooperation, and thus brought back to a situation of incomplete alienness): the truly destructive attitude for dialogue is the one where the foreigner is also felt to be similar, either because he resides in the community or on its borders, or because he is interested in possession of the same goods etc., i.e. the one in which the Other’s diversity accompanies real or presumed hostile similarity, in turn generating hostility and antagonism.

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2. The Foreigner For these reasons the emblematic figure of the problematic relationship with the Other is that of the foreigner resident in the community, who, nowadays in our developed societies, is, in most cases, an immigrant. This figure, by his very nature, is bound to give rise to all the problems and degeneration of the similarity-diversity relationship with the Other, but, also, and for this very reason, to constitute a particularly significant and paradigmatic reference point for an ethics of this relationship. Consideration of the figure of the resident foreigner is extremely topical, in view of the massive problems of immigration in present day European societies. Anyone seeing in this a mere historical circumstance, not worth philosophical investigation, would be seriously guilty of superficiality: at the basis of individual and group psychological and social behaviour towards immigrants lies an essential problem of interpersonal relations, precisely in the sense of the relationship with the diverse/similar person and thus the task of an ethics capable of understanding and regulating this relationship. As confirmation of this, it should be recalled that, beyond accidental historical differences, the foreigner’s partially real and partially presumed diversity within a society is a historical constant in ideological arguments in favour of all discrimination and persecution of minorities, so much so that the term «racism» is appropriate, and normally used, beyond its exact meaning, for all historical forms of this persecution. In our culture, luckily, an ethical elaboration of this problem, of great ideal dignity and unsurmountable social effectiveness has always been present: this elaboration is to be found in the Jewish-Christian tradition, from the outset, in the Bible. It is the source and foundation of law and morality concerning this problem. Admittedly, the sources of Western law are classical, Greek, and especially Roman, no less than Jewish-Christian. Nevertheless, with reference to the theme of the resident foreigner the main source is the latter tradition, because Greek and Roman culture, though actually having formulated the juridical principle of the equality off citizens’ civil rights before the law, always had a limit precisely in the discriminatory notion of

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«citizen», which excluded the foreigner. In the Jewish-Christian tradition, on the other hand, we can find the process of development of that universal ideal of «humanity» founding the universal rights of the human being as such. Ancient Israel, despite its strict attention to and defence of monotheism in respect of the idolatry of neighbouring peoples, was bound by the Torah to the principle of universal brotherhood with n Edomite; for he is thy brother; other peoples: «Thou shalt not abhor an thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land» (Deut. 23:8). And Solomon, in the prayer of dedication of the Temple in Jerusalem, invoked the Eternal: «Moreover concerning the foreigner (nokri) when he shall come out of a far country (…) and prays toward this house, hear Thou in heaven» (1 Kings 8:41-43). Isaiah returned to the theme: «For mine house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples» (Isa. 56:7).5 But the doctrine of the Torah concerning the foreigner (nokri) became much more pregnant with meaning and precise when considering the foreigner resident in Israel ((ger). He was indistinguishable from an Israelite in the face of the law: «One Torah shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you» (Ex. 12:49). He could present himself in a trial involving an Israelite, with the same rights, without the need for a citizen as patron, as was required in Greece and Rome (cf. Deut. 1:16 f.). The foreign resident was entirely equal to an Israelite before the law: «As for the congregation there shall be one statute both for you and for the stranger that sojourneth with you, a statute forever throughout your generations; as you are, so shall the stranger be before the Eternal» (Num. 15:15 f.); «Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for the homeborn; for I am the Eternal your God» (Lev. 24:22). It is from this principle of equality between Israelite and foreigner that more detailed coherent norms in respect of all aspects of common law descended. The foreigner had equal rights with the Israelite in the economic field (cf. Lev. 25:35 ff.) and in the inviolability of the physical person, even when a slave (cf. Ex. 21:26 f.). 5

These passages are quoted by Hermann Cohen in RV V 139 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 120. In what follows I shall make explicit reference to Cohen’s analyses.

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The resident foreigner even had the right to possess an Israelite as his slave (cf. Lev. 25:47)! The foreigner had the same rights as an Israelite in criminal law too: cities of refuge, for example, were set up to protect an unintentional homicide, Israelite and resident foreigner alike (cf. Num. 35:15). Ezekiel even went so far as not to discriminate between foreigners and Israelites in land distribution (cf. Ezek. 47:22 f.). In the religious field, to which the Torah jealously devoted its strictest, most coherent regulations, to avoid the temptation of idolatry, the resident foreigner was respected to the extent of showing true tolerance of his religious diversity: on the one hand, he was not subjected to any of the religious duties proper to an Israelite, such as being forbidden to eat the meat of animals who had died of natural causes (cf. Deut. 14:21), and, on the other, he had the right to sacrifice to the Eternal (cf. Num. 15:14).

3. Correlation If we now ask ourselves how the Israelite culture of the Old Testament, at the origins of our culture, could have brought about such a lofty conception of love for one’s fellowmen, which went far beyond other adjacent or comparable ancient cultures, the answer must be: by means of a process of idealisation, which produced the universal idea of humanity, and which can n be situated in the context of religious correlation, peculiar to monotheism. I shall attempt e now to account for this thesis. I shall follow the main points of the arguments put forward by Hermann Cohen, who maintainedd and developed this conviction.6 First of all Cohen started out from the fundamental observation, which I mentioned at the beginning of this paper: we always experience others only as men beside us ((Nebenmenschen), not as our fellowmen (Mitmenschen). The latter relationship can only be the result of ethical idealisation, which has its ground in religious idealness. It is just this problem m that highlights the inseparable complementarity between the man-God and man-man correlations, i.e. between religion and ethics. As we shall see, it is not possible to arrive 6

Cf., especially ibid., Chapters Eight and Nine.

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at universally considering the other man as one’s fellowman and love him as such, except with reference to God; but, on the other hand, no correlation can be set up between man and God, if the man in this correlation is not moral man, therefore Mitmensch, the man who loves other men as his fellowmen. Cohen showed how the biblical elaboration of ethical duties towards the resident foreigner, which was subsequently re-elaborated and developed in the Talmud teaching of duty towards all men inasmuch as they are Noachides, i.e. sons of Noah, the heirs to the pact between God and the patriarch, and, in Noah, brothers of every other man, as far as the universal ethical idea of man, expressed in Maimonides’ notion of «the pious of the peoples of the world» (~lw[h twmwa ydysx), 7 leads to the ideal production of the concept of «humanity», which alone allows the ethical shift from the relationship with others as Nebenmensch to that with Mitmensch, i.e. to love of one’s fellowmen. It is not belonging to the same people that requires love for my fellowmen of me: my Mitmensch must also be the foreigner. Not even common acceptance of religious faith in the unique God is the condition for my moral duty towards my fellowmen: the foreigner, inasmuch as he is Noachide, «is not bound to the law of Moses, but only to the seven precepts, “the seven commandments of the sons of Noah” (xn ynb twcm [bv : Sanhedrin 59). And these seven precepts have a have a strictly moral character»;8 from the religious viewpoint they do not make anything compulsory: they restrict themselves to forbidding blasphemy and idolatry. All political or racial discrimination and all religious intolerance are prevented from the outset by the ethical ideal of humanity. But Cohen went further. Love for one’s fellowmen in the same nation is also only possible on the basis of the idea of humanity, without which the way is open for the outbreak of political and social conflicts: «the acknowledgment of the other as the fellow countrymen only arose from a biased misinterpretation. Not to speak of the fact that it is senseless to say, love your fellow countryman as yourself, if 7 8

Ibid., pp. 141, 143; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 122, 123. Ibid., p. 142; Eng. trans. cit., p. 122.

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the love of man in general has as yet not even been discovered – either the national feeling is already so strong that I feel in my fellow countryman my blood and my image, in which case the commandment is superfluous; or the national feeling still has to be taught, in which case, however, the intensification “as yourself ” or even “he is as you” is only intelligible if the notion of the fellow countryman has already been permeated by the concept of man in general. The equality of the fellow countryman is clearly based on the equality of man; otherwise my fellow countryman is my neighbor, with whom I quarrel, or the poor man, who hates the rich who oppress him. The moral concept of the fellow countryman has as its indispensable supposition the general concept of man».9 Thus no national or racial community relationships are grounded in soil or blood, but rather in the idea of humanity; no national community can be established on particular naturalist foundations, but only on the universal ethical foundation of humanity: if it is authentic it is not born through naturalist separation and discrimination, but through ethical opening up to the universal idea of humanity. Cohen took another step forward. Correlation with the other man, i.e. «compassion» (Mitleid ), does not constitute only the Other authentically as a man, transforming him from Nebenmensch into Mitmensch, but also constitutes the very Ego in its authentic correlative meaning. Compassion is not a simple reflexive affect, man’s reaction to the suffering of his alter ego, which consists in the elimination of alterity (his dispute is directly, though not exclusively, with Schopenhauer); it is rather ethical action which turns the other man into Thou, the Mitmensch, it is the effective action for eliminating his suffering: it is in this active correlation that man takes over the suffering of the Other, not in Schopenhauer’s sense of the elimination of alterity, but taking up the ethical task of actually eliminating suffering. In this correlation man constitutes the Other as Thou, but, at the same time, constitutes himself as Thou for the Other: thus compassion is not a reflexive feeling of a constituted Ego, who, by means of the reduction of the Other to himself returns to himself,

9

Ibid., p. 138; Eng. trans. cit., p. 119.

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but it is ethical action, which taking up the suffering Other as Mitmensch constitutes himself at the same time in correlation.10 Therefore compassion is the ethical attitude that turns Nebenmensch into Mitmensch,11 and thus love for man consists in it: «although God created man, – wrote Cohen, – man must create the fellowman for himself».12 This process, then, is not only recognising the similarity of the Other, but real production of man by means of an ideal process discovering in the diversity of Nebenmensch the similarity of Mitmensch inasmuch as he is simply Mensch:13 this process is carried out, in the Jewish-Christian tradition, precisely starting out from recognition of Mitmensch in the diversity of the foreigner, thanks to discovery in him of that essential similarity, much deeper than any diversity, which consists in common belonging to humanity, in being part of the same posterity of Noah: «The concept of the Noachide is the foundation of natural law not only as an expression of the objective law but also as a determination of the subject of law. Noah has received no other revelation yet but that of man as a living creature. Man is, to begin with, life and soul. But already upon this foundation he becomes fellowman. The Noachide embodies this thought, and it is important evidence for the inner coherence in the history of monotheism, for the homogeneous continuation of the biblical spirit by tradition, that the Noachide as an institution of state law belongs to the oldest reports of the Mishnah».14 The idea of humanity, then, is the universal value on which alone it is possible to found compassion, i.e. the discovery of Mitmensch in Nebenmensch. In other words: it is only on the basis of the universal idea of humanity that interpersonal relations are protected from the fragility of affects and the fickleness of passion, from inclinations and idiosyncrasies, thus solidly setting themselves up as love for fellowmen. This is actually the unsurpassed wisdom of Kant’s imperative, which announces this idealist principle very clearly: i.e. that love for others can only find sure ethical ground in respect for their humanity, without which interpersonal relations would cease to 10

Cf. ibid., pp. 164 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 141 f. Cf. ibid., p. 170; Eng. trans. cit., p. 147. 12 Ibidem. 13 Cf. ibid., p. 165; Eng. trans. cit., p. 142. 14 Ibid., p. 142; Eng. trans. cit., p. 123. 11

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belong to the ethical level and find themselves at the mercy of circumstances and fortuitousness of pragmatic, aesthetic and erotic inclinations.

4. The Religious Ground It is precisely idealisation, which is necessary for ethically founding love for one’s fellowman, that is the element containing the need for opening up to the religious dimension. Similarity with the other man, who appears, however, in his diversity (and again the relationship with the foreigner is the paradigm of this situation) is certainly founded on historical memory of the similar experience of ours: «for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt» (Ex. 22:20) (it should be noted that there is already idealisation here, since the exile in Egypt is a experience that the individual takes up as his own inasmuch as it is part of tradition and historical memory); but, in the end, similarity with the Other must be led back to the common, universal participation of men in divine love: «God loves the stranger» (Deut. 10:18).15 Concerning this Cohen referred to and commented on the interesting dispute between Rabbi Akiba and Ben Azai on the biblical ground of love for fellowmen:16 «Akiba says: “Thou shalt love your other (rea’), he is as you. This is a great embodiment of the Torah”. Ben Azai says: “This is the book of the generations of man (Gen. 5:1). This is a greater embodiment than the other”. We should consider the conclusion that follows: “In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him”. Which foundation is the superior? Perhaps the first, which stresses the equality between man and man, which makes man into “the other”, and therefore into the fellowman? Or the one that makes man, as God’s creature, the image of God? Evidently Ben Azai is right».17 And, shortly after this, Cohen completed his comments: «The love of the neighbor is dependent upon God’s 15

Cf. ibid., pp. 168 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 145. Cf. j Nedarim 9,4. 17 RV V 137 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 119. 16

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creation of man, and not upon the subjective feeling with which I love myself or somebody else. “This is the book of the generations of man … in the likeness of God made He him”. Upon this principle rests the history of mankind. In monotheism lies the origin of the history of man. And monotheism itself prevents any inner partition between believers in monotheism and all nonbelievers. The Israelite is a son of Noah before he is a son of Abraham. And even as the son of Abraham, his blessing is dependent on the blessing of all the peoples of the earth. But before he is a son of Abraham and a son of Noah, the Israelite is, just as every man is, God’s creature and is created in his image».18 Correlation between man and man, then, is grounded in the correlation between man and God; in Cohen’s words the one «includes»19 the other, the former is «the inner correlation»20 within the latter. This is well summed up in God’s imperative in Lev. 19:2: «Be thou holy for I am holy, the Eternal your God».21 To be more precise, it is a question here of specifically declining the general imperative: you must be compassionate, because I, the Lord, your God, am merciful. After what I have said, it could still be thought, however, thatt grounding of man’s love for his fellowmen in the love of God also has nothing to do with a process of idealisation, because the love of God too, like that for fellowmen, must be understood as an existential experience, not as an idea, and that idealisation would actually drain the experience of the love of God of its real contents, as it would for human interpersonal n relations. Horror in the face of presumed sterility of ideas, parallel a to enthusiasm for the rich fruitfulness of the experience lived in its immediacy, are a major characteristic of the cultural climate that gave birth to the main ethical approaches to interpersonal relations, and where they found nourishment. But this is not the case. As it is true that man can only ground his correlation with other men in correlation with God, it is also true that only in the ethical realisation of the latter can he discover the former, and he discovers it as a paradigm and ideal of his love for fellowmen: God’s mercy for men is not only the ground of compassion among men, but 18

Ibid., pp. 138 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 119 f. Ibid., p. 133; Eng. trans. cit., p. 114. 20 Cf. ibid., p. 153; Eng. trans. cit., p. 132. 21 Cf. ibid., p. 188; Eng. trans. cit., p. 162. 19

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also the ideal towards which it, inasmuch as it is a task, looks. We also find the same articulation of the two correlations in the New Testament: «If God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. No man has seen God at any time; if we love one another, God dwelled in us and his love is perfected in us » (1 Jn. 4:11 ff.). Let us again follow Cohen on this point. He noted: «The concept of man grows in the reciprocal correlation between men, and accordingly the content of the correlation of God and man also grows».22 On the other hand, only love for God is the ultimate idea conferring the force of realisation on the moral action of love for fellowmen: «In this action love is directed to man. But insofar as the archetype of all action is searched for, insofar as the archetype of the correlation between man and God is a problem, love is directed to God. This love comes into force as the quest for the fulfilment of the idea, as enthusiasm for the idea, as love for the idea, which is the original force of all moral efficacy (sittliche Wirksamkeit) and which in any action is a substitute for the problem of actuality (Wirklichkeit)».23 Finally God is the object of human love i.e. the archetype of compassion between men, the ideal of the moral task of love for one’s fellowman, only inasmuch as he is recognised as the very origin of this love: love for one’s fellowmen is situated in the task of love for God, only inasmuch as it is grounded in God’s love for every man as such, in God’s mercy, the meaning of which we discover in our very moral realisation of compassion: «It thus becomes understandable that in the fight of the Jewish tradition against anthropomorphism, one speaks only of “attributes of action” with regard to God. And it is in accordance with this that all expressions of affects with regard to God are explained. God is compassionate; this attribute the rabbis explain thus: as he is compassionate, so are you to be compassionate. The attribute has only the meaning of a model. But the model makes only emulation possible, and not imitation; it is only an archetype. This whole trend of thought carries into effect the idea: “Be thou holy for I am holy, the Eternal your God”.

22 23

Ibid., p. 154; Eng. trans. cit., p. 133. Ibid., p. 187; Eng. trans. cit., p. 161.

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As holy, God is not so much the model that never can be reached, but rather the archetype and, therefore, f the idea which, in the case of action, has the meaning of the ideal. This idealistic meaning is the clear, exact sense of the love for God». d 24 Thus the characteristic circle of religious correlation closes. In its general meaning, the «holy spirit», religious correlation, is characterised by the holiness of God as the unconditioned origin of man’s morality («Be thou holy for I am holy, the Eternal your God»: Lev. 19:2); though in the unbridgeable difference between the originative holiness of God and human morality, which offers protection from all mystical and dialectical identification, God’s holiness has the meaning for man of the sanctification of God by means of his moral action («I will be hallowed among the children of Israel»: Lev. 22:32); man realises sanctification through himself, i.e. by means of moral effort («Sanctify yourselves … and be ye holy»: Lev. 11:44); this moral effort by man is made possible by the ideal of God’s holiness («I am the Eternal, who sanctify you»: Ex. 31:13; Lev. 20:8; 21:8). The situation is analogous in the specific sphere of love for man as Mitmensch: God’s mercy is the origin of the moral effort of man’s compassion for other men, and the latter is, in turn, the historical realisation of divine mercy and, at the same time, is made possible by this as its ideal. It is clear that, in this way, the entire correlation process is one of idealisation, which alone makes possible love for one’s fellowman as an unconditioned ethical imperative turning Nebenmensch into Mitmensch, i.e. into the other man unconditionally worthy of being loved, not owing to accidental and particular circumstances, nor his belonging to a naturalist category, like a people or race, but owing to his inalienable belonging to the ethical idea of humanity. Concluding these brief considerations of the figure of the foreigner as a paradigm of the other man, I should like to briefly present the main points of my argument again. Interpersonal relations are always a conjugation of the similarity and diversity of the Other. This conjugation can only stably take on the ethical value of love for one’s fellowmen inasmuch as, by an idealisation process, the Other as 24

Ibid., pp. 187 f., Eng. trans. cit., p. 162.

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Nebenmensch is turned into Mitmensch, by means of recognition of his belonging to humanity as a universal moral idea. This process has its origins and ideal in God’s mercy towards every man, and thus in religious correlation. In turn, man’s correlation with God takes on effective historical meaning and force only in man’s ethical correlation with other men. Contemporary ethical approaches to interpersonal relations, with their methodological attention to the immediate concreteness and fullness of existential experience, have certainly had their many, important merits, not only in developing the phenomenology of interpersonal relations, but also in the call to complete engagement of the human person in moral responsibility to his fellowmen. Nevertheless, the reference to the ideal moment, to the idealisation process, which is necessary for endowing the imperative of love for one’s fellowmen with universal unconditionedness and stability, as well as opening up to the religious horizon, cannot be ignored by any ethical approach to interpersonal relations, except at the cost of depriving oneself of absolute validity, without which no ethics remains such, but falls into a pragmatics, which is not necessarily a utilitarian pragmatics, but is, nevertheless, grounded solely in hypothetical, and thus non moral imperatives.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PORTRAIT IN HERMANN COHEN’S AESTHETICS

Cohen’s discourse on art in his Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls is formulated according to strict philosophical and systematic requirements. Art is considered by Cohen in the light of the philosophical principles of his system: his concern, in short, is not to elaborate theoretical principles starting from artistic creation or enjoyment, but to find in works off art the philosophical principles of his own aesthetics. Cohen’s Ästhetikk is not in any way the work of an artist or an art-lover who theorises about the criteria and the rules of a poetics from the experience of his own activity; instead, it is strictly the work of a philosopher who projects into works of art his own philosophical criteria, which are then found to be exemplified and realised in them. In short, Cohen’s approach is executed programmatically and conditioned explicitly by philosophical prejudices. Inevitably, this makes it an extrinsic approach. Of course, this should not be taken to indicate an artistic insensitivity on Cohen’s part; it does not mean that Cohen was personally incapable of understanding the intrinsic meaning of works of art, nor that it had no influence on his aesthetic conception. Indeed, it is clear, historically speaking, that Cohen was a man sensitive to art, perhaps more to music than to painting, but in any case capable of enjoying the authentic fruits of art in all its forms. But this belongs to his biography. Even if the experience of artistic fruition influenced his aesthetic ideas (and this is certainly the case), this concerns his biography. It may also be a useful historical-biographical element for understanding the origin of some features of his aesthetic theories, but has no importance in the relationship between Cohen’s aesthetic principles and aesthetic approach to works of art. From this point of view the relationship is unambiguous: Cohen finds in works of art the 145

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realisation and exemplification off his own aesthetic principles, because he examines them in the lightt of these principles. He finds in works of art what he himself has put into them. In reality this attitude, far from being exceptional or perverse, is the normal and constitutional attitude of philosophy to works of art: the extraneity of the perspective can be more or less emphasised, but is in any case constitutive. Strictly speaking, such extraneity limits every perspective on the work of art, and the case of paintings represents it in the most radical manner, because not just the viewer of the painting but the painter himself is and remains outside the work. However, such a limit, though insuperable, is not negative, it does not limit the possibility of grasping the meaning of the work, but on the contrary is the condition for the multiform richness of its meanings to reveal itself. However, in the case of the philosophical perspective (as in other but perhaps not all cases), the extraneity is not confined to exteriority: it is also heterogeneity. t The conceptual language within which philosophy moves is irreducibly different from the symbolic or figurative language of art. For this reason every philosophical interpretation is strongly allegorical compared with the strictly tautegorical meaning of the artistic work. This constitutes a decisive problem for the interdisciplinary relation between philosophy and art. The following considerations on Cohen’s approach to painting may, I hope, help to shed some light on this problem, but only if it is clear from the outset that such an approach is extrinsic and conditioned by philosophical prejudice, not just for the particular formulation of Cohen’s aesthetics, but more generally for the constitutive attitude of philosophy to art. Any attempt to remove the extraneity, of which there are also examples in the history of philosophy, is to be rejected, from the viewpoint both of method and of content. As regards method, in fact, such attempts cannot but lead to an undifferentiated confusion between the method of artistic creation and the method of philosophical reflection, in the alternate search for a reduction of art to philosophy or of philosophy to art, the fruits of which are a sterile

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intellectualistic art1 or an obscure oracular philosophy. As regards content, the result is the same, with the aggravating circumstance that in such a confusion art and philosophy suffer from the illusion that they can find a common content in mysticism and both are thereby transformed into a caricature of the latter. For these reasons it is a good idea, before commenting on Cohen’s approach to some examples of the pictorial realisation of the portrait theme, to set out briefly some principles of his aesthetics, essential to an understanding of how he reads paintings.

1. Nature of Man and Man of Nature Nature and man as a moral being, the contents of logic and ethics respectively, seem to constitute the only two possible directions of the productive activity of consciousness, as thought and as will, and so seem to exhaust the system. If aesthetics is to find a systematic place, it must be able to find a new, specific direction of consciousness, though it cannot disregard the two contents indicated above. It must therefore be able to found artistic activity as a direction of pure reason which, without dissociating itself from the two contents of the science of nature and of the sciences of the spirit, i.e. nature and man, yet produces from these a new content by means of a new direction of pure consciousness. This is precisely the peculiarity of art, of which philosophical aesthetics lays the foundation in «pure feeling». Every productive act of consciousness, whether thought or will, is accompanied by feeling. In the preceding parts of the system, especially in the Ethik des reinen Willens2, Cohen had already developed this theme of feeling as a «suffix» of thought and the will in the production of their contents. However, the peculiarity of art consists in the fact that feeling in it does not have a value merely relative to the logical and ethical directions of the productive activity 1

Obviously this is not to deny an artistic value to any poetics which contains an intellectual, also programmatic contribution, but only to those in which the poetic method is reduced to a philosophical method. 2 Cf. ERW W 196, 488.

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of consciousness, but becomes autonomous, becomes itself productive of a content. This content is love, as aesthetic feeling, which therefore, unlike the relative character of the feelings which accompany the theoretical activity of thought and the ethical activity of the will, is itself autonomously productive, is pure feeling. As such, aesthetic love cannot be reduced to the naturalistic meaning of biological love nor to the ethical meaning of moral love: certainly it implies these two meanings as its conditions, but it goes beyond these, constituting itself as a new and particular form of feeling, capable of producing by itself its own content. This peculiarity also manifests itself in the peculiarity of the artistic object. Logic and ethics, to safeguard the fundamental methodological principle of truth, that is, of the system, must keep rigorously distinct the two areas which they found, i.e. Being and What Ought to Be, nature, as object of theoretical knowledge, and man, as subject-object of moral action. If they were to fail to meet this fundamental methodological prescription, they would commit the fundamental philosophical error which Cohen sometimes designates, according to the manifestations in which it historically presents itself, as naturalism, philosophy of identity, orr pantheism. At the same time the obligation of logic and ethics to remain strictly faithful to this methodological distinction does not mean that it is impossible or inadmissible to think the unity of man and nature: indeed, this is the regulative horizon which is always present and without which the systematic unity, and so the truth of philosophy, would disappear too. Thinking the distinction between nature and man in the horizon of their unity, without therefore reducing the distinction to identity, is what Cohen means by the notion of «correlation», and is the unrelinquishable systematic rule of logic and ethics. For these first two parts of the system, therefore, the unity of nature and man is the infinite task to which every reality and every realisation tends, without ever being able to achieve it fully. Pure feeling, in the production of the artistic work, is capable of giving «completion» to this idea in the production of its own particular content: the nature of man and the man of nature. This completion is realised in the production of the artistic work as a «figure» (Gestalt). Cohen writes: «How does art realise this unity? Precisely in this, plastic art is so instructive: it produces this unity in the figure of man. The figure is not just his

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body, just as it is not simply his soul. The figure is the unity of soul and body. In this way pure feeling reveals itself as production. This becomes immediately clear in the content of an object. And this object, in all its interiority, is pre-eminently the figure (…). Production goes in search of the object; pure feeling goes in search of the subject. If the soul of the figure must become the content of production, then the subject must become immanent in the object».3 In this way pure feeling produces, in the figure, a new content, which is neither the nature of scientific consciousness, nor the man of moral conscience, nor the juxtaposition or the sum of the two. A new content is involved, constituted by the achieved unity of man and nature: in the work of art the idea off man is effectively and completely realised in the figure and, at the same time, the natural character of bodies is completely idealised through the ideal meaning with which art imbues them. This is the meaning of the aesthetic notion of «ideal», in the sense clearly defined by Kant, to whom Cohen evidently refers. In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in fact, Kant had designated the ideal as «the idea not simply in concreto, but in individuo, i.e. as a particular thing, determinable or even determined d solely by means of the idea»,4 adducing as an example the Stoic moral ideal of the sage: «Virtue and with it human wisdom, in all their purity, are ideas. But the (Stoic) sage is an ideal, that is, a man who exists only in thought, but fully corresponds to the idea of the sage. Just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal, in such a case, serves as a modell for the perfect determination of the copy (…). These ideals, though real objectivity (existence) cannot be attributed to them, are not therefore to be considered chimeras, indeed they offer a criterion to reason, which requires a concept of that which is perfect in its kind, to appraise by its standard and measure the degree and the defect of the imperfect».5 If, however, in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant hastens to emphasise, immediately after this exemplification, the non-realisability of this 3

ÄRG 1 191 f. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Auflage 1787, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 3, p. 383. 5 Ibid., p. 384. 4

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ideal, in the Kritik der Urteilskraftt he underlines the possibility of producing it offered to art: «that prototype of taste which certainly rests on the indefinite idea of a maximum provided by reason, and which cannot be represented by concepts, but only in an individual production, would be better called the ideal of the beautiful; an ideal which, if we do not possess it, we strive to produce it in us».6 And a few pages further on Kant makes precise reference to the «human figure» as the ideal of the beautiful.7 The success of this aesthetic notion in German culture is enormous. One need think only, by way of example, of its resplendent appearance in the final apotheosis of Goethe’s Faust: «Here insufficiency / becomes fulfilment; / Here the indescribable / is accomplished» ((Das Unzulängliche / Hier wird’s Ereignis; / Das Unbeschreibliche / Hier ist’s gethan).8 Cohen is thus heir to a great tradition, which he develops further. The work of art, as ideal, is therefore the completion of the unity between man and nature, the nature of man and the man of nature, which logic and ethics can only think as a regulative horizon, as an infinite task. In art the task achieves completion: it is completed in the production of the work. The work, in actual fact, as the concrete product of artistic activity, does not in itself alone constitute the object of art: the true object is the subject itself, as individual, which in the individuality of the work is realised as the individuality of the genius. The correlation between man and nature therefore achieves completion in the work of art also in the sense that the production of the object and the production of the subject, which remain distinct in logic and ethics, are realised in a united manner in aesthetics, inasmuch as the work is the objective realisation of the subject itself and the latter is the only true content of the work.

6

I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 232. Cf. ibid., p. 235. 8 J. W. GOETHE, Faust: Eine Tragödie, in Goethes Werke, hg. im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen, fotomechanischer Nachdruck der im Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, Weimar 1887-1919 eschienenen Weimarer Ausgabe oder Sophien-Ausgabe, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1987, 1. Abt., Bd. 15, p. 337. 7

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A further specification of the character of artistic production is nevertheless still necessary, so as not to run the risk of misunderstanding the meaning of the «completion» achieved in the work of art. In Cohen’s critical idealism, in fact, the pure activity of reason, in all its directions, in aesthetics as well as in logic and ethics, is the foundation and, correlatively, the infinite task: without the infinity and inexhaustibility of the task, the activity of reason would lose its idealistic character and so its foundational value as well. The artistic task, too, cannot dispense with this infinite dimension, which is therefore not lost but takes a particular form in the completeness of the artistic work. Infinity of the task, its realisation in finite forms, the non-definitive character of such realisations are the terms of a dynamic correlation between infinite task and finite realisation, present in all directions of the system. In the Logik der reinen Erkenntnis Cohen clearly indicates, for example, the dynamics of this correlation in connection with the concept: «The concept is a question and remains a question, nothing but a question. The answer which it contains must also be a new question, it must raise a new question. This is precisely the intimate methodological relation which exists between question and answer: that every question must itself be an answer; therefore every answer also can and must be a question. It is a new type of reciprocal conditioning, of reciprocal action, which is realised in the system of the concept: the reciprocal action between question and answer. No solution can be regarded as definitive. The concept is not an absolute totality».9 In the Ethik des reinen Willens, too, for example in connection with the ethical ideal, Cohen emphasises this correlation: «The ethical ideal contains three moments: completeness, fulfilment, the incompleteness of fulfilment».10 Art also proceeds according to the same correlation between the infinity of the task and the finiteness of the realisation. The difference, compared with logic and ethics, is that in aesthetics, while the correlation remains substantially valid, the emphases on various moments are put in a different way. In a manner corresponding to the peculiarity of art, which, as we have seen, produces the unity of man 9 10

LRE E 378. ERW W 424.

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and nature in the figure, in the concreteness and individuality of the work, the emphasis of the correlation is mainly put on the fulfilment, which is then designated as non-definitive and inexhaustive, thus opening up room for the ulteriority and infinity of the task, by virtue of which no work of art is the last one and artistic production continues from work to work. We are dealing here with two different systematic perspectives on the same correlation: while for logic and ethics the opening to the infinite taskk is always immanent in natural reality and in the historical realisation, for aesthetics, in the work of art, the realisation of the task is always immanent in the task itself: «In science the concept can never assume the value of an absolute solution; but the work of art, in accordance with its concept of fulfilment, must be thought and valued as such. Therefore the foundation, as task, inasmuch as the solution is immanent in it, is the correct principle for pure feeling. The idea of the beautiful means the task of the beautifull (…). The foundation is only task, in which the solution is nevertheless immanent».11

2. The Sublime and Humour This correlation between infinite taskk and its realisation in the finite, not in the generic sense in which it applies to every direction of consciousness, but in the particular configuration which it assumes in aesthetics, is what constitutes the content of aesthetic feeling: the beautiful. In an alternative, constantly pursued and consciously elaborated, to the tendency of Romantic aesthetics to reduce the beautiful to the sublime, Cohen develops a doctrine of the beautiful as a correlation between the two «subordinate concepts»12 of the sublime and humour. In an accurate analysis, which I omit here for the sake of brevity,13 Cohen criticises Kantian aesthetics for emphasising, on the one hand, the intellectualistic character of the beautiful, and then rescuing, on the other, art’s connection with morality in a doctrine of 11

ÄRG 1 247 f. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 249 passim. 13 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 100 ff., 250 f. 12

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the sublime which is not satisfactorily integrated with the preceding doctrine of the beautiful and is therefore exposed to confusion between the aesthetic ideal and the ethical ideal. The Kantian position clears the way for the restriction and misrepresentation of the content of aesthetics, which also implies the reduction of aesthetics to ethics: this confusion cancels the autonomy of aesthetics and, at the same time, misinterprets ethics, which is falsified in the direction of metaphysical pantheism and mysticism.14 Against all this Cohen sets a concept of the beautiful which remains authentically that: it comprehends the sublime as a necessary but not exclusive moment, always integrated by the correlative concept of humour. A work is beautiful because it is a realisation of the straining towards the infinite. Both these aspects: the straining towards the infinite and its concrete realisation in the individuality of the artistic work must together be present in the feeling of the beautiful; if either is lacking, the beautiful itself falls short. Cohen’s dissociation from a unilateral aesthetics of the sublime then takes a further step: the rejection of a reduction of the meaning of the sublime to ethics. Knowledge and morality, i.e. the contents of the two preceding parts of the system, of logic and ethics are, as we have seen, unavoidable conditions of aesthetic feeling, because there are no other contents of thought besides nature and man. But pure feeling, in art, refers to these two contents in their unity: the nature of man and the man of nature. Always, in every moment, the beautiful is therefore a realised unity of knowledge and morality, of nature and man; but this unity is the dynamic result of a continual oscillation between the prevalence of an impulse towards knowledge and the prevalence of an impulse towards morality.15 Now, in the Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, – unlike his position in Kants Begründung der Ästhetik,16, in which Cohen, still aligned to the traditional Kantian view, assigns to the prevalence of an impulse towards the infinite, proper to the sublime, a mainly theoretical connotation17 – the prevalence of the ethical 14

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 9 ff., 125 f., 255. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 257. 16 Cf. KBA 280 f. 17 Cf. ÄRG 1 254 ff. 15

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impulse is recognised in humour, as the feeling of realisation, of the fulfilment, of peace.18 The important moment of humour integrates the sublime by stopping it from transforming itself into the aspiration to overcome the finite, in scornful irony for the finiteness of every figure. In this critical function humour delimits the sublime in its authentic meaning of the elevation of the finite to the infinite: humour, in contrast to irony and scepticism, is the ability to love the finite, seeing in it the realisation, certainly not definitive, but real, of the infinite. For this reason, among others, Cohen’s aesthetics is capable of dealing with the subject of the «ugly», not in the sense of a vulgar pleasure in the defect, which renounces the aspiration to the infinity of perfection, but in the sense of a loving consideration of finiteness and limitation, which is able to see in it the presence of the infinite and thus idealises the ugly, elevates it to the dignified form of the presence and manifestation of the beautiful: «The ugly a problem of the beautiful? Humour gives and founds the answer. The ugly does not remain ugly: it becomes a moment of the beautiful, is a moment of the beautiful. The beautiful is not in itself an object of art; it is only an idea, only the general requirement and faith, the methodological task of pure feeling. This task is fulfilled in the first place by the sublime; but in a just as necessary way by humour. Because man’s nature reveals itself broadly and compellingly in the ugly. Love would not be true if it did not also wish to embrace the ugly. Love embraces, transforms it: it makes it a moment of the beautiful. Love comprehends the ugly, permeating it with its power. Thus the satyr becomes eros. Love ennobles the animal by making it a man».19 Art, then, is realisation of the infinite task in the finiteness of the concrete and individual work of art. Straining towards the infinite and calm realisation, «infinite work» and «end of the struggle in victory and in peace»20 are not in contradiction but in profitable correlation, that is, in a dynamic relation in which the two moments do not neutralise but strengthen each other reciprocally: «the genius should

18

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 274 ff. Ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 288 f. 20 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 275. 19

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not just aspire to heaven but conquer heaven in the work of art».21 What characterises Cohen’s aesthetics from this point of view (and is, m feature of Cohen’s thought moreover, in various forms, an important as a whole) is an awareness, profound and precious, that straining towards the infinite becomes empty and turns into scepticism if it is incapable of accepting its own finite realisations as authentic, just as, on the other hand, satisfaction in the finite is nothing but vulgarity and renunciation of the idea if it does not consist in the elevation and idealisation of the finite itself in the light of the ideal’s infinity. The sublime and humour are the two integral and inseparable parts of the beautiful; if separated, they turn into the opposite of the beautiful, into the scepticism of irony or the scepticism of vulgarity. Nevertheless, without prejudice to this inseparable correlation, humour, on account of the prevalence of the ethical impulse in it, has a particularly important function and, so to speak, a primacy in art, precisely because of art’s peculiarity of being the realisation (never definitive) of the infinite task in the finiteness of the concrete and individual work. Cohen in fact writes: «Just as there is no fixed state of consciousness which corresponds to the sublime or to humour, so there is not even a single sublime work of art nor an isolated work of humour. Both concepts, being only moments of the beautiful, are also only moments of the artistic work, impulses in the oscillation of creation and experience, but not directions which have become stable. We are considering here only the advantage of this conception for the concept of the aesthetic Self. Therefore it also needs to be said expressly that we must attribute this result more to humour than to the sublime. For humour is preponderant for morality. It therefore gravitates more towards objectification of the Self as Self, while the sublime, since the direction towards knowledge is more predominant for it, must objectify the I more in the concept. The will, however, leads to self-consciousness, and this is closer to self-feeling than the consciousness of the I proper to the concept. And in this way humour has a more evident part in clarifying pure feeling as unity of

21

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 274.

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consciousness, in that it is thought in abstraction from any conceptual content».22

3. The Portrait This pre-eminent function of humourr is particularly evident, among the figurative arts, in painting. We said, in fact, that the object of art is the unity of nature and man: the nature of man and the man of nature. This means, with regard to the first part of the formula, that the artistic representation of man must show the profound and complete unity between the natural aspect of man, the body, and his ethical and spiritual aspect, the soul. However, this unity should not appear in any way as a reduction of one dimension to another. This is the error of the naturalistic conception of art, which aims to express the beauty of the soul as a result of the beauty of the body. In this way naturalistic art reduces the soul to the body, neutralises it, and, in the final analysis, nullifies it. «Therefore naturalism cannot avoid not just showing what is animal in human nature, but even bringing it to the fore (…). Its concept of man’s nature is not the concept of a correlation between body and soul in this human nature; in its view, there is no correlation but at most an involution of the soul in the body».23 For authentic art, however, the soul, understood as man’s moral dimension, his participation in the idea of humanity, and therefore his dignity,24 is the «central force»,25 «the fire, the central point of the radiation which constitutes the body, as the body of the soul».26 The nature of man, thus understood as a profound unity of soul and body, is the content both of the sublime and of humour, because if some or other artistic feeling were unable to grasp this unity, it could not be an integral part of the beautiful. Yet the sublime and humour produce this unity in different ways. For the sublime (Cohen is 22

Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 421. Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 298. 24 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 299. 25 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 298. 26 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 297. 23

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thinking for instance of classical Greek statuary) the body as figure remains the primary element in which the soul «dwells»: the body is foundation, the soul consequence. Only humour is capable of grasping this unity in the fullness of its meaning: «in the art of humour the greatest task appears in the fact that this unity is represented starting from the soul in the direction of the body».27 This is fully realised by painting in the portrait. For this reason the «problem of the portrait» is not only a problem of painting but «the problem of painting»,28 in fact: «In what else does the peculiarity of the portrait consist among the tasks of painting if not in the predominance of the soul, as the centre and point of departure of production? Sure enough, everywhere, also in the landscape, the soul must enter into it effectively from the beginning; but in the portrait every direction starts exclusively from it. And therefore the theme, too, is clearly more profound and perhaps also the artistic technique is greater when this starting-point of the soul does not fit the face and the figure of the soul to the type of beauty, but comes from the horizon of humour».29 The portraitt therefore borders on the caricature, but without being reduced to it. Cohen adopts a Kantian position here. Kant, as is well-known, placed the human figure as the ideal of the beautiful, as «the visible expression of the moral ideas which prevail in man’s heart», between the type, i.e. the «normal idea», which «cannot contain anything specifically characteristic», and the caricature, i.e. «the characteristic of this [human] species when it is exaggerated, i.e. when it detracts from the normal idea itself (i.e. from the effectiveness of the species)».30 Analogously, Cohen places the portrait, a product of the prevalence of humour in the beautiful, between the «type of beauty» and the «caricature», which «is in itself a violation of the conventional lines of beauty, not just an absence, an avoidance of these».31 In the portrait humour does not stop at conventional and 27

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 295. Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, p. 347. 29 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 296. 30 Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, cit., p. 235. 31 ÄRG 1 296. 28

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abstract beauty, but raises what is ugly in man’s naturality, animality, to beauty, idealises it in the love for man’s nature: «no portrait without ideality (…) no portrait without humour. Under the sign of the sublime no true portrait can be realised. Here the portrait ceases and plastic art takes over. But plastic art therefore transforms man into a god. What else is Michelangelo’s Moses if not a Zeus? For the portrait, by contrast, man would become a caricature, without possibility of salvation; he would have to assume a rhetorical pose; he would become an abstraction, a schematic figure; he could not be the object of a creative human love – if it were not for humour».32

4. Leonardo’s Mona Lisa and Rembrandt’s Hendrikje Stoffels The theme of the portrait, then, takes on a central meaning for Cohen, not just for painting but for art and aesthetics in general. The portrait realises in a particularly meaningful way the aesthetic ideal of the nature of man, as the profound irradiant unity of the soul in the body; this ideal is realised in the concreteness of the human figure and in the peculiar characteristics of an individual, which humour elevates to the idea, transforming the apparent canonical typology of the sublime into an ideal correlation which constitutes beauty. Among the many pictures which Cohen considers in connection with the theme of the portrait, we will now, by way of example, dwell on two paintings which are particularly significant for Cohen, in order to observe the way in which he applies his own aesthetic principles to the effective commentary on individual works of art. The paintings in question are two well-known masterpieces, the portrait of Mona Lisa by Leonardo da Vinci and the portrait of Hendrikje Stoffels by Rembrandt, both exhibited in the Louvre. In contemplating the portrait of Mona Lisa, Cohen’s attention is mainly focused on the celebrated «smile», which, in the words of Cohen, «is the most profound meaning of the mystery of the Mona Lisa».33 The theme is clearly 32 33

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 297. Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 306; cf. ibid., Bd. 2, p. 347.

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conventional, but Cohen’s reading goes far beyond the commonplace. The smile is pre-eminently a fleeting, indeed momentary, expressive feature, whose instability seems to meet only the portraitist’s need to grasp the peculiar becoming of a face rather than the fixity of a type.34 With its instability he also seems to suggest the aleatory nature of the spiritual state which it expresses: that of friendliness.35 But Cohen goes beyond this first appearance to grasp a more profound sense of the smile: it is the realisation, of which only art is capable, of the solution to a profound contradiction between the transcendence of the good and man’s participation in it. Can man be good? Only God is good, indeed he is the Good One. Yet what would man be if he did not in some way reflect the divine good?36 This antinomy threatens to plunge man into scepticism, into irony, into self-mockery. True enough, art has been able to find a solution by expressing the goodness of the human figure and at the same time raising this figure to represent the divine in classical mythological themes or in Christian representations of Jesus, who is also God, and of Mary, who is the mother of God. But Leonardo’s portrait represents a woman who is purely human and yet in her smile reveals a sign of the good. Mona Lisa’s smile, also in the transitory character which it shows as a psychological trait, indeed precisely through it, expresses a sense of profound ethical stability: «Only when the mystery of goodness radiates from the human face, only in this way is every change in man’s being overcome in unity. Now not just the mouth and the eyes smile, but the soul reveals itself. Now man’s soul is not just allegorically described as virtue, but this virtue is not an abstraction: it is the most concrete life which can exist in the world. This is the life which the portrait realises. This realisation in an ideal fulfilment is Mona Lisa».37 What Leonardo has admirably achieved in the portrait of Mona Lisa is the artistic work of humour, which, preventing the sublime from betraying the ideal of man by escaping into the dream of 34

Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 344 f. Cf. ibidem. 36 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 305. 37 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 346. 35

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superman, and raising, on the other hand, the narrowness and defectiveness of man’s naturality through idealisation, effectively realises the aesthetic ideal of man’s nature and thus erects a defensive bulwark against scepticism and irony: «This is Leonardo’s humour: on this borderline between man’s paradise and hell, between his disposition to morality, which leads him to heaven, and the egoism in him, which not only becomes a torment to him, but also the peril of blindness, of vain presumption and self-deification, at this crossroads to the most profound ugliness, the ugliness of the soul, he needs mercy, which only great art can obtain for him. Humour transforms the laugh into a celestial smile, in which one cannot lose faith, in which only he loses faith who fails to understand that he is called upon here to take on a new artistic task: that of learning to believe, of having to believe in the appearance of the good in man’s eye, on man’s lips. Does art in this way perhaps become an edifying moral sermon? Absolutely not: this is its normal task, to which it gives only a particular direction here, love for man’s nature».38 Even more than in Leonardo, Cohen sees a significant presence of humour in Rembrandt, going so far as to affirm: «Rembrandt is the painter of humour»,39 and: «Rembrandt became the painter of the ugly».40 What does Cohen mean by these judgements, which are a long way from agreeing with the accepted understanding and image of the meaning of Rembrandt’s painting? Cohen sees in Rembrandt the painter who, more than others, was capable of taking, in a precise sense, the ugly as a moment of the beautiful. Undoubtedly remembering Kant’s considerations on the difference between the aesthetic ideal and the «normal idea», i.e. the aesthetic canon,41 Cohen develops some considerations in general and on Rembrandt in particular. If these two notions are confused, the history of art assumes the form of a tiresome competition between artists to reproduce exactly canonical beauty and, if this «normal idea» of beauty were finally to be achieved in some or other work, «the history of art would 38

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 306. Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 382. 40 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 384. 41 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 233 ff. 39

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thus be completed».42 But the ideal cannot be reduced, in fact, to the normal idea of the beautiful. The ideal surpasses the normal idea and, paradoxically, surpasses it precisely because it never achieves it. The ideal is an infinite task and this infinite character is given to it by its eternal movement away from the canonical model. Now, every work of art, inasmuch as it never completely realises the canonical idea of the beautiful, has something deficient, something lacking in regard to this canon: something ugly. The function of humour in general, and its supreme realisation in Rembrandt in particular, consists in the inversion of this negative meaning of the ugly into a positive meaning, in that it regards the ugly not as that which contradicts the beautiful, but as a moment of opposition in it, and in seeing precisely in this dynamics, which does not permit resignation to the definitive realisation of the intellectualistic canon of beauty, another type of realisation of beauty, based not on the illusory stasis of the realised concept but on peace, on interior calmness, on indulgence to the partial and yet effective realisation off an infinite task. In this sense humour elevates the ugly from the meaning of an opposition to the beautiful, which would exclude it from art and aesthetics, to the meaning of an opposition within the beautiful, which makes it instead an essential moment of art and aesthetics.43 According to Cohen, Rembrandt is precisely the painter capable of treating the ugly in this sense. He does not take pleasure in the ugly as such, nor, on the other hand, does he uncritically adapt to the canons of the beautiful. Rather, precisely because he seeks to realise the beautiful, he goes in search of those differences, those deficiencies, which distinguish the ideal of the beautiful from its canon and which, far from impoverishing the meaning of the work, give it a relative value and a participation in the ideal: «It is always an incompleteness, a deficiency, which constitutes his [Rembrandt’s] theme (…). One could perhaps even say that it is not at all the ugly which he wants and attempts to represent. Yet there is no doubt that his type differs from the ideal type, that his type is marked by a defect with respect to classical beauty. Why is it so hard for us to

42 43

Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 383. Cf. ibidem.

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admit this to ourselves? Why do we think that what Rembrandt paints is also beautiful, that, as regards content, it is just as beautiful as the beauty of Raphael? (…) It is humour which makes the difference, but which also gives Rembrandt’s paintings the right to beauty (…). For him it is enough to consider the ugly by itself in its connection with the completeness that the history of art declares to be beauty. He sees man’s nature in the absence of this historical beauty; he perceives it in the features which are not framed in accordance with this canon».44 Humour shows the «preponderance»45 of the ethical moment in pure feeling, just as the sublime shows the preponderance of the theoretical moment. This principle needs to be correctly understood if one wishes to avoid seriously misunderstanding the correct conception of art. On the one hand, such an assertion does not conflict with the unrelinquishable autonomy of art. Humour is not the reduction of art to extrinsic moral meanings; as was said above, it is a moment of pure feeling and, as such, it should not be confused with theoretical thought or with ethical action. But because both, too, are always the «conditions» of aesthetic love, humour is not an illegitimate introduction of ethics into art, but an emphasising of ethical contents in the feeling of the beautiful, which always remains pure and disinterested feeling. On the other hand, if, as we saw in considering the ugly, humour is an irreducible opposition to the reduction of the beautiful to its canonical task, one could ask whether this is not in contradiction with the correlative functions of the sublime and human in general, as set out above. It was said, in fact, that the sublime represents, in the beautiful, the moment of yearning for the infinite and humour the moment of realisation and peace. However, as I already indicated, in idealising the ugly, humour opposes the completeness of canonical beauty, which is an illusory, external, and intellectualistic completeness, in order to reveal another type of completeness, of a moral, internal, authentic origin: quiet acceptance of the finite, which comes from the capacity to perceive and love, in its concrete narrowness and deficiency, the presence of the infinite, of the ideal, which is real and authentic too. As regards the human figure, 44 45

Ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 293 f. Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, p. 421.

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human nature, it is a question, as was said, not of suggesting the spiritual power of the soul through the perfect and harmonic proportion of the canonical forms of the body, but, on the contrary, of showing the ideal transfiguration of the body in its natural defective and even ugly reality through the radiation from within of the soul’s power and meaning. This is in general the task to be realised by art, to which painting, and the portrait in particular, offers a special contribution. By virtue of the excellent results achieved by Rembrandt in this «penetration of soul and body, he is one of the supreme geniuses of his art».46 For Cohen, more than any other among Rembrandt’s works, the portrait of Hendrikje Stoffels, «the crowning glory of his portraits»,47 documents this brilliance of Rembrandt. He compares this portrait with Leonardo’s Mona Lisa to stress the different directions in which humourr realises its own meanings. If there it is the smile which illuminates the face and shows the radiation of the soul’s goodness through the features and the figure, here «the moist eyes are steeped in sadness; here humour shines as the pure spiritual force of participating feeling, of compassion for the fate of humanity».48 This love for suffering humanity, this participating acceptance of ugly human actions, has nothing dramatic let alone rebellious in Hendrikje’s expression. On the contrary, «this compassion for the ugly has the force of a theodicy».49 As in the Hebrew faces which Rembrandt likes to portray in so many of his paintings, so in Hendrikje’s face and expression «there is a sadness (…) which is neither grief nor lament, but radiates only an inner spiritual peace. One could think that there is a transcendence of aesthetic beauty here, that the love of man, which is not normally equated with artistic production, has achieved here the skilful expression of superiority with regard d to every work and every human 46

Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 383. Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 389. 48 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 390. In truth, the term «compassion» (Mitleid) d is used here by Cohen in a sense which does not wholly accord with the meaning that he usually attributes to it. Here, in fact, he stresses the sentimental aspect which is secondary in the normal meaning: precisely for this reason Cohen normally treats «compassion» as a notion of ethics and above all of religion. 49 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 387. 47

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act».50 «This painting in the Louvre – writes Cohen – is the model of Rembrandt’s beauty».51

5. Conclusion As we said, Cohen designates the content of art by means of a complex formula: not just «the nature of man» but also «the man of nature». These are the two complementary aspects of the unity of man and nature which is realised in the work of art. The portrait is the theme in which painting realises in supreme fashion this unity as «the nature of man», raising finiteness and imperfection, even the ugliness of the human figure’s natural features, by manifesting and radiating the power and dignity of the soul. The «man of nature» is the complementary aspect of the same unity, examined by painting especially in the theme of the landscape, in which, through the pictorial transfiguration, the nature of the environment is brought back to its profound unity in man, who, even when no human figure appears in the painting, is always present as a centre and focal point from which the aesthetic meaning of the natural environment radiates, so that the painted landscape, through light and colour, is not just an object of interest to scientific knowledge, but the realisation of an ulterior spiritual meaning: «Nature, inasmuch as it does not constitute the problem of natural science but of art, r is not a thing in itself, neither in the large phenomenon nor in the smallest; on the contrary, what must always become living in it is the unitary spirit of man. Only in this does the difference of the landscape from a “herbarium” appear».52 In modern painting, writes Cohen, «the landscape has become the soul of nature».53 Cohen’s considerations on the theme of the landscape are interesting, also because it is particularly in this context that Cohen expresses all his appreciation for nineteenth-century French painting, 50

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 294. Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 390. 52 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 327. 53 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 312. 51

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for Millet above all, and for the Barbizon school, for the impressionists, and also for the Dutch (Jozef Israëls) and German (Wilhelm Leibl and Max Liebermann) painters who refer to it.54 I pass over here a further examination of these interesting reflections by Cohen on the pictorial theme of the landscape for the sake of brevity and because Cohen’s remarks on this theme are less ordered and univocal, are interwoven with political considerations which tend to compromise the clarity and precision of the argument and, above all, he barely stops to consider individual works (with the relative exception of some works by Jean-François Millet), but elaborates his argument in comprehensive ideological terms. The theme of the portrait, by contrast, already gave us an opportunity to consider Cohen’s approach to individual works. On this material, therefore, I can set out some conclusive considerations. Above all, it seems to me, what has clearly emerged is what I advanced from the beginning as a premiss, i.e. the extrinsic character of Cohen’s aesthetic approach to the paintings considered. The questions raised by this method are many, but it is worth saying something about at least two of these: to whom can such an approach be useful? What meaning does it have and what contribution does it bring to the truth of art? As regards the first question, one has to say above all that the considerations of philosophical aesthetics (Cohen’s, but the argument fundamentally holds for any philosophical aesthetics, as I said at the start) do not seem to have any usefulness for the artist himself. This for the simple and important reason that the artist’s task is to produce work, not reflect on it. One could apply to this situation what Kant said about geometry in relation to the philosophical foundation of space: the painter has no need «to obtain a permit from philosophy» which would guarantee the legitimacy of his artistic work.55 He can proceed, indeed he must proceed in sovereign autonomy, not because artistic production is anarchic, but because it is a law unto itself, it is genius. This principle of the autonomy of art from any philosophical

54 55

Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 399 ff. Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, cit., p. 101.

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canon,56 this negation of any directt influence of philosophical aesthetics on the artist’s activity must be established and maintained without any reduction, on penalty of the denaturalisation of art. Rather we will reclaim an indirectt relation of the artist with philosophical aesthetics which is integral and complementary, but in no way reductive of this fundamental principle. The matter is different with regard to art criticism. The latter is also a reflection on art and an attempt analytically to understand individual works through various approaches: historical, technical, poetical, and also sociological, political, religious etc. But all these approaches are not enough to legitimise art criticism and make it persuasive. This is not because the list lacks the philosophical approach as a further perspective among the others which is added to and completes the horizon of perspective, but rather because all these approaches lack a foundation in philosophical aesthetics. Every work of art is certainly unique, but it is not episodic: the work becomes part of a unitary meaning of art; its unicity does not consist in the absence of any relation with other works past and present, but on the contrary in its peculiar and unrepeatable meaning within the unitary context of art. The lawfulness of genius, style, the connection between tradition and innovation, the expressive and communicative character of the artistic work can only be realised within a unitary context and thanks to this context; this context is what we call art, in which we place every individual work, designating it, in fact, as a work of art. Beyond this there is a further problem, but one no less important: the relation between art and the arts. The individual arts, also in their peculiarity, need to be fitted into a unitary system, not only in the sense of establishing operative relations between them, but even more in the sense of being able to recognise a unitary foundation which they share. All these requirements, which artistic activity is not concerned with answering, not because it regards this as useless or impossible, but because it believes that this is not part of its responsibility, must however be dealt with by art criticism. But none of the methods indicated above, neither the historical nor the technical nor any of the others can treat these problems. Only philosophy, as thought which is critical because 56

See above, note 1.

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it is foundational, can legitimise the unity of art, both in the sense of art as the unity of the arts, and in the sense of the foundation of art, in its various manifestations, in a particular direction of the productivity of consciousness, in a direction which, in its turn, has a systematic place in the unity of directions, i.e. in culture. Since philosophy is the critical foundation of the systematic unity of the spirit’s productive directions, it is philosophy of culture, and since, as aesthetics, it is capable of establishing and justifying a priori a unitary concept of art in relation to the philosophical system, it offers to art an awareness of its meaning and its place in culture. For these reasons, it seems to me, in considering the individual work of art, criticism, without renouncing its various methods of analysis, cannot do without a conscious reference to the foundation and horizon provided by philosophical aesthetics. And in this sense, while maintaining the principle of the artist’s independence in his work from any direct philosophical conditioning, we must nevertheless recognise an indirect relation, insofar as the artist is placed and wants to take his place in culture with his own creative activity: he wants to be rooted in it and contribute to it. In my view, this also gives us useful elements for dealing with the second question. In this connection, because we have already touched on the subject of artistic creation, we will now focus on the aspect of artistic fruition and on the criticism thereof. I believe that a broad and general consensus would be obtained if artistic enjoyment, the pleasure of the beautiful, were defined as an awareness of oneself in the work of art. But this would come down to very little if it meant only a recognition of the agreement between what the work represents and the features of natural reality, physical or psychological. Such a naïve naturalistic or psychologistic realism seems very far from the authentic meaning of the pleasure of the beautiful, but seems rather a caricature of it. In fact, it seems so full of subjectivism, of relativism, and of fortuitousness as to represent rather the antithesis of authentic artistic fruition. If therefore recognition of oneself in the work of art, the awareness that it realises a profound f meaning which pertains to us, should not be attributed to the fortuitousness of the natural and psychological subject, it is rather the subject inasmuch as he participates in a universal and eternal meaning, that which recognises itself in the work of art. The enjoyer n does not take a narcissistic

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pleasure in the work of art as in a mirror which reflects his natural and psychological features, but as in an interlocutor in which he finds realised the meaning of himself which he is seeking. In the fruition of the artistic work the subject recognises himself in the work, precisely inasmuch as the work reveals to him what he failed to see clearly introspectively, inasmuch as it raises him by revealing to him the universal and eternal meaning in which he takes part, but which he is unable to see clearly without the aid of art. This is exactly the cultural and true meaning of the work of art. Without the philosophical foundation, which provides the justification f and definition of culture and of its ideal heritage, the awareness of the subject has difficulty in seeing clearly this surmounting of more trivial meanings of the empirical subject and in raising himself to the discovery in the work of art of universal and eternal meanings in which he participates and which constitute his worth and dignity.

CHAPTER NINE

RELIGION AS A FACT OF CULTURE AND THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie was published in 1915, in Band 10, Heft 1 of the «Philosophischen Arbeiten» jointly edited by Hermann Cohen and Paul a Natorp for the Töpelmann publishing house in Gießen. It was formally presented by Cohen as a «necessary response to the collective volume of the “Philosophische Abhandlungen”, with which my friends honoured my seventieth birthday».1 In 1912 Cohen had left his university chair in Marburg and had settled in Berlin, and this was not devoid of painful human aspects. But, in this essay, he showed his profound, permanent and intense relationship with Marburg, as a philosophical school he himself had founded and a university where he worked for so long. His return to Marburg in the 1915/16 winter and 1916 summer semesters, to teach courses once again, which he strongly desired and, in the end, accomplished, is a clear sign of this relationship. But Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie is even more effective evidence of this continuity. In the essay in which Cohen embarked on a phase of decisive development and partial innovation of his thought, he provided simultaneous evidence of the profound continuity of these new developments with his Marburg period philosophy and maintenance of his relationship with his friends and collaborators in the Marburg school and at the University, as a spur to his new philosophical dynamism.

1

BR v. Cohen refers to Philosophische Abhandlungen. Hermann Cohen zum 70sten Geburtstag (4 Juli 1912) dargebracht, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin 1912.

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It is not only a question of the exterior aspects of the essay, however significant, such as the dedication «to the Marburg school with gratitude and confidence»,2 or the Vorrede,3 mostly devoted to stating Cohen’s intense relationship with his school and his certainty about its vitality and future potential, despite the difficulties of the present situation. There was something of greater weight, more from the philosophical than biographical viewpoint. The whole essay, with its important new elements, can be understood in the light of two fundamental driving motives: on the one hand, the need for development of important problems within Cohen’s philosophical system, which had remained unresolved or were no longer entirely satisfactory for the author in the way in which they had been dealt with; on the other hand, the debate on the problem of religion, which found new vitality in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, between Cohen and the Marburg environment, especially, with his closest collaborator in the «school», Paul Natorp, and the theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, who did not belong to the school, but was an eminent member of the University. Those who were, and still are, in favour of a «turning point» in Cohen’s late philosophy of religion in respect of his philosophical system, should justify the contradiction between this thesis and the dominant character of continuity throughout the essay, which actually was a new, further, though not ultimate or alien contribution to Cohen’s existing debate with and in Marburg. The two highlighted aspects intertwine and amalgamate to such an extent, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, that it is only occasionally possible to find them isolated. More often, they constituted the two basic, inseparable aspects of a single argument: the debate with Natorp and Herrmann was a spur for Cohen to develop his thought and, at the same time, this development was the only true line followed by his direct or indirect responses to his interlocutors.

2 3

BR III. Cf. ibid., pp. V ff.

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1. Religion as a Fact of Spiritual Culture Cohen’s essay began by acknowledging the difficulty and problematic nature of philosophical comprehension of a «fact of spiritual culture»,4 such as religion, which is not a «science». He started off from this to reaffirm, despite this difficulty, the need for a priori philosophical foundation of religion, in opposition to the inductive method of the history and psychology of religion. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile pausing over this definition of religion as a «fact of culture». Cohen’s affirmation once again raised an important, unresolved problem in his philosophy, i.e. that of the legitimacy and modality of application of the transcendental method, not to a «science» but to a «fact off culture». Before his philosophy of religion, this problem was already posited for his aesthetics, and, albeit controversially, for his ethics. But this is not the problem I am going to consider here. It is, rather, of interest to clarify the double sense of the expression «fact of culture». The first term «fact» suggests a shift of critical-philosophical investigation from an object in itself theoretical and ideal, i.e. science, to an immediately empirical one, which cannot be considered a priori by means of the mediation of a theory, but in the factuality of its historical givenness. This is actually the presupposition of the inductive method of the history and psychology of religion, as is also the case for the merely sociological consideration of ethics.5 However, for Cohen, religion was not only a «historical fact», but a «fact of culture»,6 and the latter term corrected any possible mistaken interpretation of the former. Cohen saw «culture» not as an empirical given, justified by its mere factuality, but as a product of the spirit, i.e. of thought, whose «facts» are not immediate data, but results of a productive spiritual process. The factuality of the «facts of culture» 4

BR 1. Cf. ibid., p. 5. 6 In Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie (Poppelauer, Berlin 1907), in J 3 152, on the other hand, Cohen acknowledged religion as a «historical fact», denying its status as a fact of culture. 5

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does not mean their empirical immediacy, but only their historical givenness for the individual, empirical subject, which is, however, founded on the productive process of the transcendental subject. The definition of religion as a «fact of culture» did not mean, then, for Cohen opposition to science, but, on n the contrary, its positioning beside it, since, though not having the structure and logical rigour of a science in the form and arrangement of its phenomena, it unambiguously presented its character as spiritual production, owing to which it is an integral part of «culture». The initial recognition of religion as a «fact of spiritual culture» certainly posits a historical fact as given, from which to start out, but, at the same time, posits a philosophical hypothesis, on the basis of which investigation must proceed: i.e. religion’s belonging to culture. Cohen’s investigation in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie aimed, first of all, to raise the historical given of religion to the philosophical hypothesis of religion as the integrating aspect of culture. If it is a mistake, as has been said, to concentrate on a historical given, so as to extract, inductively, an empirical concept of religion; it is also just as mistaken to entrust oneself to a totally a priori deduction of religion, starting from «metaphysical» concepts, as was the case with Hegel and his successors.7 Therefore, Cohen put forward the transcendental method as the only correct one for philosophical investigation, for religion too.8 We can thus highlight an initial important characteristic of the formulation of the problem of religion in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie: the fundamental task of philosophy in respect of religion is that of justifying its placing in the sphere of culture and, inversely, the place of religion in culture can only be determined by philosophy. Whether this philosophical investigation of religion can entirely cover its content and meaning is naturally debatable: such an expectation could be excessively presumptuous on the part of philosophy, an attempt to dominate religion and reduce the latter to itself. This was not, in fact, Cohen’s intention in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, since he affirmed here that 7 8

Cf. BR 2 f. Cf. ibid., p. 8.

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religion has its ««foundation of truth»9 in philosophy, which is quite different from claiming that its truth is in philosophy. Furthermore, he stated, admittedly, that the definition of the concept of religion, and thus foundation of its truth, was the exclusive task of philosophy,10 but acknowledged that this task was also only a problem for philosophy, not for religion,11 since the latter is not only «knowledge», but also «faith».12 But that this philosophical investigation of religion was indispensable was a constant for Cohen, since, if this operation were not to take place, religion would be relegated to the fringes of the human spirit, in the irrationality of mysticism,13 myth, fanaticism and obscurantism.14 Historical investigation is thus certainly a condition for the transcendental method, inasmuch as it must start off from fact, but it is only a «negative presupposition», since «the concept (…) is the problem of positive creation, which can only be accomplished by deduction, never induction».15 Deduction of the concept of religion is thus the task of philosophy, on the basis of the principle of the «immanence of philosophy in all the principal directions of culture».16 But the principle of the immanence of philosophy in culture, which grounds the hypothesis of the immanence of philosophy in religion, must not be distorted in the mistaken thesis of the identity of religion and philosophy, or one of the parts of the latter17 (for Cohen, as we shall see, the problem involved, above all, though not exclusively, the relationship between religion and aesthetics).18 Simple consideration of the numerous important relations between the contents of religion and those of philosophy could lead to this superficial conclusion, if one were to leave the main thread of transcendental research, i.e. from 9

Ibid., p. 6. Cf. ibidem. 11 Cf. ibid., p. 22. 12 Cf. ibid., p. 104. 13 Cf. ibid., p. 8. 14 Cf. ibid., p. 65. 15 Ibid., p. 5. 16 Ibid., p. 9. 17 Cf. ibid., pp. 42 f. 18 Cf. ibid., p. 94. 10

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the concept of «culture» proper to systematic critical philosophy.19 Culture must be considered by critical philosophy as the «unity of culture», and philosophy, correspondingly, as the «system of philosophy». The unity of culture is not, for critical philosophy, an undifferentiated identity; it is, on the contrary, an articulated system, in which each sphere of the spirit finds its position in unity with the other spheres and in independence from them. This is why only the systematic transcendental is able to include the «fact» of religion in the «unity» of culture.20 The principle of the immanence of philosophy in culture must be understood in the terms of critical philosophy, for which «the unity of humanity is the hypothesis of the unity of culture. The unity of culture is the hypothesis of the unity of systematic consciousness».21 Religion must be grounded in truth, therefore it must be grounded in philosophy.22 But the system is the truth of philosophy, since, actually, these two concepts make up a single one: the «system of truth»,23 in which all the directions of the productivity of the human spirit are collected together in the unity of culture. Truth is the «common objective of all the systematic directions».24 The subject of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, then, can only be formulated in a transitory, ambiguous manner as «the problem of the concept of religion in relation to the history of religion and metaphysics» (the title of Chapter One), or as a generic problem of the relationship between the concept of religion and philosophy: this kind of approach is useful for preliminary identification of contents and themes common to religion and philosophy, in their different aspects (and this is what Cohen did in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie up to § 16 of Chapter Three). But if one were to stop here, there would be the danger of confusing the borders between religion and philosophy, without grasping the placing of religion in the system of philosophy 19

Cf. ibid., pp. 42 f. Cf. ibid., p. 10. 21 ÄRG 2 429. 22 Cf. BR 9. 23 LRE E 397. 24 BR 18. 20

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and culture. To reach this last objective, the problem of the «concept of religion in the system of philosophy» must, instead, be posited in a more rigorous, determined way (precisely the theme of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie from § 17 of Chapter Three).

2. The «Peculiarity» of Religion in the System As is well known, in his previous philosophical works, Cohen had frequently argued for reduction of religion to ethics. In the Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu F. A. Langes Geschichte des Materialismus, he suggested the «solution (Auflösung ( ) of religion in ethics».25 In Ethik des reinen Willens Cohen wrote: «Ethics cannot, in any way, recognise the independence of religion (…). Thus it can only recognise religion as a state of nature, whose cultural maturity becomes part of ethics».26 In Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie Cohen also argued that «the direction of religion is elevated and preservedd (aufgehoben) in that of ethics».27 Admittedly, this position of his did not imply the intention of eliminating religion; however, its survival was not justified by systematic reasons, but solely by historical circumstances: only the insufficient maturity of present day culture justified the survival of religion.28 In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen’s views on the subject substantially changed. As we have seen, here religion was no longer considered a simple «state of nature», which became part of culture, only inasmuch as it was taken over by ethics: religion is itself a «fact of culture», and, as such, must occupy a position in the system of philosophy. Here too Cohen rejected the 25 These are Cohen’s words in the first (1896) and second (1902) editions of the Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu F. A. Langes Geschichte des Materialismus. But in the third (1914) edition he corrected the earlier texts, referring to «acceptance (Aufnahme) of religion in ethics» (E 106). 26 ERW W 586. 27 Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Grundlegung der Religionsphilosophie, cit., in J 3 151. 28 Cf. ibid., in J 3 158 ff.

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«independence» of religion in the system: the system of philosophy was entirely and exhaustively articulated in the three «directions» of consciousness (knowledge, will and feeling) and religion could not constitute an independent fourth direction, neither were there objective gaps in logical, ethical and aesthetic culture, which it had to fill.29 Nevertheless, religion had «a new content», or, more precisely, «a new modification» of a content of culture already present in the system. This constituted the «peculiarity» (Eigenart) of religion in the system.30 This peculiarity consisted, first of all, in a «modification» of the content of ethics, involving an «enrichment»,31 «completion as development» and «enlargement»32 of ethics itself. This modification of the content of ethics essentially concerned the concept of man as an individual. Cohen foregrounded this theme in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie; right from the Vorrede he stated that, in this work, he intended to «ground the systematic concept of religion in the concept of the individual»,33 and an essential, large part of it was devoted to this intent. The unilateral highlighting of this theme, which is without doubt important, but not unique, in Cohen’s philosophy of religion, constituted a not entirely positive trait, since it partially overshadowed the fundamental theme of correlation, which, though present in the work, did not receive the necessary, thorough elaboration it was to have in the posthumous Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. It should also be noted that, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Cohen defined the peculiarity of religion, not only in respect of ethics, but, in a wider sense, in respect of the whole system. If religion only contributed to the enrichment of ethics, though no longer being resolved in the latter, it would still be restricted to being a cultural contribution totally included in the sphere of ethics itself. And, the theme of the individual, to tell the truth, does not, in itself, justify a cultural value of religion which is more ample than the

29

Cf. BR 18, 44. Cf. ibid., p. 44. 31 Ibid., p. 51. 32 Ibid., p. 58. 33 Ibid., p. V. 30

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ethical sphere. But Cohen was convinced that the peculiarity of religion, though having a privileged relationship with ethics, as far as content goes, extended its effects over all the spheres of the system: that it also exercised important influence on aesthetics, and, retroactively,34 on logic. Religion is positioned in the philosophical system as an «appendix» (Anhang ( )35 and «derivation» 36 ( (Abstammung g) of ethics and «cannot be removed from living connection with ethics»;37 but, inasmuch as it is knowledge, «religion could not become part of philosophy except on the ground of its entrance as part of philosophy through the door of logic»;38 and inasmuch as «religion addresses feeling, in this expectation, the intimate connection existing between religion and art shows itself indirectly».39 For these reasons, an acceptable philosophical evaluation of religion as a «fact of culture», in Cohen’s view, must consider the peculiarity of religion, not only in the face of ethics, but also in that of the entire philosophical system.40 The peculiarity of religion in respect of the entire system has its ground, not so much in the concept of man as an individual, which is more proper to the relationship of religion with ethics, as in the idea of the unique God, on which the concept of man as an individual is also founded. Thus monotheism, which, for Cohen, had always been the central idea of religion (and of Judaism in particular) again came to the fore, as the peculiar contribution of religion and as its essential contribution to culture: God is the «hub» of religion.41 Cohen had already introduced the idea of God into his ethics, not as a principle of foundation, but «at the conclusion»,42 in accordance with Kant’s approach. In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen repeated that the idea of God was for ethics a 34

In ERW W 90, Cohen wrote about a «retroaction» (Rückwirkung) of ethics on logic W VIII*). One could also (cf. on this S. SCHWARZSCHILD, Introduction, in W 7 (ERW) speak of retroaction of the peculiarity of religion on logic. 35 BR 9. 36 Ibid., p. 10. 37 Ibid., pp. 9 f. 38 Ibid., p. 16. 39 Ibid., p. 18. 40 Cf. ibid., pp. 45, 107. 41 Ibid., p. 39. 42 ERW W 439.

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«fundamental concept, but not for the beginning of foundation, only for its fulfilment»,43 and proudly recalled this particular character of his ethics.44 In Cohen’s ethics the problem of truth has a methodological meaning, as unity between logic and ethics, but also has a further meaning, as harmony between nature and morality.45 The idea of God’s transcendence, in ethics, is a methodological solution, but the problem, in this second meaning, is not methodological.46 The idea of the uniqueness of God, which includes that of his transcendence, but which cannot be reduced to it, inasmuch as it founds correlation, is peculiar to religion and contributes to enlarging and developing the problem of the Being of nature, and thus of logic, like that of the moral What Ought to Be, and thus of ethics. So we must rely on this idea to highlight the peculiarity of religion in respect of the system.

3. Religion and Logic Religion enters philosophy «through the door of logic» inasmuch as it too is «knowledge» and, therefore, proceeds in accordance with the critical method of idealisation. In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen returned, in outline to his interpretation of Plato’s teaching of idea as «hypothesis», as foundation,47 so as to show the methodological unity of monotheist religion with critical idealism. The unique God of Jewish monotheism corresponded to the idea of being in Greek philosophy. In the burning bush, God revealed himself to Moses as «he who is». In this revelation it was not only affirmed that «God is», but also that «this God manifests himself as the being».48 The idea of God, as the idea of being, places religion in a relationship with logic, not only in method, but also content, since being is the object of the latter; but method and content of logic are 43

BR 51. Cf. ibid., p. 42; RV V 23; Eng. trans. cit., p. 23. 45 Cf. ERW W 466. 46 On this see S. UCKO, Der Gottesbegriff in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Sigfried Scholem, Berlin 1927, pp. 18 ff. 47 Cf. BR 28 ff. 48 Ibidem. 44

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indivisible, since being is only contained in thought as idea. The logic of pure knowledge teaches that being is only the object of thought as a «product» of thought itself, and that ««production itself is the product»,49 that «activity itself is content».50 In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen insisted on this principle with regard to the idea of the good.51 There is only one alternative to the method of critical idealism: splitting the meaning of being in the metaphysical hypothesis of the absolute being, on the one hand, and of the immediate given of the empirical being, on the other, which are then mixed up in identity. Metaphysics and empiricism, from Aristotle onwards, are two sides of a single error and have their common result in pantheism.52 The way of metaphysics and pantheism removes the concept of the divine being from pure knowledge, so as to turn it into the object of an unfounded, illusory mystical «intuition»,53 and thus places religion beyond the system of critical philosophy. For this reason, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen argued for the identity of the method of religion with the «scientific» one of logic. This thesis is partially justified only in this context, so as to underline the common opposition of logic and religion (as moments of critical philosophy) to «intuitionism», «pantheism» and «mysticism»:54 it is, however, insufficient for thorough determination of the correlation method, on which religion is founded. Plato’s teaching of idea reached its climax and limit in the idea of the good. With it Plato raised the problem of the «determinations of the limit»55 between logic and ethics. In Cohen’s view, Plato had not provided a satisfactory answer to this problem, and perhaps no such 49

LRE E 29. Ibid., p. 60. 51 Cf. BR 111. 52 Cf. ibid., pp. 27 ff. We are referring to post-Aristotelian pantheism here, since Cohen also referred to the «pantheism» of Eleatic philosophy (cf. ibid., pp. 23 ff.), which must, however, be understood as indifference between being, nature and God, and not as identification and confusion of previous dualist separation of the meaning of being. 53 Ibid., p. 30. 54 Cf. ibid., pp. 30 f. 55 Ibid., p. 35. 50

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answer is possible, but positing the problem and the way in which it is posited have an important meaning for critical philosophy.56 The double aspect of the problem of the good, in Plato, provides the basis of the conception of the relationship between logic and ethics in critical idealism.57 On the one hand, the good is also an idea and thus «idea can, in the good too, bear its methodological witness for the good itself». f 58 On the other hand, the idea of the good is «beyond being» of «power of dignity».59 In this case too, the mistaken alternative of critical idealism is the mixing of metaphysics and empiricism, between hypostatisation of the good as absolute being, identified with God, and the object of metaphysical theology, and the reduction of ethics to a mere empirical teaching of the pragmatic way to «become good», which began with Aristotle and left a negative mark on the history of thought after him.60 There is, however, another possibility of misunderstanding the idea of the good, which is different from the Aristotelian metaphysical one: it consists in identifying the good with «Humaneness» (Humanität) and, at the same time, with God and in thus denying God’s transcendence, thus rejecting an essential content, not only of religion, but also of ethics. Cohen was well aware of the danger of this position and of the need for facing up to it, since it was precisely a question of one of the fundamental theses of Natorp’s philosophy of religion.61 Critical idealism must precisely determine the idea of the good. It is identical to the idea of humanity;62 inasmuch as it is idea it transcends the empirical being and is subject to the method of pure knowledge; for its content, on the other hand, it transcends by value the being of nature, but does not identify itself with God, who is still transcendent in respect of it. Actually, as Cohen had already stated in Ethik des

56

Cf. ibid., p. 36. Cf. ibid., p. 37. 58 Ibid., p. 36. 59 Cf. ibid., p. 37. 60 Cf. ibid., pp. 11 ff., 37 f. 61 Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpädagogik, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 19082. 62 Cf. BR 33. 57

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reinen Willens,63 it is precisely the idea of God’s transcendence that assures, in the regulative sense, the teleological immanence of the Being of nature and moral What Ought to Be. The identification of God with humanity, maintained by Natorp, in Cohen’s view, led, by another route, to the same pantheistic result as the Aristotelian metaphysical way: the latter through a mistaken conception of knowledge, the former through a mistaken concept of feeling.64 The only possible line of defence of the critical concept of religion against pantheism is the intransigent affirmation of monotheism, i.e. of the idea of the unique God and his correlation with man.65 It is in this close connection of religion with logic and ethics, only within this connection, that the peculiarity of religion produces its effects on all spheres of philosophy, above all through the concept of the unique God. This nucleus of monotheism carries out a re-formulation of the problem of being, which does not reject the content of logic, and a re-formulation of the problem of the good, which does not reject the content of ethics: both are, instead, placed in a new unitary horizon. Starting out from the idea of God to found every other content on it was an important characteristic of Cohen’s philosophy of religion, as Sigfried Ucko66 correctly pointed out. This is an essential meaning of Cohen’s concept of religious «correlation». This theocentrism of Cohen’s philosophy of religion, though remaining strictly in the sphere of rationalism, is an interesting trait, also from the historical viewpoint, since it opposed the predominant trend among his contemporaries (including Herrmann and Natorp) towards an anthropocentric conception of religion. The revelation of the unique God in the burning bush does not only mean that «God is the being»,67 but also that «God alone (…) is the being».68 In opposition to the pantheism of Eleatic philosophy, which

63

Cf. ERW W 466. Cf. BR 121 ff. 65 Cf. ibid., pp. 136 f. 66 Cf. S. UCKO, op. cit., pp. 22, 35. 67 BR 20. 68 Ibid., p. 27. 64

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included God, being and nature in an indistinct unity,69 and in opposition to post-Aristotelian pantheism, which separated the metaphysical hypostatisation of the divine being, as absolute substance, from the empirical being of nature, only to re-unite them in a mystical and also materialist paradoxical identification (Spinoza’s Deus sive natura),70 Jewish monotheism affirmed the unity of being together with its transcendence in respect of nature in the idea of God’s uniqueness. Nevertheless, the affirmation that «God alone is» does not annul the world; on the contrary, it founds its existence. Inasmuch as the idea of the unique God is not a metaphysical, but a critical concept, it only has meaning in correlation with another term: in correlation with the world, i.e. in creation, and correlation with man, i.e. in revelation and redemption. The world is grounded in its existence in creation, i.e. in the «renewal of conservation».71 But the second meaning of Plato’s idea also emerges in the concept of «correlation» and, with it, the second, fundamental dimension of critical idealism: idea as end. The metaphysical question: «What is the relationship between the being of God and that of nature?» must be replaced by the question: «What is the relationship between the being of God and the existence of nature?» and the latter question refers back to an end: «What is God’s end for the existence of nature? Or also: What end has the existence of nature for God?»72 Thus investigation is shifted to the limit between logic and ethics, both because idea, inasmuch as it is end involves the passage from logic to ethics, and because God’s correlation with nature, God’s «creation» of the world, only has its justification in the light of God’s correlation with man (it is in this that the «retroaction» exercised on logic by the peculiarity of religion in respect of ethics consists): «Thus even if God alone represents the true being, nevertheless there must be a relationship with the being of nature in him, because of his necessary correlation with man».73 69

Cf. ibid., pp. 23 ff. Cf. ibid., pp. 27 f. 71 Ibid., p. 48. 72 Ibid., p. 49. 73 Ibid., p. 45; cf. ibid., pp. 50 f. 70

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Actually, the analysis of correlation between God and nature, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, is somewhat problematic. Cohen himself pointed out that the difference between «being» as the object of science and «existence» as an empirical given, was also a problem in logic, apart from religion.74 But then he showed he was more intent on denying the idea of God’s existence than saving the «being» of nature in the context of creation. What is the fate of the «being» of nature, the object of science, in creation? Creation founds the existence of the world, but the uniqueness of God appears to absolutely deny its being and thus drain science of its object. So how is God’s correlation with nature compatible with the method of science? There is no satisfactory f answer to this problem in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, since there is no adequate analysis of the method off religious correlation and of its relationship with scientific method. Cohen only briefly mentioned the problem, but did not give it adequate treatment.75 In his posthumous work, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, Cohen was to provide more substantial elements for answering these questions, both in consideration of the world as «becoming» in the face of the «permanence» of the divine being,76 and in consideration of the difference and complementarity of the religious correlation method in respect of the scientific method.77 The idea of the unique God is also the peculiar content of religion in the face of ethics; or rather, above all, in the face of ethics and only by way of it, as we have seen, in that of logic too. If ethics, in Plato’s approach, is able to posit the idea of the good as a problem, but cannot provide an adequate reply to the question of the good, monotheist religion, on the other hand, reveals to man what the good is. «It has been told thee, O man, what is good»: in these words of the prophet Micah (6:8) Cohen presented the essentials of religious revelation and

74

Cf. ibid., p. 46. Cf. ibid., p. 27. 76 Cf. Chapter Three: Die Schöpfung g in RV, V pp. 68 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 59 ff. (cf. also ibid., p. 53; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 45 f.). 77 Cf. ibid., pp. 8 ff., 105 ff., 276 f., 298 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 7 ff., 90 ff., 236 f., 255 f. 75

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the «essence of prophetism»,78 i.e. messianism. God’s revelation to man does not have as its content either God’s being or man’s existence79 (strangely enough here Cohen referred to the «State» as well as the «people» as the form of man’s empirical existence), but rather the «good», i.e. the «new man», «humanity» (Menschheit).80 The universal ideal of humanity and confidence, founded on divine assurance, in the future realisation of this ideal are the content of Jewish messianism, of the conception of history founded on monotheism: «With this new concept of man they [the prophets] annihilate the world of the gods and discoverr and reveal the Unique God d of one humanity (den Einzigen Gottt der Einen Menschheit)».81 Nevertheless, the question of the peculiarity of religion in respect of ethics cannot come to an end here. For Cohen the ideal of humanity was, without doubt, a product of Jewish monotheism and messianism, which Greek philosophy had never reached. However, a historical origin does not justify systematic peculiarity. Cohen had also acknowledged this historical primacy of Jewish monotheism in respect of the ideal of humanity in his previous works, without this preventing him from forecasting the resolution of religion in ethics. And, actually, in his previous ethical works he had already taken up the ideal of messianism from religion and elaborated it as an exclusively ethical content.82 The peculiar and irreducible aspect that religion adds to ethics is not the simple ideal of humanity as the end of history, but it is concepts that make possible the realisation of this end, fill its advancement, the development of history towards its end, with contents, that connect the individual with humanity. God reveals «what humanity is» to man: God does not restrict himself to indicating the ideal of humanity to man, but explains it, opens it up, not in the sense of a theoretical definition, but in that of a practical task. «The unique God (…) is unique for man, inasmuch as he must be thought as a unique man»:83 only in correlation with the unique God does man 78

BR 33. Cf. ibidem. 80 Ibidem. 81 Ibidem. 82 Cf. ERW W 53 ff., 214 ff., 406 f. 83 BR 61. 79

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realise his individuality, not in opposition to the universality of humanity, but in the way to realisation of his individuality in humanity and of humanity in the elevation and idealisation of individuality. The peculiarity of religion in respect of ethics is revelation; the content of revelation is messianism: but revelation and messianism are truly peculiar to religion and effectively enlarge the sphere of ethics only inasmuch as they are in a direct relationship with redemption.84

4. Religion and Ethics Both Natorp and Herrmann placed the individual at the centre of their reflections on religion, inasmuch as he is the subject of religious experience, and both of them criticised Cohen on this point, accusing him of not having devoted adequate attention to the individual in his ethics.85 But Natorp’s opposition to Cohen was less radical than Herrmann’s. In Natorp’s view the individual, the subject of religious experience, for whom he used terminology oriented entirely to expression of the latter’s originative, immediate and intimate character,86 and in whom he thus acknowledged an unobjectivisable character, was still a concept in philosophical thought, inasmuch as it proceeds, not in the direction of objectivisation, but in the opposite one, for which one returns to the subject, starting out from his objective products in culture, in accordance with the «reconstruction» method, theorised in his psychology. Herrmann, on the other hand, 84 There was an open dispute with Natorp on this point too: cf. P. NATORP, op. cit., pp. 119 f. 85 Cf. W. HERRMANN, Hermann Cohens Ethik, in «Die Christliche Welt» 21 (1907), n. 3, coll. 51-59, n. 10, coll. 222-228; repr. in ID., Schriften zur Grundlegung der Theologie, hg. von P. Fischer-Appelt, Kaiser, München 1966-1967, 2. Teil, pp. 101 f., 112 f.; ID., Die Auffassung der Religion in Cohens und Natorps Ethik, in «Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche» 19 (1909), n. 1, pp. 57-69, n. 2, pp. 162-175; repr. in ID., Schriften zur Grundlegung der Theologie, cit., pp. 212 ff.; P. NATORP, op. cit., p. 123. 866 «Bewußtheit», «unmittelbare Einheit des Bewußtseinsleben», «Individuität» (P. NATORP, op. cit., p. 45); «Selbstheit», «Lebenswille des Individuums», «Selbsterlebnis», «Selbstleben der Seele» (ID., Philosophie. Ihr Problem und ihre Probleme. Einführung in den kritischen Idealismus, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 19213, pp. 109 f.).

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denied philosophical discourse any possibility of access to the individual subject and his religious experience. He removed the latter, not only from scientific thought in the narrowest sense, but from all rational consideration, denying it generality and communicability, essential, indispensable conditions for rationality in any of its meanings, even the broadest one. Herrmann, in this much more of a follower of Schleiermacher than of Kant, continually returned to this theme and criticised both Cohen and Natorp on this point.87 This is perhaps why Cohen, though having taken critical note of the theme of individuality in Natorp’s philosophy of religion,88 in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie carried out his analysis of the theme of the individual in an explicit dialogue with Herrmann, postponing his confrontation with Natorp on more crucial, peculiar points of their dispute. Cohen had already dealt with Herrmann’s criticism on this subject in the second edition of Ethik des reinen Willens.89 He returned to the question in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie,90 maintaining that the further development of the theme of the individual there had adequately dealt with this criticism, though «within certain limits»: the limits regarded the internal requirements of his systematic philosophy. The best confirmation of this is the evident ffact that treatment of the concept of the individual in these pages of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie developed in a completely different direction from the one followed by Herrmann: if the latter’s objections to Cohen were all in the sense of the presumed abstraction of his idealist ethicsi, which was incapable of grasping the immediate existential concreteness of individual religious experience, Cohen’s answer consisted in enrichment of idealist ethics by means of a peculiar content of religion, i.e. man as an individual, but only inasmuch as it could be

87

Cf. W. HERRMANN, Die Auffassung der Religion in Cohens und Natorps Ethik, cit., p. 214. 88 As shown by his notes on Natorp’s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität: cf. H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 2, pp. 99 f. 89 Cf. ERW XIII, 351, 502. 90 Cf. BR 56.

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elevated to an ideal «homogeneous» meaning91 with that of the idea of humanity. In the pages devoted to man as an individual, there is a crucial passage, which is particularly revealing of the critical-idealist direction of Cohen’s thought on this theme as well, which, however, could be taken up as the main thread of the entire analysis. After repeating that only the idea of humanity confers his value and reality on man, Cohen continued as follows: «Man can and must rise up so high, and only at this height does he stand on morally well founded ground. Nevertheless, he stands on the ground even without it always offering him this moral foundation. He is a living being afflicted by the tribulations of the earth, and moral suffering and sickness threaten his life and destiny. Humanity does not remain his univocal guideline (…). So often has pure ethics been misunderstood, and this could, in the end, be the scandal felt in the struggle against eudaemonism: that the annihilation of the individuall is seen as the necessary consequence of this opposition, so that the ethics of humanity would become identical to the teaching of the annihilation of selff This consequence must be an error; it is simply based on misunderstanding of idea. Every idea requires the correlate of its phenomenon. Thus humanity requires man, so that man may purify himself towards humanity in the eternity of self-development».92 Here the critical-idealist approach of Cohen’s teaching on the individual was formulated with the greatest clarity. The fundamental principle of critical idealism: «To resolve the diversity of things in differences of ideas»,93 obliges the philosopher to start out from the phenomenon to find its foundation in idea; and this distinguishes it from the metaphysical deductivism off absolute idealism. Now, Kant had already noted the lack of adequate phenomena for moral ideas94 and Cohen had taken over this observation.95 If practical philosophy must «go beyond experience», this does not mean, however, that it 91

Cf. ibid., p. 60. Ibid., p. 53. 93 KTE E 270. 94 Cf. I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 4, p. 427. 95 Cf. KBE E 14. 92

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should not begin with experience. The relationship of «pure» thought with the empirical given was cleared up once and for all by Cohen in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis: «Nothing could be further from the truth than the layman’s suspicion that “pure” is empty, freed of its content. Impure content, which is not real content, is the sole opposite of “pure”; and this is only the case in the sense of the extension of “pure” to impure content, in order to turn it into pure content. This is the inevitable relationship of “pure” with content. Without this “pure” becomes senseless».96 If the moral idea does not have adequate phenomena in empirical reality, there are, nonetheless, inadequate phenomena, which can be elevated to it, idealised; there are «impure contents» which can be turned into «pure contents». Man in his «poverty and weakness»,97 i.e. the suffering, sinful individual, is precisely the correlate phenomenon of the idea of humanity. Ethics cannot ignore man in his concrete situation as an individual, not because it must be empirical, but because «every idea requires the correlate of its phenomenon», and thus, precisely inasmuch as it is critical-idealist, ethics must include the ideality of the phenomenon: «One cannot say that cognition of one’s own defects is not at all damaging for man, but is only useful. This is only valid if cognition makes him capable of improvement, and thus becomes help and consolation for him. Without the possibility of such help man’s condition would perhaps become one without consolation».98 Man the sinner is not, therefore, Cohen’s critical-idealist concept of the individual, as, on occasion, interpreters have mistakenly argued, but only the initial phenomenon, which must be transformed into the ideal individual of self-liberation from sin and of redemption. «Insertion» and «peculiarity» of religion in ethics depend precisely on this: from its capacity to integrate ethical treatment of the universal idea of humanity with the «passage» (Übergang)99 from the individual, in the factual situation of his guilt, to the ideal man of 96

LRE E 5; my italics. BR 53. 98 Ibid., pp. 53 f. 99 Ibid., p. 56. 97

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humanity.100 Man is poor and weak: «this self-recognition of weakness is the birthplace of religion»;101 but if religion starts out from here, it does not stop here, however: its task is the «elevation of the individual»;102 it must overcome the individual’s «sinfulness» (Sündhaftigkeit),103 without eliminating the individual himself, but rather purifying him, discovering and producing him,104 i.e. idealising him in what, with a symmetrical expression to the biblical one used for purified Israel, Cohen called the «remnant of the individual»,105 i.e. the individual freed from sin and suffering, forgiven and redeemed, who can now «go beyond himself and preserve himself (sich aufheben) in universality», while «also remaining an individual in universality».106 The initial stage of the sinning, suffering individual is therefore always overcome, in religion, by his idealisaation: it is only being aware of his sin that man discovers he is a sinner, but awareness of sin is already the beginning of «moral labour», which leads to forgiveness and redemption.107 It is also only in «compassion» (Mitleid) d that the other man is seen to be suffering,108 but in this he has already been idealised as «fellowman» (Mitmensch). All the degrees of the process of liberation from guilt, «self-knowledge» (Selbsterkenntnis), «repentance» (Buße ( ), «punishment» (Strafe), just as the degrees of liberation of the other man from suffering, recognition of the «poor man» as «devout» and «fellowman», «compassion» constitute the «bridge» connecting the factuality of suffering man the sinner with the ideality of humanity, the bridge by which religion transforms what for ethics was a «jump» into a «passage».109 100

Cf. ibid., pp. 55 f. Ibid., p. 54. 102 Ibid., p. 55. 103 Ibidem. 104 Cf. ibid., p. 56. 105 Ibid., pp. 56, 57. 106 Ibid., p. 56. 107 Cf. ibid., p. 57. 108 Cf. ibid., p. 76. In RV V 19; Eng. trans. cit., p. 17, Cohen explicitly stated that «suffering is for the sake of compassion». 109 Cf. BR 56. 101

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These successive meanings of the idealisation of man as an individual and of his realisation in humanity (which is at the same time realisation of humanity in the individual) come to maturity in religion thanks to consideration of man’s correlation with God. Man is also considered in correlation with h God in ethics, but only in the universal idea of humanity.110 It is only in religion that man, inasmuch as he is a sinning suffering individual, is placed in correlation with God, and it is only in this correlation with the God of forgiveness and redemption that man can free himself from sin,111 just as only in correlation with the God who loves, i.e. God the caring father, does the poor suffering man find assurance and protection.112 But it is once again necessary to point out that Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie lacks adequate further development of the theme of correlation, so that this work must be seen as a stage towards a more mature definitive elaboration, which was to come in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. Also concerning the peculiarity of religion in respect of ethics, and thus the theme of man as an individual, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie Cohen pointed to correlation between man and God as the central element of religion; but then he did not provide an adequate explanation of its meaning; thus the peculiarity of religion in respect of ethics is not entirely protected from all objections since the religious correlation method is not adequately characterised and justified in respect of the scientific method of ethics. Other problematic aspects of Cohen’s discourse also originated in this fundamental defect. The individual’s sin is discovered, as has been said, in the individual’s very self-awareness. But what is it that makes this self-awareness possible? Cohen rejected the cynical position of those who would like to have silenced human consciousness of man’s own guilt, actually, as we have seen, identifying in it the «birthplace» of religion,113 but what is its unsuppressible origin? Cohen answered this 110

Cf. ibid., p. 60. Cf. ibid., p. 65. 112 Cf. ibid., pp. 79 ff. 113 Cf. ibid., p. 54. 111

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question indirectly, when as an addition to and further development of Kant’s theory of «radical evil» as the «inversion of principles», and not in opposition to it, he affirmed the «radical good» in man, of which awareness of sin is a confirmation and not a denial114 and himself linked man’s yearning (Sehnsucht) for redemption with this principle. But the concept of the «radical good» in man was affirmed here, rather than explained and justified. Side by side with this, the concept of redemption by God was treated too vaguely. Admittedly, in his anxiety to keep his distance from the Christian mingling of man’s moral liberation labour and God’s redeeming grace Cohen insisted on the distinction between these two elements, but was not equally careful about defining what should be understood in the concept of redemption by God, i.e. in the idea of God the sole redeemer. He pointed to redemption as the «end» of man’s self-liberation labour but, precisely owing to the above mentioned distinction, which was so important for Cohen, redemption as man’s end cannot be confused with redemption as the work of God, i.e. redemption as man’s yearning and God the redeemer. And the distinction between «factor» and «end», which he used,115 is enough to point out the difference, but not define the work of God. When he wrote Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Cohen had already glimpsed the rightt direction for adequate further development of these themes,116 but only made a brief reference to it:117 it is the theme of the «holy spirit», which was to reach its full development in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, and thanks to which Cohen would fully exploit the implications of the

114

Cf. ibid., p. 59. Cf. ibid., p. 63. 116 This is also shown by the fact that, in the same year in which Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie was published (1915), Cohen also published the essay Der heilige Geist, in Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstage Jakob Guttmanns, hg. vom Vorstande der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums, Leipzig 1915, pp. 1-21; repr. in J 3 176-196/W 16 439-464, where he developed the concept of the «holy spirit» more thoroughly, already in the direction he would follow in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (cf. Chapter Fifteen, below). 117 Cf. BR 104 f., 123. 115

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concept of correlation, which can also provide an adequate answer to the problems raised here.

5. Religion and Aesthetics The parts of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie in which Cohen examined the relationship between religion and art already showed, on initial reading, a particular character, and a special progression in respect of the others. On closer reading, this initial impression becomes more substantial, when noting a particularly negative attitude on Cohen’s part to this subject. Admittedly, on more than one occasion, he showed the historical given of the continual intertwining of religion and art, in the religious destination of artistic products and the artistic character of religious and worship expressions; but he acknowledged the mere historical given, which he did not follow up with the hypothesis of a more profound affinity in content, as he had done in the case of the relationship of religion with other cultural spheres: on the contrary, he hastened to warn of the danger of mingling.118 The risk of confusion and mutual absorption exists for religion in its relations with every cultural sphere, and Cohen readily acknowledged this, but the relationship between religion and aesthetics is particularly dangerous in this respect: «Recently as in ancient times systematic delimitation must supervise feeling as the most difficult and most dangerous neighbour of religious consciousness».119 Furthermore, in the case of the relationship of religion with logic and ethics, Cohen moved from the analysis of a common conceptual sphere to then specify the differences in it and thus the peculiarity of religion in accordance with the principle, announced by Cohen himself with reference to the religion-ethics relationship,120 that the connection of religion with the other cultural spheres, and thus with the system, must first be verified, so as to go on to be able to define its peculiarity. In the case of the 118

Cf., for example, ibid., pp. 17 f., 39. Ibid., p. 94. 120 Cf. ibid., p. 10. 119

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relationship between religion and aesthetics, t Cohen did not proceed in this way. For all the concepts aapparently common to the two cultural spheres he examined: love, feeling, emotion and yearning, his discourse proceeded unilaterally in the direction of demonstrating that the mutual conceptual belonging of religion and art is pure illusion, and that, on the other hand, there is total diversity in the religious and aesthetic meaning of these concepts. What is the reason for this special attitude of Cohen’s? I do not think that it can have objective causes, since, at the content level, the relationship and interchange between religion and ethics (and also between religion and logic, inasmuch as it includes the ample, important problems of being and idea) were, for Cohen himself, much more intense than those between religion and aesthetics, and thus the risk of confusion too should be estimated to be greater. Actually, I think that the answer to our question should be found, above all, in subjective reasons. Cohen was particularly concerned about the danger of mingling religion and aesthetics, owing to the appearance and permanence of this attitude, which was more and more common among the philosophers and theologians of his time, some of them close to him, even within the Marburg school itself, in Paul Natorp’s philosophy of religion, and therefore his reaction was especially lively. It is the latter who was the particular polemical, ever present and deeply influential hub in all discussion of the religionaesthetics relationship in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. It was only in the last pages of the work121 that reference to Natorp became explicit, but it actually conditioned the whole of Cohen’s argument on this subject and, seeing the total opposition between the two Marburg philosophers on this point, it explains its solely negative character. Admittedly, Cohen’s irritation with Natorp, as it were, on the theme of religion does not emerge from the pages of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, though it can be seen, for example, in the former’s personal notes on the latter’s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität.122 As is required of philosophical argument, Cohen toned down his discourse, but this 121 122

Cf. ibid., pp. 121 ff. Cf. H. HOLZHEY, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 99-104.

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does not diminish his radically fierce rejection of Natorp’s approach; and this strongly conditioned the development of the theme in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. The specific direction of aesthetic consciousness, its methodological principle, is feeling, as Cohen had amply theorised in the two volumes of Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls. Feeling was also the central theme, on which he concentrated in the parts of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie dealing with aesthetics, but with the intention of confuting the apparent connection between art and religion.123 Feeling is a «false expression»124 for religion, at least in the meaning of the methodological principle of aesthetics, i.e. as «pure feeling»,125 and even more in the sense given to it by the Schleiermacher tradition, as the «feeling of infinity» (specified by Natorp, with stress on the formal character, in «infinity of feeling»).126 Though Cohen, on occasion, used the expression «religious feeling», the meaning he attributed to it was solely that of «emotion» ( (Rührung ),127 i.e. of a simple affect accompanying the religious attitude, not of its methodological principle. But, to follow Cohen in the order of his arguments, before directly facing the crucial theme of the feeling of infinity, the profound diversity between religion and aesthetics in respect of love, a fundamental expression of this feeling, must be considered. Between aesthetic and religious love, in Cohen’s view, there was nothing more than terminological coincidence: they are quite different in meaning. This difference is a consequence of the different methodological principle between the two spheres. Religion is founded on «correlation»: this principle, which is alien to aesthetics, is also an essential influence, with its peculiarity, on the content of religious concepts, determining an absolutely specific meaning. Thus the centrality of the principle of correlation in Cohen’s conception of religion also emerged in this context: it is the fundamental 123

Cf. BR 41. Ibid., p. 134. 125 Cf. ibid., p. 96. 126 Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, cit., p. 38. 127 Cf., for example, BR 96 f. 124

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distinguishing feature between religion and aesthetics.128 Correlation between man and God and that between man and man constitute the ground of religion. It is not a question of two different correlations, but a single relationship, and the absence of this principle in aesthetics causes man’s aesthetic relationship with God and the other man to be profoundly different from the religious one and the very concepts of «man» and «God» to be completely different in the two spheres.129 Natorp (like Herrmann) insisted on the individual character of religious experience. Cohen challenged it, not denying this characteristic of religion (on which, as we have seen, much of Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie concentrated), though overturning Natorp’s approach. Religion concerns man as an individual, above all inasmuch as he is discovered by the «Other» and not by himself, thus above all inasmuch as he is active-ethical, not aesthetic-sentimental love. For art the other man is only a means, matter, to reach the Self; he is not authentic content. While, for religion, the other man is the suffering individual, in his isolation, with whom the Self identifies himself in compassion.130 Religious love actively addresses the other man’s suffering, in his individuality and isolation, to eliminate it. Aesthetic love only contemplates the ugliness in the other suffering man, to elevate it to beauty by idealising it; it is incapable of understanding the suffering, and thus also of grasping man’s individuality, made manifest in it and imposing itself in it: aesthetic love only addresses the other man as a «type» of humanity. The clearest example of this aesthetic idealisation was, for Cohen, Greek tragedy: «Even the true art of suffering, tragedy, does not allow man to end up in suffering, but transfigures his death with the glory of the heroic characterr (…). Thus even in tragedy, man does nott remain a human individual, who I can understand in his suffering with my compassion».131 This is one of the passages132 where Cohen totally 128

Cf. ibid., pp. 85 f. Cf. ibid., p. 86. 130 Cf. ibid., p. 87. 131 Ibid., p. 88. 132 There are others in Cohen’s works: cf., for example, RV V 309; Eng. trans. cit., p. 265. 129

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rejected the tragic character of suffering for religious consciousness and relegated it to the level of aesthetic experience. On this point it is still interesting to note that Cohen took up the chance for open recognition of the value of Christianity. He explicitly contrasted the suffering Christ with the tragic hero: the former representing humanity, not as its aesthetic «type», but as a concrete individual, in the isolation of the soul, i.e. in pure correlation with God.133 This positive judgement on Christianity («This is the most profound sense of Christian mythology, which transforms it into religion»)134 is all the more interesting, because it is quite unusual in Cohen’s normal systematically polemical attitude to Christianity.135 This too is to be explained with reference to the dispute with Natorp. The latter, in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, had presented Christ as a figure of the tragic hero.136 Cohen challenged him, not only in the name of the philosophical meaning of religion, but also in that of the very Christianity that Natorp intended to represent. Spurred on by this dispute, Cohen actually intervened, quite unusually, in the defence of Christian dogma against its interpretation as an aesthetic symbol,137 once again in direct, albeit not explicit, opposition to Natorp.138 But the following objection could be raised: was it not Cohen himself who had stated that only idea can be loved,139 giving rise to lively disputes, the best known of which was with Martin Buber? How could Cohen now maintain that religious love, compassion, addresses man as a concrete individual, in his unrepeatable existence, actually in the dramatic factuality of his suffering? As a matter of fact, religious love, the compassion Cohen spoke of, in no way contradicts the principle of idealisation. It is only differentiated from aesthetic idealisation, which, like logical and ethical idealisation, consists in an

133

Cf. BR 93. Ibidem. 135 And in partial contradiction with BR 40. 136 Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, cit., p. 58. 137 Cf. BR 93 f. 138 Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, cit., pp. 60 f. 139 Cf. BR 82. 134

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«abstraction»,140 which, by neglecting man’s concrete individuality, only considers the «concept of man»,141 i.e. his «universality». Neither is the aesthetic «type» excluded from this reference to the universal: admittedly, the aesthetic «type» is not the universal concept, but the universal as a figure, and, nevertheless, it is also a product of the idealisation which is also abstraction from the concrete individual, in the particular form of symbolic representation. This is why aesthetic idealisation turns out to be inadequate towards the suffering individual: even when art considers man’s negative, finite aspect (though not his suffering, but his «ugliness»), it renders him sublime, «beautifies» him,142 and, in a way, removes him, thus showing its «sovereignty», but also its «indifference»143 concerning him.144 This is why aesthetic feeling, even in experience of the «ugly», is always «supreme and the purest pleasure, a joy absorbing the whole vital feeling».145 This type of idealisation does not take place in religious love; but is replaced by correlation, another type y of idealisation. Religion understands man as a concrete individual in his suffering, not because it stops at its mere empirical perception (which actually cannot take place, because suffering is, first of all, discovered in the Other, in fellowman, and thus compassion rises up above simple physical pain, to spiritual suffering),146 but because it posits it and understands it in the correlation relationship with God: «Religious man is, par excellence, an individual. And this absolute individuality is conferred on him by correlation with God».147 Owing to this idealisation, which does not abstract from man’s concrete reality, but actually thoroughly penetrates it in its meaning, «in religious love man’s nature in its corporeality moves back in the face of the soul and spirit, only in

140

Cf. ibid., p. 92. Cf. ibidem. 142 Cf. ÄRG 1 287. 143 Cf. BR 91. 144 Cf. ibid., p. 133. 145 Ibid., p. 92. 146 Cf. ibid., p. 98. 147 Ibid., p. 92. 141

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which can the religious concept of man reach fulfilment».148 Religious idealisation of suffering, i.e. its spiritualisation (in opposition to the aesthetic requirement of considering the figure in its corporeality), which is a synonym of correlation, does not produce escape from the drama of suffering itself, and thus a quietist attitude. On the contrary, precisely the aesthetic, tragic contemplation of suffering, which from art passes on to mysticism, encourages its passive sublimation.149 Thus love for man, compassion, recalls love for God, yearning (Sehnsucht): it is a question of two complementary aspects of the correlation of man as an individual with God and the other man. In the discovery of fellowman as a suffering individual, the Self of compassion also sets himself up as an individual and addresses God in yearning, which is expressed in prayer, in the Psalms,150 where morality is fully transformed into religion.151 Yearning is only apparently an aesthetic feeling, which is by itself taken over by religion; actually, the opposite is the case.152 God is not the direct object of aesthetic consciousness.153 When God becomes the content of a work of art (Cohen gave the example of Schiller’s An die Freude and Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte),154 this happens because religion, inasmuch as it is included in morality, constitutes a precondition155 of art.156 Thus yearning also exercised its influence over German lyric poetry and song, endowing it with religious afflatus.157 It is thus a question of the influence of religion on art, not vice-versa. Yearning is a particular r attitude of religious man in 148

Ibid., p. 90. Cf. ibid., p. 91. 150 Cohen had already dealt with the Psalms, particularly in ÄRG 2 35 ff., and in an article specifically devoted to the theme: Die Lyrik der Psalmen, published posthumously, in 1924, in J 1 237-261/W 16 165-198, though presumably written in 1914, i.e. at the same time as Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. 151 Cf. BR 100. 152 Cf. ibid., p. 99. 153 Cf. ibid., p. 90. 154 Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 103. 155 Cf. ibid., p. 91. 156 On knowledge and morality as preconditions of art, cf. ÄRG 1 79 ff., 254 ff.; ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 210 ff., 422 f. passim. 157 Cf. BR 103. 149

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correlation with God; it sets him up as an individual in the face of God, « «protection and help»158 of poor and suffering man, but also redeemer of the sinning individual.159 Messianism and redemption unite in man’s yearning towards God, in that of the individual appealing to the defender of the sufferer and redeemer of the sinner. Yearning must never be separated from faith (Glaube), i.e. from «trust (Vertrauen) in salvation of the human soul»160 by God. Religious spirituality is different from aesthetic vitalism in this too: religious faith in immortality, like confidence in God’s preservation of the human soul, is quite different from the natural teleology of aesthetics, i.e. from the concept of an infinite evolution of life.161 With yearning man’s religious relationship with the other man, love as compassion, is integrated with man’s relationship with God: religion is made manifest in the fullness of correlation. With it, furthermore, the apparent identity of art and religion shows all its illusory character. Cohen thus reached the very nucleus of his dispute with Natorp. He began from a greater distance, from his judgement on Schleiermacher, but his main objective was Natorp. Cohen did, however, acknowledge that Schleiermacher162 had the merit of specifically placing religion in philosophy, overcoming the inadequacy and ambiguity of Kant’s definition of religion as the «knowledge of all duties as divine commandments».163 With this definition Kant left room for the double danger of the reduction of religion to ethics, on the one hand, and the reduction of ethics to religion (with the elimination of moral autonomy), on the other. But Schleiermacher’s foundation of religion, as the feeling of infinity, solely in human consciousness, involved an even greater danger: pantheism. And by immediately foregrounding the indeterminate character of Schleiermacher’s «feeling of infinity», Cohen showed that he wanted to pass on, without mediation, to criticism of the 158

Ibid., p. 99. Cf. ibid., pp. 101 ff. 160 Ibid., p. 105. 161 Cohen was writing in a direct, albeit not explicit, dispute with Natorp on this point too: cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, cit., pp. 58 ff. 162 Cf. BR 94 f. 163 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 129. 159

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«infinity of feeling», a central concept in Natorp’s philosophy of religion. It was precisely on this central point that Cohen, albeit with all his personal respect, attacked Natorp explicitly:164 «magis amica veritas – was his justification – And our truth is the systematic foundation of religion».165 Cohen’s main criticism, as I have already mentioned, was that infinite feeling led to pantheism; but the arguments used in this criticism were conducted by means of an interesting contrast between infinite feeling and religious correlation. Actually, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Cohen had presented a more subtle and complex theory of the relationship between the finite and infinity in aesthetic feeling, by means of the articulation of the «beautiful» in the «sublime» and «humour».166 But polemical requirements prevailed over systematic ones, on this theme, in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. The fact that religion as the feeling of infinity is seen as the expression of an immediate, originative experience of consciousness (that Natorp himself related to myth)167 would seem to give it a decisive advantage for «critical» consideration of religion «within the borders of Humaneness». And Natorp advanced it as such, against any dogmatic conception of God’s transcendence. But, for Cohen, «the immediacy of feeling is an ambiguous advantage».168 On the contrary, it is precisely correlation, by maintaining the difference between man and God, and thus God’s transcendence, that grounds a correct critical conception of religion and the possibility of authentic understanding of man in his individuality and finiteness.169 In the indeterminacy of feeling, on the other hand, pantheist identification takes on a shape which entirely re-includes God in the sphere of the contents of human consciousness, but, at the same time, and paradoxically, makes man dependent on a mythical infinity, which escapes all rational control

164

Cf. BR 121 ff. Ibid., p. 121. 166 Cf. ÄRG 1 237 ff. 167 Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität, cit., pp. 97 f. 168 BR 95. 169 Cf. ibid., pp. 133 f. 165

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and is identified with God. This is the pantheism of myth170 and mysticism.171 This implies, from the point of view of the system of culture, «preponderance « of religion over all man’s spiritual forces»,172 owing to its presumed originativeness and fullness of meaning; from the anthropological viewpoint, excessive tension of man’s dimension, since the infinity of feeling is only identified with God instrumentally: actually, as is proper to aesthetic feeling, «that infinity coincides with the Ego of pure feeling».173

170

Cf. ibid., pp. 123 f. Cf. ibid., pp. 89 f. 172 Ibid., p. 121. 173 Ibid., p. 123. 171

CHAPTER TEN

HUMOUR IN RELIGION: PEACE AND CONTENTMENT

The concept of humour appears rather infrequently in Cohen’s Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, and then only in relatively minor contexts.1 However, it does take on an important role in part of the final chapter, in relation to the meaning of religious holidays, especially the Sabbath, which is the holiday par excellence. Here humour is linked to the important virtue of contentment, and is acknowledged as one of the most profound traits of the people of Israel, thanks to which they managed to survive, despite persecution: «Peace in the joy of the feast is a characteristic of the Jewish mentality. Considering the suffering that pervades the whole historical life of the Jew, it is surely a wonder that he could continually maintain such equanimity, such a genuine humor, without which he would never have been able to lift himself again and again from the deepest humiliations to proud heights; the Jewish holidays have brought about this wonder for him. On the Sabbath and on the feasts, joy governed the Ghetto no matter how much suffering had embittered the days of the week. Joy on a holiday was a religious duty, and hence it became an inviolable and vital power in the Jewish consciousness. But it could not have been established and preserved as such a power if peace had not been, and remained, such a strong magic power in the Jewish spirit».2 The importance of the link between religion and the aesthetic notion of humour, which emerges from these few lines from the final 1 2

Cf. RV V 64 f., 346; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 55 f., 298. Ibid., pp. 529 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 458 f.

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chapter of Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, the book’s highly significant climax, will be the subject of my reflections in this paper, though they will be necessarily brief. Before embarking on the task of discovering links and relationships between religion and humour, however, the subject must be carefully and rigorously circumscribed. Otherwise, Cohen’s thought would risk being seriously distorted. Actually, beginning immediately with the relationship and mutual influence of art and religion would appear to be the easiest and most obvious hypothesis, but it is also the most misleading and deviant one. Cohen, though being a systematic thinker, who was particularly attentive towards the multiple relationships between the different cultural fields, was always suspicious of the relationship between aesthetics and religion, never recognising any similarity between them. If we look, as is natural, at his previous writings, in which one would expect to find the formulation and articulation of this relationship, that is Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls and Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, we realise that such a formulation is missing. Cohen was so concerned about the risk of simplification and confusion between art and religion that, even where comparison is highlighted, the connection is never more than recognition of chance encounters and actual exchanges, whose meaning is secondary. It is the differences that are emphasised. It is legitimate to say that there is no serious analysis of the link between art and religion in Cohen’s writings. What we do have is a clear, repeated, statement of their differences, and of the need for distinguishing between them. It is not difficult to find the reasons for Cohen’s attitude, beginning with contingent historical ones. He was openly hostile to a common tendency of his time to see close links, going as far as actual identification, between ethics, aesthetics and religion. On the one hand, there was ethical aestheticism, with roots in English moral philosophy, which had been championed by Herbart in Germany, and, on the other, there was the widely accepted link between religion and art, based on the common notion of the «feeling of infinity», originating with Schleiermacher and strongly reinforced within liberal theology. This was the position of thinkers who were close to Cohen, such as the Marburg theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, and, especially Cohen’s great friend and collaborator Paul Natorp. Cohen’s reactions to these positions profoundly influenced his negative view of the

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relationship between aesthetics and religion, to the extent that he was unable to see any positive relationships beyond accidental encounters. A particularly significant example of this is that in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, an explicit study of the relationships between religion and the parts of the philosophical system, the chapter on Das Verhältnis der Religion zur Ästhetik actually concludes with nothing more than pointing out the radical differences between these two cultural fields.3 What then is the meaning of the inclusion of the notion of humour in the final chapter of Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums? How is this to be interpreted? Cohen’s justification, based on the right of religion to use elements of aesthetics, as it uses those of ethics, is surely insufficient.4 He studied in detail the relationship between ethics and religion throughout his career, not only in this posthumous work. At first sight, it would seem to be more interesting to investigate the «physiological sign» to which Cohen refers, that is the feeling of being moved. It is actually indicated as a symptom of the peace of the soul.5 Since Cohen also deals with the feeling of being moved, as a symptom in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls,6 this would seem to be a promising line of enquiry; it might even be that common element establishing the link. But this is also a dead end. The feeling of being moved is only apparently a a symptom common to art and religion. One can certainly speak of the aesthetic feeling of being moved, just as of the ethical and religious ones, but in the two cases the contents are radically different. In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Cohen emphasises the exclusively aesthetic character of this feeling, denying it any ethical or religious value: «the feeling of being moved is entirely aesthetic and not moral».7 He is careful to point out that when the ethical or religious feeling of being moved is referred to incorrectly, it is really a case of an aesthetic contribution in these different areas of the activity of consciousness. The characteristic trait 3

Cf. BR 85 ff. Cf. RV 525; Eng. trans. cit., p. 455. 5 Cf. ibidem. 6 Cf. ÄRG 1 204. 7 Ibid., Bd. 1. p. 206. 4

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showing the purely aesthetic character of the feeling of being moved consists of its total estrangement from presumed compassion (which here is still being used by Cohen in Schopenhauer’s sense of metaphysical identification with the Other). The aesthetic feeling of being moved is in no way an expression of sympathy for man’s suffering. It is the joyous expression of pure feeling, of love for «man’s nature», for «the prototype of humanity».8 In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Cohen returns to the question from a different viewpoint, though still emphasising the difference between art and religion. He acknowledges the ethical and religious feeling of being moved, but clearly separates it from the aesthetic one. Once again the criterion for this distinction is compassion for others, which here, however, takes on an authentic, positive meaning grounded in religious correlation. It is precisely the absence of compassion in the aesthetic feeling of being moved which distinguishes and isolates it, from the standpoint of ethical and historical importance, in respect of religious compassion, whose content lies precisely in the feeling of man’s weakness and suffering and in sympathy for it.9 Therefore the reference to the feeling of being moved as a feature shared by art and religion in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums appears too vague and simple to serve as a solid link and possible line of enquiry for the evaluation of the meaning of the reference to humour in the previously mentioned pages of this work. Let us now turn to Cohen’s constant interest in preserving the distinction between aesthetics on the one hand, and ethics and religion on the other. As we have seen, this attitude is undoubtedly conditioned by important contingent debates, but, as a contextualising and founding horizon for them, there is a more general and deeply philosophical reason behind this. Actually, Cohen saw the tendencies, in certain of his contemporaries, to confuse aesthetics, ethics and religion, which he opposed, as evidence of the root philosophical error of pantheism. In all his writings, he considered this in the above mentioned guise (or in that of naturalism, philosophy of identity, or 8 9

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 183 f., 204-210. Cf. BR 96-98, 102, 123.

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metaphysics) to be the antithesis of his own philosophy of critical idealism. The aspect, among many, of this struggle against pantheism that especially interests us here is the problem of the «ideal». When approaching the problem of the ideal, in his ethics, as in his aesthetics or in the essay on religion and the system, Cohen always points out how ambiguous this notion is. In this notion, ethical, aesthetic and religious meanings are confused even to the point of identification.10 Nevertheless, if the ambiguity and confusion of meanings to be found in the pantheistic viewpoint are to be avoided and opposed, the problem of the ideal is still crucial for Cohen, both in ethics and aesthetics and religion. What I should like to emphasise here is the development of a further investigation of this problem, which he pursued through the stages of ethics, aesthetics and religion, and of which two prominent traits are the aesthetic notion of humour and the religious ones of peace and contentment. They are not identical, but can be linked, because of their difference. Actually, we are dealing with a particular aspect of an important, fruitful direction in Cohen’s thought, to which his ever more profound and effective formulation of a philosophy of history is closely linked. Many interpreters, over a long period off time, have highlighted this dimension of his thought. All I aim to do here is to point out one further detail. As is well known, in Ethik des reinen Willens, the «ideal» is the central notion of the «applicative» part of the argument following the founding one. In Cohen’s ethics, pure foundation, which is by nature formal, is not formalistic (as it also is not in Kant), since it is followed by an applicative part, not as an appendix, but through internal, essential necessity. This part must respond to the concrete, historical actuality of the ethical idea, of the Being of What Ought to Be: «The most profound sense of purity», writes Cohen, «lies in its applicability, in the production of being, as the application of the pure concept. The application of purity aims at concrete actuality, but purity, in this way, carries out a radical change in this actuality».11 The ideal, which is only seen by Cohen here in its ethical meaning, 10 11

Cf., for example, ERW W 418 ff., 460 ff.; ÄRG 1 57; BR 39, 85. ERW 391.

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deliberately separated from the aesthetic one,12 means the aesthetic being, which, separated from existence, consists of actualisation (Verwirklichung). The ideal bestows the consistence of being, which frees it of the risk of being reduced to empty, illusory, utopian appearance, on the eternity of the infinite task, on its character of infinite progress. In the ethical ideal, perfection and infinite improvement are freed from contradiction and resolved in a fruitful correlation, which is expressed in the dynamics of the three moments: «perfection, improvement and the imperfection of improvement».13 As « is well known, Cohen introduces the idea of God as a guarantee of the actuality of ethical actualisation, though in the eternity of moral progress. In contrast with pantheism, which resolves the unity of nature and ethicality through identity in the hypostatisation in God of absolute perfection, Cohen’s critical idealism preserves and guarantees, through God’s transcendence, the mutual immanence of nature and ethicality, that is their separation and, at the same time, the certainty of their harmony, of the realisability of ethics in nature.14 Even from this outline, it is not difficult to perceive the strength of the requirement of actualisation in Cohen’s ethics, that is the essential connection in it between the founding and applicative moments, between pure ethics and the philosophy of history. The accent he places in the notion of the ideal, not only on its function as a «model», but also, and especially, on that as «attempted work» which is to actualise the perfection of the model, is a qualifying characteristic of his ethics, which makes the building on it of a philosophy of history possible. But for this to take place, a further, no less important need must be faced: the conceptual tools must be prepared for understanding how concrete man, the empirical individual, can be the protagonist of this actualisation of the ideal; how he can rise up to the universal self-consciousness of the law and thus actualise the ethical ideal in the concreteness of nature and history. This comes out very clearly from Cohen’s own words: «Does not the positive meaning of purity surely lie in a fruitful application? The pure will only shows its logical value 12

Cf. ibid., p. 421. Ibid., p. 424. 14 Cf. ibid., pp. 462 ff. 13

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in ethics if this purity is applied to the subject of will and action, if it shows itself in nature and history. Nature and history are therefore essential presuppositions of purity. It is not only the fundamental law of truth that places ideal and nature in correlation, but it is the initial, obvious premiss from which the method of purity starts out. Natural will is not pure will. Natural man is not pure man. The empirical I is not the pure I. But if natural men with a natural will and natural self-consciousness did not exist, the method of purity could not begin; it would have no sense at all».15 Cohen was unable to reach an entirely satisfactory solution, within the area of ethics and with its conceptual means. If peace, the full actualisation of the ethical ideal in nature and history, is not to remain mere utopia, it must be the object and task of the individual’s concrete historical actions. But since the individual can never reach the final fulfilment of this eternal task, the problem of the sense of his historical action and awareness of this sense arises, without which a dangerous path to scepticism would be opened up. Once the pantheistic solution has been rejected on a systematic principle («Man must not search for his peace in unity with the whole, but only in that small part of nature and history at his disposal»),16 the problem remains of how the individual can operate knowingly, and thus responsibly, in this «small part» he has been granted, in the certainty that his action is not illusory, but shares in the «eternal progress of ethical activity»17 towards peace. Undoubtedly, owing to Cohen’s special emphasis on the actualisation aspect of the ideal, the individual can be assured that his historical action will not be lost, since «the being of the ideal lasts much longer than the individual»18 and the idea of transcendent God «denies any form of pessimism and quietism»,19 because it means the «victory of good»,20 of which the individual can be certain, though not experiencing it definitively during his existence. This allows the individual to operate in history, not in the perspective 15

Ibid., pp. 436 f. Ibid., p. 461. 17 Ibid., p. 410. 18 Ibid., p. 426. 19 Ibid., p. 450. 20 Ibid., p. 452. 16

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of a mere struggle for survival, as would inevitably be the case if he only clung to awareness of the natural fact of his own individual existence side by side with and against other individual existences, but in the ideal perspective of universal peace, supported and justified by the inclusion of his own partial, finite activity in the «eternity of humanity».21 Nevertheless, something is missing from the argument: a satisfactory answer to the problem of how, in what way and by what route, the empirical individual can rise up to this meaning as an effective bearer of the ideal, as the real presence of humanity in history. It is not enough to answer that the individual is conscious of the eternity of moral progress beyond the finite limits of his own life, and thus, actually, beyond himself. He must be and must be aware of being the effective, fully responsible bearer of the ideal in the hic et nunc of that moment in history of which he is the protagonist, otherwise, there would be a risk of falling back on a Hegelian metaphysical conception of history, as the vicissitudes of idea, of which the individual is at most an unknowing instrument. But Cohen’s ethics has little to say about this, at least, it cannot say enough, owing to a root limit, residing in the very conditions of its foundation: that is in the methodologically limited perspective of the understanding of the individual. As is well known, owing to the methodical need to understand man starting out from the pure concept of him as «totality», in ethics, the individual can only be considered in the light of humanity. The opposite direction, that is consideration of humanity, starting out from the individual, which is necessary for completion of the picture of the philosophy of history, cannot find foundation and sufficient understanding in the ethics of the pure will. In Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen had to face up to this dimension, owing to internal needs of the argument on the applicability of pure ethics. This is the case, for example, in the chapter on Die Autonomie des Selbstbewusstseinss and in its four moments: self-legislation (Selbstgesetzgebung), g self-determination Selbsbestimmung) g , self-responsibilityy (Selbstverantwortung) g and self-preservation (Selbsterhaltung), g but the introduction of this perspective is easier to understand as a need than methodologically justified. It is precisely 21

Cf. ibid., pp. 426 f.

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with this consideration that, in the problem, Cohen clashes with the inability to understand the individual satisfactorily. The utmost limit of the ethics of the pure will on this side, the most advanced point it can reach, is represented by the last chapter dealing with Humaneness ((Die Humanität). This is where ethics reaches its methodological limit and opens up its perspective to aesthetics, by saying its last word on the individual. As is well known, Humaneness appears in Ethik des reinen Willens as a second degree virtue, correlative to justice. But its meaning is so abundant that it certainly oversteps the restricted borders of this systemic placement. Right from the first lines of the last chapter of Ethik des reinen Willens, devoted to Humaneness, it is quite clear that the latter, at the same time, raises the question and provides (at least an initial) answer (within ethics) concerning the fundamental limit of ethics itself, which has already been mentioned. The question is the difficult one of the actualisation of the ideal by the concrete individual and with reference to him. ««Justice», writes Cohen, «is the virtue of the ideal. It is in its very great superiority that its limit resides».22 The limit of justice is that of ethics in general; reference to the ideal, owing to the essentially «eternal» characterr of the Being of What Ought to Be, implies the continual inadequacy of its actualisation and the temptation of irony in respect of all finite actuality, which is the insurmountable condition of the concrete individual: «justice is the most difficult [virtue] to actualise, that which, concretely, is most distant from the ideal (…) actuality with its specific traits, in the face of the ideal, loses value, and therefore interest in the virtue of the ideal (…). The ideal seems, thus, to be repressed. Nevertheless, the specific, concrete case requires evaluation, treatment, to which justice itself does not appear to be able to do justice».23 Humaneness is the virtue to which Cohen turns in order to go beyond this limit, but it is only able to do this inasmuch as, at the same time, it leads ethics itself to its limit. It consists of «will and action inclining towards a relationship which sets aside judgement».24 This is only possible by giving free rein to feeling. This is still, 22

Ibid., p. 617. Ibidem. 24 Ibid., p. 623. 23

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admittedly, a moral feeling, owing to its contents, but, at the same time, it tends to join aesthetic feeling,25 since «honour» and love are no longer «suffixes» of the pure will, but joined in the anticipatory feeling of harmony: «If Humaneness means a virtue that has the task of showing the unilateral character of all virtues, it leads to the limit of an idea that is actually the limit of ethics. The idea of harmony (…) is this limiting idea of ethics. Humaneness is an originary human feeling, not a judgement on the value of man. The contrary affects of honour and love are here amalgamated».26 The treatment of Humaneness at the end off Ethik des reinen Willens is an important precedent for the argument on peace and contentment at the end of Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, as Cohen himself acknowledges there.27 Within the meaning of Humaneness he already considers much of the content referred to in the latter work with regard to peace and contentment, also making explicit reference to them.28 And yet, in Ethik des reinen Willens, Humaneness, as an opening limit of ethics, does not look to religion, but aesthetics. It is the «connection», the «road sign», «mediation» between ethics and art: it «opens (…) the perspective from ethics to aesthetics».29 Cohen’s orientation is certainly due to the emphasis on feeling in his argument on Humaneness spontaneously leading on towards aesthetics and away from religion, as a result of his already mentioned distrust of the contemporary conception of religion. But there is a further, equally important element behind this orientation: that is, the hypothesis of being able to elaborate a satisfactory response, in aesthetics, to the still open problem of the fulfilment in the individual and through the concrete individual of the actualisation of the ideal. At the very end of Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen refers to the well known lines from Goethe’s Faust, often quoted or alluded to, not only in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, to the extent that they can be seen as a 25

Cf. ibid., pp. 635 ff. Ibid., pp. 632 f. 27 Cf. RV 515; Eng. trans. cit., p. 446. 28 Cf. ERW W 631. 29 Cf. ibid., pp. 635 f. 26

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kind of personal motto: «Here insufficiency / becomes fulfilment; / Here the indescribable / is accomplished» ((Das Unzulängliche / Hier wird’s Ereignis; / Das Unbeschreibliche / Hier ist’s gethan).30 In this context, the core, problem and resoluble hypothesis of the reference lies in the final verb ist gethan. The passage from Handlung to Tat appears to Cohen, in this phase, to be the necessary condition, the appropriate route, to radically resolve the problem of the actualisation of the ideal, and this route leads to aesthetics. In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls,31 Cohen returns to his argument on Humaneness and its content which had already emerged in Ethik des reinen Willens, and which can be summed up in the unification of honour and love. He adds another important m aspect with reference to Humaneness as faith in good, thus being able to point out the specific contribution of aesthetics to Humaneness, which goes beyond the limits of ethics, together with the link between ethics and aesthetics. This formulation of the meaning of Humaneness gives a clear idea of its ethical valency, but, while, in ethics, this important, authentic, value of Humaneness, though present, can only consist of a «need», a «foundation», for religion,32 of a «hope», in art it takes on the actuality of «accomplishment», of «fulfilment»:33 « «Das Unzulängliche / Hier wird’s Ereignis; / Das Unbeschreibliche / Hier ist’s gethan». Thus Humaneness manages to accomplish its important function as a steadfast barrier against pessimism and scepticism.34 The individual, 30

J. W. GOETHE, Faust: Eine Tragödie, in Goethes Werke, hg. im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen, fotomechanischer Nachdruck der im Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, Weimar 1887-1919 eschienenen Weimarer Ausgabe oder Sophien-Ausgabe, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1987, 1. Abt., Bd. 15, p. 337. 31 Cf. ÄRG 1 229 ff. 32 In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (1912), Cohen mostly treats religion in Schleiermacher’s sense, which he regarded as negative, of «feeling of infinity». This is of interest for the chronological development of his thought. Understanding religion as «feeling of finitude» (BR ( 134), which is the final outcome of his reaction to Schleiermacher’s philosophy of religion is still practically absent from Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, while it became a decisive feature of his own philosophy of religion, at least as of 1915, the year Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie was published. 33 Cf. ÄRG 1 230. 34 Cohen saw the temptation of pessimism and scepticism as a serious, constant risk, not only for ethics, but also aesthetics. Just as he posits Humaneness as a solid

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the artist as a receiver, carries out the work or contemplates it, inclining towards the ideal, but also in the certainty, directly experienced in the present, of the actualisation of the ideal itself, and both these experiences are depicted in the work of art. Owing to this aesthetic specificity, Humaneness is on the border of ethics, has a fundamental function for ethics, but is not itself entirely reducible to ethics: «Art almost seems to go beyond ethics here», Cohen notes.35 Humaneness is rather a loan from aesthetics to ethics. As a virtue, it is a «route to morality», but an «artistic route to morality».36 This approach obviously recalls Schiller’s conception of «aesthetic education», explicitly appreciated by Cohen, though wisely delimited in its value in respect of the romantic (and Herbartian) inclination to the aestheticisation of ethics.37 Thus Cohen seems certain that he could find the actuality of the actualisation in the consciousness of the acting concrete individual in art, this still being an open question for ethics. This is an important strand in the whole web of his aesthetics, and, I believe, one of the crucial reasons for his turning to aesthetics as a further step in the development of his thought, apart from its being the third member of the system. What more directly concerns my line of investigation here is the fact that this particular, important meaning of the fulfilment of actualisation, of the feeling of fulfilment f for the individual, in Cohen’s view, is what is represented by humour in art. In the aesthetic context, Cohen responds to the pantheistic identification of good, beautiful and God with the distinction and highlighting of the specificity of the beautiful. The process of foundation and definition of the «purely aesthetic»38 ideal opposes romantic aesthetics of the sublime, for defence from this danger, elsewhere, he invests humour with this task. This is the case in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (cf., for example, ibid., Bd. 1, p. 306; Bd. 2, p. 180) and previously in his essay on Mozarts Operntexte (cf. H. COHEN, Mozarts Operntexte. Zur 150. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages, in S 1 512 f.). This is significant for what I shall have to say further on about humour. It should also be noted that Cohen also posits the peace-contentment correlation as the contradiction of all pessimism: cf. RV 524, 527; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 454, 456 f. 35 ÄRG 1 230. 36 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 178. 37 Cf. ERW 635; ÄRG 1 234 ff.; ibid., Bd. 2, p. 76. 38 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 109.

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which Cohen believed Kant a was seriously responsible. This takes place by two important steps. Firstly, the sublime is no longer considered alongside the beautiful, which is inevitably absorbed in its meaning. It is placed, together with humour, within the beautiful, as a «sub-concept».39 Secondly, in the correlation between sublime and humour, the dominance of the ethical impulse is recognised in humour, thus leaving aside the mingling of ethics, religion and aesthetics in the sublime. In this way Cohen, in the conception of the aesthetic ideal, rejects both the danger of Herbart’s aestheticisation of ethics, and the identification, originating with Schleiermacher, of art and religion, on the basis of the presumed common relationship of the feeling of infinity. Humour has a crucial function in this process. Firstly it is entrusted with the meaning of art as the accomplished actualisation of the ideal, which differentiates it from ethics, and, at the same time, the meaning of the beautiful as the feeling of love for finiteness, which differentiates art from religion, inasmuch as the latter is the presumed feeling of infinity. Cohen explicitly states that humour alone, not the sublime, allows the foundation of the independence of art from ethics and religion.40 At the same time, humour is that aspect of the feeling of the beautiful allowing art to provide an answer to the problem of the actuality of actualisation, still an open question in ethics: « «Hier wird das gesuchte Ich wirkliches Ereignis».41 Artistic activity, inasmuch as it is poiesis, is characterised by the essential link between the infinite inclination and actualisation in the finite work. But the work is not beautiful, not a work of art, if it does not figuratively express the double feeling of the infinite inclination and real fulfilment of this inclination in the finite. The feeling of the sublime and that of humour, joined in the feeling of the beautiful, constitute the mediation between the real individual, who accomplishes and contemplates the work, and the work itself. In this mediation humour is not so much fulfilment as the feeling of

39

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 256 passim. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 332 ff. 41 Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 199. 40

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fulfilment, the individual’s certainty that the infinite inclination of the ideal actually finds its figure in real finiteness. Humour is the feeling of actualised fulfilment, of victory, of peace, in the infinite inclination towards the ideal. It is not only Cohen’s insistence on the meaning of humour as peace that interests us here, but also, and above all, the meaning of humour as the real foretaste of peace in the individual’s feeling. This is humour: not so much the fulfilment of the work, but the «formation»,42 the hypothesis, the awareness of fulfilment experienced as a feeling as the source of the work’s productive activity. Humour (like the sublime) is not the result of the work of art, but its productive principle. The feeling of fulfilment does not spring from the work’s fulfilment, but precedes it and makes it possible, just as the infinite inclination towards fulfilment does in the sublime. Having this meaning, humour is mediation between the individual and the work; it is the root of the individual’s ability to depict the infinite ideal of the imperfection of the finite. In humour, peace actually becomes the «certainty of conviction», the «rest and fulfilment» of the feeling of self, through which the individual actualises the Self, and which constitute the meaning of Humaneness.43 Progress has definitely been made in further investigation of the ethical meaning of Humaneness and in coming closer to the religious meaning of the peace-contentment correlation. But the temptation must still be resisted to simply weld the links in the chain, presuming that a non-existent continuity actually exists. Cohen’s explicit intention, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, to ground the difference, rather than the similarity, between art and religion, in the sense of feeling of infinity, in humour, opposes this presumed continuity: «preference must here be accorded to humour in respect of the sublime (…) the specificity of the beautiful is not clarified, if it is only thought under the moment of the sublime. Humour, on the other hand, is constituted on itself and constitutes art on itself from the outset. Religion has no humour».44 Cohen’s new position regarding religion also opposed this continuity, from a different viewpoint, three years after Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, in the 1915 work Der Begriff der Religion im System 42

Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 271. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 231. 44 Ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 333 f. 43

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der Philosophie. Here the aesthetic ideal is radically and systematically criticised and reduced to its limits, surprisingly, in the name of its inability to comprehend the concrete historical actuality of the finite. Again, the contingent object of discussion is the pantheistic identification of art and religion on the basis of a common feeling of infinity. However, the discussion is no longer carried on from the viewpoint of art, but from that of monotheism, the authentic religion. Despite the undoubted distortion of the concept of art, owing to the unilateral, polemical emphasis on the «feeling of infinity», causing the important function of humour to be almost totally overlooked, the limits of art pointed out by Cohen in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie are significant. Their importance extends beyond the immediate discussion to the formulation of the concept of religion in Cohen’s last works, and, in particular, in the further investigation of the theme that interests us here: the historical actualisation of the ideal by the individual. The various criticisms of art to be found in this work all have a common denominator: the inability of art to understand the individual’s concrete limitations. Aesthetic love turns out to be unable to reach the concrete individual in his weakness and imperfection, sinfulness and suffering. It exclusively concerns the individual as a «type». Even when it appeals to his imperfection, to «ugliness», it is only to transfigure it into beauty.45 Religion alone is able to discover and found the concrete individual in his characteristic imperfection and weakness, that is as a sinning and suffering individual, and to carry out the «crossover» (Übergang)46of the individual to humanity, in such a way that this «crossover» does not eliminate the individual, but preserves him fully actualised in humanity. This is possible, owing to correlation with God, the specifically religious approach to the problem of man as an individual. In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie and even more in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, the correlation between God and man is

45 46

Cf. BR 85 ff. Cf. ibid., pp. 55 f.

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the mainstay of religion. In this guise it is also the last and most mature word from Cohen on the problem of the historical actualisation of the ideal. It is useful here to return briefly to this problem from a specific viewpoint: the meaning of the idea of the good. This fundamental Platonic theme, as is well known, was a constant problem for Cohen, throughout his career, and it forced him to attempt various approaches and solutions to the serious difficulties he saw there, without the solutions attempted before his last religious works proving successful. Cohen always saw the transcendence of the good as the main, most difficult problem. I am unable here to cover all the stages in his thought on this question, and will limit myself to noting that he reached a turning point in his last religious works, this being made possible by religious correlation. In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie,47 and even more in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums,48 good becomes an attribute of God: God is the Good One and the Holy One. Thus transcendence is shifted from good to God and, by means of correlation (that is the good itself), it is situated in a real, concrete relationship with man’s historical limitations. This is nothing more than the meaning of the holy spirit, that is of the essential characteristic of religious correlation, through which man, as a concrete, natural, historical individual is actually understood and founded in his characteristic weakness, sinfulness and suffering, and precisely in this, or rather in liberation from this, he is raised to the role of protagonist of the history of humanity, through redemption and messianism. The individual of religious correlation is more capable of historical actualisation than the individual of art, because his love for man is not only idealisation transfiguring ugliness into the beauty of the work of art, but the practical idealisation transforming his own sin and the suffering of others with the moral and historical labour of his own sanctification, and the liberation of others from suffering. The religious individual is the actual historical individual, i.e. he is able to intervene in actuality with concrete acts bearing the ideal meaning of 47 48

Cf. ibid., pp. 34 ff. Cf. RV 243 ff., 343 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 208 ff., 294 f.

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moral action, for the messianic actualisation of the idea of humanity and peace. The superiority of the historical individual’s foundation, in respect of the exclusively ethical and aesthetic one, precisely consists of correlation with God: «Ye shall be holy; for I the Eternal your God am holy».49 In religion the important aesthetic function of humour finds itself, left behind and reinforced, in the correlation between God and man. Faith in holy, good God allows the individual’s historical action as liberation from his own sin and elimination of the suffering of others, which constitutes the messianic actualisation of humanity. That calm certainty of the fulfilment of the actualisation of the ideal, which alone allows the individual’s responsibility for the never fulfilled actualisation, against all pessimism, quietism and scepticism, that calm certainty that Cohen had considered in the ethical virtue of Humaneness and in the aesthetic feeling of humour, finds further, more profound and solid foundation in the aspect of religious correlation represented by the peace-contentment link. Shalom, Cohen notes, originally meant «perfection» and thus becomes «the symbol of human perfection, the harmony of the individual, and the perfection of the human race (…) the token of the Messianic Age (…) the embodiment of all morality».50 Peace as a divine attribute is united with truth. It means the unity and uniqueness of God as a guarantee of the unity of nature and morality,51 just as ethics taught, and is thus the goal for man and the whole of actuality, the «principle of finality».52 But religious correlation takes a step forward in the sense of the actuality of this ideal. Peace, as a divine attribute founds and allows its actuality, anticipated in the individual. Actually, it is only real inasmuch as it is linked to it, that is to the peace of the soul, to contentment: «Peace, as the highest goal of man, is at the same time the highest strength of man. Peace as a way of virtue is the final step in the development of man. Peace is perfection. 49

Lv. 19:2; cf. RV 111, 239; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 96, 205. Cf. ibid., p. 516; Eng. trans. cit., p. 447. 51 Cf. ibid., p. 517; Eng. trans. cit., p. 447. 52 Cf. ibidem. 50

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Self-perfection is on the track of the final goal when it reaches the peace of the soul».53 «Perfection, improvement, imperfection of improvement», thus Cohen, in Ethik des reinen Willens, articulated the dynamism of the meaning of the ideal. Perfection can only be the first moment, since it is only here that the foundation of moral labour lies. This is the very sense of the ideal. But now, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, through religious correlation, the first position assigned to perfection does not only mean that the ideal is the model of historical action, but also that it is the «power», the driving force of historical action in the individual, against all scepticism, quietism and pessimism: «The fundamental power of the human soul is as certainly peace, as peace is the goal of human history».54 The difficult problem that, as we have seen, accompanied Cohen throughout the development of his thought, the very problem of the ideal: the difficulty of reconciling the infinity of the ideal with its historical actualisation by the concrete individual, at last finds its ultimate response in religious correlation. The correlation between peace and contentment is the formula of this response. Contentment is the real, historically effective anticipation, in the heart of man, as a concrete individual, of the ultimate goal, of the divine attribute of peace. This anticipation is hardly att all illusory, being so effectively real as to be the driving force behind the individual’s historical action, the condition of his participation in eternal progress. This is true, both for the moral labour that the individual accomplishes for his own liberation from sin, and for the moral action of compassion for the liberation of other men from suffering. Concerning the first aspect, it should be recalled that Cohen emphasises the «unification of the heart» as the condition of self-liberation from sin,55 but «peace of soul is to establish the unity of the heart».56 The second aspect is even more evident, since only the radical denial and complete elimination of hatred, on principle devoid of any justification, in the individual’s 53

Ibid., p. 518; Eng. trans. cit., p. 449. Ibid., p. 525; Eng. trans. cit., p. 454. 55 Cf. ibid., pp. 440 f., 483 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 379, 416 f. 56 Ibid., p. 520; Eng. trans. cit., p. 450. 54

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heart allows the latter to open up to compassion for the suffering of others, without discrimination. This uprooting of hatred from the individual’s heart is also the result of the anticipation of peace by contentment.57 Peace, actually anticipated in the virtue of the historical individual’s contentment, is thus the condition for the latter’s participation in the historical actualisation of the ideal: through it he becomes the «messianic man».58 Religious holidays, the Feast of the Law,59 like the Feast of Tabernacles,60 and, above all, the Sabbath,61 are the visible, historically manifest phenomena of the anticipation of peace in contentment, of which joy is the essential expression, and of the power of historical actualisation of this anticipation: «The conquest of the world, which has been achieved by the Sabbath, does not permit one to abandon the hope, the confidence, that this joy is no empty illusion, and that the peace which radiates in this joy is, and will remain, a fundamental power of the human race. Among all the ways of virtue, peace is perhaps the most forceful, magical power. This view is not contradicted by the fact that the power of peace is very much doubted and contested. This is so because peace is the most inward, the most hidden, and therefore the least revealed power of human, of historical consciousness».62 The joy of the Sabbath is what immediately and most obviously connects the religious virtue of contentment to the aesthetic feeling of humour: «As once Isaiah called, “Comfort ye, comfort ye my people”, so the peace of humor spread its wings over the people of the Ghetto».63 But, in Cohen’s interpretation, there is no inclination to the aestheticisation of religion. Humour is not the truth of the Sabbath. On the contrary, one could say that the Sabbath is the truth of humour, because only in religious correlation does the feeling of the anticipated actuality of peace, which in humour only produces the «figure» of the 57

Cf. ibid., pp. 521 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 451 ff. Cf. ibid., pp. 517, 520; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 448, 450. 59 Cf. ibid., pp. 519 f., 528; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 450, 457 f. 60 Cf. ibid., pp. 523, 528; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 453, 457. 61 Cf. ibid., pp. 528 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 457 ff. 62 Ibid., p. 529; Eng. trans. cit., p. 458. 63 Ibid., p. 530; Eng. trans. cit., p. 459. 58

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ideal of the work of art, through contentment, allow the individual’s messianic action for the production of the actuality of peace in human history. It is no accident that, while in aesthetic feeling humour is parallel to the sublime, in history, contentment, the religious analogue of humour (whose aesthetic expression lies in humour alone) is parallel to Kiddush Hashem, to martyrdom.64 Martyrdom is the effective historical actualisation of the infinite inclination to the ideal, which is only figuratively present in the sublime. Thus it reproduces the same analogy and the same decisive difference that exists between contentment and humour. So far we have encountered two fundamental moments in Cohen’s further investigation of the problem of the actualisation of the ideal: humour and the peace-contentment correlation. From this viewpoint, aesthetic humour is a fundamental innovation in respect of ethics, and particularly the virtue of Humaneness.65 Cohen thus clarifies a decisive point for the individual’s actualisation of the ideal: it is not only the infinite inclination to actualisation, but also the feeling of fulfilled actualisation that is required for the production of the beautiful. Humour is not the conclusion at the end of the infinite inclination, but the «methodical formation», the hypothesis of conclusion.66 It does not therefore interrupt the infinite movement of the inclination, proper to the sublime, but, rather, makes it possible, qualifying it as an inclination to perfection, as improvement.67 With the introduction of humour as an essential moment of the feeling of the beautiful, Cohen had cleared up one question: the seeming aporia between the transcendent perfection of the ideal and the infinite imperfection of the work for its actualisation, which had already been overcome by ethics in the correlation between perfection, improvement and the imperfection off improvement, in the individual’s anticipation of perfection finds the effective driving force to start up and maintain its inclination in the direction of actualisation. In 64

Cf. ibidem. It is a novelty, to all intents and purposes, despite Cohen’s remarks, in the chapter on Humaneness in Ethik des reinen Willens, on Kant’s teaching of «natural disposition for the good», cf. ERW 626 f. 66 Cf. ÄRG 1 271. 67 Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 272. 65

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humour, the advance awareness of the actuality of fulfilment does not deprive the infinite inclination of its dynamism. Actually it fuels and reinforces it, freeing it from «toils» and «trouble»,68 from the doubts of scepticism and pessimism. The step ahead consisting of the peace-contentment correlation with respect to humour is no less important. The lesson from humour is not rejected: it wholly enters religious contentment. The decisive difference lies in the historical effectiveness of that anticipation. In his aesthetics, Cohen represents a classic solution of the problem of the actualisation of the ideal: in the face of the problem of the transcendence of the ideal, of the Platonic idea of the good, the beautiful constitutes the possibility of mediation through which man, in the finiteness of his individuality, by his own labour can actualise the infinity of the ideal, without inclining to the illusory, mystical overcoming of his own finiteness in pantheistic identification with the infinity of the ideal. In art, therefore, yearning (Sehnsucht) towards the ideal, towards humanity (Menschheit) is actualised in the figure, in the nature of man ((Natur des Menschen).69 In religious correlation, on the other hand, transcendence becomes an attribute of God (and this is in continuity with what had already been established in ethics). The ideal, good or holiness, can thus be restored to complete homogeneity in respect of the individual and his historical action. It is the very correlation between God and man.70 Both art and religion incline towards transcendent infinity, but, while in art, the ideal itself, the goal, and the transcendent, which can only be figuratively actualised, and thus the anticipation of fulfilment can only be the anticipation of its figure, in religion, God is the transcendent, who is not identified with the ideal, with the good, but is rather its ground, the Good One. In this way «the individual is now rescued ((gerettet)» and his anticipation of the good, which has the solidity of faith, becomes an effective power of historical actualisation.71 The peace-contentment correlation is the 68

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 275. Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, pp. 266 f. 70 Cf. BR 32 f.; RV 39, 121, 124; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 33, 104, 106 f. 71 Cf. ibid., pp. 434 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 374 ff. 69

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formulation of this anticipated aspect of fulfilment: since peace, the fulfilled ideal of humanity is originally actualised in divine love, as an attribute of God, it can actually be anticipated by the individual, in the virtue of contentment, and this anticipation becomes an effective power of historical actualisation of the ideal itself. Therefore, «in the testimony of religion, peace is the characteristic of the historical world» and, at the same time, «the fundamental power of the human soul is as certainly peace, as peace is the goal of human history».72 Peace is religious power, whose aesthetic expression is humour, which has bestowed on Israel, and which bestows on every man and every people willing to receive it, the consolation of the present, survival, redemption and effective messianic action.73 This brief outline has certainly only been able to present the fundamental lines of Cohen’s enquiry. It needs to be investigated further both from the point of view of its potentiality, and also in the problems it raises. The first problem that needs to be faced is that of religious correlation in general, as thought by Cohen: that is, whether it represents an opening (or, from another viewpoint, surrender) to ontology, and, if this is the case, whether this opening can be reconciled with the method of purity or, more generally, with critical idealism. At the moment my tentative hypothesis is that Cohen’s religious correlation is not incompatible with his critical idealism. But the importance and complexity of the question do not allow discussion here, on the sidelines of another argument, but suggest the need for separate treatment, on some other occasion. This is also true of consideration of the final pages of Religion der Vernunftt concerning death,74 which are an integral part of Cohen’s argument on peace. They are arguably the most important of his remarks on death and individual immortality, owing to their explicit, positive character. For this reason, the subject and the explicit and implicit themes it offers deserve separate treatment.

72

Ibid., pp. 524 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 454. Also in BR 134 Cohen speaks of «saving individuality» (Rettung ( der Individualität). 73 Cf. RV 529 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 458 ff. 74 Cf. ibid., pp. 531 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 460 ff.

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I should like to conclude on a different note. While I was writing this paper, I, like all of us, I imagine, watched the daily drama of the civil war in former Jugoslavia unfold on television. The bitter, mutual hatred on the faces of those people and the terrible suffering caused by that hatred, in that particular, as in every, war, were a continual source of complications in my reflections on what I was writing, but also on what Cohen had written, during the dark period of the First World War massacres. I believe that it is our duty to be loyal to Cohen and his thought, to his endeavors to write of peace in times of hatred and suffering, that were his and are ours, to recall and highlight once again the fact that the historical optimism, which he believed was the only principle of history,75 is never, and can never be separated from man’s active responsibility. Man’s historical action is made possible by faith and hope for peace, but this, in turn, can only be actualised in the individual’s ability to act in history with a pure heart, and uproot any justification of hatred from himself. That messianic individual is, must be every one of us.

~Il'iv'Wry> ~Alv. Wla]v; (Ps 122:6)

75

Cf. ibid., pp. 523 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 453 f.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

LYRIC POETRY AND PRAYER

Although the relationship with lyric poetry is only one aspect of Cohen’s reflections on the meaning of prayer in monotheism, it is an important, especially apt interpretative key for the illustration of the essential meaning he attributes to prayer in religious correlation. The comparison between aesthetics and religion, implied by this theme, recalls the process of reflection on and further investigation of the problem of the individual’s participation in the historical process of the realisation of the ideal, on which Cohen concentrated his philosophical efforts after the publication of Ethik des reinen Willens, in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls and his writings on the philosophy of religion up to Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. I have already provided an account of the main points of this process.1 My aim here is to investigate its characteristics in relation to the specific theme of prayer. The first «analogy»2 between prayer and lyric poetry highlighted by Cohen in the psalm as a model of prayer in monotheist religion lies in the fact that the subject, who is neither god nor hero, the praying I, is the pure result produced in the life experience of love. As in all analogies, the common feature is accompanied by a difference, a peculiarity of prayer in respect of the aesthetic life experience in lyric poetry: in prayer the life experience of love is totally free of any non allegorical reference not only to sexual intercourse, but also to its idealisation in the Platonic eros.3 Here Cohen sees a purer realisation of the process of «internalisation» (Verinnerlichung) also essential to 1

Cf. Humour in Religion: Peace and Contentment, in Chapter Ten of this volume. Cf. RV V 433; Eng. trans. cit., p. 373. 3 Cf. ibidem. 2

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the aesthetic production of pure feeling.4 Here then the idea is suggested of a specific feature of religion in respect of art with reference to a common procedure. Secondly, an analogy of prayer with lyric poetry is posited owing to the common form taken on by yearning, the affect of love, in both of them.5 The analogy also involves a difference in this case. In religion the effective anticipation of the future, trust in redemption, is realised, while in lyric poetry it remains a figure, an immediate life feeling (Lebensgefühl ( l).6 The analogy between lyric poetry and prayer in Religion der Vernunft is the result of a complex process of development, a brief account of which seems desirable at this point. Lyric poetry occupies a significant role in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, since not only is the unification of nature and spirit in the pure feeling of love fully realised in it, but this realisation takes place through the production of the individual subject.7 This happens because the aesthetic process of internalisation, i.e. of the metaphorical unification of nature and morality in the subject’s feeling, is realised through yearning, which is «the most intimate internalisation simply by means of the idealisation of the Self».8 In yearning the double contrasting feeling binding lover and beloved, the I and his you, i.e. the expansive inclination and the connected depressive feeling of loneliness, is overcome not through elimination, but through the positive life f experience of this infinite inclination towards that you. It is the true you, which, despite being unreachable, actually for this very reason can alone complete the I in his individuality and can produce this individuality in the ideal purity of feeling.9 4

Cf. ibidem. For the aesthetic notion of Verinnerlichung, cf. ÄRG 1 379 ff. Cf. RV 434 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 373 ff. 6 «The individual is now rescued (…). Now the individual is no longer rooted only in his natural feeling for life; now his moral foundation has been sanctioned» (ibid., d p. 436; Eng. trans. cit., p. 376). 7 Cf. ÄRG 1 392; ibid., Bd. 2, p. 22. 8 Ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 27. 9 «Only he who knows yearning, – ah he knows and loves me ((Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt, – ach der mich liebt und kennt). These are the two cornerstones of knowledge: yearning and he who knows me. The Ego is tensely included in this correlation. Thus he moves almost entirely back behind he who knows me and behind yearning. Only 5

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This peculiar reality of poetic feeling, for which the subject is constituted in the duality of the love relationship and this duality is totally and fully experienced (erlebt) in the inner feeling of yearning makes any form of narrative expression unauthentic. «Confession/profession» (Bekenntnis ( ) alone is the adequate form of poetic expression: in it pure feeling not only expresses the reality of the individual subject, but produces this reality.10 Reference to biblical psalms is of considerable significance in the treatment of lyric poetry in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls. Cohen points to them as an important precedent in the purification of the feeling of love from the empiricalness of erotic content (and thus in its universalisation) and from mystical illusion, inasmuch as the psalmist’s aspiration is not immersion in the divine, unification with it, but «the nearness of God» ((Nähe Gottes).11 He attributes the «regeneration of German popular song»12 to the Lutheran Reformation’s inspiration by the psalms, which reached fulfilment in Goethe’s lyric poetry.13 However, while Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls already concentrates on the problem of the realisation of the subject as an individual and of his participation in the realisation of the ideal, Cohen’s concept of religion, in this work, is still tied to that in his previous works. Religion is nothing more than a historical form of ethics and, as such, only includes the individual in the perspective of universality.14 For this reason the psalms, although being substantially innovative in respect of myth and making the above mentioned positive contributions to the growth of authentic

he who knows yearning knows me. Only yearning, only this suffering fills the Ego. It is in this suffering of yearning for he who knows me that the Ego is dissolved. Only he who knows yearning, only he knows what I suffer, only he knows what I am. This is love. This is the passion of love» (ibidem). 10 «The expression of the suffering of love, this expression is confessing/professing (Bekennen). And only through confession/profession ((Bekenntnis) does experience (Erlebnis) also obtain its personal value. Experience becomes representative of the individual. The event belongs to a sphere of those sharing it; experience happens to the personal life of an individual. Thus confession/profession f belongs to experience. It is only through confession/profession that experience is fulfilled with its individual character» (ibid., d Bd. 2, pp. 55 f.). 11 Cf. ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 35-37. 12 Ibid., Bd. 2, p. 39. 13 Cf. ibid., d Bd. 2, pp. 41-45. 14 «Religion levels out men’s individuality» (ibid., Bd. 2, p. 32).

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lyric poetry, are still the expression of the man of universality, of moral man, since the God whom they address is the ideal of morality, «the good». d 15 In his poetry Goethe absorbed the universalist riches of religious Humaneness ((Humanität) sung by the psalms. However, it was he who perfected lyric poetry precisely because he did not restrict himself to the expression of the universality of love and suffering, but was capable of internalising this universality in individual confession/profession of love yearning: «This fulfilment by Goethe of lyric poetry realises the idealisation of sexual love».16 Cohen’s reflections on religion soon attained greater depth, reaching a climax in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. One clear sign of this process is his further investigation of the theme of prayer and its relationship with lyric poetry. A decisive step was taken with the essay entitled Die Lyrik der Psalmen, probably written in 1914. The aspects of lyric poetry already foregrounded in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls17 are applied here to the psalms, but with a new definition of their meaning with reference to redemption, which is a peculiarity of prayer in respect of lyric poetry: the notion of «trust in God» (Gottvertrauen). In Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls a redeeming effect on the individual is also attributed to lyric poetry,18 though still linked to the form of aesthetic experience, to the «song itself, thanks to the purity dominating it».19 Addressing the God of yearning in the psalms, he being none other than «the good», the moral ideal, is hope not trust. 15

«When God is thought as a father, this is only a yardstick, with which, however, no originative mythological meaning is any longer associated; poetry is the sole creator of this memory. And just as God only lives in the poetic yardstick, so man’s love for God is nothing other than a yardstick, with no mythological basis, where sexual mythology can again creep in. God is the essence of morality, the place of justice and the rock of perfection. Loving him means loving the good» (ibid., d Bd. 2, pp. 36 f.). 16 Ibid., Bd. 2, pp. 44 f. 17 Cf., for example, H. COHEN, Die Lyrik der Psalmen, in J 1 p. 246/W 16 177 f. 18 Cf. ÄRG 2 31 and 46 f. 19 Ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 31. In the following lines Cohen explains: «Purity would be abandoned, if the song put an end to suffering beyond itself, if it did not clarify only in pain, in infinity, in the eternity of the language of this pain, redemption from man’s suffering (…). The pure feeling of art can only search for its satisfaction within its own limits» (ibidem).

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Goethe’s expression taken by Cohen as a model of poetic confession/profession expresses the suffering of this hope: «When Goethe said: “Give me a God, to say what I suffer” (Gab mir ein Gott, zu sagen, was ich leide), this is how he characterises the stylistic character of lyric poetry».20 The innovation of religious trust in God in respect of poetic yearning is obvious if the above mentioned quotation from Goethe is compared with some references to the psalms in Die Lyrik der Psalmen, for example Psalm 31: «Into your hand I commit my spirit, you will redeem me Eternal, God of truth. I trust in you, my times are in your hand. Oh how great is your goodness, which you have prepared for he who fears you. Blessed be the Eternal, for he has shown me his grace as a miracle».21 From the very beginning of the essay Cohen emphasises «trust» as a fundamental disposition on the part of the psalmist and poetic expression as its simple «means of production» (Erzeugungsmittel ( l).22 This link, but also this difference between poetic yearning and religious trust is even more important than the purification of lyric poetry r from eroticism for the purpose of characterising the peculiarity of religious in respect of aesthetic experience, as emerges in the new phase of Cohen’s reflections. The latter aspect had already been acknowledged in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls as a contribution by the psalms to lyric poetry, while the former is highlighted for the first time as a peculiarity of religion and acknowledged as a step beyond aesthetic feeling.23 Poetic yearning is «aesthetic mediation»,24 the «poetic vehicle»25 that transforms the theoretical certainty of the knowledge of God into the «vigorous affect of trust».26 The latter feeling produces the true individual: not only the moral individual of the prophets, but the

20

Ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 55. H. COHEN, Die Lyrik der Psalmen, cit., p. 254/188. 22 Ibid., d p. 237/165. 23 Cohen writes that the expressions used in the psalms to refer to confidence in God are: «the words (…), that change yearning in the psalms, exactly from fundamental aesthetic meaning to the depth and heights of confidence in God» (ibid., p. 240/169). 24 Ibid., d p. 240/168. 25 Ibid., d p. 253/186. 26 Ibid., d p. 253/187. 21

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«individual’s soul»,27 the «lyrical individual».28 He is, however, now, in religion, more than the aesthetic individual, since the yearning of lover for beloved has turned into sinning man’s trust in the good God who redeems him. Trust in God gives the individual «strength of fulfilment» ((Kraft der Vollendung),29 in accordance with the anticipation of the future which is the peculiarity of religious correlation and the true strength supplied by it to the individual for his historical action.30 In this essay Cohen points to the relationship between the individual’s moral activity for freedom from sin and trust in redemption,31 but fails to subject it to exhaustive analysis. He does not define in detail the founding function of God’s goodness with respect to the anticipating strength of religious trust. Adequate further investigation of this theme is important for the purpose of full understanding of the meaning and real effectiveness of prayer. Cohen took a decisive step forward in this direction in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. Here the relationship between religion and aesthetics is given a mostly negative evaluation, more to highlight the differences than similarities. The reason for this is Cohen’s prevailing interest in avoiding the risk of an aesthetisising conception of religion,32 examples of which could be found in contexts close to him, as in the case of Natorp.33 So as to clarify the essential notion of «trust in God» one aspect of the difference between aesthetics and religion discovered in this work is particularly important: the finiteness of the feeling of self in religion in respect of its infiniteness in art. Within the context of a characterising theme in Cohen’s opposition to Natorp’s conception of religion and, with it, to 27

Ibid., d p. 239/168. Ibid., d p. 240/169. 29 Ibid., d p. 255/190. 30 «While the prophets proclaim the unique God of all peoples as the God of the future, this God of all men is for the lyric poet the God of his present, of whom he has experience, whom he professes» (ibid., d pp. 259 f./p. 195). 31 Cf. ibid., d pp. 250/182 f. and 251/183 ff. 32 Cf. BR 17 f. 33 Cf. my essay on: Religion as a Fact of Culture and the System of Philosophy, in Chapter Nine of this volume, pp. 169 ff. 28

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Schleiermacher and his school, i.e. the contrast between religion as «feeling of the finite» and «feeling off infiniteness». which in Natorp is explicitly revealed in its true meaning as «infinity of feeling»,34 Cohen defines the religious subject, as opposed to the aesthetic one, as the humble individual, aware of his weakness and finiteness, at the same time trusting in his correlative participation in the spirit of holiness given him by God.35 The weakness and humility of man and the goodness of God the redeemer are the constitutive features of correlation instituted in religion but absent from art. The messianic hope in the ethical message of the prophets is internalised in poetic yearning. It becomes feeling of personal sin and, at the same time, «yearning for protection of the soul».36 In Die Lyrik der Psalmen Cohen had accepted the fact that «aesthetic yearning» is the means of this transformation, but, at the same time had already pointed out that it is insufficient for the explanation of the new «centrifugal force» (Schwungkraft) placing the individual in correlation with God.37 This peculiarity of religious correlation, expressed in the yearning of prayer, is the meaning of «trust»: «In conformity with this the fundamental form of the Hebrew word generally translated as faith (Glaube) belongs to the peculiarity of religion, together with yearning (Sehnsucht), t confidence (Zuversicht), to have trust in (Vertrauen). The fundamental meaning of the word 34

Cf. P. NATORP, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpädagogik, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 19082, p. 38. 35 «But infinity, which constitutes the reflection of the work of art, is neither identical to God nor to his correlate. In the work of art that infinity corresponds to the Ego of pure feeling. In religion there must be no identical correspondence, but correlation alone must remain the task. Aesthetic feeling exaggerates the measure of man in the artistic exposition of the nature of man. Thus it is from this glimpse on the ideal nature of man that the emotion arises, that is commonly considered moral, even religious, but which is rather of pure, authentic aesthetic temperament and character. Religious emotion, on the other hand, is made manifest in the humility of the human heart, in the ready confession of its own weakness, which, at the same time, is illuminated by the consolation of its own liberation and redemption from dust to strength, which cannot be lost, of one’s own originative, divine purity of soul. The dust of the earth cannot defile it, its holy spirit always returns to God who gave it» (BR 123). 36 Ibid., d p. 99. 37 Cf. H. COHEN, Die Lyrik der Psalmen, cit., pp. 240 f./168 ff.

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(Emuna) is steadfastness (Festigkeit ( ) and confirmation (Bestätigung). Amen comes from the same root. Scepsis is the open contradiction of prayer».38 The feeling of yearning expresses in prayer dynamics analogous to that of lyric poetry, but the meaning is substantially different because in prayer feeling is authentically correlative between the individual sinner and the idea of God the redeemer. Trust in God the redeemer corresponds to the «anguish of the soul» (Seelenangst),39 «anguish in the face of perdition and destruction» ((Angst vor Verderben und Vernichtung)40 of man who confesses/professes that he is a sinner. But this only takes place in religious correlation, in the «holy spirit»: «Now everything has been clarified and ordered regarding what counts for the yearning of he who is making amends for redemption: God cannot reject him; since God cannot take his holy spirit away from him. God gave man his holy spirit. Thus the very spirit of man became holy. Thus redemption from sin cannot be absent. Yearning has reached its steadfast end. Correlation between man and God is safe from the most serious doubt. This steadfastness, this disposition of the spirit founds the ideal prayer, the prayer of yearning and of the certainty of one’s own confidence».41 It is important to note that this is the only place in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie where Cohen explains his conception of the holy spirit, i.e. of a notion that was to become one of the fundamental themes of Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums as well as the main form of elaboration of the meaning of religious correlation. These fruits of the maturity of Cohen’s reflections are returned to and developed in the chapter on Die Versöhnung g in Religion der 42 Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. The essential theme i.e. the correlative character of religious confession/profession is also foregrounded in this work. Confession/profession had already been acknowledged as the essential form of poetic expression in Ästhetik 38

BR 104. Ibid., d p. 103. 40 Ibid., d p. 99. 41 Ibid., d p. 104. 42 Cf. RV 242-248; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 207-213. 39

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des reinen Gefühls.43 In Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, however, it has a double meaning, which only reveals all the riches of its content when read as correlation in «trust». «Confession/profession» is both confession of the individual’s sins and his profession of faith in God’s goodness. The correct correlative relationship of these two meanings exists if the latter is not solely understood as the infinite goal for the former, but, at the same time, as the ground of the former.44 Confession of sin consists of awareness by the individual, the «soul» of the «son of man»,45 of his guilt, but this confession has no hope of redemption nor the strength to take on the task of self purification unless it is originarily joined, in trust, to the profession of God’s goodness.46 Therefore it is wrong to say that Cohen, in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, grounds man as an individual in consciousness of sin. He actually grounds him in consciousness of the correlation between sin and redemption and this correlation is the new content of religious in respect of aesthetic yearning: «Longing (die Sehnsucht) is not directed, as in lyric poetry, to the union of the lovers, but in this case merely to the forgiveness of sin (…). Sin alienates me from God, 43

Cf. ÄRG 1 393 f.; ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 55 f. «Now, however, the question might arise: if forgiveness belongs to repentance, does not heterogeneous element enter the work of penance in that God represents this goal and thus has to effect forgiveness? (…) If, however, our methodological framework must remain standing, then we have to recognize the new meaning of the correlation in the meaning of God as the redeemer from sin (…). In the spirit of the theodicy one could say: sin is explainable a through God’s forgiveness of it» (RV 242 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 207 f.). 45 Cf. ibid., d p. 246; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 210 f. 46 «Man deserves forgiveness of his sins, for although he is an individual, yet he is at the same time only the son of man. He should become an individual; the knowledge, acknowledgment, and confession of sin should mature him to this individuality. But if he is to create for himself a new heart and a new spirit, he is yet, in its striving, dependent on God’s grace. And God’s goodness shows itself to him in forgiveness (…). In reality, his humanity therefore begins with his rebirth, which he attains through the confession of sin. He is a son of man; everything which belongs to man, both outside of himself and within, cannot give him the certainty that the preparations for his rebirth, which are his own, will be successful. Therefore only God can help him. God’s goodness is his only refu f ge. Therefo f re he puts his confi f dence (Zu Z vers r icht) in it. Thus arises trust (Vertrauen) in God» (ibid., d pp. 246 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 211). 44

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forgiveness brings me near again. And thus is formed an unceasing two-way communication between God and the human soul: the longing (die Sehnsucht) t and the bliss, consisting in trust (Vertrauen)».47 In the chapter on prayer the depression-thrust towards infinity dynamics, proper to poetic yearning, is reinterpreted in the light g of these new contents48 and transformed into the dynamics of trust.49 It is not in awareness of his sin, but rather in the profession of God’s redeeming goodness that the individual is discovered, grounded, continually newly grounded and equipped with «the ability, to anticipate the future and to make it effective».50 In prayer, then, the individual is not constituted as empirical singularity, but as unity of self-consciousness, unification of the «heart», saved from the «cleavage» of sin. 51 The profundity of this notion needs to be highlighted to grasp the full meaning of religious love and its peculiarity in respect of aesthetic love. As has already been pointed out, Cohen’s aesthetics is an attempt to realise the systematic unity of the individual’s self-consciousness, by means of the internalisation of pure feeling, and lyric poetry is the principal expression of this realisation. The unity of the individual’s self-consciousness is claimed by Cohen at a further level for religious love.52 This profound, integral unity of self-consciousness in the individual, the «unity of personality» is required radically and explicitly in the command of love of the 47

Ibid., d p. 248; Eng. trans. cit., p. 212. The published English translation uses «longing» for Sehnsucht, while I prefer «yearning». 48 Cf. ibid., d pp. 435 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 375. 49 «The psalm, however, idealizes this longing (Sehnsucht), in analogy to eros, by means of the highest human end of life, which is constituted by redemption from sin; the idealization proceeds to that freedom of confidence in God (Gottvertrauen), thanks to which the love for God is, at the same time, the foundation for the continuous renewal of the I» (ibid., d p. 436; Eng. trans. cit., p. 375). 50 Ibid., d p. 435; Eng. trans. cit., p. 375: Cf. ibid., d pp. 186 f., 462 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 160 f., 398 f. 51 Cf. ibid., d p. 440; Eng. trans. cit., p. 379. 52 «(…) is love in its religious meaning identical with knowledge, which has a theoretical meaning, and indeed a double one, one for logic, and one for ethics, so that the concept of knowledge is not unambiguous? Is love in the religious sense now to be identified with this dual concept of knowledge? Love is a new concept of religion, which is not identical with sexual love, nor with eros, nor therefore with aesthetic love either» (ibid., d p. 168; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 144 f.).

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Shema.53 This unity of the soul is the fundamental disposition of «intention» ((Kawwana).54 It is realised and finds expression in prayer.55 So as to correctly highlight this realisation of the individual in prayer the perspective needs to be widened from the meaning of religious correlation for morality to its meaning for the entire complexity of self-consciousness. This becomes possible by extending the consideration of prayer beyond correlation with divine holiness to correlation with God as truth.56 The idea of God, which already in ethics, in the meaning of the transcendence of God, is the guarantee of truth, understood as unity of nature and morality, in prayer is no longer simply the guarantee of the ideal, but the authentic correlate of the individual soul, the correlative foundation of the unity of religious self-consciousness, which is expressed in «truthfulness»: «The devotion of the prayer establishes the unity of consciousness (…). Prayer is therefore the fundamental form, the fundamental religious act. For in this goal of prayer, the rooting of the consciousness of man in truthfulness, God appears as the other link of the correlation. God is the God of truth, and man is to become the man of truthfulness. Therefore, man prays to God».57 Once again due weight must be given to the founding character of the divine in respect of the human correlate, which only from this correlative origin draws the force off the anticipation of the future and historical realisation: «The confession of the truth should not be the final product of his truthfulness (…) but it should become a means to sharpen and strengthen his truthfulness».58 53

Cf. ibid., d pp. 184 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 159. Cf. ibid., d p. 432; Eng. trans. cit., p. 372. 55 Cf. ibid., d p. 431; Eng. trans. cit., p. 371. 56 «Hence, even for God, Truth becomes the highest expression of himself (…). What is true for God must be even more true for man, for he is, as the man of reason, the man of truth. Truth and holiness would be identical if holiness did not limit itself to morality, while truth unites the theoretical with the ethical and hence more than holiness becomes the ideal of reason. Truth, therefore, is the binding link between science, including ethics, on the one hand, and religion, on the other» (ibid., d p. 441; Eng. trans. cit., p. 380). 57 Ibid., d pp. 442 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 381. 58 Ibid., d p. 444; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 381 f. 54

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A final consideration is desirable on the «psychological» dimension of prayer. Cohen frequently refers to this aspect concerning prayer, love and yearning. It is clear that he is referring neither to the naturalistic nor systematic meaning of psychology. The subject of religious yearning and love or of their expression in prayer is not consciousness as a psycho-physical structure. Neither is it a case of consciousness as «the unity of consciousness of unitary culture», 59 of the consciousness of systematic psychology. Here the term «psychological» should be understood as reference to the «soul», to man as an individual, grounded in correlation, produced by the unity of the heart. However, reference to the psychological dimension, strengthened by a highly characteristic terminology (love, dialogue, life experience, confession/profession etc.), might tempt the reader to see convergence with an existential perspective. It is not by chance that Franz Rosenzweig, when describing the turning point which is supposed to have led Cohen away from idealism,60 towards a conception of religious correlation not far from Buber’s dialogic relation,61 especially foregrounds the freedom of the I-Thou correlation, in Cohen’s last philosophy of religion, from the «golden chains of the aesthetics of lyric poetry».62 He quotes, with particular emphasis, a passage from Die Lyrik der Psalmen: «Monotheism is a psychological mystery. He who does not recognise this does not understand it in its depth».63 In Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums reference is also made again to «the mystery, which the psalm constitute in world literature»64 and, even more clearly, to the «riddle in the history of the soul» which «is the monotheism itself».65 While it is important to emphasise, once again, that these expressions are certain indicators of innovation in Cohen’s philosophy, the grounding of the individual 59

ÄRG 2 429. Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG., Einleitung, in J 1 xlv ff. 61 Cf. ibid., d p. lix. 62 Cf. ibid., d p. xlix. 63 H. COHEN, Die Lyrik der Psalmen, cit., p. 239/167; cit. in F. ROSENZWEIG, op. cit., p. li. 64 RV 463; Eng. trans. cit., p. 399. 65 Ibid., d p. 434; Eng. trans. cit., p. 373. 60

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in religious correlation, this innovation was not in the direction, glimpsed by Rosenzweig, of an exit from the «magic circle» of idealism, but rather in that of its further investigation and completion. Already in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, where «experience of love», «confession of love»66 are acknowledged to be the essence of lyric poetry, where the immediate dialogue of I with a you, who cannot become a he, is indicated as the specific character of lyric poetry,67 the fully idealist meaning of these theses is foregrounded: «experience» is not the existential experience of the event, but ideal, even though immediate, production of the unity of feeling.68 Love is pure feeling, ideal production of the Self.69 In Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums the idealisation of love in prayer is even more radical. Against any pathological, but also existential misinterpretation of love for God, Cohen insists on its ideal character. To the possible objection «How is it possible to love an idea?», Cohen answers: «How is it possible to love anything but an idea? Does one not love, even in the case of sensual love, only the idealized person, only the idea of the person?»,70 and insists on the «idealistic meaning» of love for God,71 which for Cohen finds its precise definition, in opposition to any mystical deviation, in the idea of the «nearness of God» as sole goal.72 Thus the idealisation of the event in life experience, which is proper to aesthetic yearning, is reintroduced and radicalised in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums in connection

66

ÄRG 1 393 f. Cf. ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 23. 68 «It [lyric poetry] must transform the miracle of the event into the experience of feeling» (ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 50). 69 «In the systematic expression love is by no means fatality, since it is the purity of feeling, thanks to which man’s feeling of himself is produced» (ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 51). 70 RV 185; Eng. trans. cit., p. 160. 71 Ibid., d p. 188; Eng. trans. cit., p. 162; and, more generally, pp. 187 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 161 f. 72 Cf. ibid., d pp. 189 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 163 f. 67

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with prayer.73 This is the result of the further idealisation of the individual.74 Neither does the dialogue between the soul and God have a psychological-existential meaning. It is actually a «dialogic monologue»,75 which takes place in the internality of the soul, since Cohen always rejects as naturalistic and mistaken the conception of God as a person and also the attribution of real existence to God.76 This does not mean that the idea of God is unable to produce (leisten) a real effect, which can well be understood as love of God for man: «God as the Good One must therefore accomplish a kind of personal ( ) of the achievement of goodness».77 This effective power (Leistung idea of God is the correlation that founds man’s love for God: «What the idea as ethical reality means positively, and as such is able to achieve for actuality, becomes most clear in man’s love for God, on the basis of God’s love for man».78 73

«Lyric poetry has yet another basic psychological power, which proves useful to the idealization of the beloved person, and which, in prayer, turns into a peculiar healing power. The lyric poem is the confession of an experience, but not of one out of many experiences, not of a particular and transitory experience; rather, the experience is expanded to the sum total of one’s own life. f The finite, the transitory, becomes infinite, eternal (das Endliche, Vergängliche wird d ein Unendliches, ein Ewiges). It is, therefore, not quite correct to say that the actual, momentary occasion is the proper content of a love poem. In it the occasion is immortalized and hence the actual becomes infinitely distant (…). Lyric poetry itself needs the distant, which therefore becomes the ideal of actuality. Furthermore, what distance means spacially takes place as a psycholigical factor in longing (Sehnsucht). Longing is the idealistic element of affect. Although longing desires the actual presence of the beloved, it is based on the substitution for presence of the distant image, which it paints with the glow of its heart. Longing, therefore, holds fast to its distant goals without which it cannot accomplish the activity of approaching the beloved, without which it cannot maintain the balance of its pendulum-like swinging. Love is the longing for the essence, which is not present in perceptible actuality, and should not be, insofar as it is being longed for. So also is the prayer a longing for God, who should not be desired as a perceptible actuality; as such he cannott be sought for in knowledge, and therefore also not in love» (ibid., pp. 434 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 374). 74 «Now the individual is no longer rooted only in his natural feeling for life; now his moral foundation has been sanctioned» (ibid., d pp. 436 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 376). 75 Ibid., d p. 436; Eng. trans. cit., p. 375. 76 Cf. ibid., d p. 185; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 159 f. 77 Ibid., d p. 243; Eng. trans. cit., p. 208. 78 Ibid., d p. 185; Eng. trans. cit., p. 160.

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The psychological aspect of prayer is thus to be understood as nothing other than the realisation of the correlation process for the individual «soul».79 We have returned to the crucial point of the meaning of religious correlation in general and, in particular, of the way in which it is realised in prayer. «Trust» is the «psychological» element to which Cohen refers to explain the «mystery», the «miracle» of monotheism. The soul, experiencing trust in redemption, a gift from the goodness of God, in itself, is grounded in its capacity for moral improvement and is equipped with the force of historical action for the realisation of its love for other men, in its inclination to the «nearness of God»: «Thus prayer becomes the fundamental religious means for the idealization of man».80

79

«Now we recognize the complement, which the psalm, the prayer has to add to the moral work of repentance in order to insure the success of the reconciliation. Now we also recognize the purely religious factor off reconciliation, which we denoted before by trust (Vertrauen) and confidence (Zuversicht) in God. We asked for a more precise expression for this religious condition, for a psychological expression for this objective condition: prayer is the psychological form of the religious factor of reconciliation. The fundamental form of religion, the logical expression of which is the correlation of man and God, is, psychologically, the love for God» (ibidd., p. 434 ; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 373 f.). 80 Cf. ibid., d p. 462; Eng. trans. cit., p. 398.

CHAPTER TWELVE

SUFFERING AND NON-ESCHATOLOGICAL MESSIANISM IN HERMANN COHEN

In this paper I shall consider only one of the many important aspects of the messianic idea in Cohen’s thought. In his view the Jewish messianic idea is the historical origin, source of meaning and regulative ideal of the universal idea of humanity and therefore of universal history; it is the regulative ideal of the idea of political justice and the dignity of the poor and therefore of the profound relationship between ethics and politics. Furthermore, the messianic idea is an integral part of the monotheist idea and hope of redemption. Here I shall investigate another of its aspects: the relationship of the messianic idea with suffering, which raises the latter to its supreme meaning of «vicarious suffering». It is here, in my view, that the problem of the relationship between messianism and eschatology lies. Though, this problem is resolved unequivocally in Cohen, the solution is an unsatisfactory one, owing to its radical nature. There appear to be significant difficulties in Cohen’s thoughtt on this point, and they also involve his anti-eudaemonism. I shall start from a passage in Cohen’s Die Messiasidee, where he writes, with reference to the radical novelty introduced by DeuteroIsaiah: «The new Messiah does not need to be powerful; the entire cult of heroes must be destroyed. This gives birth to the moving image of the servant of God, who, like a miserable, afflicted, despised man of pain and suffering, with neither aappearance nor beauty, is led, like a lamb, to the slaughter, and, like a sheep, falls dumb before its shearers. He is buried with the wicked. But “by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many”. This servant of God deposed God’s anointed. But since he is a man of the people, the people are 243

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now significantly called “the servant of God”, as is especially the case in Deuteronomy. The object of religious-patriotic yearning is now purified in the strictly religious concept of the servant of God, replacing the anointed king».1 The essay immediately goes on to indicate an initial consequence: Israel’s historical universalism as its messianic task.2 All this can easily be identified with an important stage in Cohen’s attempt to develop a radical, coherent anti-eudaemonistic ethics (and thus a philosophy of history and religion), in the direction of Kant, but one that was even more drastic, since his intention was not only non-eudaemonistic but anti-eudaemonistic. It is well known that Cohen, though appreciating the non-eudaemonistic nature of Kant’s ethics, rejected Kant’s location of the idea of the supreme good in ethics, and within it the idea of happiness, which, though not a determining factor for morality, pointlessly weakened and obscured the purity of ethics.3 Admittedly, Kant, as is well known, was aware of the problem and attempted to treat it as delicately and subtly as possible. In the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, he initially looks for «a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a [sensuous] gratification, as “happiness” does»,4 and concludes that: «this word is “self-contentment”».5 Subsequently, still preserving the difference from «Glückseligkeit», he places «Zufriedenheit» next to «Seligkeit»: «Thus we can understand how the consciousness of this capacity of a pure practical reason through a deed (virtue) can produce a consciousness of mastery over inclinations and thus of independence from them and, from the discontentment which always accompanies them, bring forth a negative satisfaction with one’s condition, i.e. contentment, whose source is contentment with one’s own person. Freedom itself thus becomes in this indirect 1

H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, J 1 114. Cf. ibidem. 3 See, for example, KBE E 351 ff. 4 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 117; Eng. trans. by L. White Beck, Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts, New York 19933, p. 124. 5 Ibid., p. 117.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 124. 2

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way capable of being enjoyed. This cannot be called happiness, since it does not depend upon a positive participation of feeling; nor can it be called bliss, because it does not include complete independence from inclinations and desires. It does nevertheless resemble the latter so far at least as the determination of the will which it involves can be held to be free from their influence, and thus, at least in its origin, it is analogous to the self-sufficiency which can be ascribed only to the Supreme Being».6 At this stage an interesting operation makes it necessary and possible for him to extend the empirical definition of happiness, to which he usually refers, to a new, more generic definition opening the way to an ideal, pure concept of happiness: «Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will. It thus rests on the harmony of nature with his whole end and with the essential determining ground of his will».7 Now the scene is set for the introduction of happiness into the supreme good, though still keeping intact the latter’s ideal nature: «The holiness of morals is prescribed to them even in this life as a guide to conduct, but well-being proportionate to this, which is bliss, is thought of as attainable only in eternity. This is due to the fact that the former must always be the archetype of their conduct in every state, and progressing toward it is even in this life possible and necessary, whereas the latter, under the

6

Ibid., p. 118; Eng. trans. cit., p. 125. See also the note ibid., p. 123; Eng. trans. cit., p. 130. See also the distinction between «moral happiness» and «material happiness» in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 6, pp. 67 f.: «By this [moral happiness] I do not mean that assurance of the everlasting possession of contentment with one’s physical state (freedom from evils and enjoyment of ever-increasing pleasures) which is physical happiness; I mean rather the reality and constancy of a disposition which ever progresses in goodness (and never falls away from it). For if only one were absolutely assured of the unchangeableness of a disposition of this sort, the constant “seeking for the kingdom of God” would be equivalent to knowing oneself to be already in possession of this kingdom, inasmuch as an individual thus minded would quite of his own accord have confidence that “all things else (i.e., whatt relates to physical happiness) would be added unto him”». 7 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, cit., p. 124; Eng. trans. cit., p. 131.

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name of happiness, cannot (as far as our own capacity is concerned) be reached in this life and therefore is made only an object of hope».8 Nevertheless, Cohen was dissatisfied with Kant’s efforts. The latter had been prevented from taking the final step in a clear break with eudaemonism by two aspects: a) the need to reward moral «worthiness» (Würdigkeit); b) the consideration of the good as hope concerning the individual. Cohen definitely freed his ethics from this second limit, grounding the concept of man as an individual in the universal one of humanity. Here the messianic idea plays an important role. In Cohen’s view messianism only reaches its full value when it loses all personal, still somewhat mythical connotations, linked with an individual and becomes an idea. Again in Die Messiasidee we read: «We call this idea historical, in the sense that it becomes the guiding concept of history, absolutely not exclusively in the direction of national history. Whereas from the patriotic standpoint the political presupposition ensures that the Messiah be the liberator of Israel, the prophet gradually takes the Jewish state, the kingdom of David, the city of Jerusalem to mean the kingdom of God on earth. Thus the Messiah, who is called upon to found this kingdom of God, turns from political envoy to guarantor of the faith in the realisation of divine requirements on earth. This is the eminent historical meaning of the concept of Messiah. The Messiah not only passes from conventional priest and king to free individual with a subjective function and responsibility. He is also freed from the ambiguities of personal heroism. He must remain a person, but the person becomes a symbol of an age, in which the person, inasmuch as he has this meaning, disappears. Roughly speaking, the Messiah becomes a concept of the calendar. The person of the Messiah is replaced later by “the days of the Messiah”. The anointed one is idealised in the idea of a historical period of the human species».9 This idealisation is underlined further in the distinction, dating from the talmudic period and later revived by

8 9

Ibid., p. 128 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 135. H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, cit., in J 1 107 f.

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Maimonides,10 between «future world» (abh ~lw[) and «future time» (awbl dyt[).11 Thus Cohen thought he had excluded messianism from any trace of eschatological meaning, at the same time raising it to the meaning of a universal historical ideal. Nevertheless, if the Messiah has thus actually, uniquely become a historical «idea», losing all connotations as a mythical «individual», this does not mean that this idea, resulting from Cohen’s elaboration, does not still have even greater impo m rtance forr the historical individu d al and his action of ethical realisation. This point has the purpose of opening up an initial prospect on the problem of eschatology. In both Die Messiasidee12 and the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums,13 Cohen, in the very name of the above mentioned idealisation and historicising of messianism, abandons all hope for the immortality of the individual as such, seeing in this hope an eschatological illusion, with which he contrasts the ethical ideal of the survival of the individual in the eternity of the moral, historical progress of humanity. Another negative prospect on the problem of eschatology arises from the above mentioned aspect of a strict anti-eudaemonistic conception in Cohen’s view. The dignity acquired by man in his moral activity does not require or expect a reward. Therefore happiness can be neither a determining motive nor even an expectation for the individual, either in this world or in the illusory future world of eschatology. Only «peace» can be the messianic hope: a historical, not an eschatological hope; universal, not individual.14 Thus, in Cohen’s thought, anti-eudaemonism and rejection of eschatology are complementary, not merely co-existent, but inextricably linked. On the one hand, denying that happiness is the sense of history is not a manifestation of pessimism or moral 10

Cf. H. COHEN, Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis (1908), in J 3 280 f.; Eng. trans. by A. Sh. Bruckstein, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison (Wisconsin) 2004, pp. 169 f. 11 Cf. H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, cit., in J 1 117 f.; see also RV V 291, 361; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 249, 310 f. 12 Cf. H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, cit., in J 1 117 f. 13 Cf. RV, V Chapter Fifteen, pp. 344 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 296 ff. 14 Cf. H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, cit., in J 1 115 ff.; RV V 290 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 249.

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cynicism, but, on the contrary, a positive affirmation of the value of the infinity of the ideal and of its immanent reality with respect to historical progress.15 But rejection of a utopian next world does not mean shutting the door of hope; it is rather rejection of flight from the moral activity of the historical realisation of the good.16 Nevertheless, it appears to me that there are considerable difficulties on both sides. On the one hand, however attractive and objectively significant Cohen’s attempt at formulating a strictly anti-eudaemonistic ethics may be, the problem does present itself of whether this kind of ethics is feasible within critical philosophy, avoiding the pitfall of the mystique of pure love. On the other hand, however convincing the appeal to the absolute faithfulness of ethics to history may be, the reduction of eschatology to mere utopia is debatable. The difficulties involved in both Cohen’s radical anti-eudaemonism and anti-eschatologism become unavoidably clear as soon as attention is shifted to the individual and his role in history. As is well known, this happens when we pass from ethics to religion. As long as Cohen saw the messianic idea as originating in religion, though only of interest for the transfer of content to ethics (as is also essentially the 15

See, for example, KBE E 351: «The simple question: “how is the supreme good practically possible?” is bad. There are no more questions. What is needed in the face of the forum of practical pure reason is therefore f practically possible. Our human efforts are unimportant, as are cultural conditions and the whole of nature. All our experiential knowledge desired to find its limits and it found them in the realm of ends». 16 H. COHEN, Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis, cit., in J 3 283 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 179 f.: «The removal of sensualism from the World Beyond corresponds to the idealization of the temporal world in the messianic era. The distinction between these two corresponding states, the denial of their being identical, establishes the ethical correlation between the two. The yearning for the messianic redeemer has not lost its universal human significance, despite all political terrorization and persecutions of Israel; however, skepticism or mysticism has turned the idea of the messianic future into utopianism. Maimonides discerns the same old eudaemonia in the utopianism of Arabic political theories; actually, Sir Thomas More was also a stoic eudaemonist. Maimonides could take advantage of an ethicized Beyond, defined in terms of the ideal state of self-perfection, as a model for the messianic era, by presenting the messianic era as the preparatory stage for that Beyond. To aspire to one’s qualification for and ascertainment of self-perfection f is tantamount to recognizing the messianic idea».

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case in his essay Die Messiasidee), the difficulties are latent. However, when, in the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, the messianic idea, without any change in content, is also considered in its religious specificity, and thus also in the prospect of the responsibility and universal historical vocation of the individual (as person or people), these difficulties become evident and require examination and resolution. This is sparked off by the theme of messianic suffering. Suffering, which had not been of particular importance for Kant’s ethics, takes on, as is well known, a multiple, important role in Cohen’s ethics and philosophy of history and religion: as Mitleiden, a moment in the moral activity of liberation from guilt and, finally, in its culminating meaning of messianic man’s vicarious suffering. This historical r and ethical value and dignity of suffering raises important questions in respect of Cohen’s anti-eudaemonism and anti-eschatologism. There is no doubt that Cohen opposed metaphysical exaltation of suffering, for which he criticised Schopenhauer, for example: «The metaphysical meaning of suffering makes suffering the only reality in human existence proper, and the practical consequence of this metaphysics of pessimism is therefore the realization and verification of this principle in the negation, in the repeal of existence. However, if this wisdom is considered to be metaphysics, in no case can it be considered ethics; for the latter is throughout the affirmation, development, and elevation of human existence. If ethics now sees existence afflicted with suffering, the compassion becomes for it only a signpost for the question: How can suffering be overcome? Subjectively, suffering is pain; does passion abide on one level with pain, or does it contain in itself a means of dissolving it? It is perhaps the wound itself, which brings with it its own healing?»17 Cohen is always unambiguous when dealing with the notion of Mitleiden (often in opposition to Schopenhauer) not in the sense of sympathetic suffering, but in that of a moral act whose aim is the elimination of the suffering of the other, firstly poverty, historical social suffering. Thus, also in the individual’s action of moral liberation from guilt, Cohen clearly treats suffering as a stage in the process, not its final result, 17

RV V 21; Eng. trans. cit., p. 19.

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even less as its end: «Other systems of faith made the mistake of thinking that suffering is not a means but a final end. Thus it became possible to represent the divine itself as suffering, as human suffering. Although in this idea the end of the redemption of men is seen along with and beyond suffering, yet the redeemer himself must take this suffering upon himself. And through this idea, suffering becomes and is the end. Moreover, there is a corrupting attraction in the idea that suffering is a divine end in itself. Nonetheless, this idea is false. Only morality itself, only the correlation of God and man can be an end in itself. Everything else in morality, everything else in religion, is accessory and a means to this unique end. Therefore, suffering also can only be a means. And the end itself, which is redemption, cannot be thought of in isolation from its means; both have to cooperate in order to achieve the end. Hence, redemption and not suffering is the final meaning of life. In order to consummate redemption man and God cooperate; in this the correlation of man and God receives his highest confirmation».18 Further on in the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, Cohen reaffirms: «Suffering is the precondition for redemption. The latter, however, is the liberation from all the dross of empirical humanity and the ascent to the ideal moment in which man becomes a self. (…) suffering is only a prelude, even if it lasts thousands of years».19 The meaning of suffering takes a qualitative step forward, placing it in a position well beyond the limits of a mere instrumental value, when it is further investigated in the messianic idea where suffering, free from any function as liberation from the individual’s guilt, as the suffering of the just one, takes on the supreme dignity of an ultimate, anti-eudaemonistic sense of history, and, at the same time, of a supreme force of historical progress. In Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, which deal with the messianic idea, a number of passages testify to this shift, although the previously illustrated intention remains elsewhere. In his comment on Isa. 45:7: «He [God] makes peace and 18 19

Ibid., p. 268; Eng. trans. cit., p. 230. Ibid., p. 274; Eng. trans. cit., p. 235.

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creates evil», Cohen separates the meaning of «misfortune» and suffering, sent by God, from moral evil, for which God is not responsible.20 In the same passage he distinguishes between moral good and earthly well being and prosperity, refuting the idea that the latter are signs of divine blessing; on the contrary, in Cohen’s view, the ethical rigour of monotheism, in opposition to eudaemonism, recognises the sign of the divine vocation and the ideal meaning of history in suffering, particularly in its social form, i.e. poverty: «The poor become the pious. This identity is the high point of ethical monotheism. Plato’s ethical idealism never reached this height».21 Further on, returning to the anti-eudaemonistic meaning of history,22 Cohen reveals the meaning and value of «vicarious suffering»:23 «The historical concept of Messianism produced a concept, namely, that of the vicarious sufferer, which will now be elucidated. This concept seems to contradict the fundamental concept of ethical autonomy, because morality in all its stages has to be one’s own deed, and does not admit of any representative. However, this autonomy means only that a representative for guilt is excluded, but not for suffering. Social insight and feeling have disclosed the way this distinction is to be understood, and this understanding has the value almost of a new revelation. Only through the above distinction can the identity between God’s justice and love become understandable. Man’s sufferings become “chastisements of love”. Consequently the man, the Messiah, is conceivable as representative not of the guilt of men and peoples but of the suffering, which otherwise would have to be their punishment. Only through the Messiah’s taking the earthly suffering of man upon his shoulders does he become the ideal image of the man of the future, the image of mankind, as the unity of all peoples. He becomes through this not a Tantalus or Sisyphus but the Atlas who supports the moral world of the future. 20

Cf. ibid., p. 302; Eng. trans. cit., p. 259. Ibid., p. 302; Eng. trans. cit., p. 259. 22 «For “man doth not live by bread only”. Bread stands here for earthly happiness in general. This saying wards off the idea off eudaemonism. The value of human life lies not in happiness but rather in suffering» (ibid., p. 307; Eng. trans. cit., p. 263). 23 Cf. ibid., p. 246; Eng. trans. cit., p. 149. 21

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Only through this concept of the representation of human suffering could the messianic concept of history be fulfilled. For the concept of powerr in history is only naturalistic, anthropological, ethnological, or nationalistic. The ethical concept of world history must be basically free of all eudaemonism. Therefore, power cannot be the standard of ethical history».24 By reconciling the two viewpoints: the value of vicarious suffering and the denial of suffering as a value as such and as an end, Cohen formulates an anti-eudaemonistic view of history, for which «every eudaemonistic appearance is nothing but an illusion; and (…) the genuine value of life for the entire history of peoples lies in moral ideas and is therefore represented among men only by those who are accredited as carriers of these ideas».25 Therefore, the protagonists of history are the poor and the suffering, who take on the messianic role of universal salvation. Here Cohen is not indulging in a tragical view of history,26 but favours an anti-eudaemonistic conception, for which the historical value of «humility» is contrasted with «the acceptance of superficial human reality as displayed in power, in splendor, in success, in dominion, in autocracy, in imperialism».27 Suffering and humility are the characteristics of the Messiah, of the «ideal man», who «will restore justice and peace on earth».28 Inasmuch as he takes upon himself this responsibility of vicarious suffering, the people of Israel assume the messianic, concretely historical meaning of the «Servant of the Eternal»:29 «Every injustice in world history is an accusation against mankind, and consequently the misery of the Jews has been at all times a great rebuke against the other peoples. But from the messianic point of view, a light of theodicy is cast even upon this riddle of world history. Considered 24

Ibid., pp. 308 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 263 f. Ibid., p. 309; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 264 f. 26 «It does not have to be the case, and certainly it shall be different in the future, that there should be only tragic representatives of morality. This is a conception of dramatic poetry, to which ethics in no way has to consent» (ibid., p. 309; Eng. trans. cit., p. 265). 27 Ibid., pp. 309 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 265. 28 Cf. ibid., p. 310; Eng. trans. cit., p. 266. 29 Cf. ibid., pp. 311, 312, 313; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 266, 267, 268. 25

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from the point of view of eudaemonism, the suffering of the Jews is, to be sure, a misfortune. But the messianic calling of Israel sheds another light upon its own earthly history. As Israel suffers, according to the prophet, for the pagan worshipers, so Israel to this very day suffers vicariously for the faults and wrongs which still hinder the realization of monotheism».30 All peoples and all men «the pious peoples of the world» d are involved in this messianic responsibility, inasmuch as they understand and accept vicarious suffering as the only authentic meaning of history.31 This clear evaluation of suffering, not only as a means, but also as absolute historical and moral dignity, as I pointed out above, does not replace the ideal of freedom from suffering, but co-exists with it, as Cohen observes when commenting on Isa. 25:6-8,32 and has peace as its final ideal:33 «And the solution of this world-historical riddle provided by theodicy is formulated in the line “chastisement for our welfare”(…). Israel’s suffering is the tragic chastisement which is to bring about peace among men».34 Cohen thus appears to occupy the middle ground between two alternatives, neither of which is acceptable in itself. On the one hand, he had conducted such a detailed, profound exploration of the ethical and historical value of suffering, so much so as to be no longer able to restrict its meaning to a mere instrumental value, whose ethics would be kept within the limits of eudaemonism. On the other hand, the exaltation of the dignity of suffering as an absolute value and ultimate sense of history, if it is unilaterally pushed to its ultimate consequences, would inevitably transform Cohen’s argument into a mystical cult of pain, which is quite alien to his critical philosophy. It is possible to avoid this alternative that leads nowhere by following the classic route offered by eschatology, which keeps the option of an eventual overcoming of suffering, while at the same time 30

Ibid., pp. 312 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 268; cf. also ibid., pp. 330, 332, 333; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 283 f., 285, 286. 31 Cf. ibid., d p. 313; Eng. trans. cit., p. 268. 32 Cf. ibid., d pp. 319 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 274. 33 Cf. ibid., d p. 321; Eng. trans. cit., p. 275. 34 Ibid., d p. 331; Eng. trans. cit., p. 284.

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placing this final stage beyond history, and preserves the immanent value of suffering by warding off eudaemonism. However, eschatology appeared to be unacceptable a to Cohen, since it was still too mythical, and, in the end, not sufficiently cleansed of every trace of eudaemonism. He saw it as a utopian flight into the next world of history, draining the ideal of its potential for historical realisation. He thought he could replace eschatological hope in the «future world» with the historical hope for future «peace» in this world. Peace is the ultimate end of eternal historical progress together with messianic hope and suffering. As the ultimate end which is totally immanent in history, even though it is purely ideal, peace is both the horizon determining the direction of the historical progress of humanity and hope for the moral engagement of the individual, who can thus make his suffering significant, though giving up any interested expectation of a reward concerning the individual I. Among the many sections of Cohen’s works dealing with this problem, Chapter Fifteen of the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums on Unsterblichkeit und Auferstehung35 is one of the most significant. The essay Die Messiasidee is also explicit: «This idealisation of the personal Messiah in the messianic age required, as could be expected, further mediation. Such a crucial idea grew together with the most secret premonitions of the human spirit. One of these is the thought of resurrection, a feature of general mythology, learnt by the Israelites in Persia and developed, on the one hand, into the idea of the immortality of the soul, and, on the other, linked with their messianic hopes. This mixture, which is preserved in the prayers of later ages, is to be found in our most recent canonic writings. Traces are to be found in Isaiah, Ezekiel and Malachi. Malachi relates this thought to the saga of Elijah, whom he presents as the precursor of the Messiah. This is the Elijah seen in the Book of Sirach by the blessed, “those who have fallen asleep in love”. It is finally and above all in Daniel that there is the hope that “those who sleep will awake in the dust of the earth”. This is connected to hope for the kingdom of God, brought by the “son of man”. This son of man is also the Messiah, resulting from the generalisation of the servant of God. Now, however, the connection of 35

Cf. ibid., pp. 344 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 296 ff.

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“eternal life”, to which the pious are aroused, the Messiah’s kingdom of God, raises the crucial question: whether this connection can remain standing. The decisive question arises on the contingent relationship between religion and independent pure morality: the question on the relationship between eternal life after death and eternal peace on earth. In a way one idea is the correction of the other. Only the good rejoice in eternal life. But the bad, in a historical sense, should no longer exist in eternal peace. And the prophets, who insist on this faith, assure us that this pious desire is not a fantastic religious desire, originating in a “superficial” human morality. If the idea of the Messiah had to be purified in the idea of universal peace, it was important to establish the difference between the resurrection of the dead and the future age. This difficult task belonged to the talmudic age of messianic Judaism: the distinction between the “future world” and “future time”».36 But has everything been resolved in this way? Certainly, from the universal point of view of humanity, the immanent ideal of peace allows idealistic thought to avoid the two dangers which, with Kant, could be called empiricism and mysticism, i.e. the risk of being limited to an unsatisfactory empirical datum of the historical society as such, on the one hand, and seeking refuge in the imaginary representation of a utopian paradise, on the other. Thus the ideal remains within its correct limits, which are its reality and historical effectiveness: «completeness, fulfilment, the incompleteness of fulfilment».37 If an anti-eudaemonistic prospect for ethics is accepted, the ideal of universal peace is a sufficient end for the historical action and for the acceptance of suffering of the individual as well, when sufficiently purified for free acceptance of the determining motive of moral law and thus free from worry about a reward for his individual «dear I». This is certainly sufficient for the individual to reject courageously any sceptical temptation concerning the sense of history and his own engagement therein. But is it possible for the individual to keep up a day to day existence in pain, depriving himself, on the one hand, of all hope of consolation and, on the other, rejecting 36 37

H. COHEN, Die Messiasidee, cit., in J 1 117 f. ERW W 424.

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the leaden mystique of suffering? This is the further question. We are dealing with the problem of a horizon of redemption for the individual, not only in the ideal off the universal peace of humanity, but also in the hope of individual salvation beyond suffering. Redemption is certainly a strong driving force for the individual in his moral and historical engagement, which is continually renewed and never fulfilled: «Redemption is liberation from sin. In suffering sin became thinned out. Thus redemption is also liberation from suffering. In religious existence, so far as it is regulated and developed by the guiding thread of morality, everything is only valid for moments of ascent and transition. There is no fixed, rigid existence, rather everything is transition. Hence liberation from suffering, too, is only a moment in the course of moments, and suffering has to become again the disciplinary means for the self-discipline of man. Moreover, the feeling of joy in being liberated from suffering has its validity only as a moment. Such a moment is redemption. Also the place upon which the self sets itself up and builds its sheltering booth is such a moment. It gives protection only for the moment. Only for the moment does the I have stability. Only for a moment can it demand and use redemption. This difference between the moment of ascent and stabilized existence brings about the separation with regard to redemption between pure monotheism and other creeds. We are not yet discussing immortality. We have not even finished with the human world below. But since we have now set up, beyond the fellowman, the man as I, we need for the concept of his redemption from sin the limit determining the moment of redemption. Redemption is to be thought of only for one moment’s duration. Only for one moment, which may be followed by moments of sin. No matter! They also will again be relieved by the moment of redemption».38 But this is insufficient both for the individual and humanity. The hope for final redemption from sin and suffering accompanies engagement in day to day historical progress and cannot be drained of meaning, cannot be declared illusory, without the ideal of messianic redemption being hopelessly diminished: «However, the unique God 38

RV V 268 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 230 f.

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is the forgiving God each human individual, and therefore also for all men. The liberation of men from the burden of sin is therefore provided for in the very concept of this God. It is not possible for the matter to remain at the fact that men always sin and that God always merely forgives».39 If this hope for the whole of humanity can and must be «peace», seen as an immanent ideal in history, not a utopia beyond it, the individual, who does find a sense in his engagement in active participation in this ideal off humanity, still has the inalienable, legitimate need for his individuality, t elevated to this ideal of humanity, not to be annulled in it, but preserved, and, with it, a legitimate hope for definitive redemption as an individual. This «peace» should be reachable and expected by the individual. Individual «peace», however, cannot be legitimately conceived as a historical moment, except in the prospect of expectation: but this is only grounded in correlation with final peace. The Friede/Zufriedenheitt correlation, dealt with by Cohen in the last chapter of the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, contains important implications in this context. The notion of Zufriedenheit, as we have seen, had already been chosen by Kant to elaborate the moral individual’s passage from the historical experience of his moral engagement to eschatological hope for supreme good, in a non eudaemonistic context. Kant, in this conceptual elaboration, refers to Zufriedenheit, seen as «self-contentment» (Selbstzufriedenheit), t 40 «contentment with one’s own person» (Zufriedenheit mit seiner Person),41 in correlation with divine «bliss» (Seligkeit).42 Cohen, on the other hand, interprets Zufriedenheitt as certainty of historical progress, of the actual realisation of the ideal, and correlates it with divine Friede. The fact that in Cohen the notion of Zufriedenheit, although preserving a fundamental Stimmung g of happiness and joy, does not keep Kant’s emphasis on the character of satisfaction, and is considered in the context of suffering (which is alien to Kant)43 39

Ibid., p. 342; Eng. trans. cit., p. 293. I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, cit., p. 117; Eng. trans. cit., p. 124. 41 Ibid., p. 118; Eng. trans. cit., p. 125. 42 Ibidem. 43 Cf. RV V 527-531; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 456-460. 40

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and with reference to «humour»44 is connected with this shift of the prospect of the individual from himself to humanity. Zufriedenheitt as a daily, real anticipation of redemption in the life of the individual is correlated with peace, which is both a divine attribute and an ideal of humanity. Elimination of any form of eschatology also seems active and effective here. But the final pages of the Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (among the finest ever written by Cohen, in my view) offer a faint, but significant glimpse of an unexpected prospect. It is a hope of realised peace, of achieved redemption, even for the individual as such, not only as a participator in humanity. These few pages, as is well known, do not deal with the classic themes of individual eschatology, such as immortality and resurrection. On the contrary, they concern death. And yet, in a glimpse, they open up a prospect of individual redemption, which, owing to its explicit character as an ultimate event, on the extreme limit of the individual’s historical life and looking beyond it, must be acknowledged in its authentic eschatological traits: «Human life has its conclusion in death. Death is not the end but a conclusion, a new beginning. It is significant for the Jewish consciousness that it also thinks of death as, and calls it, peace. “Peace be upon him”: this is the phrase by which Jewish usage designates the deceased. Peace takes away from death its sting. It also gives a solution to the riddle of death. The man who is torn from life is not removed from peace, but rather brought nearer to it. He is now directly under the reign of God’s peace (…). Death is the world of peace. One cannot praise death better and more blissfully than by distinguishing it from the world of struggle, from the life of error and conflict. Life ought to seek peace; it finds it in death. Death is therefore not the actual end of human life but rather its goal, the trophy of life and all its striving».45 This idea of death as the individual’s ultimate redemption is certainly linked by Cohen with the meaning of peace as the eternal historical ideal of humanity,46 but this cannot hide its eschatological traits. Admittedly this eschatology is solely limited to the individual. 44

Cf. ibid., pp. 529 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 458 f. Ibid., pp. 531 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 460. 46 Cf. ibid., pp. 532 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 461 f. 45

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The guarded argument is also conducted with the discretion appropriate for critical philosophy, which is aware of being on the limit, to be followed but never crossed. And yet in these last pages of his last work, in his final words, in this requiem for himself and for all, Cohen communicates a breath of hope for the individual, which up to this point had been missing from his wide ranging elaboration of the messianic theme.

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AUTONOMY OF THE LAW

The title of this paper certainly evokes in everybody’s mind, by assonance, the fundamental principle of Kant’s ethics. At the same time, however, everyone will also notice the difference from Kant: «autonomy of the will» is one of Kant’s typical expressions, while «autonomy of the law» is not, even seeming something of a strain modifying the expression to the extent of non meaning. My arguments aim at justifying this strain and supporting the productivity of meaning that can be implied by it. The relationship between authority and power, involves a problem constitutively, continually addressed, but never overcome, in philosophy: i.e. the problem of the primacy of one concept or the other, whether authority is the origin or expression of power. At the beginning of The Republic, Plato had already represented the alternative in the dialectical confrontation between Socrates and Thrasymachus In Plato’s learned description Thrasymachus is presented, from the outset, not only as a supporter of the primacy of power, but as something of a bully: «gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces»,1 and Socrates, as the wise man under attack, who, nevertheless, remained calm owing to his authority in investigation and knowledge: «And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice. But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at 1 PLATO, The Republic 336b; Eng. trans. by P. Shorey, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey) 1963, p. 586.

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him first, so that I became capable of answering him».2 As everybody knows, Socrates’ authority prevailed over Thrasymachus’ overbearing attitude, and the result was not only the victory of the former’s definition of «justice» over the latter’s, but, above all, that of the method of authority over the one off power, i.e. of dialogue and objective, common investigation over the dogmatic attitude to definition: in short, the result was the very dialogue of The Republic. However, there are some even better known passages (if this is possible) in Plato, than the one quoted above, where the figure of Socrates appears as the paradigm of the superiority of authority over power: I am thinking of the dialogues the Apology of Socrates and Crito, where Plato describes the actions and words of Socrates during his trial and before his death. The figure of Socrates is so paradigmatic that philosophical thought has incessantly returned to it, to interpret, evaluate and learn from it. Socrates’ last speech is so well known that is does not require presentation here. It concludes thus: «Now it is time that we were going: I to die and you to live, but which of us has the happier prospect is unknown to anyone but God».3 Socrates, the first political martyr, triumphs by dying. His accusers had prevailed, but were defeated. If, however, we dig a little deeper into the dramatic situation, things become more complicated, and thus more interesting. Let us try, then, to enrich the picture with more detail. Socrates was condemned in the name of the law, and yet he, not his accusers, saved the value of the law: it was not power, which made it effective, but the authority which gave it value that sustained the law. Thus Socrates, by opposing the lawgivers and not the law, founded law against the will of the lawgivers and, submitting to their power, dismissed it by its authority: by succumbing Socrates saved the law. But in what role, and with what authority did Socrates determine his attitude and, by means of it, found the law? It certainly was not as an empirical individual; as such, he would simply have had to respond to the first fundamental empirical necessity, self-preservation, and thus save himself by escaping, following his friends’ advice. 2

Ibid., 336d-e; Eng. trans. cit., p. 586. PLATO, Apology of Socrates 42a; Eng. trans. by H. Tredennik, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters, cit., p. 26.

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However, he was not justified in his attitude as a moral individual either: if he had identified his moral personality with his individuality, which, in accordance with conscience, was threatened by an unjust law or unjust application of the law, it would not only have been his right, but also duty to have justice prevail over injustice, the absolute moral principle over the positive norm: in this case too he would have escaped; actually, in this case, it would have been his moral duty to escape, as advised by his friends. So who was Socrates? On the basis of what self-consciousness did he make his decisions? This is the question I should like to pose as the core of my argument. By this question and the notion of «self-consciousness» contained in it I mean a deeper level underpinning the problem of the relationship between authority and power: the problem of the ethical subject, of the will as self-consciousness. In what follows I shall make full, though free reference to Hermann Cohen’s fundamental reflections on the subject.4 The ethical subject cannot be identified with the empirical individual, because ethics itself would be denied with it. The relationship between empirical individuals, the causes and effects of their acts, are entirely included among natural phenomena and knowledge of them is arguably only the task of the science of nature, i.e. a natural anthropology, to which sciences, such as psychology, sociology, ethology, demography etc., would make their exhaustive contribution. Thus there would be no place for ethics, in its sense as the knowledge of What Ought to Be and value, neither could the principles of human action aspire to necessity or universality, except to that of natural causality, which is entirely unevaluative. Modern thought has identified and formulated the characteristic peculiarity of the subject precisely in its irreducibility to the natural phenomenon and in its contraposition to it, in the sense of object. This took place in Descartes with the elevation of the subject to principle, inasmuch as it is self-consciousness. But Descartes’ self-consciousness, the cogito, was actually a theoretical subject: however broad Descartes’ notion of thinking was, as far as including

4

Cf. ERW, W especially Chapters Four and Five.

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every act and affect of the subject, it was, nevertheless, a theoretical notion, inasmuch as it was constitutively correlated with the object. Also Kant’s development of the conception of the subject as the synthetic unity of consciousness, though radically new in respect of Descartes, moved in the direction of the theoretical subject. Self-consciousness was thus understood, above all, as the correlate of the consciousness of the object. And yet Kant, when positing the ethical problem, clearly recognised the peculiarity of the ethical subject and its irreducibility to the theoretical dimension. The ethical subject, as Kant taught, is will, precisely inasmuch as, unlike the knowing subject, it does not aim at the determination of a given object, but the production of an object, i.e. «action», and thus the determination of self by means of action. In this sense only is ethical consciousness truly self-consciousness. This certainly does not mean that will is entirely alien to thoughtt and reduced to affectivity: on the contrary, inasmuch as it is reason, will maintains a constitutive link with thought, but, since it is not a question here of phenomenology of the faculties, but foundation of the uses of reason, what is determining is precisely the different functional direction of consciousness: while in theoretical use it determines the object in thought, in practical use it determines itself in action and is thus in the proper sense self-consciousness. It could be thought that Fichte started out on the right road by elevating the Ego, as self-consciousness, to the highest principle, which, contrasting the non-Ego with itself, newly included it in itself. But Fichte’s non-Ego is still the objectt and, consequently, the Ego is subject inasmuch as it is correlated with the object. The will, on the other hand, in action, is not correlated with the object, but with the Other, the non-Ego as subject: the non-Ego is not the object taken over by originative consciousness, but the origin of the subject, of the Self, which is thus the task and result of action, not its initial given. We have thus arrived at the identification of the fundamental core of the meaning of the ethical subject, i.e. of self-consciousness as will, which Kant had already clearly defined and founded. The autonomy of the pure will does not have the mere negative meaning of the subject, which is free inasmuch as it is non heteronomous, i.e. unconditioned, but the most radical positive meaning of the subject which gives itself the law of its action, which actually, only in the

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autonomy of action sets itself up as the ethical subject and elevates itself to a necessary, universal value. Thus the individual is not denied value, but it is simply recognised that man is elevated to an ethical subject, to a «person», as an individual as well, neither in individuality nor plurality, but only in the universality of autonomous action. But what does this action in which and for which the Self is set up consist of? Or, formulating the same question in another way: what does the Self produced by action consist of? Taking Cohen as our guide again, and in this he consciously and intentionally departed from Kant, we turn to law for clarification, the latter being methodologically taken up as an analogue, in the sphere of ethics, of the fact of science in the sphere of logic. Juridical action and the juridical person are important models for understanding the ethical subject. The notion of «juridical person», in law, unambiguously shows that the juridical subject is not necessarily identical to the physical person. The juridical person results from a juridical action, from a contract, and, once set up, is itself, not as the sum or community of the contracting parties, an autonomous subject of action. More generally, every contract should be seen as an action, in which the contractors, I and Thou, are not given subjects but set themselves up, as «parties», in the action itself of the contract. Unlike the community, people or fatherland, notions determined in a naturalist mode, Genossenschaft, a particularly important notion in Germanic law, and societas in Roman law, at least in the comparable aspects with the previous notion, and, in the last, fundamental instance, the State, constitute the purely ethical authentic notions, in which the ethical subject, the Self of self-consciousness, determines itself. It is clear that law, understood in this sense, is neither that of the natural law doctrine nor that of the historical school, but law solely and rigorously grounded in ethics. Precise determination is also necessary for the notion off the State. Two rather different meanings, theoretically and concretely, meet historically in the State: the State as lawgiver and the State as holder of power. Now it is clear that, in the above mentioned context, only the first meaning defines the State: it is the unity of the will and its actions consist of the laws. The individual does not maintain ethical independence towards the State neither is he alienated in it: rather he achieves his self-consciousness, his own Self in the State, and beyond, but by means of it, in humanity. The State, as

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the unity of the will, is realised in its actions, in its laws; no hypostatisation of the will of the State, independent of the laws in which it is realised, is legitimate: the autonomy of the will is the autonomy of the law. Any different conception inevitably posits the State as the centre of power and justifies f the authority of the law over the foundation of a power alien to the law itself, thus determining the heteronomy of the will. Thus anarchy (though certainly not revolution) remains without foundation. Anarchy, actually, could be justified in a contractual conception, in which the individual’s will is constitutive of the state institution, and thus, drawing back or opposing, could even overturn it; but, in the conception proposed here, anarchic rebellion against the State can be correctly justified as rebellion against power, but does not thus overturn the State; on the contrary, it recalls it to its authentic meaning as a lawgiving principle: as rebellion against this ethical principle, on the other hand, as a claim to replace it with a particular, naturalist authority (one could mention, for example, nationalism, which is a form of anarchy), anarchic rebellion would deny ethical self-consciousness and thus also the Self of he who undertakes it. It may seem that what has been said so far is slowly but surely moving towards justification of terrifying political totalitarianism. Such a totally false impression will be corrected by introducing an essential dimension of our argument, which has not been mentioned so far, and which is constitutive of the very statute of What Ought to Be, the object of ethics. It should be remembered that the juridical person is, also technically, a «fiction». By this we certainly do not mean falsity or empty appearance, but rather a fundamental scientific principle, the very concept of method. In logic, fiction is a hypothesis and in ethics completes its meaning as a task. From Plato onwards, critical idealism has always understood idea as hypothesis and task and mainly entrusted ethics with the development of the second meaning. The will, i.e. the ethical subject, and thus the State as lawgiver should be strictly understood in the sense of task. The utmost clarity is required on this point: no room can or must be allowed Hegel’s identity of real and rational. This does not mean that What Ought to Be is drained of all reality and weakened in an empty utopia. The Being of What Ought to Be has equal dignity with the Being of nature; actually it has primacy over the latter: ®p™kina t j oªsºaj

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presbe¸a kåi dynåmei.5 But the statute of reality of What Ought to Be cannot be reduced to that of the Being of nature, to existence. In my view, this is a crucial point, to which, so far, critical idealism has not devoted adequately deep thought, and, for this reason requires much greater investigation. This does not mean that much valuable clarification has not been carried out and that the conception of What Ought to Be as a task is not a fundamental acquisition. The State, as a juridical person, inasmuch as it is a fiction, is also a task. Its authority as a lawgiver is not given, but is a hypothesis, and its legislative actions are the never complete and never assured realisation of its task. Thus, as has already been mentioned, anarchic rebellion can only attack the false figure of the State as a centre of power, unfortunately extremely real, from the historical point of view, though ethically tenuous, but can do nothing but confirm the State as a lawgiving principle ( P ). If one or more individuals disobey or rebel against the laws of the State, the latter, inasmuch as it is a task, is not denied, but confirmed: the State must more and more become itself, not by the force of power, but with the authority of the law. So, who was Socrates? We now have the answer: he was the ethical subject, the person endowed with authority r inasmuch as he was the bearer of the ethical will, i.e. the law. He could not escape and save himself, in this way, as an individual, since he had now become a «person» in the ethical sense and was such inasmuch as he identified his empirical and moral individuality with the universality of the law. Socrates’ sentence to death is the archetypal figure of the conflict between the authority of the law and the violence of power, where, however, the State is clearly realised in Socrates, not in his persecutors. u To be more precise, one should say that his sentence is the archetype of the succumbing of the authority of the law and of the ethical Self to the force of power devoid of authority. This statement includes the crucial question: why must justice be witnessed against power through defeat and martyrdom? Why do the victims and not the victors make history? This fundamental question concerns the sense of history and inevitably opens up a religious perspective: despite its importance, I am forced to leave it here. This interpretation of Socrates as the figure of the ethical Self, as the true 5

Cf. PLATO, The Republic 509b.

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critical sense of the State and authentic requirement of the authority and autonomy of the law against the violence of power devoid of authority also emerges from a fine passage in Cohen’s Ethik des reinen Willens, which I think it is of interest to quote here: «This is the immortal meaning for the world of ethics of Socrates’ martyrdom. In it, in a sanction blinded by the hatred of a lost generation, the concept of the law in its fundamental moral strength was, nevertheless, affirmed. For the world of ethics, the law of the citizens of Athens is full of gaps and contradictions, for Socrates’ self-consciousness it was the guiding concept which allowed him to attain pure will and self-consciousness. Thus, with his interpretation of this law, he was able to fill the gap left by Athenian law in the world of ethics. He remedied, healed the fracture that this single law caused in the set of laws of the moral world. The situation appears to have been overturned here: the individual becomes the guiding concept for the State. But only apparently: it is from the concept of the State that Socrates drew the force of the law. He isolated the single law, not in its statistical peculiarity, but recognised and honoured in it the majesty of the State and concept of the law».6 These considerations are certainly abstract, as every philosophical theory must be, but not abstruse. As can easily be seen the very real, important, though equally problematic question of the ethicity of the State is already posited in them. Nowadays the idea of the ethical State has practically been removed from sight and the historical reasons for this are clear. In the history of the West the attempts at realising an ethical State gave rise to religious or non religious tyrannies, leading up to the dramatic domination of fascism in much of Europe and Nazism in Germany, which sadly marked the century that has recently come to an end. The painful experience of the unleashing of tyranny and violence in the name of supposed values has taught Western culture to seriously mistrust any ethical conception of the State. The conception of an ideological indifferent State has thus increasingly come to the fore, is now the predominant one in Western society and has been realisedd in ever more extreme forms.

6

ERW W 264.

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Actually, the realisation of this process passed through intermediate, often ambiguous phases. The formula «a free Church in a free State», for example, which was an important rule in the setting up of the Italian State was somewhat ambiguous, inasmuch as, by explicitly stating the reciprocal independence of Church and State, it sounded like an act of emancipation of the State from a specific ethical-religious ideology, while, at the same time, implicitly and unavowedly allowing the State to free itself of any ethical responsibility towards society inasmuch as it could tacitly delegate to the Church the proposition and partial imposition of an ethical frame of reference, in which the majority of society, whether religious or not, could identify itself. Nowadays, however, in contemporary Western societies, there seems to be a situation in which no ideology is the point of reference for a majority, and thus the State finds itself governing a society euphemistically called pluralist, butt which is actually more simply ideologically heterogeneous and disjointed and, more often, defective. It is a fact that, in contemporary societies, there is a major gap and real crisis in ethical choice and deliberation in respect of numerous important, unavoidable problems. In the most diverse spheres: ecology, medicine, genetics, criminal and commercial law, the regulation of financial affairs and communication etc., the need is continually emerging for choices and consequent laws, which are out of the question without reference to an ethical framework, and which the State, owing to its very presuppositions, cannot possess. Even internationally important choices are necessary, concerning, for example, population growth, ecological deterioration, international intervention in local or civil conflicts, which cannot take place without ethical criteria. This means, in many fields, weakness or absence of State authority, normally substituted by unthinking acceptance of the will or interests of specific powers in law making. Thus, even what appears to be to the great advantage of an ethically indifferent State: the guarantee of the full development of individual freewill is compromised to a serious degree. Actually ever increasingly wide ranging and specialised aspects of individual behaviour are strongly conditioned, up to a real determination, on the part of political and economic powers, which impose their choices on the basis of mere power, without any authority.

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For decades now, at least since the representatives of the Frankfurt School have been carrying out their important critical work, philosophical and political reflection has warned of an even more worryingly characteristic phenomenon in Western societies. It now seems clear that present day technological society is mostly moving in directions no longer determined by any subject, not even the above mentioned centres of power, but simply by the process itself, which no longer posits an end, apart from its own working, and of which, thus, there is no subject, since all the agents included in it, even the powers presuming to manage it, are reduced to elements in the process and find they are unable to act, except as a function of it. No subject decides on the process, simply because no subject exists, except as an element in the process and not as the subject. No subject, no end and therefore no alternative possibility: all challenges are not defeated but simply impossible, since, as they do not find themselves facing a constituted order but managed disorder, they are always part of it and are always a function of it. Thinking the ethical idea of the State and then representing and realising it in a political project is thus a vital present day necessity. Such a project is clearly enormously difficult and problematic, and I am unable to supply any content for it. What does appear to me to be the consequence of what I have said is a fundamental regulative direction for thinking this idea. The ethical State cannot be thought like the totalitarian or authoritarian State, in accordance with the sad picture provided by history: it is rather the most radical antithesis of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. The primacy of authority over power is precisely the foundation of a correct conception of the ethical State. As is well known, Kant took up coaction as a principle of law and thus considered the latter as a heteronomous determination of the will, therefore ousting it from ethics.7 It is necessary to keep our distance 7

Cf. I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 6. Actually, taking into consideration all Kant’s works, firstly his writings on the philosophy of history, but also only going deeply enough into his Die Metaphysik der Sitten, one cannot restrict oneself to such a drastic, simple judgement off his thought on the relationship between ethics and law. Though aware of the scientific inadequacy of this cliché,

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from Kant on this point and, in the direction of Cohen’s reflections followed so far, newly restore law and the State entirely to ethics. This is only possible if coaction is not recognised as a principle of law, whose ultimate end is actually the autonomous production of the will. The ethical State is the idea of law itself as action and as the universal ethical subject, not inasmuch as it is the absolute right of coercive imposition on individual will, but rather inasmuch as it is the infinite task of realisation, where each individual will must find the full meaning of its freedom and assured room for expression. The autonomy of the will is not shifted from the individual will to the collective will, but is placed as law in the universal will, so that each individual will can entirely realise itself there, protected from pressure and coercion by any individual or collective power. In this sense, if, on the one hand, the ethical idea of the State only has its place of realisation in historically existing States, on the other, inasmuch as it is an idea and task, it can never identify itself with any of them, but is always a critical requirement in the face of reality. In extreme cases, but unfortunately not so rare ones in history, as the figure of Socrates shows, the authority of the State, thus understood, can appear transferred to the will of an individual in conflict with the will of those in power. From the ethical viewpoint, however, this individual is, in the situation described, the bearer of the authority of the law; therefore he represents the State, and opposes any powerful, violent subject, though devoid of all authority, since the law only receives authority from itself: it produces the ethical subject and only this task justifies it.

I have used it here as an indication of a characteristic attitude, which Kant did actually take up, from which we must keep our distance.

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Positing the existence of ideas, and especially of the ethical ideal, has always been a serious problem for idealism. Since Plato, every kind of idealism has counted on the certainty that ideas are real, or rather that they are the sole constituent of true reality. However, the objection of those who insisted that this reality be exhibited in an existence also needed to be met. This objection, originating in both philosophical thought and common sense, is at once a serious and inevitable one, since existence is the fundamental criterion for what is, and is thus indispensable, both for common sense and philosophical reason, even though the truth of the a priori be acknowledged, to expect exhibition of its empirical actuality, without which the a priori itself runs the risk of appearing empty, illusory and, in the end, fallacious. Yet the ethical ideal constitutively resists the yardstick of empirical ascertainment, since its conformity with any empirical given would also involve its being emptied and falsified, inevitably depriving it of the character of infinity and perfection which constitute its idealness. Therefore, an ethical category of «existence», analogous but not identical to the logical one, needs to be thought, thus allowing this difficulty to be overcome. Here my aim is to set out briefly the significant steps taken by Cohen in this direction. The ambiguous notion of «existence» has several meanings, in line with which it must be evaluated so as to identify a possible ethical analogue. Putting aside the ontological meanings, which belong to pre-critical thinking (the etymology of the words used both in English and Italian having common roots in the Latin ex-sistere), I shall restrict my considerations here to three main meanings: existence as correspondence with the sensible given; existence as being there, as presence; existence as the ability to produce effects in the actual 273

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world. Taking these meanings into account, I propose to examine briefly the contributions of Cohen’s philosophy to the determination of a category of existence for the ideal. Correspondence with the sensible given does not appear to be attributable to the ideal. And what is more, it is even denied to it, so that its purity may be preserved. A fundamental principle of Kant’s ethics is that the moral phenomenon is not given. It is of interest to note that, whereas in the Kritik der reinen Vernunftt Kant defined as «existing (wirklich)» «that which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation)»,1 in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, setting up a table of categories, whose symmetry with the theoretical one is certainly partial and, to a certain extent, artificial, though still intentional, he made the ethical category correspond with the logical one of «existence»: «duty and the opposite of duty».2 He recognised the «exclusion of all the determining motives originating in inclination»,3 i.e. any determining connection with sensation, as the latter’s defining character. This is certainly coherent with his fundamental distinction between the theoretical use of reason, for which it determines an object «given on the other hand», and its practical use, for which it realises its own object,4 while leaving open a serious difficulty in the conception of history, in judgement on historical progress, as is shown, for example, by the complex, problematic nature of Kant’s view of the French Revolution.5 The problem was certainly less serious for Cohen than for Kant, inasmuch as, in view of the fundamental orientation of the former’s philosophy, the difference between logical reality and ethical realisation is substantially reduced by the conception also of logical reality as realisation. As is well known, in his works on the 1

Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Auflage 1787, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 3, p. 185. 2 Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen k Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 66. 3 Cf. ibid., d p. 80. 4 Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, cit., p. 8. 5 Cf. I. KANT, Erneuerte Frage: Ob das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei, in ID., Der Streit der Facultäten, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 7, pp. 83 ff.

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interpretation of Kant, and later in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, Cohen denied the non deducible givenness of perception and turned sensibility itself into a category of pure productive thought.6 Although there is a clear difference between Kant’s viewpoint and the reworking of the problem of reality in the sense of realisation in Cohen’s logic, the fact should not be overlooked that the problem of sensation is still present, as is that of the difference between logical and ethical existence. Although, in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, Cohen saw the givenness of sensation independent of thought as mere psychological g appearance, a prejudice of empirical consciousness (Bewußtheit),7 and thus, rejected the uncritical inclusion of this prejudice in philosophical argument,8 nevertheless he did acknowledge the importance of the «requirement» ((Anspruch) of sensation for knowledge: «But our motto is: against the independence of sensation; but in favour of the requirement of sensation».9 Sensation, inasmuch as it is a requirement of content as individual, is an unavoidable problem not only for the category of «effectual existence» (Wirklichkeit), but also for the category of possibility (Möglichkeit), since «a problem which is incapable of founding the requirement of sensation – the requirement not its satisfaction – is an impossible problem (…). If the requirement of sensation cannot be founded – the requirement not its solution and satisfaction – then impossibility is obvious».10 In judgement of «effectual existence» pure thought also reaches the solution of the requirement of sensation, by means of the concept of «greatness» (Größe).11 But this conceptual determination of effectual existence as individuality would not be possible without a «demand of the individual»,12 without the request, however indeterminate, of the «obscure impulse»13 of sensation. 6

On this see H. HOLZHEY, Cohen und Natorp, 2 Bde, Schwabe & Co. AG Verlag, Basel/Stuttgart 1986, Bd. 1, pp. 156 ff. 7 Cf. LRE E 456. 8 Cf. ibid., d pp. 151 f. 9 Ibid., d p. 472. 10 Ibid., d pp. 452 f. 11 Cf. ibid., d pp. 478 ff. 12 Ibid., d p. 470. 13 Ibid., d p. 469.

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In Logik der reinen Erkenntnis Cohen was already aware of the problem of transposing this request of sensation and this concept of effectual existence on the ethical level. With reference to Plato, for example, he wrote: «Thus ethics also posits the problem of being present in an entirely necessary way: that morality become effectual existence on earth. Ethics, as a system of concepts, may well be fully constructed. If its laws have effectual f existence among men, peoples and in states, it is of no importance whether this be the case now or in the future: it can express no judgement on this. Being there or effectual existence posits this problem to it. Sensation lies in this problem, in conformity with its concept, affirming the requirement, or leaving it to others to affirm it. The difference is noteworthy, but the request of sensation cannot be outflanked, even though it is incapable of representing its right by itself».14 Nevertheless what concept, analogous to «greatness», can be turned to for the problem of effectual ethical existence? In Logik der reinen Erkenntnis Cohen referred explicitly to «chronology»,15 but this choice, as a mere historiographical method, seems insufficient and unsatisfactory to address the complexity of the problem. Let us put this question aside for the moment, to take it up again later, and turn to another aspect and meaning of the existence of the ideal. From the Einleitungg to Ethik des reinen Willens Cohen had forcefully maintained the difference between Being (Sein) and What Ought to Be (Sollen), as a fundamental, unsurmountable principle of systematic philosophy. He did, on the other hand, with equal rigour, claim that there was a Being of the What Ought to Be which is different from the Being of nature, but just as real. This is required to avoid ambiguity which would reduce the ethical ideal to «a catechism of duties» or «a fantastic realm of pious hopes».16 The question is an important one, since the difference between ethical ideal and utopia is involved. Kant, in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, had already highlighted the difference between What Ought to Be and

14

Ibid., pp. 459 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 495. 16 ERW W 24. 15

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Being in the expression, also referred to by Cohen,17 «what must happen, even though it never happens».18 Cohen goes further than Kant in foregrounding not only the value of the ideal, independent of its realisation, but also the character of specific reality of What Ought to Be in respect of the Being of nature. In his letter to Louis and Helene Lewandowsky, dated 19 August 1871, Cohen had already written: «The idealist conception of the world does not consist of the fact that things are believed to become as they should be, but of the fact that they are believed to have to become as they should be».19 In Vom ewigen Frieden, Cohen pointed out that if idea must be distinguished «from any real existence of nature and from any historical experience», it, however, «establishes its specific meaning» inasmuch as «it takes charge of effectual reality».20 It is here that Cohen placed the decisive difference between ethics and utopia: «The irreplaceable, very deep ground of the ethics of humanity can no longer lie in the prophetic hope of the future, but, in accordance with its method, in the reality of the future. This reality is idea, ethical idea: the idea where the idealism of ethics separates from the utopia of a transcendent bucolic world, as Jean Paull once called the hereafter (…). If ethical reality is an idea, then it is grounded in idealism, and therefore in knowledge. The knowledge of morality needs the guarantee of the certainty of that future for humanity».21 Reality is thus an essential category of being, not only of the Being of nature, but also of that of the ideal. Reality cannot do without a dimension of «presence» (Gegenwart), of «being present» ((Dasein) of the «object» (Gegenstand), d as content of thought: «The object has its ground in reality».22 But the ethical ideal, What Ought to Be, cannot 17

Cf. KBE E 22, 124. I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 4, p. 427. 19 H. COHEN, Briefe, ausgewählt und hg. von Bertha und Bruno Strauß, Schocken Verlag/Jüdischer Buchverlag, Berlin 1939, pp. 32 f. 20 Cf. H. COHEN, Vom ewigen Frieden, in S 2 343/W 16 314 f. 21 H. COHEN, Religion und Sittlichkeit. Eine Betrachtung zur Religionsphilosophie, in J 3 148. 22 LRE E 139. 18

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be reduced to the Being of nature, in this sense either. The reality of What Ought to Be cannot be constituted or recognised as mere «Being there» ((Dasein); an analogous, but not identical category needs to be thought for it: «Ought to Be There» (Dasollen ( ).23 Cohen’s view of logical reality as realisation makes the problem a less thorny one than in Kant, in this case as well. However, for this aspect, even more than for the relationship with sensation, it is useful to try to understand precisely both the analogy and difference between logic and ethics, in a tricky balance which has not always been upheld by Cohen’s interpreters. This is my aim from now onwards, especially with a view to exact understanding of the notion of «eternity». Here reference is required to Cohen’s theory of time and space, as formulated in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, and to its further elaboration in Ethik des reinen Willens. Many interpreters have correctly highlighted and thoroughly analysed the primacy of the future and the reduction of the present to space in Cohen’s philosophy,24 though, in my view, the importance of this spatial presence in his logic and of its analogue in ethics has generally been underestimated. Without reference to this, the reality of being, which is realised as «anticipation of the future» lacks the necessary prospect of «Allness» ((Allheit). Admittedly, in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, Cohen defined the present as «a moment of space»25 and the relationship between space 23 Although I am normally against neologisms in philosophical argument, I submit this term at this point, since, in this case, it appears to me to be necessary for defining a specific category of ethical «existence». I believe that this particular case is justified by an important m precedent: the Italian historian off religion and philosopher Ernesto de Martino, in his excellent posthumous work, La fine del mondo. Contributo all’analisi delle apocalissi culturali, ed. by Clara Gallini, Einaudi, Torino 1977, used the expression «doverci essere» (Ought to Be There). 24 I shall limit reference to P. FIORATO, Geschichtliche Ewigkeit. Ursprung und Zeitlichkeit in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1993. The theme was re-examined by R. GIBBS, Hermann Cohen’s Messianism: The History of the Future, in “Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums”. Tradition und Ursprungsdenken in Hermann Cohens Spätwerk. Internationale Konferenz in Zürich 1998, hg. von H. Holzhey, G. Motzkin und H. Wiedebach, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, pp. 331 ff. 25 LRE E 228.

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and time as «resolution of space in time»,26 but the correlation between time and space would nott be completely and correctly understood unless sufficient importance were attributed to the consideration that «it is not that space is now dismissed, so that only time remains. Actually, it is only now that the background, d principally constituted by space, becomes effective».27 The «Plurality» (Mehrheit) t of time would be a mere precondition for the reality of objective content without correlation with the «Allness» ((Allheit) of space: «If only time were in charge, the disposition for content would certainly be made ready, but a true content would not be constituted. Plurality in general has proved to be a preparation, but only a preparation for content. It is relativity, like the finite number. One continues uninterruptedly with it and in accordance with it; there can be no conclusion anywhere. Allness comes to the aid of this relativity without a conclusion. It brings integration (…). Now future and past do not whirl round in a changing no longer. Space fixes these unities; it no longer consumes them only as unities of a Plurality; its Allness unites them in a whole. Juxtaposition, or rather togetherness is the new contribution required of space, and which space fulfils».28 Thus space has its premise in time, but time also, inasmuch as it is the future, in the sense of anticipation of the future, has its premise in space, «inasmuch as its ambit develops from the infinite series to integral calculus».29 Therefore, if, in the ambit of the Being of nature, the reality of content as realisation and anticipation of the future does not have a meaning independent of its presence, as spatial co-presence, but is correlative to it, the meaning of the anticipation of the future cannot be immediately extended by identity in the ethical ambit of the Being of the ideal, but an analogous, though not identical concept to the logical one of spatial co-presence, to which the ethical anticipation of the future is to be correlated, needs to be identified. This concept for

26

Ibid., p. 231. Ibidem. 28 Ibid., pp. 193 f. 29 Ibid., p. 199. 27

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Cohen is «eternity», which, as an ethical analogue of space, provides the concept of future with a «new meaning».30 One of the reasons why Cohen’s concept of «eternity» is difficult to understand correctly and completely lies in a lack of homogeneity between the first and second parts of the chapter entitled Das Ideal in Ethik des reinen Willens, where Cohen dealt with the theme of eternity. A unified meaning of these two parts can, however, be traced if they are interpreted in the aabove mentioned perspective of the difference and analogy between the reality of the Being of nature and that of the Being of What Ought to Be. In the first part of the chapter, Cohen underlined the analogy between logic and ethics in respect of the conception of time and, at the same time, the difference between them concerning reference to the Allness of space.31 He also reintroduced for ethics a conception of time as anticipation of the future, to which the anticipation of the past is correlated and consequent, in opposition to the anticipation of the present peculiar to «fantasy» and utopian «hope».32 The realisation of the will as an «anticipation» of the future cannot, however, make reference and find a ground, like thought, in the Allness of space. The intent to make this difference explicit forced Cohen into unilateral, imprecise statements, unless they are amplified and improved in the light of successive development. I shall quote the two most obviously problematic passages: «While the determination of the effectual reality of nature is based on space, the concept of the pure will is fully realised in the fundamental concept of the time. The problem of the effectual reality of the pure will thus refers not to space but time».33 «An analogon of infinity in time, opposed to Allness, lines up with the infinity of space indicated by Allness. This is the meaning of the concept of eternity».34 Two serious ambiguities could arise both from these passages and the general tenor of the first part of the chapter dealing with Das Ideal: firstly ethical reality could be believed to be entirely resolved in 30

Cf. ERW W 294. Cf. ibid., pp. 395 ff. 32 Cf. ibid., pp. 398 ff. 33 Ibid., p. 398. 34 Ibid., p. 400. 31

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time, and thus in becoming; secondly eternity could be believed to be resolved in Plurality, in the infinite, undefined series of particular realisations, with no reference to Allness, which founds its meaning. Actually here Cohen was concerned with clarifying the point that time in the ethical, in contrast with logic, is not in correlation with space and the infinite process of action is not in correlation with Allness understood as the sum and co-presence of moments. This does not mean, however, that he was not aware that the reality of ethics, like that of logic, cannot be reduced to Plurality and time either, but must be grounded in a correlation with an Allness, different from space, but analogous to it. Otherwise time, as «anticipation», would lose its foundation: «This anticipation is, on the contrary, the real problem».35 Further on Cohen developed his argument and overcame the ambiguity. He showed how the proper, determining meaning of «eternity» is not its temporal dimension, which was already present in the Greek concept of kþ , but the idea of messianic peace, announced by Jewish prophecy as «the time to come towards which all politics must aim, towards which the whole of effectual reality must be oriented», as «the beginning of a new time, a new world, a new humanity, a new humanity on earth».36 This essential clarification allowed Cohen to develop the meaning of eternity more correctly and thoroughly. Thinking eternity «nevertheless as a measure of time» inevitably implies falling back on a conception of time as «Allness», of the future «as the infinite sum of the whole of future time»,37 and thus as «anticipated present»,38 proper to utopia.39 In this sense, though Cohen, in Ethik des reinen Willens, recognised the essential value of the messianic ideal of Jewish prophecy, he pointed out its limit as a static poetic representation of

35

Ibid., p. 399. Ibid., p. 406. 37 Ibid., p. 409. 38 Ibid., p. 399. 39 P. A. SCHMID, Ethik als Hermeneutik. Systematische Untersuchungen zu Hermann Cohens Rechts- und Tugendlehre, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1995, pp. 190 ff., acknowledges the character of Allness of eternity, though taking it to be a «temporal Allness» (p. 192). 36

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peace.40 As we know, in his subsequent works, especially Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls and Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, he further developed his interpretation of prophetic messianism and overcame this criticism of the religious ideal of peace.41 Though provisional, Cohen’s partial criticism of the prophetic conception of peace is a clarifying passage, in the economy of this chapter of Ethik des reinen Willens, which brings out the meaning of eternity as an ethical category which cannot be reduced to time, but is in correlation with it, as the foundation of «a new meaning»42 for the concept of the future, as an answer to the problem: «what effectual reality is ensured by ethics?»43 as «the perspective of the incessant, infinite trend to go forward on the part of the pure will».44 In this complete, integral meaning, ethical eternity represents the dimension of Allness, different from and analogous to space, that correlatively founds the possibility of the ethical anticipation of the future, i.e. of «progress»: «We recognise the effectual reality of the ethical (…) in the purpose imposed on ethical activity: being infinite. (…) Certainly, in this development, the single level does not represent the effectual reality of the ethical perfectly, but this single level should not be considered separately, if the problem is its relationship with the question of effectual reality. The infinitely far off point to which it conceptually refers is included in each single level. Eternity is this infinitely far off point for each single point. They need to be taken together so as to explain thatt eternity is the effectual reality of the ethical, and that the finite point of realisation is not a contradiction».45 As the reality of nature consists in the correlation between time and space, ethical reality takes place in the progress-eternity correlation, for which eternity is only real in the infinite anticipation of the future 40

Cf. ERW W 405, 407 f. On the theme of peace as a fundamental concept, not only of Cohen’s ethics and philosophy of religion, but also of the whole system, see the fundamental work by D. ADELMANN, Einheit des Bewußtseins als Grundproblem der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Diss., Heidelberg 1968. 42 ERW 408. 43 Ibid., d p. 409. 44 Ibid., d p. 410. 45 Ibid., d pp. 410 f. 41

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and, on the other hand, the latter is not authentically so (but rather mythical nostalgia of the past or a utopian anticipation of the present) except for inasmuch as the future is determined and ensured as eternity. Complementariness is set up in the progress-eternity correlation between becoming and being, analogous, though different, in respect of that which is represented in logic by the time-space correlation: «Progress concerns the becoming of the pure will, while eternity points to a being. Though splitting this being off from the concept of time, how can it be thoughtt except as a type of being? In eternity a being, totally comparable with nature in its relationship with thought, is thus opposed to progress. New hope for the problem of the effectual reality of the ethical could arise from this confrontation, as long as eternity can bear this confrontation with nature; as long as it is capable of satisfying the desire for effectual reality just as much as nature does for thought».46 The anticipating reference of future time to an Allness that is not time (though it is not space either) is the essential distinction between ethical will and «desire»: «Desire lacks the objective of eternity. Only trivially can one compare the enjoyment of yearning for desire to eternity. Desire looks towards temporality. The pure will detaches itself from the finiteness of temporality, searching for what gives it strength in infinite penetrating, with its thought and trend, to the utmost in time, beneath the guiding star of eternity. In it all that is temporal must thus become a mirror to eternity, and transform into eternal».47 Cohen explicitly treats «eternity» and «ideal» as synonyms, substituting and developing the notions of «What Ought to Be», «law» and «task»,48 for indicating the non temporal Allness of ethics.49 It is clear that eternity, in its correlation with progress, gives entirely adequate expression to the content (which, rather than dialectical, so as to keep the analogy with logic,50 we can call «integral») of the 46

Ibid., p. 417. Ibid., p. 412. 48 Cf. ibid., p. 424. 49 Cf. ibid., p. 423. 50 Cf. LRE E 182. 47

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ethical ideal: «completeness, fulfilment, the incompleteness of fulfilment».51 We must now turn to one last, unavoidable meaning of existence: effectuality (Wircklichkeit). The reality of the ideal would remain empty rhetoric, if it could not be guaranteed effectuality, though this cannot be the effectuality of nature. We can start off from an important analogy with the aesthetic ideal, which is retained by Cohen, not forgetting a clear distinction made to avoid the much feared ambiguity of the aestheticisation of ethics. He wrote that the aesthetic ideal «is not effect but creation».52 Similarly, concerning the ethical ideal, he pointed out that: «Effectual reality connected with the pure will can only be sought in the production of this pure will. The concept of effectual reality needs therefore to be modified, so as to transfer its sense to the will».53 If we return to the themes which have emerged during analysis of the first two meanings of existence, in an attempt to determine the third meaning, effectuality, for ethics, we accept that, on the one hand, ethical effectuality cannot be reduced to phenomenic reality, to the given of sensible perception, though it must satisfy, in its own specific way, the requirement of sensation. On the other hand, it cannot be reduced to a mere effectual being there, to the given present, though its anticipation of the future cannot be a utopian flight in an anticipated present. If the difference between the effectuality of nature and that of ethics is the unsurpassable unavailability of the ethical phenomenon, a common level of reality can, nevertheless, be found in «happening». By also reflecting on the Kantian formula mentioned above, it could be said that even though what must happen never does, it must really happen nonetheless. A conceptual space is opened up here for understanding and interpreting ethical realisation as transformation of reality,54 i.e. for the elaboration of politics grounded in the ideal. 51

ERW W 424. On «eternity» and «ideal» cf. especially S. KAPLAN, Das Geschichtsproblem in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Reuther & Reichard Verlag, Berlin 1930, pp. 74 ff. 52 ERW W 419. 53 Ibid., d p. 422. 54 Cf. ibid., p. 391.

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With the seriousness and rigour always shown by Cohen in his further approach to the problem of the «realisation of the ethical», he does not sidestep the trial of sceptical doubt: «What do we still require, to reach effectual reality, iff the eternity of realisation, in accordance with the purity of the will, means, at the same time, the progress of this realisation? Can we continue to fear that this eternity be an illusion, and that ethicity not have that effectual reality without which it is nothing more than an illusion? Does everything in man’s history, in law and the state appearr to work towards ethicity, ought it to strengthen our suspicion that everything is only the result of natural impulses, of instinct, that there is no reason to suppose the presence of a thrust in the direction of eternity in all this, to which ethical culture moves?»55 Cohen’s answer had a definite orientation: «Those who only see instinct and the power impulse in the creations of ethical culture; those who do not see there a point of departure and sign to see whether, thanks to the foundation of the pure will, this hypothesis does not allow a correct formulation of the problem of ethicity, and thus a satisfactory solution, cannot be acquainted with ethicity. They see nothing but nature in it».56 Ethical realisation is not determination of given effective reality, but the production of a new effective reality. It is authentic politics, i.e. not the economic management of the present following the «power impulse», but the real anticipation, by means of action, of the eternal ideal. With the mythical conception of politics, which «does not think much beyond the following dawn»,57 Cohen contrasted a prophetic conception, for which the ideal of peace opposes war, not as an abstract model, as a utopian dream, but as a political programme: «The ethical value of messianism consists in this political meaning it has, we could almost say a meaning of philosophy of history. The history of peoples, as the history of humanity, this is the problem of the prophets’ messianism. Here on earth peace must reign among men, among peoples. Swords must be melted down and turned into pruning

55

Ibid., p. 416. Ibidem. 57 Ibid., p. 401. 56

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knives. This irrevocable opposition to what history calls international politics is the prophets’ messianism».58 Contrasting the eternal ideal of peace with the effective reality of war, for Cohen, did not mean an empty utopia of «perpetual peace»,59 but rather contrasting politics as the anticipation of the future and infinite but effective progress in the fulfilment of the eternal ideal of humanity with politics as economic management of the present and as an affirmation of power. «Complaints are made – Cohen wrote – that ethicity lacks, as is commonly said, effectual reality. Only natural beings are recognised in men and the peoples of history. The best representation of the life of men and peoples seems to be the image thanks to which Darwin updated old Heraclitus. War is the father of All (…). Here lie the roots of the materialist conception of history: history is reduced to the level of nature. Therefore, f humanity is no more than an empty abstraction. And the future is nothing more than the dragging on of the present, where romantic inspiration, which at least looks back to the past, is also missing. The past is also only taken up again if it can be of help to the omnipotence of the present. Eternity, on the other hand, returns to catechism and is silenced in immortality. In the struggle for existence there is no victory for eternity. Ethics does posit this purpose, however. The eternity of moral self-consciousness, the eternity of humanity which bears this self-consciousness: this is the ideal; this is the being of the will, this the highest being of idealism».60 The analogy with logic also needs to be sought in connection with the problem of the effectuality of the ideal. In Logik der reinen Erkenntnis Cohen had pointed to the «individual» (das Einzelne) as the critical category representing the requirement of sensation61 and to «greatness» (Größe) as the category by means of which pure thought can satisfy this requirement and produce the individual62 and had, finally, determined «greatness» by means of «connection» 58

Ibid., d pp. 406 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 408. 60 Ibid., d pp. 426 f. 61 Cf. LRE E 471 f. 62 Cf. ibid., pp. 476, 478 f. 59

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(Zusammenhang) with «equality» (Gleichheit),63 which constitutes its «premise». An analogy with this logical orientation cannot be just glimpsed in Cohen’s ethics; it is explicitly stated. Cohen began the chapter of Ethik des reinen Willens entitled Die Gerechtigkeit precisely with a discussion of the requirement of effectual reality of sensation and pointed to justice as the ethical analogue of «greatness», so as to satisfy this requirement.64 In the next chapter on Humanität Cohen posited this virtue, explicitly considered, firstly, in the meaning of «aequitas» i.e. «equality»,65 as a necessary complement to justice for realisation in connection with the «individual» (der Einzelne).66 The formulation of this close analogy is not a mere abstract, artificial architectural construction for the delight of an empty exterior symmetry. In fact it is the conceptual foundation of ethical effectuality as a concrete political programme grounded in the ideal and transforming the present, in opposition to politics as the pragmatics of power and economic management of the present. In the chapter on justice Cohen set out a political programme where the entire conceptual foundation of ethics is finally realised. He attained this result through two conceptually significant stages. Firstly he turned the frequently stated principle of the ethical foundation of law into the latter’s foundation as the «science of law».67 He did not mean this in the common sense of metareflection on law, but rather a conception of law itself, not as «technique» but as «science»: «Justice is directly built on truthfulness, since it sets up a method, a science of law. Law is not only, as it were, a particular technique, it is a true, specific science flanking the sciences of nature and history. A specific science is one that possesses and constructs specific concepts. From this point of view technique which elaborates 63

Cf. ibid., p. 483. Cf. ERW W 591. 65 Aequitas «means equality»: cf. ibid., p. 622. 66 Cf. ibid., pp. 617 ff. 67 Cf. ibid., p. 599. The importance of referece to Judaism for Cohen’s conception of the «science of law» is upheld and explained by D. NOVAK, Das noachidische Naturrecht bei Hermann Cohen, in “Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums”. ” Tradition und Ursprungsdenken in Hermann Cohens Spätwerk. Internationale Konferenz in Zürich 1998, cit., pp. 226 f., 230 ff. 64

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already given concepts, differs from methodd which creates concepts, and, in them, creates science. The science of law is a methodological system of concepts which are proper and peculiar to it».68 Secondly, in the chapter on justice, Cohen set out a somewhat radical socialist political programme, suggesting serious limitations on the right of property and the elimination of hereditary law. He was not too distant from the more radical forms of socialism, such as those of Lassalle and Marx. He had always criticised the latter less for the content of his works than for his materialist foundation. The important point to make is that this programme was grounded in a critique of legal mystification consisting in the attribution to capital of a juridic 68

ERW W 599. Therefore, I am unable to accept the objection made by E. WINTER, Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft. Eine historisch-systematische i Untersuchung zur Ethik-Konzeption des Marburger Neukantianismus k im Werke Hermann Cohens, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1980, p. 262, that Cohen’s ethics runs the risk of degenerating into a «theory of the science off law». Peter Schmid, who also criticised this view of Winter (cf. P. A. SCHMID, op. cit., p. 89), correctly pointed out: «Nevertheless, Cohen’s ethics of law does not become a scientific theory of the science of law. Rather it largely becomes a philosophical theory of law, i.e. a critical explanation of the rational principles of positive law» (ibid., d pp. 53 f.). On this topic cf. also H. HOLZHEY, Rechtserfahrung oder Rechtswissenschaft – eine fragwürdige Alternative. Zu Sanders Streit mit Kelsen, in Reine Rechtslehre im Spiegel ihrer Fortsetzer und Kritiker, hg. von O. Weinberger und W. Krawietz, Springer, Wien 1988, pp. 167-192; G. GIGLIOTTI, Dalle facoltà alle forme. Introduzione al concetto di volontà in Cohen, in H. COHEN, Etica della volontà pura, a cura di Gianna Gigliotti, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1994, pp. XLVII ff. This meaning Cohen gave to «law» as the «science of law» needs to be kept in mind in reflection on the problem of his methodological anomaly of a transcendental foundation of ethics, without reference to the «fact of a science». The problem is admittedly a real one and is still there after Cohen’s conception of law as the science of law has been clarified, since this science of law, as understood by Cohen, finds its reality in politics, which we could call science in contrast with politics as mere technique. This is certainly a programme which has yet to be realised and thus cannot be considered the «fact of science». On the other hand, socialism for Cohen was the concrete expression of this programme and the authentic strength of its historical realisation. Taking into account historicity as an undeniable dynamic component also attributed to the «fact of science» in the realm of nature by Cohen, this conception of socialism as the political and historical reality of the «science of law» can, in my view, contribute to the consideration, in a new light, of the problem, which remains a problem, of the «fact of science» as a point of reference for the transcendental foundation of ethics.

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person.69 Here the ethical foundation of law is realised in a concrete political programme which goes beyond the ethical, in advance of the economic, alienation of the individual from his personality, through legal return of the moral concept off person to its real subject: «But what is the situation when dealing with profit from work, if it is the same concept of capital which is to be applied, or used with the worker? Does the worker become the owner of the profit from his work? Or, behind all these various façades, does an outsider remain, who is forced into an obligation by a work contract? Like that of the Sphinx, this question originates in law itself. Law is obliged to question this problem, profound concern on the part of the State. It becomes the main problem of ethical culture. Here economic interests become cultural interests. Law again appears as the eternal creation of ethicity. The virtue of justice has pointed to and planned its path here. Law is no longer only at the service of the furtive subterfuges of economic power. It has returned to its relationship with ethics. Law has come back into its own as the law of justice. The rebirth of the State, as ethical self-consciousness, begins and ends in this clarification, in this concentration of law on its true purpose. The idea that had comforted Kant that the evil of culture contains the seeds of its salvation appears to be confirmed. The mythology of capital holds within itself the redemption of the person who works».70 It is on this basis that, in the subsequent parts, Cohen formulated the opposition between «power state» (Machtsstaat) t and «law state» ( (Rechtsstaat t), not as an alternative between two possible political conceptions, nor as a utopian contraposition of the idea of de facto reality, but as the position of the sole ideal, the «law state», as a principle of political transformation of the «empirical state».71 «The ideal is the being of eternity. Thus justice becomes the virtue t of eternity. Its being is eternal, every virtue is eternal. Without justice, however, all virtues lose value. As the virtue of the ideal it also goes beyond all scepticism and any weak conservative opportunism, for whose worldly wisdom faith in a new world is an illusion of ideology. 69

Cf. ERW W 609. Ibid., p. 611. 71 Cf. ibid., p. 615. 70

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Justice is the virtue of man, as a man of the new rather than the other world. The double meaning of man, as an individual and Allness, is fully realised thanks to it».72 The beginning of the following chapter of Ethik des reinen Willens, entitled Die Humanität, may lead one to believe that Cohen conceived this virtue as a completion of justice in the sense of an addition for understanding of the reality of the individual, of the ««specificity of a case of effectual reality».73 Taking up this meaning would underestimate the untiring philosophical pursuit of realisation on Cohen’s part as a continuous, further attempt to get closer to the foundation and understanding of effective reality, which would indirectly confirm the originative abstractness of the ideal, in the end its formalism. In fact, Humaneness is in correlation with justice and, in this correlative meaning, is the condition of the possibility of justice itself, besides being grounded in it. It is indeed the condition of all virtues, inasmuch as it constitutes the «limit» of ethics, the horizon and perspective condition, only with reference to which the production of all content is possible: «If Humaneness means a virtue which has the task of showing the unilaterality of all virtues, then it leads to the limit of an idea which is actually the limit of ethics».74 This is coherent with the authentic general layout of Cohen’s ethics and entire philosophy, for which the requirement of effective reality and the trend towards realisation are not artificial, constrained extensions of an essentially formalist founding theory, but a true originative stimulus and regulative principle of a theory of form as the sole authentic principle of real content, in line with Cohen’s well known statement: «Nothing could be further from the truth than the layman’s suspicion that “pure” is empty, freed of its content. Impure content, which is not real content, it is the sole opposite of “pure”; and this is only the case in the sense of the extension of “pure” to impure content, in order to turn it

72

Ibid., p. 616. On these themes see: H. HOLZHEY, Hermann Cohen: der Philosoph in Auseinandersetzung mit den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Problemen seiner Zeit, in Philosophisches Denken – Politisches Wirken. Hermann-Cohen-Kolloquium Marburg 1992, hg. von R. Brandt und F. Orlik, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1993, pp. 30 ff. 73 ERW 617. 74 Ibid., p. 632; cf. ibid., p. 628.

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into pure content. This is the inevitable relationship of “pure” with content. Without this “pure” becomes senseless».75 At the beginning of the chapter, Cohen did actually write that Humaneness does not concern «the legal principle», but only the «legal demonstration».76 This could lead one to think of an extrinsic addition on the level of mere empirical application. However, shortly afterwards, he specified that the problem answered by Humaneness, in the legal field, is not simply the appropriateness of evaluation, by the judge, of possible «attenuating circumstances» to be applied in a specific case.77 Humaneness is, however, necessary in the ambit of the very foundation of law, for «determinations of the universal problem of the particular».78 For this reason, though it remains true that Humaneness is not involved in the determination of the principles of law, it is important to point out that it is not only an applicative instrument of law, but a critical category of it,79 and as such itself a part of law.80 It is easy to see how Cohen, in this context, made use of the concept of Humaneness, in its meaning of aequitas, to address not only the problem of the application of law, but the fundamental question of an ethical category of existence (Wirklichkeit). In total analogy with logic, he found in Humaneness the meaning of «equality», with which to set up a «connection» with «greatness» and the measure proper to justice. He also found the «requirement» of the «individual» (das Einzelne), which in ethics is the «individual person» (der Einzelne).81 As in logic, also in ethics the category of effectual existence is not a mere applicative appendix of the founding theory, but an integral part of the latter. In the case of ethics, Humaneness is an integral part of law, not inasmuch as it determines its principles, but inasmuch as it allows adequate consideration of «the Sphinx

75

LRE E 5. Cf. ERW 620. 77 Cf. f ibide d m. 78 Ibid., d p. 621. 79 Cf. ibid., d p. 622. 80 Cf. ibid., d p. 620. 81 « as «D a Einzeln l e is i t hier schliesslich de d r Einzeln l e»: ibid. d , p. 619. 76

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constituted by the impenetrability of the particular».82 Cohen also theorised the intrinsic correlative relationship in ethics between foundation and application, which, as I have already mentioned, is implicit in the very meaning of «purity». He wrote this about law: «The principle of law only serves – but this is necessary – to teach, and as a guide for finding the particular».83 Justice cannot do without correlation with Humaneness because law cannot do without reference to realisation in politics. It was on this basis that Cohen developed the meaning of Humaneness as the foundation of the partly political relationship with the other man as an individual, with the «face of man»,84 inasmuch as, thanks to it, it is possible to treat the Other without judging him and before judging him. He thus had already introduced into ethics the foundation of the realisation of «peace» in negation of any justification of hatred:85 an orientation that would be significantly developed in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums.86 The politics of peace thus became concrete in a programme founded on the columns of justice and Humaneness, or rather, justice in Humaneness. Thus ethics, already profoundly linked to logic, opens up to aesthetics, and politics becomes the full expression of culture. The path followed by psychology, wrote Cohen, is also similarly marked: «Representing this macrocosm of human essence in the microcosm of the man of culture is the great task of psychology».87 Lastly politics is the concrete figure of the convergence of ethics and religion, since it is conceived as the realisation of the messianic ideal of the prophets: peace as the realisation of justice and mercy. As a conclusion to these considerations of mine on the existence of the ideal, I should like to devote a few words to our common research. I should like to underline the fact that the importance of Cohen’s political demand has always been highlighted. In his 1968

82

Ibid., p. 620. Ibidem. 84 Ibid., p. 627. 85 Cf. ibid., pp. 627 ff. 86 Cf. RV V 520 ff. On this subject cf. D. ADELMANN, op. cit., pp. 222 ff. 87 ERW W 637. 83

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dissertation88 Dieter Adelmann suggested it was one of the main keys to the interpretation of Cohen. Steven Schwarzschild89 also foregrounded the political importance of Cohen’s thought. Helmut Holzhey, in the important introductory paper at the Marburg congress in 1992,90 placed it at the centre of his reflections. Nevertheless, Cohen has still to become a reference point for new political reflection. A small but significant group of scholars engaged in research on Cohen’s thought regularly meet at congresses dealing with the subject. These congresses, which are attended by most of those involved in this research, have now become stimulating events. Our work on the study and interpretation of Cohen is certainly useful and important, but it will never be able to reconstruct and revive Cohen’s thought completely unless it is also an active testimony of political engagement inspired by the ideal. Admittedly our social and political situation is rather different from Cohen’s, but certainly today too, perhaps more now than then, do we need a critique of politics which has declined to an economic management of the present and a new positing of political truthfulness in the light of the ethical ideal. Perhaps we too, today, «have again reached the point when we must bear witness».91

88

Cf. D. ADELMANN, op. cit. Cf. S. SCHWARZSCHILD, The Democratic Socialism of Hermann Cohen, in «Hebrew Union College Annual» 27 (1956), pp. 417-438; ID., “Germanism and Judaism” – Hermann Cohen’s Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis, in Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: The Problematic Symbiosis, ed. by D. Bronsen, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1979, pp. 129-172. 90 Cf. H. HOLZHEY, Hermann Cohen: der Philosoph in Auseinandersetzung mit den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Problemen seiner Zeit, cit. The problem is also a central one for Holzhey’s pupil P. A. SCHMID, op. cit. and H. WIEDEBACH, Die Bedeutung der Nationalität für Hermann Cohen, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/ New York 1997. 91 Cf. H. COHEN, Ein Bekenntnis i in derr Judenfrage, Dümmler, Berlin 1880; repr. in J 2 73. 89

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE HOLY SPIRIT OUT OF THE SOURCES OF JUDAISM AND KANTIANISM

The theme of the holy spirit in Cohen’s thought undoubtedly has some special characteristics. Firstly, it is only present in his last works. He devoted an essay to the subject in 1915 entitled Der heilige Geist,1 the contents of which were substantially returned to in Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums. He also referred briefly to this theme in other works dating from 1915 and subsequent years.2 Secondly, it is an organic part of the context of a philosophy of religion overtly drawing inspiration «out of the sources of Judaism», though this theme is decidedly not characteristic of the Jewish tradition, but rather of that of Christianity. These two peculiarities may, at least partially, serve to explain the little interest shown in this theme by Cohen scholars. On the one hand, its late emergence in Cohen’s last philosophical works, which foregrounded religion, may have induced some to consider it an aspect of the last stage of Cohen’s thought which was distant from his system and perhaps philosophically less significant, or the expression of the breaking of the magic circle of idealism and moving closer to the new thought grounded in understanding of the concrete individual and 1

H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, in Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage Jakob Guttmanns [Schriften, hg. von der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums], hg. vom Vorstande der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums, Gustav Fock, Leipzig 1915; repr. in J 3 176-196/W 16 439-464. 2 Cf. BR 104 f., 123; H. COHEN, Deutschtum und Judentum, mit grundlegenden Betrachtungen über Staat und Internationalismus, Töpelmann, Gießen 1915; repr. in J 2 237, 245/W 16 469, 480 f.; ID., Der Jude in der christlichen Kultur, in «Neue Jüdische Monatshefte» (1917); repr. in J 2 201 f./W 17 432 f.; ID., Einheit oder Einzigkeit Gottes, in «Neue Jüdische Monatshefte» (1917/18); repr. in J 1 97 ff./W 17 640 ff.

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new logic of the I-Thou dialogue, as Franz Rosenzweig argued.3 On the other hand, others may have considered this theme somewhat «un-Jewish» and thus less significant than others in the context of religion «out of the sources of Judaism». Actually some scholars have pointed out its importance, but they are a minority, who have not attracted sufficient attention to it.4 In my view, this theme was in the foreground of Cohen’s late philosophy of religion, not in the sense of a turning point, but in that of continuity with his systematic philosophy and its integration. I have already argued for this view elsewhere,5 and if I am returning to it now, it is to make a small contribution which is now more than ever relevant to research on Cohen. On the one hand, Cohen’s thought belongs to the philosophical tradition we could describe as «Kantian», but which it would be better to call «critical idealism», since opinion is now unanimous that Cohen’s philosophy is much more than development of, and a late variation on Kantianism. It is rather an original elaboration of idealist, critical transcendental philosophy, with its roots certainly in the fruitful humus of Kant’s teaching, but developing it autonomously, also drawing inspiration from other classics of critical idealism, such as Plato and Leibniz. On the other hand, Cohen belonged to the tradition of Jewish thought, his roots extending deep down into the religious and philosophical «sources» of Judaism, in both the written and oral traditions. These two 3

Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, in J 1 XLVIII f. Among those who noted the importance of the theme of the holy spirit in Cohen’s thought I should like to single out at least Franz Rosenzweig, who, in his Einleitung g to Cohen’s Jüdische Schriften mentioned above, underlined the fact that «in this holy spirit placed by God in man, and who will not even be removed from the sinner, is condensed the correlation, in which God and man are united, precisely because they remain essentially separate» (ibid., p. LIV), and Hinrich Knittermeyer, who, in a review of Cohen’s Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums published in 1922, wrote: «It is in man’s holy spirit that the quality of the moral reason in his being in relation to religion is discovered. This is the fundamental new position of the Religion der Vernunftt as concerns the System der Philosophie and its implications must be taken into consideration in all further formulations» (H. KNITTERMEYER, Hermann Cohens Religion der Vernunft, in «Die Christliche Welt» 36 (1922), n. 42/43, col. 796). 5 Cf. A. POMA, Correlation in Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of Religion: A Method and More than a Method, d Chapter Four off this volume. 4

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dimensions, both of them important in Cohen’s thought, have, fortunately, been adequately investigated and highlighted by competent scholars. The question remains open, however, of whether the two lines of investigation are to be developed separately, the one excluding the other, or whether, as I believe, a horizon of unity and integration is to be found between them, which was certainly present in Cohen’s own perspective. In my view, the theme of the holy spirit provides an excellent opportunity for such a synthesis, as I shall attempt to show here, however briefly. As documentation of Cohen’s intention to carry out this synthesis, a number of examples from his output could be referred to. I shall start off from the short 1916 essay entitled Der polnische Jude,6 both because it seems to me to be significant for the subject in question, and because it is relevant to the context in which this paper is being presented. As is well known, this short essay was closely linked with, and explicitly referred to Cohen’s journey to Russia in May 1914, which left a deep, significant mark not only on his human experience, but also on his philosophical and religious thought. Cohen scholars have long been convinced of the interest and importance of his relationship with Russian (especially, but not exclusively Jewish) culture, though the subject is still to be adequately investigated, owing to the difficulty of gathering together all the required competences and operating with them on a unitary basis. It is certainly thanks to Professor Belov and the University of Saratov, the organisers of the conference on «Kant and Neo-Kantianism» at which this paper was presented, that an important stage in this project has been achieved. I do not intend to go too deeply into Der polnische Jude here, but shall only look at one central theme. After highlighting the qualities and merits of Eastern European Jews, Cohen, on the basis of his experiences in Russia, also criticised the culture in question: «I have often had the opportunity of noting that the intellectual sensibility of the Eastern Jew is torn by a spiritual fracture: there is no mediation in it between orthodoxy and religious indifference».7 He was convinced 6

H. COHEN, Der polnische Jude, in «Der Jude» (Juni 1916); repr. in J 2 162-171/ W 17 189-202. 7 Ibid., p. 165/pp. 193 f.

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that German Judaism could show its Eastern counterpart a third way, and that, by allowing Polish and Russian Jews into Germany, they would contribute new religious vitality to German Judaism and learn from the latter a less lacerated attitude t to religion and one that was more appropriate for modern culture. This attitude was the «much despised religious liberalism» taught to German Jews by Moses Mendelssohn and realised by them inn the reformed Science of Judaism (Wissenschaft des Judentums) movement.8 Now, the characteristic of this exemplary way was the synthesis between the most authentic contents of the Jewish religious tradition and the scientific, critical method of German culture: «We certainly do not intend to abolish our rites (…) – wrote Cohen –. Nevertheless, as far as it has become extinct in our hands, we still go on with our religious life and show in it that we have built up our authentic culture (wir … erweisen … uns als echte Kulturmenschen), promoting the revelation of science to our religion and starting out from it».9 This synthesis of Jewish monotheism with critical idealism, i.e. with «true scientific philosophy, which does not hide the amateurishness of imagination, but which methodologically grew up with the sciences»,10 this synthesis is what German Jews achieved by means of the Science of Judaism and were able to teach to all Judaism, both Western and Eastern: «This is the great example and paradigmatic meaning that the German Jew has for the future of Judaism, for Judaism in the whole world in its religious evolution (…). We were able to posit the interpretation of our history and continuation of our religious practices in harmony with the most intimate motives of our religious tradition and, at the same time, with those of universal culture».11 The theme of the «holy spirit», which appeared in Cohen’s last works, seems to me to be an excellent example of this synthesis between Jewish religious monotheism and German critical idealism, as I shall attempt to illustrate briefly as follows. 8

Cf. ibid., d pp. 165 f./193 ff. Ibid., d p. 166/195. 10 Ibid., d p. 170/200. 11 Ibid., d p. 166/pp. 195 f. 9

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Cohen himself pointed out12 that the expression only occurs rarely in the Bible: twice in Isaiah (63:10 and 11): «But they rebelled, and grieved His holy spirit» and «Where is He that put his holy spirit in the midst of them?», and once in Psalm 51:13: «Cast me away from Thy presence; and take not Thy holy spirit from me». Actually Cohen explained that the true biblical expression is not «holy spirit», but «the spirit of sanctity or of holiness», or, even more precisely, «the spirit of Thy holiness», in the psalm, and «the spirit of His holiness» in Isaiah.13 The post-biblical Jewish tradition did not devote much attention to this theme either, and Cohen made few references to the Talmud or Midrash and very few to Medieval exegesis (particularly Rashi). Some references to the theme could be found in Medieval Neo-Platonic or mystical Jewish thought, but they are also not very frequent and oriented towards hypostatisation of the holy spirit, going in the opposite direction to Cohen’s perspective; either he did not know them or was not interested in using them. One could think, then, that he developed this typically Christian theme with the intention of underlining the difference between Judaism and Christianity, taking up a polemical position towards the latter. This intention was undoubtedly present in Cohen, and he insisted on it, rejecting Christian hypostatisation of the holy spirit as an intermediary between God and man and showing how this is part of a pantheist or mystical conception, eliminating the difference between them and thus making correct thinking of religious correlation impossible. Cohen underlined «the value of this concept for consolidation of the correlation between God and man. This would be ruined if one were to think a particular personall mediation in the holy spirit. The holy spirit can be neither God nor man, nor God and man together; it is rather an attribute, strength, like an organ in God and

12

Cf. H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., p. 177/440; RV V 117 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 101 ff. 13 Cf. H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., pp. 176, 190/439, 457; RV V 121; Eng. trans. cit., p. 104.

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man. The spirit is nothing more; holiness even less so; how could the holy spirit mean more than a function?»14 But this critical, hostile intent against Christianity, pantheism and mysticism, though undeniable, was not Cohen’s only, or even most important reason for the elaboration of this theme. It was rather merely an implication of the meaning and fundamental role he attributed to it in his mature thought: the holy spirit was the concept of religious correlation on which his philosophy of religion was based and constituted the ultimate meaning of its peculiarity, i.e. of its difference from the system, but, at the same time, of its collocation in respect of it. With religious correlation, i.e. with the holy spirit, Cohen moved critical idealist philosophical reflection beyond the barrier (Schranke) of the «scientific» method, i.e. of the system, to exercise it on its limit (Grenze) and from here newly include the very contents of the system in a different non scientific, but still rational perspective, which was not alternative but integrative in respect of systematic thought. That there was room for the development of this different perspective can already be indirectly glimpsed in Ethik des reinen Willens, where Cohen repeated his conviction, which was later abandoned, that religion has a historically important role for ethics, but that it is overtaken by it in both concepts and method. He wrote: «The proposition: God is spiritt only has ethical value inasmuch as it prepares the thought: God is idea. Person, life, spirit are attributes whose roots lie in myth, which are of no use to ethics. The very concept of spirit, even if we completely put aside its theological meaning, is already ambiguous, because it mixes up nature and ethics in itself».15 The idea of God or, more precisely, the idea of God’s transcendence is the systematic concept of immanence, in the distinction, between logic and ethics, Being and What Ought to Be, nature and morality, against any pantheistic a conception of identity.16 The systematic distinction between logic and ethics, imposed by the 14

Cf. H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., p. 191/457. Cf. also ibid., d pp. 191 ff./457 ff.; RV V 116 f., 122 f., 124 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 100 f., 105 f., 107 f. 15 ERW W 453. 16 Cf. ibid., d pp. 453 ff.

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scientific method, cannot do without, precisely owing to the same requirements of the system, the horizon of unity, i.e. the realisation of morality in nature: the idea of God is the methodological guarantee of this realisation: «This [the problem of God] only originates in the close methodological connection between ethics and logic, in accordance with which ethics cannot even begin without taking as its supreme guide the fundamental law of truth, which establishes this connection. It is, as it were, the supreme principle of all moral knowledge. So here we catch the first sight of the necessary consequence to be drawn at the conclusion of the main ethical concepts. If this conclusive problem m were not to find a satisfactory answer, seeing that ethics rests on logic, seeing that the fundamental law of truth exercises this methodological constraint over ethics, ethics itself would collapse. What would be the methodological value of this conceptual construction if it were not certain that it could find application? And the doubt of application is not put off indefinitely (ad calendas graecas); as a matter of fact, it could disturb each step forward of moral progress. Each time the doubt would intervene that this thrust of the pure will be denied effective reality. The idea of God establishes the profound methodological agreement between our morality and nature».17 In the thought of his last years Cohen returned to the value of the religious concepts of Judaism, not only in their meaning as historical precedents of philosophical concepts, but in their peculiar meaning in respect of systematic philosophy. The religion of reason is the possibility of going beyond the solely methodological meaning of the idea of God, taken over by the philosophical system, and considering nature and morality in the light of the uniqueness of God. Jewish monotheism is the core of the «religion of reason», and the conceptual structure by means of which Cohen elaborated the founding relationship between the unique God, on the one hand, and the world and man on the other, as an alternative to identity, is «correlation», which he considered in the form of the religious concept of the «holy spirit». Certainly, for Cohen the meaning of creation was already correlation between God and the world, but still in the limited sense of 17

Ibid., d p. 465; cf. ibid., d pp. 444 ff.

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the logical-functional relationship between being and becoming, substance and function.18 With revelation, correlation between God and man in the «spirit» is set up and this is enriched by the meaning of reciprocity, inasmuch as, in revelation, God, as the creator of man, endows him with His spirit and man, «the discoverer of God» as it were, knows God in the spirit and actualises Him.19 But it is only in the «holy spirit» that correlation between God and man reaches the full determination of its meaning: «Holiness determines and actualises the spirit as moral spirit. And in the same way the spirit determines and actualises holiness as the action of moral reason».20 Cohen’s claim that the spirit given by God to man is the «spirit of holiness» determines the fulfilled meaning of religious correlation inasmuch as it constitutes it on the ethical level. «Holiness» is what unites God and man without identifying them. The distinction is maintained, not only because God is the origin of the spirit of holiness, but also because he is holy, while man must become holy and must fulfil moral progress towards the realisation of the infinite task of holiness. The non equality between the two terms of correlation, God and man, is one of its important characteristics; it is the dynamic principle of correlation. Cohen quoted Leviticus 19:12: «Thou shalt be holy, for I am holy, the Eternal, your God», commenting: «Here (…) holiness is required d by God, imposed by him as a taskk for man. Conferring as well as the solution of this task are only conditioned by the correlation between man and God. In no other place than here could it appear in such a determined, univocal way. Holy you! Since holy I ((Heilig ihr! Denn heilig ich). Thus the task has this correlation as a presupposition; otherwise foundation would have no sense. And could one not think that God alone can be holy, in accordance with His concept, that man, on the other hand, in accordance with his concept, cannot reach holiness? It is in no way certain that he will really reach it. Despite this, the task as such has its consistency. What ought to be must be stressed, while for 18

Cf. RV V 68 ff., 103; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 58 ff., 88; cf., on this question, A. POMA, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, Eng. trans. by J. Denton, State University of New York Press, Albany (New York) 1997, pp. 174 f., 192. 19 Cf. RV V 102 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 87 f. 20 Ibid., d p. 130; Eng. trans. cit., p. 112; cf. ibid., d p. 116; Eng. trans. cit., p. 100.

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God the concept is fulfilled by his definition. Thus it is only the correlation between man and God that founds this requirement, which is its basis as a presupposition. It requires and makes possible this connection in holiness».21 As can be seen, in the sharing of the «spirit of holiness» by God and man, it is a question of correlation between man’s morality and God’s holiness,22 but this does not mean the reduction of religion to ethics, since, given the content of ethics, here what is stressed is God’s holiness as origin, as end and ground of the sense of man’s infinite moral effort: it is only religious faith and hope that assure man that his morality is already holiness, that his moral What Ought to Be is alreadyy participation in being holy. The unavoidable distinction between God’s present holiness and man’s inchoative holiness allows understanding of correlation as reciprocity, without the risk of turning it into pantheist identity. «I will be hallowed among the children of Israel»: in this verse (Lev. 22:32), as in other parts of Scripture,23 God reminds man of the reciprocity: «God is not determined as holy through the secrets of His essence – Cohen commented –. And, generally speaking, not through knowledge does He become the holy God, but only through the act of sanctification; His holiness is effected through action, which man has to accomplish».24 Man sanctifies God by sanctifying himself («Sanctify yourselves … and be ye holy»: Lev. 11:44) and, at the same time, he can actually sanctify himself, since God gives him His holy spirit («I am the Eternal who sanctify you»: Ex. 31:13; Lev. 20:8; 21:8). This relationship between God’s holiness and man’s moral action constitutes religious correlation, the correlation between God and man in the holy spirit, which founds the real sense of men’s moral, political and historical action, guided by the ideal of messianism.25 The correlation between God and man in n the holy spirit also allows the religion of reason the consideration of the concrete individual which is not 21

H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., p. 184/448. Cf. RV V 111; Eng. trans. cit., p. 96. 23 Cf. ibid., d p. 128; Eng. trans. cit., p. 110. 24 Ibidem. 25 H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., pp. 184 f., 195 f./449 f., 462 ff.; RV V 125; Eng. trans. cit., p. 107. 22

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entirely possible for «scientific» ethics.26 This is not to be seen, however, as a turning point in Cohen’s philosophy, as a destruction of the «magic circle» of idealism, as Rosenzweig argued,27 but rather in the above mentioned sense of further development and integration of critical idealism, by means of the peculiar contribution of religion. In correlation with God the concrete individual is not «discovered philosophically» «in his sin and repentance», with no relation with the «universality of humanity», as Rosenzweig wrote,28 but is understood starting from awareness of his sin, where the «passage» and «elevation» to the ideal man of humanity is opened up for him.29 Man the sinner is the man who is aware of his sin and this awareness is, at the same time, a need for forgiveness and redemption: but in this awareness, man is already redeemed. Only religion, with its peculiar content, the correlation between God and man in the holy spirit, allows man to discover himself as a sinner becausee it reveals his holiness to him, thus opening up the possibility of the «moral activity» of self-sanctification, a in the faith in its possibility on the basis of certainty of his holiness: «Man, as holy spirit, becomes an individual».30 It is in this sense that Cohen interpreted the text of Psalm 51, where the expression «holy spirit» appears: «The poet, who deplores his sin, appeals through his prayer for forgiveness to God’s holy spirit, which He has placed in him. It is as though he wanted to say: You cannot take it away, once You have given it to me. The holy spirit, given to man by God, constitutes the indestructible characterr of man. Sin can do nothing against this; the renewal of the spirit comes to his aid against sin».31 Therefore, the holy spirit was, for Cohen, the very concept of religious correlation and, as such, together with the uniqueness of 26

«Man in his ultimate depth is to be established and founded by the holy spirit: man in his correlation with God, man in accordance with the uniqueness of God, man himself as unity, as individual. (…) Man, as holy spirit, becomes an individual. The spirit does not make man into an individual, only the holy spirit does this» (ibid., p. 124; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 106 f.). 27 Cf. F. ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung, cit., in J 1 xlviii f. 28 Cf. ibid., d p. xlv. 29 Cf. BR 55 ff. 30 RV 124; Eng. trans. cit., p. 107. 31 H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., pp. 189 f./p. 456; cf. RV V 119; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 102 f.

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God, the fundamental theme of his philosophy of religion and ultimate meaning of its «peculiarity» in respectt of the philosophical system. As I mentioned at the outset, it is in this theme that Cohen’s effort is evident to carry out a synthesis between the contents of the Jewish religion and those of scientific, systematic philosophy, not by means of the reduction of the one to the other, but by interpreting, on the one hand, the contents of Judaism in the light of philosophical problems and categories, and showing, on the other, the peculiarity of the contents that the Jewish religion can contribute to philosophical knowledge and culture. To highlight the extent of the contribution made by monotheist religion to philosophy, I shall restrict my remarks to a brief reference to one theme, albeit a very important one. The holy spirit, as correlation between God and man, allows religion, but also reason in general, correct, adequate understanding of the great classic problem appearing in Plato under the name of the idea of the good. Cohen devoted lengthy attention to this problem, delving deep into its difficulty and attempting various ways of approaching it. Plato’s idea of the good expresses a multiplicity of essential philosophical principles for any idealism, which are, at the same time, difficult to synthesise. On the one hand, it is «idea» like any other idea, but, on the other, is superior to other ideas: ®p™keina t q oªsºaq presb eºa Ÿ ueton. ), but Ÿnypø kåi dynåmei ; it is not only «hypothesis» ( Ê ø This means the primacy of the knowledge of the good and, at the same time, the transcendence of the good in respect of being. The primacy of the knowledge of the good finds strong and clear expression in Cohen’s theme of the holy spirit, which is entirely coherent with the philosophical tradition of critical idealism. Cohen himself underlined this agreement: «For the holy spirit limits that area of the spirit that connects God and man to holiness. And through this limitation and its exclusiveness, holiness becomes morality. The ethics of critical idealism has clarified this determination, because, to begin with, it laid down the distinction between the certainty of scientific knowledge and that of ethics. Through this distinction, Kant established the veracity of ethical knowledge (…). In this, its systematic arrangement, critical idealism completes the historical tendency of the idea of faith of the

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Reformation. Judaism accomplishes through the holy spirit this fundamentally honest tendency (…). Judaism in its biblical sources does not philosophise, but the basic logic of monotheism carries through its consequences beyond biblical limits. Through the “statutes and ordinances” the holy spirit actually becomes morality; in the same way the holy spirit in later history always more and more definitely stamps itself onto the moral spirit. And the priority given to it over any other qualities of the spirit makes it possible to recognise in it the nucleus of the thought that Kant expressed by the “Primacy of the Practical Reason”».32 In the transcendence of the good, on the other hand, Cohen saw and rejected all the implications, which were, in his view, inevitable, leading to ontological hypostatisation and, as a consequence, pantheism. Neither did he accept even a reduction of the idea of the good to the empirical good, which would inevitably involve eudaemonism. The solution he found in his late works on the philosophy of religion consisted in not attributing transcendence to the good, but to God, «the Good One», the origin of the good, and in considering the good as correlation between God and man. The idea of the good is not diminished in its importance in this way; actually, as Cohen wrote in Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, it is the object proper to religion, as well as ethics: «Religion, monotheism to be precise, arises with this concept. This concept seems to put both God and man in the shade, as if both only rose up and were legitimate thanks to the concept of the good».33 What the «Greek spirit, i.e. scientific philosophy from Plato onwards, was unable to do is possible for Jewish monotheism, by means of the concept of religious correlation, of the holy spirit: «Through the holy spirit, Jewish monotheism is connected to scientific idealism as a natural link of simplicity and certainty. The interest, in the service of which the holy spirit offers itself as a mediator, not a unifier, is that of the specifically and absolutely scientific world, which cannot ascertain the difference between God and man and thus, 32

Ibid., p. 123; Eng. trans. cit., p. 106; cf. f H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., pp. 192 f./459 f. 33 BR 33.

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in the last analysis, cannot even understand those who profess the uniqueness of God. The Greekk spirit, which is the type of the scientific sense of the world, looks for mediation, as they call it, between God and man. Philo, with his Logos, was a victim of this Greek magic».34 The holy spirit, as correlation between God and man, posits holiness, i.e. morality, i.e. the good, as the unifying term between God and man, though still maintaining the difference between them, i.e. God’s transcendence, while the «Greek spirit», halting at the transcendence of the good, inevitably deified it, separating it from man and then having no choice but to follow the road to pantheism, in the search for a mediating hypostasis between separate terms: «This humility of recognising the limits of human knowledge, which at the same time is the greatest human pride, is surmised by the Greek mind in the Idea of the Good. d But the latter, in the Greek mind, becomes a God, and thus there is no correlative link to the holy spirit of man. Because there is no unification, one has to look for a mediation».35 Up to this point I have highlighted the difference and peculiarity of the holy spirit in respect of the contents of «scientific» philosophy, thus justifying Cohen’s awareness that this concept, though so infrequent in the Bible, had deep, specific roots in the «sources of Judaism» and the coherent religious reflection on them. Nevertheless, it is right to shed adequate light on the extent to which Cohen’s reflection on this theme drew on the philosophical tradition of critical idealism, especially Kant. I have already mentioned Cohen’s explicit indication of the analogy between the meaning of the holy spirit and

34

H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., p. 194/461. The reference to «Philo the Jew» is interesting because it shows Cohen’s conviction that the search for mediation between God and man, a characteristic of the «Greekk spirit», inevitably leading to pantheism, does not only have its historical development in Christianity, but constitutes an ancient risk for Judaism as well, as shown, at the origin of Jewish philosophy, by Philo’s error and, many centuries later, by that of Spinoza. Franz Rosenzweig (cf. Einleitung, cit., in J 1 LIII), underlining the «diabolically enormous (dämonisch-riesenhafte Maß)» dimension taken on by the figure of Philo in Cohen’s eyes, in the last years of his activity in Berlin, quotes a phrase of the latter’s during a lecture in the 1913/14 Winter semester: «If Philo had not come up with the Logos, no Jew would ever have doubted». 35 RV V 124; Eng. trans. cit., p. 107.

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Kant’s primacy of practical reason. Furthermore, the meaning Cohen, in these writings and throughout his work, attributed to morality and its relationship with holiness clearly had its origin in Kant. Cohen’s drawing on Kant for this theme was so faithful as to reach almost literal quotation, on occasion. For example, when commenting on God’s command in the biblical expressions: «I will be allowed among the children of Israel» (Lev. 22:32), «Ye shall sanctify me», «Him shall ye sanctify» (Isa. 8:13), «Sanctify yourselves … and be ye holy» (Lev. 11:44), Cohen wrote: «The holy spirit in man becomes alive insofar as man sanctifies himself. And in this self-sanctification he accomplishes the sanctification of God. For what could holiness in God mean in it were not the archetype (Urbild ) for the action of man?»36 Now, knowing how important Kant’s philosophy was for Cohen and how deep his knowledge off it was, we cannot doubt that, when writing these lines, he was clearly thinking of the place in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunftt where Kant, also commenting on a verse from Scripture (albeit from the Christian Bible): «Love God above all else, and thy neighbour as thyself» (cf. Mt. 22:34-40; Mk. 12:28-31; Lk. 10:27), presented God’s holiness precisely as the «archetype» of human morality: «Therefore, that law of all laws – as every moral precept in the Gospels – presents the moral intent in all its perfection, as an ideal of holiness which no living creature can attain, and which is, nevertheless, the archetype (Urbild ) at which we must aim and become equal with uninterrupted, but infinite progress».37 It is necessary, then, to refer briefly to Kant’s theory of «radical evil». It is true that Cohen’s rather original interpretation of this theory may have been influenced by traditional Jewish teaching of the «two instincts»,38 but it is equally true that this reference to Kant was important for Cohen’s elaboration of the theme of the holy spirit. Already in Kants Begründung der Ethikk Cohen had interpreted the

36

Ibid., p. 128; Eng. trans. cit., p. 110. My italics. The term «Urbild» referring to God’s holiness also appears ibid., d p. 120; Eng. trans. cit., p. 103. Cf. also ibid., d p. 251; Eng. trans. cit., p. 215. 37 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 5, p. 83. 38 RV V 212 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 181 f.

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Kantian «natural propensity in man to evil»39 fully integrated in and as confirmation of the «original predisposition to good»:40 «I must judge his [man’s] evil as though in a peccatum originarium he had accepted among his maxims a natural perversion of his incentives: so that he might become better; so that the originative predisposition to good be re-instated; so that impurity be turned into purity. Without duty there is no moral law among men. Without radical evil there is no moral purification, no self-education of humanity. “Despite this fall, in our souls, the voice still resounds with undiminished vigour of the commandment: we must become better men; we must thus also have the possibility of becoming so. Re-establishment of the purity of moral predisposition, it is true, can only come about from a “revolution of intention” (…). Therefore, the fact that this propensity [to evil] is called indelible, “uneradicable”, has the aim of being suppressed by us; “nevertheless it must be possible to prevaill over it, since it is present in man, inasmuch as he is a freely acting being”. The root is, rather, an indication of uprooting».41 For Cohen, as for Kant, this consciousness of man’s sinfulness, which, rather than contradicting, actually reveals his originative goodness, opening up the way for him to moral improvement, cannot be understood on the merely ethical level, but only on the religious one: «Here we find ourselves before an ancient crossroads of the religious word (…). We certainly do not simply say that man is bad because of his essence, his fundamental instinct. In Kantt as well I have long determined and limited the meaning he gave to radical evil, precisely in accordance with the literal meaning of his words, to the ““perversion of principles”. Consequently, authentic radical evil is pessimism, which always only wants to recognise the desire for vengeance or egoism, even though only in the form of compassion, as man’s incentive. Therefore, it is good that is really radical in man, though it be falsified and turned into evil (in das Schlechte). Thus the 39

Cf. I. KANT, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 6, p. 29. 40 Cf. ibid., d p. 24. 41 KBE E 341 f.

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consciousness of sinfulness in man certainly does not mean the bad nature of his essence. The consciousness of sin, rather, bears witness against this bad nature and in favour of the vigilance of good».42 Now, it is correlation with God, i.e. with the holy spirit, on which this certainty of man’s originative, inalienable goodness is founded: «man has the holy spirit in his heart. To it is issued the call, that is the calling to holiness. The natural predisposition to evil would be in contradiction to the fundamental commandment of holiness. More fundamentally, it would be in contradiction to God’s holiness. “God, the holy One, is sanctified through righteousness” [Isa. 5:16]. The holy God could not have put evil into the human heart».43 We thus return to the core of Cohen’s concept of the holy spirit: it is God’s very holiness, which He «transplanted»44 in man’s heart, and thanks to which man can be certain, against all scepticism and pessimism, of his originative goodness, i.e. of the infinite, though effective possibility of realisation off his self-sanctification and thus of redemption. In Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, where the theme of the holy spirit had not yet been adequately treated, Cohen did, however, clearly show that this meaning is the very essence of religion, i.e. it is faith, «trust (Vertrauen) in God»: «God gave his holy spirit to man. Thus man’s very spirit became holy. Thus redemption from sin cannot be lacking. Yearning (Sehnsucht) has reached its consolidated goal. Correlation between man and God is safeguarded from the most serious doubt. Such protection, such a situation founds ideal prayer, the prayer of yearning (Sehnsucht) and of certainty in one’s own confidence (Zuversicht). In conformity with this the fundamental form of the Hebrew word generally translated as faith (Glaube) belongs to the peculiarity of religion, together with yearning (Sehnsucht), confidence (Zuversicht) to have trust in (Vertrauen). The fundamental meaning of the word (Emuna) is steadfastness and confirmation. Amen comes from the same route. Scepsis is the open contradiction of prayer».45 42

BR 59. RV V 213; Eng. trans. cit., p. 182. 44 H. COHEN, Der heilige Geist, cit., p. 177/441. 45 BR 104. 43

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Finally, reference to the specific theme of the holy spirit in Kant cannot be omitted. Actually, Kant did not show particular interest in this, and, in the few places where it was mentioned, its meaning greatly differs from that of Cohen. Kant saw the holy spirit as the trinitarian hypostasis of God «the Just Judge», next to the Father «the Holy Lawgiver» ad the Son «the Benevolent Governor»,46 and attributes to Him the severity and rigour proper to one endowed not so much with the judgement of love, proper to the Son, as with that of condemnation.47 It is clear that this conception of the holy spirit has nothing in common with the one we have examined in Cohen’s work. Nevertheless, there is a passage in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, which will not have escaped Cohen’s notice, where Kant referred to the holy spirit in its attribute as «Paraclete», in a rather similar perspective to Cohen’s. The context is doubt over whether «moral happiness» can be achieved, in the sense of «the reality and constancy of an intention always progressing in good (never falling outside it)».48 This doubt is certainly well founded on the basis of the fact of man’s sinfulness, but Kant believed that it could and had to be overcome, precisely thanks to faith in the holy spirit. He wrote: «One could refer the man who was worried about this, with his desire, to these words: “His (God’s) spirit bears witness to our spirit” etc».49 Anyone can notice, in this reference to Rom. 8:16, an evident analogy with Cohen’s references to Exodus and Leviticus. Further on Kant explained: «The good, pure intention (which can be named good spirit, that guides us), of which we are conscious, also brings with it, albeit indirectly, confidence (Zutrauen) in its constancy and steadfastness, and it is the comforter (Paraclete), when our false steps make us anxious over its persistence».50 Knowing the deep relationship between Cohen and Kant, one cannot think that this passage was irrelevant for the development of the meaning of the holy spirit in Cohen. 46

Cf. I. KANT, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, cit., p. 139. Cf. ibid., d pp. 140, 145 f. 48 Ibid., d p. 67. 49 Ibid., d p. 68. 50 Ibid., d pp. 70 f. 47

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The doctrine of the holy spirit, then, inasmuch as it is a formulation of the theory of religious correlation, is really, together with that of the uniqueness of God, the fundamental theme of Cohen’s philosophy of religion, i.e. of his conception of religion out of the sources of Judaism, and, at the same time, out of the source of reason,51 as manifest in the philosophical tradition of critical idealism, of which Cohen considered Kant the major representative. Therefore, when elaborating the theme of the holy spirit, Cohen’s effort towards a synthesis of philosophical culture and Judaism clearly emerges, in which the ideal of the «Jew integrated into European culture» ( (Kulturjude ),52 realised by means of the Science of Judaism, consists, and in which and on behalf of which, Cohen was deeply engaged. As he wrote in Der polnische Jude, «it is the great product of Mendelssohn’s spirit and the unassailable evidence of its universal historical meaning for preservation of Judaism in general. (…) [we] show (…) that we have built up our authentic culture (wir … erweisen … uns als echte Kulturmenschen), promoting the revelation of the science of our religion and starting out from it».53

51

Cf. RV V 5 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 4 f. H. COHEN, Der polnische Jude, cit., p. 165/194. 53 Ibid., d p. 166/195. 52

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

YEARNING FOR FORM: HERMANN COHEN IN POSTMODERNISM Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt, – ach der mich liebt und kennt (J. W. Goethe – H. Cohen)

The question I intend to face here is, I believe, a simple and relevant one: if and how Hermann Cohen’s thought can be an important point of reference in present day postmodern culture. The implicit assumption is that nowadays we live and think in a completely new cultural context, which is radically different from modernism and aware of this difference. Postmodernism is not only a current of thought, which reached its climax in certain philosophical theorisations and artistic expressions between the 1960s and 1990s, doomed to oblivion, like all fashions, but a profound turning point, involving all aspects of contemporary society and culture, with which philosophy must also come to terms on a stable basis. This is the assumption, and the consequence is clear: either Hermann Cohen’s thought has perspectives and themes that are relevant for the development of philosophical thoughtt and culture in general in the postmodern period, or it will be relegated to archaeology and the museum, which, at most, would justify going on with historical and philological research into it, but not theoretical development starting out from it. The question in the form of «if and how» as I posed it at the beginning, could appear pleonastic, since, it would seem, there is no other way to demonstrate the present relevance of a philosophy than that of exhibiting those of its aspects and themes which are still valid and significant. Nevertheless, with the first question, I intend to face an absolutely preliminary, radical problem: whether, that is, the very consideration of content and method of Cohen’s philosophy is still 313

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justified or not. Only an affirmative answer to this question will lead to the problem of «how», i.e. identification of possible reasons for present day interest in this philosophy. Postmodern culture, like all culture, is certainly not unitary, even less uniform: there is room in it for many different perspectives, divergences, disputes and even conflicts of ideas. Besides, when looking beneath appearances, postmodern problems are not all that different from those of modern culture and previous cultures. Fundamental problems have always continued and will perhaps always continue to be present and posed anew as cultures develop. Nevertheless, like every culture, postmodernism also radically rejects certain past thought modalities, perspectives and even categories. They are not considered in debate nor is any right of citizenship allowed them. They are simply ignored, precisely because the entire culture is built up despite them; it actually develops on the basis of this rejection. Now, if we were to accept that Cohen’s philosophy is part of these denied, rejected, obsolete thoughts, there would be no point in further considering his contemporary relevance. But if, on the contrary, we were able to demonstrate that it does not fall under this cultural ostracism, then it would have every right of entry into the P of philosophical debate and present its arguments there. Then there would be good reason for going on to the question of «how». When posing the question of the contemporary relevance of Cohen’s philosophy, something that in my view has still to receive adequate attention, despite the flourishing state of research on Cohen over the last few decades, my aim is not some kind of overstressed, comic apology. There will be no attempt to show that Cohen was a postmodern philosopher. He was in all respects a philosopher of modernity and a man of his time (though, in some ways, in his last years, showing some difficulty in following and interpreting the cultural changes of his time). It is rather a question of seeing whether, in the thought of a classic of modernity, like Hermann Cohen, there are useful references for contemporary philosophical thinking, in a new cultural context. This approach to the question, if it were to lead to positive results, could be of far greater importance than a clumsy recycling, or misinterpretation of his philosophy, since it could help to bring to light authentic traits of modernity which can still

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communicate with postmodernity, though still respecting the latter’s true novelty. I certainly do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of the question in these few pages. I am simply attempting to begin to posit it and point out certain themes, which, in my view, could and should be further developed and added to by others, in future research that I hope will be fruitfully carried on by both established and new Cohen scholars. Although simplification and generalisation are inevitable, in my view, the philosophical core of postmodernism lies in thought on difference and it intends to leave behind thought of identity, the concept and representation. In my outline of the situation I shall refer to the theory worked out by Gilles Deleuze in Différence et répétition.1 Certainly, other writers and theories could be mentioned, but my choice is not an arbitrary one. Firstly, Différence et répétition is and has been acknowledged as one of the fundamental works for this new school of thought. Michel Foucault explicitly stated that Deleuze is to be credited with this new starting point: «a thunderbolt has appeared, which will bear the name of Deleuze: new thought is now possible; thought itself is possible again. Not thought to come, promised from the most distant point of new beginnings. It is here in Deleuze’s texts, jumping up and dancing before us and among us».2 Secondly, Deleuze’s theory has numerous, important aspects where problems develop in substantial, occasionally surprising, parallelism 1

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1968; Eng. trans. by P. Patton, The Athlone Press, London 1994. Gilles Deleuze subsequently modified the theory presented here in other works and partially criticised his own previous views (cf. the author’s note in the appendix to the Italian translation of ID., Logique du sens, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1969; Italian trans. by M. de Stefanis, Feltrinelli, Milano 1975, pp. 294 f.). However, concerning the central themes, which will be the sole object of my attention here, this book remains a stable point of reference for Deleuze’s thoughtt and postmodern theory in general. 2 M. FOUCAULT, Theatrum philosophicum, in ID., Dits et écrits 1954-1988, Édition établie sous la direction de D. Defert et F. Ewald avec la collaboration de J. Lagrange, Gallimard, Paris 1994, vol. 2, p. 98.

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with those treated by Cohen. The latter thus becomes ideal comparison for my purpose in this essay. In Deleuze’s view, the error of traditional philosophy of difference, throughout its history «from Aristotle to Hegel via Leibniz»,3 consists «in confusing the concept of difference with a merely conceptual difference, in remaining content to inscribe difference in the concept in general».4 Philosophy continually tried to «save»5 difference from its condition as a rebel and cursed insubordination in the face of identity turning to «reason» understood as «representation» capable of returning the anarchy and individualism of difference to the hierarchy and organicity of the concept. That prius which is in no way deducible and is the source of all production, «difference», where universal and particular were originatively joined, is reflectively submitted by representation to the identity of the concept and included in the general-particular organic relation, and thus distorted in its meaning. In Deleuze’s view there are four aspects of representative reduction and mediation, by means of which «reason» neutralises the strength and meaning of difference: «identity, in the form of the undetermined concept; analogy, in the relation between ultimate determinable concepts; opposition, in the relation between determinations within concepts; resemblance, in the determined object of the concept itself».6 Starting out from Aristotle (and this choice is undoubtedly significant), Deleuze showed how, thinking in terms of the general-particular relationship, representative reason organically includes difference in the identity off the generic concept as an element of specification, in various forms, among which opposition is «at once the greatest and the most perfect».7 Thus difference becomes a predicate of the concept identical to itself. If one moves to the upper logical and ontological level of comparison between the genus or categories, where, owing to the non univocity of being, which cannot 3

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 41; Eng. trans. cit., p. 27. Ibidem. Cf. ibid., d pp. 48, 71; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 32, 50. 5 Cf. ibid., d p. 45; Eng. trans. cit., p. 29. 6 Ibid., d pp. 44 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 29. 7 Ibid., d p. 45; Eng. trans. cit., p. 30. The reference is to ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 8 and 9. 4

, 4,

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be considered itself a genus, difference cannot be understood as opposition, it is nevertheless returned by judgement to a form of identity, albeit weaker and more confused, i.e. analogy, and is thus still included in organic representation. In the other direction, towards the complete determination of the individual, specific differences are again included in the organicity of conceptual representation as resemblances perceived among specific objects, which presuppose «a continuity of sensible intuition in the concrete representation».8 With this conceptual and representative reduction of difference Deleuze contrasts new thought capable of seeing difference in its authentic meaning, as the «state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction»:9 «instead of something distinguished from something else – he wrote –, imagine something which distinguishes itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it».10 In this authentic meaning it cannot be thought within organic representation, with subordinate reference to the identity of the concept and analogy of being. On the contrary, it catastrophically subverts, provoking «breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances (…) impassable fissures between the analogical structures».11 The new thought of difference must abandon the resemblance of representations, the identity of the concept and analogy of being, to affirm the absolute univocity of being, thinking, however, being not as a supreme genus, but as difference: «the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, off all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is “equal” for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense (…). Being is said in a single and same sense

8

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 51; Eng. trans. cit., p. 34. Ibid., d p. 43; Eng. trans. cit., p. 28. 10 Ibidem d . 11 Ibid., d p. 52; Eng. trans. cit., p. 35. 9

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of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself».12 This, evidently, produces radically alternative thought to the organic form of representation: the distribution splitting up the spaces distributed by the concept is substituted by a nomadic distribution of differences, which are mobile and scattered over an unlimited open space. The hierarchy determined by resemblance in respect of the identical is substituted by the «crowned anarchy»13 of the free unfolding of differences. To reach this, however, thought must consider difference without the mediation of representation: not as a subordinate element to be returned to the identity of the concept, but as the originative being, previous to identity and the concept; not as a predicate of the identical, but as being itself inasmuch as it is production, as the «differenciator of difference».14 Deleuze wrote: «Repetition must be understood in the pronominal; we must find the Self of repetition, the singularity within that which repeats. (…) we must distinguish two forms of repetition. In every case repetition is difference without a concept. But in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea».15 Briefly anticipating comparison with Cohen’s thought which I shall deal with later, some significant assonances can already be noted, which are by no means extrinsic or extemporaneous. Deleuze himself made implicit reference when writing: «There are internal differences which dramatise an Idea before representing an object. Difference here is internal to an Idea, even though it be external to the concept which represents an object»;16 and, continuing, with reference to Kant’s acknowledgement of spatial differences irreducible to the 12

Ibid., d p. 53; Eng. trans. cit., p. 36. Ibid., d p. 55 passim; Eng. trans. cit., p. 37 passim. 14 Ibid., d p. 48; Eng. trans. cit., p. 32. 15 Ibid., d p. 36; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 23 f. 16 Ibid., d pp. 39 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 26. 13

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concept, commented: «In other words, following certain neo-Kantian interpretations, there is a step-by-step, internal, dynamic construction of space which must precede the “representation” of the whole as a form of exteriority. The element of this internal genesis seems to us to consist of intensive quantity rather than schema, and to be related to Ideas rather than to concepts of the understanding».17 That the reference to «certain neo-Kantian interpretations» concerns precisely Hermann Cohen, becomes more explicit further on.18 In Deleuze’s view, representative thought attempted alternative routes for understanding difference. Organic representation, which «by inscribing itself within the identical concept or within analogous concepts (…) only fixed the limits within which determination became difference»,19 is substituted by «orgiastic representation»,20 which actually thinks difference as «the extreme», the infinite, in the two senses as infinitely large and infinitely small. In orgiastic representation it really seems that thought abandons the purposes of reducing the excess of difference to the Apollonian calm of the organic form of the identity of the concept, to actually discover the «tumult, restlessness and passion»21 of difference. Deleuze refers to the two different directions of Hegel’s philosophy, on the one hand, and that of Leibniz, on the other. Hegel, through dialectical contradiction, elevated difference to the infinite: «In this manner – wrote Deleuze –, difference is pushed to the limit – that is, to the ground which is no less its return or its reproduction than its annihilation».22 Leibniz, by means of the infinitely small, introduced infinite difference as the generator of the identity of essence. 17

Ibid., d p. 40; Eng. trans. cit., p. 26. Cf. ibid., d p. 298; Eng. trans. cit., p. 231. Actually Deleuze only appears to be acquainted with Kants Theorie der Erfahrung g (cf. also G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 394; Eng. trans. cit., p. 336), and perhaps only by way of J. VUILLEMIN, L’héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne. Fichte – Cohen – Heidegger, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1954. Direct contact by Deleuze with Cohen’s Logik der reinen Erkenntnis would certainly have been interesting! 19 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 61; Eng. trans. cit., p. 42. 20 Ibidem and passim. 21 Ibidem d . 22 Ibid., d p. 65; Eng. trans. cit., p. 45. 18

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With the introduction of the infinite in representation, the «limit» is no longer the limitation of the finite form, but the generating principle of infinite differences.23 Nevertheless, orgiastic representation is still directed to mediation and reduction of difference to identity, no longer in the sense of organic representation, as reduction of the finite element to the principle of form, but rather as reduction of the infinite element to the principle as ground.24 In infinite representation the principle, the concept, is no longer the genus, which includes and neutralises specific differences in its own identity, but is still the ground in which the differences converge. Deleuze wrote: «Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this foundation is not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the principle of identity particularly seriously, giving it an infinite value and rendering it coextensive with the whole, and in this manner allowing it to reign over existence itself. It matters little whether identity (as the identity of the world and the self ) be considered analytic, in the form of the infinitely small, or synthetic, in the form of the infinitely large. In the former case, the foundation or sufficient reason is that which vice-dicts identity; in the latter case, it is that which contradicts it. In all cases, however, the foundation or sufficient reason employs the infinite only to lead the identical to existt its very identity».25 To think difference as «unilateral distinction»,26 it is necessary to remove it from representation and the concept, to think it before and independently of identity and opposition, analogy and resemblance. It is a question of thinking difference as an absolute, manifold, informal prius, pure intensity and power.27 This also means thinking difference independently of negation, as more originative than the latter, as pure affirmation. It is clear that the models for this thought are Nietzsche’s will to power and eternal return. Negation and contradiction are only 23

Cf. ibid., d p. 62; Eng. trans. cit., p. 43. Cf. ibid., d p. 63; Eng. trans. cit., p. 43. 25 Ibid., d p. 70; Eng. trans. cit., p. 49. 26 Cf. ibid., d p. 43; Eng. trans. cit., p. 28. 27 In Différence et répétition Deleuze, when stating the originativeness of difference, also continually uses expressions concerning «depth» (cf. ibid., d p. 72 passim; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 50 f. passim), which I shall not deal with here, since this is one of the aspects he later rejected and abandoned (cf. above, note 1). 24

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epiphenomena of difference, which, in its originativeness and immediacy, is pure affirmation, intensity and power. Identity itself must be brought back to difference. For this reason «repetition» is the opposite of «representation»: «Re-petition opposes re-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said of the different».28 Difference, in this originative meaning is the indeterminate principle of all determination, «the disparate» (dispars),29 «to differing»: «Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown differing».30 In his attempt to formulate a radically new thought of difference, Deleuze had to face up to Plato’s philosophy. Michel Foucault correctly identified an essential characteristic of Deleuze’s philosophy in its «overturned Platonism».31 The general confrontation of postmodern philosophy with Plato is a theme of primary importance for understanding the former. Here I shall only take a brief glance at this, only with reference to Deleuze, taken as a paradigm of postmodernism with whom to compare Cohen’s perspective. Foucault is even more radical: «Overturn Platonism: is there any philosophy which has not tried to do so?»,32 adding: «All philosophies, especially the “anti-Platonaceous” ones?»33 This rhetorical question seems exaggerated to me, though Foucault himself explains it in far greater detail, showing how this anti-Platonism itself testifies to the profound links of all philosophy with Plato.34 There have, actually, been philosophies desiring to follow Plato, differentiate themselves from him, confirm or refute him, interpret him better than the original or

28

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 80; Eng. trans. cit., p. 57. Cf. ibid., d pp. 80, 157; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 57, 121. 30 Ibid., d p. 79; Eng. trans. cit., p. 56. 31 M. FOUCAULT, op.cit., p. 77. Deleuze himself often stated that it was his intention to overturn Platonism: cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 91 f. passim; Eng. trans. cit., p. 66 passim. 32 Ibid., d p. 76. 33 Ibidem. d 34 Cf. ibid., d pp. 76 f. 29

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overturn him. What is certain is that there are philosophical classics which are always worth approaching, then we have Plato and Kant, who must necessarily be taken into account. Postmodernism cannot avoid this rule either. So Deleuze intended to overturn Platonism; «that this overturning should conserve many Platonic characteristics – he admitted – is not only inevitable but desirable».35 It was Plato, actually, who began the thought of identity and representation, but, for this very reason, he was also the philosopher in whom the irreducibility of difference was still present; he was «the origin or at the crossroads of a decision»:36 he authentically thought difference and repetition, though the result of his thought was identity and representation: «It is like an animal in the process of being tamed, whose final resistant movements bear witness better than they would in a state of freedom to a nature soon to be lost: the Heraclitan world still growls in Platonism. With Plato, the issue is still in doubt: mediation has not yet found its ready-made movement».37 Deleuze’s first aim then, before the overturning, was the rediscovery y of the true Plato, the one Aristotle had not understood faithfully,38 the Plato of dialectic. Plato certainly did not see dialectic as a process of division and mediation, which must lead to genus specification, by means of subordination of difference to the concept of representation. This is how dialectic had been conceived from Aristotle onwards reaching its most glorious climax with Hegel. Plato, on the other hand, saw dialectic as a genetic process of purification, in which difference acts as the originative power, which, in the chaos without identity of the question, generates and selects idea as a problem.39 «The Idea – wrote Deleuze – is not yet the concept of an object which submits the world to the requirements of representation, but rather a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not “representable” in things. The Idea has 35

Ibid., p. 82; Eng. trans. cit., p. 59. Ibid., d p. 341; Eng. trans. cit., p. 263. 37 Ibid., d p. 83; Eng. trans. cit., p. 59. 38 Cf. ibid., d pp. 83 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 59 f. 39 On the Platonic idea, and in general on thought as a problem, cf. ibid., d pp. 198 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 153 ff. On the relationship between «question» and «problem», cf. ibid., d pp. 251 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 195 ff. 36

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therefore not yet chosen to relate difference to the identity of a concept in general: it has not given up hope of finding a pure concept of difference in itself».40 Plato’s idea is not the identical, but rather difference, and the purpose of dialectic is not mediation, which reduces difference to the identical, but selection producing pure difference: «it is a question not of identifying but of authenticating».41 So idea is not being as the stable, ungenerated principle, like the identity of the concept representing the differences in itself, but the problematisation of being, the constantly further question «what is X?»,42 which must produce the identity of being itself as authenticity and affirm it, denying (i.e. annihilating) its simulacra, its false claimants: «The one problem which recurs throughout Plato’s philosophy is the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants. This problem of distinguishing between things and their simulacra within a pseudo-genus or a large species presides over his classification of the arts and sciences. It is a question of making the difference, thus of operating in the depths of the immediate, a dialectic of the immediate. It is a dangerous trial without thread and without net, for according to the ancient custom of myth and epic, false claimants must die».43 Plato thought being as difference, or rather as different, in the sense that difference is more originative than being; it is its ground. Platonic dialectic is dialectic of idea, previous to the being of the concept, which is rather its infinite task as problem. In this sense idea is rather non-being, in the problematic, founding meaning of the negative: «Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question».44 There are some very significant passages in Deleuze on this, in the literal meaning of the text, in their striking similarity to Cohen’s writings. Here are just two examples: «In this sense, it turns out that the infinitive, the esse, designates less a

40

Ibid., d p. 83; Eng. trans. cit., p. 59. Ibid., d pp. 84 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 60. 42 Cf. ibid., d pp. 242 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 187 f. 43 Ibid., d p. 85; Eng. trans. cit., p. 60; cf. ibid., d pp. 349 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 272. 44 Ibid., d p. 89; Eng. trans. cit., p. 64. 41

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proposition than the interrogation to which the proposition is supposed to respond. This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis. As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced».45 In his Conclusion Deleuze wrote: «We have seen that Ideas are genuine objectivities, made up of differential elements and relations and provided with a specific mode – namely, the “problematic”. Problems thus defined do not designate any ignorance on the part of a thinking subject, any more than they express a conflict, but rather objectively characterise the nature of Ideas as such. There is indeed, therefore, a ìx –í,, which must not bee confused with the š – , and which means the being of the problematic and not the being of the negative: an expletive NE rather than the negative “not”. This ìx –í,, is soo called because it precedes all affirmation, but is none the less completely positive».46 These are the «Platonic characteristics» which, in Deleuze’s view, it is «desirable to conserve».47 Overturning Platonism, on the other hand, concerns its result. Deleuze wrote: «the whole of Platonism (…) is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between “the thing itself” and the simulacra».48 The Same, the one of idea, is certainly not the identity of the concept: it is rather the unity of ground. Nevertheless, according to Deleuze, «it is difficult to see what its effect is if not to make that which is grounded “identical”, to use difference in order to make the identical exist».49 Therefore, the result of Plationism is, in the end, thought as identity and representation, and the overturning of Platonism, the authentic thought of difference, consists in the elimination of the ground, in «ungrounding»,50 which removes difference from the representation of the relationship between the thing itself and the simulacra, recognising its full power, completely immanent in the very simulacra, substituting the representation of the Same with repetition, the eternal return of the 45

Ibidem. Ibid., d p. 343; Eng. trans. cit., p. 267. 47 Cf. above, note 35. 48 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 91; Eng. trans. cit., p. 66. 49 Ibidem. 50 Ibid., d p. 92; Eng. trans. cit., p. 67. 46

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different in the simulacra: «Difference is not thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections».51 To explain the result of Plato’s thought and the need to overturn it, Deleuze introduced a crucial theme: the ethical inspiration of this «decision». The affirmation of the Same as ground in Plato reflects the dominant requirement of his thought: distinguishing true from false appearances, copies from simulacra. It is from this and nothing else that the whole of Platonism developed as representative thought.52 Now, this requirement is an ethical prejudice, will of form and truth profoundly inspiring the Platonic theory of the idea: «Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves with a theory of Ideas which willl allow the deployment of representation. In his case, however, a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral. What is condemned in the figure of simulacra is the state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the copy. Later, the world of representation will more or less forget its moral origin and presuppositions. These will nevertheless continue to act in the distinction between the originary and the derived, the original and the sequel, the ground and the grounded, which animates the hierarchies of a representative theology by extending the complementarity between model and copy».53 This, in my view is an extremely important point also for comparison with Cohen’s philosophy. But let as put aside, for the moment, this question to make our first comparison with Cohen on the basis of what has been dealt with so far and supply an initial answer to the question asked at the outset: whether Cohen’s philosophy can be a

51

Ibid., d pp. 91 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 66. Cf. ibid., d pp. 340 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 264 f. 53 Ibid., d p. 341; Eng. trans. cit., p. 265. 52

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significant reference point for postmodern thought or whether, on the other hand, it belongs to those philosophies which have no right of citizenship in the latter. We can start out from Cohen’s interpretation of Plato, with which that of Deleuze shows unsuspected similarities.54 For Cohen, Plato was the philosopher of pure thought as the foundation of being. He turned to and unified the Eleatic, Pythagorean and Socratic traditions, producing the theory of ideas as the theory of the grounding of being in thought. In Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik,55 the work inaugurating his mature interpretation of Plato, Cohen showed how the Eleatic tradition reached full maturity in the Platonic theory of ideas. Parmenides had affirmed the fundamental principle, in accordance with which «there is no other being than that of thought»,56 and Democritus had investigated this being of thought, this «true being » (®te ˜ œn) as a «no n-being » (mÓ œn). Democritus had taken this crucial step, because he had profited from Pythagoras’ reflection on mathematics: «Now there is a being which the Eleatics consider a non-being; this is the true being! This true being consists of mathematical concepts, not only as regards atoms, but also the abstraction of a separator, in the thought of an interval (Zwischen), or of a distance ( (Abstand d), in which sensible beings are no longer present».57 As can be seen, if it were acceptable to express Cohen’s thought using terminology different from his, it would not be much of a problem to see his recognition of the Platonic theory of ideas as «thought of difference», inasmuch as the Platonic idea is precisely that non-being which it is necessary to address to justify being. Thus Plato can take a decisive step in development of the Socratic concept. The 54

I shall restrict myself here to a few short remarks. For more detail analysis see my book on Cohen (A. POMA, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, Eng. trans. by J. Denton, State University of New York Press, Albany (New York) 1997) and my essay on: Plato’s Idea of the Good and Its Different Interpretations by Cohen and Natorp, in Chapter Two of this volume. There is a highly analytic study of the Marburg School’s interpretation of Plato by K.-H. LEMBECK, Platon in Marburg. Platonrezeption und Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie bei Cohen und Natorp, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1994. 55 H. COHEN, Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, in S 1 336-366. 56 Ibid., d p. 337. 57 Ibid., d pp. 340 f.

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concept, which is not the reply to the question «what is it?» ( º ® ), 58 but rather the question itself; it is not the principle, but the task. The idea as pure thought «justifies» the concept, grounding being in non-being: ««Idea became the justification of concept, in the sense that thought laid its own foundation on it. “Giving account” ( ëüãïí didønai) and laying foundation (Ê º ) become synonyms. Logos is the same concept. But when it becomes logos by itself, then it becomes self-foundation. And this foundation of idea means and guarantees the true being. There is no truth, no knowledge, no being beyond this, just as on this side there is no being and no science».59 Therefore Cohen rejected any ontological or psychological interpretation of the Platonic idea. Neither separate entities, following the misinterpretation begun by Aristotle, nor psychic ones, but «non-entities», «hypothesis», «method» for grounding being in thought. Thus Plato’s theory of ideas is not at all speculative ontology, but the true origin of critical and transcendental philosophy, the method of hypothesis, dialectic, not as a technique of division of the genus in the species, but the genetic process of the production of being in thought. Pure thought, the idea, «hypothesis», «non-being», is the «true being»; dialectic is the very movement of idea, which as «difference», we could say, produces the being of knowledge. Thus the Platonic dialectic, which is true knowledge, inasmuch as it is pure thought, has nothing to do with representation: «In his critique of knowledge Plato’s task was to bring about such a drastic separation as to put the thought of knowledge entirely on one side, while he put representation on the side of sensation. One ought to believe that representation also partakes of thought, or rather thought of representation. But Plato makes a clean divide and, to all intents and purposes, assigns representation to sensation».60 For Cohen another fundamental stage in the development of a philosophy of pure thought was, as is well known, Leibniz’s theory of the infinitesimal. The differential and intensive, to which Deleuze

58

Cf. LRE E 378. Ibid., p. 211. 60 ERW W 113. 59

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devoted so much attention in the thought of difference,61 were also fundamental concepts of pure thought for Cohen. Leibniz has the merit of grounding the reality of being in the true being of intensity, quantity in the infinitesimal of the differential. But even more meritorious is his conception and elaboration of these notions and method in the sphere of mathematics and physics, starting from a purely philosophical methodological principle: that of continuity: «Continuity became the higher concept, from which infinity derives (…). Continuity, inasmuch as it is idea, and inasmuch as it is law, is now a principle both of reason and of nature».62 Only in the light of Plato’s and Leibniz’s lessons can Kant’s transcendental method be understood, and, even more, Cohen’s profound revision of it. This revision, which headed in the direction of a clear break off from the thought of representation, even in respect of the remnants of the latter in Kant’s theory of knowledge was possible for Cohen thanks to the elaboration of pure thought as «hypothesis», in the Platonic sense of «idea», and «continuity», in Leibniz’s sense of the entirely pure origin of being in thought. The radical reform of Kant’s «synthesis» is understandable in this perspective, of which the grounding of space in the intensive, which Deleuze specifically attributed to Cohen,63 is merely one aspect. What, in Cohen’s view must be overcome in the purification of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is reference to the given of intuition: «So to thought preceded an intuition. This is also pure, and therefore close to thought. But thought starts off in something outside itself. This is where the weakness in Kant’s grounding lies. Here lies the reason for the early defections in his school. (…) Returning to the historical ground of critique, we will not allow a theory of sensibility to precede logic. We begin with thought. Thought can have no origin outside itself, if its purity must be unlimited and not obscured. Pure thought in itself and only from itself

61

Apart from the already quoted pages, cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., Chapter Four. 62 PIM M 57 f. 63 Cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 298; Eng. trans. cit., p. 231.

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must produce pure knowledge. Therefore, the theory of thought must become the theory of knowledge».64 Seeing knowledge as anything different from representation means seeing it as pure thought and the theory of knowledge as «logic»: «Thought is not representation, even if a logical attribute were conferred on the latter, seeing it as true representation (…). The creative force of thoughtt (…) can only be revealed by logic».65 Nevertheless, for the separation of thought from representation, for the formulation of a logic of pure thought, a statement of intention is not enough; what is needed is radical philosophical re-elaboration, since the collusion between thought and representation is deeply rooted and influential, in numerous ways and must be carefully eliminated.66 First of all there is a metaphysical aspect, for which Aristotle was initially responsible. In his view, logic has an entirely formal character, inasmuch as the entities, the objects of knowledge, have an independent ontological status and are «given» to consciousness through perception: «The mistaken opinion that thought, inasmuch as it is unification, consists in the formation of orders lies in the fundamental prejudice that sensation supplies thought with its material and that the latter must only elaborate this material».67 On the contrary, thinking knowledge as pure thought means seeing it as pure activity, production of its own content: «It is in this determined meaning that we take the statement that activity produces content. The whole, inseparable content of thought must be production of thought. And it is the very, inseparable activity of thought that constitutes the content. The concept of pure thought requires this unity of production and product. The relationship of thought with knowledge required and encouraged this meaning of thought».68 Rigorous grounding of knowledge in pure thought does not only mean the conception of the content of knowledge as a «product» (Erzeugnis) of thought (which would still be, as Deleuze correctly 64

LRE E 12 f. Ibid., d p. 23. 66 Cf. ibidem. d 67 Ibid., d p. 58. 68 Ibid., d p. 59. 65

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saw, a more refined form of «representation» as reduction to «ground»), but also recognition of the unity of the «product» with the activity of «producing» ((Erzeugung), which is thought itself: «for this reason the figured expression of “producing” cannot harm the characteristic of thought, because, when producing, what counts is not so much the product as the very activity of producing. Production itself is the product. In thought, it is not so much a case of constituting what is thought, inasmuch as this is considered something already accomplished, removed outside itself by thought; rather thought itself is the purpose and object of its own activity. This activity does not transfer to anything; it does not go outside itself. Inasmuch as it reaches the end it is over and ceases to be a problem. It is what is thought itself and what is thought is nothing beyond thought».69 So it is not a still representative strategy of bringing the manifold back to the identity of «ground», but of radically thinking «foundation» as the irreducible, problematic, hypothesis. «Grounds are foundations»,70 wrote Cohen, who, so as to avoid any representative ambiguity, also put aside the metaphor of «production» and «product», preferring instead «thought of origin».71 Another, psychological aspect of representative thought, which must be overcome, is linked to all this. Thought is generally seen as «connection»:72 In Cohen’s view, this takes place as the result of a mistaken psychologistic of thought, as an organising activity of consciousness. In this sense the «synthesis» of thought is understood as reduction of the manifold to unity, as «composition» (Zusammensetzung).73 This is ambiguous, and, as we have already said, even Kant was not immune: the synthesis is «synthesis y of unity», but with given manifoldness as its presupposition.74 The logic of pure thought, on the other hand, needs to be able to see thought as the origin of all content of knowledge, even of the manifold, and thus must put aside all psychological contamination, every representation 69

Ibid., d p. 29. Ibid., d p. 528. 71 Cf. ibid., d p. 36. 72 Cf. ibid., d pp. 23 f. 73 Cf. ibid., d p. 26. 74 Cf. ibid., d pp. 26 f. 70

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of the procedure of consciousness,75 to comprehend the pure movement of thought itself, as activity and production, the dialectical movement of the idea, as understood by Plato:76 true dialectic of the idea as a «problem», where, unlike that of Hegel, negation is not contradiction, but origin, and the process does not constitute mediation, but infinite tension.77 The true dialectic of thought, in Cohen’s view, does not consist, like Hegel’s, in a «dialectical movement of concepts, which takes place in the “overturning of opposites”»,78 nor in their «arbitrary exchange» in a continuous follow on, still showing «psychological g interest in the process of the consciousness of thought»,79 but in «correlation» between «separation» (Sonderung) g and «unification» (Vereinigung), which constitutes the movement of thought.80 «Correlation» between «separation» and «unification» is the authentically logical, not representative meaning of «synthesis» as the «synthesis of unity»:81 it is «conservation» (Erhaltung ( )82 of separation and unification. The unity of separation and unification understood as «correlation», i.e. as «conservation», not only evidently refers back to Platonic dialectic, is unbridgeable difference from Hegel’s dialectic and the psychology of the representative process, but also expresses the fundamental 75

Cf. ibid., d pp. 59 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 20. 77 It is significant, taking into account the necessary differences, which I shall highlight later, that Deleuze also referrred to this «true dialectics» of the Platonic idea as a «problem», in contrast with Hegel’s dialectic: cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 83, 209, 212 f., 234 ff., 243 f., 344 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 59, 161, 163 f., 181 f., 188, 268. 78 LRE E 113. 79 Cf. ibid., d p. 61. 80 On the specific, fundamental meaning off Cohen’s «correlation» and its radical difference from Hegel’s dialectic, the following is still of crucial importance: J. GORDIN, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des unendlichen Urteils, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1929. 81 Cf. LRE E 61. 82 Cf. ibidem. When formulating this notion off «conservation», Cohen took as his model the law of the conservation of energy (cf. ibid., d pp. 70 ff.). He actually and explicitly saw thought as energy («may the energy of thoughtt come to the fore in stimulating this alternation»: ibid., d p. 61; my italics). There is also a significant analogy with Deleuze’s thought of difference. Over the meaning of the notion of «energy» there is also considerable divergence between the two philosophers, which I shall deal with later, making this analogy more apparent than real. 76

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character of pure thought as hypothesis and foundation, the infinite problematic tension characterising it. In Cohen’s words: «There is no exchange, but conservation, at the same time, of separation and unification. Unification is conserved in separation and separation in unification (…). Therefore, it is to be expected that unity be conserved in manifoldness and manifoldness in unity».83 The paradox of correlation, as an authentic movement of thought, is only apparent and also attributable to psychological overturning of the conception of thought as representation. Only if the synthesis of thought is seen as mediation accomplished by the different manifold in the unity of the identical, can separation and differentiation be nothing but resolved, or rather always be resolved, in identity. But if thought is freed of all psychological-representative aspects and restored to the purity of its logical movement, if it is removed from the present of the given and representation (which, actually, is an ever accomplished past) and placed in the correct future perspective (Cohen himself pointed out that it is not a case of categories of time, but of logical dimensions)84 of the problem of an infinite task, the apparent contradiction disappears: «That is, in the direction of separation, we think of the act, which is fulfilled, and inasmuch as it is fulfilled. The same is true of unification. And, concerning content, the act is, therefore, considered to have reached fulfilment. Correspondingly, we think of the respective contents as concluded. This is where the error lies. Both activities, just like their contents, must not settle in a present, but incline towards the future, in relation to the future, starting from the present. Unification must not be thought as an event, whose fulfilment has been reached, but as a taskk and the ideal of a task, in the way that only logic can posit such a task, and formulate such an ideal. The task that is posited to thought in judgement can never be considered to have come to rest, to have been fulfilled. The situation is the same for separation. Both directions rise in the future (heben sich in die Zukunft hinein). Separation, which can never be thought as concluded, with this remains unification. Unification remains in it. And unification, which can never be thought as 83 84

Ibid., d p. 62. Cf. ibid., d p. 63.

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accomplished, in this way conserves itself as separation. Thus, by means of conservation, the co-penetration of the two directions can be understood. Both directions are tasks and must incessantly remain tasks. But only logic can posit and resolve these tasks».85 Pure thought must also be freed from cooperation with representation under a third, grammatical, heading. The double meaning of the Greek word ü , as thought and word,, had already led Aristotle to identify judgementt with proposition and understand logic as «general grammar».86 The categorical judgement model «S is P», for example, clearly shows this ambiguity and reduction of logical judgement to a mere formal rule of the relationship of a predicate with a given subject. But the logic of pure thought is one of judgement, not of propositions, and judgement is not a relationship between given contents, but the origin of content. In Cohen’s words: «It is a mistake to use, for categorical judgement, inasmuch as it is judgement of substance, the formula S is P. S is not P, but S is S forr P; more exactly, S is x for P (…). Thus it immediately becomes clear that S cannot mean a determined content, but only the presupposition for this content; more precisely, for the determination of the content. The formula S is P came about from the confusion of judgement with proposition. As though categorical judgement did not exist for any other reason than for representing, or at most, preforming the articulation of the proposition in subject and predicate».87 Judgement, purified of all representative and grammatical implications, is the «origin» of knowledge, and thus also that of the content of knowledge. Therefore it is, above all, infinite judgement: «Infinite judgement is the judgement of origin».88 Infinite judgement has been severely misunderstood and distorted in its fundamental importance89 owing to ambiguity over the meaning of negation. Since being is not principle, but must be led back to an origin in thought,

85

Ibid., d pp. 64 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 14. 87 Ibid., d pp. 537 f. 88 KTE E 790. 89 Cf. LRE 86 f., 89 f. On this cf. J. GORDIN, op.cit. 86

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thought, then, is «non-being», not, however, in the sense of absolute negation (Nicht ( ) or contradiction, but as «relative nothing ((Nichts)»,90 constituting the «true passage»91 (Übergang) to something. The distinction between absolute negation ( ª ) and the relative, productive negation of being ( ¸), dealt with by Deleuze, was, long before, a fundamental passage of Cohen’s logic of pure thought. Thought is judgement inasmuch as it is origin; it is origin inasmuch as it is problem, hypothesis. In Cohen’s words: «What is it? (tº ®sti ), asked Socrates, and in this question formulated concept. What was being? ( ô’ ôß ƒí åqíáé ), asked Aristotle, making this question the crux of his metaphysical terminology. Thus the logical meaning of a question, inasmuch as it is the lever of origin, is shown in these famous examples. The lesser of a sentence the question is, the more important is its meaning as a type of judgement. It is the outset of knowledge. The corresponding affect is wonder. It is with wonder that Plato had philosophy begin. Thus, question is the foundation of judgement, one could say, the fundamental foundation stone».92 Thus thought, for Cohen, was not representation but production, origin and problem. Consequently, it was not even reduction to identity. Identity and contradiction were certainly «laws of thought» ( (Denkgesetze ) for him, but in no way absolute principles. Since being is only inasmuch as its origin lies in thought as «non-being», foundation and method, thought does not presuppose a given, while all content presupposes it as origin: «If A counts as a sign of the simplest content, then, first of all, one must ask: whence this A? One cannot begin to act with this A and only subsequently attempt to confirm its validity. Such a posteriori efforts cannot lead to any decisive result, but can be seen as suspect symptoms of the fact that at the outset legitimate progress was impossible. As soon as A appears, the legitimacy of its origin must be investigated».93

90

LRE E 93; cf. ibid., d pp. 104 f. Ibid., d p. 91. 92 LRE 83 f. 93 Ibid., d p. 82. 91

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Identity is the subsequent passage of pure thought, for which it affirms its content. So identity is also judgement, as «affirmative judgement». It is not a question, as in representative thought, of a proposition which, in accordance with Aristotle’s conception, establishes the correspondence of the true with itself: A is A, A=A. It is rather one of the affirmation of the content produced by thought in its uniqueness before any comparison. I do not think it is stretching things too far to note the analogy with Deleuze’s definition of difference as «the state of determination as unilateral distinction». Cohen wrote: «It is not a question of linking here, but rather one of separating. And, as a consequence, a statement does not merely mean establishing, but, at the same time, keeping stable. A cannot disappear, even though, and because, agreements with other elements must be produced and made possible».94 Thus affirmative judgement as «assurance (Affirmatio ( )»95 of the identity of content further marks the distance between pure thought as idea and representation: «A is A, and remains A, however many times it is thought. However many times it is thought, or rather, however many times it is represented. d It is only thought as the sole identity. Its repetitions are psychic processes, its logical content persisting in identity».96 Similarly, the «law of thought» of contradiction is also a judgement of pure thought: the «judgement of contradiction». It is a question of negation, this time absolute negation, the «annihilation» (Vernichtung) g of the «false claimants» mentioned by Deleuze with reference to Plato, no longer, however, in representation, but in the very internal dialectic of idea: «The most important of the rights of judgement is that of rejecting and annihilating false judgement. It is in this annulment, or better annihilation, that the authentic, true “nothing” of “not” consists (…). Being able to posit the requirement of annihilation in itself is the vital question of judgement. The “no” expressed by this requirement, is completely different from that “nothing”, which is the source of something. It is the activity 94

LRE 100. Ibid., d p. 96. 96 Ibidem. 95

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of judgement; it is judgement itself, that does not acknowledge this right and value in a content that insists (sich anmaßt) on becoming content of judgement. The presumed non-A is decidedly not already a content. Rather it only claims (beansprucht) to be one. Negation however, denies it this value. There is no non-A, and there cannot be a non-A, which, in contrast with the nothing of origin, has a fulfilled content».97 Lastly, Cohen’s logic of pure thought is radically different from the representative, totalitarian logic off concept as identity to which all differences are reduced. Rather, in Cohen’s view, the concept of the object is the horizon, the task towards which all the judgements of knowledge converge.98 It is not the reductive identity of differences nor the closed totality entirely enveloping it, but the infinite openness of the problem, which produces differences in the organic, but open framework of the system: «This is the profound, eternal meaning, in which Socrates defined his concept as the question: What is it? (tº ®stii) . Concept is a question and remains one, nothing but a question. The answer it incorporates must be a new question, must provoke a new question. This is the intimate methodical relationship between question and answer: that every question must itself be an answer. Therefore, every answer can and must be a question. What is realised in the system of concept is a new kind of reciprocal conditioning or action: reciprocal action between question and answer. No solution can be definitive. Concept is not an absolute totality».99 What has been discussed so far has been limited to the analogies between Cohen’s philosophy and Deleuze’s thought of difference, simply because attention has not yet been focused on the profound differences in the two directions of thought followed. As I pointed out at the beginning, the first objective was to show that Cohen’s philosophy does not belong to the representative thought radically rejected by postmodern culture, and which, for this reason, cannot occupy a place in contemporary debate. When doing so the actual analogies with Deleuze’s philosophy came very much to the fore. 97

LRE E 106 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 325. 99 Ibid., d p. 378. 98

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Now the second objective must be followed, i.e. to show the specificity of a philosophical perspective linked to Hermann Cohen in the postmodern context. With this in mind, it will be possible and necessary to highlight the profound differences of this perspective from other directions of postmodern thought and, in particular, from that of Deleuze, chosen here for comparison. So, let us return to the main point, where we had temporarily suspended examination of Deleuze’s theory, i.e. on the «moral motivation» inspiring the whole of Plato’s philosophy, whose abandonment and rejection is the fundamental step in overturning Plato for Deleuze. In Deleuze’s view, in Plato «everything culminates in the great principle: that there is – before all else, and despite everything – an affinity or a filiation – or perhaps it should be called a philiation – of thought with the true; in short, a good nature and a good desire, grounded in the last instance upon the form of analogy in the Good. d As a result (…) Plato (…) was also the first to erect the dogmatic and moralising image of thought».100 Overturning Platonism, setting up a new thought of difference for Deleuze above all meant rejecting this presupposition. Even when philosophy puts forward a beginning, without presuppositions, it finds itself moving forward on the basis of implicit, subjective presuppositions, of which it never gives account, but which deeply and originatively influence every r stage in its development. It is worth pointing out that Deleuze noted the distinction between «objective» and «subjective» presuppositions, not only on the basis of the explicit or implicit character of either, but also, in this connection, on the basis of their conceptual or sentimental character: the objective presuppositions are «concepts explicitly presupposed by a given concept»; the subjective ones, on the other hand, are «implicit (…) contained in feelings rather than concepts» (enveloppés dans un sentiment au lieu de l’être dans un concept). t 101 Throughout its history and in all its directions, philosophy of representation has always been grounded in the «presupposition that 100

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 185; Eng. trans. cit., p. 142. Cf. ibid., d p. 169; Eng. trans. cit., p. 128 (the English translation has been modified, «feelings» substituting «opinions»). 101

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there is a natural capacity for thought endowed with a talent for truth or an affinity with the true, under the double aspect of a good will on the part of the thinkerr and an upright nature on the part of thought (…). The most general form of representation is thus found in the element of a common sense understood as an upright nature and a good will».102 This «claimed affinity with the true», constituting φilºa, as an implicit, prejudicial element in philosophy,103 determines its knowledge as «recognition», i.e. as «harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object»,104 as «common sense».105 Therefore, philosophy, which was born with the claim to constitute an alternative to opinion, common sense, doxa, is, on the other hand, its permanent, systematic confirmation; it is orthodoxy: «the supposed three levels – a naturally upright thought, an in principle natural common sense, and a transcendental model of recognition – can constitute only an ideal orthodoxy. Philosophy is left without means to realise its project of breaking with doxa (…). The image of thought is only the figure in which doxa is universalised by being elevated to the rational level».106 Inasmuch as philosophy is constitutively «recognition» and «orthodoxy», it is inevitably conservative and reactionary: «What is recognised is not only an object but also the values attached to an object (…). In so far as the practical finality of the recognition lies in the “established values”, then on this model the whole image of thought as Cogitatio natura bears witness to a disturbing complacency. As Nietzsche says, Truth may well seem to be “a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring all the powers that be that no one needs to be the least concerned on its account; for it is, after f all, only ‘pure knowledge’…”. What is a thought which harms no one, neither thinkers nor anyone else? Recognition is a sign of the celebration of monstrous nuptials, in which thought “rediscovers” the State, rediscovers “the Church” and 102

Ibid., d p. 171; Eng. trans. cit., p. 131. Cf. ibid., d p. 181; Eng. trans. cit., p. 139. 104 Ibid., d p. 174; Eng. trans. cit., p. 133. 105 Cf. ibid., d p. 175; Eng. trans. cit., p. 133. 106 Ibid., d pp. 175 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 134. 103

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rediscovers all the current values that it subtly presented in the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified eternal object».107 All this is opposed by the thought of difference, as «pure thought»,108 «without presuppositions», that «effectively begins and effectively repeats».109 Actually, the thought of difference proposed by Deleuze also starts out from implicit, or subjective presuppositions, i.e. of the sentimental, not conceptual kind. It opposes orthodox philosophy because it is propelled by «ill will»;110 it is termed «misosophy»,111 is a «radical critique» of orthodoxy,112 which is not merely posited as «local scepticism»,113 still involved in dialectical interest in recognition, but as irreducible, anarchic novelty.114 The new thought is generated as an event of mere strength, an act of violence,115 which, in opposition to the good will and common sense of orthodox thought, does not bring about the convergence of the different faculties for recognition of a common object, but unilaterally directs each faculty to its excess, to its «transcendental exercise», where difference is received as the uncontainable origin of every content: the insensible sentiendum of sensibility, the unthinkable cogitandum of thought etc. «The violence of that which forces thought – wrote Deleuze – develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum. Each faculty is unhinged, but what are the hinges if not the form of a common sense which causes all the faculties to function and converge? Each one, in its own order and on its own account, has broken the form of common sense which kept it within the empirical element of doxa, in order to attain its “nth” power and the paradoxical element within transcendental exercise. Rather than all the faculties converging and contributing to a common project of recognising an 107

Ibid., d p. 177; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 135 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 174; Eng. trans. cit., p. 133. 109 Cf. ibid., d p. 171; Eng. trans. cit., p. 130. 110 Cf. ibidem. 111 Cf. ibid., d p. 182; Eng. trans. cit., p. 139. 112 Cf. ibid., d p. 173; Eng. trans. cit., p. 132. 113 Cf. ibid., d p. 181; Eng. trans. cit., p. 139. 114 Cf. ibid., d pp. 177 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 135 f.; cf. also ibid., d p. 356; Eng. trans. cit., p. 278. 115 Cf. ibid., d p. 189; Eng. trans. cit., p. 145. 108

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object, we see divergent projects in which, with regard to what concerns it essentially, each faculty is in the presence of that which is its “own”. Discord of the faculties, chain of force and fuse along which each confronts its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it face to face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its perfection (comme de son disparate ou de son incomparable)».116 In this excessive, transcendent use of the faculties, the new thought opposes the common sense of orthodox philosophy and takes up the paradox, the «para-sense», which «determines only the communication between disjointed faculties».117 It is in this movement of the thought of difference that «overturning of Platonism» basically consists, in the rejection of ground or «ungrounding» (effondement). t 118 Representative thought is oriented, on the one hand, towards «common sense», the convergence off the faculties in recognition of the sole object, on the other hand, towards the unity of grounding, the «Same» of the identical, determining the undetermined:119 «To ground is to determine»,120 thus «to ground is always to ground representation».121 The thought of difference, on the other hand, consists in allowing determination to emerge, together with its dark background, to its «depth» or «groundlessness».122 Idea is not «clear and distinct», but «distinction-obscurity»,123 not the «sameness» in which to ground the determination of the particular, but the «obscure manifoldness» emerging together with the difference of the singular. The «animality» (animalité), the «stupidity» (bêtise) of thinking difference as identification and ungrounding opposes the reductive rationality of the orthodox philosophy of determination and grounding; the thought of simulacrum opposes the thought of form: 116

Ibid., d p. 184; Eng. trans. cit., p. 141; cf. also ibid., d p. 186; Eng. trans. cit., p. 143. Cf. ibid., d p. 190; Eng. trans. cit., p. 146. 118 Cf. ibid., d pp. 92, 261; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 67, 202; cf. also ibid., d p. 352; Eng. trans. cit., p. 275. 119 Cf. ibid., d p. 352; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 274 f. 120 Ibid., d p. 349; Eng. trans. cit., p. 272. 121 Ibid., d p. 351; Eng. trans. cit., p. 274. 122 Cf. ibid., d p. 352; Eng. trans. cit., p. 275. 123 Cf. ibid., d pp. 190 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 146. 117

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«The fact is that to ground is to determine the indeterminate, but this is not a simple operation. When determination as such occurs, it does not simply provide a form or impart form to a given matter on the basis of the categories. Something of the ground rises to the surface, without assuming any form but, rather, insinuating itself between the forms; a formless base, an autonomous and faceless existence. This ground which is now on the surface is called depth or groundlessness. Conversely, when they are reflected d in it, forms decompose, every model breaks down and all faces perish, leaving only the abstract line as the determination absolutely adequate to the indeterminate, just as the flash of lightning is equal to the night, acid equal to the base, and distinction adequate to obscurity as a whole: monstrosity. (A determination which is not opposed to the indeterminate and does not limit it) (…). Thought understood as pure determination or abstract line must confront this indeterminate, this groundlessness. This indeterminate or groundlessness is also the animality peculiar to thought, the genitality of thought: not this or that animal form, but stupidity (bêtise)».124 As can be seen, in Deleuze,125 the new thought becomes a radical alternative to rationalism. Paradox is contrasted with orthodox thought;126 in contrast with common sense as a «syllogism», as co-operation by the faculties, we have the «disparate» (dispars), difference, thought as disparity, as radical «diaphora»;127 in contrast with reason as form and «benevolence» of the true, we have anarchic formless thought as the repetition of «simulacra».128 Thinking difference is not the rational connection of the manifold in a form, but «intoxication, the properly philosophical stupor or the Dyonisian

124

Ibid., d pp. 352 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 275. This radical irrationalism is not to be found in other postmodern philosophers. They attempt a new conception of reason (See Michel Serres, for example). Nevertheless, irrationalism is a common characteristic of postmodern theories (not only in philosophy, but also in poetics, ethics, politics etc.), especially in those foregrounding the emancipatory character of postmodernism. 126 Cf. ibid., d pp. 250, 293; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 194, 227. 127 Cf. ibid., d pp. 193 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 148 f. 128 Cf. ibid., d pp. 94 f., 382 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 69, 299 ff. 125

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Idea».129 Thus postmodernism searches for and finds models of «thinking» that are very distant from modern ones and alternative to them. As is well known, Deleuze pointed to schizophrenia with particular emphasis as «a possibility for thought».130 «Stupidity» and «madness» are models of thought that substantially distances itself from common sense and the identity of representation, the foundation of reason and the benevolence of the true: «Turning over the ground is the most dangerous occupation, but also the most tempting in the stupefied moments of an obtuse will. For this ground, along with the individual, rises to the surface yet assumes neither form nor figure. It is there, staring at us, but without eyes (…). Stupidity is neither the ground nor the individual, but rather this relation in which individuation brings the ground to the surface without being able to give it form (…). All determinations become bad and cruel when they are grasped only by a thought which invents and contemplates them, flayed and separated from their living form, adrift upon this barren ground. Everything becomes violence on this passive ground. Everything becomes attack on this digestive ground. Here the Sabbath of stupidity and malevolence takes place. Perhaps this is the origin of that melancholy which weighs upon the most beautiful human faces: the presentiment of a hideousness peculiar to the human face, of a rising tide of stupidity, an evil deformity or a thought governed by madness. For from the point of view of a philosophy of nature, madness arises at the point at which the individual contemplates itself in this free ground (…) to the point that it can no longer stand itself».131 Deleuze clearly characterised the specificity of the new thought of difference in respect of representative thought on the basis of this general philosophical attitude, more profoundly than on the basis of rejection of the characteristics of representation. Or rather, he identified the origin of both ways of thinking in that difference in 129

Ibid., d p. 276; Eng. trans. cit., p. 214. Ibid., d p. 192; Eng. trans. cit., p. 148. This theme is widely dealt with in subsequent works by Deleuze and Guattari: cf., for example: G. DELEUZE, F. GUATTARI, Capitalisme et schizophrénie. L’Anti-Œdipe, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1972; ID., Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Mille plateaux, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1980. 131 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 197 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 152. 130

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fundamental attitude. However, we have seen that Cohen’s philosophy not only cannot be understood as logic of representation, but constitutes itself as a radical alternative to the latter. Secondly, I think it is clear enough not to require special discussion that the new thought of difference, presented as pure, i.e. with no presuppositions, is in fact not so, requiring «subjective» or «implicit» presuppositions, which determine it genetically: a well characterised basic feeling, like malevolence, misosophy, transgression, nomadism, anarchy, animality, madness, profoundly inspiring it in its whole procedure and results. Thirdly, it appears clear to me that for anyone who knows Cohen’s philosophy, even superficially, that, despite the analogies that have emerged on specific themes, there is a radical diversity between it and the postmodern thought of difference presented by Deleuze: diversity in the basic «sentiment» behind the two perspectives. We can, however, look at Cohen’s philosophy as a point of reference with its own place and role within the postmodern sphere, which give rise to a different line of thought from others, but which is not alien or anachronistic: specific, critical, perhaps even polemical, but not entirely outside the present cultural context. To lay the foundations of this possible development, it might be useful to go on with comparison with Deleuze’s theories and at least mention some of the most important, obvious differences between the two philosophical conceptions. First of all, I think one must highlight the radically different perspective on origin. This theme is just as important for Deleuze as it was for Cohen and we have found some interesting analogies. But at the root of these there is a basic difference, which mostly makes them apparent and in any case secondary. Cohen’s principle of origin, which inspired not only his logic but also his whole philosophy, consists in the firm methodological conviction that all content originates from thought. Cohen’s philosophy can be read on the whole as authenticating Platonism. Inasmuch as it developed the meaning of the Platonic idea as hypothesis with rigorous method and fruitful results. Deleuze’s thought of difference, on the other hand, presents itself as the overturning of Platonism (in Nietzsche’s sense) also and especially because it posits difference as a non logical, non rational, nor rationalisable principle of thought. When commenting on the well known part of The Republic (523 ff.) to which Cohen had also devoted

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his attention, in a completely different direction,132 Deleuze wrote: «concepts only ever designate possibilities. They lack the claws of absolute necessity – in other words, of an original violence inflicted upon thought; the claws of a strangeness or an enmity which alone would awaken thought from its natural stupor or eternal possibility: there is only involuntary thought, aroused but constrained within thought, and all the more absolutely necessary for being born, illegitimately, of fortuitousness in the world. Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with misosophy. Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think. The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounterr (…). In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition».133 The principle of difference, referred to by Deleuze, is also called idea or thought, but it is an energetic principle, r whose stated model is in Nietzsche’s «will to power». Reference to the concept of «energy» is interesting, because it does not so much mean (unlike for Cohen, as we shall see) reference to science and its laws but rather to the mythological conception of energy, which, disassociating itself from true scientific discourse, was widely used in non scientific fields, such as art and philosophy. Nietzsche can certainly be seen behind Deleuze in this, but also, and to no lesser extent, Bergson. Michel Serres rightly noted: «The crisis of philosophy. It had long intuited the precedence of power over reasons. The classics had written it in their language. Descartes and Leibniz in rational theology, Aristotle in metaphysics. And here we have a physicist appearing to re-inscribe metatheory. a He appeared to be showing a system of reference where everything happens under our eyes. Where 132 133

Cf. H. COHEN, Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, k cit., p. 353. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 181 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 139.

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the rational grows together with irreversible time. At the same time the possible decreases; at the same time power decreases. As if the rational were maximised when energy was at its maximum degradation. Either the fallen rational or rational decadence, this is precisely the criticism of Nietzsche and Bergson respectively».134 We find the same mythological meaning of «energy» in Deleuze: «When we seek to define the energy in general, eitherr we take account of the extensive and qualified factors of extensity – in which case we are reduced to saying “there is something which remains constant”, thereby formulating the great but flat tautology of the Identical – or, on the contrary, we consider pure intensity in so far as it is implicated in that deep region where no quality is developed, or any extensity deployed. In this case, we define energy in terms of the difference buried in this pure intensity and it is the formula “difference of intensity” which bears the tautology, but this time the beautiful and profound tautology of the Different».135 Actually, it is precisely the themes highlighted above that suggest interesting analogies between Deleuze and Cohen: non-being as origin, intensity as a generating principle and idea as a problem very clearly mark, at the same time, owing to their radically different meanings in the two philosophers, the difference between the two directions of thought. The relative, productive non-being of being, Ó œ in Deleuze has an energetic, not a methodological positivity (as in Cohen).136 Deleuze’s intensity is not, like Cohen’s, the generative law of reality, in accordance with continuity as the method of thought, but the principle that «makes difference an object of affirmation»,137 the sensible principle of thought (albeit of transcendent sensibility).138 Ideas are problems, not in the sense of Cohen’s «hypothesis», but random imperatives, trials and selections arbitrarily deciding their own truth and which do not search for answers, but rather impose themselves as open questions, actually decisions, affirmations, 134

M. SERRES, Hermès IV. La distribution, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1977, p. 71. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 310; Eng. trans. cit., p. 240. 136 Cf. ibid., d pp. 342 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 266 f. 137 Ibid., d p. 301; Eng. trans. cit., p. 234. 138 Cf. ibid., d pp. 187 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 144. 135

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productions of energy and power.139 Even idea as «task», behind an apparent analogy, hides a profound difference between Deleuze’s and Cohen’s perspectives, since in Deleuze the task is not possibility of realisation, but power of affirmation. Here too the above mentioned energetic model acts, not only for deliberate use of the notion of «potential» by Deleuze,140 but especially for his precise choice of the notion of «virtual», in contrast with that of «possible». It is clear that Deleuze approaches the ancient metaphysical notion of «energy», conceived by Aristotle as an actualising force, rather than the thermo-dynamic scientific notion off the law of transformation. The virtual, unlike the possible, requires no realisation and thus, in Deleuze’s view, cannot be grasped and removes idea from the representative relationship with reality: it is complete affirmation and positivity which is actualised.141 The energetic conception of thought taken over by Deleuze from Nietzsche,142 is not only different, but antithetic to Cohen’s logical perspective: «It is true that Nietzsche was interested in the energetics of his time, but this was not the scientific nostalgia of a philosopher. We must discover what it was that he sought to find in the science of intensive quantities – namely, the means to realise what he called Pascal’s prophecy: to make chaos an object of affirmation (…). A thought contrary to the laws of nature, repetition in the eternal return is the highest thought, the gross Gedanke».143 Thought in this sense is not logos or law, but will to power, nomadism, «crowned anarchy», hybris.144 One can say that Deleuze’s new thought of difference, and postmodernism represented by it is, in a way, realised Nietzscheanism, the teaching of the will to power and eternal return brought about and fulfilled. Coherently with Nietzsche’s presuppositions, this fulfilment 139

Cf. ibid., d pp. 210, 255 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 161 f., 197 ff. Cf. ibid., d pp. 273 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 212. 141 Cf. ibid., d pp. 272 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 211 ff. 142 The interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought given by Deleuze in his book, Nietzsche et la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1962, is an essential reference point for his subsequent works. 143 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 313; Eng. trans. cit., p. 243. 144 Cf. ibid., d pp. 55 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 37 f. 140

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has its epiphany in a midday without sun and light and in a superman, who, as Cohen wrote, coincides with subman.145 Emphasis on difference and individuality dissolves the subject to make room for the cruel affirmation of the different, positivity without laws, hybris of the will as power. In Deleuze’s words: «The great discovery of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which marks his break with Schopenhauer and goes under the name of the will to power or the Dyonisian world, is the following: no doubt the I and the Self must be replaced by an undifferentiated abyss, but this abyss is neither an impersonal nor an abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the contrary, it is the I and the self which are the abstract universals. They must be replaced, but in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors which consume them and which constitute the fluid world of Dionysus. What cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we find not the impersonal but the individual and its factors, individuation and its fields, individuality and its pre-individual singularities. For the pre-individual is still singular, just as the ante-self the ante-I are still individual – or– rather than simply “still”, we should say “finally”. That is why the individual in intensity finds its psychic image neither in the organisation of the self nor in the determination of species of the I, but rather in the fractured I and the dissolved self, and in the correlation of the fractured I with the dissolved self. This correlation seems clear, like that of the thinker and the thought, or that of the clear-confused thinker with distinct-obscure Ideas (the Dionysian thinker). It is Ideas which lead us from the fractured I to the dissolved Self (…), what swarms around the edges of the fracture are Ideas in the form of problems – in other words, in the form of multiplicities made up of differential relations and variations of relations, distinctive points and transformations of points. These Ideas, however, are expressed in individuating factors, in the implicated world of intensive quantities which constitute the universal concrete individuality of the thinker or the system of the dissolved Self» . 146 145 146

Cf. ERW W 28. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 332 f.;Eng. trans. cit., pp. 258 f.

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The concept of «energy» also played an important role in Cohen, at different levels, in logic as in ethics, but he only referred to scientific consideration of this concept, to the law of the conservation of energy. Cohen interpreted the category of «substance» in the sense of «conservation» (Erhaltung ( ) of energy, thus attributing a strongly dynamic meaning to it in the same direction as Kant’s concept, but even more radically. Substance as «conservation» is in correlation with causality as «movement» (Bewegung) and «transformation» (Verwandlung): «transformation is, in a rigorous sense, self-transformation. Causality only recognises conservation of substance in it. Energy, on the other hand, teaches the conservation of movement. This is the novelty: that movement too, in the difference of its forms and despite this, is, nevertheless, in all of them the same movement. Thus what energy makes known is the conservation of movement».147 For Cohen the conservation of energy was also a model for the most fundamental logical level, for the very method of thinking: not, however, as an extralogical mythical principle, but as an exemplary law of the very movement of the logos. Thus the notion of «conservation», taken over from physics, was chosen by him, at the level of the method of thinking in general, of the logic of pure thought, not only to understand the correlation between «unity of knowledge» and multiplicity of the «modes» of judgement,148 but, as we have seen, to explain the very movement of thought in general, «correlation», as «conservation» of «separation» and «unification»: «It certainly cannot be the opinion that an arbitrary exchange between separation and unification can take place; that thought jumps from one to the other type of activity and that the energy of thought comes out in the stimulus of this alternation (…). In the new science, in particular from Descartes onwards, an expression appears which recent times have taken over for the fundamental unitary principle of

147 148

LRE E 292; cf. ibid., d pp. 288-299. Cf. ibid., d pp. 70-72.

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the mathematical science of nature: the term “conservation”. And “conservation” could now also be the concept defining the correlation between the two directions of activity of judgement. It is not an exchange that takes place, but conservation, at the same time, for separation and unification».149 Reference to the notion of «energy» was also deeply influential in Cohen’s ethics, albeit in a rational perspective and on the scientific model of the law of conservation. Transposition onto the ethical level of the category of «energy» allowed Cohen to reach dynamic, not ontological understanding of the fundamental ethical categories of «subject», «action», «will» and «freedom». freedom, wrote Cohen, «must mean nothing else than the conservation of the subject in the conservation of its actions. Freedom is the energy of the will. And all the forms of the energy of the will are self-transformations of the moral subject».150 It certainly would be a fictitious, over-stretched actualisation to speak of deconstruction of the subject in Cohen, but it is entirely legitimate to speak of desubstantialisation and deontologisation of the subject, which is resolved in dynamic correlation, whose unity is presupposed, but only as an infinite ethical task: «the moral person cannot be considered given – wrote Cohen in Ethik des reinen Willens –, defined in accordance with certain natural dispositions and conditions (…). The subject is not the soul, which for ethics immediately becomes a ghost; the subject is not something which is simply born, is inherited (…). What sense would ethics have if the subject were understood as already given, born and brought up in its environment?»151 Even in the intense discussion by Cohen, in Ethik des reinen Willens,152 of the affective and impulsive aspect of the will, in constant comparison with the psychophysiology of his times, he was not aiming at the negation of this dimension of the will or its intellectualistic reduction to thought, but rather at the setting up correlation between thought and affectivity, f thought and emotional 153 impulse, on the basis of an analogy, however imperfect, between 149

Ibid., d pp. 61 f. Ibid., d p. 302; cf. ibid., d pp. 299-302. 151 ERW 95 f. 152 Cf. ibid., d Chapters Two and Three. 153 Cf. ibid., d p. 167. 150

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«affectivity» and «movement»154 and between «task» and «substance» (understood in the above sense of «conservation of energy»).155 Affectivity is not reduced to thought; it keeps its energetic meaning, but, for this very reason, is placed in correlation with thought and genetically understood, by means off the method of continuity and the conception of intensity, starting from its pure origin. In Cohen’s perspective there certainly was no destruction of the subject in Nietzsche’s sense, but neither was there dogmatic reaffirmation of a static, unchanging subject, the bearer of authoritarian, totalitarian reason. Cohen’s ethical subject was an infinite task, freely and dynamically in constant self-transformation and realisation. It was not the anti-human superman, but rather rediscovered its human dignity in the condition of subjectum, which is also social and political: the «poor man» is the realisation of the human subject, he is the «righteous man», who is entrusted with the sense of historical and political action: «suffering reveals itself to be the essence, as it were, of man (…). If you wish to know what man is, then get to know his suffering. This iss no longer a metaphysics of pessimism; rather, on the basis of social insight the poverty of man is personified».156 Clearly, two such radically different perspectives, like those of Cohen and Deleuze, can do nothing but lead in radically different 154

Cf. ibid., d pp. 132 f. Cf. ibid., d p. 176. 156 RV V 170; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 146 f. It is interesting to note the clearly deliberate assonance the last but one sentence quotedd with from line from Goethe, which was particularly important for Cohen and to which I shall return later (cf. note 258). Several developments in contemporary Latin American philosophy are particularly interesting in this context, especially Enrique Dussel’s «philosophy of liberation». Dussel placed poor, oppressed man at the centre of his thought, explicitly speaking of «transmodern» thought, which is different from the «postmodern» European and North American variety (cf. E. DUSSEL, Filosofía de la Liberación, Usta, Bogotá 19802; ID., Ética de la Liberación en la Edad de la Globalización y de la Exclusión, Editorial Trotta, Madrid 1998; ID., Posmodernidad y transmodernidad. Diálogos con la filosofia de Gianni Vattimo, Universidad Iberoamericana Plantel Golfo Centro, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente, Universidad Iberoamericana Plantel Laguna, Puebla 1999). Andrés Ancona Quiroz, in a paper: “Die Religionsphilosophie Hermann Cohens in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie und Philosophie der Befreiung in Lateinamerika” (as yet not published), read at the Congress on “Gott in der Philosophie aus den Quellen des Judentums” (Zurich, 7th and 8th November 2002), attempted an interesting reading of Cohen, starting out from the «a priori» of poverty. 155

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directions, but what needs pointing out here once again is, above all, that both ways of thinking are entirely alien to «metaphysical» thought as representation: in this sense Deleuze’s «thought of difference» and Cohen’s «thought of purity» are actually two possibilities for postmodern philosophy. The line of thought I am analysing in Deleuze, as an exemplary model, but where many others are to be found and which well reflects important aspects of contemporary culture, could certainly not have come to the fore if it had not been backed up by the complex, radical critique of modernity characterising European culture from the end of the 19th to the mid 20th centuries. Many philosophers, on the basis of different presuppositions and modalities, have taken part in a single, large scale, radical critique of abstract, totalitarian, instrumental reason, in the name of a «new thinking», that is closer to life and itself an expression of concrete life (understood under very different headings: existential, biological, psychic, historical-political etc.). At the same time, a route was being searched for leading to thought, which, freed of bad rationality, could reach the point of thinking the unthought, or even the unthinkable. This radical philosophical critique was part of a more widespread cultural movement also including the deconstruction and dissolution of form, in the artistic sphere, the discussion and weakening of grounds, in the scientific sphere, and the critique and destruction of bourgeois models, in the moral, political economic and religious spheres. This cultural movement, which was so widespread and complex as to make up a common atmosphere for quite different theories, is what I would call «Antimodernism», since, despite its critical character aiming at the dissolution of the structures it identified with «Modernity», or rather precisely owing to this critical, and on occasion dialectical, character, it was still in every way a stage in Modernity itself. If one considers postmodernism the heir of antimodernism, this cannot be understood in the sense of continuity: postmodernism, which we see here exemplified in Deleuze’s thought, is actually something quite different, firstly because it explicitly rejects the critical character typical of antimodernism which kept the latter in the sphere of modernity. Postmodernism can be considered the heir of antimodernism only in the sense that it came to the fore on the basis of the results of the latter, in the cultural void left by the destructive action (actually, significant, necessary and inevitable) completed by it:

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the specificity of postmodernism, at least in the form considered here, is the enthusiastic, Dionysian conviction of being able to settle in that place, void of all form, left by the destruction of the modern, so as to give birth to a culture that, perhaps for the first time in history, is not built up on new forms, grounds and models, but is total emancipation from all form and ground. Reference to Cohen in postmodern culture is possible in a different framework. It is a question of rediscovering the tradition of modernity that Cohen himself and his school identified with the name «critical rationalism» or «critical idealism». This tradition is an authentic expression of modernity, actually the most authentic one, from this point of view, and, from within modernity, constantly carried out its intransigent critique against totalitarian or instrumental reason, against dogmatism of possessed, static forms, against established moral, political and religious models, in the name of critical, dynamic reason, openly constituted as an infinite task aware of the need to move thought beyond the limits of concept as far as thinking on the limit of idea, though careful never to go beyond this limit. In line with this modern tradition, which also played an important role in the critical work of antimodernism (one immediately thinks of important aspects of the Frankfurt School, but more recent research has also foregrounded this dimension in thinkers like Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin, and the thought off Hermann Cohen himself can be seen in this perspective, under several headings), thus with reference to Cohen, who deliberately represented and revitalised it, different postmodern thought can be developed, since it is justt as aware of the irreversible result of antimodern critique, at the same time being convinced of being able to think the new culture in continuity with rationalism and modern critical idealism, which survives because it was not the target of correct, inevitable antimodern iconoclasm.157

157

The picture I have only too briefly outlined here (and which I hope to enlarge elsewhere on another occasion) clearly converges with the arguments of J. HABERMAS, Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt, in ID., Kleine politische Schriften (I-IV), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 1981, pp. 444-464, although

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Before concluding, it still seems worthwhile outlining the divergent lines of these two perspectives in postmodernism: on the one hand, Dionysian irrationalism, for which I shall make further reference to Deleuze’s model, and, on the other, critical rationalism going back to Cohen, though there is a need to go further in adequate development for the new cultural situation. In Deleuze’s view, the new thoughtt of difference must take an opposite direction to traditional philosophy: if the latter, as has been seen above, is orthodoxy, good and common sense, the new thought is paradox, violence and para-sense: «Philosophy is revealed not by good sense but by paradox. Paradox is the pathos or the passion of philosophy. There are several kinds of paradox, all of which are opposed to the complementary forms of orthodoxy – namely, good sense and common sense. Subjectively, paradox breaks up the common exercise of the faculties and places each before its own limit, before its incomparable: thought before the unthinkable which it alone is nevertheless capable of thinking; memory before the forgotten which is also its immemorial; sensibility before the imperceptible which is indistinguishable from its intensive. At the same time, however, paradox communicates to the broken faculties that relation which is far from good sense, aligning them along a volcanic line which allows one to ignite the other, leaping from one limit to the next. Objectively, paradox displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, along with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the direction of a good sense».158 If common sense is the convergence and co-operation of the faculties in recognition of the object (óõëëïãéóìüò ),159 paradox, which is «the opposite of good sense»,160 pushes each faculty out of the «hinges» of good sense, in a discordant, transcendent, divergent exercise, in which there is no further communication between the faculties, except for the «discordant agreement», installed by violence which makes them developing along different routes and themes, thus leading to conclusions that are not identical in respect of the perspectives of postmodernism. 158 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 293; Eng. trans. cit., p. 227. 159 Cf. ibid., d pp. 184, 193; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 141, 148. 160 Ibid., d p. 250; Eng. trans. cit., p. 194.

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diverge:161 «Rather than all the faculties converging and contributing to a common project of recognising an object, we see divergent projects in which, with regard to what concerns it essentially, each faculty is in the presence of that which is its “own”. Discord of the faculties, chain of force and fuse along which each confronts its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it face to face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its perfection (comme de son disparate ou de son incomparable)».162 It is only this discordant, transcendent exercise of the faculties that allows the «sublime»,163 to be reached, i.e. the «limit-object» of each faculty: the insensible which can only be felt and which makes all that is sensible possible,164 the unthinkable which can only be thought and which makes all that is thinkable possible,165 and analogously, the immemorable for the unimaginable166 and for these other new faculties can emerge as a consequence of emancipation from the limits of common sense.167 That which «awakes»168 and moves this paradoxical activity of the faculties is idea, as difference, intensity and energy. Ideas, as we have already seen, are not concepts of thought, but energetic intensities and violent powers, more sensible (to transcendent sensibility) than «ideal» (in the sense of the abstract universal). It is they that, at the same time, move each faculty in the direction of its transcendent exercise, constituting the transcendent object for each of them, and connect the faculties by means of the violence of discord they impose. Ideas, multiple and irreducible, obscure and distinct differences and intensities, constitute «para-sense», the opposite of common and good 161

Cf. ibid., d p. 190; Eng. trans. cit., p. 146; cf. also ibid., d p. 250; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 193 f. 162 Ibid., d p. 184; Eng. trans. cit., p. 141. 163 Cf. ibid., d p. 190; Eng. trans. cit., p. 146. Explicit reference is made to Kant’s notion, though developments are radically different from it. 164 Cf. ibid., d p. 305; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 236 f. 165 Cf. ibid., d p. 249; Eng. trans. cit., p. 192. 166 Cf. ibid., d p. 188; Eng. trans. cit., p. 144. 167 Cf. ibid., d p. 187; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 143 f. 168 Cf. ibid., d p. 213; Eng. trans. cit., p. 164.

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sense, which makes the paradoxical exercise of the faculties possible and to which the latter always refers back: «there are Ideas which traverse all the faculties, but are the object of none in particular. Perhaps in effect (…) it will be necessary to reserve the name of Ideas not for pure cogitanda but rather for those instances which go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility, capable of engendering in each case, according to their own order, the limit- or transcendent-object of each faculty. Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise. Considered in this light, Ideas, far from having as their milieu a good sense or a common sense, refer to a para-sense which determines only the communication between disjointed faculties. Neither are they illuminated by a natural light: rather, they shine like differential flashes which leap and metamorphose (…). The restitution of the Idea in the doctrine of the faculties requires the explosion of the clear and distinct, and the discovery of a Dionysian value according to which the Idea is necessarily obscure in so far as it is distinct, all the more obscure the more it is distinct. Distinction-obscurity becomes here the true tone of philosophy, the symphony of the discordant Idea».169 It now seems clear to me that Deleuze’s thought of difference does not only represent a confutation of rationalism, understood in the restricted meaning identifying it with representative thought, but is programmatically constituted as irrationalist thought, understood as energy and will to power. What I should like to further show is that this thought has an ecstatic, apophatic, and, in the end, mystical outcome, significantly reflecting a possibility in postmodern culture. Deleuze’s new thought, as we have seen, opposes rationalism understood as thought by concepts and representations. The concrete, empirical dynamism170 of idea opposes the abstraction of the concept, the «dramas of Ideas» the «schemata of concepts».171 Ideas are originative forces and intensities, which must be contemplated ecstatically by thought, «learning», not concepts, that reason can 169

Ibid., d pp. 190 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 146. Cf. ibid., d p. 3; Eng. trans. cit., p. xx. 171 Cf. ibid., d p. 281; Eng. trans. cit., p. 218. 170

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«know»: «the Idea and “learning” express (…) the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of consciousness».172 This is why the new thought is a radical alternative to Hegel’s rational dialectic, which claims to understand and represent «abstract and dead essences» in the concept, opposing it with extrarational, irrational thought, capable of giving free expression to idea as «inessential».173 The «Theatrum Philosophicum»174 must not be understood as the representation of concepts, but as a drama of ideas: «The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which refers it back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a “terrible power”».175 This reference to the energetic, violent character of ideas, to the «cruelty» of the new thought connotates it, however, beyond its opposition to representative thought, as irrationalism in the widest, most radical sense. I have already pointed out how, rather than the critique of representation, it was the rejection of the principle of «good will» and «philosophy» and opposition to it of «bad will» and «misosophy» that are the real barrier between Deleuze’s thought of difference and Cohen’s thought of purity. Now it must be highlighted that this barrier radically qualifies the latter as rationalism and the former as irrationalism. For the characteristics so far discussed, the thought of difference opposes the very existence of reason as «form» and «law» and constitutively takes on a transgressive, anti-nomistic character, both in the theoretical and moral spheres,176 which goes well beyond the critique of established order and is set up as 172

Ibid., d p. 248; Eng. trans. cit., p. 192. Cf. ibid., d pp. 242 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 187 f. 174 Cf. M. FOUCAULT, op. cit. 175 G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 19; Eng. trans. cit., p. 10. 176 Cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 8 f., 12; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 2 f., 5. 173

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programmed negation of every order, every «form», and thus every «ratio». We are dealing, then, with radical, aware and aggressive irrationalism. In the words of Deleuze: «we believe that when these problems attain their proper degree of positivity, and when difference becomes the object of a corresponding affirmation, they release a power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul by depriving it of its very identity and breaking its good will. The problematic and the differential determine struggles or destructions in relation to which those of the negative are only appearances, and the wishes of the beautiful soul are so many mystifications trapped in appearances. The simulacrum is not just a copy, but that which overturns all copies by also overturning the models: every thought becomes an aggression».177 It will be no surprise then to note the apophatic, mystical outcome of this new thought of difference, since history shows that this is the possible, if not inevitable, outcome, not of all irrational thought, but of all programmatically irrationalist thought, when it is adequately developed in its implications and consequences. The attempt to think the unthinkable which can only be thought and feel the insensible which can only be felt, i.e. difference in its originative univocity and incomparability, does not only reject the expression of this thought in representation and the concept, but considers any expression of difference inadequate. What is more, it considers all formalisation of it unfaithful. The intensive, which Cohen considered a law, generating and founding the reality of the extensive, for Deleuze, is an implicit individuality, which any explanation necessarily betrays and neutralises. Idea, which for Cohen was hypothesis and form, the principle of the origin of any objective reality, for Deleuze is obscurely distinct, pure formless energy, which inevitably loses itself in any formalisation and rationalisation. Thus thought of difference, in the face of the inevitable problem of thinking the unthinkable in some way (though not by means of representation), takes the apophatic route whose method is paradox. There is an «inexplicable», difference, which, nevertheless, is explicated and when this happens, is not explicated: «It is not surprising that, strictly 177

Ibid., d pp. 2 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. XX.

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speaking, difference should be “inexplicable”. Difference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends to be cancelled; this means only that difference is essentially implicated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be explicated is to be cancelled or to dispel the inequality which constitutes it. The formula according to which “to explicate is to identify” is a tautology. We cannot conclude from this that difference is cancelled out, or at least that it is cancelled in itself. It is cancelled in so far as it is drawn outside itself, in extensity and in the quality which fills that extensity. However, difference creates both this extensity and this quality (…). Difference of intensity is cancelled or tends to be cancelled in this system, but it creates this system by explicating itself. Whence the double aspect of the quality as a sign: it refers to an implicated order of constitutive differences, and tends to cancel out those differences in the extended order in which they are explicated (…). Difference in the form of intensity remains implicated in itself, while it is cancelled by being explicated in extensity».178 Reading passages like this one (and there are many other similar ones) analogies immediately spring to mind with many teachings in the mystical tradition or with that of Nicholas of Cusa on «complicatio» and «explicatio» of God, though such references are not explicit in Deleuze, or, further, with Bruno’s «complicatio»179 and ground and the inversion of powers in Schelling, to whom Deleuze does make explicit reference.180 Therefore, apophatic thought of difference is inevitably paradoxical, since it consists in explicating the inexplicable implicated, while maintaining awareness of its inexplicability, at the same time, however, thinking it in its mystifying explication: «We must therefore distinguish two orders of implication or degradation: a secondary implication which designates the state in which intensities are enveloped by the qualities and extensity which explicate them; and a primary implication designating the state in which intensity is implicated in itself, at once both enveloping and enveloped (…). Only

178

Ibid., d pp. 293 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 228. See also the following pages in the same text. 179 Reference can be found ibid., d p. 161; Eng. trans. cit., p. 123. 180 Cf. ibid., d p. 296; Eng. trans. cit., p. 230.

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transcendental enquiry can discover that intensity remains implicated in itself and continues to envelop difference at the very moment when it is reflected in the extensity and the quality that it creates, which implicate it only secondarily, just enough to “explicate it”. Extensity, quality, limitation, opposition indeed designate realities, but the form which difference assumes here is illusory. Difference pursues its subterranean life while its image reflected by the surface is scattered. Moreover, it is in the nature of that image, but only that image, to be scattered, just as it is in the nature of the surface to cancel difference, but only on the surface».181 Paradox is, therefore, not only a rhetorical figure, but the structure of this apophatic thought, which cannot think inexplicable difference, except as the para-sense to which it refers back, only negatively, systematic understanding of the explicit meanings alien and opposed to their common sense, i.e. paradoxical. Hence the meaning and importance of the «simulacrum» for this thought. It is the opposite of copy, just as thought as «repetition» is alternative to thought as representation: «The mask, the costume, the covered – wrote Deleuze – is everywhere the truth of the uncovered. The mask is the true subject of repetition. Because repetition differs in kind from representation, the repeated cannot be represented: rather, it must always be signified, masked by what signifies it, itself masking what it signifies».182 But the simulacrum is not only alternative signification to representation, it refers back, more radically, to nothing, the ‘en-soff of difference, since the sense to which it refers back, masking it, is formless, anarchic, nomadic chaos, the bottomless depth of different ideas,183 and its significant modality does not consist in masked expression, in simulation and variation of an original, but in infinite variation on no theme (a trait recalling more the rococo than the baroque),184 parody which leaves no place for the original.185 Here is 181 Ibid., d pp. 309 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 240; cf. ibid., d pp. 305, 316; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 237, 245 f. 182 Ibid., d p. 29; Eng. trans. cit., p. 18. 183 Cf. ibid., d pp. 355 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 277 f. 184 Infinite variation with no theme is a common subject in many postmodern writers and deserves further consideration.

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Deleuze’s definition: «by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a copy».186 The mystical character of the thought of difference is, actually, somewhat aware and explicit, if Deleuze himself, with reference to the empiricism of ideas, can write: «Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts».187 The positive absolute of difference stands as the pleroma implying and making possible all the divergent series of its manifestations, but which, at the same time, cannot be referred back to, as their point of convergence, since it is a formless, chaotic horizon, continually shifted and «ungrounded».188 Ideas, as has been seen above, are the «distinct-obscure», and this is «intoxication, the properly philosophical stupor or the Dionysian Idea».189 Thought is the «universal undergrounding» of the «fractured I» and «dissolved Cogito».190 The thought of difference, then, stands as an apophatic route, entirely transcendent in respect of form, law and reason, towards the ecstatic, and mystical vision of the absolutely positive being of difference: «if the eternal return – wrote Deleuze – reduces qualities to the status of pure signs, and retains of extensities only what combines with the original depth, even at the cost of our coherence and in favour of a superior coherence, then the most beautiful qualities will appear, the most brilliant colours, the most precious stones and the most vibrant extensions. For once reduced to their seminal reasons, and having broken all relation with the negative, 185

Cf. ibid., d p. 92; Eng. trans. cit., p. 67. Ibid., d p. 95; Eng. trans. cit., p. 69. 187 Ibid., d p. 3; Eng. trans. cit., p. XX. 188 Cf. ibid., d pp. 161 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 123 f. 189 Ibid., d p. 276; Eng. trans. cit., p. 214. 190 Cf. ibid., d p. 251; Eng. trans. cit., p. 194. 186

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these will remain forever affixed in the intensive space of positive differences. Then, in turn, the final prediction of the Phaedo will be realised, in which Plato promised to the sensibility disconnected from its empirical exercise temples, stars and gods such as had never before been seen, unheard-of affirmations. The prediction is realised, it is true, only by the very overturning of Platonism».191 If we now want to think the direction of thought developing in and for postmodern culture in the light off inspiration from Cohen, we must immediately acknowledge that, however original this thought might be in respect of its source of inspiration, it cannot abandon an intrinsic, unavoidable character of Cohen’s philosophy, i.e. its methodologically rational and programmatically rationalist character. Whether such a direction of thoughtt can adequately place itself in the context of postmodern culture and whether it can produce a form of understanding and interpretation, as well as relevant propositions concerning it, is the fundamental question to which an initial answer is attempted in this essay. If a positive response emerges the conviction is implicit that such a response, in contrast with Deleuze’s and those of many others, will be found in the sphere of the option for rational thought and a rationalist programme. Itt is now a question of seeing, in conclusion, on what fundamental «présupposés « » and «sentiments»192 this thought, which is the aware, intentional heir of Cohen’s philosophy, should be carried out. We have seen above that Deleuze’s new thought of difference is constituted starting off from the rejection of representative reason, and we have also seen that Cohen’s thought of purity is certainly of the rationalist type, though in no way agreeing with the conception of reason as a faculty of representation. Nevertheless, at a much more interesting, deeper level, Deleuze’s rejection of «reason» is rejection of its very «presuppositions»: «good will», «common sense», «orthodoxy»: these presuppositions, even more radically than representative procedure, in Deleuze’s view, must be rejected in

191

Ibid., d p. 314; Eng. trans. cit., p. 244. I am deliberately using this terminology, here and in the following pages, in the meaning given it by Deleuze. 192

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rational thought and in the philosophy of the father of this thought, Plato, so that a new thought, the result of Nietzschean «overturning» of Platonism, must necessarily have an irrationalist, and, in the end, mystical outcome. Cohen’s philosophy now requires evaluation at the level of these presuppositions. Starting from different understanding of Plato, it was inspired by the later to develop as rationalist thought. In my view, the departure point of this examination is a clear lack of uniformity between Cohen’s conception of «rational thought» in respect of Deleuze’s paradigm and this is not restricted to the already discussed conception of non representative reason, but concerns the presuppositions themselves. This lack k of uniformity allows Cohen’s rationalism to escape from postmodern condemnation and posit itself as an alternative route in contemporary culture. As has been said, Deleuze identifies f and rejects, as inseparable presuppositions of classical «reason», «good will», «common sense» and «orthodoxy». What I aim to show here is that these presuppositions are not at all inseparable and that, on the contrary, Cohen’s philosophy, as the heir and exponent of critical rationalism, precisely in the name of the critical approach, as the essential, determining dimension of reason, is fundamentally based on the presupposition of «good will» and, at the same time, does not at all partake of the presuppositions of «common sense» and «orthodoxy»: it is, in short, a non orthodox philosophy.193 If «good will» is the disposition of thought towards the true and the good,194 «orthodoxy» or «common sense» is thought as co-ordination and harmonisation of the faculties.195 The inseparability, or rather the coincidence of these two presuppositions implies the will to truth of philosophy and is realised so as to «appropriate the ideal of an “orthodoxy”»,196 i.e. in «syllogism» as harmonious co-operation of the faculties197 and as the position of illusory problems, inasmuch as the Cff. the meaning given by Deleuze to: φȚλȓα ilosophy misosophy Cf. G. Deleuze, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 171 andd 172; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 131 and 132. 195 Cf. ibid., d pp. 174 ff.;Eng . trans. cit., pp. 133 ff. f 196 Cf. ibid., d p. 193;Eng . trans. cit., p. 148. 197 Cf. ibidem d . 193 194

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solution is guaranteed by the choice of premises between the «places « » of «common sense».198 For Cohen, on the other hand, in accordance with the authentic meaning of Platonic dialectic,199 thought as idea or hypothesis is rendering reason, not of the conclusions of the syllogism, starting from presupposedly true premises, but of the premises themselves, which are thus producers of knowledge, precisely inasmuch as they are «forms» that have not been definitively acquired, but that are still subjected to further critical analysis. Thought, in Plato’s and Cohen’s sense, of the dialectic of ideas cannot be reduced to the banal «question-answer» scheme, but moves in the inexhaustible riches of the «foundation-infinite task» correlation. The «good will» of philosophy, the disposition of thought to truth, does not at all consist in seeking protection from a truth or, more generally, a common «form» that is dogmatically accepted, but, on the contrary, exposing itself to the search (Suchen), as I will say later, to the «yearning for search» (Sehnsucht), for truth and «form» never before possessed. In a well-known passage in his Ethik des reinen Willens, Cohen, commenting on Lessing’s famous parable in the sense of «truth as method», wrote: «In Lessing’s parable, the father was holding truth in one hand and in the other the aspiration to truth (das Suchen nach Wahrheit). We do not only give up the gift of one hand but do not even recognise the difference between the two hands. What could mean truth for the father does not enter the sphere of our problems. And we do not even allow the value of aspiration to truth to be denied by the doubt (Skepsis) that truth be in the other hand. The search for truth, this alone is truth (das Suchen der Wahrheit, das allein ist Wahrheit)».200 Syllogism, as a method of thought, takes on, then, an entirely different meaning from the one described above, though retaining a rigorously rational meaning, actually making this meaning much 198

Cf. ibid., d pp. 207 f.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 159 f. Cf. The Republic 510b-511e. On Cohen’s interpretation of the Platonic distinction between diånoia a and nøhsiq , cf. H. COHEN, Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, cit., and A. POMA, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, cit., p. 32. 200 ERW W 68. 199

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richer and pregnant with meaning, precisely inasmuch as it does not present rational procedure as obvious orthodoxy, technical inference within the presupposed limits of common sense, but as critical thought and, as such, thought on the limit. In Cohen’s wide ranging, detailed reflection on syllogism in Kants Begründung der Ethikk201 and Logik der reinen Erkenntnis,202 some especially important elements for the present context, which also characterise Cohen’s conception of reason, emerge. First of all, ø comes from syllogism is «reason», i.e. «logos»: « ll løgoq»,2203 secondly, the main premise, in which the whole syllogism is grounded, is idea, i.e. «hypothesis» and with it «task»: it posits the «problem» inasmuch as it is an infinite «task». When commenting on a rather well known passage in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft,204 Cohen understood its deep meaning and took it over as an essential part of thought as idea and hypothesis: «That in the major a miserable tautology was expressed, meaning nothing more that what is stated, cannot have been hidden from anyone. But that “all” is a “petition” guiding and generating the whole rational procedure of the syllogism, that in the main premise speaks a principle (Prinzip), this is where the strength of the syllogism lies, its incorruptible meaning in the apparatus of knowing and the history of thought. The petition contained in the main premise is the principle; for this and in this syllogistics is free of a petitio principii. The principle of syllogism is the idea of the unconditioned. We can put it like this: if the conditioned is given, then the complete series of conditions, the unconditioned, d represented as an object, must be understood as a taskk (Aufgabe)».205 This meaning of the «unconditioned», i.e. of «idea», as an infinite task, which Cohen took over from Kant,206 is a fundamental structure of pure thought, just as much as the thought of origin. If pure thought 201

Cf. KBE, Part One, Chapter Three. Cf. LRE, especially pp. 553-584. 203 Ibid., d p. 533. 204 Cf. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Auflage 1787, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. 3, pp. 243 f. 205 KBE 79. Cf. KTE 665 f.; LRE 593. 206 Cf. ibid., p. 532. 202

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can not refer back to a ground, but has its origin in itself as infinite foundation, on the other hand, it is never concluded in a solution, but is always open in an infinite task. Actually, origin itself is not «given», but rather a «petitio « », a «task».207 The very movement of thought, correlation as the conservation of separation and unification, must be thought as an infinite task;208 and the resulting concept of object, is not simply a solution of the problem, but always, at the same time, re-proposition of the task. Concept, wrote Cohen, is «the unity of answer and question, of solution and task»;209 concepts «persist in this fluctuating g between solution and task»;210 «concept cannot be concluded in a solution; any true solution is the womb of new tasks».211 Action as task is certainly a central theme of ethics (and this is also the case in Cohen’s ethics), but it is also something more than this; it is a central, but not specific theme of ethics: it is nearer the truth to say that, through the theme of action as task, the primacy of ethics in the system emerges, the ethical «presupposition» of the whole system, including logic. Cohen wrote in Ethik des reinen Willens: «In Logik der reinen Erkenntnis we tried to supply the characteristic of judgement following the constitutive line of the concept of action. Here also it was the taskk that this characteristic had its ground and confirmation in. Concept is not given to thought; it is judgement that must create it. Reaching this conviction is already a great deal, but all has not been achieved with this. And this conviction is not assured unless another is added and unless the other one becomes vital and, only in this way, makes the initial conviction vital. Concept, in other words, is not only not given in advance and must be produced, but is not even given at the end of production; there is no end and no conclusion for it. Its end would be its annihilation. Its existing only consists in its being

207

Cf. ibid., d p. 570. Cf. ibid., d pp. 64 f. 209 Ibid., d p. 381. 210 Ibid., d p. 382. 211 Ibid., d p. 385. 208

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produced, and its being produced does not allow an end, if the concept is authentic. This means: concept is task. This task of the concept constitutes the content of thought, the object of judgement. Thought, judgement are therefore action».212 Therefore, if ethics has a specificity in respect of logic, this does not consist in the centrality of the theme of task in general, but in other aspects, for which this theme takes on specific meanings and directions in ethics. I shall mention only two of them, which appear to me to be the most important for the argument I intend to develop. Firstly, it is only in the ethical sphere of reason as the pure will that the dimension of «affectivity» is added to that of «thought». Here I cannot dwell on the elaboration of the affective component of the will, developed in detail by Cohen, also in direct comparison with contemporary psychology and psychophysiology.213 I shall restrict myself to highlighting how the affective dimension of the will was entirely understood by Cohen through the meaning of task, which is not even absent in the dimension of the will as thought: «As « the content of affectivity task remains the only, perfect content. Task fulfils itself, but, at the same time, certainly does not exhaust its fulfilment. This depends on other circumstances, thought, first of all (…). Task makes affectivity reflective and immanent, but, at the same time, also, as the type and direction of consciousness, sovereign and pure».214 Secondly, if in logic it is the concept of the object that presents itself as the infinite task of thought, in ethics the subject itself is the true task of the will, understood as both thought and affectivity. In Cohen’s philosophy, reason is not presented in a dogmatic, orthodox and totalitarian meaning, but in a critical, authentically dialectical and infinitely open one, because, neitherr the concept of the object nor the subject itself are presuppositions but an infinite task. The subject of reason mentioned by Cohen is obviously not the empirical, psychological or psychoanalytical subject (though also being the 212

ERW 170 f. This is being investigated by H. WIEDEBACH, Physiology of the Pure Will: Concepts of Moral Energy in Hermann Cohen’s Ethics, in The Ethics of Hermann Cohen, ed. by D. Novak and R. Gibbs (forthcoming). 214 ERW W 144; cf. ibid., d pp. 143 f. 213

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foundation of these) but the transcendental one. I think postmodern deconstruction or annihilation would be something of a problem, or even out of place, for this subject, since there would be nothing to deconstruct, the subject being the target of a construction process that had never been carried out, an infinite task. Ethics is the sphere of the infinite production of the subject by reason as the pure will. Let us examine this point in two stages: the different functions of «action» in logic and ethics and ethical understanding of «self-consciousness», i.e. of the subject, as a task. Logical thought, as has been said, is action inasmuch as it is infinite task of production of the concept of the object, while, for the pure will, action is the only purpose and the object is ratherr necessary mediation for producing action: «In thought the object is the purpose, the content. And action is the means for producing this object. In the will, on the other hand, action is the content and purpose. And the object is nothing more than the means for producing action, to bring it into being».215 Consequently the Self, «self-consciousness», the subject of the will, is not the presupposition of action, but the unachieved result of it as an infinite task: «From the beginning – wrote Cohen –, we have used the concept of task, differentiating it from that of object. But if self-consciousness, in the ultimate, supreme sense, is only a task, this had never been stated explicitly. Nevertheless, this precise conception is decisive. If we now see that the problem of self-consciousness does not concern consciousness in the psychological sense, but only in the methodological one, then we will also be able to say that self-consciousness means self-will, and that is the will of the Self (den Willen zum Selbst)».216 This differentiation of the «methodological», i.e. transcendental, subject from the psychological one already allows definition of a clear cut difference between the rational conception of the subject as task and the irrational Nietzschean and Deleuzean one of the will to power and the psychological Ego which it should deny and substitute. Cohen clearly highlighted this difference: «So if we were to ask how and where self-consciousness exists without and beyond action, we would 215 216

Ibid., d p. 175. Ibid., d p. 259.

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be posing a question which is the expression of the prejudice of the psychological Ego, which would be alright for the theoretical Ego at most, but is of no use at all for the Ego with a will; the latter should always and only be understood as a task, and never, as a psychological source and hearth ((psychologischer Quell und Herdd), as the power and strength of so-called self-consciousness».217 The Self, self-consciousness, as a pure, transcendental, non psychological, empirical subject is thus h the «law of self-consciousness»: origin and task find their unity in the «law» and the rational, critical meaning of idea as hypothesis finds its ethical expression: «The law must be acknowledged as the foundation placed in self-consciousness. However, the task of self-consciousness is the hypothesis of self-consciousness. And it has no other meaning than the task of the Self, re-awakening of the Self. Thus the task of self-consciousness becomes the law of self-consciousness because it becomes the foundation of self-consciousness. In this case it is impossible to speak of an alien task; it is rather more profound carrying out of the basic idea of hypothesis, the one achieved in the requirement of law. And it is, at the same time, the clearest, natural removal of all that is egoistic, transitory and changeable in the isolated individual. Just as I manage to find my Self not in the Ego, but only in the Thou and We, in the same way, I manage to realise the task rising up in me in the first motion of the will only by acknowledging self-consciousness as law, which I must recognise in the State».218 I should finally like to add a last remark on a further implication of the ethical meaning of «task», in Cohen’s philosophy, so as to highlight another important difference between his rigorously rationalist idea of the «pure will» and Deleuze’s irrationalist theme of the «streams» of desire with reference to the problem of realisation. If the de-subjectivised, de-teleologised streams of desire referred to by Deleuze219 run through a body without organs with neither law nor end, neither sense nor form, nomadically and anarchically, action as 217

Ibid., d pp. 259 f. Ibid., d p. 266; cf. ibid., d pp. 324 f. Cf., on this, my essay on: Autonomy of the Law, in Chapter Thirteen of this volume. 219 Cf. G. DELEUZE, F. GUATTARI, Capitalisme et schizophrénie. L’Anti-Œdipe, cit.; ID., Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Mille plateaux, cit. 218

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an infinite task of production self-consciousness takes place in a sphere of realisation, «eternity», which is itself an infinite task and, at the same time, «assurance» (Sicherung) for the «effectual reality» (Wirklichkeit) of action.220 This allows escape, on the one hand, from a rationalist-totalitarian conception of history as the identity of rational and real, and, on the other, from nihilist denial of history and the rationality of action. In Cohen’s words: «What claims to resolve the pure will in a harmonious peace by removing it from work and struggle, is not a reality of the ethical. We recognise the latter, on the other hand, precisely in the purpose of ethical activity: to be infinite. In this infinity we do not see a defect or limit of eternity, but rather only its superiority. Certainly, in this development, the single level does not perfectly represent the reality of the ethical, but it should not be considered separately, if the problem is one of its relationship with the question of reality. The infinitely far off point to which it intrinsically refers from the conceptual point of view is included in each single level. Eternity is for each single point this infinitely far off point (…). Eternity is the objective, and as such the authentic content of the pure will. Eternity means eternal task. Heaven and earth can even set, ethnicity remains. We now understand better the value of the task: its solution, its reality are assured by eternity. Eternity is their reality».221 We can take a step further towards making explicit the «presupposition» of Cohen’s philosophy and all philosophy that, in postmodern culture, aims at development by drawing inspiration from it, continuing the investigation so far pursued through the themes of «aspiration to truth», «petition» and «task», as far as other key themes developed by Cohen, mainly in aesthetics, but important in meaning and wideness of application for his whole philosophy. Here I shall restrict myself, for reasons of brevity, to a few general remarks on the themes of the sublime, humour and yearning. In Deleuze’s view, the theory of the «sublime» is the only case «in which Kant considers a faculty [the imagination] liberated from 220

Cf. ERW W 410. Ibid., d pp. 410 ff. Cf., on this point, my essay on: The Existence of the Ideal in Hermann Cohen’s Ethics, in Chapter Fourteen n of this volume. 221

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the form of a common sense, and discovers for it a truly legitimate “transcendent” exercise».222 In Kant’s sublime, he continues, imagination and thought are subjected to the violence of difference and forced, beyond their limit, to perceive the unimaginable and unthinkable, i.e. «the unformed or the deformed in nature».223 Cohen, in a theory of the sublime rather different from Kant’s, also interpreted this feeling as tension and elevation of the finite towards infinity, but considered it a «subordinate concept» (Unterbegrifff ) of the beautiful, whose meaning cannot be abstracted from correlation with the concept of «humour», understood as feeling of the realisation of the infinite in the finite.224 Besides, (and this is even more important for the present comparison with Deleuze’s perspective) Cohen, unlike Kant, denied that the ethical presupposition was prevalent in the feeling of the sublime and recognised the prevalence of the theoretical presupposition in the trend towards infinity. Cohen seems to have seen very lucidly the mystical result, clearly realised in Deleuze, of a sublime of the will to power. He showed how the ambiguous mixture of aesthetics and ethics, already present in Kant’s sublime, had been developed and emphasised in romanticism,225 which «has not yet died out, even in our own time»,226 and denounced its mystical character, precisely linked to the claim to express the inexpressible by means of excess and immoderation: «But if nature, in its simplicity and isolated majesty of its calm greatness, appeared as an image of the sublime, and if, on the other hand, the ground of the sublime was placed in the ethical and thus in man, in this way it was being moved away from nature, the other danger for the aesthetic representation of the ethical arose from this: that the sublime only consisted in exaltation and an excess of moral forces and their expression. Limitation and moderation thus did not have the value of a sufficient representation of the sublime; it only appeared as a reduction of moral requirements, as lowering of the moral level to the lower average. 222

G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 187 note; Eng. trans. cit., p. 320 note. Cf. ibid., d p. 187 note; Eng. trans. cit., p. 321 note. 224 Cf. A. POMA, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, cit., pp. 140 ff. 225 Cf. ÄRG 1 9 ff. 226 Ibid., d Bd. 1, p. 11. 223

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If this way of seeing is already dangerous for the conception of morality and pedagogical consideration of it, it is actual fatal from the aesthetic point of view. And here not only the danger of mysticism and religious symbolism, but also, and not less, that of aesthetic balance in general, of the calm of the work of art in its fundamental forms, of harmony in the system of its contrasting movements, are shaken by this conception».227 This in no way means that Cohen thought of aesthetic activity as an orthodox exercise of common sense, or as calm, peaceful contemplation of the fulfilled, possessed form. He saw art, as did Deleuze, as the finite tending towards the infinite of feeling, free of all normality in the use of the faculties and continually forced to its limit, but it is not subject to any form of «bad will», perversion and paradoxicality: on the contrary, it is inspired by the «good will» of realisation. This realisation is not presumptuous possession of form, but an infinite, though real process of the search for it: Cohen was entirely aware of the Faustian temptation to freeze and possess the beautiful form and was quite devoid off this temptation, but he was just as distant from the sceptical, gnostic temptation to despise any finite realisation of form as inadequate: ascetic irony as a libertine parody, both contrasting, but, in the end, equivalent expressions of the mystical option, are not only alien to the «good will» of Cohen’s philosophy, but represent a danger to be avoided for it and an antagonist to be fought. In Deleuze’s view, irony and humour are the two opposite and equivalent routes of transgression of the law: the first overturns the law referring back to principles and so tragically showing their non-originativeness and relativity; the second circumvents the law, descending towards the consequences and activating them with hypocritically and comically falsifying precision.228 Actually what Deleuze calls humour is more like parody. Cohen also foregrounded humour as an important concept in aesthetics, complementary to and correlated with the sublime, and he elaborated it, extracting extremely important meanings, not only for aesthetics, but for all his thought, to 227 228

Ibid, d Bd. 1, p. 256. Cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 12; Eng. trans. cit., p. 5.

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the extent that, in my view, humour can be one of the key concepts for reading the whole of Cohen’s philosophy.229 Since the theme of humour is central, not only in Cohen, but also in much of postmodernism, I believe that it deserves specific, careful and well developed elaboration, which I cannott supply here: I believe, that is, that for anyone intending to think postmodernism in the light of Cohen’s philosophy, reflection on humour constitutes a true main highway, which should be followed very carefully. While postponing this intention to another occasion, I shall restrict myself here to a few remarks, so as to show how, in Cohen’s view, humour, together with the sublime, in correlation with it, is an authentic moral and sentimental presupposition of thought: that which allows form to be thought as an infinite task, which is longed for, without, however, transfiguring it and annulling it in a transcendent absolute, which can only be thought and felt apophatically in the paradox of its simulacra. For Cohen, if the sublime was the permanently unfulfilled trend of the finite towards the infinite, humour is smiling, benevolent feeling towards the actual realisations of this trend, the pacific ability to recognise the real immanence of idea, form, in those realisations, albeit defective and incomplete ones. Deleuze wrote that, in the sublime, Kant led imagination to face «the unformed or the deformed in nature».230 Cohen’s conception of humourr precisely allowed denial of the identity of «unformed» and «deformed»: i.e. allowing recognition in the imperfect, defective form, of the true realisation, the unfulfilled but real immanence of form, of idea, its sole dwelling place. This allowed Cohen to found the possibility of aesthetics of the «ugly», whose meaning is the opposite of and alternative to Deleuze’s method of perversion and simulacrum: «This is – wrote Cohen – the indispensable task of art, not to superficially cover over or disguise 229

On the meaning of humour in aesthetics and other spheres of philosophy dealt with by Cohen, cf., apart from my book The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, cit., pp. 140 ff., my essays: Cohen and Mozart. Considerations on Drama, the Beautiful and Humaneness in Cohen’s Aesthetics; The Portrait in Hermann Cohen’s Aesthetics; Humor in Religion: Peace and Contentment; Lyric Poetry and Prayer, in Chapters Five, Eight, Ten, Eleven of this volume. 230 Cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., p. 187 note; Eng. trans. cit., p. 321 note.

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man’s links, in his whole culture, with the animal world. This link is represented, threateningly, for any truthfulness of art, by the ugly. This task belongs to the beautiful. Is the ugly a problem of the beautiful? Humour supplies and establishes the answer. The ugly does not remain ugly; it becomes a stage of the beautiful, it is a stage off the beautiful. The beautiful is not, in itself, an object of art. It is only an idea, only the general need and trust, the methodical task of pure feeling. This task is, firstly, resolved through the sublime, but, in an equally q necessary way, by humour. For man’s nature shows itself thoroughly and convincingly in the ugly. Love would not be true if it did not also wish to envelop (Umfangen) the ugly. Love envelops it, transforms it, makes it one of the stages of the beautiful. Love understands the ugly, filling it with its own power. Thus Satyr becomes Eros. Love ennobles the animal, turning it into man».231 Along this route, albeit a swift f one, fr f om aspiration to tru r th, petition, task, and fi f nally the sub u lime and humour, I believe we have neared the implicit m or sentimental presupposition animating Cohen’s philosophy and which is indispensable for postmodern thought seeking inspiration in it: i.e. the yearning (Sehnsucht)232 of form. Anti-modernism, as has already been said, devastated the established forms of modernity that was too rigid in its schemes and presumptuously sure of them. This critical activity on the part of anti-modernism must be acknowledged as an inevitable, necessary activity by modernity itself, the critical and self-critical vocation of 231

ÄRG 1 288 f. It is useful to compare this passage with the one with the opposite meaning in Deleuze regarding «animality» (animalité), «stupidity» (bêtise): cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 352 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 275. 232 The word Sehnsuchtt does not have a satisfactory translation equivalent in English. «Yearning», its usual translation, is only a partial, inadequate translation of the German. A separate essay would be required to explore the meaning of this word, so, here too, I must put off this task and restrict myself to using the English word, partially exploring the meaning of the German word by means of the following considerations. In Cohen’s writings the Sehnsuchtt theme is not particularly fully treated and mostly concerns discourse on lyric poetry. Nevertheless, some of Cohen’s reflections on this theme raise it to a level of importance and wider ranging meaning showing how crucial it is for understanding the basic disposition of his thought and a contemporary perspective aiming at being inspired by it. On the theme of Sehnsucht in Cohen, cf. my essay on: Lyric Poetry and Prayer, in Chapter Eleven of this volume.

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reason, which represents modernity no less, actually more than the dogmatic, totalitarian and technocratic degeneration of reason itself. Postmodern society and culture were born and live in the formless void left by this destructive activity. The Nietzschean theories of postmodernism, including that of Deleuze, which we have dealt with here and which is a good example of them, express and analyse, rather efficiently this situation of the absence of form, which constitutes the dominant experience of contemporary society and individuals, and they elaborate it programmatically in the positive sense of emancipation from form. God’s death, proclaimed by Nietzsche, involving man’s death as well, that of truth, the subject, the death of all forms, is now an established fact. Now the aim is life without regret in the absence of all form, in the Dionysian dizziness of the void, in the game of players in a theatre of simulacra. However, in my view, it is possible to propose to the present situation, still remaining faithful to it, and thus to the condition of the absence of form, a different evaluation and programmatic indication, referring back precisely to Cohen’s thought. It has already been said that Deleuze’s «bad will» and «misosophy» are implicit presuppositions of his thought, though to a no lesser extent than «good will» and «philosophy» are for Plato’s and the whole of critical idealism up to Cohen. Being open to inspiration by this «good will» of thought, affectivity and feeling in no way means being in favour of the «return» of old or new form. It is not a return to the past or reactionary «nostalgia» for old forms, which can no longer be put forward. Neither is it a «return to the future», or utopian evasion towards new forms and new stability and certainties, which would only have the appearance of the new inasmuch as they are placed in the future, but would actually be nothing more than a return to outdated dogmatism and orthodoxy. What inspiration by Cohen allows us to elaborate is the possibility of living and thinking in the present context of the absence of form contesting this very absence. It is a question of remaining faithful to the condition of contemporary man, but also to the dynamic aspect of this condition, to the unease it brings for society and individuals. Post-Nietzschean apology for the absence of form risks hiding behind a mask of strained gaiety, very close to the one we find in the media, a self-destructive void anxiety, which is very difficult to interpret in an emancipatory sense. Here it is significant

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that, in Mille plateaux, a later work than the one considered in this essay, Deleuze, with a totally unjustified, f incoherent break with his own line of thought, almost as if he were worried and afraid about the consequences, should introduce an insistent call to «prudence», which should prevent self-destruction by overdose.233 Reflection on postmodernism inspired by Cohen could point to a different way of living the condition of the absence of form as yearning for form. One could also make a concession to Deleuze by arguing that the implicit presupposition, the fundamental feeling of thought were not «common sense» and «good will», iff they are understood as an excessive, acritical certainty of the natural conjunction of thought with the true and good.234 In this sense it can be conceded that thought is not «philosophy», if the latter is understood as «knowing» and not «learning»,235 if lº is understood as «affinity» with knowledge and truth, which means contiguity, contact, customary, intimate association, possession.236 But, one must ask, did authentic rational, critical philosophy really mean its «good will» to be taken in this sense? We all recall Socrates’ ironic answer, in Plato’s Symposium, to Agathon, who suggested a clumsy philosophy by contiguity and contact:237 «I only wish that wisdom were the kind of thing one could share by sitting next to someone – if it flowed, for instance, from the one that was full to the one that was empty, like the water in two cups finding its level through a piece of worsted».238 It is well known that Plato pointed to Eros as the true philosopher: he is «a lifelong seeker

233

Cf. G. DELEUZE, F. GUATTARI, Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Mille plateaux, cit., pp. 198 f., 201, 330 f., 348 ff., 424, 628, 632, 633 f. 234 Cf. G. DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, cit., pp. 171 f.; Eng. trans. cit., p. 131. 235 Cf. ibid., d pp. 213 ff.; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 164 ff. 236 Cf. ibid., d pp. 181, 185; Eng. trans. cit., pp. 139, 142. 237 PLATO, Symposium, 175 c-d; Eng. trans. by M. Joyce, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters, ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey) 1963, p. 53: «Here you are, Socrates. Come and sit next to me; I want to share this great thought that’s just struck you in the porch next door. I’m sure you must have mastered it, or you’d still be standing there». 238 Ibid., d 175 d; Eng. trans. cit., p. 530.

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after truth»,239 «what he gains will always ebb away as fast. So Love is never altogether in or out of need»,240 since, Plato continues: he «stands, moreover, midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must understand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not long for wisdom, because they are wise – and why should the wise be seeking the wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the ignorant seek the truth or crave to be made wise. And indeed, what makes their case so hopeless is that, having neither beauty, nor goodness, nor intelligence, they are satisfied with what they are, and do not long for the virtues they have never missed».241 Eros, Plato taught us, is longing for what we do not possess, for that «which is not yet to hand».242 On the other hand, in the Cratylos, Plato differentiates desire for what is present ( m r q ) from longing for what is not there ( ø u ),243 so that it appears one must conclude that philosophy, like Eros, is ø u for what is «not present but absent, and in another place» ( “ º œ Á Ÿ ø ).244 Actually, however, Eros is more Òmeroqq than pø uoq , since it «is never altogether in or out of need»:245 it longs for what it does not have, what is not present, but, at the same time, is not «elsewhere and far off», since it is just the presence of the absence of the desired object thatt sets off this kind of longing and feeling, which is the implicit presupposition of philosophy, the authentic meaning of its presupposed «good will». This feeling of love for the presence of an absence, Ò , is Cohen’s yearning (Sehnsucht).246 Thus, Deleuze’s «misosophy», or «bad will», is not the only alternative to philosophy understood as presumptuous, pseudo-learned thought. The absence of form can also be seriously lived and thought as yearning g for form, as the «profession» (Bekenntnis) of one’s «love»

239

Ibid., 203 d; Eng. trans. cit., p. 556. Ibid., 203 e; Eng. trans. cit., p. 556. 241 Ibid., d 203 e-204 a; Eng. trans. cit., p. 556. 242 Ibid., d 200, especially 200 e; Eng. trans. cit., p. 553. 243 PLATO, Cratylos, 420 a; Eng. trans. by B. Jowett, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters, cit., p. 455. 244 Ibidem. 245 Plato, Symposium, 203 e; Eng. trans. cit., p. 556. 246 Cf. Ä ÄRG 2 279. 240

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((Liebe) and «passion» (Leidenschaft ( ) of this love247 for the presence of the absence of form. The «Theatrum philosophicum», which is no longer a «representation of concepts», must not necessarily become a «drama of Ideas», in Deleuze’s pulsional, violent sense: it can and must be, on the other hand, «lyric poetry of Ideas», whose inexhaustible though meaningful theme is yearning for form. The absence of form, of every form, and the bent or dissolved Ego can still stand in a different relationship from the violent, irrational one of the anarchical streams of desire: this relationship is yearning, where the Ego receives, not so much its static, identical consistency as much as its dynamism, its direction, from idea, form, precisely inasmuch as it is absent, i.e. it is presentt (it is there) as absent. Yearningg is the «idealisation of the Self». This is how Cohen described it in his commentary on a wonderful song of Mignon in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre:248 «Yearning (Sehnsucht) is above all an expansive feeling of the Ego; it spreads the Ego beyond the limits within which it must move and feel itself. But depression immediately appears, or rather it constitutes a concomitant factor. Solitude is the content of this depression, and only from it does the strength to move towards the outside grow, beyond this restriction, almost beyond this shrivelling up of which the spirit has become a victim. Only he who knows yearning, – ah he knows and loves me ((Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt, – ach der mich liebt und kennt). t These are the two cornerstones of knowledge: yearning and he who knows me. The Ego is tensely included in this correlation. Thus he moves almost entirely back behind he who knows me and behind yearning. Only he who knows yearning knows me. Only yearning, only this suffering fills the Ego. It is in this suffering of yearning for he who knows me that the Ego is dissolved. Only he who knows yearning, only he knows what I suffer, 247

Cf. ibid., Bd. 1, p. 393; Bd. 2, p. 26. Cf. J. W. GOETHE, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, Book Four, Chapter Eleven, in Goethes Werke, hg. im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen, fotomechanischer Nachdruck der im Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, Weimar 1887-1919 eschienenen Weimarer Ausgabe oder Sophien-Ausgabe, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1987, 1. Abt., Bd. 22, p. 67. Here is the well known text of the poem: «Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt / Weiß, was ich leide! / Allein und abgetrennt / Von aller Freude, / Seh’ ich an’s Firmament / Nach jener Seite. / Ach! der mich liebt und kennt / Ist in der Weite. / Es schwindelt mir, es brennt / Mein Eingeweide. / Nur wer die Sehnsucht kennt / Weiß, was ich leide!» Franz Schubert used the poem for a well known Lied d (Op. 62 n. 4, D 877), to which Cohen referred in ÄRG 2 184 f. 248

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only he knows what I am. This is love. This is the passion of love (…). Thus yearning is the most intimate interiorisation simply by means of the idealisation of the Self. Admittedly, idealisation cannot uproot the entire multiplicity and ambiguity which is still linked to the Ego. Thus all sophistry of subjectivity comes close up. Thus the monologue of yearning becomes a dialogue, a duel between lovers, or even that of a single partner in the various phases of his love or under the different connected effect of other feelings».249 The object of yearning is at the same time absent and present; it is the presence of an absence. Therefore yearning for form is actually and seriously a feeling of absence and, correlatively, yearning for presence. It is non-orthodox, anti-conformist courage in supporting the condition of absence, but without anxiety, because the absence of presence is kept present and the absent present inspires the incessant yearning, the «yearning for search» (Sehnsucht). In yearning for form the antidote to anxiety is «confidence» (Zuversicht),250 which is not possession, nor acquired certainty, but «forecast» (Zu-versicht),251 anticipation while waiting, the culture of waiting as an incessant search. In this sense Cohen’s perspective is the heir to that critical modernity which has never considered form acquired possession, but an infinite task, and which has incessantly directed its criticism against all dogmatic certainty and violent totalitarianism. Now, however, in the postmodern condition of the absence of form, critical philosophy must take on a new task, together with the traditional one. If, on the one hand, it must continue to question the false certainties present, above all, in capitalist and technocratic dogmatism, on the other, it must reawaken yearning for form, in the face of Dionysian scepticism and Cynicism of the culture of ephemera and simulacra. Thus two alternative routes are opened up in reflection on 249

Ibid., d Bd. 2, pp. 26 f. Cf. ibid., d Bd. 2, p. 37. 251 This is actually the original meaning of the German word «Zuversicht», which is still contained in its present meaning. Cf. J. und W. GRIMM, Deutsches Wörterbuch, bearbeitet von G. Rosenhagen und der Arbeitsstelle des Deutschen Wörterbuches zu Berlin, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1984, Bd. 32, coll. 879 ff. 250

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postmodernism and its understanding. On the one hand, we have the dramatic-Dionysian Nietzschean perspective, for which the condition of the absence of form is accepted and taken up as a fully emancipated condition; on the other, there is a lyric perspective, for which it is in the condition of the absence of form, albeit without illusory evasions from this condition, that the open meaning of this absence, the presence of absence as an opening towards the presence of form is incessantly cultivated in feeling and thought. The latter alternative is the one we can build up drawing inspiration from the philosophy of Hermann Cohen.

SOURCES

Introduction – Hermann Cohen: A Philosophy Classic? Not published previously. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter One – Hermann Cohen’s Response to Anti-Judaism In Atti del II Convegno tenuto a Idice, Bologna, nei giorni 4 e 5 novembre 1981 [«Associazione Italiana per lo Studio del Giudaismo». Testi e studi, n. 1], a cura di Fausto Parente e Daniela Piattelli, Carucci, Roma 1983, pp. 59-75. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Two – Plato’s Idea of the Good in Its Different Interpretations by Cohen and Natorp In I filosofi della scuola di Marburgo, a cura di Brunella Antomarini, «Il Cannocchiale» (gennaio-agosto 1991), n. 1/2, pp. 361-382. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Three – Authentic and Historical Theodicy in Kant and Cohen In «Studi Kantiani» 5 (1992), pp. 71-89. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Four – Correlation in Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of Religion: A Method and More than a Method In «Annuario Filosofico» 8 (1992), pp. 207-227; German trans. in Neukantianismus. Perspektiven s und Probleme, hg. von Ernst Wolfgang Orth und Helmut Holzhey, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1994, pp. 343-365. Translated by John Denton.

381

382

SOURCES

Chapter Five – Cohen and Mozart Considerations on Drama, the Beautiful and Humaneness in Cohen’s Aesthetics In Philosophisches Denken – Politisches Wirken. Hermann-CohenKolloquium Marburg 1992, hg. von Reinhard Brandt und Franz Orlik, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1993, pp. 110-130. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Six – Religion of Reason and Judaism in Hermann Cohen In La storia della filosofia ebraica [Biblioteca dell’«Archivio di Filosofia», vol. 9], a cura di Irene Kajon, CEDAM, Padova 1993, pp. 289-303; German trans. in Zeit und Welt. Denken zwischen Philosophie und Religion, hg. von Eveline Goodman-Thau, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 2002, pp. 57-71. Translated by John Denton. Chapter Seven – Similarity and Diversity of the Other: The Foreigner. Topical Motives in Hermann Cohen’s Ethical Idealism In «Annuario Filosofico» 10 (1994), pp. 389-400; repr. as Somiglianza e diversità dell’altro: lo straniero. Il momento ideale nel rapporto interpersonale, in «Idee» 12 (1997), n. 34/35, pp. 35-48. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Eight – The Portrait in Hermann Cohen’s Aesthetics In Dipingere l’idea. Interpretazioni tra filosofia e pittura, a cura di Franco Biasutti, Il Lavoro Editoriale, Ancona 1996, pp. 123-143; English trans. in Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism, ed. by R. Munk, Springer, 2005, pp. 283-306. Translated by Anthony Runia.

Chapter Nine – Religion as a Fact of Culture and the System of Philosophy Part of an essay published in a different form as Einleitung, in

SOURCES

383

H. COHEN, Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, in ID., Werke, hg. vom Hermann-Cohen-Archiv am Philosophischen Seminar der Universität Zürich unter der Leitung von Helmut Holzhey, Bd. 10, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1996, pp. 7*-49*; repr. 2002, pp. 7*-48*. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Ten – Humour in Religion: Peace and Contentment In Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of Religion. International Conference in Jerusalem 1996, ed. by Stéphane Moses and Hartwig Wiedebach, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1997, pp. 183-204. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Eleven – Lyric Poetry and Prayer In “Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums”. Tradition und Ursprungsdenken in Hermann Cohens Spätwerk (“Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism”. Tradition and the Concept of Origin in Hermann Cohen’s Later Work). Internationale Konferenz in Zürich 1998, hg. von Helmut Holzhey, Gabriel Motzkin und Hartwig Wiedebach, Georg Olms, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2000, pp. 129-143. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Twelve – Suffering and Non-Eschatological Messianism in Hermann Cohen In Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism, ed. by R. Munk, Springer, 2005, pp. 413-428. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Thirteen – Autonomy of the Law In La responsabilità del pensare. Studi in onore di Mario Signore, a cura di Laura Tundo Ferente, Liguori, Napoli 2004, pp. 379-389. Translated by John Denton.

384

SOURCES

Chapter Fourteen – The Existence of the Ideal in Hermann Cohen’s Ethics In The Ethics of Hermann Cohen, ed. by David Novak and Robert Gibbs (forthcoming). Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Fifteen – The Holy Spirit out of the Sources of Judaism and Kantianism In I. Kant. Neokantianstvo i G. Kogen, Sbornik nauþnych trudov, pod redakcie Professora Vladimir Nikolaevich Belova, Nauþnaja kniga, Saratov 2004, pp. 92-106. Translated by John Denton.

Chapter Sixteen – Yearning for Form Postmodernism

Hermann Cohen in

P apers presented at the Conference on Hermann Cohen’s Ethics, Toronto, 26-28 agosto 2001. Not published previously. Translated by John Denton.

INDEX OF NAMES

Bruno, Giordano, 358 Buber, Martin, 10, 11, 14, 58, 61, 130, 196, 238

Adelmann, Dieter, IX, 282, 292, 293 Aeschylus, 89, 91 Akiba, 139 Altmann, Alexander, 61, 62, 66, 68, 70, 74, 75 Ancona Quiroz, Andrés, 350 Antomarini, Brunella, 127, 381 Aristophanes, 89-92 Aristotle, 30, 179, 180, 316, 322, 327, 329, 333-335, 344, 346

Cairns, Huntington, 261, 375 Cassirer, Ernst, VII, 21 Cusa, Nicholas of, 38, 358 Darwin, Charles Robert, 286 Da Vinci, Leonardo, 158-160, 163 Defert, Daniel, 315 Deleuze, Gilles, 315-329, 331, 334-337, 339, 341-347, 350, 351, 353, 355-362, 368-377 De Martino, Ernesto, 278 Democritus, 326 Denton, John, XII, 22, 105, 302, 326, 381-384 Descartes, René, 21, 263, 264, 344, 348 Dreyfus, Alfred, 8, 9 Dussel, Enrique, 350

Bauch, Bruno, 13 Bayle, Pierre, 43 Beck, Lewis White, 244 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 89, 98 Belov, Vladimir N., 297, 384 Ben Azai, Simeon, 139 Benjamin, Walter, 352 Bergson, Henri, 344, 345 Bertolino, Luca, XIII Biasutti, Franco, 382 Boehlich, Walter, 1, 11 Borries, Hans-Joachim m von, 2 Brandt, Reinhard, IX, 290, 382 Bresslau, Harry r ,2 Bronsen, David, 11, 293 Bruckstein, Almut Sh., 25, 247

Eckhart, Johannes Meister, 38 Endner, Wilhelm, 2 Ewald, François, 315 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 67, 68, 71, 264, 319 385

386

INDEX OF NAMES

Fiorato, Pierfrancesco, 127, 278 Fischer-Appelt, Peter, 185 Förster, Bernhard, 2 Foucault, Michel, 315, 321, 356 Gallini, Clara, 278 Gibbs, Robert, 278, 366, 384 Gigliotti, Gianna, 288 Girard, René, 131 Gluck, Christoph Willibald, 89 Görland, Albert, VII, 31, 66 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 150, 212, 213, 229-231, 313, 350, 377 Goodman-Thau, Eveline, 382 Gordin, Jakob, 66, 331, 333 Gordon, Peter E., X Graetz, Heinrich, 2, 5 Grimm, Jacob, 378 Grimm, Wilhelm, 378 Guattari, Félix, 342, 368, 375 Guttmann, Jakob, 191, 295 Habermas, Jürgen, IX, 352 Hamilton, Edith, 261, 375 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, X, 11, 68, 117, 127, 172, 210, 266, 316, 319, 322, 331, 356 Heidegger, Martin, IX, 319 Heraclitus, 37, 286 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 204, 215 Herrmann, Wilhelm, 170, 181, 185, 186, 195, 204

Holzhey, Helmut, VII, IX, X, 3, 9, 31, 33, 34, 40, 64, 66, 80, 83, 107, 186, 193, 275, 278, 288, 290, 293, 381, 383 Israëls, Jozef, 165 Jean Paul (= Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich), 277 Jowett, Benjamin, 376 Joyce, Michael, 375 Kajon, Irene, 382 Kant, Immanuel, VII, XI, XII, 5, 12, 21, 22, 27, 31, 37, 43-53, 57-59, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106, 113-116, 118, 124, 125, 138, 149, 150, 153, 157, 160, 165, 177, 186, 187, 191, 199, 207, 215, 222, 244-246, 249, 255, 257, 261, 264, 265, 270, 271, 274-278, 289, 296, 297, 305-312, 318, 319, 322, 328, 330, 348, 354, 364, 369, 370, 372, 381, 384 Kaplan, Simon, VIII, 284 Kellermann, Benzion, VIII Kelsen, Hans, 288 Kinkel, Walter, 105 Klatzkin, Jacob, 20 Kluback, William, 106 Knittermeyer, Hinrich, 296 Krawietz, Werner, 288 Lagarde, Paul de, 9 Lagrange, Jacques, 315 Landucci, Sergio, 43

INDEX OF NAMES

Lange, Friedrich Albert, VIII, 111, 175 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 288 Lazarus, Moritz, 2, 4-6, 13 Leibl, Wilhelm, 165 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, XI, 21, 22, 38, 58, 59, 63, 296, 316, 319, 327, 328, 344 Lemb m eck, Karl-Heinz, 326 Lewandowsky, Helene, 277 Lewandowsky, Louis, 277 Liebermann, Max, 165 Maimonides, 18, 25, 41, 136, 247, 248 Marquard, Odo, 80 Marx, Karl, 288 Massenzio, Marcello, 131 Mendelssohn, Moses, VII, 298, 312 Meyer, Michael A., 2 Michelangelo, 158 Millet, Jean-François, 165 Mommsen, Theodor, 2 More, Thomas, 248 Morgan, Michael L., X Moses, Adolf, 7, 17 Moses, Siegfried, 61 Moses, Stéphane, 383 Motzkin, Gabriel, 278, 383 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 87-100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108-110, 198, 214, 272, 282 Munk, Reinier, XIII, 382, 383

387

Natorp, Paul, VII, X, 9, 21, 22, 26-40, 66, 80, 83, 107, 169, 170, 180, 181, 185, 186, 193196, 199, 200, 204, 232, 233, 275, 326, 381 Naudh, H. (= Nordmann, Heinrich G.), 2 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 320, 338, 343-347, 350, 362, 367, 374 Nipperdey, Thomas, IX Novak, David, 287, 366, 384 Ollig, Hans-Ludwig, 105 Orlik, Franz, 290, 382 Orth, Ernst Wolfgang, 381 Parente, Fausto, 381 Parmenides, 326 Pascal, Blaise, 346 Patton, P., 315 Philo, 307 Piattelli, Daniela, 381 Plato, XI, XII, 17, 21-42, 63, 67, 71, 77, 91, 100, 178-183, 251, 261, 262, 266, 267, 273, 276, 296, 305, 306, 321-323, 325-328, 331, 334, 335, 337, 344, 361-363, 374-376, 381 Plotinus, 38 Poma, Andrea, XII, XIII, 105, 296, 302, 326, 363, 370 Pseudo-Dionysius, 38 Pythagoras, 326 Raphael, 162 Rashi, 299

388

INDEX OF NAMES

Rembrandt, 158, 160-164 Rosenhagen, Gustav, 378 Rosenzweig, Franz, VII, 7, 61, 62, 66, 75, 108, 129, 238, 239, 296, 304, 307, 352 Rossini, Gioacchino, 89 Runia, Anthony, 382 Sander, Fritz, 288 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 68, 358 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich, 198, 214 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst, 186, 194, 199, 204, 213, 215, 233 Schmid, Peter A., 281, 288, 293 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 137, 206, 249, 347 Schubert, Franz, 377 Schwarzschild, Steven S., 11, 13, 20, 21, 177, 293 Scotus Eriugena, John, 38 Serres, Michel, 341, 344, 345 Shakespeare, William, 89-92, 95-97, 100 Schoeps, Julius H., VII Schulte, Christian, VII Shorey, Paul, 261 Sieg, Ulrich, X

Socrates, 33, 261-263, 267, 268, 271, 334, 336, 375 Spinoza, Baruch, 182, 307 Stern, Paul, 105 Stoecker, Adolf, 1 Strauß, Bertha, 277 Strauß, Bruno, VII, VIII, 9, 277 Strauss, Leo, VIII Sturm, Thomas, IX Tramer, Hans, 61 Tredennik, Hugh, 262 Treitschke, Heinrich von, 1-6, 11, 17 Tundo Ferente, Laura, 383 Ucko, Siegfried, 74, 178, 181 Vattimo, Gianni, 350 Vuillemin, Jules, 319 Wagner, Richard, 90 Warr, Wilhelm, 1 Weinberger, Ota, 288 Wiedebach, Hartwig, X, 278, 293, 366, 383 Winter, Eggert, 64, 288 Wolandt, Gerd, 105 Zöllner, Friedrich, 2

Studies in German Idealism 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

A. Peperzak: Modern Freedom. Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-7040-6; Pb 1-4020-0288-2 G. Freudenthal (ed.): Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic. Critical Assessments. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1473-2 W. Desmond, E.-O. Onnasch and P. Cruysberghs (eds.): Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2324-3 Y. M. Senderowicz: The Coherence of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-2580-7 A. Poma: Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Hermann Cohen’s Thought. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3877-1

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