Yearbook on Space Policy 2007 2008: From Policies to Programmes

~ SpringerWienNewYork

Yearbook on Space Policy

Edited by the European Space Policy Institute Director: Kai-Uwe Schrogl

Editorial Advisory Board: Herbert Allgeier Alvaro Azcarraga Frances Brown Alain Gaubert Leen Hordijk Peter Jankowitsch Ulrike Landfester Andre Lebeau Jan-Baldem Mennicken Alfredo Roma

European Space Policy Institute Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds.)

Yearbook on Space Policy 2007/2008 From Policies to Programmes

SpringerWienNewYork

European Space Policy Institute, Vienna, Austria Kai-Uwe Schrogl Charlotte Mathieu Nicolas Peter

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machines or similar means, and storage in data banks. Product Liability: The publisher can give no guarantee for all the information contained in this book. This does also refer to information about drug dosage and application thereof. In every individual case the respective user must check its accuracy by consulting other pharmaceutical literature. The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.  2009 Springer-Verlag/Wien Printed in Germany SpringerWienNewYork is a part of Springer Science þ Business Media springer.at Cover illustration: “International Space Station with the European Columbus Laboratory and ATV (Automated Transfer Vehicle)”  ESA/NASA Typesetting: Thomson Press (India) Ltd., Chennai Printing: Holzhausen Druck & Medien, 1140 Wien Printed on acid-free and chlorine-free bleached paper SPIN: 12560608

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ISSN 1866-8305 ISBN 978-3-211-99090-2 SpringerWienNewYork

Preface At the time of finalising this second volume of the “Yearbook on Space Policy” which covers the period mid-2007 to mid-2008, Europe is as visible and strong in the area of space activities as never before. Its space probes are present on the Moon, around Mars, and on Saturn’s Moon Titan, and are chasing asteroids and comets; Ariane V is the most successful commercial launch vehicle; and more and more European space applications satellites are in operation. Finally, with the successful launch of the Columbus Orbital Facility (COF) – the most prominent highlight of this period which is also depicted on the cover of this Yearbook – and the first Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), Europe has become a decisive player in human spaceflight. This is accompanied by new policy initiatives on the ministerial level which have been bringing the European Space Agency and the European Union steadily closer. Europe’s outstanding development and positioning in the space field is based not only on Europe’s successful engineering and scientific capabilities and capacities, but also on the forceful political determination of all European actors to maintain and even further their engagement in the use of outer space. And it is this political determination which provides the focus for this “Yearbook on Space Policy”. The Yearbook describes and analyses the contexts and contents of space policy. Its primary field of investigation is Europe, but it also covers the whole range of global space activities and their influence on European endeavours. While Europe is highly successful today, challenges to the organisation and shape of its programmes, structures and approaches as well as to the strength of its position in the international arena – be it for political, regulatory or commercial reasons – are manifold. The “Yearbook on Space Policy” therefore traces not only Europe’s success story in space but also provides critical views and perspectives on the expectations raised by Europe’s joint space policy and the national space policies of various European countries. The second volume of the Yearbook perpetuates the approach of the first volume by comprising three distinct parts. The first part, authored by ESPI Research Fellow Nicolas Peter, depicts the “Year in Space” covering – as does the whole volume – the period from July 2007 to June 2008. Europe’s space activities are analysed in a global context before developments in space policies, programmes and technologies both in Europe and throughout the world are thoroughly reviewed. For the second part, the editors were able to invite ten outstanding experts to contribute their views and insights on specific issues of importance during this period. Thus, articles were contributed by eminent European v

Preface

researchers in the field of space policy on topics as diverse as the long-awaited launch of the COF and ATV, programmatic areas like navigation, exploration and space situational awareness, or European initiatives in global forums. In addition, experts from outside Europe were again invited to share their views and perspectives, this time on the topics of export control and on the role of the United Nations in the first fifty years of the space age. It is this joint endeavour of ESPI’s in-house analysts and members of the European Space Policy Research and Academic Network (ESPRAN) which adds a particularly vivid note to this volume. ESPRAN, organised by ESPI to implement its goal of bringing together the European space policy research community, provides a pool of globally unmatched intellectual and analytical strength from which the Yearbook and its readers can benefit. The third part of the “Yearbook on Space Policy” again presents facts and figures, including a chronology, country profiles and a comprehensive bibliography. It was prepared by ESPI Research Fellow Charlotte Mathieu who is also the editor of the second part of the Yearbook, and Blandina Baranes, ESPI’s documentalist. By taking the first and second volume of the Yearbook together, the reader will start to see the growing value of this series as an archive of space activities and policy developments. The editors have received a broad feedback on the first volume of the “Yearbook on Space Policy”. While the approach and structure have remained unchanged due to the positive response, numerous adaptations were made to improve the content and scope of the Yearbook. Particularly valuable suggestions were also provided by the Editorial Advisory Board. Cooperation with the publisher Springer Wien New York was again excellent and has settled into an inspiring “routine” following the establishment of the “Yearbook on Space Policy” as a long-term project. The editors would like to thank ESPI Research Interns Julie Abou Yehia, Raphaelle Delmotte, Deborah Rice and Matxalen Sanchez Aranzamendi for their enthusiastic and competent support. The editors hope that the “Yearbook on Space Policy” will proceed on the path of becoming an established reference publication for space policy developments and a valuable source and resource of information, analysis, inspiration and policy advice. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter ESPI editorial team

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Table of contents List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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PART 1 The Year in Space 2007/2008 Chapter 1. European space activities in the global context. Nicolas Peter 1.

Geopolitical trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Global economic outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Political developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1. Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2. The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4. Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.5. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.6. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. International security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Major scientific achievements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5. Main science and technology indicators relevant for space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5.1. Science and technology inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5.2. Science and technology outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Worldwide space policies and strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. The United Nations system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1. United Nations General Assembly Committees . . . . 2.1.2. Other UN bodies and organs monitoring outer space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. The Group on Earth Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Regional cooperation in space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1. European Space Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2. European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 vii

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2.4.3. 2.4.4. 2.4.5.

Other European institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eumetsat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5.1. France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5.2. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5.3. Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5.4. The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. The United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7. Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10. Emerging space powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Overview of institutional space budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Overview of commercial space markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Evolution of the space industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1. Industrial evolution in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2. Industrial evolution in the United States . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3. Industrial evolution in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4. Industrial evolution in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.5. Industrial evolution in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Industrial overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1. Launch sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2. Satellite manufacturing sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. Satellite operators sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The security dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. The global space military context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. The European space military context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. The United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5. Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8. Other space actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9. Threats to the space environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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22 23 23 23 24 24 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 32 32 34 36 37 38 39 40 40 40 41 43 45 46 47 48 51 52 53 53 54 54 55

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Chapter 2. Developments in space policies, programmes and technologies throughout the world and in Europe. Nicolas Peter 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Space policies and programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Highlights in activities and programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Highlights in partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Space transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7. Emerging actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8. Industrial comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Space science and exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Human spaceflights activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Lunar exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Mars exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Saturn exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. Venus exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. Mercury exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7. Jupiter observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8. Solar observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9. Outer solar system space probes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.10. International cooperation in space exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . Satellite applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. Space-based communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Space-based positioning, navigation and timing systems . . . . 4.3. Space-based Earth observation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Technology developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. Propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. Information technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3. Spacecraft operations and design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. Other technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5. Suborbital activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. Innovation policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 63 64 68 69 70 71 72 72 73 73 74 79 80 82 84 86 86 87 87 87 88 89 90 90 95 100 103 103 105 105 106 106 108

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PART 2 Views and Insights 1.

Space in the Treaty of Lisbon. Jan Wouters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Current constitutional bases for the EU in pace . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Antecedents and context of the Lisbon Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Analysis of sapec-related provisions in the Lisbon Treaty . . . 2. Galileo and the issue of public funding. Laurence Nardon . . . . . . . . 2.1. Galileo finally on track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1. Galileo under EU governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1.1. Timeline from June 2007–July 2008 . . . . . 2.1.1.2. The calls for tender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2. The impact on future European policies . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3. Meanwhile at the ranch: the in-orbit validation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. A bigger issue: when should taxpayers pay for space?. . . . . . . 2.2.1. Space needs public money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.1. The case of satellite navigation . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2. Why should governments pay for space? – Defining the National Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.1. Exhibit A: The UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2.2. Exhibit B: The U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3. Galileo and the national interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.1. Galileo for security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.2. Galileo for innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3.3. Galileo for prestige . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Europe’s approach to Space Situational Awareness: A proposal. Lucia C. Marta and Giovanni Gasparini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. A European Space Situational Awareness programme . . . . . . 3.3. SSA end-users and their requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1. Institutional end-users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2. Military end-users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3. Commercial end-users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4. Scientific end-users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Some existing models in the space domain for developing a suitable data-policy and governance model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1. Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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116 116 116 119 120 125 125 125 126 126 127 129 129 129 130 131 132 132 133 133 135 135 138 138 139 140 140 141 142 142 143 143

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3.4.2. Galileo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. TerraSar-X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4. Graves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. A possible European model for SSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The European Union proposal for a Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. Marcel Dickow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. Good reasons to get active – Why the European Union drafts a Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1. Treaty versus Code – The UN discussion process and the academic background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2. Process or outcome? – The European Union’s objectives and its Member States’ divergent interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. “A tightrope walk” – The European Union tackles the space between claim and reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. The contents of the EU Draft CoC . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.1. General provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.2. Co-operation mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. A first appraisal of the CoC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. International cooperation in space exploration: Lessons from the past and perspectives for the future. Alain Dupas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2. The easy part: Robotic exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1. The fundamental importance of science as a driver of space exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2. The early steps in space cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3. Basic space cooperation principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3. Human spaceflight and its globalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1. Cold War competition in human spaceflight . . . . . . 5.3.2. The opening of the Space Shuttle programme to international cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3. The de facto globalisation of human spaceflight . . . . 5.4. The special case of the International Space Station . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. The origin of the International Space Station programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. The original European human spaceflight strategy of the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. A paradigm shift: Russia joins the International Space Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

144 144 145 146 149 152 152 154

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5.4.4.

The remarkable resilience of the International Space Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.5. The legal framework of the International Space Station as a model for the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5. The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) and the Global Exploration Strategy (GES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1. The VSE: A major space policy decision . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2. A very significant step: the establishment of the Global Exploration Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3. From principles to requirements in the GES Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6. What model for the future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1. The limits of the GES Framework exercise . . . . . . . 5.6.2. The case for an integrated framework . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3. Could the ITER model be applied to long-term human space exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Exploration – How science finds its way in Europe. Jean-Claude Worms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. What is exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3. Consulting the scientific community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. Main recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. The role of humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6. The international dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7. The next steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. The political dimension of Europe’s new human spaceflight capabilities. Mischa Hansel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. Columbus and the ATV in historical perspective . . . . . . . . . 7.3. Costs and benefits of spaceflight – A framework for analysis . . . . 7.4. Looking backward – Political costs and Europe’s involvement in the Space Station programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5. Options for reducing political costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. Potential benefits of ATV evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Space technologies and the export control system in the Unites States: Prospects for meaningful reform. Henry R. Hertzfeld . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Other types of export controls in the United States . . . . . . . . 8.3. Cold War thinking vs. 21st century reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

174 175 176 176 178 180 182 182 184 184 188 188 189 190 191 193 194 194 196 196 196 200 202 203 206 207 210 210 212 213

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8.4.

Living with ITAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.1. Brief history. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.2. The system today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5. ITAR and the space sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.1. The current system as applied to space technologies . . . 8.5.2. Export control laws and U.S. government space policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.3. Evidence of the impact of ITAR on the space industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6. Current effort for reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.1. A new bill to reform the administration of the arms export control and for other purposes . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.2. Reform of ITAR and the space industrial sector . . . . 9. Space for resources. Isabelle Sourbes-Verger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2. “Space for Development”: a long-standing and long-term policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1. The well entrenched benefits of space . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2. Major changes in the utilisation of space for resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3. “GMES and Africa”: a new step in the European space for resources policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1. The need to make the benefits of space technology more universal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2. The political significance of space for resources . . . . . 9.4. Implications for the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.1. The geopolitical significance of space for resources . . . 9.4.2. The implications of increasing competition . . . . . . . 9.5. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. The United Nations and outer space: Celebrating 50 years of space achievements. Niklas Hedman and Werner Balogh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. The establishment of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. The UNISPACE Conferences and capacity building in space technology and applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. The use of space technology and applications in the United Nations system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. The United Nations and space law: recent trends . . . . . . . . 10.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

215 215 216 218 218 219 220 222 222 223 226 226 226 226 228 230 230 231 232 232 233 235 237 237 238 242 245 246 249 xiii

Table of contents

PART 3 Facts and Figures Blandina Baranes and Charlotte Mathieu 1.

Chronology: July 2007-June 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Access to space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Space science and exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Applications ... . .. . . . .. .. ..... .... . . . .. ..... .. . . 1.4. Policy and international cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2. Country profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Bibliography of space policypublications July 2007-June 2008. . . . . . 3.1. Monographs.. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ... .. . . .. .. . 3.2. Articles... ... . .. . . .. . . ...... . ... ...... ....... . List of figures and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiv

254 254 258 258 263 265 287 287 289 293 296 304

List of acronyms A AFET: Committee on Foreign Affairs, EU ALC: African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology For Sustainable Development ALOS: Advanced Land Observing Satellite AMC: African Resource and Environment Management Constellation AMESD: African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development APM: Attached Pressurized Module APRASAF: Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum APSCO: Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization ARCA: Aeronautics and Cosmonautics Romanian Association ARTES: Advanced Research Telecommunications Systems ASAT: Anti-Satellite ASI: Italian Space Agency (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana) ATV: Automated Transfer Vehicle B BCC: British Chamber of Commerce BNSC: British National Space Centre C CASTC: China Aerospace Science and Technology corporation CBERS: China Brazil Earth Resources Satellite CBM: Confidence-Building Measures CCD: Charge-Coupled Device CCL: Commerce Control List CD: Conference on Disarmament CEA: Space Conference of the Americas (Conferencia Espacial de las Americas) CEODE: Centre for Earth Observation and Digital Earth CERN: European Organisation for Nuclear Research (Organisation Europeenne pour la Recherche Nucleaire) CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy CIP: Comeptitiveness and Innovation Framework programme, EU CLEP: China Lunar Exploration Programme CNES: French Space Agency (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) xv

List of acronyms

CNSA: China National Space Administration CoC: Code of Conduct CoCOM: Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls CODUN: Council Working Group on Disarmament in the United Nations COF: Columbus Orbital Facility COPUOS: Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space COROT: Convection, Rotation and planetary Transits Cosmo-SkyMed: Constellation of Small Satellites for the Mediterranean Basin Observation COSPAR: Committee on Space Research COSTIND: Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence, China COTS: Commercial Orbital Transportation Services CPC: Congress of the Communist Party of China CRECTEALC: Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education for Latin America and the Caribbean. CSA: Canadian Space Agency CSD: Commission on Sustainable Development CSIRO: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies CSTS: Crew Space Transportation System D DARPA: Defense Advance Research Projects Agency DBS: Direct Broadcast Services DDTC: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, USA DISEC: Disarmament and International Security DLR: German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum f€ ur Luft- und Raumfahrt) DOC: Department of Commerce, USA DoD: Department of Defense, USA DOS: Department of State, USA DRDO: Defense Research and Development Organization DTH: Direct-to-home DTI: Department of Trade and Industry DTSA: Defense Technology Security Administration E EAR: Export Administration Regulations ECPT: European Conference on Post and Telecommunications xvi

List of acronyms

EDA: European Defence Agency EISC: European Interparliamentary Space Conference ELDO: European Launcher Development Organisation ELIPS: European Programme for Life and Physical Sciences and Applications Utilising the International Space Station ELM-PS: Experiment Logistics Module Pressurised Section EPO: European Patent Office ERA: European Robotic Arm ERCS: Emergency Response Core Service, GMES ESA: European Space Agency ESAC: European Space Astronomy Centre ESAS: Exploration System Architecture Study ESC: European Space Conference ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy ESF: European Science Foundation ESP: European Space Policy ESPI: European Space Policy Institute ESRO: European Space Research Organisation ESTRACK: European Space Tracking ESSC: European Space Sciences Committee EU: European Union EUSC: European Union Satellite Centre F FAA: Federal Aviation Administration, USA FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization FOC: Full Operational Capability FRS: Strategic Research Foundation (Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique) FSS: Fixed Satellite Services G GA: General Assembly GAGAN: Augmented Navigation-Technology Demonstration System GAO: Government Accountability Office, USA GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GBM: GLAST Burst Monitor GCC: Gulf Coopertaion Council, Arab States GDP: Gross Domestic Product GEO: Geostationary Orbit GEO: Group on Earth Observation xvii

List of acronyms

GEO BON: Group on Earth Observations Biodiversity Observatory Network GEOSS: Global Earth Observation System of Systems GES: Global Exploration Strategy GIOVE: Galileo In-Orbit Validation Element GIP: Galileo Inter-institutional Panel GLAST: Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope GLONASS: Globalnaya Navigationnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, Russia GMES: Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GNP: Gross National Product GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite Systems GOES-R: Geostationary, Operational Environmental Satellite GPS: Global Positioning System GSA: GNSS Supervisory Authority GSC: Guyana Space Centre GSLV: Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle GTO: Geostationary Transfer Orbit H HDTV: High Definition Television HMA: Heterogeneous Mission Accessibility HTV: H-II Transfer Vehicle I IA: Implementing Arrangement IADC: Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency IAI: Institute of International Affairs (Istituto Affari Internazionali) ICG: International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems ICSU: International Council for Science IGA: Intergovernmental Agreement IGY: International Geophysical Year IGS: Information Gathering Satellites IHY: International Heliophysical Year IMF: International Monetary Fund IMT: International Mobile Telecommunications INKSNA: Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act INSPIRE: Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community ILN: International Lunar Network ILS: International Launch Services IOI: In-Orbit Infrastructure xviii

List of acronyms

IOV: In-Orbit Validation IPCC: International Panel on Climate Change IPY: International Polar Year IRIS: Infrared Imaging Surveyor ISECG: International Space Exploration Coordination Group ISPM: International Solar Polar Mission ISRO: Indian Space Research Organization ISS: International Space Station ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations ITER: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor ITRE: Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, EU ITU: International Telecommunication Union IUGS: International Union of Geological Sciences IYPE: International Year of Planet Earth J JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency JEM: Japanese Experiment Module JPO: Japanese Patent Office K KARI: Korea Aerospace Research Institute L LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean LADEE: Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer LAIP: Libyan African Investment Portfolio LAT: Large Area Telescope LCROSS: Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite LEO: Low Earth Orbit LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, Japan LMCS: Land Monitoring Core Services, GMES LoA: Letter of Agreement LoI: Letter of Intent LRO: Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter M MCS: Marine Core Service, GMES MDA: Missile Defense Agency, USA xix

List of acronyms

MDG: Millennium Development Goal MEA: Multinational Environmental Agreement MESSENGER: Mercury Surface, Space Environment, Geochemistry and Ranging MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan MoU: Memorandum of Understanding MRO: Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter MSAS: Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System MSRC: Makeyev State Rocket Centre MSS: Mobile Satellite Services MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime MTFF: Man-Tended Free-Flyer MUSIS: Multinational Space-based Imagery System N NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, USA NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEO: Near-Earth Object NEREUS: Network of European regions Using Space Technologies NFIRE: Near Field Infrared Experiment NGA: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, USA NGSU: Navigation Signal Generation Unit NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command NPC: National People’s Congress, China NPO PM: Academician M.F. Reshnev Research and development Association of Applied Mechanics, Russia NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NRO: National Reconnaissance Agency, USA NSAU: National Space Agency of Ukraine NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group NSSA: National Space Security Agency, USA NSSO: National Security Space Organization, USA O OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of Treasury, USA OOSA: Office for Outer Space Affairs OST: Outer Space Treaty xx

List of acronyms

P PAC: Plan or Growth Acceleration, Brazil PACIFIC: PRS Application Concept Involving Future Interested Customers PAROS: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PDR: Preliminary Design Review PECS: Plan For European Cooperating States PFI: Private Financing Initiative PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party PHM: Passive Hydrogen Maser PLA: People’s Liberation Army, China PM: Pressurised Module PNT: Positioning Navigation and Timing POES: Polar Operational Environmental Satellite PPF: Polar Platform PPP: Public-Private Partnership PPWT: Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects PRS: Publicly Regulated Services PRS: Public-Restricted Signal PSLV: Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle Q QZSS: Quasi Zenith Satellite System R RASCOM: Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation R&D: Research and Development RM: Rover Module RNII KP: Russian Scientific Research Institute for Space Instrument Engineering ROC: Rover Operation Centre RSRM: Reusable Solid Rocket Motor R&T: Research and Technology S SAP: Space Applications Programme, UN SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar SASTIND: State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, China xxi

List of acronyms

SatDSiG: Satellite Data Security Law, Germany (Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz) SBAS: Space-Based Augmentation System SECCHI: Sun Earth Connection Coronal and Heliospheric Investigation. SEDE: Subcommittee on Security and Defence, EU SGAC: Space Generation Advisory Council SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SMD: Science Mission directorate, US SME: Small and Medium Enterprise SOI: Statement of Intent SSA: Space Situational Awareness SSC-NRB: Space Studies Board of the National Research Council, USA SSIK: Turkish Defence Industry Implementation Committee SSN: Space Surveillance Network STEREO: Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory STM: Space Traffic Management S&T: Science and Technology T TBD: To be determined TCBMs: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures TDP: Technology Demonstration Payload TEC: Treaty of the European Community TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TIRA: Tracking and Imaging Radar TRAN: Committee on Transport and Tourism, EU TTE: Transport Telecommunications and Energy TT&C: Telemetry, tracking and Command U UAE: United Arab Emirates UARS: Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations UNCOPUOS: United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNGA: United Nations General Assembly UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research xxii

List of acronyms

UNISPACE: United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UNPSA: United Nations Programme on Space Applications UN-SPIDER: United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response U.S.: United States USA: United States of America USML: United States Munitions List USPTO: United States Patent and Trademark Office USSEP: U.S. Space Exploration Policy, US USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USSSN: U.S. Space Surveillance Network V VSE: Vision for Space Exploration W WEU: Western European Union WGS: Wideband Global Satcom WINDS: Wideband InterNetworking engineering test and Demonstration Satellite WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization WMO: World Meteorological Organization WRC: World Radiocommunication Conference WTO: World Trade Organization

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PART 1 THE YEAR IN SPACE 2007/2008

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

European space activities in the global context Nicolas Peter

1. Geopolitical trends The second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 was a period marked by the confirmation of several key trends that appeared in recent years, such as the economic and political rise of powers from the “South” like China and India as well as the recovery of Russia while the “North” and particularly the United States experienced limited growth. In addition, skyrocketing prices not only of natural resources such as oil and gas but also of primary products are further aggravating the global economic situation. Moreover, inflation has increased considerably since mid-2007 in both advanced and emerging markets. Climate change and particularly global warming as well as security remained priority issues during this period.

1.1. Global economic outlook The expansion of the world economy remained robust in 2007. However, global economic growth slowed markedly in the final quarter of 2007 following major losses in the financial sector which had originated in the U.S. subprime sector. By now, however, the financial crisis has spread to institutions in other countries. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), world output in 2007 reached 5%, a level similar to 2006.1 In 2007, the growth rate in the United States increased by 2.2% and the euro zone expanded at a robust pace of 2.6% (3.1% in the European Union).2 Japan has been quite resistant to the global economic downturn, with a growth of 2.1% in 2007.3 Many emerging economies have continued to grow at a rapid pace. China’s economy sustained further momentum with a growth of 11.9% in 2007, similar to India (9.3%) and Russia (8.1%).4 The projections for the advanced economies, however, were reduced significantly in early 2008. This was the result of deteriorating market conditions and limited U.S. growth, which affected economic activities in other advanced economies. 2

1. Geopolitical trends

Amid market turmoil and slow growth in the major economies, energy commodities (e.g. crude oil and gas) reached record prices when given in U.S. dollars in the first half of 2008, reflecting a solid growth in demand in the face of sluggish supply and prevailing geopolitical concerns. Several staples like soybean, corn and wheat also reached high price levels. Furthermore, poor harvests in many countries led to further price hikes, causing some major food shortages in certain parts of the world and triggering public protests.

1.2. Political developments 2007/2008 was a period of transition, since a series of general elections led to leadership changes in some major countries.

1.2.1. Europe

2007/2008 was an important period for Europe, characterised by an effort to both strengthen and restart the institutional process of the European Union. On 13 December 2007, during a special Summit in Lisbon (Portugal), EU heads of State and governments officially signed the “Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community” known as the “Lisbon Treaty”, which incorporates most of the defunct EU Constitution. The Lisbon Treaty aims at enhancing the efficiency of the European Union, with a major focus on the reorganisation of the institutional and decisionmaking process. Hungary was the first country to ratify the Treaty on 17 December 2007, followed by 23 counties by the end of June 2008.5 However, the European Union now faces a stalemate because of Ireland’s negative referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on 13 June 2008. Another important milestone for the European Union has been that in 2008, the largest share in the EU budget will for the first time be dedicated to measures intended to boost economic growth and cohesion in the Union. While agriculture will continue to receive over 40% of the EU budget, about 45% of all EU spending will now be devoted to competitiveness. The European Union also reinforced its position on the world stage by strengthening a series of partnerships. The first-ever EU-Brazil Summit was held on 4 July 2007 in Lisbon (Portugal). A strategic partnership agreement with Brazil was concluded. An EU-African Union Summit in Lisbon was held on 8–9 December 2007. It was the first meeting of this kind in seven years since the Cairo meeting in 2000.6 The Summit ended with the signing of a strategic political “partnership of equals” aiming to overcome the “traditional donor-recipient 3

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

relationship”.7 The 17th EU-Japan Summit took place on 23 April 2008. The debate focused on global issues such as energy security and climate change as well as unresolved issues within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). During the fifth EU-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Summit held in Lima (Peru) on 16–17 May 2008, the great importance of the European Union’s relations with the LAC and the EU’s aspiration to strengthen the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership was reiterated. Negotiations with Russia on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) started in spring 2008, since the current PCA which entered into force on 1 December 1997 was concluded for a ten-year period.8 Finally, the French President Sarkozy’s push to create a “Mediterranean Union” was accepted and its principle enlarged (under the new title “Union for the Mediterranean”) at the European Council of 13–14 March 2008.9 The main focus of the new Union will be to improve energy supply, fight pollution in the Mediterranean, strengthen the surveillance of maritime traffic and “civil security cooperation”, set up a Mediterranean Erasmus student exchange programme, and create scientific bonds between Europe and its southern neighbours.

1.2.2. The United States

The subprime loan crisis and the subsequent growing trade deficit have been the major focus of the U.S. economy in recent months. In the political domain, the nomination process for the Democratic and Republican U.S. presidential candidates got under way in early 2008. In both camps, the economy, immigration, the war in Iraq, healthcare and the environment dominated the agenda. Strongerthan-expected results were obtained by Senator Barack Obama who finally won the primary elections in June 2008 and thus represented the Democratic Party in the November 2008 presidential elections. Senator John McCain won enough delegates to deliver him the Republican party’s nomination as early as March 2008. Iraq was far from secure by mid-2008 and five years after the beginning of the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Al-Qaeda remained the greatest threat to Iraq’s security. 2007 ended as the deadliest year in Iraq for U.S. soldiers and the conflict in Afghanistan worsened in spring 2008, when more U.S. soldiers were killed there than in Iraq.

1.2.3. Russia

The last year has been a year of transition for Russia. President Vladimir Putin’s first deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was elected new President of the 4

1. Geopolitical trends

Russian Federation on 2 March 2008. President Medvedev subsequently selected Vladimir Putin as his Prime Minister. Russia’s renewed involvement in world affairs that was witnessed in recent years continued in 2007/2008. In particular, Russia was awarded the 2014 Winter Olympics, which will take place in Sochi. In August 2007, Russia also dispatched a highly publicised expedition to lay symbolic claim to part of the Arctic seabed in order to access potential natural resource reserves. Russia sent two mini-submarines beneath the North Pole to scoop samples and put up a Russian flag.10 Russia also continued to instrumentalise its “energy superpower” status, particularly vis-a-vis Ukraine. Yet, with the development of the world’s largest nonnuclear explosive device, Russia has been enlarging not only its soft power portfolio but also its hard power arsenal.

1.2.4. Japan

Following the election of July 2007, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is no longer the biggest party in the upper house of the Diet (parliament) for the first time since 1955, but still has a large majority in the lower house. With the defeat of the LDP, Shinzo Abe resigned as Japan’s Prime Minister on 12 September 2007, just one year after taking office. The LDP and the lower house of the Diet then chose Yasuo Fukuda as Japan’s 91st Prime Minister on 23 September 2007. In the last few months, Japan has been trying to reinforce its position on the world stage. Despite dire finances and an effort to curb a bulging public debt which lead to Japan’s falling in the ranking of foreign aid donors, Japan continues to reach out to developing countries. Japan has used foreign aid as a policy tool for making its international profile match its economic power since the 1970s. In particular, 40 African leaders were invited to Japan in May 2008. The host country expressed its ambition to double its aid to Africa. Furthermore, in a buoyant regional context, the new President Yasuo Fukuda continues to follow the “Fukuda Doctrine” (named after the late Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda) which conceives Japan as a country committed to peace, but also as a country that builds up relationships of mutual confidence and trust with the Southeast Asian countries in a wide range of fields.

1.2.5. China

The last few months saw both the strengthening of the current political leadership and preparations for transitions in China. For instance, the 17th National 5

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a resolution on an amendment to the CPC Constitution to enshrine a “scientific outlook on development”. During the 11th annual session of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2008, China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao also proposed the creation of new “super-ministries” for improving the efficiency of bureaucratic decision-making. In particular, a new ministry for the environment was created. China and Japan’s diplomatic relations improved with the visit of China’s President Hu Jintao to Japan in May 2008. Moreover, China’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan were re-established through formal talks during a meeting in Beijing (China). China also continues to combine its diplomatic relations and foreign policy with the need to open up new resources, Africa being a target of choice. In the meantime, an alarming number of indicators threaten China’s future prospects for growth and stability, such as rising inflation, pollution, etc. In particular, outbreaks of protest against Chinese rule in Tibet in early 2008 triggered repression from Chinese forces. As the protests extended into ethnicTibetan areas of China, fire was opened by Chinese police. The Tibetan uprisings generated reactions of support from all over the world, resulting in disruptions of the Olympic flame’s relay in major world cities.

1.2.6. India

By the 60th year of its independence from Great Britain in 2007, India had established itself as a dominant economic actor. The period between July 2007 and June 2008 was one of political change for India. On 25 July 2007, India swore in its first female President, Pratibha Patil, who succeeded Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. A major development in India’s foreign policy was constituted by the growing ties with Africa. In July 2007, the Indian government launched the Pan-African E-network project in cooperation with the African Union to develop Africa’s information and satellite communications technologies. The initiative has been called Africa’s largest infrastructure project. It aims at eventually connecting 53 African countries to a satellite and fibre optic network whose main components will be education and tele-medicine services. Moreover, the first India–Africa Summit took place in New Delhi (India) on 8–9 April 2008 to build up and expand India’s economic and diplomatic ties with the African continent. The two-day Summit was attended by 14 African leaders. Despite a booming economy and increasing international ties and involvement in world affairs, India continues to be plagued by internal issues. In late August 2007, two bombs killed more than 40 people in Hyderabad, and several bombs 6

1. Geopolitical trends

exploded in Jaipur in May 2008. Moreover, in September 2007, around 25,000 poor people – mainly landless farmers – convened in New Delhi after marching from various parts of India to demand a land reform and protest against the loss of their land to industrial development.

1.3. International security In 2007/2008, transnational security threats and particularly terrorist attacks as well as significant military events and new and emerging conflicts continued to menace world peace and stability. Pakistan witnessed several destabilising moments in recent months. In particular, Benazir Bhutto, twice prime minister of Pakistan, returned home after eight years in exile to participate in the general election. However, her assassination on 27 December 2007 led to political turmoil. In late March 2008, her husband Yousaf Raza Gillani finally became Prime Minister as the head of a coalition government. International inspectors confirmed in July 2007 that North Korea’s plutoniumproducing nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and four other facilities were shut down. Consequently, American and North Korean officials held talks in Geneva (Switzerland) in September 2007, and both sides agreed that North Korea should reveal and disable all nuclear facilities by the end of the year. In June 2008, North Korea finally handed in a list of its nuclear facilities to comply with its international obligations. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continued their resurgence despite a rising number of soldiers sent to Afghanistan through a NATO-led mission. Several conflicts and contested elections occurred in Africa in the past few months, threatening regional peace and stability. However, the Horn of Africa remains the centre of attention on the continent. In August 2007, the United Nations Security Council voted in favour of sending a peacekeeping force of up to 26,000 soldiers and police to the Darfur region of Sudan. Furthermore, in Somalia, humanitarian agencies estimated that 20,000 people were fleeing violence in Mogadishu each month. Terrorism is also becoming a major concern on the African continent. A series of terrorist bombings occurred in Algeria. Nigeria’s oilrich Niger Delta region witnessed frequent attacks on oil infrastructures as well as kidnappings of foreign oil workers. Piracy attacks against foreign vessels on the shore of Somalia also increased in the first half of 2008. In July 2007, the Israeli air force bombed a target in Syria which was suspected of being a nuclear power plant in development, but neither the Israelis nor the Syrians disclosed the nature of the target. 7

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

In October 2007, the Turkish Parliament gave the government approval for a cross-border operation and military incursion into Northern Iraq after Turkish soldiers had been killed by rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), some of whom may have come from bases in northern Iraq. The Turkish ground offensive occurred in February 2008 and considerably weakened the Kurdish militants. Although a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council of December 2007 concluded that Iran did have a nuclear-weapons programme until 2003 but had since halted it, the United Nations Security Council imposed a third, more punishing range of sanctions on Iran for failing to stop enriching uranium in March 2008. The Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad visited Iraq in early March 2008. As the first regional leader to do so, he highlighted his country’s influence on Iraq and on the Middle East region in general. In Iraq, the five-year old conflict has been stabilising, as the number of Iraqi civilian deaths began to decline by the end of 2007. However, no hope of a lasting peace and enduring stability are expected in the near future, as attacks and conflicts continue throughout the country.

1.4. Major scientific achievements In recent months, climate change has topped the political agenda of most countries, since the consequences of global warming are becoming increasingly salient. In particular, according to recent data from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the year 2007 was the fifth-warmest for global land and ocean surface temperatures since records began in 1880.11 Furthermore, according to the European Space Agency (ESA), the sea ice covering the Arctic had shrunk by September 2007 to its lowest level since satellite measurements began nearly 30 years ago.12 Acknowledging the fact that climate change and global warming are threats demanding an urgent and coordinated global response, a United Nations Climate Change Conference took place in Bali (Indonesia) on 3–15 December 2007. Negotiations on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol dominated the Conference. The “Bali Roadmap” consisting of a number of forward-looking decisions towards more vigorous international action against climate change was adopted. The Bali Conference was followed by the UN Bangkok Climate Change Talks which took place on 31 March–4 April 2008 in Bangkok (Thailand). An agreement was reached for a work programme structuring negotiations on a long-term international climate change agreement planned to be concluded at Copenhagen (Denmark) by the end of 2009. The next major UN Climate Change meeting was 8

1. Geopolitical trends

held in Bonn (Germany) in May 2008 and addressed the issue of advancing the adaptation to climate change through finance and technology. Following the preoccupation with climate change of the 33rd G8 meeting in Heiligendamm (Germany) on 6–7 June 2007, climate change was again on the agenda of the 34th G8 meeting in Hokkaido (Japan) on 7–9 July 2008. Moreover, the Nobel Peace Prize 2007 was awarded jointly to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on 12 October 2007. From mid-2007 until mid-2008, there were two international “observance years” relating to space, namely the International Polar Year (IPY) and the International Heliophysical Year (IHY).13 In addition, the official opening of the International Year of Planet Earth (IYPE) took place on 12–13 February 2008. The IYPE is a joint initiative by the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The research themes of the year are: Groundwater, Climate, Earth and Health, Deep Earth, Megacities, Resources, Hazards, Ocean, Soil, and Earth and Life.

1.5. Main science and technology indicators relevant for space activities Several science and technology (S&T) indicators provide useful information on the dynamism of the global space sector and its evolution as well as on the overall S&T environment and context in which the space sector operates. First, inputs that aim at stimulating innovation are analysed, particularly spending on research and development (R&D). Second, the output of investments in scientific and technological research is examined, with a particular view on patent filings.

1.5.1. Science and technology inputs

Commitment to R&D spending is the main indicator of a country’s innovative activity. It illustrates how much priority a government gives to the public funding of innovative activities and the development of S&T activities, and thus to activities linked directly or indirectly to space, since space budgets depend heavily on overall R&D investment. Europe is still working to achieve the target set by the Lisbon Strategy of devoting 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to R&D activities by 2010. 9

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In 2006, the European Union spent 1.84% of its GDP on R&D.14,15 While the United States, the European Union and Japan are leading in terms of research and innovation capabilities (with budgetary figures of 273.722 billion euros for the United States, 213.127 billion euros for the European Union and 118.295 billion euros for Japan),16 countries such as China and India have a growing capacity in these domains. According to Eurostat, the European Union’s R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP) was 1.84% in 2006 and thus similar to 2005, but lower than in 2000 (1.89%) and also lower than in other major economies like the United States (2.62%) or Japan (3.20%).17

1.5.2. Science and technology outputs

A major output metric to assess the results of R&D investment are patent filings, as they reflect the inventive activity of an entity and its capacity to exploit knowledge. Worldwide patent activity increased by 4.9% between 2005 and 2006 according to the latest data of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).18 This growth was mostly due to increased filings by applicants from China, South Korea and the United States. In general, there has been a significant increase in the level of the internationalisation of patent activity,19 particularly due to an increase in the patenting level of emerging economies. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was the largest recipient of patent filings for the first time since 1963,20 with a total of 425 966 patent applications filed. At the same time, a small decrease (0.4%) in the number of patents filed at the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) was observed in 2006 (408 674 patents were granted in 2006). The patent offices of China (210 501) and South Korea (166 189) as well as the European Patent Office (EPO) (135 231) also received a large number of filings.21 Looking at the data on triadic patents22 also provides valuable insights, since the “home advantage” disappears to a certain extent. When looking at the geographic distribution of triadic families between 1996 and 2001, triadic patent family applications and grants are concentrated in the three major economies, headed by the United States and followed by Japan and the European Union. However, the shares of the European Union dropped from 32% to about 26%, while the shares of Japan and the United States as well as other shares increased (Table 1). Thus, the European Union appears to be losing some ground. 10

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies Tab. 1: Triadic patent families in the European Union, United States, Japan and other countries as a percentage of the world total in 1996 and 2001 (Source: Eurostat).23 Country

1996

2001

EU-27

32.9

25.8

Japan

27.1

31.2

United States

33.7

35.7

5.8

6.9

Others

When looking specifically at the space sector, according to the 2007 OECD Compendium of Patent Statistics, 2 367 space-related patents were granted by the EPO between 1980 and 2005, and 2 708 by the USPTO.24 The majority of the filed patents originated from the United States and Europe (Table 2). Tab. 2: Share of space-related patents filed per country at the EPO and USPTO in 1980–2005 (Source: OECD Compendium of Patent Statistics 2007).25 Countries

EPO 1980–2005

USPTO 1980–2005

USA

47.4

74.3

France

15.7

6.0

Japan

9.5

7.4

Germany

9.3

4.1

The United Kingdom

4.8

1.5

The Netherlands

1.9

0.7

Canada

1.3

1.4

10.0

4.6

Other countries

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies In the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, major developments occurred in several space-faring countries at the policy and strategy level. However, fewer space policies were put forward by the major space actors compared to the period ranging from early-2006 to mid-2007. Nonetheless, the implementation of recently adopted policies and the development of new strategies by emerging space actors in various parts of the world reflects a growing quest for enhancing national 11

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competitiveness in an increasingly competitive international and global space context.

2.1. The United Nations system In 2007, at the 62nd plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), four resolutions pertaining to space affairs were passed. The three draft resolutions concerned the peaceful use of outer space and the risk of space militarisation and a subsequent arms race, and called for more cooperation among the space-faring countries to tackle these issues. The first resolution in question was the annual draft resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Dealing with space security issues, it was adopted on 5 December 2007 (A/RES/62/20) with 178 votes in favour, one vote against (United States) and one abstention (Israel). The second was a draft resolution entitled “Transparency and ConfidenceBuilding in Outer Space Activities” and was also adopted on 5 December 2007 (A/RES/62/43) with an overwhelming majority of 179 votes in favour, one vote against and one abstention (again by the United States and Israel). The third was the draft resolution “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” which was adopted without a vote on 22 December 2007 (A/RES/62/217). Finally, the Resolution on the “Recommendations on Enhancing the Practise of States and International Intergovernmental Organisations in Registering Space Objects” were adopted without a vote on 17 December 2007 (A/RES/62/101). As of 1 January 2008, the status of the UN treaties which govern the use of space was as indicated in Table 3. In 2007, Turkey ratified the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Tab. 3: Signature and ratification of the five United Nations space-related treaties. Treaty

Non-Party

Signatory

Party

Outer Space Treaty (1967)

70 States

27 States

98 States

Rescue Agreement (1968)

79 States

24 States

92 States

Liability Convention (1972)

82 States

24 States

13 States

Registration Convention (1975)

139 States

4 States

52 States

Moon Agreement (1979)

178 States

4 States

13 States

12

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

Convention”) as well as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue Agreement”), and Algeria ratified the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration Convention”).

2.1.1. United Nations General Assembly Committees

In 2007/2008, three UNGA committees were particularly involved in space affairs: the First Committee for Disarmament and International Security (DISEC),26 the Fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonisation (SPECPOL)27 and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).28,29 During the First Committee’s session in October 2007, there was a consensus on the need to preserve outer space for peaceful and cooperative uses and to prevent its weaponisation and a subsequent arms race. Two draft resolutions tackling these issues were presented and adopted: the annual draft resolution on PAROS (A/C.1/62/L.34) and a draft resolution entitled “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in Outer Space Activities” (A/C.1/62/L.41). The Fourth Committee adopted two texts pertaining to space activities. Firstly, a text on “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (A/C.4/62/L.9) setting the work programme for the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UNSPIDER) for the coming year was put forward.30 The draft resolution was approved without a vote. Secondly, a text on “Recommendations on Enhancing the Practise of States and International Intergovernmental Organisations in Registering Space Objects” (A/C.4/62/L.8) which gives direction to the reduction of space debris was also adopted. During the 45th session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS on 11–22 February 2008, UNSPIDER was a main focus. Possible dangers from Near-Earth Objects (NEOs), space debris mitigation and a safety framework for nuclear power sources in outer space were other key agenda items. In the following month, during the 47th session of the Legal Subcommittee (31 March–11 April 2008), capacity-building in space law and the exchange of information on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space were two new items on the agenda. Finally, at the 51st Plenary Session of COPUOS (11–20 June 2008), disaster management, climate change and food security, space and water, space and society, as well as space and education were among the main topics of discussion. 13

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2.1.2. Other UN bodies and organs monitoring outer space activities

Besides the UNGA and related specialised committees, there are also other UN programmes, specialised agencies and organs that are engaged in activities relevant to space. The newly created International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG)31 has gained momentum in recent months. The second meeting of the ICG, organised by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), took place in Bangalore (India) on 5–7 September 2007. A Providers Forum was established at this occasion with the aim of promoting greater compatibility and interoperability among current and future providers of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). The current members of the Providers Forum include China, the European Community, India, Japan, Nigeria, Russia and the United States. Like the UN Space Applications Programme (SAP), UNSPIDER organised a series of workshops in 2007/2008. The UNSPIDER Bonn Office was inaugurated on 29 October 2007 and more offices are foreseen to open shortly in Beijing (China) and Switzerland. In 2007/2008, UNESCO was involved in a series of space-related events. In particular, the “Open Initiative” which addresses the use of space technologies in the monitoring of natural and World Heritage sites was an area of major progress. In November 2007, the German Aerospace Center (DLR) formally joined the “Open Initiative”, bringing with it the possibility to use TerraSAR-X data for the preservation of UNESCO World Heritage sites. In March 2008, Spot Image also joined the “Open Initiative”. Moreover, a Chinese proposal to establish a centre for the “Open Initiative” in Beijing (China) within the Centre for Earth Observation and Digital Earth (CEODE) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was approved during UNESCO’s 179th Executive Board Meeting.32 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was particularly active in 2007/2008 concerning the adoption of new regulations. The recent spread of broadband wireless capability or “International Mobile Telecommunications” (IMT) has raised the specter of competition over limited bandwidth. However, in October 2007, the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) of the ITU voted to safeguard satellite C-band services from terrestrial interference and therefore dismissed a global C-band identification for IMT services, including WiMax. Furthermore, a conference entitled “Global Forum on the Effective Use of Telecommunications/ICT for Disaster Management: Saving Lives” was held in Geneva (Switzerland) on 10–12 December 2007.33 Two important initiatives resulted from the conference: the ITU Framework for Cooperation in Emergencies and the ITU Network of Volunteers for Emer14

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

gency Telecommunications. Agreements with industries were also concluded in order to provide the ITU with more material capabilities and funding for these emergency operations.34 Finally, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)35 organised two conferences in 2007/2008 to generate food for thought and promote informal confidence-building dialogues on outer space issues. UNIDIR is also home to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community and also deals with space arms control. For many years, a general agreement has developed through resolutions and discussions within the UN that an arms race in outer space should be prevented. However, due to the structure of the international legal regime and the objection of a few States (mainly the United States), a treaty on PAROS has not yet been negotiated. Furthermore, some delegations and experts have argued that PAROS is not the most relevant topic or treaty to pursue. A treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space was proposed jointly by Russia and China on 12 February 2008 – the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Furthermore, discussions in the CD have recently evolved towards discussing a Code of Conduct.

2.2. The Group on Earth Observations On 30 November 2007, the first Ministerial Summit of the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) since it was formally created took place in Cape Town (South Africa). The Cape Town Ministerial Declaration which calls for the strengthening and integration of Earth observation and predictions systems was adopted at this occasion. It recognises “that sound policymaking for addressing the environment and sustainable development must be based on understanding, describing, and predicting a complex and interdependent world, therefore requiring terrestrial, oceanic, air-borne, and space-based Earth observations, data assimilation techniques and Earth system modelling”.36 The Declaration also recognises the contribution that GEOSS (Group on Earth Observation System of Systems) can make to the relevant Multinational Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The GEO Ministerial Summit was preceded by a two-day GEO-IV Plenary session meeting attended by representatives of 72 national governments, the European Commission and 46 international organisations. At this occasion, the governments of Brazil and China announced the launch of a new service that will 15

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provide Earth observation data from the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme free of charge to end-users throughout Africa. In the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008, the GEO Members and participating organisations made numerous contributions and reached early achievements towards the GEOSS 10-Year Implementation Plan. Also, the creation of the GEO Biodiversity Observatory Network (GEO BON) which will monitor and assess the status of the world’s species and ecosystems in order to prevent further loss was announced in April 2008. This is the first step towards achieving a more complete understanding of the status and evolution of the world’s living resources. GEO’s membership has increased to 73 countries plus the European Commission in 2007/2008. In addition, there are currently 51 participating organisations with a mandate in Earth observation or related activities, and seven observers (two countries and five organisations).

2.3. Regional cooperation in space activities In 2007/2008, regional and sub-regional organisations have continued to gain momentum. The regionalisation of space activities is one of the recent trends in the evolving space context, particularly in Asia, the Americas and Africa.37 In Asia, there are two main regional organisations with different memberships involved in space activities: the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). In recent years, major progress has been made under Chinese impulsion towards the establishment of APSCO as an intergovernmental organisation aiming at the facilitation of space cooperation in the region. Following the entry into force of the APSCO Convention on 12 October 2006, most of the attention and work in 2007/2008 were concentrated on consolidating the foundation of the organisation. In particular, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for Programme Planning for APSCO was held in Beijing (China) on 24–26 September 2007. About 40 participants from the nine signatory States of the APSCO Convention attended this meeting.38 The other Asian regional structure, the APRSAF, has also been active in 2007/2008 under Japanese leadership. The 14th session of APRSAF took place on 21–23 November 2007, for the first time in India. The main theme was “Space for Human Empowerment”, with the aim of strengthening and enabling the countries of the region to improve the quality of life of their citizens through the enhanced use of space-based systems, activities and services. More than 130 participants from 19 countries and five regional and international organisations 16

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

attended the event. At this occasion, the Sentinel Asia pilot project was announced as having been completed. This project permitted the successful sharing of disaster-related information from several Earth observation satellites, along with training and technical support. The next phase of Sentinel Asia (Step-2) for the 2008–2012 period was launched with the objective of expanding the utilisation of disaster-related information, including data on environmental changes. Also at the meeting, a new Joint Project Team for the implementation of the second phase was established. Finally, the proposal made by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) of a joint study on a small satellite concept focusing on disaster management and a pilot project to develop the technology for an APRSAF satellite was welcomed. In the Americas, a series of workshops and seminars was organised in 2007/ 2008 to support regional space activities, for instance by the Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education for Latin America and the Caribbean (CRECTEALC). However, the main regional activities are concentrated in the Space Conference of the Americas or Conferencia Espacial de las Americas (CEA) which seeks to facilitate dialogue and cooperation on space-related activities in the region. The sixth CEA was supposed to be held in Guatemala in 2009, but has been postponed to 2010. In Africa, the second African Leadership Conference on Space Science and Technology for Sustainable Development (ALC) focusing on the theme “Building African partnerships in space” was held on 2–5 October 2007.39 This ALC deliberated on the role of space science and technology for Africa’s present and future development, with an emphasis on the development of knowledge and skills. Various multilateral African projects on satellite applications in Earth observation and communications have gained momentum. Progress on the African Resource and Environment Management Constellation (AMC) has accelerated with the participation of Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. The first African communications satellite dedicated to covering the whole African continent, RASCOM-QAF1, was launched on 21 December 2007 for the pan-African operator RASCOM (Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation)40 and marks a great step forward for the continent. RASCOM-QAF1 aims at providing communications services as well as intercity and international phone lines, direct TV broadcast and internet access services to rural areas.41

2.4. Europe The major focus in recent months lay on the implementation of the first European Space Policy unanimously adopted in May 2007 during the fourth 17

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

Space Council by 29 European ministers in charge of space. Major developments also occurred at the programmatic level, such as the resolution of some difficulties concerning the Galileo programme or policy statements on space affairs by the executives or legislative branches of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

2.4.1. European Space Agency

ESA’s activities in 2007/2008 revolved around implementing the European Space Policy and other programmatic elements of the European Space Programme, but also around preparing the ESA Council meeting at Ministerial Level in November 2008. Moreover, ESA was particularly active in the technical and scientific aspects of space exploration, space science and space applications. ESA’s membership also increased in the last few months. On 28 May 2008, Slovenia became the second new EU Member State to sign a cooperative agreement with ESA after Estonia in June 2007. On 28 April 2008, Poland signed the Charter of the Plan for European Cooperating States (PECS) as a follow-up to its signature of the European Cooperating State Agreement in April 2007. Poland has been the fourth country to subscribe to PECS after Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania. ESA accounted for the largest share of Europe’s space expenditures and more than half of Europe’s total civil spending on space in 2007, with about 2.975 billion euros – a level similar to 2006.42 The European Space Astronomy Centre (ESAC) covering astronomy and solar system exploration activities was inaugurated in Spain on 7 February 2008, making it the sixth ESA establishment.

2.4.2. European Union

While the European Union does not yet have any direct responsibility for space issues despite the adoption of the European Space Policy in May 2007, it is foreseen that its role will increase in the near future with the entry into force of the “Lisbon Treaty” or an alternative document.43 The “Lisbon Treaty” aims at creating a legal framework for action by the European Union in areas which were previously not explicitly covered, including space. Using a very similar wording as the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (“the Draft Constitutional Treaty”), the Lisbon Treaty refers to “space” in two articles. 18

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

Article 4.3 states that: “In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.” Article 189, included under Title XIX headed “Research and technological development and space”, states that: “To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies, the Union shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space. In order to reach the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency. This Article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of this Title.” The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty thus clearly assign a “support competence” in the space field to the European Union, on the basis that space activities are recognised as a strategic instrument in the construction of Europe and European policies. In 2007/2008, the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (“European Presidency”) initiated a series of milestones at the EU-level. Space is increasingly used as a foreign diplomacy tool by the European Union and its services.44 The EU has established a series of bilateral dialogues with other space powers, particularly the United States and Russia. In addition, under the Portuguese Presidency, European-African cooperation in space development was an important agenda topic in the second half of 2007 next to Galileo issues. In December 2007, a “GMES for Africa” event was held in Lisbon (Portugal) as a first attempt to bring together actors from both continents to address the issue of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme and Africa.45 Two technical seminars (environment and agriculture; crisis response and monitoring for security) took place on 6 December 2007. The event “Space for 19

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

Development: The case of GMES and Africa” was then held on 7 December 2007. The overall Lisbon exercise led to the adoption of two documents, the Lisbon Declaration on “GMES and Africa” and the Lisbon Process on “GMES and Africa”, which support the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and first Action Plan (2008–2010). The Joint Africa-EU Strategy mentions space as supporting key development issues such as human and social development but also environmental sustainability and climate change. In the Action Plan, eight partnership areas and priority activities are singled out, one of which explicitly addresses the need for enhanced cooperation initiatives in space applications and technology to support Africa’s sustainable development objectives. The Portuguese Presidency also launched a two-year process leading to the drafting and consolidation of an Action Plan for the “GMES and Africa” partnership for approval at the third EUAfrica Summit scheduled for the end of 2009.46 In the first half of 2008, under the Slovenian Presidency, the main activities linked to space affairs concerned the re-profiling of the Galileo programme and the development of legislation concerning Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) in Europe. The GMES programme was also an element of attention. Another major concern of the Slovenian Presidency was the end of the public consultation period for the EU budget reform for the post-2013 period. The Council of the European Union was a major European actor involved in space affairs in 2007/2008. Two “formations” of the Council were particularly involved in space: the Competitiveness Council and the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council. Other Councils like the Economic and Financial Affairs Council were involved in space affairs on a more irregular basis. The Competitiveness Council was principally involved in overseeing space policy and the development of the GMES programme, while the TTE Council was mainly involved in monitoring Galileo issues and regulatory developments in the domain of MSS. In 2007/2008, the executive body of the European Union, the European Commission, pushed for a solution to the Galileo crisis by shifting the project from a public-private-partnership (PPP) scheme to a structure fully funded by public money. Within ten months, the Commission put forward a new plan and call for tender for the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the Galileo programme. Most efforts of the Commission focused on developing regulations for the further implementation of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes and on preparing the procurement phase.47 The Commission also continued to work on its second flagship, the GMES programme, and particularly the three Fast Track Services – the Emergency Response Core Service (ERCS), the Land Monitoring Core Service (LMCS) and the Marine Core Service (MCS) – as well as the GMES atmosphere and security 20

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

core services. In February 2008, the Commission approved funding for the recurrent satellites in each Sentinel Family needed for GMES. The Commission also put forward a proposal for the selection and authorisation of systems providing MSS which was then agreed upon by the European Parliament and the Council. The general objective of this proposal was to foster EU-wide MSS by overcoming the national selection and authorisation of MSSproviders to promote a competitive internal market for MSS to ensure that these transnational services work at their optimum potential. The current expenditures for space-related activities at the EU level are mainly spent under the Framework Programme (FP) rather than on operational programmes.48 However, this will change with the extra budgetary allocation to the Galileo programme approved in April 2008. The EU Member States earmarked 1.43 billion euros for space activities in the 2007–2013 timeframe (FP7). The first open call for proposals (FP7-SPACE-2007-1) closed on 19 June 2007 and had a budget of 34.5 million euros. Besides the space theme, other themes in the FP7 could channel additional financial resources to the space sector, such as the themes Information and Communication Technologies, Security, and Transport. For instance, the call for proposals which closed on 29 February 2008 (FP7-GALILEO-2007-GSA-1) had a budget of 25 million euros. Apart from the FP7, parts of the Trans-European Networks funds are also dedicated to space activities, specifically to the Galileo programme. Furthermore, with the budget agreed to by the European Parliament on 23 April 2008, EU funds of 3.4 billion euros over seven years in total, or an average of 485 million euros per year, will be allocated to the deployment of Galileo. Another 70 million euros are allocated to space activities through the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP).49 Over the 2007–2013 period it is therefore estimated that the European Union will spend about 700 million euros on space activities per year on average.50 The role of the European Parliament in space affairs has expanded considerably over the past years through the passing of legislation as well as through its authority over the European Union budget, and 2007/2008 was no exception. In particular, the European Parliament was a major actor in the Galileo deadlock. For instance, in the conciliation meeting of 23 November 2007, it reached an agreement with the Council and the Commission to revise the European Union’s financial framework for 2007–2013 with the purpose of providing Galileo with public funding taken mainly from unused farm-support funds. Furthermore, with the creation of the Galileo Inter-institutional Panel (GIP) composed of seven representatives including three from the European Parliament, the European Parliament has now more say in the political control of the project. Three specialised standing committees of the European Parliament were also active in tackling space issues in recent months. The Committee on Industry, 21

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Research and Energy (ITRE), the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) along with its Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) dealt with issues such as Galileo, MSS, space policy and space security.51

2.4.3. Other European institutions

Several other bodies and organs, particularly linked to parliamentary and regional structures, were active and influential in European space activities in 2007/2008. The Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) released a report on space issues through one of its permanent committees, the Technological and Aerospace Committee. The report entitled “Space Systems for Europe’s Security: GMES and Galileo – Reply to the annual report of the Council“ was released on 4 June 2008. A recommendation was subsequently adopted during the third sitting of the 54th Plenary Session on 4 June 2008.52 The European Interparliamentary Space Conference (EISC)53 held its ninth Conference on 8–9 October 2007 in Italy, during which the relation between the European Space Policy and its impact on the life of citizens, enterprises and public administrations was discussed. A final resolution was approved at the end of the Conference stressing, among other things, the need to strengthen the interrelations between the European Union, ESA, national agencies, national programmes and national parliaments. In 2008, the Czech Republic held the chairmanship of the EISC for the first time.54 In the first half of the year, two events were held. In February 2008, a workshop took place as part of the threeday Conference “NavAge 08”. A second workshop on space applications was held on 28 June 2008, also in Prague (Czech Republic), and dealt with the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with a particular view to the new EU Member States. Recognising that the European regions are increasingly involved in space activities from infrastructures to applications, the Network of European Regions Using Space Technologies (NEREUS) was formally established on 18 December 2007 in order to foster coordination and cooperation at the regional level as well as to influence decision-making on space-related activities. NEREUS intends to create a forum for dialogue exchange and discussion among the regions and the European space stakeholders. Representatives of twenty-three European regions from nine Member States were present and signed the NEREUS Charter, a formal document developing the scope and aims of the network.55 Since then, a total of 35 European regions representing ten EU Member States have expressed their interest in NEREUS.56 22

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

2.4.4. Eumetsat

In 2007/2008, following the successful launch of the first Metop polar-orbiting satellite (Metop-A) in October 2006, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) continued to expand beyond its core mission of providing operational meteorological observations. With the successful launch of the Jason-2 ocean altimetry satellite on 20 June 2008, it also included ocean surface topography in its portfolio since Eumetsat will act as an interface for the near-real-time product distribution to European users. Completing its push into new activities, the European meteorological agency continues to broaden its geographical presence. In particular, on 4 April 2008, Eumetsat and the African Union Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the contribution of Eumetsat to the African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development (AMESD) project by providing both data from its satellites and technical assistance and training.57 Eumetsat also continued to reinforce its trans-Atlantic ties. Besides its Jason-2 mission with the United States, it initiated a MoU with Canada on 18 October 2007. Eumetsat aims at advancing cooperation in satellite monitoring activities, in particular to improve weather, climate and environmental monitoring through the observation of the atmosphere and the oceans. The Eumetsat budget for 2007 covered total expenditures of 205 million euros compared to 251.9 million euros in 2006. This budget is largely financed by Member contributions as well as some limited additional income received from the licensed users of particular services.58 Finally, Slovenia became the latest full Member of Eumetsat in February 2008. Eumetsat now has 21 Member States59 and nine Cooperating States.60

2.4.5. National governments

The major European space countries were also the most active in 2007/2008 in terms of policy and strategy developments. However, other European countries have also been updating their national guidelines.

2.4.5.1. France

A series of high-level policy documents was released in France in the past months, illustrating the sustained support for space at a high political level. On 11 February 2008, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy gave a structuring policy speech in which he recalled the importance of the European dimension of 23

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

space activities as a condition for the success of an ambitious space policy, and encouraged a growing involvement of the European Union in space affairs. He stressed the need to strengthen Europe’s assets in space exploration and underlined Ariane’s role as a cornerstone of space policy and Europe’s space autonomy. In his speech, the French President mentioned four “programmes” suited for strengthening the European Union’s role: navigation (Galileo), Earth observation (GMES), climate change, and space surveillance. He also expressed his wish to significantly increase France’s national space defence budget. A French law on space activities was adopted by the French Parliament on 9 April 2008 and entered into force on 3 June 2008. This new law provides France with a legal framework for activities in space. In particular, it highlights the need for a national legal framework regulating the relation between the French government and private operators. The main objective of the law is the creation of a safe national framework while ensuring the competitiveness of France’s space activities. France has the largest civilian national budget in Europe, with about 1.466 billion euros. In 2007, the French space agency CNES had an estimated budget of 713 million euros allocated to its national programme, and the French contribution to ESA was about 753.2 million euros.61

2.4.5.2. Germany

Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her views on space matters on 14 February 2008 in a discussion with the STS-122 crew during the commissioning of the Columbus orbital module to the International Space Station (ISS). In her address, Chancellor Merkel referred to the necessity of inducing young people to take up engineering professions, and mentioned her willingness to create a favourable environment to this effect, among other things.62 The cooperative nature of space activities was also highlighted. In 2007, Germany allocated an estimated 912.17 million euros to civilian space activities, making it the second-largest institutional space spender in Europe. An estimated 290 million euros were spent by DLR (Deutsches Zentrum f€ur Luft- und Raumfahrt), while the German contribution to ESA was an estimated 578.2 million euros in 2007.63

2.4.5.3. Italy

In 2007, Italy held the chairmanship of the EISC for the second time. Italy is the third-largest European space power budget-wise: it spent about 744 million euros on civilian space activities in 2007 (with 369.9 million euros going to ESA and 24

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

about 349.3 million euros allocated to the national programme managed by the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana–ASI).64 2.4.5.4. The United Kingdom

The British space policy is in transition. The House of Commons’ Science and Technology Committee released a report entitled “2007: A Space Policy” on 17 July 2007.65 The report underlined that with space being a significant science and policy area, it is necessary for the Government to take a longer-term strategic approach to certain space activities like robotic exploration, satellite navigation and Earth observation. The report called for a civil space strategy to inspire and motivate the UK space sector. It also emphasised the need for the British National Space Centre (BNSC) to outline its activities and vision for space, and called for a more effective programme management. In particular, the need to strengthen the oversight of the space programmes was underlined. The report also called for more funding and new mechanisms to increase support for SMEs. It also considered the UK’s impact at the European level, both within ESA and the European Union’s programmes. On 14 February 2008, the British Government released its new strategy and proposals for the UK’s future involvement in space, the so-called “UK Civil Space Strategy: 2008–2012 and beyond”. The main cornerstones of this strategy are: *

*

*

*

Continued UK involvement in Earth observation, space science and communications development; Continued close cooperation with ESA and the establishment of an ESA facility at Harwell (Oxfordshire) which will focus on climate change, robotic space exploration and applications; Closer involvement in international initiatives regarding the future shape of space exploration to the Moon, Mars and beyond; Setting up of a National Space Technology Programme to support the development of new, innovative technologies and services.

The strategy identifies space as a “strategic economic sector”. Therefore, the British government proposed a set of amendments to lower the insurance costs for space companies and thus promote commercial space activities on its territory. Furthermore, while the UK had since 1986 rejected the idea of manned spaceflight, this position changed at the beginning of 2008 when the new space strategy stated that the UK was now interested in astronaut-related programmes, although neither deadlines nor budgetary estimations were detailed. The United Kingdom is the last member of the four large European space spenders. In Fiscal Year 2007/2008, it spent an estimated 318.2 million euros on 25

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

civilian space programmes, including about 75 million for national programmes and about 243.3 million euros for ESA.66

2.5. The United States In the United States, space security became a major agenda item in high-level policy circles following the Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test of January 2007.67 This event forced the United States to develop new strategies and capabilities. In particular, the White House issued a classified memorandum in summer 2007 on the importance of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), i.e. the monitoring and identification of space objects for determining whether they pose a threat. The United States in February 2008 destroyed also an old U.S. reconnaissance satellite that would have posed a risk upon re-entry to the Earth. Furthermore, confirming its longstanding position on international space security in international fora, the United States rejected both the annual PAROS resolution and the new Russian/ Chinese draft on PPWT presented in February 2008. With a budget of about 36.653 billion euros (a level similar to 2006), the United States was the main space power and clear hegemon according to the budget criterion in 2007.68 Moreover, the relative stagnation of the United States’ overall space budget in 2007 compared to 2006 is linked to the fact that many U.S. government agencies were subject to a “continuing resolution” for the 2007 Fiscal Year. This year-long spending resolution implied that most U.S. agencies were funded at the same level as in the previous year. The largest difference between NASA’s funding request and appropriation concerned the amount it was foreseen to spend on science missions and crossagency support activities. Relatively more funds were allocated to science and aeronautics and less funds than requested to exploration and cross-agency matters. The Government’s request for Fiscal Year 2009 contains a modest rise for NASA (þ1.8%), reaching 12.048 billion euros. While the proposed budget would keep the development of the space transportation infrastructure on track, the new budget proposal also reflects the White House’s push for a greater emphasis on Earth observation and climate change research, since the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) would have additional funds for planetary science and Earth observation missions geared towards studying climate change. The United States invested an estimated 24.282 billion euros in the military/ intelligence segment in 2007. This figure includes Department of Defense (DoD) space affairs, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and part of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The U.S. military space budget is thus by far the largest in the world.69 26

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

2.6. Russia The Russian space policy and its implementation is gaining momentum. Russia is currently implementing three major civil space programmes: the 2006–2015 Federal Space Programme, the Federal Target Programme 2002–2011 on GLONASS, and the 2006–2015 Federal Target Programme on the Development of Russia’s Cosmodromes. This new political drive has awakened new ambitions in space following the country’s economic recovery in recent years. The Russian space budget was estimated at about 1.256 billion euros in 2007.70 Furthermore, on 11 April 2008, Russia’s Security Council approved a draft space policy for the period until 2020 and beyond.71 The document specifies Russia’s national interests, key objectives and priorities in the areas of space research, the utilisation of space, and international space cooperation. This policy aims at retaining Russia’s status as a leading space power. Among the country’s principal goals are a guaranteed access to space and the maintenance of an independent space industry. One of the recent main issues and activities in Russia’s space programme has been to become a major partner in the ISS venture. Russia also continues its work on its GNSS constellation, the GLONASS system. A speech given by President Vladimir Putin at the occasion of the adoption of the draft space policy unfolded into five main themes: guaranteed access to outer space; the need for a clear outline for developing Russia’s orbiting constellations; an increased Russian presence in the world market for space apparatuses; modernising Russia’s technology and creating a more dynamic human resource potential; and the need to make effective use of the scientific and resource potentials of related scientific programmes.72 The Russian space industry is also in transition, trying to increase its competitiveness by consolidating the industrial base in each branch.

2.7. Japan On 26 May 2008, Japan’s new space law which commits Japan to a series of major administrative and conceptual changes was finally endorsed by the Diet, the Japanese parliament.73 It contains three main elements. *

Firstly, it sets up both a new Minister for Space Development who will be appointed by and reporting directly to the Prime Minister, and a “Space Development Headquarters” residing in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. The new law therefore places all space-related projects under one unified programme, allowing for better coordination and strategic planning. 27

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

*

*

Secondly, the “Basic Law of Space Activities” reconsiders the assumption of the “exclusively peaceful purpose” clause in the Diet resolution of 1969 to allow the use of space assets by military authorities. Thirdly, elements of the law concern ways and means to increase the competitiveness of the Japanese industry. In particular, in order to promote Japan’s “industrialisation”, the Basic Law calls for the strengthening of industrial capability and the establishment of publicly-funded autonomous businesses.

The first Space Development Minister Fumio Kishida, the former Science Policy Minister, was appointed in June 2008. However, he was replaced by Seiko Noda in August 2008 and she has kept her portfolio under the new Prime Minister Taro Aso. The Secretariat of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development was established on 26 August 2008. It was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat as the Government’s management office for space development. A Basic Space Plan is foreseen to be drafted and approved by the Prime Minister by May 2009. The Japanese space agency, JAXA, is also in transition. In its second mid-term plan (April 2008–March 2013) it has set itself two main objectives: first to foster the utilisation of technologies contributing to a secure and prosperous society and to the expansion of human frontiers, and second to focus on research and the demonstration of technologies. As to the first objective, JAXA deals with environmental issues and disasters on a global scale by focusing on the three areas of global environment observation, disaster monitoring and communications, and satellite positioning. To reach the second objective, JAXA relies on the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) Kibo (Hope), and strives to produce worldclass results in selected scientific domains (e.g. X-ray astronomy). JAXA seeks to concentrate its resources on selected fields where it possesses either a technical advantage or which are deemed conducive to societal benefits or comprehensive security. JAXA has also transformed itself into a mission-oriented organisation by creating mission directorates implementing this mid-term plan. Japan’s investment in space focuses almost exclusively on civilian space activities. In 2007, Japan allocated an estimated 1.512 billion euros to space affairs.74

2.8. China China has in recent years emerged as a major space power with ambitious goals backed by heavy investments and strong political support. In this context, the COSTIND (Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence) which had previously been in charge of the military industrial complex was merged into a new super-Ministry called the Ministry of Industry and 28

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

Information (MII) and renamed into the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) in early March 2008, for the purpose of implementing, streamlining and reorganising China’s institutional structure.75 2007/2008 was a symbolic year for China’s space exploration activities, as China successfully launched its first lunar orbiter Chang’e 1 on 24 October 2007. This major accomplishment for China’s space efforts echoed the first Chinese human spaceflight launch and reflected China’s ambition to master all space activities. Chinese President Hu Jintao considered this successful mission as placing China among the countries with a real capacity for space exploration.76 China’s space budget generates much speculation and is difficult to appraise. However, taking into account the 2006 White Paper on Space and also the plans of the ex-COSTIND and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC), it is estimated to have increased.

2.9. India India’s space policy is currently shifting trajectory. Since its inception, the Indian space programme has been dominated by a pragmatic approach which saw space activities predominantly as a means to support the country’s development. Space applications were therefore the main priority of the Indian space programme along with ensuring autonomous access to space, as indicated by the 11th Five Year-Plan (1 April 2007–31 March 2012) approved by the National Development Council on 19 December 2007 which identified five main objectives: *

*

* * *

Improve India’s space communications and navigation capacities (through R&D, use of high power Ka band satellites, etc.); Become a leader in Earth observation (through the improvement of India’s imaging and data processing capacities as well as of applications for use in agriculture, land, water resource and infrastructural management, etc.); Develop space transportation systems; Develop space science; Promoting spin-offs.77

However, in a changing regional space context, India’s space agency ISRO is eager to start a human spaceflight programme, which would mark a very big step for India.78 In spring 2008, ISRO submitted a project outline for a proposed first manned space mission in the 2014–2015 timeframe to the Indian government, with a decision to be expected by the end of 2008. 29

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

The increasing funds made available for the Indian space activities in recent years illustrate the country’s ambition in space and the priority status awarded to the national space programme by the Indian government. In 2007, a budget of 659 million euros was estimated to have been allocated to space affairs in India.79

2.10. Emerging space powers Besides the traditional space powers, a variety of new actors have increased their involvement in space in the last months and have put forth new strategies and plans. In Africa, various multilateral projects on satellite applications in the areas of Earth observation and communications are gaining momentum (e.g. the African Resource and Environment Management Constellation (AMC) or RASCOMQAF1). National developments are also on-going, particularly in South Africa. On 5 December 2007, the Cabinet approved the establishment of a national space agency which will be tasked with coordinating the use of space technology and local science research. As of June 2008, however, the Bill entitled “South African National Space Agency Bill” was still debated in the South African Parliament. A draft of the first South African space policy document was also under preparation by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Major plans and activities were also proposed by emerging space actors in Asia in 2007/2008. South Korea is particularly making notable investments and progress in indigenous space capabilities and programmes, although it became involved in space activities later than its Asian counterparts. For instance, South Korea’s first astronaut Yi So-yeon went to the ISS aboard the Russian spacecraft SoyouzTMA-12 in April 2008.80 South Korea also released its “Long-Term Plan for National Space Development Promotion” in 2007, which provides a vision and direction for the national space policy through 2016. The objectives of the next decade include the development of a reliable indigenous launch vehicle, more capable Earth observation systems, and exploration activities. The plan also changes the focus of attention from a programmatic approach to the acquisition of an independent core space technology. In line with South Korea’s hope of becoming a regional space leader and a major space-faring country, its programme has received increasing funding in recent years. Budget-wise, the government plans to invest 189 million euros in 2008 to boost the country’s space industry.81 Furthermore, according to the South Korean authorities, the amount spent on 30

2. Worldwide space policies and strategies

space programmes will double relative to the last decade in the next ten years (i.e. from 1.015 billion euros in 1996–2007 to 2.149 billion euros).82 Finally, Vietnam as the last Asian space actor in the period 2007/2008 launched its first communications Vinasat-1 satellite on 18 April 2008, illustrating the growing interest of the Vietnamese government in space activities. In the Middle East, Israel launched two satellites in the 2007/2008 period: a reconnaissance synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite (TechSAR) in January 2008 onboard an Indian launcher, and a communications satellite (Amos-3) on 28 April 2008 (this satellite has since been renamed Amos-60). In the Arab States, plans of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)83 to launch a joint remote-sensing satellite have also been reported.84 Following the launch of an Iranian sounding rocket on 25 February 2007, a new suborbital test flight was successfully conducted on 4 February 2008 using the twostage rocket Safir (Envoy). In addition to the space segment, Iran has also been developing its ground segment for telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) and data acquisition. Regardless of the technical characteristics of the launchers and payloads, the level of Iran’s activities in the past months and its plans for the next years demonstrate Iran’s continued intention to further advance and develop its space capabilities. In Oceania, Australia is augmenting its space activities which had been modest since the 1970s due to a greater interest in Australia’s space involvement at the political level. In particular, a bipartisan investigation was approved by the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Economics which seeks to identify ways to strengthen and expand Australia’s position in space science, industry and education. This enquiry follows the release in October 2007 of a plan developed by the Australian space science community under the leadership of the Australian Academy of Science’s National Committee for Space Science.85 The preliminary findings of the Senate investigation were released on 23 June 2008. Major developments also occurred in Latin America in 2007/2008, particularly in Brazil. The recent Brazilian policy directive has been to promote the commercialisation of the means of access to space. In this context, space activities were added to the PAC (Plan for Growth Acceleration) 2007–2011 to stimulate private and public investments, particularly the implementation of the full infrastructure of the Alc^antara Launch Center. Brazil is also developing the scientific satellite Lattes designed to observe atmospheric phenomena in the equatorial region such as luminescence, electric discharges, etc. Brazil also continues its involvement of access to space with Russia and in space applications within the scope of the “South-South” cooperation in Earth observation, as exemplified by the successful launch of CBERS-2B in September 2007 in cooperation with China. 31

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues The size of the global space sector is estimated by the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) to have been about 126.906 billion euros in 2007 including both institutional space budgets and commercial space revenues.86 The revenues of the global space industry are estimated to have reached 78.065 billion euros, while the institutional space budgets (including civil and military budgets) added up to an estimated 48.841 billion euros in 2007.87

3.1. Overview of institutional space budgets Institutional space budgets accounted for an estimated 38.4% of the global space activities in 2007. Public spending for space programmes at a global level remained robust in 2007 following the sustained budgetary allocation of the U.S. and European space budgets, as well as continued growth in the space expenditures of the space agencies in Asia and Russia. It is estimated that like in 2006, military/intelligence investments constituted the largest share in the public allocations to space activities, amounting to about 52% of the world’s public budgets in 2007. However, the size of the overall military/intelligence sector is certainly underestimated due to the secrecy of defence budgets in general and particularly those of Russia and China. While the total budgets for civilian space programmes are less important than the total budgets for space military/intelligence (23.489 billion euros were dedicated to civilian space programmes in 2007), they are more common. All over the world, an increasing share of the institutional budgets is allocated to civilian space activities due to the continuing internationalisation and globalisation of space affairs.88 However, while the number of countries investing in space is growing, differences in the invested amounts remain high, with the major spacefaring countries accounting for an overwhelmingly large share of the world’s institutional space expenditures. The trend of different dynamics in institutional investment prevalent in 2006 continued in 2007, with Asia and others significantly augmenting their space efforts. Only the United States, France, Japan, China, Russia, Germany and Italy are estimated to have spent more than 800 million euros on space in 2007 (Figure 1). Without considering the estimated increase in the size of the Chinese space budget, the hierarchy is similar to that of 2006. Civilian space spending is not always limited to national space agencies, although they usually administer most of a country’s civilian space budget. When looking at the top 10 agencies according to their budgets, the list is – not 32

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

36653

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Fig. 1: Estimate of the major space powers’ public space budgets in 2007.

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Fig. 2: Estimate of the top 10 space institutions according to their space budgets in 2007 and 2006.90

surprisingly – dominated by the United States, with five of the ten agencies in the list being U.S. agencies (Figure 2). Like in 2006, the DoD is the biggest space agency in the world, followed by NASA (Figure 2). These two agencies account 33

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

for 54% of all public funding spent on space worldwide. The United States has also two intelligence-related agencies in the top 10 list: the NRO, in charge of developing and operating dedicated intelligence and reconnaissance space assets, and the NGA, in charge of exploiting the gathered data. The fifth U.S. agency in the top 10 list is the NOAA that focuses on the condition of the oceans and the atmosphere. Two European agencies appear in the list: ESA, the second largest civilian space agency in the world, and CNES, the French space agency. Japan, Russia and India complete the top 10 list (Figure 2).89 Compared to 2006, a slight change in the ranking can be observed, with CNES having overtaken JAXA and the Russian space agency Roscosmos having overtaken NOAA in the 2007 hierarchy.

3.2. Overview of commercial space markets The annual revenues of the commercial space sector increased in overall terms from 2006 to 2007, to reach an estimated 78.065 billion euros in 2007.91 On the one hand, this was due to the aforementioned sustained institutional investment in space and on the other hand to a growing demand for new applications and services. Commercial space revenues were principally concentrated on satellite services and ground equipment. Combined, those two segments represented about 95% of the world’s commercial space markets in 2007 (Table 4). Satellite services are the major source of commercial revenues to the space sector (Table 4). In broad terms, satellite services comprise three sectors: Direct Broadcast Services (DBS), Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) and MSS. The revenues of the DBS sector, made up of direct-to-home (DTH) television and satellite radio services, represented three quarters of the total satellite service Tab. 4: Estimated breakdown of global commercial space revenues in 2007. Type

Value in billion euros

Satellite manufacturing

2.6

Launch industry

1.05

Ground equipment

23.461

Satellites services

50.5

Insurance

0.410

Space tourism

0.044

Total 34

78.065

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

revenues in 2007 and reached an estimated 39.330 billion euros.92 While DTH is the dominant DBS segment, satellite radio continued to experience a strong growth in 2007 fuelled principally by subscriber growth and the increasing availability of receivers (pre-installed or offered as an option in automobiles). Revenues from FSS and other elements such as transponder agreements, network management services, remote sensing or end-user broadband grew by 1.505 billion euros to 9.781 billion euros in 2007.93 Most revenues accrued from the leasing of transponder capacity to commercial and governmental customers for video distribution and broadcasting as well as for high-speed data distribution and internet access. In most market studies, remote sensing revenues are included in the FSS data. Revenues from space-based Earth observation have been growing due to extending military and intelligence contracts and the increasing development of mapping services and, in particular, web-based portals like Google Earth or Virtual Earth. According to BCC Research, the remote sensing market was estimated at about 4.993 billion euros in 2007, with an estimated 1.3 billion euros coming from Earth imagery and related solutions for imagery and products with a resolution of three metres or better.94 In 2007, MSS revenues grew modestly to reach about 1.436 billion euros.95 MSS operators provide voice and data services using a network of one or more satellites in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) or Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and associated ground facilities. The overall growth of MSS revenues was driven by a growing demand for TV and broadband as well as voice and data services, but also by the rollout of new applications requiring higher bandwidth. The increasing availability of lower-cost, lightweight terminals has also helped to drive up demand. Satellite manufacturing revenues declined from 8.208 billion euros in 2006 to 7.934 billion euros in 2007.96 However, satellite manufacturing revenues from commercial customers grew by 27% to 2.6 billion euros in 2007.97 Companies involved in this sector design and manufacture satellites, space systems and space system components for commercial and governmental customers whose applications include DBS, FSS, MSS, space-based Earth observation, and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT). Launch industry revenues increased by 19% to reach 2.189 billion euros in 2007.98 Based on estimates of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 2007 revenues of the 23 commercial launches identified were evaluated at about 1.059 billion euros, an increase of about 86 million euros from 2006. Europe generated most revenues from commercial launch services, followed by Russia and the United States (Figure 3). Ground equipment revenues, the second largest segment of space industry revenues (Table 4), reached 23.461 billion euros in 2007, which is an increase of 35

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 53%

1% 5% 10% Europe

31% Russia

United States

Multinational

Indian

Fig. 3: Share of revenues generated by commercial launch services in 2007.

19% from 2006.99 This rise was fuelled mostly by revenues from consumer equipment due to an increase in the number of end-user terminals in all sectors. However, this estimate excludes revenues from consumer electronics incorporating PNT technologies, such as mobile phones. According to Aon, the space insurance market was worth an estimated 410 million euros in launch and in-orbit premiums in 2007.100 The size of the commercial orbital and suborbital human spaceflight sector was estimated at about 44 million euros in 2007.101 In the domain of orbital space tourism, Charles Simony became the fifth space tourist by paying an estimated 23 million euros in April 2007. While it is difficult to accurately gauge the size of suborbital space tourism as a business sector, the emerging private space-travel industry has seen some developments in the past months that might lead to a price competition years before the first privately-financed vehicles are scheduled to fly. For the past few years, commercial suborbital spaceflight has been virtually synonymous with a single company – Virgin Galactic – but other newcomers are poised to enter the market, particularly EADS and XCOR Aerospace.

3.3. Evolution of the space industry The space industry is in transition, as the trend of a rapidly increasing number of consolidations, mergers and strategic alliances which started a few years ago has been gaining momentum. The restructuring of the space sector now concerns all subsectors, but also all sizes of companies involved in it. The space industry is therefore experiencing a consolidation phase both at the prime and at the equipment supplier level. In the various space-faring countries, different policies and practices are being devised to promote a robust industrial and technological 36

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

base and to support and enhance the global economic competitiveness of the space sector stakeholders in these countries.

3.3.1. Industrial evolution in Europe

In 2007/2008 the shareholding of the major European communications satellite operators has continued to change, as major takeovers occurred. On 20 August 2007, the European Commission approved the acquisition of Telenor Satellite Services by the investment fund Apax Partners for 274 million euros.102 On 31 October 2008, Spain’s Abertis telecom reached an agreement with ENSAFECA Holding Empresarial and BBVA to acquire a 28.4% stake in the Spanish satellite operator Hispasat for 199 million euros. This latest transaction was authorised by the Spanish Cabinet on 15 February 2008, making Abertis the largest shareholder in Hispasat.103 Abertis telecom’s entry into Hispasat consolidates the strategy initiated by the acquisition of 32% of the capital shares of Eutelsat (also a Hispasat shareholder).104 Lehman Brothers International raised its share in the MSS operator Inmarsat to 15%.105 In the meantime, Harbinger Capital has become the largest shareholder of Inmarsat with about 28.8%. On 31 January 2008, the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) exercised an option (“put option”) under an existing agreement to sell an additional 15% of the satellite-fleet operator SES Sirius to the Luxembourg-based SES. This transaction increases SES’s ownership of the Swedish operator from 75% to 90%. In the area of space manufacturing and services, a series of mergers, takeovers and strategic alliances occurred in 2007/2008. On 7 April 2008, EADS Astrium announced that it had acquired about 99% of Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) from the University of Surrey106 for 61 million euros. It is expected that SSTL will complement Astrium’s existing space capabilities in the design and manufacturing of small and micro satellites. In March 2008, EADS signed an agreement with Khrunichev Centre (FGUP M.V.Khrunichev GKNPTs) to jointly supply the Russian Satellite Communications Co. (RSCC) with a new generation of high power spacecraft.107 In the meantime, Thales Alenia Space concluded a wide-ranging cooperation agreement with NPO PM (Academician M.F. Reshetnyov Scientific and Production Association of Applied Mechanics) on 6 December 2007. In particular, the parties agreed to jointly develop a new low-cost high-power communications satellite bus. With navigation being a fast-growing business and location-based services expanding rapidly into mobile communications devices, several major acquisi37

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

tions occurred in the navigation and communications segment in recent months. On 1 October 2007, Nokia and NAVTEQ announced a definitive agreement for Nokia to acquire NAVTEQ for an aggregate purchase price of approximately 5.54 billion euros.108 Moreover, TomTom acquired Tele Atlas for about 2.7 million euros in mid-May 2008109 after the European Commission’s investigation and conclusion that the transaction would not have any significant impact on effective competition.110

3.3.2. Industrial evolution in the United States

Several cross-mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. entities occurred in 2007/2008. Alliant Techsystems (ATK) announced on 8 January 2008 that it agreed to buy Canada’s largest space hardware manufacturer, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), for 889 million euros. However, Industry Canada rejected the takeover on 10 April 2008 on the grounds that it would have been a bad deal for Canada. Moreover, the Canadian Industry Minister Jim Prentice indicated the importance of the Radarsat-2 satellite, which is manufactured by MDA, for safeguarding Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic region.111 Universal Space Network Inc. (USN), a leading provider of space operations and ground control and communications services, purchased the satellite tracking and control assets of Honeywell Technology Solutions’ Datalynx in February 2008. On 7 February 2008, the start-up MSS operator TerreStar announced that EchoStar Corp. and private-equity investor Harbinger Capital as well as other unnamed investors had agreed to invest 205 million euros in the company. This was to allow the completion of the development and launch of TerreStar-1 and the initiation of work on the TerreStar-2 satellite.112 On 4 February 2008, Intelsat announced the successful closing of the acquisition of the entire primary equity ownership of Intelsat Holdings, valued at approximately 3.42 billion euros, by Serafina Holdings (an entity formed by funds advised by BC Partners, Silver Lake and other equity investors). The Canadian firm Telesat was acquired on 31 October 2007 by Loral Space & Communications and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSP) of Canada through the joint venture company Acquireco for 3.25 billion Canadian dollars (about 1.9 billion euros). Loral now owns 64% of the company and PSP owns the remaining 36% of the now fourth-largest satellite fleet operator. The U.S. Department of Justice issued an outright approval on 24 March 2008 for the merger of the satellite-radio companies Sirius Satellite Radio and XM 38

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

Satellite Radio after concluding that the merger would not “substantially reduce competition”.113 The proposed three billion euros-merger was subsequently approved by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in summer 2008.

3.3.3. Industrial evolution in Russia

The Russian space industry faces important shifts due to an attempt from the highest political level in Russia to halt the decline of the country’s industrial base. The Russian space sector has therefore undergone fundamental changes in recent months which aimed at enhancing its competitiveness. In a speech on 11 April 2008, President Putin emphasised the importance of competitiveness and the promotion of high-tech developments and services in the space sector. The Russian space industry strategy involves several new developments: first, the formation of ten to eleven horizontally and vertically integrated structures by 2010; and second, the organisation of these integrated structures into three to four space corporations which will encompass most of the field’s main enterprises before 2015. This strategy is likely to lead to a completely reshaped and streamlined industry. The consolidation of the Russian industry into major holdings which started in 2006 has continued in recent months following several Presidential decrees. A new holding company was created in fall 2007 around the Russian Scientific Research Institute for Space Instrument Engineering, known as RNII KP. On 29 February 2008, the Scientific and Research Institute of Chemical Engineering and the Scientific and Research Institute of Chemical and Construction Machine Manufacturing were reorganised into the Rocket and Space Industry Research and Test Centre. On 3 March 2008, further shifts were ordered for the ex-NPO PM (Academician M.F. Reshetnev Research and Development Association of Applied Mechanics). The company underwent a State registration at that time to become a joint-stock company called Academician M.F. Reshetnev Information Satellite System, made up of a total of nine subsidiaries. Finally, in May 2008, the State Rocket Centre Academician V.P. Makeyev Design Bureau was reorganised into the Makeyev State Rocket Centre (MSRC) integrating four subsidiaries. The newly created entities are planned to offer a comprehensive range of space products and services. Russian space enterprises are also cooperating with international partners, particularly European companies (EADS and Thales Alenia Space) in the area of satellite manufacturing. Finally, in the launch sector, the announcement was made on 29 May 2008 that the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Centre acquired the shares 39

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

of the launch service provider International Launch Services (ILS) owned by the majority shareholder Space Transport Inc.114 3.3.4. Industrial evolution in Japan

The Japanese space policy is in transition, with one of its goals being to raise the competitiveness of Japan’s industrial base. In this context, SkyPerfect JSAT Corp. announced the purchase of Space Communications Corp. (SSC) for about 185 million euros on 13 February 2008.115 This acquisition consolidates JSAT’s position as the world’s fifth-largest satellite fleet operator. JSAT and SSC will combine ground operations as well as in-orbit operations and expect to secure satellite launches and insurance contracts under better conditions. The aim of this transaction was to obtain a competitive advantage in the satellite industry in order to promote expansion strategies in the “subscription multi-channel pay TV market”.116 The first Japanese-built commercial satellite was also finished in 2007/2008 and launched in summer 2008. The Mitsubishi Electric Corp. (Melco) built the Superbird-7 satellite for SCC. This satellite is the first made-in-Japan commercial spacecraft ordered by a Japanese fleet operator. This event illustrates Melco’s interest in establishing a position as a competitive and reliable actor in the commercial satellite manufacturing market. 3.3.5. Industrial evolution in China

China continued its efforts to develop and improve its space industry in 2007/ 2008, particularly in the areas of commercial satellite manufacturing and launch services, to have a mature space industry on par with its global aspirations. The Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC) unveiled a plan in summer 2008 to set up four more scientific research and production bases in three regions of China with a total of eight space industry centres in the coming years. CASTC ambitions are also to acquire up to 10% of the international commercial satellite market and 15% of the world commercial space launch services market by 2015. The Chinese space sector is therefore in the process of being transformed to achieve greater competitiveness.

3.4. Industrial overview A sectoral analysis allows the appraisal of the overall state of the main segments and markets of the space sector as well as of the competitiveness of the major 40

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

space-faring countries’ industrial bases. In particular, three segments need to be assessed: the launch segment, the satellite manufacturing segment and the satellite operators segment, since they are the driving forces of the space sector.

3.4.1. Launch sector

Launch services are an enabler of other space activities rather than a significant economic activity per se. However, reliable and affordable access to space is essential for developing space infrastructures and support existing and new services. Launch providers from Russia, the United States, China, Europe, India, Japan, Israel and the multinational consortium Sea Launch conducted a total of 68 launches in 2007 compared to 66 launches from six countries plus Sea Launch in 2006. Three of the 68 orbital launches – two commercial launches and one noncommercial launch – failed. The 23 commercial orbital launches which occurred in 2007 represented about 33% of the total launches of the year, similar to last year’s level (21 commercial launches). Russian-built vehicles conducted 12 commercial launches in 2007, accounting for an estimated 53% of the market, followed by Europe (six commercial launches representing a market share of 26%), the United States (three commercial launches representing 13% of the launch market) and finally Sea Launch and India (one commercial launch and 4% of the market share each). In 2007, Arianespace confirmed its position as the dominant commercial launch services provider. Six successful Ariane 5 launches were performed from the Guiana Space Centre as well as three Soyuz launches from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Arianespace launched 12 of the 15 commercial communications satellites launched that year, including three satellites originally planned for competitors’ launchers. Its subsidiary, Starsem, conducted three successful launches orbiting nine satellites (eight satellites for the Globalstar constellation and the Radarsat-2 satellite). While ILS planned to launch up to six satellites in 2007 depending on satellite delivery schedules, it only launched three satellites successfully because of a launch failure on 6 September 2007 due to a damaged wiring harness. ILS’s launcher, the Proton launch vehicle, was consequently grounded for almost two months in the fall of 2007. Furthermore, an anomaly on 15 March 2008 left an SES Americom AMC-14 spacecraft in an incorrect orbit when the Proton’s Breeze M upper stage shut down prematurely.117 In 2007, Sea Launch conducted only one launch, which was unsuccessful and resulted in the loss of the NSS-8 satellite for SES New Skies on 30 January 2007. 41

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

Consequently, the 25th mission of Sea Launch was delayed for almost one year until 15 January 2008 also due to satellite delays as well as difficult conditions in the Pacific Ocean.118 Land Launch, which is a joint venture of the Boeing-led Sea Launch and Space International Services, entered into service on 28 April 2008 with the successful launch of Amos-3. When looking at the commercial mass launched per launch service provider, Arianespace dominated with 64% of the total commercial mass launched into Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) in 2007. ILS launched about 27% of the total commercial mass launched to GTO, and Sea Launch launched 9%. Concerning non-GTO launches, Boeing launched 35% of the total commercial mass launched followed by Starsem (34%), which corresponds to about six metric tons each. Kosmotras and AKO Polyot launched 19% and 9% of the commercial mass to non-GTO, respectively. An estimated 37 contracts for GEO communications satellites were signed in 2007.119 The main actors in this area were Arianespace, ILS and Sea Launch (Figure 4).120 In 2007, Arianespace won 13 new “Service and Solutions” contracts for launches into GEO, and two contracts for four Soyuz launches orbiting 24 satellites for the LEO Globalstar constellation as well as four Elisa (ELectronic Intelligence by SAtellite) satellites. In its first year as an independent company marketing the Proton Breeze M vehicle from the Baikonur Cosmodrome,121 ILS signed contracts for 17 launches, including a five-launch agreement with SES.122 Following the technical failures and delays in its activities, Sea Launch signed only two contracts in 2007 compared to five satellites orders in 2006.123 A newcomer in the commercial launch services provider market is the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). In 2007, it signed one contract to

46%

43%

3% Arianespace Sea Launch SpaceX

3%

5% International Launch Services China Great Wall Industry Corporation

Fig. 4: Worldwide shares of GEO orders signed per launch services provider in 2007. 42

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

launch the Palapa-D communications satellites for PT Indosat aboard a Chinese Long March 3 B rocket in late 2009. Finally, the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) signed a contract with the UK-based Avanti Communications Group (Avanti) for the launch of the HYLAS satellite onboard a SpaceX Falcon 9.124

3.4.2. Satellite manufacturing sector

The space-based communications sector is the most mature market of all space applications and constitutes the core business area of the satellite manufacturers. The health of the commercial satellite communications market thus determines to a great extent the sustainability of the space industry as such. In this context, an appraisal of the satellite manufacturing market share of the GEO communications satellites ordered for a particular year is a good proxy of the vitality of a national space industry, since it reflects the industry’s competitiveness in the most lucrative segment of the satellite manufacturing market. A total of 115 payloads were launched in 2007125 (compared to 101 in 2006), of which 27% were commercial (compared to 23% in 2006). The United States was the leader in the number of payloads manufactured and launched in 2007 with about 38%, followed by Russia (about 15%), Europe (12%) and China (8%). Out of the 27 commercial payloads launched in 2007, 14 aimed at GEO and 13 at other orbits. The United States was the leader in the area of commercial satellites manufacturing in 2007, as nine U.S.-built satellites were launched into GEO (64% of the market share). Europe had a market share of about 29% of all commercial satellites manufactured, with three satellites built by Thales Alenia Space and one by EADS Astrium. China manufactured one commercial satellite in 2007, which confirms its increasing involvement in this domain. 2007 was a solid year in terms of orders. According to company announcements and industry officials, 25 firm GEO communications satellites were ordered in 2007, including 20 commercial ones. U.S. manufacturers won 14 contracts for GEO communications satellites, including 11 commercial contracts. Europe followed with eight contracts, all of them commercial. China won two contracts and Israel one. When looking at the performance of the satellite manufacturers, Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC) was the leader with five orders including four domestic ones (Figure 5). Space System/Loral (SS/L) had four firm orders, out of which 75% were domestic. The European “primes” (EADS Astrium and Thales Alenia Space) together had eight firm orders, five of which came from outside Europe. 43

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

5

Number of orders

4

3

2

1

I IA

T AS C

L/ L SS

SC O

ar tin M

Lo

ck

he

ed

Bo ei ng

Th al es

S/ D EA

Th

al

es

EA

Al

D

en

S

ia

As

tri um

Sp ac e

0

Domestic order

Non-domestic order

Fig. 5: Commercial GEO satellite orders in 2007 by manufacturer.

This confirms the competitiveness not only of these companies’ products and services but also of the European space industry as a whole (Figure 5). In 2007, five GEO non-commercial communications satellites were ordered, with three orders from the United States and two from China. However, as in 2006, no single manufacturer was able to win a non-commercial GEO communications satellite outside its captive domestic market. In 2007, OSC was the overall world leader in terms of GEO communications satellites orders with five orders. It was followed by SS/L and Boeing, both with four orders (Figure 6). Thales Alenia Space had seven orders, but this included five satellites to be developed by EADS as the co-prime. EADS had six orders (including five satellites to be developed jointly with Thales Alenia Space) (Figure 6). Finally, Lockheed Martin, CAST and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) had four orders in total last year. In 2007, a trend witnessed in recent years continued in that the two-largest space hardware manufacturers Boeing and Lockheed Martin were not very active in the commercial market (only one order each) but instead focused their efforts on the U.S. governmental market. Despite the market entry of new actors from the “South”, European and U.S. companies are still leading in the commercial satellite manufacturing market. 44

3. Worldwide space budgets and revenues

5

Number of orders

4

3

2

1

0 e

um

ac

tri

DS

EA

As

le

sA

le ha

nia

Sp

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EA

les

ha

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g

ar

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Bo

ed

M

tin

C

OS

/L

SS

ST

CA

I

IA

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h ck

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T

Commercial

Non-commercial

Fig. 6: GEO commercial and non-commercial satellite orders won in 2007 by satellite manufacturer.

3.4.3. Satellite operators sector

Space-based communications continued to be a major source of revenue for the space industry in 2007 and it is now widely acknowledged that the economic activity generated by satellite services extends well beyond this segment. The communications sector has in the last few years experienced a combination of the consolidation of the most mature services (DBS, FSS, MSS) and the emergence of new commercial opportunities brought about by the appearance of new operators and new service concepts. The most established sector of the satellite industry is the FSS sector, made up of operators which lease the capacity of their GEO satellites for voice and data communications to commercial and governmental customers. In 2007, the hierarchy of the top FSS operators changed, with SES taking the first place followed by Intelsat and Eutelsat (Table 5). Behind this trio, there is an important quantitative gap, with other FSS operators having only between three and twelve satellites in orbit, compared to the 37 of SES, 54 of Intelsat and 24 of Eutelsat (Table 5). The top 3 FSS operators gained 64% of all revenues generated by FSS operators in 2007 (3.974 billion euros), and possessed 52% of all satellites in orbit and 38% of the satellites on order (Table 5). 45

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 Tab. 5: Top 10 FSS operators in 2007 (adapted from Space News).126 Rank

Company

Location

2007 revenue in million U.S. dollars

Satellites in orbit

Satellites on order

Luxembourg

1621.08

37*

9*

1504.8

54*

4*

1

SES

2

Intelsat

Bermuda/USA

3

Eutelsat

France

848.16

24*

6

4

Telesat Canada

Canada

468.33

12

3

5

JSAT Corp.

Japan

237.62

8*

3*

6

Star One

Brazil

141.86

7*

0

7

Hispasat

Spain

129

3

1

8

Singtel Optus

Australia

117.78

4

1

9

Russian Satellite Communications Co.

Russia

110.12

11

3

10

Space Communications Corp.

Japan

103.56

4

1

* Includes co-owned satellites

As mentioned above, the satellite operators have continued their move towards further consolidation. However, several new operators are emerging based on private ventures or national initiatives (in Vietnam, Venezuela, etc.). Asia has now ten operators among the top 25, followed by Europe with seven operators and North America with three. With the mergers and consolidations of spring 2008, the hierarchy is expected to change next year. However, the strong performance of the European actors in this sector must be stressed, which is a signal of the competitiveness of the European space industry.

4. The security dimension In 2007/2008, the militarisation of space has increased, as more and more countries pursue efforts to obtain dedicated military systems or “multi-purpose assets”, particularly in the field of Earth observation.127 Furthermore, civilian 46

4. The security dimension

capacities are increasingly used by military stakeholders, particularly civilian communications bandwidths and commercial Earth observation imagery.

4.1. The global space military context The overall economic value of the space sector in 2007 is estimated at about 127 billion euros, with 23.5 billion euros having been spent on military space affairs. Global military spending, by contrast, reached an estimated 916 billion euros in 2007 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).128 However, like the global military expenditures, spending on military space activities is very unevenly distributed between countries. Only a limited number of countries invest a substantial amount of money in military space activities. The United States is the clear leader in terms of public funding allocated to security-related space activities. Despite the increasing number of space military actors and the fact that Russia and China are modernising and upgrading their military space assets, the U.S. leadership is unlikely to be challenged in the near future according to the military space budget criterion. Other countries investing significantly in space military activities include Canada in North America; Argentina and Brazil in South America; India, Japan and South Korea in Asia; Iran, Israel and Turkey in the Middle East; and Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom in Europe. In 2007, 32 dedicated military spacecraft or explicitly recognised “dual-use” satellites were launched into space, representing 26% of all payloads launched that year. This is a considerable increase vis-a-vis 2006, when only 18 militaryrelated payloads were launched. Like in 2006, eight countries launched dedicated space military assets. However, only China, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States launched at least one military spacecraft both in 2006 and 2007. Moreover, no new country launched any dedicated military space assets in 2007. When comparing the levels of activity per country in 2007, Russia was again the world leader according to the number of military spacecraft launched (Figure 7). Having launched 11 spacecraft, it was followed by the United States with eight spacecraft, Europe with six and China with four spacecraft. Japan launched two military-related spacecraft and Israel one (Figure 7). Russia and the United States were the actors with the largest variety of assets launched into space in 2007 (Figure 7). China was the only other actor with different types of military assets launched into space (Figure 7), apart from Europe when considered as a whole (Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). 47

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

Number of payloads launched

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 e nc e c sa ns ais illan atio ce n g n rve nic n o c nin tion u illa u Re ic s mm urve war viga on Co n s rly Na ctr Ea ea Ele Oc

UK Japan Israel

Russia US China A Ger Italy many

Fig. 7: Military spacecraft launched in 2007 by country.

Navigation satellites were the most-frequently launched type of military spacecraft in 2007 (11 spacecraft) but only three countries launched them (Russia, the United States and China). In comparison, ten reconnaissance spacecraft were launched by six countries (Russia, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Israel) and five dedicated military communications satellites were launched by three countries (Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom) (Figure 7). Finally, the United States and Russia were the only space actors launching early warning satellites; Russia was the only actor launching an electronic surveillance satellite; and only the United States launched two ocean surveillance satellites (Figure 7).

4.2. The European space military context In 2007, Europe launched about 19% of all military payloads worldwide. It sent six military spacecraft into orbit, two by Italy (reconnaissance satellites), two by Germany (reconnaissance satellites) and two by the United Kingdom (communications satellites) (Figure 7). Europe’s stance towards military space has been shifting in recent years. An increasing number of European countries are acknowledging the strategic character of space for military and security activities. The importance of space in the European security arena is also increasingly recognised by policymakers, as illustrated by the inclusion in the May 2007 European Space Policy of a chapter 48

4. The security dimension

dedicated to “security and defence”. However, while this document was backed by 29 European countries, only a limited number of European countries are involved in military space, far less than in civilian space activities. The European national space projects related to security are also limited in size and scope. The amount of public funding devoted to military space activities in Europe is rather modest and represented only about 17% of the total European spending on space affairs in 2007, with an estimated 1.103 billion euros.129 However, while France – the historical European leader in military space activities – has seen its budget stagnate in recent years, more modest historical contributors like the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany or Spain have seen their investments in security-related space activities increase, as they have begun to develop or procure new capabilities in Earth observation and space-based communications. France is Europe’s major investor in defence-related space activities, with an estimated public effort of 460 million euros in 2007.130 While France did not launch dedicated military space assets in 2007/2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy gave a policy speech on 11 February 2008 in which he stressed that the highest French authorities recognise space assets as critical and strategic. He expressed his wish to significantly increase France’s national space defence budget. President Sarkozy underlined the importance of space in a national and European defence policy context and as a significant building block of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), he also emphasised the role of space in supporting Europe’s autonomous decision-making capabilities. The main programmatic elements highlighted in his speech were the establishment of MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imagery System) and space surveillance activities. President Sarkozy also mentioned the principles of self-defence and the importance of access to space and satellite integrity. Furthermore, the new French White Paper on defence and national security presented on 17 June 2008 underlined France’s plans to greatly expand its military space capabilities as part of a move towards reinforcing its reconnaissance/intelligence capabilities over the next 15 years and its intention to streamline its defence programme towards meeting existing and emerging threats. In this context, the French annual space spending is prognosticated to double from its current level. The main focus of France’s space efforts will be to develop new operational capabilities in order to fill existing gaps and ensure the continuity and modernisation of the country’s Earth observation and communications satellite systems. One of the new French projects is Ceres, a signal intelligence constellation. Another project is an early warning satellite system to protect against intermediate ballistic missiles by building upon the forthcoming Spirale system. SSA is also a major new programmatic focus. Moreover, a Joint Space Command for military oversight to be implemented and managed by the 49

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

French Air Force and placed under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Defence Staff has been created. In Germany, an increasing interest in military space activities in recent years is illustrated by the growing budget share allocated to security-related space activities and the deployment and development of new assets. Germany spent an estimated 174 million euros mainly on reconnaissance systems in 2007.131 It has launched four reconnaissance SAR satellites – SAR-Lupe 2 and 3 in 2007, SAR-Lupe 4 in March 2008 and the last satellite in this constellation (SAR-Lupe 5) in July 2008.132 The German military authorities have also ordered study contracts for a next-generation SAR reconnaissance system. Furthermore, SATCOMBw 2a and 2b, two military communications satellites, are foreseen to be launched shortly. The development of these dedicated military capabilities underlines the recent paradigm change in the military and political circles of Germany, reversing the longstanding German position. In 2007, the United Kingdom launched two dedicated military communications satellites (Skynet 5A and 5B) (Figure 7) and a third one in 2008 (Skynet 5C). Skynet 5 is a programme used to update the British Ministry of Defence’s satellite communication capability operated by Paradigm Secure Communications (a company entirely owned by EADS) through a Private Financing Initiative (PFI).133 In 2007, the United Kingdom spent an estimated 300 million euros on space military activities, principally on the aforementioned communications systems.134 Italy launched two dual-use X-band radar satellites (COSMO-SkyMed) on 7 June and 6 December 2007 (Figure 7). It spent an estimated 115 million euros primarily on reconnaissance systems in 2007 and is planning to launch its new military communications satellite SICRAL 1B soon.135 Furthermore, demonstrating Italy’s increasing cooperation with France, a Letter of Intent (LOI) for the Ka-band French-Italian dual-use satellite ATHENA-FIDUS was signed during the Franco-Italian Summit in Nice (France) on 30 November 2007. While Spain already owns a dedicated military communications satellite (Spainsat launched in March 2006) and uses XTAR-EUR (launched in 2005) as a backup capability, the Spanish government is also considering the development of dedicated reconnaissance satellites. Spain is already involved in the French-led Helios 2 satellite project, but has recently decided to build its own high resolution radar (Paz) and medium resolution optical satellite (Ingenio) for military and civil security applications. Both are scheduled to be launched in 2012. Spain spent about 50 million euros on military space activities in 2007.136 At the EU-level, space is now increasingly recognised as an “enabler” which can support the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP.137 Particularly the GMES and Galileo programmes are supporting these 50

4. The security dimension

overarching policies. The European Union also has two dedicated agencies carrying out tasks in the context of space and security: the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).138 Illustrating the fact that space security has become an issue of growing interest in Europe, a series of high-level conferences or reports have taken place or been released in recent months. In particular, several parliamentary initiatives dealt with space security issues in 2007/2008, which demonstrates that space is now recognised as an important asset for Europe at the political level. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE), responsible for the CFSP and ESDP in the European Parliament, held a series of activities linked to space security issues. Furthermore, an “own-initiative” report by the SEDE Chairman entitled “Report on space and security” was adopted by the European Parliament in 2008, underlining the need for space assets to base the political and diplomatic activities of the European Union on independent, reliable and complete information. In addition, the EU Member States are pursuing an initiative on the elaboration of a Space Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities within the European Council’s Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament matters (CODUN) which discusses small arms and other disarmament issues, including space weapons.139 The aim of this initiative is to lower the risk of the misinterpretation of incidents occurring in space, to avoid collisions and deliberate explosions, and to provide reassurance through improved information exchange, transparency and notification measures.140 Following the 2007 European Space Policy which calls for more cooperation between ESA and the EDA, ESA continues to be involved in programmes supporting synergies between space and security such as GMES, Galileo and communications activities. ESA also continues its efforts in the domain of SSA.141 Moreover, ESA leads the Heterogeneous Mission Accessibility (HMA) project which aims at establishing a portal facilitating uniform access to heterogeneous Earth observation data from multiple missions (including national missions and future ESA Sentinel missions) through standard interfaces for cataloguing, ordering, mission planning and online data access.

4.3. The United States Without taking into account several technology demonstration projects, the United States launched 25% of all military satellites in 2007: two communications satellites, two early warning satellites, two navigation satellites and two ocean surveillance satellites (Figure 7). 51

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

In the United States, the Chinese ASAT-test of January 2007 brought more attention and urgency to the consideration and evaluation of the national security space programmes. In particular, concerns about potential threats to U.S. space capabilities gained momentum in high-level political circles. In this context, the programmes enhancing SSA were boosted in the Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriation agreed upon on 8 November 2007. Furthermore, on 20 February 2008, an imagery radar spacecraft (NROL-21/USA-193) which was owned by the NRO and had been launched in December 2006 was destroyed. This was done in order to prevent the satellite’s hydrazine fuel tank from dispersing highly toxic fumes on the ground. A Standard Missile (SM-3) and the ship-based Aegis targeting system developed for the sea-based component of the U.S. missile defence architecture were used to destroy the satellite. While the anti-satellite test conducted by China in January 2007 occurred at an altitude of about 850 km, the U.S. intercept occurred at an altitude of about 20 km. Moreover, unlike the Chinese ASAT-test, the United States informed the international community well in advance of the attempted shot-down. As part of the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill, a Panel was congressionally mandated to assess the organisation and management of the U.S. national space security due to currently suboptimal capabilities (delay, cost overruns and failures of national security space systems). Most of the work of the “Allard Commission” took place in spring 2008. A central finding of the Commission was the lack of cohesive management. The Allard Commission recommended combining the responsibility for the classified and unclassified national security space capabilities and procurement under a National Security Space Authority (NSSA) which was to be created by abolishing the NRO and other entities. This would then lead to a new organisation, the National Security Space Organization (NSSO), responsible for the acquisition and operation of all U.S. military and intelligence space assets. The establishment of a National Space Strategy was also considered, as well as the reestablishment of the National Space Council to be chaired by the National Security Advisor.

4.4. Russia In 2007, Russia launched 35% of all military spacecraft to upgrade its navigation (seven satellites), reconnaissance (one satellite), early warning (one satellite), electronic surveillance (one satellite) and communications capabilities (one satellite) (Figure 7). Following Russia’s economic growth, the Russian military space programmes are recovering from the under-investment that characterised the immediate post52

4. The security dimension

Cold War period, and profiting from an overall effort to upgrade and modernise Russia’s military in-orbit infrastructure. Russia’s involvement in military space programmes is channelled through the 2007–2012 State Armaments Programme and the two Federal Target Programmes: on GLONASS (2002–2011) and the Development of Russia’s Cosmodromes (2006–2015). Russia maintains activities in military space programmes in six areas: reconnaissance, communications, navigation, early warning, signal intelligence and access to space. In particular, the Russian Federal Space Forces in charge of the military space activities announced that they will close the Svobody base so that all military spacecraft will be launched from Plesetsk in the future.

4.5. Japan In 2007, Japan launched two dedicated security satellites – the Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) (Figure 7). These two additions provide Japan with an Earth observation constellation dedicated to security issues. As mentioned above, the Diet finally approved the “Basic Law for Space Activities” in May 2008, which commits Japan to a series of major administrative and conceptual changes. In particular, the switch of space planning from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet underscores a shift in attitude concerning the strategic importance of space for national security and other areas. The new law replaces also the 1969 Resolution which restricted Japan to the use of space for “exclusively peaceful purposes”, with a commitment that any military use of space would be for defensive purposes in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and with the pacifist spirit of Japan’s Constitution. Japan’s ban on any non-defensive governmental uses of space has thus been lifted. However, this policy change does not aim at promoting an aggressive use of space, but among other things at allowing Japan the use of space assets for crisis management and disaster monitoring in the Asian region, as well as for peacekeeping missions.

4.6. China In 2007, China launched 13% of all military spacecraft: two reconnaissance satellites and two navigation satellites (Figure 7). The long-term, comprehensive transformation of China’s military forces is ongoing at a high pace following high investments in the military sector. However, it is difficult to precisely evaluate the Chinese military capabilities, as China is very secretive about its military activities and military space is no exception. Nonethe53

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

less, in an August 2007 speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), President Hu called for accelerating the modernisation of China’s weapons and equipment, enhancing personnel training, and strengthening combat skills through a “coordinated development between national defence-building and economic construction”.142 This is thought to also have covered space activities.

4.7. India India did not launch any military satellites in 2007 and has until now not focused on space technology for military-only purposes. However, while India continues to emphasise the peaceful uses of space, it is considering the development of a military space programme and the optimisation of its space applications for military purposes following the 2007 Chinese ASATtest. Nonetheless, no formal decision has yet been made on the creation of an Indian Aerospace Command as part of a wider process to increase the role of military applications and defence forces in India’s space activities. Furthermore, the relation between the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and ISRO remains distant in order to avoid sanctions. India’s military space activities are therefore still officially separated from ISRO’s civilian activities. It is, however, widely speculated that the ISRO spacecraft Cartosat-2A launched on 28 April 2008 is the first satellite of a constellation dedicated to reconnaissance, since it has a sub-metric resolution.

4.8. Other space actors Apart from the six main space powers, only Israel launched a dedicated military satellite in 2007 (Ofeq-7) (Figure 7). Furthermore, in February 2008, Israel received the first images from its new reconnaissance satellite which was successfully launched by the Indian space agency ISRO onboard a PSLV on 21 January 2008. Different from the Ofeq series, TechSAR is a SAR satellite. Additionally to its reconnaissance capabilities, the Israeli government invested about 181 million euros in the Amos-4 communications satellite planned for launch in the third quarter of 2012, which illustrates the high national priority granted to military space in Israel.143 Other non-traditional space powers have also been acquiring dedicated military space capabilities or creating new structures, which highlights the increasing trend of the “internationalisation of the militarisation of space”. 54

4. The security dimension

In November 2007, the Australian government agreed to an investment of about 563 million euros in the U.S. Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) system to fund the sixth WGS satellite.144 This will provide access to high communication bandwidth in the X and Ka-bands to support bandwidth-intensive applications.145 Turkey is also about to acquire the long-delayed military reconnaissance satellite G€okt€ urk.

4.9. Threats to the space environment Over the period 2007/2008, a series of events occurred in the domain of communications jamming and orbital debris creation. There have been reports on the intentional jamming of communications satellites, which demonstrates the vulnerability of space systems. In particular, in September 2007, reports of satellite TV jamming spread across Israel and Lebanon without any certified identification of the source of the interference.146 Furthermore, Yahsat satellite communications has been negotiating the purchase of a commercial anti-jamming system to prevent piracy and the intentional jamming of satellite signals.147 Space debris, which is predominantly caused by man-made objects, is now widely acknowledged to represent a growing threat to orbiting spacecraft. A series of debris-creating events occurred in 2007/2008 and in July 2008, 12 851 pieces of debris were catalogued by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (USSSN)

Tab. 6: Orbital debris per major space country as of 25 June 2008 as catalogued by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (Source: NASA). Country/ organisation China

Payloads

Rocket bodies and debris

Total

66

2684

2750

CIS

1370

3202

4572

ESA

39

38

77

France

46

326

372

India

36

108

144

104

71

175

1086

3164

4250

416

95

511

3163

9688

12851

Japan United States Other Total

55

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

(Table 6). The total number of medium and large-size objects (10 cm in diameter or larger) catalogued by the USSSN had thus increased by 897 objects since June 2007. According to NASA, three debris-generating events were detected in the second half of 2007. On 25 July 2007, the second stage of the Japanese H-2A rocket body launched in September 2006 generated space debris. On 10 November 2007, debris was ejected from NASA’s retired Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). On 11 November 2007, debris was generated by the second stage of the Delta IV launch vehicle. In the first half of 2008, six events creating debris were detected by the USSSN: on 16 January 2008 from the Cosmos 2105 satellite; on 27 January 2008 from the third-stage of the CZ-3A launch vehicle launched in October 2007; on 17 February 2008 from the final stage of the Molniya-M launch vehicle launched on 23 August 1994; on 14 March 2008 from the Cosmos 2421 satellite; and on 21 March 2008 from an Atlas 5 upper stage. The United States also destroyed the propellant tank of the USA-193 spacecraft through a hyper velocity collision. The majority of the created debris fell to Earth shortly after the break-up, with the reentry of the last debris occurring in summer 2008. Finally, 18 months after the deliberate destruction of the Chinese Feng Yun-1C spacecraft, the USSSN had officially catalogued 2800 pieces of debris from this satellite measuring 10 cm in diameter or more with less than 1% of the debris having re-entered the atmosphere.

International Monetary Fund “World Economic Outlook Update: Global Slowdown and Rising Inflation.” 17 July 2008. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 6 The African Union (AU) is an intergovernmental organisation comprising 53 African countries. Established on 9 July 2002, the AU was formed as a successor to the amalgamated African Economic Community (AEC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its headquarters are in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). 7 “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan.” African Union 9 Dec. 2007. http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2007/December/eu-au/docs/joint_ strategy_3_years_final_en.pdf. 8 The formalisation of bilateral relations between the European Union and individual partner countries was achieved through the negotiation of PCAs. The aim of the PCA at hand is to encourage political, commercial, economic and cultural cooperation between Russia and the European Union. 9 President Sarkozy originally envisioned the new Union as comprising only the Mediterranean countries within the European Union and their non-European neighbours, not the European Union as a whole. 1

56

4. The security dimension Under international law, the five countries lying partly in the Arctic Circle (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) are limited to a 200 miles (320 km) economic zone from their shores. Russia claims a larger slice, saying its continental shelf extended from Siberia to the North Pole. 11 “2007 Was Tenth Warmest for U.S., Fifth Worldwide.” NOAA 15 Jan. 2008. http://www. noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/20080115_warmest.html. 12 “Satellite Witnesses Lowest Arctic Ice Coverage in History.” ESA – Observing the Earth 14 Sept. 2007. http://www.esa.int/esaEO/SEMYTC13J6F_index_0.html. 13 For more information, see Peter, Nicolas. Space Policy, Issues and Trends in 2006/2007. ESPI Report 6. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2007. 8–9. 14 Eurostat. R&D Expenditure and Personnel. Statistics in Focus 91/2008. 15 Germany, France and the United Kingdom accounted for nearly two thirds of the total EU R&D expenditure in absolute terms. 16 Eurostat. R&D Expenditure and Personnel. Statistics in Focus 91/2008. 17 Ibid. 18 World Intellectual Property Organization. World Patent Report: A Statistical Review. Geneva: WIPO, 2008. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 A triadic patent is a patent which was applied for and filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and if it was granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to protect the same invention. Triadic patent families provide a good indication of the innovation potential of a country outside its domestic market and a better international comparability of patent-based indicators. 23 Eurostat. Patent Statistics: Applying PATSAT a New Generation of Methodological Concepts. Statistics in Focus 17/2008. 24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Compendium of Patent Statistics 2007. Paris: OECD, 2007. 25 Ibid. 26 DISEC is concerned with disarmament and related international security questions. 27 SPECPOL deals with a variety of political subjects not dealt with by the First Committee. 28 COPUOS aims to review the scope of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space to devise programmes in this field to be undertaken under UN auspices, to encourage the continuing of research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space. COPUOS has two standing Subcommittees: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. 29 See the article “The United Nations and Outer Space: Celebrating 50 Years of Space Achievements” by Niklas Hedman and Werner Balogh in this Yearbook for more information on the COPUOS. 30 UNSPIDER aims to ensure access to and the use of such solutions during all phases of disasters, including the risk reduction phase, which will significantly contribute to a reduction in the loss of lives and property. It was created by UNGA Resolution 61/110 adopted on 14 December 2006. 31 The ICG was established on a voluntary basis in December 2005 as an informal body to promote cooperation, as appropriate, on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based positioning, navigation, timing, and value-added services on the one hand, and compatibility and interoperability among Global Navigation Satellite Systems on the other hand. 32 This process requires the endorsement of the UNESCO General Conference that will be held in October 2009. 33 “Zambia Flood Victims Re-Connected to Aid Relief and Reconstruction.” ITU Press Release 17 Mar. 2008. http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2008/06.html. 34 “ITU Global Forum Adopts Action to Strengthen Response in Emergencies.” ITU Press Release 13 Dec. 2007. http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2007/38.html. 10

57

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 35

UNIDIR is an autonomous entity within the UN structure whose role is to inform States and the global community on questions of international security and to assist in disarmament efforts. 36 Group on Earth Observations. “Cape Town Declaration.“ Cape Town Ministerial Summit 30 Nov. 2007. http://www.earthobservations.org/05_Cape%20Town%20Declaration.pdf. 37 Peter, Nicolas. “Towards an Evolving Geography of Space Activities.” Advances in Space Research. Forthcoming. 38 The APSCO Convention has been signed by Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Turkey and Thailand. 39 This is an initiative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to establish an African Institute of Space Science (AISS) facilitating a network of isolated individual scientists working in the space field in university departments and other institutions. The AISS was proposed by the Working Group on Space Science at the NEPAD S&T Regional Workshop on 15–18 November 2004 and is one of the flagship R&D programmes of Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (Cluster 4) which consolidates the S&T programmes of the African Union Commission and NEPAD. 40 RASCOM, established in 1993, is an intergovernmental treaty-based organisation which has as its prime objective the provision, on a commercial basis, of the satellite capacity required for national and international public communications services, including sound and television broadcasting in Africa. 41 Due to a helium leak after launch, the expected lifespan of Rascom-QAF has been estimated to be two years, rather than 15 years as originally planned. 42 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 95. 43 The consequences of the rejection of the adoption of the “Lisbon Treaty” in the Irish referendum of 12 June 2008 are still unclear, but the ratification process is expected to continue and no major modifications to the articles dealing with space affaires are foreseen if a new document should be drafted. 44 Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplomacy.” Space Policy 23.2 (May 2007): 97–107. 45 See the article “Space for Resources” by Isabelle Sourbes-Verger in this Yearbook for further information on this topic. 46 This initiative follows the Maputo Declaration signed on 15 October 2006 by the Commission of the African Union (AU), the Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and five regional Economic Communities of Sub-Saharan Africa (the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)). The Maputo Declaration explicitly asks for an extension of the GMES initiative to Africa and other ACP countries (the so-called “GMES – Africa”). 47 On 1 July 2008, the Commission and ESA launched the procurement of the programme (procurement procedure of “Competitive Dialogue”). 48 Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplomacy.” Space Policy 23.2 (May 2007): 97–107. 49 The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme addresses both technological and non-technological aspects of innovation, focusing on the downstream parts of the research and innovation process. One sub-programme, the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP), can be of support to space activities. 50 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008. 102. 51 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 152, 168. 52 Recommendation 821. 53 The EISC is a permanent forum for fostering cooperation on space policy issues between the European national parliaments. 54 Up to 2007, the following countries held the Presidency of the EISC: Belgium (twice), France (twice), Germany (once), Italy (twice), Spain (once) and the United Kingdom (once). 58

4. The security dimension 55

Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 170. 56 Regions which have shown their interest are: Wien-VBA (Austria), Region Bruxelles Capitale, Region Wallonne (Belgium), Alsace, Aquitaine, Bretagne, Midi-Pyrenees, Nord Pas-de-Calais, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (France), Baden-W€urttemberg, Bayern, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany), Abruzzo, Basilicata, Campania, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Lombardia, Molise, Piemonte, Puglia, Toscana, Veneto (Italy), Mazovieckie Viovodeship (Poland), A¸cores, Madeira (Portugal), Kosice, Presov (Slovakia), Aragon, Catalonia, Madrid (Spain), and East Midlands (United Kingdom). 57 AMESD is the follow-on initiative to the Preparation for the Use of Meteosat Second Generation in Africa (PUMA). It is an international cooperation programme aimed at providing all African countries with the resources required for managing their environment more effectively and ensuring long-term sustainable development in the region. 58 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 97. 59 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 60 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 61 “European Space Technology Master Plan.” ESA ESTMP Issue 5, Dec. 2007. 62 Pisani, Pierre-Henri. European Leaders Charter Course for Space. ESPI Flash Report 4. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Mar. 2008. 63 “European Space Technology Master Plan.” ESA ESTMP Issue 5, Dec. 2007. 64 Ibid. 65 United Kingdom, House of Commons. “House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2007: A Space Policy: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2006–2007.” HC 1042, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 9 Oct. 2007. London: The Stationary Office Limited, 23 Oct. 2007. 66 “European Space Technology Master Plan.” ESA ESTMP Issue 5, Dec. 2007. 67 For more information, see Neuneck, G€otz. “China’s ASAT Test: A Warning Shot or the Beginning of an Arms Race in Space?” Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007: New Impetus for Europe. Eds. KaiUwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu and Nicolas Peter. Vienna: Springer, 2008: 211–224. 68 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 28. 69 Ibid. 70 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 29. 71 The Security Council is a consultative body of the Russian President which works out the President’s decisions on national security affairs. Composed of key ministers and agency heads and chaired by the President of Russia, it draws up crucial documents defining conceptual approaches to national security. 72 Putin, Vladimir. “Opening Remarks at a Meeting with the Security Council on Russia’s Space Exploration Policy for the Period through to 2020 and Beyond.” President of Russia Official Web Portal 11 Apr. 2008. http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/04/11/1840_type82913_ 163670.shtml. 73 For more information, see Suzuki, Kazuto. “Basic Law for Space Activities: A New Space Policy for Japan for the 21st Century.” Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007: New Impetus for Europe. KaiUwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu and Nicolas Peter, eds. Vienna: Springer, 2008: 225.238. 74 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 29. 75 Other government agencies merged into the MII along with SASTIND included the Ministry of Information Industries, the State Council Information Office, portions of the National Development 59

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 and Reform Commission responsible for industrial and trade issues, and the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration. 76 “President Hu: China Joins Nations with Capability of Deep Space Exploration.” Xinhuanet 12 Dec. 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/content_7233971.htm. 77 Indian Space Research Organisation, Department of Space. “Report of the Working Group on ‘Space’ on the Eleventh Five Year Plan Proposals 2007–12 for Indian Space Programme.” Center for Defense Information 18 Nov. 2008. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/11thplan.pdf. 78 India has had only one astronaut to date: Maj Rakesh Sharma, who flew under the Soviet Intercosmos programme in April 1984 on a seven-day mission. 79 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 29. 80 Yi So-yeon replaced Ko San one month prior to the mission at the request of Russia’s Federal Space Agency because Mr. Ko broke training centre rules. 81 “Korea to invest W316 billion in space research.” The Chosun Ilbo 17 Jan. 2008. http://english. chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200801/200801170008.html. 82 de Selding, Peter. “South Korea Outlines Space Spending Plan.” Space News 16 Jan. 2008. 83 The GCC was established in 1981 and is a regional political and economic bloc that consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 84 “UAE to Launch Joint Remote-Sensing Satellite with GCC countries.” Xinhuanet 29 Apr. 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/29/content_8073297.htm. 85 Dayton, Leigh. “Boost for Space Program.” The Australian 25 Mar. 2008. http://www.theaustralian. news.com.au/story/0,25197,23426809-5013871,00.html. 86 Estimating the overall size of the space sector is difficult since it varies with the chosen data source and definition of the space sector. Consequently, the overall size of the space sector can only be approximated, and estimates will vary from one study to the other. However, there is a consensus that the annual revenues of the space sector keep increasing in overall terms from one year to the next due to higher institutional investments in space on the one hand and a sustained demand for new applications and services on the other hand. 87 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 27. 88 Peter, Nicolas. “The Changing Geopolitics of Space Activities.” Space Policy 22.2 (May 2006): 100–109. 89 Chinese agencies not included in the list because gauging their respective size is impossible. 90 The values for DoD, NRO and NGA are estimates of the Space Foundation. 91 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008. 36. 92 Satellite Industry Association/Futron. State of the Satellite Industry Report. San Diego: SIA; Bethesda: Futron, June 2008. 93 Ibid. 94 Wilson, James. Remote Sensing Technologies and Global Markets. BCC Research Report IAS022A. Wellesley: BCC Research, Feb. 2007. 95 Satellite Industry Association/Futron. State of the Satellite Industry Report. Diego: SIA; Bethesda: Futron, June 2008. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 “Pivotal Time for Space Insurance as Insurers Look for Rates to Lift-off.” Aon News Release 20 Mar. 2008. http://aon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s¼43&item¼1086. 101 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 50. 60

4. The security dimension Lawsky, David. “EU Approves Apax Buy of Telenor Satellite Services.” Reuters 20 Aug. 2007. http://www.reuters.com/article/technology-media-telco-SP/idUSBRU00590120070820. 103 Now that the Spanish government has authorised the deal, it must be cleared by the anti-trust authorities. 104 Eutelsat owns a 27.7% stake in Hispasat. 105 de Selding, Peter. “Lehman Brothers Reinvests in Inmarsat Shares.” Space News 13 Feb. 2008. 106 The University of Surrey put its company, SSTL, on the auction block in November 2007. 107 Taverna, Michael and Alex Komarov. “Khrunichev-Astrium Deal Changes Balance in Russian Satellite Market.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 24 Mar. 2008: 35. 108 “Nokia to Acquire NAVTEQ.” PRNewswire 1 Oct. 2007. http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/ stories.pl?ACCT¼ind_focus.story&STORY¼/www/story/10-01-2007/ 0004673032&EDATE¼MONþOctþ01þ2007,þ08:35þAM. 109 TomTom. “Annual Report and Accounts 2007.” 18 Nov. 2008. http://ar2007.tomtom.com/pdf/ tomtom_Ar07.pdf. 110 Lawsky, David. “TomTom Wins EU Permission to Buy Tele Atlas.” Reuters 14 May 2008. http:// www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSBFA00063720080514. 111 Galt, Virginia. “Prentice Defends Takeover Veto.” Globe and Mail 11 Apr. 2008. http://theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2Fstory%2FRTGAM.20080411.wprentice_space0411% 2FBNStory% 2FrobNews%2F&ord¼89524609&brand¼theglobeandmail&force_login¼true. 112 The U.S. hedge fund Harbinger Capital has acquired sizeable positions in several MSS companies in recent months. In addition to its involvement in TerreStar, it now owns 28% of Inmarsat as mentioned above, and is also a major shareholder of Mobile Satellite Ventures (MSV). 113 U.S Department of Justice. “Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.” 24 Mar. 2008. http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226.html. 114 Space Transport Inc. is a British Virgin Islands-based company that was formed in 2006 for the sole purpose of holding an interest in ILS. Space Transport Inc. purchased ILS shares from Lockheed Martin in October 2006. 115 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008. 113. 116 “SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation’s Acquisition of Space Communication Corporation Shares.” SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation News Release 13 Feb. 2008. http://www.sptvjsat.com/en/newsSCC/ news_pdf/080213_SC_SKY.pdf. 117 After studying potential options to raise the satellite’s orbit and get some useful life out of the spacecraft, SES Americom declared the satellite a total loss and filed a claim with insurers. AMC-14 will not be replaced and the contract between SES and EchoStar for the satellite has been cancelled. The satellite was subsequently sold to the U.S. Department of Defence. 118 AMC-21 is now planned to be launched by Arianespace onboard an Ariane 5. 119 This total includes the two 5-satellite framework contracts signed by Arianespace and ILS with SES. 120 Boeing is the majority shareholder (40%) of Sea Launch. Other partners include S. P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia of Russia (25%), Aker ASA of Norway (20%) and SDO Yuzhnoye/NPO Yuzhmash of Ukraine (15%). 121 ILS expects to inaugurate a second commercial Proton-M launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in 2008. 122 Arianespace, which was awarded the same type of contract by SES, put only two satellites of the contract in its 2007 order book. 123 Due to logistical constraints linked with the length of the voyage of the Pacific Ocean floating platform, Sea Launch is limited to six launches per year. 124 Of the seven Falcon 9 launches booked, this is the first commercial geostationary order. 125 When human spaceflight payloads and failed launches are included, a total of 123 payloads were launched in 2007. 126 “Top Fixed Satellite Service Operators.” Space News 19.26 (30 June 2008): 12. 102

61

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 The terms “military” and “security” are used interchangeably in the text, as beyond semantic differences, the use of space assets for military and security purposes overlaps considerably. 128 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Summary.” 11.9 June 2008. http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/ SIPRIYB08summary.pdf. 129 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 146. 130 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 103. 131 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 103. 132 OHB System, the satellite manufacturer, signed a contract with Germany’s Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB) for about 350 million euros for the construction, launch and operation of the constellation. The contract also features an obligation by OHB to provide imagery within 24 hours of an order for a 10-year duration. 133 Astrium Services is free to sell un-used capacity on the Skynet 5 satellites to other customers. For instance, it has booked orders from Canada, NATO, the Netherlands and Portugal, among others. 134 Peter, Nicolas. Space Policies, Issues and Trends 2007/2008. ESPI Report 15. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2008: 103. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplomacy.” Space Policy 23.2 (May 2007): 97–107. 138 More EU agencies which are involved in security issues rely on space-based information such as FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) or the EMSA (the European Maritime Safety Agency). 139 The Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament (CODUN) is one of the two preparatory bodies of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAREC) which meets at ministerial level. The second preparatory body is the Working Group on Non-Proliferation. CODUN meets once per month in Brussels and is attended by senior disarmament and non-proliferation officials from the EU Member States. The Working Groups are served by personnel from the non-proliferation and disarmament sections of the Council’s General Secretariat. Officials from the EC participate in all meetings. 140 Marcel Dickow’s article “The European Union Proposal for a Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities“ in the second part of this Yearbook further investigates this issue. 141 Lucia Marta and Giovanni Gasparini in the second part of this Yearbook in the article entitled “The European approach to Space Situational Awareness” cover extensively this topic. 142 United States of America, Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008.” 3 Mar. 2008. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/ 070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf. 143 Opall-Rome, Barbara. “Israeli Government Invests Big in High-Powered Amos-4 Telecom Sat.” Space News 25 July 2007. http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive07/amos4_0716.html. 144 “Australia to Fund Sixth WGS Satellite.” Satellite Today 3 Oct. 2007. http://www.satellitetoday. com/military/headlines/19168.html. 145 The WGS system is scheduled to achieve full operational capability in 2013 following the launch of the sixth satellite. The first satellite was launched on 11 October 2007. 146 “Mysterious Transmissions Assaulting Israeli Satellite TV Broadcasts.” International Herald Tribune 10 Oct. 2007. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/10/africa/ME-GEN-WhosJamming-Israel.php. 147 Ferster, Warren. “EMS Negotiating 1st Sale of Commercial Anti-Jamming System.” Space News 16 July 2007: 12. 127

62

1. Space policies and programmes

Developments in space policies, programmes and technologies throughout the world and in Europe Nicolas Peter

1. Space policies and programmes Among the 2007/2008 highlights in space affairs was a series of new strategies and programmes, and the reinforcement of new trends and directions. These included the internationalisation and globalisation of space affairs particularly in the domains of space exploration and space applications.

1.1. Highlights in activities and programmes New programmatic developments underline the various space powers’ quest for competitiveness and the maintenance or improvement of their position in the global “space hierarchy”. In the domain of space transportation, the major space powers are either developing new launch vehicles and ground infrastructures or improving the reliability of their existing launch fleets, since access to space remains a key element in any country’s ambition and autonomy in space activities. A number of emerging space actors, both national and private, are also progressing towards the development of reliable space transportation systems. In the domain of space science and exploration, the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) continued in 2007/2008, in particular with the addition of European and Japanese hardware. New plans for developing human spaceflight capabilities also indicate the importance of this domain as an element of space power.148 Moreover, an increasing number of countries have launched or are about to launch lunar orbiters, which has lead to an unprecedented wave of missions sent to the Earth’s natural satellite. A second wave of lunar exploration missions using rovers is under preparation as precursors to future human exploration missions. Mars is an additional target of choice for the robotic exploration plans of the major space powers.149 63

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

An increasing number of countries have procured new communications satellites in 2007/2008, including dedicated military communications systems. The bandwidth race in the private sector has reached new levels with the development of new Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) assets. 2007/2008 was also a symbolic period for Europe in the positioning, navigation and timing domain with the reprofiling of the Galileo programme to a publicly-financed system. Other space powers like the United States and Russia either sought to improve their existing Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) or continued to develop autonomous systems like China, India and Japan. New Earth observation assets were also launched, particularly in the domain of radar technology, a domain in which Europe was particularly active. New technology breakthroughs in varied space-related sectors are paving the way for future progress in space missions. The commercial sub-orbital sector is also nearing operational status.

1.2. Highlights in partnerships For political, technological or budgetary reasons, international cooperation is now a central element of the strategy of most countries involved in space activities. New partnerships are therefore arising and old ones strengthening. Europe reinforced its trans-Atlantic ties in 2007/2008. In particular, the most recent EU-U.S. Dialogue on Civil Space cooperation took place on 28 May 2008.150 This information exchange was considered very positive by both sides and specific areas of cooperation were identified in the fields of Earth observation and security as well as coordination in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). On the technical side, Jason-2 (which is the continuation of an existing trans-Atlantic cooperating mission on ocean altimetry) was successfully launched on 20 June 2008. ESA also continued to investigate potential areas of cooperation with NASA, particularly in the domain of space exploration. The two agencies worked together on comparative lunar architectures as well as preliminary elements of Mars sample return missions. Besides the Jason2 mission with the United States, Eumetsat initiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Canada on 18 October 2007 to advance cooperation in satellite monitoring activities. In particular, Europe and Canada will work together to improve their weather, climate and environmental monitoring through atmospheric and oceanic observations under this agreement. Russia remains an important axis of cooperation for Europe. The third meeting of the Steering Board of the EU-Russia Dialogue on Space Cooperation took place on 24 June 2008 in Paris (France). Set up in March 2006, the dialogue 64

1. Space policies and programmes

covers space applications, access to space, space science, and space technology development. At the last meeting, the three partners (the European Commission, ESA and the Russian Federal Space Agency Roscosmos) reported on the progress of establishing a regular dialogue at the working level in the aforementioned fields. The Steering Board identified priorities for the period 2008/2009 in each of the following sectors: Earth observation, satellite navigation, satellite communications, fundamental space science, applied space science and technology, launch systems, and Crew Space Transportation Systems. Lastly, the cooperation project on Soyuz at the Guiana Space Centre (GSC) is making progress as well. Europe is also reinforcing its cooperation with China, particularly through ESA. The main areas of cooperation are space exploration where ESA supported the Chinese Chang’e 1 lunar mission, and Earth observation with the second phase of the Dragon programme (Dragon 2) that began in May 2008. The nature of a future cooperation on Galileo remains unclear, however. Europe is also extending its reach. On 8 May 2008, the ESA-Argentina cooperation agreement was renewed for five years. Moreover, while the European Union already has existing relations and cooperation with the major space powers, it is also reaching out to new partners. In particular, during the EU-Africa Summit, a “GMES for Africa” event was held on 7–8 December 2007 in Lisbon (Portugal). Complementing the documents adopted at this occasion (the Declaration on “GMES and Africa” and the Lisbon Process on “GMES and Africa”), space activities were also specifically mentioned in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the accompanying first Africa-EU Action Plan (2008–2010) adopted by the Heads of States and Governments at the EU-Africa Summit on 9 December 2007. In the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, space is mentioned in the context of one of the four main objectives of a long-term strategic partnership, and particularly as playing an important role for progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other key development issues such as human and social development, environmental sustainability or the mitigation of climate change. It is stated that Africa and the European Union seek to strengthen their existing cooperation mechanisms and programmes in space-based technology, applications, science and systems. In the Africa-EU Action Plan, eight partnerships areas and priority activities are singled out, one of which tackles space issues explicitly. The eighth Africa-EU partnership on Science, Information Society and Space aims at enhancing cooperation on space applications and technology as a priority action to support Africa’s sustainable development objectives by developing concrete joint cooperation initiatives in selected areas. Eumetsat and the African Union Commission also signed a MoU on 4 April 2008 on how Eumetsat will contribute to the African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development 65

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(AMESD) project by providing data from its satellites as well as technical assistance and training.151 The United States has been involved in joint space activities with Europe for more than forty years. The current trans-Atlantic civil space cooperation is built around four main pillars: space science, human spaceflight, space exploration and space applications.152 The most important areas of cooperation are the domains of human spaceflight and space exploration. For instance, negotiations on NASA’s contribution to ESA’s ExoMars mission are continuing in light of the updated mission configuration. The United States and Europe are also cooperating in the field of Earth observation. In particular, Jason-2 was successfully launched in June 2008, being the continuation of an existing successful cooperation between the United States (NASA, NOAA) and Europe (CNES, Eumetsat). It is expected to provide a vital contribution to the monitoring of climate change, ocean circulation and weather. NASA maintains close cooperation with other ISS partners as well as major space powers as part of the Global Exploration Strategy (GES). However, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), besides affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. space industry, also constitutes a barrier to international cooperation given the complexity of the ITAR system and its political, legal, technical and financial consequences.153 While the United States has no partnerships with China, it does engage in new ventures with another emerging space power: India. The Indian lunar probe Chandrayaan-1 includes two U.S.-built instruments. NASA’s willingness to permit the launch of U.S. instruments onboard an Indian rocket appears indicative of a slow warming of the relations between India and the United States following an embargo on space cooperation which the United States applied after the 1992 decision of the U.S. Department of State to impose trade sanction against ISRO for proliferating missile and specifically rocket engine technology. In Russia, a renewed space interest at the highest political level combined with an increased budget devoted to space activities has led to the reinforcement of several cooperating missions and partnerships. Russia has thus successfully repositioned itself as a partner of choice in the international space fora. However, there has been a shift in the preferred cooperation type: Russia wants to move away from the client-customer relation-type of the 1990s towards more cooperative activities driven primarily by national interests and priorities. Russia continues to cooperate with the United States and Europe, both of which remain priority partners. Cooperation with the United States is particularly centred on human spaceflight activities. With Europe, cooperation focuses mainly on space transportation, i.e. Soyuz in Kourou. 66

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At the same time, Russia is diversifying its international partnerships and reaching out to emerging powers (China and India) as well as new actors (particularly emerging ones) as a tool of foreign diplomacy. Russia mainly collaborates with India on updating Russia’s GNSS (GLONASS) as well as on launchers (upper stage of India’s Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle – GSLV) as part of a broad space cooperation plan which also encompasses space science and lunar exploration. Russia also cooperates with South Korea and Brazil in the launch vehicle domain. Furthermore, it continues to use manned access to space as a foreign diplomacy tool. After the launch of the first Brazilian astronaut into space in early 2007, Russia helped both Malaysia and South Korea to send their first nationals to space in recent months. Russia might also train and send an Indian astronaut into space in the foreseeable future. Japan continues to focus its cooperation efforts on partnerships with established space powers like the United States and Europe. However, in 2007/2008, it continued its efforts to reinvigorate the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) by supporting other Asian countries in various application programmes and particularly Earth observation and education programmes. The last APRSAF annual meeting was held in Bangalore (India) on 21–23 November 2007. The main theme of this 14th APRSAF session which was co-organised by ISRO, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and JAXA, was “Space for Human Empowerment”. The 15th APRSAF session will be held in Hanoi (Vietnam) in December 2008. The Chinese space activities are primarily geared towards ensuring self-reliance, but the country remains open to international cooperation. In particular, space applications, space science and exploration have been embraced as key areas for expanding the Chinese space programme, for demonstrating the country’s autonomy and building international cooperation. For China, gaining prestige through space activities is an important motivation. China particularly cooperates with other space powers to demonstrate its status, but also with less significant space actors to use space as an international diplomacy tool. China therefore seeks cooperation with the “North” while simultaneously entering into cooperative activities with countries from the “South”. Regarding cooperation with the “North”, China cooperates mainly with Europe building on a three-decade long partnership with ESA. China has received support from ESA for the Chang’e 1 lunar mission and the joint Earth observation programmes Dragon-1 and Dragon-2. However, the “South” is also a particular focus of China’s cooperative activities. A prominent example is China’s partnership with Brazil in the context of the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme, a historical axis of “South-South” cooperation in space. As a tool of foreign diplomacy, China also 67

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aims at facilitating access to space technologies for countries from the “South”. For instance, at the GEO-IV Plenary session meeting on 28–29 November 2007, the governments of China and Brazil announced the launch of a new service that will provide Earth observation data from the CBERS programme to end-users throughout Africa free of charge. Furthermore, following the manufacturing and launch of the Nigcomsat 1 communications satellites for Nigeria, China designed, manufactured, tested and launched the Venesat-1 satellite (also called the “Simon Bolivar Satellite”) for Venezuela and Uruguay in late 2008. Besides bilateral cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Organization (APSCO) is another element of China’s portfolio of reaching out to countries from the “South.154 In 2007/2008, India has increased its presence on the international space scene, adding new cooperation agreements with countries from the “South” as well as from the “North” to the numerous existing ones. India has reinforced its historical cooperation with the United States in the domain of space exploration. It is also expanding its cooperation with Europe. For instance, Europe cooperates with India on the country’s first lunar mission Chandrayaan-1, which will carry four European instruments (three from ESA and one from Bulgaria). In addition, India has been expanding its cooperation with Israel and Russia. ISRO launched TechSAR on 21 January 2008 and is planning to launch more Israeli spy satellites onboard Indian rockets.155 India cooperates with Russia as part of a broad space cooperation plan not only on updating Russia’s GLONASS system, but also in the domain of space transportation. The Russian-Indian space cooperation has also been extended to the field of space science, with an Indian instrument being set to fly onboard the Russian Coronas-Photon satellite. Finally, Russia and India signed an agreement for the Chandrayaan-2 mission on 12 November 2007. This project includes an orbiter, a lunar lander and a rover as well as the collection of samples.156 ISRO will have the prime responsibility for the orbiter and Roscosmos will lead the development of the lander and rover elements. Chandrayaan-2 is to be launched by 2012 onboard India’s GSLV. India is also increasingly involved in “South-South” cooperation, for instance through the E-project with Africa or regional activities like its participation in the APRSAF.

2. Space transportation Possessing and maintaining an independent launch capability provides capacity for autonomous action. Guaranteed access to space is therefore a major strategic asset for any space power. In this context, many space-faring countries improved the 68

2. Space transportation

reliability of their domestic launch vehicles in 2007/2008, while newcomers continued to develop their space transportation architectures.

2.1. Europe The 2007/2008 period was marked by major achievements in the European space transportation sector. Ariane 5 confirmed its re-established leading position in the commercial market. Furthermore, the first launch of the ES-ATV version designed to launch ESA’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) was successful. Six Ariane 5 rockets were launched in 2007 and three in the first half of 2008. Moreover, on 11 November 2007, the Ariane ECA rocket set a new commercial record by lifting into transfer orbit a total payload mass of 9.535 tons for the dual launch of Skynet 5B and Star One C1. In June 2008, Ariane 5 also recorded its 25th straight launch success. While Ariane 5 will remain the European workhorse for access to space for many years to come, the development of Vega is on its way, which will provide the necessary launch capabilities for addressing small non-Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) missions. Major milestones in the development of the Vega launcher were achieved in 2007/2008. A prototype of the P80 rocket motor, which will power the first stage of the three-stage vehicle, was successfully tested at the GSC on 4 December 2007. This concluded the qualification of the engine. Then, on 27 March 2008, the second stage engine Zefiro 23 completed a static firing test at the Salto Di Quirra Inter-force Test Range, also concluding the qualification testing of the engine. However, the inaugural launch of Vega has been delayed to the second half of 2009. After the qualification flight, five VEga Research and Technology Accompaniment (VERTA) flights will follow to secure the start of the Vega exploitation phase and demonstrate Vega’s suitability for the diversified Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) market. Progress on the construction of the Soyuz launch pad at the GSC continued and the facility is anticipated to be ready by mid-2009. The opening of the launch pad was initially set for late 2008 but has been postponed due to foundation problems and other issues. The first Soyuz launch from French Guiana is now planned for the second half of 2009. Three launches are planned in 2009 and four in 2010. The start of the exploitation of Soyuz will allow Arianespace to offer a complete range of launch services. The European family of launchers will thus be made up of Ariane 5, Vega and Soyuz from the GSC, and will provide the necessary capabilities and flexibility to cover all European institutional and commercial needs (apart from human spaceflight). 69

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Lastly, the preparation of Europe’s future space transportation architecture continued through the Future Launchers Preparatory Programme (FLPP) and national programmes.

2.2. United States In 2007/2008, work on NASA’s next-generation launch infrastructure (the socalled “Project Constellation”) to implement the U.S. Space Exploration Policy (USSEP) continued and was the major focus of the U.S. activities in the space transportation sector. The “Project Constellation” programme is composed of * * *

*

Orion, an exploration vehicle for the transportation of crew; Ares I, a two-stage launcher carrying the Orion vehicle; Ares V, a two-stage heavy-lift launch vehicle carrying an Earth Departure Stage together with the Altair vehicle; The Altair lunar lander which will eventually be capable of landing four astronauts on the Moon and returning the crew to the Orion spacecraft which will bring them back to Earth.

NASA successfully undertook a series of tests for the Ares I engine from December 2007 to May 2008. Furthermore, on 5 November 2007, the main parachute for safely returning the first stage boosters of Ares I and V was successfully tested. The design of the Ares V rocket was modified with the adoption in June 2008 of a decision calling for a sixth RS-68 rocket engine to be added to the Ares V design to meet the lift requirements of 75.1 tons to the Moon. Despite this technological progress, a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released on 3 April 2008 indicated that NASA should fully define requirements and assess risks for its Ares I and Orion programmes prior to moving on to the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Five areas of concern were identified: the need to define requirements, the necessity to assess technical developments, the need to assess cost uncertainties, the need to schedule pressure, and concerns over an insufficient number of testing sites available.157 As NASA’s Shuttle fleet is set to retire in 2010, a gap of several years is expected before the United States’ new human spaceflight capabilities will be operational (most likely in March 2015). Since NASA’s current exemption from the Iran, North Korea and Syria Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA) is set to expire in 2011, NASA requested the U.S. Congress to amend the INKSA so as to allow the agency to keep paying Russia for transporting U.S. astronauts to and from the ISS beyond 2011.158 However, NASA did not request the right to purchase more Russian Progress re-supply vehicles for the ISS after 2011. Indeed, starting in 70

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2010, NASA intends to use a commercial vehicle from the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) programme for ISS logistics. While NASA’s established launch vehicles are ready to be phased out with the withdrawal of the Space Shuttle and the Delta 2 in 2010, NASA in August 2006 awarded two COTS Space Act contracts of 190 and 142 million euros, respectively, to two emerging commercial launch service providers – Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and RocketplaneKistler (RpK) – in the context of the first phase (capability demonstration) of NASA’s COTS programme.159 SpaceX completed a PDR for its Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft as part of NASA’s COTS programme in February 2008. However, SpaceX renegotiated its COTS agreement with NASA so that the first three planned demonstration flights were deferred by nine months to June 2009; the second flight is now slated for November 2009 and the final demonstration flight will take place in March 2010. SpaceX was also compelled to add new hardware development milestones as part of the agreement renegotiation.160 The contract awarded to RpK was terminated in October 2007 due to the non-fulfilment of a financial milestone as well as the failure to complete a Critical Design Review (CDR) for the cargo module. NASA consequently issued a new invitation to tender and the uncommitted funds were re-competed in February 2008. As a result, Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC) was awarded a new COTS contract amounting to 116 million euros.161 OSC will develop a system based on the Taurus II launch vehicle and a service module called Cygnus. Taurus II is scheduled to make its first flight from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport located at NASA’s Wallops Space Flight Facility in Virginia in late 2010. The first hardware milestone in the context of the COTS programme is slated for June 2009. However, the COTS budget line in the NASA budget was reduced from 161 million euros to 109 million euros in Fiscal Year 2008, which undermined NASA’s ability to influence the development of COTS.

2.3. Russia Access to space and the related infrastructures were one of the main areas of Russian activity in 2007/2008. Russia continued to work on the development of a new launch vehicle, the Angara rocket. The Federal Space Forces also announced that they will close the Svobody base, launching all military spacecraft from Plesetsk in the future. In addition, President Putin signed a decree for the creation of a new launch site, the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Amur region, on 21 November 2007. It is expected that the 71

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new launch site will be opened in 2015, launch manned spacecraft by 2018, and launch all Russian manned spacecraft by 2020. The new facility will reduce Russia’s dependence on the Baikonur spaceport located in Kazakhstan. In the meantime, the construction of the Angara launch pad will start at Plesetsk in 2008. Russia also cooperates with other countries in the domain of space transportation. Besides cooperating with Europe on Soyuz at Kourou, Russia cooperates with South Korea on developing the latter’s autonomous access to space. In addition, Russia cooperates with Brazil in the context of its Southern Cross programme. Finally, while Russia has been discussing a possible cooperation with ESA and Japan regarding the development of the Crew Space Transportation Systems (CSTS) for human access to space, India is interested in participating in the development of the launch vehicle as well. However, the launch vehicle will presumably not be ready by 2015 as initially planned, but only by 2020 with the opening of the Vostochny Cosmodrome.162 Despite new ambitions reflected in the new Federal Space Programme (2006–2015), a series of failures recently occurred in the ex-U.S.S.R launch vehicle family. On 5 September 2007, the Proton Breeze M failed to deliver the JCSat 11 satellites into orbit. Furthermore, an anomaly on 15 March 2008 left the SES Americom AMC-14 spacecraft in an incorrect orbit when the Proton Breeze M’s upper stage shut down prematurely, barely three months after the rocket’s return to service.

2.4. Japan Japan’s most recent activities have focused on the development of the H-2 Transfer Vehicle (HTV) to be launched to the ISS in 2009. It will be used to carry pressurised and un-pressurised goods to the ISS in addition to the European ATV and Russia’s Progress once the Space Shuttle retires in 2010.163 While the Japanese service sector still endures a lack of competitiveness, the Japanese space industry is improving its reliability and becoming more competitive on the commercial market. In particular, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) which markets the H-2A rocket expects to win its first commercial satellite launch contract by 2009.164

2.5. China In China, different policies and practices put forward in recent years aim at promoting a competitive industrial base, including a robust launch sector. 72

2. Space transportation

While China successfully launched its first Long March 3C from Xichang on 25 April 2008, it also continues to work on its new launch vehicle, the Long March 5. Initial tests were passed in spring 2008. The new launcher is intended to go into service in 2014, a year later than originally planned. It will be launched from the Wenchang launch base on the Hainan Island which will be ready by 2012. The Long March 5 is expected to be able to put 25 tons into LEO and 14 tons into GTO.

2.6. India A major emphasis of the Indian space programme is to increase the autonomy of the national space transport sector as illustrated by the 11th Five Year Plan (1 April 2007–31 March 2012) approved by the National Development Council on 19 December 2007. Launch vehicle development also accounts for the major share in the ISRO budget. In this context, India continued to work on developing more reliable and powerful launch vehicles in 2007/2008. In particular, the current GSLV upper stage is being replaced by an “indigenous” upper-stage in the GSLV-Mark III scheduled to be operational by 2009. The ground qualification of the indigenous cryogenic upper-stage was completed in November 2007. In parallel with developing launch capabilities for domestic use, India is now entering the worldwide launch services market. It offers commercial launch opportunities to international customers for both piggy back and dedicated launches to GEO. In spring 2008, India confirmed its entry into the commercial launch market. Following the successful launch of the Italian astronomical satellite Agile onboard a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in April 2007, Israel’s TechSAR spy satellite was successfully launched onboard a PSLV in early 2008. These two launches signal India’s intention of becoming a solid actor in the launch services market in the near future. ISRO has carried out studies for about four years to examine the technological challenges of a manned space mission and the Indian capability to undertake it. The decision to develop a man-rated GSLV has been taken and according actions have been initiated.

2.7. Emerging actors In 2007/2008, besides the major space powers emerging space actors have also worked on developing an autonomous access to space and the associated launch infrastructure. 73

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South Korea has set itself the goal to extend its capabilities for acquiring orbital launch capacities. It cooperates with Russia on the joint development of a launch vehicle and related infrastructure. South Korea is building a launch site (the Naro Space Center) and developing a launch vehicle: the Korea Space Launch Vehicle-1 (KSLV-1) derived from the Russian Angara launcher. However, due to a delay by Russia in the delivery of the ground test vehicle (GTV) used for testing the rocket engine and the liquid-fuelled propulsion system, the maiden launch of the KSLV1 was postponed from 21 December 2008 to the second quarter of 2009. Korea also intends to develop a more capable launch vehicle, KSLV-2, to be tested in 2017. KSLV-2 is foreseen to launch South Korea’s first Moon orbiter in 2020 and a lunar lander in 2025. In recent months, the main Brazilian policy directive was to refurbish the country’s launch site (the Alc^antara Launch Center) and promote the commercialisation of Brazil’s means of access to space. In particular, it was targeted to increase the participation of the industrial sector both in the implementation of the full infrastructure of the Alc^antara Launch Center and the development of the Veıculo Lan¸cador de Satelite (VLS) and its successors. In spring 2008, Brazil also concluded an agreement with Russia to develop a family of launch vehicles as part of its Cruzeiro do Sul (Southern Cross) programme. This technological alliance is foreseen to develop a rocket based on Russia’s forthcoming Angara vehicle. In particular, the first stages of Brazil’s Gamma (light weight class), Delta (medium weight class) and Epsilon (heavy weight class) launchers will be powered by a unit based on the RD-191 engine developed for Russia’s Angara rocket.165 The second stage will be powered by an engine part from Russia’s Molniya launcher.166 Iran has long declared the goal of developing a space programme. In this context, following the launch of a sounding rocket on 25 February 2007, a new suborbital test flight was successfully conducted using the two-stage rocket Safir (Envoy) on 4 February 2008, which demonstrates Iran’s continued determination to further advance and develop its space transportation capabilities.

2.8. Industrial comparison Launch systems and infrastructures are key indictors of a country’s independence in space activities. The number of launches conducted as well as the level of the activity of its launch bases indicates the dynamism of a country’s space sector and its position in the “space hierarchy”. In 2007, six countries plus Europe and the multinational private consortium Sea Launch (referred to as ‘Multinational’ in the figures below) conducted 68 launches. However, the number of launches performed and the capacity of the 74

2. Space transportation

30 26

Number of orbital launches

25 19

20

15 10

10 6 3

5

2

1

1

0 Russia

USA

China

Europe

India

Japan Multinational Israel

Fig. 8: Total worldwide orbital launches per entity in 2007.

different countries varies widely. When comparing the level of activity country-bycountry, Russia was again the world leader according to the launch rate criterion, with a share of about 39% of all launches (26 launches), followed by the United States (about 28%) (Figure 8). China completed the podium with a market share of about 15% of all launches conducted in 2007.167 Europe followed with a market share of approximately 9%, India with about 4%, Japan with 3% and finally Sea Launch and Israel with 1.5% each. The “space hierarchy” in this domain is very stable, as can be observed when comparing this year’s and last year’s podium. About 255 metric tons were launched into space in 2007, 66% of which were non-commercial and 34% of which were commercial. Four actors launched the overwhelming majority of the mass into orbit in 2007. Russia launched an estimated 89 tons into orbit (about 34% of the total mass) including 30 tons of commercial payloads (Figure 9). The United States followed with about 80 tons launched (an estimated 32% of the total mass launched), including six tons of commercial payloads. With 44 tons of commercial payloads, Europe launched more commercial mass than all other actors combined (41 tons). China conducted ten launches (15%) but this represented only 10.3% of the total payload mass launched worldwide (25 tons into orbit). Finally, Sea Launch, Japan, India and Israel launched an aggregated 6% (15.26 tons) into orbit compared to an aggregated 10.3% of all launches performed. Illustrating the different strategies of the actors involved in space transportation, only five actors performed commercial launches in 2007 while six actors performed non-commercial launches. Commercial launches are particularly important for 75

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 Commercial mass

Non-commecial mass

90000 80000

Launched mass in kg

70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 Russia

USA

Europe

China Multinational Japan

India

Israel

Fig. 9: Estimate of the mass launched per country/entity and commercial status in 2007.

Commercial

Non-Commercial

Number of orbital launches

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 Russia

USA

China

Europe

India

Japan Multinational Israel

Fig. 10: Worldwide commercial and non-commercial orbital launches per country/entity in 2007.

Russia, Europe and Sea Launch (Figure 10). By contrast, the U.S. launch service providers continue to focus heavily on the lucrative governmental market which provides them with a robust source of income. Finally, China, Japan and Israel focused only on non-commercial launches (Figure 10). However, a new trend 76

2. Space transportation 8

Number of orbital launches

7 6 5 4 3 2 1

D

el

So ta yu 2 P Lo r z-U ng oto M n-M ar c Ar h 3 i So ane yu 5 zF At G la D s Ko ne 5 sm pros 1 3M Lo S ng h Lo M uttl ng arc e M h2 ar ch 4 PS LV H 2 Z A M eni ol t 2 ny Pr ia M ot o Fa n K M lcon in Pe ota 1 ga ur su 1 s X D L el ta G 4 Ze SL ni V t3 Sh SL av it 2

0

Fig. 11: Worldwide orbital launches per vehicle in 2007.

emerged last year, with the entry of India into the commercial launch sector which performed its first commercial launch in 2007 when it successfully put the Italian satellite Agile into orbit.168 The versatility of the launch vehicle fleet reflects a country’s space capabilities and the importance it attributes to an independent access to space. The 68 launches of 2007 were distributed over 24 different launch systems (Figure 11). Twenty-six Russian vehicles were launched in 2007 using eight different systems. U.S. launch vehicles carried out 19 launches using seven different launchers. China used three different launch systems for ten launches and India two (PSLV and GSLV) while Europe, Japan, Israel and Sea Launch used only one launch system. Delta 2 was the most-used launch system (eight launches) followed by the Soyuz-U, Proton M, Long March 3 and Ariane 5 with six launches each. Those five launch systems represented 47% of all launches performed in 2007. The number and degree to which space transportation infrastructures are used is also an indicator of national capabilities and reflects the importance attributed to an independent access to space by a country. In 2007, 15 launch sites were used to perform at least one orbital launch (Figure 12) including one mobile platform (Sea Launch Odyssey platform). Baikonur in Kazakhstan (operated by Russia) was the busiest launch site in 2007, with 20 launches (three more than in 2006) from its 77

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008

20 18

Number of orbital launches

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

C

ap

an

e

C

Ba

iko

nu r( av Ka er al ) Xi (U ch S an A) g (C Ko h ur ou ) Pl Va es (EU e nd ) en tsk (R be u rg ) Ta (U i Y SA ) Sr ua n ih (C ar Ta h i ne kota ) ga ( sh Ind K ) im a W waj (J al al ei a) lo n ps Is (US la nd A) (U Ya S sn A) y (R Ji u) q Pa uan lm ( ac Ch SL Pl him ) at (I fo rm sr) (M ob )

0

Fig. 12: Launches performed by launch site in 2007.

different launch pads. Baikonur was followed by Cape Canaveral in the United States with 13 launches, three more than in 2006. Xichang in China and Kourou in Europe completed the podium with six launches each. In 2007, the United States used four different launch sites (Cape Canaveral, Vandenberg, Kwajalelin and Wallops Island) while Russia used three different launch sites (Baikonur, Plesetsk and Yasny) like China (Xichang, Tai Yuan and Jiquan) (Figure 12). Europe, India, Japan, Israel and Sea Launch used only one launch site each. The worldwide launch sector was also marked by new trends and developments in the 2007/2008 period such as the entry of new launch service providers, an increase in the price of access to space, or new procurement strategies of major customers. A series of recent failures affecting Russian-built launch vehicles has led to a temporary under-capacity in the launch services offered. Furthermore, as most commercial launch service providers have a full manifest for the years ahead, a continuing supply shortage could induce the market entry of other actors such as Boeing with Delta 4, Lockheed Martin with Atlas V or MHI with its H-2A rocket. Moreover, while national institutional payloads have in most cases guaranteed a stable launch rate and protected domestic launchers, commercial clients are having a growing choice among launchers. The emerg78

3. Space science and exploration

ing trend of an increasing number of satellites without U.S. components is also favouring the arrival on the commercial market of launch vehicles from countries which are currently precluded from launching satellites with U.S.built components, and thus reinforces the internationalisation of the launch services sector. In particular, China and India have been laying the foundations for robust domestic launch fleets, principally by enhancing their commercialisation efforts and developing comprehensive launch vehicle families which will allow them to enter the commercial launch services market at an increased pace. Furthermore, a considerable number of newly developed or successor-launch vehicles is scheduled to become operational between 2010 and 2015, which will induce major changes in the space transportation landscape. Due to the shortage in reliable means of access to space, 2007/2008 saw a continuing trend of price increases in the launch sector, also partially due to the higher costs of raw materials and production (particularly in Russia and Ukraine). A spike in helium prices also hit the launch systems industry. This was due to an increase in gas prices, as the number of helium users is increasing in the areas of scientific research and the manufacturing of semiconductors, flat-panel displays or fibre optics, for instance. Consequently, the prices of the launch providers have now almost returned to the level prior to the collapse of the satellite market a decade ago. Finally, the consequences of the latest emerging trends in the commercial launch sector that is the SES multi-launch services agreement with both ILS and Arianespace for a batch of five satellite-launching slots each are still unfolding. This bulk launcher procurement contract features one primary launcher and a back-up guaranteed by the other company and gives SES flexibility in terms of matching payloads and launch periods to meet its future deployment needs. As this agreement reportedly grants attractive terms and conditions to SES,169 other major satellite operators are also expected to sign multi-launch services contracts in the near future.

3. Space science and exploration After a long hiatus, space exploration is again part of the political agenda of a growing number of countries around the world and consequently, the overall space exploration environment has changed considerably.170 Space science also continues to be an important research domain of the major space agencies.171 79

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3.1. Human spaceflights activities The period 2007/2008 was historical for human spaceflight activities in Europe and Japan, with hardware being delivered to the ISS to complement the assembly of the orbital station. The first European-built module to be permanently attached to the ISS, the Node 2 module or Harmony, was launched on 23 October 2007 onboard the STS120 mission spacecraft along with the Italian astronaut Paolo Nespoli. Harmony was attached to the ISS three days later and was the first addition to the ISS work and living space in six years. It was developed for NASA under a contract with the Italian Space Agency (ASI) and with Thales Alenia Space as the prime contractor. On 7 February 2008, the Columbus orbital laboratory was launched by NASA’s space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-122 mission) along with two European astronauts: the German Hans Schlegel and the Frenchman Leopold Eyharts. Columbus was attached to the ISS on 11 February 2008 and the hatch between the ISS and Columbus was opened one day later.172 This significant milestone marks Europe’s new status as a full partner and co-owner of the ISS.173 The laboratory was fully activated on 13 February 2008 and has since worked well. The first ESA re-supply and reboot vehicle, the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) Jules Verne, was launched atop an Ariane 5 on 9 March 2009. It performed a successful, fullyautomated docking procedure with the ISS on 3 April 2008. The 19-ton ATV will be used to deliver cargo, propellant, water, oxygen and propulsion capability to the station.174 Following these milestones, ESA opened a call for astronauts on 19 May 2008 to recruit four candidates from its Member States to join the European Astronauts Corps. This is the first call for recruiting European astronauts since 1992. The final appointments will be officially announced in 2009. NASA continued the assembly of the ISS with the launch of five Shuttles and the delivery into orbit of ITS-S5, the Harmony module, the Columbus module and two elements from the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) in 2007/2008. NASA is also focusing its efforts on developing a new launch architecture (“Project Constellation”) for providing human access to space to implement its space exploration policy and replace the existing launch infrastructure. U.S. President Bush indicated when he announced the Vision for Space Exploration in January 2004 that the Shuttle will be retired in 2010. A gap of several years is therefore expected before the United States will have its new human spaceflight capabilities operational. NASA therefore requested the U.S. Congress in 2008 to amend the INKSNA and thus permit NASA to keep paying Russia for transporting U.S. and other astronauts to and from the ISS beyond 2011. Due to the decision to terminate Shuttle operations in 2010 and because of the gap before the entry into operation of the next U.S. human space flight vehicle, 80

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Russia will be providing vital support to the ISS and thus play a role unforeseen at the outset of the ISS programme. In fact, Russia will be the only country capable of delivering crew to the ISS, which will grant Russia a very important position in providing logistical and supply flights and particularly human access to the station. Russia has also already initiated the development of a new generation of crew vehicles (the so-called CSTS) for missions to LEO and potentially the Moon to replace the existing Soyuz vehicle. This development might be undertaken in cooperation with international partners (Europe and Japan).175 Russia is also developing a new family of launchers called Angara and developing a new spaceport, the Vostochny launch centre, as an alternative to Baikonur for manned and other missions. Russia launched four Progress vehicles to re-supply the ISS in 2007/2008 as well as two Soyuz TMA carrying in total six persons. Russia also continued to use manned access to space as a foreign diplomacy tool and helped both Malaysia and South Korea to send their first nationals to space in recent months. 2007/2008 was a symbolic period for Japan as the first two elements of the JEM were launched on the Shuttle missions STS-123 for the Experiment Logistics Module Pressurised Section (ELM-PS) on 11 March 2008, and on STS-124 for the Pressurised Module (PM) on 31 May 2008. Each of these missions had one Japanese astronaut onboard. The third JEM element is scheduled for launch on the STS-127 mission in April 2009. The first launch of the Japanese HTV vehicle which is intended to re-supply the ISS is foreseen in the second half of 2009. In spring 2008, a new call to recruit Japanese astronauts was also opened for the first time in nearly a decade. Up to three applicants will be chosen for a two-year training with NASA. JAXA will announce its selection in February 2009. China’s human spaceflights are part of a long-term programme to expand the country’s space technology capabilities. The third manned Shenzhou mission (Shenzhou-7), which had been scheduled to take place in late 2007, was postponed by almost a year and will carry three astronauts into space in late 2008, one of whom will perform an extravehicular activity (EVA) with an indigenous space suit.176 In preparation for this EVA, China has launched two new space tracking ships (Yuanwang) and its first data relay satellite (Tian-Lian-1). In a buoyant regional context, India’s space agency has been eager to start a human spaceflight programme. In spring 2008, ISRO submitted a project proposing a first manned space mission in the 2014–2015 timeframe to the Indian government, with a decision to be expected by the end of 2008. ISRO has been carrying out studies to examine the technological challenge of a manned space mission and the Indian capability to undertake it for about four years. The decision to develop a man-rated GSLV has already been taken and according actions were initiated. ISRO already validated its re-entry technology with the successful 81

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recovery of its space capsule, the Space-capsule Recovery Experiment (SRE-1). The agency has also started to work on pre-project, long-lead items for human missions such as spacesuits and simulation facilities under a preliminary funding by the government of 16 million euros.177 In the meantime, India is also considering sending one of its citizens into space onboard a Russian spacecraft by 2012 to acquire the skills necessary for future manned space missions.178 India has so far only had one astronaut, Maj Rakesh Sharma, who flew with Russia under the Soviet Intercosmos programme in April 1984. In 2007/2008, two countries sent their first nationals to space. On 10 October 2007, Sheikh Muszaphar Shukhuor was the first Malaysian astronaut or “Angkasawan” in space onboard the Soyouz-TMA-11 spacecraft. South Korea’s first astronaut Yi So-yeon went to the ISS onboard the Soyouz-TMA-12 spacecraft in April 2008.179

3.2. Lunar exploration The recent months confirmed an increasing interest in lunar exploration by a number of countries, as new plans for orbiter, lander and rover missions were disclosed. ESA was particularly active in defining new future exploration activities. Most prominently, ESA and DLR organised the International Space Exploration Conference which took place on 8–9 November 2007 in Berlin (Germany) to discuss future missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond. In 2007/2008, ESA and NASA investigated the potential for cooperation in the domain of space exploration and particularly worked together on comparative lunar architectures and preliminary elements of Mars sample return missions. ESA also reinforced its cooperation with China. The ESA ground station network and particularly its three ESTRACK (European Space Tracking) stations provided direct support to critical phases of the Chinese Chang’e 1 lunar mission. In return for ESA’s tracking services, China will share the scientific data generated by the mission. ESA also cooperates with India on the latter’s first lunar mission, Chandrayaan-1. Three instruments were provided by ESA for this mission; the first two were upgraded instruments from the SMART-1 mission and the third one was a modified version of ASPERA which has flown onboard Venus Express and Mars Express. Due to the high expenditures associated with space exploration, most European involvement in lunar exploration has been related to the ESA mission SMART-1. However, ideas and proposals have recently come up within Europe for lunar exploration missions to be performed and funded within the framework of national 82

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or bilateral programmes. Several European countries are now considering future robotic missions to the Moon. For instance, the United Kingdom is developing a Moon orbiter including penetrators (MoonLITE) and Germany a Lunar Exploration Orbiter (LEO).180 For the United States, the development of a lunar architecture and associated technology to support the establishment of a human outpost on the Moon (most likely in the South Polar Region) is the main emphasis of its exploration plans besides the development of a new human space transportation infrastructure. A series of robotic missions are also planned to be launched in the next years to prepare for a human return to the Moon, such as the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) mission, the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission, or the Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission following the Vision for Space Exploration announced by President Bush in January 2004. Yet although President Bush called for the first in a series of robotic lunar precursor missions to be launched by 2008, the first U.S. missions to the Moon – the joint LRO/LCROSS missions – will be delayed until spring 2009 due to a payload shift onboard an Atlas V, with a DoD payload being launched instead of NASA’s mission spacecraft. During the first six months of 2008, representatives of NASA and ESA engaged in a detailed assessment of the degree to which NASA and ESA’s lunar exploration architecture concepts could complement, augment, or enhance each other. On 20 June 2008, NASA also finished a study which will allow the establishment of the technical parameters needed for the preparation of the vehicle requirements for manned missions to the Moon. Russia, which pioneered the robotic exploration of the Moon, is starting to develop its first lunar mission in more than 30 years. With increasing funds, Russia is re-energising its lunar programme, particularly through a partnership with ISRO on a mission foreseen to land on the Moon in 2012.181 Furthermore, while there are no human spaceflight plans to the Moon in the new Federal Space Plan (2006–2015), the long-term Russian space programme (until 2040) considers a first human trip to the Moon in 2025 and the setting-up of a base in the 2027–2032 timeframe. In 2007/2008, Japan outpaced its Asian rivals by launching its lunar probe more than a month before China deployed its lunar mission and several months before the start of India’s lunar mission. The SELenological and ENgineering Explorer (SELENE), renamed “Kaguya”, was launched onboard an H-2 A launch vehicle on 14 September 2007. Kaguya is JAXA’s first large lunar explorer mission.182 The lunar probe successfully released its two sub-satellites Rstar and Vrad on 9 and 12 October 2007, respectively. These two microsatellites should help to map lunar gravitation and measure changes in the Moon’s orbit. 83

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China’s space exploration activities reached an important milestone in 2007/ 2008 when China successfully launched its first lunar orbiter (Chang’e 1) onboard a Chinese Long March 3A on 24 October 2007. The four scientific objectives of the Chang’e 1 missions are: the realisation of a 3D global map of the Moon, the study of the Moon’s mineral composition, measuring the width of the Moon’s soil, and monitoring the environment between the Earth and the Moon.183 Chang’e 1 is part of the first phase of the China Lunar Exploration Programme (CLEP). China also plans to launch a second lunar probe, Chang’e 2, before the end of 2011 as the second stage of the country’s Moon programme. Chang’e 2 will include a lander. Another lunar mission, Chang’e 3, will eventually carry lunar soil samples back to Earth around 2017. India is also showing greater interest in lunar exploration. Chandrayaan-1, the first Indian lunar mission initially foreseen to be launched on 9 April 2008, was postponed until the second half of 2008. It includes international instruments from Europe (ESA and Bulgaria) and the United States. Chandrayaan-1 will be followed by Chandrayaan-2, a lunar lander mission developed in cooperation with Russia. Even though it started later than its Asian counterparts, South Korea is making notable investments and progress in its indigenous space capability. While South Korea has significantly ramped up its space programme in recent years following its long-term space-investment plan which includes a domestic line of Earth observation satellites and launch vehicles, South Korea plans to send a mission to the Moon by 2020 which is to be followed by a lunar lander by 2025 if the first mission is successful.184 Finally, the recently launched Google Lunar X PRIZE for the first privatelyfunded team to send a robot to the Moon before the end of 2012 is spurring global interest. As of the end of June 2008, 13 teams aiming for the prize were registered, mainly from the United States and Europe.

3.3. Mars exploration The Red Planet remains a centre of attention in the space exploration plans of the major space powers. ESA’s Mars Express, on orbit around Mars since Christmas 2003, continues to deliver new results. It has been able to map water and carbon dioxide ice deposits, some of which are estimated to contain enough water to cover the entire planet in eleven metres of water.185 Marsis, a radar placed on MarsExpress, has created the first map of the Martian ionosphere. Sediments were observed in the southern hemisphere of Mars by the DLR-operated High Resolution Stereo Camera placed 84

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on Mars Express.186 Scientists believe that this might have been formed in a similar way to the Earth’s river deltas, with water-carrying sediments.187 ExoMars, which is planned to be the first mission of ESA’s Aurora programme and Europe’s first Mars rover, is entering its procurement phase. In July 2007, ESA released its Request for Quotation for Thales Alenia Space for the combined spacecraft – the Carrier Module (CM), the Descent Module (DM), the Rover Module (RM) and the Rover Operation Centre (ROC).188 Industrial proposals were received in October 2007 and evaluated through November 2007. Decisions were taken by the Tender Evaluation Board in December 2007. However, the cost estimates for the Enhanced ExoMars mission have increased significantly in recent months, threatening to delay the mission. Mars is a target of choice for the United States, and NASA is pursuing a vigorous Mars robotic exploration programme with various missions planned to complement the existing (orbiting or landed) ones, including a mission for roving on Mars’s surface. NASA’s Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) which was launched in August 2005 to characterise the Martian climate and geology, determine whether life ever existed on Mars and prepare future human exploration, continued to gather information about the Red Planet in 2007/2008. The MRO took a picture of an avalanche on Mars on 19 February 2008.189 Furthermore, it provided indication that the crust and upper mantle of Mars were stiffer and colder than initially thought by scientists. This suggests that any liquid water and accompanying life would lie deeper than expected.190 At the end of June 2008, the MRO also revealed images of what appears to be the largest impact crater ever observed in the solar system. The Borealis basin covers 40% of Mars’ surface.191 NASA’s Mars Odyssey orbiter (orbiting the Red Planet since 2001) has found evidence of salt deposits on Mars. This could prove the past existence of small quantities of water which evaporated upon reaching the surface.192 NASA’s twin rovers Opportunity and Spirit have been exploring regions on two opposite sides of Mars since January 2004. In 2007/2008, Opportunity went down into the Victoria crater while Spirit explored a plate called the Home plate. Both rovers have by far exceeded their expected lifetime and travelled distance. One of the milestones of NASA’s exploration activities in 2007/2008 was the successful landing of the Phoenix mission near the North Pole of Mars. Phoenix was successfully launched on 4 August 2007 and landed in the Vastitas Borealis plains of Mars on 25 May 2008. Phoenix confirmed the presence of water ice below the Martian arctic surface detected by the Mars Odyssey orbiter in 2002. It has since performed a series of soil chemistry tests and discovered that the Martian soil is remarkably Earth-like and could support a wide array of plants and organisms. Indeed, mineral nutrients essential to life were discovered in the Martian soil 85

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(potassium, magnesium and chloride).193 The collected samples appear to differ in their composition (minerals, size, grains etc.) from all other samples collected elsewhere on Mars. However, despite these scientific and engineering achievements, NASA’s work on an updated Mars Design Reference mission has been halted due to a wording in the U.S. Appropriation Act of 2008 which prohibits the funding of any research, development or demonstration activities related exclusively to the human exploration of Mars. Most of NASA’s efforts focus therefore on robotic exploration. Russia’s exploration activities are on the rise. Russia is planning to launch a sample return mission (Phobos-Grunt) to the Martian moon Phobos in October 2009 in order to analyse its structure and chemical characteristics. China and Russia have also signed an agreement on launching Yinghuo-1 (a microsatellite) along with the Phobos-Grunt probe.194

3.4. Saturn exploration The NASA spacecraft Cassini continues to make an extensive survey of the Saturn system. In 2007/2008, Cassini flew over Titan and Enceladus, two of Saturn’s moons. Two hydrocarbon lakes were found on the South Pole of Titan.195 Furthermore, scientists discovered that Titan has an ocean of water and ammoniac beneath its frozen crust.196 When flying over Enceladus, Cassini also detected organic matter (methane, propane, acetylene and formaldehyde), suggesting that the composition of Enceladus resembles that of a comet.197 Furthermore, with the provided images, scientists were able to discern geological features indicating tectonic plate movements as well as the possibility that ancient sub-surface heating has slumped more ancient ice features.198 In addition, Cassini observed the “Tiger stripes” around the South Pole which lead scientists to conclude that they were the result of former “spectacular geysers of water and ice” which now appear as cracks in the frozen surface of Enceladus.199 Cassini’s mission will be extended by two years to make it fly over other satellites orbiting Saturn as well as over the planet’s rings and magnetosphere.200

3.5. Venus exploration ESA’s Venus Express mission has been studying Venus’ atmosphere and the interaction between the planet’s atmosphere and surface as well as Venus’ interaction with the interplanetary environment since spring 2006. Among the main results has been the first global view of the South Pole of Venus as well as the 86

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first global view of Venus’ atmospheric structure, a detailed map of Venus’ winds and their strength, 3D data on Venus’ atmospheric dynamic, the most comprehensive map of Venus’s atmospheric temperatures, and the first evidence of lightning in the atmosphere of Venus.

3.6. Mercury exploration Messenger (MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry and Ranging) is a NASA spacecraft designed for the exploration of Mercury launched in August 2004. The pictures and measurements taken by Messenger indicate that the planet’s blue colour, craters, possibly volcanic areas and rose deposits are still found on the newly photographed surface.201 In January 2008, the industrial contract for BepiColombo was signed between ESA and Astrium. BepiColombo will consist of two spacecraft – one orbiter for planetary investigation developed by ESA and one for magnetospheric studies developed by the Japanese space agency (JAXA). Scheduled to be launched in 2013 and to reach Mercury after a six-year journey, BepiColombo is expected to make the most extensive and detailed study of Mercury ever attempted. The aim of this mission is to gather data on the Mercury’s surface composition and to produce temperature maps of Mercury.

3.7. Jupiter observation Observations by the Voyager, Galileo and New Horizon probes indicate that the rotational axis of Jupiter’s moon Europa has wandered by about 80 degrees. This is taken as an indication by scientists that a liquid water ocean lays beneath Europa’s frozen crust.202 In addition, NASA’s New Horizon has been able to capture details never observed before, such as lightning over Jupiter’s poles, the life cycles of fresh ammonia clouds, clumps speeding through Jupiter’s faint rings, the structure inside volcanic eruptions on Io, or the path of charged particles in the planet’s magnetic tail.203

3.8. Solar observation NASA’s Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) mission launched in October 2006 provides new views of the Sun-Earth system. In particular, using the Sun Earth Connection Coronal and Heliospheric Investigation (SECCHI) instruments, scientists saw large waves of solar material sweeping past Earth for 87

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the first time in December 2007. When scientists compared these white-light images with in-situ plasma and magnetic field measurements obtained by nearEarth spacecraft, they found a perfect association between the occurrence of these waves and the arrival of high-density regions which rotate with the Sun.204 On 9 April 2008, STEREO also observed tornado-like jets erupting from the Sun which lasted for about 10 minutes and were a thousand times faster than terrestrial tornadoes.205 The Hinode (Solar-B) mission, a collaborating mission of JAXA with the U.S. National Astronomical Observatory of Japan, NASA, the UK’s Science and Technology Facilities Council and ESA, experienced technical difficulties in February 2008 which have resulted in a reduced rate of scientific data transmission to the ground, thus undermining the initially planned continuous data transmission. The joint ESA/NASA Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) mission, designed as a solar physics mission and launched in December 1995, keeps providing new data on the Sun. In particular, SOHO in April 2008 confirmed a 36 year-old theory that solar flares drive global oscillations in the Sun. There appears to be a strong correlation between the high-frequency energy in the solar acoustic spectrum and the appearance of solar flares.206 The Japanese Akari mission previously known as ASTRO-F or IRIS (Infrared Imaging Surveyor) which was successfully launched on 22 February 2006 finished its supply of cryogen (liquid helium) on 26 August 2007 and thus came to an end.207 The joint ESA/NASA mission Ulysses returned a wealth of valuable data on the Sun’s environment and structure.208 However, in early February 2008, it was announced that the mission would cease in the following months since the Ulysses spacecraft was succumbing to the harsh space environment.209

3.9. Outer solar system space probes The CNES-led mission COROT (COnvection, ROtation and planetary Transits) launched in December 2006 and dedicated to the search and study of planets orbiting stars continued to perform routine operations in 2007/2008 and provided a continuous stream of new data. In particular, COROT discovered a second exoplanet named Coro-Exo-2b which is 1.4 times larger and 3.5 times heavier than Jupiter. This planet completes a full circle around its star in less than two days.210 The satellite COROT also discovered three additional new exoplanets whose density should be twice as high as that of platinum.211 NASA’s Spitzer space telescope, launched in August 2003, found water vapour in a giant exoplanet which was baptised HD-189733b in July 2007.212 Further88

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more, in August 2007, Spitzer observed four galaxies slamming into each other. The clashing galaxies are merging into a single galaxy which will be up to 10 times more massive than our own Milky Way.213 NASA’s Hubble and Spitzer Space Telescopes jointly discovered nine of the smallest, faintest and most compact galaxies ever observed in the distant Universe.214 Spitzer’s observation of the Milky Way also indicated that it possesses only two arms instead of the four arms previously assumed.215 Both the Deep Impact and Stardust probes were given new secondary missions by NASA in July 2007.216 Deep Impact was planned to fly by Comet Boethin but since the latter could not be found, Deep Impact was redirected towards Comet Hartley 2. Stardust, after collecting dust and carbon-based samples from Comet Wild 2 in 2004, will fly over the comet Tempel-1 in February 2011 in order to study changes on its surface since its impact with the Deep Impact probe in 2005.217 NASA launched the Dawn mission on 24 September 2007, three months later than initially planned. This mission will explore two asteroids: Vesta (in 2011–2012) and Ceres (in 2015). Its three instruments will produce imagery, mineral maps and complementary measurements of those two asteroids.218 On 11 June 2008, NASA successfully launched an astronomy satellite – the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope (formerly GLAST, short for Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope) – equipped with both a Large Area Telescope (LAT) built by the Italian Space Agency and the GLAST Burst Monitor (GBM). Fermi will allow scientists to observe and study high-energy events in the Universe such as the action of black holes and subatomic particles. Furthermore, more information will be gathered on the birth and early evolution of the Universe as well as on gamma-ray bursts.219

3.10. International cooperation in space exploration In 2007/2008, major progress was made in the definition of a strategic framework for space exploration in a multilateral context. Formal discussions on the goals, capabilities and timelines of future space exploration took place among the major space agencies, focusing particularly on the Moon.220 This illustrates a paradigm shift in space exploration and indicates that international cooperation is now becoming central to any long-term space exploration strategy.221 In particular, the work of the representatives of fourteen space agencies at the third ESA/ASI workshop on “International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Exploration” led to the adoption on 31 May 2007 of the 25page report “Global Exploration Strategy – The Framework for Cooperation”.222 89

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A key finding of the Framework Document was the need to establish a voluntary, non-binding international coordination mechanism through which individual agencies may exchange information regarding interests, objectives and plans in space exploration, with the goal of strengthening both individual exploration programmes and collective efforts.223 To support the implementation of the Global Exploration Strategy, the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) was created in November 2007 to facilitate the coordination of future space exploration plans. It was also equipped with an ISECG Secretariat. A new programmatic plan was also jointly formulated in 2008, with the space agencies of Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States agreeing to develop a robotic International Lunar Network (ILN) to accelerate the first multinational operations on the surface of the Moon. In particular, it was considered to place relatively standardised small, fixed robotic stations or simple rovers at several locations across the Moon in as early as 2013–2014.224 This robotic network will be designed to gradually place six to eight fixed or mobile science stations on the lunar surface which would then form a seismic network geared towards determining the nature of the Moon’s core and understanding moonquakes and meteor impacts.225 ILN will allow the building of a coordinated network which none of the involved countries could afford independently and serve as a test-bed technology project for lunar communications and navigation spacecraft, robot landers, and other significant infrastructures such as ground segment elements or power supplies for surviving in the lunar night. The participants of specific ILN activities will be determined by international agreements. Additional participants may join in the future once they are programmatically and financially ready.

4. Satellite applications In 2007/2008, major developments occurred throughout the world in the three main domains of space technology applications – space-based communications, space-based positioning, navigation and timing systems, and space-based Earth observation.

4.1. Space-based communications 2007/2008 was marked by the continuing internationalisation of the space-based communications sector, with an increasing number of assets being procured, purchased and launched particularly in the “South”. 90

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In Europe, the development of a new mechanism for the selection and authorisation of systems providing MSS was a major issue. On 22 August 2007, the European Commission transmitted to the European Parliament and European Council a proposal entitled “Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the selection and authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services (MSS)”. This proposal provides a legal framework for new mechanisms on the selection and authorisation of systems providing MSS. It lays down a Community procedure for the common selection of MSS operators at the EU-level; it also mentions provisions for the coordinated authorisation by national authorities of selected operators which use the radio spectrum for the operation of such systems in the European Union.226 The Commission’s proposal was subsequently examined by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council under the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies. Negotiations with the European Parliament started in early 2008 and on 18 April 2008, a compromise was reached on the Commission proposal. On 21 May 2008, the European Parliament adopted the Commission’s proposal (652-16-10) on the basis of a first-reading compromise, only with the provision that no more than 15 MHz from Earth to space and 15 MHz from space to Earth can be assigned to each single applicant. Then, on 16 June 2008, a decision of the European Parliament and the European Council on the selection and authorisation of MSS-providing systems was published. On 23 June 2008, the European Council adopted a decision which established a common framework for the selection and authorisation of systems providing MSS. The S-band licensing process started on 30 June 2008. Four companies are reported to have filed applications: Solaris Mobile (a joint venture of Eutelsat and SES), Inmarsat, TerreStar Europe, and ICO. The target date for completing the selection process is early 2009. On the technical-side, ESA and Inmarsat announced the formal signature of the contract for the Alphasat satellite on 23 November 2007, which made Inmarsat the first customer of the Alphabus platform jointly developed by Astrium and Thales Alenia Space and initiated by a partnership between ESA and CNES. Alphabus is Europe’s next-generation multi-purpose platform for the high-power payload communications satellite market. Alphasat will be available for launch in 2012 and should provide an extended L-band communications capacity for Inmarsat’s global mobile satellite network.227 In addition to the Inmarsat payload, it will carry three ESA-produced Technology Demonstration Payloads (TDPs). ESA also signed a protocol agreement with Hispasat for a public-privatepartnership (PPP) on the Small-GEO mission ARTES-11 (under the Advanced Research TElecommunications Systems, or ARTES programme).228 This contract involves the development of a Small GEO satellite (AG1) and associated 91

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mission to provide flight qualification as well as in-orbit demonstration for the platform. The Small GEO programme aims at developing a general-purpose small GEO satellite platform and subsequent mission. Europe was also active in the field of military communications. The United Kingdom launched two dedicated communications satellites (Skynet 5A and 5B) in 2007 and a third one in 2008 (Skynet 5C). Skynet 5 is used to update the British Ministry of Defence’s satellite communications capability. The operator of the programme is Paradigm Secure Communications (a company entirely owned by EADS) under a Private Financing Initiative (PFI).229 Demonstrating the increasing cooperation between Italy and France, a Letter of Intent (LOI) for the Ka-band French-Italian dual-use satellite ATHENA-FIDUS was signed during the Franco-Italian Summit in Nice (France) on 30 November 2007. This joint programme concerns two-way military and non-military broadband communications. In the United States, the military communications satellite WGS 1 (or Wideband Global Satcom-1) was launched on October 2007 onboard an Atlas V. It was placed in operational service above the Pacific on 16 April 2008.230 On 10 December 2007, NROL-24 was successfully launched and on 13 March 2008, NRO-28 was successfully placed into orbit with an Atlas V rocket. In line with Russia’s renewed interest and investment in space affairs, a series of military communications assets were sent into orbit in 2007/2008. The communications satellite Raduya-1 M was successfully launched on 9 December 2007 and three military communications satellites (Kosmos 2437, 2438 and 2439) were launched on 23 May 2008. On 23 February 2008, Japan launched the Wideband InterNetworking engineering test and Demonstration Satellite (WINDS), renamed Kizuna, onboard an H-IIA launcher. Kizuna is part of the e-Japan Priority Policy Programme to establish the world’s most advanced information technology network. China successfully launched two communications satellites – Chinasat-6B (ZX 6B) on 5 July 2007 and Chinasat-9 (ZX 9) on 9 June 2008. Furthermore, the Chinese geostationary relay satellite Tian Lian-1 (TL1) was successfully launched on 25 April 2008 with the goal of supporting the future Chinese human spaceflight activities. India successfully launched Insat-4CR on 2 September 2007 onboard a GSLV. Insat-4CR is a replacement satellite for the Insat-4C satellite launched in July 2006. Although the reached orbit for Insat-4CR was initially lower than planned, the satellite had enough fuel to reach an operational geostationary orbit. In November 2007, the Australian government agreed to an investment of 563 million euros in the U.S. WGS system to fund the sixth WGS satellite.231 92

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This will provide access to high communications bandwidths in the X and Ka-bands to support bandwidth-intensive applications.232 With the advent of new satellites to provide new services and cover new regions, the period 2007/2008 was marked by a “bandwidth race” in the private sector. In Europe, new assets were launched. The Swedish Sirius-4 satellite was launched in November 2007 onboard a Proton-M. On 11 February 2008, ILS launched the communications satellite Thor-5 which aims at providing a fixed communications capacity and direct-to-home television broadcasting services, thereby improving Telenor's service coverage in the Nordic countries. In the U.S. market, the DirectTV-10 satellite was launched on 7 July 2007 and DirectTV-11 on 19 March 2008. Both are to broadcast High Definition Television (HDTV) across the United States. Furthermore, Intelsat 11 which had been booked as the payload of the maiden Land Launch was eventually launched on an Ariane 5 in October 2007. Hughes Network System’s Spaceway 3 was also launched on an Ariane 5 in the aftermath of a Zenit-3SL launch failure. However, the AMC-14 satellite which was launched on 14 March 2008 onboard a Proton M was delivered to a wrong orbit due to a launch vehicle failure, and was declared a complete loss by SES Americom. Finally, Intelsat’s communications satellite Galaxy-18 was successfully launched on 21 May 2008 with a Sea Launch rocket. In Russia, the domestic satellite-communications market is facing a supply shortage due to the low capacity of the operators to keep up with the growing demand by businesses and the government.233 In this context, the Russian communications satellite Express-AM33 was launched successfully onboard a Proton-M on 28 January 2008 for the Russian Satellite Communication Co. (RSCC).234 Moreover, Thales Alenia Space concluded a wide-ranging cooperation agreement with NPO PM on 6 December 2007 to jointly develop a new lowcost high-power communications satellite bus. Astrium and Khrunichev signed also an agreement in mid-March 2008 to “jointly supply the first of a new generation of higher-power spacecraft to RSCC”.235 To cover the African market, Inmarsat inaugurated on 16 July 2007 its Inmarsat 4 F1 satellite placed into geostationary orbit and aimed at providing cheap phone services to Africa and other areas.236 The retired Malaysian communications satellite Measat-1 was also moved to an orbital slot closer to Africa and renamed Africasat-1 to provide services to African customers.237 One major milestone, however, is the first African communications satellite entirely dedicated to covering the whole African continent: RASCOM-QAF1, which was launched on 21 December 2007 for the pan-African operator RASCOM (Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation).238 RASCOM-QAF1 aims at providing communications services to rural areas as well as intercity and international phone 93

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lines, direct TV broadcast, and internet access services. This project was financed mainly by Libyan funds channelled through GTPC (a communications services provider) and LAIP (the Libyan African Investment Portfolio),239 a society created in 2006 to stimulate investments in Africa. RASCOM-QAF1 is operated by the private society RascomStar-QAF which was founded to operate the satellite. Its shareholders include LAIP (33%), Rascom (26%), GPTC (29%) and Thales Alenia Space (12%). However, due to a helium leak once RascomQAF 1 was in orbit, its lifespan is now estimated at two years compared to the 15 years originally planned.240 In the Middle East, the Israeli communications satellite Amos-3 was launched on 28 April 2008 with the maiden launch of Land Launch (the satellite has since been renamed Amos-60). The United Arab Emirates-based operator Thuraya also completed the launch of its third communications satellite (Thuraya 3) on 15 January 2008, aiming at improving voice/data commercial services in the AsiaPacific region. Finally, T€ urksat 3A was launched along Skynet 5C onboard an Ariane 5 on 12 June 2008. In the Latin American market, Arianespace launched the Brazilian communications satellites StarOne-C1 and C2 for the Brazilian operator StarOne on 14 November 2007 and on 18 April 2008, respectively, both onboard an Ariane 5. With the help of China, the Venesat-1 satellite (also called the “Simon Bolivar Satellite”) for Venezuela and Uruguay will be launched in late 2008.241 In Asia, Japan has been particularly active in the space-based communications sector. On 14 August 2007, the BSAT-3a satellite was launched to provide direct broadcast services throughout Japan. Then, on 5 September 2007, ILS launched the Japanese JCSat-11 communications satellite to provide communications services throughout Japan and Asia. However, the satellite was lost in the launch failure of a Proton-M. A replacement for the lost JCSat-11 is planned to be launched in 2009. However, JSAT Corporation successfully launched the Horizon-2 communications satellite onboard an Ariane 5 on 21 December 2007.242 The first Japanese-built commercial satellite was also under final development in 2007/2008 and launched in summer 2008. The Superbird-7 satellite built by Mitsubishi Electric Corp. (Melco) for Space Communications Corp. (SSC) is the first made-in-Japan commercial spacecraft ordered by a Japanese fleet operator.243 This event illustrates Melco’s interest in establishing itself as a competitive and reliable actor in the commercial satellite manufacturing market. On 18 April 2008, Vietnam was the latest Asian actor to launch a dedicated communications satellite in the 2007/2008 period. Vinasat-1 is the first satellite ever procured by Vietnam and seeks to address postal and communications needs in the country, which illustrates the growing interest of the Vietnamese government in space activities. 94

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In the Pacific region, Optus D2 was launched in October 2007 onboard an Ariane 5. Optus D3 will be launched in 2009, also with an Ariane 5. The global MSS operators Globalstar and Orbcomm launched several new assets in 2007/2008. Globalstar, which operates a fleet of 48 in-orbit satellites, had four Globalstar satellites successfully launched by a Soyuz-FG Fregat rocket on 21 October 2007. Orbcomm, which operates a constellation of 29 LEO satellites for narrowband communications, had six Orbcomm satellites launched on 19 June 2008 onboard a Russian Kosmos-3 M. Several regional MSS operators possessing GEO satellites also procured and launched new assets. In particular, ICO Global Communications successfully launched its GEO satellite to cover North America on 14 April 2008, joining the company’s F2 MEO satellite already in orbit.

4.2. Space-based positioning, navigation and timing systems In the period 2007/2008, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) was a particularly active space application domain, with the upgrade of the existing U.S. and Russian GNSS, the re-profiling of the planned European Galileo programme, and the development of indigenous PNT systems in Asia. In Europe, the period was marked by major progress on the Galileo flagship programme which has been a centre of attention for European policy and decisionmakers alike.244 Most European efforts were focused on salvaging the European satellite radio-navigation programmes (Galileo and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service – EGNOS) by developing further regulations for their implementation, improving the public governance models and preparing their procurement phases. In the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008, the European Commission pushed for a solution to the Galileo crisis by shifting the project from a PPP scheme to a structure fully funded with public money. First, on 6 September 2007, the Commission cancelled its call for tender for a concession for the deployment and operation phases of the Galileo programme. The Commission then put forth a Communication on 19 September 2007 which aimed at ensuring that the Galileo and EGNOS deployment phases would be funded by the European Community. The publication entitled “Progressing Galileo: Re-Profiling the European GNSS Programmes” addressed the main areas of concern regarding Galileo and EGNOS, including: * *

Infrastructural costs; Risks in terms of completing the programmes and their management; 95

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* * *

Expected benefits and revenues; The funding of the European GNSS programmes; Public-sector governance.

The Communication reassessed the importance of Galileo both geopolitically and commercially and proposed that the deployment phases of the Galileo and EGNOS projects should be funded by the European Community. In an effort to safeguard these projects, a proposition to use unspent agricultural and administration funds from the European Union budget was made to provide an additional source of funding for the procurement of the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the Galileo programme.245 The Commission also proposed that the Council and the European Parliament agree on a modification of the public governance of the European GNSS programmes. In particular, it was proposed to: * *

*

*

Create a European GNSS programme committee; Define the role of the Commission as the European GNSS programme manager and maître d’ouvrage (or sponsor); Strengthen the role of the GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) in the market preparation and both as an advisor to the Commission and assist in the programme management; Define ESA as the maître d’oeuvre (or prime contractor) acting on the basis of an ESA-EC GNSS agreement.

On 19 September 2007, another Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council was issued. It assessed a proposal for a decision by the European Parliament and the Council amending the “Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending the Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management as regards the multiannual financial framework”. Another amending proposal was submitted on the further implementation of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo). The proposed regulation ascribes the full responsibility for the deployment phase of Galileo to the European Community. In 2007/2008, the European Parliament also played a major role in solving the Galileo deadlock.246 In particular, in the conciliation meeting of 23 November 2007, it reached an agreement with the Council and the Commission to revise the EU’s financial framework for 2007–2013 with the purpose of saving Galileo by using unspent public funds.247 A week later, at the TTE Council meeting, conclusions were adopted on launching the European GNSS programmes, on defining the general principles 96

4. Satellite applications

of public sector governance, and on the public procurement of the programmes. In particular: *

*

*

*

The budgetary and political decision-making bodies will be the Council and the European Parliament; The Commission and the GSA remain fully responsible for the management of the programmes; ESA is designated as the procurement agent for Galileo and the maître d’oeuvre of the programme; it has thus the authority to issue the contract; The European Community will be the full owner of Galileo and EGNOS.

Subsequently, a proposed amendment to the “Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending the Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management as regards the multiannual financial framework” was presented by the Commission on 5 December 2007 in order to adjust the 2007–2013 budget of the European Union.248,249 Then, on 7 April 2008 under the Slovenian Presidency, the TTE Council reached a general agreement on a proposal to further implement the Galileo and EGNOS programmes. The proposal lays down the rules for the implementation of the two programmes, including those on governance and the financial contribution of the European Community. However, significant amendments to the Commission’s initial proposal were made. In particular, the European Community will assume responsibility for the deployment of the system. Moreover, the budgetary resources needed to finance both programmes for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013 were set to 3.4 billion euros. Finally, the GNSS related proposal was voted on by the European Parliament on 23 April 2008 (607-36-8). The vote on GNSS yielded the approval of the re-profiled flagship project. With the adoption of the aforementioned amended proposal by the European Parliament and the Council, the management structure of the programme was modified not least through the creation of a Galileo Inter-institutional Panel (GIP). The GIP is composed of seven representatives (three of the Council, three of the European Parliament and one of the Commission) scheduled to meet four times per year to cooperate on decisions regarding the annual work programmes. Finally, on 25 June 2008, the Commission issued an invitation to tender for the six work packages of the Galileo satellite navigation system.250 On 1 July 2008, the Commission and ESA launched the procurement phase of the programme completing the In-Orbit-Validation contract placed by ESA for the first satellites and associated ground control infrastructure. For the deployment phase, the 97

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Commission and ESA have chosen the procurement procedure of “Competitive Dialogue”.251 Overall, the developments of the last few months illustrate that for various political stakeholders in Europe, Galileo remains a justifiable enterprise solely on the grounds that it will provide Europe with autonomy regarding PNT, not just for economic reasons. Also at the technical level, major progress was made on Galileo in 2007/2008. The U.S.-EU “joint compatibility and interoperability working group” solved technical challenges in July 2007, ensuring that Galileo and the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) will be compatible for joint security issues and commercial purposes.252 However, because of this agreement to make the signals of the future GPS III and the Galileo satellites compatible, GIOVE-B’s launch was postponed from March to April 2008 in order to modify the Navigation Signal Generation Unit (NGSU) and wait for some seasonal eclipse phenomena to pass.253 Finally, GIOVE-B was successfully launched on a Starsem rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome on 27 April 2008 and since 7 May 2008, it has been transmitting the GPS-Galileo common signal. Europe now has two GIOVE satellites in orbit (GIOVE-A and B). The GPS system is also being modernised through the addition of new satellites and the modification of satellites and control segments in order to achieve better accuracies. In 2007/2008, a series of Navstar-2R (NAVigation System using Timing And Ranging) or GPS-2RM satellites were launched to upgrade the GPS Constellation. These satellites are the third evolution stage of the Navstar GPS satellites’ second generation. The U.S. Air Force successfully launched Navstar-2RM 4 (formerly Navstar-2R 17) on 17 October 2007, making it the 56th GPS satellite launched. Navstar-2RM 4 will replace the Navstar-2A-14 satellite which was launched in 1992.254 On 20 December 2007, the navigation satellite Navstar-2RM 5 (formerly Navstar-2R 18) was launched, and Navstar2RM 6 (GPS 48, USA 201) (formerly Navstar-2R 19) was launched on 15 March 2008.255 On 18 December 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that the “selective availability” (SA) function which would enable the U.S. military to degrade civil GPS signals would not be incorporated into GPS III.256 The Russian government has decided to revamp its GNSS constellation, the Globalnaya Navigationnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS). In particular, Russia is implementing three major civil space programmes including a dedicated Federal Target Programme 2002–2011 on GLONASS. Furthermore, a renewed interest in space at the highest political level has led to an increase in the institutional space budget and the revitalisation of the Russian PNT space 98

4. Satellite applications

programme. The government promised to make GLONASS fully operational by the beginning of 2008, but this was delayed due to equipment and other technical failures. The system had once been designed to have 24 satellites, but this number had dwindled after the 1991 collapse of the U.S.S.R. Now, however, the Russian government is replenishing and expanding the constellation (planning a constellation of 30 satellites). Three Glonass-M (Uragan-M) satellites were launched on 26 October 2007 using a Proton-K Blok-DM-2 rocket (Kosmos 2431, 2432 and 2433).257 On 25 December 2007, three additional Glonass-M satellites were launched: Kosmos-2434, 2435 and 2436. Furthermore, six satellites will be launched in 2008 and nine in 2009. A Russian Parus navigation satellite was also launched on 11 September 2007. It provides “specialised navigation data and store-dump radio communications to the Russian naval forces and ballistic missile submarines”.258 The Parus satellites are also reported to be relays for data from the US-P (Upravlenniye Sputnik Passivny) EORSAT (Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite) ocean surveillance satellites which track naval vessels from space by registering their electronic emissions. Work on the first satellite of the Japanese three-satellite constellation Quasi Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) continued in 2007/2008, particularly on the Lband antenna. This joint government-private sector programme will be allied with GPS to provide better PNT information for Japan. The Chinese government is moving ahead with its plan to build its own GNSS, the Compass/Beidou system. Chinese satellite navigation officials have said that they are planning to have a satellite constellation covering all of Asia ready by 2010, but few details on the constellation’s development plan or potential global coverage have been publicised. However, the issue of the system’s compatibility with other GNSS systems remains; especially with the proposal that the Compass/Beidou signals could overlay Galileo’s Publicly Regulated Services (PRS) signal to be used for security applications. India has increased its activities in the PNT domain in recent years. PNT is an important element of the 11th Five Year Plan approved by the National Development Council on 19 December 2007. In 2007/2008, India continued its work on the space segment of its regional navigation system called the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) comprising seven satellites (three in geostationary orbit and four in non-geostationary orbit). The satellites will be launched on India’s PSLV, and the entire constellation is expected to be in place by 2012. Furthermore, in December 2007, the GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation-Technology Demonstration System (GAGAN) for the monitoring of GPS signals and thus improving the positioning accuracy for users across India has completed its final acceptance test. GAGAN is a Space-Based Augmentation 99

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System (SBAS) for GPS which aims to improve the accuracy and integrity of flight navigation aid. It is expected to bridge the gap between the European EGNOS and the Japanese Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) and thus providing seamless navigation to aircraft in Eurasia. The first payload should be flown on the GSAT-4 satellite, expected to be launched in 2009. Two more payloads will fly on two other geostationary satellites.

4.3. Space-based Earth observation In 2007/2008, an increasing number of countries launched Earth observation satellites and particularly radar satellites. In Europe, progress was achieved towards ensuring the transition from the preoperational phase to the operational phase of the flagship programme GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security), and particularly on the three Fast Track Services – the Emergency Response Core Service (ERCS), the Land Monitoring Core Service (LMCS) and the Marine Core Service (MCS) – as well as the GMES atmosphere and security core services. The pre-operational validation of the Fast Track Services is planned for the end of 2008. On 27 September 2007, ESA Member States participating in the GMES programme approved the transition to Phase-2 of Segment 1 of the GMES Space Component Programme, paving the way for progress on the development of the Sentinel satellite series and in particular on the construction of Sentinels 1, 2 and 3 along with the necessary ground segment. The oversubscription of the programme by the ESA Council at the Ministerial Level in Berlin (Germany) in 2005 was confirmed by an oversubscription to Phase-2 of 116%. On 28 February 2008, ESA and the European Commission also signed an agreement to transfer the management of 624 million euros in funds from the Commission’s budget to ESA for building the GMES components. The funds will be distributed in two stages: 419 million euros for segment 1 and 295 million euros for segment 2.259 Consequently, on 14 April 2008, Thales Alenia Space signed a 305 million euro contract for building the Sentinel-3 satellite which will be dedicated to oceanography and land vegetation monitoring and whose launch is planned for 2012. On 17 April 2008, ESA and Astrium then signed a 195 million euro contract for the Sentinel-2 satellite which will be devoted to monitoring the land environment and will be launched in 2012. Europe is also extending the reach of its GMES programme. In December 2007, a “GMES for Africa” event was organised in Lisbon (Portugal) as a first attempt to bring together actors from both continents to address the issue of GMES and Africa. The overall Lisbon exercise, attended by about 350 partici100

4. Satellite applications

pants, led to the adoption of two documents: the Lisbon Declaration on “GMES and Africa” and the Lisbon Process on “GMES and Africa” supporting the joint Africa-EU strategy and first Action Plan (2008–2010). The Portuguese Presidency also launched a two-year process leading up to the drafting and consolidation of an Action Plan for the “GMES and Africa” partnership, to be approved at the third EU-Africa Summit scheduled for the end of 2009. On 27 May 2008, ESA and Astrium also signed a 263 million euro contract for the development of the sixth Earth Explorer mission of ESA’s Living Planet Programme, the EarthCARE satellite (Earth Clouds, Aerosols & Radiation Explorer). This satellite will address the need for a better understanding of the interaction between clouds, radiative and aerosol processes which play a role in climate regulation. It is scheduled for launch in 2013. Germany launched two reconnaissance synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites in the 2007/2008 period: SAR-Lupe 2 was launched in July 2007 and SAR-Lupe 3 in November 2007. The SAR-Lupe system was declared operational on 3 December 2007. In March 2008, the fourth SAR-Lupe satellite was launched onboard a Kosmos-3 M. Finally, the last satellite in this constellation (SARLupe 5) was launched in July 2008. Italy launched one dual-use X-band radar satellite, COSMO-SkyMed-2 (Constellation of Small Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation), on 6 December 2007. This dual-use system aims at monitoring national territory, the Mediterranean region and the rest of the globe. The launch of COSMO-SkyMed-2 completed the launch of COSMO-SkyMed-1 which had been in orbit since June 2007. In 2007/2008, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) continued to expand its core mission of providing operational meteorological observations. In particular, following the launch of the Jason-2 ocean altimetry satellite, Eumetsat included ocean surface topography in its portfolio. Eumetsat will act as an interface for near-real-time product distribution to European users. Jason-2 was successfully launched on 20 June 2008 as a follow-up to the Jason-1 mission launched in December 2001 and will be placed into the same orbit. Jason-2 is expected to provide a vital contribution to the monitoring of climate change, ocean circulation and weather. It is the continuation of an existing successful cooperation between the United States (NASA, NOAA) and Europe (CNES, Eumetsat). Besides its cooperation with Europe on the Jason series, the United States is also procuring the next generation of its environmental satellites. In particular, the NOAA-N Prime spacecraft, a Polar Operational Environmental Satellite (POES), is getting ready for launch on 4 February 2009. Furthermore, Boeing Space Intelligence Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems and Northrop 101

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Grumman Space Technology have submitted a proposal for building the GOES-R (Geostationary, Operational Environmental Satellite-R), a collaborative development and acquisition effort of NOAA and NASA.260 However, it was decided to acquire the spacecraft, the ground segments and the instruments separately.261 GOES-R is to replace the GOES N/O/P satellite series. A first launch is planned for 2015 and the operational lifetime has been extended to December 2027. The first half-meter resolution commercial imaging satellite of the U.S.-based company DigitalGlobe, WorldView 1, was launched successfully on 18 September 2007. Worldwide 1 complements the QuickBird satellite already in orbit; WorldView-2 is anticipated to be launched in mid-2009. In an effort towards the development of the Latin American region, the Japanese space agency JAXA and the World Bank signed in April 2008 an agreement for using JAXA’s Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) to gain knowledge on climate and environmental threats in Latin America.262 China continued to develop its Earth observation capabilities in 2007/2008. It successfully launched the third optical CBERS satellite (CBERS-2B) in September 2007. Two additional satellites should follow by 2011, ensuring a service until 2015. Furthermore, at the two-day GEO-IV Plenary session meeting held in November 2008, the governments of China and Brazil announced the launch of a new service which will provide Earth observation data from the CBERS programme to end-users throughout Africa free of charge. China also launched a SAR satellite, Yaogan 3, on 11 November 2007.263 Yaogan 3 will be used for surveying land resources, estimating crop yields and providing assistance to disaster prevention and relief efforts. Finally, in May 2008, China launched the Feng Yun 3 (FY-3) satellite – the second generation of the Chinese polar orbiting meteorological satellites which were in turn the successor generation of the FY-1 series. India continued to develop its space applications in 2007/2008. It launched its latest Earth observation satellite (Cartosat-2A) on 28 April 2008 along with nine other satellites (including eight foreign ones). Cartosat-2A has a spatial resolution of less than one metre and complements Cartosat-2 launched on 10 January 2007. Cartosat-2A is widely speculated to be the first satellite of a constellation dedicated to military use. With the successful launch of CBERS-2B in September 2007 in cooperation with China, Brazil continued its involvement in space applications within the scope of the “South-South” cooperation on Earth observation. Brazil is also developing the scientific satellite Lattes designed to observe atmospheric phenomena in the equatorial region such as luminescence and electric discharges. Moreover, Brazil is conducting preliminary studies on the development of a 102

5. Technology developments

Brazilian geostationary satellite which would meet the needs of the Brazilian government in areas such as meteorology. Israel launched a SAR satellite (X-band), TechSAR, on an Indian PSLV launch vehicle instead of the originally planned Shavit-1 on 21 January 2008. TechSAR is the first Israeli radar satellite and complements the Ofeq series. After years of delays, Radarsat-2 was successfully launched on 14 December 2007. This Canadian C-band SAR satellite is a follow-on to the Radatsat-1 satellite launched in 1995. Radarsat-2 is the first commercial SAR satellite to offer multi-polarisation. In 2007/2008, progress was made on the African Resource and Environment Management Constellation (AMC) which is a joint Earth observation endeavour of Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. In the Middle East, plans of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)264 to launch a joint remote-sensing satellite have been reported.265 Furthermore, the first satellite of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – DubaiSat-1, an Earth observation satellite – is planned to be launched in December 2008. Finally, Turkey is about to acquire the long-delayed military reconnaissance satellite G€okt€ urk. In July 2006, Turkey’s Under Secretariat of Defence Industry received tenders from EADS Astrium, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), OHBSystem AG and Telespazio (now Thales Alenia Space) for manufacturing this reconnaissance satellite. In January 2007, the Turkish Defence Industry Implementation Committee (SSIK) decided to continue its discussions for the construction of G€okt€ urk with Telepazio, OHB and EADS Astrium. A final decision on the prime contractor for this high-resolution reconnaissance satellite is expected to be taken soon.

5. Technology developments Several major developments in space-related technologies in 2007/2008 paved the way for future breakthroughs.

5.1. Propulsion Several technological advances and milestones were achieved in the area of propulsion. This includes progress towards the completion of new rockets, the improvement of existing engines or the development of new propulsion systems through research and testing. 103

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In Europe, a series of engine-firing tests took place in 2007/2008. The Vega launcher passed major milestones with the qualification of the P-80 and Zefiro 23 engines. The French company Snecma achieved three restarts of the Vinci engine in August 2007. Vinci is a cryogenic engine which was initially planned for the ESC-B stage of Ariane 5 but was discarded after fund relocations caused by the failure of Ariane 5 in December 2002. A series of static tests was successfully performed in the United States. On 1 November 2007, Alliant Techsystems (ATK) achieved static test firings of a Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) which is currently used on the Shuttle. The tests were meant to improve the boosters’ lifespan.266 On 14 November 2007, Northrop Grumman announced the success of a series of static test firings of a new engine: the TR-408. This liquid oxygen-methane engine has a specific impulse of 340 seconds. It uses two liquid ergols valves and no other dynamic component.267 On 26 July 2007, however, an explosion occurred during the testing of the flow of nitrous oxide through an injector for a new rocket motor for the SpaceShipTwo suborbital vehicle at the Mojave Desert airport (USA). This explosion killed three people and injured three others. ATK was awarded a 2.3 million euros contract to develop, build and test a multi-mode small spacecraft propulsion system for the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. The system will use both chemical and electrical propulsion to achieve a manoeuvring flexibility suitable for small spacecraft.268 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and SpaceDev signed a contract on the demonstration of a solar-thermal propulsion system for the orbital manoeuvring of a small spacecraft.269 India successfully completed the hot test of a Cryogenic Upper Stage for 800 seconds on 15 November 2007. This represents a milestone in India’s space programme since the country now masters this technology.270 In the domain of air-breathing supersonic combustion propulsion (scramjet), NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate released its “Research Opportunities in Aeronautics 2008”. The goal of this project is to address the technical challenges of supersonic flights over land as well as to develop the necessary technologies for building “future high Mars entry systems”.271 Details of China’s scramjet research were also presented during the Joint Propulsion Conference in late August 2007. Most notable was the “Hypersonic Propulsion Test Facility at Beijing’s Laboratory of High-Temperature Gasdynamics” which features a hydrogen/air and oxygen replenishment combustion heater that can generate velocities of up to Mach 5.6.272 Other projects included “an aerodynamic performance of waverider designs; computational fluid dynamic codes for coupled ramjet/scramjet inlet flowfields; designs for a controllable hypersonic inlet; scramjet combustion mode translation studies; hydrogen injection and scramjet 104

5. Technology developments

ignition testing; thermal and structure studies and numerical simulation of combustion instability.”273

5.2. Information technology In 2007/2008, major progress was made on laser communications. High data rates combined with little power consumption and low payload masses make laser communication terminals particularly interesting for the application on-board of satellites, space telescopes and scientific space probes. On the Canary Islands (Spain) in November 2007, a team of the Swiss company Oerlikon Space demonstrated the feasibility of a deep space 10-megabit per second laser communications link. To achieve this, the transmission unit was modified in such a way that the conditions on the 142 kilometre stretch between the islands of La Palma and Tenerife reflected exactly those on a 1.5 million kilometre link through space equivalent to the distance between the Earth and Lagrange points L1 and L2. The system, which uses pulsed modulation impervious to atmospheric turbulence, was developed under ESA’s Dolce project. The first satellites equipped with laser communication terminals are already orbiting the Earth and more will follow in the coming years. For instance, the German radar satellite TerraSAR-X which was launched in June 2007 has become operational and carries a laser communication terminal built by the German company Tesat-Spacecom. An inter-satellite link between the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite and TerraSAR-X is planned for the near future. In 2009, the German Aerospace Centre will also launch TanDEM-X, a satellite nearly identical to TerraSAR-X which will also be equipped with a laser communication terminal allowing inter-satellite communication between the two satellites.

5.3. Spacecraft operations and design In the domain of spacecraft operations, most work focused on ways to improve energy efficiency and to advance spacecraft design concepts. NASA announced that it intends to make a new type of radioscopic power system (Radioscopic Thermoelectric Generators) available which would allow space missions to generate their own energy by transforming heat from decaying plutonium-238 into electricity without having to rely on ever-larger solar panels.274 105

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The space solar power concept is becoming increasingly popular, since both economic and climate change concerns drive research in this direction. The idea is to collect solar energy on spacecraft and to beam it to the Earth in the form of microwaves or laser light. The concept dates from the 1960s, but only now is there an economic incentive to develop it.275 This idea has been encouraged by a U.S. Pentagon report undertaken by the National Security Space Office (NSSO)276 which considers space solar power as a “strategic opportunity” and recommends the government to take steps towards the development of such technologies.277 In May 2008, Genesis I – the first test module launched by the commercial space habitat developer Bigelow Aerospace – completed its 10,000th orbit around the Earth following its 12 July 2006 launch. Bigelow Aerospace launched the Genesis II spacecraft on 28 June 2007 and is currently working on Sundancer, its first module designed to support a human crew. Moreover, following an announcement made during the 2007 National Space Symposium, Bigelow Aerospace and Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services indicated in February 2008 that they were converging on terms for the launch of crew and cargo to the future Bigelow space complex in LEO using Atlas V rockets. During the operational phase which is currently planned to begin in 2012, up to 12 missions per year are envisioned, a number which might potentially increase later.

5.4. Other technologies Oceaneering International Inc. has been selected to lead a team of contractors in building NASA’s next generation spacesuits. The Constellation Spacesuit system will comprehend two different suits: one to protect astronauts in launch, ascent and abort environments on the planned Orion crew exploration vehicles; the second will feature helmets, gloves and components to go with the launch suit and will be adapted to lunar exploration. The contract may possibly be worth 510 million euros through 2018.278

5.5. Suborbital activities In the field of suborbital activities, several new developments occurred in 2007/ 2008. Work on the SpaceShipTwo (SS2) and White Knight II (WK2) is progressing. Virgin Galactic unveiled the designs of both vehicles in New York (USA) on 23 January 2008.279 The first commercial flight is foreseen for 2010–2011. 106

5. Technology developments

On 30 August 2007, Virgin Galactic also announced a contract with Nastar Centre to train the company’s first one hundred suborbital passengers.280 An estimated 250 prospective customers have signed up for suborbital trips through direct contact with Virgin Galactic or its network of about 90 agents worldwide, generating about 24 million euros in ticket purchases and deposits.281 About 68 million euros are estimated to have been spent on the project thus far and the final costs are estimated at 171 million euros. Provided that the development phase will be successful, a fleet of two WK2s and five SS2s will be constructed and Virgin Galactic has an option to buy seven additional SS2s. In the first year of operation, Virgin Galactic foresees one flight per week over 40 weeks, generating 34 million euros. However, after three years of operations, Virgin Galactic plans to conduct ten flights per week over 50 weeks per year, generating annual revenues of about 410 million euros.282 Virgin Galactic’s first launch site will be in Sierra County, New Mexico (USA). In this context, following the successful spaceport tax referendum in the Doña Ana County for the development of Spaceport America in April 2007, another successful referendum was passed in Sierra County on 24 April 2008. Like in the Doña Ana County vote, an increase in the county’s sales tax was at stake for financing part of the project.283 Virgin Galactic’s second launch site is foreseen to be at Sweden’s Esrange launch site, with flights beginning in the 2012–2013 timeframe. The Swedish authorities hope to lower the cost and regulatory barriers to this operation by having space tourism spacecraft classified as sounding rockets and granted the tax advantages of hot-air balloon flights. South Australia and Victoria, both in Australia, are also being considered as launch sites for Virgin Galactic.284 On 26 March 2008, XCOR Aerospace unveiled plans for a rocket-powered suborbital space plane to be known as the Lynx, designed to carry a pilot and a passenger or payload, and to take off and land from a conventional airport. The foreseen inaugural launch date for this two-seat spaceship is 2010. The vehicle will be substantially smaller, slower and less expensive than other suborbital vehicles, flying only to a peak altitude of 60 kilometres (rather than above 100 kilometres) for a two-minute weightlessness period. XCOR hopes to make its spaceflights available for about 68,000 euros each. Moreover, the company intends to sell blocks of rides to resellers who would offer value-added services. The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory has already agreed to use the Lynx as a platform for testing the performance of space hardware in weightlessness conditions. In the future, XCOR aims to roll out a more powerful version of the Lynx, featuring dual engines to reach higher altitudes. On 13 June 2007, EADS Astrium disclosed the basic design of the space plane it proposes to build for suborbital space tourism ventures. EADS 107

Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 Tab. 7: FAA-permitted flight events in 2007/2008 (Source: FAA). Flight date

Operator

Vehicle

Launch site

20 October 2007

Armadillo Aerospace

MOD 1

Holloman AFB

27 October 2007

Armadillo Aerospace

MOD 1

Holloman AFB

27 October 2007

Armadillo Aerospace

MOD 1

Holloman AFB

28 October 2007

Armadillo Aerospace

MOD 1

Holloman AFB

28 October 2007

Armadillo Aerospace

MOD 1

Holloman AFB

intends to build a four-passenger rocket-equipped jet designed to take off from a normal runway (liquid methane and liquid oxygen engine) by raising about one billion euros for completing the vehicle’s development and ordering the first models. However, as of mid-2008, the search for financial partners was not successful. In 2007/2008, five flights were conducted under the authority of the FAA experimental permits for the development of reusable suborbital rockets.285 All flights were conducted by Armadillo Aerospace with a single vehicle, MOD 1, and all flights used vertical-takeoff and landing (Table 7).

5.6. Innovation policy In 2007/2008, the reliance on cash prizes to spur the development of advanced space technologies continued, in particular with the second Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge taking place during the Holloman Air and Space Expo in October 2007. However, the only participating team – Armadillo Aerospace – failed to win the X PRIZE Cup due to engine and other mechanical problems. Following the success of the seven million euros Ansari X PRIZE, the X PRIZE Foundation launched a new space prize on 17 September 2007 by teaming up with Google to offer up to 21 million euros for the first privately-funded team sending a robot to the Moon, travelling 500 metres and transmitting video (so-called “Mooncast”) images and data back to the Earth. The first team able to accomplish this before 30 December 2012 will win 14 million euros. After that deadline, the prize drops to 10 million euros for two more years and then expires. Unlike the original Ansari X PRIZE, the Google Lunar X PRIZE has a second place with a purse of three million euros whose deadline is also the end of 2014. An additional three million euros have been reserved for “bonus” prizes such as for taking images of Apollo and/or human artefacts left on the Moon. Like the Ansari 108

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X PRIZE, the Google Lunar X PRIZE is intended for the private sector, since at least 90% of the funding of each team must come from private sources. On 22 February 2008, the X PRIZE Foundation and Google announced the first ten teams which registered for the Google Lunar X PRIZE: seven are from the United States (Astrobotic, Chandah, FredNet, LunaTrex, Micro-Space, Quantum3, and the Southern California Selene Group) and three from Europe (the Aeronautics and Cosmonautics Romanian Association (ARCA) from Romania, Odyssey Moon from the Isle of Man, and Team Italia from Italy). As of the end of June, three more teams were registered – a “Mystery Team” and the team Stellar and JURBAN from the United States, and the multi-national team Advaeros. Meanwhile, the Southern California Selene Group has withdrawn from the contest.

Peter, Nicolas. “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a Conceptual Framework.” Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, 29 Sept.–3 Oct. 2008, Glasgow, Scotland. IAC-08E3.2.10. 149 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 150 This dialogue was set up in 2006 and aims at facilitating an exchange of information and mutual understanding of policies, programmes, priorities and structures. 151 AMESD is the follow-on initiative to the Preparation for the Use of Meteosat Second Generation in Africa (PUMA). It is an international cooperation programme aimed at providing all African countries with the resources required to manage their environment more effectively and ensure long-term sustainable development in the region. 152 “Joint ESPI-SPI Memorandum on Trans-Atlantic Space Relations.” European Space Policy Institute 25 Feb. 2008. http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/espi-spi% 20memorandum.pdf. 153 See the article “Space Technologies and the Export Control System in the United States: Prospects for Meaningful Reform” by Henry Hertzfeld in this Yearbook for more information on this topic. 154 The signatory States to the APSCO Convention are: Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. 155 Raghuvanshi, Vivek. “Indian Agency Plans More Israeli Spy Sat Launches.” Defense News 11 Feb. 2008. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?I¼3366868&c¼MID&s¼AIR. 156 Bagchi, Indrani. “Indian Study on Manned Moon Mission in 2008.” The Times of India 14 Nov. 2007. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Indian_study_on_manned_moon_mission_ in_2008/articleshow/2539048.cms. 157 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). “NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure Progress.” GAO-08-186T. 3 Apr. 2008. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d08186t.pdf. 158 Portions of the INKSA adopted in 2005 prohibit “extraordinary payments” for the ISS both “in cash” and “in kind” from the U.S. Government to the Russian government, Roscosmos or entities under the authority of Roscosmos as long as Russia is viewed as a proliferation threat for nuclear and missile technology. 159 For more information, see Peter, Nicolas. Space Policy, Issues and Trends in 2006/2007. ESPI Report 6. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2007. 148

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Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 160

According to a NASA News Release dated 22 April 2008, NASA has awarded SpaceX an indefinite delivery and quantity contract for launch services on the company’s Falcon 1 and planned Falcon 9 launch vehicles. 161 Orbital Sciences committed another 103 million euros. 162 “Komarov, Alexey, and Michael A. Taverna. “First Things First.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 14 Jan. 2008: 23. 163 “Japan Unveils First HTV.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 28 Apr. 2008: 18. 164 MHI was chosen by the Japanese government in 2002 to operate the H-2 fleet after the privatisation of the project. So far, all H-2A launches were institutional ones. 165 Zaitsev, Yury. “Russia Begins Elbowing Ukraine Out from Brazil’s Space Program.” RIA Novosti 17 Sept. 2008. http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080917/116874710.html. 166 Ibid. 167 China conducted 10 launches, not including the 2007 ASAT test. 168 U.S. export regulations are an issue for launching more international commercial payloads with Indian launchers, as India has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the relationship between the two countries is improving. 169 The financial details were disclosed neither by SES, nor by ILS and Arianespace. 170 Peter, Nicolas. “Towards a New Inspiring Era of Collaborative Space Exploration.” Humans in Outer Space: Interdisciplinary Odysseys. Eds. Luca Codignola and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, with Agnieszka Lukaszczyk and Nicolas Peter. Vienna: Springer, 2008. 171 See the article “Exploration – How Science Finds its Way in Europe” by Jean-Claude Worms in this Yearbook. 172 More European-built ISS elements are still under preparation and to be launched to the ISS such as the Material Science Laboratory (MSL), the Muscle Atrophy Research and Exercise System (MARES), the European Robotic Arm (ERA), Node-3 and the Cupola observation deck. 173 See Mischa Hansel’s article “The Political Dimension of Europe’s New Human Spaceflight Capabilities” in this Yearbook. 174 The ATV carries about three times as much payload mass as Russia’s Progress freighters. 175 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 176 Shenzhou-5 carried one taikonaut in 2003 (Yang Liwei), and Shenzhou-6 carried two taikonauts in 2005 (Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng). 177 Mathews, Neelam. “Decision Near: India Takes Another Step Toward Human Spaceflight.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 5 May 2008: 31–32. 178 Ibid. 179 Yi So-yeon replaced Ko San one month prior to the mission at the request of Roscosmos because Mr. Ko broke training centre rules. 180 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 181 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 182 Previously, Japan had launched Hiten in 1990, delivering the small lunar orbiter Hagomoro. 183 Lardier, Christian. “La Chine Entre dans le Club Lunaire.” Air & Cosmos 26 Oct. 2007: 44–45. 184 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 185 Morring, Franck, Jr. “Data Trove.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 3 Dec. 2007: 17. 186 “Traces of the Martian Past in the Terby Crater.” DLR 25 Jan. 2008. http://www.dlr.de/mars/en/ desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-207/422_read-11355/. 187 “River Delta in Nepenthes Mensae.” DLR 25 Apr. 2008. http://www.dlr.de/mars/en/ desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-207/422_read-12328/. 188 “Development History.” ESA ExoMars 31 Jan. 2008. http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ExoMars/ SEMSVIAMS7F_0.html. 110

5. Technology developments Brown, Dwayne, Guy Webster and Lori Stiles. “NASA Spacecraft Photographs Avalanches on Mars.” NASA News Release 3 Mar. 2008. http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/MRO/news/ mro-20080303.html. 190 Brown, Dwayne. “NASA Satellite Finds Interior of Mars is Colder.” NASA News Release 15 May 2008. http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/may/HQ_08128_MRO_Mars_Temp.html. 191 “NASA Spacecraft Reveals Largest Crater in Solar System.” Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Press Release 25 June 2008. http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/mro/newsroom/pressreleases/20080625a.html. 192 Brown, Dwayne, Guy Webster, Robert Burnham and Tara Hicks-Johnson. “NASA Mission Finds New Clues to Guide the Search for Life on Mars.” NASA News Release 20 Mar. 2008. http://www. nasa.gov/mission_pages/odyssey/odyssey-20080320.html. 193 Moskowitz, Clara. “Minerals Needed for Life Found on Mars.” Space News 30 June 2008: 14. 194 Peter, Nicolas. Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Aug. 2008. 195 Frankel, Charles. “Gros Plan sur la Lune et les Planetes.” Air & Cosmos 28 Mar. 2008: 33. 196 “Cassini: Un Ocean sur Titan.” Air & Cosmos 28 Mar. 2008: 34. 197 “Cassini: Encelade.” Air & Cosmos 4 Apr. 2008: 40. 198 Covault, Craig. “Enceladus Incentive.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 24 Mar. 2008: 31. 199 Morris, Jefferson. “Hot Stripes.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 7 Apr. 2008: 17. 200 “Cassini: Extension de la Mission.” Air & Cosmos 25 Apr. 2007: 28. 201 Frankel, Charles. “Gros Plan sur la Lune et les Planetes.” Air & Cosmos 28 Mar. 2008: 33. 202 Morring, Franck, Jr. “Potter’s Wheel.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 19 May 2008: 21. 203 Brown, Dwayne and Michael Buckley. “NASA Spacecraft Sees Changes in Jupiter System.” NASA News Release 9 Oct. 2007. http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/oct/HQ_07221_ New_Horizons_Jupiter_Encounter.html. 204 “SECCHI Team Obtains Images of the Solar Wind at Earth.” Naval Research Laboratory Press Release 14 Dec. 2007. http://www.nrl.navy.mil/pao/pressRelease.php?Y¼2007&R¼77-07r. 205 Lovett, Richard A. “Giant ‘Tornadoes’ Seen Erupting from the Sun.” National Geographic News 3 June 2008. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/06/080603-solar-tornadoes.html. 206 “SOHO Confirms 36 Year Old Solar Theory.” ESA SOHO News Release 17 Apr. 2008. http://sci. esa.int/science-e/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid¼42602. 207 See JAXA Akari mission website http://www.ir.isas.jaxa.jp/ASTRO-F/Outreach/index_e.html. 208 See NASA Ulysses Mission Overview website http://ulysses.jpl.nasa.gov/mission/index.html. 209 “International Solar Mission to End Following Stellar Performance.” NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory 22 Feb. 2008. http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news.cfm?release¼2008-031. 210 Lardier, Christian. “Corot Decouvre sa Seconde Exoplanete.” Air & Cosmos 4 Jan. 2007: 38–39. 211 “Espace: France.” Air & Cosmos 30 May 2008: 7. 212 “Espace: Etats-Unis.” Air & Cosmos 20 July 2007: 7. 213 “NASA’s Spitzer Spies Monster Galaxy Pileup.“ NASA Spitzer Space Telescope News Release 6 Aug. 2007. http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/Media/releases/ssc2007-13/release.shtml. 214 “NASA Space Telescopes Find ‘Lego-Block’ Galaxies in Early Universe.” NASA Spitzer Space Telescope News Release 6 Sept. 2007. http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/Media/releases/ssc2007-15/ release.shtml. 215 “Two of the Milkyway’s Spiral Arms Go Missing.” NASA Spitzer Space Telescope News Release 3 June 2008. http://www.spitzer.caltech.edu/Media/releases/ssc2008-10/release.shtml. 216 On 3 July 2007, NASA announced that the Stardust mission would become the EPOXI mission. 217 “NASA: Deep Impact and Stardust.” Air & Cosmos 13 July 2007: 40. 218 Guerin, Frederic. “Dawn s’Elancera Vers l’Aube du Systeme Solaire.“ Air & Cosmos 20 July 2007: 24. 219 See NASA Fermi website http://fermi.gsfc.nasa.gov/. 220 Other international working groups like the International Mars Exploration Working Group (IMEWG), the International Lunar Exploration Working Group (ILWEG) or the International Primitive Body Exploration Working Group (IPWEG) with representatives from all space agencies 189

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Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 and major institutions are used for exchanging information on plans and strategies and promoting international cooperation in order to maximise the outcomes of each mission. 221 Peter, Nicolas. “Towards a New Inspiring Era of Collaborative Space Exploration.” Humans in Outer Space: Interdisciplinary Odysseys. Eds. Luca Codignola and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, with Agnieszka Lukaszczyk and Nicolas Peter. Vienna: Springer, 2008. 222 The fourteen agency signatories are the national space agencies of Australia, China, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and ESA with its 17 Member States. 223 Alain Dupas in the second part of this Yearbook in the article entitled “International Cooperation In Space Exploration: Lessons From The Past And Perspectives For The Future” cover extensively this topic. 224 Covault, Craig. “Lunar Robotic Network Revealed.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 17 Mar. 2008: 56. 225 Ibid. 226 Under the current European Union communication rules, the operators of satellite communications are licensed by national authorities. The existing regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) include radio frequency coordination procedures to avoid any unacceptable interference between satellites, but none for licensing those systems. 227 Taverna, Michael A. “Generation 4.5: New Inmarsat Satellite to Drive BGAN Expansion.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 3 Dec. 2007: 48. 228 “Mission Small-Geo: Protocol d’Accord avec Hispasat.” Air & Cosmos 30 May 2008: 21. 229 Astrium Services is free to sell un-used capacity on the Skynet 5 satellites to other customers. For instance, it has booked orders from Canada, NATO, the Netherlands and Portugal, among others. 230 “Espace: Etats-Unis.” Air & Cosmos 16 May 2008: 7. 231 “Australia to Fund Sixth WGS Satellite.” Satellite Today 3 Oct. 2007. http://www.satellitetoday. com/military/headlines/19168.html. 232 The WGS system is scheduled to achieve full operational capability in 2013 following the launch of the sixth satellite. The first satellite was launched on 11 October 2007. 233 de Selding, Peter. “Russia Faces Lengthy Shortage of Satellite Communications.” Space News 8 Oct. 2007: 6. 234 “Espace: Russie.” Air & Cosmos 1 Feb. 2008: 7. 235 Komakov, Alexey and Michael A. Taverna. “New Man in Town: Astrium Alliance Could Help Make Khrunichev a Credible Satcom Competitor.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 24 Mar. 2008: 35. 236 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Highlights in Space 2007: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law.” New York: United Nations, 2008. 23. 237 “Retired Measat Satellite Moved to Cover Africa.” Space News 21 Jan. 2008: 9. 238 RASCOM, established in 1993, is an intergovernmental treaty-based organisation which has as its prime objective the provision, on a commercial basis, of the satellite capacity required for national and international public communications services in Africa, including sound and television broadcasting. 239 Lardier, Christian, and Theo Pirard. “L’Afrique a l’Heure du Spatial.” Air & Cosmos 21 Dec. 2007. 240 de Selding, Peter. “Pan-African Comsat Ready, but Service Might Last Only a Few Years.” Space News, Business Report, 5 Feb. 2008. 241 Uruguay later joined the 162 million euro project, funding 10% of the project’s costs. 242 The satellite is co-owned with the Bermuda-based Intelsat Ltd. 243 Superbird-7 will be used by SkyPerfect JSAT Corp. following the acquisition of SSC by SkyPerfect JSAT Corp. 244 See the article “Galileo and the Issue of Public Funding” by Laurence Nardon in this Yearbook. 245 In 2007, 1.7 billion euros came from the Agriculture budget (500 million euros in 2008) and 120 million euros from the Administration budget (100 million euros in 2008), totalling 2.72 billion euros (300 million euros of which are to be used for the European. 112

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246 The European Parliament has co-decision powers (along with the Council) over regulations on the deployment and commercial phases of Galileo. 247 In the July 2007–June 2008 period, Galileo was also a major space agenda topic in the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). In particular, the report led by Rapporteur Etelka Barsi-Pataky on the amended proposal for a “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the further implementation of the European radio-navigation programmes (Galileo and EGNOS)” was the major space issue discussed by the Committee. 248 Commission of the European Communities. “Amended Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline and sound financial management as regards the multiannual financial framework.” COM(2007) 0783 final, 5 Dec. 2007. 249 On 11 December 2007, the Council adopted the amended version of the European Union’s financial framework for 2007–2013. 250 The six work packages are: system support, ground mission segment, ground control segment, space segment (satellites), launch services, and operations. 251 In the first phase of the procedure, interested entities may submit to ESA a “Request to Participate” and will be short-listed on the basis of pre-defined selection and exclusion criteria. The selected candidates will then be invited to the dialogue phase, which represents the formal kick-off of the second phase of the tendering process. The Competitive Dialogue procedure will be organised and managed by ESA as the delegated procurement agent, and in close coordination with the Commission as the contracting authority. 252 “United States and the European Union Announce Final Design for GPS-Galileo Common Civil Signal.” Press Release IP/07/1180, 27 July 2007. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference¼IP/07/1180&format¼PDF&aged¼1&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼fr. 253 Coppinger, Rob. “GIOVE-B Signal Generator Modified as Launch Slips to April.” Spaceflight 16 Jan. 2008. http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/01/16/220838/giove-b-signal-generatormodified-as-launch-slips-to-april.html. 254 “Lancement du Navstar-2R17.” Air & Cosmos 19 Oct. 2007: 39. 255 “Espace: Etats-Unis.” Air & Cosmos 21 Mar. 2008: 7. 256 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Highlights in Space 2007: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law.” New York: United Nations, 2008. 26. 257 The Uragan-M satellites are the second generation of the Glonass satellites. 258 Morring, Frank, Jr. “Russian Milsat.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 24 Sept. 2007: 23. 259 “GMES Secures European Commission Funding.“ Space News, Business Report, 15 Feb. 2008. 260 “Big Three All Submit Bids to Build GOES-R.” Space News 17 Mar. 2008: 7. 261 Ibid. 262 “Latin-America: Sophisticated Japanese Satellite System (ALOS) will Provide Advanced Data to Adapt to Climate Threats.” JAXA Press Release 18 Apr. 2008. http://www.jaxa.jp/press/2008/04/ 20080418_worldbank_e.html. 263 The band of the satellite and the resulting imagery resolution is unknown. 264 The GCC was established in 1981 and is a regional political and economic bloc consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 265 “UAE to Launch Joint Remote-Sensing Satellite with GCC Countries.” Xinhuanet 29 Apr. 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/29/content_8073297.html. 266 “Constellation: Essais d’Ares.” Air & Cosmos 23 Nov. 2007: 63. 267 Ibid. 268 “ATK to Build Prototype Small Satellite Thruster.” Space News 17 Sept. 2007: 3. 269 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Highlights in Space 2007: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law.” New York: United Nations, 2008: 64.

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Part 1 – The Year in Space 2007/2008 Indian Space Research Organisation. “Annual Report 2007–2008.” http://www.isro.org/rep2008/ Index.html. 271 Dickey, Beth. “NASA Announces Aeronautic Research Opportunities.” NASA News Release 11 Mar. 2008. http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/mar/HQ_08080_Aero_Research_ Opportunities.html. 272 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Highlights in Space 2007: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law.” New York: United Nations, 2008: 62. 273 Ibid. 274 “NASA Eyes New Nuclear Generator for Outer Planet Missins.” Space News 29 Oct. 200: 13. 275 Morring, Franck, Jr. “Space Solar Power.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 20/27 Aug. 2007: 76. 276 “Space-Based Solar Power as an Opportunity for Strategic Security: Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study.” Report to the Director, National Security Space Office Interim Assessment Release 0.1. 10 Oct. 2007. http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.html. 277 “Solar Power Projection.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 15 Oct. 2007: 23. 278 “Spacesuit Contract.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 16 June 2008: 20. 279 While SpaceShipOne could carry only three persons, SS2 will carry two pilots and six paying customers. 280 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Highlights in Space 2007: Progress in Space Science, Technology and Applications, International Cooperation and Space Law.” New York: United Nations, 2008: 13. 281 Coppinger, Rob. “Sales are Rocketing at Virgin Galactic.” Flight Global 25 Mar. 2008. http://www. flightglobal.com/articles/2008/03/25/222290/sales-are-rocketing-at-virgin-galactic.html. 282 Ibid. 283 A provision in the State law indicates that the money which is collected through this tax in the Doña Ana County cannot not be spent until a spaceport “tax district” is created, which in turn cannot be done until another county or locality approves the tax. 284 Deery, Shannon, and Elissa Doherty. “SA on Shortlist for Space Base.” Sunday Mail 13 Apr. 2008. http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/0,22606,23530233-2682,00.html. 285 For more information, see Peter, Nicolas. Space Policy, Issues and Trends in 2006/2007. ESPI Report 6. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, Sept. 2007: 27. 270

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PART 2 VIEWS AND INSIGHTS

Part 2 – Views and Insights

1. Space in the treaty of Lisbon Jan Wouters

1.1. Introduction Concerning outer space, how are the EU’s competences affected by the Treaty of Lisbon, which, after the European Council meeting of 10–11 December 2008, looks finally set to enter into force by the end of 2009? To answer this question, this contribution first looks into the current constitutional bases for the EU’s involvement in space, in accordance with the historical evolution thereof (1.2). Following such analysis, the antecedents and context of the Lisbon Treaty will be discussed briefly (1.3) and finally, an analysis will be made of the latter’s provisions touching on space (1.4).

1.2. Current constitutional bases for the EU in space In the present state of EU law – i.e. under the Treaty of Nice – the EU’s basic Treaties do not contain any reference to outer space. In the current constitutional set-up an EU space policy necessarily has to be linked to other existing legal competences of the EU and/or the EC. There are quite a number of such possible linkages. Already in 1988, in its first Communication on “The Community and space: a coherent approach”, the Commission observed that “there are many different areas in which the Community has exclusive or joint competences and ambitions, and on which space activities have or are likely to have a bearing: these include research, telecommunications, industrial development, agriculture, the environment, development aid and regional development”.286 Ten years later, the EU Council recognized in its resolution of 22 June 1998 “on the reinforcement of the synergy between the European Space Agency and the European Community”287 (adopted in parallel by the ESA Council on 24 June 1998) that “space technologies are underpinning public policies towards the environment, the information society and transport and are contributing to the creation of new job opportunities and to a better quality of life”.288 In its 2003 White Paper the Commission affirmed that, “[a] although an EU common policy for space will have to await a Treaty amendment . . . [a] number of legal bases can already be invoked which enable existing EU policies to call upon to space as a relevant technology to support their implementation”.289 116

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These statements help to explain why, in the course of time, existing legal bases in the EC Treaty have been used (or have at least been proposed to be used) by the EU Council for space-related decisions, such as in the field of transport (Article 71 [ex 75] (1) and 80 [ex 84] (2) EC)290 and common commercial policy.291 Nevertheless, it is interesting to go through the successive Treaty changes which have taken place since the mid-1980s, as they show a consistent broadening of the Community’s/Union’s competences, going ever further beyond the predominantly economic nature of the original Treaty of Rome and bringing the EU/EC – directly or indirectly – ever closer to space and its related space applications. The first important constitutional step in this respect was the Single European Act (1986, entry into force 1 July 1987). It inserted into the EEC Treaty a new Title on “Research and technological development” (Articles 130f – 130q)292 and it proved to be especially through these R&D competences that the EU gradually came to space. However, the new Treaty provisions linked R&D explicitly to the single market, trade and competition. In other words, the Community R&D effort initially served clearly economic purposes: “special account [had to] be taken of the connection between the common research and technological development effort, the establishment of the internal market and the implementation of common policies, particularly as regards competition and trade”.293 The Maastricht Treaty (1992, entry into force 1 November 1993) significantly broadened this R&D competence to “promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters of this Treaty”.294 It also elevated “the promotion of research and technological development” to one of the basic tasks of the Community in order to achieve the latter’s overall objectives.295 Hence, Community R&D activities in areas that are not primarily of an economic nature, such as environment or public health – two fields for which the Community was given wider or new competences in the Maastricht Treaty – were made possible by virtue of the EC’s constitution. Apart from ‘transversalizing’ R&D, the Maastricht Treaty also strengthened the role of the European Parliament in this field by introducing the co-decision procedure, at least as far as the adoption of the multi-annual framework programmes was concerned. However, the adoption of such programs remained subject to the requirement of unanimity in the Council.296 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, entry into force 1 May 1999) likewise brought about some significant innovations. In the R&D field, certain limited but important changes were made as far as decision-making procedures were concerned. Thus, the aforementioned requirement of unanimity in the Council for the adoption of multi-annual framework programs was replaced by qualified majority voting.297 Likewise, in relation to the possibility for the Community to set up joint undertakings or any other structure for R&D, the unanimity 117

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requirement was replaced by qualified majority voting298 – a change which may have facilitated the adoption of the Galileo Joint Undertaking Regulation.299 This being said, it is precisely the Galileo Joint Undertaking Regulation that illustrates how the Community’s R&D competence, though it has been strengthened over the years, carries with it important limitations with respect to space applications. Article 171 EC empowers the Community to “set up joint undertakings or any other structure necessary for the efficient execution of Community research, technological development and demonstration programmes”. Since this Article constitutes the legal basis for the Galileo Joint Undertaking, the operation of the latter was initially restricted to the definition and development/validation phases. For the deployment (2008) and exploitation (2013) phases a new regulation was adopted in 2008, using Article 156 EC as a legal basis, i.e. a provision on trans-European networks.300 The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced other changes which, at least indirectly, have a relationship with space policy. For instance, it introduced sustainable development as one of the overarching aims of the Union301 and reinforced the EU’s commitment to environmental protection,302 which has to be integrated in all Community policies.303 The connection with space is quickly established when one thinks of satellite remote sensing for environmental protection purposes or for verifying international treaty compliance (such as Kyoto Protocol commitments), and the ever more important issue of safeguarding the space environment with regard to space debris.304 The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced the objective of establishing an “area of freedom, security and justice” for the EU.305 As stated by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 18 May 2000 on a coherent European approach for space, space-based systems should inter alia be used effectively for security, in order to protect citizens’ lives and combat crime.306 Last but not least, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the EU a stronger constitutional basis for establishing a common defense policy. The incorporation by the EU of the WEU Torrejón Satellite centre as an Agency under the Council in July 2001 is a clear indication of the strategic potential which the EU attaches to space-based information, especially for “strengthening early warning and crisis monitoring functions within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in particular of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)”.307 The Treaty of Nice (2001, entry into force 1 February 2003) further consolidated the legal bases for the EU’s common security and defense policy. Importantly, in Article 24 TEU the Nice Treaty gave the EU the power to conclude agreements with “one or more States or international organizations” in implementation of CFSP/ESDP. On this basis an ESA-EU agreement on the security and exchange of classified information was concluded.308 118

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The foregoing overview shows not just the constant broadening of the competence of the EU/EC in various fields, bringing the latter ever closer to space and space applications, but also the creative and dynamic use that is made of such competence in the space field. Nevertheless, the lack of an express and comprehensive Treaty basis for involvement in space makes it very difficult for the EU to formulate a consistent and comprehensive policy in this respect. If there is one area of policy-making where the subsidiary principle should have an “up-stream” effect for the benefit of the EU rather than a “down-stream” effect for the benefit of its Member States, it may well be space. As noted by Jean-Luc Dehaene, the ViceChairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, space-related activities are by their very nature extra-territorial and call for human resources and financial support that go beyond purely national constraints.309

1.3. Antecedents and context of the Lisbon Treaty It is well-known that the Lisbon Treaty constitutes the culmination of more than five years of constitutional process. Following the adoption of the Nice Treaty, European leaders agreed to reconsider the EU’s basic treaties in order to make Europe more democratic and efficient. With the Laeken Declaration of December 2001310, the basis was laid for an innovative process of treaty revision, namely the Convention for the Future of Europe. In 2002–2003 the Convention, a broadlycomposed body chaired by the former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing, developed the text for a “Constitution for Europe”.311 The Convention’s draft text, adopted in June–July 2003, was further negotiated at an intergovernmental conference and culminated in the signing, in Rome on 29 October 2004, of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.312 The euphoria was very shortlived, though. The rejection of the Treaty by popular vote in France (May 2005: 55% against)313 and the Netherlands (June 2005: 61.5% against)314 brought the ratification process to a stand-still and heralded a long “reflection period”. A new treaty scheme was agreed under the German Presidency in Spring 2007 and finalized under the Portuguese Presidency in the autumn of 2007, with the Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007.315 Although nearly all EU Member States cautiously shied away from a referendum this time, it was the Irish voters who, with 53.4% voting against, wiped out the new treaty on 13 June 2008. It took another six months before the European Council, in its meeting of 11–12 December 2008, defined the path forward. It re-affirmed that “the Treaty of Lisbon is considered necessary in order to help the enlarged Union to function more efficiently, more democratically and more effectively including in international affairs”. Apart from a remarkable deal on the composition of the Commis119

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sion (which, it decided, will continue to include one national of each Member State), it decided that, provided Ireland committed itself to ratifying the Treaty “by the end of the term of the current Commission” (i.e. September 2009), the “necessary legal guarantees” would be given that Ireland’s stated concerns would not be affected or prejudiced by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.

1.4. Analysis of space-related provisions in the Lisbon Treaty As is known, unlike the Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty does not merge the EU’s basic treaties under one single text. It brings the basic objectives and institutional provisions, as well as CFSP/ESDP, in the re-vamped “Treaty on the European Union”. All of the EU’s other policies are hence laid down in a re-baptized EC Treaty, the “Treaty on the Functioning of the Union” (TFEU), which “organises the functioning of the Union and determines the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements for exercising its competences”.316 Both treaties specify that they have the same legal value.317 Hereafter the provisions of the TFEU will be especially analysed. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that, pursuant to the TEU, the Lisbon Treaty merges the EC into the EU: the EU “shall replace and succeed the European Community”318 and is hence given legal personality.319 In addition, although it does not mention space as such, the TEU contains provisions which could be of interest for the EU and its space endeavours. This proceeds from the clauses on “enhanced cooperation” (Art. 20), which make it possible under certain conditions for a number of Member States (the minimum is now set at nine) to use the EU’s institutions and competence to integrate more deeply than is politically possible with all Member States, to those on the European Defence Agency (Art. 42(3), 2nd para., and 45 TEU), which will inter alia support defence technology research, that could touch on space. The first provisions of the TFEU focus on categories and areas of EU competence. In that respect a crucial first provision mentioning space is Art. 4(3): “In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.” The formulation of this clause immediately raises the question as to the nature of the competence in question. It is clear that it is no exclusive EU competence. The provision is part of Art. 4 TFEU, which deals with shared competences. It is not included in Art. 6 TFEU, which relates to EU competence to “support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States”. Still, the manner in which Art. 4(3) is formulated 120

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leaves no doubt that a crucial characteristic of shared competences, namely the pre-emption effect of EU action, is not present here.320 In this sense, space competence appears “supportive”: which include Art. 2(5) TFEU indicating that the EU does not supersede Member States’ competence in this area, and that legally binding acts of the EU in these areas “shall not entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations”. Remarkably enough, the latter point is applicable for space but appears only later, in Art. 189(2) TFEU (infra), and not in the provision of principle of Art. 4(3). Therefore, the question is rightly asked whether one should instead speak of a “parallel” competence of the EU in space as opposed to one shared.321 Of lesser importance for the competence issue yet still touching on space, is Art. 13 TFEU. According to this provision, “[i]n formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.” The actual elaboration of the Union’s space competence is laid down in Title XIX of the TFEU, titled “Research and technological development and space”. The core provision is Art. 189, which is quoted in full here:

1. “To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies, the Union shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space. 2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 3. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency. 4. This Article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of this Title.” Obviously, like most Lisbon Treaty provisions, Art. 189 is almost literally taken over from the Constitution.322 There are some noticeable differences with Art. III-254 of the Constitution, though. Unlike the Constitution, Art. 189 (2), last sentence explicitly rules out “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. Furthermore, Art. 189(4) is new as well. 121

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Let us first try to assess the added value of Art. 189 in light of the existing legal bases for EU action. The generality of Art. 189(1) TFEU is striking. A European space policy receives a constitutional basis, and this not just to serve scientific and technical progress – in the Treaty Title of which the space clause is situated – but also to promote industrial competitiveness (an area as such laid down in Title XVII and clearly nothing more than a “supportive” competence323) and the implementation of all the EU’s policies. The latter objective makes clear that the EU’s space policy can serve both civilian and military purposes. The fact that the CFSP/ESDP provisions are still a separate “pillar” in that they are the only EU policy laid down in the TEU and not in the TFEU324, is of no importance for this purpose. As to Art. 189(2) it is worth noting that it follows from Art. 4(3) TFEU (supra) that the EU does not only have the competence to adopt (or define) a European space programme, but also to implement it. The exclusion of “any harmonisation” power if deplorable, as space is – as stated above – par excellence an area where EU action is preferable to national action. However, the non-harmonisation clause leaves it possible for the EU to exercise, in a judicious manner, its legislative and regulatory competences: the phrase “necessary measures” is sufficiently broad to encompass other initiatives such as model laws, best practices, benchmarking, etc. It is noteworthy that, although Art. 189(2) refers to the co-decision procedure, it does not make consultation of the Economic and Social Committee necessary.325 Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Art. 189(4) proclaims that the article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaty Title in question: for most of the measures regarding research and technological development the Economic and Social Committee has to be consulted.326 It can obviously also be a way to safeguard the autonomy of the EU’s multiannual framework programmes on research and technological development vis-a-vis a future European space programme and to make clear that the instrument of “joint undertakings” is not available for space initiatives per se. Art. 189(3) gives the EU the power to establish a relationship to ESA, but leaves the actual form and scope thereof undefined. As is known, the current EU-ESA relationship is governed by a Framework Agreement of 2004 based on Art. 170 EC (i.e. for the implementation of the multiannual framework programmes).327 Models for the final structuring of this relationship have been circulating for a while328 but no ultimate governance model has been decided yet. The openness of the provision (“any appropriate relations”) leaves all possibilities open. The advantage of the clause is that it makes it possible to either have the EU become a member of ESA or have ESA become an agency of the EU without the need to recur to a Treaty change at EU level.329

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European Comission. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The Community and space: a coherent approach. COM(1988)417final. Brussels, 02 July 1988: 10. 287 Council of the European Union. Council Resolution on the reinforcement of the synergy between the European Space Agency and the European Community. Brussels, 22 June 1998. 08 Jan. 2009. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼OJ:C:1998:224:0001:0002:EN:PDF. 288 Ibid., 3rd recital. 289 European commission. White Paper. “Space: a new European frontier for an expanding Union. An action plan for implementing the European Space policy.” COM(2003)673final. Brussels, 11 Nov. 2003: 6. 290 Legal bases for Council Decision concerning the Agreement between the European Community, the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation on a European contribution to the development of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) 98/434/EC, 18 Jun 1998. Except Article 170 (ex 130m) and 300 (ex 228) (2), (3) and (4) EC. 291 On the basis of Art. 113 EEC (Art. 133 EC) the European Commission proposed in 1993 a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Russian Federation on space launch services (COM(93) 355 final.). The agreement did not come about, apparently owing to disagreements on jurisdiction. See Rovsing, Christian. Written question. “On the Agreement with the Russian Federation on Space Launchers”. E-2213/94. European Parliament, 31 Mar. 1995. European Parliament 08 Jan. 2008. http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference¼E-1994-2213&language¼MT. 292 European Single Act. Art 24. 293 TEC (Rome) Art. 130f(3). 294 TEC (Maastricht) Art. 130f(1). 295 Ibid. See Art. 3(m). 296 On the complexity and diversity of the decision-making procedures in the R&D Title after the Maastricht Treaty, see Devroe and Wouters, Jan. De Europese Unie. Het Verdrag van Maastricht en zijn uitvoering: analyse en perspectieven. Leuven: Peeters, 1996: 557–560. 297 TEC (Maastricht) Art. 166 (1). 298 Ibid, Art. 172. 299 See Council of the European Union. Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking (EC), 876/2002 ([2002] OJ L138/1), 21 May 2002, amended by Council Regulation (EC) 1943/2006 ([2006] OJ L367/21). 300 European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Regulation of the of 9 July 2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo). (EC) 683/2008. 9 July 2008 (OJ [2008] L196/1). 301 See TEU (Amsterdam) preamble (7), TEU Art. 2, TEC Art. 2 and TEC Art. 6. 302 See TEU (Amsterdam) preamble (7) and TEU Art. 2, changed to include “a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” among the EC objectives; See also Art. 95(3), (4), (5) EC; Art. TEC 174(2). 303 See Art. 6 TEC (Amsterdam): “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” 304 See, e.g. Fernandez-Albor, Gerardo. Written question. “Action by the European Union to dispose of space waste”. E-3127/97. European Parliament 13 Oct. 1997 (OJ [1998] C117/206). 305 TEU (Amsterdam) preamble (10), Art. 2, TEU Art. 29, TEC (Amsterdam) Art 61. 306 European Parliament. Resolution on the communication of the Commission on the Commission working document. “Towards a coherent European approach for space”. A5-0119/2000. 18 May 2000. (OJ [2001], C59/248): 16. 307 See Council of the European Union. Joint Action on the establishment of a europeana Union Satelite Centre. 2001/555/CFSP. 20 July 2001 (OJ [2001] L 200/5). Preamble (2). 308 See Coucil of the European Union. Council Decision (and attached agreement) concerning the Conclusion of the agreement between the European Space Agency and the European union on the security and exchange of classified information. 2008/667/JHA. 7 Apr. 2008 (OJ [2008] L219/58). 123

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Remarks at the Institute for International Law, Second European Space Policy Workshop, 10 Jan. 2003, Leuven, Belgium. Eurospace Policy.org 08 Jan. 2009. http://www.eurospacepolicy. org/espw2.htm. 310 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union. Brussels, 14–15 Dec. 2001. 311 European Convention. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Draft Constitution) CONV 850/03. 18 July 2003, CONV 850/03. 312 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Rome 29 Oct. 2004 (OJ [2004] C 310/1). 313 Dupoirier, Elisabeth. “Le referendum de ratification du traite constitutionnel europeen en France: l’impact de la question nationale sur la question sociale.” Annales d’etudes europeennes de l’Universite catholique de Louvain 2005–2006. Christian Franck, Sandra Boldrini, eds. Brussels: Bruylant, 2006: 173–185. 314 Rigo, A. “Le referendum neerlandais sur la Constitution europeenne”, Annales d’etudes europeennes de l’Universite catholique de Louvain 2005/2006. Christian Franck, Sandra Boldrini, eds. Brussels: Bruylant, 2006: 197–211. 315 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Lisbon, 13 Dec. 2007 (OJ [2007] C 306/1). 316 TFEU Art. 1(1). 317 TEU (Lisbon) Art. 1(3) and TFEU (Lisbon) Art. 1(2). 318 TEU (Lisbon) Art. 1(3) 319 Ibid Art. 47. 320 Mastroianni rightly observes that the applicability of the principle of primacy of EU law remains intact here. Mstronianni, Roberto “Article I-14.” Traite etablissant une Constitution pour l’Europe. Parties I et IV Architecture constitutionelle: commentaire article par article. Laurence BurgorgueLarsen, Anne Levade, Fabrice Picod, eds. Brussels: Bruylant, 2008: 233–234. 321 And this even prior to the exclusion of harmonisation under the Lisbon Treaty. Becker, Peter “Die vertikale Kompetenzenordnung im Verfassungsvertrag.” Der Vertrag €uber eine Verfassung f€ur Europa. Eds. Mathias Jopp and Sakia Matl. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005: 187, at 198–199; Hobe, Stephan and Reuter, Thomas. “The EU Constitutional Treaty and Space: Towards EU Jurisdiction on Board a Space Station?.” The International Space Station. Commercial Utilisation from a European Legal Perspective. Frans G. von der Dunk, Marcel Brus, eds. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2006: 125, at 132. 322 It is interesting to point out the nuances as well as the imperative nature of the space competence. Art. 189 makes clear that the EU “shall” draw up a European space policy; that it “shall establish the necessary measures” and “shall” establish any appropriate relations with ESA; and finally, that it “shall” be without prejudice to the other provisions of that treaty title. All the rest is less imperative; the EU “may promote joint initiatives”, etc. as well as it “may” adopt a European space programme. 323 “Industry” is specifically listed as such competence in TFEU Art. 6(b). 324 Wouters, Coppens and Bart De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations after Lisbon.”, The Lisbon Treaty. European Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty? Stephan Griller, Jacques Ziller, eds. ViennaWienNewYork: Springer, 2008: 143 and 146–148. 325 This has been rightly observed by Stender-Vorwachs, Jutta. “Artikel III-254.” Eds. Christoff Vedder and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007: 660. 326 See TFEU Art. 188, second para. 327 See Council of the European Union. Council decision on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency. 2004/578/EC. 29 Apr. 2004 (OJ [2004], L261/63). 328 See inter alia Hobe, Stephan. “Prospects for a European space administration”, Space Policy 20.1 (2004): 25–29; von der Dunk, “Towards one captain on the European spaceship – why the EU should join ESA”. Space Policy 12.2 (2003): 83–86. 329 Comparable with the question of the competence of the EC to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights and Opinion 2/94 of the European Court of Justice (1996) ECR I-1759.

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2. Galileo and the issue of public funding Laurence Nardon

In the Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007, Serge Plattard presented a complete summary of the evolution of the Galileo programme since it was induced in the late 1990s.330 It provided a clear analysis of the encountered problems and included useful chronologies and tables. This paper will pick up where he left off by presenting the dramatic recovery of the programme since summer 2007 – how the funding and governance of the programme were fixed, how this may affect future European programmes and how meanwhile, development of the technology for Galileo has been progressing. In addition, the paper will explore a wider issue touched by Galileo, that of the public funding of space programmes. Most space programmes rely to some degree on public money for setting up primary space and ground segments. The idea behind this is that space programmes will later on become profitable and be taken over by the private sector. Yet how efficient is this financing model, and why do governments continue to fund space if it is not?

2.1. Galileo finally on track Perhaps for the first time ever in the life of the Galileo programme, observers can now be optimistic about the outcome of the project. This comes after the early years when Washington challenged the very legitimacy of a European navigation system and a dispute arose about the potential military use of the programme. More recently, European actors wasted two years with their inability to agree on a proper Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). In those years, the termination of the programme always remained a looming possibility. Not so anymore – the past year has seen decisive moves forward for Galileo. 2.1.1. Galileo under EU governance

2007–2008 saw momentous choices and evolutions for Galileo. This was mostly the merit of EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot, who in the spring of 2007 demanded that the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) effort be halted.331 The failure of the PPP funding model was due to several causes, among them the lack of a definite business case upon which companies could base their budget 125

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forecast and decide how much to invest, and also the lack of a single strong authority for the management of the programme.332 2.1.1.1. Timeline from June 2007 to July 2008

Evolutions in the life of the Galileo programme mostly follow the rhythm of the Transport Councils, held every three months. The Transport Council of June 2007 acknowledged the incapacity of the different actors to set up a PPP. It endorsed a fully public funding scheme for the construction and deployment phases of the Galileo programme. However, no decision was made regarding the funding modalities. The participants of the October Transport Council also disagreed on the funding modalities but most countries preferred the funding of the programme through the EU budget because they thought that the European Commission would be more efficient in managing the programme. Yet Germany wanted the attribution of future funds according to the rule of “fair geographical return” and therefore favoured the funding of Galileo through the European Space Agency (ESA).333 During the Transport Council of December 2007, Germany finally agreed on a fully EU-funded budget. Other Member States had managed to reassure Germany that future calls for tender would give a fair place to German companies and that Germany would continue to exert an implicit leadership in the Galileo programme. The main consequence of this funding plan was that the EU received full authority over the programme since it provided the funds. The Commission now acts as the contracting authority for Galileo, with ESA as a procurement agent. In April 2008, the European Commission and the European Parliament agreed on details for the funding of the Galileo programme. An additional amount of 3.4 billion euros will be shifted to Galileo from unused budget lines of the Common Agricultural Policy. Moreover, a new management structure was set up for the programme, with Galileo being placed under the authority of four EU bodies: the Transport Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and a new body, the GIP (Galileo Inter-institutional Panel). A call for tender was issued on 1 July 2008 concerning the development and deployment phase of the programme – the achievement of Full Operational Capability (FOC). 2.1.1.2. The calls for tender

The Galileo programme comprises six work packages (Table 1). Requests to participate were expected by 7 August 2008. Pre-selected entities will then be invited to a “competitive dialogue” with ESA, which will conduct the negotiations in the fall of 2008 and spring 2009. The Commission hopes to sign the contracts in May – June 2009. The satellites package will receive at least two 126

2. Galileo and the issue of public funding Tab. 1: The work packages of the Galileo programme. System support

120 million euros

Ground mission segment

270 million euros

Ground control segment

45 million euros

26 satellites

840 million euros

Launch services for the satellites

700 million euros

Co-ordination of the operation

170 million euros

Total amount

2.145 million euros

offers: one by EADS Astrium Satellites as the prime contractor with Thales Alenia Space as the major subcontractor, and another by OHB-System teaming with Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL). Being relatively smaller companies, OHB and SSTL insist on a “dual sourcing” for the system. This means that two bidders would be selected for each phase of the project in order to have a back-up, which would give companies the size of OHB and SSTL a bigger chance of being selected for building satellites alongside big companies such as EADS.334 Astrium and Alenia both insist that the selection process set up by the European Commission and ESA is too long and that this may delay the programme yet again.335 ESA has responded that some work packages may be contracted earlier if this proves possible, which is however not predictable since the number of the bidding companies is still unknown. Among the other known bidders at this time is the Anglo-Dutch firm LogicaCMG, which will submit a bid for the software-providing System Support package.336 Non-European companies may also bid, but under restricted conditions.337 For reasons of security, the EU decided to select only European candidates for the prime level. For the sub-prime level, restrictions to EU-only companies will apply if they work on critical technologies. For sub-prime contracts involving non-crucial technologies, competition will be open to non-EU companies and the EU will respect the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, since launch services are not under WTO rules (this provision was adopted at the request of the USA), a European preference may apply in the choice of the launch service for Galileo. 2.1.2. The impact on future European policies

The difficulties with and the recovery of Galileo as well as the interruption of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon have impacted on the recent discussions 127

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about the future governance of the European space programmes. Article 189 of the “Revised Treaty” would have made space a “shared competence” between the EU and its Member States, making space activities easier to manage at the European level. But the Irish vote of June 2008 suspended this evolution. Meanwhile, Galileo progressed in spite of the PPP fiasco. Most remarkably, it did so by investing the European Commission with more authority, at a time when the process of the EU’s political integration experienced difficulties. Two lessons seem to have come out of this: First, the contrasting evolution of the Galileo programme seems to be in line with the story of EU integration since the 1950s. Top-down political pushes such as Treaties and bottom-up management breakthroughs such as the December 2007 decision do not necessarily follow the same pace. They rather complement each other and seem to result in a continued progression of the EU. Second, reinforcing the Commission’s authority over Galileo was a pragmatic and forceful solution that may influence the management of future major European programmes. We can think here of GMES (now called “Copernicus”) but also of programmes outside the realm of space such as TransEuropean networks or ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor).338 The way in which future space programmes will be managed in Europe remains to be clarified, however. Discussions between the EU and ESA are underway and decisions could be made public during the ESA Ministerial Council of November 2008. It is very likely that the EU will continue to turn to ESA for help in managing space programmes. But the suggestion – dating back to the Wise Men Report of 2000339 – that ESA should become an agency of the EU has been put on the back burner for now. Some Member States such as Germany do not want to give up the policy of “fair geographical return”. There is also a fear that the EU may not have enough political will to promote space projects and finance space infrastructures when there are so many other programmes to be taken care of at the European level. In the present situation, ESA thus remains autonomous, with its funding coming directly from the Research Ministries of the Member States. That way, there is less risk that space will be neglected. Last but not least, the failure of the “Revised Treaty” leaves the EU in a state of continuing confusion and the time may therefore not be ideal for merging ESA with the EU. In the more distant future, the EU may have a consolidated space budget line and even a Space General Directorate, making it safer to turn over all responsibility for space policy to Brussels. But there is no indication that this may happen any time soon. Still, a single model of cooperation between the EU and ESA must be elaborated (paying particular attention to the difficult issue of “geographical return”) so that the two entities do not have to negotiate from scratch for every new programme and thereby waste time, as they did with Galileo and GMES. 128

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2.1.3. Meanwhile at the ranch: the in-orbit validation process

Galileo has also undergone positive developments on the technical side. A few years ago, delays in the programme were still causing concerns that the frequencies allotted to Galileo by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) might be lost. The first test satellite, GIOVE-A, was launched in December 2005 and started to send navigation signals by May 2007. GIOVE-B was launched on 27 April 2008 and will test Galileo’s most innovative technologies.340 Its payload comprises two rubidium atomic clocks (allowing for a stability of ten nanoseconds per day) and one of the new clocks created for Galileo, the Passive Hydrogen Maser (PHM).341 This state-of-the-art technology developed by Astrium measures time with a lapse of less than one nanosecond per day. This means that the system will be able to provide a precision of about one metre to its users. The final payload of the Galileo satellites will comprise two PHM clocks and two atomic clocks as a back-up. Other technologies aboard GIOVE-B include instruments for radiation studies and high precision telemetry as well as a signal generator in three different frequencies. ESA announced that the test phase was a complete success during an in-orbit test review on 3 July 2008. Currently, Astrium is building the next four satellites of the Galileo in-orbit validation phase which will be completed by 2010–2011. Many European actors are involved: The German Aerospace Center (DLR) manages the operation segment activities of the IOV phase for ESA and recently awarded a contract to Inmarsat, which will develop an in-orbit payload testing facility.342

2.2. A bigger issue: when should taxpayers pay for space? In the past years, one of the most disputed issues regarding Galileo has been whether it should be funded using public money and if yes, to what degree. This is indeed a major issue for all space programmes.

2.2.1. Space needs public money

A basic principle of economics is that private companies need a large expected return on investment if they are to invest in a programme. Yet many space programmes are not significantly profitable or even financially self-sustaining. They rely to different degrees on public funding. Extreme cases in point are exploration and manned spaceflight programmes. It is fairly obvious that no 129

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profit can be expected from such activities and that they therefore rely entirely on public funding. There is, however, a wide-spread belief that many space applications and launching activities will eventually become profitable. The primary investments, as for the development of a prototype or the deployment of a space and ground architecture, are so immense that only a public institution will be able to fund them. But afterwards, the private sector can take over and run the business. This is the model followed by ESA, which funds technology developments and then turns them over to the private sector once they are operational. Most space programmes, in contrast, do not generate enough profit to pay for the development of second-generation satellites. Indeed, it is often considered a success if they can even cover their running costs. Launching activities in Europe and the U.S. are still heavily subsidised. In the 1990s, the space community came to realise that observation systems were not profitable. U.S. commercial companies such as DigitalGlobe or GeoEye rely on “national” contracts designed to keep them afloat. SpotImage was unable to pay for the development and launching of the successive Spot satellites. Some service operators, most famously in the telecommunications sector, do make a huge profit from space. But since they are one step away from the actual production of space systems, they cannot be expected to invest in space programmes.

2.2.1.1. The case of satellite navigation

The profit motive has been put forward many times regarding Galileo but still remains questionable. The Galileo system will include five different signals, four of which will come at a fee in exchange for a guarantee of service (Table 2). This fee will add to the profit obtained through down-stream services. Several consulting firms have tried to assess the future profitability of the programme. The British consulting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers produced an estimate in 2001;343 the California-based consulting firm Frost & Sullivan produced its own analysis in 2004.344 European companies conducted similar works for their own purposes. Most of these reports forecast an annual income of 7 to 9 billion euros between 2012 and 2027, and a products and services market that could reach a cumulated turnover of 400 billion euros by 2025. However, these studies were deemed too optimistic and not credible enough, given that precise information on the future revenues of the different Galileo signals did not exist at the time (and still does not exist). Private companies refused to risk their own money in the venture of the PPP, and this was surely a sign that profit remained a distant prospect. Profit will surely come in time, but it cannot be put forward as a reason for embarking on the Galileo programme. 130

2. Galileo and the issue of public funding Tab. 2: The five Galileo signals and their characteristics (source: Nardon 2007). Precision

Protection

Integrity

Guarantee of service

Price

1. Open service

Standard

No

No

No

Free

“Authenticated Open Service” TBD

Standard

Access conditions TBD

No

First level (authentication) TBD

Pay service

2. Commercial

High-level

Commercial level encryption

No

Second-level

Pay service

3. Safety of Life Signal

Standard

No

Yes

Third-level

Pay service

4. PublicRegulated Signal

Standard

High level encryption

TBD

Not applicable

Pay service

5. Search and Rescue Service

Standard

No

No

Yes TBD

Pay service

Satellite navigation thus confirms the rule observed for most space application programmes: The bill for the Galileo infrastructure will have to be footed by public authorities. Private companies will take over once the system is up and running and hopefully make a profit from the operation.345 At the end of the day, the question about space and profit is not about whether private companies can be convinced of financing primary investments for a space programme – they will not. The issue is rather whether they will make a profit from operating the space system later on, and even whether they will make enough profit for being able to finance second-generation systems. 2.2.2. Why should governments pay for space? – Defining the national interest

After space prototypes and architectures have been developed using public money, governments often continue to fund running costs and further investments. Why do they agree to such outrageous expenses? Because, contrary to private money, public money can be spent without any prospects of a return on investment if it is in the “general” or “national interest”. The definition of this general interest varies greatly according to cultural factors, political creeds and economic theories. More precisely, the dispute takes place between the advocates of a strong state and 131

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the advocates of “laissez-faire”. The latter, also called “free market” or “liberal” economists, see a problem in using taxpayers’ money for funding large programmes.346 They contend that if a venture is profitable, it will naturally be undertaken by the private sector, i.e. “the market”. Governments should not meddle in such activities. Rather, they should strictly limit their actions to ensuring a secure environment and property rights. Therefore, only space programmes with a security aspect should be funded by governments.

2.2.2.1. Exhibit A: The UK

The United Kingdom provides a perfect illustration of a “liberal” point of view. The British national space programme and the UK’s contribution to the ESA budget are both extremely limited. The British National Space Council is only a small coordinating body. By contrast, there has been one major contribution of the UK to space – the Skynet telecommunications system – in the field of defence. Skynet, now reaching its 5th generation, is a military system intended for the Royal Navy. It was developed because it was deemed in the “national interest” that the Navy’s ships could communicate both amongst themselves and with the Admiralty in London. The funding for developing the system was therefore granted.

2.2.2.2. Exhibit B: The U.S.

The case of the United States is more complex. In the context of the Cold War, winning the race to the Moon was of the utmost national concern. In the 1960s, space as a whole came to be considered a “national interest” and all areas of space development were public-funded. To this day, space remains an area covered by public funding. This is the case, of course, for exploration and manned spaceflight as well as for military programmes. Moreover, civilian space applications and launchers are also subsidised – although indirectly – by the sheer volume of government activity in civilian space. The United States boasts of the biggest national space budget in the World, with a total of almost 40 billion dollars in 2008.347 However, there are also voices which dispute the public monopoly in the U.S. space sector, and there is indeed a recent trend of private ventures undertaking launch activities and even space exploration.348 The X-Prize Foundation has revived the tradition of prizes that helped along the advent of aeronautics. The Ansari X-Prize for Suborbital Spaceflight was awarded to Burt Rutan and his SpaceShipOne in 2004. He had been funded by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and won 10 million dollars. There is also an on-going Google Lunar X-Prize that will award 20 million dollars to a privately developed lunar rover, as well as a “Northrop Grumann Lunar Lander Challenge”. NASA acknowledged this trend 132

2. Galileo and the issue of public funding

when it launched the “Commercial Orbital Transportation Services” (COTS) in 2006. With this programme, NASA will select and help private companies in the development of a cargo demonstrator to the ISS. A budget of 500 million dollars has been set aside for this purpose. Yet these efforts still represent only a fraction of the U.S. space budget and remain peripheral to the system. Moreover, they do not really differ from the financing model observed for Galileo in which an entity chooses to “lose” money by subsidising the initial costs without any hope of a return on investment. Even if the space company receives the money for that from a private patron rather than a public authority, the investment is still not spurred by the market itself.

2.2.3. Galileo and the national interest

It was always evident that Galileo would at least in part be funded with public money. The PPP was set up to infuse some private money into the programme and make it look good for policy-makers. When the PPP failed, however, some commentators with a “free market” approach questioned the rationale of a completely public funding scheme. The British weekly “The Economist” claimed that Galileo should be abandoned because it made no sense economically.349 By the time it would be operational, GPS would have been upgraded and GLONASS would be back on the market. In such an environment, Galileo would never be profitable. Yet in choosing to ignore any possible motivations for Galileo other than profit, the author of the article presumably made the assumption that Galileo could not promote any “national interests” because it is a European programme and Europe is not a nation. However, this political opinion about Europe is highly debatable, since one might argue quite to the contrary that the EU could and should come to represent something close to “a nation” and endorse responsibilities similar to that of a “nation state”. As we saw, the “national interest” includes at the very least security and defence capacities. However, it is often defined more broadly. For instance, most governments consider it their duty to support their economies via technology and innovation programmes. Acquiring a prestigious image is also a key attribute of a “nation state”. Galileo may meet all of these “national interests” for the benefit of the EU.

2.2.3.1. Galileo for security

The potential use of Galileo by military personnel has given rise to a difficult debate. France, on the one hand, has a strong wish to use Galileo for military 133

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purposes since the motive of strategic independence has been paramount in France’s decision to participate in a satellite navigation system. Possible uses comprise direct services such as navigation for troops and applications such as precision-guided munitions. The UK, on the other hand, seeks to be loyal to U.S. interests and in this case the doctrine of Navigation Warfare as defined by the U.S. Air Force.350 The “NavWar Doctrine” dictates that the U.S. must be able to interrupt or incapacitate all satellite navigation systems anywhere and anytime. However, Galileo’s governmentused Public-Restricted Signal (PRS) will be equipped with very strong antijamming devices which make this impossible. The UK government has therefore held the position that Galileo should not be used by military forces. Ironically, this ran counter to the tenet of free-market economists that security should be the only justification for the public funding of space programmes. This difference of positions was consecrated by the Transport Council of December 2004, when the definition of Galileo as a “civilian system under civilian control” was coined. The definition was understood by the British as meaning that no military uses of Galileo would be allowed, whereas to the French, it meant that the customers could be civilian or military. That dispute was partly settled later when difficulties concerning the PPP had arisen. At that time, worries about the profitability of the system made it clear that forbidding 27 possible customers (i.e. the military forces of the 27 Members States) access to the system would seriously undermine the profits from the system. Again, this ran counter to the objective of “best value for money” on the basis of which British civil servants had largely relied to “sell” the Galileo project to their own authorities. According to an 18-months study published by the GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) in June 2008,351 half of the users of the PRS signal will be non-military government services such as police, customs, emergency response units etc. The other half will be military users. The Survey estimates that PRS will be used by 4 million individuals across the 27 Member States. The latest development is the vote of the European Parliament of 10 July 2008 agreeing to the use of Galileo for operations related to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).352 The parliamentarians were asked to vote on a report on “Space and Security” presented by Karl von Wogau, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence. The report was adopted by 483 votes in favour and 99 against, with 20 abstentions. Given the reinforced authority of EU institutions over Galileo and since ESDP operations are conducted by the military forces of the Member States, this may signal the end of the disagreement. 134

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2.2.3.2. Galileo for innovation

Proponents of the Galileo programme in Brussels have repeatedly said that Galileo could spur innovation in Europe. This is true for the system architecture itself (as shown by the maser clock, for instance), but also for the down-stream services for which many new applications can be developed. This will contribute to the maintenance of a strong industrial base as well as highly qualified jobs in Europe, which is also in line with the “Lisbon Strategy” adopted in 2000. A number of exercises have therefore been conducted in that area, many of them particularly productive in recent months. A “Green Book on Satellite Navigation Applications” was presented to the EU Council of the Ministers of Transport in December 2006. The text launched a consultation process that addressed the industry, public authorities, consumer groups and individuals in order to identify possible commercial and civilian uses of Galileo. The exercise was continued by a conference on the civil applications of Galileo held on 24 June 2008. It was funded by several European Union bodies, private companies and media enterprises. A parallel effort for finding new uses for government and military-used signals was launched by the GSA, also equipped with EU funds (under the 6th Research Framework Program). Starting in September 2006, an EADS-led consortium explored potential uses of the governmental signal PRS. The 18-months consultation was called PACIFIC (PRS Application Concept Involving Future Interested Customers). The final workshop was conducted in Sofia Antipolis in April 2008. In addition, private companies such as Altran in France lead efforts to search for new applications for Galileo.353 Brain-storming sessions conducted in the spring of 2008 were particularly creative. For instance, Galileo may offer services for finding lost objects inside buildings because the signal can go through concrete walls, for high-precision traffic information by showing vehicles coming from opposite directions, for sending information about nearby restaurants to moviegoers, or for receiving local weather information when travelling on the road. Many unexpected services should appear in the coming years, which shall be very exciting.

2.2.3.3. Galileo for prestige

Finally, prestige may be construed as a justification for spending public money. Again, an important factor here is whether people think that the EU has a political status similar to that of a nation. Do Europeans feel patriotic towards the EU’s institutions? Do they want prestige for Europe? Certainly not all of them. But for those who do, Europe should surely not be absent from satellite navigation when the U.S., Russia and China have their own systems. 135

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GALILEO CHRONOLOGY FROM SPRING 2007 to SUMMER 2008 Spring 2007: 6–8 June 2007:

Commissioner Barrot demands the end of the PPP. The Transport Council ends the PPP and adopts the principle of public funding. 30 November 2007: The Transport Council agrees on a fully-EU budget. April 2008: The EU Commission and Parliament agree on details for the funding of the programme. This decision is endorsed by the Parliament. GIIP is created. Launch of GIOVE-B. 25 June 2008: A call for tender is issued. 9 July 2008: The Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo) is adopted. August 2008: Bids and start of negotiations.

Plattard, Serge. “What’s the Problem With Europe’s Flagships Galileo and GMES?” Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007: New Impetus for Europe. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter, eds. Vienna: Springer, 2008: 153–166. 331 As of summer 2008, the new Transports Commissioner is Antonio Tajani. 332 Nardon, Laurence. Galileo and the Profit Motive: How to Make the Europe’s Future Satellite Navigation System Most Beneficial? Note de l’Ifri, March 2007. Ifri 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.ifri.org/ files/Espace/NardonGalileo.pdf. 333 When attributing workshares, ESA follows the rule of “fair geographical return”. This means that for a given programme, contracts in an amount roughly equivalent to the country’s contribution to that programme will be awarded to national companies. Some technology transfers may be necessary to enable the country’s enterprises to fulfil the contracts; this sometimes decreases competitiveness but also guarantees the participation of more ESA members and especially smaller states. By contrast, the European Union awards contracts on the basis of calls for tender. 334 “Galileo, Les premiers contrats seront signes au plus tard debut 2009.” Europolitique Transport 22 July 2008. 335 de Selding, Peter. “Industry Officials Predict Current Procurement Plan Will Delay Galileo.” Space News 4 Aug. 2008: 6. 336 “Logica to Participate in Tender to Provide Software for Galileo.” Dutch News Digest 16 July 2008. 337 Paul Verhoef, qtd. in “The French Presidency of the EU and the Dynamics of European Space.” Conference Report, 2 July 2008. 11. Ifri 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.ifri.org/files/Espace/CRNardon.pdf. 338 ITER is an international project. Members include the EU, Russia, the USA and Japan. 339 Bildt, Carl, Jean Peyrelevade, and Lothar Sp€ath. “Towards a Space Agency for the European Union.” Report to the Director General of the European Space Agency, November 2000. ESA 3 Oct. 2008. http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/annex2_wisemen.pdf. 330

136

2. Galileo and the issue of public funding “Mise en orbite de GIOVE-B, nouvelle etape vers le deploiement de Galileo.” Bulletin Electronique France 210, 26 May 2008. BE France 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.bulletins-electroniques.com/actualites/ 054/54760.htm. 341 Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (maser) provides a high-precision frequency reference that is used for measuring time. It is the predecessor of the laser (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). 342 “Inmarsat to Manage Payload Tests for Galileo IOV Programme.” M2 Presswire 28 July 2008. 343 PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Inception Study to Support the Development of a Business Plan for the Galileo Programme. 20 Nov. 2001. European Commission 3 Oct. 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ energy_transport/galileo/doc/gal_exec_summ_final_report_v1_7.pdf. 344 Frost & Sullivan. Global Positioning System and Galileo: Lift-off Time for Applications Markets. 16 February 2004. Frost & Sullivan 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/ report-homepage.pag?repid¼B310-01-00-00-00. 345 For the U.S. navigation satellite system GPS, profitability was never an issue since it is entirely paid for by the U.S. Air Force (i.e. using American taxpayers’ money). 346 The tradition of liberal economics is well-established, having started with Jean-Baptiste Say and Adam Smith in the 18 and 19th century. Around 1900, the “Austrian School” of Carl Menger and Friedrich von Hayek was founded. Today, Pascal Salin is a prominent free-market economist in France. Research societies such as the CATO Institute of the Objectivist Center in the Unites States focus more on political philosophy than on economics. 347 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: Fiscal Year 2006 Activities. Washington, D.C.: NASA, 2006. 113–115. 20 Oct. 2008. http://history. nasa.gov/presrep2006.pdf. 348 Leahy, Bart. “Space Access: The Private Investment vs. Public Funding Debate.” National Space Society website 12 May 2006. Space.com 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.space.com/adastra/adastra_ debate_060512.html. 349 “Lost in Space.” The Economist Online 10 May 2007; “Struggling Galileo.” The Economist Online 22 May 2007. 350 An official source for this can be found in the Report of the House of Commons Transport Committee “Galileo: Eighteenth Report of Session 2003–2004.” HC1210, 25 Nov. 2004. 19–21 and oral questions 203–219. UK Parliament 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200304/cmselect/cmtran/1210/1210.pdf. 351 de Selding, Peter. “Half of Galileo Users Expected to be Military.” Defense News 14 July 2008. 352 von Wogau, Karl. Report on Space and Security. European Parliament A6-0250/2008, 10 June 2008. European Parliament 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?pubRef¼-//EP//NONSGMLþREPORTþA6-2008-0250þ0þDOCþPDFþV0//EN. 353 See the Altran presentation in “The French Presidency of the EU and the Dynamics of European Space.” Conference Report, 2 July 2008. 15. Ifri 3 Oct. 2008. http://www.ifri.org/files/Espace/ CRNardon.pdf. 340

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3. Europe’s approach to Space Situational Awareness: A proposal Lucia C. Marta & Giovanni Gasparini

3.1. Introduction According to the “User Expert Group of ESA SSA Requirement Study”, a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system can be defined as a system which provides “comprehensive knowledge of the population of space objects, of existing threats and risks, and of the space environment”.354 As distinguished from the notion of “space surveillance” which denotes the routine and operational service of the detection, correlation, characterisation and orbit determination of space objects, the SSA concept “implies more in terms of data processing and use”.355 An SSA system is normally composed of space and ground segments. The United States is the only country which has so far developed a global SSA system.356 A European SSA programme could be started by connecting the existing national ground radars and telescopes in a single European network. In a later step, the system could then be completed with ESA space assets. A European SSA system could provide four categories of services that can be grouped into two big families: *

Space Object Surveillance, including

 a Surveillance and Monitoring Service  an Imaging (Characterisation) Service *

Space Environment Monitoring, including

 a Space Weather Service  a Near-Earth Object (NEO) Service. A quick look at the offered services357 shows that the SSA system would be a dual-use system from the beginning. This applies primarily to the end-user communities and the security and defence relevance of the first family of tools, which would therefore be more demanding (in terms of security requirements, governance and data policy) than the second family. This article, which strongly relies on a recent study carried out for the European Space Agency (ESA),358 puts forward a proposal for a suitable governance model and data policy for a future 138

3. Europe’s approach to Space Situational Awareness

European SSA system. To this end, the expected end-user communities and their requirements are considered along with some European and national space programmes that could provide useful input and examples. In an effort to balance national interests and a European-oriented approach, an SSA model for Europe is then proposed.

3.2. A European Space Situational Awareness programme The use of space assets is recognised by the European Union as a major element of a wide range of applications and services relevant for its security and defence policy (including civil protection and emergency situations) and, more generally, for research as well as for economic and societal functions.359 The European countries and the EU have therefore developed important space infrastructures (for communications, positioning, monitoring and intelligence applications), but the independent utilisation of those assets depends not least on the ability to operate them safely, i.e. to protect them from collision, disruption and malfunction. Space assets are very fragile and can be seriously damaged unintentionally (e.g. through collision with debris) or intentionally (e.g. by attacks, as was demonstrated by the Chinese anti-satellite experiments of 2007). This implies that the surveillance of the space environment and of space weather has become an important capability, all the more so because Europe’s dependence on space assets will grow. Thus, it should be ready to develop its own, independent SSA system allowing it to operate its space assets safely. An SSA system makes it possible to predict, assess and attribute responsibility for abnormal events in space (collision, disruption, system breakdown and malfunctioning). Moreover, an SSA system has an important “business dimension” (e.g. for satellite operators and insurance companies) and provides a fundamental support tool for political decisions (e.g. for the evaluation of intentional events). As the Conclusions of the Workshop on Space Security and the Role of the EU held in Berlin in June 2007 clearly pointed out, Europe lacks a capability to monitor space and its space assets and to identify potential natural and man-made threats to its security. The Conclusions thus called for the development of a European SSA system as a key requirement. It is still controversial whether there is a real possibility of European space assets being threatened by intentional attacks predictable (and/or avoidable) only by an SSA system. Nonetheless, the need to face the vulnerability created by the EU’s dependency on space assets is generally acknowledged. In line with the European Space Policy’s recommendations and the ESA Convention, ESA initiated a series of parallel industrial studies in 2006 with the 139

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objective of compiling SSA end-users’ needs in order to translate them into technical requirements and identify high-level architectural options for responding to them. ESA also set up an SSA User Group representing a wide range of potential users whose task was to support these studies and specify a set of relevant applications and services. This preparatory activity was followed by a DirectorGeneral Proposal on an SSA programme, indicating the objectives and giving an overview of the end-user requirements and the SSA’s foreseen services and architecture. The Proposal also sketched out the logistic and financial requirements for the programme’s evolution. Finally, in February 2008, an ESA Council Resolution for establishing an optional SSA programme was adopted.360 The Council invited the DirectorGeneral to study possible models for the overall infrastructure, governance and data policy of a European SSA system and to report the results to the Council by 2010. A government commitment is to be officially endorsed during the Space Council of November 2008, but the Member Governments have already tentatively agreed on allocating 100 million euros for the system’s development in the next three years.

3.3. SSA end-users and their requirements The four services mentioned above lead to the identification of four comprehensive end-user communities (see Table 3). Each will take advantage of one or more services and will require specific technical and operational assistance, which will have an influence on the European SSA governance model and data policy. 3.3.1. Institutional end-users

Governments have specific legal and political responsibilities linked to the management of public space activities. National space agencies are fully involved in the management of orbital space since they are often satellite operators and take on the legal responsibilities of their governments in the technology domain. Due to their often constrained budgets and priorities, they would therefore welcome the development of an SSA system, especially at the European level. Some of the main needs of institutional stakeholders are: improving the monitoring of the space population so as to avoid satellite damage; improving liability in the case of atmospheric re-entry or other launch or orbital events (linked also to the juridical consequences facing the launch State or State owner); and improving the regulation of orbital positions. Institutional end-users would certainly ask for specific data requirements such as information availability, reliability, integrity and 140

3. Europe’s approach to Space Situational Awareness Tab. 3: High-level end-user needs, services, and communities. High-level users’ needs

Services

End-user communities

Assess the functional status and capabilities of space systems

– Survey and Tracking – Imaging

– Institutional – Military – Commercial – Scientific

Support risk management and liability assessment

All

– Institutional – Military – Commercial – Scientific

Support the safe and secure operation of space assets and related services

– Survey and Tracking – Space Weather

– Institutional – Military – Commercial – Scientific

Enable the assumption of responsibility and support confidence-building measures

– Survey and Tracking – Imaging – Space Weather

– Institutional – Military – Commercial

Detect non-compliance with – Survey and Tracking relevant international treaties – Imaging and recommendations – Space Weather

– Institutional

Elaboration based on Table 1 in: European Space Agency Council. “Space Situational Awareness Programme Proposal.” ESA/C(2008)30, 27 Feb. 2008.

precision. This category of end-users should also be allowed access to almost all data (including highly security-sensitive and confidential information), with the only exception of military data which are not relevant for the activities of the civil national space agencies, anyway.

3.3.2. Military end-users

The military communities represent the most demanding group of end-users. They often represent highly structured, nationally-oriented actors and are in charge of the most demanding security and defence-related systems and data with very stringent confidentiality requirements. Military users’ needs include the obtaining of relevant, reactive and precise information (related to the security of their own assets or to the general monitoring and cataloguing of activities) and the protection of the confidentiality of security and defence-related data in terms of access and distribution (both regarding specific space-objects and the SSA system). Moreover, possessing SSA capabilities constitutes an important element 141

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of a dissuasion strategy since it implies the capacity to attribute responsibility to offensive acts in space and allows militaries to respond to them. European military end-users should be allowed to access the maximum amount of data as long as they are considered “European”, meaning that the data do not contain any nationally classified information or if they do, the data are not ascribable to any specific nation. 3.3.3. Commercial end-users

Commercial satellite operators already use space surveillance information on a regular basis and will certainly do so increasingly in the coming years. Therefore, it is likely that a European SSA system would have commercial end-users seeking to complement the data made available through the American SSN (Space Surveillance Network)361 system. The resulting revenue income would thus contribute to the SSA system’s long-term sustainability. However, revenues will only flow if the European SSA system will provide a clear added value for the end-users vis-a-vis the “free of charge” SSN system. SSA information is very useful for protecting in-orbit assets during their lifetime and during possible in-orbit reallocation manoeuvres, thus saving commercial operators financial losses and increasing reliability. Moreover, SSA information is also needed to protect transmitted signals from interferences. Although this SSA usage does not touch upon security issues, business-related information can be sensitive and should be protected from competitors. Therefore, a certain degree of commercial confidentiality is requested by this end-user community; at the same time, certain security-sensitive information should not be made available to this end-user group. 3.3.4. Scientific end-users

A scientific community dedicated to the surveillance of space (including debris, satellites and natural phenomena) already exists. However, it only uses open source information and the scope of its activity is mainly scientific. Nevertheless, this community does contribute to alerting the appropriate authorities about the existence of potential risks or threats. Compared to other end-users of an SSA system, this end-user category would have a relatively low level of requirements which would thus not influence the SSA system’s overall governance and data policy structure. Some of the requirements of this user community lie in the need to obtain information in a short period of time and with high precision. Lastly, it must be noted that scientific communities have already developed important 142

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networks and web-based assets for the distribution of information and services that could be exploited by/for a European SSA system.

3.4. Some existing models in the space domain for developing a suitable data-policy and governance model In order to devise a suitable governance model and data policy for an SSA system, it may be useful to consider some existing European and national models in the space domain. Indeed, some models can provide input and examples as an orientation for the future architecture of an SSA system, since they are built around a delicate equilibrium between national and European assets and data policies, and often involve Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

3.4.1. Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES)

A GMES data policy has not yet been developed. Before GMES is completely operational, it will thus not be possible to assess the efficiency of its governance structure. While waiting for a politically-shared European data policy to be developed at a high level to provide the basis for future space systems in the EU, the INSPIRE directive362 can provide some general principles, and the GMES structure some interesting inputs. The space segment of the GMES constellation will be composed of national satellites and European satellites, some of them conceived to work expressly as “gap fillers” for the national constellations. Ownership of the assets implies ownership of the raw data, therefore a data policy model including two levels of declassification or two filters preceding the information distribution (first national, then European) would seem an appropriate solution. Indeed, the GMES data policy will be a combination of two levels of data ownership and data policies, trying to reconcile the right of every EU Member State to access information with the sensitive nature of some data belonging to only a few of them. However, in a situation in which the obtained information is supposed to serve 27 countries and several end-user communities, this model could penalise the service quality. If the model were applied to an SSA system, this would certainly be the case, considering the high sensitiveness of the data and the large number of national data sources especially at the beginning. The implied risk is that space actors in Europe would prefer to enter into multinational agreements to ensure service quality. Moreover, if a rigid model was followed, this could undermine the potential evolution of the 143

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system into a more European-oriented model (which would have to happen in the near future when the national capabilities are replaced by European ones). Therefore, for both GMES and SSA, a well-balanced data policy and governance structure would be preferable which takes into account both national and European requirements and leaves room for future evolutions which will certainly occur with the “nationality” shift of the space assets. 3.4.2. Galileo

The most interesting characteristic of Galileo may be its intention to provide encryption/decryption signals for regulating the access to information of its two main families of end-users, i.e. commercial and institutional end-users (the latter including, with a high probability, European military staff supporting European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions). Each of the four levels of service access will be characterised by an ad-hoc combination of factors like the availability, integrity and cost of information. The concession model adopted by Galileo, according to which the GSA (GNSS Supervisory Authority) appoints a private operator to deploy and operate the system, could perhaps be used for the distribution of SSA information to commercial and scientific end-users as well. The GSA is a community agency which has eight departments headed by managers authorised to manage all aspects of the system (external relations, budget, Research and Development (R&D), etc.).363 Moreover, the GSA is supported by a System Safety and Security Committee (3SC) representing national quotas and whose Chairperson is the representative of the current EU Council Presidency. A similar structure could be envisaged for SSA: an ad-hoc European agency (newly founded or emerging from a previous structure) composed of managers equally representing the EU countries and tasked with administering all aspects of the system, including the gathering and distribution of the data. 3.4.3. TerraSar-X

The 2007 German Satellite Data Security Law (SatDSiG),364 adopted to establish a national security policy for space-based Earth remote sensing systems, could provide some interesting input for an SSA system especially with regard to its sensitivity data check procedure. There are two phases in the procedure: During the first phase, a private-commercial company performs an initial “sensitivity check” on all data received from TerraSar-X that is initially not considered as classified. By means of an automated and transparent procedure (Black Box system) based on specific objective criteria, the private company assesses the non144

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sensitiveness or sensitiveness of the data and then delivers them accordingly. If the results point to sensitive information, a government authority intervenes to check and possibly classify the information. This PPP is quite interesting considering the role entrusted to private companies and the approach by which the latter classify (rather than declassify) information. This approach is in fact functioning well, although this could also be due to the fact that the information in question is not particularly sensitive and that the system serves only Germany. Nevertheless, such an automated procedure which is based on objective criteria and keeps human intervention to a minimum could be considered for a future SSA system and especially for the Space Environment Monitoring family of services.

3.4.4. Graves

Graves is a French national radar system owned and operated by the French Air Force since 2005. Graves produces surveillance and tracking data used for cataloguing space objects in LEO (Low Earth Orbit) for predominantly military purposes. Before 2005, only U.S. space surveillance systems provided such information, which was disseminated free of charge through a database on the internet. While the American programme is global and comprehensive in outreach, the Graves radar system only observes and tracks the space above French territory. Nevertheless, this is the only non-American programme which provides alternative information on the space environment. Indeed, the data obtained through Graves have highlighted the fact that the American catalogue is incomplete (i.e. some data from U.S. satellites are missing whereas all non-U.S. satellite information is publicised), which demonstrates the obvious shortcomings of a single information source. The Graves radar system could be a good point of departure for a future SSA system. In fact, it is the only European tool originally conceived and developed for this purpose, whereas the other national ground systems that will initially form the European SSA system were developed for other purposes and will therefore require some technical changes. It is worth considering that using Graves as a starting point could influence both the SSA model and the logic behind it. Therefore, this influence should be carefully assessed, since Graves is a national, military and geographically-oriented programme that would certainly limit the scope and European approach of a wider SSA system. The four space programmes considered here can offer useful input for the definition of a European SSA model. GMES highlights important strategic considerations that must be taken into account for SSA as well: the co-existence of 145

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national and European assets and the consequent coexistence of different datapolicies; the need to discriminate, at least in the first phase, between the European countries participating and not participating in the optional programme; and the need to choose a model that leaves room for future evolutions of the system, among them a shift in the ownership structure. Galileo provides a good system governance example. The GSA structure could be considered for SSA as well, not only because it ensures the fair representation of the countries involved but also because its “inter-governmental” structure is organised in departments taking care of all security and management aspects of the programme, including the management of a possible PPP. TerraSar-X case is an example of a successful PPP for the management of potentially classifiable, sensitive data. Indeed, this model overturns the classic approach and ensures a more efficient and less time-consuming data management procedure. Due to the multinational and sensitive characteristics of a European SSA programme, such a management model could be considered only for nonsensitive services (like Space Environment Monitoring). Finally, the first existing European SSA component – the French Graves radar system – was presented above not only because it shows the importance of diversifying the sources of information but also because it could influence the overall SSA system model. Nonetheless, being a national and military-only programme and covering only the space above French territory, the Graves model also exhibits some specific characteristics that are too limited compared to the broader scope of a future European SSA system.

3.5. A possible European model for SSA Having considered the four examples above, a model for a future European SSA programme will now be proposed, keeping in mind some of principles that emerged above (especially in the context of the European experiences) and avoiding some of the rigidities that are typical for national models. The future European SSA system could be shaped around a governance and data policy model that is based on three flexible filters inserted into the process in three main phases, from the collection of the raw data via the data processing to the distribution of the data (see Figure 1).365 The first phase of the SSA process concerns the gathering of raw data. A European SSA system would initially collect data from national sensors, mostly ground-based due to the existing assets at the national level. It is foreseen, however, that the system would be complemented with a space-segment provided by ESA in the not-so-distant future. In this first “raw data gathering” phase, due to the national (and future ESA) ownership of the raw data collected, the model should 146

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INTERGOVERMENTAL /ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD (High-level intergovernmental body: MS (civil and military), ESA, EU Council, EC?)

RD = Raw Data DP = Data Policy IP = Information Policy

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Fig. 1: Proposal of a suitable governance and data policy model for a European SSA system.

accommodate all different prevailing national data policies and eventually also the new ESA data policy (see Section 3.4.1. on the future GMES data policy model). All raw data would be collected in a Black Box (see Section 3.4.3. on the TerraSar-X model) which would be automated to the maximum possible degree. The high level of automation (and therefore the low level of human discretionality in the management of the raw data) would reduce not only national concerns about the identificability of the sources, owners and requesters of raw data, but also all security and sensitivity issues linked with national ownership, thus serving as a confidence-building measure. An automated Black Box would also reduce “human intervention” to a minimum, thereby assuring a high degree of transparency, equity of treatment and efficiency in handling the data. The Black Box could be managed by ESA or a commercial entity (see TerraSar-X model), although both of these options would imply some security problems considering the civil or commercial nature of the structure. As a different option, the Black Box could be managed by a European (military?) structure (possibly the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC)366 after some amendments to its Statute and procedures, or the European Defence Agency (EDA),367 or a new ad-hoc structure responsible for security procedures and a confidential management). The “Administrative Board” managing the Black Box should in this case be a high-level intergovernmental body. Under its supervision, a “Technical Body” should be foreseen to implement the Board’s political decisions. 147

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The Black Box would merge the national and ESA raw data into the information transferred to different service structures (second phase). At this stage, a second filter would be created: The structure managing the Black Box would categorise the obtained information according to the receiving services and would define a new data policy that is nationally acceptable but unified at the European level. In the third phase, different service-oriented managing structures would appear. Indeed, the SSA has been conceived of as responding to two “services” and two “tools”. Near-Earth Observation and Space Weather can be considered nonsensitive services geared mainly towards scientific and commercial end-user communities. Due to their analogous characteristics, a similar or even the same governance model, structure and/or operator could be chosen for both services. Thus, the operator(s) could be private (given the non-sensitivity of the services) and serve the scientific community for free while asking a fee from the commercial community. Conversely, Imagery and Tracking activities should be considered sensitive tools rather than services. The characterisation and detailed knowledge of space objects (potentially including classified military satellites) is either commercially sensitive (as it could give some operators an advantage over others, particularly in the case of malfunction) or a matter of State security. The sensitive nature of the tool requires a non-commercial operator managing the distribution of the information to the respective end-user communities (the GNSS Supervisory Authority of Galileo could serve as a model). The end-users for Imagery and Tracking include public, military and commercial communities. For example, Space Traffic Management could be provided to commercial entities which would then supply the service to private satellite operators. In this case, the service would entail a fee due to its potential commercial value. The service would provide information on “un-identified” objects on a certain planned satellite’s track, thereby ensuring the shielding of sensitive information from commercial entities. The same Space Traffic Management tool could be available to public and military authorities, and in this case, similar sensitivity issues would have to be addressed. In this third phase, a third filter to be set up by public and/or private operators would therefore involve the designation of different data policies according to the service (Near-Earth Observation, Space Weather, Imagery, or Tracking) and the enduser communities addressed (public, military, scientific, or commercial). Finally, public-private operators should act in accordance with specific agreements with the “Administrative Board” and their activities should be carefully followed by the “Technical Body” in charge of ensuring that political decisions about the dissemination of, and access to, the system’s information are respected. The strategic dimension of SSA should be taken into account from the beginning. In the mid-term, possessing exhaustive and detailed knowledge about 148

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space platforms, in particular military ones, could prove a stabilising factor (by improving confidence-building and dissuasion) as much as it could lead in the very opposite direction. The outcome will depend largely on the management of the international implications of data dissemination, in particular at the transatlantic level. Therefore, the European SSA structure will require a high-level political steering committee (Galileo-style) for managing the security implications of the architecture. In all cases (the provision of both services and tools), a distinction should be made between non-participating State “customers” and end-user communities which belong to States or EU structures participating in the SSA optional programme. The latter should be able to access the system for free.

3.6. Conclusions Studies368 have demonstrated that the trend towards the pooling of national space assets at the European level and the construction of European space assets will pick up speed in the future as a result of the current economic and financial turbulences. Indeed, decreasing defence and civil budgets will spur the presently weak political will to share resources in the near future, especially since the lifetime of many national assets will expire. For this reason, it is likely that the composition of a European SSA system will gradually change over time, including ever more European assets and less national ones. The governance model to be developed today should take this into account and leave room for an associated data policy evolution. A rigid federate model comprising two filter levels (first national, then European) would give States an excuse for not moving towards a shared space tool with a shared data policy, and eventually a European political space systems concept. Contrariwise, the model proposed above exhibits the necessary degree of flexibility. A first advantage of the model proposed in this article is the presence of various “flexible” filters. By starting with a “mostly nationally-based model” (co-existence of different national data policies at the first stage due to the national ownership of the data), it would be possible to reduce the influence of national data policies in gradual steps, with a parallel shift towards a “European information policy” based on the future use of commonly-funded capabilities. A European-based model would be the final aim of this process, guided by a unique European data policy before and (or) just after the passage of the data through the Black Box. Since this is not a realistic option at the moment, however, the existing national data policies should be adhered to during the first stage, so as to ensure the quality and quantity of the raw data collection. 149

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A second advantage of our model lies in the presence of a Black Box that would maximise the added value of the system. Given the use of national assets and the persistently strong national attitudes towards the strategic issues involved, a governance model based on an intergovernmental agreement will have to be developed. The added value of such a system is obtained by pooling different national sources. The initial presence of national data policies should encourage the EU Member States to feed their data into the system, thereby maximising the quality and quantity of the data received through the Black Box and increasing the added value of the overall system. An automated Black Box would greatly support this process because it would reduce human intervention to a minimum, simplify the procedure, and therefore allay the data owners’ security concerns. The result would be a set of information that is combined from a maximum number of raw data for which the involved assets, owners and original purposes remain unknown. To conclude, the creation of a European SSA system based on a unique European data policy will allow for a fair transatlantic exchange of information based on a bilateral agreement (EU-USA) and maximise space situational awareness on both sides of the Atlantic.

354 User Expert Group of ESA SSA Requirement Study. http://www.sidc.be/esww4/presentations/ SWWT/SSA%20-%20Space%20Weather%20Week.ppt, slide 1. 355 Ibid. 356 So far, only the French Graves system and partly the German TIRA (Tracking and Imaging Radar) ground radar system have provided limited SSA information on the space above their territories. 357 Other categorisations of services are possible. See, for instance, the ESA presentation “A European Approach to Space Situational Awareness.” Fourth European Space Weather Week, 5–9 Nov. 2007, Brussels. Solar Influences Data Analysis Center 20 Oct. 2008. http://www.sidc.be/esww4/ presentations/SWWT/SSA%20-%20Space%20Weather%20Week.ppt. 358 This ongoing study is conducted by a consortium led by the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), Paris, with the participation of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome. 359 The European Space Policy acknowledges that space is a strategic tool for independence, prosperity, development and progress from an economic, technological, scientific and societal point of view. Moreover, it states that the use of space assets has become essential, particularly for security and defence purposes. See: Council of the European Union. “Resolution on the European Space Policy.” 10037/07, 22 May 2007. Public Register of Council Documents 22 Aug. 2008. http://register.consilium.europa. eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10037.en07.pdf. 360 ESA/C(2008)30, 27th Feb. 2008. 361 So far, the SSN system has no competitors and provides very comprehensive global information free of charge. Nevertheless, the system has some limits that could be overcome by a future European SSA system, among them a low accuracy, incomplete information, and a proprietary data format (the socalled two lines element). 362 “Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2007 Establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community (INSPIRE).” Official Journal of the European Union 25 Apr. 2007. 20 Oct. 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/kopernikus/ pdf/Dir_INSPIRE_L108.pdf. The INSPIRE Directive entered into force on 15 May 2007.

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The eight departments cover the following sectors: Concession, Technical, Security, Market Development, Finance and Administration, Personnel, Communications, and Institutional Relations. http://www.gsa.europa.eu/go/gsa/governance. 364 “Gesetz zum Schutz vor Gef€ahrdung der Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland durch das Verbreiten von hochwertigen Erdfernerkundungsdaten (Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz – SatDSiG).” [Law Safeguarding the Security Interests of the Federal Republic of Germany from Endangerment by the Distribution of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data, in German]. Bundesgesetzblatt I 23 Nov. 2007. 2590. Juris BMJ 20 Oct. 2008. http://bundesrecht.juris.de/ satdsig/. 365 It must be noted that several definitions of “data”, “information” and “service” exist. For the scope of this article which considers mainly political rather than technical aspects, data can be defined as a set of elements of different formats obtained by a single national/European asset. Data need to be processed and combined with other data in order to yield useful information about a specific phenomenon. The final service comprises pieces of information ready to be delivered to an end-user able to use and understand them without requiring any further elaboration or specific technical skills. 366 The European Union Satellite Centre located in Torrejon (Madrid) seems to be the best candidate, due to its experience in handling multinational data transmitted by commercial and sensitive satellites. However, the EUSC Statute foresees the same rights for all EU Members (in this case to access information), which has created some security concerns and induced some nations to lower the quality of their data inputs. It must be noticed that recently, the EUSC has been negotiating the signature of an agreement with the Italian Government for the use of sensitive images from the Cosmo-SkyMed satellite system for ESDP missions. This agreement warrants attention because it could provide an interesting model for the sharing of classified information among some EU Member States for specific purposes and under the political direction of the Council. 367 The European Defence Agency could be a good candidate, since it handles military and security dossiers and has military staff with the necessary security training and clearances. Despite this, however, the Agency’s Statute does so far not foresee the direct management or operation of European space systems. 368 See, for example: Giovanni Gasparini, Jean-Pierre Darnis, and Xavier Pasco. “The Cost of NonEurope in the Area of Satellite-Based Systems.” Study EXPO/B/SEDE/2006/15, PE 348.587. Brussels: European Parliament, December 2007. 20 Oct. 2008. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ activities/committees/studies/download.do?file¼19571.

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4. The European Union proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Marcel Dickow

4.1. Good reasons to get active – Why the European Union drafts a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Following a stalemate in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) regarding both its general agenda and PAROS (the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) in particular for more than one decade, the European Union has started an initiative of its own to put the topic of security in space back on the agenda of the international fora. It has proposed a “Code of Conduct in Outer Space Activities” (in the following referred to as CoC), a document which was agreed upon by the EU Member States in June 2008. However, how, when and with which content this document will find its way into the CD discussions is still an open question, since the EU is going to hold third-party talks with key-partners in space such as the U.S., Russia and China in late 2008 and 2009. Space security, i.e. security in space as well as the security of space objects, has the potential to drive the EU towards a more comprehensive approach on space policy. Although the concept of space security was not worked into the European Space Policy (ESP)369 of 2007, it was a topic in the subsequent political discussions leading to some major initiatives and programmes (see below). It is a European – not to say a European Union – peculiarity that discussions being launched in various EU fora sometimes lead to a convergence process which may eventually result in a coherent future policy. If the concept of space security turns out to be one of those processes (and it certainly has that potential), the EU draft CoC is one of the main tracks which the Member States will have followed more or less stringently in 2007/2008. With the evolution of the ESDP and its application of European (ESA and Member States’) space assets by the 2003 Council Document “ESDP and Space”,370 space security has increasingly appeared on the EU agenda. Boosted by some singular events in 2007/2008 in combination with the launch of several political initiatives, Europe and the EU began to realise the importance of a secure 152

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environment in space for their (often strategic) assets. As a ‘catalyser’ for a growing space security awareness, the January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test drove the EU towards a more active role in the field of arms control, space surveillance, and debris control and mitigation – not only EU-internally but also on the international stage. Both the EU’s technological endeavours in space and its conception of foreign and security policy are designed to follow a cooperative approach. Drafting a CoC and making it acceptable for as many States as possible is therefore reasonable against the background of a cooperative policy. One of the abovementioned initiatives tackling the field of space security is ESA’s Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programme (see the article of Marta and Gasparini in this volume) initiated in 2006 and most likely to be agreed on as an Optional Programme by the ESA Ministerial Council in November 2008. Although the 2007 European Space Policy set only a first framework in terms of the lowest common denominator among the EU Member States, it did trigger some important developments like the von-Wogau Report “On Space and Security” approved by the European Parliament in July 2008.371 Beyond the EU but with the support of its Member States, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines372 of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)373 were adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) in 2007.374 Meanwhile, the long-lasting stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and the still prevalent, strict distinction between civil (COPUOS) and military (CD) uses of outer space in the UN framework has left its marks on the EU’s efforts towards more cooperative security. Since the implementation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 2000s, the EU Member States have been coordinating their position in UN (related) bodies, such as the CD, in Council Working Groups. The competent group for arms control and disarmament with regard to space is CODUN (the Council Working Group on Disarmament in the UN), which prepares the EU’s position and statements given by representatives of the EU Presidency in UN bodies. To bring arms control in space on the EU agenda, Germany in 2005/2006 prepared a “Workshop on Security and Arms Control in Space and the Role of the EU” which was held under the German EU Presidency in June 2007 and attended by EU delegations and international experts. In the final session of the workshop (which took place at the German Federal Foreign Ministry) and after several of the invited speakers had referred to the concept of a CoC, German Ambassador L€udeking stated: “An incremental approach to arms control in space is required. Instead of aiming at a treaty banning weapons in space, it might be more promising to first go for a Code of Conduct or rules of the road. It is understood, of 153

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course, that an incremental approach does not preclude other parallel steps like political commitments, unilaterally declared moratoria, etc., which could precede more far-reaching and ambitious objectives like a legally binding international treaty”.375 Following an Italian initiative, the Portuguese Presidency finally drafted a first version of an EU CoC in the second term of 2007. While it was at first planned to present the document to the CD in 2008, the document was eventually agreed upon in CODUN at the end of the Slovenian Presidency in June 2008. At the same time, the Netherlands proposed a “way forward”, indicating as the next steps a discussion with the EU’s key partners in space and identifying the necessary modalities for promoting the document in the international arena, including the CD and COPUOS. Meanwhile, the former Chairman of COPUOS, Gerard Brachet, who had already initiated a Working Paper entitled “Future Role and Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”376 which included the suggestion to draft a space CoC in 2007, started a personal initiative to put together “[ . . . ] an informal working group comprised primarily of government officials from the key Western space powers and representatives of the global telecommunications industry to flesh out what might be included in a broad regime to ensure the sustainable, long-term use of space”.377 Whereas the in-coming French Presidency presented an outline of the EU CoC to UNCOPUOS in June 2008, Brachet introduced his initiative to CODUN in September 2008. So far, it is blurry whether these initiatives will ever be connected or unified or whether the world is witnessing another self-compensating initiative doublet.

4.1.1. Treaty versus Code – The UN discussion process and the academic background

PAROS Resolutions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN First Committee (on Disarmament and International Security) have become an annual ritual since the first Resolution passed with an overwhelming majority at the 23rd session of the UNGA in 1968. In 2005, the U.S. delegation voted against a PAROS Resolution for the first time and has been doing so ever since.378 At the Geneva CD, Russia and China proposed a Working Paper (CD/1679)379 for a draft treaty on banning space weapons in 2002. Whereas the CD is still stalled by the agenda argument and far from establishing a new PAROS ad-hoc Committee, Russia introduced a Resolution (UNGA 60/66) at the UNGA in January 2006 (which was later recalled by UNGA Resolution 61/75380 of December 2006) inviting “[ . . . ] all Member States to inform the Secretary-General” before the UNGA’s “sixty-first session of their views on the advisability of further developing 154

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international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space”.381 In the same year, China and Russia presented another Working Paper entitled “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities and the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (CD/1778)382 at the CD. It already anticipated some of the structures and topics found later in the EU CoC which strongly relies on the idea of Transparency and ConfidenceBuilding Measures (TCBMs). Meanwhile, in 2007, the international community celebrated the 40th anniversary of the ‘Magna Charta’ of outer space, the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Before the EU delegations met in Berlin as mentioned above, UNIDIR (the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) held its annual Geneva conference in spring. The conference report summarised the discussion about the best way towards a new arms control regime in outer space and the danger of an arms race as follows: “We can simply neglect it and avoid any action, or we can amend the existing legal instruments and attempt to resolve the problem. A third way is to establish confidence-building measures and a code of conduct to increase transparency and guide our activities in outer space. A possible fourth path is to negotiate and conclude a new legally binding international instrument so as to completely avoid the danger of weaponization of and arms racing in outer space”.383 Almost two years after the EU’s CoC initiative was born, the CD again witnessed a joint Russia-China draft treaty proposal in early 2008 but still no European child. That latest draft entitled “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (CD/1839)384 of 29 February 2008 (“PPWT” in short) was reluctantly responded to by the Slovenian EU Presidency in February 2008. The statement referred not only to a missing “effective and robust verification system” in the draft but also outlined the new EU approach: “Considering the current state of affairs in the CD and of the here above elements the EU wishes to focus on a pragmatic and incremental approach, which will contribute to the strengthening of space security and create the atmosphere of confidence and transparency. To that end, the EU is working on a set of transparency and confidence building measures which it plans to present at the CD for discussion. Such transparency and confidence building measures could be an important 155

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stepping stone in this area, as it was announced in EU reply to UNGA Res. 61/75 Transparency and Confidence Building Measure in Outer Space Activities”.385 The underlying reason for a shift in the European approach to space security is not only the constant blockade of the U.S. in the CD against any discussions on a comprehensive space weapons ban treaty (or a modernised OST) but also the verification problem and the long-lasting argument over the definition of terms such as “space weapon”. Proposals brought to the attention of the CD in recent years have represented two classes of arms control concepts for outer space activities: those focusing on negative definitions (i.e. prohibitions, for instance of space weapons) and those focusing on behaviours (preferable or nonpreferable activities). Whereas the Russian-Chinese draft treaties of the last decades belong to the former category, the EU CoC is part of the latter. The abovementioned 2007 UNIDIR conference report framed the problem in the following terms: “Referring to the question of definitions, particularly of space weapons and differences between military and civilian uses of outer space, it was suggested that rules of the road or codes of conduct could circumvent these problems if the focus was on behaviour rather than on definitions”.386 Notwithstanding the upcoming CoC proposal, the EU approach to space security in the UN forum eventually aims at a comprehensive, legally binding treaty. Yet for tactical reasons, the European Union switched to a tiered process trying to overcome the reluctance of the U.S. to negotiate on any legally binding instruments. This idea, however, is not new. Academic Rebecca Johnson already proposed a CoC (together with an ASAT and space weapons ban) in 2001, stating that the CD had previously discussed rules on the road or a CoC but without any pressure to succeed.387 The first detailed draft CoC was introduced by Michael Krepon et al. in 2003/2004 who suggested to negotiate “[ . . . ] a code of conduct between space-faring nations to prevent incidents and dangerous military activities in space. Key activities to be covered under such a code of conduct include avoiding collisions and simulated attacks; creating special caution and safety areas around satellites; developing safer traffic management practices; prohibiting anti-satellite tests in space; providing reassurance through information exchanges, transparency and notification measures; and adopting more stringent space debris mitigation measures”.388 156

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Needless to say that this “Model Code of Conduct”389 turned out to have been significantly more far-reaching than the actual EU proposal discussed in Section 4.2.

4.1.2. Process or outcome? – The European Union’s objectives and its Member States’ divergent interests

So far, the EU’s dedication to arms control in space, both within and outside the UN framework, was discussed without enlarging upon the EU’s objectives in particular. Admittedly, this is a difficult task, not only because the EU as an actor consists of 27 Member States but also because space is a cross-pillar topic which involves different bodies dealing with different aspects. Whilst the EU Member States share the opinion that the prevention of weapons in outer space is necessary, their views on the attainable impact of a Code of Conduct drift apart. This has much to do with the transatlantic relations of both the EU as an entity and its individual Member States. The UK and some of the new Member States tend to not want to confront the U.S. with too explicit references to space weapons and arms control in the Code. Their diplomats call for a “realistic view”, as the initiative relies on universalisation and the inclusion of the “big players” for being effective. Contrary to its former and more EU-focused position, the French Presidency has accepted or even supported a somewhat weaker wording and in particular a modified document entitled “Rules of the Road”, thereby seeking to increase the likelihood of successful third-party talks under its auspices. On the other side, the Scandinavian countries, Italy and Germany have supported a stronger negotiating position towards the U.S. They share with the UK a long-lasting tradition in arms control policy. Against the background of different EU Member States’ orientation, there is a fundamental divergence on whether to give the EU a clear independent position in space arms control (vis-a-vis other players like the U.S., Russia, or China) or to make the Code acceptable for a maximum number of signatories, including the U.S., by softening the draft. Beside these dissonances, the EU bodies and Member States are aware of Europe’s long-lasting tradition in the peaceful use of outer space and ESA’s “exclusively peaceful purposes” statutes. At the same time, the growing dependency on space-based information systems (civil, dual-use, or military) has become a major spur for space security initiatives like the EU CoC. Not only governments rely increasingly on satellites, but also the expanding European space industry pushes more and more for a secure space environment. Anyway, Europe’s industrial space segment as well as its political actors in the field of space policy and arms control in space have a mid-position between the 157

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U.S. on the one hand and Russia, China and the emerging space-faring nations on the other hand. This has become apparent not only in its technological cooperation with China on Galileo390 but also in the CD, where the EU has been constantly reluctant to support the Russia-China draft treaty initiatives with an eye to its transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, the EU now seeks more room for manoeuvre to present itself as an active political player in the field of space and space security, despite or rather due to the stalemate in Geneva. Although it is somehow cynical, the 2007 Chinese ASAT test expanded the EU’s room for finding an independent position between the Russia-China treaty and the U.S. anti-treaty position, since China partly lost credibility and the U.S. could not neglect a need for action any longer. In the framework of the CFSP, the EU CoC is a perfect example of the EU’s “effective multilateralism” approach to global security and stability. The CoC meets all the conditions which the EU has often struggled with in other common policy fields: the initiative is within the scope of the UN, it follows a cooperative approach and benefits not only the EU Member States and societies but also the European industrial space segment. At the same time, it is now difficult for the U.S. administration (the same applying for Russia and China) to drive a wedge between the EU Member States as it has done (or does) successfully regarding the issues of ballistic missile defence and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Although not all EU Member States are active in space (or even members of ESA), they are equal parties to the OST. And unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the OST does not divide the Treaty parties into haves and have-nots which facilitates the definition of joint initiatives in bodies such as CODUN or even the CD, because all EU Member States share the same rights and obligations.

4.2. “A tightrope walk” – The European Union tackles the space between claim and reality It is safe to say that the EU Member States are more or less convinced that a world without space weapons is the better choice. As shown above, it is not only their perspective but there are also essential arguments to follow this political directive. It is therefore time to raise the question whether the EU is willing to discuss its stance openly with its key-partners in the upcoming bilateral talks. An initial answer is given by the draft CoC which the EU Member States agreed upon in CODUN in June 2008. The following refers to a draft document of March 2008 which is only marginally different from the final version. 158

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4.2.1. The contents of the EU draft CoC

The EU CoC consists of a Preamble and 13 Articles subdivided into four sections: Core Principles and Objectives (I), General Measures (II), Co-operation Mechanisms (III) and Organisational Aspects (IV). Sections II and III represent the core of the Code, dealing with Space Traffic Management and Space Debris Control and Mitigation (Articles 4 and 5), Notification, Registration, Information, Consultation and Investigation (Articles 6 to 10), respectively. 4.2.1.1. General provisions

Article 4 calls on the Subscribing States to implement Space Traffic Management (STM) in their national policies and to establish “[ . . . ] procedures to minimize the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other nations’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space” (4.1). The behaviour-oriented character of the document is furthermore underlined by elaborations on what is to be avoided (4.2) – damage or destruction and (the risk of) collisions – and by steps towards the implementation of the recommendations and regulations on space traffic management of the ITU (International Telecommunication Union). Lastly, “all manoeuvres initiated by Subscribing States with the objective of repairing space objects, mitigating debris, avoiding collisions or managing space traffic” are to “be permitted provided they do not create additional risks of collision” (4.3). Article 5 on space debris control and mitigation determines that the Subscribing States will adopt procedures “in order to implement all Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee Guidelines as well as the Debris Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (5.1). Explicitly, it is demanded that the Subscribing States “refrain from [the] intentional destruction of any on-orbit space object or other harmful activities in space which may generate long-lived space debris”. This creates a link between behaviour and consequences but has only relevance for long-lived space debris. 4.2.1.2. Co-operation mechanisms

Articles 6 to 10 describe mechanisms for enhancing transparency and confidence among the Subscribing States. Article 6 stipulates that notification be required in the case of “scheduled manoeuvres, orbital change and re-entry, as well as other relevant orbital parameters, collisions or accidents, malfunctioning of orbiting space objects with risk of orbital decay or collision”. Article 7 calls for the timely registration, “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, [of] the relevant data as set forth in the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 159

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Space”. Article 8 requests the Subscribing States to share certain information, among them annual updates on their national space policy as well as “basic objectives for security and defence related activities” (8.1). With regard to space surveillance data, however, the chosen wording is rather cautious: The Subscribing States “may consider providing timely information on space environmental conditions and forecasts to other Subscribing States or private entities through their national space situational awareness capabilities” (8.2). Article 9 establishes a mechanism for initiating consultations if requested by “Subscribing State[s] with reason to believe that certain space activities conducted by one or more Subscribing State or States is, or may be, contrary to the purposes of the Code”. The timeframe for such consultations is to be set by the involved States. Additionally, other Subscribing States may take part in the consultations upon request. Finally, Article 10 allows for the creation (under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General) of “a mechanism to investigate space activities deemed to be contrary to the purposes of the Code” (10.1). The necessary information is to be made available through national sources provided on a voluntary basis by the Subscribing States: “The mechanism will be based on [ . . . ] a roster of national experts to undertake an investigation and who will report to the United Nations Secretary General” (10.2).

4.3. A first appraisal of the CoC It is highly welcome that the EU has started an initiative to promote space security through a CoC. Arms control in space has been neglected in the international fora for too long. Moreover, it was high time to address the issue despite the stalemate in the CD because a new U.S. administration will take office in 2009. In so doing, the EU has indicated its willingness and ability to tackle questions of international security and arms control even in the face of opposition from key partners. It was a clever choice to use an instrument like the CoC which addresses the security concerns of all space-faring nations and therefore prevents divisions among the potential Subscribing States. However, although the consequent “behaviour approach” chosen by the EU does help to circumvent a bulk of definitional problems especially with regard to technical terms used in the PPWT391 or Stimson CoC,392 it also precludes the opportunity to specify actions, situations, timeframes and spatial conditions in more detail. Cases in point are the missing specification of “long-lived space debris” (5.1) and the absence of “keep-out zones”. Since guidelines for the mitigation of space debris have already been established by UNCOPUOS, the EU CoC is more concerned with defining “good behaviour” along the prevention of space debris (5). This approach is reasonable because the 160

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rules in question are widely accepted, even by the United States. However, some of the space debris provisions in the CoC are weaker than necessary. In particular, Clause 4.3 softens the general provisions of 4.2 and leaves room for dubious activities. According to Clause 4.3, procedures to mitigate space debris, etc. should be subject to specific regulations since they hold an inherent potential to undermine the Code. Furthermore, the draft CoC does not consider the possibility of temporally interfering with space objects (jamming, spoofing, blending, deorbiting, turning) without damaging or destroying them. The UN Registration Convention has for different reasons proven an inefficient tool since it entered into force in 1976. One reason for this lies in the civil-military duality in space and of space objects that stands in contradiction to the UN structure and its clear separation of civil (COPUOS) and military (CD) activities. The EU does not address the issue of a better coordination or cooperation of those bodies and moreover keeps quiet about the important dual-use problematic. Would it have been too ambitious to at least try to enhance and improve the registration procedures (7.1)? It is remarkable that an important arms control document like the EU CoC contains no reference to arms control as such. It is understandable that the Code is primarily meant to preserve the peaceful use of outer space and that for tactical reasons, it refrains from referencing any previous initiatives (such as PAROS) within the CD. Yet if it is taken into consideration that some EU Member States were even reluctant to mention the UN Charta principles in the Preamble but instead emphasised the “legitimate defence interests of states”, it appears almost a matter of anticipatory obedience that no references to UNGA and 1st Committee Resolutions are included in the CoC document. One can raise the question why the EU does not take a stronger and more independent stance on its CoC initiative. There are in fact good reasons why the EU should go more self-confidently into the third-party talks, especially with the U.S. Europe has recently developed advanced technological capabilities such as Galileo, Ariane 5, the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) Jules Verne and the ambitious GMES (now: Kopernikus) programme. The EU–U.S. talks on Galileo were characterised by an eye-to-eye negotiation constellation after the U.S. had had to acknowledge that Europe was decided to proceed with Galileo.393 The same will happen with ESA’s Space Situational Awareness programme, as the EU is heading towards the creation of an independent capability in space surveillance. While Europe aims to step out of the shadow of its transatlantic partner, it must be aware of its capabilities and the available means to put its interests through. Judging from the draft CoC, however, it seems that the EU Member States are subordinating such strategic considerations to the tactical advantages of a moderate draft. 161

Part 2 – Views and Insights Commission of the European Communities. “European Space Policy.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2007)212, 26 Apr. 2007. European Commission 22 Aug. 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/space/doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf, and Council of the European Union. “Resolution on the European Space Policy.” 10037/07, 22 May 2007. Public Register of Council Documents 22 Aug. 2008. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ en/07/st10/st10037.en07.pdf. 370 Council of the European Union. “ESDP and Space.” 11616/3/04 REV 3, 16 Nov. 2004. Register of Council Documents 22 Aug. 2008. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st11/st11616-re03. en04.pdf. 371 Wogau, Karl von. “Report on Space and Security.” 2008/2030(INI), 10 June 2008. European Parliament 22 Aug. 2008. http: //www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang¼2& procnum¼INI/2008/2030. 372 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. “IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.” IADC-02-01, Revision 1, Sept. 2007. IADC 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.iadc-online.org/ docs_pub/IADC_Mitigation_Guidelines_Rev1_Sep07.pdf. 373 For more information, see IADC website. http://www.iadc-online.org. 374 United Nations. “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Official Records A/62/20, 2007. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_62_20E.pdf. 375 Ambassador R€ udiger L€udeking, Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, qtd. in the “Workshop Conclusions” of the Workshop on Security and Arms Control in Space and the Role of the EU, 21–22 June 2007, Berlin. Paragraph 14. 376 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. “Future Role and Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” Working Paper submitted by the Chairman A/AC.105/L.268, 10 May 2007. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 22 Aug. 2008. http:// www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/l/AC105_L268E.pdf. 377 Hitchens, Theresa. “COPUOS Wades Into the Next Great Space Debate.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 26 June 2008. 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.thebulletin.org/node/3434. 378 An excellent and brief summary on the 60th session of the United Nations First Committee can be found. In: Johnson, Rebecca, ed. “Enhanced Participation and Politicking: Report on the 2005 UN First Committee.” Disarmament Diplomacy 81, Winter 2005. 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.acronym. org.uk/dd/dd81/81unfc.htm. 379 Conference on Disarmament. “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.” Working Paper CD/1679, 28 June 2002. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva 20 Oct. 2008. http://www.geneva.mid.ru/disarm/doc/CD1679-ENGLISH.pdf. 380 United Nations General Assembly. “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.” Resolution 61/75, 18 Dec. 2006. United Nations Documentation 20 Oct. 2008. http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r61.htm. 381 United Nations General Assembly. “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.” Resolution 60/66, 6 Jan. 2006. United Nations Documentation 20 Oct. 2008. http:// www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r60.htm. 382 Conference on Disarmament. “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities and the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space.” Working Paper CD/1778, 22 May 2006. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva 20 Oct. 2008. http://www.geneva.mid.ru/disarm/doc/ CD1778-ENGLISH.pdf. 383 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “Conference Report.” Celebrating the Space Age: 50 Years of Space Technology, 40 Years of the Outer Space Treaty, 2–3 Apr. 2007, Geneva. UNIDIR 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-4-978-92-9045-189-1en.pdf. 369

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4. The European Union proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Conference on Disarmament. “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.” Draft Treaty CD/1829, 29 Feb. 2008. Conference on Disarmament 20 Oct. 2008. http://disarmament.un.org/Library.nsf/ a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/b387f2a6bb147c5c852573e700701b27/$FILE/cd-1839.pdf. 385 The Slovenian Presidency of the European Union. “EU Response to Russian Proposal of the Draft PPWT.” 28 Feb. 2007. United Nations Office at Geneva 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.unog. ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FD13D7B0785521C7C12573FD00376F2C/$file/1094_ Slovenia_E.pdf. 386 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “Conference Report.” Celebrating the Space Age: 50 Years of Space Technology, 40 Years of the Outer Space Treaty, 2–3 Apr. 2007, Geneva. Session II, 13. UNIDIR 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-4-978-92-9045189-1-en.pdf. 387 Johnson, Rebecca. “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponisation of Space.” Disarmament Diplomacy 56, Apr. 2001. 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd56/56rej.htm. 388 Krepon, Michael, and Michael Heller. “A Model Code of Conduct for Space Assurance.” Disarmament Diplomacy 77, May/June 2004. 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/ dd77/77mkmh.htm. 389 Henry L. Stimson Center. “Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Incidents and Dangerous Military Practices in Outer Space.” 22 Aug. 2008. http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/codeofconduct. pdf. 390 China’s financial involvement in Galileo was repeatedly criticised by the U.S. because of a possible transfer of critical infrastructure technology. 391 Definitions are given for: outer space, outer space object, weapon in outer space, use of threat. 392 Definitions are given for: space debris, satellite, directed energy, laser, anti-satellite weapon, space weapon, special caution zone. 393 Giegerich, Bastian. “Navigating Differences: Transatlantic Negotiations Over Galileo.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20.3 (2007): 491–508. 384

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5. International cooperation in space exploration: Lessons from the past and perspectives for the future Alain Dupas

5.1. Introduction What will be the proper framework for international cooperation in space exploration in the coming decades? This question appears simple but it is in fact extremely complex, and addressing it requires the careful examination of what is meant by the words and expressions used in the sentence. Even the meaning of space exploration is open to discussion: does it refer to the robotic exploration of the physical bodies of the solar system (Moon, planets, asteroids, comets), to the human exploration of those bodies (which will however be limited to the Moon, Mars and possibly some Near-Earthfc Objects (NEOs) in the foreseeable future), or both? The fact is that international cooperation raises very different issues for robots and humans. We will briefly consider the robotic topic but will mainly focus on the human exploration issues, which are much more complex. The meaning of international cooperation is in itself subject to interrogation. The range of possible cooperation types is very large, from the simple sharing of data and results (which is how fundamental science commonly works) to totally integrated efforts for which the International Space Station (ISS) is a great example (as long as the ISS is classified as an exploration programme or at least an exploration-associated programme). What is more, questions about the proper nature of a cooperation framework will certainly lead to as many answers as there are partners in the framework. For political, strategic and even cultural reasons, the views of the United States (the world’s space leader), Russia (a former space superpower which is currently having a strong come-back), Europe (not a nation but a region with very different countries), Japan, Canada, India, China, Brazil and others can differ significantly. In order to give some (hopefully) meaningful answers to the question raised above, we will try to draw conclusions from the first fifty years of the space age, which provided many examples of robotic and human spaceflight cooperation and also of coopetition, i.e. cooperation in a competitive situation. The Soviet-Russian 164

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space station programme (first Salyut, then Mir) will be analysed as well as the U.S. Shuttle programme which opened the door for human spaceflight in Europe, Canada and Japan. We will then consider the specificities of the U.S.-led space station programme (currently the ISS programme, which however was very different at the beginning of the mid-1980s). And finally, we will address the current round of thinking and discussions started by the U.S. decision to return to the Moon as a first step towards Mars and beyond, with final questions such as: could the ISS scheme serve as a basis for a post-ISS international space exploration effort, and if yes, with what modifications? Could a different system of systems approach provide a realistic framework for enabling the international partners to rise up to the huge challenges of sending astronauts to the Moon, Mars and beyond? Could examples of non-space cooperative Research & Technology (R&T) ventures like ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) be applied to large-scale future exploration programmes? And could not the model of the European Space Agency (ESA), which was and is very successful in enabling different nations to pool resources for major space undertakings, be applied to a larger international framework?

5.2. The easy part: Robotic exploration 5.2.1. The fundamental importance of science as a driver of space exploration

The robotic exploration of the space environment and solar system bodies is mostly a science-driven activity and therefore works according to the basic principles of fundamental research: peer-reviewed results are published in academic journals and discussed openly in international conferences. The academic space science community is not limited to countries able to launch or operate satellites and probes. Thus, it is not surprising that soon after the beginning of the space age in the 1960s, space exploration by automated spacecraft became a major area of international cooperation. This can be considered the merit of the international scientific community which had played a major role in starting the space age: without the call of the International Council of Scientific Union (ICSU) to launch artificial Earth satellites during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) between mid-1957 and the end of 1958, the first American and Russian satellite projects might have been developed later and in a less competitive context. Yet after the launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957, Cold War politics marginalised science as the main driver of the two superpowers’ space activities. However, science remained an important rationale and one reason for other countries to enter the 165

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space arena. Although this happened usually in cooperation with the USA or the USSR, the ultimate goal was often to become autonomous in the launching of satellites, both for the purpose of research and the later development of practical applications.

5.2.2. The early steps in space cooperation

The United States and its civilian space agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), have been particularly active in inviting their allies to participate in space experiments. The U.S. launched its first foreign satellite (the Canadian Alouette) as early as 1962, this marking the beginning of a very successful American space cooperation programme, with more than 3,000 agreements with over 100 nations and international organisations signed since the creation of NASA 50 years ago.394 The USSR opened its space programme to scientific cooperation later, with the Intercosmos programme which was mostly directed at the countries of the USSR’s own political camp but which also put a strong emphasis on cooperation with France, which began at a very high political level with the visit of French President Charles de Gaulle to the Baikonur space centre in 1966 and has lasted to this day, with Russia having taken over the space heritage from the Soviet Union. The scientific and political value of space research played a very important role in the decision by the main western European countries to join their efforts in developing ambitious space activities. The creation of the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 1964 can be considered a turning point in space history.395 It was a process parallel but very different to the creation of the Commission of the European Communities (now simply the European Commission established by the Rome Treaty of 1955) and was inspired by the model of the European Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN) established in the 1950s for pooling the scientific resources of the western European countries in order to build big particle accelerators for fundamental physical research (the French physicist Pierre Auger was instrumental in the creation of both CERN and ESRO).396 ESRO then paved the way for the creation of the European Space Agency in the 1973–1975 period, which is now (along with CERN) one of the most successful European organisations, managing about half of the European space activities on behalf of its Member States and being a major player in most large international space cooperation projects. ESA operates in the framework of an ad-hoc treaty separate from the European Union treaties, and its very flexible working process could become a model for large-scale international exploration projects in the future. We shall come back to this point later. 166

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5.2.3. Basic space cooperation principles

The development of international space cooperation in the field of automatic satellites and probes has de facto created different levels of cooperative relationships: *

* * * * *

Scientist-to-scientist data exchanges with the joint analysis, interpretation and publication of the results; Cooperative ground-based tracking support; Joint sounding rocket campaigns; Highly coordinated sets of independent space missions; The flight of scientific instruments and sub-satellites on foreign spacecraft; Joint mission development programmes.

Basic principles have also emerged which are used by most cooperative projects (apart from the projects of ESA, which are per se highly integrated): *

*

*

*

The partners are usually government agencies, due to the required investment level and legal requirements; Each partner funds its own contribution, although the contributions need not be equivalent: there is “no exchange of funds”; Projects are structured so as to establish clearly defined and distinct managerial and technical interfaces in order to minimise complexity; Projects are structured so as to prevent unwarranted technology transfer.

Different kinds of approaches can be used for developing and negotiating international agreements, depending on the scope of the project: * * * * * *

Government-to-Government Framework Agreements; Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs); Agency-to-Agency Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs); Implementing Arrangements (IAs); Letters of Agreement (LOAs); Statements of Intent (SOIs).

Projects also differ regarding the number of partners and the integration level of different management models: * * * * *

High integration; Coordination via consultative groups; Joint management; Shared leadership vs. lead role of one partner; Consensus. 167

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5.3. Human spaceflight and its globalisation 5.3.1. Cold War competition in human spaceflight

Contrariwise to automatic space experiments, human spaceflight emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s in a purely competitive context involving only two players: the Soviet Union and the United States. The required technologies and investments were entirely out of reach for any other nation and in fact, even if the race to the Moon did take place on the world scene with a shared interest by most humans, no country apart from the USSR and the USA would have seen any advantage in participating in the conquest of the Moon at that time. The ‘space race’ was a fierce competition and the visible and spectacular facet of the foolish military technological race which characterised the Cold War until it ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union around 1990.397 The situation changed entirely in the 1970s, after the American victory on the Moon and the decision of the USA to change its human spaceflight strategy completely by stopping the Apollo Moon programme and developing a partially reusable, very capable manned and unmanned transportation system with access only to Low Earth Orbit (LEO): the Space Shuttle. This decision, taken in 1972 by the Administration of President Richard Nixon, can be considered a terrible space policy mistake because it failed to ease and reduce the price of space transport, led to two tragic accidents (in 1986 and 2003) and obliged the United States to adopt a radically new space policy in the 2000s: the Vision for Space Exploration. On the positive side, however, it must be stressed that the U.S. decision to build the Space Shuttle opened the way for international cooperation in the field of human spaceflight. The Soviet Union, which also had a programme to send humans to the Moon, likewise took a turn towards human spaceflight to LEO at that point in time (just after the successful Apollo landing): it engaged in a programme of small space stations in LEO, the Salyut family (and later Mir) while secretly pursuing its own lunar project and later developing its own costly and unnecessary shuttle (Buran).

5.3.2. The opening of the Space Shuttle programme to international cooperation

The turning point for international human spaceflight came in 1972 when the Administrator of NASA toured the USA’s European allies to propose them to participate in the Space Shuttle programme. The part first offered to the Europeans was a Space Tug – a reusable rocket stage for transporting payloads 168

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from LEO to more distant locations like the Geostationary orbit (GEO) 36,000 km over the equator. However, the Space Tug (which 35 years later has still not been developed) was apparently too critical for the future of the U.S. space programme to be built by foreign partners, and so the Europeans were finally proposed to develop a scientific laboratory fitting into the large Space Shuttle cargo bay – the Spacelab, which was to transform the Space Shuttle with its possible crew of 7–10 persons into an interim manned space research station. Mainly supported by Germany, the Spacelab was one of the projects in the package deal approved by the last European Space Conference (ESC) in July 1973,398 which decided to create ESA on the basis of ESRO. The other major programme in the package deal was Ariane, undertaken mainly with French support with the goal of giving Europe independent access to space for automatic satellites and probes. The Spacelab was a great technical success and had its first flight in 2003. It has certainly not fulfilled all expectations in terms of the number and cost of flights, but it has created the scientific and industrial basis for Europe’s future participation in human spaceflight to LEO and beyond. Canada was also taken to the table of human spaceflight in the framework of the Shuttle programme: it provided the robotic arm and developed the technologies which made the Canadian space industry a world leader in space robotics. The international cooperation on the Space Shuttle was framed using the abovementioned toolbox of space partnerships, including an IGA, MOUs, the non-exchange of funds (although NASA bought one Spacelab hardware set from the European industry), clear interfaces, and a lead role for the USA. The Soviets, in turn, were not ready to integrate hardware from other countries into their space stations although they had to accept interfacing their own manned transportation system (the Soyuz spacecraft which still operates today) quite closely with the U.S. Apollo vehicle in for preparation and realisation of the historical Apollo-Soyuz rendezvous of July 1975, which symbolically put an end to the human space race. Overall, however, the Soviets adopted a different approach: they invited other countries to send one of their citizens to Star City for training and then fly aboard the Soviet space stations for a few days. This was a bold extension of the cooperative Intercosmos programme which had previously been limited to automatic satellites and probes. The first guest cosmonaut was the Czechoslovak Vladimir Remek in 1978, who thus became the first European in space years before the first flight of the Spacelab aboard the Space Shuttle which included the participation of a German astronaut (in fact, a French pilot, Jean-Loup Chrétien, had also flown to space prior to the Spacelab, as a guest cosmonaut of the Soviets aboard Salyut 7 in 1979 – an event which was politically very significant at a time of renewed tension between the East and the West). 169

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5.3.3. The de facto globalisation of human spaceflight

In political terms, flying the astronauts of foreign countries to space is much less significant than the technical participation in joint programmes like the Spacelab project. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have invited foreigners to participate in Space Shuttle flights. The global result of these cosmonaut/astronaut guest programmes, augmented by cooperative human spaceflight projects like the Spacelab or later the International Space Station (see Section 5.4) has been that, as of May 2008, representatives of 39 countries have travelled to space. In spite of the fact that only two countries (the USSR/Russia and the United States) had the capability to send humans to space between 1961 and 2003 and that China did not conduct national flights before 2003, human spaceflight has become a global interest and endeavour. Even nations without the technological knowledge to participate in spaceflight scientifically are eager to send citizens to outer space. Tab. 4: Number of space travellers by citizenship as of May 2008. The USSR and Russia (from 1991 onwards) are listed as different countries (source: Wikipedia). Flag

Country

% of total

Belgium

2

0.42

Bulgaria

2

0.42

Canada

8

1.67

France

9

1.88

10

2.09

Italy

5

1.04

Japan

7

1.46

The Netherlands

2

0.42

People’s Republic of China

3

0.63

Russia

41

8.56

U.S.S.R.

72

15.03

305

63.67

27

5.64

Germany

United States Other countries Total 170

Number of space travelers

479

100

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The de facto globalisation of human spaceflight has been accompanied by changes in the way in which space guests are invited, trained and flown by the Soviets/Russians: free flights were replaced by paid participation, with the price approximating the marginal cost of an additional traveller on a Soyuz spacecraft (about 20–25 million dollars). Invitations have also been extended by Russia to private citizens ready to pay such an amount for travelling to space, so-called space tourists.

5.4. The special case of the International Space Station 5.4.1. The origin of the International Space Station programme

Building on the political success of the internationalisation of the Space Shuttle programme, the Administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan decided to pursue the same policy with a major follow-up human space project approved in 1984: the building of a large LEO space station, tentatively called Freedom, which was considered the next logical step in the U.S. space programme after the Space Shuttle (which was to be used for transporting and assembling the space station parts, and then for serving the operational station) and a focal point for international cooperation with U.S. allies in the area of human spaceflight. The U.S. President himself called the leaders of the principal European countries and Canada (the countries already participating in the Space Shuttle programme) and Japan, proposing them to become partners in the development of the space station. The personal involvement of the U.S. President was certainly instrumental in securing the agreement of Europe, Canada and Japan to what was clearly going to be a very ambitious and costly project.

5.4.2. The original European human spaceflight strategy of the 1980s

Two ESA Council meetings at ministerial level in 1985 and 1987 approved not only ESA’s participation in the U.S.-led project (with a research module to be attached to the station) but also the development of autonomous elements: a manned transportation system using the new Ariane-5 launcher (a spaceplane called Hermes), and an autonomous space laboratory called the Man-Tended Free-Flyer (MTFF) where research in microgravity could be conducted apart from the main station. Japan also accepted the U.S. offer and planned to build an additional research module. Canada was to provide a robotic facility. 171

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Fig. 2: The European human spaceflight projects of the 1980s: the visitable station MTTF and the Hermes spaceplane, which were started as an answer to the U.S. call for participation in an International Space Station programme (source: ESA).

For Europe and Japan, participating in the Freedom Station project implied a large increase in their space efforts and expenditures. It must also be stressed that by associating autonomous and cooperative elements, the European strategy of the time was very bold and original. It failed ultimately when the overly ambitious Hermes project was cancelled in the early 1990s but can be considered a very interesting case in point for the future of international spaceflight: autonomy and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.

5.4.3. A paradigm shift: Russia joins the International Space Station

At the beginning, the U.S.-led Space Station project was a Cold War programme, competing in some ways with the Soviet Salyut and later Mir stations. But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War around 1990, the political goal of the Space Station changed completely: after seriously considering to cancel the expensive project, the new Clinton Administration decided in 1993 to invite Russia to join the project in order to provide an attractive activity to the latter’s space (and missile!) engineers and to limit the risk of Russian specialists working on proliferating projects. There is no doubt that the Space Station programme was saved because of its international nature. Yet the arrival of Russia on the international team profoundly changed the project.399 Russia took to the party its unique experience in space station development and operations. A Russian part had to be added to the design and the Russian Soyuz 172

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Fig. 3: The integration of Russia into the ISS programme was accompanied by a U.S.-Russian cooperation on joint Mir-Space Shuttle operations (source: NASA).

(for crew transport) and Progress (for cargo transport) vehicles augmented the ISS project’s transport capabilities and resilience: two independent access systems are better than one, as became evident after the 2003 Shuttle accident when only the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft were able to support the partly assembled Space Station. This lesson must also be kept in mind when thinking about a future international space exploration strategy. The redesigned and simply renamed International Space Station programme was re-approved by the previous partners (Europe, Canada and Japan). In Europe, this was done at the 1995 ESA Council at ministerial level meeting, which decided for a modified programme including the Columbus laboratory and an automatic cargo transport vehicle, the ATV (Automated Transfer Vehicle). The programme then moved forward and the first elements were launched in 1998. It also survived the Shuttle Columbia’s disintegration in January 2003 and remained a part of the new human space policy announced by President George W. Bush on 14 January 2004, essentially to respect the international agreements with the foreign partners. For a second time, the Station project was thus saved by its international character. Therefore, internationalisation clearly increases the resilience of a major space project. This is another important lesson for the future. By agreeing to become an ISS partner, Russia had to renounce its own station Mir, which had been launched in the Soviet time but was still successfully operating when the assembly of the ISS began.400 Mir was destroyed in 2001 and the Russian space engineers, who were very proud of their national achieve173

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ments, considered this event very traumatic. Their frustration is now fuelling ideas about the resurgence of an autonomous Russian space station programme in the second half of the 2010s when the exploitation of the ISS might draw to a close. It is even possible that the Russians may separate their ISS part after 2015 and use it as a national station, because the Russians feel that they are not getting the respect they deserve for their role in saving the ISS when the U.S. Space Shuttle was grounded. Mutual respect and recognition by the international partners and particularly the leading partner is therefore a very important issue and a further lesson for the future.

5.4.4. The remarkable resilience of the International Space Station

The ISS programme stands out not only by its incredible resilience but also by its complexity and size. It is by far the largest cooperative R&T project, with a total cost of 100 billion dollars at the time of order completion. It is also a very integrated project involving 5 partners (and 15 international participants if one counts the participating ESA Member States separately). Its assembly, which will be completed in 2010, will by then have lasted more than 10 years. Its operation and management involves facilities all over the world. The ISS project provides not only many lessons for the future of human solar system exploration, but also a very interesting model for cooperation among multiple partners under large-scale programmes.

Fig. 4: International centres involved in ISS operations (source: NASA).401 174

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5.4.5. The legal framework of the International Space Station a model for the future

The ISS framework is built on three levels of international cooperation agreements: *

*

*

The International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) is an international treaty signed on 29 January 1998 by the governments involved in the Space Station project.402 This key government-level document has established a long-term international cooperative framework on the basis of genuine partnerships for the detailed design, development, operation, and utilisation of a permanently inhabited civil space station for peaceful purposes and in accordance with international law. Four Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and each cooperating space agency: the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The objective of these space agency-level agreements has been to describe in detail the role and responsibilities of the agencies in the design, development, operation and utilisation of the Station. In addition, the agreements served to establish the management structure and interfaces necessary for ensuring the effective utilisation of the Station. Various bilateral Implementing Arrangements between the space agencies were established to implement the MOUs. The Arrangements assign concrete guidelines and tasks to the national agencies.

The IGA allows the ISS partners to extend their national jurisdictions to outer space, so that the elements they provide (e.g. laboratories) are assimilated to the territories of the partner states. The basic rule is that each partner shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers and over the personnel in or on the Space Station who are its nationals. This means that the owners of the ISS – the United States, Russia, the ‘European Partner’, Japan and Canada – are legally responsible for the respective elements they provide. The European states are treated as one homogenous entity called the European Partner on the Space Station. However, any European state can extend its respective national laws and regulations to the European elements, equipment and personnel on the Space Station. This extension of the national jurisdictions determines which laws are applicable to activities occurring on a partner’s ISS elements (e.g. European law in the European Columbus laboratory). This legal regime recognises the jurisdiction of the partner states’ courts and allows the application of national law in areas such as 175

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criminal matters, liability issues, and the protection of intellectual property rights. Any conflict of jurisdiction between the partners may be resolved through the application of other rules and procedures already developed nationally or internationally. The rule concerning the utilisation of the Space Station provides that each partner utilise equipment and facilities in or on each other’s elements in accordance with the respective utilisation rights. Those rights are defined in the IGA and the different MOUs and state that: *

*

Partners providing ISS user elements retain the use of those elements (e.g. research laboratories such as Columbus); Partners providing resources and infrastructural elements for operating and using the ISS elements (e.g. the Canadian robotic arm) receive a fixed share of the use of certain other elements in exchange.

One important point is that the international partners can barter or sell their unused utilisation rights among themselves and to other non-participants in the ISS programme. The common philosophy of this approach is that goods and services are exchanged by the space agencies without an exchange of funds. The bartering system has enabled a significant reduction of technical and financial risks and has supported the process of standardisation and commonality in the ISS programme. The terms and conditions of any barter or sale are determined on a case-by-case basis by the parties to the transaction, and must comply with the overall ISS legal framework.

5.5. The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) and the Global Exploration Strategy (GES) 5.5.1. The VSE: A major space policy decision

The Space Shuttle Columbia accident in early 2003 triggered an in-depth review of the purpose and goals of the U.S. human space programme by the Administration of President George W. Bush. Apparently, many options were considered, including the cancellation of the programme. However, the final decision was to return to the original core objective of NASA: the robotic and human exploration of the solar system, beginning with a return to the U.S. civilian space programme’s historical goal – landing crews on the Moon – and expanding later to Mars and beyond. President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration on 14 January 2004. 176

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The VSE was the boldest U.S. space policy decision since the Apollo decision of President John F. Kennedy in 1961. It was very comprehensive and respectful of the international commitments to the ISS, even if the U.S. Federal Administration would have preferred to get rid of the dangerous Space Shuttle immediately and focus instead on the new human Moon programme. However, the VSE supported the completion of the ISS using the Space Shuttle until its retirement in 2010 and the exploitation of the Station until at least 2016. It did not envision a one-shot exploration programme but a long-term strategy for exploring the bodies of the solar system in the decades and possibly centuries ahead. It was also pragmatic in considering a sustainable programme conducted along the pay-as-you-go principle. President Bush’s VSE called for international cooperation: “We’ll invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of this new era of discovery. The vision I outline today is a journey, not a race, and I call on other nations to join us on this journey, in a spirit of cooperation and friendship.” Yet in spite of these nice words, President Bush did unfortunately not invite the leaders of other nations to join the forthcoming programme in person. Moreover, the first step towards the implementation of the VSE has been the definition of a purely American human exploration architecture for the Moon,403 the Constellation programme outlined in September 2005, and applying a quite nationalistic principle: no foreign systems on the critical path. This approach was very much in agreement with the hierarchy of opportunities that NASA sees the VSE as opening up: “Global Prestige and

Fig. 5: The lunar exploration architecture defined by NASA in 2005 includes all elements necessary for a return to the Moon without any international partners (source: NASA). 177

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Leadership” and “National Leadership” were put above “International Cooperation”. Therefore, the practical implementation of the VSE clearly marks a step backwards from the previous, very open and integrated U.S. human space project: the ISS.

5.5.2. A very significant step: the establishment of the Global Exploration Strategy Framework

A first international conference on the VSE in the USA in December 2005 was badly received by the ISS partners and the other nations invited to this event (including China, India, Ukraine, and others): the U.S. leadership was heavyhanded, with no choice being left to the potential partners other than accepting or not accepting the U.S. plan and proposing non-critical additions (for instance, hardware for lunar surface facilities which will not be needed before 2025 at the earliest!). However, the U.S. approach changed at a follow-up meeting in Washington, D.C. in May 2006, when representatives and experts from international space agencies but also from academia and the private sector were convened for what amounted to a brain-storming session on the goals and means of Moon (and to a lesser extent Mars) exploration. This very interesting exercise was well received by the participants and led to a new joint effort by 14 international space

The Global Exploration Strategy The Framework for Coordination

May 2007

Fig. 6: Global Exploration Strategy Framework (source: Globalspaceexploration.org). 178

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agencies404 to draft a Global Exploration Strategy Framework, which was ready by and published in May 2007.405 The truth is that the establishment of this Framework has not changed the initial U.S. plan, which has progressed (although slowly, for budgetary reasons) and even been refocused on a new, specific goal in December 2006: the installation of a permanent inhabited base on the Moon, probably near one of the lunar poles, i.e. in a region where sunlight is available on most lunar days. The document outlining the Global Exploration Strategy Framework is nevertheless a very important step towards the international recognition of space exploration (including human spaceflight) as a common goal of humankind across civilisations and cultures. According to the document: *

*

*

*

*

Space exploration enriches and improves humanity’s future. Searching for answers to fundamental questions such as: ‘where did we come from?’, ‘what is our place in the universe?’ and ‘what is our destiny?’ can bring nations together under a common cause, reveal new knowledge, inspire young people and stimulate technical and commercial innovation on Earth; Global-scale space exploration represents the sum of many projects undertaken nationally and internationally. At the same time, it also signifies a collective will to find answers to profound scientific questions, to create new economic opportunities and to expand the boundaries of human life beyond Earth. These goals of space exploration in the service of society are embodied by the recurring themes of the Global Exploration Strategy; The challenges and constraints which arise with any space activity stimulate creative minds. Many of the capabilities and technologies developed for space programmes would probably not have been developed otherwise, even with the same level of investment; The shared challenges of space exploration and the common motivation to answer fundamental scientific questions encourage nations of all sizes to work together in a spirit of friendship and cooperation; Space exploration follows a logical evolution, starting with gaining basic knowledge and culminating (it is hoped) in a sustained human presence in space. This journey requires a variety of both robotic and human missions. The Global Exploration Strategy provides a framework for coordinating the efforts and contributions of all nations so that all may participate in the expansion into space and benefit from it. 179

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The document even recognises the importance of the Moon as an important goal: *

The Moon will be the first place where humans learn to live on another celestial body. Just three days from Earth, the Moon has low gravity and natural resources which make it an ideal location for preparing people and machines for venturing further into space. As a repository of four billion years of solar system history and a place to observe the Earth and the universe, it has great scientific potential. The exploration of the Moon will also reveal whether the resources available in space will allow humans to live off their home planet.

The Global Exploration Strategy Framework document furthermore calls for a strong robotic exploration programme for destinations farther than the Moon: *

In parallel with the sustained human exploration of the Moon, the robotic exploration of Mars, asteroids and other destinations offers nations the chance to develop important skills which may then be useful for the human exploration of Mars and farther planets.

However, Mars is singled out as the most important exploration goal: *

Mars is a key focus of space exploration because it has both an atmosphere and water. Increasingly complex robotic missions are already being mounted to study Mars’s geology and to search for the presence of ancient and maybe even existing life forms. As robotic capabilities have their limits, humans will have to step in to unlock further secrets. Other destinations such as asteroids, comets or the moons of the giant planets are also important targets of human curiosity.

5.5.3. From principles to requirements in the GES Framework

Quite naturally, the GES Framework document contains many generalities but not so many practical steps. It simply recognises the importance of international cooperation in space: *

International cooperation expands the breadth of what any one nation can do on its own, reduces risks and increases the potential for success of robotic or human space exploration initiatives. It is important to establish and sustain practical mechanisms for supporting exploration endeavours if humanity is to succeed in implementing a long-term space exploration programme on a global scale.

180

5. International cooperation in space exploration Tab. 5: Requirements for global exploration cooperation (source: GES Framework document). Principles Open and inclusive

Resulting requirements *

*

Flexible and evolutionary

*

*

*

*

receives inputs from all interested agency participants that invest in and perform activities related to space exploration provides for consultations among all interested agencies with a vested interest in space exploration and also space agencies or national government agencies without specific related capabilities takes into account and may integrate existing consultation and coordination mechanisms allows consultation and coorduiation structures and mechanising) to gradually build and evolve as requirements for these activities grow allows for entry of assigned representatives of governments with a vested interest and clear stake in space exploration provides for different levels of consultation and coordination

Effective

*

encourages participating agencies to accept the role of the coordination process and act upon the anticipated results of the coordination mechanism

Mutual interest

*

contributes to common peaceful goals and benefits all participants respects the national prerogatives of panic lpatmg agencies allows for optional participation based on the level of each agency’s interest

* *

Moreover, the document puts forward that: *

*

The future establishment of a formal (though non-binding and voluntary) coordination mechanism among interested space agencies could assist in the development and implementation of the Global Exploration Strategy; Such a mechanism could help coordinate a global space exploration programme by:

 Providing a forum for participants to discuss their interests, objectives and plans in space exploration; and

 Promoting a societal interest and engagement in space exploration activities *

for the purpose of:

 Making use of all available resources, knowledge and technological capabilities; Leveraging each agency’s individual investments; Identifying gaps in national programmes and overlaps between them; Sharing ‘lessons learnt’ from national and international missions; Improving the safety of humans in space – for example through the interoperability of life support systems; and  Enhancing the overall robustness of global space exploration.

   

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Lastly, these basic principles are also linked to practical requirements in the GES Framework document:

5.6. What model for the future? 5.6.1. The limits of the GES Framework exercise

The importance of the Global Space Exploration Framework cannot be overstated, particularly because it provides what amounts to a common global understanding of the future of solar system exploration by both robots and humans. A graphic in the document makes that explicit: This common view, approved by the world’s 14 major space agencies, may in the very long term, i.e. by the second half of the 21st century, become humankind’s roadmap to the discovery and occupation of the solar system. In fact, even apart from and before the GES Framework exercise, this common perspective had been expressed by two of the main agencies participating in the ISS: by ESA as part of its Aurora programme initiated in 2000, and by JAXA in its 2025 vision. However, in the short (2015) and medium (2030) term, the probable prospect is that this roadmap will mostly be implemented by the United States without any significant contributions from the current ISS partners (Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia) or emerging space powers (China, India),

Fig. 7: Common steps for a global exploration strategy (source: GES Framework document). 182

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at least what human spaceflight is concerned. Two main reasons support this view: *

*

The USA’s investment in human spaceflight apart from the ISS operations (which will probably last until 2020) will be in the order of 10 billion dollars per year in the coming decades. To be of significance, an international participant must spend about 5–10% of this amount. Currently, this is the case for all ISS partners other than Canada, which has a more limited role. Considering that the ISS partners will have to pay for the operation of the ISS until at least 2020 and that they might even have to develop new hardware for servicing the ISS (as the Europeans did with the ATV for enabling cargo recovery and human access to LEO in the future), the current ISS partners will probably not be in a position to invest significantly in human spaceflight beyond LEO before 2020. This is certainly the case for Europe and Japan, and the present Russian space leadership does also not seem to be interested in the Moon (maybe in Mars, but only after 2020). The two major emerging space powers (China and India) will probably pursue their own goals in human spaceflight before expanding their interest to the Moon at least until 2020–2025, by acquiring and mastering the necessary technologies, developing independent systems, and learning to operate in LEO.

Another consideration is that the GES Framework can be interpreted as calling for a system of systems approach in which quite independent but coordinated projects are geared towards the same goal: the human exploration of the solar system – Moon, Mars, and beyond. Such an approach is feasible if independent systems exist, which is currently the case for the robotic exploration of the Moon with probes from Japan, China, India, the United States, and possibly Europe in the 2010s (at the ESA level, but also with national projects by Germany and the UK). A system of systems approach might also become feasible for LEO human spaceflight in the second half of the 2010s if China and India move forward with their own space stations (and if Russia resumes its national LEO flights, which is a definite possibility). However, it is difficult to envision any realistic international system of systems in the area of distant human spaceflight before the 2020s at the earliest, and not unless China, India and possibly Russia develop their own human exploration systems (independently or cooperatively, like in the case of a joint RussianChinese lunar programme). The GES Framework may thus be primarily suitable for not too ambitious independent, but coordinated robotic ventures to the Moon (and later Mars). 183

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More ambitious missions like a Mars Sample Return Mission, however, would probably demand a much more integrated framework.

5.6.2. The case for an integrated framework

System of systems approaches are well fit for goals which can be parallelly pursued by different nations or groups of nations, when each is able to conduct meaningful missions independently and ready to jointly discuss how to make the best of its respective project through coordination and cooperation. Yet this does not apply to the human lunar programme of the 2010s and probably also the 2020s, which will, as far as we can foresee, be characterised by: * *

A de facto U.S. leadership; Limited contributions from existing (Canada, Europe, Japan) and potential new partners (India?).

What would be the right framework for such an internationally complemented American human space programme? The ISS model, in spite of the frustrations it may have created for most of the partners, has proven valuable. It would certainly be applicable if any significant contributions to the U.S.-led programme were to be provided by some partners, and particularly if the U.S. would open the door to contributions in the critical path. Under a more flexible system of systems approach, only marginal contributions would be feasible. An International Lunar Programme with a focus on human missions would be at least as complex as the development and operation of the ISS, and only an integrated framework like the ISS model could provide the security and resiliency which such a programme would demand.

5.6.3. Could the ITER model be applied to long-term human space exploration?

The ISS’s legal and managerial model was born in a context of U.S. leadership. Yet in cases when other nations or groups of nations are economically and politically ready to provide more important contributions to an integrated international programme like a human Mars mission, could other models (which also provide security and resiliency, but in a more balanced way) be considered as a framework for cooperation in the longer term? Most probably, this would not make sense before the 2020s at the earliest, but one model does exist which may be worth considering: the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). 184

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ITER International Organisation Council Advisory Committees

Auditors

Director-General (DG)

ITER Project Team Central Team

Field Team

Field Team

Domestic Agency

Domestic Agency

Industries and Supply Organisations

Industries and Supply Organisations

Field Team

Domestic Agency Industries and Supply Organisations

Fig. 8: ITER International Organisation (source: ITER.org).

Many characteristics of the ITER model are applicable to human space exploration as well: *

*

*

*

It is the largest international R&T effort apart from the ISS, with a total cost in the order of 10 billion dollars; Its participants are the major current (European Union, Japan, Russia, United States) and future (China, India, Korea) economic and political powers; It works according to the principle of the non-exchange of funds, with each partner managing the development and procurement of its own part of the system; It has an integrated managerial structure.

The ITER model is quite different from yet another model that could be considered: The European Space Agency model with its two programmatic levels: *

*

The mandatory programmes (in practice the obligatory scientific programme) which are funded according to the Gross National Products (GNP) of all ESA Member States; The a-la-carte programmes which are funded by the voluntary contributions of Member States and managed nearly independently by the respective programme boards. 185

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Finally, ESA does not endorse the no-exchange-of-funds rule but a much more flexible fair-return policy. Could an international human exploration programme be managed like an ESA a-la-carte programme? This appears doubtful, at least for the coming halfcentury: the ESA system is adapted to the economically and politically quite integrated European context. It would be difficult to make it work on the world scene, even if one might dream of a time when ESA will become the model for an International Space Agency. However, we are not at that point yet and will not be for decades! Therefore, the application of three models is advocated here: *

*

*

The system of systems model of the GES Framework for the robotic exploration of the solar system (Moon today, Mars tomorrow, beyond later), but not for ambitious human exploration ventures; The ISS model for the emerging U.S.-led human lunar programme of the 2010s and 2020s; The ITER model for longer-term ambitious ventures like Mars human missions in the 2030s and 2040s.

394 Rausch, Diane P. “Negotiating International Partnerships at NASA.” Panel Presentation, U.S. Government Space Sector Short Course, George Mason University, 19 Oct. 2006. GMU 9 Dec. 2008. http://www.gmupolicy.net/space/shortcourse/14Rausch%20InternationalPartnershipsNASA.pdf. 395 A comprehensive and very general introduction to the European space programmes (both national and multinational) can be found in: Harvey, Brian. Europe’s Space Programme: To Ariane and Beyond. London: Springer, 2003. 396 A second European space body was created next to and at the same time as ESRO: the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). ELDO’s goal was to give Europe autonomy in the space transportation of science and application payloads, but it worked according to very different rules than ESRO and eventually failed. Thus, it was ELDO which served as the basis and model for ESA, which then took over the responsibility for developing a space launcher by means of the Ariane project. 397 So many books have been published on the history of the USSR and U.S. space programmes that only two will be quoted here. For the U.S. programme, see: Burrows, William E. This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age. New York: Random House, 1998; for the Soviet programme, see: Siddiqi, Asif A. Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945–1974. NASA SP-20004408. Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2000. 398 The European Space Conference was a purely political framework under which ministers representing the space interests of the various ESRO and ELDO countries but also Members of a third body, the European Conference on Post and Telecommunications (ECPT), met to agree on Europe’s space policy and goals. After the creation of ESA, the ESC’s role was assumed by the ESA Council meetings at ministerial level. 399 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space.” OTAISS-618. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1995. 400 Harland, David M. The Mir Space Station: A Precursor to Space Colonization. Chichester: Wiley, 1997; see also: Harvey, Brian. The New Russian Space Programme: From Competition to Collaboration. Chichester: Wiley, 1996.

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The Intergovernmental Agreement establishing the International Space Station cooperative framework was signed by fourteen governments: the governments of the United States of America, Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation and ten Member States of the European Space Agency (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). 402 This architecture emerged from a focused effort, the Exploration System Architecture Study (ESAS), initiated by the new NASA Administrator Michael Griffin who took his position in April 2005. 403 In alphabetical order: ASI (Italy), BNSC (United Kingdom), CNES (France), CNSA (China), CSA (Canada), CSIRO (Australia), DLR (Germany), ESA (European Space Agency), ISRO (India), JAXA (Japan), KARI (Republic of Korea), NASA (United States of America), NSAU (Ukraine), Roscosmos (Russia). 404 The document “The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination” was published jointly by all participating agencies (in particular NASA and ESA) and can be found on their websites (for instance at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/178109main_ges_framework.pdf or http:// esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/GES_Framework_final.pdf). 405 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “ISS International Facilities and Operations.” NASA 9 Dec. 2008. www1.nasa.gov/pdf/167122main_Facilities.pdf.

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6. Exploration – How science finds its way in Europe Jean-Claude Worms

6.1. Introduction The international space exploration programme agreed on by 14 space agencies worldwide foresees multiple robotic and human missions in the solar system in the coming decades. In Europe, a major planning effort is ongoing in the framework of ESA’s Exploration Programme (formerly known as “Aurora”) which now envisages the launch of ExoMars in 2016 as a first step towards a robust and renewed exploration effort. Furthermore, a strong heritage exists in Europe within both the mandatory programme under which several solar system missions have been launched, and the various research programmes funded via ELIPS (the European Programme for Life and Physical Sciences and Applications Utilising the International Space Station). This allows Europe and ESA to face new explorative challenges while making use of successful experiences. In view of this evolving international context, ESA in 2006–2007 initiated the further analysis and definition of Europe’s potential role in the exploration initiative by identifying related scientific, technological, societal, and policyrelated priorities. For the scientific part, ESA asked the European Space Sciences Committee (ESSC) of the European Science Foundation (ESF) to conduct a broad user consultation with the goal of defining a science-driven scenario for what is formally identified as a European technology-driven exploration programme. Following a broad consultation, a final report was published in February 2008 in which numerous recommendations were formulated to help ESA and Europe to better define a challenging but realistic roadmap for solar system exploration of their own. The report recommended that Europe’s overarching programmatic goal should be the investigation of the “emergence and co-evolution of life with its planetary environments”. The programme should therefore focus on targets which can ultimately be reached by humans, although its first steps should be robotically-led. The ESA Council meeting at ministerial level on 25–26 November 2008 in The Hague confirmed the support of the ESA Member States for ExoMars, the first European robotic mission for studying the surface of Mars, by granting it some 850 million euros in funds and the prospect of an additional 150 million euros at the end of 2009. 188

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This article will present the ESSC report’s recommendations on the structure of Europe’s Exploration Programme, the focus on the planet Mars as its key “target”, and particularly the need for synergies within and beyond ESA as a criterion for the programme’s success.

6.2. What is exploration? Is exploration the pursuit of knowledge and science, wherever it may lead us? Explorers throughout the ages have searched for fire, fresh water, food, milder weather, new hunting grounds, stones, minerals, spices, terra incognita, gold, precious stones, other life forms, rare animals, high mountains to climb, or remote and/or mysterious places to reach, and in this process they have sought to bring back answers, novel things to study, theories, and many more questions to ask. Exploration seems to lie at the cross-section of several (not necessarily compatible) human drives and behaviours such as curiosity (the search for novelty and change), the quest for new territories, conquest or riches, or the need to display and consolidate one’s nation’s prestige. Thus, exploration is not the realm of scientists alone: it is a true societal enterprise which, among other aspects, requires the definition and enforcement of rules and ethics. Science often seems to arise as a by-product of exploration, since explorers have sometimes been scientists as well. Yet what is exploration? Perhaps, it is best defined by the well-known quote from the famous television series Star Trek:

Fig. 9: Anonymous wood engraving: “A middle-age missionary claimed he had found the place where the Heavens and Earth meet.”411 189

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“Exploration is to boldly go where no man has gone before”. Space exploration certainly follows that definition. What could be bolder for humans than to sit on top of a largely untested and slowly exploding bomb, as was the case in the early 1960s? And what could induce people to do so if not the yearning to go where no one has gone before, around and even beyond the limits of the Earth? What could be bolder than to land a craft and set foot on the Moon when nobody can be certain that the ground will not collapse underneath? Science and technology have made these voyages possible. However, despite the many existing definitions, exploration boils down to humans going beyond the existing limits, beyond the edge. Since one of the ultimate quests of space exploration by humans and robots is to discover whether or not we are alone in the universe, the search for extraterrestrial life is an extremely powerful driver of space exploration. Naturally, there are places where humans can go and places where only robots can work. Planetary exploration will continue to be done initially by robots and only later by humans, but the key issue is that the debate of “man or machine” is obsolete and that humans should and probably will play a leading role in the exploration of the solar system. Without their presence, space exploration would simply lack an important societal and even scientific component and perspective. It is therefore quite paradoxical that space exploration has for so long remained the remit of rocket scientists while for the general public, the human element has always been pivotal (and I would argue, rightfully so): should we leave it to machines to explore the universe in our place? This realisation led the ESF to launch an interdisciplinary initiative in 2007 which was aimed at examining the issue of the human exploration of space both from the perspective of the natural sciences and the humanities. A conference was subsequently held and a position paper published in 2008,406 emphasising such topics as a cosmic perspective; a social and political case for human space exploration; the ethical distribution of risks and benefits in connection with space exploration; the confrontation of religious faith with evidence of extraterrestrial life; or more “down to Earth” topics from the social sciences such as the legal aspects of exploring the Moon, Mars or near-Earth asteroids. The richness of this reflection called for follow-up initiatives, and the prospect of such initiatives (like the identification of the actual research areas to be pursued and funded) will be discussed in the context of an ESF conference to be held in April 2009.

6.3. Consulting the scientific community A major planning effort is ongoing in Europe in the framework of the ESA Exploration Programme which envisages the launch of ExoMars in 2016 as a first 190

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step towards a renewed exploration effort. This programme is not meant to operate in isolation but is articulated within the context of the related roadmaps of the 14 space agencies which agreed on a “Global Exploration Strategy” in April 2007.407 A roadmap for the “Aurora” exploration programme had already been developed in 2001, showing a clear interest in Mars exploration missions. A more uncertain period followed after U.S. President George W. Bush’s 2004 announcement to go back to the Moon, but the ExoMars and Aurora core programmes received the backing of the European ministers at the ESA Council meeting in December 2005. This was recently confirmed at the Ministerial Conference in The Hague on 25–26 November 2008. In view of this evolving context, ESA initiated the further analysis and definition of Europe’s potential role in the exploration initiative by identifying scientific, technological and societal priorities. For the scientific part, ESA asked the European Space Sciences Committee of the European Science Foundation to conduct a broad consultation as a basis for defining a science-driven European space exploration scenario. ESSC appointed a Steering Committee and an Ad Hoc Group to conduct the evaluation. A workshop was then organised to consult with the relevant scientific communities. Roughly one hundred scientists and national representatives from ESA’s Member States met in Athens in May 2007 for a workshop organised by the ESF and supported by ESA. A final report on this exercise was published in December 2007 and has already been taken into account by ESA as an input to its architecture studies.408 As indicated, Europe’s Exploration Programme operates in an unusual context, at least for the science community, because science is not its main driver. Rather, the programme is driven by technology, policy and human spaceflight-related interests. Nevertheless, since science and the search for knowledge are integral parts of exploration, the ESSC’s evaluation was geared towards identifying the scientific developments which could be enabled by ESA’s Exploration Programme.

6.4. Main recommendations Hence, one main task of this exercise was the elaboration of an exploration vision for Europe, i.e. “to prepare for long-term European participation in a global endeavour of human exploration of the solar system, with a focus on Mars and the necessary intermediate steps, initiated by robotic exploration programmes with a strong scientific content”. Moreover, the evaluation produced an overarching scientific goal for this technology-driven programme: the investigation of the “emergence and co-evolution of life with its planetary environments”. A corollary search should concern the issues of habitability and life beyond the Earth. Indeed and contrary to ESA’s mandatory programme, the Exploration Programme is allegedly 191

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Fig. 10: Aurora – en route to Mars and the Moon (source: ESA – P. Carril).

about putting humans on Mars in the long term. Targets were therefore defined that could ultimately be reached by humans. In line with this vision and goal, the consultation helped define a roadmap for science missions – first robotic missions to the Moon, Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) and Mars, and later human missions to the Moon and Mars. A main message from this consultation is that Europe should focus on Mars exploration missions, but that unique scientific opportunities also exist on and from the Moon and NEOs if these targets become included in the Exploration Programme. The report featured eleven generic recommendations and five thematic sections: Mars (robotic missions); Moon (robotic missions); NEOs (robotic missions); Moon (human missions) and Mars (human missions). The latter two sets of missions address both the life and geo-sciences. Concerning the robotic exploration of Mars, the recommendations focussed on going beyond the experience gained with Mars Express, and a roadmap which contains the following steps: (a) ExoMars: the first and therefore critical step; hence, securing the 2016 launch of this mission must be the top priority of Europe’s robotic exploration programme; (b) the Mars Sample Return Programme, in which Europe should position itself as a major actor; (c) a human missions programme. For lunar robotic missions, the main objective would be the discovery, exploration and use of the “8th continent”, as well as the harvesting of unique information on the Moon as an archive of the formation and evolution of the solar system; furthermore, the Exploration Programme should consider the use of the Moon as a large laboratory in free space, for instance for developing low-frequency 192

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radio-astronomy from the far side. For the third element of this scientific roadmap (Near-Earth Objects), the next short-term goal after flyby and landing missions should be sample return and consequently the detailed investigation of primitive and organic matter from a selected small body, with priority being given to a pristine body such as a C or D-type asteroid or comet. At a later stage, the diversity of these objects should then be investigated by different missions. Also, the characterisation of potentially hazardous objects should be envisaged at that stage. Europe’s capabilities and achievements have been central to the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group. The Group stressed that in order to remain a key player with a unique expertise, Europe must maintain and further develop its independent capabilities for planetary exploration in order to gain independent access to planetary exploration. This ambitious goal should be achieved by developing Europe’s key enabling technologies and domains of scientific expertise. Some niches already exist, as in the development of hardware for the life sciences, geophysical sciences and planetary sciences. In addition, Europe has scientific capabilities which benefit human spaceflight in the areas of human physiology, countermeasures and radiation health. Since many of these niches are the legacy of the scientific work carried out in the context of the ELIPS programme (ESA’s programme for life and physical sciences in space), the Exploration Programme will have to draw heavily on ELIPS. In line with the aim of becoming a major partner in an international Mars Sample Return Programme, the Group recommended that Europe should develop a sample reception and curation facility, which would serve both ESA’s science and exploration programmes. A sample distribution policy will thus need to be established among the international partners at an early stage in the process.

6.5. The role of humans As mentioned above, a strong driver of any exploration programme is to advance the presence of humans in space. Future manned missions should therefore make use of humans as intelligent exploration tools, with the following specific scientific goals: (i) reach a better understanding of the role of gravity in biological processes and in the evolution of organisms at large; (ii) determine the physical and chemical limits of life; (iii) determine the strategies of life adaptation to extreme environments; and (iv) acquire the knowledge required for a safe and efficient human presence in outer space. Even more importantly, human exploration has several scientific advantages, among which are (i) the much more efficient collection of a more diverse range of samples from larger geographical areas by humans than by robots; (ii) the 193

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facilitation of large-scale exploratory activities such as deep drilling for determining geological details about the surface of the Moon (e.g. paleo-regolith deposits) or searching for possible habitable environments in Martian aquifers; (iii) the landing of much more complex geophysical and other equipment than would be feasible with robots; (iv) more opportunities for serendipitous discoveries; and (v) the facilitation of a number of other (non-planetary) scientific activities on the Moon (e.g. life-scientific investigations under reduced gravity conditions or the maintenance and upgrading of astronomical instruments on the lunar surface).

6.6. The international dimension All involved actors, both space agencies and scientists, agree that international cooperation will be essential for accomplishing advanced missions such as Mars Sample Return. One of Europe’s strengths is its large number of Member States and its habit of conducting projects in a cooperative manner which makes Europe naturally open to international cooperation. The current situation sees the duplication of similar initiatives by various international partners, e.g. Moon missions by India, China, and Japan. The coordination of these initiatives would make it possible to limit this duplication and subsume the different initiatives under an internationally-coordinated programme to which all partners could bring their own assets and modules without compromising their predefined priorities. The situation is evolving quickly in this respect. The recent U.S. election apparently generated a trend in the American space community towards more cooperation, more openness, and the wish to define and implement a model of international collaboration which will better incorporate the wishes and needs of non-U.S. partners. In short, the time looks ripe for a different model of U.S. leadership.409 This trend will not solve everything, however, and the United States’ export control rules (see next section) are still a major problem that needs to be solved.

6.7. The next steps The ESSC-ESF report offered a portfolio of attractive scientific activities to be carried out under Europe’s Exploration Programme, depending on the choices that will continue to be made by the ESA Member States in the wake of the essentially successful Ministerial Conference of November 2008. ESA’s programme architecture is in the making and ESA took notice of the ESF recommendations concerning science in exploration in defining that architecture (in fact, ESA and NASA have taken their programmatic considerations already one step further by starting to work on a comparative architecture assessment and identi194

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fying the respective assets and potential contributions of both partners). At the programmatic level, ESA’s Exploration Programme has recently been split between two ESA Directorates and a strong coordination mechanism will therefore be needed. It seems clear that Europe cannot afford to undertake major efforts in all of these directions simultaneously and priorities will thus have to be established regarding which direction should be taken. Similarly and to strengthen the non-dependence of Europe, several critical technologies must be developed. As has been stated elsewhere,410 Europe should become “ITAR-independent”. It is clear that the scientific community should be consulted on the further missions to be implemented following the decisions taken in The Hague. An important aspect, for instance, is that the community should remain aware of (and deal with) several other issues such as the fact that a lunar exploration programme will have a definite impact on the lunar environment. Consequently, lunar protection guidelines should be developed by the space agencies and the scientific community, making use of representative bodies such as the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) or ESSC-ESF. Regarding future human missions to Mars, one should keep in mind that the search for life can be incompatible with the presence of human beings on Mars who carry terrestrial micro-organisms. Enforcing guidelines for planetary protection and even planetary area safeguarding must therefore be a priority from the programme’s very early phases. Here again, bodies like the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), COSPAR, the ESSC-ESF in Europe, the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council (SSB-NRC) in the USA, or similar structures at the international level should partake in the definition of these guidelines.

Acknowledgements The contribution of the members of the ESSC-ESF Ad Hoc Group on Exploration is gratefully acknowledged. 406 European Science Foundation. Humans in Outer Space: Interdisciplinary Odysseys. SCH-ESSC Position Paper. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation, 2008. http://www.esf.org/publications/ space.html. 407 “The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination.” April 2007. ESA 9 Dec. 2008. http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/exploration/InternationalCoordination/Global%20_ Exploration_Strategy_framework_for_coordination.pdf. 408 European Science Foundation. Science-Driven Scenario for Space Exploration. ESSC-ESF Position Paper. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation, 2007. http://www.esf.org/publications/ space.html. 409 Personal communication with Jacques Blamont on the “new dawn of American leadership” in space and the international lunar exploration architecture, 2008. 410 De Selding, Peter B. “Scientists Urge ESA to Make Station a Priority.” Space News 3 Nov. 2008: 11. 411 Flammarion, Camille. L’Atmosphere: Meteorologie Populaire. Paris: Hachette, 1888. 163.

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7. The political dimension of Europe’s new human spaceflight capabilities Mischa Hansel

7.1. Introduction According to NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, the successful first flight of an Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the full operational status of the Columbus research laboratory mark “the arrival of Europe as a full-fledged space power”.412 This may be a bit exaggerated since the European Space Agency (ESA) still lacks a vehicle to carry astronauts into space. Nevertheless, by putting these systems into service, Europe has significantly improved its human spaceflight capabilities. The following analysis is intended to provide a political perspective on Europe’s new human spaceflight capabilities. First, the critical decisions and turning points leading to the current state of these capabilities are described. This serves as a starting point for a more analytical point of view in terms of an evaluation of the costs and benefits of spaceflight in general. Turning back to empirical description, the article then describes the impact of political costs which Europe faced during the planning and construction process of the International Space Station (ISS). This is followed by an assessment of Europe’s options for reducing political costs in future endeavours. Both a modular approach towards hardware development and a re-orientation towards system-of-systems architectures instead of integrated structures are recommended. Finally, the article briefly discusses the strategic value of upgrading ESA’s ATV vehicle with a view to socioeconomic benefits, symbolic politics, and security-related aspects.

7.2. Columbus and the ATV in historical perspective Europe’s human spaceflight assets originated in the geopolitical and economic context of the 1980s. A more ambitious and assertive Europe than nowadays committed itself to the long-term goal of becoming autonomous in human spaceflight. At the same time, a substantial contribution to the U.S. Space Station programme was envisaged. Thus, in what constituted a new package deal, cooperation and autonomy were pursued simultaneously. 196

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In the early 1980s, German and Italian enterprises had already conceived of European space modules as part of a future American Space Station. The “Columbus” project was eventually backed by the Italian and German governments and presented to the European Space Agency (ESA) in early 1984. A few days later, President Reagan invited the American allies to join a U.S. Space Station programme in his State of the Union address of 25 January 1984.413 Meanwhile, France was trying to ‘europeanise’ the idea of an autonomous crew transport capability dubbed Hermes: based on a winged design, it was to be launched on a new rocket succeeding Ariane-4. Thus, concrete concepts were already on the table when ESA’s Members endorsed the goal of autonomy in human spaceflight at the Ministerial Conference of January 1985 in Rome. The aim was to “prepare autonomous European facilities for the support of man in space, for transport of equipment and crews and for making use of low earth orbits” in the following years.414 A substantive role in the American Space Station project was thought to serve this long-term goal. Between 1985 and 1988, the conditions of the Space Station partnership were negotiated. What became clear quite early, however, was that the United States accepted only peripheral and complementary foreign contributions to an American core station.415 Under these conditions, the goals of preparing autonomy and being involved in the Space Station programme simultaneously were only compatible if developing at least some major elements sustainable and operable by Europe alone. The next Ministerial Council Meeting in The Hague in 1987 endorsed the goals set two years earlier and decided to initiate both the conceptual and definitional phases of Columbus and Hermes as part of a coherent European In-Orbit Infrastructure (IOI). The Columbus programme encompassed a mantended free-flying laboratory (MTFF) docked to the Space Station only temporarily, a platform in polar orbit (PPF) and a pressurised module (APM) permanently attached to the Space Station. As recognised by NASA, the MTFF and PPF would be serviced by Hermes and operated under full autonomy except for the time when they were docked to the main station or serviced by the Shuttle.416 However, if this was the “‘golden age’ of the IOI era”,417 it was soon coming to an end. After the end of the Cold War, Germany – the biggest contributor to Columbus – had to bear the costs of reunification. Other ESA Member States were also facing new financial constraints due to worsening economic conditions and the guidelines set for the process of building a European monetary union. Finally, the strategic value of autonomous capabilities seemed reduced, since cooperation with the Russian Federation possibly provided ESA and its member states with a new viable option outside the transatlantic framework. 197

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Under these new conditions, the Munich Council Meeting of November 1991 delayed decisions on new project phases for Columbus and Hermes and established an annual review process which gave credit to the new financial constraints and the changed international environment. This opened up the opportunity for calling ESA’s entire human spaceflight architecture into question.418 Indeed, a substantial down-scaling was initiated by the ESA Council in Granada in November 1992. The PPF was descoped and handed over to ESA’s Earth Observation programme whereas the MTFF was abandoned altogether. This left only the Hermes spaceship and Ariane-5 as autonomous capabilities. However, Hermes entered a three-year reorientation phase and was afterwards cancelled as well. Out of the remaining elements, the final configuration of ESA’s Space Station elements emerged and was approved by the Ministerial Council Meeting of October 1995 in Toulouse: basically, these elements included the Columbus Orbital Facility (COF) which is a descoped version of the APM, and the Automated Transfer Vehicle. The latter had initially been regarded only as a minor supplement to the development of Ariane-5,419 but turned out one of the most important European contributions. Meanwhile, Russia was becoming involved in the Space Station programme as well. Contributions, procedures, and responsibilities were thus redefined accordingly in the second Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) in 1998.420 In the same year, the construction of what was now called the International Space Station started with the launch of the Russian Zarya module. On 10 October 2000, the first crew arrived at the ISS. The construction process was on halt for three years because of the Columbia catastrophe in 2003 but finally, on 7 February 2008, ESA’s Columbus module was launched and began its operation on 11 February 2008. By that time, ESA had already delivered several components to the ISS: the Harmony connecting module (Node 2), a data distribution system (DMS-R) for the Russian portion of the station, and several equipment racks. Node 3, a small observation post (Cupola) and the European Robotic Arm (ERA) will follow. However, the Columbus research laboratory is Europe’s prime contribution to the ISS. Providing working space for up to three astronauts at a time, the laboratory serves experiments in the life sciences, material sciences, fluid physics and a whole range of other disciplines. Columbus is intended to operate for at least ten years. Its mid-and long-term usability, however, seems to be seriously constrained by the U.S. decision to retire the Shuttle fleet in 2010 and to redirect its civil space policy towards exploration goals. Following the launch and initial operation of Columbus, the first ATV mission started a few weeks later on 9 March 2008. After successfully performing a set of 198

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CUPOLA

CENTRIFUGE

US LAB

ERA

MODE 3

ATV

ZVEZDA

JEM

MPLM

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UDM

Fig. 11: Europe and the International Space Station: ESA elements (dark grey) and Space Station elements to which ESA contributed (light grey) (source: ESA).

totally autonomous rendezvous and docking manoeuvres, the first ATV – dubbed Jules Verne – supplied the ISS with propellant, water, oxygen and equipment. During its six-month mission, it increased the altitude of the International Space Station by periodic reboosting manoeuvres. Reloaded with waste, the ATV undocked from the ISS on 5 September 2008. On 29 September, the vehicle finally burned up while descending into the atmosphere. Although the ATV cannot carry astronauts into space, it is still a human spaceflight asset because it can harbour astronauts once docked to the ISS. Indeed, it has turned out that when unloaded, the interior of the ATV provides welcome additional living space for the ISS crew.421 Thus, the ATV already fulfils certain human safety requirements unless when actually travelling through space. Four more ATV flights are planned until 2013. The current discussions are centred on exploiting the ATV design as a springboard for partly recoverable or even human-rated space vehicles. Both Columbus and the ATV are valuable augmentations to an integrated ISS architecture and enable Europe to greatly increase its experience in human spaceflight. However, even the ATV’s structural importance for maintaining the ISS is quite limited compared to the American and Russian contributions. What follows is an attempt to systematically evaluate the structural conditions of 199

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Propulsion Module

Pressurized Module

Avionics Module

Payloads

Fig. 12: The Automated Transfer Vehicle (source: ESA).

Europe’s involvement in the ISS programme and its political consequences. For this purpose, an analytical framework is suggested below.

7.3. Costs and benefits of spaceflight – a framework for analysis Aiming for a certain role in spaceflight is usually the result of balancing contrary political agendas. This assumption reflects a rather strong consensus in space policy research which emphasises the existence of divergent goals, policy logics, and problem definitions relentlessly competing with each other.422 These goals, logics and perspectives can be subsumed under four categories: First, there is the category of socioeconomic implications. Socioeconomic costs refer to resources such as financial investments, skilled labour or organisational efforts which a State must ‘spend’ to fulfil a specific role. On the other hand, socioeconomic benefits can arise through commercialisation, the provision of civil infrastructure, the advancement of scientific and technological knowledge, or industrial capacities. Some of these issues are quite intangible, particularly in the case of the International Space Station. 200

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Second, security-related aspects need to be taken into account as well. Securityrelated costs and benefits are very much distributed on a case-by-case basis according to the technological applications and historical circumstances involved. For instance, observation satellites enhanced security at least during the Cold War. In contrast, the deployment of anti-satellite technologies might result in a net loss of security by provoking an arms race. Third, space flight in general and human spaceflight in particular is highly suitable for symbolic politics. This refers to the effects inflicted on a society’s or government’s public image when outside or inside forces succeed in credibly portraying space flight efforts as an indicator of more general achievements or deficiencies. Costs and benefits of this type did in fact spur the ‘space race’ between the United States and the Soviet Union. Currently, they are the drivers behind the prestigious space efforts of some Asian countries and particularly China. Alternatively, the collaboration (or non-collaboration) with other space powers causes repercussions on symbolic politics. Because spaceflight provides a highly symbolic setting, cooperation or non-cooperation in space is often framed and perceived as a reflection of inter-state relations in general. Benefits of this second variant were a crucial factor in the United States’ decision to include Russia in the Space Station programme, thereby symbolising the end of the Cold War. Nowadays, the symbolic dimension is rather impeding U.S.-Russian cooperation. In the aftermath of the war in Georgia, there was a strong opposition within the U.S. Congress against permitting NASA to buy Soyuz flights from Russia.423 Finally, political costs and benefits respectively refer to a diminished or increased room for manoeuvre in relation to other space powers. However, they are almost never fully one-sidedly distributed. This is because interactions between space powers are usually more or less characterised by interdependence, i.e. they could be conceived of as transactions whose interruption, alteration or refusal would be costly for both sides.424 After all, even a State which offers satellite data or services is usually interested in continuing interaction to obtain some return, be it in the form of profit, security or prestige. Nevertheless, interdependence is probably very asymmetrically structured in such cases. The receiving side has more to lose from an interruption of transactions than the supplying side. Therefore, political costs tend to be low for monopolists and autonomous powers, and high for mere users of space assets. What is already indicated in this brief review of political costs is that their very essence lies in their risk of being converted into other cost types. Political costs can result in serious socioeconomic losses or diminished security and prestige. The following section will provide more evidence of these risks by turning back to Europe’s commitment to the ISS. 201

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7.4. Looking backward – Political costs and Europe’s involvement in the Space Station programme The process of building the Space Station provided numerous examples of the risks involved in asymmetrical interdependence. In 1986, the U.S. Pentagon revealed its intention of using the Space Station for military purposes, worsening public opinion about the ISS partnership and implicating security-related costs most notably from the perspective of the neutral ESA Member States425 and Germany.426 As early as 1989, NASA decided on the first redesign of the Space Station without consulting its European partners,427 and many more design changes were still to come. Being at the end of the construction sequence, ESA’s contributions were particularly vulnerable to any modifications. This is not to say that the United States intended to cripple Europe’s space efforts. Rather, NASA’s planning was subject to annual budget allocations by the U.S. Congress and there were times of dramatic cutbacks. However, the asymmetrical cooperation between the United States and Europe provided the structural conditions for American domestic politics overruling international constraints. In the early 1990s, the U.S. Congress even threatened to cancel the Space Station project altogether. In the Fiscal Year 1994 budget considerations, the Space Station passed the House by only one vote.428 All in all, from 1991 to 1997, 19 attempts were made to end the Space Station programme.429 Moreover, Russia’s inadequate and unreliable funding of its critical contributions caused further delays and insecurity.430 Finally, with the American decision to retire the Shuttle fleet after the Columbia catastrophe in 2003, no one could be certain that the launch of Columbus would ever take place. The above analysis would be incomplete without putting the structure of the ongoing cooperation on the International Space Station in a wider context. For along with interdependence theory, one must consider also the “relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face”.431 Indeed, the disposing of alternative partners or the option of going it alone does make a difference. Europe would probably have had more influence on the reiterate down-scaling of the Space Station architecture, had it had alternative human spaceflight opportunities. Throughout the 1980s, ESA kept its double option, i.e. integration in the Space Station programme or autonomous orbital infrastructures.432 However, scarce resources no longer allowed this two-way track in the 1990s. ESA was trying to compensate for its political weakness by exploring cooperation opportunities with the Russian Federation. The “‘cooperation plus cooperation’ scenario” had taken “most of the place [which] autonomy [had] occupied in European space policy” before.433 However, the U.S.-Russian agreement of September 1993 effectively pre-empted any alternative arrangements with regard to Space Station 202

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architectures.434 The United States could therefore make subsequent decisions quite unilaterally, or bilaterally with Russia. It would also have made a difference if another space vehicle besides the Shuttle had been able to lift up the Columbus module. Without any fall-back option, ESA could do nothing but struggle to influence the rearrangements of the Shuttle’s scheduling. Even now, with Columbus in orbit, Europe’s vulnerability remains. As the Shuttle will no longer be available in the next decade, the maintenance of Columbus will be dependent on Russia’s Soyuz vehicles alone. Obviously, the ISS construction experience influenced ESA’s stance on political relations. A guideline in its current Moon and Mars exploration strategies is that in any cooperative arrangement, Europe’s contribution should “to the maximum extent possible” not be “critically dependent on a single partner’s capabilities”.435

7.5. Options for reducing political costs This is not the first time that European policy makers approached international cooperation in a new way. Europe had already experienced several unexpected and costly American decisions, for instance during the Aerosat project and the International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM). ESA therefore insisted on more reliable commitments when negotiating the Space Station partnership.436 However, the United States regarded the IGA as a mere executive branch agreement rather than an international treaty, and refused to agree to a mechanism of compulsory arbitration in the case of conflicts. Responsibilities in the framework of the IGA remained subject to the annual budget allocation by Congress.437 Thus, diplomacy could not compensate for independent capabilities as a safeguard against socioeconomic risks. The prospects for independent European capabilities are not only limited by scarce resources but also by divergent policy preferences because the costs and benefits of human spaceflight are quite differently perceived by the European States.438 France is still most sensitive to political costs and the symbolic dimension. This was underscored quite recently by President Sarkozy’s emphasis on “strategic independence” and spaceflight as a “mark of national prestige and industrial/technological power”.439 Italy is also a strong supporter of (particularly human) spaceflight capabilities and is currently disposing an increased space budget.440 Germany has been taking up a more utilitarian and cautious approach towards human spaceflight since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it is still the biggest contributor to ESA’s Columbus laboratory. Great Britain decided to completely opt out of any human spaceflight programmes in 1987 but various reports by influential advisory bodies have recently demanded a policy shift.441 203

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Yet ESA is not the only actor struggling with divergent space policy preferences. For instance, the design of the U.S. Space Shuttle resulted partly from the accommodation of different bureaucratic interests.442 Rather than resorting to catch-all projects like the Shuttle, ESA’s answer to the problem of disharmonious preferences has been the practice of package deals. Modular technology development as discussed in the context of ATV upgrades seems to provide yet another solution. A step-by-step approach has the advantage of preventing cautious ESA Member States from facing all-or-nothing decisions. Instead, decisions on each new stage can be made separately, which maximises the chances of pooled resources and operational capabilities.443 As a first step, this may lead to a European cargo return vehicle. Provided with a download capsule, the ATV could bring back equipment and scientific payloads from the ISS. This effort could build on a series of studies on re-entry, descent and landing technologies conducted by ESA in the late 1990s.444 By adding comprehensive life support systems and by human-rating Ariane-5, Europe could take a much bolder step: an ATV-derived crew transfer vehicle carrying up to three astronauts by 2017.445 ESA studies have explored even more modifications, ranging from small and large payload return capacities to a free-flying space lab or an exploration transport vehicle.446 The ATV technology could also provide for new cooperation options, something Europe is in dire need of. The United States has shifted priorities away from the ISS partnership and towards space exploration. Moreover, the U.S. has rejected to offer ESA any involvement in the critical path of a future exploration

Fig. 13: ATV evolution – the Large Cargo Return scenario (source: ESA/D. Ducros). 204

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architecture. Ongoing talks are instead centred on the vague possibility of European partners providing complementary or back-up systems.447 This could be the opportunity for expanding cooperation with Russia. Several reasons seem to support this view: first, Russia can offer tremendous experience in spaceflight. Second, there are already strong institutional ties between ESA, the European Union and the Russian Space Agency Roscosmos.448 Third, Russia is even more interested in extending the International Space Station’s life-time because of its immense sunk costs and the delayed construction of the Russian Space Station segment.449 As early as 2004, Russia proposed the joint building of a winged spaceship called “Clipper”, which was intended to fly up to six astronauts to the ISS. However, ESA-delegates at the Ministerial Conference of December 2005 approved only six instead of 30 million euros for a joint conceptual study. This rejection was caused both by ESA’s fears of being only a junior partner in a predetermined Russian project and by the vehicle’s technical features. The winged design presumably poses high development risks and makes the vehicle rather inappropriate for re-entries after future exploration missions. In the aftermath of the December 2005 rejection, European and Russian study teams agreed on a more Moon-friendly capsule shape. The Crew Space Transportation System (CSTS) may rest on an ATV-derived service module as well as an upgraded Soyuz capsule for re-entry. Japan has also expressed interest in the project.450 From a foreign policy point of view, which takes more account of the risks of symbolic politics, Japan may in fact be a more adequate cooperation partner for Europe. Given that European-Russian discussions in 2008 were still troubled with disagreements on work shares and technical characteristics, collaboration with Japan might be the better option even from a more capability-oriented perspective. All in all, the current situation might turn out quite favourably for Europe. A credible commitment to ATV upgrades may lead Russia or Japan to further improve their cooperation offers, which would in turn strengthen ESA’s position in any future bargaining with the United States. This is because the United States is likely to prefer embedding Europe in its own architecture rather than letting it go alone for reasons of political costs and benefits and also symbolic politics. At least, this has been the case in the past on several occasions.451 This perspective finally leads to questions of a more long-term relevance. If any collaborative exploration effort will emerge at all, what role should Europe intend to play therein? The historical experience of transatlantic cooperation in space seems to at least suggest what should be avoided: Europe should not aim to be included as a minor partner in a wholly integrated structure, as in the case of the ISS project. Considering political costs and benefits, Europe would be better off by participating in a systemof-systems architecture. This refers to architectures of compatible elements which augment each other’s performance while being maintained and operated by 205

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independent means. The socioeconomic risks associated with unexpected decisions by cooperation partners are limited in this structure, while at the same time, Europe would not have to provide for all capabilities on its own. In other words, this approach resembles the mixture of autonomy and cooperation ESA had originally envisaged in the 1980s. Whatever path Europe will take, the ATV experience is likely to be a major building block. Thus, the last section of this article focuses on the costs and benefits of ATV upgrades.

7.6. Potential benefits of ATV evolution In terms of the symbolic policy dimension, the ATV already serves as a showcase of Europe’s industrial competences. Future ATV-derived vehicles may also provide Europe with a valuable soft power tool452 supporting external and internal policies. As far as ATV evolutions are helping to sustain the orbital activities of the European astronaut corps, they could have an impact on European cohesion and identity-building since the astronaut corps represents Europe as a single entity in a highly symbolic setting. Furthermore, joint endeavours of European and foreign astronauts may give credibility to Europe’s claim of taking on global responsibilities and being committed to multilateralism. However, reaping these benefits would probably require the European Union and ESA to put more emphasis on these aspects of Europe’s activities in space. Far from being intended, Europe’s new human spaceflight capability has also certain security-related implications. Advanced autonomous rendezvous and docking technologies are prerequisites for sophisticated anti-satellite missions.453 Acknowledging this, Europe has one reason more to play an active part in ongoing arms control efforts. However, autonomous flight and docking technology could also contribute to increasing the survivability of Europe’s space assets. Enabling the servicing and repair of critical satellites, the ATV technology could improve the chances of swift reconstitution after a possible attack. It would thereby reduce the incentives for hostile behaviour against European space assets in the first place. Referring to socioeconomic benefits, the ATV flights are already part of the payment for ESA’s share in the operating costs of the ISS. For Europe, fulfilling its responsibilities goes therefore hand in hand with fostering its industrial base. Commercial opportunities may both arise from private and institutional demand. Beginning with the latter, NASA intends to leave transport to low-Earth orbit to the private sector by granting it both funding and technical assistance.454 Upgraded ATV vehicles are expected to have some chances of getting into this market, especially if private cargo ships will not yet be available by 2011.455 However, there is already competition from both the Russian Progress vehicle and 206

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the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) which will be operational by 2009. Moreover, there is the prospect of overlapping space tourism and ISS servicing markets. This raises the question of how competitive privately funded vehicles will be in relation to state-funded spaceships like the ATV. On the other hand, there is the possibility that privately funded orbital outposts like Robert Bigelow’s space hotel or industrial facilities demand new service and logistic support.456 The ATV might already have a competitive advantage in this regard. Both the planned commercial vehicles and the HTV lack a fully autonomous docking capability, making them perhaps inappropriate for targets other than the ISS.

7.7. Conclusion By providing and operating the Columbus module and the ATV, Europe has substantially increased its experience in human spaceflight. However, Europe’s involvement in the ISS has also shown how easily political costs are translated into socioeconomic risks and losses. Europe should therefore seek to minimise political costs as far as possible when deciding on the future course of its human spaceflight programme. Given this imperative, some independently sustainable capabilities are indispensable. Taking budgetary constraints and divergent policy preferences into account, a step-by-step upgrading of the ATV is likely the most viable option in this regard. Finally, whatever type of international cooperation emerges, an ATV-derived capability will certainly enable Europe to make a valuable and independent contribution in the future. 412 Qtd. in Malik, Tariq and Peter B. de Selding. “European Space Freighter Makes Docking Debut.” 3 Apr. 2008. Space.com 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/080403-atv-issdocking-wrap.html. 413 Krige, John, Arturo Russo, and Lorenza Sebesta. A History of the European Space Agency. Vol. II: The Story of ESA, 1973–1987. Nordwijk: European Space Agency, 2000. 619–622. 414 Qtd. in Madders, Kevin. A New Force at a New Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 296. 415 Krige et al. 2000. 631–633. 416 Krige et al. 2000. 659–662. 417 Madders 1997. 311. 418 Madders 1997. 320. 419 Madders 1997. 313. 420 Sadeh, Eligar. “Technical, Organizational and Political Dynamics of the International Space Station Program.” Space Policy 20.3 (2004): 171–188. 177–186. 421 European Space Agency. “Jules Verne ATV Reveals Unexpected Capabilities.” 16 June 2008. European Space Agency 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEM6IZUG3HF_index_2.html. 422 See Kay, W.D. Defining NASA: The Historical Debate over the Agency’s Mission. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, and Suzuki, Kazuto. Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003.

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Part 2 – Views and Insights Kaufmann, Marc. “Discord with Russia a Worry for NASA.” The Washington Post 15 Aug. 2008: A16. 424 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 425 Bonnet, Roger M., and Vittorio Manno. International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1994. 111. 426 Reinke, Niklas. The History of German Space Policy. Paris: Beauchesne, 2007. 236–239. 427 Harvey, Brian. Europe’s Space Programme: To Ariane and Beyond. Chichester: Springer/Praxis, 2003. 311–314. 428 Krige et al. 2000. 633–637. 429 Sadeh 2004. 176. 430 Sadeh 2004. 185. 431 Keohane and Nye 1977. 12–13. 432 Krige et al. 2000. 633–637. 433 Madders 1997. 331. 434 Harvey 2003. 314. 435 Messina, Piero, et al. The Aurora Programme: Europe’s Framework for Space Exploration. ESA Bulletin 126. Nordwijk: ESA Publication Division, 2006. 15. 436 Bonnet and Manno 1994. 98–119. 437 Krige et al. 2000. 656–657. 438 J€ager, Thomas and Mischa Hansel. “Nationale Weltraumpolitiken im Vergleich: Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien und Großbritannien und die Kooperationsoptionen im Rahmen der Europ€aischen Union.” Europas Zukunft zwischen Himmel und Erde: Weltraumpolitik f€ur Stabilit€at, Sicherheit und Prosperit€at. Ed. Heiko Borchert. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005. 13–33. 439 Qtd. in Pisani, Pierre-Henri. “European Leaders Charter Course for Space.” ESPI Flash Report 4, Mar. 2008. European Space Policy Institute 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/ dokumente/studies/flashreport5.pdf. 440 Peter, Nicolas. “Space Policy, Issues and Trends 2006/07.” ESPI Report 6, Sept. 2007. European Space Policy Institute 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/ 6th%20espi%20report.pdf. 35. 441 Coppinger, Bob. “UK Astronaut Decision Expected Next Year.” 15 Oct. 2007. Flight International 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/10/15/218174/uk-astronaut-decisionexpected-next-year.html. 442 Klerkx, Greg. Lost in Space: The Fall of NASA and the Dream of a New Space Age. New York: Vintage Books, 2004. 167–171. 443 Kerner, Irina. “ATV Evolution: Is Europe Ready?” 19 Mar. 2008. The Space Review 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1132/1. 444 European Space Agency. “First Automatic Parafoil Flight Test in Support of ESA’s Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV).” 15 July 1997. European Space Agency 13 Oct. 2008. http://asimov.esrin.esa.it/ esaCP/Pr_22_1997_i_EN.html, and European Space Agency. “Ariane 503/ARD: A Successful Complete European Space Mission.” 30 Oct. 1998. European Space Agency 13 Oct. 2008. http:// asimov.esrin.esa.it/esaCP/Pr_46_1998_p_EN.html. 445 EADS Astrium. “ATV Evolution: Background to the Study.” 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.astrium. eads.net/news/2008/atv-evolution, and Taverna, Michael. “Return of Jules Verne: Europeans Jump on Bandwagon for Independent Crew Transportation System.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 168.24 (2008): 40. 446 European Space Agency. “ATV Evolution Scenarios.” 3 May 2008. European Space Agency 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.esa.int/esaMI/ATV/SEMNFZOR4CF_0.html. 447 European Space Agency. “NASA and ESA Complete Comparative Exploration Architecture Study.” 9 July 2008. European Space Agency 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.esa.int/esaCP/ SEMBA0THKHF_index_0.html. 423

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7. The political dimension of Europe’s new human spaceflight capabilities Peter, Nicolas. “The EU’s Emergent Space Diplomacy.” Space Policy 23.2 (2007): 97–107. 103–104. 449 Space Travel. “Russia to Call for Extending ISS Use.” 11 April 2008. Space-Travel.com 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Russia_to_call_for_extending_ISS_use_999.html. 450 Rayl, A.J.S. “Europe and Russia Join Forces to Study Advanced Crew Transportation System.” 28 June 2006. The Planetary Society 13 Oct. 2008. http://planetary.org/news/2006/0628_Europe_and_ Russia_Join_Forces_to_Study.html. Coppinger, Rob. “Apollo-like Capsule Chosen for Crew Space Transportation System.” 22 May 2008. Flight International 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.flightglobal. com/articles/article.aspx?liArticleID¼223941&PrinterFriendly¼true. 451 See Suzuki 2003. 72, and Reinke, Niklas. “Sicherheit und Europ€aische Weltraum-Außenpolitik: Die Kooperationsbeziehungen zwischen Europa, den USA, Russland und China.” Europas Zukunft zwischen Himmel und Erde: Weltraumpolitik f€ur Stabilit€at, Sicherheit und Prosperit€at. Ed. Heiko Borchert. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005. 38–53. 452 Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2004. 453 Spacesecurity.org. Space Security 2007. Waterloo, Canada: Spacesecurity.org, 2007. 130–131. 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2007.pdf. 454 Foust, Jeff. “Opening Wallets, Closing Windows.” 30 Apr. 2007. The Space Review 13 Oct. 2007. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/860/1, and Morring Jr., Frank. “NASA Aims for AllCommercial ISS Resupply.” 20 Apr. 2008. Aviation Week & Space Technology 13 Oct. 2008. http:// www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel¼space&id¼news/aw042108p2.xml. 455 Morring Jr., Frank and Taverna, Michael. “ISS Chiefs Endorse Exploration Goals.” 18 July 2008. Aviation Week & Space Technology 13 Oct. 2008. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_ generic.jsp?channel¼awst&id¼news/aw072108p2.xml&headline¼ISS%20Chiefs%20Endorse%20 Exploration%20Goals. 456 Whittington, Mark R. “A Final Commercial Frontier.” Washington Post 21 Oct. 2006: A19. 448

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8. Space technologies and the export control system in the United States: Prospects for meaningful reform Henry R. Hertzfeld

8.1. Executive summary The export controls imposed by the United States are law, and the one law that receives the largest amount of criticism from the space community is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).457 The penalties for violating export control laws are severe.458However, they are not the only laws in the United States that have a severe impact on foreign relations and trade. There are many others, including the Patriot Act,459 the Iran Nonproliferation Act,460 and the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.461 And there are at least ten government agencies that have regulatory responsibilities for these and other related laws. Although this paper will focus on ITAR and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR),462 even reform or changes in these laws would not significantly change the overall policy, approach, and attitude now present in the United States toward security. However, adjustments to the regulations with regard to communications satellite technology and other commercial dual-use space items would recognise the realities of a global industry, benefit domestic firms, and add to the competitiveness of those firms internationally. Some aspects of ITAR even extend to citizens of other nations under certain circumstances. Even though this appears to be inequitable and unjust, it can be enforced through various business sanctions. The export control laws do not exclude government agencies and can also have negative consequences for some international cooperative scientific technological ventures. Nobody can argue the fact that some very advanced technologies and some that have important strategic value should be held closely by the United States government and not be readily put on the open worldwide marketplace. However, a strict codification along with restrictions on specific technologies can lead to counterproductive results. Over time, all technologies mature and are either copied by others or are put into open and general use much faster than governments can adjust their laws and lists. Restricting the export of particular items also encourages 210

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other nations to take advantage of the supply shortage, produce competitive products, and openly sell them, thereby hurting the industry in the nation that first invented and manufactured the capability.463 In effect, what began as a legitimate and valid security policy can, over time, have the dual result of decreasing national security and dampening the economic competitiveness of that nation. The most restrictive aspects of ITAR arose from events and subsequent legislation in the late-1990s that particularly hurt the satellite manufacturing industry in the United States. There have been calls for reform of these laws since they were passed. None have succeeded. And even the most recent legislative attempts for reform do not address the core of the problem; they are focused on making the process of enforcing the laws a bit more efficient and not on taking a broader policy approach to insuring that only the most important technologies are protected while allowing the U.S. to more freely engage in the growing global economy. Most experts as well as business interests complain bitterly about this system. But, since the events of 11 September 2001, in the United States it has become very difficult politically for a member of Congress to vote against a bill intended to “protect our security”. It is unlikely that major changes in export controls, which are considered to be part of the system of national security, will occur in the near future. Beyond ITAR, there are other trends in the United States that also have a negative effect on U.S. exports, the U.S. space sector, and the ability of the U.S. to fully engage in cooperative and competitive world trade. One example of this is the increasing difficulty non-U.S. citizens have in obtaining student visas as well as the much stricter visa and immigration regulations that have recently been issued. Other examples include: export controls and their effect on the growing commercial launch industry (both suborbital and orbital, including “tourism”); international cooperation on government space missions; and the space insurance industry. The key unanswered issue is the effect of these restrictive laws on the continued ability of the United States to remain the technological leader in space and related sectors, which has been and is a major component of U.S. space policy. Going beyond the specifics of the space sector, will these laws isolate the United States from the growth of world trade and eventually lead to a decline in the overall leadership and importance of the U.S. in world politics, economics, and influence? This result could occur. But an equally valid argument can be made that these types of restrictions are nothing new for the U.S. and that for many years, particularly with regard to space technologies, U.S. policy has been isolationist, restrictive, and has included many elements where space policy, security policy, and economic policy have been inconsistent and uncoordinated. 211

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Up to the present time these mixed signals and inconsistent policies have had a minor, not a major impact on U.S. technological leadership. Today the world economy is changing radically and U.S. policy, which still has its intellectual roots in the Cold War era, is not responding quickly or nimbly to these changing conditions.

8.2. Other types of export controls in the United States ITAR and related controls are only part of the system of international restrictions in the United States. Because of their direct impact on the space and defence industries they receive the most attention. However, even if there were a significant effort to reform them, there are a host of other regulations that reinforce and expand the influence of policies designed to insure the security of the United States. Many times these other regulations also have a serious chilling effect on international cooperative space ventures and on U.S. competitiveness. A detailed discussion of these laws and regulations is beyond the scope of this paper. A few examples are presented below. The Patriot Act:464 contained legislation to screen visitors to the United States more carefully and to deny visas to anyone that has engaged in terrorism. Because of this and other immigration regulations, students, visiting scholars, and others have experienced delays in getting visas and many have decided not to come to the United States for education, conferences, etc. In the long-run this may mean fewer opportunities for cooperative international research projects. It also does not encourage good-will toward the U.S. from abroad. Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSA) of 2005:465 This Act amended the Act of 2000, which was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, particularly from Russia. The 2005 Act extended the provisions of the Act to Syria as well as Iran. The INKSA bans payments from the U.S. to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determines that Russia is taking steps to prevent such proliferation. This could affect the utilisation of the ISS since NASA will be dependent on Russia for transportation.466 The 2005 Act included an exception for the ISS, but only for payments until January 2012.467 Buy America Act:468 Although not specifically export control legislation, the Buy America Act of 1933 gives preference to U.S. companies over foreign companies for U.S. government procurements. Exceptions can be granted, and international trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 212

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and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have provided avenues for foreign competition for U.S. government purchases. However, even today, this attitude prevails as evidenced by U.S. restrictions on companies such as Arianespace that are precluded from bidding on launches of U.S. government payloads.469

8.3. Cold War thinking vs. 21st century reality In the early days of space activity the United States and the Soviet Union were alone in having a full range of space capabilities. National security, particularly with respect to the fear of the use of and/or spread of nuclear weapons, and the Cold War jockeying for both economic and technological supremacy were the driving forces behind the space race. Private sector initiatives and the “commercialisation” of space were concepts and ideas far from being realised. Even telecommunications through satellites was in its infancy and, at least in the United States, involved private companies but only under very careful regulatory supervision. Essentially, there was no commercial or economic issue of any great magnitude for the U.S. government to be concerned about. Wherever it might be possible, the U.S. had a virtual lock on competition since in the non-Soviet arena the U.S. had the only capable launch vehicles and U.S. policy did not allow for the launch of foreign nation’s operational communication satellites.470 Today, just about everything has turned around. There is no technological race with another superpower. Nuclear technology, although still under strict controls, has spread across the world. Space capabilities ranging from launch vehicles to satellites, likewise, are available to almost any nation with the money and inclination to purchase or develop them. Space technical and manufacturing capability exists in just about every developed region of the World and nations are not dependent on the United States. The world economy has become far more interconnected and the importance and dependence of the U.S. in international trade in goods and services has grown from approximately 5% of the GDP in the 1960s to about 20%. The issue that confronts the U.S. export control and space policies is whether any policy that attempts to put the United States in a dominant economic role in space will be effective.471 The data presented in this paper has illustrated that, with regard to commercial satellite manufacturing, this policy has backfired. It has encouraged other nations to invest in competitive systems to develop and maintain their own independent capabilities in space for both economic and security reasons. As Table 6 points out, not only the world economy has changed but the world’s geopolitical structure has also changed dramatically. The economy is truly global 213

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with finance, multinational firms, and very rapid transportation and communications permitting both goods and information to move rapidly and efficiently among nations. Commercial space capabilities have become an important part of this transformation. In contrast, the geopolitical world is based on issues of sovereignty and on protecting territorial borders. That focus promotes policies which have a natural conflict with the changing economic scenario.472 But, even if the basic premise of national borders has not changed, the geopolitical world has experienced another major change: there are no longer two competing superpowers. There is one superpower juxtaposed with a number of other nations with rapidly growing populations, economies, and technological capability. In addition there are a growing number of regional international partnerships. In the space sector, cooperative programs are either in place or being discussed. Examples are China-Russia, Russia-India, China-Brazil, as well as various African nations and South American nations initiating space partnerships. One notable aspect of these is that they are seeking “independent” capabilities – ones that lessen their dependence on the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. has a number of separate and different cooperative space programs individually and collaboratively with most of these nations. There is no easy solution to balancing national policy between economic strength and security/defence. And, it is even more difficult for the United States since the U.S. is, at the same time, a very important trading partner and a

Tab. 6: Comparison of space in 1958 and 2008. Space in 1958

Space in 2008

Political

U.S. and Soviet Union vying for technological leadership

U.S. undisputed leader; at least 12 other nations with significant and competitive space capabilities

Personnel

U.S. and Soviet Union have most sophisticated space workforce

Workforce and technical expertise found in all parts of the world; many U.S.-trained

Finance

All government

Less than 50% government financed; private financing very strong in space services (e.g. telecommunications)

Markets

All government; not for sale Any nation or individual can purchase space equipment, components, and launch services to orbit

International Cooperation

Between governments, mainly science research

214

All forms, including public/private partnerships and purely private partnerships

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formidable competitor and target. As the nation with the leading defence and commercial technologies, there is a recognised need to protect itself by restricting those technologies that are the most critical. On the security side of the equation, the U.S. export controls dominate. On the economic side, the tools include patent protections and tariffs. For a variety of reasons, none work very well in the longerrun. Even though all of the above problems are clearly recognised in the United States, it is still very slow and difficult to move from a Cold War policy mentality to one that more accurately reflects today’s world. Treaties, legislation, regulations, judicial decisions, etc. are all interconnected and are firmly in place. They neither can, nor should, be changed quickly. A rapid set of reforms, quite possibly not well coordinated among all of the laws and entities involved, could result in a far less predictable and more chaotic system. As described below, export controls of many types in the United States are necessary, important, and have a long history. They will not be overturned in any radical fashion very quickly. And, since many of them stem from 50 years of experience with the Cold War era, the current generation of policymakers are not likely to be the ones with reform as a priority, especially in light of continued world unrest. In summary, the United States cannot return to the space era and space policies of the 1960s. The U.S. is a leader in space technology, but it is not the leader in all aspects of space – and has not been for some time. Policies aimed at isolation and at the protection of commercial industries only encourage others to develop similar (and sometimes better) products. Export controls and other regulations should change and be aligned with the reality of a new era. Absent a sudden revolutionary awakening, about all that can be hoped for are changes that are incremental.

8.4. Living with ITAR 8.4.1. Brief history473

Controls affecting foreign trade in the United States go back to the First Continental Congress, which, in 1774 passed a law making the importation of British goods to the U.S. illegal. A year later they outlawed the export of goods to Britain. Other Embargo Acts followed. In October 1917 when the U.S. entered World War I Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act.474 It prohibited buying or selling goods to the enemy or any ally of an enemy of the United States without a license from the President of the U.S. This Act, which has been amended many times over the years, is still in effect. 215

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The Atomic Energy Act of 1946475 was enacted at the beginning of the Cold War to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology to the Soviet Bloc countries. It also restricted the access to information from U.S. citizens and established the Atomic Energy Commission to oversee nuclear activities in the U.S. and to issue licenses for the transfer or use of nuclear technology. The legal aspects of the transfer of nuclear technology are complex and include a number of treaties and international agreements in addition to the legislation cited in this short article. A series of additional peacetime Acts were passed by the U.S. Congress that limited non-nuclear transfers of materials and technology. The Export Control Act of 1949476 was designed to enhance national security and it was administered by the Department of Commerce (DOC). The Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act of 1951477 (and renewed a number of times between 1951 and 1965) gave the U.S. Government the power to deny military, economic, or financial aid to nations that shipped items to restricted destinations. The Export Administration Act of 1969478 (also amended a number of times including the 1979 amendment that required the DOC to maintain a list of controlled commodities) was meant to develop a balance between trade and national security. This Act was not renewed in 1994 and was replaced in 1995 by an Executive Order (after a declaration of a national emergency).479 These national laws were supplemented by a series of mainly U.S.-led international regimes aimed to control the export of arms and dual-use goods and technologies to certain countries. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCOM) was established in 1949. CoCOM maintained three lists, one for atomic energy, one for munitions, and an industrial list for dual-use items not included elsewhere. After the Cold War had ended, the Wassenaar Arrangement replaced the CoCOM in 1996. This new agreement was designed to deny the trade in dangerous arms and sensitive technologies to regions and states that pose new security threats. The lists under Wassenaar differ from CoCOM in that each country can decide how to implement the common control list. Other international export control groups include the Australia Group (restrictions on chemical and biological weapons), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (nuclear and nuclear-related dual use items), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary agreement (U.S. and 31 other nations) to limit exports of large missiles and missile-related technologies.

8.4.2. The system today

The export control system that is of most concern to the space sector has three major components. The first is the ITAR and is administered by the Department 216

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of State (DOS), Office of Defence Trade Controls. The technologies affected are listed in the USML (United States Munitions List) that has 21 categories of defence articles and services. Category IV, for example, is Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs and Mines; Category XV is Spacecraft and Associated Equipment. These, taken together with the other categories, include almost all space items. Authorisation by the State Department to export items on the USML is on a case-by-case basis and only what is authorised can be exported. Re-export of any covered item also needs to be authorised. Not only do items exported by industry need authorisation, but government agencies such as NASA also need to get a license from the DOS. There are, however, some exemptions for government such as for temporary exports used for carrying out cooperative projects of NASA. But, even those exemptions do not apply to transfers involving a proscribed country. “This policy applies to Belarus, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. This policy also applies to countries with respect to which the United States maintains an arms embargo (e.g., Burma, China, Liberia, and Sudan) or whenever an export would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States”.480 The second element is the Export Administration Regulations.481 These regulations are administered by the Department of Commerce. The Commerce Control List (CCL) is divided into ten categories of controlled items. Again, most space equipment is included since the categories focus mainly on high-technology areas such as electronics, nuclear equipment, communications, optics, and space vehicles. The definition of what is an export is different in the ITAR and EAR regulations, with ITAR specifically aimed at defence articles and the EAR at all other goods and services (technical data and technical assistance are included) that are dual-use, although the EAR also may control commercial items without an obvious military use. The third element is the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The OFAC, on a case-by-case basis, enforces economic trade sanctions against specific foreign countries, terrorism-sponsoring organisations and international narcotics traffickers. The nations include the Balkans, Belarus, Burma, Ivory Coast, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. It reviews the transaction finances and money flows. In certain cases, OFAC will issue licenses for services or exports involving sanctioned destinations under narrow exceptions. As with any complex set of regulations, there are many definitions, rules, interpretations, and conditions that not only are different among the various laws and implementing agencies, but these regulations also are subject to 217

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constantly changing domestic and international conditions. This paper is too short to delve into those details, but it is sufficient to emphasise that the process of negotiating the complexities of complying with these export control laws is one that requires a high level of expertise in many areas including law, policy, and technology.

8.5. ITAR and the space sector 8.5.1. The current system as applied to space technologies

The commercial satellite communications market is the largest and most profitable space business. From this industry’s inception in the early 1960s, these satellites in the United States have been built and operated by private companies, with the exception of a set of secure satellites operated by the military. The military also purchases bandwidth from commercial companies and therefore all satellites fall clearly into the dual-use category. There are also a growing number of commercial Earth observation satellites that also provide services for defence and security as well as sell information commercially. Most other space hardware is either for civilian government programmes or for launch vehicles and related services. Because of their research orientation or their strategic value, they do not constitute a large share of the export or import markets in the United States. Export control laws, although clearly applicable to these technologies as well, are not viewed as a significant problem as are the same laws applied to communications satellites.482 U.S. policy toward the export and import of commercial communications satellites and related components has changed several times over the past 20 years. The specific issue is whether these satellites are covered by the USML and therefore under the jurisdiction of the State Department or by the CCL and under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. The business interests prefer the more commercially attuned DOC while the security community favours having these satellites under the more restrictive USML. Satellites and components were in the Munitions List and regulated by the Department of State under ITAR rules prior to 1992. However, in 1990, dualuse items were removed from the USML (unless national security issues would be jeopardised) in an effort to coordinate U.S. controls with a list maintained by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. Commercial satellites were included, but with restrictions whereby some items and components remained on the USML and under the jurisdiction of the State Department. 218

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In 1996, after another U.S. Government review, commercial satellites (excluding certain components that were deemed critical to national security) were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, but still required approvals from a number of other agencies including the Departments of Defence and Energy. In late 1995 and early 1996 two of China’s Long March rockets failed. Both were carrying U.S.-made commercial satellites.483 As part of the failure investigations and insurance requirements, Hughes and Loral, the manufacturers of the satellites, transferred technical information to China. They acted under a DOC review that determined that this information transfer was allowable under the DOC license. Unfortunately it was not clear whether the DOC actually had the authority to approve the export; a Congressional study determined that the launch failure review actually required a State Department export license and had violated ITAR.484 Congress then, as part of the National Defence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1999, removed all communications satellites from the jurisdiction of the DOC and returned the latter to the State Department, where it remains today.485 8.5.2. Export control laws and U.S. government space policy

The 2006 U.S. Space policy486 contains clauses that, in theory, conflict with the goals and elements of the export control regulations. For example, in Section 3, the goals of the U.S. Space Policy include: *

*

Enable a dynamic, globally competitive domestic commercial space sector in order to promote innovation, strengthen U.S. leadership, and protect national, homeland, and economic security; Encourage international cooperation with foreign nations and/or consortia on space activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful exploration and use of space, as well as to advance national security, homeland security and foreign policy objectives.

The policy continues in Section 12, Effective Export Policies, with the first guideline that space-related exports which are currently available or are planned to be available in the global marketplace shall be considered favourably. It should be apparent from the evidence presented in this paper that U.S. policy toward space assets contains elements of contradictory actions toward commercial and dual-use space technologies. On one hand, the U.S. encourages international cooperation and the development of a robust domestic commercial sector. On the other hand, a full reading of the 2006 Space Policy in comparison with prior 219

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policies stresses the national security aspects of space in a far more aggressive tone. Overall, in the United States: * * *

security policy will prevail over all other policies; defence space will supersede commercial space; trade, treaty, and other monetary and fiscal economic policies will overshadow space economic policy.

In other words, space commercial policy is at the bottom of the pecking order.487 This is not the case in most other nations and also for international consortia such as the European Space Agency (ESA).488 Their space policies are clearly set out to create jobs, develop cutting-edge technologies that will augment both trade and security, and place their nations in a favourable global competitive position. This dichotomy between U.S. policy towards space and the policies of other nations partially explains the frustration and issues that occur in international forums and in both government and private commercial transactions with the United States. 8.5.3. Evidence of the impact of ITAR on the space industry

A recent study by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)489 shows the dramatic change in the distribution of commercial space activity in the economy. As Figure 14 illustrates, in the last seven years there has been a relative decline in the U.S. manufacturing of launch vehicles, the manufacturing of satellites, and the manufacturing of ground equipment.490 The decline in launch vehicle manufacturing likely reflects the economic slowdown in the early 2000s and today the industry is showing signs of recovery from both NASA and DOD investments as well as the above mentioned entrepreneurial efforts. Economic Impact by Industry: 1999 Distribution Launch vehicle Industries manufacturing 1% 6% Remote sensing 1%

Economic Impact by Industry: 2006

Satellite manufacturing 11%

Distribution Launch vehicle Industries manufacturing 4% Remote 1% sensing 1%

Satellite manufacturing 3%

Ground equipment manufacturing 28%

Satellite services 42% Ground equipment manufacturing 39%

Satellite services 63%

Fig. 14: Industry distribution of the space industry in the United States, 1999 and 2006 (source: FAA). 220

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But the relative decline in building satellites and ground equipment in the U.S. is more likely a fundamental change. One reason for this is the maturation of the space. For years the U.S. had the unchallenged global leadership in the quality and capability of its satellites and receiving equipment. That leadership has steadily eroded with the increased technical abilities around the world coupled with national interests pushing the need for their own independent manufacturing capability. Further compounding these efforts is the U.S. export control regime that makes it very difficult, expensive, and time-consuming for firms and governments in other nations to purchase U.S. manufactured satellites and components. The statistical trend is evident. However because there are multiple reasons for the growth of space manufacturing abroad, the total decline cannot be attributed to any one cause alone.491 In 2007 the United States had exports of spacecraft, missiles, rockets and parts that were just over two billion dollars and imports that were just under one billion dollars.492 Those data include both civil and military hardware. Reflecting the above trends in foreign capabilities, the 2:1 ratio of exports to imports for space hardware is a significant decline from the 3:1 ratio that existed in the mid-1990s. Similar data for the trade of space services are not reported in the same data series. These findings are also supported by a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Their analysis emphasises the rapid growth of foreign capabilities in space in two aspects: many more nations have space programs including commercial satellite and component manufacturing and the technical sophistication and capability of those systems is competitive with U.S. manufacturing in many areas. In the last nine years, besides the U.S., there are now two other countries with their own positioning and navigation systems, double the number of nations with reconnaissance satellites, twelve nations with launching capability, and 38 nations that operate and control their own communications satellites. The CSIS also finds five nations with imaging satellites of one-metre resolution or better, eight nations with radar imaging satellites (some commercial, an option not available from U.S. satellites).493 Similar trends are observed by the Space Security Organization,494 and in the Space Foundation’s Space Report 2008.495 All of these nations and their companies are quite willing and able to offer their space goods and services on the world market; those that do not contain U.S. components are exempt from ITAR restrictions.496 The list of commercial space competitive problems continues in the CSIS study and includes evidence that the 2nd and 3rd tier manufacturers in the U.S. of space equipment are particularly hurt by export controls. Costs for those companies of compliance with the export control regime have risen by almost 50% between 2004 and 2006. Those costs include: insurance, consulting and software, training of employees, DTSA (Defense Technology Security Administration) monitoring, 221

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and outside legal expenses.497 The same study has indicated that lost sales to those firms as a percent of sales opportunities in 2006 was nearly 14% from ITAR alone (another 3% was attributed to the DOC-administered EAR). The message is quite clear: U.S. export controls, particularly ITAR, have had a significant impact on U.S. manufacturing leadership in space and have created a sizable cost burden to all firms engaged in international trade in those commodities. The impact has been particularly harmful to small firms and firms lower down in the supply chain.498 And, not reported in these numbers are the firms that have decided to forgo competing in this market because of the imposition of large expense and potential liability from exposure to ITAR liability.

8.6. Current effort for reforms 8.6.1. A new bill to reform the administration of the arms export control and for other purposes

HR 5916 is currently under consideration by the U.S. Congress.499 Although it is labeled “reform”, that is essentially a misnomer. It does address the process by which companies apply for and receive licenses by the State Department under ITAR, but it does little to change the substance of ITAR. Essentially this bill addresses the complaints of industry about time delays and other administrative procedures in the system. This is a positive and needed step, but it hardly touches on the basic issues discussed in this paper: whether the system itself is really effective in protecting the security of the United States in light of strong evidence that some technologies the U.S. stringently “protects” are readily available on the open global market using non-U.S. components. A very strong case can be made that the commercial satellite industry in the United States has lost a good part of its market share to foreign competition as a result of these export controls. Specifically, this bill mandates a 60-day goal for processing applications for licensing under the USML and requires a review for commodity jurisdiction determination (Sec. 104). It also provides for more staff and resources for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) (Sec. 105). It directs the State Department to review the USML to determine if some items on that list might warrant different or additional controls (Sec. 108). Although some of these changes might result in real reform – the reclassification of certain items on the USML – it is not likely that much will change with respect to satellites. And, the option of additional controls is also mentioned in the legislation. Given that the history of the control of satellite technologies has only 222

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had a small and short window where parts of the sector have been moved to the DOC, it seems unlikely that any major shift will occur as a result of this Bill. And, the tenor of the words calls for a review of the list itself. Fewer changes are likely to result in the “modification” of an existing list than a more proactive approach that could lead to true substantive reform. Such an approach might start with a directive to the appropriate agencies to develop a new list that clearly and narrowly delineates only those technologies that are essential for national security and that clearly need to be controlled.

8.6.2. Reform of ITAR and the space industrial sector

It has been ten years since any real changes were made to the export control regime. In that period of time events such as the 11 September 2001 incidents and the war in Iraq have prolonged policies of controlling U.S. technology by laws and measures that have the effect of closing our borders and our minds from some types of international cooperative engagements. All of this has been occurring along with the expansion of global economic developments, including many that involve the use of commercial space assets for communications and navigation. As this market has grown, the U.S. has capable competitors for commercial business in this field. Clearly, there is a policy in force that has disconnected with reality. It is a good sign that Congress now recognises the need for the “reform” of ITAR. It is also unfortunate that the proposed reforms are only a small step in that direction. A related issue is just how much special attention the space sector should have in these reforms. Many other industries are affected by export controls and other businesses have lost sales and technological opportunities through ITAR and related controls. Open questions continue to prevail about the U.S. government and “industry policy” and about whether one industry should be singled out over others for special treatment. There are no clear answers to these issues. Political winds will ebb and flow on these issues, as they have in the past. Export controls are a reality in the United States and it is highly unlikely that true reform will occur. At least a start has been made on reforming the process of obtaining a license. Perhaps this will also stimulate small but important changes in the substantive arena even if each exemption and change has to be individually negotiated and will be on the fringes of true reform. Since it is apparent that national security in the U.S. trumps both overall economic initiatives as well as space commercial policy, it is hard to image a set of events that might stimulate the reform of export controls. Arguments that 223

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emphasise the economic hardships of U.S. companies and the loss of sales to companies in other nations have failed to stimulate the defence establishment and the politicians. Perhaps the future wake-up call will be when foreign owners may deny the availability for U.S. security missions of critical commercial space. Perhaps it will be when our own industrial base is no longer capable of producing the most highly advanced space equipment. Or, perhaps it will not occur at all, particularly if domestic demand and production continues to expand.

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The CFR 730–774 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR 120–130) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR – based on a Presidential Directive that implements the now expired Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA, P.L. 96–72) are the most visible and controversial laws that have a direct impact on space manufacturing and trade in space-related goods and services. 458 Lockheed-Martin agreed to a 4 million dollar settlement for violations in August 2008; Boeing (Hughes) and Loral paid over 30 million dollars for violations involving commercial communications satellites in the late 1990s. Criminal penalties are also possible under the law. 459 U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, Public Law No: 107-56 (2001). 460 United States Congress. “Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005.” Public Law 109–112, 25 November 2005. 461 Operating under Presidential powers granted during wartime and national emergencies. 462 Op. cit., footnote 1. 463 Economists call this phenomenon import substitution. 464 Op. cit., Section B. 465 Op. cit. 466 Squassoni, Sharon, and Marcia Smith. “The Iran Nonproliferation Act and the International Space Station: Issues and Options.” United States Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 22 August 2005. 467 In September 2008 Congress passed an extension of this exception until 2016. 468 Buy American Act (BAA – 41 U.S.C. x 10a–10d) (1933). 469 Formal U.S. policy allows only U.S. launchers to be used for U.S. government payloads; this is not part of the Buy America Act, but used here to illustrate the continuing attitude of the U.S. which differs from that of other nations. 470 The case of the French-German Symphonie satellite is an example of this policy being used to prohibit a potential competitor from entering the market in operational telecommunications. 471 Although export controls through ITAR have security as the primary motivation, and space policy has strong economic and technological goals as well as addressing security issues. Taken together, they are a strong force that isolates parts of U.S. industry from the rest of the world. At the same time, a policy of economic and technological dominance pushes for open trade and business opportunities for U.S. firms. 472 The one partial exception to this is the European Union. Although founded on the basis of a common monetary system and one that is still primarily an economic grouping of nations, over time the EU has also developed policies that involve a coordinated approach to trade, security, and other issues. 473 A more detailed summary can be found in Jakhu, Ram, and Joseph Wilson. “U.S. Export Control Regime and its Impact on the Communications Satellite Industry.” Annals of Air and Space Law 25 (2000): 157. 474 Trading with the Enemy Act, Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), and codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. x1–44. 224

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Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Public Law 585, 79th Congress; since amended and replaced by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law 83–703 68 Stat. 919, 30 August 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as Amended (P.L. 93–438). Today the Nuclear Regulator Agency oversees licenses for the use and transfer of nuclear technology. 476 Export Control Act of 1949, 63 Stat 7 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. x2021–2036 (1965). 477 Mutual Defense Control Act of 1951, Ch. 575, 65 Stat 644 (1951). 478 Public Law No. 91–184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969). 479 National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d) and Presidential notice of 15 August 1995 (60FR 42767). 480 ITAR, Part 126. 481 15 CFR 730–774. 482 With the possible growth of the commercial suborbital launch vehicle industry in the United States this could change in the near future if that industry expands to offer services that cross international borders. 483 These were being launched under a waiver of the economic restrictions placed by the U.S. on China after the Tiananmen Square incident and the subsequent Tiananmen Square Sanctions Law (P.L. 101–246) in 1990. 484 In 2002 Space Systems/Loral agreed to settle the charges of illegal technology transfer by paying a fine of 20 million dollars and in 2003 the Boeing Company (having purchased Hughes) agreed to pay 32 million dollars. 485 U.S. Congress, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Title XV, Subtitle B, (Public Law 105–261), 1998. 486 Executive Office of the President. U.S. National Space Policy, 31 August 2006. 487 For a more complete discussion see: Hertzfeld, Henry R. “Globalization, Commercial Space and Spacepower in the USA.” Space Policy 23.4 (2007): 210–220. 488 See, for example, Article VII of the ESA Charter (ESA, SP-1271(E), March 2003). 489 U.S. Department of Treasury/Federal Aviation Administration. The Economic Impact of Commercial Space Transportation on the U.S. Economy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DOT/FAA, April 2008. 490 Interim studies have shown a wide degree of variation in these trends. 491 Other reasons may include an increasing market abroad, national prestige, independent security, cooperative programmes and even currency fluctuations. 492 Space Foundation. The Space Report 2008: The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity. Colorado Springs: Space Foundation, April 2008. 16. 493 Center for Strategic and International Studies. Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the U.S. Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export Controls, February 2008. 494 Space Security Organization. Space Security Index 2006, July 2006, Ch. 4. 79–95. 495 Op. cit., Ch. 5. 496 Thales-Alenia, a European firm, even advertises its satellites as being “ITAR-free”. 497 CSIS, op. cit; quoting from a U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory survey of 202 space business units in 2007. 498 Large defence and space companies are also affected by the cost and delays inherent in this system. But they routinely deal with these issues and have the legal and support staffs to manage much more effectively than smaller firms. Nonetheless, large firms have lost business opportunities and partially because of their size have experienced management and oversight mistakes in this complicated area. Penalties of millions of dollars have been levied on firms found in violation. 499 U.S. Congress, passed the House of Representatives on 19 May 2008 and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

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9. Space for resources Isabelle Sourbes-Verger

9.1. Introduction On 7 December 2007, the “Lisbon Declaration on ‘GMES and Africa’” adopted under the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union marked a new step in Europe’s implementation of the ‘space for resources’ concept. The aim of the Declaration was to improve the partnership between Europe and Africa in the context of the Millennium Development Goals and to induce the use of relevant space applications such as Earth observation, telecommunications, navigation and meteorology. Everyone agrees that improving benefits from space has been a permanent concern since the early days of the space age. The growing number of satellites dedicated to a large range of applications and owned by an increasing number of countries confirms that space is definitely perceived as a preferential medium for supporting development. However, after more than 50 years of practice, the relationship between space and sustainable resources is more complex than might appear at first sight. New trends are emerging and different strategies are being pursued. This chapter will first consider the wide range of space potentialities which may ensure an optimal resource use. Then it will present the case of GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, now Kopernikus) and Africa, which raises the question of space and resources in the specific context of improving the partnership between developed and developing countries. This will finally lead to an analysis of the challenges of new cooperation models and their implications for Europe.

9.2. ‘Space for development’: a long-standing and long-term policy 9.2.1. The well entrenched benefits of space

The idea of space benefits is familiar to everybody. In their everyday lives, people are now used to experimenting with a large range of space tools from weather forecasting to navigation devices and other achievements which space has helped to materialise since the first prototypes were demonstrated to be operable in the various application fields 30 to 40 years ago. 226

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Telecommunications satellites stand out against other fields of space activities. They are an ideal means for transmitting information over vast geographical expanses and have removed the need for expensive infrastructures at the ground level. Their immunity to natural disasters such as floods, storms and earthquakes also represents a significant advantage. However, due to the technological level required for developing such capacities, space telecommunications were initially developed under cooperative (multilateral or bilateral) programmes. The intergovernmental organisation Intelsat can be considered a perfect example of this logic as well as the logic’s modification over more than 40 years of space practice.500 Founded in 1964 as the result of President Kennedy’s initiative to invite “all nations to participate in a satellite telecommunications system in the interests of world peace and closer brotherhood among people of the world”, the organisation has allowed a tremendous number of countries to use space technology for development. Having started with 11 Member States, Intelsat had already 138 Member States in 1987 and 300 users in 2000 when the historic meeting of the Assembly of Parties unanimously approved the privatisation of the organisation. During that period, Intelsat satellites played a key role in the communication infrastructures of Third World countries, with more than 30 countries depending solely on this global system for national links. The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector produced a decisive change, as the international space systems were now characterised by a much larger variety of relationships among the involved actors, which now include both countries and private companies. Bilateral agreements have also represented a key medium for initiating the use of space telecommunications for development. For instance, India celebrated its first achievements in remote education and tele-medicine after former American and European satellites had been put at its disposal. Such initiatives with an ensuing technology transfer also played a crucial role in setting up India’s ambitious national programme Insat, which provides the infrastructure for the current Indian telecommunications system. Earth observation is another key tool for development. This category includes two major families inducing different actors and users. One family is comprised of meteorological satellites, which are usually operated by government bodies in the framework of programmes that are sometimes international, like World Weather Watch. While there is a trend towards the commercialisation of some products, the provision of public services remains the guiding concern. This corresponds to the specific role of these satellites in addressing very sensitive issues such as environmental management or risk monitoring. The second family – remote sensing satellites which can transcend borders and cover inaccessible areas – represent an inestimable means for acquiring an overview of the entire planet in the course of repeat visits. In the 1970s, the free Landsat 227

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images offered by the United States revealed the wide potential of remote sensing systems for exploiting natural resources. Even if the situation has evolved towards the diffusion of pictures on a commercial basis, such sales are generally made at a reasonable cost, which allows a broad access to space products.501 However, the numerous existing national remote sensing programmes clearly indicate that the independent acquisition of data is a real concern for an increasing number of states. If telecommunications and remote sensing satellites have constituted the backbone of development resources and still remain crucial, scientific and navigation satellites have played an increasing role in the past decade due to globalisation and new priorities in the management of Planet Earth.

9.2.2. Major changes in the utilisation of space for resources

The 1990s can be considered a turning point. The commercialisation of space products in that decade was part of a general trend linked to the more important role played by private actors. In the field of telecommunications, deregulation has deeply changed the rules of the international space systems. The privatisation process paved the way for the establishment of consortiums and opened up projects to a wide range of international investors, as in the case of Intelsat whose privatisation was successfully completed in July 2001. In parallel, national systems have been developed as a response to a wide range of concerns from social needs to political and commercial interests. The launches of national satellites carried out by developing countries which do not belong to the space club – like Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Argentina or more recently Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Venezuela – attest that space telecommunications is a decisive factor in any national economy. The Earth observation sector has seen similar trends. After an initial funding by government agencies, the exploitation of remote sensing systems has increasingly been handled by private companies with more or less direct governmental support. With Spot Image paving the way, private American firms inaugurated a new era with industrial investments guaranteed by a very large amount of orders. However, trade with Earth images is still limited and the concept of public services remains valid. Some agreements such as the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters” illustrate an approach developed by space agencies which relies on a commitment to global solidarity. The progressing use of space technologies is illustrated by the increasingly dense occupation of space. In fact, the emergence of new actors has resulted in a more complex situation. For instance, the multiplication of satellites in geostationary orbit raises sensitive issues about the allocation of limited resources (radio frequency bands and orbit positions). Telecommunications satellites provide a 228

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large range of services and most systems are multipurpose. Besides the two classical markets of television broadcasting and fixed and mobile telecommunications, the development of new services like internet and multimedia brings about new growth due to the increasing needs of especially developed countries seeking to bridge the digital divide. The same trend is evident in developing countries, where terrestrial means and fibre optics are less competitive than space-based solutions and where the number of users is rising. Finally, navigation and localisation systems (for which satellites are particularly well suited) work towards different ends, even if the degree of convergence is growing due to new telecommunications and remote sensing programmes. Siding with the universal American GPS (Global Positioning System) and the new Russian GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System), the European Galileo programme, which was initially open to wide-ranging cooperation, reflects the common opinion that these technologies cannot be ignored. The Chinese Compass and the Indian Gagan programmes also emphasise the common view that any independent state should be able to rely on its own national capabilities. However, the high technological requirements will delay the completion of these systems for some time to come. Over the past ten years, the number of remote sensing systems has also risen rapidly and the range of facilities offered has become more diverse. This is in turn reflected in an expanding user community. At the present time, two different trends can be distinguished. The first trend is the exploitation of the greater resolution of modern sensors for surveying landforms on a large scale. Civil activity in this area is likely to surge with the emergence of very high-resolution systems, whose products are now becoming serious rivals to aerial photography. The second trend is the exploitation of this technology’s global scope and integrative potential. Longer time series, a wider range of spectral bands and more sophisticated sensors capable of collecting data on different phenomena simultaneously support progress. This opens up previously undreamed-of possibilities for global modelling, which is particularly useful for understanding phenomena such as climate change. The increase of Earth observation systems in developing countries is the combined result of various tendencies apart from the goal of national autonomy. First of all, the existence of small satellites which cost relatively little has offered new possibilities for acquiring and experimenting with remote sensing know-how. Second, the relaxed controls on some technologies like CCD (Charge-Coupled Device) sensors has allowed new actors to gain independent access to space imagery for the better management of natural resources as well as for security purposes. This dual potential of remote sensing is important but it would be erroneous to consider it a major concern. 229

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9.3. “GMES and Africa”: a new step in the European space for resources policy Europe has always been aware of the potential of space for scientific and civilian needs. Its desire to open up a third way characterised by broad cooperation has contributed to a new qualitative approach of stronger partnerships with Southern countries. Furthermore, over the past decades, satellites have been instrumental in providing evidence of the finite nature of our planet’s resources and the fragile balance between human beings and their environment. Satellites have also provided unprecedented tools for monitoring the evolution of environmental conditions like our climate over time and space.502 In this context, the “Lisbon Declaration on ‘GMES and Africa’” of December 2007 is a perfect example of the specificity of the European approach and its implications.

9.3.1. The need to make the benefits of space technology more universal

Initiated by early initiatives of the United States and to some extent the Soviet Union, international programmes like the United Nations Programme on Space Applications (UNPSA) created in 1971 have played a decisive role in developing knowledge about and experience with space systems around the globe.503 Having joined the rank of the space-faring countries more recently, Europe has focused particularly on scientific and application systems. It has widely participated in international programmes on the dissemination of space competences. Since 1991, UNPSA and the European Space Agency (ESA) have organised regional workshops on basic space science covering a large range of topics from fundamental physics to exobiology. However, Europe is also a major actor in the Natural Resources Management and Environmental Monitoring Programme which supports developing countries in the use of space-based tools for environmental monitoring and natural resources management. This initiative paved the way for the Millennium Declaration which was adopted in September 2000 and defined a framework for global cooperation by merging eight Millennium Development Goals into a concrete and ambitious agenda for significantly improving the human condition by 2015. In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development made explicit references to the use of space-based facilities in the support and implementation of sustainable development actions. At that time, ESA also launched the TIGER initiative whose primary objective was to help African countries to overcome problems with the collection, analysis 230

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and dissemination of geographical information through the use of Earth observation technology. In 2005, the Group on Earth Observation (GEO) initiated the creation of several space and ground-based data acquisition networks and implemented its 10year plan (2005–2015). More recently, in 2006, the establishment of the UNSPIDER (United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response) programme has reinforced the determination to share data globally for the benefit of all participants. The current space programmes are a concrete expression of this attitude. This is largely the work of the national space communities which are anxious to use applications for breathing new life into space activities, and eager to achieve more results by coordinating their actions. The standard architecture set up in the framework of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) programme exemplifies the success of such initiatives.504 As far as technology is concerned, some new elements play a decisive role. For example, technological opportunities were created by the diffusion of the microsat technology which allowed more countries to experiment with space science and Earth observation, as mentioned above. At the same time, more and more attention has been paid to users’ needs by bilateral or multilateral agreements. Both trends were confirmed in 2007–2008, as with the “Lisbon Declaration on ‘GMES and Africa’” under the Portuguese EU Presidency in December 2007 which was the result of a collaboration between ESA and Eumetsat.505

9.3.2. The political significance of space for resources

“GMES and Africa” is more than the result of some workshops held by scientists during the Portuguese EU Presidency. It marks the recognition of opportunities offered by space for concrete actions promoting peace, security, development, and human rights. It is part of the Space and Africa programme included in the framework of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy.506 A European Commissioner507 expressed the rationale behind this European vision quite clearly: “Europe and Africa are natural allies. An indispensable partnership, strong and sincere between these two large and beautiful continents, can build a future of peace and prosperity. Together, they can decisively create a new order, fairer, more equitable and freer.” A concrete European-African partnership is essential for turning political initiatives into reality. According to the Director of ESA’s Earth Observation Programme, the involvement of ESA is important for the success of that partnership: “The ESA strategy for Africa is therefore the result of a natural evolution of cooperation in the context of global concerns we face today”.508 This is 231

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the result of a process which has evolved in different steps. In October 2006, the Maputo Declaration recognised the huge potential of “GMES and Africa”. In the same vein, the Cairo Declaration explicitly indicated that accurate geospatial information is an essential prerequisite for the implementation of the Millennium Development goals. A European Union-African Union working group on space applications was set up for providing a better understanding of the African Union’s needs, identifying existing gaps, and developing and deploying added-value services.509 The idea to bring together international user and supplier communities and organisations then led to the more political “Space for Africa” initiative. Space cooperation is expected to develop according to the same logic in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

9.4. Implications for the future Space technology has advanced rapidly in recent years. Nevertheless, a number of countries still lack the human, technical and financial resources for mastering basic space-related applications like meteorology, communications and natural resource management. From this point of view, the role of the leading space powers is obvious and adds a new dimension to the ’space for resources’ approach, although many factors shape this visionary concept. The diversification of the political and geopolitical uses of space is a key element in this regard. 9.4.1. The geopolitical significance of space for resources

Space is now recognised as a critical element of global sustainable development, but some contradictions may arise between political logics and scientific requirements. This is one reason why many crucial challenges are still to be addressed. For instance, the challenge of climate change can be tackled from several standpoints and whatever the approach, national concerns will have a part to play. These differences notwithstanding, the scientific and technological approaches to this topic provide the building blocks for an analysis shared by all stakeholders. The fact remains there must be a strong enough political commitment to guarantee that adequate investments are made and above all, that the existing international tools, agencies, processing centres etc. are improved in order to take full advantage of the data provided by space instruments and ground-based tools. This is a vital dimension of a topic which relies strongly on complex physical, chemical and human interactions.510 As was said before, telecommunications, Earth observation and navigation are essential tools for development. Therefore, many space partnerships have been 232

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created and are still ongoing. At the same time, such partnerships traditionally follow the geopolitical map because they reinforce political and economic links. A political concern for independence and a high level of technological know-how are prerequisites for belonging to the select club of space powers. There is nevertheless great inequality between countries whose space activities constitute a genuine area of national activity and a source of political and economic power, and countries where space is a sideline with only a marginal role in the economy, although space does grant such countries a limited and intermittent presence on the international scene. Space has always been a source of influence and the different kinds of cooperation in the various space domains have been largely dependent on the national interest of the leading partner. Many examples can be given, from telecommunications or Earth observation to manned space activities. However, one has to underline the fact that despite the unequal relationship between senior and junior partners, cooperation has offered a vast number of countries access to space resources. Of course, the increasing number of actors has produced a decisive evolution. The question of licenses for technology transfer remains crucial, although more and more capabilities are being developed and made available (even if some of them may be less sophisticated). Furthermore, new logics have emerged such as developing-to-developing country cooperation as a way to avoid unequal relationships and have more balanced partnerships. The CBERS (China Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) programme is a good example of this tendency, even if some difficulties due to differences in technical and administrative culture had to be solved according to the partners.

9.4.2. The implications of increasing competition

For the aforementioned reasons, approaches which focus on space as a means for resource development are becoming more and more frequent. However, in parallel to the existing cooperative trend which may even prove an interesting business tool in the end, competition remains high among the providers of small platforms and various subsystems to new customers. Besides, a new market is emerging for specific products aimed at fulfilling the requirements of domestic systems in developing countries. These systems are usually ordered from foreign space industries and must be adapted to the national needs and financial constraints of each buyer country. However, the sale of sensitive technologies raises some complex issues linked with the level of autonomy of the national space industry. The very strict control of technological transfers practised by the United States 233

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represents a bottleneck on many occasions. The capability to develop one’s own patent would be the easiest way to solve this problem. For instance, the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations)-free satellites built by Thales Alenia Space mitigate this concern but their prize is increased by the necessity to master the whole range of technologies. In this context, one can easily understand the attractiveness of producer countries which are entirely autonomous from U.S. technology. The space

Fig. 15: Civil Earth Observation Satellites per launch date and country. 234

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industries of these countries are now highly concerned with adapting the cost of their systems to the demand of new customers with a low spending power. Primarily Russia, but also China are representatives of this emerging group of space technology sellers that further reinforce their technological advantage by affirming their political independence from the U.S. and the West in general. The selling of space technology to Iran by Russia or to Venezuela by China is a way to affirm this autonomy and establish privileged links with countries marginalised on the international scene by the United States and other Western countries. One can expect that this trend will to some extent be followed by emerging space powers like India. The current efforts to reinforce cooperation on a regional basis contribute to strengthening India’s position and diminish its need to acquire technologies from the usual Western providers. A similar position has been adopted by China in the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), making Japan very aware of the possible implications for its political influence. The picture therefore appears quite complex due to the growing importance of new actors elaborating their own strategies in order to be recognised as significant players in the space field in the near future. The similarity of their needs and economic constraints may reinforce a common interest relatively far away from the logic of the traditional space technology suppliers if the latter do not catch this point very quickly.

9.5. Conclusion The diffusion of space technologies and competences has progressively changed the deal. Microsatellites offer many countries new opportunities for discovering and practising space applications programmes, mainly in the fields of Earth observation and science. In parallel, competition among firms has led to the multiplication of proposals to new customers. Technology transfer issues still have a limitative impact but some players like Russia or China have the opportunity to play their own game. A new dimension in the relationship between space and resources is undeniable. From this point of view, some observers have seen the recent Chinese sales of telecommunications satellites to Venezuela and Nigeria as an interesting case study. Yet even if this may be a stimulant model for a more modern thinking on space which is closer to economic common sense, it is essential to remain cautious with any interpretations. Although space (being global by nature) is a critical element of solidarity among nations, it also remains a widely-used tool for gaining or maintaining political influence, as shown by recent facts. Overall, however, sustainable development and global challenges do play a decisive role in the new 235

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perception of space by many actors, and these challenges may eventually lead to a new framework for the relationship between those actors.

500

Verger, Fernand, Isabelle Sourbes-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space: Missions, Applications and Exploration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 501 Baker, John C., Kevin M. O’Connell and Ray A. Williamson, eds. Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency. Santa Monica: Rand, 2001. 502 Thales Alenia Space. Climate Change and Satellites. Sud concept, 2008. 503 “Mandate of the Programme on Space Applications.” UNOOSA 15 Dec. 2008. http://unoosa.org/ oosa/en/SAP/mandate.html. 504 Fellous, Jean-Louis. “The IPCC Report: In Need of Earth Observations.” Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007: New Impetus for Europe. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter, eds. Vienna: Springer, 2008. 505 “The Lisbon Declaration on ‘GMES and Africa.’” 7 Dec. 2007. Mundiconvenius 15 Dec. 2008. http://www.mundiconvenius.pt/2007/gmes/docs2/PT_Presid_GMES_Africa_Lisbon_Declaration_ EN.pdf. 506 Highlighted in: Global Spatial Data Infrastructure Association. SDI-Africa Newsletter 6.11 (Nov. 2007). http://www.gsdi.org/SDIA/docs2007/nov07links/GMES-Africa-workshop.pdf. 507 European Commission. Africa-Europe: the Indispensable Alliance. Brussels: European Communities, 2008. 508 Dr. Volker Liebig during the opening of the “Space for Development: The Case for GMES and Africa” ceremony on 7 December 2007. See ESA.“Africa Focuses on GMES”. 11. Dec. 2007. http:// www.esa.int/esaEO/SEMRGE361AF_index_0.html. 509 “Space for Development: The Case for GMES and Africa. Introduction.” Mundiconvenius 15 Dec. 2008. http://www.mundiconvenius.pt/2007/gmes/intro.htm. 510 United Nations Environment Programme. Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development (GEO-4). Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 2007. 15 Dec. 2008. www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media. 236

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10. The United Nations and outer space: Celebrating 50 years of space achievements Niklas Hedman and Werner Balogh

10.1. Introduction In 2007, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) held its fiftieth session and commemorated a remarkable convergence of space anniversaries as recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 62/217 of 21 December 2007. These anniversaries included the fiftieth anniversary of the advent of the space age with the launch into outer space of the first artificial Earth satellite, Sputnik 1, on 4 October 1957; the fortieth anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty511 which entered into force on 10 October 1967; the fiftieth session of COPUOS; and the fiftieth anniversary of the International Geophysical Year, which was commemorated by proclaiming the year 2007 as the International Heliophysical Year.512 The launch of Sputnik 1 heralded the beginning of the space age and realised a dream as old as humankind itself: to reach and explore outer space. Ten years later and following a period of space achievements which occurred at an amazing speed, the growing significance and importance of space activities and the need for an international legal and political framework for these activities led to the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty (the “Magna Charta of Space Law”) in 1967, which contains the fundamental principles and regulations applying to the exploration and use of outer space. Since then, a legal regime governing space activities has been created comprising four other treaties and five declarations and legal principles on outer space activities. Half a century has passed since the launch of Sputnik I. Humankind has walked on the Moon, has sent space probes to explore the planets and the farthest reaches of our solar system, and has unravelled secrets of our universe with a series of spacebased telescopes. Space science and technology and their applications have also become a significant part of our daily lives. Satellites enable us to better understand the Earth-space system and the fragility of the Earth’s environment, and they provide us with data and information essential for disaster risk reduction, managing the resources of our planet, and achieving sustainable development. 237

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They interconnect people on all continents through global telecommunication links, help to precisely locate positions and to navigate and have become an important tool for capacity-building, education, and cultural exchange. The United Nations has played a significant role in all stages of the space age. New developments are unfolding before our eyes and it is expected that much more is still to come. As we celebrate fifty years of space achievements, this is a good opportunity to pause for a moment and to reflect on the entry of the United Nations into the space field and the establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism for dealing with space affairs at the global level.

10.2. The establishment of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations defines the purposes of the United Nations:513 to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve international cooperation by solving international problems addressing economic, social, cultural or humanitarian issues, to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to act as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. With humankind beginning to project its activities beyond the confines of the Earth, it appeared obvious to many that the principles of the United Nations Charter should also apply to activities in outer space. In his letter dated 2 September 1958 and addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations requested the inclusion of an additional item on a “programme for international co-operation in the field of outer space” in the agenda of the thirteenth regular session of the General Assembly.514 Following the subsequent discussions in the General Assembly in December of that year, Resolution 1348 (XIII) was adopted515 which established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Ad Hoc Committee was tasked with reporting back to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly on the following issues:

a) The activities and resources of the United Nations, of its specialised agencies and of other international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;

b) The area of international cooperation and programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices to the benefit of states irrespective of their level of economic or scientific development; 238

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c) The future organisational arrangements for facilitating international cooperation in this field within the framework of the United Nations;

d) The nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee held its first meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 May to 25 June 1959516 at which all the items listed in Resolution 1348 (XIII) were duly addressed. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on this meeting manifestly reflects the Unitd Nations Member States’ awareness of the importance of the unfolding space events in a wider historical context, and emphasises the potential of space technology and applications for the future of humankind. In fact, it can be argued that this report defined an outline for the space-related work of the United Nations for the decades to come. In response to that report, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1472 (XIV) in December 1959.517 The Resolution established COPUOS as a permanent body of the General Assembly and mandated the Committee to “review, as appropriate, the area of international co-operation, and to study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space

Fig. 16: First session of the 24-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held at United Nations. Headquarters in New York on 27 November 1961 after it was established by a General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1959. Newly elected Chairman, Dr. Franz MATSCH (centre) of Austria, is seen here as he presided the meeting. Other Officers are L. to R.: Professor Mihail HASEGANU (Romania), ViceChairman; U THANT, Acting. Secretary-General of the U.N.; Dr. MATSCH; Mr. F.Y. CHAI, Committee Secretary; and Mr. Geraldo de. CARVALHO SILOS (Brazil), Rapporteur. (UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata). 239

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Fig. 17: Opening of the 50th session of the 67-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held in Vienna, Austria, on 6 June 2007. (UN Photo/Natercia Rodriguez).

which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices”, as well as to “study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the exploration of outer space”. Due to some disagreements between the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR), the permanent Committee did not hold its first one-day session before 27 November 1961.518 On 20 December 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1721 (XVI)519 which not only established a United Nations register of space objects, but also contained specific recommendations for international space cooperation in the fields of meteorology and telecommunications with the involvement of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). In its second session on 19 March 1962, the Committee agreed that all its future decisions would be based on the consensus principle.520 It also established two Subcommittees which held their first sessions in Geneva, Switzerland: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on 28 May to 13 June 1962521 and the Legal Subcommittee on 28 May to 20 June 1962.522 The Legal Subcommittee immediately delved into addressing the legal aspects of activities in outer space. Already at its first session, the delegation of the USSR tabled proposals for a declaration governing activities of states in outer space as well as for an international agreement on the rescue of astronauts and spaceships 240

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Fig. 18: Poster published by the United Nations on the occasion of the 50th session of the 67-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. (United Nations).

making emergency landings. The delegation of the United States made proposals for the assistance to and return of space vehicles and personnel, and for the liability for space vehicle accidents. Several other legal problems suggested the need for future study: the delimitation of outer space and air space, the jurisdiction and laws applicable to humans in outer space and manned stations on celestial bodies, measures for preventing interference with space projects due to scientific experiments or other space activities, the prevention of the contamination of (or from) outer space and celestial bodies, control over the launching and orbits of spacecraft and artificial satellites, and international rules for broadcasting radio and television programmes. These discussions marked the beginning of the law-making phase of the Committee, which eventually led to the adoption of the five space treaties and the five declarations and legal principles on outer space activities. Resolution 1721 (XVI) sparked an exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, outlining opportunities for space cooperation between the two superpowers.523,524 In hindsight, this exchange can be seen as the beginning of the initial stages of international space cooperation. In response to that Resolution, the WMO and ITU also prepared reports which outlined the potential role of these United Nations entities.525,526 The ITU subsequently became responsible for addressing issues of frequency allocation and orbital positions 241

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for satellites, and the WMO, which explored how space-based assets could be used for improving weather forecasts, eventually established its WMO Space Programme. To provide substantive secretariat services to the Committee and its Subcommittees, the United Nations in 1962 established an expert unit within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. The unit was transformed into the Outer Space Affairs Division of that Department in 1968 and finally into the Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA) in 1992. It has been located at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria since 1993.527 With 69 Member States in 2008528 (having grown from 24 Member States at the time of its establishment), COPUOS is now one of the largest Committees in the United Nations system. In addition to states, a number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations have permanent observer status in COPUOS.529 The founding principles for the establishment of this intergovernmental body are still valid fifty years later, and its mandate has remained unchanged. The general character of this mandate has given the Committee and its subsidiary bodies the necessary flexibility in the decision-making process to keep up with the fast development in space technology and the expansion of the number of actors, both public and private, in the space field.

10.3. The UNISPACE Conferences and capacity building in space technology and applications On 19 December 1966, in its Resolution 2221 (XXI), the General Assembly decided that a United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should be held in 1967.530 However, it was only in 1968 that the first United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE) was finally convened in Vienna, Austria, following the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty. It was to be the first in a series of three UNISPACE Conferences held in 1968, 1982 and 1999, respectively. Each of these conferences marked a milestone in the development of space activities and in the space-related work of the United Nations and resulted in new initiatives and in a series of achievements. Among the recommendations of the first UNISPACE Conference was the establishment of the post of the United Nations Expert on Space Applications, who was to lead the United Nations Programme on Space Applications which was launched in 1971 and has since then carried out a wide range of activities in support of building capacities for the use of space science, technology and applications, particularly in developing countries. 242

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The next UNISPACE Conference was only held in 1982, again in Vienna. It was marred by the growing confrontation between the two superpowers, but nevertheless managed to further strengthen the international mechanism for international cooperation in space activities. A large number of recommendations were made by UNISPACE’82, which were followed-up by COPUOS in the following years. Among the concrete results were the strengthening of the United Nations Programme on Space Applications and the establishment of the Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education affiliated to the United Nations as a means for directly implementing capacity building activities in developing countries. The centres were established for Africa (Morocco, Nigeria), Asia and the Pacific (India), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil and Mexico). They are affiliated to the United Nations through the Office for Outer Space Affairs.531 The end of the East–West confrontation, the emergence of new issues regarding sustainable development, the advances made in space science and technology, and the increase in the number of emerging space nations led to the consensus to organise the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNISPACE III, on 19–30 July 1999. The Conference concluded with the adoption of a Resolution entitled “The Space Millennium: Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development” (Vienna Declaration)532 which contained 33 specific actions which were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in its Resolution 54/68 of 6 December 1999. As an immediate result of this event, the World Space Week was declared by the General Assembly to be celebrated between 4 and 10 October every year, and the Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC) was created in support of the United Nations Programme on Space Applications. Following UNISPACE III, COPUOS and its subsidiary bodies established several new mechanisms for facilitating the implementation of the Conference’s recommendations. The structure of the agendas of the two Subcommittees was revised to enable the introduction of new agenda items under multi-year work plans or as single items for discussion. The Office for Outer Space Affairs prepared a plan of action, outlining the conditions under which it could contribute to the implementation of specific recommendations. The Committee established twelve action teams comprising Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations which considered several of the recommendations. At its session in 2004, the Committee finalised a comprehensive report reviewing the status of the implementation of the recommendations of UNISPACE III. The so-called UNISPACE III þ 5 review and its report provided a roadmap for the further development of space capabilities for advancing human development 243

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by making space tools more widely available and moving from the demonstration of the usefulness of space technology to a broader operational use of space-based services. 533 The Plan of Action constituted a long-term strategy for enhancing mechanisms at the national, regional and global level for developing and strengthening the use of space science, technology and applications for sustainable development; developing coordinated global space capabilities; supporting specific agendas for meeting human developmental needs at the global level; and supporting an overarching capacity development process. In its report, the Committee concluded that by implementing the Plan of Action, it could provide a bridge between the users and potential providers of space-based development and services by identifying the needs of Member States and coordinating international cooperation for facilitating access to the scientific and technical systems which might meet those needs, while also observing the interaction between different stakeholders in the future implementation of the strategy and building upon the respective roles and needs of the actors involved in the wider space community. The implementation of the Plan of Action resulted in two major concrete achievements: first, the establishment of the United Nations Platform for Spacebased Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UNSPIDER)534 and second, the establishment of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG)535. Other important achievements are the successful 2007 conclusion by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee Working Group on space debris, and the on-going work of some Working Groups of that Subcommittee on Near-Earth Objects and on the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, the latter being considered jointly with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Through this implementation process, the Committee has also initiated a closer link with the work of the Commission on Sustainable Development by contributing to the multi-year thematic cluster of work within the Commission. The first report by COPUOS536 targeted the thematic cluster for 2006–2007 on energy for sustainable development, industrial development, air pollution/atmosphere, and climate change; the second report537 then targeted the thematic cluster for 2008–2009 on agriculture, rural development, land use, drought, desertification and sustainable development in Africa. The Committee is presently preparing its contribution to the thematic cluster for 2010–2011 on transport, chemicals, waste management, mining, and the ten-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production patterns. The overall thematic cluster of work of the Commission on Sustainable Development comprises many more areas on sustainable development including (inter alia) forests, biodiversity, mountains, oceans and seas and marine re244

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sources, small-island developing states, disaster management and vulnerability. It concludes in 2017 with an overall appraisal of the implementation of the Agenda 21. In 2008 the General Assembly took note of the fact that a number of the recommendations of UNISPACE III have been implemented and that satisfactory progress is being made in implementing the outstanding recommendations.538 2009 will see the celebration of the 10th anniversary of UNISPACE III and on this occasion COPUOS and its Subcommittees will continue to review the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Vienna Declaration and in the Plan of Action, and, in light of this, will also discuss additional follow-up activities.

10.4. The use of space technology and applications in the United Nations system Right from the beginning of the discussions on space activities in the United Nations, it became obvious that space activities concerned the work of several United Nations entities. In particular it was found that space applications could make important contributions to support activities of the United Nations. Following the example of the ITU and the WMO, and in parallel to the deployment of the first operational commercial telecommunications satellites and the launch of civilian Earth observation satellites in the early 1970s, other United Nations entities began to consider the use of space applications. In particular, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) began to use remote sensing data from space. The growing number of such activities soon made it necessary to ensure the proper coordination of all space-related activities ongoing in the United Nations system. For this purpose, the Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities was established in 1974. The Meeting continues to meet annually to assess the coordination of the space-related activities of the United Nations entities and to prepare the annual report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the coordination of outer space activities within the United Nations system.539 Today, approximately twenty-five United Nations entities, including the World Bank Group, routinely make use of space technologies and their applications in a wide range of activities under their respective mandates. Examples include the use of satellite imagery and Geographic Information Systems in 245

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peacekeeping operations, resource management, agriculture and land use, treaty verification, disaster management, and a wide range of other applications. Satellite communications and satellite navigation have become indispensable tools particularly for field operations, but also for applications such as health mapping projects. Weather forecasts and the monitoring of climate change, for example, are dependent on the reliable and uninterrupted collection of global surface- and space-based data by satellites coordinated by WMO’s Global Observing System. The substantive issues on the agenda of the Inter-Agency Meeting are related to the implementation of the recommendations of major conferences, events and initiatives within the United Nations system or to areas of current focus which could benefit from the use of space technology and applications. For example, the Meeting has considered the implementation of the recommendations of the three UNISPACE Conferences, and space-based contributions of United Nations entities to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals as well as to the implementation of the recommendations of the Agenda 21, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the World Summit on the Information Society. Today’s extensive use of space-based solutions by the United Nations family is an indicator of the extent to which space technology and its applications have achieved operational status. Applications which one or two decades ago had only been considered in theory or had merely been demonstrated to be operable or useful through one-off pilot projects today provide practical solutions, data and information for use in policy and decision making on a regular basis. In several instances, space-based solutions have proven to be essential and have provided new knowledge or opened new venues for addressing pressing issues. It is thus expected that space-based applications will continue to play an increasingly important role in the work of the United Nations. The Office for Outer Space Affairs is therefore working on further strengthening the InterAgency Meeting on Outer Space Activities as the primary mechanism in the United Nations system to ensure the most efficient and effective use of space technology and its applications.

10.5. The United Nations and space law: recent trends The legal regime on outer space comprises the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement, as well as five sets of declarations and legal principles on outer space activities.540 Since the adoption of the Moon Agreement in 1979, no 246

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new treaty has been negotiated and the latest declaration, the so-called “Benefits Declaration”, was endorsed by the General Assembly at its fifty-first session in 1996. In the late 1990s, in conjunction with an emerging consensus to hold UNISPACE III, a common understanding evolved among the Member States of COPUOS to revitalise the agenda structure of its two Subcommittees, in particular the Legal Subcommittee, in order to promote a less static consideration under its mandate. The result became the introduction of “items to be considered under work plans” and “single issues/items for discussion” to the agenda structure. This innovative system has proven to be a particularly valuable mechanism for achieving specific objectives and practical results within a fixed timeframe. Since the early 2000s, the Legal Subcommittee has completed two successful multi-year Working Groups541,542 resulting in two specific General Assembly Resolutions: Resolution 59/115 of 10 December 2004 on the application of the concept of the “launching state”; and Resolution 62/101 of 17 December 2007 on recommendations for enhancing the practice of states and international intergovernmental organisations in registering space objects. These results demonstrate a willingness among the Member States of COPUOS to study the closer relationship between the treaties, in particular in areas related to the responsibility of national space activities, the liability for damage caused by space objects, and the registration of objects launched into outer space. The determination of a “launching state” as identified in the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention provides the legal basis for identifying the state of registry and the state which may have to pay compensation in the case of damage caused by a space object. In view of the changes in space activities since the entry into force of these treaties, the continuous development of new technologies, the increase in the number of states carrying out space activities, the increase in international cooperation, and the increase in space activities carried out by non-governmental entities (in particular commercial and private actors), the demand for a more unified and harmonised application of the legal regime on outer space has emerged. In 2007, the Subcommittee consequently agreed to include on its agenda a new single discussion issue/item on capacity-building in space law (which in 2008 was extended for another year), and an item under a multi-year work plan on the general exchange of information on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Several legal areas relevant to modern space activities will be compared in a Working Group to be established in 2009, including national jurisdictions for regulating the space activities of governmental 247

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and non-governmental entities; procedures for authorising and licensing national space activities; liability; indemnification procedures; insurance; intellectual property rights; the distribution of remote sensing data; the registration of objects launched into outer space; the establishment of national registries; safety requirements for the conduct of space activities, in particular for launching activities; and regulatory frameworks for national space agencies or other national entities mandated to carry out and supervise space activities. The relationship between the agenda item on national space legislation and that on capacity-building in space law is considered particularly important by the Subcommittee, since capacity-building efforts are essential for promoting an understanding of the national requirements of space activities, especially due to the different constitutional and legal systems around the world. Of relevance for the exchange of information on national regulatory frameworks are also domestic regulations on space debris mitigation and the protection of the space environment in relation to space activities. In 2008, the Legal Subcommittee agreed to include in its agenda a new item on the general exchange of information on national mechanisms relating to space debris mitigation measures which will provide a better understanding of how Member States with space capabilities are handling this threat to the space and planetary environment. In this regard, the work carried out by the Working Group on Space Debris within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee deserves to be mentioned, which resulted in the adoption by COPUOS of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 2007543 and were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in its Resolution 62/217 of 21 December 2007. Member States are invited to implement the guidelines through relevant national mechanisms. While the guidelines are voluntary in nature and thus non-binding under international law and reflect the existing practices as developed by a number of national and international organizations, they constitute a vital step towards the long-term sustainability of space activities and mark an important milestone in the recent work of the Committee. Another milestone in the activities of COPUOS is the agreement reached by the Legal Subcommittee in 2000544 on some aspects concerning the use of the geostationary orbit, including a recommendation that where coordination is required between countries with a view to the utilisation of satellite orbits including the geostationary satellite orbit, the countries concerned should take into account the fact that access to that orbit has to take place inter alia in an equitable manner and according to the ITU Radio Regulations. This agreement reached by the Subcommittee was also transmitted to ITU in the same year. 248

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10.6. Conclusions Looking back at, and assessing the role which the United Nations have played throughout the first 50 years of space activities, a number of important accomplishments can be listed – most importantly, the legal framework established through the five space treaties as well as through the declarations and legal principles on outer space activities, but also other related General Assembly Resolutions which have contributed to establishing and maintaining a legal order in space activities. The efforts made by the United Nations have also contributed to space technology and its applications becoming essential tools of economic and social development, as demonstrated by the extent to which space-based solutions are nowadays being used by a large number of United Nations entities. Looking to the future, the United Nations will continue to work towards an increased awareness of the potential of space tools for sustainable development through COPUOS and its subsidiary bodies, thereby promoting a better understanding, acceptance and implementation of the space law treaties, strengthening the capacity of countries to use space science, technology and applications, and increasing coherence and synergy effects within the space-related work of United Nations entities and other international space-related entities. Other aspects which will possibly influence the United Nations’ future work are the growing involvement of private-sector players in both established and emerging space technology applications, and developments in the advancement of space exploration initiatives. There is also a strong willingness among many countries to build regional mechanisms for cooperation and coordination in space activities. As the space age enters the second half of its first centennial, we cannot predict what the future will hold for humankind in space. In terms of human history, we are still at the beginning of the space age. We can however certainly project with good confidence that space activities will play an increasingly important role in meeting major challenges related to climate change, food security, disaster management and global health issues. Space-based tools and solutions are already essential tools for achieving development goals, and they will eventually help us to become a truly global society. Most certainly the United Nations will continue to be part of developments in space, a true human adventure, demonstrating how human imagination, creativity and ingenuity can overcome frontiers once believed insurmountable and so help in shaping our common future. As space pioneer Robert Goddard once famously noted: “It is difficult to say what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday is the hope of today and the reality of tomorrow”.

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Part 2 – Views and Insights “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” General Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), 19 December 1966, Annex. 512 “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Document A/62/20, 2007. 513 United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. DPI/511. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, October 2000. 514 “Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Thirteenth Regular Session: Programme for International Co-operation in the Field of Outer Space.” General Assembly Document A/3902, 22 September 1958. 515 “Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space.” General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), 13 December 1958. 516 “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Document A/4141, 14 July 1959, Agenda Item 25. 517 “International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV), 12 December 1959. 518 See General Assembly Document A/7987, “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, 27 November 1961. 519 “International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), 20 December 1961. 520 In the “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (General Assembly Document A/5181 of 27 September 1962, Paragraph 4), it is stated: “it has been agreed among the members of the Committee that it will be the aim of all members of the Committee and its subcommittees to conduct the Committee’s work in such a way that the Committee will be able to reach agreement in its work without need for voting”. 521 “Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on the Work of its First Session.” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/5, 3 July 1962. 522 “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of its First Session.” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/6, 9 July 1962. 523 Letter dated 19 March 1962 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the acting Secretary-General (containing the Letter dated 7 March 1962 from President Kennedy addressed to Chairman Khrushchev). General Assembly Document A/AC.105/1, 19 March 1962. 524 Letter dated 21 March 1962 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the acting Secretary-General (containing the Letter dated 20 March 1962 from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy on the question of the exploration and use of outer space. General Assembly Document A/AC.105/2, 21 March 1962. 525 World Meteorological Organization. First Report of the WMO on the Advancement of Atmospheric Sciences and their Application in the Light of Developments in Outer Space. A/5229. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1962. 526 International Telecommunication Union. First Report by the International Telecommunication Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. A/5237. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union, 1962. 527 For information on OOSA and its activities, refer to the OOSA. website: http://www.unoosa.org. 528 As of December 2008, the membership of the Committee consists of the following 69 states: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, (Islamic Republic of) Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 511

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10. The United Nations and outer space: Celebrating 50 years of space achievements United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, (Bolivarian Republic of) Venezuela, and Vietnam. 529 Those organisations are: the African Organization of Cartography and Remote Sensing, the Association of Space Explorers, the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, the Committee on Space Research, the European Organization for Astronomical Research in the Southern Hemisphere, Eurisy, the European Space Agency, the European Space Policy Institute, the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization, the International Academy of Astronautics, the International Astronautical Federation, the International Astronomical Union, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, the International Institute of Space Law, the International Law Association, the International Mobile Satellite Organization, the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, the International Space University, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communications, the National Space Society, the Planetary Society, the Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz International Prize for Water, the Regional Centre for Remote Sensing of the North African States, the Secure World Foundation, the Space Generation Advisory Council, and the World Space Week Association. 530 “International United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Resolution 2221 (XXI), 19 December 1966. 531 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Capacity-Building in Space Science and Technology: Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education Affiliated to the United Nations. ST/SPACE/41. New York: United Nations, November 2008. 532 “Report of the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Document A/CONF.184/6, 18 October 1999. 533 “Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.” General Assembly Document A/59/174, 23 July 2004. 534 For information on UN-SPIDER and its activities, refer to the UN-SPDER. website: http://www. unspider.org 535 For information on ICG and its activities, refer to the ICG pages on the OOSA. website: http:// www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SAP/gnss/icg.html 536 “Contribution of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the Work of the Commission on Sustainable Development for the Thematic Cluster 2006–2007: Space for Sustainable Development.” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/872, 9 March 2006. 537 “Contribution of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the Work of the Commission on Sustainable Development for the Thematic Cluster 2008–2009: Space for Sustainable Development.” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/892, 13 July 2007. 538 “International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space – Report of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee).” General Assembly Document A/63/399, para.11, Draft resolution “International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space”, para.31, 18 November 2008. 539 See the website of the United Nations Coordination of Outer Space Activities: http://www.uncosa. unvienna.org/uncosa/index.html. The 2008 report of the Inter-Agency Meeting is contained in General Assembly Document A/AC.105/909 of 23 January 2008. The 2008–2009 report of the Secretary-General is contained in General Assembly Document A/AC.105/910 of 23 January 2008. 540 The “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space” ('Rescue Agreement’: General Assembly Resolution 2354 (XXII), Annex); the “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects” ('Liability Convention’: General Assembly Resolution 2777 (XXVI), Annex); the “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space” (‘Registration Convention’: General Assembly Resolution 3235 (XXIX), Annex); and the “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (‘Moon Agreement’: General Assembly Resolution 34/68, Annex). The five declarations and legal principles are the “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space” (General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII)); the 251

Part 2 – Views and Insights “Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting” (General Assembly Resolution 37/92, Annex); the “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” (General Assembly Resolution 41/65, Annex); the “Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space” (General Assembly Resolution 47/68); and the “Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries” (General Assembly Resolution 51/122, Annex). 541 “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty-first session, held in Vienna from 2 to 12 April 2002” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/787, Annex IV, “Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on agenda item 9, entitled “Review of the concept of the ‘launching State’””, 19 April 2002. 542 “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 26 March to 5 April 2007” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/891, Annex III, “Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on the Practice of States and International Organizations in Registering Space Objects”, 2 May 2007. 543 The text of the Guidelines is contained in the Annex to the “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, General Assembly Document A/62/20 of 26 July 2007. 544 “Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its thirty-ninth session, held in Vienna from 27 March to 6 April 2000” General Assembly Document A/AC.105/738, Annex III, “Some aspects concerning the use of the geostationary orbit: paper adopted by the Legal Subcommittee”, 20 April 2000.

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PART 3 FACTS AND FIGURES

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008 Charlotte Mathieu

1.1. Access to space Europe

Other countries LAUNCH LOG July 07 02 Kosmos 3M – SAR Lupe 2 (I) 05 Long March 3B – Chinasat 6B (C) 07 Proton M – DIRECTV 10 (C) August 07

14 Ariane 5 ECA – Spaceway 3 and BSAT 3A (C)

02 Soyuz – Progress ISS 26P (ISS) 04 Delta 2 7925H – Phoenix (S) 08 Shuttle Endeavour – STS 118 and ISS 13A.1 (ISS)

September 07 02 GSLV – Insat 4C R (C) 06 Proton M – JCSAT 11 (failure of second stage) (C) 11 Kosmos 3M – Kosmos 2429 (N) 14 Soyuz – Foton M3 (S) and YES 2 (D) 14 H 2A 2022 – Kaguya, RSAT and VRAD (S), mLabSat 2 and mLabSat 2 Subsat (D) 18 Delta 2 7925-10 – WorldView 1 (R) 19 Long March 4B – CBERS/Ziyuan 2B (R) 27 Delta 2 7925H – Dawn (S) October 07 05 Ariane 5 GS – Optus D2 and Intelsat 11 (C)

10 Soyuz – Soyuz ISS 15S (ISS) 10 Atlas V 421 – WGS 1 (C) 17 Delta II 7925-10 – Navstar GPS 2RM-4 (N) 21 Soyuz – Globalstar Replacements 5, 6, 7 and 8 (C) 23 Shuttle Discovery – STS 120 and ISS 10A (ISS)

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1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008 23 Molniya – Kosmos 2430 (I) 24 Long March 3A – Change 1 (S) 26 Proton (SL-12) – Glonass K R7, R8 and R9 (N) November 07 14 Ariane 5 ECA – Skynet 5B and Star One C1 (C)

01 Kosmos 3M – SAR Lupe 3 (I) 10 Delta IV Heavy – DSP 23 (EW) 12 Long March 4C – Yaogan 3 (R) 18 Proton M – Sirius 4 (C)

December 07 21 Ariane 5 GS – RASCOM 1 and Horizons 2 (C)

08 Delta II 7420-10 – Cosmo-Skymed 2 (R) 09 Proton M – Kosmos 2434 (C) 10 Atlas V 401 – NRO L-24 (I) 14 Soyuz – RADARSAT 2 (R) 20 Delta II 7925-10 – Navstar GPS 2RM-5 (N) 23 Soyuz – Progress ISS 27P (ISS) 25 Proton M – Glonass K R10, R11 and R12 (N) January 08 15 Zenit 3SL – Thuraya 3 (C) 21 PSLV – TecSAR (I) 28 Proton M – Express AM33 (C) February 08 05 Soyuz – Progress ISS 28P (ISS) 07 Shuttle Atlantis – STS 122 and ISS 1E (ISS) 11 Proton M – Thor 5 (C) 23 H 2A 2024 – WINDS (D) March 08

09 Ariane 5 ES-ATV – ATV 1 (ISS)

11 Shuttle Endeavour – STS 123 and ISS 1J/A (ISS) 13 Atlas V 411 – NRO L-28 (I) 14 Proton M – AMC 14 (failure of upper stage) (C) 15 Delta II 7925-10 – Navstar GPS 2RM-6 (N) 19 Zenit 3SL – DirecTV 11 (C) 27 Kosmos 3M – SAR Lupe 4 (I) 255

Part 3 – Facts and Figures April 08 18 Ariane 5 ECA – Vinasat 1 and Star One C2 (C)

08 Soyuz – Soyuz ISS 16S (ISS) 14 Atlas V 421 – ICO G1 (C) 16 Pegasus XL – C/NOFS (S) 25 Long March 3C – Tianlian 1 (C) 27 Soyuz – GIOVE B (N) 28 PSLV – Cartosat 2A, IMS 1 and NLS-5 (R), AAUsat 2, CanX-2, Compass 1, Cute 1.7 þ APD 2, Delfi C3 and SEEDS 2 (D) and Rubin-8 (C) 28 Zenit 3SLB – Amos 3 (C)

May 08 15 Soyuz – Progress ISS 29P (ISS) 21 Zenit 3SL – Galaxy 18 (C) 23 Rockot – Gonets D1M 2, 3 and 4, Yubileiny (C) 27 Long March 4C – Fengyun 3A (M) 31 Shuttle Discovery – STS 124 and ISS 1J (ISS) June 08 12 Ariane 5 ECA – Skynet 5C and Turksat 3A (C)

09 Long March 3B – Chinasat 9 (C) 11 Delta II 7920H – GLAST (S) 19 Kosmos 3M – Orbcomm CDS 3 (D), Orbcomm Replacements 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (C) and UGATUSAT (S) 20 Delta 2 7320 – Jason 2 (M) 27 Proton (SL-12) – Kosmos 2440 (I)

TECHNOLOGY 1 August 07 Launch of the first hybrid motor rocket PERSEUS by CNES

15 November 07 Successful test of ISRO’s indigenously developed Cryogenic Stage to be employed as the upper stage of India’s Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) March 08 NASA completed first full-scale rocket motor test for Orion spacecraft

BUSINESS 16 July 07 NASA awarded 1.2 billion dollar contract for upper stage engine of Ares I and V rockets to Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne

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1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008 2 August 07 NASA and Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne signed 975 million dollar contract extension for Space Shuttle main engine maintenance 10 August 07 NASA awarded 1.8 billion dollar contract for first stage of Ares I and V launchers to ATK 28 August 07 NASA selected Boeing as contractor for Ares I upper stage 15 February 08 NASA awarded 812.5 million dollar contract modification for Space Shuttle reusable solid rocket motors to ATK Launch Systems 19 February 08 NASA commissioned Orbital Sciences to develop commercial space transport services under the COTS programme 22 April 08 NASA awarded launch services contract for Falcon 1 and 9 launchers to SpaceX 8 May 08 NASA awarded contract for Ares I launcher to Hensel Phelps C: Communications – D: Development – I: Intelligence – M: Meteorological – N: Navigation – R: Remote Sensing – S: Scientific – EW: Early Warning System

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Part 3 – Facts and Figures

1.2. Space science and exploration Europe

Other countries EARTH SCIENCES

14 September 07 Launch of Foton M3 (ESA) Microgravity experiments mission

16 April 08 Launch of C/NOFS (U.S. Air Force) Communication/Navigation Outage Forecasting System 19 June 08 Launch of UGATUSAT (Ufa State Aviation Technical University) Monitors the Earth’s water and forest resources 20 June 08 NASA announced next Explorer Mission of Opportunity investigations to study black holes and determine how the Earth’s outer atmosphere responds to external forces

ASTRONOMY 14 September 07 Launch of the SELENE mission (RSAT and VRAD) (JAXA) Studies the Moon’s origin and evolution 18 October 07 Conclusion of NASA’s FUSE (Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer) mission 7 February 08 Inauguration of ESAC (European Space Astronomy Centre) in Spain

11 June 08 Launch of GLAST (Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope) (NASA) Renamed FGST (Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope) EXPLORATION 04 August 07 Launch of the Phoenix Mars lander (University of Arizona, Department of Planetary Sciences) Investigates water in the northern polar region of Mars

14 September 07 Start of ESA’s Foton microgravity mission

27 September 07 Launch of Dawn (NASA) Investigates the asteroids Vesta and Ceres 15 October 07 NASA extended the activities of the Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity 24 October 07 Launch of the Chang’e 1 lunar orbiter (CNSA)

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1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008 Investigates the lunar surface, measures soil depth and explores space weather between Earth and Moon 10 December 07 NASA announced mission to study the Moon’s internal structure and evolution 14 January 08 NASA’s Messenger spacecraft flew by Mercury 15 April 08 NASA extended the international Cassini-Huygens mission to Saturn by two years 25 May 08 NASA’s Phoenix spacecraft landed on Mars MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 08–21 August 07 STS-118 mission (NASA) Delivery of the ITS S5 Truss 23 October–7 November 07 Paolo Nespoli mission to the ISS

23 October–07 November 07 STS-120 mission (NASA) Delivery of the Harmony Module (or Node 2)

February 07 Delivery of ESA’s Columbus Laboratory to the ISS

07–20 February 08 STS-122 mission (NASA) 11–26 March 08 STS-123 mission (NASA) Delivery of the Japanese Kibo Logistics Module and the Canadian Dextre robotics system

3 April 08 ESA’s Automated Transfer Vehicle Jules Verne performed a fully automated docking with the International Space Station

19 April 08 U.S. astronaut Peggy Whitson and Russian cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko set up a record for spending 192 days in space 31 May–14 June 08 STS-124 mission (NASA) Delivery of the Japanese Kibo Pressurized Module and robotic arm

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Part 3 – Facts and Figures

1.3. Applications Europe

Other countries EARTH OBSERVATION September 07 18 Launch of WorldView 1 (DigitalGlobe, USA) 19 Launch of CBERS/Ziyuan 2B (China) November 07 12 Launch of Yaogan 3 (China)

December 07 08 Launch of Cosmo-Skymed 2 (Italy)

December 07 14 Launch of RADARSAT 2 (MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates, Canada) April 08 28 Launch of Cartosat 2A, IMS 1, NLS-5 (India, Canada) May 08 27 Launch of Fengyun 3A (M) (China)

June 08 20 Launch of Jason 2 (M) (CNES, Eumetsat, NOAA and NASA) INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY WARNING July 07 02 Launch of SAR Lupe 2 (Germany)

October 07 23 Launch of Kosmos 2430 (Russia)

November 07 01 Launch of SAR Lupe 3 (Germany)

November 07 10 Launch of DSP 23 (USA) December 07 10 Launch of NRO L-24 (USA) January 08 21 Launch of TechSAR (Israel)

March 08 27 Launch of SAR Lupe 4 (Germany)

March 08 13 Launch of NRO L-28 (USA) June 08 27 Launch of Kosmos 2440 (Russia) NAVIGATION September 07 11 Launch of Kosmos 2429 (Russia) October 07 17 Launch of Navstar GPS 2RM-4 (USA) 26 Launch of Glonass K R7, R8 and R9 (Russia)

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1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008 December 07 20 Launch of Navstar GPS 2RM-5 (USA) 25 Launch of Glonass K R10, R11 and R12 (Russia) April 08 27 Launch of GIOVE B (ESA)

March 08 15 Launch of Navstar GPS 2RM-6 (USA)

May 08 07 First GIOVE-B signal TELECOMMUNICATIONS/BROADCASTING July 07 05 Launch of Chinasat 6B (China Satcom) 07 Launch of DIRECTV 10 (DIRECTV, USA) August 07 14 Launch of Spaceway 3 and BSAT 3A (Hughes Communications, USA and BSAT, USA) September 07 02 Launch of Insat 4C R (India) 06 Failed launch of JCSAT 11 (JSAT, Japan) October 07 05 Launch of Optus D2 and Intelsat 11 (Singtel/Optus, Australia and Intelsat, Bermuda) 10 Launch of WGS 1 (USA) 21 Launch of Globalstar Replacements 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Globalstar, USA) November 07 14 Launch of Skynet 5B* (Paradigm Secure Communications, UK) 18 Launch of Sirius 4 (SES Sirius, Sweden)

November 07 14 Launch of Star One C1 (Star One, Brazil) December 07 09 Launch of Kosmos 2434* (Russia) 21 Launch of RASCOM 1 (shortened lifetime due to leak) and Horizons 2 (Rascom/QAF Joint Venture and Intelsat, Bermuda) January 08 15 Launch of Thuraya 3 (Thuraya Satellite Communications Company, UAE) 28 Launch of Express AM33 (Russian Satellite Communications Company, Russia)

February 08 11 Launch of Thor 5 (Telenor AS, Norway)

March 07 14 Failed launch of AMC 14 (SES Americom, USA) 19 Launch of DirecTV 11 (DIRECTV, USA) 261

Part 3 – Facts and Figures April 08 28 Launch of Rubin-8 (Cosmos International GmbH, Germany)

April 08 14 Launch of ICO G1 (ICO Global Communications, USA) 18 Launch of Vinasat and Star One C2 (Vietnam and Star One, Brazil) 25 Launch of Tianlian 1 (China) 28 Launch of Amos 3 (SpaceCom Limited, Israel) May 08 21 Launch of Galaxy 18 (Intelsat, Bermuda) 23 Launch of Gonets D1M 2, 3 and 4, and Yubileiny (Russia)

June 08 12 Launch of Skynet 5C* (Paradigm Secure Communications, UK)

June 08 09 Launch of Chinasat 9 (Chinese Telecommunications Broadcasting Satellite Corporation, China) 12 Launch of Turksat 3A (Turkish Telecom, Turkey) 19 Launch of Orbcomm Replacements 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (ORBCOMM, USA)

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT July 07 09 Inauguration of the new Fresnel collector at Plataforma Solar de Almería, Spain

September 07 14 Launch of MicroLabSat-II (Japan) Micro-satellite technology demonstrator

September 07 14 Launch of YES 2 (ESA) 2nd Young Engineers Satellite, a student-built re-entry vehicle

April 08 28 Launch of AAUsat 2 (Aalborg University, Denmark), CanX-2 (University of Toronto, Canada), Compass 1 (Aachen University, Germany), Cute 1.7 + APD 2 (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan), Delfi C3 (Delft University, Netherlands) and SEEDS 2 (Nihon University, Japan) BUSINESS

23 November 07 ESA and Inmarsat signed contract for Alphasat satellite 14 April 08 ESA and Thales Alenia Space signed 305 million euro contract for Sentinel-3 earth observation satellite

17 April 08 ESA and Astrium signed 195 million euro contract for Sentinel-2 earth observation satellite *: military

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22 April 08 NASA selected General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems as contractor for Landsat Data Continuity Mission spacecraft

1. Chronology: July 2007–June 2008

1.4. Policy and international cooperation GENERAL POLICY 8 November 07 Inauguration of the China-UK Joint Laboratory of Space Science and Technology GENERAL COOPERATION 1 February 08 Signature of a NASA-ISRO framework agreement for future cooperation 24 June 08 Third meeting of the Steering Board of the EU-Russia tripartite Dialogue on Space Cooperation SPACE SCIENCE 16 July 07 Signing of the NASA-CSA Cooperation Agreement for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) 3 October 07 Agreement between NASA and Roscosmos about the launch of Russia’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and Mars Science Laboratory 8–9 November 07 International Space Exploration Conference 2007, Berlin

12 November 07 Signature of an ISRORoscosmos agreement on Chandrayaan-2

15 February 08 BNSC/NASA Joint Working Group report on possible UK–U.S. lunar exploration cooperation APPLICATIONS 19 September 07 Adoption of the Communication “Progressing GALILEO: Re-profiling the European GNSS Programmes” by the European Commission 27 September 07 The ESA Member States participating in the GMES Programme approved the transition to Phase-2 of Segment 1 of the GMES Space Component Programme 2 October 07 Adoption of the “Conclusions on the European Galileo and EGNOS Satellite-Navigation Programmes” by the EU Transport Council 10 October 07 Presentation of the new EU maritime policy (the “Blue Book”), to be supported by GMES

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Part 3 – Facts and Figures 23 November 07 Agreement between the EU Finance Council and the European Parliament on the financing of the Galileo system’s deployment 30 November 07 Adoption of the “Draft Council Conclusions Launching the European Global Navigation Satellite System Programmes” by the EU Transport Council 28 February 08 Signature of the ESA-EC agreement on a 624 euro million EC contribution to the implementation of the GMES Space Component (GSC) 11 April 08 Release of a new version of the Galileo Open Service Signal-In-Space Interface Control Document 26 July 07

U.S.–EU agreement on the final design of the GPS-Galileo common civil signal

21–25 April 08 Beijing Symposium 2008 and launch of the second phase of the Sino-European Earth Observation Dragon Programme

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Part 3 – Facts and Figures

2. Country profiles AUSTRIA Population545

8.3 millions

GDP546

271 billion euros

Responsibility

The Austrian space activities are funded by the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) and managed by the Aeronautics and Space Agency (ALR) of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG).547

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, Austria has a national programme, the Austrian Space Applications Programme (ASAP) with an additional budget for GMES activities in 2008.

Budget

In 2008, 51,8 million euros (ESA 32.8, Austrian Space Applications Programme 10.2, Austrian Academy of Sciences 4.25, Eumetsat 3.35)

Staff

ALR – 10

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry548

314

BELGIUM Population545 546

10.6 milions

GDP

331 billion euros

Responsibility

The Belgian Federal Science Policy Office manages the Belgian space activities and the Belgian participation in national and international programmes through its Department for Space Research and Applications.549

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes (mainly telecommunications, Proba, Launchers, Prodex, ISS), Belgium is involved in bilateral cooperation projects with the U.S. on STEREO, France on Spot, COROT and Pleiades, Argentina on the SAOCOM programme and Russia on MIRAS and SPICAM.

Budget

In 2007, the Department for Space Research and Applications had a budget of about 170 million euros including contributions to ESA (145.2), ESO, Eumetsat (about 6) and the EU.

Staff

Department for Space Research and Applications – About 20

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

1,233

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CZECH REPUBLIC Population545 546

CZECH SPACE OFFICE

10.3 millions

GDP

128 billion euros

Responsibility

The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports supervises space activities and cooperation with ESA. The Czech Space Office (CSO)550, a private organisation, coordinates the space activities.

Activities

In addition to the ESA PECS programme, the Czech space activities focus on astronomy, magnetospheric, ionospheric and atmospheric research, microgravity research experiments, scientific instruments and micro-satellites.

Budget

In 2007, 3.41 million euros (ESA PECS 1.3, Eumetsat 0.7, other activities 1.41)

Staff

CSO – 10

DENMARK551 Population545 546

5.5 millions

GDP

228 billion euros

Responsibility

The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation is responsible for the national space policy and space activities. The National Space Institute at the Technical University of Denmark (DTU Space), established in January 2007, undertake most space-related activities.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes (e.g. Exomars, Planck, Swarm), bilateral cooperation is undertaken with the U.S. (NuStar, HydroGrav).

Budget

In 2007, about 31 million euros (ESA 26.2 and national projects about 5) A Eumetsat contribution of about 3 million euros should be added to that amount.

Staff

DTU Space – 122

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

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2. Countries profiles

FINLAND552 Population545 5.3 millions GDP546

180 billion euros

Responsibility The Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) and the Academy of Finland are funding space activities in Finland. The Finnish Space Committee consists of representatives of all stakeholders and coordinates all activities. Tekes is the executive body for space activities and, together with the Academy of Finland for basic research, manages the Finnish participation in ESA programmes and other international projects. Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, Finland is involved in bilateral activities with the U.S. (TWINS, Mars Science Laboratory, Phoenix, ISS), Russia (MetNet), France (Pleaiades), Germany (TanDEM-X and TerraSAR-X), India (Chandrayaan-1) and Japan (BepiColombo, ISS), as well as a national space technology programme.

Budget

In 2007, 44.3 million euros (including 17.3 for ESA and 27 for national projects, which includes about 3 to Eumetsat).

Staff

Within Tekes, Space Technology – 9

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

148

FRANCE Population545

63.4 millions

GDP546

1,892 billion euros

Responsibility

The Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales553 (CNES) is responsible for the French space activities. It is under the shared responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Research and of the Ministry of Defense. The Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches A erospatiales (ONERA)554 is also responsible for some space-related research.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, national civil and military programmes are undertaken (Helios, Pleiades), as well as bilateral cooperation with the U.S. (Chemcam on MSL 09, Calipso, Jason, Declic), India (Megha-Tropiques, Saral, Oceansat-3), Switzerland and Belgium (Picard). CNES also undertakes balloons campaigns.

Budget

In 2007, CNES had a budget of 1740 million euros (including ESA 685). ONERA had a budget of 187 million euros and 57% of ONERA’s revenues came from space-related research activities. A contribution to Eumetsat of about 32 million euros should be added.

Staff

CNES – 2,419

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

11,355

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Part 3 – Facts and Figures

GERMANY Population545 546

82.3 millions

GDP

2,423 billion euros

Responsibility

The German Space Agency within the German Aerospace Center (DLR)555 is responsible for the German space activities. It is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economics and Technology.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, Germany has national civil and commercial programmes in the fields of Earth observation (RapidEye, TerraSar-X, EnMAP, TanDEM), smallsat platforms (AstroBus), telecommunications (Tubsat), manned space flight (ISS, microgravity experiments), launch services (Eurockot, OHB-Cosmos), associated ground systems, space technologies (such as intersatellite links). Germany is onvovled in bilateral cooperation with the US (GRACE). The German military programmes include remote sensing satellites (Sar-Lupe radar satellites) and satcoms (Satcom BW).

Budget

In 2007, 917 million euros including ESA 578, DLR 119 and national space programme 175, and Eumetsat about 44.

Staff

DLR for space activities – 1,624

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

4,799

GREECE556 Population545 546

11.2 millions

GDP

229 billion euros

Responsibility

The General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT) of the Ministry of Development is responsible for the Greek space activities.

Activities

The Greek space activities cover mainly the fields of space physics, remote sensing and telecommunications.

Budget

In 2007, 11.17 million euros for ESA, to which should be added the contributions to Eumetsat, about 3 million euros.

Staff

Space < 5

268

2. Countries profiles

HUNGARY557 Population545 546

10.1 millions

GDP

101 billion euros

Responsibility

The Hungarian Space Office (HSO), under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Water, manages the Hungarian space activities.

Activities

In ESA PECS projects and national activities, the main fields are Earth observation applications, space physics, life sciences and space technology.

Budget

In 2007, the budget of the HSO was 1.77 million euros (ESA PECS 1.05, national projects 0.72). In addition, the Eumetsat contribution was about 0.2 million euros.

Staff

HSO – 3

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry558

About 30

IRELAND Population545 546

4.3 millions

GDP

186 billion euros

Responsibility

Enterprise Ireland,559 in association with the Office of Science and Technology of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, manages and coordinates the Irish space activities.

Activities

Ireland’s space activities are in the fields of software systems and services, precision mechanical components, advanced materials, electronics/microelectronics and telecommunications systems and service engineering.

Budget

In 2007, 12.1 million euros for ESA and about 2 million euros for Eumetsat.

Staff

For Space < 5

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

51

269

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

ITALY Population545

59.1 millions

GDP546

1,536 billion euros

Responsibility

The Italian Space Agency (ASI)560, under the Ministry of University and Research, manages the Italian space activities.

Activities

The Italian civil space activities include both ESA programmes and a national civil programme according to the Aerospace Plan 2007–2009. Italy’s national activities include small scientific and Earth Observation missions such as AGILE, PRISMA, MIOSAT, the development of scientific payloads for Earth observation (ROSA) and Universe observation, dual-use Earth observation satellites (Cosmo-Skymed) and military satcoms (Sicral), as well as commercial telecommunications and radar satellites. Italy has developed bilateral cooperation with France (Vega, Pleiades, Athena Fidus) and Argentina (SIASGE).

Budget

In 2007, 721 million euros (ESA 356 and ASI 365). To that amount should be added the contribution to Eumetsat, about 26 million euros.

Staff

ASI – About 200

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

3,969

LUXEMBOURG Population545 546

0.5 millions

GDP

36 billion euros

Responsibility

Luxinnovation,561 the National Agency for Innovation and Research under the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture, Higher Education and Research, coordinates Luxembourg’s space activities.

Activities

Luxembourg focuses mainly on telecommunications with a major player in the field, SES Astra.

Budget

In 2007, 9.2 million euros for ESA. A contribution to Eumetsat of about 0.4 million euros should be added.

Staff

Luxinnovation Space < 5

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

270

27

2. Countries profiles

NETHERLANDS Population545

16.4 millions

GDP546

567 billion euros

Responsibility

The Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programmes (NIVR)562, under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, is responsible for the industrial space activities and the Institute for Space Research (SRON)563 manages the research activities.

Activities

The fields of activities include astrophysics, astronomy, microgravity and Earth Observation.

Budget

In 2007, about 110 million euros (ESA 75, national 25, Eumetsat 9)

Staff

NIVR Space Division – 18; SRON – 205

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

525

NORWAY564 Population545 546

4.7 millions

GDP

284 billion euros

Responsibility

The Norwegian Space Centre (NSC), under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, manages the Norwegian space activities.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes (in particular Earth observation, telecommunications, and launchers), Norway has national support programmes and commercial activities (Telenor). Moreover, Norway operates the Andoya rocket range and the Svalbard ground station. Norway has also a bilateral agreement with Canada on the use of Radarsat-2 data.

Budget

In 2007, 51.8 million euros (including ESA 43.32). A contribution to Eumetsat of about 4 million euros should be added.

Staff

NSC – 30

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

316

271

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

POLAND Population545 546

38.1 millions

GDP

309 billion euros

Responsibility

The Space Research Centre565 coordinates the Polish space activities and hosts the Polish Space Office (PSO).566 The Ministry of Economy is in charge of the ESA PECS activities and the Ministry of Science and Education of the national activities.

Activities

The Polish space activities are mainly in the fields of space science, navigation and remote sensing applications.

Budget

In 2007, about 5 million euros (including Foresight project 0.15). In 2008, 1.2 million euros for ESA PECS activities to be added.

Staff

PSO – 4

PORTUGAL Population545 546

10.6 millions

GDP

163 billion euros

Responsibility

The Portuguese space activities are coordinated by the Portuguese Space Office (GPE) within the International Relations Department of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (GRICES).567

Activities

Mainly participation in ESA programmes (telecommunications systems, navigation, technology developments, Earth observation, exploration, tracking station of Santa Maria).

Budget

In 2007, about 16 million euros including ESA 12.8, Eumetsat 2.6 and less than 1 for national activities.

Staff

GPE – 7

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

272

79

2. Countries profiles

ROMANIA Population545 546

21.6 millions

GDP

121 billion euros

Responsibility

The Romanian Space Agency (ROSA),568 under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Research and Youth manages the Romanian space activities.

Activities

The ESA PECS and national activities defined by the R&D programme are covering the fields of space science (space physics and astronomy), space systems and technology (construction of nanosatellites, onboardsystems, microgravity experiments) and space applications (telemedicine, Earth observation and navigation space-based services).

Budget

In 2007, about 2 million euros for the ESA PECS activities. For national activities, the budget for “Space and Security” in the “National Plan 2007–2013” – which includes space but also security and aeronautics projects – was 12 million euros in 2007.

Staff

ROSA (including ROSA Research Centre) – 75

SPAIN Population545

44.5 millions

GDP546

1,051 billion euros

Responsibility

The Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI),569 under the Ministry of Science and Innovation, funds and coordinates the Spanish space activities.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, Spain has a national space programme including governmental and commercial programmes, especially in civil and military telecommunications (Hispasat, Spainsat), and is involved in bilateral cooperation projects as with France on military observation systems (Helios). Moreover, Spain manages national, ESA and NASA ground facilities.

Budget

The total budget of the 2007–2011 Strategic Plan for the Space Sector amounts to 1,071 million euros. In 2007, the contribution to ESA was 141.3 million euros and to Eumetsat about 14 million euros.

Staff

n.a.

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

2,137

273

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

SWEDEN Population545

9.0 millions

GDP546

327 billion euros

Responsibility

The Swedish National Space Board (SNSB),570 under the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, is responsible for space activities in Sweden. Basic research is funded via the Ministry of Education and Research.

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, Sweden has national programmes (subsystems, satellites and sounding rockets) and bilateral cooperation mainly with France (Spot, Vulcain, Pleiades) and Germany (Texus, Rexus, Bexus). Both countries are also partners of the Swedish technology demonstration project Prisma.

Budget571

In 2007, about 82 million euros (including 51 for ESA)

Staff

SNSB – 19

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

678

SWITZERLAND Population545 546

7.5 millions

GDP

312 billion euros

Responsibility

The Space Affairs Division (or Swiss Space Office)572 of the State Secretariat for Education and Research of the Federal Department of Home Affairs is responsible for the Swiss space activities and cooperates closely with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs on that topic. The Federal Commission for Space Affairs is preparing the Swiss space policy and the Interdepartmental Coordination Committee for Space is responsible for the interdepartmental coordination of the activities.

Activities

Most of the Swiss activities are undertaken within ESA programmes (space science, human spaceflight, launchers, Earth observation, navigation, Prodex).

Budget

In 2007, about 95 million euros, including 92.9 for ESA. A contribution to Eumetsat of about 6 million euros should be added.

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

274

707

2. Countries profiles

UNITED KINGDOM Population545

60.8 millions

GDP546

2,019 billion euros

Responsibility

The British National Space Centre (BNSC)573 coordinates the UK civil space policy and programmes. It is a partnership of 7 UK government departments and 2 research councils and is hosted by the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS).

Activities

In addition to ESA programmes, the main fields of activities are space science, Earth observation systems (Topsat), military and commercial communications systems and microsatellites.

Budget

In 2007/2008, BNSC’s partners spent 239 million pounds on space programmes (about 325 million euros, including 244 for ESA in 2007, 53 for national activities and 28 for Eumetsat).

Staff

BNSC headquarters – about 40

Direct employment in the space manufacturing industry549

3,144

275

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

European Space Agency Responsibility

The European Space Agency (ESA)574 is an inter-governmental organisation with the mission to provide and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, the exploitation of space science, research and technology as well as space applications. ESA achieves this through: * Space activities and programmes * A long-term space policy defined with the EC * A specific industrial policy * Coordinating European with national space programmes

Activities

ESA’s activities are divided into mandatory programmes (mainly scientific programmes) and optional programmes, including Telecommunications, Earth observation, launchers, human spaceflight, microgravity and exploration, and navigation.

Budget

In 2007, 2,975 million euros (including 2,639 from member States’ contributions). 2007 Contributions from ESA member States and Canada Contribution (in thousand euros) France

753,236

28.5%

Germany

578,314

21.9%

Italy

369,951

14.0%

Great Britain

243,156

9.2%

Belgium

145,285

5.5%

Spain

141,357

5.4%

Switzerland

92,937

3.5%

Netherlands

74,926

2.8%

Sweden

51,973

2.0%

Norway

43,322

1.6%

Austria

33,273

1.3%

Denmark

26,200

1.0%

Canada

21,954

0.8%

Finland

17,288

0.7%

Portugal

12,865

0.5%

Ireland

12,105

0.5%

Greece

11,168

0.4%

9,207

0.3%

2,638,517

100.0%

Luxembourg Total Staff 276

Percentage

2043 in Feb. 2008

2. Countries profiles

European Commission575 Responsibility

The European Commission’s responsibilities include: * Defining the priorities and requirements for space-based systems at the service of the EU’s main objectives, policies and citizens’ needs * Aggregating the political will and user demand in support of these * Ensuring the availability and continuity of operational services supporting EU policies * Ensuring the integration of space-based systems with related ground and in-situ systems to promote the development of user-driven application services supporting EU policies * Creating an optimum regulatory environment to facilitate innovation * Promoting the coordination of the European position in international cooperation

Activities

Space-related activities in the Commission take place in different Directorates. The Directorate Aerospace, GMES, Security and Defence of the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry DirectorateGeneral is responsible for the coordination of the European Commission’s space policy and the GMES activities. The Directorate General for Research is responsible for space-related research activities. The Directorate General for Energy and Transport is responsible for most Galileo-related activities.

Budget

The Framework Programme 7 has a budget dedicated to the Theme “Space” of 1,430 million euros576 over the period 2007–2013. This budget covers mainly GMES-related activities. The budgetary resources for EGNOS and Galileo were set at 3.4 billion for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013. The Galileo programme also benefits from additional funding from the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) programme.

277

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

Eumetsat Responsibility

The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat), founded in 1986, is an intergovernmental organisation which operates a fleet of meteorological satellites and related ground systems.

Activities

Eumetsat’s main purpose is to continuously deliver reliable and costefficient weather and climate-related satellite data, images and products. This information is supplied to the National Meteorological Services of the organisation’s 21 Member and 9 Cooperating States in Europe, as well as to other users worldwide. Through EUMETCast (Eumetsat’s Broadcast System for Environmental Data), Eumetsat disseminates data and products to a wide user community. In addition, Eumetsat provides training to help users exploit satellite data.

Budget577

In 2007, 205 million euros. The Member States’ contributions are based on a scale, proportional to the gross national income of the individual Member States. In addition, each of the Cooperating States contributes 50% of the full membership fee. 2007 Contributions of Eumetsat’s Member States (in %) Percentage Contribution (in million euros) Germany

21.4%

43.9

United Kingdom

16.6%

34.1

France

15.7%

32.2

Italy

12.6%

25.9

Spain

7.3%

14.9

Netherlands

4.4%

9.1

Switzerland

3.1%

6.3

Belgium

2.7%

5.5

Sweden

2.6%

5.3

Austria

2.2%

4.5

Norway

2.0%

4.1

Turkey

1.9%

3.9

Denmark

1.8%

3.7

Greece

1.4%

3.0

Finland

1.4%

2.9

Portugal

1.3%

2.6

Ireland

1.1%

2.2

Slovak Republic

0.3%

0.5

Croatia

0.2%

0.5

Luxembourg

0.2%

0.4

100.0%

205.5

Total Staff577 278

233 in Dec. 2007

2. Countries profiles

CANADA Population578

32.9 millions

GDP578

1,531 billion Canadian dollars/1,06 billion euros

Responsibility

The Canadian Space Agency (CSA)579 manages the Canadian space activities. It reports to the Parliament through the Ministry of Industry.

Activities

The CSA activities include: * Four key programmes: Earth Observation (Radarsat 2), Space Science and Exploration (MOST, ePOP on Cassiope), Satellite Communications (Anik), and Space Awareness and Learning. * Manned spaceflight (Canada has an astronaut corps) * Cooperation on a variety of projects with NASA (e.g. ISS, Dextre robotic arm, Phoenix, CloudSat, JWST) * Participation in ESA programmes as a Cooperating State Canada also develops – and cooperates with the U.S. on – military space capabilities.

Budget580

In 2007/2008, about 368.2 million Canadian dollars, i.e. about 255 million euros (including about 21.9 million euros for ESA).

Staff

CSA – 635

Employment in the space sector581

6,678 in 2006

279

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

CHINA Population578

1,321.1 millions

GDP578

24,664 billion Yuan Renminbi/2,294 billion euros

Responsibility

The CNSA (Chinese National Space Administration) coordinates the civilian space programmes and the cooperation with foreign space agencies. Until March 2008, CNSA was under the responsibility of the COSTIND (Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense). In March 2008, COSTIND was incorporated in the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and renamed as the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND). The GAD (General Armament Department), under the auspices of the Central Military Commission (CMC), runs the military space programmes, the launch infrastructure and manned spaceflight activities. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is responsible for space research and the elaboration of the National Programmes.

Activities

The Chinese activities include:582 * Satellites for science and technology demonstration (Shi Jian), Earth observation (Zi Yuan), navigation (Beidou), meteorological (Feng Yun), telecommunications (DFH) as well as recoverable capsules. * Lunar orbiter (Chang’e 1) * Commercial telecommunications satellites (sold for instance to Nigeria and Venezuela) * Ground facilities for satellites * Launch services, launchers (Long March) and launch facilities * Manned spaceflight * Bilateral cooperation with Brazil on CBERS satellites and with ESA on the scientific mission Double Star and on the Dragon programme in applications. * Development of the Beidou/Compass navigation system China is hosting the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) Headquarters.

Budget

Estimated between 1 and 2 billion euros.

280

2 . Countries profiles

INDIA

.. ..

r~,

1, 12 4 mill ions

~

4 5 ,4 54 billion Rupees/784 billion euros

':" -

The Space Commi ssion defines the Ind ian space poli cy and the Deportment o f Space is responsible fo r Indi o' s space act ivities . The Indian Space Research Organisat ion IISRO)583 implements the space programmes .

.. .

...-

....

~

........

The Indian space activi ties incl ude: • Remote sensing satelli tes (IRS) and multi-purpose satell ites (INSA T) w ith teleco mmunicat io ns and meteoro log ical functions • Dual-use satellites (CartoSat) • l au nch veh icles (PSlV and GSlV] and services • Sounding rockets • A ssoc ia ted ground systems • Cooperation mainly w ith Bulgaria , ESA and NASA an Chandrayaan-l , wi th CNES on M egha·Trop iq ues, Sorel a nd Oceo nso t-S, w ith A SI on Oceo nso t-Z, w ith Russia on Co ronas-Foton a nd Ch and ray a an-2, w ith Israel an TAUVE X and w ith Canada an UVIT In 2007/2008, about 32 .9 billion rupees (abou t 567 mill io n euros).

28 1

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

JAPAN Population578 578

127.8 millions

GDP

515,732 billion yen/3,127 billion euros

Responsibility

The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA),584 under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), manages the Japanese space activities. The Cabinet Secretariat is responsible for the IGS system and the Ministry of Defense oversees additional space-related activities.

Activities

The Japanese space activities include: * Scientific missions (Selene, Solar-B, Planet-C, Astro, Akebono) * ISS and manned spaceflight (Kibo module) * Earth observation (GOSAT, GCOM) * IGS (Information Gathering Satellites) * Telecommunications (ETS-VIII, Winds, QZSS) * Navigation (QZSS) * Technology development (Remei) * Launch services (HII-A and M-V) * Cooperation with ESA on BepiColombo, EarthCare and ALOS and with NASA on AQUA, TRMM, Geotail, GPM

Budget

In 2007/2008, 190 billion yens (1.15 billion euros) for JAXA from MEXT, 64 billion yens (0.4 billion euros) from the Cabinet Secretariat for IGS and 42 (0.25 billion euros) from the Ministry of Defense.

Staff

JAXA – about 1,700

282

2. Countries profiles

RUSSIA Population578 578

142.1 millions

GDP

32,989 billion Rubles/917 billion euros

Responsibility

Russia’s Federal Space Agency Roscosmos,585 under the direct responsibility of the Government, manages the Russian civil space activities, while the Military Space Forces (VKS) under the Ministry of Defence, manages the military space programmes.

Activities

The Russian civil activities defined in the Federal Space Programme for 2006–2015 include: * Satellites for science (Kompass), remote sensing (Resurs), communications * Launchers (Soyuz, Proton, Rockot, Cosmos, Start, Cyclone, Zenit, Volna, Shtil, as well as Dnepr with Ukraine, and Angara – under development) * Cooperation with international partners in commercial ventures to commercialise launch services (ILS, Starsem, Rockot, Cosmos, Sea Launch) * Cooperation with CNES on future launchers (Oural) * Manned spaceflight (ISS) in cooperation with NASA and ESA, including commercial activities (space tourists) * Associated ground facilities Military activities include dual-use navigation systems (Glonass), surveillance, early-warning, ELINT, and communications missions.

Budget

In 2007, Roscomos’ budget was 32.9 billion rubles (about 900 million euros), and the Federal Space Programme’s budget for 2006–2015 represents 305 billion rubles (about 8.5 billion euros).

283

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

UKRAINE Population578 578

46.1 millions

GDP

710 billion Hryvnia/95.5 billion euros

Responsibility

The National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU)586 is responsible for space activities in Ukraine, as are about 30 design offices, research institutes and enterprises that represent most of the Ukrainian space sector. The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine supervises space research in its institutes and has joint institutions with NSAU.

Activities

Ukraine has a National Space Programme that includes: * Scientific research (astrophysics and astronomy, ionosphere and magnetosphere research, microgravity and life sciences) * Launch vehicles and launch services  Operational launch vehicles (Zenit, Cyclone, Dnepr)  Launch vehicles under development (Cyclone 4, Dnepr-M, Mayak) * Remote sensing satellites (Okean and Sich series), telecommunications satellites (Lybid), automatic multi-purpose space platforms, * Rocket and spacecraft engines as well as advanced materials and technologies * Ground facilities (National Space Facilities Control and Test Centre in Yevpatoriya)

Budget

In 2007, 52 million euros

Staff

NSAU HQ-115

284

2. Countries profiles

USA Population578

299.1 millions

GDP578

13,844 billion U.S. dollars/9,4 billion euros

Responsibility

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)587 is responsible for most U.S. civil space programmes. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), under the Department of Commerce, manages the meteorological and oceanographic programmes. The Department of Defense (DoD), and in particular the Air Force, manages most of the military space programmes. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is responsible for the intelligence programmes.

Activities

The U.S. civil space activities include: Manned spaceflight (ISS) * Science (including Hubble, Stereo, THEMIS, Dawn, GLAST, Kepler, SDO) * Exploration (New Horizons, Phoenix with other international partners, LCROSS, LRO) * Earth observation (including AIM, Aqua, Terra, Aura, Calipso, CloudSat, Jason 2 with France) and meteorological satellites (GOES) * Commercial telecommunications satellites * Launchers and launch services (Shuttle, Pegasus, Minotaur, Falcon, Ares, Taurus) * Associated ground systems Military systems includes launchers (Atlas, Delta) as well as dual-use navigation (GPS), meteorological (DMSP), surveillance, intelligence, communications, early-warning, and technology demonstration systems. *

Budget

Most of the U.S. space budget comes from NASA and the DoD. In 2007, NASA’s budget amounted to 15.1 billion U.S. dollars (about 10.3 billions euros), which included about 7% for aeronautical activities.

285

Part 3 – Facts and Figures 545

Eurostat. Statistics In Focus 81/2008. Eurostat. Gross Domestic Product at market prices, 13 September 2008. 547 FFG website. www.ffg.at. 548 Eurospace. 2008 Facts & Figures Survey Report. 549 Belgian Federal Science Policy Office website. www.belspo.be/belspo/res/rech/spatres_en.stm. 550 Czech Space Office website. www.czechspace.cz. 551 DTU Space website. www.space.dtu.dk. 552 Tekes website. www.tekes.fi/eng/interests/interests.asp?aihe¼Avaruus&eng¼Space. 553 CNES website. www.cnes.fr. 554 ONERA website. www.onera.fr. 555 DLR website. www.dlr.de. 556 GSRT website. www.gsrt.gr. 557 Hungarian Space Office website. www.hso.hu. 558 Source HSO. 559 Enterprise Ireland. www.enterprise-ireland.com/space. 560 ASI website. www.asi.it. 561 Luxinnovation website. www.innovation.public.lu. 562 NVIR website. www.nivr.nl. 563 SRON website. www.sron.nl. 564 Norwegian Space Center website. www.spacecentre.no. 565 Space Research Centre website. www2.cbk.waw.pl. 566 Polish Space Office website. www.kosmos.gov.pl. 567 GPE website. www.grices.mctes.pt/gpe. 568 ROSA website. www.rosa.ro. 569 CDTI website. www.cdti.es/index.asp?MP¼15&MS¼192&MN¼3. 570 Swedish National Space Board. www.snsb.se. 571 SNSB Annual report 2007. 572 Space Affairs Division website. www.sbf.admin.ch/htm/themen/weltraum_fr.html. 573 BNSC. UK Space Activities 2007. www.bnsc.gov.uk/assets//channels/resources/publications/pdfs/ BNSC%20SpaceActivities_2007.pdf. 574 ESA website. www.esa.int. 575 European Space Policy website. ec.europa.eu/enterprise/space. 576 FP7 website. “Space” theme budget as of December 2006. http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/budget_en. html. 577 Eumetsat. Annual report 2007. 578 IMF. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008. 579 CSA website. www.space.gc.ca. 580 RPP 2006–2007, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0607/CSA-ASC/ csa-asc04-eng.asp#section3-2. 581 CSA. State of the Canadian Space Sector 2006. http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/pdf/etat_spatial_2006_e. pdf. 582 CNSA website. www.cnsa.gov.cn. 583 ISRO website. www.isro.org. 584 JAXA website. www.jaxa.jp. 585 Roskosmos website. www.roscosmos.ru. 586 NSAU website. www.nkau.gov.ua. 587 NASA website. www.nasa.gov. 546

286

3. Bibliography

3. Bibliography of space policy publications. July 2007–June 2008 Blandina Baranes

3.1. Monographs Allen, Marc S. NASA Space Science Vision Missions. Reston: AIAA, 2008. Andersen, Geoff. The Telescope: Its History, Technology, and Future. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Belfiore, Michael. Rocketeers: How a Visionary Band of Business Leaders, Engineers, and Pilots Is Boldly Privatizing Space. New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007. Bennett, Jeffrey. Beyond UFOs: The Search for Extraterrestrial Life and Its Astonishing Implications for Our Future. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Bond, Peter. The Earth Observation Handbook: Climate Change Special Edition 2008. Frascati: ESA Communication Production Office, 2008. Bortz, Alfred B. Astrobiology. Minneapolis, Minn.: Lerner Publications, 2007. Bruca, Loredana, Douglas Paul J. and Sorensen, Trevor. Space Operations: Mission Management, Technologies, and Current Applications. Reston: AIAA, 2007. Br€ unner, Christian, Soucek, Alexander and Walter, Edith, eds. Raumfahrt und Recht. Faszination Weltraum. Regeln zwiechen Himmel und Erde. Wien, K€oln, Graz: B€ohlau, 2007. Brzezinski, Matthew. Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age. London: Times Books, 2007. Callmers, William N., ed. Space Policy and Exploration. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008. Catchpole, John E. The International Space Station: Building for the Future. Berlin, New York: Springer; Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2008. Corfield, Richard. Lives of the Planets: A Natural History of the Solar System. New York: Basic Books, 2007. De Maria, Michelangelo and Orlando, Lucia. Italy in Space. In Search for a Strategy 1957–1975. Paris: Beauchesne, 2008. Diederiks-Verschoor, Isabella H.P. and Kopal Vladimır. An Introduction to Space Law. 3rd Edition. London: Kluver Law International, 2008. Duggins, Pat. Final Countdown: NASA and the End of the Space Shuttle Program. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007. Feuerbacher, Berndt and Messerschmid, Ernst. Vom All in den Alltag. Der Weltraum – Labor und Marktplatz. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 2007. French, Francis and Burgess, Colin. In the Shadow of the Moon: A Challenging Journey to Tranquility, 1965–1969. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Gainor, Chris. To a Distant Day: The Rocket Pioneers. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Gallagher, Nancy W. and Steinbruner, John D. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. Godwin, Matthew. The Skylark Rocket. British Space Science and the European Space Research Organisation 1957–1972. Paris: Beauchesne, 2007. Godwin, Robert. The Lunar Exploration Scrapbook. Burlington Ontario: Apogee Books, 2007. Gordon, Michael R. The Space Shuttle Program: How NASA Lost Its Way. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc., 2008. Hardesty, Von and Eisman, Gene. Epic Rivalry: The Inside Story of the Soviet and American Space Race. Washington DC: National Geographic Press, 2007. 287

Part 3 – Facts and Figures Hettling, Jana Kristin. Satellite Imagery for Verification and Enforcement of Public International Law. K€oln, M€ unchen: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2008. Hofmann-Wellenhof, Bernhard, Lichtenegger, Herbert and Wasle, Elmar. GNSS – Global Navigation Satellite Systems. ViennaWienNewYork: Springer, 2008. Hogan, Thor. Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative. Washington DC: NASA, 2007. Hunley, John Dillard. Preludes to U.S. Space-launch Vehicle Technology: Goddard Rockets to Minuteman III. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. ––––. U.S. Space Launch Vehicle Technology: Viking to Space Shuttle. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. IISL. 50th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space. Reston: AIAA, 2008. Kuhn, Betsy. The Race for Space: the United States and the Soviet Union Compete for the New Frontier. Minneapolis, Minn.: Twenty First Century Books, 2007. Launius, Roger D. and McCurdy, Howard E. Robots in Space: Technology, Evolution, and Interplanetary Travel. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. Laureys, Dawinka. La contribution de la Belgique a l'aventure spatiale Europeenne des origines a 1973. Paris: Beauchesne, 2008. Levin, Frank. Calibrating the Cosmos: How Cosmology Explains Our Big Bang Universe. New York: Springer, 2007. Logsdon, John M. and Launius, Roger D., eds. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program. Vol. 7, Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini and Apollo. Washington DC: NASA History Division, 2008. Martin, Donald, Anderson Paul R. and Bartamian, Lucy. Communication Satellites, Fifth Edition. Reston: AIAA, 2007. Matloff, Gregory L., Johnson, Les and Bangs, Constance. Living Off the Land in Space: Green Roads to the Cosmos. New York: Copernicus Books, 2007. Meltzer, Michael. Mission to Jupiter: A History of the Galileo Project. Washington DC: NASA History Division, 2007. ––––. When Biosheres Collide: A History of NASA’s Planetary Protection Programs. Washington DC: NASA History Division, 2008. Miller, Ron. Satellites. Minneapolis, Minn.: Twenty First Century Books, 2008. ––––. Space Exploration. Minneapolis, Minn.: Twenty First Century Books, 2008. ––––. Rockets. Minneapolis, Minn.: Twenty First Century Books, 2008. ––––. Robot Explorers. Minneapolis, Minn.: Twenty First Century Books, 2008. Mindell, David A. Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008. Moore, Mike. Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance. Oakland CA: The Independent Institute, 2008. Mudgway, Douglas J. William H. Pickering: America’s Deep Space Pioneer. Washington DC: NASA History Division, 2007. NASA. A View of NASA’s International Cooperation. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Earth Science Enterprise and Office of External Relations, 2008. Neufeld, Michael J. Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. OECD. The Space Economy at a Glance. Paris: OECD, 2008. Olla, Phillip. Commerce in Space: Infrastructures, Technologies, and Applications. PA: Hershey; London: Information Science Reference, 2008. Pelton, Joseph and Marshall, Peter. Space Exploration and Astronaut Safty. Reston: AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2007. Pisacane, Vincent L. The Space Environment and Its Effects on Space Systems. Reston: AIAA, 2008. Powell-Willhite, Irene E., ed. The Voice of Dr. Wernher von Braun. Burlington, Ontario: Apogee Books, 2007. 288

3. Bibliography Rapp, Donald. Human Missions to Mars: Enabling Technologies for Exploring the Red Planet. New York: Springer/Praxis Books, 2007. Ravillon, Laurence. Gestion et partage des risques dans les projets spatiaux. Paris: A. Pedone, 2008. Reinke, Niklas. The History of German Space Policy. Paris: Beauchesne, 2008. Reuter, Thomas. Die ESA als Raumfahrtagentur der Europ€aischen Union. K€oln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007. Schwab, Maximilian. Sachenrechtliche Grundlagen der kommerziellen Weltraumnutzung. K€oln, M€ unchen: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2008. Seedhouse, Erik. Tourists in Space: a Practical Guide. Berlin, New York: Springer; Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2008. Sheehan, Michael J. The International Politics of Space. Abingdon: Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007. Space Foundation. The space report: the Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity. Colorado Springs, CO: Space Foundation, 2008. Space Security Org. Space Security 2007. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Org., 2007. Spitzmiller, Ted. Astronautics: Book 1 – Dawn of the Space Age: A Historical Perspective of Mankind’s Efforts to Conquer the Cosmos. Burlington Ontario: Apogee Books, 2007. ––––. Astronautics: Book 2 – To the Moon and Towards the Future. Burlington Ontario: Apogee Books, 2007. Steinhardt, Paul J. and Turok, Neil. Endless Universe: Beyond the Big Bang. New York: Doubleday, 2007. Tsiao, Sunny. Read You Loud and Clear! The Story of NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network. Washington DC: NASA History Division, Office of External Relations, 2007. Turner, Pamela S. Life on Earth – and Beyond: An Astrobiologist’s Quest. Watertown, MA: Charlesbridge Publishing, 2008. Van Pelt, Michel. Space Invaders: How Robotic Spacecraft Explore the Solar System. New York: Copernicus Books, 2007. Viikari, Lotta. The Environmental Element in Space Law. Assessing the Present and Charting the Future. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. Watkins, Billy. Apollo Moon Missions: The Unsung Heroes. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Wie, Bong. Space Vehicle Dynamics and Control, Second Edition. Reston: AIAA, 2008. Zimmerman, Robert. The Universe in a Mirror: The Saga of the Hubble Space Telescope and the Visionaries Who Built It. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

3.2. Articles Armor, James B. Jr. “It is Time to Create a United States Air Force Space Corps.” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 273–288. Astorg, Jean-Marc, et al. “The Soyuz at Guyana Space Center Project: An Overview.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 425–431. Blamont, Jacques. “We the People: Consequences of the Revolution in the Management of Space Applications.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 13–21. Brumfitt, Anne, Thompson, Lachlan A. and Raitt, David. “The Art and Science of Mission Patches and their Origins in Society.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 715–720. Chatzipanagiotis, Michael. “Registration of Space Objects and Transfer of Ownership in Orbit.” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 56 (2007): 229–238. Cho, Gwang-Rae, et al. “The Korean Sounding Rocket Program.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 706–714. Clark, Benton C. “Mars Sample Return: The Critical Next Step.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 95–100. 289

Part 3 – Facts and Figures Dempsey, Paul Stephen. “The Evolution of US Space Policy.” Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIII (2008). Dos Santos, Álvaro Fabricio and Filho, Jose Montserrat. “Need for a National Brazilian Centre of Space Policy and Law Studies.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 6–9. Fay, Stephane. “Europe on Board the Space Station.” research eu 57 (2008): 30–33. Forden, Geoffrey. “China and Space War.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 138–153. Franklin, Mark. “Sovereignty and Functional Airspace Blocks.” Air and Space Law 32 (2007): 425–430. Freeland, Nyamuya Maogoto. “From Star Wars to Space Wars – The Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms to Anchor Space Security.” Air and Space Law 33 (2008): 10–37. Froehlich, Annette. “Die European Space Policy und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Verl€angerung des ESA/EG-Rahmenabkommens.” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 57 (2008): 67–77. Fukushima, Masahiko. “Legal Analysis of the International Space Station (ISS) Programme Using the Concept of “Legalisation”.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 33–41. Gable, Matthew W. “Take me to your Lawyer – The Inadequacies of Current Regime of Space Law and Its Effect on Commercialization of Space.” Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIII (2008). Garretson, Peter. “The Next Great White Fleet: Extending the Benefits of the International System into Space.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 50–70. Gerhard, Michael and Marenkov, Dmitry. “Zur Lizenzierung von Weltraumaktivit€aten in Russland.” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 56 (2007): 211–228. Gerhard, Michael, Kroymann, Max and Schmidt-Tedd, Bernhard. “Ein Gestz f€ur die Raumfahrt: Das neue Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz.” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 57 (2008): 40–54. Gibson, Roy. “The History of International Space Programmes.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 155–158. Giemulla, Elmar and Heinrich, Oliver. “Haftungsrisiken und Haftungsmanagement im Sat-Nav Bereich (Galileo).” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 57 (2008): 25–39. Halstead, Brandon C., Hart, Brandon L. and Singh, Karan. “Legal Analysis of a Case concerning Liability for Commercial Space Endeavors: Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition 2007 – Emeralda v. Mazonia.” Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIII (2008). Hart, Brandon L. “Anti-Satellite Weapons – Threats, Laws and Uncertain Future of Space.” Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIII (2008). Hays, Peter L. and Lutes, Charles D. “Towards a Theory of Spacepower.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 206–209. Henry, Philippe, et al. “The Militarization and Weaponization of Space: Towards a European Space Deterrent.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 61–66. Hertzfeld, Henry R. “Globalization, Commercial Space and Space Power in the USA.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 210–220. Hickman, John. “Problems of Interplanetary and Interstellar Trade.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 95–104. Huntley, Wade L. “Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of Space Governance.” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 237–271. Jahjah, Munzer, et al. “Archaeological Remote Sensing Application Pre-post War Situation of Babylon Archaeological Site – Iraq.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 121–130. Kasturirangan, Krishnaswamy. “Space Technology for Humanity: A Profile for the Coming 50 Years.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 159–166. Larrimore, Scott C. “International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 172–179. Launius, Roger D. “A Significant Moment for the Space Age.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 141–143. ––––. “Space Stations for the United States: An Idea Whose Time has Come – and Gone?” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 539–555. ––––. “Underlying Assumptions of Human Spaceflight in the United States.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 341–356. 290

3. Bibliography Lebeau, Andre. “Space: The Routes of the Future.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 42–47. Lee, Joosung J. “Legal Analysis of Sea Launch License: National Security and Environmental Concerns.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 104–112. Logsdon, John M. “Why Space Exploration Should be a Global Project.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 3–5. Lundquist, Charles A. “Fred L. Whipple, Pioneers in the Space Program.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 91–96. Macauley, Molly K. “Environmentally Sustainable Human Space Activities: Can Challenges of Planetary Protection be Reconciled?” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 209–236. ––––. “The Supply of Space Infrastructure: Issues in the Theory and Practice of Estimating Costs.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 70–79. Marshall, Will. “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 154–199. Martinez, Larry F. “Science in Service of Power: Space Exploration Initiatives as Catalysts for Regime Evolution.” Air and Space Law 32 (2007): 431–456. Manzini, Pietro and Masutti, Anna. “An International Civil Liability Regime for Galileo Services: A Proposal.” Air and Space Law 33 (2008): 114–131. Milowicki, Gene V. and Johnson-Freese Joan. “Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 1–21. Mineiro, Michael C. “The Legality of Outer Space Weaponization – Defining the Legal Parameters of Weaponization Applicable to the United States.” Annals of Air and Space Law 33 (2008). Mitchell, Robert T. “The Cassini Mission at Saturn.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 37–43. Moltz, James Clay. “Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 199–205. M€ uller, Hartmut, Heidmann Hans-J€org and Apel, Uwe. “Autonomous European Lunar Exploration – Entry Point for a Global Cooperation.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 88–94. Noichim, Chukeat. “Promoting ASEAN Space Cooperation.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 10–12. Paxton, Larry J. “‘Faster, Better, and Cheaper’ at NASA: Lessons Learned in Managing and Accepting Risk.” Acta Astronautica 61 (2007): 954–963. Peeters, Walter and Madauss, Bernd. “A Proposed Strategy Against Cost Overruns in the Space Sector: The 5C Approach.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 80–89. Pyne, Stephen J. “The Extraterrestrial Earth: Antarctica as Analogue for Space Exploration.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 147–149. Race, Margaret S. “Communicating about the Discovery of Extraterrestrial Life: Different Searches, Different Issues.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 71–78. Robinson, George S. “Space Law for Humankind, Transhumans and Post Humans – Is There a Need for a Unique Theory of Natural Law Principles?” Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIII (2008). Rohner, Nicola, Schrogl, Kai-Uwe and Cheli, Simonetta. “Making GMES Better Known: Challenges and Opportunities.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 195–198. Sadeh, Eligar. “Export Controls of Space Technologies.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 105–111. ––––. “Bureaucratic Politics and the Case of Satellite Export Controls.” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 289–302. Salin, Patrick A. “US Space-related Rules Adopted in 2005/2006.” Air and Space Law 32 (2007): 179–194. Schaffer, Audrey M. “What do Nations want from International Collaboration for Space Exploration?” Space Policy 24 (2008): 95–103. Sim, Liang, Cummings, Mary L. and Smith, Cristin A. “Past, Present and Future Implications of Human Supervisory Control in Space Missions.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 648–655. Smith, Lesley Jane and Doldirina, Catherine. “Remote Sensing: A Case for Moving Space Data Towards the Public Good.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 22–32. Snead, James Michael. “Spacefaring Logistics Infrastructure: The Foundation of a Spacefaring America.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 71–94. 291

Part 3 – Facts and Figures Spall, Nick. “Creating a UK Human Spaceflight Capability: A Modest Proposal.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 150–154. Suzuki, Kazuto. “Space and Modernity: 50 Years on.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 144–146. Swartwout, Michael, et al. “Mission Results for Sapphire, a Student-built Satellite.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 521–538. Tarikhi, Parviz. “Iran’s Ambitions in Space.” Position 35 (2008): 63–65. Turcat, Nicolas. “The Link Between Aerospace Industry and NASA During the Apollo Years.” Acta Astronautica 62 (2008): 66–70. Vedda, James A. “Challenges to the Sustainability of Space Exploration.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 22–49. Wajnberg, Alexandre. “Six Months above the Earth” research eu 53 (2007): 30–31. Wassersug, Richard J. “Truly Dead or Just Comatose? The Status of Space Biology at the Half-century Mark.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 67–69. Wilmouth, Rupert and Sivalingam, Raj. “The New UK Civil Space Strategy, 2008–2012.” Space Policy 24 (2008): 90–94. Wins-Seemann, Elmar. “Das Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz aus industrieller Sicht – Angemessener Rahmen f€ ur die kommerzielle Nutzung von weltraumgest€utzten Fernerkundungssystemen.” ZLW – Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (German Journal of Air and Space Law) 57 (2008): 55–66. Wortzel, Larry M. “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare.” Astropolitics 6 (2008): 112–137. Zelnio, Ryan J. “Whose Jurisdiction over the US Commercial Satellite Industry? Factors Affecting International Security and Competition.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 221–233. Zhongyang, Zheng. “The Origins and Development of China’s Manned Spaceflight Programme.” Space Policy 23 (2007): 167–171.

292

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

List of figures and tables

Figures Part 1: The Year in Space 2007/2008

Figure 1: Estimate of the major space powers’ public space budgets in 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2: Estimate of the top 10 space institutions according to their space budgets in 2007 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 3: Share of revenues generated by commercial launch services in 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 4: Worldwide shares of GEO orders signed per launch services provider in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 5: Commercial GEO satellite orders in 2007 by manufacturer . . . Figure 6: GEO commercial and non-commercial satellite orders won in 2007 by satellite manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 7: Military spacecraft launched in 2007 by country . . . . . . . . . . Figure 8: Total worldwide orbital launches per entity in 2007 . . . . . . . . Figure 9: Estimate of the mass launched per country/entity and commercial status in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 10: Worldwide commercial and non-commercial orbital launches per country/entity in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 11: Worldwide orbital launches per vehicle in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . Figure 12: Launches performed by launch site in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 33 36 42 44 44 48 75 76 76 77 78

Part 2: Views and Insights

Figure 1: Proposal of a suitable governance and data policy model for a European SSA system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2: The European human spaceflight projects of the 1980s: the visitable station MTTF and the Hermes spaceplane, which were

147

293

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

started as an answer to the U.S. call for participation in an international space station programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 3: The integration of Russia into the ISS programme was accompanied by a U.S. – Russian cooperation on joint Mir-Space Shuttle operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 4: International centres involved in ISS operations. . . . . . . . . . . Figure 5: The lunar exploration architecture defined by NASA in 2005 includes all elements necessary for a return to the Moon without any international partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 6: Global Exploration Strategy Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 7: Common steps for a global exploration strategy . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 8: ITER International Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 9: Anonymous wood engraving: “A middle-age missionary claimed he had found the place where the Heavens and Earth meet.” . . . . Figure 10: Aurora – en route to Mars and the Moon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 11: Europe and the International Space Station: ESA elements (dark grey) and Space Station elements to which ESA contributed (light grey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 12: The Automated Transfer Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 13: ATV evolution – the Large Cargo Return scenario . . . . . . . Figure 14: Industry distribution of the space industry in the United States, 1999 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 15: Civil Earth Observation Satellites per launch date and country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 16: First session of the 24-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 27 November 1961 after it was established by a General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1959. Newly elected Chairman, Dr. Franz Matsch (centre) of Austria, is seen here as he presided the meeting. Other Officers are L. to R.: Professor Mihail Haseganu (Romania), Vice-Chairman; U. Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the U.N.; Dr. Matsch; Mr. F.Y. Chai, Committee Secretary; and Mr. Geraldo de Carvalho Silos (Brazil), Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 17: Opening of the 50th session of the 67-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held in Vienna, Austria, on 6 June 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 18: Poster published by the United Nations on the occasion of the 50th session of the 67-member Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

172

173 174

177 178 182 185 189 192

199 200 204 220 234

239

240

241

List of figures and tables

Tables Part 1: The Year in Space 2007/2008 Table 1: Triadic patent families in the European Union, United States, Japan and other countries as a percentage of the world total in 1996 and 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 2: Share of space-related patents filed per country at the EPO and USPTO in 1980–2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 3: Signature and ratification of the five United Nations space-related treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 4: Estimated breakdown of global commercial space revenues in 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 5: Top 10 FSS operators in 2007 (adapted from Space News) . . . Table 6: Orbital debris per major space country as of 25 June 2008 as catalogued by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (Source: NASA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 7: FAA-permitted flight events in 2007/2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 11 12 34 46

55 108

Part 2: Views and Insights Table Table Table Table

1: The work packages of the Galileo programme . . . . . . . . . . . . 2: The five Galileo signals and their characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 3: High-level end-user needs, services, and communities. . . . . . . 4: Number of space travellers by citizenship as of May 2008. The USSR and Russia (from 1991 onwards) are listed as different countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 5: Requirements for global exploration cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . Table 6: Comparison of space in 1958 and 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127 131 141

170 181 214

295

About the authors

About the authors Werner Balogh is a Programme Officer in the Committee Services and Research Section of the Office for Outer Space Affairs at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. Before, he worked as International Relations Officer of the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) and as Programme Manager of the Austrian Space Agency. Prior to this, as the Associate Expert for Space Applications in the Space Applications Section of the Office for Outer Space Affairs, he was involved with the organization of the UNISPACE III conference and with capacity building activities in space technology and its applications. He has been a representative and delegate to various international space-related bodies and fora as well as to several programme boards of the European Space Agency and to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). He is a member of the International Institute of Space Law and of the International Academy of Astronautics. Werner Balogh holds engineering and doctorate degrees in technical physics from the Vienna University of Technology, a Master of Science degree in space studies from the International Space University and a Master of Arts degree in international affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Blandina Baranes joined the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) in Vienna in February 2005. She is the librarian and documentalist of ESPI. Before she was the chief librarian of the Jewish Studies Department at the University of Vienna. During the past years she has been working as documentalist and librarian for different institutions such as, The Austrian Broadcasting Corporation, DER SPIEGEL and others. She conducted her studies and research in Austria and Israel and graduated with a Master from Vienna University, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology Marcel Dickow has been a post-doc fellow researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) since April 2007. His research project “Space – A new dimension for the EU” is funded by the German Volkswagen Foundation and deals with the link of the new European Space Policy (ESP) to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Marcel Dickow holds a doctorate degree in Physics and a Masters degree in Political Science. He has recently served as a scientific advisor in space affairs to the German Federal Foreign Office and to the European Commission. He was a visiting researcher at the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) in 2007 and will be a research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2009. 296

About the authors

Alain Dupas is an international expert in space technologies, industries and policies as well as in defence and information technologies and industries. Since 2004, he has occupied the part-time position of Director of Strategic Studies at the Collège de Polytechnique, Paris. As an international consultant, he has been Senior Space Advisor to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London since 2000. Trained as a physicist, Alain Dupas obtained a Doctorat d’Etat from the Universite Paris-XI/Orsay in 1977. He is one of the founders of a multidisciplinary teaching course at the Universite de Versailles-St Quentin en Yvelines (Master of Strategic System Analysis) where he is a researcher and teaches courses on the “Relationships between Strategies and Technologies” and on “Methodologies for System Analysis”. In the 1980s, he became – and still is – a research associate of the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University (Washington, D.C.). In 1987, Alain Dupas was one of the founders of the think tank CREST-Ecole Polytechnique (Center for Research on Relationships between Strategies and Technologies of the Ecole Polytechnique) where he created a centre of competencies in aerospace strategies and the impact of new technologies on security. He was Scientific and Technical Director of CREST between 1987 and 1993 and directed many studies on aerospace and different high-technology fields. Since 1993, he has been working as an expert for many organisations and companies, including Aerospatiale – later EADS, SEP – now part of Safran, Alcatel Alenia Space – now Thalès Alenia Space, ESA, CNES, ONERA, Altran, SES Astra, Eutelsat, etc. Alain Dupas has specialised in international space policy studies with a focus on human spaceflight and exploration and strategic space applications. He has conducted many analyses on the development of information technologies and their impact on aerospace, and was also a part-time advisor to the French Space Agency CNES between 1982 and 2004. Between 1989 and 1993, Alain Dupas was a Board member of the International Space University (ISU) and participated in many ISU Summer Schools as a faculty member. He was the European Editor of the scholarly journal “Space Policy” from its foundation in 1983 until 2003. He is the author of many books, including “L’^age des satellites” (Satellite Age, Hachette 1977), “Une autre histoire de l’espace” (A Different History of Space, Gallimard 2000) and “Destination Mars” (Solar 2002) which was translated into English and published by Firefly Books in 2004. Giovanni Gasparini is a research fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome. Holding a degree in Economics, his main areas of research include: the ESDP, NATO, the aerospace and defence industry, defence economics, and transatlantic relations. Giovanni Gasparini served in the Italian Air Force, working as a military researcher at the Military Centre for Strategic Studies of 297

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

the Italian Ministry of Defence (CeMiSS). He is a consultant to CeMiSS and regularly contributes to the Monthly Observatory on European Defence and Defence Industry Issues. He has been a visiting fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) in Paris and a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Mischa Hansel is a research assistant and Ph.D. candidate at the Chair for International and Foreign Policy Analysis at the University of Cologne, headed by Prof. Dr. Thomas J€ager. Recently, he became a member of the editorial team of the newly founded Zeitschrift f €ur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Journal of Foreign and Security Policy, ZfAS). He studied Political Science, Medieval and Modern History, and German Philology in Cologne. His research interests include the theoretical understanding and empirical analysis of international order, causes of war studies, strategic studies, and particularly European and international space policy. His research findings were presented at the annual conferences of the British International Studies Association (BISA) and the International Studies Association (ISA) in Cork and Chicago, respectively, and at the German Armed Forces General and Staff Academy in Hamburg. Mischa Hansel has taught courses on international politics, methods of social science, and causes of war studies at the University of Cologne and Matej Bel University Banska Bystrica (Slovakia). His dissertation focuses on the changing actors, interests and vulnerabilities in international space policy, and their repercussions regarding the international space regime. The dissertation is supported by a dissertation grant from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Niklas Hedman is Chief of Committee Services and Research Section of the Office for Outer Space Affairs at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. Before joining the United Nations in 2006, he worked in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in particular in the areas of Law of the Sea, including the ratification by Sweden of UNCLOS, maritime boundary delimitation and fisheries; Space Law and Space Affairs; as well as on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular biological weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (HCOC). He represented Sweden to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for ten years and held various positions, including Chairman of the UNISPACE III þ 5 review, and Chairman of the Working Group of the Legal Subcommittee on registration practice until he joined the United Nations. He has also held the position of Vice Chairman of the International Relations Committee of ESA, responsible for coordination at sessions of COPUOS. He has been involved in several academic conferences and workshops on space law and policy as speaker and moderator. He is a member of the 298

About the authors

International Committee on Space Law of the International Law Association, the International Institute of Space Law and the International Academy of Astronautics. Niklas Hedman holds degrees in general law from Uppsala University, in international law from National University of Singapore, and in maritime law, marine insurance law and petroleum law from Oslo University. Henry R. Hertzfeld is a research professor of Space Policy and International Affairs in the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He is an expert in the legal and economic issues concerning the impacts on the economy and society of space and technology programmes. He has authored studies of the economics and policies of launch vehicles, Earth observation, technology transfer, and other space programmes as well as on legal and regulatory issues related to space including the analysis of the commercialisation and privatisation of the space environment. He teaches a course in Space Law and is the Faculty Advisor to the annual Space Law Moot Court Team at GW. He also teaches a course in the Economics Department. Lucia C. Marta is a researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome. She mainly works on issues linked to the defence economy and industry. In this capacity, she also collaborates with the Osservatorio Transatlantico and on the “SIPRI Yearbook”. Currently, Lucia Marta pursues several European studies and projects dealing with the use of space assets for defence and European security purposes. After her degree in Political Science from the Universita degli Studi in Milan, Lucia Marta obtained a Masters degree in International Strategic-Military Studies at the Center for Advanced Defence Studies (CADS) in Rome. She completed a traineeship with the Italian delegation to the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna) and was a research assistant in the area of defence and security at the Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS), Paris. Charlotte Mathieu has been a Research Fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) since October 2006. Before joining ESPI, she was a research assistant at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where she conducted research on “fractionated” satellite architectures for DARPA for two years. In 2003–04, she was a Young Graduate Trainee in the Cost Engineering Division at ESTEC. She interned at the CNES Washington Office, EADS Launchers and SNECMA. She holds a double Masters degree in aerospace engineering from the Ecole Centrale Paris, France, and the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Sweden, as well as a second Masters degree in Technology and Policy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA. She also holds a degree in Economics from Universite Pierre Mendès France, France. 299

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

Laurence Nardon is a senior research fellow and the manager of the Space Policy Programme at Ifri, the French Institute of International Relations in Paris. She also teaches at the Institut d‘etudes politiques de Paris. Her field of expertise is space policy, looking at the military, commercial and exploratory aspects of space programmes in Europe, the U.S., Asia and Russia. Prior to joining Ifri, she was a research analyst at Aerospatiale Espace et Defense (now EADS Astrium ST), then at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS). She was also a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. from 2001 to 2003. Laurence Nardon holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Universite Paris-1 Pantheon-Sorbonne. She studied at the University of Kent at Canterbury after having graduated from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. In the fall of 2000, she was a Fulbright scholar at the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. Laurence Nardon has published numerous books, monographs and articles on space policy. Nicolas Peter is currently Research Fellow at the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI). He has been a Lockheed Martin Fellow for two years at the Space Policy Institute at the George Washington University (GWU) and has worked for the X PRIZE Foundation in Washington D.C. on future space prizes. Mr. Peter has also been a Trainee in the Science, Technology and Education Section of the European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, as well as Teaching Associate for the International Space University’s Master programme and a Faculty and Team Project Co-chair for the Summer Session Programme. Nicolas Peter has completed various research activities in Europe (France and Austria) North America (Canada and USA) and Asia-Pacific (Australia and Japan). His primary research interests are in space policy and international relations. Mr. Peter has published and presented over 80 reports, book chapters, articles in peer-reviewed journals, international conferences related to space activities, particularly on space policy issues. He has also been invited to be rapporteur for sessions dealing with space policy affairs held in the framework of international space conferences in Canada, Spain and India. Mr. Peter holds a Bachelor of Geography from the Louis Pasteur University in Strasbourg, France. He holds also his first Masters Degree in Space Systems and Environment and second Masters Degree in Space Technology Applications from the Louis Pasteur University. Nicolas Peter is also a graduate from the International Space University’s Master in Space Studies programme and holds a Master of International Science and Technology Policy from GWU’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Kai-Uwe Schrogl is the Director of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) in Vienna, Austria since 1 September 2007. Before, he was Head Corporate 300

About the authors

Development and External Relations Department in the German Aerospace Center (DLR). In his previous career he worked with the German Ministry for Post and Telecommunications and the German Space Agency (DARA). He has been delegate to numerous international forums and recently served as the chairman of various European and global committees (ESA International Relations Committee, UNCOPUOS working groups). Kai-Uwe Schrogl has published nine books and more than 100 articles, reports and papers in the fields of space policy and law as well as telecommunications policy. He is Member of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law, Member of the International Academy of Astronautics (chairing its Commission on policy, economics and law) and the Russian Academy for Cosmonautics as well as member in editorial boards of international journals in the field of space policy and law (Acta Astronautica, Space Policy, Zeitschrift f€ur Luft- und Weltraumrecht, Studies in Space Law/Nijhoff). He holds a doctorate degree in political science, lectures international relations at T€ ubingen University, Germany (as a Honorarprofessor) and has been a regular guest lecturer i.a. at the International Space University and the Summer Courses of the European Centre for Space Law. Isabelle Sourbès-Verger is a researcher at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and is currently the Deputy Director of the Laboratoire Communication et Politique in Paris. From 2000 to 2004, she was also a senior researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) in Paris. Before, she was a member of the Center of Research on Strategy and Technology (CREST), Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau. As a geographer, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger focuses her research on the occupation of outer space and the international comparison of space policies. She recently edited several volumes, among them “Un empire très celeste, la Chine a la conqu^ete de l’espace” (with D. Borel, Dunod 2008), the “Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space” (with R. Ghirardi and F. Verger, Cambridge University Press 2003), and “L’espace, nouveau territoire: atlas des satellites et des politiques spatiales” (with R. Ghirardi and F. Verger, Belin 2002). She has also published many articles in different journals, such as the McGill Air and Space Annals, Questions Internationales and Courrier des Pays de l’Est, and has participated in various international studies directed by the Eisenhower Institute (Washington, D.C.), the Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), the European Space Policy Institute (Vienna), and McGill University (Montreal). She is a guest lecturer at French universities as well as at the International Space University. Among other responsibilities, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger is a member of the Scientific Committee of Hermès Journal, an Expert on Social Sciences to the Delegation Generale pour l’Armement (DGA), a member of the Scientific Committee of the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Ingenieurs des Etudes et 301

Part 3 – Facts and Figures

Techniques d’Armements (ENSIETA) in Brest, and a member of the Space Commission of the French Society of Space and Air Law (SFDAS). Jean-ClaudeWorms is Head of the Space Sciences Unit of the European Science Foundation (ESF), managing the European Space Sciences Committee and all space programmes of the ESF. He holds a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Paris 6 and was an assistant professor in Physics and Astronomy (Paris 6 and Versailles) from 1989 to 1992. He is an associate researcher at the Laboratoire de Physique et Chimie de l’Atmosphère, the Laboratoire des Sciences de l’Image et de la Teledetection, the Laboratoire des Systèmes Photoniques, and the Service d’Aeronomie. Having worked on radiative transfer in granular media, preplanetary aggregation and space debris, he was Principal Investigator of the PROGRA2 facility (dealing with the polarimetry of dust clouds in microgravity), the LIBRIS project (on the in-orbit optical detection of space debris), and Co-Investigator of ESA’s ICAPS facility (studying particle systems on the ISS). Jean-Claude Worms has been the Main Scientific Organiser and editor of solar system sessions in the Scientific Assemblies of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) since 1998 and is a member of the editorial board of the International Journal on Nanotechnologies. In 1994, he was also a consultant for Dassault on the state-of-the-art French civilian research in infrared and SAR imaging. He is involved in high-level science advisory structures of ESA and the European Commission, and has had observer status at ESA’s Ministerial Conferences since 1999. As a result of the unique structure of the ESSC which reflects the whole variety of space-related disciplines, he deals with strategic planning, programme evaluation and reviewing, and intelligence monitoring in every sector of space sciences, including space policy and GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security). Jan Wouters is professor of international law and the law of international organizations and Director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the Institute for International Law at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. He is also visiting professor at the College of Europe, Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Council on International Affairs of the Flemish Government, and President of the United Nations Association Flanders-Belgium. He practises law as Of Counsel at Linklaters in Brussels. He studied law and philosophy in Antwerp and Yale University (LLM 1990), worked as a visiting researcher at Harvard Law School and defended his Ph.D. at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. He has held teaching positions at the Universities of Antwerp, Liège and Maastricht and worked previously as referendaire at the European Court of Justice. He is the editor of the International Encyclopedia of Intergovernmental Organizations, is vice-director of the Revue belge de droit international and participates in the 302

About the authors

European Network of Excellence Connex (Connecting Excellence in European Governance). Prof. Wouters has published widely on international law and international organisations, European Union law and corporate and financial law, including a recent comprehensive handbook on public international law (with M. Bossuyt), a book on the World Trade Organization (with B. De Meester: The World Trade Organization. A Legal and Institutional Analysis, Intersentia, 2007) as well as a number of edited books, including Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004), Legal Instruments in the Fight Against International Terrorism (Martinus Nijhof, 2004) and The United Nations and the European Union. An Ever Stronger Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006).

Contributors to the Yearbook on Space Policy 2007/2008 during the authors’ conference on 11 September 2008 at ESPI in Vienna. From left: Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Charlotte Mathieu, Jan Wouters, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, Lucia Marta, Nicolas Peter, Blandina Baranes, Jean-Claude Worms, Laurence Nardon, Mischa Hansel, Henry R. Hertzfeld, Marcel Dickow.

303

Index

Index A Abertis telecom 37 Afghanistan 4, 7 African Union 6, 23, 56, 58, 65, 232 Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI) 25, 80, 89, 187, 270, 281, 286 Algeria 7, 13, 17, 103, 250 Allard Commission 52 Alliant Techsystems 38, 104 Anti-Satellite test (ASAT) 26, 153 Applications 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29–31, 34, 35, 43, 50, 54, 55, 60, 63, 65–67, 90, 91, 93, 99, 102, 112–114, 117–119, 130, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 166, 188, 201, 222, 226, 230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 239, 242–246, 247, 249, 260, 263, 265, 269, 272, 273, 276, 286, 296, 297, 300 Ares-I 70, 109, 256, 257 Ares-V 70, 256, 257 Ariane 24, 41, 61, 69, 77, 80, 93–95, 104, 161, 169, 171, 186, 197, 198, 204, 208, 254–256 Arianespace 41, 42, 61, 69, 79, 94, 110, 213 Asia Pacific Cooperation Organisation (APSCO) 16, 58, 68, 109, 235, 280 Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) 69, 72, 80, 110, 161, 173, 183, 196, 198, 199, 204–208, 255 Autonomous access to space 29, 72, 73

B Ba€ıkonur Cosmodrome 41, 42, 61, 98 Bali Roadmap 8 Basic Law for Space Activities 53, 59 Biodiversity Observatory Network (GEO BON) 16 304

Brazil 15, 16, 31, 46, 47, 67, 68, 72, 102, 110, 164, 214, 233, 239, 243, 250, 261, 262, 280 British National Space Centre (BNSC) 25, 187, 263, 275, 286 Budgets 9, 32, 33, 140, 149 Buy America Act 212, 224

C Cape Town Ministerial Declaration 15 Cassini 86, 111, 259 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 221, 225, 300 Centre for the “Open Initiative” 14 Centre National des Études Spatiales (CNES) 24, 33, 34, 66, 88, 91, 101, 187, 256, 260, 267, 281, 283, 286, 297, 299 Chang’e 1 29, 65, 67, 82, 84, 258, 280 China 2, 5, 6, 10, 14–16, 28, 29, 31–33, 40, 41–43, 45, 47, 48, 52–55, 58–60, 62, 64–68, 72, 73, 75–79, 81–84, 86, 92, 94, 102, 104, 109, 110, 112, 135, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 163, 164, 170, 178, 182, 183, 185, 187, 194, 201, 209, 214, 217, 219, 225, 233, 235, 250, 260– 263, 280 Climate Change 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 20, 24–26, 65, 66, 101, 106, 229, 232, 236, 244, 246, 249 Cold War 53, 132, 165, 168, 172, 197, 201, 212, 213, 215, 216 Columbus 24, 80, 173, 175, 176, 196– 199, 202, 203, 207, 259 Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) 71, 133, 257 Committee for Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) 13, 57

Index

Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG) 14, 57, 244, 251 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) 13, 57, 153, 154, 161, 162, 237, 239, 240–245, 247–249, 298 Competitiveness 3, 12, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 37, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 58, 63, 66, 72, 121, 122, 136, 210–212 Conference on Disarmament (CD) 15, 152–156, 158, 160–163 Conferencia Espacial de las Americas (CEA) 17 Constellation 17, 27, 30, 41, 42, 49, 50, 53, 54, 62, 70, 80, 95, 98, 99, 101–103, 106, 113, 143, 161, 177 COROT (COnvection, ROtation and planetary Transits) 88, 265 Czech Republic 18, 22, 59, 250, 266

D Data policy 138, 140, 142–144, 146–150 Debris 55, 56, 139, 142, 153, 159 Department of Defense (DoD) 26, 33, 60, 83, 220, 285 Deutsches Zentrum f€ur Luft-und Raumfahrt (DLR) 14, 24, 82, 84, 110, 129, 187, 268, 286, 301 Direct Broadcast Services (DBS) 34, 35, 45 Direct-to-home (DTH) television 34, 35 Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) 222 Disaster monitoring 28, 53 Dragon-1 67 Dragon-2 65, 67 Dual-use 47, 50, 92, 101, 138, 157, 161, 210, 216, 217–219, 270, 281, 283, 285

E Earth Observation 14–17, 24–26, 29–31, 35, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 64, 65–68, 84, 90, 100, 102, 103, 148, 198, 218, 226– 227, 231–233, 235, 236, 245, 251, 260,

262, 264, 268–276, 279, 280, 282, 285, 299 Energy 3–5, 22, 88, 89, 105, 106, 113, 137, 163, 218, 219, 225, 244, 274, 277 Environment 4, 6, 9, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 30, 59, 64, 65, 79, 83, 84, 86– 88, 100–103, 106, 109, 116–118, 123, 132, 133, 143, 153, 188, 191, 193–195, 198, 226, 227, 230, 236, 237, 245, 248, 269, 277, 278, 300, 302 European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) 32, 57, 58–62, 109–111, 114, 208, 296, 299, 300 ESTRACK (European Space Tracking) 82 EU Council 135, 144, 147 EU-African Union Summit 3 EU-Brazil Summit 3 EU-Japan Summit 4 EU-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 4 Eumetsat 23, 64–66, 101, 231, 260, 265– 275, 278, 286, 296 Europe 3, 4, 9, 11, 17–20, 22, 24, 35–37, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51, 59, 63, 64–70, 72, 74–78, 80–82, 84, 85, 91–93, 95, 98, 100, 101, 104, 109–111, 119, 124, 128, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143, 151, 152, 157, 161, 164, 165, 169, 171–173, 183, 184, 186, 188–209, 226, 230, 231, 236, 254, 258, 260, 278, 293, 299, 301, 302 European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 36, 37, 39, 44, 45, 50, 92, 107, 127, 135, 297, 299 European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)-Astrium 37, 43, 44, 103, 107, 127, 208, 300 European Commission (EC) 15, 16, 20, 37, 38, 62, 65, 91, 95, 100, 113, 116–120, 122–124, 126, 127, 137, 147, 150, 162, 166, 231, 236, 263, 264, 276, 277, 300, 302 European Council 4, 51, 91, 116, 119 European Council’s Working Group on Global Arms Control and 305

Index

Disarmament matters (CODUN) 51, 62, 153, 154, 158 European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) 95–97, 100, 113, 123, 136, 263, 277 European Interparliamentary Space Conference (EISC) 22, 24, 58 European Parliament (EP) 19, 21, 51, 91, 96, 97, 113, 117, 118, 121, 123, 126, 134, 136, 137, 150, 151, 153, 162, 264 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 49–51, 118, 134, 144, 120, 122, 151, 152, 162, 296, 297 European Space Agency (ESA) 8, 18, 19, 22, 24–26, 33, 34, 51, 55, 57–59, 64, 66–69, 72, 80, 83–89, 91, 96–98, 100, 101, 105, 110–113, 116, 118, 121–124, 126–128, 130, 132, 136, 138, 141, 146–148, 150, 152, 153, 157, 158, 161, 165–167, 169, 171–175, 182, 183, 185–200, 196, 197, 202–208, 220, 225, 230, 231, 236, 251, 258, 259, 261, 262–276, 279, 280–283, 286, 296, 297, 298, 301, 302 European Space Astronomy Centre (ESAC) 18, 258 European Space Policy 17–19, 22, 32, 48, 51, 57, 58, 59, 60–62, 109–111, 114, 121–124, 139, 150, 152, 153, 162, 202, 208, 251, 286, 296, 299–301 European Space Programme 18, 19, 121, 122, 124, 128, 186 European Union (EU) 2–4, 10, 11, 18–22, 24, 25, 50, 51, 56–58, 61, 62, 65, 91, 96, 97, 112, 113, 116–128, 133–137, 139, 143, 144, 147, 149, 150–153, 156, 157, 158–163, 166, 185, 205, 206, 209, 224, 226, 231, 232, 263–265, 277, 296, 298, 300, 303 European Union Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council 20, 91, 96, 97 ExoMars 66, 85, 110, 188, 190–192, 266 Exploration 13, 17–19, 24–26, 29, 30, 43, 57, 59, 60, 63–68, 70, 71, 79–87, 306

89–90, 106, 109–112, 121, 129, 132, 159, 164–166, 168, 173–178, 198, 203–205, 208, 209, 219, 236, 237, 240, 242, 243, 247, 249, 250–252, 258, 263, 272, 276, 279, 282, 285, 297 Export Administration Regulations (EAR) 210, 217, 222, 224 Export control 109, 194, 210–213, 215–219, 221–225

F Fast Track Services Federal Space Programme 2006–2015 Federal Target Programme 27, 53, 98 Feng Yun-C 56, 102, 280 Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 34, 35, 45, 46, 294 Framework Programme (FP7) for Research, Technological Development 21, 58, 117, 122, 277, 286 France 11, 18, 23, 24, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 50, 55–59, 64, 90, 92, 111, 112, 119, 124, 133–135, 137, 166, 170, 187, 197, 203, 250, 265, 267, 273, 274, 276, 278, 285, 299, 300 Fukuda Doctrine 5 Full Operational Capability (FOC) 20, 96, 126

G Galileo 18–22, 24, 50, 51, 64, 65, 87, 95, 96–99, 112, 113, 118, 123, 125–131, 133, 134–137, 144, 146, 148, 149, 158, 161, 163, 229, 263, 264, 277, 294 Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU) 118, 123 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 212 Geographic return 97 GEOSS (Group on Earth Observation System of Systems) 15, 16, 231 Geostationary orbit 35, 92, 93, 99, 169, 228, 248, 252

Index

Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) 67, 68, 73, 77, 81, 92, 254, 256, 281 Germany 9, 11, 18, 24, 32, 33, 47, 48–50, 56–59, 62, 82, 83, 90, 100, 101, 112, 126, 128, 145, 151, 153, 157, 169, 170, 183, 187, 197, 202, 203, 250, 260, 262, 267, 268, 274, 276, 278, 301 Giove-A 98, 129 Giove-B 98, 113, 129, 136, 137, 261 Global Exploration Strategy (GES) 66, 89, 90, 176, 178–183, 186, 187, 191, 195, 293 Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) 19–22, 24, 50, 51, 58, 65, 100, 101, 113, 128, 136, 143– 145, 147, 161, 226, 230–232, 236, 263–265, 277, 302 Global Navigation Satellite System (Glonass) 14, 27, 57, 64, 99, 113, 123, 229, 244, 255, 260, 261, 264, 283 Global Positioning System (GPS) 98, 99, 100, 113, 133, 137, 229, 254, 255, 260, 261, 264, 285 Globalisation 32, 63, 168, 170, 171, 228 GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) 21, 96, 97, 100, 134, 135, 144, 146, 148 Governance 95–97, 122, 125, 128, 138, 140, 142–144, 146–151, 302, 303 Ground equipment 34, 35, 220, 221 Group on Earth Observation (GEO) 15, 16, 35, 42–45, 58, 68, 73, 91, 92, 95, 99, 102, 169, 231, 236 Guiana Space Centre (CSG) 41, 65

H Hispasat 37, 46, 61, 91, 112, 273 House of Commons’ Science and Technology Committee 25, 59 Human exploration 63, 85, 86, 164, 176, 177, 180, 183, 186, 190, 191, 193 Human spaceflight 29, 36, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70, 80, 81, 83, 92, 110, 164, 165, 168, 169–172, 179, 183, 191, 193, 196–199, 201–203, 206, 207, 274, 276, 297 Hungary 3, 18, 56, 59, 250, 269

I India 2, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 29, 30, 33, 34, 41, 47, 54, 55, 84, 64, 66–68, 72, 73, 75, 77–79, 81–83, 90, 92, 99, 102, 104, 109, 110, 112, 164, 178, 182–185, 187, 194, 214, 227, 235, 243, 250, 256, 260, 261, 267, 281, 300 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) 9, 10, 21, 29, 33, 54, 57, 58, 61, 66–68, 73, 81, 83, 108, 117, 133, 135, 179, 187, 219, 256, 263, 265–267, 270, 273, 275, 277, 286 Inmarsat 37, 61, 91, 93, 112, 129, 137 Innovation 9, 10, 21, 57, 58, 61, 108, 117, 133, 135, 179, 219, 265–267, 270, 273, 275, 277, 286 Intelsat 38, 45, 46, 93, 112, 227, 228, 254, 261, 262 Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) 58, 150, 167, 169, 175, 176, 187, 198, 203 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 9, 236 International cooperation 12, 13, 57, 59, 64, 66, 67, 89, 109, 112–114, 155, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171, 175, 177, 178, 180, 194, 203, 207, 208, 211, 214, 219, 238, 239, 243, 244, 247, 251, 252, 263, 277 International Heliophysical Year (IHY) 9, 237 International Launch Services (ILS) 40– 42, 61, 79, 93, 94, 110, 283 International Polar Year (IPY) 9 International Space Station (ISS) 24, 27, 30, 63, 66, 70–72, 80–82, 109, 110, 124, 133, 164, 165, 170–178, 182–188, 196, 198–207, 209, 212, 224, 254–256, 259, 265–268, 279, 282, 283, 285, 293, 298, 302 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 14, 15, 57, 112, 129, 159, 240, 241, 245, 248 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 128, 165, 184, 136, 185, 186, 293 307

Index

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 66, 195, 210, 212, 212, 215– 225, 234 Iran 8, 31, 47, 58, 70, 74, 109, 210, 212, 217, 224, 235, 250 Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSA) 70, 109, 212 Iraq 4, 8, 217, 223, 250 Israel 12, 31, 41, 43, 45, 47, 48, 54, 55, 62, 68, 73, 75–78, 103, 260, 262, 281, 296

Lisbon Treaty 3, 18, 19, 58, 116, 119, 120, 121, 124 Lockheed Martin 45, 61, 78, 101, 106, 224 Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 35, 42, 69, 73, 81, 83, 106, 145, 168, 169, 183, 197, 206 Lunar exploration 62, 67, 82–84, 106, 111, 177, 195, 263, 293 Lunar reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) 83, 263, 285

J

M

Japan 2, 4–6, 9–11, 14, 17, 27, 28, 32–34, 40, 41, 46–48, 53, 55, 59, 64, 67, 72, 75–78, 80, 81, 83, 88, 90, 92, 94, 99, 110, 112, 136, 164, 165, 170–173, 175, 183–185, 187, 194, 205, 235, 250, 261, 262, 267, 294, 300 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) 17, 28, 33, 34, 67, 81, 83, 87, 88, 102, 111, 113, 175, 182, 185, 187, 258, 282, 286 Jules Verne 80, 161, 199, 207, 208, 259

K Kaguya 83, 254

L Laeken Declaration 119, 124 Laser Communication 105 Launch industry 34, 35, 211 Launch infrastructure 70, 73, 80, 280 Launch sector 39, 41, 72, 77–79 Launch site 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 107, 108, 292 Launcher 31, 41, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 77– 79, 81, 92, 104, 110, 132, 171, 186, 223, 224, 257, 265, 271, 274, 276, 280, 283, 285, 299 Law 13, 19, 24, 27, 28, 53, 57, 59, 112– 114, 116, 121, 122, 124, 144, 151, 175, 210–212, 215–219, 223–225, 237, 241, 246–249, 251, 296, 298, 299, 301–303 308

Maastricht Treaty 117, 123 MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) 26, 38 Malaysia 67, 81, 228, 250 Mars 25, 63, 64, 82, 84–86, 104, 110, 111, 164, 165, 176, 178, 180, 183, 184, 186, 188–195, 203, 258, 259, 263, 267, 293, 297 Mars Design Reference 86 Mars Express 82, 84, 85, 92 Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) 85, 111 Mediterranean Union 4 Messenger (MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry and Ranging) 87, 259 Metop A 23 Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport 71 Military 7, 8, 26, 28, 32, 35, 46–55, 62, 64, 71, 92, 98, 102, 103, 112, 122, 125, 132–135, 137, 141, 142, 144–149, 151, 153, 156, 157, 161, 163, 168, 202, 216–218, 221, 262, 267, 268, 270, 273, 275, 279, 280, 283, 292, 297, 299, 300 Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) 20–22, 34, 35, 38, 45, 64, 91, 95 Moon 12, 25, 70, 74, 81–84, 89, 90, 108, 109, 132, 164, 165, 168, 176, 177–180, 183, 186, 190–192, 194, 203, 205, 237, 246, 250, 251, 258, 259, 293 Multinational Space-based Imagery System (MUSIS) 49

Index

N

P

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 26, 33, 55, 56, 64, 66, 70, 71, 80–83, 85–89, 101, 102, 104–106, 109, 111, 114, 132, 133, 137, 166, 168, 169, 173– 177, 186, 187, 194, 196, 197, 201, 202, 206–209, 212, 217, 220, 256– 260, 262, 263, 273, 279, 281–283, 285, 286, 293, 294 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 8, 33, 34, 57, 66, 101, 102, 260, 285 National People’s Congress (NPC) 6 National Reconnaisance Office (NRO) 26, 33, 34, 52, 60, 92, 255, 260, 285 National Space Policy 30, 160, 225, 266, 297, 298 Natural resources 2, 180, 228–230 Navigation 14, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 35, 37, 38, 48, 51–53, 57, 64, 65, 90, 95–100, 113, 123, 125, 129–131, 134–137, 221, 223, 226, 228, 229, 232, 244, 246, 257, 258, 260, 263, 264, 272–274, 276, 280, 282, 283, 285 Near Earth Objects (NEOs) 13, 164, 192, 193, 244 Nigcomsat 1 68 Nigeria 7, 14, 17, 68, 103, 228, 235, 243, 250, 280 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 7, 62, 112, 297 North Korea 7, 70, 212, 217

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 4, 56 Patent 9–11, 57, 215, 234, 294 Patriot Act 210, 212, 224 Phoenix mission 85 Plesetsk 53, 71, 72, 78 Poland 18, 56, 59, 250, 272 Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) 54, 73, 77, 99, 103, 255, 256, 281 Portuguese Presidency 19, 20, 101, 119, 154, 226 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) 12, 13, 15, 26, 152, 154, 155, 161, 298 Propulsion 74, 80, 103, 104, 111, 200 Public funding 9, 21, 34, 47, 49, 112, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132–134, 136, 137 Public-Private Partnership 20, 125, 143

O OHB 62, 103, 127, 268 Operations 15, 38, 40, 80, 88, 90, 105, 107, 113, 134, 172–174, 183, 187, 246, 293 Operators 24, 35, 37, 41, 45, 46, 61, 79, 91, 93, 95, 112, 130, 139, 140, 142, 148, 294 Orbital Sciences Corp 43, 71 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 11, 57 Orion 70, 106, 109, 256

R Radio services 34 Raw data 143, 146–150 Reconnaissance satellites 48, 50, 53, 221 Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education for Latin America and the Caribbean (CRECTEALC) 17 Remote sensing 31, 35, 60, 103, 113, 118, 144, 151, 220, 227–229, 245, 248, 251, 252, 257, 268, 272, 281, 283, 284 Research and Development (R&D) 9, 10, 29, 57, 58, 117, 118, 123, 144, 273 Robotic exploration 25, 63, 83, 85, 86, 164, 165, 180, 183, 186, 191, 192 Romania 18, 56, 59, 109, 239, 250, 273, 293 Roskosmos 286 Russia 2, 4, 5, 14, 15, 19, 26, 27, 30–37, 39, 41, 43, 46–48, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59– 61, 64, 66–68, 70–72, 74–84, 86, 92, 93, 98, 109, 110, 112, 135, 136, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 164, 166, 170–173, 175, 183, 185, 187, 198, 201–203, 205, 208, 209, 212, 214, 235, 260–263, 265, 267, 281, 283, 293, 294, 300 309

Index

S Satellite positioning 28 Satellite services 14, 20, 34, 37, 45, 61, 64, 91, 220 Saturn 86, 259 Science and Technology (S&T) 9, 58 Sea Launch 41, 42, 61, 74, 78, 93, 283 Security 2, 4, 7, 8, 12, 13, 19, 20–22, 26–28, 46–53, 57–59, 62, 64, 98–100, 106, 114, 118, 123, 127, 132–134, 137–139, 141–144, 146– 158, 160, 162, 184, 196, 201, 202, 206, 209–226, 229, 231, 238, 242, 249, 273, 277, 296–299, 302 Shuttle 70–72, 77, 80, 81, 104, 165, 168– 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 197, 198, 202–204, 254–257, 285, 293 Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council 20, 153 Small Mission for Advanced Research in Technology-1 (SMART-1) 82 Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) mission 88, 111 Solar observation 87 Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) 88, 265 South Africa 15, 17, 30, 103, 250 South Korea 10, 30, 33, 47, 60, 67, 72, 74, 81, 82, 84, 112, 228 Soyuz 41, 42, 65, 66, 69, 72, 77, 81, 95, 169, 171–173, 201, 203, 205, 254–256, 283 Space debris 13, 55, 56, 118, 153, 156, 159–163, 244, 248, 302 Space Conference of the Americas 17 Space Council 18, 52, 132, 140 Space environment 55, 87, 88, 118, 138, 139, 145, 146, 157, 160, 165, 248, 300 Space expenditures 18, 32 Space markets 34 Space powers 19, 30, 33, 54, 63–67, 73, 84, 154, 183, 201, 232, 233, 235, 292 Space Situational Awareness (SSA) 26, 49, 51, 52, 138–150, 153, 292 Space spending 32, 49, 60 Space surveillance 24, 49, 55, 138, 142, 145, 153, 160, 161, 294 310

Space Surveillance Network (USSSN) 55, 56 Space transportation 26, 29, 63, 65, 66, 68–70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 83, 186, 205, 209, 225 Spacecraft 30, 37, 40, 41, 47, 48, 52–56, 61, 70–72, 80, 82, 83, 85–88, 90, 93, 94, 101, 102, 104–107, 111, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 217, 221, 241, 256, 259, 262, 284, 292 Space-faring country 30 Spaceport 71, 72, 81, 107, 114 SpaceX 42, 43, 71, 110, 257 Spain 18, 33, 37, 46, 47, 49, 50, 56, 58, 59, 105, 187, 250, 258, 262, 273, 276, 278, 300 Spin-offs 29 Spitzer 88, 89, 111 Starsem 41, 42, 98, 283

T TechSAR 31, 54, 68, 73, 103, 260 Telecommunications satellites 227, 228, 235, 245, 280, 284, 285 Telenor Satellite Services 37, 61 Telesat 38, 46 Terrorism 7, 212, 217, 303 Thailand 8, 58, 109, 228, 250 Thales Alenia space 37, 39, 43–45, 85, 91, 93, 94, 100, 103, 127, 234, 236, 262 Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 12, 13, 155, 162 Treaty of Amsterdam 117, 118 Treaty of Lisbon 116, 119, 124, 127 Treaty of Nice 116, 118 Treaty on the Functioning of the Union 120 Turkey 12, 47, 55, 58, 59, 103, 109, 250, 262, 278

U Ukraine 5, 33, 61, 79, 110, 112, 178, 187, 250, 283, 284 Ulysses 88, 111 UN Space Applications Programme (SAP) 14, 236, 251

Index

United Kingdom (UK) 11, 18, 25, 43, 47–50, 56–59, 83, 88, 90, 92, 112, 132, 134, 137, 157, 183, 187, 208, 251, 261–263, 275, 278, 286 United Nations (UN) 7–9, 12–15, 57, 58, 64, 112–114, 153, 159, 160–163, 195, 230, 231, 236–246, 249–251, 293– 296, 298, 302, 303 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 9, 14, 57, 245 United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UNSPIDER) 13, 14, 57, 231, 244 United States (U.S.) 2, 4, 10–12, 14, 15, 19, 23, 26, 32–36, 38, 41, 43, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55–57, 62, 64, 66–68, 70, 75, 78, 80, 83–85, 90, 92, 93, 101, 104, 109, 112, 113, 132, 138, 161, 164, 166, 168, 170, 175, 182, 183, 185, 187, 194, 197, 201–205, 210–215, 217, 218, 220–225, 228, 230, 233, 235, 238, 241, 250, 293, 294 U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 39 U.S. National Space Policy 225 U.S. Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) 55, 62, 92, 112, 254, 261

V Vega 69, 104, 270 Venezuela 46, 68, 94, 217, 228, 235, 251, 280 Venus 82, 86, 87 Venus Express 82, 86 Virgin GAlactic 36, 106, 107, 114 Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) 176–178 Vostochny 71, 72, 81 Voyager 87

W Wallops Space Flight Facility 71 Weaponisation 13, 163 White House 26 WiMax 14 World economy 2, 212, 213 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) 14 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 4, 127, 213

X X Prize 84, 108, 109, 132, 300 Xichang 73, 78

311