Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Christopher Miles Coope
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Christopher Miles Coope
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion Christopher Miles Coope
© Christopher Miles Coope 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978-0-333-76018-5 hardback ISBN-10: 0-333-76018-2 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Coope, Christopher. Worth and welfare in the controversy over abortion / Christopher Miles Coope. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-333-76018-2 (cloth) 1. Abortion – Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title. HQ767.15.C68 2005 179.7′6 – dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
2005047531
In memory of Nicholas Coope (1980–1998)
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks
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Contents Preface
viii
Part 1: Introductory
1
Part 2: Worth
51
Part 3: Rights and Interests
163
Part 4: Arguing about Interests
231
Part 5: The Idea of a Right to Life
302
Index
335
vii
Preface Many books, I suppose, come about by accident. This is certainly one of them. I had simply set out to write some notes for our students here at The University of Leeds. One day a week, these students take a break from their work in the community and follow our course of Health Care Ethics. Year on year, they have impressed me with their enthusiasm, their friendliness and their willingness to walk in the strange ways of our subject. It has always been a privilege to write for them, and I think about them affectionately now, as once again I set about it. Abortion tends to take over the lives of those who write about it. Yet this is no bad thing, for without a certain amount of ‘taking over’ one would not succeed. Abortion is an important public issue, so our attention is not misplaced. It also raises theoretical difficulties in philosophy, many of which are not in ethics at all – as this book will show. Even those interested neither in the issue nor in the philosophical difficulties could still become fascinated by abortion as a controversy simply because of the extraordinary curiosities of the public debate. But being ‘taken over’ has its dangers. We who write about abortion and who think that there is a public issue of great moment should not lose sight of the fact that there are so many equally important problems faced by the world. Some of these naturally have to do with children. I have a good friend, a paediatrician, who in her professional life has been able to do far more to ensure a respect for young human individuals than a philosopher writing about abortion could hope to do. My views about this subject have changed greatly over the years. I cannot pretend that they have changed as a result of anything very sophisticated by way of argument – at least in regard to argument closely related to the topic. In fact my current thoughts about abortion are somewhat naive. I do not think of this as a defect. I am inclined to follow Berkeley in this matter: thinking that so often in philosophy we first raise a dust and then complain we cannot see. A simple argument justifying the exposure of infants on the grounds that ‘The Tok went in for it and they were not such a bad lot’, is – however unsatisfactory it may be – more to be trusted than a justification of the same on the basis of the latest extravagance of academic philosophy. There are times when it is better to believe a peasant than a pedant. Despite all the talk of the sanctity of life, I do not regard the issue as particularly ‘religious’. But I am not so sure that our underlying and uncontroversial beliefs about homicide, beliefs which people are just not prepared to give up (or rather, are not yet prepared to give up) can deeply be understood without religious beliefs which I and many others have been, perhaps understandably, reluctant to adopt. Nietzsche, I imagine, saw this only too viii
Preface
ix
well. About these beliefs I will only say here that the philosophical foundations of agnosticism appear to me not as strong as they once seemed, and that I for one am continually tempted to jump ship. And insofar as this is so, it is in part an outcome of my work on this controversy. I do not ever remember that questions about abortion featured at all in my upbringing, in my teenage years say. I certainly heard plenty about religion at my school, but abortion seemed not to be a matter of public concern at that time. It must have seemed beyond consideration. The issue first came to my attention when, as a student of psychology, I chanced to read Glanville Williams’s newly published The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law,1 taking it up, no doubt, because it was not on the reading list. This book also discussed other matters: suicide, euthanasia, and contraception (though what this last had to do with the sanctity of life was, and remains, something of a puzzle). The book was derived from lectures given at Columbia University, and seems to have had a crucial impact at the time on the development of (what is called) liberal thinking about abortion. For a brief while Glanville Williams was my guide. It must have all seemed pleasantly shocking and agreeably secularist. To me, ‘both human history and the history of ethics was just beginning’, and I wanted to be part of it.2 It was around this time that I found myself, with a few other students, interviewing A. J. Ayer for a TV programme. He answered all our questions with his customary energy and ease. Naturally I wanted to ask him about the sort of issues I had been reading about in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. In fact, I afterwards sent my copy of the book to him, which he then read ‘with pleasure and approval’. The book must have caused a stir, for it was picked over by a panel of notables on the then Third Programme. It received, I remember, a curiously cold response from the philosopher on the panel, who seemed not willing to join in the discussion at all and was given a quarantined space all to herself. Not much pleasure or approval there. She was G. E. M. Anscombe, at that time just a name to me. As it turned out, I was later to find myself in tutorial conversations with both these philosophers at Oxford and I successively learned much from them.3 1 The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, London: Faber and Faber, 1958. Glanville Williams, Professor of Law at Cambridge, was from 1962 to 1997 President of the Abortion Law Reform Association. 2 I owe this phrase to Derek Parfit. In Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) he heads one of his sections: ‘How both human history, and the history of ethics, may just be beginning’. He claims that ‘Non-Religious Ethics has been systematically studied, by many people, only since about 1960’ (p. 453). The debate about Glanville Williams’s book dates from 1958, slightly before history. 3 Some idea of what Elizabeth Anscombe must have said can now be gleaned, almost 50 years later, from ‘Glanville Williams’ The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law: a Review’, in Mary Geach and Luke Gormally. eds, Human Life, Action and Ethics, Essays by G. E. M. Anscombe, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005.
x
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By the time I reached Oxford, however, I had long forgotten the problems of abortion and kindred topics. My days were spent largely on the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of language. I dare say the matter never crossed my mind until, many years later, my wife was pregnant with our fourth child. Since she was then well on in her thirties she was of course offered ‘the tests’. Well, who wants a damaged baby? I was, I remember, quite anxious that the chromosomes should carefully be counted. I just refused to consider what if. Distressing choices, I must have said to myself, should not be faced while it was still unsettled whether the question arose. In dedicating the book to the memory of the child in question, my son and good friend Nicholas, who died on the cliffs of Glen Clova while I was writing it, I cannot help thinking back to these beginnings. I am acutely aware that had ‘the tests’ turned out differently, he might well have been killed by doctors, with my connivance, before he was born. Luck saved him – and me. How many there are who have not been lucky.
Part 1: Introductory
1.1 The academic problem and the unhappiness behind it In September 1995 three pro-choice activists in Boston sat down with three pro-life activists. They were answering a call from civic leaders, the state Governor and the local Catholic bishop, for talks between the representatives of ‘choice’ and of ‘life’ after a man had shot dead two receptionists at clinics in the area. After more than 150 hours of conversations over the next five and a half years these six activists decided to reveal to the world at large what they had achieved. And what was that? On the substance of their disagreement: nothing. ‘Since that first fear-filled meeting, we have experienced a paradox. While learning to treat each other with dignity and respect, we have all become firmer in our views about abortion.’1 It is here, when all else fails, that our curious study philosophy has a part to play. Philosophy is the art of the intractable. It is what we call upon when we do not know what further information would be relevant. As so often, we need to recognise that our difficulties might have to do with understanding better the information we already have. We may need to retreat a bit to consider more carefully our presuppositions. And we doubtless need at least to recognise that there are several problems, not just one. Some of these problems might be of our own making. But other problems must lie deep in the nature of things. No one may yet know how to deal with this or that aspect. We must think things out patiently and slowly. If we do so we may hope to learn something not just about the immediate issue but about moral philosophy and perhaps even about ourselves.2
1 Anne Fowler, Nicki Nichols Gamble, Frances X. Hogan, Melissa Kogut, Madeline McComish and Barbara Thorp, Boston Globe, 28 January 2001. 2 We do ourselves no good by misdescribing or mystifying our difficulties. Kristin Luker in her well known book, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) gives an unfortunate account of the difficulty of agreement. ‘The two sides’, she says, ‘share almost no common premises.’ But 1
2
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
The difficulties faced by these patient negotiators were doubtless only in part intellectual. Sometimes people simply want different things. The topic is also quite difficult to face up to. There are questions which are hard to raise, let alone discuss. One is not surprised to fi nd that a pro-life group in England was prohibited from presenting its election broadcast on television on the grounds of ‘taste and decency’. This is of course very striking in view of what is otherwise thought tasteful and decent enough to be shown on television. Perhaps the abortion issue threatens to undermine the security we find in being thought moderately decent.3 I have wished in this book to remove certain hindrances that beset the abortion debate, to look for partial progress, to examine some of the arguments, and to narrow to some extent the area in which a solution may lie: a difficult and disturbing enough task even in the space offered by a book. These introductory chapters will provide some context to the enquiry, and in particular explain how I have come to focus on worth and on welfare. Arguments used which seem to support ‘life’ and arguments which seem to support ‘choice’ can both be unsatisfactory as I hope in what follows to show. In particular I have in mind bad thoughts about foetal worth in the first case, and about foetal welfare in the second. I do not claim that both then, how would anyone know this? No one can survey their own beliefs – for one can be reminded of what one believes. Furthermore, no one can know in advance which beliefs might turn out to be relevant. Argument can after all surprise us. Quite apart from all that, people can come to agree starting from different premises, for different valid arguments can of course share the same conclusion. 3 The Pro-Life Alliance is a political party in the UK and it wished to air its programme as part of its campaign in the 2001 general election. The High Court, upholding the ban, said that broadcasters were merely protecting viewers ‘from offensive images which included graphic footage of aborted foetuses’ (BBC website, 24 May 2001). The Pro-Life Alliance then offered to ‘blur’ the images, but this was not considered sufficient. Perhaps there was blood in evidence, which would still have looked distressingly red on a blurred image? But this would hardly be relevant, for it is a matter of routine these days to show detailed pictures of operations, with plenty of red blood to be seen. The Pro-Life Alliance listed various stressful images which have appeared on television screens in the UK and which they say have been defended by the broadcasting standards authorities, rejecting viewers complaints. These include explicit footage of bodies in a Kosovo mortuary, graphic scenes of a postmortem, the stoning of two men found guilty of adultery, other executions, a 15-year-old boy sodomised by a 29-year-old, various exotic genital mutilations, a rock musician defecating on stage, footage of a Brazilian boy whose face and penis had been chewed by a pig, etc. This raises the question: what then is so special about abortion? Part of the story must be this: that abortion is quite unlike execution or killing in a war, in that so very many of us are personally involved, either directly or at one remove. This will of course include the broadcasters and their technicians, the members of the broadcasting standards authorities, lawyers, judges and officials of the High Court, etc.
Introductory
3
sides are equally confused, but that there is at least some confusion on both sides seems undeniable. Doubtless too there is confusion and error in this book. One can only set out in the spirit of Tartakower: the mistakes are all there, waiting to be made. Any discussion of this topic should start by thinking of the problems faced by many pregnant women. This is admittedly an academic book. But we cannot but be aware of the quite unacademic unhappiness beyond the library and the lecture room. Very many women across the world face difficulties for which abortion is thought to offer the only way out, and often this will be deeply troubling to them. More generally, we might speak of the difficulties faced by parents, or prospective parents. We only have to think of the reassurance parents are now offered ‘not to have a disabled child’. It seems inconceivable that we as a community would now throw away this opportunity, especially when we add the usual comfort-clause that no one ‘with moral objections’ is obliged to avail themselves of it. This opportunity will seem even more precious when we realise that most would-be parents are only proposing to have one or two children. How difficult it must be to stand aside from the crowd and refuse the benefits. If abortion is bad in the way its critics say it is, a woman who refuses to have ‘the tests’ on this ground displays a remarkable courage. It is not true that heroism only concerns what is supererogatory. It may not happen very often, but people can find themselves in a situation where the demand of justice, that is to say of what is owed, is the demand for pretty well everything they hold dear.4 We need then to meditate on these difficulties faced by parents. Perhaps our conventions and practices need to be reorganised in a way which would give them better support. This is more a matter for us as citizens than as academics.5 It is obviously possible for people to help in ways which cause no moral controversy. As someone whose life is spent in libraries I am continually impressed by, and grateful for, the patient work put in by so many who show this practical concern, so often on a voluntary basis. It is easy 4 Perhaps I should add the obvious point that there is no reason to suppose that all women who want an abortion are desperate and consider themselves in difficulties which drive them to abortion: the feminist writer Naomi Wolf has suggested not, and she is in a better position to know this sort of thing than an academic philosopher. Much of her article is devoted to the vigorous unmasking of various pro-choice pretences (Naomi Wolf, ‘Our Bodies, Our Souls’, New Republic, 16 October 1995, reprinted in the UK, New Statesman and Society, 20 October 1995). 5 Politically, one might want to combine elements of what is conventionally right and left. See Alasdair MacIntyre’s note explaining why he was not going to vote in the 2004 presidential election, seeing that one party failed to respect the lives of the unborn while the other failed to respect the needs of their mothers. ‘The Only Vote Worth Casting in November’, www.nd.edu/~ndethics/macintyrevote. shtml.
4
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
to forget that abortion might seem to be the only way out just because of the poverty of what we bystanders, as individuals or as a community, have to offer.6 Sometimes indeed we fail to understand what is possible. Thus we might take it for granted that continued pregnancy in a 14-year-old must mean the end of her education and that abortion is therefore necessary. But need this be so? Might it not be possible to turn things around? Might we not make something good emerge from the difficulty, a good which might not have been achieved otherwise? As I write, just such a teenager, who had been reluctant to attend school at all, was now showing herself determined to sit for exams, supported and encouraged imaginatively by her local authority.7 Disagreements begin when we ask what kinds of solution to these difficulties are permissible. If there is such a thing as moral obligation at all, there will obviously be some limits to the kind of assistance which can be demanded, or offered, or indeed to the legitimacy of self-help. Everyone, whatever they think about abortion, will agree with that. This brings us back to the academy. We say so casually that a doctor must do his best for his patients, but only if we exclude all sorts of doings will this have a chance of being true. In real life we hedge such a remark with tacit restrictions. A physician might say ‘I came into medicine to help people’, and that sounds fine, but it would not always be an honourable defence of his (or her) conduct. It would all depend on what form the helping took. It is odd to have to say this, but it turns out to be necessary.8 What, in the case of those who are unhappy to be pregnant, are the ‘helping limits’? We cannot ask this question without moving beyond moral problems that are peculiar to abortion. For what is usually wanted is that a certain developing human individual will cease to exist, the fact that the individual is still in the womb providing the opportunity, in a society which at present more or less forbids infanticide, to bring this about. If this
6 Those who think that there are ‘abortion rights’ often like to say that abortion should be ‘safe, legal and rare’. But this might easily in practice go along with hostility towards those who help pregnant women to make it rarer, by offering abortion alternatives. In 1997 Glasgow’s Cardinal Winning introduced a scheme to provide financial help to enable pregnant women to keep their babies. Opponents have described it as ‘bribery’. It has even been said to ‘reduce choice’ (BBC News, 11 October 1999). 7 BBC Today programme, 5 March 2001. 8 A plea of just this kind was recently made by a Colorado doctor, one of four plaintiffs in a lawsuit against anti-abortion activists, and the director of the Boulder Abortion Clinic. ‘My medical colleagues and I went into medicine to help people, and we do.’ See Warren M. Hern, ‘Free Speech that Threatens My Life’, New York Times, 31 March 2001. An ad for the film Vera Drake reads: ‘Vera sees herself as simply helping women in need, and always does so with a smile and kind words of encouragement.’ I think we are supposed to say: so that’s all right then.
Introductory
5
were not at issue, we would be inclined to repeat the conventional formulae, saying that what a pregnant woman ‘does with her own body’ is up to her, or that it is a matter between her and her doctor. We would certainly not be saying that she would first have to consider impartially the interests of all sentient beings, in that comical phrase so solemnly invoked in the strange realms of moral philosophy. We would go along with the spirit of these ritual remarks about bodily autonomy. (I mean it would be pedantic to insist that so much wronging, after all, involves the wrongdoer ‘doing something with his own body’.) If justice, in the sense of what is owed, lays a burden on someone, it is not always a burden which it is entirely that individual’s own affair to carry. Here the very language of ‘owing’, with its suggestion of dollars and pounds, can be misleading – for in monetary matters we do think that it is an individual’s private responsibility to pay up. Others are not expected to bail him out. Most debts are voluntarily acquired, after all. But some of the ‘owings’ under justice are simply visited upon us, and may be severe. A child, let us say, suddenly demands care quite beyond what is usual on account of its unexpectedly acquired disabilities. Justice suddenly demands that one changes one’s whole life. One has to take on a different role, become a different person, lay aside cherished prospects. Could it not also be a requirement of justice that others rally round – either as individuals directly or through public institutions? Sometimes, though much less commonly, a pregnant woman will face a very different problem. She will want the protection of the moral law and of the law of the land against someone who might threaten to kill her unborn offspring – and a particular kind of protection at that. She will want such an action to be classified as murder (as legally it is classified in certain American states9) rather than as the theft of a body-part, let us say, or battery, as if there were no third party involved. In so doing, she will demand that the developing individual within her be acknowledged and respected by the community, not necessarily as a citizen, but as a vulnerable 9 See the Californian Supreme Court ruling in People v. Davis, 872 P. 2d 591 (Calif. 1994), holding that ‘third party killing with malice aforethought of a foetus is murder . . . as long as the state can show that the foetus has progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks’. It rejected the claim that the foetus would have to be viable. The judgment also refers to and discusses similar statutes in Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota and Utah, commenting that in these cases, unlike in California, ‘the murder statutes do not require that the unborn have reached a particular stage of development’. Injuring the unborn can have legal consequences in England too. ‘A man who stabbed his pregnant girlfriend, wounding their unborn child, was given two life sentences yesterday’ (The Times, 23 November 1999). A useful review of the law as it stands in the various American states can be found in ‘Foetal Homicide’ at <www.ncsl.org/ programs/health/fethom.htm>.
6
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
human being, and that there be no pretence in the law that it somehow isn’t there.10 Recognition, she will insist, should be accorded not just when its life is threatened by design, but also let us say when this life is taken in a road accident, perhaps caused by a reckless driver. This problem can even affect women whose unborn babies die naturally: If your baby died before birth, you will not receive an official death certificate. This can feel disappointing because it somehow denies the fact that your baby was alive inside you! As an alternative, some hospitals provide a “baby certificate,” which lists the baby’s name, date of birth and other life affirming information. You can also design your own certificate or find a print shop to make one for you.11 Is an unborn offspring entitled to this recognition and protection? Must this recognition be denied simply in order that those who perform abortions can feel less anxious about what they do? This is a very real question for some women.
1.2 Questions and their context The arguments we shall be considering in this book will proceed as if we are just concerned with pregnancy. It is in the main a book about the abortion controversy. However, it is important at the outset of our discussion to see the broader picture, for very often similar questions will arise where there is no pregnancy at all, no question of abortion, nor of a battery upon pregnant women. We do well to remind ourselves that there is a range of cases which seem to raise similar issues. An appreciation of this context will remove certain distractions which make thinking difficult. What, for example, are we to say about a proposal to destroy embryos which have resulted from fertilisation in a glass dish, embryos which have never been inside a woman’s womb? It might prove very useful to have this freedom. At the present time the pro-life movement seems to be preoccupied not so much with abortion as with the destructive use of human embryos to provide tissue with which to treat diseases. Again, if artificial wombs are eventually possible, a controversy is bound to arise whether we may (‘painlessly’) dispose of the human individuals inside them, or use them for testing drugs, or ‘harvest’ them for their body-parts. We might 10 Phillips, J, in de Martell v. Merton and Sutton Health Authority, [1992] 3 All ER 820, at 831, talks here of ‘the fiction . . . which denies the living creature which became the plaintiff a persona in the period prior to birth’, a fiction which the law in this case had to fi nd a way around. 11 Deborah L. Davis, Empty Cradle, Broken Heart: Surviving the Death of Your Baby, Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 1991, p. 71.
Introductory
7
not think it appropriate to refer to such destruction as abortion. Lastly, a number of well-regarded philosophers have in recent decades been defending infanticide – while admitting perhaps that one must be duly cautious about side-effects. Such a defence, at one time rather daring, is by now quite usual, and the case for it is carefully and non-directively presented in nearly every anthology of practical ethics. What might once have been the gasp of astonishment has become the yawn of familiarity. Where we are concerned with pregnancy, it is not always the termination of pregnancy – standardly abbreviated as TOP12 – which will concern us. Let us leave aside the fact that the mere induction of birth early, a common enough practice, is the deliberate termination of a pregnancy and confine ourselves to lethal procedures. The lethal procedures involved in so-called ‘pregnancy reduction’ – employed where a woman is expecting several children – tend in practice to keep the pregnancy going. I do not know of anyone writing about these matters who seems to have noticed this point. And where we are concerned with lethal termination, it is not always the woman’s own pregnancy which is at issue. A woman who wants there to be an abortion might not herself be pregnant, for she may have ‘rented a womb’ and be hoping, because of her changed circumstances, to have a surrogate abortion. Anyone paying all that money will probably contract to receive a ‘perfect’ child – no missing fingers, etc – and will want imperfect specimens selected out. Or again she will want just one child to be born, and will insist that a twin should not also survive.13 All of these cases involve homicide in the early stages of life, or at least what is said to be such. It is this, in the main, which is our topic. We should not even assume that when we are concerned with pregnancy, and are discussing allegations of homicide, that we are necessarily concerned with women, since it is presumably only a contingent fact that only women can be pregnant. A womb is not stricly necessary. A baby can develop in the abdominal cavity outside the womb and survive. It might soon be possible for a male to be pregnant in this way. Male seahorses seem to be able to cope with pregnancy. A report at a scientific gathering that male pregnancy was now a fact might be met with some scepticism, yet it would not reasonably be dismissed as a barely intelligible fairy story or 12 It could be that this remarkable abbreviation is confi ned to the UK, where we may find it even in academic journals. Talk of ‘termination of pregnancy’ in the UK has no doubt been proved popular on the ground of what is not mentioned. Those who use it seem not to have noticed that ‘to top’ is a verb meaning to kill (perhaps originally, to kill by decapitation). 13 ‘A British woman pregnant with twins is suing a California couple, saying the husband and wife backed out of a surrogacy contract after she refused to abort one of the foetuses’ (CNN, 14 August 2001). The case was widely reported. There was some disagreement whether the pregnant woman was ‘requested’ or ‘told’ to have the abortion.
8
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
fantasy. Robert Winston, perhaps the best known fertility specialist in the UK, has said that such a feat would certainly be possible. One day there might be a demand for male pregnancy clinics in the name of equal opportunity. Still, those who believe that abortion is murder are hardly going to think differently or make exceptions when it is a man who is pregnant. And those who talk of the right to do what one likes with one’s very own body, will talk similarly in this case too. Are we at any rate essentially concerned with reproduction? No. This is perhaps surprising, but it will help us to handle our topic to see that this is so. We need to remember the range of cases we mentioned. It is particularly obvious that someone who is wondering whether a new-born baby may be gently ‘put down’ if terminally ill, or whether it may be sedated and left to die if affected by Down’s syndrome, is not thinking about a reproductive question. The question only arises because reproduction has already occurred and the fact is perhaps unwelcome. (I am assuming of course that breast feeding and toilet training and elementary schooling are not part of the reproductive process. There is perhaps a harmless element of stipulation involved.) Sometimes the question whether we are concerned with reproduction is part of the issue to be discussed. This simple point is nearly always missed. At the present time much is made of a distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. The terminology is tendentious if therapeutic cloning already involves reproduction. Perhaps I should say at this point that our topic is not about sexuality – except of course for Freudians who think that every topic is about sexuality. Our problems would be just the same if scientific research was able to provide women with babies parthenogenetically – an advance which may arrive sooner than we think. There seems to be a good deal of associative unthinking in this matter, both among those who are for choice and those who are for life. Some examples. Historian James Mohr, writing about the nineteenth century, says: ‘Christian women could not and would not be involved with such an unchaste and unnatural procedure, and as a consequence, there was no reason to discuss the matter in their publications.’14 Whence the ‘unchaste’? Would infanticide count as an unchaste topic too? Judge and academic Richard A. Posner, in his book entitled Sex and Reason, includes a section on abortion. What is a discussion of abortion doing in an academic book about sex, especially when it is said at the outset, and reasonably enough, that abortion is usually objected to as a form of infanticide? The morality of infanticide is hardly related to problems about sexuality.15 An exhaustive (981-page) study of Roe v. Wade by David Garrow is entitled Liberty and Sexuality.16 The prominent campaigner Lawrence Lader 14 Abortion in America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 183. 15 Sex and Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 272. 16 Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade, New York: Macmillan, 1994. Just over a third of this book is devoted to controversies over
Introductory
9
wants us to think that having an abortion is a kind of sexual behaviour. He talks of ‘prohibitions, not only over abortion, but over other forms of sexual behaviour as well’.17 Philosopher Georgia Warnke would like to stress the supposed association with sex in the minds of abortion opponents. ‘For pro-life advocates, not only is human life sacred, so is the act of intercourse through which new life begins.’18 And what about the bed sheets one wants to ask? Wouldn’t they be considered just a little sacred too? Sidney Callahan, who is pro-life, does not go quite so far. But she states that ‘how one interprets and defines sexuality is critical to abortion discussions and decisions’.19 With due allowance for the obscurity of ‘interpretation and definition’ in such a context, this seems to be arbitrary and unfounded. Pro-choice pioneer Mary Anne Warren writes: ‘One reason that abortion is controversial now is that it has become a symbol of contemporary cultural and political struggles over sexual morality and the social roles of women.’20 Seeing that this is something of a received opinion, I should perhaps say on my own behalf that I have no view whatsoever on the social roles of women21 and find sexual morality impossible on the whole to think well about. So these ‘struggles’ will have little part to play in what follows. A discussion of sexual morality might indeed involve reference to abortion, but abortion is a topic to itself.22
17 18
19 20 21
22
contraception. It is of course possible to think of abortion as a form of ‘birth control’, and indeed to think of infanticide in this way, as controlling a certain consequence of birth – as in Linda Gordon’s Women’s Body, Woman’s Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977; for example, p. 28. In regard to infanticide ‘Birth Correction’ would be the better term. Much homicide might be seen as birth correction, I suppose. Abortion, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, p. 90, italics added. Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 90. Professor Warnke’s book was singled out for discussion at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association. ‘Value Choices in Abortion’, in Sydney and Daniel Callahan, eds, Abortion: Understanding Differences, New York: Plenum Press, 1984, p. 287. Moral Status, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 208. In this respect I am unlike Mill, who quaintly wrote: ‘The great occupation of woman should be to beautify life’ (‘On Marriage’, in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Equality, Law, and Education: The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XXI, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p. 44). People like to assimilate the objection taken by Catholics to abortion with that other objection they make to contraception. This is clearly a useful move. Not only is the teaching against contraception much despised, but the association plays down disturbing thoughts of homicide – two birds with one stone. Sometimes, of course, this will not be dishonest, but merely unthinking. The BBC programme Panorama ran a feature called ‘Sex and the Holy City’ (12 August 2003) which included a good deal of comment on abortion. The reporter, Steve Bradshaw, said that ‘trying to stop abortions is just one way the Vatican is trying to impose its sexual values across the world’ (BBC website). Most people oppose infanticide. Should this too be seen as an attempt to ‘impose sexual values’?
10
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
About abortion in particular I am going to assume, as is natural, that abortion is a failure if the pregnancy ends with a living baby, a baby which then must be kept or given up for adoption or perhaps killed. If the individual in the womb has already died of natural causes then any subsequent medical procedure in connection with it will not be counted an abortion. 23 As I said: what is wanted almost invariably is that a certain developing human individual will cease to exist. (I do not, of course, mean that this is wanted for its own sake. Perhaps it would not be intelligible to claim to want such a thing ‘just in itself’ and for no further reason.) What is paid for, the service, is that by such and such a time there will no longer be such an individual. If there were some way of proceeding which would give the baby a chance of a healthy normal life this would deliberately be avoided. If the foetus happened to be viable, its heart might need injecting with potassium chloride, or its head might need crushing or cutting off. Of course, no one would want to dwell on this aspect. But it would just be embarrassing in a particular case if at the last minute someone were to wheel in an efficient artificial womb, the latest Sony Pregnatron just arrived from Tokyo. Not every choice is welcome. I am going to consider arguments which aim to legitimise abortion in this sense, where death is not a by-product or sideeffect (or even something one could somewhat cheatingly imagine to be a side-effect: what counts as a side-effect is clear in some cases, but there is a large zone of indeterminacy). That is enough to be going on with.24
23 It is perhaps rather pedantic to make this stipulation. But Sarah Weddington, the lawyer who argued Roe v. Wade before the US Supreme Court, is prepared to put a case for abortion rights in the following terms. ‘What if a woman is discovered to be carrying what is already a dead foetus? Surely she should have the right to an abortion’ (A Question of Choice, New York: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 252). 24 Bernard Nathanson, who had once been in charge of a large abortion clinic, wants vehemently to insist in his anti-abortion book that abortion is not killing. ‘Medically speaking, abortion is not the killing of the foetus, never has been, and (I trust) never will be. I repeat. Abortion is not the killing of the foetus. Rather abortion is the separation of the foetus from the mother. The fundamental misunderstanding here corrupts the entire debate. Though in practice death has become the aim as well as the result of separating the foetus, the medical term does not imply any intent to destroy it. From Alan Guttmacher’s essay in the first medical anthology on abortion (1954) through recent statements of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the point is made that the foetus is not the doctor’s target, and that its death is a by-product of its removal’ (Aborting America, New York: Doubleday, 1979, p. 177, italics in text). Indeed, Dr Nathanson, following an older usage, does not want to call what happens after viability abortions at all. By contrast, Leonora Lloyd of the National Abortion Campaign says rather plainly and clearly that ‘it is important to remember that the desired outcome, even in a later abortion, is a dead foetus’ (R. Gillon, ed., Principles of Health Care Ethics, Chichester: Wiley, 1994, pp. 573–4). Charles Rodeck and Susan Bewley (in S. Bewley and R. Humphrey Ward, eds, Ethics in
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11
Abortion thus understood is not to be classed with self-defence, where the use of minimum force would be expected, and the child might chance to live – to everyone’s satisfaction. Still less should it be classed with an assertion of one’s property rights in one’s body, or resistance to a ‘hostile takeover’.25 There has been much discussion of abortion as mere detachment – like turning an unwelcome guest out of one’s house – with death as a sad foreseen consequence, a ‘letting die’ rather than a killing, which one would have avoided if one reasonably could (but one must be allowed one’s privacy, after all . . .). Perhaps abortion is sometimes like this. Deliberate detachment gives us a spectrum of cases. At one end of the spectrum we have ordinary induced birth, where a woman decides for one reason or another not to continue the pregnancy. Those opposed to abortion have no objection to that. At the other end, where death is certain, detachment might incur the guilt of murder, either because it is a mere pretence that the death is unintended, or because, as seems reasonable, we should not insist that the kind of wronging we class as murder must in every case involve the intention to kill (in this respect, we are of course following the legal concept of murder in the common-law tradition). But the topic of mere detachment is not our concern. What people mean by abortion emerges clearly from what they choose to mean by a safe abortion. Cases where a pregnant woman has a cancerous uterus removed can involve foetal death which is clearly not wanted – even reluctantly, in the way someone may want to go to the dentist. A woman might wait, hoping against hope, day by day, that the operation can be postponed long enough to give the baby a chance of survival. I once saw a harrowing programme
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, London: RCOG Press, 1994) reasonably contrast mere termination of pregnancy, which might, as they point out, be undertaken to save the life of the foetus, with abortion ‘with the aim that the foetus does not survive’ (p. 262). And they point out, for example, that ‘extra-amniotic infusion is now less used because it has a higher failure and infection rate, and also may result in a live baby’ (p. 263, italics added). The authors regard foetal survival as an ‘appalling complication’ (p. 263). 25 Implantation is described by Miriam Stoppard as ‘the fi rst step in the embryo’s hostile takeover of the innocent mother and a sign of the uncompromising savagery to come’. The ‘vandalizing’ embryo, she says, acts ‘like a malignant cancer’, the mother’s uterus having to ‘absorb the ferocity of the baby’s attack’. ‘You thought you were having a baby?’ Think again, ‘your baby is having you’ (‘Forced Labour? Birth is More a Hostile Takeover’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 26 January 2001.) This would all be just amusing chatter in the ante-natal clinic if it were not for what ethicists tend earnestly to say about self-defence, enslavement and property rights. L. W. Sumner expresses himself more soberly, but in the same vein. ‘Not only does pregnancy violate a woman’s physical integrity . . .’ (Abortion and Moral Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 8.) Would having an aged parent to look after violate one’s social integrity?
12
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
on TV involving just that. The poor woman was eventually given her dead baby to caress. This will not be the sort of case under consideration here. Catholics often say that this operation is justified under so-called ‘double effect’. And to be sure, it seems to me that some doctrine involving double effect considerations is required in moral philosophy. I half suspect, however, that a reasonable doctrine of this kind might often be too weak to give us the result we would like, even in this case. But I will not pursue the matter. Our central problem concerns killing: the killing of (what is said to be) a developing human individual. And this, as we have said, whether or not the individual is detached from a pregnant woman – it might be in an artificial womb, a hospital incubator or a homely cradle. It might be in a petri dish. Is it sometimes permissible to kill young human individuals, if that is what they are? Wouldn’t that always be murder? Wouldn’t it always be murder if we can rule out, perhaps as fanciful, considerations of selfdefence? And if we are not to talk of murder here, should we at least view killing as the destruction of something specially valuable? Is that our real worry, hidden behind our worried language? Don’t we all, whatever our views, think that what is destroyed is somehow valuable, but differ, understandably enough, when asked just how valuable it is, and what could be worth sacrificing in order to preserve it? Or do we think (in addition perhaps) that what is destroyed has the most fundamental right of all which is being violated? Do we understand this reference to a right? If we talk concernedly about human rights abuses around the world, is there not a human rights abuse which has become a daily part of the respectable life of our own community, and therefore not to be mentioned? 26 Or could we confidently reply that someone at this early stage in life cannot possibly have rights – any more than there could be rights possessed by cabbage plants? After all, it will be said, a human individual at this stage of life cannot have plans, cannot be disappointed, cannot assert a right, cannot stick up for the rights of others – that much would be agreed by everyone. Would this in turn show us that abortion is not – could never be – murder? Or does the wrongfulness of murder not turn upon the possession of rights at all? Many of these issues are rather general, and will even be of interest to those (if any) who simply do not care how the dispute over abortion is 26 People talk of ‘the human rights community’, which must surely be a partisan organisation of mutual admirers. We could hardly expect its members to recognise abortion as an infringement of a human right. Frances Kissling says with evident satisfaction: ‘The human rights community is moving steadily towards recognising a woman’s right to choose and there is no countervailing view in this community that even considers the question of whether or not foetuses are rights-bearing entities’ (‘Is There Life after Roe?’, Conscience, Winter 2004/05, <www.catholicsforchoice.org/conscence/current/LifeAfterRoe.htm>, p. 2 italics added).
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to be decided. Indeed, we will probably not think about these matters well unless, at least to some extent, we can detach ourselves from the practical anxieties and retreat into the study.
1.3 Down with murder or up with maternity? It will help us to focus on the question of killing if we reflect that our topic has nothing to do with a fondness or fi xation on maternity. Or indeed on the equivalent paternity – should men become capable of gestating. Given that abortion is bad in the way usually supposed, what would be required of a pregnant woman? I want to suggest: much less than many moralists might suppose. Opposition to homicide represents a minimal requirement in a sense, something not in the least impressive. What more generally is required could perhaps be put like this: that the pregnant woman is required to treat her foetus with (what could vaguely be called) ordinary care. It will be quite usual for women to want to do more than this minimum, of course, and even to talk quite extravagantly of what is required of them. But it would be mere moralism to take this talk seriously, though it might be attractive enough in its place. What is required, the ‘treating with ordinary care’, would usually involve doing rather little, but simply leading a normal life. Someone might wish to comment that the woman’s body is doing rather a lot, or that her circulation is working overtime, that her glands put out this and that, etc. The amount of activity which goes on under the headings of digestion and metabolism might be pretty impressive too come to think of it. Books on our subject sometimes like to remind us of this sort of thing lest we be insufficiently appreciative, so let us be duly reminded. Let us now suppose that for some reason the pregnant woman is liable to have a miscarriage unless she stays in bed, the opponent of abortion need not suppose that she is required to stay there, still less that she should be forced to do so. (‘With some pregnancy complications, the mother and her foetus may benefit from a very sedentary existence’ says Williams Obstetrics.27) Again if the woman needed some medicine that might well cause a spontaneous abortion as a side-effect, this would not show that it was wrong of her to take it.28 All this would involve a very different discussion. Surely a woman might be entitled to take certain risks? Analogies might be 27 F. Gary Cunningham et al., eds, Williams Obstetrics, 20th edn, London: PrenticeHall International, 1997, p. 240. 28 It has recently been suggested that miscarriage is correlated with taking aspirin. Suppose that there is a causal influence. Why should someone who thinks abortion is murder suppose it wrong on this account for a pregnant woman to swallow an aspirin for her headache?
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
found helpful. Thus we might ask what a woman would be entitled to do if she were to wake up one day to find that she had become attached by various tubes to someone else during the night, and was now providing irreplaceable life support. Would one be entitled to behave in ways which might risk his life? Smoking? Walking about? In special circumstances of course it could easily be wrong to act in a way which increases the likelihood of a miscarriage. This is because any action which is in general all right can be wrong if done for a bad reason. If abortion for Down’s syndrome is gravely wrong qua homicide, and qua unjust discrimination against the already disadvantaged, then it would seem to be wrong to risk miscarriage by having amniocentesis if this is done with a view to eliminating one’s offspring if affected. Recent research at St Bartholemew’s Hospital, London, claims that for every Down’s syndrome baby identified by amniocentesis, four unaffected babies are miscarried.29 A woman who did not happen to feel sad after a miscarriage should not be the subject of any reproach. This is worth underlining. No one opposed to abortion need insist that a woman be ‘maternal’. It might of course be true that those opposed to abortion also tend to admire baby-bearing. Abortion opponents might even come, by some proceess of association, to be fond of babies. I know of someone, long opposed to abortion for foetal handicap, who once felt privileged to hold a young baby born with spina bifida, where the killing option, though doubtless available, had not been chosen. It is true that we regard someone as doubly wrong who kills someone for whom they have (perhaps very rudimentary) duties of care. But this is not particuarly or exclusively a maternalist thought, for we think exactly this about a doctor who kills a patient (who might perhaps be a foetal patient). And of course this is a side issue in regard to abortion. The mistaken idea that the objection to abortion has something to do with an odd enthusiasm for birth – perhaps it will be called ‘pro-natalism’ – is very common. No doubt it helps to suppress an uncomfortable thought. Lofty-sounding sentiments of a pronatalist character are freely attributed, as if these were of the essence. The judgment in Casey, for example, talks of those whose view is based on such a reverence for the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term . . .30
29 As reported in the Independent, 5 April 2001. One imagines that Professor Dworkin – about whom more in a moment – would come out strongly against the practice, on grounds of the loss of all that ‘intrinsic value’. 30 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853. This pious attitude of reverence is even-handedly contrasted with another from the abortion-friendly side of the fence: ‘that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child’. Moralists tend not to be pleased
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The question at issue, say the justices, is whether the state can insist ‘upon its own vision of the woman’s role’.31 Yet why must someone opposed to abortion (or indeed contraception, since that seems also to be under discussion) think that a woman ought always to welcome being pregnant? Such a sentimental idea is harmful to clear thinking on this topic. Elizabeth Anscombe was a philosopher twice arrested for protesting about abortion (as I have recently learned). And she was indeed prepared to say there were ‘times and places where child-bearing was a woman’s pride and many children her honour’. However, she also felt free to talk about the ‘reckless and callous begetting of children’.32 Hardly a maternalist turn of phrase. And not one to fit the Casey piety. A woman might well be heard to say: ‘Dammit, I’m pregnant again!’ How could anyone take exception to that? It would be quite in line for a friend who takes it for granted that an abortion would be murder to sympathise with her: ‘Rotten luck!’ Perhaps the woman is determined this time not to fall in with ‘the vision of a woman’s role’. She will have the child adopted. Far from protesting, opponents of abortion might well be offering to assist her. It can even be all right to be pleased about a miscarriage. Since there are very many people opposed to abortion, there are no doubt some so silly and insensitive to think that a teenager who is unhappily pregnant should be made ‘to pay for her mistake’ by being made to keep the baby. But it is no part of the view that killing an unborn child is a wrong to think such a thing. A miscarriage in such circumstances is not the ‘unjust avoidance of punishment’. Quite generally, a woman (or the man in the case) can sometimes, all things considered, welcome without reproach the fact that their baby has died, whether born or unborn. This would not even be evidence of hardness of heart, as it might well be in the case of the death of a toddler. It is here that talk of ‘bonding’ has a place – though no doubt a certain amount of ‘bonding’ must go with a baby in the womb after ultrasound or after quickening. It is reasonable to spend medical resources on the saving of born children in particular, partly because they tend to be particularly loved. when the sincerity of this unlovely excuse is put to the test by the provision of help for both mother and offspring. 31 Casey, 852. 32 ‘You Can Have Sex Without Children’, Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, first quote p. 82, second p. 83. And there is no reason to suppose that in admitting that begetting can be reckless and callous she would have gone as far as the illiberal Mill. Mill claimed, in On Liberty of all places, that the state was entitled to prevent poor people from marrying, people who could not show that they had the means of supporting a family. ‘On Liberty’, Chapter 5, para. 15, in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Politics and Society: The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XVIII, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 304.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
There is a general point here to be made about death. It is quite often reasonable to be gratified by someone’s death, and not just because one considers it the best thing from the deceased’s point of view. Someone who is a pain in the neck drops dead, leaving a job opportunity for one’s friend Bill. One says: ‘Thank heavens!’ Why must a reasonable devotion to the sanctity of life rule out such a reaction? It would be distinctly unimpressive (though no doubt expected) for someone keen on ‘abortion rights’ to express shock horror.33 This point is quite important. There is no such thing as the natural or the appropriate reaction to a death, the mandatory response of the long face. To an undertaker a death means a business opportunity. It would be especially comical to suppose that there was an appropriate response to the death of organisms generally, even if we confine our attention to those which are ‘sentient beings’. A man might be more upset by the death of his goldfish than by the death of his uncle – he would not necessarily have to reproach himself for that. And of course we should not be drawing earnest conclusions about their respective ‘moral statuses’! Nor should we be wondering whether goldfish-days are somehow more valuable than avunculardays. If all this makes it more difficult to understand the objection we rightly make to murder, then that is progress. This whole topic invites humbug. And how many there are who respond to the invitation. I know very well, as we all know, that people are dying all the time. They are dying right now as I write. Each full stop marks the full stop of someone’s life. I am quite unmoved. Everyone would say something of the kind if they were not trying to make a good impression. In truth, it would be rather alarming to learn that death had just been abolished. Environmentalists would be particularly upset. People might well retort: ‘If you don’t feel upset a little bit at the thought that an individual, NN, has died, you cannot really think of him as a human being. You must think of him as sub-human, a robot, a crocodile perhaps – or a mere foetus.’ This species of ‘argument’ – it is hard to avoid the scare quotes – turns out to be quite popular. In particular, we are told: ‘You cannot “really” think of this miscarriage as the death of your child, because the appropriate reaction to the death of your child is XYZ and your reaction is PQR.’ This is often thought decisive: ‘So there . . .’ It seems to me an exceptionally feeble consideration, which would not be accorded weight if it did not allow us do what we want
33 ‘Pro life advocates link the principle of the sanctity of human life to the need to accept, gratefully, new human life in all its forms and in all circumstances’ (Warnke, Legitimate Differences p. 93). Some of them might be generous or yeasaying in this way. But why need they be? It is hardly of the essence of their case – the hard-edged case that many people would evidently like to hide beneath a lather of scented soap. Professor Warnke is here tripped up, like so many, by the misleading connotations of the phrase ‘pro-life’.
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to do without feeling too bad about it. Sometimes people feel devastated at a miscarriage, sometimes relieved, quite often a bit of both. Each reaction can be appropriate. What dies, however, is the same in each case.34 Abortion liberals do not like to refer to their opponents as pro-life. They prefer to say anti-choice or anti-abortion. In this, their animus leads them aright. It is most misleading to say that the aim of their opponents is ‘the preservation of foetal life’.35 That better describes a specialist in foetal medicine. Janet Radcliffe Richards assumes the presence of a ‘principle’ in the mind of the abortion-opponent who is not just moved by disgraceful prejudices ‘perhaps unconscious’, to wit: ‘that life is more important than freedom and the absence of suffering’.36 Allowing for a certain unclarity as to meaning, I do not see how an abortion opponent who supposes abortion to be murder need sign up to such a grand generalisation. He or she might reasonably think it right on occasion to support measures to protect freedom or reduce suffering, measures which will eventually, sooner or later, have lethal consequences. We all do, whatever our views about abortion.
1.4 A limited objective The central problem then concerns killing rather than life-saving. Now it is not part of my purpose to provide (what might be called) a comprehensive solution to this central problem. I could hardly do that, for I do not know of such a solution. Here, for once, is a book on this subject which does not pretend to answer all your questions. My treatment, as I have suggested, is confined to certain topics within the field. I will certainly not be attempting to prove that it is bad to kill a baby, before or after its birth. People who believe that it is gravely wrong to kill a baby – as I do – simply lack such a proof. At least, we have nothing which would frogmarch any competent philosopher to the conclusion in question. The place of proof in our lives
34 Arguments of the kind ‘you cannot honestly believe it is a baby because you do not shed tears as you would have to if you really thought . . .’ spread about like the common cold. Or the argument, on similar grounds, might be that you cannot believe it is really a ‘person’ (whatever that is). For an example here see Simon Blackburn, Being Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 64–5. Simon Blackburn is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. See also Margaret Olivia Little, ‘The Moral Permissibility of Abortion’, in Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, eds, Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, p. 28. 35 ‘. . . the conservative, whose aim is the preservation of foetal life’. Christine Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Prespective, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 79. 36 Janet Radcliffe Richards, The Sceptical Feminist, London: Routledge, 1980, p. 217. See also p. 283 below. I prefer Bill Shankley: ‘Football is not a matter of life and death. It’s much more important than that.’
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
is grossly exaggerated. Philosophers themselves soon run out of reasons and carry on regardless. Furthermore, it is extraordinarily easy for a philosopher of modest ability to ‘justify’ the most monstrous conduct. This is one of the first things a student should learn on a course in ‘practical ethics’. It induces the right kind of scepticism. (As an exercise, the reader might like to consider in how many ways he might ‘justify’ the killing of toddlers or destroying the world. Hint: he could start by saying ‘suffering should be prevented at all costs’, or again, ‘there is, philosophically speaking, no such thing as moral obligation’.) Apart from this inability to provide a proof, I am quite uncertain what to say in particular about human zygotes, morulas and blastocysts. These entities should not be referred to as ‘babies’. It is not that this would be upsetting, or ‘rhetorical’. To call them babies would be at best unnatural and at worst untrue. But would they be human beings? Not every human entity is a human being, a human blood corpuscle, for example. Those who are opposed to abortion often say with confidence that human zygotes, etc., are all human beings, and thump their textbooks of embryology. For all I know they might be right in their conclusion; but nearly all of what I have to say will bypass this issue. I suspect that it is not a straightforward ‘empirical’ question – the answer being well known to every textbook writer.37 I imagine that it is at least in part a conceptual issue in biology. If there is a subject called philosophy of biology it would be dealt with there. It seems to me important to admit the existence of such a discipline. There are certainly conceptual unclarities in biology and these can have a bearing on our subject. Thus it has become surprisingly usual to ask whether a foetus (or embryo or zygote) is a ‘full’ human being. Perhaps there is thought to be comfort in it. However, we should settle fi rst what this obscure question means. Do we know that a toddler is a full human being? Is a puppy a full dog? If there were centaurs we might indeed wonder whether to say that a centaur was a full human being, but even here the question would not really be satisfactory. Such questions arise because our grasp of our concepts is not wholly secure. This is a very familiar situation in philosophy. However, even if the opponents of abortion are not right to say that human zygotes, morulas, etc., are human beings, this admission might not be as big a concession as they tend to suppose. For certain anomalous
37 More unusual, however, is the appeal to the textbook of embryology to establish, in support of ‘choice’, that doctors who have consulted such a volume, even if they recall little of it, will somehow know that abortion is not murder: ‘Some doctors are opposed to abortion, strongly upholding the right of the embryo. But the major issue that confuses them is not that they think abortion is murder – they usually vaguely remember sufficient embryology to ensure that this is not the case . . .’ (Malcolm Potts, Peter Diggory and John Peel, Abortion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 533).
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human entities, or quasi human-beings, or whatever we call them – human entities which are significantly unlike blood corpuscles – might come under the protection of the moral law in just the way human beings do. That is perhaps not implausible. Again, people who say that human beings are ‘valuable’ – not an altogether satisfactory notion as we shall see – might be entitled to claim that these anomalous human entities are equally ‘valuable’. It is so very often assumed that those who are pro-life will say: the killing in question is wrong if and only if what is killed is a human being. But what entitles us to attribute to them the ‘only if’ part of this claim? This question might become acute where a philosopher offers a restricted account of what it is to be a human being. If for example a newborn baby is not to count, and is instead referred to as a ‘potential’ human being rather than a real one, the ‘only if’ will be rejected. However, I do not discuss the issue – even though, what we ought to say about human zygotes and morulas is coming to be of practical importance as people wonder whether they can do wrong by destructively experimenting with them, perhaps with the aim of ‘doing good’. The debate here seems to me to share all the difficulties of the one I shall be engaged in – with the addition of a few more. Perhaps these difficulties are easily settled, as is often supposed by those who are pro-life – but perhaps not. Perhaps there will be indeterminacy – after all, even someone who believed that a human being starts to exist at conception might have to admit that since the process of conception is continuous there will be times at which it will be indeterminate whether we yet have a new human being. I make no judgement about these matters. In what follows I may occasionally bring up questions about zygotes, etc. But in the main they are not my business. I shall largely confine myself to the ‘if’ part of the above claim: the thought that the killing in question is wrong, and indeed gravely wrong, if what is killed is a human being. And I shall adopt a naive approach, or what might appear to be such, as to what counts as a human being. People opposed to abortion sometimes like to wear a little gold badge showing tiny feet. I shall largely be guided by this icon, and in the main will confine myself to human individuals or entities which have such feet, or would have them if they were not maimed by injury or heredity. I shall assume that non-disabled members of the human race, ‘men’ generically speaking, have feet. People who think that abortion is permissible suppose that it is often all right to dismember a foetus, and that seems to their opponents to be murder. I am interested in this difference of opinion. Dismembering presupposes members. This restriction in the scope of our enquiry is in no way a matter of sentiment. It is not as if it were especially cuddly to be the kind of being which has lower extremities. The assumption is a temporary one for purposes of argument. No one who is pro-life has reason to be cross about it. It is merely a matter of setting a modest target. Why should we have to solve all our
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problems at once? Why is one expected to have a well worked-out position across the board? Perhaps we will need to say something special about morulas, etc. But we can come back to that another day, after we have made progress with matters which ought to be easier. It is quite often said, by philosophers at least, that certain developing human beings (‘with feet’ let us say) are somehow not ‘persons’ and that this entitles us to kill them, or to kill them ‘for a serious reason’ such as saving a reasonably large sum of money, etc. It is this kind of thought which will concern us. Doctrines of this kind divide human individuals into two categories, those protected from assault under the shield of justice, and the others not, being insufficiently developed. We will not be much concerned with the various definitions of personhood introduced for this liberating purpose, though such a task can be quite entertaining in an academic sort of way. Instead we will look at the substantive claims which lie behind the introduction of a special use of ‘person’ in the first place. That there are two such categories is increasingly being taken for granted. Indeed this category of ‘persons’ comes into quite elementary treatments, as if there were no difficulties in the notion. In fact the word ‘person’ need not itself appear, and homicide need not be under consideration. Here, for instance, is a remark selected as an epigraph by the well regarded philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett: Once the child has learned the meaning of ‘why’ and ‘because’ he has become a fully paid-up member of the human race. That seems to have a certain charm. Joining in, one might try other possibilities: ‘Once someone has blushed for shame . . .’, ‘Once someone can be held legally liable . . .’. ‘Once someone has said “I love you”. . . .’ Texans will insist that one must have visited Texas. We assume that the thought of homicide is not even on the horizon. No one supposes that those who are not ‘fully paid up’ can be used for target practice. Here, however, is something rather more sinister, just one step along the road. It is a clip just culled from an exam paper by a good student. He is writing about the idea of ‘equal rights’. Babies do not have the concept of what a human right to life is and, therefore, without comprehending this right, can be seen in a sense to be not fully under its protection. The remark is presented just as it is, without further discussion. He had evidently learned to be cautious: ‘in a sense . . .’, ‘not fully . . .’. We cannot therefore be sure what conclusions he would have drawn. Abortion or infanticide were not on the syllabus at all. The student had simply been doing his own study. Things of this sort are a commonplace in academic
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circles. What is here a student’s remark could easily have been memorised from a textbook. It will be noted that no special meaning of ‘person’ had to be introduced. Here the question arises: what can we take for granted? Or rather: what can we nowadays take for granted. I expect that the time is upon us when a division of human beings into those protected under the moral law and those not protected, or only, as it were, half protected, will be said to be where we start out from. The question will be: how is this to be explained? Various accounts will be offered, and there will be many academic papers on the topic, leading to further, more complex, accounts. Or again, a difficulty with what is said by philosopher Robinson will take the form: How can Robinson’s theory of virtue, piety and integrity be reconciled with the fact that it is quite all right to kill a baby? Exam papers will ask: Seeing that it it is seriously wrong to kill a six-year-old but not seriously wrong to kill a toddler (religious considerations aside), what is the morally relevant difference between the cases? We can be sure that a moderately competent student will fi nd some ‘morally relevant differences’, a good student rather more. Moral theory and metaphysics respond to just such needs. It is no longer thought sufficient to raise the objection ‘but that would mean deliberately killing a child’. After all, what is so special about a child, we shall be asked. (‘If you must use such an emotive word.’) What are its ‘morally relevant characteristics’? I would be very surprised if anyone could say. Someone opposed to abortion as baby-killing could not, I believe, explain, in the face of modestly competent philosophical enquiry, why it is bad to kill a toddler – that is to say in the way it is still thought to be bad. Quite generally, our understanding of what underlies the morality of homicide is very defective. I have been struck while working on this subject how often the public discussion does not directly concern the plausibility of moral judgements, but turns on certain background considerations. I have selected some of these for attention in this book, thinking that we are likely to make more progress if we attempt to settle some relevant issues. We shall be taken up with questions like: is the right to life an atypical right? What sorts of beings have a good of their own? Can we understand the claim that a human being is valuable? It will be noted incidentally that none of these questions about rights, worth and welfare are about abortion as such. That is all to the good. Some of our discussion will have just as much relevance to disagreement in environmental ethics, for example. I would like to think the pages which follow would offer something of interest to someone quite
22
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
uninvolved with the abortion controversy. The topics are important in their own right. In our consideration of these topics we shall often be concerned about what it makes sense to assert or to suppose. The idea that philosophers often go wrong by saying what is nonsensical rather than false was of course made much of – perhaps too much of – by logical positivism in the 1920s and 1930s. Our very reasonable rejection of positivism since that time should not lead us to lose the insight that questions of sense, and not just questions of truth, are important in our subject. We do not need the doctrine of verification to see that people can become very muddled when handling abstract questions. Nor need a rejection of what is said as meaningless – or at least as insufficiently clear to be discussed – be brash or scientistic.38
1.5 The permissive case will be represented in this book by the work of various philosophers. But in particular by the ‘liberal’ arguments of Ronald Dworkin. What liberalism is. Do we then have this freedom to take young human life? To dismember? If we are to consider this question well we need to know what is being said in defence of this freedom, and to represent it fairly and in some detail. In 38 Perhaps I should indicate here a further way in which my enquiry is limited. A publisher’s reader regretted that this book did not discuss what the position of the law should be. I have deliberately left out this much discussed topic, though I know it is of interest to many. It seems to me secondary. I shall confine myself to a few brief points. First, that it is not reasonable to ask ‘Whose choice should it be, the government’s or the pregnant woman’s?’ (with the obvious expected answer) before we have settled that someone should be given the two-way power to decide in the first place, the only question being who should be given it. Second, that someone who urges that abortion (perhaps just ‘later’ abortion) should be made a crime need not be suggesting – a strange thought! – that pregnant women or doctors are somehow less able to make moral judgements, or are less to be trusted, than other people. Third, that even if abortion (or ‘later’ abortion) is recognised by legislators to be murder it would not follow that they should make it a crime. One might say much the same thing about a proposal to make duelling illegal in a country in which it is largely accepted. The law must take into account all manner of pragmatic considerations. What would follow is that the law should not talk or act as if there were a right to abortion. The law can frown where it does not forbid. It can refuse to support litigants. If abortion is murder the law should at least refuse to support a woman who wished to sue her doctor for not having given her the chance to kill her offspring, or again where an incompetent procedure had resulted in that dreadful complication: a surviving child. Fourth, that if abortion were were made illegal on the ground that it is murder, it would not follow that those involved should be dealt with just like those who commit other kinds of murder, shoot a business rival, say, or poison an aunt. Nor conversely could we conclude from the punishments provided by statute
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23
this way, we might hope to move the debate on a bit, either by acknowledging ground already won, or by clearing away obstacles. I shall for the most part (though not exclusively) build my argument around the most broadly well-received among modern attempts to defend this freedom to kill: that offered by Ronald Dworkin in three chapters of his easily accessible book Life’s Dominion, parts of which I shall expound and discuss with some thoroughness.39 Ronald Dworkin will no doubt be thought the most eminent academic to write on this topic in recent times. This does not of course entail that his work on this subject is pre-eminently good. But it has evidently been well thought over, for he seems effortlessly able to provide answers to all objections. His work is especially useful to us, for it raises just the questions we singled out for attention just now, to do with the right to life, the concept of a good of one’s own, and the idea that human individuals have a special kind of value. I shall argue, at the very end of this book, that he has had a very useful insight, without quite seeing its importance. It is equally significant that his book is devoted to the reconciliation of the warring parties to the dispute about abortion and therefore might for this reason seem to have a certain plausibility. It will appeal to all those who complain – perhaps rather conventionally and even unthinkingly – that the debate has become ‘polarised’. A reconciling book might be thought to that the law did not ‘really’ regard abortion as murder (a mistake frequently made in discussions of the history of these matters). Fifth, that where abortion (perhaps just ‘later’ abortion) is a crime we should be careful to describe things correctly. It is quite tendentious, but exceedingly common, even among people supposedly possessed of critical minds, to say that such a law ‘forces women to have babies’ or ‘forces women to remain pregnant’. It would be as tendentious to maintain such a thing as it would be to say that the law wittingly punishes the innocent on the mere ground that innocent people unfortunately suffer (sometimes quite grievously) when a man is justly sent to jail. Sixth, that it is not an objection to the introduction of a law against abortion, thought of as murder, that the rich will still be able to obtain abortions abroad. Whatever ‘equal opportunity’ may be, we need not seek to provide equal opportunities to kill the innocent. 39 Life’s Dominion, London: Collins, 1993. Ronald Dworkin is Jeremy Bentham Professor of Jurisprudence at University College, London, and Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University. For many years he was the Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. Material from this book has been reprinted in numerous anthologies. Some of the arguments about abortion had appeared earlier in ‘Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe v. Wade Should be Overruled’, University of Chicago Law Review, 1992. This article has recently been republished under the name ‘What the Constitution Says’, in Professor Dworkin’s collection, Freedom’s Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, alongside several related articles. References to Life’s Dominion will be indicated by the abbreviation ‘LD’; Freedom’s Law by ‘FL’. Practically all that I have to say about Life’s Dominion concerns just the fi rst three chapters – perhaps a third of the whole. Two later chapters of the book deal with euthanasia, and I shall not be remarking on these.
24
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
be ‘moderate’ in its claims – though the significance of such an estimate, as is often forgotten in discussions of abortion, plainly depends upon the range of comparison, of what lies round the corner.40 The book will perhaps seem to offer a certain sensitivity missing in the writings of ostensibly bolder ethicists. Often it presents in an elaborate way what many people outside the academy, one suspects, are half inclined to think but are unable to express. All this goes some way to explain why the critical reception has been almost embarrassingly rapturous – as we shall see in the next chapter. My remarks must on the whole be critical. However, I hope also to point out what must be praised and underlined. In the search for truth, a critic is a collaborator. We are concerned about thoughts rather than a thinker, however wellregarded. Ronald Dworkin’s ideas on these matters, though doubtless original in many ways,41 are part of a stream of contemporary opinion in which many academics, so sceptical in other ways, have a remarkable confidence. No doubt we are all under considerable pressure ‘not to let the side down’. However, when we consider Professor Dworkin’s case rather generally, it might seem that on this particular point or that, another philosopher (it might be Joel Feinberg perhaps, or Bonnie Steinbock) can produce a better defence of it. From time to time, therefore, we shall turn to discuss what various other writers have to say. Naturally I do not want unfairly to attribute to Professor Dworkin the ideas and arguments of others who think rather like him. It is important to see ideas in their academic context, especially, as here, where this context is rich and remarkable. Someone with not the slightest interest in the outcome of the debate might well be intrigued by the oddities of it. At times I will be presenting various exhibits from the academy, as in a museum. It is instructive to see just what can be thought by those who are paid to think. It is to be hoped that the reader will be patient with
40 The ‘moderate’ convict to young Pip: ‘You bring me, to-morrow morning early, that file and them wittles . . . You fail, or you go from my words in any partickler, no matter how small it is, and your heart and your liver shall be tore out, roasted and ate. Now I ain’t alone, as you may think I am. There’s a young man hid with me, in comparison with which young man I am a Angel. That young man hears the words I speak. That young man has a secret way pecooliar to himself, of getting at a boy, and at his heart, and at his liver. It is in wain for a boy to attempt to hide himself from that young man . . . I am a keeping that young man from harming you at the present moment with great difficulty. . . . Now, what do you say?’ 41 I do not wish at all to criticise Ronald Dworkin for ‘being unoriginal’, if that is what he is. Sometimes he may say what is new. But like anyone of sense, he is not concerned about such a thing. ‘I do not wish to claim originality for my work: that is the most foolish claim an author can make’ (‘Posner’s Charges: What I Actually Said’, posted on the internet at <www.nyu.edu./gsas/philo/ faculty/dworkin/papers/posner>).
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this, the documentary side, of this book. I have tried to confine my attention to authors who seem to know what an argument looks like and who offer their thoughts in reasonably clear prose. This latter requirement cuts down the field considerably, for like the unexplored depths of the ocean the universities nurture some very strange creatures, but it still remains large. Since readers in a wide variety of disciplines read books of this kind, and since what is said might often seem to those new to this topic to be somewhat odd or implausible, I will sometimes state where these authors are employed or for what they are noted. This is a practice followed by Dworkin himself. Specimens in a museum need to be labelled. In the title to this chapter I put the word liberal in scare quotes – so often necessary in regard to such labels. In this case, something more needs to be said. Although Dworkin appears before us as peacemaker, it is clear from his other writings that he considers himself to be a liberal, and because of the way this word has come to be used we will naturally suppose that the abortion-peace is to be made on pro-choice terms. And the other writers whose views we shall examine will doubtless think of themselves as liberals too. However, if we do not want the use of a political label to replace thought, we should not assume at the outset that what deserves to be regarded as a liberal view of abortion will have to be pro-choice. A liberal might have to take a very different line. And then he might well be called not just a conservative, but an extreme conservative.42 The liberalism offered in the marketplace of ideas is like feminism, a package deal, and the question will arise for anyone with a critical mind whether a belief in or support for ‘abortion rights’ must be included.43 42 The latest example to come my way. Margaret Olivia Little talks about ‘Extreme conservatives’ who claim ‘abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder’. Those who say that it is a form of murder must presumably be entirely off the Richter scale (‘Abortion’, in R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman, eds, A Companion to Applied Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 313). 43 Some documentation. Elisabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman express their liberal unease at the outset of their long, ‘search for compromise’ article on the abortion controversy ‘The Politics of Virtue’ (Georgia Law Review, Vol. 25, 1991, p. 934, also published as a book, Duke University Press, 1993). ‘We have both been identified with the left-liberal side of law and politics, a setting in which unquestioning adherence to the pro-choice position has seemed obligatory.’ Columnist Katha Pollitt clearly finds it difficult to see how a North American liberal can be anti-choice. She has been made uncomfortable by the position on this issue of paradigm liberal Dennis Kucinich, chairman of the Congressional Progressive Caucus. ‘From tax cuts for the rich and the death penalty (against) to national health insurance and the environment (for), Kucinich has the right liberal positions.’ Very reassuring. Unfortunately, she says, as if revealing a secret, he is ‘a solidly anti-choice politician,’ and she details his voting record (‘Regressive Progressive?’, The Nation, 27 May 2002. It might be a mere coincidence, but after this drubbing Dennis Kucinich has suddenly become a progressive progressive,
26
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
It is hard not to be attracted to liberalism is some shape or form.44 There seems something honourable about it. We are not thinking of the modern refrain that we ought to be ‘tolerant’ and ‘inclusive’ – offered to us without the slightest indication of what and of whom and in which way. We might not be in the least attracted to the liberal doctrine of wife-beating: let us say, the idea, once claimed to be part of the common law, that a man must be allowed to chastise his wife so long as his stick is no thicker than his thumb.45 No doubt there have been liberals who have taken this view. They will have talked about rights, privacy, etc.; they will compassionately have insisted that a wife should not be permanently harmed. But we tacitly exclude such liberties. Assuming then this precautionary fi ltration, what, shall we say, is a liberal, broadly speaking?46 ‘and now, just in time for his announcement of his presidential bid, affirms Roe v. Wade on his website’, reports Katha Pollitt, The Nation, 10 March 2003). The Archbishop of Canterbury and head of the world-wide Anglican Church, Rowan Williams, is said repeatedly in the press to have liberal social views. What is not said is that he has long been a member of the English pro-life group, The Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child. Naturally, a reporter writing for a newspaper like the Guardian will talk of opposition to abortion as if it must be a ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’ affair. It is what its readership will on the whole like to hear. For example: ‘The ground was laid for an epic battle over abortion yesterday after conservatives delivered their most significant blow in decades to a woman’s right to choose.’ The report later talks of ‘the anti abortion movement and other causes of the Christian right’. It does not mention that the measure under discussion in the House of Representatives was supported by nearly a third of the Democrats (62 for, 133 against) (Guardian, 6 June 2003). (When the measure reached the Senate, 21 October 2003, the vote among Democrats was 17 for, 30 against.) 44 I say ‘in some shape or form’ because even Ronald Dworkin is only a liberal on his own terms. Readers of Professor Dworkin’s earlier work will know that he rejects the idea that there is a ‘right to liberty’. And Life’s Dominion clearly shows that he also rejects Mill’s ‘harm principle’: the idea ‘that the only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’. For in Dworkin’s view, the liberal state may sometimes forcibly protect items of (what he calls) intrinsic value. (See LD, p. 149, mentioning Mill in this connection. Also, for example, FL, p. 97: ‘government sometimes acts properly . . . when it requires businessmen to spend money to avoid endangering a species’. As we shall see, some species are said to have ‘intrinsic value’.) 45 The idea that English Common Law allowed such beating is amusingly and instructively discussed by the philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers in Who Stole Feminism?, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994, pp. 203–7. See also the Victorian kidnap case of R. v. Jackson QB1 [1891] 671, where the Lord Chancellor remarked: ‘such quaint and absurd dicta as are to be found in the books as to the right of a husband over his wife in respect of personal chastisement are not, I think, now capable of being cited as authorities in a court of justice in this or any civilized country’. 46 I have in mind a social or political outlook. ‘Liberal’ has other uses. A liberal Christian, for example, is not someone with views about the economy, helping
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One answer might be this. A liberal is someone who thinks that there are aspects of what we vaguely call ‘morality’ which are not matters of obligation or of social demand. ‘Morality’ under these aspects, the liberal will say, should not be pressed upon people even where it would be practicable to do so. This is an eminently reasonable view. Morality, it would seem, comprises more than a set of demands. The moral law (the phrase is of course to be found in both Kant and Mill) can indeed involve an extreme imposition on our liberty, as liberals will recognise like everyone else, and where practicable we would all expect the positive law to back it up, as Mill says in the last chapter of Utilitaranism.47 However, there is another part of what we are inclined to call ‘morality’ which encompasses diverse, and sometimes incompatible, ideals from which we may select as the spirit moves us. Raising a family can plainly be an excellent and challenging way to lead a life. But Helen Prejean chose another path, spending her life campaigning against capital punishment. One would not have to be convinced by all her arguments to see something wholly admirable in this alternative. No one, not even an anti-abortion ‘maternalist’, will suppose that she should have been forced instead to have babies and raise them. And perhaps there is another part of ‘morality’ which enjoins personal prudence or good sense, one of the cardinal virtues, perhaps indeed the most cardinal of them all. The law-like part of morality might insist – ‘Do not lie!’, ‘Do not kill!’, ‘Pay your debts!’, etc. But otherwise, within these bounds, it leaves us at liberty – perhaps more than many moralists are apt to suppose. Often, on this version of liberalism, we are free to choose – perhaps to be ungenerous, perhaps to be unattractive and annoying, perhaps to be unwise. But the choice is ours. It is our own affair. In these matters, the liberal is someone who is unfriendly to the busybody, and is rather cool towards the improver. The liberal slogan would seem to be: ‘Live and let live’. Yet what happens when we turn to the debate over abortion? We find that the word liberal seems to have been appropriated; it has been been given a different, and altogether more sinister, meaning. Abortion is not just the action of someone who might have been a little more generous or a little less irritating. ‘Live and let live’ would not be the favoured phrase at all. the poor and weak, or whatever, but is rather a Christian who does not believe in God, or in a personal God, or in a divine lawgiver, or in the divinity of Christ, etc. 47 ‘It would . . . chime in with our feelings of fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should be punished, though we do not always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals . . . We should be glad to see . . . injustice repressed, even in the minutest details, if we were not, with reason, afraid of trusting the magistrate with so unlimited an amount of power over individuals . . . The idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of justice, but into that of any kind of wrong.’ ‘Utilitarianism’, Chapter 5, para. 13, in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society: The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, p. 245.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
There is another aspect to what has been called liberalism, something less passive than a tolerant attitude of live and let live. Liberals have thought of themselves as the guardians of the voiceless, children among them. In On Liberty Mill raised a protest on behalf of the young: ‘One would almost think that a man’s children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them.’48 Here again, abortion seems to have had the power to make black into white, to make up into down. A liberal in this regard is now to be someone who wishes to support the strong in an assault upon the weak. ‘Absolute and exclusive control’ is continually called for. It is said to be a right. Unborn human individuals are regularly supposed to be bodily parts49 – if indeed they are not characterised as parasites.50 To be sure, this astonishing turnabout is often obscured by the claim that these liberals are standing up for the weak, namely for women. It is readily forgotten, in this context, that this represents a somewhat inaccurate and unfortunate stereotype. The voiceless are those whose liberty we hold in trust. And it would be a contemptible liberalism which cared only about the liberties of those at present able to exercise them. And suppose it be said that liberalism is more concerned with equality rather than the mere protection of the voiceless? Abortion seems to flout equality in the most dramatic possible way, since the most basic protection offered to many under the moral law is, as a matter of design, not to be available to all. When it comes to the teachings about justice and wronging by which we are to live, some of our fellow individuals are not to count. The shield of justice is not to be extended over them. They are nobodies. They can be cut limb from limb. Their remains are not even entitled to a decent burial. Ronald Dworkin’s work on abortion might be seen as an uneasy, and I shall argue unsuccessful, struggle to come to terms with these paradoxes.
1.6 Something for everybody The teachings in Life’s Dominion will, as I have said, provide the framework for our discussion here. Professor Dworkin’s book has provoked admiration 48 Mill, ‘On Liberty’, p. 301. 49 ‘Medically and legally the embryo and foetus are merely parts of the mother’s body and not yet human’, write Keith Hindell and Madeleine Simms reassuringly. In case there are residual doubts, they add that at twelve weeks the foetal head is ‘grossly misshapen’ (Abortion Law Reformed, London: Peter Owen, 1971, pp. 47–8, published with a charming frontispiece of David Steel MP, hero of the British 1967 Abortion Act). 50 ‘Pregnancy is a parasitic relation . . .’ (Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory, p. 8). A defi nition of ‘parasite’ is given in a supporting footnote, together with the comment: ‘Host and parasite need not be members of different species.’
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in a way quite unusual for a scholarly work. We shall first illustrate this reaction and then seek to understand it. Even before its birth, the book was the object of considerable devotion and care. A fine team of midwives were on hand, to judge at least from the lengthy acknowledgements page, including Thomas Nagel, Frances Kamm, Joseph Raz, Derek Parfit, John Finnis and G. A. Cohen, names which will be known to more or less every student in moral philosophy. A draft of the book was used as the basis of a seminar in Oxford conducted by its author and the philosopher Bernard Williams, regarded by some as the leading moral philosopher of his day. Its influence already extended beyond the academy. When in a landmark case the Court of Appeal in England concluded that a hospital could lawfully cease to feed a comatose patient Tony Bland, a manuscript of Life’s Dominion, with its intricate account of ‘the sanctity of life’, was found helpful by one of the judges, Lord Hoffman, as he generously acknowledges.51 The book’s emergence into public view was widely celebrated. Articles by Professor Dworkin based on it appeared in The Times (‘When Can a Doctor Kill?’, 27 April 1993) and the New York Times Magazine (‘Life is Sacred. That’s the Easy Part’, 16 May 1993). And as one might expect, the New York Review of Books came out with an extract (‘Feminism and Abortion’, 10 June 1993). A special debate was held in London to mark the book’s arrival before the public. The Independent joined in with a full-page ‘profile’ of the author. The Times, for its part, went so far as to speculate that he might shortly be elevated to the United States Supreme Court, an event we are still awaiting. Life’s Dominion was described (admittedly by its publishers) as ‘the most important and original examination of this controversy to have appeared in many years’. ‘The reader leaves the book’, they said, ‘with his thinking on the questions which it tackles immeasurably clarified.’ To be sure, no one would normally bother with such talk. Grand claims are made for every book. But in this case appreciative reviews quickly followed, for once entirely bearing out a publisher’s estimates. Almost immediately the book was being characterised as ‘a miracle’, ‘a meticulous and rich reformulation of how we think’, ‘important and compelling’, something which ‘illuminates the very nature of how we live our lives’, etc.52 Two commentators even went so far 51 ‘It seems to me that in such an unusual case as this, it would clarify my own thought and perhaps help others, if I tried to examine the underlying moral principles . . . In so doing, I must acknowledge the assistance I have received from reading the manuscript of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion’, Judgment of 9 December 1992, Airdale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All E.R. 825–6. For a nice example of an American case relying heavily on Life’s Dominion, see the 1999 case in the Montana Supreme Court, Armstrong v. State 1999 MT 261. 52 Some further appreciations for the record: Susan Sontag proclaimed Life’s Dominion as Ronald Dworkin’s ‘most seasoned, most necessary book’, that the argument it contains is ‘fresh, agile and improving’. Its author was complimented by
30
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
as to refer to Life’s Dominion, quite without irony, as a courageous book, and a third informed us that the argument in it is brave. This is a little odd, for how could anyone be tempted to break the good professor’s windows for writing a work which seems to offer all of those capable of throwing a stone
Baroness Helena Kennedy, chair of the UK Human Genetics Commission, on his ‘great clarity and wisdom’. T. M. Scanlon of Harvard, writing in the New York Review of Books (15 July 1993), was singularly impressed. Ronald Dworkin, he said, is ‘our leading public philosopher’; in this work he shows a ‘characteristic brilliance and subtlety to the values at stake’, a brilliance which has given us ‘an exciting, thought provoking and potentially very constructive book’. Professor Tribe, the leading constitutional lawyer, also of Harvard, referred to it as a ‘wonderfully rich and evocative investigation’, ‘a feast for the mind and balm for the soul’; adding for good measure that it was ‘Dworkin’s masterpiece’, in which he displayed ‘enormous ingenuity and insight’ (New York Times, 16 May 1993). Dame Mary Warnock said (Spectator, 29 May 1993): ‘it is of immense value to have so intelligible and sympathetic a discussion of the moral issues’. The philosopher A. C. Grayling, referring to Professor Dworkin as ‘the world’s leading philosopher of law’, tolds us that ‘in this book he shows that complicated questions can be discussed with originality, profound insight and utter clarity’. Indeed nothing, it seems, would ever be the same again: ‘From now on’, he wrote, ‘there can be no discussion of abortion and euthanasia that does not start from here’ (Financial Times, 12 June 1993). ‘It is a work of considerable humanity’, said Christopher Belshaw of the Open University in Mind (July 1995). The book was ‘timely, generous, and above all sane’. Jeremy Waldron, Professor of Law at Columbia University, said: ‘Life’s Dominion gives us a deeper account than any we have yet had of what is at stake in these life-and-death controversies, and is clearer, more sensitive in its arguments than anything that I have read’ (London Review of Books, 12 May 1994). Eric Rakowski, Professor of Law at Berkeley, said that we were offered ‘a remarkably coherent argument’ from ‘our most thoughtful and influential legal philosopher’ (Yale Law Journal, 1994). According to Stephen L. Carter, Professor of Law at Yale, writing in the New Yorker (9 August 1993), Professor Dworkin is ‘as thoughtful and creative a legal scholar as the American academy currently possesses’ and his new book ‘is as thoughtful and creative a scholarly treatment as the subject is likely to receive’. ‘As a new and stronger case for a woman’s right to choose . . . one would have to pronounce it a resounding success.’ John A. Robertson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas, talked about ‘the richness and subtlety of his highly accessible and compelling account of why society should defer to individual choice about abortion . . .’ (‘Autonomy’s Dominion’, Law and Social Enquiry, Journal of the American Bar Foundation, 1994, p. 458). Professor Robinson was specially impressed with the book’s more cosmic insights: few thinkers, he says, ‘have confronted as forthrightly as Life’s Dominion does the religious or spiritual nature of these dilemmas’ (p. 457). A philosopher at Cambridge, David Mitchell, said in the Times Higher Education Supplement (16 July 1993), that the writing is of ‘an exemplary lucidity and sensitivity’, and claims that the work is ‘rich in original argument’, ‘marks a major advance’ and ‘sets a new standard’. Karen Armstrong, author of many books on Christianity, etc., is full of admiration: ‘Dworkin refuses to simplify these immensly difficult issues: he leads the reader through the moral and legal maze with mastery and humility. His book is learned, passionate, careful, eloquent and highly readable’
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exactly what they want?53 For Life’s Dominion does indeed offer something to everyone. This is a generosity, I shall argue, which we should not be grateful for. There is indeed something of value in this book, but it does not emerge here. Let us see how this versatility operates, looking at the book first from one side then from the other side of the fence. (Sunday Times, 13 June 1993). Conor Gearty, now Professor of Human Rights Law in the University of London, wrote in the the Independent (12 June 1993) that the book is ‘brilliantly argued and utterly convincing’, adding that it should be ‘required reading for every member of every legislature that has to address the abortion issue’. The reputed ethicist James Rachels says of Ronald Dworkin: ‘Readers of his earlier books will have high expectations, and they will not be disappointed . . . It is a tour de force that could have been written only by an accomplished philosopher who has thought long and hard about a great many matters’ (Bioethics, 1994, p. 268). Frances Kamm, of Harvard University, herself a well known writer on these topics, said that the book ‘does a superb job of providing . . . an account with complex and subtle philosophical reasoning, always aimed at elevating the nature of the public debate’ (‘Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion’, Columbia Law Review, 1995, p. 160. I shall return to Professor Kamm’s essay several times in what follows). Eileen L. McDonagh in her admired book Breaking the Abortion Deadlock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 199) said of Life’s Dominion that it offered ‘perhaps the most philosophically complex and persuasive denial that a foetus is a person’ (we discuss this curious aspect in Chapter 3.2 below). Frances Olsen, Professor of Law at UCLA, said of two articles in the New York Review of Books published as a sort of preliminary to Life’s Dominion: ‘Ronald Dworkin recently presented the conventional liberal argument in support of Roe v. Wade in what is perhaps its most elegant form to date’ (‘Unraveling Compromise’, Harvard Law Review, 1989, p. 109). It perhaps should be noted that Conor Gearty and Helena Kennedy are both eminent Roman Catholics. I do not, of course, wish to suggest that these reviewers had no critical comments to make. Eric Rakowski’s review in the Yale Law Journal, for example, is 70 pages long, and could hardly consist entirely of praise and exposition. And not every reviewer liked Life’s Dominion. Jenny Teichman made some good critical points in ‘What is Sacred? Ronald Dworkin and His Answers’ (Polemical Essays, Aldershot: Ashgate 1997). And Peter Singer in the British Medical Journal (23 October, 1993, pp. 1077–8) complained that Professor Dworkin did not engage with other writers: Glover, Hare, Kuhse, Parfit, Rachels, Tooley or Warren. (This last is odd: Ronald Dworkin was actually helped by Derek Parfit – who offered ‘long, generous and searching comments’ (LD, p. 261), – and the book refers to Rachels (p. 248) and Tooley (p. 245). It does not, however, refer to Peter Singer as Professor Singer was too modest to mention.) 53 Academics who argue in favour of abortion, but with a slightly furrowed brow, are certainly not in any danger from their colleagues who just love to hear this sort of thing put across in this sort of way. It is curious that Amy Gutmann can admiringly say of Judith Jarvis Thomson that ‘she has dared to defend the morality of abortion’ (Introduction by Professor Gutmann to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Goodness and Advice, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. viii, italics added). The morality of abortion is continually defended on university campuses by legions of the timid, and Judith Thomson’s well known ‘Defence of Abortion’
32
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Suppose that a reader is outraged by abortion, and thinks it an infamous assault on the weak for whom we have a responsibility of care. What is there for him? Dworkin could hardly be more reassuring. First of all, he is offered ‘a sovereign commitment to the sanctity of life’ (LD, p. 238). This is a matter which ‘we all take so seriously’ (LD, p. 238). ‘Each separate human life’, it is proclaimed, ‘has an intrinsic and inviolable value’ (LD, p. 27). It is indeed ‘worthy of a kind of awe’ (FL, p. 93). It is ‘a miracle’ which ought not to be ‘frustrated’ (LD, p. 90). ‘Human life is sacred just in itself’ (LD, p. 11). This is theme which catches the editorial eye. The review in the Financial Times (A. C. Grayling) appears under the title ‘With Respect for the Sanctity of Life’. The review in the New York Review of Books (T. M. Scanlon) is proudly headed ‘Partisan for Life’.54 Needless to say, this ‘sovereign commitment’ extends to the life of those in the womb – the book is quite explicit on the matter, referring to ‘the sanctity or inviolability of every stage of every human life’ (LD, p. 238, italics added). The individual in the womb is ‘something we should respect and honour and protect as marvelous in itself’ (LD, p. 73). This is ‘a value that unites us as human beings’ (p. 238). We all agree that it is ‘in principle wrong to terminate a life’ (LD, p. 34). The life of every single human individual ‘commands respect and protection . . . no matter in what form or shape’ (LD, p. 84). It has ‘intrinsic creative importance’.55 We must all show a ‘reverence for the wonder of creation’.56 ‘I myself believe’ he says, ‘that an abortion is morally wrong when it does not show respect for the intrinsic value of every human life, in no matter what stage or form . . .’.57 That sounds a severe test. Is there anything we ever do which shows such comprehensive respect? No wonder the reviewers found the work so inspiring. Someone opposed to abortion might indeed be inclined to think that this stress on sacredness, reverence and commitment is just a little overdone. ‘Steady on now!’ he might exclaim, ‘We’re not asking you to worship it. We’re just asking you not to kill it.’ Anyway, not content with having expressed this reverence, Professor Dworkin often talks frankly about what is going on behind closed doors in our hospitals and clinics.58 This is, in part, what makes his book of value.
54 55 56
57 58
has proved more popular than perhaps any other philosophical article. She must have known she was onto a winner. For references to Grayling and Scanlon, see note 52, this Part. New York Review of Books, 10 June 1993, p. 28. This, though very much in Ronald Dworkin’s style, actually comes from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833, at 853. The phrase is singled out by Professor Dworkin (LD, p. 171) as a way of conveying this notion of sacredness. Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 431. Often he talks frankly in this way, but not always. Sometimes he is restrained by prudence. When talking about the abortion of disabled individuals he avails himself of the popular and so often innocuous phrase ‘bringing a child into the
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Someone who has an abortion is not, in Professor Dworkin’s view, simply failing to rescue – as if she were refusing (reasonably or unreasonably) to give life-saving bone marrow. Abortion is not a matter of ‘letting die’. We are not entitled to the (surely sometimes quite dubious) comfort of that phrase. As everyone knows, if there is a chance of foetal survival, steps are taken to prevent it. Human individuals are the subject of deliberate attack. ‘Abortion generally requires a physical attack on the foetus, not just a failure to aid it’ (LD, p. 111). Professor Dworkin clearly wants to emphasise this point, for the sentence also occurs twice in his collection Freedom’s Law (pp. 48 and 87). Those who are involved in abortion, he says, without mincing words, are engaged in ‘deliberate killing’ (LD, p. 3). Theirs is a ‘choice for death’ (LD, p. 3). One can hardly get more forthright than that. He does not take refuge in scare quotes. Abortion is not for him merely alleged killing.59 His article in The Times introducing Life’s Dominion is entitled, as we saw, ‘When Can a Doctor Kill?’ In his article ‘Objectivity and Truth,’ which is not particularly about abortion, abortion is described in passing as ‘the deliberate killing of an innocent human being’.60 In case anyone is not sure what ‘human being’ means, what is killed is said in Freedom’s Law (unsurprisingly of course) to be ‘a member of the animal species Homo sapiens’, and (a little oddly) ‘a human organism whose life has begun’ (FL, world’ (LD, p. 33). It should be realised what ‘not bringing a child into the world’ means in this context. It won’t simply be a matter of avoiding pregnancy, you can be sure of that. It will be . . . well, what the above paragraph indicates. Margaret Olivia Little’s article ‘The Moral Permissibility of Abortion’ affords an excellent example of what I here complain of: p. 36 quite bristles with such misleading phrases. The context, of course, is one of impressive ‘responsibility’, of not wanting to burden the poor child with more life. One might be tempted ‘to bring a child into existence’ which is ‘already burdened by rejection’, but ‘responsibility’ says no. This is all rather familiar. If a mother looks after her toddler in the usual way would we describe this as bringing a toddler into the world? Bringing an older toddler into the world? Bringing a teenager into existence? Would she perhaps have to answer for doing these things? 59 Scare quotes are often a comfort for those who favour what is called choice. Even the normally forthright Katha Pollitt resorts to them. ‘That the woman who “kills” one baby can be and often is a loving mother to another is just mindboggling’ (‘Everything’s Up to Date in North Dakota’, Tikkun, January/February 1990, p. 58). Of course it is a matter of interest that parents can kill their children. In fact, most (born) children who are killed ‘die at the hands of their parents or carers. Those most at risk are babies under one year old’, writes Mary Marsh, director NSPCC (The Times, 10 August 2002), adding: ‘it is not true that these cases are rare and are becoming less common’. The rate ‘has not dropped for more than 25 years’. Perhaps the ability to kill one’s children is a manifestation of intelligence, as human sacrifice is. Thus if there is such a thing as maternal instinct, intelligence enables people to transcend it. 60 ‘Objectivity and Truth – You’d Better Believe It’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1996, p. 98.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
p. 85).61 In describing the controversy in his anthology The Philosophy of Law, it comes naturally to Professor Dworkin to talk of ‘the unborn child’ (as legal documents quite often do, and as ‘foetus’ is often still defined in dictionaries, though we could have expected that to have changed by now).62 And insofar as the killing is concerned, deliberate must surely be the right word – the thing is done with care and skill by doctors, etc. It is often necessary – though Dworkin does not mention this – to count the body parts, a stressful activity calling for ‘desensitising strategies’ and a little recontextualisation.63 And though innocent is an odd semi-technical notion when used in debates about homicide, it does not matter much for present purposes how it is interpreted. It might seem odd that there should be this insistence that abortion involves killing. But it is admirable of Professor Dworkin to emphasise the fact, for it is denied or covered up by distinguished legal academics. Lawrence Tribe, for example, talks of abortion as if it were like refusing to give a kidney in order to save a life, and so does Cass Sunstein. In Constitutional Choices Professor Tribe contrasts the idea that men are not to be forced to 61 I say oddly, because the qualification seems somewhat redundant. What would a human organism be whose life had not yet begun? Anyway, things become more complicated in Life’s Dominion. By this time Professor Dworkin had come to think that the phrase ‘human being’ is ambiguous, though the different senses are not explained (LD, p. 22). Is ‘rabbit’ similarly ambiguous I wonder? Professor Dworkin does not explain why ambiguity gives trouble here – so often ambiguity gives no trouble at all, and such trouble as is caused is easily avoided. Any ambiguity that there might be seems of little conseqence, for those who are opposed to abortion seem to use ‘human being’ in the plain sense recognised so clearly in Freedom’s Law, and I think implicitly at least in Life’s Dominion. Compare also Joel Feinberg who says: ‘But the term “human being” is subtly ambiguous’ (Freedom and Fulfillment, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 56). The ‘subtly’ here is nice. It suggests refi ned appreciation or perceptiveness. If we still fail to perceive the ambiguity, why, we must be missing something. For more on the alleged ambiguity see the much reprinted article by Mary Anne Warren, ‘On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion’, The Monist, 1973. Professor Warren talks surprisingly about a sense of ‘human being’ which means ‘something like “a fully fledged member of the moral community” ’. I seem to have lost my membership card. 62 Ronald Dworkin, ed., The Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 13. 63 Wendy Simonds, Abortion at Work: Ideology and Practice in a Feminist Clinic, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996. Women working at the Center ‘developed strategies’ that ‘enabled them to desensitise themselves’. They would, for example, make sure that the parts did not become arranged in order, in ‘the “broken doll” configuration’. Or they would ‘never look at the face’ when ‘processing tissue’ (pp. 86–7). ‘Many realised they had the power to recontextualise their work; they could deliberately see late abortion as interesting rather than disgusting’ (p. 71).
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donate organs to save their children’s lives with the thought that it is all right for the community to force poor women to act as ‘incubators’ by not being willing to provide them with free abortions.64 In his later book, The Partial Constitution, Professor Sunstein refers to abortion as ‘a refusal to allow one’s body to be devoted to the protection of another’, and compares this with a refusal on the part of a man to undergo a ‘risk free’ kidney transplant to save a child.65 None of this sounds like the deliberate killing that Dworkin is talking about. As for the other side of Dworkin’s coin, that abortion is not just the withdrawal of the helping hand, the point is still well worth his making. It is important to note in this connection how unnatural it is to see gestation as a matter of giving aid. (What! Continuously, 24 hours a day? And for nine whole months!) This point will be clear when we consider what is essentially the same process in a non-human mammal, a rabbit say. A pregnant rabbit helps its foetal rabbits only in the vestigial sense in which it helps its fleas. It is not that it is impossible for a woman to assist her developing child. Thus a woman might indeed be said to be helping her foetus grow well by choosing to eat certain dietary supplements recommended by her doctor, and this might indeed be thought of as benevolence. To be sure, a pregnant woman ‘provides’ oxygen in a sense – just as the soil ‘provides’ nutrients to a tree, whose leaves in turn ‘provide’ shade to a grateful cow. And we will equally say that a woman’s lungs provide her with oxygen. But we would hardly want to conclude that the two of them are continuously and faithfully giving aid. And no one would call them ‘life savers’ except playfully. It is if anything even more misleading to suggest that a gestating woman is acting creatively, especially if we would not be prepared to say such a thing about a pregnant rabbit or a tree putting forth leaves in the spring. (Perhaps it sounds complimentary to women. Fancy being able to engage in such sophisticated creating continuously – even when fast asleep or when concentrating on a mathematical proof! And fancy being able to create two babies at the same time! How does she do it?) Even those voluntary actions on the part of the pregnant woman which could be counted as the providing of care should not be thought of as ‘creative’, as if the newborn baby was somehow being created by them. Plainly, when the baby is born, and is being fed and kept warm, no one would say that these activities amounted to ‘creating a toddler’.66 64 Lawrence Tribe, Constitutional Choices, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 245. 65 Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 274. 66 For a conspicuous failure to consider these matters see Margaret Olivia Little, ‘Abortion’. Professor Little contrasts what she calls ‘metaphors’ – metaphors which ‘depict gestation as passive carriage’ – with ‘the truth’ which ‘is of course far different’. She goes on in the same paragraph to talk about ‘providing’,
36
Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Abortion then is killing. And this killing is said to matter in a very fundamental way. It is a kind of dishonouring. ‘Something is sacred or inviolable’, Dworkin explains, ‘when its deliberate destruction would dishonour what ought to be honoured’ (LD, p. 74). He pointedly reminds us of ‘the horror we feel in the wilful destruction of a human life’ (LD, p. 84). We are horrified at the dishonour done to innocent human beings when they are killed by our doctors. And as we all know, there is a great deal of this wilful destruction going on. (One hears said that abortion is the commonest surgical procedure.) It is very important, we are told, that these lives ‘flourish and not be wasted’ (LD, p. 74). All this is strong language, but perhaps in the circumstances understandable. To be sure, one might well wonder who is covered by this phrase ‘the horror we feel’. For there are those for whom wilful destruction is all in a day’s work. As I once heard an abortion doctor say, ‘one gets used to it’. But the ‘we’ is certainly intended to include the author of Life’s Dominion. That is why Professor Dworkin is called a Partisan for Life. Needless to say all this threatens to disconcert some of Professor Dworkin’s loyal readers. They will certainly not be accustomed to such ‘foetocentric discourse’ – as it is sometimes known in the academic trade. They will regard what he says as inflammatory. Does he really have to talk about ‘deliberate killing’ in this way?67 They might even accuse him of inciting violence against abortion doctors, in effect if not in intention. How, they might anxiously ask after all this frankness, is he going to be able to support the abortion status quo? But they need not worry; they are in very safe hands. No one is going to be called ‘our leading public philosopher’ who ‘donating’, ‘creating’ (‘creating blood’), ‘delivering’ – and says ‘assistance it plainly is’. This she adds ‘has crucial implications for abortion’s alleged status as murder’ (all p. 315). She does not go so far as to say that the developing child puts in an order for various nutrients, but it is hard to see why not. Later she tells us that ‘decisions to abort often represent, not a decision to destroy, but a refusal to create’ (p. 322) – making it sound like the proposal of an artist to take time off. 67 It is interesting to see what happens to all this upsetting talk about ‘deliberate killing’, when Professor Dworkin is synopsising. Chapter 7 starts out with quite extraordinary tact (LD, p. 179): ‘Abortion is the waste of the start of human life. Death intervenes before life in earnest has even begun. Now we turn . . .’ What is missing? All this could be said of miscarriage. Dworkin could easily have expressed what he really believes, making use of his word ‘deliberately’: ‘In having an abortion, we deliberately lay waste or ruin someone else’s life, before he (more probably she) has had a chance of appreciating what life in earnest is all about.’ I am not here arguing that he is right to believe this about every abortion, for it might be difficult to know what to say about the very earliest stage of pregnancy, and technical innovation might make very early abortion possible. But it is his view, and he is obviously right to be troubled in mind if it is even remotely possible that this is correct.
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would seriously frighten them in this matter. The edition of Life’s Dominion printed in the UK has the subtitle ‘An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia’. However, the US edition seems wisely to have expanded this description, adding ‘and Individual Freedom’. No doubt it was feared that sensitive liberal readers, hearing all this stress on the sanctity of life, might be put off. These nervous readers need, it would seem, to take the deeper view. As the philosopher Galen Strawson remarks in his review of Life’s Dominion for the Independent on Sunday (13 June 1993): ‘To go deep is to see that to be “pro-life” is to be “pro-choice”.’ The remark is reprinted in the middle of the review, in large letters, in case anyone missed it. It well represents the spirit of the book. This emphasis on the inviolability of human life should in fact be reassuring to those in the business of taking it. It is indeed an emphasis which has suddenly come into its own. For the Democratic Party has begun to realise, after the 2004 presidential election, that a public acknowledgement of the exceptional value of foetal life might be necessary if it is ever to secure the White House once again. That enthusiast for ‘choice’ Frances Kissling recently wrote an article asking whether ‘we’ had perhaps ‘ceded too much territory to antiabortionists by not articulating the value of foetal life’. On the strength of this, a commentator detected that Ms Kissling might be leaning towards the pro-life position. ‘The fact is, I am already pro-life’, she replied. After all she had written in her article that pro-choice values ‘include respect for life, recognition of foetal life as valuable and a concern for fostering a society in which all life is valued’.68 This kind of claim is not new. Pamela Maraldo – when president of Planned Parenthood, one of the largest abortion providers in the United States – was able to proclaim her organisation to be pro-life. This was clearly quite an achievement. ‘We can begin again to inculcate America with our values’, she said. ‘We are the real pro-life force in America. I want to take the moral high ground.’69 (In truth of course, the heart of the debate about abortion entirely occupies the moral low ground: that minimal part of morality which concerns what we strictly owe one another. That is why both sides talk about rights.) Certainly there is in Life’s Dominion this sovereign commitment to the total, complete and absolute inviolability of every stage of every human life, a fundamental commitment which unites us all as human beings . . . But what will it cost, the nervous reader will ask, to agree with such a pronouncement? The truly extraordinary thing about Professor Dworkin’s teaching about inviolability is just how untroubling it can be. Its yoke is easy and its burden light. 68 ‘Is There Life after Roe?’ 69 J. Warner, ‘Mixed Messages: Where is Pamela Maraldo Taking Planned Parenthood?’, Ms, November–December 1993 Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 25.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Remember the title of Professor Dworkin’s article in the New York Times, mentioned above: ‘Life is Sacred. That’s the Easy Part’. No doubt he meant that it was easy to recognise it. But in fact it can turn out remarkably easy to live with it too. The sovereign fundamental commitment is quite compatible with the deliberate killing of the innocent. People who learn to believe in Dworkin-sanctity will be able to destroy their offspring – let us say in the furtherance of their careers. It is not surprising that this will be thought a sufficient reason. That is the way of the world. What is so new and refreshing is to hear this explained in terms of the sanctity of life. A doctor could specialise in gruesome late abortions – and perhaps earn a good deal of money in the process – all the while being overwhelmed with the unutterable sacredness of the seriously unwanted infants he is daily disposing of. The keen-eyed reader will have noticed the occurrence of the phrase ‘in principle’: it is ‘in principle wrong to terminate a life’ (LD p. 34, quoted above). And we are all said to accept that ‘in principle human life is inviolable’ (LD, p. 84). To be sure, the very occurrence of the word principle in one’s manifesto sets a good tone, and it is elsewhere a favourite item in Professor Dworkin’s vocabulary. But the phrase ‘in principle’ is what British readers will associate with that well-known civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby. Professor Dworkin, it would seem, wants to defend abortion even where others who seem eminently sensible and loving are willing to adopt the individual whose life is in question. For ‘many women would suffer great emotional pain for many years if they turned a child over to others to raise and love’ (LD, pp. 103–4). In case we have doubts about this, Professor Dworkin cites an example where a Catholic woman, seeking to justify having an abortion, claimed that this had once been the case when she had previously ‘turned a child over’. Of course, many women might also suffer great emotional pain for many years if they were to destroy their offspring instead – there seems to be evidence, matching anecdote for anecdote, for this too. The curious thing is that someone can be thought to show a reverence for human life who is prepared to say: better killed than cared for.70 Inviolability in Life’s Dominion tends, as we have just seen, to be not-quiteinviolability. But something might be better than nothing. We are told that ‘abortion is never permissible except to prevent serious damage of some kind’ (LD, p. 33). That sounds pretty restrictive. How many abortions do we hear about that are necessary to prevent serious damage? But just how 70 This passage about adoption is significant, for it reinforces what we have been saying: that Professor Dworkin is talking about a right to destroy one’s offspring, not just to detach oneself from it and ‘let it die’. An abortion is here exactly of the kind we are considering: the procedure is a failure if the child survives it and grows up like any other child, ‘for others to raise and love’.
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restrictive is it? We do not have to look far. In the very next paragraph, we find Professor Dworkin claiming that it would have been all right deliberately to kill (his own honest language, of course, but not employed here) a foetal thalidomide victim (LD, p. 33). To be fair, Dworkin emphasises later that the liberal doctrine does not imply contempt for disabled individuals (LD, pp. 98–9), and we might take his word for it. But we are thinking here of the ‘serious damage’ claim – that abortion is never permissible except to prevent serious damage. Yet if a foetus already lacks arms, the damage is done. What damage is one preventing by destroying utterly the whole of the body which remains to it? The old story! Strong claims are made which are scarcely spoken before they are being weakened. It is the old absolutely never, well hardly ever, I mean quite often really slide. The general impression that the reader will get from Professor Dworkin is that although an abortion, like a funeral, is somehow a solemn occasion, one can more or less do what one wants, even beyond the fi rst couple of months of pregnancy, provided one is sufficiently earnest and conscientious in the doing of it.71 ‘Abortion?’ he seems to be saying, ‘Ain’t it a shame!’ Did I say ‘seems’? When, in casting an initial glance at Life’s Dominion, this phrase first crossed my mind I wondered whether it wasn’t rather unfair and polemical to describe his outlook in this way. Yet the phrase turned out to be a near quotation. There is scholarly accuracy in it. Abortion in Professor Dworkin’s view, and apparently in everyone else’s view, is ‘a shame’ (LD, p. 84). The deliberate ending of a single human life is ‘objectively a shame’ (LD, p. 81). It is, for what its worth, ‘a cosmic shame’ (p. 13). So Ain’t it a shame! is precisely the message. It would have made a good title for his book.72 In 1920 a legal scholar, Karl Binding, joined with the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche to publish a book now well remembered. It was called Permission for 71 In a section of her article ‘Abortion’ – it is called ‘The Sanctity of Life: Respect Revisited’ – Margaret Olivia Little, after appreciative remarks about Life’s Dominion, asks us to consider whether ‘crass jokes’ should perhaps be avoided during an abortion (p. 319). They might after all make us ‘morally queasy’ (p. 320). Clearly a nice topic for the ‘ethics’ class. Sample jokes might be compiled and their queasibility put to the test. 72 Naomi Wolf’s ‘Our Bodies. Our Souls’ (see note 4, this Part) takes very much this line, and indeed mentions Professor Dworkin. ‘Ain’t it a shame!’ is the message here too. One has to be honest, she says, and admit just what one is doing. One must be serious about the whole business, promising in advance to repent and make amends – to prepent, one might say – while waving a fond goodbye to the individual one is about to wrong. ‘Ain’t it a shame!’ also seems to be the attitude of Whoopi Goldberg: ‘But, yeah, we wept . . . we wept going for those abortions, we wept coming back . . . because both times this was something made from love.’ (Angela Bonavoglia, The Choices We Made, New York, Random House, updated edn, 1992, p. 119, ellipses in text.)
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life.73 Karl Binding was at the end of a distinguished career. He is described by the historian Michael Burleigh as ‘one of Germany’s leading specialists in constitutional and criminal jurisprudence’.74 The book was written at a time when German scholarship was second to none in the world; and of course, it was not yet tainted with Nazism. Michael Burleigh refers to the premises from which Binding argues in this book as ‘unimpeachably liberal’.75 Now the phrase ‘life unworthy of life’ is not one we would be inclined to use nowadays, even if the thought behind it has not quite gone away. We cannot help remembering what it eventually meant for psychiatric patients in Germany, and indeed what happened after that; and indeed, without remembering what it might have meant for psychiatric patients outside Germany – in England, let us say.76 And one would clearly not be turning to such an unpopular phrase in connection with Life’s Dominion. Life’s Dominion is written in quite a different 73 Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens, Ihr Mass und Form, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920, on the web at <staff-www.uni-marburg.de/~rohrmann/ Literatur/binding>. There is a translation by Walter E. Wright, under the title ‘Permitting the Destruction of Unworthy Life: Its Extent and Form’, in Issues in Law and Medicine, 1992. I have preferred the perhaps more usual translation of the title given by Michael Burleigh in the book cited in the next note. 74 Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany, 1900–1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 15. 75 The book, when one gets beyond its rather disagreeable title, is what would be called liberal in its conclusions too. In so many ways it has not dated. Thus there is much talk of compassion as a motive for killing, and of course an absolute insistence on securing consent where the patient is competent. In the case of children, the mother of a child is naturally to be given a ‘choice’ whether the killing should proceed. An ethics committee is to be consulted (where there is time). There is an insistence that killing should be painless. There is the by now familiar compulsion to invent a sense of ‘not really alive’ to characterise the living. And we find the search for a soft word (here ‘release’) to describe what is done to them. Lastly, we find throughout our modern assumption that someone who has the misfortune to be completely dependent somehow lacks dignity as a human being. As a secondary matter, the book evinces a responsible attitude to social costs. All this is quite current. The work of Binding and Hoche is surely due for rehabilitation. If they did not get everything right – that had to wait for the early 1970s – they were remarkable pioneers. 76 Virginia Woolf on an uncomfortable incident, writing in her diary, 1915: ‘On the towpath we met and had to pass a long line of imbeciles. The fi rst was a very tall young man, just queer enough to look twice at, but no more; the second shuffled, and looked aside; and then one realised that every one in that long line was a miserable ineffective shuffling idiotic creature, with no forehead, or no chin, and an imbecile grin, or a wild suspicious stare. It was perfectly horrible. They should certainly be killed. We found a market going on at Kingston, as if it were Marlborough. We bought a pinapple for 9d. . . .’ (Anne Olivier Bell, ed., The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vol. 1, London: Hogarth Press, 1977, p. 13). It should not be thought that such an opinion was particularly unusual among intellectu-
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41
spirit. Its tone is reverential. What we are offered is something quite different: Permission for the Destruction of Life Worthy of Life. Is this an advance? Even those who are not particularly opposed to voluntary euthanasia have been disturbed by the permissive claims of Binding and Hoche. For many, the worry has been that some are to be killed for the good of others – family members, society at large. This is, as it happens, a very secondary consideration in Binding and Hoche, but even a trace of it makes us liberals nervous. We would be decidedly cautious about this kind of altruism in regard to euthanasia. However this element is much in the mind of of abortion advocates. It is almost always the good of others they have in mind (though there are certain well known pretences used to cover this up). Permission for the destruction of life worthy of life – for the sake of others. That seems to be what is on offer.
1.7 ‘What people really think’ How can Professor Dworkin make all those admissions about ‘deliberate killing’, etc., at so little a cost? Here is someone, we might say, who allows himself to be handcuffed, stuffed into a weighted sack and thrown into the sea from the top of a cliff, only to emerge moments later a free man. How is the trick done? Answer in brief: Professor Dworkin appropriates the way people talk about the sanctity of life and puts it to a novel use. He uses it in the interest of what we might call adult liberation. It might seem at fi rst sight that few people who object to abortion could be persuaded to follow him, even though they are all adults and stand to gain. But, he argues, they are more or less persuaded already. Professor Dworkin, it would appear, has made a significant discovery: that the familiar and uncomfortable objections that people often make to abortion do not represent what they really think. The public protest says one thing, but the thought behind it says another. He wants us all to get away from the nasty idea that abortion, even later abortion, in the second trimester, let us say, is doing to the unborn human individual what Dr Shipman, graduate of my university, was convicted of doing to so many of his patients – an idea which has distinctly awkward implications. People who say such a thing, he argues, cannot really be in earnest about it, although they evidently seem to be in earnest about something. What they want, indeed what everyone wants whether they are pro-life or pro-choice, is to avoid ‘insulting’ (his word) ‘the value of human life’. ‘Almost everyone shares, explicitly or intuitively, the idea that human life has objective, als. For more, see Donald J. Childs, Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats and the Culture of Degeneration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. I am indebted to Professor Childs’s book for putting me on the track of this particular quotation.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
intrinsic value that is quite independent of its personal value for anyone’ (LD, p. 67). This is a doctrine which is usefully open to differing interpretations (LD, p. 70), but which enables everyone to exercise their moral passions, without, one hopes, being a nuisance to others in the free exercise of theirs. This forms the basis of the reconciling project. On this view, abortion is on the whole sad rather than bad. What people who are opposed to the procedure really think, according to Professor Dworkin, is, as we have already suggested, that it is such a pity to destroy one’s offspring, or for a surgeon to do the deed on one’s behalf. And the good news is that those who speak up for what are called abortion rights think just the same! – with perhaps a difference of emphasis (replacing ‘such’ with ‘rather’). It was generally admitted in these discussions, even before Dworkin’s researches, that no woman ever went in for having abortions as an agreeable pastime. Which woman would enjoy surgical intermeddling with her reproductive system? Which woman would want a doctor to scrape around, and perhaps dismember something or other inside her that she (and the nurses) would rather not see? But we can now say more. Those seeking to have abortions, even those later abortions, when the embryo has become a foetus, which pretty uncontroversially involve the killing of human beings, indeed the killing of human beings that it is their evident responsibility to protect and cherish, are quite as deeply concerned as the other lot about the value of human life – though in this case it may of course be a concern for the value of their own lives, business prospects, etc., abstractly considered (LD, p. 60).77 The ‘abstractly considered’ is important, for otherwise the decision might risk being called selfish. Professor Dworkin puts his point here by referring us to the ‘abortion decision study’ discussed in a well-known book by the Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice.78 Here 29 women
77 ‘pretty uncontroversially involves the killing of human beings’. For a philosopher who thinks that human beings, along with cats, horses, are not animals – are not, to put the matter pedantically, organisms belonging to the animal kingdom – and that a human foetus in mid-term is only an animal and not a human being, see Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, and my discussion of it in ‘Death Sentences’ (Philosophy, forthcoming). 78 In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Of the 29 women interviewed only four are known to have decided against abortion. Two miscarried, and the decision of a further two is unknown (p. 72; Ronald Dworkin also gives these figures). I should perhaps add that Professor Gilligan does not claim that her study tells us much about what women in general think about the abortion decision (p. 72). However, in a later edition she talks of the ‘strong resonance’ she feels with Dworkin’s account of what people really think on the topic as opposed to what they might say. See ‘Letter to Readers’ in the 1993 reprint, p. xi.
Introductory
43
were interviewed about abortion. All of them considered abortion an option, and nearly all of them eventually decided to go ahead. Only one of them appears to have mentioned murder, and even this, says Professor Dworkin, was hardly to be taken seriously (LD, pp. 58–9). Instead – to everyone’s surprise, we can only assume – they all ‘talked and wondered about responsibility’ (LD, p. 59, italics added). What is more, ‘some of them said that the selfish choice would be to have their babies’! (LD, p. 59, italics added. To have in this context, we must remember, is to turn down the killing offer). Professor Dworkin’s suggestion on the basis of such evidence – he recognises that the sample will not be typical of all women having abortions – is that people on the point of choosing to have an abortion, in a country in which the procedure is, to say the least, controversial, and is commonly referred to by quite ordinary and sober people as baby-killing, would, if they consent to being interviewed about it, report they are being ‘unselfish’. They would make themselves out to be sensitive and caring people. One can almost hear them say: ‘I did it for you!’79 If they had been of an academic bent they might also have claimed to be preserving, or honouring, or not wasting, abstract value, a quantity they would have read about in ethics books. All this gives us an important result. Whatever the choice, virtue rules. And one might add, people seriously prepared to have an abortion tend not to say that it is murder.80 From all this we may conclude that their eventual decision to have an abortion was very respectful of the sanctity of life broadly considered. As Professor Dworkin puts it, each of these abortionchoosers was taking up the ‘challenge to show respect for all life’ (LD, p. 60, italics added). Well then, seeing that even those who dispose of their offspring tend to be devoted to this sanctity and respect, there is every hope that we, the parties in the abortion debate, can all get together and make a convivial evening of it, celebrating jointly the value of human life and congratulating
79 Catharine MacKinnon: ‘Many women have abortions as a desperate act of love for their unborn children.’ Ach! So! It gives a wholly unexpected meaning to ‘She loved him to bits’ (see her ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’, Yale Law Journal, 1991, p. 1318). I originally came across this reference in Janet Hadley’s Abortion: Between Freedom and Necessity, London: Virago 1996, p. 85. She adds that it finds Catharine MacKinnon in an ‘uncharacteristically delicate moment’. An indispensible source on this matter is of course Naomi Wolf’s ‘Our Bodies, Our Souls’ (see note 4, this Part). 80 This finding is quite parallel to another, which is just about to be made, the results to be published in The Times and the New York Review of Books, after a preliminary announcement at a specially convened wine and cheese party in Tate Modern, that candidates who are being interviewed for a job – 98.31 per cent, in fact – make out that they are eager and competent, and in general are on their best behaviour.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
one another on our quiet, dignified unselfishness and piety. One is reminded of Mr Squeers and Mr Snawley: ‘I should wish their morals to be particularly attended to,’ said Mr Snawley. ‘I am glad of that, sir,’ replied the schoolmaster, drawing himself up. ‘They have come to the right shop for morals, sir.’ ‘You are a moral man yourself,’ said Mr Snawley. ‘I rather believe I am, sir,’ replied Squeers. ‘I have the satisfaction to know you are, sir,’ said Mr Snawley. ‘I asked one of your references, and he said you were pious.’ ‘Well, sir, I hope I am a little in that line,’ replied Squeers. ‘I hope I am also,’ rejoined the other. ‘Could I say a few words with you in the next box?’ ‘By all means,’ rejoined Squeers with a grin.81 Like a good showman, Professor Dworkin seems eager to tell us just what a wonderful audience we are. Of course there will remain disagreements about the comparative value of this or that. That can hardly be helped. But these disagreements, even if they are between atheists, can usefully be supposed ‘religious’, and hence, according the First Amendment of the American Constitution, a no-go area for legal intervention. (One can see this coming a mile away without one’s specs at dusk on a foggy evening; it arrives in fact in Dworkin’s Chapter 6.) 82 The idea that people who say that abortion is murder hardly ever believe it seems to me deeply implausible, and that Professor Dworkin’s arguments in favour of this view are bad. It would be a distraction, however, to consider this matter here. As for the substance of the matter, it seems to me very arguable that at the very least by eight weeks or so, and probably quite a bit earlier, abortion can, with dry and undemonstrative accuracy, be described as murder, something morally comparable, let us say, to the killing of a toddler.83 Furthermore it seems to me very arguable that the
81 Charles Dickens, Nicholas Nickleby. 82 Arguments of this general character must be quite common. Joel Feinberg, for example, suggests that the objection to abortion, in the fi rst trimester at least, cannot be incorporated into law since this would involve the ‘establishment’ of religion forbidden under the Constitution. See his article ‘Abortion’ in Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 75. 83 Or, if you like: the killing, in a way that is pretty painless and quite unfrightening to the victim, of a toddler, unwanted by its parents or carers, in circumstances that will never come to light and cause distress. That would certainly be counted murder, even if permitted by corrupt laws of the country in queston, the particular child being Jewish let us say, and the society anti-Semitic.
Introductory
45
value story, as we might call it, is unintelligible. And if it is unintelligible, people cannot really believe it whatever they say.
1.8 Why it is wrong to kill. Are there two independent reasons? We can usefully approach the doctrine of Life’s Dominion by considering an innocent-seeming question. Let us assume that we have a sufficiently adequate understanding that actions can be ‘wrong’. This notion is doubtless quite problematic when it comes to philosophical enquiry, as so many notions are, but we will not go into that here. Let us then ask why is it wrong for us to kill other human individuals – when that is to say it is wrong? Of course, we leave aside incidental exacerbating circumstances. Anyone who teaches moral philosophy will recognise that the explanations people put forward for their quite uncontroversial moral beliefs are often unsatisfactory. And this will assuredly include the explanations offered by moral philosophers. No doubt the notion of ‘explanation’ involved is not very clear. But at any rate, we expect there to be a deeper understanding of these matters, but find that it often eludes us. And here it really is illuminating to get away from issues about which people, for good reason or bad, disagree. We should not be racking our brains about abortion or capital punishment or the targeting of civilian populations during a war. We should think of what we suppose to be the plainest of moral truths. ‘It is wrong to kill an aunt for a legacy’ or ‘It is wrong to shoot a toddler in a playground’ might do as examples. We are all confident here.84 Yet although we understand very well that these judgements are true – no one in such a case would accept the wide-eyed plea ‘I did not know it was wrong!’ – we are apt to offer inadequate accounts when we seek to understand what it is that we know. Professor Dworkin’s work has a merit here missed by those who have so much praised it. It shows up very well both that there is a problem of understanding and how far we are from solving it. To see how our understanding of what we know falls short in this way we need not restrict ourselves to the case of homicide. Consider a simpler matter: the bill that is to be paid. Very many people, when asked why one has to pay, will exclaim: ‘Well, you wouldn’t like it if someone refused to pay your bill!’ That this is an inadequate understanding of our obligation to pay bills is very evident, for we often owe money to corporations, which 84 At least if we so much as accept the category of ‘the wrong’ at all. Someone might, I suppose, say that ‘wrong’ and ‘all right’ are tied in with a conception of ethics which they reject. This is not of course to say that it would be impossible for them to criticise the killing of the aunt or the toddler in other terms – as unjust or improvident, etc.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
have no feelings to be hurt, or to the taxman, whose feelings on the matter can be discounted. We can also steal goods from forgetful individuals which we are confident will not be missed. This example of explanatory inadequacy is, of course, quite superficial; we are merely illustrating the general idea. Our convictions in regard to the killing of aunts, etc., are not of course contingent upon the convincingness of the answers we give to the philosopher’s question why it is bad to kill. To undermine our explanatory answers is not to undermine our moral convictions at the bar of reason. Suppose that we have always taken it for granted that the objection to murder turns upon a right to life. At least this much is true, we say to ourselves, even if ‘this much’ does not take us very far. We then meet a philosopher – not Professor Dworkin – who tells us that the whole idea of a natural right of this kind is a nonsense. There are indeed difficulties with the notion. Anyway, we are impressed by the way he argues. But we will not now draw a liberal conclusion, claiming a new freedom. We will not say that murder is permissible after all. We will properly search for another explanation why murder is bad, assuming we are sufficiently interested in the topic. In regard to what is obvious, conviction comes first, and the deeper understanding comes a poor second. Thus we shall be inclined to think that there is a right to life because murder is bad, and not vice versa. To borrow an image from Wittgenstein: the house supports the foundations.85 An understanding of the wisdom in our objection to (what is uncontroversially regarded as) murder is, I suspect, pretty difficult. We can of course say something, but we will lack the whole picture.86 Of course, there is nothing to stop an action from being wrong on more than one count. This is particularly evident when we consider an individual action rather than a kind of action. In this sense there need be no such thing as the badness of a particular act of killing. Thus the killing of a certain child may be complained of both as murder and as a betrayal, a betrayal of the child in view of our responsibilities of care. Or it might be bad because one is a doctor and it is contrary to some oath one has taken. It might also be a bad example to others, cause considerable distress to third parties, deprive 85 ‘I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation walls are carried by the whole house’ (On Certainty, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969, para. 246). 86 Here I would like to draw attention to Jeff McMahan’s striking and I believe accurate remark: ‘Although the belief that killing is normally wrong is as universal and as uncontroversial a moral belief as we are likely to fi nd, no one . . . has ever offered an account of why killing is wrong which even begins to do justice to the full range of common sense beliefs about the morality of killing’ (‘Killing and Equality’, Utilitas, 1995, p. 1. See also his The Ethics of Killing, p. 189). This is to my mind a fair comment, and would remain a fair comment about our beliefs even if they deviated to some extent from ‘common sense’.
Introductory
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people who long for a child of the opportunity of caring for it and loving it, etc. But special circumstances apart, murder just as such might be bad for more than one reason. If we are asked why killing someone, a child say, is a bad kind of action, and we are making our first steps towards understanding, we will perhaps come up with two answers. We will say that individuals have ‘a right to life’, of course. That is very natural. But we might also say that ‘human life is valuable’ – thinking here of a special kind of value constitutive of sacredness or at least indicative of it. The rights answer and the value answer would not be carefully distinguished. In fact, all we would have in hand would be a couple of catchphrases – hardly anything much thought over. Elucidation would be called for. It is here that Professor Dworkin appears to help us. He himself offers these two answers, but wants us carefully to distinguish them. That sounds like a good thought: we often run different things together. This distinction between having a right and having a value enables Dworkin to make a crucial move. Very often, we may presume, a killing will be objectionable on both grounds at once. In the case of most of us, it would be a twofold wrong were we to be deliberately killed (LD, p. 108). Something valuable or sacred would be destroyed, and in addition our right to life would be violated. But here we encounter a surprise. At a sufficiently early stage of our lives (we are told) we lacked this right to life, and had only our value to protect us. Accordingly, early killing (abortion, the killing of a foetus in an artificial womb, and presumably infanticide) never involves the violation of a right to life; all we have is ‘just’ the destruction of something precious. This is indeed more or less admitted (we are to believe) by those who oppose this destruction, at least when they are not being carried away by purple prose, their own or their advisor’s. Of course it is not only a human foetus that is alleged to have this value: as I have just indicated, we are all said to have it whether we are at the foetal stage or not. Professor Dworkin says, rather unusually for a liberal, that it might be all right for the state to forbid suicide for this reason (LD, p. 108), that is, in order one might say to preserve the objectively precious, This sounds a matter of great seriousness, though it has its comic side. One might after all choose to kill oneself in some value-enhancing way, say by feeding oneself to objectively precious Siberian tigers which would otherwise become extinct. Or one could make up for the loss by having one’s remains turned into a work of art, following the example of Jeremy Bentham. Works of art are said to have this special value which human beings also have. This distinction between an appeal to an individual’s rights and an appeal to his value is thus of practical importance. It could help us, we might suppose, to solve other disputes about homicide. We could perhaps make use of Professor Dworkin’s idea to raise an objection to capital punishment
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
– in fact it is hard to believe that someone has not already taken this line. We would argue that although certain criminals, fairly convicted of certain crimes, had indeed forfeited the right to life as people say, this would not be the end of the matter. In lacking a right to life, these criminals would, in this respect at least, be in the position of unborn babies (as seen by Professor Dworkin). Still, these criminals, just like the babies, would be objects of value, and not to be killed unless this would be needed to preserve intrinsic value overall – one thinks perhaps of using them as life-saving organ banks. It might be necessary to assess with some care the value of this or that criminal. These days, no doubt, an ‘ethics committee’ would be set up to advise the state governor, the home secretary, or whoever has to make the decision. This new idea seems then to be quite powerful. It must be acknowledged, however, that opponents of abortion have been a little slow to accept this ‘value not rights’ reformulation of what they think. And this, even after the publication of Life’s Dominion and the prominent reviews it received. For example, 45 of these opponents, mostly academics, and including Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School whose views are taken seriously by Dworkin (LD, pp. 61–5), persist in talking about the rights of the unborn. In their manifesto ‘The America We Seek’ they say, for example, The right-to-life of the unborn will not be secured until it is secure under the Constitution of the United States.87 and The renewal of American democracy according to the highest ideals of the Founders requires us to stand for the inalienable right-to-life of the unborn, to stand with women in crisis, and to stand against the abortion license.88 On the other hand, the Dworkin formulation has seemed curiously plausible to those on the ‘liberal’ side. Frances Kissling, president of the oddly named Catholics for a Free Choice, also aims to end the abortion war.89 Indeed, as if in anticipation of Professor Dworkin’s own findings, she herself has recommended that those who are pro-choice should acknowledge 87 Society, July/August 1997, p. 15. 88 Ibid., p. 16. 89 ‘Ending the Abortion War: A Modest Proposal’, The Christian Century, Vol. 107, No. 6, 21 February 1990, pp. 181–4. Frances Kissling is upbeat: ‘politicians considered pro-life are defecting to the pro-choice camp daily’ (ibid., p. 180). Free Choice Catholics, it seems to me, might increase the flow still further with the assistance of a patron saint. Might I respectfully suggest St Uncumber? (Feast Day 20 July).
Introductory
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‘foetal life as valuable’ but should not be ‘conferring . . . rights on the foetus’.90 In the matter of rights they should simply talk of the woman’s right to make what are coyly called ‘reproductive health decisions’.91 Like Professor Dworkin, she too considers that abortions are a shame. Perhaps she goes somewhat further. ‘The goal of caring people’ is ‘eliminating all abortions’. This will require in a way unexplained ‘a radical transformation of society’.92 Ironically, Professor Dworkin’s account of the distinction between our rights and our worth might well have taken its origin from his reading of John Finnis, a professor of law at Oxford, and a Catholic not at all for a free choice. In 1977, Dworkin edited an anthology called The Philosophy of Law. It included not only the well-known article by Judith Jarvis Thomson on abortion – what anthology would be complete without it? – but also a reply to this article by Professor Finnis. In his introduction to the anthology, Professor Dworkin wrote a comment about this last which contains, I believe, the seed of his further thoughts: John Finnis’s reply is valuable . . . because it argues that it is wrong and pointless to conduct the debate about abortion as a debate about competing rights. Finnis believes that abortion is wrong, not because the balance of rights cut against it, but because acts that take life in any circumstances, including suicide, deny the fundamental value of life, and so are wrong quite independently of any theory of rights. The issue he thus raises is of great importance, because it questions certain widespread assumptions about the justification that is needed for any constraint on liberty.93 This is the view which was to emerge 15 years or so later in Life’s Dominion. Professor Dworkin’s key distinction between our worth and our rights sets us an agenda. We must ask two independent questions: 1. Can we make sense of the idea that the badness of a killing can be explained by the value of what is destroyed? 2. Did we at an early stage of our lives lack a right to life? The first question will occupy us in the next part, Part Two. I shall attempt to show, insofar as such a thing is capable of demonstration, that a certain would-be idea of intrinsic value which appears in Life’s Dominion (and, it 90 91 92 93
Ibid., p. 181. Ibid., p. 183. Ibid., p. 184. Dworkin, The Philosophy of Law, p. 13.
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Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
must be said, in many other people’s writings too) has not been given a sense. The idea that we lacked a right to life at an early stage of our existence is based upon the suggestion that at that time we had no good of our own – no welfare – which such a right would exist to protect. So the second question largely resolves into 2a. Did we at an early stage of our lives lack a welfare? Parts Three and Four are devoted to a consideration of this question. In effect, we shall first criticise an argument which might tend to make people uncomfortable about abortion, and then criticise an argument devoted to setting their minds at ease. Eventually we will return, in Part Five, to consider the initial thought, that the destruction of value and the violation of rights form distinct reasons for objecting to homicide. I shall argue that although it is indeed misleading to see things in this twofold way, Dworkin’s idea eventually leads us towards a better understanding – though so much remains to be understood.
Part 2: Worth
In Part Two we shall investigate with some thoroughness whether it really makes sense, after all, to talk about the intrinsic value of human beings, of paintings, of animal species, etc., where this is given as a reason why they should not be destroyed. Of course, we shall be specially interested in the idea that human beings have this value. The idea that we must not kill human beings because they are in some way valuable – or at least that we should be reluctant to kill them for this reason – is exceedingly common, and it is this general conviction which will be our topic. It is worth our taking considerable trouble with it, for otherwise it seems to be here to stay. We shall, of course, be paying special attention to Ronald Dworkin’s rather worked-out version of this story, but many people fall in with this general idea of value quite independently. Jeff McMahan, for example, is a writer whose recent ruminations on these topics have been much praised. He tells us – and the ink is hardly dry – that the reason why it is wrong to kill (what he chooses to call) a person – where it is wrong – is that such a killing would be ‘an egregious violation’ of that person’s ‘intrinsic worth’.1 This appeal to value or worth is quite natural. If we are going to say that people are valuable at all, ‘intrinsic’ seems the right word. And we certainly understand the remark or instruction ‘Don’t throw that away! It is quite valuable.’ I mean, as this might be said in daily life, far from the academy.
1 Symposium on Jeff McMahan’s The Ethics of Killing, in Philosophical Books, 2005, p. 2. I should remark here that Professor McMahan in The Ethics of Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) argues that his notion of ‘worth’ is not the same as Dworkin’s ‘sanctity’ (p. 331). But they seem to be allied notions. In explaining how an individual’s worth explains the way it is wrong to kill, McMahan points out how such a killing is, among other things, ‘to annihilate that which is irreplaceable’ and ‘to show contempt for that which demands reverence’ (p. 242) – which is exactly the language which Dworkin would use about ‘intrinsically valuable’ items like paintings. 51
52 Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
Eventually I am going to argue that we cannot make anything of this talk of intrinsic value – whether we are asserting or denying its presence. The background which makes the ‘daily life’ remark so readily comprehensible is missing. But first we need to have some thoughts about what is vaguely called the sanctity of life.
2.1 The concept of the sanctity of life In this initial chapter I am going to fall in line with the idea that to talk of the sanctity of life and the value of life come to the same thing, at least in the context of the problems which here concern us. These phrases are pretty unclear on the face of it, and hence this assimilation will not seem obviously incorrect, though we should even now feel some discomfort over it. But we should feel even more unease over a destruction of distinctiveness of another kind. This is the topic of the present chapter. What is it that has this sanctity or value? It is natural to suppose that we have in mind the sanctity or value of the human individual, the individual who has the life. Professor Dworkin, for example, seems at first sight to take this view. Thus in the section ‘The Sanctity of Each Human Life’ it is ‘each individual human being’ that is said to have this remarkable value, seeing that every one of them is a ‘masterpiece’ to the credit of God or Nature (LD, p. 82). It is the individual that is said to be a triumph. ‘Any human creature, including the most immature embryo, is a triumph of divine or evolutionary creation’ (LD, p. 83). So Professor Dworkin is thinking of a property of individuals. It is not as though we were proposing to deprive an individual of a valuable possession, namely, his life. A human individual’s life is his existence. That is to say, a human individual is an animal, and an animal continues to be just so long as it continues to be alive. To kill is to destroy. A dead parrot is not a parrot in the very worst of health. It is, as we all know, an ex-parrot.2 It might seem pedantic to insist on this. But not so. There is a distinct danger that the vague but possibly significant idea of the value or sanctity 2 Some philosophers seem to want to say that a corpse is an animal – though an animal not perhaps in the best of condition. One still owns an animal, for a while at least, after one’s pet rabbit has died. There it is, in a heap at the bottom of its hutch. I suppose this is correct in a sense – in what we might call the butcher’s sense. On this account, a corpse would not have to remain intact or even complete. One would still have one’s pet animal when it had been skilfully incorporated into a rabbit pie – provided the pie was yet uneaten. And even then, some philosophers will want to say, no doubt, that there is a scattered object – one’s rabbit – existing in different places, in the way various discrete bits of land go up to make the United States. Alternatively, one might keep one’s animal by having it stuffed and put on the mantelpiece. Perhaps that involves yet another sense of ‘animal’ – the taxidermist’s sense.
Worth 53
of life will lose distinctiveness where distinctiveness is important. For example, there is a danger that offences coming under the sanctity of life will be taken to include a great range of featherweight misdemeanours – for example, the mere inconveniencing of others. That might seem far-fetched. But consider: if I inconvenience Smith a bit of life does not go quite so well. It would be hard to say that Smith himself somehow became less valuable when inconvenienced. However, if I express the doctrine in terms of the value of his life, then inconveniencing will tend to raise what will be called sanctity of life issues. Outside the academy, at least, ‘recognising the sanctity of life’ would commonly be taken to mean something down to earth like resisting the temptation to kill. The phrase in quotes would be interpreted as a whole. More accurately perhaps: it would mean resisting the temptation to kill the innocent. No doubt we would have to add a rider: ‘. . . and not just because one fears the police, or because killing would be bad for business’. Dworkin himself says that the idea that we should respect the sanctity of life is not just the idea that it is wrong to kill people: ‘the idea of sanctity is meant to offer a special kind of reason why killing people is wrong’.3 There is something correct in this remark: we need to say, in the way explained, that talk of sanctity is meant to exclude certain answers. That would be enough to give it a role. To be sure, this would be thought a bit too tidy. What we have just described would be recognising the sanctity of life in the primary way. In a secondary way, such recognition would involve something more indeterminate – but still connected with homicide. Someone who recognises the sanctity of life might have to be prepared in some degree to prevent others from killing, though acknowledging that this is largely the job of the police. The demands of sanctity might also include not allowing someone in one’s charge to perish by neglect, or taking steps to save someone who could fairly easily be rescued: the italics suggesting a considerable limitation of scope. It would certainly not require the infliction of burdensome life-prolonging treatment on the terminally ill. Nor would it require enormous expenditures to prolong a life for a day.4 Because of these secondary matters 3 Letter in response to Richard Stith, to New York Review of Books, 28 March 1991, italics in text. 4 People sometimes feel free to attribute very fanciful ideas to those who are opposed to the killing of the innocent, perhaps carelessly, perhaps in order to discredit them. Philosopher Alison Hills remarks: ‘Some people think that human life is sacred and should be preserved in all circumstances’ (Do Animals Have Rights? Thriplow: Ikon Books, 2005, p. 142, italics added). The and from the context is evidently and hence. I wonder whether anyone who claims to believe in the sanctity of life would wish to assert such an extravagance? Physiologist Clifford Grobstein talks about ‘right-to-life insistence that foetal life be continued, whenever and however possible, as an absolute value in any circumstance’ (Science and the
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especially, the notion can hardly be expected to be precise. People might well differ as to what this recognition required – in regard to capital punishment or warfare for example. But for all this indeterminacy, they would see something distinctive and limited about the issues involved. Significantly, however, Dworkin does his bit to destroy this distinctiveness, and we may be sure that in this respect he is not alone. Ordinary people who believe in what are called abortion rights will often feel uneasy about the matter. They will not want to say that women have a right to destroy their children. On the contrary, they will have a need to appear as devoted to the sanctity of life as anyone, perhaps especially devoted to it. For this purpose what is wanted is a use for this impressive phrase which is as broad and indeterminate as they can get away with. It should be aspirational and open ended rather than forbidding. The idea that the sanctity of life controversies are about war, capital punishment, self-defence, abortion and euthanasia – which straightforwardly raise questions about homicide – would be an embarrassment. To be devoted to the sanctity of life could not simply mean: to live by the conviction that it is wrong to kill the innocent and to encourage others to think likewise. It would include, say, becoming a doctor. Or encouraging others to take exercise and keep off fatty foods. Perhaps one recognises the sanctity of life in some very minimal way simply by breathing. Breathing preserves life. And of course we would all be encouraged to look beyond preserving. A cheery disposition helps to maintain the quality of life. Dworkin explicitly rejects the view that respect for the sanctity of life ‘requires only that we do not kill, and has nothing to do with preserving or protecting’ on the ground that although ‘respect for the lives of handicapped people would require us not to kill them, it would give us no reason to help them at all’.5 We should not be so distracted by the kindly concern exhibited in such a remark to notice the semantic dilution involved. We need not deny that we have reason to help. The question is: does this issue come in here? A general atmosphere of edification surrounds any talk of helping the handicapped. The smoke in a smokescreen need not smell bad. As we have seen, Professor Dworkin likes to use the word ‘insult’ in connection with the sanctity of life. What do you think ‘the greatest insult to the sanctity of life’ would be? The targeting of a toddler? Chopping the head off a hostage kidnapped off the street and having the procedure videoed for the TV networks? Or perhaps something on a larger scale? September 11? The willingness of governments to drop hydrogen bombs? The deliberate reintroduction of smallpox into the world? Auschwitz? Rwanda? Not at all. Unborn, New York: Basic Books, 1988, p. 116). He does not refer us to anyone who has maintained this quite extraordinary opinion. Our remarks on avoiding miscarriage in Chapter 1.3 are relevant to all this. 5 Letter in response to Richard Stith, New York Review of Books.
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‘The greatest insult to the sanctity of life is indifference or laziness in the face of its complexity’ (LD, p. 240). Abstraction-distraction this might be called. One could hardly meet a better example of it. But Dworkin does not quite leave things here. He also gives a somewhat more definite account of what it is to recognize the sanctity of life. Recognition ‘means . . . not frustrating investments in life that have already been made’ (LD, p. 99). This takes us away from harsh questions of homicide. Idleness would turn out to be a sanctity of life matter. Having got some way with the piano, investing considerable time and effort, one would show some sort of failure to recognise the sanctity of life by not keeping up with one’s practising. We shall have more to say about this talk of ‘investment’ later.6 Anyone who feels threatened by talk of the sanctity of life, thinking that it has especially to do with homicide, can help themselves not just by being very abstract but by being biologically inclusive. People who are willing to kill a baby when moderately pressed will often have qualms (at least on paper) about stepping on a blade of grass. Naturally there will be little obligations and larger ones. One would need a little excuse for stepping on the blade of grass, a somewhat more weighty one for mowing a whole lawn, etc. With that understood, the broad account of the sanctity of life – the sanctity of protoplasm, one might say – is quite popular among those who believe there are abortion rights as one might expect. Three specimens: ‘It is wrong to destroy life, whether it be human life, or animal life, or vegetable life for no good reason.’7 ‘The wanton, pointless destruction of any living thing, aside from being terribly stupid from a self interested point of view, is indefensible.’8 ‘Living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise harmed, without good reasons. . . .’9 Naturally, all these authors are pro6 I am not sure how closely Professor Dworkin adheres to this ‘investment’ account. Life’s Dominion explains how one can intelligibly be said to ‘offend against the sanctity of life’ by having sexual intercourse without the desire to conceive. ‘In Catholic tradition, and in the imagination of many people who are not Catholics, it is itself an offense against the sanctity of life to make love without that desire: that is the basis of many people’s opposition to contraception’ (LD, p. 96, see also p. 158). How is this extraordinary idea supposed to relate to the thought that respecting the sanctity of life ‘means . . . not frustrating investments in life that have already been made’ (LD, p. 99)? (Incidentally, I suspect that Catholics might want to make two distinctions: between (i) ‘Not (particularly) wanting X to happen’, and (ii) ‘Wanting X not to happen’, and between (iii) ‘Wanting X not to happen’ and ‘Taking steps to ensure that X does not happen’.) 7 A. T. Nuyen, ‘Moral Contracts and the Morality of Abortion’, in Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, eds, New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume VIII, 1982, p. 153. 8 Richard Flathman, ‘The Theory of Rights and the Practice of Abortion’, in his Toward a Liberalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 184, fn. 9 Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 149.
56 Worth and Welfare in the Controversy over Abortion
choice. Indeed, it will be said ‘when the interests of life in this larger sense [i.e. all life on this planet] are taken into consideration, the pro-choice position is actually the one most deserving of the adjective “pro-life” ’, a popular claim as we have seen.10 Of course, some destruction of living things is necessary. And this indeed might provide an opportunity for denying altogether that there is such a thing as a right to life. ‘There is no right to life in any society on Earth today . . . We raise farm animals for slaughter; destroy forests . . . All these beasts and vegetables are as alive as we.’11 No doubt this destruction is a shame. In a perfect world it would not happen. But it would be churlish to complain about abortion doctors in particular, who merely do in a little way what we all do in a big way. The thought that the sanctity of life is just to do with murder (more or less) will seem by contrast to be very narrow, fi xated and obsessive. In fact, those who are opposed to abortion will continually be accused, we can be sure, of not caring about the welfare of children once they are born. ‘Prolifers think that life begins at conception and ends with birth’ has been a popular saying for some time. The versatile Carl Djerassi, ‘the father of the contraceptive pill’, who teaches a graduate class in ethics at Stanford, still considers it worth an airing: ‘The pro-life people tend to be obsessed with life before birth but pay very little attention to it afterwards. Quite often the same people who are against abortion are also against gun control and for the death penalty.’12 Katha Pollitt expresses the point with more vigour: What is it about babies that drives people so wild? Not real babies, mind you . . . but theoretical babies . . . On behalf of real-life disabled babies – 10 We came across this sort of claim in chapter 1.5, in regard to Galen Strawson, etc. The present version is the work of Ronnie Zoe Hawking, ‘Reproductive Choices: The Ecological Dimensions’ selected to be reprinted in James E. White, ed., Contemporary Moral Problems, 6th edn, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000, p. 198. This is the concluding sentence of the article. Earlier we are told that ‘planetary life itself, construed in the larger sense as encompassing all the diverse extant as well as the potential future forms arising through the evolutionary process, is faced with a crisis of unprecedented proportions’ (p. 188). But it is not all bad news. The ‘termination of almost a million and a half pregnancies every year in the United States for instance, has served to lessen significantly the toll on the global ecosystems’ (p. 191). This article had earlier been published by the American Philosophical Association. 11 Carl Sagan and Anne Druyan, ‘Abortion: Is it Possible to be both Pro-choice and Pro-life?’, in Carl Sagan, Billions and Billions: Thoughts on Life and Death at the Brink of the Millennium, New York: Random House, 1997, p. 166. Carl Sagan was a recipient of 23 honorary doctorates. 12 ‘The Guardian Profi le’, Guardian, 26 August 2000. Carl Djerassi, in addition to teaching ethics, is an organic chemist, a novelist, playwright, art collector, the recipient of 17 honorary doctorates, etc. Of course, we shouldn’t lazily go along with the belief that people who are pro-life will be more likely than others to
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not to mention their older brothers and sisters – the ‘pro-life’ movement has yet to stir a finger. But Peter Singer’s books – now there’s a real threat to infant welfare!13 This is for many an irresistible thought. It finds its way into cartoons.14 The critic and commentator Robert Hughes declares confidently that those opposed to abortion ‘prefer the unborn to the born’.15 (He thinks it has something to do with ‘innocence.’) The irresistible thought beguiles that heroine of the cause Sarah Weddington: ‘Why don’t those who claim to be “pro-life” do more to improve the lives of kids in poverty?’, she asks. Of course, we do not know how much they already do, or indeed how much she does, and do not need to know in the least. This is all a big distraction – as perhaps it is meant to be.16 The short answer to the complaint that those opposed to abortion care little about babies once they are born is this: let the US Supreme Court hand down a right to infanticide, and let there be a million cases a year, and just watch how passive the anti-choice crowd will be about it, how little they care about life after birth. And we can usefully remember that people who are (wonderfully or tiresomely) pro-life are not just concerned with the very young. They also insist that a dependent and helpless adult is not to be starved to death – as in the case of Terri Schiavo. We have yet to be told that they do not care a bit in what condition these dependent people are kept, so long as they are fed. But give it time.
13
14
15 16
support the death penalty. For what it is worth, a Gallup survey of 1990 designed to probe attitudes to abortion found that 75 per cent of those who identified themselves as strongly pro-choice said they favoured the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, compared with 68 per cent of the strongly pro-life. This survey is discussed in James Davison Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins, New York: The Free Press, 1994, pp. 106 and 269. ‘Peter Singer Comes to Princeton’, The Nation, 3 May 1999, p. 10. Ms Pollitt has not done her homework. Peter Singer is famous or infamous for his views about what she would call ‘real-life disabled babies’. He wishes to extend ‘the right to choose’ to include infanticide. I have on my desk two pro-choice cartoons reprinted in Reproductive Freedom News. In one (September 2000) a middle-aged man is saying to some poor unfortunate: ‘We’ll protect you till you’re born; then you’re on your own punk!’ (italics in text). In the other (June 2000) another middle-aged man is bearing a placard which reads ‘Ban Partial Birth Abortion’. He is bending over and addressing the abdomen of a pregnant woman who looks as if she is about to have her baby: ‘We’re only concerned with saving your life’. The woman is saying ‘What about mine?’ Robert Hughes, Culture of Complaint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 53. Sarah Weddington, A Question of Choice, New York: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 283. I say that this is perhaps meant to be a distraction as it occurs in a fi nal chapter on tactics – what one can do in order to be a ‘champion for choice’ (p. 268).
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Of course, this, the irresistible thought, is a frivolity. On a more serious matter though, it could well happen that our community is unreasonably concerned with the welfare of born infants – as well as not caring enough for the welfare of those unborn. ‘The welfare of the child must come first’ is an attractive slogan. Yet the reiteration of this slogan can be the cause of much misery and injustice to many women whose babies are taken away from them on the suspicion that these children might, just might, be harmed. The fact that a child would be more likely to flourish in a different home is certainly not a sufficient reason for transplanting it. More interesting for our present purposes, however, is the thought that ‘infant welfare’ is what is principally at stake in the controversy over abortion. It is totally misleading. Katha Pollitt should have asked ‘What is it about wronging or injustice that drives so many people so wild?’ People are often particularly concerned about injustice, and indeed with particular injustices. Would it be reasonable to complain about those opposed to unjust discrimination that they seem, as a body, to have no particular concern for those who, for some reason, are no longer at risk of being unjustly treated in this way? That they do not campaign for more hospitals, or against slippery pavements? It is very natural that those who are upset by a wronging will side with the wronged, and be noticed for it. Peter Geach tells us of a Viking who was named Bairnsfriend ‘because he would not share in the popular sport of tossing infants from spearpoint to spearpoint’.17 But it is quite evident that people who object to abortion, as a wronging, are not simply driven by thoughts about the welfare of babies, theoretical or otherwise. An article in the Sunday Times (1 September 1996) was headed ‘Tissue from Aborted Foetuses Used to Save Unborn Babies’. It reported that the technique in question was condemned, not praised, by a representative of the anti-abortion charity Life. That is what one would expect. Furthermore, abortion opponents would nearly always object to ‘foetal reduction’ designed to save foetal lives overall. As for born babies, we have now had the case of the conjoined twins, legally known as Jodie and Mary, who could not both survive. Those opposed to abortion tended to think that Mary should not be killed to let Jodie live. It is not of course that they wanted both babies to die, but they believed doctors should not attempt to save the life of a patient by killing another patient. This shows very well the difference between idea of the sanctity of life (which bids us not to kill) – and the idea that life is valuable (which bids us to conserve value, if necessary by killing). We shall return to this difference in the next chapter. But for the moment we are going along with the idea that sanctity and value come to the same thing.
17 Peter Geach, The Virtues, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 32.
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In the summer of 1996 in England a professor of obstetrics announced that he had had a hard decision to make. He was going to abort one of a pair of ordinary healthy twins, the woman being ‘in straightened circumstances’.18 The professor was known to be opposed to abortion, which is presumably why he had only performed 3,000 of them. About the dismembering that is sometimes involved he said: ‘I don’t find it pleasant but I am of sufficiently tough constitution to do it.’19 In the present case he satisfied his conscience by arguing that if he did not kill one of these babies the woman would have both killed elsewhere. Now this at first sight would seem to be no argument at all. One is not entitled to kill Smith on the mere ground that if one sits on one’s hands someone else is going to kill both Smith and Robinson. Armed, however, with Ronald Dworkin’s distinction we can sort this out. If Smith is a grown-up with rights we could of course not kill him for such a reason. But if Smith is still in the womb and only has a value, things will naturally be different. Killing the one will conserve value. In fact the killing will surely be obligatory. (There might still be a problem here for the sensitive ethicist. He might still wonder whether one would have to be scrupulously fair in deciding which twin to kill – tossing a coin perhaps – in order to give the twins ‘equal opportunity’. Or whether, if one twin were disabled, one would have to compensate for its ill luck by favouring it.) That killing might be undertaken out of respect for the sanctity of life interpreted as a matter of ‘intrinsic value’ might seem to many to be Professor Dworkin’s great contribution to the abortion debate. He invites someone who is thinking of abortive killing on the ground of disability to ask themselves whether acting or refraining would represent the ‘more terrible frustration of the miracle of life’ (LD, p. 90).20 There is more to this effect at LD, p. 151. Here we learn that if someone is ‘deformed’, it is possible that one ‘best serves the intrinsic value of life’ by killing him.21 This, says Professor Dworkin, is indeed ‘controversial’. It is simply something one might gravely consider. Considering things of this kind apparently encourages in oneself a ‘sense of moral responsibility’. Of course, after the individual to be disposed of has developed sufficiently to have a right to life, it would be murder, even in Professor Dworkin’s view, to serve the intrinsic value of life in this way. 18 A considerable amount of money was then raised to help her cope. The poverty bit of the story subsequently turned out not to be true; she was a career woman whose husband was a company director – but all this is hardly relevant here. 19 Guardian, 8 August 1996. 20 Such a phrase is surely a terrible frustration of the miracle of language. 21 In the article in The Times ‘When Can a Doctor Kill?’ (27 April 1993) the point is made using the description ‘seriously deformed’. Not killing in such a circumstance, it is thought, ‘would itself frustrate or damage human life in some other grave way’.
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No doubt we are expected to say: ‘Killing someone merely valuable, someone who fortunately happens to have no rights, would be a shame, perhaps a dreadful shame, but when the infringement of a right would also be involved – well that would be something else entirely!’ But what would this amount to? Isn’t it also a shame when a right is infringed? And if so, how would the shames be compared? For all we could tell in advance the destruction of a valuable thing of the kind in question might by far outweigh in cosmic frightfulness the mere infringement of the right? And might not a bout of serious thinking whether to kill an older child with a right to life also encourage in oneself a ‘sense of moral responsibility’? What killing, one wonders, could not be done in the name of the sanctity of life and the threatened ‘frustration of miracles’? We argued (pp. 47–8) that capital punishment might be attacked in the name of the sanctity – here meaning the intrinsic value – of life. But might not it also be defended? Even if capital punishment were not considered to be a deterrence, it might simply be meted out in solemn recognition of the sanctity of life of the victim. Relatives of the victim in particular might see the matter in this way. Other killings too could be sanctioned by appeal to this impressive but elusive value. The very existence of X or Y, degenerate specimens using up valuable resources, might be thought an insult to this value as manifested in other, normal, individuals. Certain psychiatric patients might be held to be a parody of mankind. Their very presence might be thought an offence, an insult, to ‘human dignity’. We might remember the passage from Virginia Woolf’s diary about the imbeciles on the towpath, quoted in note 76 of Part One. The thought that everyone has this value is surely a fragile thought. Even if everyone has it, the language of value invites the language of tradeoff. Consider the wholesale bombing of cities during a war. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, presumably undertaken after serious thought, and with regretful worryings about the ‘moral cost’, in order to shorten the war and prevent further bloodshed, would have been undertaken in the name of value. ‘In a perfect world this would not happen.’ As we know, this life-saving reason is offered over and over to defend those bombings – almost obsessionally, one might say, as if to ward off a thought not to be thought.22 Naturally, I am not arguing that these actions would have to be counted legitimate just because the value of life was being ‘honoured’ or ‘reverenced’ – as I suppose we should say. Far from it. Nor of course would Professor Dworkin come within a mile of supposing so. Honouring the sanctity of 22 A correspondent to the London Review of Books (5 September 2002) helpfully reminds us, referring us to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946, that if we had not dropped the two atomic bombs we would have had to kill many more civilians by having to continue with the conventional bombing of civilian targets.
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life in these ways would by no means guarantee rectitude. One might after all be infringing other people’s rights, and their weight might more than counterbalance sanctity considerations – though as we saw, it could be hard, not to say impossible, to determine when this is so. The honouring of sanctity would simply be an attractive aspect of what might, on the whole and all things considered, be held to be a mistake. All in all then, the notion of life’s value (sanctity, inviolability) can acquire an unruly life of its own. This is entirely to be expected. It is the price to be paid for the destruction of distinctiveness.
2.2 Why the notion of sanctity or inviolability should not be thought of as a kind of value It is quite usual for writers in this field to think of sacredness as a kind of value. And we have ourselves rather gone along with this idea for purposes of exposition. Nevertheless I want now to argue, that insofar as there can be a right and wrong in regard to these indistinct concepts, sacredness is not to be thought of as a kind of value at all. We have already seen difficulties in the value account of sanctity when we briefly considered the notion of ‘foetal reduction’ and again the case of the conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary. Here in each case, where killing-tosave is in prospect, the vague and possibly unsatisfactory idea of sanctity speaks up against, whereas the vague and possibly unsatisfactory idea of value speaks up in favour. Again, a pregnant woman who would be thought firmly to believe in the sanctity of life, and who would never consider having an abortion even if made pregnant by a rapist, might nevertheless put up with the risk of miscarriage, refusing for example to take extra rest when advised to do so by her doctor, as in the case we discussed in Chapter 1.3. This ‘nevertheless’ would be hard to understand if everything had to turn on the ‘value’ of her unborn child. This incongruity is especially easy to see if we imagine another woman in just this predicament who refuses to follow her doctor’s advice in order, if possible, to procure a miscarriage, other methods not being available. It is natural to talk of sanctity of life when we are thinking of the teaching that we are not to lay our murderous hands upon one another. By contrast, the idea of value seems more apposite when talking about the duty to rescue.23 This is because the notion of costs are here relevant. We are not to count the costs of respecting the sanctity of life, at least where this is 23 It is instructive to see that John Harris in The Value of Life (London: Routledge, 1985) introduces the topic of value by talking about the duty to rescue. Indeed he does so three times. See the first page of the Introduction (p. 1), the opening page of Chapter 1 (p. 7) and then the page long section entitled ‘What do we mean by value?’ (pp. 8–9). Dodgy questions about killing are naturally left for later. When the time comes Professor Harris does not say (as far as I can see) that
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narrowly construed: that is part of what we have in mind by talking of sanctity in such matters. But it is perfectly reasonable to consider the cost, even in a purely monetary sense, when thinking whom to save. This is a regular part of public health care. And we will reasonably be prepared to spend more saving some rather than others, thus regarding some as ‘more worth saving’ for one reason or another. Someone might be inclined to express this by talking about their differing value, though we might not find such language comfortable, or even particularly intelligible. However when we think of the sanctity of their lives, we will think them all alike. They will have an inviolability which does not differ in degree.24 That there is a difference between sanctity and value also comes out when we think of everyday talk of sanctity in cases not involving homicide. Thus we talk about the sanctity of contract. We are obviously not referring to the value of contract as an institution, or the value of any particular contract. We talk about the sanctity of property. We do not have in mind the worth of property in some sense or other. Other people’s private letters are regarded as sacrosanct, but not necessarily precious. I remember being solemnly told at school that the lavatories were sacred, meaning that a certain privacy was to be respected in connection with them. We children were no doubt teasing some unfortunate boy who was shy about his natural functions. It was not being suggested by the authorities that these places had a value over and above their utility. In the letter to the New York Review of Books, previously cited,25 Professor Dworkin rejects as ‘too crude’ the view that the doctrine of the sanctity of life simply means ‘that it is wrong to kill people’. ‘The idea of sanctity’, he it is wrong to kill people because they are valuable. Rather, to kill someone deprives him of an opportunity, an opportunity to value his own life (p. 17). Or again (a second view) killing deprives the individual of something he in fact values (p. 83). 24 Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, in their article ‘Should all seriously disabled newborns live?’, lump together value and inviolability, as would seem to suit their case. ‘Few people, if any, ultimately take the view that all human life is equally valuable and inviolable to its logical conclusion’ they write. (Peter Singer, Unsanctifying Human Life, Helga Kuhse ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, p. 236) And what would this ‘taking to its logical conclusion’ amount to? ‘The view that all human lives . . . are equally valuable or inviolable would, if applied consistently, have the grotesque consequence that life would have to be prolonged even in a situation where the patient would not benefit from such efforts or would be harmed by them’ (p. 237). If in both quotations we leave out the reference to equal value, where would the difficulty be? The view that everyone is equally inviolable (it is surely individuals rather than their lives which are the subjects of violation) would not have this ‘grotesque’ consequence. For why should we think that a patient is violated at all if we decide to give up trying to rescue him with stressful treatment and let him die in peace? 25 See p. 53 above.
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says ‘is meant to offer a special kind of reason why killing people is wrong’. I indicated that there is something correct about this. If there is not much of a reason offered, the killing is at least to be seen in a certain light. We are not simply to say that the blood would make a mess on the carpet. The question is: in what light? In what way is it to be seen? Dworkin’s answer is quite straightforward and accurate. ‘Part of the sense of the sacred is a sense of taboo’ (LD, p. 149). We might say in the abortion case: a taboo against destroying the developing child. We talk about the sacred in order to erect a fence. ‘Comment is free but facts are sacred’ said C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian. The facts may or may not be valuable, but in either case it is taboo to tamper with them. To be sure, we will not want to say that every taboo involves the sanctity of something or other, and this might be what Dworkin had in mind by talking of a part of the sense of the sacred. The etiquette-taboo of the merely ‘not done’ is hardly enough. Nor would we think here of dietary restrictions, like the Pythagorean abhorrence of beans (perhaps not unconnected with the prevalence of favism in Mediterranean countries). Rather we would have in mind an unthinkableness based on respect, perhaps for an individual, perhaps for an institution. As we would all agree, we should only live by a sanctity-taboo if there is a good reason somewhere at the back of it. Mere talk of sacredness, even if appropriate, hardly gives us a reason – it merely indicates what we would like to be able to explain. We certainly expect there to be a further story. To be sure, we may rationally accept such an interdiction without comprehending this reason, as children do and must do. Or without wholly comprehending the reason, for there are obviously degrees of understanding in this matter. As it happens, the work of Ronald Dworkin serves well to illustrate this point. In an article about the trial of several Argentine military leaders,26 he wrote: ‘The world needs a taboo against torture. It needs a settled undoubted conviction that torture is criminal in any circumstance, that there is never justification or excuse for it, that everyone who takes part in it is a criminal against humanity.’ He admitted that there is: ‘a widespread opinion that it is justifiable sometimes, that it is defensible when carefully aimed only at extracting information needed to save lives from terrorism, for example.’ Yet he insisted that ‘torture cannot be surgically limited only to what is necessary for some discrete goal, because once the taboo is violated the basis of all the other constraints of civilisation, which is sympathy for suffering, is destroyed.’ This is instructive. For it is evident that sympathy for suffering is not at all a sufficient basis for the constraints of civilisation. As people will hasten to point out, it can often be perfectly all right to cause suffering. It is innocently done every day in medicine and dentistry. One might cause severe and lasting misery by refusing to marry a suitor. As a community too 26 ‘Report from Hell’, New York Review of Books, July 1986, quotations from p. 16.
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we need to be able to disappoint, and sometime the disappointment is grievous. Furthermore, we need to be able to punish, for foolish pity spoils the city. If in all these instances we may hurt, why not by torturing where torture is unfortunately ‘required’? But we see an enormous difference. It is a matter of wronging. Justice begins, one might almost say, where sympathy for suffering leaves off. There is nothing too wicked that might not be called for under the rubric ‘sympathy for suffering’, including torture. When we object to torture, an appeal to inviolability and human dignity is surely essential, and this aspect is not captured at all by tearful talk of pain-avoidance. This point is especially important in connection with abortion. People can easily be got to think: ‘A foetus cannot yet feel pain, how could it matter if we dispose of it? A pregnant woman, however, might well suffer if she does not get the abortion she wants, to say nothing of the man in the case who might have to pay out for many years . . .’.27 Still, when all this is said, it would not be irrational for Professor Dworkin to stick to his taboo, for the bad reason he gives is more a rationalisation of his conviction than a ground for it. There need not be anything wrong with rationalisation. Much of the best philosophy consists of it, where we are seeking to understand better what we know or think we know. We perhaps think that a certain teaching or a certain tradition is wiser than we are likely to be. This could be sensible humility – or it could be laziness. But if we are rational we will assume that there is a point to a teaching which we accept.
27 Phillipa Foot also says that we need an absolute ban on torture, and mentions Ronald Dworkin’s article. Interestingly, her brief remark, like Dworkin’s, seems inadequately to illuminate the reason, for she talks about seeing torture ‘as the ultimate negation of the impulse humans have to come to each other’s aid’ (Footnote 21, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 78.) Torturing a terrorist suspect might be called for under the heading ‘aid’, that is to say aid for those thought to be under threat. This is recognised for example by Alan Dershowitz, of Harvard Law School, who thinks it might be all right on occasion for the highest authorities to issue ‘torture warrants’. (‘Dershowitz: Torture could be justified’, CNN March 4, 2003). Incidentally, Professor Dworkin does not simply think that it must always be wrong to wrong someone, that is to say, to treat him unjustly. His absolute rejection of police torture does not therefore arise in this way. And indeed, despite appearances, it is not inconsistent to say that it can be all right to wrong. After all, this italicised thesis is rejected by Socrates in the Crito, as a matter of substance. That Dworkin considers it an open question whether to wrong someone comes out in his remarks on the proposal to treat those thought to be associated with terrorism in certain judicial ways, lacking the usual safeguards. He says that we should have the candour to admit that what is proposed is unjust. He goes on to ask whether the current emergency is so serious ‘that we must act unjustly’ – calling this a ‘difficult question’. (‘The Threat to Patriotism’, New York Review of Books, 28 February 2002, p. 49.)
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On this understanding we should not unthinkingly disparage something called ‘taboo morality’.28 In particular, it seems perfectly reasonable and necessary to say that the life of a child is sacred in the way this notion is normally but rather vaguely understood. We recognise a taboo in this case, a hands off. The word ‘inviolable’ does indeed seem appropriate, as Dworkin realises. In the mid nineteenth century, Dr Stephen Tracy wrote, The life of this new human being is sacred, and no one but God himself either has, or can have, the least shadow of a right or liberty to take it away.29 This is more or less how the notion of ‘sanctity of life’ is still used, in regard to abortion and elsewhere. One simply has no business to kill the innocent, even to preserve several other people. When Peter Singer talks of ‘unsanctifying’ human life, it is this sort of thing he objects to. This reference to God should not of course distract us. The notion of the sacred we are discussing is quite at home in a secular world. We do well to recognise this in view of a kind of religiosity which is apt to creep into Professor Dworkin’s language, a religiosity which some will find appealing and some appalling. It seems unnecessary. The worldly business-man grumbling about his taxes will rabbit on about the sacredness of his earnings. If people who are much exercised by the sanctity of life tend to have certain religious convictions, this must have something to do with the particular case, not merely because it involves an unthinkableness based on respect. For our purposes in this book, it is crucial to note that if we think of the sacred in this informal way, the idea of the sanctity of life need not be an alternative to the idea that individuals have a right to life. An appeal to the rights of the individuals at risk of being killed may come in when we try to account for this sanctity. Thus the existence of such a right might be We might also note that Professor Dworkin appears to be tempted to join the very many who object to the idea that firm rules might have a place in what we teach about conduct. In ‘Tyranny at the Two Edges of Life’ (New Perspectives Quarterly, Winter, 1994, p. 19) he complains about ‘the postulation of abstract absolutes expected to apply to unforeseen circumstances’. If this were a speech to the multitude this remark would be followed by loud applause. But come the next morning one would probably remember that to rule out torture by the police is to reject this permissive appeal to unforeseen circumstances. 28 I notice that Bertrand Russell in discussing this matter chose to employ the unusual spelling ‘tabu’, perhaps in order to hint at superstition, black magic and unreason. Human Society in Ethics and Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, pp. 29–33. 29 The Mother and Her Offspring, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1858, p. 109, quoted in Marvin Olasky, Abortion Rites, a Social History of Abortion in America, Washington: Regnery, 1995, p. 114. Opposition to abortion was very usual among American doctors in the nineteenth century.
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mentioned in order further to specify the way in which human life is sacred. Dworkin can talk of the sanctity of life as something which gets violated30 – and that does suggest that a right is involved. Rape is both a rights infringement and an invasion of the sanctity of the person, and I doubt whether we would want to make a distinction and talk of two offences. The idea of sanctity of property would certainly be spelled out by talking of rights. (We might not, in so doing, be talking up this sanctity. We might be explaining why property is not reasonably to be considered as sacred as all that.) However we might be able to understand the sanctity of life in a conceptually economical way, without bringing in rights at all – a distinct advantage to anyone still haunted by Bentham’s talk of ‘nonsense on stilts’ and ‘bawling on paper’. The connections here remain to be explored. We shall return to the subject of this paragraph at the end of this book – in Part Five. Dworkin wants to help himself to the language of ‘the sanctity of life’, but it must be said, at minimal expense. Let us think of his use of the notion of inviolability. The word sacred, he says, means inviolable, (LD, pp. 25 and 73), and of course we need have no quarrel with this.31 What he says follows the dictionary. Yet what would inviolable mean? Is it simply an impressive word without any substance to it? It is perfectly possible for a philosopher to employ the word inviolable without simply striving for effect. Consider the use made of it by Robert Nozick in his much read Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) which Professor Dworkin will naturally know well. ‘Individuals are inviolable’ says Professor Nozick firmly (p. 31). This means, he explains, that they are not to be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends, unless perhaps they give consent. Individuals may not be violated even ‘for the greater social good’ (p. 32). Nozick maintains that we are required to act within strict ‘side constraints’, and that these side constraints ‘express the inviolability of others’ (p. 32). Whatever one may say about the libertarian political use to which Nozick eventually puts these notions, it is very clear that he is honestly talking of a kind of inviolability. He expresses a Kantian thought, a thought which was surely treated by Kant as a sort of axiom.
30 See e.g. FL, p. 254: ‘The sanctity of life, properly understood, is not violated by such a killing’. 31 Jenny Teichman however is perhaps correct to see a logical difference between inviolability and sanctity. ‘Inviolability has no degrees, whereas I think the sacred does; after all, we have the holy, and the holier than thou, and the holy of holies, and so on’. (‘What is Sacred? Ronald Dworkin’s Answers’, Polemical Papers, Aldershot: Aldgate, 1997, p. 112.) Suzanne Uniacke argues that a teaching as to inviolability is an appropriate response to the sacredness of something (‘Is Life Sacred?’, in Ben Rogers, ed., Is Nothing Sacred?, Abingdon: Routledge, 2004, p. 75) and Ronald Dworkin seems to admit in his reply (p. 141) that we have distinct concepts here.
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If someone said to me that the life of a baby in the womb – I mean something with arms and legs and organs – was inviolable, I, like almost anyone else, would take him to mean that it was to be safe from deliberate poisonings or dismemberings, etc., especially on the part of those who are trusted with its charge, its mother or its doctor. One thinks of the Dictionary: ‘not liable or allowed to suffer violence; to be kept sacredly free from . . . assault’. The violation of an individual is often taken to mean rape, thought of as a bodily assault not to be contemplated or excused. Let us return to that phrase from the dictionary: ‘not liable or allowed to suffer violence; to be kept sacredly free from . . . assault’. Presumably, if this language in Life’s Dominion is not the merest show, we are to think of the person of the foetus as similarly protected. If human life ‘at every stage’ really is sacred, as Dworkin insists, we ought to find this out if we can, and hence accept this taboo. What is amazing is that Professor Dworkin can judge it perfectly proper to cut up an inviolable baby in the womb, in a second trimester abortion, whose life he says is sacred, and which is therefore protected by this taboo, for the sake of advancing one’s career (we need not deny that such a thing is important), or because the inviolable baby has, or might have, Down’s syndrome. Dworkin thinks abortion is all right granted a sufficiently unfrivolous reason, and as everyone knows these are typical of what are counted such. He might at least have required that the remains be given a decent burial. Would not the remains have this sacredness too? One reads his book expecting him to say this at any moment, but . . . Professor Dworkin retains the mere language of protest and the intimations of piety given by the regular use of this language. And all this without the burdensome substance of the matter. Frances Kamm in Abortion and the Value of Life conjectures that Professor Dworkin uses the language of sacredness and inviolability for tactical reasons: so that ‘his position can thereby appear to give more to conservatives than it really gives, thus mollifying them.’ (Kamm, p. 171) This seems to me rather too narrow and calculating a verdict. I think that Professor Dworkin really is carried away by the verbiage and its associations. He says: I look at the sanctity of life as true. I feel this. It is my conviction that we do wrong to insult that inherent, objective value of life.32 32 ‘Tyranny at the Two Edges of Life’, (p. 19) It is important to notice this passage, for in talking about sanctity he so often seems merely to be reporting what others might judge to be sacred. Jeff McMahan understandably, but mistakenly, says: ‘Dworkin himself never explicitly endorses the claim that human life is sacred in this sense [i.e the sense explained in his book]; he is reporting what he thinks other people believe’ (The Ethics of Killing, p. 331). The matter is fi nally put to rest in the recent ‘The Concept of the Sacred’, published of course after Professor McMahan’s book, which ends by saying that human life as we know it is ‘obviously and indisputably sacred’ – only expressing an odd reservation about such people as might some day be ‘created entirely from non-organic chemicals’, presumably in some laboratory. (Is Nothing Sacred, p. 142.)
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Yet one is not too sure whether he would be glad to see this verbiage taken up. If it were proposed to amend the American Constitution to include a provision ‘that the life of every human being, born or unborn, is to be treated as sacred and inviolable’ how does one imagine that Professor Dworkin would be encouraging people to vote? What would he be saying in his next elegant article in the New York Review of Books? My guess is that he would be seriously alarmed at such a prospect.
2.3 Acceptable uses of ‘intrinsically bad’, ‘intrinsically good’ and ‘intrinsically valuable’ Having separated the idea of sanctity from the idea of value, we are now better able to think about the latter on its own. In particular we are better able to take up our main concern, the contention that people, paintings, and certain species of animals or plants have a special kind of value called intrinsic, a value which gives us a reason not to destroy them. But it is still wise for us to proceed slowly. This chapter takes up yet another preliminary issue. I want to consider certain acceptable ways of using the phrases ‘intrinsically good,’ ‘intrinsically bad’ and ‘intrinsically valuable’. Some readers might want to take it for granted that there are such uses and pass straight to the next chapter. We only need to look into this question because the kind of talk we shall eventually criticise relies somewhat for its appearance of legitimacy on its association with these other uses. ‘Intrinsic’ is surely an academic word that is perhaps not quite at home in our everyday talk. Talk of intrinsic value might indeed be an inheritance from medieval scholastic philosophy. 33 In modern discussions the language crops up in various places. Let us think first of the way in which actions are called ‘intrinsically bad’. We can ask: is this action a case of torturing? Is it procuring the condemnation of the innocent? Is it killing a child? – that sort of thing. We can use the phrase ‘intrinsically bad’ to characterise kinds of actions, such as torturing, for example. And individual actions of these kinds – a particular deed which counts as torturing, etc. – might also be called intrinsically bad. Other kinds of action will not be intrinsically bad. Posting a letter, for example, or kicking a stone. However, particular actions of these latter kinds may yet be bad, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, or again of the end for which they are pursued, or yet again because the agent thinks the particular action is bad. Thus giving a present, is not an intrinsically bad kind of action. Indeed it seems positively amiable. But a particular action of this kind may be bad because the agent believes (correctly or incorrectly) that the object is not his to give, or again because he hopes the recipient 33 See note 40, this Part.
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will harm himself with it. A particular action will be all right, or perhaps good, if it is neither intrinsically bad, nor incidentally bad in some way or other: that is to say, if it passes all the tests. (I say ‘or perhaps good’ – leaving open the possibility that any action which has no defect must be counted good, if only because it is done to some purpose, exhibiting rationality or good sense.34) Someone might indeed believe that there are no kinds of action which are intrinsically bad in the above sense, but this would not be a criticism of the concept. The concept would be clear enough, but, in his view, nothing would fall under it. He would perhaps want to say that lying, torturing, or whatever are of necessity bad for the most part, but you could never rule out ‘having to’ do actions of these kinds. This is the view called consequentialism by Elizabeth Anscombe when she coined this word in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.35 Promise-breaking is a bad kind of action in a way, but on the above test it would not be an intrinsically bad kind of action, since everyone thinks that it is all right sometimes to break a promise. We might, however, introduce an extended definition of ‘intrinsically bad action’ to include kinds of action which are, as described, defeasibly bad in this way. We might possibly give the phrase ‘intrinsically bad’ a use not in relation to actions but in relation to states of affairs, or happenings. Some states of affairs are misfortunes – for individuals or groups. But only some are intrinsic misfortunes. Compare pain and rain. To know what pain is, is to see it as prima facie a misfortune. Not so with rain. We need to know why people complain of rainy days, when they do. Ducks – they say – like rain. We might have been like ducks. In the light of all this, we might choose to say that pain is intrinsically a misfortune for people and that rain is not so. People will be taught to regret the fact that others suffer from misfortune (perhaps undeserved misfortune) and in this spirit they will say, perhaps, that certain misfortunes are ‘intrinsically bad’. This, one might say, is a secondary use of ‘intrinsically bad’: the teaching is not founded on a concept of value independently understood. We bring to our judgement of value the assumption that properly regulated sympathy is a virtue. Perhaps a toughminded Nietzschean would take another view. One could not hope to decide the issue by investigating from scratch whether Smith’s toothache really was A Bad Thing – as opposed to a misfortune for Smith. There would still be something to investigate. Although within a certain system of belief Smith’s toothache would be judged bad for no further reason, this being the 34 I have discussed this possibility in ‘Modern Virtue Ethics’, in T. D. J. Chappell, ed., Virtues and Values, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. 35 G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, p. 36. (This article was fi rst published in Philosophy, 1958. The OED, under ‘consequentialism,’ seems unaware both of this source and this sense.)
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teaching, further reasons should exist why this background system of moral belief is correct in this particular and the ‘Nietzschean’ system incorrect, even if no one is as yet very good at articulating these reasons.36 There will be other uses of the word ‘intrinsic’ in connection with value. We might find it natural to call something ‘an intrinsic good’ if it is necessarily a good to the individual who has it, if it is necessarily a benefit, or something that necessarily makes a thing better of its kind. We might claim, for example, that virtues (patience, courage, etc.) are intrinsic goods, meaning that we would not call something a virtue unless it were a good to its possessor, or rendered its possessor good of its kind. This would be so, according to this claim, even where the virtues in question are qualities of inanimate objects. The virtues of a bicycle would be those qualities which made it a good or efficient bicycle. True enough, someone might happen to be brought low by his possession of a virtue – he might be killed by his courage – but this would be the exceptional case: virtues, of necessity, would be suitable gifts for a fairy godmother to give to a child at its christening. On this view, virtues would be an intrinsic good, while a quality like the ability to get one’s way might be thought too contingently connected with one’s good to count. A fairy godmother could not safely give one such an ability; she would have to know what other qualities one had. Some things are wanted, as we say, ‘for their own sakes’, as Aristotle noted in the famous discussion at the beginning of his Ethics. It is natural to refer to such things as intrinsically valuable, at least if this wanting is not based upon some defective understanding. We will also call something intrinsically valuable if it is worth having for its own sake even though the individual in question does not happen to want it. The individual might be a child, not yet the master of the necessary concepts. A happy life is something of intrinsic value to such a child, for to ensure that the child would have a happy life would be bestow a benefit worth having for its own sake. Someone might want to talk here of what the child would want for its own sake if the child were rational and well informed. In the light of this we might wonder whether we should strain to bring the concept of wanting into the account of intrinsic value. We might say that a certain trace element is instrumentally valuable to a plant – its presence in the soil helps it to 36 Michael Zimmerman (The Nature of Intrinsic Value, Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), takes up a passage in Philippa Foot: ‘It seems preposterous to deny that there are some things that a moral person must want and aim at insofar as he is a moral person and that he will count it “a good thing” when these things happen . . .’, and he comments: ‘But this is all that is at issue when something is intrinsically good’ (p. 26). (See Philippa Foot, ‘Morality, Action and Outcome’, in Ted Honderich, ed., Objectivity and Value, London: Routledge, 1985, now reprinted in Foot’s Moral Dilemmas, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.) Naturally, we have no quarrel with such non-explanatory or derivative talk of intrinsic goodness, except that it might mislead philosophers.
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remain healthy. Health itself, by contrast, might be thought intrinsically valuable: it constitutes being in good condition, it does not merely facilitate it. That wanting so often comes in to our account – as it should – would be a fact about the concept of wanting rather than about the concept of intrinsic value understood in this way. We surely do not need to talk of what a plant would want for its own sake if it had a mind of its own! (For more on the concept of welfare in relation to plants, see Chapter 4.5.) There seems to be a difference between necessity and contingency in regard to what is wanted for its own sake. ‘A happy life’ is something which seems necessarily wanted for its own sake (though not necessarily wantedall-things-considered, of course, for people sometimes lay down their lives for causes). But there are things which simply happen to be wanted for their own sakes. Thus some people, but not all, want to walk in the countryside, though not to any further purpose (they may not want to work off fat, or break in their boots, or look for a photo opportunity, or extract money for a good cause from ‘sponsors’). The flourishing of another person, or of a tree, etc., can be intrinsically valuable to individuals in this way. A payoff would not be expected or relevant, though it might naturally be welcomed. This concern is the most ordinary thing in the world (though, perhaps, for all that, it is surprising when thought of in a certain way). If a great number of unrelated people care for the good of the admirable Robinson in this fashion we might be inclined to say that Robinson’s flourishing just is intrinsically valuable in its own right, and not valuable to anyone – but no doubt this in an inclination to be resisted. We could not conclude that instances of flourishing, health, amusement, etc. were ‘good things’, or ‘good states of the universe’, or ‘proper existents from an abstract point of view’. Or rather we would not yet have given any sense to these phrases. Intrinsic value in the sense we have introduced is always value to. It is value relative to a subject or to individuals. We should not, for all that, call this use of intrinsic value ‘subjective’, for this suggests that there can be no fact of the matter or that disagreements cannot be resolved. (‘Relativist’ and ‘individualist’ might well be misleading too.) This then gives a sense – or perhaps several related senses – to ‘intrinsic value’, and it is possible that the phrase is sometimes used rather in the way we have just characterised. Something that is wanted (the academic will no doubt prefer to say ‘valued’) as a means to something else might be said to be instrumentally valuable, assuming of course that it is indeed suitable. Naturally, something or someone can be of both instrumental and intrinsic value, and sometimes the distinction is not one which we are happy to make: as when one finds a friend good company. Whether the two categories exhaust the field I leave to one side. ‘Instrumental’ is not perhaps the best word for our purposes. A sense of humour is no doubt valuable in this way, but no one would think of it as anything like an instrument. ‘Use value’ might be a better phrase.
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What is of more importance is to note that – as with the notion of intrinsic value just discussed – the wanting is quite unnecessary to the value. We can say, as above, that certain trace elements are valuable to a plant, being conducive to its health. Judith Jarvis Thomson correctly does not bring in wanting at all. For her, instrumental value is ‘the goodness or badness the thing inherits from what it causes.’ This appears somewhat defective in another way, in that it only naturally fits certain cases. Rain is valuable to plants via what it causes. But actual instruments, screwdrivers for example, are not naturally thought of as having beneficial causal results. Rather, we produce beneficial results by using them. Even in the human case where wanting is possible, wanting is obviously not a necessary condition of the presence of instrumental value, for we are often ignorant of what is of value to us. Jeff McMahan forgets this elementary fact in regard to abortion when he writes: ‘In most cases in which an abortion is at issue, the foetus is unwanted and therefore has no positive instrumental value’. Of course, we often realise that something had instrumental value only when it is too late, and we have destroyed the item in question. In fact, it is quite unusual for something to have no instrumental value whatever. This is what makes it difficult to load up the car when setting out for the municipal tip. People are always of instrumental value. True, they are constantly reminded that ‘unto dust they will return’, but they change into compost before that. 37 This account of intrinsic value, distinguished in this way from instrumental value is fairly clear. Perhaps all too clear for philosophical purposes. Objects, activities, or whatever, have an instrumental value if they are valued [I presume she means rationally valued] for the sake of something else – tools, money, and chores would be standard examples. A common explanation of the supposed contrasting kind [of goodness], intrinsic goodness, is to say that a thing is intrinsically good if it is valued for its own sake, that being the obvious alternative to a thing’s being valued for the sake of something else. This is not, however, what the words ‘intrinsic value’ mean.38 Well, ‘intrinsic value’ can be a technical phrase, and a philosopher may introduce it as he likes – provided of course that what purports to be an introduction is intelligible. Professor Korsgaard prefers to say that intrinsic goodness is a goodness which is non-relational. However we cannot be sure 37 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 132, fn 6. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 334, italics added. 38 Christine Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions of Goodness’, Philosophical Review, 1983, p. 170.
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in advance whether a non-relational account of something can be given. A non-relational concept of, say, the distance to London, would be the intrinsic distance, the distance-in-itself rather than its distance from anywhere in particular. That would seem an unpromising phrase to introduce! But in regard to goodness the matter is unclear. Being a good friend is clearly a relational matter, being a good tap dancer is perhaps not, for tap dancing is not judged in relation to something else, at least in the way being a friend is. This might not lead us to a concept of non-relational value, because it would be odd to say that ‘a good tap dancer’ meant ‘a valuable tap dancer’. It is not too clear outside a special context what this last would mean. But perhaps we already have a sense of intrinsic value which is, as it were, comparatively non-relational. In the everyday, non-academic world material goods might be said to have intrinsic value. The thought would be that they are worth good money on the open market and are not just of sentimental value to an individual. Thus when property was found to be missing at Buckingham Palace the police at Scotland Yard found it natural to use the phrase in just this way: A Yard spokeswoman said items of ‘intrinsic value’ were thought to have been taken from an office. ‘They were of no personal or sentimental value to any member of the Royal family.’39 The contrast here is plain. Writing towards the end of the seventeenth century, John Locke had a use for the phrase ‘intrinsic value’. In the famous chapter on property in the Second Treatise he writes (section 37): This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than men needed, had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man . . . It is not perhaps easy to see how this is to be taken. But ironically it rather suggests that Locke’s understanding of the phrase intrinsic value is what nowadays would be called use value or instrumental value. This of course would not be a mistake: it is simply that the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ has been given different senses. I wonder whether either the Yard spokeswoman or John Locke would say that an endangered species or an endangered baby were items of intrinsic value. 39 Observer, 3 October 1999. Another example, this time from a catalogue of Fired Earth. ‘Fired Earth was started with . . . a second-hand typewriter and a motley collection of old office furniture, much of it still about . . . We think we should also admit to paying the princely sum of a thousand pounds for the name Fired Earth. It encapsulated the very essence of our business, terracotta tiles, and was probably the only thing at the outset to have any intrinsic value.’
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Perhaps we could say the following. Resort to ‘intrinsic’ suggests a certain contrast which might differ from case to case. It invites the question ‘by contrast with what?’. Think of a certain violin. People might want to own it for all sorts of reasons: to play it, because grandpa once played it, because it would look nice on the wall, to keep it out of the hands of Smith, because one’s ownership of it would make Robinson envious, because it would make a good investment . . . We would say that a violin is essentially a musicmaking device, and might incidentally be useful in these other ways. We might then want to say that its intrinsic value or worth is its quality for music-making purposes.40 But intrinsic value could come in in another way. Suppose that old violins tended to be bought as investments, and imagine that a story had recently been circulating that the glue used to make them was proving unstable. Then presumably the market price of violins among investors would fall. A man might discover that this story was based upon a scientific misunderstanding. He would then be in a position to say, giving advice to investors, that violins were currently undervalued. And one way of putting this would be to say that the intrinsic value of old violins was currently higher than the market value. The phrase ‘intrinsic value’ does seem to be used in this kind of way among investors. What we have said in these paragraphs has an importance for our project. They show that our enquiry in this book is not about ‘the existence of’ intrinsic value, as if the description intrinsic value was unambiguous and well understood, but might have proved, alas, not to apply to anything. Rather, as we have said, we are concerned to ask in the particular case whether this somewhat technical phrase has been well introduced. In Dworkin’s work, a notion of intrinsic value has not perhaps been well introduced. That is a matter for our investigation. We should not allow this would-be concept to hitch a free ride on the back of the usages we have just described. Illegitimate free-riding of this kind is perhaps quite common in philosophy. The rest of this chapter will take up some examples. It is important for our argument to see how easily we can be misled. Consider the entry under ‘good-in-itself’ in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy.41 The entry is by Mary Warnock, and this is the whole of it (italics in the last sentence added). 40 John Locke also makes use of the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ in his writings on money. See Patrick Hyde Kelly, ed., Locke on Money, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, e.g., p. 234. The editor comments in his introductory materials: ‘the concept of intrinsic value derives from scholastic philosophy and denotes the inherent capacity of an object to perform certain functions, e.g. the “intrinsic value” of bread is to assuage hunger’ (pp. 82–3). This is not too clear in sense for ‘inherent’ like ‘intrinsic’ stands in need of an explanation. 41 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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A good-in-itself is otherwise referred to as an intrinsic good. Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics made use of the idea, in attempting to define the good for man. He distinguished between things pursued for their own sake (such as health) and things pursued for the sake of their consequences (such as money). He concluded that there was a number of different things that were goods-in-themselves. To his list of health, sight and intelligence, we may now add such values as the continuing existence of diverse species of animals. This ‘addition’ just slips by so casually. But seems quite questionable. Would Aristotle have made anything of it at all? Health, sight and intelligence are human goods. Smith’s health is a blessing to Smith, Robinson’s to Robinson. In each case it is worth having for its own sake, as we say. A healthy man is doing well, is in good condition. No doubt health is also valuable for what it enables the individual to do. But none of this enables us to say, or even to understand what is meant by saying, that the continued existence of diverse species of animals is just a good in itself – that this is ‘a value’, as the misleading jargon might have it. In respect of whom would this be a good? We can hardly say that the universe is doing well on this account. The idea of intrinsically good states of affairs as viewed from nowhere in particular seems foreign to Aristotle. What is supposed to be the good of ‘there being this species still in existence tomorrow’? Or the good of ‘there continuing to be several species of this or that kind next week’? Mary Warnock’s innocent seeming add-on is thus very problematic in sense. I shall return to consider the good of biodiversity later, in Chapter 2.15. It is a familiar enough argument that if there are items of instrumental value, something must have intrinsic value. But this will not help us understand a phrase like ‘the intrinsic value of there being diverse species’ as it comes up in these discussions. Jeremy Waldron in his review of Life’s Dominion writes: The concept of intrinsic value . . . is a difficult one to isolate . . . it is easy to confuse the proposition that we judge something to be of value with the instrumental proposition that something is judged to be of value to us. Nevertheless, there could not be instrumental value unless there were intrinsic value: the chain of instrumentality must end somewhere.42 Naturally, when we are discussing ‘the good for man’, and the idea that chains of instrumentality must end, we once again think of Aristotle. But this would appear to be an improper attempt to recruit him. Aristotle opens his Ethics by pointing out that we do not choose everything for the sake of
42 London Review of Books, 12 May 1994, p. 11, italics in the last sentence added.
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something else: ‘for the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain’.43 That seems fair enough. But it does not show that there is such a thing as abstract, cosmic, Dworkonian, intrinsic value, that there are some things that are of value, but (amazingly) for the benefit of no one, man nor beast. (Is this perhaps what Korsgaard was attempting to have in mind by non-relational value?) What we have to accept is the commonplace idea that some things can be of value to us, but for no further purpose. These are things (circumstances, events) that are wanted, but not for anything. The proposition that one of these things is of value to us in this way is not, despite what Professor Waldron suggests, an ‘instrumental proposition’; it is not the proposition that one of these things is somehow useful. Jenny Teichman, elsewhere a critic of Life’s Dominion, insists firmly that human individuals have intrinsic value. She supports this conclusion by saying: The states and qualities of human beings . . . could have no intrinsic value if human beings as such had no intrinsic value . . . If human life itself is not an ultimate value, how can human beings give value to other things?44 Once again, we find an acceptable use of intrinsic value being used to underwrite a use which would seem dubious. The implied argument seems unconvincing, insofar at least as it can be understood. We could hardly say that nothing could be intrinsically valuable to Smith – that he could want nothing for its own sake – unless Smith himself was somehow intrinsically valuable. One might well wonder, when we are talking of value, what sort of ‘giving’ is involved. If a sensitive nose is of value to a gazelle, does the gazelle give value to its nose? Could it be said quite generally that the necessary conditions of value give value? This might call for gratitude. Where would we be without thieves, seeing that thieves give value to all our precautions? In Jenny Teichman’s last sentence there appears to be a curious appeal to that not wholly reliable medieval tag: You cannot give what you do not have. True enough, you cannot give someone a cold (in the everyday way we use 43 Aristotle, Ethics, 1094a 20. 44 ’Life and Its Meanings’, in Polemical Papers, p. 161. Jenny Teichman writes about Life’s Dominion in ‘What is Sacred? Ronald Dworkin’s Answers’, reprinted in this volume. It is not even true that for a man to value something for its own sake – that people should not be unjustly treated, for example – he must also value his own continued existence for its own sake. In a depressed mood he might think of his life as worthless, or as having worth only instrumentally (‘perhaps I can still be of use to the children . . .’).
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this phrase) if you don’t have a cold – which fits. You cannot give news unless you have news to give. Something cannot heat unless it is itself hot, one says, which again seems to fit. But then one remembers that old breakfast cereal advertisment, displayed no doubt in the cold of winter: ‘Food does not have to be hot to heat you.’ And you can certainly cheer someone up while not yourself feeling cheerful. A king-maker, furthermore, need not himself be king. A very silly book can impart wisdom, if only as a salutary lesson. When Professor Dworkin says that human beings are intrinsically valuable he is not just saying that many people happen selflessly to love these human beings, and therefore want them to continue in being and to flourish for no further reason or instrumental purpose. Nor is he saying that each individual loves himself for his own sake. He is saying that every human being just has this value whether or not he is intrinsically loved, a value consequent upon a (supposedly) interesting property of the object, such as its origins. That Smith remains alive is not just a good from the perspective of his friends, those who care for his welfare because they love him, or a good from his own perspective. It is simply a good thing, cosmically speaking. Smith, on Dworkin’s account, is an abstractly excellent existent whether or not he happens to be prized for his own sake or would be prized in this way if only people knew him. For this reason, it would be bad to poison him (without excuse). Perhaps the whole universe could be said to have an intrinsic value, which would be the grand sum of the value of the people, the paintings, the species, the cultures, the national flags, the evolutionary processes, the structure of crystals, the complexities of Latin grammar, and so on. It is this kind of language which, I shall argue, we at best appear to understand.
2.4 Supposed kinds of intrinsic value in Life’s Dominion We need now to consider the account of intrinsic value that Professor Dworkin actually gives, and the distinctions he makes. Others who offer us what I call ‘a value story’ – who base an objection to homicide on the intrinsic value of human individuals – might not offer quite the same account. They might think, for example, that organisms, human organisms especially, had intrinsic value just on account of their complexity and their ability to sustain themselves and to reproduce, a view which Professor Dworkin repudiates.45 But since Dworkin has thought about these matters 45 Suzanne Uniacke draws our attention to this possibility in ‘Is Life Sacred?’, with particular reference to the opinions of John Kleinig on the ‘self-renewing’ and ‘self-integrating’ character of organisms, which in his view calls for ‘esteem’ (pp. 70–1). Professor Dworkin is distinctly unimpressed with life’s self-sustaining and adaptive properties: see his article ‘The Concept of the Sacred’, p. 142.
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more systematically than most, we will acquire a good feel for this family of would-be notions if we outline what he has to say. This outline will attempt to give sense to these would-be notions, or at least the impression of sense. Though I have tried to be accurate here – not at all a straightforward task – it might be sufficient for the busy reader simply to acquire a rough impression of this terrain, attending in particular to what Dworkin has had to say about human beings. Intrinsic value of human life, of living human individuals, would seem, according to the Dworkin value story, to be a category of great importance to us. We would be seriously handicapped in our thinking not to recognise it. Just how handicapped we would be emerges from a remarkable claim: our opinions about how and why our own lives have intrinsic value crucially influence every major choice we make about how we should live.46 We must at least recognise the intrinsic value of ourselves, it would seem, otherwise we could hardly make any important decisions at all. We must, as this remark indicates, even have some view about the how and the why. Let us take the first steps in this direction. There are, we are told, two broad kinds of intrinsic value. One kind of intrinsic value Dworkin calls ‘incremental’. The prospect that an item will have this sort of value gives us a reason to bring it into being – and not because it would be attractive or useful (that would be a bonus). It is just better that it should come to be. The world is (cosmically, abstractly) a better place for its existence. Knowledge is one of the items said to have this sort of intrinsic value. We should regret that there is not more of it, even if it is evident that the knowledge in question is totally useless – and even if the person who knows does not care to know, and no one else cares that he knows either, nor needs to care. We might note in passing that this thought about knowledge is distinctly odd. If you tell someone something he did not already know, and he believes you, you will, on this account, have increased the amount of intrinsic value in the universe, though it seems hard to say even roughly by how much. But now that it is possible to broadcast to millions at a go, one can perhaps augment the total value most impressively in this way. To be sure, there is an unclarity in the notion of new knowledge. In one sense I acquire new knowledge only if I find out something which no one else knows – what I have currently in my pockets, for example. Perhaps it is only new knowledge in this sense which is intrinsically valuable? Would it be intrinsically valuable for there to be true propositions written down in books, with evidence cited where necessary, even if no one currently knows what is said in them?
46 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What the Constitution Says’, FL, p. 99.
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We must be careful to distance this special talk of the world’s being a better place from a way this might be said in everyday life. The world is a better place – we would naturally and unphilosophically say – for the existence of a telephone system, dental anaesthesia, swimming baths, friendship, sliced bread . . . Without such things our lives would be impoverished, perhaps greatly, perhaps marginally. Here the items under discussion will not particularly be such as would be called intrinsically valuable by those whose talk we are examining. We must have in mind: a better place from a cosmic perspective. We are not thinking of vulgar utility, comfort or enjoyment. We must now turn to consider another kind of cosmic intrinsic value, one which is non-incremental. The prospect that an item will have this value gives us no reason to bring it into being. The world would not necessarily be an abstractly better place for its existence.47 The important example of this kind of value, at least for our purposes in this book, is the value that we ourselves are said to have. To the relief of all those concerned about overpopulation, the value of a human being is not, he says, incremental – emphasising the point ‘several times’ (LD, p. 87). Individuals who have this second kind of intrinsic value are said to have the characteristic: sacredness. ‘The hallmark of the sacred as distinct from the incrementally valuable is that the sacred is intrinsically valuable because – and therefore only once – it exists’ (LD, pp. 73–4). When we talk about the sanctity of life it is this sort of thing we are talking about. If something has this intrinsic value and is sacred this very fact would supposedly give us a reason not to destroy it.48 Professor Dworkin is very fond of the word ‘sacred’. He wants to put us right about the notion. The idea of the sacred, though ‘familiar’, has been ‘widely misunderstood’ (LD, p. 25). Human beings have sacredness which is bound up in some way to their having a kind of non-incremental intrinsic value. The word ‘incremental’ is a little misleading for this purpose. It might be better to talk of Intrinsic Production-Worthiness. To call a value incremental is not simply to say that the addition of an item which possesses it to our store increases the value of what we have. For presumably this might also be true of objects which have that kind of intrinsic value which marks them out as sacred, this value, according to this account, not being an incremental value. Thus a collection of paintings by Tintoretto is
47 This is now made clear in Dworkin’s article ‘The Concept of the Sacred’, p. 139. We would have to say, I suppose, that destroying the object may well be bad on account of this value, but not because the world thereby became a (cosmically) worse place. 48 People sometimes destroy something because they consider it valuable, and perhaps this might happen in the case of intrinsic value too: one thinks here of a sacrifice offered to a god, or possibly the competitive destruction which would take place at a potlatch among the Kwakiutl.
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presumably of greater intrinsic value than any one of them on its own. It would be a greater outrage to destroy them all. Still, we might judge, with Professor Dworkin, these paintings have merely sacred intrinsic value, in the sense that we would have had no reason to wish in advance that Tintoretto would paint them. Perhaps we are thinking of Tintoretto’s later paintings, after he had painted enough. I am here going along with Dworkin’s suggestion (LD, p. 74) that he was somewhat over productive. Not everything that is sacred has intrinsic value. Some things have sacredness ‘by association or designation’, and these need not have the value called intrinsic. This shows us that for Professor Dworkin the division between items of intrinsic and instrumental value is not exhaustive. Flags – or indeed Egyptian cats – can have a value by association or designation, but this value falls into neither of these categories; it is not intrinsic or instrumental. So there is at least one more category of value. We could bring out Dworkin’s thought here in the following way, though this involves something of a conjecture. If flags were not only sacred but had intrinsic value we would be disturbed by the thought that a manufacturer was about to pulp a warehouse-full of them on the ground that they were surplus to requirements. But since a sacred flag is only sacred and has no intrinsic value, it would only be wrong to destroy it in a way indicating contempt. The category of things which are sacred but which do not have intrinsic value is rather brought in for completeness, and will not much concern us. Human beings, paintings, rare animal species etc. have both intrinsic value and sacredness value, and it is here where we need to focus our attention. Paintings, even bad paintings, are not lightly to be sent for pulping. And the same goes for people.49 If items are sacred and (unlike sacred flags) are also of non-incremental intrinsic value,we would not have any particular reason to produce them. That after all is what is meant by talking about the value as ‘not incremental’. But we can say more. We would have reason not to produce them. As
49 See ‘The Concept of the Sacred’. This article settles that on his intended analysis not everything sacred has intrinsic value – a matter, I think, not really made clear in Life’s Dominion. In this article flags are once again the chosen example. They can be sacred without having intrinsic value. But even with the help of this recent article there still seems to be a difficulty. Professor Dworkin writes here that if something is sacred ‘it must not be destroyed except for the most urgent kind of reason: for example, perhaps only to protect something else that is sacred’ (p. 142). I have thought it best to regard this – what we might call the strong principle of sacredness – as something of a slip. I do not think that Professor Dworkin would want to object to the pulping of the surplus flags. The strong principle of sacredness might seem more convincing in relation to a particular flag carried in a particular battle, and now preserved in a place of honour for the nation. But it is clear that Dworkin does not merely have particular flags in mind (LD, p. 74).
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Frances Kamm has pointed out50 we would have a prima facie reason against the production of these sacred things, for once they are around we have to be at some pains not to destroy them, and even to care for them – a right regular nuisance.51 An accumulation of sacred things, one might say, would be like an accumulation of nuclear waste: the stuff would have to be housed, and for thousands of years. What a burden to leave to our progeny! Think again of Tintoretto. We have no reason to regret, Dworkin suggests, that Tintoretto did not make more pictures. But once made they have to be found a home, guarded, kept at the right temperature . . . Tintoretto clearly has a lot to answer for. Perhaps we could get our own back by destroying some of his pictures. As for human beings, it is a great blessing that they cannot (yet) be preserved indefinitely. A human being who is not ‘sacred by association or designation’ (I am assuming he might be sacred in this way too – a king, perhaps, or an ambassador, thought of as a walking flag) is said to be sacred as a result of investment as we have seen. We should, I think, regard this as an explanation of how it comes about that entities have this sanctity-involving value, rather than a definition of the concept. The concept is supposed to be more or less understood. Someone who thought – disagreeing with Dworkin – that ‘complexity’, or ‘uniqueness’, accounted for this sanctity-involving value, or was at least part of the story, would be offering a different explanation for the possession of the same characteristic. No doubt definition and explanation are not here sharply distinct. Explanation and making sense seem up to a point to go hand in hand. If we accept the investment account it perhaps52 follows that we do not (much) trample on, besmirch, outrage, offend or whatever, the sanctity of life if we kill someone who is likely to die soon. He might be terminally ill, or he might be about to be shot by someone else. Similarly, where one steps in and destroys a painting which is scheduled to be destroyed later in the afternoon. In either case the ‘investment’ is about to be wasted anyway. Someone seriously impressed with all this might wonder whether investment sacredness would be proportional to durability, so that infi rm people would be less sacred than those in robust health. We shall return to consider this idea of investment in Chapters 2.13 and 2.14.
50 Kamm, ‘Abortion and the Value of Life’, p. 179. 51 I am assuming that once we recognise that something is valuable we will be reluctant to destroy it. A vandal, however, might fi nd it rather excitingly outrageous to destroy valuable things. And when it is a matter of sacrificing something to a god, the most valuable items would deliberately be chosen. Thinking of people as especially valuable might encourage human sacrifice. 52 I say ‘perhaps’ on the ground that it does not fit very well with what I called the strong principle of sacredness, laid down in ‘The Concept of the Sacred’ quoted in note 49, this Part.
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Are production-worthiness (the kind of value attributed here to knowledge) and sacredness (what a painting or a person or a flag might have) exclusive kinds of value, or can something have both? One would assume the latter. As we saw in regard to Tintoretto, we are surely to rejoice that he produced some pictures to begin with, and did not spend his whole career in the dye works; but after a certain amount of painting we are to consider that he had produced a cosmic sufficiency. That seems to be Dworkin’s thought. In production-worthiness a law of diminishing returns would operate. If this is correct, the earlier but not the later pictures would have both kinds of intrinsic value. We might not of course be able to tell which are the earlier pictures, and possess the double value-dose. Knowledge of what has happened can be utterly irrecoverable. (Or must we see things quite differently, and say that the painting of the later pictures has diminished the production-worthy intrinsic value of the earlier ones?) What about human beings? Do they have not only sacredness but also incremental value? Could they have incremental value? Professor Dworkin denies that human beings are incrementally valuable. This point is plainly a matter of some importance to him. As we saw, he says that he has emphasised it ‘several times’. He simply says ‘we do not treat it [human life] as incrementally good’. Of course one wants to ask when such things are said: are ‘we’ right? The mere fact that people are also Dworkin-sacred does not answer this question. Might not human life have an intrinsic productionworthiness to which we are blind? Would human beings have this incremental value if they were rarer? One might argue that people must have incremental intrinsic value just as knowledge does. After all, since every human being knows something, and the existence of knowledge has incremental intrinsic value, we would have reason to be producing more and more people. The general idea that to say that life is sacred is to say that it has some kind of objective value is not of course unique to Professor Dworkin. Intelligible or not, this sort of talk is quite familiar. Peter Singer, for example, says: ‘We may take the doctrine of the sanctity of human life to be no more than saying that human life has some very special value.’53 The way this is presented by Peter Singer – the ‘we may take . . . to be’ – is surely correct. A phrase like ‘the sanctity of life’ is to be made something of, and it might seem that in talking about ‘very special value’ we were succeeding in capturing what people might have in mind. It is a rather portentous abstraction and one looks to see how one’s author is using it. Indeed we might not even get a constant use from one work to another. Consider Peter Singer once again. In his essay ‘Life’s Uncertain Voyage’ he characterises the doctrine of the sanctity of human life (which he rejects) as the doctrine ‘that all human 53 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1st edn, 1979, p. 73, 2nd edn, 1993, p. 84, reference to this last edition.
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life is of equal worth’.54 Of course he must mean ‘of great and equal worth’, otherwise the doctrine would not have the expected kind of impressiveness. Be that as it may, we should at least note that the accounts are different, and that Professor Dworkin waves a flag for the first, but definitely not for the second.55
2.5 Has this terminology of intrinsic value been adequately introduced? Let us now reflect on the (would-be) notion of impersonal mattering, and in particular the (would-be) thesis that human beings possess this characteristic. What we are given is some bit of theorising which at least appears to be problematic in sense. We are introduced to a way of talking and we will naturally want to ask whether it has been well introduced – well introduced by the various philosophers who favour it. For we are not being taught something like simple arithmetic involving concepts which people have used successfully for generations and about which we do not even begin to have doubts (even though philosophers can and should raise awkward questions about them). Professor Dworkin freely admits that the language of intrinsic value as it appears in his text will seem suspect. Some may say, he suggests, that it is ‘mysterious’ (LD, p. 25, see also p. 69) – indeed that it is ‘too mysterious or metaphysical even to make sense’ (FL, p. 86). However he has a remarkable confidence in the notion, handling criticisms with a magisterial ease.56 There is a suggestion that those who call this would-be notion in question are going to be soulless and narrow counters of coin: ‘No doubt the free market economists of the Chicago School would argue that worrying about the “intrinsic” value of human life is only a superstition.’ Not our sort at all.57 54 Peter Singer, ‘Life’s Uncertain Voyage’, in Philip Pettit et al., Metaphysics and Morality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 154, italics added. 55 I say ‘definitely’ for that seems to be the moral of the ‘investment’ account of sanctity: there has, presumably, not been equal investment in the production of each of us. But for a doubt see pp. 138–9, below. 56 See Frances Kamm’s article ‘Ronald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide’, Journal of Ethics, 2001, drawing on her Columbia Law Review article, which raises six difficulties about what Dworkin says about ‘intrinsic value’. Ronald Dworkin provides six succinct replies in the same issue. Revised criticisms follow in Frances Kamm’s ‘Ronald Dworkin’s Views on Abortion and Assisted Suicide’, in Justine Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, followed by further succinct replies. (Frances Kamm does not, however, disagree with his curious idea that a foetus somehow has value which is a value to no one, not even to itself.) 57 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Tyranny at the Two Edges of Life’, New Perspectives Quarterly, 1994, p. 18, italics added.
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One does not need to be a philosopher (or indeed an economist) to see something fishy about the proposition that human beings are valuable. ‘My aunt is worth a great deal.’ Flattering perhaps, but surely the words rather grate on one’s understanding.58 And matters are scarcely made any better by the insertion of the word ‘intrinsic’, or indeed the word ‘inherent’ (LD, p. 159): ‘My aunt is intrinsically valuable.’ One does not need to be a philosopher, but one does need a pinch of tell-it-to-the-marines astonishment at the odd things philosophers say.59 The word ‘intrinsic’ in such a context would have to be some sort of philosopher’s technicality. We would need to have it explained to us. Professor Dworkin naturally sees that there is some explaining to do. For the idea is not simply that people value their own lives, want to go on living, would want to go on living if they were not depressed, etc. Nor is it the view that a human life has the potential to be deeply rewarding to the person whose life it is, unlike say the life of a cockroach. And not even if this thought is much amplified by being given a Christian context.60 Nor is it the view that other people happen to love certain human beings, value them, and like to see them around: in a case of homicide, no one can even begin to excuse himself by claiming that the victim under the knife had but few friends in the world. No, the intrinsic value of life is a notion altogether more esoteric. Most of us, it would appear, seem to need special 58 True enough, economists seem to be able to work out the value of pretty well anything. You and I are worth, apparently, about $750,000 each, at 1985 prices. (Perhaps more if valued as a pair?) I take this figure from Dan Usher’s ‘The Value of Life for Decision Making’, in Ellen Frankel Paul et al., eds, Ethics and Economics, 1985, p. 191. In a broadcast in 1995, the then Minister of Health, Virginia Bottomley, said that the government initiative to vaccinate babies against measles had saved about 50 lives, at a cost of £400,000 apiece – apparently money well spent. 59 There is indeed a historical oddity about this last remark. G. E. Moore became a philosopher, he explained, because he was filled with just this astonishment. He was puzzled about what these odd philosophical pronouncements could mean. (‘An Autobiography’, in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2nd edn, New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952, p. 14). But it is to Moore above all that we should look to find this curious emphasis on an ‘intrinsic value’ unrelated to our needs and wants. In criticising this part of Moore’s legacy we are following in his footsteps. (For Moore’s own later doubts about the would-be concept he did so much to promote, see note 135, this Part.) 60 ‘What people are for is … to home in on God … It’s this potentiality, this incredible possibility, of the knowledge of God and of sharing in his nature which Christianity holds out to people and because of this potentiality every life, right up to the last, is infinitely precious. Its potentialities in all things the world cares about may be slight; but there is always the possibility of what it’s for’ (Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Contraception and Chastity’ in Michael D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and Population, Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1976.) This value would be value to the individual concerned, and to others who love him.
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assistance from on high in order to understand it. It is ‘one of the most fundamental purposes of traditional religions’ to make belief in this sort of thing ‘seem intelligible’ (LD, p. 156). The word seem here is well chosen. The traditional religions surely have their work cut out, at least when dealing with anyone of ordinary good sense. Anyway, once one has this idea, we are told, it somehow spreads itself about one’s being, like a host of cancerous secondaries: ‘each person’s own conception of what that idea means radiates throughout his entire life’ (LD, p. 28, italics in text). Darker, and darker yet. Professor Dworkin is at some pains to perform this elucidatory office for secular, though sometimes religiositising, man. I think he must himself be uncomfortable with the notion. For example, there is obviously something rather odd about all this talk of insult – of insulting the intrinsic value of life – how can one possibly insult something so abstract? One might just as well talk of insulting a meridian line or a coincidence. True enough, one could insult someone’s memory, but that is a way of insulting him. Dworkin talks about intrinsic value or sacredness as if it were the God he cannot quite believe in. At one point he even suggests that sacredness is something which might be offended by what we do (LD, p. 24). One begins nervously to suspect that this sublime value, having taken offence, might punish us for our transgressions. How then is the notion to be introduced? The difficulties here seem manifest. We cannot for example introduce a notion merely by saying what it is not. In offering his explanations, Dworkin is assiduous in telling us what intrinsic value isn’t. However, a negative definition, so to speak, can leave us very much in the dark. ‘A tove is neither a weekday, nor a spoon, nor a ticket to Ramsgate, that’s what a tove is!’ Sometimes an account of X will tell you both what X is and what it is not. Definitions of intrinsic value are often given in this form. Christopher Gowans, for example, offers us an explanation: To say that persons are intrinsically valuable means that they are valuable, but not merely because they have instrumental value as means to some valued end or as parts of some valued whole.61 61 Christopher Gowans, ‘Moral Theory, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Responsibilities’, in H. E. Mason, ed., Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 208–9. Professor Gowans, for example, simply refers to this as familiar in philosophy, gives a simple definition, and passes on to what he is really concerned to defend: that we are also ‘irreplaceably valuable’. To believe these two doctrines of value, he suggests, is somehow essential: ‘That we regard persons as being intrinsically and irreplaceably valuable is one of the most significant features of our understanding of ourselves’ (p. 210). However, we can say that human beings are ‘irreplaceable’ without talking the language of value. We can simply say e.g. that a woman is not entitled to kill a baby on the mere
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An explanation of this sort can, however, run into trouble. There is a danger that one will take with one hand everything one has given with the other, as in: To say that pebbles are ‘intrinsically’ owned means that they are owned but not by anyone, or by any community or corporation. Given a sufficient number of exclusions, intrinsically valuable objects would all find themselves in the same box as Lichtenberg’s elusive knife, the knife without a handle the blade of which has been lost. Nor does it help us to appeal to ‘objectivity’. Dworkin tells us that ‘human life has objective, intrinsic value’ (LD, p. 67, italics added) and that we have ‘a responsibility . . . to protect human life as an objective or intrinsic good’ (FL, p. 84, italics added). ‘We consider an individual life valuable not only to itself, but objectively. That idea is quite central to our culture.’62 Far from helping us to understand the notion, this insistent introduction of the word ‘objective’ makes for an extra difficulty. Objectivity seems on this account to be reserved to the intrinsic. It appears that we are to take the or in ‘objective or intrinsic’ to be or in other words. However, insofar as the word ‘objective’ is clear at all, it would seem evident that kinds of value with which Dworkin is evidently not concerned are quite objective. If I have my house valued I want an objective judgement on its value from an expert who demands a fee. This expert is not to be moved by his personal likes and dislikes, or those of his wife Betty. He might have to train himself to be objective. He claims, perhaps rashly, something about the way things are, which (I suppose) is what people are on about when they use the word objective. For the value of something to be objective in this sense this value would not of course have to be independent of what people want or need, or more generally of the needs of organisms.63 Nor will it do to make a vague gesture towards ‘our experience’. Professor Dworkin claims that the notion is ‘a familiar part of our experience’ (LD, p. 69), but this reference to experience, though it has a robust, down-toearth sound to it, is really something of a cheat. This is not an unusual situation, perhaps, when philosophical academics feel driven to invoke ground that she proposes to have another a baby (or two) just to make up. Talk of value hardly explains this conviction! 62 Dworkin, ‘Tyranny at the Two Edges of Life’, p. 16, italics in text. 63 We need to ask of course in the particular case what a claim as to ‘objectivity’ amounts to. Despite Dworkin’s talk of objectivity, Gilbert Harman mentions the account of intrinsic value in Life’s Dominion as providing one more item of support for his general thesis that moral claims are not objective. See Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 11.
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‘experience’. (Think, for example, of the appeal to religious experience.64) Dworkin cannot surely mean that we detect intrinsic value with our eyes and ears. Or again that we endure an experience like dizziness in the presence of the valuable object, a dizziness which is supposed to be revelatory. Perhaps he merely means to convey that those of us with more ‘experience of life’ are especially able to discern it. But we would have to know what intrinsic value is before we could understand, and then appraise, this claim. So his explanations, though welcome, fall short of what we need. Thomas Nagel seeks to defend this notion of intrinsic value, if not by an appeal to personal experience, at least by drawing on each person’s own thoughts. In his book The Last Word, we are each of us invited by Professor Nagel to think of our own case. There is apparently an intelligible, if gloomy, view on offer: that each of us, when ‘considered impersonally,’ is quite valueless! – that each of us is ‘objectively’ worthless!. My exclamation marks here indicate how Professor Nagel expects us to react to such a suggestion: This judgment . . . is in my opinion . . . difficult honestly to accept. Can you really believe that objectively, it doesn’t matter whether you die of thirst or not – and that your inclination to believe that it does is just the false objectification of your self love?65 The assumption here is that there is such an intelligible but gloomy thought which we cannot, if we are straight with ourselves, accept.66 But someone who rejects the suggestion that there is such a thought will not of course say that he himself is impersonally valueless or objectively worthless. For him there will be nothing for him to be gloomy, resigned, or perhaps toughminded, about. He won’t say that his life fails objectively to matter, in 64 For useful cautions about appeals to experience, see Anthony Kenny, Faith and Reason, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 55–8. ‘I think that the phrase “religious experience” is an unfortunate one; not because of anything to do with religion, but because of the confusing nature of the relevant concept of “experience” ’ (p. 55). 65 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 122. As it happens, this book is dedicated to Professor Dworkin. Another prominent philosopher who wishes to talk of intrinsic value in the way under dispute is Robert Nozick. See below, Chapter 2.8. 66 Perhaps there is even a hint that someone who considers himself intrinsically worthless must suppose he is not entitled to put in a claim for anything – to have his bill paid, for example. I don’t know whether Professor Nagel would go so far. But the much anthologised environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott takes seriously a ‘proof of the existence of intrinsic value’ which turns upon this thought. ‘Human ethical entitlement’, it is said, ‘is grounded ultimately in our claim to possess intrinsic value’. (‘Intrinsic Value in Nature: A Metaethical Analysis’, Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 1995, p. 1.)
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Professor Nagel’s tone of voice. Nor, of course, will he claim to be ‘subjectively valuable’, still less ‘only subjectively valuable’. In fact it is quite unnatural for a man to say that he himself is valuable at all (as distinct from, let us say, a valuable member of the crew). And this is not at all a matter of conventional modesty. Thomas Nagel is apt to refer to the view he opposes as ‘egoistic’.67 But someone who can only understand his value as ‘a valuable member of the crew’ and the like can hardly be said to be working with an egoistic conception of value. If anything, one would call the concept un– egoistic. Nor is Professor Nagel entitled to monopolize the word ‘impersonal’. The question whether one is a valuable member of the crew can be judged quite impersonally. How can we be so much as tempted to talk of objective mattering? Well, someone in mortal danger might well be inclined to say to himself: ‘Those other people have a reason, simply on account of my condition and nothing else, to rescue me!’ He will think (if a philosopher, at least) that there just is such a reason, no further explanation being called for or possible. He will similarly suppose that others have a reason to relieve his pain. It is as if distress itself issues demands. We need not ask here how strong these reasons might be, and whether they exist when the unfortunate individual has foolishly brought about his unhappy state. The question is: are there such reasons at all? Isn’t it merely the case that in such circumstances we would naturally like there to be reasons? Or again that we make this supposition simply to derive the improving conclusion that we have these unexplained ground-floor duties to help others? If five pounds would suit me, does that very fact miraculously create some kind of obligation upon bystanders to pass such a sum into my hand?68 In his earlier book, The View from Nowhere, Nagel writes: it seems that some of [our] interests give evidence that their objects have an intrinsic value which is not merely a function of the satisfaction that 67 Nagel, The Last Word, p. 122 (twice). 68 John Searle writes: ‘Intuitively, it seems reasonable to suppose that if I am in pain I have reason for wanting to alleviate my pain. My feeling this degree of pain involves feeling a need for its alleviation. My need for pain alleviation is for me a reason to alleviate my pain and I even believe that others, where they have the ability and the opportunity, have a reason to help alleviate my pain. But I cannot believe that they have a reason for helping me, without committing myself to believing that in the same situation where the pronouns are reversed, I am bound to recognize that I have a reason for helping them. It is rational of me to want them to help me, for the reason that I am now in need of help. But then in consistency when they are in need of help I am committed to recognizing the existence of their need as a reason for my helping them’ (Rationality in Action, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001, p. 161, italics added). This kind of argument must have tempted many a philosopher. But why should any circumspect person subscribe to the belief expressed in the italicised phrase?
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people may derive from them or of the fact that anyone wants them – a value which is not reducible to their value for anyone.69 But once again, a suggestion has to make sense before there can be any question of evidence, and here it at least appears that there is no sense in it. Little wonder that Professor Nagel goes on to add: ‘I don’t know how to establish whether there are any such values.’ This is both frank and revealing. But the problem under discussion is not a matter of establishing or failing to establish the existence of anything or of how things are. Professor Nagel’s remark is not at all like ‘I don’t know how to establish whether this person died of arsenic poisoning.’ In raising our doubts about intrinsic value we are not concerned with knowledge. We are not engaged in that sceptical teasing which is a feature of a certain style of philosophy (Do we know that there are other minds, that there was a past, that the sun will rise, etc.?), or asking the perhaps rather unclear question whether our unproblematic talk of X’s (numbers, points of the compass, etc.) commits us to believing that X’s ‘really exist’ or are ‘objects’. Our problem is with the content of Professor Nagel’s would-be thought, not with its credibility. It is rather suggested, to return to Ronald Dworkin, that we already implicitly understand this notion of intrinsic value. Like Thomas Nagel, he thinks it sufficient to draw on each person’s own thoughts. This time the thoughts involve aesthetic judgement: We say that we want to look at one of Rembrandt’s self-portraits because it is wonderful, not that it is wonderful because we want to look at it. (LD, p. 72) The contrast drawn here cannot be faulted. But it is hard to see what this remark is supposed to show. It hardly provides a notion of intrinsic value with a sense. We could say something analogous to the remark about Rembrandt in connection with anything we have a standard interest in. We want to hear a joke because it is funny; we do not say it is funny because we want to hear it. That truism, however, does not seem to tell us anything about intrinsic value. Professor Dworkin nowhere suggests that a joke is an abstractly valuable ingredient of the universe. We want to eat the ice cream
69 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 153. To be sure, anyone will admit that items can be valuable in a perfectly unproblematic way even though no one can derive satisfaction from them and no one wants them. In the fi rst place, all sorts of useful things are not wanted because no one knows that they are useful. And of many things known to be useful it is rather unnatural to say that people ‘derive satisfaction’ from them. Think of traffic lights, air-bags, white lines along the road, etc.
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because it is nice, it is not nice because we want to eat it. We want to inspect the drains because they are giving problems, they are not – unless they are very unusual drains – giving problems because we want to inspect them. A painting which became wonderful when for whatever reason we wanted to look at it would be like something out of a fairy story. The first half of what is said above about a fine painting will have a point because a contrast is possible. One might have a great range of reasons for wanting to look at a painting other than the wonder of it: to fi nd out whether it is damaged; to see whether it is the original or a copy; to assess what some fool might be prepared to pay for it; to boast to one’s friends that one has seen it; to find out whether the colours would match one’s carpet; to assess whether it could be suitably reproduced on one’s chocolate boxes; to encourage lascivious thoughts; to be seen looking at it by others; because it was painted by a friend or an ancestor; because one wanted to recognise someone similar to the person depicted; to glean some information about history; to reconstruct a building depicted in it and since destroyed in a war; to avoid using a similar technique in one’s own painting; to keep a promise; to pass an exam; to test one’s eyesight; or out of simple curiosity. We would not say that it was wonderful simply because we wanted to look at it. One can want to look at bad paintings, even under that description, and for aesthetic reasons. One learns to appreciate what is good by contrast with that which is not so good, and an introduction to a few specimens of the latter might be part of one’s education. We even want to keep open the possibility that a painting might not be wonderful even though very many people, even educated people, enjoy it – that there might be a rather general corruption of taste. The aesthetic interest of a painting is related in a roundabout way to the interest people happen to find in it. One thing we cannot do is to want to look at a painting because it is wonderful, if to be wonderful means simply that it would be ‘a bad thing, from a cosmic perspective’ were the painting to vanish. Just imagine someone offering such a reason! I do not doubt that the value story has an imaginative grip, and might come in handy. Many people will very reasonably execrate the infanticide currently practiced in parts of India. If they could honestly use the value story as a reason, perhaps one reason among others, why this killing should cease they would gladly avail themselves of it. But if I am right they cannot with a good intellectual conscience take up this weapon. In this sense, what I have to say is of no joy to me. In arguing that the value story is unintelligible I am arguing, thus far, on the side of those who want the moral freedom to commit infanticide. No matter. People can be kept from bad deeds by bad reasons. Limited or local rationality, the broad picture being unavailable, or not attended to, can easily lead in the wrong direction. If the objection to abortion or infanticide had to rest entirely on the value story, there would be no objection, and the opposition would rest on mere
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prejudice: the sooner we entirely discounted it the better. (One could say exactly the same about a proposal to kill one’s neighbourhood grocer.) Professor Dworkin, in making so much of ‘seriousness’ and ‘inviolability’, would irrationally nourish a guilt which so many women, to say nothing of their spouses and doctors, could well do without. I imagine that there will be those who are ‘pro-choice’ who will feel impatient with Dworkin for this very reason. His language, if not his thought, will be disconcerting to them.70
2.6 How language we appear to understand can nevertheless be unintelligible In claiming that this curious idea of intrinsic value is not intelligible I must repeat and underline a qualification I made at the outset of Part Two: it is not intelligible where a claim about this value is given as a reason why the valuable item should not be destroyed. I speak in this qualified way because it seems to me that this talk of value is best seen as a reflection of people’s objection to murder, rather than something that might help us understand why the objection is sound.71 Thus we should not necessarily take exception 70 One is not surprised to hear Leslie Cannold describe the idea that ‘the foetus is intrinsically and independently valuable’ as an ‘anti-choice view’, and as something ‘profoundly anti-feminist’ (The Abortion Myth: Feminism, Morality and the Hard Choices Women Make, St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1998, p. 75, italics in text). She does not refer to Life’s Dominion. 71 Several people seem to have come to a similar conclusion. I list those known to me. First Roger Wertheimer. We talk, he says, of the value of a human being as if it explained and justified the usual teachings that we should not harm others ‘whereas actually the attribution of value is a consequence of the rationality and categorical character of moral choices, not a precondition of them. The propriety of sacrificing one person to save the life of many in some cases and the impropriety of doing so in other cases cannot be explained in a coherent calculus of value’ (‘Applying Ethical Theory: Caveats from a Case Study’, in David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi, eds, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988, p. 254). Second, Anne Maclean: ‘Talk about the value of life in this context can be nothing other than talk about how we may treat the possessor of that life; it is not talk which explains how we may treat the possessor of that life’ (The Elimination of Morality, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 34, italics in text). This thought is not confined to those who, like Roger Wertheimer, oppose abortion. Leslie Cannold perhaps has the same idea when she writes: ‘The key to understanding women’s assumptions regarding the value of foetal life is to remember that they follow from women’s beliefs about the morality of abortion, they are not the reasons behind them’ (The Abortion Myth, p. 116). There is something right about this remark, though of course we need to talk about beliefs generally, not just ‘women’s beliefs’. Think too of John Harris who explains what it is for lives to have something called ‘moral value’ thus: ‘Talk about the lives of individuals having moral value refers to the moral reasons we
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to the remark in the House of Lords Walton Report: ‘the special worth of human life is at the heart of civilised society’.72 And it could well be that the use of this language induces a certain respect in us, that we will behave somewhat better in a society in which this language is current – though after reading Dworkin, and seeing the uses to which it can be put, we might well be having doubts about that. Similar remarks might be made about the notion of ‘respect’ itself, as it appears in these discussions, a respect which is deemed to be due but does not reflect the qualities of one individual as against another, a qualfication which once again seems to cut an ordinary notion adrift from its anchorage. We may be glad to hear this peculiar use in these contexts – but as far as explanation is concerned the work remains to be done. The solemn language does not do it for us. We might even go further, and allow that talk of the special value of the human individual has a minimally explanatory role. It excludes something, just as sanctity-talk excludes something – as we saw (p. 53). It expresses the view that what is wrong with killing Smith is not just this or that: is not just that Smith does not particularly want to die, or again that Smith can be expected to ‘contribute to society’, as we say. Or again, people might say that human beings are intrinsically valuable simply to stress that they should not be thought of as a mere assemblage of ‘instrumentally valuable’ body-parts and tissues. There would be no contrast here with the objection to homicide expressed in terms of rights. This talk of value would remind us of what we know or think we know. If a genuine explanation can be uninformative save in this exclusionary way, then we have an explanation here. These concessions might be said to give the philosopher of intrinsic value all that he wants. If so, that is fine. The satisfied reader could pass straight to Part Three. Explanation in some richer sense, or at least a better understanding, is very much what Professor Dworkin is after. ‘Astronomers discovered the planet Neptune . . . only after they realised that the movements of the
have for respecting claims to continued existence made by or on behalf of such creatures’ (‘The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life’, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, December 1999, p. 294). Here again claims about value would not be offered to explain why we have ‘moral reasons’ not to kill. We will be inclined to talk about value just because we think we have these reasons. 72 Lord Walton of Detchant (Chairman), Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, London: HMSO, 1994, p. 13. ‘[Section] 34. Belief in the special worth of human life is at the heart of civilised society. It is the fundamental value on which all others are based, and is the foundation of both law and medical practice. The intentional taking of human life is therefore the offence which society condemns most strongly. [Section] 35. ‘Witnesses spoke in different ways about the value which human life holds . . . Nobody suggested that human life did not have its own intrinsic value’. Ronald Dworkin gave oral evidence to this committee.
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planet Uranus could be explained only by the gravitational force of another celestial body, yet unknown, orbiting the sun further out’. For many people, he says, ‘the idea that life has intrinsic value . . . is the undiscovered planet that explains otherwise inexplicable convictions’ (LD, pp. 69). It is because a more richly explanatory notion of intrinsic value – this would-be idea that certain items (which might include human beings, biological species, paintings, ways of life, certain events, or whatever) are just ‘good-in-themselves’ – seems to play a key role in much contemporary moral philosophy, that I have thought the issue worthy of a fairly painstaking examination. It has an importance far beyond the particular controversy about abortion which forms the framework of this book. In regard to the concept of intrinsic value itself, the real difficulty arises, I believe, from a radical misunderstanding of the grammatical category of the adjective ‘good’, a matter we shall come to in the last chapter of this Part. David Lewis once remarked: ‘Any competent philosopher who does not understand something will take care not to understand anything else whereby it might be explained.’73 Taking the hint, I should admit at the outset that we philosophers should be slow to claim that what other (sober) philosophers say is nonsense. That is why the discussion to come has to be a fairly long one. We must avoid certain quick solutions. Thus nothing I have to say will depend upon the thought, sometimes encountered in philosophy, that to admit that certain claims make sense would be to commit us to a belief in queer or uncanny entities – in this case intrinsic values. This consideration is of very little help. Magnetism has been thought pretty rum, but no one is tempted to say that the word ‘magnetised’ lacks sense. Nor do I want to argue that the only things which can intelligibly be said to exist are either straightforwardly perceptible or would be suitably discussed in physics books, adding that intrinsic value conspicuously fails this (admittedly somewhat indeterminate) test. That drug-taking is or is not foolish, that humility is or is not a virtue, that inflation is or is not rising – these are quite discussable matters but are not about the perceptible or the physical. (And if they are about the perceptible or the physical in some very indirect way, then intrinsic value might be so too.) Again, we shall not insist that would-be propositions about the intrinsically valuable must be nonsensical because we could not in principle verify them. Considerations of verifiability can however be put to gentle, undogmatic use. Unverifiability can at least suggest that (once again) we philosophers are talking through our hats, especially where the notion seems fishy to begin with. We can also ask questions of the form: if such and such were true would this other thing be true? Too many failures here to find our way would undermine our confidence that we knew what we were talking about. We should expect the process to take time and to be untidy. Doubts about 73 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 203.
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logical positivism, with its swift test of meaning, should not rob us of the insight that we run the risk of saying what is senseless rather than what is false. We must now take up an objection which threatens to wreck my case at the outset. It will be said that the explanatory value story can’t possibly be unintelligible simply because so many people appear to understand it. Let us look into this. Of course we can think we understand something when we turn out not to understand it – nothing could be more familiar. But the objection we are at present considering remains. For we not only appear to understand this talk of intrinsic value, we tend up to a point to agree in our (apparent) judgements. If we were to conduct a survey and people had to answer, straight off, whether the existence of human beings had objective intrinsic value they would overwhelmingly be inclined, I am sure, to reply yes rather than no. They will take a different view of, let us say, toenail clippings. This consensus seems to show that the question must make sense. If the question could not be understood, we could not respond to the survey at all, or at the very least our answers could be expected to be distributed at random between the yes and the no. Wittgenstein would sometimes make a mark on a blackboard, or a blot on a piece of paper, and ask whether or not the mark fitted exactly into its surroundings.74 We are all inclined to say yes. Certainly, yes rather than no. But on second thoughts, would we know what was being asked? Something fits exactly when (given some standard of exactness appropriate to the context) there is a very good fit between its edge and another edge. Think of a bit of wood skilfully inlaid into another. But in the case of the mark or the blot we do not have two edges to consider. It would be silly, for example, to look at the blot more closely with a magnifying glass. What would one be looking for? So the question of accuracy of fit cannot arise. We had the impression of understanding a question, but as it happens no real question was being posed. The language of ‘fitting’ seemed to do some work. But this is an illusion. We do not understand what failing to fit would mean in such a case. We can however see why people tend to answer in a uniform way even though the question is misasked. We should not be surprised to fi nd that people would almost unanimously agree that human beings had this abstract value which sounds so imposing – at least if they are not asked to consider whether the question should be rejected. After all, we are taught not to kill, and that immediately suggests value. And in any case, the yes sounds heart-warming, serious, etc.; and of course it costs nothing at all. This last may perhaps be doubted, but at the very least this yes is going to be quite costless to anyone with a mod74 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edn, 1958, para. 216.
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erately ingenious or devious mind such as one acquires by the study of philosophy or law. I am not of course asserting that the value story appears before us like a sentence in Greek to the Greekless, otherwise the many purchasers of Life’s Dominion would be demanding their money back. Nor is the value story so obviously senseless that almost any competent philosopher who is working in this area would see as much right away. It is a story invented by philosophers after all. The story gives the impression of sense, it appears to throw light on the way it is bad to kill, and when forced to choose whether to go along with it, we plump for an answer accordingly. And it is perfectly easy to see why we turn to the yes rather than to the no. Concepts exist in a web of other concepts. But it is possible for us to cut away these vital connections without quite realising what we are doing. Remember the ordinary way in which we said that the world containing this or that would be a better place, swimming baths, sliced bread, etc. Without such things our lives would be impoverished, perhaps greatly, perhaps marginally. Someone might then attempt to sever this thread, and say that something or other is ‘just’ valuable – explicitly rejecting any talk of impoverishment. And it is quite possible that we will now have cut ourselves off from intelligibility. Such a severance need not be noticed. Earnest discussion involving our marooned would-be concept could continue pretty well indefinitely, particularly in universities. There is an obvious difficulty in showing that a view is defective from the point of view of sense. Strictly speaking there will be no such view. There will therefore be no such thing as expressing this view adequately. But how can one honestly criticise what someone says if one does not first give an adequate account of his opinion? If one tries to give a clear account it will seem to miss something: it will seem to be a travesty, a parody, to miss out that je ne sais quoi. What we need is some ersatz for accuracy: something we can call the adequate expression of nonsense. Ideally – though this is a good deal to expect, humanly speaking – the person criticised will say: ‘Yes, that is just what I meant!’ But the process is not going to be clear cut. Language has a kind of versatility of its own. One is inclined to say that one cannot put an event into a hole. The very supposition would not make sense. The categories simply do not mesh – so there is no such thing as putting an event into a hole. But then – one could have a birthday party in a cave. Or select the right size of test-tube to enclose a reaction. It must be admitted that our understanding of what we say and believe is frequently defective, but we do not judge it to be nonsense for that reason. Even mathematicians, as Frege showed, were inclined to give inadequate accounts of what it is to add one number to another. We should therefore not give up a would-be notion as senseless simply because we are having some difficulties with it. Nor can we complain of senselessness on the mere ground that what is said in terms of this notion is not completely clear: we
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struggle to be clear in regard to very many meaningful concepts, but we so often have to fall short. Sometimes we must use language which we realise must miss the mark because it is not possible to express our would-be thought – as Frege realised when trying to explain the notion of a mathematical function.75 However there comes a time, after many difficulties with a notion which perhaps we have unwisely introduced, to set the whole matter aside as a misunderstanding. We should eventually ask ourselves, in the course of our discussion, whether such a moment has been reached. The notion of ‘having sense’ is pretty unsharp. We can usefully return to Wittgenstein here. Wittgenstein talks about the ‘inclinations’ we have to use particular words in certain contexts. We might playfully ask, for example, what colour the vowels are. ‘For me the vowel e is yellow.’ Given the two ideas ‘fat’ and ‘lean’, would you be rather inclined to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or the other way around? (I incline to choose the former.) . . . I want to use these words (with their familiar meanings) here. – Now, I say nothing about the causes of this phenomenon. They might be associations from my childhood. But that is a hypothesis. Whatever the explanation, – the inclination is there.76 Wittgenstein says that the uses of ‘yellow’ or ‘fat’ in such contexts are secondary (though not metaphorical). Now I think that in this way we could ask rather playful questions about value. ‘Is a bird’s nest better than a rabbit hole?’, ‘Is the top of the tin better than the bottom?’ I am inclined to say ‘yes’ to both questions. And if that counts as understanding them, then I understand them. All the same, this should not make us totally incapable of criticising what is often said about value as nonsensical. For what is wanted by those who talk about intrinsic value is something more than this minimal, and playful, comprehensibility.
2.7 Permission to destroy items of value: countervailing obligations contrasted with mere licences For the next few chapters we shall be considering the difficulties we would have to face if we were seriously tempted to put this supposed concept of value to use. It may serve as an intimation that all is not well.
75 P. T. Geach and Max Black, eds, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952. See ‘On Concept and Object’: ‘By a kind of necessity of language, my expressions sometimes miss my thought . . . I fully realize that in such cases I was relying on a reader who would be ready to meet me half way – who does not begrudge a pinch of salt’ (p. 54). See also a similar remark in ‘What is a Function?’ (p. 115). 76 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II: xi, p. 216.
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What interests us in this particular chapter is how the argument as to permissibility is supposed to work. We are supposed no doubt to compare the intrinsic values of what is lost and gained, hoping that the destruction of a valuable item (a tree, a baby, a painting, or whatever) will turn out to be all right. Now it is significant that this claim might be made in two quite different ways, and we need from the outset to distinguish them. First, the destruction might turn out to be obligatory, and hence permissible for this reason. (What one must do, trivially one may do.) Or second, it might be that the destruction is merely permissible – licensed. We need to know which of these claims is under consideration. If we have no way of knowing, this rather suggests that we do not know what we are talking about. A comparison might help to make the distinction clear. We find just such a difference of view in regard to the ethics of killing in self-defence, where killing the attacker is the only way of saving one’s life. Some may judge that self-defence is obligatory: so that if this involves the death of the assailant, as in the case envisaged, one must kill. The obligation not to kill is overridden by a counter-obligation to preserve oneself. This is (perhaps) a Jewish view of the matter.77 Others however may think that one has a choice in such a situation: one may defend oneself, but need not. One has a licence. Thus for example a mother being attacked by her deranged child might choose, at the critical moment, to die rather than defend herself in a way that would kill it. She has a licence but chooses not to use it.78 The obligation or the permission to destroy might presumably concern the destruction of anything of intrinsic value. But let us confine our discussion to the case of abortion. What seems at first sight to be required is a counterobligation: that is to say an obligation sufficient to outweigh the obligation ‘that we all take so seriously’ (LD, p. 238) not to take life. After all, human life is said to be so very sacred. Surely only a competing and suitably imposing duty could make it all right to take a life? We would have to be able to lay our hands on our hearts and say: ‘We can do no other’. This seems to be what is at issue when intrinsic values are to be weighed. Abortion is said to be wrong ‘unless the intrinsic value of other lives would be wasted by a decision against abortion’ (LD, p. 60). This remark is made in the context of a 77 That this is a Jewish view was suggested to me by Rabbi Daniel Schiff. 78 I have, incidentally, tried to write the above in a way which does not presuppose that the killing in either case is intentional. It is arguable that private individuals living in civil society may not intentionally kill even in self-defence. This was Elizabeth Anscombe’s view. ‘When a private man struggles with an enemy he has no right to aim to kill him, unless in the circumstances of the attack he can be considered as endowed with the authority of the law and the struggle comes to that point. By a “private” man, I mean a man in a society; I am not speaking of men on their own, without government, in remote places: for such men are neither public servants nor “private”.’ ‘War and Murder’, Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Oxford: Blackwell. 1981, p. 54.
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‘carefully accurate’ account of what ‘most people think’. It seems from this context however that we are to believe that most people are level-headed in this particular matter and that Professor Dworkin sides with this majority. Here we seem to be subject to a requirement to minimise life-waste. Here the woman’s choice is going to be determined either way by duty, save where there is the prospect of equal waste whatever she chooses. This doctrine seems to leave the pregnant woman in chains – bound every bit as much as the most rigorous pro-life teaching would insist. In either case there is, morally speaking, no choice whatever. Pro-life says you mustn’t. Value-theory, if we may call it that, says either you mustn’t or you must, depending on the details of the case; there is little room for the merely may. In the Preface to the Vintage edition of Life’s Dominion, Professor Dworkin writes about ‘enemies of freedom of choice’ (LD, p. x). But in one respect he might find himself in their company, differing with them only on the question of public policy: how best to encourage the triumph of the good. ‘Morally’ there would be little or no choice. The insult to intrinsic value, one might say, is to be minimised. There would of course be the case, presumably rare, where the intrinsic value lost is equal either way. Perhaps there would be the opportunity for choice in this circumstance. And even here, the sterner moralist would no doubt insist that one ought to settle the matter by lot: heads I let the baby live, tails I pursue my career (or whatever). It is commonly assumed – except in China – that if a woman does not want an abortion, well that is just fine. She need have no anxieties. In the usual case, the pregnancy is welcomed and friends rally round with their congratulations. Pretty ultrasound pictures are pinned up and oohed over. But all this suggests that the public are not seriously concerned with intrinsic value. The philosophers have not succeeded in putting over their hard teaching in this regard. Sure enough, the new baby has its value. But at what cost does it continue to exist? The roughest of estimates will not have been made. New babies cost money, and money, public or private, can nearly always be used to conserve what would be called ‘the intrinsic value of other lives’. Madeleine Simms, one of Professor Dworkin’s many admiring reviewers, and a former general secretary of the Abortion Law Reform Association, can help us here with the latest calculations. ‘By the latest calculations’, she writes, ‘it [an unwanted baby] will cost more than four times as much in N.H.S. expenditure alone as a wanted abortion, thereby reducing the N.H.S. resources available for other urgently needed medical procedures. Ten per cent of cardiac patients die on the waiting list for heart surgery, for starters. In terms of public health, where is the morality in that?’79 Where indeed? It is perhaps those who are too inhibited, lazy or
79 ‘Foetal Positions’, a review of Life’s Dominion, New Statesman and Society, 4 June 1993, p. 37.
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cowardly to have abortions who are the real killers, allowing their babies to be born at the expense of all those poor cardiac patients. In this last paragraph we have been assuming that it is always ‘the intrinsic value of other lives’ which is in the balance. But Professor Dworkin seems not to have given an entirely sympathetic account of his own view. Granted that abortion wastes a life why would it be permissible only to prevent the waste of the intrinsic value of other lives? Why this concentration on life? Would the waste of the intrinsic value of other, non life-related, items have no weight at all? That would appear to be wholly against the spirit of Life’s Dominion. Someone might offer to pay the woman to have an abortion – the child’s father might be immensely rich and want the matter hushed up and disposed of. The money could then go towards preserving the inanimate stones of Venice.80 The savings to be made out of abortion are not inconsiderable, and, when all the estimates are in, the procedure might be thought quite often compulsory, at least on the balance-of-value account under discussion. We should not pretend to be offended by the intrusion of ‘crass financial considerations’. For as we have just seen we may assume that the money saved is to be devoted to the preservation of endangered Venice. Or indeed paintings, animal species, unusual cultural practices, etc., to say nothing about the provision of heart operations. John T. Noonan, writing in 1979, assembled some useful statistics in this area. (They would by now of course need some adjustment for inflation.) One recent estimate of savings put the ‘welfare cost’ of mother and child at more than $6,000 as against $360 for an abortion, so that Medicaid in California in one year alone saved the taxpayers almost a half-billion dollars by funding 77,000 abortions. Planned Parenthood Affi liates of California, Memo, October-November 1977, 3. The financial argument is also pressed vigorously upon state legislatures. For example, on March 13, 1978, the author was present at a hearing before an appropriations subcommittee of the California Senate considering state funding of abortion. A county health officer speaking on behalf of all county health officers urged the funding on the ground of financial savings calculated by him at $4,061 per pregnancy times 70,000 pregnancies, or $284,270,000 a year. He observed, ‘That’s only one year’s crop,’ and ‘We’ll be supporting them [i.e., babies born on welfare] for the next eighteen years.’81
80 I am leaving aside here obligations which arise not from the need to preserve net intrinsic value but from other sources – via promises for example. One might have promised to do something (e.g., take someone on a European holiday) for which one’s abortion was a prerequisite. Surely that might be a factor? And how would we factor it in? 81 John T. Noonan, A Private Choice, Abortion in America in the Seventies, New York: The Free Press, 1979, pp. 200–1.
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Noonan also noted the argument that there would be ‘savings in criminal conduct eliminated because potential criminals had been eliminated’.82 In regard to this last, we can now say more. A piece in The Economist, ‘The criminal unborn’, reports the unpublished findings of John Donohue of Stanford University Law School and Steven Levitt of the University of Chicago. ‘A steep rise in abortion after 1973 [the year of Roe v. Wade] has meant that many individuals prone to criminal activity in the 1990’s were never born’. The financial implications are spelled out: ‘Current crime rates would be 10–20% higher if abortion had not been legalised. Using current estimates for the social cost of crime, the authors estimate the concomitant social benefits of abortion to be in the order of $30 billion a year’.83 In one respect infanticide is rather more likely to be required of us than abortion, for the benefits must be much the same while the cost of the procedure must be a good deal lower. No doctors need be involved. One could very well employ workers on the statutory minimum wage, people just about able to pull on a string or hold down a pillow. Similar consideration would apply when it came to the disposal of people suffering from congenital disabilities of mind, assuming, as with neonates, that we had only to consider their intrinsic value, comparing it with what we might spend on art galleries, etc. Michael Burleigh reports a real life estimate of the economies to be expected from one such disposal programme, involving some 70,000 deaths. In marmalade alone, for example, total consumption over an estimated lifetime would have amounted to 5,902,920 kg.84 The attractions of this ‘can do no other’ mode of justification is plain. Here morality compels us to act, so the choice is taken out of our hands. Not so when we turn to the other mode, where an appeal to the net value of what would be lost is invoked simply to claim a licence. A licence betokens liberty. We are left free to choose either way. A fishing licence does not oblige us to fish, but simply allows us to do so. Naturally, those who are always talking about ‘choice’ will tend to think of our value-weighing problem in this way, especially when they are not actually confronted by such a choice. We might naturally suppose this licence to be more readily available to some people rather than others. I am thinking of those who have already done their bit in regard to value, or who sincerely propose to do so. For people can beget people. And they can also save the lives of those already in existence. This might well have to be taken into account. It would be a 82 Noonan, p. 40. 83 The Economist, 14 August, 1999 p. 42. See now Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, New York: William Morrow, 2005. 84 Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 160–1.
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simple matter of justice. It would only be reasonable to allow those who had already had babies, or who had saved lives, a licence to dispose of one or two lives in return. Someone might indeed set about saving a few lives in advance in order to allow themselves a certain leeway in case of future emergencies. Perhaps they would not need to have gone so far as to have had babies themselves; they might simply have invested a great deal in other people’s babies, by working as a midwife let us say, and putting in overtime. After many years of construction it would be a little ungenerous to begrudge a little destruction. In cases of doubt, they might even promise to construct a little more in the future. Since for good reason or bad, caring is so much in the hands of women, does not this give us a wholly new slant on ‘a woman’s right to choose’? Uncreative, uncaring people might have to provide stronger reasons for killing than those who already have investments in the moral bank. And once again, as we have been reminding ourselves, there are many items which have intrinsic value that are not human individuals: in particular, paintings. This might suggest to us that prolific artists are entitled, when it suits them, to kill a few young humans who are as yet only protected by their intrinsic value. And that those mothers who have often resisted the temptation to abort their babies could – fair’s fair – have an occasional bash at some of their less agreeable canvasses. The ethics of all this remains to be resolved. We turn now to consider some further difficulties for the value balancer.
2.8 Could we find out whether something had this value, and (roughly) how much value it had? The value-balancer has now to face some further questions, elementary but quite baffling. How would he discover that something was Impersonally Precious? Could he be taught how this is done while at school? Would it be suitable for the kindergarten, or would we have to reserve it for the sixth form? Could some people make a living out of such enquiries, setting up as Intrinsic Valuers with an office in the better part of town? Would clergymen be expected to be good at this sort of thing? The old? The young, who can approach the matter with a fresh eye? Let us return in particular to Professor Dworkin’s own example: the intrinsic value of knowledge (LD, pp. 69, 73). As we saw earlier, the idea that knowledge has intrinsic value is very peculiar, at least if one is to suppose, as would seem the case, that new knowledge increases the total value of the universe. But we now have to turn our mind to practical questions, questions that would be faced, let us say, by the trainee intrinsic valuer. Would an individual’s knowledge of two people’s telephone numbers add up to more intrinsic value than the knowledge of any one such? Would it add up to twice the value? To roughly twice the value? Would the
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knowledge of a six-figure number be more valuable, intrinsically speaking, than the knowledge of a five-figure number? Perhaps it would be insisted that only some items of knowledge have intrinsic value, knowledge of higher things, etc. – of numbers perhaps, but not, certainly not, of telephone numbers! But even here there is a difficulty in assessing how the intrinsic value incrementally increases with new knowledge. Is a child who finds out at school that there are an infinite number of numbers suddenly blessed with an infinite increase in its knowledge? And would this knowledge have infinite intrinsic value? Would the possession of such knowledge render the child itself of infinite value? Noah Lemos, an authority on intrinsic value, is able to make rather curious comparative judgements: I, for one, would prefer many trivial cognitive states, such as knowing how many phone numbers are in the local phone book, to the existence of one bacterium.85 This remark rather epitomises our difficulty. It is even odder than it looks. For it is possible to take a pride in knowing things. But if it is the intrinsic value of knowledge which is under discussion, it is surely irrelevant whose knowledge it is. One has to be able to prefer that this item of knowledge exist somewhere, in some mind, to the existence of that (presumably harmless) bacterium. This suggestion runs us into a difficulty about the limits of sense: about what is to count as ‘preferring’. A judgement of preference is not just the report of an internal impression, an impression which might surprisingly, not to say miraculously, attach itself to any item in relation to any other.86 In so saying, we need not deny that rather rum ‘better than’ questions can be asked and answered, perhaps in a not-too-serious spirit, as when we asked above whether a bird’s nest was better than a rabbit hole. The trouble begins when the answers are thought to embody estimates of something independent: the actual comparative value of things where we are not concerned with usefulness – the value of this bit of knowledge weighed against the value of that bacterium. If knowledge turned out to have intrinsic value we could perhaps turn this discovery to good liberal use. I have in mind of course a discriminating liberalism, according to which some human beings count for less. Killing grown-ups would certainly be undesirable, for knowledge would be destroyed in the process. Every grown-up can be expected to know something, if only 85 Noah Lemos, Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 96. Children often ask baffl ing questions of this sort – ‘Which is better, a kangaroo or a kettle?’, etc. 86 This remark might seem somewhat cryptic. For a classic discussion of the way mental attitudes are internally related to their objects see Philippa Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs’, reprinted in her Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Blackwell, 1978, pp. 112–16.
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his name. Babies, however, are know-nothings and as such are less valuable. This is a liberating thought. Professor Dworkin seems to have missed this enabling exercise of reason. It is very much of a piece with what goes on in the bolder reaches of ‘practical ethics’. Let us consider in particular the intrinsic value which for Professor Dworkin entails sacredness – the kind that is supposed to be especially relevant to the abortion issue. Professor Dworkin tells us that although paintings have this sort of value, the value of a person could well be ‘vastly greater’ (LD, p. 73). This suggests all sorts of questions – and we ought to be able to say, roughly, where we would look to fi nd answers to them. Consider, for example, Rembrandt’s picture, The Night Watch. Is it worth, very roughly – for precision is not crassly to be insisted on – a tenth of a male two-year-old child with a club foot? A twentieth? A two-hundredth? And how would the child compare with a first edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan, slightly foxed? Or with a foetus of 14 weeks? Or with an endangered species of beetle? Would it matter whether the human being had behaved badly? Would Rembrandt’s picture count for more than the notorious Yorkshire Ripper? Would it be about on a par with the total value of those present inhabitants of Armley Jail who have been justly sentenced for crimes of violence? (Robert Nozick tells us that ‘the immoral person is a less valuable being than the moral one’.87) Would two people be just twice as valuable as a single one (of the same age and condition)? Could we say that these two paintings, this plump neonate, and such and such species of frog were in sum somewhat more valuable than a certain act of kindness conjoined with the works of Shakespeare? Or (to consider the other ‘associational’ kind of sacredness) with 22 assorted national flags and an Egyptian cat? Or would we simply have no idea what we were talking about? What would be the relationship between the objective intrinsic value of something and damage to it? Would damage be expected to decrease this kind of value? To be sure, not everything that has intrinsic value can be damaged. Events, apparently, can have intrinsic value (LD, p. 69), but we do not naturally talk of damage to events. Nor is it easy to see what would be meant by damage to a species. But paintings can clearly be damaged. Someone once cut off a large slice off The Night Watch so as to make it fit onto a wall. Is it now of less intrinsic value? Would the missing fragment have some value? A foetus can be damaged too. It is now possible for surgeons to operate on a foetus. Suppose a careless surgeon accidentally 87 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 409. This, interestingly enough, seems to bail out all those ethicists who down the years have been troubled by the question ‘Why be moral?’ We, the virtuous, can now tell the other lot: ‘Come, come. You can’t possibly want to become less valuable!’ Philosophy does make progress after all.
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deprived a foetus of a leg, or so damaged its brain as to render it unlikely, in later life, to gain admittance to Oxford. Would this decrease the intrinsic value? And by a little or a lot? Would the detached foetal leg have some value? Damage might actually increase intrinsic value, making the damaged item unique in some way? Who could tell? Stamp collectors value misprinted stamps. As the collectors seem not to want these stamps for anything, and they are clearly of benefit to no one, perhaps their value is intrinsic? People are inclined to say that any animal is more ‘valuable’ than a mere plant. They would be even more adamant if the animal were a mammal. But why should we agree? Robert Nozick, who has clearly thought a good deal about such questions, suggests that a mouse is not more ‘valuable’ than an 800-year-old redwood tree.88 How could one possibly resolve such a controversy? Might a mouse become every bit as valuable if, because of some genetic modification effected in the laboratory, it had lived very much longer than most mice? Professor Nozick also suggests that ‘planetary systems and scientific theories’ have intrinsic value too. Can we, however, so much as ask whether the kinetic theory of gases is of more value in itself than a certain redwood? Surely, we would want to say, the answer is no. And this, we would add, is not a matter of our limited knowledge, for we do not begin to understand what we would need to find out to settle the matter. Is a human foetus more valuable than a grown-up mouse or less? A distinguished gynaecologist I know who gives talks under the heading ‘Confessions of an Abortionist’, and who has not only read his Singer, his Hare, and his Judith Jarvis Thomson, but can give a skilled account of what they say, tells me that although a foetus certainly has some value, it is about one mouseworth. He certainly gives the impression of knowing what he is talking about. He knows more about foetal life than most of us will ever know. Mightn’t this estimate be about right? Might it not indeed be an overestimate, the gynaecologist having been carried away by his emotions? Of course we are not very sure what a mouse is rightly valued at. Tom Regan, the well-known ethicist, has given some thought to this matter, and has concluded that a mouse is just as valuable as you or I.89 Would human beings be more valuable than other animals? Once again, if forced to come up with a yes or a no, people, with the exception of dog lovers and Tom Regan, will tend to choose the former. This might well be called the conventional response. But do we understand what we are asking? We might be struck by the following honest confession to be found in Jonathan Glover’s book, Causing Death and Saving Lives: ‘I am inclined to the conven88 Ibid., p. 415. 89 See below, p. 138.
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tional view that animal life is much less important than human life, but my reasons when written down have a disconcerting air of intellectual dishonesty, as though they were merely constructed to rationalise my nonvegetarianism. So they are not included here.’90 But if we are wondering why it is all right to eat pigs and not people, if that is what we think, are we going to be helped in the least by asking whether, abstractly considered, people are somehow More Important than pigs? For we are not considering importance to someone; Lord Emsworth, for example. We are just concerned with Importance In Itself. If one asks such an unsatisfactory query is it any wonder that the merest rationalisation results from it? We are told that there are different kinds of value, intrinsic value being just one kind. Could we then add up valuations of different kinds to produce a grand total? A painting might have intrinsic value, a market value, and a value for teaching purposes. Could these be lumped together to form the Overall Value? It seems very odd to suppose so, but it doesn’t follow that philosophers haven’t tried.91 The difficulties that we have encountered in this chapter spring up as soon as we try to take this notion of intrinsic value seriously. We seem to lack any criterion of this value, and any criterion for comparing valuable items. Utter incommensurability would be a sign that the notion of values is not intended to carry any explanatory weight. We would be back with the idea that our inclination to talk of the value of human life simply reflects our beliefs about murder, and does not account for them.92 I talk of ‘utter’ incommensurability, because what we have found is not simply a question of the incommensurabilities we meet with in daily life. Perhaps there is no answer to the question, asked by a child let us say, whether Wagner was a ‘better composer’ than Brahms. For the reply might be that they should be assessed on different ladders. In an uninteresting sense they were doing the same thing, in an interesting sense they were doing different things. Comparative questions about the cosmic intrinsic value of things do not seem to admit of a common-sense solution of this kind. But one might give it a try. We might postulate the existence of many different categories of ‘intrinsic value’ and deny that there is any meaning in the question whether something is more valuable than another save wihin a
90 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 16. 91 ‘William Frankena, Chisholm, and others have suggested that the overall value of a thing is the sum of its intrinsic value, its extrinsic value, and any other sort of value it might have’, reports Fred Feldman, who seems to think that talk of such conglomerating makes sense (‘Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value’, Journal of Ethics, 1998, p. 345). 92 See above, p. 91.
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single category.93 Here one acts upon the principle: when in doubt about a suspect concept introduce complexity and hope no further difficulties will arise. But I do not think that Dworkin would want to take this line. He needs to be able to compare the value of pretty disparate items. So we are back to our question about the criterion of comparison. At this point we are perhaps inclined to say that there is a criterion of value and of comparison, but insist that these are not criteria that can be stated or explained. Rather these matters would be determined by judgement. Is this the way out we need? I do not think so. A criterion cannot be provided by appealing to judgement in this fashion. To be able to judge is a capacity, and we need to know independently what is to count as a successful exercise of this capacity. There needs to be a way of putting the claims of intrinsic valuers to the test. At this point we need to bring in those old friends of critical thought, the chicken-sexer and the water diviner. Chicken-sexers, it is said, do not know what they see in a newly hatched chicken which leads them to judge male or female: but we can find out whether they are good at their job. A claim to be able to tell that there is water underground by means of a twitching twig would be perfectly intelligible, even though no one could explain the causal process involved. One understands what is meant by saying that there is water under the ground, and so one would be in a position intelligibly to assert or deny that someone has the uncanny power in question. One knows independently what it means to say that there is water under the ground. But nothing of the kind is possible to us if we have simply to rely on ‘judgement’. What Professor Dworkin has to say (LD, p. 80) about the way people are in fact inclined to call this but not that intrinsically valuable is indeed most instructive. Debarred from choosing what is of mere economic value, they naturally choose what is interesting or is aesthetically pleasing, (though not necessarily to them): that is to say, they choose what is valuable to human beings in a sense of value not in dispute. Why else would they be concerned about the Siberian tiger, no doubt thought of as magnificent and as interestingly rare, but not about a kind of beetle more or less indistinguishable from other beetles? Why else would they be talking about redwood trees? Again, consider the following remark about the demise of cultures: ‘we think it a shame when any distinctive form of human culture, especially a complex and interesting one, dies or languishes’ (LD, p. 72). Well, naturally enough, if it is interesting, we might want it to be kept going for that reason, though perhaps not if it featured slavery, human sacrifice or contempt for women . . . Interestingness is a perfectly ordinary if rather vague 93 Robert Nozick, perhaps, would want to say this: ‘Some things I cannot easily compare, so perhaps there are separate rankings, better pictured by parallel lines or by lines which cross like an X, rather than by one vertical line’ (Philosophical Explanations, p. 415).
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value-description. What Professor Dworkin needs is an example of a totally uninteresting form of human culture that is yet worth preserving, something whose intrinsic value shines forth unencumbered with other more mundane excellences.
2.9 The plight of the abortion counsellor Much of our discussion about the intelligibility of intrinsic value talk is not confined to its role in the abortion controversy, and that is just as it should be. We are concerned after all with a general question about the concept of value. But since abortion is the topic which frames this book, let us take time in this chapter to consider the singular difficulty we would have in putting these thoughts of intrinsic value to practical use in this narrow area. If the doctrine that the growing embryo or foetus has this special intrinsic value were one we could understand, we would expect to be able to put this discovery to work, though doubtless only in a somewhat rough and ready way. If on the other hand the whole idea were just a muddle, we would expect to find, well . . . what in fact we do find. We shall be helped to see the difficulties here if we consider the unenviable position of an ‘abortion counsellor’, employed by a hospital as someone of robust good sense. The pregnant woman might wish to consult the counsellor on these matters, and will naturally put the counsellor into the picture, presenting the facts of the case which might have a bearing on the intrinsic value of this or that. The counsellor will then have to be able to provide rough assessments of the value of what is to be destroyed, bearing in mind the investment, of a suitably significant kind, that has gone into it, so as to help the pregnant woman make her choice in line with the all important value considerations. It might be necessary for the counsellor to assess ‘the complexity of the foetus as an organism’ – some people think this has a bearing on its worth. Then there would have to be an investigation into the intrinsic worth of other things which might be preserved if the baby was destroyed. We must remember here that the issue does not turn on how much the pregnant woman ‘values’ the item in question, where the role of a counsellor could be expected to be somewhat minimal, a humble matter of facilitating or reminding. It is objective, cosmic value we are concerned with here, how much of it is going to be lost, how much is going to be saved. Indeed this very fact raises a difficulty. Counsellors, it is said, are to be ‘non-directive’. But where intrinsic values are at stake it is hard to see how this would be appropriate. Even to suggest that a baby might be valuable sounds pretty directive. And we can hardly expect a suitably ethical counsellor to say: ‘Your baby has an enormous cosmic objective intrinsic worth, but of course whether you take this into account in the slightest is entirely up to you, and in fact you might want to forget that I ever mentioned it’.
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(Admittedly, it is not very clear what it is to be non-directive. Is it sufficient not to badger or raise one’s voice? I once heard a counsellor comforting a troubled woman about fifteen weeks into her pregnancy, telling her ‘There are no right and wrong answers here’. Does that count?) Abortion opponents have caused offence by insisting that women seeking abortion must first be ‘informed’ about foetal development and abortion alternatives. Yet anyone who is truly concerned about the intrinsic value implications must also insist on an informing imperative. To be sure, the phrase ‘informed consent’ is somewhat misleading in this special context. Generally speaking a doctor does not need to get informed consent before treating a patient. A patient might reasonably refuse to be informed about a procedure, being too timid or too busy. He could give a generalised consent to treatment within a certain range. But clearly, if we have to take something into account in deciding what to do, we need to be appropriately informed. Here, the pregnant woman will need to know the valueconsequences of what she proposes to do. And the counsellor’s job cannot just be client-centred. She has not only to help but to warn. This has nothing to do with ‘a lack of respect for women’s moral decision-making’ (a curious phrase sometimes to be heard in this connection). After all, the counsellor will in all probability be a woman too. And who is there, woman or man, who can claim a blanket respect for the decisions they make? Don’t we insist that people be held accountable? Feminists apparently insist that the ‘complex decision’ is the one that the woman concerned is ‘best placed to make,’ at least according to Professor Dworkin, and he seems to think they judge aright. They have added, he says ‘a very important dimension to the abortion debate’ (LD, p. 57).94 However the idea that the pregnant woman is best placed ought to seem very questionable to anyone able to take seriously the theory of intrinsic value and who was not already in love with this comfortable conclusion.95 Why would a person contemplating abortion, who would often have a strong interest in a particular outcome, be in the best position to judge in 94 These feminists, he says, are quite like the rest of us in being very ‘responsible’ about abortion. Thankfully, their thinking is not ‘cramped’ by the ‘one dimensional’ idea that abortion is murder (LD, p. 57). May the Lord save us from cramps and the single dimension! They believe instead that what so many women set about having killed at their friendly local clinic is ‘a creature of moral consequence’ (LD, p. 57). It is not always a sign of virtue to claim to find a decision ‘complex’. No doubt such talk is defensive. It will be thought to reflect seriousness of purpose. In all probability however it will simply reflect an unwillingness to face a hard demand. 95 In cases of surrogacy where one woman is having a baby for another there will be two women involved. Have we any idea who is in the best position to judge here?
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this matter? Would she not, rather, be in a poor position? Surely the sensitive judgement-apparatus would need shielding from the wind of partiality. We might just as well say: ‘If you want to know whether a new railway line is needed go by the opinion of the householders whose view would be adversely affected.’ Or: ‘If you want to know whether Smith should be prosecuted just ask his rivals in business.’ Professor Dworkin’s own value theory threatens here to come up with a result that he would not like. What we have said so far might sound rather intimidating. But perhaps the story about intrinsic value and our responsibilities in regard to it just has this consequence. ‘Abortion is always a grave moral decision’ says Dworkin. And that seems correct. After all, something inviolable is up for violation. Yet there might be a way out, a way in which the abortion counsellor’s task might prove less stressful. To be sure, the initial estimates of intrinsic value might be weighty. But the counsellor, one can only assume, simply has to calculate the net loss of value, the destroying being compared with the saving. There must be occasions when the killing is almost, but not quite, excused. In such a case it would surely amount to little more than a peccadillo, like forgetting to pay a very small bill to a very large (and possibly disagreeable) company. Such a finding might be quite significant when it comes to post-abortion counselling where the client is thinking anxiously about what she has done. The philosopher Ruth Anna Putnam wrote in 1989, looking back on Roe v. Wade: ‘I am one of those who demonstrated in favour of legalising abortion in those days. I still believe that abortion must remain legal. But I also believe that many, perhaps a majority, of those fifteen million abortions [in the US since Roe] are morally indefensible’.96 She writes as if all those who agree with her could be expected to be ‘horrified’ at this outcome. However, if morally indefensible abortions turned out in nearly every case to be small faults, to be explained by saying that the balance of intrinsic value had only just tilted the wrong way, perhaps we could all relax and think about something of more importance. This attractive suggestion immediately runs into an elementary problem. How is the counsellor to discover and set out the rough comparative values so that proper decision can be made? How would she recognise a peccadillo for the purposes of post abortion reassurance? How indeed would those who train counsellors train them in these skills? In the previous chapter we saw how ill equipped we were to answer even the most basic value questions – whether these three babies are worth more or worth less than those 23 paintings, etc. – even when rough assessments only were called for. In view of what we have already considered, the prospects for helpful counselling do not look good. Would the counsellor learn to judge well by long 96 Ruth Anna Putnam, ‘Being Ambivalent about Abortion’, Tikkun, 1989, p. 81, italics added.
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experience in her job? If so, the person most likely to know the answers might well be a full time hardworking abortionist who will have faced these decisions very many times. In a rational world, experienced abortionists would be expected to have developed a good nose in this matter, and would be offered spare time employment as counsellors. Don’t people say that it is a requirement of employment justice that the most suitable be appointed? But this appeal to the benefits of experience meets with an instant hiccup. How could anyone benefit from experience if there were never any way of knowing whether he had in the past hit or missed the target? The abortion counsellor will perhaps attempt to learn from some specific cases which come up in Life’s Dominion. Let us take up two abortion-reasons which are held to be light if not totally weightless, and one such reason which is held to be sufficient. There is for example the case of the longawaited trip to Europe.97 ‘It would be wrong for a woman to abort her pregnancy because she would otherwise have to forfeit a long-awaited European trip, or because she would find it more comfortable to be pregnant at a different time of year’ (LD, p. 33). This is indeed the sort of stand which has earned Professor Dworkin the title ‘partisan for life’. But how, on the value story, could the abortion counsellor confirm this opinion, even in the crudest way? Would it be all right for a woman to have an abortion if she proposed to combine a trip to Europe with a little work – an academic conference let us say? Or if she wanted to write a travel book? Or to visit art galleries? Or to sample great wines? Is there not cosmic value in developing a fastidious palate? And if these further reasons are thought frivolous, could several frivolous reasons add up to a serious one? One wonders whether Dworkin is really making use of his theory in coming to his conclusions, or whether as a partisan for life he is allowing his enthusiasm to run away with him. Professor Dworkin’s second example of a reason without merit is of more interest. He thinks it would be unacceptably trivial, considering the value of the infant in question, for a woman to have an abortion just because she would prefer a baby of the other sex. Amniocentesis is of course used overwhelmingly for this reason in India. So this is a matter of practical importance. The abortion counsellor might be asked questions about it and she will not want to be caught out. How can Professor Dworkin tell that sexselection is not a serious ground? she might ask. People will assume that the reason for sex-selection must count as ‘sexist’ or offensively anti-woman. But might not a feminist justly consider herself entitled to kill off her unborn sons, or perhaps just one or two of them, as a gesture of reverse 97 The idea that women might shockingly have an abortion in order not to miss a trip to Europe must be something of a stock example. We fi nd it for instance in a paper by James Foster Scott read before the Washington Obstetrical and Gynecological Society in 1895. (‘Criminal Abortion’, American Journal of Obstetrics, Vol. XXXIII, 1896, p. 82).
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discrimination? And why indeed need the reason be so high-minded? If a woman, who has several boys already, longs to have a baby girl, and proposes to abort the current boy in the hope of a girl next time, how is Professor Dworkin or anyone else to show that her reason is frivolous? Mrs Cheryl Berriman . . . described herself as ‘desperate for a little girl’. Already the mother of five boys, her desire is so great that she is willing to risk £1,500 (the average cost of treatment at the London Gender Clinic) even though her husband is unemployed.98 Confronted by someone seeking an abortion for this purpose, Professor Dworkin might insist: ‘But can’t you see? The life of that infant in the womb is inviolable!’ His questioner, troubled in mind though she might be, would surely manage a smile, especially when she reflects what ‘inviolable’ amounts to in Dworkin’s book. Of course, abortion on the grounds of ‘the wrong sex’ might be regarded as a discriminatory wrong in certain cases. Foetuses, or since we are dealing with a question of discrimination where we are to be sensitive about nomenclature, foetal persons, would have a right not to be assaulted and killed on the grounds of sex. But Professor Dworkin is debarred from taking this line, as he believes that the foetal persons who get aborted, in India let us say, have no rights at all – can have no rights – save not to be wantonly hurt. Persons they may be – for who knows nowadays what people might have in mind by this description? – but they are not, he insists, persons-withrights (LD, pp. 22–3). (This ‘no rights’ thesis is of course a matter we will shortly be taking up.) 99 One reason which Professor Dworkin appears to regard as sufficient to justify killing is the pain a woman might feel in having her child adopted, as we saw (p. 38). I fully realise that any male, safe in the knowledge that he does not run the risk of becoming pregnant, who claims to lack sympathy for any pregnant woman in distress whatever her reason might be, is not going to be well received. And this even if, as in the present case, the happiness of other women is involved. women are often very concerned indeed to adopt, and adoption might well lead to joy and fulfi lment for many years – an obvious point which Professor Dworkin unaccountably fails to notice. There is said to be a ‘shortage’ of babies.100 Perhaps this is
98 Rosalind Coward, writing in Observer, 4 July 1993. 99 Professor Dworkin seems to have retreated somewhat from his objection to sex selection since Life’s Dominion. See ‘Tyranny at the Two Edges of Life’, New Perspectives Quarterly, where he talks of an exception for people ‘who already have three children of one sex and want one of the other’. 100 A report in England, for example, claimed that there were ten couples seeking to adopt for each available baby. BBC News at One, 14 July, 1993. Dorothy Wertz says (writing about the US): ‘There are waiting lists of parents who would adopt
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largely due to the prevalence of abortion. So we must ask ourselves, whatever our sex, whether we should have a tender regard to the plea of a pregnant woman who claims that she will feel miserable ‘for years’ if she does not go ahead and kill her inviolable offspring. Misery does not always earn solicitude.101 At this point, the hard-pressed counsellor will remember that the whole issue is supposed to turn upon the weighing of intrinsic value lost and gained. If a counsellor sets about weighing up the misery of having to give up a baby for adoption against the thought that the baby, if unterminated, will bring joy to another woman, won’t the story about intrinsic value have dropped out of the picture? We would be back among the Benthamites, calculating the pleasures and the pains. Now many women will be anxious to adopt. Would the counsellor, ever mindful of equal opportunity, have to track them all down and estimate in each case, not the likely joys and fulfilments of parenthood (utilitarian computation being set aside) but rather the probable net increase in intrinsic value of each woman (or indeed man) when endowed with the baby in question? With this absurdity added to the job description there would surely be no counsellors left. The whole matter would have to be turned over to the local ethics committee. Any abortion counsellor still so improbably in post, will next have to turn her attention to the uncomfortable issue of ‘harvesting’ or ‘recycling’, not of course a recycling of the intact living baby – we have just discussed that – but of its body parts. Every human being who is now a claimant was once a humble resource. That at least is our new, ethical, perspective on development. A foetus is not only said to have intrinsic value; it will be thought to have a use value, to be a bag of bits. That might appear a little
children with Down Syndrome and other more serious conditions.’ ‘The Need for Fictive Lines,’ Society, July/August, 2001, p. 28. 101 The painfulness of having a baby adopted might be related to some extent to current adopting practices, which we should not regard as unalterable. We might also note the following. Having a baby adopted is not of course succumbing to a disability. But a research fi nding about disability might yet be relevant. There is some reason to suppose that patients are apt to be unduly pessimistic in their estimate of how they will cope with disabilities, illnesses, etc. See Julian Savulescu’s ‘Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life-Sustaining Treatment’, Bioethics, 1994, Part II, pp. 202–8. Note too the results of a study of 43 cases of surrogate motherhood reported at the annual conference of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology in Vienna, 2002. The researcher, Fiona MacCallum said: ‘It is often assumed that surrogate mothers will have difficulties handing the child over following the birth. In fact, we found only one instance of the surrogate having slight doubts at this time, with all other mothers reporting no problems’. We should note that in just over threefifths of the cases, the surrogate mother was also the genetic mother, conception being effected through artificial insemination. BBC News, 1 July, 2002.
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crude. But there are ways of using a foetus which will be thought ‘respectful’ – for the preservation or enhancement of intrinsic value attached to other items, including (it might turn out) other foetuses. Would it therefore be permissible – even obligatory – to keep an inviolable foetus on the go until its useful organs were mature enough to be harvested? That sounds like a very serious reason indeed. However it is oddly said that that a woman should not be influenced in her decision whether to kill her foetus by thoughts about the usefulness of its body parts. This rather goes against our suggestion that the pregnant woman needs to make an informed choice. The Polkinghorne Committee, set up in the UK in order to consider the ethical implications of this sort of thing, said very confidently: The prior decision to carry out an abortion should be reached without consideration of the benefits of subsequent use. The generation or termination of pregnancy to produce material for research or therapy is unethical.102 One must not, the Committee said, treat the foetus ‘as a “thing” ’. We might find this niceness puzzling. Dworkin of course has said very firmly that ‘the life of a single human organism commands respect and protection’ (LD, p. 84). Kantians, seeing the word ‘respect’, will of course say that a foetus is not to be used as a mere means. But what would this amount to? Possibly one would treat the ‘donor’ foetus with sufficient respect if one killed it in a solemn manner for what one deemed a serious reason. This would seem to accord with Professor Dworkin’s own interpretation of the somewhat arcane Principle of Mere Means. The principle tells us, he suggests (LD, p. 236), ‘that people [ought] never be treated in a way that denies the distinct importance of their lives’. That is the kind of remark which appears to be closing doors but is in fact opening them. If it can be all right for the pregnant woman to kill a foetus in her own interests – and this is not thought of as ‘treating it as a thing’ – why would it not be permissible for her to kill one in the interests of others? Surely no one is going to appeal to the idea that this would be to use her disposable offspring as a mere means, and cry ‘unethical!’ Professor Dworkin himself writes ‘Women may one day be encouraged to become pregnant just to produce lifesaving tissue through an abortion at the right moment’ (LD, p. 240), and adds – very understandably in the
102 Review of the Guidance on the Research Use of Foetuses and Foetal Material, London: HMSO, 1989, sec 4.1. (I believe that regulations in the US follow the Polkinghorne rule, and prevent the pregnant woman from being reminded of the possibility of altruistic abortion of this kind.)
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light of what has gone before – that we do not yet know whether such a policy is compatible with this ‘inviolability’ on which he lays such stress. ‘It would,’ he says, ‘be absurd to speculate.’ (p. 241). And why would the tissue have to be life-saving? It is hoped that foetal girls will soon have the opportunity to ‘donate’ their ovaries posthumously, becoming the youngest mothers ever. Every year, it would seem, we find new uses for bits of babies. Rich possibilities lie ahead. Perhaps by now the giving – or should we say the taking? – has already begun. And why should the drug companies not make use of purpose-bred foetal individuals for testing purposes? This might well conserve intrinsic value. People would initially be horrified at such a suggestion, but perhaps only because drug companies are unpopular. No doubt these companies would describe in considerable detail the truly horrible conditions which some people have to endure in the absence of foetal-tested drugs and treatments, conditions which those who protest about foetal use must be held, in considerable part, ‘responsible for’ – especially when they continue to protest when these material facts are pointed out to them. There would of course be coloured pictures. Companies particularly eager to appear ethical would be sure to point out how foetal testing saves having to experiment on mice (they would of course include pictures of mice). Such experiments would raise all those anxieties about unfair discrimination on the basis of species. Abortion counsellors should indeed take the possibility of foetus farming very seriously, for it is put forward as patently innocent in Professor Singer’s Practical Ethics, read by one cohort of students after another and often taken as a guide. ‘I see nothing inherently wrong with . . . pregnancies being undertaken in order to provide foetal tissue’, he says.103 To be sure he ‘dislikes’ the thought of such a practice being put on a commercial basis, but other people might quite like the idea, arguing perhaps that it is more efficient to manage things in this way, and that efficiency saves lives. One could easily imagine such farming being introduced in a progressive country like Holland, if not immediately, within the next decade when people have had time to get used to the idea, ‘are ready for it’ in the indispensable phrase used on these occasions. It would perhaps be called ‘illegal’ for a few years, and those who went in for it would have to make a show of following official guidelines (or at least some of them) if they were not to be prosecuted. And why would the individuals to be recycled have to be unborn? As John Harris very reasonably says in his popular textbook, the event of birth ‘is an arbi103 See the new section ‘Making use of the foetus’ in Practical Ethics, 2nd edition, p. 168. Professor Singer adds a proviso: ‘so long as the women involved are freely choosing to do this.’ Might not this condition be relaxed somewhat if the advantages for other sentient beings – impartially considered of course – are sufficiently great?
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trary point of no moral significance’.104 Already, in Honduras, ‘the practice is for baby-farmers to adopt retarded children and use their organs as human “spare parts” ’.105 One can almost hear a baby-farmer, Life’s Dominion under his arm, insisting that one of these children, considered as a set of magnificent working organs, was of much greater intrinsic value than the retarded and defective whole. And why would the children have to be retarded? Jeff McMahan has carefully explained, and at considerable length, how it might be permissible, or even obligatory, to kill and recycle quite normal newborns – in order to save lives.106 Now I am far from suggesting that Professor Dworkin does not appreciate some of the difficulties we have described in these last pages. In a dark but solemn passage he says about the decisions we face: We discover what we think about these grave matters not in advance of having to decide on particular occasions, but in the course of and by making them. (LD, p. 100). This remark107 is nicely calculated to relieve us of the burden of enquiry. The idea that we cannot think such things out in advance is, I suspect, the making of a virtue out of a necessity, given the terms in which the matter is to be resolved. Knowing what we know about the value story, it is only
104 John Harris, The Value of Life, London: Routledge, 1985, p. 128. 105 I am assuming one may believe the Observer. See ‘Takeaway Babies Farmed to Order’, 26 September, 1993. 106 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 359–60. And why would the one killed and recycled have to be a child? Killing to save is becoming more acceptable to ethics experts by the hour (for some references see below, p. 173). In this way they have more or less caught up with what people have said for years about the mass bombing of civilians in WW2. 107 It is a remark curiously reminiscent of the Oxford ‘intuitionist’ H. A. Prichard. Professor Prichard ended his famous 1912 lecture ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ by saying: ‘If we . . . doubt whether there really is an obligation to originate A in a situation B, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking, but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation B, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate A in that situation’. Moral Obligation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 17. It is interesting to see this mystical methodology appealed to, no doubt independently, in the abortion community. Ava Torre-Bueno, who has worked as a Director of Counselling for Planned Parenthood, tells us: ‘I have never been pregnant nor had an abortion. I have a few more years of fertility left, and if I were accidentally to become pregnant, I do not know if I would have the child or an abortion. Like every woman, I can only make that decision when, and if, the time comes.’ (Peace after Abortion, San Diego, CA. 2nd edn, 1997, p. 5. my italics.) To be sure, one can only take a fork in the road when one reaches the fork in the road. That does not stop one looking at the map before setting out.
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to be expected that there will be no general guide in it. And there is a further virtue. If one can no more make the same decision twice as step twice into the same river, and if one is not in a position to judge except while actually making the decision, this rather disarms in advance the embarrassing possibility that one’s decisions can reasonably be subject to criticism, even criticism at the hands of one’s later self. (It also keeps at arm’s length the nagging thought that there are some kinds of action which one ought not to be contemplating at all, and that this might be one of them.) I said ‘even criticism by one’s later self’. But in fact, such plausibility as the doctrine might possibly boast will hardly extend to retrospective judgement. Surely we can ask shortly after the decision whether we weighed the intrinsic values correctly? I cannot think that Professor Dworkin would want to say that such retrospective weighing is quite impossible. And in any case, he would surely want to say that some abortions could be ruled out ahead of time, and even without the help of an expert in intrinsic valuation. One only has to consider the famous case of the European holiday we have just discussed. Why might someone be tempted to say that one can only weigh intrinsic values when decision-time is imminent? Well, the actual prospect of destroying one’s own offspring might concentrate the mind. To that extent we must allow for a pinch of truth in the idea that we learn what we think ‘in the course of making decisions’. Dr John Collee was for a while a lively medical correspondent for the Observer. When his ‘partner’ became pregnant, they were very mature about it all. They both sat down with pen and paper, as advised by the abortion counsellor, to write a couple of sides deciding for life or for death: ‘It was, on reflection, the most important thing either of us had written in our lives’, he said. ‘Predictably, the anti-parenthood lists dealt with things like losing mobility and losing independence. The pro-parenthood lists were more vague. Somewhere I just wrote Abortion Seems Wrong, meaning wrong in the moral sense of the word, which is strange because that’s something I never previously believed. My view has always been that abortion is liberating and therefore a good thing; although, strangely, when it is your own foetus the sense that it involves killing becomes very strong’ (Observer, 2 January, 1994). Rush Rhees writing about euthanasia said ‘I do not think that anyone is qualified to speak about it unless he has had to make this decision, as doctors commonly do’ (Moral Questions, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 109). This is a milder thesis than the one offered by Prichard. One confrontation at the bedside would presumably suffice for the future. But the claim is still unreasonable, though it sounds well.
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But someone might argue that Dr Collee’s judgement had been warped by sentimentality, and that what he had previously believed in a calm hour represented a more balanced opinion. Who could tell? We have seen in this chapter that the practical application of this idea of sacred value lands us with many unsolved mysteries. Now this very fact itself has a practical importance. Suppose that we do, after all, have some unconfused notion of the intrinsically valuable but that we are singularly bad at detecting it, as our argument might suggest. Would we not end up with what Professor Dworkin would regard as an unacceptable conclusion? For it might be held irresponsible and wicked to destroy what might turn out, who knows, to have immense intrinsic value. The counsellor would surely have to err on the side of caution. This is a point hard to miss. Think of the way environmentalists are perpetually urging caution upon us. (We will usefully remind ourselves that they too are often concerned to preserve what they suppose to be items of intrinsic value.) This would seem to lead to a strongly ‘conservative’ position. As we know, many thoughtful people judge that a human being is infinitely valuable. This, one might almost say, is the usual view among those who talk about the value of life. Now if there is even a small chance that they are right, one could hardly risk putting the knife in. Without going quite as far as infinity, Dworkin seems to have intimations that human individuals possess immense value. He says in regard to abortion ‘if it is a horrible desecration to destroy a painting . . . even though a painting is not a person, why should it not be a much greater desecration to destroy something whose intrinsic value may be vastly greater?’ (LD, p. 73). Thus in having an abortion one would risk something vastly worse than what is already admitted to be a horrible desecration. How could one bring oneself to be involved in what might be more horrible than horrible?108 It is important not to exaggerate here for mere effect. The abortion would not be more serious than ‘the destruction of all human art and knowledge’ – in Professor Dworkin’s view at least (LD, p. 81). He does not explain why, but we can easily supply the deficiency. Such a destruction would lead to the immediate extinction of everyone, for without any knowledge no one would know how to feed himself, etc. And that would presumably represent an enormous loss of value. But the destruction of a 108 Appealing to infi nity might prove treacherous. Suppose every foetus, or every toddler, etc. had infinite value, a claim one does hear from time to time. The idea that human beings are of infi nite value, far from being restrictive as is always hoped by those who introduce it, would appear to me to be most unrestrictive. There are an enormous number of human beings, and we may assume that we are not able or willing to kill them all. Short of that, the doctrine of infinite value would liberate us. Kill any one, kill any hundred – how could it matter? There would still be infi nite value left. There would be residual infi nite value right up to the very last man.
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foetus might be pretty serious none the less. It might well be much more serious than the destruction of all the works of Rembrandt, as the word vastly (‘. . . whose intrinsic value might be vastly greater’) rather suggests. That would seem reason enough to close down the clinics. Remember that 1.3 million such risks are taken every year in the USA alone. There are about 170,000 annual risks in the UK. And each year a million secondtrimester risks in India.109 Of course there is said to be countervailing value at stake. A setback to the pregnant woman’s career prospects say. But who has ever been moved to suppose that a such a setback would represent a sacrifice of infinite intrinsic value? Who has ever felt the need to say that, though pretty bad, it would not be worse than the destruction of all human art and knowledge?
2.10 Might human beings turn out to have no intrinsic value? The last chapter ended on rather an alarming note. Huge values, like huge voltages, are enough to make anyone cautious. In this chapter we take a step away from the practical concerns of the abortion counsellor and turn to a more general issue. No doubt it was always a bit ludicrous of us to expect applied ethics actually to be applied. Let us return to something a little more removed from daily life. We need to raise some radical possibilities. In doing so, we might eventually find reason not to be alarmed after all. Professor Dworkin, as we know, writes as if various species of animals or plants have intrinsic value, intrinsic value of the kind which entails sacredness. This is a possibility he takes very seriously. He seems to have doubts about insect species, as well he might (LD, p. 80). Perhaps he suffers here from a touch of ‘species-favouritism’, but let us not delay over such frivolities. This idea that at least some animal species are sacred raises an interesting issue. Most people in history until quite recent times seem to have cared very little for the preservation of species of any kind. And insofar as anyone cared it can hardly have been on the ground of sacredness. No matter how learned they have been, our forbears seem to have been totally unaware that species might have this remarkable property. Now in one way we should not be surprised that people could be so ignorant, for, as we have seen, Professor Dworkin insists that intrinsic value is an ‘objective’ quality – which is surely meant to indicate that items could have this quality even if no one were aware of the fact. And the value of something is not going to be hard to miss, like a bright colour in broad daylight. Our novel enlightenment about species brings rather forcefully before us how deeply we can 109 Figures from BBC documentary, ‘Let Her Die’, 28 September 1993.
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be mistaken more generally as to the bearers of this objective quality. If our ancestors were so ignorant, what about us today? After all, we who judge are but an infinitesimal part of the cosmos. It cannot be easy for us to judge from the cosmic point of view. What other surprises might be in store for us? Mankind has only been sensitive to these questions in the last hundred years or so, since the time of G. E. Moore, or perhaps a little earlier, the time of Brentano, say. The adventure is just beginning. What else might turn out to have intrinsic value? Might we discover to our astonishment that pebbles on the beach possessed this property, and in a peculiarly concentrated form? On the other hand, what might turn out to lack this value? In this chapter I want to consider two ‘negative’ possibilities. First, that we cannot know how much of this value human beings possess, which in turn suggests that the answer could be none. Second and more radically, that we can know that human beings entirely lack it. Nietzsche wrote: One would have to be situated outside life, and on the other hand to know it as thoroughly as any, as many, as all who have experienced it, to be permitted to touch on the value of life at all; sufficient reason for understanding that this problem is for us an inaccessible problem.110 It would appear too that Christians of rather different outlook have agreed with Nietzsche’s opinions here, if nowhere else. Thus the authors of a Catholic working party report ‘Euthanasia and Clinical Practice’ say that the value ‘in itself’ of a human being’s existence ‘cannot in this life be known to anyone’.111 And the revered Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer held just such a view. In regard to saving-the-mother-or-savingthe-baby cases, he seems initially to concede that the comparative value of the parties might be a relevant consideration. But he argues, hardly surprisingly, that we are not going to be able to judge the issue. ‘The question whether the life of the mother or the life of the child is of greater value can hardly be a matter for human decision’, he says.112 Albert Schweitzer felt obliged to be even more sceptical about these matters: he thought we were ill placed to compare the value of living things quite generally: 110 Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Section 5, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1990, p. 55. See also p. 59: ‘The Problem of Socrates’, Section 1: ‘the value of life cannot be estimated’ – even to raise the matter at all shows apparently that one lacks wisdom. 111 Reprinted in Luke Gormally, ed., Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law, London: Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics, 1994, p. 43, fn, see also p. 95. Report first published 1982. 112 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. E. Bethge, London: SCM Press, 1971, p. 176 fn.
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To undertake to lay down distinctions of value between different kinds of life will end in judging them by the greater or lesser distance at which they stand from us human beings – as we ourselves judge. But who among us knows what significance any other kind of life has in itself, and as part of the universe?113 Someone who kills germs, let us say, ‘is conscious of acting arbitrarily’ and ‘knows that he bears responsibility for the life which is sacrificed’.114 Naturally, this ethic ‘marks off no skilfully defi ned circle of duties’.115 This is, no doubt, part of its attraction. There is a remarkable consensus here on the side of doubt. But might we not be a little bolder, and conjecture that human beings have little if any of this value? After all, Professor Dworkin and his friends might have all made a ghastly mistake, moved as we all are (as it is said) by a pride in our own species.116 The major advances in our knowledge of the world have been made in the teeth of human pride. There has been a continual need to downgrade man from his presumptuous belief in his own importance. (That at any rate would seem the received view of intellectual history.) It is perhaps time for the next great Copernican step. Down with people and up with pebbles! It is already evident that we need to take pebbles far more seriously than heretofore. After all, they are more durable than human beings, and they could be said to have a greater unity. Many of them are spherical, and this might reasonably be supposed the perfect shape – at least from a cosmic perspective. Moreover, pebbles are one and all incapable of moral fault, in this respect being made in the image of God. And we might need to take account of the way they have come to be – the investment put into them by countless ocean waves. So there is much to be said for the value of pebbles. There is however another, more radical, possibility: namely that neither people nor pebbles have intrinsic value. This, as it happens, was the view
113 Albert Schweitzer, My Life and Thought: An Autobiography, trans. C. T. Campion, London: Allen and Unwin, 1933, p. 271. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid, p. 273. 116 I am taking it for granted, as being rather in the spirit of his book, that Professor Dworkin himself believes that human individuals, including unborn children, have this value, this inviolability as he calls it. But perhaps this is not to be taken as read. Eric Rakowski, who acknowledged Professor Dworkin in 1991 as ‘a friend, mentor, and gentle critic for the past eight years’ (Equal Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. vii) and who is therefore in a better position to judge than I, suggests otherwise. In his view, Professor Dworkin estimates that ‘prenatal foetal life’ entirely lacks this value (or has at best very little of it) but that for some reason he is not letting on (‘Ronald Dworkin, Reverence for Life, and the Limits of State Power’, Utilitas, 2001, p. 60). (Dworkin does not reply to this bit in his ‘replies’ in Burley, Dworkin and His Critics.) But see above, p. 67.
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of the immensely painstaking G. E. Moore, and since he was more or less the founding father of this way of thought, the original sponsor of the concept among analytic philosophers, we must surely give weight to what he said. To him it was quite clear that human beings could not have any intrinsic value. Nor ‘material things’ either – so there could be no intrinsic value in paintings or Siberian tigers. Nor in pebbles. ‘One thing, I think, is clear about intrinsic value,’ he said, ‘. . . that it is only actual occurrences . . . not such things as men, or characters, or material things, that can have any intrinsic value at all.’117 Let us leave aside pebbles, paintings and tigers, and stick with the question as it arises in connection with human beings. Let us imagine we met someone who said, with confidence, that an individual human creature had no intrinsic value whatever. How would Dworkin demonstrate to such a person that he was making a big mistake? Or if ‘demonstrate’ suggests too high a hurdle, what considerations might be offered to put matters straight? If something had been overlooked, a short reminder would surely correct the deficiency. As we noted in the last chapter, many people like to say, remarkably, that everyone is of infinite value. This enormous value should be something one could hardly miss. But perhaps it has simply been asserted, or breathed, into existence. People have no doubt convinced themselves that they do not have to respond to down to earth questioning in this area. They have picked up the idea that they can more or less say what they like as far as the more arcane kinds of value are concerned – so why not go for the big one? It might be thought that there could hardly be anyone so blind to in-itself people-worth, at least among those who have thought about these matters. But there are. We have just noted the confident opinion of G. E. Moore. And he was not alone. Moore’s distinguished contemporary at Cambridge, McTaggart, seems to have been equally confident: ‘It is generally agreed that only the spiritual can have value.’118 And it is ‘intrinsic’ value that he says he has in mind.119 I doubt whether Professor Dworkin thinks that human beings, including foetuses, are ‘spiritual’ entities. Modern writers too can think that human beings lack this value. Jonathan Glover, for example, considered to be a distinguished philosopher of life and death, says quite plainly: ‘there is nothing intrinsically good
117 G. E. Moore, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’, Philosophical Studies, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1922, p. 327. Of course, we might be unclear when to say that two philosophers were making different estimates about the intrinsic value of this or that, or whether they meant something different by ‘intrinsic value’ in the first place, or whether they had differing unintelligible accounts to offer. 118 J. McT. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927, section 788. 119 Ibid., section 786.
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in a person merely being alive’.120 That suggests that a person h