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Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has generated many interpretations since its publication in 1921, but over the years a consensus has developed concerning its criticisms of Russell’s philosophy. In Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell, Gregory Landini draws extensively from his work on Russell’s unpublished manuscripts to show that the consensus characterizes Russell with positions he did not hold. Using a careful analysis of Wittgenstein’s writings he traces the Doctrine of Showing and the ‘‘fundamental idea’’ of the Tractatus to Russell’s logical atomist research program which dissolves philosophical problems by employing variables with structure. He argues that Russell and Wittgenstein were allies in a research program that makes logical analysis and reconstruction the essence of philosophy. His sharp and controversial study will be essential reading for all who are interested in this rich period of the history of analytic philosophy. GREGORY LANDINI
is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa.
Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in conversation in 1922. From the archives of Dora Russell at McMaster University Library. Reproduced by permission of McMaster University Library.
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell Gregory Landini University of Iowa
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521870238 © Gregory Landini 2007 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2007 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-511-29510-2 ISBN-10 0-511-29510-3 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 ISBN-10
hardback 978-0-521-87023-8 hardback 0-521-87023-2
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Frann to whom I am a grateful apprentice
Contents
Preface 1
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein Two dogmas of Russellian interpretation Logical fictions of Russell
2
Logical atomism Logical atomism as a research program The logical independence of the facts that are truth-makers Acquaintance with logical objects Russell’s paralysis Retreat from Pythagoras
3
My fundamental idea Showing as radical Russellianism Ideal versus ordinary language Sub specie aeternitatis Russell’s rejection of Showing Kicking away the ladder
4
Logic as if tautologous Logic as if decidable Scaffolding Wittgenstein’s N-operator Quantification and the N-operator
5
Tractarian logicism Ramified types as scaffolding in Russell and Wittgenstein Equations versus tautologies Numbers as exponents of operations
6
Principia’s second edition Extensionality and neutral monism The oracle on Reducibility Slipshod notations? Ramsey’s extensional functions
page ix 1 5 11 24 25 40 53 65 72 77 79 90 94 100 103 107 112 118 125 134 147 150 158 170 189 192 201 208 214
vii
viii
Contents
7
Logic as the essence of philosophy Ontology as meaningless Ontology as structured variables Carnap versus Quine on ontology Return to Pythagoras
Appendix A: Exclusive quantifiers Appendix B: Modality in the Tractatus Bibliography Index
227 230 237 241 245 253 266 285 297
Preface
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has generated many interpretations since its publication in 1921. Time has produced something of a consensus, however, concerning the nature of the Tractarian criticisms of Russell’s early philosophy. Challenging this consensus is the subject of the present book. Russell’s unpublished manuscripts have brought about a revolution in the understanding of his philosophy. The manuscripts reveal that the consensus about the Tractarian criticisms characterizes Russell with positions he did not hold. Rereading Russell requires rereading Wittgenstein. Russell’s logical atomism is not an empiricism couched in a logic of ramified and type-stratified entities (propositional functions) and based on a principle of acquaintance with sense-data. Logical atomism is a research program for dissolving philosophical conundrums by employing variables with structure – an ontologically austere structural realism. Wittgenstein transformed Russell’s method of structured variables into his Doctrine of Showing. The book identifies the Tractarian Grundgedanke (‘‘fundamental idea’’) with Showing and argues that Russell and his apprentice Wittgenstein were allies in a research program that makes logical analysis and reconstruction the essence of philosophy. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote, ‘‘The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it’’ (TLP 6.5). Of course, paradoxes are all too easy to fall into. When my son Ansel was young, our bedtime ritual was for me to ask him ten questions. After a short time of repeating the questions every other night, he had memorized the answers. Finally, he demanded, ‘‘I want new hard questions.’’ I thought I’d be clever and give him a riddle. I fondly recalled walking with the logician Raymond Smullyan when I was a teaching assistant in graduate school. On one occasion we were off to his logic class and he turned to me and said, ‘‘Is the answer to this question, no?’’ I wanted something similar. I said to Ansel, ‘‘OK, here you go with the new hard questions: What is the first question?’’ Not surprisingly, he complained, saying that it doesn’t count as a question. I replied that it does count and is in fact easy to answer. The answer is, ‘‘What is the first question?’’ It seems that Ansel got ix
x
Preface
the better of me in this exchange. He replied, ‘‘Well, if it is easy, then it is not among the new hard questions.’’ Now we have a puzzle. It would seem that my performative act of utterance assured that whatever question I asked is the first of the new questions if and only if it is hard. But is the question hard to answer? If it is hard, then it is the first question and so it is easy. If it is easy, then it is not the first question and that makes it a hard question to answer. What, after all, would then be the first question? Philosophical problems are, to my mind, puzzles whose solutions are very difficult because they require in some cases an almost complete understanding of logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Wittgenstein held that the task of the philosopher is to dissolve riddles (philosophical problems) by elucidating the misconceptions that are involved in their characterization. Russell clearly had a similar view. It was with just this attitude concerning the paradoxes plaguing logicism that he boldly entitled one of his papers ‘‘On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic.’’ From a historical perspective, this is perhaps the most important among Russell’s published papers for understanding the historical development of Principia Mathematica. It was originally published only in French with the title ‘‘Les paradoxes de la logique.’’ In the paper, Russell embraces a substitutional theory of propositional structure. He separates logical from semantic paradoxes, and shows how the structure of a type-theory of attributes (propositional functions) adequate to mathematics is to be emulated in a formal reconstruction of the first principles of logic that is type-free and makes no assumption that every formula comprehends a class (or an attribute). Based on Russell’s unpublished manuscripts on this theory, my book Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory set forth an entirely new account of the historical origins and nature of Principia. Russell’s substitutional theory, hidden among the voluminous collection of his manuscripts and work notes until the 1970s, shatters interpretations of Russell’s philosophy that have persisted for decades. Perhaps most startling among the discoveries I made is that Principia does not embrace a ramified type-hierarchy of entities. Principia offers a type-free ontology of universals, particulars, and facts. Its ‘‘type-theory’’ is a scaffolding built into its use of structured variables – a scaffolding which emulates the fundamental laws of a type- and order-regimented theory of attributes and thereby emulates a type-theory of classes and relations-in-extension. Principia does not embrace a hierarchy of orders of entities. It offers a recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ which assumes that the facts that are truth-makers, and the universals (relating relations and properties) inhering in them, are logically independent of each other. It offers a ‘‘no-propositions theory’’ according to which logical connectives are not relation signs standing for entities. These discoveries, and more like them,
Preface
xi
require a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. They demand a new account of logical atomism and the relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein. Earlier accounts are constructed with foundations in clay and washed away by Russell’s manuscripts. Early drafts of chapters of this work have greatly benefited from the comments of Pasquale Frascolla, Nicholas Griffin, Francesco Orilia, Russell Wahl, and Kenneth Williford. Each has made a mark on some chapter of the book. The manuscript was improved by being read in its entirety by Tuomas Manninen, who helped in translating parts of Mu¨ller’s Abriss of Schro¨der’s Algebra of Logik. Many thanks to the Bertrand Russell Research Center, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, for permission to use scanned images.
1
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
Since its publication in 1921, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has attracted a broad variety of interpretations. The work has been viewed as a revolution in the metaphysics of logic, with Wittgenstein inventing the truth-tables and ushering in modern logic and even modal logic. It has been viewed as the holy text of the antimetaphysical doctrines of logical empiricism – a work attempting to establish a foundational observation language grounding empirical (scientific) discourse in an effort to show that all philosophical or metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions.1 Wittgenstein’s attraction to the tragic lives of Schopenhauer, Weininger, and Kierkegaard has been a resource for irrationalist interpretations as well. Rejecting both logic and metaphysics as the focus of the Tractatus, they herald its entries on solipsism, value, religion, and mysticism as central to its message. Therapeutic interpretations attempt an even more radical break than do irrationalist interpretations. The therapeutic reading denies that there is any positive philosophical theory in the work. On this reading, the Tractatus is against philosophical theory and offers a treatment for the condition of thinking that there are riddles that must be solved by a philosophical theory. Thus, we find diametric opposition among even the most prominent philosophical interpretations of the Tractatus. We find those that take its central focus to be in epistemology, ontology, logic, semantics, ethics, religion, mysticism, or all of these together. We find interpretations of the text as realist, physicalist, phenomenalist, solipsist, idealist, existentialist, irrational, and therapeutic. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that interpretations differ significantly on what figures provide the best background orientation from which to understand the book. Is it to be Russell and Frege, or logical positivists such as Carnap, Ayer, and Popper? Is it to be Kant’s transcendental idealism or Schopenhauer’s mysticism? 1
Karl Popper, ‘‘Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report,’’ in C. A. Mace, ed., British Philosophy in the Mid-century: A Cambridge Symposium (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), pp. 163–164.
1
2
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
It is difficult to avoid a pessimistic induction that reaches the conclusion that no satisfactory account of the Tractatus will be found. There seems to be no fundamental principle, no Archimedean point, which could unify the apparently diverse themes of the book. ‘‘The history of Tractatus interpretation,’’ writes Stern, ‘‘is for the most part a history of wishful thinking, each successive group of interpreters seizing on the passages they have found most interesting in order to reconstruct the doctrines they knew must be there.’’2 Stern believes that an important lesson can be exacted from this. No interpretation, he says, could be adequate to all the Tractarian doctrines because the work itself is in tension between diverse metaphysical, antimetaphysical, and antiphilosophical tendencies and motives. Russell’s philosophy had once served as an Archimedean point for viewing the Tractatus. Wittgenstein was, after all, Russell’s student. And Wittgenstein himself wrote that his book was an effort to address the problems he and Russell shared.3 But over the years interpreters have fought themselves free of interpreting Wittgenstein as a Russellian. Perhaps the breach began when Anscombe correctly pointed out that Tractarian ‘‘objects’’ cannot be identified with the sense-data Russell embraced in his Problems of Philosophy (1912), Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), and logical atomism lectures (1917). A consensus emerged among many interpreters that Russell’s logical atomism is not the proper starting point from which to understand Wittgenstein. In hope of illuminating the central questions that animated Wittgenstein, Anscombe abandoned Russell’s atomism and turned instead to Frege’s philosophy of language and arithmetic. No interpretation today finds Russell and Wittgenstein working in alliance on the same project in philosophy. The interpretations of Pears and Hacker, both very influential and important, acknowledge that the two started out that way with Russell imagining his ´ e.´ But they conclude that the Tractatus Austrian pupil to be his proteg ushers in an orientation that is in opposition to Russell’s philosophy. The marginalization of Russell is deeper in therapeutic readings of the Tractatus. For instance, Conant finds no precedent in Russell’s philosophy for the Tractarian notion that logical truths are meaningless (sinnlos). Conant does see a precedent in Frege’s philosophy. He likens the matter to Frege’s distinction between function and object. Functions, in Frege’s view, are incomplete or unsaturated (ungesa¨ttigt) while objects are complete. Since
2
3
David Stern, ‘‘The Methods of the Tractatus: Beyond Positivism and Metaphysics?’’ in Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon, and Merrilee Salmon, eds., Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2003), p. 126. Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, 1914–1944 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), p. 162.
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
3
function words represent unsaturated entities, Frege demands that they never occur in subject positions. Russell rejected Frege’s doctrine, noting that ‘‘inextricable difficulties’’ envelope the view.4 How are we to say of a function that it is unsaturated or even that it is a function without violating Frege’s doctrine? The very statement of Frege’s doctrine that functions are unsaturated violates its own proscriptions governing meaningfulness. This suggests to Conant an example of something literally meaningless and yet elucidatory.5 Diamond’s ‘‘resolute’’ reading of the Tractatus demands that its entries be regarded literally meaningless. In her work, the conceptual distance between Wittgenstein and Russell is maximized. Diamond writes: My way of talking about what is in the book is meant to reflect Wittgenstein’s ideas about his own authorship: there are lines of thought which he wanted a reader of his book to pursue for himself. In the case of the Tractatus, one can add that there are lines of thought which he wanted Russell, as reader – Russell in particular – to pursue.6
Far from an ally, Wittgenstein is now construed as antithetical to Russell’s philosophy. In Diamond’s view, parts of the Tractatus were intended as lessons of instruction for Russell. The viability of such interpretations may seem surprising given that in the preface of the Tractatus Wittgenstein disavows any ‘‘novelty in detail,’’ and mentions that he is ‘‘indebted to Frege’s great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts.’’ But in present debates over the message of the Tractatus the historical fact that the themes of the Tractatus were developed under Russell’s mentorship is regarded as little more than a platitude. The curious events surrounding Wittgenstein’s failed efforts to publish the Tractatus are often cited to buttress this attitude. Having been rejected by the publishers of Kraus, Weininger, and Frege, Wittgenstein beseeched Russell for help in bringing the work to press. Russell agreed to write an introduction, and on its basis Wittgenstein was able to negotiate with the Leipzig publishing house Reclam.7 Russell sent the introduction and quite naturally wrote that he would try to amend it if Wittgenstein found anything unsatisfactory in his remarks. Wittgenstein 4 5 6
7
Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937, 1964), p. 45. James Conant, ‘‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein,’’ in Alice Carey and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 174–217. Cora Diamond, ‘‘Does Bismark Have a Beetle in His Box? The Private Language Argument in the Tractatus,’’ in Alice Carey and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 262–292. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cambridge Letters, ed. Brian McGuinness and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 147.
4
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
responded by thanking Russell for the introduction, and included the following in his letter: There’s so much of it that I’m not in agreement with both where you are critical of me and also where you’re simply trying to elucidate my point of view. But that doesn’t matter. The future will pass judgment on us – or perhaps it won’t, and if it is silent that will be a judgment too . . . The introduction is in the course of being translated and will then go with the treatise to the publisher. I hope he will accept them!8
But when Wittgenstein sent the translated introduction to Reclam, he had a change of heart. He insisted that it was not to be published with the work but was only to help in the publisher’s own orientation with regard to the work’s significance. The note soured the deal with Reclam. Wittgenstein wrote a letter to Russell, taking responsibility and explaining that ‘‘when translated into German all the refinement of your English style was obviously lost in the translation and what remained was superficiality and misunderstanding.’’9 Wittgenstein’s rejection of Russell’s introduction suggests that the problems and motivations for the theses of the Tractatus were not shared by Russell. This bolsters the view that the Tractatus was not a work in alliance with Russell’s philosophy. Accordingly, interpreters of the work have not felt constrained by the context of Russell’s philosophical positions, goals, successes, and desiderata. Of course, all of this is set in the context of a fixed interpretation of Russell’s philosophy. But what were Russell’s philosophical positions? The answer is complicated. Russell’s philosophy evolved significantly in the years leading up to and after the publication of Principia Mathematica. Against which of Russell’s many philosophical theses was Wittgenstein allegedly rebelling? Hacker writes: Both Frege and Russell conceived of the logical connectives as names of logical entities . . . Russell construed them as naming functions from propositions to propositions. This conception was linked to their idea that propositions are names of truth-values (Frege) or complexes (Russell). But it is a dire error to think that ‘‘p v q’’ has the same logical form as ‘‘aRb.’’10
Hacker awards Wittgenstein the ‘‘achievement’’ of having ‘‘freed himself of many of Russell’s deep confusions about the role of logical expressions.’’11 But in the Principia, Russell had abandoned his early ontology of propositions and adopted the wedge (‘‘v’’) and the tilde (‘‘’’) as statement connectives 8 9 10 11
Ibid., p. 152. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, ed. G. H. von Wright with the assistance of B. F. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 86. P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 28. Ibid., p. 22.
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
5
in just the modern sense.12 Hacker should award Wittgenstein the achievement of having agreed with Principia on the logical connectives. A gap in one’s understanding of Russell’s positions on the nature of logic easily distorts one’s picture of Wittgenstein. Quite clearly, the degree of distance found between the Tractatus and Russell’s philosophy depends on what one takes Russell’s philosophy to have been. Though Wittgenstein published little in his life, he left a voluminous Nachlass of worksheets. The years since the publication of the Tractatus have produced a good many distinct interpretations of its central theses. Time has produced something of a consensus, however, concerning the Tractarian criticisms of Russell’s philosophy, and this is the subject of the present book. Russell also left voluminous worksheets, and these have shed an entirely new light on Russell. Much of the consensus as to the nature of the Tractatarian criticisms relies upon attributing to Russell positions he did not hold. In the last thirty years, there has been a significant rereading of Russell. Rereading Russell demands a rereading of Wittgenstein. Two dogmas of Russellian interpretation Two theses have dominated interpretations of Russell’s philosophy for many years. These two theses are so widely held that it is rare to find challenges to either in the vast literature on Russell. They are: (1) In Principia Mathematica, Russell advanced a ramified type-theory of entities. (2) Russell’s logical atomism is a form of reductive empiricism. Russell’s manuscripts and work-notes reveal that both are false. To borrow a colorful phrase from Kant, the manuscripts awaken us from a dogmatic slumber. Rejecting the two dogmas of Russellian interpretation has very important consequences for rereading Russell and Wittgenstein. Ray Monk’s recent biographies nicely illustrate how historical accounts of Russell and Wittgenstein are built upon the dogmas. The nature of the personal and intellectual relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein is invariably built around Russell’s letters to Ottoline Morrell. Much has been made, for instance, of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Russell’s multiplerelation theory of judgment, a theory first espoused in Principia and later worked out in Russell’s 1913 manuscript for a book on the theory of knowledge. In the wake of a storm of protest from Wittgenstein, Russell abruptly abandoned his book project some 350 pages toward its completion. One can find Russell writing Ottoline that Wittgenstein’s criticisms 12
Sadly, the change in Russell’s view is often missed. There are many examples. Recently we find it in Thomas Ricketts, ‘‘Wittgenstein Against Frege and Russell,’’ in Richard Reck, ed., From Frege to Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 228.
6
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
were an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater. I became filled with utter despair, and tried to turn to you for consolation.
Indeed, in the same letter Russell goes on to say that ‘‘Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me. So there was no really vital satisfaction of my philosophical impulse in that work, and philosophy lost its hold on me. That was due to Wittgenstein more than to the war.’’13 When Russell writes Ottoline of despair of ever doing fundamental work in philosophy, of suicidal depression over failed work – feelings which, he says, were caused by exasperating exchanges with Wittgenstein – Monk seizes upon what he takes to be evidence of Wittgenstein’s transformation from Russell’s pupil to Russell’s master. The exact nature of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory is, in fact, hard to pinpoint from the cryptic passages of the Tractatus and the remains of the exchanges between the two. On the interpretation advanced by Griffin and Sommerville – an interpretation that Monk assumes to be correct – Russell’s multiple-relation theory requires the assumption of Principia’s type-theory of entities. Wittgenstein allegedly rejected the theory of types of Principia, writing to Russell that ‘‘all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another’s places.’’14 Monk concludes that Wittgenstein was ‘‘jettisoning large parts of the logic that Russell had devised for Principia, in particular the theory of types.’’15 Wittgenstein’s idea, then, is supposed to have been that the theory of types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of symbolism. Monk offers what he takes to be a stinging blow: In the face of such a sweeping dismissal of his theory, Russell might have been expected to present a spirited defense of his position or at least some tough question as to how his logicist foundations of mathematics might avoid contradiction without a theory of types. But he had by this time abandoned logic almost entirely.16
13 14 15 16
Russell, Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 66. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 122. Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude 1872–1921 (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 286. Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 71.
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
7
Monk’s interpretation weds itself to the thesis that Russell embraced an ontology of types of entities. This is understandable, for this is part of the orthodoxy and appears in a great many works on Russell’s philosophy of mathematics. For instance, Hacker writes, ‘‘It is easy to suppose, Wittgenstein remarked in his first onslaught upon the Theory of Types . . . that ‘individual,’ ‘particular,’ ‘complex,’ etc., are primitive ideas (Urzeichen). But in so doing, we forget that these are not primitive ideas.’’17 Wittgenstein is often said to have pointed out that a type-theory of entities is not a solution but an ad hoc dodge of the paradoxes that confront logicism. He is said to have pointed out that Russell violates type-theoretical strictures in his effort to set out a theory of types of entities. Moreover, he is said to have revealed that ramified type-theory relies on contingent truths as if they could provide a foundation for logic. None of these interpretations can stand once it is discovered that Russell never embraced a theory of types of entities. This is just the discovery that faces us. The dogma that Russell advanced a ramified type-theory of entities clouds the proper understanding of Wittgenstein. Russell’s manuscripts and publications reveal that he had worked steadfastly since 1905 to formulate a theory of symbolism which made the type distinctions that block the paradoxes part of the formal grammar of a type-free calculus for logic. Russell’s work reached an apex with his ‘‘substitutional theory’’ of propositional structure. This theory attempts to solve the paradoxes plaguing logicism by showing how logic can reconstruct mathematics without the ontological assumption that every open formula comprehends an entity (attribute or ‘‘propositional function’’), and without the ontological assumption of classes. Russell’s manuscripts reveal that his work to build type and order distinctions into formal grammar evolved into the no-propositions, no-classes, and no-propositional function theory of Principia. Thus, the idea that grammar must supplant type distinctions among entities is a position Wittgenstein learned from Russell. It is not at all odd or perplexing, then, that Monk doesn’t find Russell worried about Wittgenstein’s alleged ‘‘sweeping dismissal of his [type-] theory.’’ There was no such dismissal because there was no type-theory of entities. The rejection of the first dogma requires an entirely new picture of the intellectual and philosophical relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein wrote that ‘‘all theories of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism,’’ he surely was not criticizing Russell’s ontology of types of entities. There was no theory of types of entities in Principia. The demand that types be built into grammar was a lesson Russell taught him. We shall
17
P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 22.
8
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
argue that his point was that Russell had not gone far enough in building type distinctions into formal grammar. Russell relies on a difference between a universal and a particular (another ‘‘type’’ distinction, as Wittgenstein saw it). In Wittgenstein’s view, this must also be built into logical grammar. Monk’s biographies attempt to explain issues pertaining to Russell’s life by tying them to his debates with Wittgenstein over philosophical logic. This is laudable, but it takes a serious risk. If one gets the philosophy wrong, the explanation collapses. In his efforts to demonstrate that Wittgenstein became Russell’s ‘‘master,’’ Monk relies on the dogmas of Russellian interpretation. But the dogmas are mistaken. Clarke’s 1975 biography of Russell started the ‘‘pupil becomes master’’ motif. He writes: From the early summer of 1912 Wittgenstein’s relationship with Russell, little more than six months old, began to change. On paper it might still be that of pupil and teacher, but the teacher was already eager for the pupil’s opinion of his work.18
Monk expanded the theme significantly. As characterized by Monk, Wittgenstein began as Russell’s student, but was soon to become his intellectual master where the philosophy of logic and mathematics were concerned. They first met in October 1911 during Cambridge’s Michaelmas term. Wittgenstein continued in January 1912 and over the next term. As Monk tells the story, he pursued his studies in mathematical logic with such vigor that, by the end of it, Russell was to say that he had learned all he had to teach, and indeed gone further.19 Monk takes Russell literally, and would have us believe that Wittgenstein learned everything important Russell knew about mathematical logic in less than one year. By January 1913, Monk proclaims that the cooperation between the two has come to an end. ‘‘In the field of logic, Wittgenstein, far from being Russell’s student, had become Russell’s teacher.’’20 Monk’s case is largely based on Russell’s self-deprecating letters to Ottoline. Yet there is a straightforward alternative explanation of the letters. Russell’s emotional life was a shambles during this period. His failed relationship with his first wife Alys was largely the cause. Lady Ottoline was his angel of mercy, his hope in new love for release from despair and suffering. Yet Ottoline was often aloof to Russell’s pouring sentimentality and took much of his letters as attempts to cajole her sympathies in hope of a level of intimacy and emotion she simply did not feel. Russell was then forty-one, and wanted a companion and children.21
18 19 21
Ronald Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell (New York: Knopf, 1976), p. 176. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein (Penguin, 1990), p. 72. 20 Ibid. Bertrand Russell, Letter to Ottoline Morrell, 18 August 1913, in The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, ed. Nicholas Griffin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992), p. 469.
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
9
Ottoline had no intention of abandoning her life with Philip Morrell and her daughter, and soon tired of Russell’s often maudlin declarations of suicidal feelings contrived to drive her away from them. Russell’s letters to Ottoline must be read in the context of his technical work, otherwise they lend support to a skewed picture of events. One oftenquoted letter concerns Wittgenstein’s ‘‘rewriting’’ of Principia. Russell once remarked to Ottoline that ‘‘Wittgenstein has persuaded me that the early parts of Principia are very inexact, but fortunately it is his business to put them right, not mine.’’22 August 1913 dates the following entry in Pinsent’s diary: ‘‘It is probable that the first volume of Principia will have to be re-written, and Wittgenstein may write himself the first eleven chapters. That is a splendid triumph for him!’’23 Monk takes this to provide evidence of Russell realizing his inferiority to Wittgenstein in mathematical logic and his bequeathing its foundations to his pupil. Monk writes: These remarks are revealing. They show how Russell was still inclined to look upon Wittgenstein’s work as a kind of ‘‘fine tuning’’ of his own. He talks as if the inexactitude of the early parts of Principia are a mere detail, but those early parts contain the very foundation upon which the whole of the rest was built. And Wittgenstein was not repairing it, as Russell continued to think, but was demolishing it altogether.24
The colorful image of the genius Austrian pupil who bested the most famous philosopher of the time now reaches a zenith. This has become part of the folklore of Wittgenstein, but it does not pass technical scrutiny. Sections A and B of Principia consist of eleven starred numbers: *1–*5 is the propositional system, *9, *10, and *11 concern quantification theory, *12 introduces Reducibility, *13 discuss identity, and *14 is Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. There were new technical developments concerning *1–*5 that came to Russell’s attention in 1913. Sheffer read a paper to the American Mathematical Society on 31 December 1912 maintaining all the quantifier-free formulas of Principia’s sentential calculus can be expressed via one logical connective.25 Russell received Sheffer’s paper on 15 April 1913 and was interested in the revisions to Principia that it enables. The Sheffer stroke appears in Wittgenstein’s ‘‘Notes on Logic 1913’’ which were composed in Norway.26 With the intercession of Moore, these notes were later offered on Wittgenstein’s behalf so 22 23 24 25 26
Russell, Letter to Ottoline Morrell, 23 February 1913, ibid., p. 446. Quoted from Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 180. Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, p. 290. H. Sheffer, ‘‘A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with Application to Logical Constants,’’ Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 14 (1913): 481–488. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 103.
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that he would fulfill the dissertation requirement for a Research Student for the B.A. degree.27 It would not in the least belittle Russell’s stature as mentor if he had agreed that Wittgenstein should make it part of his work for the degree to find a new sentential deductive system based on Sheffer’s new connective, reducing the number of primitive principles of Principia’s *1–*5. This is the likely explanation of the so-called ‘‘splendid triumph’’ that Pinsent mentions. But Wittgenstein did not find the reduction Nicod found in 1916. Nicod demonstrated that only one axiom, together with the rule of uniform substitution and one other inference rule governing Sheffer’s one logical connective, suffices to generate Principia’s sentential calculus.28 Nicod died tragically in 1924. In the 1925 introduction to the second edition of Principia, Russell recommended that Sheffer ‘‘rewrite’’ [foundational chapters of] the Principia in accordance with the new methods.29 There is no question that Wittgenstein had ideas for improving the philosophical foundations of Principia and that Russell was enticed by them. But this provides no basis for Monk’s conclusion that Russell abandoned Principia in favor of Wittgenstein’s work on logic. Russell was attracted to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that Reducibility would be obviated by the doctrine that ‘‘a [propositional function] can only occur through its values.’’30 In the first edition of volume 1 of Principia, Russell’s own remarks concerning the status of Reducibility are illuminating. He wrote: although it seems very improbable that the axiom should turn out to be false, it is by no means improbable that it should be found to be deducible from some other more fundamental and more evident axiom. It is possible that the vicious circle principle, as embodied in the above hierarchy of types, is more drastic than it need be, and that by a less drastic use the necessity for the axiom might be avoided. Such changes, however, would not render anything false which has been asserted on the basis of the principles explained above: they would merely provide easier proofs of the same theorems.31
In Principia, Russell offered a pragmatic justification of Reducibility. He recognized that it is ‘‘not the sort of axiom about which one can rest content.’’32 He maintained that some formulation embodying type structures must be correct, and expressed a hope that with further work in the
27 28
29 30 32
That Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic were submitted as a dissertation to fulfill the requirements of the B.A. degree is argued by McGuinness. See McGuinness, Wittgenstein, p. 199. Jean Nicod, ‘‘A Reduction in the Number of the Primitive Propositions of Logic,’’ Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 19 (1917): 32–41. The paper was read before the society on 30 October 1916. A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), p. xv. Ibid., p. xxix. 31 Ibid., p. 59 (quoted from the 2nd ed.). Ibid., p. xiv (quoted from the 2nd ed.).
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area, Reducibility might yet be supplanted. Indeed, he acknowledged that there remained philosophical difficulties with Principia’s reliance on Reducibility and invited all readers to work on them.33 It is quite understandable that Russell would be agreeable to the interesting new ideas of Wittgenstein about how difficulties in the philosophical foundations of the Principia might be overcome. But to imagine possible amendments and improvements to the philosophical foundations of logic and mathematics offered in Principia is certainly not, as Monk thinks, to ‘‘replace’’ or ‘‘demolish it.’’ As we are beginning to see, an assessment of the Tractarian criticisms of Russell’s philosophy often depend essentially on an interpretation of some rather technical features of Russell’s work – his reconstruction of classes, ramified type-theory, and the like. Moreover, much of the literature on the relationship between Russell’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is concerned to distinguish Tractarian doctrines from an empiricist reading of Russell’s theory of sense-data. This brings us to the second dogma of the Russellian interpretation – the doctrine that Russell’s atomism was a form of reductive empiricism. Again we ask: What becomes of such interpretations if it is discovered that the second dogma is mistaken? Again, this is precisely the situation that faces us. Indeed, the reasons for rejecting the first dogma of Russellian interpretation give rise to reasons for rejecting the second. We shall see that the lessons Russell distilled from his endeavors to build the structure of ramified types into logical grammar render an entirely new conception of Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism. The ‘‘logical constructions’’ or ‘‘logical fictions’’ of Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism cannot properly be understood in terms of empiricist reduction. Research coming from Russell’s manuscript has shed a flood of new light on this history, and a new picture is emerging. The new picture presents a fresh way to understand Russell’s philosophy, and with it comes a promising new approach to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Logical fictions of Russell Russell wrote in his autobiography that the theory of descriptions ‘‘was the first step toward solving the difficulties which had baffled me for so long.’’34 In a letter to Lucy Martin Donnelly of 13 June 1905, Russell wrote that the theory of descriptions ‘‘throws a flood of light on the 33 34
A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. vii, xiv, 60. Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1, 1872–1914 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 79.
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foundations of mathematics.’’35 The ‘‘difficulties,’’ of course, pertained to the paradox of the class of all and only those classes that are not members of themselves. The floodlight (solution) from 1905 through 1907 was Russell’s substitutional theory. Definite descriptions of propositions are used to emulate a type-hierarchy of attributes in intension and thereby classes. In Principia (1910), the ontology of propositions is abandoned and Whitehead and Russell write that ‘‘the phrase that expresses a proposition is what we call an ‘incomplete’ symbol.’’36 The theory of incomplete symbols is involved in the ‘‘no-classes’’ theory according to which ‘‘classes, are in fact, like descriptions, logical fictions or (as we say) ‘incomplete symbols.’’’37 After Principia the notion of a ‘‘logical fiction,’’ ‘‘incomplete symbol,’’ or ‘‘false abstraction’’ came to pervade Russell’s philosophy. In the 1920s, Russell wrote that ‘‘I and the chair are both logical fictions, both being in fact a series of classes of particulars.’’38 Ramsey aptly described Russell’s theory of definite descriptions as ‘‘a paradigm of philosophy.’’ Wittgenstein proclaimed that ‘‘it was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one’’ (TLP 4.0031). But what is Russell’s conception of a ‘‘logical fiction’’? What connection, if any, does it have with empiricist reduction? Empiricist reductions in philosophy became popular with the success of Newton’s philosophy of science. The wide success of Newton’s science encouraged philosophers to investigate his scientific methods. Newton’s famous dictum, Hypotheses non fingo (I do not make hypotheses), aptly distinguished his natural philosophy from that of the mechanical philosophy that preceded it. Newton embraced a philosophy of science according to which crucial experiments are essential to the very nature of scientific discovery. The mechanical philosophy that preceded Newtonian science had sought to exclude appeals to Aristotelian metaphysical essences, entelechies, drives, animal spirits, life forces, and the like. The principle of demarcation of the mechanical philosophy was the requirement that only mechanical processes, governed by quantitative mathematical laws, are properly scientific. For example, mechanists regarded it to be a scientific hypothesis that the lodestone spews forth screw-shaped particles which permeate the iron, 35 36 37 38
Ibid., p. 152. A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 44. Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), p. 182. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ in Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 241. This is a fourdimensional theory of time according to which the notion of a material continuant (enduring through time) obeying physical laws is to be abandoned and the laws of matter are to be reconstructed in terms of series of events.
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pulling the two together. The conjecture that it contains within it a force of magnetic attraction is not ‘‘scientific’’ because it is not mechanical. The hypothesis that air consists of many moving particles which exert a pressure when compressed is scientific. That nature abhors a vacuum is not. But strict adherence to mechanical philosophy threatens to exclude Galileo’s work on laws governing ‘forces’ and ‘accelerations.’ To the mechanical philosophy, forces are anathema; they are vestiges of Aristotelianism. Newton offered a grand synthesis of the mechanical and Galilean traditions by appeal to empiricism.39 Forces are legitimate in science only if precise mathematical laws govern them, laws that admit of empirical test. The criterion of a hypothesis’s being scientific is its amenability to empirical test. In the hands of philosophy, empiricism is the thesis that all nonanalytic knowledge is obtained by sense experience. This gives rise to a conceptual thesis of empiricism. The conceptual thesis has it that each meaningful nonanalytic statement is logically equivalent to some statement which involves only terms which refer to sense experience. The logical equivalence renders the empirical import of the statement. Every idea about the world must originate either in ideas of sense experience or be compounded of such ideas. For example, the meaning of a material object term such as ‘‘tomato’’ is wholly compounded from actual (and anticipated) sense experiences – tastes, smells, colors, feels, and the like. It soon became clear, however, that strict adherence to empiricism requires that notions of ‘‘matter’’ and ‘‘cause’’ also obtain their meanings from sense experience. Attempts to carry out such an empiricist meaning analysis of theoretical terms were greatly facilitated by the development of modern quantificational logic. But the new logic changed the emphasis of the project from terms to sentences. The project evolved into the plan of setting out the evidentiary relations between the laws in which theoretical terms are couched and sentences of sense experience (or observation). The derivations were to be piecemeal, sentence by sentence. Carnap illustrates this form of reductive empiricism in his book Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). Carnap’s valiant efforts conclusively showed that many commonplace theoretical terms (such as ‘‘temperature’’) can only be given conditional (partial) definitions in his observation language. Where T is the theoretical sentence in question and q contains only sentences pertaining to sense (or observation), we have: If p, then T if and only if q.
39
See Richard Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 159. See also E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1952).
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For example, ‘‘If the mercury thermometer is in contact with x, then the temperature of x is c degrees if and only if the thermometer reads c.’’ When the condition p is not met, the theoretical sentence T is undefined. Be this as it may, Carnap did go some way in revealing how sentences in which theoretical terms are couched stand in evidentiary relationships to sentences in which only observation terms occur. Carnap’s partial definitions naturally give rise to the thesis that theoretical terms are not referential but serve simply as instruments to predict and control observations. Further investigation into scientific practice complicated matters even more. Duhem’s investigation of the experimental methods that provide evidence for (or against) a scientific theory resulted in the discovery that no sentence, taken in isolation from the empirical theories in which it is embedded, admits of confirmation of disconfirmation by experiment. This ‘‘holistic’’ relationship between theory and the conditions of its empirical evidence marginalizes the importance of the question as to whether a given theoretical term is referential. The successes of the experimental method in science were a main catalyst in favor of empiricism in philosophy. Holism is a fundamental feature of the empirical scientific method, and its discovery reverberated throughout empiricism. The unit of meaning reduction is not the term or the sentence, but the entire theory.40 Within reduction, two models emerge: Reductive Identity and Elimination. Both may be called ‘‘ontological reductions,’’ but the difference can be significant. Eliminations are exemplified by the historical development of physics and chemistry. Important eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories offered a number of subtle fluid and aetheric objects that were highly successful at explaining a wide variety of phenomena. In the process of theory change, the research programs that gave rise to such theories were supplanted by atomistic physical theories couched within a new research program that abandons the aether. Empirical and conceptual problems pertaining to the aether (such as its elasticity) became mute, and an entirely new research program, with a new language and a new set of empirical and conceptual techniques, was inaugurated. Many successes of the earlier aether theories were retained by the theories of the new research program. Retention, however, is always partial. The confirmed predictions of an earlier theory in a rival research tradition do not always survive into the supplanting research tradition. Indeed, theoretical processes and mechanisms of earlier theories are at times treated as flotsam.41 The supplanting tradition may come to regard the 40 41
See Carl Hempel, ‘‘The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,’’ in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 109–129. Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
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terms of the earlier theories as nonreferential, or regard earlier ontologies as idle wheels that serve no explanatory purpose. It is tempting, given these examples of elimination in the history of science, to suggest the following simple way of distinguishing elimination from reductive identity. In an elimination, the ontology of the old theory is abandoned. The theoretical terms of the old theory don’t refer. Accordingly, one might expect that an elimination would regard the old theory’s statements as literally false. Reductive identity, in contrast, regards the terms of the old theory as referential – because they are suitably reinterpreted to be about entities countenanced in the new theory. In this way, the sentences of the old theory can be regarded as true. But this way of distinguishing the two conceptions of reduction is inadequate. An elimination may endeavor to reconceptualize the laws of the old theory without countenancing its objects in any way. It can regard certain of the laws of the old theory as approximately true, though not true of the objects the old theory countenanced. In 1914 Russell advocated a ‘‘scientific method in philosophy,’’ which puts logical constructions (the notion of a logical fiction) at center stage. Russell characterizes his program as one governed by a ‘‘supreme maxim of all scientific philosophizing,’’ namely this: ‘‘Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.’’42 In his paper ‘‘On the Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’’ he described the method thus: Given a set of propositions nominally dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make these propositions true. By dint of a little logical ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which has the requisite properties. This constructed function we substitute for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question.43
In his article ‘‘Logical Atomism’’ (1924), Russell stated the maxim in the form: ‘‘Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities.’’44 Since Russell maintained in several works of the period that sense-data and universals are entities of immediate acquaintance, the maxim has naturally enough been interpreted as if it advocates an empiricist reduction. Indeed, even Russell’s ‘‘no-classes’’ theory has been shoehorned into this mold. For instance, Ayer writes:
42
43 44
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,’’ in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (Totowa, N. J.: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p. 115 (first published in Scientia 4, 1914). Ibid., p. 116. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ in Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 326.
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when Russell spoke of an object as a logical fiction, he did not mean to imply that it was imaginary or nonexistent . . . Similarly, in the period during which Russell held that physical objects were logical constructions, he did not wish to suggest that they were unreal in the way that gorgons are unreal . . . Logical fictions do indeed exist, but only in virtue of the existence of the elements out of which they are constructed. As Russell put it, they are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world.45
Ayer has in mind reductive identity. Rocks and mountains do exist, according to reductive empiricism, their being orderings of sense experiences notwithstanding. Ayer interprets Principia similarly. He assumes that Principia is a theory of ramified types of entities (‘‘propositional functions’’), and that classes are logical fictions in the sense that they are identified with propositional functions. In this sense, classes exist. There is, however, a rival interpretation of Russell’s supreme maxim of all scientific philosophizing – an interpretation that separates Russell’s logical constructions from empiricism entirely. The rival interpretation is supported by the historical evolution of Russell’s attempts to solve certain paradoxes plaguing the logical theory of a class or attribute.The naive theory of classes assumes that for every condition Ax, there is a class of all and only those objects x satisfying the condition. In symbols the assumption can be expressed as follows: ðCP2 Þ ð9yÞðx1 Þ; . . . ; ðxn Þð5x1 ; . . . ; xn 4 2 y :: AÞ;
where y is not free in the formula A. Letting A be the condition x ¼ x, our naive assumption assures the existence of a universal class V, since every object is self-identical. Letting Ax be the condition x 6¼ x, our naive assumption assures that there is an empty class because no object satisfies the condition of non-self-identity. Letting Ax be the condition x ¼ V, there is a class V whose only member is V. We now have V 2 V and V 2 V. Russell revealed that our naive assumption is contradictory. Letting Ax be x 2 = x, we get the Russell class r of all and only those classes that are not members of themselves. This yields a contradiction, namely, r 2 r .. r 2 = r. The naive theory of classes is little more than an extensional shadow of the logical conception of an attribute. On the naive view of attributes, every condition comprehends an attribute which is exemplified by all and only those objects that satisfy the condition ðCPÞ 45
ð9’Þðx1 Þ; . . . ; ðxn Þð’ðx1 ; . . . ; xn Þ :: AÞ;
A. J. Ayer, ‘‘Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher,’’ in The Meaning of Life (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 152.
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where ’ is not free in the formula A. There is an attribute ’V of being selfidentical, the attribute ’ of being non-self-identical, the attribute y of being identical to ’, and so on. On this view, attributes are intensional entities. That is, there are attributes y for which the coexemplification of attributes ’ and y, i.e., (x)(’x « yx), does not assure that y (’) y (y). It does not assure it because coexemplifying attributes do not assure their identity. Classes, on the other hand, are extensional. If classes z and y have all the same members, i.e., (x)(x 2 y .. x 2 z) then they are identical. Hence, for any class w, we have y 2 w .. x 2 w. This difference can, however, be minimized. One can emulate extensionality within a theory of attributes. Russell showed the way. For any context y which is such that (x)(’x yx) does not entail y (’) « y (y), we can appeal to (CP) to find an attribute , which is such that ðyÞððyÞ ð9GÞðGz z yz : &: ðGÞÞÞ:
Hence we now have that (x)(’x yx) does entail (’) (y). In this way all theorems of the naive theory of classes simply shadow theorems of the logic of attributes. Since attributes in intension seem to be purely logical objects, the theory of classes (its extensional shadow) is a logical notion of a class. Of course, since the logical notion of a class simply shadows the logical theory of attributes, one should expect Russell’s paradox of classes to shadow a paradox of attributes. This is, in fact, what Russell discovered. The naive assumption of attributes is contradictory. We need only consider the attribute R that all and only those attributes have that do not exemplify themselves. That is, from (CP) one readily arrives at: ðyÞðRðyÞ :RðRÞÞ:
In Russell’s view, the paradoxes show that the naive logical assumption of attributes in intension is on a par with the naive logical assumption of classes. Logic must get along without either assumption. The paradoxes require a genuine solution, and a solution can only be found by a reconceptualization of logic itself. It might be thought that mathematics does not rest on the ontology of logical objects such as attributes (or classes in the logical sense). This is hard to reconcile with the thesis that mathematics (or at least arithmetic) is necessary. Russell was prepared to accept synthetic necessities known a priori, but only if those necessities are logical necessities.46 In Russell’s view the only necessity is logical necessity. Modern set theories reject the logical notion of an attribute (or class) and instead postulate the existence 46
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, p. 457.
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of nonlogical entities called ‘‘sets.’’ If arithmetic truth depends on sets, then arithmetic truths are either contingent truths about sets, or metaphysical (nonlogical) synthetic necessities governing such sets. Russell found both unacceptable. To see things right, one must find a solution of the paradoxes of attributes (and classes) by means of a deeper understanding of the nature of logic. The logical notion of an attribute (or class) seems impossible to maintain. Yet if one does not maintain it, mathematical necessity seems unintelligible.47 Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879) had argued in favor of a new way of looking at logic – a way that made logic a genuine science. He rejected the long-held dogma famously recounted by Kant that logic can never be informative, that the conclusion of a deduction can never go beyond what is contained in the premises. Frege offered a new quantificational form for logic according to which functions of level n þ 1 ‘‘mutually saturate’’ with functions of level n. In Frege’s view, functions are unsaturated entities and this makes them distinct from objects. In Frege’s terminology, the first-level function f ‘‘falls within’’ (or ‘‘mutually saturates’’) the universal quantifier function (8x)’x. This is a new logical form, quite different from the notion of an object’s exemplification of an attribute. Frege embraces levels of mutual saturation. For instance, the quantifier function (8x)’x falls within the quantifier function (8’)M’. Frege’s notation demands that function signs always appear in function (predicational) positions. In this way, the notation respects his thesis that functions are entities, not objects. If Frege’s ontology of functions is part of logic, then logic is informative. The quantificational structures given in the premises of a deduction can yield entirely new information in the conclusion. In Frege’s view, arithmetic is founded upon these quantificational structures – arithmetic is a branch of logic. Frege’s new conception of logic as the science of functions is consistent. But Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetic (1898) introduced a theory which collapsed the hierarchy of levels of functions. Each function of level n þ 1 is correlated with a function of level n, and in turn, each level-1 function is correlated with an object Frege calls its ‘‘course-of-values.’’ Frege’s philosophy of arithmetic was wedded to courses-of-values, and this was its Achilles heel. In a letter of 1901, Russell broke the bad news to Frege that he had found a paradox of classes which has an analog for the Grundgesetze theory of courses-of-values. 47
Russell’s paradoxes are quite different from the old conundrum about the barber of a village who shaves all and only those of the village that do not shave themselves. There is no ‘‘paradox’’ of such a barber because there is no reason whatever to embrace the existence of such a barber.
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Retreat to Frege’s hierarchy of levels of functions first appeared to Russell to be worth investigating. But Russell was not prepared to accept Frege’s doctrine of mutual saturation and the accompanying thesis that functions are entities, not objects. In Russell’s view, logic is a universal science whose laws apply to all objects alike, be they universals, functions, particulars, abstract, or concrete. Russell’s guiding principle is a doctrine that has come to be called his ‘‘doctrine of the unrestricted variables of logic’’: A formal calculus for the science of logic must adopt only one style of genuine variables – entity/individual/object variables.
The calculus for logic cannot embrace different variables for a hierarchy of types of objects. Frege and Russell agreed that logic cannot embrace a hierarchy of levels of objects. But Frege distinguished functions from objects and allowed levels of functions. Russell could not accept this. In Russell’s view, whatever is, is an object. Thus a retreat to Frege’s levels of functions is impossible for Russell. In his search for a deeper understanding of logic, Russell’s recognized that there is no way to find principles of pure logic which exclude the problematic cases such as Russell attribute R (or the class r) and yet retain attributes (or classes) as objects for the construction of mathematics. The lesson Russell drew from the paradoxes is that the calculus for logic must proceed without the ontological assumption that every open formula comprehends an attribute. It must also proceed without the ontological assumption that every open formula comprehends a class of just those entities that satisfy the formula. By December of 1905 Russell had used his new theory of definite descriptions to form a wonderfully unique reconstruction of the first principles of logic. The reconstruction enables one to emulate a type-theory of attributes without its ontology. It is a eliminativistic reconstruction, not reductive identity, that Russell had in mind when he said that classes are ‘‘logical fictions.’’ Contrary to Ayer, classes do go the way of the gorgon sisters. From 1903 until 1907, Russell regarded logic as the general science of propositional structure. No paradox plagues an ontology of propositions understood as mind- and language-independent states of affairs. Propositions are natural candidates as purely logical objects – candidates which could be used to emulate a logical theory of types (or levels) of attributes (and accordingly classes in the logical sense). Russell called this new reconstruction of logic his ‘‘substitutional theory.’’ The substitutional theory is type-free and makes no assumption that every condition determines an attribute (or a class). This does not mean that the substitutional theory denies that there are universals (attributes) which have both a predicable and an individual/objectual nature. Quite the contrary, the theory maintains that there is a universal (a logical relation) of ‘implication’ which
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holds between certain propositions. The point of the substitutional theory is to generate mathematics without comprehension principles such as (CP) and (CP2). The substitutional theory emulates a type-stratified theory of attributes (and classes in the logical sense) powerful enough to generate mathematics. This is what Russell meant by speaking of classes as ‘‘logical fictions.’’ By using ‘‘variables with structure’’ Russell emulates a type-theory of attributes in intension (and classes in the logical sense) without its ontology. In this way, Russell hoped to demonstrate that the necessity of mathematical truth is the synthetic logical necessity of the theory of propositional structure. Russell’s substitutional theory was a monumental achievement. It illustrates what Kuhn came later to call a ‘‘paradigm shift.’’48 It offers a genuine solution of the paradoxes plaguing the logical notion of an attribute (and class). Its formal calculus for logic is a genuinely universal calculus in the sense that its language is type-free and adopts only one style of variable (the entity/individual/object variable). Its laws hold of everything, be it a universal, a particular, or whatever. The substitutional language and ontology supplants the language and ontology of a type-stratified theory of attributes in intension (and/or a type-stratified theory of classes and relations-in-extension).The type distinctions that dismantle the paradoxes are built into the formal reconceptualization of logical first principles.49 Classes in the substitutional theory are not identified with any entities countenanced in the supplanting theory. The theory offers a logical analysis and reconstruction that is ontologically eliminative and structurally retentive. In this way, the major successes obtained by appeal to the existence of classes, the positive constructions of Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass, and Frege, are retained within substitution. Russell explained that ‘‘the principles of mathematics may be stated in conformity with the theory,’’ and the theory ‘‘avoids all known contradictions, while at the same time preserves nearly the whole of Cantor’s work on the infinite.’’50 The substitutional theory involves, as Russell put it, ‘‘an elaborate restatement of logical principles.’’ The results obtained by appeal to the existence of classes are conceptualized in an entirely new way within the research program of the substitutional theory. There will be some loss – some flotsam – such as Cantor’s transfinite ordinal number !!, the usual generative process for the series of ordinals, and the class of all ordinals. But this loss is to be measured
48 49 50
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). See Appendix B for a brief sketch of how this is accomplished. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic,’’ in Essays in Analysis, ed. Douglas Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 213.
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against the successes of the new program. Indeed, had the program yielded the conceptual successes that Russell had anticipated, present mathematics would regard the notion of a set (or class) as present physics regards phlogiston, caloric fluid, the aether, and other relics of past sciences. The substitutional theory sheds new light on the historical evolution of Principia and on Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism. It reveals the unity of Russell’s philosophical method. Unfortunately, the substitutional theory was largely unknown until the 1970s. The main reason is that Russell himself abandoned substitution sometime late in 1907 because of a paradox of propositions. It was not the semantic Liar Paradox (i.e., the proposition asserting of itself that it is false) that was the source of the difficulty, but a syntactic paradox that was unique to the substitutional theory itself.51 Indeed, the often-repeated interpretation that Russell never distinguished syntactic and semantic paradoxes is little more than myth.52 In 1906, Russell’s solution of the syntactic paradoxes (the paradoxes of classes and attributes) was to build type structure into the formal grammar of the theory of propositions.53 He offered an entirely distinct Tarski-style hierarchy of languages as a solution of the paradoxes (Richard, Ko¨nigDixon, Berry) which are now called ‘‘semantic.’’54 Russell’s propositions were intensional entities, not intentional ones involving semantic notions such as ‘‘truth,’’ ‘‘reference,’’ or ‘‘designation.’’ The paradox that spoiled the substitutional theory is syntactic in nature. Russell came to believe that to avoid the new paradoxes within the substitutional theory he would have to introduce a stratified language with variables restricted to orders. A theory of orders of entities, however, would undermine the legitimacy of the theory’s claim to be a universal science of logic. It is incompatible with Russell’s doctrine of the unrestricted variable. With the substitutional theory largely buried in unpublished manuscripts, Russell’s eliminativistic philosophical method has been lost. This has for years clouded the proper understanding of both Wittgenstein and Russell. In the Principia, Russell hoped to preserve his conception that the calculus for the science of logic must be type- and order-free. In this respect, Russell’s motive for the constructions of Principia are no different
51 52
53
54
Gregory Landini, New Evidence Concerning Russell’s Substitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). See Gregory Landini, ‘‘Russell’s Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes,’’ in ´ Philippe de Rouilhan, ed., Russell en heritage, Revue internationale de philosophie 3 (2004): 257–294. Russell, ‘‘On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic,’’ p. 209. See also Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations,’’ in Essays in Analysis, ed. Douglas Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 186. Landini, ‘‘Russell’s Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes.’’
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Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
than for the constructions of the substitutional theory. In fact, Russell intended Principia to be more radically eliminative than the substitutional theory! In Principia, logic is to proceed without the blanket assumption of attributes, classes, or even propositions. Principia espouses a logical reconstruction which endeavors to philosophically explain and justify order indices on predicate variables. The explanation builds the structure of order into a nominalistic semantics which generates the truth-conditions for formulas – a recursive correspondence theory of truth based on Russell’s ‘‘multiple-relation theory of judgment.’’55 In short, type and order indices on the predicate variables of the language of Principia are explained away as ‘‘limitations built into the conditions of significance’’ of the use of the predicate variables. Principia’s order\types are given by an informal semantics for predicate variables. In Russell’s view, Principia is not a theory of types and orders of entities/objects. Russell’s ‘‘supreme maxim’’ for philosophy, his program for a new scientific philosophy based on logical form, evolved from this work in logic. In Russell’s view, the logical paradoxes (of classes and predication), and conundrums such as Kant’s antinomies and Zeno’s paradoxes of rational dynamics, are produced because ordinary grammar has not done justice to logical form. Russell’s work in logic is certainly not a form of empiricism. It is a method of supplanting one language and ontology by another, recovering the structure of the former without the ontological assumptions that generate philosophical paradoxes. Russell described his technique as ‘‘building structure into the variables.’’ That is, variables for classes, functions, and the like are not genuine variables but are syntactically structured so that the correct logical form is revealed. Ordinary language, of course, contains simple predicates for many concepts, and their grammar makes them appear as if they stand for (simple) properties like any other. Russell’s program challenged this. Once logical form is revealed, the conundrums, paradoxes, and speculative metaphysical doctrines surrounding these notions fall away. ´ e.´ He was enthralled by Wittgenstein was Russell’s student and proteg the ideas of Russell’s new eliminativistic approach toward finally solving the enduring conundrums of philosophy. Enthusiastic and brash, Wittgenstein hoped to extend Russell’s ideas widely – all philosophical problems would be solved, he thought, by means of eliminativistic analyses. Philosophical problems and riddles are generated by taking notions such as ‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘universal,’’ ‘‘particular,’’ ‘‘fact,’’ ‘‘truth,’’ ‘‘falsehood,’’ 55
The individual variables of Principia are treated objectually, however. Universals (properties and relations in intension) have both an individual and a predicable nature and are counted among individuals.
Rereading Russell and Wittgenstein
23
‘‘necessity,’’ ‘‘possibility,’’ ‘‘belief,’’ and nonextensional contexts generally, as if they were genuine. The proper role of philosophical analysis is to reveal logical form through eliminative conceptual analysis. The logical and semantic notions used in ordinary language have been misconstrued by philosophers, and their mistakes have led them to speculative metaphysics. Logical and semantic notions are, as Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus, ‘‘formal concepts and are represented in conceptual notation by variables’’ (TLP 4.1272). The suggestion that they be represented by ‘‘variables’’ is directly connected with Russell’s eliminativistic techniques for solving the problems facing logicism by ‘‘building structure into the variable.’’ Viewing Russell’s philosophy as eliminativistic creates a powerful new tool for a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. New and striking connections between Russell’s philosophy and the Tractatus are illuminated. With Russell’s nonempiricist methods revealed, we shall see how misleading it is to characterize his logical atomism as espousing a form of British empiricism which uses logic as a tool for its empiricist reductions. Attention to the historical evolution of Principia reveals that Russell worked to provide a genuine solution of the paradoxes by means of a theory of logical form. He distilled from this work a new research program which makes logical construction the essence of philosophy. In Russell’s program, philosophy involves the elucidation and analysis of logical form. It is quite misleading to characterize Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as being antithetical to this program. Wittgenstein was Russell’s ally. Russell knew that some of his own constructions for logicism, and certainly those for the foundation of the sciences, were incomplete. Wittgenstein was working to perfect and complete them.
2
Logical atomism
In 1918 Russell gave a series of lectures in London with the title ‘‘Logical Atomism.’’1 He glowingly praised Wittgenstein, writing that the lectures are largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learnt from my friend and former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein. I have had no opportunity of knowing his views since August 1914, and I do not even know whether he is alive or dead. He has therefore no responsibility for what is said in these lectures beyond that of having originally supplied many of the theories contained in them.2
Russell was eager to launch his new program for philosophy as the science of logical form and to introduce Wittgenstein. But in his efforts to establish a reputation for Wittgenstein, he embellished matters greatly. Wittgenstein’s ideas were at a very immature stage during his conversations with Russell between 1912 and 1914, and his studies on logic in Norway were poorly developed. Wittgenstein’s ‘‘Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway’’ (dated April 1914) did not reach Russell until April 1915. The war intervened, and Russell lost contact with Wittgenstein. He did not hear of him again until June 1919. When Russell finally did get news, he found that Wittgenstein had managed to write a book while in the Austrian army. With the war at an end, Wittgenstein wrote a letter to Russell from an Italian prison camp in Cassino. In it, he announced that he had reached solutions to the problems he had been working on: I’ve written a book called Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung3 containing all my work of the past 6 years. I believe I’ve solved all our problems finally . . . This may 1 2 3
The lectures started on 22 January 1918 and ended on 12 March. They were published in The Monist 28 (Oct. 1918): 495–527; 29 (Jan., Apr., July 1919): 32–63, 190–222, 345–80. The Monist 29 (Apr. 1919): 205. Interestingly, the title is very similar to Johann Heinrich Lambert’s 1782 Logische und philosophische Abhandlungen. Wittgenstein later changed the title at the suggestion of Moore. Lambert wrote voluminously on logic, but his most important essays are in this volume which is composed of a series of studies with later ones referring to numbered results of the earlier. In C. I. Lewis’s A Survey of Symbolic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918), p. 4, Lambert’s work is characterized as part of a tradition in logic and
24
Logical atomism
25
sound arrogant, but I can’t help believing it . . . But it upsets all our theory of truth, of classes of numbers and all the rest.4
The letter makes it clear that Wittgenstein took the Tractatus to be addressing ‘‘our’’ problems – problems shared with Russell. Unfortunately, this point has been forgotten, and in the absence of an understanding of the complex historical development of Russell’s philosophy, Wittgenstein’s views have come to be interpreted as offering a unique form of logical atomism opposed to Russell. As we shall see, there was only Russell’s logical atomism and Wittgenstein’s apprenticeship. Logical atomism as a research program One of the earliest appearances of the phrase ‘‘logical atomism’’ occurs in Russell’s 1914 paper ‘‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy.’’ Russell calls his philosophical approach ‘‘logical atomism’’ to contrast it with those philosophical systems, exemplified by philosophers such as Hegel, who were (as Russell sees it) inspired by religious and ethical desires to build a metaphysics tailored to human nature. ‘‘The essence of philosophy,’’ writes Russell, is analysis, not synthesis. To build up systems of the world, like Heine’s German professor who knit together fragments of life and made an intelligible system out of them, is not, I believe, any more feasible that the discovery of the philosopher’s stone. What is feasible is the understanding of general forms, and the division of traditional problems into separate and less baffling questions.5
To emphasize this piecemeal approach, Russell proclaims that there are no propositions of which the ‘universe’ is the subject. He writes: ‘‘The philosophy which I wish to advocate may be called logical atomism or absolute pluralism, because, while maintaining that there are many things, it denies that there is a whole composed of those things.’’6 Russell focuses on logical analysis, rejecting metaphysical speculations inspired by religious, moral, or self-oriented conceptions of what the world must be like. The following passage nicely captures this attitude: Intellectually, the effect of mistaken moral considerations upon philosophy has been to impede progress to an extraordinary extent. I do not myself believe that philosophy can either prove or disprove the truth of religious dogmas, but ever
4 5 6
arithmetic leading to Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, and Russell – a tradition distinguished from the algebraic logic of Boole which reached its perfection in the work of Peirce and especially in Ernst Schro¨der’s Vorlesungen u¨ber die Algebra der Logik (1890). Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, 1914–1944 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), p. 162. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy,’’ in Mysticism and Logic (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p. 84. Ibid.
26
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
since Plato most philosophers have considered it part of their business to produce ‘‘proofs’’ of immortality and the existence of God . . . In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions. All this is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy . . . For this renunciation, they have been rewarded by the discovery that many questions formerly obscured by the fog of metaphysics, can be answered with precision, and by objective methods . . . Take such questions as What is number? What are space and time? What is mind, and what is matter? I do not say that we can here and now give definitive answers to all these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the truth.7
In his logical atomism lectures, Russell used the metaphor of a zoological taxonomy of logical forms to describe his atomism. ‘‘I think one might describe philosophical logic,’’ he wrote, ‘‘as an inventory, or if you like a more humble word, a ‘zoo’ containing all the different forms that facts may have.’’8 Russell characterized logic as having two parts: The first part investigates what propositions are and what forms they may have; this part enumerates the different kinds of atomic propositions, of molecular propositions, of general propositions, and so on. The second part consists of certain supremely general propositions which assert the truth of all propositions of a certain form. This second part merges into pure mathematics, whose propositions all turn out, on analysis, to be such general formal truths. The first part, which merely enumerates forms, is the more difficult, and philosophically the more important; and it is recent progress in this first part . . . that has rendered a truly scientific discussion of many philosophical problems possible. The problem of the nature of judgment or belief may be taken as an example of a problem whose solution depends upon an adequate inventory of logical forms. We have already seen how the supposed universality of the subject–predicate form made it impossible to give a right analysis of serial order, and therefore made space and time unintelligible. But in this case it was only necessary to admit relations of two terms. The case of judgment demands the admission of more complicated forms.9
Russell calls his new philosophy a logical atomism because it ‘‘is concerned with the analysis and enumeration of logical forms.’’ Moreover, because it essentially involves the analysis of logical form, Russell concludes that philosophy becomes indistinguishable from logic. In Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) he writes that ‘‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to 7 8 9
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 835. Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ in Logic and Knowledge: Essays by Bertrand Russell 1901–1950, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1924), p. 216. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), p. 67. (First published 1914.)
Logical atomism
27
be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical.’’10 Logic is the essence of Russell’s philosophy. In his paper ‘‘Logical Atomism’’ (1924) Russell makes no mention of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ideas, but instead traces the origin of his philosophy to Principia. Russell writes: One very important heuristic maxim which Dr. Whitehead and I found, by experience, to be applicable in mathematical logic, and have since applied in various other fields, is a form of Ockham’s razor. When some set of supposed entities has neat logical properties, it turns out, in a great many instances, that the supposed entities can be replaced by purely logical structures without altering any of the detail of the body of propositions in question. This is an economy, because the entities with neat logical properties are always inferred, and if the propositions in which they occur can be interpreted without making this inference, the ground for the inference fails, and our body of propositions is secured against the need for a doubtful step.11
In Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell heralds Frege’s analysis of the notion of cardinal number as ‘‘the first complete example’’ of ‘‘the logical-analytic method in philosophy.’’12 But he also discusses Principia on classes, rational numbers, and real numbers (construed as lower sections of Dedekind cuts), and Whitehead on points and instances in physics. He greatly admires Cantor on infinity and continuity, and Weierstrass on the notion of the ‘‘limit’’ of a function.13 Their studies eventuated in new logical analyses of these notions. With Cantor, the notion of continuity which seemed impossible to render by any notion of magnitude, depends only on the notion of order. The derivative and the integral became, through the new definitions of ‘‘number’’ and ‘‘limit,’’ not quantitative but ordinal concepts. Continuity lies in the fact that some sets of discrete units form a dense compact set. ‘‘Quantity,’’ wrote Russell, ‘‘has lost the mathematical importance which it used to possess, owing to the fact that most theorems concerning it can be generalized so as to become theorems concerning order.’’14 Weierstrass had banished appeals to infinitesimals in the calculus. He showed that the notion of the ‘‘limit’’ of a function, which used to be understood in terms of quantity, as a number to which other numbers in a series generated by the function approximate as nearly as one pleases, should be replaced by a quite different ordinal notion. In Russell’s view, Cantor’s work on the transfinite put to rest centuries of speculative 10 11 12 13
14
Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 42. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ in Logic and Knowledge, p. 326. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 7. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Mathematics and the Metaphysicians,’’ in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (Totowa, N. J.: Barnes & Noble, 1976), pp. 59–74. (First published with the title ‘‘Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mathematics’’ in The International Monthly, 1901.) Ibid.
28
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
metaphysics surrounding the ‘‘infinite’’ and the notion ‘‘continuity.’’ Russell writes: ‘‘Continuity had been, until he [Cantor] defined it, a vague word, convenient for philosophers like Hegel, who wished to introduce metaphysical muddles into mathematics . . . By this means a great deal of mysticism, such as that of Bergson, was rendered inadequate.’’15 In his 1924 paper ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ Russell added yet more examples of logical analyses. He includes his neutral monism which constructs both physical continuants and conscious minds as series of events, and he includes his ‘‘perdurance’’ (or four-dimensional) theory of time according to which ordinary enduring physical objects are logical constructions of phases. In A History of Western Philosophy (1945), Russell even includes Einstein on space-time and the new theory of quantum mechanics as an examples of the analytic methods of logical atomism. ‘‘Physics,’’ Russell tells us, ‘‘as well as mathematics, has supplied material for the philosophy of philosophical analysis . . . What is important to the philosopher in the theory of relativity is the substitution of space-time for space and time.’’ Turning to quantum theory, Russell writes: ‘‘I suspect that it will demand even more radical departures from the traditional doctrine of space and time than those demanded by the theory of relativity.’’16 Conspicuous by its absence from Russell’s many examples of his program in philosophy is any mention of empiricism. An empiricist epistemology involving a ‘‘meaning analysis’’ or reduction of theoretical terms and sentences to their evidentiary conditions in sense experience (sensedata) is certainly not the paradigm. Nonetheless, a longstanding interpretation defines Russell’s logical atomism as a form of empiricistic reduction, with acquaintance as its fundamental feature. Pears writes: ‘‘Logical atomism’’ is Russell’s name for the theory that there is a limit to the analysis of factual language, a limit at which all sentences will consist of words designating simple things . . . His theory of knowledge led him to claim that the only simple particulars that we know are sense-data, and that the only simple qualities and relations we know are certain qualities and relations of sense-data. Their simple qualities and relations are those with which we have to achieve acquaintance in order to understand the words designating them. This fixes the character of his logical atomism. It is a version of empiricism and it uses a criterion of simplicity based on the exigencies of learning meanings . . . The doctrine of forced acquaintance is the foundation of Russell’s logical atomism.17
Russell allegedly operates with a criterion of simplicity that allows him to identify logical atoms as things with which we are familiar, namely 15 16 17
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 829. Ibid., p. 833. David Pears, The False Prison, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 63.
Logical atomism
29
sense-data and their properties.18 The foundation of Russell’s atomism, on this view, is an empiricist principle of acquaintance. It takes sense-data as its logical atoms, and offers an empiricistic construction of factual language. On this view, acquaintance also plays a role in Russell’s taxonomy or inventory of logical forms. For example, Pears characterizes Russell’s ‘‘inventory’’ metaphor as the thesis that philosophy comprises a body of knowledge that is gained by exploring a ‘‘second world,’’ a Platonic heaven of logical entities.19 Pears writes: A short answer to the question about the relation between Wittgenstein’s view of logic in the Tractatus and Russell’s . . . is that they were really opposed to one another. Russell believed that the logician’s task is to carry out a survey of ‘‘logical objects,’’ some of which are forms while others are the real counterparts of the logical connectives. Wittgenstein’s view was that there are no logical objects, . . . and logical connectives do not stand for anything in the world.20
On Pears’s reading, Russell arrives at his inventory of logical forms by appeal to acquaintance with other-worldly logical entities. In contrast, Pears characterizes Wittgenstein’s atomism as unconcerned with epistemology and sense-data. Wittgenstein endeavors to set ‘‘limits of thought’’ (from within) and show the ‘‘logical scaffolding’’ of thought, language, and the world. Anscombe made the point earlier: Russell was thoroughly imbued with the traditions of British empiricism. Wittgenstein’s admirers have generally been like Russell in this, and have assumed that Wittgenstein was too; therefore they have had assumptions about what is fundamental in philosophical analysis that were quite out of tune with the Tractatus.21
Anscombe is quite correct that it is questionable history to assume that the ‘‘objects’’ of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are Russellian sense-data.22 An identification of the elementary (atomic) propositions of the Tractatus with sense-data statements (or with phenomenalistic observation statements) is not well supported by the textual evidence. But her point does not at all reveal a difference between Russell’s logical atomism and the Tractatus. For it is every bit as questionable to import empiricist (and phenomenalistic) epistemology into Russell’s conception of logical atomism. For a time, Russell’s epistemology adopted sense-data, but he was not an empiricist. Russell had very strong nonempiricist leanings because of his logicism. In fact, in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) he thought that 18 21 22
Ibid., p. 68. 19 Ibid., p. 22. 20 Ibid., p. 25. G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 14. There has been a recent revival of this early interpretation of the Tractatus. See Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
30
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
he had achieved a new compromise between empiricism and rationalism. He allows for intuitive (synthetic and a priori) knowledge of relations between universals.23 This, he hopes, provides the ground not only for knowledge of logic and mathematics, but also for synthetic a priori knowledge of the principle of induction, and even some ethical principles.24 Logical atomism is not a form of empiricism. Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World bears a resemblance to the constructions of empiricists such as Berkeley, Hume, and the phenomenalism of C. I. Lewis’s Mind and World Order.25 But the resemblance is superficial. In stark contrast to traditional empiricism and especially phenomenalism, Russell’s analysis begins with what is physical, not with what is mental. Indeed, it seems likely that Russell always intended his sense-data to be physical entities, though not bits of ‘‘matter’’ (physical continuants that persist through time). In ‘‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’’ and in Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell was explicit that sense-data are physical.26 In The Problems of Philosophy, however, matters are more difficult. Russell then accepted a more traditional distinction between the mental and the physical. He hints that sense-data are not mental but rather physical appearances, which, because they depend both upon the sensory apparatus of an observer’s body and her position in space, are likely to be private and ephemeral.27 Sense-data are the objects of sensations (which are mental), and they serve as the physical evidentiary data for inference concerning ‘‘physical objects’’ (i.e., continuants which persist through space-time). In Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell explains that Whitehead’s work on points and instances in space prompted him to avoid the view espoused in Problems that inferences from the data of sense grounds knowledge of the existence of material continuants.28 Instead of inference, Russell offers an eliminativistic reconstruction, supplanting the language and ontology of material continuants (matter) by a new theory of relations among physical appearances (sense-data) and recovering the structure of physical theory of matter (continuants) within it. By 1915, Russell is beginning to chip away at the traditional distinction of mental and physical. Let me quote at some length from Russell’s letter to the editor of The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods: 23 24 25 26 27 28
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), pp. 73–74, 103. Ibid., p. 112. C. I. Lewis, Mind and World Order (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929). Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,’’ in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, p. 111. (First Published in Scientia, January 1914.) Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 41. See Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 8.
Logical atomism
31
In a quotation from the Athenaeum printed in this Journal, I am represented as having said, ‘‘there may be perspectives where there are no minds; but we cannot know anything of what sort of perspectives they may be, for the sense-datum is mental.’’ I did not see the Athenaeum, and do not remember what I said, but it cannot have been what I am reported as having said, for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is not mental – indeed my whole philosophy of physics rests on the view that the sense-datum is purely physical . . . A particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be causally dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain. Since we carry those about with us, we cannot discover what sensibilia, if any, belong to perspectives from places where there is no brain. And since a particular of which we are aware is a sense-datum, we cannot be aware of particulars which are not sense-data, and can, therefore, have no empirical evidence as to their nature.29
Russell says explicitly that sense-data are physical. He then goes on in his letter to imagine how one might go about defining ‘‘mental.’’ Noting that a world without mind contains no relations such as perceiving, remembering, desiring, enjoying, and believing, he writes: ‘‘This suggests that no particulars of which we have experience are to be called ‘mental,’ but that certain facts, involving certain relations, constitute what is essentially mental in the world of experiences.’’30 In Russell’s view, the traditional notion of what is mental is questionable. Russell soon adopted neutral monism and abandoned his distinction between the physical sense-datum and the mental sensation. He endeavored to transcend the traditional distinction between mind and matter, constructing both as continuants in time built out of orderings of the physical events that are their phases. Acquaintance is not the foundation of Russell’s logical atomism. In the logical atomism lectures, Russell embraces acquaintance with complexes (facts) that have universals and particulars among their constituents. Thus, being acquainted with an object is not sufficient for that object’s being a logical simple (atom). Neither is acquaintance a necessary condition for logical simplicity. Russell allows that there might be logical atoms with which we are not acquainted. Consider the following passage from 1914: Sense-data at the times when they are data are all that we directly and primitively know of the external world; hence in epistemology the fact that they are data is allimportant. But the fact that they are all we directly know gives, of course, no presumption that they are all that there is. If we could construct an impersonal metaphysics independent of the accidents of our knowledge and ignorance, the privileged position of the actual data [sense-data] would probably disappear, and 29
30
Bertrand Russell, letter to the editor published in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 12 (1915): 391–392. Reprinted in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 8, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, ed. John G. Slater (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 87. Ibid.
32
Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell
they would probably appear as a rather haphazard selection from a mass of objects more or less like them. In saying this, I assume only that it is probable that there are particulars with which we are not acquainted. Thus the special importance of sensedata is in relation to epistemology, not to metaphysics. In this respect, physics is to be reckoned as metaphysics: it is impersonal, and nominally pays no special attention to sense-data. It is only when we ask how physics can be known that the importance of sense-data re-emerges.31
Russell’s logical atomism leaves the question as to what are to be the logical atoms open for investigation. Logical atoms, Russell tells us, are what he calls ‘‘particulars,’’ and these are terms of relations (or properties) in atomic facts. Russell writes: ‘‘It remains to be investigated what particulars you can find in the world, if any. The whole question of what particulars you actually find in the real world is a purely empirical one which does not interest the logician as such.’’32 Russell makes no dogmatic claim about what must be the logical atoms found at the end point of logical analysis. His reply to Urmson in My Philosophical Development (1959) expresses the point emphatically: As regards simples, I can see no reason either to assert or to deny that they may be reached by analysis. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and I on occasion spoke of ‘‘atomic facts’’ as the final residue in analysis, but it was never an essential part of the analytic philosophy which Mr. Urmson is criticizing to suppose that such facts were attainable.33
In the atomism lectures, Russell entertained the possibility that simples (or logical atoms) might never be reached. ‘‘I think it is perfectly possible,’’ he wrote, ‘‘to suppose that complex things are capable of analysis ad infinitum, and that you never reach the simple. I do not think it is true, but it is a thing that one might argue certainly.’’34 Russell did think that the endpoint of analysis was epistemically attainable, but not that it must be. In Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948), he wrote: there is nothing erroneous in an account of structure which starts from units that are afterwards found to be themselves complex. For example, points may be defined as classes of events, but that does not falsify anything in traditional geometry, which treated points as simples. Every account of structure is relative to certain units which are, for the time being, treated as if they were devoid of structure, but it must never be assumed that these units will not, in another context, have a structure which it is important to recognize.35
31 32 33 34 35
Russell, ‘‘On the Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,’’ p. 110. Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ in Logic and Knowledge, p. 199. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 221. ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 202. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1948), p. 252.
Logical atomism
33
In My Philosophical Development he explained the point further: ‘‘I believed originally with Leibniz that everything complex is composed of simples, and that it is important in considering analysis to regard simples as our goal. I have come to think, however, that although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple.’’36 Acquaintance does not determine what must be the simples of logical atomism. In truth, Russell’s notion of acquaintance underwent rather dramatic changes as his logical analyses expanded. The significance of the changes is not always manifest in Russell’s writings. In My Philosophical Development, he wrote: I have maintained a principle, which still seems to me completely valid, to the effect that, if we can understand what a sentence means, it must be composed entirely of words denoting things with which we are acquainted or definable in terms of such words. It is perhaps necessary to place some limitation upon this principle as regards logical words – e.g., or, not, some, all. We can eliminate the need of this limitation by confining our principle to sentences containing no variables and containing no parts that are sentences. In that case, we may say that, if our sentence attributes a predicate to a subject or asserts a relation between two or more terms, the words for the subject or for the terms of the relation must be proper names in the narrowest sense.37
Russell formulates the principle to exempt words for logical particles and words for properties and relations. Understanding, in those cases, is a much more complicated matter. Complicated indeed. Radical changes occurred in Russell’s conception of ‘‘acquaintance.’’ In ‘‘On Denoting’’ (1905), the principle of acquaintance is stated as follows: In every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e., not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.38
In his ‘‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’’ (1910–1911) and in Problems (1912), Russell renders the principle as follows: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.39
The word ‘‘proposition’’ wants clarification in these passages. In ‘‘On Denoting,’’ Russell embraced an ontology of atomic, molecular, and 36 38 39
My Philosophical Development, p. 165. 37 Ibid., p. 169. ‘‘On Denoting,’’ in Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 119. ‘‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,’’ in Mysticism and Logic, p. 159; The Problems of Philosophy, p. 58.
34
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even general propositions (as mind- and language-independent, obtaining or non-obtaining, states of affairs). The logical particle ‘‘’’ stands for a relation of ‘implication’ between propositions. But propositions in this sense were abandoned in Principia (1910), never to reappear in Russell’s philosophy. Quite obviously the notion of a ‘‘proposition’’ changes in Russell’s formulations of the principle of acquaintance after Principia. Moreover, by the time of the logical atomism lectures, acquaintance with a universal is no longer construed simply as a relation with a universal as one of its relata. ‘‘Understanding a predicate,’’ Russell writes, ‘‘is quite a different thing from understanding a name . . . To understand a name you must be acquainted with the particular of which it is a name, and you must know that it is the name of that particular. You do not, that is to say, have any suggestion of the form of a proposition, whereas in understanding a predicate you do.’’40 Russell had come to maintain that universals have only a predicable nature. Consequently, words for universals (properties and relations) must always occur in predicate positions and never in subject positions.41 Pears is mistaken when he says that Russell’s logical atomism adopted an epistemic principle of acquaintance that ‘‘fixes the nature’’ of logical atoms as sense-data. In fact, Russell abandoned sense-data in 1918 when he embraced neutral monism, and this occurred only a few months after completing the atomism lectures. In the atomism lectures themselves, Russell was on the verge of embracing neutral monism. Consider the following: I feel more and more inclined to think that it [neutral monism] may be true. I feel more and more that the difficulties that occur in regard to it are all of the sort that may be solved by ingenuity . . . One is the question of belief and the other sorts of facts involving two verbs. If there are such facts as this, that I think may make neutral monism rather difficult, but as I was pointing out, there is the theory that one calls behaviorism, which belongs logically with neutral monism, and that theory would altogether dispense with those facts containing two verbs, and would therefore dispose of that argument against neutral monism.42
In My Philosophical Development, Russell recalled that his adoption of neutral monism required the abandonment of a conscious subject or ‘self’ and this put an end to his theory that ‘sense-data’ are the immediate objects of mental acts of sensation. Russell came to hold that it is no longer possible to distinguish the cognitive act of sensation from the physical sense-datum. To take one of Russell’s examples, the sensation that we have when we see a patch of color simply is that patch of color, an actual 40 42
‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 205. Ibid., pp. 279–280.
41
Ibid., pp. 205, 225–226.
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constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with.43 The results of this change were striking. Russell explained that ‘‘new problems, of which at first I was not fully conscious, arose as a consequence of the abandonment of ‘sense-data.’ Such words as ‘awareness,’ ‘acquaintance,’ and ‘experience,’ had to be re-defined, and this was by no means an easy task.’’44 Russell attempts to replace ‘acquaintance’ and offers an analysis of knowing in sympathy with behaviorism which he regards as the natural ally of neutral monism.45 Neutral monism is, in fact, a theory within logical atomism. Undue emphasis on acquaintance obscures this. Tully writes: ‘‘The most notable feature of Russell’s conversion to neutral monism from logical atomism (as he called his position in 1914) was the abandonment of acquaintance or awareness as the cornerstone of his metaphysics and epistemology.’’46 If a primitive relation of acquaintance with sense-data were definitive of Russell’s logical atomism, then Russell’s adoption of neutral monism would have to be a ‘‘conversion’’ in the sense of an abandonment of logical atomism in favor of neutral monism. But logical atomism was not abandoned in favor of neutral monism. Russell makes it explicit that neutral monism is a theory within logical atomism.47 Russell had been grappling with James’s 1903 paper ‘‘Does Consciousness Exist?’’ for many years. James rejected the relational character of sensation. He contended that those who still cling to consciousness as an entity ‘‘are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ‘soul’ upon the air of philosophy.’’ The phrase ‘‘neutral monism’’ suggests that both mind and matter are composed of some ‘‘neutral stuff’’ which, in itself, is neither. Spinoza held that there is only one substance and that laws of mind and laws of matter are two among infinitely many different systems of attributes under which it can be comprehended. But Russell’s neutral monism was more directly connected with his logical analysis of space and time. In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell offered a logical reconstruction of the notion of ‘‘matter’’ in rational dynamics, abandoning the notion of a substance persisting through time, and offering new accounts of motion and continuous change informed by Weierstrass’s work on limits.48 Russell concluded that Zeno would be right to conclude that change is not a transition in time from one state to a consecutive state. Russell explains that ‘‘Weierstrass, by strictly banishing all infinitesimals, has at last shown that we live in an 43 45 46 47 48
My Philosophical Development, p. 101. 44 Ibid. Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1927), pp. 67, 129, 172. Russell did not embrace behaviorism, however. Robert Tully, ‘‘Three Studies of Russell’s Neutral Monism,’’ Russell 13 (1993): 7. See, for instance, Philosophy, p. 248; History of Western Philosophy, pp. 812, 833; ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ p. 342. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1937), p. 471.
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unchanging world, and that the arrow, at every moment of its flight, is truly at rest. The only point where Zeno probably erred was in inferring (if he did infer) that, because there is no change, therefore the world must be in the same state at one time as at another.’’49 In Principles, Russell accepted a perdurance theory of time according to which events stand in temporal ordering relations. He rejected the theory that material objects endure, change their properties in a (consecutive) succession of moments. When Russell came to adopt neutral monism he welded it to his theory of time. Russell’s early views on the philosophy of space and time are important, for they explain how he came to weld his neutral monism with Einstein’s theory of relativity. Tully surmises that Russell’s neutral monism evolved significantly. He argues that it is only in late incarnations of the theory that Russell came to think of his ‘‘neutral stuff’’ in terms of physical events of space-time.50 To be sure, in Russell’s The Analysis of Mind (1921) the connections to his perdurance theory of time are not made, though Russell’s preface hints that his neutral monism is a form of physicalism.51 But neutral monism is as much a philosophy of matter (physical continuants changing through time) as it is a philosophy of mind. It is not surprising that Russell would offer neutral monism as a philosophical ally of general relativity. In his essay ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ Russell summarized the position on matter and time as follows: Every event has to a certain number of others a relation of ‘compresence’; from the point of view of physics, a collection of compresent events all occupy one small region in space-time. One example of a set of compresent events is what would be called the contents of one man’s mind at one time – i.e., all his sensations, images, memories, thoughts, etc., which can coexist temporally . . . We will define a set of compresent events as a ‘minimal region.’ We find that minimal regions form a fourdimensional manifold, and that, by a little logical manipulation, we can construct from them the manifold of space-time that physics requires. We find also that, from a number of different minimal regions, we can often pick out a set of events, one from each, which are closely similar when they come from neighboring regions, and vary from one region to another according to discoverable laws. These are the laws of the propagation of light, sound, etc. We find also that certain regions of spacetime have quite peculiar properties; these are the regions which are said to be occupied by ‘matter.’ Such regions can be collected, by means of the laws of physics, into tracks or tubes, very much more extended in one dimension of space-time than in the other three. Such a tube constitutes the ‘history’ of a piece of matter; from the point of view of the piece of matter itself.52 49 50 51 52
Ibid., p. 347. R. E. Tully, ‘‘Russell’s Neutral Monism,’’ in Nicholas Griffin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 359. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), pp. 5f. ‘‘Logical Atomism,’’ p. 342.
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The ‘‘neutral stuff’’ are events which compose space-time.53 It is worth quoting as well from Russell’s book Philosophy (1927): The physical world, both through the theory of relativity and through the most recent doctrines as to the structure of the atom, has become very different from the world of everyday life, and also from that of the scientific materialism of the eighteenth-century variety. No philosophy can ignore the revolutionary changes in our physical ideas that the men of science have found necessary; indeed it may be said that all traditional philosophies must be discarded . . . The main point for the philosopher in the modern theory is the disappearance of a ‘thing.’ It has been replaced by emanations from a locality.54 In a word, ‘matter’ has become no more than a convenient shorthand for stating certain causal laws concerning events . . . But if matter has fared badly, mind has faired little better. The adjective ‘mental’ is one which is not capable of any exact significance. There is, it is true, an important group of events, namely percepts, all of which may be called ‘mental.’ But it would be arbitrary to say that there are no ‘mental’ events except percepts, and yet it is difficult to find any principle by which we can decide what other events should be included. Perhaps the most essential characteristics of mind are introspection and memory. But memory in some of its forms is, as we have seen, a consequence of the law of conditioned reflexes, which is at least as much physiological as psychological, and characterizes living tissue rather than mind. Knowledge, as we have found, is not easy to distinguish from sensitivity, which is a property possessed by scientific instruments. Introspection is a form of knowledge, but turns out on examination to be little more than a cautious interpretation of ordinary ‘knowledge.’ Where the philosopher’s child at the Zoo says ‘‘There is a hippopotamus over there,’’ the philosopher should reply: ‘‘There is a coloured pattern of a certain shape, which may perhaps be connected with a certain system of external causes of the sort called ‘hippopotamus.’’’ (I do not live up to this precept myself.) In saying that there is a coloured pattern, the philosopher is practicing introspection in the only sense I can attach to the term, i.e., his knowledge-reaction is to an event situated in his own brain from the standpoint of physical space . . . Thus ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are merely approximate concepts, giving convenient shorthand for certain approximate laws. In a completed science, the word ‘mind’ and the word ‘matter’ would both disappear, and would be replaced by causal laws concerning ‘events,’ the only events known to us otherwise than in their mathematical and causal properties being percepts, which are events situated in the same region as a brain and having effects of a particular sort called ‘knowledge-reactions.’55
According to Russell’s neutral monism, selections of events have orderings that constitute a physical continuant in space-time; other selections have 53 54
See Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Philosophy in the Twentieth-Century’’ (1924), The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 8, p. 465. Philosophy, p. 97; see also pp. 146, 213f., 276f. 55 Ibid., p. 280.
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orderings that constitute a conscious mind. Russell’s ‘‘neutral stuff’’ are events; space-time is itself a construct of such events, and in this sense they are ‘‘neutral’’ between matter (physical continuants) and mind (conscious entities). Among the orderings relevant to the series of events that constitute a conscious mind there are those which, as a series, involve ‘‘physiological inference’’ (reaction patterns grounded in associative learning). ‘‘Knowing,’’ on Russell’s account, is an activity – a way of reacting to the environment.56 Russell’s neural monism involved a naturalization project that anticipates some of the most contemporary naturalization studies in the philosophy of mind. In view of the many different versions of acquaintance in Russell’s philosophy, it is clear that an empiricist principle that a mind (in the traditional sense) is acquainted with a sense-datum (as a mental entity) cannot play the role Pears assigns to it in defining logical atomism. Indeed, no version of Russell’s principle of acquaintance can play the role of defining his logical atomism. Why then does ‘acquaintance’ seem to have such a central position in Russell’s logical atomism lectures? Russell discusses ‘acquaintance’ in the lectures because he was imagining what a logically perfect or ideal and complete theory – the endpoint of an analysis and reconstruction – would be like. The syntactic forms found in Principia were taken as a guide to the sort of syntactic forms that would be present in the language of the perfect theory. Of course, the final and complete theory might contain linguistic forms not in Principia’s formal language because it would adopt new non-logical axioms appropriate to the contingent theories of physics, mind, psychology, etc., couched within it. Unlike Principia, the language of the perfect theory might contain genuine (logically proper) names aside from variables, and adopt primitive predicate constants and function constants pertaining to these various applied fields.57 Russell imagines that, as a necessary condition for understanding the ideal theory, one would have to have acquaintance with the universals indicated by the primitive predicate constants and the objects that are the referents of the logically proper names used in the contingent empirical theories that compose the ideal theory. ‘‘All analysis,’’ he says, ‘‘is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain simple symbols.’’58 Russell therefore speculates in his logical
56 57 58
Ibid., p. 17. ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 201. In Principia the only singular terms are variables. Ibid., p. 194.
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39
atomism lectures that the logically proper names of an ideal theory of knowledge and theory of mind would be indexicals like ‘‘this’’ and ‘‘that,’’ which refer to ephemeral momentary experiences – sensible particulars such as a patch of color or a sound. These, together with acquaintance with relations between universals (which yield synthetic a priori knowledge), would be the building blocks for the construction of knowledge. Russell’s examples of the philosophy of logical atomism, however, do not corroborate the interpretation that atomism involves ontological reduction to known (epistemic) entities and a zoological inventory of logical forms based on the entities with which a mind may be acquainted. They show that logical atomism was a conception of philosophy as analysis, reconceptualization, and reconstruction. Russell’s atomism was not a theory about an empiricist analysis of factual language – any more than Einstein’s theory of space-time is an analysis of the nineteenth-century factual language of physics or Weierstrass’s reconstruction of limits is an analysis of the use of the word ‘‘limit’’ in the calculus. Logical atomism is a form of structural realism. The ontology of the old theory is abandoned (or obviated), but the reconstruction for it retains (at most) the structures given by the laws of the old ontological framework (just as Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetic waves in an aether are retained in Einstein’s no-aether theory of relativity). In The Analysis of Matter (1927), Russell says that knowledge of physics is confined to structural and mathematical properties, not intrinsic natures of physical substances.59 In his book Philosophy Russell put it starkly: ‘‘Our knowledge of the physical world is purely abstract: we know certain logical characteristics of its structure, but nothing of its intrinsic character.’’60 Russell’s inventory of logical forms takes place only after the eliminativistic analysis and reconstruction of the structures of the old theory. Theories of mind and knowledge are themselves subject to analysis and reconstruction. Russell’s early theory of acquaintance cannot play a role in determining what must be in the ontological inventory, for that very theory later became subject to reconstruction. Russell’s early theory that acquaintance is a dyadic relation between a mind and sense-data, universals, and complexes was not the foundation of his philosophy of logical atomism. It was a feature of an epistemic theory he couched within his logical atomist research program – a theory he abandoned in favor of neutral monism. It is important not to lose sight of this. The lectures on the philosophy of logical atomism are just Russell’s attempts to set out a philosophical
59 60
Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (London: Kegan Paul, 1927), pp. 264, 287. Philosophy, p. 296.
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method. Subtheories within it, especially epistemic theories concerning sense-data and acquaintance, come and go. We must not hold Russell’s logical atomism hostage to the theses he advanced when working out this or that epistemic theory. Logical atomism is a research program. We must not define logical atomism as if it is wedded to any of the theoretical constructions couched within it – be it Russell’s early theory of acquaintance, Principia’s theory of classes, the multiple-relation theory of judgment, the construction of physical continuants from sense-data, neutral monism, or whatever. Russell’s ideas on epistemology in the logical atomism lectures changed when his eliminativism widened. But in spite of the rather radical changes Russell made from The Problems of Philosophy to Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, none mark any change whatsoever in what he meant by his philosophy of logical atomism. The logical independence of the facts that are truth-makers In order to understand Wittgenstein’s influence on the logical atomism lectures, we must understand some of the technical constructions of Principia’s recursive theory of truth and falsehood. Unfortunately, Principia’s theory of truth has not been well understood. To see why, it is important to recall a bit of the historical development of Russell’s notion of a proposition and its role in his philosophy of logic. Prior to Principia, Russell maintained that logic is the science of propositional structure. Russell’s propositions are states of affairs – considered as intensional objects. That is, propositions may logically imply one another and yet be distinct. Some states of affairs obtain (are true) and others do not obtain (are false). Obtaining (truth) and nonobtaining (falsehood) are accepted as primitive unanalyzable properties. States of affairs are mind- and language-independent entities that contain ordinary objects, rocks, trees, mountains, and the like, as constituents. In Russell’s early philosophy, logic is the general theory of propositions. Propositions are purely logical objects. Hence, Russell accepts the thesis that every well-formed formula of the language of logic can be nominalized to form a singular term for a proposition. Implication is adopted as a primitive logical relation marked by the horseshoe sign. The horseshoe sign is flanked by terms to form a formula. It must not be conflated with the modern horseshoe for ‘‘if . . . then . . .’’ which is flanked by formulas to form a formula. Russell originally used the horseshoe sign to stand for a relation of implication. For clarity of exposition, let us stretch and boldface the horseshoe when it is used as a relation sign. Where ‘‘x’’ and ‘‘y’’ are individual variables, Russell allows
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‘‘x ) y’’ to be a well-formed formula of his language of the logic of propositional structure. Adopting the use of brackets to mark a nominalizing transformation, Russell allows the transformation of the formula ‘‘x ) y’’ into a term ‘‘{x ) y}.’’ This term is read ‘‘x’s implying y’’ and should not be conflated with the formula ‘‘x implies y.’’ The term can then occur in the position of ‘‘y’’ in ‘‘x ) y’’ to form the formula ‘‘x ) {x ) y}.’’ This is read ‘‘x implies x’s implying y.’’ It is convenient, however, to allow subject position to itself mark the nominalizing transformation and use dots as punctuation. In this way, we can write the convenient ‘‘x . ). x ) y’’ instead of the cumbersome ‘‘x ) {x ) y}.’’ On the early version of the theory of propositions, Russell allows the nominalization of any formula, including those containing bound variables of quantification. For instance, the formula ‘‘(x)(x ) y)’’ which says ‘‘everything implies y’’ can be nominalized to make the singular term ‘‘{(x)(x ) y)}’’ which is read ‘‘Everything’s implying y’’. Putting this in the position of ‘‘y’’ in the formula ‘‘x ) y’’ yields the formula ‘‘x ) {(x)(x ) y)}.’’ More conveniently this can be written ‘‘x .). (x)(x ) y).’’ This is read ‘‘x implies everything’s implying y.’’ Inference rules in the logic of propositions must be crafted so as to respect that grammar of the language. One must not let an individual variable such as x occur on a line of a proof. For example, the inference rule modus ponens is not the incoherent rule: From x and x ) y infer y.
It is all too easy to slight this fact by misunderstanding Russell’s use of the letters ‘‘p’’ and ‘‘q’’. One might think it acceptable to formulate the rule of modus ponens as follows: From p and p ) q infer q.
But this is every bit as incoherent as before. Russell uses ‘‘p’’ and ‘‘q’’ as individual variables, not special ‘‘propositional variables.’’ The appearance of legitimacy comes from the modern formulation of modus ponens as From P and P Q infer Q.
But in the modern use, the letters ‘‘P’’ and ‘‘Q’’ are schematic for formulas and the modern sign ‘‘’’ is flanked by formulas to form a formula. Matters are even more confusing since Principia uses the horseshoe sign ‘‘’’ in the modern sense. Principia abandons Russell’s early ontology of propositions and the signs ‘‘’’ and ‘‘v’’ are adopted as primitive statement connectives. The logical signs of Principia are statement connectives in the modern sense. In Russell’s early logic of propositions, one can offer definitions as follows:
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¼ df ) f f ¼ df ðxÞðyÞðx ) yÞ & ¼ df ð ) Þ:61
Here and are any singular terms. This is certainly impossible in a modern sentential calculus. When Russell embraced his early ontology of propositions, he dallied with the theory that belief is a relation between a mind and a proposition. But in 1907 he published a paper entitled ‘‘On the Nature of Truth’’ which explored, without endorsement, the strengths and weaknesses of a ‘‘multiplerelation’’ theory of belief. On the multiple-relation theory, there are no propositions and belief is analyzed in a new way. In Principia, the multiplerelation theory plays a central role in the philosophical explanation of the order component of the order\type indices on the predicate variables of the formal language of the system. Unfortunately, its role in Principia has been missed. For many years Principia has been interpreted as adopting ´ Vicious Circle Principle (VCP) as the justification for embracPoincare’s ing a ramified and type-stratified hierarchy of entities (propositional functions). This interpretation became orthodoxy. The principle is this: (VCP) Whatever involves an apparent [bound] variable must not be a value of that variable.
The orthodoxy holds, in Russell’s view, that the logical paradoxes (of classes and propositional functions) have a source in common with semantic paradoxes such as the Epimenides Liar. Both arise from violation of the VCP. The weakness of this interpretation is that it is incompatible with the historical evolution of ramified types and with central features of Principia’s introduction. Russell in fact separated logical from semantic paradoxes, offering quite different solutions for the kinds of paradoxes in 1906.62 Principia itself offers philosophical justifications for ramified type structure quite independently of the VCP. Principia’s formal language adopts order\type indices on its variables. The type component is justified in the introduction by a ‘‘Direct Inspection Argument.’’ The order component is justified by means of a recursively defined hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ whose foundation is the multiple-relation theory of judgment.
61 62
Gregory Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). I use a boldface & to distinguish it from the statement connective conjunction. See Gregory Landini, ‘‘Russell’s Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes,’’ in ´ Philippe de Rouilhan, ed., Russell en heritage, Revue internationale de philosophie 3 (2004): 257–294.
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The Direct Inspection Argument assumes a nominalistic semantics for Principia’s predicate variables. Whitehead and Russell write: a direct consideration of the kind of functions which have functions as arguments and the kinds of functions which have arguments other than functions will show, if we are not mistaken, that not only is it impossible for a function ’^ y to have itself or anything derived from it as argument, but that if y y^ is another function such that there are arguments a with which both ‘‘’a’’ and ‘‘ya’’ are significant, then y y^ and anything derived from it cannot significantly be arguments to ’^ y. This arises from the fact that a function is essentially an ambiguity, and that, if it is to occur in a definition proposition, it must occur in such a way that the ambiguity has disappeared, and a wholly unambiguous statement has resulted.63
The idea is that a predicate variable can occur in a subject position (argument position) of another predicate variable only if in the semantics this position represents a predicate position in a formula. According to the nominalistic semantics, the type component of the order\type indices on predicate variables indicates the nature of the formulas of the language that can stand in for it. Whitehead and Russell give the following example: Take, e.g., ‘‘x is a man,’’ and consider ‘‘is a man.’’ Here there is nothing definite which is said to be a man. A function, in fact, is not a definite object which could be or not be a man; it is a mere ambiguity awaiting determination, and in order that it may occur significantly it must receive the necessary determination.64
The notion that a function is an ‘‘ambiguity awaiting determination’’ seems obscure until we realize that this is simply an archaic phrase for the notion that a predicate variable is undetermined until given an assignment (‘‘determination’’) in the semantic interpretation of the formal language. Whitehead and Russell are speaking about predicate variables and are concerned with the semantics. If a nominalistic semantics were to assign the formula ‘‘. . . is a man’’ to the variable ’ and ‘‘. . . is mortal’’ to the variable y, then it would assign the ungrammatical ‘‘. . . is a mortal is a man’’ to ’(y). However, if it assigns ‘‘Every thing is such that . . . it . . .’’ to ’, then the result is the grammatical ‘‘Everything is such that it is mortal.’’ Type superscripts on ’((o)) and y (o) track the semantic requirement that the sort of formula that the semantics can assign to y (o) must occupy a predicate position in the formula assigned to ’((o)). By appeal to this informal semantics, Principia endeavors to philosophically justify and explain the type component of the order\type indices on its predicate variables.65
63 64
A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), vol. 1, p. 47. Ibid., p. 48. 65 A formal definition of order\type is given in Chapter 5.
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The introduction of Principia explicitly abandons propositions. It adopts a multiple-relation theory of judgment and a hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ Writing on behalf of the orthodoxy, Goldfarb says that the multiple-relation theory ‘‘plays no role in Russell’s explanation of his formal system.’’66 Church went so far as to say that the multiple-relation theory was a late addition not well integrated into the system of Principia. He holds that an ontology of propositions is ‘‘clearly demanded by the background and purpose of Russell’s logic . . . in spite of what seems to be an explicit denial by Whitehead and Russell in Principia.’’67 In truth, Principia’s explanation of types and orders is not founded upon the VCP. Russell regards the VCP as a regulative principle which guides the search for a solution. The solution offered in Principia is its thesis that only individual variables of the work are genuine. Predicate variables are given a nominalistic semantics. This generates a philosophical explanation of the type component of the order\type indices adorning the predicate variables. To philosophically justify the order component of the order\type indices, Russell offers a ‘‘no-propositions’’ recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’68 The abandonment of propositions plays a central role in Russell’s philosophical justification of the order component of the order\type indices on the predicate variables of Principia. To appreciate this, however, it is important to pause to consider Russell’s reasons for abandoning propositions. Some interpretations maintain Russell abandoned propositions because of his growingly robust sense of reality – his stand against Meinongian objects of intentional inexistence such as the round square. Others find troubles with Russell’s account in The Principles of Mathematics of the unity of a nonobtaining (false) proposition.69 The search for such reasons is, however, in vain. The propositions Russell embraced prior to Principia were not postulated to account for the intentionality of mental acts. What Meinong calls an ‘‘objektiv,’’ on the other hand, is postulated as part of an account of intentionality (the aboutness of the mental). To be sure, in Principles Russell embraced a theory according to which there are denoting concepts. When a denoting concept occurs predicatively (if you will) in a proposition,
66
67 68 69
Warren Goldfarb, ‘‘Russell’s Reasons for Ramification,’’ in Wade Savage and C. Anthony Anderson, eds., Rereading Russell, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 24–40. Alonzo Church, ‘‘Comparison of Russell’s Resolution of the Semantic Paradoxes with that of Tarski,’’ Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (1976): 747–760. Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory. See, for instance, Bernard Linsky, ‘‘Why Russell Abandoned Russellian Propositions,’’ in A. D. Irvine and G. A. Wedeking, eds., Russell and Analytic Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 193–209.
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Russell says that the proposition is ‘‘about’’ the object(s) denoted by the concept.70 But Russell hastens to add that this sense of ‘‘aboutness’’ is a purely logical notion, not a psychological or mental notion.71 It is not, therefore, a notion appropriate for an account of the intentionality of the mental. The logical notion of aboutness is not what Meinong (and Brentano) took as the mark of the mental. In ‘‘On Denoting,’’ Russell abandoned denoting concepts and with them he abandoned his early theory that there is a logical notion of aboutness. He still retained his early theory that belief is a dyadic relation between a mind and a proposition. But this too would soon be jettisoned. By 1906, Russell was imagining doing without general propositions. Only quantifier-free formulas (of the formal language) can be nominalized to form terms for propositions. Hence, belief, in the case when something general is believed, cannot be construed as a dyadic relation to a proposition. There is nothing Meinongian whatever in the postulation of false (nonobtaining) propositions as part of logic as the science of structure. Nor is there any problem Russell saw with the notion of the unity of a proposition. According to Russell, universals (properties and relations) have a predicable nature. The unity (and so the existence) of a proposition, whether obtaining or nonobtaining, is due to there being a universal occurring predicationally in it. The existence of the proposition is not to be conflated with the truth (or obtaining) of the proposition. With an ontology of propositions (states of affairs) assumed, truth (obtaining) and falsehood (nonobtaining) must be taken as primitive unanalyzable properties.72 The abandonment of propositions, on the other hand, opens the way to defining notions of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ Russell’s technical conception of a fact, invented for his new multiple-relation theory, is itself part of the abandonment of propositions. The notion of a fact is part of the analysis of ‘‘truth’’ as correspondence. The truth of a belief, in the simplest case, is analyzed as the existence of a fact that corresponds to the belief. The falsehood of the belief is the absence of a corresponding fact. The occurrence of a relating relation in a fact does not make the fact true. The notion ‘‘true fact’’ is incoherent. The occurrence of the relating relation is what makes it the case that there is such a fact. Facts and propositions are like men and dinosaurs: they never coexisted. Why then did Russell come to abandon his early theory of propositions in Principia? In his paper ‘‘On the Nature of Truth,’’ Russell explained that 70 72
The Principles of Mathematics, pp. 53, 64. 71 Ibid., p. 53. Russell likens them to the whiteness and redness of roses. See Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions,’’ Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 75.
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the chief difficulty in embracing belief as a relation between a mind and a proposition is the existence of paradoxes ‘‘analogous to that of the Liar.’’73 Russell’s comment is odd. The propositional Epimenides Liar is the contingent paradox of the existence of a person who asserts that all propositions he believes are mistaken, and whose other beliefs are indeed all mistaken.74 Why would the Epimenides provide reason for abandoning propositions? In fact, Russell had considered and put aside worries about a propositional Epimenides paradox as early as June 1905 in a manuscript entitled ‘‘On Fundamentals.’’ Russell’s theory of propositions is well insulated against any propositional liar paradox because ‘belief,’ ‘assertion,’ and the like are not part of the logic of propositions. In papers of 1905 and 1906 on the theory of propositions, Russell separated logical and semantic paradoxes and offered different solutions for them.75 No semantic notions are involved in the pure language of Russell’s logic of propositions. And certainly nothing in the logic of propositions demands that belief or assertion is a relation between a mind and a proposition. Unfortunately, this is rarely appreciated. For example, Goldfarb holds that paradoxes akin to the Epimenides Liar can be generated in Russell’s logic of propositions. Goldfarb attempts to formulate a paradox with (x)(Ax ) x), maintaining that we need only let A be a formula that is uniquely satisfied by the proposition {(x)(Ax ) x)}.76 But any such attempt along these lines is doomed to failure. The letter A is being used as a stand-in for some formula of the object-language of the theory. But there is no formula of the object-language of Russell’s quantificational logic of propositions that can play the role Goldfarb assigns to it. In fact, the Russellian logic of propositions (i.e., quantification theory, including quantification over propositions) is quite consistent.77 What, then, was the paradox of propositions ‘‘analogous to the Liar’’ that Russell had in mind? The answer was long buried in Russell’s unpublished manuscripts. Russell had worked out an extension of his quantificational logic of propositions to form a substitutional theory of propositional structure. 73 74 75
76 77
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Nature of Truth,’’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7 (1907–1908): 28–49. This differs from the Statement Liar – the paradox that arises with the statement, ‘‘This sentence is false.’’ See Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Substitutional Theory of Classes and Relations,’’ manuscript received by the London Mathematical Society on 24 April 1905. Published in Essays in ´ Analysis, pp. 165–189. See also Russell’s ‘‘Les paradoxes de la logique,’’ Revue de metaphysique et de morale 14 (1906): 627–650. The English manuscript is titled ‘‘On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic’’ and is printed in Essays in Analysis, pp. 190–214. Goldfarb, ‘‘Russell’s Reasons for Ramification,’’ p. 29. The proof of consistency simply tracks the proof of the consistency of modern quantification theory.
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The theory began in 1905 on the heels of the theory of definite descriptions, and it lasted in one form or another until Russell’s official abandonment of propositions in 1910. Russell’s substitutional theory is entirely type-free, and adopts only one style of variables – namely, individual variables. The theory is able to emulate the structures of a type-stratified language of predicate variables (with such variables allowed in subject and well as predicate positions). That is, it recovers the structure of a simple typetheory of attributes in intension without assuming that every open formula comprehends an attribute. In this way, Russell hoped that the substitutional theory would save the logicist program by providing a genuine solution of Russell’s paradoxes of classes and attributes. In 1906, however, Russell discovered a new paradox of propositions unique to substitution. I have called it Russell’s ‘‘po/ao paradox.’’ It was this paradox that caused him to abandon propositions.78 Russell’s po/ao paradox of substitution involves no semantic notions such as ‘‘truth’’ or ‘‘designation.’’ Nonetheless, Russell thought it is ‘‘analogous’’ to the semantic paradox of Epimenides. That is, he thought that by investigation of solutions of the Epimenides he might find a solution of the paradox of substitution. Ultimately, he concluded that the only way to salvage the substitutional theory from the po/ao paradox is to adopt a theory whose genuine variables come with indices appropriate to different ‘‘orders’’ of propositions. This led Russell to abandon the substitutional theory. The theory had succeeded in emulating a type-stratified theory of classes within a type-free calculus that has only individual/entity variables. But retrofitting the substitutional theory with order indices on its individual/entity variables proved unacceptable to Russell. Just as the substitutional theory built types into logical form of a no-logical-assumptionof-attributes/classes (‘‘no-classes’’) theory, Russell endeavored to find some deeper analysis that would build the structure of types of attributes and the structure of orders of propositions into the grammar of a ‘‘no-logical-assumption-of-attributes/classes’’ and ‘‘no-propositions’’ theory. The desire to avoid an ontology of orders of propositions and emulate the structure of orders by recursive definitions of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ motivated Russell to abandon the substitutional theory. Principia offers a recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ The recursive definition philosophically explains the order component of the order\type indices on the individual and predicate variables of the formal language. The notion of ‘‘truth’’ as applied to syntactically complex formulas is defined in terms of a notion of ‘‘truth’’ as applied to less syntactically complex formulas. By
78
Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory.
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appealing to the truth conditions involved in a nominalistic semantics for predicate variables, Principia endeavors to make both order and type part of the significance conditions of its ‘‘structured’’ variables. Principia’s multiple-relation theory of judgment plays a central role in the atomic (base) case of the recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ The recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ is intended to provide a means of recovering the structural characteristics (though not the ontology) of a ramified hierarchy of orders of propositions in an order-free (and type-free) no-propositions theory. Central to the recursive definition is Russell’s abandonment of his former ontology of propositions and conversion to the view that the logical particles are statement connectives; they are not signs that stand for relations or properties (of propositions). In Principia, Whitehead and Russell write: Owing to the plurality of the objects of a single judgment, it follows that what we call a ‘proposition’ (in the sense in which this is distinguished from the phrase expressing it) is not a single entity at all. That is to say, the phrase that expresses a proposition is what we call an ‘incomplete’ symbol; it does not have meaning in itself, but requires some supplementation in order to acquire a complete meaning.79
‘‘A proposition,’’ Whitehead and Russell continue, ‘‘like such phrases as ‘the so and so,’ where grammatically it appears as subject, must be broken up into its constituents if we are to find the true subject or subjects.’’80 In ‘‘On the Nature of Truth,’’ Russell intimates that a statement flanked by ‘‘. . . is true’’ is a disguised definite description. He writes that his new theory of ‘‘truth’’ is ‘‘an extension of the principle applied in my article ‘On Denoting’ [Mind, October, 1905].’’81 This strongly suggests that the theory of definite descriptions is directly involved in Russell’s new definition of truth. Russell is not explicit as to how the analysis is ‘‘like’’ the analysis of definite descriptions, nor does he say what definite description is disguised. But his intent seems clear. The recursive characterization of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ is a correspondence theory. The notion of ‘‘truth0’’ applicable to formulas that are atomic (involving no logical constants or quantifiers) is defined in terms of correspondence between a belief and a fact. ‘‘Falsehoodo’’ is defined as the absence of any corresponding fact. When an atomic formula ‘‘R(c1,. . ., cn)’’ is flanked by the expression ‘‘. . . is true0’’ the formula is to be construed as a disguised definite description. It should be noted that unlike modern formal semantic theories, this allows a formula itself and not a name of a formula to be
79 80
A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 44. Ibid., p. 48. 81 Russell, ‘‘On the Nature of Truth,’’ p. 48n.
Logical atomism
49
flanked by ‘‘. . . is true.’’ To state the base of the recursion generally, we have the following: [R(c1, . . ., cn)] is true if and only if there is a unique fact consisting of the relation R relating c1, . . ., cn in proper order.82
In this way, we can see how the theory of definite descriptions was to play a central role at the base of the recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ Russell does not take up the question of how to formulate a truthdefinition for cases where formulas contain free variables. He did not anticipate Tarski’s ingenious notion of a denumerable sequence of objects (in the domain of an interpretation) satisfying an open formula. Nevertheless, with the base of the recursion for atomic statements established by the multiple-relation theory, he goes on to give truth-conditions for quantified formulas. Whitehead and Russell write: That the words ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’ have many different meanings, according to the kind of proposition to which they are applied, is not difficult to see. Let us call the sort of truth which is applicable to ’a ‘‘first truth.’’ . . . Consider now the proposition (x).’x. If this has truth of the sort appropriate to it, that will mean that every value ’x has ‘‘first truth.’’ Thus, if we call the sort of truth applicable to (x).’x ‘‘second truth,’’ we may define ‘‘[(x) .’x] as second truth’’ as meaning ‘‘every value for ’x has first truth,’’ i.e., ‘‘(x).(’x has first truth).’’83
The passage is informal and sketchy. Moreover, there is no clause for molecular formulas. But the idea seems to be this. Where p is an atomic formula containing exactly n-many subordinate elementary propositional clauses, [ p] truee.n if and only if it is not the case that [p] is truee.n1. Where p and q are atomic statements, [p q] is truee.n if and only if either [p] is falsee.a or [q] is truee.b, where a and b are some numerals appropriate to the molecular complexity of p and q and such that a þ b ¼ n. Where Ax is a quantifier-free formula, [(x)Ax] is true1.1; e.n if and only if every entity x is such that [Ax] is true1.o; e.n. The truth-conditions given for general statements is important. According to the recursive characterization of the Principia, the truth of a general statement lies in its correspondence with several facts. Whitehead and Russell are explicit: And generally, in any judgement (x). ’x, the sense in which this judgment is or may be true is not the same as that in which ’x is or may be true. If ’x is an elementary
82
83
That is, the fact consisting of the relation R relating c1, . . ., cn in proper order exists. The vexing problem of order which has come to be called the ‘‘direction problem’’ will be addressed anon (pp. 55ff.). Principia Mathematica to *56, p. 42.
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judgment, it is true when it points to a corresponding complex. But (x). ’x does not point to a single corresponding complex: the corresponding complexes are as numerous as the possible values of x.84
The recursive characterization of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood,’’ the abandonment of propositions, and the multiple-relations theory of judgment are central features of Russell’s philosophical explanation of order in the ramified type-theory of Principia. To better understand how the recursion was to be implemented when predicate variables are involved, let us examine the recursion in a bit more detail. The plan is that the order indices on the predicate variables track the hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ as applied to statements (formulas) of a fixed hierarchy of languages. For instance, language L1 contains formulas with bound and free individual variables and no formulas with higher-order variables. Language L2 contains L1 and allows formulas with bound and free predicate variables of order 1, but no higher. To illustrate how order indices on predicate variables are explained in the semantics, let us introduce fine-grained order indices. For instance, instead of Principia’s predicate variable, ’ðoÞ
whose type is (o) and order is 1, consider the following variable: 1:m; e:a ðon oÞ
’
:
This is a predicate variable of type (o) which in the nominalistic semantics is such that only formulas that contain exactly m-many bound individual variables and a-many quantifier-free propositional subordinate clauses can be substituted for its occurrences. Arguments to this predicate variable are individual variables of the form oxo. Following Russell’s example, the recursively defined hierarchy of truth and falsehood contains clauses such as the following. Where A is a well-formed formula containing the variable 1..n; e.b (o\o) ’ free, and where d is the number of occurrences of the bound predicate variable in predicate positions in the formula A, we have [(1.n; e.b ’(o\o))A] is true z.w; . . .; 1..m; e.a iff Every formula A* is true z.w; . . .; 1..m þ (nd); e.a þ (bd) where A* is obtained by replacing each occurrence of the variable 1..n; e.b’(o\o) in A by a formula B containing exactly n-many bound individual variables, and b-many elementary (molecular) subformulas.
84
Ibid., p. 46.
Logical atomism
51
Consider the following example: ½ð1:1; e:1 ’ðonoÞ Þðo xo Þð1:1; e:1 ’ðonoÞ ðo xo Þ 1:1; e:1 ’ðonoÞ ðo xo ÞÞ is true
2:1; 1:1; e:0
Here the formula A is ðo xo Þð1:1; e:1 ’ðonoÞ ðo xo Þ 1:1; e:1 ’ðonoÞ ðo xo ÞÞ
Let B be a formula which contains a free individual variable ovo and which contains exactly one bound variable of order\type o and one elementary (quantifier-free) subformula. For instance, let B be the formula ðo zo Þð1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ;o o ÞÞ
The result of the replacement is this: ðo xo Þ ðo zo Þð1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo ÞÞ ðo zo Þð1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo ÞÞ
This is formula A* and it is true 2.1–1; 1.1 þ (1 2); e.o þ (1 2). That is, it is true 2.0; 1.3; e.2, for it has two elementary subformulas, three first-order quantifiers, and zero second-order quantifiers. Russell’s recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ next applies to the formula A*. But to apply the recursion, this formula must be defined in terms of an equivalent all of whose quantifiers prefix a quantifier-free formula. The definitions that accomplish this in Principia are given in its section *9 which defines subordinate occurrences of quantifiers in terms of formulas with all quantifiers initially placed. The prenex formula for which the truthconditions of A* are to be given is this: ðo xo Þðo zo Þð9o yo Þ
1:0; e:1
Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo Þ 1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo yo ; o xo Þ
Let us call this ‘‘prenex(A*).’’ The recursion then continues, but now objectually instead of nominalistically. The notion that the prenex(A*) is true 2.0; 1.3; e.2 is recursively defined to mean (to use the modern Tarski-style locution) that every entity satisfies (with respect to the variable oxo) the formula ðo zo Þð9o yo Þ
1:0; e:1
Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo Þ 1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo yo ; o xo Þ
(Or, as Russell would put it, this expression is true 2.0; 1.2; e.2 for every entity oxo.) In turn, this is defined to mean that every entity satisfies (with respect to the variable ozo) the formula ð9o yo Þ
1:0; e:1
Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo Þ 1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo yo ; o xo Þ
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where oxo is fixed. (Or, as Russell would put it, this expression, with oxo fixed, is true 2.0; 1.1; e.2 for every entity ozo.) Next, we have that some entity satisfies (with respect to oyo) the expression
1:0; e:1
Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo Þ 1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo yo ; o xo Þ
where oxo and ozo have been fixed as above. It is, in Russell’s locution, true 2.0; 1.0; e.2. To satisfy this formula, of course, is to fail to satisfy the formula 1:0; e:1
Gðono; onoÞ ðo zo ; o xo Þ 1:0; e:1 Gðono; onoÞ ðo yo ; o xo Þ
Or, in Russell’s locution, the above formula is true 2.0; 1.0; e.2 just when this formula is false e.2. And the material conditional is false e.2 just when (assuming oxo, ozo, and oyo are fixed as above 1.0; e.1G(o\o, o\o)) (ozo, oxo) is truee.1 and 1.0; e.1G(o\o, o\o) (oyo, oxo) is falsee.1. At last, the base of the recursion is given by means of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment (discussed anon). Russell had nothing as sophisticated as the formal semantics found in Tarski’s pioneering work in the 1930s. But his intent is clear. The hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ does the work of explaining the order component of the order\type indices on Principia’s predicate variables. Its predicate variables are ‘‘structured’’ by these conditions of significance, and in this respect they are not genuine variables. The only genuine variables of Principia are its individual variables. The discovery that Principia’s hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood,’’ not the VCP, is the philosophical explanation of ramification has striking consequences for understanding Russell’s logical atomism and its relationship to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Central to the recursive account of truth in Principia is the abandonment of propositions, the abandonment of the thesis that the logical particles stand for relations or properties (as they had in Russell’s logic of propositions), and the adoption of a recursive correspondence theory according to which only ‘‘atomic’’ facts (as it were) are truth-makers. Negated statements are not made true by negative facts, and general statements are not made true by general facts. Indeed, all the facts that are explicitly embraced by Principia are ‘‘atomic.’’ That is, as far as the truth-conditions for the formulas of the formal language of Principia go, the universals that inhere predicatively in the facts that are truthmakers are logically independent. This thesis will at first appear shocking. The predicate variables of Principia have commonly been interpreted to range over a hierarchy of ‘‘propositional functions’’ in intension regimented by type and order, and
Logical atomism
53
these were frequently identified with Russell’s universals.85 On such a view, universals may be logically related. But we now see that Russell did not intend a realist interpretation of Principia’s predicate variables; he intended a nominalistic interpretation of predicate variables (and a realist interpretation of individual variables). In Russell’s intended interpretation, Principia is not a theory postulating the existence of a hierarchy of order- and typestratified entities. The structure of the hierarchy of order\types is built into the nominalistic semantics. To be sure, at the time of Principia, Russell allows that at least some universals are necessary existing logical individuals and he found himself acquainted with several. But the lesson he drew from his paradox of predication was that logic is powerless to offer any general comprehension principles that determine what universals exist. One of the tasks of Principia was to demonstrate how logic can get along without assuming such principles. Universals are in the range of Principia’s individual variables and are not stratified by orders or types. There are no logical relations between the universals that inhere in the facts that provide the truth-conditions for formulas of Principia. If there were, Principia’s recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ would collapse. Of course, this does not assure that Russell held that no universals stand in logical relations. But if Russell accepts such universals, they cannot not play any role whatsoever in the facts that provide the truthconditions for formulas of the language of Principia.86 We now see that Wittgenstein’s much celebrated Tractarian thesis of the logical independence of atomic facts was an idea he arrived at by study of Russell’s work in Principia. It is of utmost importance, therefore, to not lose sight of this when evaluating the extent to which Wittgenstein’s ideas are in alliance with Russell’s or in opposition. Acquaintance with logical objects Facts are structured complexes. The structure is very important. Distinct facts can have exactly the same constituents. In Principia, Whitehead and Russell use hyphens to compose names of facts. For instance, the expression ‘‘a-in-the-relation-R-to-b’’, or more tersely ‘‘a-R-b,’’ is used to name a fact. For example, there is ‘‘Desdemona-in-the-relation-loves-to-Cassio’’. A better expression which emphasizes the point that such an expression
85 86
See W. V. O. Quine, ‘‘Russell’s Ontological Development,’’ Journal of Philosophy 63 (1941): 657–667. Observe that Principia’s *13.01, which defines the ‘‘identity’’ sign to mean indiscernibility with respect to predicative propositional functions, does not stand for the universal (relation) identity.
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is a term and not a formula is ‘‘Desdemona’s loving Cassio.’’87 As we see, the quite different fact b-R-a (Cassio’s loving Desdemona) has exactly the same constituents but is structured differently. On Russell’s multiple-relation theory, belief (judgment, understanding) is not a dyadic relation between a mind and a proposition (state of affairs), but a multiple relation whose relata (in the atomic case) include the constituents of a would-be corresponding fact. Russell holds that when a person m has a belief (or makes a discursive judgment), say that a bears R to b, there is a belief (understanding or judgment) complex, a m-believing
R b
consisting of the mind m related by ‘belief’ to the entities ‘loves’ and a and b. This complex (or fact) is structured. We can form a name for this complex as follows: ‘‘m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, R, b).’’
On the other hand, when a person m has a belief that b bears R to a there is a complex (or fact) with the same constituents but structured differently. It has the picture, b m-believing
R a
We can form a name for this complex with ‘‘m-believing-with-respect-to-(b, R, a).’’
Now it is likely that Russell originally thought the definite description that the formula ‘‘aRb’’ disguises when it is flanked by ‘‘. . . is true’’ is
87
Unfortunately, confusion on this point is prevalent. It is found, for example, in Herbert Hochberg, ‘‘Propositions, Truth and Belief: The Wittgenstein–Russell Debate,’’ Theoria 66 (2000): 3–40. See also Thomas Ricketts, ‘‘Wittgenstein Against Frege and Russell,’’ in Erich Reck, ed., From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 217–251. Russell’s multiple-relation theory is characterized as holding that there is an attribute J of judgment such that ðxÞðyÞðRÞðJðx; y; R; zÞ :: x judges that y bears R to zÞ: Russell is then characterized as abandoning his early view that there is a attribute of judgment J that is a dyadic relation to a proposition, so that ðxÞðpÞðJðx; pÞ :: x judges that pÞ: Russell’s expression ‘‘J(m, a, R, b)’’ thereby gets misconstrued as a formula. Russell intends it to be a term (name) for a judgment-complex.
Logical atomism
55
‘‘the fact corresponding to m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, R, b).’’
Accordingly, truth consists in there being a complex a-in-the-relation-R-to-b
which corresponds to the belief complex m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, R, b).
That is, there is a fact consisting of a, loves, and b structured in the right way.88 Falsehood consists in there being no corresponding fact. Russell’s multiple-relation theory faces a difficulty that has come to be called the ‘‘narrow direction problem.’’89 G. F. Stout objected that the theory could not distinguish the belief that a loves b from the quite different belief that b loves a.90 It must be understood, however, that the problem is not to explain what distinguishes belief complexes. There is no special difficulty with belief complexes in this regard. On Russell’s view, facts (complexes) are structured entities. The complex a-loving-b differs from the complex b-loving-a because the entities a and b occur in different positions in them. For a similar reason, the belief complexes m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, loves, b) m-believing-with-respect-to-(b, loves, a)
differ in structure. The narrow direction problem does not challenge the assumption that complexes are structured entities. The problem is to explain how it is that the first belief complex (above) points only to a-loving-b as its would-be corresponding fact, while the second points only to b-loving-a as its would-be corresponding fact. Russell was quick to acknowledge the problem. In ‘‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’’ he says that in the belief complex m-believing-withrespect-to-(a, loves, b), the subordinate relation loves ‘‘must not be 88
89
90
Hochberg claims that my account assumes that Russell took ‘correspondence’ as a primitive relation. See Hochberg, ‘‘Propositions, Truth and Belief. See also Herbert Hochberg, ‘‘The Role of Subsistent Propositions and Logical Forms in Russell’s 1913 Philosophical Logic and in the Russell–Wittgenstein Dispute,’’ in Ignacio Angelelli and Maria Cerezo, eds., Studies on the History of Logic: Proceedings of the III Symposium on the History of Logic (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 317–341. I do not take correspondence to be a primitive relation. The multiple-relation theory is the basis of a recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ In the base case of the recursion, the ‘correspondence’ (truth-) conditions of a belief-complex are defined as the existence of a fact consisting of certain constituents of that complex. The expression seems due to Nicholas Griffin. See his ‘‘Russell on the Nature of Logic,’’ Synthese 45 (1980): 117–188. See also Nicholas Griffin, ‘‘Russell’s Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment,’’ Philosophical Studies 47 (1985): 213–247. G. F. Stout, ‘‘The Object of Thought and Real Being,’’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1911): 187–208.
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abstractly before the mind but must be before it as proceeding from a to b rather than from b to a.’’ On this view, the subordinate relation as it enters into the belief state has a ‘‘sense’’ and in the corresponding complex it must have the same sense.91 Russell soon came to admit, however, that this proposal does not succeed. As he later put it in his manuscript Theory of Knowledge (1913), relations do not come with a ‘hook’ at one end and an ‘eye’ at another.92 When a relation occurs as a substantive (as is the case when it occurs as a constituent in a belief complex) it is not relating, and the so-called ‘‘sense’’ of the subordinate relation is lost. In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell thought he had the narrow direction problem solved by employing the idea of a partial isomorphism of structure. Though a relation does not come with a hook and an eye, the complex in which it occurs as a relating relation is structured. Russell writes: If Othello believes truly that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is a complex unity, ‘Desdemona’s love for Cassio,’ which is composed exclusively of the objects of the belief, in the same order as they had in the belief, with the relation which was one of the objects occurring now as the cement that binds together the objects of the belief. On the other hand, if Othello believes falsely, there is no such complex unity composed of the objects of the belief.93
A belief complex such as m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, loves, b) has a structure – an order of occurrence of its constituents generated by the relating relation ‘belief’. It is in virtue of this that a-loving-b is its appropriately corresponding fact, for this fact alone has the constituents a, b, and ‘loves,’ and has a structural ordering of these constituents that is partly isomorphic to their structural order in the belief complex. A picture may help: a
a m-believing
R b
R b
It is the partial isomorphism of structure that assures that the belief complex points to exactly one would-be corresponding complex. In Theory of Knowledge Russell rejected this plan. The notion of the order of the constituents of a complex relies upon a linear or spatial analogy. In
91 92
93
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood,’’ Philosophical Essays (London: Longmans, 1910), ch. 7, p. 158. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 7, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, ed. Elizabeth Ramsden Eames in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 86. The Problems of Philosophy, p. 128.
Logical atomism
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the complex, a-loving-b, it is not proper to say that the constituent a occurs ‘‘first,’’ and b occurs ‘‘second.’’ Complexes do indeed have structures, but the structure is not always spatial and certainly it does not track the linear order of the expressions of a statement. In Theory of Knowledge, Russell gave a final attempt to solve the narrow direction problem. He introduced what he calls ‘‘position relations.’’ An entity a has a determinate position in a complex even though one may not legitimately order the positions by ‘‘first,’’ ‘‘second,’’ and so on. For example, Russell tells us that in the complex a-similarity-b, there is only one position that both a and b occupy. He calls this complex ‘‘symmetrical.’’ The complex a-loving-b, on the other hand, is such that a and b occupy two distinct positions. The complex is ‘‘unsymmetrical.’’ It is structurally possible for distinct a and b to occupy one another’s positions in the complex. Accordingly, Russell calls it ‘‘homogeneous’’ with respect to these positions. In a complex such as Socrates’ being human, the positions occupied by Socrates and Humanity are quite different. The complex is unsymmetrical. But in this case it is not structurally possible for Socrates to occupy the predicational position of Humanity in the complex. Socrates is not a universal (and so lacks a predicational nature). The complex is both unsymmetrical and heterogeneous (non-homogeneous). Russell calls such complexes ‘‘nonpermutative.’’ A complex is ‘‘permutative’’ with respect to the two of its constituents when those constituents occupy distinct positions and when those positions are homogeneous.94 Russell’s account relies upon type* distinctions.95 Concrete complexes cannot occur as constituents of entities that are not complex, and universals are of a different type* from concrete complexes (facts) and entities that are not complex. Russell’s characterization of unsymmertrical and non-permutative complexes depends upon distinctions of type*. But it is important to note that types* are not the types or orders of Principia. Russell had done away with order\types of entities by building the structure of such a theory into Principia’s informal nominalistic semantics for its predicate variables. The notion of types*, unlike the notion of order\ types, was perfectly legitimate to Russell. Indeed, in Principles Russell held that the difference between universal and particular is an unanalyzable and primitive logical notion. Universals have both a predicable and an individual nature, and this is essential to the viability of the multiple-relation theory quite independently of the direction problem. The difference in 94 95
Collected Papers, vol. 7, pp. 122ff. Pierdaniele Giaretta claims that my account of the multiple-relation theory assumes that Russell excludes type* differences. This is not correct. See Pierdaniele Giaretta, ‘‘Analysis and Logical Form in Russell: The 1913 Paradigm,’’ Dialectica 51 (1997): 273–293.
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type* is not coded into logical grammar. Universals are values of the individual variables (type o) of Principia. In addition to the new notion of an entity’s ‘‘position in a complex,’’ Russell amends the multiple-relation theory in Theory of Knowledge by maintaining that in mental complexes of belief, judgment, and understanding, there occurs a cognitive act of logical intuition (acquaintance) with logical forms. As we saw, Russell tells us that the complex a-similarity-b is symmetrical and therefore has only one position; it is identical with the complex b-similarity-a.96 The complex a-before-b, on the other hand, is distinct from the complex b-before-a, but all these concepts have the same logical form – namely, the form of a dual complex (of two-place predication). Russell maintains that position relations are not determined by the logical form of a complex but by the relating relation of the complex. An object has a position in a complex. The logical form of a complex (fact) is not a template which shows where the terms are to be fitted together to form the purportedly corresponding complex. Logical forms play a different role. They are introduced to provide the content of our understanding of the classification of complexes into those that are ‘permutative’ and those that are ‘nonpermutative.’ Belief or judgment requires an understanding of the form of the purported corresponding complex. In Russell’s view, it is acquaintance with logical form that is essential for, and logically prior to, understanding words such as ‘‘predicate,’’ ‘‘relation,’’ ‘‘dual complex,’’ and logical words such as ‘‘or,’’ ‘‘not,’’ ‘‘all’’, and so on.97 For example, understanding the sentence ‘‘a is red’’ requires more than being acquainted with a, and the universal ‘redness.’ It presupposes an understanding of predication – the form of a monadic complex (fact). According to the multiple-relation theory, when the statement ‘‘a is red’’ is flanked by ‘‘. . . is true’’ it is a disguised definite description. Extrapolating from the modifications of the theory in Theory of Knowledge, the definite description now is this: ‘‘the fact corresponding to m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, redness, P),’’
where P is the logical form of monadic predication. The statement ‘‘a is red’’ (and so also the belief complex) is true if and only if there is a complex consisting of a and the universal Redness – namely, a’s-redness. In this simple case, the direction problem does not arise. The corresponding complexes are non-permutative.
96
Collected Papers, vol. 7, p. 122.
97
Ibid., p. 101.
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In contrast, consider the truth-conditions for ‘‘a loves b.’’ The would-be corresponding complex is permutative, and consequently Russell’s characterization of the notion of ‘‘correspondence’’ is indirect. The truthconditions of this statement cannot be given simply by stating that it is true just when there is a fact consisting of a and b and the relating relation loves. The order is central. To capture the order, Russell makes an appeal to his new view that the relation ‘loves’ fixes two position relations C1 and C2. Accordingly, the statement ‘‘a loves b,’’ when it occurs flanked by the predicate ‘‘is true,’’ disguises the following definite description: ‘‘the such that a C1 and b C2 .’’98
In short, ½a loves b is true if and only if ð9Þða C1 :&: b C2 : : ¼ Þ:
At first blush, this may seem to simply push the problem back. The truthconditions for ‘‘a C1 ’’ and ‘‘b C2 ’’ must be given. But according to Russell, these do not involve the direction problem. That is, [a has C1 in ] is true if and only if there is a fact consisting of a and C1 and . The complex asserted to exist is non-permutative. Thus the truth-conditions which involve indirect correspondence with permutative complexes such as ‘a-loving-b’ will be defined recursively from the truth-conditions that involve direct correspondence with non-permutative complexes such as ‘a-C1-’ and ‘b-C2-.’ Russell’s account assumes that there is a type* distinction between a fact (complex) and an entity a that is not a complex. The relata of a position relation C1 must differ in type*. A fact cannot have a position in an entity that is not complex. With type* distinctions in place and logical forms taken to be constituents of belief complexes, the narrow direction problem cannot arise. Principia’s recursive correspondence theory of truth did not address the problem of the truth-conditions for ascriptions of propositional attitudes. Neither did Russell’s unfinished manuscript Theory of Knowledge. The multiple-relation theory was only needed to set out the truth-conditions of the atomic statements at the base of the recursion. Thus, questions as to the nature of logical forms as objects severally before the mind do not immediately show themselves. Russell does owe an account of belief ascriptions, however. To properly define the correspondence (truth-) conditions of ‘‘S believes that a loves b,’’ Russell must form a definite description which captures the structural order of the belief complex: m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, loves, b, R2). 98
Ibid., p. 147.
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(I use R2 as the logical form of dyadic predication.) Of course, the narrow direction problem arises once again.99 But one can apply Russell’s solution to the narrow direction problem in such cases. We are to find position relations E1, E2, E3, and E4 fixed by the relating relation ‘believes.’ The statement ‘‘S believes that a loves b,’’ when it is flanked by the truth-predicate, would, on this view, be interpreted as the following disguised definite description: ‘‘the fact such that a has E1 in and b has E2 in and ‘loves’ has E3 in and R2 has E4 in .’’
In this way, Russell hoped at last to have solved the narrow direction problem. The question of the ontological nature of logical forms, however, vexed Russell. This is particularly the case for those grounding our understanding of logical words. In Theory of Knowledge, Russell was tentative when it came to the question of what sort of entities logical forms are to be. In a chapter entitled ‘‘Logical Data,’’ he notes that ‘‘logical objects cannot be regarded as entities, and therefore what we shall call ‘acquaintance’ with them cannot really be a dual relation.’’100 There must be kinds of acquaintance. Universals, concrete particulars, and complexes differ logically, and ‘‘relations to objects differing in logical character must themselves differ in logical character.’’101 Whatever the ultimate analysis, Russell decides that something like logical experience or logical intuition is required for the understanding of logical words like ‘‘particular,’’ ‘‘universal,’’ ‘‘relation,’’ ‘‘dual complex,’’ and ‘‘predicate.’’ Russell regards logical intuition as a kind of immediate knowledge obtained through a process of abstraction and generalization carried to its utmost limit. Every logical notion is a summum genus – the limit of this process of abstraction. Finally, Russell comes to a decision in Theory of Knowledge. ‘‘If possible,’’ he writes, ‘‘it would be convenient to take as the form something which is not a mere incomplete symbol.’’ Logical forms are to be identified as abstract general facts ‘‘with no constituents.’’ Russell explains: the form of all subject-predicate complexes will be the fact ‘something has some predicate’; the form of all dual complexes will be ‘something has some relation to something.’ . . .[T]he logical nature of this fact is very peculiar. For ‘something has some relation R to something’ contains no constituent except R, and ‘something has some relation to something’ contains no constituent at all. It is therefore suitable to serve as the ‘form’ of dual complexes. In a sense, it is simple, since it cannot be analyzed. At first sight, it seems to have structure, and therefore not to be simple; but it is more correct to say that it is a structure.102
99 100
For a dissenting opinion, see Hochberg, ‘‘Propositions, Truth and Belief.’’ Collected Papers, vol. 7, p. 97. 101 Ibid., p. 100. 102 Ibid., p. 114.
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In Russell’s view, abstraction and generalization directs the mind in such a way that it becomes acquainted with a logical form. Construed as abstract facts with no constituents, logical forms are puzzling entities. But in any event, it is clear that logical forms do not contain ontological counterparts of logical particles, quantifiers, or variables: they contain no constituents at all. Russell is explicit. He remarks that ‘‘a molecular form is not even the form of any actual particular; no particular, however complex, has the form ‘this or that,’ or the form ‘not-this’.’’103 Consider the belief ascription made by a person S that m believes that every human is mortal. Extrapolating from the Theory of Knowledge, Russell’s approach would take the ascription to be true in virtue of the existence of the following corresponding belief complex: m-believing-with-respect-to-(humanity, mortality, GEN).
A constituent of this belief state is the logical object GEN, acquaintance with which grounds our a priori knowledge of the logical notion of the subordination of one universal under another. The logical form GEN is to be identified as the abstract general fact some-universal’s-being-subordinate-to-some-universal.
The person believes truly, however, when every human is mortal. The truth-conditions of the statement ‘‘Every human is mortal’’ are rendered by Principia’s recursive definition, not by correspondence with this logical form (construed as an abstract general fact). In this way, Russell’s account of the content of our understanding of logical notions is compatible with Principia’s recursively defined hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ A similar account applies where the understanding of logical particles is involved. Consider an ascription made by a person S that m believes a is red or b is white. The ascription is true in virtue of the existence of a complex belief-fact, namely m-believing-with-respect-to-(a, redness, b, whiteness, OR).
The logical notion OR which is a constituent of this belief state is not a relation that the logical particle ‘‘v’’ stands for. The logical particles of Principia do not stand for relations. They stood for relations when Russell embraced an ontology of propositions. But Principia is a ‘‘no-propositions’’ theory. The logical form OR is rather a logical object, acquaintance with which is to account for our a priori knowledge of the nature of disjunction. Russell was uncertain as to what sort of object it might be, but his
103
Ibid., p. 132.
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comments in Theory of Knowledge suggest that he identifies it with an abstract general fact such as the following: some-universals-being-such-that-one-or-another-of-them-is-exemplified.
It is important to realize that it is not in virtue of the existence of a molecular fact containing an ontological analog of the logical particle ‘‘v’’ that a person m believes truly that a is red or b is white. Rather, the person believes truly because a is red or b is white. That is, the truthconditions of ‘‘a is red or b is white’’ are given in accordance with Principia’s recursive definition. There are no molecular facts containing ontological counterparts of logical particles. Principia’s recursive theory of truth maintains that the existence of many facts is what provides truth-makers for general statements. No general facts are truth-makers. The recursive theory of truth in Principia requires that all facts (that are truth-makers) be atomic and logically independent. The exemplification of one universal (which occurs in such a fact that is a truth-maker) never excludes exemplification of another. The purpose of the multiple-relation theory in Principia was to provide the basis for a hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ The hierarchy depends upon the view that general facts (if there are such) are not truth-makers. Without these features of the recursion, Principia’s philosophical explanation of order indices on its predicate variables would be lost. Russell’s Theory of Knowledge manuscript inclines toward embracing abstract general facts. But in his 1918 logical atomism lectures Russell goes much further. He argues on behalf of both partly general facts and negative facts.104 These positions are quite compatible with Principia’s recursive definitions of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ Unfortunately, their compatibility has gone largely unnoticed. Interpreters frequently read Russell’s later inclinations toward general facts and negative facts into Principia. The mistake lends itself to the view that in Principia Russell held that the logical particles are relation signs and that general facts are the truth-makers for general statements. The interpretation obliterates the role that the recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ plays in Principia’s philosophical explanation of order indices on predicate variables. It ignores the recursive nature of its definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ and, accordingly, it must construe the Vicious Circle Principle as providing the philosophical justification for ramified types.105 This undermines a proper understanding of the criticisms Wittgenstein had of Russell’s theory. 104 105
Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 211. Richard McDonough, The Argument of the Tractatus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 19.
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Russell’s version of the multiple-relation theory in his Theory of Knowledge manuscript was surely intended to be consistent with Principia’s recursive theory of truth. In the manuscript, Russell reluctantly embraced a theory that explains knowledge of logical notions as a form of acquaintance between a mind and certain logical forms. He assumes tentatively that there is a faculty of pure logical intuition which acquaints the mind with the logical forms grounding our understanding of notions such as ‘‘all,’’ ‘‘some,’’ ‘‘not,’’ ‘‘or,’’ and ‘‘if . . . then.’’ He reified logical forms, identifying them (albeit tentatively) with abstract general facts. This was his plan for an account of our a priori knowledge of logical notions and for our grasp of abstract logical structure. But Russell’s identification of logical forms with abstract general facts could not reasonably have been entertained by Russell if it undermined the recursive nature of the correspondence theory of truth set forth in Principia. It is perfectly coherent for Russell to hold a recursive definition of truth which requires that no facts contain ontological counterparts of the logical connectives, and yet maintain that the mind can be acquainted with purely logical objects such as universal, particular, not, or, dyadic relation, all and some, and so on. In the logical atomism lectures, Russell embraces more than the fully abstract general facts ‘‘with no constituents’’ that Theory of Knowledge identifies as logical forms. He embraces general facts such as Every man’s being mortal, which has the universals Humanity and Mortality among its constituents. Indeed, Russell remarks that in his 1914 lectures at Harvard, he was inclined to accept negative facts in his ontology – in spite of its ‘‘nearly producing a riot.’’ Russell gives in to this inclination in his logical atomism lectures. In his 1919 paper ‘‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean’’ he embraces neutral monism and discusses his inclination for negative facts as follows: There might be an attempt to substitute for a negative fact the mere absence of a fact. If A loves B, it may be said, that is a good substantial fact; while if A does not love B, that merely expresses the absence of a fact composed of A and loving and B, and by no means involves the actual existence of a negative fact. But the absence of a fact is itself a negative fact; it is the fact that there is not such a fact as A loving B. Thus, we cannot escape from negative facts in this way.106
This is a striking change of mind. Russell himself had tried to escape from negative facts in just this way. His multiple-relation theory maintained that the sentence ‘‘A loves B’’ is false when there is no corresponding fact! There is no appeal whatsoever to negative facts as truth-makers in Principia, and
106
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,’’ Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, ed. R. C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 288.
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no such appeal occurs in Problems of Philosophy or The Theory of Knowledge. What then is the proper explanation of Russell’s new inclination toward an ontology of general facts and negative facts, and how does it fit with Principia’s requirement that the logical particles do not stand for relations that occur in facts? The answer is that by 1914 Russell had lost confidence in the multiple-relation theory. With the multiple-relation theory in trouble, Russell has to revise the base clause of Principia’s recursive definition of the hierarchy of sense of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ It is in considering such revisions that Russell becomes inclined toward general facts and negative facts. Russell is famous for saying in his logical atomism lectures that the truth-conditions of a general formula (x)Ax require more than the truth of each among Ax1 through Axn. It requires the general fact that x1, . . ., xn are all the entities.107 But it certainly does not follow that this general fact is itself the truth-maker for the general formula. Russell seems ready to abandon the multiple-relation theory at the base of the recursion, but he is surely not prepared to abandon Principia’s recursive theory of truth itself. As we saw, that theory provided the philosophical justification for Principia’s hierarchy of orders. It requires the thesis that the logical particles do not stand for relations (or properties) and demands that general facts are not truth-makers for general formulas. Indeed, Russell explicitly states in his logical atomism lectures that the logical particles do not stand for relations that occur as constituents of facts.108 ‘‘In a logically perfect language,’’ he writes, ‘‘the words in a proposition should correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as ‘or,’ ‘not,’ ‘if,’ ‘then,’ which have a different function.’’109 We can now recognize the unfortunate impact that Russell’s tentative suggestions concerning general facts and negative facts in the logical atomism lectures have had. Undue emphasis on general facts and negative facts has inappropriately distanced Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ideas from Russell. The difference between Russell and Wittgenstein is wrongly characterized by saying that Russell, unlike Wittgenstein, considered philosophy to be a special ‘‘zoological’’ taxonomy of logical entities – general facts, universals, particulars, negative facts, etc. This characterization leaves out the very essence of Russell’s logical atomism – namely, its conception of philosophy as an eliminativistic reconstruction of structure. Logical analysis enables a reconceptualization of our concepts, and offers a reconstruction that avoids philosophical and ontological conundrums by building structure into logical grammar. Wittgenstein adopted the view implicit in 107 109
Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ pp. 183, 234. Ibid., p. 196; further evidence is found at pp. 197, 211.
108
Ibid., p. 211.
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Principia’s recursive definition of truth and falsehood that all facts are atomic and logically independent. What explains Russell’s departure from his earlier view in favor of a theory of acquaintance with logical objects was his underdeveloped philosophy of mind. He was therefore vulnerable, as we shall see, to Wittgenstein’s demand for more thoroughly eliminativistic analysis in this quarter. Russell’s paralysis What then had Russell learnt from Wittgenstein for the logical atomism lectures? In 1924, Ramsey wrote to Wittgenstein with the following assessment of the influence he had on Russell. ‘‘Of all of your work,’’ says Ramsey, ‘‘he seems now to accept only this: that it is nonsense to put an adjective where a substantive ought to be which helps in the theory of types.’’110 Ramsey was not far off. It must be understood that the seemingly small point is quite important. Its importance is lost because of a tradition of interpretation which took Principia’s type theory to apply to universals. Principia’s propositional function signs cannot occupy positions open to individuals, so it seemed that within type-theory universals cannot occupy positions open to individuals. But the tradition of interpretation is mistaken. Principia’s theory of order\types of propositional functions is not a theory of order\types of entities. Universals are entities for Russell; they are among the values of Principia’s individual variables, not its predicate variables. Though Russell felt strongly disposed toward the view that universals are logical entities whose existence is logically necessary, the paradox of predication had forced him to conclude that formal logic must get along without any general axioms comprehending universals. We are, in Russell’s view, acquainted with universals (especially sensible qualities), but this does not render logical truths concerning what universals there are. Russell’s multiple-relation theory was fairly well worked out in Theory of Knowledge. Nonetheless, Russell had abandoned the multiple-relation theory by the time of his logical atomism lectures. Reflecting on the matter some forty years later in My Philosophical Development, Russell explained that ‘‘I had, later, to abandon this theory because it depended upon the view that sensation is an essentially relational occurrence – a view which . . . I abandoned under the influence of William James . . . I abandoned this theory, both because I ceased to believe in the ‘subject,’ and because I no longer thought that a relation can occur significantly as a term, except 110
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to C. K. Ogden, with an Appendix of Letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, ed. G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), p. 84.
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when paraphrase is possible in which it does not so occur.’’111 In short, it was Russell’s adoption of neutral monism, together with the thesis that universals have only a predicable nature, that led him to abandon the multiple-relation theory. It seems odd that Russell doesn’t mention Wittgenstein’s influence. Russell’s letters of 1912–1913 suggest a different picture. It is quite certain from the letters that Wittgenstein’s criticism played a significant role in Russell’s abandonment of the multiple-relation theory. On 27 May 1913 he wrote to Ottoline Morrell of the progress on his new Theory of Knowledge book: we were both cross from the heat – I showed him a crucial part of what I have been writing. He said it was all wrong, not realizing the difficulties – that he had tried my view and knew it wouldn’t work. I couldn’t understand his objection – in fact he was very inarticulate – but I feel in my bones that he must be right, and that he has seen something I have missed. If I could see it too I shouldn’t mind, but as it is, it is worrying, and has rather destroyed the pleasure in my writing.112
What did Russell feel in his bones was right? Was it Wittgenstein that caused Russell to abandon the multiple-relation theory or was it, as Russell reports, his conversion to neutral monism? The correct answer is that it was both. In the lectures on logical atomism, Russell wrote of ‘‘the impossibility of putting the subordinate verb on a level with its terms as an object term in the belief,’’ and concludes that the multiple-relation theory was ‘‘a little unduly simple’’ because it does treat the object verb as if one could put it as just an object like the terms, ‘‘as if one could put ‘loves’ an a level with Desdemona and Cassio as a term for the relation ‘believe.’’’113 Russell confesses that it was Wittgenstein who convinced him that in statements of judgment or belief there are two verbs and that both must occur in predicate positions. That universals have both a predicable and an individual nature had long been central to Russell’s philosophy. So one might well expect Russell to object to Wittgenstein’s idea that universals have only a predicable nature. But the thesis offers Russell exciting possibilities that he felt must be worked through. Russell held that an ever more thoroughly eliminativistic analysis (revealing that all proper contexts are extensional) might well avoid the axiom of reducibility and dissolve many of the outstanding problems plaguing Principia’s logicism.
111 112 113
Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 181. The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, ed. Nicholas Griffin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992), p. 459. ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 226.
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The thesis that universals have only a predicable nature requires a new nonrelational reconstruction of the notion of a mind standing in a relation of acquaintance with a universal. Accepting neutral monism was, therefore, difficult for Russell. It finally came late in 1918, a few months after Russell completed his lectures on logical atomism.114 Russell had been coming to grips with neutral monism since 1907, and we now know that it was discussed in early chapters of Russell’s Theory of Knowledge manuscript which Wittgenstein read. Russell and Wittgenstein surely would have had many conversations about the doctrine. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein was becoming convinced that a thoroughly eliminativistic analysis of all logical and semantic notions was needed. This would quite naturally attract him to neutral monism as well. But what, precisely, were Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the multiplerelation theory? In a passage that has become infamous, Wittgenstein wrote the following in a letter to Russell in June of 1913: I believe it is obvious that, from the prop[osition] ‘A judges that (say) a is in the Rel[ation] R to b’, if correctly analyzed, the prop[osition] ‘aRb v bRa’ must follow directly without the use of any other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein put the criticism as follows (TLP 5.5422): The correct explanation of the form of the proposition ‘A makes the judgement p,’ must show that it is impossible for a judgment to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
What are the ‘‘other premises’’ upon which Russell’s multiple-relation theory allegedly relies? In what sense does Russell’s theory not rule out judgments of nonsense? Consider the belief ascription, ‘‘S believes that Socrates is mortal.’’ On Russell’s theory, the following is to be the fact (belief-state) that makes the ascription true: m-believing-with-respect-to-(Socrates, Mortality, P)
where P is the logical form of monadic predication. But according to Wittgenstein, nothing in Russell’s theory shows that Mortality is a universal with a predicable nature and that Socrates is a particular. Russell will need added premises to assure this. When Wittgenstein first raised the objection Russell thought himself fortified because he had already improved the theory set out in the Problems. In working on a solution to the order problem, Russell had included P (the logical form of predication) as an 114
Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 100.
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object to which a mind may be acquainted. Moreover, Russell held that acquaintance with the universal Mortality itself yields an acquaintance with P (an awareness of its predicable nature). Wittgenstein holds that logical notions are pseudo-concepts. The difference between a universal and a particular is a logical difference which has to be shown in formal grammar itself. There is no faculty which yields this information about universals, and it is no help to offer an explanation of our knowledge of logical notions by reifying them as logical forms with which we are acquainted. On Wittgenstein’s view, it is not at all incidental that the expression ‘‘. . . is mortal’’ occurs in a predicate position in ‘‘S believes that Socrates is mortal.’’ For it is precisely in virtue of its occurrence in predicate position that shows in the grammar of natural language that Mortality is a universal with a predicable nature. Nothing short of this will suffice. All theories of types (including Russell’s types*) must be done away with! It is important to realize that this is a powerful objection to the multiplerelation theory only if one adopts Wittgenstein’s extreme demands of analysis. In attempting to give truth-conditions for a statement through an analysis of ‘‘correspondence’’ between belief and fact, the multiplerelation theory relies upon a faculty of ‘logical experience’ with logical forms. This grounds understanding of the notions ‘predicate,’ ‘dual relation,’ ‘complex,’ and the like. For Russell, understanding logical form is presupposed in belief, and thus logical forms (construed if only tentatively, as abstract fully general facts) were included as constituents of beliefstates. But in Wittgenstein’s view, any such theory must use pseudoconcepts such as ‘‘universal,’’ ‘‘fact,’’ ‘‘logical form.’’ Allowing logical forms as constituents of a belief-complex accomplishes nothing in his view. Our understanding of the logical impossibility of a concrete particular occurring as a relating relation in a dual complex cannot be explained by appeal to our acquaintance with an extra entity – a logical form of predication construed as an abstract general fact before the mind. Wittgenstein writes (TLP 5.522): The ‘experience’ that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience.
As Wittgenstein’s sees it, Russell’s multiple-relation theory relies on the employment of pseudo-concepts in its effort to exclude nonsense judgments. Russell reported to Wittgenstein that he was paralyzed by this criticism.115 As we saw, Russell understood him to be arguing that in a 115
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 24, letter R13, dated 22 July 1913.
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statement such as ‘‘S judges that a loves b’’ the subordinate verb ‘‘loves’’ must retain an assertoric force – it must, as Russell put it, appear in a complex as a relating relation. And yet it cannot actually be relating a and b, for nothing in the mere fact that S has this belief assures that it is the case that a loves b. In his logical atomism lectures Russell wrote that, in judgment, both verbs have got to occur as verbs, because if a thing is a verb it cannot occur otherwise than as a verb. The subordinate verb is functioning as a verb, and seems to be relating two terms, but as a matter of fact does not when a judgment happens to be false. That is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. The discovery of this fact is due to Mr. Wittgenstein.116
In Russell’s estimation, Wittgenstein has revealed ‘‘a new beast for our zoo.’’117 This is a beast indeed, for surely no atomic sentence can have two verbs occurring assertorically.118 It should be emphasized that Wittgenstein is offering a general objection to the very idea of a ‘‘theory’’ of truth and not just objecting to Russell’s theory. Wittgenstein’s demands have force against every theory that attempts to do semantics. To state the nature of the correspondence relations that characterize truth requires the employment of notions that Wittgenstein regards as pseudo-concepts. The nature of correspondence with fact that is involved in truth must be built into the proper syntactic expression of an assertion. Facts (complexes) cannot be named or described. A name of a fact, such as Russell’s ‘‘the-redness-of-this’’ or ‘‘a-in-the-relation-R-to-b,’’ fails to show the predicable nature of the relating property (or relation). Forming a definite description fares no better. In attempting to avoid the narrow direction problem and characterize the proper correspondence relation grounding truth, Russell had offered a description of the appropriate fact that is to be the truth-maker. But Russell’s description ‘‘the such that a has C1 in and b has C2 in ,’’
where the position relations C1 and C2 are fixed by the relation ‘loves,’ does not avoid the problem Wittgenstein sees. It relies upon the truth-conditions for ‘‘a has C1 in ,’’ and in giving these truth-conditions we saw that the predicate for C1 will not occur in a predicate position. Russell’s account has to rely upon an acquaintance with the logical form of dual predication to recover the predicable nature of the relation C1. Wittgenstein’s
116 118
Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ p. 225. 117 Ibid. Davidson’s theory comes close. See Donald Davidson, ‘‘On Saying That,’’ Synthese 19 (1968–1969): 130–146.
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criticism is that any characterization of the correspondence relation must ultimately say that there is a universal that relates the constituents of the purported fact that is to correspond to the belief state. But to speak of the relating relation – to put a sign for it in a subject position in a descriptive clause – is to fail to represent its universal nature. The notion of being a ‘‘universal’’ is a logical notion; it must be given in the syntax by keeping signs for universals in predicate positions. In the language of Principia, a metaphysical theory of the nature of universals has to be expressed through special metaphysical axioms concerning individuals. Such a theory of universals would involve the assumption of nonlogical predicate constants such U(x) for the property of being a universal and P(x, y) for exemplification. Using xo and yo as individual variables of order\type o, the theory would then adopt metaphysical axioms. For example, ð8xo Þð8yo ÞðPðxo ; yo Þ Uðyo ÞÞ
would be an axiom assuring that if individuals xo and yo stand in the relation of predication, then yo is a universal. Wittgenstein found this to be an unsatisfactory result that is due to the insufficient depth of Russell’s logical analysis. He maintained that notions such as universal, particular, predication, and the like have logical content and are therefore pseudoconcepts that should be expressed by logical grammar, not by special predicate constants. Looking back on matters in 1916, Russell recalled how Wittgenstein severely objected to the Theory of Knowledge book project. He wrote the following to Ottoline Morrell: Do you remember that at the time when you were seeing Vittoz [Ottoline’s doctor] I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticized with the greatest severity? . . . I saw that he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against breakwater. I became filled with utter despair [* I soon got over this mood], and I tried to turn to you for consolidation . . . I had to produce lectures for America, but I took a metaphysical subject although I was and am convinced that all fundamental work in philosophy is logical. My reason was that Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me. So there was no really vital satisfaction of my philosophical impulse in that work, and philosophy lost its hold on me. That was due to Wittgenstein more than to the war. What the war has done is to give me a new and less difficult ambition, which seems to me quite as good as the old one. My lectures have persuaded me that there is a possible life and activity in the new ambition. So I work quietly, and I feel more at peace as regards work than I have ever done since Wittgenstein’s onslaught.119 119
Russell, Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 66.
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Wittgenstein accuses Russell’s work in Theory of Knowledge as betraying the research program of logical analysis. It appeals to logical forms and universals as components of states of understanding and belief. Russell had forged ahead with the work, working at a remarkable speed of ten pages a day. His enthusiasm for the work is clear. But the pace found him with promissory notes (of the availability of a more exacting analysis) when dubious assumptions arose (such as the identification of logical forms with abstract general facts). The intellectual burdens of too many such promises ultimately proved too much, and Russell’s enthusiasm flagged. At times Russell found Wittgenstein’s philosophical tirades against the account barely intelligible, but it was clear enough to him that Wittgenstein was right that a much deeper logical analysis is needed. Russell described this as ‘‘an event of firstrate importance in my life,’’ which ‘‘affected everything I have done since.’’ Wittgenstein held that Russell’s constructions had not gone far enough and Russell was more than willing to believe this. Valiant as Principia was, it failed to salvage logicism. It endeavors to develop all of nonapplied mathematics from its replacement for a theory of classes and relations-in-extension which is based on an axiom of Reducibility. But Russell came to see that his philosophy of logic does not support Principia’s Reducibility axiom. Russell had conceded in Principia that the solution of the problems plaguing logicism was incomplete. He observes that some form of type-structure is correct, but hopes that a deeper analysis might show how to avoid Principia’s axiom of Reducibility. Wittgenstein offered Russell new ideas. What is required, according to Wittgenstein, is a more thorough analysis which extends Russell’s own technique of building structure into variables. On Wittgenstein’s view, universals have only a predicational capacity, and they are logically independent – exemplification of one never logically precludes exemplification of another. The appearance of a universal standing in logical relation is a sure sign that one’s analysis is incomplete. A complete analysis reveals the genuine universals involved (i.e., ‘‘material’’ properties and relations) and these are not logical entities – they are posits of the empirical science of physics. With Wittgenstein clamoring for an analysis of the logical difference between universals and particulars, Russell imagined a possible escape from the axiom of Reducibility. The task is daunting. It challenges one of Russell’s most sacred doctrines. Russell had long held that universals are capable of a twofold occurrence – a predicational occurrence and also an individual occurrence.120 If universals are not capable of occurring otherwise than predicationally, an entirely new way of thinking of metaphysics, logic, knowledge 120
The doctrine that universals are capable of a twofold occurrence was unchanged from Russell’s 1903 Principles of Mathematics through 1914.
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is required. Acquaintance and logical intuition would require a complete reconstruction. From this perspective it is not at all surprising to find that Russell turned to neutral monism and behavorism for help. Russell needed help. A wholly new set of analyses, more extensive than ever, would have to be uncovered. Retreat from Pythagoras We have seen that Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism is not founded upon an empiricist doctrine of acquaintance. Principia does not offer a program of ontological reduction to objects of acquaintance. Classes and numbers are not identified with ramified type-stratified attributes (propositional functions in intension). They are not identified (reduced) to any entities of Principia’s ontology. The same holds of propositions. Principia’s ‘‘no-propositions’’ theory is not a reductive identity thesis, with propositions identified with order\types of judgments arranged in a hierarchy. There are no entities countenanced in the Principia with which propositions are to be identified (logically constructed). In fact, there is no ‘‘theory’’ of ramified types of entities in Principia at all; ramified types are, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, ‘‘logical scaffolding.’’ As his endeavors to solve the paradoxes plaguing logicism became ever more extensive, Russell found himself retreating further and further from the mystical splendor generated by the Pythagorean (or better, Platonistic) conception that logic and pure mathematics are founded upon the residents of (Plato’s) heaven. In My Philosophical Development (1959), Russell wrote: The solution of the contradiction . . . seemed to be only possible by adopting theories which might be true but were not beautiful. I felt about the contradictions much as an earnest Catholic must feel about wicked Popes. And the splendid certainty which I had always hoped to find in mathematics was lost in a bewildering maze.121
Russell continues: Wittgenstein maintains that logic consists wholly of tautologies. I think he is right in this, although I did not think so until I read what he had to say on the subject. Mathematics has ceased to seem to me non-human in its subject matter. I have come to believe, though very reluctantly, that it consists of tautologies. I fear that, to a mind of sufficient intellectual power, the whole of mathematics would appear trivial, as trivial as the statement that a four-footed animal is an animal . . . I cannot any longer find any mystical satisfaction in the contemplation of mathematical truth.122
121
Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 212.
122
Ibid., pp. 119, 212.
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Russell goes on to describe himself as reluctantly submitting to truths which were to him repugnant – in particular, the view that logic and mathematics consist of tautologies. One can find Russell advocating the view that logical truths are tautologies in The Analysis of Matter (1927) and in his introduction to the second edition of The Principles of Mathematics (1937), though in the latter work his enthusiasm for the view seems to have waned. Carnap’s conventionalist approach in The Logical Syntax of Language is rejected outright in Russell’s introduction. Carnap imagines two logical languages, one of which admits the multiplicative axiom and the axiom of infinity as ‘‘analytic,’’ while the other does not. In Russell’s view, Carnap makes analyticity ‘‘arbitrary’’ (pragmatic) and to be settled by choice of a formal linguistic calculus. Russell explains: I cannot myself regard such a matter as one to be decided by our arbitrary choice. It seems to me that these axioms either do, or do not, have the characteristic of formal truth which characterizes logic, and that in the former event every logic must include them.
Russell rejected Carnap’s account of ‘‘analyticity’’ and the thesis that logical truth (logical necessity) is ‘‘linguistic’’ in the sense of its being conventional – the adoption of grammatical rules governing the nondescriptive particles of a given language form. He would have nothing of Carnap’s conventionalist account of ‘‘analyticity’’ and logic, and rejects Carnap’s watering-down of the notion of logical form to linguistic form. Russell nevertheless describes the view that logic consists of tautologies as a doctrine that logic and mathematics are ‘‘linguistic.’’ He writes: Logical constants must be treated as part of the language, not as part of what the language speaks about. In this way, logic becomes much more linguistic than I believed it to be at the time when I wrote the Principles.123
This suggests that, under the influence of Wittgenstein, Russell came to believe that logic is linguistic. Monk, for example, writes: ‘‘Since his conversion by Wittgenstein to a linguistic view of logic, Russell had regarded mathematics not as a body of knowledge but as a set of tautologies.’’124 This is a serious misunderstanding. Imagine how misleading it would be to say that because Principia’s theory of classes makes class symbols fac¸on de parler, the theory of classes is ‘‘linguistic.’’ To be sure, in Principia Russell rejected his early view that logical constants stand for relations between entities. But modern logic 123 124
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed., p. xi. Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness (New York: The Free Press, 2001), pp. 56, 202.
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agrees with that and yet has little patience for a conception of logic as linguistic. Russell did not come to think that logic is linguistic; he has simply rejected his early account of the ontology and metaphysics of logic. Is no less misleading to characterize Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as construing logic as ‘‘linguistic.’’ The mistake is prevalent. The thesis that Wittgenstein held a ‘‘linguistic’’ conception of logic is congenial to those who wish to set the stage for an account of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and marginalize Russell. For instance, Hacker writes: When the metaphysics of logical atomism fell apart, it became clear that the very idea of logical form amounted to no more that the grammar of expressions, the rule for their use – in particular, their combinatorial possibilities and the circumstances that license their employment. ‘Logical form’ does not reveal the objective logical structure of things, since they have no logical structure. They can be said to have a nature or essence, but that is determined by grammar, by the rules for the use of the expressions in question, which lay down what it makes sense to say, and is not answerable to reality for truth or correctness.125
We shall find that Wittgenstein’s Tractarian account of logical necessity as tautologyhood makes logic part of metaphysical scaffolding. It does not make logic ‘‘linguistic’’ in the sense of being a part of linguistic or cognitive practices or ‘‘rules for the use of expressions.’’ Russell’s retreat from Pythagoras is not a retreat from a metaphysical conception of logic. The influence of Wittgenstein caused a retreat from the postulation of logical entities in favor of a new metaphysics. In Principia, the logical connectives are statement connectives flanked by statements to form statements. The logical particles do not stand for relations between propositions, and no facts (that are truth-makers) contain ontological counterparts of tilde, the conditional, the generality sign, etc. But Russell still viewed logic as a synthetic a priori science of metaphysical structure. In The Theory of Knowledge structures are reified as ‘logical forms’ and identified as abstract general facts that have no constituents. Logical notions such as predication, universal, fact, particular, negation, generality, and the like stand for logical forms with which we are immediately acquainted by a faculty of ‘logical intuition.’ Wittgenstein persuaded Russell that the problems Principia faced in relying upon its axioms of infinity and reducibility might be met by adopting a deeper analysis of notions such as universal, particular, fact, and the like. It was for this reason that in the 1920s Russell investigated Wittgenstein’s idea that the proper way to characterize the notion of logical truth (logical necessity) as ‘‘truth in virtue of form’’ is by means of the notion of tautology. 125
P. M. S.Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996), p. 80.
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Faced with the paradoxes plaguing Logicism, Russell had come to hold that the formulas of mathematical languages are to be reconceptualized and recovered in formulas of the proper formal language for logic – formulas which, by means of Russell’s logical constructions, eschew Platonic (Pythagorean) ontological commitments to mathematical objects such as numbers, classes, relations-in-extension, and functions. In Principia, Russell’s desire to build the structure of orders of propositions into a ‘‘no-propositions’’ recursive theory of truth led him to reject his former conviction that the logical particles are signs for logical relations obtaining between mind- and language-independent structures (propositions). Logical truth or ‘‘truth in virtue of logical form’’ thus turns on the structures that are rendered by the logical particles. Now the logical particles, Russell tells us, are ‘‘concerned with syntax.’’ In this respect, he speaks of his having written an ‘‘epitaph on Pythagoras.’’ As he puts it: ‘‘the propositions of logic and mathematics are linguistic,’’ and they ‘‘are concerned with syntax,’’ and ‘‘all the propositions of mathematics and logic are assertions as to the correct use of a certain small number of words.’’126 But the correct use of the logical particles of the language for logic is not, in Russell’s estimation, determined by our having adopted certain linguistic rules in using the language. Russell rejected Carnap’s conventionalist position that there are different formal systems for logic with different logical particles. As we saw, in My Philosophical Development Russell described the evolution of his thinking on mathematical logic as a ‘‘retreat from Pythagoras,’’ for he came to believe ‘‘logic and mathematics are linguistic’’ and ‘‘tautologous.’’ But we now see that this is quite different from the homophonic forms of the thesis advocated by Carnap and by interpreters of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical ideas. There is another wrinkle to the story of Russell’s retreat from Pythagoras. Russell’s reconstruction of consciousness within neutral monism had striking consequences for his theory of knowledge and for knowledge of logic and mathematics in particular. Russell came to express these consequences as revealing a ‘‘linguistic’’ component to logic and mathematics. But, more accurately, it reflects what we now call the naturalization project in the philosophy of mind. Russell made several efforts toward reconstructions of ‘belief,’ ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘perception,’ ‘matter,’ and ‘mind.’ His neutral monism eventually led him to a naturalized epistemology, and this in turn led him to a new appreciation for Hume’s empiricism. He was pushed to a psychological conception of ‘‘knowing’’ as an activity. Inference is a ‘‘habit’’ built out of stimulus-response patterns governed by 126
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic?’’ in Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 306.
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the Law of Effect.127 Dewey was also advocating a naturalized epistemology and theory of ‘‘logic’’ which developed from his pragmatism. On Dewey’s view, the traditional notion of an organism’s ‘representation’ of the world as being ‘true’ or ‘false’ is to be abandoned in favor of notions of organism–environment states of equilibrium or disharmony (‘‘inquiry’’) with accompanying degrees of ‘‘success.’’128 Recovering the traditional notion of ‘truth’ within naturalism proved to be quite important to Russell, and it was the focus of some stormy exchanges with Dewey. Russell’s program of logical atomism began in moderation, with logic and knowledge of logic exempted from analysis. By the 1930s Russell had concluded that knowledge of logic must succumb, and this drives his thought toward naturalism in psychology and Humeanism in epistemology. Understanding this evolution in Russell’s thought has important consequences for interpreting Russell’s logical atomism and its relationship with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Wittgenstein was Russell’s student, his apprentice. The Tractatus consists of ideas on how to find constructions which would realize the full import of Russell’s new logical atomist conception of philosophy. Russell’s logical atoms (simples) were never fixed as sense-data, and both sense-data and the primitive relation of ‘acquaintance’ were abandoned in 1918. Principia’s recursive theory of truth anticipates both the Tractarian thesis that the logical particles do not represent relations between propositions and the logical independence of facts. Once logical atomism is freed from the cloud of interpretations that model it as a form of reductive empiricism, we can begin to see that Wittgenstein belongs at Russell’s side.
127 128
Russell, Philosophy, p. 27. See Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
3
My fundamental idea
No interpretation of the Tractatus can be adequate unless it reconciles two central themes of the work. The first is the Grundgedanke (fundamental idea) of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein states it as follows (TLP 4.03): My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
The fundamental idea, by its name alone, has rights to being the focal point of the Tractatus. The second central theme is the Doctrine of Showing. In a letter to Russell of 1919, Wittgenstein responded to some questions Russell had raised about the Tractatus. He writes: Now I’m afraid you haven’t really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions – i.e., by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.1
Wittgenstein’s letter says that distinction between showing and saying is the ‘‘main contention’’ of the work. These two themes must somehow be fit together. On Anscombe’s interpretation, the ‘‘picture theory of meaning’’ is the central principle of the Tractatus. Both Showing and the fundamental idea are subsumed under it. Anscombe argues that the picture theory entails the thesis of truth-functionality – namely, the doctrine that all meaningful nonatomic statements are built up truth-functionally from atomic statements.2 The consequence of this, she says, is that Wittgenstein has a large program to carry out. He has to establish that contexts such as identity, quantification, logical necessity, ascriptions of propositional attitudes, etc., 1 2
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letter to Russell, Keynes and Moore, ed. G. H. von Wright with the assistance of B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 71 (19 August 1919). G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 79.
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that apparently do not fit into the truth-functional mold, and which are not simply ungrammatical, can be recovered. Favrholdt has a similar project of deriving the main Tractarian themes from a central principle.3 He maintains that the focal point of the Tractatus is extensionality – namely, that all sentences are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The picture theory, he goes on, is entailed by the thesis of extensionality, and indeed so also is Wittgenstein’s treatment of contexts of identity, quantification, logical necessity and possibility, and even ascriptions of propositional attitudes. In McDonough’s more recent contribution, it is argued that all the main ideas of the Tractatus are entailed by the Grundgedanke itself, which he interprets as the doctrine that the logical connectives do not refer (together with a characterization of logic as tautologous).4 The difficulty with all such interpretations is that it seems quite impossible to derive the Tractarian themes from the principles deemed to be fundamental. Discussing McDonough’s project, Carruthers puts the problem nicely: One telling point against him [McDonough], is that the argument he attributes to Wittgenstein simply helps itself to the thesis that all propositions are tautologies; whereas this clearly needs arguing for, and indeed presupposes a whole program of analysis which must receive its justification from elsewhere. Another point is that even granting McDonough’s account of the nature of tautologies (which is, in fact, only partly accurate . . .), his attempt to demonstrate all other features of TLP is extremely weak. For example, his argument to show that all genuine propositions are contingent . . . can only succeed by making assumptions about what it is to say something which would need to be independently argued for; and once such an argument is provided, we can in fact derive the thesis that all genuine propositions are contingent without having to appeal to the nature of tautologies.5
In McDonough’s view, the ‘logical constants’ discussed in the fundamental idea include only the usual logical particles of the predicate calculus. The weight of Wittgenstein’s project then hinges their treatment as truthfunctions. As Carruthers points out, this notion cannot bear the weight. Anscombe and Favrholdt face similar difficulties. The entailments cannot be forged. More recent ‘‘therapeutic’’ interpretations searching for a central principle have focused on Wittgenstein’s notion of an ‘‘elucidation’’ and his metaphor of climbing a ladder and then throwing it away. But what then is the role of the Grundgedanke? The therapeutic approach cannot simply 3 4 5
David Favrholdt, An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1965). Richard McDonough, The Argument of the Tractatus (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1986). Peter Carruthers, Tractarian Semantics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 185.
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turn its back on what Wittgenstein explicitly took to be the fundamental idea of the work. Showing and the Grundgedanke must be reconciled. But how? The simple answer is that the two are identical. As we shall see, the identification yields a powerful new approach for interpreting the Tractatus. Showing as radical Russellianism In his preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein credits Frege’s work, writing that ‘‘I am indebted to the great works of Frege, and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts’’ (TLP, p. 3). The emphasis Wittgenstein placed on Frege has been interpreted as slighting Russell. Such a reading is surely overreaching.6 There is, however, an important connection between Showing and Frege’s distinction of concept and object. Frege held that concepts are not objects, and this embroiled him in an exchange with Benno Kerry that centered on the question of whether the concept horse is a concept. In Frege’s view, concept expressions are predicational and as such are incomplete. They must be combined with singular terms to form an assertion. Singular terms, on the other hand, do not have this feature. Frege holds that the linguistic distinction has an ontological analog. Concepts are incomplete or unsaturated; objects are saturated. Frege admits that the ontology he intends cannot be articulated without the appearance of self-refutation. Frege hoped that his readers would grant him a ‘‘pinch of salt’’ when he used ordinary language to distinguish concept and object.7 The situation bears a similarity to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian idea that there are aspects of reality that cannot be expressed in language but can nonetheless be revealed. Geach maintains that Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing grew out of a sympathy for Frege’s point of view.8 Geach suggests that it is to Frege that Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing owes its greatest debt, not to Russell. In Frege’s dispute with Kerry, Russell famously sided with Kerry. The very statement of the thesis that a concept is not an object refutes it. Russell’s doctrine of the unrestricted variable demands that any proper formal system for logic adopt one style of genuine variable – the ‘‘individual’’ variable or ‘‘logical subject’’ variable. To deny that an entity is a logical subject (‘‘object’’), Russell wrote, must always be false or 6 7 8
Frege was largely unappreciated until Russell brought to light the importance of his work. Wittgenstein is simply adding to Russell’s efforts in this quarter. Gottob Frege, ‘‘On Concept and Object,’’ Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), p. 54. P. T. Geach, ‘‘Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein,’’ in Essays in Honor of G. H. von Wight, J. Hintikka, ed., Acta Philosophical Fennica 28 (1976), p. 55.
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meaningless.9 At first, this seems to make Frege’s concept/object distinction attractive as a model of Showing. But once we identify the Doctrine of Showing with the Tractarian fundamental idea, we see that the model is too weak. The identity of Showing with the fundamental idea yields a new way of understanding Showing. According to the Tractatus, all (and only) notions with logical and semantic content are pseudo-concepts that are shown – i.e., built into structured variables. This makes it impossible to construe Showing in a Fregean way. Nor is it possible to capture the connection by the Fregean inspirations that generate Conant’s view that Showing is a distinction between constative uses of language, in which a formula states what is the case, and elucidatory uses of language, in which an apparently constative is employed to dissolve a philosophical puzzle.10 Showing is not the vague doctrine that there are certain aspects of reality that cannot be expressed in language but must be conveyed through certain sorts of elucidatory employments of language. Our identification of Showing with the fundamental idea fixes what ‘‘aspects of reality’’ Wittgenstein targeted. He targeted the logical and semantic aspects. And Wittgenstein’s plan is not simply that they be conveyed through ‘‘elucidatory employments of language’’ but that they be built into structured variables (if only in the language of an ideal completed scientific theory of the world). Interpretations of the Tractatus have not failed to notice that there is some connection between Wittgenstein’s Showing, Principia’s ramified type-theory, and the Frege/Russell conception of logic. Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka have suggested that the central Tractarian themes derive from the doctrine that language is a ‘‘universal medium’’ which must contain its own metatheory. One cannot, while using a given language, render the semantics of that language, for to do so would rely on a given network of meaning-relations obtaining between the language and the world, and so presuppose them in stating what they are. On the Hintikkas’ view, the origin of Wittgenstein’s distinction between showing and saying lies in his conviction that semantics is ineffable. The Hintikkas trace their notion of language as a ‘‘universal medium’’ to van Heijenoort’s famous distinction between ‘‘logic as language’’ and ‘‘logic as calculus.’’11 On the ‘‘logic as language’’ view attributed to Frege 9 10
11
Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), pp. 46, 449, 507. The expression ‘‘constative use of language’’ is from James Conant, ‘‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein,’’ in Alice Carey and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 179. Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 4.
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and Russell, logic is a universal and all-encompassing language with content in its own right. Van Heijenoort correctly observes that Frege advocated a ‘‘syntactic’’ approach to logical truth and validity which construes these notions in terms of deductive closure under the axioms of a formal system. He contrasts this with the ‘‘semantic’’ approach to logic of Tarski, where logical truth and validity are construed in terms of invariant truth throughout all admissible interpretations.12 Van Heijenoort aligns the semantic approach with the algebraic tradition of Boole, Peirce, and Schro¨der. This makes Frege appear to reject the semantic tradition when, in distinguishing his work from that of Boole and his followers, he spoke of them as offering only a ‘‘calculus ratiocinator’’ and not also a ‘‘lingua characteristica.’’ On the semantic approach, one sets out a formal system that is subject to various semantic interpretations that are given from a metatheoretic perspective. For instance, in the Boolean calculus, ‘‘x þ y’’ can be interpreted as the union of two sets, or as the logical sum of two formulas. The formal system expresses a ‘‘content’’ only when a particular interpretation over a domain is given. Followers of van Heijenoort think that according to Frege and Russell, logic is a language which contains its own semantic metatheory. Their conception of logic as a language rejects the modern distinction between the formal calculus of logic and the metasystem. The rejection makes metasystemic research into such issues as decidability and semantic completeness impossible. The van Heijenoort interpretation, however, makes questionable history. It assumes that the new logic which the semantic tradition and the Frege/Russell tradition were working with was quantification theory. But the new logic set out by Frege in his Begriffsschrift (1879) is not just a quantification theory; it is a theory of functions. Indeed, his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893) it a theory of functions and their extensions. Logic in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903) is theory of propositions and their structures. The proper contrast between the semantic tradition and the Frege/Russell conception of logic does not lie in van Heijenoort’s distinction between ‘‘logic as uninterpreted system’’ (or calculus) and ‘‘logic as language.’’ The distinctness of the formal systems of Frege and Russell is that they embody comprehension principles postulating the existence of purely logical entities. The ‘‘content’’ Frege and Russell saw in their respective formal systems for logic lies in the comprehension principles, not in advancing (per impossibilia) a language that somehow contains its own metatheory. This undermines hope of tracing Wittgenstein’s showing versus saying distinction to a conception 12
Jean van Heijenoort, ‘‘Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language,’’ Synthese 17 (1967): 324–330.
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of language as a universal medium that is to be found in the Frege/Russell conception of logic. Notions such as ‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘universal,’’ ‘‘particular,’’ ‘‘object,’’ ‘‘value,’’ which Wittgenstein maintains must be shown and not said, cannot be explained as consequences of a conception of language as a universal medium. Wittgenstein’s showing versus saying distinction does owe its origins to Russell’s conception of logic, however. The conceptual linchpin is the notion of the variable in logic. Russell held that any proper calculus for logic must adopt only one style of genuine variables – individual/entity variables. By constructing other ‘‘variables with structure’’ (e.g., predicate variables, class variables, etc.), Russell hoped to solve the paradoxes plaguing Logicism by building distinctions (of type and later order\type) into formal grammar. The structured variable shows what otherwise would have to be said by predications involving pseudo-predicates such as ‘‘x is an object,’’ ‘‘x is a class,’’ ‘‘x is a number,’’ and so on. Russell originally imagined reconstructing the structure of a type-theory of classes by means of a substitutional theory which builds structure into variables in a syntactic way. To understand his method, perhaps a brief note on an analogous method in elementary mathematics is helpful. The equation mþ3¼2
has no solution in the natural numbers. But we can replace this equation with an equation of two variables, a and b, as follows: ða bÞ þ ð3 0Þ ¼ ð2 0Þ:
This equation has solutions in the natural numbers. For example, it is solved when a ¼ 0 and b ¼ 1. This approach employs new definitions for ‘‘addition,’’ ‘‘multiplication,’’ and ‘‘identity.’’13 Once the new definitions are introduced, we can go on to pretend that the original equation has a solution when m is the ‘‘negative integer’’ 1. But properly speaking there are no such entities as ‘‘negative integers.’’ Similarly, an ordinary unproblematic equation such as m þ 2 ¼ 3;
which does have a solution in the natural numbers, can be replaced by the new equation: ða bÞ þ ð2 0Þ ¼ ð3 0Þ: 13
ða bÞ ¼ ðc dÞ ¼ df ða þ dÞ ¼ ðb þ cÞ ða bÞ þ ðc dÞ ¼ df ða þ cÞ ðb þ dÞ ða bÞ ðc dÞ ¼ df ðac þ bdÞ ðad þ bcÞ
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This has a solution when a ¼ 1 and b ¼ 0. We then engage in the pretense that the original unproblematic equation has the ‘‘positive integer’’ þ1 as its solution. But again there is no such entity as a positive or a negative integer. The structure, not an ontology of positive and negative integers, is recovered by using relations on pairs of natural numbers. Russell’s substitutional technique for solving the paradoxes of attributes and classes is kindred in spirit to the approach to positive and negative integers. The language of substitution has only one style of genuine variables, namely individual variables. To emulate special structured variables for quantification over attributes in intension, multiple individual variables are used. Consider the following example. The type-theoretic expression ð8’ðoÞ Þ’ðoÞ ðxo Þ
says that all attributes ’(o) are exemplified by xo. Instead of a special bindable predicate variable ’(o) with a type index (o), Russell’s substitutional theory employs two individual variables a and b, writing ðaÞðbÞð9yÞða=b; x!y :&: yÞ:
This type-free substitutional statement says that for all entities a and b, there is an obtaining entity (proposition) y which is exactly like a except that x occurs in it wherever b occurs in a. Russell’s logical atomism was born in his work on substitution and became part of his philosophical methodology thereafter. Principia abandons the substitutional technique, but not the idea of structured variables that motivated it. There are no orders or types of entities (propositional functions) countenanced in the Principia. Quite the contrary, it offers a construction more extensively eliminativistic than the substitutional theory. In Principia, the ontology of propositions is abandoned and the logical particles no longer stand for relations among propositions. Although predicate variables (adorned with suppressed order\type indices) are adopted as part of the language, only individual variables are regarded as genuine variables. The predicate variables are ‘‘variables with structure’’ whose significance conditions give the variables ‘‘internal limitations.’’ That is, the admissible range of a variable is internally limited by its significance conditions and not said by statements of the language of the formal theory. Principia’s Introduction is not part of its formal theory. It gives a nominalist semantic interpretation of the predicate variables of the formal theory. It is this nominalistic interpretation that does the work of building orders and types into the significance conditions of the variables. Russell’s philosophical method of building ‘‘variables with structure’’ is adopted by the Tractatus and extended widely. It is worth examining some
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quotes from Russell and Wittgenstein side by side. During the era of Russell’s substitutional theory, we find the following: the range of significance must somehow be given with the variable; this can only be done by employing variables having some internal structure for such as are to be of some definite logical type other than individuals . . . But then we have to assume that a single letter, such as x, can only stand for an individual; and that can only be the case if individuals are really all entities, and classes, etc., are merely a fac¸on de parler.14
In his 1908 paper, ‘‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Logical Types,’’ Russell gave the doctrine a semantic twist which set the stage for the nominalistic interpretation of predicate variables in Principia. We find: The difficulty which besets attempts to restrict the variable is that restrictions naturally express themselves as hypotheses that the variable is of such or such a kind, and that, when so expressed, the resulting hypothesis is free from the intended restriction . . . Thus a variable can never be restricted within a certain range if the propositional function in which the variable occurs remains significant when the variable is outside that range. But if the function ceases to be significant when the variable goes outside a certain range, then the variable is ipso facto confined to that range, without the need of any explicit statement. This principle is to be borne in mind in the development of logical types.’’15
The variable is ‘‘internally limited by its range of significance.’’16 Russell’s method is to solve philosophical problems by eliminating certain questionable ontological commitments and employing structured variables. The limits are given by the structure of the variables and not made by statements of the formal language of the theory. They are ‘‘internal’’ to the signs of the language itself. In the Tractatus we find the following: We can now talk about formal concepts, in the same sense that we speak of formal properties. (I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole of traditional logic.) When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc.) . . . So the expression for a formal concept is a propositional variable in which this distinctive feature alone is constant. (TLP 4.126)
14 15
16
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution by Symbolic Logic,’’ Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 205. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types,’’ in Logic and Knowledge: Essays by Bertrand Russell 1901–1950, ed. Robert C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 73. Ibid., p. 72.
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Thus, the variable name ‘‘x’’ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object. Whenever the word ‘‘object’’ (‘‘thing,’’ ‘‘entity,’’ etc.) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name . . . The same holds for the words ‘‘complex,’’ ‘‘fact,’’ ‘‘function,’’ ‘‘number,’’ etc. They all signify formal concepts and are presented in logical symbolism by variables. (TLP 4.1271)
Wittgenstein accepts Russell’s idea of building structure into variables. It is part of his notion that ‘‘formal concepts’’ are properly expressed by variables. In interpreting the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus, we must resist the tradition of interpretation that characterizes the logical constants narrowly. Wittgenstein’s conception of the ‘logical constants’ includes much more than the truth-functions (statement connectives), quantifiers, and identity sign of predicate logic.17 He held that words like ‘complex,’ ‘fact,’ ‘function,’ ‘number,’ etc., all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by variables. The notion of a ‘‘formal concept’’ here means to cover any expression that involves logical (or semantic) content. Wittgenstein writes (TLP 4.126): I introduce the expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole of traditional logic. When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign of this object . . . Formal concepts cannot, in fact, be represented by means of a function, as concepts proper can.
Wittgenstein uses ‘‘logical constant’’ (in his statement of the Tractarian ‘‘fundamental idea’’) synonymously with his use of the expressions ‘‘formal concept’’ and ‘‘internal property (relation).’’ That is, the logical constants include all and only notions with logico-semantic content. Among such notions, Wittgenstein included ‘identity,’ ‘universal,’ ‘particular,’ ‘name,’ ‘fact,’ ‘necessity,’ ‘possibility,’ and all semantic notions such as ‘truth,’ ‘reference,’ ‘belief,’ representation,’ ‘content,’ and the like. We can now understand how it is that Wittgenstein took Showing to be the ‘‘main point’’ of the Tractatus while at the same time expressing his ‘‘fundamental idea’’ in terms of the logical constants. The Tractatus advocates an uncompromising extension of Russell’s method of building structure into variables. Russell’s logical atomism was a research program that grew out of this method. It is an eliminativistic program which makes philosophy the analysis of logical form. The Tractatus endeavors to perfect and complete this program by extending the eliminativism widely: all (and 17
McGuinness notices this. He argues that Wittgenstein’s original notion of a logical constant was ‘‘anything that had been supposed to be a logical object.’’ See Brian McGuinness, ‘‘The Grundgedanke of the Tractatus,’’ in G. Vesey, ed., Understanding Wittgenstein (London: Macmillan, 1974).
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only) logico-semantic distinctions are to be built into the logical syntax (the ‘‘variables’’) of an ideal language for science. In reading the Tractatus it is essential to keep in mind that it assumes the viability of many of Russell’s analyses – if only in broad outline. Consider, for instance, Wittgenstein’s discussion of Kant’s problem of incongruous counterparts (i.e., that it is a synthetic and yet necessary truth that a righthand glove cannot be made to coincide spatially with a left-hand glove). Wittgenstein writes (TLP 6.36111): Kant’s problem about the right and left hand, which cannot be made to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed it exists in one-dimensional space
---o—x--x—o---a b in which two congruent figures, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are moved out of this space. The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely congruent. It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be made to coincide. A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned around in four-dimensional space.
Concerning this argument Fogelin writes: This is one of the few arguments in the Tractatus that strikes me as just awful. It is surely obvious that Kant’s central point is that a right-hand glove and a left-hand glove cannot be made to coincide in a three-dimensional space. For this reason he calls them incongruent. Here it will not help to offer – as Wittgenstein does – an alternative definition of congruency.18
Unfortunately, Fogelin misses the fact that Wittgeinstein’s remark is part of an eliminativistic program of conceptual analysis whose intent is precisely to offer a reconstruction of the notion of congruence. Wittgenstein’s discussion of Kant on incongruous counterparts speaks loudly as an endorsement of Russell’s eliminativism. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s position in the Tractatus is simply borrowed from Russell. In Russell’s view, Kant’s discussion of incongruent counterparts relies upon an erroneous importation of ordinary language notions of superposition and motion into the properly metrical notion of congruence – as if congruence requires that there must be a continuous series of equal figures moved through physical space and leading from A to B. Russell wrote: No motion will transform abcd into a tetrahedron metrically equal in all respects, but with the opposite sense. In this fact, however, there seems to my mind, to be
18
Robert Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 90.
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nothing mysterious, but merely a result of confining ourselves to three dimensions. In one dimension, the same would hold of distances with oppose senses; in two dimensions, of areas. It is only to those who regard motion as essential to the notion of metrical equality that right and left-handedness form a difficulty.19
Fogelin is correct in holding that motion and superposition are certainly part of the ordinary conception of congruence used by Euclid, Kant, and others, but this is irrelevant to its reconceptualization (its new ‘‘definition’’) within the new research program of logical analysis. A similar, though less compelling, case can be made with respect to Wittgenstein’s discussion of color incompatibility. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s comments on color include the following (TLP 6.3751): For example, the simultaneous presence of two colors at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of color. Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics; more or less as follows – a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be identical. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time is a contradiction.)
It is certainly a formidable task to find an eliminativistic analysis of the ordinary notion of ‘‘color’’ which separates out the logical components from the material, but the Tractatus is committed to it – if only at the limit of scientific inquiry. The issue of color (assuming it is the physical property of surface reflectance) is complicated because it concerns the application of arithmetic in the theory of the measurement of a (perhaps) continuous physical process (surface reflectance). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein attempts to tackle the problem of color incompatibility as a problem of the incompatibility of surface reflectance potentials, i.e., the impossibility of a particle (photon) having different velocities at the same time. This has seemed inadequate, since it simply would avoid the problem of color incompatibility only to confront the equally difficult problem of explaining why it is a logical impossibility for a material particle have two velocities (be at two positions in space) at the same time.20 An examination of Russell’s Principles again reveals Wittgenstein’s debt. Russell wrote:
19 20
Russell, Principles of Mathematics, pp. 417f. Ramsey objected that Wittgenstein explains the allegedly necessary connections within the color system by appeal to the allegedly necessary connections within space and time, but no argument is given that these spatio-temporal relations are logically necessary. See Frank Ramsey, Critical Notice of the Tractatus, Mind 32 (1923): 465–478.
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The most fundamental characteristic of matter lies in the nature of its connection to space and time. Two pieces of matter cannot occupy the same place at the same moment, and the same pieces cannot occupy two places at the same moment, though it may occupy two moments at the same place. That is, whatever, at a given moment, has extension, is not an indivisible piece of matter: division of space always implies division of any matter occupying the space, but division of time has no corresponding implication. (These properties are commonly attributed to matter: I do not wish to assert that they do actually belong to it.) By these properties, matter is distinguished from whatever else is in space. Consider colors, for example: these possess impenetrability, so that no two colors can be in the same place at the same time, but they do not possess the other property of matter, since the same color may be in many places at once.21
Wittgenstein’s aphorism on color is certainly not a paraphrase of Russell’s Principles as was his entry on incongruous counterparts. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘Space, time, and color (being colored) are forms of objects’’ (TLP 2.0251); ‘‘Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable’’ (TLP 2.0272). These are among the most cryptic passages in the Tractatus. But Russell’s work offers our best hope of deciphering them. In Principles, Russell prefaces his discussion of matter by noting that he is not concerned with the nature of the matter that actually exists, he is rather interested in the philosophical problem of matter – the problem of ‘‘the analysis of rational Dynamics considered as a branch of pure mathematics, which introduces its subjectmatter by definition, not by observation of the actual world.’’22 Russell is not speaking of an enduring material object, but defining the notion of a material point as extensionless, occupying exactly one place at a time. Russell holds that the impenetrability of colors, as with the impenetrability of matter, is a logical feature of the analytic reconceptualization of space, time, and matter. That these passages of the Tractatus are closely tied to Russell’s work encourages the interpretation that the key to unraveling Wittgenstein’s ideas lies with a proper understanding of Russell. Interpretations of the Tractatus emphasizing its picture theory often call attention to Hertz’s Principien der Mechanik (1894). In the preface to his book, Hertz suggests that physics constructs mathematical models (Bilder) of reality, representing the essential features of the physical world by the relations that hold in the model. Wittgenstein says that a picture must have the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity as the fact it pictures, and Hertz says that a system that is the model of another must satisfy the condition ‘‘that the number of co-ordinates of the first system is equal to the number of the
21
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, p. 467.
22
Ibid., p. 465.
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second.’’23 The isomorphism between linguistic picture and fact is akin, Wittgenstein says, to the isomorphic relations between the gramophone record, the musical idea, the score, and the sound-waves (TLP 4.014, 4.0141). Similarly, Hertz says that the relation of a dynamical model to the system of which it is regarded as the model is precisely the same as the relation of the images which our mind forms of things to the things themselves. Wittgenstein himself invites us to compare his comments with those of Hertz on dynamical models (TLP 4.04). The many similarities with Hertz are important.24 But it equally important to understand that in Principles, well before Wittgenstein got his feet wet, Russell had already called attention to Hertz. Russell regarded Hertz’s work as an example of conceptual analysis. Working within a kinematic theory that embraces Maxwell’s equations for the propagation of electromagnetic waves in the aether, Hertz offers a systematic reconceptualization of Newtonian dynamics that avoids forces acting at a distance. Hertz’s ‘‘picture theory’’ (his notion of a dynamical model) was employed as an aid in achieving this reconceptualization of ‘‘force.’’ Hertz’s work offers an example of an approach that is eliminativistic.25 Hertz’s work is not historically relevant to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus simply (or even primarily) because it embraces a form of the picture theory. It is relevant because it is an example of a reconstruction which employs picturing as an eliminativistic tool. On the present identification of the Tractarian fundamental idea with Showing, the picture theory is demoted.26 The notion of picturing plays a role in the Tractatus not unlike the one it plays in Hertz’s work; it is but one of several tools for building logical semantic notions into structured variables. What then was original with Wittgenstein? Russell’s science of logical form is an eliminativistic analysis that builds structure into variables. It involves the supplanting of one language and ontology by another within which the successes of the former have been retained but completely reconceptualized. The supplanting framework dissolving all philosophical problems, of course, does not presently exist. It is an ideal, a limit of
23 24 25
26
Heinrich Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 175. See James Griffin, Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 100ff. In a surprising move, Timm Lampert has argued that Wittgenstein’s comments on color incompatibility assume Hertz’s conception of physical theory, replete with its assumption of the aether! See Timm Lampert, Wittgenstein’s Physikalismus: Die Sinnesdatenanalyse des Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in ihren historischen Kontext (Paderborn: Mentis, 2000). McGuinness has seen this. See ‘‘The Grundgedanke of the Tractatus.’’
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scientific and conceptual analysis, obtainable in principle. Russell’s method of solving philosophical problems by building structure into variables became, in the hands of the youthful Wittgenstein, the Doctrine of Showing. Russell’s eliminativism was moderate; it exempted certain logical notions and knowledge of logic. Wittgenstein hoped to find analyses of these notions. In the language of the logically ideal scientific theory, a language in which the analysis of logical form is complete, all (and only) logico-semantic notions are built into logical syntax of structured variables. Ideal versus ordinary language Our identification of Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing with the Tractarian fundamental idea has very important consequences for understanding the role that the notion of an ‘‘ideal’’ or ‘‘logically correct’’ language plays in the Tractatus. In his introduction to the Tractatus, Russell put matters as follows: In order to understand Mr. Wittgenstein’s work, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of this theory which deals with symbolism he is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language.
Russell took the picture theory to pertain only to the language of an ideal and complete scientific theory. In the language of the ideal (‘‘logically perfect’’) theory, logical notions are built into the syntax itself. In some passages Wittgenstein corroborates this. He writes (TLP 4.002): Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.
Ordinary language disguises thought, and therein, in Wittgenstein’s view, is the source of philosophical conundrums and confusions of which the whole of philosophy is full (TLP 3.324). Wittgenstein writes that ‘‘in order to avoid these errors we must make use of a symbolism that excludes them . . . that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar – by logical syntax’’ (TLP 3.325). An interpretation that attributes the Russellian quest for an ideal language to Wittgenstein is not currently popular. The prevailing wisdom in interpreting the Tractatus takes the work as endeavoring to delimit the very conditions for the possibility of representation – i.e., to set limits so as to reveal that philosophical problems are generated by a violation of the conditions for meaningfulness that underlie all language and thought.
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Wittgenstein supposedly held in the Tractatus that picturing is a necessary condition for the very possibility of thought and representation. Stern puts the view as follows: ‘‘‘Logical form’ is reserved for those aspects of representation that must appear in any representation whatsoever. Wittgenstein introduces logical form as a generalization of the notion of pictorial form.’’27 ‘‘Wittgenstein held that philosophical analysis will show us the rules we tacitly accept,’’ Stern continues, ‘‘the underlying structure of our language, and so enable us to avoid the misunderstandings that had generated traditional philosophical controversies. He thought that one could do so by specifying rules for translating from our ordinary language into a new symbolism that would clearly display the rules governing the underlying structures of ordinary language.’’28 On this interpretation, Wittgenstein is concerned with the ‘‘logical form’’ of every language. Hacker puts the point starkly: One deep misapprehension runs through Russell’s introduction [to the Tractatus]: namely, that Wittgenstein was concerned with elaborating the conditions for a logically perfect language. This was no trivial misunderstanding, since the point of the book was to elaborate the logico-metaphysical conditions for any possible language. It was a treatise on the essential nature of any form of representation whatever – a metaphysics of symbolism.29
Hacker continues, ‘‘Frege and Russell had held that natural languages are defective . . . and are only partial guides to the objective logical structures of reality . . . whereas the Tractatus had argued that every possible language must, as a condition of sense, mirror (on analysis) the logical forms of what is represented.’’30 If this is Wittgenstein’s conception of logical form, it is certainly out of step with Russell’s. But an interpretation that severs Wittgenstein’s conception of logical form from that of Russell is not viable. Wittgenstein’s ideas on language and representation must be set in the context of his view that ‘‘formal concepts’’ are ‘‘represented in conceptual notation by variables’’ (TLP 4.1272). This forges a bond with Russell, for it was Russell who inaugurated the method of using variables with structure to solve philosophical problems. Moreover, the most important new tool of Russell’s method was his 1905 theory of definite descriptions. In his article ‘‘On Denoting’’ Russell drew the lesson that ordinary grammatical form
27 28 29 30
David Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 38. Ibid., p. 49. P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 69. Ibid., p. 80.
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may be misleading as to logical form. In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein endorses the lesson. He writes that ‘‘your theory of descriptions is quite undoubtedly right, even if the individual primitive signs in it are quite different from what you believe.’’31 Similarly, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote (TLP 4.0031): All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’ (though not in Mauthner’s sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.
Wittgenstein’s statement that philosophy is a ‘‘critique of language’’ is conspicuously placed side by side with an endorsement of Russell’s discovery about logical form. Wittgenstein was certainly not unaware of the significance Russell placed upon his theory of incomplete symbols. Ramsey later called it ‘‘a paradigm of philosophy.’’32 The paradigm requires that we ally Wittgenstein’s thesis that formal concepts are shown by variables with Russell’s ideas on building structure into variables. Logical form is not the underlying condition for meaningfulness in thought and language; it is rather a reconceptualization of the ‘‘formal concepts’’ that are rightly (if naively) employed in ordinary languages but wrongly understood by speculative philosophy. In Russell’s view, philosophical analysis involves supplanting one linguistic framework by another in such as way as to retain (wherever possible) the successes of the old framework, and through a reconceptualization and reconstruction reveal the sources and solutions of the philosophical conundrums the former framework generated. The Tractatus offers a program of eliminativistic reconstruction, not a metaphysics of symbolism. Wittgenstein calls attention to ordinary language when he writes that ‘‘we need to understand the logic of our language,’’ and that ‘‘all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order’’ (TLP 5.5563). Appearances to the contrary, passages such as this do not support the thesis that Wittgenstein was concerned with the formal conditions for representation in thought and language. These entries are not statements of disagreement with Russell – as if Russell thought the nonphilosophical use of ordinary language is somehow flawed. It is the philosophical use of ordinary language that is flawed. Obviously the work of Cantor, Weierstrass, Dedekind, and Frege and 31
32
Letter of November 1913, in Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 129. Wittgenstein objected to Russell’s use of the identity sign in his theory of definite descriptions. Frank Ramsey, ‘‘Philosophy,’’ The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 263n.
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Hertz on logical form does not employ the ordinary language use of words like ‘‘infinite,’’ ‘‘limit’’ and ‘‘continuity,’’ ‘‘number,’’ or ‘‘force.’’ Their works are revisionist. They offer reconstructions based on the logical analyses of infinity, of limits and continuity, of numbers, force, and space and time. It is the philosopher’s use of the concepts of ordinary language that gives rise to metaphysical muddles. The muddles are dissolved once the proper analyses of these concepts is set out. It is from the perspective of an eliminativistic reconceptualization of all logico-semantic notions that we come to understand Wittgenstein’s discussion of ordinary language. It is from the perspective of an eliminativistic reconstruction that the preface of the Tractatus must be understood. In the preface we find the following: The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. Thus the aim of the book is to set limits to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set limits to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limits can be set, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.
Wittgenstein writes that ‘‘It [philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outward through what can be thought. It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said’’ (TLP 4.114–4.115). The emphasis on language has inspired an interpretation that Wittgenstein offers a program that explores the limits of language and thought – a program which aims to bring about an insight into the nature of our language, an insight that would make it clear that traditional philosophical problems and the solutions that have been proposed to them are literally nonsense. But the notion of ‘‘setting limits from within’’ is again adopted from Russell’s work. Once again the idea originates with Russell’s work to build the structure of type-theory into syntax (and thereby evade an ontology of types of entities). In his early substitutional theory, Russell endeavored to build logical distinctions of type into the formal syntax by using ‘‘variables with structure.’’ There are no type restrictions on the variables. The logical reconstruction of statements about classes renders the limits that block the paradoxes of classes (and attributes) from within formal grammar. The language of Principia employs predicate variables adorned with order\type indices, but Russell
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hastens to add that the variables are not restricted but limited from within by their significance conditions. The limitations on the variables that block the paradoxes are part of the logical reconceptualization of classes, propositions, attributes in intension, numbers, and the like. In this way, Russell labored to explain that the distinctions of type and order – the limitations they impose – are not properly limits outside of which there is another realm. This provides the proper background for understanding Wittgenstein’s thesis that philosophy must set limits to language. The limits are from within, not restrictions or boundaries imposed from outside. Wittgenstein’s phrase ‘‘setting the limits of language’’ reveals his debt to Russell. He is extending the compass of Russell’s program of building structure into variables. Wittgenstein advocates building structure into variables so that all distinctions between would-be logical entities become part of the logical syntax of a ‘‘no-logical-entities’’ analysis. Understood in this way, the picture theory of the Tractatus applies only to Wittgenstein’s notion of a logically perfect language. It was not intended to place strictures of picturing on the admissible devices of representation, reference, and communication in natural languages. In Wittgenstein’s view, all logical (and semantic) notions are to be reconceptualized so that (where proper) they will be shown by the syntactical forms of a logically perfect language – the language of the ideal and complete scientific theory at the limit of inquiry. Russell’s introduction to the Tractatus characterized the point spot on.
Sub specie aeternitatis The identification of Showing with the Tractarian fundamental idea aids greatly in the clarification of both. What makes Showing seem to be a perplexing doctrine is that its connection with the Grundgedanke has been underappreciated. Objectors will be quick to call attention to the fact that the Tractatus places ‘‘the mystical,’’ ethics, God, and value as matters under the purview of Showing – they ‘‘show themselves’’ (sich zeigen). Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They show themselves. They are what is mystical’’ (TLP 6.522). In his early attempts to publish the Tractatus, Wittgenstein sent the manuscript to Ludwig von Ficker and subsequently wrote the following in a letter to him: the book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My
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work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend that you read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.33
This letter presents another theme which must be reconciled with Showing and the Tractarian fundamental idea: Wittgenstein says that the point of the book is ethical. Wittgenstein’s inclusion of notions of God, ethics, and value among the notions that show themselves lends itself to an interpretation that makes Showing appear quite distinct from the Tractarian fundamental idea. Indeed, it lends itself to the construal of Showing as a mystical mode of access to the deep and important questions of human existence. This encourages interpretations of Showing that make it a mysticism which reveals that what is really important lies beyond the limits of the sayable. Engelmann put this as follows: He [Wittgenstein] has something of enormous importance in common with the positivists; he draws the line between what we can speak about and what we must be silent about just as they do . . . Positivism holds – and this is its essence – that what we can speak about is all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about.34
Presented with passages like these, one might be inclined to agree with Pears that the Doctrine of Showing is ‘‘a baffling doctrine bafflingly presented.’’35 He writes: If we try to deduce the meaning of the doctrine and its justification from the things that he puts on the list of what can be shown and not said,’’ writes Pears, ‘‘we do not get much help. For the list includes such disparate items as the existence of a named object (TLP 4.1211, 5.535), the identity of the world with my world (TLP 5.62), and the value of anything that has value (TLP 6.4–6.421).36
The fact that Wittgenstein viewed the Tractatus as having something to reveal about ethics does not, however, undermine our identification of 33 34 35
Quoted from G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 83. Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), p. 97. David Pears, The False Prison, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 143. 36 Ibid.
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Showing with the Grundgedanke. Without a doubt, the notions of ethics and value present a challenge to the present interpretation. Shortly after he met him in The Hague in December of 1919 to discuss the Tractatus, Russell wrote the following to Ottoline Morrell: I felt in his book a flavor of mysticism, but was astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius and he seriously contemplates becoming a Monk.37
Wittgenstein’s interest in Schopenhauer, James, and Kierkegaard has proved to be a bountiful resource for interpretations of the Tractatus. But the broad success of our identification of Showing with the Tractarian fundamental idea forms a template for interpreting the Tractatus as a work in alliance with Russell. If Wittgenstein’s views on ethics can be understood as echoing what Russell was saying on ethics at the time, this surely trumps interpretive experiments which call upon Schopehauer, James, Kierkegaard, and the like. Ethical truths seem to be synthetic necessities which do not contain logico-semantic content. But in his Notebooks 1914–1916, Wittgenstein writes that ‘‘Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.’’38 What sense can be made of this? The answer lies in Russell’s Spinozism. In 1912 Russell published a paper entitled ‘‘The Essence of Religion’’ – a piece excerpted from a failed book project called Prisons which Russell wrote in 1911 while his affair with Ottoline Morrell was new. Russell wrote: Religion consists in union with the universe. Formerly, union was achieved by assimilating the universe to our own conception of the Good . . . we must find a mode of union which asks nothing of the world, and depends solely upon ourselves . . . The moralist divides the world into good and bad . . . But besides this dualistic attitude, there is another, wholly compatible with it, but monistic: an attitude which ignores the differences between the good and the bad, and loves all alike. This is the essence of religion; but because it has not been clearly distinguished from the moralist’s attitude, it has been supposed, wrongly, to require the belief that the world is good . . . Every such demand [that the world shall conform to our standards] is an endeavour to impose Self upon the world . . . The essence of religion is the union with the universe achieved by subordination of the demands of Self . . . This subordination is not complete if it depends upon a belief that the universe satisfies some at least of the demands of Self.39 37 38 39
Quoted from Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 279. Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 77. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Prisons I’’ (Morrell Papers, University of Texas at Austin). Quoted from Kenneth Blackwell, The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 111.
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The same ideas emerge in Russell’s discussion of ‘‘true philosophic contemplation’’ in The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Russell wrote: ‘‘By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without the hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge – knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to obtain.’’40 Self-interest and subjectivity are a ‘‘prison’’ in Russell’s view, because they shut out the possibility of impersonal contemplation of the world – a Spinozistic ‘‘intellectual love of God’’ interpreted as an attitude produced by viewing the world sub specie aeternitatis.41 According to the paper ‘‘The Essence of Religion,’’ the ‘‘infinite self’’ is universal and impartial and peace comes to this self through harmony or agreement with the whole, by means of its experience of ‘‘wisdom.’’ Russell approvingly calls this ‘‘mysticism,’’ though he warns that it is misguided to interpret it as a ‘‘perception of new objects.’’ It is, instead, ‘‘a different way of regarding the same objects, a contemplation more impersonal, more vast, more filled with love than the fragmentary, disquiet consideration we give to things when we view them as a means to help or hinder our own purposes.’’42 Russell maintains that constructing a metaphysics tailored to the values of humans is a fundamental source of error in both religious thinking and in philosophy. This position is set out nicely in Russell’s ‘‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’’: The ethical element which has been prominent in many of the most famous systems of philosophy is, in my opinion, one of the most serious obstacles to the victory of scientific method in the investigation of philosophical questions. Human ethical notions, as Chuang Yzu perceived, are essentially anthropocentric, and involve, when used in metaphysics, an attempt, however veiled, to legislate for the universe on the basis of the present desires of men. In this way, they interfere with that receptivity to fact which is the essence of the scientific attitude towards the world.43
Russell contrasts this self-interested approach with his new philosophy of logical atomism – a philosophy which takes a global and non-self-interested perspective. In Russell’s view, logical analysis has cleared away centuries of 40 41 42
43
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), p. 160. Blackwell, The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell, pp. 160f. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘The Essence of Religion,’’ in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 12, ed. Richard Rempel, Andres Brink, and Margaret Moran (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 112–122. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy,’’ in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p. 82.
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metaphysical muddles that were introduced because of an emotional attachment to a particular ethical view. It is emotional detachment that Russell finds praiseworthy in the mysticism of Spinoza. In ‘‘Mysticism and Logic’’ Russell wrote: Good and bad, and even the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are the reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in themselves. And therefore an impartial contemplation, freed from all preoccupation with Self, will not judge things good or bad, although it is very easily combined with that feeling of universal love which leads the mystic to say that the whole world is good.44
Russell demanded a scientific (analytic) approach to philosophical problems – an approach which embraces atheism and an abandonment of spiritual, emotional, and religious perspectives. Nonetheless, he grappled to find some analog of the mystical that might accrue to the scientific and intellectual contemplation of the world. What this analog might be is explored early on in Russell’s ‘‘A Free Man’s Worship’’ (1903) and it was a recurring focus of discussion during Russell’s relationship with Ottoline Morrell. Eventually Russell settled on a new meaning for ‘‘the mystical’’ and illustrated it by Spinoza’s intellectual contemplation of the universe sub specie aeternitatis. Russell confessed to Ottoline that Wittgenstein ‘‘detested’’ his paper ‘‘The Essence of Religion.’’ In Wittgenstein’s view he ‘‘had been a traitor to the gospel of exactness and wantonly used words vaguely; also that such things are too intimate to print.’’ Russell would surely agree that Leopardi had put the ideas better in his poems ‘‘L’infinito’’ and ‘‘La ginestra o fiori del deserto.’’ Russell and Ottoline were fond of reading Leopardi together while working on Prisons.45 But Wittgenstein’s remarks do not show that he disagreed with Russell’s ideas.46 They reflect his objection to Russell’s having expressed them. In fact, it is the very same Spinozistic ideas that appear in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914–1916. Wittgenstein wrote that ‘‘the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis . . . The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing
44 45
46
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Mysticism and Logic,’’ in Mysticism and Logic, p. 27. See Ottoline Morrell, Ottoline at Garsington: Memoirs of Lady Ottoline Morrell, 1915–1918, ed. Robert Gathorne-Hardy (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), p. 226. Russell quotes from ‘‘La ginestra’’ in Power: A New Social Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1938), p. 33. He quotes ‘‘L’infinito’’ in full in his book The Impact of Science on Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 98, prefacing it by writing: ‘‘This point of view is well expressed in a little poem by Leopardi and expresses, more nearly than any other known to me, my own feeling about the universe and human passions.’’ Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 280.
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seen together with the whole of logical space.’’47 Wittgenstein goes on to say that ‘‘In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what ‘being happy’ means.’’48 Wittgenstein’s comments on ethics and God in the Notebooks and the Tractatus echo Russell’s Spinozistic theme of a contemplation of the facts of the world sub specie aeternitatis. The proper ethical attitude is one of harmony or peace of mind with the world. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case . . . And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing of what is higher’’ (TLP 6.41, 6.42). He goes on to say, ‘‘it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)’’ (TLP 6.421). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus aims to illustrate the attitude of harmony. It is shown by the conspicuous absence of any statements in the work which would attempt to metaphysically ground truths governing what is good or evil, permissible or obligatory. Such statements (and Russell’s own statements in ‘‘The Essence of Religion’’) only reflect a ‘self’ in disharmony with the world’s facts. The allegiance to Russell’s Spinozism is striking in the following passage (TLP 6.43): If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language. In short, the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
There are no ethical facts. But harmony is shown in one’s attitudes toward the world as a whole. Wittgenstein continues as follows: ‘‘We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course then there are no questions left, and this is itself the answer’’ (TLP 6.52). On this view, there can be no ethical theory. To espouse any theory of ethics is to be in disharmony. The conspicuous absence in the Tractatus of an ethical philosophy is itself what shows its ethical position. The proper ethical perspective is that of silence, because silence is a manifestation of one’s harmony. Compare the following passage from Russell’s ‘‘Mysticism and Logic’’: Although, as we saw, mysticism can be interpreted so as to agree with the view that good and evil are not intellectually fundamental, it must be admitted that here we are no longer in verbal agreement with most of the great philosophers and religious teachers of the past. I believe, however, that the elimination of ethical 47 48
Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 77. See also TLP 6.45. Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 75.
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considerations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary and – though this may seem a paradox – an ethical advance.49
We need to look no further than Russell to understand Wittgenstein on ethics. Wittgenstein’s comment to von Ficker that the Tractatus concerns ethics may well appear to be a sort of mysticism. In truth, it quite naturally reveals his agreement with Russell’s Spinozism.50
Russell’s rejection of Showing Our thesis is that the Tractatus contains Wittgenstein’s ideas on how to extend and perfect logical atomism – Russell’s eliminativistic program for a scientific philosophy based on the analysis of logical form.51 Wittgenstein’s doctrine of Showing is but a radical form of Russell’s eliminativism. But why then would Russell reject Showing? There is a problem shared by Wittgenstein’s attempt to make a distinction between showing and saying and Frege’s attempt to make a distinction between concept and object. Frege’s distinction leads to a conundrum that is similar to that which the Doctrine of Showing leads – namely, that the fundamental idea, and all attempts to justify it, will (when expressed literally) violate it. Frege’s conundrum is local. Wittgenstein’s is global. Every logical distinction is such that its expression via anything but a structured variable is self-undermining. How then can one philosophically justify the introduction of such structured variables? Russell couldn’t accept Frege’s local conundrum. And he certainly bridled when Wittgenstein embraced it globally. Russell rejected Wittgenstein’s extreme eliminativism. The extreme eliminativism of the Tractatus produces a mysticism about logical form that Russell found unacceptable and tangential to the theses of atomicity and extensionality which he regarded as the central tenets of the work. Russell characterizes the Tractarian picture theory as maintaining that a proposition (at least in the ideal language for science) represents by being a picture or morphic model (Bild) of the facts which it represents. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or 49 50
51
‘‘Mysticism and Logic,’’ p. 27. Correspondence suggests that the Spinozistic title of the Tractatus was proposed by Moore: von Wright, Wittgenstein, p. 97. The original title was the German Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung. McGuinness glimpses this. He writes: ‘‘This will give us a true ‘logical atomism’ with no two particulars differing in type, no difference of type, for example, between mental and physical particulars: neutral monism.’’ See Brian McGuinness, ‘‘Pictures and Form,’’ in Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers of Brian McGuinness (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 61–81.
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incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality’’ (TLP 2.18). As Russell put it, ‘‘a map clearly conveys information, correct or incorrect; and when the information is correct, this is because there is a similarity of structure between the map and the region concerned.’’52 In My Philosophical Development, Russell wrote that for a time he was prepared to accept Wittgenstein’s picture theory, but not his mysticism according to which ‘‘propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to represent it – the logical form.’’53 Russell criticizes Showing as a form of mysticism concerning the relationship between language and the world. In his efforts to distance himself from what he regarded as an untenable mysticism, Russell caused readers of the Tractatus to miss important connections between the work and his own research program. In his introduction to the Tractatus, Russell wrote (TLP, xxi): Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language . . . This inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy. The right method of teaching philosophy, he says, would be to confine oneself to propositions of the sciences, stated with all possible clearness and exactness, leaving philosophical assertions to the learner, and proving to them, whenever he made them, that they are meaningless . . . What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless, he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is adequate, but for my part, I confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort.
Russell goes on in his introduction to say that he cannot agree with Wittgenstein’s remark that ‘‘propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them . . . What expresses itself in language we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality’’ (TLP 4.121). Russell hoped for a loophole through which one might escape from Tractarian mysticism. In My Philosophical Development,
52 53
My Philosophical Development, p. 113. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 114.
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Russell recalled his fundamental disagreement with Wittgenstein on this point: ‘‘To be able to represent the logic form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with the propositions outside of logic, that is, outside the world’’ (Tractatus 4.12). This raises the only point on which, at the time when I most nearly agreed with Wittgenstein, I still remained unconvinced. In my introduction to the Tractatus, I suggested that, although in any given language there are things that language cannot express, it is yet always possible to construct a language of higher order in which these things are said. There will, in the new language, still be things which it cannot say, but which can be said in the next language, and so on ad infinitum. This suggestion, which was then new, has now become an accepted commonplace of logic.54
It is Wittgenstein’s extreme eliminativism that Russell is criticizing because it generates an untenable mysticism. Russell’s eliminativism, his logical atomism, was moderate. It exempted certain foundational logical notions and knowledge of logic itself. Showing is extreme because, unlike Russell’s atomism, it is resolute and makes no such exemption. Wittgenstein agrees with Russell that ‘‘logic is the essence of philosophy,’’ but he holds that Russell was mistaken in thinking that philosophy is itself a science founded upon knowledge of logical form. This is an in-house debate among allies. The Tractatus makes several suggestions designed to reveal the possibility, in principle, of a radically eliminativistic analysis and reconstruction – an eliminativistic analysis that envelops knowledge of logic itself. These suggestions, however, will themselves be in violation of the eliminativistic ideal because they will employ what the Tractatus regards as logical and semantic pseudo-concepts as if they were genuine concepts. This situation causes a serious tension in Wittgenstein’s work. On the one hand, the eliminativism inaugurates a research program requiring that we realize the ideal by finding the constructions that build logico-semantic notions into formal grammar in such a way that their content is shown, not said by predicate expressions. On the other hand, the extreme form of eliminativism Wittgenstein seeks – where all logico-semantic concepts are pseudo-concepts – leaves one employing the structures of the ideal framework, with complete silence observed when it comes to their explanation and justification. Any attempt at justification of the new framework would be self-refuting. Wittgenstein closes the Tractatus with: Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daru¨ber muß man schweigen.55
54
Ibid.
55
‘‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’’
My fundamental idea
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Pure adherence to the eliminativistic ideal would be to content oneself with speaking in the new framework and to otherwise be silent, letting the syntax do the work of showing or wearing its logico-semantic relations on its sleeve. Showing is the thesis that all (and only) logico-semantic notions are pseudo-concepts that would be shown in the syntax of an ideal language for empirical science. This is an eliminativistic claim that the old ontological framework, in which notions with logico-semantic content are taken as primitive, can (in principle) be supplanted by an (ideal) framework within which these notions are reconceptualized and constructed anew. But what is the status of the eliminativistic claim itself, and how can it be supported? If all logico-semantic notions are pseudo-concepts which, in an ideal language, would be shown because built into logical syntax, then the very basis from which such an ideal language could be sought and justified seems wholly undermined. Russell knew the dark consequence of Wittgenstein’s radical position – it threatens to reduce his eliminativistic conception of philosophy as the science of logical form to philosophy as mysticism based on the pronunciations of an oracle.
Kicking away the ladder Wittgenstein’s doctrine of Showing originates from Russell’s eliminativism. Russell was quick to point out, however, that a thoroughly eliminativistic approach to knowledge of logic is self-undermining. Wittgenstein, working still as Russell’s apprentice, was undaunted. He simply embraced an ouroboric conception of philosophy.56 In Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy reaches its completion and perfection when it vanishes at the ideal end point of its own analyses. The Tractatus itself makes a distinction between what is sinnlos and what is unsinnig. The distinction helps to explaining the doctrine of showing. It softens the self-refutation that seems to arise if we take it at its word that its own entries are ‘‘meaningless.’’ In the Prototractatus, Wittgenstein wrote: Tautologies und Contradiction sind (sinnlos) nicht unsinnig. Sie geho¨ren zum Symbolismus und zwar a¨hnlich wie der 0 in die Arithmetik.57 56 57
The ouroboros symbol depicts a serpent swallowing its tail and forming a circle. It symbolizes ideas of self-reference, completion, and unity. ‘‘Tautologies and contradictions are sinnlos, not unsinnig. They are part of the symbolism, just as 0 is in Arithmetic.’’ See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Prototractatus, ed. B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, and G. H. von Wright, with a translation by B. F. McGuinness and D. F. Pears (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 38.
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(Similar entries occur in the Tractatus at 4.461 and 4.4611.) In understanding the doctrine of showing one should distinguish between the admirably ‘‘meaningless’’ (sinnlos) expressions of logic, mathematics, the picture theory, etc., which show the scaffolding of the world, and despicably ‘‘meaningless’’ (unsinnig) statements which, though they may be perfectly grammatical in natural language, are violations of logical form. Heidegger’s ‘‘The nothing nothings’’ is unsinnig. Russell’s ‘‘Classes are logical fictions’’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘‘Numbers are exponents of operations’’ are sinnlos. The attempt to exonerate the Tractatus from self-incrimination by appeal to its distinction between what is sinnlos and what is unsinning has come under heavy fire recently. The distinction between sinnlos and unsinning is often conjoined with Ramsey’s view that the Tractatus aims to set out the formal preconditions for meaningful representation in thought and in any language. The conjunction is unstable. The sinnlos sentences that show proper logical grammar would seem to violate the conditions for meaningful representation no less than do the unsinnig propositions. Resolutely speaking, they are both gibberish. Therapeutic interpretations demand a resolute reading. They focus on the comments in the preface and the entries at the end of the Tractatus at 6.53 and 6.54 where Wittgenstein proclaims that his own statements are themselves nonsense and introduces the metaphor of throwing away a ladder once climbed. Wittgenstein wrote (TLP 6.54): My propositions serve as elucidations [Erlau¨tern] in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world alright.
These passages define what the therapeutic interpretation calls the ‘‘frame’’ of the work. The purpose of the Tractatus, on the therapeutic reading, is to liberate its readers from philosophy. The therapeutic interpretation demands that readers of the Tractatus be resolute in taking its expressions to be meaningless and yet elucidatory. Courageous readers are supposed to accept that the work elucidates what is important about logic, philosophy, God, ethics, and value by being quite literally meaningless. The complicated historical evolution of early drafts of the Tractatus may never be fully sorted out. But whatever the history is, it will not be accommodated by a boldly therapeutic reading.58 There is, after all, a Grundgedanke in the Tractatus. In ignorance of the revolution that has
58
Hacker has given a scathing, and telling, criticism of the therapeutic interpretation. See P. M. S. Hacker, ‘‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’’ in Alice Cary and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 353–388.
My fundamental idea
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occurred in understanding Russell’s philosophy, one is free to imagine that Showing might involve elucidations by use of meaninglessness. But this freedom is no longer viable. Wittgenstein’s inherited the view that there can be no theory of types of entities. It was Russell’s view that the limits of type-theory must be built into logical grammar by means of variables with structure, and not said by predicates which assert restrictions on the variables. The Tractarian fundamental idea is inextricably tied to Russell’s conception of the variables of logic. It says that all and only ‘‘formal concepts’’ (logical and semantic concepts) are properly shown by means of structured variables. This is incompatible with a therapeutic interpretation of Showing. A therapeutic interpretation cannot hope to explain why the Tractatus endorses so much of Russell’s philosophy. Reading the Tractatus as ouroboric, on the other hand, does justice to the resoluteness demanded by the therapeutic interpretation and yet also preserves the identity between Showing and the fundamental idea. It is this that explains the comments in the Tractatus in the preface and at the end (the so-called ‘‘frame’’ of the work). Wittgenstein agrees with Russell that logic is the essence of philosophy, but he disagrees with Russell that some fundamental logical notions and knowledge of logic must be exempted from analysis. Since the statements in the Tractatus employ concepts that have logical and semantic content, they are themselves pseudo-statements. Anticipating Russell’s criticism that ‘‘Mr. Wittgenstein says a good deal of what cannot be said,’’ the Tractatus contains the metaphor of climbing a ladder and then throwing it away when one reaches the top. The ‘‘Tractarian ladder’’ and the idea of statements as ‘‘elucidations’’ is Wittgenstein’s official defense against the self-refuting nature of Showing. Wittgenstein borrowed the ladder simile used in Mauthner’s discussion of absolute skepticism. Mauthner was speaking of the consistency of the position of a skeptic who exploits knowledge of logic to show that such knowledge is itself unreliable. We find the following: Just as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to a high place by a ladder to overturn the ladder with his foot after the ascent, so also it is not unlikely that the skeptic after he has arrived at the demonstration of his thesis by means of an argument proving the non-existence of proof, as it were by a step-ladder, should then abolish this very argument.59
59
F. Mauthner, Beitra¨ge zu einer Kritik der Sprache (Stuttgart, 1901), p. 2, as quoted in Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 377.
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The radical skeptic challenges knowledge of logic itself. Wittgenstein’s radical eliminativism seems to do the same, for in proclaiming that logic is not a genuine science with a subject matter, it undermines knowledge of logic. In The Problems of Philosophy Russell made the following comments concerning radical skepticism: When, however, we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge, it is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude of a complete skeptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge, and asking, from this outside position, to be compelled to return within the circle of knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our skepticism can never be refuted. For all refutations must begin with some piece of knowledge which the disputants share; from blank doubt no argument can begin. Hence the criticism of knowledge which philosophy employs must not be of this destructive kind, if any is to be achieved. Against this absolute skepticism, no logical argument can be advanced. But it is not difficult to see that skepticism of this kind is unreasonable.60
Russell responds to the radical skeptic who challenges logic by conceding that there is a limit to philosophical criticism. Wittgenstein responds differently. He writes (TLP 6.51): Skepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.
Wittgenstein refuses to concede to a limit. Russell maintained that the radical skeptic’s question as to why she should be compelled to accept knowledge of logic is unanswerable. Her skepticism is irrefutable, though unreasonable. Russell hoped to ground knowledge of logic in an epistemic theory of self-evidence and logical intuition. Wittgenstein strongly objected. He writes that ‘‘Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake – What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought’’ (TLP 5.4731). As Wittgenstein sees it, the radical skeptic who challenges logic has failed to ask any question. ‘‘If a question can be asked it must be answerable. The riddle does not exist’’ (TLP 6.5). Wittgenstein holds that we may proceed with logical analysis. This is the ladder. Ultimately, the analysis will envelop logic. But on Wittgenstein’s ouroboric conception of philosophy, this does not undermine the process. It completes it. There is no limit to logic because logic is the scaffolding of both thought and the world.
60
The Problems of Philosophy, p. 150.
4
Logic as if tautologous
Norway provided Wittgenstein with the solitude he thought necessary for work on logic. Together with his close friend David Pinsent he had found a place to vacation at O¨ystese, a tiny village in a little bay on the Hardangerfjord with majestic hills rising behind. When he returned to Cambridge on 2 October, he told Russell of his firm intention to leave Cambridge and live in Norway. Russell wrote to Lucy Donnelly on October of 1913: Then my Austrian, Wittgenstein, burst in like a whirlwind, just back from Norway, and determined to return there at once to live in compete solitude until he has solved all the problems of logic. I said it would be dark, and he said he hated daylight. I said it would be lonely, and he said he prostituted his mind talking to intelligent people. I said he was mad, and he said God preserve him from sanity. (God certainly will.)1
The ideas germinated in the year Wittgenstein spent in Norway would become a centerpiece of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic – the doctrine that logic consists of tautologies. August 1913 dates the following entry in Pinsent’s diary: ‘‘It is probable that the first volume of Principia will have to be re-written, and Wittgenstein may write himself the first eleven chapters. That is a splendid triumph for him!’’2 The catalyst for Wittgenstein seems to have been that Russell came to know of Sheffer’s result that all the quantifier-free formulas of Principia’s sentential calculus can be expressed via one logical connective – the Sheffer stroke.3 Russell received a copy of a paper from Sheffer on 15 April 1913. Russell read a paper to the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club in April 1912 entitled ‘‘On Matter.’’ On the back page of a later draft of Russell’s paper entitled ‘‘On Matter: The Problem Stated,’’ there are jottings in Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s hands which reveal that they were discussing truth-tables and 1 2 3
Letter to Lucy Donnelly, quoted from Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 184. Quoted from McGuinness, Wittgenstein, p. 180. H. Sheffer, ‘‘A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with Application to Logical Constants,’’ Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 14 (1913): 481–448. Peirce’s unpublished papers show that he had discovered this result earlier.
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Sheffer’s stroke.4 (See Fig. 4.1, below.) In his ‘‘Notes on Logic’’ composed in Norway, and in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein employs the Sheffer dagger instead of the stroke. He suggests that it has a special significance, and speaks as if it reveals inner logical connections between the logical particles. The dagger is the dual of the stroke.5 The relationship is displayed in the table below. Principia
dagger
stroke
p pq pvq p&q (p v q) (p & q)
p#p (p # q) (p # q) p # q p#q (p #q)
pjp p j q p j q (p j q) (p j q) pjq
We find the following passage in the Tractatus (TLP 5.1311): When we infer q from p v q and p, the relation between the propositional forms of ‘p v q’ and ‘p’ is masked, in this case, by our mode of signifying. But if instead of ‘p v q’ we write, for example ‘p # q .#. p # q’ and instead of ‘p’, ‘p # p’ (p # q ¼ neither p nor q), then the inner connection becomes obvious. (The possibility of inference from (x).fx to fa shows that the symbol (x).fx itself has generality in it.)6
It is unclear why Wittgenstein thought the that the dagger reveals inner or internal logical connections – as if the internal nature of the logical connectives in the inference (disjunctive syllogism) p v q; p =\ q
is unmasked when expressed by ðp # qÞ # ðp # qÞ; p # p =\q:
Nicod’s reduction of the propositional calculus to one rule and one axiom may provide a clue. In a letter to Russell from Norway dated 30 October 1913 Wittgenstein proclaims to have found such a reduction: ‘‘One of the consequences of my new ideas will – I think – be that the whole of Logic 4 5
6
See McGuinness, Wittgenstein, p. 160. The dagger symbol does not occur in Sheffer’s paper, and Wittgenstein used the stroke sign p/q to mean what we now mean by the dagger. I have rewritten quotes accordingly. Principia used a dot for conjunction. I use &. This entry also occurs in Wittgenstein’s Prototractatus at 5.04112 and in the Vienna and Engelmann typescripts of the Tractatus.
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Fig. 4.1. Verso, turned upside down, of folio 1, ‘‘On Matter: The Problem Stated,’’ Bertrand Russell Research Center, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. The Sheffer stroke appears as p q and is defined as p v q. Close scrutiny suggests Russell’s handwriting p on the left, with Wittgenstein’s handwriting W (Wahrheit) for true and F (Falsch) for false.
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follows from one Pp only!’’7 Wittgenstein worked with the Sheffer dagger. Nicod later worked with the Sheffer stroke. Nicod’s one inference rule is this: From p j (q j r) and p, infer r.
Modus ponens is an immediate instance of this rule, putting q for r. Since Wittgenstein was also looking for a reduction to one rule, it is natural that he might imagine disjunctive syllogism to be that rule. If we consider what would be a straightforward analog for the dagger of Nicod’s rule for the stroke we get: From p# (q # r) and q # q, infer r.
Disjunctive syllogism is an instance of this rule, putting (p # q) for p and p for q and q for r. Neither this, nor disjunctive syllogism, works to provide one inference rule for the dagger, however. A successful single rule is this: From (p # q) # r . # . s and p, infer r.8
Wittgenstein failed to find the reduction that Nicod discovered in 1916.9 But his investigations convinced him that he had discovered that logic must be decidable. The ramified type-structure of Principia left Russell a puzzle as to the nature of logical truth (logical necessity). Before Principia, Russell conceived of logic as the science of propositional structure, and he maintained that any true and fully closed formula in the language of the logic of propositions is logically true (logically necessary). The ramification in Principia’s no-propositions theory undermines this account of logical truth. The logical truths of the intended model of Principia’s ramified type-structures do not include all instances of the axiom schema of Reducibility, the infinity axiom, or the multiplicative axiom (axiom of choice). Yet all of these are fully general and (presumably) true. So how can one get at the notion of logical necessity as truth in virtue of form? Russell had reached an impasse and Wittgenstein was eager to offer an escape: logical truth (logical necessity) is tautologyhood.
7
8 9
Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘‘Extracts from Letters to Russell 1912–1920,’’ in Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), pp. 123, 126. See Thomas Scharle, ‘‘Axiomatization of Propositional Calculus with Sheffer Functors,’’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 6 (1965): 209–217. Jean Nicod, ‘‘A Reduction in the Number of the Primitive Propositions of Logic,’’ Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 19 (1917): 32–41. The paper was read before the society on 30 October 1916.
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What is logic? How can one get at the notion of logical truth as truth in virtue of form? In his book Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919), Russell confesses ignorance. He explicitly notes that it would not do to fix upon some particular formal system for logic and proclaim that the logical truths are just those deducible within the system. In one system of deduction, a given logical truth may be adopted as an axiom, and yet in another it is a theorem from a different set of axioms. Nor, he notes, would it suffice to make derivability of a contradiction from its denial the criterion for logical truth. Such derivability will be dependent upon the particularities of the deductive system in question.10 Russell then introduces Wittgenstein, who was working on the matter: The importance of ‘‘tautology’’ for a definition of mathematics was pointed out to me by my former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was working on the problem. I don’t know whether he has solved it, or even whether he is alive or dead.11
Wittgenstein had been working on the problem since 1913, but with the onset of the war, his communication with Russell ceased. Russell does not endorse Wittgenstein’s idea that the notion of ‘‘truth in virtue of logical form’’ that characterizes the propositions of logic (and therefore, in Russell’s view, of nonapplied mathematics generally) can be explicated by means of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘‘tautology.’’ But he notes enthusiastically that it may bear fruit. In The Analysis of Matter (1927), however, Russell accepted Wittgenstein’s view that the new criterion of logical truth is tautologyhood. He writes: We must ask ourselves, therefore: What is the common quality of the propositions which can be deduced from the premises of logic? The answer to this question given by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus seems to me the right one. Propositions which form part of logic, or can be proved by logic, are all tautologies – i.e., they show that certain different sets of symbols are different ways of saying the same thing or that one set of symbols says part of what the other says . . . Such propositions, therefore, are really concerned with symbols. We can know their truth or falsehood without studying the outside world, because they are only concerned with symbolic manipulations. I should add – though here Wittgenstein might dissent – that all pure mathematics consists of tautologies in the above sense.12
Interestingly, Russell does not endorse Wittgenstein’s notion of tautologyhood in the introduction to the second edition of The Principles of Mathematics (1937). He remarks: ‘‘The fundamental characteristic of logic, obviously, is that which is indicated when we say that logical 10 11 12
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), p. 203. Ibid., p. 204. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (London: Kegan Paul, 1927), p. 171.
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propositions are true in virtue of their form . . . I confess, however, that I am unable to give any clear account of what is meant by saying that a proposition is ‘true in virtue of its form’.’’13 Now more measured, Russell seems to back away from his earlier enthusiasm for Wittgenstein’s idea. But what was Wittgenstein’s idea? In the Tractatus we find Wittgenstein’s account of logical necessity summarized as follows. ‘‘The certainty, possibility or impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a proposition, but by an expression’s being a tautology, a proposition with sense, or a contradiction’’ (TLP 5.525). Russell came to describe himself as reluctantly agreeing with Wittgenstein that logical truths are tautologies. But, as we shall see, the agreement is more appearance than substance. Logic as if decidable What Wittgenstein thought he had discovered in Norway is that logical notions are pseudo-notions. Logical truths do not have a logical ‘‘content’’ which the mind comes somehow to know. This entails that there can be no formal system of logic – no set of axioms (chosen because they embody selfevident logical content) from which logical truths are deducible. There cannot be an a priori science of logic, for logic has no subject matter. There are no objects for it to study. Consequently, there can be no theory of deduction. If logical notions are pseudo-concepts, the science of deduction must be supplanted. Wittgenstein hoped to do this by finding a form of representation in which all and only logical equivalents have exactly one and the same expression. In a November 1913 letter to Russell, he wrote: The great question is now: How should a notion be constructed which will make every tautology recognizable as a tautology in one and the same way? This is the fundamental problem of logic.14
The tautologous nature of an expression would thereby be shown immediately in the symbol. Consider the following passages from the Tractatus: It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every proposition is its own proof. (TLP 6.1265) All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case that some of them are essentially primitive propositions and others essentially derived propositions. Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology. (TLP 6.127)
Of course, if there is a form of expression in which all and only logical equivalents have exactly one and the same expression, then the translation 13 14
Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1937), p. xii. ‘‘Extracts from Letters to Russell 1912–1920,’’ Notedbooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 129.
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of a given formula into such a notation would form a decision procedure for logic. Wittgenstein’s did not balk at this consequence. His philosophical commitment to the decidability of logic is clear. In the Tractatus one finds: It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so too it is a very important fact that the truth or falsity of non-logical propositions cannot be recognized from the proposition alone. (TLP 6.113) One can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the logical properties of the symbol . . . The proof of logical propositions consists in the following process: we produce them out of other logical propositions by successively applying certain operations that always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones. (And in fact only tautologies follow from a tautology.) Of course, this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not at all essential to logic, if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must show without any proof that they are tautologies. (TLP 6.126)
In Wittgenstein’s view, Russell was mistaken in thinking that deductive inference relies on the application of logical truths discovered by a science of logic. The inference rules of a formal system for logic would have to lie outside the formal system. But any would-be justification of an inference rule for the formal system would employ pseudo-notions such as ‘‘implication,’’ ‘‘truth,’’ ‘‘negation,’’ and the like. Wittgenstein writes (TLP 5.452): (Thus in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica there occur definitions and primitive propositions given in words. Why this sudden appearance of words? It would require a justification, but none is given, or could be given, since the procedure is illicit.)
If all logical (and semantic) notions are pseudo-concepts, a system of formal deduction must be eliminated in favor of the view that a formula’s status as a logical truth, a contingent truth, or a contradiction should be shown by the syntax of its very expression in the ideal language for empirical science. An early attempt at finding such a notation is embedded in the following story told by Russell of the odd event of Wittgenstein’s first meeting the Whiteheads: Whitehead described to me the first time that Wittgenstein came to see him. He was shown into the drawing room during afternoon tea. He appeared scarcely aware of the presence of Mrs. Whitehead, but marched up and down the room for some time in silence, and at last said explosively: ‘‘A proposition has two poles. It is apb.’’ Whitehead, in telling me, said: ‘‘I naturally asked what are a and b, but I found I had said the wrong thing. ‘a and b are indefinable,’ Wittgenstein answered in voice of thunder.’’15 15
Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2, 1914–1944 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), p. 139.
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aqb
a pb
b
Fig. 4.2
a
a pb
a
aaq bb
apb
b
b
Fig. 4.3
In Wittgenstein’s ab-Notation, the truth-conditions for the conditional p q are pictured in Fig. 4.2. The b-pole depicts falsehood and the a-pole truth. One may use any two mutually exclusive poles in place of a and b. In the Tractatus, W (Wahreit) and F (Falsch) are used. An illustration of the technique is exemplified in Fig. 4.3 for the formula p .. q p. Following the b-pole, one sees that it leads to the a-pole of p and the b-pole of q p, which yields the b-pole of p. Thus, the b-pole leads to contradictory assignments to p. The formula is a tautology. Something quite similar to the ab-Notation was independently discovered much later by Martin Gardner, who calls it a system of ‘‘shuttles.’’ Gardner does not discuss the Tractatus, but his notation significantly improves the ab-Notation because shuttles offer a uniform way to present the many connecting lines associated with the a and b poles. Gardner does not label his shuttles as a and b poles, and he splits up complex formulas into several shuttle diagrams. But these are not essential parts of the technique. Moreover, though Gardner does not employ it, we can use the device of twisting the shuttle lines to represent negation. A double twist represents
Logic as if tautologous
∼q ⊃ p
a pb
115 aq b
a b
a b
p .⊃. ∼q ⊃ p
Fig. 4.4
double negation. To illustrate the technique, consider the shuttle diagram of p .. q p (Fig. 4.4). The poles of q are twisted for negation. Wittgenstein never wrote out the general rules for checking complex formulas for validity by the ab-Notation. Indeed, he refused to write out general rules for Russell, writing: ‘‘I’m upset that you did not understand that rule for the signs in my last letter, since it bores me unspeakably to explain it! . . . Please think the matter over yourself, I find it awful to repeat a written explanation, which I gave the first time with the greatest reluctance. So another time!’’ In truth, Wittgenstein had given no general explanation of rules needed to use the ab-Notation to check compound formulas. Gardner made an effort to state some of the important rules for applying the technique and remarks that they would indeed be tedious to state fully.16 Wittgenstein’s ab-Notation offers a decision procedure for propositional tautologies. But Wittgenstein was after much more, as we see in the following letter to Russell from Norway: I can’t myself say quite clearly yet what tautologies are, but I’ll try to give a rough account. It is the peculiar (and most important) characteristic of non-logical propositions, that their truth cannot be seen in the propositional sign itself . . . But the propositions of logic – and they alone – have the property of expressing their truth or falsehood in the very sign itself. I haven’t yet succeeded in getting a notation for identity which satisfies this condition; but I don’t doubt that such a notation must be discoverable. For compounded propositions (elementary propositions) the ab-Notation is adequate.17 16 17
Martin Gardner, Logic Machines and Diagrams, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 60–79. See ‘‘Extracts from Letters to Russell 1912–1920,’’ Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 128.
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Wittgenstein is after for a decision procedure that would be extendable to quantification theory with identity. The idea is to find a notation for logic which would be such that once a formula is expressed in the notation one could discern from the notation itself whether or not it has the status of a logical truth. In his ‘‘Notes on Logic,’’ Wittgenstein speaks as if he has found a way to extend the ab-Notation to quantification theory. He writes: The application of the ab-Notation to apparent variable propositions becomes clear if we consider that, for instance, the proposition ‘‘for all x, ’x’’ is to be true when ’x is true for all x’s and false when ’x is false for some x’s. We see that some and all occur simultaneously in the proper apparent variable notation. The notation is: for ðxÞ’x : a-ðxÞ-a’xb-ð9xÞ-b and for ð9xÞ’x : a-ð9xÞ-a’xb-ðxÞ-b Old definitions now become tautologous.18
One can only guess how this proposal was supposed to proceed. But it is clear that Wittgenstein is attempting to convince Russell that the ab-Notation’s decision procedure can, in principle, be extended to quantification theory. This is corroborated in the following letter: Of course the rule I have given applies first of all only for what you call elementary propositions. But it is easy to see that it must also apply to all others. For consider two Pps in the theory of apparent variables *9.1 and *9.11. Put then instead of ’x, (9y).’y. y ¼ x and it becomes obvious that the special cases of these two Pps like those of all the previous ones become tautologous if you apply the ab-Notation. The ab-Notation for Identity is not yet clear enough to show this clearly but it is obvious that such a Notation can be made up. I can sum up by saying that a logical proposition is one of the special cases of which are either tautologous – and then the proposition is true – or self-contradictory (as I shall call it) and then it is false. And the ab-Notation simply shows directly which of these two it is (if any).19
The reference to Principia’s *9 is important. Wittgenstein claims that if one examines *9.1 and *9.11 (the two axioms for quantification theory in *9 of Principia) we can see that it is ‘‘obvious’’ that the logical truths of quantification theory are tautologous. To see how he might have come to this conclusion, we have to understand *9. Principia renders quantification theory in two ways: first at section *9 and then again in *10. The system of *10 parallels that of modern quantification theory. But Principia regards it as a convenience justified by the system of *9 which is required by the philosophical foundation for
18 19
‘‘Notes on Logic 1913,’’ Appendix I of Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 96. ‘‘Extracts from Letters to Russell 1912–1920,’’ Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 126.
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ramified type-theory. The quantification theory of section *9 defines subordinate occurrences of quantifiers in terms of occurrences of quantifiers prefixing the whole formula. Where p is quantifier-free and y does not occur free in the formula ’ and x does not occur free in the formula y, Principia’s definitions include the following: *9.01 *9.02 *9.03 *9.04 *9.05 *9.06 *9.07 *9.08
(x)’x ¼df (9x) ’x (9x)’x ¼df (x) ’x (x) ’x v p ¼df (x)(’x v p) p v (x) ’x ¼df (x)(p v ’x) (9x) ’x v p ¼df (9x)(’x v p) p v (9x) ’x ¼df (9x)(p v ’x) (x)’x v (9y)yy ¼df (x)(9y)(’x v yy) (9y)’y v (x)yx ¼df (x)(9y)(’y v yx)
Principia’s *9 endeavors to demonstrate that each line of any proof in the system of *10 can by recovered in the system of *9 which works by employing universal and existential generalizations on tautologies.20 Given a formula, say (9y)(Ay (x)Ax), where A is quantifier-free, the definitions of *9 pull subordinate quantifiers to initial placements. We arrive at (9y)(x)(Ay Ax). Next remove the quantifiers and we have Ay Ax:
This is not a tautology. But in this example, it easy to see that we can start our derivation from the tautology Ay Ay and work our way back to the original formula by generalization and the definitions provided by *9. By existential generalization, we get (9y)(Ay Ax). By universal generalization we have (x)(9y)(Ay Ax); by a rule implicit in *9 which tells us when we may switch quantifiers, we arrive at (9y)(x) (Ay Ax). Then by employing the definitions of *9 we arrive at our formula (9y)(Ay (x)Ax). By proceeding in this way, the system of *9 can recover all the principles and inference rules of the quantification of Principia’s *10. Captivated by the results of *9, Wittgenstein came to believe that logical truths of quantification theory are in a sense generalized tautologies. Russell could hardly disagree with this. But the adequacy of *9 as a quantification theory certainly does not entail that there is a decision procedure for the logical truths of quantification theory. The deductive
20
This is not to say that logic itself consists of generalized tautologies, not at least if standard second-order calculi count as capturing logic. The comprehension principle of standard second-order logic is not a generalized tautology. Ramsey seems to recognize this in exempting Principia’s Axiom of Reducibility.
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techniques of *9 provide no general recipe for deciding whether or not there is a tautology from which to begin a derivation. In 1936 Church proved that quantification theory is undecidable.21 Principia’s *9 is semantically complete with respect to the logical truths of quantification theory.22 It is therefore undecidable. For a time, Russell confessed that he agreed with Wittgenstein’s conception of logic as tautologous.23 But his conception of a ‘‘tautology,’’ unlike that of Wittgenstein, did not connote decidability. It was divorced from the idea of finding a notation in which all and only logical equivalents have exactly the same representation. The undecidability of quantification theory is a significant blow to Wittgenstein’s conception of logic. As we shall see, it undermines Wittgenstein’s hope of finding a notation in which all and only logical equivalents have one and the same representation.24 Scaffolding It is common today to explain the notion of tautologyhood by reference to a truth-table and even to credit Wittgenstein with the invention of truthtables. But truth-tables were not Wittgenstein’s innovation.25 It is difficult to say precisely when they were discovered. Certainly they are related to proofs of the independence of the axioms of postulate systems. Independence proofs designate a desired value and employ the idea that a complex formula’s value is a function of the values of its subcomponents. If the desired value is possessed by all but one of postulates of the system, and is preserved 21 22 23 24
25
Alonzo Church, ‘‘A Note on the Entscheidungsproblem,’’ Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (1936): 40–41. See Gregory Landini, ‘‘Quantification Theory in *9 of Principia Mathematica,’’ History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2000): 57–78. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 119. Oddly, Hacker writes, ‘‘There can be no doubt that Wittgenstein’s explanation of the tautologousness of the propositions of logic has had a profound effect upon the general understanding of logic.’’ See P. M. S. Hacker, ‘‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’’ in Alice Carey and Rupert Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 356. This piece of misinformation is repeated again and again and has become part of the folklore of Wittgenstein. It appears in works intended for a wide readership such as A. C. Grayling, Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 32; and it is found in popular books such as David Edmonds and John Eidinson, Wittgenstein’s Poker (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 232. It also appears in more serious works aimed at history such as Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973). See also Anthony Kenny, ed., Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 260. Indeed, it even occurs in scholarly academic works such as Matthieu Marion’s Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 3. It also creeps into Alan Janik’s ‘‘Weininger and the Two Wittgensteins,’’ in D. Stern and B. Szabados, eds., Wittgenstein Reads Weininger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 67.
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by the system’s inference rules, then all theorems will have the designated value. In this way the independence of a given postulate of a system can be proved. Edward Huntington read a paper to the American Mathematical Society in September 1903 which employs independence proofs for axioms of propositional logic.26 Russell cites Huntington’s article in the Principia, mentioning the independence proofs approvingly.27 Of course, Frege invented the idea of a truth-function – a function from truth-values to truth-values. In his Begriffsschrift (1879) a truth-functional calculus is set out. Frege could not have missed the fact that if f(z,y) and g(x) are functions, then the composition f(g(x),y) of these functions is itself a function, for this is a commonplace mathematical result. If f(z,y) is the truthfunction for the conditional, and g(x) for negation, then Frege’s ‘ f(g(p),q) is akin to the modern P ! Q. It would be quite obvious to Frege both that the truth-conditions of any such composition function can be displayed in a table and that there is an algebraic decision procedure to determine which such compounds yield the value t, for all truth-values as argument. The likely reason Frege did not make this a point of emphasis in his work is that the achievement he awarded his Begriffsschrift, in contrast with Boole’s algebra of logic, is that it goes well beyond such simple algebraic results of a set of simple functions (operations). The Begriffsschrift set out a quantification theory which permits the comprehension of new functions and quantification over them. Frege maintained that, unlike Boole’s algebra, his incorporation of comprehension principles makes logic genuinely informative. The comprehension of functions reveals new logical structures. Boole’s Calculus for Logic appeared in 1848. Extensions of it to form an algebra of relatives were advanced by Schro¨der and (independently) Peirce. In his manuscript ‘‘Qualitative Logic’’ of 1886, Peirce set out a system of logic and employed a propositional reading of Venn diagrams to justify his rules and principles.28 Peirce used diagrammatical and truthconditional techniques to determine whether a given proposition belonged to logic. In Mu¨ller’s 1909 Abriss of Schro¨der’s Vorlesungen u¨ber die Algebra der Logik, we find a truth-table: x72 Two-Valued Systems. If , , , . . . are general symbols for the domain of these systems, i.e., such that they can only mean 0 or 1, then each expression put together
26 27 28
Edward Huntington, ‘‘Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic,’’ Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 5 (1904): 288–307. A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), vol. 1, p. 206. Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘‘Qualitative Logic’’ (1886), in The Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5, 1884–1886, ed. Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 369.
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[composed] from these, e.g., þ also gets one of the two values 0 or 1, as long as the values of the individual symbols are determined. Thus, one can easily check [verify] in two-valued calculi the correctness of each and every theorem or axiom of the domain, e.g., of the Axiom VIIx, ð þ zÞð þ zÞ ¼ z by successively [in succession] assigning to the individual symbols appearing therein [in the theorem] the value 0 and 1 for all possible combinations – as shown, for instance, in the following diagram [scheme], where the values belonging together are placed in columns under one another.29
This is an explicit tabular method used as a decision procedure. Since ð v Þ & ð v zÞ : : z
always gets the value 1, it is a truth of logic. Perhaps one day the historical record will be set straight and Wittgenstein will no longer be given credit for inventing truth-tables.30 But one shouldn’t correct one historical error only to offer another – attributing to Wittgenstein the innovation of using truth-conditions to represent a 29
Eugen Mu¨ller, Abriss der Algebra der Logik; repr. in Ernst Schro´´der, Algebra der Logik, vol. 3 (New York: Chelsea Publishing Co., 1966), p. 708. The translation was aided by Tuomas Manninen. The original reads: ‘‘x 72. Zweiwertige Symbole. Sind , , , . . . allgemeine Symbole fu¨r die Gebiete dieses Systems, d. h. solche, deren jedes nur entweder 0 oder 1 bedeuten kann, so wird auch jedem daraus zusammengesetzten Ausdruck, z. B. þ , einer der beiden Werte 0 und 1 zukommen, sobald die Werte der Einzelsymbole bestimmt sind. ‘‘Man kann somit auch leicht die Richtigkeit eines jeden beliebigen Gebietstheorems oder axioms – z. B. des Axioms VIIx þ Þ ¼ ð þ Þð im zweiwertigen Kalkul nachpru¨fen, indem man den darin vorkommenden Symbolen einzeln die Werte 0 und 1 nacheinander in allen mo¨glichen Zusammenstellungen beilegt, – etwa wie das folgende Schema andeutet, worin die zusammengeho¨rigen Werte kolonnenweise untereinander stehen. ¼ 0011 ¼ 0101 ¼ 1010 þ ¼ 0 1 1 1 þ ¼ 1 0 1 1 ð þ Þð þ Þ ¼ 0 0 1 1 ¼ :’’
30
Some steps at correcting the historical record are made in McGuinness, Wittgenstein, p. 162. See also John Shosky, ‘‘Russell’s Use of Truth-Tables,’’ Russell 17 (1997): 11–26, and also Irving Anellis, ‘‘The Genesis of the Truth-Table Device,’’ Russell 24 (2004): 55–70.
Logic as if tautologous p
q
r
1
t
t
t
2
f
t
t
3
t
f
t
4
f
f
t
5
t
t
f
6
f
t
f
7
t
f
f
8
f
f
f
121
p
q 5
7
6
1 2
3 8 4
r
Fig. 4.5
propositional formula.31 John Venn did this in the 1880s. The general idea of a diagrammatic procedure for checking syllogistic and class inferences is quite old and dates at least to Euler (1761) if not also to the Stoics. John Venn supplanted Euler’s limited techniques.32 His propositional diagrams are very instructive, for they picture truth-conditions by means of a spatial representation. This is particularly illuminating when it comes to Wittgenstein’s philosophical views. Truth-table and Venn diagrammatic representations have a relationship that is given, for three propositional letters, in Fig. 4.5. Wittgenstein’s idea that a proposition has two poles is nicely represented spatially in Venn’s diagram by the fact that the formation circles have an inside region and an outside region. Venn’s propositional diagrams capture truthtables. Fixing on the ordering of the values as in the above truth-table, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus represents p q as: 1; 2; 3; 4 ðt; t; f; tÞðp; qÞ:
Venn’s spatial method represents it as: p
31
32
q
This occurs in McGuinness, Wittgenstein, p. 162. It is also found in Gordon Baker, Wittgenstein, Frege, and the Vienna Circle (New York: Blackwell, 1988), p. 86. More recently, it is suggested by P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 280. John Venn, ‘‘On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings,’’ Philosophical Magazine (July, 1880).
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On the Venn diagrammatic method, one shades just those regions whose value in the tabular method get an f. Thus, our example shades area 3 alone. Venn showed how propositional deductive inferences can be checked by overlaying pictorial diagrams of the premises and checking the resulting diagram for the truth-conditions of the conclusion. For instance, let us apply the technique to check the following argument for validity. We have: p
q
p ⊃ (q & r ) ∼r ∼p r
The analogous technique with a truth-tabular representation is illustrated below: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (t, t, f, t, f, t, f, t) (p, q, r) (f, f, f, f, t, t, t, t) (r, r, r) (f, f, f, f, f, t, f, t) (p, p, p)
Pairing the two premises together requires that we look only at those columns that both get the value t, namely, 6 and 8. The argument is valid, since in every such column the conclusion also gets the value t. Of course, for arguments with many primitive propositional signs, Venn’s diagrams become increasingly impractical. Rectangular graphs extending Venn’s diagrams for n-many terms were presented by Allan Marquand and published in 1881.33 Modern truth-tables are little more than a notational variant. The overlapping circles of Venn’s propositional diagrams are particularly illuminating for Wittgenstein’s conception of logic. (Indeed, the Tractatus and Notebooks 1914–1916 use a spatial analogy to represent negation in just the way found in the Venn diagrams.)34 Venn’s spatial diagrams require that the primitive propositional symbols are assigned to the fundamental regions of the diagram. (The circles must not be tagged by compound formulas.) Otherwise, the diagrams would no longer show the proper structural (logical) relationships. Consider the following: 33 34
See Gardner, Logic Machines and Diagrams, p. 43. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 30.
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123 q
∼p p⊃q p⊃q
The diagram fails to represent the proper inferential relations because p q is not logically independent of p and q. This feature corresponds nicely with the Tractarian thesis of the logical independence of all (atomic) states of affairs (TLP 2.061). Determinateness of sense (truth-conditions) requires the logical independence of atomic statements. At Tractatus 6.12 Wittgenstein writes that ‘‘tautologies show the logical form of language and the world.’’ That an expression is a tautology or a contradiction is a formal notion built into the syntax of the ideal language. Tautologies and contradictions are to be shown syntactically in the logically perfect language; they are ‘‘limiting cases – indeed the disintegration – of the combination of signs’’ (TLP 4.466). Wittgenstein writes that ‘‘tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing’’; they ‘‘lack sense’’ but are ‘‘part of the symbolism’’ (TLP 4.461). Venn’s propositional diagrams nicely illustrate Wittgenstein’s ideas. In a logically perfect language the status of an expression as tautologous, contradictory, or contingent is built into (shown by) the syntactic conditions for the representation of genuine assertions. A propositional tautology shades nothing, and contingencies shade some but not all areas. In Venn diagrams, tautologies and contradictions are not genuine statements. A genuine statement is made by shading some, but not all, areas of the diagram. All tautologies have nothing shaded; they are just the overlapping circles – the scaffolding. Indeed, in Venn’s propositional diagrams, formulas that are logically equivalent have exactly one and the same representation. The same Venn diagram represents (p & q), p v q, (p q), etc. At Tractatus 5.513 Wittgenstein wrote that ‘‘it is manifest that ‘q .&. p v p’ says the same thing as ‘q,’ and ‘p v p’ says nothing.’’ This is realized in the Venn’s propositional diagrams (Fig. 4.6). The Venn diagram q .&. p v p is the same as the diagram for q. The tautology p v p does nothing to the shading. Venn’s propositional diagrams also show the relationship Wittgenstein saw between propositional logical necessity and tautologyhood. In every contingent proposition some regions of the diagram are shaded and some are not. The contingency of a genuine atomic statement (one that is neither tautologous or contradictory) is displayed immediately by the fact that its spatial diagram depicts it with an inside region and an outside region,
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p
q
Fig. 4.6
exactly one of which must be shaded. The contingency of a statement is given as an immediate structural feature of its representation in the Venn diagrams. The representation of a statement is the inverse image of the representation of its negation; one simply inverts the shading. Indeed, we saw that all and only logical equivalents are represented in exactly one and the same way. In the ideal system of representation (which we have glimpsed with the Venn diagrams) logical necessity, contingency, and logical falsehood are part of the symbolism itself. Tautologies are not statements of the ideal language because ‘‘the propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it’’ (TLP 6.124). Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘A tautology leaves open to reality the whole – the infinite whole – of logical space; a contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way’’ (TLP 4.463). Wittgenstein did not invent truth-tables. Nor did he invent the idea of representing formulas by their truth-conditions. We found that in Venn’s diagrams. Nor, indeed, did he teach Russell the thesis that the logical particles do not stand for relations between entities. The logical particles in Principia are statement connectives, not predicate expressions as in Russell’s earlier logic of propositions. Wittgenstein hoped to make a quite different contribution. He hoped to demonstrate that a deductive calculus for logic can be supplanted by a representational system in which all and only logical equivalents have exactly one and the same expression. The representation of quantifier-free sentences in terms of their truth-conditions (or, alternatively, Venn’s representation) offers just such a notation. As Wittgenstein sees matters, systems that employ different logical particles ‘‘&,’’ ‘‘v,’’ ‘‘,’’ ‘‘,’’ etc., hide their formal (‘‘internal’’) nature. Wittgenstein attempted to exploit the truth-table representation of propositions as evidence for his view that a proper representation would reveal that tautologies and contradictions are scaffolding.
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Wittgenstein’s N-operator Logical representations such as Venn’s propositional diagrams which depict quantifier-free sentences in terms of their truth-conditions provide a notation in which all logical equivalents have exactly one and the same representation. This notation builds tautologies and contradictions into scaffolding. Wittgenstein hoped to extend this result to quantification theory with identity. Logically equivalent quantified propositions are to have exactly one and the same representation. For example, both (x)fx and (9x)fx are to have the same expression; similarly, (x)(fx & gx) is to have the same expression as (x)fx & (x)gx. Wittgenstein’s plan for achieving this was to invent a notation that would reveal the internal connections between universal quantification and conjunction, and between existential quantification and disjunction. Wittgenstein maintains that the concept all is not properly expressed by a universal quantifier. He writes (TLP 5.521): I dissociate the concept all from truth-functions. Frege and Russell introduced generality in association with logical product or logical sum. This made it difficult to understand the propositions ‘(9x)fx’ and ‘(8x)fx’ in which both ideas are embedded.
In this entry, Wittgenstein criticizes Russell and Frege for having failed to reveal the proper internal connections between the quantifiers and the propositional connectives. He writes (TLP 5.451): once negation has been introduced, we must understand it both in the propositions of the form ‘‘p’’ and in propositions like ‘‘(p v q),’’ ‘‘(9x) fx,’’ etc. We must not introduce it first for the one class of cases and then for the other, since it would then be left in doubt whether its meaning were the same in both cases, and no reason would have been given for combining the signs in the same way in both cases.
The definitions of Principia’s section *9, definitions such as *9.01, *9.02, and *9.07, define tilde and disjunction signs for quantifiers in terms of different tilde and disjunctions signs as applied to quantifier-free formulas. The definitions were an unavoidable result of Principia’s philosophical explanation of the order component of the order\type indices on its predicate variables. The order component is explained by reference to the hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ as applied to formulas of the intended nominalistic semantics for the predicate variables of the calculus.35 The philosophical foundation of order lies in the hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ The hierarchy is generated from the
35
See chapter 2.
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nominalistic semantics which requires that the truth-conditions for quantified formulas depend upon the logically prior and independent truth-conditions for quantifier-free formulas. For this to be possible, the quantification theory of *9 must define subordinate occurrences of quantified formulas in terms of an equivalent formula in prenex formal form. Wittgenstein objected to Principia’s recursive definition of ‘‘truth.’’ His replacement is symbolism which reveals the internal connections between the use of quantifiers and the propositional logical particles. Wittgenstein adopts the view that the concept all is given by the use of a free variable.36 If Wittgenstein’s plan is to eliminate universal quantification in favor of conjunction and eliminate existential quantification in favor of disjunction, one might naturally ask why he did not use a truth-table approach to quantification theory. The general form of a truth-function is: ð1 ; . . .; 2 n Þðp1 ; . . .; pn Þ:
Each stands for a truth-value and n is schematic, so that the form represents an arbitrary large number of argument positions. Now, in order to represent ‘‘(9x)fx,’’ one might think to put: ðt1 ; . . .; t2n 1 ; f2 n Þðfx1 ; . . .; fxn Þ:
The free variables do the work of generality. Similarly, for (x)fx one would have: ðt1 ; f2 ; . . .; f2 n Þðfx1 ; . . .; fxn Þ:
In this representation, (9x)fx has the same expression as (x)fx. Indeed, for (x)(fx & gx) we have ðt1 ; f2 ; . . .; f2 n Þðfx1 ; . . .; fxn ; gx1 ; . . .; gxn Þ:
This also represents the logically equivalent (x)fx & (x)gx. An important benefit of this approach is that it inherits all the merits of truth-tabular (or Venn-diagrammatic) representations of propositional truth-conditions. Tautologies are shown as scaffolding and this would extend to (9x)(fx v fx). There are insuperable difficulties in this approach, however.37 In order to express quantification in the form ( 1, . . ., 2n)(p1, . . ., pn), we must 36
37
See F. P. Ramsey, ‘‘Facts and Propositions,’’ in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 153. Fogelin argues that Wittgenstein would have objected to this approach because it is incompatible with TLP 4.128, 5.453, 5.553, which reject ‘‘privileged numbers’’ in logic. See Robert Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 64. But given that n is used schematically for any arbitrary large (though finite) number, I don’t see how the approach is committed to privileged numbers.
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know where to position the t’s and f’s among the ’s. The positions, for arbitrarily large n, can always be known in cases where we have only monadic predicates. But when polyadic predicates are allowed this is not the case. For the quantified formulas involving polyadic predicates, there is no computable relationship in general between an increase in the number of objects in the range of the quantifiers and the positions of new t’s among the ’s in the truth-table representations. Once relation signs are allowed, the truth-table representation for n þ 1 cannot be determined from the truth-table for n. Surely Wittgenstein would have known these problems with truth-table representations of quantified formulas. Indeed, assuming that he knew them, we are led to the thesis that Wittgenstein introduced his N-operator notation to avoid the weaknesses of truth-tabular representations. The N-operator is offered as a notation in which all and only logical equivalents of quantification theory with identity have exactly one and the same representation. Before we explain how Wittgenstein thought that the N-operator notation accomplishes this striking result, we do well to ask how it recovers the result for quantifier-free expressions. How does the N-operator notation provide a symbolism in which all propositional (quantifier-free) logical equivalents have exactly one and the same representation? Tautologies and contradictions should be scaffolding, as in the Venn-diagrammatic and truth-table notations. Wittgenstein says little about the nature of operations. He does, however, distinguish operations from what he calls ‘‘functions’’ in the following passages: The occurrence of an operation does not characterize the sense of a proposition. Indeed, no statement is made by an operation, but only by its result, and this depends on the bases of the operation. (Operations and functions must not be confused with each other.) (TLP 5.25) A function cannot be its own argument, whereas an operation can take one of its own results as its base. (TLP 5.251)
These passages are far from clear. Surely a function f, like an operation, can take one of its own results, e.g., the value fx, as its base (as its own argument). So TLP 5.251 does not seem to distinguish functions from operations. Evidently, Wittgenstein has in mind the notion of a propositional function, not the mathematical notion of a function. Where ’ is a predicate variable (propositional function sign), Principia’s grammar does rule out ’(’yˆ) and ’(’) as ungrammatical. In Principia, an ontology of mathematical functions is not primitive. The primitive signs of the language are propositional function signs (i.e., predicate variables), not function signs. Descriptive mathematical function signs are defined by means of
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definite descriptions which use predicate variables. Likely, Wittgenstein’s point is simply that, unlike Principia, he adopts the mathematical notion of a function as a primitive. That is, his notion of an operation is just the mathematical notion of a function. Wittgenstein introduces his N-operator notation in the following rather cryptic passage which ties the notation to the truth-tabular presentation of a proposition. He writes: NðÞ is the negation of all the values of So instead of ‘(——T)(, . . .)’ I write NðÞ. the variable . (TLP 5.502)
Wittgenstein’s comments suggest that the N-operator notation is akin to Sheffer’s dagger notation. The two-placed Sheffer dagger p # q could be written as #(p, q), and this parallels Wittgenstein’s N(p, q). Indeed, for any propositional formula of a language with the logical signs, v, &, , , we can find an N-operator analog for the formula by first translating the formula into dagger notation and then replacing each occurrence of the dagger with N. (More conveniently, we can translate to dagger and tilde, and replace each with N.) But the differences between the N-operator notation and the Sheffer dagger are quite significant. If the sign N(p1, p2, . . ., pn) is a function sign in the mathematical sense, then it is a term, not a formula. This is important. The expression #(p, q) is a formula. Wittgenstein’s N(p, q) is a term which names (or represents) the truthconditions for such a formula. It is akin to the truth-tabular representation of a formula which pictures truth-conditions. Unfortunately, this is but the first of several puzzles that arise in attempting to understand the N-operator notation. The following passages are of concern: What values a propositional variable may take is something that is stipulated. The stipulation of values is the variable. (TLP 3.16) To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the propositions whose common characteristic the variable is. The stipulation is a description of those propositions. The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not with their meaning. And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified. How the description of the propositions is produced is not essential. (TPL 3.317) When a bracket expression has propositions as its terms – and the order of the terms ‘’ is a inside the brackets is indifferent – then I indicate it by a sign of the form ‘ðÞ.’ variable whose values are terms of the bracketed expression and the bar over the variable indicates that it is the representative of all its values in the brackets. E.g., if has the three values P, Q, R, then
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129 ¼ ðP, Q, RÞ: ðÞ
What the values of the variables are is something that is stipulated. The stipulation is a description of the propositions that have the variable as their representative. How the description of the terms of the bracketed expression is produced is not essential. We can distinguish three kinds of description: 1. Direct enumeration, in which case we can simply substitute for the variable the constants that are its values; 2. giving a function fx whose values for all values of x are the propositions to be described; 3. Giving a formal law that governs the construction of the propositions, in which case the bracketed expression has as its members all the terms of a series of forms. (TLP 5.501) ¼ p (not p); if it has two values, then NðÞ ¼ If has only one value, then NðÞ p q (neither p nor q). (TLP 5.51)
Wittgenstein’s intent in using the bar over is not clear. Is the Tractatus introducing several syntactically distinct N-operator symbols at 5.501, or is it that we have a one-placed symbol? Does Wittgenstein mean that in the one-placed expression N() the variable can take several values at once? Or does he mean there can be several different N-operator expressions N(), N(1 2), N(1 2 3), and so on? The best answer is that the syntactic expression N() of the N-operator is one-placed. Wittgenstein allows, however, that we can place in the position of a list, or a recipe, or a schema, which determines what are to be the base(s) of the operation. Thus, for example, when is assigned to the list ‘‘p, q, r’’ we may write N(p, q, r) as if we had a three-placed expression N(1 2 3), with p, q, and r in the respective places. Wittgenstein’s intent breaches syntax as we know it, and it is uncomfortable to have to get along with a wink and a nod. In any event, on Wittgenstein’s view, the positions of p and q in the value of N(p, q) are clearly supposed to be unordered so that the sign N(p, q) is somehow the same as the sign N(q, p). Indeed, we shall see that N(NN(p, q), r) is to be regarded, in some sense, as the same as N(p, q, r).38 The N-operator notation is a picture of the truth-conditions of a formula – something akin to a propositional Venn diagram. Realizing this, we can see what Wittgenstein had in mind in thinking that N-operator symbolism recovers the characteristic features of truth-table representations – namely, that all and only propositional logical equivalents have the same representation and tautologies are scaffolding. We have the following rules of operation: (1) N(1, . . ., n) ¼ N(i, . . ., j), 1 i n, and 1 j n. (2) N(. . ., . . ., . . .) ¼ N(. . .. . .). 38
´ ˆ me Sackur, Formes et faits (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005), p. 138. This is also noted in Jero
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(3) N(. . .NN(1, . . ., n). . .) ¼ N(. . .1, . . ., n, . . .). (4) N(. . .N(. . ., . . ., N, . . .). . .) ¼ N(. . . .). (5) NN(, N(1, . . ., n)) ¼ N(N(, N1), . . ., N(, Nn)).39 The addition of an N to both sides of any among (2)–(5) is allowed as well.40 These rules assert the sameness of certain practices of operation. They are not, therefore, identity statements. Most of the rules are straightforward. Clause (1) tells us that arguments to N may be permuted. Clause (2) permits the deletion of repeated arguments. Clause (3) says that if NN(1, . . ., n) is an argument to the N-operator, then we can delete this argument and add 1, . . ., n to the arguments. Clause (4) tells us that we may delete or insert any argument of the form N(. . ., . . ., N, . . .). Finally, (5) applies to distributed forms. For example, NN(p, N(q, r)) ¼ N(N(p, Nq), N(p, Nr)). This is the analog of the rule of distribution for expressions p .v. q & r and p v q .&. p v r. What explains distribution is the fact that both sides are picked out by N(N(, )). Hence, when N(, ) is regarded as picking out the list N(, 1), . . ., N(, n), the form yields NðNð; N1 Þ; . . .; Nð; Nn ÞÞ:
The same form also yields NNð; Nð1 ; . . .; n ÞÞ
when picks out N(1, . . ., n). The difference in the two lies only in the designation of values. By application of (1)–(5) we can see how Wittgenstein thought that the N-operator recovers the features of truth-table representations and Venn’s propositional diagrams. The N-operator notation gives a picture of the truth-conditions. Where A is a quantifier-free formula of Principia, let t[A] be its expression in dagger notation.41 The following examples illustrate the transformations that show that logical equivalents have exactly one and the same representation in N-notation.
39
40 41
Wittgenstein’s N-operator anticipates, and has much in common with, the ‘‘primary algebra’’ of George Spencer Brown. Brown points out the important difference between his symbolism and the dyadic Sheffer stroke, and he intimates that all and only logical equivalents have the same notation. He admits to having been influenced by the Tractatus, but he does not discuss the N-operator. See George Spencer Brown, Laws of Form (New York: Julian Press, 1967), pp. 109, 115. For convenience let us use ‘‘NN(1, . . ., n)’’ instead of ‘‘N(N(1, . . ., n)).’’ The dagger expression of ‘‘p’’ is ‘‘p # p’’ but we keep the tilde for convenience.
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Example 1: t½p & q ¼ p # q NðNp; NqÞ ¼ NðNq; NpÞ by ð1Þ q # p ¼ t½q & p Example 2: t½p v p ¼ ðp # pÞ NNðp; pÞ ¼ NNp by ð2Þ ¼ NðNp; NpÞ by ð2Þ p # p ¼ t½ p & p Example 3: t½q :&: p v p ¼ q # ðp # pÞ NðNq; NNNðp; NpÞÞ ¼ NðNq; Nðp; NpÞÞ by ð3Þ ¼ NNq by ð4Þ ð q # qÞ ¼ t½ q
This example reveals what Wittgenstein had in mind at TLP 5.513 when he wrote that it is ‘‘manifest that ‘q: p v p’ says the same thing as ‘q’, and that p v p says nothing.’’ Example 4: t½p : : q r ¼ ð p # ð q # rÞÞ NNðNp; NNðNq; rÞÞ ¼ NNðNp; Nq; rÞ by ð3Þ ¼ NNðNq; Np; rÞ by ð1Þ ¼ NNðNq; NNðNp; rÞÞ by ð3Þ ð q # ð p # rÞÞ ¼ t½q: : p r Example 5: t½p :v: q & r ¼ ðp : # : q # rÞ NNðp; NðNq; NrÞÞ ¼ NðNðp; qÞ; Nðp; rÞÞ by ð5Þ; ð3Þ ¼ NðNNNðp; qÞ; NNNðp; rÞÞ by ð3Þ ð ðp # qÞ : # : ðp # rÞÞ ¼ t½p v q :&: p v r
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Example 6: t½p v q :&: r r ¼ ðp # qÞ # ð r # rÞ N½NNNðp; qÞ; NNNðNr; rÞ ¼ N½Nðp; qÞ; NðNr; rÞ by ð3Þ ¼ NNðp; qÞ by ð4Þ ðp # qÞ ¼ t½p v q Example 7: t½p ¼ p NNp ¼ NfNp; NðNp; Nq; pÞg by ð4Þ ¼ NfNp; NðNp; NNðNq; pÞÞg by ð3Þ ¼ NNfNðNp; pÞ; NðNp; NðNq; pÞÞg by ð5Þ ¼ NðNp; NðNq; pÞÞ by ð4Þ and ð3Þ q # p : # : p ¼ t½q p :&: p
We saw that tautologies drop out of Venn’s diagrams. All logical equivalents have the same Venn diagram, and so p v q .&. r r has the same diagram as p v q. Example 6 reveals that the same result is embedded in the N-operation. The tautologous conjunct adds nothing; and every subordinate occurrence of N(. . .p. . . Np . . .) drops out. When expressed by N-notation, every atomic propositional sign contains within itself its logical (truth-conditional) relationships with all the propositional signs. Wittgenstein wrote (TLP 3.42): A proposition determines only one place in logical space; nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it. (Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more and more new elements – in coordination.) (The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space.)
The N-operator sign for p implicitly contains every propositional sign q, r, s, . . . of the entire language. In N-operator notation, the sign for p is taken to be the same as the sign for its logical equivalent p :&: q q .&. r r .&., . . . This is what Wittgenstein had in mind in saying that the whole of logical space is ‘‘given by’’ every propositional sign. If we interpret the N-operator as picturing truth-conditions and follow TLP 5.51, then all and only tautologies have their truth-conditions pictured by NN(. . ., . . .N, . . .). This is easily demonstrated. If a formula has this form it clearly has the truth-conditions of a tautology. Suppose a formula A is a tautology. A formula in conjunctive normal
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form42 is tautologous if and only if every conjunct is a disjunction containing some formula and its negation. Thus the conjunctive normal form of A can be expressed as follows: p1 v p1 v C1 : & : p2 v p2 v C2 : & :; . . .; : & : pn v pn v Cn :
When the truth-conditions of this are pictured in N-notation, the result is: NðNðp1 ; Np1 ; C1 Þ; Nðp2 ; Np2 ; C2 Þ :; . . . ; : Nðpn ; Npn ; Cn ÞÞ:
By rule (4) we can eliminate all of the components except one, and arrive at: NNðpi ; Npi ; Ci Þ;
where 1 i n. This has the form NN(. . ., . . .N , . . .). In this way, calculation by means of the N operator forms a decision procedure for tautologyhood. In Wittgenstein’s view, propositional logic is a practice of calculating with equations using the N-operator. We can now see how he imagined this to be the case. Upon first receiving the Tractatus, Russell wrote to Wittgenstein asking several questions. In his remarks, Russell reveals that he thinks of the N-operator as a sort of generalized Sheffer dagger. At TLP 6 Wittgenstein wrote: NðÞ . The general form of a truth-function is ½ p; ; This is the general form of a proposition.
Russell asks the following question about this passage: NðÞ .’ Yes, this is one way. But could one not do ‘General truth-function ½ p; ; equally well by making NðÞ‘at least one value of is false,’ just as one can do equally well with p v q and with p q as fundamental? I feel as if the duality of generality and existence persisted covertly in your system.43
Wittgenstein’s reply was this: may also be made to mean p v q v r v . . . But this You are right that NðÞ doesn’t matter! I suppose you don’t understand the notation . It does not mean ‘‘for all values of . . .’’44
Rules (1)–(5) are equally valid whether we regard N as akin to a generalized Sheffer dagger or its dual as a generalized Sheffer stroke. The 42
43 44
A formula is in conjunctive normal form if and only if it is a conjunction (possibly degenerate), each conjunct of which is a disjunction (again possibly degenerate) of propositional letters or their negations. A single propositional letter or its negation or a disjunction of such is a degenerate conjunction. Bertrand Russell, ‘‘Letter of 13 August 1919,’’ Russell 10.2 (1990): 108. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 131.
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truth-conditions of tautologies will be pictured differently, of course. If we interpret the N-operator as picturing truth-conditions akin to a generalized stroke, then all and only tautologies have their truth-conditions pictured by Nð. . . ; . . . N; . . .Þ:
Perhaps it was because (1)–(5) apply equally on either approach that Wittgenstein felt justified in his reply that Russell’s concern doesn’t matter. Quantification and the N-operator Wittgenstein’s goal, of course, was to find a symbolism for quantification theory with identity in which all logical equivalents have exactly one and the same representation. If one takes the sign ‘‘¼’’ for identity to be a primitive relation sign like ‘‘R,’’ then the logical (tautological) nature of statements such as ‘‘(x)(x ¼ x)’’ and ‘‘x ¼ x’’ is lost; the statements appear as though they have the same form as contingent statements such as ‘‘(x)Rxx’’ and ‘‘Rxx,’’ and special axioms have to be introduced to justify inferences governing the identity sign. In Wittgenstein’s view, identity is a logical notion and therefore must be shown in the formal grammar of an ideal language. But how can identity be built into logical grammar? In a letter to Russell dated December 1913 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘‘The question of the nature of identity cannot be answered until the nature of tautologies is explained. But that question is the fundamental question of all logic.’’45 It took some time for Wittgenstein to settle on a plan. In the language of Principia Mathematica, the identity sign is defined as follows:
13:01 x ¼ y ¼ df ð’Þð’x ’yÞ:46
One might at first think that Wittgenstein would be very attracted to this definition. Employing the definition, the offensive ‘‘(x)(x ¼ x)’’ becomes ‘‘(x)(’)(’x ’x)’’ which looks much more like a tautology on the grounds that it is but a universal generalization of a tautologous form – namely, ’x ’x. Similarly, if we apply the definition of the identity symbol to ‘‘(y)(9x)(x ¼ y)’’ we arrive at ‘‘(y)(9x)(’)(’x ’y).’’ This too is arrived at by generalization on a tautologous form ‘‘’x ’x.’’ The advantages of this approach to the problem of showing that identity is part of logical grammar are clear. But Wittgenstein rejected it, writing (TLP 5.5302): 45 46
Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘‘Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway,’’ Notebooks 1914–1916, 2nd ed., p. 129. This expression omits Principia’s notion of predicativity which is not germane to the present discussion.
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Russell’s definition of ‘¼’ is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never correct, it still has sense.)
This passage wants clarification. Though Whitehead and Russell were realists concerning universals, they intended that the attribute (propositional function) variables in the Principia be interpreted in terms of a nominalistic semantics. Accordingly, the propositional function variables in *13.01 have an intended interpretation quite different from what Wittgenstein had in mind when he spoke of ‘‘material properties.’’ Moreover, in Russell’s 1912 paper ‘‘On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,’’ Russell himself argued that two distinct particulars might have all their properties in common.47 Wittgenstein’s comment therefore seems to saddle Russell with a position he did not hold.48 A better interpretation is needed, and a simple one is at hand. When properly understood, TLP 5.5302 is not criticizing definition *13.01 as it functions in Principia. Wittgenstein was pointing out that in his efforts to build identity into grammar he could not employ a definition of the identity sign akin to that of Principia. That is, if the identity sign is defined to mean coexemplification of all the same material properties, the definition would not be adequate. Russell certainly would agree. Wittgenstein’s answer to the problem of building identity into scaffolding is his informal semantic interpretation of quantifiers and variables. Each free individual variable has an assignment which makes it such that its referent is distinct from every other free individual variable. Though Ramsey found translation procedures between the language of exclusive quantifiers and predicate logic with identity, there has been little progress toward the development of a deductive system for exclusive quantifiers. Carnap worried that such a system encounters serious problems with respect to keeping track of the exclusiveness of the variables when quantifiers are instantiated and generalized.49 In our Appendix A, a deductive system is set out which addresses these problems by introducing quantificational expressions such as (8xz1, . . ., zn)A, where the variables z1, . . ., zn are free 47
48
49
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,’’ in Logic and Knowledge: Essays by Bertrand Russell 1901–1905, ed. R. C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 118. Russell corroborates this in a marginal comment to his copy of F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Annotating Ramsey’s comment that ‘‘the definition makes it self-contradictory for two things to have all their elementary properties in common,’’ Russell wrote: ‘‘Don’t agree.’’ The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 10, A Fresh Look at Empiricism 1927–1942, ed. John G. Slater (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 106. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 50.
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and must include all variables free in A except x. In a universal instantiation of (8xz1, . . ., zn)A, x must be replaced by a variable distinct from each among z1, . . ., zn. For the present discussion, it will suffice to examine the role Wittgenstein’s exclusive reading of free individual variables plays in his thesis that the N-operator recovers quantification theory. The following passages in the Tractatus concerning the N-operator are important to our discussion. We shall find that they can be understood as consistent with the goal of representing all and only logical equivalents of quantification theory in exactly one and the same way. If has as its values all the values of a function fx for all values of x, then ¼ (9x)fx. (TLP 5.52) NðÞ NðÞ . This is the general form of a The general form of a truth-function is ½ p; ; proposition. (TLP 6) What this says is just that every proposition is a result of successive applications to (TLP 6.001) elementary propositions of the operation NðÞ.
Reading TLP 5.52, one may take the syntax of the expression N(fx) to indicate that the N-operator operates on every closed formula of the form fx. Fogelin, for example, takes N(fx) to form a formula that is the possibly infinite conjunction of the negations of every proposition of the form fx.50 Thus, N(fx) signifies the formula N(fa, fb, fc, fd, . . .) where a, b, c, and so on are all the names of the language. In this way, Fogelin maintains, Wittgenstein intended to express (9x)fx, which is the same as (x) fx. This amounts to a substitutional interpretation of quantification, and it not clear that this was Wittgenstein’s intent. The existence of the expression (9x)fx for quantification must not assure the existence of names for the objects in the range of the quantifier. Wittgenstein is explicitly committed to the rejection of any view that would make logic depend upon the existence of an actual infinity of contingent particulars. For similar reason, it is doubtful that Wittgenstein intended a substitutional account of quantification. It would commit logic to the actual existence of an infinite conjunctive or disjunctive formula. Moreover, if there are nondenumerably many entities in the range of the quantifier, there cannot be a name for every object. (Wittgenstein may, however, have rejected the Cantorian proofs of the nondenumerability of entities. Real numbers, classes, and the like, after all, are not entities for Wittgenstein.) In any event, given Fogelin’s reading, we shall want to know how to capture the truth-conditions of (9x)fx. It will be necessary to be able to confine the scope of the generality of the variable. Otherwise, NN(fx) 50
Fogelin, Wittgenstein, pp. 57 and 62.
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would render the truth-conditions of (x)fx. Wittgenstein was not unaware of the issue of confining the scope. He wrote (TLP 4.0411): If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as ‘‘(x).fx’’ by putting an affix in front of ‘‘fx’’ – for instance by writing ‘‘Gen.fx’’ – it would not be adequate: we should not know what was being generalized. If we wanted to signalize it with an affix ‘‘g’’ – for instance by writing ‘‘f(xg)’’ – that would not be adequate either: we should not know the scope of the generality sign. If we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument places – for instance by writing ‘‘ðG; GÞFðG; GÞ’’ – it would not be adequate: we should not be able to establish the identity of the variables. And so on. All these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary mathematical multiplicity.
Perhaps we might introduce braces to confine scope. Then NN(fx) which expresses (x)fx is distinguished from N[N(fx)] which expresses (x) fx and (9x)fx. Interestingly, Fogelin maintains that Wittgenstein’s N-operator notation must be inadequate to express the formulas of ordinary quantification theory because it cannot capture the right scope distinctions. Fogelin maintains that the generality of the variables must be confined within one and the same scope. On Fogelin’s reading, the N-operator notation can express homogenous multiply general formulas, such as (x)(y)fxy and (9x)(9y)fxy, but not mixed multiply general formulas such as (9x)(y)fxy. In order to arrive at (9x)(9y) fxy (where the quantifiers are interpreted Thus, N(fxy) inclusively) Fogelin puts fxy for Wittgenstein’s in NðÞ. expresses (9x)(9y) fxy. This is just equivalent to (x)(y)fxy, and, as we see, the scope of the generality has not been confined. Fogelin does think that it is possible to express the homogenous multiply general formula (9x)(9y) fxy by, as he puts it, bringing (9x)(9y)fxy under the operator N.51 He does not say how this is to be done. As we saw, this requires confinement of scope, otherwise N(N(fxy)) expresses (x)(y) fxy. Using braces to confine generality, N[N(fxy)] expresses (x)(y) fx and so (9x)(9y)fxy. But if we use braces, what forces us to confine all variables with one and the same scope? Why not allow innermost brackets to confine the right-most variable only? Then N[N[fxy]] would capture (9x)(y)fxy after all. The explanation lies in Fogelin’s reading of Wittgenstein’s comment that N() expresses (9x)fx, when is assigned all propositions of the form fx. Fogelin concludes that in any embedded occurrence, the expression fxy always represents faa, fab, fba, fac, and so on. Thus, on 51
Ibid., p. 79.
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Fogelin’s reading, fxy plays the same role in N[N(fxy)], which we used to express (9x)(9y)fxy, and in NN(fxy), which expresses (x)(y) fxy. This is why Fogelin thinks that the scope of the variables will always be confined together. Geach agrees with Fogelin that the original N-operator notation NðÞ is expressively inadequate for quantification theory. Geach’s remedy is to extend of the notional resources of the Tractatus. Geach takes the N-operator to be flanked by class terms, and he modifies the original Tractarian notation to accommodate this view. Geach’s enhancement of the Tractarian notation commits the Tractatus to an ontology of classes of formulas. Geach acknowledges that his interpretation runs against Wittgenstein’s rather unequivocal rejection of the view that a theory of classes is part of logic. ‘‘Wittgenstein was exaggerating,’’ says Geach, ‘‘when he said that the theory of classes is altogether superfluous in mathematics (6.031) for he cannot get on without classes of propositions. But his class theory is very rudimentary: it has no null class, nor has it classes of classes; and by the same token it can never generate any Russellian Paradoxes.’’52 On Geach’s construal, N(fx) is a bad notation and better replaced by N(x:fx) where x:fx represents a class of quantifier-free sentences each of which is of the form fx. For example, to express (9x)(y)fxy, Geach puts N(N(x:N(y:N(fxy)))). To see how this is arrived at, consider the propositional model of (9x)(y)fxy (interpreted inclusively) in an n-object domain (where a1, . . ., an are names): fða1 ; a1 Þ&; . . .; & fða1 ; an Þ : v: fða2 ; a1 Þ&; . . .; & fða2 ; an Þ : v; . . .; v: fðan ; a1 Þ&; . . .; & fðan ; an Þ:
Geach’s notation represents each disjunct f(ai, a1) &, . . ., & f(ai, an) by N(y:N(fai,y)). So he has: Nðy : Nfða1 ; yÞÞ : v; . . .; v : Nðy : Nfðan ; yÞÞ:
Next Geach represents this disjunction and arrives at his N(N(x:N(y:N (fx, y)))). Consider the more simple example of (x)fx which Geach expresses by N(x:N(fx)). Geach considers the possibly infinite class x:(N(fx)) of closed formulas (sentences) N(fa), N(fb), N(fc), etc., each obtained by replacing x in N(fx) by a name. Then he considers N(x: (N(fx))). This tells us to take as bases of N the sentences which are members of the class x:N(fx), and so we arrive at the possibly infinite conjunction N(fa) & N(fb) & N(fc) & . . . Then, discharging the many N’s in this formula, one gets the possibly infinite (fa) & (fb) & (fc) & . . . As Geach 52
Peter Geach, ‘‘Wittgenstein’s Operator N,’’ Analysis 41 (1981): 169.
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observes, in the last step no one instance of the operator N is applied infinitely many times. Fogelin argues that Geach’s enhancement of the Tractarian notion could not have been adopted by Wittgenstein. Fogelin reads Geach’s class x: N(fx) as ‘‘a set of propositions that is the result of possibly infinitely many (unordered) applications of the operator N to a possibly infinite set of propositions.’’53 That is, Fogelin sees x:N(fx) as the class of closed formulas each member of which is obtained by putting a name for x in fx and applying N to the result. If the class is infinite, then there have been infinitely many applications of N. Thus, even in Geach’s expression of (x)fx as N(x:N(fx)), Fogelin objects on the grounds that it is committed to possibly infinitely many applications of N. Fogelin therefore rejects Geach’s approach, pointing out that at TLP 5.32 we find: All truth-functions are results of successive applications to elementary propositions of a finite number of truth-operations.
In Fogelin’s view, Geach’s proposal permits infinitely many applications of the N-operation and also violates the demand of successiveness. ‘‘If the set of base operations is infinite,’’ writes Fogelin, ‘‘then nothing will count as the immediate predecessor of the final application of the operation N in the construction of a universally quantified proposition.’’54 Geach rightly pointed out that Fogelin misreads his class notation x: N(fx). It does not require infinitely many applications of the N-operation. But Fogelin is unrepentant. His criticism of Geach is based on an interpretation of the role fx plays in x:N(fx). He rejects Geach’s reading of x: N(fx) because he maintains that N(fx) in x:N(fx) cannot be used to pick out formulas N(fa), N(fb), and so on. In Fogelin’s view, innermost N in Geach’s x:N(fx) is not a constituent of the propositional function N(fx) but must operate on each of the propositions picked out by fx.55 He concludes that Geach has not found a way to enhance the Tractarian N-operator notation that would secure its expressive adequacy for quantification theory. Fogelin holds that only fx, fxy, and so on, where f is a primitive predicate letter of the language, can pick out formulas. Geach rejects this view. This is the crux of the dispute between them. What then of Fogelin’s objection that Geach violates Wittgenstein’s criterion of successiveness? At TLP 6, Wittgenstein gave the general form NðÞ . Wittgenstein then writes at TLP of a truth-function as follows: ½ p; ; 6.001 that this general form says that ‘‘every proposition is the result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation NðÞ.’’ He follows up with this (TLP 6.01): 53
Fogelin, Wittgenstein, p. 80.
54
Ibid., p. 81.
55
Ibid.
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Therefore the general form of an operation O0 ð Þ is NðÞ Þ NðÞ 0 ð Þ ð¼ ½ ; ; ½; This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.
Now it is far from clear that Wittgenstein means to say that every oper NðÞ 0 ð ation O0 ð Þ has the general form ½; Þ for this would make every operation a transition between propositions. Perhaps there are other sorts of operations. We will take up this matter again in our discussion in chapter 5 of number. The safe interpretation is that Wittgenstein is offering NðÞ 0 ð ½; Þ as the general form of an operation O0 ð Þ which enables the ‘‘transition from one proposition’’ to another. Anscombe interprets the general form to be the general term of a con NðÞ is a particular secutive series of truth-functions. She says that ½ p; ; example of Wittgenstein’s statement of the ‘‘general term’’ of a formal (consecutive) series.56 Wittgenstein wrote: If an operation is applied repeatedly to its own results, I speak of successive applications of it. (‘‘O’O’O’a’’ is the result of three successive applications of the operation ‘‘O’ to ‘‘a’’.) In a similar sense, I speak of successive application of more than one operation to a number of propositions. (TLP 5.2521) Accordingly, I use the sign ‘‘[a, x, O’x]’’ for the general term of the series of forms a, O’a, O’O’a, . . . This bracketed expression is a variable: the first term of the bracketed expression is the beginning of the series of forms, the second is the form of a term x arbitrarily selected from the series, and the third is the form of the term that immediately follows x in the series. (TLP 5.2522)
In these passages, Wittgenstein is speaking of the general term of a series. Indeed, he writes at TLP 5.2523 that the concept of successive applications of an operation is equivalent to the concept ‘‘and so on.’’ Moreover, Wittgenstein observed that operations may be repeated to form a consecutive series of expressions. In the case of a one-placed operation O(x), Wittgenstein writes ½x; ; OðÞ
as an abbreviation for ½O0 ðxÞ; Ov ðxÞ; Ovþ= ðxÞ
where x is the first term of the series. Anscombe concludes that
56
See G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 132.
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NðÞ ½ p; ;
can be replaced by ½ p; Nn ðpÞ; Nnþ1 ðpÞ
where the ‘‘first’’ term of the series is some set of atomic propositions picked out by p. Thus, for example, if p picks out just p and q, then Anscombe hopes to show that a series of truth-functions of p and q can be generated by ‘‘successive applications’’ of the operation NðÞ. A serial ordering is one that is transitive, asymmetric, and connected. A serial ordering is not always a consecutive ordering, however. Rationals are serially ordered but are not consecutive – there is no rational immediately after 1/2. Moreover, the real numbers are serially ordered even though they are nondenumerable. Now, a ‘‘general term of a series’’ (if there is one for the series) relies upon the existence of a consecutive ordering. For instance, the general term of the consecutive numeric series 0, 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, . . .
is n2. The general term of the series relies on the consecutive ordering of the natural numbers, for we are to consecutively replace n in n2 by 0, then by 1, then 2, and so on. By identifying Wittgenstein’s ‘‘general form of a truthfunction’’ as a ‘‘general term of a formal series,’’ Anscombe argues that Wittgenstein was committed to holding that the truth-functions are correlated one to one with the natural numbers. She goes on to point out, however, that since Wittgenstein allows that there can be infinitely many bases, this conflicts with Cantor’s power-class theorem.57 If there are @o many propositions there will be nondenumerably many truth-functions and hence they cannot be in one–one correspondence with the natural numbers. Anscombe concludes that Wittgenstein’s claim of successiveness is mistaken.58 NðÞ is the general term of the series Wittgenstein does not say that ½ p; ; of truth-functions. He says it is the general form of a truth-function. Wittgenstein explicitly says that the truth-functions can be serially
57
58
Ramsey also interprets Wittgenstein as allowing that there can be infinitely many bases. See F. P. Ramsey, ‘‘The Foundations of Mathematics,’’ in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931), p. 7. Anscombe rightly notes that there is reason to believe that Wittgenstein did not accept Cantor’s power-class theorem. Wittgenstein embraced predicative quantification and Cantor’s proof requires impredicative quantifiers. In Principia (1910) impredicative quantification is avoided only by relying on an axiom of Reducibility. Wittgenstein rejected Reducibility.
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ordered, at TLP 4.45 and 5.1. But this by no means entails that they have a general term (and thus are consecutively ordered). Wittgenstein calls a series that is ordered by an internal relation a ‘‘series of forms,’’ and he says that the number series is ordered by an internal relation (TLP 4.1252). NðÞ to be Hence, if Anscombe is right that Wittgenstein intended ½ p; ; the general term of a consecutive series of truth-functions, then we should expect there to be some internal relation which determines what selections to make and in what consecutive order to make them.59 Indeed, if one attempts to offer a general term for a consecutive series of truth-functions, one obviously cannot rely upon the consecutive ordering of the natural numbers. How would such a general term determine which propositions are to be picked out first and offered to the N-operator and which come NðÞ next? No principle for selection derives from Wittgenstein’s ½ p; ; interpreted as if it were the general term of the series of truth-functions. We do well to recall, however, Wittgenstein’s use of the bar. Perhaps he NðÞ to allow that stands in for a (yet to be intended the bar in ½ p; ; determined) recipe for selecting the bases of the operation. In some instances of the schema – say in the case of the sixteen dyadic truth-functions – the bar stands in for a recipe which provides a consecutive ordering. In other instances, the bar stands in for a selection method which does not order the selections consecutively.60 Anscombe works her way through the dyadic truth-functions (i.e., those based on two propositional bases p and q). She takes N(p, q) so that we get the truth-function (t,f,f,f)(p, q). The next selection she makes is N(p, q) so that applying N() we get the truth-function (t,t,t,f)(p, q). She goes on to apply N() to get N(N(p, q), N(q, p)) and this yields (f,f,f,f)(p, q), and by various selections she eventually arrives at all the dyadic truthfunctions. Oddly, she does not follow the ordering of dyadic truthfunctions Wittgenstein set out at TLP 5.101. For any finite n, there are several ways to consecutively order the n-adic truth-functions. Based on n-many propositions there will be p-many (namely, 2n) rows of the truthtable, and 2p many truth-functions. Wittgenstein himself computes this at TLP 4.42. A typical algorithm for writing out the rows is to alternate t and f in the first row 2n many times, then alternate in twos, then fours, then eighths, etc., eventuating in the last row where 1/2 (2n) of t’s occur and then the same number of f’s. Alternatively, one can start with these
59
60
A general term of a consecutive series of natural numbers relies on the natural ordering of the numbers. This ordering is derived from an internal relation, since number is a formal concept in Wittgenstein’s view. I came to this idea during an interesting conversation with Dick Schmitt concerning the N-operator.
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and work in the other direction. But there are 16! many ways to order them.61 Each consecutive ordering will determine a distinct selection of bases to the N-operator, but none can be viewed as being given by an internal relation. Anscombe is mistaken. Wittgenstein’s assertion that all truth-functions can be reached by ‘‘successive’’ applications of the N-operator does not require Anscombe’s identification of his notion of ‘‘the general form of a truth-function’’ with the notion of the general term of a consecutive series of truth-functions. When Wittgenstein said that every truth-function is the result of successive applications of the N-operator, he may have simply meant that the N-operator is expressively adequate. As long as we reject Anscombe’s account, nothing in Geach’s embellishment of the N-operator conflicts with Wittgenstein’s criterion of successiveness. Fogelin maintains that the expressive adequacy of the N-operator notation entails the decidability of polyadic predicate logic. This is clear in his criticism of Geach. Fogelin writes: At 6.126 Wittgenstein tells us that ‘‘one can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the logical properties of the symbol’’ . . . Since one can decide whether a proposition belongs to logic by calculating the logical properties of the symbol, the truth of a proposition of logic will not depend upon the disposition of independent logical objects. In is in this way that Wittgenstein’s commitment to a decision procedure goes hand in hand with his ‘‘fundamental idea’’ that ‘the logical constants are not representatives.’ (4.0312)62
In Fogelin’s view, the purpose of the N-operator notation was to reveal that the logical constants are not relation signs. Thus, he holds that if the N-operator is expressively adequate then it will show that the logical constants are not relation signs. Fogelin thinks that this entails decidability. But how does it entail it? On the modern view of logic, the logical particles do not stand for relation signs and this is certainly compatible with undecidability. Geach’s enhancement makes the N-operator notation expressively complete, but Geach rejects the connection Fogelin tries to forge between the apparatus of expressing quantified sentences by the N-operator and the issue of decidability. Fogelin is correct, however. There is a connection between the N-operator notation and Wittgenstein’s conviction that logic is decidable. But Fogelin has not properly established what the connection is. The N-operator notation is adequate to express any formula of propositional logic. It inherits this from the expressive adequacy of the Peirce/Sheffer stroke (and dagger), 61 62
There are sixteen different dyadic truth-functions (including tautology and contradiction). The number of permutations is thus 16! Robert Fogelin, ‘‘Wittgenstein’s Operator N,’’ Analysis 42 (1982): 127.
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which was proved by Post in 1920.63 The question of the expressive adequacy of the N-operator notation for (formulas of) quantification theory, however, is quite another matter. On the present interpretation, Wittgenstein intended the N-operator notation to provide an apparatus that represents all and only logical equivalents in one and the same way. This forges a connection between expressive adequacy and decidablity. If the N-operator notation succeeds in expressing every logical equivalent in exactly one and the same way, then it has to fail to be expressively adequate, for polyadic predicate logic is not decidable. Unfortunately, neither Geach’s nor Fogelin’s interpretations show how Wittgenstein could have thought that the N-operator notation provides a means of expressing all and only logical equivalents of quantification theory in exactly one and the same way. A new interpretation is needed. How could Wittgenstein have thought that the N-operator notation is adequate for the expression of quantification? Recall that many-placed N-operator expressions are obviated by the fact that Wittgenstein allows himself to view the expression N(p, q, r) as composed of a one-placed operator sign N() with the variable assigned to p and q and r. At the same time, he allows himself to view it as composed of a triadic operator sign N(1, 2, 3) with p and q and r at their respective positions. This is can be illegitimate. But let us proceed anyway. The bar above in NðÞ used to abbreviate an n-placed expression N(1, . . ., n), where each variable among 1, . . ., n themselves may pick out several propositions. Consider, then, the mixed and multiply general sentence (9x)(y)fxy with the quantifiers exclusive. In an n-many element domain (where n any is a finite cardinal) we have: fðx1 x2 Þ &; . . .; & fðx1 xn Þ : v; . . .; v : fðxn x1 Þ &; . . .; & fðxn xn1 Þ:
The free variables are to be read exclusively. Expressed with the N-operator notation we have: NNðNðNfðx1 x2 Þ; . . .; Nfðx1 xn ÞÞ; . . .; NðNfðxn x1 Þ; . . .; Nfðxn xn1 ÞÞÞ;
where the free variables are read exclusively. This has the same truthconditions (over an n-element domain) as: ðx1 Þ; ðx2 Þ; . . .; ðxn Þðfðx1 x2 Þ &; . . .; & fðx1 xn Þ : v; . . .; v : fðxn x1 Þ &; . . .; & fðxn xn1 ÞÞ;
63
Emil Post, ‘‘Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary propositions,’’ Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1920. See also his ‘‘Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions,’’ American Journal of Mathematics 43 (1921): 163–185.
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where the quantifiers are understood exclusively. This approach avoids the problem of having to determine the positions of t’s and f’s in a truth-table representation ð1; . . .; 2 v Þðp1; . . .; pv Þ;
where v ¼ 2n. This, then, was Wittgenstein’s way of expressing (9x)(8xy)fxy by means the N-operator notation. The original Tractarian notation is expressively adequate to express heterogeneous multiply general quantification over an arbitrarily large finite domain. Be this as it may, the N-operator falls well short of its purpose of reconstructing quantification (even over an arbitrarily large finite domain) in such a way that all logical equivalents have exactly one and the same representation. Wittgenstein’s hopes are realizable without the N-operator notation for the monadic predicate calculus (although Wittgenstein did not know this). Monadic predicate logic is decidable. Thus, for any formula of monadic predicate logic, we can find a pattern (for the positions of the t’s and f’s) that is preserved in the truth-table expression of the formula when the number of elements in the domain of the quantifiers increases. Of course, to find the pattern requires us to find a decision procedure. It is now well known that a formula A of monadic predicate logic with p-many distinct predicate letters is logically true (logically valid) if and only if its propositional model in a 2p-many element domain is a tautology. We can therefore, find the pattern of t’s and f’s for a given formula (with p-many distinct predicate letters) by looking at its propositional model in a domain of 2p. Perhaps it seemed to Wittgenstein that the expressive adequacy of quantification by the N-operator notation (over an arbitrarily large finite domain) is all he needs. In such an N-notation, all and only logical truths of predicate logic have the ‘‘tautologous’’ form: NNð. . . ; . . . N; . . .Þ:
Consider the simple case of ‘‘(y)(9x)(fx fy)’’ with the quantifiers inclusive. We have: fx1 fx1 :v:; . . .; :v: fxn fx1: & :; . . .; : & : fx1 fxn :v:; . . .; :v: fxn fxn
where the free variables are to be read inclusively. Expressed with the N-operator notation and applying our rules, we have: NðNðNfx1 ; fx1 . . .; Nfxn ; fx1 Þ; . . .; NðNfx1 ; fxn . . .; Nfxn ; fxn ÞÞ:
All the subcomponents can be dropped by rule (4) except one, and we have: NNðNfx1 ; fx1 . . .Þ:
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This is a tautologous form. Likely this is what Wittgenstein was up to. But a careful reflection reveals that in polyadic predicate logic we shall not be able to apply our rules governing the N-operator effectively unless the finite number n is fixed. As we have presented it, the N-operator notation employs a schematic use of the letter ‘‘n.’’ But this undermines our ability to apply the rules governing the use of N-operator notation. In short, if we cannot apply the rules when ‘‘n’’ is employed schematically, then it is no longer the case that all and only logical equivalents have the same expression in N-operator notation. Expression in the N-operator notation will not be a decision procedure even for monadic predicate logic. Wittgenstein failed to reconstruct a formal (internal) connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction; and he failed to reconstruct such a connection between the existential quantifier and disjunction. He fails to provide a notation in which all and only logical equivalents have one and the same form. The Tractarian N-operator notation postulates the existence of a construction to fit a research paradigm, and presents itself as reaching that goal. But it is little more than bravado based on a belief that logic must be decidable. Wittgenstein seems never to have pursued the matter further. He was content to leave the considerable toil of investigating the Entscheidungsproblem to Ramsey.64
64
Frank Ramsey, ‘‘On a Problem of Formal Logic,’’ The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), pp. 82–111.
5
Tractarian logicism
Logicism is the thesis that mathematics is reducible to logic, or so it is often said. Unfortunately, this characterization is misleading. Frege’s logicism concerned arithmetic, not mathematics in general; and, as we shall see, reduction, in the sense of a derivation from axioms, is not essential to logicism. Frege’s logicism is the thesis that all arithmetic truths are logical truths. Russell held a more encompassing form of logicism according to which all mathematical truths, including those of analysis and geometry, are logical truths. Russell’s more encompassing form is based upon his acceptance of the arithmetization of the branches of nonapplied mathematics. Arithmetization reconstructs the branches as theories of order and structure, not theories of magnitude. The theory of order is part of the logic of relations. Relational order is involved in modern dynamics insofar as it employs conceptions of continuity and change over time in its account of motion in space.1 For this reason, Russell imagined that logicism plays a central role in the solution of Zeno’s famous dynamical paradoxes and Kant’s antinomies of space. Logicism arose in connection with the quest for rigor in the deductive methods of mathematics and logic. The quest uncovered a new quantification theory quite distinct from the categorical systems dating back to Aristotle and medieval logicians. Boole, Peirce, and Schro¨der’s methods construed logic as an algebra. Frege started afresh, importing the notion of variables and functions into logic. Both schools founded modern quantification theory. But Frege’s Begriffsschrift discovered something more than a new quantification theory. Frege’s pioneering work showed that the comprehension of new functions is part of logic. Quantification theory does not make logic ampliative – the conclusion of a deduction cannot get beyond what is analytically contained in the premises. Comprehension, on the other hand, does just this. Frege’s ideas eventually sparked a firestorm
1
Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), chs. 5, 6, 7.
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of debate between proponents of rival conceptions of the nature of logic, necessity, and analyticity. Frege and Russell held different conceptions of the nature of logic. Interpretations of their work continue to be rigorously debated. Followers of van Heijenoort argue that in Frege’s view ‘‘logic contains its own meta-theory’’ because it is itself an interpreted universal language (a characteristica lingua universalis), not a formal calculus (in the Boolean tradition) which admits of different interpretations. Hylton interprets Russell in a similar vein.2 Both are questionable.3 But we need not take up the debate here. What is important for the present is that both assumed that there is a consistent axiomatic system within which all and only logical truths are deducible. This is a ‘‘deducibility assumption’’ which, put in modern terms, is the thesis that there is a consistent axiomatic calculus for logic that is semantically complete (with respect to the formulas that are logically true in the Tarski semantics for the language of the calculus). Since Frege and Russell held that arithmetic truths are logical truths, their deducibility assumption entails that all arithmetic truths can be reached deductively from the axioms of a would-be semantically complete calculus for logic. It is important to understand that the deducibility assumption is not part of logicism proper. It is a component of both Frege’s and Russell’s plan for establishing that logicism is true. For instance, mathematical induction seems to provide an example of nonlogical and uniquely arithmetic necessary truth. To account for its necessity, Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic postulated the existence of a pure aesthetic (sensory) intuition of time which forces all empirical experiences to be temporally structured into successive and consecutive episodes. Frege and Russell hoped that by deducing mathematical induction within an axiomatic system for logic – a system austere enough to preclude the intrusion of nonlogical intuitions from creeping into its inferences – they would reveal that no special Kantian intuitions are required to account for arithmetic truth (and arithmetic necessity). The only intuitions needed are logical intuitions. It is now well known that first-order predicate calculi are semantically complete. But the axiom system for logic that Frege proposed, and those Russell proposed, were not first-order predicate calculi. They offered what are sometimes called ‘‘higher-order’’ calculi. There are different forms of such calculi. The language of a first-order predicate calculus does not 2 3
Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See Gregory Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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include bindable predicate variables. A ‘‘standard second-order calculus’’ permits bindable predicate variables but requires that such variables always occur in predicate positions. Where ’ and y are predicate variables, ‘‘’(y)’’ is ungrammatical in such a calculus. Russell’s famous paradox of the attribute that an attribute G exemplifies if and only if G does not exemplify itself cannot be formulated within the language of a standard second-order calculus. Russell’s paradox arises in a different calculus – a naive second-order calculus with nominalized predicates. What is called ‘‘simple type-theory’’ is a second-order calculus with nominalized predicates that avoids Russell’s paradox by a type-regimentation of the language of the calculus. Now, standard second-order calculi are type-free and consistent. They are, however, semantically incomplete. That is, no consistent axiomatization of a standard second-order predicate calculus is semantically complete with respect to the formulas of its language that are logically true (in the Tarski semantics for the language of the calculus). The semantic incompleteness result extends to second-order logic with nominalized predicates. It is important to understand that these results do not jeopardize logicism. They certainly do destroy Frege’s and Russell’s original plans for demonstrating the truth of logicism. But logicism is not wedded to a deducibility thesis. Indeed, logicism is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of arithmetic truth (and in Russell’s form, about mathematical truth in general). Logicism cannot be shown to be false because of the failure of the deducibility assumption.4 Wittgenstein rejects all theories of deduction because a theory of deduction would present logic as if it were a genuine science. He therefore rejects the deducibility assumption made by both Frege and Russell. But it would be incorrect to conclude that Wittgenstein rejected logicism. As we have seen, logicism does not entail the deducibility assumption. Nor does it entail the existence of a semantically complete axiomatic theory of logic. To be sure, the Tractatus rejects the logical objects that epitomize Frege’s logicism. But again Wittgenstein’s rejection is not ipso facto a rejection of logicism. If it were, Russell could not be counted as a logicist. Logicism certainly does not entail that the logical particles stand for logical relations or that there are logical objects such as classes, 4
Go¨del showed that arithmetic truth is not consistently recursively axiomatizable. Every axiomatic theory S of arithmetic which is consistent and adequate to represent every recursive numeric function is such that there is a sentence G of the language of the theory such that neither G nor G is provable in S. But the result that concerns us here is the semantic incompleteness of standard second-order logic. For a discussion of the impact of Go¨del’s result for logicism, see Geoffrey Hellman, ‘‘How to Go¨del a Frege-Russell: Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems and Logicism,’’ Nouˆs 15 (1981): 451–468.
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propositions, or propositional functions in intension. In Principia, the logical particles do not stand for relations; and a calculus for logic is reconstructed without assuming that there are logical truths which assure the subsistence of classes or propositions. Principia endeavored to formulate an eliminativistic reconstruction of logic without the ontology of classes or propositions, or the assumption that every well-formed formula comprehends an attribute (or as Russell put it, a ‘‘propositional function’’ in intension with both an individual and predicable nature). Wittgenstein’s doctrine of Showing demands that logic is not a science of logical objects. But this does not separate him from the logicist camp any more than Principia’s no-classes and no-propositions theory separates Whitehead and Russell. Logicism is not wedded to the assumption of logical objects. It is, therefore, mistaken to think that Wittgenstein cannot have been a logicist because he rejected the notion that there are purely logical objects which are the subject matter of a science of logic. As we shall see, the Tractatus does not reject logicism. Quite the contrary, it advocates a new and more radically eliminativistic form of logicism than that found in Principia.
Ramified types as scaffolding in Russell and Wittgenstein The formal system of the first edition of Principia embodies a ramified type structure. The primitive signs are v, , (,), 0 (prime). Predicate variables and individual variables come with order\type symbols. The individual variables are xo, yo, zo, and their primes (so that we cannot run out), and the predicate variables are ’t, y t, t, and their primes. An order\type symbol can be defined recursively as follows: (1) o is an order\type symbol. (2) If t1, . . ., tn are order\type symbols, then (t1, . . ., tn) is an order\type symbol. (3) There are no other type symbols. The notion of the order of an order\type symbol is defined as follows: (1) The order\type symbol o has order 0. (2) An order\type symbol (t1, . . ., tk) has order n þ 1 if the highest order of the order\type symbols t1, . . ., tk is n. The order of an order\type symbol can be determined by counting parentheses from left to right, adding þ1 for every left parenthesis and –1 for every right parenthesis. The order is the highest (necessarily non-negative) integer obtained in the counting process.5 A variable is predicative if its 5
William Hatcher, The Logical Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 106.
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order is the order of its order\type index. On the present characterization, all and only variables of the formal language of Principa are predicative.6 The atomic formulas of Principia are of the form ’ðtl; ...; tnÞ ðxtll ; . . .; xn tn Þ:
The formulas (wffs) are the smallest set K containing all atomic wffs such that if A, B, C are wffs in K and xt is an individual variable free in C, then so are (A), A v B, and (xt)C. The primitive language of the theory does not allow complex predicate terms formed by circumflexing variables in formulas.7 The axiom schemata for Principia’s quantification theory are given in two ways. The first is at *9 and is intended to be sensitive to the philosophical explanation of the order\type indices on predicate variables. For technical convenience, however, Principia sets out the simpler quantification theory of *10. The axiom schemata (with *10) are as follows. A v A . . A B . . A v B A v B . . B v A A v (B v C) . . B v (A v C)8 B C . . A v B . . A v C (xt)A A[yt j xt], where yt is free for free xt in A. (xt)(B v A) . . B v (xt)A *10.12 where xt does not occur free in B. *12.1n (Reducibility) ð9’ðtl; ...; tnÞ Þðxl tl ; . . .; xntn Þð’ðtl; ...; tnÞ ðxl tl ; . . .; xn tn Þ
*1.2 *1.3 *1.4 *1.5 *1.6 *10.1
Aðxl tl ; . . .; xn tn ÞÞ; where ’(tl, . . ., tn) is not free in A. The inference rules are: Modus Ponens: From A and A B, infer B Universal Generalization: From A, infer (8xt)A 6 7 8
See Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory. I count individual variables as predicative for convenience. Circumflex is only used in Principia as an aid in explaining the system. It is not part of the formal theory. See Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory, p. 265. This is not independent and thus should be dropped. See P. Bernays, ‘‘Axiomatische Untersuchung des Aussagenkalku¨ls der PM,’’ Mathematische Zeitschrift 25 (1926): 305–330.
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Definitions include the following: ð9xt ÞA ¼df ðxt Þ A A B ¼df A v B A & B ¼df ð A v :BÞ A B ¼df ðA BÞ &ðB AÞ
This completes the formal system. As we formulate it, the order\type indices on the variables of Principia’s ramified type-theory look like those of simple type-theory. In simple typetheory, what we have called ‘‘order\type symbols’’ are called ‘‘type symbols.’’ Simple type-theory ignores order altogether. If we want variables whose indices display the order component of an order\type symbol, we could replace individual variables xo with oxo, replace predicate variables ’(o) with 1’(o\o), replace predicate variables ’((o)) with 2’(1\ (o\o)), and so on. But order in Principia always tracks the order of the type symbol. This is because the formal language of Principia’s ramified-type theory allows only predicative variables – i.e., variables whose order is the order of the type symbol. All and only variables of Principia are predicative, and the only terms are its variables. For this reason, there is no need to display the order component of a predicate variable. It is given with the order of the type symbol.9 The difference between Principia’s ramified types and simple type-theory lies in what comprehension principles are legitimate. In simple type-theory, *12.1n is not a ‘‘reducibility’’ axiom, since orders are irrelevant. In Principia’s ramified type-theory, *12.1n is a reducibility axiom. We can see this by observing that *12.1n strays significantly from the predicative principles of comprehension that are validated by the semantics Russell intended for Principia. To see this, recall that Russell intended a nominalistic semantics for Principia’s predicate variables. The only genuine variables of Principia are its individual variables of order\type o. Only individual variables are to be interpreted objectually. All entities countenanced in the work, whether universal, particular, or complex (facts), are on a par as individuals. There are no types or orders of entities. Russell’s nominalistic semantics comes, however, at a high price. It generates a ramified-type structure. The informal semantics relies on a hierarchy of languages the formulas of which are to be the admissible substituends for predicate variables of a given order\ type. The hierarchy is recursively defined by means of the admissible senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ as applied to the formulas. The nominalistic semantics interprets a formula such as 9
See Landini, Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory.
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ð1 ’ðonoÞ Þ1 ’ðonoÞ ðo xo Þ
of a language L2 as asserting that every formula A(z) of a fixed first-order language L1 is such that A(xjz) is satisfied (given z is free for free x in A). It is essential that L1 be a language whose formulas do not themselves contain bound predicate variables, else the truth-conditions of the semantics would be viciously circular. We can go on to build a new language L3, by introducing order-indexed predicate variables 2’(1\(o\o)) which are nominalistically interpreted over formulas of L2. The process continues to introduce variables 3’(2\(1\(o\o))), and 4’(3\(2\(1\(o\o)))), whose significance conditions are fixed by the nominalistic semantics. It is the truth-conditions of the nominalistic semantics of Principia’s first edition that philosophically justifies and explains the orders of the order\type indices on the predicate variables of the system. The nominalistic semantics of Principia validates comprehension principles for predicative type-theory. Consider the following predicative axiom schema for comprehension: ð9’p Þðx1 t1 ; . . .; xn tn Þð’p ðx1 t1 ; . . .; xn tn Þ AÞ;
where ’(t1, . . ., tn) is not free in A, and the order of the order\type index p is that of the truth-conditions of the formula A (rendered by the recursively defined hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ of the nominalistic semantics). The semantics makes it difficult to justify a comprehension principle in which the order\type symbol of the predicate variable strays from the sense of ‘‘truth’’ for the formula A. Recall that impredicative quantification is excluded in Principia. To take Russell’s famous example, consider the following: x satisfies all the conditions of every great general.
According to predicative type structure, satisfying all the conditions of every great general cannot be among the conditions that x satisfies. The notion of all conditions is disallowed. In Principia we have ðy ðoÞ ÞðGðzo Þ zo y ðoÞ ðzo Þ : : y ðoÞ ðxo ÞÞ:
The formula contains a quantifier binding a predicative variable y (o) whose is order 1. Thus the formula has the truth-conditions of order 2. (It is capable only of truth2 or falsehood2.) With *12.1n (Reducibility), however, we can put this formula in the position of A and arrive at the following:
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ð9’ðoÞ Þðxo Þð’ðoÞ ðxo Þ ðy ðoÞ ÞðGðoÞ ðzo Þ zo y ðoÞ ðzo Þ: :y ðoÞ ðxo ÞÞÞ:
We see that ’(o) has an order\type index whose order is 1 in spite of the fact that the formula that comprehends it has truth-conditions of order 2. In this way, Principia’s comprehension principle *12.1n strays markedly from comprehension principles of predicative type-theory. It is in this sense that *12.1n is a ‘‘reducibility’’ axiom. Russell explained in his lectures on logical atomism that ‘‘the theory of types is really a theory of symbols, not of things. In a proper logical language, it would be perfectly obvious.’’10 This attitude is sometimes characterized as a change of heart brought about by the influence of Wittgenstein. But the influence goes in the other direction. The demand of type-freedom was the consequence of Russell’s unwavering adherence to the doctrine that any proper calculus for logic must adopt only one style of genuine variables (individual variables). This has come to be known as Russell’s ‘‘doctrine of the unrestricted variable.’’ The doctrine dates back to Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903) and led to his construction of the structure of a type-theory of classes (and attributes in intension) in both the substitutional theory (1905–1908) and in Principia. The purpose of the constructions is to enable pure logic to proceed to the development of arithmetic (and pure mathematics) without relying on assumptions of the logical existence of classes or attributes – assumptions that (because of Russell’s paradoxes) cannot be part of logic. Wittgenstein agreed with Russell’s demand that a ramified type-theoretical structure without the ontology of ramified and typed entities must be constructed within a type-free language for logic. But he advocates a philosophical explanation of the structure of predicative types that is quite different from Principia. Unfortunately, the similarities and differences have not been properly understood. Part of the confusion stems from the longstanding interpretation that Principia embraced a ramified type-theory of entities (propositional functions). This obliterated Principia’s nominalistic semantics. The fog of this confusion has finally cleared. A predicative comprehension is acceptable to Wittgenstein as long as predicate variables are rendered by a nominalistic semantics. For this is compatible with his thesis that logical truths are tautologies. For example, the semantics would treat the formula ð9’ðoÞ Þðxo Þð’ðoÞ ðxo Þ ðyo ÞRðo;oÞ ðxo ; yo ÞÞ
10
Bertrand Russell, ‘‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’’ Logic and Knowledge: Essays by Bertrand Russell 1901–1950, ed. R. C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 267.
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as saying that some formula A that is capable of truth1 (and falsehood1) is such that its substitution for the variable ’(o) yields a formula that is true1. Since (yo)R(o,o) (xo, yo) is among the possible substitution instances for ’(o), and ðxo Þððyo ÞRðo;oÞ ðxo ; yo Þ ðyo ÞRðo;oÞ ðxo ; yo ÞÞ
is a generalized tautology, Wittgenstein finds it perfectly acceptable. But Reducibility is quite another matter. Wittgenstein rejected Reducibility. It cannot be construed as a tautology. Moreover, though he agreed with Russell that a predicative type-structure must be built into the significance conditions of the predicate variables, he strongly disagreed with Principia’s use of the multiple-relation theory to generate the recursive hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood.’’ Wittgenstein’s doctrine of showing makes every semantic theory illicit. Truth-conditions must be pictured by syntax of the structured variable alone, not set out in a semantic theory. Principia’s multiple-relation theory of judgment – which forms the base case for its recursive definition of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood,’’ must say what can only be shown. The theory puts words for universals in subject positions. It must embrace pseudo-predicates with logical content such as ‘‘. . . is a universal,’’ and ‘‘. . . is a fact.’’ Russell’s amendments to the theory in his ‘‘Theory of Knowledge’’ project of 1913 makes matters even worse. They embrace still more logical pseudo-objects such as abstract general facts and logical forms. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus endeavors to avoid the constructions of Principia’s semantics altogether by using structured variables. He writes (TLP 3.333): The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition ‘F(F(fx))’ in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form ’(fx) and the outer one has the form y(’(fx)). Only letter ‘F’ is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of ‘F(F(fu))’ we write ‘ð9’Þ: Fð’ðuÞÞ : ’ðuÞ ¼ Fu’: That disposes of Russell’s paradox.
The plan is to build the structure of predicative order\types into structured variables so that the variables themselves picture the structure of their admissible values. The variable pictures the structure of its values without need of any semantic theory. The syntactic complexity of the
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structured variable is a ‘‘prototype’’ which pictures the structure that all of its admissible values are to have. Wittgenstein hopes to find a notation in which the structure, not the ontology, of types and orders is shown by the syntax of the variables.11 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not even attempt to offer a notation which realizes the goal. Borrowing from Frege, however, we can imagine a notation of structured variables that does justice to type structures.12 Frege’s Begriffsschrift introduced different levels of functions. The notations for the levels have important similarities to simple type structures. On Frege’s view, a first-level function f yields a value for an object x taken as its argument. As Frege puts it, the argument ‘‘falls under’’ the first-level function. A first-level function, on the other hand, can ‘‘fall within’’ a second-level function when it ‘‘mutually saturates’’ it. Many second-level functions (and higher-level functions) are quantifier concepts for Frege. For example, Frege takes the quantifier concept (8x)fx to be a second-level function under which first-level functions may fall. (To distinguish the Fregean language, we use the symbol 8 for the universal quantifier.)13 For example, the first-level function of self-identity falls within this secondlevel function, because every object x is self-identical. To introduce a structured variable that ranges over second-level quantifier concepts, put Mf. The lower-case Greek appears as a subscript in Mf to remind us of the bound individual variable in expressions of second-level quantifier concepts. Then we can quantify over second-level quantifier concepts with the notation (8M)Mf. For example, we have: ð8MÞM f ð8xÞfx:
Since function signs can only appear in predicate (function) positions, and quantifier concepts are extensional, we have: ’x x yx : ’y : M ’ M M y :
For instance, we have: ’x x yx: ’y : ð8xÞ’x ð8xÞyx ’x x yx: ’y : ð8xÞ ’x ð8xÞ yx
11
12 13
Sackur notices the conection between Wittgenstein’s idea of structured variables (as prototypes) and Russell’s use, during the era of his substitutional theory of propositions, ´ ˆ me Sackur, Formes et faits (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005), of the ‘‘prototype of a matrix.’’ See Jero pp. 89, 121. I do not mean to suggest that Frege himself embraced such variables in his Grundgesetze. Accordingly, ’x x yx now abbreviates (8x)(’x yx).
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and so on. Next we have third-level quantifier concepts. For instance, we can represent ð8xÞ’x ð9xÞyx
as a context resulting from the mutual saturation of the quantifier concept (8x)fx with the concept O’ ’ (9x)yx. Accordingly, we represent a notation perspicuous of the quantificational structures of third-level concepts as follows: Y’[O’]. The occurrence of the subscripted Greek ’ indicates that a first-level function variable ’ is bound in the quantifier concept. The pattern continues as we ascend the levels. A brief chart of one-place expressions might help: Russellian types o
x ’(o) ’((o)) ’(((o)))
Fregean levels x ’ Mf Y’[O’]
Fregean levels are captured by using structured variables which display the higher-level concepts as quantifier concepts. Such structured variables are not exploited in the notation of Principia’s ramified type-structure. Typestructures are shown in the Fregean notation. By keeping function symbols in function position, the structured variables provide prototypes of the structure of their values. Is a similar technique of prototypes (structured variables) possible for orders and ramification? We saw that orders are philosophically explained in Principia by Russell’s informal nominalistic semantics which offers a recursively defined hierarchy of senses of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘falsehood’’ founded upon the multiple-relation theory of judgment. In this way, Russell endeavored to make Principia’s predicate variables unrestricted; they are ‘‘limited from within by their conditions of significance.’’ Wittgenstein cannot accept this semantic approach. Principia’s semantic theory endeavors to say what should be shown (pictured) by the syntax of structured variables. The Doctrine of Showing rejects all semantic theories. There can be no ‘‘theory’’ of truth. Wittgenstein hopes to achieve the structure of predicative type-theory by employing syntactically structured variables (prototypes) which picture the structure of their admissible values. He offers nothing whatever to achieve this. We had good fortune with types by employing Fregean structured variables, but in the case of order\types it is far from clear that what Wittgenstein wants can be accomplished. In any case, we see that both Principia and the Tractatus agree in rejecting orders and types of entities. They disagree only on how this is to be done.
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Equations versus tautologies Wittgenstein’s views on how to philosophically ground orders and types are obviously allied with Russell’s endeavors to solve the problems plaguing logicism by ‘‘building structure into the variables.’’ Unfortunately, the alliance had not been appreciated and Wittgenstein has been interpreted as abandoning logicism. Perhaps the central argument for the position that Wittgenstein was not a logicist comes from his rejection of the thesis that arithmetic consists of tautologies.14 As Ramsey put it: W[ittgenstein] and I think it is wrong to suppose with Russell that mathematics is more complicated formal logic (tautologies); and I am trying to make definite the vague ideas we have of what it does consist of.15
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian approach construes arithmetic as ‘‘equations,’’ not tautologies. Curiously, Russell had a tendency to ignore this feature of Wittgenstein’s work. It is not mentioned in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919). In the first printing of the second edition of The Principles of Mathematics (1937) Russell continued to ignore it. He observed that Principia’s multiplicative axiom and axiom of infinity are fully general and explained that this shows that truth and full generality (in the calculus for pure logic) do not form a sufficient condition for logical truth. What, then, he asked, is sufficient for a statement to belong to logic (mathematics)? Russell answers as follows: ‘‘In order that a proposition may belong to mathematics, it must have a further property: according to Wittgenstein it must be ‘tautological,’ and according to Carnap it must be ‘analytic.’’’16 Wittgenstein had by now become vociferous in his objection to Russell’s repeated mischaracterization. When G. H. Hardy read a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge in 1940, he attributed to Wittgenstein the view that mathematics consists of tautologies. Reportedly, Wittgenstein attended and denied having ever held the view, pointing to h